Media Narratives and the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Asian Experience 1032003901, 9781032003900

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations
Figures
Tables
Contributors
Introduction
The ‘Global Village’ in the Time of Corona
Remembering Pandemics and Natural Disasters
References
Part I: Missing and Marginalized Narratives
Chapter 1: Unrest in the Comments: Voicing the Discontent of Japan’s Foreign Residents in the Comments Sections of Japan Today
Introduction
Big in Japan, but Always an Outsider
Having Your Say: News Comments and Their Value
Methods
Reader Sentiment and Article Themes
Entry Ban
State of Emergency: What Emergency?
Second-Class Citizens
Conclusion
References
Chapter 2: Gender, Media and the Covid-19 Pandemic: An Investigation into Missing Gendered Narratives in Indian News Media
Introduction
Gendered Impact of Covid-19
Gender and Media: Gender Bias in News Media/Coverage
Methodology
A Brief Overview of Indian Press
Gender and the Indian News Media
Of Numbers and Statistics
‘Symbolic Annihilation’ of Gender Concerns
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: The Mask Dilemma: Hierarchy between Two Know-Hows in Chinese-Language Media of Canada
The Study
The Pre-Outbreak Phase
Confinement and Border Control
The Mask Issue
The Theresa Tam Issue
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Missing Media Narratives: Covid’s Impact on Transgender Population in India
Introduction
Impact of Covid on Indian Transgender Community: Three Case-Studies
Missing Media Narratives: Analysis of English News-Stories on Transgender Persons
Theme One: Impact of Covid and 2020 Lockdown/Pandemic on Transgender Population
Theme Two: Plight of Hijra Community during Covid
Theme Three: Government Initiatives
Theme Four: Government Negligence
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Part II: Media Memory and Narratives
Chapter 5: Masked Presence: Covid-19 and Remembering SARS in Taiwan
Introduction
The “Taiwan Model” for Containing Covid-19
Mask Diplomacy and Masked Governance
Masking as a Total Social Fact
“Lucky to be Taiwanese”? SARS, Masks, and Covid-19
The Past, Redux: Remembering SARS
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 6: Familial Halcyon: Narratives of Nostalgia in the Lockdown
Introduction
The Disjuncture Apparatus
‘Hum Saath Saath Hain’
Second-Order Myths and Intellectual Uncertainty
Narratives of Nostalgia
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part III: Media Bias and Propaganda
Chapter 7: Taiwan Can Help: Covid-19, the Model Minority State, and the Limits of Taiwan-as-Beacon Rhetoric
Taiwan-as-Beacon and the Model Minority State
Covid-19 and the Model Minority State
Conclusion
References
Chapter 8: The Myths of Hate: Digital Deception in the (Communal) Times of Covid-19
Introduction
The Deception Ecosystem
Islamophobia and The Indian State
The Communal Turn of Covid-19
Decoding Digital Disinformation
Actors
Goals
Media Ecosystems
Stratagems
Concluding Remarks: The Myths of Hate
Notes
References
Chapter 9: Risk Communication versus Risks in Communication: Efforts of Vietnam Government in Controlling Messages during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Introduction
Literature Background
Organizational Model of Covid-19 Prevention Communication System of the Government of Vietnam
Message about Covid-19 Pandemic Prevention by Government
Discussion and Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Modern Hua Mulans in Global Chinese-Speaking Media: Female Frontline Workers as Tools of Propaganda during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Introduction
Official PRC Media Coverage of Female Frontline Workers during the Pandemic
The Problem of Hua Mulan and the Masculinization of Working Women
Backlash from Chinese-Speaking Media Outside Mainland China
Conclusion
References
Part IV: Mainstream and Alternative Narratives
Chapter 11: Confronting Anti-Asian Bias in the Classroom: Reflections on the Importance of Asian and Asian American Studies in the Wake of Covid-19
The Importance of Asian and Asian American Studies
The Need for Media Literacy
Andragogical Strategies to Confront Yellow Peril
Supporting Asian International and Asian American Students
Reflections on Our Roles as Educators
One of the Few (Kimberly)
Always Asking Why (Meghan)
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 12: From a Story of Disaster to a Story of Victory: Chinese Media Reports in the Covid-19 Crisis
Introduction
Theoretical Background: Media in China
Party Journalism and Market Journalism
Media under Xi Jinping
Method and Data Selection
Results
Local and Central Governments: Whose Faults? Whose Merits?
Health Workers: “War Heroes” or Victims?
In and Out of Hospitals: Setting the Stage, Setting the Narrative
Discussion and Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 13: The Covid-19 Pandemic: News Reporting in Malaysia
Introduction
The Malaysian News Media
The Star Online
Malaysiakini
Journalists and News Sources
Malaysia and the Covid-19 Pandemic
Methodology
Findings
Themes
March 2020
April 2020
May 2020
June 2020
Sources
March 2020
April 2020
May 2020
June 2020
Conclusion
References
Part V: Narratives of Othering
Chapter 14: Viral Vilification
Introduction
Cartoon
Cover
Citizenship
Criticisms
Consequences
Notes
References
Chapter 15: Pandemics, Politics and Religious ‘Others’: Exploring Media Narratives during Covid-19 in India and Pakistan
Introduction
Politics of Religion in India and Pakistan
Media Narratives in India
Media Narratives in Pakistan
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part VI: Social Media Narratives
Chapter 16: Social Media and Vietnamese Undocumented Workers in Thailand during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Introduction
Marginalization during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Use of Social Media to Mitigate Everyday Experience of Marginalization
Use of Social Media to Mitigate Marginalization during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Discussion and Conclusion
References
Chapter 17: Representations of Covid-19 in West Asia: A Case Study of Islamic Republic News Agency’s (IRNA) Instagram Account
Introduction
Methodology
Findings
Analysis of National and International News Covered by IRNA Instagram Page
Analysis of National News on Covid-19 Covered by IRNA Instagram Page
Analysis of International News Covered on Covid-19 by IRNA Instagram Page
Analysis of the Type of Content used by IRNA Instagram Page
Conclusion
References
Chapter 18: Don’t Panic! Reach Us: Indian Tech Unions’ Social Media Narratives during the Pandemic
Introduction
Review: Existing Accounts and Unexplored Aspects
Methods
Data: Narratives of Precarity
Individual Narratives
Collective Narratives
Discussion: Interpreting the Narratives
Conclusion
Note
References

Citation preview

MEDIA NARRATIVES AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

This volume investigates mediated lives and media narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic, with Asia as a focus point. It shows how the pandemic has created an unprecedented situation in this globalized world marked by many disruptions in the social, economic, political, and cultural lives of individuals and communities— creating a ‘new normal’. It explores the different media vocabularies of fear, panic, social distancing, and contagion from across Asian nations. It focuses on the role media played as most nations faced lockdowns and unique challenges during the crisis. From healthcare workers to sex workers, from racism to nationalism, from the plight of migrant workers in news reporting to state propaganda, this book brings critical questions confronting media professionals into focus. The volume is of critical interest to scholars and researchers of media and communication studies, politics, especially political communication, social and public policy, and Asian studies. Shubhda Arora is an Assistant Professor of Communication at the Indian Institute of Management, Lucknow, India. She is a media sociologist with research interests in Gender, Environmental and Disaster Communication. She has authored research papers and book chapters exploring ideas of Vulnerability and Social Inequality. Keval J. Kumar is an Adjunct Professor at MICA, India. Earlier, he was a Reader at Pune University and Director of SIMC. He is the author of Mass Communication in India (5th Edition), Media Education, Communication and Public Policy, and has contributed to the International Encyclopaedia of Media Literacy and The Handbook of Media Education Research.

MEDIA NARRATIVES AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC The Asian Experience

Edited by Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

Cover image: Getty Images/ ronniechua First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-00390-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-52415-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-40656-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563 Typeset in Bembo by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive)

This book is dedicated to the courage, resilience, care, and love shown by people and communities in times of pain, loss, and panic.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations x Contributors xi Introduction Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

1

Part I

Missing and Marginalized Narratives

11

1 Unrest in the Comments: Voicing the Discontent of Japan’s Foreign Residents in the Comments Sections of Japan Today 13 Christopher J. Hayes 2 Gender, Media and the Covid-19 Pandemic: An Investigation into Missing Gendered Narratives in Indian News Media Shipra Raj

28

3 The Mask Dilemma: Hierarchy between Two Know-Hows in Chinese-Language Media of Canada Grace Cheng-Ying Lin

41

4 Missing Media Narratives: Covid’s Impact on Transgender Population in India Shubhda Chaudhary

56

viii  Contents

Part II

Media Memory and Narratives

73

5 Masked Presence: Covid-19 and Remembering SARS in Taiwan Jacob F. Tischer

75

6 Familial Halcyon: Narratives of Nostalgia in the Lockdown Azania Imtiaz Patel

87

Part III

Media Bias and Propaganda

97

7 Taiwan Can Help: Covid-19, the Model Minority State, and the Limits of Taiwan-as-Beacon Rhetoric Jamin D. Shih

99

8 The Myths of Hate: Digital Deception in the (Communal) Times of Covid-19 Saesha Kini and G. Gyanesh 9 Risk Communication versus Risks in Communication: Efforts of Vietnam Government in Controlling Messages during Covid-19 Pandemic Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen and Nguyen Thanh Mai 10 Modern Hua Mulans in Global Chinese-Speaking Media: Female Frontline Workers as Tools of Propaganda during the Covid-19 Pandemic Ashley Liu and Shuyue Yang

111

123

135

Part IV

Mainstream and Alternative Narratives 11 Confronting Anti-Asian Bias in the Classroom: Reflections on the Importance of Asian and Asian American Studies in the Wake of Covid-19 Meghan Cai and Kimberly D. McKee 12 From a Story of Disaster to a Story of Victory: Chinese Media Reports in the Covid-19 Crisis Runya Qiaoan and Beatrice Gallelli

147

149

163

Contents  ix

13 The Covid-19 Pandemic: News Reporting in Malaysia Normahfuzah Ahmad, Awan Ismail and Norsiah Abdul Hamid

174

Part V

Narratives of Othering

185

14 Viral Vilification Gita V. Pai

187

15 Pandemics, Politics and Religious ‘Others’: Exploring Media Narratives during Covid-19 in India and Pakistan Laraib Niaz

197

Part VI

Social Media Narratives

209

16 Social Media and Vietnamese Undocumented Workers in Thailand during the Covid-19 Pandemic Anthony Le Duc

211

17 Representations of Covid-19 in West Asia: A Case Study of Islamic Republic News Agency’s (IRNA) Instagram Account 222 Hamideh Molaei and Maziar Mozaffari Falarti 18 Don’t Panic! Reach Us: Indian Tech Unions’ Social Media Narratives during the Pandemic Rianka Roy

233

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures 1 3.1 Theme from March until June 2020 13.2 News sources from March until June 2020

180 182

Tables 1.1 Sampled articles from Japan Today with the results of basic sentiment analysis 4.1 Content analysis of major transgender-focussed news stories 7.1 Breakdown of Congressional bills dealing with Taiwan introduced from 2009 to 2020 7.2 Breakdown of online publications on Taiwan’s Covid-19 response in 2020 8.1 Cases of disinformation selected for study from ALTNews Website 9.1 Examples of Government announcement messages 9.2 Statistic results about the mainstream media content broadcasted 17.1 Frequency of the main themes extracted in news with national topics from 19th February to 20th August 2020 18.1 Indian tech-unions’ public Facebook pages 18.2 Month-wise distribution of posts

18 60 101 105 117 130 131 227 236 236

CONTRIBUTORS

Normahfuzah Ahmad, PhD is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Multimedia Technology and Communication, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia. She is interested in journalistic development, news values, news framing, and media narratives. Meghan Cai is an Associate Professor of Chinese language and literature in the Department of Modern Languages and Literatures, and of East Asian Studies in Area and Global Studies at Grand Valley State University. Her research is centred on community- and identity-building, spanning from the contemporary university to 11th and 12th century Chinese literati. Shubhda Chaudhary is currently teaching as an Assistant Professor at the Media Department of Indraprastha College for Women, Delhi University. She pursued her PhD and MPhil from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and her MA in International Journalism from the University of Westminster, London. Her area of specialization is Arab Media in the context of Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain. Anthony Le Duc is a member of the Society of the Divine Word, a religious congregation in the Catholic Church. At present, he teaches at Saengtham College/ Lux Mundi National Major Seminary of Thailand. He is also the Executive Director of the Asian Research Center for Religion and Social Communication (St. John’s University, Thailand) and the Chief Editor of the scholarly journal ‘Religion and Social Communication’. Maziar Mozaffari Falarti has a PhD in political science and works as an Assistant Professor in the Department of South, East Asia and Oceanian Studies in the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran. He has taught, researched, and published on a number of political science and international relations topics in Asian Studies.

xii  Contributors

Beatrice Gallelli is an Assistant professor at Ca’ Foscari University in Venice and a China fellow at the think-tank Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. Beatrice’s research interests include contemporary Chinese political communication, discourse analysis, and governance strategies in the People’s Republic of China. G. Gyanesh is currently a doctoral candidate at MICA, Ahmedabad. His primarily interest lies at the intersection between news media, digital culture, and news communities. Norsiah Abdul Hamid is an Associate Professor at the School of Multimedia Technology and Communication, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia. Her area of interest include the impact of media on society, media psychology, women’s issues, and knowledge-based society. Christopher J. Hayes is a Lecturer in Tourism & Events at Teesside University. He received his PhD from Cardiff University in 2019. In 2019–2020, he was post-­ doctoral fellow at the Kyoto Institute, Library and Archives, researching foreign fans’ perceptions of Japan at the Rugby World Cup. He is currently investigating the impact of Covid on Japan’s inbound tourism and destination image. Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen was the first Vietnamese doctor in PR, graduated from South Korea in 2010. She is Head of the Department of PR and Advertising and Vice Dean of the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Hanoi National University. Being one of the pioneers in PR Vietnam, her research interests are theories and practices of PR, including government PR and activist PR, among many others. Awan Ismail is an Associate Professor at the School of Multimedia Technology and Communication, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia. Her specialization is in journalism and media, with a focus on journalism practices and journalism education in Malaysia. Saesha Kini is currently a doctoral candidate at MICA, Ahmedabad. Her research interests encompass poststructuralism, new materialism, fat studies, new media communication, and post-qualitative methods. Grace Cheng-Ying Lin is a faculty member in the Department of Humanities, Philosophy and Religion at John Abbott College, Montreal, Canada. She is currently a member of a college-level project that studies the learning experiences of racialized students in higher education in Quebec. She completed her PhD in East Asian Studies at McGill University. Her research interests focus on the anthropology of Chinese religion and ethnographic studies of rituals within cross-cultural dynamics. Ashley Liu is a former lecturer of modern Chinese literature at the University of Maryland. She graduated from the University of Pennsylvania with a PhD degree in

Contributors  xiii

East Asian Languages and Civilizations. She specializes in postmodern and postcolonial issues in Sinophone literature, especially connections among mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. She is currently teaching in a private academy in Japan. Nguyen Thanh Mai has a PhD in Public Relations and Advertising from Sookmyung Women’s University, South Korea. She is one of the four Vietnamese doctors in PR and currently is a lecturer of the Department of PR and Advertising, School of Journalism and Communication, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University in Hanoi. Her research interests are national branding, government PR, cultural PR, social media, CSR, and PSA. Kimberly D. McKee is an Associate Professor of the Integrative, Religious, and Intercultural Studies at Grand Valley State University. She is the author of Disrupting Kinship: Transnational Politics of Korean Adoption in the United States (University of Illinois Press, 2019) and co-editor of Degrees of Difference: Reflections of Women of Color on Graduate School (University of Illinois Press, 2020). Hamideh Molaei has a PhD in media and communications from University of Sydney, in Australia. Her area of interest is media, culture, and society in Southeast Asia. Her publications mostly focus on social media movements in Indonesia. Currently, she works as an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Iran. Laraib Niaz is a post-doctoral researcher at the Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge, where she is a part of the independent evaluation of the Girls Education Challenge and an education consultant at the World Bank. She completed her PhD from the Institute of Education, University College London, where her research focuses on the intersection of religion and education in Pakistan at the classroom level. Gita V. Pai is a cultural historian of South Asia and the author of Architecture of Sovereignty: Stone Bodies, Colonial Gazes, and Living Gods in South India (Cambridge University Press, 2023). She is Professor of History and Director of International and Global Studies at the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, where she began after earning her PhD in South Asian Studies from the University of California, Berkeley. Azania Imtiaz Patel is a Rhodes Scholar in residence at the University of Oxford. She is currently pursuing an MSc in Modern South Asian Studies and has interdisciplinary research interests. She is primarily interested in questions of narrative, identity, and urban marginalization. A published author of both fiction and academic work, Azania enjoys experimenting with form and content. Runya Qiaoan is an Assistant professor at Palacky University, Olomouc (Czech Republic), and an analyst at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies

xiv  Contributors

(CEIAS). Runya’s research focuses on civil society, social governance, and international relations through cultural sociological lenses. Shipra Raj teaches Media Studies at Delhi School of Journalism, University of Delhi, and is a Research Scholar at Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University. She has been associated with research projects in the areas of media and minorities and media and elections in India. Her research interests include political communication, new media, public policy, and media and gender. Rianka Roy is a graduate researcher in Sociology at the University of Connecticut. Her research interests are in the areas of labour, social movements, technology, gender, and immigration. She completed her previous doctoral research on social media surveillance at Jadavpur University, India. She taught as an Assistant Professor of English at Surendranath College for Women, Kolkata, for four years before going on a study break to pursue further research. Her current project is on trade unions in the Indian tech industry. Jamin D. Shih is a scholar of critical race and ethnic studies from the University of California, Merced. His work focuses on popular culture, U.S. imperialism in Asia, queer orientalism, and Taiwan’s contested statehood. Jacob F. Tischer is a PhD candidate in anthropology at Boston University. While in Taiwan for dissertation fieldwork on traditional popular religion, the pandemic shifted his attention to how people communicate in digital spaces. As a result of this change in focus, his article “Pandemic Inoculation: How Taiwan Is Nerfing the Pandemic with Cute Humour,” was published in the East Asian Journal of Popular Culture in 2022. Shuyue Yang obtained her PhD degree from the School of Journalism and Communication at Jinan University. She has a Master’s degree in Journalism and Communication from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. She specializes in women’s issues in Chinese media. She has nearly ten years of experience working in journalism in mainland China and Hong Kong. She remains an active media personality in China today.

INTRODUCTION Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted the social, economic, political and cultural lives of individuals and communities around the world – creating a ‘new normal’. A vocabulary of fear, panic, social distancing, vaccine shortages and many media narratives characterize this new normal. Neologisms like ‘Covidiot’, ‘Coronapocalypse’, ‘Coronageddon’, ‘Covidient’ and other terms such as ‘long haulers’ and ‘herd immunity’ have become commonplace. As most nations face unique challenges during this crisis, citizens are expected to adapt, evolve, adjust and cope with this new way of life and living. At the same time, the pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities of medical infrastructure and the burden on frontline workers that include doctors, nurses and medical staff (An & Tang, 2020; Khalid & Ali, 2020; Leach et al., 2021; Patnaik & Sharma, 2020). The challenges of global supply chains and coordination between nations have also brought to light the role of governments, global civil society, journalists and international bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI). In such a scenario, this volume investigates mediated lives and media narratives during the corona pandemic, with Asia as a focus point. Asia is of course a vast continent of as many as 49 nations with an infinite variety of cultures, media and ecologies; the novel coronavirus has hit each region at different times and with diverse effects during the first, second, third and even fourth ‘wave’. Small island nations like Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Taiwan appear to have managed to control it much more efficiently than large nations like China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines (Lee, 2020; Zakaria, 2020). This book is inclusive of a number of perspectives and voices from different Asian countries including China, Malaysia, Thailand, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, India, Vietnam and Taiwan, and brings together voices that allow individuals and communities separated by geography to find a collective experience of this pandemic. At the same time, the idea that ‘we are in this together’ has been critically examined. DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-1

2  Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

Like elsewhere around the world, the pandemic has not been an equalizer in Asia (Manganas & Loda, 2020). Poorer nations have been impacted much more severely than richer emerging economies and have taken longer to get their populations fully vaccinated. With the earliest reported cases of Covid-19 coming from Wuhan in China, it is no surprise that the Asian and Chinese diaspora, particularly in the United States, has been routinely subjected to racist stereotyping and othering in the media (Pai, Chapter 14) with instances of pandemic orientalism (Lin, Chapter 3), xenophobia and the ‘yellow peril’ (Cai & McKee, Chapter 11). The pandemic has created new vulnerabilities for women (Raj, Chapter 2), transcommunities (Chaudhary, Chapter 4) and non-binary people than what they ordinarily face. At the same time, Covid-19 and its media reporting have compounded the discrimination against marginalized religious groups (Kini & Gyanesh, Chapter  8; Niaz, Chapter 15), as well as other marginalized categories of caste, class, gender (Arora & Majumder, 2021) and nationality (Hayes, Chapter 1). Using critical approaches to examining media narratives, this book raises questions of agency, systemic inequalities and the disproportionate burden of the pandemic. The loss of innumerable lives and livelihoods, the challenge of caregiving and the mental and physical toll of the pandemic have significantly altered the way people understand and experience their lives. The precarities faced by contractual labour in the informal economy (Roy, Chapter 18) or that by the ill-equipped medical fraternity (also known as the ‘Covid warriors’ and ‘frontline workers’) have been exposed by this pandemic. While nations struggled to provide care and support for their citizens, the migrants became the ‘others’ who were more ‘disposable’ and did not feature within the priority of governments. Within this volume, the experiences of Vietnamese migrant workers in Thailand have been discussed as an example of how migrant marginalization processes work (Le Duc, Chapter 16). Besides, Cai and McKee (Chapter 11) offer andragogical strategies to confront the ‘yellow peril’ discourse and anti-Asian sentiment as they relate to building cultural and global competencies. Their line of inquiry includes a reflection on the centrality of media literacy in shaping students’ perceptions of Asia and Asian America.

The ‘Global Village’ in the Time of Corona Revisiting McLuhan’s understanding of a ‘global village’ (McLuhan, 1964) in times of the Covid-19 pandemic, it can be argued that the co-dependency between different geographies coexists with tensions in transnational flows of people, commerce and culture. As Zakaria (2020), arguing for the continuance of a liberal international order in the context of a post-pandemic world, puts it: If people cooperate, they will achieve better outcomes and more durable solutions than they could by acting alone. If nations can avoid war, their people will lead longer, richer, and more secure lives. If they become intertwined economically, everyone ends better off. (pp. 232–233)

Introduction  3

With many Asian countries like India and Bangladesh being the production hubs for pharmaceutical companies (Neogi et al., 2014; Mamun & Al, 2020) and China being a big exporter of raw materials for medicines, there is a codependent ecosystem of the global economy which requires different geographies to present a united front against the pandemic; however, xenophobia, closing down of borders and travel restrictions are all examples of tensions that have altered the global village. With three Asian countries – China, Russia and India, having their own ‘home-grown’ vaccines namely Sinovac, Sputnik V and Covaxin, and India being the largest manufacturer of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, narratives of nationalist pride and ‘self-sufficiency’ became dominant within these Asian countries (Mukherjee, 2021). Geo-political factors and global political economy dictate many such narratives, where power dynamics and inequalities between developing and developed nations shape responses to the crisis. In times like these, the flow of humanitarian aid, vaccine allocation and other decisions are based on underlying historical, economic and political motives rather than on humanitarian grounds (Shih, Chapter 7). With successful vaccine development against Covid-19, issues of patents, vaccine inequality or what some have called ‘vaccine apartheid’ came to the fore. Countries in the global south, including many Asian countries, are facing disparity in terms of access to vaccines (Atthar & Rauhala, 2021). Within a largely capitalist set up, big pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, Moderna and AstraZeneca that made huge capital investment in vaccines want to retain patents to ensure profits. Consequently, vaccine shortages and interrupted supply chains within developing and underdeveloped nations have made populations in these countries more vulnerable. With great shortages in lifesaving drugs, oxygen and ventilators, the death toll in countries like India have wreaked havoc (Yasir & Raj, 2021). Narratives of loss, pain and suffering and hope to go back to a pre-pandemic state are common among the different stakeholders of this crisis. South Africa and India have pleaded for a waiver of intellectual property rights on vaccines that immunise people against the novel coronavirus; this has been supported by the WHO and the United States but turned down by some countries of Europe (Krishnan & Wesel, 2021). The G-20 has favoured negotiation under the WTO rules, though this has not pleased the United Nations-backed global alliance for vaccines, COVAX, led by GAVI (Varshney, 2021). Since the beginning of the pandemic, free and unrestricted data and information flows have been critical to finding solutions. China, for instance, shared the genome sequence of the virus with virology laboratories around the world, but kept the origin under wraps, giving rise as a consequence to a whole lot of conspiracy theories. One of them is that China had planned to ‘weaponize’ the lab experiment on the virus; another is that the experiment went awry. A third such theory is that China deliberately delayed informing the WHO about the potential of human-to-human transmission of the new virus (BBC News, 2021a). These conspiracy ‘narratives’ have obfuscated the facts about origins of the new virus; the official WHO mission to the Wuhan Institute of Virology has not helped to clear the air. Thus, data have been used to both educate and hide. Quantified data in the form of statistics on

4  Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

Covid-deaths, Covid-recovery, population vaccinated, affected citizens and Covidwave projections are all numbers used to both enlighten and deceive the public. In many Asian countries like China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Russia and Indonesia, among others, citizens were deceived through the undertesting, manipulation and fudging of data and using the less reliable RAT (Rapid Antigen Test) instead of the global gold standard RT-PCR (Reverse Transcription-Polymerase Chain Reaction) test (Bloomberg, 2020; Krishnan, 2021). This underreporting of data is done by governments to maintain a desirable image of being efficient and to prevent receiving any flak from their citizens. This is also the political reason why governments like China and India resist labelling of the novel coronavirus as the ‘Wuhan’ or ‘Chinese’ virus, or the ‘Indian’ virus; they would rather wrap them in dry technical names such as ‘COVID-19’ (an abbreviation of Corona Virus Disease 2019) and ‘B.1.617.2’, respectively. It is therefore evident that governments play a huge role in editorial decision-­ making in crisis reporting during a pandemic and the example of Malaysian news media is a case in point (Ahmad et al., Chapter 13). Similar observations were made in China when a research study compared Caixin, a well-respected market newspaper known for its investigative journalism, and CCTV, an official organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The research points out the freedom and limits of market media in crisis reports and the technics through which official media carved out a ‘story of victory’ from the Covid-19 tragedy (Qiaoan & Gallelli, Chapter 12). At the same time, information flow during a crisis is uneven, patchy or nonuniform, travelling at a different pace for different geographies and different media (Morley & Robins, 2002; Mythen, 2010). During a crisis, receiving the right information at the right time is a key imperative to making lifesaving decisions. It has been observed, in the past, that the media tends to provide inaccurate, biased and exaggerated information which causes a lot of harm (Ireton & Posetti, 2018). This information makes intervention agencies and the affected individuals draw wrong conclusions and make erroneous decisions (Mileti, 1999). Inaccurate medical information, rumours and unscientific data when circulated can cause serious harm during a pandemic. The ‘infodemic’ (fake news and misinformation that cause panic) during the pandemic has been a source of major concern across the world, where countries like the Philippines introduced the #ChecktheFAQs campaign to emphasize the importance of accurate information in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic and encourage the public to fact-check information that they come across (Dado-Ladrizabal, 2021). Other infodemic management practices in Thailand, India, China among other Asian countries had governments treading a fine line to address the dichotomy between freedom of expression and people’s right to be safe from the adverse impact of inaccurate information (Rodrigues & Xu, 2020). While most governments clamped down on fake news and implemented a number of strategies to manage Covid-19 including issuing public advisories, advertising campaigns, holding press conferences and instituting punitive regulations to combat

Introduction  5

the distribution of false and misleading information, in some cases governments were also responsible for spreading misinformation, like in India many government officials promoted unscientific and unverified cures for Covid-19 that included the use of cow urine as a cure for Covid-19 (Mander, 2021). Therefore, the use of the media as a tool for government propaganda to deceive and mislead the public needs further investigation. Within this volume, Liu and Yang (Chapter 10) explore Chinese government propaganda through the creation of modern Hua Mulan like figures of the female frontline workers. They focus on media representation of female frontline workers as de-feminized and dehumanized tools of propaganda whose contribution and abilities are measured through being unfavourably compared to men. CCPs usage of the female body and women’s suffering for propaganda is just one example among the extensive use of media for spreading favourable government messages. With much of social, economic and political life moving online during the pandemic, social media has been a critical space for crisis information sharing, connecting and learning. Simultaneously, it has been a source of fake news as well as government propaganda. During the Covid-19 crisis, several unreliable morphed videos (and also ‘deep fakes’) circulated very fast through WhatsApp, WeChat and Weibo, among others, which have had serious ramifications for pandemic management (Shen, 2020; Singh, 2020). On the other side, social media has helped several citizens seek and give monetary and mental help, share information, access advice, donations and other resources. In India, for example, as citizens were struggling for oxygen cylinders, ventilators and hospital beds, during the severe second wave of the pandemic, many citizens and social media influencers helped the ordinary public through Twitter, Facebook and Instagram (Bloomberg, 2021). Traditional TV and print news media, particularly the legacy media, also have digital presence to access and participate in the social media discourse. Molaei and Falarti (Chapter 17) explore the Instagram and Twitter handles of the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), an Iranian state-run media agency, and how social media was used to spread information regarding government strategies, policies and actions. The chapter by Hayes (Chapter 1) critically analyses the public discourse created through comments by foreign residents in Japan on news websites. Social media, therefore, has started to play a significant role for members of the public during disasters (Giri & Vats, 2019; Meier, 2015; Philip & Kannan, 2019). During the last two decades, there has been an increased interest in looking at social media for emergency management. However, in many developing and underdeveloped Asian countries, social media has limited access and is preferred by educated public (Soni, 2020). As countries like Indonesia, Singapore and India, among others, link their vaccine access to mobile applications and technology, the issue of digital divide leaves many vulnerable groups behind, leading to vaccine inequality (BBC News, 2021b). For example, Java island constitutes more than half of Indonesia’s internet usage. Similarly, in India, many elderly citizens from lower socio-economic classes who do own a smartphone and do not have sufficient media literacy were unable to register for vaccination through the centralized state app.

6  Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

When citizens are expected to own a smartphone, download an app, register with details, book vaccine slots and also access important information online, very little help and support is available to them from the government. Further, apps for geo-tracking those infected or at risk of infection have been in wide use in Singapore, India and other countries. The apps have drawn flak for their potential for citizens’ surveillance and the invasion of their privacy (Sen, 2020).

Remembering Pandemics and Natural Disasters The last theme explored in this book is that of media narratives as memory. A study by Tischer (Chapter 5) argues that the memory of the SARS epidemic of 2003 in Japan was crucial in the ready societal acceptance of the Covid-19 interventions like social distancing and mask wearing. Memory and the process of remembering is an active process of meaning-making through time. Remembering has a lot of significance, especially in its communal form (Arora, 2018). Remembering disasters allows societies to better understand the present and predict future vulnerabilities (Arora, 2020). People who remember a tragic event are supposed to be more aware of risks than people who forget and know nothing about the event (Le  Blanc, 2012). Therefore, remembering past events, in the present, to better manage disasters and communicate mitigation strategies for the future has important significance. The Covid-19 pandemic brought back memories of the 1918 Spanish influenza. Liang et al. (2021) make comparisons between the two to learn lessons from the past and understand what one may expect from Covid-19. Past memories of idyllically happy and peaceful times are also important during times of crisis. Patel (Chapter  6) focuses on how telecasting family-centred television soap operas in India allows individuals to reconcile with what is purported as the ‘New Normal’. While acknowledging the limitations of the halcyonic representation and the ‘ideal type’ family image being portrayed in these soaps, she argues how the familiarity of these shows emerges as a spectacle that helps audiences deal with the pandemic. This makes a case for looking at media narratives and memories as a source of resilience by helping bring people together. Within all these critical themes, there are also narratives of hope, where ordinary citizens have come together to help and support each other in times of crisis; they form what Mander (2021, p. 206) terms ‘circles of kindness’ and ‘new communities of belonging’. We look at all these narratives as a liminal space, a chaotic state of transition marked by loss and disorientation that creates new identities, temporality and ways of existing than what existed before. Narratives, therefore, play a huge role in verbalizing lived experiences and memorializing them. Some narratives tend to be more dominant than others and therefore alternative stories, marginalized and ignored voices need to be highlighted to fully uncover the pandemic experience in the context of the media in Asia. In most parts of the continent, traditional and new social media are not free to allow these marginalized narratives to be aired. Indeed, there has been far greater suppression of democratic media during the time of corona so as to maintain the ruling regimes’ image of good governance; dictatorial

Introduction  7

regimes, in particular, have ushered in colonial-era emergency disaster legislation to put down any attempt to criticize or question the powers that be (Chaturvedi, 2020). Journalists in India and Bangladesh, for instance, have been thrown in jail for giving voice to the public’s dissatisfaction with the provision of basic medical care and equipment (Islam, 2021; The Wire Staff, 2020). Novelists, poets and scientists too have not been spared, though several brave souls continue to raise their voices in an environment of fear, panic and fudged data. Arundhati Roy, the Indian writer and subaltern intellectual, for instance, has refused to be silenced; instead, she offers her own challenging Covid ‘narrative’ (Roy, 2020). In an article in the Financial Times, London, she speaks of the pandemic as ‘a portal, a gateway between one world and the next’. We can choose, she argues, to walk through it, dragging the carcasses of our prejudice and hatred, our avarice, our data banks and dead ideas, our dead rivers and smoky skies behind us. Or we can walk through lightly, with little luggage, ready to imagine another world. And ready to fight for it (quoted in Mander, 2021, p. 201).

References An, B. Y., & Tang, S. Y. (2020). Lessons from COVID-19 responses in East Asia: Insti­ tutional infrastructure and enduring policy instruments. The American Review of Public Administration, 50(6–7), 790–800. Arora, S. (2018). Post-disaster memoryscapes: Communicating disaster risks and climate change after the Leh flash floods in 2010. Communication and the Public, 3(4), 310–321. Arora, S. (2020). ‘I Lived Through a Disaster’: Disaster memories and lived experiences after the 2010 Leh Flash Floods. In Disaster studies (pp. 107–125). Singapore: Springer. Arora, S., & Majumder, M. (2021) Where is my home?: Gendered precarity and the experience of COVID-19 among women migrant workers from Delhi and National Capital Region, India. Gender, Work & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12700 Atthar, M., & Rauhala, E. (2021, April 22). Countries in the global south, including many Asian countries are facing disparity in terms of access to vaccines. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/coronavirus-vaccineinequality-global/ BBC News. (2021a, March 31). Coronavirus: More work needed to rule out China lab leak theory says WHO. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56581246 BBC News (2021b, April). Coronavirus: WHO chief criticises ‘shocking’ global vaccine divide. BBC New. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-56698854 Bloomberg, (2020, August 17). India’s bid to control the virus could actually be making things worse for the country. The Economic Times. https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/indias-bid-to-control-the-virus-could-actuallybe-making-things-worse-for-the-country/articleshow/77582889.cms?utm_source= contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst Bloomberg. (2021, April 22). Please help!’: Frantic calls to save lives flood Twitter, Instagram in India. LiveMint. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/please-help-frantic-calls-tosave-lives-flood-twitter-instagram-in-india-11619072262855.html Chaturvedi, S. (2020, September 3). Pandemic exposes weaknesses in India’s disaster management response. The Hindu Centre. https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/ current-issues/article32502100.ece

8  Shubhda Arora and Keval J. Kumar

Dado-Ladrizabal, D. (2021, April 11). #ChecktheFAQs campaign to fight vaccine mis­ information. The Manila Times. https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/04/11/business/ columnists-business/checkthefaqs-campaign-to-fight-vaccine-misinformation/862403/ Giri, D., & Vats, A. (2019). Social media and disaster management in India: Scope and limitations. In Smart technologies and innovation for a sustainable future (pp. 349–356). Cham: Springer. Ireton, C., & Posetti, J. (2018). Journalism, fake news & disinformation: handbook for journalism education and training. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Islam, A. (2021, May 18). Bangladesh: Journalist could face death penalty for COVID reporting. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/bangladesh-journalist-could-face-death-penalty-forcovid-reporting/a-57571650 Khalid, A., & Ali, S. (2020). COVID-19 and its challenges for the Healthcare System in Pakistan. Asian Bioethics Review, 12(4), 551–564. Krishnan, M. (2021, May 12). COVID: Are India’s rapid antigen tests reliable? DW. https:// www.dw.com/en/india-coronavirus-testing-concerns/a-57509045 Krishnan, M., & Wesel, B. (2021, May 17). India’s push for COVID vaccine patent waiver hits EU roadblock. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/indias-push-for-covid-vaccine-patentwaiver-hits-eu-roadblock/a-57557338 Le Blanc, A. (2012). Remembering disasters: The resilience approach. Journal of Art Theory and Practice, 14, 217–245. Leach, M., MacGregor, H., Scoones, I., & Wilkinson, A. (2021). Post-pandemic transformations: How and why COVID-19 requires us to rethink development. World Development, 138, 105233. Lee, Y. N. (2020, May 18). These Asian economies seem to have contained the coronavirus outbreak. Here’s how they did it. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/19/howtaiwan-hong-kong-vietnam-contain-the-coronavirus-outbreak.html Liang, S. T., Liang, L. T., & Rosen, J. M. (2021). COVID-19: A comparison to the 1918 influenza and how we can defeat it. Postgraduate Medical Journal, 97(1147), 273–274. Mamun, M., & Al, A. (2020). Profitability analysis of pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh. Journal of Economics and Business, 3(4). Mander, H. (2021). Locking down the poor: The pandemic and India’s moral centre. New Delhi: Speaking Tiger. Manganas, N., & Loda, A. (2020). A borrowed life: Introduction to the great dis-equalizer – the covid-19 crisis. PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, 17(1–2), 1–6. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The extensions of man. New York: MIT Press. Meier, P. (2015): Digital humanitarians: How big data is changing the face of humanitarian response. London: Routledge. Mileti, D. (1999). Disasters by design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. Morley, D., & Robins, K. (2002). Spaces of identity: Global media, electronic landscapes and cultural boundaries. New York: Routledge. Mukherjee, A. (2021, January 4). Vaccine nationalism in India should worry the whole world. LiveMint. https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/vaccine-nationalism-inindia-should-worry-the-whole-world-11609774401506.html Mythen, G. (2010). Reframing risk? Citizen journalism and the transformation of news. Journal of Risk Research, 13(1), 45–58. Neogi, C., Kamiike, A., & Sato, T. (2014). Factors behind the performance of pharmaceutical industries in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 81–89. Patnaik, A., & Sharma, A. (2020). The COVID-19 crisis an opportunity to invest in Equitable Public Health Systems. Economic and Political Weekly, 12–17.

Introduction  9

Philip, L., & Kannan, S. (2019). An exploratory study on the use of social media as a disaster management tool in India. International Journal of Scientific Research and Review, 7(3), 1409–1418. Rodrigues, U. M., & Xu, J. (2020). Regulation of COVID-19 fake news infodemic in China and India. Media International Australia, 177(1), 125–131. Roy, A. (2020, April 3). The pandemic is a portal. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/ content/10d8f5e8-74eb-11ea-95fefcd274e920ca Sen, K. M. (2020, April 25). From Aadhaar to Aarogya Setu: How surveillance tech­ nology is devaluing India’s democratic rights. Scroll. https://scroll.in/article/960137/ from-aadhaar-to-aarogya-setu-how-surveillance-technology-is-devaluing-indiasdemocratic-rights Shen, X. (2020, February, 5). How WeChat and Weibo fight coronavirus fake news. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3049007/howwechat-and-weibo-fight-coronavirus-fake-news Singh, S. (2020, April 7). WhatsApp has a fake news problem: Here’s everything that it’s doing to fight it in wake of Coronavirus outbreak. Financial Express. https://www. financialexpress.com/industry/technology/whatsapp-has-a-fake-news-problem-hereseverything-that-its-doing-to-fight-it-in-wake-of-coronavirus-outbreak/1921515/ Soni, C. (2020, August 12). Bridging Asia-Pacific ‘digital divide’ vital to realize tech benefits. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070502 The Wire Staff. (2020, June 16). 55 Indian Journalists Arrested, Booked, Threatened for Reporting on COVID-19: Report. The Wire. https://thewire.in/media/covid-19journalists-arrested-booked-report Varshney, V. (2021, May 18). COVID-19 vaccines for all: Why COVAX is not working. Down To Earth. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/health/covid-19-vaccines-forall-why-covax-is-not-working-76977 Yasir, S., & Raj, S. (2021, May 3). Deaths Mount at an Indian Hospital After Oxygen Runs  Out. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/03/world/asia/ India-coronavirus-deaths-oxygen.html Zakaria, F. (2020). Ten lessons for a post-pandemic world. London: Allen Lane.

PART I

Missing and Marginalized Narratives

1 UNREST IN THE COMMENTS Voicing the Discontent of Japan’s Foreign Residents in the Comments Sections of Japan Today Christopher J. Hayes

Introduction On 13th September 2020, the English-language Japanese news website Japan Today published an article with the headline “Foreigners in Japan becoming target of discrimination due to virus”. Since the emergence of the coronavirus, it has been widely reported that Chinese and other Asian people (mistakenly confused for Chinese) have been subject to discrimination, harassment, and threats across the world, particularly in the United States following President Trump’s repeated terming of the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” (Lindaman & Viala-Gaudefroy, 2020). In Japan, however, it was suggested that this discrimination is not limited only to Chinese residents, but all foreigners. As a result of the relatively low numbers of positive cases in Japan, the coronavirus has been perceived by some as a foreign virus that predominantly affects foreigners. Indeed, controversially it was even suggested by Deputy Prime Minister Taro Asō that the Japanese are not affected as much by the virus because of their mindo, their quality of people (O’Shea, 2020). As a means to keep the virus out, the Japanese government closed its borders on 3rd April 2020. However, while Japanese nationals could still return, foreign residents of Japan, even long-term residents, were unable to go back to Japan and forced to stay where they had been visiting, even if their home and employment was in Japan. Meanwhile, foreign residents in Japan have been subject to discrimination, based on the belief that they were spreading the virus (Kyodo News, 2020), similar to anti-Chinese discrimination that flared up across the world during the initial spread of the virus. What has the Covid-19 pandemic meant for foreign residents of Japan? Making up a very small part of the overall population, the voices and experiences of foreign residents in Japan can be easily overlooked, particularly as they are not seen as being equal to Japanese nationals. While Japanese-language media have focussed on DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-3

14  Christopher J. Hayes

the country’s experience as a whole, the experiences of foreign residents may not be highlighted here. There is also a matter of language competency, with foreign residents possessing lower Japanese language levels or no language ability at all. The purpose of this chapter is to shine a light on the Covid experiences of this population, or at least part of it, by analysing comments on Covid-related news articles on English-language Japanese news websites, which offer a platform for foreign residents to air their views through user comments.

Big in Japan, but Always an Outsider In Japan, there is an overriding sense that foreign residence in the country is temporary, and even long-term residents are perceived as visitors (Cordes, 2020). It is very much a myth that Japan is ethnically and culturally homogenous, as Japanese society comprises a diverse range of groups, including recent migrants, those of Chinese and Korean descent, and of course the indigenous Ainu population (as the ancestors of “ethnically” Japanese originally came from the Korean peninsula). However, Japanese nationality is determined by jus sanguinis, the right of blood, rather than jus soli, the right of soil, as in many other countries. Naturalisation is possible, but it requires giving up other citizenships, as dual citizenship is not permitted in Japan. In spite of this attitude, Japan needs migrants. It has an ageing population and declining birth rate that together mean a dwindling workforce ( Jones & Seitani, 2019). On average the Japanese live longer than in many countries, too, with many living into their 100s. As such, there is an increasing demand for care workers, in addition to all the other jobs that need to be filled by a shrinking workforce. The majority of Japan’s foreign population is made of Asian migrants, with most coming from China, South Korea, and Vietnam. In 2019, the number of Chinese migrants was 813,675, South Korean migrants was 446,364 and Vietnamese was 411,968 (Statistics Bureau, 2020). These were followed by migrants from the Philippines (282,798) and Brazil (211,677) (Statistics Bureau, 2020). Many other migrants come from the Global South, including India and the African continent, primarily to undertake much-needed low-skilled manual labour. A recent study by Davison and Peng (2021) found that in interviews with Japanese nationals, there was confusion about the term “immigration”. Rather, interviewees distinguished between those that wanted to move to Japan and live there and those that wanted to work in Japan and make money. Their study found that interviewees were generally receptive to foreign workers, acknowledging their need in important sectors such as healthcare, but they also saw a risk of a loss of Japanese culture and values. Perhaps most telling, when the authors explained “immigration” to an interviewee, suggesting that they might seek citizenship, the interviewee responded “Get Japanese citizenship? So they’re Japanese?” (2021, 7), possibly thinking that the authors were talking about someone of Japanese descent trying to move to Japan. While it is possible for a foreign resident to obtain Japanese citizenship, the meaning of “citizenship” for individual Japanese has a strong ethnic focus. On 3rd April 2020, in response to the coronavirus pandemic, Japan closed its borders to all foreigners entering Japan, even permanent residents. No distinction

Unrest in the Comments  15

was made between a foreign tourist or visitor to Japan and someone who had lived in the country, possibly for years, and had happened to be out of the country when the ban came into effect. Bekeš (2020) argues the Japanese government’s blanket ban on foreigners entering Japan was completely at odds with the government’s goals of internationalisation and “coexistence with foreigners”, noting that among developed countries, Japan was the only country to discriminate against its foreign residents in this way. How did foreign residents feel about these actions?

Having Your Say: News Comments and Their Value News comments offer a valuable source for the public’s perception of an event, representing a mode of public discussion (Ksiazek, 2018). However, the quantity and quality of comments can vary hugely depending on the particular news topic. Journalists and editors value the input of users, and direct engagement by journalists with user comments can lead to both greater quantity and quality of discussion (Ksiazek, 2018). Diakopoulos and Naaman found that newsrooms can be overwhelmed by comments on certain stories on their websites, which puts pressure on their moderators (2011). On news websites that retain commenting functionality, it is not uncommon for this to be disabled on topics that are potentially sensitive or problematic. Banning comments on such topics has, however, been seen as an infringement on free speech and close to censorship (Diakopoulos & Naaman, 2011, 141). Although many news websites have removed the comments function from some if not all of their articles, since the advent of Web 2.0, the Internet has become inherently participatory, offering a means for individuals to express their views through platforms such as Reddit, Twitter, Tumblr, Facebook, and so on. Writing about YouTube, Jenkins, Ito, and Boyd describe it as a play where members “believe their contributions matter, and feel some degree of social connection with one another” (2015, 4). In recent years, news sources have moved to using Web 2.0 platforms such as Facebook as an alternative to allowing comments on their own websites, effectively outsourcing the comments system and moderation responsibilities (Hille & Bakker, 2014; Ksiazek, 2018). On Facebook, and similarly on Twitter too, news sources post links to their articles, and the audience comments on the post. Compared with comments on news websites, news sources have found that comments on Facebook tend to be of a higher quality, with less abusive and offensive content, arising from the lack of anonymity on Facebook, where users typically use their real names and set photographs of themselves as their profile pictures (Hille & Bakker, 2014). On the other hand, in at least one study, commenters have not found Facebook comments to yield a better quality of comment, but nor do they think that quality has worsened (Kim et al., 2018). Indeed, studies of the quality of anonymous comments versus named user comments have yielded mixed results (Ksiazek, 2018). While many studies have focussed on the use of news comments for spreading hate speech and trolling (Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012), these platforms do also generate genuine debate and engagement with an issue, especially when they perceive the

16  Christopher J. Hayes

climate to be against their worldview (Duncan et al., 2020). In commenting on an article, commenters are placing value on that news story; it has meaning and significance to them. They are also doing this in real-time, contributing their views to a recent or ongoing issue (Henrich & Holmes, 2013). While such comments can often feature strong, inflammatory language (Chen, 2020, 437), in its largely unmoderated and unrestricted form, there is the potential for more “direct and authentic public deliberation” (Manosevitch & Walker, 2009, 6).

Methods For my analysis, I selected Japan Today, a popular English-language Japanese news website. I purposely selected this source as it is an English-first publication, unlike English editions of Japanese newspapers, which may focus on translating Japanese articles. Like many news publications and websites, Japan Today shares its articles through Facebook and Twitter, but it also allows for comments on its website directly. For my study, I decided to focus on the comments on the Japan Today website itself as I hypothesised that since commenting on the website requires a conscious effort to sign up, its users would apply a similar effort to their comments. I searched the Japan Today website for the terms “Coronavirus” or “Covid” and “foreign” to gather articles that directly related to foreigners in Japan during the coronavirus pandemic, limiting this search to within a timespan of between 1 January and 30 September 2020. At the time of writing, the pandemic is ongoing, but an arbitrary limit had to be defined in order to facilitate data collection. This nine-month period encompasses the initial spread of the virus through to global lockdowns and then easing of restrictions towards the end of summer. From the resultant sample, articles with fewer than ten comments were removed, and the remaining articles were randomly selected across the period. In order to examine these comments, I undertook two forms of analysis: first, sentiment analysis in order to assess the general attitudes of the comments; and second, textual analysis of individual comments in order to dive deeper into the specific concerns and use of language by foreign residents in response to news articles. Sentiment analysis is a method for finding the sentiment expressed in a text and then classifying its polarity as positive, neutral, or negative (Mukwazvure & Supreethi, 2015). This is usually supported by software that parses the text, either by extrapolating sentiment from a lexicon of positive and negative words or through machine learning, whereby a model dataset is prepared in order to train the software to more accurately identify sentiment. While this latter form is more accurate, it is more time-consuming. For our purposes here, a simple lexicon-based approach was used to provide a general impression. Texts were subsequently analysed through a close reading of the language and discursive attitudes of the comments in order to understand the specific concerns of the users. Before we look at the results of the analyses, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this study. The relative anonymity afforded by the news comments system means that it is not possible to understand the demographics of the

Unrest in the Comments  17

commenters. While some commenters use personal names as their usernames and in some cases use full first and last names, it is impossible to know whether these are their real names. As it is an English-language news website, it can be assumed that many commenters will have English as their first language. If an American or British person, for example, were to move to Japan, it would likely be for professional employment, to teach English, or to travel. Their experiences are therefore completely different to those of Asian migrants, in Japan as a source of cheap labour. Nonetheless, discrimination does still occur (Myslinska, 2014), and the experiences covered here are no less valid.

Reader Sentiment and Article Themes From the 14 articles sampled for this study, 700 user comments were extracted and analysed. For the sake of readability, the full dataset has not been reproduced here, and this chapter instead focuses on a thematic discussion based on the main topics of news articles throughout the sampling period. In Table 1.1, the sampled articles are listed with their headlines and the data resulting from the sentiment analysis. According to the sentiment analysis, across the sample, negative comments largely outweigh positive comments, with 41% of comments being negative, while only 34% are positive. 17% of comments were defined as neutral, while 8% could not be determined by the software. 53% of comments disagree with the content of the articles, based on the language used by the users. Although on average users are more negative in their comments and more often disagree with the content of articles, it is notable that it is not by a significant majority. In many articles, the number of positive comments is not far behind negative comments, and there are also neutral comments, too. What this shows is that the issues discussed in these articles are complex and provoke a range of responses from different users, which we will explore in our analysis of individual comments. The number of comments on each article varies greatly, although the article that attracted the most comments was “Japan’s re-entry ban to contain virus unfair, Western business lobbies say”, dated 19th August 2020 (n = 135). Indeed, as can be seen in the table, articles about the entry ban are the most commented on in the same. What is also noticeable is that at different stages of the pandemic, the entry ban remains the subject of focus, with half of the articles reporting on this specifically. As the discussion will show, even in articles that are not directly about the entry ban, it is a topic that is frequently discussed by users. The second main theme that emerged in the analysis of articles is the matter of the Japanese government’s approach to tackling the pandemic and the lack of any state of emergency or lockdown as countries around the world were enacting stay-at-home orders. Last, the third theme to emerge from the analysis was that of foreign residents as being treated as different to Japanese nationals. We will now look at each of these three themes in turn, examining user comments in order to understand the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the lives of foreign residents in Japan.

Date

Headline

8th March 2020 How is the coronavirus affecting your livelihood? Have you lost any income? 30th March Japan not planning to declare state of emergency but will expand entry 2020 bans 4th April 2020 Foreigners given extra 3 months to renew stay due to coronavirus 23rd May 2020 After the coronavirus is contained and international borders are open, what factors will you take into consideration before taking a flight overseas? 4th June 2020 Foreigners with humanitarian needs will be exempt from Japan re-entry ban 5th June 2020 Japan’s coronavirus entry ban disrupting lives of foreign residents 6th June 2020 Economy struggles to come to terms with shortfall of foreign workers 15th June 2020 Japan hasn’t decided to ease entry ban, foreign minister says 7th July 2020 New support center opens in Tokyo for foreign residents in Japan 6th August Abe says no need for another state of emergency over coronavirus 2020 19th August Japan’s re-entry ban to contain virus unfair, Western business lobbies say 2020 21st August Rakuten CEO urges review of Japan’s Covid-19 entry curbs on 2020 foreigners 13th September Foreigners in Japan becoming target of discrimination due to virus 2020 23rd September Japan to ease entry ban to allow longterm stays from Oct 1, but not 2020 tourists Total Percentage

Comments Positive Negative Neutral Indeterminate Agree Disagree 15

4

5

4

2

6

9

110

36

49

13

12

60

50

10 14

6 6

1 4

2 3

1 1

6 8

4 6

46

16

14

10

6

20

26

66 13 23 25 86

20 4 8 17 32

29 7 10 4 36

12 1 2 1 13

5 1 3 3 5

22 5 17 20 42

44 8 6 5 44

135

44

56

31

4

47

88

24

7

11

3

3

15

9

110

22

58

22

8

46

64

23

14

5

1

3

13

10

700

236 34%

289 41%

118 17%

57 8%

327 47%

373 53%

18  Christopher J. Hayes

TABLE 1.1  Sampled articles from Japan Today with the results of basic sentiment analysis

Unrest in the Comments  19

Entry Ban In the first article of the sample, dated 8th March 2020, readers are directly invited to describe how the coronavirus had impacted their lives. As the virus had only begun to spread beyond China, commenters generally reported that they had not yet felt the effects, although several users working in the tourism industry described how their work had ground to a halt. Nevertheless, users were wary of the future, with one writing “in the long term, it will affect all of us, because the economy will go down”, while another warned that “we’re only seeing the initial effects”. The next day, on 9th March 2020, Italy went into a nationwide lockdown, and other countries around the world followed suit in the following days and weeks. However, in spite of its close proximity to China, the Japanese government made no similar moves. In the article “Japan not planning to declare a state of emergency but will expand entry bans”, dated 30th March 2020, there is clear dissatisfaction in the comments with 44.5% of commenters expressing negative sentiment. Much of this is directed towards the Japanese government, accusing them of being too slow to act. Commenters describe the expansion of entry bans as “really too late” and question why “the Japanese government seems reluctant to address this”. Users’ language indicates a lack of faith in the government and incredulity at the lack of action. Although considered far too late, the ban itself is welcomed, although some commenters do ask what impact it will have on long-term residents and whether they will be treated the same as Japanese nationals arriving back in the country. One user provides anecdotal evidence of the impact that this ban would have on longterm foreign residents for much of the summer: I know two people with work visas who were turned back at Kansai airport. They were teachers returning after a vacation in the UK. They were denied entry to Japan. The ban when into effect on 3rd April 2020, and on 4th April 2020, Japan Today reported that foreigners were having their visas extended by three months. The comments in this article are generally positive regarding this development, but individual comments reveal the experiences and concerns of some foreigners affected by the visa situation. One user writes that when they had visited the immigration office it was “crowded” and “like a bad dream”. Another user suggests that there are differences between the English and Japanese versions of the announcement, leading to confusion as to what the actual requirements and procedures are for foreigners to actually have their visas extended. Another comment asks “Where can I find official information about this?”, suggesting that while this arrangement had been made for foreigners in Japan with expiring visas, it had not necessarily been effectively communicated. In another article directly addressing the readers, on 23rd May 2020, the website posed the question: “After the coronavirus is contained and international borders are open, what factors will you take into consideration before taking a flight

20  Christopher J. Hayes

overseas?” The question prompts a range of responses, including some anti-Chinese sentiment (“Avoiding places which are plagued by Chinese tourists”). Other users say that they will only travel if they have to, first asking themselves “Do I really (I mean really, really) need to be taking the flight?” One user expresses particular concern about how travel restrictions affect their life, writing: Necessary or not, I want to return to Japan. Families, friends, children, babies. I dread the cost, though, at this moment, but I hope ANA will help, Vancouver to Haneda. I’ll put up with the extra screening, but I’m thinking this autumn is a pipedream. Comments show that users take the virus seriously and have no intention of travelling without real cause. The comment quoted above highlights the disparity between the intention of the travel ban to prevent unnecessary visitors such as tourists and disruption that it is having on people, separating families by thousands of miles. On 4th June 2020, two months after the entry ban, Japan Today reported that “Foreigners with humanitarian needs will be exempt from Japan re-entry ban”. Restrictions would not be eased, but foreigners would be able to make a case that entry should be granted. Responding to this, most users criticise a plan they describe as “clear as MUD”. Indeed, comments employ sceptical language, and little trust in the amendment, claiming that it is just for show, as the assessment “case-by-case just means that the ‘no’ will be less public”. One user writes: “If a non-Japanese is a permanent resident under the law he or she should have the same rights for entry and exit as the Japanese. This murky case-by-case system that the Japanese system has set up is discriminatory”. Other comments also express the feeling of being discriminated against, attributing it to a wider attitude towards “people from the ‘outside’” in Japan or “institutionalized racism”. Another user compares the Japanese government’s use of the term “humanitarian” with Japan’s policy towards refugees: Cripes, what BS … Japan accepts what 10 refugees per year and now they are going to allow foreigners reentry for humanitarian reasons? I feel sorry for those who really need it! One user partially defends the government, calling it a possible “case of overlooking the foreign residents of Japan”, but says that the ban should have been reversed when attention was drawn to it. They write that the inaction “suggests a Japanese concern that foreign residents are more likely to get infected when they are overseas”. This aligns with the belief held by some in Japan that the Japanese are less likely to contract coronavirus, which led to the anti-foreigner sentiment described at the beginning of this chapter. After reports were circulated that the entry ban was being eased for those from Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and Thailand, on 15th June 2020, Japanese

Unrest in the Comments  21

Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi went on record to clarify that this was not the case and that the ban would remain in place, which was reported by Japan Today. Comments are largely critical of the apparent lack of consistent discourse within the Japanese government, with one urging politicians to “make your minds up”. A user urges the government to “lift the ban completely”, while another says “don’t think about japanese [sic] people only. Please think about other’s lives too”. This last comment uses pleading language and speaks to the uncertainty and desperation caused by the situation. The issue of the entry ban was brought to the attention of the Japanese government by Western business lobbies and the CEO of the Japanese business Rakuten, as reported by Japan Today on the 19th and 21st August 2020, respectively. Comments on both articles express the frustration of foreign residents in Japan, describing “200,000 taxpayers stuck in expensive limbo”, and the “shameful, disgraceful and immoral” actions of the Japanese government. Commenters continue to perceive the ban as open xenophobia and “complete apathy to people’s welfare”. Others call on the international community to help their plight. One user provides an anecdote of how the ban had affected a friend: An acquaintance of mine attempted to come back from Europe with his Japanese wife and 2 children. They actually made him return to Europe. This shocked me to the core and it is the reason I became so passionate about this issue. There is a strong sense across the comments that the entry ban is an injustice and unfair treatment of tax-paying foreign residents. Others see it as a move by the government to show that it is making an effort against the coronavirus pandemic while not actually taking any firm action.

State of Emergency: What Emergency? As already introduced above, on 30th March 2020, it was reported that there would be no state of emergency declared in Japan, which produced a largely negative response. The decision to widen the entry ban instead was described as too late and ignored the damage that the “second wave” was already inflicting in Japan. Indeed, users describe coronavirus as a “domestic” threat, which the government is ignoring. As one user puts it, “How about starting at home? I don’t see any pachinko parlors being closed down, even [Prime Minister] Abe’s wife was out this weekend”. Across the sample, users are sceptical and mistrustful of the government and its approach to handling the coronavirus pandemic. Responding to an article in Japan Today on 6th August 2020, in which Prime Minister Abe is quoted as saying there is no need for another state of emergency, users describe him as “so out of touch it’s offencive [sic]”, “Trumpist”, “a walking hypocrite”, and a “poor excuse of a leader”. Multiple users question why, if there is no state of emergency, are foreign

22  Christopher J. Hayes

residents still banned from entering? These users are particularly critical of the government’s position because their precarity is greater than Japanese citizens. While united in discontent, attitudes towards states of emergency and lockdowns differ greatly. While one user writes “Japan is in dire need of a state of emergency”, another comments: obviously all of the people here who support another lockdown aren’t affected financially by doing so. You can work from the comfort of home, have some days off & still receive your full salary. Well not everybody is so lucky. This comment highlights the complexities of states of emergency and lockdowns, not only in Japan but across the world, and the balancing act between protecting lives and protecting jobs. However, in the case of Japan, users are generally unconvinced about what Japan’s strategy is. Responding to the Prime Minister’s comments about testing capacity in the article, one user writes “if they are refusing testing to those with symptoms, who are they testing then?” Here, the user is referring to news that was reported internationally in February and then again in May, that hospitals in Japan were refusing to test individuals with symptoms in order to conserve resources (The New York Times, 2020). Rather, users see the entry ban as a discriminatory action that allows the government to claim that it is attempting to prevent cases from entering the country, but without infringing the rights of Japanese citizens. As we have seen, in an earlier example, a family with a European husband and a Japanese wife were separated, despite the family residing in Japan. In comments for an article from 23rd September 2020 about easing of the entry ban for the Olympics, one user writes “I am an internal transfer who has been waiting in limbo since June. Meanwhile my Hong Kong office has continuously received several Japanese expats in a one-sided arrangement”. While even long-term foreign residents of Japan were banned from returning home, Japanese nationals could continue to travel in and out of Japan. Comments also highlight how the move to allow Olympic athletes entry in Japan does not help foreign residents or those with “job offers or acceptance letters to Japanese universities” access the country.

Second-Class Citizens This brings us to the third theme found among user comments in the sampled articles: that of being second-class citizens. During the pandemic, foreign residents have felt that they have been treated unequally. On 5th June 2020, Japan Today published an article looking at how the entry ban affected foreign residents. In the comments, the sentiment is mostly negative, with users strongly criticising the government. One Japanese national user sympathises with the difficulties faced by foreigners and says that “once again, Japan appears cold, inhumane and socially backwards”. It is interesting that this user uses “once again”, indicating exasperation and dissatisfaction with the Japanese government amongst Japanese nationals. Many

Unrest in the Comments  23

of the comments write of how the entry ban was characteristic of the Japanese government’s attitude towards foreigners in the country more widely. One user who has lived in Japan for 30 years says that although he has “always known that to govt etc us long termers are just tolerated as we are useful”, the entry ban is “some real cold $%#”. Other comments express similar sentiments, with another saying, “If you were ever in any doubt as to your real status here, permanent resident or not, this should be a wake-up call… We are surplus to needs”. As in the previous article, the entry ban is once again “discriminatory and amoral”, and one user writes of how the entry ban meant that they could not leave Japan to attend their daughter’s funeral due to “unfounded and outrageous restrictions”. The next day, an article was published about how Japan was experiencing a shortfall in foreign workers. Comments were unsympathetic, with one addressing the entry ban, writing “maybe the govt should allow them to return to Japan from abroad when they travel…”. Another comment addressed Japan’s attitude towards foreign migrants much more critically, writing “Japan’s slave labor at a standstill. I see”. The comparison with slave labour is extreme, but it is a discourse suggestive of the abuse of minority labourers, the low income they receive, and their lack of integration into society. In a comment on the 15th June article, a user describes foreign residents as being “treated like dirt”, despite paying taxes, showing a frustration that foreign residents are treated differently to citizens even though they make the same contributions. The Japanese government appeared to be listening, as on 7th July 2020 it was reported that a new support centre was opening in Tokyo for foreign residents. However, user comments range from pleased to sceptical, and some are critical, dismissing the move as “nothing but Lip Service” and “window dressing”. Negative comments point to the dated and unprofessional “mis-mash [sic] website”, while others wonder how this helps foreigners that are stuck outside of Japan as the centre “doesn’t even provide a way to email or message someone”. Although the article is not about the entry ban, it is still one of the main issues discussed in the comments, showing how significant it is to foreign residents. Another issue raised is that of housing, with a user writing that foreigners have trouble accessing “adequate and affordable” housing. In the 19th August article, a commenter writes that the entry ban should not be lifted to foreign residents: Yes I know, we foreigners pay tax here, but we are not japanese [sic] and we don’t have a japanese [sic] passport. So we have to be patient until Japan eases the Entry Ban for foreigners again, but nobody knows when that will be. Probably after a vaccine is found. For this user, the difference in treatment comes down to not being “Japanese” and accepting that this is a condition of living in the country. While this view is not held by the majority of commenters, it is indicative of the pervasiveness of the attitude that foreign residents are guests of Japan, and that any benefits that they have

24  Christopher J. Hayes

can be taken away at any time. In the 21st August article, one user writes that the rights that come from paying taxes and owning property are “western concepts of citizenship”, suggesting that these are incompatible with Japanese attitudes. As one user puts it: This is the most honest policy ever in Japan. The message is clear. You can live here for 30 years, buy property, marry our citizens, have children who are citizens, pay taxes and support the community but when the crunch comes… Japan does not want you. In the minds of these commenters, the entry ban thus serves to reaffirm the perception that foreigners are welcome to live and work in Japan, but “Japan doesn’t really want you”. This is in keeping with Davison and Peng’s (2021) study and the misunderstanding the interviewee had over the concept of an immigrant receiving Japanese citizenship. There is a strong sense across comments in all articles discussed in this section that foreign residents do not feel valued by the government and that the ban only confirms what they already knew. When coronavirus-related discrimination was reported in Japan Today on 13th September 2020, there was a mixed response in the comments. Some users denied that there could be racism in Japan, citing their own lack of experiences or comparing the lack of seriousness of the reported cases with the Black Lives Matters protests in the United States. Others accepted that there might be discrimination, but that it was the price to pay to live in Japan and that they should be “grateful to be able to be in this beautiful country” rather than “play the victim card”. While the commenters in this sample are largely supportive of each other or engage in respectful debate, on this issue, some commenters appear disrespectful. Indeed, in this and other articles, there is a view held by some commenters that foreign residents have no rights to criticise Japan, and if they do have problems, they should leave. Despite being foreign residents themselves, they hold that it is only the Japanese people that should be allowed to speak out. This extends to the travel ban, too. Those that did agree with the story attributed this to the fact that “Japan has no public agency addressing discrimination, nor does it have any dedicated anti discrimination laws”, concluding that foreigners have to be “at best, 2nd class citizens”. The use of “at best”, suggests, at least for this user, that treatment of foreigners can be far worse in Japan. Another user describes that racism in Japan has “never been far below the surface”; rather, the pandemic has allowed Japanese nationals to be more openly racist or discriminatory to foreigners, including “hostile” stares, people refusing to sit next to them on trains, and people “covering their mouth and nose” when they saw one user’s husband, with one Japanese calling him “corona spreader”.

