Mayor Michael Bloomberg: The Limits of Power 9781501756399

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MAYOR MICHAEL BLOOMBERG

MAYOR MICHAEL BLOOMBERG The Limits of Power Lynne A. Weikart

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ​ ​ITHACA AND LONDON

 Copyright © 2021 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu. First published 2021 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of Amer­i­ca Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Weikart, Lynne A., 1943– author. Title: Mayor Michael Bloomberg : the limits of power / Lynne A. Weikart. Description: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2021. |   Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020049150 (print) | LCCN 2020049151 (ebook) |   ISBN 9781501756375 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501756399 (pdf) |   ISBN 9781501756382 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Bloomberg, Michael. | Municipal government—­New York   (State)—­New York. | Mayors—­New York (State)—­New York. | State-­local   relations—­New York (State)—­New York. | Federal-­city relations—­New York   (State)—­New York. | Urban policy—­New York (State)—­New York. |   New York (N.Y.)—­Politics and government—1951– Classification: LCC JS1229 .W45 2021 (print) | LCC JS1229 (ebook) |   DDC 974.7/1044092 [B]—­dc23 LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2020049150 LC ebook rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2020049151

  For Nyah and Grace

 City government cannot end a national recession—­nor can we control the business cycle, but we can shape our own destiny, and we have. Bloomberg, State of the City, 2011

Contents

Preface Acknowl­edgments List of Abbreviations

ix xiii xv

Introduction: External and Internal Limitations on Mayoral Power 1.

1

Bloomberg’s Place in Urban Theory and in the City’s History

11

2.

Setting the Tone

24

3.

Creating Long-­Term Fiscal Health

43

4.

Growing the City and Protecting the Environment

76

5.

The Staggering Growth in Homelessness

106

6.

The Lack of Low-­Income Housing

132

7.

Antipoverty Initiatives

172

8.

Successes and Failures in Education Reform

200

9.

Crime and Punishment

227

Conclusion: The Limits of Power

240

Appendix 1: The Number of Homeless in New York City, 2002–2014 Appendix 2: National Assessment of Education Pro­gress Test Scores in Reading and Mathe­matics for Grades Four and Eight Notes Bibliography Index

255

257 259 261 311

vii

Preface

Mayor Michael Bloomberg: The Limits of Power is filled with facts, but the facts merely illuminate and delineate the power strug­gle ­every New York City mayor ­faces. New York City mayors are blamed for the horrible condition of the subways, for spending too much on city employee pensions, for spending federal funds on shelters instead of permanent housing, and for a host of other failures, ­whether or not t­ hese mayors have the authority or control to effectuate solutions. It is a public authority reporting to the governor that controls the subways, the New York State legislature and governor often approve pension hikes, and the US government long ago froze the use of federal money to build more public housing units. E ­ very mayor responds differently to the fragmented and l­imited nature of the city’s mayoral power. Edward Koch accepted the external controls scripted by the New York State Emergency Financial Control Board in the late 1970s and 1980s. David Dinkins became lost in a difficult financial crisis. Rudolph Giuliani took control of what was available and ignored t­ hose areas over which he had ­little control. Michael Bloomberg took a dif­fer­ent tack, and that is what this book is about. Michael Bloomberg, with no experience in government, would not know when he started governing just how l­imited his authority was. When he found out, he took control where he could, created a close relationship with Governor George Pataki to achieve his goals, and or­ga­nized other New York State mayors to achieve statewide goals when pos­si­ble. When he lost (and sometimes he lost big), he went on to the next goal and did not look back. Bloomberg remained strategic regardless of the obstacles he faced. He was comfortable in the private sector and sought to encourage public-­private partnerships throughout city government. He sought to hire very good ­people and supported them when they ­were challenged. Sometimes his determination to protect his p ­ eople led to m ­ istakes, as when he defended their poor decisions. This became a serious prob­lem when he failed to stop the loss of low-­income housing units in the city and would not listen to ­those who advocated changes in policy. He invested heavi­ly in improving the education system, but chose a chancellor who had l­ittle experience in education and Bloomberg refused to listen to t­ hose who ­were critical of his methods. Two terms ­were not enough for Mayor Mike Bloomberg. Bloomberg wrestled the city council to agree to allow a third term, creating an exception to the NYC term limit law (McNickle 2017, 258). He was voted in, but by his third term he ix

x Preface

was no longer seen as bringing ­people together; he took on the ­labor ­unions and insisted on cuts in pensions and health benefits—­positions that made the ­unions furious. At the same time, he alienated many city residents who w ­ ere increasingly worried over ever rising housing costs. Bloomberg failed to adequately address the rising costs of housing and the accompanying increase in the homeless population, as his economic development plans built thousands of new luxury apartment units across the five boroughs. While he strug­gled with ­these issues, New York State pulled the rug out from ­under Bloomberg by refusing to fund the city’s Advantage Program, which placed the homeless into permanent housing. The federal government reduced funding to the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) ­every year, and the number of federal Section 8 vouchers for more permanent housing was reduced drastically (Bach and ­Waters 2014). Residents blamed the mayor; it was easier to do that than to look to Albany and Washington, DC, for answers that ­were not forthcoming. In his last term, Bloomberg lost even more support as he stubbornly clung to his notorious stop-­and-­frisk police policy. Yet many city residents look back fondly on the Bloomberg years as an era of competency and stability. Bloomberg was at his best u ­ nder the pressure of rebuilding the city a­ fter the terrorist attack of 9/11, when the media predicted the demise of the city. He became the leader of a revitalized city as he planned and implemented large building proj­ects throughout the five boroughs. In his first term, he brought ­people together. He was instrumental in resolving issues at the World Trade Center site (Ground Zero). He defended immigrants. He was the first politician to take a stand against bigotry during the uproar over an Islamic cultural center to be built a few blocks from Ground Zero. The remarks he made then remain among the most impor­tant of his ­career; he asserted that if the city said no to the mosque, “we would undercut the values and princi­ple that so many heroes died protecting. . . . ​And we would hand a valuable propaganda tool to terrorist recruiters, who spread the fallacy that Amer­i­ca is at war with Islam. . . . ​ ­Today we are not at war with Islam—we are at war with al-­Qaeda and other extremists who hate freedom” (Bloomberg 2010a). Certainly this was one of Bloomberg’s finest moments. He did so much more. He tackled the environment, creating acres of public plazas, new parkland, 350 miles of bike lanes, planted a million trees (Bloomberg n.d.-­a); built a booming job market; ensured that New Yorkers could at last enjoy the waterfront; created linkages between high schools, colleges, and high-­tech corporations; and, in par­tic­ul­ar, developed a technology sector that now competes with ­those of Boston and Silicon Valley. He insisted on data-­driven decision making and experimented with programs to systematically eliminate poverty. He did not reduce poverty, but he redefined it, proving that poverty rates w ­ ere higher than the country wanted to admit. He succeeded in keeping poverty rates

Preface

xi

steady—­even during the 2008 recession, when poverty rates r­ ose nationally. The city opened more shelters, and fewer homeless ­people slept on sidewalks. He dramatically improved the public’s health: “city residents literally live longer” b ­ ecause of Bloomberg’s public health policies (Farley 2015). At times, Bloomberg’s m ­ istakes may have overshadowed his accomplishments as residents strug­gled to find affordable housing. Yet, many New Yorkers remain grateful for his success in leading the city’s economic growth and the recovery from the devastation of 9/11, the 2008 recession, and Hurricane Sandy.

Acknowl­e dgments

I have received wonderful advice and guidance from so many p ­ eople. I am grateful for a wonderful team at Cornell University Press and Westchester Publishing Ser­ vices: Michael McGandy, Se­nior Editor and Editorial Director of Three Hills; Clare Jones, Acquisitions; Mary Kate Murphy, Production Editor; Ange Romeo-Hall, Director of Manuscript Editing; and Brock E. Schnoke, Marketing Assistant. I am particularly indebted to Mary Gendron, Production Editor at Westchester Publishing Ser­vices, for her guidance, and Kate Mertes for indexing the book. I would like to thank Lilliam Barrios-­Paoli; Nicholas Bloom, Greg Chan, Daniel Feldman, Paula L. Fleming of Fleming Editorial Ser­vices; Lizabeth Gewirtzman, Nancy Kolben, Mark Levitan, Eric Nadelstern, Wilbur C. Rich, and Samuel Stein. I benefited immeasurably from insights of my colleagues at the Marxe School of Public Affairs, Baruch College. I am indebted to Charles Blake in the Department of Po­liti­cal Science, James Madison University, for his encouragement, and am especially grateful to my colleagues at James Madison University, who have made my time ­there so welcoming. I would like to thank the two professors at Columbia University who supported my doctoral studies so many years ago: Dall Forsythe and Donna Shalala. Most of all, I would like to thank my good friend, Laura Gentile, Esq., without whom this book would have never been written.

xiii

Abbreviations

CBA Community Benefits Agreement CIDI Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence CPC City Planning Commission CTE ­career and technology education DC 37 District Council 37 DHCR Division of Homes and Community Renewal DHS Department of Homeless Ser­v ices DOE Department of Education EAU Emergency Assistance Unit EDC Economic Development Corporation EFCB Emergency Financial Control Board FBEOP Five Borough Economic Opportunity Plan HPD Department of Housing Preservation and Development HRA ­Human Resources Administration LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design MAC Municipal Assistance Corporation MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority NIEM National Information Exchange Model NPCC NYC Panel on Climate Change NYCHA New York City Housing Authority NYCLU New York Civil Liberties Union NYIRN New York Industrial Retention Network NYPD New York Police Department OLTPS Office of Long-­Term Planning and Sustainability OSOW Out of School, Out of Work PERB Public Employment Relations Board RFP request for proposal RGB Rent Guidelines Board SBI South Bronx Initiative SCA School Construction Authority SRO single-­room occupancy UFT United Federation of Teachers ULURP Uniform Land Use Review Procedure WTC World Trade Center xv

MAYOR MICHAEL BLOOMBERG

INTRODUCTION External and Internal Limitations on Mayoral Power Though we must start by rebuilding lower Manhattan, that’s only a start. We must stimulate economic growth across the city. We must modernize the management of government. We must renew our waterfront. And, we must reform our school system. And, we must be ever-­vigilant to make sure New York continues to be the safest large city in the nation. —­Michael R. Bloomberg, State of the City Address, 2002a

­Every city in the United States has state-­established l­egal ­bound­aries—as well as state-­established geographic bound­aries—­ that circumscribe its powers. —Frug and Barron, 2008

Michael R. Bloomberg succeeded Rudolph Giuliani as mayor of New York City in 2002, four months ­after the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center. New Yorkers elected this newcomer, who had no experience in governing, to lead the city at a time of ­great peril. Bloomberg, a billionaire who ran on the Republican Party ticket, was elected over the seasoned liberal Demo­cratic Party candidate, Mark Green, the city’s public advocate. Bloomberg campaigned on a plan to revive the city a­ fter the traumatic consequences of 9/11 by implementing a strong economic development agenda, modernizing government, and keeping the city safe. He received crucial endorsements from both Demo­crats and Republicans, including former mayors Giuliani and Ed Koch and Governor George Pataki. He spent over $50 million to defeat Green in 2001, even though Demo­ crats enjoyed a five-­to-­one advantage in the city (Hicks 2005). Mayor Bloomberg financed his own campaign and took office without financial or po­liti­cal debt. New Yorkers voted for someone who represented the establishment ­because, ­after 9/11, the New York electorate was playing it safe. In Bloomberg’s first State of the City Address, the new mayor laid out his agenda to restore New York City to its premier world-­class status, an agenda he faithfully pursued and often successfully executed over the next twelve years and 1

2 INTRODUCTION

three terms. In response to the devastation of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the mayor worked hard to rebuild his city by fulfilling the goals he outlined in that address. Bloomberg leveraged his po­liti­cal role with his background as a businessman to aid in rebuilding Ground Zero; he revitalized the city’s economic engine through a multitude of large-­scale building proj­ects from the Bronx to Brooklyn; he envisioned and created a booming technology sector, which grew by over “18 ­percent from 2004 to 2014” (NYC International Business 2014), he rebuilt the waterfront; he kept crime at bay, he renewed the city’s once shining role as the Big Apple and a tourist destination; he created the 311 call center and used the data collected to resolve New Yorkers’ complaints; and, most of all, he restored confidence that the city could still thrive ­after 9/11. Bloomberg gained national recognition for some of his accomplishments, such as a ban on smoking in restaurants, advocating mandatory sentences for ­those who carried illegal guns, a ban on trans fats in restaurant cooking, energy-­efficiency rules for building o ­ wners, and a power­ful commitment to sweeping environmental protections. His proposal for congestion pricing for automobiles driving into Lower Manhattan, much derided when he proposed it in 2008, was approved in the fiscal year 2019 New York State legislative session (Norimine 2019). Bloomberg operated from two princi­ples. The first was data-­driven policymaking. He credited his success as the product of policy decisions based on data carefully collected and analyzed. A corollary to the first princi­ple was his insistence that decision making can be objective and ideologically neutral. Bloomberg’s commitment to a scientific approach to decision making is rare in the history of urban management. Bloomberg’s second operating princi­ple was an emphasis on economic growth The mayor fully welcomed, planned for, and expected the city to grow by a million ­people within a de­cade. He was determined that he would not be a caretaker mayor and would not watch the city further deteriorate ­after the 9/11 attack. At the same time, Bloomberg was challenged and l­imited by the bound­aries of municipal power imposed by the external constraints of state government and the limits imposed by federal and state courts. He was also ­limited by his own shortcomings. Unlike ­earlier mayors, Bloomberg opened all five boroughs to development by rezoning 40 ­percent of the city for mixed use and inviting developers to build both residential buildings and commercial settings (Doctoroff 2017, 75). Construction took off, and he turned his attention to city government to make it work as effectively and efficiently as pos­si­ble to support this economic activity, including raising taxes to support government activity. He was impeded at times by his own management style of not holding man­ag­ers accountable and not recognizing when their strategies ­were inadequate. Unfortunately, he did not anticipate all the consequences of economic growth. He responded tepidly to the spread of

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON MAYORAL POWER

3

homelessness as a result of rising rental costs, and he ignored racial issues around stop-­and-­frisk police policies. Not dependent upon any interest groups for his reelection, Bloomberg did not accept outside advice as re­sis­tance grew. This book examines the effect federal and state policies had on Bloomberg’s decision making in his major policies—­pro-­growth strategies, homelessness, housing, poverty, criminal justice, and education—­within a po­liti­cal context of power constraints imposed by ­these higher authorities. In each of ­these arenas Bloomberg developed strategies for improvement but did not always succeed. He established a superior rec­ord in stabilizing the finances of the city, in environmental policies, and in public health, but did not broaden his successes into other key areas. This book explores ­these issues and explains urban decision making by accounting for the constraints on municipal power as well as Bloomberg’s leader­ ship limits.

Mayoral Power Impeded by Federal and State Government The first issue is that Bloomberg sometimes was impeded by federal and state government policies. Bloomberg faced power­ful forces aligned against his agenda. The state rejected his bid for a sports stadium on the West Side of Manhattan. The state rejected his plan for congestion pricing (charging high fees for automobiles in certain parts of Manhattan). The state rejected his attempt to use state dollars to subsidize apartments for homeless ­people. The state recalibrated state education tests to make them harder, wiping out all the gains that the city had seen in annual state educational testing. The state even refused to increase the number of cameras on city streets (see chapters 4 and 8). The list of state rejections is quite long, but t­ hese never slowed Bloomberg’s ambitions or efforts. Bloomberg responded in part by organ­izing, collaborating, networking, and strategizing. In the midst of the 2008 recession, he or­ga­nized upstate mayors to pressure the New York State legislature to reduce ­future pension costs and they won (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012b). When Bloomberg wanted to increase taxes that required state approval, he lost; undeterred, he carefully crafted a strong relationship with Governor Pataki, who, time and again, provided support for Bloomberg’s bud­get. When Bloomberg was shut out of any meaningful role in rebuilding the World Trade Center by the state, he quietly pressured state officials to name him chair of the Memorial Foundation (Sagalyn 2016, 351). The families of ­those who died w ­ ere in turmoil over how the memorial would be structured, and building could not continue u ­ ntil that turmoil was resolved; Bloomberg undertook countless meetings with the families. Lynne Sagalyn, who wrote an

4 INTRODUCTION

in-­depth book on the rebuilding of the World Trade Center, has said of Bloomberg, “The depth of his knowledge and respectful consideration of the issue, in concert with his personal influence and po­liti­cal power, resolved the issue” (2016, 351). He sought to manage state interference and often succeeded. The role of such outside forces has long been underappreciated by t­ hose analyzing urban politics. Mayor Bloomberg failed to solve one of the most pressing issues facing the city—­the lack of low-­income housing. Even though 165,000 affordable housing units ­were built during his twelve years as mayor, he still ended his mayoralty with less affordable income housing than when he started (Bach and W ­ aters 2013). A significant part of the fault lay with the federal government, which s­ topped supporting the building of low-­income housing. Unlike an ­earlier era, in which the federal government, beginning with President Franklin D. Roo­se­velt (1933–45) and Senator Robert F. Wagner (1927–49), built or financed thousands of low-­ income housing units throughout the nation, since the administration of President Ronald Reagan the federal government had refused to contribute to new public housing units and per­sis­tently reduced its financial commitment to ­those units that remained despite the growing crisis of homelessness (Lusignan 2002, 36; Bloom 2008, 35). The federal government ended that power­ful assistance when Reagan convinced a vast number of Americans that “government is not the solution to our prob­lem, government is the prob­lem” (Reagan 1981). Traditional public functions ­were turned over to the private sector, which had (and has) l­ittle interest in low-­income housing. Indeed, federal law (the Faircloth Amendment in 1999) capped the number of public housing units that could be built using federal funds, and this reflected the extreme abandonment in the building of public housing by the federal government since the 1980s (US HUD 2016b). Likewise, for years New York State refused to provide needed funds for more supportive housing, ­stopped funding the city’s public housing completely, and ­until 2019 insisted on vacancy decontrol in the rental housing market while failing its responsibility to enforce existing rent control laws (Bloom 2008, 251).1 The rise in homelessness is closely related to the loss of low-­income housing units. The mayor was condemned by housing advocates b ­ ecause he ended the policies of providing permanent apartments to the homeless through increasing numbers of federal Section 8 vouchers and public housing. But Section 8 vouchers ­were cut by the federal government. The mayor faced two serious recessions, in 2002 and 2008, in which he witnessed constant state and federal cuts. It is unrealistic to expect that Bloomberg could commit to increased funding of low-­ income housing units without the help of the federal and state governments. He was further condemned for eliminating his two programs—­Housing Stability Plus and the Advantage Program—­that had been created to take the place of federal Section 8 vouchers, but the state had withdrawn all state funds for t­ hose programs.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON MAYORAL POWER

5

And when the state funds ­were withdrawn, so ­were the federal funds (Secret 2011). In addition, Bloomberg was criticized for not moving more of the homeless population into New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) housing, which already had a lengthy waiting list (NYCHA 2019). It is time to acknowledge the destructive role of federal and state governments in failing to address the profound need for low-­income housing for poor ­people in all of our cities. It is time for critics and organizers to focus attention on federal and state actors for solutions. The state played a major role in education that Bloomberg could not control. State test scores increased from 2002 to 2010 and then abruptly declined b ­ ecause the state had de­cided that the tests w ­ ere too easy and changed the test norms. Throughout the state, scores plummeted (Haimson and Ravitch 2013). Bloomberg, who had bet the farm on increasing test scores, was defeated. Once again, the state reigned.

The Limits of Bloomberg’s Management Style The second issue is that Bloomberg had a management prob­lem. He did not know when to tell his key ­people no. For example, when his deputy mayor for economic development, Daniel Doctoroff, spent almost all of his time on vast economic development proj­ects with ­little low-­income housing, Bloomberg failed to rein him in. When Doctoroff ignored NYCHA housing deterioration, Bloomberg did not redirect him. When the Department of Homeless Ser­vices told religious organ­ izations that they w ­ ere no longer qualified to h ­ ouse the homeless, Bloomberg did not step in. When the ­Human Resources Administration threw welfare recipients off of its rolls and then lost most of the administrative hearings concerning t­ hese actions, he did not stop it. The mayor’s tendency to “back his ­people” remained flawed throughout his mayoralty and cost him both goodwill and good governance (Sadik-­Khan, quoted in Holeywell 2013).

Building Co­a li­t ions The third issue is Bloomberg’s focus on a strong partnership with the private sector, sometimes blinding him to the potential of other co­ali­tion partners to achieve his goals. He established an environmental co­ali­tion, an antipoverty co­ ali­tion and a public health co­ali­tion, all of which w ­ ere quite successful in implementing innovative public policies. But he did not create an expansive housing co­ali­tion to seriously examine and develop a plan for low-­income housing.

6 INTRODUCTION

The housing plan Bloomberg did develop favored real estate developers, ignored disappearing affordable-­income rentals, glossed over the crucial distinction between affordable housing and low-­income housing, and failed to integrate low-­ income housing possibilities that many policy analysts advocated. Bloomberg’s lack of focus on NYCHA, the city’s largest landlord of low-­income housing, left NYCHA’s prob­lems on the periphery. His dearth of any emphasis on saving rent controlled and rent stabilized apartments perpetuated a continued loss of ­those apartments to market forces, and his rezoning efforts often ignored the critical need of low-­income housing. Action on ­these fronts would not have eliminated the prob­lem, but it would have ameliorated it. Bloomberg faced similar limits in other public policy areas. In education he has been castigated for centralizing decision making ­under his own power and ignoring the petitions of parents. Yet the previous decentralization structure, with a board separate and almost immune to the mayor, had been a disaster for the city’s school system. Bloomberg was the first mayor in the city’s history to take responsibility for the school system rather than let it drift along as a major patronage mill for elected officials and interest groups, and in so d ­ oing exhibited more courage than any other New York City mayor in this area. He succeeded in improving graduation rates and improving student attendance (Bloomberg 2007b). He succeeded in improving the quality of the teaching force and limiting teacher attrition (Kelleher 2014, 42). He was the first New York City mayor to extend the school day and begin the school year e­ arlier (Bloomberg 2005c). He succeeded in giving more power to principals, so that principals could choose their assistant principals and no longer had to choose the most se­nior teacher but could choose someone based on merit. Bloomberg wisely expanded the number of ­career and technical high schools. And, prob­ably most impor­tant, he succeeded in paying educators a competitive wage so that fewer skilled teachers left for the more attractive salaries of the suburbs (Bloomberg 2005c). Yet he did not build a co­ali­tion with educators; he disdained educators and sought hires outside the world of education. He alienated teachers with his insistence on unreasonable accountability and supported using precious tax dollars for charter schools that had no accountability (see chapter 8).

Bloomberg’s Mixed Rec­o rd on Race ­ here is a fourth issue that is less mea­sur­able but no less impor­tant, and it is an T underappreciated but critical component in the successful delivery of the city’s public ser­v ices: the effect of race. Bloomberg unflinchingly faced issues of race in his first term. As regards race ­matters, he was certainly far more successful in his

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON MAYORAL POWER

7

first term than he was in his latter two terms, and part of his early success was in ameliorating the ­bitter and divisive aftermath from the Giuliani administration (1994–2002). At the heart of Giuliani’s law enforcement policy, in case ­after case, was a lack of accountability for police misconduct. The most power­ful example of his clash with ­people of color is a scary event that occurred before Giuliani even became mayor but set the tone for what was to come in his administration. In September 1992, ten thousand off-­duty police officers marched on City Hall, blocking traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge. The police ­were angry that African American mayor David Dinkins had proposed removing police representatives from the Civilian Complaint Review Board. Uniformed police officers stood aside as the throng of off-­duty police stormed City Hall, shouting “Dinkins must go!” Giuliani addressed the unruly crowd, and instead of calming the angry mob, he shouted out that Dinkins’s policies ­were “bullshit.” The police chanted “Rudy, Rudy, Rudy” (Ackerman, Beckett, and Lartey 2016). Upon taking office one year ­later, Mayor Giuliani refused to meet with African American officials. It was only ­after the NYPD shooting death of West African immigrant Amadou Diallo that he changed his mind, meeting with state comptroller H. Carl McCall and ­others. As Rudy Crew, the African American school chancellor ­under Giuliani, said, “I find his policies to be so racist and class-­biased. . . . ​I ­don’t even know how I lasted three years. . . . ​He was barren, completely emotionally barren, on the issue of race” (Crew, quoted in Powell 2006). This was the tone of the mayor’s office when Bloomberg took over. Mayor Bloomberg took a more refreshing and healing approach to leadership. As mayor he sought to be inclusive by embracing and adopting the goals and interests of communities of color. He talked to every­one, which meant that African Americans and other ­people of color, ­people of all faiths, and the LGBTQ community ­were welcome once more in City Hall. At the beginning of Bloomberg’s mayoralty, immigrants made up 35 ­percent of the city’s population (Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold 2000b, 15). Bloomberg attended religious ser­v ices throughout the city, and he accepted speaking engagements from all ethnic and racial groups. He spoke up for Muslims, and was the first po­liti­cal figure in the nation to support Muslims who wished to build a community center near the World Trade Center site. Bloomberg built programs to help young Black and Latino men to get into college. He worked hard to move juvenile offenders (most of them ­children of color) from upstate closer to their families in the city. His emergent poverty programs clearly supported ­people of color, who ­were disproportionately represented in the city’s poor communities (McDaniel et al. 2014; Astone et al. 2016; NYC Office of the Mayor 2012d). Unfortunately, his second and third terms w ­ ere not as successful in race relations, largely ­because of the stop-­and-­frisk program of the NYPD, which was led

8 INTRODUCTION

by Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly. Bloomberg supported the program of stopping, without reasonable suspicion, p ­ eople at random on city streets to search for weapons and/or contraband. As Jennifer Fratello, Andres F. Rengifo, and Jennifer Trone noted, “Most of ­those ­stopped ­were young men of color. Nearly 10 years of data on stops in New York City reveal a ­great deal but also raise impor­tant questions. In at least 50 ­percent of recorded stops annually—­just over 286,000 in 2012, the most recent full year of data available—­those ­stopped are young, between the ages of 13 and 25. During the vast majority of t­hese stops, the officers discovered nothing illegal and took no further action” (Fratello, Rengifo, and Trone 2013, 8). The community anger t­oward the stop-­and-­frisk program was one reason many ­people of color s­topped supporting Bloomberg over time. Bloomberg remained unapologetic, however. He believed that stop-­and-­frisk made the streets safer for all, including young men of color, ­under the theory that the policy s­ topped young men from carry­ing guns on the streets. It was not u ­ ntil he ran for president that Bloomberg changed his mind and apologized to the Black community for the stop-­and-­ frisk program (Cole and Alesci 2019). When he was sensitive to the ways his policies affected communities of color, and when he took the time to include the concerns of ­these communities in his decision making, the goodwill he generated fostered his governance goals. When he fell short, the resentment he accrued undermined his agenda across the board.

Expanding the Perspective of Pluralism versus Class Analy­s is This book explores Mayor Bloomberg’s unique blend of economic and social reforms within the external constraints of state institutions and federal power, as well as the internal constraints of interest groups and Bloomberg’s own shortcomings. The book aspires to a broader and deeper perspective than former analyses using po­liti­cal economy as a guide. Clarence Stone has pointed out that the urban po­liti­cal arena is undergoing a profound shift. Urbanists have long placed themselves in a pluralist camp or a class analy­sis orientation, but Stone asks that we expand our thinking to understand urban policies within the context of intergovernmental challenges and issues of race. Both have enormous implications for how we approach urban prob­lems. He maintains that the current theory of po­liti­cal economy “does not go far enough in showing the way multiple parts of an urban polity converge and intertwine with one another in forming a ­whole” (Stone 2019, 1544). This book looks at ­these issues in depth. The introduction sets the themes of the book. Chapter 1 places the book in urban theory. Chapter 2 examines Bloom-

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON MAYORAL POWER

9

berg’s first term and his success in setting a tone of recovery. Chapter 3 analyzes the mayor’s financing strategies and tracks how they changed over time. When Bloomberg took office on January 1, 2002, he faced a $5 billion deficit, but twelve years ­later, he left the city a $1.9 billion surplus (Posillico 2014). Chapters 4–9 examine several public policy areas—­pro-­growth strategies, homelessness, low-­ income housing, antipoverty initiatives, the criminal justice and the public education system. The analy­sis herein focuses on Bloomberg’s policy mix of economic and social investment and how urban theory helps explain how the mayor, who exemplified a strong leader with considerable skills, sometimes failed to meet his own objectives ­because of external constraints. Of course, his own limitations also accounted for some of his failures, as in his unfailing support of his commissioners: Bloomberg gave them wide latitude, and when they w ­ ere inadequate to the task, his reluctance to step in caused prob­lems. Institutions ­matter. The institutions that l­imited Bloomberg time and time again ­were the federal and state governments—­particularly the governorship, the state legislature, and the state courts. Power­ful institutions ­were a major source of Bloomberg’s inability to realize his agenda. The best example of this can be found in a comparison of Bloomberg with his successor, Mayor Bill de Blasio. Bloomberg always contended with a divided state legislature, and it was thus difficult to get legislation passed that was favorable to New York City, while de Blasio enjoys a Demo­cratic majority in both ­houses. In the first session of this new state legislature, the Demo­crats passed rent control reform, which eliminated vacancy rent decontrol in order to reduce the number of city residents evicted and thus reduce homelessness. Forty-­three ­percent of the homeless come from rent regulated housing forced out by evictions (NYC In­de­pen­dent Bud­get Office 2014). This one change in state law corrected a major prob­lem contributing to homelessness in the city, and the number of eviction cases in the city has plummeted (Barbanel 2019). “New eviction cases against city tenants for nonpayment of rent are down by more than 35,000 since the law was signed on June 14, compared with the same period in 2018, a drop of 46%, according to The Wall Street Journal’s analy­sis” (Barbanel 2019). But such an opportunity was unavailable to Bloomberg ­because of the divided state legislature. Changes at the state level can mean dramatic changes in the city. Regardless of the power of state government, Bloomberg asserted the leadership required to bring the city to recovery from both 9/11 and the 2008 recession, and he led the city to a new era of growth. Other than Fiorello La Guardia during the ­Great Depression, no New York City mayor faced greater challenges or changed the city so fundamentally than did Mike Bloomberg. In protecting and growing the city’s fiscal, environmental, and public health resources,

10 INTRODUCTION

he remains unequalled. His successor enjoyed rich revenue streams gained from both tax increases and economic development that poured into the city b ­ ecause of Bloomberg’s pro-­growth strategies. Unfortunately, Bloomberg failed in other crucial areas b ­ ecause of state and federal policies, his own management weaknesses, and his unwillingness to build broad co­ali­tions in the crucial areas of low-­ income housing and education.

