Medieval political philosophy : a sourcebook

Table of contents :
The enumeration of the sciences / Alfarabi
translated by Fauzi M. Najjar --
The political regime / Alafrabi
translated by Fauzi M. Najjar --
The attainment of happiness / Alfarabi
translated by Muhsin Mahdi --
Plato's laws / Alfarabi
translated by Muhsin Mahdi --
On the divisions of the rational sciences / Avicenna
translated by Muhsin Mahdi --
Healing: metaphysics x
translated by Michael E. Marmura --
On the proof of prophecies and the interpretation of the prophet's symbols and metaphores / Avicenna
translated by Michael E. Marmura --
The governance of the solitary / Avempace
translated by Lawrence Berman --
Havy the son of Yaqzan / Ibn Tufayl
translated by George N. Atiyeh --
The decisive treatsie, determining what the connection is between religion and philosophy / Averroes
translated by George F. Hourani --
Logic / Maimonides
translated by Muhsin Mahdi --
Guide of the perplexed / Maimonides
translated by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi --
Letter on astrology / Maimonides
translated by Ralph Lerner --
Book of roots / Albo
translated by Ralph Lerner --
Commentary on the Bible / Abravanel
translated by Robert Sacks --
Commentary on the ethics / Thomas Aquinas
translated by Charles I. Litzinger --
Commentary on the politics / Thomas Aquinas
translated by Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. O'Neill --
Condemnation of 219 propositions / translated by Ernest L. Fortin and Peter O'Neill --
Opus maius: moral philosophy / Roger Bacon
translated by Richard McKeon, Donald McCarthy, and Ernest L. Fortin --
On ecclesiastical power / Giles of Rome
translated by Joseph Sheerin --
On kingly and papal power / John of Paris
translated by Ernest L. Fortin --
On monarchy / Dante
translated by Philip H. Wicksteed --
The defender of the peace / Marsillius of Padua
translated by Alan Gewirth --
The dialogue / William of Ockham
translated by Francis Oakley --
On the merits of the laws of England / John Fortescue
translated by S.B. Chrimes.

Citation preview

MEDIEVAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Agora Editions General Editor: Allan Bloom

CONTRIBUTORS

George N . Atiyeh, Universidad de Puerto Rico Lawrence Berman, Dropsie College S. B. Chrimes, University College, Cardiff Ernest L. Fortin, Assumption College Alan Gewirth, University of Chicago George F. Hourani, University of Michigan Ralph Lerner, University of Chicago Charles I. Litzinger, St. Stephen’s Priory, Dover, Mass. Donald McCarthy, Boston College Muhsin Mahdi, University of Chicago Richard McKeon, University of Chicago Michael E. Marmura, University of Toronto Fauzi M. Najjar, Michigan State University Francis Oakley, Williams College Peter D. O’Neill, Assumption College Robert Sacks, St. John’s College, Annapolis Joseph Sheerin, Assumption College Philip H. Wicksteed

MEDIEVAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A Sourcebook dited by Ralph lerner and MUHS1N mahdi WITH

THE

COLLABORATION

OF

ERNEST

L.

FORTIN

T H E F R E E PRESS, N E W Y O R K C O L L IE R -M A C M IL L A N

L IM IT E D ,

CANADA

Copyright © 1963 by The Free Press of Glencoe A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Printed in the U nited States o f A m erica A ll r ig h ts r ese rv e d . N o part o f th is b o o k m a y b e r e p r o d u c e d o r tra n sm itted in a n y fo r m o r b y a n y m ean s, e le c tr o n ic o r m e c h a n ic a l, in c lu d in g p h o to c o p y in g , r e c o r d in g , o r b y a n y in fo r m a tio n sto ra g e and r etriev a l sy ste m , w ith o u t p e r m issio n in w r itin g fr o m th e P u b lish er. C o llie r -M a c m illa n C an ada, L td ., T o r o n t o , O n ta r io L ib r a ry o f C o n g re ss C a ta lo g C ard N u m b e r : 6 3 -8 4 1 9

S eco n d Printing Ju ly 1p 6 j

FOREWORD

W i t h the publication of this sourcebook in Medieval Political Philosophy the Agora Editions presents for the first time a volume that can enable the general reader to get a serious introduction to the sources of all modern theological-political thought. On the basis of this book one can study not only the adaptation of the philosophic teaching about politics made by each of the three great revealed religions, but also the interrelations between these three doctrines. N o attempt to understand the Western tradition can be undertaken without consideration of these works, which are the immediate sources of our thought. It is in the political domain in particular that the alternative teachings about the‫־‬relation between reason and revelation can be most clearly grasped. Hence the editor believes this to be a capital volume for the study of political philosophy and a unique contribution to our available sources. Many of the texts are translated for the first time into English; all are translated by competent scholars. Fidelity to the text was the first principle of the translations so that the English reader can, with some real assurance of reliability, make his own interpretations. The selections were made so as to present, in so far as possible, complete works or at least the whole of the relevant sections of the works; in this w ay the reader is not at the mercy of the selections, and hence interpretations, of the editors. N o framework is imposed from the outside; each author is meant to be understood in his own terms and on his own grounds. This volume should be of value to serious scholars as well as to students. It is the result of an extraordinary effort of cooperation. As such, it gives evidence to the fact that the truest and deepest source of understanding between the faiths is a return to, and respect for, the profound teachings which are their inspiration. A lla n B loom

General Editor , Agora Editions

v

PREFACE

S e v e n centuries ago Roger Bacon could lament the neglect of moral philosophy by the scholars of his age, adding ruefully: “ But the books on this science by Aristotle and Avicenna, Seneca and Tullius and others, cannot be obtained except at great cost, both because the principal works are not translated into Latin and because copies of the others are not found in the usual schools or elsewhere.” It is perhaps remarkable that what Bacon held to be true of his situation should also be applicable in part to our age, which has labored more than any other at the task of recovering all kinds of information about every conceivable period and civilization, and which has the further advantages of rapid translation and cheap printing. Everyone knows that the political philosophy that developed in Greece first spread throughout the classical world and, at some later date, penetrated into the three monotheistic religions, which among them commanded the allegiance of almost all men living between the Indus and the North Atlantic. Some people know that the encounter between political philosophy and revealed religion manifested itself in different ways in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity; but the study of these noteworthy confrontations has, by and large, been limited to the case of Christianity. This narrowing of the field of investigation is, in our judgment, regrettable. W e believe that this judgment would be concurred in, above all, by the Christian scholastics themselves, who were diligent students of the works of many of the Muslims and Jew s represented in this volume. These Christians wrote with a deep awareness of the work of those who, loosely speaking, might be regarded as their counterparts in Islam and Judaism. For one reason or another the mutual interest that figured so prominently in the medieval concourse of scholars waned. This change was followed by the rise of a radically new kind of political philosophy in the W est—one that progressively narrowed its field of inquiry to the point where the questions that had preoccupied the greatest medieval thinkers no longer seemed relevant or even intelligible. Today we find ways of defining our inquiries so as to avoid such problems, though it may be doubted whether the role of science and religion in politics has ceased to be problematical for us. The student of political life can hardly do better than to turn to the writings of those political philosophers for whom this was the central political problem. Nowhere will he find a fuller and more sober account of the political implications of the encounter of science and religion. The aim of this Sourcebook is to provide the student for whom these V ll

viii

P r e fa c e

problems still retain a spark of life with a more direct access to medieval political philosophy than is afforded presently by footnotes in general histories of that subject. W e do so out of the conviction that only a direct confrontation with the texts will enable him to discover for himself such insights as they may contain, and supply him with material for further reflection and inquiry. In delimiting our subject matter and selecting the works to be included here, we have borne in mind a number of difficulties that might be raised by intelligent readers. These are dealt with in the course of the introductory essay. It suffices to state here that we distinguish political philosophy from the political thought of theologians, legists, and so forth. W e have tried to look at this vast medieval literature with eyes uninformed by any prejudgment, however scholarly, that would assure us in advance that political philosophy could not conceivably be found in the writings of this particular man or of this particular religious community. In every case we began with the attempt to ascertain the state of the text in the language in which it originally was written. In a number of cases we found that texts existed only in manuscript form and these first had to be edited before a reliable translation could be attempted. In other cases the existing vulgate text had to be compared with additional manuscripts. In all cases the translations included here were made directly from the Arabic, Hebrew, or Latin originals. There is much in this literature that deserves close study even though it is not, strictly speaking, political philosophy. W e have included some of this related literature in the bibliography at the end of this volume. (There are important works of political philosophy whose original texts have not as yet been found; such works, as for example Averroes’ commentaries on the R e p u b lic and the E th ic s , must await the discovery of their Arabic originals, or at least a satisfactory edition of their Hebrew translations, before they are ready to be translated.) The majority of the texts included in this volume are translated into English for the first time, and in some cases these are the first translations ever to be made from the originals. This Sourcebook is divided into three Parts, corresponding to the order in which political philosophy made its appearance within the three religious communities. The authors in any given Part are presented chronologically; but where an author is represented by more than one work, the texts are in what we regard as a logical order and not necessarily in the order of composition. Certain editorial devices have been used that require explanation. Where present, italic numbers in brackets inserted in the body of the translation refer to the pagination of the critical edition or the vulgate text that is cited in the preceding introduction. It is hoped that these will help students who plan to read the present volume in conjunction with the original texts or to consult the latter on particular points. A ll f o o tn o te r e fe r e n c e s are to th ese p a g e s and not to the pages of

Preface

ix

this Sourcebook. Citations from the Old Testament, the N ew Testament, and the Koran are given in italics. References to the Koran, which appear in Part One in the form of Roman and Arabic numerals, indicate the chapter and verse numbering of the Egyptian edition; references to the Old Testament in Part T w o follow the Masoretic text; references to the Old and N ew Testaments in Part Three follow the Vulgate, which may be consulted in the Douay-Rheims and Knox translations. All such references are inserted in the body of the translation. (N ot infrequently, an author will use a near-quotation from the Bible or the Koran in apparent disregard for its original wording. Where these have been recognized, they have been identified also.) Usually we have adopted the names that common usage in the Latin W est assigned to Muslim and Jewish writers and that remain current in medieval studies; their full Arabic or Hebrew names are given in the biographical notices that precede the first text of each author. The responsibility for this Sourcebook as a whole, the inclusion or exclusion of any materials, and the introductory essay is shared by the two co-editors. Each Part is under the supervision of a single editor; in preparing Part Three, we sought the collaboration of the Reverend Ernest L. Fortin, A .A ., of Assumption College, Worcester, ]Massachusetts. The editor of each Part shares with the individual translator the responsibility for the general integrity and accuracy of the translation. Where previously published translations have been used, the editor has compared these with the original text and has made the necessary changes to secure as high a degree of literalness as is compatible with intelligible English and to preserve a certain measure of uniformity in the transiation of technical terms. In addition, the editor of each Part wrote the short introductions that preface each translation. Many have contributed toward the publication of this Sourcebook. Foremost among them is Father Ernest L. Fortin. He has fully shared in, and reinforced, our enthusiasm for this project. W e have taught, and learned from, one another, and we have agreed and disagreed, in a spirit that we saw exemplified in the very works we were editing. W e wish to thank the individuals who contributed their talents and labors in the form of new translations made especially for this volume. T h ey have borne our detailed criticisms with remarkable patience, and they have accepted our suggested revisions, even where these have been extensive. A number of scholars have benefited us through their constructive criticisms at various stages of this enterprise: Joseph Cropsey, William Daley, Father I. Th. Eschmann, Father Theodore Fortier, Etienne Gilson, George F. Hourani, Father George A. Laberge, Father Armand Maurer, the late Rabbi Maurice B. Pekarsky, Shlomo Pines, Joseph Sheerin, Leo Strauss, J. L. Teicher, and Richard Walzer. The co-editors have each received generous grants from the Rockefeller

x

Preface

Foundation’s program in Legal and Political Philosophy; these grants have contributed substantially toward completing the research for this volume. W e are happy to acknowledge our thanks to the Foundation. The Publication Fund of the College of the University of Chicago has helped in meeting the costs of manuscript preparation. Finally, the following publishers have kindly permitted us to reprint or to make use of translations to which they hold the copyright: Cambridge University Press (Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, trans. S. B. Chrimes, pp. 3-4 1); Columbia University Press (Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace, trans. Alan Gewirth, Vol. II, pp. 3-55, 95-9 7^ 87-9 2); J. M. Dent and Co. ( The Latin Works of Dante Alighieri, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed, pp. 127-72, 275-79); the Trustees of the Gibb Memorial Fund (Averroes on the Harmony between Religion and Philosophy, trans. George F. Hourani, pp. 4 4 -71); from Selections from Medieval Philosophers, V ol. II, edited and translated bv Richard AIcKeon, pp. 81-99, too-106. Copyright 1929 Charles Scribner’s Sons; renewal copyright © 1957. Used by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons. Henry Regnerv Co. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle, trans. Father Charles I. Litzingcr, O .P.); University of Chicago Press (M oses iMaimonidcs, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines). W e thank all of the aforementioned individuals and institutions for their aid and counsel, while absolving them of any responsibility for this Sourcebook. R .L. M.AI.

Chicago, Illinois

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

V vii

PREFACE INTRODUCTION

p a r t

I

o n e

Political Philosophy in Islam EDITED BY MUHSIN MAHDI

1. Alfarabi,

t h e e n u m e r a t io n

of t h e s c ie n c e s

22

Translated by Fauzi M. Najjar 2.

Alfarabi,

t h e p o l it ic a l r e g im e

31

Translated by Fauzi M. Najjar

3 . Alfarabi,

t h e a t t a in m e n t o f h a p p in e s s

58

Translated by Muhsin Mahdi 4.

Alfarabi,

Pl a t o ’ s l a w s Translated by Muhsin Mahdi

5 . Avicenna ,

83

o n t h e d iv is io n s o f t h e r a t io n a l s c i e n c e s

95

Translated by Muhsin Mahdi

6 . Avicemia,

h e a l in g : m e t a p h y s ic s x

98

Translated by Michael E . Marmura

7 . Avicenna,

o n t h e pr o o f o f p r o p h e c ie s a n d t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

OF THE PROPHETS’ SYMBOLS AND METAPHORS Translated by Michael E . Marmura 8.

Avevtpace,

t h e g o v e r n a n c e o f t h e s o l it a r y

I I2 122

Translated by Lawrence Berman 9.

Ibn Tufayl,

h a y y t h e so n o f y a q z a n

134

Translated by George N . Atiyeh

10. Averroes,

t h e d e c is iv e t r e a t is e , d e t e r m in in g w h a t t h e

CONNECTION IS BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

1 63

Translated by George F. Hourani

p a r t

t w o

Political Philosophy in Judaism EDITED BY RALPH LERNER

11. Maimonides,

18 8

l o g ic

Translated by Muhsin Mahdi XI

C o n te n ts

Xll 12. M a im o n id e s ,

191

guide of the perplexed

T r a n sla te d b y R a lp h L e rn er and M u h sin M ah d i

13. M a im o m d e s ,

227

letter on astrology

T r a n sla te d b y R a lp h L e rn er

14. A lb o , BOOK OF ROOTS

237

T r a n sla te d b y R a lp h L e rn er

15. A b r a v a n e l,

254

c o m m en t a r y on th e bible

T r a n sla te d b y R o b e r t Sacks

p a r t

Political Philosophy in Christianity

t h r e e

EDITED BY ERNEST L. FORTIN

16.

T h o m a s A q u in a s ,

coxM m e n t a r y o n t h e

272

e t h ic s

T r a n sla te d b y C h arles I. L itz in g e r

17.

T h o m a s A q u in a s,

co m m en tary

on

th e

297

p o l it ic s

T r a n sla te d b y E r n e st L . F o r tin an d P e te r D . O ’N e ill

18 .

CONDEMNATION OF 2 1 9 PROPOSITIONS

335

T r a n sla te d b y E r n e st L . F o r tin and P e te r D . O ’N e ill

19. R o g e r B a c o n ,

o pus m a i u s :

m oral

p h il o s o p h y

355

T r a n sla te d b y R ic h a r d M c K e o n , D o n a ld M c C a r th y , and E r n e st L . F o r tin

20.

G ile s o f R o m e ,

on e c c l e s i a s t i c a l

po w er

39 1

T r a n sla te d b y J o sep h S h ee r in

2 1 . J o h n o f P a ris ,

402

on k i n g l y a n d p a p a l p o w e r

T r a n sla te d b y E r n e st L . F o r tin

22.

D a n te ,

418

on m o n a r c h y

T r a n sla te d b y P h ilip H . W ic k s te e d

23. M a rsiliu s o f P adu a,

th e d efen d er of th e pea c e

439

T r a n sla te d b y A la n G e w ir th

24.

W illia m o f O c k h a m ,

492

t h e d ia l o g u e

T r a n sla te d b y F ran cis O a k le y

25. J o h n F o r te s c u e ,

on t h e m e r it s o f t h e l a w s o f

En g l a n d

507

T r a n sla te d b y S. B . C h rim es

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

527

INDEX

5 29

Introduction

I f o n e were to try to state the theme and problem of medieval political philosophy with the utmost conciseness and at the price of considerable oversimplification, the following statement might be made. Medieval political philosophy, as far as it is accessible to us in the form of extant treatises, commentaries, and other written records, consists of the inquiries and conclusions of individuals, living as Muslims or Jew s or Christians, who attempted to identify the classical political teaching and to distinguish it from, or to harmonize it with, the political teaching of their particular religion. Or one might say, somewhat more pointedly: medieval political philosophy is the attempt by men, living in communities that were defined by a particular religion, to understand the differences between the political teaching of certain pagan philosophers and the political teaching of the revelation that constituted their religious community, and as far as possible to reconcile the two. For the moment— but only for the moment—we may disregard, not only the profound differences that separate Islam from Judaism and each of these from Christianity, but also the differing practical situations in which men who would pursue philosophy found themselves within these religious communities. W hat at first glance appear to be the most striking elements are shared by all three: a divinely-revealed religion, the appearance of Greek political philosophy within a community that is constituted— either w holly or in its highest aims—by a divinely-revealed Law, and the disagreement or conflict between the demands of the divine Law and the political teaching of the philosophers. These are the elements of the enterprise that we call medieval political philosophy. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the size or number of the obstacles that stand in the w ay of the modern reader’s effort to understand that enterprise and enter into its spirit. Brushing aside vulgar notions that see only dark ages or ingenious exercises in logic-chopping, we still must take account of the intellectual baggage that the modern reader typically drags along with him, baggage that well-nigh blocks the subject matter from his view. Even an open-minded reader might be expected to regard i

2

In tro d u c tio n

the texts of medieval political philosophy as utterly incomprehensible by virtue of the bizarreness of the themes, as irrelevant by virtue of the religious adherence of the authors, or as superfluous because of the vast over-complication of the material. Such reactions, we believe, account in large measure for the curious treatment (or nontreatment) of medieval political philosophy today. It is'no exaggeration to say that a text by Plato or Aristotle seems less exotic to the modern reader than a text by Aquinas, let alone Alfarabi or iVIaimonides, though the latter group, both in time and in their adherence to a monotheistic religion, stand in a closer relationship to today’s reader than do the pagans of classical Greece. W hy is this so? The three kinds of reaction just mentioned are at bottom the products of three characteristically modern prejudgments. First, we tend to assume that the particular form of expression that political philosophy takes is that which is most familiar to us: there will be a book'w holly or largely devoted to a systematic discussion of forms of government, law, justice, and so forth; we think of the L e v ia th a n or the S o c ia l C o n tr a c t. W e are not accustomed to looking for an author’s political philosophy in the interstices, so to speak, of his w ork—especially if his work takes the form of a commentary on yet another work, or a resumé (sometimes rather fanciful in appearance if compared with the text it claims to summarize), or if his work seems largely concerned with religious and doctrinal questions arising from revealed religion. Generally speaking, we find it hard to see w hy someone who had a contribution to make to political philosophy did not go about it in a straightforward manner; hence the impatient judgment that sees most medieval thinkers as doing little more than dotting the fs and crossing the f s of Aristotle’s texts. This first reaction, then, rests on the erroneous view that political philosophy has a typical or normal form of expression and that it should be judged solely in terms of its originality or its manifest innovations. Second, we tend to draw hard and fast lines between reason and revelation and then summarily to dispose of medieval authors by placing them on the one side or the other. Averroes, Albo, and Roger Bacon all filled a certain religious office or belonged to a religious order; this fact, in itself, does not mean that these men were fitted with theological blinders that kept them from casting sidelong glances. It may safely be granted that these were not rationalists cut to the pattern of the Enlightenment, but then neither were they “ know-nothings” blindly led by a blind faith in their religion. This second reaction, then, rests on the erroneous notion that every adherein of a religious Law is completely incapable of freeing himself—if only provisionally—from the fundamental views enjoined by that Law. Third, we tend to underestimate the very formidable difficulties that stood in the w ay of the medieval enterprise. Exaggeration in any direction may be misleading; minimizing the tension between philosophy and revela-

Introduction

3

tion is no surer w ay to proper understanding than is magnifying that tension. Although pious and learned men had dismissed philosophy as having nothing to say to them, and although equally pious men detested philosophy, men of the stature of Avicenna, iVlaimonides, and Aquinas devoted their lives and thoughts to achieving some measure of clarity, for themselves and for others, about the problem posed by philosophy for the divine Law. As intelligent men, they were in search of wisdom; as political philosophers, they were in search of practical or political wisdom. W e have argued that their search was not foreclosed or prcdetermined in some crude fashion by their membership in a religious community. A t the same time, however, their search for political wisdom was conducted within a religious community. As men of practical wisdom, they were no more disposed than is a responsible lawyer to posit cases upon the ruin of the constitution. Unlike a lawyer or jurist, however, they were able to examine their constitution critically from the highest vantage point available to man. However easily we may say today that the medieval political philosophers tried to prove that the goals of the divine Law and of philosophy were in large measure identical, we ought never to forget what they constantly bore in mind: that clarifying the differences between the divine Law and philosophy and clarifying their relationships is a difficult and, not seldom, hazardous undertaking. This third reaction, then, follows from an inadequate appreciation of the fact that classical political philosophy initially had the status of a newly-arrived alien in an established community. W e have dwelt at length upon these preliminary obstacles to understanding solely because common prejudices of these kinds preclude even the most rudimentary recognition of the subject matter of medieval political philosophy. But if our reader succeeds in freeing himself from the sway of unexamined certainties, he has done so only to become more perplexed than he had any reason to anticipate. One of the first thoughts that will cross his mind is that the themes of medieval political philosophy, as represented here, do not correspond to the commonly-received accounts of that subject matter. He may be surprised by some things he reads in the Christian Part; he may be at a loss to understand how some passages in the Islamic and Jewish Parts can be comprehended under political philosophy; above all, he will wonder how it came about that the reception or adaptation of classical political philosophy by the three great monotheistic religions should have taken such diverse forms. However unfamiliar and perplexing these questions may be, there is much that suggests that a determined effort to pursue them will be rewarding. A moment’s reflection should make it clear that all the arguments that support the comparative study of cultures and political institutions apply with at least equal force to the comparative study of

4

In tro d u c tio n

medieval political philosophy. Social scientists recognize that it is necessary to know and understand cultures other than our own. The proper study of man is seen to require the ability to transcend the horizons of one’s own time and place. From Herodotus’ time down to ours, men have left the familiar surroundings they called their own in search of the different and the strange, in the expectation that breadth of view would provide a truer perspective by which to take in social life as a whole. The benefits of a broad view are at least as great in the study of political philosophy, giving the student a more comprehensive picture of the uniformity and diversity characteristic of a distinctively human activity. Needless to say, the benefits will not be reaped if other men and other ways are not first studied in their own terms. W e must make the greatest effort to see things as these men saw them—that is, to take seriously what they took seriously—rather than to impose upon their thoughts whatever added wisdom hindsight may appear to have given us. The least one can say is that such a methodological device seems in order initially, or until such time as we put this methodology aside and try to determine, on the basis of the available evidence, the worth or worthlessness of these men’s thoughts and ways. W e have maintained that arguments supporting a comparative approach apply to the field of medieval political philosophy. One might go further and argue that medieval political philosophy stands in special need of such an approach. As regards medieval studies generally, we have learned to broaden rather than to narrow our views. One example must suffice: the study of medieval economic history has shown the advantage of considering the Mediterranean world as a unit. What is necessary in understanding the traffic in goods is at least as necessary in understanding the traffic in ideas. It is common knowledge that the classical tradition of science and philosophy originally and in part moved through the Muslims to the Jew s to the Christians of Western Europe. Important as this linear transmission is in the history of medieval political philosophy, it is by no means sufficient for our understanding of its subject matter. The reason is that political philosophy combines both theory and practice in an exceptionally intimate connection. In view of this, the w ay in which men conduct themselves as philosophers becomes itself a political question, linked to the particular political and social conditions that prevail in the community within which that activity is being carried on. Hence any comparative investigation of medieval political philosophy has to consider, not only what was held in common (for example, the broad features of classical political philosophy and of revealed monotheistic religion), but also the significant and specific differences between the three religious communities of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. W e may now summarize the advantages accruing from this kind of comparative study. The medieval world is sufficiently foreign and re-

Introduction

5

moved from our own for us to view it with some measure of detachment. W e are in a good position to learn about a number of matters that have passed out of currency; we are in a good position to be reminded of considerations that we tend, without sufficient reflection, to dismiss as irrelevant or that we tend simply to ignore. A t the same time, the medieval world is, in some respects, closer to us than the present-day Antipodes or Yucatan. The medieval world has formed our own history and heritage and remains a part of it. W e still can recognize in our world much that we share with it: the classical tradition, the religious tradition, and the interest in science. Furthermore, a part of this medieval world is, for many millions of men living today, more than tradition or cultural legacy. In states where any one of these religions is the official church, or in enclaves within secular societies, there are to be found men for whom this past still lives. In speaking of the themes or subject matter of medieval political philosophy, the first thing to be noted is that for men in all three religious communities, political philosophy was both possible and important. T h ey did not doubt the possibility of their enterprise: they believed that, in principle, it is within the grasp of the human mind to attain knowledge of the nature of political things. Moreover, they regarded political philosophy (or political science, as it was sometimes called) as the highest of the practical sciences. In their eyes its importance lay in its comprehensive treatment of the ways of life and opinions of human communities, or of man’s political life in the broadest sense. A n y misgivings that the modern reader may entertain with respect to this estimate of the feasibility and scope of political philosophy may have to be suspended temporarily if he is to gain any access to the thoughts or aims of these men. It also is important to note in this connection that political philosophy, as pursued by these medieval thinkers, was not an abstract exercise in speculation idly indulged in by men in the privacy of their closets. The medieval political philosopher did not write for the man in the street, but neither did he write for himself. He did not regard his activity as falling into what is today called the “ policy sciences” ; but then again neither did he regard his activity as unrelated to the amelioration of the political conditions and political opinions of ordinary men. However “ theoretical” the speculation became, it was and remained speculation about political things and, as such, had a practical end. Finally, it ought to be noted that the medieval political philosophers were concerned with recovering the political teaching of the classics and with making that teaching meaningful or relevant for their own times. This concern frequently expressed itself in the writing of summaries, paraphrases, and commentaries. While there are some remarkable differences between the religious communities in the extent to which the classical teaching was incorporated into the

6

In tro d u c tio n

medieval philosopher’s teaching and in the manner in which that incorporation was effected, there is a common regard for what the classics taught. Political philosophy is concerned with every kind of governance, especially with the best governance. W e may sketch very broadly the themes of the medieval political philosophers by considering the varieties of governance that they discussed and the kinds of questions that they then were led to investigate. !Most familiar to us is the discussion of the governance of men by men. Here we are faced with a great variety in the kinds of governance, corresponding both to the differences in the size or scale of governance and to the great variety in the things that men honor. A common distinction is that drawn between man’s governance of himself (ethics) and the governance of the household (economics) and the governance of the city, of the nation, or of many nations or of the great nation. Similarly, a distinction is drawn between the political forms of governance in terms of the differing goals or ends to which they are directed. These governances, however they are distinguished, are based upon human—that is, man-made—laws. The status of these laws requires study; the relation of these laws to other kinds of law (natural, divine, and so forth) also requires investigation. In the Christian religious community, there is a need to clarify the relationship of a governance based on human law to a governance based on divine Law: that is, the relationship of civil law and human government—state or emperor—to canon law and divine government—church or pope. Another form of governance is that of men by God. This inquiry begins with an investigation of the divine Law ( le x d iv in a ) or religious Law ( sharVa or to r a h ) and its distinctive features. In Islam and Judaism, the all-inclusive character of the religious Law leads to a special emphasis upon the intentions of the Law or upon the intentions of the prophet who promulgated that Law. In this way, revelation, the agency of the prophet-legislator in defining a particular religious community, and religion itself, all become major themes of political philosophy. Finally, and as a special branch of the individual’s governance of himself, it is possible to speak of the philosopher’s governance of himself. This emerges as a theme of medieval political philosophy in two ways: in so far as the philosopher is a solitary, he is guided by some kind of natural law in his occasional relations with others; and inasmuch as he lives in the midst of a religious community, he is guided by the Law of that community. It is in this w ay that the place of philosophy in the religious community and the philosopher’s own activity become parts of the subject matter of medieval political philosophy. N ot all of these themes were the exclusive province of political philosophy as distinguished from political thought. One can hardly turn to

I1itroductio7i

7

a single text of medieval political thought that does not evince a concern for such problems as well as an effort to deal with them at some level of understanding. Most of these themes appear in medieval political literature, but not all of that literature is able to articulate or to discuss these themes with an equal degree of insight and authority. The study of the law is a case in point. There was a multitude of jurists and lawyers who were daily involved in this study, but it is evident (no less today than in medieval times) that, as jurists and lawyers, these men could at best ascertain and seek to interpret or reinterpret the fundamentals of the law with a view to applying it to particular cases; but they were not equipped to raise and consider the broad questions lying at the bottom of the law. N or could they, as jurists and lawyers, reflect on the relation between the principles of the law and, say, the principles of the theoretical or practical sciences. W e must distinguish, then, a treatment of these themes that is sufficient for most practical purposes, from a truly comprehensive treatment of these themes. In the middle ages such a comprehensive treatment—that is, the investigation of the principles of political things in the highest and most orderly form—was the subject matter of two distinct disciplines: political philosophy and political theology. A n y study of medieval political thought presupposes an awareness of this distinction and an understanding of the complex relationship between these two disciplines. Political philosophy is a branch of philosophy. Just as philosophy is the love and quest of wisdom or universal and comprehensive knowledge, so political philosophy is the love or quest of wisdom about the nature or principles of all human affairs or political things. Just as philosophy seeks to understand the whole and the parts of the whole and the place of the parts within the whole, so political philosophy seeks to understand the principles of political life, the relation of these principles to each other, and the relation of political things to all other things. Political theology is an integral part of theology. (In speaking of theology here, we do not mean what Aristotle, for example, called theology—the inquiry into divine things, as distinguished from the account of divine things given by mythographers, poets, legislators, and the ancestral tradition. The medievais themselves distinguished natural theology from sacred theology. Natural theology is the inquiry into divine things, as far as these are accessible to the human mind without the aid of any revelation. This belongs to metaphysics and constitutes its highest theme. When speaking of theology in the present context, we are referring to sacred theology—that is, the inquiry into divine things based upon a divine revelation whose highest principles are, as such, not accessible to the unassisted human mind.) As a part of sacred theology, political theology is the elucidation of the political teachings of a divine revelation or the inquiry into political things based upon a divine revelation.

8

In tro d u c tio n

Both of these comprehensive treatments were “ political” with respect to their subject matter. But by virtue of the fact that each claimed to present a comprehensive account of political things, there arose the possibility of a conflict between them and, accordingly, the need to define and establish a proper relationship between the two. E very medieval political philosopher had to face this problem at some point: he had to distinguish political philosophy from political theology, and he had to relate the two kinds of activity. A number of inconclusive compromises were reached, but two particular approaches are of paramount importance. One or the other of these was followed by all of the great figures among the medieval political philosophers. One approach was to consider political theology within the framework of political philosophy. This was the dominant mode among all of the Muslim political philosophers; it was used by Maimonides in so far as he followed their political teaching; and it was an important aspect of socalled Latin Averroism in the Christian West. This mode was justified in the following way. The principles of political theology are derived from a particular revelation and divine Law ; political theology has to accept and cannot question these principles. On the other hand, the comprehensive inquiry into political things, an inquiry that goes to the roots, cannot take these principles for granted; it must broaden its horizon and ask questions about the intentions of the Lawgiver, questions that ultimately cannot be answered except through an inquiry into the end of man, his place within the whole, and the nature of political things. N or can these questions be answered by accepting, without further investigation, the answers given to them in that divine Law. For these answers, too, were given as a part of the legislative activity of the Law giver. Through these beliefs, the Law giver intended to found a particular religious community; he regarded these beliefs as best for those men. This does not exclude the possibility that the political teaching based upon such beliefs is indeed simply the best political teaching. But this cannot be granted prior to inquiry; and if the argument is not to be circular, it must begin from principles accessible to the unassisted human mind. Whatever the results of this investigation, political philosophy must begin with the attempt to replace the beliefs held by the followers of a given divine Law with knowledge of the essential character of any divine Law ; similarly, the inquiry into political things based on belief in a given divine Law must be replaced by knowledge of the nature of political things and especially of the nature of all kinds of law. Given the possibility of such knowledge—or at least the possibility of knowledge of the fundamental political questions as questions—political philosophy becomes a higher and a more comprehensive science than political theology. It inquires into the things that political theology accepts as its

Introduction

9

unquestioned point of departure. More generally stated: the principles of political theology are the fundamentals of a particular religious polity. These fundamentals were revealed for the sake of that body and they constitute its basic beliefs. Political philosophy, on the other hand, is not relative or bound to any particular religious or nonreligious polity. If political theology probes to the roots or principles of a particular religious polity, political philosophy inquires into these principles and roots, and attempts to probe to the roots of the roots, of all kinds of polity. Such an inquiry cannot presuppose any principles or roots as articles of faith or as unquestioned beliefs. This subordination of political theology to political philosophy does not lessen the need for the former or diminish its importance as a political and practical discipline. It is both necessary and useful for the particular religious community in which it is pursued, although it is not of any use to other religious communities, which do not share or accept these beliefs. The political teaching of every divine revelation needs to be identified, clarified, interpreted, and defended. This is the specific function of the political theologian. The political philosopher himself may, and normally does, engage in this activity, which is an integral part of his practical or political activity as a teacher, reformer, and so forth, within his own religious community. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two is settled and so is the subordination of political theology to political philosophy. (W e have included a number of texts in which medieval political philosophers treat the political teaching of their revealed Law as political philosophers or as political theologians or as both. In order to understand these texts the reader needs to remind himself of the distinctive character of these two approaches and of the practical importance of political theology in helping to elucidate the revealed Law.) The other approach was to consider political philosophy within the framework of political theology. This mode itself does not rest upon philosophic principles. It took many forms and was represented by various theologians and theological schools in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. It could, for instance, be based on a purely practical consideration. As members of this religious community, the most important thing is to live the kind of life prescribed by our divine Law ; everything else, ineluding all foreign or mundane sciences, either should not be pursued at all or should be pursued only to the extent necessary to promote the life of faith and virtue. Political philosophy, especially, has become superfluous because our divine Law provides us with everything needed to conduct our lives and to promote our welfare both in this world and in the next. Only where it can be shown that the study of political philosophy can contribute in some w ay to this end should it be admitted; its contribution, in any case, is of limited importance and its place clearly

IO

In tro d u c tio n

subordinate. While from a practical point of view this position is understandable, it does not properly meet the problems posed by political philosophy that were sketched above. A far more adequate approach is rendered possible by making an effort to meet political philosophy on its own ground. Theology is conceived of as a comprehensive theoretical ,and practical science, just as philosophy is. Political theology is conceived of as a more comprehensive science than political philosophy; it sees further and more deeply than political philosophy. Political theology, in this sense, does not begin by inquiring whether, beyond the knowledge based on revelation and the divine Law, we need political philosophy. Rather it begins by asking whether, beyond the knowledge that is provided (or that can be provided) by political philosophy, we need something more, a higher knowledge than that which political philosophy offers or can offer. This question is not asked by the simple believer in a revelation or a divine Law. For him, belief or faith means that he is convinced or certain that following the precepts of the divine Law and the beliefs prescribed by it is the only w ay to salvation and hence that no other law and no other kind of knowledge is sufficient for this purpose. Furthermore, he is not troubled by the multiplicity of laws and even of divine Laws, for he believes that the others are either false or incomplete. Nevertheless, the simple believer holds to two essential elements of the political theology about which we are speaking: that he must follow his own divine Law and no other, and that his divine Law goes beyond all the precepts of a merely human science. It remained for certain theologians in the three religious communities to support these beliefs, which the simple believer accepts on faith, through a science of political theology. The development of such a science required drawing the fundamental distinction between the political teaching, based on revealed principles, that is e sse n tia lly not accessible to the unaided human mind, and the revealed political teaching that is accessible to the unaided human mind but which, for one reason or another, needed to be stated for all members of the religious community. The political theologian treats the revealed teaching as principles from which he deduces their necessary consequences. In so doing, and because he has access to principles higher than the highest principles accessible to the political philosopher, he develops a comprehensive political doctrine. He will include in it the teaching of the political philosophers. But being the possessor of a higher knowledge, he has the right to incorporate as much of the lower (political philosophy) as he sees fit, as he judges to be in harmony with or to support or to promote the higher (sacred) political teaching. Again, in so doing, he does not think that he is in any w ay limiting, to say nothing of corrupting, the teaching of the political philosophers. Quite the contrary. When he selects from it or corrects it or refutes certain parts of it, he believes that he is improving it and

Introduction

11

improving on it. He is placing it in the broader context within which it properly belongs, and he is providing it with the benefit of a higher light that enables it to see and judge more clearly the truth of its principles, including its practical function and aim. It was in the Christian world that this mode of placing political philosophy within a theological framework received its most elaborate expression—not only in the patristic period (when Christians first had to come to terms with pagan philosophy), but also in the work of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’ insistence on the distinction between the domains of philosophy and sacred doctrine represents a departure from some earlier Christian theologians who sought to incorporate or absorb philosophy into the “ one wisdom.” Much of the Thomistic teaching is devoted to defining the separate realms of theology and of philosophy; and when speaking as a commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics or the Politics, Aquinas is indeed speaking about political things as far as these are known to natural reason. But the Thomistic teaching about society goes beyond commentaries on Aristotle and includes his view of the church, as elaborated in his theological works and in the treatise On Kingship. In other words, the Thomistic teaching about society is neither complete nor fully clear unless one takes into account, not only his distinction between man’s earthly end—which may be attained through civil society and earthly kings—on the one hand, and man’s supernatural end—which must be ordered through the church and the priests—on the other, but also Aquinas’ subordination o f the former to the latter. This relationship, which in his view constitutes a Christian society, cannot be properly treated except within a theological framework. W e may now summarize these two heterogeneous approaches to the study of political things. The first is based on the position that philosophy alone is capable of giving a comprehensive account of the highest principies and that it alone can illuminate the understanding o f all political things, including the political teaching of the divine Law, which occupies an honored place within political philosophy. The second approach is based on the position that the highest political teaching is contained in that revelation or divine Law in which the theologian believes. Only the science of that revelation or divine Law (that is, the theology that takes revelation or the divine Law as its premise) can illuminate fully the understanding of all political things, including the teaching of political philosophy, which occupies an honored but subordinate place within political theology. These two approaches, as well as varying combinations of the two, were followed by men in all three religious communities in their study of political things. The predominance of one mode over another in any particular community requires explanation, though in the nature of the

12

Introduction

case an explanation can only be tentative and suggestive. W e shall attempt to sketch the outlines of an explanation by considering the relative positions of theology and jurisprudence in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Broadly stated, theology was the paramount science in Christianity. The Christian community was constituted, not by a single divine Law that comprehensively prescribed opinions and actions of every kind, but rather by a sacred doctrine. The custodians of this doctrine were apostolic successors, the hierarchy, and the theologians, not the jurists. In Islam it is the all-embracing Law and its study that are supreme. Theology occupies a prominent, though subordinate^ position. Judaism, like Islam, is constituted by a comprehensive revealed Law. That Law and the jurists’ activity in interpreting, elaborating, and applying it are paramount. Theology does not appear to have a significant or even a well-defined position. These broad differences in the relative prominence of theology and jurisprudence within the religious communities seem to have had important consequences for the w ay in which political philosophy was regarded, the definition of its subject matter, and the place it came to occupy. Christianity begins by rescinding the Old Law and replacing it with a N ew Law, the Law of Grace. This N ew Law is not a comprehensive Law in the sense that the Pentateuch is; it does not include, as an integral part, the regulation of men’s private and public lives as citizens. There is no penal legislation in the N ew Testament. The N ew Law prescribes beliefs that complement, rather than supplant, the civil and public law of Caesar; the latter develops independently and continues, as before, to regulate men’s political and social lives. T o be sure, certain changes were made in Caesar’s law: for example, the old laws prescribing cults and forms of worship and governing the pagan priests were rescinded, and new laws consonant with Christianity were substituted; then, too, the civil and public law was restrained from hindering the exercise of the Christian virtues. As a result there developed a twofold system of law—canon and civil—that has no analogue in Islam or Judaism. In general, the Christian divine Law, more than the Koran and to a vastly greater extent than the Jewish Bible, is largely directed to a transpolitical, other-worldly goal. There were no medieval Christian counterparts to the Islamic faqihs or the Jewish talmudists, whose task it was to ascertain the text of the original revelation, take it as a body of premises, and deduce from it a more elaborate set of rules—all this without paying, or needing to pay, much attention to the foreign sciences of the pagans. Even more important than the foregoing features is the w ay in which Christian theology received effective institutional support. This theology developed in an intimate relation with a church that claimed to be catholic. In the councils, the church had at once the authority and the

Introduction

13

effective instrument by which it could define an article of faith and make binding decisions as to its correct interpretation. This institution was almost a millenium old by the thirteenth century, that is, by the time the Latin W est felt the impact of the newly acquired Islamic and Jewish learning and the impact of the newly recovered works of Aristotle. Concomitantly with the rise of political philosophy, there arose the need to define its relation to the existing traditional theology. (The latter consisted in the study of Christian dogmas as found in the N ew Testament, the decisions of councils, Peter Lombard’s Book of Sentences, certain works by Augustine and other church fathers, and those elements from the writings of Cicero, Plotinus, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and a number of others, that had been incorporated into traditional theology.) A number of attempts were made to reform this theology in the light of the newly acquired learning. The penetration of political philosophy into the Christian community raised the question as to which one of the reformed versions of theology is correct. In Islam and Judaism, on the other hand, the penetration of classical political philosophy led to the posing of a quite different question. There the primary issue was whether these new and alien sciences are permitted or prohibited by the religious Law. This was a juridical, rather than theological, question; the jurist, and only the jurist, could render a decision, and that decision would take the form of a judicial ruling. In Islam and Judaism it was quite possible to rule that the Law permits the pursuit of all or most of these sciences and of the various modes of integrating them with one another. It was quite possible to leave the differing advocates to argue their case against one another, provided that in doing so they did not gainsay or interfere with the beliefs and w ay of life prescribed by the Law, as defined by the jurists. Furthermore, neither in Islam nor in medieval Judaism was there an ecclesiastical institution that had the authority to determine the correct interpretation of the beliefs prescribed b y the Law. The far-reaching consequences of these differences may be seen in this extreme example: Averroes could present the case of Philosophy vs. Theology before the tribunal of the Law, and ask for a decision to the effect that theology is the enemy of the Law and that the Law demands the truly scientific—that is, the philosophic—interpretation of certain doctrines. Within Christianity, certain Averroists appear to have envisaged a reformation of traditional theology along these lines. T h ey wished the Christian church to remove itself from the controversy between theology and philosophy, rather than sit in judgment on the conflicting interpretations of the proper relation of the two. The church, however, declined to withdraw from the controversy. Certain bishops availed themselves of their authority to determine the curriculum of the schools, and proceeded to condemn

14

Introduction

some of the more notable attempts at reforming traditional theology. In general, some of the reformed versions of theology were approved, others condemned, and still others left free. In time one version came to be approved by the church itself; other competing versions, never having been rehabilitated, failed to enter into the mainstream of Christian thought. In Islam and Judaism, in contrast, the preference of individual jurists for a certain theological or philosophic school or interpretation could find no institutional channel through which this could be declared as the correct catholic doctrine and through which its opponents could be condemned or persecuted as being beyond the pale of the true religion. There was no instrument for establishing a universal or permanent doctrine. W e may now summarize this discussion of the relative positions of theology and jurisprudence with a view to its bearing upon the content of political philosophy. The separation of canon and civil law, in the Christian community, left the civil law as the domain of the legists. B y the same token it could also become the domain of the political philosophers, who could raise such questions as: what is the natural law? what is human law? what is the common good? In other words, the political philosophers could reflect upon the foundations of the civil law without necessarily having to touch upon the divine Law and the sacred doctrine. A political philosophy that was restricted or that restricted itself to such questions could be incorporated into a political theology that proceeded beyond it to the study of the divine Law and the sacred doctrine. W here there is no such separate civil law, as in Islam and Judaism, political philosophy has no such limited area of human law to which it can be confined. If political philosophy was to reflect upon any law, it had to be the Law ; political philosophy had to inquire into the roots of a single comprehensive divine Law, which itself preempts any place that might be left to a human law. Consequently, when political philosophy plunged into a study of the Law, it was inevitably drawn to inquire into revelation (or the source of that L aw ), prophecy (or the agency through which the Law was revealed), and the religious polity as a species of governance (or the political community organized under such a L aw ). Nothing that we have said ought to be interpreted as meaning that the Thomistic synthesis was a foregone conclusion in Christianity or, similarly, that the Averroistic synthesis was a foregone conclusion in Islam and Judaism. The fundamental differences we have sketched in the character of the divine Laws of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, and in the relative positions of theology and jurisprudence in these communities do not, of themselves, necessitate the one mode or the other. H ow one accommodated the conflicting claims of the revealed teaching and the political philosophers’ teaching turned on a still more funda-

Introduction

15

mental question. Is, or is not, man directed to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason, and ordained to an end that is not proportionate to, but exceeds, his natural ability? Muslims, Jews, and Christians alike divided among themselves when they interpreted their revelation with a view to answering this question. Both interpretations—let us call them the philosophic and the theological—found ardent and powerful supporters within each community. W e have already made it clear that only in medieval Christianity was it institutionally possible to convert one of these interpretations of the revelation into a catholic teaching and, with authority, to condemn an alternative interpretation as contrary to the faith. In Islam, to take the other extreme, it was possible for both interpretations to be pursued and advocated side by side. In the light o f this difference, it is not perhaps fortuitous that those who favored the philosophic interpretation of the revelation in Islam and in Judaism were all staunch supporters of the Law who labored to uphold its authority. A t the same time, their counterparts in Christianity developed an anticlerical tendency. Men like iMarsilius argued against the plenitude of power o f the Popes, against their authority to define articles o f the faith, and especially against their claim to have coercive power to compel anyone in this world (that is, by temporal pain or punishment) to observe the commands of the evangelical Law, let alone a particular interpretation of it. Whatever the broader political implications of this anticlcricalism may have been, it was certainly an integral part of philosophic politics; it was aimed at removing the practical impediment to the pursuit of the philosophic interpretation of revelation within the Christian community. In this respect, some of the so-called Latin Averroists and their Islamic and Jewish counterparts shared the same goal, despite the apparent differences in their approach. Going hand in hand with these differences in the character of the divine Law and in the relative positions of theology and jurisprudence in the three religious communities, is the presence of two rather distinct classical political traditions in the middle ages. This fact has significance only if one takes seriously the fact of which all medieval political philosophers were fully aware: that political philosophy had been handed down to them from the pagan philosophers. The medieval political philosophers themselves did not claim to have developed their teaching solely on the basis of direct reflection upon medieval political life without any regard for earlier conventions and traditions. The analyses of the political life of their own communities, the very terms employed, were largely borrowed from classical political philosophy. In this respect, the medieval political philosophers were like the Romans before them and the moderns after them. If they added to, or modified, or radically changed the frame­

16

Introduction

work of the classical political tradition, it was nonetheless to that tradition that they first turned. This classical tradition was, as it were, a pair of spectacles that all of them wore and through which they looked at political life. Depending on our estimate of the fundamental soundness or ultimate worth of classical political philosophy, we may think that these spectacles enabled them £0 see the nature of political life more clearly or that these spectacles distorted their vision. But the fact remains that there is no medieval political philosopher who did not directly or indirectly make use of the classical tradition in approaching the study of political things. N ot all of the classical political writings were available to, or utilized by, all of the medieval political philosophers. W hile the !Muslim political philosophers frequently refer to Aristotle’s Politics by name and occasionally quote from it, none of them wrote a commentary on that work. B y the late twelfth century, Averroes could state that he had not been able to obtain a copy of it. Moreover, the entire Latin tradition of political philosophy, both pagan and Christian, was not translated into Arabic and remained inaccessible to the Muslims. Instead, the main classical political writings of which they made constant use were the works of Plato and the Eastern Hellenistic Platonic tradition. Plato’s Republic and Laws were known to the Muslims from the tenth century onward. Alfarabi wrote commentaries on both. Avicenna considered Plato’s Laws to be the fundamental philosophic w ork on prophecy and the divine Law. And Averroes, the Commentator of Aristotle, wrote a commentary on Plato’s Republic , but not on Aristotle’s Politics. Plato, however, by no means appears only as the author of works expounded in commentaries; his political philosophy dominates the entire approach of the Islamic tradition of political philosophy and of that part of Jewish political philosophy which had access to the Arabic philosophic literature. The situation in Latin Christianity and in the Jewish political philosophy that had access to the Latin philosophic literature is somewhat different. Here Plato’s Republic and Laws are absent throughout the entire medieval period. T h ey were not translated until the Renaissance. Neither were the Arabic commentaries on these works translated into Latin. (Averroes’ Republic was translated into Latin from the Hebrew version in the sixteenth century.) Aristotle’s Politics, on the other hand, was translated in the thirteenth century, and at least seven commentaries on it were written within a generation (including those of Albert the Great, Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne, and Siger of Brabant). Aristotle’s Politics, not Plato’s Republic and Laws, was the fundamental work of political philosophy in the Latin-Christian tradition. In addition, the Christians had access to the Roman pagan political philosophers, particularly Cicero. One may note in this connection a feature of Christian political philosophy that is absent from Islamic political philosophy (and from the writings of Jew s

Introduction

17

who followed its lead): the great interest in the question of natural law, which was a hallmark of the Roman political tradition. This difference in the classical traditions available to the medieval readers of Arabic and Latin is clear. It also seems clear that this difference is somehow related to the previously discussed differences as to the ways in which political philosophy was regarded, the formulations of its subject matter, and the relations between it and political theology. As a result, political philosophy in Islam and Christianity took distinctive forms, and Jewish political philosophy was, by and large, divided into Judaeo-Arabic and Judaeo-Latin branches. W hat is not clear is whether the presence or absence of Plato’s Republic and Laws, and of Aristotle’s Politics, as the case may be, was due purely to chance. W as it the availability in Arabic of Plato’s political writings that gave Islamic political philosophy its decidedly Platonic character? Or was it the need to investigate the Islamic divine Law, revelation, prophecy, and so forth, that directed these Muslim philosophers to Plato, whose writings in turn proved more pertinent and helpful to them in their efforts to inquire into these Islamic political problems? Similarly, was the availability of Aristotle’s Politics in Latin what led the Christian tradition to regard political philosophy as confined to human laws and mundane governance? Or was it the existence of a civil law, with its distinct and restricted area of operation, that directed these Christian philosophers to Aristotle’s Politics, where political things are discussed as a relatively restricted and independent field of inquiry and where divine Law and the divine origins of laws are not discussed as political themes? W hile we have no intention of underestimating the role of chance in the transmission of manuscripts, we may note the following facts in passing. There is strong circumstantial evidence that Aristotle’s Politics was translated into Arabic, and it is certain that Aristotle’s political teaching was known to the Muslims at least in the form of quotations from the Politics, and from the Nicomachean Ethics and his other works. Again, the Latins, up to some time in the thirteenth century, had neither Plato’s Republic or Laws nor Aristotle’s Politics at hand. These texts had to be searched for before they could be translated; the first Latin translation of the Politics appears to have been made at the request of Albert the Great or of Aquinas. Finally, there is the affinity between the facts of political life in Islam and the issues discussed by Plato, on the one hand, and the facts of political life in Christianity and the w ay in which Aristotle proceeds in the Politics, on the other. However this may be understood, it would be misleading to leave it at that. The three religious communities shared a large and important part of the classical tradition. There was the other Aristotle, the Aristotle of the Organon, Physics, Metaphysics, and the Nicomachean Ethics. These works provided a common basis in all three religious communities for the distinction between the theoretical and practical sciences. The political philosophers in

18

Introduction

all three religious communities were as one in maintaining the superiority of theory to practice and in regarding man’s ultimate end as the study and contemplation of divine, rather than merely human, things. N o general account of the themes and problems of medieval political philosophy, however detailed, cán give an adequate notion of the richness, variety, and refinement (both in style and thought) of the writings of the medieval political philosophers. Like all great writings, these must be confronted directly. The reader must be prepared to be led by the hand by their authors into strange and wondrous lands, to follow them as they present the great themes of political philosophy as they saw them, and to listen to them as they discourse on the beliefs and the ways of life of these religious polities. These medieval political philosophers remain our best guides to the understanding of what is important and lasting in medieval political life. T h ey had access to it as it was actually lived rather than through pages in history books. T h ey participated in it as we can never hope to do. And they were competent and intelligent judges who, in looking at these religious polities, combined sympathy and understanding with dispassionate inquiry to a degree that is rarely equalled by their modern counterparts. The modern student of medieval politics cannot hope to form an adequate notion of his subject without encountering their writing. This encounter will not be fruitful, however, if the reader is not conscious of the gulf that separates us from those authors, as well as of the many elements that we share with them. T o begin with the latter, we must first remember that the Reformation was restricted to the Christian community, and that even here it was not universal or comprehensive: not everybody or everything was reformed. There are many individuals and communities today, in Islam, Judaism, as well as in Christianity, for whom the political teaching represented in this volume remains the true teaching in its classical form. That is, they not only retain the beliefs and ways of life prescribed by these religions, but consider the medieval formulation of their political teaching as either the valid formulation or the treasured heritage whose recovery is a precondition for further achievements in political philosophy. But even where men revolted against the medieval tradition of political philosophy and ventured into novel modes o f thought, they nevertheless retained certain elements of it. One need only consider the doctrine of the law of nature, which found its w ay from Aquinas through Hooker to Locke and which remains of central importance for a number of modern political philosophers. Also retained were more than a few doctrines normally associated with socalled Latin Averroism; these are important directly as the background of Machiavelli’s political philosophy, and indirectly for all the modern political philosophers who were influenced by Machiavelli.

Introduction

19

There were, of course, many other elements in medieval political philosophy that were suppressed, although never completely so, or in a satisfactory or decisive manner. Perhaps the most important of these suppressed elements is the doctrine of the supremacy of theoretical knowledge over the practical. The medieval thinkers maintained that the highest end of man consists in contemplation rather than action, without in any w ay belittling the great importance of action and the necessity, for men in general and for the philosopher in particular, of leading a virtuous life. The dethronement of theoretical knowledge is a fundamental change that in one w ay or another marks modern political philosophy as a whole. One can see it exemplified most dramatically by comparing Ibn T u fa y l’s Hayy the Son of Yaqzan and Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Ibn T u fa y l’s story was popular in late seventeenthcentury England, and Defoe may have taken it as a model for his own story. Ibn TufayPs hero, who is convinced of the necessity of reforming the multitude and is willing to do his duty toward his fellowmen, spends his remaining days back on his deserted island contemplating God. Defoe’s hero, in contrast, returns to England, enjoying the comforts of the material civilization of his time. T o champion the doctrine that the end of man consists in the enjoyment of material civilization, or in comfortable selfpreservation, would have looked human, all too human, to the medieval political philosophers. But apart from their difficulty in seeing anything particularly pious about such a doctrine, they did not think that it was reasonable. The dethronement of theoretical knowledge is an aspect of modern political philosophy that is not universally recognized or admitted: modern political philosophy emerged as a revolt, not only against the medieval tradition, but also—and more specifically—against the classical tradition of political philosophy, which the middle ages had found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. W e do not always recognize the fact that medieval political philosophy gives testimony to the great vitality of the classical tradition and supplies the most damaging evidence against the hypothesis that classical political philosophy was purely a Greek affair. The times seemed most unpropitious: revealed religions had arisen claiming the privilege of having received the very word of God Himself, directly or through His chosen messengers. W h y should anyone attach importance to what certain pagans had thought about God, the ultimate end of man, and the best political order? Yet classical political philosophy asserted its claim that it can offer the best, if not the only, w ay to investigate the truth of the claims of these religions, even the truth of their revelations and prophecies and divine Laws. Everyone who cared to pursue the truth of these matters was forced to listen to it, come to terms with it, and, curiously enough, learn from it how to investigate divine and human things, how to reform the beliefs and w ay of life of his own

20

Introductio?1

community, and how to act in a manner conducive to the common interest of his community and to his own interest as an investigator. In contrast, the break with classical political philosophy has led modern political philosophy progressively to simplify and oversimplify the complexity of the relation between philosophy or science and society: first by narrowing the horizon within which knowledge is pursued (notwithstanding the great expansion of the material of investigation within this narrowed horizon), then by lowering the aims pursued in political life, and finally by reducing the possibilities of action open to man within society by emphasizing the causal determination exercised by the lower elements of life over the higher. In its anxiety to free itself from medieval dogmatism, modern political philosophy has shown a tendency to substitute new forms of dogmatism whose scientific claims cannot entirely conceal their dogmatic foundation or their harmful practical consequences. T oday we are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the revolt against medieval political theology did not liberate modern political philosophy; it only led to the substitution of new political theologies for the old one. W e moderns are willing to admit this fact about almost the entire modern tradition, and even about all the contemporary schools of thought, with the sole exception of contemporary scientific social science. But we refuse to consider the possibility that the reason for the failure of modern political philosophy and for our dissatisfaction with it may be due not so much to its revolt against medieval political theology as to its revolt against classical political philosophy. Medieval political philosophy can teach us many things, but perhaps its most telling lesson is that classical political philosophy has both the theoretical and practical possibilities to humanize a barbarous age and to free men from the darkness of their prisons.