Conclusion From this small selection of comments, we can clearly see a high level of dissatisfaction among foreign residents of Japan. Sentiment analysis revealed that across the

Unrest in the Comments  25

sample, the views of commenters were almost always polarised, though on average not in agreement with the content of the news article. A closer reading of these comments showed that the entry ban was largely perceived as discrimination and part of a wider issue of inequality in Japan and the value placed on foreign residents by the Japanese government. In the comments, through users’ anecdotes, examples are given of how the ban has impacted individuals and separated families, with many questioning their status as tax-paying individuals amidst this treatment. Activities to help foreigners, such as the new support centre, were considered as being “window dressing”, with no real intention of helping to improve the situation of foreigners living in Japan. Users were critical of the government’s leadership and its slowness to act, but there was no clear agreement between users about the right course of action, with users divided over whether they would support a state of emergency or not. Often, it was shown that this was due to the nature of the individual’s work and whether they could work online, with at least one commenter working in the tourism industry and finding themselves without any kind of income. Perhaps the most interesting finding of this study is the number of foreign residents who support the entry ban. Some users defend the allowance of Japanese nationals back in the country and not foreign residents because they accept that Japanese nationals have more rights than foreign residents. For them, it is irrelevant how long a foreign national has lived in Japan – if they are not citizens, they should not expect to be treated as such. These users argue that if someone does not like this, they should not live in Japan. The users also defended discrimination and racism towards foreigners as a condition of living in Japan, advising other users to stop being a “victim” and to ignore it. This suggests that the belief that foreign residents in Japan are simply long-term visitors or even guests is deeply entrenched, even in the foreigners themselves. If the Japanese government is aiming towards “coexistence with foreigners”, it will have to undertake significant actions to change this mentality. There are other contributing factors that have not been explored in this chapter and warrant further research. For example, what level of multilingual support has been given to foreign residents during the Covid pandemic? As Kawasaki, Henry and Meguro (2018) found, during Japan’s last great disaster, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, many foreigners encountered difficulty accessing information due to a lack of language proficiency. The Japanese government identified this themselves (Kawasaki, Henry & Meguro, 2018), but were lessons learned and strategies implemented during this latest emergency? Much has already been written on migrants in Japan, including Shipper (2008), but post-Covid it will be vital to further investigate the experiences of foreign residents in Japan.

References Bekeš, A., (2020). Dissonance: Coexistence with foreigners vs. coronavirus epidemic countermeasures in Japan. Inter Faculty, 10, pp. 55–75. Chen, C.W.-Y., (2020). Analyzing online comments: A language-awareness approach to cultivating digital literacies. Computer Assisted Language Learning, 33(4), pp. 435–454.

26  Christopher J. Hayes

Davison, J. and Peng, I., (2021). Views on immigration in Japan: Identities, interests, and pragmatic divergence. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 0(0), pp. 1–18. Diakopoulos, N. and Naaman, M., (2011). Towards quality discourse in online news comments. In: Proceedings of the ACM 2011 conference on Computer supported cooperative work, CSCW ’11. [online] New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 133– 142. https://doi.org/10.1145/1958824.1958844 [Accessed 28 December 2020]. Duncan, M., Pelled, A., Wise, D., Ghosh, S., Shan, Y., Zheng, M. and McLeod, D., (2020). Staying silent and speaking out in online comment sections: The influence of spiral of silence and corrective action in reaction to news. Computers in Human Behavior, 102, pp. 192–205. Erjavec, K. and Kovačič, M.P., (2012). “You Don’t Understand, This is a New War!” Analysis of hate speech in news web sites’ comments. Mass Communication and Society, 15(6), pp. 899–920. Henrich, N. and Holmes, B., (2013). Web news readers comments: Towards developing a methodology for using on-line comments in social inquiry. Journal of Media and Communication Studies, 5(1), pp. 1–4. Hille, S. and Bakker, P., (2014). Engaging the social news user. Journalism Practice, 8(5), pp. 563–572. Jenkins, H., Ito, M. and Boyd, D., (2015). Participatory Culture in a Networked Era: A Conversation on Youth, Learning, Commerce, and Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Jones, R. S. and Seitani, H., (2019). Labour market reform in Japan to cope with a shrinking and ageing population (OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1568). Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/labour-market-reform-in-japan-tocope-with-a-shrinking-and-ageing-population_73665992-en Kawasaki, A., Henry, M. and Meguro, K., (2018). Media preference, information needs, and the language proficiency of foreigners in Japan after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 9(1), pp. 1–15. Kim, J., Lewis, S.C. and Watson, B.R., (2018). The imagined audience for and perceived quality of news comments: Exploring the perceptions of commenters on news sites and on Facebook. Social Media + Society, 4(1), p. 2056305118765741. Ksiazek, T.B., (2018). Commenting on the News. Journalism Studies, 19(5), pp. 650–673. Kyodo News, (2020). Foreigners in Japan becoming target of discrimination due to virus. [online] Kyodo News. Available at: https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/09/b7a412698d9efeature-foreigners-in-japan-becoming-target-of-discrimination-due-to-virus.html [Accessed 20 February 2021]. Lindaman, D. and Viala-Gaudefroy, J., (2020). Donald Trump’s ‘Chinese virus’: the politics of naming. [online] The Conversation. Available at: http://theconversation.com/donaldtrumps-chinese-virus-the-politics-of-naming-136796 [Accessed 4 January 2021]. Manosevitch, E. and Walker, D., (2009). Reader comments to online opinion journalism: A space of public deliberation. In: International Symposium on Online Journalism. pp. 1–30. Mukwazvure, A. and Supreethi, K. P., (2015). A hybrid approach to sentiment analysis of news comments. In: 2015 4th International Conference on Reliability, Infocom Technologies and Optimization (ICRITO) (Trends and Future Directions), Noida, India. pp. 1–6. https://doi. org/10.1109/ICRITO.2015.7359282 Myslinska, D., (2014). Racist racism: Complicating whiteness through the privilege & discrimination of westerners in Japan. UMKC Law Review, 83(1), pp. 1–55. O’Shea, P., (2020). Sweden and Japan are paying the price for COVID exceptionalism. The Conversation. [online] 27 Dec. Available at: http://theconversation.com/sweden-andjapan-are-paying-the-price-for-covid-exceptionalism-151974 [Accessed 20 February 2021].

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Shipper, A.W., (2008). Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration and Its Impact on Japanese Democracy. Cornell University Press. Statistics Bureau, (2020). Japan Statistical Yearbook 2021. Japan Statistical Yearbook. Tokyo: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The New York Times, (2020). Testing Is Key to Beating Coronavirus, Right? Japan Has Other Ideas. The New York Times. [online] 29 May. Available at: https://www.nytimes. com/2020/05/29/world/asia/japan-coronavirus.html [Accessed 7 March 2021].

2 GENDER, MEDIA AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC An Investigation into Missing Gendered Narratives in Indian News Media Shipra Raj

Introduction Through the spread of literacy and subsequently the advances in communication technology in the twentieth century, media has become the principal source of news and information for the masses. The advancement in communication technologies has enhanced mass communications and empowered citizens, as a wide variety of media is available for information purposes. Media also plays a key role in providing public information during a crisis. From the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan to the images of patients hospitalised struggling for life in the Intensive Care Unit, stories from quarantine facilities, from pictures of overflowing morgues to the migrant crisis in India in the wake of nationwide lockdown, the media covered it all. Which topics and issues gained prominence and which were side-lined is a matter of interrogation. Of many issues that did not get the media’s attention, gender is one (Kassova, 2020a; Jones, 2020). It is argued that Indian news media’s coverage of the pandemic ignored the gender dimensions of the pandemic. When it comes to gender and gender-related concerns, the media largely remains gender-blind (Gallagher, 1982; Made, Morna & Kwaramba, 2003; The Global Media Monitoring Project, 2005, 2010, 2015; Steeves, 2007). To be gender-blind may appear to be unbiased though it is rooted in the idea that men and women have the same needs. The gender-blind approach of the media has resulted in the invisibilisation of gender issues in the media. Gender is not a binary, but it’s a spectrum which includes a number of different identities. This study primarily looked at the representation and coverage of women’s issues in the news reporting of Covid-19. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and a nationwide lockdown to protect Indian citizens is enormous. More than 1.5 lakh people have lost their lives and many more have lost their livelihoods (Yadav, 2020; Mehta, Mehta, & Kumar, 2021). A crisis like this can exacerbate the existing inequalities and inequities of all DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-4

Gender, Media and the Covid-19 Pandemic  29

sorts. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that the global human development index (HDI), an index that measures the world’s ‘education, health and living standards’ is on the decline this year for the first time since the HDI concept was developed in the 1990s. According to the World Bank, the Covid-19 pandemic could push around 40 and 60 million people into extreme poverty. The International Labour Organization estimates that half of working people could lose their job in the next few months. The World Food Programme suggests that 265 million people will face crisis levels of hunger unless direct action is taken (UNDP, 2020b). Covid-19 pandemic has widened the inequalities in all societies. Poor and those who are already vulnerable are suffering the most. The daunting pictures of migrant workers walking several kilometres barefoot and people queuing up for food grain exposed the weakness of our system, which has put vulnerable and marginalised people in peril. Physical distancing and working from home is a luxury that only a few can afford. The other dimension of inequality – the gendered dimension is completely missing from the political and media discourse. It is argued, media coverage of Covid-19 ignored the important dimension of this crisis: the gendered dimension and the impact of Covid-19 on women. While all vulnerable and deprived groups are suffering, it is important to view this crisis from a gender lens. It is argued that the consequences and experiences of the Covid-19 pandemic are gendered (Wenham et al., 2020; World Health Organization, 2020b; UN Women, 2020b). Women are over-represented in healthcare services, they constitute almost 70% of healthcare workers globally (International Labour Organization, 2020a). They are on the frontline of the fight against Covid-19. There are gender-based disparities in access to healthcare. Cases of domestic violence against women increased during this crisis (Campbell, 2020; Krishnadas & Taha, 2020; Radhakrishnan, Sen,  & Singaravelu, 2020; World Health Organization, 2020a; UN Women, 2020c), their access to sexual and reproductive health services reduced (Church, Gassner,  & Elliott, 2020; Lokot & Avakyan, 2020), violence against transgender increased (Rosario, 2020; Perez-Brumer & Silva-Santisteban, 2020), and other gender-based violence increased ( John et al., 2020; UNDP, 2020a). Although statistics suggest that more men are affected by the virus than women, it is imperative to recognise that both experience it differently. Academics who studied earlier health crises such as Ebola in 2014, Zika in 2015–2016, and recent outbreaks of SARS suggest that these crises had long-lasting effects on gender equality (Menéndez, et al., 2015; Davies, 2016). The media needs to be mindful of the gendered dimensions of this pandemic. Gender-sensitive news coverage has been missing in the Indian news media (Patil, 2018; Kassova, 2020b). Woes of women often go unreported in the media. Following the Covid-19 pandemic, it has become paramount for the news media to do a balanced coverage. It is important that media cover the issues, stories, and perspectives of men, women, and also the LGBTQIA+ community. Women need to be seen and heard in the media. Women continue to be under-represented and stereotyped in both national as well as global news media (Byerly & Ross, 2006;

30  Shipra Raj

Pande, 2014; UN Women, 2019; Geertsema-Sligh, 2019). Studies have suggested that the media continue to represent reality through a male voice (Hartley, 1982; Ross & Carter, 2011). In the majority of news stories, the news sources are men, the experts are men, and majorly the story is about men. When it comes to the LGBTQIA+ community, the media tend to stereotype and marginalise their stories (Capuzza, 2016; Åkerlund, 2019). This chapter explores how the Indian press covered gender issues during the pandemic. This chapter is divided into three parts: first, it presents an overview of the gendered impact of Covid-19 and about gender and the media; second, it describes the methodology of the study. Finally, the analysis of the study is presented. This chapter looks at the media discourse on women’s issues in this pandemic. It does so by analysing how the top three English dailies have covered the gendered narratives during the pandemic. For this purpose, it employs Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995; Dijk, 2001) methodology to investigate how the stories related to women are constructed in the news media. There has been academic research going on media and gender, this research adds to the literature on media and gender. It also draws attention to the role and importance of media. Media coverage can empower people and media coverage can influence public policies.

Gendered Impact of Covid-19 Covid-19 has accentuated the existing inequalities; it has increased the exclusion; it has increased poverty, sufferings of people all over the world; it has increased the economic inequality all over the world; and it has also increased gender inequality (UN Women, 2020b; World Health Organization, 2020b; Oxfam International, 2021). The virus has pushed hundreds of millions of people into destitution and abject poverty. It has affected everyone, but it is important to be mindful of the gendered dimension of this pandemic. Across the globe, women represent 70% of healthcare workers, they are over-represented in the informal sectors of the economy which are the most-hard hit sectors by the pandemic (International Labour Organization, 2020b). The advancements made by the feminist movements have brought women and gender issues to the fore. Feminism has come a long way since the first wave of feminism in terms of women’s rights and gender equality. In this pandemic, the advancements made by feminism and the women’s movement in terms of women’s rights and their ‘independence will be silent victims of the pandemic’ (Lewis, 2020). Recent studies also suggest that the Covid-19 case fatality rate is higher in women in India ( Joe, et al., 2020). Of the confirmed cases, 3.07% of women and 2.62% of men have died in India. The cases of domestic violence in India increased during the pandemic (Krishnadas & Taha, 2020; Arora & Kumar, 2020), as well as other gender-based violence increased (Vranda & Febna, 2020; The Wire, 2020). The LGBTQIA+ community is already living on the margins. The pandemic pushed them further to the wall. The survey of the three months of the three newspapers resulted in only one news story about LGBTQIA+. Research suggests that

Gender, Media and the Covid-19 Pandemic  31

members of the LGBTQIA+ community are likely to have the pre-existing disease, which means they are likely to fall sick and be infected by the virus. Most of them do not have a proper healthcare facility (Lathan, 2020), in the absence of access to healthcare facilities, a pandemic disproportionately affected the LGBTQIA+ community (Banerjee & Nair, 2020). Policymakers have called for a gender-responsive policy for the pandemic which caters to the special needs of women and the LGBTIQIA+ community (Dasgupta & Mitra, 2020).

Gender and Media: Gender Bias in News Media/Coverage Media can play a transformative role in achieving gender equality. By giving importance to gender issues, media can contribute to the advancement of women. Recognising the role media can play, Beijing Platform for Action, 1995 specifically addressed the continuing problems that women across the world face concerning access and representation in the news media. Mass media research has academically investigated media and gender. Over the past few decades, feminist media scholarship within the media and cultural studies has critically examined the media and its relationship with gender. Starting with the seminal work of Betty Friedan (1963) – The Feminine Mystique, which criticised the mass media for perpetuating the existing social norms, today a rich body of work is available on media and gender (Gallagher, 1982; Carter & Steiner, 2004; Byerly & Ross, 2006; Gill, 2007; Byerly, 2013). Global studies like Global Report on the Status of Women in the News Media (2011), as well as The Global Media Monitoring Project (2005, 2010, 2015), noted media to be deeply implicated in the discrimination against women. Since the 1970s feminist media scholarship has produced critical studies on Gender and Media. Initial studies were concerned about ‘under-representation’, ‘exclusion’, ‘objectification’, and ‘sexualization’ while these issues still form the major issues of the larger issue around media and gender. We have come a long way where we see the increased representation of women in media both in media and on media. Women’s participation in news media has grown over the years; however, Frohlich (2007) argues that the increase in women journalists has not led to an increase in the coverage of gender issues. When it comes to women in leadership roles they still do not occupy top positions (UN Women, 2019). A recent study on ‘Women and Leadership in the News 2020’ found that of the 200 major online and offline news outlets in ten different markets across four continents only 23% of the top editors are women (And, Selva, & Nielsen, 2020). On average, 40% of the journalists in these countries are women. A 2020 study on under-representation of women in news media, ‘The missing perspectives of Women in Covid-19 news’ commissioned by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, noted substantial bias towards men’s perspectives in news gathering and news coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic across six countries: the UK, the USA, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. The study looked at three indicators to examine the coverage of women’s issues – women as sources of news expertise (newsgathering), news stories leading with women protagonists (news outputs), and

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coverage of gender equality issues in coronavirus/Covid-19 news stories (news outputs). The study noted that women’s voices are marginalised in the news-reporting and gathering of news on Covid-19 (Kassova, 2020).

Methodology The purpose of this study is to analyse the press coverage of gender issues during the Covid-19 pandemic in the Indian news media. To pursue this, I examined the three highest circulated English dailies – The Times of India (2,880,144 copies), The Hindu (1,415,792 copies), and Hindustan Times (1,072,966 copies) – As per Audit Bureau of Circulation. The period for the study is three months – from the time when the first lockdown was announced on March 25th to June 25th, 2020. The duration was purportedly selected as it is noted that the restrictive measures like nationwide lockdown to secure the Indian citizens from the spread of the virus had various implications on gender. National lockdown also resulted in an unprecedented migrant crisis which also had gendered consequences. I looked at the Delhi edition of all three dailies. All three dailies are ‘national’ newspapers with multiple editions across the country. The coverage of different editions is similar except for city and state-related issues for which they have devoted separate pages. The front-page, nation page, special reports, editorials, and opinion pieces are usually common to all the editions. I looked at the front-page, nation page, editorials, and opinion pieces of all the selected newspapers. I employed Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995; Dijk, 2001) methodology to investigate how the stories related to gender were constructed in the news media. The purpose of the study is not to just look into whether the gender is covered or not but also to how it is covered. All the news stories which had women/woman, gender, transgender, third gender, or female in the headline or in the body were selected for the analysis. The search resulted in 64 stories – The Hindu had 12 stories, The Times of India 33 and, Hindustan Times 19. There was only one story on trans-person which Hindustan Times carried.

A Brief Overview of Indian Press The Indian Press is two centuries old which played a significant role in the national freedom movement as well as in movements for social emancipation, reform, and amelioration (Ram, 2011). Freedom of speech and expression is well-respected in India, and the media has remained free, except for a brief period of 1975–1977, known as ‘emergency’. Although there is no direct reference to freedom of the press in the Indian Constitution, Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of the press. Media now reaches every corner of India. There are newspapers and news channels in multiple languages. India has the most diverse, complex, and highly developed newspaper industry in the world ( Jeffrey, 1993). Studies have noted that the newspaper publication, circulation, and readership in India have been growing since the 1980s ( Jeffrey, 2000; Ninan, 2007; Indian

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Readership Survey). The daily readership of newspapers has grown to 425 million in 2019 from 407 million in 2017 and 295 million in 2014. As per the Registrar of Newspapers for India (RNI), as of March 31, 2018, the total number of registered publications in India is 1,18,239 of which 17,573 are newspapers and 1,00,666 are periodicals. India also has the world’s largest circulated English daily – The Times of India. However, the proliferation of media has not led to an increase in media coverage of gender issues.

Gender and the Indian News Media Women’s issues do not make many headlines in Indian news media ( Joseph & Sharma, 1991; Pande, 2014; UN Women, 2019; Kassova, 2020). There have been several critical studies that have studied media and gender in India, particularly media and women (Balasubrahmanyan, 1988; Krishnan and Dighe, 1990; Joseph & Sharma, 2006; Patil, 2018). Since 1975, the women’s movement in India has also taken up the issue of women’s representation in the media (Pande, 2018). In the past few decades, women have entered the journalism profession but it has not resulted in an increased representation of women or women’s issues in media (International Federation of Journalists, 2015). But the debate is not about whether the media covers gender or not but the debate today is how gender is constructed and represented in the media. Women continue to be depicted as ‘victims’, ‘sexual objects’, ‘negatively stereotyped’, and ‘family figures’. A recent study on Indian news media – Gender Inequality in Indian Media, 2019 by UN Women suggests a low level of representation of women in the Indian news media. In the English newspapers, merely 2.6% of all articles are on gender issues and in the Hindi newspapers only 3% of the news articles are on gender issues. In terms of representation of women in leadership positions the study noted that only 20.9% of women hold leadership positions, in TV channels, 13.6% in magazines, 26.3% in digital portals and, 0% in newspapers which is reflective of the marginalisation and exclusion of women issues in the Indian news media.

Of Numbers and Statistics The Indian press looked at the pandemic largely in terms of statistics. The reporting focused on the number of cases and death rates. For instance, a news story (HT, April 04th, 2020, p-6) reported ‘Covid is three times more fatal for men, says study’. The story focused on the percentage of deaths among men who were hospitalised. Several studies have suggested that the death ratio among women is less as compared to men because it’s the male members of the family who get hospitalised. Hence, resulting in a less number of women being hospitalised leading to fewer deaths. Without a gender perspective, the media ignored the varied ways women were affected during the pandemic. Even in terms of mere statistics, data suggest that more women in India have died than men. But this was also not reported in the media.

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The nationwide lockdown was important to control the spread of the virus. But this lockdown had a gendered impact in terms of its effect on violence against women, women suffered greater joblessness, and transgender persons were disproportionately affected. Even closures of workplaces and schools had an unprecedented effect on women. As early as March, the National Commission of Women suggested that there has been an upsurge in the cases of domestic violence in India. In terms of healthcare workers, particularly the nurses – data suggest a whopping majority is women. Informal and unorganized sectors were worst affected by the pandemic, and in this also women were disproportionately affected. The lead stories followed by the nationwide lockdown on March 25, 2020, ‘National lockdown’ dominated the news headlines. The entire front page of all three dailies covered the lockdown which certainly was important news. The migration of the large population from the urban areas also got top billing. The Migrant crisis also has a gendered dimension that was completely missing from the media reporting. It is noted that men constitute 80% of all work-related migration, however, in the past few decades, female migration has doubled (Bhandare, 2020). The migrant crisis, had a gender dimension, talking about this Urvashi Butalia in an interview noted: as we first heard the news about migrant laborers having to leave cities and saw tragic pictures of thousands of poor people walking without water or food, it was women’s groups that pointed out to the media that there were women among these groups. At that time, the women were not visible because all the focus was on the men. This is not to say that the men were not vulnerable, but it’s important to notice that there were also women workers. (Butalia, 2020) All three newspapers focused on the number of infections and the number of deaths. The media reporting of Covid-19 for the three months focused on statistics. Numbers were an inextricable part of the news coverage on Covid-19. ‘Cases doubled in 4.1 days due to Tablighi Jamaat event: government’, was the headline that The Hindu carried on its first page on April 06th, 2020. The majority of the health workers who were also the frontline workers during Covid-19 are women. The media did not report the impact that this pandemic has on these workers. The experts writing in the opinion pages did mention the safety of health workers but they did not mention that women health workers have special needs hence need special protection. The Hindu carried an opinion piece titled ‘Ironing out wrinkles in India’s pandemic response’ on March 25th, 2020 by two health experts. The experts talked about the problems with the Indian health system. It also mentioned that health workers are crucial and the health workers’ safety is important but nowhere it was mentioned that female health workers have special needs. Many studies have noted that women’s employment has suffered due to Covid19. Media also did not pay heed to this. Job loss was reported in the media but it was not reported how women are affected by this. Another opinion in The Hindu

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titled ‘Safeguarding the vulnerable among us’ (The Hindu, March 27th, 2020) talked about protecting the weakest sections of the society. But it did not mention how women have suffered job loss. Even when women were featured in the news, they were only mentioned as heroes or warriors. Headlines like ‘women warriors join battle against virus’ (The Hindu, March 30th, 2020, p-1), ‘Woman under quarantine in Kargil moved to hospital delivers baby boy’ (TOI, April 1st, 2020, p-1), ‘Mom duty: Cops rush pregnant woman to hosps’ (TOI, April 5th, 2020, p-1), ‘Delhi woman with Covid-19 delivers a healthy baby’ (HT, April 4th, 2020, p-1) such stories were covered on the front page. Headlines like these capture the gaps in media coverage of women. Media does not have the language to capture the sufferings and stories of women. Media’s inability to move beyond the framing of news stories as either a ‘victim’ or a ‘hero’ are evident from its coverage of stories about women in the pandemic. These stories suggest how media think about women’s issues. There was no mention of how LGBTQIA+ community has suffered during the pandemic.

‘Symbolic Annihilation’ of Gender Concerns The lack of representation or invisibility of women in media is what Gaye Tuchman (1978) has called ‘the symbolic annihilation of women in mass media’. By largely ignoring women or women issues and portraying them in stereotypical ways media symbolically annihilate women. Women’s issues are still missing in the Indian news media. Rarely the media coverage of Covid-19 was done through a gender perspective. Writing about the lack of media coverage on gender issues during the pandemic, Philipose (2020) writes, ‘The cruellest aspect of the gaps in coverage is the inability to perceive the female gender as a heterogeneous social category’. Many studies during the pandemic suggested that men and women are differently affected by the pandemic. But the media failed to acknowledge this which was reflected in their reporting of the pandemic. There was not even one story that was covered on page 1 on gender. There were few opinion pieces on gender and the impact of Covid-19 on gender. The kind of coverage of gender issues in the time of unprecedented crisis suggests a similar trend of media’s lack of interest in covering gender. This is not a new trend. Several opinion pieces discussed the issue of the rise in domestic violence during the lockdown – ‘No lockdown for abuse’ (The Hindu, April 09th, 2020, p-7), ‘Women’s safety during lockdown’ (The Hindu, April 13th, 2020, p-7). An opinion piece ‘The invisible face of the fallout’ (The Hindu, April 21st, 2020, p-6) captured the gendered dimension of the pandemic. The writer noted, assigning Accredited Social Health Activist workers to specifically address women’s welfare during this pandemic, setting up exclusive cells to quickly address domestic violence, and women’s health-related issues, including men in conversations, and even online counselling for alcoholism in men are not difficult to implement. Similarly, TOI carried one story on the rise of domestic violence amid pandemic – ‘Legal aid widened as domestic violence rises amid lockdown’ (TOI, June 07th, 2020, p-7).

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Another writer pointed towards the plight of domestic workers. In domestic work also it is women who are employed in large numbers. In the article titled ‘helping the helpers’ (The Hindu, June 16th, 2020, p-7) the author mentioned the need for recognising how Covid-19 has impacted the domestic workers. Domestic work is one of the biggest employers in India’s large informal economy, especially in urban areas. It is also one of the largest employers of women. Yet, not enough focus has been placed on working women in our discussions on Covid-19 and the lockdown-there are no special economic packages for domestic workers unlike, say for construction workers. A TOI opinion piece discussed the problems of women in an article titled ‘The double whammy of work from home and work at home’ (TOI, April 5th, 2020, p-12) the author writes ‘chores war are also erupting all over the place, and traditional gender roles are rearing back in many modern homes. Women are predictably saddled with the bulk of housework, while also working their day jobs’. Another opinion mentioned the difficulty working women are facing during the pandemic – ‘The working woman’s lockdown; doing Zoom conferences, cooking and cleaning at the same time’ (TOI, April 16th, 2020, p-10). Here a class divide was clearly visible. TOI carried an interview with Shipra Deo, who talked about the need to recognise women as independent individuals (TOI, April 16th, 2020, p-12). TOI carried another interview with Shoko Noda, where she discussed the importance of raising women’s participation in the labour force (TOI, May 13th, 2020, p-14). While there was no story on the front page in Hindustan Times, the English daily did carry a few opinion pieces on women’s issues during the pandemic. In ‘Women the invisible face of hunger’ – the author wrote ‘Migrants, mostly men in cities, are the visible face of hunger and despair we see every day in the media. The woman left behind in the villages, while their menfolk migrate, are equally deprived of food and cash’ (HT, May 11th, 2020, p-8). A Hindustan Times opinion piece mentioned ‘The lockdown is hard for women with disability’ (HT, May 2, 2020, p-8). Another by the same writer mentioned ‘women are bearing the brunt of the lockdown’ (HT, April 04th, 2020, p-10). The Hindu reported that the domestic violence in India recorded a twofold rise during the pandemic.

Conclusion Media not only represents reality but also constructs reality. The coverage of gender issues is often created from the male gender’s perspective. Examining media discourses on Covid-19 in media enabled me to see how media constructed or ignored the gendered dimension of the pandemic. Covid-19 pandemic affected everyone but it disproportionately affected the marginalised and the vulnerable. While media reported various aspects of the pandemic such as the migrant crisis, issues of health workers, and economic hardship faced by the marginalised community. The number of cases, deaths, and economic fallout dominated the media discourse. The media did not recognise that all these issues have gendered dimensions. The intersectional approach was completely missing from the media discourse. All groups

Gender, Media and the Covid-19 Pandemic  37

suffered but all groups are not one homogenous group. The sufferings of all women are not the same. The number of factors, such as caste, class, religion, region, and sexuality, plays a role. Media presented the representation of mass human suffering never seen before in a century. The powerful imagery circulated quickly but it failed to capture the sufferings of women. By not reporting the issues concerning women media rendered women invisible. Media coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic overlooked the gender dimensions.

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Kassova, L. (2020b). The Missing Perspectives of Women in News. Seattle, Washington: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Krishnadas, J., & Taha, S. H. (2020, June-August). Domestic violence through the window of the COVID-19 lockdown: A public crisis embodied/exposed in the private/domestic sphere. Journal of Global Faultlines, 7(1), 46–58. Krishnan, P., & Dighe, A. (1990). Affirmation and Denial: Construction of Femininity on Indian Television. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Lathan, C. (2020, June 06). Fight for LGBTQ rights is more important than ever during Covid-19 pandemic. Retrieved 20 December, from The Print: https://theprint.in/opinion/fightfor-lgbtq-rights-is-more-important-than-ever-during-covid-19-pandemic/435783/ Lewis, H. (2020, March 19). The Coronavirus Is a Disaster for Feminism. Retrieved from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/03/feminismwomens-rights-coronavirus-covid19/608302/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium= social&utm_campaign=share Lokot, M., & Avakyan, Y. (2020). Intersectionality as a lens to the COVID-19 pandemic: Implications for sexual and reproductive health in development and humanitarian contexts. Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters, 28(1), 40–43. Made, P. A., Morna, C. L., & Kwaramba, A. (2003). Gender and Media Baseline Study. Johannesburg: Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) and Gender Links (GL). Mehta, B. S., Mehta, S., & Kumar, A. (2021). Covid-19 Impact: Lockdown and livelihood in the Lurch. Economic and Political Weekly. Menéndez, C., Lucas, A., Munguambe, K., & Langer, A. (2015). Ebola crisis: The unequal impact on women and children’s health. Lancet Global Health, 3(3), 1. Ninan, S. (2007). Headlines from the Heartland: Reinventing the Hindi Public Sphere. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Oxfam International. (2021). The Inequality Virus. Oxford: Oxfam GB. Pande, M. (2014). Where Are the Women? New Delhi: Newslaundry. Pande, R. (2018). The history of feminism and doing gender in India. Estudos Feministas, 26(3), 1–17. Patil, R. (2018). Breaking News, Missing Views. Oxford: Thomson Reuters Foundation. Perez-Brumer, A., & Silva-Santisteban, A. (2020). COVID-19 policies can perpetuate violence against transgender communities: Insights from Peru. AIDS and Behaviour, 24(2), 2477–2479. Philipose, P. (2020, December 3). Gender blindness during Covid Women have been equally affected, but media focus bore a male face. Retrieved January 2021, from The Tribune : https://www. tribuneindia.com/news/comment/gender-blindness-during-covid-179109 Radhakrishnan, V., Sen, S., & Singaravelu, N. (2020, June 22). Domestic violence complaints at a 10-year high during COVID-19 lockdown. Retrieved January 2021, from The Hindu: https://www.thehindu.com/data/data-domestic-violence-complaints-at-a-10-yearhigh-during-covid-19-lockdown/article31885001.ece Ram, N. (2011). The changing role of the news media in contemporary India. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 72. Indian History Congress. Rosario, K. (2020, April 6). COVID-19 lockdown: transgender community pushed further to the margin. Retrieved January 2021, from The Hindu: https://www.thehindu.com/news/ cities/mumbai/covid-19-lockdown-transgender-community-pushed-further-to-themargin/article31265535.ece Ross, K., & Carter, C. (2011). Women and news: A long and winding road. Media, Culture & Society, 33(8), 1148–1165. Steeves, H. L. (2007). The Global Context of Women in Communication. In P. J. Creedon, & J. Cramer, Women in Mass Communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

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The Wire. (2020, July 24). Delhi: 14-Year-Old Sexually Assaulted at COVID Care Centre. Retrieved January 2021, from The Wire: https://thewire.in/rights/delhi-14-yearold-sexually-assaulted-covid-care-centre Tuchman, G. (1978). The Symbolic annihilation of women by the mass media. In G. Tuchman, A. C. Daniels, & J. Benét, Hearth and Home: Images of Women in the Media. New York: Oxford University Press. UN Women. (2019). Gender Inequality in Indian Media. Delhi: UN Women. UN Women. (2020a, September 16). COVID-19 and its economic toll on women: The story behind the numbers. Retrieved January 2021, from UN Women: https://www.unwomen. org/en/news/stories/2020/9/feature-covid-19-economic-impacts-on-women UN Women. (2020b). Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Women. United Nations. UN Women. (2020c). The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19. Retrieved from UN Women: https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focusgender-equality-in-covid-19-response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19 UNDP. (2020a). Gender-based violence and COVID-19 pandemic. New York: United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. (2020b). Coronavirus vs inequality. United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from UNDP: https://feature.undp.org/coronavirus-vs-inequality/ Vranda, M. N., & Febna, M. (2020). Response to sexual and gender-based violence against women during COVID-19. Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine, 42(6), 582–584. Wenham, C., Smith, J., Davies, S. E., Feng, H., Grépin, K. A., Harman, S., Morgan, R. (2020). Women are most affected by pandemics – Lessons from past outbreaks. Nature, 583, 194–198. World Health Organization. (2020a, April 7). COVID-19 and violence against women What the health sector/system can do. Retrieved from World Health Organization: https://apps.who. int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331699/WHO-SRH-20.04-eng.pdf?ua=1 World Health Organization. (2020b). Gender and COVID-19. World Health Organization. Yadav, Y. (2020, April 8th). India lost more jobs due to coronavirus lockdown than US did during Depression. Retrieved from The Print: https://theprint.in/opinion/india-lost-more-jobsdue-to-coronavirus-lockdown-than-us-did-during-depression/397693/

3 THE MASK DILEMMA Hierarchy between Two Know-Hows in Chinese-Language Media of Canada Grace Cheng-Ying Lin

As an unforeseen and disruptive crisis, the Covid-19 outbreak in 2020 engendered multiple challenges to many governments’ capability and society’s values (CGTN, 2020). The implemented public health measures such as mask mandate, border control and vaccine accessibility often triggered a surge in the sense between self and other, or even superior and inferior, between jurisdictions. In China, a “precautionary principle” was employed, which is to “always take the safest approach in an outbreak and not wait for all of the scientific evidence before acting” (Miller, 2020a). On the contrary, in Canada, a different approach that recommended public health protocols according to “evolving science” (Mahal, 2020) was adopted. Through the study of voices in the media, this paper examines how Chinese immigrants interpreted those Canadian public health protocols, which then challenged or reinforced their sense of belonging to Canada. Over the last two decades, many Asian jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, learned lessons from sequences of epidemics such as the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, SARS-CoV) in 2002–2003, and they have proactively and vigilantly prepared themselves to tackle any new crises (Adhopia, 2020). This is the data of the incidence rate (no. of new cases per 100,000) of Covid-19 observed on April 16th, 2021: 6839.69.46 for England, U.K., 8041.44 for France, 2805.32 for Ontario, Canada; 115.19 for Hubei, China, 4.49 for Taiwan, 219.99 for South Korea, 2.85 for Vietnam and 448.08 for Sri Lanka. ( Johns Hopkins University & Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center, 2021) There are various theories explaining the differences between the East and West. In this research, the analysis focuses on public health protocols as a form of knowhow. This is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “knowledge of how DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-5

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to do something smoothly and efficiently”. One of its synonyms is “expertise” and one of its antonyms is “inexperience” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Edward W. Said’s Orientalism illustrates how Eastern knowledge is evaluated and assessed in the gaze of the West. This refers to a “political-intellectual culture”, which involves an “uneven exchange with various kinds of power” between the East and West (Said, 1978, p. 12). That being the case, the West owns the legitimacy, the means, and the capability to create appropriate and advanced knowledge in contrast to the East. Therefore, it is believed that, since Asia cannot do better than the West, their know-how is not valuable, nor reliable, nor copiable, implying that their values are short of symbolic or cultural capital (Stavro, 2014, p. 172). Observers have raised the terms “Pandemic Orientalism” (Godamunne, 2020) and “Corona Orientalism” (Debeuf, 2020) to describe how the West responded to the Asian knowledge that was employed to prevent the spread of Covid-19. For the most part, Asian knowhow is usually ignored by Western authorities. For example, New York Times published an article titled: “In a Crisis, True Leaders Stand Out” that lists the global Western leaders who were able to perform the “most effective responses” to the pandemic through “swift action, compassion and trust in science” (The Editorial Board, 2020). Asian leaders were almost absent in the articulation. An observer thus titled his critique: “In The NYTimes, Only White Leaders Stand Out” (Samarajiva, 2020). Due to the West’s “complacency” (Debeuf, 2020), “(the West) couldn’t even understand that non-white leadership was possible” (Samarajiva, 2020). Sometimes, the performance of Asian know-how is attributed to its ontological advantage or deficiency. For example, in another article published by New York Times, the author described Taiwan’s efforts to maintain a normal life of the citizens in 2020 through border control as “spookily”, “good fortune” and “good luck” (Zhong, 2021). Western observers were also critical to information technology such as big data and alert apps that scan and trace possible cases introduced by Asian governments (Debeuf, 2020), worrying it may be “dystopian” (Adhopia, 2020). This type of generalisation created a dichotomy: democratic and independent West vs. authoritarian and obedient East. Both the disparity between numbers in infections and death between the West and East as well as the skewed perception of the Eastern know-how attracted criticism from some other observers. For example, researcher Martin Jacques argued that it seemed that the West cannot handle the pandemic without a vaccine while the East had strived to control the virus’ spread through governments’ competency and strategies, social respect for authority as well as the sense of responsibility for the community: The West likes to think it is cosmopolitan. Wrong… If the West was cosmopolitan it would seek to learn from East Asia, ask why it is successful. Yet the worse things get, the less curious the West has become about East Asia. This is the story of the West as a failing, self-absorbed, inward-looking culture and civilization. (CGTN, 2020)

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In Canada, the symbolic violence against Chinese-ness reached one of its peaks during the November 2002 and July 2003 Canadian outbreaks of SARS. There were 44 deaths and 251 probable cases from SARS and most were found in Toronto. In her thorough comparative study of media narratives, Elaine Stavro (2014) claimed that Western media and institutions portrayed China and the West (particularly Toronto) in sharply different manners. Chinese were “dirty, secretive, the embodiment of authoritative and pre-modern practices” when the Torontonians were “hygienic, reliable, truthful the embodiment of democracy and modern science” (p. 172). Drawing a line between the two allowed Westerners to ease their mental stress, to maintain their purity of self, and to forward the “fear, hate, resentment, and blame” to the other at the same time (p. 173). Since the first Covid-19 case was found in Hubei, China, in December 2019, the Chinese government had been vilified for how it handled the situation and how it distributed its information. Meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO) was also denounced by many for being slow and for being highly influenced by China. The Covid-19 pandemic extended the conceptualisation of “the other” into the complexity of global politics. Within such political climate, in Canada, Chinese- and AsianCanadians were victimised by anti-Asian racism. A survey showed that people in the three largest cities (Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver) believed that there is a positive correlation between Covid-19 and Chinese/Asian people. 21% would feel unsafe if they sit beside a Chinese/Asian person without wearing a mask (Chinese Canadian National Council – For Social Justice, 2020a). According to a September 2020 investigation, since the outbreak, more than 600 racism-related incidents have been reported across Canada (CCNC-SJ, 2020b). At the same time, slurs targeting Chinese-ness including texts, memes, or videos permeated the internet, such as a Chinese woman eating bat soup, “Kung Flu” or “The Corona virus won’t last long because it was made in China”. Within such an atmosphere, Chinese immigrants in Canada experienced conflicts between host and home discourses.

The Study Focusing on the pre-vaccine phase ( January 2020 – January 2021) of the Covid-19 crisis, this essay observes voices of Chinese communities in the media that respond to the evolution of Canadian public health measures, mostly recommended by Dr. Theresa Tam, the Chief Public Health Officer (CPHO). Dr. Tam was born in Hong Kong and grew up in the U.K., where she attained her undergraduate degree before pursuing her training and career in Canada. She was appointed as the country’s first female Chinese CPHO in 2017. Her Chinese ethnicity and her Western training make her an interesting figure to observe during the pandemic. The methodology of Thematic Analysis (TA) was employed to study the data collected from major online news websites in simplified Chinese language based in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal, and most importantly, comments and critiques posted by users. The data was analysed using a qualitative analysis approach. Here are the websites mainly studied:

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Vanpeople (https://www.vanpeople.com/): Web portal based in Vancouver; top 9 news aggregation website in the Chinese language in Canada, based on Alexa Ranking (CnWeb.ca, 2022). 51.CA (https://www.51.ca/): Web portal based in Toronto; top 1 news aggregation website in the Chinese language in Canada, based on the Alexa Ranking (CnWeb.ca, 2022). Sinoquebec (https://www.sinoquebec.com/): one of the first Chinese newspapers in simplified Chinese (used in mainland China) founded in Montreal; top 10 news aggregation website in the Chinese language in Canada and top 1 in Quebec, based on the Alexa Ranking (CnWeb.ca, 2022). All the platforms listed above have official accounts on WeChat, which is one of the most popular Chinese social media apps. In this paper, the term “huaren (people of Chinese ethnicity)” is often employed by the platform users to refer to Chinese immigrants. Despite the cultural consistency among huaren, there exists some political inconsistency; for example, not all huaren shared their support for the Chinese Communist Party’s rule (Mamuji et al., 2020, p. 12).

The Pre-Outbreak Phase In January 2020, when asked about the new virus, Dr. Tam claimed: “There has been no evidence to date that this illness, whatever it’s caused by, is spread easily from person to person”. On January 20th, Dr. Tam stated: “It is important to take this seriously, and be vigilant and be prepared. But I don’t think there’s reason for us to panic or be overly concerned”. On January 23rd, Dr. Tam affirmed: “The risk of an outbreak in Canada remains low”. However, the Chinese community did not seem convinced. On January 21st, a long article was published by the Vanpeople site, expressing strong concerns after the first case in the U.S. was identified in Seattle on January 15th (“Jinji! Wuhan,” 2020). This article elaborated a detailed know-how on the best ways to tackle the virus. First, it presented information about masks, such as different types and their functions, proper ways to wear and store them, mask tips for vulnerable populations, and the list of stores/websites in the Vancouver area where N95 masks were available. Second, it provided recommendations to prevent aerosol spread and contact transmission, including social distancing, proper hand washing, and avoiding gatherings. Third, it gave suggestions on how to build a stronger immunity, such as eating nutritious food and sleeping well and enough. Finally, it reminded readers to pay close attention to any possible symptoms and to avoid seeking medical assistance whenever they appear. This detailed know-how information chart was possibly borrowed from China since, at the bottom of several illustrations, it read “Hubei Province Health and Family Planning Promotion and Education Center” and “Wuhan City Health and Family Planning Promotion and Education Center” (“Jinji! Wuhan,” 2020). These tips still seemed accurate and valid, even at the beginning of 2021, which was a year into

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the pandemic. More importantly, all of this information was not mentioned nor promoted by the Canadian government until months later. In late January 2020, the Canadian government did not impose any forceful measures on border control such as suspension of flights to and from China, which was praised by Beijing for being a “bulwark of calm”. Moreover, on January 29th, Dr. Tam condemned the growing anti-Chinese/Asian racism in Canada. Nonetheless, the Canadian calm received mixed responses by huaren on the 51.CA website (Tailunsi, 2020): I applaud Canada’s three-level governments for their promotion of the idea not to discriminate huaren. However, at this very moment, we should think from a higher point of view … If the experience in China already proved that this virus is extremely harmful and contagious, then anti-discrimination does not take precedence over disease prevention. (February 3, 2020) Some were more critical (TERENCE, 2020): This public health officer presents a false appearance of peace and prosperity ( fenshi taiping), does not recommend masks, does not isolate possible patients, and accuses people of racism, instead of doing research on how to prevent the virus from spreading everyday. What’s the difference between this and the local officers of Wuhan? (January 30, 2020) A petition was filed in early February urging the government to block all flights from China, and more than 62,000 signatures were collected before February 10th. According to the Sinoquebec newspaper, this petition caused mixed feelings among huaren communities, where many were disappointed, yet many still signed (Yiming, 2020). A Chinese woman who came back to Quebec from China gave an interview to the Montreal Gazette, arguing that the Canadian airports did not place any vigilant measures as well as regulations of self-isolation, which showed that Canada did not learn a lesson from SARS (Yiming, 2020). Researches have shown that Chinese communities’ early and aggressive responses to Covid-19 were “valuable experience in mitigating the spread of infectious diseases” (Mamuji et al., 2020, p. 8). However, these efforts were compromised by the popular anti-Asian/Chinese racism. Meanwhile, huaren also expressed their dissatisfaction with the way Canada prevented the spread of virus. On 51.CA (Tailunsi, 2020), readers commented: Very often Canada is really weird… This time they are ignorant and inactive, but they are proud because they think they are special. (February 4, 2020)

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The difference between huaren and other Canadians was shown: The ethnicity that has most members wearing masks is Chinese – (we’re) more scared than anyone is. (February 4, 2020) In these comments, the believed superiority of Western know-how was challenged, and the reliability of Chinese know-how is affirmed. Due to the anxiety about Canada’s sluggish responses, the sense of belonging to the host society was compromised while the sense of belonging to the home society, or at least the community, was strengthened.

Confinement and Border Control In February 2020, Dr. Tam recommended quarantine only to passengers with symptoms: “As you move further away from that epicentre, any other border measures are much less effective”. At the beginning of March 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau still called popular appeals to close the border as “knee-jerk reactions”. Yet, on March 11th, the WHO announced Covid-19 as a pandemic. Starting from March 18th, 2020, Canada’s border was closed, and the two most populated provinces – Ontario and Quebec – went into a state of emergency and lockdown. Social distancing and frequent hand washing were recommended as main personal preventive options. On March 25th, all passengers – with or without symptoms – were required to self-isolate after arriving in Canada. Meanwhile, the country officially recognised, on March 24th, that local transmission was a major reason why the number of positive cases kept increasing, with a total number of 2,792 patients. Dr. Tam admitted that “Canada waited too long to close borders” on May 21st, 2020. On December 22nd, 2020, when asked about the discovery of a new Covid-19 variant in the U.K., Dr. Tam claimed that the virus was “not yet identified in Canada”. However, only four days later, the first two cases of the variant were confirmed in Ontario. On December 16th, 2020, Trudeau admitted that the government should have acted faster on Covid-19 warnings such as procurement of PPE. On February 3rd, 2021, the number of total deaths reached 20,328, and 788,997 cases were recorded. A huaren on the Sinoquebec website (“Tan Yongshi,” 2020) asked: Wasn’t that you (Theresa Tam) who said again and again in press conferences that there is no need to worry and the risk that Canadians are infected remains low? (December 20, 2020) On June 4th, 2020, it was reported that in British Columbia, most cases resulted from virus strains of Europe, Eastern Canada and the U.S. It is understandable why the media in Chinese language, including 51.CA and Xinhua, the news agency

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affiliated with the government of The People’s Republic of China (PRC), had a headline written this way: After covering it for more than four months, Canada finally announced the source of the virus. (Tucaojun, 2020) Nonetheless, some huaren readers were keenly aware of this type of titles associated with the division between states. On 51.CA (Tucaojun, 2020), one commented: Where were the viruses that Europeans and Americans carry from? After all, weren’t they all from Wuhan? (June 11, 2020) This post received the highest likes (54) and dislikes (39) at the same time. This shows the division in terms of opinions about the origin of the virus among Chinese communities. There is also a possibility that the users were expressing their critiques against how the PRC government handled the virus and related information. In mid-January 2021, it was reported that more than 1,500 flights shipped Canadians, including politicians, to vacation destinations over the last three months since no border control was placed. On 51.CA (BCbay, 2021), huaren were frustrated. Some were critical of the Canadians: Is it selfishness or freedom? (January 16, 2021)

This is a good thing, but the key is please don’t come back before half a year. (January 16, 2021) Huaren were anxious. Through constant comparisons, the merit of Chinese knowhow was underlined: China is well aware of the fierceness of the virus so they prevented it in extreme ways a long time ago. Not long from now only Chinese people will survive in the world. (January 16, 2021) To some, yet again, the sense of belonging to Chinese community was reinforced.

The Mask Issue During the Covid-19 pandemic, mask mandate was imposed by many East Asian jurisdictions for it was believed to protect oneself and others at the same time.

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In March 2020, when being asked about masks Dr. Tam stated: “Most people haven’t learned how to use masks” and “there is no need to use a mask for well people”. However, in May, Dr. Tam officially recommended masks, and “Canadians are confused by the changes” (Mahal, 2020). On June 5th, 2020, the WHO published a research study that showed a fabric mask should be composed of three layers (World Health Organization, 2020, p. 9). However, Dr. Tam did not recommend this type of mask until November. She also did not mention the possibility of aerosol transmission, but on November 4th, 2020, Canada “quietly update[d] COVID-19 guidelines on risk of airborne spread” (Miller, 2020b) without public notice. In fact, an article published on 51.CA on October 11th was already titled: “Really stubborn! Canada has not acknowledged: COVID is airborne!” (Bianyuanjun, 2020). Dr. Tam’s belated update of information regarding masks had resulted in a “maskbased stigma” against the Chinese/Asian communities since society was not told to wear it until May. The stigma ignored huaren’s know-how and resulted in “criticism of a common Asian cultural practice” (Mamuji et al., 2020, pp. 9–10). Being baffled, many huaren believed that the theory that the “mask is useless” was invented by Western authorities to excuse the mask shortage in spring 2020 and to convince people there was no need to purchase them. On 51.CA (Mutao, 2020), a reader commented: Tell the truth if there are no masks left. In January, why did you say you had learned from SARS and have been well prepared? (April 1, 2020) This is an interesting contrast to the popular image of the Chinese government as a truth-hiding, manipulative authority. On April 30th, 2020, Global News, one of the major Canadian TV news stations, published an investigation report alleging that the Chinese government has made “warlike efforts” to mobilise overseas Chinese to purchase PPE and ship them to China in order to “back batches of scarce supplies for the motherland” (Cooper, 2020). However, this article was retorted by an article posted on various websites including Vanpeople (“Qing Tingzhi,” 2020). This article criticised that the report intentionally portrayed huaren as a homogeneous entity that was controlled by the Chinese government, which would have resulted in Canadian society’s hatred and hostility. The author acknowledged that, in January and February, huaren sent a large amount of masks to China. It was because that was the time when China suffered from the peak of the epidemic and, of course, people would try their best to help their families. After March, when Canada started suffering, a lot of Chinese organisations also donated masks to communities and medical institutions in Canada, but, strangely, this act was not at all mentioned by Global News. Moreover, Canadians have not been encouraged to wear masks since that was not how they were taught to prevent disease (“Qing Tingzhi,” 2020). In December 2020, when asked about the contradictory messages surrounding the use of masks, Dr. Tam “bristle[d] a little” (Rabson, 2020). She affirmed that she followed evidence and scientific study, so, later in 2020, she changed her statement

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about masks. However, for many huaren, the “precautionary principle” seemed to be much preferred. Moreover, on the Sinoquebec website (“Tan Yongshi,” 2020), someone commented: The fact that she bristles means the question touched a sore spot. (I) believe whoever sits in that position won’t do it worse than her. (December 20, 2020) On 51.CA (Linsen, 2020), one commented: Extremely shameless… such a person without common sense is surprisingly the highest health official in Canada. (December 20, 2020) In addition to Dr. Tam, many Canadians were hesitant about wearing masks. Starting from the summer of 2020, protests against the mandatory use of masks and confinement were launched in major cities across Canada with slogans such as “Trust my body”. In July, some Quebecers launched a petition against masks, collecting more than 40,000 signatures. Here are the responses from the huaren on the Sinoquebec website (“Kuibeike Ren,” 2020): Who wants to die, then die himself. We need to segregate these who are unwilling to put mask on. (July 14, 2020) This is freedom of speech… It’s a shame that they are illiterate at the same time. (July 14, 2020) In another protest in downtown Vancouver, the author commented on the Vanpeople website about what they saw: Everyone was emotional and excitedly out of control … Surprisingly in Vancouver so many people believe in this “cult”. I wanted laugh but couldn’t. They are against the authority, and they are against technology such as 5G. I don’t know if 5G is good, but I’m pretty sure they are still in the undeveloped phase of -10086G. They are even against vaccines? I was surprised to see many protestors travelled from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. One participant had a theory of “the vulnerable has reason” by saying that patients with COVID-19 should have the rights to do things as usual. Why don’t you ask the patients if they prefer to take rest at home or work hard bitterly?… They shouted to journalists and photographers asking why they had fabricated fake news… At the Queen of Oak wharf… They lost their minds by intimidating the passengers who wore masks! (“Fule! Wengehua,” 2020)

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Huaren were frustrated because of the laissez-faire governing style and other Canadians’ refusal to work together. However, it is noteworthy that some huaren also expressed their appreciation of freedom and democracy that is integral to Canadian values. On the Sinoquebec website (“Kuibeike Ren,” 2020), a reader expressed their critique: …this type (Canadian) of freedom determines that nobody can make decision on behalf of the people: not only in this case (COVID-19), but every case. You can be illiterate, but I defend to death your right to speak. If you try by all means but still do not understand the life and values here, you can leave. Coming here to smack everyday does not change anything, and it only makes people believe you can’t fit as a dog who is used to submit to people. (July 15, 2020) Apparently, this comment targeted the authoritarian governing style of the immigrant’s home country: PRC. As diaspora, the community has been constantly situated within conflicts between values. To many Chinese immigrants, the difference between the two values serves as the key factor to migration, even in the difficult time of Covid-19.

The Theresa Tam Issue The federal government and Dr. Tam’s contradictory advice as well as the laggard response to Covid-19 caused some anger in society. Petitions such as “Dr. Theresa Tam to resign as Chief Public Health Officer” (Moore, 2020), “Fire Theresa Tam as Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer” (King, 2020), and “Dr. Theresa Tam, Canada’s chief public health officer, must resign or be fired” (Levant, 2020) were launched in April. She was also accused of working for China instead of Canada. Conservative MP Derek Sloan claimed: “Dr. Tam must go! Canada must remain sovereign over decisions. The UN, the WHO, and Chinese Communist propaganda must never again have a say over Canada’s public health!” (April 21, 2020). His comment was immediately reprehended by people within and outside the party. Trudeau interpreted the critiques as racist remarks by affirming that “intolerance and racism have no place in our country”. However, the petitions were supported by some huaren. The calls for petition were circulated among Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants. On the Sinoquebec website (“Chaole Tan Yisheng”, 2020), all the comments about the news were critical of Dr. Tam: What on earth did our CPHO do to improve the COVID-19 situation? (April 24, 2020)

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Trudeau’s defence of Dr. Tam was also not appreciated: Next time, when your company fires you, tell your boss: don’t fire me; otherwise it will trigger anti-Asian violence, according to the PM. (April 24, 2020) When dealing with a public health crisis, some huaren interpret Chineseness as a way to do things instead of skin colour. Moreover, on 51.CA (Xinfeng, 2020), some huaren questioned Dr. Tam’s Chinese identity: She (Dr. Tam) was born in Hong Kong, grew up in the U.K., and works in Canada. What’s the relationship between her and China? (April 27, 2020) Nonetheless, at the same time, some huaren pointed out that this dispute should be understood in a Canadian context: It is racist because he said she serves China and she happens to have a Chinese face. If she has a white face, would the MP say she serves China? (April 27, 2020) How does one identify Chineseness? The arbitrary correlation between skin colour and identity played by Canadian politics was explained. In an interview with the Canadian Press published on December 20th, 2020, in addition to talking about the progress of vaccine, Dr. Tam admitted her mistakes in the earlier stages of the pandemic (Rabson, 2020). For example, in regards to lockdown and border control between Canada and the U.S., Dr. Tam explained: “When in the history of the world have we seen this?… It’s really rather extraordinary times and measures” (Rabson, 2020). While many Canadian platforms titled this interview with “[e]motional Dr. Theresa Tam very thankful for speed of COVID-19 vaccine delivery”, the Chinese language equivalent was instead titled: “Theresa Tam: ‘the mistake in earlier stage of the pandemic Canada focused too much on travellers from China when virus originated from Europe and the U.S.’”. On the one hand, the Canadian government and media focused more on Dr. Tam’s emotions as a concerned person, but on the other hand, Chinese media examined the mistakes that she made during the pandemic’s beginnings. One user denounced Dr. Tam’s inconsistent advice on 51.CA (Linsen, 2020): She will change what she said in three months. (December 20, 2020) A user denounced Dr. Tam’s attitude towards her decision-making mistake: Anyway, she has no problems with herself, that’s what she is saying.

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On July 25th, 2020, an assessment of performance since the outbreak of Covid-19, conducted by seven Canadian experts in infectious disease and public health, was released. Canada received a B, U.S. an F, and the world a C. This result was ridiculed by huaren readers on 51.CA (Sjun, 2020): You compared yourself with the worst and even graded it. Fine, Cannabis-da (leisure use of cannabis is legal in Canada), you’re almost full mark. (July 25, 2020) In fact, not all huaren were against Dr. Tam. In February 2021, on 51.CA (Siyi, 2021), amidst the 24 critical comments in a thread responding to Tam’s update, one was sympathetic with her: Compatriots, please be more accepting. She is by no means a shrew. She is dedicated to her job. It is easy to blame someone as an outsider. I don’t think you’re qualified to blame Dr. Tam. She is possibly not doing it well enough. However, if you look at the world, not many countries are doing it well, either. (February 3, 2021) Nonetheless, Tam’s performance finally engendered strong criticism from the Auditor General of Canada in 2021. On March 25th, AG Karen Hogan’s report, released via Canadian media, criticised the federal government for being poorly prepared for Covid-19. The Public Health’s tool, methodology and conclusion to predict, prevent and control the risk were “an utter failure” (Robertson & Walsh, 2021).

Conclusion This paper examines how Chinese immigrants interpreted Canadian know-how during the Covid-19 crisis pre-vaccine phase (January 2020 – January 2021). In contrast to the precautionary principles that many Chinese immigrants were familiar with due to their experiences in their home society, the Canadian Public Health prioritised the availability of scientific evidence. Huaren were disappointed by the government’s ignorance, incompetency and procrastination, despite their offered know-hows. They were frustrated by people’s lack of communal commitment despite experiences in their Asian home countries already showing how fierce this disease was. To many huaren in Canada, this pandemic marks a milestone in which their perception of Canadianness and Chineseness has dramatically shifted. Asian immigrants are often portrayed in lenient and peaceful stereotypes, and it seems that the Asian identity is beyond the struggle of races or ethnicities. However, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese ethnicity has drawn a lot of public attention. In Canada, huaren have been stigmatised and harassed despite their preemptive efforts. On the contrary, within the Chinese communities, as this paper analysed, Chinese experiences serve as a power to shape their identity as a “more knowledgeable minority” in the time of Pandemic Orientalism.