1 BLOOMBERG’S PLACE IN URBAN THEORY AND IN THE CITY’S HISTORY

Urban po­liti­cal theory provides an analytical perspective to view the leadership strategies and tactics of Mayor Michael Bloomberg. The perspective of the history of mayors in New York City provides a gauge to mea­sure Bloomberg’s successes and failures. The classic pluralist studies, Edward Banfield’s Po­liti­cal Influences (2007), Robert Dahl’s Who Governs (1961), and Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman’s Governing New York City (1960), focus on interest group analy­ sis. Pluralists argue ­there was no one elite that dominated urban decision making; rather, “the bargaining among a multiplicity of groups defined the urban power structure” (Mollenkopf 2010, 383). Opposing t­ hese pluralists are the structuralists, who emphasize “the power of the state and the under­lying socioeconomic system” in shaping “the po­liti­cal agenda,” rejecting interest group competition (Mollenkopf 2010, 383). Structuralists focus on the power of corporate elites in urban policy making: Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz in “Two ­Faces of Power” (1962); John Logan and Harvey Molotch in Urban Fortunes (1987); and Clarence Stone in Regime Politics (1989). Structuralists are divided into dif­fer­ent camps. One camp relies on class analy­ sis, “a capitalist-­centered class structure in which economic in­equality was dominant and neoliberalism the hegemonic ideology” (Stone 2019, 1536). In this camp, capitalism is the sole driver. The other camp thinks that “a class analy­sis fails to fit in the evolving post industrialism in urban Amer­i­ca” (Mollenkopf 2010, 386). Stone leads the polity approach “beginning with multiple structures that coexist through a variety of par­tic­u­lar mechanisms” (2019, 1537). He uses V. O. Key’s work on southern politics to explain “a po­liti­cal order” that encompasses a 11

12 CHAPTER 1

multi-­element setting including race and intergovernmental politics (Stone 2019, 1536). Mollenkopf comes to a similar conclusion: “Cities can no longer be taken as in­de­pen­dent entities isolated from the larger economic and social forces that operate on them” (2010, 386). Michael Bloomberg’s policies fall within Stone’s analy­sis—­the polity approach. Yes, Bloomberg is of a long line of pro-­growth reformers (Logan and Molotch 1987). Growth policies are the efforts of local governments to improve their economies by attracting mobile wealth to invest in their cities. Logan and Molotch describe growth policies as intended “to strengthen the tax base, create jobs, provide resources to solve existing social prob­lems meet the housing needs caused by natu­ral population growth and allow the market to serve public tastes in housing, neighborhoods and community development” (1987, 202). This certainly describes Michael Bloomberg. Bloomberg, however, was not an economic determinist, such as Paul Peterson, who saw “how external economic conditions s­ haped and constrain the urban po­liti­cal arena” (Mollenkopf 2010, 386). Peterson went so far as to say that “po­liti­cal variables no longer become relevant to the analy­sis” (1981, 12). Rather, Bloomberg believed in the power of elected officials to improve citizens’ lives. As mayor of New York City (2002–14) he advocated economic growth achieved by local government working side by side with the private sector and with the state government when pos­si­ble. Bloomberg went further than growth theorists. Bloomberg’s mayoral decision making u ­ nder Stone’s polity approach reveals a more complex view of power than that of growth theorists or other structuralists (Harding and Blokland 2014, 105). The polity approach emphasizes the role of politics over markets. “Co­ali­tion,” Stone says, emphasizes “bringing together vari­ous ele­ments of the community and the dif­fer­ent institutional capacities they control” (Stone 1989, 5). Stone called ­these “urban regimes” that work cooperatively. Bloomberg excelled in creating urban regimes. In addition to enlisting business ­people, Bloomberg created strong co­ali­tions with cultural institutions, religious leaders, and officials in higher education. He also created a strong alliance with many Black leaders in the city who supported him throughout his mayoralty even in the midst of the stop-­and-­frisk controversy. Stone has observed that cities had an identifiable urban regime, “a set of arrangements by which a community is actually governed” (Stone 1989, 6). “An urban regime may thus be defined as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (1989, 6). Participants may come from government and business. Stone identified “four types of regimes”: caretaker or maintenance regimes that make “no effort to introduce significant change”; economic development or corporate regimes; middle-­class progressive regimes (i.e., with



Bloomberg’s Place in Urban Theory and in the City’s History

13

liberal goals of “environmental protection, historic preservation,” affordable housing, ­etc.); and “lower-­class opportunity-­expansion” regimes (Stone 1993, 18). “The dominant form of urban regimes is a corporate regime,” notes Mirya Holman, “where the co­ali­tion can tap into resources provided by private actors to pursue development policies” (2014, 3). Pursuant to this typology, Bloomberg led a corporate regime for twelve years. But he had a far more comprehensive view of leadership than simply focusing on economic development. Stone lamented, in his case study of Atlanta, that the Atlanta corporate regime did not address the “needs of the lower-­income population in ways that would enhance their economic opportunities” (1993, 205). It was Marion Orr and Valarie Johnson, writing about Stone’s contributions to urban theory, who pointed out that “if Atlanta and other cities [had] pursued a broader economic redevelopment strategy of education and training, safe and affordable housing and other policies,” it would have made for “a socially healthier community” (2008, 20). This broader umbrella distinguished Bloomberg, who created such an umbrella for a corporate regime of several co­ali­tions. Another way of thinking about him was that he led both a corporate regime and a middle-­class progressive regime. An impor­tant consideration is that both pluralists and structuralists do not sufficiently take into consideration power­ful state actors—­the governor, the state legislature, and state courts. When Jeffrey L. Pressman wrote his groundbreaking essay, “Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership,” he observed that mayoral leadership depended “to a large extent on the type of governmental and po­liti­cal system in which he operates” (1972, 513). This is an arena on which Gerald Frug and David Barron focus: “­Every city in the United States has state-­established l­ egal bound­aries—as well as state-­established geo­graph­i­cal bound­aries—­that circumscribe its powers” (2008, xii). And it is the exertion of po­liti­cal power by New York State that handed Bloomberg his most difficult defeats. The state said no to the sports stadium on the West Side of Manhattan (Schragger 2016, 92). The state said no to congestion pricing (charging high fees for automobiles) in parts of Manhattan. The state said no to Bloomberg’s efforts to use state dollars to subsidize apartments for homeless ­people. The state recalibrated state education tests, making them harder, wiping out all the gains that the city had seen in annual state educational testing. And the list goes on. As Frug and Barron note, “Cities . . . ​only have power to the extent they are given it by statutes and constitutional provisions ­adopted by the state government” (2008, 231). The Bloomberg administration represents an excellent case study of a strong mayor constrained and ­limited by power­ful state institutions. The governor, state legislature and state courts ­were the power­ful institutions that dictated constraints on Bloomberg’s policymaking. The 1989 New York City Charter revisions, which w ­ ere required by the US Supreme Court’s unan­im ­ ous ruling in Board of Estimate v. Morris that the structure

14 CHAPTER 1

of the city’s Board of Estimate (the power center for the borough presidents) was unconstitutional, shifted power to the mayor and the New York City Council, thereby reducing the power of the borough presidents. The city council retained power over land use and zoning, which it shared with the mayor. When Bloomberg was elected mayor, two-­thirds of the city council members ­were new, and thanks to term limits many experienced members w ­ ere gone. The mayor had power over almost all the municipal boards, including the power­ful City Planning Commission. The mayor’s office now controlled procurement and, most impor­tant, it controlled the revenue projections for next year’s operating bud­ get. James Bowers and Wilber Rich noted “the importance of mayors’ controlling the existing governing and po­liti­cal infrastructure or building new ones that they can control” (2000, 222). Bloomberg benefited from the additional powers gained through the city charter revisions. Yet even with t­ hese enhanced powers, the agency of the mayor was still relative to, and constrained by, other powers. Benjamin Barber shows that state legislative sovereignty had many ways to block city initiatives (2014, 8–9). As Bloomberg took the reins of city government, he met the mighty powers of state government. He quickly faced the real­ity that Governor George Pataki controlled the ruined World Trade Center site (Ground Zero)—­and the mayor was effectively shut out of decision making for rebuilding a part of Lower Manhattan ­after the devastation of the 9/11 attacks. As Kubler and Pagano explain, “City governments are constrained entities, as their autonomy is l­imited by authority at higher levels” (2012, 116). The rebuilding at the World Trade Center site lay in the hands of Governor Pataki, who created the eleven-­member Lower Manhattan Development Corporation three weeks ­after Mayor Bloomberg was elected and before he was sworn into office (Sagalyn 2016, 40). The corporation consisted of seven ­people chosen by the governor and four chosen by out­going mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Consequently, a large chunk of Manhattan’s economic development was controlled by the state. Bloomberg had to deal with the real­ity that the city did not control its own revenue streams. The New York State Constitution is so constrained that New York has been identified as one of seven states in which its cities have l­ittle control over their own finances and personnel (Zimmerman 2012, 39). Article VIII, Section 12 of the New York State constitution demands the state legislature “restrict the power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money contracting indebtedness, and loaning the credit of counties, cities, towns, and villages, so as to prevent abuses in taxation and assessment and in contracting indebtedness by them.” The city’s only opportunity to control its own income was through property taxes, and even that was only within strict par­ameters. The city could not increase sales tax, corporate income tax, or any of the other means of municipal taxation without state legislation.



Bloomberg’s Place in Urban Theory and in the City’s History

15

Bloomberg also discovered the limits to his control over the city’s other resources; the state retained l­egal authority to take a wide variety of actions. The mayor could not even increase the number of security cameras on city streets without state legislative approval. The state legislature could increase the pension of city workers and force the city to pay for it. The list of the State of New York’s encroachments in city affairs seemed endless. Bloomberg discovered ­there is “no such ­thing as local autonomy” (Frug and Barron 2008, 41). Judge John F. Dillon of Iowa declared in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad (1868), “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature” (Richardson, Gough, and Puentes 2003, 8). In 1872, Dillon (2010) expounded the princi­ple, which was a­ dopted by other jurisdictions. The New York State Constitution does just that in Article IX: “In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or any other law, (i) e­ very local government ­shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to its property, affairs or government.” Cities in New York State have only t­ hose powers not denied them by state legislatures or the state constitution. And the state legislature can add to t­hose demands at any time. In 1929, Article IX was enforced when the highest court of New York ruled in Adler v. Deegan that “the conclusion follows that the life, health and safety of the inhabitants of the city of New York are not, ­under the Home Rule Amendment, a city concern which can be localized and delimited by the city bound­aries, but are the concern of the w ­ hole State” (Adler v. Deegan 251 N.Y. 467 N.Y. 1929). N ­ eedless to say, this encompasses most governmental actions. It is a fiction that New York is a home rule state. The real­ity is that New York municipalities can make laws only within the bound­aries drawn by state law. And the courts rained hard on Mayor Bloomberg’s municipal governance parade. Even before Bloomberg’s time as mayor, the city was sued in many policy areas, and the suits often continued for years. City officials often agreed to settlements (consent decrees) and oversight by special masters rather than risk losing in court. Callahan v. Carey (No. 49-­42582 Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Cot. 18, 1979) successfully challenged the city for a shortage of shelter beds for single men: “The Court is of the opinion that the Bowery derelicts are entitled to board and lodging.” ­Later the suit was broadened to include ­women and ­children. Both of ­these lengthy lawsuits resulted in consent decrees requiring the city to improve ser­vices and the appointment of special masters to enforce the court ­orders and settlement agreements. T ­ hese suits, which attempted to right existing wrongs, l­ imited mayoral options. As Schragger points out, “The city’s vertical po­liti­cal fragmentation [state and federal government authority] limits the ability of its leaders to effectuate public policy” (2016, 96). Douglas Yates (1977) went so far as to examine

16 CHAPTER 1

cities ­under the lens of “the ungovernable city” and asserted that, externally, the city was too dependent upon the state and, internally, power was too fragmented among city officials and ­labor u ­ nions. Indeed, New York City remains an international economic power­house, yet it remains within the constraints dictated by New York State, which has its own priorities and is a power­ful impediment to ­every mayor’s plans and aspirations (see Frug and Barron 2008; and Sassen 2001). Past mayors, who had been politicians before they w ­ ere mayors, ­were well aware of limits imposed by the state and the courts. But Bloomberg came from the private sector, had built and run his own com­pany. Such limitations ­were very new to him. This context is what makes Bloomberg’s policy successes remarkable. External constraints on mayors are considerable, but Bloomberg prevailed in some of his policy choices, with some notable successes in dealing with the state. Within the constraints of federal and state governments, Bloomberg also had to face internal constraints: ser­v ice demanders (­labor ­unions) and money providers (the business community). Sayre and Kaufman (1960) explain that internally strong interest groups, such as ­labor ­unions, can overwhelm city officials. The external constraints are real, but so are t­hose constraints found within the city: Bloomberg was called upon to balance the ­labor demands with the l­imited resources of the city, particularly a­ fter 9/11. He achieved a balance in his first two terms between the two, but in his third term he demanded far more from ­labor and the result was an impasse. The polity approach developed by Stone can be broadened to focus on the external constraints of state government and state judiciary. Urban theory can focus on both external and internal constraints, which is much more reflective of what city officials actually experience—­not just in New York but around the nation. Then comes the issue of race separate and distinct from capitalism. Far from being saddled ­under the analy­sis of economic class, race must be recognized as a power­ful influence permeating so much of the mind-­set of our governing actors and institutions. Often the insidious role of race is underplayed or denied in its entirety. But the influence of race remains “one of the enduring pillars in American po­liti­cal development” (Stone 2019, 1540). Race is interwoven not only in policing, stop-­and-­frisk, and other parts of the criminal justice system but also in decisions involving resource allocation, educational options, and zoning (to name a few). Bloomberg attacked racism through his willingness to improve the educational system and to develop meaningful education programs for young men of color without understanding that he needed to focus on racism within his policing policies. Bloomberg had the personality and the skills to be far more assertive than previous mayors about social policy innovation. This was clear when he sought to pay attention to redistributive issues, such as reducing poverty. As Barber notes, “Bloomberg incarnates the idea that mayors are practical rather than ideological,



Bloomberg’s Place in Urban Theory and in the City’s History

17

bridging politics and business with non-­politics of practical science and numbers” (2014, 26). The mayor believed that state and federal government had failed his city and that city officials had to respond to the challenge. He demonstrated over twelve years that, regardless of the fragmentation of authority, the city was indeed governable and that he could promote economic development and also promote an agenda that diminished poverty, even though external constraints of the state and the internal constraints of the ­labor ­unions sometimes defeated his aspirations. Stone examined urban mayors, understanding that the “New Deal days of haves versus have-­nots have yielded to a politics in which race and culture have become pervasive ele­ments” (2019, 1538). Although some analysts saw a “capitalist-­centered class structure in which economic in­equality was dominant and neoliberalism the hegemonic ideology,” “they miss how p ­ eople or­ga­nize po­liti­cally is influenced by race and culture” (Stone 2019, 1536). T ­ here is a richness to Stone’s urban theory that surpasses the progressive approach of blaming capitalism; it explains so much more. Bloomberg also had something e­ lse: money. He financed his own campaigns for mayor, not beholden to anyone. His money gave him a freedom of choices that previous mayors did not enjoy. He spent $108 million in his 2009 mayoral campaign while his opponent, William Thompson, spent $10 million. Bloomberg’s spending surpassed his $84 million war chest of 2005 (NYC CFB, n.d.). ­Because he financed his own campaign, Bloomberg was not dependent on power­ ful interest groups, ­either cap­i­tal­ist or ­labor. Yes, Bloomberg was a cap­i­tal­ist, but he was also a pragmatist who believed that growth would solve many of the city’s prob­lems. Ronald Coan (2014) said it best: Neoliberals ­were supposed to cut taxes and fees—­Bloomberg increased them a lot. They are supposed to deregulate and Bloomberg, among other ­things, s­ topped me from driving through Times Square, and took away my salt and Slurpee. His affordable housing program may not have been all that every­one wanted it to be—it certainly was large in scale and expensive. His takeover of the school system was meant to make it better, not prepare it for a charter school ­future—­and he paid the teachers more and hired more of them. Bloomberg was big on public-­private partnerships (arts and culture, as well as workforce and schools) and his physical redevelopment proj­ects fit the neo-­liberal mold, but he used the “State” (city government) a ­great deal. At the same time, Bloomberg worked hard to improve conditions for all New Yorkers, not just t­ hose who fit into his economic development engine. He came with a belief system that centered on creating jobs to take ­people out of poverty. He advocated reducing poverty and bridging the city’s racial and cultural divide

18 CHAPTER 1

far more than any New York City mayor since Fiorello La Guardia. In many ways he succeeded. And although many liberals are quite critical of Bloomberg’s management of the city’s welfare programs, his policing policies, and his inability to stem the low-­income housing crisis, ­there remains the power­ful proficiency, competency, and confidence that Bloomberg brought to city government—­without parallel in the city’s history. Jeffrey Pressman reminds us that although governmental and po­liti­cal structures set limits on what any mayor can do, personality can make a difference (1972, 521). Bloomberg had the confidence and credibility to take on very difficult prob­lems and achieve success in several policy areas.

In the Context of the City’s History: Bloomberg’s Strong Economic Agenda Coupled with a Progressive Social Agenda Bloomberg followed other New York City mayors who strug­gled to develop more innovative and forward-­thinking policies. T ­ here is a history of innovative mayors in New York City as t­here is throughout the country. Some New York City mayors w ­ ere quite conservative, and ­others quite progressive. The first innovative mayor to wrestle the mayoralty away from the corruption of Tammany Hall (a caretaker regime) and win the New York City mayoralty for a brief period was James Harper (1844–45), a businessman and “an upper-­class moralist who promised to vanquish corruption and implement efficiency reforms” (Barry 2009, 17). He put in place a corporate regime to make the city more business oriented, sought to reform the police force, and took the first steps ­toward creating a citywide sanitation system. He represented the educated class that wanted to remove Tammany Hall from power. Tammany Hall started out a social organ­ization to help immigrants but quickly distorted into a corrupt po­liti­cal machine that ruled New York City for many years. T ­ hose in opposition to it w ­ ere, like Harper, reformers in the l­ater 1800s and early 1900s and w ­ ere, by and large, nativists. The Republican Party pursued a municipal agenda that was “anti-­alcohol, anti-­foreign and anti-­partisan” (Barry 2009, 17). The party wanted saloons closed on Sunday, believed immigrants should have to wait twenty-­one years before becoming eligible for citizenship, and sought to end party corruption. ­These corporate regimes, supported by the city’s financial and corporate interests, created the City Reform League lead by industrialist and philanthropist Peter Cooper. In the last part of the nineteenth c­ entury, the league supported charter reforms to improve the election pro­cess. It also lobbied for low taxes and for efficient government ser­v ices that would support business and end corruption.



Bloomberg’s Place in Urban Theory and in the City’s History

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­Others followed. Soon ­after the turn of the twentieth ­century, the reformers took the mayoralty again through a fusion ticket (multiple parties) with John Purroy Mitchel (1914–17), who implemented the latest in management techniques. Through civil ser­v ice reform, Mitchel succeeded in conducting the first major cleanup of corruption within the police department. Two de­cades ­later, it was the Republican middle-­class progressive Fiorello La Guardia (1934–45) who headed another successful fusion ticket that aimed to end corruption in government during the ­Great Depression. But La Guardia built a dif­fer­ent, progressive regime that fought for a better life for poor ­people. He challenged the banking control of the city’s finances and won. During the ­Great Depression and World War II, La Guardia created thousands of jobs through numerous public works proj­ects financed by the federal government. Like previous reformers, he insisted upon efficiencies in government, fought for large building proj­ects, and promoted civil ser­v ice reform. He also supported President Franklin D. Roo­se­velt’s federal safety net. Reformer mayors who succeeded La Guardia followed his example. ­Later mayors continued to rely on the federal government’s investment in cities. Demo­crat Robert Wagner Jr. (1954–65), one of the ­great middle-­class progressive mayors who cast a lasting legacy over the city, built some of the largest public housing proj­ects in the nation thanks to the federal government, and greatly enlarged the then ­free City University of New York (CUNY). Republican John Lindsay (1966–73) followed in the tradition of progressive reform by expanding the safety net for the poor, but by the time he led the city, the Roo­se­velt style of progressive government funding was ending. Corporate regimes took control during the city’s 1975 fiscal crisis. Banks refused to buy city bonds issued not just for construction proj­ects but for operating expenses. Soon, without the banks, the city was on the verge of bankruptcy. Governor Hugh Carey, with the help of bankers and ­labor ­unions, rescued the city from the financial abyss, but only a­ fter laying off over sixty thousand city workers, creating chaos in the public schools, and, for the first time, charging tuition at the City University System (Weikart 2009, 2). Governor Carey created the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB), which supervised the city’s finances, and the Municipal Assistance Corporation, which entered the bond market for the city (Weikart 2009, 4). The business community took over the finances of the city. The corporate regime surrounding Mayor Abraham Beame (1974–78) insisted on lower taxes with the belief that business would invest in the city. Business leaders argued that increased economic activity would follow and thus raise overall tax revenue. Beame’s most difficult decision put him in tears: the EFCB insisted that CUNY charge tuition for the first time in its history.

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Since 1975, business leaders from vari­ous industries—­real estate, banks, other businesses, and even newspapers—­have coalesced into a conservative bloc that has advocated, often successfully, for lower taxes, fewer ser­v ices to the poor, and tax incentives for investment in the city. Redistributive functions, such as a ­free university system and increased welfare payments, w ­ ere ended or sharply reduced. Mayor Ed Koch (1978–89) reflected this economic development regime model: “­Under Ed Koch’s leadership the New York City regime was an upfront, progrowth operation. His tough-­on-­crime and anti-­welfare rhe­toric fortified his right-­leaning co­ali­tion” (Rich 2007, 64). ­After the one-­term stint of the liberal mayor David Dinkins (1989–93), crime-­fighting mayor Rudolph Giuliani (1993–2001) took over. Wedged between the administrations of Koch and Giuliani, Dinkins was a traditionally progressive mayor, but he held office during a fiscal crisis and was unable to implement his progressive ideas. Policy choice requires melding together “the resources commensurate with the governing responsibility undertaken” (Stone 1993, 22), and with Dinkins the resources during a fiscal crisis simply ­were not ­there. A twenty-­first-­century mayor, Michael Bloomberg pursued policies to promote both economic investment and social investment. He was transformative—­a billionaire businessman with both an economic development agenda and a social agenda to help all New Yorkers. He led a corporate regime but also pursued progressive ideas in affordable housing, public health, and antipoverty initiatives. He believed in the power of government to make a difference. Government was not in the way, as many neoliberals would maintain; to Bloomberg, government was the way. Bloomberg believed that mayors had to be practical rather than ideological, and if he remained practical, he could bridge politics and businesses with “a non-­politics of practical science and numbers” (Barber 2014, 26). Bloomberg is best known for environmental advances, gun control, and improving public health. But he also paid attention to other areas. He supported business through countless incentives but also raised taxes so that public ser­v ices need not be cut. At times he sought to reduce ser­v ices to ­those in poverty, but, departing from the course of Mayors Koch and Giuliani, he studied the results of innovative poverty programs and experimented with dif­fer­ent poverty programs. He incentivized large building proj­ects but also improved large regional parks around the city ­because he wanted ­every New Yorker to be only a few blocks from green space. His focus on environmental improvements includes painting rooftops and planting one million trees. Best of all, he linked young p ­ eople—­particularly young ­people of color—to technology through partnerships between high schools, colleges, and the technology sector. When Mayor Bloomberg could not count on money from the federal ­government to maintain the city’s safety net for the poor, he turned to the state



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government. But he was confronted by the state’s reluctance to invest in the city, which made no sense to him. When the mayor sought the state’s permission to recast the tax system, he was rebuffed. When he sought permission from Albany “permitting the city to sell 900 new taxi medallions over the next three years; using money from state environmental bonds to pay for the city’s recycling program; letting the city use more cameras to catch d ­ rivers ­going through red lights,” the state supreme court said no (Cooper 2002c). When he thought he had control over zoning and tried to place a sports stadium on the West Side of Manhattan, he was ­stopped by state officials. When he looked to state achievement tests to validate his educational reforms, the state changed the tests and, suddenly, New York students’ achievements on the tests w ­ ere drastically reduced. To Bloomberg it was shocking that the state had such control. It became clear to the mayor that New York City had very l­imited home rule. Before becoming mayor, Bloomberg had been a highly successful business leader and man­ag­er. With a bachelor’s degree in engineering from John Hopkins University, he had been trained in systems thinking, and with an MBA from Harvard University, he learned business strategies. Bloomberg’s experiences working at Salomon ­Brothers and building his own com­pany, Bloomberg L.P., prepared the mayor to make decisions. “You ­can’t run governments or companies successfully by polling or asking for suggestions,” he explained. “Someone must have a vision and take o ­ thers along, not the reverse” (Bloomberg 1997, 147). Bloomberg had effective decision-­making skills in abundance, expanding the mayoral role. He issued over 260 executive o ­ rders. His instinct to act without consulting the legislative branch seemed boundless. A short list of such actions includes instituting bike lanes, pedestrian plazas, a sanitary grading system for restaurants, the 311 city information number, payments to students for attending school, programs to keep juvenile offenders closer to home, a smoking ban in restaurants and bars, elimination of trans fats in restaurants, and social impact bonds. Sometimes he lost: the West Side sports stadium and Midtown Manhattan congestion pricing ­were notable failures. Yet city officials continued the strug­gle for congestion pricing, and several years ­later the state legislature fi­nally agreed although it has not yet been implemented. Often ­these losses ­were dictated by the judiciary or the state. When Bloomberg attempted to tighten eligibility requirements for homeless ­people seeking shelter, the courts said no. When he sought the state’s help to enforce a hybrid fleet of taxis, the courts said no. Despite such setbacks, the mayor continued his forceful decision making. Bloomberg took pride in the team he built to implement his vision. The p ­ eople he chose w ­ ere experienced, highly educated and, for the most part, leaders in their respective fields. He had confidence in his appointees, gave them latitude to make decisions, and did not abide complaints about them. Sometimes this management

22 CHAPTER 1

style worked. Certainly, a quality appointment, such as Dr. Thomas Frieden, the New York City health commissioner who ­later became director of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, benefited from autonomy (Colgrove 2011, 233). But not all of Bloomberg’s appointments w ­ ere of such quality, and the autonomy was not always well used. Bloomberg, time and again, had evidence that not all was not well with the city’s H ­ uman Resources Administration; yet he did not intervene, not even when the city lost the vast number of fair welfare hearings in administrative judicial hearings. The same pattern occurred in housing. When critics complained to Bloomberg (who prided himself in data-­driven decision making) that the data demonstrated the city was losing low-­income housing far faster than he was building it, he failed to act. His hands-­off management style with his deputy mayors and commissioners only worked part of the time. Part of Bloomberg’s strategy to encourage economic opportunity was addressing the issues of poverty so that ­every New Yorker could participate in the city’s economy. But his efforts against poverty w ­ ere a means to an end; his number one priority was economic growth, ­because to him that was how the city could generate the resources needed to serve all New Yorkers.