P

A

R

T

O

N

E

Political Philosophy in Islam

E D I T E D

B Y

M U H S I N

M A H D I

1.

A lfarabi THE OF

ENUMERATION THE

SCIENCES

Translated by Fauzi M. Najjar

A lf a r a b i ( A b u N a s r M u h a m m a d a lF ã r ã b í, ca. 8 7 0 - 9 5 0 ) w a s b o r n in T r a n s o x a n ia a n d s t u d ie d in K h o r a s a n a n d B a g h d a d . In 9 4 2 h e l e f t B a g h d a d f o r t h e c o u r t o f t h e S y r ia n P r in c e

M u s lim con q u est seem s to have f o r c e d t h is s c h o o l t o m o v e fir s t t o A n t i o c h ( e a r l y in t h e e ig h t h c e n t u r y ) a n d t h e n t o H a r r ã n ( i n th e m i d d ie o f t h e n in t h c e n t u r y ) , w h e r e G r e e k le a r n in g a n d p a g a n is m c o n t in u e d t o f lo u r is h in t h e m id s t o f S y r i a c - s p e a k i n g C h r is t ia n n e ig h b o r s a n d u n d e r I s la m ic r u le . ( A c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a in r e p o r t s , A lf a r a b i s t u d ie d t h e r e h i m s e l f .) A lf a r a b i w a s t h e fir s t M u s lim p h ilo s o p h e r to h e a d a “s c h o o l” a n d to b e c o m e k n o w n as a “ t e a c h e r .” H e w a s

S a y f a l- D a w l a h in A l e p p o . W h i l e in S y r ia , h e v is it e d E g y p t a n d l iv e d in D a m a s c u s , w h i c h w a s s e iz e d b y h is p a t r o n p r in c e t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r A l f a r a b i’s d e p a r t u r e f r o m B a g h d a d . H e d ie d a t t h e a g e o f e i g h t y a n d w a s b u r ie d w i t h f u ll h o n o r s in D a m a s c u s . A m o n g o t h e r s , A lf a r a b i s t u d ie d u n d e r Y ü h a n n ã I b n H a y lã n , a S y r ia c - s p e a k i n g C h r is t ia n w h o

t a u g h t in H a r r ã n

a c k n o w l e d g e d b y s u b s e q u e n t M u s lim p h ilo s o p h e r s as t h e tr u e f o u n d e r o f p h i lo s o p h y in I s la m , a n d M u s lim h is -

(C a r r h a e ) an d B a g h d a d (w h e r e he d ie d in t h e fir s t t h ir d o f t h e t e n t h c e n t u r y ) , a n d h e tr a c e s t h e p h i lo -

t o r ia n s o f p h i l o s o p h y c a lle d h im

th e

M u s lim p h i lo s o p h e r a n d t h e “ s e c o n d M a ste r ” (a fte r A r is to tle ). H is c o m -

s o p h ic t r a d it io n r e p r e s e n t e d b y th is Y ü h a n n ã t o t h e s c h o o l o f A le x a n d r ia , w h e r e p h i l o s o p h y s u r v iv e d d e s p it e t h e r e s t r ic t io n s i m p o s e d b y c h u r c h a u t h o r it ie s . T h e d e c li n e o f t h e c u ltu r a l p o s i t i o n o f A le x a n d r ia a f t e r t h e

m e n t a r ie s o n A r i s t o t l e ’s w o r k s e s t a b lis h e d t h e l a t t e r ’s a u t h o r i t y in l o g i c , p h y s i c s , a n d m e t a p h y s ic s . S im u lt a n e o u s l y , h e r e c o v e r e d t h e s i g n if i c a n c e o f

22

a

L F a

R a B i : The Enumeration of the Sciences

Plato and introduced him as the supreme authority on political philosop h y and the investigation o f human and divine laws. In his preface to the Enum eration of the Scien ces, A lfarabi states that his intention is to give an enumeration of the w ell-kn o w n sciences, and make known the basic themes of each, its subdivisions, and the basic themes of each o f the subdivisions. T h is will be done in five chapters: ( 1 ) the science of language, (2) logic, (3) mathematics, (4) physics and m etaphysics, and (5) political science, jurisprudence, and dialectical theology. H e concludes the preface b y enumerating the uses o f the book’s content: it will enable the student w h o wishes to study a particular science to know w here to begin, w hat he w ill gain from his study, and so forth, and to be aware o f w hat he is undertaking rather than plunge into it blindly. It enables one to com pare the various sciences and learn w hich of them is m ore excellent, more useful, more precise, and so forth. It enables one to uncover the ignorance of w h o ever pretends to kn ow a particular science; b y asking about its subdivisions and basic themes, one will be able to show his false claim. It enables one w h o know s a particular science to find out w hether he knows all or only certain parts of it, and to w hat extent he knows it. Finally, it is useful to the educated man whose intention is to

23

acquaint himself with only the basic themes o f every science and to the man w h o seeks to resemble the men of science and be considered one of them. Despite its terseness, Chapter V contains the earliest and most significant com prehensive account of the basic themes and subdivisions of political science in Islamic philosophy. In the A ra b ic original, the Enu~ meration of the Sciences became an indispensable introduction to the study of the sciences and was freely copied and paraphrased b y m any en cyclopedists and historians o f the sciences. Ju d aeo -A ra b ic authors used it in the A ra b ic original, and substantial extracts from it w ere translated into H eb rew b y Shem tob ben Falaquera (who lived in Spain and Provence during the thirteenth cen tu ry) and K a lonym os ben K alonym os o f A rles (in 1 3 1 4 ) . Dom inicus G undisalvi (perhaps in collaboration w ith Joh n o f Spain [Ibn D ã w ü d ]) extracted about half of it in his composite w o rk D e Scientiis (m iddle o f the tw elfth cen tu ry; printed in Paris, 1 63 8) ; and G erard o f Crem ona made a com plete Latin translation from the A ra b ic in T o le d o in about 1175. T h e follow ing transiation is based on Osman A m in e’s second edition of the A ra b ic original: Ihsa* al-ulftm (C airo , 19 48 ), pp. 10213. T h e notes to the translation spec ify w hether the readings adopted here occu r in the notes to this edition.

C H A P T E R O N

P O L I T I C A L A N D

S C I E N C E ,

D I A L E C T I C A L

P O L I T I C A L

V

J U R I S P R U D E N C E T H E O L O G Y

S C I E N C E

investigates the various kinds of voluntary actions and ways of life;1 the positive dispositions, morals, inclinations, and states of character that lead to these actions and ways of life;1 the ends for the sake of which they are performed; how they must exist in man; how to order them in man in the manner in which they must exist in him; and the w ay to preserve them for him. It distinguishes among the ends for the sake of which actions are performed and ways of life1 are practiced. It explains that some of them are true happiness, while others are presumed to be happiness although they are not. That which is true happiness cannot possibly be of this life, but of another life after this, which is the life to come; while that which is presumed to be happiness consists of such things as wealth, honor, and the pleasures, when these are made the only ends in this life. Distinguishing the actions and ways of life,1 it explains that the ones through which true happiness is attained are the goods, the noble things, and the virtues, while the rest are the evils, the base things, and the imperfections; and that they [must] exist in man in such a w ay that [/05] the virtuous actions and ways of life1 are distributed in the cities and nations according to a certain order and are practiced in common. It explains that this comes about only through a rulership (r fa s a h ) by which [the ruler] establishes these actions, ways of life,2 states of character, positive dispositions, and morals in the cities and nations, and endeavors to preserve them so that they do not perish; and that this rulership comes about only by virtue of a craft and a positive disposition that lead to the actions that establish [these virtues] and to the actions that preserve what has been established among them [that is, the cities and nations]. This is the royal craft or kingship, or whatever one chooses to call it; politics ( siy ã sa h ) is the operation of this craft. [Political science explains] that rulership is of two kinds, (a ) A rulership that establishes the voluntary actions, ways of life,2 and positive dispositions, with which to attain what is truly happiness. This is the P

o l i t i c a l

s c i e n c e

24

A LF A R A B i :

The Enumeration of the Sciences

25

virtuous rulership; the cities and nations that submit to this rulership are the virtuous cities and nations, (b) A rulership that establishes in the cities the actions and states of character with which to attain the things that are presumed to be happiness although they are not. This is the ignorant rulership. It has many divisions, each of which is designated by the purpose it seeks and strives for; there are thus as many of them as there are ends and purposes for this rulership to pursue. If it pursues wealth, it is called the vile3 rulership; if honor, timocracy; and if something else, it is given the name of its particular end. [Political science] further explains that the virtuous royal craft is composed of two faculties. The one is the faculty for [104] general rules. The other is the faculty that man acquires through long practice in political deeds, dealing with the morals and the individuals existing in actual4 cities, and becoming practically wise through experience and long observation, as is the case in medicine. For the physician becomes a perfect practitioner by virtue of two faculties. The one is the faculty for the generalities and the rules he has acquired from medical books. The other is the faculty he acquires by the long practice of medicine on the sick and by becoming practically wise in this through long experience and observation of the bodies of individuals. B y virtue of this latter faculty, the physician is able to determine the medicaments and the cure with a view to a particular body in a particular state. Similarly, it is by means of such a faculty and experience that the royal craft is able to determine what is to be done with a view to a particular accident, state, and time.5 Regarding the voluntary actions, ways of life,1 positive dispositions, and so forth, that it investigates, political philosophy gives an account of the general rules. It gives an account of the patterns according to which they should be determined with due regard to particular states and times: how, with what, and by how many things, they are to be determined. Beyond this, it leaves them undetermined, because actual determination belongs to another faculty, with a different function, which should be joined to this one. !Moreover, the states and the accidents with a view to which the determination is made are indefinite and uncircumscribable. This science is divided into two parts: (A) One part comprises making known what happiness is; distinguishing between true and presumed happiness; enumerating the general voluntary actions, ways of life, morals, and states of character that are to be distributed in the cities and nations; and distinguishing between the ones that are virtuous and the ones that are not. ( B ) Another part comprises the w ay of ordering the virtuous states of character and w ays of life in the cities and nations; and making known the royal functions by which the virtuous ways of life and actions are established [ /oy] and ordered among the citizens of the cities, and the activities by which to preserve what has been ordered and established

26

P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y i77 I s l a m

among them. It then enumerates the various kinds of the nonvirtuous royal crafts—how many they are, and what each one of them is; and it enumerates the functions each one of them performs, and the ways of life1 and the positive dispositions that each seeks to establish in the cities and nations under its rulership. (These things are to be found in the P o litic s , the book on the regime by Aristotle. T h ey are to be found also in Plato’s R e p u b lic and in [other] books by Plato and others.) It explains that all of these actions, ways of life, and positive dispositions are like diseases to the virtuous cities: the actions that pertain to the royal crafts and the royal ways of life [in the nonvirtuous cities] are diseases to the virtuous royal craft; and the ways of life and the positive dispositions that pertain to these cities are like diseases to the virtuous cities. It then enumerates the grounds and the directions because of which the virtuous rulerships and the ways of life1 of the virtuous cities are in danger of being transformed into the ignorant ways of life1 and positive dispositions. Furthermore, it enumerates the various kinds of actions by which virtuous cities and rulerships are regulated so that they do not become corrupt and transformed into nonvirtuous ones. It enumerates also the various measures, devices, and methods that should be used to restore them to their previous state once they have been transformed into ignorant [cities and rulerships]. It then explains of how many things the virtuous royal craft is composed; [/06] that they include the theoretical and the practical sciences; and that to these should be joined the faculty acquired through the experience arising from long practice in cities and nations—this last is the ability to discover well the conditions according to which the actions, ways of life, and positive dispositions are determined with a view to a particular group, city, or nation, and with a view to a particular state and accident. It explains that the virtuous city remains virtuous and escapes transformation only if its princes continue to succeed one another in time and possess identical qualifications, so that the successor would possess the same attributes and qualifications as his predecessor and their succession would be without break or interruption. It makes known what must be done in order to avoid a break in the succession of princes. It explains which natural qualifications and attributes must be sought in the sons of the princes and in others, so that they may qualify their possessor to assume authority after the ruling prince. It explains how the one who is endowed with these natural qualifications must grow up and how he ought to be educated, so that he may possess the royal craft and become an accomplished prince. It explains, further, that those w hose rulership is ignorant should not at all be called0 princes, and that they do not need either theoretical or practical philosophy in any of their states, activities, or policies. Rather, each one of them can achieve his purpose in the city or nation under his rule by virtue of the experiential faculty that he acquires through

a

L F a Ra B i

: The Enumeration of the Sciences

27

the continual practice in the kind of actions with which he attains his goal and achieves whatever goods he aims at, [/07] provided he happens to possess a fine natural perceptive faculty with which to discover what he needs to do in order to attain the good that is his goal—be it pleasure, honor, or something else—supplemented by the ability to follow in the footsteps of the preceding princes whose goal was the same as his.

T H E

S C I E N C E

OF

J U R I S P R U D E N C E

Jurisprudence ( fiqh) is the art that enables man to infer the determination of whatever was not explicitly specified by the Lawgiver, on the basis of such things as were explicitly specified and determined by him; and to strive to infer correctly by taking into account the Law giver’s purpose with the religion he had legislated for the nation to which he gave that religion. N ow every religion comprises certain opinions and certain actions. Examples of the opinions are those legislated about God (praise be to Him) and His attributes, about the world, and so forth. Examples of the actions arc those by which God (the M ighty and !Majestic) is magnified, and the actions by means of which transactions arc conducted in the cities. For this reason, the science of jurisprudence has two parts, one part dealing with the opinions and another dealing with the actions.

THE

S C IE N C E

OF

D I A L E C T I C A L

THEOLOGY

The art of dialectical theology (kalã7;7) is a positive disposition that enables man to argue in the defense of the [/0#] specific opinions and actions stated explicitly by the founder of the religion, and against everything that opposes these opinions and actions. This art is also divided into two parts; one part deals with the opinions, and another deals with the actions. It is different from jurisprudence. For the jurist takes the opinions and the actions stated explicitly by the founder of the religion and, using them as axioms, he infers the things that follow from them as consequences. The dialectical theologian, on the other hand, defends the things that the jurist uses as axioms, without inferring other things from them. If it should happen that a certain man possesses the ability to do both, then he is both a jurist and a dialectical theologian. He defends the axioms in his capacity as a dialectical theologian, and he infers from them in his capacity as a jurist. As far as the ways and opinions that must be employed in defending

28

P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y in I s l a m

religions are concerned [dialectical theologians hold a variety of views that can be summed up as follows]: ( A ) There is a group of dialectical theologians who are of the opinion that they should defend religions by arguing that religious opinions and all their postulates are not susceptible of examination by human opinions, deliberation, or intellects, becau$è they are superior to these in rank since they are received through divine revelation, and because they comprise divine mysteries that human intellects are too weak to comprehend or approach. Again, man is such that, through revelation, religions can offer him what [/09] he cannot apprehend by his intellect, and before which his intellect is impotent. Otherwise, revelation would be meaningless and useless, for it would only offer man that which he knows already or what he could, upon reflection, come to apprehend by his intellect. W ere this the case, man would have been left to depend on his intellect, and he would have had no need for prophecy or revelation. But this is not the w ay he is treated. Consequently, the knowledge supplied by religions must be what our intellects are unable to apprehend and, what is more, also what our intellects reject; for the more intensely we reject it, the greater the possibility that it is vastly advantageous. That is because the things that are brought forth by religions and that the [human] intellects reject and [human] fancies regard as abominable, are in reality neither objectionable nor absurd, but are valid for the divine intellects. For even though man were to reach the limit of human perfection, his position in relation to the possessors of divine intellects is like that of the child, the adolescent, and the callow youth in relation to the perfect man. Most children and callow youths consider as objectionable by their intellects many things that are not in reality objectionable or impossible— although to them they are impossible. The one who has reached the limit of human perfection occupies a similar position in relation to the divine intellects. Also, prior to his being trained and experienced, man considers many things objectionable, [//0] regards them as abominable, and imagines that they are absurd. But once he is trained in the sciences and acquires practical wisdom through experience, he is freed from such beliefs: the things he had considered absurd prove to be necessary, and he would wonder about the opposite of what form erly used to cause him wonder. Similarly, it is possible that the man who is perfect in humanity may consider certain things objectionable and imagine that they are impossible, although in reality they are not. The reasons w hy these [dialectical theologians] held the opinion that religions must be considered valid are as follows. He who brought us revelation from God (praised be His name) is veracious and it is inadmissible that he may have lied. That he is such, may be attested in one or both of two ways: the miracles that he performs7 or that take place through him, or the

A L F A R A B i

: The Enumeration of the Sciences

29

testimonies to his veracity and his place with God (the M ighty and Majestic) of the veracious and trustworthy ones who preceded him. Once we validate his veracity in these ways, and [acknowledge] that it is inadmissible that he may have lied, there ought not to remain any room for intellecting, reflection, deliberation, or speculation with respect to the things he says. It is with such and similar arguments that these [dialectical theologians] thought they should defend religions. ( B ) Another group of them are of the opinion that they should defend religion by first presenting everything stated explicitly by the founder of the religion in the very words he used to express them. Then they look around for the various sensible, generally accepted, and intelligible things. Whenever they find that one of these, or something that follows from it as consequence, [ 11 1 ] supports, though remotely, anything in the religion, they use the former to defend the latter; and whenever it contradiets anything in the religion, and they are able to interpret, no matter how remote the interpretation may be, the words in which the founder of the religion has expressed it [that is, what is in the religion] in such a manner as to make it harmonious with that which contradicts it, they would proceed to interpret it in this manner. If this were not possible for them, but it were possible to argue against that contradicting thing, or to construe it in a manner that would make it accord with what is in the religion, they would do so. When, however, the testimony of the generally accepted opinions and of the objects of sense contradict each other—for instance, when the objects of sense or their consequences require one thing and the generally accepted opinions or their consequences require the contrary—they would look for the one whose testimony in support of what is in the religion is stronger and adopt it, and they would dismiss the other and argue against it. N ow , when it proves impossible to construe the religious text to accord with either of these [that is, the objects of sense or the generally accepted opinions], or to construe any of these to accord with the religion, or to dismiss or argue against any of the objects of sense, the generally accepted opinions, or the intelligibles that contradict a certain thing in the religion, they then hold the opinion that this thing [in the religion] should be defended by arguing that it is true on the ground that it is reported by him who could not have lied or erred. These [dialectical theologians] argue concerning this part of the religion as the first group argued concerning all of it. This, then, is the w ay in which these [dialectical theologians] thought they should defend religions. [112] A certain group of them8 hold the opinion that they should defend things of this sort [in their religion] (namely, the ones that they imagine to be absurd)9 by looking into all other religions and selecting the absurd things in them, so that when a follower of one of the other religions

30

Political Philosophy hi lsla?n

seeks to vilify something in theirs, they will confront him with the absurd things in the religions of others and thus ward off his assault upon their own. Another group of them, realizing that the arguments they advance in the defense of things of this sort are insufficient to prove their complete validity—so that their adversary’s silence would result from his accepting the validity of these things rather than from his inability to argue against them—were then forced to use certain things that would drive him to cease arguing against them,10 either from shame and his inability to express himself adequately, or from fear of being harmed. And still others, convinced of the validity of their own religion beyond any doubt, [//5] hold the opinion that they should defend it before others, show it to be fair and free it of suspicion, and ward off their adversaries from it, by using any chance thing. T h ey would not even disdain to use falsehood, sophistry, confounding, and ^contentiousness because they hold the opinion that only one of two men would oppose their religion. He is either an enemy, and it is admissible to use falsehood and sophistry to ward him off and to defeat him, as is the case in war (jihad) and combat. Or he is not an enemy, but one who, owing to weak intellect and poor judgment, is ignorant of the advantage he would derive from this religion; and it is admissible to use falsehood and sophistry to make man seek his well-being, just as is done in the case of women and children.

NOTES 1. Reading siyar (n.) for sunan (laws). 2. Reading siyar for sunan; cf. preceding note. 3. For a detailed description of this and other regimes, see Alfarabi, Political R egime, pp. 57 ff. (below, Selection 2). 4. Literally: “ experiential” (tajribiyyah). 5. Sec Alfarabi, Attainment of Happiness, pp. 17 ff. (below, Selection 3). 6. Reading yusammaw (n.) for yakünü (be).

7. Reading yotmaluha (n.) for ya‘qiltihã (intellects them). 8. From the manner in which Alfarabi introduces and concludes the description of (A ) and (B ), it appears that this and the following two subdivisions belong to group (B). 9. The phrase in parentheses appears to be an interpolation. 10. Adding bi-l-qannl (n.).

A lfarabi THE

POLITICAL

REGIME

Translated by Fauzi M. Najjar

In a famous letter to his translator Ibn Tibbon, Maimonides wrote: “ Do not busy yourself with books on the art of logic except for what was composed by the wise man Abü Nasr alFãrãbl [Alfarabi]. For, in general, everything that he composed—and particularly his book on the Principles of Beings—is all finer than fine flour. His arguments enable one to understand and comprehend, for he was very great in wisdom.” The work referred to by Maimonides is known under two titles: the Principles o f Beings (or the S ix P rin ciples ) and the Political R egim e. The first title seems to have been extracted from the opening passage of the work, which gives the impression that it is a treatise on the principles of the natural world and their respective ranks of order: (1) the First Cause, (2) the Second Causes, (3) the Active Intellect, (4) the soul, (5) form, and (6) matter. The entire

first part of the work consists of an account of these six principles and of how they constitute the bodies and their accidents. Only when one proceeds to the second part (the human and political part translated here) does one perceive that this account is an introduction to, and a preparation for, an account of political life and a classification of political regimes. Alfarabi wrote a parallel book, the Principles of the O pinions of the Citizens of the Virtuous C it y , which discusses the

same themes in similar terms. As the titles indicate, however, the Political R egim e is concerned more with regimes or constitutions while the V irtuous C ity is concerned more with the opinions of the citizens in these regimes. The Political R egim e is frequently cited by Muslim authors as one of the fundamental works of Alfarabi. It was translated into Hebrew in the middle

32

P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y in I s l a m

o f t h e t h ir t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e f o l l o w i n g t r a n s la t io n

is b a s e d

o n a c r it ic a l

e d i t io n o f t h e A r a b ic t e x t t h a t is b e i n g p rep a red b y F au zi M . N a jja r . T h e p a g e n u m b e r s in s e r t e d in t h e tr a n s ia -

t i o n r e f e r t o t h e H y d e r a b a d t e x t : a lS iy ã sã t a l-m a d a m y y a h ( 1 3 4 6 A . H . ) . T h i s e d i t io n is i n c o m p l e t e , a n d s o a r e a ll t h e m a n u s c r ip t s , w i t h t h e p o s s ib le e x c e p t i o n o f F e y z u l la h

1279.

to the species that cannot accomplish their necessary affairs or achieve their best state, except through the association of many groups of them in a single dwelling-place. Some human societies are large, others are of a medium size, still others are small. The large societies consist of many nations that associate and cooperate with one another; the medium ones consist of a nation; the small are the ones embraced by the city. These three are the perfect societies. Hence the city represents the first degree of perfection. Associations in villages, quarters, streets, and households, on the other hand, are the imperfect associations. O f these the least perfect is the household association, which is a part of the association in the street, the latter being a part of the association in the quarter, and this in turn a part of the political association. Associations in quarters and villages are both for the sake of the city; they differ, however, in that the quarters are parts of the city while the villages only serve it. [40] The political [or civic] society is a part of the nation, and the nation is divided into cities. The absolutely perfect human societies are divided into nations. A nation is differentiated from another by two natural things—natural make-up and natural character—and by something that is composite (it is conventional but has a basis in natural things), which is language—I mean the idiom through which men express themselves. As a result some nations are large and others are small. The primary natural cause of the differences between nations in these matters consists of a variety of things. One of them is the difference in the parts of the celestial bodies that face them, namely, the first [that is, the outermost] sphere and the sphere of the fixed stars, then the difference in the positions of the inclined spheres from the various parts of the earth and the variation in their proximity and remoteness. From this follows the difference between the parts of the earth that are the nations’ dwelling-places; for from the outset, this difference results from the difference in the parts of the first sphere that face them, from the difference in the fixed stars that face them, and from the difference in the positions of the inclined spheres with respect to them. From the difference between the parts of the earth follows the difference in the vapors rising from the earth; since each vapor rises from a certain soil, it is akin to that soil. From the difference in the vapors follows the difference in the air and water, inasmuch as the water of each country is generated from M

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its underground vapors, and the air of each country is mixed with the vapors that w ork their w ay up to it from the soil. In the same manner, the difference in the air and water [of each country] follows from the difference [in the parts] of the fixed stars and of the first sphere that face it, and from the difference in the positions of the inclined spheres. From all these differences, in turn, follows the difference, in the plants and in the species of irrational animals, [4 1 ] as a result of which nations have different diets. From the difference in their diets follows the difference in the materials and crops that go into the composition of the individuals who succeed the ones who die. From this, in turn, follows the difference in the natural make-up and natural character. Moreover, the difference in the parts of the heaven that face them causes further differences in their make-up and character, in a different manner from the one mentioned above. The difference in the air, too, causes differences in make-up and character in a different manner from the one mentioned above. Furthermore, out of the cooperation and combination of these differences there develop different mixtures that contribute to differences in the make-up and character of the nations. It is in this manner and direction that natural things fit together, are connected with each other, and occupy their respective ranks; and this is the extent to which the celestial bodies contribute to their perfection. The remaining perfections are not given by the celestial bodies but by the Active Intellect;1 and the Active Intellect gives the remaining perfections to no other species but man. In giving [these perfections] to man, the Active Intellect follows a course similar to that followed by the celestial bodies. First, it gives him a faculty and a principle with which, of his own accord, he seeks, or is able to seek, the remaining perfections. That principle consists of the primary knowledge and the first intelligibles present in the rational part of the soul; but it gives him this kind of knowledge and those intelligibles only after man (a) first develops the sensitive part of the soul and the appetitive part, which gives rise to the desire and aversion that adhere to the sensitive part. [42] (The instruments of the last two faculties develop from the parts of the body.) They, in turn, give rise to the will. For, at first, the will is nothing but a desire that follows from a sensation; and desire takes place through the appetitive part of the soul, and sensation through the sensitive, (b) Next, there has to develop the imaginative part of the soul and the desire that adheres to it. Hence a second will develops after the first. This will is a desire that follows from [an act of the] imagination. A fter these two wills develop, it becomes possible for the primary knowledge that emanates from the Active Intellect to the rational part to take place. A t this point a third kind of will develops in man—the desire that follows from intellecting—which is specifically called “ choice.” This choice pertains specifically to man, exclu­

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sive o f all o th e r anim als. B y v irtu e o f it, m an is able to do e ith e r w h a t it co m m en d ab le o r blam able, n o b le o r base; and because o f it th e re is re w a rd and p u n ish m en t. ( T h e first tw o w ills, on th e o th e r hand, can exist in th e irratio n al anim als to o .) W h e n this w ill develops in m an, w ith it he is able to seek o r n o t to seek happiness, and to do w h a t is g o o d o r evil, noble o r base, in so far as«, this lies in his p o w e r. H ap p in ess is th e g o o d w ith o u t qualification. E v e ry th in g useful fo r the ach iev em en t o f happiness o r b y w h ic h it is attain ed , is g o o d to o , n o t fo r its o w n sake, h o w ev er, b u t because it is useful w ith re sp e c t to happiness; and e v e ry th in g th a t o b stru c ts th e w a y to happiness in a n y fashion is u n q u alified evil. T h e g o o d th a t is useful fo r th e ach iev em en t o f happiness m ay be so m eth in g th a t exists b y n a tu re o r th a t com es in to b ein g b y th e w ill, and th e evil th a t o b stru c ts th e w a y to happiness m ay be so m e th in g th a t exists b y n a tu re o r th a t com es in to bein g b y th e will. T h a t o f it w h ic h is b y n a tu re is given b y th e celestial bodies, b u t n o t because th e y in te n d to assist th e A ctiv e In te lle c t to w a rd its p u rp o se o r [45] to h am p er it. F o r w h e n th e celestial bodies give so m eth in g th a t c o n trib u te s to th e p u rp o se o f th e A ctiv e In tellect, th e y do n o t do so w ith th e in te n tio n o f assisting th e A c tiv e In te lle c t; n e ith e r are th e n atu ra l th in g s th a t o b s tru c t th e w a y to its p u rp o se in ten d ed b y th e celestial bodies to h am p er th e A ctive In tellect. R ath er, it is in h e re n t in th e substance o f th e celestial bodies to give all th a t it is in th e n a tu re o f m a tte r to receive, w ith o u t c o n c e rn in g them selves w ith w h e th e r it c o n trib u te s to, o r harm s, the p u rp o se o f th e A ctiv e In tellect. T h e re fo re it is possible th a t th e sum to ta l o f w h a t is p ro d u c e d b y th e celestial bodies sh o u ld com prise at tim es th in g s th a t are fav o rab le, and at o th e r tim es th in g s th a t are u n fav o rab le, to th e p u rp o se o f th e A ctiv e In tellect. A s to v o lu n ta ry g o o d and evil, w h ic h are th e n oble and th e base resp ectiv ely , th e y have th e ir o rig in specifically in m an. N o w th e re is o n ly one w a y in w h ich th e v o lu n ta ry goo d can com e in to being. T h a t is because th e facu lties o f th e h u m an soul are five: the th e o re tic a l-ra tio n a l, th e p ractical-ra tio n al, th e ap p etitiv e, th e im aginative, and th e sensitive. H app in ess, w h ic h o n ly m an can k n o w and perceive, is k n o w n b y th e th e o re tic a l-ra tio n a l fa c u lty and b y no n e o f th e rem ain in g faculties. M an k n o w s it w h e n he m akes use o f th e first p rinciples and th e p rim a ry k n o w le d g e given to him b y th e A ctiv e In tellect. W h e n he k n o w s happiness, desires it b y th e ap p etitiv e fa c u lty , deliberates b y the p ra c tic a lratio n al fa c u lty u p o n w h a t he o u g h t to do in o rd e r to a tta in it, uses th e in stru m en ts o f th e ap p etitiv e fa c u lty to do the actions he has d isco v ered b y d elib eratio n , and his im aginative and sensitive faculties assist and o b ey th e ratio n al and aid it in aro u sin g m an to do th e actions w ith w h ic h he attain s happiness, th en e v e ry th in g th a t orig in ates fro m m an w ill be good. It is o n ly in this w ay th a t the v o lu n ta ry g o o d com es into being. As to v o lu n ta ry evil, it o rig in ates in th e m a n n er th a t I shall state. N e ith e r th e

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imaginative nor the appetitive faculty perceives [44] happiness. N ot even the rational faculty perceives happiness under all conditions. The rational faculty perceives happiness only when it strives to apprehend it. N ow there are many things that man can imagine that they ought to be the aim and end of life, such as the pleasant and the useful, honor, and the like. Whenever man neglects to perfect his theoretical-rational part, fails to perceive happiness and hasten toward it, holds something other than happiness—what is useful, what is pleasant, domination, what is honorable, and the like—as an end toward which he aims in his life, desires it with the appetitive faculty, uses the practical-rational faculty to deliberate in the discovery of what enables him to attain this end, uses the instruments of the appetitive faculty to do the things he has discovered, and is assisted in this by the imaginative and the sensitive faculties, then everything that originates from him is evil. Similarly, when man apprehends and knows happiness but does not make it the aim and the end of his life, has no desire or has only a feeble desire for it, makes something other than happiness the end that he desires in his life, and uses all his faculties to attain that end, then everything that originates from him is evil. Since what is intended by man’s existence is that he attain happiness, which is the ultimate perfection that remains to be given to the possible2 beings capable of receiving it, it is necessary to state the manner in which man can reach this happiness. Man can reach happiness only when the Active Intellect first givés the first intelligibles, which constitute the primary knowledge. However, not every man is equipped by natural disposition to receive the first intelligibles, because individual human beings are made by nature with unequal powers and different preparations. Some of them are not prepared by nature to receive any of [43‫]־‬ the first intelligibles; others—for instance, the insane—receive them, but not as they really are; and still others receive them as they really are. The last are the ones with sound human natural dispositions; only these, and not the others, are capable of attaining happiness. #

#

#

Since what is intended by man’s existence is that he attain supreme happiness, he—[48] in order to achieve it—needs to know what happiness is, make it his end, and hold it before his eyes. Then, after that, he needs to know the things he ought to do in order to attain happiness, and then do these actions. In view of what has been said about the differences in the natural dispositions of individual men, not everyone is disposed to know happiness on his own, or the things that he ought to do, but needs a teacher and a guide for this purpose. Some men need little guidance, others need a great deal of it. In addition, even when a man is guided to these two [that is, happiness and the actions leading to it], he will not,

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in th e absence o f an ex tern al stim ulus and so m e th in g to arouse him , n ecessarily do w h a t he has been ta u g h t and g u id e d to . T h is is h o w m o st m en are. T h e re fo re th e y need som eone to m ake all this k n o w n to th e m and to aro u se th e m to do it. Besides, it is n o t in th e p o w e r o f e v e ry m an to g u id e o th e rs n o r in th e p o w e r o f e v e ry m an to in d u c e 'o th e rs to do these things. H e w h o does n o t possess th e p o w e r to arouse a n o th e r to do a n y th in g w h a te v e r, n o r to em p lo y him in it, b u t o n ly has th e p o w e r alw ays to do w h a t he has b een g u id ed to, is n ev er a ru le r in a n y th in g at all; he is alw ays ru le d in e v e ry th in g . H e w h o has th e p o w e r to g u id e a n o th e r to a ce rta in th in g , to in d u c e him to do it, and to e m p lo y him in it, is in th a t th in g a ru le r o v er th e one w h o c a n n o t do it on his o w n. A n d he w h o c a n n o t d isco v er so m e th in g on his o w n , b u t does it w h e n he is g u id ed to it and in stru c te d in it, and has th e p o w e r to arouse a n o th e r to do, and to em p lo y him in, th a t th in g in w h ic h he him self has been in stru c te d afrd to w h ic h he has b een g u id ed , is a ru le r o v e r one m an and is ru le d b y a n o th e r. T h u s th e ru le r m a y be a su p rem e o r a su b o rd in a te ru le r. T h e su b o rd in a te ru le r is one w h o is s u b je c t to one m an [49] and in tu r n rules o v er an o th er. T h e se tw o ty p e s o f ru le can be in one k in d [o f a rt], su ch as h u sb a n d ry , trad e , o r m edicine, and can p e rta in to all kinds o f hu m an [arts]. T h e su p rem e ru le r w ith o u t q u alification is he w h o does n o t need a n y o n e to ru le him in a n y th in g w h a te v e r, b u t has a c tu a lly acq u ire d th e sciences and e v e ry k in d o f k n o w led g e, and has n o need o f a m an to g u id e him in a n y th in g . H e is able to c o m p re h e n d w ell each one o f th e p a rtic u la r th in g s th a t he o u g h t to do. H e is able to g u id e w ell all o th e rs to e v e ry th in g in w h ic h he in stru c ts th em , to em p lo y all th o se w h o do an y o f th e acts fo r w h ic h th e y are eq u ip p ed , and to d eterm in e, define, and d ire c t these acts to w a rd happiness. T h is is fo u n d o n ly in th e one w h o possesses g re a t and su p e rio r n a tu ra l dispositions, w h e n his soul is in u n io n w ith th e A c tiv e In tellect. H e can o n ly attain this [u n io n w ith th e A c tiv e In te lle c t] b y first a c q u irin g th e passive in tellect, and th e n th e in te lle c t called th e acq u ired ; fo r, as it is stated in O n t h e S o u l ,3 u n io n w ith th e A c tiv e In te lle c t results fro m possessing th e acq u ire d in tellect. T h is m an is th e tru e p rin c e a c c o rd in g to th e ancients; he is th e one o f w h o m it o u g h t to be said th a t he receives rev elatio n . F o r m an receives rev elatio n o n ly w h e n he attains this ran k , th a t is, w h e n th e re is no lo n g e r an in te rm e d ia ry b e tw e e n him and th e A c tiv e In te lle c t; fo r th e passive in te lle c t is like m a tte r an d su b stra tu m to th e acq u ire d in tellect, and th e la tte r is like m a tte r and su b stra tu m to th e A c tiv e In tellect. I t is th e n th a t th e p o w e r th a t enables m an to u n d e rsta n d h o w to define th in g s and actions and h o w to d ire c t th em to w a rd happiness, em anates fro m th e A ctiv e In te lle c t to th e passive in tellect, [ jo ] T h is em an atio n th a t p ro ceeds fro m th e A c tiv e In te lle c t to th e passive th ro u g h th e m e d iatio n o f th e acq u ired in tellect, is rev elatio n . N o w because th e A c tiv e In te lle c t

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emanates from the being of the First Cause, it can for this reason be said that it is the First Cause that brings about revelation to this man through the mediation of the Active Intellect. The rule of this man is the supreme rule; all other human rulcrships are inferior to it and are derived from it. Such is his rank. The men who are governed by the rule of this ruler are the virtuous, good, and happy men. If they form a nation, then that is the virtuous nation; if they are associated in a single dwelling-place, then the dwellingplace that brings together all those subject to such a rule is the virtuous city; and if they arc not associated together in a single dwelling-place, but live in separate dwelling-places whose inhabitants are governed by rulerships other than this one, then these are virtuous men who are strangers in those dwelling-places. T h ey happen to live separately either because no city happens to exist as yet in which they can be associated, or because they were [associated] in a city, but as a result of certain disasters—such as an enemy attack, pestilence, failure of crops, and so forth— they were forced to separate. If at any one time a group of these princes happens to reside in a single city, in a single nation, or in many nations, then this group is as it were a single prince because they agree in their endeavors, purposes, opinions, and ways of life. If they follow one another in time, their souls will form as it were a single soul, the one who suececds will be following the w ay of life of his predecessors, and the living will be following in the w ay of the ones who have died. Just as it is permissible for each of them to change a Law lie had legislated at one time [y/] for another if he deems it better to do so, similarly it is permissible for the living who succeeds the one who died to change what the latter had legislated, for the one who died also would have changed it had he been able to observe the new conditions. But if it does not happen that a man exists with these qualifications, then one will have to adopt the Laws prescribed by the earlier ones, write them down, preserve them, and govern the city by them. The ruler who governs the city according to the written Laws received from the past imams will be the prince of the law ( sunnah). As every citizen of the city docs what is entrusted to him—either by knowing it on his own or by being guided and induced to it by the ruler—he acquires, by these actions, the good states of the soul, just as by continued practice in good writing a man acquires excellence in the art of writing, which is a state of the soul; and the more he continues practicing, the more firm his excellence in writing becomes, the greater the pleasure he takes in the resulting state, and the stronger the delight of his soul in that state. Similarlv, the actions that arc determined and directed toward happiness strengthen the part of the soul that is naturally equipped for happiness, and actualize and perfect it—to the extent that the power resulting from the perfection achieved by it enables it to dispense with

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m a tte r; h av in g b een th u s freed fro m m a tte r, it is n o t d e stro y e d b y th e d e s tru c tio n o f m a tte r, since it is no lo n g e r in need o f m a tte r in o rd e r to exercise its p o w e r o r to exist—at w h ic h tim e it attain s happiness. I t is ev id e n t th a t th e kin d s o f happiness attain ed b y th e citizens o f th e c ity d iffer in q u a n tity and q u a lity as^a re su lt o f th e d ifferen c e in th e p e rfe c tions th e y acq u ire th ro u g h p olitical activities. A c c o rd in g ly , [52] th e pleasures th e y attain v a ry in excellence. W h e n th e soul becom es sep arated fro m m a tte r and in c o rp o re a l, it is no lo n g e r su b je c t to a n y o f th e accid en ts th a t are atta c h e d to bodies as such; th e re fo re it c a n n o t be said o f it th a t it m oves o r th a t it rests. R a th e r one o u g h t th e n to a p p ly to it th e statem en ts a p p ro p ria te to w h a t is in c o rp o re a l. E v e ry o n e o f th e th in g s a d h e rin g to th e h u m an soul and th a t fits th e d esc rip tio n o f th e b o d y as b o d y , o u g h t to b e co n sid ered as one o f th e n eg ativ e a ttrib u te s o f th e sep arate soul. T h e c o m p re h en sio n and c o n c e p tio n o f th e states o f th e sep arate soul are ex tre m e ly difficult and at v arian ce w ith co m m o n usage, ju st as it is difficult to co n ceiv e th e substances th a t are n o t bodies o r in bodies. A s one g ro u p o f th em passes aw ay , an d th e ir bodies are d e stro y e d , th e ir souls have ach iev ed salvation and happiness, and th e y are su cceed ed b y o th e r m en w h o assum e th e ir positions in th e c ity and p e rfo rm th e ir actio n s, th e souls o f th e la tte r w ill also achieve salvation. A s th e ir bodies are d e stro y e d , th e y join th e ra n k o f th e fo rm e r g ro u p th a t had passed aw ay , th e y w ill be to g e th e r w ith th e m in th e w a y th a t in c o rp o re a l th in g s are to g e th e r, and th e k in d re d souls w ith in each g ro u p w ill b e in a state o f u n io n w ith one an o th er. T h e m o re th e k in d re d separate souls increase in n u m b e r and u n ite w ith one a n o th e r, th e g re a te r th e pleasure fe lt b y each soul; and th e m o re th e y are jo ined b y those w h o com e a fte r th em , th e g re a te r th e pleasure fe lt b y each o f th e la tte r th ro u g h th e ir e n c o u n te r w ith th e fo rm e r as w ell as th e p leasure fe lt b y th e fo rm e r th ro u g h th e ir u n io n w ith th e la tter. F o r each soul w ill th e n b e in te lle c ting, in ad d itio n to itself, m a n y o th e r souls th a t are o f th e sam e k in d ; and it w ill be in te lle c tin g m o re souls as th e ones th a t had passed a w a y are jo in ed b y th e ones su cceed in g them . H e n c e th e pleasure fe lt b y th e v e ry an c ie n t ones w ill c o n tin u e to increase ind efin itelv•‫ ׳‬. S u ch is th e state o f e v e ry g ro u p o f them . T h is, th e n , is tru e and su p rem e happiness, w h ic h is th e p u rp o se o f th e A c tiv e In tellect. W h e n th e activities o f th e citizens o f a c ity are n o t d ire c te d to w a rd happiness, th e y lead th e m to acq u ire [ y j] bad states o f th e soul—ju st as w h e n th e activities o f [th e a rt of] w ritin g are b a d ly p e rfo rm e d , th e y p ro d u c e bad w ritin g , and sim ilarly, w h e n th e activities o f a n y a rt are b a d ly p e rfo rm e d , th e y p ro d u c e in th e soul bad states, c o rre sp o n d in g to th e [b a d ly p e rfo rm e d ] art. As a re su lt th e ir souls b eco m e sick. T h e re fo re th e y tak e pleasure in th e states th a t th e y acq u ire th ro u g h th e ir activities. J u s t as because o f th e ir c o rru p t sense [o f ta ste ], th o se w ith b o d ily sick-

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ness—for example, the ones affected by fever—take pleasure in bitter things and find them sweet, and suffer pain from sweet things, which seem bitter to their palates; similarly, because of their corrupt imagination, those who are sick in their souls take pleasure in the bad states [of the soul]. And just as there are among the sick those who do not feel their malady and those who even think that they arc healthy, and such sick men do not at all listen to the advice of a physician; similarly, the sick in their souls who do not feel their sickness and even think that they are virtuous and have sound souls, do not listen at all to the words of a guide, a teacher, or a reformer. The souls of such individuals remain chained to matter and do not reach that perfection by which they can separate from matter, so that when the matter ceases to exist they too will cease to exist. The ranks of order among the citizens of the city, as regards ruling and serving, vary in excellence according to their natural dispositions and according to the habits of character they have formed. The supreme ruler is the one who orders the various groups and every individual in each group, in the place they merit—that is, gives each a subservient or a ruling rank of order. Therefore, there will be certain ranks of order that are close to his own, others slightly further away, and still others that are far away from it. Such will be the ruling ranks of order: beginning with the highest ruling rank of order, they will descend gradually until they become subservient ranks of order devoid of any element of ruling and below which there is no other rank of order. A fter having ordered these ranks, if the supreme ruler wishes to issue a command about a certain matter that [54] he wishes to enjoin the citizens of the city or a certain group among them to do, and to arouse them toward it, lie intimates this to the ranks closest to him, these will hand it on to their subordinates, and so forth, until it reaches down to those assigned to execute that matter. The parts of the city will thus be linked and fitted together, and ordered by giving precedence to some over the others. Thus the city becomes similar to the natural beings; the ranks of order in it similar to the ranks of order of the beings, which begin with the First and terminate in prime matter and the elements; and the w ay they are linked and fitted together will be similar to the w ay the beings are linked and fitted together. The prince of the city will be like the First Cause, which is the cause for the existence of all the other beings. Then the ranks of order of the beings gradually keep descending, each one of them being both ruler and ruled, until they reach down to those possible beings—that is, prime matter and the elements—that possess no ruling element whatever, but arc subservient and always exist for the sake of others. The achievement of happiness takes place only through the disappearance of evils—not only the voluntary but also the natural ones—from the

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cities and nations, and w h e n these acq u ire all th e goods, b o th th e n a tu ra l and th e v o lu n ta ry . T h e fu n c tio n o f th e c ity ’s g o v e rn o r—th a t is, th e p rin c e —is to m anage th e cities in such a w a y th a t all th e c i ty ’s p arts b eco m e linked and fitted to g e th e r, and so o rd e re d to enable th e citizens to c o o p e ra te to elim inate th e evils and acq u ire th e goods. H e sh o u ld in q u ire in to e v e ry th in g given b y th e celestial bodies. T h o se o f th e m th a t are in a n y w a y h elp fu l and suitable, o r in a n y w a y useful, in th e ach iev em en t o f happiness, he sh o u ld m ain tain and em phasize; [y y ] th o se o f th e m th a t are h arm fu l he should t r y to tu rn in to useful th in g s; and those o f th e m th a t c a n n o t be tu rn e d in to useful th in g s he sh o u ld d e stro y o r re d u c e in p o w e r. In general, he should seek to d e s tro y all th e evils and b rin g in to existence all th e goods. E a c h one o f th e citizens o f th e v irtu o u s c ity is re q u ire d to k n o w th e h ig h est p rin cip les o f th e beings and th e ir ran k s o f o rd e r, happiness, th e su p rem e ru lersh ip o f th e v irtu o u s c ity , and th e ru lin g ran k s o f o rd e r in it; th en , a fte r th a t, th e specified actio n s th a t, w h e n p e rfo rm e d , lead to th e a tta in m e n t o f happiness. T h e se actio n s are n o t m e re ly to be k n o w n ; th e y sh o u ld be d o n e and th e citizens o f th e c ity sh o u ld be d ire c te d to do th em . T h e p rin cip les o f th e beings, th e ir ran k s o f o rd e r, happiness, and th e ru lersh ip o f th e v irtu o u s cities, are e ith e r co g n ized and in te lle c te d b y m an, o r he im agines th em . T o cog n ize th e m is to have th e ir essences, as th e y really are, im p rin te d in m a n ’s soul. T o im agine th e m is to have im p rin te d in m a n ’s soul th e ir im ages, rep re se n ta tio n s o f th em , o r m a tte rs th a t are im itatio n s o f th em . T h is is analogous to w h a t takes place w ith reg ard to visible o b jects, fo r instance, m an. W e see him him self, w e see a re p re se n ta tio n o f him , w e see his im age reflected in w a te r and o th e r re fle c tin g substances, and w e see th e im age o f a re p re se n ta tio n o f him reflected in w a te r and in o th e r reflec tin g substances. O u r seeing him h im self is like th e in te lle c t’s c o g n itio n o f th e p rin cip les o f th e beings, o f happiness, and so fo rth ; w h ile o u r seeing th e reflectio n o f m an in w a te r and o u r seeing a re p re se n ta tio n o f him is like im ag in atio n , fo r o u r seeing a re p re se n ta tio n o f him o r o u r seeing his reflectio n in a m irro r is seeing th a t w h ic h is an im ita tio n o f him . S im ilarly, w h e n w e im agine th o se th in g s, w e are in fa c t h av in g a c o g n itio n o f m a tters th a t are im itatio n s o f th e m ra th e r th a n a c o g n itio n o f th e m them selves. M o st m en, e ith e r b y n a tu re o r b y habit, are unab le to c o m p re h e n d and co g n ize those th in g s; these are th e m en f o r w h o m one o u g h t to re p re se n t th e m a n n er in w h ic h th e p rin cip les o f th e beings, th e ir ran k s o f o rd e r, th e A c tiv e In tellect, an d th e su prem e ru lersh ip , exist th ro u g h th in g s th a t are im itatio n s o f th em . N o w w hile th e m eanings and essences [ 5 6 ] o f those th in g s are one and im m u tab le, th e m a tte rs b y w h ic h th e y are im ita ted are m a n y and varied. S om e im itate th e m m o re closely, w h ile o th e rs d o so o n ly re m o te ly —ju st as is th e case w ith visible o b jects: fo r

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the image of man that is seen reflected in water is closer to the true man than the image of a representation of man that is seen reflected in water. Therefore, it is possible to imitate these things for each group and each nation, using matters that are different in each case. Consequently, there may be a number of virtuous nations and virtuous cities whose religions are different, even though they all pursue the very same kind of happiness. For religion is but the impressions of these things or the impressions of their images, imprinted in the soul. Because it is difficult for the multitude to comprehend these things themselves as they are, the attempt was made to teach them these things in other ways, which are the ways of imitation. Hence these things are imitated for each group or nation through the matters that are best known to them; and it may very well be that what is best known to the one may not be the best known to the other. Most men who strive for happiness, follow after an imagined, not a cognized, form of happiness. Similarly, most men accept such principles as are accepted and followed, and are magnified and considered majestic, in the form of images, not of cognitions. N ow the ones who follow after happiness as they cognize it and accept the principles as they cognize them, are the wise men. And the ones in whose souls these things are found in the form of images, and who accept them and follow after them as such, are the believers. The imitations of those things differ in excellence: some o f them are better and more perfect imaginative representations, while others are less perfect; some arc closer to, others arc more removed from, the truth. In some the points of contention are few or unnoticcablc, or it is difficult to contend against them, while in others the points [57] of contention are many or easy to detect, or it is easy to contend against them and to refute them. It is also possible that those things be presented to the imagination of men by means of various matters, but that, despite their variety, these matters bear a certain relation to each other: that is, there are certain matters that are the imitations of those things, a second set that are the imitations of these matters, and a third set that are the imitations of the second. Finally, the various matters that are the imitations of those things —that is, of the principles of the beings and of happiness—may be on the same level as imitations. N o w if they are of equal excellence as regards imitation, or with respect to having only a few or unnoticcablc points of contention, then one can use all or any one of them indiffercntly. But if they are not of equal excellence, one should choose the ones that arc the most perfect imitations and that cither are completely free of points of contention or in which the points of contention are few or unnoticcablc; next, those that arc closer to the truth; and discard all other imitations. The virtuous city is the opposite of (A) the ignorant city, (B) the

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im m o ral c ity , and (C ) th e e rrin g c ity . ( D ) T h e n th e re are th e W e e d s in th e v irtu o u s city . ( T h e p o sitio n o f th e W e e d s in th e cities is like th a t o f th e d arn el am o n g th e w h eat, th e th o rn s g ro w in g a m o n g th e c ro p , o r th e o th e r grass th a t is useless o r even h a rm fu l to th e c ro p o r p lan ts.) F in ally , th e re are th e m en w h o are bestial b y n atu re . B u t th e bestial b y n a tu re are n e ith e r p o litical beingV n o r co u ld th e y ever fo rm a po litical association. In stead , som e o f th em are like g reg ario u s beasts and o th e rs are like w ild beasts, and o f th e la tte r som e are like rav en o u s beasts. T h e re fo re som e o f th e m live isolated in th e w ilderness, o th e rs live th e re to g e th e r in d e p ra v ity like w ild beasts, and still o th ers live near th e cities. Som e eat o n ly ra w m eats, o th e rs graze o n w ild v eg etatio n , and still o th e rs p re y on th e ir victim s like [j‫־‬#] w ild beasts. T h e se are to be fo u n d in th e ex trem ities o f th e in h ab ited earth , e ith e r in th e fa r n o rth o r in th e fa r so u th . T h e y m u st be tre a te d like anim als. T h o se o f th e m th a t are g re g ario u s and are in som e w a y useful to th e cities, shoúld be spared, enslaved, and e m p lo y ed like beasts o f b u rd en . T h o se o f th e m fro m w h o m no use can be d eriv e d o r w h o are h arm fu l, should be tre a te d as one tre a ts all o th e r h arm fu l anim als. T h e sam e applies to those ch ild ren o f th e citizens o f th e cities w h o tu r n o u t to have a bestial n atu re.

[A

.

THE

IGNORANT

CITIES]

A s fo r th e citizens o f th e ig n o ra n t cities, th e y are p o litical beings. T h e ir cities and th e ir p o litical associations are o f m a n y kinds, w h ic h co m p rise (i) indispensable associations, (ii) th e association o f vile m en in th e vile cities, (iii) th e association o f base m en in th e base cities, (iv ) tim o c ra tic association in th e tim o c ra tic c ity , (v ) desp o tic association in th e despotic cities, (v i) free association in th e d e m o c ra tic c ity and th e c ity o f th e free.

[Í.

THE

IN D I S P E N S A B L E

C IT Y ]

T h e indispensable c ity o r th e indispensable association is th a t w h ic h leads to c o o p e ra tio n to acq u ire th e b are necessities fo r th e subsistence and th e sa fe g u a rd in g o f th e b o d y . T h e re are m a n y w ay s to acq u ire these th in g s, such as h u sb a n d ry , grazin g , h u n tin g , ro b b e ry , and so fo rth . B oth h u n tin g and ro b b e ry are p ra c tic e d e ith e r b y stealth o r o p en ly . T h e r e are c e rta in indispensable cities th a t possess all th e arts th a t lead to th e acq u isitio n o f th e b are necessities. In o th e rs th e bare necessities are o b ta in e d th ro u g h one a rt o n ly , su ch as h u sb a n d ry alone o r a n y o th e r art. T h e citizens o f this c ity re g a rd th e b est m an to be th e one w h o is m o st exc e lle n t in skill, m an ag em en t, and acco m p lish m en t in o b ta in in g th e b are

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necessities through the ways of acquisition that they employ. Their ruler is he who can govern well and is skillful in [jy ] employing them to acquire the indispensable things, who can govern them well so as to preserve these things for them, or who generously provides them with these things from his own possessions.

[ ii .

THE

VILE

CITY]

The vile citv or the association of the vile citizens is that whose members (a) cooperate to acquire wealth and prosperity, the excessive possession of indispensable things or their equivalent in coin and in money,4 and their accumulation beyond the need for them and for no other reason than the love and covetousness of wealth; and (/;) avoid spending any of it except on what is necessary for bodily subsistence. This they do cither by pursuing all the modes of acquisition or else such modes as are available in that country. T h ey regard the best men to be the wealthicst and the most skillful in the acquisition of wealth. Their ruler is the man who is able to manage them well in what leads them to acquire wealth and always to remain wealthy. Wealth is obtained through all the methods employed to obtain the bare necessities, that is, husbandry, grazing, hunting, and robbery; and also through voluntary transactions like commerce, lease, and so forth. w/

[ iii .

THE

BASE

C IT Y ]

The base city or the base association is that in which the citizens coopcrate to enjoy sensual pleasures or imaginary pleasures (play and amusement) or both. T h ey enjoy the pleasures of food, drink, and copulation, and strive after what is most pleasant of these, in the pursuit of pleasure alone, rather than what sustains, or is in any w ay useful to, the body; and they do the same as regards play and amusement. This city is the one regarded by the citizens of the ignorant city as the happy and admirable city; for they can attain the goal of this city only after having acquired the bare necessities and acquired wealth, and only by means of much expenditure. T h ey regard whoever possesses more resources for play and the pleasures as the best, the happiest, and the most enviable man.

[ iV .