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References Adhopia, V. (2020, March 19). Is Taiwan’s impressive response to COVID-19 possible in Canada? CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/taiwan-covid-19-canada1.5502194 BCbay. (2021, January 16). Wuyu! Sangeyue nei 1500 jia hangban zai Jianada ren chuguo dujia (Speechless! 1500 flights flew Canadians to vacation destinations over the last three months). 51.CA. https://bbs.51.ca/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=1006897 Bianyuanjun. (2020, October 11). Zhenshi jue! Jianada haibu chengren: Xinguan cunzai kongqi chuanbo! (Really stubborn! Canada has not acknowledged: COVID is airborne!). 51.CA. https://info.51.ca/news/canada/2020-10/934893.html Chaole Tan yisheng? Fan yayi baoli shangsheng! Duluduo huiyingle (Fire Dr. Tam? Surging antiAsian violence! Trudeau responds). (2020, April 23). Sinoquebec. https://www.sinoquebec. com/article-121561-1.html?type1=portal.php?mod=view CGTN [China Global Television Network]. (2020, December 23). Martin Jacques on fighting against COVID-19: The West has failed [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=qkIBUYXFMvc Chinese Canadian National Council – For Social Justice (CCNC-SJ). (2020a, April 27). Anti-Asian racism rife amid COVID-19 in Canada’s largest Cities. CCNC-SJ. https://ccncsj. ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/CCNC_SJ-National-Poll-on-COVID-19-BiasPress-Release-1.pdf Chinese Canadian National Council - For Social Justice (CCNC-SJ). (2020b, September 9). More anti-Asian racist incidents reported per capita in Canada than US according to first national report. CCNC-SJ. https://ccncsj.ca/more-anti-asian-racist-incidents-reported-per-capitain-canada-than-us-according-to-first-national-report/ CnWeb.ca. (2022, August 16). CnWeb.ca Provides Ranking in Traffic of Websites in Chinese Language Traffic in Canada. http://www.cnweb.ca/. Cooper, S. (2020, April 30). United front groups in Canada helped Beijing stockpile coronavirus safety supplies. Global News. https://globalnews.ca/news/6858818/ coronavirus-china-united-front-canada-protective-equipment-shortage/ Debeuf, K. (2020, April 23). “Corona Orientalism”: nothing to learn from the East?. euobserver. https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/148135 Fule! Wengehua you xian shen caozuo! Qianren zai DT youxing, fan kouzhao, fan yimiao, fan  5G! (I surrender! Incredible exercise in Vancouver again! Thousands protesting downtown, anti-mask, anti-vaccine, anti-5G!). (2020, October 18). Vanpeople. https://info.vanpeople. com/1132167.html Godamunne, V. (2020, May 23). Pandemic Orientalism and Some Realities. Vichitra Godamunne. https://vichitra-ksg.medium.com/pandemic-or ientalism-and-some-realities76eca70455b6 Jinji! Wuhan feiyan kuosan zhi Xiyatu, Wengehua quanmian jiebei, huaren huiguo qing sansi! (Urgent! Wuhan Pneumonia spread to Seattle. Vancouver on full alert. Huaren please think carefully before return to China!). (2020, January 21). Vanpeople. Retrieved January 18, 2021, from https://info.vanpeople.com/1018974.html Johns Hopkins University & Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center. (2021, April 16). COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU). https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html King, A. (2020, April). Fire Theresa Tam as Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer. Change.org. https://www.change.org/p/justin-trudeau-fire-theresa-tam-as-canada-s-chief-publichealth-officer

54  Grace Cheng-Ying Lin

Kuibeike ren wangshang qingyuan: Nachu dai kouzhao youyong de zhengju! (Quebecors launched petition online: show the proof of masks’ function). (2020, July 14). Sinoquebec. https://www.sinoquebec.com/article-125027-1.html Levant, E. (2020, April 16). Dr. Theresa Tam, Canada’s chief public health officer, must resign or be fired. Rebel News. https://www.rebelnews.com/dr_theresa_tam_canada_ chief_public_health_officer_must_resign_or_be_fired Linsen. (2020, December 20). Tan Yongshi: Zaoqi cuozai guanzhu Zhongguo lüke, bingli laizi Oumei (Theresa Tam: the mistake in earlier stage of the pandemic Canada focused too much on travellers from China when virus originated from Europe and the U.S). 51 CA. https://info.51.ca/news/canada/2020-12/955659.html Mahal, I. (2020, May 22). Why Theresa Tam changed her stance on masks. Maclean’s. https:// www.macleans.ca/opinion/why-theresa-tam-changed-her-stance-on-masks/ Mamuji, A. A., Rozdilsky, J. L., Lee, C. T., Mwarumba, N., Tubula, M., Chu, T. (2020). Expanding the Narrative in Anti-Chinese Stigma during COVID-19. York University. https:// www.yorku.ca/laps/sas/wp-content/uploads/sites/202/2020/11/EXPANDING-THENARRATIVE-ON-ANTI-CHINESE-STIGMA-DUR_Aaida-Mamuji.pdf Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Know-how. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved January 18, 2020, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/know-how Miller, A. (2020a, October 17). The key lesson from SARS that Canada failed to heed when COVID-19 hit: Experts say Canada could have fared better if it followed “Precau­ tionary Principle” early in the pandemic. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/ coronavirus-canada-sars-1.5766021 ——— (2020b, November 4). Canada quietly updates COVID-19 guidelines on risk of airborne spread. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/coronavirus-canada-aerosoltransmission-covid-19-1.5789906 Moore, A. (2020, April). Dr. Theresa Tam to resign as Chief Public Health Officer. Change.org. https://www.change.org/p/justin-trudeau-dr-theresa-tam-to-resign-as-chief-publichealth-officer-and-bipartisan-supported-pandemic-playbook-developed-for-canadianhealth-and-safety Mutao. (2020, April 1). Jianada Weisheng buzhang chengren: Meiyou zugou de kouzhao yingdui xinguan (Canada’s Minister of Health admitted: Short of masks to tackle COVID-19). 51. CA. https://info.51.ca/news/canada/2020-04/872785.html Qing tingzhi wuminghua huaren qunti, ji kouzhao huiguo meiyou name bukan (Please stop stigmatizing huaren community: sending masks back home is not that obscene). (2020, May 4). Vanpeople. https://info.vanpeople.com/1068178.html Rabson, M. (2020, December 20). Dr. Theresa Tam ‘emotional,’ thankful for speed of  coronavirus vaccine delivery. Global News. https://globalnews.ca/news/7533760/ coronavirus-vaccine-tam-emotional-thankful/ Robertson, G. & Walsh, M. (2021, March 29). Tam criticized for supporting ‘indefensible’ assessment of COVID-19 risk. The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ canada/article-tam-criticized-for-supporting-indefensible-assessment-of-covid-19-risk/ Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. Pantheon Books. Samarajiva, I. (2020, May 4). In the NYTimes, only white leaders stand out: The Times spends exactly one sentence on Asia. Indi Samarajiva. https://indica.medium.com/in-the-nytimesonly-white-leaders-stand-out-3e2c175245f8 Siyi. (2021, February 2). Jianada shouxi weishengguan jinggao: Bianzhong bingdu yizai shequ chuanbo (Canada’s CPHO warned: community transmission of COVID-19 variants). 51.CA. https://info.51.ca/news/canada/2021-02/967818.html Sjun. (2020, July 25). Jianada, Meiguo, quanqiu kongyi cuoshi da PK, zhuanjia zheyang dafen (Face-off of pandemic control measures between Canada, the U.S. and the Globe, this is how experts evaluate). 51.CA. https://bbs.51.ca/thread-970458-1-1.html

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Stavro, E. (2014). SARS and Alterity: the Toronto-China Binary. New Political Science, 36(2), 172–192. Tailunsi. (2020, February 3). Jiamei: Meiguo he Jianada duidai Wuhan yiqing de fanying da butong (Canadian media: the U.S. and Canada responded to the Wuhan epidemic differently). 51.CA. https://info.51.ca/news/canada/2020-02/854317.html Tan Yongshi: Zaoqi cuozai guanzhu Zhongguo luke, bingli laizi Oumei (Theresa Tam: the mistake in earlier stage of the pandemic Canada focused too much on travellers from China when virus originated from Europe and the U.S). (2020, December 20). Sinoquebec. https://www.sinoquebec.com/article-131185-1.html TERENCE. (2020, January 30). Jianada shouxi weishengguan jinggao chuxian zhendui huaren de zhongzu qishi (Canadian CPHO blows whistle on racial discrimination against huaren). 51.CA. https://info.51.ca/articles/853052 The Editorial Board. (2020, April 30). In a crisis, true leaders stand out. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/opinion/coronavirus-leadership.html Tucaojun. (2020, June 11). Wu le sige yue hou, Jianada zhongyu gongbu bingdu laiyuan (After covering it for more than four months, Canada finally announced the source of virus). 51. CA. https://info.51.ca/news/canada/2020-06/896829.html World Health Organization. (2020, June 5). Advice on the use of masks in the context of COVID-19. Xinfeng. (2020, April 27). Silong yiyuan zhiyi Tan Yongshi, zhe shi zhongzu qishi ma? (MP Sloan questions Theresa Tam; is this racial discrimination?). 51.CA. https://info.51.ca/ articles/881324 Yiming. (2020, February 18). Mengtelier huaren yimin piping Quisheng dui quanqiu gongwei tufa shijian fanying chidun (Montreal Chinese Criticizes that Quebec is unresponsive to Global Public Health Emergency). Sinoquebec. https://www.sinoquebec.com/portal. php?mod=view&aid=117884 Zhong, R. (2021, January 2). How Taiwan plans to stay (mostly) Covid-free. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/world/asia/taiwan-coronavirus-healthminister.html

4 MISSING MEDIA NARRATIVES Covid’s Impact on Transgender Population in India Shubhda Chaudhary

Introduction The fragile, deep-seated and systemic structures of social inequality and stratification have been openly exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Initially termed as the ‘great equaliser’, Covid-19 instead metamorphosed into an even more difficult challenge for minorities, marginalised sections and lower strata of societies – both domestically and internationally.1 One such stratum in India is the transgender community, hardly counted or academically represented. Therefore, this paper tries to contextualise the challenges faced by this community in India, especially in terms of the missing narratives in their media representation during the pandemic. A global cross-sectional study done on transgender and non-binary people from 76 countries in 2020 stated 55% witnessed reduction in gender-affirming medical care, approximately 50% suffered from anxiety and depression while 77% underwent income reductions (Todorovic, 2021). This was further highlighted in another study published by D’Angelo et al. in 2021. In fact, gender-based violence was further exacerbated due to the imposition of stay-at-home measures as well as lockdown regulations, by forcing women, transgenders as well as non-binary identities within closed doors of their homes (where they live with violent or abusive family members) or living spaces (in the absence of government shelters or welfare programmes). Additionally, the continuing uncertainties, anxieties and protocols related with vaccination still exist. One can question if years of struggle, demand for legitimacy and empathy for/towards the transgender community has now been abandoned? There are no clear-cut answers as the pandemic still evolves and unravels itself, therefore making it even more difficult to form a predictive trajectory of its upcoming impact on the transgender identities at a global level. DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-6

Missing Media Narratives  57

Impact of Covid on Indian Transgender Community: Three Case-Studies Transgender population lives in different parts of India even though their exact number is unknown. They are locally known by names such as Hijras, Shiv Shaktis, Khusras, Jogappas, Jogtas, Iravanis, Kothis and Kinnars. Historically, transwomen have been culturally organised into gharanas (houses) reflecting the Hijra community discourses, where the guru-chela (mother-daughter) relationship of mutual care continues till today. The practical reality faced by transmen is least documented. Dalit trans activist Living Smile Vidya stated to author Gee Imaan Semmalar (2014) how transphobia is another form of Brahmanism in India where transgenders have been rendered untouchables. This could be one of the reasons that very limited academic literature is currently present especially in the Indian academia regarding the transgender population. The lack of narrative – both in media/academia as well as the willingness of transgenders themselves – posed a serious challenge for this research paper. On one hand, Indian media reports on this subject protected the identities of transgenders, either by keeping them anonymous or by changing their names. On the other hand, transgenders themselves, irrespective of their stature or position in the socio-economic structure, did refrain from revealing their personal experiences to the author due to several possible facts such as: fear, anxiety, lack of social support or paranoia. Additionally, hardly any academic books could be found on the realities/struggles of transgender in India, which posed a serious challenge. Though few autobiographies have been published, no concrete academic scholarship exists. The paper discusses the stories of three transgender: Rachana Mudraboyina, Damini Sinha and Kabir Maan. Ranchana Mudraboyina (a transgender-rights activist) participated in a Press Conference organised by an NGO called Loktantrashala on 6 June 2020, covered by the author. Rachana is also the creator of TransVision – India’s first YouTube channel for Trans rights. During the Press Conference, Rachana revealed several narratives regarding the absence of state-led policies for the transgender community in India. Firstly, according to the 2011 census, there were approximately five lakh ‘third gender’ identities in India. These numbers would have drastically increased in the past ten years.2 Like many transgenders, Rachana was openly critical of giving their confidential data to the government. This lack of trust reflects the deeplyentrenched suspicion harboured by the Indian transgender community against the government. Therefore, when the government promised Rs 1500 for transgenders in India, several could not avail the service as they lacked an Aadhar Card3 issued by the Government of India. Secondly, in several towns and tier-2 /tier-3 cities, the pandemic unleashed further discrimination against the transgenders. Transphobic posters, stating how reading quotes like ‘Keep transgenders away as COVID spreads through them’, rampantly cropped up on the walls of several South-Indian villages. This even led

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to a stark rise in suicide rates or attempts to suicide in the community due to the recurrent mental abuse.4 Thirdly, the lack of access to medical care experienced by the transgender community took place in two concrete dimensions. Due to the lockdown, those transgenders who were in dire need of hormone replacement therapy/gender-affirming therapy did not get access to medical care as both government and private hospitals were mostly used for emergency Covid patients. Those on testosterone therapy started having their menstrual cycles again, causing massive physical, physiological and mental affliction. Meanwhile, sex workers who needed abortion also did not have adequate emergency access for it during the lockdown. Damini Sinha, a blogger and software development engineer based in Pune, provided deep insights into the ways in which several missing media narratives continue to challenge the concrete issues that dominate the empowerment of transgender population in the country. Firstly, she spoke about the difference between intersex5 and transgender persons – a difference that is not clearly revealed by media discourse, as journalists do not have the right grip over the finer nuances of it. Secondly, media discourses often cover stories related to transgender during the Pride month or often to celebrate the 2019 Act, but no media platform, be it radio, television, print or even online has tried to write one daily narrative about transgender persons every day, just as there is a daily sport, entertainment or business section. Thirdly, she explained how media keeps using the term – ‘Hijra’ – community with transgender. Hijra is a culture, in which even intersex, transgender or cisgender can be a part of. A normal person can also follow the Hijra or kinnar culture even if they are not intersex or transgender, Damini explained. Fourthly, the massive violence that Hijra community members do against any other transgender who tries to fetch their own separate identity, or fight for human rights issues, is hardly reported. Damini also believed that the culture of nude protests by transgender often leads to more police apathy by further trivialising the issue of demands. Lastly, Damini explained the entire process of sex-change which takes almost a year and costs around Rs 6–7 lakhs in a private hospital. She also explained how several transgender persons died before, as instead of getting operated, their genitals were cut-off, leading to massive bleeding and eventual death. Kabir Maan, a 30-year-old transman from Delhi, reflects on the impact of mental violence and surveillance at home suffered by the transgender community during the lockdown. Kabir, who had worked as an Educational Consultant in creating awareness regarding child sexual abuse, stated how kids do not have any knowledge about the difference between sex and gender. This lack of awareness further permeates within domestic households, which later causes surveillance, abandonment and the ignominy of being unheard. Interestingly, for Kabir, the lockdown period also endowed a certain level of confidence as it acted as a learning period to embrace one’s reality. Acceptance, he believes, is the first step, especially in homes. Even today, Kabir feels that his body

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and choices are more under the mercy of others, who supposedly want to ‘include’ him, instead of his own comfort, which is often compromised. As he is currently in transition, a process that would last for two to three years, his friends often ask him to shave his face or cover it with a mask while visiting their respective homes. Therefore, he continues to feel like a man trapped in a woman’s body. As he is currently in the transition period, the hormonal changes in his body, cracking of voice and growth of facial hair started strikingly reflecting the process started during the lockdown. During the lockdown period, when the hormone replacement therapy injections were not delivered in time, Kabir did undergo menstruation, which in his words felt, ‘someone raping me on a regular basis’. The impact of body shaming on transgender population is hardly documented. Also, any kind of abuse, threat or assault that transgenders face is generally not registered in an FIR at the police stations due to the prevalence of police apathy. Even simple requests like using public restrooms, trial rooms in malls or even metro are a concern but no concrete policy formulation has been done to even deal with these growing concerns. Kabir also stated his transgender population is so scared of being under surveillance that they are horrified of sharing their dead/certificate names with others. Hence, it is not easy to live a transgender’s life in India, especially with the lack of empathy and awareness regarding it. These three case-studies have thrown light into the policy formulations as well as the crisis in media narratives that are often not reported, thereby making it now easier to scrutinise the published news stories from March 2020 to February 2021.

Missing Media Narratives: Analysis of English News-Stories on Transgender Persons After employing the research methodology of qualitative content analysis, the chapter selected the time-frame from March 2020 to February 2021 to highlight the missing media narratives from English-speaking national online news platforms. At least one main story of every month has been scrutinised. The following tabulation endows brief ideas about the main narratives, sub-themes and other important details related to the stories/reports published (Table 4.1).

Theme One: Impact of Covid and 2020 Lockdown/Pandemic on Transgender Population Why Jammu’s transgender community hit the streets in protest – Down to Earth – 19th February 2021 The transgender community in Jammu launched a nude protest on January 21, 2021, to protest against police apathy and inaction after four transgender persons were forcibly abused and castrated. The report states how after the abrogation of Article 370, transgender persons have been ‘one of the worst sufferers of communication blackout in J&K’.Missing narratives: The report failed to mention the

S. No.

Main Narrative and sub-themes

1

Impact of Covid and the Lockdown/Pandemic on Transgender Population Sub-themes: Economic, mental, social and human rights perspective on Covid pandemic on transgenders Plight of Hijra Community during Covid

a) Why Jammu’s transgender community hits the streets b) Misgendering, Sexual Violence: What is it to be a transgender in an Indian prison

Kiran, a 40-year-old transwoman in Nagpur Central Prison

1) Visibly Invisible: The plight of transgender community due to India’s Covid-19 lockdown 2) I am on a mission to empower India’s transgender community, one painted palm at a time 3) Broke, Sick and Stigmatised: India’s ‘third-gender’ Hijra in fight for survival during the pandemic

1) Sazia, a 22-year-old transwoman in Kolkata 2) Jiya – Operation Theatre Technician in Kolkata 3) Kalki Subramaniam

Government Initiative - Legal, social, employment and education-related initiatives taken by the government

1) National Council for Transgender Persons formed 2) ‘Pride Station’: North India’s first Metro Station dedicated to transgenders in Noida 3) Transgenders in India may soon get reservation in education under OBC quota 4) India’s first transgender home to be in Bengaluru 5) All Government offices, MCDs, police to have separate toilets for transgenders 6) Zoya Khan becomes India’s first transgender operator of Common Service Centre

2

3

Headline of the story

Names of Transgender/activists mentioned, if any

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TABLE 4.1  Content analysis of major transgender-focussed news stories

4

Government Negligence - The lack of implementation of Transgender Person (Protection of Right) Act, 2019. - Lack of data, education facilities, reservation and democratic opportunities in terms of marriage, renting/owning homes, etc - Lack of data on the number of transgender children and their respective literacy rates

1) Transgender seek a meeting with District Authority to push for rights to be identified 2) As India enters 21-day lockdown period, the transgender community will be pushed into margins 3) Transgender’s plights during coronavirus pandemic 4) For transgender persons, discrimination begins at schools 5) Why Transgender People Still have to go through Hoops to get married or inherit property in India 6) Restoring Dignity: Nuances of Transgender Rights in India 7) Why Indian Parliament should have a Transgender MP 8) NHRC warms States and UTs over plight of transgenders in India

Anindya Hajra – Transwoman and Maya Urmi Aher – Transgender activist Reena Rai – Founder of Deepa Ardhanarishwar Empowerment Foundation Harshini Mekala and Naaz Joshi

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62  Shubhda Chaudhary

total number of protestors that had participated along with the reasoning behind boycotting the local media. The total number of transgender persons in Jammu was also not mentioned. Misgendering, Sexual Violence: What It Is to Be a Transgender in an Indian Prison – The Wire – 23rd February 2021 This report was submitted by Sukanya Shantha. It was one of the reports in the series called ‘Barred – The Prisons Project’ of the Wire, which was produced with the partnership of Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. The report starts with explaining the turmoil failed by 40-year-old Kiran, a transgender woman in Nagpur Central Prison, where she is lodged with 2,000 male prisoners. In her personal memoir, she writes about the constant mental, physical and sexual abuse she regularly undergoes for the past 17 months, by the under-trial prisoners, convicts and jail staff. Due to the lockdown, petitioning in a court or informing a lawyer abruptly ended. The report also highlighted the poor legal representation endowed to transgender persons in jails.Missing Narratives: Apart from just safeguarding the names of a few transgender persons for their security, this report is an in-depth investigative scrutiny done by the journalist even highlighted how the National Crime Records Bureau has been annually publishing prison statistics since 1995 but within the male-female binary. The lack of details about imprisoned transgender persons in local police as well as state level has also been aptly highlighted.6

Theme Two: Plight of Hijra Community during Covid Visibly Invisible: The plight of transgender community due to India’s Covid-19 lockdown The report starts with the lament of Sazia, a 22-year-old transgender woman in Kolkata who is coming in terms with the reality of the lockdown imposed in the country. It states how the members of the Hijra community in particular are in a ‘Gordian knot’ as they usually made money on the streets. Even though the term ‘social distancing’ has made an advent during the pandemic, the transgender community has been socially distanced and rendered invisible for a very long time. As transgender persons have higher chances of AIDS/HIV infection, cancer as well as consumption of tobacco, their immunity system remains highly compromised. In a rare effort, the report includes the experience of Jiya, an OT technician from Kolkata who is a ‘Corona Warrior’ and provides essential services to her transgender community members.Missing Narratives: Towards the end, the report does not delve into detail about Jiya’s age or background, thereby making it to a sudden halt. I am on a mission to empower India’s transgender community, one painted palm at a time – Kalki Subramaniam – 23rd June 2020 This personal essay-cum-memoir by Kalki Subramaniam, a well-acclaimed Transgender activist as well as Founder of Sahodari Foundation is an eye-opening narrative. It explains how Kalki – after being abandoned by her family – found solace in the company of Hijras. Though, later Kalki lost many of them to suicide and

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AIDS. From a very young age, her childhood was marred with episodes of vitriolic brutality against transgender persons – rape,7 physical torture and abandonment – thereby, motivating her to become an activist. Missing Narratives: This first-person account of Kalki in her own words does justice in bringing out the lessons of her life and how art has endowed her solace and healing. These kinds of persona feature-stories are often missing in the Indian media, especially when it comes to transgender persons.Broke, Sick and Stigmatised: India’s ‘third-gender’ Hijra in fight for survival during the pandemic – 27th August 2020 – The Telegraph Linking the job and migrant labour crisis created in the country during the pandemic, the report focuses the impact of Covid on transgender community in India. Assuming the number of transgender persons in India to be 500,000, the report links their historic presence since the time of Mahabharata and Kama Sutra of 400 BC. Missing Narratives: The report carries a wrong understanding of the term ‘Hijra community’ in India. The report also called India’s public health system as being ‘the most underfunded in the world’ without any reasoning/evidence.

Theme Three: Government Initiatives National Council for Transgender Persons formed – 22nd August 2020 – The Hindustan Times The news article stated how India’s first National Council for Transgender Persons was formed by the gazetted order under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act of 2019.8 The Council would be headed by the Union Social Justice Minister. Joint Secretary level members from the Ministries of Education, law, labour, rural development and others would also join. In the first rotation, representatives from Gujarat, Tripura, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir would be appointed. In a rare attempt captured by Indian media, this article shows concern about the intersex community in India and how they are rendered invisible, especially the intersex children. Missing Narratives: One constant lacunae in the narratives of media discourses, such as these articles are the lack of information provided to the readers about terms such as intersex and how they are different from transgender. No impact of the pandemic in the creation of the council was discussed.‘Pride Station’: North India’s first Metro Station dedicated to Transgenders in Noida – 27th October 2020 – Hindustan Times The report states how Sector 50 Metro Station has been renamed as ‘Pride Station’ by Noida Metro Rail Corporation (NMRC). This step was taken to celebrate the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. It also stated that this move would be empowering for the 35,000 transgender persons staying in Delhi NCR (according to the 2011 census). Six transgenders had also been recruited to work at the ‘Pride Station’. In the past, 27 transgenders were employed in a similar move by Kochi Metro Rail Limited in Kerala.

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Missing Narratives: The report gives a more official account of this step, instead of asking the thoughts of the six transgenders who had been also recruited. Transgenders in India may soon get reservation in education under OBC quota – 19th November 2020 The report mentions it took the government six years after the Supreme Court in 2014 passed the widely appreciated judgement endowing the legitimacy of fundamental rights to all transgender persons. It mentioned how the Education Ministry is trying to include the transgender population under the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) identity for admission in the higher academic institutes. Missing Narratives: The report mentions an estimate that states that India currently has two million transgender people but fails to name the source. India’s first transgender home to be in Bengaluru – The Hindu – 3rd December 2020 The report states the go-ahead provided by the Ministry of Women and Child Development to establish the first transgender children’s home in Bengaluru under the child protection services. These transgender children have been categorised into child victims who have suffered abuse, child labourers, street children, abandoned children and orphans. This idea was originally mooted by Pallavi Akurathi, Director (IAS officer) of Directorate of Child Protection. Missing Narratives: The report fails to mention why Pallavi Akurathi’s first request for establishment of a children’s home for transgenders was not accepted. It also fails to contextualise the impact of Covid on the mental health, degree of abuse and changes in degrees of abandonment faced by the children. All Government offices, MCDs, police to have separate toilets for transgenders – The Hindustan Times – 17th February 2021 The report states how Delhi government has made it mandatory for all the municipal corporations, district authorities, state-run companies to create exclusive washrooms for transgender persons under the protocol mentioned by Section 22 of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 in the next two years. For the time-being, the washrooms for Persons with Disabilities (PwD) would be used for transgender persons, too. The report also mentioned the opinion of Amrita Sarkar, advisor of Transgender Wellbeing and Advocacy at India, critiquing the lack of ‘gender-neutral’ washrooms in the capital. Missing Narratives: A major reflection of this report states how the government perceives a trans body as a disabled body. Very limited critique or even awareness about the normalising of this perception is discussed academically. The report fails to contextualise or even mention the impact of Covid pandemic on the timing of this decision of the Delhi government. It also uses the term ‘activists’ but mentions the name of only Amrita Sarkar in welcoming the move. The total number of PwD washrooms in Delhi is not specified along with the deadline stated for the completion of the two-year interim period. Zoya Khan becomes India’s first transgender operator of Common Service Centre – 5th July 2020 – The Mint The report highlights the creation of the Common Service Centre under the Digital India Programme which had been launched to increase the government’s reach to the rural and less-developed parts of the country. Therefore, in Vadodara

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in Gujarat, Zoya Khan had been appointed as the first transgender at the Common Service Centre, focussing primarily on the education and banking sectors. Missing Narrative: The struggles and hardships suffered by Zoya, her own history of activism, were not given any detailed insight.

Theme Four: Government Negligence Transgender see meeting with District Authority to push for rights to be identified – The Hindustan Times – 25th February 2021 In an effort to implement the Transgender Person (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, the community members in Pune demanded to be recognised as ‘trans person’ as being done in various other states on the basis of affidavits. Though, the report states how transgender persons had ‘strong objections’ against the need of psychologist to certify their identity. Missing narratives: The report mentions the procedure of registering oneself as a ‘transperson’ it does not include details about the extra sections to be filled if one has undergone the sex-change operation and wants to register themselves as male and female. As India enters 21-day lockdown period, the transgender community will be pushed into margins – 26th March 2020 – The Scroll Published just a few days after the implementation of the nation-wide lockdown in the country, the article mentions how the pandemic has left the transgender community in India at heightened level of ‘ill health and poverty’. The quote of Anindya Hajra, a transwoman was added that predicted that ‘two million’ transgender persons in India would suffer in the coming months. As the lives of most of the community members were ‘precariously balanced’ on social interactions, the lack of shifting to online spaces would not be a privilege easily available for them. Missing Narratives: Quite general in nature, the report does not talk about the impact of the pandemic on those transgender persons who were undergoing transition and how the lack of availability of hormone blocker injections would affect their transition. Transgender’s Plights during Coronavirus pandemic – 22nd May 2020 – The New Indian Express The report starts by revealing how Reena Rai, Founder of, Deepa Ardnareshwar Empowerment Foundation,9 got very distraught after reading Facebook Posts of Transgender Persons, who had to resort to sex-work during the pandemic to make ends meet. Therefore, with the help of her husband, she started helping the transgender community members, especially by providing them food and ration. Trans women like Harshini Mekala did acknowledge the government’s role but found it deeply ‘inadequate’. The trans community has been largely overlooked by even the civil society members distributing masks and food to the other marginalised sections of the society. Naaz Joshi, a transgender activist and India’s first international transgender beauty queen explained how those undergoing transition/sex-change need to pay Rs 1,200 for one shot of oestrogen, thereby making it even more difficult for them to make ends meet when daily work faces stagnation. Joshi also

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explained how in spite of being Miss World Diversity, at least three times, she is still dependent on donations and has no job. Daily-wage is earned by transgender population through begging or sex-work, she stated. Missing Narratives: The report lacks to mention the amount of welfare capital being invested by the government under the schemes to empower the transgender community members, their recipients and how their respective selection was made, especially taking into consideration that many transgender community members do not have official identity proofs. For Transgender persons, discrimination begins at schools – The Wire – 24th July 2020 The report explains how out of the total 1,889,878 students registered for Class 10th and 1,206,893 students registered for Class 12th, only 19 and 6 were transgender persons, respectively (according to the CBSE results). The reason behind the pass percentage of transgender students being ignored has been debated in the essay. The 2011 census revealed the literacy rate of transgender persons in India was 57.06%. It also stated that there were 54,854 transgender kids below the age of six during the 2011 census. (It must be noted that these are the documented numbers and might be slightly lesser than the real figures.) Missing Narratives: The socio-economic causes and ramifications of lack of data and low literacy rate in transgenders are not discussed in detail. Why Transgender People Still have to go through Hoops to get married or inherit property in India – September 3rd, 2020 – News18 The report focuses on three basic parameters – statutory rights, personal liberties and state policies. It also explains the loopholes in Section 13 of the National Food Security Act, which does not give any right to a transgender person to be the head of the household if he/she/they attain 18 years of age. It further adds the case of marriage that came in 2019 to the Madurai Bench of the High Court of Madras. Both the religious authorities and Marriage Registrations Officer (MRO) did not endow legitimacy to the wedding of the male and transwoman. This move to decline the sanctity of the wedding – both legal and religious – was done on the grounds that according to the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, only a ‘woman’ could be referred to as ‘bride’ on the wedding day. Thus, in response the Court stated that the Article 21 of the Indian Constitution allows one the right to choose their marriage partner. It also added that the term ‘bride’ in the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 would also include transgender persons as well as intersex women. Missing Narratives: As this report is part of a three-part series, it retains its focus and reveals the legal challenges faced by the transgender community in terms of marriage as well as food security. Restoring Dignity: Nuances of Transgender Rights in India – The Jurist – 12th October 2020 The report mentions how the Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment – on 25th September 2020 – had removed the mandatory physical/ medical examination by the District Magistrate to confirm the transgender person’s identity. Missing Narratives: As Ayush Mishra, the author of the report is an Advocate in the Allahabad High Court, his legal vocabulary and knowledge of the transgender

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ecosystem does justice to understand the further nuances of the current paradigm. The only missing contextualisation in this report, per se, is the lack of connecting the implications of the analysis with the Covid pandemic. Indian Parliament should have a Transgender MP – 26th October 2020 – Outlook India The opinion piece starts with demanding the political representation of transgender persons through reservation of seats in the Parliament, especially after the scrapping of the earlier two seats reserved for the Anglo-Indian Community in the Lok Sabha. Even though six transgenders had contested during the 2014 and 2019 General Elections, none of them got elected. The report also states that since the Election Commission of India rendered the earlier existing gender binaries obsolete, 28,527 voters had registered themselves in the ‘Others’ category. With the appointment of Shree Gauri Sawant a transgender activist, as a Goodwill Ambassador during the 2019 polls, the number of registrations in the ‘Others’ category rose till 38,970. Even though this increase in the new registrations was appreciated, the 2011 census revealed the total number of transgender population in India was 487,203. The slashing of the annual budget for transgenders by the Union Ministry from Rs 15 crore in 2016–2017 to Rs 5 crore in 2019–2020 was also included in the report. Missing Narratives: The report fails to explain the source of the Election Commission of India’s report on the number of new registrations. The challenges faced by the transgender person in registering along with the fear/abuse faced in the bureaucratic process (along with the deep distrust against it) needed to be explained instead of just ambiguously hinting towards it. The challenges faced by Gauri Sawant would have also added to the narrative of the opinion piece. NHRC warms States and UTs over plight of Transgenders in India – January 9th, 2021, BusinessWorld The report reveals how the National Human Rights Commission has shown extreme ‘displeasure’ and warned the Chief Secretaries of all Union Territories and States in India for failing to submit their respective Action Taken Reports (ATRs) on the current plight and struggle faced by transgender population. It also includes the opinion of Radhakanta Tripathy, a Human Rights Activist who clearly stated that neither the States or the UTs have done anything for the ‘survival of trangenders’. He even termed the community members as ‘unfortunate victims of State negligence’. Missing Narratives: Even though the report consists of strongly worded opinions of Radhakanta Tripathy, it fails to give an analysis of the reasons why the states and UTs have failed to implement the Supreme Court’s National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), judgement of 2014.

Conclusion As the impact of pandemic continues to unravel itself with new mutations and deaths, it is essential to study its impact on the marginalised sections of the society. Any form of demographical study is incomplete without analysing the impact of transgender in India’s informal economy along with the policy changes brought

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by legislative provisions. Therefore, the chapter started by analysing the impact of the pandemic at the international level in an effort to give insight into how the transgender community was facing the challenging implications of the pandemic at a global level. After contextualising the narrative, the two case studies of Rachana Mudraboyina, Damini Sinha and Kabir Maan threw limelight into the government policies that were implemented (or not) during the pandemic and the amount of financial assistance that the transgender community received. The lack of official documents and identity proofs by the transgender along with the heavy distrust against the government was explained by Rachana in detail during the Press Conference. Meanwhile, Damini explained five key loopholes that are prevalent in the media discourse regarding the transgender persons. The police apathy, violence inflicted by Hijra community members and the difference between intersex and transgender were also explained by her in detail, thereby pointing how ambiguously the terms are used, without proper address and differentiation. The content analysis of English language news published on transgender persons from March 2020 to February 2021 highlighted few main missing narratives. Firstly, the lack of database or sources regarding transgender persons was an apparent missing theme. More details about the number of trans community members at the state, Union Territory or Centre level have remained ambiguous. Secondly, contextualising the pandemic, especially its negative impact on any kind of policy change, especially after June 2020 remained missing. The events related to transgender persons, be it naming the Pride Station, or employment to transgender, data of Election Commission of India with respect to transgender – did not carry the context of Covid pandemic behind any policy decision. Therefore, towards the end of the 11-month study, it seemed as if the pandemic and transgender news stories were alienated from each other and did not have any inter-subjective linking. Indian media platforms also need to endow space to transgender activists to write their own personal narratives like that of Kalki Subramaniam, so that it connects and empowers more victims. The role of police apathy as well as the violence inflicted by the Hijra community should also be published at a larger level. In the end, the voices of transgender themselves are missing from the context of Covid pandemic, which not only treats them as marginalised and singular community, but also takes away their right to self-determination by rendering them invisible.

Notes 1 Wald and Woulfe (2020) studied the impact of Covid on Transgender and Non-Binary (TGNB) community in the United States, stating three challenges faced by this group. Firstly, the community had more risk of exposure to the virus. Secondly, they had limitations in having access to gender-affirming care. Finally, severe discrimination and stigma further increased due to lack of social support. Each of these challenges reinforce the other. In response to these challenges, US-based Transgender Law Center (TLC) – the largest trans-led organisation organised in the United States, established in 2002 – started weekly video webinars and community-driven projects to advocate for federal, local and state-level based demands for support and access to resources for the transgenders.

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Though, such community-driven actions have not been emulated or mobilised in every country, the lack of medical care to sizable transgenders – children, adolescents as well as adults – cannot be ignored. 2 A comprehensive study done in 2014 by the Ministry of Women and Child Development stated that there are 2.8 million sex workers in the country (most of them in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal), while a 2016 estimate by the United Nations states that there are 657,800 sex workers in the country. The lack of government ID proof or a rent agreement further worsens their access to medical care or even identification. 3 Aadhar Card is a government identity proof that includes the demographic and biometric data of an Indian citizen. A 12-digit number is given to every Aadhar card holder. It is considered the world’s largest system of storing biometric data. The Unique Identification Authority of India, a statutory body created in 2016, is responsible for the security of data of every citizen. 4 According to the French sociologist Durkheim (1897) in his book ‘Suicide: A study in Sociology’, suicide is a result of imbalance in moral integration or social integration in society. He introduces four concepts of suicide: egoistic, altruistic, and fatalistic and anomic. This chapter focuses on the concept of anomic suicide discussed by Emile, where, periods of political, social and economic uncertainty, as being witnessed during the pandemic currently, result in the rise of normlessness, which further causes deregulation of suffering as well as desires. This leads to rise in suicide rates. Though, contextualizing this theory through behavioural-attitudinal study and cognitive study, especially on the pandemic’s impact on suicide rates merits another research paper, this chapter just hints at the possibility of this narrative to be contextualised, too. But at the same time, the lack of suicide deaths committed by transgender or sex-workers, especially from the media narratives, makes it even more difficult to ascertain the impact of the theory and pandemic, too. 5 Intersex is someone who was born without any medically identified ‘normal’ genitals while transgender persons are born in a male or female gender body with a different mental understanding of their gender. 6 The report also attributed to the report titled ‘Lost Identity: Transgender Persons in Indian Prisons’ released by Common Wealth Human Rights Initiative on November 27, 2020. 7 The chapter also includes a research by IndiaSpend in 2017 that reveals that in the Indian states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra – four in ten transgender individuals experience sexual abuse by the age of 18, even if they remain silent about it. 8 Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act of 2019 was passed by the Indian Parlia­ ment to endow legal recognition, security and welfare to the transgender population in India. It defines the term ‘transgender’ and also prohibits any form of discrimination, especially in the fields of education, employment, medical treatment, housing, etc. Transgender activists have strongly opposed the Act on several grounds. Firstly, the need of District Magistrate for mandatory certification before the sex reassignment surgery. Secondly, the criteria of a minor transgender to stay with their natal family ignores the mental, physical and emotional violence that often emerges within homes. Thirdly, no reservation in employment or educational avenues is also controversial. 9 The Deepa Ardnareshwar Empowerment Foundation is a charitable organisation established on 26th June 2018 to help and empower transgender community members in India. The Directors are Reena Rai and Manoj Kumar Rai.

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ANI. (2020, July 5). Zoya Khan becomes India’s first transgender operator at Common Service Centre. The Mint. Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/news/india/ zoya-khan-becomes-india-s-first-transgender-operator-of-common-service-centre11593919959336.html ANI, (2021, January 9). NHRC Warn States, UT Govts over Plight of Transgender In India. The Business World. Retrieved from http://www.businessworld.in/article/NHRC-warnStates-UT-Govts-over-plight-of-transgender-in-India/09-01-2021-363601/ Banerji, A. (2020, March 26). As India enters 21-day lockdown, the transgender community will be pushed further to the margins. The Scroll. Retrieved from https://scroll.in/ article/957204/as-india-enters-21-day-lockdown-the-transgender-community-will-bepushed-further-to-the-margins Business Standard Team, (2020, November 19). Transgenders in India may soon get reservation in education under OBC quota. The Business Standard. Retrieved from https:// www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transgenders-in-india-may-soonget-reservation-in-education-under-obc-quota-120111900334_1.html Chakrabarti, A. (2020, April 25). Visibly Invisible: The Plight of Transgender Community Due To India’s COVID-19 Lockdown. Outlook India. Retrieved from https://www. outlookindia.com/website/story/opinion-visibly-invisible-the-plight-of-transgendercommunity-due-to-indias-covid-19-lockdown/351468 Chandra, M. (2020, September 03). Why Transgender People Still Have to Go Through Hoops to Get Married or Inherit Property in India. News 18. Retrieved from https:// www.news18.com/news/buzz/why-transgender-people-still-have-to-go-throughhoops-to-get-married-or-inherit-property-in-india-2842545.html Chaturvedi, S. (2017, January 6). Abuse Of Transgender Indians Begins In Early Childhood. IndiaSpend. Retrieved from https://www.indiaspend.com/abuse-of-transgender-indiansbegins-in-early-childhood-94265 Chaudhary, S. (2020, June 12). Just 1% of Transpersons and Sex Workers Receive Government Relief So Far. The Citizen. Retrieved from https://www.thecitizen.in/ index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/7/18870/Just-1-of-Transpersons-and-Sex-WorkersReceive-Government-Relief-So-Far D’Angelo, A. B., Argenio, K., Westmoreland, D. A., Appenroth, M. N., & Grov, C. (2021). Health and Access to Gender-affirming Care During COVID-19: Experiences of Transmasculine Individuals and Men Assigned Female Sex at Birth. American Journal of Men’s Health, 15(4), DOI: 10.1177/15579883211062681. Dey, S. (2020, October 26). Why Indian Parliament Should Have A Transgender MP. Outlook Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/indianews-why-must-indian-parliament-reserve-seats-for-transgenders/363008 Dhanuka, M. & Ghosh, A. (2020, November 27). Lost Identity: Transgender Persons in Indian Prisons. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. https://www.humanrightsinitiative. org/publication/lost-identity-transgender-persons-in-indian-prisons Goswami, S. (2021, February 17). All govt offices, MCDs, police to have separate toilets for transgender persons. The Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www. hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-news/all-govt-offices-mcds-police-to-have-separatetoilets-for-transgender-persons-101613584502022.html Hodwitz, O. & Frey, K. (2016). Anomic suicide: A Durkheimian analysis of European normlessness, Sociological Spectrum, 36: 4, 236–254, DOI: 10.1080/02732173.2016. 1148652 Jarrett, B., Peitzmeier, S. M., Restar, A., Adamson, T., Howell, S., Baral, S., & Beckham, S. W. (2020). Gender-affirming care, mental health, and economic stability in the time of COVID-19: A global cross-sectional study of transgender and non-binary people. medRxiv.

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Jyoti, D. (2020, August 22). National Council for Transgender Persons formed. The Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/national-councilfor-transgender-persons-formed/story-QXO57cxN8jhrpdmZZaWtbM.html Kajal, K. (2020, April 17). Sex Workers, High-Risk for COVID-19, Seek Government Help. IndiaSpend. Retrieved from https://www.indiaspend.com/sex-workers-highrisk-for-covid-19-seek-government-help/ Konnoth, C. (2020). Supporting LGBT communities in the COVID-19 pandemic. Assessing Legal Responses to COVID-19. Boston: Public Health Law Watch. Retrieved from https:// transgenderlawcenter.org/resources/covid19 Koppala, M. (2019, November 25). Rachana Mudraboyina On Trans Vision And Trans Representation In Media. Feminism India. Retrieved form https://feminisminindia. com/2019/11/25/rachana-mudraboyina-transvision-interview/ Kotwal, R. (2021, February 19). Why Jammu’s transgender community hit the streets in protest. Down To Earth. Retrieved from https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/ governance/why-jammu-s-transgender-community-hit-the-streets-in-protest-75603 Kulkarni, T. (2020, December 03). India’s first transgender children’s homes will be in Bengaluru. The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ karnataka/indias-first-transgender-childrens-homes-will-be-in-bengaluru/article 33243137.ece Mishra, A. (2020, October 12). Restoring Dignity: Nuances of Transgender Rights in India. The Jurist. Retrieved from https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/10/ayushmishra-transgender-india/# Moore, S. E., Wierenga, K. L., Prince, D. M., Gillani, B., & Mintz, L. J. (2021). Dispro­ portionate Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Perceived Social Support, Mental Health and Somatic Symptoms in Sexual and Gender Minority Populations. Journal of Homosexuality, 68:4, 577–591. DOI: 10.1080/00918369.2020.1868184 Peterman, A., Potts, A., O’Donnell, M., Thompson, K., Shah, N., Oertelt-Prigione, S., & Van Gelder, N. (2020). Pandemics and violence against women and children (Vol. 528). Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Rajdev, B. (2020, July 24). For Transgender Persons, Discrimination Begins in Schools. The Wire. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/lgbtqia/cbse-results-transgender-studentseducation-stigma-discrimination Semmalar, G. (2014). Unpacking Solidarities of the Oppressed: Notes on Trans Struggles in India. Women’s Studies Quarterly, 42(3/4), 286–291. Retrieved on May 6, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24365012 Shantha, S. (2021, February 23). Watch | Misgendering, Sexual Violence: What It Is to Be a Transgender in an Indian Prison. The Wire. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/lgbtqia/ transgender-prisoners-india Shinde, S. (2021, February 25). Transgenders seek meeting with district authority to push for right to be ‘identified’. The Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www. hindustantimes.com/cities/others/transgenders-seek-meeting-with-district-authorityto-push-for-right-to-be-identified-101614249652019.html Soni, M. (2020, October 27). ‘Pride Station’: North India’s first Metro station dedicated to transgenders in Noida. The Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www. hindustantimes.com/india-news/pride-station-north-india-s-first-metro-stationdedicated-to-transgenders-in-noida/story-SYuCwRuTBV8VsuhVePyHbJ.html Subramaniam, K. (2020, June 23). I’m on a mission to empower India’s transgender community, one painted palm at a time. CNN. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/style/ article/kalki-subramaniam-opinion/index.html Tabbush, C., & Friedman, E. (2020). Feminist Activism Confronts COVID-19. Feminist Studies, 46(3), 629–638. doi:10.15767/feministstudies.46.3.0629

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Tankha, R. S. (May 22, 2020). Trans gender’s plight during coronavirus pandemic. The New Indian Express. Retrieved from https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/delhi/2020/ may/22/transgenders-plight-during-coronavirus-pandemic-2146509.html The Hindu, (2019, November 30). Watch | The Transgender Persons Bill explained. The Hindu Net Desk. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/watch-allabout-the-transgender-persons-bill/article30122229.ece Todorovic, S. (2021). The Impact of Interruptions in Gender-Affirming Medical Care during COVID-19 on Anxiety and Depression among Trans and Non-binary People in Canada: A Longitudinal Study (Doctoral dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)). UNAIDS – Key Population Atlas (n.d.) – Retrieved from https://kpatlas.unaids.org/ dashboard Van der Miesen, A. I., Raaijmakers, D., & van de Grift, T. C. (2020). ‘You Have to Wait a Little Longer’: Transgender (Mental) Health at Risk as a Consequence of Deferring Gender-Affirming Treatments During COVID-19. Archives of Sexual Behaviour, 49, 1395–1399. Wald, M., & Woulfe, J. (2020). The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Transgender and Non-Binary Community. Columbia University, https://www.columbiapsychiatry. org/news/impact-covid-19-pandemic-transgender-and-non-binary-community Wallen, J. (2020, August 27). Broke, sick and stigmatised: India’s ‘third gender’ hijra in fight for survival during pandemic. The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www. telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/broke-sick-stigmatised-indias-thirdgender-hijra-fight-survival/

PART II

Media Memory and Narratives

5 MASKED PRESENCE Covid-19 and Remembering SARS in Taiwan Jacob F. Tischer

Introduction1 At the time of writing ( January 26, 2021), Taiwan had 891 confirmed cases and seven deaths due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19). However, only 71 of these 891 cases were locally acquired (Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, 2021). The bulk of new cases were reported shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic in East Asia, between February and April 2020. After April 12, 2020, Taiwan went more than 250 days without a single case of domestic transmission of the disease, the longest such streak for any country that had any cases of Covid-19 (Davidson, 2020). Most studies of Taiwan’s pandemic response concentrate on the government’s interventions, to which they assign responsibility for the country’s relative success containing Covid-19. But efficient government intervention is not the only factor that sets Taiwan’s experience apart, as these official measures were assisted by remarkable public support by the citizenry. Here, I will thus shift the focus to the Taiwanese population, which has so far received less attention. This chapter looks at the way people talked about a pandemic that was announced all over the media but never really manifested itself in any palpable sense outside of restrictions on everyday life. How did ordinary Taiwanese make sense of their country doing so well, compared with the imagery of suffering from seemingly everywhere else? Two possible explanations figured large in the media as well as my conversations with Taiwanese: The SARS experience and face masks. Some have questioned the power of the SARS memory as an explanatory variable (e.g. Yen, 2020). However, Taiwan’s government took up the cue and promoted masks as a sign of responsible, civic behaviour and social trust. Irrespective of its “scientific” truth value, I argue that we should heed the “folk explanation” of Taiwan’s success if we want to understand the role of the citizenry in this very success. DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-8

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The “Taiwan Model” for Containing Covid-19 Taiwan’s successful response to the biggest global health crisis since the influenza pandemic of 1918–1920 surprised most observers, as Taiwan has long been excluded from participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) and early models had predicted it to be among the places most severely affected by the disease, due to its population density, proximity to the source of the outbreak, and close socioeconomic interactions with China (Gardner, 2020). As early as March and April, several publications in medical journals reported on the reasons for Taiwan’s successful response to Covid-19 (Cheng et al., 2020; Su & Han, 2020; Summers et al., 2020; C. J. Wang et al., 2020). These early studies suggested Taiwan as a model to be emulated by other countries, a call heeded most notably by New Zealand in its own successful pandemic response. These studies attributed Taiwan’s success to a few key interventions on the governmental as well as societal levels. Most crucially, even though the government had to prepare for general elections on January 11, 2020, it reacted in a fast, proactive manner to hearing rumours of SARS-like pneumonia in Wuhan on an online bulletin board in late December 2019 (Hsiao, 2020). Subsequently, it created a taskforce and monitored incoming flights, and in mid-January, it sent two experts to China. On January 2020, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) was activated, a centralized health authority with quasi-executive power at ministerial level and the ability to coordinate across government institutions. As in many other East Asian countries, this central unit had been set up in response to the SARS epidemic in 2003. The CECC is headed by the Minister of Health and Welfare and staffed with healthcare professionals, many of whom had first-hand experience with the SARS response led by the epidemiologist Chen Chien-jen, Taiwan’s Vice President between 2016 and May 2020. SARS had claimed 84 lives in Taiwan (Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS, 2015).2 At the time, governmental failure led to a “societalization” of the crisis, which triggered discussion in the public sphere and inaugurated democratic processes that changed the institutional setup of healthcare as well as information policy (Lo & Hsieh, 2020). The lingering memory of SARS undergirded both the urgency of government intervention towards the novel coronavirus, i.e., SARSCoV-2, and a readiness of the population to accept the scientifically grounded recommendations given by CECC staff during daily press conferences. Clips from these press conferences were repeatedly shown on Taiwan’s many TV news channels. From the beginning, Taiwan’s health authorities attempted to inform the public in a transparent, communicative way that allowed citizen feedback via Q&A sessions and telephone hotlines (Lee, 2020; C.-F. Lin et al., 2020; Yen, 2020). Most importantly, the government understood the decisive role of cooperative digital governance for managing public trust during a global pandemic. It engaged civil society, in particular the expertise of “civic hackers,” in the development of a virtual platform for citizen feedback and in creating measures for the use of big data in quarantine surveillance. One result of this inclusion were very

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popular, crowdsourced apps that showed the availability of face masks in drugstores (Ellington et al., 2021; Yuan et al., 2020). Another example of feedback mechanisms concerned the story of a boy who refused to go to school because he only had a “girly” pink mask to wear and feared being bullied. The next day, all CECC members demonstratively wore pink masks during their daily press conference (Murti, 2020). Social media, including Twitter, Facebook, and the very popular messaging app Line, played a major role in the government’s information policy. By using an open data approach, the government also signalled its trust in the population, encouraging participation and experimentation in a quest to “reimagine democracy” (Nabben, 2020, p. 6).

Mask Diplomacy and Masked Governance Other crucial interventions concerned border control and an emphasis on the wearing of face masks, both of which built on the existing foundations of Taiwan’s excellent national healthcare system. Taiwan closed its borders early, first to travellers from China and then from most other places around the globe. Big data were used to link the travel histories of incoming passengers with the national health insurance (NHI) system and to enable an “electronic fence” that allowed efficient contact tracing and monitoring the mandatory 14-day quarantine for travellers introduced on March 19 (H.-M. Lin, 2020; Schneider & Creemers, 2020; Yen, 2020). This system tracks location via (less accurate) triangulation rather than GPS and shares the data with the CECC; law enforcement is only activated if quarantine regulations are breached (Eigen et al., 2020). Albeit this electronic fence is supposed to last only for the duration of the pandemic, given Taiwan’s authoritarian past the extent of the tracked personal information has raised fears about the potential misuse of its capabilities (Hsieh, 2020). Not the least of these threats concerns hacking attempts to steal government data (Pranggono & Arabo, 2020). In addition, the government banned the export of face masks on January 24, rationed and centralized their sale on February 6, and purchased additional production lines, with which the number of manufactured masks could be increased from less than two million per day in February to 20 million in May (Focus Taiwan, 2020). Surgical masks even became an important part of the Taiwanese government’s efforts to export its success story abroad through the donation of millions of them (Aspinwall, 2020). Widely publicised in Taiwan as well as abroad, this “mask diplomacy” targeted diplomatic allies as well as strategically important partners such as the United States and the European Union. It tied in with more conventional attempts at promoting Taiwan’s interventions in the international media. President Tsai Ing-wen, who had previously appeared on the cover of Time’s Asia edition in 2015, published a piece in Time Magazine on April 16 (Tsai, 2020). This official side of diplomacy went hand in hand with civic initiatives, including a crowdfunded campaign to place a full-page advert in the print version of the New York Times on April 14. A companion website (https://taiwancanhelp.us/)3

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collected media coverage of Taiwan under the hashtag #TaiwanCanHelp. Like the Times ad, the website puns on Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO by using the full-screen headline: “WHO can help?” To which it replies: “Taiwan,” before offering a declaration of solidarity with “what you are going through.” The website further clarifies its intent to rectify Taiwan’s reputation just days after the WHO Director-General had claimed racist attacks against him had originated there (Hioe, 2020; Zhang & Savage, 2020, pp. 469–470). Emerging from civil society, the #TaiwanCanHelp initiative reverberated back on the government, which adopted it as a slogan to streamline its outreach efforts across several media platforms (Rowen, 2020). For example, President Tsai concluded her Time essay with those exact words. One unintended consequence of the crisis has thus been a surge in Taiwanese national identification (Batto, 2020), fuelled by pride in the country’s handling of the pandemic despite its exclusion from the international community.4 The general efficiency and transparency of the government’s interventions elicited widespread social support, even though these measures were more drastic than in other contexts. A law passed on February 25 afforded the CECC with a legal blank check to employ any measures necessary for containing the spread of the virus, including publishing the personal data of rule violators.5 This concentration of power has so far only been remedied by Chen Shih-chung’s reluctance, as head of the CECC, to fully use it (Huang, 2020). Still, based on the so-called Covid-19 Act, workers in the healthcare sector were barred from leaving Taiwan, selectively curbing their individual rights (C.-F. Lin et al., 2020, p. 265). The CECC also affected social life adversely insofar as it prophylactically prohibited any large-scale gatherings. This regulation contained significant potential for conflict, as the high point of the season of religious festivals was approaching and religious actors felt unfairly targeted. The leader of the temple which organizes Taiwan’s largest pilgrimage—an event lasting eight days that attracts more than 100,000 participants annually (cf. Tischer, 2021)—declared that the pilgrimage would take place unless explicitly forbidden by the CECC. This did not happen, but the temple boss relented after mounting pressure from civil society and postponed the pilgrimage (Shan, 2020). For a period of two months between February and April, when Taiwan’s success in containing Covid-19 was far from foreseeable, the social situation was tense, and much of social life ceased out of precaution. Schools closed; university meetings were cancelled. Religious groups, like the one I studied, chose not to meet for practice, self-disciplining at least in part out of fear of ostracization: Lest there be a clustering event in which we spread the disease! On the other hand, President Tsai and the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who had just been re-elected in early January, never introduced a lockdown and enjoyed persistently high approval ratings throughout 2020, which is rare in Taiwan’s volatile political environment. On YouGov’s “COVID-19 tracker: government handling” Tsai’s government stayed above 80% approval for the entire range of the poll, between May 12 and December 21, 2020 (Smith, 2020).

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Masking as a Total Social Fact Despite sharp increases in production, the distribution of masks—administered by the state through the NHI system—stayed restricted to two per person per week in February and rose only slowly to nine masks every two weeks in April. The rationing forced people to wait in long lines, sometimes for hours, in front of local pharmacies, the only places where proper, surgical-grade face masks could be obtained. At least until pharmacies ran out of stocks and had to turn people away. Such logistical problems were solved by the face mask app that, linked up with the NHI system, updated mask supplies in real time. By making the process transparent, it also defeated any doubts whether pharmacies—and, by extension, the government—were really doing their best to deliver masks to as many people as possible. This was an important issue, as the wearing of proper masks was required in all urban public spaces and on public transport. Taiwan’s so-called digital minister, Audrey Tang, who was heavily involved in the anti-Covid-19 efforts, went as far as calling masks a “physical vaccine” (Tang et al., 2020, p. 24). Face masks, a common sight in Taiwanese winters in the past, thus took on the roles of ubiquitous symbol, possible remedy, and constant reminder of the ongoing pandemic. In contrast to European and American societies, where both governments and populations held ambiguous attitudes towards face coverings, virtually everyone in Taiwan accepted the wearing of masks right from the start as their (small) contribution in a collective effort of fighting the virus. They did so in compliance with official regulations and ideology, but also because of increased sanctioning, e.g., on public transport: Taipei’s subway company sent additional personnel to every station to monitor prospective passengers; rule violators were subject to heavy fines. During its press conferences, the CECC educated the public on the importance of wearing masks but on occasion also gave up information about people who had been punished for breaking the quarantine regulations and thereby endangered collective well-being. However, rule violations affected only 0.3% of all cases (C. Wang et al., 2020). Yet, the masking of society was not entirely a government-concerted effort; indeed, social pressure created strong deterrents against breaking rules like maskwearing in public. Privately owned shops and restaurants adopted the same masking and temperature-measuring standards as official institutions, refusing to serve whoever exceeded 37.5°C. As late as summer, when no domestic cases of transmission had been recorded in two months, I heard people reproach others for not wearing their masks correctly. Once, I posted a critical inquiry on social media, asking whether people thought that the strict regulations regarding masks and quarantining were proportionate with the nearly non-existing risk of infection due to a lack of domestic case transmission. Apparently, I had severely underestimated the amount of determination in my social bubble, for a minor “shitstorm” broke lose. Though the majority of respondents explained the importance of face coverings patiently to me, a minority questioned my moral integrity for even thinking about loosening restrictions. They referred to the skyrocketing number of victims claimed by

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Covid-19 around the world as evidence for the culpability of my thinking. In line with this, mask-wearing has been interpreted as a sign of mutual respect and solidarity in Taiwan (Lee, 2020, p. 2). As evidenced by my anecdote of authorial mishap, this solidarity is acutely aware and inclusive of the global dimensions of the disease. Indeed, as artefacts, masks were omnipresent throughout Taiwan. Masked faces populated public spaces. People ironically masked all sorts of things, most prominently their pets and stuffed animals. Face masks were indexed even when they were not directly visible. For instance, long, orderly lines of people—occasionally weaving around neighbourhoods for a hundred metres or more—became so common that they took on a life of their own on social media, where they gave rise to memes and other parodic content representing the pandemic in cultural terms. Whether directly or indirectly signified, masks became the leitmotif for what people associated with Covid-19. Between constant media coverage, the necessity of covering one’s face in public, and the cessation of much communal life, the virus turned into a total social fact (cf. Mauss, 2000). It reverberated throughout society, transcended the modern borders of the economic, the political, the religious, and reflected in all aspects of social life. In its existential significance, the virus enveloped the sociological, historical, and physio-psychological dimensions of being in every individual (Lévi-Strauss, 1987, p. 26; Valeri, 2013). And it managed to do so without even leading any palpable existence in Taiwan! The virus’ presence was marked by its absence (Scott, 2018), an absurd (yet socially productive) situation unto itself. For a few months, society remained in a state of futile, breathless wait for the pandemic to arrive, an eventuality prefigured in media reports of a simultaneity taking place elsewhere, cut off from the rest of the world as the world descended into utter chaos. Taiwan found itself in an excessively ambivalent and paradoxical moment, a situation eased through the assurance of mutual trust and shared responsibility. In this negotiation process, face masks took on a prime symbolic role as signifiers of meaning, meaning that lay in accepting one’s individual responsibility within society at large. Related to this, the point of observing the pandemic as total social fact is not to illuminate hierarchical structures or a collectivist belief in authority, but to highlight the implicitly understood assumption that reciprocity lies at the heart of social exchange. Given the situation, this meant collectively practiced, temporary individual sacrifice as a moral obligation—something that works only if individuals trust that both their government and fellow citizens will honour the underlying, unwritten social contract.

“Lucky to be Taiwanese”? SARS, Masks, and Covid-19 In general, the Taiwanese were very well-informed about the state of the emerging pandemic around the world. During my fieldwork—which was not related to Covid-19 and had gotten rather waylaid by the total social pandemic— interlocutors would often ask with a concerned expression if my family were okay; they had heard alarming things about the virus in Germany. Several friends

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offered to send me masks even after I left Taiwan. Clearly, they were aware of the exceptionality of the Taiwanese situation, where life went on almost unimpededly. Several times, I heard acquaintances state with a solemn expression how lucky and grateful they were to be Taiwanese. When people ventured to explain Taiwan’s success in the face of bewildering political failure in Europe and the Americas, nearly everybody would inevitably refer to Taiwan’s traumatic SARS experience. This was both an attempt at modesty—attributing the country’s performance to “lucky” circumstance—and an earnest answer. The people to whom I spoke to believed they had to thank the habit of wearing masks for their safe situation relative to other countries, even though the effectiveness of masks had not been proven conclusively at that point. In the recollection of most Taiwanese, masks had become commonplace only after SARS, which was why they voiced understanding for the trouble the European and American populations at large seemed to have in finding a consensus regarding the benefits of wearing masks: They simply hadn’t had the SARS experience. The belief in the causal role of SARS plays a mythic role in explaining Taiwan’s exceptionalism on a planetary scale, while also identifying motivations for why the Taiwanese should stay vigilant in their compliance with social distancing and mask-wearing rules. SARS had been the first epidemic in Taiwan heavily covered by live media, which had rapidly developed since the 1990s. Even though the WHO only recorded 671 cases in Taiwan, the high mortality rate of over 12% added to the disease’s fear factor. Moreover, at least 137 of the cases were connected with one cluster outbreak at a single hospital, from where the disease spread to other hospitals around the country. The government reacted with a heavy hand and placed more than 150,000 people under quarantine (Hsieh et al., 2005). On April 24, the Taipei City government closed off Hoping Hospital without prior warning (Chen, 2008, p. 118), confining more than 1,000 people inside. The director, who was on a lunch break during the initial confinement, refused to go back to the hospital and holed out at home. One nurse wrote to a newspaper that being quarantined inside the hospital was concomitant to a death sentence. Television broadcasts featured disconcerting images of banners taped on the hospital windows from inside: “We are healthy people. We don’t want to wait for death!” Dramatic scenes showed a nurse almost jumping out of a window on the eighth floor (Han, 2020). One doctor, who sent diary-like emails every day, shared the worsening conditions inside the quarantined hospital, where several nurses and doctors had fallen ill, one patient had committed suicide, and body bags piled up in the elevator.6 In his messages, the doctor criticized the government’s willingness to sacrifice a minority inside the hospital in order to safeguard the majority outside—a classic “trolley problem”—even though other options, like isolating each quarantined person separately, had been available (Chang, 2020). The exaggerated reporting of these dramatic events, motivated by intense competition between several media companies, stirred panic buying of masks and raised doubts about the authorities’ handling. It also had the psychological effect of elevating the perceived threat of

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SARS disproportionately over the risk it posed to the health of the general population (Liu et al., 2005). In response to the role of the media during SARS, the government increased both its transparency in communicating risk and its collaboration with (and control of ) the media (Hsu et al., 2017). Besides adjustments to the legal framework, these changes included weekly press conferences, a round-the-clock toll-free call hotline, open data, and rumour monitoring—rumour-spreading in the media became punishable by law. Starting with the H1N1 swine flu outbreak in 2009, digital media were not only analysed on a daily basis but also used extensively to disseminate information about health threats. The latter proved crucial, since digital social media are particularly susceptible to concerted misinformation campaigns (Dickey, 2019). Yet, this is where 80% of the Taiwanese obtained their information about Covid-19, in contrast with 54% who consulted print media (P.-W. Wang et al., 2020). Social media are particularly popular with younger people who have grown disenchanted with the politically biased print media (Wong & Wright, 2018). Taiwan’s community of civic hackers devised several highly useful, crowdsourced chatbots that, once integrated into a (group) chat, sent automated replies to misinformation that has been confirmed as false, including links to the correct information, without recording the conversation itself.7

The Past, Redux: Remembering SARS In 2020, the SARS experience acted like a black hole on the memories of the Taiwanese. Particularly at the beginning of the year, the present experience of Covid-19 was constantly framed in reference to the older epidemic. A surge of reports and documentaries brought back the emotional events from 17 years ago. Most importantly, Taiwanese over 30 years of age talk about SARS in terms of personal memory and relate it to how the events affected their own lives. SARS thus falls into the realm of communicative memory and oral history (Assmann, 1995; Vansina, 1985) as much as that of mediated memory (Zierold, 2008). Since people draw on their own recollections to make sense of the epidemic, SARS does not possess a streamlined interpretation, even if certain elements are repeated and emphasized in the media’s continuous retelling of the story—while others are forgotten (cf. Assmann, 2011, p. 11). The protective function of face masks is as close to a consensus as could be found in Taiwan in 2020. Many conversation partners stated that masks had not been very common in Taiwan before SARS. Indeed, one doctor recalled that mask-wearing used to be stigmatized and masks had been rejected by patients in the past ( Jennings, 2020). Preferences regarding the use of masks—often attributed to “cultural” characteristics—do indeed change over time: In many places around the world, masks disappeared gradually after their use had been widespread and even prescribed during the influenza pandemic of 1918–1920—even though the reasons for non-compliance may not have changed much (Navarro & Markel, 2021). Since SARS occurred less than a generation ago, the Taiwanese habit of mask-wearing has not had time

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to vanish. What is more, people have found other reasons to wear face masks: Motorcyclists use them as protection against exhaust fumes, and employees who feel sick wear masks out of courtesy to others if they have to visit public spaces since they are not typically at liberty to take sick leave. Neither does a consensus regarding the wearing of masks in public necessarily imply that all of the government’s measures were unanimously accepted in 2020. Rather, a broad social consensus mandated that safeguarding everybody’s health took temporary precedence over political discord. Following the government’s interventions, which were based on the advice of experts, was just common sense. No segment of the population felt unduly targeted by the CECC’s interventions— even the religious actors who felt unfairly treated worked out a compromise with the authorities. Embracing humour and transparent risk communication on social media channels contributed significantly to creating accountability, confidence, and social trust. That said, digital surveillance tools as well as the power invested in government agencies in a state of emergency have a tendency to become normalized once introduced (C.-F. Lin et al., 2020; Schneider & Creemers, 2020), and should thus keep Taiwan’s battle-hardened civil society on its toes.

Notes 1 The fieldwork on which this study is based was generously supported by a Global Religion Research Initiative project launch grant, a Taiwan Fellowship awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and a graduate research abroad fellowship from Boston University, all of which I gratefully acknowledge. During fieldwork in 2019–2020, I was hosted by the Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica. I thank Gana Ndiaye and Daniel Idziak for comments on earlier versions of this paper. 2 This is the official number given by the WHO. Other sources report figures as high as 181 (Chen et al., 2005) or as low as 37 deaths (Ruan & Zeng, 2008, 75). 3 All Internet links were last accessed on January 31, 2021. 4 For example, the government changed the design of Taiwanese passports by mid-2020, minimising the official name of the country in English, Republic of China, while highlighting the word Taiwan to avoid confusion with the neighbouring People’s Republic of China. For the same reason, a name change of the state-owned China Airlines, which delivered the donated mask, was devised by the parliament (S. Lin 2020). 5 “Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens,” Article 8, https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll. aspx?pcode=L0050039. 6 A copy of the diary can be found at https://morpheus.typepad.com/iait/2004/09/sars. html (in Chinese). Chang (2020) includes a few passages translated into English. 7 Cofacts is only the most well-known of these chatbots, see https://github.com/cofacts.

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Su, S.-F., & Han, Y.-Y. (2020). How Taiwan, a non-WHO member, takes actions in response to COVID-19. Journal of Global Health, 10(1), 010380. https://doi.org/10.7189/jogh. 10.010380 Summers, D. J., Cheng, D. H.-Y., Lin, P. H.-H., Barnard, D. L. T., Kvalsvig, D. A., Wilson, P. N., & Baker, P. M. G. (2020). Potential lessons from the Taiwan and New Zealand health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Lancet Regional Health - Western Pacific, 4, 100044. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanwpc.2020.100044 Tang, A., Buchser, M., Kundnani, H., & Niblett, R. (2020). In Conversation with Audrey Tang (pp. 1–27) [Transcript]. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/ all/members-event/conversation-audrey-tang Tischer, J. F. (2021). The invisible hand of the temple (Manager): Gangsters, politicalpower, and transfers of spiritual capital in Taiwan’s Mazu pilgrimages. Review of Religion and Chinese Society, 8(1), 61–91. https://doi.org/10.1163/22143955-20200001 Tsai, I. (2020, April 16). President of Taiwan: How My Country Prevented a Major Outbreak of COVID-19. Time. https://time.com/collection/finding-hope-coronaviruspandemic/5820596/taiwan-coronavirus-lessons/ Valeri, V. (2013). Marcel Mauss and the new anthropology. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 3(1), 262–286. https://doi.org/10.14318/hau3.1.027 Vansina, J. M. (1985). Oral Tradition as History. University of Wisconsin Press. http://muse. jhu.edu/book/8436 Wang, C., Ellis, S., & Bloomberg. (2020, October 31). How Taiwan’s COVID response became the world’s envy. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2020/10/31/taiwan-best-covid-response/ Wang, C. J., Ng, C. Y., & Brook, R. H. (2020). Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing. JAMA, 323(14), 1341–1342. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151 Wang, P.-W., Lu, W.-H., Ko, N.-Y., Chen, Y.-L., Li, D.-J., Chang, Y.-P., & Yen, C.-F. (2020). COVID-19-Related Information Sources and the Relationship With Confidence in People Coping with COVID-19: Facebook Survey Study in Taiwan. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 22(6 e20021), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.2196/20021 Wong, S. C., & Wright, S. (2018). Generating a voice among “media monsters”: Hybrid media practices of Taiwan’s Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. Australian Journal of Political Science, 53(1), 89–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2017.1416587 Yen, W. (2020). Taiwan’s COVID-19 management: Developmental state, digital governance, and state-society synergy. Asian Politics & Policy, 12(3), 455–468. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/aspp.12541 Yuan, E. J., Hsu, C.-A., Lee, W.-C., Chen, T.-J., Chou, L.-F., & Hwang, S.-J. (2020). Where to buy face masks? Survey of applications using Taiwan’s open data in the time of coronavirus disease 2019. Journal of the Chinese Medical Association. https://doi.org/10.1097/ JCMA.0000000000000325 Zhang, J. J., & Savage, V. R. (2020). The geopolitical ramifications of COVID-19: The Taiwanese exception. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 61(4–5), 464–481. https://doi. org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1779773 Zierold, M. (2008). Memory and Media Cultures. In A. Erll & A. Nünning, Cultural memory studies: An international and interdisciplinary handbook (pp. 399–408). Walter de Gruyter.

6 FAMILIAL HALCYON Narratives of Nostalgia in the Lockdown Azania Imtiaz Patel

Introduction Toward the end of March 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic had well and truly thrown a wrench into the regular functioning of India. On the 24th of March, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the first Indian lockdown – initially for a period of 21 days (Gettleman and Schultz, 2020). However, with various extensions, this hold on the movement of people in the country except for essential purposes continued till the 8th of June, when the process of ‘unlocking’ began (ibid). A collateral consequence of this lockdown was on Indian television channels. Indian Film & Television Directors’ Association (IFTDA), Producers Guild of India, and Federation of Western Indian Cine Employees (FWICE) had decided to suspend all shooting from the 19th of March (Press Trust of India, 2020), a decision that was extended indefinitely by the national lockdown. As most current fictional content that is telecast relies on extremely limited episode banks, the turn to older, alternative content was inevitable. This chapter engages with this turn to alternative content. The intriguing commonality that emerged among the first set of shows that were announced as alternative content on Hindi-language television channels were family-oriented soap operas from the early 1990s and 2000s. Through this chapter, I explore a content analysis of four television shows that were rerun during the initial phase of the pandemic, two mythological – Ramanand Sagar’s Ramayana and BR Chopra’s Mahabharata,1 along with two sitcoms – Balaji Telefilms’ Hum Paanch and Hats Off Productions’ Sarabhai vs Sarabhai.2 This content analysis works on two frames, primarily the notion of a Derridean disjuncture (expounded momentarily), and a section of the Prime Minister’s first lockdown speech which invokes the sense of a united family front against an ominous outsider. Drawing on these, I explore how the familiarity of this narrative DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-9

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emerges as a specter that allows individuals to reconcile with what is purported as the ‘New Normal’ (Lee, 2020). I also critique the hegemonic ‘Hum’ (Hindi for ‘us’) mainstream media presents as its idea of a united India or national front against the Covid-19 pandemic. Conclusively, I ground the implications of this limiting halcyonic representation in the socio-political sentiments that have gripped the nation in recent times – and what this narrative of the ideal type family that creates an opposition to a perceived outsider or other creates.