The Bloomberg Vision Was Built on Data and Powered by Business Growth Unlike many previous mayors, Bloomberg was a strategic, long-­term, data-­driven planner. He created a plan to build affordable housing through public-­private partnerships. He convened a commission on poverty and one on AIDS prevention. He created the Commission on Construction Opportunity to improve access to employment for minorities, ­women, and veterans. His commission on city planning, PlaNYC, became a blueprint for the city’s ­future. He formed the New York City Panel on Climate Change to examine that issue. When Hurricane Sandy tore into the city in 2012, Mayor Bloomberg acted decisively in the emergency, and then, in its aftermath, planned for f­uture weather-­related catastrophes, reconvening the Panel on Climate Change to educate the city about preparedness mea­sures. He took the commission’s recommendations seriously, even in the last year of his administration, and with his planning he created a blueprint for the next mayor to follow. Bloomberg envisioned a strong technological city operating along flexible organ­izations, rather than the current bureaucracies, and using sophisticated public-­private partnerships. He saw a f­uture in which new high-­tech industries generated wealth, and he made vigorous investments in scientific and technological education. This would create a diversified economy, reducing the de­pen­



Bloomberg’s Place in Urban Theory and in the City’s History

23

dency on the financial sector as the technology sector grew. He foresaw strong relationships with like-­minded city officials, not just in this country but overseas. And it worked: “New York City emerged from the global recession ranked number one in the 2011 Cities of Opportunity report, while traditional towns such as London, Paris and Tokyo dropped out of the top five” (Barber 2014). A twenty-­ first-­century mayor, Bloomberg led a renewal of his city and took on tasks once performed at the state and federal levels. He led the wave of mayors who ­today are innovative and entrepreneurial on the local level. He had to be: federal and state governments had turned away from the cities. Urban policy innovations w ­ ere not coming from the federal government or the state­houses; they ­were happening in cities. Bloomberg recognized that ­because state and federal governments reduced their financial support, cities needed “greater flexibility to design and allocate what is likely to be shrinking levels of resources” (Katz and Bradley 2013, 3). As Chris McNickle notes, “[Bloomberg] was an activist executive who used government assets boldly and wisely for the greatest good, for the greatest number of ­people” (2017, 314). But Bloomberg failed in critical areas of low-­income housing, policing, and welfare policy—­areas that encompass ­people in poverty. This book calls for a balanced examination of Bloomberg’s public policies that takes into account his failures in housing more homeless families, not building sufficient units of low-­income housing, harassing p ­ eople of color ­under his stop-­and-­frisk policies, and denying poor ­people welfare benefits. Certainly Mayor Bloomberg, hampered by the state, boxed in by the courts, and sometimes challenged by his own shortcomings, succeeded in many impor­tant ways, but the lessons of his failures and shortcomings must be included in a meaningful evaluation of his leadership.

2 SETTING THE TONE

Two months ­after 9/11, the citizens of New York elected Michael Bloomberg to the city’s highest office, preferring him to Mark Green, a typical liberal Demo­ cratic. In uncertain times, New Yorkers voted for a highly successful businessman and well-­known philanthropist. Bloomberg had built an innovative technology business for the twenty-­first ­century, and he brought to the mayor’s office years of management and planning experience. His mayoralty would combine his private world of business with the public world of government. Bloomberg faced a huge job: “In New York City as a ­whole, the attack caused an additional loss of about 143,000 jobs per month over a three-­month period beyond the trend in job losses already occurring as a result of the economic recession of 2001. The effect of September 11th was concentrated on the finance, professional ser­v ices, information, arts, entertainment, management, and manufacturing industries that make up the ‘export’ sector of the New York economy. About two-­thirds of the attack-­related job losses ­were in the export sector” (US Bureau of ­Labor Statistics 2004). In the fourth quarter of 2001, New York City’s job losses w ­ ere significantly worse than t­ hose of the country as a ­whole (Parrott and Cooke 2002, 10). Given the g­ reat mobility of capital and l­ abor in the twenty-­ first ­century, Bloomberg faced economic volatility that could destroy the city as businesses and residents fled ­after 9/11. Mayor Bloomberg wasted no time in getting to work, taking the subway to his office on January 2, 2002. Within a week, he had set a tone by taking actions unheard of during former mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s tenure. At news conferences, he let his commissioners talk. If he rode in a car rather than taking the subway, 24



Setting the Tone

25

the car s­ topped for red lights (Steinhauer 2002b). “In a sharp departure from his pre­de­ces­sor, the mayor reached out to one of the Giuliani administration’s most prominent ­legal foes: Steven Banks, director of the L ­ egal Aid Society’s Homeless Rights Proj­ect. . . . ​Mr. Banks seemed disarmed. ‘­We’re not in court this week ­because this administration, unlike the prior administration, has been willing to come up with solutions for ­people night-­to-­night at the same time that it’s been discussing with us ways to get out of this box,’ he said” (quoted in N. Bern­stein 2002a). Mayor Bloomberg thought that two ­things mattered most in the first one hundred days: that he set the correct tone and that he pick a good team (Steinhauer 2002b). Setting a positive and gracious tone came at a price, however. His ignorance about the way government worked was notable. Take state oversight as an example: he had no idea that the state’s involvement in city ­matters was so ubiquitous. “ ‘­There are very few ­things you can do without Albany’s acquiescence,’ the mayor said, citing his frustration with not being able to install special cameras at street corners to curtail speeders without the state’s approval. ‘They control our destiny. . . . ​If ­there is a frustration level, I guess it is that’ ” (Steinhauer 2002a). New York City politicians ­were usually knowledgeable about the state’s power and authority, but Bloomberg had been the CEO of his own private-­sector com­pany, where not many ­people could stop him from ­doing what he wanted. Working within the constraints of po­liti­cal structures was a new experience for him. He did talk, however, about how well government worked and how good government workers ­were, given government’s complexities and the outside pressures (­whether u ­ nion contracts or court o ­ rders or state mandates): “One of the ­things that surprised me was just how good the municipal workforce is” (quoted in Auletta 2013).

Bloomberg the Healer Michael Bloomberg was not Rudolph Giuliani. The former mayor refused to meet with nearly all Black leaders, including respected public officials, such as former state comptroller Carl McCall, as well as controversial figures, such as the reverend Al Sharpton (Barrett 2019). Giuliani considered Sharpton in par­tic­u­lar an ­enemy. But not so Bloomberg; he welcomed dialogue with every­one and continually sought out representatives of minority groups to meet with and discuss issues. On January 21, 2002, twenty-­one days a­ fter being sworn in, Bloomberg went to Sharpton’s National Action Network to attend the annual Public Policy Forum, an event that Mayor Giuliani had not attended (Nelson 2002). “­After only three weeks on the job, Bloomberg seems to have figured out what Giuliani ­wouldn’t:­

26 CHAPTER 2

There’s no win in needlessly antagonizing citizens, particularly when, like Sharpton, they have a constituency and know how to work the media” (Nelson 2002). The message Mayor Bloomberg was sending was very clear: he was not Giuliani. In ­later years, Bloomberg and Sharpton often disagreed, but that positive beginning made a lasting difference. They worked together in juvenile justice programs (see chapter 9). This cooperative effort came from the mayor’s willingness three years e­ arlier to re­spect Sharpton’s role in the community. The mayor did not just reach out to Sharpton; he seeded goodwill in African American communities in his first year in office that paid off for years to come. During his difficult campaign for a third term, more than thirty Black ministers publicly endorsed him (Confessore and Barbaro 2009). New York Times columnist Elissa Gootman relates one of t­ hese endorsements: The mayor started his day at the Allen A.M.E. Church in Jamaica, Queens, where about 400 congregants greeted him with applause, even as he referred to the pending 18.5 ­percent property tax rate increase he signed into law last week. “The public always wants more ser­v ices, and the public ­doesn’t want to pay for it,” Mr. Bloomberg said. “We are in a difficult time. Raising taxes is necessary.” As the mayor spoke from the dais, the church’s se­nior pastor, the Rev. Floyd H. Flake, called out a word of support. When Mr. Bloomberg noted, jokingly, that Mr. Flake had not endorsed him during his campaign for mayor, Mr. Flake indicated he would next time (2002). Mayor Bloomberg repeatedly talked about his vision of including all New Yorkers in civic life and economic prospects. In addressing the Council of Urban Professionals, he said, “As mayor I work for ­every person in this city, in ­every borough. And I—­we—­have an obligation to try and extend opportunity’s promise to ­every community” (Bloomberg 2011). On this occasion he was discussing specifically his success in developing an initiative to help young Black and Hispanic men, a program roundly criticized by conservatives who thought it a waste of city resources. Bloomberg went on to say that while he had made pro­gress, ­opportunity had not reached every­one. “­Because when we look at poverty rates, graduation rates, crime rates and employment rates, one ­thing stands out: Blacks and Latinos are not fully sharing in the promise of American freedom and far too many are trapped in circumstances that are difficult to escape” (Bloomberg 2011). Significant at the time and still striking ­today are Bloomberg’s clear and resolute statements about bigotry against Muslims a­ fter 9/11. He was the first public official in the nation to speak out about freedom of religion during the controversy when Muslims wished to build a community center several blocks from the



Setting the Tone

27

ruined World Trade Center site (Adler 2013). “Let us not forget that Muslims ­were among ­those murdered on 9/11 and that our Muslim neighbors grieved with us as New Yorkers and as Americans,” Bloomberg said. “We would betray our values—­and play into our enemies’ hands—if we ­were to treat Muslims differently than anyone ­else. In fact, to cave to popu­lar sentiment would be to hand a victory to the terrorists—­and we should not stand for that” (quoted in Adams 2010). This stand was quite unpop­ul­ar with many who ­were determined to stop the development of any type of Muslim institution near Ground Zero.

Bloomberg the Planner Before becoming mayor, Bloomberg had run the highly successful com­pany he had founded, Bloomberg L.P., for twenty years (Biography, n.d.). This experience had taught him the importance of planning: “You have to manage for the next quarter, and for the de­cades to come. So we came into office determined to achieve, not just short-­term recovery, but long-­term growth” (Bloomberg 2007b). In addition to having been a CEO, Bloomberg had been an engineer; he was trained to carefully design plans. As he entered the mayor’s office for the first time, economic development was at the top of his planning agenda for two main reasons: he had assumed leadership of the city just a­ fter 9/11, when many ­people ­were predicting that the city would never recover; and he understood that economic development would be at the heart of the city’s recovery. He first focused on Lower Manhattan. His priorities included improving transportation, rebuilding neighborhoods, and creating more public spaces such as parks. As he explained, “While the number of ­people who live below Chambers Street had grown significantly—­from 12,000 to 20,000 in the past ten years—­other than Battery Park City, for residents t­here ­isn’t a t­here ­there. No real super­ markets, not enough open space, and not enough schools. And for that reason, families make up a much smaller percentage of the downtown community than in other communities throughout the city” (Bloomberg 2002e). This was how the mayor’s plan to make the waterfront accessible to its citizens began: “Starting at the prow of Lower Manhattan—­the Battery—we ­will build on the successes of the Battery Conservancy, by dramatically reshaping Battery Park to turn what is ­today just a place to pass through—­into a destination in itself—­a Sheep’s Meadow for Lower Manhattan” (Bloomberg 2002e). Although Lower Manhattan was his immediate priority due to the destruction of 9/11, Bloomberg had his eye on all five boroughs. Years l­ater, a­ fter 140 successful rezonings that altered the character of major portions of the city’s landscape,

28 CHAPTER 2

New Yorkers saw that he had not forgotten the outer boroughs (Doctoroff 2017). He sought waterfront improvements in all five boroughs, from the Bronx to Brooklyn. And he worked with ­unions representing city workers to get a major infusion of cash from ­union pension funds to fund the construction of housing across the city (Green­house 2002a). For the city to attract business and new residents, the government had to become ­people friendly. The mayor saw that technology would carve the path to that friendliness. In his first year, he established the 311 call center system, which opened successfully in ­little over a year (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013b). “It w ­ ill be a one-­stop center for questions about any city ser­v ice or program, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. More than that, it’ll be a 21st ­century management tool that lets us track and quantify just how well w ­ e’re serving the ­people of New York” (Bloomberg 2003a). By 2007, Bloomberg announced the release of PlanIT: Better Government through Customer Ser­v ice, which outlined a technology strategy that included thirty-­two technology initiatives throughout city government (NYC Office of the Mayor 2007a). With the help of Deputy Mayor Daniel Doctoroff, he restructured the Economic Development Corporation (EDC), establishing a power­house agency that would support large economic development proj­ects. “EDC has special powers. It owns real estate and can keep some of the proceeds outside of the normal city bud­geting pro­cess when it disposes of the property. It has the capacity to issue tax-­exempt, industrial-­revenue bonds on behalf of private-­sector borrowers and collects fees in exchange” (Doctoroff 2017, 38). Capital investment in large building proj­ects became the signature of the Bloomberg administration: “$90.2 billion worth of capital commitments ­were registered since fiscal year 2003, with an additional $20.9 billion authorized in the current fiscal year, for a total of $111 billion” (Citizens Bud­get Commission 2014). Another commission that demonstrated Bloomberg’s expertise in planning was his Mayor’s Commission on Construction Opportunity in 2005. By 2007, “10 ­percent of the slots in their [the u ­ nions’] apprenticeship programs are reserved for ­women. . . . ​Major development proj­ects throughout the City are meeting their goal and w ­ omen represent 15 ­percent of the trades p ­ eople on ­these proj­ects” (Peterson 2007). Bloomberg was a master at creating change through substantive planning. Many mayors place strategic emphasis upon promoting their cities as centers of production or consumption. Bloomberg promoted both. His economic development plans filled the city trea­sury and his emphasis upon tourism, entertainment, and culture attracted millions of visitors. Planning for both production and consumption remained key to Bloomberg and his successes.



Setting the Tone

29

Bloomberg the Man­a g­e r Mayor Bloomberg’s management style reflected his years as a CEO. He expected carefully constructed plans, listened to his key ­people, made decisions and expected them to be executed, and often evaluated plans with hard data. When the mayor saw data about crime in the homeless shelter system, he immediately increased the security bud­get (Rosegrant 2007). And he backed up his p ­ eople. Bloomberg’s experience in creating and growing his own com­pany had ingrained in him a deeply held value for loyalty to his staff. “Loyalty is every­thing,” he has written. “Our p ­ eople expect me to have it for them and vice versa. Be honest, work hard, treat each other fairly and openly. Add a dash of competency and w ­ e’ll be together a long time” (Bloomberg 1997, 167). Along with loyalty came trust that the commissioners knew how to do their jobs. As Thomas R. Frieden, the city’s health commissioner, said, “The mayor lets commissioners run their agencies” (quoted in Steinhauer 2002b). This philosophy certainly enabled the mayor to run a business about which he knew a ­great deal; it did not work as well when he became the chief executive of one of the largest governmental units in the world, a sector he knew ­little about. A good example of an early ­mistake is a decision Bloomberg made about the homeless. Mayor Bloomberg did not necessarily base decisions on politics or public relations. And he was very willing to try something new. Sometimes his willingness to innovate without testing the winds of public opinion led to public m ­ istakes in his first year of office. A poignant example of decision making gone awry was the decision to place fifty-­one homeless families awaiting placement in the city’s only intake unit, the Emergency Assistance Unit in the Bronx, in a nearby unused jail (Kolker 2002). Some background is helpful to understand why the city would do this. For twenty years, following a lawsuit, the state court, through a court decree, had exercised complete oversight of the city’s shelter system, naming a special master to oversee the city’s h ­ andling of the homeless. And the city had agreed that ­under no circumstances would homeless families be ­housed overnight in the intake unit sleeping in chairs and on the floor (Main 2016, 152). Bloomberg had inherited this prob­lem from Giuliani, who had built ­little housing for the poor. ­After visiting the Emergency Assistance Unit, the mayor agreed with his staff to ­house ­those families awaiting shelter in a nearby unused jail. But this was done without consulting the advocates for the homeless who had brought the lawsuit or the special master assigned by the state judge. And to top it off, the mayor agreed to this plan without testing to determine w ­ hether the jail held any environmental ­hazards (Kolker 2002). When the advocates and court learned of Bloomberg’s actions, they w ­ ere furious. As it happened, the jail exposed the families ­housed t­here to lead, a leading environmental h ­ azard. The image of the homeless

30 CHAPTER 2

being put in jail was also a disaster in terms of public relations. So city officials ended up in court attempting to explain their actions (Kolker 2002). Although the mayor had initially consulted ­people outside his administration, as time passed, he less often sought advice from outsiders at crucial moments. This tendency would be problematic in the latter years of his administration. The best example of Bloomberg’s managerial skills and his penchant for ignoring public relations is his h ­ andling of the 2004 blackout. Christopher Swope (2004) describes the mayor’s actions: “Throughout the g­ reat blackout, Bloomberg was a ubiquitous and calming force. He was on CNN, coolly assuring every­one that the crisis was no act of terrorism; on the Brooklyn Bridge, cheering commuters walking home in the heat; on the radio, explaining the inner workings of the electric grid; in a darkened stairwell, trudging up 19 floors for a late-­night hash-­out with the head of the local power com­pany.” The mayor received wonderful press about how the city handled the blackout. What he did next was extraordinary. “So, just three days a­ fter the lights came back on, Bloomberg asked a mixed group of ­people from the public, private and nonprofit sectors to perform a frank analy­sis of the city’s blackout response. They uncovered all sorts of unseen management failures, in communications, transportation and planning” (Harney 2004). And, of course, the press coverage was negative. A traditional politician would never have asked for such a review, let alone released it. The mayor initiated a similar report ­after Hurricane Sandy. Bloomberg believed that he needed to hire the right p ­ eople, and he drew staff from many backgrounds. Some appointees came from Bloomberg L.P. but also had previous experience in government. Patricia E. Harris, his first deputy mayor, had been the director of corporate communications for Bloomberg L.P. for several years and had also worked in government during the administration of Mayor Ed Koch (Bloomberg Philanthropies, n.d.). Kevin Sheekey, deputy mayor for governmental affairs, had worked for Bloomberg L.P. as the firm’s chief lobbyist in Washington, and had been chief of staff for the late senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Partnership for Public Ser­v ice, n.d.). Bloomberg also hired p ­ eople whom he had not worked with at his own com­pany: Thomas R. Frieden as commissioner of the Department of Health; Nicholas Scoppetta as commissioner of the fire department; Lilliam Barrios-­Paoli as commissioner of the Department of Aging; and Janette Sadik-­Khan as commissioner of the Department of Transportation. All had a lifetime of highly regarded work in city and federal government. Amanda Burden, an experienced planner, had worked in the Department of City Planning for a de­cade before she became the planning director (Bloomberg Philanthropies, n.d.). Other staff members came from the private sector but not from Bloomberg L.P. For example, Daniel Doctoroff led a revitalized team as deputy mayor for economic development and rebuilding. Prior to joining the Bloomberg



Setting the Tone

31

administration, he was managing partner of Oak Hill Capital Partners (Bloomberg the Com­pany 2014). Most of the mayor’s appointments ­were highly qualified for their assignments. Bloomberg’s management style also ended the centralized patronage machine so well developed during the administrations of former mayors Abraham Beame, Ed Koch, David Dinkins, and Rudolph Giuliani. When Bloomberg took office, the mayor’s office had controlled all vacancies even in the school system. Giuliani’s then wife worked in the ­Human Resources Office of the Board of Education when he was mayor (anonymous, pers. comm., May 14, 2013). Bloomberg simply eliminated any centralization of patronage and let his commissioners do the hiring. In another move to eliminate the patronage machine, on March 4, 2002, the mayor re-­created via executive order the nineteen-­member Mayor’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary to advise him on judicial appointments; Giuliani had disbanded this committee, which had originally been created by Koch (Mayor’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary 2002). ­Going forward, the committee and the New York City Bar Association would recommend candidates, and the mayor would consider only t­ hose candidates. In his executive order, Bloomberg called for a diverse group of panelists, including w ­ omen and minorities (Mayor’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary 2002). But having hired capable p ­ eople, the mayor took a hands-­off approach; he did not get involved in the day-­to-­day operations of his agencies. And this was problematic. If a commissioner knew what he or she was d ­ oing, then Bloomberg’s hands-­off approach worked. But if the commissioner came up with ideas that did not work, then the approach led to serious prob­lems. A major prob­lem was that Bloomberg did not appreciate how difficult it was for commissioners to deal with constant bud­get cuts. ­Every year for twelve years, several of his commissioners ­were faced with 2 or 3 ­percent bud­get reductions. As Bloomberg explained in an interview with Chris Smith (2013), I would describe myself as a social liberal and a fiscal conservative. But I think I’m too liberal for the liberals, b ­ ecause I actually try to deliver the ser­v ices rather than just promise them. If they delivered every­thing they promised, nobody could afford it. I actually am a conservative more so than other conservatives in the sense that I think you could go and cut 2 or 3 ­percent out of the bud­get in ­every agency. We’ve done that twelve times, and ­we’ve cut roughly a billion and a half and t­ here’s six-­ odd billion that’s recurring, and you can go and cut ­people or find other revenue sources. ­There are ways to do ­those ­things. With ­these remarks the mayor demonstrated a serious disconnect between himself and the agencies for which he was responsible. B ­ ecause of constant bud­get

32 CHAPTER 2

cuts, agencies sometimes ­were underfunded and ser­vices suffered. Bloomberg applied bud­get cuts to the Department of Corrections on a regular basis (chapter 3). Meanwhile the city’s jail complex, Rikers Island, had a history of increasing vio­lence that Bloomberg did l­ittle to end. From 2001 to 2013, uses of force by corrections officers increased from 1,772 to 3,285 (Blau 2020). Another example is the reinvention of how the city provided childcare ser­v ices and the limitations the bud­get cuts created (see chapter 7). Bloomberg’s unwillingness to seriously supervise his commissioners meant that interagency connections w ­ ere weak. And it can be seen in his housing policies. It was an impor­tant accomplishment to build 165,000 units of affordable housing, but he did not attempt to change the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) eviction policies that drove p ­ eople into homelessness, he did not stop the Rent Guidelines Board from raising rents, he did not lobby the New York State legislature to stop the loss of rent regulated apartments, and he did not hire sufficient attorneys to stop evictions in housing court. The only way to even approach building sufficient affordable housing is a multiagency approach. The person in charge of interagency collaboration was the mayor, not anyone e­ lse in his administration. The deputy mayor who supervised building housing was not the same deputy mayor who supervised homelessness ser­v ices. Why Bloomberg did not ­insist upon strategies that l­imited the loss of rent regulated housing and at the same time push NYCHA to stop evictions and improve its housing conditions reflected his own managerial shortcomings. Certainly in his first term Mayor Bloomberg demonstrated sympathy for working-­class ­people. “In November 2002, Mayor Bloomberg signed into law a living wage ordinance that increased the wages of direct-­care workers providing homecare ser­v ices ­under the City’s Medicaid Persona-­Care / Home Attendant or House­keeping Programs (50 cent increments to $10.00 in July 2006)” (Seavey 2006, 13). He “also signed into law displaced workers legislation, which w ­ ill protect janitors and security guards from losing their jobs when buildings in which they work are sold or change contractors” (Brennan Center for Justice 2002). By the end of his first year in office, Bloomberg had established a mixed rec­ ord with regard to serving the poor. Advocates for the poor objected when the mayor continued policies begun by Giuliani. For example, Bloomberg continued to look for ways to reduce the welfare rolls, and he did so during an economic downturn. He would not agree to a New York City Council bill that broadened the eligibility of welfare recipients to “access job training and education” (N. Bern­stein 2002b). His commissioner of the ­Human Resources Administration, Verna Eggleston, declined a federal waiver that “would have given the city the flexibility to offer food stamps [Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program cards] to jobless, childless adults beyond the current limit of three months in a three-­year period”



Setting the Tone

33

(N. Bern­stein 2002b). Such policy positions signaled that the new administration was not interested in broadening aid for some of ­those in need. At the same time, however, many liberals appreciated Bloomberg. His previous opponent, Mark Green, said “He’s been, by and large, a liberal on certain social issues and a bottom-­ line man­ag­er on fiscal policy” (B. Smith 2003).

Bloomberg the Communicator When Mayor Bloomberg first entered public office, he often projected boredom in public. He was not comfortable with the press and he did not seem warm and empathetic when addressing groups. He sometimes made gaffes in public that experienced politicians would not have made. When asked about putting a garbage incinerator on the East Side, he said it was a bad idea b ­ ecause it would drive business away (Seifman 2002a). If, like a skilled politician, he had given a more general answer and then gathered more information, he would have known that Gracie Mansion, the official mayoral residence, was being considered as a pos­si­ ble site, and he might then have handled the question with more aplomb. At a graduation ceremony for new police officers in March 2002, the first since 9/11, Mayor Bloomberg came across as emotionally flat and unmoved (Steinhauer 2002b). In contrast, Bloomberg was far more comfortable among businesspeople. When he attended a software industry summit in early March 2002, one participant said that, contrary to his expectations, the mayor was warm and funny (Steinhauer 2002b). The event attendee had seen the mayor on tele­vi­sion and had simply found him not engaging. The same month, Bloomberg addressed professionals in the construction industry and was relaxed and jocular. The mayor would prove a quick study. Over the years he became more comfortable in the po­liti­cal world and more accomplished at ­handling ­people outside the business world. But Bloomberg believed that part of his job was to say no: “Every­ body would like to have every­thing at no cost. That’s normal. That’s not the real world. It’s easy to say yes. It’s not easy to say no when ­people scream at you at a parade, give you the fin­ger, criticize you in the paper” (quoted in Auletta 2013). Bloomberg maintained an ability to ignore criticism and continue his chosen path throughout his tenure. ­There is another side to communication. On January 5, 2002, the fifth day of his mayoralty, Bloomberg called Rev. Dr. Thomas K. Tewell to let him know that a federal judge had ruled that homeless p ­ eople could “sleep on the steps” of his Fifth Ave­nue Presbyterian Church, but not on the sidewalk next to its walls (Wakin 2002). The church’s disagreement with the city had come about when police started rousting the homeless from around the church during the Giuliani administration;

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Fifth Ave­nue Presbyterian had taken the city to court to stop the police from bother­ing the homeless (Wakin 2002). What amazed Rev. Tewell was that someone from the city had both­ered to call him and let him know the outcome: “He [Mayor Bloomberg] said that he wanted me to know about the decision and that it just came out. We never knew before what was happening” (quoted in Wakin 2002). This was a common reaction: Mayor Bloomberg reached out, and New Yorkers appreciated it. At the beginning of his mayoralty Bloomberg set up a “big tent,” including a broad array of stakeholders in policy discussion. As Jennifer Steinhauer (2002a) notes, “Bud­get watchdogs, u ­ nion leaders, civil rights activists, former mayors and ­others roundly praised the mayor for fostering an inclusive atmosphere at City Hall, in which all ­were welcome to share opinions on policy.” This was in sharp contrast to Mayor Giuliani. “We had zero contact with the previous administration,” said Larry Horo­witz, chairman of Community Board 7 on the Upper West Side, who was invited to Gracie Mansion for the first time since the Koch administration for a cocktail party. “It was r­ eally an encouraging sign” (quoted in Steinhauer 2002a). One of the most telling remarks came from the Rev. Floyd H. Flake, Black pastor of the Greater Allen A.M.E. Cathedral, who endorsed Mayor Bloomberg and “denied that the mayor’s philanthropy played a role in his decision [endorsement]. ‘If Giuliani had the money Bloomberg had, and spread it around, he still w ­ ouldn’t get support,’ Mr. Butts said. ‘This is not about Bloomberg’s money’ ” (Confessore and Barbaro 2009). The mayor opened up the bud­get pro­cess, making it more transparent. He discussed his first bud­get as a work in pro­gress and was open to other ideas. Bloomberg met with Demo­cratic leaders, for example. “I do not have all the good ideas,” he said. “It’s just a bud­get; ­you’re always changing ­things” (quoted in Hardt 2002). This approach was certainly dif­fer­ent from that of his pre­de­ces­sor, who had been loath to compromise. “It has been an open pro­cess,” explained Manhattan Borough President C. ­Virginia Fields, who emphasized she had rarely had any contact with number crunchers in the Giuliani administration. U ­ nder Giuliani, she said, ­there “was no opportunity to make recommendations or, even if you made them, to believe they would make a difference or would be given serious consideration” (quoted in Hardt 2002). Yet this “big tent” was not representative of all three terms; the further into his mayoralty, the less Bloomberg listened to critics.

Bloomberg the Crime Fighter Mayor Bloomberg sent a message very early about keeping crime at bay and, more impor­tant, keeping New York City safe from terrorism. In his inaugural address



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and in his State of the City Address, he referred to this concern. Within a month of taking office he had hired David Cohen, formerly the head of operations for the CIA, to head up the newly established Counterterrorism Bureau reporting directly to Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly. The police spent the next twelve years putting the Muslim community ­under strict surveillance. As Bloomberg bragged, “This makes us the only police department, I believe, in the United States with somebody of this stature focusing on intelligence. I think it is just a reflection of how we should be dealing in the 21st ­century” (Cooper 2002b). Although Bloomberg had extraordinarily good relationships with the Muslim community in his early years as mayor, the path he chose to prevent terrorism by the monitoring of many Muslim mosques and other organ­izations eventually put him at odds with the Muslim community. In addition, Mayor Bloomberg’s stop-­and-­frisk policy alienated many minorities over time, and particularly African Americans. But in his first year, stop-­and-­ frisk had not yet become an issue. “In 2002, Mayor Bloomberg’s first year in office, NYPD officer conducted 97,296 street stops. By 2011, the number of stops spiked to 685,724—an increase of 605 ­percent. [In 2012], the number of stops dipped to 533,042. Still, 473,300 of the stops, or 89 ­percent, resulted in no arrest or ticket. And 87 ­percent of ­people s­ topped ­were black of Latino” (NYCLU 2013b). During his first year, Mayor Bloomberg did not protect the police department from bud­ get cuts. Facing a $5 billion deficit citywide, he called for cuts from both the police and fire departments, which in the past had always been the last to be cut, even in tough times (Bloomberg 2002b, 24).