THE

TIMOCRATIC

C IT Y ]

The timocratic city or the timocratic association is that in which the citizens cooperate with a view to be [60] honored in speech and deed:

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th a t is, to be h o n o re d e ith e r b y th e citizens o f o th e r cities o r b y one a n o th e r. T h e ir h o n o rin g o f one a n o th e r consists in th e exchange o f e ith e r equal o r u n eq u al h o n o rs. T h e exchange o f equal h o n o rs takes place th ro u g h som eone b e sto w in g on som eone else a ce rta in k in d o f h o n o r at a c e rta in tim e so th a t th e la tte r m ay at a n o th e r tim e re tu rn th e sam e k in d o f h o n o r o r a n o th e r k in d õ f h o n o r th a t, in th e ir eyes, is o f equal w o rth . T h e ex ch an g e o f un eq u al h o n o rs takes place th ro u g h som eone b e sto w in g a ce rta in k in d o f h o n o r on som eone else, w ith th e la tte r b esto w in g on th e fo rm e r a n o th e r k in d o f h o n o r o f g re a te r w o rth th an th e first. In e v e ry case, m o re o v e r, this [exch an g e o f u n eq u al h o n o rs] am o n g th e m takes place o n th e basis o f m e rit (o n e o f tw o m en m erits an h o n o r o f a c e rta in w o rth , w h ile th e o th e r m erits a g re a te r o n e ), d e p e n d in g on w h a t th e y co n sid er m e rit to be. In th e eyes o f th e citizens o f th e ig n o ra n t c ity , m erits are n o t based on v irtu e, b u t ( a ) on w ealth , o r ( b ) on possessing th e m eans o f pleasure and p la y and on o b ta in in g th e m o st o f b o th , o r ( c ) o n o b ta in in g m o st o f th e necessities o f life (w h e n m an is serv ed and is w ell p ro v id e d w ith all th e necessities he n e e d s), o r ( d ) on m a n ’s b ein g useful, th a t is, d o in g g o o d to o th e rs w ith re sp e c t to these th re e th in g s, ( e ) T h e re is one m o re th in g th a t is w ell liked b y m o st of th e citizen s o f th e ig n o ra n t cities, th a t is, d o m in atio n . F o r w h o e v e r achieves it is envied b y m o st o f th e m . T h e re fo re this, to o , m ust be re g a rd e d as one o f th e m erits in th e ig n o ra n t cities. F o r, in th e ir eyes, th e h ig h est m a tte r fo r w h ic h a m an m u st be h o n o re d is his fam e in ach iev in g d o m in atio n [th a t is, su p e rio rity ] in one, tw o , o r m a n y th in g s; n o t b ein g d o m in ated , because he him self is stro n g , because his su p p o rte rs are e ith e r n u m e ro u s o r stro n g , [ 6 1 ] o r because o f b o th ; and th a t he be im m u n e to b ein g h arm ed b y o th ers, w hile able to harm o th ers at w ill. F o r, in th e ir eyes, this is a state o f fe lic ity fo r w h ic h a m an m erits h o n o r; h ence th e b e tte r he is in this resp ect, th e m o re he is h o n o red . O r th e m an [w h o m th e y h o n o r] possesses, in th e ir eyes, d istin g u ish ed ancestors. B u t an cestors are d istin g u ish ed because o f th e th in g s m e n tio n ed above: nam ely, o n e ’s fath e rs and g ra n d fa th e rs w e re e ith e r w e a lth y , a b u n d a n tly fa v o re d w ith pleasure and th e m eans to it, had d o m in atio n [th a t is, w e re su p e rio r] in a n u m b e r o f things, w e re useful to o th e rs—be th e y a g ro u p o r th e citizens o f a c ity —w ith re sp e c t to these things, or w ere fav o red w ith th e in stru m en ts o f these th in g s, such as n o b ility , en d u ra n c e , o r th e c o n te m p t o f d eath , all o f w h ic h are in stru m e n ts o f d o m in atio n . H o n o rs o f equal w o rth , on th e o th e r hand, are som etim es m e rite d b y v irtu e o f an external possession, an d som etim es h o n o r itself is th e reason f o r th e m erit, so th a t th e one w h o begins an d ho n o rs som eone else m erits th e re b y to be h o n o red b y th e o th e r, as is th e case in m a rk e t tran sactio n s. T h u s , in th e ir eyes, th e one w h o m erits m o re h o n o r rules o v e r th e one w h o m erits less o f it. T h is in e q u a lity c o n tin u es on an ascen d in g scale te rm in a tin g in th e one w h o m erits m o re h o n o rs th a n a n y o n e else in th e

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city. This, therefore, will be the ruler and the prince of the city. B y virtue of this office, he ought to be of greater merit than all the rest. N o w we have already enumerated what they consider to be the bases of merit. Accordingly, if honor, according to them, is based on distinguished ancestry alone, the ruler ought to have a more distinguished ancestry than the others; and similarly if honor, according to them, is based on wealth alone. Next, men are distinguished and given ranks of order according to their wealth and ancestry; [62] and whoever lacks both wealth and a distinguished ancestry will have no claim to any rulership or honor. Such, then, is the case when merits are based on matters that are good to their possessor alone; and these are the lowest among timocratic rulers. When, on the other hand, the ruler is honored because of his usefulness to the citizens of the city in their pursuits and wishes, it is then because he benefits them with regard to wealth or pleasure; or because he brings others to honor the citizens of the city or to provide them with the other things desired by them; or because he supplies them with these things from his own or he enables them to obtain and preserve them through his good governance. O f such rulers, they consider the best to be the one who provides the citizens of the city with these things without seeking anything for himself except honor: for instance, the one who provides them with wealth or the pleasures without desiring any for himself, but rather seeks only honor (praise, respect, and exaltation in speech and deed), to become famous for it among all nations in his own lifetime and after, and to be remembered for a long time. This is the one .who, in their eyes, merits honor. Often, such a man requires money and wealth to spend it on what enables the citizens of the city to fulfil their desires for wealth or pleasure or both, and on what helps them to preserve these things. The more he does in this respect, the greater his wealth must be. His wealth becomes a reserve for the citizens of the city. This is the reason w hy some of these rulers seek wealth and regard their expenditures as an act of generosity and liberality. T h ey collect this money from the city in the form of taxes, or they conquer another group—other, that is, than the citizens of the city—for its money, which they bring to their treasury. T h ey keep it as a reserve [63] out of which they disburse great expenditures in the city in order to obtain greater honor. The one who covets honor by whatever means, may also claim distinguished ancestry for himself and his offspring after him; and so that his fame survive through his offspring, he designates his immediate offspring or members of his family as his successors. Furthermore, he may appropriate a certain amount of wealth for himself to be honored for it, even though it is of no benefit to others. Also, he honors a certain group so that they may honor him in return. He thus possesses all the things for which men may honor him, reserving for himself alone the things regarded by them as manifesting splendor, embellishment, emi­

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nence, and m ag n ificen ce—such as buildings, costum es, and m edals, and, finally, in accessib ility to people. F u rth e r, he lays d o w n th e law s co n c e rn in g h onors. O n c e he assum es a c e rta in office and p eo p le are accusto m ed to th e fa c t th a t he an d his fam ily w ill be th e ir p rin ces, he th e n o rd ers th e peo p le in to ranks in such a w a y as to o b tain h o n o r and m ajesty . T o each k in d o f ran k , he assigns ( a ) a k in d o f h o n o r and ( b ) th in g s b y v irtu e o f w h ic h o ne m erits h o n o r, such as w ealth , b u ild in g , co stu m e, m edal, carriag e, and so fo rth , and w h ic h c o n trib u te to his m ajesty ; and he arran g es all this in a definite o rd e r. F u rth e rm o re , he w ill sh o w special p re fe re n c e fo r those m en w h o h o n o r him m o re o r c o n trib u te m o re to th e e n h a n c e m e n t o f his m ajesty, and he c o n fe rs h o n o r and d istrib u tes fa v o r a c c o rd in g ly . T h e citizens o f his c ity w h o c o v e t h o n o r k eep h o n o rin g him u n til he ack n o w led g es w h a t th e y have d o n e and c o n fe rs h o n o rs o n th em , because o f w h ic h th e y w ill be h o n o re d b y th e ir in ferio rs and superiors. F o r all these reasons, this c ity can be likened to th e v irtu o u s c ity , esp ecially w h e n th e h onors, and m e n ’s ranks o f o rd e r w ith re sp e c t to h o n o rs, are c o n fe rre d because o f o th e r, m o re useful things: fo r exam ple, w ealth , pleasures, o r a n y th in g else th a t is desired b y w h o e v e r seeks a fte r useful th in g s. T h is c ity is th e b est am o n g th e ig n o ra n t cities; u n lik e those o f th e o th ers, its citizens are [m o re p ro p e rly ] called “ig n o ra n t” [ 6 4 ] and so fo rth . H o w e v e r, w h en th e ir love o f h o n o r becom es excessive, it becom es a c ity o f ty ra n ts, and it is m o re likely to ch an g e in to a d espotic c ity .

[v.

THE

DESPOTIC

CITY]

T h e d esp o tic c ity o r th e desp o tic association is th a t in w h ic h th e m em bers co o p e ra te to achieve d o m in atio n . T h is happens w h e n th e y are all seized b y th e love o f d o m in atio n , p ro v id ed th a t it is in d iffe re n t degrees, and th a t th e y seek d iffe re n t kinds o f d o m in atio n and d iffe re n t things fo r th e sake o f w h ic h to d o m in ate o th e r m en; fo r instance, som e like to d o m in ate a n o th e r m an in o rd e r to spill his b lo o d , o th ers, to tak e his p ro p e rty , still o th ers, to possess him so th a t th e y m ay enslave him . P eo p le o c c u p y d ifferen t ranks o f o rd e r in this c ity d e p e n d in g on th e e x te n t o f o n e ’s love o f d o m in atio n . Its citizens love to d o m in ate o th e rs in o rd e r to spill th e ir b lo o d and kill them , to possess th e m so th a t th e y m ay enslave them , o r in o rd e r to take th e ir p ro p e rty . In all this, w h a t th e y love and aim a t is to dom in ate, subdue, and hum iliate o th e rs, and th a t th e su b d u ed should have no c o n tro l w h a te v e r o v e r him self o r a n y o f th e th in g s because o f w h ic h he has been d o m in ated , b u t sh o u ld do as the su b d u e r co m m an d s and w ishes. (In d e e d w h e n th e lo v er o f d o m in a-

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tion and subjugation—who is inclined to, or desires, a certain thing— obtains it without having to subdue someone else, he does not take it and pays no attention to it.) Some of them choose to dominate through wiliness, others, through open combat alone, and still others, through both wiliness and open combat. Therefore many of those who subjugate others in order to spill their blood, do not kill a man when asleep and do not seize his property until they first wake him up; they prefer to engage him in combat and to be faced with some resistance in order to subdue him and harm him. Since every one of them loves to dominate the others, each one loves to dominate everyone else, [65] whether a fellow citizen or not. T h ey refrain from dominating one another as regards the spilling of blood or the taking of property, only because they need one another so as to survive, cooperate in dominating others, and defend themselves against outside domination. Their ruler is he who shows greater strength in governing well with a view to employing them to dominate others; who is the wiliest of them; and who has the soundest judgment about what they ought to do in order to continue to dominate forever and never be dominated by others. Such is their ruler and prince. T h ey are the enemies of all other men. All their laws and usages are such that, when followed, they enable them better to dominate others. Their rivalries and contentions center on how many times they dominate others or on the extent of their domination, or else on the abundant possession of the equipment and instruments of domination. (The equipment and instruments of domination exist either in man’s mind, in his body, or in what is external to his body: in his body, like endurance; external to his body, like arms; and in his mind, like sound judgment regarding that which enables him to dominate others.) A t times, such men become rude, cruel, irascible, extravagant, and excessively gluttonous; they consume great quantities of food and drink, overindulge in copulation, and fight each other for all the goods, which they obtain through subjugating and humiliating those who possess them. T h ey think that they should dominate everything and everybody. ( i ) Sometimes this is true of the entire city, whose citizens will then choose to dominate those outside the city for no other reason than the citizens’ need for association [and hence for a common cause that would promote it]. (2) Sometimes the vanquished and the subjugators live side by side in a single city. [66] The subjugators then either (a) love to subjugate and dominate others to the same degree and hence have the same rank of order in the city, or ( b) they occupy various ranks of order, each one of them having a certain kind of domination over their vanquished neighbors, which is lesser or greater than that of the other. In this way, and depending on the power and judgment through which

48

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th e y achieve d o m in atio n , th e y o c c u p y th e ir resp ectiv e places n ex t to a p rin c e w h o rules th e m and m anages th e su b ju g a to rs’ affairs as reg ard s th e in stru m e n ts th e y use fo r su b ju g atio n . (3 ) A n d som etim es th e re is b u t a single su b ju g a to r, w ith a g ro u p o f m en as his in stru m e n ts fo r s u b ju g a tin g all o th e r m en. T h e g ro u p in q u estio n does n o t seek to enable him to d o m in ate and seize 'so m e th in g fo r som eone else’s sake, b u t so th a t he d o m in ate so m eth in g th a t w o u ld b e lo n g to him alone. T h e single su b ju g a to r, in tu rn , is satisfied w ith w h a t m aintains his life and s tre n g th ; he gives [th e rest] to th e o th ers and do m in ates fo r th e sake o f th e o th ers, like dogs and falcons do. T h e rest o f th e citizens o f th e c ity , to o , are slaves to th a t one, serv in g his e v e ry w ish; th e y are su b m issive and h u m iliated , possessing n o th in g w h a te v e r o f th e ir o w n. Som e o f th e m c u ltiv ate th e soil, o th e rs trad e, fo r him . In all this, he has no o th e r p u rp o se b e y o n d seeing a c e rta in g ro u p su b ju g a te d and d o m in ated an d subm issive to him alone, even th o u g h he derives n o 'b e n e fit o r pleasure fro m th e m e x cep t th a t o f seeing th em h u m iliated and d o m in ated . T h is (3 ), th e n , is th e c ity w h o se p rin c e alone is d espotic, w hile th e re st o f its citizens are n o t d esp o tic. In th e one th a t p re c e d e d it (2 ), h alf o f th e c ity is desp o tic. In th e first ( 1 ), all th e citizens are desp o tic. T h e d esp o tic c ity m ay th u s have su ch a c h a ra c te r th a t it em p lo y s one o f these m e th o d s in th e p u rsu it o f d o m in atio n alone and th e e n jo y m e n t o f it. B u t if d o m in atio n is loved o n ly as a m eans f o r th e acq u isitio n o f b are necessities, p ro sp e rity , th e e n jo y m e n t o f pleasures, h o nors, o r all o f these to g e th e r, th e n this is a d esp o tic c ity o f a d iffe re n t so rt; an d its citizens b e lo n g to th e o th e r cities m e n tio n e d above. [67] !Most p eo p le call su ch cities d esp o tic; b u t this nam e applies m o re p ro p e rly to th e one a m o n g th e m th a t seeks all o f these ( th r e e ? ) 5 th in g s b y m eans o f su b ju g atio n . T h e re are th re e sorts o f such cities: th a t is,6 (3 ) one o f th e citizens, (2 ) half o f them , o r (1 ) all o f th em are despotic. B u t th e y [th a t is, th e citizen s o f these cities], to o , do n o t p u rsu e su b ju g a tio n and m a ltre a tm e n t fo r th e ir o w n sake; ra th e r th e y p u rsu e, an d aim at, som eth in g else. T h e re are, fu rth e r, o th e r cities th a t aim at so m eth in g else and at do m in atio n as w ell. T h e first o f these cities, w h ic h aims at d o m in atio n h o w ev er and fo r w h a te v e r it m ay be, m ay in clu d e som eone w h o inflicts h arm on o th e rs w ith o u t a n y b en efit to him self, su ch as to m u rd e r fo r no o th e r reason th a n th e pleasu re o f su b ju g a tio n alone; its citizens fig h t fo r th e sake o f base th in g s, as it is to ld a b o u t som e o f th e A rabs. In th e second, th e citizen s love d o m in atio n fo r th e sake o f c e rta in th in g s th a t th e y re g a rd as p ra is e w o rth y and lo fty , n o t lo w ly ; and w h en th e y attain these th in g s w ith o u t su b ju g a tin g o th ers, th e y do n o t re so rt to it. T h e th ird c ity does n o t h arm o r m u rd e r, unless it k n o w s th a t this enhances one o f its n o b le qualities. H e n c e w h en one [o f its citizens] gets to the th in g s he w ants, w ith o u t h av in g to d o m in ate an d su b ju g ate o th e rs—fo r instance,

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when the thing exists in abundance, when someone else takes care of seizing it for him, or when someone else gives him the thing voluntarily— he will not harm others, remains indifferent to the thing in question, and does not take it from others. Such individuals are also called high-minded and manly. The citizens of the first city confine themselves to such subjugation as is indispensable for the achievement of domination. Sometimes they strive and struggle very hard to possess a certain property or human soul that is denied to them, and they persist until they get it and are able to do with it whatever they please; but at this point they turn away and do not seize it. Such men may also be praised, honored, and respected for what they do; also, [68] those who seek honor do most of these things so that they may be honored for them. Despotic cities are more often tyrannical than timocratic. Sometimes the citizens of the [vile or] plutocratic city and the citizens of the [base] city that is dedicated to play and amusement imagine that they are the ones who are lucky, happy, and successful, and that they are more excellent than the citizens of all other cities. These delusions about themselves sometimes lead them to become contemptuous of the citizens of other cities and to suppose that others have no worth, and to love to be honored for whatever caused their happiness. Consequently, they develop traits of arrogance, extravagance, boastfulness, and the love of praise, and suppose that others cannot attain what they themselves have attained, and that the others are therefore too stupid to achieve these two kinds of happiness [which result from wealth, and play and amusement, respectively]. T h e y create for themselves titles with which they embellish their ways of life, such as that they are the talented and the elegant, and that the others are the rude. Therefore they are supposed to be men of pride, magnanimity, and authority. Sometimes they are even called high-minded. When the lovers of wealth and the lovers of pleasure and play do not happen to possess any of the arts by which wealth is obtained except the power to dominate, and they achieve wealth and play by subjugation and domination, then they become extremely arrogant and join the ranks of tyrants (in contrast, the former group are simply idiots). Similarly, it is possible to find among the lovers of honor some who love it, not for its own sake, but for the sake of wealth. For many of them seek to be honored by others in order to obtain wealth, either from those others or from someone else. T h ey seek to rule, and to be obeyed by, the citizens of the city in order to obtain wealth alone. Many of these seek wealth for the sake of play and pleasure. Thus they seek to rule and to be obeyed in order to obtain wealth to make use of it in play; and they think that the greater and the more complete their authority and the obedience of others to them, the greater their share of these things. Hence they desire to be the sole rulers over the citizens

P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y in I s l a m

5°

o f th e c ity in o rd e r to possess m ajesty, b y w h ic h to achieve g re a t and in co m p arab le w e a lth [ 6 9 ] in o rd e r to m ake use o f it in o b ta in in g a m easure o f p la y and pleasures (fo o d , d rin k , sex) th a t no one else can o b ta in b o th as reg ard s its q u a n tity and q u ality . V*

[vi.

THE

DEMOCRATIC

CITY]

T h e d e m o c ra tic c ity is th e one in w h ic h each one o f th e citizens is giv en free rein and le ft alone to d o w h a te v e r he likes. Its citizens are equal and th e ir law s say th a t no m an is in a n y w a y a t all b e tte r th a n an y o th e r m an. Its citizens are fre e to do w h a te v e r th e y like; and no one, be he one o f th e m o r an o u tsid e r, has a n y claim to a u th o rity unless he w o rk s to en h an ce th e ir freed o m . C o n se q u e n tly , th e y d ev elo p m a n y kin d s o f m orals, in clin atio n s, and desires, and th e y tak e p leasure in co u n tless th in g s. Its citizens consist o f co u n tless sim ilar and dissim ilar g ro u p s. T h is c ity b rin g s to g e th e r th e g ro u p s—b o th th e base and th e n o b le—th a t existed sep arate ly in all th e o th e r cities; and positions o f a u th o rity are o b ta in ed h ere b y m eans o f a n y one o f th e th in g s w e have m e n tio n ed . T h o s e fro m am o n g th e m u ltitu d e o f this c ity , w h o possess w h a te v e r th e ru lers possess, have th e u p p e r han d o v e r th o se w h o are called th e ir ru lers. T h o s e w h o ru le th e m do so b y th e w ill o f th e ru led , and th e ru lers fo llo w th e w ishes o f th e ru led . Close in v e stig atio n o f th e ir situ a tio n w o u ld reveal th a t, in tru th , th e re is no d istin ctio n b e tw e e n ru le r and ru le d am o n g th em . H o w e v e r, th e y praise and h o n o r those w h o lead th e citizen s o f th e c ity to fre e d o m and to w h a te v e r th e citizens like and desire, and w h o safeg u ard th e citizen s’ fre e d o m and th e ir v aried and diffe re n t desires against [in frin g e m e n t] b y one a n o th e r and b y o u tsid e enem ies; and w h o lim it th e ir [7 0 ] o w n desires to bare necessities. S uch, th e n , is th e o n e w h o is h o n o re d , re g a rd e d as th e best, and is o b e y e d am o n g th e m . A s to a n y o th e r ru le r, he is e ith e r ( a ) th e ir equal o r ( b ) th e ir in fe rio r, ( a ) H e is th e ir equal w h e n it happens th a t, w h e n he p ro v id es th e m w ith th e g o o d th in g s th a t th e y w a n t and desire, th e y re c ip ro c a te w ith co m p a ra b le h o n o rs an d w ealth . In this case th e y do n o t co n sid e r him to be s u p e rio r to th em . ( b ) T h e y are his su p erio rs w h e n th e y a c c o rd him h o n o rs and allo t him a share o f th e ir possessions, w ith o u t receiv in g a n y b en efit fro m him in re tu rn . F o r it is q u ite possible to find in this c ity a ru le r in this situ atio n : he happens to be m agnified in th e eyes o f th e citizen s e ith e r because th e y tak e a fa n c y to him o r because his an cesto rs ru le d th e m w ell and th e y le t him ru le in g ra titu d e fo r w h a t his an cesto rs did. In this case, th e m u ltitu d e w o u ld have th e u p p e r h an d o v er th e ru lers. A ll th e en d eav o rs and p u rp o ses o f th e ig n o ra n t cities are p re se n t in

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this city in a most perfect manner; of all of them, this is the most admirable and happy city. On the surface, it looks like an embroidered garment full of colored figures and dyes. Everybody loves it and loves to reside in it, because there is no human wish or desire that this city does not satisfy. The nations emigrate to it and reside there, and it grows beyond measure. People of every race multiply in it, and this by all kinds of copulation and marriages, resulting in children of extremely varied dispositions, with extremely varied education and upbringing. Consequently, this city 'develops into many cities, distinct yet intertwined, with the parts of each scattered throughout the parts of the others. Strangers cannot be distinguished from the residents. All kinds of wishes and ways of life are to be found in it. Consequently, it is quite possible that, with the passage of time, virtuous men will grow up in it. Thus it may include [7/] philosophers, rhetoricians, and poets, dealing with all kinds of things. It is also possible to glean from it certain [men who form] parts of the virtuous city; this is the best thing that takes place in this city. Therefore, this city possesses both good and evil to a greater degree than the rest of the ignorant cities. The bigger, the more civilized, the more populated, the more productive, and the more perfect it is, the more prevalent and the greater are the good and the evil it possesses. There are as many aims pursued by the ignorant rulerships as there are ignorant cities. Every ignorant rulership aims at having its fill of bare necessities; wealth; ddight in the pleasures; honor, reputation, and praise; domination; or freedom. Therefore, such rulerships are actually bought for a price, especially the positions of authority in the democratic city; for here no one has a better claim than anyone else to a position of authority. Therefore, when someone finally holds a position of authority, it is either because the citizens have favored him with it, or else because they have received from him money or something else in return. In their eyes the virtuous ruler is he who has the ability to judge well and to contrive well what enables them to attain their diverse and variegated desires and wishes, safeguards them against their enemies, and takes nothing of their property, but confines himself to the bare necessities of life. As for the truly virtuous man—namely the man who, if he were to rule them, would determine and direct their actions toward happiness —they do not make him a ruler. If by chance he comes to rule them, he will soon find himself either deposed or killed or in an unstable and challenged position. And so are all the other ignorant cities; each one of them only wants the ruler who facilitates the attainment of its wishes [7 2] and desires, and paves the w ay for their acquisition and preservation. Therefore, they refuse the rule of virtuous men and resent it. Nevertheless, the construction of virtuous cities and the establishment of the rule of virtuous men are more effective and much easier out of

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the indispensable and democratic cities than out of any other ignorant city. Bare necessity, wealth, the enjoyment of the pleasures and of play, and honors may be attained by subjugation and domination, or they may be attained by other means. Hence the four cities [the indispensable, vile, base, and timocratic] can be subdivided accordingly. Similarly, the rule that aims at these four things, or any one of them, pursues the achievement of its aim by domination and subjugation, or else pursues it by other means. Those who acquire these things by domination and subjugation, and safeguard what they have acquired by force and compulsion, need to be strong and powerful in body, and to be fierce, rough, rude, and contemptuous of death in moral traits, and not to prefer life to these pursuits; they need skill in the use of arms, and good judgment as regards the means of subjugating others: all this applies to all of them. But as to the pleasure seekers [that is, the citizens of the base city], they develop, in addition, gluttony and lust for food, drink, and sex. Some of them are dominated by softness and luxury, weakening their irascible faculty to the extent that none or very little of it remains. Others are dominated by anger and its psychical and bodily instruments, and by the appetite and its psychical and bodily instruments, which strengthens and intensifies these two faculties, and facilitates the performance of their functions. Their judgment will be equally devoted to the actions of these two faculties, and their souls equally subservient to them. O f these, the final objective of some are the actions of the appetite. Thus they turn their irascible faculties and actions into instruments by which to achieve the appetitive actions, thus subordinating lofty and higher faculties to the lower; that is, they subordinate their rational faculty to [75] the irascible and appetitive, and further, the irascible faculty to the appetitive. For they devote their judgment to the discovery of what fulfils the irascible and appetitive actions, and devote the actions and instruments of their irascible faculties to what enables them to attain the enjoyment of the pleasures of food, drink, and sex, and all that enables them to seize and safeguard them for themselves, such as you see in the notables of the dwellers of the steppes from among the Arabs and the Turks. For the dwellers of the steppes generally love domination, and have insatiable lust for food, drink, and sex. Consequently, women are of great importance to them, and many of them approve of licentiousness, not considering it as being a degeneration and vileness since their souls are subservient to their appetites. You also see that many of them try to please women in everything they do, in order to gain importance in the eyes of women, considering disgraceful whatever women consider to be disgraceful, fair what women consider to be fair. In everything they do, they follow the desires of their women. In many cases, their women have the upper hand over them

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and c o n tro l th e affairs o f th e ir households. F o r this reason m a n y o f them accu sto m th e ir w o m e n to lu x u ry b y shielding th em fro m hard w o rk and k eep in g th em instead in lu x u ry and c o m fo rt, w h ile th e y them selves u n d e rtake to do e v e ry th in g th a t req u ires toil and lab o r and th e e n d u ra n c e o f pain and h ardship.

[

B

.

THE

IMMORAL

CIT IE S ]

Im m o ral cities are th e ones w hose citizens once believed in, and co g nized, th e p rin cip les [o f b ein g s]; im agined, and believed in, w h a t happiness is; and w e re g u id ed to w a rd , k n ew , and believed in, th e actio n s b y w h ic h to a tta in happiness. N ev erth eless, th e y did n o t ad h ere to an y o f th o se actions, b u t cam e to desire and w ill one o r a n o th e r o f th e aims o f th e citizens o f th e ig n o ra n t cities—such as h o n o r, d o m in atio n , and so f o r th —an d d ire c te d all th e ir actions and faculties to w a rd th em . T h e re are as m a n y kinds [74] o f these [im m o ral] cities as th e re are ig n o ra n t cities, in asm u ch as all th e ir actions and m orals are iden tical w ith those o f th e ig n o ra n t cities. T h e y d iffer fro m th e citizens o f th e ig n o ra n t cities o n ly in th e opin io n s in w h ic h th e y believe. N o t one o f th e. citizens o f these cities can attain happiness at all.

[ C.

THE

ERRING

CITIES]

E rrin g cities are th o se w h o se citizens are given im itatio n s o f o th e r m a tte rs th a n th e ones ‫־‬xve m e n tio n e d 7—th a t is, th e p rin cip les th a t are estab lish ed fo r, and im ita ted to , th e m are o th e r th a n th e ones w e m entio n ed ; a k in d o f happiness th a t is n o t tru e happiness is established fo r, and re p re se n te d to , th e m ; and actions and opinions are p re sc rib e d fo r th e m b y n o n e o f w h ic h tru e happiness can be a tta in e d .8

[

D

.

THE

WEEDS

IN

V IR T U O U S

C I T I E S ]

T h e W e e d s w ith in th e v irtu o u s cities are o f m an y classes, (i) [M em bers o f] one class ad h ere to th e actions c o n d u c iv e to th e a tta in m e n t o f happiness; h o w ev er, th e y do n o t do such actions in th e p u rsu it o f happiness, b u t ra th e r o f o th e r th in g s th a t m an can attain b y m eans o f v irtu e, such as h o n o r, ru lersh ip , w ealth , and so fo rth . S u ch individuals are called o p p o rtu n ists {mutaqanni$wi) . S om e o f th em have an in clin atio n

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P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y in I s l a m

to one o f th e ends o f th e citizens o f th e ig n o ra n t cities and th e y are p re v e n te d b y th e L aw s and th e relig io n o f th e c ity fro m p u rsu in g su ch ends. T h e re fo re th e y re so rt to th e expressions o f th e la w g iv er and th e statem en ts th a t e m b o d y his p recep ts, and in te rp re t th e m as th e y w ish, b y w h ic h in te rp re ta tio n th e y m ake th e th in g th e y are a fte r ap p ear go o d . S u ch m en are called th e m isin te rp re te rs ( m u h a r r i f a h ) . O th e rs am o n g th em do n o t d elib erate ly m isin te rp re t b u t, because th e y do n o t rig h tly u n d e rsta n d th e la w g iv er and because o f th e ir m isc o n c e p tio n o f his statem ents, th e y u n d e rsta n d th e L aw s o f th e c ity in a d iffe re n t w a y th a n th e one in ten d ed b y th e law g iver. T h e ir actio n s w ill th e re fo re n o t c o n fo rm to th e in te n tio n o f th e su p rem e ru ler. H e n c e th e y e rr w ith o u t realizin g it. T h e s e m en are th e apostates ( m ã r i q a h ) . (ii) [M em b ers of] a n o th e r class do im agine the th in g s w e m e n tio n e d ,9 y e t th e y are n o t c o n v in ced o f w h a t th e y have im agined o f th em . H e n c e th e y use a rg u m e n ts to falsify th e m fo r them selves and fo r others. [75] In so doing, th e y are n o t c o n te n d in g against th e v irtu o u s c ity ; ra th e r th e y are lo o k in g fo r th e rig h t p ath and seeking th e tru th . H e w h o belongs to this class, sh o uld have th e level o f his im agination raised to th in g s th a t c a n n o t be falsified b y th e arg u m e n ts he has p u t fo rw a rd . If he is satisfied w ith th e level to w h ic h he has been raised, he should be le ft alone. B ut if he is again n o t satisfied, and discovers h ere c e rta in places su scep tib le to c o n te n tio n , th en he sh o u ld be raised to a h ig h e r level. T h is pro cess should c o n tin u e u n til he becom es satisfied w ith one o f these levels. A n d if it happens th a t he is n o t satisfied w ith a n y one o f these levels o f im ag in atio n , he sh o u ld be raised to th e level o f th e tr u th and be m ade to c o m p re h e n d those th in g s as th e y are, at w h ic h p o in t his m in d w ill com e to rest. (iii) [M em b ers of] a n o th e r class falsify w h a te v e r th e y im agine. W h e n ev er th e y are raised to a h ig h er level, th e y falsify it, even w h e n th e y are c o n d u c te d to th e level o f th e t r u t h —all this in th e p u rsu it o f d o m in atio n alone, o r in th e p u rsu it o f en n o b lin g a n o th e r o f th e aim s o f th e ig n o ra n t cities th a t is desired b y them . T h e y falsify th em in e v e ry w a y th e y can; th e y do n o t like to listen to a n y th in g th a t m ay establish hap p iness and tr u th firm ly in th e soul, o r a n y a rg u m e n t th a t m a y en n o b le and im p rin t th e m in th e soul, b u t m e et th em w ith such sham arg u m e n ts as th e y th in k w ill d isc re d it happiness. M a n y o f th e m do th a t w ith th e in te n tio n o f a p p earin g as h av in g a p re te x t fo r tu rn in g to one o f th e aims o f th e ig n o ra n t cities. (iv ) [M em b ers o f] a n o th e r class im agine happiness and th e p rin cip les [o f b ein g s], b u t th e ir m inds are to ta lly la ck in g in th e p o w e r to co g n ize th em , o r it is b e y o n d th e p o w e r o f th e ir m inds to co g n ize th e m adeq u ately . C o n seq u en tly , th e y falsify th e th in g s th e y im agine and co m e u p o n th e places o f c o n te n tio n in them , and w h e n e v e r th e y are raised to a level o f im ag in atio n th a t is clo ser to th e tru th , th e y find it to be false.

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N o r is it possible to raise th e m to th e level o f the tr u th because th e ir m inds lack th e p o w e r to c o m p re h e n d it. A n d m a n y o f th e m m ay find m o st o f w h a t th e y im agine to be false, n o t because w h a t th e y im agine tr u ly co n tain s places o f c o n te n tio n , [7 6] b u t because th e y have a d efective im ag in atio n , an d th e y find these th in g s false because o f th e ir d efectiv e m inds, n o t because these th in g s c o n ta in a place o f c o n te n tio n . M an y o f th e m —w h e n un ab le to im agine so m eth in g sufficiently o r d isco v er th e real p o in ts o f c o n te n tio n and in th e places w h e re th e y are to be fo u n d , o r are u n ab le to c o m p re h e n d th e tr u th —th in k th a t the m an w h o has a p p re h e n d e d th e tr u th and w h o says th a t he has a p p re h e n d e d it, is a d elib erate liar w h o is seeking h o n o r o r d o m in atio n , o r else th in k th a t he is a d elu d ed m an. So th e y tr y h ard to falsify the tr u th also, and abase th e m an w h o has a p p re h e n d e d it. T h is leads m a n y o f th e m to th in k th a t all m en arc d elu d ed in e v e ry th in g th e y claim to have a p p re h e n d e d . It leads ( i ) som e o f th e m to a state o f p e rp le x ity in all things, and (2 ) o th e rs to th in k th a t no a p p reh en sio n w h a te v e r is tru e , and th a t w h e n e v e r som eo ne th in k s th a t he has a p p re h e n d e d so m e th in g th a t he is ly in g a b o u t it 10 and th a t he is n o t sure o r c e rta in o f w h a t he thinks. T h e se individuals o c c u p y th e p o sitio n o f ig n o ra n t sim pletons in th e eyes o f reasonable m en and in rela tio n to the p h ilo so p h ers. (F o r this reason it is th e d u ty o f th e ru le r o f th e v irtu o u s c ity to look fo r th e W e e d s, keep th e m o ccu p ied , and tre a t each class o f th e m in th e p a rtic u la r m a n n er th a t w ill c u re th e m : b y expelling th e m fro m th e c ity , p u n ish in g th em , jailing th em , o r fo rc in g th e m to p e rfo rm a c e rta in fu n c tio n even th o u g h th e y m ay n o t be fo n d o f it.) (3 ) O th e rs a m o n g th e m th in k th a t th e tr u th consists o f w h a te v e r ap p ears to each in d iv id u al and w h a t each m an th in k s it to be at one tim e o r a n o th e r, and th a t th e tr u th o f e v e ry th in g is w h a t som eo n e th in k s it is. (4 ) O th e rs a m o n g th e m e x e rt them selves to cre a te th e illusion th a t e v e ry th in g th a t is th o u g h t to have been a p p re h e n d e d up to this tim e is c o m p le te ly false, and th a t, a lth o u g h a c e rta in tr u th o r re a lity does exist, it has n o t as y e t been a p p re h e n d e d . (5 ) O th e rs a m o n g th e m im ag in e—as if in a d ream o r as if a th in g is seen fro m a d ista n c e —th a t th e re is a tru th , and it o c c u rs to th e m th a t th e ones w h o claim to have a p p re h e n d e d it m ay have do n e so, o r p erh ap s th a t one o f th e m m a y have a p p re h e n d e d it. T h e y feel th a t th e y them selves have m issed it, e ith e r because th e y re q u ire a lo n g tim e, and have to toil and e x e rt them selves, in o rd e r to a p p re h e n d it, w h e n th e y no lo n g e r have sufficient tim e o r th e p o w e r to to il and p ersev ere; o r because th e y are o ccu p ied b y c e rta in pleasures and so f o r th to w h ic h th e y have been accu sto m ed and fro m w h ic h th e y find it v e ry difficult to free them selves; o r because th e y feel th a t th e y c a n n o t a p p re h e n d it even if th e y had access to all th e m eans to it. C o n se q u e n tly , th e y re g re t and griev e o v e r w h a t th e y th in k o th e rs m a y have attain ed . H e n c e , o u t o f jealo u sy fo r th o se w h o m ay have a p p re h e n d e d th e tru th , th e y th in k it w ise to en d eav o r, using sham

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arg u m e n t, to c reate th e illusion th a t w h o e v e r claim s to have a p p re h e n d e d th e tr u th is e ith e r d elu d ed o r else a liar w h o is seeking h o n o r, w ealth , o r som e o th e r desirable th in g , fro m the claim he m akes. N o w m a n y o f these p erceiv e th e ir o w n ig n o ran c e and p e rp le x ity ; th e y feel sad and su ffer pain because o f w h a t th e y p erceiv e to be th e ir c o n d itio n , th e y are o v erco m e b y an x iety , and it td rm e n ts th em ; and th e y find no w a y to free them selves o f this b y m eans o f a science lead in g th e m to th e tr u th w h o se ap p reh en sio n w o u ld give th e m pleasure. H e n c e th e y choose to find rest fro m all this b y tu rn in g to th e v arious ends o f th e ig n o ra n t cities, an d to find th e ir solace in am usem ents and gam es u n til d eath com es to relieve th em o f th e ir b u rd e n . Som e o f these—I m ean th e ones w h o seek re st fro m th e to rm e n t o f ig n o ran c e and p e rp le x ity —m a y c reate th e illusion th a t th e [tru e ] ends are those th a t th e y them selves choose and desire, th a t happiness consists o f these, and th a t th e rest o f m en are d elu d ed in w h a t th e y believe in. T h e y e x e rt them selves to a d o rn th e ends o f th e ig n o ra n t cities and th e happiness [th a t th e y p u rsu e ]. T h e y c reate th e illusion th a t th e y have com e to p re fe r som e o f these ends a fte r a th o ro u g h exam ination o f all th a t th e o th e rs claim to have ap p re h e n d e d , th a t th e y have re je c te d th e la tte r o n ly a fte r fin d in g o u t th a t th e y are in co nclusive, and th a t th e ir p o sitio n w as a rriv ed a t on th e basis o f p ersonal k n o w le d g e — th e re fo re , th e irs are th e ends, n o t th e ones claim ed b y th e o thers. T h ese, th e n , are th e classes o f th e W e e d s g ro w in g am o n g th e citizens o f th e c ity . W ith such opinions, th e y c o n stitu te n e ith e r a c ity n o r a large m u ltitu d e ; ra th e r th e y are su b m erg ed b y th e citizen b o d y as a w h o le .111

NOTES 1. C f. A r isto tle D e A nim a iii. 5. A lfarabi g iv e s an a c c o u n t o f th e A c t iv e I n te lle c t at th e b e g in n in g o f th e Political R e g iv ie , p p . 2 -3 , 6 - 7 . 2. A s d istin g u ish e d fr o m th e “n e c e ssa r y ” b e in g th a t is n o t ca u sed . T h e r e fe r e n c e h ere is to th e h u m an sp e c ie s. 3. A r is to tle D e A nim a iii. 5, 7. T h e term “a c q u ir ed in te lle c t” (nous cpiktêtos) d o e s n o t o c c u r in A r is to tle ’s D e Anim a b u t in A le x a n d e r o f A p h r o d isia s’ c o m -

m e n ta r y on th a t b o o k . Its fu n c tio n is im p lied b y A r is to tle , h o w e v e r . 4. A lfa ra b i says: “d ir h e m an d d in a r.” 5. T h is w o r d app ears to b e an in te r p o la tio n . It is, h o w e v e r , p resen t in all th e m a n u scrip ts. F e y z u lla h p u n c tu a te s th e p r e c e d in g e n u m e ra tio n in su ch a m a n n er th a t it is su b d iv id e d in to th r ee parts: “bare n e c e ssitie s, p r o sp e r ity , o r th e e n jo y m e n t o f p leasu res; h o n o rs; or all o f th ese to g e th e r .”

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6. Cf. above, pp. 65-66. 7. Above, pp. 55 ff. 8. See n. 11, below. 9. Above, pp. 55 ff. 10. Here ends the Hyderabad edition and all of the manuscripts with the cxccption of Fcy7zullah. 11. This terminates the discussion of the “ opposites” of the virtuous cities enumerated on p. 58 above. Feyzullah contains an additional paragraph, which is practically7 identical with the beginning of the account of the “ opinions of the citizens of the ignorant and erring cities” in Alfarabi’s Virtuous C ity (corresponding to pp. 73 :2 3 -7 4 :10 in Dieterici’s edition [Leiden, 1895]). This paragraph may be simply7 misplaced here, in which case the work would be complete at this point. If, how7cvcr, it belongs to the Political R eg im e, then the text of Feyzullah, too, is clearly7 incomplete since it ends with an incomplete sentence and lacks the part corresponding to the V irtuous C ity , pp. 74:10 -85:7. The paragraph in question reads in Feyzullah as follows:

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“ The erring cities develop when the religion is based upon certain ancient and corrupt opinions. For instance, a group of men say: ‘W e see that the beings we observe arc contradictory, each seeking to destroy the others. W e also see that when each one of them comes into being, it is provided—in addition to existence—with something by which it preserves its existcnce from destruction, with something by which it repels its contradictory away from itself and safeguards itself against its contradictory7, and with something that enables it to employ all other things in what is useful for achieving its best existence and the continuity of its existcnce. Many7 of these beings are provided also with what enables them to dominate what resists them. All coptradictory beings arc placed in this position with regard to their contradictories and to all other beings, so that each one of them tends to achieve the best existence of itself alone, regardless of the others: therefore it is provided with what enables it to destroy. . . .’ ”

3.

A lfarabi THE

A T T A I N M E N T OF HAPPINESS

Translated by Muhsin Mahdi

T h e A t t a i n m e n t o f H a p p i n e s s is the first part of a trilogy entitled the P h i l o s o p h y o f P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e , of w hich the second part is the P h i l o s o p h y o f P l a t o and the third part is the P h i l o s o p h y o f A r i s t o t l e . It has fo u r subdivisions. T h e first gives an account of ( i ) the theoretical virtues or theoretical sciences (including “theoretical” political science) and explains the relationship am ong them . T h e second raises and answers the question of the need fo r som ething beyond theoretical science, w hich answer unfolds into an account of (2) prudence or deliberation, (3) the m oral virtues, and (4) the practical arts; and discusses the relationship am ong these four things in an individual. T h e third gives an account of the m ethods th ro u g h w hich these four are realized in a nation or a city, w hich unfolds into a discussion of the qualities of the ruler and the structure of the city,

and its opinions and actions. T h e fo u rth begins w ith the praise of theoretical science or philosophy, but proceeds to discuss the relation betw een the philosopher and the prince, betw een philosophy and religion, and betw een true and false philosophy. T his is perhaps A lfarabi’s most fundam ental w ork; it provides the philosophic fram ew ork on the basis of w hich his didactic and political w orks ought to be understood. T h e sections om itted here (secs. 2-15 [sec. 1 is given in n. 6 ] ) deal w ith logic, m athematics, and physics. A H eb rew paraphrase of the A t t a i n m e n t o f H a p p i n e s s is included in Shem tob ben Falaquera’s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S c i e n c e y w hich in tu rn was translated into Latin. T h e follow ing translation is based on an edition in progress. T h e num bers inserted in the translation refer to the H yderabad text: T a h s i l al-sa(a d a h (1345 A .H .),

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pp. 12-4 7. T h e variants adopted here have been given in “ N o tes to the A ra b ic T e x t of the A tta in m e n t o f H a p p in e s s in A lfa ra b P s P h ilo s o p h y

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o f P la to a n d A r is t o t le , tr. w ith introduction b y M uhsin M ahdi ( N e w Y o rk : T h e Free Press o f G lencoe, 19 6 2), pp. 149 ff.

I

16 W h e n o ne finally com es to in q u ire in to th e h eavenly bodies and in v estig ate th e p rin cip les o f th e ir being, this in q u iry in to th e p rin cip les o f th e ir b ein g w ill fo rc e one to look fo r p rin cip les th a t are n o t n atu res o r n a tu ra l th in g s, b u t beings m o re p e rfe c t th a n n a tu re and n a tu ra l th in g s. T h e y are also n o t bodies o r in bodies. T h e re fo re one needs a n o th e r k in d o f in v estig atio n h ere and a n o th e r science th a t inquires exclusively into beings th a t are m etap h y sical. A t this p o in t he is again sta n d in g b e tw e e n tw o sciences: th e science o f n a tu re and [m etap h y sics, o r] th e science o f w h a t is b e y o n d n a tu ra l th in g s [/•?] in th e o rd e r o f in v estig atio n and in s tru c tio n and above th e m in th e o rd e r o f being. 17 W h e n his in q u iry finally reach es th e stage o f in v e stig atin g th e p rin cip les o f th e b ein g o f anim als, he w ill be fo rc e d to in q u ire in to th e soul and learn a b o u t p sy ch ical [o r an im ate] p rin cip les, and fro m th e re ascend to th e in q u iry in to th e ratio n al anim al. As he investigates th e p rin cip les o f th e la tter, he w ill be fo rc e d to in q u ire in to (1 ) what, by what, and how, (2 -3 ) from what, and (4 ) for what it is.1 I t is h ere th a t he acq u ain ts h im self w ith th e in te lle c t and th in g s intelligible. H e needs to in v estig ate ( 1) what th e in te lle c t is and by what and how it is, and ( 2 - 3 ) from what and (4 ) for what it is. T h is in v estig atio n w ill fo rc e him to lo o k f o r o th e r p rin cip les th a t are n o t bodies o r in bodies, and th a t n ev er w e re o r w ill be in bodies. T h is in q u iry in to th e ratio n al anim al w ill th u s lead him to th e sam e co n clu sio n as th e in q u iry in to th e heav en ly bodies. H e n o w acq u ain ts him self w ith in c o rp o re a l prin cip les th a t are to th e beings b elo w th e h eav en ly bodies as those in c o rp o re a l prin cip les (w ith w h ic h he becam e a c q u ain ted w h e n in v e stig a tin g th e h eav en ly b o d ies) are to th e h eav en ly bodies. H e w ill ac q u a in t him self w ith th e p rin cip les f o r th e sake o f w h ic h th e soul and th e in te lle c t are m ade, and w ith th e ends and th e u ltim a te p e rfe c tio n fo r the sake o f w h ic h m an is m ade. H e w ill k n o w th a t th e n a tu ra l p rin cip les in m an and in th e w o rld are n o t sufficient fo r m a n ’s c o m in g to th a t p e rfe c tio n fo r th e sake o f w h o se a ch iev em en t he is m ade. I t w ill b eco m e e v id e n t th a t m an needs som e ratio n al, in tellectu al p rin cip les w ith w h ic h to w o rk to w a rd th a t p e rfe c tio n .

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18 A t this p o in t th e in q u ire r w ill have sig h ted a n o th e r genus o f th ings, d iffe re n t fro m th e m etap h y sical. I t is in c u m b e n t on m an to inv estig ate w h a t is in c lu d e d in this genus: th a t is, th e th in g s th a t realize fo r m an his o b je ctiv e th ro u g h th e in tellectu al p rin cip les th a t are in him , and b y w h ic h he achieves th a t p e rfe c tio m w h ic h becam e k n o w n in n a tu ra l science. I t w ill b eco m e e v id e n t c o n c o m ita n tly th a t these ratio n al p rin cip les are n o t m ere causes b y w h ic h m an attain s th e p e rfe c tio n f o r w h ic h he is m ade. M o reo v er, he w ill k n o w th a t these [ 1 4 ] ratio n al p rin cip les also su p p ly m a n y th in g s to n a tu ra l beings o th e r th a n th o se su p p lied b y n a tu re . In d e e d m an arrives at th e u ltim a te p e rfe c tio n (w h e re b y he attains th a t w h ic h re n d e rs him tr u ly su b stan tial) o n ly w h e n he labors w ith these p rin cip les to w a rd ach iev in g this p e rfe c tio n . M o re o v e r, he c a n n o t la b o r to w a rd this p e rfe c tio n ex cep t b y e x p lo itin g a larg e n u m b e r o f n atu ral beings and u n til he m an ip u lates th e m to re n d e r th e m useful to him fo r a rriv in g at th e u ltim a te p e rfe c tio n he sh o u ld achieve. F u rth e rm o re , it w ill b eco m e e v id e n t to him in this science th a t each m an achieves o n ly a p o rtio n o f th a t p e rfe c tio n , an d w h a t he achieves o f this p o rtio n varies in its ex ten t, fo r an isolated in d iv id u al c a n n o t achieve all th e p e rfe c tio n s b y him self an d w ith o u t th e aid o f m a n y o th e r individuals. I t is th e in n ate dispo sitio n o f e v e ry m an to jo in a n o th e r h u m an b ein g o r o th e r m en in th e la b o r he o u g h t to p e rfo rm : this is th e c o n d itio n o f e v e ry single m an. T h e re fo re , to achieve w h a t he can o f th a t p e rfe c tio n , e v e ry m an needs to sta y in th e n e ig h b o rh o o d o f o th e rs an d associate w ith th em . It is also th e in n a te n a tu re o f this anim al to seek sh elter an d to dw ell in th e neighb o rh o o d o f th o se w h o b e lo n g to th e sam e species, w h ic h is w h y he is called th e social an d p o litical anim al. T h e r e em erges n o w a n o th e r science an d a n o th e r in q u iry th a t investigates these in tellectu al p rin cip les and th e acts an d states o f c h a ra c te r w ith w h ic h m an labors to w a rd this p e rfe c tio n . F ro m this, in tu rn , em erg e th e science o f m an and p o litical science. 19 H e sh o u ld b eg in to in q u ire in to th e m e tap h y sical beings and in tre a tin g th e m use th e m e th o d s he used in tre a tin g n atu ra l things. H e sh o u ld use as th e ir p rin cip les o f in s tru c tio n 2 th e first prem ises th a t hap p en to be available and are a p p ro p ria te to this genus, an d in ad d itio n , th e d em o n stratio n s o f [ /y‫ ]׳‬n a tu ra l science th a t fit as p rin cip les o f in stru c tio n in this genus. T h e se sh o u ld be a rra n g e d a c c o rd in g to th e o rd e r m e n tio n e d ab o v e,3 u n til one co v ers e v e ry b ein g in this genus. I t w ill b eco m e ev id en t to w h o e v e r in vestigates these beings th a t n o n e o f th e m can possess a n y m a tte r at all; o ne o u g h t to in v estig ate e v e ry one o f th e m o n ly as to (1 ) w h a t and h o w it is, (2 -3 ) f r o m w h a t a g e n t and (4 ) f o r w h a t it is. H e sh o u ld c o n tin u e this in v e stig atio n u n til he finally reaches a b ein g th a t c a n n o t possess a n y o f these p rin cip les at all (e ith e r w h a t it is o r f r o m w h a t it is o r f o r w h a t it is) b u t is itself th e first p rin c ip le o f all th e a fo re m e n tio n e d beings: it is itself th a t b y w h i c h , f r o m w h i c h , an d f o r w h i c h

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th e y arc, in th e m ost p e rfe c t m odes in w h ic h a th in g can be a p rin cip le fo r th e beings, m odes free fro m all defects. H a v in g u n d e rsto o d this, he sh o u ld in v estig ate n ex t w h a t p ro p e rtie s th e o th e r beings possess as a co n seq u en ce o f th e ir h av in g th is b ein g as th e ir p rin cip le and th e cause o f th e ir being. H e sh o u ld b eg in w ith th e b ein g w hose ra n k is h ig h er th a n th e re st ( th a t is, th e one n earest to th e first p rin c ip le ), u n til he te rm in a te s in th e b ein g w hose ran k is in fe rio r to th e rest ( th a t is, th e one fa rth e s t fro m th e first p rin c ip le ). H e w ill th u s com e to k n o w th e u ltim ate causes o f th e beings. T h is is th e divine in q u iry in to th em . F o r th e first p rin c ip le is th e d iv in ity , and th e p rin cip les th a t co m e a fte r it—and are n o t bod ies o r in b o d ies—are th e divine p rinciples. 20 T h e n he sh o u ld set o u t next u p o n th e science o f m an and investigate th e what and th e how o f th e p u rp o se fo r w h ic h m an is m ade, th a t is, th e p e rfe c tio n th a t m an m u st achieve. T h e n he sh o u ld in v estig ate all th e th in g s b y w h ich m an achieves this p e rfe c tio n o r th a t are useful to him in ach iev in g it. T h e se are th e g o o d , v irtu o u s, an d noble things. H e sh o u ld d istin g u ish th e m fro m [ /6 ] th e th in g s th a t o b s tru c t his ach iev in g this p e rfe c tio n . T h e se are th e evils, th e vices, and th e base things. H e should m ake k n o w n what and how e v e ry one o f th e m is, and from what and for what it is, u n til all o f th e m beco m e k n o w n , intelligible, and d istin g u ish ed fro m each o th e r. T h is is political science.4 It consists o f k n o w in g th e th in g s b y w h ic h th e citizens o f cities a tta in happiness th ro u g h p o litical association in th e m easure th a t in n ate disposition equips each o f th e m fo r it. It w ill b eco m e e v id e n t to him th a t p o litical association and th e to ta lity th a t resu lts fro m th e association o f citizens in cities c o rre sp o n d to th e association o f th e bodies th a t c o n stitu te th e to ta lity o f th e w o rld . H e w ill co m e to see in w h a t are in c lu d e d in th e to ta lity c o n s titu te d b y th e c ity and th e n atio n th e likenesses o f w h a t are in c lu d e d in th e to ta l w o rld . J u s t as in th e w o rld th e re is a first p rin cip le, th e n o th e r p rin cip les su b o rd in a te to it, beings th a t p ro c e e d fro m these prin cip les, o th e r beings su b o rd in a te to these beings, u n til th e y te rm in a te in th e beings w ith th e lo w est ra n k in th e o rd e r o f being, th e n atio n o r th e c ity in clu d es a su p rem e c o m m a n d e r,5 fo llo w e d b y o th e r c o m m a n d e rs,5 fo llo w ed b y o th e r citizens, w h o in tu r n are fo llo w ed b y o th e r citizens, u n til th e y te rm in a te in th e citizens w ith th e lo w est ra n k as citizens and as h u m a n beings. T h u s th e c ity in clu d es th e likenesses o f th e th in g s in c lu d ed in th e to ta l w o rld . 2 1 T h is, th e n , is th e o re tic a l p e rfe c tio n . A s y o u see, it com prises k n o w led g e o f th e fo u r k in d s o f th in g s6 b y w h ic h th e citizens o f cities and n atio n s a tta in su p rem e happiness. W h a t still rem ains is th a t these fo u r be realized and have actual existence in natio n s and cities w hile c o n fo rm in g to th e a c c o u n t o f th e m given b y th e th e o re tic a l sciences.