The Disjuncture Apparatus The condition of a disjuncture is particular, it highlights an explicit breakaway while shedding light on the splintered, jagged edges of the moment. In the context of temporality, disjunctures question the fragile peace we have made with our understanding of the past, present, and what the future might bring. The Covid-19 pandemic gave new exemplars to this vocabulary. By invoking a ‘new normal’ in common parlance, a nod to the change in societal norms to accommodate the disruption of the pandemic, it identified clear periods of ‘normal’ – ‘disjuncture’ – ‘new normal’. The period of the lockdown emerges as is this disjuncture, where individuals are left to grapple with a lost way of life while a new one is in its fetal state of emergence. Derrida’s disjuncture, the framework of interest for this chapter, is marked by specters. Defined in his 1993/2006 text, ‘Specters of Marx’, he makes the postulation that the present is haunted by the ghosts of its past. With the Covid-19 pandemic, we can locate the moment this haunting first emerges, that is the moment of disjuncture. What we can also see with the disjuncture is the negative valence attached to the term. This moment of disassociation or more accurately temporal transition is an uncomfortable one. It harbingers the unknown into the everyday. Simultaneously, it creates an ideal image of the past, smoothening any fissions that existed within the previous way of life. To put it succinctly, the disjuncture creates a romanticized, rose-colored image of the past. In order to articulate this, I use the term ‘halcyon’. The halcyon refers to a non-existent temporality – a picture-perfect ideal version of the past. It is the metaphoric calm before the storm. In the following sections of the chapter, these terms are used as a disjuncture apparatus. This framework allows me to consequently look at the television reruns within temporality and question the creation of specters and the projection of a perfect past, i.e., the halcyon. Accounting for this, I argue that the content is not alien to the broader socio-political discourse of ‘Us’ vs ‘Outsiders’ prevalent in contemporary Indian society (Tripathi and Singh, 2016).

‘Hum Saath Saath Hain’ As there are deer with does As within the moon there is moonlight As the sentiments of poets As the wishfulness of a mind

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Lamp and its light We are together Companions in the cycle of birth and rebirth We are together The iconic song ‘Hum Saath Saath Hain’ from the eponymous 1999 Bollywood movie iterates a sentiment of familial belonging. The resounding ‘Hum’ – translating to ‘Us’ or ‘We’ is the focal subject of this statement and is constructed in a specific manner. Keeping with the zeitgeist, the ‘Us’ is an unshakeable unit – tied down by blood and the sacrament of marriage. The four shows that make the core of this analysis center on this unshakeable unit. The Ramayana and Mahabharata are epics set within the familial sphere. While the texts have meta-narratives that center on themes of empire, war, dharma (duty), and righteousness, they are in essence rooted in the conflict between the moralistic family unit with the immoral or non-duty-bound intruders into their circle. It is imperative to note that in both these narratives, the antagonist figures are often located within the private sphere (Kaiyekai, the stepmother in the Ramayana, or the Kaurava cousins in the Mahabharata). Despite this, the distinction between the ‘others’ and positive ‘Hum’ is made by the protagonist figures’ adherence to a moral code of conduct – often at great personal cost for the greater good. Unlike their mythological rerun counterparts, the two sitcoms – Hum Paanch and Sarabhai vs Sarabhai don’t have a mighty evil the show’s familial units must defeat, rather they take a look at life in the private and are characterized by a loud yet relatable humor. While Hum Paanch follows the adventures of five half-sisters through the eyes of their perpetually harried father, Sarabhai vs Sarabhai emerges as the caricature of a household’s post-marital upheavals and conflicts. The familial unit is put under the spotlight by both these shows, with the first pitching the united oddballs against the society (of course coming out victorious at the end of every episode) and the second making the affluent Sarabhai family emblematic of all that it imagines the middle-class viewer would take potshots at. The ‘Hum’ in this sitcom context is not ascribed to the theological morality of the mythological narratives, but it too centers the gap that exists within the familial circle and the one that is outside of it. The moral is explicit – the family is unshakeable and central for a normed society, even if it clashes within itself. There is a particular logic we can follow through the curation of such specific content during the Covid-19 pandemic. Not only are these shows cult classics, but they are also comforting in their familiarity. They play well with the Government Public Service Announcements for pandemic control (multilingual variations of the chant to stay at ‘home’) and PSAs employed by private channels themselves. For example, the Zee TV PSA that iterates its tagline for the reruns, ‘Hum Andar Toh Corona Bahar’ (If we remain in – Corona will go out), is picturized on multiple pairs of shoes, representing members of a three-generational joint family as they discuss staying indoors. The message is explicit – when the community, with the central unit being the family, comes together, it is bound to succeed.

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The family as a metaphor has always been potent in the social imagination, especially in times of crisis. This imagery is not distinct to entertainment television. Through his first public speech announcing the national lockdown, the Prime Minister set the tone for a familial vocabulary that blurs the line between state responsibility and an imbibed paternal nature of the governance. This was made explicit when Prime Minister Modi stated that he speaks not just as a national leader but as the ‘elder’ of the family while asking residents to draw a ‘LakshmanRekha’ around their houses. The ‘rekha’ or line becomes both the literal boundary of the house outside which one sees danger along with the moral code of conduct, notions of social distancing, masking, and staying indoors in Covid-19 times. Not only does this invoke a mythological vocabulary, pleading to the notion of a shared cultural understanding, it also harkens to the halcyon of the past that the current Indian state invokes as ideology. The consequence of stepping out of the guiding line is clear – one loses the protection afforded to the private sphere and is rendered vulnerable to attacks of the ‘other’, whether it is the plague or the demonic Ravana. It is in light of these thematic notions that it becomes pertinent to look at the familial halcyon projected by the rerun curation and the broader discourse it feeds into.

Second-Order Myths and Intellectual Uncertainty Unlike OTT platforms such as Netflix or Amazon Prime that are predominantly accessed through individual cellphones in India, the television allows for a more collective consumption of content. In the period of the lockdown and an emphasis on ‘staying at home’, the family finds itself as perhaps the only form of in-person social interaction for the Indian middle class. In light of this, the particular programming of reruns harkens back the imagination of a ‘simpler time’ with the visages of the entire family being brightened literally and metaphorically by the colors of the television screen and cementing what I describe as the halcyon of middle-class nostalgia. Through this project of content curation, The ‘Great Indian Family’ has been enshrined as the focus of the idiot box once again. In order to understand the tangible effect of the halcyon, we must acknowledge that the Ramayana and Mahabharata remain integral as widespread mythologies, and their television adaptations birthed a set of second-order myths during the initial runs in the late 1980s and 1990s. The initial furor of the 1990s with the family washing up and dressing up to gather in front of the screen on Sunday mornings to partake in a modern-day darshan may not find replication during the lockdown reruns, but the nostalgia for the lost innocence of that ritual reinstates a certain comfort to the ‘Stay At Home’ discourse. The private must return to its halcyonic, self-sufficient ideal to bridge the rift that has now rendered the public sphere uninhabitable. The fact that both these mythologies include a period of ‘vanvas (exile)’, perhaps the trope equivalent of social distancing and self-isolation before the eventual victory of the ideal family (and consequently the kingdom and

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communities) makes them relevant media metaphors for the time. The trope of the vanvas or exile, where one finds intellectual uncertainty and a separation from all that is familiar, is best indicative of the disjuncture. This period of learning new norms is where specters are formed and the rifts that form the disjuncture are seen most clearly. To return to the mythological metaphor, the vanvas is the period of growth that marks the before and the period of the golden Ram Rajya (rule of Ram). The Pandavas undertake a period of exile before their return and consequent declaration of war upon their cousins. The content, therefore, enshrines a period of liminality, discomfort, and suffering before a return or transition to the utopic vision of the world. The sitcom reruns deal with this conflict of before – uncertainty – utopia/return to status quo on a micro-level. The narrative nature has shorter story arcs, where conflict is created and dealt with within the episode or over two episodes. The limited tension in these shows exists to comfort and brings with it a fairy tale energy of ‘all’s well that ends well’. Within the period of the pandemic, the crippling intellectual uncertainty that is faced by individuals and communities begs for this sort of optimism. As described within the disjuncture apparatus, the period of liminality is marked by specters of the past. These specters take the form of an ideal rose-tinted past and return in a honeyed form that only bears a passing resemblance to the real. To extrapolate this further, we turn to the conceptual ancestor of the disjuncture, the ‘uncanny’ (Freud, 1919). Freud’s thesis on aesthetics dealt with the notion of the uncanny – the experience of terror when something familiar from the past returns in an unfamiliar way, made disconcerting by the powers of repression (ibid). However, in the case of the familial halcyon projected by the Indian media, the familiar of the past is packaged as ideal and comforting, returning not through repression but as a conscious projection. The intellectual uncertainty of a twisted every day is combatted by the use of a fantasy. This fantasy shows an ideal past, a glorified one, which cannot be returned to. The promise of simpler times blankets the harsh worries of the reality faced by Indians during a pandemic. This notion of a halcyon or a vision of simpler times can be seen through the complement of mainstream media coverage to these reruns. From interviews with the cast of the shows reminiscing on the days of the initial telecast (‘Hum Paanch Star Ashok Saraf “Didn’t Even Know” The Show Is Being Rerun’, 10 April 2020) to photo series of the now greying actors from the Ramayana watching the rerun with their own families (‘Lord Ram aka Arun Govil watches Ramayana rerun with family on Doordarshan, pic goes viral’, 31 March 2020) the notion of a throwback was propounded with doe-eyed romanticism. In fact, in his opinion piece ‘Memories of Ramayana’, Ranjan (2020) terms the days of the lockdown as an involuntary throwback to the 1990s. By describing how the everyday life of the middle class has been returned to a restricted private sphere with a limit, he segues into the second-order myths attached to the television show. Here I take the definition of second-order myths as described by Barthes

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(1957/2013), where objects or signifiers take on cultural power. As Ranjan (2020) illustrates, watching the television adaptation Ramayana in the 1990s was complemented by a sense of sacredness: At my home, Ramayan was given the same respect accorded to religious texts. While watching the show, we were asked to sit on the floor in a respectable position. No stretching of legs, no eating food, and no talking during the show. This gives insight into the cultural power that was gained by the show and subsequent others, where the ephemeral experience of viewing was rendered sacrosanct by the active creation of cultural norms. Cusack (2012) describes this process as a ‘spontaneous outburst of popular piety’ coupling it with what Mitchell (2005) describes as the consecration of television as altars. This synergy associated with the second-order myths ensures that we cannot look at the reruns in isolation from the societal discourse that has been prevalent in contemporary India.

Narratives of Nostalgia As Cusack (2012) extrapolates, the popularity of the Ramayana during its initial run can be linked to the upsurge in Hindu nationalism of the era. The power of these narratives as second-order myths has been iterated and established through various processes of knowledge production and mainstream discourse, but my concern remains with their harkening back. The cultural symbolism that has been ascribed to all four of these shows, as cult classics, worthy of providing comfort in uncertain times of disjuncture, is what propounds the base notion of othering. By becoming the only source of communication from the ‘outside’ or the public sphere, these fictions contribute to visions of a purist halcyon even if unintentionally. The metaphoric ‘Hum’ represents the aspirational family and resistance to the festering virus of the ‘Other’. The Other in this context takes two forms – the first of the coronavirus itself, which comes from across the kalapaani (foreign seas), and the bodies that carry it. The television reruns become implicit in this halcyon driven othering of human bodies itself. We can see representations of this in two socio-political examples. The first being the equating of Covid-19 as the Chinese virus. This xenophobic articulation that shows hate crimes against North Eastern citizens of India and the sinophobic economic rhetoric of the central government (Sheng and Xin, 2020) position the Chinese as the first ‘other’ that the united front subjects to bodily hate. The second ‘Other’ that is propelled is the Muslim body. By the spotlighted spread of Covid-19 at a Tablighi Jamat event in Delhi, the condition of the malady was politicized (Sarkar, 2020). The integration of an anti-Muslim discourse into pandemic control within the nation cemented the Lakshman-Rekha of the inside circle and the outsider. As Asthana (2008) puts forth, the television politics

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of mythological shows push the narrative of a previously glorious, moralistic Hindu empire plagued by the bodily presence of the ‘other’, more often than not a demonic evil. The Sinophobia and Islamophobia of Indian media’s early Covid-19 coverage makes explicit how this evil is represented. The anthropomorphized coronavirus illustration of government billboard PSAs tells us how it is easier to perceive an evil or danger that can be seen as opposed to the invisible, non-controlled concept of a medical crisis. As the narratives tell us, the evil must have a face, an identity to be defeated. Beyond the mythological shows, the principle of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ remains clear. The sitcoms consist of ideal, sometimes sparring – always blended Hindu families. Their long-term victory is imminent. The sense of disconcertion does not last long. The ritual of set up – conflict – unison – resolution provides a backbone of storytelling that is not different from Indian mythologies. As second-order myths, these sitcoms also bring with them memories of a faux utopic childhood for members of the Indian middle class that are now earning adults. The private sphere is joyous and is the control room in which one regroups before facing the great evil that lurks outside. The narratives of nostalgia that the content of the reruns births propel this. The familial halcyon is a silver lining to cling to when the figurative speech of war and invisible enemies becomes more literal with each passing day. The pandemic has shaken faith in all institutional structures with a ‘post-COVID’ world looking unrecognizable in many theorizations. In this wave of uncertainty, the reruns and the familial morality they espouse provide a singular, tangible comfort for their viewers, even if it all changes the ‘ideal family’ and its rose-tinted halcyon will remain constant.

Conclusion The Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdown have split temporality much like a Derridan disjuncture with the specters of ideal ‘pre-lockdown’ time haunting the debilitating present of the current time. Doordarshan’s decision to broadcast reruns of the 1987 cult classic ‘Ramayan’ added to this mix of spectral presences from the past. Initially, a pragmatic decision in the face of disrupted television shooting schedules, its success in terms of viewership has had other television networks replicate this strategy. Therefore, the first weeks of the Indian lockdown saw the return of popular family entertainers from the 1990s and the early 2000s including both mythological dramas (Mahabharata) and sitcoms (Hum Paanch, Sarabhai vs Sarabhai). The ‘stay at home’ emphasis of government guidelines along with the private sphere centric PSAs of television channels present an emphasis on ‘Hum’, or a united ‘us’. Through this chapter, I have put forth an interrogation of this ‘Hum’ by contextualizing it through both media and public discourse metaphors. The notions of othering, conflict, and a Lakshman Rekha become pertinent to take into account when we read these reruns as texts.

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The four shows used as examples here are also established as having cultural power as second-order myths. The rituals and nostalgia associated with them produce conditions of nostalgia, which in turn contribute to visions of a utopic familial halcyon. The term halcyon is used as an intervention to understand the comfort that individuals cling to while experiencing conditions of disjuncture. The specters of a lost past and the creation of a new normal are bridged together by this halcyon. This ideal world is one that cannot be returned to but remains guiding and aspirational. This aspirational principle in times of intellectual uncertainty can be seen in the Prime Minister’s speech, which too invokes a mythic Hindu past to propound the need to do one’s part in curtailing the spread of the pandemic. This allows for a segue into the socio-political implications of the halcyon. The coronavirus pandemic has a bodily dimension. The fear of contamination or infection is made tangible by associating it with the body that carries it, which in the context of the Indian sphere took a primarily Sinophobic and Islamophobic tone. Through anti-China disinformation and spotlighting of the Tablighi Jamaat congregation that took place in Delhi, public discourse put the onus of infection on the affective body of the other. This other can be seen as an evil that disjuncts one from the halcyon period. This conception is not alien to the narrative structure that the reruns use. The chapter categorizes this as the principle of set up – conflict – unison – resolution. Reconciling this with the notion that the private sphere is the space of the ‘Hum’ or the united us, which provides resistance to the Other/Outsider, we can see how the synergy of second-order myths through rerun curation complement and add to divisive popular discourse in India during the time of the pandemic.

Notes 1 The Ramayana and Mahabharata are television shows based on Hindu epics. The show was originally aired between 1987 and 1988 on DD National. It was written and directed by Ramanand Sagar. The show drew its source material from Valmiki’s Ramayan and Tulsidas’ Ramcharitmanas. BR Chopra’s Mahabhrata aired in 1988 with a run of 94 episodes and was directed by Ravi Chopra. It was scripted by Pandit Narendra Sharma and Rahi Masoom Raza, drawing from the source material of Vyasa’s Sanskritic Mahabharata. Both shows achieved cult status with their viewership and spawned academic discourse on the particularly modern worship that comes with religious television. 2 Balaji Telefilms’ Hum Paanch aired from 1995 to 1999 on ZEE TV with an extremely successful run as a sitcom. It had multiple directors over the course of its run and was written by Imtiaz Patel. The show is considered a classic of Indian pop culture and experimented with a number of path breaking themes for the time such as remarriage, blended families, and proto-feminism. Hats Off Production’s Sarabhai vs Sarabhai is also considered as a cult comedy classic and had its initial run from 2004 to 2006 on the private channel STAR ONE. The show was created by Jamnadas Majethia and Aatish Kapadia and directed by Deven Bhojani. A second season of the show was released in 2017 on the digital streaming platform Hotstar.

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References Asthana, S. (2008). Religion and Secularism as Embedded Imaginaries: A Study of Indian Television Narratives. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 25(3), 304–323. https:// doi.org/10.1080/15295030802191998 Barthes, R. (2013). Mythologies: The Complete Edition (2nd ed.). Hill and Wang. Cusack, C. (2012). The Gods on Television: Ramanand Sagar’s Ramayan, Politics and Popular Piety in Late Twentieth-Century India. Semantic Scholar, 5(1), 279–297. Derrida, J. (2006). Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning & the New International (Routledge Classics) (1st ed.). Routledge. Freud, S. (1955) [1919]. The “Uncanny”. In: The Complete Psychological Works, Vol. XVII (pp. 217–256). Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (2003). The Uncanny (Penguin Classics) (Illustrated ed.). Penguin Classics. Gettleman, J., & Schultz, K. (2020, March 25). Coronavirus in India: Modi Orders Total Lockdown of 21 Days. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/ world/asia/india-coronavirus-lockdown.html Lee, T. H. (2020). Creating the New Normal: The Clinician Response to Covid-19. NEJM Innovations in Care Delivery, 1–3. https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/ CAT.20.0076 Press Trust of India. (2020, March 16). Coronavirus scare in Bollywood: Film bodies put shootings on hold from March 19 to 31. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/movies/ bollywood/story/coronavirus-scare-in-bollywood-film-bodies-put-shootings-on-holdfrom-march-19-to-31-1655876-2020-03-16 Mitchell, J. (2005). Christianity and Television. Studies in World Christianity 11(1), 1–8. Ranjan, H. (2020, April 1). Memories of Ramayan. New India Express. https://www. newindianexpress.com/cities/bengaluru/2020/apr/01/memories-of-ramayan-2124052. html Sarkar, S. (2020). Religious Discrimination is Hindering the COVID-19 Response. BMJ, 228–229. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m2280 Sheng, Y., & Xin, L. (2020, December 29). India keeps hyping Sinophobia, Modi govt shows no intention to fix ties with China: experts. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202012/1211390.shtml Tripathi, R. C., & Singh, P. (2016). Perspectives on Violence and Othering in India (Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2016 ed.). Springer.

PART III

Media Bias and Propaganda

7 TAIWAN CAN HELP Covid-19, the Model Minority State, and the Limits of Taiwan-as-Beacon Rhetoric Jamin D. Shih

In April 2020, in the midst of a surge of U.S. Covid-19 cases, a social media meme comparing Taiwan to the Marvel nation of Wakanda went viral in the Taiwanese American internet sphere. The meme juxtaposes a screengrab of Chadwick Boseman’s Black Panther with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen alongside the captions “Wakanda can help,” and “Taiwan can help.” Its accompanying tweet compares the two states in four further ways: 1 . 2. 3. 4.

You [sic] heard of it yet don’t know where it is. It’s a country with happy, wealthy residents and advance [sic] technology. Led by a Feline President. This country is now trying to save the world from Covid-19. (Joshua Wong 黃之鋒, 2020)

The four points of comparison—barring the comedic reference to Tsai’s love of cats—rest on the rhetoric of Taiwan as an advanced, democratic, liberal state that has been unrightfully kept out of global politics, similarly to Wakanda. The fantasy in comparing Taiwan to Wakanda reflects a larger history of Taiwan’s contested sovereign status and the rhetorical strategies Taiwanese and Taiwanese diaspora have leveraged to legitimize this sovereignty. Comments to the post use Taiwan’s preemptive response to Covid-19 as evidence that Taiwan is “the better” and “the REAL China” (Nyeles, 2020; I AM GROOT, 2020). Taiwan is framed as home to the “civilized Chinese” in contrast to a “Barbarian #CCPChina” (Samson Mark, 2020). For these commentors, proving Taiwan is equipped and willing to contribute to a global crisis marks it as deserving of official state recognition. For if the “barbarian” communist China is the birthplace of disease, a “civilized” capitalist China is the vaccine. These popular representations mirror contemporary state political discourse. Just over a month later, DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-11

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the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate both introduced the Covid-19 Accountability Act, deploying the same rhetoric of Taiwan as “a model contributor to world health” to advocate sanctioning the Communist Party of China for, presumably, actively spreading Covid-19 (H. R. 6863, 2020). Yet, this rhetoric of Taiwan as a civilized China did not originate at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, and its primary function is not actually to bolster U.S. support for Taiwan’s precarious political status. It is merely the latest manifestation of what I call Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric, which has deeper histories in mid20th century U.S. imperial goals. As a result of fears of spreading communism, the U.S. sided with the Republic of China (ROC) government during the Chinese Civil War against the Communist Party of China, which later founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To justify its support, U.S. state documents framed the ROC as a bastion of liberal capitalist democracy in Asia (Tucker, 1994). In turn, the U.S. attributed Taiwan’s democratization to its shared values of liberal democracy and a capitalist economy. In this way, Taiwan acted as “a symbol of victory in the cold war,” or a proxy for the American process of communist containment over the perceived racialized threat of China (Tucker, 1994, p.6). For the U.S., Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric is a useful concept to justify its investment in Taiwan, and by extension the Asia-Pacific region. For Taiwan and Taiwanese diaspora, the U.S.’s Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric offers a tantalizing half-promise of U.S. support for Taiwan. I identify three major themes of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric that originate from this era: (1) shared liberal values of the U.S. and Taiwan, (2) Taiwan as a key to the peace and security of Asia, and (3) Taiwan as a model of an ideal western liberal democracy for Asia. In each case, Taiwan is an exemplar for Asia to aspire to. With “shared values,” Taiwan is seen as more progressive than its neighbors because of abstract liberal values like freedom and liberty. As a “key to regional peace,” Taiwan is a civilizing agent in Asia—one that helps to contain the “communist threat of China” and the “barbarism of Islam.” Finally, as “a model of liberal democracy,” Taiwan is a progressive, modern exception to Asia and a model Asian state. Of course, because these values of “freedom” and the ideal of a U.S.-style liberal democracy are abstract, these are not clear standards the U.S. holds itself to. Rather, they are platonic ideals the U.S. can hold Asia to. This culminates in constructing Taiwan as what I call a model minority state, a racialized state which gains conditional praise at the expense of being rhetorically leveraged against other racialized states. The model minority myth, originating in the mid-1960s U.S. in response to racial justice movements, racializes Asian Americans as an exemplary success story for communities of color. The myth obscures structural histories of anti-Asian legislation and wedges marginalized racial groups against each other in such a way that a larger racial hierarchy goes unquestioned (Cheng, 2013; Kim, 1999; Museus and Kiang, 2009; Park and Park, 2005). I argue that in a similar manner, the valorization of Taiwan as a model minority state hides imperial power under the shining image of successful economic marketplaces. The myth of the model minority state wedges Taiwan against the rest of

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Asia in such a way that justifies continuing U.S. interests in the region. The convergence of Taiwan-as-Beacon praise with anti-communist U.S. jingoism explains the rhetoric’s disproportionate presence in jingoistic right-wing and far-right bills and publications. In my data of U.S. congressional bills on Taiwan from 2009 to 2020, 70% of bills referencing Taiwan are authored by Republican congresspeople and Taiwan-as-Beacon praise is substantially more prevalent in right-wing publications anxious about communism (Table 7.1). The conditional valorization of Taiwan from the U.S., then, can be seen for what it is—an appropriation of Taiwan’s precarious sovereignty for U.S. state aims. As the newest example of the deployment of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric, the Covid-19 pandemic offers an opportunity to critically analyze the continuing salience and impact of U.S. framings of Taiwan as a model minority state. I ask how U.S. legislation and publications portray Taiwan’s Covid-19 responses as exceptional through Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. What matters for our purposes is not Taiwan’s actual response to Covid-19, but how these responses are rhetorically framed by U.S. legislation and media, how they become a venue to contest Taiwanese sovereignty, and what underlying U.S. policies these framings justify. To explore this imperial dynamic, I first expand on the historical background of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric and the model minority state as products of post-WWII TABLE 7.1 Breakdown of Congressional bills dealing with Taiwan introduced from 2009

to 2020 Congressional Taiwan as Beacon Rhetoric Bills “Shared “Key for “Liberal Introduced Values” Regional Democracy” Peace & Stability”

Total No. of Bills using Rhetoric

Secondary Bills (Budget, PRC)

Other Bills

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total

8 6 10 4 8 5 5 5 10 11 19 21 112

5 5 8 4 7 3 4 3 6 2 9 2 58

0 4 1 2 4 2 5 2 0 2 7 9 38

4 4 7 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 12 10 51

6 3 7 2 5 5 4 5 9 8 14 10 78

2 2 2 2 5 1 1 3 5 6 10 17 56

N/A

Total No. of Bills

13 15 19 10 19 10 14 10 16 15 35 32 208

Bills are split into two larger categories: bills that use some form of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric and bills that do not. Some bills use multiple styles of rhetoric and are represented in multiple columns. Bills that do not use any Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric are split into two categories: Secondary Bills, where reference to Taiwan is insubstantial and Other Bills which are more substantively related.

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U.S.-Taiwan relations. Then, I apply these theories to the Covid-19 pandemic and U.S. coverage of Taiwan’s successful pandemic management from four U.S. online publications (Breitbart, The Federalist, The Hill, and NPR). Through this lens, we can disrupt much of U.S. praise for Taiwan’s Covid-19 response not as sincere support for Taiwan’s political sovereignty but as a reflection of U.S. imperial interests in Asia, and in so doing, the drawbacks of a Taiwanese embrace of U.S. Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric are highlighted.

Taiwan-as-Beacon and the Model Minority State Rhetoric of Taiwan’s exceptional nature in Asia is embedded in the very fabric of U.S.-Taiwan legal relations that date back to the creation of the contemporary state in 1945. During the 1927–1949 Chinese Civil War, two opposing governments (the PRC and ROC) claimed to be the true government of China. The U.S. feared that if the PRC won, it “would lose the profits of trade and manufacturing enterprises, the devotion of converts, or the opportunity to make of China a strategic bastion against the Soviet Union” (Tucker, p.22). Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric thus formed the foundation and justification for military, foreign policy, and trade decisions. To that end, Taiwan was seen by the U.S. as “a promising experiment in democracy,” “a bastion of democracy” in Asia, and a key strategic island for the containment of Chinese communism (Tucker, p.78). Formal U.S. support for the ROC ended in the late-1970s as it transitioned toward recognizing Beijing as a strategic maneuver against the Soviet Union. As the starting point for a new paradigm of U.S.-Taiwan relations, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act constructs the rhetorical boundaries that frame later U.S. legislation on Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act defines what a U.S.-Taiwan relationship is post-recognition and is used to walk the fine line between continuing to engage with Taiwan and contradicting formal recognition of China. The act allows the U.S. to assert that its interests in the island have no bearing on its official recognition of the PRC. Selling military arms to Taiwan, then, is not a reflection of support for the island’s self-determination or a violation of a One China Policy. The other pillar of U.S.-Taiwan relations is the U.S.’s Six Assurances, a set of informal promises introduced in 1982 to Taiwan that include continued arms sales and abidance to the Taiwan Relations Act. Together, the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances allow the U.S. to pursue its economic and political interests in Taiwan without officially commenting on Taiwan’s political sovereignty. Bills reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances are introduced to Congress yearly. Reaffirmation bills position Taiwan as a key “anti-Communist ally in the Asia-Pacific” and “beacon of democracy in Asia” that has led to the shared American and Taiwanese values of freedom, and democracy (H. Con. Res. 88, 2016). These shared values are framed as a rare element of stability in Asia. According to the resolution, the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. “has endured for more than 65 years through many shifts in Asia’s geopolitical landscape” (H. Con. Res. 88, 2016). In other words, while Asian geopolitics has shifted

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dramatically over time, Taiwan acts as an anchor of regional stability. Because of this stability, Taiwan represents “a prosperous, free, and orderly society with strong institutions, worthy of emulation and envy” that “showed the world again what a mature, Chinese-speaking democracy looks like” (H. Con. Res. 88, 2016). Taiwan is explicitly pivoted against the rest of Asia, particularly the rest of the “Chinesespeaking” world. Here, in order for Taiwan to be prosperous, to be free, to be orderly, and to be mature, the rest of Asia must in turn be impoverished, unfree, disordered, and immature. For Taiwan to be an exceptional Asian success story, the rest of Asia and particularly the PRC must necessarily be un-except-able. Yet while the language here purports to be praising Taiwan, the role of the U.S. is always lurking in the subtext of the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. It is the “United States economic aid [that] prevented Taiwan from sliding into an economic depression in the 1950s and greatly contributed to the island’s later economic takeoff,” just as it is the U.S.-drafted Taiwan Relations Act that “[helped] maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific” (H. Con. Res. 88, 2016). Here, the democratization of Taiwan is worthy of praise, but the actual subject of praise is the U.S.’s pivotal role in this democratization. Taiwan emerges as a model minority state explicitly because its statehood is contested; Taiwan’s unrecognizability affords the U.S. the grounds to frame Taiwan as exceptional and the U.S.’s support as benevolent. In the same manner that the model minority is given conditional praise that ultimately serves to compliment the benevolence and inherent righteousness of the system that suppresses them, Taiwan is propped up as a model minority state to reinforce the U.S.’s role as benevolent international peacekeeper and leader in free liberal democracy. These discursive narratives are inextricably linked to the U.S.’s legal relationship with Taiwan today. The continued frequency of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric in congressional bills reflects their lasting power. From 2009 to 2020, roughly 54% (112 out of 208) of bills on Taiwan used some form of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric, 75% (112 out of 150) once bills whose reference to Taiwan is minimal—such as appropriations bills—are removed (Table 7.1). U.S. bills regarding Taiwan fall broadly within four major categories: (1) bills to officially recognize Taiwan in some organization, (2) military bills, including military training and arms sales to Taiwan, (3) trade and economic bills, and (4) appropriations bills for the American Institute in Taiwan. Military bills are by far the most common. Here, the language of Taiwanas-Beacon justifies increased military training and arms sales in Asia under a guise of support for a thriving liberal democracy in need of American protection. The conditional praise of Taiwan embedded in the Taiwan-as-Beacon narrative hides an insidious pattern of military spending, political intervention, and geopolitical warmongering. While a Taiwan-as-Beacon narrative promises substantive American support for the island, praise for Taiwan hinges on the U.S.’s own imperial aims in Asia—particularly, anxieties that China will surpass the U.S. as a global superpower. When employed as a model minority state, Taiwan is positioned as conditionally civilized relative to an inherently backwards Asia. Yet like with any model minority, this acceptance is fleeting and superficial because it holds little

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concrete political value for an unrecognized Taiwan. Should the narrative cease to be politically useful it will be reneged, as was the case in the U.S. disassociation with the ROC failure to gain control of mainland China. In this way, the deployment of the U.S. rhetoric of Taiwan-as-Beacon demonstrates not a substantive support for the island but the imperial aim of continued U.S. political, economic, and military influence in Asia.

Covid-19 and the Model Minority State Since the foundation of a U.S.-Taiwan relationship is built on Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric, the narrative of Taiwan as a model minority state has seeped into broader U.S. representations of Taiwan, particularly conservative publications. Popular representations of Taiwan, such as online publications or memes, provide perhaps the clearest view into the popular salience of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric despite its origin in foreign policy. In turn, the saturation of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric in popular sources bolsters the claims of legislation that deploy it. As the most recent high-profile resurgence of this rhetoric, the Covid-19 pandemic offers a cogent look at the continuing impacts of framing Taiwan as a model minority state. As a result of preemptive action, enforced travel quarantines, widespread maskuse, and accessible aid, Taiwan celebrated over 250 consecutive days without locally transmitted Covid-19 cases in 2020. Because of its comparatively successful pandemic management, Taiwan attracted international attention as a Covid-19 success story, and this success became an ideal host for the U.S. to deflect from its pandemic failings through Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. I coded all articles from four U.S. publications in 2020 substantively covering Taiwan’s Covid-19 pandemic management to analyze the prevalence of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric and the outcomes it justifies (Table 7.2). I chose two far-right sources (Breitbart and The Federalist) and two moderate sources for comparison (The Hill, which leans center-right and NPR, which leans center-left). I initially included far-left The Jacobin but found no significant use of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. In total, I analyzed 130 articles on Taiwan (60 from Breitbart, 16 from The Federalist, 40 from The Hill, and 14 from NPR). Because the amount of coverage of Taiwan’s Covid-19 response varied in each source, the total number of articles analyzed from each source varies. Only explicit uses of Taiwan-as-Beacon language were counted; as a result, many articles that carry the spirit of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric (i.e., mentioning Taiwan’s success to contrast China’s failures) but do not explicitly use language of “shared values,” “key to peace,” or “model liberal democracy for Asia” are coded as not containing the rhetoric. Articles that only quote others who use this rhetoric were also not coded as using Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. However, even within this limited frame, almost 52% of articles contain explicit Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. Far-right Breitbart used Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric in 58% of its articles while center-left NPR only used it in 29% of its articles. The Hill initially appears to have similar ratios to Breitbart at 57%; however, a large portion of these articles come from a single opinion contributor, Joseph Bosco, former China Country Desk

TABLE 7.2  Breakdown of online publications on Taiwan’s Covid-19 response in 2020

Publication

Breitbart Federalist, The Hill, The NPR Total

Taiwan as Beacon Rhetoric

Rhetoric Outcomes

“Shared Values”

“Key for Regional Peace and Stability”

“Liberal Democracy”

Total No. of Bills using Rhetoric

Justifies Racist Rhetoric

Justify Isolationism

Deflects from U.S. Pandemic Failures

Perpetuates Conspiracy Theories

Total No. of Articles Justifying Outcomes

9 1 7 1 18

1 0 4 0 5

33 5 23 4 65

35 5 23 4 67

30 13 7 0 50

6 13 3 0 22

7 9 5 0 21

10 5 9 0 24

40 14 15 0 69

Total No. of Articles

60 16 40 14 130 Taiwan Can Help  105

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Officer to the Secretary of Defense, whose work we will analyze in greater depth. An adjusted analysis without Bosco’s contributions leaves The Hill with 38% use of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. Notably, the publications on Taiwan from center-left NPR manage to praise Taiwan’s successful pandemic management without using it to legitimize the U.S.’s response. When most NPR publications bring up Taiwan’s Covid-19 response, it is as an example of the effectiveness of specific policies or as an overview of Taiwan’s management strategy divorced from a geopolitical contest between the U.S. and China. When outside the frame of congressional foreign policy or right-wing jingoistic publications, we see praise for Taiwan on its own terms, rather than as a tool to justify U.S. policy or condemn its enemies. There were four major outcomes to reporting on Taiwan’s Covid-19 management that were especially prevalent on articles using Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric. These were: (1) justifying racist rhetoric, (2) justifying U.S. isolationism, (3) deflecting from U.S. pandemic failures, and (4) perpetuating conspiracy theories of Covid-19. Racist rhetoric most often manifested as variations of “Wuhan Virus,” “Chinese Virus,” or “CCP Virus” after the World Health Organization (WHO) officially recommended “Covid-19” on February 11 to minimize the risk of stigmatizing civilians. U.S. isolationism is defined as attempts to withdraw U.S. funding or membership from international organizations. Deflection of U.S. pandemic failures most often occurred through pinning all blame of the impacts of the pandemic (i.e., cases, deaths, lockdowns) on China and avoiding any mention of failed U.S. policy. Finally, the most common conspiracy theories claimed the PRC manufactured the virus or intentionally spread it to harm Western civilization, misinformation frequently peddled by the far-right The Epoch Times. Of the four publications analyzed, far-right sources Breitbart and The Federalist justified these outcomes (67% and 88%, respectively) more than their moderate counterparts The Hill and NPR (38% and 0%). Justifying racism was the most common outcome of deploying Taiwan-asBeacon rhetoric for Taiwan’s Covid-19 response. Covering a scandal where WHO Director-General Tedros alleged receiving racist threats from Taiwan in response to the organization refusing to include Taiwan as a member or observer, author Ben Weingarten of The Federalist accuses Tedros of “playing the race card” in “a seemingly unprovoked tirade at Taiwan” (Weingarten, 2020). He laments, …[Tedros’s] effort to deflect criticism by invoking race parallels China’s attempt to de-link itself from the coronavirus by claiming that calling the Wuhan virus by its name is racist, which sadly far too many in the West have bought into, to devastating effect. (Weingarten, 2020) Weingarten presents any criticism of racialized rhetoric as a Chinese communist conspiracy or insincere identity politics. This is despite racialized rhetoric like “Chinese Virus” connecting to rising rates of anti-Asian hate speech and violence in the U.S. (Siu and Chun, 2020). So committed to the racializing of Covid-19 is

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Breitbart that one article even inserts the term “Chinese coronavirus” into a quote from a Taiwanese official who used the term “COVID-19” (Reyes, 2020). Here, legitimizing racist anti-Asian rhetoric is framed as to the benefit of Taiwanese. Further, Weingarten justifies U.S. isolationism and repeats anti-Chinese conspiracy theories that deflect from the U.S.’s failed pandemic response. He repeatedly positions Taiwan as a democratic alternative to China and a model for “what a free and democratic China could look like,” then emphasizes WHO’s early praise of China as evidence of communist infiltration (Weingarten, 2020). Withdrawing from the WHO and any responsibility for international collaboration, then, is justice for an aggrieved Taiwan. A political maneuver in the interests of an isolationist U.S. becomes transfigured into benevolent support for an unrecognized model minority state. Similarly, opinion contributor Joseph Bosco for The Hill deploys all three Taiwan-as-Beacon frameworks in many of his editorials. For Bosco, the effectiveness of a Taiwanese response to Covid-19 is attributed to its status as “the model international citizen” and “a democratic society” (Bosco, 2020b). These complimentary titles are used to paint President Trump’s criticism of “Beijing and its WHO ally” as “decisive” despite his own praise of China’s response up until the end of February 2020. Worse, calls to withdraw from the WHO are paired alongside the more rational charge that Taiwan ought to be a full participating member of the WHO, implying policies that bolster U.S. isolationism support Taiwanese sovereignty. In Bosco’s work, rhetorical support for Taiwan and criticism of China operates to legitimize a U.S. Cold War with China and obscure failed U.S. policy. While Bosco condemns Chinese authorities for “first deny[ing] or minimiz[ing] the outbreak, then say[ing] it was under control,” he fails to acknowledge the U.S.’s similar failings. Like China’s initial response, President Trump minimized the threat of Covid-19 in February, when he claimed it had “not been spreading very much” and was “very much under control in the USA” (Keith, 2020). Bosco continually suggests without evidence that the Covid-19 pandemic was a sinister plot to destroy Western civilization: “We may never know whether the pandemic’s devastation of Western economies was a fortuitous coincidence for China or something more sinister”; “Enter, serendipitously or otherwise, the Wuhan virus…” (Bosco, 2020c; 2020d). He and other authors use Taiwan as a model minority state and China as a unique racialized communist super-threat to bolster the U.S.’s geopolitical position. Bosco makes the case that China’s authoritarianism is the cause of their poor pandemic management and Taiwan’s democracy is the cause of its success: “The coronavirus pandemic… originated in China and… spread globally by the Chinese government’s inept, reckless and willful policies… By contrast, democratic Taiwan’s disciplined, transparent and eminently sensible approach to the pandemic earned accolades…” (Bosco, 2020a). Yet, these authors do not explore what an association of liberal democracies with pandemic success and authoritarianism with pandemic failure might imply about the U.S.’s own pandemic management failure. If “…capable democracies, have managed the health emergency… [while] China and Russia, on the other

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hand, have repressed key medical information… and peddled disinformation campaigns…” then it is curious that the U.S.’s continual minimization of the pandemic and failure to successfully enact containment or aid policies is not a moment of reflection for the U.S. on its status as a democratic nation (Twining and Quirk, 2020). Instead, the U.S. legitimizes Taiwan as a democratic bastion and counterpart to the U.S.’s geopolitical enemy China, and then uses this designation to support its own claim to liberal democracy. If (1) Taiwan is a successful liberal democracy because of U.S. support and (2) its success managing Covid-19 demonstrates the righteousness of capitalist liberal democracy and the failures of a Chinese authoritarian communism, then the U.S.’s catastrophic pandemic management must be a result of a Chinese conspiracy, rather than its own structural and political failings laid bare. Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric, and the outcomes they justify, appear concurrently and in strikingly similar phrasing in online publications and congressional bills. Inaccurate claims published on far-right publications make their way into conservative-introduced legislation and vice versa. For example, Breitbart repeatedly claims that Taiwan knew there was human-to-human transmission as early as December 31, 2019, and the WHO intentionally hid this information because of loyalty to an authoritarian communist China (Martel, 2020; Kent, 2020). These accusations go as far as accusing the WHO to falling under communist control and undermining Western democracies (Hayward, 2020). In turn, they justify withdrawing from all accused international organizations. However, Taiwan’s Centers for Disease Control clarified this as inaccurate; in its e-mail to the WHO on December 31, Taiwan merely believed there was a possibility of human-to-­ human transmission and reached out for confirmed information (Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, 2020). Yet, congressional legislation uncritically repeats these claims to bolster explaining a U.S. surge in cases as a sinister Chinese plot. As the Global Covid-19 Truth, Transparency, and Accountability Act claims, The Government of Taiwan, based on its own research, communicated to the WHO in December 2019 that COVID-19 pandemic [sic] was spread by human to human [sic] contact… The WHO disregarded the more accurate information from the Government of Taiwan because of anti-Taiwan animus driven by malign influence of the government of the People’s Republic of China. (H. R. 6915, 2020) This framing of Taiwan effectively deflects attention from the U.S.’s own failed pandemic management to an imagined sinister Chinese plot. Taiwan-as-Beacon articles cloak their support for U.S. nationalist and isolationist policies under the veneer of support for Taiwan, which both crafts an exceptionalized model minority state and frames right-wing jingoism as the only liberatory option for Taiwan. While U.S. legislation and publications celebrate a model

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international citizen or a free and democratic China, the U.S. obfuscate its own failings in pandemic response by criticizing China, shirks economic responsibilities for contributing to global collaborations, and reinforces racist rhetoric that disproportionately harms Asian American communities. As in the case of the model minority itself, the model minority state does not see tangible results of its provisional acceptance. For all its ostensibly pro-Taiwan rhetoric, Taiwan-as-Beacon praise is predominantly in service of U.S. state aims.

Conclusion Under the veneer of benevolence, the U.S. deployment of Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric vis-à-vis Taiwan’s pandemic management functions to mask the inadequacies of a U.S. response to Covid-19. Taiwan becomes the example of how a thriving capitalist democracy handles a public health crisis while an authoritarian communist China hides information and fails to contain the spread. Simultaneously, the U.S.’s parallel disinformation campaigns and failure to mitigate its infections become proof of a more sinister racialized conspiracy. The deployment of Taiwan as a model minority state is vital here. Taiwan’s image as a liberal democracy legitimizes the U.S.’s and provides the venue to explain why the U.S.’s pandemic management has not been successful. It replaces U.S. government failure with ammunition against its geopolitical rival China and hides U.S. imperial goals under the veneer of benevolent support for a contested state. Yet, because Taiwanese sovereignty is so precarious, Taiwan-as-Beacon rhetoric is often quite seductive for Taiwanese and Taiwanese diaspora. When it appears that U.S. far-right rhetoric or conservative bills are the only path toward U.S. support for Taiwan, it is understandable why so many Taiwanese buy into the trap of the model minority state. However, this praise, like that of the model minority myth, is conditional and fragile. In the comments of Breitbart publications praising Taiwan, we can see how even as a model exception, Taiwan fails to escape its U.S. racialization. Taiwan’s successes are attributed to sinister government cover-ups or to a “DOG MEAT LOMEIN DIET,” which point to a U.S. inability to distinguish between racial stereotypes and linguistic dialects of China and Taiwan (Kew, 2020). For just as a model minority is praised as a racial success then barred from the full privileges of whiteness, Taiwan as a model minority state is pedestaled as an exemplary Asian democracy then dismissed as the very racialized threat it was leveraged against by powerful empires.

References Bosco, Joseph. (2020a). Pass the Taiwan Defense Act – Tell China That Americans Will Defend Taiwan. The Hill. Bosco, Joseph. (2020b). Taiwan: China’s Nemesis Could Be the WHO’S Salvation. The Hill. Bosco, Joseph. (2020c). Trump Defends Democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan – While Xi Awaits Biden. The Hill.

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Bosco, Joseph. (2020d). The Wuhan Virus and Regime Change in Washington. The Hill. Cheng, Wendy. (2013). The Changs next door to the Diazes: Remapping race in suburban California. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). H. Con. Res. 88. Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations. (2016). H. R. 6863. COVID-19 Accountability Act. (2020). H. R. 6915. Global COVID-19 Truth, Transparency and Accountability Act. (2020). Hayward, John. (2020). Hayward: WHO, International Bodies Must Be Purged of Chinese Communist Influence. Breitbart. I AM GROOT [I_Am_Grooootttt]. (2020, April 3). the REAL China [Twitter]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/I_Am_Grooootttt/status/1246121563528839174 Keith, Tamara. (2020). Timeline: What Trump Has Said and Done About the Coronavirus. NPR. Kent, Simon. (2020). Furious China Warns U.S. Over HHS Secretary Azar Visit to Taiwan. Breitbart. Kew, Ben. (2020). Taiwan Fines Airline $35,000 After Pilot Tests Positive for Coronavirus. Breitbart. Kim, Claire Jean. (1999). The racial triangulation of Asian Americans. Politics & Society, 27(1), 105–138. Martel, Frances. (2020). Taiwan Publishes December Letter Warning WHO About Chinese Coronavirus. Breitbart. Museus, Samuel D. and Peter N. Kiang. (2009). Deconstructing the model minority and how it contributes to the invisible minority reality in higher education research. New Directions for Institutional Research, 142, 5–15. Nyeles [NyelesOfficial]. (2020, April 3). the better China [Twitter]. Retrieved from https:// twitter.com/NyelesOfficial/status/1246056616186851328 Park, Edward J.W. and John S.W. Park. (2005). Engineering the Model Minority. Probationary Americas: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities, (97–106). New York: Routledge.) Reyes, Gabrielle. (2020). Taiwan Passes 100 Days with No Local Coronavirus Cases. Breitbart. Samson Mark [sam0sang]. (2020, April 3). Barbarian #CCPChina VS civilized Chinese [Twitter]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/sam0sang/status/1246060836545679360 Siu, Lok and Claire Chun. (2020). Yellow Peril and Techno-Orientalism in the Time of COVID-19. Journal of Asian American Studies, 23(3), 421–440. Taiwan Centers for Disease Control. (2020). The facts regarding Taiwan’s email to alert WHO to possible danger of COVID-19. https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Category/ListContent/ sOn2_m9QgxKqhZ7omgiz1A?uaid=PAD-lbwDHeN_bLa-viBOuw Tucker, Nancy B. (1994). Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships. Woodbridge: Twayne Publishers. Twining, Dan and Patrick Quirk. (2020). Democracy Will Win This Battle. The Hill. Weingarten, Ben. (2020). World Health Organization Director Again Parrots Chinese Propaganda In Anti-Taiwan Tirade. The Federalist. Wong, Joshua 黃之鋒 [joshuawongcf]. (2020, April 3). Wakanda in Asia: Taiwan? [Twitter]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/joshuawongcf/status/1246056414084083712

8 THE MYTHS OF HATE Digital Deception in the (Communal) Times of Covid-19 Saesha Kini and G. Gyanesh

Introduction On 2 April 2020, a video surfaced on social media featuring an undertrial acting defiant with police. The 27-second clip shows the man abusing and even spitting on the police personnel. Facebook user Meghraj Choudhury shared this content to his page along with a caption in Hindi, which translates to, “Those who wanted proof, here it is. The action of angels. Peacefully spitting. They were spitting yesterday, they are also spitting today”. By “angels” and “peacefuls”, he insinuates that the man was among the Muslim attendees at the infamous Covid-19 hotspot in Nizamuddin Markaz, New Delhi. The post by Choudhury, a Hindu, was well-received on social media. However, the video eventually turned out to be an unrelated February 2020 incident that preceded the Markaz incident itself (Chaudhuri, 2020b). By then, the damage was done as several individuals had taken to social media to air contempt and allegations at Muslims for deliberately flouting Covid-19 protocols. The video itself was one among several others which fabricated a communal narrative to a global health crisis. What was the larger purpose behind such machinations, and who were its prime conspirators-cum-benefactors? Covid-19 pandemic has rattled human lives, institutions, economies, and politics worldwide, causing widespread panic, unrest, and a despairing uncertainty about the future. The world is coming to terms with the new order, one marked by soaring cases, overburdened healthcare systems, curfews and lockdowns, social distancing and wearing of masks, testing and quarantine, layoffs and work-fromhome arrangements, endless blame-game, and the race among nations to produce a robust and affordable vaccine. The calamitous circumstance has also created an atmosphere rife with speculations, rumours, stereotyping, false alarms, misinformation, fake news, disinformation, conspiracy theories, and propaganda. These range from unsubstantiated/overgeneralized/debunked claims on the virus source DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-12

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(bat soup, 5G towers), carriers of the virus (Asian people, newspapers, WhatsApp messages), motivations for virus spread (biological warfare), preventive measures against the virus (mask exemptions for people with disabilities, bathing with bleach), and motives behind preventive measures and vaccination (mind-body control, conversion to homosexuality). There have been few cases where a particular group was accused without definitive evidence of intentionally spreading the virus, the most notable case being allegations of biological warfare against China – the epicentre of Covid-19. In India, one of Asia’s fastest-growing nations besides China, Covid-19 took a particularly sinister turn as the pandemic scenario was leveraged to stoke communal tensions using different forms of deceptive communication. The incident which single-handedly triggered the phenomena was the Tablighi Jamaat fiasco in March 2020. A Sunni Muslim missionary with a global presence, the Jamaat’s mid-March meeting during the onset of the pandemic became a Covid-19 hotspot and was linked to over 30% of the reported cases in the coming months. When reports of non-cooperation, misbehaviour, and violence by a minority of its attendees came to light, the situation was exacerbated. The Jamaat received condemnation from across quarters for lapses on its part. Right-wing forces, in particular, troublingly used the incident as a springboard to vilify the Muslim community as a whole. Media played an extensive role in priming public sentiments against Jamaat attendees (and Muslims), with state-sympathizing print and television media mainly serving as valuable mouthpieces. Even more alarming was the spike in online disinformation targeted at Muslims, with dispersed IT cells predominantly creating and circulating such content (Banaji and Bhat, 2020). In this chapter, we examine anti-Muslim and Islamophobic online disinformation generated during Covid-19 on the Tablighi-Jamaat incident. We select content declared as “false” by the fact-finding website ALTNews1 and examine four elements that would help understand how such media narratives are produced – actors, goals, media ecosystems, and stratagems. Our chapter opens with a theoretical foundation on deceptive communication, namely its definitions and forms with a particular emphasis on online disinformation. Next, we provide a contextual backdrop to our inquiry by discussing the concept of Islamophobia and the rise of right-wing politics. We follow up with a detailed account of the Tablighi-Jamaat incident during Covid-19. Post-analysis, we discuss the broader implications of these media-narratives, namely, the banalization of evil and the demonization of Muslims and Islam, which transpired amidst the global pandemic.

The Deception Ecosystem Deception exists as an enduring feature throughout human times, extending to spheres including interpersonal relationships, politics, medicine, psychiatry, religion, performing arts, business, media, human relations, advertising, journalism, public relations, law, criminology, diplomacy, warfare, and militancy (Chiluwa &

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Samoilenko, 2019; Docan-Morgan, 2019). Merriam-Webster defines the term as the act of “causing (someone) to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid”. Scholars from disciplines such as philosophy, social psychology, and communication have proposed alternate definitions of deception (Kalbfleisch & Docan-Morgan, 2019). These definitions focus on the deceiver’s intentions, stratagems, actions, manipulations, and fabrications to mislead others. Various manipulations are used in the process of deliberately misleading someone, which includes omission, equivocation, avoidance, and ideological amplification (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). Upon reviewing these, we find that Samoilenko’s definition (2017, p.1) most succinctly captures the elements which comprise deceptive communication. It reads as follows, “Deceptive communication are a set of stratagems that are deliberately employed by pragmatic actors to attain their goals within current media ecosystem”. The myriad forms of deception include false rumours, gossips, malingering, white lies, false denials, outright lying, half-truths, hoaxes, confabulation, spin, science-bending, omission, strategic ambiguity, misappropriation, fake news, photo manipulation, conspiracy theories, black propaganda, and disinformation (Cooke, 2017). The advent of internet technologies offers deceptive communication a new lease of life. In this online deception ecosystem, the actors, forms, scale, and reach of deception have boomed owing to network affordances of replicability, scalability, and shareability (Papacharissi & Easton, 2013). In this chapter, we focus on disinformation as a form of deceptive communication. Disinformation concerns “the distribution, assertion, or dissemination of false, mistaken, or misleading information in an intentional, deliberate, or purposeful effort to mislead, deceive or confuse” (Fetzer, 2004, p.231). Due to the higher distortion of fidelity, disinformation has a relatively short-term goal, to achieve maximum impact before its deception nature is found out. Disinformation has a higher probability of acceptance when its content appeals to the prevailing sentiments of its targets. The statement is particularly true for stereotypes and inaccurate information about outgroups and controversial topics which have captured media attention (Barberá et al., 2018). Social media is frequently used as channels for disinformation, triggering ideological polarization and uncivil exchanges, which sometimes have violent offline implications. Such content often flows upwards via local and high-partisan platforms until it achieves mainstream salience or gets debunked on its journey. Trolls, either independent or hired by companies, the general public, media platforms, government, foreign agencies, conspiracy theorists, hackers, and bots, become the wilful or unwitting carriers for circulating such disinformation. In recent times, various online firms and regulatory bodies, and independent fact-checkers have increased efforts to curb online disinformation and other forms of deceptive communication.

Islamophobia and The Indian State The world has witnessed an explosive rise of Islamophobia in modern history. Islamophobia refers to the “unreasonable dislike, fear and hatred of or prejudice

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against the Islamic religion or Muslims generally, especially when seen as a geopolitical force” (Ushama, 2020, p.2). Adherents of Islam are perceived as narrowminded, misogynistic, violent, fanatical, uncivilized, and a threat to modern democracy (Bleich, 2012). Controversial practices among a section of Muslims, including female genital mutilation, honour killing, and violent radicalization, are generalized to the entire populace. Media has played a significant role in framing and priming Islamophobia. The image of Islam promoted by media houses severely regressed between the 1950s and 2000s (Akbarzadeh, 2016). Post-9/11 incident, media houses aggressively played up the clash of civilizations narrative where Islam became antithetical to a supposedly superior (Western) modernity. Negative public attitudes gave rise to derogatory stereotypes about Islam and social discrimination and exclusion of Muslims at both interpersonal and institutional levels (Wilkins-Laflamme, 2018). India, home to over 200 million Muslims who form the largest minority religion, has witnessed a steep rise in Islamophobia over the last century. Islamophobia in India has roots in the Mughal rule over the Indian subcontinent from 16th to 19th century. While the relations between Hindus, the religious majority, and Muslims are historically cordial for the most part, certain sections of Hindus have doggedly pursued the alleged Mughal atrocities of the past, such as forced conversions and demolition of non-Islamic places of worship (Ushama, 2020). Islamophobia amplified dramatically during the partition of 1947 as several Muslims demanded a separate national identity (Ikram, 1995). Post-independence, anti-Muslim sentiments, and Hindu-Muslim riots remained prevalent whether during Indian National Congress or Bharatiya Janata Party rule (Cheema, 2017). The dramatic rise of Islamophobia however coincided with the rise of Hindu right-wing nationalism and populism. Such a phenomenon has been especially witnessed in the last decade, a period marked by chauvinistic and virulent forms of nationalism and populism in multiple nations globally along with weakening of democracy (Bieber, 2018). Anderson and Jaffrelot (2018) identify two key strategies that helped broaden Hindu nationalist influence. First, diligent work to gain support at the grassroots. Second, the establishment of a host of periodicals and publishing houses that ran parallel to leftist, elite, and metropolitan media to appeal to populist rhetoric. With the recent electoral verdicts in India, the world’s largest secular democracy inches close to becoming a majoritarian state. McDonnell and Cabrera (2019), in their study on right-wing populism in India, draw attention to how key political figures have resorted to creating distinctions between “the people”, “elites”, and “others”. The patriotic and fundamentally-united believers of the “Hindu” way of life and deemed loyal to the land were deemed “the people”. This may extend to Indian religious minorities as well, albeit conditional to their allegiance to (Hindu) nationalism. Those perceived as failing to subscribe to homogenous conception of nationality, and whose actions were labelled unpatriotic or threatening the Hindu (nationalist) vision were derogated as “elites” or “others” (McDonnell & Cabrera, 2019). Such distinctions have manifested an increased frequency of anti-minority sentiments and religious hate crimes (Ayyub, 2019).

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Muslims are especially singled out as both the enemy within and the enemy beyond, with incidents of communal tensions, terrorism, and migration (as well as general prejudice towards the Islamic way of life) becoming fodder to demonize the community (Leidig, 2020). The “saffronization of the public sphere” (Anderson & Jaffrelot, 2018) and the concurrent rise of Islamophobia have extended to and exponentially magnified in the digital space (Mirchandani, 2018). Banaji and Bhat’s recent blog (2020) discusses how staunch right-wing supporters have significantly taken advantage of the pandemic to flood Islamophobic anti-Muslim disinformation online. The authors identify the key elements of such deception: actors, goals, media ecosystems, and stratagems. The actors responsible for deliberately creating and spreading disinformation include dispersed IT cells and avowed Hindu nationalist groups, which usually comprise Hindu men from upper and middle caste/class positions. They produce their own “vernacular expressions” of Hindu nationalism (Anderson & Jaffrelot, 2018) as well as share content of ideologically right-wing media to frame Islam as the common enemy, similar to Chomsky’s propaganda filter of anticommunist ideology. Macleod (2019), assessing relevance of Chomsky’s propaganda filters in the present age, notes how the anti-communist ideology filter has become nebulous and malleable in the age of new media technologies and is wielded against any group or state. In this regard, while Islam and Muslims remain the primary targets, online disinformation has also been used to villainize other individuals or communities deemed antithetical to Hindu nationalism (Chatterji et al., 2019). Youth with basic computer literacy who seek entrepreneurial opportunities are also lured by NGOs and shadowy firms with the promise of either monetary reward or mileage in politics (Banaji & Bhat, 2020). The authors suggest the use of local actors allows disinformation to “inflect broader imaginaries with local contexts” (ibid, p.2). Digital affordances, facilitating differentiated mass distribution, allow the actors to execute their goal of promoting Hindu nationalism/Muslim-bashing in potentially new ways (Anderson & Jaffrelot, 2018). Tactics of persuasion include encoding exaggerated and shocking imagery, which evokes a strong emotional response from potential targets. The content is likewise embedded amidst the “constant flow of banal messaging from ‘trusted elders’ or ‘community leaders’” (ibid, p.3), which ensures it incurs limited cognitive evaluation by the targets. Sharing disinformation also becomes a performance of group membership and a militant show of strength towards Hindu nationalism, and against Islam.

The Communal Turn of Covid-19 Given India’s long-standing history of Hindu-Muslim conflict and the unprecedented rise of Hindu nationalist politics, it comes as no surprise that the Covid-19 global pandemic took a communal turn at the first opportunity. The nation began taking concrete measures against the pandemic starting MidMarch of 2020, much after it had gravely affected nations, including China and

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France. These measures were initially circumscribed to India’s capital city of Delhi, which passed orders to curb the gatherings by large groups. The Central government subsequently announced a nationwide curfew on March 22nd before enforcing a complete lockdown starting March 24th. Several people were left stranded at their locations, with public transport coming to a sudden and grinding halt. The Tablighi Jamaat fiasco panned out around this time. Tablighi Jamaat is a non-political global Sunni Islamic missionary movement to shape the Islamic community centred on the Koran. It has active patronage among the Muslim community in India as well. Between 13th and 15th March 2020, Tablighi Jamaat held large congregations at the Nizamuddin Markaz, New Delhi, which drew people from across 40 nations. Coincidently, it happened right when the Delhi government had enforced restrictions on large gatherings. Following the congregations, around 2500 people stayed back at the Markaz quarters, whereas the rest commenced nationwide missionary activities. When the Central government announced its curfew a week later, another 1500 attendees evacuated from mosque premises. The remaining were evacuated by the end of March. Unfortunately, the Markaz became a Covid-19 “hotspot” by then, with nearly 30% of the nation’s positive cases linked to the Delhi congregations. Tablighi Jamaat, along with its leader Muhammad Saad Kandhalvi, received tremendous flak from all quarters for alleged lapses on their part. The group meanwhile insisted they had followed stipulated guidelines and blamed the government’s delayed actions. Our objective is not to investigate the veracity of claims by Tablighi Jamaat and government officials. We are more interested in understanding the media narratives that emerged around this event, focusing on online disinformation. To start, we conducted a preliminary review of narratives in print articles published on the topic between 31st March and 6th April 2020, taking two leading English-language Indian newspapers, namely the Times of India and Hindustan Times. This process helped us identify six overarching narratives in traditional mainstream media, all of which were sharply critical of Tablighi Jamaat and presented them as, 1) A threat to humanity, 2) Responsible for virus outspread, 3) Disobedient with local civic bodies, 4) Violators of government protocol, 5) Dishonest, and 6) Part of an international terrorist conspiracy against the nation. We also observed the use of strong language bordering on hyperbole and name-calling through words like “intransigent”, “callousness”, “aggressive”, “sin”, “Jamaat virus”, “biojihad”, “Muslim bigots”, and “pushed innocent Tablighis into the jaws of a pandemic”. Mainstream Indian media thus played a strong role in framing negative perceptions towards the Tablighi Jamaat among the wider public, eventually spiralling into a massive online backlash against Jamaat members (Shantha, 2020). During this period, there was a sharp spike in Islamophobic disinformation online, which targeted Jamaat attendees in particular or Muslims and Islam in general. Such content was woven around prevailing mainstream media narratives, albeit with manipulations to promote an explicitly communal angle. ALTNews, a factchecking website certified by the International Fact-Checking Network, has debunked several such disinformation. Similar to Humprecht’s data collection approach (2019)

The Myths of Hate  117 TABLE 8.1  Cases of disinformation selected for study from ALTNews website

Title

Type

Published Date

Old, unrelated video shared as Muslims licking utensils to spread coronavirus infection (Chaudhuri, 2020a) Viral audio falsely claims Muslim vendors have sprung up in Surat to spread coronavirus (Patel, 2020a) Old video from Pakistan falsely went viral as Tablighi Jamaat member roaming naked in an isolation ward (Patel, 2020b) Video from Bijnor went viral with the false allegation that an elderly Muslim vendor sprinkled urine on fruits ( Jha, 2020)

Audiovisual (digital)

1 April 2020

Audio (digital)

7 April 2020

Image (digital)

8 April 2020

Audiovisual (digital)

24 April 2020

while studying online disinformation in Western democracies, we choose disinformation identified by the ALTNews website and selected four such cases. After searching for the keywords “Tablighi Jamaat” and “Muslim” on ALTNews’ search box, we purposively traced for articles revolving around online disinformation, i.e., information created and shared primarily on social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, or internet-enabled messaging like WhatsApp. The articles were selected from April 2020 (see Table 8.1), i.e., when the incident was fresh in the news.

Decoding Digital Disinformation We analyse the information based on Samoilenko’s (2017) definition of deceptive communication, which identifies four primary elements – the actors, the goals, the media ecosystems, and the stratagems.

Actors There were two actors, one responsible for creating the original disinformation and the second for sharing the message. The majority of creators (the source deceiver) maintained complete or partial anonymity. In one instance, we found the person giving sparse background details, such as their locality. In most cases, ALTNews did not confirm who exactly was responsible for producing the disinformation, as it already reached a large audience before ALTNews could encounter and debunk it. Hindu-nationalist supporters, right-wing politicians, TV anchors, public personalities, and self-proclaimed nationalists, in general, were primarily the targets for the disinformation. Words used in this effect include “bharatvaasi ke bhai beheno” and “Hindu bhaiyon” (Patel, 2020a). Not every disinformation explicitly addressed someone; however, the mere mention of loaded words like “Mulla” and “Jihadi” (both used derogatorily by Hindus towards Muslims) and “Jamaati” sufficed in drawing particular targets.

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Those who shared the disinformation include BJP media panellist Rohit Chahal, editor-in-chief of high-partisan Sudarshan News Suresh Chavhanke, Facebook page Hindustan ke Awaaz Live, and vocal critic of Islam Pakistani-Canadian author Tarek Fatah. Chavhanke, sharing a video falsely accusing an elderly Muslim man of sprinkling urine on fruits, tweeted (translated from Hindi to English): In UP’s Bijnor, this Jihadi was caught [filling] bottles with urine and sprinkling it on fruits. After he was caught he began playing the victim card. Don’t get influenced by… either left-wing portals or anti-Hindu fact­-checkers. What I’m claiming is 100% true…#BindasBol#आर्थिक_बहिष्कार (followed by a link to article). (2020) In the tweet, the actor interestingly projects alternate information sources, such as fact-checkers and left-wing publications, antagonistically. Statements like these aim to tighten ideological actor-networks.

Goals The disinformation was partly based on the existing mainstream media narrative, albeit with explicitly communal pro-Hindu/anti-Muslim sentiments. Their goals ranged from distrusting Muslims, calling for an economic and social boycott, outraging over Tablighi Jamaat’s conduct, promoting it as a terror group with an anti-national conspiracy, and projecting Hindus as victims of Muslim villainy. A Twitter user, reacting to a video of a man behaving unruly, tweets: “Look how the Tablighi Jamaat members act vulgar and cause terror even during self-isolation” (Sharma, 2020). The video was eventually an old unrelated episode in Karachi, Pakistan (Patel, 2020b).

Media Ecosystems The primary media platforms for spreading digital disinformation included social media (Facebook, Twitter) and messaging apps (WhatsApp). Consistent with Banaji and Bhat (2020) the content flowed upward from local actors to gain virality among a much more extensive network.