Bloomberg the Innovator The mayor restructured three major government areas: the school system, the economic development agencies, and health care. Bloomberg was passionate about improving the school system, and in order to do so, he wanted control of it. This required a change in state law, which meant he had to undertake a major lobbying effort to convince the governor and state legislators that mayoral control of the schools would be best for students and best for their po­liti­cal ­careers. Within six months he had convinced them to agree to mayoral control, a major structural change that his pre­de­ces­sor had advocated for but had been unable to obtain. Instead of a board, the legislation established the thirteen-­citizen Panel for Educational Policy (PEP), appointed by the mayor, to advise him (Gewertz 2002). But PEP was dominated by the mayor, who could remove his appointees if they refused to vote for his proposals. The community school districts remained hollow shells, each district staffed by a superintendent who had no power. Parent volunteers w ­ ere

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part of citywide and community educational councils. The mayor wanted to keep ­those in charge of education next to him. It indicated he wanted accountability in the Department of Education: “Shortly ­after Mr. Bloomberg won control of the city’s schools last year, he moved the system’s main administrative offices into Tweed Court­house, across from City Hall in Manhattan” (Take Note 2003). Bloomberg focused on leadership. The Department of Education sought to increase the autonomy of principals in exchange for more accountability. From an autonomy standpoint, while the principals did not have complete control of hiring teachers, they did gain control over hiring assistant principals and were no longer being l­imited by se­niority lists in hiring teachers. From an accountability standpoint, the schools’ chancellor had the power to remove principals based on a determination of their success or failure. The mayor appointed Joel Klein, an attorney who had been chair and CEO of Bertelsmann Inc., to be his education chancellor. Klein’s only teaching experience was as a young man, when he had taught math to sixth graders for less than a year in Queens (Heilemann 2005). His expertise was in litigation, and he took pride in having prosecuted large corporations for antitrust violations. One observer thought that Bloomberg wanted a litigator to take on the United Federation of Teachers in contract talks (anonymous, pers. comm., June 23, 2004). The appointment of someone who knew almost nothing about education stunned many New Yorkers. The next appointment was just as odd. The deputy chancellor for teaching and learning, Diana Lam, came from Rhode Island, where she had run the relatively tiny Providence school system (Wardenski 2002). So now the top two ­people who ­were to run a multibillion-­dollar operation knew nothing about New York City schools. ­These hiring decisions ­were problematic and ­were an early sign of the mayor’s isolation from t­ hose who might have offered better counsel. ­Those interested in public policy knew that Mayor Bloomberg had a deep and abiding interest in public health. Indeed, he wanted to make the city’s public health ser­v ices world class. Within his first year as mayor, he announced a reor­ga­ni­za­ tion of the Department of Health and appointed Dr. Thomas R. Frieden to lead the effort. The department’s resources soared, and its portfolio grew ­under Mayor Bloomberg. Bloomberg wanted to make public hospitals more efficient and effective, so one emphasis of the new administration was on upgrading information technology at the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. The reor­ga­ni­za­tion broadened the Department of Health’s mandate by merging “the Department of Health with the Department of M ­ ental Health, ­Mental Retardation and Alcoholism Ser­vices to create the Department of Health and M ­ ental Hygiene,” whose mandate was “to protect and promote the health and ­mental hygiene of all New Yorkers” (Farley 2015). “City residents approved the merger in a charter revision vote” in November 2002 (Farley 2015).



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Bloomberg also prioritized regulations that would end smoking in public places. In the summer of 2002 he announced his attempt to do this accompanied by numerous supporters, including restaurant o ­ wners, religious leaders, health advocates, and representatives of health associations (Fingerhut, Demmer, and Lovasi 2018). The support of some restaurant o ­ wners was surprising, as they had to withstand the opprobrium of other restaurant and bar o ­ wners who w ­ ere furious over the mayor’s legislation. The legislation would “expand the city’s 1995 Smoke-­Free Air Act by making bars, and restaurants of any size,” smoke-­free (Colgrove 2011, 243). On December 30, 2002, a year ­after taking office, Mayor Bloomberg signed legislation (Smoke F ­ ree Air Act) ending smoking in public places, including restaurants and bars. It was an incredible victory (Citron 2014). Another innovation was the use of public-­private partnerships in dif­fer­ent areas of the city. The educational system had a nonprofit arm, the Fund for Public Schools, established in 1982. In the fall of 2002 Mayor Bloomberg named Caroline Kennedy its vice chair, and she led the fund-­raising activities from the foundation and corporate sector for the school system. In October 2002 the Department of Education “opened the Office of Strategic Partnerships to oversee the development and management of partnerships between the public schools and the private sector” (New York Sun 2004). The new office would bring in millions of dollars in contributions from corporations, foundations, and nonprofits. The mayor clearly did not see the private sector as anathema to the public sector. Instead he wanted the two to work together. Some money came from the Wallace Foundation, which provided a $15 million grant to create the Leadership Acad­ emy to recruit and train ­future principals (Wallace Foundation 2003, 7). That was just the beginning, however, of public-­private partnerships. Ed Koch supported the creation of the Central Park Conservancy, “a foundation that would take over private fund raising and management of Central Park” (Soffer 2010, 264). Bloomberg followed in his footsteps and created several foundations to support dif­fer­ent parks, starting with Brooklyn Bridge Park. “A 2002 agreement between former Gov. George Pataki and Mr. Bloomberg was struck to use $360 million in state and city funds to help develop an 85-­acre park” (Kusisto 2013). The mayor rezoned the area for residential towers, and the resulting development was projected to pay for the park’s annual bud­get. Many New Yorkers believed that allowing the private sector to link to a public park was moving the city t­ oward privatization, and they objected on philosophical grounds. Another reason Bloomberg was such an innovator goes back to how he managed. Sadik-­Khan, the commissioner of transportation, wanted to turn Times Square into a pedestrian mall, but it was an election year, and the opposition would be considerable. As Sadik-­Khan tells the story, “I remember him telling me at the time, ‘I ­don’t ask my commissioners to do the right ­thing according to

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the po­liti­cal calendar; I ask my commissioners to do the right t­hing, period.’ I think that pretty much says it all” (quoted in Holeywell 2013). So Bloomberg’s willingness to allow his commissioners ­great autonomy could work to his advantage or not, depending upon the skills of the commissioner.

Bloomberg the Bud­g eteer New York City’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. Thus, when a new mayor comes into office in January, he has to deal with a bud­get that has been developed and implemented by his pre­de­ces­sor. Bloomberg inherited a deficit from Giuliani, a result of both Giuliani’s previous bud­get decisions ($2.9 of the $5 billion deficit) and the economic fallout of 9/11, which included an “84,000 . . . ​job decline . . . ​during the fourth quarter, effectively the post–­September 11 period. . . . ​ Post–­September 11, the FIRE sector led all industries in job declines (–26,600), although nearly half of this involved jobs being relocated outside of the city. Air transport (–9,900), restaurants (–7,700), other retail (–5,600), and ­hotels (–3,100) ­were hard hit” (Parrott 2003). “For the 4 months since September 11 for which ­there are data, the city’s unemployment rate . . . ​averaged 7.2%” (Parrott 2003). So the mayor had to propose a new bud­get for the fiscal year beginning July 1 knowing that he already had a sizable deficit. Mayor Bloomberg was not ­eager to cut the city’s bud­get. In February 2002 he stated that the city faced a deficit of $5 billion in the fiscal year beginning July 1. In his Inaugural Address he said, “We cannot repeat the ­mistakes of the past. We cannot drive p ­ eople and business out of New York. We cannot raise taxes. We w ­ ill find another way” (Bloomberg 2002c). So he did: he proposed in February, a month a­ fter taking office, that he would borrow $1.5 billion to cover operating costs (Pasanen 2009a). Of course, he used other strategies—­cutting agency bud­ gets, negotiating with the state and federal government for more aid—­but the clincher was borrowing, something that city officials had been afraid to do ever since the 1975 fiscal crisis (Bloomberg 2002b). And he won the right to borrow. Perhaps no other mayor could have gotten away with borrowing ­under the circumstances. The fiscal year 2003 bud­get, passed in June 2002 by the city council, did not contain any new taxes except for an increase in the cigarette tax (McMahon 2005, 3). Bloomberg’s refusal to raise taxes in the early months of his administration reflected his candid analy­sis of the po­liti­cal situation. Governor Pataki, a Republican, was up for reelection in November 2002. Bloomberg wanted the governor’s cooperation in the f­uture, and in spring 2002 Pataki looked strong. Neither the governor nor the state legislature wanted any tax increases in an election year.



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The governor, in par­tic­u­lar, wanted to wait u ­ ntil a­ fter the November election. So the mayor played along, not raising taxes and stitching a bud­get together that he knew would soon result in more deficits (Barrett 2002a). Mayor Bloomberg may not have had a ­career in politics, but he was a fast study. On June 10, 2002, “Mayor Bloomberg and the teachers ­union reached ­agreement . . . ​on a new contract that raises salaries by 16 ­percent over 30 months. . . . ​ Teachers’ starting salaries would increase from $31,900 to $39,000 and pay for ­those with the most experience would jump from $70,000 to more than $81,000” (Seifman 2002). The mayor did what no mayor had done before. He made teachers’ salaries much more competitive with t­ hose of surrounding counties. In addition, the mayor succeeded in gaining major productivity improvements—­one hundred more minutes of instruction a week (Fertig 2013). In his first few ­union negotiations, the mayor had succeeded in getting productivity increases in return for salary increases. And the governor came through. The city could not afford t­ hese increases, but the governor provided a one-­time payment from the state to pay for higher teacher salaries. Of course, the UFT endorsed the governor for reelection, and that helped the governor make up his mind. ­After Pataki gained reelection in November, the mayor changed his views (Bloomberg 2002d). Bloomberg no longer thought raising taxes was off limits. “I think at this point all I can say is that every­thing has to be on the t­ able. . . . ​The law requires us to have a balanced bud­get. Period. And t­ hose that think we can cut $5 billion out of expenses just have absolutely no idea how this city works” (M. Cooper 2002a). He pushed very hard for reinstituting the commuter tax, but the governor and state legislature would not agree (Pasanen, n.d.). It must be remembered that it was the Demo­crats who had agreed with the Republicans to eliminate the commuter tax years ­earlier (Pasanen, n.d.). The mayor did not comment about the governor’s position on the commuter tax. A ­ fter all, Pataki had helped the mayor with the UFT contract. So Mayor Bloomberg sought an increase in the one tax that the city controlled—­the property tax. In the November financial plan, put forward right ­after the state elections, he proposed a 25 ­percent increase in the tax. He succeeded in getting the city council to approve an increase of 18.5 ­percent (Parrott 2015). Of course, his poll ratings dropped immediately, but he did not care. “Acknowledging that it was ‘not a way to win a popularity contest,’ the mayor, whose favorable poll ratings dropped in the Sunday Daily News to the lowest since David Dinkins’s, vowed more taxes” (Barrett 2002b). The city council did not want layoffs, and since the state would not agree to reinstate the commuter tax, the council went along with the property tax increase. Then came the ­labor contracts, which ­were rapidly expiring over 2002 and 2003 (Berkey-­Gerard 2004). The mayor announced in the November Plan, “In

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November 2002, the city did not fund f­ uture salary increases. . . . ​Any ­future wage increases for the City workforce ­will have to come ­after achieving the balance of revenue and spending set forth in this plan and must be funded through productivity” (NYC OMB 2002a). This meant that l­abor ­unions would have to provide productivity savings if they sought wage increases (Bloomberg 2005c). The state comptroller’s office estimated that “wage increases at the projected inflation rate without any offsetting productivity improvements would widen the City’s projected bud­get gaps by $750 million in FY2004” (NYS OSC 2002, 35). The other ­union contract signed during Bloomberg’s first year was between New York City Transit Union Local 100 and the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), which is a state authority. The MTA chair, Peter Kalikow, led the negotiations, and the mayor stayed in the background. The transit ­union, ­under Roger Toussaint’s leadership, won major increases in health benefits and a sweeping reform of the MTA’s disciplinary procedures. T ­ here ­were no wage increases for the first year of the contract, but ­there ­were one-­time $1,000 bonus. No other ­union contracts w ­ ere signed in 2002.

Bloomberg the Billionaire When Bloomberg ran for mayor in 2001, he was worth several billion dollars and financed his campaign himself. By 2020 he was worth over $60 billion and was the ninth-­richest person in the world. His com­pany, Bloomberg L.P., of which he owns 88 ­percent and continued to grow in his absence, leases Bloomberg financial terminals that provide real-­time financial market data for $24,000 each a year. ­These terminals sit on desks of financial analysts throughout the world. His com­pany takes in about $10 billion in revenue annually (Foussianes 2020). ­Needless to say, when he ran for mayor, Bloomberg took no campaign contributions. He was not dependent on any interest groups—­not business leaders, not ­union leaders. He believed this gave him an in­de­pen­dence that previous mayors did not have. And he did not limit his self-­financing to campaigns. Bloomberg exemplified many in the world of philanthropy with his interest in arts and culture; while he was mayor, he invested heavi­ly in the arts and culture of the city. He directed more than $200 million of his own money anonymously through the Car­ne­gie Corporation of New York and his own private foundation to arts and social ser­v ice organ­izations throughout the city. He gave large amounts (the Metropolitan Museum of Art had received over $30 million from the mayor since 2002) and smaller amounts ($100,000 for the Queens Theater in the Park) (Barbaro and Bennett 2013). When he started the Young Men’s Initiative, he contributed $30 million (Burger 2016). ­After leaving the mayoralty, he moved on to a



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national and international stage concentrating upon climate change, gun control, college scholarships, and city management. Between 2014 and 2018 his f­ amily foundation spent “$1.65 billion to hundreds of cities, universities, cultural groups and global institutions” (Foley and Smith 2020). The fact that Bloomberg was financially in­de­pen­dent of much po­liti­cal pressure also meant that he could ignore voter dis­plea­sure. He did not participate in the cultural wars. Other politicians ­were much more open to complaints and favored disallowing cultural institutions that ­were not seen as po­liti­cally correct. For example, Giuliani had created the Decency Commission to pass judgment on questionable works of art displayed in city-­owned or financially supported museums. Bloomberg renamed the commission the Cultural Advisory Commission and its new mission was to provide awards in the arts (Boucher 2019). Another example is when the cultural wars came to Ground Zero. Bloomberg was one of the few politicians who said he wanted inclusion and did not f­avor disallowing two cultural institutions from the 9/11 site ­because ­those two ­were thought to be po­liti­cally incorrect (Mandell 2005). As a billionaire, Bloomberg was somewhat insulated from this kind of po­liti­cal pressure.

Chapter Summar y In his first year Mayor Bloomberg demonstrated that he was both a conservative and a liberal. He would not extend additional benefits to ­those in poverty, but he would ensure that poor ­people ­were safe. He would insist upon productivity improvements in return for salary increases, and at the same time, would acknowledge how talented and hardworking government employees ­were and often increased their salaries. He would follow the path of conservatives in his first year in office and insist on no new taxes; yet he followed the path of liberalism when he discovered he had to raise property taxes to protect the city he loved. He was an experienced man­ag­er. As Lilliam Barrios-­Paoli remembers, “One of the wonderful ­things I discovered about the Bloomberg administration is that they pretty much let you have your own agenda. . . . ​If you could sell it to him, you could do it” (pers. comm., 2017). But Bloomberg was ­limited by what he did not know. He would appoint an extremely talented and knowledgeable star in public health, a field he knew a g­ reat deal about, but choose as chancellor of the school system a person who knew ­little about education. He brought technology to City Hall. As Mitchell Moss (2007) notes, “Bloomberg is the first mayor who considers a ‘platform’ to be part of a computer system, not a po­liti­cal ideology.” And he proceeded to build the hardware and software to make data-­driven decision making a real­ity.

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New York City needed someone who could heal the city—­someone with the necessary experience to point the way to recovery. The city needed Bloomberg to use his business savvy and connections to obtain the resources needed for that recovery. He husbanded the city’s resources. In his first round of u ­ nion negotiations, Bloomberg got what he wanted—­salary increases in exchange for productivity increases. In his first year, Mayor Bloomberg demonstrated ability to compromise and an interest in building consensus. In his first term, Bloomberg demonstrated strong leadership in bringing New Yorkers together again. In a change from the previous administration, he welcomed every­one to participate in discourse about public policy, and New Yorkers w ­ ere enthusiastic about the new tone he set. Giuliani had left a bad taste ­behind; his anger and rudeness hung over the city. Mayor Bloomberg brought civility, and New Yorkers ­were grateful for it. His first term was successful both financially and socially.

3 CREATING LONG-­T ERM FISCAL HEALTH

This is a story about a mayor who grew in understanding how the city could be structured financially for its long-­term fiscal health. Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s ideas about urban finance matured over time as he gained experience in raising and spending New York City’s resources, even while dealing with major fiscal crises. He also learned more about the limitations on his powers as compared to ­those of the governor and the federal government, and his insufficient power relative to that of entrenched l­abor ­unions. Bloomberg held the reins of government ­after the 9/11 attack, the 2008 recession, and Hurricane Sandy, and ­after each of ­these crises he balanced the bud­get, an impressive achievement. Bloomberg’s fiscal years ended with a surplus in ten out of his twelve years in office (­table 3.6). Bloomberg a­ dopted one set of strategies before the 2008 recession and a second set ­after it, halfway through his second term. Before the recession, Bloomberg gave city workers generous salary increases (Bloomberg 2005c). Though he did insist on productivity improvements, his liberal compensation policies for government employees drove conservatives crazy: Bloomberg’s tenure meant “steep recent tax hikes, especially the mayor’s $1.9 billion property-­tax increase in 2003—­the largest single increase in the city’s history, which fell disproportionately on businesses” (Malanga 2009). The mayor even rewarded ­labor ­unions for supporting him in his first reelection campaign by agreeing to wage increases without demanding productivity improvements (NYC Office of the Mayor 2006a). His policies changed a­ fter the 2008 recession, however. As Glenn Pasanen (2013) argues, “The second crisis, the financial collapse of 2008 and subsequent bud­get crisis, was resolved in a quite dif­fer­ent way: the regressive city sales tax 43

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was increased from 4.0 ­percent to 4.5 ­percent—­and made permanent; the other major taxes ­were not tapped; and ­there followed a nearly-­exclusive focus on reductions in city spending.” Bloomberg became much tougher in ­labor negotiations, and he strongly pushed the New York City Council to reduce city agencies’ bud­gets (Bloomberg 2005a). It is best to discuss the city’s finances with a focus on employee salaries, benefits, and pensions b ­ ecause so much of the bud­get is driven by t­ hese ­factors. This chapter first discusses mayoral power as compared to the state’s power, then moves on to an overview of the city’s finances during each of the mayor’s three terms. It then provides a detailed examination of the major ­labor u ­ nion contract costs and, fi­nally, an examination of federal and state financial support.

The Limits of Mayoral Power The state dictated the ­legal structure within which New York City mayors had to manage. Article IX of the New York State Constitution described and defined the powers, duties, and limitations of all New York local governments. The state controlled most aspects of localities.1 The New York State legislature controlled all taxing authority, except the property tax, and even that had to be equally applied to all four of the city’s categories of property tax in order for the city to raise tax revenue on property without state approval. The property tax was a regressive tax—­that is, it affected all property ­owners regardless of income, and so poor ­people faced proportionately greater property taxes for their income compared to more affluent ­people. The income tax, on the other hand, was a much more progressive tax: ­those with higher incomes could be taxed at a greater rate than ­those with lower incomes. Bloomberg had to get state approval, from both the state legislature and the governor, to enact a progressive income tax. The state also faced similar challenges, particularly with state courts: “In New York, the top state court overturned a decision by the governor and legislature to change the actuarial methodology used by the state employees’ pension fund and ordered the state to repay nearly $3 billion to the pension system” (Forsythe 2004, 77). Unfavorable court decisions can occur at any level of government. In addition, Bloomberg had ­little control over vast stretches of the city’s land. Most New York State public authorities w ­ ere unaccountable to mayoral control. In New York the 583 public authorities are public benefit corporations designed to “construct or operate a public improvement wholly or partially within the state, the profits from which incur to the benefit of this or other states” (NYS OSC 1972, 1). ­These authorities can be granted enormous powers by the state, including suing, acquiring property, borrowing money, and collecting fees. Of the 583 author-

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ities, the purpose of 192 of them is housing and the purpose of 168 is economic development (Citizens Bud­get Commission 2006). Gerald Frug (2010) explains that “New York State has fractured government authority in the region by giving power not to the city but to state-­controlled public authorities. . . . ​Much of the impor­tant development in the city is controlled not by the city but by the Empire State Development Corporation—an agency, appointed by the Governor not the Mayor, which, directly or through subsidiaries, dominates major proj­ects ranging from Ground Zero to Battery Park City to Times Square.” ­There are two state agencies involved with transportation issues: the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The MTA board is appointed by the governor, with only four of twenty-one members “recommended by the city” (MTA, n.d.). The governor of New Jersey and the governor of New York run Port Authority. Even the New York City transit system is a subset of the MTA. As Bloomberg soon discovered, e­ very mayor faced this fractured landscape. Bloomberg had to deal with numerous state restrictions on his actions. He could not raise taxes, except the property tax; he could not increase the number of cameras on city streets; he could not implement congestion pricing in Midtown Manhattan; all of t­ hese actions depended on the state’s permission. Although the mayor benefited at first from increased federal aid due to 9/11, federal bud­ get cuts soon badly affected his plans. Lastly, New York City is a u ­ nion town. The municipal u ­ nions are incredibly power­ful, and ­union contracts establish detailed working conditions that the city has agreed to over the years. When contracts expire, the previous contract continues to be in force ­until a new one is signed, giving ­union members less incentive to ­settle for a new contract they do not like. Within the city, the mayor had much more power than did the city council. The mayor appointed all commissioners and members of boards and, most impor­tant, was the only entity with the power to estimate revenues and impound funds from revenue sources enacted by the city council. The mayor’s authority to estimate revenues was indeed power­ful. If he projected fewer revenues in the ­future, then the city council had fewer resources to fund its programs. Mayor Bloomberg had no trou­ble using his muscle with the city council, although he complained loudly about his ­limited power vis-­à-­v is the state.

The First Term During Bloomberg’s first term, he enjoyed cooperative relationships with the city council and other elected leaders, ­labor ­unions, and community advocates that

46 CHAPTER 3

he met with. He consulted with city council members and negotiated generous contracts with ­labor ­unions; in return he demanded and got improvements in productivity. The l­ abor ­unions had refused to negotiate with the previous mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, who had not offered fair salary increases. ­Under Giuliani the ­unions had gone five to seven years without contracts. They ­were thus highly motivated to reach agreement on a contract and ­were willing to commit to productivity increases. In his l­ ater terms, Bloomberg changed his negotiating strategy as he sought to control the growth of pension and health benefit costs. It is difficult to overstate the precarious financial position of the city ­after 9/11. The bad news was not just the $5 billion deficit; it was the fear that the city had been so hard hit that it would not recover. Revenues w ­ ere not just down; they had gone through the floor. Immediately a­ fter 9/11, the city had lost almost 21 ­percent in income taxes and 18 ­percent in corporate and utility taxes (Weikart 2009, 120). New York corporations, including financial institutions, w ­ ere actively seeking real estate west of the Hudson River. New York City had lost its manufacturing base a long time back; now it faced losing its financial ser­v ices base. It was a daunting task to take the reins ­after 9/11, but many New Yorkers had voted for billionaire and entrepreneur Bloomberg, a newly registered Republican, ­because they thought he understood the New York economy far better than his rival, Mark Green, a traditional “tax-­and-­spend” Demo­crat. And they ­were right. Facing a $5 billion deficit in January 2002, the mayor refused to raise taxes and immediately called for cuts to reduce the number of staff working in city agencies. For the first time since the 1975 fiscal crisis, firefighters and police officers faced layoffs. The next year’s bud­get, for 2002–3, had to be put to bed by July 1, 2002, the beginning of the new fiscal year. The mayor had six months to build a consensus to pass a bud­get. First, he needed the city council to pass his proposed (executive) bud­get. Second, he needed the support of Governor George Pataki, b ­ ecause the state played a major role in enabling the city to balance its bud­get. The governor at any point could offer more state aid to the city; he could offer to lessen mandates that cost the city money; and he could relax stringent rules the city faced in a wide variety of arenas that would then lower city costs. The governor of New York was, indeed, a key player. Mayor Bloomberg played a delicate strategic game with Governor Pataki, a Republican up for reelection that fall. The mayor needed the governor’s support in a year when the governor did not want to see any tax increases. Further, the governor and his advisers made major decisions through the lens of the governor’s ambitions to run for president. Although many advocates called for the mayor to ask the state for tax increases, Bloomberg refused, knowing that the governor

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did not want to be put in that position in a reelection year and with his ambition to run for the presidency. Bloomberg counted on Pataki rewarding him for his restraint ­after the election. Bloomberg proposed three strategies in his fiscal year 2002–3 executive bud­ get. Instead of increased taxes, he proposed bud­get cuts, more state and federal aid, and borrowing (Bloomberg 2002b). The bud­get of $42.3 billion, a­ dopted by the city council, reflected this thinking, including agency bud­get cuts but no layoffs. Bud­get cuts w ­ ere applied to almost e­ very agency, including the police and fire departments. Bloomberg canceled packages of tax enticements offered by former mayor Giuliani, such as the city support for the Yankees and Mets stadiums, and also canceled the large package of tax write-­offs to expand the New York Stock Exchange in Lower Manhattan. In addition, ­there ­were no new taxes except one on cigarettes and a monthly surcharge on telephones. T ­ here was more state and federal aid. And ­there was more borrowing, to the tune of $1.5 billion. But the borrowing was problematic. New York City had under­gone a dramatic fiscal crisis in 1975 in which it almost went bankrupt. Its revenues had not kept up with liberal expenditures, and the city had borrowed heavi­ly for years to pay operating expenses before the 1975 crisis. Since then, state and city monitors had been totally against the city’s borrowing for operating expenses. In 2002, “good government” groups, such as the Citizens Bud­get Commission, opposed borrowing such a large amount but did support a smaller amount. The mayor had power­ful friends in the financial sector on his side. ­After all, the mayor was Mike Bloomberg, widely respected as a businessman who briefed Wall Street analysts early and often. Accordingly, Robert Kutter, a se­nior vice president at Moody’s Investors Ser­vice, commented on the borrowing, “Of course, [one-­shot deals are] a concern from a credit perspective but this appears to be a necessary action that the city must take to get the bud­get balanced” (quoted in Weikart 2009, 120). Bloomberg convinced the financial sector to back him not just on the basis of his reputation but also b ­ ecause of his strong pre­sen­ta­tion of the bud­get. As Andrea Bern­stein (2002) noted at public radio affiliate WNYC, “Michael Bloomberg was a man in his ele­ment yesterday. With a large video screen and a Power­Point remote in hand, he spoke without notes for an hour and fifteen minutes, selling his bud­get.” It was an amazing per­for­mance, particularly for someone who had none of the typical mayor’s experience in city policymaking. The city council ­adopted Bloomberg’s bud­get with few changes, but the bud­ get almost immediately ran into trou­ble as revenues continued to decline, and the city was soon in a deficit (NYC OMB 2002a). As Bloomberg’s letter attached to the Office of Management and Bud­get’s November 2002 financial plan reflected, “The change in estimates is due primarily to a reduction in anticipated revenues

48 CHAPTER 3

resulting from a continued softening of the economy. In addition to decreasing revenues, the revised financial plan reflects growth in the relatively unchangeable fixed cost components of the bud­get such as debt ser­v ice, the City’s unique share of Medicaid, pension fund contributions, and health benefits” (NYC OMB 2002a). Bloomberg pointed out that “­there is no silver bullet to address the $7.5 billion bud­get shortfall facing the City over the next twenty months—­$1.1 billion in Fiscal Year 2003 and $6.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2004” (NYC OMB 2002a). The governor’s election was in November 2002, however, so the mayor deliberately waited to roll out his financial plan ­until a­ fter Election Day (Steier 2002).