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II 2 2 D o y o u su ppose th a t these th e o re tic a l sciences have also given an a c c o u n t o f th e m eans b y w h ic h ,these fo u r can be [ /7 ] a c tu a lly realized in n atio n s and cities, o r not? T h e y have indeed given an a c c o u n t o f th e la tte r as th e y are p erceiv ed b y th e intellect. N o w if it w e re th e case th a t to give an a c c o u n t o f these th in g s as th e y are p erceiv ed b y th e in te lle c t is to give an a c c o u n t o f th e ir [actu al] existence, it w o u ld fo llo w th a t th e th e o re tic a l sciences have given an a c c o u n t o f th e m as a c tu a lly existent. ( F o r instance, if it w e re th e case th a t g iv in g an intelligible a c c o u n t o f a rc h ite c tu re and p e rc e iv in g b y th e in te lle c t w h a t co n stitu tes a rc h ite c tu re and w h a t co n stitu te s a b u ild in g m ake an a rc h ite c t o f th e m an w h o has in tellected w h a t m a n n er o f th in g th e a rt o f b u ild in g is, o r, if it w e re th e case th a t g iv in g an intelligible a c c o u n t o f a b u ild in g is to give an a c c o u n t o f its actual existence, th e n th e th e o re tic a l sciences do b o th .) B u t if it is n o t th e case th a t th e in te lle c tio n o f a th in g im plies its existence o u tsid e th e in te lle c t and th a t to give an intelligible a c c o u n t o f it is to give an a c c o u n t o f its actual existence, th e n , w h e n one in ten d s to m ake these fo u r th in g s exist, he n ecessarily re q u ire s so m eth in g else beside th e o re tic a l science. 23 T h a t is because th in g s p erceiv ed b y th e in te lle c t are as such free fro m th e states and accid en ts th a t th e y have w h e n th e y exist o u tside th e [th in k in g ] soul. In w h a t rem ains n u m e ric a lly one these accid en ts do n o t v a ry o r ch an g e a t all; th e y do v a ry , h o w ev er, in w h a t rem ains one, n o t n u m erically , b u t in th e species. T h e re fo re w h e n it is necessary to m ake th e th in g s p erceiv ed b y th e in te lle c t and rem ain in g one in th e ir species exist o u tsid e th e soul, o n e m u st join to th e m th e states and accid en ts th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y th e m if th e y are to have actual existence ou tsid e th e soul. T h is applies to th e n atu ra l intelligibles, w h ic h are and rem ain one in th e ir species, as w ell as to th e v o lu n ta ry intelligibles.7 24 H o w e v e r, th e n atu ra l intelligibles, w h ic h exist ou tsid e th e soul, exist fro m n a tu re o n ly , and it is b y n a tu re th a t th e y are accom panied w ith th e ir accid en ts. A s fo r th e intelligibles th a t can be m ade to exist o u tsid e th e soul b y w ill, th e accid en ts [ /# ] and states th a t a c c o m p a n y th em w h e n th e y co m e in to b ein g are w illed to o . N o w v o lu n ta ry intelligibles c a n n o t exist unless th e y are acco m p an ied w ith these accid en ts and states. Since e v e ry th in g w hose existence is w illed c a n n o t be m ade to exist unless it is first k n o w n , it fo llow s th a t w h e n one plans to b rin g a n y v o lu n ta ry intellig ib le in to actual existence o u tsid e th e soul, he m u st first k n o w th e states th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y it w h e n it exists. B ecause v o lu n ta ry intelligibles do n o t b elo n g to th in g s th a t are one n u m e rically , b u t in th e ir species o r genus, th e accid en ts and states th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y th em v a ry c o n sta n tly , increase an d decrease, and fall in to co m b in atio n s

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th a t c a n n o t be co v ered at all b y invariable and u n ch an g eab le form al rules. In d eed fo r som e o f th e m no ru le can be established. F o r o th e rs rules can be established, b u t th e y arc variable rules and ch an g eab le definitions. T h o s e fo r w h ic h no rule at all can be established are th e ones th a t v a ry c o n s ta n tly and o v e r sh o rt periods. T h e o th ers, fo r w h ic h rules can be established, are th o se w hose states v a ry o v e r lo n g periods. T h o se o f th e m th a t co m e to exist arc fo r th e m ost p a rt realized b y th e a g e n c y o f w h o e v e r w ills and does them . Y et because o f obstacles sta n d in g in th e ir w a y —som e o f w h ic h arc n atu ral and o th e rs v o lu n ta ry , re su ltin g fro m th e w ills o f o th e r in d iv id u als—som etim es no n e o f th e m at all is realized. F u rth e rm o re , th e y suffer n o t o n ly te m p o ral variations, so th a t th e y m ay exist at a c e rta in tim e w ith accid en ts and states d iffe re n t fro m th o se th a t a c c o m p a n y th e m at a n o th e r tim e b e fo re o r a fte r; th e ir states also d iffer w h en th e y exist in d iffe re n t places. T h is is ev id en t in n atu ra l th in g s, fo r exam ple, M an. F o r w h e n it [th a t is, th e intelligible idea !Man] assum es actu al existence o u tside th e soul, [ / ‫ ] ע‬th e states and accid en ts in it at one tim e are d iffe re n t fro m the ones it has at a n o th e r tim e, a fte r o r b efo re. T h e sam e is th e case w ith resp ect to d iffe re n t places. T h e accid en ts and states it has w h en existing in one c o u n try arc d iffe re n t fro m th e ones it has in a n o th e r. Y et, th ro u g h o u t, th e in te lle c t perceives Alan as a single in tellig ib le idea. T h is holds fo r v o lu n ta ry th in g s as w ell. F o r instan ce, M o d e ra tio n , W e a lth , and th e like arc v o lu n ta ry ideas p e rccived b v th e in tellect. W h e n w e decid e to m ake th e m a c tu a lly exist, th e accid en ts th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y th e m at a ce rta in tim e w ill be d iffere n t fro m th e accid en ts th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y th em at a n o th e r tim e, and th e accid en ts th e y m u st have w h e n th e y exist in one n atio n w ill be d iffe re n t fro m th o se th e y m u st have w h en existing in a n o th e r. In som e o f th e m , these accid en ts ch an g e fro m h o u r to h o u r, in o th e rs fro m d a y to d ay , in o th e rs fro m m o n th to m o n th , in o th e rs fro m y e a r to y ear, in o th e rs fro m d ecad e to decade, and in still o th e rs th e y ch an g e a fte r m an y decades. T h e re fo re , w h o e v e r sh o u ld w ill to b rin g a n y o f th e m in to actu al existence o u tsid e th e soul o u g h t to k n o w th e variable accid en ts th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y it in th e specific p e rio d at w h ic h he seeks to b rin g it in to existence and in th e d e te rm in e d place in th e in h ab ited p a rt o f th e earth . T h u s he o u g h t to k n o w th e accid en ts th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y w h a t is w illed to exist fro m h o u r to h o u r, fro m m o n th to m o n th , fro m y ear to y ear, fro m d ecad e to decade, o r in som e o th e r p e rio d o f d e te rm in a te le n g th , in a d e te rm in e d lo c a lity o f large o r small size. A n d he o u g h t to k n o w w h ic h o f these accid en ts are co m m o n to all nations, to som e nations, o r to one c ity o v e r a lo n g p erio d , co m m o n to th e m o v e r a s h o rt p erio d , o r p e rta in to som e o f th e m sp ecifically and o v er a s h o rt p erio d . 25 T h e accid en ts and states o f these intelligibles v a ry [20] w h e n e v e r c e rta in events o c c u r in th e in h a b ited p a rt o f th e earth , events c o m m o n to all o f it, to a c e rta in n atio n o r c ity , o r to a c e rta in g ro u p w ith in a

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c ity , o r p e rta in in g to a single m an. S u ch events are e ith e r n a tu ra l o r w illed. 26 T h in g s o f this s o rt are n o t co v ered b y th e th e o re tic a l sciences, w h ic h c o v e r o n ly th e intelligibles th a t do n o t v a ry at all. T h e re fo re ano th e r fa c u lty and a n o th e r skill is re q u ire d w ith w h ich to d iscern th e v o lu n ta ry intelligibles [n o t as such, b u t] in so fa r as th e y possess these variable accid en ts: th a t is, th e inodes a c c o rd in g to w h ic h th e y can be b ro u g h t in to actu al existence b y th e w ill at a d e te rm in e d tim e, in a d e te rm ined place, and w h en a d e te rm in e d e v e n t o ccu rs. T h a t is th e delib erativ e fa c u lty .8 I t is th e skill and th e fa c u lty b y w h ich one discovers and discerns th e variable accid en ts o f th e intelligibles w hose p a rtic u la r instances are m ade to exist b y th e w ill, w h en one a tte m p ts to b rin g th em in to actu al existence b y th e w ill a t a d e te rm in e d tim e, in a d eterm in ed place, and w h e n a d e te rm in e d e v e n t takes place, w h e th e r th e tim e is lo n g o r sh o rt, w h e th e r th e lo c a lity is large o r small. 27 T h in g s are d isco v ered b y th e d elib erativ e fa c u lty o n ly in so far as th e y are fo u n d to be useful fo r th e a tta in m e n t o f an end and purpose. T h e d isco v erer first sets th e end b efo re him self and th e n investigates th e m eans b y w h ic h th a t end and th a t p u rp o se are realized. T h e delib erativ e fa c u lty is m o st p e rfe c t w h e n it discovers w h a t is m o st useful fo r th e a tta in m e n t o f these ends. T h e ends m ay be tru ly g o o d , m ay be evil, o r m a y be o n ly believed to be g o o d . If the m eans disco v ered are th e m o st useful fo r a v irtu o u s end, th en th e y are n o b le and fair. [ 2 /] If th e ends are evil, th e n the m eans disco v ered b y th e d elib erativ e fa c u lty are also evil, base, and bad. A n d if th e ends are o n ly believed to be good, th e n th e m eans useful fo r a tta in in g and ach iev in g th e m are also o n ly believed to be g o o d . T h e d elib erativ e fa c u lty can be classified a c c o rd in g ly . D elib erativ e v irtu e is th a t b y w h ic h one discovers w h a t is m o st useful fo r som e v irtu o u s end. A s fo r th e delib erativ e fa c u lty b y w h ic h one discovers w h a t is m o st useful fo r an evil end, it is n o t a d elib erativ e v irtu e b u t o u g h t to have o th e r nam es. A n d if th e d elib erativ e fa c u lty is used to d isco v er w h a t is m o st useful fo r th in g s th a t are o n ly believed to be g o od, th e n th a t d elib erativ e fa c u lty is o n ly believed to be a delib erativ e v irtu e. 2 8 (1 ) T h e re is a ce rta in delib erativ e v irtu e th a t enables one to excel in th e d isc o v e ry o f w h a t is m o st useful fo r a v irtu o u s end co m m o n to m a n y nations, to a w h o le n atio n , o r to a w h o le c ity , at a tim e w h en an ev en t o c c u rs th a t affects th em in co m m o n . (T h e re is no d ifferen ce b e tw e e n say in g m o st useful fo r a v irtu o u s end and m o st useful and m o st noble, because w h a t is b o th m o st useful and m ost noble necessarily serves a v irtu o u s end, and w h a t is m o st useful fo r a v irtu o u s end is indeed th e m o st noble w ith resp ect to th a t en d .) T h is is political d elib erativ e v irtu e. T h e events th a t affect th e m in co m m o n m ay persist o v er a lo n g p e rio d o r v a ry w ith in sh o rt p eriods. H o w e v e r, p o litical delib erativ e v irtu e is th e d elib erativ e v irtu e th a t discovers th e m o st useful and m o st n o b le th a t

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is c o m m o n to m a n y nations, to a w h o le n atio n , o r to a w h o le c ity , irre sp e c tiv e o f w h e th e r w h a t is d isco v ered persists th e re fo r a lo n g p e rio d o r varies o v e r a s h o rt p erio d . W h e n it is c o n c e rn e d exclusively w ith th e d isc o v e ry o f th e th in g s th a t are c o m m o n to m a n y nations, to a w h o le n atio n , [22] o r to a w h o le c ity , and th a t do n o t v a ry ex cep t o v er m a n y decades o r o v er lo n g e r p erio d s o f d e te rm in a te le n g th , th e n it is m o re akin to a legislative ab ility . (2 ) T h e d elib erativ e v irtu e w ith w h ic h one disco v ers o n ly w h a t varies o v er s h o rt periods. T h is is th e fa c u lty th a t m anages th e d iffe re n t classes o f p a rtic u la r, te m p o ra ry tasks in c o n ju n c tio n w ith , and a t th e o c c u rre n c e of, th e events th a t affect all nations, a c e rta in n atio n , o r a c e rta in c ity . I t is su b o rd in a te to th e fo rm e r. (3 ) T h e fa c u lty b y w h ic h one discovers w h a t is m o st useful and noble, o r w h a t is m o st useful f o r a v irtu o u s end, relativ e to one g ro u p a m o n g th e citizens o f a c ity o r to th e m em b ers o f a household. I t consists o f a v a rie ty o f d elib erativ e v irtu es, each associated w ith th e g ro u p in q u estio n : fo r instance, it is e co n o m ic d elib erativ e v irtu e o r m ilita ry d elib erativ e v irtu e. E ac h o f these, in tu rn , is su b d iv id ed inasm uch as w h a t it discovers (a) does n o t v a ry ex c e p t o v e r lo n g p erio d s o r ( b) varies o v er s h o rt periods. (4 ) T h e d elib erativ e v irtu e m ay be su b d iv id ed in to still sm aller fractio n s, such as th e v irtu e b y w h ich one discovers w h a t is m o st useful and noble w ith re sp e c t to th e p u rp o se o f p a rtic u la r arts o r w ith re sp e c t to p a rtic u la r p u rp o ses th a t h ap p en to be p u rsu e d at p a rtic u la r tim es. T h u s it w ill have as m a n y subdivisions as th e re arc arts and w ay s o f life. (5 ) F u rth e rm o re, this fa c u lty can be divided also in so far as (a) it enables m an to excel in th e d isc o v e ry o f w h a t is m o st useful and n o b le w ith re sp e c t to his o w n end w h e n an e v e n t o c c u rs th a t co n c e rn s him specifically, and ( b ) it is a d elib erativ e v irtu e b y w h ic h he discovers w h a t is m o st useful and n o b le w ith re sp e c t to a v irtu o u s en d to be attain e d b y so m e b o d y else—th e la tte r is c o n su lta tiv e d elib erativ e v irtu e. T h e se tw o m a y be u n ite d in a single m an o r m ay exist sep arately . 29 I t is o b v io u s th a t th e one w h o possesses a v irtu e b y w h ic h he d isco v ers w h a t is m o st useful and noble, and this fo r th e sake o f a v irtu o u s end th a t is g o o d (irre sp e c tiv e o f w h e th e r w h a t is disco v ered is a tru e g o o d th a t he w ishes [23] fo r him self, a tru e g o o d th a t he w ishes som eone else to possess, o r so m eth in g th a t is believed to be g o o d b y w h o m e v e r he w ishes it f o r ) , c a n n o t possess this fa c u lty w ith o u t possessing a m oral v irtu e. F o r if a m an w ishes th e g o o d fo r o th ers, th e n he is e ith e r tr u ly g o o d o r else believ ed to be g o o d b y those fo r w h o m he w ishes th e g o o d a lth o u g h he is n o t g o o d and v irtu o u s. S im ilarly he w h o w ishes th e tru e g o o d fo r him self has to be g o o d and v irtu o u s, n o t in his d elib eratio n , b u t in his m o ral c h a ra c te r an d in his acts. I t w o u ld seem th a t his v irtu e , m o ral c h a ra c te r, and acts, have to c o rre sp o n d to his p o w e r o f delib eratio n and a b ility to d isco v er w h a t is m o st useful and noble. H e n c e if he d isco v ers b y his d elib erativ e v irtu e o n ly those m o st useful and noble

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m eans th a t are o f g re a t fo rc e (su c h as w h a t is m o st useful fo r a v irtu o u s en d co m m o n to a w h o le n atio n , to m a n y nations, o r to a w h o le c ity , and does n o t v a ry ex c e p t o v e r a lo n g p e rio d ), th e n his m o ral v irtu es o u g h t to be o f a co m p arab le m easure. S im ilarly, if his d elib erativ e v irtu es are co n fin ed to m eans th a t are movst useful fo r a re stric te d en d w h e n a specific e v e n t o ccu rs, th e n this is th e m easure o f his [m o ral] v irtu e also. A c c o rd in g ly , th e m o re p e rfe c t th e a u th o rity and th e g re a te r th e p o w e r o f these d elib erativ e v irtu es, th e stro n g e r th e a u th o rity and th e g re a te r th e p o w e r o f th e m o ral v irtu es th a t a c c o m p a n y th em . 30 (1 ) S ince th e d elib erativ e v irtu e b y w h ic h one discovers w h a t is m ost useful and n o b le w ith re sp e c t to th e ends th a t do n o t v a ry ex cep t o v er lo n g p erio d s and th a t are co m m o n to m a n y nations, to a w h o le n atio n , o r to a w h o le c ity w h en an ev en t th a t affects th e m in co m m o n o ccu rs, has m o re p e rfe c t a u th o rity and g re a te r p o w e r, th e [m o ral] v irtu es th a t a c c o m p a n y it sh o u ld possess th e m o st p e rfe c t a u th o rity an d th e g re a te st p o w e r. [24] (2 ) N e x t fo llo w s th e d elib erativ e v irtu e w ith w h ic h one excels in th e d isc o v e ry o f w h a t is m o st useful fo r a co m m o n , th o u g h te m p o ra ry end, o v er s h o rt p erio d s; th e [m o ral] v irtu es th a t a c c o m p a n y it are o f a co m p arab le ra n k . (3 ) T h e n fo llo w th e d elib erativ e v irtu es co n fin e d to in d iv id u al p a rts o f th e c ity —th e w a rrio rs, th e rich , and so on; th e m o ral v irtu es th a t have to do w ith these p arts are o f a co m p arab le ran k . (4 ) F in ally , one com es to th e d elib erativ e v irtu es rela ted to single arts (ta k in g in to a c c o u n t th e p u rp o ses o f these a rts) and to single households and single h u m an beings w ith in single households (w ith a tte n tio n to w h a t p erta in s to th e m as events fo llo w one a n o th e r h o u r a fte r h o u r o r d ay a fte r d a y ) ; th e y are acco m p an ied b y a [m o ral] v irtu e o f a co m p arab le ran k . 3 1 T h e re fo re one o u g h t to in v estig ate w h ic h v irtu e is th e p e rfe c t and m o st p o w e rfu l v irtu e. Is it th e co m b in atio n o f all th e virtues? O r, if one v irtu e (o r a n u m b e r o f v irtu e s) tu rn s o u t to have a p o w e r equal to th a t o f all th e v irtu es to g e th e r, w h a t o u g h t to be th e d istin ctiv e m a rk o f th e v irtu e th a t has this p o w e r an d is h en ce th e m ost p o w e rfu l v irtue? T h is v irtu e is su ch th a t w h e n a m an decides to fulfil its fu n c tio n s, he c a n n o t do so w ith o u t m ak in g use o f th e fu n c tio n s o f all th e o th e r virtu es. If he him self does n o t h ap p en to possess all o f these v irtu e s—in w h ic h case he c a n n o t m ake use o f th e fu n c tio n s o f p a rtic u la r v irtu e s p re se n t in him w h e n he decides to fulfil th e fu n c tio n s o f th a t v irtu e —th a t v irtu e o f his w ill be a m oral v irtu e in th e exercise o f w h ic h he exploits th e acts o f th e v irtu es possessed b y all o th ers, w h e th e r th e y are nations, cities w ith in a n atio n , g ro u p s w ith in a c ity , o r p arts w ith in each g ro u p . T h is, th e n , is th e lead in g v irtu e th a t is n o t surpassed b y a n y o th e r in a u th o rity . [23‫]־‬ N e x t fo llo w th e v irtu es th a t resem ble this one in th a t th e y have a sim ilar p o w e r w ith re sp e c t to single p a rts o f th e c ity . F o r instance, to g e th e r w ith th e d elib erativ e fa c u lty b y w h ic h he discovers w h a t is m o st useful and

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n oble w ith re sp e c t to th a t w h ic h is co m m o n to w a rrio rs, th e general o u g h t to possess a m oral v irtu e. W h e n he decides to fulfil th e fu n c tio n s o f th e la tte r, he exploits th e v irtu es possessed b y th e w a rrio rs as w arrio rs. H is co u rag e, fo r instance, o u g h t to be su ch as to enable him to exploit th e w a rrio rs ’ p a rtic u la r acts o f co u rag e. S im ilarly, th e one w h o possesses a d elib erativ e v irtu e b y w h ic h he discovers w h a t is m o st useful and noble fo r th e ends o f th o se w h o acq u ire w ealth in the c ity o u g h t to possess th e m o ral v irtu e th a t enables him to ex p lo it th e p a rtic u la r v irtu es o f th e classes o f peo p le en g ag ed in a c q u irin g w ealth . 32 T h e arts, to o , o u g h t to fo llo w this p a tte rn . T h e leading a rt th a t is n o t surpassed b y a n y o th e r in a u th o rity is such th a t w h e n w e d ecide to fulfil its fu n ctio n s, w e are unab le to do so w ith o u t m ak in g use o f th e fu n c tio n s o f all th e arts. I t is th e a rt fo r th e fu lfilm en t o f w h o se p u rp o se w e re q u ire all th e o th e r arts. T h is, th en , is th e leading a rt and th e m o st p o w e rfu l o f th e a rts—ju st as th e c o rre sp o n d in g m oral v irtu e w as th e m ost p o w e rfu l o f all th e m o ral virtues. It is th e n fo llo w ed b y th e rest o f th e arts. A n a rt o f a certain class a m o n g th e m is m o re p e rfe c t and m o re p o w e rfu l th an th e re st in its class if its end can be fulfilled o n ly b y m ak in g use o f th e fu n c tio n s o f th e o th e r arts in its class. S uch is th e status o f th e p a rtic u la r lead in g arts. F o r instance, th e a rt o f co m m a n d in g arm ies is su ch th a t its p u rp o se can be achieved o n ly b y m a k in g use o f th e fu n c tio n s o f th e p a rtic u la r arts o f w a rfa re . S im ilarly, th e [26] leading a r t o f w ealth in th e c ity is such th a t its p u rp o se w ith reg ard to w ealth can be achieved o n ly b y ex p lo itin g th e p a rtic u la r arts o f a c q u irin g w ealth . T h is is th e case also in e v e ry o th e r m a jo r p a rt o f th e c ity . 33 F u rth e rm o re , it is obvious th a t w h a t is m o st useful and n oble is in e v e ry case e ith e r m o st n o b le a c c o rd in g to g en erally acc e p te d o p inion, m o st n o b le a c c o rd in g to a p a rtic u la r religion, o r tr u ly m o st noble. Sim ilarly , v irtu o u s ends are e ith e r v irtu o u s and g o o d a c c o rd in g to g e n e ra lly acc e p te d o p in io n , v irtu o u s and go o d a c c o rd in g to a p a rtic u la r religion, o r tr u ly v irtu o u s and g o od. N o one can d isco v er w h a t is m o st noble a c c o rd in g to th e fo llo w ers o f a p a rtic u la r relig io n unless his m oral v irtu es are th e specific v irtu es o f th a t relig io n . T h is holds fo r e v e ry o n e else; it applies to th e m o re p o w e rfu l v irtu es as w ell as to th e m o re p a rtic u la r and less p o w e rfu l. T h e re fo re th e m o st p o w e rfu l d elib erativ e v irtu e and th e m o st p o w e rfu l m o ral v irtu e are inseparable fro m each o th e r. 34 It is e v id e n t th a t th e d elib erativ e v irtu e w ith th e h ighest a u th o rity can o n ly be su b o rd in a te to th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e ; fo r it m e re ly discerns th e accid en ts o f th e intelligibles th a t, p rio r to h av in g these accid en ts as th e ir acco m p an im en ts, are a cq u ired b y th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e. If it is d e te rm in e d th a t th e o ne w h o possesses th e d elib erativ e v irtu e should disc o v er th e variable accid en ts and states o f o n ly those intelligibles o f w h ic h he has p erso n al in sig h t and personal k n o w le d g e (so as n o t to m ake discoveries a b o u t th in g s th a t p erh ap s o u g h t n o t to tak e p la c e ), th e n th e

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d elib erativ e v irtu e c a n n o t be sep arated fro m th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e . It fo llo w s th a t th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e , th e lead in g d elib erativ e v irtu e , th e lead in g m o ral v irtu e , and th e leading p ra c tic a l a rt are inseparable fro m each o th e r; o th e rw ise th e la tte r [th re e ] w ill be u n so u n d , im p e rfe c t, and w ith o u t co m p lete a u th o rity . [37] 35 B u t if, a fte r th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e has caused th e in te lle c t to p e rceive th e m o ral v irtu es, th e la tte r can o n ly be m ade to exist if th e d elib erativ e v irtu e discerns th e m and discovers th e accid en ts th a t m u st a c c o m p a n y th e ir intelligibles so th a t th e y can be b ro u g h t in to existence, th e n th e d elib erativ e v irtu e is a n te rio r to th e m o ral v irtu es. If it is a n te rio r to th em , th e n he w h o possesses th e d elib erativ e v irtu e discovers b y it o n ly su ch m o ral v irtu es as exist in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e d elib erativ e virtu es. Y et if th e d elib erativ e v irtu e is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e m o ral v irtu e , th e n he w h o has th e c a p a c ity f o r d isco v erin g th e (g o o d ) mQral v irtu es w ill n o t him self be g o o d , n o t even in a single v irtu e .9 B u t if he him self is n o t g o o d , h o w th e n does he seek o u t th e g o o d o r w ish th e tru e g o o d fo r h im self o r fo r others? A n d if he does n o t w ish th e g o o d , h o w is he cap ab le o f d isco v erin g it w ith o u t having set it b e fo re him self as an end? T h e re fo re , if th e d elib erativ e v irtu e is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e m o ral v irtu e, it is n o t possible to d isco v er th e m o ral v irtu e w ith it. Y e t if th e m oral v irtu e is inseparable fro m th e delib erativ e, and th e y coexist, h o w co u ld th e d elib erativ e v irtu e d isco v er th e m oral and join itself to it? F o r if th e y are inseparable, it w ill fo llo w th a t th e d elib erativ e v irtu e did n o t d isco v er th e m o ral v irtu e ; w h ile if th e d elib erativ e v irtu e did d isco v er th e m o ral v irtu e, it w ill fo llo w th a t th e d elib erativ e v irtu e is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e m o ral v irtu e. T h e re fo re e ith e r th e d elib erativ e v irtu e itself is th e v irtu e o f goodness o r one sh o u ld assum e th a t th e d elib erativ e v irtu e is acco m p an ied b y som e o th e r v irtu e, d iffe re n t fro m th e m oral v irtu e th a t is d isco v ered b y th e d elib erativ e fa c u lty . If th a t o th e r m oral v irtu e is fo rm e d b y th e w ill also, it fo llo w s th a t th e d elib erativ e v irtu e d isco v ered it—th u s th e orig in al d o u b t recu rs. I t follow s, th e n , th a t th e re m u st be som e o th e r m o ral v irtu e —o th e r, th a t is, th a n th e one d isco v ered b y th e d elib erativ e v irtu e —th a t acco m panies th e d elib erativ e v irtu e and enables th e possessor o f th e d elib erativ e v irtu e to w ish th e g o o d and th e v irtu o u s end. [ 2 8 ] T h a t v irtu e m u st be n a tu ra l and m u st com e in to b ein g b y n a tu re , and it m u st be co u p led w ith a c e rta in d elib erativ e v irtu e [th a t is, cleverness] th a t com es in to b ein g b y n a tu re and discovers th e m o ral v irtu es fo rm e d b y th e w ill. T h e v irtu e fo rm e d b y th e w ill th e n w ill be th e h u m an v irtu e b y w h ic h m an, a fte r a c q u irin g it in th e w a y in w h ic h he acq u ires v o lu n ta ry th in g s, acq u ires th e h u m an d elib erativ e v irtu e. 36 B u t one o u g h t to in q u ire w h a t m a n n e r o f th in g th a t n a tu ra l v irtu e is. Is it o r is it n o t id en tical w ith this v o lu n ta ry virtue? O r o u g h t one to say th a t it c o rre sp o n d s to this v irtu e, like th e states o f c h a ra c te r th a t

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exist in irratio n al anim als?—ju st as it is said th a t c o u ra g e resides in th e lion, c u n n in g in th e fox, shiftiness in th e bear, thievishness in th e m agpie, and so fo rth . F o r it is possible th a t ev e ry m an is in n a te ly so disposed th a t his soul has a p o w e r such th a t he g en erally m oves m o re easily in th e d ire c tio n o f th e a c c o m p lish m en t o f a c e rta in v irtu e o r o f a c e rta in state o f c h a ra c te r th a n in th e d ire c tio n o f d o in g th e o p p o site act. In d eed m an m oves first in th e d ire c tio n in w h ic h it is easier fo r him to m ove, p ro v id e d he is n o t co m p elle d to do so m eth in g else. F o r instance, if a m an is in n a te ly so disposed th a t he is m o re p ro n e to stand his g ro u n d against dangers th a n to reco il b e fo re th em , th e n all he needs is to u n d e rg o th e ex p erien ce a sufficient n u m b e r o f tim es an d this state o f c h a ra c te r becom es v o lu n ta ry . P rio r to this, he possessed th e c o rre sp o n d in g n atu ra l state o f c h a ra c te r. If this is so in p a rtic u la r m oral v irtu es th a t a c c o m p a n y p a rtic u la r d elib erative v irtu es, it m u st also be th e case w ith th e h ig h est m oral v irtu es th a t a c c o m p a n y th e h ig h est d elib erativ e v irtues. If this is so, it follow s th a t th e re are som e m en w h o are in n a tely disposed to a [n a tu ra l m oral] v irtu e th a t c o rre sp o n d s to th e h ig h est [h u m an m oral] v irtu e and th a t is jo in ed to a n a tu ra lly su p e rio r d elib erativ e p o w e r, o th e rs ju st b elo w th em , and so on. [2y] If this is so, th e n n o t e v e ry ch an ce hum an b ein g w ill possess art, m o ral v irtu e , and d elib erativ e v irtu e w ith g re a t p o w er. 37 T h e re fo re th e p rin c e o ccupies his place b y n a tu re and n o t m e re ly b y w ill. S im ilarly , a su b o rd in a te occu p ies his place p rim a rily b y n a tu re an d o n ly se c o n d a rily b y v irtu e o f th e w ill, w h ic h p e rfe c ts his n atu ral eq u ip m en ts. T h is b ein g th e case, th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e , th e h ig h est delib erativ e v irtu e , th e h ig h est m oral v irtu e , an d th e h ighest p ra c tic a l a rt are realized o n ly in those eq u ip p ed fo r th e m b y n atu re : th a t is, in those w h o possess su p e rio r n atu res w ith v e ry g re a t p o tentialities.

Ill 38 A f te r these fo u r th in g s are realized in a c e rta in m an, th e realizatio n o f th e p a rtic u la r instances o f th e m in n ations and cities still rem ains; his k n o w in g h o w to m ake these p a rtic u la r instances exist in n atio n s and cities rem ains: he w h o possesses su ch a g re a t p o w e r o u g h t to possess th e c a p a c ity o f realizin g th e p a rtic u la r instances o f it in nations and cities. 39 T h e r e are tw o p rim a ry m eth o d s o f realizin g th em : in stru c tio n and th e fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r. T o in s tru c t is to in tro d u c e th e th e o re tic a l v irtu es in n atio n s and cities. T h e fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r is th e m e th o d o f in tro d u c in g th e m o ral v irtu es and p ra c tic a l arts in nations. In stru c tio n p ro ceed s b y sp eech alone. T h e fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r p ro ceed s th ro u g h h a b itu a tin g n atio n s and citizens in d o in g th e acts th a t issue fro m th e p ra c tic a l states o f c h a ra c te r b y aro u sin g in th e m th e reso lu tio n to do

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these acts; th e states o f c h a ra c te r and th e acts issuing fro m th e m should co m e to possess th e ir souls and th e y should be, as it w ere, e n ra p tu re d b y th em . T h e reso lu tio n to do a th in g m ay be aro u sed b y speech o r b y deed. 40 In s tru c tio n in th e th e o re tic a l sciences should be given e ith e r to th e im am s and th e p rinces, o r else to those w h o should p reserv e th e th e o re tic a l sciences. T h e in stru c tio n o f these tw o g ro u p s p ro ceed s b y m eans o f id en tical ap p ro ach es. T h e se are th e ap p ro ach e s [50] stated ab o v e .10 F irst, th e y sh o u ld k n o w th e first prem ises and th e p rim a ry k n o w le d g e relativ e to e v e ry k in d o f th e o re tic a l science. T h e n th e y should k n o w th e vario u s states o f th e prem ises and th e ir various arra n g e m e n ts as stated b e fo re ,10 and be m ade to p u rsu e th e sub jects th a t w e re m entio n ed . (P rio r to this, th e ir souls m u st have been set a rig h t th ro u g h th e tra in in g b e fittin g th e y o u th s w hose natu res e n title th em to this rank in th e o rd e r o f h u m a n ity .) T h e y should be h ab itu ate d to use all th e logical m e th o d s in all th e th e o re tic a l sciences. A n d th e y should be m ade to p u rsu e a co u rse o f stu d y and fo rm th e habits o f c h a ra c te r fro m th e ir c h ild h o o d u n til each o f th em reaches m a tu rity , in a c c o rd a n c e w ith the plan d escrib ed b y P la to .11 T h e n th e prin ces am o n g th em w ill be placed in su b o rd in a te offices and p ro m o te d g ra d u a lly th ro u g h th e ranks u n til th e y are fifty years old. T h e n th e y w ill be placed in th e office w ith th e h ig h est a u th o rity . T h is, th en , is th e w a y to in s tru c t this g ro u p ; th e y are th e elect w h o should n o t be co n fin ed to w h a t is in c o n fo rm ity w ith unex am in ed co m m o n o p inion. U n til th e y acq u ire th e th e o re tic a l virtues, th e y o u g h t to be in s tru c te d in th in g s th e o re tic a l b y m eans o f persuasive m eth o d s. T h e y should c o m p re h e n d m a n y th e o re tic a l th in g s b y w a y o f im ag in in g th em . T h e se are th e th in g s—th e u ltim a te p rin cip les and th e in c o rp o re a l p rin c ip le s—th a t a m an c a n n o t p erceiv e b y his in te lle c t ex cep t a fte r k n o w in g m a n y o th e r things. T h e v u lg a r o u g h t to c o m p re h e n d m e re ly th e sim ilitudes o f these p rin cip les, w h ic h should be established in th e ir souls b y persuasive arg u m en ts. O n e should d ra w a d istin ctio n b e tw e e n th e sim ilitudes th a t o u g h t to be p resen ted to e v e ry nation, and in w h ic h all nations and all th e citizens o f e v e ry c ity should share, and th e ones th a t o u g h t to be p resen ted to a p a rtic u la r n atio n and n o t to a n o th e r, to a p a rtic u la r c ity and n o t to a n o th e r, o r to a p a rtic u la r g ro u p am o n g th e citizens o f a c ity [ 4 /] and n o t to an o th er. A ll these [persuasive a rg u m e n ts and sim ilitudes] m u st be d iscern ed b y th e delib erativ e v irtu e. 41 T h e y [th e p rin ces and th e im am s] sh o u ld be h a b itu a te d in th e acts o f th e p ra c tic a l12 v irtu es and th e p ra c tic a l arts b y e ith e r o f tw o m ethods. F irst, b y m eans o f persuasive a rg u m e n ts, passionate arg u m en ts, and o th e r arg u m e n ts th a t establish these acts and states o f c h a ra c te r in th e soul c o m p le te ly so as to arouse th e reso lu tio n to do th e acts w illin g lv . T h is m e th o d is m ade possible b v th e p ra c tic e o f th e ratio n al a rts —to w h ic h th e m in d is n a tu ra lly in c lin e d —and b v th e benefits d eriv ed fro m

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such p ractice. T h e o th e r m e th o d is co m p u lsio n . It is used w ith th e rec a lc itra n t and th e o b stin ate am o n g those citizens o f cities and nations w h o do n o t rise in fa v o r o f w h a t is rig h t w illin g ly and o f th e ir o w n a c c o rd o r b v m eans o f arg u m e n ts, and also w ith those w h o refuse to teach o th e rs th e th e o re tic a l sciences in w h ic h th e y arc engaged. 42 N o w since th e v irtu e o r th e a rt o f th e p rin c e is exercised b y exp lo itin g th e acts o f th o se w h o possess th e p a rtic u la r v irtu es and th e arts o f th o se w h o p ra c tic e th e p a rtic u la r arts, it follow s necessarily th a t th e v irtu o u s and th e m asters o f th e arts w h o m he [th e p rin c e ] em p lo y s to fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f n ations and citizens o f th e cities co m p rise tw o p rim a ry g ro u p s: a g ro u p e m p lo y ed b y him to fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f w h o e v e r is su scep tib le o f having his c h a ra c te r fo rm e d w illin g ly , and a g ro u p em p lo y e d b y him to fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f those w h o are such th a t th e ir c h a ra c te r can be fo rm e d o n ly b y com p u lsio n . T h is is analogous to w h a t heads o f h o useholds and su p e rin te n d e n ts o f c h ild re n and y o u th s do. F o r th e p rin c e fo rm s th e c h a ra c te r o f n ations and in stru c ts th em , ju st as th e head o f a h o u sehold fo rm s th e c h a ra c te r o f its m em bers and in stru c ts th em , and th e s u p e rin te n d e n t o f ch ild ren and y o u th s form s th e ir c h a ra c te r and in s tru c ts them . J u s t as each o f th e last tw o fo rm s th e c h a ra c te r o f som e o f those w h o are in his c u s to d y [52] b y b ein g g en tle to th e m and b y p ersuasion and fo rm s th e c h a ra c te r o f o th e rs b y co m pulsion, so does th e p rin ce. In d eed it is b y v irtu e o f th e v e ry sam e skill th a t th e classes o f m en w h o fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f o th ers and su p e rin te n d th em u n d e rta k e b o th th e c o m p u lso ry fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r and th e fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r receiv ed w illin g ly ; th e skill varies o n ly w ith re sp e c t to its d eg ree and th e e x te n t o f its p o w e r.13 T h u s th e p o w e r re q u ired fo r fo rm in g th e c h a ra c te r o f n ations and fo r su p e rin te n d in g th e m is g re a te r th a n th e p o w e r re q u ire d fo r fo rm in g th e c h a ra c te r o f ch ild re n and y o u th s o r th e p o w e r re q u ire d b y heads o f households fo r fo rm in g th e c h a ra c te r o f th e m em bers o f a household. C o rre sp o n d in g ly , th e p o w e r o f th e p rin ces, w h o are th e su p e rin te n d e n ts o f n ations and cities and w h o fo rm th e ir c h a ra c te r, and th e p o w e r o f w h o m e v e r and w h a te v e r th e y e m p lo y in p e rfo rm in g this fu n c tio n , are g re a te r. T h e p rin c e needs th e m o st p o w e rfu l skill fo r fo rm in g th e c h a ra c te r o f o th e rs w ith th e ir c o n se n t and th e m o st p o w e rfu l skill fo r fo rm in g th e ir c h a ra c te r b y co m pulsion. 43 T h e la tte r is th e c ra ft o f w ar: th a t is, th e fa c u lty th a t enables him to excel in o rg an iz in g and leading arm ies and u tiliz in g w a r im p lem en ts and w arlik e peo p le to c o n q u e r th e n ations and cities th a t do n o t su b m it to d o in g w h a t w ill p ro c u re th em th a t happiness fo r w hose acq u isitio n m an is m ade. F o r e v e ry b ein g is m ade to achieve th e u ltim ate p e rfe c tio n it is su scep tib le o f ach iev in g a c c o rd in g to its specific place in th e o rd e r o f being. !Man’s specific p e rfe c tio n is called su p rem e happiness; and to each m an, a c c o rd in g to his ran k in th e o rd e r o f h u m a n ity , belongs th e

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P o litic a l P h ilo s o p h y m Isla m

specific su p rem e happiness p e rta in in g to his k in d o f m an. T h e w a rrio r w h o pursu es this p u rp o se is th e ju st w a rrio r, and th e a rt o f w a r th a t p u rsu es this p u rp o se is th e ju st and v irtu o u s a rt o f w ar. 44 T h e o th e r g ro u p , e m p lo y ed to fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f natio n s and th e citizens o f cities w ith th e ir co n sen t, is co m p o sed o f those w h o possess th e ratio n al v irtu es and arts. F o r it is obvious th a t th e p rin c e needs to re tu rn to th e th e o re tic a l, intelligible th in g s [55] w hose k n o w le d g e w as acq u ired b y c e rta in d em o n stratio n s, look fo r th e persuasive m e th o d s th a t can be e m p lo y ed fo r each, and seek o u t all th e persuasive m e th o d s th a t can be e m p lo y ed fo r it (he can do this because he possesses th e p o w e r to be persuasive a b o u t in d ividual cases). T h e n he sh o u ld re p a ir to these v e ry sam e th e o re tic a l th in g s and seize u p o n th e ir sim ilitudes. H e o u g h t to m ake these sim ilitudes p ro d u c e im ages o f th e th e o re tic a l th in g s fo r all n atio n s jo in tly , so establish th e sim ilitudes th a t persuasive m e th o d s can cause th em to be acc e p te d , and e x e rt him self th ro u g h o u t to m ake b o th th e sim ilitudes and th e persuasive m eth o d s such th a t all n ations and cities m ay share in th em . N e x t he needs to e n u m e ra te th e acts o f th e p a rtic u la r p ractical v irtu es and arts th a t fulfil th e ab o v e-m en tio n e d re q u ire m e n ts.14 H e sh o uld devise m e th o d s o f p o litical o ra to ry w ith w h ic h to arouse th e re so lu tio n to such acts in n ations and cities. H e sh o u ld e m p lo y here: (1 ) a rg u m e n ts th a t s u p p o rt [th e rig h tn ess of] his o w n c h a ra c te r; (2 ) passionate and m o ral arg u m e n ts th a t cause ( a ) th e souls o f th e citizens to g ro w re v e re n t, subm issive, m u ted , and m eek. B u t w ith re sp e c t to e v e ry th in g c o n tra ry to these acts he sh o u ld em p lo y ( b ) passionate and m oral a rg u m e n ts b y w h ic h th e souls o f th e citizens g ro w co n fid e n t, spitefu l, insolent, and c o n te m p tu o u s. H e sh o u ld e m p lo y these sam e tw o kinds of arg u m e n ts [rt and £ ], resp ectiv ely , w ith th e p rin ces w h o agree w ith him and w ith those w h o o p p ose him , w ith th e m en and th e auxiliaries cm p lo y e d b y him and w ith th e ones e m p lo y ed b y those w h o o ppose him , and w ith th e v irtu o u s and w ith those w h o oppose th em . T h u s w ith resp ect to his o w n positio n , he sh o u ld em p lo y arg u m e n ts b y w h ic h souls g ro w re v e re n t and subm issive. B u t w ith re sp e c t to his o p p o n e n ts he sh o u ld em p lo y arg u m e n ts th a t cause souls to g ro w sp itefu l, insolent, and c o n te m p tu o u s; a rg u m e n ts w ith w h ic h he c o n tra d ic ts, using persuasive m eth o d s, th o se w h o disagree w ith his o w n op in io n s and acts; an d a rg u m en ts th a t sh o w th e o p in ions and acts o f th e o p p o n e n t as base and m ake th e ir m eanness and n o to rie ty ap p aren t. H e should em p lo y here [54] b o th classes o f arg u m en ts: I m ean th e class th a t sh o u ld be e m p lo y e d p e rio d ically, d aily, and te m p o ra rily , and n o t p reserv ed , k e p t p e rm a n e n tly , o r w ritte n d o w n ; and th e o th e r class, w h ic h sh o u ld be p reserv ed and k e p t p e rm a n e n tly , o ra lly and in w ritin g . [T h e la tte r should be k e p t in tw o B ooks.] H e sh o u ld place in these tw o B ooks th e op in io n s and the acts th a t n ations and cities w e re called u p o n to em b race, the a rg u m e n ts b y w h ich he s o u g h t to p reserv e am o n g th em and to establish in th e m th e

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tilings th e y w ere called u p o n to em b race so th a t th e y w ill n o t be fo rg o tte n , and th e arg u m e n ts w ith w h ic h he c o n tra d ic ts th e o p p o n e n ts o f these o p in io n s and acts. T h e re fo re th e sciences th a t fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f n atio n s and cities w ill have th re e o rd e rs o f ran k ; each k ind w ill have a g ro u p to p reserv e it w h o sh o u ld be d ra w n fro m am o n g those w h o possess th e fa c u lty th a t enables th em to excel in th e d isc o v e ry o f w h a t had n o t been c le a rly stated to th em w ith re fe re n c e to th e science th e y p reserv e, to d efen d it, to c o n tra d ic t w h a t c o n tra d ic ts it, and to excel in te a c h in g all o f this to o th ers. In all o f this th e y should aim at acco m p lish in g th e p u rpose o f th e su p rem e ru le r w ith re sp e c t to nations and cities. 45 T h e n he [th e su p rem e ru le r] sh o u ld in q u ire n ex t in to th e d iffe re n t classes o f n ations b y in q u irin g in to e v e ry n atio n and in to th e h u m an states o f c h a ra c te r and th e acts fo r w h ic h all n ations are eq u ip p ed b y th a t n a tu re w h ic h is c o m m o n to them , u n til he com es to in q u ire in to all o r m o st nations. H e should in q u ire in to th a t in w h ic h all nations sh are—th a t is, th e h u m an n a tu re co m m o n to th e m —and th e n in to all th e th in g s th a t p e rta in specifically to e v e ry g ro u p w ith in e v e ry nation. H e should d iscern all o f these, d ra w u p an actual, if ap p ro x im ate, list o f th e acts and th e states o f c h a ra c te r w ith w h ic h e v e ry n atio n can be set a rig h t and g u id ed to w a rd happiness, and sp e c ify th e classes o f persuasive a rg u m e n t (re g a rd in g b o th the th e o re tic a l and th e p ra c tic a l v irtu e s) th a t o u g h t to be e m p lo y ed am o n g th em . H e w ill th u s set d o w n w h a t e v e ry n atio n is capable of, h av in g su b d iv id ed e v e ry n atio n and in q u ire d w h e th e r o r n o t th e re is a g ro u p fit fo r p re se rv in g th e th e o re tic a l sciences [53‫ ]־‬and o th e rs w h o can p reserv e th e p o p u la r th e o re tic a l sciences o r th e im agem a k in g th e o re tic a l scien ces.15 46 P ro v id e d all o f these g ro u p s exist in nations, fo u r sciences w ill em erge. F irst, th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e th ro u g h w h ic h th e beings b eco m e in tellig ib le w ith c e rta in d em o n stratio n s. N e x t, these sam e intelligibles acq u ired b y persuasive m eth o d s. S u b seq u en tly , th e science th a t com prises th e sim ilitudes o f these intelligibles, ac c e p te d b y persuasive m eth o d s. F in ally , th e sciences e x tra c te d fro m these th re e fo r each n atio n . T h e r e w ill be as m a n y o f these ex tra c te d sciences as th e re are nations, each c o n ta in in g e v e ry th in g b y w h ic h a p a rtic u la r n atio n becom es p e rfe c t and h ap p y . 47 T h e re fo re he [th e su p rem e ru le r] has to secure c e rta in g ro u p s o f m en o r c e rta in in d iv id u als w h o are to be in s tru c te d in w h a t causes th e happiness o f p a rtic u la r nations, w h o w ill p reserv e w h a t can fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f a p a rtic u la r n atio n alone, and w h o w ill learn th e persuasive m eth o d s th a t sh o u ld be e m p lo y ed in fo rm in g th e c h a ra c te r o f th a t n atio n . T h e k n o w le d g e w h ic h th a t n atio n o u g h t to have m u st be p reserv ed b y a m an o r a g ro u p o f m en also possessing th e fa c u lty th a t enables th e m to excel in th e d isc o v e ry o f w h a t w as n o t a c tu a lly given to this m an o r this g ro u p o f m en b u t is, n evertheless, o f th e sam e k ind fo r w h ic h th e y a c t

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as custo d ian s, enables th e m to d efen d it and c o n tra d ic t w h a t opposes it, and to excel in th e in stru c tio n o f th a t nation. In all o f this th e y should aim a t acco m p lish in g w h a t th e su p rem e ru le r had in m ind fo r th e n atio n , f o r w h o se sake he gave this m an o r this g ro u p o f m en w h a t w as given to th em . S u ch are th e m en w h o sh o u ld be e m p lo y ed to fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f n ations w ith th e ir con sen t. 48 T h e best co u rse is th a t each m e m b er o f th e g ro u p s to w h ic h th e fo rm a tio n o f th e c h a ra c te r o f nations is d eleg ated sh o u ld possess a w arlik e v irtu e and a d elib erativ e v irtu e fo r use in case th e re is need to excel in lead in g tro o p s in w a r; [ 3 6 ] th u s e v e ry o n e o f th e m w ill possess th e skill to fo rm th e [n a tio n ’s] c h a ra c te r b y b o th m eth o d s. If this co m b in a tio n does n o t h ap p en to exist in one m an, th e n he [th e su p rem e ru le r] sh o u ld add to th e m an w h o fo rm s th e c h a ra c te r o f nations w ith th e ir co n sen t, ano th e r w h o possesses this c ra ft o f w ar. In tu rn , th e one to w h o m th e fo rm atio n o f th e c h a ra c te r o f a n y n atio n is d eleg ated should also fo llo w th e cu sto m o f e m p lo y in g a g ro u p o f m en to fo rm th e c h a ra c te r o f th e n atio n w ith its co n se n t o r b y co m p u lsio n , e ith e r b y d iv id in g th e m in to tw o g ro u p s o r em p lo y in g a single g ro u p th a t possesses a skill fo r d o in g b o th . S u b seq u en tly , this one g ro u p , o r the tw o gro u p s, sh o u ld be subdivided, and so on, e n d in g in th e lo w est divisions o r th e ones \y ith th e least p o w e r in th e fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r. T h e ranks w ith in these g ro u p s should be established a c c o rd in g to th e d elib erativ e v irtu e o f each individual: th a t is, d e p e n d in g on w h e th e r this d elib erativ e v irtu e exploits su b o rd in a te ones o r is ex p lo ited b y one su p e rio r to it. T h e fo rm e r w ill rule and th e la tte r have a su b o rd in a te office a c c o rd in g to th e p o w e r o f th e ir resp ectiv e d elib erativ e virtues. W h e n these tw o g ro u p s are fo rm e d in a n y n atio n o r c ity , th e y , in tu rn , w ill o rd e r th e rest. 49 T h ese, th en , are th e m odes and m eth o d s th ro u g h w h ic h the fo u r h u m an th in g s b y w h ic h su p rem e happiness is achieved are realized in n atio n s an d cities.

IV

50 F o re m o st a m o n g all o f these [fo u r] sciences is th a t w h ic h gives an a c c o u n t o f th e beings as th e y are p erceiv ed b y th e in te lle c t w ith ce rta in d em o n stratio n s. T h e o th e rs m erely take these sam e beings and e m p lo y persuasion a b o u t th e m o r re p re se n t th em w ith im ages so as to facilitate th e in stru c tio n o f th e m u ltitu d e o f th e nations and th e citizens o f cities. T h a t is because n ations and th e citizens o f cities are co m p o sed o f som e w h o are th e elect and o th e rs w h o are the vu lg ar. T h e v u lg a r confine them selves, o r sh o u ld be co n fin ed , to th e o re tic a l c o g n itio n s th a t are in c o n fo rm ity w ith u n ex am ined co m m o n opinion. [57] T h e elect do n o t

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co n fin e them selves in a n y o f th e ir th e o re tic a l c o g n itio n s to w h a t is in c o n fo rm ity w ith u n ex am in ed c o m m o n op in io n , b u t reach th e ir co n v ictio n and k n o w le d g e on th e basis o f prem ises su b jected to th o ro u g h s c ru tin y . T h e r e f o r e w h o e v e r th in k s th a t he is n o t co n fin ed to w h a t is in c o n fo rm ity w ith u n ex am ined co m m o n o p in io n in his inquiries, believes th a t in th em he is o f th e “ e le c t” and th a t e v e ry b o d y else is vu lg ar. H e n c e th e c o m p e te n t p ra c titio n e r o f e v e ry a rt conies to be called one o f th e “ e le c t” because p eo p le k n o w th a t he does n o t co n fin e him self, w ith re sp e c t to th e o b jects o f his art, to w h a t is in c o n fo rm ity w ith u n exam ined c o m m o n o p in io n , b u t exhausts th e m and scru tin izes th e m th o ro u g h ly . A gain, w h o e v e r does n o t hold a political office o r does n o t possess an a rt th a t establishes his claim to a political office, b u t e ith e r possesses no a rt a t all o r is en ab led b y his a rt to hold o n ly a su b o rd in a te office in th e c ity , is said to be “ v u lg a r” ; and w h o e v e r holds a p o litical office o r else possesses an a r t th a t enables him to aspire to a political office, is o f th e “ e le c t.” T h e re fo re , w h o e v e r th in k s th a t he possesses an a rt th a t qualifies him fo r assum ing a political office o r th in k s th a t his p o sitio n has th e sam e statu s as a p o litical office ( f o r instance, m en w ith p ro m in e n t ancesto rs and m a n y w h o possess g re a t w e a lth ), calls him self one o f th e “ e le c t” and a “ statesm an .” 51 W h o e v e r has a m o re p e rfe c t m a ste ry o f th e a rt th a t qualifies him fo r assum ing an office is m o re a p p ro p ria te fo r inclusion am o n g the elect. T h e re fo re it fo llo w s th a t th e m ost elect o f th e elect is th e su p rem e ru ler. It w o u ld ap p ear th a t this is so because he is th e one w h o does n o t c o n fine him self in a n y th in g a t all to w h a t is in c o n fo rm ity w ith un ex am in ed c o m m o n o p in io n . H e m u st hold th e office o f th e su p rem e ru le r an d be th e m o st elect o f th e elect because o f his state o f c h a ra c te r and skill. A s fo r th e o n e w h o assum es a p olitical office [5£] w ith th e in te n tio n o f acco m p lish in g th e p u rp o se o f th e su p rem e ru le r, he adh eres to th o ro u g h ly sc ru tin iz e d opinions. H o w e v e r, th e op in io n s th a t caused him to b eco m e an a d h e re n t16 o r because o f w h ic h he w as c o n v in ced th a t he sh o u ld use his a r t to serve th e su p rem e ru ler, w e re based on m ere c o n fo rm ity to u n ex am in ed o pinions; he c o n fo rm s to unexam ined co m m o n o p in io n in his th e o re tic a l c o g n itio n s as w ell. T h e re su lt is th a t the su p rem e ru le r and he w h o possesses th e science th a t encom passes th e intelligibles w ith c e rta in d e m o n stra tio n s b elo n g to th e elect. T h e rest are th e v u lg a r an d th e m u ltitu d e . T h u s th e m e th o d s o f persuasion an d im ag in ativ e re p rese n ta tio n are e m p lo y ed o n ly in th e in stru c tio n o f th e v u lg a r and th e m u ltitu d e o f th e n atio n s and th e cities, w h ile th e c e rta in d e m o n stra tiv e m eth o d s, b y w h ic h th e beings them selves are m ade intelligible, are em p lo y e d in th e in s tru c tio n o f th o se w h o b e lo n g to th e elect. 52 T h is is th e su p e rio r science and th e on e w ith th e m o st p e rfe c t [claim to ru le o r to ] a u th o rity . T h e re st o f th e a u th o rita tiv e sciences are s u b o rd in a te to this science. B y “ th e re st o f th e a u th o rita tiv e sciences”

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I m ean th e seco n d an d th e th ird , and th a t w h ic h is d eriv e d fro m th e m ,1‘ since these sciences m e re ly fo llo w th e exam ple o f th a t science and are e m p lo y ed to acco m p lish the p u rp o se o f th a t science, w h ic h is su p rem e happiness and th e final p e rfe c tio n to be ach ieved b y m an. 53 I t is said th a t this science existed a n c ie n tly a m o n g th e C h ald ean s,18 w h o are th e p eo p le o f al-‘Irã q ,19 su b se q u e n tly re a c h in g th e peo p le o f E g y p t,20 fro m th e re tra n sm itte d to th e G reek s, w h e re it rem ain ed u n til it w as tra n s m itte d to th e S y rian s,21 and th e n to th e A rabs. E v e ry th in g co m p rised b y this science w as e x p o u n d ed in th e G re e k language, la ter in S y riac, and fin ally in A rab ic. T h e G re e k s w h o possessed this science used to call it tru e w isdom and th e h ig h est w isdom . T h e y called th e acq u isitio n o f it, science, and th e scientific state o f m ind, p h ilo so p h y ( b y w h ic h th e y m e a n t th e q u est and th e love fo r th e h ig h est w isd o m ). [39] T h e y held th a t p o te n tia lly it subsum es all th e v ir tu e s .'T h e y called it th e science o f sciences, th e m o th e r o f sciences, th e w isd o m o f w isdom s, and th e a rt o f arts ( th e y m ean t th e a rt th a t m akes use o f all th e arts, th e v irtu e th a t m akes use o f all th e v irtu es, and th e w isdom th a t m akes use o f all w isd o m s). N o w , “ w isd o m ” m a y be used fo r co n su m m ate and ex trem e c o m p e te n c e in a n y a rt w h a tso e v e r w h e n it leads to p e rfo rm in g feats o f w h ic h m o st p ra c titio n e rs o f th a t a rt are incapable. H e re “ w isd o m ” is used in a qualified sense. T h u s he w h o is e x tre m e ly c o m p e te n t in an a rt is said to be “ w ise” in th a t a rt. S im ilarly, a m an w ith p e n e tra tin g p ractical ju d g m e n t and acu m en m a y be called “ w ise” in th e th in g re g a rd in g w h ic h he has p e n e tra tin g p ractical ju d g m e n t. H o w e v e r, tru e w isd o m is this science and state o f m in d alone. 54 W h e n th e th e o re tic a l sciences are isolated and th e ir possessor does n o t have th e fa c u lty fo r ex p lo itin g th e m fo r th e ben efit o f o th ers, th e y are d e fectiv e p h ilo so p h y . T o be a tr u ly p e rfe c t p h ilo so p h e r one has to possess b o th th e th e o re tic a l sciences and the fa c u lty fo r ex p lo itin g them fo r th e b en efit o f all o th e rs a c c o rd in g to th e ir c a p a c ity . W e r e one to co n sid er th e case o f th e tru e p h ilo so p h er, he w o u ld find no d ifferen ce b e tw e e n him and th e su p rem e ru ler. F o r he w h o possesses th e fa c u lty fo r ex p lo itin g w h a t is co m p rised b y th e th e o re tic a l m a tte rs fo r th e ben efit o f all o th e rs possesses th e fa c u lty fo r m ak in g such m a tte rs intelligible as w ell as fo r b rin g in g in to actual existence those o f th em th a t d ep en d o n th e w ill. T h e g re a te r his p o w e r to do th e la tte r, th e m o re p e rfe c t is his p h ilo so p h y . T h e re fo re he w h o is tr u ly p e rfe c t possesses w ith sure insight, first, th e th e o re tic a l virtu es, and su b se q u e n tly th e p ractical. M o reo v er, he possesses th e c a p a c ity fo r b rin g in g th e m a b o u t in nations and cities in th e m a n n e r and th e m easure possible w ith re fe re n c e to each. Since it is im possible fo r him to possess th e fa c u lty fo r b rin g in g th e m a b o u t ex cep t b y e m p lo y in g c e rta in d em o n stratio n s, persuasive m eth o d s, [40] as w ell as m eth o d s th a t re p re se n t th in g s th ro u g h im ages, and this