Stratagems Producing the disinformation itself involves a set of stratagems, including 1) Manipulation, 2) Tonality, 3) Localization, 4) Stereotyping and dehumanization, and 5) Pro-Hindu/Anti-Muslim and “nationalist” sentiment. Manipulations: Manipulations include the use of an image out of context. For instance, one video claimed that Muslims were intentionally licking utensils to

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spread Covid-19. It was later found to be a 2018 clip of the Dawoodi Bohra Muslim sect practising the custom to avoid food wastage. Tonality: The tonality ranged from equanimity to urgency and aggression. In an audio-clip falsely claiming the presence of Muslim vendors in Surat city of Gujarat (Patel, 2020a), the narrator sounded composed throughout and urged listeners to decide for themselves. The lack of sensationalism, in this case, seemed to increase message credibility. On the other hand, an emotional appeal accompanied by shocking visuals to grab attention and rile up sentiments. Localization: The disinformation was localized by language to broaden its reach and appeal among prospective targets. The audio-clip spreading rumours about Muslim vendors (ibid) was made both in Hindi and Gujarati to gain national and regional spread. Stereotyping and dehumanization: The disinformation selected visuals with Muslims having identifiable religious markers like topi2 to perpetuate existing stereotypes. Besides, dehumanizing words such as “jihadi” (terrorist, in this case) and “Hindu virodhi” (enemy of the Hindu) were used repeatedly for Muslims. Pro-Hindu/Anti-Muslim and “nationalist” sentiment: The common link among all the disinformation, whether expressly or subtly conveyed, was a call to Hindus/ Hindu nationalists to protect national integrity against the terror of Muslims/ Islam. To quote the narrator of the audio-clip on Muslim vendors (translated from Hindi), If we Hindus don’t come together that there will be a big problem ahead. It’s possible that they [Muslims] are running their Jihad by doing this… Bharat mata ki jay (Salute to Mother India)! (Patel, 2020a) To conclude, digital disinformation aimed to cultivate fears that India was under imminent threat of Islamization from its country’s own Muslims, who were allegedly using Covid-19 as a warlike weapon. To quote a tweet, “Stay aware, stay safe. Coronavirus is not spreading in India but it is being spread in the country” (Chaudhuri, 2020a). Hindu nationalism was the only solution to (imagined) “terror” where, instead of silently witnessing (claimed) Islamic atrocities, confrontation and vigilantism would become the new India’s modus operandi.

Concluding Remarks: The Myths of Hate Indians have had a long-held penchant for myth-making. This is exemplified in their response to the Covid-19 global pandemic as well. The mythical theme of good vanquishing evil and “us” versus “others” manifested in the communalization of the pandemic last year. The heroes in this narrative were Hindus, the selfanointed “rightful” inhabitants of Akhand Bharat3. They were the dutiful citizens, abiding by every health-guidelines and following state-orders and initiatives, be it

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junta curfew, banging vessels, or lighting diyas. On the other side were the Muslims, threatening, invading Others whose presence contravened the Hindu nationalist dream of Akhand Bharat. Theirs were the disobedient lot, who were found pelting stones at health officials and questioning the state’s treatment towards them. As the mythical narrative goes, the (Islamic) evil had to be fought and won against, and only restoring a Hindu nation could make this evitable. To do so, the Tablighi Jamaat incident, at worst a terrible mistake, was mythicized into something it never was – an Islamic plot against (Hindu) national integrity. Media was generously used to this effect, with our inquiry revealing some ways in which disinformation fabricated such myths and released them into cyberspace. The incident became yet another in the series of efforts to demonize Islam and subject Indian Muslims to condemnation and incarceration. Post-Tablighi Jamaat, the state clampdown on Muslims has only grown over months, be it through the arbitrary use of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act to arrest activists (and even comedians) and the state-level introduction of “love jihad”4 ordinances. The hypocrisy in media’s treatment towards its largest religious minority of Muslims and its majority of Hindus became evident during the recent Kumbh Mela.5 The pilgrimage took place with state sanction at a time when the nation faced its worst Covid-19 crisis yet. It was eventually cut short as many visitors tested positive. The media flak towards Kumbh Mela paled compared to the virulence against Tablighi Jamaat (Bajpai, 2021), though the latter incident happened during the onset of the pandemic when public awareness was relatively low. This only reinforces our argument that the Tablighi Jamaat incident was exploited to consolidate and embolden Hindu nationalist powers, as witnessed in the increasing demonization of the nation’s secularism and fervour towards reclaiming Hindu places of worship that were allegedly destroyed during the Mughal rule. As these myths become closer to reality and unfold in our everyday lives, we witness the trail of destruction they leave behind, the banalization of evil and politics of hatred, and above all, the loss of our humanity in times of pandemic, when we need it the most.

Notes 1 AltNews is an independently-run fact-checking website based out of India. The initiative, co-founded in the year 2017 by Pratik Sinha and Mohammed Zubair, is committed to debunking disinformation and misinformation both on social media and in mainstream media. 2 Topi or taqiyah are skull caps worn by Muslims usually for religious purposes. 3 The idea of Akhand Bharat or “Undivided India”, as advocated by many Hindu nationalists, refers to the reunification of the territory of ancient Bharat, encompassing India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Tibet. 4 Love Jihad is a Hindu right-wing conspiracy theory claiming Muslim men lure Hindu women into marriage with the hidden motive to convert them to Islam. 5 The Kumbh Mela, a religious gathering of the Hindus, is the largest gathering event in the world.

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Fetzer, J. H. (2004). Disinformation: The use of false information. Minds and Machines, 14(2), 231–240. Humprecht, E. (2019). Where “fake news” flourishes: a comparison across four Western democracies. Information, Communication & Society, 22(13), 1973–1988. Ikram, S. M. (1995). Indian Muslims and partition of India. New Delhi: Atlantic & Distributors. Jha, P. (2020, April 24). Video from Bijnor viral with false allegation that elderly Muslim vendor sprinkled urine on fruits. Retrieved May 5, 2020, from https://www.reddit.com/r/ unitedstatesofindia/comments/g77s05/video_from_bijnor_viral_with_false_allegation/ Kalbfleisch, P. J., & Docan-Morgan, T. (2019). Defining truthfulness, deception, and related concepts. In T. Docan-Morgan (Ed.), The palgrave handbook of deceptive communication (pp. 29–39). Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Leidig, E. (2020). Hindutva as a variant of right-wing extremism. Patterns of Prejudice, 54(3), 215–237. MacLeod, A. (2019). Assessing the strength of the five filters today. In A. McLeod (Ed.), Propaganda in the information age: Still manufacturing consent. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. McDonnell, D., & Cabrera, L. (2019). The right-wing populism of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (and why comparativists should care). Democratization, 26(3), 484–501. Mirchandani, M. (2018). Digital hatred, real violence: Majoritarian radicalisation and social media in India. ORF Occasional Paper, 167. Papacharissi, Z., & Easton, E. (2013). In the habitus of the new. A Companion to New Media Dynamics, 171–184. Patel, J. (2020a, April 7). Viral audio falsely claims Muslim vendors have sprung up in Surat to spread coronavirus. Retrieved May 5, 2020, from https://www.altnews.in/viral-audiofalsely-claims-muslim-vendors-have-sprung-up-in-surat-to-spread-coronavirus/ Patel, J. (2020b, April 8). Old video from PAKISTAN Falsely viral as Tablighi Jamaat Member ROAMING naked in isolation ward. Retrieved March 11, 2021, from https:// www.altnews.in/old-video-from-pakistan-shared-as-tablighi-jamaat-member-roamingnaked-in-isolation-ward/ Samoilenko, S. (2017). Strategic deception in the age of “truthiness”. In I. Chiluwa (Ed.), Deception & deceptive communication: Motivations, recognition techniques and behavioral control (pp. 129–168). New York: Nova Science Publishers. Shantha, S. (2020, November 18). COVID, Communal Reporting and Centre’s Attempt to Use Independent Media as Alibi for Inaction. The Wire. Retrieved from https://thewire. in/communalism/tablighi-jamaat-communal-reporting-ib-ministry-coronavirus Sharma, R. [@RajShar41438261]. (2020, April 7). देखिए 14 दिन के एकांतवास में भी इन तबलीगी जमात के लोगों ने अश्लीलता और आतं क मचा रखा हैै [Tweet; thumbnail link to video]. Twitter. Tweet unavailable. Ushama, T. (2020). Islamophobia in India: an exploration of its roots, rise and history. Al-Shajarah: Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), 25(1), 1–29. Wilkins-Laflamme, S. (2018). Islamophobia in Canada: Measuring the realities of negative attitudes toward Muslims and religious discrimination. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne de Sociologie, 55(1), 86–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/cars.12180

9 RISK COMMUNICATION VERSUS RISKS IN COMMUNICATION Efforts of Vietnam Government in Controlling Messages during the Covid-19 Pandemic Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen and Nguyen Thanh Mai

Introduction With a large population and sharing more than 1000 kilometers of boundary with China, Vietnam was one of the first countries in the world with a confirmed case of Covid-19 and officially announced the pandemic in January 2020. However, thanks to effective disease control, Vietnam remained stable as the country with the lowest rate of Covid-19 patients per one million people in the world. Until January 20, 2021, the total number of confirmed cases in Vietnam was 1540, including 35 deaths. Vietnam is also one of the first four countries that was able to isolate a new variant. Within a short period of time since the pandemic, it proactively produced mechanical ventilators and test kits, and began testing of the Covid-19 vaccine. The Ministry of Health (MoH) of Vietnam evaluated that the battle against the Covid-19 result was one of the ten achievements of the health industry in 2020, and emphasized that one of the main reasons was the innovation and assurance of communication; it is certain that all people were announced to prevent and fight the pandemic. Therefore, research on communication activities countering the risk of Covid-19 in Vietnam can contribute to introducing lessons for communicators and scholars. The fight is still ongoing. As of this writing, a new wave of disease infection broke out in Northern Vietnam, very close to the traditional Lunar New Year holidays. The research shows that disease prevention is growing increasingly complicated, and that the communication lessons that Vietnam has experienced are not only of successes, but also the risks and challenges which need further research. The chapter aims to analyze Covid-19 pandemic prevention communication in Vietnam by describing the national government’s communication system; analyzing and evaluating some of the core messages and transmission methods using the various media channels, and considering related variables such as cultural identity or community support. DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-13

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Literature Background Risk communication is a communication process in which individuals, groups, and organizations exchange opinions and information about the level of risk, its importance, and the decisions, policies and actions to take risk management and control (Covello, 1986; Powell & Leiss, 1997). The term “risk communication” originates by exactly what field is still debated by many scholars, however, most acknowledge that it has been researched since the 1980s. Derived from the 1979 incident at the Three Miles Island nuclear power plant in the US, followed by a series of large-scale chemical incidents in the mid-1980s, risk communication was conducted by the US parliament and government agencies with a wide range of legal and policy efforts. In primitive risk communication research, risk communication meant unilaterally providing objective information obtained from experts to the public. Risk communication provides accurate knowledge to the public and modifies public risk perceptions to reduce differences in perception between the public and experts. Thereafter, risk communication has expanded from one-way communication to two-way communication based on voluntary participation, which is a two-way exchange of opinions and mutual agreement. In particular, the public is considered an important factor in the risk communication process, acting as a participant in the communication, along with other subjects such as experts and government participants in the communication process to exchange information, knowledge, values, beliefs and feelings (Grabill & Simmons, 1998). In this two-way risk communication model, sources and the public are considered equal factors in the communication process and emphasize coordination, consensus through mutual exchange during the communication process. To the public, risk is subjective perception and judgment and is the result of a social product generated by social interaction. According to the theory of Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson, 1992), risk is reinterpreted by individuals or groups and transmitted back to members of society. Through this communication process, risk is reprocessed and reinterpreted with socio-cultural values and beliefs. In other words, risk begins with physical and reality dangers, but is socially broadened and narrowed by psychological factors that influence the interpretation and transmission of risk that is based on values and beliefs related to risk (Kasperson et al., 1988). Risk communication mentions all decisions, actions or policies to control or manage risk (Covello & Slovic, 2001). Therefore, its most important purpose is to provide the public with sufficient information and knowledge about specific risk issues, so that the public can effectively cope with the risks involved. In other words, risk communication does not only provide information or knowledge related to risk, but also promotes attitude or behavior changes of individuals, groups, and even the whole society. It can be related to various issues such as environmental pollution, climate change, natural disasters, epidemics, etc. In particular, the most outstanding issue that concerns the public most recently is the Covid-19 pandemic due to its direct

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relation to health and its detrimental effects to life. At the same time, aside from its rapid spreading speed, the severity increases fast and influences all over the world. Therefore, this can be considered as an urgent issue that the governments as well as the whole society have been facing, requiring researchers and communicators to build and implement the effective risk communication campaigns (RCCs). In risk communication, many complex factors such as individual psychology, social system, politics, culture, etc., all influence public perception and behavior. According to the Social Amplification of Risk Framework theory (Kasperson, 1992), risk is widened or narrowed by the interplay between members of society, that is, between the public and organizations, agencies, the media and the government. This process consists of two specific phases, including the transmission of information related to risks and social response. When risks arise, information will be announced and explained by the media, organizations and individuals, and the problem is widely spread in society. Then, the public will respond to the problem, leading to a series of involved actions, and these actions can lead to a secondary reaction (ripple effects). In addition to improving communication effectiveness, especially in risk communication, the communicators need to focus on raising public awareness about the level of risk. Thereby, promoting the public to change behavior from passive to active, so that the public can actively participate in the communication process. With this positive response, communication efficiency is enhanced. Communication in the prevention of the Covid-19 epidemic in Vietnam not only follows the totalitarian communication model, but also combines with the asymmetric two-way model to ensure uniformity and synchronicity while still creating opportunities for the public to actively participate in the communication process. Meanwhile, emphasizing on emotional factors, such as enhancing the spirit of national solidarity, national pride and creating artistic, intimate message content to reduce strain, had not only active responses from the public, but also active attitudes and behaviors changing on disease prevention.

Organizational Model of Covid-19 Prevention Communication System of the Government of Vietnam Since the first confirmed Covid-19 case, the Vietnamese government had closely monitored the epidemic developments and affirmed the risk of a strong impact due to the shared borderline with China, the large population, and the poor medical infrastructure. “Fight epidemic as fighting enemies” is the appeal of PM. Nguyen Xuan Phuc in his statements and official documents guiding to counter the epidemic. As a country which experienced many wars with much grief and loss, this immediately created great sympathy among every citizen because of its clear definition of the wartime mind, “all for the front-lines”. Hence, it attracted both the political system and citizens once again, united to fight against the common enemy. The prevention strategy is activated with an earlier and higher level of warning regarding the anxiety of the subjective risk of outbreaks.

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The most prominent point is the comprehensiveness and consistency of the epidemic prevention activities. Along with the anti-pandemic campaign, communication activities to respond to epidemics in Vietnam have been effective and synchronously implemented on a large scale. One of their bases which regards synchronism is the organized model of inter-organization coordination affairs. With its experience in dealing with previous infectious diseases, especially the SARs in 2003, Vietnam enacted the Law on Disease Prevention in 2007 with clear regulations on organizing communication during an epidemic. From this law, the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) is responsible for directing mass media to regularly inform and communicate on preventing infectious diseases and integrate the aforementioned program with other communication programs. Thus, communication activities during the epidemic phase of the Vietnamese government are not only the implementation responsibility of an individual party but also the interdisciplinary coordination of all relevant media agencies. According to the law, all press agencies in Vietnam operate under the state’s management, with no private press. Therefore, this way of organizing communication activities ensures the integrity of information when the MIC is responsible for and when it’s directing. This partly avoids information conflicts among media agencies, contributes to controlling public opinion when false, fake news, and unorthodox news appear, especially in the open information era, and information influences significantly on the public’s mind nowadays. To well implement the provisions of the Law on Disease Prevention in 2007, decision 34/2007/QD-TTg on regulations on the establishment of inter-agency coordination organizations and decision 56/2010/QD-TTg prescribe the authority to establish, organize, and operate the anti-epidemic committee at all levels had been issued. Based on these two legal documents, the government’s operational model for the National Committee for Disease Prevention (NCPD) was determined. The communication model of Vietnam in the epidemic prevention campaign is also similar. During the Covid-19 pandemic prevention campaign, the NCPD was officially established according to decision 170/QD-TTg on 2020/01/30, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam is its head. Until 2020/02/07, more members were added, four anti-epidemic subcommittees were established according to decision 216/ QD-TTg and 80/QD-BCĐQG. The four subcommittees on epidemic prevention include: the monitoring, treatment, communication, and logistical subcommittees. Not only the central level, the local administrative levels such as commune, ward, organizations, schools, companies, etc., also have their own committee, similar to the operating model and linkage to the national committee. In which the members of the committee include representatives of relevant ministries, agencies, and organizations. With the task of advising and supporting the committee’s chief, planning and controlling communication activities, the communication subcommittee participates in the national main media agencies. Its members are chosen by the Prime Minister, including nine individuals who are representatives of the MIC, MoH, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism; Television Broadcasting, Radio Station,

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Vietnam News Agency, Central Communication Department, Viettel Military Telecom Corporation, and VNPT. Accordingly, MIC is responsible for mobilizing, organizing activities, and assigning tasks to relevant agencies. The communication subcommittee will also work closely with the MoH, especially the Department of Communications (DoC), and coordinate with other major organizations such as WHO and CDC. The activities of the campaign to counter pandemic requires fulfilling three main tasks: (1) provide information and communication about the epidemic situation and anti-epidemic measures, (2) communicate to encourage and raise people’s awareness of observing the government’s direction, and (3) control and correct untruthful sources that causing public confusion. The campaign’s communication activities, as well as the epidemic prevention activities, have been implemented both in breadth and depth. The breadth is reflected via the linking of all relevant domestic and foreign media. In addition, the depth of communication activities is exploited by interdisciplinary coordination to exploit the right aspects, in accordance with the principles of health communication. In-depth interviews with DoC leaders showed that it is responsible for coordinating communication activities, issuing guidance documents to the local DoCs, advising the national committee on the orienting communication activities, and developing sample communication materials in various forms such as infographic, video, etc. These documents will be saved online and can be accessed by everyone. On MoH’s official page, there is a specialized site that continuously updates on Covid-19 pandemic prevention situations at https://ncov.moh.gov.vn. In addition, the DoC also collaborated with branches of major health organizations in Vietnam such as WHO to develop communication materials. On Facebook, the MoH has two fanpages, namely Vietnam Health and Ministry of Health. On YouTube, it also had a channel for posting commanding clips by the government, the committee, and itself. The Department also coordinates with the MIC to send SMS messages to all citizens. In applications such as Lotus, Grab, etc., there is also an anti-epidemic section that also provides information from the MoH. Eventually, TV screens in buildings and hospitals broadcast the epidemic prevention program. The MoH also has its own hotline number, and a list of hotlines of central and local health agencies for public use. Its Health & Life Newspaper page is constantly updated with epidemic prevention’s information. E-newspapers also rely on their original documents to post information besides their other articles. Local media can get information updated by connecting and sharing with the MoH’s permanent network of medical reporters. The network has updated information continuously at least twice a day through OneDrive to ensure consistency. For social networks, the MoH has organized social networking sites, such as its fanpage, Vietnam Health, to provide official information. It also uses many other social platforms including Facebook, Zalo, or Viber to distribute media documents. The MIC is responsible for handling rumors and fake news related to Covid-19 by monitoring and verifying information from the MoH and closely cooperates with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).

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The Covid-19 anti-epidemic communication model of the Vietnamese government shows responsibility, coherence, consistency, and avoidance of risks in direction, administration, and implementation. However, this model still contains the risk in early stages of outbreak, when the communication systems for epidemic prevention have not been properly and smoothly operated, and have not taken advantage of the social network – where most people used Facebook as a daily communication channel. It caused discontent, even panic, and runaways from the area before lockdown time when patient No.17 appeared and caused the first wave of community infection. Meanwhile, due to inexperience in controlling information, the patient’s personal information was published publicly in the press and on social networks, causing the appearance of psychological fear of medical reporting. Rumors of new cases, critical opinions to new regulations announced such as canceling the pharmacy permission if they increase the price of masks and medical supplies, request domestic sewing factories focusing on producing masks, curfews in place or the indecision of the Ministry of Education and Training on allowing students to go to school or take exams unnecessarily, etc., that spread on social networks also have caused discontent in community. These are lessons that communicators and administrators must notice when communicating risks.

Message about Covid-19 Pandemic Prevention by Government The communication message about the Covid-19 translation is posted by the government of Vietnam on a diverse system of transmission channels. Beside social advertisements, disease prevention instructions are also displayed outdoors on TV screens in crowded places such as residential areas, clinics, hospitals, schools, etc. In response to the disease, the communication subcommittee always set the task following the fundamental goals set out by the national committee for Covid-19 prevention, related to changing public awareness, consciousness, attitudes and behavior, and coping well with the risks during the epidemic. From these basic goals, the messaging system of RCC to respond to the disease was also formed. However, in reality, information contents are increasingly plentiful, diversified, and constantly changing. Thus, the three above information target groups are just basic instructions. These groups need to expand and deepen the range of information so as not to miss information and creatively report. In a media campaign, the active and passive public will show different reactions that largely depend on their emotions. Therefore, for the maximum effectiveness of the message, the communicator needs to stimulate the most positivity among the public. It comes from the relationship, connections between the public and the disease risk or the attention they receive in the campaign. Basically, the communication campaign against Covid-19 in Vietnam has three main message groups corresponding to three communication objectives of the government as follows: (1) messages that update situations, (2) messages that guide and direct the public, (3) messages that raise public sense of social responsibility and positive emotions. These are the foundation for effective communication content.

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If the first is informative, the second aims to encourage public participation. In particular, the last one plays a role in stabilizing, adjusting the public’s emotions, avoiding confusion, and acting wrongly or unexpectedly communicating risks. Besides, in order to achieve the best communication goals, they are interlocked. When messages are made carefully and communicated in the right direction, information combined with many messages can obtain more effective results, even receiving a high response from the public. During the national committee meetings as well as during the government announcements, these types of messages were easily discernible. Continuously emphasized and transmitted in many different forms, they gradually become familiar to the public. Some of them are shown in Table 9.1. Various types of messages are displayed continuously on many channels at the same time. For example, news reports on the number of new/cured cases are officially announced twice a day, in early morning and late afternoon for the public to follow. Second type messages, as shown above, are given every time when an epidemic develops, such as group infection and the prevention committee have to raise alert level. However, in each period, there are some types of messages that are given more emphasis. In particular, storytelling messages play an important role in creating the best effect for prevention messages and guidance messages. The first two types of messages are informative, imperative, and closed; contrary, storytelling messages are open and relevant to daily life, so it is easy to attract the public’s attention and discussion, connecting them to the campaign and creating conditions for the public to recognize those messages. In its most common form, storytelling messages will be explained by the facts related to the disease. These events will be set up as an agenda, arousing discussions that transfer the prevention message or anti-epidemic message. We could give examples of discussions with topics which may be familiar or unfamiliar to the public. From them, the messages of prevention or anti-epidemic were expressed implicitly or explicitly. Sometimes there are open questions for the public to help themselves to find out. These messages have played an important role in the easier transmission of prevention and anti-epidemic work. The communication content during the epidemic season is considerably wide and involves many different fields, and the implementation method of each press agency is not the same. This difference will be suggested to the public. They will rely on the characteristics of each website to choose whether to access it or not. It is also the decisive factor to implement and arrange message groups on each website. In the anti-epidemic communication campaign of the MoH and the Vietnamese government, besides using their mainstream media, they also use their own news sites on Facebook to promote communication activities. Being Vietnam’s most used social media, with over 60 million users, there are six main news sites including: VTV, VOV (TV and radio broadcasting in general), official MoH and Government of Vietnam’s sites, etc. Considering the content characteristics of each news site, the campaign can be divided into three main categories: administrative, health, and news sites.

130  Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen and Nguyen Thanh Mai TABLE 9.1  Examples of government announcement messages

Type of messages

Examples

Situation updates

- Number of new confirmed cases, cured, and death - Epidemiological investigation of confirmed cases and calling for health declaration - Measures to prevent epidemics in important places such as borders, schools, hospitals, and places where people are crowded - Simple individualized prevention measures – “5K” in Vietnamese language. - Treatment and recovery progress of major cases and for even foreigners (Chinese patients, British pilot case, etc.) - PM’s statement - Self-curfew imposed - Inter-agency coordination in epidemic prevention - Offers financial assistance packages and quarantine fee policy - Penalties for those who deliberately cause discontent and public confusion - Organized rescue flights to Danang city and abroad - Strengthen slogan “Let no one be left behind” with supporting by the government, companies, and communities to whom affected by Covid-19 (produce free rice ATM; donating food, protection materials such as masks and blouse for medical staff, soldiers, and police; donating masks, hand cleansing, disinfected water for patients’ family, etc.) - Countering rumors - “We will do our best to fight to cure and save the lives of the patients”: update the progress of major cases, especially the case of British patients. - “Prevention is better than cure”: comply with hygiene management guidelines, enhancing health, and nutrition - Coexistence safely with epidemic but not neglect it because the fighting is still ahead - Request for solidarity, supporting each other, together with the government against the epidemic - Influential images about the sacrifice of counter-disease people - Young people’s creative activities in anti-epidemic communication: making videos, challenges online, etc.

Direction and guidance

Social responsibility

We will focus on analyzing content of three main sites, representing the three groups of news sites above, which are also the sites that are most interesting and interacted by the public. We have the statistical results based on the media content broadcasted from 2020/01/01 to 2020/04/30 presented in Table 9.2.

Risk Communication versus Risks in Communication  131 TABLE 9.2  Statistic results about the mainstream media content broadcasted

Site

Situation updates

Direction & guidance

Social responsibility

Total

Government Information VTV24 News Center (belongs to VTV) Health and Life Newspaper (belongs to MoH) Total

253 150 206

93 52 76

190 172 92

536 374 374

609

221

454

1284

The administration of the government information page is highly appreciated because of the higher message count for updating, prevention and fighting against epidemics than the other two. About the VTV24 News Center page, social responsibility messages are the main advantage. The reason is because they are not administrative like the government’s website, nor specific in an area like Health & Life. The social responsibility messages on the VTV24 website are often broadcasted as mass agenda, creating public discussion, through which prevention and anti-epidemic messages are also transferred smoothly. In other words, it has a way to transmit content suitable for storytelling messages that are exchanged, two-way communication with the public. Unlike the aforementioned two, the Health & Life Newspaper is a more specific, specialized site. Its available content and the public’s framed view are often health oriented. Without a strong focus on epidemic updates such as the government information page, the precautionary message is emphasized more professionally, aimed at increasing public awareness of the epidemic and other health issues. Articles of the Health & Life e-newspaper are also regularly shared on the site. Thus, despite the lower content of prevention messages than the government Information page, it has more in-depth content. Posts on Facebook pages receive a relatively high level of interest from the public, expressed through a high number of reactions. Commenting and sharing the two activities also achieved remarkable results. In campaigns, creating topics that stimulate active public participation is not easy. With the topic of interest, news sites have created discussions with thousands of comments or shares that help spread information quickly to the community. About Health & Life Newspaper, health consultancy livestreams of the site have also achieved many good results with most views exceeding 10,000, and there are three counseling programs reaching more than 50,000 views. Thus, the communication activities of the MoH and the government had achieved certain positive results in terms of statistics. Making good use of the strengths of channels and implementing content properly are two reasons for such effective communication. The most concrete demonstration of public participation is the content of comments that are interacted under each post on the government and MoH’s sites. Based on our observations on the information pages mentioned in the study, public

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comments can be classified based on the following four types: positive, negative, suggestions, and request comments. The first type mostly shows the confidence and joy of the public about the situation in Vietnam. These comments appear a lot under posts transfer prevention messages such as updates on patients’ recovery, controllable situation of the pandemic in Vietnam, etc. The second type appears less yet focuses on specific posts. They can be classified into two subsidiaries: comments expressing pessimism and anxiety about disease risks, and ones expressing dissatisfaction with the measures of the government and the MoH. There are not many posts with this type of comment, including some posts that transfer storytelling messages, epidemic prevention regulations, and posts about the worsening situation of the epidemic in Vietnam. Besides showing negative or positive sides, the public also shows a higher level of concern through suggestions and requests. These types often appear in posts that transfer anti-epidemic and storytelling messages. The suggestions are often relevant to the issues. Answer – requesting comments are mostly related to the government’s directions. The specificity and characteristics of the public group are also clearly shown. The public only focuses on asking about issues related to themselves or more. Through some of the above examples, the public actively discusses the situation on the websites of the government and the MoH. Everyone can speak, initiate stories, and express their thoughts. They recognize, discuss the content and express their opinion when the problem is related to themselves. There are cases where some provinces misunderstood the Direction No.16/ CT-Ttg on the date 2020/03/31, leading to the implementation of prohibiting goods’ circulation between localities. Immediately, the committee issued a statement affirming the right way and the communication channels coordinated promptly so that the administrators at all provinces understand the directions. To sum up, through statistics and specific examples, the communication effectiveness of the disease prevention communication campaign of the MoH and the government. The campaign attracted and had a strong impact on the public. The public is not only receptive to the media but also positively responds variably.

Discussion and Conclusion By analyzing the organization model of communication activities for disease prevention and control of Covid-19 of Vietnam government, we found that it applied a two-way asymmetrical model of communication (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). It has shown the activeness and totalitarianism of the state media, yet partly accepted interaction and conversation with the general public. Up to now, this model has created stability and relative consensus in public opinion, thereby creating consistency in spreading messages, supporting the government in implementing measures to prevent the epidemic, building trust, reducing the fake news and rumors that cause confusion, and minimizing the level of infection in the community. The messages system was defined from the beginning period, following the communication goals of the Vietnamese CDC. These are messages that update

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the epidemic situation to provide official and reliable information; messages about disease prevention direction and administration by the government and all levels of local administrations; messages that reflect the public lives in a “neo-normal” situation with the existence of Covid-19. These groups are cohesive, intertwined, and complement each other in the emergency situation at the beginning of the epidemic outbreak. They also keep the public from being distracted whenever the epidemic situation gets under control. The transmission channel system of the Covid-19 pandemic prevention campaign is diverse, including press agencies which are completely under the State’s management – the information system of each agency and groups. And especially the use of social networking sites – universal platforms which are both faster and more effective at enabling interaction and spreading of information. Even though it is also risky, a variety of technical and legal measures to detect and punish these behaviors that have an important deterrent and preventive effect in society have been used. Pandemic prevention communication is not only the task of state agencies but also attracts the attention of many businesses and communities. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs for employees and social communities of many businesses have been implemented with a radical communication method. They help the public to adapt more quickly to changing circumstances that coexist with Covid while guaranteeing livelihood. In addition, young people who have creative ways of communication through music, video clips, etc., have also created emotional media effects, attracting a lot of attention from the public. Still, unavoidable risks in Covid-19 prevention communication are present, as this is a complicated pandemic that affects many countries around the world. Noise in information reception, direction and management, specific decisions in the epidemic circumstance, and disclosure of personal information of patients cause severe psychological confusion, insecurity, and bad response that may strain the society. In reality, these risk factors happen since the beginning of the epidemic outbreak. However, the control of disease information becomes more methodical and more suitable when the administrators and public gradually adapt to new normal circumstances from time to time.

References Covello, V. (1986). Risk communication: A review of the literature. National Emergency Training Center. Covello, V. T. Winterfeldt, & Slovic, P. (2001). Risk communication, the West Nile Virus epidemic, and bioterrorism: Responding to the communication challenges posed by the international or unintentional release of a pathogen in an urban setting. Journal of Urban Health, 78(2), 382–391. Grabill, J. T., & Simmons, W. M. (1998). Toward a critical rhetoric of risk communication: Producing citizens and the role of technical communicators. Technical Communication Quarterly, 7(4), 415–441. Grunig, J. E., & Hunt, T. T. (1984). Managing public relations. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

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Kasperson, R. E. (1992). The social amplification of risk: Progress in developing an integrative framework in social theories of risk. Kasperson, R. E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. S., Emel, J., Goble, R., … Ratick, S. (1988). The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk Analysis, 8(2), 177–187. Law on Disease Prevention. (2007, November 21). Law No. 03/2007/QH12 of November 21, 2007, on prevention and control of infectious diseases. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/ natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/84337/93679/F1954113128/VNM84337.pdf Powell, D., & Leiss, W. (1997). Mad cows and mother’s milk: the perils of poor risk communication. McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP. The Ministry of Health. (2020, December 30). The Ministry of Health publishes 10 medical and epidemic prevention events in Vietnam by 2020. https://moh.gov.vn/tin-noi-bat/-/ asset_publisher/3Yst7YhbkA5j/content/bo-y-te-cong-bo-10-su-kien-y-te-va-phongchong-dich-viet-nam-nam-2020 The Ministry of Health. (2021a, January 20). National online conference on epidemic prevention and control COVID-19. https://moh.gov.vn/tin-noi-bat/-/asset_publisher/3Yst7YhbkA5j/ content/hoi-nghi-giao-ban-truc-tuyen-toan-quoc-cong-tac-phong-chong-dichcovid-19 The Ministry of Health. (2021b, March 31). Government Direction No.16/CT-Ttg. https:// moh.gov.vn/documents/176127/356256/31.3.2020+16+CT-TTg.pdf/ce10621259de-4093-bfcc-47f50a9044f2 Vietnamnet Newspaper. (2021, April 20). Where is Vietnam’s social network compared to Face­ book, Google? https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/cong-nghe/ung-dung/mang-xa-hoi-viet-namchung-ta-dang-o-dau-so-voi-facebook-google-688437.html Vnexpress Newspaper. (2021, January 22). The toughest decision is against the majority. https:// vnexpress.net/quyet-dinh-kho-khan-nhat-la-nguoc-voi-so-dong-4224819.html

10 MODERN HUA MULANS IN GLOBAL CHINESE-SPEAKING MEDIA Female Frontline Workers as Tools of Propaganda during the Covid-19 Pandemic Ashley Liu and Shuyue Yang

Introduction Since the turn of the twentieth century, the societal status and media portrayal of women have been an integral part of how China measures its progress towards modernity. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), women’s liberation from the traditional domestic space and participation in the workforce is central to official propaganda. During the Covid-19 pandemic, official PRC media have paid special attention to female healthcare and essential workers on the frontlines. In official PRC media, female workers are Hua Mulan-like figures who sacrifice their femininity and put on a masculine façade to fight for the country. This depiction reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) long-established practice of asking women to forego their gender identities and masculinize in order to fully participate in the workforce (Wang, 2017, p. 221–241). It normalizes the cultural expectation that women’s place in the workforce and on the frontlines is to be earned through relinquishing their femininity. This expectation constitutes a gendered double standard, where women are expected to make gendered sacrifices not required of men and shoulder the extra burden of gender transformation. Whereas the official PRC media’s focus on female frontline workers is intended to reflect the CCP’s highprofile commitment to feminism, its portrayal of femininity as a weakness that needs to be discarded is blatantly sexist. This chapter examines Xinhua News’, the official news outlet of the CCP, transformation of female frontline workers into de-feminized and dehumanized tools of propaganda whose contribution and abilities are measured through being unfavourably compared to men. Moreover, it analyses the backlash from Chinese-speaking media outside mainland China, namely those of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the USA, who criticize the CCP’s usage of the female body and women’s suffering for propaganda.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-14

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Official PRC Media Coverage of Female Frontline Workers during the Pandemic Xinhua News’ depiction of female frontline workers is patently gendered and sexist. The stereotypical tender and loving nature of women is contrasted with the toughness they demonstrate in the harsh conditions of the pandemic. In Xinhua’s narratives, female strength and bravery are not absolute; they are gendered and constantly mixed with moments of feminine vulnerability and weakness. On February 3, an article brought attention to pregnant female frontline workers. The significance of pregnancy is that it is a powerful symbol of female tenderness and strength, which reflects Xinhua’s agenda of stressing the double identity of women being both weak and strong (“Fangyi zuji,” 2020). In the article, the 37-week pregnant local government leader Xu Zhiyi is a caring protector of her community at the time of emergency. Her work is described to be intimately connected to her love for her unborn child: Xu Zhiyi felt fetal movement as she spoke. She continued, “firmly holding my position at work and running to the frontlines are the best method of prenatal education. I want my baby to welcome the moment of victory in this war against the pandemic with me.” Whereas this article tries to depict Xu as being extra noble for working while pregnant, perpetuating a narrative about the entanglement between pregnancy and work is potentially harmful to women because the perceived inability of women to separate being a mother from work has historically hindered professional women from advancement. Xu’s effectiveness and strength as a leader are not absolute; they are constantly intersected by her vulnerability as a pregnant woman. The segment about her organizing and providing for her community is interrupted by comments about her large belly and the help others had offered her due to her pregnancy. Her image of leadership is disrupted by her gendered vulnerability. Women’s relative weakness compared to men was explicitly stated in one article published on February 25 (“Ganshou Wuhan,” 2020). This article is about the unique gendered struggles of female healthcare workers, such as menstruation and appearance-related sacrifice. The article begins by describing the toll of healthcare work on a woman’s physical appearance: “blisters and marks [from wearing protective gears] spread across their foreheads, nose bridges, cheeks, and behind the ears. Their smooth hands are covered with abrasions from interacting with chemicals over a long time.” After describing female workers who cried when discussing their families, the article claims, “in general, female health workers’ ability to resist stress and stamina are a bit worse than men.” Later in the article, female weakness compared to men is brought up again: “some would say that women’s power is feeble compared to that of men. However, we are not women right now. We are warriors.” In this comment, women are not warriors; being a warrior requires forfeiting being a woman. Like the aforementioned article about pregnant female leader, the female

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frontline workers in this article do not harbour absolute strength. Their strength is intersected by their inherent weakness as women and potential incompatibility with being a warrior. Their gendered weakness is manifested through the exacerbated effects of healthcare work on their bodies and minds compared to those of men; the gendered effects include chemical abrasions on their feminine “smooth hands” and their lack of ability to handle stress as well as men. A sustained narrative about female frontline workers concerns stereotypical women giving up their feminine identities to become warriors. A March 7 article that celebrates the International Women’s Day depicts the transformation of frontline workers from women to warriors: Before, they were obedient and cute daughters in the eyes of their parents, tender and virtuous wives in the eyes of their husbands, and kind and gentle mothers in the eyes of their children. Once the call-to-arms is out, they become fearless warriors who resolutely throw themselves into this frightening and soul-stirring war against the pandemic. (“Jinguo yingxiong,” 2020) A February 7 article also describes female workers shedding their womanly roles as daughters, wives, and mothers to become frontline warriors (“Yankuang jituan,” 2020). Regarding the contrast between a stereotypical female identity and that of a warrior, a February 10 article states, “it is these ‘female warriors’ who use their slender and weak shoulders to empower the war against the pandemic” (“Puding Yuxiu,” 2020). Here, female frontline workers’ powerful contribution is contrasted with their “slender and weak shoulders.” A March 8 article asserts, “facing the pandemic, they [female frontline workers] are not soft and weak flowers; they are strong and unbending silver poplar trees” (“Jinnian ‘Sanba jie,’” 2020). The juxtaposition of “soft and weak flowers” and “strong and unbending silver poplar trees” represents the contrast between a conventional female identity and that of a masculinized warrior. One of the most prominent examples of Xinhua’s narratives about the transition from women to warriors is regarding female healthcare workers shaving their hair off for work. Whereas the stated reason for the haircuts is for sanitation and efficient work, the experience is portrayed to be highly gendered and strongly associated with the idea of women acquiring strength by forfeiting femininity. On February 13, an article reports that upon arriving at Wuhan, female healthcare workers cut off their long hair and got buzz cuts (“Jiangsu: jinguo qiangjiang,” 2020). Regarding the haircuts, a female party member named Wu Aimei comments, “all girls like to be pretty. However, we are all brave now. Everyone is a female warrior!” In this comment, the stereotypical feminine quality of liking to be pretty is contrasted with bravery and being a warrior. Instead of reporting the haircutting as a gender-neutral gesture, Xinhua contextualizes it in the perceived opposition between being feminine and being professional—another sexist perception that has long held women back from career advancement.

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The gendered aspects of haircutting are explored in depth in a February 10 article (“228 ming” 2020). It begins with a description of the lack of tears from female healthcare workers when their hair was cut. To stress the gendered bravery involved in women not crying about cut hair, the article states, Men getting a buzz cut or becoming bald is not a big deal. However, it is different for women. A full head of luxuriant hair shows the tender beauty of women. Many women are willing to spend money on hair care and time on hairdos. Usually, very few young women would shave off their hair. The haircutting is further gendered through the article’s association of it with societal expectations of female beauty: Female healthcare workers becoming bald is only sacrificing surficial beauty; it further reveals the beauty of their hearts. Although in terms of appearance, bald female healthcare workers do not look beautiful, they are still a pretty sight to people due to the strong and attractive power within their noble hearts. On one hand, this article tries to subvert the traditional expectation about female appearance by arguing that bald female healthcare workers should be valued for their inner, rather than outer, beauty. On the other hand, it perpetuates the sexist idea that women need to be beautiful by discussing professional women’s sacrifice as a matter of beauty. The focus on beauty is especially upsetting considering the graveness of the situation. The life-saving work performed by female healthcare workers to combat a century pandemic and contain one of the biggest threats facing humanity is said to be a “pretty sight.”

The Problem of Hua Mulan and the Masculinization of Working Women A phrase repeatedly used by Xinhua to capture the aforementioned transformation and contrast is a Classical Chinese one rooted in premodern descriptions of female warriors: “the one who wears hair accessories is not inferior to the one with a beard and [thick] eyebrows” (Jinguo bu rang xu mei 巾帼不让须眉). In this phrase, “the one who wears hair accessories” refers to a woman; “the one with a beard and [thick] eyebrows” is a man. This phrase applies to situations where a woman is as good as or even outdoes a man in a domain traditionally considered masculine, such as war and politics. When used in the modern era, this phrase suggests that men constitute the standard against which women’s achievements are measured; being accomplished as a woman means being as good as or better than a man. In the context of the pandemic, the phrase implies that frontline work is supposed to be a man’s job. The most iconic female figure associated with this phrase is Hua Mulan, the legendary female warrior who disguises as a man to go to war. This

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well-known story is invoked by Xinhua to applaud female frontline workers’ transformation into masculinized warriors. A poster featured by Xinhua’s official website illustrates a female healthcare worker having her long hair cut. The slogan on the poster reads, “in ancient times, there was Hua Mulan who cut her hair to join the military in place of her father. Nowadays, there are female healthcare workers who cut their hair to fight against the pandemic” (“Zhijing,” 2020). A February 5 article, titled “New Age ‘Hua Mulan’ Goes to War Against the Pandemic in Place of Her Father,” reports a story shockingly similar to that of Hua Mulan. In it, a sickly old father, a former soldier, could not go to the frontlines of the pandemic. In his place, his daughter Ma Xiangwen volunteered and was placed in the frontline through a veteran’s organization (“Xin shidai,” 2020). A February 7 article profiles four female front workers and compares them to Hua Mulan (“Guangdong Yunfu,” 2020). An April 24 article advertises a song titled “Mommy, I Miss You,” which is about appraising female frontline workers from a child’s perspective (“Qingting fenzhan,” 2020). The article compares the women in the song to Hua Mulan. The expectation of women to become Hua Mulan-like masculinized warriors is a long-established aspect of Chinese socialist rhetoric regarding gender equality. In the CCP’s feminist ideology, gender equality is to be achieved by women erasing their feminine qualities. In 1964, the Iron Girls appeared in socialist China as an icon of women’s liberation (Wang, 2017, p. 221). The Iron Girls were female workers from Dazhai of the Shanxi Province in the 1960s who took on demanding physical tasks, such as salvaging crops from floods and rebuilding houses; they were said to be “made of iron” (Wang, 2017, p. 222). These women were made national models to emulate by Mao Zedong and enjoyed widespread admiration (Wang, 2017, p. 225–226). Whereas poor women in parts of premodern China had traditionally performed heavy physical labour, it was considered to be demeaning and a sign of low class. Breaking with this traditional perception, Maoist China glorified women’s engagement in physical labour as a symbol of progress and gender equality (Wang, 2017, p. 222–223). The Iron Girls’ “iron” identity was built on being measured against men and superseding men in tasks considered to be masculine; for example, their stamina was remarked to be better than that of men (Wang, 2017, p. 225). This association between women excelling in physical labour and masculinization instilled anxiety among many urban elite men, some of whom publicly mocked the Iron Girls for being unattractive as women and denounced the idea that women should become masculine. Some even argued that the masculinization of women constituted sexual repression of men (Wang, 2017, p. 229–230). Such gendered and sexual frustration regarding the glorification of women’s participation in heavy labour was significantly due to the unnecessary entanglement between women working and masculinization. Women should be able to work without being forced to renounce their feminine qualities and be perceived as masculine. In addition to Iron Girls, the image of Hua Mulan was frequently invoked in Maoist China to applaud women’s participation in agriculture (Wang, 2017, p. 224), which was another way to entrench the association between women doing physical work and a de-feminized gender identity.

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Backlash from Chinese-Speaking Media Outside Mainland China PRC media’s narratives about female frontline workers transforming into de-feminized warriors during Covid-19 have drawn significant backlash and criticism from Chinese-speaking media outside mainland China. Apple Daily, a Hong Kong newspaper, published an article on February 19 to accuse mainland news coverage about female healthcare workers as dehumanizing (Zhang 2020). The article claims, In these reports and stories, normal people can only perceive endless absurdity, shock, and humiliation. Every healthcare worker who fights on the frontlines are, of course, worthy of respect. These people who should be cared for, when covered by the official media, become increasingly non-human. Rather, they are debased to become a cheap tool of propaganda called “hero.” In China, heroes are not human. They are superhumans and sages. Regarding mainland media’s focus on women’s gendered sacrifice, the article asserts, If you read carefully, you will find that the protagonists of these reports are all women. It is as if only a woman’s sacrifice can illustrate the suffering. Thus, during the pandemic, women need to work even when pregnant. Women don’t have the right to choose a short hairstyle; they must sacrifice their dignity and be shaved to baldness… All of these are for propaganda: if women sacrifice like this, men should be even more vigorous in the war against the pandemic. In the viewpoint of this article, the gendered sacrifice made by women in mainland news is propaganda to motivate men; the glorification of these “warriors” dehumanizes women by turning them into tools of propaganda. As mentioned above, CCP-endorsed rhetoric about gender equality often suggests that women’s excellence resides in being measured against men and superseding men in masculine tasks. This perception is common in Xinhua’s narratives about female frontline workers. It is entirely conceivable that the effect of this gender competition is stirring gendered anxiety in and “motivating” men, who fear being less masculine than women. This is reminiscent of the Iron Girls, whose perceived capacity to outdo and replace men had triggered a crisis of masculinity among many men. A February 24 article published by Apple Daily uses Michel Foucault’s notion of “biopolitics” to describe the CCP’s usage of the female body in propaganda. It explains that “biopolitics” refers to the nation’s intervention in and regulation of people’s bodies and health (Huasheng Pinglun Yuan, 2020). It points out that biopolitics is rooted in patriarchy and men’s control over the female body. In biopolitics, the female body is dehumanized: “the body becomes politics and a battlefield. The body is no longer merely one’s physical body; it is a discourse, a symbol, and a representation of power.” To illustrate how the female body is dehumanized and used by mainland media, the article contends,

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Regarding female healthcare workers’ who were sent to Wuhan to help: their collective hair-shaving for the sake of showcasing their resolution, forfeiture of breastfeeding after childbirth, unfortunate miscarriage after nine months of pregnancy, and continuation of patient care despite these conditions are all manifestations of the nation’s control over the bodies of female healthcare workers. Even if these female healthcare workers all have countless reasons to motivate them to go to the frontlines, they become unrecognizable in official media narratives; who they are, whether they have names, whether their bodies are cared for, whether they have the right to choose are not important at all. As long as they exemplify the propaganda of the entire nation doing its best to fight the pandemic, the goal is fulfilled. To emphasize that such propaganda prioritizes the collective at the expense of the individual, the article comments, “the concern of political authority is not individual health, but the collective health of the population.” It contrasts capitalist societies with communism and claims that due to the PRC’s atheist ideology, it must inspire people through nonreligious means, such as using the human body as propaganda. Moreover, the article connects the usage of the female body in propaganda during the pandemic to the PRC’s one-child policy, which it characterizes as a sort of biopolitics that regulates women’s reproductive systems and harms women’s mental health. The Taiwanese newspaper United Daily News published an article on February 19 that accuses PRC official media of using female healthcare workers for propaganda (Luo, 2020). Quoting the words of Chinese-speaking netizens, the article characterizes mainland media narratives as a sort of “formalism”—emphasis on outer form over inner reality—that uses women as “tools for show and stirring emotions.” To further reveal the phoney “formalism” of media narratives, the article points out the gap between how female healthcare workers are portrayed in the media and how they were treated in real life: female biological needs were routinely neglected via the lack of menstrual products. An OB-GYN professional in mainland is reported to comment that due to the lack of opportunities for menstruating female workers to change their menstrual pads, they risked infection and health complications. The article points out that this shortage of menstrual products was manmade and due to the lack of awareness of women’s issues among leaders and relevant organizations. Moreover, it speculates that the media narratives did not capture the hearts of the mainland audience and brings attention to mainland netizens’ backlash. It quotes those who question the gendered double standard where men are not required to shave off their hair. It ends by using Xinhua News’ own words to attack mainland media’s usage of women as tools of propaganda: “It is indeed as what an article by Xinhua News says: female healthcare workers are angels in white uniforms, but they are also normal people with blood and flesh.” Here, the article points out the irony where mainland media claim to value female workers as human beings but dehumanize them through propaganda.

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Radio Free Asia (RFA), a nonprofit Chinese-speaking news broadcasting organization funded by the US government, published an article on March 6 that also brought attention to Chinese-speaking netizens’ backlash against mainland media’s treatment of female healthcare workers (“Zai daguo,” 2020). It quotes netizen comments that reflect frustrations over the usage of women as tools for show and propaganda and accuses official PRC media of creating dramatic tragedies out of female suffering. The article contains a comment by Zhang Qing, a female leader in US-based feminist activism concerning China, that characterizes official media narratives as mere entertainment built on female suffering: The point of publishing these photos and videos [of female workers being shaved bald] is for entertainment. Right now, everyone’s attention is focused on the war against the pandemic, which is filled with the desperate atmosphere of death and crying. In this moment, suddenly there is news about female healthcare workers going bald to attract everyone’s attention; wouldn’t this lighten up the heavy mood during the pandemic? … This is entertainment and a show to make people think that the Chinese government, official media, and society recognizes women’s rights. She further points out that there is a long history in China where women are pushed to the front of propaganda efforts to serve political purposes. She highlights the gap between the high-profile image of gender equality created by propaganda and the fact that women’s rights are often neglected in real life and politics. Ming Xia, a professor of political science at the City University of New York, is quoted to accuse the CCP of being a patriarchy that habitually sacrifices women in times of emergency: The CCP disrespects healthcare workers in general and treats female healthcare workers with even more disrespect. This demonstrates that the CCP’s reign is a patriarchy. When there was a need for sacrifice, do you see who was in charge of Wuhan? It was Sun Chunlan. After the pandemic broke out in Wuhan, there was not a single man [who was willing to go to the frontlines] in the Politburo; at the end, they sent a woman to the frontlines. Sun Chunlan was the only woman in the Politburo. The sacrifice of women started with sacrificing the only woman in the Politburo. This shows the tradition and mentality of sacrificing women in the CCP. To reinforce his argument, the article mentions that during the 2003 SARS outbreak, the CCP also put a female Politburo member, Wu Yi, in charge. Regarding the connection between the media portrayal of female frontline workers and the Iron Girls of Maoist China, Xia states, Whether it’s the Iron Girls created during the Cultural Revolution, or the “strong women” created after the market reform, you can see that women are

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required to inherit all the virtues of China’s patriarchal society and history. All the nation and society’s sacrifices are to be shouldered by women. In China’s traditional culture, women must endure and tolerate at all times and shoulder all types of heavy burdens; they must sacrifice themselves and contribute for the sake of the family. During the pandemic, the Chinese patriarchal society naturally thinks that now is the time for women to step up. He attributes the “Iron Girls” mentality to China’s patriarchal tradition of expecting women to endure hardship and sacrifice the self, which subverts the CCP vision of the Iron Girls representing modernity and progress in gender equality. He even likens women’s role in the PRC to women in premodern China who were sold to brothels to make money for the family, which constitutes another example of sacrificing women for the “greater good.” Moreover, he accuses the CCP brand of feminism as “unhealthy”: After Mao’s reign, the CCP’s so-called ‘women’s liberation’ is, in fact, a very unhealthy type of so-called feminism. It is about framing women sacrificing more than men and being more proactive than men as womanly virtues. They [the CCP] don’t pay attention to women’s unique needs at all. According to him, CCP feminism reconceptualized womanly virtue—a traditional Confucianist concept that defines moral and behavioural standards for women from a patriarchal perspective—as women doing more than men. Whereas the CCP holds itself to be the liberator of women from Confucianist expectations, he challenges this narrative by arguing that CCP feminism is about reinventing and reinforcing womanly virtues, rather than catering to the needs of women. In his view, mainland media coverage of female frontline workers reflects a much larger gender issue in the PRC where modern CCP feminism and traditional patriarchy work together to demand more sacrifice from women than men. The Epoch Times, a Chinese-speaking news organization based in the US that represents the Falun Gong religion, published an article on September 23 about mainland netizens protesting against a CCP-sponsored documentary that features female healthcare workers being shaved bald (Hu 2020). The article reports that netizens have criticized the CCP for using women to motivate people for the war against the pandemic. It quotes a netizen who says, “when will Chinese women be truly respected and not used as talking points in problems?” Other netizens are reported to accuse the CCP of using women to divert attention from the sensitive issue of the CCP’s mishandling of the pandemic. Moreover, the article features a heart-wrenching video of female healthcare workers crying and screaming in a hospital due to distress. Rather than empathizing with the workers and praising their sacrifice, the article accuses videos that show female workers crying as propaganda. The Epoch Times’ treatment of this issue reflects a larger problem and irony in the backlash against PRC media from Chinese-speaking media outside mainland China. Searching the keyword “female healthcare workers” on the websites of

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Apple Daily, RFA, and The Epoch Times reveals that these news sources primarily cover the issues of female healthcare workers during the Covid-19 pandemic to portray the PRC and the CCP in a negative light. Almost all results yielded from this search concern how female healthcare workers suffer in the PRC and are mistreated by the CCP. In other words, the immense sacrifice and contribution of female frontline workers are mainly used by these media outside mainland China to attack the PRC and the CCP. This is especially true for Apple Daily, RFA, and The Epoch Times, whose anti-CCP sentiment is patent. Whereas they raise valid points about the CCP using women for propaganda and politics, they are also guilty of caring about female frontline workers only when it suits their anti-CCP agenda. The Epoch Times’ claim that mainland media narratives about women distract from the “real” issue of the CCP’s incompetence seems to imply that the toil of female healthcare workers are not that important, which potentially reflects the outlet’s far-right tendency and hostility against feminism.

Conclusion During the Covid-19 pandemic, women’s role on the frontlines became a point of contention in Chinese-speaking media. In addition to shedding light on the CCP’s feminist propaganda strategies, the media controversies reveal deep ideological divisions between the CCP and anti-CCP forces regarding feminism. The CCP’s socialist feminism is a vital aspect of its politics and identity. Its version of feminism, which emphasizes the masculinization of women and women’s gendered sacrifice and participation in jobs traditionally performed by men, clashes with gender expectations and views regarding feminism throughout the Chinesespeaking world. Whereas some criticize the CCP’s feminism for its inhumane treatment of women, others do so due to their unfavourable views of feminism. The characterization of feminism as a type of socialist propaganda and unwillingness to discuss feminism outside the context of feminism being used as left-wing propaganda potentially reflect a deeper agenda of discouraging feminism. In the Chinesespeaking world, CCP-related controversies are often rooted in varying opinions about the value of traditional culture. The CCP’s political legitimacy largely derives from its role in rejecting the oppressive aspects of traditional culture, such as the restriction of women to the domestic realm. Its version of feminism is a revolt against traditional gender norms. To those who hold favourable views of traditional gender norms, the CCP’s feminism (or just feminism itself ) is an assault. It is important to understand that CCP-related politics are not the only issue at stake in Chinese-speaking media’s debates on female frontline workers; the war against the CCP’s feminism is often inseparable from resistance against feminism itself.

References “228 ming yuan Wuhan yihu ‘xiaofa kangyi,’ shi lingyizhong damei.” 22名援汉医护“削发 抗疫”，是另一种大美 Xinhua News, 10 February 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ comments/2020-02/10/c_1125551921.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021.

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“Fangyi zuji zhan ‘yinghe yunma’ zai xingdong.” 防疫阻击战 “硬核孕妈” 在行动 Xinhua News Jiangsu, 2 March 2020, http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/2020-02/03/c_1125525478. htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Ganshou Wuhan kangyi yixan de ‘ta liliang’—‘Baozhang dajia anquan, women you nengli yeyou xinxin!’” 感受武汉抗疫一线的“她力量”——“保障大家安全，我们有能力也 有信心!” Xinhua News, 2 February 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/finance/202002/25/c_1125620991.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Guangdong Yunfu: Zhanyi ‘Hua Mulan,’ jinguo burang xumei.” 广东云浮:战疫“花木 兰”，巾帼不让须眉 Xinhua News Guangdong, 7 February 2020, http://www.gd. xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2020-02/07/c_1125542875.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. Hu, Yulong. “Dalu minzhong pi Zhonggong Yangshi kangyi ju beili shiqing huyu tingbo.” 大陸民眾批中共央視抗疫劇背離實情 呼籲停播 The Epoch Times, 23 September 2020, https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/20/9/22/n12423007.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. Huasheng, Pinglun Yuan. “Hushi beipo shiyao wubei ‘yima dao’ Zhonggong kangyi wan shenti zhengzhi?” 護士被迫食藥唔畀「姨媽到」 中共抗疫玩身體政治? Apple Daily, 24 February 2020, https://hk.appledaily.com/china/20200224/PU3MPQ2G3 LFKU5JEX5WUOUILFI/. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Jiangsu: jinguo qiangjiang jinrui chuzhan, kangqi kangyi zhanxian ‘banbiantian’.” 江苏: 巾帼强将尽锐出战，扛起抗疫战线“半边天” Xinhua News Jiangsu, 13 February 2020, http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/2020-02/13/c_1125570409.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Jinguo yingxiong zhan yimo—xiangei kangyi zuiqianxian de ‘banbiantian’.” 巾帼英雄 战疫魔——献给抗疫最前线的“半边天” Xinhua News, 7 March 2020, http://www. xinhuanet.com/2020-03/07/c_1125678549.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Jinnian ‘Sanba jie,’ xiang zuisa de tamen zhijing!” 今年“三八节”，向最飒的她们致 敬! Xinhua News, 8 March 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2020-03/08/ c_1125678987.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. Luo, Yingchong. “Jiti bei ti guangtou kangyi! Nü yihu hanlei haiyou geng naoren de simi shi.” 集體被剃光頭抗疫! 女醫護含淚 還有更惱人的私密事 United Daily News, 19 February 2020, https://udn.com/news/story/120936/4354526. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Puding Yuxiu jiedao chuandong shequ: fangyizhan zhong de ‘nüzhanshi’ jinguo burang xumei.” 普定玉秀街道穿洞社区:防疫战中的“女战士”巾帼不让须眉 Xinhua News, 10 February 2020, http://www.gz.xinhuanet.com/2020-02/10/c_1125554538.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Qingting fenzhan ‘yi’ xian de Jiading ‘Hua Mulan’ gushi ‘Mama wo xiang ni’ MV jijiang bochu.” 倾听奋战“疫”线的嘉定“花木兰”故事 《妈妈，我想你》 MV 即将 播出 Xinhua News Shanghai, 24 April 2020, http://sh.xinhuanet.com/2020-04/ 24/c_139004071.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. Wang, Zheng. Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1964. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017. “Xin shidai ‘Hua Mulan’ tifu chuzheng zhan yiqing.” 新时代“花木兰”替父出征战疫 情 Xinhua News Sichuan, 5 February 2020, http://www.sc.xinhuanet.com/content/ 2020-02/05/c_1125535414.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Yankuang jituan Yangcun meikuang chongzai yiqing fangkong yixian de zhequn nüzi ‘jinguo burang xumei.’” 兖矿集团杨村煤矿冲在疫情防控一线的这群女子 “巾帼不让须 眉” Xinhua News Guizhou, 2 February 2020, http://www.sd.xinhuanet.com/cj/202002/11/c_1125559073.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Zai daguo kang ‘yi’ zhong bei xiaofei de Zhongguo nüquan.” 在大国抗“疫”中被消费 的中国女权 Radio Free Asia, 6 March 2020, https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/ fuyouluntan/women-03062020143913.html. Accessed 31 January 2021.

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Zhang, Taige. “Bei caonong de ‘jinguo yingxiong.’” 被操弄的「巾幗英雄」Apple Daily, 19 February 2020, https://hk.appledaily.com/china/20200219/6KKCVJ5E5KITG K5RKVELD36ESI/. Accessed 31 January 2021. “Zhijing! Zuimei ‘nixingzhe.’” 致敬!最美“逆行者” Xinhua News, 8 March 2020, http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/original/2020-03/08/c_138852803_7.htm. Accessed 31 January 2021.

PART IV

Mainstream and Alternative Narratives

11 CONFRONTING ANTI-ASIAN BIAS IN THE CLASSROOM Reflections on the Importance of Asian and Asian American Studies in the Wake of Covid-19 Meghan Cai and Kimberly D. McKee

“It’s not racist at all. No. Not at all. It comes from China. That’s why. It comes from China. I want to be accurate.” —President Donald J. Trump, March 18, 2020 (Lindaman & Viala-Gaudefroy, 2020) As Covid-19 spread across the globe and eventually to the United States, the Trump administration’s reference to the novel coronavirus as the Wuhan virus, Chinese virus, and kung-flu is illustrative of their xenophobia and racism. They rooted their justification to using those terms in outdated practices in naming diseases, which also departs from the World Health Organization (WHO) guidance from 2015 concerning this very issue (World Health Organization, 2015).1 Politicians’ deployment of racist terminology to describe Covid-19 trickled down to everyday American parlance as a result of news and popular media. The need for increased information and media literacy became evident as xenophobic and racist attacks manifested online and offline toward Asians and Asian Americans. An extreme and deadly example of how this rhetoric leads to violence is the stabbing of a Burmese American family in Midland, TX in March 2020 (Chen, 2020). The perpetrator attacked the family, assuming they were Chinese. This misidentification of the family as Chinese illustrates how Asian/Asian Americans are considered racially homogenous and interchangeable. The Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center received more than 2,500 reports of anti-Asian harassment or violence between March 19 and August 5, 2020 (Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center, 2020).2 Those accounts only reflect reported attacks. There are countless others that go unreported, and as the November 2020 presidential election intensified, Asian American communities anticipated an increase of anti-Asian sentiment that seems to accompany U.S. elections (Caputo, 2020; Chin, 2010; Mak, 2012). DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-16

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Politicians’ persistent endorsement of anti-Asian sentiment through the racist naming of the coronavirus as either the Wuhan virus or Chinese virus underscores the ways the yellow peril circulates in the U.S. imaginary. These public figures’ statements along with Republicans who opposed an anti-Asian racism resolution in the House of Representatives validate the xenophobia and racism Asians encounter in public spaces (Gajjar, 2020; Yam, 2020).3 By March 2021, the number of incidents reported to the Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center had increased by an estimated 1,300 to nearly 3,800 ( Jeung et al. 2021) and on March 16, 2021, eight people, six of whom were Asian/Asian American women were murdered in Atlanta, GA as a result of racialized misogyny and anti-Asian racism (Ho 2021; Kwon 2021; Leong and Kuo 2021). U.S public discourse surrounding Asians, Asian immigrants to the United States, and Asian Americans demonstrate the importance of Asian Studies and Asian American Studies in higher education. These fields serve as vehicles within the humanities to strengthen students’ cultural competencies and increase their intellectual dexterity in a globalized world. The evolution of Oriental Studies to Asian and Area Studies led to a shift that encourages students to rethink Orientalist understandings of Asia and de-centre the West. In the past decade, Area Studies scholars have questioned whether creating disciplines around large, diverse geographic regions falsely creates an idea of a single culture within that geographic boundary, reinforcing preconceptions of the existence of a monolithic, exotic, foreign Other. At the same time, in her discussion of Asian American Studies, Jennifer Ho (2015) writes: Claiming Asian American as a political and ideological identity and asserting the epistemological and pedagogical value of Asian Americans, Asian American studies affirm the culture, history, and set of experiences for Asian Americans as Asian Americans, recognizing the process of racialization in the United States that has created the conditions for a disparate group of people with ancestry in various Asian nations to be labelled, marked, and identified as Asian American. (p. 126) Training students within the methods of both fields bolster their abilities to disentangle Orientalist notions of Asia and Asian America from the lived realities of Asian and Asian Americans. Students engaged in these courses can describe historical trends that shaped contemporary understandings of Asia and Asian America, while increasing their abilities to discuss multiple perspectives surrounding the formation of Asian and Asian American identities. As these courses meet student learning outcomes related to preparing students for encountering Asian cultures and communities from a variety of ways (e.g., political and economic systems, regional differences) and considering the immigration patterns of Asians in the United States and the growth of Asian American communities, students move away from reductive notions that fetishize Asian and Asian Americans as Other or perpetually foreign.

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We situate this essay within broader scholarship that discusses the role of the humanities and liberal education in facilitating increased awareness of xenophobia and racism. First, we offer andragogical strategies to confront yellow peril discourse and anti-Asian sentiment as it relates to building cultural and global competencies.4 This line of inquiry includes a reflection on the centrality of media literacy in shaping students’ perceptions of Asia and Asian America. We then turn our attention to how Asian Studies and Asian American Studies can support Asian international and Asian American students as well as serve as on-campus resources to combat anti-Asian sentiment on campus. Finally, we reflect on our own roles as educators, paying careful attention to our positionalities—Kimberly as a Korean American adopted person and Meghan as a white woman.

The Importance of Asian and Asian American Studies Originating in the nineteenth century, the yellow peril positioned Japan and China, and more broadly Asia writ-large, as an Oriental threat. While the history of Western nations in Asia is context-specific based on their imperialist and colonial aims, the Orientalism shaping their engagement with Asian nations and peoples is easily transferable, as traits of devilish or sneaky behaviour, as well as assumptions of sexual promiscuity, and depravity are used interchangeably to describe various Asian cultures and communities. William Wei (2016) notes, “It was a metaphor for a larger, shape-shifting threat from Asia that was felt to endanger Western civilization. It was a myth rooted in racial anxiety” (p. 177). This stereotype proved mutable and evolved with the emergence of different geopolitical threats. In the United States, the yellow peril arose in tandem with the development of anti-Chinese sentiment in the mid-to late-nineteenth century. This was particularly evident on the West Coast in San Francisco’s Chinatown. Tied to the yellow peril was the association of Chinese immigrants with disease. Nayan Shah (2001) writes: Nineteenth-century San Francisco health officials and politicians conceived of Chinatown as the preeminent site of urban sickness, vice, crime, poverty, and depravity. The San Francisco Board of Health and the Public Health Department… reports produced extremely menacing conceptions of Chinatown identifying it as a “plague spot,” a “cesspool,” and the source of epidemic disease and physical ailments. (p. 1) The geographic space of Chinatown became interchangeable with Chinese people and vice versa. Public health saw itself linked to notions of race and citizenship. Notions of the yellow peril continued to evolve and persisted into the twentieth century. The yellow peril manifested itself in exclusionary immigration laws (e.g., 1875 Page Law, 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, 1917 Immigration Act), racist state laws (e.g., Alien Land Laws), and other foreign and domestic policies (e.g., Executive Order 9066). At the same time, it shifted as a result of geopolitical events.