­After the Election Immediately ­after Governor Pataki’s reelection, Bloomberg acknowledged that the bud­get was in deficit and bud­get cuts would not be enough; the city needed more revenue. The mayor announced he wanted increased tax rates on January 23, 2003, “No one likes the imposition of taxes or bud­get cuts—­the only choices the law allows. But devastating the very ser­vices that make this the world’s second home— is far worse than paying more and ­doing with less. Taxes and frugality are far better than crime, filth and abandonment” (quoted in Associated Press 2003). By making such an announcement, Bloomberg showed himself to be a very dif­fer­ ent mayor from the conservative mayors who had come before him. He insisted on raising taxes rather than decimate city ser­v ices, as had occurred in the fallout from the 1975 fiscal crisis. Bloomberg sought a commuter tax, which had been eliminated in 1999 when Demo­crats in the state legislature attempted to woo Republican voters. But Governor Pataki did not support reinstating the tax. The mayor then pushed for an increase in the only tax over which he had control: the property tax. He pressed, and succeeded in persuading the city council to adopt a property tax increase of 18.5 ­percent (he had proposed 25 ­percent), delighting liberals and infuriating some conservatives. “It is an amazing moment to attempt to mitigate what is a huge deficit on the back of real estate,” said Mary Ann Tighe, the president of real estate com­pany CB Richard Ellis (quoted in Bagli 2002). The Real Estate Board, an association of brokers, had no leverage over billionaire Michael Bloomberg; he took no campaign contributions from them. The business community was divided. The Citizens Bud­get Commission condemned the tax increase. As Bloomberg Businessweek (2002) wrote, “Bloomberg’s taxes w ­ ill almost certainly hurt New York’s already fragile competitive position. Worse, the ­whole country could suffer if mayors and governors around the U.S. copy him and raise taxes.” Yet, part of the business world understood. “ ‘­There’s a general feeling that he did what was necessary,’ [Kathy] Wylde of the Partnership [for New York City]

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49

said of her members. ‘At this point they are taking him at his word that he is ­going to keep the city competitive from a ser­v ice and tax standpoint’ ” (quoted in Steinhauer 2002c). The mayor was respected by many in the business community, and it was recognized that this was a unique time in the city’s history. Nonetheless, voters w ­ ere dismayed by the property tax increase, and the mayor’s standing in the polls deteriorated. As Maurice Carroll, director of the Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, commented, “Bloomberg had a 57–23 ­percent approval in a July 18 poll. . . . ​ In ­today’s poll [November 21, 2002], Bloomberg gets a negative 34–53 ­percent rating for his ­handling of the bud­get. . . . ​The honeymoon is over. ­Unless your city or state is awash in cash, bud­get times are bad times for elected officials. A ­ fter a big welcome, Mayor Bloomberg rates only a standoff in job approval” (Quinnipiac University Polling Institute 2002). In the spring of 2003 the mayor had to prepare the fiscal year 2003–4 bud­get facing the same dismal outlook: the economy remained in tatters, and the next fiscal year would be no easier than the last (Bloomberg 2003b). To balance his fiscal year 2004 bud­get, the mayor had to obtain more state aid. The governor and state legislators did not want to increase taxes. Bloomberg asked them for an increase in the sales tax, an increase in the personal income tax for the wealthy, suspension of the clothing items sales tax exemption, and a property tax surcharge for landlords who did not live in their buildings. His strategy was straightforward. If the state legislature agreed, the mayor would not close down the zoos in Brooklyn and Queens, cancel trash pickups, close c­ hildren’s health clinics and libraries, end after-­school programs, eliminate scholarships to city universities, and discontinue weekend meals for the el­derly. It was a ferocious bid, but he won. Some cuts did take effect; six fire departments remained closed, and over four thousand city positions ­were cut (Steinhauer 2003). But, he won his increased tax revenues of $2.3 billion from the state (NYC IBO 2003a). The highlights w ­ ere • The legislature allowed the sales tax to increase temporarily, one-­eighth of a ­percent, ­until May 31, 2005; this produced approximately $120 million in revenue for fiscal year 2003–4 (NYC Office of the Mayor 2003c). • “Income tax rates increased for the wealthy—4.45 ­percent for ­those with incomes over $500,000 and 4.25 ­percent for ­those with incomes starting at $100,000” (McMahon 2003). • The state legislature temporarily suspended the sales tax exemption on clothing items costing less than $110 (Farrell 2004). Once again Bloomberg through the state raised taxes rather than cut vital city ser­v ices. On June 30, 2003, he signed a city council bill implementing the state

50 CHAPTER 3

authorization for the city to increase t­hese taxes. Governor Pataki did not support him, but he did not contest the mayor’s plans. Bloomberg had lobbied the state legislature heavi­ly, and the legislature overrode the governor’s veto. What Bloomberg promoted was “taxing the rich” to balance his bud­get. This made sense, since the rich paid most of the income tax. The New York City In­de­ pen­dent Bud­get Office (IBO) examined the city’s tax structure and found that ­house­holds that earned over $1 million a year generated “one-­third of the city’s income tax revenue,” despite the fact that taxpayers earning over $1 million ­were only 0.5 ­percent of the total income tax filers (Sweeting 2011, 1). As George Sweeting of the IBO wrote to city council member James Oddo, “Filers with incomes above $105,400—­one tenth of all who filed 2009 tax returns—­received 58.2 ­percent of total personal income and paid 71.2 ­percent of the city PIT [personal income tax]” (Sweeting 2011, 1). ­These “soak-­the-­rich” income tax policies ­were condemned by conservatives. Conservatives advocated that ­because of ­these tax increases, “the stage seemed to be set in New York for a downward economic spiral reminiscent of the early 1990s” (McMahon 2005). Yet, many liberals w ­ ere critical of increases in the sales tax rate: “I am voting for this ­because it was the only option given to us by Albany. We should be voting on a commuter tax right now, but it is ­either this or 31,000 cops and 40 closed fire­houses,” said council member Peter Vallone (Gotham Gazette Staff 2003). Again, the mayor did not flinch at criticism from ­either side, b ­ ecause ­after 9/11, the city simply needed more revenue. A ­later year, when the city’s finances ­were in better shape, Bloomberg would give property ­owners a rebate and at one point give them a 7 ­percent decrease in property taxes (Gralla 2008). This amounted to a $400 annual payment to homeowners (McMahon 2005). Overall, however, he departed from the policies of Giuliani and put ­little energy into lowering tax rates. He set the stage for years of sound fiscal health that the city had not experienced in years b ­ ecause of the increase in property taxes. The mayor’s determination to increase tax revenues made a large difference in his first term. See t­ able 3.1. Although Pataki did not agree with the tax increases, he rewarded Bloomberg for his loyalty in many ways. In October 2002 the two announced that “the Port Authority and City of New York have reached an agreement that means approximately $700 million to the City when the deal closes, and significantly raises annual payments on John F. Kennedy International and LaGuardia airports through 2050” (PANYNJ 2003). Pataki gave Bloomberg control over the memorial foundation that “gave him a formal claim to decision-­making at Ground Zero” (Sagalyn 2016, 721). Furthermore, Pataki and Bloomberg agreed to joint funding of the Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation (Shibley et al. 2011). In another instance of cooperation, Bloomberg signed legislation increasing income exemption eligibility levels to reduce the tax burden on se­nior homeowners ­after the gov-

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­TABLE 3.1  Tax revenue increases in constant dollars during Mayor Bloomberg’s first term TAXES

% CHANGE IN TAX REVENUE, 2002–6

Property

19.50%

Personal income

32.90%

General sales

9.10%

General corporation

40.00%

Financial corporation

108.90%

Unincorporated business income Mortgage recording Commercial rent Conveyance of real property

36.60% 135.00% 2.70% 152.20%

Other taxes

19.80%

Total taxes

30.70%

Source: New York City Office of the Comptroller 2002 and 2006b. Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR). Note: Constant dollars by Implicit Price Deflator at US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy­sis, Gross Domestic Product, not seasonally adjusted, index 2009-100.

ernor signed enabling legislation in July 2002 to increase exemption levels (Estock 2003). The most impor­tant f­ avor as far as Bloomberg was concerned was the governor’s support for school governance legislation. In June 2002, u ­ nder a new state law, the mayor took over the city’s school system—­the board of education was abolished and the chancellor reported to the mayor (Stern 2007). In another enormous ­favor, the governor gave the mayor $200 million of state monies to support the new United Federation of Teachers (UFT) teacher contract, signed on June 10 (Bowers 2000). The mayor’s ambitions for economic development often required the help of the governor. A good example is a press release from the mayor’s office that reads, “Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Governor George Pataki ­today unveiled the West Harlem Master Plan, an in-­depth study that incorporates guidelines for redeveloping the area bounded by 125th and 135th Streets, Broadway and the Hudson River in West Harlem. The State has committed $4 million and the City has committed $2 million in funds to support the first phase” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2002). The mayor also wanted the 2004 Republican National Convention to be held in his city, and Pataki helped make that happen. ­These are just a few of the many ways in which the mayor and governor worked together during the mayor’s first few years and the many rewards that Bloomberg reaped for having strategically supported Pataki in his reelection campaign. The mayor’s strategies of supporting the governor and keeping any quarrels private paid off in dividends for the mayor and the city.

52 CHAPTER 3

Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio, quickly discovered that publicly quarreling with the governor can have disastrous consequences when he fought openly with Governor Andrew Cuomo about how to fund de Blasio’s pre-­K education program. In the end de Blasio may have increased the number of c­ hildren in pre-­K programs, but the big winner was the charter school movement, which gained more city educational funds and precious public school space with the governor’s help. The big loser, other than Mayor de Blasio, was the public school system, which had to install air-­conditioning in charter schools and provide private space for charter schools if public school space was not available. The irony is that de Blasio, a lifelong politician, did not understand the power of the governor, while Bloomberg, a lifelong businessman, understood the governor’s power immediately. In fiscal year 2004–5, the upturn started. The mayor had good news. Revenues ­were picking up—­just in time for his reelection in the fall of 2005. The city comptroller’s office announced that in the third fiscal quarter, “for the first time in more than four years, the City’s Gross City Product (GCP) showed stronger growth than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rising more than seven p ­ ercent” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2004, xii). In the spring of 2004, the mayor declared that the city’s economic recession was over. He presented a bud­get for fiscal year 2004 of $46.9 billion, with a proposed surplus of $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2004—­money that would help pay the wage increases he had negotiated with the ­unions in fiscal year 2005 (Bloomberg 2004b, 3). Throughout his first term, Bloomberg made his priorities—­education, health care, and economic development—­clear through his bud­get cuts, as shown in ­table 3.2. ­These bud­get cuts ­were often sizable but not evenly applied. The mayor demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the police department and other portions of the justice system rated a much lower priority than education, health care, and economic development. This was unheard of in the administrations of previous mayors, who had added hundreds of positions to the police ranks. Bloomberg cut a large number of positions from the offices of other elected officials as well. This did not endear him to the borough presidents, city council, or the district attorney. At the same time, he gave hefty increases to the headcount of several agencies, as is evident in reports of the NYC Office of the Comptroller, when comparing FY 2002 to FY 2014: • The Department of Education gained 15,088 pedagogical positions and 2,258 nonpedagogical positions. • The community colleges gained 469 pedagogical positions and 60 nonpedagogical positions.

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­TABLE 3.2  Major losses in agency positions during Mayor Bloomberg’s first term (2002–2006) AGENCIES

CHANGE IN NUMBER OF POSITIONS (LOSS)

PUBLIC SAFETY

Corrections, uniform Corrections, civilian Police District attorney offices Probation Total public safety

(1,447) (224) (1,017) (335) (317) (3,340)

OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS

Borough presidents’ offices Comptroller Total other elected officials

(64) (65) (129)

SOCIAL SER­VICES

ACS Aging Total social ser­vices

(909) (17) (926)

OTHER

­Human rights

(47)

Investigations

(72)

Rec­ords

(4)

Sanitation, uniform

(88)

Sanitation, civilian

(248)

Total other Total

(459) (4,854)

Source: New York City Office of the Comptroller 2002 and 2006b. Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR).

• The Department of Health and ­Mental Hygiene gained 998 positions as the mayor combined the Department of Health with the Department of ­Mental Health, ­Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Ser­v ices. • The Department of Homeless Ser­v ices increased by 691 positions as the mayor sought to get the homeless off the streets by increasing the number of shelter beds. • Agencies that could carry out Bloomberg’s economic development plans grew. The Department of Small Business Ser­v ices grew by 51 positions, the Department of Environmental Protection by 245 positions, the

54 CHAPTER 3

Department of Information Ser­v ices by 642 positions, and the Department of Transportation by 216 positions (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2002–14). Although in his first term the mayor cut over four thousand positions, he also added almost nineteen thousand positions, most of them in education (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2002–14). In addition, covered agencies and nonprofit corporations associated with the city received large increases: the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation received $200 million more in operating subsidy (NYC Office of the Mayor 2004a) and $1.2 billion in capital funds (NYC IBO 2003b).

The Second Term In his second term Mayor Bloomberg had to deal with the effects of the 2008 recession. At first the mayor had good news: In the spring of 2005, he projected the fiscal year would end on June 30 with a $2.5 billion surplus. In fact, for two years of his second term, the city had large surpluses (Posillico 2014). The mayor’s reelection in November 2005 coincided with an uptake in revenues for the city. In the spring of 2006, when the mayor brought his proposed bud­get for fiscal year 2006–7 to the city council, he announced a $3.4 billion surplus (Bloomberg 2006). Due to the surplus, he proposed lowering the property tax rate by 5 ­percent, extending the property tax rebate, and reducing business taxes (Cardwell 2007). Property tax rates w ­ ere lowered by 7 ­percent for one year (Cardwell 2007). Then tax revenues dropped precipitously during the 2008 recession, and the city had to live off its surpluses. Overall, tax revenues, when controlled for inflation, ­were down by 4 ­percent; in contrast, tax revenues had grown 30 ­percent in Bloomberg’s first term (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2002, 2006b). See ­table 3.1. The 2008 recession hit income tax revenue. When controlled for inflation, personal income tax revenue decreased by 16.5 ­percent in the second term (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2006b, 2010). See t­ able 3.3. Corporate tax revenue was down also. The public was not buying real estate in the city during the recession, as demonstrated by the steep drop in revenues from taxes on mortgage recording and conveyance of real property. But property tax revenues continued to grow, thanks to the large property tax rate hike. See t­ able 3.3. The mayor resolved this second financial crisis in quite a dif­fer­ent way than he had responded to the economic fallout from 9/11. “The one big change in Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s executive bud­get for fiscal year 2010 is his proposed

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­TABLE 3.3  Tax revenue increases in constant dollars in the second term TAXES

Property Personal income General sales General corporation Financial corporation Unincorporated business income Mortgage recording Commercial rent Conveyance of real property

% CHANGE IN REVENUE, 2006–10

14.4% −16.5% 0.9% −21.3% 9.3% 2.9% −76.1% 9.3% −58.3%

Other taxes

−4.0%

Total taxes

−4.0%

Source: New York City Office of the Comptroller 2006b and 2010b. Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR). Note: Constant dollars by Implicit Price Deflator at US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy­sis, gross domestic product, not seasonally adjusted, Index 2009-100.

increase in the city sales tax from 4.0 ­percent to 4.5 ­percent, double the increase he proposed in January’s preliminary bud­get. . . . ​The sales tax increase, the largest in 35 years, includes the elimination of the current exemption for clothing and footwear” (Pasanen 2009b). He also got a repeal of the property tax cut of 7 ­percent, which had been set to expire in June (Barro 2008). ­After ­those tax rate changes, “­there followed a nearly-­exclusive focus on reductions in city spending. In what has continued as a five year, nearly year-­round series of bud­get modifications, mostly cuts in city spending, the city ‘saved’ a lot of money” (Pasanen 2013). Many city agencies lost positions; ­these included social ser­v ice agencies as well as the police, corrections, and fire department, as shown in t­ able 3.4. Certainly Bloomberg’s favored agencies—­education, community colleges, health care, parks, and information technology—­continued to gain positions. City positions increased by over seven thousand even in his second term, but the rate of growth slowed considerably from that of his first term, in which almost nineteen thousand positions w ­ ere added (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2002, 2006b).

The Third Term Bloomberg persuaded the city council to change the New York City Charter to allow him to run for a third term (McNickle 2017, 270). This action alienated some of his constituency, since New Yorkers had voted to limit elected officials

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­TABLE 3.4  Major losses in agency positions during Mayor Bloomberg’s second term (2006–2010) AGENCIES

CHANGE IN NUMBER OF POSITIONS (LOSS)

PUBLIC SAFETY

Corrections, uniform Fire, uniform

(417) (563)

Police, uniform

(1,137)

Total public safety

(2,117)

OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS

Borough presidents’ offices

(45)

Comptroller

(22)

Public advocate Total elected officials

(5) (72)

SOCIAL SER­VICES

ACS Aging Homeless ser­vices Social ser­vices Total social ser­vices

(776) (69) (285) (364) (1,494)

OTHER

City planning

(12)

Finance

(224)

HPD

(225)

­Human rights

(9)

Investigations

(28)

Sanitation, uniform

(506)

Total other

(1,004)

Total losses

(4,687)

Source: New York City Office of the Comptroller 2006b and 2010b. Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR).

to two terms. Nevertheless, he won the election, and in his third term continued the fiscal policies he had ­adopted ­after the 2008 recession—­namely, to cut city agencies and put less emphasis on tax increases. In his third term Bloomberg wanted more control over the city’s workforce. In January 2011 he signaled his intentions by releasing a report issued by his Workforce Reform Task Force, which criticized the state’s role in civil ser­vice and recommended twenty-­three changes to state and local law to improve the civil ser­vice system: “The State Civil Ser­v ice Commission (SCSC), a three-­commissioner

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body appointed by the Governor with offices in Albany, oversees the operations of all municipal civil ser­vice commissions, as well as city and county personnel officers throughout the State. New York City is required to obtain approval from the SCSC before promulgating or amending civil ser­vice rules” (NYC WRTF 2011, 7). The recommendations sought to limit state regulation and allow the city to regulate its workforce by changing the state civil ser­vice system. The Citizens Union, a nonprofit “good government” organ­ization, explained the prob­lems with the current state civil ser­vice system (Church et al. 2012, 2). The mayor wanted the ability to hire, fire, and promote at any time. He sought to expand the probationary period from one year to three years. He wanted to eliminate as many civil ser­vice exams as pos­si­ble to change jobs from competitive to noncompetitive positions so that it would be easier for the mayor to hire ­those he thought qualified rather than the civil ser­vice system determining qualifications. The mayor’s efforts centered on broadening job descriptions so that workers could be required to do work other than what a civil ser­vice job might formally entail. “The State is not as responsive as the City would like for their desire to make regular changes as a 21st ­century workforce” (Church et al. 2012, 10). The irony was that reformers at the turn of the twentieth ­century had fought to establish a civil ser­vice system to end patronage. Bloomberg was prepared to defy the history of civil ser­vice, which replaced the corrupt fee-­based ser­vice for a competitive one. Before civil ser­vice, “land office receivers and registers received a fee for ­every transaction, and postmasters ­were entitled to a percentage of the stamps they sold at all but the largest post offices” (R. White 2017, 359). Corruption ran rampant throughout government. Mayor Bloomberg now wished to weaken the civil ser­vice to gain control over the workforce so that he could transfer employees where needed and discharge incompetent employees easily. He was ultimately unsuccessful: his proposals infuriated the l­abor ­unions, and he did not persuade the state legislature to allow the mayor to exercise more authority over the city’s workforce. Bloomberg’s last term was the height of the “bud­get dance”: time and again the mayor cut back city programs dedicated to social ser­v ices of all kinds, and then the city council put the funds back into the bud­get. Nonetheless, most city agencies lost staff during the mayor’s third term, reflecting the mayor’s determination to reduce the size of city agencies, as shown in t­ able 3.5. Even the mayor’s most cherished agencies—­those involved with education and health care—­underwent cuts in positions. Although some agencies saw an increased head count, the net result was a loss of 2,294 city positions in the mayor’s third term (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2010, 2014a). Except for his first two years of office, Bloomberg ended each fiscal year with a bud­get surplus, as shown in t­ able 3.6.

58 CHAPTER 3

TABLE 3.5  Major losses in agency positions during Mayor Bloomberg’s third term (2010–2014) AGENCIES

CHANGE IN NUMBER OF POSITIONS (LOSS)

PUBLIC SAFETY

Corrections, civilian

(42)

Fire, uniform

(762)

Police, uniform

(196)

Police, civilian

(134)

Probation Total public safety

(210) (1,344)

OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS

Borough presidents’ offices Public advocate Total other elected officials

(15) (9) (24)

SOCIAL SER­VICES

Aging Homeless ser­vices Social ser­vices Youth development Total social ser­vices

(33) (64) (371) (8) (476)

OTHER

Buildings Business Integrity Commission City planning

(106) (11) (21)

Citywide ad ser­vices

(333)

Education

(488)

Environmental Protection

(202)

Finance

(80)

Health

(667)

HPD

(404)

­Human rights Investigations Mayoralty Rec­ords

(9) (6) (65) (3)

Small business

(28)

Sanitation, uniform

(42)

Sanitation, civilian Transportation

(94) (155)

Total other

(2,714)

Total

(4,558)

Source: New York City Office of the Comptroller 2010b and 2014a. Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs).

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TABLE 3.6  Bud­get surpluses during Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure (in millions of dollars) FY

REPORTED SURPLUS/DEFICIT

RETIREE HEALTH FUND TRANSFERS

2003

($4,760)

2004

($3,800)

2005

$3,529

2006

$3,751

$1,000

2007

$4,665

$1,500

2008

$4,635

2009

$2,914

2010

$3,646

2011

$3,742

2012

$2,462

2013

$2,807

2014

$1,983

DEBT DEFEASANCE

$1,319 $1,986

$196 $864

Source: Posillico 2014.

­ hese surpluses angered ­labor ­unions and community advocates who wanted T the money used for contract settlements or enhanced city ser­v ices. Bloomberg did not agree. His goal was to limit city spending on ser­v ices except for t­ hose he prioritized, such as education and economic development. The surpluses developed ­because of the increase in property tax rates and the dramatic increase in taxable real estate. The direct tax rate on all property increased from $10.41 per $100 in assessed value in fiscal year 2001 to $12.84 in fiscal year 2014 (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2001, 2014). (In the previous ten years the property tax rate stayed around ten dollars per $100 in assessed value.) In 2001 the estimated ­actual value of NYC taxable property was $354 billion and in 2014 the value was $858 billion (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2001, 2014). The tax revenues poured into the city and continue to do so during de Blasio’s mayoralty. Mayor de Blasio ­will continue to benefit from the increased tax rates and Bloomberg’s development boom.

­L abor Unions and the Mayor Over three hundred thousand employees work for the city, and most are a member of one of over a hundred ­unions. ­There is a ­legal structure and a practice governing u ­ nion negotiations with the city. The negotiation pro­cess is fragmented in ways that make it very difficult for any mayor to control costs. The Citizens Bud­get Commission (2013) describes the three major levels of negotiation:

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• Salaries, wages, and work rules are negotiated between city officials and individual ­unions. The mayor’s most power­ful position is when negotiating salaries ­union by u ­ nion. • Employee health insurance is negotiated between the mayor and the Municipal ­Labor Committee, which is a co­ali­tion of ­unions. ­Here the mayor is in a much more difficult position, since the u ­ nions form a united front. • Pension benefits are part of state law and “can only be changed by the state legislature” (CBC 2013). ­Here is where the mayor loses most of his control, and can only plead his case with the state actors. “Change to reduce benefits can only be enacted for prospective employees” (CBC 2013). ­ here is also another level of negotiation with some u T ­ nions. If contract negotiations reach an impasse with the uniform ser­vices (police and firefighter ­unions), the ­unions are entitled to binding mediation ­under state law through the Public Employment Relations Board. Once the police and fire ­unions demand binding arbitration, the mayor loses control. As Ronnie Lowenstein (2010) has noted, “A one ­percent increase for all municipal employees costs about $300 million in city funds.” “The city has about 150 collective bargaining agreements covering 300,000 municipal employees” (CBC 2013). In his first term, the mayor exchanged productivity increases from the major ­labor u ­ nions for increased salaries, including relatively large salary increases for teachers and the police. Bloomberg’s insistence on productivity increases in return for salary increases was similar to the demands made by Giuliani in his first term, but the teachers and police did not get the pay hike ­under Giuliani (Weikart 2009, 99). Bloomberg’s management philosophy in his first term included taking care of his workforce. For example, the mayor created an “innovative housing initiative [that allows] municipal workers preference for five ­percent of units in city-­ sponsored lotteries for affordable homes and apartments, and as first-­time home buyers, they could be eligible for down payment grants of up to six p ­ ercent of purchase price or on average $20,000 through the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development” (District Council 37, 2005a). In his first year Bloomberg took a liberal tack, signing “living wage” legislation that raised pay for home health care workers and ­later for “childcare workers and other caregivers employed by agencies receiving contracts from the city” (Cooper 2002). As Amanda Cooper (2002) reports, “The living wage rate started at $8.10 per hour plus health benefits and increased by 50 cents each year.” As Doug Turetsky (2011) notes, “The Brennan Center at New York University estimated that u ­ nder the new requirements, the pay of 50,000 home health care workers would rise im-

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mediately and l­ater the pay of up to 9,000 child care workers.” Conservative Steve Malanga (2009) said disappointedly, “Thanks to Mayor Bloomberg, New York ­will now have the largest number of workers covered by any living-­wage law in the nation.” Bloomberg changed his strategy concerning ­labor contracts over time. Most ­labor contracts (except for the UFT’s contract, which had expired e­ arlier) expired on January 1, 2003. At first Bloomberg sought productivity improvements, but then as the fall 2005 election neared, he signed contracts without givebacks; ­later in his second term, a­ fter the 2008 recession was over, he again became intent on productivity improvements. The next section is an examination of contracts negotiated with three of the city’s ­labor u ­ nions.

The District Council 37 Contract District Council 37 (DC 37), one of the largest municipal u ­ nion, endorsed the mayor in his first and second mayoral campaigns but endorsed his opponent in 2009. In February 2004 the mayor settled a contract with this ­union that ran from July 1, 2002, to June 30, 2005. The mayor agreed to a $1,000 payment for each member “in the first year, a 3 ­percent raise in the second year, and a 2 ­percent raise in the third year” (NYC IBO 2004a). But he would only agree to ­these modest increases if the ­union paid for ­these increases with productivity savings. ­These savings ­were achieved by “reducing starting salaries by 15 ­percent for two years, fewer days off and the attrition of roughly 1,000 workers” (NYC IBO 2004a). This 5 ­percent increase was too low for other ­unions who would live with the consequences of bargaining u ­ nder which the wage increases, agreed to in the first contract signed, generally applied to the ­unions that signed subsequent contracts. In June 2004 more than twenty thousand teachers, police officers, and firefighters demonstrated in one of the largest ­labor protests City Hall had seen in years. They ­were making a frontal assault on the mayor. ­Because of the DC 37’s agreement and other actions the mayor took, DC 37 endorsed Mayor Bloomberg for reelection in the fall of 2005. Some of Bloomberg’s first-­term actions that contributed to DC 37’s endorsement included • “ending hundreds of private contracts” and returning “the work to city employees”; • supporting funding HHC public hospitals and health care facilities in the face of a huge bud­get deficit; • beginning a major civilianization program in the New York Police Department that moves police officers from ­behind desks and onto city

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streets and “lets DC 37 members do their clerical, janitorial and computer programming jobs”; and • “introducing solid changes to improve the public school system.” (District Council 37 2005b) In July 2006, DC 37 and the Bloomberg administration agreed on a second contract covering thirty-­two months from July 1, 2005, to March 2, 2008. DC 37 got its reward for having supported the mayor in his reelection campaign: for the three-­year contract, the u ­ nion negotiated a generous contract that included a 9.15 ­percent wage increase over the three years and additional dollars contributed to the welfare fund, as well as, significantly, no productivity givebacks (DC37/ NYC 2006). Lillian Roberts, executive director of DC 37, spoke of why the ­union was supporting the mayor for reelection: “We have reached a fair ­labor settlement that serves the needs of both the City and u ­ nion members. Increased compensation and benefits coupled with a proposal to eliminate the City residency requirement ­will give a much deserved wage increase and additional flexibility to more than 100,000 u ­ nion members. . . . ​I want to thank the Mayor and his negotiating team for working long and hard with us to come to this agreement” (quoted in NYC Office of the Mayor 2006a). Roberts’s comments demonstrated what Bloomberg had accomplished in his first term with DC 37. He had mostly avoided layoffs for DC 37, and he had hired more civilians in the police and fire departments. Then came the 2008 recession, and Bloomberg got tougher with DC 37. In response, the ­union withdrew its support. In November 2008, DC 37 agreed to a third contract from March 3, 2008, to March 2, 2010 (District Council 37 2008). Within a year the ­union had split with the mayor over a reduction in health benefits (District Council 37 2009a). In 2009, in exchange for postponing the layoffs of one thousand permanent, noncompetitive, and labor-­class workers for ninety days ­under an agreement announced June 2 with the Municipal L ­ abor Committee, DC 37 agreed to $400 million in savings in health care costs over the next two years (Russo 2009). In May 2009, DC 37 was furious with the mayor’s proposed bud­get for fiscal year 2010. Facing a deep recession, Bloomberg saw no option and began layoffs that significantly affected DC 37 members (Sims 2009). For example, he wanted a reduction of almost one thousand civilians in the police department; almost all of ­these ­were members of DC 37. Lillian Roberts launched both a subway ad campaign and radio campaign opposing layoffs (District Council 37 2009b). DC 37 no longer supported Bloomberg and endorsed Bill Thompson for the mayoral race of 2009 (District Council 37 2009c) (see ­table 3.7).

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­TABLE 3.7  District Council 37 contracts during the Bloomberg administration DC 37 SIGNING DATE

FEBRUARY 2004

JULY 2006

NOVEMBER 2008

Length of contracts

July 1, 2002, to June 30, 2005

July 1, 2005, to March 2, 2008

March 3, 2008, to March 2, 2010

Percentage salary increase

6% plus $1,000 lump sum

9.15% wage increase

8% wage increase

Givebacks

Cut 15% of new hire salaries; additional hires in police department

No givebacks

No givebacks

Endorsements

Yes

Endorsed opponent

Source: DC37/NYC 2004, 2006, 2008.