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e ith e r w ith th e c o n se n t o f o th e rs o r b y co m p u lsio n , it fo llow s th a t th e tru e p h ilo so p h e r is him self th e su p rem e ru ler. 55 E v e ry in s tru c tio n is co m p o sed o f tw o things: (a) m ak in g w h a t is b ein g stu d ie d co m p re h en sib le and causing its idea to be established in th e soul and (h) cau sin g o th e rs to assent to w h a t is c o m p re h e n d e d and established in th e soul. T h e r e are tw o w ay s o f m a k in g a th in g co m p reh en sib le: first, b y causing its essence to be p erceiv ed b y th e inte llect, and seco n d , b y cau sin g it to be im agined th ro u g h th e sim ilitude th a t im itates it. A ssent, to o , is b ro u g h t a b o u t b y one o f tw o m ethods, e ith e r th e m e th o d o f c e rta in d e m o n stra tio n o r th e m e th o d o f persuasion. N o w w h e n one acq u ires k n o w le d g e o f th e beings o r receives in stru c tio n in th e m , if he p erceiv es th e ir ideas them selves w ith his in tellect, and his assent to th e m is b y m eans o f c e rta in d e m o n stra tio n , th e n th e science th a t com p rises these c o g n itio n s is p h ilo so p h y . B u t if th e y are k n o w n b y im ag in in g th e m th ro u g h sim ilitudes th a t im itate them , and assent to w h a t is im ag in ed o f th e m is caused b y persuasive m eth o d s, th e n th e an cients call w h a t co m p rises these c o g n itio n s religion. A n d if th o se intelligibles them selves are ad o p ted , and persuasive m e th o d s are used, th e n th e religion c o m p risin g th e m is called p o p u la r, g en erally a cce p ted , and external p h ilo so p h y . T h e re fo re , a c c o rd in g to th e ancients, relig io n is an im ita tio n o f p h ilo so p h y . B oth co m p rise th e sam e su b jects and b o th give an a c c o u n t o f th e u ltim a te p rin cip les o f th e beings. F o r b o th su p p ly k n o w le d g e a b o u t th e first p rin c ip le and cause o f th e beings, and b o th give an a c c o u n t o f th e u ltim a te en d fo r th e sake o f w h ic h m an is m ad e—th a t is, su p rem e happiness—and th e u ltim ate end o f e v e ry one o f th e o th e r beings. In e v e ry th in g o f w h ic h p h ilo so p h y gives an a c c o u n t based on intellectu al p e rc e p tio n o r c o n c e p tio n , relig io n gives an a c c o u n t based on im ag in atio n . In e v e ry th in g d e m o n stra te d b y p h ilo so p h y , relig io n em p lo y s persuasion. P h ilo so p h y gives an a c c o u n t o f th e u ltim a te p rin cip les ( th a t is, th e essence o f th e first p rin c ip le and th e essences o f th e in c o rp o re a l second p rin ciples22), [41] as th e y are p erceiv ed b y th e intellect. R elig io n sets fo rth th e ir im ages b y m eans o f sim ilitudes o f th e m ta k e n fro m co rp o re a l p rin ciples and im itates th em b y th e ir likenesses a m o n g political offices.23 It im itates th e d iv in e acts b y m eans o f th e fu n c tio n s o f p o litical offices.23 I t im itates th e actio n s o f n atu ral p o w e rs and p rin cip les b y th e ir likenesses a m o n g th e faculties, states, and arts th a t have to do w ith th e w ill, ju st as P lato does in th e Timaeusr* It im itates th e intelligibles b y th e ir likenesses am o n g th e sensibles: fo r instance, som e im itate m a tte r b y “ ab y ss” o r “ d ark n ess” o r “ w a te r,” and n o th in g n ess b y “ d ark n ess.” I t im itates th e classes o f su p rem e happiness—th a t is, th e ends o f th e acts o f th e h u m an v irtu e s—b y th e ir likenesses a m o n g th e g oods th a t are believed to be th e ends. I t im itates th e classes o f tru e happiness b y m eans o f th e ones th a t are believed to be happiness. It im itates th e ranks o f th e beings b y

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th e ir likenesses a m o n g spatial and te m p o ra l ranks. A n d it a tte m p ts to b rin g th e sim ilitudes o f these th in g s as close as possible to th e ir essences.2‫״‬ A lso, in e v e ry th in g o f w h ic h p h ilo so p h y gives an a c c o u n t th a t is d em o n strab le and c e rta in , relig ion gives an a c c o u n t based on persuasive arg u m ents. F in ally , p h ilo so p h y is p rio r to relig io n in tim e. 56 A g ain , it is ev id en t th a t w h e n one seeks to b rin g in to actual existen ce th e intelligibles o f th e th in g s d e p e n d in g on th e w ill supplied b y p ractical p h ilo so p h y , he o u g h t to p rescrib e th e c o n d itio n s th a t re n d e r possible th e ir actu al existence. O n ce th e c o n d itio n s th a t re n d e r th e ir actu al existence possible are p rescrib ed , th e v o lu n ta ry intelligibles are em b o d ied in laws. T h e re fo re th e leg islato r is he w h o , b y th e excellence o f his d elib eratio n , has th e c a p a c ity to find th e c o n d itio n s re q u ire d fo r th e actu al existence o f v o lu n ta ry intelligibles in such a w a y as to lead to th e ach iev em en t o f su p rem e happiness. It is also ev id en t th a t o n ly a fte r p e rc e iv in g th e m b y his in te lle c t should th e legislator seek to disc o v e r th e ir co n d itio n s, and he c a n n o t [ 4 2 ] find th e ir c o n d itio n s th a t en ab le him to g u id e o th e rs to w a rd su p rem e happiness w ith o u t h aving p erceiv ed su p rem e happiness w ith his in tellect. N o r can these th in g s b eco m e in tellig ib le (a n d th e legislative c ra ft th e re b y hold th e su p rem e office) w ith o u t his h av in g b e fo re h a n d acq u ired p h ilo so p h y . T h e re fo re , if he in ten d s to possess a c ra ft th a t is a u th o rita tiv e ra th e r th a n su b servient, th e leg islato r m u st be a p h ilo so p h er. S im ilarly, if th e p h ilo so p h e r w h o has acq u ire d th e th e o re tic a l v irtu es does n o t have th e c a p a c ity fo r b rin g in g th e m a b o u t in all o th e rs a c c o rd in g to th e ir capacities, th e n w h a t he has acq u ired fro m it has no valid ity . Y et he c a n n o t find th e states and th e c o n d itio n s b y w h ic h th e v o lu n ta ry intelligibles assum e actual existence, if he does n o t possess th e d elib erativ e v irtu e ; and th e d elib erativ e v irtu e c a n n o t exist in him w ith o u t th e p ractical v irtu e. M o reo v er, he c a n n o t b rin g th e m a b o u t in all o th e rs a c c o rd in g to th e ir capacities ex cep t b y a fa c u lty th a t enables him to excel in persuasion and in re p re se n tin g th in g s th ro u g h im ages. 57 It follow s, th e n , th a t th e idea o f Im am , P h ilo so p h er, an d L egisla to r is a single idea. H o w e v e r, th e nam e “ p h ilo so p h e r” signifies p rim arily th e o re tic a l v irtu e. B u t if it be d e te rm in e d th a t th e th e o re tic a l v irtu e reach its u ltim a te p e rfe c tio n in ev e ry resp ect, it fo llo w s necessarily th a t he m u st possess all th e o th e r faculties as w ell. “ L e g isla to r” signifies excellence o f k n o w le d g e c o n c e rn in g th e c o n d itio n s o f p ra c tic a l20 in telligibles, th e fa c u lty fo r finding th em , and th e fa c u lty fo r b rin g in g th e m a b o u t in n ations and cities. W h e n it is d e te rm in e d th a t th e y be b ro u g h t in to existence on th e basis o f k n o w led g e, it w ill fo llo w th a t th e th e o retical v irtu e m u st p reced e th e o th e rs—th e existence o f th e in fe rio r p re supposes th e existence o f th e h igher. T h e nam e “ p rin c e ” signifies sove re ig n ty and ab ility . T o be c o m p le te ly able, one has to possess [ 4 3 ] th e p o w e r o f th e g re a te st ab ility . H is a b ility to do a th in g m u st n o t resu lt

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o n ly fro m ex tern al th in g s; he him self m u st possess g re a t ab ility as a re su lt o f his art, skill, and v irtu e bein g o f ex ceed in g ly g re a t p o w er. T h is is n o t possible ex cep t b y g re a t p o w e r o f k n o w le d g e , g re a t p o w e r o f deliberatio n , an d g re a t p o w e r o f [m o ral] v irtu e and art. O th e rw ise he is n o t tr u ly able n o r sovereign. F o r if his a b ility stops sh o rt o f this, it is still im p e rfe c t. S im ilarly , if his ab ility is re stric te d to g o o d s in fe rio r to su p rem e happiness, his a b ility is in c o m p le te and he is n o t p e rfe c t. T h e re fo re th e tru e p rin c e is th e sam e as th e p h ilo so p h e r-leg isla to r. A s to th e idea o f Im am in th e A ra b ic language, it signifies m e re ly th e one w hose exam ple is fo llo w ed and w h o is w ell-rec eiv ed : th a t is, c ith e r his p e rfe c tio n is w ell-rcc civ cd o r his p u rp o se is w ell-receiv ed . If he is n o t w ell-rec eiv ed in all th e infinite activities, virtu es, an d arts, th e n he is n o t tr u ly w ellreceiv ed . O n ly w h e n all o th e r arts, v irtues, and activities seek to realize his p u rp o se and no o th e r, w ill his a rt be th e m o st p o w e rfu l a rt, his [m o ral] v irtu e th e m o st p o w e rfu l v irtu e , his d elib eratio n th e m o st p o w e rfu l deliberatio n , and his science th e m o st p o w e rfu l science. F o r w ith all o f these p o w e rs he w ill be ex p lo itin g th e p o w e rs o f o th e rs so as to acco m p lish his o w n p u rp o se. T h is is n o t possible w ith o u t th e th e o re tic a l sciences, w ith o u t th e g re a te st o f all d elib erativ e virtu es, and w ith o u t th e rest o f th o se th in g s th a t are in th e p h ilo so p h e r. 58 So let it be clear to y o u th a t th e idea o f th e P h ilo so p h er, S u p rem e R u le r, P rin ce, L eg islato r, and Im am is b u t a single idea. N o m a tte r w h ic h o ne o f these w o rd s y o u take, if y o u p ro c e e d to lo o k at w h a t each o f th e m signifies [ ^ ] a m o n g th e m a jo rity o f those w h o speak o u r language, y o u w ill find th a t th e y all finally agree b y sig n ify in g one and th e sam e idea. 59 O n c e th e im ages re p re se n tin g th e th e o re tic a l th in g s27 d e m o n stra te d in th e th e o re tic a l sciences arc p ro d u c e d in th e souls o f th e m u ltitu d e and th e y are m ade to assent to th e ir im ages, and o n ce th e p ra c tic a l th in g s (to g e th e r w ith th e c o n d itio n s o f th e possib ility o f th e ir ex isten ce), tak e hold o f th e ir souls and d o m in ate th em so th a t th e y are unable to resolve to do a n y th in g else, th e n th e th e o re tic a l and p ra c tic a l th in g s are realized. N o w these th in g s are p h ilo so p h y w h e n th e y are in th e soul o f th e legislato r. T h e y arc relig io n w h e n th e y are in th e souls o f th e m u ltitu d e . F o r w h e n th e leg islato r k n o w s these th in g s, th e y are e v id e n t to him b y su re insight, w h ereas w h a t is established in th e souls o f th e m u ltitu d e is th ro u g h an im age and a persuasive a rg u m e n t. A lth o u g h it is th e legisla to r w h o also rep resen ts these th in g s th ro u g h im ages, n e ith e r th e im ages n o r th e persuasive a rg u m e n ts arc in ten d ed fo r him self. As far as he is c o n c e rn e d , th e y arc c ertain . Fie is th e one w h o in v en ts th e im ages and th e persuasive arg u m e n ts, b u t n o t fo r th e sake o f establishing these th in g s in his o w n soul as a relig io n fo r him self. N o , th e im ages and th e p ersuasivc a rg u m e n ts arc in te n d e d fo r o th e rs, w h ereas, so fa r as he is c o n c e rn e d , th ese th in g s are c ertain . T h e y are a relig io n fo r o th ers, w hereas,

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so fa r as he is c o n c e rn e d , th e y are p h ilo so p h y . S uch, th e n , is tru e p h ilo so p h y and th e tru e p h ilo so p h er. 60 As fo r m u tila te d p h ilo so p h y : th e c o u n te rfe it p h ilo so p h e r, th e vain p h ilo so p h er, o r th e false p h ilo so p h e r is th e one w h o sets o u t to s tu d y th e th e o re tic a l sciences w ith o u t' b ein g p re p a re d fo r them . F o r he w h o sets o u t to in q u ire o u g h t to be in n a te ly eq u ip p ed fo r th e th e o re tic a l sciences—th a t is, fulfil th e co n d itio n s p re sc rib e d b y P lato in th e R e p u b l i c :28 H e sh o u ld excel in c o m p re h e n d in g and co n c e iv in g th a t w h ic h is essential. M o re o v e r, he sh o u ld have g o o d m e m o ry and be able to e n d u re th e toil o f stu d y . H e sh o u ld love tru th fu ln e ss and tru th fu l people, and justice and ju st p eo p le; [ 4 5 ] and n o t be h e a d stro n g o r a w ra n g le r a b o u t w h a t he desires. H e sh o u ld n o t be g lu tto n o u s fo r fo o d and d rin k , and should b y n a tu ra l d isp o sitio n disdain th e ap p etites, th e d irh em , th e d in ar, and th e like. H e sh o u ld be h ig h -m in d ed an d avoid w h a t is d isg racefu l in people. H e sh o u ld be pious, yield easily to goodness and justice, and be s tu b b o rn in y ie ld in g to evil and injustice. A n d he sh o u ld be s tro n g ly d e te rm in e d in fa v o r o f th e r ig h t th in g . M o re o v e r, he sh o u ld be b ro u g h t up a c c o rd in g to law s and habits th a t resem ble his in n a te disposition. H e sh o u ld have so u n d co n v ic tio n s a b o u t th e opinions o f th e relig io n in w h ic h he is re a re d , h o ld fast to th e v irtu o u s acts in his relig io n , and n o t fo rsak e all o r m o st o f th em . F u rth e rm o re , he sh o u ld hold fast to th e g e n e ra lly a cce p ted v irtu es and n o t fo rsake th e g e n e ra lly acc e p te d noble acts. F o r if a y o u th is su ch, and th e n sets o u t to s tu d y p h ilo so p h y and learns it, it is possible th a t he w ill n o t b eco m e a c o u n te rfe it o r a vain o r a false p h ilo so p h er. 61 T h e false p h ilo so p h e r is he w h o acquires th e th e o re tic a l sciences w ith o u t ach iev in g th e u tm o st p e rfe c tio n so as to be able to in tro d u c e o th e rs to w h a t he k n o w s in so fa r as th e ir c a p a c ity perm its. T h e vain p h ilo so p h e r is he w h o learns th e th e o re tic a l sciences, b u t w ith o u t g o in g a n y f u r th e r and w ith o u t b ein g h a b itu a te d to d o in g th e acts co n sid ered v irtu o u s b y a c e rta in relig io n o r th e g en erally a cce p ted noble acts. In stead he fo llo w s his o w n in c lin atio n and ap p etites in e v e ry th in g , w h a tev er th e y m a y h ap p en to be. T h e c o u n te rfe it p h ilo so p h e r is he w h o studies th e th e o re tic a l sciences w ith o u t b ein g n a tu ra lly eq u ip p ed fo r th em . T h e re fo re , a lth o u g h th e c o u n te rfe it and th e vain m ay c o m p lete th e s tu d y o f th e th e o re tic a l sciences, in th e end th e ir possession o f th em dim inishes little b y little. B y th e tim e th e y reach th e age at w h ic h [ 4 6 ] a m an sh o u ld b eco m e p e rfe c t in th e v irtues, th e ir k n o w le d g e w ill have been c o m p le te ly ex tin g u ish ed , even m o re so th a n th e e x tin c tio n o f th e fire [sun] o f H e ra c litu s m e n tio n ed b y P la to .9‫ ־‬F o r th e n atu ral dispositions o f th e fo rm e r and th e h ab it o f th e la tte r o v e rp o w e r w h a t th e y m ig h t have re m e m b e re d in th e ir y o u th and m ake it b u rd en so m e fo r th e m to re ta in w h a t th e y had p a tie n tly toiled for. T h e y n eg lect it, and w h a t th e y re ta in begins to dim inish little b y little u n til its fire becom es in-

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effectiv e and ex tin g u ish ed , and th e y g a th e r no fru it fro m it. As fo r th e false p h ilo so p h e r, he is th e one w h o is n o t y e t aw are o f th e p u rp o se fo r w h ic h p h ilo so p h y is p u rsu ed . H e acquires th e th e o re tic a l sciences, o r o n ly som e p o rtio n o f th em , and holds the o p in io n th a t th e p u rp o se o f th e m easure he has acq u ire d consists in c e rta in kinds o f happiness th a t are believed to be so o r are co n sid ered b y th e m u ltitu d e to be g o o d th in g s. T h e re fo re he rests th e re to e n jo y th a t happiness, asp irin g to achieve this p u rp o se w ith his k n o w led g e. H e m a y achieve his p u rp o se and settle fo r it, o r else find his p u rp o se d ifficult to achieve and so hold th e o p in io n th a t th e k n o w le d g e he has is superfluous. S uch is th e false p h ilo so p h er. 62 T h e tru e p h ilo so p h e r is th e one m e n tio n e d b e fo re .30 If a fte r rea c h in g this stage no use is m ade o f him , th e fa c t th a t he is o f no use to o th e rs is n o t his fa u lt b u t th e fau lt o f those w h o e ith e r do n o t listen o r are n o t o f th e o p in io n th a t th e y sh o u ld listen to him . T h e re fo re th e p rin c e o r th e im am is p rin c e o r im am b y v irtu e o f his skill and a rt, regardless o f w h e th e r o r n o t an y o n e ack n o w led g e s him , w h e th e r o r n o t he is o b ey ed , w h e th e r o r n o t he is su p p o rte d in his p u rp o se b y a n y g ro u p ; ju st as th e p h y sician is p h y sician b y v irtu e o f his skill and his ab ility to heal th e sick, w h e th e r o r n o t th e re are sick m en fo r him to heal, w h e th e r o r n o t he finds tools to use in his a c tiv ity , w h e th e r he is p ro sp ero u s o r p o o r—n o t h av in g a n y o f these th in g s does n o t do a w a y w ith his p h y sician sh ip . S im ilarly , n e ith e r th e im am ate o f th e im am , [47] th e p h ilo so p h y o f th e p h ilo so p h er, n o r th e p rin ce sh ip o f th e p rin c e is done a w a y w ith b y n o t h av in g tools to use in his activities o r m en to e m p lo y in re a c h in g his p u rp o se. 63 T h e p h ilo so p h y th a t answ ers to this d e sc rip tio n w as h an d ed d o w n to us b y th e G re e k s fro m P lato and A risto tle o n ly . B o th have given us an a c c o u n t o f p h ilo so p h y , b u t n o t w ith o u t g iv in g us also an a c c o u n t o f th e w ay s to it and o f th e w ay s to re-establish it w h e n it becom es co n fu sed o r ex tin ct. W e shall begin b y e x p o u n d in g first th e p h ilo so p h y o f P la to and th e o rd e rs o f ran k in his p h ilo so p h y . W e shall begin w ith th e first p a rt o f th e p h ilo so p h y o f P lato , and th e n o rd e r one p a rt o f his p h ilo so p h y a fte r a n o th e r u n til w e reach its end. W e shall do the sam e w ith th e p h ilo so p h y p resen ted to us b y A risto tle , b eg in n in g w ith th e first p a rt o f his p h ilo so p h y . 64 So let it be clear to y o u th a t, in w h a t th e y p resen ted , th e ir p u rpose is th e sam e, and th a t th e y in te n d e d to o ffer one and th e sam e p h ilo so p h y .

NOTES i. These are the four ways of interpreting and askihg the question w h y , which Alfarabi has indicated previously

in sections 5 ff.; they ask after (1) the form, (2-3) the agent and the material, and (4) the end.

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2. For the source of the distinction between the “ principle of instruction” and the “ principle of being,” between “ what is better known to us” and “ what is better known by nature,” or between the causa cognoscendi and the causa essendi, consider Aristotle Physics i. 1. 184*16-23, i. 5. 189*4 (cf. Posterior A nalytics i. 2. 7 1 b3 4 6 * 7 2 ‫) ־‬, N icom achean Ethics i. 4. 1095*30 ff., vi. 3. 1139b25 ff. 3. Sections 4 ff. 4. That is, the “ theoretical” part of it. Cf. below, section 26; Alfarabi, Enum eration o f the Sciences, pp. 103-4 (above, Selection 1). 5. Alfarabi says “ first principle” and “ principles” respectively; cf. the physicalmetaphysical and political connotations of archê (archõn) : prijicipium -princeps, “ principle” -“ prince.” 6. Enumerated by Alfarabi in section 1 : “The human things by which nations and citizens of cities attain earthly happiness in this life and supreme happiness in the life beyond are of four kinds: theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts.” 7. The distinction between “ natural” and “ voluntary” intelligibles and the meaning of “ voluntary” intelligibles are stated below, sections 24 ff. 8. The “ rationative,” “ thinking,” “ calculative” or “ reflective” faculty (fik riy y a h ). 9. Cf. Aristotle N icom achean Ethics vi. 12, 13. 10. Sections 4 ff. 11. R ep u b lic ii. 376E—iv. 427C, vii. 521C -41B . 12. That is, deliberative and moral. 13. Note, however, the end of the section and the following sections where the dual aspect of this skill is emphasized. 14. Sections 41-43, perhaps also sections

28 ff. 15. The latter two sciences are (derivatively) “ theoretical” (or “ philosophic,” cf. section 55 [40 :12-13]) inasmuch as (a) they deal with opinions (vs. acts) and (b) their subjects were originally seized upon in the theoretical sciences properly so-called (above, section 44, below, section 46). 16. Or “ follower,” “successor” (tãbP). He functions as an “ aide” or “subordinate” who is employed by the supreme

ruler to apply and preserve his law (above, sections 44, 47-48). In the absence of the supreme ruler, the “ adherent” is envisaged as his “successor.” This is a second-best arrangement, because the ruler will then lack theoretical knowledge and hence the ability to be a true lawgiver (above, sections 45 ff.). Cf. Alfarabi, Political R eg im e, pp. 51, 54 (above, Selection 2). 17. Above, section 46. 18. For an account of the “ philosophic” sciences (mathematics, astronomy, etc.) of the “ Chaldeans,” cf., e.g., Sa'id alAndalusi, Classes o f N ations (Tabaqãt alum am ), ed. Louis Cheikho (Beirut, 1912), iv. 3. 19. Southern Mesopotamia, the alluvial region bounded in the north by a line from al-Anbãr to Takrit. Cf. ibid. i. 20. Ibid. iv. 6. Sa‘id al-AndalusI reports the popular myth of the “ prophetic” origin of the philosophic sciences. In addition to claiming that philosophy alone is true wisdom, Alfarabi insists (below, section 55 [4 1:12 ]) that “ philosophy is prior to religion in tim e.” 21. al-Siryãn : the Jacobite and Nestorian (Monophysite) Christians using Syriac as a literary medium in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Empire. 22. The causes or principles of the heavenly bodies. 23. Alfarabi says “ principles.” Cf. above, n. 5. 24. 19D, 2 1B-C, 29B ff. 25. See Alfarabi, Political Regi?ne, pp. 56-57 (above, Selection 2). 26. “ Practical” as distinguished from “ incorporeal” and “ natural.” T h ey are the intelligibles whose realization depends on deliberation, moral character, and art. Above, sections 2 2 ff., 40. 27. “Things” (ashyã’ ). The term shay’ is used throughout in a variety of senses (roughly corresponding to “ being” ). It can signify particulars or universais, what exists outside the mind or the intelligible ideas (as here), the objects of knowledge or of opinion and imagination (as in the rest of the section). 28. ii. 375A ff., vi. 487B ff., passim. 29. R ep u b lic vi. 498B; cf. Aristotle M eteorologica ii. 2. 355*9 ff. 30. Sections 53, 57, 59.

4 .

A lfarabi P L A T O ’S LAWS

Translated by Muhsin Mahdi

Plato's Laws consists

o f an introduction and summaries o f the first nine books o f Plato’s Laws, o f w hich o n ly the first tw o are given here. In the introduction, A lfarab i explains Plato’s art o f w ritin g in general and the method he follow s in w ritin g the Laws in particular. H e also states his ow n method o f sum marizing Plato’s Laws, points to the tw o groups o f readers for w hom the w o rk was w ritten, and indicates the benefit that each can derive from reading it. In the preceding texts, especially in the Attainment of Happiness, A lfarab i treats of the place o f laws and legislation in the broader context o f political philosophy. H ere, the question of laws becomes the object o f a specialized

[

study. In the guise of a com m entary on Plato’s Laws, A lfarab i shows the relevance o f Plato’s investigation o f G reek divine laws to the study and understanding o f all divine laws; hence A vicen n a ’s statement (below , Selection 5 ) that Plato’s Laws treat of prophecy and the L a w . T h e term nãmüs (nom os) is translated throughout as “ law .” T h e translation is based on F. G a b rieli’s edition: Alfarabius Compendium Legum Platonis (Lo n d o n , 19 5 2 ), pp. 3 -16 , and takes into account the additional evidence presented b y Muhsin M ahdi, “ T h e Editio Princeps o f F ã rabl’s Compendium Legum Platonis,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, X X ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 1-24.

i n t r o d u c t i o n

]

W h e re a s th e th in g b y w h ic h m an excels all o th e r anim als is th e fa c u lty th a t enables him to d iscern th e m eans and th e affairs w ith w h ic h he deals and th a t he observes, in o rd e r to k n o w w h ic h o f th e m i

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is useful so as to w a n t and o b tain it, an d to re je c t an d avoid th e useless; w h ereas th a t fa c u lty em erges fro m p o te n tia lity in to a c tu a lity o n ly th ro u g h ex p erien ce ( “ e x p erien ce” m eans reflec tio n u p o n th e p a rtic u la r instances o f a th in g and, fro m w h a t one finds in these p a rtic u la r instances, passing ju d g m e n t u p o n its u n iv ersal c h a ra c te ris tic s )—th e re fo re , w h o e v e r acq u ires m o re o f these experien ces is m o re ex cellen t and p e rfe c t in his h u m a n ity . H o w ever, th e m an o f ex p erien ce m ay e rr in w h a t he does and experiences, so th a t he conceiv es th e th in g to be in a d iffe re n t state th a n th e one in w h ic h it re a lly is. ( T h e r e are m a n y reasons fo r e rro r, w h ic h have been en u m e rated b y th o se w h o have discussed th e a rt o f so p h istry . O f all m en, th e w ise m en are th e ones w h o have acq u ired th e experiences th a t are tr u ly so u n d .) N ev erth eless, all m en are n a tu ra lly disposed to pass a universal ju d g m e n t a fte r o b serv in g o n ly a fe w p a rtic u la r instances o f a th in g ( “ u n iv ersal” m eans here th a t w h ic h cov ers all th e p a rtic u la r instances o f th e th in g as w ell as th e ir d u ra tio n in tim e ); so th a t o n ce it is observ ed th a t an in d iv id u al had d o n e so m eth in g in a c e rta in w a y o n a n u m b e r o f occasions, it is ju d g e d th a t he does th a t th in g in th a t w a y all th e tim e. F o r instance, w h e n som eone has spoken th e tr u th on one, tw o , o r a n u m b e r o f occasions, m en are n a tu ra lly disposed to ju d g e th a t he is sim p ly tru th fu l, and sim ilarly w h e n som eone lies; and w h e n som eone is o b serv ed on a n u m b e r o f occasions to a c t w ith c o u ra g e o r as a c o w a rd , o r to give ev id en ce o f an y o th e r m oral habit, he is ju d g e d to be so, w h o lly and alw ays. 2 W h e re a s th e w ise m en k n o w this aspect o f m e n ’s n a tu ra l dispositio n , som etim es th e y have re p e a te d ly sh o w n them selves as possessing a c e rta in c h a ra c te r u n til m en ju d g e d th a t this is h o w th e y alw ays are. T h e n , a fte rw a rd s, th e y a c te d in a d iffe re n t m an n er, w h ic h w e n t u n n o tic e d b y m en, w h o su pposed th a t th e y w e re a c tin g as th e y had d o n e [4] fo rm e rly . It is related , fo r exam ple, th a t a c e rta in abstem ious ascetic w as k n o w n fo r his p ro b ity , p ro p rie ty , asceticism , and w o rsh ip , and b ecam e fam o u s fo r this. H e feared th e ty ra n n ic a l so v ereig n and decid ed to ru n a w a y fro m his c ity . T h e so v e re ig n ’s co m m an d w e n t o u t th a t he is to be search ed fo r and arrested w h e re v e r he is fo u n d . H e c o u ld n o t leave fro m an y o ne o f th e c ity ’s gates and w as ap p reh en siv e lest he fall in to th e hands o f th e so v e re ig n ’s m en. So he w e n t and fo u n d a dress th a t is w o rn b y v agabonds, p u t it on, c a rrie d a c y m b a l in his hand, p re te n d e d to be d ru n k early at n ig h t, and cam e o u t to th e g ate o f th e c ity sin g in g to th e a c c o m p a n im e n t o f th a t cy m b al o f his. T h e gatek eep er said to him , “W h o are y o u ? ” “I am so and so, th e asc e tic !” he said in a jo c u la r vein. T h e g a te k e e p e r th o u g h t he w as p o k in g fu n a t him and he did n o t in te rfe re w ith him . So he saved him self w ith o u t h av in g lied in w h a t he said. 3 O u r p u rp o se in m ak in g this in tro d u c tio n is this: th e w ise P lato did n o t feel free to reveal and u n c o v e r th e sciences fo r all m en.

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T h e re fo re he fo llo w e d th e p ra c tic e o f u sin g sym bols, riddles, o b sc u rity , and d ifficu lty , so th a t science w o u ld n o t fall in to th e hands o f those w h o do n o t deserve it and be d e fo rm e d , o r in to th e hands o f one w h o does n o t k n o w its w o rth o r w h o uses it im p ro p e rly . In this he w as rig h t. O n c e he k n ew and becam e c e rta in th a t he had b eco m e w e ll-k n o w n fo r this p ra c tic e , and th a t all m en cam e to k n o w th a t this w as w h a t he did, he som etim es tu rn e d to th e su b je c t he in te n d e d to discuss an d stated it o p e n ly an d literally ; b u t th e one w h o reads o r hears his discussion th in k s th a t it is sy m b o lic and th a t he in te n d e d so m e th in g d iffe re n t fro m w h a t he has stated o p en ly . T h is n o tio n is one o f th e secrets o f his books. M o reo v er, n o one is able to u n d e rsta n d th a t w h ic h he states o p e n ly and th a t w h ic h he states sy m b o lically unless he is tra in e d in th a t a rt itself, and no one is able to d istin g u ish b e tw e e n th e tw o unless he is skilled in th e science th a t is b e in g discussed. T h is is h o w his discussion p ro ceed s in th e L a w s . In th e p re se n t b o o k , w e have resolved u p o n e x tra c tin g th e no tio n s to w h ic h he alludes in th a t b o o k an d g ro u p in g th e m to g e th e r, fo llo w in g th e o rd e r o f th e D iscourses it contains, in o rd e r th a t th e p re se n t b o o k b eco m e an aid to w h o e v e r w an ts to k n o w th a t b o o k and sufficient fo r w h o e v e r c a n n o t b ear th e h ardship o f s tu d y and reflectio n . G o d acco m m o d ates to w h a t is rig h t. [5]

F I R S T

D I S C O U R S E

1 A q u e stio n e r asked a b o u t th e cause o f la y in g d o w n th e laws: “ cau se” m eans h ere th e m ak er, th e m a k er o f th e law s b e in g th e one w h o legislates th em . T h e in te rlo c u to r an sw ered th a t th e one w h o legislated th e m w as Zeus; a m o n g th e G reek s, Zeus is th e fa th e r o f m en w h o is th e last cause. 2 T h e n he m e n tio n e d a n o th e r legislation in o rd e r to explain th a t th e re are m a n y law s and th a t th e ir m u ltip lic ity does n o t d e tra c t fro m th e ir v alid ity . H e su p p o rte d this b y th e te stim o n y o f g en erally a c c e p te d an d p o p u la r poem s an d tra d itio n s in praise o f som e an c ie n t legislators. 3 T h e n he in d icate d th a t, because th e re are som e w h o d e tra c t fro m th e v a lid ity o f th e law s and te n d to arg u e th a t th e y are foolish, it is rig h t to exam ine th em . H e explained th a t th e law s o c c u p y a v e ry high place and th a t th e y are su p e rio r to all w ise sayings. H e exam ined th e p a rtic u la rs o f th e law th a t w as g e n e ra lly a c c e p te d in his tim e. P la to m e n tio n e d th e cy p ress trees; he m e n tio n e d th e p a th th a t w as b e in g ta k en b y th e in te rlo c u to r and th e q u estio n er, and its stations. M o st p eo p le th o u g h t th a t b en eath this th e re are su b tle notions: th a t b y “ tre e s” he m e a n t “ m e n ,” and sim ilar difficult, fo rc e d , an d offensive notions, w h ic h it w o u ld tak e to o lo n g to state. B u t th e case is n o t as th e y th in k .

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R a th e r, he in te n d e d th e re b y to p ro lo n g his discourse, an d to establish a link b e tw e e n th e literal sense o f th e discussion and so m eth in g th a t co rre sp o n d s to it, b u t th a t refers to o th e r m a tte rs—this b e in g his p u rp ose—in o rd e r to hide his in te n tio n . 4 T h e n he tu rn e d to som e o f th e rules o f th a t law w h ic h w as g e n e ra lly acc e p te d b y th e m and he exam ined th e m (h e so u g h t to d e te rm ine in w h a t w a y th a t law w as rig h t an d w h e th e r it ag reed w ith the req u ire m e n ts o f so u n d ju d g m e n t)—th a t is, m essing in co m m o n and c a rr y in g lig h t arm o r. H e explained th a t such rules have m a n y ad v antages —fo r instance, th e y p ro m o te frien d sh ip and m u tu al aid—and th a t th e y w e re called fo r because th e ir ro ad s w ere ru g g e d and m o st o f th e m w e re in fa n try m e n ra th e r th a n cav alry m en . 5 T h e n he explained th a t because m en in general, and those p eo p le in p a rtic u la r, are n a tu ra lly disposed to p e rp e tu a l w ar, th e c a rry in g o f a p p ro p ria te arm s and th e ir acquisition, and association and frien d sh ip , are n ecessary th in g s. H e explained also th e ad vantages reap ed fro m w ar, gave an exhaustive a c c o u n t o f th e kinds o f w ar, and explained th e specific and general fo rm s o f w ar. 6 T h e n he ex p an d ed on th e discourse on w ars u n til he stated [6] m a n y th in g s a b o u t th e ad vantages o f th e law : it enables an in d iv id u al to c o n tro l him self, to o b tain th e p o w e r to suppress evil th in g s (b o th th e ones th a t are in th e soul and th e external o n es), and to p u rsu e w h a t is just. M o reo v er, he explained in this c o n n e c tio n w h a t is th e v irtu o u s c ity and w h o is th e v irtu o u s m an. H e explained th a t th e y are th e c ity and th e m an th a t c o n q u e r b y v irtu e o f tr u th and rig h tn ess. H e explained also th e tru e need fo r a ju d g e, th e o b lig atio n to o b e y him , and h o w this p ro m o te s th e co m m o n interests. H e d escrib ed w h o is th e agreeab le ju d g e, h o w he o u g h t to c o n d u c t him self in suppressing th e evil ones and p ro te c tin g m en against w ars b y gentleness and g o o d g o v ern an ce, and th a t he sh o u ld beg in w ith w h a t is m o st need ed , th a t is, th e low est. H e explained th a t m en are b ad ly in need o f av o id in g w ars am o n g them selves, and th a t th e y in ten sely desire to avoid w ars because this p ro m o te s th e ir w ell-b ein g . B u t it is im possible w ith o u t a d h e rin g to th e law and a p p ly in g its rules. W h e n th e law co m m an d s w a g in g w ars, it does so in th e p u rs u it o f peace, n o t in th e p u rsu it o f w a r—ju st as som eone m ay be co m m an d ed to do so m eth in g und esirab le because its final co n seq u en ce is desirable. H e stated also th a t it is n o t sufficient fo r an in d iv id u al to live in p ro s p e rity w ith o u t se c u rity . H e su p p o rte d this statem en t b y th e te stim o n y o f a poem b y a m an w e ll-k n o w n am o n g th em , th a t is, th e p o em o f T y rta e u s . H e explained also th a t th e co u rag eo u s and p ra is e w o rth y m an is n o t th e one w h o is first to a tta c k in ex tern al w ars, b u t he w h o , in ad d itio n , c o n tro ls him self and m anages to u p h o ld peace an d se c u rity w h e n e v e r he can. H e s u p p o rte d this sta te m e n t b y poem s c o m m o n ly k n o w n a m o n g them .

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7 T h e n he explained th a t th e p u rp o se o f th e le g islato r’s fo rb e a ra n c e and acc o m p lish m e n t is to seek th e face o f G o d , th e M ig h ty and M ajestic, lo o k fo r re w a rd and th e last abode, an d acq u ire th e highest v irtu e, w h ic h is h ig h e r th a n th e fo u r m o ral v irtues. H e explained th a t th e re m a y be c e rta in m en w h o im itate th e legislators. T h e se are individuals w ith various p u rp o ses, w h o legislate hastily to achieve th e ir bad aims. ( H e tu rn e d to m e n tio n these individuals o n ly so th a t m en g u a rd against b ein g b eg u iled b y th e like o f th e m .) [7] H e d iv id ed th e v irtu es and explained th a t som e o f th e m are h u m a n and o th e rs are divine; th e divine are p re fe ra b le to th e h u m an ; and th e one w h o has acq u ire d th e h u m an m ay have m issed th e divine. T h e h u m an v irtu e s—like p o w e r, b e a u ty , p ro sp e rity , science, and so f o r th — are th e ones e n u m e ra te d in th e books on ethics. H e stated th a t th e tru e la w g iv er is th e o ne w h o o rd ers these v irtu es in a suitable m a n n er lead in g to th e acq u isitio n o f th e divine v irtu es; fo r w h e n th e hu m an v irtu es are p ra c tic e d b y th e one w h o possesses th e m as th e law req u ires him to do, th e y b eco m e th e divine v irtu es. 8 T h e n he explained th a t th e law givers tu r n to th e m eans th a t lead to th e acq u isitio n o f th e v irtues, and th e y co m m an d and im press u p o n m en th a t th e y sh o u ld ad h ere to th e m so th a t, th ro u g h th e realizatio n o f th ese m eans, th e v irtu es w o u ld be realized. E xam ples o f these m eans are legal m arriag e, th e o rd e rin g o f th e ap p etites and th e pleasures, and in d u lg in g in each o n ly to th e e x te n t p e rm itte d b y th e law . T h e sam e applies to fe a r and an g er, base an d noble m atters, and e v e ry th in g else th a t serves as a m eans to th e virtues. 9 T h e n he explained th a t Zeus and A p o llo had used all those m eans in th e ir tw o law s. H e explained th e m a n y ad vantages o f each one o f th e rules o f th e ir L a w —fo r instance, th o se d ealin g w ith h u n tin g , m essing in co m m o n , w a r, and so fo rth . H e explain ed also th a t w a r m ay ta k e place b y n ecessity o r because o f th e a p p e tite and desire. H e explained w h ic h w a r is desirable and p leasant and w h ic h is th e one caused b y necessity. H e stated in th e o b liq u e p a rt o f his discussion th a t th e a rg u m e n t th a t ru n s b e tw e e n th e sp eak er and th e in te rlo c u to r m ay lead to debasing an d d e g ra d in g c e rta in n o ble an d desirable th in g s; b u t w h a t is in te n d e d b y this is to exam ine th e m and reflec t u p o n th e m so as to explain th e ir excellence, clear th e m o f suspicion, and ascertain th e ir v a lid ity and d esirab ility . T h is is rig h t. H e p resen ted this as an excuse fo r w h o e v e r arg u es fo r reflec tin g u p o n [#] a n y o f th e rules o f th e law , fo r such a o n e is th e lo v er o f m o d e ra tio n and in q u iry , n o t o f c o n te n tio n o r m ischief. 10 T h e n he p ro c e e d e d to c o n d e m n c e rta in rules th a t w e re k n o w n to th e m in th o se laws. H e stated th a t to a c c e p t such rules, regardless o f o n e ’s su sp icio n fro m th e o u tse t th a t th e y m ay be d efectiv e, is to

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a c t like c h ild re n an d ig n o ra n t m en; an in te llig e n t m an m u st exam ine su ch rules in o rd e r to o v erco m e his d o u b t an d u n d e rsta n d th e tr u th a b o u t them . 11 T h e n he stated th a t to c a r r y o u t th e dem an d s o f th e law is one o f th e m o st d ifficu lt th ings, ^vhile to cen su re and m ake u n fo u n d e d claim s is v e ry easy. 12 T h e n he m e n tio n e d som e o f th e g e n e ra lly a c c e p te d ru les th a t had been laid d o w n in earlier law s—fo r in stan ce, th e ones c o n c e rn in g festivals—and h o w th e y are e x tre m e ly c o r r e c t because th e y in v o lv e pleasure, to w h ic h all m en are n a tu ra lly in clin ed ; and he m e n tio n e d th e established law th a t re n d e rs th e pleasure divine. H e p raised it, app ro v e d o f it, an d explained its advantages. A n o th e r exam ple is th a t o f w in e -d rin k in g , its ad v an tag es w h e n p ra c tic e d as th e law dem ands, and its co n seq u en ces w h e n p ra c tic e d d iffe re n tly . 13 T h e n he w a rn e d against b eliev in g th a t th e v ic to rs are alw ays r ig h t and th a t th e v an q u ish ed are alw ays w ro n g . V ic to r y m a y be due to larg e n u m b ers, and th e y m ay v e ry w ell be in th e w ro n g . T h e re fo re a m an o u g h t n o t to be d elu d ed b y th e ir v ic to ry , b u t re fle c t u p o n th e ir qualities an d th e qualities o f th e ir laws. If th e y are in th e rig h t, it m akes no d ifferen c e w h e th e r th e y are v ic to rs o r v an q u ish ed . N ev erth eless, in m o st cases th e one w h o is in th e r ig h t is th e v ic to r; it is o n ly a c c id e n ta lly th a t he is v an quished. 14 T h e n he stated th a t n o t an y o n e w h o w ishes to legislate is a tru e legislator, b u t o n ly th e one w h o m G o d creates an d equips fo r this p u rp o se. T h is is tru e o f e v e ry m aster in an a r t—like th e n a v ig a to r and o th e rs —w h o th e n deserves to be called a m aster b o th w h e n p ra c tic in g his a rt an d w h e n n o t p ra c tic in g it. J u s t as th e one w h o is k n o w n fo r his m a ste ry o f an a rt deserves to be called a m aster reg ard less o f w h e th e r he is p ra c tic in g it, th e one w h o p ractices an a rt w ith o u t b ein g g o o d o r p ro fic ie n t in it does n o t deserve to be called a m aster, [y] 15 T h e n he explained th a t th e leg islato r o u g h t first to p ra c tic e his o w n law s and o n ly th e n c o m m an d o th ers to p ra c tic e them . F o r if he does n o t p ra c tic e w h a t he co m m an d s o th ers, an d does n o t re q u ire o f him self w h a t he req u ires o f o th ers, his c o m m an d and a rg u m e n t w ill n o t be receiv ed w ell and p ro p e rly b y th e ones w h o m he co m m an d s— ju st as w h e n th e g en eral is n o t a h e ro w h o is him self able to fight, his lead ersh ip w ill n o t tak e p ro p e r effect. H e gave an exam ple o f this d ra w n fro m th e d rin k in g p a rty . H e said th a t w h e n th e ir lead er an d m aster, to o , is d ru n k like th e rest, he w ill n o t be able to c o n d u c t th e p a rty in th e rig h t w a y ; ra th e r, he o u g h t to be sober, and ex tre m e ly sh a rp -w itte d , k n o w led g eab le, and v ig ilan t so as to be able to c o n d u c t a d rin k in g p a rty . W h a t he said is c e rta in ly tru e . F o r a leg islato r w h o is as ig n o ra n t as his p eo p le w ill n o t be able to legislate th e law th a t benefits th em .

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16 T h e n he stated th a t th e fo rm a tio n o f c h a ra c te r and tra in in g are useful in p re se rv in g th e laws, and th a t th e o n e w h o neg lects him self o r his su b o rd in a te s ends u p in g re a t co n fu sio n . 17 T h e n he explained th a t w h e n an in d iv id u al becom es g e n e ra lly k n o w n f o r his a b ility as a g o o d d ialectician and discussant, and as a co p io u s sp eak er, th e n w h e n e v e r he tu rn s to a th in g in o rd e r to praise an d d escrib e it, it w ill be su sp ected th a t th e th in g itself is n o t as excelle n t as he describes, b u t th a t his d e sc rip tio n o f it results fro m his ab ility as a discussant. T h is is a disease th a t o fte n afflicts th e m en o f science. T h u s th e o n e w h o listens to a discussion m u st use his in te lle c t to reflect, so u n d ly an d ex h au stiv ely , u p o n th e th in g itself, and d e te rm in e w h e th e r th e stated d escrip tio n s exist in it o r w h e th e r th e y are th in g s th a t th e d iscu ssan t d escribes because o f his c a p a c ity fo r discussion and re fu ta tio n o r because he loves th a t th in g and th in k s w ell o f it. If he finds th a t th e th in g itself is n o b le and deserves these d escrip tio n s, let him d riv e fro m his m in d th e suspicion w e have d escrib ed . In itself, th e law is n o b le and ex cellen t; it is m o re ex cellen t th a n a n y th in g said o f it and in it. 18 T h e n he explained th a t th e re is n o w a y o f k n o w in g th e tr u th o f th e law s and th e ir excellence, and th e tr u th [ /0 ] o f all things, e x c e p t th ro u g h reaso n and tra in in g in reaso n in g ; and th a t m en m u st tra in and exercise them selves in it. A lth o u g h in itia lly th e ir aim m ay n o t be th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e tr u th o f th e law , this can be o f b en efit to th e m la te r on. H e gave an exam ple o f this d ra w n fro m th e arts, fo r exam ple, th e ch ild w h o sets u p d o o rs and houses fo r p lay, w h e re b y he ob tain s c e rta in states o f m in d and acco m p lish m en ts in th e a r t in qu estio n , w h ic h b eco m e u sefu l to him w h e n he plans to acq u ire th e a r t seriously. 19 T h e n he tu rn e d to th e la w g iv e r an d stated th a t exercise fro m c h ild h o o d in p o litical m a tte rs and re fle c tin g u p o n th e ir rig h tn ess and w ro n g n e ss b en efit him w h e n he becom es serio u sly en g ag ed in politics. B ecause o f his earlier exercise and train in g , he w ill be able to c o n tro l h im self an d face w h a t c o n fro n ts him w ith p ersev eran ce. 20 T h e n he b eg an to explain th a t th e re are in th e soul o f e v e ry m an tw o c o n tra ry p o w e rs th a t a ttr a c t it in o p p o site d irectio n s, and th a t m an is also s u b je c t to so rro w and gladness, pleasure an d pain, and th e o th e r co n tra rie s. O n e o f these tw o p o w ers is th e p o w e r o f d iscern m e n t, and th e o th e r is th e bestial. T h e law o p erates th ro u g h th e p o w e r o f d iscern m en t, n o t th ro u g h th e bestial. H e explained th a t th e a ttra c tio n exercised b y th e bestial p o w e r is s tro n g and hard , w h ile th e a ttra c tio n exercised b y th e p o w e r o f d isc e rn m e n t is so fte r and m o re gentle. T h e in d iv id u al m an o u g h t to reflec t o n h o w his soul is fa rin g in th e p resen ce o f these a ttra c tio n s, and fo llo w th e one exercised b y th e p o w e r o f d isc e rn m e n t. So also th e w h o le citizen b o d y : if b y them selves th e y are in cap ab le o f d isc e rn m e n t, th e y m u st a c c e p t th e tr u th fro m th e ir la w ­

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givers, fro m th o se w h o fo llo w in th e la tte r ’s fo o tstep s, fro m those am o n g them selves w h o speak th e tru th , and fro m those w h o are g o o d and rig h teo u s. 2 1 T h e n he explained th a t it is ju st a n d e x tre m e ly rig h t th a t one sh o u ld b ear th e to il and th e d isc o m fo rt c o m m a n d e d b y th e la w g iv er because it leads to c o m fo rt an d v irtu e —ju st as th e pain ex p erien ced b y th e one w h o d rin k s d istasteful d ru g s is co m m en d ab le because, at th e end, it leads to th e c o m fo rt o f health. 2 2 T h e n he explain ed th a t m o ral habits fo llo w ^ fro m , an d resem ble, one a n o th e r, and th a t o n e o u g h t to d istinguish th e m fro m th e ir c o n traries. F o r instan ce, m o d e sty is co m m en d ab le, b u t th e excess o f it beco m es im p o te n c e and is b la m e w o rth y ; h av in g a g o o d o p in io n o f m en is c o m m en d ab le and an expression o f o p en h earted n ess, b u t if it is o f o n e ’s enem ies it b ecom es b la m e w o rth y ; and [ / / ] c a u tio n is co m m en d ab le, b u t th e excess o f it becom es c o w a rd ic e and in a c tio n and th u s b la m e w o rth y . H e explained th a t it is b la m e w o rth y fo r an in d iv id u al to use b la m e w o rth y m eans to re a c h his in te n d e d p u rp o se —even th o u g h it m a y be e x tre m e ly g o o d and v irtu o u s—and th a t it w o u ld be b e tte r if he c o u ld achieve his in te n d e d p u rp o se th ro u g h fa ir and desirable m eans. 23 T h e n he m e n tio n e d so m eth in g useful, th a t is, th a t an in te llig e n t m an m u st d ra w n ear evil th in g s and k n o w th e m in o rd e r to be able to avoid th e m and be m o re o n g u a rd ag ainst th em . H e gave an exam ple d ra w n fro m w in e -d rin k in g . H e explained th a t th e so b er m an o u g h t to d ra w n ear to th e d ru n k a rd s an d a tte n d th e ir parties in o rd e r to k n o w th e blem ishes g en e ra te d fro m d ru n k en n ess and in o rd e r to k n o w h o w to avoid th e blem ishes an d th e b la m e w o rth y th in g s th a t o c c u r am o n g th em : th a t, fo r instan ce, a fte r d rin k in g a fe w cups, th e on e w ith a w eak b o d y m ay th in k th a t he is s tro n g a lth o u g h he is n o th in g o f th e s o rt (b ecau se he th in k s he is stro n g , he w an ts to sh o u t and fight, b u t his s tre n g th fails h im ), and n u m e ro u s o th e r th in g s th a t h ap p en to w in e -d rin k e rs. 24 T h e n he explained th a t he w ho w an ts to acq u ire one o f th e v irtues o u g h t first to ex ert him self in d riv in g a wa y th e vice th a t opposes it. F o r it is v e ry ra re th a t v irtu e is acq u ire d w ith o u t th e p rio r d e p a rtu re o f vice. 25 T h e n he explained th a t e v e ry n atu ral disposition has an a c tiv ity esp ecially suitable to it. H e n c e th e la w g iv er m u st know 7 this in o rd e r to m a tch th e d u ties he lavs d o w n wfith th e suitable and a p p ro p ria te n atu ra l dispositions so th a t his rules wro uld n o t be dissipated. F o r w7hen th e th in g is n o t p laced p ro p e rly , it w ill be dissipated an d no tra c e o f it wfill be left.