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For example, Japan’s participation in World War II as an Axis Power gave rise to anti-Japanese sentiment in relation to the yellow peril, while China saw itself positioned as an ally and saw exclusionary Chinese immigration restrictions lifted with the passage of the 1942 Magnuson Act. Yet by the height of the Cold War, China was once again a foe of the United States. The alleged inscrutability of Asians and Asian Americans alike (as seen in the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II) reveals the mutability of the yellow peril. To this end, Lok Siu and Claire Chun (2020) wrote, “Filtered through the U.S. racial lens, East Asian phenotype—no matter one’s ethnic background—is sufficient enough to provoke hate, anger, and violence” (p. 433). Questions of loyalty and allegiance cloud perceptions of whether or not those persons of Asian descent are truly American. One of the most brutal examples of the yellow peril’s links to violence against Asian Americans is the 1982 murder of Vincent Chin in Detroit, MI. Recognizing how the spectre of the yellow peril operates and rears its head in times of anti-Asian sentiment, as Covid-19 spread across the globe and hateful rhetoric and violence against Asians increased, Asian American Studies scholar Jason Oliver Chang (2020a) wrote: “The racist settler narrative of Yellow Peril was being revived on a global scale at the pace of social media” (p. 330). Chang (2020b) developed “Treating Yellow Peril: Resources to Address Coronavirus Racism,” resources meant to “provide easy access to material useful for teach-ins, talking points, and classroom teaching.” Serving as one centralized site of information for scholars and activists to share, the resources make evident the ways in which anti-Asian sentiment circulates around the world and persists across decades. Both humanities interdisciplines do the important work of making the invisible visible—in this case, Orientalism’s implicit and explicit role in affecting how society consumes information about Asian and Asian American peoples and cultures. The section that follows explores the importance of integrating media literacy in Asian and Asian American Studies courses. We then turn our attention to providing andragogical examples of how we incorporate teaching media literacy skills while simultaneously meeting our student learning outcomes.

The Need for Media Literacy The rise of anti-intellectualism in the twenty-first century against the backdrop of declining cosmopolitanism exposed the need for increased teachings of information literacy, which the Association of American Colleges & Universities (AAC&U, 2014) defines as “the ability to know when there is a need for information, to be able to identify, locate, evaluate, and effectively and responsibly use and share that information for the problem at hand” (p. 1). The misinformation and disinformation surrounding Covid-19 underscored the importance of media literacy, that is, methods of critical analysis of all forms of media and “relationships between media and audiences, information, and power” (Kellner & Share, 2007, p. 59). The coronavirus pandemic also revealed what some characterize as an infodemic—“an excessive amount of information concerning a problem such that the solution is

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made more difficult… [, whereby] an anxious public finds it difficult to distinguish between evidence-based information and a broad range of unreliable misinformation” (Naeem & Bhatti, 2020, p. 233). Addressing the stakes of the Covid-19 infodemic in a joint statement, the World Health Organization, United Nations, UNICER, UNDP, UNESCO, UNAIDS, ITU, UN Global Pulse, and IFRC note (2020): “Mis- and disinformation can be harmful to people’s physical and mental health; increase stigmatization; threaten precious health gains; and lead to poor observance of public health measures, thus reducing their effectiveness and endangering countries’ ability to stop the pandemic” (para. 2). The integrity and credibility of governments, non-governmental organizations, and the scientific community is at stake as the infodemic contributes to an erosion of trust (The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2020). Developing and strengthening students’ critical thinking skills is, thus, vital in efforts to increase media literacy and information literacy more broadly. Salman Bin Naeem and Rubina Bhatti (2020) write, In the “post-truth” era, audiences are likely to believe information that appeals to their emotions and personal beliefs, as opposed to information that is regarded as factual and or objective (Maoret, 2017). […] Thus, it becomes vital to educate people generally, and youth in particular, about the nature of fake news and negative outcomes of sharing such news. (p. 234) Gaining media literacy improves students’ abilities to make connections concerning how power and privilege become operationalized in society and encourage students to become active consumers of the news, looking beyond superficial reporting to see the ways in which policies and language are tied to ideologies of race, class, and gender, for example (Kellner & Share, 2007, p. 62). The advent of news-entertainment media and the blurring of satire and news requires savvier media consumption. Strengthening students’ information and media literacy directly corresponds to increasing their cultural competence, both of which are benefits of the humanities and liberal education. Students’ global dexterity and ability to engage multiple forms of information critically is crucial as they matriculate and enter professions designed for a connected world. Students must understand how implicit bias and their intersectional identities impact how they interact with the world, including their consumption and creation of media.

Andragogical Strategies to Confront Yellow Peril Courses in Asian Studies and Asian American Studies should be seen as vehicles to enhance students’ cultural competencies and challenge student biases concerning monolithic assumptions of “Asia” or “Asian culture.” Not only can faculty address specific student learning outcomes, the employment of andragogical approaches can increase informational literacy and strengthen how students’ construct Asia and

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Asian America in their imaginations. Similar to historian Jennifer Mercieca’s classroom instruction on propaganda, we see our role in the classroom as “providing [our] students with the language and context to understand the world around them” for this training will support their ability to do their own analyses (McMurtrie, 2021). This means that faculty must train students to assess their sources by “pay[ing] attention to the author’s word choice, affiliations, purpose, use of evidence, and other relevant elements,” while also reminding students to recognize how “confirmation bias, filter bubbles (or echo chambers), motivated reasoning, and information avoidance” shape how we consume information (Carillo, 2018). Asian Studies and Asian American Studies are fields for rich conversation to confront Orientalism and anti-Asian bias, while also reinserting persons of Asian descent in the historical record, in the case of Asian American Studies, and re-centreing histories of Asia around Asian experiences, in the case of East Asian Studies. While Mercieca’s efforts are focused on disinformation and political rhetoric, we see her investment toward strengthening students’ information and media literacy tied to the work we conduct in our classrooms to combat anti-Asian bias. To disentangle anti-Asian bias around Covid-19 from broader disinformation tactics employed by politicians elides the ways in which the Trump Administration trafficked in unsubstantiated conspiracy theories concerning the coronavirus. When we teach about Asian or Asian American experiences, we find that starting from what students already think they know is a useful, informative exercise. Our basic approach to teaching adults about Asian or Asian American history is similar to Matt K. Matsuda (2020), who enters historical thinking through a comparative, interdisciplinary approach: beginning with the familiar, examining new subject matter from multiple lenses (e.g., social, political, religious), and framing subject matter within larger issues, such as ethical questions, identity, subjectivity, revisionism, memory, commemoration, and so on. We overlay these with lessons on media literacy, supported by library staff. Although most K-12 schools teach world history, the focus is still on European nations, with gestures to Asia and other non-European nations that fit into our national narrative about these peripheral countries, usually framed in terms of rejection or acceptance of Western values. Even the typical tripartite structure of East Asian history places the West at the centre—pre-contact with the West, engagement with the West, and post-WWII—progressing from completely foreign/savage, to aggressive/defensive, to tamed/submissive and exotic. Images and stereotypes from popular culture reinforce this narrative. Meeting students where they are in terms of their assumptions or preconceived notions of Asia allows for fruitful and generative teaching moments and discussions related to confronting the ways we may engage in tokenism or fetishism unconsciously. In an introductory East Asian Studies course, for example, Meghan often uses a contemporary debate within Japan about what it means to be Japanese, using the example of Ariana Miyamoto, the first bi-racial Miss Universe Japan (Lies, 2015). After reading about this controversy, students usually comment that they had always considered Japan to be a homogenous country, a myth that Japan has promoted since

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the Meiji period (Yamamoto, 2015). This allows the opportunity to introduce ethnic minority groups in East Asia, and to reflect on how national identities are created and re-created to serve national interests; how indigenous peoples were artificially delin­ eated into official ethnic groups, leading to the erasure of some indigenous languages and customs, lack of political representation, and exploitation through ethno-­tourism; how family history, regionalism, and religion, rather than race, inform class division and political structures; what makes one Japanese or Chinese or American; beauty standards; and so on. This student-centred approach, as Matsuda states, “rescue[s] them from the merely anecdotal or the simple image or stereotype and re-incorporate[s] them into a wider comparative and analytic understanding” (p. 3). It is equally important to provide a semi-private space where students can critically reflect upon their original assumptions and how these align with newly acquired knowledge. Sometimes we see students present one viewpoint in class and express another in these reflection pieces. Sometimes we students struggle to fit new perspectives into their worldviews. It can be difficult for adult learners to change long-standing assumptions, or to even admit to themselves that they hold these beliefs. Structured reflection, coupled with instructor feedback, allows the instructor to correct misconceptions, answer inquiries, and to encourage further reflection by posing follow-up questions on an individual basis. Through regular reflection over the semester, students might acquire a habit of reflection that can enhance their critical thinking and facilitate deep learning for a lifetime.

Supporting Asian International and Asian American Students The courses that we teach offer significant support to Asian international and Asian American students. As faculty at a regional, Master’s comprehensive institution in the Midwest, we recognize that our classrooms may be a space where non-Asian students encounter Asia and Asian America for the first time, and where students of Asian descent might not be the only non-white student. Our courses also serve as a space to support those students of Asian descent as our courses provide access to histories that they may be unfamiliar with or refuge as a space where their cultures and heritage are valued in ways unseen in other spaces. This andragogical instruction also plays a vital role in educating students about anti-Asian stereotypes and their historical roots. Because we recognize the way Orientalism operates in the United States, we are aware that our courses may be students’ first introductions to learning that Asia is not a monolith and that all Asian people are not just Chinese (or another singular group of persons from “insert Asian country name here”). This applies to both courses in East Asian Studies, where Meghan primarily teaches, and in courses rooted in an Asian American Studies framework that Kimberly teaches to students. By offering nuance about East Asian cultures and communities including the so-called heterogeneity one can even find within East Asian nations, students gain an increased understanding of how Orientalism impacts their worldviews. Readings, course lectures, and assignments centre Asian voices and perspectives.

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Many students may be unfamiliar with Asian American communities with knowledge limited to the role of Chinese immigrants building the transcontinental railroad and Japanese internment to racist depictions of Asian Americans in the media. In teaching courses that explicitly focus on Asian Americans or that include Asian American communities as part of broader discussion of diversity in the United States, Kimberly offers an overview of Asian American immigration history. This supports students’ learning about why the perpetual foreigner myth exists, while troubling students’ perceptions of stereotypes that circulate in American popular culture. To encourage students’ reflection on how they may hold implicit biases toward Asian and Asian Americans, Kimberly screens the comedic video “What Kind of Asian are You?” by Ken Tanaka (2013). This video highlights the everyday insults and indignities Asian Americans encounter as a result of the perpetual foreigner myth. Students engage in high-level discussion as they reflect on instances where they have witnessed, or participated in, these racial microaggressions. At the same time, Kimberly sees her role in the classroom as an opportunity to support students’ notions that Asia and Asian America are not interchangeable even as there are diasporic flows back and forth between Asian nations and the United States. Discussions of Asian Americans include situating the immigration and migration patterns of communities to contextualize their histories within broader narratives of U.S. history. For example, students frequently mention that they cannot wait to learn more about Asia at the outset of her course on Grace Lee Boggs and Yuri Kochiyama. Kimberly’s first lecture covers Orientalism and situates the forever foreigner stereotype within broader histories of Asian exclusion to bolster their understandings of why they initially believe a course about these two women will aid their learning about Asia. By the end of the semester, students will not only engage the histories of both Japanese and Chinese Americans in the United States, but also examine interracial solidarities and Asian American activism. While this type of work in her courses may seem unrelated to combating anti-Asian bias, Kimberly sees this instruction as operating alongside direct examination of violence enacted toward Asians and Asian Americans. In other words, teaching the histories of Asian Americans in the United States facilitates students’ learning of the role and place of person’s of Asian descent in American society. We see our work in the classroom as directly linked to advocating on behalf of students to administrators and our faculty and staff colleagues. Far too often, Asian international and Asian American students are conflated under the category of “Asian” with little nuance. We know that these students have similar yet different experiences even as these students may encounter instances of bias due to their shared Asian racial background. More importantly, the movement toward disaggregated data to support more comprehensive understanding of Asian American experiences underscores the heterogeneity of Asian American students in higher education. Advocating for disaggregated data that recognizes the heterogeneity of Asian and Asian American students supports student success in that universities gain greater insights to who they are serving—not just an “Asian” monolith.

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Reflections on Our Roles as Educators Though Asian Studies (and by extension Japanese studies) and Asian American studies have different origin stories and intellectual genealogies, what we do share as scholarly fields is a deep investment in the lives of Asian people— their histories and lived experiences. —Jennifer Ho (2020, p.1) The positionalities that we inhabit affect our interactions with students inside and outside the classroom. Recognizing the role of intersectionality, we are aware of the way in which race and gender impact students’ perceptions of us. We write this chapter as a white woman (Meghan) and an Asian American woman (Kimberly). While race and gender are only two components of our intersectional identities, we believe that they are the most salient in how students respond to us in the classroom given that we both are feminine-presenting women. We believe it is important for educators to not only reflect on their teaching but also be self-aware of the ways in which gender and race (as well as other identity categories) may impact how students respond. After all, research on student evaluations continues to underscore the ways in which bias operates in the classroom (Grimes et al., 2017; Linse, 2017; Mitchell & Martin, 2018; Fan et al., 2019). The section that follows explores the ways we harness particular rhetorical and teaching strategies to support students’ nuanced understanding of Asian and Asian American communities and histories.

One of the Few (Kimberly) Teaching in the Midwest has taught me that I may be one of the only faculty of colour that a student may encounter in their undergraduate career and that of those faculty, I may be the sole Asian or Asian American faculty they take a course with during that time. This is not surprising given the small percentage of graduate students of colour and smaller percentage of women graduate students of colour (Leong, 2020). The percentage declines as women enter the professoriate. At my current institution, I am one of twenty-five tenured, Asian women faculty. We represent 3.75% of all tenured faculty. When accounting for non-tenure-track and tenure-track faculty, Asian women represent 3.66% of all faculty.5 Women of colour, broadly, compose 7.83% of all faculty regardless of rank. Acutely aware of how few women of colour and women of Asian descent teaching at my institution, I find that I am both invisible and hypervisible. My physical absence at events may be more noticeable than other colleagues even as the presence of my body disrupts assumptions of who teaches at universities due to gendered and raced stereotypes of faculty. Faculty of colour like myself assure students of colour that they too can dream big and achieve success in the academy. For example, in June 2015, I received an email from a former student that I taught while a postdoctoral scholar at a small liberal arts college in the Midwest. This student disclosed, “When I learned that my Introduction to [Gender, Women’s, and Sexuality Studies] professor

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was Korean American, I was delighted. I called my mother to share this great news of having a Korean professor, and I began envisioning myself in Professor McKee’s shoes, after which my goals and interests became more tangible, possible, and legitimized”. Her excitement at seeing someone who embodied her gender and ethnic identities in the front of the classroom is important. To claim space in academia also means that I challenge stereotypes concerning Asian and Asian American women’s passivity and submissiveness as I assert my expertise and voice. At the same time, in the classroom, I am aware that my name—Kimberly D. McKee—disrupts the norms of Asian American identities. When asked about whether they wondered about my English language proficiency upon the first day of class as part of class discussions on white privilege, some students do reveal that yes, they were concerned. They recognize this as a form of bias and want to discuss what it means when we make assumptions such as English language proficiency and assumptions about names (e.g., “white-sounding” names such as mine). Students’ reflections on their implicit biases encourage a broader discussion of how raced and gendered stereotypes circulate in society and their effects on our everyday lived experiences. Integrating my Asian American Studies expertise with my personal experiences enriches my teaching as I firmly believe the personal is political. To pretend that my interactions in the classroom with students are not shaped by their perceptions of my gender and race overlooks the ways in which our intersectional identities impact our lived realities. This is not to say that faculty should be compelled to disclose personal information to students; rather, this is a call to recognize how the information, whether true or assumed that students glean from appearance plays a role in their learning. The experiences shared in this section provide context to how I negotiate my presence in the classroom. Not only do I disrupt notions of what it means to be a faculty, I also challenge assumptions about Asian American identity in that as a transracial adoptee, my narrative departs from common notions of same-race Asian American families whose migration narratives more closely resemble the patterns of immigration from Korea, even as my adoption story is part of those same narratives. I see my role as one to dispel and challenge outdated notions of who Asian Americans are to not only include adoptees, but also mixed-race Asian Americans and complicate notions of citizenship, given the highest number of undocumented immigrants are of Asian descent and Asian Americans are continuously finding themselves deported.

Always Asking Why (Meghan) As a white woman teaching classes about China and East Asia to a majority white student body, I think it is vital to constantly question my motives, the ways in which I present information to students, and how I present my expertise, especially considering that Oriental Studies, the predecessor to Asian Studies, is deeply rooted in colonial ideology. I have been learning Chinese and visiting and studying Mainland

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China for thirty years, yet regardless of my affinity to China, my experiences will always be those of an observer, even though I have been married to a Chinese person for twenty years. I try to make clear to students that my surname and marriage are not symbols of authenticity; they do not make me more qualified to teach my courses. Nor does my whiteness make me less qualified to teach. Rather, I demonstrate how my expertise originates from my training in Chinese Studies. I also find that, as a feminine-presenting, mild-mannered, middle-aged white woman, I am often placed in a motherly role. Rarely do students question my sincerity or concern for them, and they often come to me for advice and emotional support. On the other hand, my credentials and intelligence are too frequently questioned in course evaluations. While it might reason that I should try to present myself as tougher or “masculine” in order to combat negative associations with my appearance, as many “power” women of the 1980s and 1990s did, I prefer to teach through vulnerability and humility. I am aware that my ability to make this choice is due to my privileged position as a white academic, and because these qualities are already part of the stereotypical role in which I am placed. I do not want to present myself as the all-knowing expert because I want to encourage my students to recognize that the goal is not to know it all, but to ask good questions and to seek informed answers. The main objective in my courses then becomes remembering how to be curious, learning how to ask the right questions, identify reliable sources of information, and interrogate and synthesize them in search of answers. Perhaps most importantly, I highlight research by minoritized scholars, select resources that centre Asian experiences, and work to problematize standard narratives. Put quite simply, it is easier for me to point out Orientalist viewpoints and other biases in standard narratives, because as a white person, my motivations and loyalties are not scrutinized in the same way as my colleagues of Asian descent.

Conclusion [T]he racialized terms, the “Chinese virus” and the “kung flu,” naturalizes the virus as being endemic to Chinese bodies, thereby conjuring the phantasm of the Chinese/Asian contagion. While the ideational power of the Chinese/ Asian contagion lies in its construction of the Asian body as the vehicle and embodiment of the virus, the deployment of blame against China/the Chinese for the spread of the virus serves as the catalyst that directs anger and rage against Chinese/Asian bodies. —Lok Siu and Claire Chun (2020, p. 428) Reporting of Covid-19 and American politicians’ responses to the coronavirus demonstrated the importance of the humanities and liberal education. In particular, the coronavirus infodemic underscores the importance of information literacy and the humanities. The ability to locate current events within broader socio-historical contexts only bolsters one’s ability to critically engage the world around them. When Chinese and Asian bodies, more broadly, are seen as sources of contagion

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and foreign, providing students with the histories of the yellow peril aids their ability to confront and challenge their own assumptions and biases about Asian and Asian American communities. While this is just one example of how to bolster students’ critical thinking skills, when paired with other andragogical strategies outlined within this essay, we elucidate multiple avenues to support the growth of students’ cultural and global competence. To overlook the fields of Asian Studies and Asian American Studies risks further marginalizing the histories, voices, and experiences of Asian and Asian American peoples, communities, and cultures. As the Trump administration demonstrated, the yellow peril continues to circulate more than a century after its emergence. Whether in the form of techno-Orientalism or rooted in outdated, Sinophobic tropes, it is incumbent upon scholars of Asian Studies and Asian American Studies, among other fields rooted in social justice, to support the necessary critical thinking skills to unpack racialized rhetorics and actions. In doing so, these fields encourage students to confront their own implicit biases and examine why such beliefs persist. If not, there’s a risk that history repeats itself. The spread of mis- and disinformation during the Trump presidency demonstrated the value of humanities and the necessity of increased information and media literacy.

Notes 1 The WHO best practices guide to naming new human infectious disease aims to avoid stigmatizing groups of people, geographic locations, and cultures, for example. 2 The Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center found “a relationship between xenophobic statements from political leaders and the increase of hate incidents” (Takasaki, 2020, p. 345). Please see Kara Takasaki’s essay in the “Viral Racisms” special issue of the Journal of Asian American Studies to learn more about the impact of community organizations, activists, and scholars coming together to combat anti-Asian sentiment (Takasaki, 2020). 3 For a further discussion of politicians’ responses to Covid-19, please see (Arora & Kim, 2020). 4 We are choosing to employ the term andragogy (i.e., the art and science of teaching adults), instead of pedagogy (i.e., the art and science of teaching children), first, because we teach adult learners who draw from diverse life experiences, and second, because much of our teaching centres on guiding adult learners to reframe received narratives and to recognize how stereotypical images and messages inform long-standing, implicit biases. Whereas pedagogical strategies might focus on helping students understand these basic concepts with an eye on the future, andragogical strategies must include significant reflection on the past, critical analysis of current social and political contexts, as well as preparation for the future. For examples of andragogical approaches in other disciplines, see (Chan, 2010). 5 This number may be lower when considering the disaggregated data of Asian international and Asian American women faculty.

References Arora, M., & Kim, H. J. (2020). Stopping the hate: Political condemnations of anti-Asian rhetoric during the COVID-19 crisis. Journal of Asian American Studies, 23(3), 387–405. https://doi.org/10.1353/jaas.2020.0031

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Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U). (2014). Information literacy VALUE rubric. Retrieved September 15, 2020 from https://www.aacu.org/value/ rubrics/information-literacy Caputo, M. (2020, May 20). Anti-China sentiment is on the rise. POLITICO. https://www. politico.com/news/2020/05/20/anti-china-sentiment-coronavirus-poll-269373 Carillo, E. (2018, July 31). Digital literacy in “post-truth America”: An interview. The MLA Style Center. https://style.mla.org/digital-literacy/ Chan, S. (2010). Applications of andragogy in multi-disciplined teaching and learning. Journal of Adult Education, 39(2), 25–35. Chang, J. O. (2020a). Walking with Asian American studies. Journal of Asian American Studies, 23(3), 329–333. https://doi.org/10.1353/jaas.2020.0026 Chang, J. O. (2020b). Yellow peril teach-in resources. [Google Docs]. Retrieved September 25, 2020 from https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-DLnAY5r-f4DRLZgndR_ Bu47nqHVtAOKem5QRmbz7bg/edit?usp=embed_facebook Chen, M. (2020, March 31). Texas Sam’s Club stabbing of Burmese man and son confirmed by FBI as hate crime. NextShark. https://nextshark.com/sams-club-hate-crimetexas-stabbing/ Chin, J. (2010, October 22). Fear mongering 101: Anti-China campaign ads. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-11316 Fan, Y., Shepherd, L. J., Slavich, E., Waters, D., Stone, M., Abel, R., & Johnston, E. L. (2019). Gender and cultural bias in student evaluations: Why representation matters. PLoS ONE 14(2): e0209749. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209749 Gajjar, S. (2020, September 23). Asian Americans call out Republicans who opposed anti-racism measure. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/asianamericans-call-out-republicans-who-opposed-anti-racism-measure-n1240870 Grimes, A., Medway, D., Foos, A., & Goatman, A. (2017). Impact bias in student evaluations of higher education. Studies in Higher Education, 42(6), 945–962. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03075079.2015.1071345 Ho, J. (2015). Identity. In Schlund-Vials, C. J., Võ, L. T., & Wong, K. S. (Eds.), Keywords for Asian American studies (pp. 125–127). New York University Press. Ho, J. (2020). Anti-Asian racism, black lives matter, and COVID-19. Japan Forum, 33(1), 148–159. https://doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2020.1821749 Ho, J. (2021, March 17). To be an Asian woman in America. CNN.com. https://www.cnn. com/2021/03/17/opinions/to-be-an-asian-woman-in-america-ho/index.html Jeung, R., Yellow House, A., Popovic, T., and Lim, R. (2021). Stop AAPI Hate 2020– 2021 National Report. Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center. https://stopaapihate.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/Stop-AAPI-Hate-National-Report-210316.pdf Kellner, D., & Share, J. (2007). Critical media literacy is not an option. Learning Inquiry, 1, 59–69. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11519-007-0004-2 Kwon, R.O. (2021, March 19). A letter to my fellow Asian women whose hearts are still breaking. Vanity Fair. https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2021/03/ro-kwon-letter-toasian-women Leong, K. (2020). Foreword. In McKee, K. & Delgado, D. A. (Eds.), Degrees of difference: Reflections of women of color on graduate school. (pp. ix–xvi). University of Illinois Press. Leong, K., & Kuo, K. (2021, March 22). US has a long history of violence against Asian women. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/us-has-a-long-history-ofviolence-against-asian-women-157533 Lies, E. (2015, April 3). Multiracial Miss Universe Japan hopes to change homeland’s thinking on identity. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/03/national/ social-issues/multiracial-miss-japan-hopes-change-homelands-thinking-identity/

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Lindaman, D., & Viala-Gaudefroy, J. (2020, April 21). Donald Trump’s “Chinese virus”: The politics of naming. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/donald-trumpschinese-virus-the-politics-of-naming-136796 Linse, A. R. (2017). Interpreting and using student ratings data: Guidance for faculty serving as administrators and on evaluation committees. Studies in Educational Evaluation, 54, 94–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.stueduc.2016.12.004 Mak, T. (2012, February 6). Hoekstra Super Bowl ad hits a nerve. POLITICO. https://www. politico.com/story/2012/02/hoekstra-ad-hits-a-nerve-072466 Maoret, M. [TEDxTalks]. (2017, May 10). The social construction of fats: Surviving a post-truth world. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tHbSasnvno Matsuda, M. K. (2020). A primer for teaching Pacific histories: Ten design principles. Duke Univer­ sity Press. McMurtrie, B. (2021, January 12). Teaching in the age of disinformation. The Chronicle of Higher Education. https://www.chronicle.com/article/teaching-in-the-age-of-disinformation Mitchell, K. M. W., & Martin, J. (2018). Gender bias in student evaluations. PS: Political Science & Politics, 51(3), 648–652. https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909651800001X Naeem, S. B., & Bhatti, R. (2020). The Covid-19 “infodemic”: A new front for information professionals. Health Information & Libraries Journal, 37, 233–239. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/hir.12311 Shah, N. (2001). Contagious divides: Epidemics and race in San Francisco’s Chinatown. University of California Press. Siu, L., & Chun, C. (2020). Yellow peril and techno-orientalism in the time of Covid-19: Racialized contagion, scientific espionage, and techno-economic warfare. Journal of Asian American Studies, 23(3), 421–440. https://doi.org/10.1353/jaas.2020.0033 Stop AAPI Hate national report (3.19.20 - 8.5.20). (2020) Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center. http://www.asianpacificpolicyandplanningcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/STOP_ AAPI_Hate_National_Report_3.19-8.5.2020.pdf Takasaki, K. (2020). Stop AAPI Hate Reporting Center: A model of collective leadership and community advocacy. Journal of Asian American Studies, 23(3), 341–351. https://doi. org/10.1353/jaas.2020.0028 Tanaka, K. [helpmefindparents]. (2013, May 23) What kind of Asian are you? YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWynJkN5HbQ The Lancet Infectious Diseases. (2020). The COVID-19 infodemic. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 20(8), 875. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30565-X Wei, W. (2016). Asians in Colorado: A history of persecution and perseverance in the Centennial State. University of Washington Press. World Health Organization. (2015, May). World Health Organization best practices for the naming of new human infectious diseases. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/ 163636/WHO_HSE_FOS_15.1_eng.pdf World Health Organization. (2020, September 23). Managing the COVID-19 infodemic: Promoting healthy behaviours and mitigating the harm from misinformation and disinformation. https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/23-09-2020-managing-the-covid19-infodemic-promoting-healthy-behaviours-and-mitigating-the-har m-frommisinformation-and-disinformation Yam, K. (2020, September 17). House passes resolution to denounce Covid-19 racism toward Asian Americans. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/ house-passes-resolution-denounce-covid-19-racism-toward-asian-americans-n1240385 Yamamoto, K. (2015). The myth of “Nihonjinron,” homogeneity of Japan and its influence on the society. CERS Working Paper. https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/ 2016/04/The-myth-of-%E2%80%9CNihonjinron%E2%80%9D-homogeneity-ofJapan-and-its-influence-on-the-society-Kana-Yamamoto.pdf

12 FROM A STORY OF DISASTER TO A STORY OF VICTORY Chinese Media Reports in the Covid-19 Crisis* Runya Qiaoan and Beatrice Gallelli

Introduction At the earlier stage of the Covid-19 epidemic, the liberal market media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were allowed to tell a different story from the official line. Yet, this unsanctioned story that could harm the Party-State’s legitimacy was quickly marginalised and replaced by an official media’s counter-narrative celebrating the Chinese Party-State’s responsive governance (Repnikova, 2020). How did it happen? How far can the market media go in time of crisis? How could the official media remould a story of disaster into a story of victory? To answer these questions, we carry out a comparative analysis of a Covid-19 report from Caixin, a liberal market-oriented newspaper, and a video-report by CCTV, the Chinese Party-State’s mouthpiece. Combining frame analysis as applied to news discourse (Reese, 2007) with critical multimodal discourse analysis (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001), this chapter examines the representation of the main protagonists in the Covid-19 crisis – i.e. local and central governments and medical professionals – and the settings, e.g. scenarios in the hospitals. The analysis demonstrates that regardless of the two sources’ similarities in emphasising good governance from the central government, they diverge in terms of how the other protagonists and the management of the crisis are framed. This study, on the one hand, contributes to our understanding of the limitation and agency of market media in times of crisis, demonstrating that as long as the legitimation of the central government and the socialist system remains unchallenged, the market media has ample amount of freedom in its crisis investigation. On the other hand, it provides insights into the official media’s crisis propaganda * Funding Information: This work was supported by the European Regional Development Fund through the project “Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges” (no. CZ. 02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000791). DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-17

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and the tactics used to boost “disaster nationalism” (Zhang, 2020, p. 163), showing how the Party-State embedded the narration of its responsive deeds into a kind of responsive report to legitimise its rule. In the following parts, we will first present our theoretical background, detailing an established distinction between Party journalism and market journalism. After that, we introduce our data selection and data analysis methods. Following this methodological account, we move on to our analytical results, showing how the protagonists are presented respectively in Caixin and CCTV. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the findings and their implications on the media control strategy in the Xi era.

Theoretical Background: Media in China Party Journalism and Market Journalism The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approach to media has been traditionally shaped by Leninist theories, according to which media are instrumental in organising the collective and “freedom of criticism” may undermine unity. Moving from the Leninist approach, in the Maoist era, media functioned as the “eyes, ears, tongue, and throat of the Party” (Brady, 2017, p. 128–129) and were fully funded by State subsidies. Following the “market turn” in 1978, media has been intended “to serve both the State and the market” (Stockmann, 2013, p. 50). State subsidies were cut as early as 1978 and media were thus encouraged to resort to advertising as alternative sources of funding. The self-sufficiency of the media, together with an enlarging commodity market, resulted in the expansion of the media marketplace. However, the commodity nature of the press was acknowledged for the first time only in 1992. The lesson learnt from the collapse of the Soviet Union, where economic stagnation was deemed a major cause (Shambaugh, 2008, p. 81), together with the Tian’an Men Incident,1 pushed the new leadership to, on the one hand, further free market forces, on the other hand, renovate the propaganda technics (Brady, 2008, pp. 65–85). The reforms implemented in the 1990s were thus carried out with a twofold aim in mind: pushing the media outlet to become economically self-­sufficient (Stockmann, 2013), while rendering the “main melody” attractive in order to “guide” (yindao 引导) public opinion (Brady, 2008, p. 50). The very beginning of the new millennium has seen a further acceleration of the commercialisation of the media to let them compete with foreign news outlets (Shirk, 2011, p. 9). The result has been a fragmentation of media marketplace. Stockmann (2013, p. 50–73) distinguishes between official and commercialised media, according to their degree of marketisation, though neither can be deemed completely independent from the State (all the media in China are still majority-owned by the State). Almost all commercialised media are part of a media group led by the Party or the government newspaper; however, since their survival in the market depends on their selling, commercial newspapers are more reactive to public demands. Moreover, it is

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worth pointing out that, instead of being a threat for the Party-State rule, commercial media, as a medium for societal feedback, are instrumental in the Party-State “responsive authoritarianism” in the PRC (Stockmann, 2013), at least during the Hu-Wen era2 (Qiaoan & Teets, 2020).

Media under Xi Jinping Soon after being appointed president, in August 2013, Xi Jinping urged the media to spread “positive energy” (zheng nengliang 正能量). The expression “positive energy” is essentially a restyle of “emphasise positive propaganda” featuring Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras. Yet, terminological innovation soon followed, as some official newspapers began to discuss the need to win the “war on public opinion” (yulun douzheng 舆论斗争). A series of measures that tightened control over the information sphere followed: September 2013 saw a crackdown on Weibo and other Chinese social media; in November of the same year, the registration process for journalists was tightened by introducing an exam involving the study of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”; in January 2015, after assuming the leadership of a newly formed commission for the supervision and administration of cyberspace, Xi Jinping declared “Chinese sovereignty over the internet”, blocking the use of several VPNs (virtual private networks) used to bypass the Great Firewall (Brady, 2017, p. 135–138). In 2016, Xi Jinping made a high-profile tour to the country’s top three State-run media outlets, urging editors and reporters to pledge “absolute loyalty” to the CCP. This tour anticipated his remarks at a meeting held in the afternoon when Xi Jinping spelt out that the “media run by the Party have the Party as their family name” (Associated Press, 2017). Although political stability has always been the key objective in media management, Xi’s approach in achieving this goal is characterised, as Repnikova (2017, p. 207) notes, by “a more intensive deployment of repressive tools, combined with enhanced ideology-based propaganda work, and a more centralised model of upholding vertical accountability”. Repnikova goes as far as to suggest that “Xi’s approach resembles more the Putin-style personalistic governance than that of the Leninist one-party system” (2017, p. 219).

Method and Data Selection Based on Stockmann’s distinction outlined above, we focused on the Covid-19 report from Caixin, a well-respected market-oriented newspaper, and a video-­ report by CCTV, one of the mouthpieces of the Chinese Party-State. Caixin Media is a Chinese media group known for investigative journalism. Its founder, Hu Shuli, is a former Knight Fellow in journalism at Stanford University and an honorary doctorate recipient from Princeton University. As a liberal-leaning media platform, Caixin earned its reputation for being outspoken in crisis report. Caixin was one of the first media to pay attention to the Covid-19 outbreak and offered many timely and in-depth reports. The material we chose to analyse in this chapter is a collective

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report from 37 Caixin journalists, named “How did the new coronavirus come to this point? (Xinguan bingdu heyizhici新冠病毒何以至此?)”, 2020. The  report, released in February 2020 and counting 40,000 words in total, might be the most comprehensive journalistic documentation and investigation of the early days’ situation in Wuhan. The ten-episode video-report by CCTV, titled “The general secretary commands this people’s war” (Zongshuji zhihui zhe chang renmin zhanzheng 总书记指挥这场人民战争), was broadcasted online in March 2020. In November 2020, it was named one of the best video-report on the war against the epidemic at the China New Media Conference (Zhongguo xin meiti da hui 中国新媒体大会) (Renmin Wang, 2020). At this conference, Xu Lin, the vice-director of the Central Propaganda Department, guarded against the risk that digitalisation of Chinese media may “diluting the Party’s leadership”, urging to “resolutely prevent the risk of capital manipulating public opinion” (Baptista, 2020). These two points emphasised by Xu Lin reflect what has been called “Xi Jinping Thought on the News” (Bandurski, 2020). The video-report by CCTV can be thus deemed an example of the direction undertaken by official media in Xi Jinping’s “new era” in order to enhance their appeal in the era of digitalisation. In order to systematically analyse storytelling and the representation of the crisis management by the two different kinds of media reports, we adopt a qualitative methodology that shares common ground with frame analysis (Goffman, 1986) as well as critical multimodal discourse analysis (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001). While following the general approach of frame analysis according to which frames “set up categories, define some ideas as out and others in” (Reese, 2007, p. 150), we also focus on how different semiotic modes interact in the two reports. Specifically, we first coded the linguistic and visual materials of both the Caixin and the CCTV reports3 to gauge the main frames in each text. Secondly, we focused on the main actors, analysing how each of them is framed and how they interact with one another. We then compared the results, drawing similarities and differences between the representation of the crisis management in the two reports.

Results Local and Central Governments: Whose Faults? Whose Merits? The Caixin report explicitly pointed out that the Wuhan and Hubei governments should be held accountable for the epidemic crisis. According to the report, as early as 2018, the Wuhan citizens already complained about the hygiene problems around the seafood market to the municipal government, but no improvement was seen (p. 6). In early January 2020, while it was clear that the new virus can be highly contagious, the Wuhan (p. 8) and Hubei (p. 11) governments still gave priority to the local “two sessions” (the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) and downplayed the health crisis’ severity. Moreover, instead of swiftly reacting to the epidemic emergency, the leadership in Hubei even attended a spring festival celebration on January 21, which involved

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a mass gathering of performers and audiences (p. 14). Besides, it also quoted virologists who complained about the abrupt shutdown and mass cleaning of the seafood market, which caused the loss of essential data for tracing the virus’ origin (p. 31). In addition, it mentioned the side effect of a complete lockdown of the whole city – a lot of suspected cases are trapped at home, unable to find transportation to reach the hospital because of the traffic closure; or wandering outside the hospital, unable to obtain timely diagnosis (p. 25). The report summarised: Looking back, [we can see] the virus has been spreading silently since at least late December 2019. Clinicians have reported promptly, and the internal information notification of the disease control system is relatively smooth, but there are obvious problems in information release and public management. The local medical government system had significant obstacles in understanding and managing suspected cases, which led to the failure of containing the rapid spread of the virus among the population.4 (p. 23) Compared to such a clear investigation into the responsibility of the local governments, Caixin’s discussion on that of the central government seems to be much more ambiguous. It acknowledged the central government’s effort in the epidemic control, mentioning a timely visit of Premier Li Keqiang to Wuhan in late January (p. 3). It also quoted the paramount leader Xi Jinping’s guidance – to treat “the people’s life safety and physical health as the top priority (renmin qunzhong de shengming anquan he shenti jiankang fang zai di yi wei 人民群众的生命安全和身体健 康放在第一位)” (p. 12) and cited the WHO’s compliment towards China’s crisis management (p. 35–36), which resembles the CCTV narrative we will discuss later on. However, reading between the lines, Caixin readers can tell that the central government is not entirely innocent. For example, the former deputy director of the China Centres for Disease Control and Prevention told a Caixin journalist: After the SARS epidemic in 2003, China has spent a lot of money establishing a direct reporting system that can achieve rapid monitoring. In fact, there is a clear mechanism to deal with unknown pneumonia in China. It is important to distinguish between two things: neglect of the experts and no action after the experts’ report. (p. 18) Such a statement implicitly pointed to the liability of the decision-makers, who should have been informed long ago but failed to act until it was too late. Since it is no secret that the local officials often had to wait for the central government’s endorsement for any significant actions, such a quote sheds light on the responsibility of the central government, or even that of the top leaders. In contrast to the Caixin report, the CCTV video-report completely ignored the local governments’ mishandling during the initial phase of the crisis. The same

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goes for the China Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which is not even mentioned en passant. Since its first episode, the CCTV video-report depicted the handling of the situation as appropriate and effective thanks to Xi’s “personal management” (qinzi zhihui, qinzi bushu 亲自指挥，亲自部署 literally “personally command and deploy [troops]”), as it is specified several times. Number two in Party’s political hierarchy, Li Keqiang, never appears, though he visited Wuhan long before Xi Jinping, who went there only in March. Xi Jinping represents the main protagonist of the entire CCTV video-report, whose successful management of the crisis is reasoned by the huge amount of aid provided to Wuhan by the central government through the People’s Liberation Army. Seven out of ten episodes start with an aeroplane landing in Wuhan, followed by images of soldiers offloading the aid. Moreover, interviews and press-conferences released by a number of Chinese and foreign experts – such as the US virologist Peter Daszak – and key foreign representatives of international organisations further sustain the idea of an effective control over the crisis. Amid them, the words spelt out by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the general director of WHO, explicitly refers to Xi Jinping’s capacity in leading the country out from the epidemiological emergency: I would praise China again and again, because its actions actually helped in reducing the spread of the coronavirus to other countries. The commitment of the political leadership, starting from the number one, from the president Xi Jinping himself, […], the level of his knowledge is very very amazing. Comments by foreign experts legitimise the CCTV storytelling and leave the impression that China’s central government is relaying a consensus among foreign and Chinese scientists in a neutral and factual way. Besides praising China’s central government, some of the foreign actors express their gratitude towards Chinese leaders. The seventh episode contains an interview with the Italian Deputy Minister of Health, Pierpaolo Sileri, expressing his thanks to China for providing information about the virus timely and setting the model on how to manage the epidemic. Sileri’s words are followed by shots depicting China’s aid arrival in Italy, and the episode continues with medical workers and patients in Africa. China’s aid to foreign countries depicts China as not only a responsible country for its own people but also a charitable power for global wellbeing.

Health Workers: “War Heroes” or Victims? Health workers are covered extensively in both reports, but the two differ substantially on how they are depicted. In the Caixin report, medical professionals appear to be ordinary human beings who are emotional and vulnerable. The doctors are often described as being “shocked” upon realising the seriousness of the new virus. For example, the report mentioned that after Dr. Liu reported to Caixin journalists the number of cases – 143 out of 200 turned out to be suspected cases in the past

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24 hours – “he could not help but burst into tears” (p. 14). In another scenario, Dr. Li was described as counting the number of CT scans showing lung infection with “trembling hands and remained silent long afterward” (p. 20). In both cases, the readers do not see brave and strong heroes; instead, they see ordinary, vulnerable, and emotional human beings who are as shocked or scared as everyone else. Besides, Caixin also reported in detail how the frontline medical workers fell ill. As early as January 6, a respiratory physician who had never been to the seafood market was diagnosed with lung infection, confirming the virus can spread among people, but he and his colleagues were instructed not to leak out the information “so as not to cause social panic (yimian zaocheng shehui konghuang 以免造成社会恐慌)” (p. 9). In another case, a neurologist’s lung scan was described as “full of shadows like being hit by bullets” (p. 9). An otorhinolaryngologist was reported passing away on January 25 due to lung infection, becoming the first medical worker who died of Covid-19 (p. 9). Taken together, these narrations do not construct the medical doctors as bulletproof war heroes; instead, they look more like war victims shot by bullets both in the form of a fatal virus and in the form of ill policies. However, such a humanistic approach in depicting health workers does not leave readers the impression that they are weak. Instead, it can be argued that they look even more respectful as vulnerable human beings who stand up for their patients despite their fear. In one case, a doctor told a Caixin journalist that witnessing the disastrous situation, he could not help thinking “what would the situation be like if he was brave enough to stand up earlier?” He felt a sense of guilt for “not risking his life to speak truth to power (pin si shang jian 拼死上谏)” (p. 17). Such portrayal shows beautifully the human side of the doctor who looked intensely real to the readers. This kind of narration is not often seen in socialist-style journalism. As a liberal media outlet, Caixin seems to be consciously distinguishing itself from the conventional hero-constructing journalism commonly seen during China’s crisis report. However, as we can imagine, the official CCTV narrative fell back to the conventional track. The CCTV video-report frame medical workers as heroes, whose endeavours in fighting the disease demonstrate the Party’s political commitment. By means of both linguistic and visual devices, medical workers’ efforts were attributed to their pursuit of the communist ideology. In more than one episode, groups of doctors are portrayed with their right fist raised, symbolising their faith in communism and their loyalty to the Party. In his interview, Zhu Wentao, from Tongji Hospital in Wuhan, goes even further by specifying that “90% of our frontline medical staff are Party members”. The episode that includes this interview is titled “great political parties take on responsibilities” (da dang dandang 大党担当) and is entirely dedicated to the CCP’s political commitment and ideology, reflected in the gestures of actors and the symbols of hammer and sickle. In addition, health workers are militarised in this “people’s war” (renmin zhanzheng 人民战争) through terminology such as “white-coated troops” (bai yi zhanshi 白衣战士 or baiyi zhijia 白衣执甲). In the official media, health workers embody the quintessential “socialist hero”, completely devoted to the political ideal. Meanwhile, consistent with the trend

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of “reform era propaganda”, they are also “normalised”, becoming the kind of “everyday hero” that anyone can become by simply doing his/her job (Chen, 2014, p. 10). This is in stark contrast to the liberal market-media report by Caixin. Indeed, most of the photos that appeared in the Caixin report were shot from the back of the patients and doctors, leaving readers the feeling that both the patients and the doctors were caught off guard, like vulnerable soldiers attacked from the back in this ill-prepared battle.

In and Out of Hospitals: Setting the Stage, Setting the Narrative If reading the Caixin report, you see the chaotic scenes in Wuhan hospitals during the epidemic’s early days. In one hospital, it is said that even though temporary respiratory infectious disease isolation wards were built, they were far from enough (p. 7). In another hospital, it is described that hundreds of patients crowded in the small hall, and the hallway was transformed into a temporary transfusion room, full of patients receiving intravenous drip (p. 16). Inside these hospitals full of stressful doctors and patients, the picture is, understandably, not always harmonious and peaceful. Some patients were seen scolding the doctor because they could not be admitted to the hospital due to the shortage of wards, and some emotional patients even hammered the glass door with their hands to show their desperation (p. 16). These patients have the reason to be desperate: some of them told the Caixin journalists that they had been lining up here for almost 24 hours but still did not get their registration numbers for a check (p. 17). However, the doctors are equally helpless – many of them have been working non-stop for days without seeing their own families (p. 17). In addition to these chaotic scenes inside the hospitals, Caixin also reported the testing problems during the early days. Many suspected cases who should have been tested could not be due to the shortage of testing kits (p. 22); the tested have to wait for three to five days to get the results (p. 24). Such a shortage and delay, no wonder, adds to the frustration of the patients and doctors. In the CCTV video-report, instead, hospitals are depicted as perfectly in order, with smiling medical workers, fully equipped with safety protection devices, taking care of cheerful patients. A number of doctors and patients are portrayed with their thumb up, symbolising that the crisis is well under control. Besides, the CCTV video-report placed great emphasis on the building of two new hospitals in Wuhan in just a few days. The speed in which the hospitals were built and, more generally the entire crisis was placed under control, is a proof of the superiority of the Chinese political system, according to the official narrative. To further strengthen this narrative, the CCTV video-report dedicates an entire episode to the “war against poverty”. Eradicating absolute poverty in rural areas has been one of the key goals of Xi Jinping, meant to be achieved by 2020, in time for the centenary of the CCP’s foundation. In the episode, with images of Xi Jinping surrounded by people benefiting from China’s poverty alleviation programs, a male voice rises: “Our country will reach the targets set by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ten years ahead”. In December

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2020, Xi declared that the task of poverty alleviation has been accomplished as scheduled (Xie & Zhang, 2020) and, soon afterwards, this goal was defined as a “world miracle” (shijie qiji 世界奇迹) (Liu, 2020). Using the concept of “miracle” is not a random choice; instead, it is a well-established discursive technic in Chinese politics that goes back to Mao’s time. In terms of discursive functions, “miracles are”, as Sorace maintains, “successful shifts of cognition, attitude, and practice, ways of realigning how people understand their society and the role of government” (Sorace, 2017, p. 18). Therefore, the entire CCTV video-report not only supports the Party’s resilience in front of the epidemiological crisis, but also contributes to its moral authority by sanctifying its values and showing its capacity to keep its words despite all the obstacles.

Discussion and Conclusion The analysis demonstrates that despite the two sources’ similarities in emphasising good governance from the central government, their framing of the other protagonists is largely different. Specifically, while Caixin focuses on the local governments’ liability, CCTV focuses on the central government’s responsiveness. While Caixin presents doctors as vulnerable human beings, CCTV presents doctors as the CCP heroes. While Caixin does not shun away from the chaos and frustration in hospitals, CCTV shifts the focus to cheerful patients taken care of by doctors and governments. Moreover, while CCTV relies on military metaphors to present a grandiose narration of the “great people’s war”, Caixin avoids such metaphors to show a more humanitarian approach in storytelling. One thing worth mentioning is that the CCTV video-report was released a month after the Caixin report. Therefore, the official voice sounds like a ­counter-narrative that intends to “correct” the unsanctioned story. Interestingly, while the Caixin narration – reporting the delayed notification and local mishandling resulted in massive chaos – gained massive popularity and resonance during the early days of the epidemic, the CCTV narration – i.e. Chinese people’s successful war against Covid-19 under the leadership of the CCP – did manage to replace the previous storytelling. In addition to the timely response from the State-media, this transition is also sustained by the pandemic’s development: so far, the Chinese management of the epidemic looks like a success compared to the performance of other major powers in the world. Therefore, to some extent, the unsatisfactory performance from “the West” has contributed to the legitimacy of the CCP. This study, on the one hand, deepens our understanding of the limitation and agency of market media in times of crisis, challenging the traditional view that the CCP wields total control over information flow. It shows that while the market media has to follow the Party’s overall policy on information management, crises also give them an unprecedented window of opportunity to practise investigative journalism within certain limits. The bottom line is never to challenge the legitimacy of the central government and the socialist system. On the other hand, this research provides insights into the official media’s crisis propaganda. It sheds light on

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the responsiveness of the Party-State media control, reflected in the phenomenon we call “double-responsiveness” – in their responsive report that is embedded in the existing discourse, the official media showed their responsive deeds that legitimise the Party-State rule. It is worth highlighting that in March, the same month when the CCTV video-­ report was released, a “gratitude education” (gan’en jiaoyu 感恩教育) campaign was launched in Wuhan. The politics of “gratitude” already featured Hu-Wen decade, yet in Xi’s new era it has been enriched with one significant content: this time people should thank not merely the Party, but also, especially, its general secretary Xi Jinping (Qian, 2020). The CCTV video-report, with Xi Jinping as the main protagonist, explained why they should do so. This is how the epidemiological crisis has been turned into a story of victory, in which Xi played a major role. In that being so, this research provides empirical data to argue a “personalistic governance” (Repnikova, 2017, p. 219), featuring the Party-State’s responsiveness in Xi’s “new era”.

Notes 1 The Tian’an Men Incident refers to the violent repression, on June 4, 1989, of a pacific movement asking for the transformation of China’s political system. 2 The Hu-Wen era covers the decade from 2002 to 2012, during which Hu Jintao was general secretary of the CCP and president of the PRC, and Wen Jiabao was the prime minister. 3 Before coding, each episode of the CCTV video-report was divided in shots and the audio in the original Chinese language was transcribed in full. 4 All the translations from the original Chinese language are by the authors.

References Associated Press (2017, November 29). Xi Jinping asks for “absolute loyalty” from Chinese state media. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ feb/19/xi-jinping-tours-chinas-top-state-media-outlets-to-boost-loyalty Bandurski, D. (2020, November 23). Red convergence. China Media Project. Retrieved from https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/11/23/red-convergence/ Baptista, E. (2020, November 20). Chinese Communist Party tells online media firms to put loyalty first. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/ china/politics/article/3110777/chinese-communist-party-tells-online-media-firmsput-loyalty Brady, A.-M. (2008). Marketing dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in contemporary China. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Brady, A.-M. (2017). Plus ça change?: Media control under Xi Jinping. Problems of PostCommunism, 64(3–4), 128–140. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1197779 How did the new coronavirus come to this point? (Xinguan bingdu heyi zhici 新冠病毒何以 至此?). (2020, February 3). Caixin Weekly. Chen, R. (2014). On the strategic transformation of China’s propaganda: From propaganda to communication, from communication to rhetoric (Lun wo guo guojia chuanbo fangshi de zhanlüe zhuanxing – cong xuanchuan zou xiang chuanbo, cong chuanbo zou xiang xiuci 论 我国国家传播方式的战略转型 -- 从宣传走向传播，从传播走向修辞). Chuanmei Da Jiangtan 传媒大讲坛 3, 8–12.

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Goffman, E. (1986). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Lebanon, New Hampshire: Northeastern University Press. Kress, G. R., & Van Leeuwen, T. (2001). Multimodal discourse: The modes and media of contemporary communication. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Liu, M. (2020, December 8). Lookout: Poverty alleviation, a world miracle (Liaowang— Tuopin gongjian shijie qiji 瞭望丨脱贫攻坚:世界奇迹). Xinhua. Retrieved from http:// www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-12/08/c_1126834882.htm Qian, G. (2020, March 23). The politics of gratitude. China Media Project. Retrieved from https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/03/23/the-politics-of-gratitude/ Qiaoan, R., & Teets, J. C. (2020). Responsive authoritarianism in China—A review of responsiveness in Xi and Hu administrations. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 25(1), 139–153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-019-09640-z Reese, S. D. (2007). The framing project: A bridging model for media research revisited. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 148–154. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00334.x Repnikova, M. (2017). Media politics in China: Improvising power under authoritarianism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Repnikova, M. (2020, February 5). The Subtle Muckrakers of the Coronavirus Epidemic. Reporters and citizen-journalists in China are asking hard questions about the crisis. Why is the government letting them? New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes. com Shambaugh, D. L. (2008). China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and adaptation. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Shirk, S. L. (Ed.). (2011). Changing media, changing China. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Sorace, C. (2017). Shaken authority: China’s Communist Party and the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Stockmann, D. (2013). Media commercialization and authoritarian rule in China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Xie, J., & Zhang, Y. (2020, December 4). Xinhua headlines: Xi announces major victory in poverty alleviation. Xinhua. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2020-12/04/c_139561843.htm Zhang, C. (2020). Covid-19 in China: From ‘Chernobyl moment’ to impetus for nationalism. Made in China Journal, 5(2). https://doi.org/doi.org/10.22459/MIC.05.02.2020.19 2020 China’s new media top ten products on the “epidemic” released (2020 Zhongguo xin meiti zhan “yi” shi da jingpin anli gongbu 2020 中国新媒体战“疫”十大精品案例公布). (2020, November 20). Renmin wang. Retrieved from http://media.people.com.cn/ n1/2020/1120/c14677-31938167.html

13 THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC News Reporting in Malaysia Normahfuzah Ahmad, Awan Ismail and Norsiah Abdul Hamid

Introduction Scholarship on the type of media system practised in Malaysia varies, with some contending that the nation practises an authoritarian-style of control while others view it as semi-authoritative (Steele 2009; Fong and Md Sidin 2013; Weiss 2013). Concentration of media ownership by politically affiliated parties has been a norm in Malaysia (Abdul Latif, Wan Mahmud, and Salman 2013) wherein media freedom is heavily restricted by ownership and legislation (Fong and Md Sidin 2013) imposed by the ruling political party. However, the presence of alternative news, especially through online platforms, provides legitimization to views that differ from the mainstream narrative. Yet, distribution of information in times of a complex global health crisis should neither be suppressed nor influenced by any forces. News framing informs and may heighten the influence of public perception of a news event in times of crisis. Similarly, sources of news remain important facets in news construction, particularly in conveying information as vital as the Covid-19 pandemic. Lack of authentic sources in news media weakens public confidence in information obtained. With the rise of infected cases and intricate nature of the pandemic, mass population including journalists were confronted with what the World Health Organisation, the United Nation and various other global humanitarian aid organizations describe as ‘infodemic’ – a combination of information consisting of truth, falsehood, disinformation, misinformation and rumours. Across the world, the public is confused with variations of information pertaining to the pandemic ranging from ways to identify symptoms of the virus, variations of virus and many more. Journalists and news outlets are trusted for the reliability and credibility of their sources – without which their vocation would lose its meaning. Studies on news framing and news sourcing are vital within the journalistic discourse to understand DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-18

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how a nation is informed on a given issue. With reference to the Malaysian experience, this chapter aims to discuss news framing and news sourcing pertaining to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Malaysian News Media Newspapers in Malaysia are available in various languages with English and Malaylanguage mediums dominating others. The diversity of languages offered in the news media reflects a diverse nation of races and ethnicities. The news media plays a significant role to inform its public and this role is especially more crucial in times of crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic. News media should highlight key information relayed by health and medical practitioners as well as authorities and policymakers working towards overcoming the Covid-19 pandemic. This study selects two newspapers in Malaysia – The Star Online, representing a mainstream newspaper and Malaysiakini, a representative for alternative news. Description of selected newspapers is briefly explained:

The Star Online The Star is one of the nation’s popular English-language mainstream newspapers. Mainstream media consists of state-run organisations while alternative media consist of smaller organisations which are linked to opposition parties or social movements (George 2007). Similar practice is observed within Malaysian media landscape. Established in 1971, The Star is one of the largest circulations in the nation and owned by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) – one of the components within Barisan Nasional (BN), a political party. Its online version, The Star Online was later established to provide similar news for online platform consumers.

Malaysiakini Established in 1999, Malaysiakini.com is Malaysia’s pioneer online news portal. Through its existence, Malaysiakini became a platform to diverse political discourse whereby views of alternative individuals and parties were brought to public attention. Unlike The Star Online which provides news in the English language, Malaysiakini offers news in four different languages – English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil – to cater to respective communities in the country. The presence of alternative media in a nation signifies that it upholds journalistic democracy for its people. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for alternative news outlets in Malaysia to be heavily curtailed as compared to mainstream press. Similarly, Malaysiakini has had its fair share of obstacles such as being raided by the Malaysian police and being sued for defamation. To allow for a fully practised democracy, allowance should be given to news media to criticise and provide opposing views from that of the government or those in authority. Framing of a news event enables either magnification or miniaturization of news events to shape the significance of a news event in the eyes of the mass

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public (Entman 1991). Building on this, the first research question for the study asks ‘How are types of information framed by online news portals in informing the Malaysian public about the pandemic?’

Journalists and News Sources Sources selected by journalists play a vital role in the tapestry of news produced. Which sources journalists select to be part of their news and which sources journalists rely upon as reliable sources help frame the news construct and influence public opinion on any issue. The type of sources adopted by journalists reflects on what journalists’ view as important, credible and true (Chyi, Lewis, and Zheng 2016). Sources make important groups to study due to their fundamental role in news production (Munnik 2018) and its role is ever more crucial in times of crisis. The Covid-19 pandemic is unprecedented in innumerable aspects of our lives. Even medical and health experts were initially searching in the dark to comprehend characteristics of the virus. Thus, identifying the right source to be selected as part of a journalists’ news construction is vital to ensure credibility of the news organisation and its products remain intact. Journalistic sourcing plays an important role among scholars analysing the role of journalism as shapers of social reality (Hermida 2013) as works produced by journalists impact its public (Hoxha and Hanitzsch 2018). Scholarships of literature suggest journalists are likely to turn to institutional sources and usual sources such as opinions from experts above others (i.e. unknown sources), in their search for information (Hermida 2013). Journalists are likely to ascribe credibility to elite sources which consist of experts of a particular field, political leaders or representatives from the business industry (Paulussen and Harder 2014). The public is informed about the developments of Covid-19 pandemic through news outlets they consume. As with other forms of news reports, crisis reporting requires journalists and news outlets to produce fair and balanced reporting. This can be achieved, partly through representation of mainstream and alternative voices on a given issue. Saliency given by journalists to selected news sources influences the type of information which informs the public. It is vital for journalists to identify relevant sources while ensuring balanced voices are represented as part of news production. Building on this, the second research question aims to identify which news sources were adopted by Malaysian news portals in the process of making the public informed about the Covid-19 pandemic. The next section of this chapter will provide a chronology of Malaysia’s Covid-19 pandemic spread.

Malaysia and the Covid-19 Pandemic The nation’s first few cases of Covid-19, reported on 25 January 2020 consisted of imported cases from Chinese nationals visiting the country. At the same time, the Malaysian administration was going through a government transition when infected cases began to increase. The then Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad made a

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sudden resignation on the 24 February 2020 which shocked the nation. His resignation, which led to the collapse of the ruling government, caused a fiasco to the Malaysian politics and the nation was left without a government. This happened at a period in which the spread of Covid-19 in the country was still minimal. A few days later, Muhyiddin Yassin was appointed by the Malaysian King to lead the nation. Muhyiddin Yassin became Malaysia’s 8th Prime Minister when he took office on 1 March 2020. The new government under the leadership of Muhyiddin Yassin implemented a variation of national lockdown, the first being Movement Control Order (MCO) from 18 March till 31 March 2020. The rise of infected cases in Malaysia led the government to extend the MCO period for the next few weeks. Other forms of imposed lockdown are the Enhanced Movement Control Order (EMCO), Conditional Movement Control Order (CMCO) and Recovery Movement Control Order (RMCO). Regions and states were colour coded to indicate the level of spread severity from green (for no infected case), yellow (20 or lower cases), orange (21–40 cases) and red (41 or more cases). These colour coding determine the type of lockdown imposed by the government. Additionally, variations of lockdown signify different types of rules imposed. For example, rules regarding public mobility vary depending on the type of lockdown imposed on a colour-coded region. While most forms of economic sectors were put on hold during the MCO, more economic sectors were allowed during the CMCO and RMCO. As part of the government’s effort to curtail the spread of Covid-19 pandemic in Malaysia, standard operating procedures (SOP) were adopted throughout the nation, and fines were imposed on anyone who violates the SOP enforced. SOP varies depending on the type of lockdown imposed on a particular region or state. Nevertheless, social distancing and mask-wearing became a universal rule adopted throughout the nation regardless of the type of lockdown imposed in the area. The next section will explain the research methodology for the study.

Methodology The study aims to identify the types of news framed and news sources selected which were shared to the public regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. It employed a qualitative approach in which a content analysis method was utilised to examine the process of framing and news sources regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. Comparisons of media narratives enable researchers to understand the textual selection of news media that shape the dimension of a particular news event (Entman 1991) and incorporating both mainstream and alternative news media into a study provides a holistic approach to the understanding of media narratives in light of health crisis due to the spread of Covid-19 pandemic in Malaysia. Content analysis is a useful method to obtain information according to behaviour and society views as it emphasizes the categorisation development which contributes to problem, aiming and field of study (Berelson, 1952). Neueundorf (2002) defined content analysis as ‘the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of

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message characteristics’ (p.1). In addition, Krippendorff (2004) suggests that contemporary content analysis method has three characteristics which are firstly, it is an empirically grounded method, exploratory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent; secondly, contemporary content analysis transcends traditional notions of symbols, contents and intents; and thirdly, it has been forced to develop a methodology of its own, one that enables researchers to plan, execute, communicate, reproduce and critically evaluate their analyses, whatever the results. The unit of analysis employed is news articles. The variables of the study were (i) news sources which were divided into individuals, entities, experts (international and locals) and others, and (ii) themes divided into responsibility, legislation, economy, destruction, preparedness, politics and others. Although Covid-19 dominates most aspects of news reporting especially in the early days of the pandemic, other news events were also reported in these news portals. Thus, this study proposed two keywords – ‘COVID’ or ‘COVID-19’ to narrow research scope in selected news portals. The collected news articles from content analysis method were interpreted using a coding sheet to ensure that coding tasks were carried out systematically. Both The Star Online and Malaysiakini were chosen due to mass followers on online platforms. Malaysia’s Media Consumption Report identified The Star Online and Malaysiakini to be the top two most-read online newspaper for 2019 (VASE 2019). This study allows a comparison of news sources and themes framed in both online news portals. The period of news articles collection was recorded from the first 100 days of lockdown starting from 18 March up until 26 June 2020. A total of 1,005 news articles were collected from both online news portals. The Star Online recorded more articles on Covid-19 with a total of 680 articles, while Malaysiakini with 325 articles.

Findings Themes The next section reveals research findings for themes as found from both The Star Online and Malaysiakini. Seven categories were classified consisting of ‘responsibility’, ‘legislation’, ‘economy’, ‘destruction’, ‘preparedness’, ‘politics’ and ‘others’.

March 2020 A total of 275 articles were collected for the month of March by The Star Online. The theme for ‘legislation’ obtained the highest number with 43 articles framed (28.10%). This was followed by 36 articles (23.52%) for ‘preparedness’, 28 articles (18.30%) for the ‘responsibility’ theme, 23 articles (15.03%) for ‘destruction’, 12 articles (7.84%) for ‘economy’, seven (4.57%) for ‘other’ category and finally, four (2.61%) for ‘politics’. Meanwhile, for Malaysiakini the ‘responsibility’ frame is the theme with the highest number with 29 articles (23.77%). This is followed by 28 articles (22.95%)

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for ‘legislation’ theme, 24 articles (19.67%) for ‘preparedness’, 19 articles (15.57%) for ‘economy’, 16 articles for (13.11%) ‘destruction’ and six articles (4.91%) for the category of ‘others’. No article was framed under the ‘politics’ category. Overall, ‘legislation’ and ‘responsibility’ themes were the two highest themes framed by The Star Online and Malaysiakini respectively.

April 2020 A total of 351 articles were categorised according to various themes for the month of April. For The Star Online, ‘legislation’ became the theme with the highest number of articles for a total of 62 articles (28.10%). This was followed by the ‘responsibility’ frame for 49 articles (22.17%), 45 articles (20.36%) for ‘preparedness’, 39 articles (17.64%) for ‘destruction’, 14 articles (6.33%) for the ‘others’ category, eight articles (3.61%) for ‘economy’ and four articles (1.80%) for ‘politics’ in The Star Online. Similarly, ‘legislation’ became the highest theme for Malaysiakini with 47 articles (36.15%), 34 articles (26.15%) for the theme of ‘preparedness’, 33 articles (25.38%) for the ‘responsibility’ theme, seven articles (5.38%) for ‘economy’, seven articles (5.38%) for ‘destruction’, one article (0.76%) for ‘politics’ and finally one article (0.76%) for the ‘others’ category. Overall, ‘legislation’ was the two highest themes framed by both The Star Online and Malaysiakini respectively.

May 2020 For the month of May, ‘responsibility’ was the highest theme in The Star Online with 58 articles (31.01%), followed by ‘legislation’ theme with 54 articles (28.87%) articles, ‘preparedness’ with 38 articles (20.32%), ‘destruction’ with 28 articles (14.97%), ‘economy’ with six articles (3.20%) and the ‘others’ theme with three articles (1.60%). No article was framed under the ‘politics’ theme. Meanwhile, for Malaysiakini ‘destruction’ theme was the highest with 20 articles (50.00%), followed by ‘legislation’ with nine articles (22.5%), six articles (15.00%) with ‘responsibility’ frame and five articles (12.5%) for ‘preparedness’ theme. The themes for ‘economy’, ‘politics’ and ‘others’ were not framed for the month of May in Malaysiakini. Overall, the ‘responsibility’ frame was most frequent for The Star Online and ‘destruction’ frame was the highest for Malaysiakini.

June 2020 For the month of June ‘legislation’ was the highest theme with 52 articles (43.69%) for The Star Online. This was followed by 25 articles (21%) for ‘preparedness’, 22 articles (18.48%) for ‘responsibility’ frame and 20 articles (16.8%) for ‘destruction’. No other themes were reported for June.

180  Normahfuzah Ahmad et al. 250 28.10% 200

No. of articles

18.30%

23.52%

150 15.03% 100

23.77%

22.95% 13.11%

2.61%

50

0

19.67%

7.84% 15.57%

4.57%

Others

Responsibility

Legislation

Economy

The Star

157

211

26

110

144

45

24

Malaysiakini

73

87

27

63

69

1

8

The Star

FIGURE 13.1 

Destruction Preparedness

4.91%

1% Politics

Malaysiakini

Theme from March until June 2020.

Meanwhile, the theme of ‘destruction’ was the highest for Malaysiakini with 20 articles (60.6%). This was followed by five articles (15.15%) for ‘responsibility’, ‘preparedness’ with three articles (9.09%), ‘legislation’ with three articles (9.09%) and one article (3.03%) for ‘economy’ and ‘others’ category respectively. Similar to The Star Online, no theme was reported for the ‘politics’ category. Overall, the ‘legislation’ frame was most frequent for The Star Online and the ‘destruction frame’ was the highest theme framed by Malaysiakini.