The United Federation of Teachers The UFT and Bloomberg w ­ ere often at odds, particularly late in his mayoralty. Even so, the mayor offered higher salaries to teachers in exchange for enhanced productivity. In his first term, the UFT agreed to this condition. In addition, while the UFT failed to endorse Bloomberg for ­either of his reelection campaigns, neither did the ­union endorse his opponents. In June 2002 Bloomberg and UFT president, Randi Weingarten, announced an agreement on a new contract for 117,000 employees of the New York City Board of Education, including eighty thousand teachers, for thirty months (November 16, 2000, to May 31, 2003) (Seifman 2002b). The major agreements ­were • “Raises [of] salaries by 16 ­percent over 20 months” (Seifman 2002b). • “Teachers’ starting salaries would increase from $31,900 to $39,000 and pay for ­those with the most experience would jump from $70,000 to more than $81,000” (Seifman 2002b). • A substantial increase in instructional time (twenty minutes a day) for the city’s nearly 1.1 million public school students (Seifman 2002b). In the second contract, settled in October 2005, right before the election, the mayor succeeded in gaining major productivity improvements. The agreement (June 1, 2003, to October 12, 2007) included the following: • “New teachers got a starting salary of $42,512, up from $39,000. The top salary would rise from $81,232 to $93,416” (Bloomberg 2005c). Bloomberg was determined to end the loss of teachers to the suburbs by paying teachers a more competitive salary. • “The new contract changed the staffing pro­cess for teachers and schools in three major ways. First, it protected the right of schools to choose

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which teachers they hired, regardless of se­niority. Second, it ended the “bumping” of novice teachers out of their positions by se­nior teachers who claimed ­these positions based on se­niority and without input from principals or school staffs. Fi­nally, it established a more open hiring pro­cess for ‘excessed’ teachers” (Daly et al. 2008). • “Another 50 minutes was added to the school week” (Bloomberg 2005c). With this contract, the mayor succeeded in keeping the UFT from endorsing his opponent. In November 2006, the mayor announced a third contract in force from October 13, 2007, to October 31, 2009, in which the teachers got a 7.1 ­percent increase in salary and had to make only minor productivity increases (UFT 2006b). In this contract, a new teacher’s minimum starting salary would be $45,530, and the most se­nior teachers could earn a maximum salary of $100,049. Bloomberg did not seek productivity increases. An additional onetime cash payment of $750 brought the total salary package increase for all members to over 8 ­percent (UFT 2006b). The contract demanded no additional hours worked, no reduction of teaching time, no less favorable working conditions, and no reduction of pension and health benefits (UFT 2006b). The Bloomberg administration was paving the way for making savings on health care and pension costs by meeting with the co­ali­tion of ­labor ­unions in the city (the Municipal ­Labor Committee). As David Herszenhorn (2006) reported, “Negotiations over health benefits are to be conducted separately in talks with the Municipal ­Labor Committee, the umbrella group for the city’s ­unions, and since Ms. Weingarten is the committee chairwoman, her good ­will is essential if headway is to be made on insurance issues.” The mayor partially succeeded. In 2009 Bloomberg made an agreement with the Municipal L ­ abor Committee to amend the health benefits of all city workers and thus save $400 million over two years (Unity 2009). Although it looked as if the mayor was being generous with the ­unions, which he was in salaries, he got back what he wanted, which was savings in health benefits. Bloomberg succeeded in increasing the average teacher’s salary by 43 ­percent over his mayoralty: in 2000, a beginning teacher received $33,186, and by 2013 received $45,530, which was a 37.2 ­percent increase; the maximum had grown from $73,801 to $100,049, which was a 35.6 ­percent climb, an incredible increase given extremely difficult fiscal times. As Bloomberg said at the time, ­ here’s a compact between teachers and government and that is the pubT lic has to be willing to reach into their pocket and tax themselves to pay our teachers fairly. We want the best and the brightest and I’ve never been ashamed about saying p ­ eople that work hard and r­ eally make a difference deserve to be compensated, and I think compensated better than

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TABLE 3.8  United Federation of Teachers contracts during Mayor Bloomberg terms UFT SIGNING DATE

JUNE 2002

OCTOBER 2005

NOVEMBER 2006

Length of contracts

November 15, 2000, to May 31, 2003

June 1, 2003, to October 12, 2007

October 13, 2007, to October 31, 2009

Percentage teacher salary increase

16% to 22%

14.25%

7.1%

Givebacks

Increase in instructional time of twenty minutes a day

Increase in instructional time of fifty minutes a week; two extra days of work a year; end teacher se­niority rights for principals’ hiring; master teacher position

Minor givebacks

None

None

Endorsements Source: UFT 2002, 2005, 2006a.

t­ hose who d ­ on’t. . . . ​When I came into office, we would lose about 12,000 a year to retirements and to resignations, and we had trou­ble filling t­ hose 12,000 slots with certified teachers. ­Today we have 50-­odd thousand teachers a year from around the country, who apply to teach in the NYC school system and we only have about 5,000 vacancies on a base of 80,000. (NYC Office of the Mayor 2007b) The teachers’ salaries ­were now nearly competitive with ­those of the suburbs (see ­table 3.8).

Police Contracts The mayor managed to keep the Police Benevolent Association (PBA) of New York, which represented New York City police officers, from endorsing anyone ­else in the first mayoral race. For Bloomberg’s second election, other police u ­ nions did endorse him. The PBA had long sought pay for its members equal to that earned by police officers in other cities. The beginning salary was $36,878, while in some suburbs beginning salaries ­were $47,853 (Green­house 2002b). Having not reached an agreement with former mayor Giuliani, the police u ­ nion fi­nally went to binding arbitration, which was set up by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (NYS Public Employment Relations Board 2006). In September 2002, ­after the u ­ nion had been without a contract for twenty-­five months, a state arbitration panel awarded the PBA an 11.75 ­percent raise over twenty-­two months (Green­house 2002b).

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In June 2005 the PBA returned to arbitration for the next round of contract talks and won a 10 ­percent raise covering the years 2002–4. The panel said the police w ­ ere underpaid compared with police in other cities and nearby suburbs. The police had to relinquish their one annual personal day, and rookie officers received less during their six months in the police acad­emy; their pay would start at $25,100 and rise to $32,700 upon graduation (NYS Public Employment Relations Board 2006). Then, in May 2008, ­there was another arbitration, to cover the period from August 1, 2004, to July 31, 2006. Starting salaries moved from $25,100 to $35,881, while all police officers received raises of 4.5 to 5 ­percent (NYC PBA 2008a). T ­ here was a sizable increase in maximum basic pay, from $59,588 to $65,382. New recruits received ten annual leave days in addition to their eigh­teen chart days off. The mayor won productivity increases, however: a reduction of vacation days from twenty to ten for police officers with fewer than five years of ser­v ice. The ­union also agreed to more flexibility in deploying officers, which saved on overtime (Bloomberg 2008a). Then, in October 2008, the mayor and the PBA came to a four-­year agreement covering August 1, 2006, to July 31, 2010, without arbitration; the u ­ nion did not wish to return to arbitration ­because the last round had cut annual leave days for new officers (NYC PBA 2008b). The contract that the PBA and Bloomberg announced in the fall of 2008 meant a 4 ­percent increase for each of four years. By the time the contract would expire, the starting salary would be nearly $42,000, and it raised the base salary ­after 5.5 years on the job from $65,382 to $76,488 (Bloomberg 2008a) (see t­ able 3.9). In summary, Mayor Bloomberg demanded and got productivity increases in his first term. DC 37, the largest municipal ­union, with 121,000 members, sup-

­TABLE 3.9  New York Police Department ­union contracts during the Bloomberg administration JUNE 2005 ARBITRATION DECISION

MAY 2008 ARBITRATION DECISION

OCTOBER 2008 CONTRACT SIGNED

Length of contracts

August 2, 2002, to July 31, 2004

August 1, 2004, to July 31, 2006

August 1, 2006, to July 31, 2010

Percentage salary increase

10% increase

5% increase

16% increase

Givebacks

Reductions in pay for cadets in police acad­emy

Reduction of vacation from twenty to ten days for new hires

No givebacks

Endorsements

None

DECISION DATE

Source: NYS Public Employment Relations Board 2006 and 2008. NYCPBA 2008.

None

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ported him for reelection in a second term. He did not succeed in getting the UFT to endorse him, but the UFT also did not endorse Bloomberg’s opponent, former Bronx borough president Fernando Ferrer (Steier 2017). Bloomberg received endorsements from the NYS Court Officers Association (New York Times 2005), NYC Mechanics Union (Rutenberg 2005), the Detectives’ Endowment Association (Hu and Confessore 2005), and the Lieutenants Benevolent Association (Otis and Steier 2005). During his second term, in order to be reelected for a third term, he did not seek productivity improvements ­until ­after the election.

The Third Term The 2008 recession changed every­thing. In his third term, the mayor who had focused on managing costs for health benefits began to focus on extracting concessions in ­union pensions. “Bloomberg, an in­de­pen­dent, said Albany’s past decisions drove the cost of the city’s pension contributions to $8 billion in 2012 from $1.5 billion in 2002” (Gralla and Burns 2012). The mayor in his final weeks in office said that he had made a commitment three years e­ arlier that he would “not sign a contract with salary increases u ­ nless” benefit packages w ­ ere reformed (Campbell 2013). This attack on u ­ nion pensions utterly alienated the l­ abor ­unions. Although the average pension for a New York City worker belonging to DC 37 fell in the $20,000 range, the pensions for police and firefighters could be enormous. The highest pension given to a city firefighter was to one who retired in 2013 with a pension of $284,624 (Empire Center, n.d.). Hundreds of firefighters and police officers had pensions over $100,000 (Empire Center, n.d.). In 2012 the mayor went to Albany and with Governor Andrew Cuomo achieved a Tier VI stage (Tier V in New York City), u ­ nder which new hires would receive less in pension and health benefits. Without the mayor’s help, the po­liti­cal w ­ ill would not have existed to pass Tier V provisions through the state legislature (Cuomo 2012b). The provisions that would affect the value of the pension benefit for all f­ uture New York City Employee Retirement System retirees u ­ nder Tier V are as follows (Fiscal Policy Institute 2012): • Reduction in the annual benefit multiplier from 2 ­percent to 1.67 ­percent. • Increase in the retirement age from 65 (­there is no provision for receiving a reduced benefit for early retirement before age 65) (Fiscal Policy Institute 2012). • Increase in the “number of years that enter into the determination of the final average salary (FAS) from the three highest consecutive years to the [five] highest consecutive years” (Fiscal Policy Institute 2012).

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The actions would save “more than $80 billion over the next thirty years” for New York State (NYS Office of the Governor 2012). Bloomberg had achieved limiting the cost of pensions for the city for all new hires. Most municipal u ­ nions concluded that Bloomberg, in his third term, was so fixated on extracting concessions that negotiating fair agreements was not pos­si­ ble. “ ‘It’s obvious that he ­doesn’t want to ­settle,’ Ed Mullins, head of the Sergeants Benevolent Association, told the civil ser­v ice weekly The Chief. ‘Every­one’s just waiting for the next guy’ ” (quoted in Peter Hogness 2013). And their wait was rewarded. In his first term, Mayor Bill de Blasio agreed to generous terms with no demands for productivity improvements. While Bloomberg was criticized widely for not negotiating l­abor contracts in his last term and leaving the prob­ lem to the next mayor, the real­ity was that he had faced this same prob­lem when he had come into the mayoralty. The ­labor ­unions had refused to negotiate contracts with Giuliani, waiting ­until Bloomberg came into office. In addition, Bloomberg faced negotiating contracts in fiscal year 2002 with no monies in the bud­get for the contracts and a huge deficit, while he left a surplus and increased revenue inflows for the next mayor.

Pensions Robert North, the city’s chief actuary of its pension funds for twenty-­four years, began a discussion about pensions with a reminder that the state controls the pension systems in New York: “Article V, Section 7 of the NYS Constitution says that the benefits of membership in a retirement system may not be diminished nor impaired. ­Because of this constitutional protection you can never reduce anybody’s benefit, including ­future accruals” (quoted in Dunbar 2006). Once pensions are granted, they cannot be reduced, even if they cost more than expected. New York City’s “pension costs r­ ose from $1.5 billion in 2002 to $8.4 billion in fiscal year 2012, representing almost 13 ­percent of the $67 billion bud­get for fiscal 2012” (Goldman 2012). The growth in pension costs has quite a history. Mayor Ed Koch loved to tell the story of how he convinced Governor Mario Cuomo to veto the police pension bill passed by the state legislature in the early 1980s. The governor visited Koch when he lay ill in a hospital bed a­ fter his first heart attack. Cuomo asked Koch what he could do for him. And the mayor, never at a loss for words, asked the governor to veto the police pension bill before the state legislature; the city could not afford it. And Governor Cuomo did (Koch 1992, 243). Pension bills came regularly to the state legislature and ­were passed regardless of ­whether they ­were supported by the city’s mayor or city council. The state had driven the cost

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of pensions higher and higher for many years. A typical example is the success of the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association in getting supplemental pay of $12,000 that was already provided to members of the police and firefighters’ ­unions, and in 2006, Governor Pataki fi­nally agreed (Cooper 2006). The cost to the city taxpayer: $100 million. Indeed, much of the increase in pension costs occurred before Bloomberg’s terms in office. In fiscal year 2000 the state legislature and governor gave “annual cost-­of-­living pension increases for the first time to retired state and local government workers. The decision, affecting 1.7 million current and former employees, [was] projected to cost New York City more than $500 million a year” (New York Times 2000). In addition, the legislature passed a bill eliminating “pension contributions from employees ­after they have worked more than 10 years. ­Until then, the workers contributed 3 ­percent of their salaries t­ oward their pensions” (Cooper and Lipton 2002). In effect, city workers with ten years in the system suddenly got a 3 ­percent raise (Pérez-­Peña 2000). Thus, a g­ reat giveaway in pensions had occurred ­under Mayor Giuliani’s watch. Another reason pension costs increased so much during Bloomberg’s tenure was that Giuliani had reduced the city’s pension contribution during the bull market of the 1990s. Pension costs ­were lower due to the dot-­com boom, and stock market profits w ­ ere so g­ reat that Giuliani made a deal with the u ­ nions allowing the city to withdraw $800 million in pension fund contributions (Cooper 2007). But ­after Bloomberg was elected, a market crash caused a sharp decline in pension assets. By 2007 the pension funds had to make up for sharp reductions in contributions ­because of the Wall Street crisis, and the decline in the stock market partially explains why average fringe benefits nearly tripled in that time from $13,356 to $37,619 (Citizens Bud­get Commission 2009, 3). Making ­matters worse, “In 2000, near the height of the stock market boom, Mr. Giuliani supported a mea­sure to put less money in the pension funds for the city’s retirees. By recognizing the funds’ investment gains at once—­instead of phasing them in over years to smooth out sharp gains and losses—he was able to spend $800 million over two years that the city other­wise would have had to invest in its pension funds” (Cooper 2007). That same spring, the state legislature “also voted to eliminate pension contributions from employees a­ fter they have worked more than 10 years. ­Until then, the workers contributed 3 ­percent of their salaries ­toward their pensions” (Cooper and Lipton 2002). In large part, it was previous administrations that had increased pension costs, a prob­lem that Bloomberg inherited. It is true, however, that when Bloomberg awarded pay increases, this meant increased pension costs. Salary increases approved by Bloomberg w ­ ere responsible for “almost 30 ­percent of the growth in

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city pension costs from the 2002 through 2008 fiscal years,” according to the ­Office of Management and Bud­get (Barbaro 2009). But the bulk of the increase comes from decisions made during Giuliani’s and Pataki’s times in office. Bloomberg was one of the few mayors to effectively lobby New York governors to address pension costs. In his second term, Bloomberg lobbied Governor David Paterson to veto a pension bill. “The legislation, which would have allowed newly hired police officers and firefighters to enroll for so-­called ‘Tier II’ pension benefits, has been routinely reauthorized since 1981” (Hakim 2009). Paterson did veto the bill. ­Because of the governor’s veto in 2009, police and firefighters hired before 2009 get 75 ­percent of their pension in disability benefits, while t­ hose hired a­ fter the legislation was vetoed get only 50 ­percent of their pension in disability benefits. In addition, ­those hired a­ fter 2009 have their pensions offset by Social Security benefits. ­These changes ­were reversed ­after Bloomberg left office (NYS Assembly, n.d.). In his third term Bloomberg pursued reducing ­future city costs incurred by the ­unions’ pension funds. He did so by organ­izing county leaders from around the state to pressure the governor and state legislature (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012b). In 2012, New York Leaders for Pension Reform was made up of fourteen county executives and legislative leaders and twelve mayors. Mayor Bloomberg commented: “Our brand-­new co­ali­tion of elected officials called New York Leaders for Pension Reform represents at the moment 15 million New Yorkers, and it’s ­going to grow from h ­ ere. We come from both ends of the po­liti­cal spectrum and all corners of the state, from urban and rural communities, from Suffolk to Syracuse and White Plains to Watertown. But in spite of ­those differences, it is our growing concern for New York’s fiscal f­ uture that unites us” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012b). Bloomberg was one of the first mayors to or­ga­nize statewide elected officials to oppose l­abor demands. He demonstrated that when mayors band together, they can sometimes win state concessions. The ­labor u ­ nions ­were furious as the mayor worked closely with the governor and state legislature to build a consensus and succeeded. Governor Cuomo signed the bill that created a new pension tier, Tier VI, effective April 1, 2012, for all new employees (Tier V for New York City employees) (NYS OSC, n.d.). This tier offered fewer benefits and came with more requirements than previous tiers had. The pension reform legislation meant that ­these changes would save the city more than $1 billion over ten years (NYS Office of the Governor 2012). It was a major win for the mayor.

Health Care Expenses Mayor Bloomberg was determined to reduce both pension and health benefit costs in a city with generous health care benefits, but he had ­little success with

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the latter. In fact, the major reason the ­labor u ­ nions refused to agree to contracts during the mayor’s third term was the changes he wanted to make to manage the costs of health care benefits and pensions. “Currently, 95 ­percent of all City workers do not make any contribution ­toward their health care insurance premium. However, more than 90 ­percent of state employees and more than 90 ­percent of private sector employees make some contribution” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013d). That did not change ­under Bloomberg. “Health insurance cost $6.3 billion in fiscal year 2013—­twice as much as in fiscal year 2002—­and [was] expected to grow by 32 ­percent to $8.3 billion in fiscal year 2017” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013d). A study by the Citizens Bud­get Commission (CBC) comparing the city’s retiree health benefits with t­hose of the federal government and other cities found that “none of the other jurisdictions matched NYC’s policy of covering 100 ­percent of the premium for both individual and f­amily coverage and reimbursing the full cost of Medicare part B premiums for retirees and spouses” (Citizens Bud­get Commission 2017). Health care expenses had increased sharply for years. Bloomberg wanted new contracts with health care ser­vice providers and a restructuring of health benefit plans. “The city is preparing a Request for Proposals to replace existing health care contracts with a modern program that incorporates wellness incentives and active disease management that provide City employees with a higher standard of care while saving up to $400 million each year” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013d). But the ­unions would not agree to the request for proposal. In addition, the mayor wanted to restructure benefits so that workers made contributions for their premiums. ­After much negotiation in fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2011, the ­unions agreed to charge retirees co-­payments for certain medical ser­vices (NYS FCB 2010, 34). But the costs of Medicare supplemental benefits ­were still absorbed by the city and not paid by the retirees (Citizens Bud­get Commission 2017). For the ­unions, the idea of cutting pensions and health benefits was infuriating ­because, so often ­under the Koch administration, ­union members had agreed to contracts in which salaries remained low but at least members ­were getting pensions and benefits (Schermerhorn 2013; Soffer 2011, 20). Now, ­after years of forgoing salary increases, ­those hard-­earned benefits ­were being attacked by Mayor Bloomberg. Unfortunately for the ­unions, business and government leaders ­were reducing benefits throughout the United States: defined-­benefit pensions ­were giving way to defined-­contribution pensions. One of the few places where an employee could find a defined-­benefit pension plan was in a municipal u ­ nion, and ­these ­were now ­under attack. The same erosion of value was true for health benefits. As can be seen in the next section, Bloomberg was responding to a context in which the state and federal governments w ­ ere providing fewer resources, thus forcing the city to finance far more ser­v ices than it had in the past.

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Slow Growth Rate and Changes in Federal and State Dollars Bloomberg witnessed a lack of support from both state and federal governments during his time in office. Part of his wish to control city expenditures reflected his understanding of the city’s financial isolation. When Governor Andrew Cuomo was elected in 2010, the friction between the governor and the mayor was readily apparent. It was not just a m ­ atter of two huge egos clashing; the mayor realized that the state was pulling back from financial commitments. A ­ fter the long, close relationship with Governor Pataki (1995–2006), the mayor had short-­term amicable relationships with Governor Eliot Spitzer (2007–8) and Governor David Paterson (2008–10). Yet Bloomberg soon endured several bruising ­battles with Governor Cuomo, whom he had endorsed. (Likewise, the mayor’s successor, Bill de Blasio, endured endless and even more ferocious b ­ attles with the governor.) In the spring of 2011, immediately a­ fter Cuomo’s victory, the governor announced that he had to cut the state bud­get, which meant he would cut education aid to the city. Bloomberg immediately responded that if the governor ­were to cut state aid to the city, the mayor must be given flexibility to lay off teachers regardless of se­niority. The mayor said, “So we have to r­ eally do something about this. Across this city, layoffs would send exactly the wrong message to our kids. You know, we tell them, ‘Work hard, play by the rules, you can rise as far as your talents can take you.’ And yet Albany rules say that when it comes to teaching, talent ­doesn’t ­matter, results ­don’t ­matter” (quoted in Barbaro and Confesseore 2011). The relationship spiraled downward as the governor, facing his own fiscal challenges, cut state aid to the city. A year l­ater Cuomo announced that he would seek tax increases on the wealthy, and Bloomberg disagreed. Then the governor and mayor bickered for a year over the need for more taxis outside of Manhattan. Fi­nally, the governor agreed, and the legislation was passed to establish a new category of livery cars that could make on-­ street pickups outside of Manhattan. The mayor wanted thirty thousand livery cars but had to agree to sixteen thousand, as the governor held the legislation hostage. Cuomo supported converting the city’s nonprofit health insurer, EmblemHealth, into a for-­profit corporation. The state would receive $1 billion in needed revenue. The mayor interfered with the governor’s plans as he wished to consider other health insurance carriers for city workers. Bloomberg knew that a for-­profit corporation might mean short-­term gain but that in the long term it would not be a good deal. Bloomberg had a dif­fer­ent prob­lem: he continually sought help from the federal government, but it was slow in coming. As can be seen in t­ able 3.10, the federal government’s bud­get did not increase at the same rates as it had for ­earlier

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­TABLE 3.10  Growth in state and federal categorical aid to New York City in each mayoralty $

State Federal

KOCH

DINKINS

GIULIANI

BLOOMBERG

136.7%

14.1%

36.0%

35.9%

28.6%

37.8%

54.0%

11.0%

Source: NYC Office of the Comptroller 1980, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2014a.

mayors, although the city benefited from the federal stimulus money ­after the 2008 recession. Although federal aid did increase immediately ­after 9/11, over time federal categorical aid increased more slowly for New York City than for other cities, even although 9/11 remained fresh in every­one’s mind. In addition, federal categorical aid had changed emphasis starting in the 1980s, reflecting the policy positions of President Ronald Reagan and the conservative presidents and Congresses that followed. In 1980, during the Koch administration, 67.9 ­percent of federal aid was dedicated to social ser­vices, and 17.9 ­percent was dedicated to education. By 2014, at the end of the Bloomberg administration, 48.4 ­percent was dedicated to social ser­v ices and 24.7 ­percent to education. This shift left the city to fund more social ser­v ices itself than previously (City of New York 2007). The state shifted its emphasis as well. The proportion of state aid ­going to city social ser­v ices declined dramatically from 1980 to 2014. In 1980, 30.9 ­percent of all state funding to the city went to social ser­v ices. By 2014, only 13.3 ­percent of all state funding went to social ser­v ices. In 1980, 30.9 ­percent of all state aid went to education; in 2014, 72.4 ­percent of all state aid went to education (City of New York 2007). Again, the city was left to pick up the tab for social ser­v ices.

Chapter Summar y Mayor Bloomberg faced financial challenges few other mayors had faced: 9/11, the 2008 recession, and Hurricane Sandy. And he dealt with them skillfully. During his three terms he had a financial surplus for most years, and when he left office, he left b ­ ehind a surplus—­quite unlike the deficit he faced when entering the mayoralty. His strategy of raising taxes on the wealthy resulted in tax revenues pouring into the city when he needed them. Thanks to t­hose early tax increases, when the 2008 recession struck, the mayor had a cushion that helped the city recover quickly. Yet his constant cuts to social ser­vice agencies ­were done without a serious consideration of their potential impact. Childcare slots declined;

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the number of correction officers in the city jails was reduced. Fi­nally, Bloomberg’s close relationship with Governor Pataki and his willingness to tread carefully with re­spect to state politics paid off. The mayor was able to achieve changes at the state level that he deemed impor­tant to the city’s f­ uture. At the same time, Bloomberg prioritized education, public health, and economic development. He was perfectly willing to attack the “sacred cows” of the police and fire departments as he maintained his priorities. The mayor held to a course opposite that of Mayor Giuliani, who consistently cut taxes and avoided cutting expenses in certain areas. Overall, thanks to his tax increases, Bloomberg enjoyed greater tax revenue increases than had other New York City mayors since the 1975 fiscal crisis. This occurred despite the tax revenue dips resulting from 9/11 and the 2008 recession. As the mayor commented on increasing income taxes on the wealthy: “They are not ­going to be happy, but that is where the money is” (quoted in Archibold 2003). By his third term Bloomberg sought agency cuts rather than tax increases. He was flexible in his approach, not hesitating to take back the property tax rebate or the property tax cuts he had intended to implement ­after he saw the results of the 2008 recession. Bloomberg also cut public safety positions and other city agencies to hold down spending. In all ­these re­spects he differed from his pre­de­ces­sor; it would be too simplistic to lump the two mayors together as conservative. When it came to financing the city’s needs, Bloomberg balanced the bud­get but remained incredibly frustrated over his inability to gain control of his workforce. Indeed, his relationship with l­abor ­unions deteriorated throughout his mayoralty. At first, he did well by the ­unions, particularly the UFT and the police ­unions, in terms of salary increases. New York City teachers and police officers had been underpaid compared to their suburban counter­parts, and Bloomberg helped close this pay gap. The ­unions had to give something, too, as the mayor succeeded in negotiating productivity improvements. In his third term he went on an all-­out attack on the ­unions, and was harshly criticized ­because he would not ­settle with them. He would not agree to new contracts without pension reform and substantial health care reform: “Pensions and health care costs have become a major percentage of the overall compensation we provide to our workforce. In fact, the pension and health care benefits we pay for uniformed workers amount to more than 100 ­percent of their salaries” (Bloomberg 2013a). The u ­ nions thought they would get a better deal with the next mayor, so they refused to bargain. And they ­were right: Mayor Bill de Blasio negotiated sweet deals with the ­unions in his first term. Clearly Mayor Bloomberg wanted far more reforms in workplace practices than what the l­ abor u ­ nions ­were willing to concede. His Workforce Reform Task Force was a blueprint for devaluing the civil ser­vice bureaucracy and hiring many

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more workers without civil ser­vice protection. Bloomberg’s strategy to reform the civil ser­v ice and reduce its size had a markedly dif­fer­ent focus from that of reformers a ­century ago, who desperately sought civil ser­v ice reform to dismantle the city’s patronage machine. Mike Bloomberg had a vision of a city: “If New York City is a business, it i­ sn’t Wal-­Mart—it ­isn’t trying to be the lowest-­priced product in the market. It’s a high-­end product, maybe even a luxury product. New York offers tremendous value, but only for ­those companies able to capitalize on it” (quoted in Cardwell 2003). Though he was speaking at an economic conference about corporations that ­were high-­end, the mayor wanted his city government to be high-­end as well. That is why he would never get the vote of ­labor u ­ nions, which are invested in the status quo. Bloomberg did not believe that government bureaucracies needed to remain the same in staffing, technology, space, and—­most impor­tant—­culture. He did not understand the importance of civil ser­vice, ignoring the history of corruption before its adoption. He did not subscribe to fears that increased taxes would drive ­people out, though he sought increased taxes only when the alternative to balance the bud­get was draconian cuts to city ser­v ices. Even so, Bloomberg grew increasingly conservative over his three terms in his approach to tax and wage increases. In his third term he cut city ser­v ices in lieu of increasing tax rates. He is criticized for not settling ­union contracts before his term expired. But he was right to insist that if the next mayor insisted on productivity savings in return for salary increases, ­there would be no fiscal issue. In many ways, Bloomberg was the ultimate pragmatic mayor. Other than Fiorello La Guardia, no New York City mayor has faced greater challenges or changed the city so fundamentally than did Mike Bloomberg. And when it came to protecting and growing the city’s resources, he remains unequalled. His successor has enjoyed rich revenue streams gained from both tax increases and economic development that has poured into the city as a result of Bloomberg’s efforts.