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D I S C O U R S E

H e explained in this D iscourse th a t th e re are in m an c e rta in n a tu ral th in g s th a t are th e causes o f his m o ral habits and o f his actions. T h e re fo re th e leg islato r o u g h t to reach fo r these n atu ral th in g s and set th e m arig h t. F o r w h en these n a tu ra l th in g s are set rig h t, so w ill th e m o ral habits [ / 2] and th e actions. (I su sp ect th a t b y “ c h ild re n ” he m eans [in this c o n n e c tio n ] all b eginners, w h e th e r in age, know ledge, o r relig io n .) H e explained th a t these n a tu ra l th in g s are based u p o n , and o rig in a te fro m , pleasu re and pain; it is th ro u g h these tw o th a t th e v irtu es and th e vices—and, at th e end, p ractical ju d g m e n t and th e sciences— are acq u ired . T h e o rd e rin g o f these tw o [th a t is, pleasure and pain] is called e d u c a tio n and train in g . H ad th e la w g iv er c o m m a n d e d m en to avoid th e pleasures a lto g e th e r, his lawr w o u ld n o t have been rig h tly established and m en w o u ld n o t have fo llo w ed it, because o f th e ir n atu ra l in c lin atio n to th e pleasures. Instead, he ap p o in te d fo r th em c e rta in festivals and tim es d u rin g w hich th e y co u ld p u rsu e th e pleasures; fo r this reason these pleasures b eco m e divine. T h is is also th e case w ith th e various kinds o f m usic th a t th e y [th e law givers] have p e rm itte d , k n o w in g th a t m en are n a tu ra lly in clin ed to w a rd th e m and in o rd e r th a t th e p leasu re in th em becom es divine. H e gave such exam ples o f this as w^ere w e ll-k n o w n a m o n g th em , such as d a n c in g and flu te-p lay in g . H e explained th a t e v e ry th in g is m ade up o f th a t w h ic h is noble and th a t w h ic h is base. T h e noble k in d o f m usic is th a t w h ic h is suitable to n o b le and useful m oral hab its—fo r instance, g e n e ro sity and c o u ra g e — and th e base k in d is th a t w h ich p ro m o te s th e c o n tra ry m o ral habits. H e gave exam ples o f this d ra w n fro m th e tu n es and th e figures th a t had existed in th e tem p les o f E g y p t and am o n g th e in h a b ita n ts o f th a t c o u n try , and had b een in stru m e n ta l in su staining th e tra d itio n s (su11 a n ) ; he explained th a t th e y w e re divine. H e explained th a t w h o ev er is y o u n g e r in age is m o re p ro n e to tak e d e lig h t in th o se pleasures, w h ile th e o ld e r he is th e m o re calm and firm he w ill be. T h e skilled la w g iv er is th e one w h o lays d o w n th e law th a t ch arm s e v e ry o n e to w a rd goodness and happiness. A gain, e v e ry g ro u p , e v e ry g en eratio n , and th e in h a b itan ts o f e v e ry reg io n , have th e ir o w n n atu ra l dispositions, w h ic h differ fro m th o se o f th e o th ers. T h e skilled [law g iv e r] is th e o n e wrho in tro d u c e s th e k ind o f m usic and o th e r rules o f law ( s u n a n ) th a t c o n tro l these n atu ra l dispositions and co m p el th e m to a c c e p t th e law‫־׳‬, reg ardless o f th e d ifferen c e and th e m u ltip lic ity in th e n atu ra l dispositions, and th e v a rie ty o f th e ir m oral habits; and not. th e o ne w h o in tro d u c e s c e rta in rules th a t c o n tro l one g ro u p an d n o t a n o th e r, fo r th e la tte r [ /^ ] can be acco m p lish ed b y th e

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m a jo rity o f th e m em b ers o f each g ro u p , w h o p ra c tic e these rules because th e y are n a tu ra lly disposed to th em . M o re o v e r, th e o n e w h o lays d o w n a law th a t co m m an d s th e o b ed ien ce o f a m an o f science and ex p erien ce is m o re ex cellen t th a n the on e w h o lays d o w n a law th a t co m m an d s th e o b ed ien ce o f a g ro u p o f m en w h o are m en n e ith e r o f scien ce n o r o f ex p erien ce: th e fo rm e r is like th e sin g er w h o excites an old, ex p erien ced , ru g g e d , and ten acio u s m an. T h e la w g iv e r and th o se w h o u n d e rta k e to a p p ly th e law and assum e th e responsibilities it entails, o u g h t to c o n tro l th e m a n y an d d iffe re n t hu m an affairs in e v e ry re sp e c t and in all th e ir details so th a t n o th in g o f these h u m an affairs w o u ld escape them . T h e y sh o u ld n o t n e g le c t a n y o f th ese affairs; fo r o n ce [th e citizens] beco m e used to n e g le c t on th e ir p a rt, th e y slip a w a y fro m th e ir hands w h e n e v e r th e y can. F o r w h e n a th in g is n eg lected o n ce, tw ic e , o r m o re, it is lost sig h t o f an d its edges are b lu n te d —ju st as w h e n it is em p lo y e d o n ce o r tw ic e , it becom es an inescapable h abit: it is fixed o r o b lite ra te d to th e e x te n t th a t it is, resp ectiv ely , used o r n eg lected . T h e y o u n g in age an d c h ild re n have no k n o w le d g e o f this; th e y should be m ade to a c c e p t it and to a c t a c c o rd in g ly . F o r if th e y g et used to e n jo y in g them selves, to fo llo w in g th e ir ap p etites, and to ta k in g p leasure in w h a t is c o n tra ry to th e law , it is th e n v e ry h ard to set th e m a rig h t b y the law . R a th e r, th e y m u st ex p erien ce pleasure to th e e x te n t d e te rm in e d b y th e law ; b o th m en and c h ild re n sh o u ld be re q u ire d to be in in tim a te association w ith th e law and to fo llo w it in p ra c tic e . T h e la w g iv er o u g h t to address e v e ry g ro u p o f m en w ith w h a t is closer to th e ir co m p reh en sio n s and in tellects, and to set th e m a rig h t w ith w h a t th e y are cap ab le o f doing. F o r som etim es it is difficult fo r m en to c o m p re h e n d a th in g , o r th e y are in capable o f d o in g it; its d ifficu lty causes th e m to re je c t it and p ro m p ts th e m to n e g le c t and d iscard it. H e gave as an exam ple o f th is th e skilled and g e n tle p h y sician w h o offers th e sick m an th e d ru g s th a t are useful to him in his fam iliar an d app e tiz in g fo o d . 2 T h e n he in te n d e d to explain th a t th e g o o d is relativ e an d n o t absolute. H e su p p o rte d th e soundness o f his sta te m e n t b y th e te stim o n y o f an an c ie n t p o em th a t m en tio n s th e th in g s—fo r in stance, health, b e a u ty , and w e a lth —th a t a c e rta in g ro u p considers g o o d , w hile o th e rs do n o t. H e explained th a t all these th in g s are g o o d [ 1 4 ] fo r g o o d m en; fo r th e evil and u n ju s t m en, h o w ev er, th e y are n o t g o o d and do n o t lead th e m to happiness. In d eed , even life is evil fo r evil m en, ju st as it is g o o d fo r g o o d m en. T h e r e f o r e it is c o rre c t to say th a t th e g o o d is relativ e. T h is is a n o tio n to w h ic h th e law g iv er, and th e p o ets to o , m u st p a y g re a t a tte n tio n , and also th o se w h o w rite d o w n th e ir sayings, so th a t th e y w ill n o t be m isu n d e rsto o d . 3 T h e n he explained th a t th e assertio n th a t all g o o d th in g s are im m ed iately pleasant, th a t e v e ry th in g th a t is n oble and g o o d is pleasan t

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an d g o o d , and th a t th e c o n tra ry assertion is also tru e , is n o t d em o n strab le. F o r m a n y pleasant th in g s—th a t is, e v e ry th in g in w h ic h m en o f w eak in tellects tak e p leasu re—are n o t g o o d . U p o n m y life, th e good can be p leasan t to th e one w h o k n o w s its o u tc o m e , b u t n o t to th e one w h o has n o t ascertain ed th a t o u tc o m e. T h e sam e applies to th e assertion c o n c e rn in g th e ju st w ay s o f life and th a t th e y are op p o sed to [th e e n jo y m e n t o f] th e g o o d things. 4 T h e n he explained th a t n o t all m en need fo llo w th e sam e ru le o f law , b u t th a t th e re are rules o f law fo r each g ro u p th a t th e o th e rs need n o t fo llo w . H e gave an exam ple o f this d ra w n fro m th e d a n c in g p e rfo rm e d b y d iffe re n t age g ro u p s, and h o w th e c o n d itio n s th a t call f o r d a n c in g and th e use m ade o f it d iffer a m o n g d iffe re n t m en, w h e th e r th e y d iffer in age o r in som e o th e r states th a t ad h ere to th e m at p artic u la r tim es. F o r w h e n a th in g is n o t used in its p ro p e r place, it w ill n o t have th e g litte r, th e fa ir look, th e ap p ro v al, and th e praise, th a t p e rta in to it w h e n it is used in its p ro p e r place. H e gave m a n y exam ples o f this: it is n o t a p p ro p ria te fo r an old m an to p la y th e flute o r to d an ce, and if he does th ese o r sim ilar th in g s in a p u b lic g ath e rin g , th e p u b lic w ill n o t c h e e r o r ap p ro v e o f it. S im ilarly, it is ex tre m e ly disa p p ro v e d and base fo r one to p lay th e flute o r d ance o n an occasion th a t does n o t call fo r such th in g s. T h is is th e case w ith ‫ ״‬e v e ry th in g th a t is d o n e b y one fo r w h o m it is n o t p ro p e r to do it, o r in a place o r tim e [ / j ] in w h ic h it is u n seem ly f o r such th in g s to be d o n e b y th e like o f him , o r w h e n th e o ccasion does n o t call fo r th e m —all th is is repu lsiv e, im p ro p e r, and d isap p ro v ed ; it p ro m p ts th e o n lo o k ers to re je c t it, and to co n sid er it base and repulsive, especially if th e y h ap p en to be in ex p erien ced . 5 T h e n he explained th a t pleasures v a ry w ith resp ect to d iffe re n t m en, th e ir co n d itio n s, n a tu ra l dispositions, and m o ral habits. T o explain this, he gave th e exam ples o f th e c o u ra g e o u s m en and th e p ra c titio n e rs o f th e arts. F o r w h a t is pleasant to th e p ra c titio n e r o f on e a rt is d iffe re n t fro m w h a t is p leasant to th e p ra c titio n e r o f a n o th e r a rt. T h e case is th e sam e w ith w h a t is rig h t, w h a t is noble, an d w h a t is just. 6 T h e n he spoke at le n g th a b o u t this su b je c t in o rd e r to explain th a t all th ese th in g s are n o b le and base relativ e to o th e r th in g s, and n o t noble and base in them selves. H e said th a t if one asks th e p ra c titio n e rs o f th e arts a b o u t this n o tio n , th e y w o u ld u n d o u b te d ly co n firm it. 7 T h e n he explained th a t th e one w h o does n o t k n o w ,w h a t th e th in g is, its essence, o r t h a t it is, c a n n o t o rd e r its p arts, w h a t suits it, its co n c o m ita n ts, and th e th in g s th a t ad h e re to it, sim ply b y g o in g a-ch asin g a fte r it; and if so m eo n e sh o u ld claim th a t he can do so, he is m a k in g a false claim . A lso, th e one w h o k n o w s w h a t th e th in g is, m ay n o t have n o tic e d h o w fa ir o r fine, o r bad an d base it is. T h e one w h o possesses a p e rfe c t k n o w le d g e o f a th in g is he w h o k n o w s w h a t th e th in g is, and also h o w fair and h o w fine, o r bad and base it is. T h is

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is tru e o f law s and o f all th e arts and th e sciences. T h e re fo re th e one w h o judges th e ir fineness, o r d e fic ien cy and badness, o u g h t to have learn ed a b o u t th e m th e th re e th in g s m e n tio n e d above and m astered th em w ell; o n ly th e n sh ould he ju d g e th em , so th a t his ju d g m e n t be c o rre c t and w e ll-fo u n d e d . T h e best ju d g e is th e one w h o c o n stru c ts and in stitu tes a th in g ; fo r th e one w h o c o n stru c ts and in stitu tes it, because he has th e th re e kinds o f k n o w le d g e m e n tio n e d above, is able to in stitu te w h a t is a p p ro p ria te fo r each c o n d itio n . As fo r th e one w h o lacks these th re e kinds o f k n o w le d g e a b o u t a th in g , and th a t p o w e r to o , h o w co u ld he be able to in stitu te and c o n s tru c t it? N o r is this p ecu liar to th e law s alone; it is tru e o f ev e ry science and e v e ry art. H e gave exam ples o f this d ra w n fro m poem s an d th e ir m eters and tunes, and fro m m usic and th o se w h o com pose it and p la y its various m odes. [ 1 6 ] 8 T h e n he spoke at len g th , m e n tio n in g d an cin g and flu te-p lay in g . H is e n tire p u rp o se w ith these exam ples is to explain th a t each ru le o f L aw and o f tra d itio n o u g h t to be applied in its p ro p e r place, and to th o se w h o are able to p e rfo rm it; and th a t th e c o rru p tio n re su ltin g fro m m isp lacin g and m isusing a th in g is w o rse and u g lie r th a n w h a t results fro m ab an d o n in g it a lto g e th e r. H e m e n tio n ed th e praise th a t w as b esto w ed u p o n those w h o p lay ed ce rta in tunes, w h ic h w e re w ellk n o w n a m o n g th em , in th e ir p ro p e r places an d to a suitable au d ience, and th e blam e b esto w ed u p o n th e ones w h o altered these tunes, ta m p e re d w ith th em , and p lay ed th e m at im p ro p e r tim es, w ith th e re su lt th a t th e y s tirre d up m an y afflictions and evils. T h e a rt o f sin g in g o ccu p ied a m arv elo u s p o sitio n am o n g th e G reek s, and th e ir legislators paid full a tte n tio n to it. A n d it is tr u ly v e ry useful, especially because its w o rk in g p e n etrates th e soul; and since th e law co n c e rn s itself w ith th e soul, he spoke a t le n g th a b o u t this su b ject. F o r such tra in in g as th e b o d y needs is b u t fo r th e sake o f th e soul; w h e n th e b o d y is m ade fit, it leads to th e fitness o f th e soul. 9 T h e n he explained a n o th e r n o tio n th a t is suitable fo r w h a t he w as d escrib in g , th a t is, th a t th e sam e th in g m ay be used in one law and ab an d o n ed in a n o th e r law . T h is is n e ith e r infam ous n o r base, fo r th e law is given w ith a view to th e req u ire m e n ts o f an existing c o n d itio n so as to lead m en to th e u ltim ate g o o d and to th e ob ed ien ce o f th e gods. H e gave an exam ple o f this d ra w n fro m w in e and th e d rin k in g o f it, and h o w it w as p ra c tic e d b y one g ro u p a m o n g th e an cien t G reek s, w h ile it w as sh u n n ed b y a n o th e r g ro u p even in case o f necessity. T h e c o n d itio n th a t n ecessarily dem ands th e d rin k in g o f w in e is th a t in w h ic h one needs to be d ep riv e d o f his in te lle c t and k n o w le d g e —fo r instance, in c h ild b irth , cau terizatio n , and th e p ainful d o c to rin g o f th e b o d y ; this is also th e case w h e n w in e is used as a re m e d y b y m eans o f w h ic h to o b ta in th e k in d o f h ealth th a t n o th in g else co u ld b rin g ab o u t.

5 .

A vicenna ON OF

THE

THE

DIVISIONS

RATIONAL

SCIENCES

Translated by Mnhsin Mahdi

A vicen n a (A b ü ‘A li al‫־‬H u sayn Ibn Slnã, 9 8 0 -10 3 7 ) was born in Afshana, near Bukhara, w here his father was governor. Bukhara (the capital of the Samanid kingdom , one of the m any principalities into w h ich Persia, nom inally still a province o f the caliph in Baghdad, was divided) was at the time a respectable center of learning. H ere A vicen n a had his early training, distinguished himself as a capable physician, w as enrolled in the service o f the sultan N ü h Ibn M ansür, and was able to make use of the excellent court library. In 999 the Sam anid kingdom broke up and A vicen n a began to w an der am ong the w arrin g Persian principalities, entering the service o f various princes. Betw een 10 15 and 102 2 he acted as the physician and, tw ice, as the vizier of the B u yid prince Shams al-D aw lah in Ham adhan. H e refused to take office under his son T ã j alM u lk and made secret overtures to

join the service of the K ak u yid prince ‘A la ’ al-D aw lah (in Isfahan), w h o was preparing to overth ro w the Buyids. A fte r a short period in hiding and four months in prison, he finally succeeded in escaping—disguised in the habit of Sufis—from H am adhan to Isfahan, w here he pursued his scientific w o rk as the intimate friend and learned courtier of the prince until his death. In Eastern Islam, A vicen n a replaced A lfarab i as the leading philosopher, and A lg a ze l’s attacks on him do not seem to have diminished his authority am ong the students of philosophy, the sciences, and m ysticism . In W estern Islam, on the other hand, he was criticized ( b y A ve rro e s and others) as having departed from A ristotle and as having com prom ised w ith dialectical theology on a num ber o f im portant issues. T h e re , A lfarab i continued to be regarded as the great master, w ith A vicen n a o ccu p yin g an important but 95

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Selection 6). U nlike A lfarabi’s classification in the E n u m e r a tio n o f th e S c ie n c e s (above, Selection 1), A vicenna here follows the m ore traditional A ristotelian classification of the sciences into theoretical and practical, and subdivides the latter into ethics, economics, and politics. N evertheless, it is n o tew o rth y that he considers the study of prophecy and the divine Law as integral parts of political science. T his w ork, like A lfarabi’s E n u m e r a tio n o f th e S c ie n c e s , was popular among students of philosophy in Islam, and am ong historians of science and authors of scientific encyclopedias. It was translated into H eb rew and Latin. T h e follow ing translation is based on a com posite text resulting from the collation of a num ber of m anuscripts of the original A rabic text, preserved in the libraries of C onstantinople. T h e tw o sections correspond to Ft a q sã m a l- u l ü m a l - q l i y y a h in T i s 1 rasa'il (C airo, 1908), pp. 105 and 107108‫ ־‬, respectively.

secondary position. T h is was true also of his place am ong Judaeo-A rabic authors, as is evident from M aim onides’ rem arks. A m ong the Latins, the differences betw een A vicenna and A verroes had significant repercussions beginning w ith the tw elfth century. O n th e D iv is io n s o f th e R a tio n a l S c ie n c e s (or the D iv is io n s o f W is d o m )

is a short epistle com posed by A vicenna in answ er to someone w ho asked him to present a sum m ary account of the rational sciences, an account that is short, com plete, clear, true, easy to understand, well arranged, and well ordered. A vicenna begins w ith a definition of the essence of wisdom , followed b y the account of the p rim ary divisions of science (o r w isdom ); then he presents the divisions of theoretical science, follow ed by the divisions of practical science. T h e rem aining parts deal w ith the principal parts and branches of natural science, mathem atics, m etaphysics, and logic. T h e “branches” of m etaphysics or divine science deal again w ith revelation and prophecy (see below,

ON

THE

PRIMARY

DIVISIONS

OF

SCIENCE

S c i e n c e i s d i v i d e d in to a th e o re tic a l, a b stra c t p a rt and a p ra c tical p a rt. T h e th e o re tic a l p a rt is th e one w h o se end is to acq u ire c e rta in ty a b o u t th e state o f th e beings w h o se existence does n o t d ep en d on h u m an actio n . H e re th e aim is o n ly to a cq u ire an o p in io n . E xam ples o f it are th e science o f [ G o d ’s] u n ity and a stro n o m y . T h e p ra c tic a l p a rt is th e o n e w h o se aim is n o t m e re ly to acq u ire c e rta in ty a b o u t th e beings; its aim can be th e acq u isitio n o f a so u n d o p in io n a b o u t a m a tte r th a t exists th ro u g h m a n ’s en d eav o r, w ith a v iew to a c q u irin g b y it w h a t is g o o d . T h u s th e aim here is n o t m e re ly to acq u ire an op in io n , b u t ra th e r to a c q u ire an o p in io n f o r th e sake o f actio n . T h e re fo re , th e end o f th e th e o re tic a l p a rt is tru th , and th e end o f th e p ra c tic a l is th e g o o d . * ON

THE

DIVISIONS

# OF

* PRACTICAL

SCIENCE

S ince h u m an g o v e rn a n c e e ith e r p erta in s to a single in d iv id u al o r does n o t p e rta in to a single in d iv id u al, since th e one th a t does n o t p e rta in

Av i c e n n a :

O n th e D i v i s i o n s o f t h e R a t i o n a l S c i e n c e s

97

to a single in d iv id u al takes place th ro u g h p artn e rsh ip , and since p a rtn ersh ip is fo rm e d w ith in th e c o n te x t o f a h o u seh o ld association o r o f a p o litical association, th e re are th re e p ra c tic a l sciences. O n e o f these sciences p erta in s to th e first division. T h r o u g h this science o n e k n o w s h o w m an o u g h t to be in his m oral habits and in his actio n s so as to lead a h a p p y life h ere and in th e h ereafter. T h is p a rt is c o n ta in ed in A ris to tle ’s b o o k o n ethics [th a t is, th e N i c o m a c h e a n E t h i c s ] . T h e seco n d science p ertain s to th e second division. T h r o u g h this science one k n o w s h o w m an o u g h t to c o n d u c t th e g o v ern an ce o f his h o u seh o ld —w h ic h is c o m m o n to him , his w ife, his ch ild ren , his servants, and his slaves—so as to lead a w e ll-o rd e re d life th a t enables him to gain happiness. I t is co n ta in e d in B ry so n ’s O n th e G o v e r n a n c e o f th e H o u s e h o l d 1 an d in b o o k s b y m a n y o th ers. T h e th ird science p erta in s to th e th ird division. T h r o u g h this science one k n o w s th e kin d s o f p o litical regim es, rulerships, and associations, b o th v irtu o u s an d bad; an d it m akes k n o w n th e w a y o f p re se rv in g each, th e reason fo r its d isin teg ratio n [ 1 0 8 ] and th e m a n n er o f its tra n sfo rm a tio n . O f this science, th e tre a tm e n t o f kingship is co n ta in e d in th e b o o k b y P lato an d th a t b y A risto tle on th e regim e, an d th e tre a tm e n t o f p ro p h e c y and th e L aw is co n ta in e d in th e ir tw o books on th e law s.2 B y th e nom oi, th e p h ilo so p h ers do n o t m ean w h a t th e v u lg a r believe, w h ic h is th a t th e no m o s is n o th in g b u t a device an d deceit. R a th e r, a c c o rd in g to th em , th e nom os is th e law and th e n o rm th a t is established an d m ade p e rm a n e n t th ro u g h th e c o m in g -d o w n o f rev elatio n . T h e A rabs, to o , call th e angel th a t b rin g s d o w n th e rev elatio n , a nom os ( n ã n tü s ) . T h r o u g h this p a rt o f p ra c tic a l w isd o m one k n o w s th e n ecessity o f p ro p h e c y and th e h u m an species’ need o f th e L aw fo r its existence, preserv atio n , and fu tu re life. O n e k n o w s th ro u g h it th e w isd o m in th e universal penalties th a t are co m m o n to all L aw s and in th e penalties p e rta in in g to p a rtic u la r L aw s, h av in g to do w ith p a rtic u la r peoples and p a rtic u la r tim es. A n d one k n o w s th ro u g h it th e d ifferen ce b e tw e e n div in e p ro p h e c y and false p reten sio n s to it.

NOTES 1. On Bryson’s Econom ist, see Martin Plessncr, D er O ikonom ikos des neupythagoreers *B ryso n ' und sein Einfluss auf die islamische W issenschaft (Heidelberg, 1928). 2. W hile in the case of Plato the references are unmistakably to the R ep u b lic

and the Law s, the references to Aristotle are less certain. Avicenna may be referring to the two books given in the bibliographies of Aristotle’s writings, which bear the same titles as the two works by Plato.

6 .

A vicenna HEALING:

METAPHYSICS

X

Translated by Michael E. Marmura

a sum m ary of the preceding nine books and serves as a transition to the subject of the tenth book. It is entitled: “O n Beginning and R etu rn (a Concise S tatem ent); on Inspirations, Dream-visions, Prayers th at are Answered, and H eavenly Punishm ents; on the States of P rophecy and the Status of A strology.” The M e ta p h y s ic s ( P h ilo s o p h ia P r im a ) was translated into Latin about the middle of the tw elfth centu ry and was printed a num ber of times in V enice (first in 1495). T h e first critical edition of the A rabic original was made by G. C. A naw ati and others: al-Shifa*: a l-I lã h iy y ã t (2 vols.; Cairo, i960). T h e follow ing translation is based on this edition, Vol. II, pp. 441-55.

T h e H e a lin g (o r “Sufficiency,” as it was called by some Latin w riters) is perhaps A vicenna’s m ost im portant, com prehensive, and detailed w ork. It is com posed of four parts: L o g ic , P h y s ic s , M a th e m a tic s , and M e ta p h y s ics or D iv in e S c ie n c e . In P h y s ic s V I (“Psychology” ) A vicenna gives an account of practical intellect, of the prophetic faculties, and of certain related political questions, w ithin the fram ew ork provided by natural science. T h e specific treatm ent of political science, how ever, is reserved for the end of the M e ta p h y s ic s , w ith the im plication that the understanding of political science has to be based on the conclusions arrived at in m etaphysics. M e ta p h y s ic s X is com posed of five chapters. T h e first chapter gives 98

a

v ic

e

‫א א‬

a

:

H e a lin g : M e t a p h y s i c s X

C H A P T E R

P R O O F T H E

OF

M A N N E R

C A L L T H E

TO “

OF

GOD,

99

2

P R O P H E C Y . T H E T H E

R E T U R N ”

P R O P H E T ’ S E X A L T E D . TO

GOD.

W e n o w s a y : it is k n o w n th a t m an differs fro m th e o th e r animals in th a t he c a n n o t lead a p ro p e r life w h en isolated as a single in d iv id u al, m an ag in g his affairs w ith no associates to help him satisfy his basic w an ts. O n e m an needs to be co m p lem e n ted b y a n o th e r o f his species, th e o th e r, in tu rn , b y him and one like him . T h u s , fo r exam ple, one m an w o u ld p ro v id e a n o th e r w ith vegetables w h ile th e o th e r w o u ld b ake fo r him ; o ne m an w o u ld sew fo r a n o th e r w hile th e o th e r w o u ld p ro v id e him w ith needles. A ssociated in this w ay , th e y b eco m e selfsufficient. F o r this reason m en have fo u n d it n ecessary to establish cities and fo rm associations. W h o e v e r, in th e e n d eav o r to establish his city , does n o t see to th e re q u ire m e n ts necessary fo r se ttin g up a c ity and, w ith his co m p an io n s, rem ains co n fin ed to fo rm in g a m ere association, w o u ld be en g ag ed in devising m eans [to g o v e rn ] a species m o st dissim ilar to m en and lack in g th e p e rfe c tio n o f m en. N ev erth eless, even th e ones like him c a n n o t escape associating w ith th e citizens o f a c ity , and im ita tin g th em . If this is obvious, th e n m a n ’s existence and survival re q u ire p a rtn e rship. P a rtn e rsh ip is o n ly achieved th ro u g h rec ip ro c a l tran sactio n s, as w ell as th ro u g h th e various trad es p ra c tic e d b y m an. R e c ip ro c a l tran sactio n s dem an d law ( s u n n a h ) and justice, and law and justice d em and a la w g iv er and a dispenser o f justice. T h is law g iv er m u st be in a positio n th a t enables him to address m en and m ake th e m ad h ere to th e law . H e m ust, th e n , be a hu m an being. M en m ust n o t be le ft to th e ir p riv ate o p in io n s c o n c e rn in g th e law so th a t th e y disagree, each co n sid erin g as ju st w h a t o th e rs o w e th em , u n ju st w h a t th e y o w e others. T h u s , w ith re sp e c t to th e survival and actual existence o f th e hum an species, th e need fo r this hum an bein g is far g re a te r th an th e need fo r such b enefits as th e g ro w in g o f th e hair on th e e y e b ro w , th e shaping o f th e arch es in th e feet, and m a n y o th e rs th a t are n o t necessary [ 4 4 2 ] fo r survival b u t at best are m e re ly useful fo r it. N o w th e existence o f th e rig h te o u s m an to legislate and to dispense ju stice is a possibility.

I‫סס‬

P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y in I s la m

as w e have p re v io u sly re m a rk e d .1 I t becom es im possible, th e re fo re , th a t divine p ro v id e n c e should o rd ain th e existence o f those fo rm e r benefits and n o t th e la tte r, w h ic h are th e ir bases. N o r is it possible th a t th e F irst P rin cip le and th e angels a fte r H im sh o u ld k n o w th e fo rm e r and n o t th e la tter. N o r y e t is it possible th a t th a t w h ic h H e k n o w s to be in itself w ith in th e realm o f p o ssib ility b u t w hose realizatio n is n ecessary fo r in tro d u c in g th e g o o d o rd e r, should n o t exist. A n d h o w can it n o t exist, w h e n th a t w h ic h dep en d s and is c o n s tru c te d o n its existence, exists? A p ro p h e t, th e re fo re , m u st existr and he m u st be a hum an. H e m u st also possess c h arac teristics n o t p re se n t in o th e rs so th a t m en co u ld reco g n ize in him so m eth in g th e y do n o t have and w h ic h d ifferen tiates him fro m them . T h e re fo re he w ill p e rfo rm th e m iracles a b o u t w h ic h w e have sp o k e n .1 W h e n this m a n ’s existence com es ab o u t, he m u st lay d o w n law s a b o u t m e n ’s affairs b y th e perm ission o f G o d , th e E x alted , b y H is co m m and, in sp iratio n , and th e d e s c e n t o f H i s H o l y S p i r i t on him [cf. xvi, 102]. T h e first p rin cip le g o v e rn in g his legislation is to le t m en k n o w th a t th e y have a M ak er, O n e and O m n ip o te n t; th a t H e k n o w s t h e h i d d e n a n d t h e m a n i f e s t [cf. xvi, 19]; th a t o b ed ien ce is du e H im since c o m m a n d m u st b e lo n g to H i m w h o c r e a te s [cf. vii, 54]; th a t H e has p re p a re d fo r those w h o o b e y H im an afte rlife o f bliss, b u t f o r those w h o d iso b ey H im an a fte rlife o f m isery. T h is w ill in d u c e th e m u ltitu d e to o b e y th e decrees p u t in th e p r o p h e t’s m o u th b y th e G o d and th e angels. B u t he o u g h t n o t to involve th e m w ith d o ctrin es p e rta in in g to th e k n o w le d g e o f G o d , th e E x alted , b e y o n d th e fa c t th a t H e is one, th e tru th , and has n o n e like H im self. T o go b e y o n d this and d em an d th a t th e y believe in H is existence as b ein g n o t re fe rre d to in place, as b ein g n o t subje c t to verb al classifications, as b ein g n e ith e r inside n o r o u tside th e w o rld , o r a n y th in g o f this k in d , is to ask to o m uch. T h is w ill sim p ly co n fu se th e relig io n ( d m ) th e y have and involve th e m in so m eth in g fro m w h ic h d eliv eran ce is o n ly possible fo r th e one w h o receives g u id an ce an d is fo rtu n a te , w h o se existence is m ost rare. F o r it is o n ly w ith g re a t strain th a t th e y can c o m p re h e n d th e tru e states o f such m atters; it is o n ly th e v e ry fe w a m o n g th e m th a t can u n d e rsta n d th e tr u th o f divine “ u n ic ity ” and divine “ rem o ten ess.” T h e rest w o u ld in e v ita b ly com e to d e n y th e tr u th o f such an existence, fall in to dissensions, and in d u lg e in d isp u ta tio n s and analogical a rg u m e n ts th a t stan d in th e w a y o f th e ir political duties. T h is m ig h t even lead th em [445] to a d o p t view s c o n tra ry to th e c ity ’s w elfare, o p p o sed to th e im p erativ es o f tru th . T h e ir co m p lain ts and d o u b ts w ill m u ltip ly , m ak in g it difficult fo r a m an to c o n tro l th em . F o r divine w isd o m is n o t easily acq u ired b y e v e ry o n e . N o r is it p ro p e r fo r a n y m an to reveal th a t he possesses k n o w le d g e he

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is h id in g fro m th e v u lg ar. In d eed , he m u st n ev er p e rm it a n y re fe re n c e to this. R a th e r, he sh o u ld le t th e m k n o w o f G o d ’s m a je sty and greatness th ro u g h sy m b o ls and sim ilitudes d eriv ed fro m th in g s th a t fo r th e m are m ajestic and g reat, a d d in g this m u c h —th a t H e has n e ith e r equal, n o r co m p anion, n o r likeness. S im ilarly, he m u st instill in th e m th e b elief in th e re s u rre c tio n in a m a n n e r th e y can co n ceiv e and in w h ic h th e ir souls find rest. H e m u st tell th e m a b o u t etern al bliss and m isery in parables th e y can c o m p re h e n d and co n ceiv e. O f th e tru e n a tu re o f th e afte rlife he sh ould o n ly in d icate so m eth in g in general: th a t it is so m eth in g th a t “ no ey e has seen and no ear h e a rd ,” 2 and th a t th e re are pleasures th a t are g re a t possessions, and m iseries th a t are p e rp e tu a l to rtu re . K n o w th a t G o d , exalted be H e , k n o w s th a t th e g o o d lies in su ch a state o f affairs. I t follow s, th en , th a t th a t w h ic h G o d k n o w s to be th e g o o d , m u st exist, as y o u have k n o w n [fro m th e p re c e d in g discussion]. B u t th e re is no h arm if th e le g islato r’s w o rd s c o n ta in sym bols and signs th a t m ig h t stim u late th e n a tu ra lly a p t to p u rsu e p h ilo so p h ic in v estig atio n .

C H A P T E R

A C T S IN

OF T H I S

W O R S H I P : W O R L D

3

T H E I R A N D

T H E

B E N E F I T S N E X T .

iVIoreover, this in d iv id u al w h o is a p ro p h e t is n o t one w hose like recu rs in e v e ry p erio d . F o r th e m a tte r th a t is re c e p tiv e o f a p e rfe c tio n like his o c c u rs in few b o d ily co m p o sitio n s. I t fo llow s necessarily, th e n , th a t th e p ro p h e t (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be u p o n h im ) m u st plan w ith g re a t care to ensure th e p re se rv a tio n o f th e legislation he enacts c o n c e rn in g m a n ’s w elfare. [ 4 4 4 ] W ith o u t d o u b t, th e fu n d a m e n ta l p rin c ip le here is th a t m en m u st c o n tin u e in th e ir k n o w le d g e o f G o d and th e re su rre c tio n and th a t th e cause fo r fo rg e ttin g these th in g s w ith th e passage o f th e g e n e ra tio n su cceed in g [th e m ission of] th e p ro p h e t (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be o n h im ) m u st be a b so lu te ly elim inated. H e n c e th e re m u st be c e rta in acts and w o rk s in c u m b e n t on people th a t th e legislato r m u st p re scrib e to be rep eated at fre q u e n t specified in terv als.3 In this w a y m e m o ry o f th e a c t is ren ew ed and reap p ears b e fo re it can die. T h e se acts m u st be c o m b in ed w ith w h a t b rin g s G o d and th e a fte rlife n ecessarily to m in d ; o th e rw ise th e y are useless. R e m e m b e rin g is achieved

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th ro u g h w o rd s th a t are u tte re d o r reso lu tio n s m ade in th e im ag in atio n and b y te llin g m en th a t these acts b rin g th em closer to G o d and are ric h ly re w a rd e d . A n d these acts m u st in re a lity be o f such a n a tu re . A n exam ple o f these are th e acts o f w o rsh ip im posed on people. In general, these should be rem in d ers. N o w rem in d ers consist o f e ith e r m o tio n s o r th e absence o f m o tio n s th a t lead to o th e r m o tions. A n exam ple o f m o tio n is p ra y e r; o f th e absence o f m o tio n , fasting. F o r a lth o u g h th e la tte r is a neg ativ e n o tio n , it so g re a tly m oves o n e ’s n a tu re th a t he w h o fasts is re m in d e d th a t w h a t he is en g ag ed in is n o t a jest. H e w ill th u s recall th e in te n tio n o f his fasting, w h ic h is to d ra w him close to G o d . T h e se c o n d itio n s m ust, if possible, be m ixed w ith o th e rs useful fo r s tre n g th e n in g and sp re a d in g th e law . A d d in g these w ill also be beneficial to m e n ’s w o rld ly in terests, as in the case o f w a r ( j i h a d ) and th e p ilg rim ag e ( h a j j ). C e rta in areas o f land m u st be d esig n ated as b est suited fo r w o rsh ip an d as b elo n g in g solely to G o d , th e E xalted. C ertain acts, w h ic h p eo p le m u st p e rfo rm , m u st be specified as b e lo n g in g exclusively to G o d —as, fo r exam ple, sacrificial o fferin g s—fo r these help g re a tly in this c o n n e c tio n . S h o u ld th e place th a t is o f su ch a b en efit c o n ta in th e leg islato r’s hom e and ab o d e, th is w ill th e n also be a re m in d e r o f him . R e m e m b ra n c e o f him in rela tio n to th e ab ove b enefits is o n ly n ex t in im p o rta n c e to th e re m e m b ra n c e o f G o d and th e angels. N o w , th e one ab ode c a n n o t be w ith in p ro x im ate reach o f th e e n tire c o m m u n ity ( i m m m h ). I t th e re fo re becom es fittin g [ 4 4 s ] to p rescrib e a m ig ra tio n and a jo u rn e y to it. T h e n o b lest o f these acts o f w o rsh ip , fro m one p o in t o f view , sh ould be th e one in w h ic h th e w o rsh ip e r con sid ers him self to be ad d ressin g G o d , b eseech in g H im , d ra w in g close to H im , and sta n d in g in H is presence. T h is is p ra y e r. T h e leg islato r sh o u ld th e re fo re p re sc rib e fo r th e w o rsh ip e r in p re p a ra tio n fo r p ra y e r th o se p o stu res m en tra d itio n a lly a d o p t w h e n th e y p re se n t them selves to h u m an kings, such as p u rific a tio n and cleanliness (in d eed , he m u st p rescrib e fu lly in these tw o th in g s). H e should also p re scribe fo r th e w o rsh ip e rs th e b e h a v io r tra d itio n a lly a d o p te d in th e p resence o f kings: rev e re n c e , calm , m o d e sty , th e lo w e rin g o f th e eyes, th e c o n tra c tin g o f th e hands and feet, th e avoidance o f tu rn in g a ro u n d , co m p o su re. L ikew ise, he m u st p rescrib e fo r each tim e o f p ra y e r p ra is e w o rth y m an n ers and custom s. T h e se acts w ill b en efit th e v u lg a r inasm uch as th e y w ill instill in th e m rem e m b ra n c e o f G o d and th e re su rre c tio n . In this w a y th e ir ad h eren ce to th e statu tes and law s w ill co n tin u e. F o r w ith o u t such re m in d e rs th e y w ill fo rg e t all o f this w ith th e passing o f a g en e ra tio n o r tw o . I t w ill also be o f g re a t b en efit fo r th e m in th e afte rlife in asm u ch as th e ir souls w ill be p u rified in th e m a n n er y o u have k n o w n [in o u r d isco u rse].4 A s fo r th e elect, th e g re a te st b en efit th e y deriv e fro m these th in g s p erta in s to th e afterlife. W e have established4 th e tru e n a tu re o f th e a fte rlife and have p ro v e d th a t

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tru e happiness in th e h e re a fte r is ach iev ed th ro u g h th e so u l’s d e ta c h in g itself b y p ie ty fro m th e acquisitions o f b o d ily dispositions opp o sed to th e m eans fo r happiness. T h is p u rific a tio n is realized th ro u g h m o ral states and habits o f c h a ra c te r acq u ire d b y acts th a t tu rn th e soul a w a y fro m th e b o d y and th e senses and p e rp e tu a te its m e m o ry o f its tru e substance. F o r if th e soul c o n tin u e s to tu r n u n to itself, it w ill n o t be affected b y th e b o d ily states. W h a t w ill rem in d and help th e soul in this re sp e c t are c e rta in a rd u ous acts th a t lie o u tsid e n a tu ra l h a b it—in d eed th e y are m o re on th e side o f ex ertio n . T h e se tire th e b o d y and c u rb th e [n a tu ra l] anim al desire fo r rest, fo r laziness, fo r th e re je c tio n o f toil, fo r th e q u ie tin g o f th e h o t h u m o r, and fo r av o id in g all exercise ex cep t th a t w h ic h is co n d u c iv e [ 4 4 6 ] to bestial pleasure. In th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f these acts th e soul m u st be re q u ire d to recall G o d , th e angels, and th e w o rld o f happiness, w h e th e r it desires to do so o r n o t. In this w a y th e soul is instilled w ith th e p ro p e n sity to be rep elled fro m th e b o d y and its influences and w ith th e positive disposition to c o n tro l it. T h u s it w ill n o t be affected b y th e b o d y . H e n c e w h e n th e soul e n c o u n te rs b o d ily acts, these w ill n o t p ro d u c e in it th e p ro p en sities and positive d isp o sitio n th a t th e y w o u ld n o rm a lly p ro d u c e w h e n th e soul subm its to th e m in e v e ry th in g . F o r this reason, th e one w h o speaks tr u th has said: S u r e l y th e g o o d d e e d s d r i v e a v c a y t h e b a d d e e d s [xi, 114]. If this a c t persists in m an, th e n he w ill acq u ire th e positive disposition o f tu rn in g in th e d ire c tio n o f tr u th and a w a y fro m e rro r. H e th u s becom es w ell p re p a re d to be d eliv ered u n to [tru e ] happiness a fte r b o d ily sep aratio n . If these acts w e re p e rfo rm e d b y som eone w h o did n o t believe th e m to be divine o b lig atio n s an d w h o , nonetheless, had to re m e m b e r G o d in e v e ry act, re je c tin g e v e ry th in g else, this one w o u ld be w o r th y o f som e m easure o f this v irtu e. H o w m u c h m o re w o r th y w ill be th e one w h o p e rfo rm s these acts k n o w in g th a t th e p ro p h e t com es fro m G o d and is sen t b y G o d , th a t his b ein g se n t is n ecessitated b y divine w isdom , th a t all th e p ro p h e t’s legislation is an o b lig atio n d em an d ed o f him b y G o d , th a t all he legislates com es fro m G o d ? F o r th e p ro p h e t w as o b lig ated b y G o d to im pose these acts o f w o rsh ip in g H im . T h e se acts ben efit th e w o rsh ip ers in th a t th e y p e rp e tu a te in th e la tte r a d h eren c e to th e law s and relig io n {s h a r V a h ) th a t in su re th e ir existence and in th a t, b y v irtu e o f th e goodness th e y inspire, th e y b rin g th e w o rsh ip ers closer to G o d in th e h e re a fte r. A40 reo v er, this is th e m an w h o is ch arg ed w ith ad m in isterin g th e affairs o f m en, fo r in su rin g th e ir livelihood in this w o rld and th e ir w ell-b e in g in th e w o rld to com e. H e is a m an d istinguished fro m th e rest o f m an k in d b y his godliness. \ 4 4 ‫] ך‬

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4

CHAPTER V"

ESTABLISHMENT HOUSEHOLD AND

OF

(THAT THE

PERTAINING

THE IS,

GENERAL TO

THESE

CITY,

THE

MARRIAGE), LAWS MATTERS.

T h e le g islato r’s first o b je c tiv e in la y in g d o w n th e Jaws and o rg a n iz in g th e c ity m u st be to divide it in to th re e g ro u p s: a d m in istrato rs, artisans, an d g uardians. H e m u st place at th e head o f each g ro u p a leader, u n d e r w h o m he w ill place o th e r leaders, u n d e r these y e t o th ers, an d so fo rth u n til he arriv es a t th e c o m m o n ru n o f m en. T h u s n o n e in th e c ity w ill rem ain w ith o u t a p ro p e r fu n c tio n and a specific place: each w ill have his use in th e c ity . Idleness and u n e m p lo y m e n t m u st be p ro h ib ite d . T h e legisla to r m u st leave th e w a y o p en to no one fo r a c q u irin g fro m a n o th e r th a t share o f a livelihood necessary fo r m an w hile e x em p tin g him self fro m an y e ffo rt in re tu rn . S u ch peo ple he m u st v ig o ro u sly restrain . If th e y fail to re fra in fro m such a p ra c tic e , he m u st th e n exile th e m fro m th e land. B ut sh o u ld th e cause here be som e p h y sical m a lad y o r d efect, th e leg islator m u st set aside a special place fo r such cases, u n d e r so m eo n e’s c h arg e. T h e re m u st exist in th e c ity a c o m m o n fu n d , p a rt o f it co n sistin g o f d u ties im posed on a c q u ire d an d n atu ra l p ro fits su ch as fru it and a g ric u ltu ra l p ro d u c e , p a rt o f it im posed as p u n ish m e n t, w h ile a n o th e r p a r t should co n sist o f p r o p e r ty ta k e n fro m th o se w h o resist th e law , th a t is, o f w a r-b o o ty . T h u s th e fu n d w ill serve to m eet th e exigencies o f th e co m m o n g o o d , to m eet th e needs o f th e g u ard ian s w h o do n o t w o rk in an y c ra ft, and those p re v e n te d fro m e a rn in g th e ir livelihood b y m aladies and c h ro n ic diseases. S om e peo p le have held th e o p in io n th a t the diseased w h o se re c o v e ry is n o t to be ex p ected sh o u ld be killed. B u t this is base; fo r th e ir su stenance w ill n o t h u rt th e c ity . If su ch people have relatives e n jo y in g a su p e rflu ity o f m eans, th e n th e leg islato r m u st im pose on these relatives th e re sp o n sib ility fo r th e ir people. [44#] A ll fines m u st n o t be im posed o n th e crim in al alone. Som e o f these m u st be im posed o n th e c rim in a l’s p ro te c to rs and relatives w h o fail to re p rim a n d and w a tc h o v e r him . B u t th e fines legislated in th e la tte r case sh o u ld be m itig a ted b y allo w in g delay in p a y m e n t. T h e sam e sh o u ld a p p ly to crim es c o m m itte d in a d v e rte n tly . T h e se m u st n o t be ig n o re d even th o u g h th e y do o c c u r b y m istake.

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J u s t as idleness m u st be p ro h ib ite d , so sh o u ld professions like g am b lin g , w h e re b y p ro p e rtie s and u tilities are tra n sfe rre d w ith o u t a n y b en efit re n d ered in exchange. F o r th e g am b ler takes w ith o u t re n d e rin g a n y service at all. R a th e r, w h a t one takes m u st alw ays be a co m p en sa tio n given in r e tu r n fo r w o rk , a co m p en sa tio n th a t is e ith e r su b stance, u tility , g o o d re m e m b ra n c e , o r a n y o th e r th in g co n sid ered a h u m an good. S im ilarly, p ro fessio n s th a t lead to th e o p p o site o f w e lfa re and usefulness, such as th e le arn in g o f th e ft, b rig an d ag e, leadership o f crim in al bands, and th e like, m u st be p ro h ib ite d . P ro fessions th a t allow p eo p le to dispense w ith learn in g th o se c ra fts p e rta in in g to th e association—professions such as u s u ry —m u st be p ro h ib ite d . F o r u s u ry is th e seeking o f excess p ro fit w ith o u t p ra c tic in g a c ra ft to achieve it, even th o u g h it does re n d e r a service in re tu rn . A lso th o se acts—w h ich , if o n ce p e rm itte d , w o u ld be d e trim e n ta l to th e c ity ’s g r o w th —like fo rn ic a tio n and so d o m y , w h ic h dispense w ith th e g re a te st p illar on w h ic h th e c ity stands, th a t is, m arriag e, m u st be p ro h ib ite d . T h e first o f th e le g islato r’s acts m u st p e rta in to m arriag e re su ltin g in issue. H e m u st call and u rg e p eo p le to it. F o r b y m arriag e is ach iev ed th e c o n tin u ity o f th e species, th e p erm a n en ce o f w h ic h is p ro o f o f th e existence o f G o d , th e E x alted . H e m u st a rra n g e it in such a w a y th a t m a trim o n y takes place as a m an ifest affair, so th a t th e re w ill be no u n ce rta in tie s c o n c e rn in g p ro g e n y cau sin g d efects in th e p ro p e r tra n sfe r o f in h eritan ces, w h ic h [ 4 4 9 ] are a so u rce o f w ealth . F o r w e a lth is indispensable fo r a livelihood. N o w w e a lth divides in to so u rce and derivatives. S ources c o n sist o f w e a lth th a t is in h e rite d , fo u n d , o r g ra n te d . O f these th re e sources, th e b est is in h e rite d w e a lth ; fo r it does n o t co m e b y w a y o f lu ck o r c h an ce b u t is o f an o rd e r akin to th e n atu ra l. T h r o u g h this also—I m ean th e c o n c e a lm e n t o f m a rria g e —d efects in o th e r resp ects o c c u r: fo r exam ple, in th e n ecessity th a t one p a r ty sh o u ld u n d e rta k e e x p e n d itu re o v er th e o th e r, in re n d e rin g m u tu a l assistance, and in o th e r m a tte rs th a t w ill n o t escape th e w ise p erso n a fte r reflectio n . T h e leg islato r m u st tak e firm m easures to assure th e p e rm a n e n c e o f th e u n io n so th a t n o t e v e ry q u a rre l sh o u ld re su lt in a sep aratio n th a t d isru p ts th e b o n d b e tw e e n c h ild re n and p aren ts and ren ew s th e need o f m a rriag e fo r ev e ry o n e . In this th e re are m a n y sorts o f harm . A lso, because w h a t is m o st c o n d u c iv e to th e g en eral g o o d is love. L o v e is o n ly achieved th ro u g h frie n d sh ip ; frien d sh ip th ro u g h h ab it; h a b it is p ro d u c e d o n ly th ro u g h lo n g association. T h is assurance, w ith re sp e c t to th e w o m an , consists in n o t p la cin g in h er hands th e rig h t to m ake th e sep aratio n . F o r in re a lity she is n o t v e ry ratio n al and is q u ic k to fo llo w passion an d anger. B u t a w a y fo r sep aratio n m u st be le ft o p en and n o t all d o o rs closed. T o p re v e n t sep aratio n u n d e r all c irc u m stan ces results in all kinds o f h a rm fu l co n seq u en ces. O f th ese is th e fa c t th a t som e n atu res c a n n o t a d a p t th e m selves to o th ers: th e m o re th e y are b ro u g h t to g e th e r, th e g re a te r th e re su ltin g evil, av ersio n , an d unpleasantness. O r again, som eone m ig h t g e t

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an u n eq u al p a rtn e r, o r o ne w h o is o f bad c h a ra c te r, o r re p e lle n t in n a tu re . T h is w ill in d u c e th e o th e r p a rtn e r to desire som eone else—fo r desire is n a tu ra l—and this in tu rn leads to m a n y h arm fu l consequences. I t also m ig h t so h ap p en th a t th e m a rried c o u p le do n o t c o o p e ra te fo r p ro c re a tio n and if ex ch an g ed fo r o th e r p a rtn e rs th e y w o u ld . H e n c e som e m eans fo r separatio n is necessary. B u t th e law m u st be s tric t a b o u t it. [ 4 5 0 ] T h e m eans fo r sep aratio n m u st n o t be placed in th e hands o f th e less ratio n al o f th e tw o , th e one m o re p ro n e to d isag reem en t, c o n fu sio n , and ch an g e. In stead , this m u st be rele g ated to th e ju d g e s‫ ־‬w h o w ill a ffect th e sep aratio n w h e n th e y ascertain th e w o m a n ’s m istre a tm e n t b y th e o th e r p a rtn e r. In th e case o f th e m an, an in d e m n ity m u st be im posed on him so th a t he w ill ap p ro a c h sep aratio n o n ly a fte r a sc e rta in m e n t and a fte r he finds it to be th e rig h t th in g fo r him in e v e ry w ay . T h e leg islato r m ust, nevertheless, leave th e w a y o p en fo r reco n cilia tio n , w ith o u t, h o w ev er, em p h asizing it lest this e n co u rag e th o u g h tle ss actio n . O n th e c o n tra ry , he m u st m ake re c o n c ilia tio n m o re difficult th a n separation. H o w ex cellen t w as th a t w h ic h [M u h am m ad ] th e g reatest o f legislato rs co m m an d ed [cf. ii, 229-30]—th a t th e m an, a fte r th ric e p ro n o u n c in g th e fo rm u la fo r d iv o rce, is n o t allo w ed to re m a rry th e w o m an u n til he b rin g s him self to d rin k a c u p unsu rp assed in b ittern ess, w h ic h is, to first let a n o th e r m an m a rry h er b y a tru e m arriag e and have real relatio n s w ith her. If su ch a p ro s p e c t aw aits a m an, he w ill n o t a p p ro a c h sep aratio n reck lessly , unless he has alre a d y d e te rm in e d th a t th e sep aratio n is to be p e rm a n e n t, o r unless he is o f a d efectiv e c h a ra c te r and takes p e rv e rte d pleasu re in scandal. B u t th e likes o f these fall o u tside th e pale o f m en w h o deserve th e seeking o f th e ir w elfare. S ince w o m a n b y rig h t m u st be p ro te c te d inasm uch as she can share h er sexual desire w ith m an y , is m u c h in clin ed to d ra w a tte n tio n to herself, and in ad d itio n to th a t is easily d eceiv ed and is less in clin ed to o b e y reason; and since sexual relatio n s o n h er p a rt w ith m a n y m en cause g re a t disdain and sham e, w h ic h are w e ll-k n o w n harm s, w h ereas on th e p a rt o f th e m an th e y o n ly arouse jealousy, w h ic h sh o u ld be ig n o red as it is n o th in g b u t o b ed ien ce to th e devil; it is m o re im p o rta n t to legislate th a t th e w o m a n sh o u ld be veiled and seclu ded fro m m en. T h u s , u n lik e th e m an, she sh o u ld n o t be a b re a d -e a rn e r. It m u st be legislated th a t h er needs be satisfied b y th e m an u p o n w h o m m u st be im posed h er sustenance. F o r this th e m an m u st be co m p en sated . H e m u st o w n her, b u t n o t she him . [ ^ j / ] T h u s she c a n n o t be m a rried to a n o th e r at th e sam e tim e. B u t in th e case o f m an this avenue is n o t closed to him th o u g h he is fo rb id d e n fro m ta k in g a n u m b e r o f w ives w h o m he c a n n o t su p p o rt. H e n c e the co m p en sa tio n co n sists in th e o w n ersh ip o f th e w o m a n ’s “ g en italia.” B y this o w n e rsh ip I do n o t m ean sexual in te rc o u rse . F o r b o th p a rta k e o f its pleasure and th e w o m a n ’s share is even g re a te r, as is her d e lig h t and pleasure in ch ild ren . B u t b y this I m ean th a t no o th e r m an can m ake use o f th em .

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It m ust be legislated w ith re sp e c t to th e child th a t b o th p aren ts m u st u n d e rta k e his p ro p e r u p b rin g in g —th e w o m an in h er special area, th e m an b y p ro v isio n . L ikew ise it m u st be p re sc rib e d th a t th e ch ild m u st serve, o b ey , resp ect, and h o n o r his p aren ts. F o r th e y are th e cause o f his existence and in ad d itio n have b o rn e his su p p o rt, so m eth in g w e n eed n o t enlarge u p o n as it is ev id en t.

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C O N C E R N I N G I M A M :

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T H E M .

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R E M A R K S

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P O L I T I C S , M O R A L S .

N e x t, th e leg islato r m u st im pose as a d u ty o b ed ien ce to w h o so e v er sueceeds him . H e m u st also p rescrib e th a t d esignation o f th e successor can o n ly be m ade b y him self o r b y th e consensus o f th e elders.5 T h e la tte r sh o u ld v e rify o p e n ly to th e p u b lic th a t th e m an o f th e ir ch o ice c a n h o ld sole p o litical a u th o rity , th a t he is o f in d e p e n d e n t ju d g m e n t, th a t he is e n d o w e d w ith th e n o b le qualities o f co u rag e, te m p eran ce, and g o o d g o v ern an ce, and th a t he k n o w s th e law to a d eg ree unsurpassed b y a n y o n e else. S uch a v erificatio n m u st be o p e n ly p ro claim ed and m u st find u n an im ous a g re e m e n t b y th e en tire p u b lic. T h e leg islato r m u st lay d o w n in th e law th a t sh o u ld th e y disagree and q u arrel, su cc u m b in g to passion and w h im , o r sh o u ld th e y ag ree to designate som eone [ 4 5 2 ] o th e r th a n th e v irtu o u s and d eserv in g in dividual, th e n th e y w o u ld have c o m m itte d an a c t o f u n b elief. D esig n atio n o f th e caliph th ro u g h a p p o in tm e n t b y testam e n t is best: it w ill n o t lead to p artisanship, q u arrels, and dissensions. T h e leg islato r m u st th e n d ecree in his law th a t if som eone secedes and lays claim to th e calip h ate b y v irtu e o f p o w e r o r w ealth , th e n it becom es th e d u ty o f e v e ry citizen to fig h t and kill him . If th e citizens are capable o f so d o in g b u t re fra in fro m d o in g so, th e n th e y d iso b ey G o d and co m m it an a c t o f u n b elief. T h e b lo o d o f an y o n e w h o can fig h t b u t refrain s becom es free fo r th e spilling a fte r this fa c t is established in th e assem bly o f all. T h e leg islato r m u st lay d o w n in th e law th a t, n ex t to b elief in th e p ro p h e t, n o th in g b rin g s on e closer to G o d th a n th e killing o f su c h a u su rp e r.