Sources The following section explains findings for sources of news quoted by The Star Online and Malaysiakini. Sources were grouped into five categories which consist of ‘individuals’, ‘entity’ (e.g. police force and various local enforcement bodies), ‘international experts’ (e.g. WHO officials and epidemiologists), ‘local experts’ (e.g. academics and local scientists) and ‘others’.

March 2020 A total of 275 articles were collected for the month of March 2020. News sources for The Star Online consisted of 72 articles (47.05%) from ‘individuals’, 63 articles (41.17%) from the ‘entity’ category, five articles (3.26%) from ‘international experts’, four articles (2.61%) from ‘local experts’ and nine articles (5.88%) from the ‘others’ category. Meanwhile, for Malaysiakini, 56 articles (45.90%) were from ‘individual’ sources, 58 articles (47.54%) from the ‘entity’ category, two articles (1.63%) from ‘international experts’, three articles (2.45%) from ‘local experts’ and three articles (2.45%) from the ‘others’ category.

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For the month of March, the category for ‘individuals’ became the highest number of sources quoted in The Star Online while the ‘entity’ category became the highest number of sources quoted in Malaysiakini.

April 2020 In April, ‘individuals’ became the highest number of sources quoted in The Star Online for a total of 152 (68.77%) out of 351 articles, followed by ‘entity’ with 49 articles (22.17%), the ‘others’ category with 12 articles (5.42%), ‘international experts’ at five articles (2.26%) and finally the ‘local experts’ category with three articles (1.35%). For Malaysiakini, the highest number of news sources quoted was from the ‘entity’ category with 69 articles (53.07%), followed by ‘individuals’ with 53 articles (40.76%), ‘local experts’ with five articles (3.84%) and the ‘others’ category with three articles (2.30%). No source was quoted from the ‘international experts’ category. For the month of April, ‘individuals’ and ‘entity’ categories became the highest number of sources quoted in The Star Online and Malaysiakini respectively.

May 2020 Out of 227 articles in May, the highest number of news sources for a total of 115 articles were from the category of ‘individuals’ which is equivalent to 61.49% for The Star Online. This is followed by ‘entity’ for 55 articles (29.41%) and the ‘others’ category for 11 articles (5.88%). Two types of ‘expert sources’ contributed three articles respectively bringing a total of six articles (3.20%) for both. Meanwhile, for Malaysiakini only two categories of sources were identified for the month of May. The ‘individuals’ category was mostly sourced with a total of 38 articles (95%) which is followed by two articles (5%) from the ‘entity’ category. For the month of May, ‘individuals’ became the highest number of sources quoted in The Star Online and Malaysiakini.

June 2020 In June, ‘individuals’ became the highest number of sources quoted by The Star Online for a total of 99 articles (83.19%) out of 152 articles, followed by the ‘entity’ category with 17 articles (14.28%), ‘others’ with two articles (1.68%) and the ‘local experts’ category with one article (0.84%). No ‘international experts’ was quoted as source for the month of June. Similarly, for Malaysiakini the highest number of news sources was from the ‘individuals’ category with a total of 29 articles (87.87%). This was followed by the ‘entity’ category with a total of four articles (12.12%). No other categories were sourced. For the month of June, the category for ‘individuals’ became the highest number of sources quoted in both The Star Online and Malaysiakini.

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Overall, with the exception of May, ‘legislation’ was the highest occurring theme in The Star Online. Examples of headlines for the theme ‘legislation’ include ‘Movement Control: Offenders face RM1k fine, six months’ jail or both’ and ‘Oh, “that” ban: Construction firm fined RM50k for operating during MCO’. The theme for ‘responsibility’ came in second for The Star Online. Meanwhile, the theme ‘destruction’ became the highest occurring theme for Malaysiakini. This research further reveals news on Malaysiakini adopts ‘responsibility’ frame in the initial stage of the Covid-19 pandemic in Malaysia. This was then followed by ‘legislation’ theme in the second month with news reports highlighting enforcement and surveillance pertaining to mask-wearing, social distancing and other SOP imposed in the country. The framing of Covid-19 takes on a different course in the final two months of this research duration by focusing on ‘destruction’ frame whereby most articles reported on the spread of infected cases. Domination of this frame is expected since Malaysia’s number of cases began to spike four months after first reported in the nation. From the aspect of sources, ‘individuals’ category was mostly quoted as news source for The Star Online newspaper. ‘Individuals’ mostly sourced include the Director General of Health and the Senior Minister for Security and the Malaysian Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the initial two months of research duration revealed ‘entity’ as most frequently sourced for Malaysiakini. ‘Entities’ include police and other variations of local enforcement bodies. Domination of ‘entities’ is due to the implementation of new policies pertaining to methods to curtail the spread of Covid-19 pandemic such as mask-wearing, business operation hours during lockdowns and social distancing. The final two months were dominated by ‘individuals’ as most frequently sourced. Individuals mostly sourced for The Star Online were similar to Malaysiakini. The MCO in Malaysia was first implemented in March, therefore, it comes as no surprise that most Covid-19 related content in the newspapers derived from 400

68.77%

350

No. of articles

300 250 200 150

40.76%

100

22.17% 53.07%

50 0

2.26%

0%

1.35% 3.84%

5.42%

2.30%

Individuals

Entity

Experts (Int.)

Experts (Local)

Others

The Star

366

121

8

7

25

Malaysiakini

120

75

0

5

3

The Star

FIGURE 13.2 

Malaysiakini

News sources from March until June 2020.

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information on the theme ‘legislation’ such as on the implementation of MCO. Additionally, the ‘individuals’ category is dominantly sourced especially from popular individuals such as the Malaysian Director General of Health and the Senior Minister for Security. This study suggests similar findings from previous study where some individuals of certain positions are more likely to be sourced over others due to their status in the community. It also aligns with previous study which argues that people of higher rank and status sits on a higher level in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ than those of lower status (Paulussen and Harder 2014).

Conclusion This research has selected one mainstream and one alternative online news outlets to analyse framing and sources adopted in informing the Malaysian public about the Covid-19 pandemic. Findings suggest selected mainstream news utilises ‘legislation’ theme most while three types of themes were adopted by alternative news, with the ‘destruction’ theme being more frequent. Previous literature pertaining to Malaysian media argues the structure of mainstream media ownership is controlled by political powers in the nation (Abdul Latif, Wan Mahmud, and Salman 2013; Fong and Md Sidin 2013) whereby the mainstream press becomes instrumental in helping to promote the state’s hegemonic influence over society (Fong and Md Sidin 2013). Meanwhile, contents produced by alternative media in Malaysia are often heavily curtailed by governing bodies. Practices of a democratic nation include the distribution of fair and balanced information in times of crisis which should neither be suppressed nor influenced by any forces. This study suggests while political standing in the nation gives impact to how the public is informed about a news event in Malaysia, the Covid-19 pandemic has enabled a fairer form of reporting from selected news media – mainstream and alternative. The theme ‘legislation’, which covers news reports on the implementation of new laws and regulations relating to Covid-19 is commonly framed by both. Meanwhile, ‘responsibility’ theme such as on person or groups responsible (to cause the spread of the pandemic in a particular area) and ‘destruction’ theme such as news reports about the spread of infected cases and mortality rate were also commonly reported by both mainstream and alternative news. This further suggests that both news media have highlighted almost similar frames as compared to others (i.e. ‘economy’, ‘preparedness’ and ‘politics’) in the study. Similarly, both mainstream and alternative news sourced most from similar individuals who hold positions in the country. As mentioned previously, this is due to the fact that news media gives saliency to individuals of high status within society. Traditional news sources – of that established by journalists and news organisations still hold sway in contemporary journalistic practice. Prevalence of themes and sources framed by news media is reflected in the news narrative presented and methods in which its publics are informed about a news event, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, it can be concluded that while institutional voice plays a part in editorial decisions, both mainstream and alternative news media have adopted an almost similar approach to types of framing and news sourcing in times

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of crisis reporting in Malaysia. While it is common for alternative media to be contentious in their news reports, as compared to mainstream news outlets which are usually viewed as proxies of the government, this study suggests a fairer and balanced approach to crisis news reports during the pandemic. However, this study is not without its limits. Similar themes and sourcing could only reflect on the initial stage of the pandemic. Future research may expand the time frame to analyse if similar findings apply. Furthermore, future research may look into additional news outlets to provide a broader perspective on news themes and sourcing in times of crisis reporting in the nation.

References Berelson, B. (1952). Content analysis in communication research. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Chyi, Hsiang Iris, Seth C. Lewis, and Nan Zheng. 2016. ‘Parasite or Partner? Coverage of Google News in an Era of News Aggregation.’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 93 (4): 789–815. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016629370 Entman, Robert M. 1991. ‘Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents.’ Journal of Communication 41: 6–27. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1991.tb02328.x Fong, Y. L., and Ahmad Ishak Md Sidin. 2013. ‘Framing Interethnic Conflict in Malaysia: A Comparative Analysis of Newspapers Coverage on the Keris Polemics.’ Ethnicities 14 (2): 252–278. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796813482310 George, Cherian. 2007. ‘Media in Malaysia: Zone of Contention.’ Democratization 14 (5): 893–910. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340701635712 Hermida, Alfred. 2013. ‘#Journalism.’ Digital Journalism 1 (3): 295–313. https://doi.org/10. 1080/21670811.2013.808456 Hoxha, Abit, and Thomas Hanitzsch. 2018. ‘How Conflict News Comes into Being: Reconstructing ‘Reality’ through Telling Stories.’ Media, War and Conflict 11 (1): 46–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635217727313 Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An Introduction to its methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Latif, Roslina Abdul, Wan Amizah Wan Mahmud, and Ali Salman. 2013. ‘A Broadcasting History of Malaysia: Progress and Shifts.’ Asian Social Science 9 (6): 50–57. https://doi. org/10.5539/ass.v9n6p50 Munnik, Michael B. 2018. ‘Reaching out in a Climate of Negativity: Perceptions and Persistence among Muslim Sources Engaging with News Media.’ Contemporary Islam 12 (3): 211–227. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-018-0415-0 Neueundorf, K.A. (2002). The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Paulussen, Steve, and Raymond A. Harder. 2014. ‘Social Media References in Newspapers.’ Journalism Practice 8 (5): 542–551. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2014.894327. Steele, Janet. 2009. ‘Professionalism Online: How Malaysiakini Challenges Authoritarianism.’ International Journal of Press/Politics 14 (1): 91–111 VASE. 2019. ‘Malaysia’s 2019 Media Consumption Report.’ Vase.Ai. 2019. https://vase.ai/ resources/malaysias-media-consumption-2019/ Weiss, Meredith L. 2013. ‘Parsing the Power of ‘New Media’ in Malaysia.’ Journal of Contemporary Asia 43 (4): 591–612. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2012.759332

PART V

Narratives of Othering

14 VIRAL VILIFICATION Gita V. Pai

Introduction In naming the coronavirus in 2020, the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) shied away from designating a geographic location to avoid stigmatizing a particular ethnic group. This decision is unlike in previous years, such as the 2012 Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and the 2014 Ebola virus (EBOV) named respectively after a massive and diverse world region and a river in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Given that under a microscope the virus appears covered with pointed structures that surround it like a corona (Latin for “crown”), the ICTV announced on February 11, 2020 that the official name of the virus is severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 or SARS-CoV-2; on that same day, the World Health Organization (WHO)—which oversees the response to global health crises—announced “COVID-19” as the name of the new disease (2020a).1 Despite the absence of a specific place or people in the seemingly generic and scientific designations, xenophobic behaviors unfortunately intensified as the outbreak spread swiftly across the globe and the WHO formally announced a global pandemic on March 11, 2020 (Serhan & McLaughlin, 2020 and Ducharme, 2020). An infectious disease like a pandemic, which passes easily from person to person in several parts of the world at the same time, generates in others a fear of contracting it. This panic in turn promotes discrimination, making the vilification of certain populations during viral outbreaks common. Victims of bigotry and prejudice during previous pandemics have included European immigrants during the 1853 yellow-fever, East Asians during the 2002–2003 SARS, and Africans during the 2014–2016 Ebola. In this chapter, I analyze coronavirus-related xenophobia in the initial months after the WHO issued its March 11th declaration, using a cartoon published in an Indian newspaper in late March, and a cover for an American public health journal DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-20

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in mid-April. In the process of inadvertently blaming Muslims for spreading the coronavirus contagion and the Chinese for starting the virus that causes the respiratory infection Covid-19, these images nevertheless contributed to the wave of racism directed at Muslims in India and Asians and Asian-Americans in the United States. This chapter examines the editorial decisions behind the image selections and the ensuing public outcries on social media over their dissemination. Finally, I seek to understand relationships between xenophobic representations and dangerously inappropriate responses to pandemics such as Covid-19.

Cartoon On March 25, 2020, a cartoon depicting the novel coronavirus terrorizing the world appeared in The Cognate, an English-language daily newspaper headquartered in Chennai, India, and one of the most circulated and widely read throughout the country (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2019). The overall sentiment of the cartoon is apocalyptic: gloomy shades of gray converge as personifications of pink-spiked coronaviruses stand on a desolate rocky terrain against a thunderous skyscape. Each virus wears a Pathani suit, the traditional attire of Pashtun Muslim men along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border comprising a long kurta shirt and waskat waistcoat over baggy shalwar trousers, as they aim AK-47 assault rifles at a cowering mask-wearing earth (Hussain, 2020). Readers in India expressed their disapproval on Twitter, accusing the newspaper of stoking anti-Muslim sentiments and insisting on an apology: So #COVID2019 attacked on the earth like a terrorist, interestingly in traditional #Muslim clothes. We strongly condemn this and demand @the_hindu and cartoonist unconditional apology. islamaphobic [sic] shame @the_hindu. (The Hindu Comment, 2020) After receiving numerous objections to his cartoon that blamed The Hindu of perpetuating the negative stereotype of Muslims as terrorists, Deepak Harichandran (2020), the newspaper’s national design editor and artist, replaced the terrorist-­ looking viruses with unclothed stick figures the following day on March 26, stating that “any link to Muslims in the attire of the virus was unintentional.” Deliberate or not, the cartoon reflects xenophobia in India under the reigning prime minister and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which espouses Hindu nationalism (Ganguly, 2019) debasing and disregarding 200 million Muslim citizens in India as a nation of 1.3 billion. Amidst the coronavirus crisis, BJP leaders labeled a conference that a global Islamic preaching group, Tablighi Jamat, held at its Delhi headquarters in early March as an “Islamic insurrection” and “corona terrorism” (Malviya, 2020 & “This is corona terrorism,” 2020), after some attendees contracted Covid-19 and perhaps subsequently spread the disease (Slater et al., 2020). When thousands of Hindu devotees defied the nationwide coronavirus lockdown

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and assembled en masse outside West Bengal temples in early April to celebrate Hindu god Rama’s birthday, nobody blamed these Hindus for their potential role in spreading the pathogen (“Defying lockdown,” 2020). Smearing Muslims and scapegoating them for a pandemic affecting all triggered religious profiling in April. For example, a hospital in Uttar Pradesh placed an ad in local newspapers stating that Muslims would only be admitted if they were screened for Covid-19, a rule not applied to others. A hospital in Gujarat reportedly separated Hindu and Muslim patients into different wards (Rupasinghe & Jones, 2020). In another example, Muslim vegetable sellers were forbidden to enter a gated community (Mukhopadhyay, 2020).

Cover On April 15, 2020, the cover of Emerging Infectious Diseases, the journal of the national public health institute in the United States called the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2020) featured an image of an eighteenth-­century Chinese silk textile. An embroidered badge worn by a Qing-era ranked military depicts a golden-hued leopard among colorful cloud swirls, flowering trees, sprouted fungi, and ocean waves against a black backdrop. Centrally placed, the leopard appears to growl menacingly at a flying bat, one of four in the landscape (see Rank Badge with Leopard, Wave and Sun motif.). Despite postulated relationships between bats and the coronavirus’ emergence familiar to many, two scientists offered an analysis of the textile emphasizing bats’ association with good fortune in Chinese culture (Breedlove & Fung, 2020).2 Regard­ less, readers found the use of a Chinese work of art on the cover of a journal issue devoted to scholarly articles on Covid-19 and other respiratory infections as inappropriate, and shared their outrage and concern on the Atlanta-based institute’s Instagram account.3 One reader, for example, tweeted that the CDC’s decision was a way to stoke up anti-asian [sic] sentiment while indulging in hellish new take on orientalism. (Harris, 2020) This particular tweet received several hundred affirming comments, calling the choice “shameful” and “unreal” (Harris, 2020). Although termed for its appearance, the virus has been referred to by its possible origin: a large seafood and live animal market in the Wuhan region of China. Some Americans, including the U.S. president and other political leaders, have publicly labeled the ailment “Chinese virus” because it “comes from China” (Rogers et al., 2020 and Gstalter, 2020). In late March after initially defending its use as “not racist at all,” the president said he would stop using the term (Leigh, 2020) and tweeted that people should “totally protect our Asian American community,” adding that the spreading of the coronavirus disease is not their fault.4 However, he would use the phrase “Kung Flu” while campaigning for re-election two months later (Lee, 2020).

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This rhetoric has incited racial abuse and slurs against Asian Americans, the f­astest-growing major racial or ethnic group in the United States, over 20 million with roots in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent (Budiman et al., 2019). In the first two months after its March 19, 2020 launch, the Stop AAPI Hate (2020) received over 1800 reports of coronavirus-related xenophobic and bigoted behaviors against Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders.5 This kind of harassment is reminiscent of previous anti-Asian racism in the United States—some enshrined as laws and national policies—that led to prohibiting Chinese immigration via the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, incarcerating Japanese Americans (including all walks of life and people of all ages, such as orphaned infants with as little as 1/16th Japanese ancestry) in camps after the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, and implementing discriminatory and exclusionary American public health and immigration policies that misrepresented Asians as diseased carriers when they entered U.S. inspection stations from early- to mid-twentieth century (Natividad, 2020).

Citizenship The history of Muslims in South Asia dates back several centuries: early Muslims arrived during the seventh century C.E. as traders from ports in the Arabian Peninsula to the southwest Indian coast of Malabar, and later beginning in the eighth century as conquerors through invasions into modern Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Umayyad campaigns in northwestern India (Metcalf, 2009). The history of Asians in North America dates back to the sixteenth century with the first recorded presence of Filipinos in what is now the United States near Morro Bay on the western coast in October 1587 (Filipino American National Historical Society, 2020). Despite these long histories, both communities have been viewed as “perpetual foreigners” (Lee et al., 2009), a situation only heightened by the coronavirus health crisis. Perpetual foreigner syndrome primarily describes the Asian American experience, whereby American citizens of Asian descent are seen as the “other” in white-­ dominant society in the United States, making them therefore never full-fledged citizens. Asian Americans are repeatedly asked: “Where are you from? No, where are you really from?” When answered with something like “California,” the response might be, “I meant, where are you originally from?” For example, an Indiana gas station owner asked a physician of Korean descent, where he is from and whether he is Chinese. Even after responding that he was born in Lexington, Kentucky— making him a U.S. citizen—the owner verbally attacked him (Winfrey, 2020). The perpetual foreigner stereotype produces a conceptual contradiction between citizenship and ancestry that marginalizes Asian Americans because dominant society regards them as never possibly being truly American (Huynh et al., 2011). This seems to have emerged during the Second World War when Japanese Americans were forcibly removed from their communities and incarcerated because of their alleged threat to the nation; the syndrome further coalesced when Asian countries started to become increasingly economically successful during the 1980s, jeopardizing postwar U.S. domination (Heale, 2009).

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Perpetual foreigner syndrome also applies to what Muslims endure in present-day India. Hindutva (“Hinduness”) is a political ideology that guides the nation’s current ruling party; it originated in the early twentieth century when V. D. Sarvarkar equated Indian culture with Hinduism. Savarkar defined Muslims as by definition not Indian (1923, p. 42–44). Despite a presence dating back several centuries they are, in other words, perpetual foreigners. Accordingly, the current Indian government has politically and socially assaulted Muslim citizens with a mass invalidation of national identity based on religious faith in Assam, a state bordering Bangladesh and Myanmar, where Muslims born and raised in the country must prove that they or their ancestors were Indian citizens before the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 (Singh & Raj, 2020). Furthermore, a recent immigration law provides fast-tracked citizenship to refugees with the exception of Muslims, whom BJP leaders now call “infiltrators” (Venkataramakrishnan, 2019).

Criticisms India reported its first coronavirus on January 30, 2020. Although Indian and international medical experts warned that the country was especially vulnerable to a pandemic because of its deep-rooted poverty, precarious healthcare system, and high-density population, the BJP government has been criticized for not doing enough to counteract the spread of Covid-19 in the weeks following the first known case: it performed minimal testing, failed to secure enough Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and avoided preparing the medical system (Rupasinghe & Jones, 2020). On March 19, the Indian prime minister asked people to clap or bang metal plates four days later for those providing essential services, a gesture to display national solidarity. On March 24, after providing only four hours’ notice, he imposed a three-week nationwide lockdown. With little forethought regarding implications, the drastic measure to contain the coronavirus outbreak left millions of migrant laborers suddenly without work, food, shelter, money, or transportation. A mass exodus ensued as the poor traveled hundreds of miles from cities—mostly on foot—back to their home villages, prompting criticisms that India’s Hindu nationalist government “mismanaged” their response (Sebastian, 2020). As the pandemic continued to spread, the government further extended the lockdown to May 3. It would have been better, some critics suggested, to have tested, monitored, stopped public gatherings, and closed restaurants and shopping malls, rather than shut down an entire country that ended up wrecking the economy and creating a massive recession. Moreover, detractors said, the government should not have loosened restrictions in June just as the number of coronavirus cases were surging (Bezzi, 2020). The U.S. government has been accused of mismanaging the pandemic, too. Critics claim that although the U.S. president received the first formal notification of the coronavirus outbreak in China on January 3, 2020, and was warned of the possibility of a pandemic later that month, he “squandered” the next two and half weeks. The United States—perhaps the best prepared nation to fight the pandemic

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with its expertise, resources, plans, and epidemiological experience—had a leader who played down the seriousness of the virus (Abutaleb et al., 2020). When coronavirus cases began to soar in March, medical health personnel across the country faced an alarming shortage of masks, surgical gowns, and eye gear to protect them from the virus and a president with no plans to address the medical equipment shortages or ramp up testing and develop tracing procedures ( Jacobs et al., 2020).6 After long delays and multiple denials of the coronavirus’ seriousness, the president finally relented in mid-March to recommend social distancing across the country, but he never issued a national mask mandate (Lipton et al., 2020).7 His administration’s lack of preparation and failed public health response left the United States to account for more than a quarter of the world’s Covid-19 deaths by late May despite having only four percent of its population. Furthermore, the federal government’s failure to adequately respond to the economic crisis left millions unemployed and an economy sluggish (Zamarripa, 2020).

Consequences In the early months after the WHO declared the global health crisis, India’s rightwing government used the pandemic to demonize Muslims. Similarly, right-wing populism in the United States used incendiary language, negatively stigmatizing Asians and Asian-Americans. Contradicting earlier rhetoric, India’s prime minister expressed unifying sentiments on social media in an April 19 tweet, maintaining that “COVID-19 does not see race, religion, color, caste, creed, language or border … Our response and conduct thereafter should attach primacy to unity and brotherhood. We are in this together” (Office of the Prime Minister of India, 2020). Mirroring some of the discourse of the U.S. president at the time, India’s prime minister’s words were at odds with dangerous actions and statements of his own BJP-led administration. It was too little and too late. The cartoon and cover demonstrate how Muslims in India, and Asians and AsianAmericans in the United States became vilified targets after the WHO announced a global pandemic in March 2020 as the viral outbreak unfolded. The disparaging responses to the coronavirus spread by both political leaders and elements of the general populace of both countries exemplified insult politics, definable as rhetoric that does not focus on criticism as such, but on “ad hominem attacks of a disparaging nature aimed at an individual or group” (Winberg, 2017, p. 3). Governmental reliance on insult politics in India and America may have been a convenient scapegoat to mask inadequacies and unpreparedness. Expressions of xenophobia, however, impaired constructive responses to the pandemic. By May end of 2020, there were 5,934,936 cases and 37,166 deaths globally, of which 182,143 cases and 5,164 deaths occurred in India and 1,716,078 cases and 101,567 deaths occurred in the United States (World Health Organization, 2020b). Seven months later as the year 2020 drew to a close, the United States and India had become, respectively, the two nations with the greatest number of coronavirus cases in the world ( Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, 2020).8

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Notes 1 While different, it is genetically related to the coronavirus responsible for the 2002 SARS. To avoid the insult and stigma inflicted by diseases named for people, places, and animals, the WHO instituted new guidelines in 2015 for naming new human infectious diseases (World Health Organization, 2015). 2 The authors dismantle this favorable view later in the article when they write that birds and animals depicted on rank badges may also “serve as zoonotic reservoirs capable of transmitting viral pathogens that can cause respiratory infections in humans” (Breedlove & Fung, 2020, p. 1057). 3 The CDC later removed the artwork along with its posts from their Instagram account (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.). 4 The U.S. president posted his comments on March 23, 2020 (Trump, 2020). After the U.S. Capitol siege on January 6, 2021, Twitter suspended his account, citing the risk of further incitement in its decision. 5 Stop APPI Hate is an initiative of the Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council (A3PCON), Chinese for Affirmative Action, and San Francisco State University’s Asian American Studies Department. 6 The shortage continued into November 2020 (Stolberg et al., 2020). 7 Beginning with the outbreak of the virus in the country in early 2020, through the president’s own diagnosis in October and up to the last days of the presidential elections in November, the U.S. president ignored his medical advisors and public opinion, even as the number of people in the country dying from Covid-19 continued to rise (Baker & Haberman, 2020). 8 As of 6:23 pm on December 30, 2020, out of the 83,399,225 global cases, 19, 967,278 were in the United States and 10,266,674 were in India, followed by Brazil, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom.

References Abutaleb, Y., Dawsey, J., Nakashima, E., & Miller, G. “(2020, April 4). The U.S. was beset by denial and dysfunction as the coronavirus raged. The Washington Post. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/04/04/coronavirus-governmentdysfunction/?arc404=true Audit Bureau of Circulations. (2019). Highest Circulated Dailies, Weeklies & Magazines amongst Member Publications (across languages). http://www.auditbureau.org/files/ JD%202019%20Highest%20Circulated%20(across%20languages).pdf Baker, P., & Haberman, M. (2020, October 2). Trump Tests Positive for the Coronavirus. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/politics/trump-covid.html Bezzi, D. (2020, June 11). Arundhati Roy: Indian Muslims facing “genocidal climate” amid pandemic. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/arundhati-roy-indianmuslims-facing-genocidal-climate-amid-pandemic/ Breedlove, B., & Fung, I.C.H. (2020, May). About the Cover: Auspicious Symbols of Rank and Status. Emerging Infectious Diseases 26 (5), 1056–1057. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ article/26/5/AC-2605_article Budiman, A., Cilluffo, A., & Ruiz, N.G. (2019, May 22). Key facts about Asian origin groups in the U.S. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/22/ key-facts-about-asian-origin-groups-in-the-u-s/ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [@cscgov]. (n.d.) Instagram. https://www. instagram.com/cdcgov/ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020, May). Emerging Infectious Diseases, 26(5). https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/articles/issue/26/5/table-of-contents

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Defying lockdown, devotees in Bengal assemble at temples on Ram Navami. (2020, April 2). The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/kolkata/defying-lockdown-devoteesin-bengal-assemble-at-temples-on-ram-navami/article31237211.ece Ducharme, J. (2020, March 11). World Health Organization Declares COVID-19 a “Pandemic”, Here’s What That Means. Time. https://time.com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemicdeclaration/ Filipino American National Historical Society. (2020). About Filipino American History Month. http://fanhs-national.org/filam/about/ Ganguly, S. (2019, May 27). India’s Prime Minister Modi pursues politics of Hindu nationalism-what does that mean? The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/indias-primeminister-modi-pursues-politics-of-hindu-nationalism-what-does-that-mean-117794 Gstalter, M. (2020, March 19). WHO official warns against calling it “Chinese virus,” says “there is no blame in this”. The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/488479who-official-warns-against-calling-it-chinese-virus-says-there-is-no Harichandran, D. (2020, March 26). Cartoonscape-March 26, 2020. The Cognate. https:// www.thehindu.com/opinion/cartoon/cartoonscape-march-26-2020/article31167023.ece Harris, M. (2020, April 23). People are accusing the CDC of stoking anti-Asian racism with an Instagram post that an art expert called an “attack on Chinese cultural heritage”. Insider. https://www.insider.com/cdc-accused-of-spreading-anti-asian-racism-withinstagram-posts-2020-4 Heale, M. J. (2009, April). Anatomy of a Scare: Yellow Peril Politics in America, 1980–1993. Journal of American Studies 43(1), 19–47. Hussain, S.K. (2020, March 26). The Hindu Publishes Cartoon Showing Coronavirus in Muslim Attire, Takes It Down After Backlash. The Hindu. https://thecognate.com/ the-hindu-publishes-cartoon-showing-coronavirus-in-muslim-attire-takes-it-downafter-backlash/?fbclid=IwAR2tL9KlSlZkVCgQ0-X0ZRSH8GfDCfnMy6d3_ahoPIsqj 8doidiTnjgA18M Huynh, Q., Devos, T., & Smalarz, L. (2011). Perpetual Foreigner in One’s Own Land: Potential Implications for Identity and Psychological Adjustment. Journal of Social and Cultural Psychology 30(2), 133–162. Jacobs, A., Richtel, M., & Baker, M. (2020, March 19). “At War with No Ammo”: Doctors Say Shortage of Protective Gear is Dire. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2020/03/19/health/coronavirus-masks-shortage.html Johns Hopkins University & Medicine. (2020, December 31). John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (CRC) Global Map. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html Lee, B.Y. (2020, March 25). Trump Once Again Calls Covid-19 Coronavirus The “Kung Flu”. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2020/06/24/trump-once-againcalls-covid-19-coronavirus-the-kung-flu/?sh=1cbe12b01f59 Lee, S.J., Anjela, N.A., & Alvarez, A.N. (2009). “The Model Minority and the Perpetual Foreigner: Stereotypes of Asian Americans.” In N. Tiwari and A. N. Alvarez (Eds.), Asian American Psychology: Current Perspectives (pp. 69–84). Taylor & Francis. Leigh, K. (2020, March 24). Trump Says He’ll Stop Using the Term “Chinese Virus”. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-25/trump-says-he-llstop-using-chinese-virus-easing-blame-game Lipton, E., Sanger, D.E., Haberman, M., Shear, M.D., Mazzetti, M., & Barnes, J.E. (2020, April 11). He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/ coronavirus-trump-response.html Malviya, A. [@amitmalviya] (2020, March 31). Delhi’s dark underbelly is exploding! Twitter, 1:18 pm. https://twitter.com/amitmalviya/status/1245083081305776128

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Metcalf, B.D. (2009). Introduction: A Historical Overview of Islam In South Asia. In B. D. Metcalf (Ed.), Islam in South Asia in Practice (pp. 1–39). Princeton University Press. Mukhopadhyay, N. (2020, April 22). Today’s Muslim Is Being Forced to Shed His Iden­ tity and Don a “Nationalist” Avatar. The Wire. https://thewire.in/communalism/indiamuslims-identity Natividad, I. (2020, February 12). Coronavirus: Fear of Asians rooted in long American history of prejudicial policies. Berkeley News. https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/02/12/ coronavirus-fear-of-asians-rooted-in-long-american-history-of-prejudicial-policies/ Office of the Prime Minister of India. [@PMOIndia]. (2020, April 19). Twitter. https:// twitter.com/pmoindia/status/1251839308085915649?lang=en Rank Badge with Leopard, Wave and Sun Motifs [Chinese Embroidered Textile]. (Late 18th century). Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art, New York: Accession no. 30.75.1025. 10 ¾ in x 11 ¼ in. Bequest of William Christian Paul, 1929. https://www.metmuseum. org/art/collection/search/68969 Rogers, K., Jakes, L., & Swanson, A. (2020, March 18). Trump Defends Using “Chinese Virus” Label, Ignoring Growing Criticism. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2020/03/18/us/politics/china-virus.html Rupasinghe, W. & Jones, K. (2020, April 25). India’s BJP and its Hindu-right allies scapegoat Muslims for spread of pandemic. World Socialist Web Site. https://www.wsws.org/en/ articles/2020/04/25/inco-a25.html Savarkar, V.D. (1923; 1969). Hindutva. S. S. Savarkar. Sebastian, T. (2020, July 1). Has India’s Hindu nationalist government mismanaged the country’s response to the coronavirus? DW News. https://www.dw.com/en/has-indiashindu-nationalist-government-mismanaged-the-countrys-response-to-the-coronavirus/ a-54018020 Serhan, Y. & McLaughlin, T. (2020, March 13). The Other Problematic Outbreak: As the coronavirus spreads across the globe, so too does racism. The Atlantic. https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-covid19-xenophobia-racism/ 607816/ Singh, K.D. & Raj, S. (2020, April 4). “Muslims are Foreigners”: Inside India’s Campaign to Decide Who is a Citizen. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/ world/asia/india-modi-citizenship-muslims-assam.html Slater, J., Masih, N., & Irfan, S. (2020, April 2). India confronts its first coronavirus “super-spreader”—a Muslim missionary group with more than 400 members infected. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/indiacoronavir us-tablighi-jamaat-delhi/2020/04/02/abdc5af0-7386-11ea-ad9b254ec99993bc_story.html Stolberg, S.G., Weiland, N., LaFraniere, S., and Jacobs, A. (2020, November 11). The Surging Coronavirus Finds a Federal Leadership Vacuum. The New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/us/politics/coronavirus-surge-trump.html Stop AAPI Hate. (2020). Stop AAPI Hate Report 3.19.20 – 5.13.20. https://secureservercdn. net/104.238.69.231/a1w.90d.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Stop_ AAPI_Hate_Report_200513.pdf. The Hindu Comment. [@TheHinduComment]. (2020, March 26). Twitter. https://twitter. com/TheHinduComment/status/1243022394844950529 “This is corona terrorism,” says BJP’s Sangeet Som over Nizamuddin Markaz. (2020, April 1) ABP Live. https://news.abplive.com/videos/news/india-this-is-corona-terrorism-saysbjps-sangeet-som-over-nizamuddin-markaz-1186833

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Trump, D.J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2020, March 23). It is very important that we protect our Asian American community in the United States. Twitter, 2:31 pm. https://twitter. com/realDonaldTrump/status/1242202290393677829 Venkataramakrishnan, R. (2019, December 20). Who is linking Citizenship Act to NRC? Here are five times Amit Shah did so. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/article/947436/ who-is-linking-citizenship-act-to-nrc-here-are-five-times-amit-shah-did-so Winberg, O. (2017, Summer). Insult Politics: Donald Trump, Right-Wing Populism, and Incendiary Language. European Journal of American Studies 12(2). https://journals.openedition. org/ejas/12132 Winfrey, K. (2020, March 31). Indiana man says gas station worker kicked him out of store because he’s Asian. WISHTV.COM8. https://www.wishtv.com/news/multiculturalnews/central-indiana-man-says-worker-kicked-him-out-of-gas-station-becausehes-asian/?fbclid=IwAR3MgD8nPlgZTa8an58WJ7ZXDHSh7hDsE1bcDH kUHlBVWXOkis6W8df1IMo World Health Organization. (2015). World Health Organization Best Practices for the Naming of New Human Infectious Diseases. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/163636/ WHO_HSE_FOS_15.1_eng.pdf;jsessionid=9AF319E6ADCE66C6100C524 F133300A7?sequence=1 World Health Organization. (2020a). Naming the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and the virus that causes it. https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virusthat-causes-it World Health Organization. (2020b, May 31). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Situa­tion Report – 132. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/ 20200531-covid-19-sitrep-132.pdf?sfvrsn=d9c2eaef_2 Zamarripa, R. (2020, June 3). 5 Ways the Trump Administration’s Policy Failures Compounded the Coronavirus-Induced Economic Crisis. Center for American Progress. https://www. americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2020/06/03/485806/5-ways-trumpadministrations-policy-failures-compounded-coronavirus-induced-economic-crisis/

15 PANDEMICS, POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS ‘OTHERS’ Exploring Media Narratives during Covid-19 in India and Pakistan Laraib Niaz

Introduction In fourteenth-century Europe, the outbreak of a deadly pandemic, The Black Death, prompted accusations against and subsequent persecution and massacre of religious minorities (mostly Jews), by the ruling Christian elites (Cohn, 2007; Glatter & Finkelman, 2020). By incriminating the religious minorities for its appearance, disease became an effective force for engendering the narrative of the religious ‘others’, in this medieval period. Following centuries of rapid secularisation, one would expect such discrimination to be inconceivable, yet it is evocative of the communalistic fervour, and exclusionary response to the novel coronavirus pandemic, particularly in India (Slater & Masih, 2020; Vetticad, 2020). In India, the trepidation over coronavirus coalesced with anti-Muslim sentiments, especially after the health ministry held an Islamic seminary, Tablighi Jamaat1, liable for spreading the virus (Desai & Amarasingam, 2020; Ellis-Petersen & Rahman, 2020). The resulting anti-Muslim attacks and rampant usage of the terms ‘tablighi virus’ and ‘corona terrorism’ provided an additional opportunity to the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP2) to accentuate the rhetoric of the Muslim ‘other’ (see for detail Slater & Masih, 2020). Yet, the annual Rath Yatra festival (world’s largest chariot festival related to Lord Jagannath and held in Odisha every year), which involved a procession of Hindu devotees, was greenlighted by the government itself in June 2020 (ANI & Menon, 2020). This is perhaps entirely unsurprising since history has demonstrated how disease and prejudice are congruent. What makes the case of India compelling is the state’s obvious manoeuvring of public sentiments around religion for the advancement of the national narrative. This commingling of religion, politics and the response to the pandemic was also visible in neighbouring Pakistan; albeit in different ways. In Pakistan similar congregations held by an Islamic seminary were overlooked by the government DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-21

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and media alike (Rehman, Abi-Habib, & Mehsud, 2020). Instead, initially the focus shifted to Shia3 pilgrims coming from Iran as the main source of the coronavirus infections ( Jaffer A. Mirza, 2020a; Jaffer Abbas Mirza, 2020). What was also noteworthy in Pakistan’s case was the consistent invocation of religion – from religious clerics refusing to shut down mosques to proclamations by religious scholars on national television concerning how God will protect the country (DAWN, 2020). This chapter uses the example of two South Asian nations with a shared fractured past, namely India and Pakistan to analyse the politics of pandemics, particularly through the use of religion. These countries are interesting case examples since both India and Pakistan’s historical trajectories have been different, yet have enabled the fashioning of a collective consciousness where religion plays a defining role with both states often using religion as a marker of inclusion and exclusion (Lall, 2008a). Here inclusion and exclusion has involved the identification and awareness of the ‘self ’ and recognition of all ‘others’ with these ‘others’ mostly being constructed on religious lines and often being demonised (Lall, 2008a). This chapter analyses the national narratives of both countries as told through the media by analysing two themes – association of the rise in Covid-19 cases on the religious ‘other’ (Muslims for India and Shias for Pakistan) and the emphasis on religion as the antidote to the virus (Hinduism for India and Islam for Pakistan). Following this, through discourse analysis of official statements by state officials, and narratives in the media during the pandemic (both print and television), this chapter observes how religion was mobilised by the political spheres of both countries in response to the cataclysmic epidemic. News reports and blog posts were obtained using Google News and Lexis Nexis through searches conducted for the period between February and June 2020 – accompanying images and texts were analysed and assessed for the way religion (Hinduism, Islam) and religious denominations (whether majority or minority) were mentioned in media narratives concerning Covid-19 in India and Pakistan. Additionally, prime-time news coverage of coronavirus in the most watched tv channels in India and Pakistan was analysed for the same time period. Here, articles only until June 2021 were analysed since the initial narratives concerning ‘religious others’ of governments of both India and Pakistan significantly diminished once greater information regarding the disease became publicly available.

Politics of Religion in India and Pakistan The building of national consciousness is a difficult process, especially in postcolonial states like India and Pakistan with a history of extractive institutions and an intrinsic predilection towards religion. Religion was predictably ensconced in the politics of both states as a way to redress the shortcoming of the state edifice (Lehmann & Smith, 1968). Even though the violent rupture of India and Pakistan in 1947 was predominantly conceived on religious grounds, India began its independent life with a focus on secularism (Gilmartin, 1998; Khan, 2017). For Jawaharlal Nehru,

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the first Prime Minister of India, religious Pakistan was a complete opposite to his idea of the ideal secular state. Nehru emphasised the unification of all Indians, regardless of their disparate ethnic and religious identities through a secularist stance that viewed religion in public life with disfavour (Brockington & Larson, 1996; Gopal, 1988); a stance that can be heavily contested given independent India’s persistent tryst with religion in public life ( Jaffrelot, 2017). Anderson (2013) notes how Nehru feared prioritising one religion over another might harm nascent India’s societal contract yet he does provide the example of The Discovery of India in which Nehru writes: ‘Hinduism became the symbol of nationalism. It was indeed a national religion, with all those deep instincts, racial and cultural, which form the basis everywhere of nationalism today’ (cited by Anderson, 2013; p. 54). There is a growing concurrence amongst researchers that India is currently witnessing an exponential rise in religious nationalism – where scholarly consensus has explicated the restricted room for dissent under the ruling government (Ruparelia, 2015). One legal manifestation of the current ultra-right leadership was the recently passed citizenship amendment bill specifically excluding Muslims, leading to riots and widespread protests (BBC, 2020). Other than legal amendments, the dominant national narrative also adopted an ultranationalist narrative that centred around the promotion of a unified Hindu identity. These state machinations are not exclusionary to politics and are also visible in school textbooks with the current government being particularly adamant on saffronizing history of the subcontinent, by presenting a predominantly Hindu narrative of pre-partition India and vilifying past Muslim leaders (Anjum, 2017). On the other hand, since Pakistan’s inception, its national narrative has heavily relied on religion to create a unified self that curbs other identities along ethnic, provincial, gender, racial and class lines (Durrani & Dunne, 2010a). This nexus between religion and politics can be traced back to the reason for the state’s conception on the two-nation theory that emphasised differences between Hindus and Muslims and a subsequent need for a separate homeland for Muslims (Shaheed, 2010). Though the founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah did not envisage a theocracy and instead proclaimed Pakistan as an Islamic democracy with equal rights for everyone regardless of race and religion, there was still ambiguity concerning the role of religion in the state (Rahman, 2016). However, subsequent democratic and authoritarian leaders have repeatedly used Islam to gain legitimacy for their governments ( Jalal, 2008; Shaheed, 2010). Perhaps the most prominent manifestation of this could be the Islamisation process initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq (army general and sixth President of Pakistan after declaring martial law) in the 1980s who stressed on the need for a political system that was based entirely on Islamic principles ( Jalal, 2008). Since then, Pakistan has witnessed both democratic and autocratic governments and though religion has not been as heavily and explicitly embedded in politics as during Zia’s time – the pre-eminence of it in the state’s narrative is incontestable (Lall & Vickers, 2008). The country has to date failed to resolve the nature and characteristics of the state – whether Islamic or democratic – with religion being a pivotal player in the politics of power.

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Media Narratives in India Modern-day journalism in India has repeatedly been criticised for its hypernationalism, sensationalised news stories, the theatrics of journalists in biased debates on television, the dramatisation of real-life events and lack of accountability (Philipose, 2020). Since the onset of the BJP government in 2014, sensationalism in news coverage has increased exponentially (Niyati, 2020; Philipose, 2020). Many channels, most prominently the right-wing Republic TV, openly telecast propagandist hate spewed by the pro-state media; with the coverage of such issues as ‘love jihad (Republic World, 2017a)’ and ‘triple talaq (Republic World, 2017b)’, being a case in point. Drabu (2018) in their discursive analysis of these issues in the prime-time English news channels of Republic TV and Times Now concluded how these channels propagate associations between Islam and backwardness, ignorance, and violence through consistent employment of the following tropes: ‘Muslim women need to be saved from Muslim men’; ‘Hindu women need to be saved from Muslim men’; and, ‘Muslims are not fully Indian – they are anti-national’. (p. 16) These narratives have differentiated between the Hindu ‘self ’ and the Muslim ‘other’, but what has especially been pertinent in the coronavirus response is the use of religion to blame the ‘Muslim other’ for spreading a disease and the supremacy of Hindu rituals for alleviating it. Though the virus was not treated as a significant story until March 2020, the social media handles of the ruling government started running misinformation campaigns in February – propagating the benefits of cow urine and cow dung4 in the face of disease (The Economic Times, 2020). On 25 March – The Times of India emphasised how the Prime Minister used an analogy from Hindu mythology – ‘Lakshman Rekha’5 to elucidate the need for social distancing (ANI, 2020). The next day another prominent news portal Indian Express gave the analogy of the Mahabharata, which holds great significance in Hindu mythology, following which the state broadcasted entertainment channel Doordarshan started telecasting reruns of the television shows based on the Hindu epics Mahabharata and Ramayana (Basu, 2020). These narratives were a part of the state’s agenda of emphasising the Hindu identity of the nation. One factor driving this rhetoric could be shared symbolism, which is an important construct for identity. Religion can be an effective way of emphasising shared symbolism, since it provides the impressions, symbols and myths that juxtapose to become the foundation of a nation and in times of crisis, its symbol of hope. The celebrated historian Eric Hobsbawm understandably called it a powerful tool for assimilation (Hobsbawm, 1992). But is religion a ‘subject’ participating in identity formation or an ‘object’ being used as a political tool as

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illustrated in the way ‘Muslims’ were scapegoated and presented as the ‘other’ during the pandemic? The blaming of Muslims as the perpetrators of the spread of the virus started as a result of the upsurge in Covid-19 cases in the second half of march – after some Muslims who had attended a rally held by the Islamic religious group Tablighi Jamaat tested positive for the virus (Slater and Masih, 2020). Republic TV was perhaps the most vocal in its censure – accusing all the Muslim attendees of harming the community. Journalist Arnab Goswami, known for his brash demeanour, cacophonous news coverage and unabashed support and propaganda for the ruling political party consistently blamed Muslims in his news debate for the spread of the virus. Muslims in his programs were constantly referred to as ‘these people’ and ‘the Tablighis’. The channel during the airing of their varied programs would air a sidebar with a separate section on Markaz cases. All these mentions of Muslims as ‘these people’ fosters their alienation and their representation as not citizens of the country, rather the ‘other’ for the nation. Goswami’s repeated coverage and prime-time debates on Tablighi Jamaat also enabled the blame of coronavirus in India to be put entirely on the Muslims, which again contributed to their ‘othering’. On April 10, India Today also aired an investigation called Madrasa Hotspots focusing on Islamic religious schools around Delhi (India Today, 2020). This onehour show was devoted entirely towards rebuking the Madrassa heads for providing housing space to students and for refusing to comply with social distancing rules. There are other congested living spaces within India that house the poor such as for upper-caste Hindu children in Varanasi (in Uttar Pradesh state) that are also congested (Sajan, 2017) – the selective emphasis on madrassas was an obvious manifestation of the treatment of Muslims as the ‘others’. This raises the question as to why Muslims were particularly singled out in the state as well as media narratives? Smith (1991) has pointed out how some ‘others’ in identity construction and for the national consciousness are more significant since they constitute a threat to the very existence of the ‘self ’, against which the nation continuously seeks to assert itself, or differentiate itself from (Smith, 1991). These significant others could be both ‘internal’, existing within the boundaries of the nation or ‘external’, existing outside. They may lie territorially close to the nation or may have certain ethnic or cultural commonalities which makes the insistence on differentiation all the more essential (Gellner, 1964). The exclusive focus on Muslims could therefore be a manifestation of their existence as an internal significant ‘other’ for India. Since uniqueness and sameness within the in-group makes identity meaningful, any threats could ‘be restored by means of a search for difference and otherness, the creation of, and then the emphasis upon, heterogeneity’ (Lemaine et al., 1978, p. 287). For right-wing Indian news channels, therefore, religion provided an effective tool and media presented a powerful medium to further the political agenda of emphasising sameness as well as differences between two religious groups during a pandemic.

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Media Narratives in Pakistan In recent years, media in Pakistan has become home to a cacophonous landscape of competing news channels using sensationalism and exaggeration as their selling points (Mulla, 2019) and belief in conspiracy theories in the society abound (Anand & Niaz, 2020). Privatised news channels with obvious inclinations towards selected political parties have transformed the news culture, with interrogative and dramatised tactics on TV that rival those from journalists across the border (Mulla, 2019). What has been most useful in winning most televised debates has been the invocation of religion – the example of vitriolic debates on Aurat March6 and whether it’s Islamic or not being a case in point (Asher, 2020). It was therefore unsurprising to witness the constant invoking of religion in media coverage of Covid-19. In Pakistan, much like neighbouring India, the Covid-19 coverage took some time to gain traction. Striking is the way the initial reports concerning coronavirus in Pakistan focused entirely on members of the Shia community coming from a pilgrimage from Iran (Mirza, 2020). In Pakistan the minority Shia community has been the recipient of well-documented doctrinal attacks (see for detail, Fuchs, 2020) by the majority Sunni Muslim community and the pandemic was no different. Particularly Pakistan’s Hazara Shias were the recipients of excessive discrimination by the state – with their racial profiling resulting in two ministers, Zulfikar Bukhari and Ali Zaidi being singled out by the media, both print and television (Mirza, 2020b). What followed was also a coordinated campaign on Twitter on April 1 and 2 where certain members of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, an anti-Shia organisation, were calling Covid-19 the ‘Shia virus’ ( Jaffer Abbas Mirza, 2020). Here religion was mobilised to blame the spread of the virus entirely on the Shias. Interestingly, Muslims who had attended congregations held by the Sunni Tablighi Jamaat, many of whom had also tested positive, were devoid of any mentions in the media. On debates on television subsequently, many religious leaders called the imposition of a lockdown as the conspiracy of the West against Islam and refused to shut down mosques. This is entirely unsurprising considering how prevalent myths concerning Western influence and propaganda in the country are. While print media effectively covered the flouting of social distancing rules by many religious clerics (see coverage by Dawn (Hussain, 2020), Express Tribune (The Express Tribune, 2020)) news channels took full advantage of the situation by running prime-time debates between religious clerics and secularists on the issue. What followed on television was also the promulgation of pseudoscientific theories concerning the virus by religious clerics. Anand and Niaz (2020) write how: ‘On national television no less, Maulana Tariq Jameel, a renowned Islamic preacher immensely favoured by the government, openly proclaimed how the pandemic was a testimony of god’s wrath that was prompted by the growing “immodesty” and immorality of women’. The terms modesty and morality play a pivotal role in the regulation of female conduct in Pakistani society with religion providing an effective tool for this demarcation (Shah, 2016), and here the narratives of religious

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clerics in media used these constructs to blame the gender for an entire pandemic. Tariq Jameel’s subsequent traction of his statement and public apology were of little significance since conspiracy theories had already been perpetuated. Women were not the only ones ‘othered’ during the pandemic. Kaukab Noorani, another Islamic scholar, promulgated the conspiracy theory that Jews were behind the virus and were going to insert chips in the coronavirus vaccine in order to control the minds of all the people of the world (Naya Daur, 2020). An ex-Senator, Faisal Raza Abidi, was also quoted as saying in a viral video that Covid-19 was an attempt to force Pakistan and Iran to recognise Greater Israel – warning how Pakistan should refrain from accepting the vaccine in exchange for accepting Israel (Rehman & Schmall, 2020). This is entirely unsurprising considering the prevalence of common stereotypes concerning Jews such as the ‘idea’ that they are essentially the enemies of the nation (Ajmal & Tahira, 2015). Since Pakistan has historically sustained a belligerent position towards Israel, with the government placing itself at the forefront of the anti-Zionist struggle, this has also translated into the rise in anti-Semitism in Pakistan (Aafreedi, 2019). This address by Noorani in a mosque in Karachi was only covered by a few news mediums, mostly online. Mainstream news channels failed to cover all such proclamations by local clerics regarding the virus. Most noteworthy during the time period analysed was the coverage of national addresses by the Prime Minister, who urged the citizens of the country to observe lockdown rules, by invoking notions of the ‘Muslim brotherhood’ but failing to mention the lack of compliance by many religious groups in following the rules.7 What was also not mentioned was the existence of all other religious denominations in the country. In Pakistan, religion has historically played a fundamental role in defining national identity (Lall and Vickers, 2008) since it was perceived by the political elites as a unifying and mobilising factor for ethnically diverse groups ( Jalal, 2008) – and the coronavirus response both in media and by the state showed how religion was used to ‘other’ a minority community within Islam.

Conclusion Issues concerning the creation of the ‘others’ in the national narrative of both India and Pakistan in education and media have been discussed in existing research (See for detail, Durrani & Dunne, 2010b; Lall, 2008b; Rahman, 2011; Saigol, 1995). Yet, none have analysed how this construction of the ‘other’, particularly using religion, as engendered through media at a time of crises. Also not recognised in research is the mobilisation of religion as a response to the coronavirus in India and Pakistan. Here, the enduring legacy of the imperial transition, due to its radical nature and iconoclasm, cannot be discounted nor can the colonial exploitation of religion be ignored. Initially, Indian and Pakistani governments did provide a configuration where individuals were free to follow their religion, without being questioned for their loyalty towards the country, since nationalism was considered an alternative to

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religion. But what is indisputable is the state of both countries today as the hotbed for religious politics over the same nationalism. For India and Pakistan, with countless religious organisations in place, from Tablighi Jamaats to Christian councils, religion too becomes a collective actor, participating in political processes. But religion is also undeniably used as a tool to curb centrifugal pressures by creating demarcations between the population. This chapter has shown how this is especially visible from the state’s narrative told through the media and its response to the pandemic that has shown how the state in India has excluded the ‘Muslim other’ and reiterated the identity of ‘The Hindu self ’ while Pakistan has emphasised on an internal religious divide and ignored religious minorities in its national narrative.

Notes 1 Tablghi Jamaat is a Sunni Islamic transnational organisation/movement that focuses on encouraging Muslims to practice Islam the way it was practiced during the time of the Islamic Prophet in Arabia (Ahmed, 2020). 2 BJP is one of the two biggest political parties in India that is known for its right-wing politics and Hindu nationalist tendencies (Britannica, 2020a). 3 Sunni and Shia are two major denominations of Islam whose historical schism can be attributed to the dispute over caliphate following the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 AD, with both denominations supporting the caliphate of different followers of the Prophet. The Sunni Muslims support the caliphate of the close friend and confidante of the Holy Prophet’s, Hazrat Abu Bakr. Around 80 percent of the Muslims in the world belong to this denomination. On the other hand, Shia Muslims believe that the Prophet’s cousin and son-in law Hazrat Ali Ibn e Abu Talib was the rightful candidate for the first caliphate (see for detail, Ali, 2010). 4 Cows are considered sacred and venerated in Hindu beliefs and have been associated with deities like Shiva, Indra and Krishna (Britannica, 2020b). 5 Lakshmana Rekha in Hindu mythology is a line shared by the Hindu God Lakshmana with his brother Rama and Rama’s wife Sita and is popularly known as a strict rule or line that cannot be broken. 6 Aurat March is an annually held socio-political movement in various cities of Pakistan to observe international women’s day for greater accountability for violence against women (Zia, 2020). 7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UHMs07MZuEQ

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Anderson, P. (2013). The Indian Ideology. Verso; Reprint edition. Retrieved from https:// www.amazon.com/Indian-Ideology-Perry-Anderson/dp/1781682593 ANI. (2020). Don’t cross ‘Lakshman Rekha’ of social distancing: PM Modi urges countrymen | India News. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/dont-cross-lakshman-rekha-of-social-distancing-pm-modi-urges-countrymen/ articleshow/74960581.cms ANI, & Menon, B. (2020). India: Lord Jagannath’s Rath Yatra begins in Puri amid COVID-19. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://gulfnews.com/photos/lifestyle/india-lordjagannaths-rath-yatra-begins-in-puri-amid-covid-19--see-photos-1.1592905511858 Anjum, T. (2017). Saffronisation of education in BJP-ruled Rajasthan. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://www.deccanherald.com/content/617205/saffronisation-educationbjp-ruled-rajasthan.html Asher, S. (2020). Aurat March: Pakistani women face violent threats ahead of rally. Retrieved February 17, 2021, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51748152 Basu, N. (2020). On Public Demand, Ramayana will Air on Doordarshan Again. Retrie­ ved February 11, 2021, from https://www.ndtv.com/entertainment/by-public-demandramayan-will-air-on-doordarshan-again-2201456 BBC. (2020). Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s new ‘anti-Muslim’law explained. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393 Britannica. (2020a). Bharatiya Janata Party | History, Ideology, & Facts |. Retrieved February 16, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bharatiya-Janata-Party Britannica. (2020b). Sanctity of the cow. Retrieved February 17, 2021, from https://www. britannica.com/topic/sanctity-of-the-cow Brockington, J., & Larson, G. J. (1996). India’s Agony over Religion. Journal of the American Oriental Society. https://doi.org/10.2307/605231 Cohn, S. K. (2007). The black death and the burning of Jews. Past and Present. https://doi. org/10.1093/pastj/gtm005 DAWN. (2020). Maulana Tariq Jameel tenders apology over ‘slip of tongue’. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://www.dawn.com/news/1552038 Desai, S., & Amarasingam, A. (2020). #CoronaJihad: COVID-19, Misinformation, and AntiMuslim Violence in India. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 341651003_CoronaJihad_COVID-19_Misinformation_and_Anti-Muslim_Violence_ in_India Drabu, O. (2018). Who is the Muslim? Discursive representations of the Muslims and Islam in Indian prime-time news. Religions, 9(9). https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9090283 Durrani, N., & Dunne, M. (2010a). Curriculum and national identity: Exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 42(2), 215–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220270903312208 Durrani, N., & Dunne, M. (2010b). Curriculum and national identity: Exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan. Journal of Curriculum Studies. https://doi. org/10.1080/00220270903312208 Ellis-Petersen, H., & Rahman, S. A. (2020). Coronavirus conspiracy theories targeting Muslims spread in India. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/apr/13/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-targeting-muslims-spread-in-india Fuchs, S. W. (2020). Reclaiming the Citizen: Christian and Shi‘i Engagements with the Pakistani State. South Asia: Journal of South Asia Studies, 43(1), 101–118. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/00856401.2020.1689616 Gellner, E. (1964). Thought and Change – Ernest Gellner. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Retrieved from https://books.google.de/books/about/Thought_and_Change.html?id= bvaEQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y

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Rahman, T. (2011). 12 Images of the ‘Other’ in school textbooks and Islamic reading material in Pakistan. World Yearbook of Education 2011: Curriculum in Today’s World: Configuring Knowledge, Identities, Work and Politics, 181–198. Rahman, T. (2016). Jinnah’s Use of Islam in his Speeches, 21(2), 21–61. Rehman, Z., Abi-Habib, M., & Mehsud, I. T. (2020). ‘God Will Protect Us’: Coronavirus Spreads through an Already Struggling Pakistan. Retrieved February 16, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/world/asia/pakistan-coronavirus-tablighijamaat.html Rehman, Z. & Schmall, E. (2020). A Covid-19 Surge and Conspiracy Theories Roil Pakistan. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/19/ world/asia/pakistan-coronavirus.html Ruparelia, S. (2015). Minimum Government, Maximum Governance: The Restructuring of Power in Modi’s India. South Asia: Journal of South Asia Studies, 38(4), 755–775. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2015.1089974 Saigol, R. U. (1995). Knowledge and the production of identity: Educational discourse in Pakistan. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. Sajan, B. (2017). Children of Varanasi: How their childhood is trapped in the ‘market of bhakti’.’ Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://indianexpress.com/article/ lifestyle/life-style/children-of-varanasi-how-their-childhood-is-trapped-in-the-marketof-bhakti-4752374/ Shah, N. (2016). Honour and violence: Gender, power and law in southern Pakistan. Honour and Violence: Gender, Power and Law in Southern Pakistan. Shaheed, F. (2010). Contested identities: Gendered politics, gendered religion in Pakistan. Third World Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.502710 Slater, J., & Masih, N. (2020). India coronavirus: Muslims blamed for outbreak as world looks for covid-19 scapegoats. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-world-looks-for-coronavirus-scapegoatsindia-pins-blame-on-muslims/2020/04/22/3cb43430-7f3f-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_ story.html Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity. Penguin. Retrieved from https://books.google.de/ books/about/National_Identity.html?id=7quoQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y The Economic Times. (2020). ‘Gaumutra’, ‘gobar’ may cure coronavirus: BJP MLA tells Assam assembly. Retrieved February 11, 2021, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/other-states/assam-bjp-mla-prescribes-cow-dung-for-covid-19/article 30967126.ece The Express Tribune. (2020). Countrywide Lockdown Stretched till May 9. Retrieved from https://tribune.com.pk/story/2206167/countrywide-lockdown-stretched-till-may-9 Vetticad, A. M. (2020). Indian media accused of Islamophobia for its coronavirus coverage. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/15/indianmedia-accused-of-islamophobia-for-its-coronavirus-coverage

PART VI

Social Media Narratives

16 SOCIAL MEDIA AND VIETNAMESE UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN THAILAND DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC Anthony Le Duc

Introduction In April 2020, during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in Thailand, in which the country found itself under a national lockdown with a nightly curfew, I received a message via Facebook Messenger from a Vietnamese migrant worker residing in the northeast of Thailand. In the message, he told me that his wife had delivered a baby just a few days before. They were forced to have the baby in Thailand because the enforced lockdown had prevented them from returning to Vietnam. Unfortunately, the baby who was born premature had respiratory issues and had to be rushed to the intensive care unit of the central hospital in Udon Thani Province. As a foreigner residing in Thailand under a tourist visa, the hospital fee for the first two days alone nearly equaled to what he could make working as an undocumented worker in Thailand in a year. The fact that foreigners were charged a different rate than Thai citizens was the primary reason for this excessively high hospital bill. In his situation, there was no possible way that he could pay for the expenses, and he desperately needed help. He asked me if I could use my Facebook fan page, which is widely followed by the Vietnamese migrant worker community in Thailand, to ask for assistance on his behalf. After investigating further details of his dire situation, I decided to make a post on his behalf asking for help from fellow Vietnamese living and working in Thailand. In addition, I contacted some Thai people whom I knew in Udon Thani province to approach the administrators of the hospital, asking for discounts for the unfortunate couple. From these two efforts, the parents of the newborn were able to pay the hospital fees having received enough donations from people who saw my post on social media and also a discount from the hospital leadership who were willing to significantly reduce the treatment fees. The episode recounted above illustrates one of the many ways that undocu­ mented Vietnamese migrant workers (UVMWs) in Thailand used social media in DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-23

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order to deal with and mitigate the experience of marginalization and hardship during the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as in their everyday life. It also demonstrates how an individual like myself who accompanies this community relies on social media to support them on an ongoing basis, but especially during times of crisis. This essay recounts the experience of marginalization that UVMWs experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic and how social media has played a role in mitigating the negative experience of UVMWs as a disadvantaged and marginalized group in Thailand.