4 GROWING THE CITY AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

Mayor Michael Bloomberg had a remarkable rec­ord in economic development; he changed the city in ways that ­will be felt for de­cades into the ­future. “Bloomberg’s most impor­tant legacy—­the one that affects their daily lives most—­may be the role he’s played in reshaping the urban landscape. If pre­de­ces­sor Rudolph Giuliani was the mayor who made New York a safer place to live, Bloomberg is the guy who’s made it a more pleasant one. Through an unpre­ce­dented emphasis on parks, pedestrians and development, Bloomberg’s signal achievement could be the physical transformation of the city” (Peteritas 2013). Bloomberg worried that the city would repeat the ­mistakes of the 1975 fiscal crisis, in which drastic cuts ­were made to ser­v ices, and spending funds on infrastructure ended. In his 2009 State of the City Address he said, “­We’ll continue investing in new infrastructure. In past recessions, too often City governments ­stopped investing in infrastructure. W ­ e’re not making that ­mistake—no way” (Bloomberg 2009b). The misery of 1975 had stayed with Bloomberg, and he refused to make the same ­mistakes. Several journalists and scholars have analyzed the mayor’s rec­ord on economic development and called attention to his ignorance of the unintended consequences of his large-­scale development in the city’s neighborhoods.1 ­These authors fail to account, however, for the tremendous economic growth the mayor initiated throughout the five boroughs, even though the city had gone through the tragedy of 9/11 and the 2008 economic recession. New businesses spread throughout the city from 2000 to 2015, most notably in low-­income neighborhoods. As the city

76

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comptroller’s office noted, “The city’s 22 lower income neighborhoods, in par­tic­u­ lar, saw rapid business growth. From 2000 to 2015, the number of private sector businesses in ­these districts grew 41 ­percent (from 29,444 to 41,640), compared to just 12 ­percent in the city’s thirty-­three higher income areas (174,254 to 195,558)” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2017a). By his third term Bloomberg had become such a polarizing figure that in the mayoral race, opponents talked about New York being two cities, one rich and one poor. But this simplistic rhe­toric ignored much of the data. The mayor reminded ­people, “In the year a­ fter 9/11, our city lost more than 100,000 private sector jobs. But ­today, we have a rec­ord number of private sector jobs—up more than 400,000 from that time. And the majority of ­those jobs have been created outside of Manhattan” (Bloomberg 2013d). Bloomberg believed passionately that to reduce poverty the city needed jobs—­ and lots of them. It was not welfare, food stamps, and so forth that got p ­ eople out of poverty—it was jobs. Four years ­after Bloomberg had left the mayoralty, the numbers of new jobs ­were incredibly impressive. “New York City is under­ going its largest and longest job expansion since World War II. More than 700,000 jobs have been added during the past eight years [2009 to 2017] (a gain of nearly 19 ­percent), pushing employment to uncharted levels” (NYS OSC 2018, 3). The business sector, including technology, was the largest source of new jobs from 2009 to 2017 (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2017a). And, of course, the city’s economy became far more diversified. Growth was driven by jobs in health care, business ser­v ices, arts and culture, and particularly tech and media companies and tourism-­related businesses (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2017b). It is clear that Bloomberg defined economic development broadly; as Ron Coan (2014) notes, “World Cities do not compete with incentives on the basis of low cost, low tax, less ser­vices. Bloomberg raised taxes/fees, especially in his first term. This may not have been the traditional business climate that most mayors think of but it was certainly Bloomberg’s idea of business climate.” To Bloomberg, the arts, the educational system, and housing all w ­ ere part of economic development. The only mayor who compares to Bloomberg in this re­spect was Fiorello La Guardia, but La Guardia had a blank check from President Franklin D. Roo­se­ velt. Bloomberg did not have a blank check; he had a much tougher time persuading the state and federal governments to invest in New York City, and he had to lead New Yorkers into believing that the city could be restored. He did this while the city overcame three major catastrophes: 9/11, the 2008 recession, and Hurricane Sandy. He also increased taxes so that he and his successors in office would have sufficient resources to maintain city ser­v ices. This chapter focuses on the mayor’s economic development strategies and their impact.

78 CHAPTER 4

Planning Mayor Bloomberg, a trained systems thinker with his degree in electrical engineering, believed in planning. During his twelve-­year tenure he developed several long-­term development plans that would guide ­every staff member in his administration and succeeding administrations. In addition, he created a structure to institutionalize ­those plans. The Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City, a nonprofit organ­ization, became a bridge between the city’s bureaucracies and the private sector. The fund was described as a means to institute “a hub for private sector financial resources, provide leadership in the development and execution of public-­private proj­ects, help monitor and evaluate metrics and impacts, and communicate between public and private sector partners” (Freedman Consulting 2014, 7). The deputy mayor for economic development for much of this planning was Daniel Doctoroff, a l­awyer and former partner at Oak Hill Capital who became most famous for attempting and then failing to bring the Olympic Games to the city. Doctoroff wrote a self-­laudatory book, Greater Than Ever: New York’s Big Comeback (2017), which focused mainly on the failed Olympic bid and Ground Zero, the World Trade Center (WTC) site. In 2002 the mayor announced his Five Borough Economic Opportunity Plan, which had three goals: (1) to “improve the quality of life in the city” to attract and retain employers and employees; (2) to create an environment that gave businesses the tools to be competitive and create jobs; and (3) to reduce the city’s dependence on financial ser­v ices and on the borough of Manhattan (Porter, Ketels, and Ramirez-­Vallejo 2009). Bloomberg was the first mayor in modern times to create a plan that focused on all five boroughs rather than just Manhattan. In 2006 the city submitted its bid for the 2012 Olympics and in d ­ oing so unveiled a development plan called NYC2012, for all five boroughs that would be implemented ­whether or not the city won the Olympic bid. As Mitchell Moss notes, “New York City’s bid for the 2012 Olympics explic­itly sought to use the Olympics as a catalyst for development of facilities and infrastructure that would have lasting value” (2011, 2). The plan concentrated on seven areas of the city that ­were still relatively underdeveloped: “the far west side of Manhattan, Brooklyn’s East River waterfront, Long Island City in Queens, the Flushing section of Queens, Harlem, the South Bronx, and downtown Brooklyn” (Moss 2011, 2). To implement ­these redevelopment plans, the Bloomberg administration had to rezone large tracts of land. One of the powers the states do not control is local zoning. Many years ago, in the 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler (a decision laced with racist and class-­biased exclusionary reasoning and impact), the US Supreme Court ruled that a municipality could limit property o ­ wners’ rights to use their land as they

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wanted. “The direct result of the Court’s holding in Euclid v. Ambler,” notes Michael Wolf, “was the continued, rapid proliferation of zoning ordinances throughout the United States.” In effect, the Supreme Court “elevated the public good over private rights” (Wolf 2008, 23). Since the Euclid decision, the Supreme Court has continued to support the right of localities to govern land use. And Mayor Bloomberg made full use of that power. In November 2007, in a speech before the conservative Manhattan Institute, the mayor explained his long-­range economic development plan: “Since 2002, ­we’ve taken seventy-­eight re-­zonings through the U­LURP [Uniform Land Use Review Procedure] pro­cess. We ­haven’t lost a single one of t­hose re-­zonings—­not one. And this is New York, where if you ask five ­people a question, you’ll get six answers” (Bloomberg 2007b). The Bloomberg administration divided rezoning into four categories according to the goal: converting manufacturing areas to mixed use (residential and office), promoting greater density in commercial areas (upzoning), controlling commercial development in residential areas (balanced zoning), and limiting commercial development in residential areas (downzoning) outside of Manhattan. Downzonings occurred particularly in Staten Island, eastern Queens, and southern Brooklyn, which preserved middle-­class neighborhoods from development (Goldberg 2015, 3). Bloomberg sought a green city as well as a growing one and hence launched another plan, PlaNYC. When he launched PlaNYC in 2007, he announced to New Yorkers a long-­term aim of meeting the challenges of greening a growing city through 2030. The plan focused on five key dimensions: land, air, ­water, energy, and transportation (City of New York 2007). The key to implementation would be making better use of land by rezoning large tracts to create greater population density in many, but not all, areas. Land had become a scarce commodity in the city, so the only way for the city to grow was up. The city’s report on PlaNYC used the Greenpoint-­Williamsburg neighborhood of Brooklyn as an example. If that area ­were rezoned for greater density, more than ten thousand housing units could be built to accommodate thousands of New Yorkers. Jamaica, Queens, was used as another example of what was pos­si­ble (City of New York 2007). PlaNYC was invaluable. The 127-­point plan included planting a million trees, and by the time he left office, Bloomberg had accomplished just that. He also cut green­house gas emissions. Heather Rogers (2015) notes, “At of the end of 2013, the city had cut its greenhouse-­gas emissions by 19 ­percent, two-­thirds of the way to PlaNYC’s goal of a thirty ­percent reduction by 2030.” At the same time, the PlaNYC agenda made New York City central to climate change strategies for cities around the globe. “To help respond to climate change in New York City and accomplish the goals outlined in PlaNYC, the City’s long-­term sustainability plan, Mayor Bloomberg convened the First New York City Panel on Climate Change

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(NPCC1) in 2008” (NYC PCC 2013, 3). This task force was charged with creating a coordinated plan to adapt transportation, ­water and sewer systems, electrical systems, and other critical infrastructure to climate change. “Following Hurricane Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg convened the second New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC2) in January 2013 to provide up-­to-­date scientific information and analyses on climate risks” (NYC PCC 2013, 3). Composed of leading climate change scientists, the NPCC2 was charged with advising the mayor and the post-­ Sandy task force (Building Resiliency Task Force) on issues related to climate change—­specifically, “to provide up-­to-­date scientific information and analyses on climate risks” (NYC PCC 2013). The report provided new climate change projections and ­future coastal flood risk maps for New York City. The Applied Sciences NYC initiative, begun in 2010, was a competition among seven universities to make a technical and engineering school central to the city and thus attract corporations and businesses to the city. “Bloomberg hopes the school ­will connect the city’s venture cap­i­tal­ists, entrepreneurs and scientific research communities, resulting in the incubation of tech startups and engendering a sort of Silicon Valley on the Hudson” (MetroFocus 2011). Through this competition, Bloomberg offered city land, seed money, and administrative support to help colleges come to the city and launch new research and teaching facilities. A year ­later, the mayor and the presidents of Cornell University and Technion–­Israel Institute of Technology, which had won the competition, agreed to a partnership to build an applied science and engineering campus on Roo­se­ velt Island. This was the first of four initiatives to build 21st-­century facilities for science and engineering (MetroFocus 2011). Then came a plan focused on the city’s waterfront. On March 14, 2011, Bloomberg and New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn unveiled a comprehensive plan called the Waterfront Vision and Enhancement Strategy (WAVES) “to reconnect New Yorkers and visitors to the ­water and reclaim New York City’s waterfront with new parks, new industrial activities and new housing and it ­will capitalize on the City’s waterways to promote water-­borne transportation, recreation, maritime activity and natu­ral habitats” (NYC EDC 2011). In the midst of this planning, the mayor became chair of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, comprising progressive cities around the world that wanted to deal with climate change. In coordination with the New York Acad­emy of Medicine, the Bloomberg administration sought to make New York City a friendlier city for older citizens through the 2009 report Age-­Friendly NYC. The document reported on fifty-­nine initiatives to better equip New York City for an aging population, noting, “The initiatives are grouped into four main areas—­community and civic participation; housing; public spaces and transportation; and health and social services—[and]

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they span all domains and w ­ ill benefit New Yorkers of all ages. They range from issues as public as the movement of traffic and the design of public seating to as private as managing personal health concerns and living one’s final years with grace and dignity” (City of New York 2009, 5). Mayor Bloomberg appointed a task force to assess the city’s vulnerability ­after Hurricane Sandy. “The storm resulted in the deaths of 44 City residents and inflicted an estimated $19 billion in damages and lost economic activity across the New York City. Most significantly, over 69,000 residential units w ­ ere damaged, and thousands of New Yorkers ­were temporarily displaced” (NYC CDBG 2013). All five boroughs suffered. The NPCC2 made major recommendations about how to avoid damage in the ­future. Not quite finished, in 2013 the mayor and city council Speaker Quinn released a report from the Building Resiliency Task Force, which they had jointly convened ­after Hurricane Sandy. The report stated that “the 33 proposals in this report address resiliency in a wide range of buildings, including commercial buildings, multifamily residences, hospitals, and 1–3 ­family homes” (Building Resiliency Task Force 2013). T ­ here is one other action that is l­ ittle noted in the history that scholars have written about Bloomberg. A ­ fter Hurricane Sandy, the mayor charged two of his deputy mayors, Linda Gibbs and Coswell Holloway, to provide an analy­ sis of what the city did right during Hurricane Sandy, what could have been better, and what they recommended that the mayor should do immediately. Gibbs and Holloway did just that. In a few months, they released Hurricane Sandy ­After Action in May 2013 (City of New York 2013), and the mayor went about implementing many of their fifty-­nine recommendations in the last year of his term. All of ­these plans provided a framework of roles and guidelines for city agencies that would persist even when Bloomberg was no longer mayor, and he established orga­nizational structures to ensure long-­term success. In 2006 he established, ­under the aegis of the mayor’s office, the Office of Long-­Term Planning and Sustainability (LTPS), to coordinate “with all other City agencies to develop, implement, and track the pro­gress of PlaNYC and other issues of infrastructure and the environment which cut across multiple City departments” (NYC LTPS, n.d.). Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio, retained the office in a slightly dif­fer­ent form. Overall, planning was integral to Mayor Bloomberg’s success with managing the city’s economic development and remains one of his finest legacies.

Staff Another integral part of Bloomberg’s success was the two ­people he hired to lead the economic development effort. From the beginning, the mayor counted on

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Doctoroff, whom Bloomberg had tapped in 2002 to be deputy mayor for economic development and rebuilding. Doctoroff led the city’s economic agenda for six years, through 2007, and in this role oversaw more than forty city agencies. “Doctoroff is responsible for 289 separate proj­ects and initiatives, including the Mayor’s PlaNYC agenda, which has made New York a global leader in sustainability. He has also served as the Administration’s point person on the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan a­ fter the devastation of 9/11” (Bloomberg 2007a). Doctoroff was determined to bring the Olympics to the city in 2012, and although he failed to achieve that goal, he did work to rezone large areas of Brooklyn and Manhattan that ­were part of the city’s Olympic bid. The other person who led the economic development effort was Amanda Burden, who had worked on the City Planning Commission since 1990. “When Bloomberg took office in 2002, he appointed her chair of the commission and head of the Planning Department. Since then, her office has led an ambitious program that rezoned an unpre­ce­dented 40 ­percent of the city” (Peteritas 2013). Over twelve years, the city rezoned 124 neighborhoods (Peteritas 2013). She was known for her concern for community input even when she did not agree with the input. “Amanda clearly has a commitment to community input into land-­use planning, and that is a refreshing change from prior administrations,” noted Anna Hayes Levin, a vice chair of the community board (quoted in Pogrebin 2004). Burden was a very active chair who worked closely with Doctoroff to implement Bloomberg’s vision. “Our basic philosophy,” she explained, “is that it is not enough to prepare handsomely bound volumes that sit on bookshelves. Rather, our plans set forth a vision for an area, and then we, the public sector, undertake the entire land use review pro­cess, including building consensus, completing environmental impact reviews, and bringing t­hese actions through the Planning Commission and City Council. By invoking a series of strategic public actions—­regulatory changes, infrastructure investments, and investing scarce public dollars in public space improvements—we can set the stage for private market investment and private market creativity” (Burden 2003). Of course, ­there ­were other ­people who ­were impor­tant to the mayor on the economic development front; ­these include Rohit T. Aggarwala, Adrian Benepe, Patricia E. Harris, Cass Holloway, Robert C. Liever, Janette Sadik-­Khan, and Edward Skyler.2 But the two central figures that made the city re­nais­sance happen ­were Doctoroff and Burden. Central to Mayor Bloomberg’s planning w ­ ere public-­private partnerships, and he believed that the health of the for-­profit and government sectors, as well as nonprofits, ­were integral to the success of his plans. The public-­private theme remained controversial throughout the mayor’s three terms; some New Yorkers

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objected to such partnerships, assuming that the government was turning many government functions over to the private sector.

Corporate Subsidies In the beginning Bloomberg, unlike his pre­de­ces­sor, rejected corporate welfare in industry. As Jonathan Bowles has noted, “During this [Bloomberg] administration, EDC has entered into only five corporate subsidy deals thus far, compared to thirty-­eight in Rudolph Giuliani’s first mayoral term and eight during the administration of David Dinkins” (2005, 3). According to Good Jobs First (2010), the Bloomberg administration insisted on the EDC increasing the number of jobs required in order to be eligible for tax breaks. As time went on, Bloomberg provided more corporate subsidies for companies seeking to build in the city, including ­those building stadiums. Certainly ­after 9/11, vast resources ­were allocated to Ground Zero; ­these resources ­were controlled by several governmental entities including the mayor and governor, and some dollars w ­ ere used as incentives for businesses to return to Lower Manhattan (Good Jobs 2009, 4).

Proj­e cts When Mayor Bloomberg gave his first State of the City Address on January 30, 2002, he laid out his platform: make government smaller and more effective, make the improvement of public education a top priority, and reframe economic development to revitalize five hundred miles of city shoreline and all five boroughs. If New Yorkers wanted to know what the mayor would do, he laid it all out from the very beginning. By the time of the State of the City Address in 2003, he was able to recite major development proj­ects ­under way in each borough that w ­ ere intended to bring jobs and housing to New Yorkers. The focus was on rebuilding Lower Manhattan (and not just the WTC site), developing the far west side of Manhattan, creating a ring of green around Manhattan for walkers and cyclists, developing downtown Brooklyn with a major arena as the centerpiece, opening major cultural centers in Queens, opening Brooklyn Bridge Park, building the Bronx Terminal Market shopping mall, and developing a major recreational center on Staten Island. T ­ hese proj­ects ­were ­under way despite the fact that 2003 was a time of fiscal hardship for the city. As the city’s economy improved, the proj­ ects became bigger: instead of 65,000 units of affordable housing, the mayor sought to build or renovate 165,000 units (Bloomberg 2003a). The following sections discuss the major proj­ects undertaken in each borough.

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The Bronx Rezoning was key to development in the Bronx. In 2003 the Morrisania neighborhood was rezoned from manufacturing to new housing development (NYC DCP 2003). At the same time, critical areas of the Bronx ­were downzoned, protecting low-­density residential neighborhoods. Bloomberg insisted that city agencies work together. Thus, when he opened the Fulton Fish Market in Hunt’s Point, job centers w ­ ere set up to hire local workers. This successful implementation was due in no small part to giving Doctoroff a portfolio of agencies that would coordinate their work through Doctoroff. In the South Bronx, the New York Yankees fi­nally got their new stadium in 2009. Although Bloomberg originally canceled the deal that previous mayor Rudolph Giuliani had made with the Yankees, he changed his mind ­after the failed Olympic bid and made a deal with the ball club to use parkland for the construction of a new fa­cil­i­ty. ­Under this agreement, “The Yankees w ­ ill lease the site for the new stadium for an initial term of forty years and w ­ ill be responsible for paying the entire cost of construction, including any cost overruns. The Yankees w ­ ill also be solely responsible for the cost of ongoing maintenance at the new stadium” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2005a). New parks ­were created to take the place of the parkland given to the Yankees. In 2006 Bloomberg started “construction at the long-­neglected Bronx Terminal Market,” a plan that had been dreamed about since Mayor John Lindsay’s time in the 1960s and 1970s. He also began building the Hub, a primary retail center for the Bronx, “fi­nally realizing its extraordinary potential. Together ­these proj­ ects became the first major retail and commercial development in the South Bronx in de­cades” (Bloomberg 2006a). In the same year, the Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market, “one of the largest retail developments in New York City,” was awarded the US Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Silver certification, “distinguishing the center as the largest retail development in the country to achieve this status and the first retail development of any size in the Bronx to be LEED Silver certified. . . . ​With this award, the nearly one-­million-­square-­foot, $500 million center became the second largest proj­ect of any type in the Northeast to achieve core and shell LEED certification” (Related 2010). That year Bloomberg also “announced the South Bronx Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive plan to sustain and strengthen the ongoing revitalization of the South Bronx. Developed by the mayor’s office and an interagency team in coordination with local elected officials and community groups, the initiative identified three focus areas: Melrose Commons / Third Ave­nue, the Bronx Civic Center, and the Lower ­Grand Concourse” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2008a). The mayor also an-

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nounced a housing development, Bronxchester Urban Renewal, with sites in the Melrose neighborhood, “the last large assemblage of city-­owned vacant land in the South Bronx, all but completing the major development proj­ects that would rebuild and revitalize the once blighted community. Bordered by Bergen Ave­nue, Brook Ave­nue, and East 149th Street, the development . . . ​encompassed five new buildings with a total of 985 units of mixed-­income housing, along with a host of new retail, community, and recreation spaces, including a new YMCA” (Bloomberg 2013f).

Brooklyn In the course of bidding for the Olympics, the Bloomberg administration sought to rezone the Greenpoint-­Williamsburg neighborhood in Brooklyn, which is close to the East River waterfront. This work continued a­ fter the city lost the Olympic bid. The community experienced the new construction and renovation of many apartment buildings. Then “came the construction of a new arena for the Brooklyn Nets, the capstone of downtown Brooklyn’s rebirth” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2009a). In 2006, construction workers began the building at Atlantic Yards, one of the largest housing, commercial, and sports developments in Brooklyn. Now named Pacific Park (­after an adjacent thoroughfare, Pacific Street), the area is a mixed-­ use commercial and residential proj­ect with the potential for sixteen high-­rise buildings. In addition, ­there is the Barclays Center sports arena, home of the Brooklyn Nets basketball and New York Islanders hockey teams. As of 2018, only the arena and the four towers ­were built (Oder 2020). The Atlantic Yards proj­ect was hotly contested by neighborhood groups, but the mayor and Brooklyn borough president Marty Markowitz strongly supported a community benefits agreement (CBA), which became a nongovernment pact between the developer and several community groups. The agreement included building 50 ­percent of the development as affordable and se­nior housing, hiring minorities for construction, opening a health care center, and creating parkland (Oder 2019). The proj­ect remains quite controversial as building has been quite slow and never lived up to 50 ­percent affordable housing. At one point, 70 ­percent of the development was sold to another developer (Oder 2019). In 2012 the mayor announced an agreement with John Sexton, president of New York University (NYU), “to create a new applied sciences center” in downtown Brooklyn with a consortium of universities led by New York University (CBS New York 2013). Then, in 2013, Bloomberg announced with Mark Kamlet of Car­ ne­gie Mellon University another new applied sciences program for the three-­ hundred-­acre Brooklyn Navy Yard; the focus of this program would be on research

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“in film, gaming, social media, interactive computing,” visual arts, and urban planning (CBS New York 2013).

Queens Several major development proj­ects ­were started in Queens by the Bloomberg administration. In 2007a multimillion-­dollar reconstruction was started to develop Willets Point. The Bloomberg administration sought to develop the Iron Triangle at Willets Point into a major center “with parks, jobs, and housing” (NYC EDC 2020). And in 2011 the mayor, along with Cornell University president ­David Skorton and Peretz Lavie of the Technion–­Israel Institute of Technology, announced “a historic partnership to build [a $2 billion] applied science and engineering campus” that would take up two million square feet on Roo­se­velt Island (Cornell Tech 2017). In 2017, elected officials celebrated the opening of Cornell Tech campus. Hunters Point South, an abandoned industrial area on the East River had been an integral part of the bid for the 2012 Olympics, “but in its aftermath, the city acquired the land from the state” and would work t­ oward “developing it for mostly affordable housing with a waterfront park” (Moss 2011). The park was part of a new mixed-­use neighborhood with affordable housing, retail and a new public school. Also, the Mets Stadium was replaced with a new stadium nearby, Citi Field, which the Mets occupied in 2009. Citi Field cost the Mets $875 million, and the city built some improvements for $91 million (Moss 2011).

Staten Island The Bloomberg administration did not neglect Staten Island. In 2004, Mayor Bloomberg alongside Governor Pataki announced the rebuilding of the Staten Island Railroad, which would “support hundreds of new jobs at the Howland Hook Marine Terminal” (Wired New York 2004). In 2006 he announced the renovation of the Homeport site, a thirty-­five-­acre former naval base, and created the five-­acre Stapleton Waterfront Park (NYC Department of Parks and Recreation, n.d.). This was followed in 2013 by the New Stapleton Waterfront Development Plan, “a major community-­driven proj­ect that w ­ ill create new housing, retail and a waterfront esplanade at the former Homeport site on Staten Island.” Ironstate, “which was selected in 2009 to lead the proj­ect a­ fter a competitive bid,” was to invest “$150 million to construct approximately 900 units of residential housing, 20 ­percent of which ­will be affordable, as well as 30,000 square feet of ground floor retail, and 600 parking spaces. The City is committing $32 million ­towards the proj­ect for infrastructure improvements and the construction of a

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new waterfront esplanade providing the public with waterfront access” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013a). In addition, Bloomberg succeeded at making a major renovation of the St. George Ferry Terminal, with new restaurants and a new baseball stadium next door (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013a).

Manhattan The transformation of Lower Manhattan was led by the state with city involvement. The reconstructed WTC site and its surroundings became a huge tourist attraction, as well as home to thousands of New Yorkers. Bloomberg’s first task was to revitalize Lower Manhattan ­after the 9/11 destruction of the WTC, but he did not have control of the WTC site; the state did. The mayor concentrated on bringing residential development to Lower Manhattan while working with the state in the complicated pro­cess of rebuilding the WTC site. In her 2016 book Power at Ground Zero, Lynne Sagalyn documented the remaking of Lower Manhattan. The mayor took on the role of chair of the World Trade Center Memorial Foundation and achieved a settlement with the families of ­those who had died so that the final plans for the memorial ­were widely accepted. Deputy Mayor Patricia Harris and Bloomberg visited several memorial sites and listened to countless ­people, from members of the Uniformed Firefighters Association to f­ amily members of t­hose who lost their lives in the terrorist attack (Sagalyn 2016). ­After countless meetings, Bloomberg presented the final plan and said, “This is what ­we’re d ­ oing.” And every­one was in agreement. Sagalyn commended Bloomberg for intervening throughout the WTC discussions during his second term: “The mayor brought clarity of leadership to a fragile and fraught po­liti­cal arena. By leveraging the power of his po­liti­cal position and his considerable personal influence as a businessman, he ­shaped a path forward for rebuilding” (Sagalyn 2016, 377). In his own book, Doctoroff (2017) detailed the difficulty working with the many personalities involved, from the state, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (which owned the WTC land), and Larry Silverstein, who had leased the WTC. Doctoroff ’s and Sagalyn’s accounts give the reader appreciation of how ­little control a New York City mayor has to shape a crucial part of the city’s economic development plans. Bloomberg promoted science and technology as a growth sector for education and jobs to diversify the economy. The idea was to develop an industry other than financial ser­vices from which the city could extract sufficient revenue and depend upon that revenue over time. The mayor managed this quite successfully: “Early indicators suggest that the tides are slowly turning for New York’s newest startup scene, with the city’s share of U.S. venture capital for biotechnology and medical

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devices rising from 0.8 ­percent in 2010 to 2.3 ­percent in 2013” (Harris 2015). Biotech has emerged as a key industry in the 21st ­century. Yet, New York City had not concentrated on developing biotech companies. Bloomberg changed this. Bloomberg selected Alexandria Real Estate Equities to develop the East River Science Park, which w ­ ill be a commercial bioscience center in New York City. “Located between Bellevue Hospital and NYU School of Medicine, the new 6.7 acre campus ­will accommodate 1.5 million square feet of state-­of-­the-­art research laboratories” (EE&K 2020). The Hudson Yards on the far west side of Manhattan (extending from Thirtieth to Thirty-­Fourth Streets north and south, and from Tenth Ave­nue to the Hudson River Park east and west) was “a district dominated by aging ware­houses, open parking lots and auto body shops. The nearest subway is a half a mile away” (Doctoroff 2017, 48). It held a rail yard, over which the Bloomberg administration de­cided to build ­giant platforms that would support skyscrapers (Mattern 2016). The Bloomberg administration made this area central to the Olympic bid, but when that effort was unsuccessful, the city continued its develop plans. Beginning in 2005 the area was rezoned to accommodate higher-­density commercial and residential uses, and the amount of land rezoned was extended in 2009. New high-­rises ­were built and, most impor­tant, the mayor funded the extension of the No. 7 subway line from Times Square to Thirty-­Third Street and Eleventh Ave­nue. This included the complete renovation, expansion, and modernization of the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center (Doctoroff 2017, 165). The Hudson Yards Proj­ect was financed by selling bonds through a nonprofit created by the city, as well as with the city’s own funds. This financing, which was quite controversial ­because of its focus on luxury housing, led to a development, the largest in de­ cades that opened up the entire Hudson Yards area for new housing, commercial offices, parks, and cultural spaces (Doctoroff 2017, 165). In 2012, Bloomberg and Columbia University president Lee Bollinger announced an “agreement to create a new institute for data sciences and engineering . . . ​[which was] the latest step in the City’s Applied Sciences NYC Initiative, announced in 2010, which aims to increase New York’s capacity for applied ­sciences and spur commercialization and economic growth” (Farmer 2012). The mayor’s emphasis on science and technology would eventually result in four science centers being built for research and education. Fi­nally, the 369th Regiment Armory was completely renovated to provide a community center. T ­ here New Yorkers can now find eight new tennis courts and seating for three thousand spectators. The community center also offers programs in “basketball, martial arts, boxing, gymnastics, and track and field” (US HUD 2006).