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If th e seceder, h o w ev er, verifies th a t th e one h o ld in g th e calip h ate is n o t fit fo r it, th a t he is afflicted w ith an im p e rfe c tio n , and th a t this im p e rfe c tio n is n o t fo u n d in th e seceder, th e n it is b est th a t th e citizens a c c e p t th e la tte r. T h e d e te rm in in g fa c to r h ere is s u p e rio rity o f p ra c tic a l ju d g m e n t and excellence in p o litical m an ag em en t. T h e one w hose a tta in m e n t in th e rest o f th e v irtu es [in c lu d in g k n o w le d g e ] is m o d e ra te —a lth o u g h he m u st n o t be ig n o ra n t o f th e m n o r a c t c o n tra ry to th e m —b u t excels in these tw o is m o re fit th a n th e one w h o excels in th e o th e r v irtu e s b u t is n o t fo re m o st in these tw o . T h u s th e o ne w h o has m o re k n o w le d g e -m u st jo in and su p p o rt th e one w h o has b e tte r p ra c tic a l ju d g m e n t. T h e la tte r, in tu rn , m u st a c c e p t th e f o rm e r’s s u p p o rt and seek his advice, as w as do n e b v ‘U m a r6 and ‘A ll.7 H e m u st th e n p rescrib e c e rta in acts o f w o rsh ip th a t can be p e rfo rm e d o n ly in th e ca lip h ’s p resence, in o rd e r to extol his im p o rta n c e and m ake th e m serve his g lo rificatio n . T h e se are th e co n g re g a tio n a l affairs, such as festivals. H e m u st p re sc rib e such p u b lic g a th erin g s; fo r these entail th e call fo r so lid a rity , th e use o f th e in stru m e n ts o f co u rag e, and c o m p e titio n . It is b y c o m p e titio n th a t v irtu es are achieved. T h ro u g h co n g reg atio n s, su p p licatio n s are an sw ered and blessings are receiv ed in th e m a n n er discussed in o u r statem en ts. L ikew ise, th e re m u st be c e rta in tra n sa c tio n s in w h ic h th e im am p a rtic ipates. T h e s e are th e tra n sa c tio n s th a t lead to th e b u ild in g o f th e c ity ’s fo u n d a tio n , such as m arriag e and co m m u n al activities. H e m u st also p re scribe, in th e tran sactio n s in v o lv in g exchange, law s th a t p re v e n t tre a c h e ry an d injustices. H e m u st fo rb id u n so u n d tran sactio n s w h e re th e o b jects o f exch an g e ch an g e b e fo re b ein g a c tu a lly receiv ed o r paid, as w ith m o n e y ch an g in g , [ 4 5 3 ] p o stp o n e m e n t in th e p a y m e n t o f d eb t, and th e like. H e m u st also legislate th a t people m u st help and p ro te c t o th ers, th e ir p ro p e rtie s, and lives, w ith o u t this, h o w ev er, entailin g th a t th e c o n trib u to r sh o u ld penalize him self as a re su lt o f his c o n trib u tio n . A s fo r enem ies and th o se w h o oppose his law , th e leg islato r m ust d ecree w a g in g w a r against th e m and d e stro y in g th em , a fte r callin g o n th e m to a c c e p t th e tru th . T h e ir p r o p e r ty and w o m en m u st be d eclared free fo r th e spoil. F o r w h e n su ch p r o p e r ty and w o m en are n o t ad m in istere d a c c o rd in g to th e c o n s titu tio n o f th e v irtu o u s c ity , th e y w ill n o t b rin g a b o u t th e g o o d fo r w h ic h p r o p e r ty and w o m en are so u g h t. R a th e r, these w o u ld c o n trib u te to c o rru p tio n and evil. S ince som e m en have to serve o th ers, such p eople m u st be fo rc e d to serve th e peo p le o f th e ju st c ity . T h e sam e applies to p eo p le n o t v e ry cap ab le o f a c q u irin g v irtu e. F o r these are slaves b y n a tu re as, fo r exam ple, th e T u r k s and th e Z injis and in g en eral all th o se w h o do n o t g ro w up in n o b le [th a t is, m o d e ra te ] clim es w h e re th e co n d itio n s fo r th e m o st p a rt are su ch th a t nations o f g o o d te m p e ra m e n t, in n ate intelligen ce, and so u n d m inds th riv e. If a c ity o th e r th a n his has p ra ise w o rth y

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law s, th e leg islato r m u st n o t in te rfe re w ith it unless th e tim es are such th a t th e y re q u ire th e d ec la ra tio n th a t no law is valid save th e revealed law . F o r w h e n n atio n s and cities go astra y and law s are p rescrib ed fo r them , a d h eren c e to th e law m u st be assured. If th e a d h eren c e to th e law becom es in c u m b e n t, it m ig h t v e ry w ell be th e case th a t to ensure this a d h eren c e req u ires th e a c c e p ta n c e o f th e law b y th e w h o le w o rld . If th e p eo p le o f th a t [o th e r] c ity , w h ic h has a g o o d w a y o f life, find th a t this [n ew ] law , to o , is g o o d and p ra is e w o rth y and th a t th e a d o p tio n o f th e n ew law m eans re s to rin g th e c o n d itio n s o f c o rru p te d cities to v irtu e, and y e t p ro c e e d to p ro cla im th a t this law o u g h t n o t to be acce p ted and re je c t as false th e le g isla to r’s claim th a t this law has com e to all cities, th e n a g re a t w eakness w ill afflict th e law . T h o s e o p p o sin g it co u ld th e n use as a rg u m e n t fo r th e ir re je c tin g it th a t th e peo p le o f th a t [o th e r] c ity have re je c te d it. In this case these la tte r m u st also be p u n ished and w a r ( j i h a d ) w ag ed on th e m ; b u t this w a r m u st n o t be p u rsu ed w ith th e sam e se v e rity as against th e p eo p le u tte r ly in e rro r. O r else an in d e m n ity m u st be im posed on th e m in lieu o f th e ir p re fe re n c e . In a n y case, it m u st be e n u n ciated as a tr u th th a t th e y are n eg ato rs [o f th e tru e la w ]. F o r h o w are th e y n o t n eg ato rs, w h e n th e y refuse to a c c e p t the divine L aw , w h ic h G o d , th e E x alted , has sen t do w n ? S h o u ld th e y perish, th e y w o u ld have m e t w h a t th e y deserve. F o r th e ir d eath , th o u g h it m eans th e end of som e, results in a p e rm a n e n t g o o d , p a rtic u la rly w h e n th e n ew law is m o re co m p lete and b e tte r. [ 4 5 4 } It sh o u ld also be legislated w ith re g a rd to these, th a t if cle m e n c y on c o n d itio n th a t th e y p a y ran so m and tax is desired, this can be done. In g eneral, th e y m u st n o t be placed in th e sam e c a te g o ry as th e o th e r no n b eliev ers. T h e leg islato r m u st also im pose p u n ish m en ts, penalties, an d p ro h ib itio n s to p re v e n t d iso b ed ien ce to th e divine L aw . F o r n o t e v e ry o n e is restrain ed fro m v io latin g th e law because o f w h a t he fears o f th e afterlife. M ost o f these [penalties and so fo rth ] m u st p e rta in to acts c o n tra ry to law th a t are c o n d u c iv e to th e c o rru p tio n o f th e c ity ’s o rd e r; fo r exam ple, a d u lte ry , th e ft, c o m p lic ity w ith th e enem ies o f th e c ity , and th e like. As fo r th e acts th a t harm th e in d iv id u al him self, th e law sh o u ld c o n ta in h elp fu l ad v ice and w a rn in g , and n o t go b e y o n d this to th e p re sc rip tio n o f o b lig a to ry d uties. T h e law c o n c e rn in g acts o f w o rsh ip , m arriag e, and p ro h ib itio n s sh o u ld be m o d e ra te, n e ith e r severe n o r lenient. T h e legislator m u st releg ate m a n y questions, p a rtic u la rly those p e rta in in g to tran sactio n s, to th e exercise o f th e in d iv id u al ju d g m e n t ( i j t i h ã d ) o f th e jurists. F o r d iffe re n t tim es and circ u m stan ces call fo r decisions th a t c a n n o t be p re d e te rm in e d . As fo r th e fu rth e r c o n tro l o f the c ity in v o lv in g k n o w le d g e o f th e o rg a n iz a tio n o f g uardians, incom e and ex p en d itu re, m a n u fa c tu re o f arm am en ts, legal rig h ts, b o rd e r fo rtificatio n s, and th e like, it m u st be p laced in th e hands o f th e ru le r in his c a p a c ity as caliph. T h e legislator

I IO

P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y in I s la m

m u st n o t im pose specific p re sc rip tio n s c o n c e rn in g these. S uch an im p o sitio n w o u ld be d efectiv e since co n d itio n s ch an g e w ith tim e. M o reo v er, it is im possible to m ake universal ju d g m en ts th a t c o v e r e v e ry c o n tin g e n c y in these m atters. H e m u st leave this to th e b o d y o f counsellors. It is n ecessary th a t th e legisliitor should also p rescrib e laws re g a rd in g m orals and cu sto m s th a t ad v o cate justice, w h ic h is the m ean. T h e m ean in m orals and cu sto m s is so u g h t fo r tw o things. T h e one, in v o lv in g th e b re a k in g o f th e d o m in an ce o f th e passions,8 is fo r the so u l’s p u rific a tio n and fo r en ab lin g it to acq u ire th e p o w e r o f self-m a stery so th a t it can lib erate itself fro m th e b o d y u n tarn ish ed . [ 4 5 5 } T h e o th e r, in v o lv in g th e use o f these passions, is fo r w o rld ly interests. A s fo r th e use o f pleasures, these serve to co n serv e th e b o d y and p ro c re a tio n . As fo r co u rag e, it is fo r th e c ity ’s survival. T h e vices o f excess are to be avoided fo r th e h arm th e y in flict in hu m an interests, w h ile th e vices o f d eficien cy are to be avoided fo r th e h arm th e y cause th e c ity . B y w isdom as a v irtu e, w h ic h is th e th ird o f a tria d co m p risin g in ad d itio n te m p e ra n c e and co u rag e, is n o t m ean t th e o re tic a l w isd o m —fo r th e m ean is n o t d em an d ed in th e la tte r at all—b u t, ra th e r, p ra c tic a l w isdom p e rta in in g to w o rld ly actio n s an d b eh av io r. F o r it is d ec e p tio n to c o n c e n tra te on th e k n o w le d g e 9 o f this w isd o m , c a re fu lly g u a rd in g th e ingenious w ay s w h e re b y on e can attain th ro u g h it ev e ry b en efit and avoid ev e ry harm , to th e e x te n t th a t this w o u ld resu lt in b rin g in g u p o n o n e ’s associates th e o p p o site o f w h a t one seeks fo r oneself and resu lt in d istra c tin g oneself fro m th e a tta in m e n t o f o th e r virtues. T o cause th e han d to be th u s fe tte re d to th e neck, m eans th e loss o f a m a n ’s soul, his w h o le life, th e in stru m e n t o f his w ellbeing, and his survival to th a t m o m en t at w h ic h he attain s p e rfe c tio n . S ince th e m o tiv a tin g p o w e rs are th re e —th e ap p etitiv e, th e irascible, and th e p ra c tic a l—th e v irtu es consist o f th re e things: ( a ) m o d e ra tio n in such ap p etites as th e pleasures o f sex, fo o d , clo th in g , c o m fo rt, and o th e r pleasures o f sense and im ag in atio n ; ( b ) m o d e ra tio n in all th e irascible passions su ch as fear, anger, depression, p rid e, hate, jealousy, and th e like; ( c ) m o d e ra tio n in p ra c tic a l m atters. A t th e head o f these v irtu es stan d te m p eran ce, p ractical w isdom , and co u rag e; th e ir sum is justice, w h ich , h o w ev er, is ex tran eo u s to th e o re tic a l v irtu e. B u t w h o e v e r co m bines th e o re tic a l w isd o m w ith justice, is in d eed th e h a p p y m an. A n d w h o ev er, in ad d itio n to this, w ins the p ro p h e tic qualities, becom es alm ost a h u m an god. W o rs h ip o f him , a fte r th e w o rsh ip o f G o d , becom es alm ost allo w ed . H e is indeed th e w o r ld ’s e a rth ly k in g and G o d ’s d e p u ty in it.

a v i c e n n a : H e a lin g : M e ta p h y s ic s X

111

NOTES 1. In M etaphysics X , ch. 1. 2. A “sacred” Tradition. 3. More literally: “ to be repeated at such short intervals that they recommence soon after they end.” 4. M etaphysics IX , ch. 7. 5. Strictly, “ forerunners” or “ predecessors,” a term usually applied to those

who had been close to Muhammad. 6. ‘Umar Ibn al‫־‬Khattab, the second orthodox caliph (d. 644). 7. ‘A ll Ibn Abí Tãlib, the fourth orthodox caliph (d. 661). 8. Literally: “ powers.” 9. Reading ta'arrufiha (n.) for ta'rifiha (making it known).

7 .

A vicenna \'

ON

THE

AND OF

PROOF

THE

THE

OF

PROPHECIES

INTERPRETATION

PROPHETS’

AND

SYMBOLS

METAPHORS

Translated by Michael E. Marmura

A vicenna’s O n th e P r o o f o f P r o p h e c ie s is no tew o rth y fo r singling out the “essence” of prophecy for a specialized treatm ent; and it is clear from O n th e D iv is io n s o f th e R a tio n a l S c ie n c e s and from M e ta p h y s ic s X that,

n o t only the general question of prophecy, b u t the prophecy of M uham mad, has becom e of central im portance in A vicenna’s political science. T h e w ork is w ritten in the form of an epistle to someone w ho had already discussed the question orally w ith Avicenna. T h e in terlo cu to r had “misgivings about accepting pro p h ecy ” that could not be dispelled b y “the claims of the advocates of prophecy.”

A vicenna now sums up the substance of w hat he had said to him before w ith a view to elim inating these misgivings. T h e treatise is made up of tw o parts. T h e first p art summarizes the proof of prophecy and shows its essence. T h e second p art offers an interpretation of certain symbols taken from the K oran and the sayings of M uham m ad. T h e following translation is based on a critical edition of the A rabic text that is being prepared by M ichael E. M arm ura. T h e num bers inserted in the translation refer to the text printed in Cairo: FI ith b a t a l-n u b u v u w a t in T i s i ra sa ’ll (1908), pp. 120-32.

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A v i c e n n a : O n th e P r o o f o f P r o p h e c ie s

113

T h e l e a d i n g [ m a s t e r ] A b ü ‘A ll a l-H u sa y n Ib n Sina [A vic e n n a ], m a y G o d have m e rc y on him , said: Y ou have ask ed —m ay G o d set y o u a rig h t—th a t I sum u p fo r y o u in a trea tise th e su b stan ce o f w h a t I said to y o u w ith a view to elim in atin g y o u r m isgivings a b o u t a c c e p tin g p ro p h e c y . Y ou w e re co n firm e d in these m isgivings b ecause th e claim s o f th e adv o cates o f p ro p h e c y are e ith er lo g ically possible assertions th a t are tre a te d as n ecessary w ith o u t th e b en efit o f d e m o n stra tiv e a rg u m e n t o r even o f dialectical p ro o f, o r else im possible assertions o n th e o rd e r o f fa iry tales, such th a t th e v e ry a tte m p t on th e p a rt o f th e ir a d v o cate to ex p o u n d th e m deserves derision. I an sw er y o u r re q u e s t—m ay G o d exten d y o u r life fo r th e p u rp o se —and b eg in b y saying: A n y th in g th a t in heres in a n o th e r essentially, exists in it in a c tu a lity as lo n g as th e la tte r exists; and a n y th in g th a t inheres in a n o th e r accid en tally , exists in it p o te n tia lly at o n e tim e and a c tu a lly a t a n o th e r tim e. W h a te v e r has this essential in h e re n c e is alw ay s actu al and is itself th e th in g th a t ch an g es w h a te v e r is p o te n tia l in to a c tu a lity , m e d ia te ly o r w ith o u t m ediatio n . A n exam ple o f this is lig h t, w h ic h is th e visible in essence [ / 2 / ] and th e cause th a t ch an g es w h a te v e r is p o te n tia lly visible in to a c tu a lity ; and fire, w h ic h is th e h o t in essence and w h ic h heats o th e r th in g s, e ith e r m e d ia te ly —as, fo r exam ple, w h e n it heats w a te r th ro u g h th e m ed iatio n o f th e c o p p e r p o t—o r w ith o u t m e d ia tio n —as w h e n it heats th e c o p p e r p o t b y itself, 1 m ean b y d ire c t c o n ta c t. M a n y exam ples co u ld b e given o f this. M o re o v e r, if a n y th in g is co m p o sed o f tw o th in g s, if on e o f th e tw o can be fo u n d w ith o u t th e o th e r, th e o th e r can be fo u n d w ith o u t th e first. A n exam ple o f th is is o x y m el, w h ic h is co m p o sed o f v in e g a r and h o n ey : if v in e g ar can be fo u n d w ith o u t h o n ey , h o n e y can be fo u n d w ith o u t v in eg ar. A n o th e r exam ple is th e fo rm e d statu e co m p o sed o f b ro n z e and th e h u m an fo rm : if b ro n z e can be fo u n d w ith o u t th e h um an fo rm , th e h u m an fo rm can be fo u n d w ith o u t th e b ro n ze. T h is can be fo u n d b y in d u c tio n an d has m a n y exam ples. I n o w say: th e re exists in m an a fa c u lty b y w h ic h he is d ifferen tiated fro m th e re st o f anim als and o th e r th in g s. T h is is called th e ratio n al soul. I t is fo u n d in all m en w ith o u t ex cep tio n , b u t n o t in all its p a rtic u la rs since its p o w e rs v a ry a m o n g m en. T h u s th e re is a first p o w e r re a d y to b eco m e in fo rm e d w ith th e universal fo rm s a b stra c te d fro m m a tte r, w h ic h in itself has no fo rm . F o r this reason it is called th e m aterial in te lle c t b y a n a lo g y w ith p rim e m a tte r. I t is an in te lle c t in p o te n tia lity in th e sam e w a y th a t fire in p o te n tia lity is a c o ld th in g , n o t in th e sense in w h ic h fire is said to have th e p o te n tia lity to b u rn . T h e n th e re is a seco n d p o w e r, w h ic h has th e c a p a b ility and th e positive d isposition to co n ceiv e th e universal fo rm s because it co n tain s th e g e n e ra lly ac c e p te d

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opinions. I t also is an in te lle c t in p o te n tia lity , b u t in th e sense in w h ic h w e say th a t fire has th e p o te n tia lity to b u rn . T h e re is, besides these tw o , a th ird p o w e r th a t is a c tu a lly in fo rm e d w ith th e fo rm s o f th e universal intelligibles [ 1 2 2 ] o f w h ic h th e o th e r tw o fo rm a p a rt w h e n these have beco m e actualized. T h is th ird p p w e r is called th e acq u ire d in tellect. It does n o t exist a c tu a lly in th e m aterial in tellect and th u s does n o t exist in it essentially. H e n c e th e existence o f th e acq u ire d in te lle c t in th e m a terial in te lle c t is due to so m eth in g in w h ic h it exists essentially and th a t causes existence; th ro u g h it, w h a t w as p o te n tia l becom es actu al. T h is is called th e universal in tellect, th e universal soul, and th e w o rld soul. T h e re c e p tio n o f w h a te v e r possesses essentially th e p o w e r o f b ein g receiv ed o ccu rs in tw o w ays, d ire c tly and in d ire c tly . T h e re c e p tio n fro m th e universal activ e in te lle c t o ccu rs, sim ilarly, in tw o w ays, e ith e r d ire c tly —like th e re c e p tio n o f th e c o m m o n opinions and th e self-ev id en t tr u th s 1— o r in d ire c tly —like th e re c e p tio n o f th e seco n d intelligibles th ro u g h th e m ed iatio n o f th e first, and o f th e intelligibles acq u ire d th ro u g h th e m ed iatio n o f o rg an s and m aterials such as th e ex tern al sense, th e c o m m o n sense, th e estim ative fa c u lty , and th e c o g itativ e fa c u lty . N o w th e ratio n al soul, as w e have sh o w n , receives at tim es d ire c tly and at o th e rs in d ire c tly ; h ence th e c a p a c ity to receive d ire c tly does n o t b e lo n g to it essentially b u t accid en tally . T h is ca p a c ity , th e re fo re , m u st exist essend a lly in so m eth in g else w h e n c e th e ratio n al soul acq u ires it. T h is is th e angelic in tellect, w h ic h receives essentially w ith o u t m ed iatio n and b y its v e ry re c e p tio n causes th e p o w e rs o f th e soul to receive. (T h e p ro p e rty p ecu liar to th e first in telligibles th a t allow s th e ir re c e p tio n w ith o u t m ed iatio n is due o n ly to tw o facto rs: b riefly, it is because these intelligibles in them selves are easily receivable, o r because th e re c ip ie n t can receiv e w ith o u t m e d iatio n o n ly th a t w h ic h is easily receiv ab le.) W e have also seen th a t th e re are d iffe re n t degrees o f stre n g th and w eakness, ease and d ifficu lty , in th a t w h ic h receives and th a t w h ic h is received. N o w , it is im possible fo r th e c a p a c ity to receiv e to be infinite. F o r [/2 5 ] th e re is fin itu d e in th e d ire c tio n o f w eakness, w h ic h consists o f th e in a b ility o f th e p o w e r to receive even one in telligible, d ire c tly o r in d ire c tly , and th e re is fin itu d e in th e d ire c tio n o f stre n g th , w h ic h consists in th e a b ility o f th e p o w e r to receive d ire c tly . [H e n c e , th e affirm ation th a t th e c a p a c ity to receive is infinite w o u ld involve o u r say in g th a t] it is b o th finite and in fin ite in b o th d irectio n s, and this is an im possible c o n tra d ic tio n . M o re o v e r, it has b een sh o w n th a t in th e case o f th a t w h ic h is c o m p o sed o f tw o things, if one o f th e m can be fo u n d w ith o u t th e o th e r, th e o th e r can be fo u n d w ith o u t th e one. W e have also seen th a t som e th in g s receiv e a t on e tim e d ire c tly and a t o th e r tim es in d ire c tly . M o re o v e r, w e have fo u n d th a t th e re are th in g s th a t c a n n o t receiv e em an atio n s fro m th e [A c tiv e ] In te lle c t w ith o u t m ed iatio n , w h ile th e re are o th e r th in g s th a t receive all th e in tellectu al em anations w ith o u t

a

vic

e

NNa

: On

th e P r o o f o f P r o p h e c ie s

1 15

m e d iatio n ; also th a t w h e n th e c a p a c ity to receive is finite in th e d ire c tio n o f w eakness, it is also necessarily finite in th e d ire c tio n o f stre n g th . N o w th e degrees o f excellence am o n g th e causes ru n along th e lines I say: som e in d iv id u al essences are self-subsisting w hile o th e rs are not, and th e first are b e tte r. T h e self-subsisting are e ith e r im m aterial, essential fo rm s o r fo rm s th a t are in m a tte r, and th e first are b e tte r. L e t us p ro c e e d and su b d iv id e th e la tte r g ro u p since here lies w h a t w e seek: th e fo rm s and m aterials th a t c o n s titu te bodies are e ith e r o rg a n ic 2 o r in o rg an ic, and th e first are b e tte r. T h e o rg an ic are e ith e r anim als o r n o t anim als, and th e first are b e tte r. T h e anim als, in tu rn , are e ith e r ratio n al or irratio n al, and th e first are b e tte r. T h e ratio n al e ith e r possess reason b y positive d isposition o r do n o t, and th e first are b e tte r. T h a t w h ich is ratio n al b y positive disposition e ith e r becom es c o m p le te ly actual o r does n o t, and th e first is b e tte r. T h a t w h ich becom es c o m p le te ly actual does so w ith o u t m ed iatio n o r th ro u g h m ediation, and th e first is b e tte r. T h is is th e one called p ro p h e t and in him th e degrees o f excellence in th e realm o f m aterial fo rm s cu lm in ate. N o w , if th a t w h ic h is best stands above and rules th e in ferio r, [ 2 2 4 ] th e n th e p ro p h e t stands above and rules all th e g en era ab ove w h ic h he excels. R ev elatio n is th e em an ation and th e angel is th e receiv ed em an atin g p o w e r th a t descends on th e p ro p h e ts as if it w e re an em anation co n tin u o u s w ith th e universal in tellect. I t is re n d e re d p a rtic u la r, n o t essend a ily , b u t accid en tally , b y reason o f th e p a rtic u la rity o f th e recip ien t. T h u s th e angels have b een given d iffe re n t nam es because [th e y are associated w ith ] d iffe re n t n o tio n s; nevertheless, th e y fo rm a single to ta lity , w h ic h is p a rticu larized , n o t essentially, b u t accid en tally , because o f th e p a rtic u la rity o f th e recip ien t. T h e m essage, th e re fo re , is th a t p a rt o f th e em an atio n te rm e d “ re v e la tio n ” w h ich has been receiv ed and c o u c h e d in w h a te v e r m o d e o f expression is deem ed b est fo r fu rth e rin g m a n ’s g o o d in b o th th e etern al and th e c o rru p tib le w o rld s as reg ard s k n o w le d g e and p o litical g o v ern an ce , resp ectiv ely . T h e m essenger is th e one w h o co n v ey s w h a t he acq u ires o f th e em an atio n te rm e d “re v e la tio n ,” again in w h a te v e r m o d e o f expression is deem ed b est fo r ach iev in g th ro u g h his o p in io n s th e g o o d o f th e sen so ry w o rld b y political g o v ern an ce and o f th e in te lle c tu a l w o rld b y k n o w led g e. T h is, th e n , is th e su m m a ry o f th e discourse c o n c e rn in g th e affirm ation o f p ro p h e c y , th e sh o w in g o f its essence, and th e statem en ts m ade a b o u t rev elatio n , th e angel, and th e th in g revealed. A s fo r th e v a lid ity o f th e p ro p h e th o o d o f o u r p ro p h e t, o f M u h am m ad (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and p eace be o n h im ), it becom es ev id e n t to th e reasonable m an o n ce he co m pares him w ith th e o th e r p ro p h e ts, peace be on th em . W e shall re fra in fro m e la b o ra tio n here. W e w ill n o w tak e u p th e in te rp re ta tio n o f th e sym bols y o u asked

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m e ab o u t. I t has b een said th a t a c o n d itio n th e p ro p h e t m u st ad h ere to is th a t his w o rd s sh o u ld be sym bols and his expressions hints. O r, as P lato states in th e L a w s : w h o e v e r does n o t u n d e rsta n d th e ap ostles’ sym bols w ill n o t attain th e D ivine K in g d o m .3 !M oreover, th e fo re m o st G re e k p h ilo so p h ers and p ro p h e ts m ade use in th e ir b o o k s o f sy m b o ls and signs in w h ic h th e y hid th e ir se c re t d o c trin e —m en like P y th a g o ra s, [/2 5 ‫]׳‬ S ocrates, and P lato . A s fo r P lato, he had blam ed A risto tle fo r d iv u lg in g w isd o m and m ak in g k n o w le d g e m anifest so th a t A risto tle had to re p ly : “ E v en th o u g h I had d o n e this, I have still le ft in m y b o o k s m a n y a p itfall w h ic h o n ly th e in itiate am o n g th e w ise and learn ed can u n d e rs ta n d .”4 M o reo v er, h o w co u ld th e p ro p h e t M u h am m ad (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be on h im ) b rin g k n o w le d g e to th e u n c o u th n o m ad , n o t to say to th e w h o le h u m an race co n sid erin g th a t he w as sen t a m essenger to all? P o litical g u id an ce, on th e o th e r hand, com es easily to p ro p h e ts; also th e im p o sitio n o f o b lig atio n s on people. T h e first th in g y o u asked m e a b o u t w as w h a t th e p ro p h e t !M uham m ad (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be on h im ) c o n v e y e d fro m his L o rd (m a y H e be h o n o re d and g lo rifie d ), saying: G o d is th e l i g h t o f t h e h e a v e n s a n d t h e e a r th . T h e lik e n e s s o f H i s l i g h t is a s a n i c h e w h e r e i n is a la?np ( t h e la m p in a g la s s , t h e g la s s is as i t w e r e a b r il lia n t s t a r ) k i n d l e d f r o m a b le s s e d t r e e , a n o l i v e n e i t h e r f r o m

th e ea st n o r f r o m

t h e w e s t . I t s o il

a l m o s t s h in e s e v e n i f n o f ir e t o u c h e d it. L i g h t u p o n l i g h t ! G o d g u i d e s to H is lig h t w h o m

H e w ill. G o d s tr ik e s s im ilitu d e s f o r m e n . G o d

has

k n o w l e d g e o f e v e r y t h i n g [xxiv, 35].

I say: l i g h t is an equ iv o cal te rm p a rta k in g o f tw o m eanings, one essential, th e o th e r m etap h o rica l. T h e essential stands fo r th e p e rfe c tio n o f th e tra n s p a re n t in asm u ch as it is tra n sp a re n t, as A risto tle said.5 T h e m e tap h o rica l m ean in g is to be u n d e rsto o d in tw o w ays: e ith e r as th e g o o d , o r as th e cause th a t leads to th e good. H e re , th e sense is th e m e ta p h o ric a l one in b o th m eanings. I m ean th a t G o d , th e E x alted , is in H im se lf th e g o o d and th e cause o f e v e ry th in g g o o d . T h e sam e ju d g m e n t applies to th e essential and to th e nonessential. T h e h e a v e n s a n d t h e e a r th stands fo r th e “ w h o le .” T h e n ic h e stands fo r [ 1 2 6 ] th e m aterial in te lle c t and th e ratio n al soul. F o r th e w alls o f a niche are close to each o th e r and it is th u s ex cellen tly p red isp o sed to be illu m in ated since th e closer th e w alls o f a place are to each o th e r, th e g re a te r th e reflec tio n and th e lig h t it holds. A n d ju st as th e actualized in te lle c t is likened to lig h t, its re c ip ie n t is likened to th e re c ip ie n t o f lig h t, w h ic h is th e tra n sp a re n t. T h e best o f tra n s p a re n t th in g s is air and th e b est [tra n sp a re n t] air is in th e niche. T h u s w h a t is sy m b o lized b y th e niche is th e m aterial in tellect, w h ic h is to th e acq u ired in te lle c t as th e n ich e is to th e light. T h e la m p stands fo r th e acq u ired actu alized in tellect. F o r lig h t, as th e p h ilo so p h ers defined it, is th e p e rfe c tio n o f th e tra n sp a re n t and th a t w h ic h m oves it fro m

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p o te n tia lity to a c tu a lity . T h e acq u ired in te lle c t is to th e m aterial in te lle c t as th e lam p is to th e niche. T h e expression in a g la s s is used because b e tw e e n th e m aterial and th e acq u ired in tellects th e re exists a n o th e r [in te rm e d ia te ] level o r place th a t is re la te d to these tw o as th a t w h ich in terv en es b etw een w h a t is tra n sp a re n t and th e lam p is related to th e la tte r tw o . H e re , in visual sight, th e lam p does n o t reach [and hence co u ld n o t be seen th ro u g h ] th e tra n s p a re n t [air] w ith o u t a m edium . T h is is th e oil vessel w ith th e w ick , fro m w h ic h th e glass p ro tru d e s. F o r glass is one o f th e tra n sp a re n t things re c e p tiv e o f light. H e n c e th e su b se q u en t u tte ra n c e , is as i t w e r e a b r i l l i a n t s t a r , is given to c o n v e y th a t it is p u re tra n sp a re n t glass, n o t op aq u e c o lo re d glass, since n o th in g co lo re d is tra n sp a re n t. B y k i n d l e d f r o m a b l e s s e d t r e e , a n o l i v e , is m e an t th e c o g itativ e p o w e r, w h ic h stands as s u b je c t and m aterial fo r th e in tellectu al acts in th e sam e w a y th a t oil stands as s u b je c t and m aterial fo r th e lam p. N e i t h e r f r o m t h e e a s t n o r f r o m t h e w e s t is explained as follow s: “E a st” lexically [727] derives fro m th e place w h e n c e lig h t em anates and “ w e st” w h e re it is q u e n c h e d ; and e a s t is used m e ta p h o ric a lly fo r th e place w h e re th e re is lig h t and w e s t fo r th e place w h e re th e re is no lig h t. (N o tic e h o w th e rules o f sim ile are ad h ered to: l i g h t w as m ade th e basis o f th e statem e n t and th e sim ile c o n s tru c te d th e re o n ; l i g h t w as c o n jo in e d w ith th e ap p aratu s and m aterials th a t p ro d u c e it.) T h u s w h a t is sy m b o lized b y th e expression, n e i t h e r f r o n t t h e e a s t n o r f r o m t h e w e s t , is as follow s: th e c o g itativ e p o w e r, in th e absolute sense, is n o t one o f th e p u re ratio n al p o w ers w h e re lig h t em anates w ith o u t re stric tio n . T h is is th e m ean in g o f th e saying, a . . . t r e e . . . n e i t h e r f r o m t h e ea s t. N o r is it one o f th e anim al p o w ers w h e re lig h t is u tte r ly lost. T h is is th e m ean in g o f n o r f r o m th e w e st.

T h e saying, i ts o i l a l m o s t s h i n e s e v e n i f n o f i r e t o u c h e d it, is in praise o f th e c o g itativ e p o w e r. In this expression, e v e n i f n o f i r e t o u c h e d i t, th e w o rd t o u c h stands fo r c o n n e c tio n and em anation. T h e say in g f i r e is explained as follow s: w h en th e sim ilarity b e tw e e n m e ta p h o ric a l l i g h t and real lig h t and b e tw e e n th e in stru m e n ts and th e co nsequences o f th e fo rm e r and th o se o f th e la tte r w as d ra w n , th e essential su b je c t th a t causes a th in g to be in a n o th e r w as likened to w h a t is c u sto m a rily c o n sid ered a su b ject, th a t is to say, fire. F o r a lth o u g h in re a lity fire is c o lo rless, cu sto m takes it to be lum inous. (O b se rv e h o w th e rules o f sim ile are ad h ered to !) M o re o v e r, since fire su rro u n d s th e elem ents { i i n m i a h a t ) , th a t w h ic h su rro u n d s th e w o rld , n o t in the spatial sense, b u t in a verbal m e ta p h o ric a l sense, is likened to fire. T h is is th e universal in tellect. T h is in tellect, h o w ev er, is n o t as A lex an d er o f A ph ro d isias b eliev ed —a ttrib u tin g th e b elief to A ris to tle —th e tru e G o d , th e F irst. F o r a lth o u g h in one re sp e c t this first in te lle c t is one, it is m u ltip le in asm u ch as it consists o f

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th e fo rm s o f n u m e ro u s universais. [ 1 2 8 ] It is th u s one, n o t essentially, b u t accid en tally , a c q u irin g its oneness fro m H im w h o is essentially one, th e one G o d (m a y H e be m a g n ifie d ). A s fo r th a t w h ic h th e P ro p h e t [iVIuham m ad] (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be u p o n h im ) c o n v e y e d fro m his L o rd (m a y H e be h o n o re d and g lo rifie d ), saying: a n d u p o n t h a t d a y e i g h t s h a l l c a r r y a b o v e t h e m t h e t h r o n e o f t h y L o r d [lxix, 17], I say: religious L aw s g e n e ra lly state th a t G o d is on th e th ro n e . A m o n g o th e r th in g s this expression m eans th a t th e th ro n e is th e last o f th e c re a te d c o rp o re a l existents. T h e a n th ro p o m o rp h ists a m o n g th e ad h eren ts o f religious L aw s claim th a t G o d , th e E x alted , is on th e th ro n e , th o u g h n o t in th e sense o f H is in d w e llin g th e re . T h e p h ilo so p h ers in th e ir language, h o w ev er, re g a rd th e n in th sp h ere, w h ic h is th e sp h ere o f all th e spheres, the last o f th e c o rp o re a l existents. T h e y state th a t G o d is th e re an d is on it, b u t n o t in th e sense o f in d w ellin g , as w as m ade clear b y A risto tle at th e end o f th e P h y s i c s .6 T h e p h ilosop h ers w h o ad h ere to relig ious L aw s have ag reed th a t w h a t is m e a n t b y th e th ro n e is this v e ry sam e celestial b o d y . T h e y m ain tain ed , in ad d itio n , th a t th e sp h ere is m o v ed b y its soul b y w a y o f desire. T h e y m ain tain ed this because m o v em en ts are e ith e r essential o r nonessential. T h e y th e n sh o w ed th a t this m o v e m e n t is n o t nonessential. E ssential m o v em en t, th e y c o n tin u e d , is e ith e r n a tu ra l o r is caused b y th e soul. T h e n th e y sh o w e d th a t th is m o v e m e n t is n o t n a tu ra l and h ence th a t it m u st be caused b y th e soul. T h e y sh o w e d th a t th e soul o f th e sp h ere is th e ratio n al, th e p e rfe c t, an d th e active, and also th a t th e spheres n e ith e r perish n o r ch an g e th r o u g h o u t e te rn ity . N o w it is a w id e ly sp read n o tio n in th e disciplines based on relig io u s L aw s th a t angels are living beings and th a t, unlike m an w h o perishes, th e y n ev er perish. O n c e it is said th a t th e spheres are ratio n al liv in g beings and th e ratio n al living b ein g th a t does n o t perish is called an angel, th e spheres are th e n called angels. A n d o n ce these prem ises are p u t fo rth , it becom es clear th a t th e th ro n e [/25)] is c a rrie d b y e ig h t and so does th e in te rp re ta tio n o f th e exegetes w h o take these to be e ig h t spheres. “C a rry in g ” is used in tw o senses: ( a ) in a h u m an sense—an d this is th e m o re a p p ro p ria te use o f the te rm c a rry in g —as w h e n w e speak o f th e sto n e th a t is c a rrie d on th e b ack o f a m an, and ( b ) in a n atu ra l sense as w h e n w e say th a t w a te r is c a rrie d on e a rth and fire on air. T h e sense is th e n a tu ra l one, n o t th e first. T h e expressions u p o n t h a t d a y , t h e h o u r , and t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n 7 are m ean t to c o n v e y w h a t th e L a w g iv e r [M u h am m ad ] spoke o f w h e n he said: “E ac h soul a fte r d eath is re s u rre c te d .” !M oreover, since th e so u l’s s c ru tin y a fte r its sep aratio n fro m the b o d y is c ertain , p u n ish m e n t and re w a rd and th e like have b een d e fe rre d to th a t day. A s fo r w h a t th e P ro p h e t [M u h am m ad ] (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be on h im ) c o n v e y e d fro m his L o rd (m a y H e be h o n o re d and g lo rifie d ), saying: “A cro ss th e fire lies a p ath , th e d esc rip tio n o f w h ic h is th a t it

Av i c e n n a :

O n th e P r o o f o f P ro p h ecies

II9

is s h a rp e r th a n th e sw o rd and fin er th a n a hair. N o n e can e n te r paradise w ith o u t cro ssin g it. T h o s e w h o cross it are saved, w h ile th o se w h o fall off it are lo st.” Y o u w ill first be re q u ire d to k n o w w h a t “ p u n ish m e n t” and “r e w a r d ” are, and w h a t is m e an t b y “ p arad ise” and “ fire.” I say: R e w a rd is to d w ell e te rn a lly w ith in divine p ro v id e n c e d ev o id o f all striv in g fo r th in g s u n a tta in a b le in th e realm o f th e p ra c tic a l and th e co g nitive. T h is is o n ly ach iev ed a fte r a tta in in g p e rfe c tio n in th e realm o f k n o w le d g e an d a fte r sh u n n in g th e vices in th e realm o f th e p ra c tic a l so th a t th e y do n o t b eco m e a h ab it and a positive disposition fo r w h ic h th e soul longs as o n e longs fo r in tim a te th in g s, m a k in g im possible th e p a tie n t e n d u ra n c e o f th e ir absence. I t w ill o n ly h ap p en w h e n o n e resists th e anim al soul in its p ra c tic a l activities and in its co g n itio n s, ex c e p tin g th e necessary . In d eed , all w h o have p erish ed have suffered th u s because th e y have c o n fo rm e d w ith th e estim ative fa c u lty , w h ic h is th e anim al fa c u lty [/5 0 ] th a t gives false ju d g m e n ts re g a rd in g th e a b stra c te d im ages w h e n th e senses are d o rm a n t. N o w o n d e r, th e n , th a t this aud acio u s fa c u lty , callin g itself “ th e m aterial in te lle c t,” b y ta k in g a w a y reason, re n d e rs su sp e ct w h o e v e r im itates it and an ap o state w h o e v e r believes it, lead in g th e m to in ev itab le c o rru p tio n an d f u tu re d e stru c tio n . W h e n th u s c o rru p te d w ith his believed im ages, such an in d iv id u al finds th a t th e ra tio n a l soul, w h o se activ ities to som e d eg ree c o rre sp o n d to his, is d ev o id o f th e n o b le in tellectu al fo rm s th a t actu alize it. T h e soul is th e n n a tu ra lly im pelled to seek th e im p ed in g cause in th e sam e w a y th a t a stone, raised to its u n n a tu ra l place and th e n released, descends seeking its n atu ra l p lace w h e n sep arated fro m th e im p ed im en t. B u t this h appens to th e soul w h e n th e in stru m e n ts used to attain th e acq u ired in tellect, such as th e ex tern al and in n e r senses, estim ation, m e m o ry , an d th e fa c u lty o f c o g ita tio n , have b een c o rru p te d . T h e in d iv id u al th u s rem ains lo n g in g fo r th e so u l’s n a tu ra l a c tiv ity o f a c q u irin g th e th in g s b y w h ic h it realizes its essence, a t a tim e w h e n n o n e o f th e in stru m e n ts f o r such an acq u isitio n exists. W h a t g re a te r c alam ity can th e re be, p a rtic u la rly th a t th e soul c o n tin u e s e te rn a lly in this state? M o re o v e r, in asm u ch as th e soul had acted in a g re e m e n t w ith such an in d iv id u a l’s in d u lg e n c e in p ra c tic a l vices, it is d o u b tfu l th a t th e soul sh o u ld rem ain th e re a fte r u n a tta c h e d to its evil k in d re d . F o r it becom es accu sto m ed to th e th in g s it had acted in a g re e m e n t w ith , h av in g n ev er o p p o sed th e ap p e titiv e pleasures o f th e senses. B u t h o w can an in d iv id u al ach iev e th ese pleasures, n o w th a t th e sensitive and a p p e titiv e facu lties exist n o m ore? H is state is w ell exem plified b y th e saying: “N e v e r fall in love w ith so m eo n e w h o is a trav e ller. F o r he w ill in e v itab ly trav el o r w ill die. Y ou w ill th e n be le ft in th e an g u ish o f love, to r tu r e d .” S ince th e m e an in g o f p u n ish m e n t and re w a rd has b een b riefly sh o w n , w e w ill n o w discuss th e essence o f paradise and fire. W e say: [ / 5 / ] If th e w o rld s are th re e , th e sen so ry , th e im ag in ativ e and estim ative,

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and th e in tellectu al, it is th e in tellectu al w o rld th a t is th e place o f d w elling. T h is is paradise. T h e im aginative and estim ative w o rld , as has b een sh o w n , is th e w o rld o f c o rru p tio n . T h e w o rld o f th e senses is th e w o rld o f th e graves. K n o w th e n th a t th e in tellect, in a c q u irin g m o st universais, needs to s tu d y th e p a rtic u la rs in d u c tiv e ly . T h is necessarily req u ires th e external senses. Y ou w ill th e n k n o w th a t th e in te lle c t takes a n a rro w and difficult p a th o r w ay : fro m th e ex tern al sense, th ro u g h th e facu lties o f im ag in atio n , estim atio n, and c o g ita tio n —all o f w h ic h b e lo n g to th e in fern al realm —u n til it arrives u n to itself and p erceives in te lle c tu a lly . I t is th u s seen h o w th e in te lle c t takes a p a th o r a w a y in th e in fe rn a l w o rld . If it crosses this p ath , it arrives a t th e in te lle c tu a l w o rld . B u t if it stops in th e in fern al w o rld , m istak in g th e estim ative fa c u lty fo r th e in tellectiv e an d a c c e p tin g as tru e w h a t this fa c u lty p o in ts to , th e n it rem ains in th e in fern al w o rld , dw ells in hell, and suffers en o rm o u s loss. T h is th e n is th e ex p lan atio n o f th e say in g c o n c e rn in g the path . A s fo r w h a t th e p ro p h e t M u h am m ad (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs an d peace be w ith h im ) co n v e y e d fro m his L o rd , th e M ig h ty an d M ajestic, saying: U p o n i t t h e r e a r e n in e te e n [lxxiv, 30], it is explained as follow s. I t has alre ad y b een sh o w n w h a t th e in fe rn o is. In b rief, w e have sh o w n th a t it is th e anim al soul, and w e have sh o w n th a t this soul rests e te rn a lly in hell. N o w th e anim al soul is div id ed in to tw o parts, th e co g n itiv e and th e p ractical. T h e p ractical, in tu rn , consists o f th e a p p etitiv e and th e irascible. T h e co g n itiv e, o n th e o th e r h an d , consists o f th e ap p reh en sio n s o f sensible th in g s b y th e im aginative fa c u lty th ro u g h th e ex tern al senses. T h e se sensible th in g s are sixteen in n u m b e r. In a d d itio n to these, th e re is th e estim ative fa c u lty th a t ju d g es these im ages in a lo g ically possible w ay , and it is one in n u m b e r. H e n c e w e have tw o , plus sixteen, plus one: these m ake nin eteen . T h u s th e saying, U p o n i t t h e r e a r e n i n e t e e n ) is e v id e n tly tru e. A s fo r th e saying: O n l y t h e [ 1 3 2 ] a?1gels h a v e vo e m a d e t h e m a s t e r s o f h e ll [lxxiv, 31], it is to be explained as follow s: I t is c u sto m a ry in th e relig io u s L a w to call th e su b tle p o w e rs th a t are n o t p erceiv ed b y th e senses “ angels.” A s fo r th a t w h ic h th e p ro p h e t M u h am m ad (m a y G o d ’s p ra y e rs and peace be o n h im ) c o n v e y e d fro m his L o rd , th e !M ighty and M ajestic, saying: “ H e ll has seven gates and paradise e ig h t,” 8 it is explained in th e fo llo w in g m an n er. It is k n o w n th a t th e co g n itiv e facu lties o f th e soul are o f tw o sorts: th e re are those like th e ex tern al senses, w h ic h are five in n u m b e r, th a t a p p re h e n d th e p articu lars. T h e se a p p re h e n d th e sensible fo rm to g e th e r w ith its m a tte r. T h e n th e re are th e faculties th a t a p p re h e n d and b eco m e in fo rm e d w ith th e sensible fo rm s w ith o u t th e ir m a tters. A n exam ple o f these is th e s to rin g place o f the sen se-p ercep tio n s, k n o w n as th e im ag in atio n . In a d d itio n to these, th e re is th e fa c u lty th a t judges these fo rm s in a lo g ically possible w ay ; this is the estim ative fa c u lty .

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I2I

T h e n th e re is f u r th e r th e fa c u lty th a t ju d g es these fo rm s in a necessary w a y ; this is th e in tellect. T h e se ad d u p to eig h t. N o w w h e n all th e facu lties are p resen t, th e y lead to etern al happiness and e n try in to p aradise. B u t w h e n o n ly seven are p resen t, w ith o u t th e e ig h th th a t co m p letes th e m , th e y lead to e te rn a l m isery. A c c o rd in g to usage in language, w h a tev er leads to a th in g is te rm e d its gate. T h u s th e seven faculties th a t lead to hell are called its gates, w h ile th e e ig h t th a t lead to paradise are called th e la tte r ’s gates. T h is, in b rief, is th e ex p lan atio n o f all th e questions y o u asked ab o u t.

NOTES 1. Literally: “ the beginning [that is, the primary knowledge or the first intelligibles] of the intellects.” 2. Literally: “ growing.” 3. N o t a quotation from Plato’s Laivs. 4. Avicenna is quoting from the “ correspondence” between Plato and Aris-

totle translated into Arabic from Hel lenistic sources. 5. Aristotle D e A nim a ii. 7. 4 1 8 ^ - 1 4 . 6. viii. 10. 267b5 1 0 ‫ ־‬. 7. Koran, passim. 8. A Tradition; cf. Koran xv, 44.

8 .

A vem pace THE OF

GOVERNANCE THE

SOLITARY

Translated by Lawrence Berman

A vem pace (A bü Bakr M uham m ad Ibn Bãjjah [or Ibn al-Sã’igh], d. 1138) was born in Saragossa tow ard the end of the eleventh century, lived in Seville, G ranada, and later in N o rth A frica (w here he seems to have enjoyed a favored position at the A lm oravid c o u rt), and died in Fez. H e is celebrated as the first Spanish-Muslim philosopher, and is credited w ith extensive know ledge of m edicine, m athematics, astronom y, and music. M ost of his surviving w orks are sh o rt treatises, m any of w hich are incom plete and do n o t appear to have been properly revised by the author. T h e G o v e r n a n c e o f th e S o lita r y is n o tew o rth y fo r having the character and position of the philosopher in the im perfect cities as its central theme. T his them e, in a sense, com plem ents A lfarabi’s discussion of the solitary individuals (o r W eed s) in the virtuous c ity in his P o litic a l R e g im e (above, 122

Selection 2). “A bü Bakr Ibn al-Sa’igh sought to establish a w ay fo r the ‘G overnance of the Solitary’ in these lands,” says A verroes, “but this book is incom plete, and besides, it is not always easy to understand its meaning. . . . H e is the only one to treat this subject, and none of his predecessors surpassed him in this respect.” T h e central them e of the w ork is interw oven w ith another them e, th at of “spiritual” or incorporeal “form s.” O nly such parts as treat the main them e are given here. Moses N arboni made a H eb rew paraphrase of the book in his com m enta ry on Ibn T u fa y l’s H a y y th e S o n o f Y a q z a n , com posed in 1349. T his paraphrase was published b y David H e rzog: D ie A b h a n d lu n g d e s A b u B e k r Ib n a l-S a ig “ V o m V e r h a lte n d e s E in s ie d le r s ” n a ch M o s e N a r b o n is A u s z u g

(Berlin, 1896). T h e first edition of the A rabic text was published by M iguel

Av

e

Mpace:

T he G o v e r n a n c e o f th e S o lita ry

Asin Palacios: T a d b i r a l - v m t a v o a h h i d (M adrid-G ranada, 1946). A t about the same time, D. M. D unlop published the first tw o chapters of the text: “Ibn Bajjah’s T a d b lru ’l-M utaw ahhid (R ule of the S o litary ),” ] o u r -

123

lacios’ ed., pp. 3-17). Both editions are based on the same m anuscript (Bodleian, Pococke, N o. 206) and present num erous difficulties, some of w hich are no doubt due to the unfinished character of the w ork as left by Avempace. T h e following translation is based on Asin Palacios’ edition, pp. 3 -Í2, 37, 54-55, 58-62, 78-79.

nal o f t h e R o y a l A s i a t i c S o c i e t y o f G r e a t B r ita in a n d I r e l a n d (1945),

pp. 63-73 (corresponding to Asin Pa­

I i T h e w o rd “ g o v e rn a n c e ” ( t a d b i r ) is used in A rab ic in m a n y senses, e n u m e ra te d b y th e ex p erts in th a t language. M o st co m m o n ly , it is used to sig n ify , in a gen eral w ay , th e o rd e rin g o f actio n s to an end th a t is b ein g p u rsu ed . T h e re fo re th e y do n o t a p p ly it to som eone w h o p e rfo rm s a single actio n w ith a view to acco m p lish in g a p a rtic u la r end: one does n o t call an a c tiv ity “ g o v e rn a n c e ” if he believes th a t it consists o f a single actio n ; w h ereas th e one w h o believes th a t th e a c tiv ity consists o f m a n y actio n s and co n siders it in asm u ch as it possesses an o rd e r, he th e n calls th a t o rd e r a g o v ern an ce. (F o r this reason, th e y say o f G o d th a t H e is th e “g o v e rn o r” o f th e w o rld .) T h is [o rd e r] m ay be p o te n tia l o r actu al; b u t th e m o re fre q u e n t use o f th e w o rd “ g o v e rn a n c e ” signifies th e p o te n tia l [o rd e r]. I t is e v id e n t th a t w h e n c e rta in affairs are o rd e re d p o te n tia lly , th e y are so o rd e re d b y m eans o f calcu latio n ; fo r this [k in d o f o rd e r] p erta in s to ca lc u la tio n and can exist th ro u g h calcu latio n alone. T h e re fo re [4] it can exist in m an alone, and th e use o f “ g o v e rn o r” [cited above] is m e re ly analogical. H e n c e g o v e rn a n c e is used in a p rim a ry and a d eriv ativ e sense.1 G o v e rn a n c e m a y also d esignate th e b rin g in g o f this [p o ten tial] o rd e r in to b ein g and in so far as o rd e r is on its w a y in to being, w h ic h is m o re fre q u e n t and a p p a re n t in h u m an actio n , less so in th e actions o f th e irra tio n a l anim al. A p p lie d in this m an n er, g o v e rn a n c e has a gen eral and a re s tric te d sense. U sed in a general sense, it designates all h u m an activ ities o f w h a te v e r kin d. I t is applied to th e c ra fts as w ell as to th e faculties, ex cep t th a t it is m o re fre q u e n t and co m m o n to a p p ly it [in th e re s tric te d sense] to th e faculties. T h e re fo re it is ap plied to th e o rd e rin g o f m ilita ry affairs an d h a rd ly ever to th e arts o f sh o em ak in g an d w eaving. W h e n ap p lied in this [re stric te d ] m an n er, again it has a g en eral and a re s tric te d sense. U sed in a general sense, it designates all th a t is c o v e re d b y th e arts called “ facu lties.” I have given an a c c o u n t o f this in [m y w o r k (s ) o n ] p o litical science. U sed in a re stric tiv e sense, it designates th e g o v e rn a n c e o f cities.

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G o v e rn a n c e is applied to m a tters som e o f w h ic h are p rio r to o th e rs in d ig n ity and p e rfe c tio n . O f these, th e m o st dignified are th e g o v ern an ce o f cities and th e g o v ern an ce o f th e household. B u t g o v e rn a n c e is seldom app lied to th e h o u seh o ld , to th e e x te n t th a t th e expression “g o v e rn a n c e o f th e h o u se h o ld ” is used in a cnetaphorical an d qualified sense. As fo r th e g o v e rn a n c e o f w a r and so fo rth , th e y fo rm p arts o f these tw o k inds o f g o v ern an ce. A s fo r G o d ’s g o v ern an ce o f th e w o rld , this is c e rta in ly g o v ern an ce o f a d iffe re n t k in d , o n ly d ista n tly re la te d to even th a t m eanin g o f th e w o rd [th a t is, th e one re fe rrin g to th e c ity ] w h ic h resem bles2 it m ost closely. T h e la tte r is g o v ern an ce in th e u n q ualified sense. I t is also th e m ost dignified, fo r it receives th e d esignation [5] “ g o v e rn a n c e ” because o f th e supposed sim ilarity b e tw e e n it and b rin g in g th e w o rld in to existence b y G o d , th e E xalted. It is ev id en t th a t this class o f am b ig u o u s n ouns [to \y h ich “ g o v e rn a n c e ” belongs] is th e fa rth e s t rem o v ed fro m u n iv o c ity ; it is alm ost c o m p le te ly equivocal. T h e m u ltitu d e uses it am b ig u o u sly . T h e p h ilo so p h ers use it w ith co m p lete eq u iv o c ity ; th e y co n sid er it am b ig u o u s o n ly in th e sense in w h ic h w e give A th e nam e o f B because A co n tain s so m eth in g t h a t is sim ilar to B —a class o f w h ic h th e y did n o t give an a c c o u n t in [th e ir discussions of] am b ig u o u s n ouns because o f its ra rity . T h e re fo re th e m u ltitu d e does n o t use th e ad jectiv e “r ig h t” in c o n n e c tio n w ith G o d ’s g o v ern an ce [o f th e w o rld ] and does n o t say o f th e g o v ern an ce o f th e w o rld th a t it is “ r ig h t” g o v ern an ce. In stead it says th a t it is “ p e rfe c t,” “ p recise,” and th e like, because these expressions im p ly th e p resen ce o f rig h tn ess and som e o th e r dignified th in g in ad d itio n . F o r in th e eyes o f th e m u ltitu d e , rig h t a c tiv ity is like a species o f p e rfe c t and p recise activ ity . T h e a c c o u n t o f this m a tte r is p resen ted elsew here. 2 W h e n g o v ern an ce is used in an unq u alified sense, as w e have used it above, to d esig n ate3 th e g o v ern an ce o f cities, and w h e n used in a re stric te d sense [to d esignate the g o v e rn a n c e o f th e h o u se h o ld ], it is d iv id ed in to rig h t and w ro n g g o v ern an ce. I t is som etim es supposed th a t g o v e rn a n c e m a y be free o f these tw o o p p o site [q u alificatio n s], b u t inv estig atio n and close s tu d y w ill reveal th a t th e y ad h ere to it necessarily. T h is can be ascertain ed easily b y an y o n e w ith a m inim al u n d e rsta n d in g o f p o litical p h ilo so p h y . T h e re fo re the tw o ty p e s o f g o v ern an ce p ro p e rly so called can be div id ed in to rig h t and w ro n g g o v ern an ce . As fa r as th e g o v ern an ce o f cities is co n c e rn e d , P lato has explained it in th e R e p u b l i c . H e explained [ 6 ] w h a t is m e an t b y th e rig h t g o v ern an ce o f cities and th e so u rce o f th e w ro n g n ess th a t adheres to it. T o tro u b le oneself w ith th e task o f dealing w ith so m eth in g th a t has been a d e q u a te ly d ealt w ith b e fo re is superfluous, a resu lt o f ig n o ran c e, o r a sign o f evil in ten t. A s fo r th e g o v e rn a n c e o f th e household, th e household as hou seh o ld is a p a rt o f th e c ity . H e [P lato ] explained th e re th a t m an alone fo rm s

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th e n a tu ra l h o u seh o ld [o f w h ic h he sp o k e]. H e explained th a t th e m o st ex cellen t existence o f th a t w h ic h is a p a rt, is to exist as a p a rt. T h e re fo re he did n o t fo rm u la te th e g o v e rn a n c e o f th e h o u sehold as a [separate] p a rt o f th e p o litical art, since it is tre a te d b y him w ith in th e p o litical art. H e explained th e re w h a t th e h o u sehold is and h o w it exists, th a t4 it exists m o st ex cellen tly w h e n th e [c ity c o n d u c ts a] c o m m o n household, and he describes its co m m u n al c h a ra c te r. As fo r th e h o u seh o ld existing in cities o th e r th a n th e v irtu o u s—th a t is, in th e fo u r [im p e rfe c t] cities en u m e ra te d [in th e R e p u b l i c 5] —t h e househ o ld exists in th e m im p e rfe c tly , and th e re is so m eth in g u n n a tu ra l in it. O n ly th a t h o u seh o ld is p e rfe c t to w h ic h n o th in g can be ad d ed w ith o u t re su ltin g in an im p e rfe c tio n , like th e sixth finger; fo r th e d istin g u ish in g fe a tu re o f w h a t is w ell c o n stru c te d is th a t it becom es im p e rfe c t b y a d d in g to it. A ll o th e r h ouseholds are im p e rfe c t and diseased in co m p ariso n w ith th e [n a tu ra l] household, fo r th e c o n d itio n s th a t d ifferen tiate th e m fro m th e v irtu o u s household lead to th e d e stru c tio n o f th e househ o ld and its ru in . T h e re fo re these c o n d itio n s are like a disease. C ertain au th o rs have g o n e th ro u g h th e tro u b le o f tre a tin g th e g o v e rn a n c e o f these im p e rfe c t—th a t is, th e diseased—households. T h o s e o f th e m w hose b ooks o n th e g o v e rn a n c e o f th e h o u sehold have reach e d us e m p lo y rh e to ric a l arg u m en ts. In c o n tra st, th e p o sitio n w e stated is clear: ex cep t fo r th e v irtu o u s h o u seh o ld, th e households are diseased; th e y are all c o rru p t; and th e y do n o t exist b y n a tu re b u t o n ly b y c o n v e n tio n . T h e r e fo re w h a te v e r v irtu e th e y m ay possess, [7] is b y c o n v e n tio n to o , ex cep t p erh ap s so fa r as th e y have so m e th in g in co m m o n w ith th e v irtu o u s h o u seh o ld . T h e v irtu o u s h o u seh o ld can be tre a te d fo llo w in g a fixed an d n ecessary o rd e r o f exposition. U n d e rsta n d ,2 th e n , th a t th e tre a tm e n t o f th a t c o m m o n elem en t can be scientific as w ell, fo r no h o u sehold is w ith o u t m a n y o f th e co m m o n featu re s th a t are to be fo u n d in th e v irtu o u s h o u seh o ld . F o r w ith o u t th em a ho u seh o ld c a n n o t e n d u re o r even be a h o u seh o ld ex cep t eq u iv o cally . L e t us, th en , tu r n aside and leave th e tre a tm e n t o f im p e rfe c t h ouseholds to th o se w h o d ev o te them selves to th e tre a tm e n t o f su ch m a tters as exist a t p a rtic u la r tim es. ]M oreover, th e p e rfe c tio n of th e ho u seh o ld is n o t so m e th in g desired fo r its o w n sake, b u t o n ly fo r th e sake o f re n d e rin g p e rfe c t e ith e r th e c ity o r th e n a tu ra l end o f m an, and th e tre a tm e n t o f th e la tte r c le a rly fo rm s p a rt o f m a n ’s g o v e rn a n c e o f him self [th a t is, eth ics]. In a n y case, th e h o u seh o ld is e ith e r a p a rt o f th e c ity and its tre a tm e n t fo rm s p a rt o f th e tre a tm e n t o f th e c ity , o r a p re p a ra tio n fo r a n o th e r en d an d its tre a tm e n t fo rm s p a rt o f th e tre a tm e n t of th a t end. T h is explains w h y th e tre a tm e n t o f th e h o u seh o ld in th e p o p u la r m a n n er is pointless and does n o t c o n s titu te a science. If it has a n y ad v an tag e, th e n this is o n ly te m p o ra ry , as is th e case w ith w h a t th e rh e to ric ia n s p re se n t in th e ir w o rk s o n “m an n e rs” (w h ic h th e y call p s y c h o lo g ic a l), such as K a l i l a h a n d D i i m i a h and