Marginalization during the Covid-19 Pandemic Thailand is a country that thrives on its tourism industry, so it was not a surprise that the coronavirus made its first appearance in the Kingdom by way of a tourist from Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China, the original epicenter of the pandemic. After the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the novel coronavirus was the cause of respiratory illness on 12 January 2020, Thailand had the first confirmed case outside of China. It came as no surprise since the WHO had already issued a statement on 10 January warning other countries to expect the virus to spread beyond the Chinese borders (Cheung 2020). However, in the months of January and February, the number of people discovered to be infected was relatively low with only several dozen cases (Reuters 2020). The threat of the pandemic became more imminent in Thailand with the recording of the first death on 1 March. As more cases were detected, local officials began to announce the cancellation of events and festivals including those associated with Thailand’s biggest annual celebration of Songkran (Water Festival) scheduled for mid-April (Boyle 2020). March saw the beginning of more local infections including a breakout involving Lumpini Boxing Stadium, which resulted in dozens of cases. The increase in infection rate led national and local officials to order the closing of schools (The Nation 2020), entertainment venues such as bars, nightclubs and massage shops for 14 days in order to deal with the climbing infection numbers ( Judd 2020). On 18 March, Thailand’s neighboring country of Laos announced the closing of immigration checkpoints bordering the two countries (The Nation Thailand 2020a). Thailand, on its part, announced that it would close the immigration checkpoints along the Thai-Malaysia border (Garda World 2020). In the subsequent days, the immigration checkpoints between Thailand and Myanmar (Chongcharoen and Satyaem 2020) and Thailand and Cambodia would be closed as well (Satrusayang 2020). In the midst of this, on 22 March, Thailand reported its largest daily jump of new cases at that time, logging in 188 and bringing the total number of infections in the country to 599 cases. In the face of immigration checkpoint closures by Thailand with all of its neighboring countries as well as an impending lockdown, migrant workers confronted an extremely difficult situation. They had to decide whether to go home or try to ride out the pandemic in Thailand until things returned to normal. As the vast majority of the millions of migrant workers in Thailand hailed from neighboring mainland

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Southeast Asian nations, the escalating crisis saw an exodus of migrant workers to their home countries where at the time, the pandemic was much less serious. Among the four countries, Vietnam had the largest number of cases. However, the total on 20 March was only 85, much fewer than that of Thailand (Dau 2020). It was not until 24 March that Laos confirmed its first two cases of the virus (Kang 2020). Along with the news from Thai government officials that foreigners infected with the virus would have to bankroll their own treatment, many migrant workers felt little incentive to stay on. When the Covid-19 pandemic began to escalate in mid-March, UVMWs were caught in a dilemma. Many had recently returned to Thailand after the Lunar New Year holidays in their country, hoping to work and save up. However, before they could even find work or receive their first month’s earnings, businesses were forced to close and the country was getting ready to go into lockdown. As airlines cancelled international flights and border immigration checkpoints also prepared to close, they had to make a choice of whether to stay and risk having their onemonth visa expire. Usually, Vietnamese extend their stay by going on visa-runs to Thailand’s neighboring countries and re-entering the country with a fresh 30-day stamp. However, this would no longer be possible with the countries closing their borders. At that time, the Thai government had not made any decision about what to do regarding foreigners who were stuck in the country during the pandemic. Vietnamese were right to worry about what consequences awaited them if their documents expired. Another cause for anxiety for Vietnamese was not being fully informed of the real situation of the pandemic in Thailand. Although many UVMWs manage to speak conversational Thai to work in the country, most do not have a good grasp of formal Thai language. Few follow the Thai-language news outlets, and most do not possess enough fluency in the language to clearly understand the various dimensions related to the pandemic in the country. They had concerns about the severity of the pandemic in Thailand and in the localities where they were residing, issues for which they could not easily get answers due to the lack of language proficiency. Others were concerned about what services the Thai government would extend to them in case they exhibited Covid-19 symptoms or if they had contracted the virus. Even information such as where to get tested was not known to the majority of the Vietnamese. Because of many uncertainties about safety and livelihood in Thailand, many Vietnamese decided to rush to the border heading for their homeland. Even then, they did not know whether they could make it in time because despite the official announcement that the immigration checkpoints between Thailand and Laos were closed, officials onsite were allowing people to exit and enter on a day-to-day basis only at a certain location. Therefore, most were heading toward the border on either very short notice or with the single hope that the checkpoint would still be open for them to exit the next day. In these respects, there was no official channel of information that they could depend on. A number of UVMWs chose to take the last available flights between Thailand and Vietnam. However, many did not know how to check for available flights, did

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not know how to reserve flights, and even if they had managed to make reservations, did not know how to get updated information on the status of their flights. At a time when even the airlines themselves faced uncertainty and could not provide definitive advanced information about the status of their flights, it was even more difficult for Vietnamese to get the information needed. Many bought tickets for flights that would eventually be cancelled. In the end, thousands of Vietnamese managed to leave Thailand before the land immigration checkpoints as well as the airports were completely closed. On 26 March, the Kingdom went into lockdown as part of its state of emergency declaration with a nighttime curfew imposed nationally. UVMWs who chose to remain behind faced a situation of joblessness, no income, uncertainty about the risk of contracting the virus and the status of their visas. While the Thai government undertook various measures to mitigate the hardships brought upon its citizens by the pandemic, foreigners like UVMWs were essentially left to fend on their own. Hardship during the pandemic was not only the experience of UVMWs. Thai people also faced tremendous challenges. However, Thai citizens had the benefit of living in their own country, and could receive various types of relief measures from the government andfree medical care. On the other hand, UVMWs had none of these channels or means of support. Like the majority of foreigners who entered Thailand on temporary visas or visa-exemption programs, UVMWs had to deal with the status of their visas. In early April, when the lockdown had been in effect for nearly two weeks, other countries such as Japan and Cambodia had already announced amnesty for foreigners stuck in the country, but the Thai government was still considering whether or not to do the same. During late March and early April, foreigners whose visas were about to expire had to go to their respective embassies in order to obtain a letter confirming their inability to return home. After that, they were to take the letter to the immigration office in order to obtain an extension of up to 30 days for their stay in the Kingdom. This requirement was a great inconvenience for foreigners and for Vietnamese migrants in particular. For a Vietnamese living in Bangkok, all the expenses combined to get the extension would amount to 120–140 USD, a large sum in the midst of a difficult time. Unbelievably, all of this hassle was taking place at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in the country. Foreigners were flocking to immigration offices in order to get their documents stamped, while everyone was being advised to stay home and practice social distance in order to flatten the infection curve. Fortunately, the country’s leaders finally realized that forcing people to congregate in large numbers at immigration offices was dangerous for both the foreigners and the immigration officers, and decided to adopt an amnesty measure on 8 April (Fairfield 2020) that would eventually be extended several more times as the pandemic went on. On 25 April 2020, Thai health officials reported 53 new cases of Covid-19 infection, the largest single-day increase since 9 April. Of the 53 cases, 42 were foreigners being detained in an immigration center in the province of Songkhla, southern Thailand, for illegal entry into the country. Although the majority came from Myanmar, there were also three Vietnamese nationals among the detained

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(Bangprapa 2020). Despite officials tracing the infection cluster to an immigration officer who worked at the Sadao border checkpoint (Khaosod English 2020), on social media many Thai people upset with a spike in the number of cases after several weeks of a downward trend accused the “aliens” of entering the country knowing that they were positive for the coronavirus. According to them, these people knew that Thai medical services were of high quality and tried to exploit the system by entering the country. Many seemed to be unaware that at that time in Vietnam, the rate of infection was much lower than that in Thailand with no deaths thus far due to Covid-19. Vietnamese citizens, of course, received free treatment. Unlike Thailand, foreigners in Vietnam did not have to pay for Covid-19 tests or quarantine (Bliss Saigon 2020). In Thailand, they would have to bankroll their treatment, which could cost hundreds of thousands of THB. This, however, did not stop many Thai people from accusing these undocumented people of trying to take advantage of the system, a sentiment that intensified when a second batch of 18 detainees from the same center were reported infected for the virus on 4 May—on a day when no Thai was reported infected (The Nation Thailand 2020b). No one seemed to sympathize with the fact that the cluster most likely occurred because the foreigners were being detained in large groups, which would have made the spread of the virus much more likely. The communal living in less than ideal conditions contributed to the large number of people being infected rather than them being infected prior to entering the country. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), immigration detention centers are considered “high-risk locations for the spread of communicable infections, as they are often overcrowded and lack adequate healthcare, food and water, sanitation and hygiene” (Fortify Rights 2020). The episode involving the infection cluster in the Songkhla ICD center illustrates to a certain extent the attitude that Thai people have toward foreign migrants, among the undocumented UVMWs. The factors that create a sense of marginalization are intensified in situations where the interests and well-being of Thai people are considered of priority or where the interests of foreigners are perceived as in conflict with those of the Thai people. Oftentimes, marginalization is simply due to the fact that undocumented migrant workers do not have support networks either from the authority or from NGOs that work on their behalf.

Use of Social Media to Mitigate Everyday Experience of Marginalization Facing emotional and physical stress experienced in their lives as undocumented migrant workers, UVMWs in Thailand often cope with social marginalization by turning to social media. Among the platforms, Facebook is the most popular one in both Vietnam and Thailand. As of 2021, there were over 48.8 million Facebook users in Vietnam out of a total population of 95 million. Vietnam ranks 7th in the world in terms of the number of Facebook users. Most Facebook users in Vietnam are young, ranging in age from 18 to 34 years (Statista 2021a). In Thailand, there

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are 54.57 million users out of the 70 million population (Statista 2021b). UVMWs in Thailand overwhelmingly choose Facebook as their platform of choice. One would be hard-pressed to find any UVMW without a Facebook account. Because UVMWs work both day and night shifts depending on the type of employment, one finds them online every hour of the day. The prevalent use of Facebook by UVMWs in Thailand has led to the social network having a distinct role in the life of this group. It has become the most common way for them to keep in touch with family members in Vietnam and particularly essential for young parents who have left their children in the care of grandparents and relatives at home. Besides serving as a way to keep in touch with family members, Facebook also serves as a means by which the UVMWs can obtain information that previously could only be spread through word of mouth. Presently, there are dozens of public community or group Facebook pages established for the purpose of discussions and information exchange. A group called “HÔ ․i Ngươi Viê․t tại Thái” (Organization of Vietnamese in Thailand) has over 100,000 members and is the largest group of this kind. One of the creators and main administrators of the page is Ha Van Phuc. According to Ha, the page was created nine years ago when there was little if any effort in the general Vietnamese migrant community in Thailand to establish something that would serve the entire community. As the page became increasingly well-known and influential in the community, other pages were also created, leading to nearly a dozen pages of this kind. Members turn to the forum mostly for general matters such as inquiring about possible employment opportunities, seeking assistance for visa-runs or sending remittances home, and advertising one’s goods and services. Many members also post news and information that directly affect the life of UVMWs in Thailand. News about possible or actual police raids and Vietnamese arrested for wrongdoing is enthusiastically shared and commented upon by members. Other posts that receive great attention from members include news of traffic accidents in which there are Vietnamese victims. In 2019, a number of serious accidents took place involving the vehicles of the CPS company, the largest visarun service for Vietnamese and Lao workers in Thailand. These accidents resulted in the injury or death of dozens of the company’s passengers, both Vietnamese and Lao nationals. News clips and photos of these accidents were posted on various forums, which were then shared by many members leading to calls by a number of outspoken members to boycott the company. Facing bad online publicity, CPS responded by organizing a meeting with popular Facebook page administrators and Vietnamese workers on 31 August 2019 in order to clarify misunderstandings and discuss ways to improve the service. CPS also responded to various questions and concerns with an official statement subsequent to the meeting, which was posted on the various Facebook group pages as well as its newly created page. In addition to general community pages, there are also Facebook pages that are religion focused. For example, the community page “Liên Hiê․p Công Giáo Viê․t Nam tại Thái Lan” (Vietnamese Catholic Association in Thailand) serves as the official page for the Pastoral Committee for Vietnamese Migrants under the

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auspices of the Bishops’ Conference of Thailand. The content of the page mostly includes weekly Mass schedules or photos of important liturgical celebrations that have already taken place. For Catholic UVMWs, having access to the church and sacraments in their native language is a source of tremendous support that helps to mitigate the sense of marginalization experienced on a daily basis. Due to lack of fluency in Thai language, especially formal language used in liturgy and ceremonies, Vietnamese workers cannot attend Thai-language Masses and be able to understand much of it. Many also report inability to receive the sacrament of reconciliation due to language difficulties. For this sacrament, they especially depend on Vietnamese priests in order to receive the sacrament regularly and in a language that they can understand. The employment of social media to announce the location and time of Masses in various places means that more Catholic UVMWs are able to receive sacraments to nourish their spiritual lives. The role of social media in mitigation of marginalization for UVMWs can be most clearly seen at the time of crisis. Sudden illness or injuries and death due to traffic and work accidents are common among the UVMWs. When tragedy happens, they receive almost no support from the local government or any social organization in Thailand. Therefore, at the time of crisis, social media becomes the primary channel for UVMWs to communicate with one another in order to seek support and assistance. Words of condolence, fundraising efforts and suggestions on how to deal with the matter are all communicated via social media. Such fundraising efforts can yield significant assistance depending on the severity of the situation. When UVMWs reach out to each other for support, they often use the famous Vietnamese adage of “healthy leaves protecting the torn leaves.” Others add to the familiar expression saying, “The torn leaves in turn protect the tattered ones,” suggesting that although the situation of UVMWs is not good, they can always share with those who are even worse off.

Use of Social Media to Mitigate Marginalization during the Covid-19 Pandemic The second part of March and first half of April 2020 represented the most chaotic and stressful time for UVMWs in Thailand as discussed earlier. The stress was intensified because many did not have access to official information regarding the continuously changing situation—both the general pandemic and issues that directly affected them as migrant workers in a foreign country. The information that they did receive through social media was often unclear or contradictory. For example, between 20 and 25 March, one source of information would say that immigration checkpoints were closed while another would declare that they were still open. Regarding visa extensions, before the official announcement of amnesty took place, there was enormous conflicting information as well. Some sources maintained that all foreigners must go to the immigration office in order to extend their stay in the Kingdom, while others insisted that no such action was necessary. People could simply let their visa run out until the border checkpoints reopen, after which they

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could resume their visa-run without penalty. This issue caused great stress and anxiety for UVMWs because although they wanted to save time and money as well as maintain social distance, the wrong decision could get them arrested, deported and blacklisted from the Kingdom. It was during this time that my active presence on social media was of great service to UVMWs. As a Catholic priest, educator and as someone who has engaged in spiritual and social support for UVMWs in Thailand for 14 years, I am wellknown in the community. Many know me through church-related activities, but many more, especially non-Catholics, know me through social media. During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in Thailand, I maintained an extremely active presence online—posting updates on the pandemic that were most relevant to the situation of UVMWs. I scoured Thai- and English-language news portals, kept in contact with the Vietnamese Embassy in Thailand, and was in constant touch with various Vietnamese who may have information on certain matters. The purpose was to have accurate, up-to-date and relevant news in order to relay it to the Vietnamese, many of whom declared that until they saw it on my page, they would not believe anything that appeared in the other Vietnamese social media pages. At the same time, my Facebook inbox was flooded with queries related to things that I posted or matters that people read or heard elsewhere and wanted me to “fact check.” I became a one-man news outlet for UVMWs as they tried to understand the situation and make decisions on matters of great importance to their lives and livelihood. As the pandemic wore on, many UVMWs found themselves in dire situations, including accidents, sickness and death, without much recourse for help. In all these instances, I was contacted via social media for various kinds of support as well as financial assistance. When they turned to me, I would turn to social media to seek help, as I had often done in the past. Despite being in the middle of a pandemic where most were barely making ends meet with their savings or whatever they could make with odd jobs, many responded with small donations to help their fellow countrymen. Thus, without official channels for assistance during the Covid-19 pandemic, UVMWs in Thailand relied on fellow Vietnamese for support, often facilitated by social media.

Discussion and Conclusion Based on the experience of UVMWs in Thailand and the role of social media in their lives, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic and other times of crisis, following are the salient points: First, social media can serve as a platform where migrant communities in diaspora can turn to for information that most concerns their situation, relying on trustworthy, albeit unofficial, sources of information to assist in making decisions with important issues related to their lives and livelihood. Social media can prove effective in urgent matters because information can be relayed much faster and with a wider reach among the target group.

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Second, social media can serve as channels to find emotional and material support for undocumented migrant workers in diaspora when official channels of support are not available due to their disadvantaged status. The experience of UVMWs shows that many feel that they cannot seek support from official entities, even when they are victims of traffic accidents or exploitation. Through the online platform, UVMWs can be informed of their rights in specific issues and circumstances. Third, social media can mitigate the sense of marginalization felt by disadvantaged communities because of the ever-present sense of interconnectedness established by these platforms, which allow them to share, discuss and seek information about matters that directly concern their circumstances. UVMWs have been seen to express frustration online at not being able to find employment, being arrested and extorted by corrupt officials, and even seeking advice on how to deal with police and immigration officers in difficult situations. Therefore, social media can provide a niche for community members to discuss matters pertaining specifically to their circumstances, even topics that would be considered illegal under the law governing their work and stay in the country. Fourth, social media can help empower the community by allowing certain individuals with the ability and interest to have a platform to promulgate useful information and galvanize members to act on behalf of one another, especially in times of crisis. Although most of the UVMWs focus on making a living, there are a number of individuals who are also concerned with the well-being of the community and make an effort to serve the community in various ways. Fifth, community and religious leaders who are not able to exercise physical presence to the community in diaspora because of social, legal, geographical and other logistical barriers can be present to the community by exercising online presence. This presence was especially important in the Covid-19 pandemic because of multiple restrictions enforced as well as encouraged in order to help control the spread of the virus. Fr. Joseph Nguyen Manh Ha, a Dominican priest who serves the UVMW community in Bangkok Archdiocese turned to social media to broadcast online Masses during the pandemic because churches were forced to shutter their doors. The pandemic demonstrated how essential social media was to the work of social and religious leaders who could only be present to those under their care through the Internet medium. Finally, research into the reality of disadvantaged communities, especially those in diaspora, in the present era must not disregard social media as a source of information into the experience, the struggles and the coping strategies of each particular group. Although in day-to-day events, social media demonstrates itself to have an important role, the degree of importance of social media is much higher in times of crisis, where information and various forms of support are needed in an urgent manner. In conclusion, social media has become an integral part of modern life; however, the nature of how it is used varies depending on the context. Although the primary purpose to stay interconnected with others is fundamental to the idea of social media, the particular ways in which the medium serves each group and individual

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are greatly influenced by the social, economic, cultural and religious circumstances in which groups or individuals find themselves. In the case of UVMWs in Thailand, social media, particularly Facebook and its Messenger application, can be perceived as a means for mitigation of marginalization, not merely a platform to be social or stay connected with family and friends. The experience of the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrates that in times of crisis, the experience of marginalization can be intensified because priorities are given to other more privileged groups/ individuals. Disadvantaged groups may even be portrayed or perceived as placing extra burdens on society or even the reason making an already bad situation worse. Realizing the potential of social media as a means for mitigation of marginalization can be of great benefit to members of the community, especially activists, social and religious leaders who have the interest and the well-being of the disadvantaged group in mind.

References Bangprapa, Mongkol. “42 Migrant Workers Among New Cases.” Bangkok Post, April 26, 2020. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1907405/42-migrant-workersamong-new-cases Bliss Saigon. “In Vietnam, Medical Tests, Treatment and Quarantine for Covid-19 Are Free for Locals: What About Foreigners?” March 14, 2020. https://blisssaigon.com/ in-vietnam-medical-tests-and-treatment-for-covid-19-are-free/ Boyle, Gary. “Khao San Songkran Party Cancelled.” Bangkok Post, March 9, 2020. https:// www.bangkokpost.com/learning/easy/1875094/khao-san-songkran-party-cancelled Cheung, Elizabeth. “Wuhan Pneumonia: Thailand Confirms First Case of Virus Outside China.” South China Morning Post January 13, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/health-environment/article/3045902/wuhan-pneumonia-thailandconfirms-first-case Chongcharoen, Piyarach and Satyaem, Chaiwat. “Border Closure Delayed for Stranded People to Cross.” Bangkok Post, March 21, 2020. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/ general/1883580/border-closure-delayed-for-stranded-people-to-cross Dau, Thau. “Di ̣ch COVID-19 (sáng ngày 20/3): Viêt Nam Công Bô Thêm 9 Ca Nhiêm Nâng Tông Sô Bênh Nhân Lên 85.” March 20, 2020. https://baodauthau.vn/thoi-su/ dich-covid19-sang-ngay-203-viet-nam-cong-bo-them-9-ca-nhiem-nang-tong-sobenh-nhan-len-85-124413.html Fairfield, Jonathan. “PM Prayuth Signs Order to Grant Visa Amnesty to Foreigners in Thailand,” Thaivisa, April 8, 2020. https://forum.thaivisa.com/topic/1158449-pm-prayuth-signsorder-to-grant-visa-amnesty-to-foreigners-in-thailand/ Fortify Rights. “42 Detainees in Songkhla Immigration Detention Center Test Positive for COVID-19.” May 1, 2020. https://www.fortifyrights.org/tha-inv-2020-05-01/ Garda World. “Thailand Government Announces Closure of Some Border Crossings,” March 18, 2020. https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/324136/thailand-governmentannounces-closure-of-some-border-crossings-march-18-update-12 Judd, Adam. “Pattaya to Close All Entertainment Venues Such as Bars, Night Clubs and Massage Shops Until the End of the Month.” The Pattaya News, March 17, 2020. https:// thepattayanews.com/2020/03/17/pattaya-to-close-all-entertainment-venues-such-asbars-nightclubs-and-massage-shops-until-the-end-of-the-month/

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Kang, Taejun. “Laos Confirms First Covid-19 Cases.” Laotian Times, March 24, 2020. https://laotiantimes.com/2020/03/24/laos-confirms-first-covid-19-cases/ Khaosod English. “Jail Turned into Field Hospital After 42 Foreigners Caught Virus.” April 27, 2020. https://www.khaosodenglish.com/news/crimecourtscalamity/2020/04/27/ jail-turned-into-field-hospital-after-42-foreigners-caught-virus/ Reuters. “New Coronavirus Infection in Thailand Takes Tally to 42.” February 29, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-thailand-idUSKBN20N07N Satrusayang, Cod. “Thailand Begins Closing Land Borders as Coronavirus Cases Climb.” Thai Enquirer, March 23, 2020. https://www.thaienquirer.com/9880/thailand-beginsclosing-land-borders-as-coronavirus-cases-climb/ Statista. “Number of Facebook Users in Vietnam from 2017-2025.” Last modified 2021a. https://www.statista.com/statistics/490478/number-of-vietnam-facebook-users/ ———. “Number of Facebook Users in Thailand from 2017-2025.” Last modified 2021b. https://www.statista.com/statistics/490467/number-of-thailand-facebook-users/ The Nation. “All Schools Ordered to Close from Wednesday.” March 17, 2020. https:// www.nationthailand.com/news/30384260?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium= internal_referral The Nation Thailand. “Laos Shuts Four Border Checkpoints Amid Covid-19 Crisis.” March 18, 2020a. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30384315 ———. “18 Illegal Immigrants Found to Carry Covid-19 in Songkhla.” May 4, 2020b. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30387242

17 REPRESENTATIONS OF COVID-19 IN WEST ASIA A Case Study of Islamic Republic News Agency’s (IRNA) Instagram Account Hamideh Molaei and Maziar Mozaffari Falarti

Introduction In a recent 2020 article on promoting the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine among a population of racially/ethnically diverse young adult women living in low-cost public housing in the United States, its co-authors found that popular social media platforms like Twitter can be considered as a reliable educational tool in combating the disease (Allen et al. 2020). In particular, the authors argue that the contemporary use, effectiveness and relevance of popular social media platforms like Twitter is real and that should be considered more broadly, in a multidisciplinary sense, since it is free, easily accessible and shared, geographically reachable, includes easy-to-use features (such as instant feedback) and is popular among a wide spectrum of people. Earlier studies in the use of Twitter, Instagram and other social media have similarly pointed to their effectiveness in harnessing public awareness, setting various social and political movements or agendas, and as conflict resolution and health promotion among others (see studies by Chomsky & Herman 2002; Korda & Itani 2013; Graham & Johnson 2013; Yildiz 2013; Surian et al. 2016). Indeed, the significance of social media outlets and tools is far-reaching, and encompasses a global geographical audience. Since late December 2019 when the first case of novel coronavirus was reported in Wuhan, China, nearly all nations have been impacted by the problems and complications made by this epidemic. Accordingly, different governments and institutions have applied various strategies, policies and measures to tackle related health, educational, economic, political and socio-cultural problems that they have faced (in the case of Egypt see a recent study by Sobatih, Hasanein & Elnasr 2020). A key difficulty, as identified early on, by most nations, governments and health organizations has not only been to fight the virus and stopping its geographical spread DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-24

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but also the public awareness on how to cope with this new global phenomena, challenge and reality. One of the best places to track the government’s perspective regarding Covid-19 related issues and challenges is the state media. This is significant given that in with the initial reports on the spread of the virus and its severity there were mixed governmental, public and social viewpoints on accepting Covid-19 as an epidemic reality (such as early denials by the then United States president Donald Trump among others). In fact, uncertainties regarding Covid-19, its nature, duration, extent and toll have caught most by surprise and with much bewilderment. With little scientific and scholarly information to go on most governmental, public and private social outlets (including traditional newspapers and those web-based) have since the early Wuhan report continued to speculate and point fingers at various incidents, localities, cures and nations. From its early reports, these uncertainties have led many state actors, international organizations (including the United Nations), governments and healthcare groups to continually call for a united approach and in tackling related information, knowledge and emergencies. In the case of Britain as early as March 2020 an official brief report, representing various government, health and academic sectors, was released in which calls for ‘practical considerations relating to the flows of information, misinformation and disinformation through online media, particularly social media networks, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic’ as part of a national public health emergency (Social Science in Humanitarian Action 2020). Here social media refers to an eclectic array of tools (including the use of computers and mobile phones) and services that specifically enable direct user interaction online. In the words of Solis and Breakenridge (2009) social media includes anything that uses the internet as a conversation tool taking the form of ‘social networking sites, blogs and Wikis’ (also podcasts). This is somewhat different to traditional sources of media, such as the use of newspapers and television that have traditionally been at the service of state and governments to propagate and report and broaden their views, regulations, official policies and information/knowledge. Indeed several studies from a number of locations (including the Islamic Republic of Iran) have outlined recent state media actors’ and the public’s overwhelming enthusiasm to accommodate social media outlets as tools to promote education, social mobilization, public relations, election-voting and businesses (Bertot & Jaeger 2010; Lee & Chan 2012; Graham & Johnson 2013; Aminolroaya & Katanforoush 2017). In this regard, Iran and the Persian (including Farsi, Dari and Tajik) speaking world of West and Central Asia numbering to more than 100 million are not an exception. Many social media tools, platforms and sources have been accommodated, used and incorporated by its governmental-based state and semi-private media outlets. In general, these platforms have been popular and effective as a source both within and outside of Iran to follow, tackle and report on the progress and challenges attributed to Covid-19. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2022) and the official spokesman of Iran’s Ministry of Health and Medicine Education (MOHME) the

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first confirmed case of Covid-19 in Iran was reported on 19 February 2020. Since that time the government of Iran has applied and implemented different policies and measures to fight Covid-19. Because of the significance of the issue different Iranian media outlets have covered coronavirus-related topics from different perspectives multilaterally. One of the most important media outlets that can represent the viewpoint of the Iranian government vis-à-vis this topic is the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) which is a state media and the largest official news source in the country. IRNA is also an active stakeholder in social media platforms for a domestic and international audience (including languages other than Farsi). Given the fact that Iran has one of the top ten global Instagram markets and membership, this study will therefore focus on IRNA’s use of Instagram as a tool for Covid-19 awareness. Indeed, in a February 2018 report the popular Financial Tribune (2018) ranks Iran the world’s seventh largest Instagram user, with 30% of the local population being active members (larger than that of Japan), while a recent 2020 internet data report indicates that social media users between April 2019 and January 2020 jumped by about 39% or 9.4 million (out of a total population of about 80 million for Iran, see Digital 2020). The study will also be significant as earlier research in Farsi or English on Instagram in Iran or the Persian speaking world has only been limited to its usage and popularity as a tool in public libraries, electing-voting, political instrument and body image (see Omidi et al. 2016; Aminolroaya & Katanforoush 2017; Rauchfleish & Kargar 2019). With virtually nothing written on the use of Instagram or other social media platforms in Iran as far as health or Covid-19 is concerned. Most traditional and alternative sources of news outside of the region reporting on Covid-19 in Iran have also been selective and criticized for their political agendas, predisposition, ulterior motives, lack of resources, as well base their facts on mere conjecture. In a recent 2020 study of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Voice of America (VOA) coverage of Covid-19 reports in Iran the authors found that these sources are in general biased, misleading and unreliable (Kharazmi & Mohammadi 2020). This chapter will thus attempt to fill in the current gap as far indigenous reports on Covid-19 have been uncovered and reported. The chapter will also argue that the present reports on IRNA Instagram are portrayed in a way that not only represent the reality on the ground but also are culture-sensitive to local method/s, beliefs, politics and literary style of reporting and broadcasting. This is important as it highlights the fact that parameters for assessing social media platforms and reports in Iran, or for that matter other parts of Asia, reporting on Covid-19 and similar issues can be flexible with their own unique flavors and approach. And not simply adhering to a particular standard or way that may reflect a Eurocentric, electronic colonialism, Western, or Orientalist approach (Said 1978; Chomsky & Herman 2002; McPhail 2008, Hammond 2017).

Methodology The study will be conducted through content analysis. It is an appropriate method for analyzing media content. Since the main objective of this study is to investigate

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the most important issues highlighted by the IRNA Instagram page as a key media outlet representing Iranian government’s official viewpoints, this content analysis is identified as the best suited and accordingly applied. Social media platforms, usage and memberships as highlighted earlier are quite popular in Iran. Instagram, in particular, is extremely popular among its population having a high penetration rate across the different age groups/categories. The success of Instagram is partly due to its simplicity and in being free but also to the fact that it can be easily accessed without any anti-filter (or VPN) application. This is important and a major contributing factor to its popularity in Iran since other social media platforms have either been banned locally (e.g. Twitter or Facebook) or stopped broadcasting to Iran by United States media outlets due to their imposed sanctions, or Trump era policies, restrictions and regulations. The case study of the research would therefore be the IRNA’s Instagram account. With the key reason for the selection of IRNA identified as twofold: 1) IRNA is a state media and can represent the Iranian government’s official view­ point regarding this important issue. It is also active in other Farsi-Persian speaking regions (particularly Afghanistan and Tajikistan) as well as has many subsidiaries that offer news and other programs in numerous languages. 2) With the rise of the Internet and social media, many mainstream media have transferred their activities partially or completely to the online sphere. Instagram has been changed as a successful platform that is popular among journalists, including IRNA, to deliver the most recent news to their local and global audiences. As of January 2021 the Instagram account of IRNA has almost 368,000 followers. The data was collected through a six-month period from 19th February 2020, when the first confirmed case of coronavirus was announced officially, till 20th August 2020. Six months is indeed a reasonable and significant period in which to assess, evaluate, identify and observe the trends of changes and/or adjustments in governments’ policies and regulations. In total, 460 news items were collected during the six-month period.

Findings In order to answer the main research question of the chapter, i.e. how does the IRNA Instagram page represent Covid-19 related news, content analysis was used. In this regard, three main types of news categories were recognized: 1) news covering national-local issues; 2) news covering international issues; and finally, 3) general news, neither related to national nor international issues. From the total of 460 news items collected, 406 discussed national issues, 40 cases were related to international news and 14 cases were of a more general type. In addition to the main themes and topics that are covered by the IRNA Instagram page, another important issue regarding the types of content was also investigated, studied and identified. It was examined whether the contents were

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provided or depicted in text, photo, video, infographic, animation or a combination of all (or an admixture of them). Examining this issue was significant because Instagram is an important popular social networking site in Iran and accordingly many Iranians not only use this platform for sharing their daily experience and to communicate with their friends, families and their existing networks, but also as a source to get updated news and information. Consequently, mainstream media that have account in social media and in particular Instagram try to be more attractive to the audience by providing more visual attractiveness.

Analysis of National and International News Covered by IRNA Instagram Page This part of the findings aims to analyze the details of both national and international news covered by IRNA Instagram page. First, the details regarding the national news are offered.

Analysis of National News on Covid-19 Covered by IRNA Instagram Page After a careful study and analysis of IRNA’s Instagram page, seven main themes were identified, selected and extracted from the 406 news items that covered national-­ local issues. These are as follows: 1) general information regarding Covid-19 disease, 2) government functions, policies and measures in dealing with the epidemic, 3) educational posts, 4) Iranian people’s sympathy-support toward each other, 5) posts related to economic issues since the early identified days of Covid-19, 6) posts related to socio-cultural issues and 7) entertainment posts. In addition to the above seven main categories, there were some other topics that because of lack of their frequencies and clarity of contents it was difficult to put them in a separate group. As Table 17.1 shows, among 406 news covered national issues, 123 were general information regarding Covid-19 disease, 97 were related to government functions, policies and activities, 77 had educational themes, 30 showed different examples of peoples’ sympathy toward each other, 26 items were related to economic issues and problems, 16 news were regarding socio-cultural problems and issues and 13 cases contained entertainment content. Finally, 24 items were related to other topics such as healthcare problems, appreciation to healthcare cadres and answering to fake news and false information (disinformation-misinformation) regarding Covid-19 disease and challenges. As shown in Table 17.1, the top priority or frequency of the news on the IRNA Instagram page went to general information regarding Covid-19 disease. These types of news included several topics. The most dominant type of this category included the statistics of the total number of patients, the number of new patients recognized in the previous 24 hours, the number of recovered and finally the number of deaths. This type of news was updated almost every two days on average. In this regard, most of the news in this category were neutral and they were just

Representations of Covid-19 in West Asia  227 TABLE 17.1 Frequency of the main themes extracted in news with national topics from 19th

February to 20th August 2020 N

Main themes of national news covered by IRNA Instagram page

Frequency

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

General information regarding Covid-19 disease Government functions, policies and measures Educational posts Peoples’ sympathy with each other Posts related to economic issues Posts related to socio-cultural issues Entertainment posts Other topics Total

123  97  77  30  26  16  13  24 406

informative and mentioning what was going on regarding the coronavirus and its progress in the country. The second theme that was prioritized by the IRNA Instagram page was related to the news that covered different functions, policies and measures made by the Iranian government. This theme was very significant, in particular when it was looked from the viewpoint of a state media. It was important for IRNA to portray and highlight the achievements of the government and the government officials positively in combating this problem in the country. Some examples of this type of news include the government policies regarding lockdown of job, quarantining of some cities, travel guidelines-restrictions and other relevant achievement or enforcement of Covid-19 regulations for the period. As the results of this study indicated, among the 97 news in this category, 56 of them directly quoted from or included one top officials of the country. This can be an emphasis that the officials of the country are directly involved in the issue and try to find the best possible solutions for the problems and Covid-19 challenges. Hasan Rouhani, the president of Islamic Republic of Iran, Saeed Namaki, the Minister of Health and Medical Education, Iraj Harirchi, Kianoosh Jahanpour and Somayeh Sadat Lari, the officials at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education are the most important figures news are covered about them. The third theme was also significant. It was related to educational posts regarding Covid-19. It includes news both related to physical and psychosocial health of people during the pandemic. This theme constituted a total of 77 posts. Most items contained topics to educate people how to keep their physiological and mental well-being during the pandemic. As an illustration, there were contents including video interviews with experts and physiologists to teach people how to control their stress if they or members of their families were affected by the virus. There were also solutions for constructive communication among the family members who had to spend much time together at home because of lockdowns of jobs, outdoor activities and schools. In addition, there were posts regarding the physical health of people. For example, there were guidelines for people telling them what

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to do if they find Covid-19 symptoms and what important points they had to take into consideration through the cure and recovery process. Interestingly, the educational posts were offered in different visual forms. Out of 77 posts, there were 28 videos and 19 infographics. In addition, 24 posts contained a combination of different forms (such as video, photo and infographics). The fourth item was related to reports regarding the illustration of people’s sympathy, compassion and messages of care with each other. During the pandemic because of the lockdown of some jobs, like elsewhere in the globe affected by Covid-19, economic and household monetary problems in Iran became prevalent. From the early days of the spreading coronavirus and the consequent problems, people showed sympathy and messages of support toward each other. The hashtag #Iran hamdel (roughly translated into Iran-Sympathy) spread through the Internet and most social media platforms and many people began helping the affected parts of the society with food and other forms of help. The reports of these volunteer activities, support and personal contributions were parallel to Instagram reports of the national efforts in making and increasing the production of affordable masks, sanitizer and other health equipment and products for the general public use. These positive news and information of state efforts in correlation to that of the public contributions were constructive to increase people’s sympathy and sense of responsibility toward each other. Covering such news provided a positive sense among citizens. The fifth category was related to economic issues and problems. As mentioned earlier, the economic problems, restrictions and issues that happened in Iran after spreading coronavirus increased and IRNA focused on these issues as well as the socio-cultural related issues and problems that constituted the sixth category. The next category relates to posts containing home-based entertainments, exercises and personal improvements (particularly as far as health is concerned). Such posts that were soft-news containing entertainment topics such as encouraging people to do simple exercise at home during the pandemic were also notable. The seventh category, which altogether was 24 posts, were a combination of different topics such as healthcare cadre problems and showing appreciation toward them. This topic was quite important in Iran. Healthcare cadres and medical staff were recognized as the devoted and moral people who sacrificed their lives and personal health voluntarily in order to help other people and serve the nation as a whole. In this regard, the discourse of the media allocated to them. Finally, there were those reports that fall outside the seven categories but relate to it. The connection of these reports to that of the seven categories is that they provide clarification, regarding fake news and false information, which may accompany or be added to them. Unfortunately, during most epidemics and global crises there tends to be a great potential for spreading rumors and fake news such as misinformation and disinformation. Particularly with the rise of the Internet and social media the speed of spreading these types of false or misleading information has become faster and easier. Accordingly, it is part of media responsibility to provide correct information to the society. Nonetheless misleading or selective news for

Representations of Covid-19 in West Asia  229

political or personal gains and objectives can often be intertwined with traditional news reporting and many social media platforms (see Kharazmi & Mohammadi 2020). Then again state media reports can too be selective and have the interests of the relevant nation or politics at heart (Chomsky & Herman 2002; Walker & Orttung 2014; Labzina & Nieman 2018).

Analysis of International News Covered on Covid-19 by IRNA Instagram Page In addition to the national news covered in IRNA’s Instagram page, some international news are also covered that content analysis of them showed that they can be categorized into three main groups and topics including problems happening in other countries, the accomplishments and achievements of other countries and general information, neither related to problems nor achievements of other countries. The first theme relates to the different problems happening in other countries such as the number of Covid-19 victims, different social, cultural, healthcare and economic problems and challenges that happened and continue to be there. These news items also focused on the failure of the authorities of those countries to manage, limit or control the associated problems. In the study it was particularly found that these types of news were selective and primarily focused on the shortcomings that exist in Western countries such as the United States and European countries. Among 40 news items that covered international news, 14 of them were in this category. In contrast to the above theme, there was another significant theme in the international news that was related to reports on the accomplishments, achievements and successful experiences of other countries to control and manage the problems related to the coronavirus. This theme was observed in 12 posts. Interestingly, the majority of these reports were concentrated on the experiences and policies of China. There was only one post in this category that reported the accomplishments of Western countries. The rest of the news that contained 14 posts reported general issues in other countries or international issues such as environmental issues or the official reports of the WHO regarding Covid-19 disease in different countries.

Analysis of the Type of Content used by IRNA Instagram Page Since this study was conducted on the Instagram platform it was significant to see what types of content are offered to the audiences. Analyzing the posts indicated that there were a combination of different posts including photos, videos, infographics and the posts that had a combination of all these things together. The results outlined that among 460 posts, 159 offered as a combination of video, infographics and photos, 142 were in the form of infographics, 87 posts contained video and 70 posts contained only photos. Among the total selected samples, there was one animation and one post that contained only texts. Interestingly, the results of the study

230  Hamideh Molaei and Maziar Mozaffari Falarti

indicated that among 123 items that were related to general information regarding Covid-19, 101 were presented in infographic form. It shows that it is a good strategy for giving fast, attractive and easily understandable news to the audiences.

Conclusion With the start of the pandemic in different parts of the world including Iran, the governments started applying and implementing different strategies, policies and actions. Since the situation was somehow considered a crisis, the role of the media in covering the news in relation to the issue was quite important. It is true that with the rise of the Internet and social media there are different additional resources for getting news and information, but the official resources and state media have always been an important option for receiving news and information. One potential reason for this is that people are curious to know about first-hand information that comes from government authorities, in particular regarding the updates of the policies and decision-making. Media not only should provide fast, true and correct information to the audiences, but also they should try to provide promising or positive information and help citizens to overcome pressures and stresses created by the situation. Accordingly, analyzing state media is significant as it shows how they had conducted their responsibility toward the society and the citizens. In order to answer the main research question regarding the modality of highlighting the news topics by one state media in Iran, IRNA was selected. Among different platforms in which IRNA releases its news and reports, Its Instagram page was selected. Instagram is a popular social media platform in Iran and recognized as a reliable source by many of its followers to get the official news and information. Data selection was conducted in the Instagram page of IRNA during the early six months following the official report of Covid-19 cases in the country. Altogether 460 posts were analyzed. Thematic analysis of the IRNA Instagram page showed that the majority of the content regarding Covid-19 were national issues. 406 out of total 460 posts covered different national topics. However, it is noteworthy that the range of this category was diverse. The majority of news covered general information regarding coronavirus, the spread of the disease in the country as well as the affected provinces and cities, the number of affected and recovered people as well as the number of victims. After this category, the most important priority went to the information regarding the government strategies, policies and actions. Definitely covering these topics mainly showed a positive perspective toward the government. As an illustration, the Iranian government did not follow the policy of quarantine of different cities and some part of public opinion was against this issue. Interestingly to cover issues regarding quarantine, IRNA both provided examples from other countries that were not successful to manage and control the spread of disease through this way. In addition, they provided some interviews with authorities and experts that explained about the shortcomings of the quarantine to stop spreading the virus. Altogether, they try to justify policies and actions made by the government.

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One piece of evidence that shows that IRNA was responsible for covering coronavirus-related news was a great deal of educational and informational posts related to physical and psychological health. IRNA allocated 77 posts to this category which is almost one-fifth of the whole posts during six months. It is important to mention that IRNA has used the attractive visual potentials of Instagram to educate people how to manage their stress, anxiety and other psychological problems. As well there was significant information regarding physical health and the ways that people should behave if they have been affected by the virus. Another positive part of the news coverage of IRNA was related to showing the people’s sympathy toward each other. This coverage gave a positive and promising sense to the readers that in the stressful time during the pandemic there are positive points that can be emphasized. It can be mentioned that among different news covered by IRNA Instagram page, only two themes were related to the problems. They were mainly about socio-cultural and economic topics. Accordingly, most of the news covered by IRNA were positive or neutral and only a few of them concentrated on the problems. The results of the article also indicated that in the international arena, the policy of this state media is to encourage the countries that have friendly relationships with Iran, such as China and Russia, and to report their achievements and positive functions. Vice versa IRNA covered the problems and failures of the Western countries including the United States. This selective approach certainly does appear to have a political inclination and undertone. Particularly it reflects Trump era (2016–2021) policies, and sanctions toward Iran which are seen domestically as unfair, unjust and immoral. This is intertwined with the fact that US-imposed sanction meant that, despite the popular Trump era rhetoric that it is not designated to impact Iran’s health-related issues, certainly has limited the country’s access to acquire, purchase, fight, eliminate and respond to Covid-19. In consequence IRNA certainly appears to be unsympathetic in reporting US failing politics and almost early non-­existent or weak response to its own population during the first six months reports of Covid-19 (see a similar discussion on Russian media in Labzina & Nieman 2018).

References Allen, D. J., Hollander, J., Gualtieri, L., Falconni, M. T. A., Savir, S., & Agenr, M. (2020). Feasibility of a twitter campaigning to promote HPV vaccine uptake among racially/ ethnically diverse young adult women living in public housing, BMC Public Health 20: DOI: 10.21203/rs.2.12685/v1 Aminolroaya, Z., & Katanforoush, A. (2017). How Iranian Instagram users act for parliament election campaign? A study based on follower network. 3rd International Conference of Web Research 19-20 April 2017, Iran. Available online in www.researchgate.net/ publication/318035899 [Accessed 2 December 2020]. Bertot, J. C., & Jaeger, P. (2010). Designing, implementing, and evaluating user-centered and citizen-centered e-government, International Journal of Electronic Government Research 6 (2): 1–17.

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Chomsky, N., & Herman, S. E. (2002). Manufacturing consent (2nd Edition). New York: Pantheon. Digital (2020). Iran, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-iran [Accessed 24 January 2020]. Financial Tribune. (February 4, 2018). Iran Ranked World’s 7th Instagram User. https:// financialtribune.com/articles/economy-sci-tech/81384/iran-ranked-world-s-7thinstagram-user#:~:text=Nearly%2030%25%20of%20Iran’s%2080%20million%20 population%20use%20Instagram.&text=It%20merits%20mention%20that%20the, social%20media%20network%20in%20Iran [Accessed 10 December 2020]. Graham, M., & Johnson, A. E.(2013). Government Public Relations and Social Media: An Analysis of the Perceptions and trends of Social Media Use at the Local Government level, Public Relations Journal 7 (4): 1–21. Hammond, P. (2017). Theorising media/state relations and power. In Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Frohlich (Eds.). The Rouledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security (pp. 80–90). London: Routledge. Kharazmi, Z., &Mohammadi, S. (2020). Persian-Language Media overseas as the Western Tools of Public Diplomacy: Framing COVID-19 Pandemics in Iran by VOA and BBC, World Sociopolitical Studies 4 (1): 1–36. Korda, H., &Itani, Z. (2013). Harnessing Social Media for Health Promotion and Behaviour Change, Health Promotion Practice 14 (1): 15–23. Labzina, E., & Nieman, D. M. (2018). State-controlled Media and Foreign Policy: Analyzing Russian-language News, Working Paper, http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1468252/ 28021746/1542833950830/Russian_Media_NL.pdf?token=G%2F5ToZxfliVVby4IAc 8J50bxu80%3D [Accessed 5 December 2020]. Lee, L. F. F., & Chan, M. J. (2012). Media Mobilisation and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong: the Power of a Critical Event. London: Routledge. McPhail, T. (2008). eColonialism Theory: Hegemony and the Role of American Media, The Global Studies Journal 1 (2): 45–54. Omidi, A., Sharifi, S. M., &Marzban, B. (2016). The Impact of Instagram Use on Body Image Concern among Iranian University Female Students: A Phenomenological Approach, International Journal of Academic Research in Psychology 3 (1): 26–36. Rauchfleish, A., & Kargar, S. (2019). Stat-aligned rolling in Iran and the double-edge affordance of Instagram, New Media & Society ( January): 1–22. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. Sobatih, E. A. E., Hasanein, M. A., & Elnasr, A. E.A. (2020). Responses to COVID-19 in higher education: social media usage for sustaining formal academic communication in developing countries, Sustainability 12: 1–18. Solis, B., & Breakenridge, D. (2009). Putting the public back in public relations. New Jersey: Pearson. Social Science in Humanitarian Action. (March 2020). Key Consideration: online information, mis-and disinformation in the context of COVID-19, www.socialscieceinaction. org [Accessed 7 January 2021]. Surian, D., Nguyen, D., Kennedy, G., Johnson, M., Coiera, E., & Dunn, A.G. (2016). Characterizing Twitter discussions about HPV vaccines using topic modelling and community detection, Journal of Medical Internet Research 18 (8). DOI: 10.2196/jmir.6045 Walker, C., & Orttung, W. R. (2014). Breaking the news: The role of state-run media, Journal of Democracy 25 (1): 71–85. World Health Organization (WHO). (2022). Iran (Islamic Republic) Response to Covid-19 in Iran, https://www.who.int/about/accountability/results/who-results-report-2020-mtr/ country-story/2021/iran [Accessed 8 April 2021]. Yildiz, K. (2013). The relationship between state and media and its effect on conflict resolution. London: Democratic Progress Institute.

18 DON’T PANIC! REACH US Indian Tech Unions’ Social Media Narratives during the Pandemic Rianka Roy

Introduction In this chapter, I examine the narratives used for collective action on social media during the Covid-19 pandemic by two Indian tech unions—the Forum for IT Employees (FITE) and the Karnataka State IT/ITeS Employees’ Union (KITU). Based on critical discourse analysis of 379 Facebook posts shared by the two white-collar trade unions from January to December 2020, I study how they used various narratives to respond to labour precarity during the global crisis. As the pandemic hit the global market in March 2020,1 tech companies hyperdigitalised production or increased the pace and volume of digital work. Unlike companies in other sectors, tech corporations led this accelerated digital transition by producing the required tools. This resulted in an almost overnight industry-wide shift to work-from-home (WFH). This rapid digital transformation was fraught with unemployment, pay cuts and overwork. Indian tech companies laid off thousands of workers, citing lack of projects. WFH increased the workload and appropriated leisure. Yet, state and corporate institutions valorised this transition with optimistic statements on opportunities. India’s Information Technology Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad hoped for economic growth in the pandemic through digital expansion (Financial Express Bureau, 2020). Similarly, Dharmendra Kapoor (2021), the CEO of a tech company Birlasoft stated that hyperdigitalisation would fortify the digital ecosystem built on ‘Trust, Agility, Talent and Innovation’. The state also made legal reforms to support corporations through this crisis. Responding to employers’ organisations such as the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), governments in many Indian states suspended labour laws during the pandemic. As a result, companies could extend daily hours of production with impunity (Agarwal, 2020). The Industrial Relations Code of 2020 also proposes to minimise workers’ rights to dissent and enhance DOI: 10.4324/9781003406563-25

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employers’ autonomy (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2020). This accelerated neoliberal transformation of the economy may further debilitate collective bargaining (Chakrabarti, 2016; Foucault, 1979; Gane, 2015). In this scenario, Indian tech workers’ unions sought to counter institutional discourses that normalised and concealed their precarity. They strategically used discursive narratives to contest the state and corporate emphasis on tech workers’ white-collar privilege. In the absence of in-person protests, at the time of social distancing, the unions also sought to utilise the affective appeal of these narratives to mobilise support.

Review: Existing Accounts and Unexplored Aspects Literature on Indian tech workers and their unions demonstrates that this white-­ collar labour group considers itself a privileged category of workers. These highskilled urban workers earn significantly more than workers in many other industries. Education and class prestige differentiate them from non-tech labour groups. Tech workers in both information technology and IT-enabled services (e.g. call center work) have global consumption patterns and opportunities to immigrate to the Global North (Aneesh, 2015; McMillin, 2006; Upadhya, 2007). Sanitised and well-decorated workplaces in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) reify this assumption of privilege. This white-collar distinction and privilege, ironically, distance tech workers from labour rights. Within the SEZs, states allow significant autonomy to tech employers to circumvent labour laws (Mirchandani, 2019). Besides, the structures of privilege mislead tech workers to believe that standard labour laws do not apply to them. Tech companies strategically use designations such as ‘associates’ and ‘experts’ to consolidate the illusion of privilege (Ramesh, 2004). This manoeuvre prevents tech workers from seeking the protection of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, which can help only ‘workmen’ (Stevens and Mosco, 2010). Organisers in the early tech groups such as the Union for Information Tech­ nology and Enabled Services (UNITES) and the West Bengal Information Techno­ logy Services Association (WBITSA) in the mid-2000s emphasised their distinction from blue-collar industrial workers (D’Cruz and Noronha, 2013; Stevens and Mosco, 2010). Although these groups mobilised against precarity, they echoed state and corporate disapproval of trade unionism and labelled themselves as associations (Bisht, 2010; Rodino-Colocino, 2007). Most of these groups were registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860, which, unlike the Trade Union Act of 1926, would not grant them the authority to sue employers. These unions looked for global support, as some of them collaborated with the Union Network International (UNI) and the Communication Workers of America (CWA) (Stevens and Mosco, 2010). These associations avoided coalition with mainstream political parties—the dominant custodians of labour laws in India. I identify two gaps in this literature. First, there has not been any scholarly conversation on the methods followed by contemporary tech unions. These unions like

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FITE, KITU and the Union of IT and ITES Employees (UNITE) started registering as trade unions in 2017. Unlike early-generation tech groups, these unions have a distinct focus on utilizing the legal resources of mainstream labour movements. In addition, some of these unions explicitly display their political and ideological alignments. KITU, for instance, is supported by the Center of Indian Trade Unions (CITU). Hence, the current unions’ methods of organising and the understanding of precarity may differ from their predecessors’. Second, none of the texts on Indian tech unions discuss the use of discursive narratives. The emphasis is on their activities, campaigns and histories. In the neoliberal market dominated by new conditions of digital production, workers often mobilise using discursive narratives on digital platforms (Rolf, 2016; Avins et al., 2018; Rothstein, 2018). In discursive activism (Katzenstein, 1995; Shaw, 2012) marginalised groups seek rehabilitation within established structures, but they also redefine dominant concepts with their discourses. Discursive activism, therefore, can also be disruptive (Shaw, 2011, 2012). Hence, I raise two questions in this research. How do contemporary Indian tech unions mobilise using discursive narratives during an extremely precarious time? Do these narratives redefine concepts like white-collar privilege and precarity? I also examine the disruptive potential of these narratives, especially because they are mediated by mainstream social media platforms. The strengths of social media platforms such as quick visibility, resilience and outreach (Castells, 2012; Van Laers and Van Aelst, 2010), and weaknesses such as heightened surveillance, individualism (Fuchs, 2014; Lyon, 2010), techno-determinism (Morozov, 2013) and half-hearted participation or ‘slacktivism’ (Glenn, 2015) may affect tech unions’ campaigns. I study how the unions utilise or address these issues.

Methods I collected 379 Facebook posts from the public pages of FITE and KITU. The posts appeared from January to December 2020. FITE has several regional pages and private groups, but I collected the posts from its main public Facebook page. Instead of using scraping tools, I collected the data manually, to make my cyberethnography (Hine, 2015) participatory. I occasionally liked and commented on the posts. Many followers on these public pages are non-tech individuals, but their participation suggests the reception of tech workers’ movements in non-tech communities. Table 18.1 shows the distribution of posts. The unions started conversations on the pandemic in March, but I collected data from two preceding months to trace if and how the pandemic shifted the trajectory of discourse. The moth-wise distribution of posts in Table 18.2 demonstrates that the pandemic increased the volume of data. The subsequent decline may indicate that the fluctuation in the market stabilised and the tech unions adjusted to the new reality. I use critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995) that unravels the micro-, meso- and macro-levels of social relations, by focusing on the use of language, its

236  Rianka Roy TABLE 18.1  Indian Tech-Unions’ Public Facebook Pages

Data

FITE

KITU

Total

Posts Likes Comments Shares Followers

281 14,394 1,731 3,207 35,185

98 50,735 2,388 11,012 8,465

379 65,129 4,119 14,219 43,650

Note: Data from January to December 2020. Follower update March 15, 2021. TABLE 18.2  Month-wise Distribution of Posts

Months

FITE

KITU

January February March April May June July August September October November December

10 8 42 29 48 39 31 22 15 13 8 16

7 0 3 14 16 4 9 18 13 8 4 2

Note: All posts are from 2020.

connection with the subjects’ agency and their locations in structures of power. This analysis of social media posts is cognizant of the literature on social movement frames (Gamson, 1992, 1995). Johnston (1995) suggests that discourses and frames intersect at micro-levels of study, but Caraway (2018) observes a gap between them. He suggests that workers’ movements on digital platforms are predominantly discursive that may not coalesce into structured frames. In this unique period of turbulence, my focus remains on the discursive nuances that may or may not eventually become definite frames of collective action. I examine the various strands in the narratives of precarity that the two tech unions put together, as the pandemic plunged them into a dreadful crisis.

Data: Narratives of Precarity Two Indian tech unions, FITE and KITU have been using individual and collective narratives of precarity on social media as instruments of discursive activism. This is not a new strategy, but during the pandemic, these narratives increased in number.

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Individual Narratives FITE shares narratives of individual struggles using anecdotes. Individual anecdotes are not divorced from collective action. Highlighting micro-contexts of everyday struggles, they form a collective resonance of solidarity. Anecdotal narratives are powerful tools in social movements. They motivate participants and strengthen resistance (Polletta, 1998; Vallee, 2017). Generally, anecdotal posts elicit the maximum amount of response as likes, comments and shares. For FITE, these anecdotes have two categories—narratives of hardship and narratives of success. In the first category, the narratives emphasise tech workers’ suffering due to unemployment, overwork and loss of benefits. FITE contextualises this precarity in the pandemic. For instance, the following post cites anonymous tech workers discussing WFH— ‘Now I work for at least 10 hours with no stretch beak and additional pressure’ ‘The techies who got the option of working from home eagerly waiting for the lockdown period to end since it brings heavy work than office’ —FITE urges the IT/ITES companies and Govt to regulate this working hours (sic) and stop threatening to extend the hours or resign. Even this tough time, IT/ ITES companies are aiming for more and more profits only. It’s against humanitarian ground and also against natural justice in this disaster situation. (April 4) In August, organisers in two tech unions, FITE and the NDLF-IT, were laid off. FITE called it the ‘Black Week in the Indian IT industry’ (August 7). On October 19, it shared the following third-person narrative on Vinod, the FITE organiser’s life story— Vinod AJ lost his job in August as a software engineer earning about Rs90k a month with #Cognizant. ‘The fear factor is everywhere,’ said Mr Vinod, speaking from #Chennai, where he lives with his wife and two-year-old daughter. For 13 years, he has sent money back to his family in (nearby) town of Kanyakumari, where his parents worked as teachers and his grandparents were rice farmers…‘These mass lay-offs are putting fear into junior employees, we are wondering how prosperity and jobs will pick up again,’ said Mr Vinod. (October 19) FITE shares this excerpt from a news article. Tech unions use news articles as informative tools to apprise their members of incidents in the industry. Narratives borrowed from mainstream news platforms also help the unions expand their repertoire. For women, these narratives are about sexual harassment and maternity leaves, which are not necessarily related to the pandemic. For instance, in February, FITE ran a campaign to help a woman victim of sexual harassment. In a post on this issue,

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FITE presents the victim’s perspective on the legal proceedings and connects it to a narrative on its collective action— At any point, Victim is not looking for any financial settlement or money related aspects from TCS in her prayers. Her prayer is on the moral ground that no victim women employee should not (sic) suffer from biased Internal committee proceedings. Real women Empowerment is the motto… Since TCS and harasser advocate are joining hands and threatening that they will take criminal action against victim, we will also be forced to initiate criminal and civil proceedings soon. (February 19) In the narratives of success, FITE highlights their beneficiaries’ experience. For instance, the following post mentions how FITE helped a woman get maternity leaves— #fitesuccess Paid #MaternityLeaves #AmountCredited to employees account. This is silver lining news in today’s scenario. A Mumbai based female was denied paid maternity leaves by female HR, after #TeamFITE intervention on 8th march this was resolved #knowYourRights #fiteawareness #Standforyourrights. We salute the female employee who stood for her rights #FemaleEmployees #somethingPositive. (March 24, 2020) Although most of the narratives are anonymised, occasionally the beneficiaries’ names are present. In April, a worker named Partha Bhattacharjee shared his picture and narrated how FITE helped him receive his release documents. Having described how he had been harassed by his employer, Bhattacherjee stated— Then I got FITE’s contact number and contacted them for help. I got true help from this forum. FITE nested the anecdote in the following post— Success Story… FITE Kolkata…. Employee: Partha Bhattacharjee Employer: Creative Info-Link (Shared from Awakening I.T.) 8 April Another #SuccessStory!!!!!!! Congratulations Partha!!! Please join us to congratulate Partha for his dedication and effort. We will fight against lopsided efforts of these companies. #AwakeningIT #KolkataFITE Follow our page, few more stories will come up very soon. (April 9) All these individual narratives are exclusively about tech workers’ concerns. FITE uses these specific cases as prototypes for problems that it seeks to resolve and repeatedly tells victims, ‘Reach us’. These posts decrease in number after August, as the pandemic contingency ostensibly subsides. From April to August, there are 18 posts with the call ‘reach us’ compared to only two posts between September and December.

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Collective Narratives As a Left-oriented union, KITU shares anecdotes of collective precarity. Unlike FITE, KITU does not quote individual beneficiaries. KITU uses Marxist expressions of class struggle and uses the term ‘proletariat’ to identify tech workers. The following post underscores the union’s ideological focus. Karnataka State IT/ITeS Employees Union #KITU on the occasion of International Workers’ Day conveys its militant greetings to all the workers of all the lands who struggle against all coercion and oppression of man by man, the struggle to uphold the right to a better life and real freedom. The workers’ blood which was shed in Chicago on 1886 reminds us of our duty today; it reminds us that nothing is given for free; every right or freedom that was conquered by our class has been won through sacrifices, conflicts and organised struggles. Workers of the world Unite! LONG LIVE MAY DAY! (May 1) In its emphasis on collective action, KITU uses third-person narration to share stories of collective precarity. For instance, Altisource is in the news infamously for their unethical and inhuman method of layoffs for last (sic) few years. Affected employees spoke to KITU about their ordeal and victims were still in a state of shock. Many employees unwillingly signed the separation and no due letters fearing humiliation and termination. Don’t Panic! Refuse to Resign! Organise! (September 12) Since April 4, KITU has raised the slogan ‘Don’t Panic! Refuse to Resign! Organise!’ emphasising urgency and assurance. In these narratives, similar to FITE, KITU also lays out its agenda. For instance— Creative Synergies Consulting India Private Limited, a Bangalore based company terminated 25 employees violating the direction given by the Central Ministry of Labour & Employment. On behalf of the victimised employees #KITU filed a complaint in Labour Department against this illegal act by the management. (April 26) Consistent with its practice, KITU situates women’s hardships in the context of class struggle. On the International Working Women’s Day, KITU states— Karnataka State IT/ITeS Employees Union #KITU greets you on International Working Women’s Day Today, under the conditions of an acute capitalist crisis, KITU call upon every working woman to stand up against capitalist barbarity on the side of the class-oriented trade union movement. (March 8)

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In support of working-class struggle, KITU also shares several posts advocating for other workers’ rights. For instance, supporting the farmers’ movements that erupted in India in response to the new agricultural act, KITU states— Karnataka State IT/ITeS Employees Union #KITU extends its solidarity and support to the call for countrywide protest and resistance action by peasants, today (25th Sept) against the anti-farmer destructive legislations being pushed through by the Central Government. (September 25) These posts on solidarity undermine tech workers’ assumption of white-collar exclusivity, highlighting similarities in precarity. However, these initiatives are not central to KITU’s campaigns, which predominantly address tech workers’ experiences. Yet, compared to earlier unions’ self-isolating strategies, KITU’s emphasis on solidarity for non-tech labour groups creates a new dimension in white-collar workers’ collective action. Unlike KITU, FITE shares only two posts (November 25 and December 22) on the recent farmers’ agitation. The first post appears in support of a strike for farmers and workers, including the tech groups. There was only one like on this post. The second post was specifically on farmers, as it stated— Hope we all know what is happening in Delhi? Farmers are protesting for last (sic) 2-3 weeks in the peak winter against the new Farm Bills. As a human (sic) who can eat everyday even in Corona Lockdown because of them, we need to be grateful to the farmers and support their voices for the rights. Need your suggestions, how can we support them? FITE used the hashtags #WeSupportFarmers, #FITEwithFarmers and #ITwith­ Farmers in this open-ended narrative. The post has 187 likes and 100 shares but it also draws enormous criticism from its followers. The supposedly ‘apolitical’ and avowedly non-partisan union FITE is excoriated for its veiled criticism of the ruling party, which introduced the farmers’ bills. KITU’s five posts supporting farmers’ movements do not receive as much censure. This suggests that despite their supposed aversion to mainstream politics (Fernandez 2018), Indian tech workers cluster around unions following their political ideologies. They also expect their preferred unions to maintain their ideological commitments. Like KITU, FITE also uses collective narratives. In the following posts, it quotes a group of tech workers who sought assistance, and then pledges support to these victims. ‘Hi- we are from Virtusa, almost 500 approx affected from PAN india. We work for this billion dollar company and our company has suddenly put most of the colleagues on bench and issued a policy in which they are only giving us basic pay which is 1/3 of our salary and they have already deducted our complete variable pay which is almost

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10-15% of our annual salary. They have given us ultimatum that if we wont get any other project in 3 months, they will fire us and it is very difficult to find new job during pandemic. We have seen you helping other corporates like wipro, TCS, capgemini and want your help in getting justice for us.’ We will surely help you. If you are affected by this, reach us… —Team FITE. (May 7) These collective narratives, similar to the individual narratives, also highlights the union’s action on the issue. For instance— Dear All, We sent the petition letter to Labour Department of Haryana & Maharashtra to take action against #Virtusa which is harassing & forcing employees to leave the company illegally during #CoronaLockdown. Attached the copy of the petition. —#TeamFITE. (May 20) Unlike KITU, FITE’s response to precarity gradually makes way for optimism about the post-pandemic situation. Its interest in white-collar privilege resurfaces, as the following post illustrates— For #Indian #IT companies, #hybrid work models could be part of #post_covid world. Resilient IT sector gears up for growth opportunities, challenges amid ‘#newnormal’ COVID-19 may have thrown curveballs this year but the $191 billion-Indian IT sector has shown resilience and 2021 promises more growth opportunities as digital spends go up to tackle the challenges amid the ‘new normal’. (December 31)

Discussion: Interpreting the Narratives The narratives shared by two Indian tech unions through the pandemic demonstrate three aspects of high-skilled white-collar workers’ movements, in which individual, institutional and structural aspects of labour remain imbricated. First, political and ideological alignment determines the selection and presentation of narratives. FITE as a non-partisan union swings between narratives of individual and collective struggles. In contrast, KITU, a Left-oriented union, does not use anecdotes of individual predicaments. For this union, all narratives are hinged on the proletariat class struggle, articulated through Marxist references. This reveals that with increasing precarity, mainstream politics becomes central to tech workers’ movements, even in neoliberal regimes. Earlier unions and associations, sceptical of militant trade unionism, distanced themselves from political allies and sought support from global organisers. In contrast, the current white-collar unions approach local political establishments to amplify their discourse. It may be an indication that precarity has been chipping away at white-collar elitism. Support from global and even transnational groups

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(Purkayastha, 2012; Collins and Bilge, 2016) can no longer address the excesses of lived precarity in local conditions, even amidst a global pandemic. Although FITE remains distant from partisan politics, during the pandemic it reached out to ministers and bureaucrats seeking help. Heeding its members’ resentment, FITE did not seek affiliation in specific parties. Instead, it maintained its political neutrality by tagging ministers from different camps in its posts. Second, the unions demonstrate discursive variation. This suggests that similar groups of workers mobilising on the same social media platform may have various organising methods and diverse approaches to structural precarity. By using hashtags like #coronavirus and #lockdown, FITE relates tech workers’ precarity to the pandemic. FITE identifies individual and institutional precarity as episodic interruptions in the continuing privilege and neoliberal opportunities for tech workers. Hence, FITE resumes the narratives of privilege in the latter part of the year when the market apparently stabilises. KITU’s narratives of collective struggles refer to exacerbated labour crises during the pandemic that affected workers across industries. This union’s dominant focus lies on class struggle, which precedes the pandemic and is likely to outlast it. Finally, narratives on social media are powerful instruments of mobilisation. The unions outline their past and future actions using the contextual and affective content of these narratives. In a reflexive turn, the narratives of other workers’ struggles become narratives about the unions. This creates dialogic depths in the posts, as the unions respond to other workers’ narratives with their pledge for collective action. These discursive narratives appear on a mainstream social media platform. That means the usual constraints of social media communication may have affected the mobilising efforts. FITE and KITU adopted some strategies to neutralise these challenges. For instance, to combat social media surveillance, the unions deployed counter-surveillance mechanisms. They used admin filters on membership requests. Anecdotes were generally anonymised, to protect the workers’ privacy. Further, the unions developed new expressions of collectivity to counter digital individualism on social media. KITU asked individual members to post pictures with slogans written on posters. Then KITU made collages with these pictures for two campaigns—first, on the occasion of the International Workers’ Day and then on ‘Save India Day’ (August 9) to protest against hostile labour conditions in tech. Hashtags in social media activism are also useful instruments for collectivity. However, FITE and KITU do not use hashtags that are as uniform and consistent as #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter. Only the names of the unions appear consistently as hashtags (e.g. #KITU, #FITE and #TeamFITE) hinting at the unions’ keenness on establishing themselves as brands. As the months progressed, the two unions’ emphasis on precarity betrayed more divergence. After October, FITE regains its optimism about opportunities in the market. KITU retains its emphasis on proletariat struggles. However, both unions seek tech workers’ rehabilitation within the new conditions of labour. The narratives emphasise demands for reemployment and security in tech jobs, and not the abolition of neoliberal structures, even though KITU strives to bring down

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capitalism. The narratives demonstrate how the ‘salaried bourgeoisie’ resist their ‘proletarisation’ (Zizek, 2012, p. 11). That said, the heightened conditions of precarity during the pandemic have increased the unions’ emphasis on dissent and mainstream political coalitions. Hence, these unions with their discursive activism build partially disruptive strategies. They partially redefine white-collar workers’ identity by undoing the assumption of privilege and foregrounding precarity, even though their dominant aim is to reclaim and protect privilege through rehabilitation in the neoliberal market. Earlier literature viewed tech workers’ mobilisation as a nearly invisible phenomenon. With the proliferation of tech unions’ narratives on social media, that invisibility has begun to dissolve.

Conclusion Indian tech workers’ unionised movements through the pandemic depended heavily on social media during the pandemic. In the absence of in-person protests and in response to aggravated precarity, Indian tech unions increased their social media engagements. The white-collar trade unions have utilised narratives of individual and collective precarity to emphasise their struggles. The narratives differ in approach, depending on the ideological alignments of the unions. For instance, FITE as a union without partisan affiliation predominantly uses individual narratives, while KITU as a Marxist union uses narratives of collective precarity in the context of class struggle. Implicitly and explicitly, mainstream politics remains central to the white-collar workers’ movements. These unions have begun to consolidate their connection with political institutions, unlike their obstinately apolitical predecessors. The overwhelming spread of precarity during the pandemic, through unemployment, pay cuts, overwork and hyperdigital production, has forced several tech workers to recognise the fragility of neoliberal privilege. After all, liberalisation in India that facilitated the expansion of the tech industry and consolidated the corporate foundations in the Indian economy has always been a political project (Nayyar, 2017). The state’s support for corporations during the pandemic, through various anti-worker and pro-market legal reforms, is a stark reminder of this truth, which white-collar unions have had to reckon with. However, as the months progressed, the emphasis on active dissent diminished in FITE’s social media posts. KITU’s focus has not shifted from proletariat precarity, but the number of posts on precarity declined. This raises some new questions. Will the recognition of precarity and of the political importance of white-collar labour prevail in tech workers’ collective action? Will the post-pandemic world create new narratives of labour movements? Answers to these questions lie in a future whose contours will be shaped by the pandemic.

Note 1 All months and dates are from 2020 unless stated otherwise.

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