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th e B o o k o f A r a b S a g e s , w h ic h c o n ta in m axim s an d sayings o f counsel. F o r th e m o st p a rt, this to p ic is tre a te d in c e rta in sections o f a b o o k , such as in th e c h a p te rs2 d ealing w ith th e co m p an io n sh ip o f th e sultan, th e social relatio n s w ith frien d s, and th e like. In th e m a jo rity o f cases, these th in g s are tr u e 2 fo r a p a rtic u la r tim e and a p a rtic u la r [#] w a y o f life. W h e n th a t w a y o f life ch an g es,2 those o p in io n s—expressed as u n iversal statem en ts—c h a n g e ;2 th e ir ap p licatio n becom es re stric te d a fte r h av in g b een u n iversal; th e y b eco m e h a rm fu l o r re je c te d a fte r h av in g b een useful. Y ou w ill u n d e rsta n d this if y o u ac q u a in t y o u rse lf w ith th e c o n te n ts o f th e b o o k s co m p o sed on this to p ic and t r y to a p p ly w h a t is said in each case to la te r tim es. 3 T h e v irtu o u s c ity is c h a ra c te riz e d b y th e absence o f th e a r t o f m ed icin e and o f th e a rt o f ju d icatio n . F o r frien d sh ip binds all its citizens, and th e y do n o t q u a rre l am o n g them selves at all. T h e re fo re , it is o n ly w h e n a p a rt o f th e c ity is b e re ft o f frien d sh ip and q u arrelsom eness b reaks o u t, th a t re c o u rse m u st be had to th e la y in g d o w n o f ju stice and th e n eed arises fo r som eone, w h o is th e ju d g e, to dispense it. M o re o v e r, since all th e actio n s o f th e v irtu o u s c ity are r ig h t—this b ein g th e d istin g u ish in g c h a ra c te ristic th a t adheres to it—its citizens do n o t eat h arm fu l foods. T h e re fo re th e y do n o t need to k n o w a b o u t th e cu res fo r th e su ffo catio n caused b y m u sh ro o m s and th e like, n o r do th e y need to k n o w a b o u t th e tre a tm e n t fo r excessive w in e -d rin k in g , fo r n o th in g th e re is n o t p ro p e rly o rd e re d . W h e n th e citizen s fo re g o exercise, this too, gives rise to n u m e rous diseases; b u t it is ev id en t th a t th e v irtu o u s c ity is n o t su b je c t to such diseases. I t m ay n o t even n eed a n y rem edies aside fro m th o se fo r dislo catio n and th e like, and, in general, fo r such diseases w h o se specific causes are external and th a t th e h e a lth y b o d y c a n n o t w a rd off b y its o w n effo rt. F o r it has b een o b serv ed in m a n y a h e a lth y m an th a t his serious w o u n d s heal [y] b y them selves, and th e re are o th e r k in d s o f ev id en ce fo r this. I t is, th en , c h a ra c te ristic o f th e p e rfe c t c ity th a t th e re is n e ith e r d o c to r n o r ju d g e, w h ile it is in h e re n t in th e fo u r [im p e rfe c t sim ple regim es o r] u n m ix ed 6 cities th a t th e y are in n eed o f d o c to r and ju d g e. T h e m o re rem o v e d a c ity is fro m th e p e rfe c t, th e m o re it is in need o f th ese tw o and th e m o re dignified th e statio n o f these tw o ty p e s o f m en in it. It is e v id e n t th a t in th e v irtu o u s and p e rfe c t c ity , e v e ry m an is o ffered th e h ig h est excellence he is fit to p u rsue. A ll o f its o p inions are tru e and th e re is no false o p in io n in it. Its actions alone are v irtu o u s w ith o u t qualificatio n . W h e n a n y o th e r actio n is v irtu o u s, it is so o n ly in re la tio n to som e existing evil. F o r instance, th e a m p u ta tio n o f a lim b fro m th e b o d y is h arm fu l in itself, b u t, b y accid en t, it m a y p ro v e beneficial to som eone w h o has been b itte n b y a snake and w hose b o d y achieves h ealth b y th a t a m p u ta tio n . S im ilarly, sc a m m o n y is h arm fu l in itself, b u t

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it is beneficial to so m eo n e w ith a disease. A n a c c o u n t o f these m a tters is given in th e N i c o m a c h e a .7 It is, th en , ev id e n t th a t e v e ry o p in io n arising in th e p e rfe c t c ity th a t is d iffe re n t fro m th e o p inions o f its citizens is false, and e v e ry actio n arisin g in it th a t is d iffe re n t fro m th e actions c u sto m a rily p e rfo rm e d in it is w ro n g . N o w th e false does n o t have a defined n a tu re and c a n n o t be k n o w n at all; this is explained in th e B o o k o f D e m o n s t r a t i o n . 8 As to th e w ro n g actio n , it m a y be p e rfo rm e d in o rd e r to achieve som e o th e r end. T h e r e are b o o k s co m p o sed to enable one to s tu d y these actions, such as th e B o o k o f D e v i c e s b y th e B anü S hãkir.9 B u t e v e ry th in g c o n ta in e d in th e m is in th e n a tu re o f p la y —th in g s in te n d e d to excite ra th e r th a n to c o n trib u te [ /0 ] to th e essential p e rfe c tio n o f m an. T o discuss such th in g s is a sign o f evil in te n t and results fro m ig n o ran ce. In th e p e rfe c t c ity , th e re fo re , one does n o t in tro d u c e arg u m e n ts d ealin g w ith th o se w h o hold an o p in io n o th e r th an th a t o f its citizens o r p e rfo rm an a c tio n o th e r th a n th e ir actio n . In th e fo u r [im p e rfe c t] cities, on th e o th e r hand, this can be done. F o r here, th e re m ay be an u n k n o w n 10 actio n th a t a m an discovers b y n a tu re o r learns fro m som eone else, and does it. O r th e re m ay be a false op in io n , and som e m an becom es aw are o f its falsehood. O r th e re m ay be erro n e o u s sciences in all o r m o st o f w h ic h th e citizens do n o t believe because th e y involve a c c e p tin g 2 c o n tra d ic to ry p ositions; and, b y n a tu re o r in stru c tio n , a m an m a y find w h ic h o f th e tw o c o n tra d ic to ry p ro p o sitio n s is th e tru e one. N o w th e ones w h o d isco v er a r ig h t actio n o r learn a tru e science th a t does n o t exist in th e c ity , b e lo n g to a class th a t has no g en eric nam e. A s fo r th e ones w h o stu m b le u p o n a tru e o p inion th a t does n o t exist in th e c ity o r th e o p p o site o f w h ic h is believed in th e c ity , th e y are called W e e d s .11 T h e m o re such opinions th e y hold and th e m o re cru cial th e o pinions, th e m o re a p p ro p ria te th e ap p ellatio n . S tric tly speaking, th e te rm applies to th ese m en alone. B u t it m ay be applied, m o re g en erally , to a n y o n e w h o holds an o p in io n o th e r th a n th e o p in io n o f th e citizens o f th e c ity , reg ard less o f w h e th e r his o p in io n is tru e o r false. T h e nam e has b een tra n s fe rre d to these m en fro m th e w eed s th a t sp rin g up o f them selves a m o n g plants. B u t let us re s tric t th e use o f this te rm to th e ones w h o hold tru e opinions. I t is e v id e n t th a t one o f th e c h arac teristics o f th e p e rfe c t c ity is th a t it is free o f W e e d s [in b o th its s tric t and m o re g en eral senses]; in th e s tric t sense, because it is fre e o f false opinions; and in th e g en eral sense, because th e ir p resen ce m eans th a t th e c ity is a lre a d y diseased and d isin te g ra tin g and has ceased to be [ / / ] p e rfe c t. T h e W e e d s can, h o w ev er, exist in th e fo u r [im p e rfe c t] w ay s o f life. T h e ir ex istence is th e cause th a t leads to th e rise o f th e p e rfe c t city , as explained elsew h ere.12 4 A ll th e w ay s o f life th a t exist n o w o r have existed b e fo re (a c c o rd ­

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ing to th e g re a t m a jo rity o f th e re p o rts re a c h in g us a b o u t th em , w ith th e possible e x cep tio n o f w h a t A b ü N a sr [A lfa ra b i] n a rra te s c o n c e rn in g th e early P ersian s’ w a y o f life ), are m ix tu res o f th e five w ay s o f life [th a t is, th e p e rfe c t and th e fo u r im p e rfe c t o nes], and fo r th e m o st p a rt w e find th e m to be m ix tu res ofi th e fo u r [im p e rfe c t] w ay s o f life. W e leave it to those w h o d ev o te them selves to th e in v estig atio n o f th e w ay s o f life th a t exist in this tim e to su p p ly the details. W e m e re ly re m a rk th a t th e th re e ty p e s o f m e n —th e W e e d s, th e judges, and th e d o c to rs — exist, o r can exist, in these w ay s o f life. T h e happyT^w ere it possible fo r th e m to exist in these cities, w ill possess o n ly th e happiness o f an isolated in d iv id u al; and th e o n ly rig h t g o v e rn a n c e [possible in these cities] is th e g o v ern an ce o f an isolated individual, regardless o f w h e th e r th e re is o n e isolated in d iv id u al o r m o re th a n one, so lo n g as a n atio n o r a c ity has n o t a d o p te d th e ir o p in io n . T h e se individuals are th e o nes m e an t b y th e Sufis w h e n th e y speak o f th e “stra n g e rs” ; fo r a lth o u g h th e y are in th e ir h o m elan d s and am o n g th e ir co m p an io n s and n eig h b o rs, th e Sufis say th a t these are stran g ers in th e ir opinions, having trav elled in th e ir m inds to o th e r statio n s th a t are like h om elands to th e m , and so fo rth . 5 W e in te n d to d iscourse h ere a b o u t th e g o v e rn a n c e o f this so lita ry m an. It is e v id e n t th a t he sufFers fro m so m eth in g th a t is u n n a tu ra l. W e w ill th e re fo re state h o w he sh o u ld m anage him self so th a t he m a y achieve th e b est existence p ro p e r to him , ju st as th e d o c to r states h o w th e isolated m an in these cities sh o u ld m anage him self in o rd e r to be h e a lth y : th a t is, e ith e r h o w to p reserv e his h ealth ( f o r instance, [ /2 ] w h a t G alen w rite s in his P r e s e r v a t i o n o f H e a l t h ) , o r h o w to re c o v e r it o n ce it is lost, w h ic h is laid d o w n in th e a rt o f m edicine. S im ilarly, this discourse is ad dressed to th e isolated W e e d : ( a ) H o w he is to achieve happiness if he does n o t possess it, o r h o w to rem o v e fro m him self th e co n d itio n s th a t p re v e n t his ach iev in g happiness o r ach iev in g th e p o rtio n he can achieve o f it, w h ic h in tu r n d ep en d s e ith e r on h o w fa r his in sig h t takes him o r on [a belief] th a t had seized him . ( b ) A s to th e p reserv atio n o f his happiness, w h ic h is sim ilar to the p re se rv a tio n o f health, it is im possible in th e th re e [fo u r? ] w ay s o f life and those m ixed o f th em ; w h a t G alen an d o th e rs p rescrib e in this situ atio n is sim ilar to a lc h e m y and astro lo g y . W h a t w e are la y in g 2 d o w n h ere is th e m edicine o f th e soul, as d istin g u ish ed fro m th e o th e r m edicine, w h ic h is th e m ed icin e o f th e b o d y , and fro m ju d icatio n , w h ic h is th e m ed icin e o f social relations. I t is e v id e n t th a t th e la tte r tw o arts disappear c o m p le te ly in th e p e rfe c t c ity and are, th e re fo re , n o t to be re c k o n e d a m o n g th e sciences. S im ilarly, th e su b je c t w e are tre a tin g w o u ld disappear if th e c ity w ere p e rfe c t, and so w o u ld the u tility o f this su b ject, ju st as w o u ld th e science o f m edicine, th e a rt o f ju d icatio n , and e v e ry o th e r a rt devised to m eet [th e p red ic am en ts c h a ra c te ristic o f] th e im p e rfe c t [k inds of] g o v ern an ce. J u s t as th e tru e opinions co n ta in e d in m ed icin e re v e rt [in

a

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th e p e rfe c t c ity ] to th e n a tu ra l sciences,13 and those co n ta in e d in th e a rt o f ju d ic a tio n to th e a rt o f politics, sim ilarly th o se c o n tain ed in th e p re se n t s u b je c t re v e rt to n atu ra l scien ce13 and th e a rt o f politics. *

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4 [57] E v e ry o n e o f these [p a rtic u la r sp iritu al form s, th a t is, th e ones p re se n t in co m m o n sense, in th e im agination, and in m e m o ry ] is beloved o f m an b v n a tu re , and h a rd lv a m an can be fo u n d w h o does n o t have a lik in g fo r at least one o f these sp iritu al form s. If m an is a p a rt o f th e c ity , th e n th e c ity is th e end th a t is served in all o f his actions. B u t this o b tain s in th e v irtu o u s c itv•‫ ׳׳‬alone. In th e o th e r fo u r cities and th e ones m ixed o f th em , on th e o th e r hand, each citizen establishes fo r him self a n y o f these sp iritu al fo rm s as an end and has a p re d ile c tio n fo r th e pleasures re su ltin g fro m them . H e n c e th in g s th a t are m ere p re p a ra tio n s in th e v irtu o u s c ity b eco m e th e ends in th e o th e r cities. *

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[54] T h e ends th a t th e so lita ry individual establishes 14 fo r him self arc th ree : his c o rp o re a l fo rm , his p a rtic u la r spiritual fo rm , o r his u n iv ersal sp iritu al fo rm [th a t is, his in tellectu al p e rc e p tio n o f th e intellig ib le ideas]. T h e a c c o u n t o f his ends w h e n h e 15 is a p a rt o f a lastin g [th a t is, p e rfe c t o r v irtu o u s] c ity has been given in political science. A s reg ard s th e ends he establishes fo r him self in each one o f th e o th e r cities—in so fa r as he is a p a rt o f one o f th e m —here, th e solita r y in d iv id u al p erfo rm s, am o n g o th ers, c e rta in activ ities a p p ro p ria te to him as he p u rsu es a n y o f these ends. N o w these ends are ( a ) p u rsu e d in th e c ity ,10 and th e gen eral a c c o u n t o f th e c ity has b een given in [ j j ] p o litical science. T o achieve a n y o f th em , one has to use reflection, in v estig atio n , in feren c e, and, in general, calcu latio n ; fo r w ith o u t th e use o f calcu latio n , an a c tiv ity is bestial, n o t p a rta k in g o f th e h u m an in a n y w a y b e y o n d th e fa c t th a t its o b je c t is a b o d y th a t has a h um an fo rm . ( b ) W h e n , on th e o th e r hand, one p u rsues a bestial p u rp o se — w h e th e r this p u rp o se can be ach iev ed th ro u g h hu m an calcu latio n o r n o t17—his k in d o f m an is n o t d iffe re n t fro m th e beast, and th e re is no d ifferen c e at this p o in t w h e th e r this b ein g possesses a hum an fo rm th a t co n ceals a beast o r it is a beast living in isolation. I t is also ev id en t

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th a t no c ity can be fo rm e d fro m beings th a t a c t in th e bestial m an n er, and th a t th e y c a n n o t a t all fo rm p a rts o f a c ity . O n ly th e so lita ry in d iv id u al can a c t in this m a n n er, and w e have sta te d th e ends o f th e so litary . H e n c e th e end o f th e bestial m an are am o n g these th re e ends. H o w e v e r, it c a n n o t be th e universal sp iritu al fo rm ; f o r this p ertain s to th e in tellect, w h ic h achieves it th ro u g h in q u iry . It is, th e n , e v id e n t th a t th e y m u st be tw o , th a t is, th e p a rtic u la r sp iritu al a n d th e c o rp o re a l fo rm s. *

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XIII i [ 5 8 ] Som e m en, as w e stated p rev io u sly , are m e re ly c o n c e rn e d w ith th e ir c o rp o re a l fo rm ; th e y are th e base. O th e rs o c c u p y them selves o n ly w ith th e ir [p a rtic u la r] sp iritu al fo rm ; th e y are th e h ig h -m in d e d and th e noble. J u s t as th e basest am o n g th e m en c o n c e rn e d w ith th e ir c o rp o re a l fo rm w o u ld be th e one w h o disreg ard s his sp iritu al fo rm fo r th e sake o f th e c o rp o re a l and does n o t p ay a n y a tte n tio n to th e fo rm e r, so th e one w h o possesses [jy ] n o b ility in th e h ighest d eg ree w o u ld be th e one w h o d isregards his c o rp o re a l fo rm and does n o t p a y a n y a tte n tio n to it. H o w e v e r, th e one w h o d isreg ard s his co rp o re a l fo rm co m p lete ly , red u ces his lo n g e v ity ; like th e basest o f m en he deviates fro m n a tu re ; and like him he does n o t exist. B u t th e re are m en w h o d e s tro y th e ir c o rp o re a l fo rm in o b ed ien ce to th e d em ands o f th e ir sp iritu al fo rm . T h u s T a ’abb ata S h a rra n 18 says: O u r lot is either captivity to be followed by the favor [o f m anumission] O r to shed our blood; death is preferable for the free. T h u s he co n sid ers d eath b e tte r th a n hav in g to b ear th e fa v o r o f m an u m ission. O th e rs ch o o se to kill them selves. T h is th e y do e ith e r b y seeking c e rta in d eath in th e b attlefield , as did, fo r exam ple, th e M a rw a n ite 19 in th e w a r w ith ‘A b d A llah Ib n ‘A ll Ib n al‫‘ ־‬A bbãs; he is th e a u th o r o f th e fo llo w in g lines: Life w ith dishonor and the dislike of death, Both I consider evil and hard. If there is no escape from one o r the other, T h en I choose to m arch nobly to death. [O r else th e y choose to take th e ir life w ith th e ir o w n hands.] Z enobia did this w h e n ‘A m r w as a b o u t to kill her: “ I w o u ld ra th e r do it w ith m y o w n hands th a n le t ‘A m r kill m e.” 0‫ ־‬So did th e q u een o f E g y p t w h o se s to r y 21 w ith A u g u stu s is given in th e histories. So also did c e r-

A V E M P A C E :

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ta in peoples [ 6 0 ] w h o m A risto tle m en tio n s w h e n tre a tin g o f th e m ag n an im o u s m a n :22 th e y b u rn e d them selves and th e ir c ity 23 w h e n th e y becam e c e rta in th a t th e ir e n e m y w as a b o u t to d efeat them . A ll this b o rd e rs on excess, ex cep t in c e rta in situations in w h ic h th e d e stru c tio n o f th e c o rp o re a l fo rm ( b u t n o t th e sp iritu al fo rm ) results fro m m agn a n im ity and h ig h -m in d ed n ess. T h is, fo r instance, applies to w h a t F ãtim ah th e m o th e r o f a l-R a b f (an d th e rest o f th e B anü Z iy ã d ) did w h e n Q ay s Ib n Z u h a y r c a u g h t up w ith her. She th re w herself off th e cam el she w as rid in g , and d ie d .24 B u t this is one o f th e special cases in w h ic h it is b e tte r to die th an to live, and in w h ic h th e ch o ice o f d eath o v e r life is th e rig h t th in g fo r m an to do. W e shall give an a c c o u n t o f this la ter on. 2 T h e r e is a n o th e r and lo w e r ty p e o f th e noble an d th e m ag n an im o u s m an, w h ic h fo rm s th e m a jo rity . T h is is th e m an w h o disreg ard s his c o rp o re a l fo rm fo r th e sake o f th e spiritu al, b u t does n o t d e stro y th e fo rm e r, c ith e r because his sp iritu al fo rm docs n o t co m p el him to do so, o r—despite its c o m p ellin g him to d e stro y his c o rp o re a l fo rm — because he decides in fa v o r o f k eep in g it. W e believe this to be w h a t H ã tim a l-T ã ’í2r> did w h e n he slau g h tered his horse and sat h u n g ry , n o t e a tin g a n y o f it him self o r feed in g an y o f it to his fam ily, w h ile his y o u n g c h ild re n w ere c o n v u lsin g w ith h u n g er. A n o th e r exam ple is w h a t thieves do [w h e n th e y e n d u re hardships an d face d a n g e r]. H o w e v e r, in th e fo rm e r case, th e p u rp o se is to c o n tro l th e b o d y and im p ro v e it, w hile these thieves e x p e n d 20 th e ir bodies fo r th e sake o f th e ir bodies and have a p re d ile c tio n fo r one c o rp o re a l state ra th e r th an a n o th e r. In th e fo rm e r case—th e case o f H ã tim a l-T ã ’í and his like—no a rg u m e n t can be a d d u c e d fo r n o t a c k n o w le d g in g th a t th e a ctio n is noble and h ighm in d ed , and th e n a tu re responsible fo r it is h o n o rab le, sublim e, [ 6 /] and free o f c o rp o re a lity ; it o ccupies th e m o st sublim e p o sition, n ex t o n ly to th a t o cc u p ie d b y w isdom ; and it m u st necessarily be one o f th e qualities o f th e p h ilo so p h ic n a tu re , fo r w ith o u t it th e p h ilo so p h ic n a tu re w o u ld be c o rp o re a l and m ixed. In o rd e r to achieve its h ighest p e rfe c tio n , th e p h ilo so p h ic n a tu re m ust, th e n , a c t n o b ly and h ig h -m in d cd ly . T h e re fo re , w h o e v e r p re fe rs his c o rp o re a l existence to a n y th in g p e rta in in g to his sp iritu al existence w ill n o t be able to achieve th e final end. H e n c e no co rp o re a l m an is h ap p y and e v e ry h a p p y m an is c o m p le te ly spiritual. B u t ju st as the sp iritual m an m u st p e rfo rm c e rta in c o rp o re a l acts—b u t n o t fo r th e ir o w n sake— and p e rfo rm [p a rtic u la r] sp iritu al acts fo r th e ir o w n sake, sim ilarly, th e p h ilo so p h e r m u st p e rfo rm n u m ero u s [p a rtic u la r] sp iritu al acts—b u t n o t fo r th e ir o w n sake—and p e rfo rm all th e in tellectu al acts fo r th e ir o w n sake: th e c o rp o re a l acts enable him to exist as a hum an, th e [p a rtic u la r] sp iritu al acts re n d e r him m o re noble, and the in tellectu al acts re n d e r him divine and v irtu o u s. T h e m an o f w isdom is th e re fo re necessarily

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a m an w h o is v irtu o u s and divine. O f e v e ry k in d o f a c tiv ity , he takes up th e b est o n ly . H e shares w ith e v e ry class o f m en th e best states th a t c h a ra c te riz e them . B u t he stands alone as th e one w h o p e rfo rm s th e m o st ex cellen t and th e n o b lest o f actions. W h e n he achieves th e final e n d —th a t is, w h e n he in tellects sim ple essential in tellects, w h ic h are m e n tio n ed in th e M e t a p h y s i c s , O n t h e S o u l , and O n S e n s e a n d t h e S e n s i b l e —he th e n becom es one o f these intellects. I t w o u ld be r ig h t to call him sim p ly divine. H e w ill be free fro m the m o rta l sensible qualities, as w ell as fro m th e h ig h [p a rtic u la r] spiritual qualities: [ 6 2 ] it w ill be fittin g to d escrib e him as a p u re d iv in ity . A ll these qualities can be o b ta in ed b y th e so lita ry in d iv id u al in th e absence o f th e p e rfe c t c ity . B y v irtu e o f his tw o lo w e r ran k s [th a t is, th e c o rp o re a l and th e p a rtic u la r sp iritu al] he w ill n o t be a p a rt, th e end, th e ag en t, o r th e p re se rv e r o f this p e rfe c t c ity . B y y irtu e o f this th ird ran k he m ay n o t be a p a rt o f this p e rfe c t c ity , b u t he nevertheless w ill b e 27 th e end aim ed at in this city . O f course, he c a n n o t be th e p re se rv e r o r th e a g e n t o f th e p e rfe c t c ity w h ile a so lita ry m an. #

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X V I I

2 [ 8 ‫ ] ך‬. . . I t is clear fro m th e situ a tio n o f th e so lita ry th a t he m u st n o t associate w ith th o se w h o se end is c o rp o re a l n o r w ith th o se w hose end is th e s p iritu a lity th a t is a d u lte ra te d w ith c o rp o re a lity . R a th e r, he m u st associate w ith th ose w h o p u rsu e th e sciences. N o w since th o se w h o p u rsu e th e sciences are few‫ ׳׳‬in som e w ay s o f life and m a n y in o th ers, th e re even b ein g w ay s o f life in w hich th e y d o n o t exist a t all, it fo llo w s th a t in som e o f th e w ay s o f life th e so lita ry m u st keep aw7ay fro m m en c o m p le te ly so far as he can, and n o t deal w ith th e m ex cep t in indispensable m a tte rs and to th e e x te n t to w h ic h it is indispensable fo r him to do so; o r em ig rate to th e w7ays o f life in w h ic h th e sciences are p u rsu e d —if such are to be fo u n d . T h is does n o t c o n tra d ic t w7h a t w as stated in p o litical science and w h a t w7as explained in n a tu ra l science. I t w as explained th e re [th a t is, in n a tu ra l science] th a t m an is p o litical b y n a tu re , and it w as explained in p o litical science th a t all isolation is evil. B ut it is o n ly evil as such; accid en tally , it m ay be g o o d , w h ic h h appens w ith re fe re n c e to m a n y th in g s p e rta in in g to n atu re. F o r instance, b read an d m e at are b y n a tu re beneficial and n o u rish in g , w h ile o p iu m and c o lo c y n th are m o rta l poisons. B u t th e b o d y m ay possess c e rta in u n n a tu ra l states in w h ich th e la tte r tw o are beneficial [75)] and m u st be em p lo y ed , and th e n a tu ra l n o u rish m e n t is h arm fu l and m u st be avoided. H o w e v e r, such states are necessarily diseases and d eviations

a

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fro m th e n atu ra l o rd er. H e n c e th e d ru g s are beneficial in ex cep tio n al cases an d b y a c cid en t, w h ile [n a tu ra l] n o u rish m e n t is beneficial in th e m ain and essentially. T h e se states are to th e b o d y as th e w ays o f life are to th e soul. J u s t as h ealth is believed to be one in o p p o sitio n to th ese m a n y [diseased] states, and h ealth alone is th e n atu ra l state o f th e b o d y w h ile th e m a n y [diseased states] are deviations fro m n atu re , sim ilarly th e lasting w a y o f life is th e n atu ral state o f th e soul and is o ne in o p p o sitio n to th e rest o f the w ays o f life, w h ich are m any, and these m a n y [w ay s o f life] are n o t n a tu ra l to th e soul.

NOTES 1. Literally: “ is said in [accordance with an order of] priority and posteriority.” 2. W ith Dunlop. 3. Reading < ‫׳‬uw->iitf//. 4. Reading iva-im i for fa'inn (indeed). 5. That is, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism. Plato R ep u b lic viii-ix. 6. See above, n. 5. 7. Aristotle N icom achean Ethics v. 11. 1 1 38bi if., vii. 5 ff., passim. 8. Aristotle Posterior A nalytics i. 16, passim. 9. Ahmad, al-Hasan, and Muhammad, the sons of Alüsã Ibn Shakir, collaborated in writing numerous works on mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics. The B o o k o f D evices is attributed to Muhammad (d. 873). 10. Reading yu jh al for yu h ill (permitted). 11. Cf. Alfarabi, Political R egim e, pp. 57, 74 ff. (above, Selection 2). 12. Cf., e.g., ibid., pp. 70-71 (above, Selection 2). 13. Avempace says “ arts” and “ art” respectively. He is perhaps alluding to the arts that treat dislocation and the like; see above, p. 8. 14. Reading yansubuha for yatadammanuhã with Narboni? 15. Reading w a-hirw for w a-h iy. 16. Bracketing al-fãdilah (virtuous). 17. Adding av) before lam. 18. A pre-Islamic Arab poet. 19. The event took place in the decisive

battle of the Greater Zab (in 750) in which the Abbasides, led by ‘Abd (not ‘Ubayd) Allah, defeated the last Um ayyad caliph Marwãn. The Umayyad (Marwanite) Yahyã Ibn M u‘ãwiyah refused ‘Abd Allah’s offer of safety and preferred to die. 20. According to an apocryphal story (reported by al-Mas‘udI, Les prairies d'or, eds. C. Barbier de Mcynard and Pavet de Courteille, Vol. Ill [Paris, 1864], pp. 189-96), the pre-Islamic Arab queen of Syria, Zenobia (captured by Aurelian in 272), was trapped by the Lakhmid king ‘Am r Ibn ‘Adi, who was about to kill her in revenge for his maternal uncle, king Jadhimah, whom she had invited to her court and treacherously murdered. Zenobia sucked at her ring, which contained poison, while addressing ‘A m r (read biyad for yã with al-Mas‘üdí). 2 1. Reading khabaruha for harruhã. 2 2. Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics iv. 3-4; Eudemian Ethics iii. 5; De Virtutibus et Vitiis chs. 3, 5. N o such story is related by Aristotle in these places. 23. Reading haraqü avfusahmn wamadinatahum with Narboni. 24. The event took place during the pre-Islamic battle days of Dãhis (second half of the sixth century). 25. Famous for his hospitality (d. ca.

6o5). 26. Reading yabdhtdfm for yubdilun (change). 27. Reading yakfni for takfni.

9 .

HAYY

THE

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YAQZAN

Translated by George N. Atiyeh

Ibn T u fay l (A b ü Bakr M uham m ad IbnT ufayl, d. 1185) was b orn in the first decade of the tw elfth cen tu ry in G uadix near G ranada. H e practiced medicine in the city of G ranada, became secretary to the governor of the province of G ranada, and in 1154 was appointed b y the founder of the A lm ohad dynasty ‘A bd al-M u’m in as secretary to his son A bü Sa‘Id, governor of Ceuta and T angier. H e became the chief physician and vizier of the second A lm ohad prince A bü Ya‘qüb (reigned, 1163—1184) w ho “was m ost affectionate and friendly to him .” “I was told,” says the historian al-M arrãkushi, “that he [Ib n T u fa y l] used to stay w ith him fo r m any days and nights w ithout leaving the palace.” In 1182 he retired as chief physician to be succeeded in this function by his protege Averroes, w hom he had introduced to the prince in 1168/9. A fter A bü Ya‘qüb’s death in 1184, his son

and successor A bü Yüsuf seems to have kept Ibn T u fay l as vizier and honored courtier until the la tter’s death in M arrakesh. H a y y th e S 072 o f Y a q z a n is an epistle addressed to a disciple and friend seeking inform ation about the secrets of the O riental o r Illuminative philosophy m entioned by Avicenna. It consists of an introduction, w hich is a critical survey of the history of Islamic philosophy; the narrative relating the birth of h a y y (alive) the son of y a q z a n (aw ake) and his developm ent on a deserted island; the narrative of the developm ent of sa lã m ã n (sound?) and ãsãl (questioner?) in a religious com m unity on a neighboring island; and the narrative of Asal’s retirem ent to H a y y ’s island, their m eeting, their decision to go back to Asal’s island to educate and im prove the religious com m unity, their failure in their mission, and their retu rn to 134

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H a y y ’s island. A num ber of the names and the elements of the sto ry are b o rrow ed from popular H ellenistic stories and from A vicenna’s story that bears the same title. Ibn T u fa y l’s H a y y t h e S o n o f Y a q z a n was translated into H eb rew by an unknow n author; and Moses N arboni w ro te a com m entary on it in 1349. T h e A rabic original was first published together w ith a Latin transiation b y E dw ard Pococke, Jr.: P h i losophus A u to d ic ta tu s, sive Epistola A b i Jaafar e b n T o p h a i l d e H a i e b n Y o k d a n , q u o m o d o ex In fe rio ru m co n tem plation e ad S u p erio ru m notitiam R a t i o h u m a n a a s c e n d e r e p o s s i t (O x-

ford, 1671; 2nd ed.: O xford, 1700). P ococke’s Latin version was translated into English by the Q uaker G eorge K eith (1674) and by Ashwell (1686). A third English translation, made directly from the A rabic, was done by Simon O ckley: T h e I m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e H u m a n R e a s o n , E x h i b i t e d in t h e

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L i f e o f H a t E b n Y o k d h a n (L ondon,

1708). T h e reason fo r the interest in this book during th at period m ay be seen in O ckley’s subtitle: “In w hich is dem onstrated, by w hat M ethods one may, by the m eer L i g h t o f N a t u r e , attain the K now ledg of things N a tu ra l and S u p e r n a t u r a l ; m ore particularly the K now ledg of G od, and the Affairs of another Life.” Q ckley found it useful to add an A ppendix “In w hich the A u th o r’s N o tio n concerning the Possibility of M an’s attaining the T ru e K now ledg of G od, and Things necessary to Salvation, w ithout the Use of external Means \ l n s t r u c t i o n ], is briefly consider’d ” because “the preceding H isto ry . . . contains several things co-incident w ith the E rrors of some Enthusiasts of these present Tim es. . . .” T h e follow ing translation and sum m ary are based on the critical edition of the A rabic text by Léon G authier: H a y y B e n Y a q d h â n (2nd ed.; Beirut, 1936).

[ i n t r o d u c t i o n ]

Y o u h a v e a s k e d m e , m y noble, sincere, and affectio n ate b ro th e r (m a y G o d b esto w u p o n y o u etern al life and in fin ite hap p in ess), to co n v ey to y o u w h a t I can o f [ 4 ] th e secrets o f th e illum inative [o r o rien tal] p h ilo so p h y re fe rre d to b y th e L ea d in g M aster A b u ‘A li Ib n Sina [A v ic e n n a ]. K n o w , th e n , th a t he w h o desires to k n o w th e p e rfe c t tr u th should seek a fte r this p h ilo so p h y and assiduously e n d eav o r to possess it. Y o u r q u estio n has aw ak en ed in m e a n o b le in te n tio n th a t led m e, praise be to G o d , to p a rta k e in th e vision o f a state I had n o t ex p erien ced b efo re. I t m ade m e reach a p o in t so e x tra o rd in a ry th a t w o rd s c a n n o t d escrib e and clear ex p o sition c a n n o t re n d e r an a c c o u n t th e re o f, because it is o f an o rd e r and realm n o t b elo n g in g to them . N o n eth eless, because o f th e jo y , ex u b eran ce, and th e pleasure rad ia tin g fro m th a t state, w h o ev er attain s it o r reaches one o f its lim its is incapable o f rem ain in g re tic e n t a b o u t it o r o f co n cea lin g its secret. H e is o v e rw h e lm e d w ith such ra p tu re , liveliness, g aiety , and ch eerfu ln ess th a t d riv e him to divulge th e gist, th o u g h n o t th e details, o f its secret.

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N o w , if th e one w h o experiences this state lacks scientific skill, he w ill speak a b o u t it in co n clu siv ely . O n e su ch m an w e n t so fa r as to d eclare w h ile in this state, “ G lo ry to m e, h o w g re a t I am .” 1 A n o th e r said, “ I am th e T r u t h .” 2 A n d still a n o th e r said, “ H e w h o w ears this g a rm e n t is n o n e o th e r th an G o d .”2 As to th e M aster A b ü H ãm id [A lg a z e l],3 w h e n he attain e d this state, he d escrib ed it b y re c itin g th e fo llo w in g verse: W h a t took place, I will not say; So take it well, and do not ask for an account.4 [ $ ‫\־‬ B u t th e n he w as a m an refined w ith k n o w le d g e and m ade skillful th ro u g h th e p u rs u it o f science. C onsider, fu rth e r, th e discourse o f A b ü B akr Ib n al-S a’igh [A v em p ace ] in c o n n e c tio n w ith his d o c trin e on th e c h a ra c te r o f c o n ju n c tio n ( i t t i s ã l ) y H e says, “If . . . som eone com es to grasp th e (in te n d e d ) m eaning, th e n it becom es ev id e n t to him th a t no k n o w le d g e o f th e o rd in a ry sciences can be placed in th e sam e c a te g o ry . H is c o n c e p tio n o f th a t m ean in g takes place on a level in w h ic h he finds him self c u t off fro m all th a t p reced e d , and h o ld in g n ew co n v ic tio n s free o f c o rp o re a lity , to o sublim e to be a ttrib u te d to n atu ra l life, and free fro m th e ep h em eral c o m p o sitio n in h e re n t in n atu ral life. T h e y are ra th e r w o r th y to be co n sid ered as divine states, b esto w ed b y G o d u p o n w h o m so ev er H e pleases o f H is serv an ts.” 0 T h is level to w h ic h A b ü B akr [A v em p ace] has allu d ed is attain e d b y w a y o f th e o re tic a l science and b y ratio n al in v estig atio n . D o u b tlessly , he m u st have attain e d su ch a level a lth o u g h he did n o t go b e y o n d it. R e g a rd in g th e level to w h ic h w e have allu d ed first, it is d iffe re n t a lth o u g h it is th e sam e in th e sense th a t th e re is n o th in g revealed in th e first th a t is n o t revealed also in th e second. T h e first, h o w ev er, differs b y its su p e rio r c la rity and in th e w a y it is b eh eld th ro u g h som eth in g th a t w e call “ fo rc e ,” b u t o n ly m e ta p h o ric a lly because w e fail to find term s, [ 6 ] w h e th e r c u rre n t o r tech n ical, th a t designate th e th in g b y v irtu e o f w h ich th a t k in d o f vision is ex p erien ced . T h e state w e have ju st d e sc rib e d —o f w h ic h , m oved b y y o u r q u estion, w e have had a taste ( d h a w q ) 7—is one o f th e states in d icate d b y th e M aster A b ü ‘A li [A v icen n a] w h e n he says, “T h e n , w h e n b y w ill and discipline one is c a rrie d to a lim it w h e re he catch es d e lig h tfu l glim pses o f th e T r u th , stro k es o f lig h tn in g as it w ere, w h ic h no so o n er flash th a n th e y disapp ear. . . . N o w , if he persists in his d iscip lin ary p ra c tic e , these ecstatic glim pses m u ltip ly . T h e n he goes d eep er and d eep er u n til he is capable o f c a tc h in g these glim pses w ith o u t a n y m o re discipline. E v e ry tim e he glances at a th in g , he tu rn s to w a rd th e A u g u st D iv in ity , and rem e m b ers so m eth in g o f th a t state. A n ecstasy takes hold o f him u n til he w o u ld see th e T r u t h in alm ost all things. . . . F in ally discipline leads him to th e

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p o in t w h e re his [tro u b le d ] tim e tu rn s in to tra n q u illity . W h a t w as o n ly ev an escen t beco m es co m m o n and w h a t w as ju st a gleam [7] becom es a sh in in g star. H e acq u ires a firm in tim a cy , a c o n sta n t association as it w e re .” H e th e n goes on to d escribe th e o rd e rly g ra d a tio n o f th e levels an d h o w th e y te rm in a te in a tta in in g th e goal as the seek er’s m o st in tim ate soul tu rn s in to “ a p o lish ed m irro r facin g th e T r u t h .” A t this p o in t th e su b lim est pleasures flo w u p o n him , and “th e traces le ft b y th e T r u t h ” in his soul fill him w ith happiness. A n d at this level, he h esitatin g ly flu ctu ates b e tw e e n “ lo o k in g at th e T r u t h and at h im self,” u n til finally “all co nsciousness o f him self is lost and he no tices n o th in g b u t th e A u g u st D iv in ity . If he ev er h appens to glance aside at his soul, he does so o n ly in asm u ch as his soul is th e g la n c in g ag ent. . . . It is th e n th a t tru e u n io n takes p la c e .” 8 N o w b y these states th a t he describ ed , A v icen n a in te n d e d th a t he [th e in itiate] ac q u ire a taste th a t is n o t a c q u ire d b y w a y o f th e o re tic a l p e rc e p tio n , w h ic h results fro m syllo g istic reasoning, th e assu m p tio n o f prem ises, and th e d ra w in g o f conclusions. If y o u w ish a co m p ariso n to illu strate th e d ifferen c e b e tw e e n th e p e rc e p tio n attain e d b y this g ro u p o f m en and th a t a ttain e d b y o th ers, th e n im agine th e case o f a m an b o rn blind, b u t e n d o w e d w ith keen innate in tellig en ce, p e n e tra tin g insight, ten acio u s m e m o ry , and d e te rm in e d w ill. Since th e d a y he is b o rn , he g ro w s up in a [#] c e rta in to w n . B y m eans o f his o th e r p o w e rs o f p e rc e p tio n , he c o n tin u es to a c q u a in t him self w ith th e in d iv id u al m en liv in g th e re , th e m a n y species o f anim ate an d inan im ate beings, th e streets o f th e c ity an d alleys th a t c u t th ro u g h it, its houses, an d its m ark ets, to th e e x te n t th a t he can w a lk a ro u n d in th a t c ity w ith o u t a g u id e, and reco g n ize in sta n tly e v e ry o n e he m eets. C o lo rs fo rm an ex cep tio n ; he k n o w s th e m b y m eans o f th e explanations o f th e ir nam es and b y c e rta in d efinitions d esig n atin g th em . T h e n , w h en he reach es this g rad e, his eyes are op en o f a su d d en , and his e y esig h t is re s to re d to him . H e ru n s all o v er to w n o n ly to d isco v er th a t in fa c t n o th in g is d iffe re n t fro m w h a t he has believed it to be, n o r does he fail to reco g n ize a n y th in g he lays eyes u p o n . H e finds th e co lo rs tr u ly c o rre s p o n d in g to th e d escrip tio n s given him . In all this he experiences, neverth eless, tw o g re a t th in g s, th e on e a co n seq u en ce o f th e o th e r: a g re a te r lu c id ity and c la rity , and an exalted pleasure. T h e state o f th e sp ecu la to rs w h o have n o t attain e d th e phase o f sa n c tity is co m p arab le to th e first state o f th e b lin d m an; th e colors, w h ic h , [ 9 ] in this state, are k n o w n th ro u g h th e d e sc rip tio n o f th e ir nam es, are co m p arab le to th o se th in g s o f w h ic h A b ü B akr [A v em p ace] said th a t th e y are to o sublim e to be a ttrib u te d to n a tu ra l life an d th a t th e y are b esto w ed b y G o d u p o n w h o m so e v e r H e pleases o f H is servants. T h e state o f th e sp ecu la to rs w h o attain s a n c tity and to w h o m G o d g ra n ts th a t th in g o f w h ic h w e said th a t it is n o t called “ fo r c e ” ex c e p t m e ta p h o ric a lly , is th e seco n d state.

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In v e ry ra re cases, one m a y find som eone w ith p ie rc in g intellig en ce, keen, and n o t in n eed o f specu latio n . H e re I do n o t m ean —m a y G o d b e sto w H is sa n c tity u p o n y o u —b y “ th e p e rc e p tio n o f th e sp e c u la to rs” w h a t th e y p erceiv e o f th e p h y sical w o rld and b y “ th e p e rc e p tio n o f th e m en o f s a n c tity ” w h a t th e y p erceiv e o f th e m etap h y sical, fo r these tw o k in d s o f p e rc e p tio n in them selves are v e ry d iffe re n t fro m each o th e r and it is h a rd ly possible to c o n fo u n d th e one w ith th e o th e r. W h a t w e m ean b y th e p e rc e p tio n o f th e sp ecu lato rs is w h a t th e y a p p re h e n d o f th e m e tap h y sical o rd e r, such as w as a p p re h e n d e d b y A b ü B ak r [A v em p ace]. W h e n this p e rc e p tio n is tru e and valid, it is possible to co m p a re it w ith th e p e rc e p tio n o f th e m en o f sa n c tity w h o are c o n c e rn e d w ith these v e ry sam e [m etap h y sical] th in g s, b u t w h o p erceiv e th e m w ith g re a te r c la rity an d pleasure. H o w e v e r, [ /0 ] A b ü B akr [A v em p ace ] cen sures th e m en o f sa n c tity fo r this p leasure and a s c rib e s J t to th e im aginative fa c u lty . H e p ro m ised to d escribe in a clear and p recise m a n n e r h o w th e state o f th e h a p p y ones o u g h t to be. O n e o u g h t to an sw er him in th is c o n te x t w ith th e saying: “ D o n o t call sw eet w h a t y o u have n o t tasted , n o r step o v e r th e necks o f th e v eracio u s.” O u r m an d id n o t do a n y o f th e th in g s he said he w o u ld do; he did n o t fulfil his prom ise. I t seems, as he him self m entions, he w as im p ed ed b y sh o rtag e o f tim e and th e trip he to o k to W a h rã n [O ra n ]. O r, it c o u ld be he realized th a t if he d escrib ed th a t state, he w o u ld find him self o b lig ed to say th in g s th a t d e c ry his o w n c o n d u c t, an d belie w h a t he had c o n tin u a lly m ain tain ed c o n c e rn in g th e effo rts on e sh o u ld ex ert to ac c u m u la te and h o ard rich es and th e use o f all k in d s o f artifices to o b ta in th em . W e have d ev iated so m ew h at fro m th e co u rse to w h ic h y o u r q u estio n had led us, as this seem ed necessary. H o w e v e r, it is n o w clear fro m w h a t has b een said th a t y o u r goal can o n ly be one o f tw o th in g s: (1 ) T h a t y o u are seek in g to u n d e rsta n d th a t w h ic h is b eh eld b y th o se w h o ex p erien ce th e vision, th e taste, and th e p resen ce [o f G o d ] in th e ir m o m e n t o f sa n c tity . T h is is one o f th o se th in g s w h o se real n a tu re c a n n o t be e n tru ste d to th e pages o f a b o o k ; and o n ce y o u t r y to do th a t, c o n stra in in g y o u rs e lf e ith e r th ro u g h th e sp o k en o r th e w ritte n w o rd , th e v e ry n a tu re o f th e ex p erien ce is altered b y passing to [ / / ] th e o th e r realm , th a t is, th e speculative. B ecause w h e n e v e r such an ex p erien ce is w ra p p e d in sounds an d le tters and b ro u g h t n e a re r to th e sensible w o rld , its n a tu re does n o t rem ain th e same, no m a tte r h o w w e lo o k at it. H e n c e it lends itself to a g re a t m a n y d iffe re n t and v aried expressions. A s a re su lt m a n y are led a stra y fro m th e rig h t p ath , an d o th e rs are th o u g h t to have g o n e a stra y a lth o u g h in re a lity th e y have n o t. T h is is because [one is try in g to explain] an in finite e n tity w ith in a divine e p ip h a n y o f e n o rm o u s dim ensions, an e p ip h a n y th a t co n tain s b u t is n o t itself co n tain ed . (2 ) T h e seco n d o f th e tw o goals to w h ic h y o u r q u estio n co u ld p ossibly lead is th a t y o u are seeking th a t this th in g be m ade

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k n o w n to y o u in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e m e th o d o f th e specu lato rs. T h is — m a y G o d h o n o r y o u w ith s a n c tity —is a th in g th a t c o u ld be e n tru ste d to b o o k s and it lends itself to bein g expressed, a lth o u g h [this k n o w le d g e ] is ra re r th a n red su lp h u r, especially in th e re g io n w e live in [th a t is, A ndalusia an d N o r th w e s t A fric a ]. S u ch [k n o w le d g e ] is so e x tre m e ly u n c o m m o n th a t o n ly n o w and th e n som eone acq u ires small p o rtio n s o f it. M o reo v er, w h o e v e r com es to acq u ire a n y p o rtio n o f it does n o t c o m m u n ic a te it to o th e rs e x cep t th ro u g h sym bols. T h e H a n ifite [Islam ic] relig io n and th e tru e [Islam ic] L aw have p ro h ib ite d d elv in g in to it and w a rn e d against p u rs u in g it. D o n o t th in k th a t th e p h ilo so p h y th a t re a c h e d us [ /2 ] in th e w o rk s o f A risto tle , A b ü N a s r [A lfa ra b i], and in [A v ic e n n a ’s] H e a l i n g is suffic ie n t to achieve y o u r p u rp o se. F u rth e rm o re , no A n d alu sian has as y e t w ritte n en o u g h o n th e su b ject. T h is is because all those A ndalusians w ith b rillia n t ta le n t—and w h o receiv ed th e ir e d u c a tio n b e fo re th e d iffu sion o f lo g ic an d p h ilo so p h y in th a t c o u n tr y —d e d ic a te d them selves to th e science o f m ath em atics, re a c h in g a high d eg ree in it. B u t th e y w e re n o t able to do m o re th a n th a t. T h e g e n e ra tio n th a t su cceed ed th e m w e n t b e y o n d and in to th e science o f logic. T h e y stu d ied it, b u t it failed to b rin g th e m to tru e p e rfe c tio n . O n e o f th e m re c ite d : Afflicted I am, because all that m ortals know A re tw o things and no m ore; A tru th whose acquisition is impossible, A nd a falsehood whose acquisition is of no use.9 T h e n fo llo w e d a n o th e r g en e ra tio n w ith a g re a te r p e rsp ic a c ity and clo ser to th e tru th . T h e re w as no n e am o n g th e m o f a finer genius, o f a g re a te r u n d e rsta n d in g , o r o f a tr u e r in sig h t th a n A b ü B akr Ib n al-$ã’igh [A v e m p a c e ]. Y et, th e th in g s o f this w o rld k e p t him b u sy u n til d eath o v e rto o k him b e fo re th e treasu res o f his science c o u ld be b ro u g h t to lig h t and th e secrets o f his w isd o m m ade available. T h e g re a te st p a rt o f his e x ta n t w ritin g s are in an im p e rfe c t state and in co m p lete, [ /5 ] such as O n t h e S o u l an d th e G o v e r n a n c e o f t h e S o l i t a r y , as w ell as his boo k s on lo g ic and p h y sics. As fo r his finished w o rk s, th e y in c lu d e o n ly co n cise b o o k s and h astily w ritte n treatises. H e him self d eclared this w h e n he m e n tio n e d th a t th e idea he m e a n t to d e m o n stra te in his treatise O n C o n j u n c t i o n c a n n o t be c le a rly u n d e rsto o d w ith o u t h ard stru g g le and g re a t e ffo rt, th a t th e o rd e r o f his explanations, in som e places, is n o t th e best, an d th a t he w as in clin ed to ch an g e th em , had tim e p e rm itte d him to do so. T h is is w h a t has co m e d o w n to us c o n c e rn in g this m a n ’s k n o w le d g e ; w e n ev er m e t his person. W ith re g a rd to his c o n te m p o ra rie s w h o are d escrib ed as b ein g o f th e sam e ra n k as he, w e have n o t fo u n d a n y w ritte n w o rk s b y th em . R e g a rd in g th e ir successors w h o are o u r c o n te m p o ra rie s, th e y are e ith e r in th e stage o f d ev elo p m en t, o r have

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sto p p ed s h o rt o f p e rfe c tio n , o r else w e are n o t su fficiently in fo rm e d a b o u t them . A s to th e b o o k s o f A b u N a sr [A lfarab i] th a t have reach e d us, th e m a jo rity are on logic. T h e ones th a t deal w ith p h ilo so p h y p ro p e r are p lag u ed w ith d o u b ts. F o r exam ple, he affirm s in th e V i r t u o u s R e l i g i o n th a t th e souls o f th e w ick ed are d o o m ed a fte r d eath to infinite su ffe rin g fo r an in fin ite tim e. T h e n he declares in th e P o l i t i c a l R e g i m e th a t th e y dissolve in to n o th in g n ess and th a t o n ly [ 1 4 ] th e v irtu o u s and p e rfe c t souls survive. T h e n in his c o m m e n ta ry on th e E t h i c s , he describes an asp ect o f h u m an happiness an d affirm s th a t this is achieved o n ly in this life and in this v e ry w o rld . H e th e n adds a re m a rk w h o se m ean in g can be sum m ed u p as follow s: all th a t is said c o n tra ry to this is senseless ja b b e r and tales to ld b y old w o m en . A d o c trin e like this leads all m en to desp air o f G o d ’s m e rc y , and places th e w ick ed and th e g o o d in th e sam e c a te g o ry since, a c c o rd in g to this d o c trin e , all m en are destined fo r n o thin g n ess. T h is is a slip th a t c a n n o t be rectified , and a false step th a t c a n n o t be rem ed ied . T h is, aside fro m his d eclared disbelief in p ro p h e c y , nam ely , his assertion th a t it is th e exclusive p r o p e r ty o f th e im ag in ativ e fa c u lty ; and n o t to m e n tio n his p re fe re n c e fo r p h ilo so p h y o v e r p ro p h e c y , and m a n y o th e r th in g s in to w h ic h w e need n o t n o w go. A s fo r th e w o rk s o f A risto tle , th e M aster A b ü ‘A li [A v icen n a] u n d e rto o k to explain th e ir co n ten ts. H e fo llo w ed A ris to tle ’s d o c trin e and p h ilo so ph ic m e th o d in his H e a l i n g . A t th e b eg in n in g o f th a t b o o k , he d eclares th a t th e tr u th in his o p in io n is o th e rw ise, th a t th e ab ove w o rk ex p o u n d s th e p e rip a te tic teach in g , and th a t he w h o seeks p u re tr u th sh o u ld lo o k f o r it in his [ /y ] I l l u m i n a t i v e [o r O r i e n t a l ] P h i l o s o p h y . H e w h o takes th e tro u b le o f rea d in g the H e a l i n g and th e b ooks o f A risto tle c a n n o t b u t reco g n ize th e ir ag re e m e n t o n m o st points, th o u g h th e re are th in g s in th e H e a l i n g th a t have n o t com e d o w n to us as A risto telian . N o w , w e re one to a c c e p t th e literal m ean in g o f e v e ry th in g p resen ted in th e b o o k s o f A risto tle as w ell as in th e H e a l i n g w ith o u t p e n e tra tin g in to th e secret and eso teric sense, this w o u ld n o t enable him to attain p e rfe c tio n —as th e M aster A b ü ‘A ll [A v icen n a] w a rn e d us in th e H e a l i n g . As fo r th e b o o k s o f th e M aster A b ü H ã m id [A lg azel], w h a t he says in th e m d ep en d s o n his p u b lic; he says one th in g in on e place and a d iffe re n t th in g in an o th er. H e charg es o th e rs w ith u n b elief because th e y hold c e rta in d o ctrin es, th e n tu rn s a b o u t and accep ts th em as law ful. A m o n g o th e r th in g s, he ch arg es th e p h ilo so p h ers w ith u n b elief, in his I n c o h e r e n c e [ o f t h e P h i l o s o p h e r s ], fo r th e ir denial o f th e re su rre c tio n o f th e b o d y and th e ir affirm ation th a t o n ly th e souls receive re w a rd s and p u n ish m en ts. B u t a t th e o u tse t o f his C r i t e r i o n [ o f A c t i o n ], he says th a t this v e ry sam e te n e t is d efin itely held b y th e Sufi m asters. T h e n , in his D e l i v e r e r f r o m E r r o r a n d t h e E x p l a i n e r o f t h e S t a t e s , he says th a t he him self holds th e sam e b elief as th e Sufis and th a t he had arriv e d

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[ /^ ] at this c o n v ic tio n a fte r a lo n g and detailed stu d y . H is books are p ack ed w ith th in g s o f this kind, and an y o n e w h o takes the pain to c o n sid er and exam ine then! can see th a t fo r him self. In fa c t he apologizes fo r su ch c o n d u c t at th e end o f his C r i t e r i o n o f A c t i o n , w h e re he m aintains th a t o p in io n is o f th re e classes: (1 ) A n o p in io n in w h ic h one agrees w ith th e m u ltitu d e . (2 ) A n o p in io n th a t is in c o n fo rm ity w ith th e w a y one addresses all q u estio n ers and seekers o f counsel. (3 ) A n o p in io n th a t one holds in tim a te ly w ith in him self, an d does n o t disclose ex cep t to th o se w h o share his co n v ictio n s. T h e n he says: “E v en if th e re w e re no value in these w o rd s ex cep t to m ake y o u d o u b t y o u r in h e rited beliefs, th a t in itself w o u ld be useful en o u g h . H e w h o does n o t d o u b t does n o t look, he w h o does n o t look does n o t see, he w h o does n o t see rem ains b lin d and p e rp le x e d .” T h e n he recites th e fo llo w in g verse: A ccept w hat you see and let go w hat you hear; W h e n the sun comes out you will need no saturn.10 So this is h o w he p resen ts his teach in g . It is m ain ly sym bols and allusions o f little use ex cep t fo r th e one w h o is capable o f g rasp in g th em first b y his o w n p e rsp ic a c ity and th e n b y listen in g to his [A lg azel’s] explanations, o r th e one w h o is n a tu ra lly disposed to u n d e rsta n d and is e n d o w e d w ith g re a t in tellig en ce and fo r w h o m th e slig h test allusion is en o u g h . H e m en tio n s [ /7 ] in his J e w e l s [ o f t h e K o r a n ] th a t he corhposed som e eso teric b ooks in w h ic h he in c o rp o ra te d th e u n veiled tru th . B u t as far as w e k n o w n o n e o f these books has reach ed A ndalusia. T h e books th a t have in fa c t reach ed us and are alleged to be his eso teric w o rk s, are in re a lity n o t so. T h e se books are: th e I n t e l l e c t u a l C o g n i t i o n s and th e B l o w i n g a n d L e v e l l i n g , and a w o rk in w h ich ce rta in o th e r p ro b lem s are b ro u g h t to g e th e r. A lth o u g h these books c o n ta in certain allusions here and th e re , th e y neverth eless c o n ta in little else th a t co u ld reveal m o re th an w h a t is alre a d y to be fo u n d in his m o re fam iliar books. In fa c t one m ay find in his S u p r e m e P u r p o s e th in g s th a t are m o re am biguous th an w h a t is fo u n d in th ese [alleg ed ly eso teric b o o k s]. S ince he him self ded a re s th a t th e S u p r e m e P u r p o s e is n o t esoteric, it m u st fo llo w if this is so, th a t these b ooks th a t have reach e d A n d alu sia are n o t th e eso teric books. A re c e n t a u th o r im agines th a t w h a t is said at th e end o f th e N i c h e [ o f L i g h t ] p resen ts a g rave d ifficu lty th a t su p p o se d ly caused alG h azãlí [A lg azel] to fall in a p it fro m w h ic h th e re is no salvation. T h e re fe re n c e is to w h a t [A lg azel] says a fte r e n u m e ra tin g th e d iffe re n t classes o f th o se w h o are veiled b y [divine] lights, and his passing to m e n tio n th e ones w h o attain ed [u n io n w ith G o d ] —he says th a t th e la tte r have learn ed th a t this B eing is c h a ra c te riz e d b y an a ttrib u te [/