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Public Parks Mayor Bloomberg cared about parkland. He wanted all New Yorkers to be “within a ten-­minute walk of a park” and made $5 billion in capital investments in parks; in addition, he “added over 850 acres of parkland” to the 28,000 already existing acres in the city, and “1,750 parks and facilities w ­ ere redesigned or upgraded between 2002 and 2013” (Bloomberg n.d.-­a). In the Bronx alone, he invested $200 million in 2005 to improve seventy neighborhood parks (Rubinstein 2014). Bloomberg and Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar signed an agreement to cooperatively “manage ten thousand acres of parkland in and around Jamaica Bay” that are part of the Gateway National Recreation Area . . . ​[in which] “city parks in the bay area total 3,300 acres . . . ​and the federal holdings . . . ​span 7,300 acres” (Foderaro 2012). In the pro­cess, Bloomberg created the Science and Resilience Institute, which provided “a home for much of the impor­tant applied research now underway in the region—­bringing together scientists and policymakers ­committed not only to restoring the Bay, but also to using it as a place to explore broader issues of coastal resilience” (Science and Resilience Institute, n.d.). The institute has eight research institutions as partners. The Bloomberg administration sought to develop large regional parks in several neglected areas of the city. Critics accused the mayor of ignoring the smaller parks in poorer areas of the city, and that criticism continues to this day. By 2005, however, the mayor had begun in the Bronx what he described in his State of the City Address as a “historic five-­year, $220 million campaign to improve thirty-­ eight of this borough’s parks and playgrounds. It’s the biggest investment in the City parks in nearly seventy years—­and it ­will produce an incredible green legacy throughout the Bronx” (Bloomberg 2005). Other boroughs benefited from Bloomberg’s commitment to parks. Some of the new parks w ­ ere part of a revitalized Manhattan. The High Line, created on a derelict elevated rail line on the West Side, became an attractive magnet for thousands of tourists as well as a major venue for outdoor walking and p ­ eople watching for local residents. In Brooklyn the East River State Park opened to the public. The 2008 national recession slowed the work ­toward revitalizing the entire waterfront; however, parkland on the East River is now open to the public in Brooklyn neighborhoods. ­There is also a new swimming complex at the Flushing Meadows Corona Park pool, originally part of the Olympic bid. Fi­nally, parkland around Jamaica Bay was also revitalized. In total, Bloomberg invested over $4.56 billion in parks throughout his tenure (Forman 2015). This major infusion in capital funds reflected Bloomberg’s commitment to the city’s open spaces. The mayor’s efforts to improve the city’s parks ­were successful in part b ­ ecause he leveraged public-­private partnerships. For years,

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mayors had cut staffing for the parks. Instead of hiring more staff, the mayor contracted with nonprofits and private donors to support parks. “Many parks fortunate enough to draw significant private contributions ­were thriving. The Prospect Park Alliance in Brooklyn, for example, had 2011 revenue of about $11 million. Public/private partnerships brought a major influx of funding to a number of New York’s marquee parks. In 2012, hedge fund billionaire John Paulson gave $100 million to the Central Park Conservancy. . . . But large gifts created in­equality; not all parks had wealthy neighbors” (Case Consortium 2014, 12). The city council passed legislation in 2008 requiring “the Department of Parks and Recreation of New York City to prepare an annual report that would detail, park by park, the contributions of nonprofits and other private donors” (Hodes 2012). Of course, many parks did not receive significant donations; often, t­ hese parks w ­ ere in the poorer areas of the city.

Critics of Bloomberg’s Park Plans Many progressives felt ­bitter about the new parkland created by the mayor’s development initiatives. Critics argued that he ignored smaller parks in poor areas, choosing to focus on parks for the wealthy. But Veronica White, parks commissioner ­under Bloomberg, maintained that much of the parkland in which the city invested was in the outer boroughs: “The Bronx River Greenway, Flushing Meadows–­Corona Park Aquatic Center, Freshkills Park on Staten Island, Fort Washington Park in Washington Heights and Coney Island are just a few examples of parks that received major investments ­under Mayor Bloomberg” (quoted in Rubinstein 2014). The critics ­were never allayed, insisting that too much attention and private money w ­ ere put into a few large parks while neighborhood parks remained neglected. PlaNYC described eight regional parks that would be renovated. As White explained, “We made the decision to prioritize funding to ­these large parks for a ­simple reason: to provide beautiful parks and recreation land for the largest pos­ si­ble number of families in the areas needed most” (quoted in Rubinstein 2014). The eight parks w ­ ere “Calvert Vaux Park in Brooklyn, Fort Washington Park in Manhattan, Highbridge Park in Manhattan and the Bronx, Highland Park in Queens, McCarren Pool and Play Center in Brooklyn, Ocean Breeze in Staten Island, Rockaway Park in Queens, and Soundview Park in the Bronx” (Bloomberg n.d.-­a). All of ­these ­were in previously underserved parts of the city. In 2012, critics of the mayor said that he had overpromised and that the parks ­were not as he had announced in his plans (Linge 2012). Some of ­these parks ­were completed, just not on schedule. ­These ­were the most controversial:

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• “At Highland Park at the Ridgewood Reservoir in Queens, the administration abandoned its plan to build a sixty-­acre sports center when environmentalists proved the site was an irreplaceable habitat” (Linge 2012). The revised proj­ect of $7 million installation of paths, lights, and fences was completed in 2013 (NYC Parks 2013). • The revised proj­ect “in Brooklyn was to get sports fields, kayak launches, and playgrounds, but amenities w ­ ere cut ­after the discovery of contaminated soil. Much of the $20.1 million bud­get had to be spent on a cleanup” (Linge 2012). The Bloomberg administration did, however, complete the work, and now the nearby residents enjoy “six soccer fields, kayak launches, picnic areas, a central lawn, new rest­rooms, a bicycle path, new nature trails, amphitheater, playground, recreation center, and a pavilion” (Kadinsky 2017). • Manhattan’s Fort Washington Park “was promised a soccer and volleyball fa­cil­i­ty, renovations to baseball and soccer fields, and upgrades to its beach area,” but “the enhancements ­were slow to materialize” (Linge 2012). The finished product was, however, highly praised: “The innovative oasis between 158th and 168th Sts. comes with five volleyball courts, picnic areas, two redesigned baseball diamonds, paths for pedestrians and bicyclists and a soccer field with natu­ral turf” (Ransom 2013). • The McCarren Park Pool in Brooklyn opened late “­after a $50 million renovation” (Linge 2012). Although renovating the pool took more time than expected, the fa­cil­i­ty is now open and extremely popu­lar (Frost 2012). • At Staten Island’s Ocean Breeze Park, work on a “$69.7 million indoor track ­stopped over concerns the site’s concrete pilings w ­ ouldn’t hold up in the marshy soil. Outdoor soccer and baseball fields w ­ ere cut. The track lacks air conditioning, making it unusable for big meets” (Linge 2012). Although it took more time than predicted, the park and its facilities are now up and ­running with state-­of-­the-­art equipment, including air-­ conditioning (Schaulsohn 2016). • “Contamination at Soundview Park in the Bronx caused delays in its $15.3 million renovation” (Linge 2012). The renovations ­were completed, however, and ­there are now baseball and soccer fields, a cricket pitch, basketball and handball courts, a r­ unning track, and lots of trails (Spotlight Stories 2017). Many of the complaints ­were exaggerated or reflected frustration about the length of time required to renovate a park rather than any neglect on the part of the

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administration. Parks Commissioner White responded to criticism of Bloomberg’s parks legacy this way: “We raised the Parks Department operating bud­get to $380 million, highest in city history. . . . ​We brought New York City’s investment in parks to double the investment of Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Miami and Philadelphia combined.” In addition, White pointed out that “the Bloomberg administration made $5 billion in capital investments in parks, the largest capital investment in the city’s history” (quoted in Rubinstein 2014). In keeping with his overarching philosophy about the best way to approach development, the mayor achieved much of what he set out to do with public-­ private partnerships. “Other­wise we ­won’t be able to afford all the t­ hings ­we’re trying to do,” Bloomberg said. “Corporate sponsorship of the city’s parks is one of the ­great resources New York City has” (Colvin and Wall 2012). Cohen, Silva, and Small have pointed out that public-­private partnerships ­were easier to form in support of the large parks rather than the smaller ones: “Some of the city’s best maintained parks, including Central, Bryant, the Highline and Prospect Parks, have been improved and maintained in large part by private conservancies who raise significant amounts of money, operate programs and hire staff (including maintenance staff) ­under contract to the Parks Department. For example the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation contributed only 40% of the operating costs for Prospect Park as of 2013” (2013, 7). Adrian Benepe, parks commissioner from 2002 to 2012, noted that the administration had raised $165 million a year from several nonprofit groups, including the “Central Park Conservancy, the City Parks Foundation, and Friends of the High Line” (Foderaro and Hu 2012). He explains Bloomberg’s philosophy: “Generous philanthropists, committed volunteers and city largess—­you put the three of t­ hose together and it becomes this very creative laboratory” (Foderaro and Hu 2012). Bloomberg’s critics could not accept the public-­private partnerships that underlay Bloomberg’s strategy for the city’s parks. The mayor’s strategy in the growing of parks and the creation of new ones was clearly quite successful, but not necessarily appreciated by t­hose who wished that only taxpayer funds, and not private funds, would be used.

The Environment Bloomberg saw promoting economic development and turning the city green as mutually compatible and indeed complementary goals. One of the best descriptions of Bloomberg’s environmental policies is Katherine Bagley and Marta Gallucci’s 2013 book, Bloomberg’s Hidden Legacy: Climate Change and the ­Future of New York City. As Bloomberg and former Sierra Club executive director Carl Pope

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have written in Climate of Hope, “One of the biggest changes in urban governance in this ­century has been mayors’ recognition that promoting private investment requires protecting public health—­and protecting public health requires fighting climate change” (Bloomberg and Pope 2017, 23). Bloomberg linked urban economic development to public health and air pollution. His efforts encompassed far more than the one million trees that ­were planted during his tenure. When they mayor released PlaNYC, with its 127 initiatives to combat climate change, he sought state involvement. In 2008, he got the state to pass a tax credit for installing green roofs; he also got a state tax credit for buildings that installed solar panels. He persuaded the state to allow the city to oversee the cleanup of brownfields and, with that authority, created the new Office of Environmental Remediation, which sped up the cleanup pro­cess (Bloomberg and Pope 2017). But sometimes when he went to the state he lost; for example, his proposal for congestion pricing, designed to limit the number of cars in Lower Manhattan, was denied by the state (Norimine 2019). And he went international. While he promoted environmental protections in the city, he also helped or­ga­nize the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, which encourages cities around the world to take charge of promoting environmental issues (Bloomberg and Pope 2017, 32). Thanks to Bloomberg’s initiatives, by 2013 “New York City’s carbon footprint had shrunk by nineteen ­percent. . . . ​At the same time, air pollution fell to the lowest levels in a half ­century” (Bloomberg and Pope 2017, 36). Bloomberg often attacked environmental issues that ­were not “sexy”—­those that did not win him a lot of positive press. For example, old buildings are generally not energy efficient. He sought to make old buildings more environmentally friendly through promoting white roofs and clean heat and, most of all, by calling both landlords and ­unions to change the building codes through a package of laws called the Greener, Greater Buildings Plan (Bloomberg and Pope 2017, 30). What is so startling is that Bloomberg needed state approval for much of his agenda. When it came to gaining state approval for congestion pricing, he lost; but he won on other impor­tant initiatives. “In 2008, we worked with the state to pass a tax credit for installing green [white] roofs, which can help reduce air pollution and carbon emissions by insulating buildings. We also won state approval to offer a tax credit to buildings that installed solar panels. We persuaded the state to give the city authority to oversee cleanup of lightly polluted, often abandoned sites called brownfields. . . . ​We also worked with the state to strengthen standards for heating oil to make it less polluting, which helped us to clean the city’s air and protect public health” (Bloomberg and Pope 2017, 30). Bloomberg could not even issue a tax credit for building ­owners to paint the roof white without state approval. It is Bloomberg’s leadership style that allowed him to push ahead without being deterred by state law and regulation. Bloomberg and Pope provided an

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excellent description of his management and leadership style. His transportation commissioner, Janette Sadik-­Khan, came to him with a proposal to close Times Square to vehicular traffic. He thought the idea was crazy, and said so, but he listened anyway. Sadik-­Khan convinced him that ­there would be less congestion and fewer traffic accidents if pedestrian plazas ­were introduced. Despite his doubts, he agreed to let her close Times Square to vehicles. His decision to move ahead on such a controversial plan was during his reelection campaign. The press was brutal, calling the idea a “road-­kill plan.” But Commissioner Sadik-­Khan persisted—­and it worked. The plaza became “incredibly popu­lar with pedestrians, increased commerce in the area, reduced the number of traffic accidents, and improved commute times around Times Square” (Bloomberg and Pope 2017, 138). The commissioner went on to open several other pedestrian plazas with the same success. The beauty of Bloomberg’s management style was that he let commissioners try new ideas; the drawback of his style was that he was dependent upon his commissioners’ good sense.

The Growth in the Department of Health’s Mandate Mayor Bloomberg did more than support good health. He understood how to establish conditions u ­ nder which all New Yorkers, rich and poor, could improve their health. Bloomberg is known for eliminating trans fats in restaurants and food ser­ vices, banning smoking in many establishments, and reducing salt in restaurants and goods. He lost the b ­ attle to limit the sale of large sugary sodas, however. The mayor’s accomplishments are well documented. Tom Farley, who was Bloomberg’s second commissioner for the Department of Health and ­Mental Ser­vices, wrote Saving Gotham: A Billionaire Mayor, Activist Doctors, and the Fight for Eight Million Lives, where he documented how the administration turned a sleepy backwater agency into a twenty-­first-­century hotbed of public health thinking (Farley 2015). In his first term, Bloomberg began with his no smoking campaign. The controversy was furious. Restaurant and bar ­owners raged, making fun of Bloomberg as the city’s nanny: “A full-­page cartoon on the cover of the [New York] Post depicted the scowling mayor in front of the ‘Bloomberg Bar and Grill,’ in the win­ dow of which hung signs with the universal ‘no’ slash over the words SMOKING and FUN. The headline: ‘Bar Humbug’ ” (Colgrove 2011, 244). ­After numerous public hearings and street theater, the city council passed one of the first smoking bans for restaurants and bars in the country. New York State followed shortly thereafter, as did many other states. Then came the no trans fats strug­gle. In Bloomberg’s second term, health commissioner Tom Frieden introduced an amendment to the city’s health code requiring restaurants to eliminate all but minute amounts of trans fat from their food

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within eigh­teen months and for chain restaurants to list the calorie content of their meals (McColl 2008). Again, the controversy raged. Bloomberg was in a better position to withstand the pressure—he had just been reelected to a second term by a large margin, and the fight over the ban on smoking had turned out to be very popu­lar, which was a good sign for the strug­gle to come. Bloomberg and Frieden won this round as well, and trans fats w ­ ere eliminated from restaurant meals. As Linda Fried has written, “The city deployed an array of tools to prevent obesity, diabetes, heart disease, stroke and asthma. Strategic investments ­were made to reduce smoking, require that calorie counts be posted in many fast-­food businesses, increase physical activity, grade restaurants for compliance with the city health code, increase screenings for ­people at risk and sponsor disease-­prevention activities.” Fried also notes that “life expectancy has increased faster in New York City than in the United States as a ­whole over the past de­cade” (2014). And Bloomberg’s impact remains worldwide. “Over thirty-­five countries around the world have copied New York,” he notes. “They have even banned smoking in the Irish bars. A Dublin pub was defined by smoke as well as by beer” (Moss 2013). Bloomberg succeeded in getting New Yorkers to focus on a serious public health issue—­ what they eat. This is a significant legacy.

Economic Development and Higher Education Mayor Bloomberg linked higher education to the economic development of the city in ways previous mayors had not, and it was one of his most successful ventures. He was determined to make the tech sector as impor­tant to New York City as the financial ser­v ices sector. He announced the centerpiece of this strategy in 2010 when he held a competition: the winning university would win a prize of “city-­owned land on Roo­se­velt Island worth hundreds of millions of dollars and up to $100 million in capital improvements” to help build a gradu­ate technical college (Eisenpress 2017). Cornell University, collaborating with Technion–­Israel Institute of Technology, won the bid. Just thirteen months ­later, the first class of eight students was up and ­running in space borrowed from Google, with an expected enrollment of two thousand technology gradu­ate students within a few years (Eisenpress 2017). This bold public policy strategy, linking commerce and education, spurred dramatic growth in the city’s technology sector, creating another pillar to support the city’s economy: “Tech employment grew 31% between 2010 and 2016, to 218,758, which includes both tech jobs and tech jobs in other industries” (Eisenpress 2017). By 2016 Cornell Tech had graduated 350 students who thus far have started thirty

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new companies (Eisenpress 2017). And the campus is almost complete, with several buildings: the Academic Building, the Bloomberg Center, and the House (a residential complex). Perhaps the most fascinating of the new structures is the Bridge, whose purpose is to facilitate the collaboration of industry and academia. Car­ne­gie Mellon University, Columbia University, and NYU “are among the city’s higher education institutions that have expanded science, technology, engineering, and mathe­matics (STEM) programming” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012e). Their initiatives are as follows: • New York University’s Center for Urban Science and Pro­gress (CUSP) would grant academic degrees in engineering and sciences, and would be a partnership of academic institutions and for-­profit companies from around the globe, led by NYU and the NYU Polytechnic School of Engineering; the consortium would include the “Car­ne­gie Mellon University, the City University of New York, the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, the University of Toronto, and University of Warwick, as well as Cisco and IBM” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012e). • “Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Columbia president Lee C. Bollinger announced an agreement between the City of New York and Columbia that would lead to the creation of the new Institute for Data Sciences and Engineering, to be located at Columbia’s Morningside Heights and Washington Heights campuses. . . . ​Dozens of new faculty would be hired to staff the university’s Fu Foundation School of Engineering and Applied Sciences” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012a). • On November 30, 2013, Mayor Bloomberg, Car­ne­gie Mellon provost Mark Kamlet, and Stein Studio chair Douglas C. Steiner announced that Car­ne­gie Mellon would open the fourth new applied sciences program in New York City. The agreement would create Car­ne­gie Mellon “Integrative Media Program, to be located at Steiner Studios in the Brooklyn Navy Yard” (Car­ne­gie Mellon University 2013). Bloomberg believed in the value of STEM jobs. In chapter 8, which examines Bloomberg’s rec­ord on education, it is clear that, for the first time in modern history, a mayor focused attention on c­ areer and technology jobs, which w ­ ere long thought to be low wage with l­ittle skill. Bloomberg created c­ areer and technology education that in the long run was g­ oing to produce more p ­ eople skilled in STEM than most had ever thought pos­si­ble. It was a long-­term plan that worked. In 2017, the Bronx Acad­emy for Software Engineering graduated its first class, with an 84 ­percent graduation rate, and the majority of the students w ­ ere ­going on to college. Moreover, t­ hese students are of diverse races and backgrounds and both male and female (NYC DOE 2018).

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Bloomberg also used higher education to create the Small Business Incubator. In 2009 he created a partnership among the city’s “Economic Development Corporation, the Polytechnic Institute of New York University, and Trinity Real Estate” (NYU Tandon School of Engineering 2010). This partnership staffed the Varick Street Incubator, which provided “low-­cost office space and valuable training to emerging technology companies” (NYU Tandon School of Engineering 2010). Dozens of companies have resulted from this incubator, and the mayor created additional small business incubators in the other boroughs (NYU Tandon School of Engineering 2010). Such innovation attracts highly educated talent to the city, as well as business investment.

Technology’s Role in Improving ­G overnment Management Bloomberg sought to improve government infrastructure so that employees could operate more effectively in serving the city’s residents. He is best known for immediately developing the 311 information line, which fields fifty thousand calls a day and offers information on every­thing a New Yorker can imagine: school closings, events in the parks, parking regulations, and so on. It also ­handles 180 languages (Holmes 2016). But that was just the beginning. Bloomberg and his staff focused on bringing new computer systems into ­every aspect of city government. One of his first decisions was to modernize the city’s building code—­a very unsexy undertaking. But for the city this was an incredibly impor­tant decision. Gaining the agreement of developers, u ­ nions, city agencies, fire and safety professionals, and the city council, he succeeded in streamlining a set of codes that reduced construction costs. And he computerized the pro­cess. He began this difficult undertaking in 2002, and modernization of the building code took twelve years (NYC Government 2008). In social ser­v ices, an overarching theme of the proj­ect was the facilitation of information sharing among disparate city agencies. This was not easy. As Allon Yaroni and Timothy Ross note, “In most re­spects, each agency acts as an autonomous organ­ization with its own business pro­cesses for managing all aspects of its mission: identifying its clients’ needs, providing ser­v ices, verifying eligibility, managing procurement and contracts with ser­v ice providers, case management, and tracking pro­gress and outcomes” (2014, 1). The Bloomberg administration and the Department of Health and ­Human Ser­vices (HHS) designed HHS–­Connect, which won an award from the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) in 2009. “The Best of NIEM Awards recognize NIEM implementation proj­ects that demonstrate how intergovernmental

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collaboration and innovative technology deliver results that improve per­for­mance, increase efficiency, and support government transparency” (Doar 2012, 2). As Robert Doar has noted, “The implementation of a system which shares data across eight health and ­human ser­vice agencies that utilize over eighty dif­fer­ent case management systems, serve over three million recipients, and report to dif­fer­ent state and federal oversight agencies was truly ground-­breaking” (2012, 2). Data-­sharing technology, including a central case management system, remains key to lessening the burden of gathering data on clients in each ­human ser­vices agency. In improving technology in ­human ser­vices, the city made ­great strides. Gibbs created the Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence (CIDI) with the mission of data coordination. As Yaroni and Ross explain, “CIDI is a data intelligence team in the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Health and H ­ uman Ser­v ices that focuses on interagency research by using data and information from multiple HHS agencies to answer policy questions, sharpen policy and program design, assess outcomes, and advocate for data-­driven best practices” (2014, 2). CIDI continues t­ oday with a closely knit team focusing on the standardization of data terms, analyzing data, and assessing outcomes. Lastly, Gibbs strengthened the city’s procurement pro­cess for h ­ uman ser­v ices. She insisted on standardization across agencies through an online procurement system “for the eight HHS agencies and for the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the Department of Small Business Ser­vices, and the Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator, all of which also provide ­human ser­v ices” (Gibbs and Gragan 2010). Bloomberg supported then Manhattan borough president Gale Brewer, who designed the Open Data concept, and in 2012 the city council passed Local Law 11, the Open Data Law, which dictated that by 2018 each city agency would have to publish its digital public data in a form that was usable by the public (Goodyear 2013). Then Bloomberg designed a BigApps Competition to encourage software developers and the public to create apps using city data. The purposes of ­these apps could be s­ imple (finding a good restaurant or a list of housing code violations) or more difficult (finding a parking place). The competition is now annual (Clcorcoran 2018). Bloomberg faced a computer system prob­lem that impaired his legacy as a technology wizard, and that was “CityTime—­a software system that was supposed to modernize the city’s payroll administration” (Bharara 2012). This “$63 million contract with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) began in 1998 and [increased] to $700 million by 2003” (Bharara 2012). Preet Bharara, the US attorney for the Southern District of New York, prosecuted t­ hose accused of fraud associated with the proj­ect and got a $500 million settlement from the com­pany. In the end the system worked, and it cost the city much less than was

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originally expected, but the fraudulent be­hav­ior on the part of the con­sul­tants and one city employee meant that Bloomberg’s rec­ord as a savvy technologist was damaged. Although the Bloomberg administration was responsible for not catching the fraud sooner, it was former mayor Giuliani who had agreed to the contract: the design, the writing of the request for proposal, and the choice of contractor had all occurred in the previous administration (Bharara 2012).

Ar ts and Culture as Par t of Economic Development In addition to jobs, Bloomberg believed that the arts contributed to the city’s economic well-­being. During his three terms he allocated over $1.3 billion to fund arts organ­izations and over $3 billion in capital investment in construction activities throughout the five boroughs (Bloomberg, n.d.-­b). What the mayor called the creative sector employed almost three hundred thousand ­people (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2019). His very successful attempt to bring talent to the city reflected the thinking of Richard Florida, who developed the idea of a creative class that could provide the engine for successful economic development in a city. Within cities, a group of innovative ­people generated far more than their proportionate share of wealth. Florida pegged this group’s annual wages and salaries at about $1.7 trillion in 2003. Investment in the arts remained a significant component of economic development policy throughout Bloomberg’s mayoralty (Florida 2005). Bloomberg revitalized the Mayor’s Awards for Arts and Culture, which had begun in 1976 but had been s­ topped by Giuliani (Pesce 2013). Bloomberg created the twenty-­one-­member Cultural Affairs Advisory Board to advise the Department of Cultural Affairs. “His position is that culture is central to the city’s economy, identity and quality of life,” explains Kate Levin, Bloomberg’s longtime commissioner of the Department of Cultural Affairs (quoted in Pesce 2013). This included film and theater: “The BCG [Boston Consulting Group] study confirms that the Bloomberg administration has successfully reestablished New York City as the creative hub of the film, tele­v i­sion, and digital media industries,” notes Kathryn Wylde, president and CEO of the Partnership for New York City. “We are pleased to make funds available to incentivize companies to conduct their post-­production work in the five boroughs” (quoted in Lehman 2012). Bloomberg announced that the industry spent $60 billion in New York City over a de­ cade and generated $7.1 billion in 2011, an increase of over 70 ­percent—­more than $2 billion annually—­since 2002. “Film and tele­v i­sion production now employs 130,000 ­people, an increase of 30,000 jobs since 2004. And even though

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about forty thousand media jobs across the country have dis­appeared over the last ten years, New York City gained forty thousand in the same time period” (Lehman 2012). In 2007 the Bloomberg administration sought to end the bud­get dance between the mayor’s office and the city council for the arts and cultural organ­izations by committing resources on a timely manner in a transparent competitive pro­cess. “On the program side we w ­ ere ­really trying to reform a funding process—it was unclear, it was unpredictable, it was unfair,” explains Kate D. Levin, the cultural affairs commissioner (quoted in Pogrebin 2004). The mayor sought to broaden the number and diversity of arts and cultural institutions the city served. The two main units of funding within the Department of Cultural Affairs w ­ ere the thirty-­three institutions in city-­owned buildings or on city-­owned land, and the Program Ser­v ices team, which funds hundreds of nonprofit arts and cultural institutions across the city. In fiscal year 2008 the Bloomberg administration sought to make program funding available to more organ­izations. The In­de­pen­ dent Bud­get Office reported that the administration was successful: “In fiscal year 2007, prior to the change, 884 groups applied for program unit funding and 780 received awards; in fiscal year 2009, 1,084 groups applied for funding and 882 received awards” (Strauss 2009). This move was not necessarily popu­lar with city council members whose funding for member items decreased as the Bloomberg administration moved to a competitive, more transparent pro­cess by creating “borough-­based peer-­review panels or­ga­nized to evaluate applications from smaller organ­izations with operating incomes of $250,000 or less” (Strauss 2009). Due to the recession, the overall funding for the Department of Cultural Affairs was reduced in fiscal year 2010. Although cultural resources continued to be distributed unequally across the city, the Department of Cultural Affairs succeeded in funding smaller neighborhoods’ arts and cultural organ­izations that had not previously received funding.

Transpor tation Chris McNickle points out that four of the city’s five boroughs are on islands, and one is a peninsula, resulting in serious transportation challenges: “Some 789 city-­ owned bridges, plus another 600 run by public authorities or the state, six tunnels and nineteen thousand miles of road link the five boroughs to each other and to the rest of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut” (McNickle 2017, 179). To deal with this massive infrastructure, New York City has regional transportation networks: the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority.

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Bloomberg’s PlaNYC called for major financing of transportation efforts. New York City does not control the MTA; the authority has a twenty-­one-­member board, fourteen of whom vote. Four members are appointed by the governor, including the chair and CEO; four by the mayor; and ­others by vari­ous counties (MTA, n.d.). City officials cannot raise tolls on the highways without permission from the New York State legislature (see chapter 3). In PlaNYC, the mass transit infrastructure called for a $50 billion investment to be funded in part by congestion pricing. Car ­owners would be charged eight dollars to travel below Eighty-­ Sixth Street in Manhattan. This plan did not happen, as Sheldon Silver, the New York State Assembly Speaker, killed it (Chung 2008). Years ­later the state legislature agreed to permit the city to implement congestion pricing in Manhattan. Bloomberg did cut down on traffic by encouraging New Yorkers to bicycle. Sadik-­Khan, the transportation commissioner, added 499 miles of bicycle lanes and over sixty pedestrian plazas in the city, and her redesigns of street intersections resulted in reduced traffic fatalities. She also created with Citicorp the bike-­ share program Citi Bike, making six thousand bikes available at 330 bike stations (Sadik-­Khan, n.d.). The MTA is dominated by the state, which refused to contribute t­ oward extending the city’s subway lines. Bloomberg wanted the subway extended to help commuters, so the city paid for the first subway extension in many years: the No. 7 subway line was extended from Times Square to Thirty-­Fourth Street and Eleventh Ave­nue, making it easier to reach the Javits Center and the newly developed Hudson Yards (NYC Office of the Mayor 2004a).

Negative Consequences of Mayor Bloomberg’s Economic Development Plan Although Bloomberg’s policies improved the city’s economy and the quality of life for many ­people, they also had some downsides.

Displacement Large-­scale urban development proj­ects w ­ ere encouraged when the US Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. New London (2005) that local governments could exercise eminent domain for private economic development and not just public uses. One ­thing the mayor did not like to discuss was the displacement of ­people that could occur with rezoning. The issue of displacement of poor p ­ eople was secondary in Bloomberg’s mind to the potential for increased economic activity that rezoning could bring about. As Neil Kleiman notes, “Outside investment in a community

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often leads to lower crime rates, more jobs and greater amenities, all of which benefit local communities. The downside is displacement caused by increased property values that can force out longtime residents and small business o ­ wners” (2002, 7). Mayor Bloomberg wanted to solve displacement by building more affordable housing through innovative deals with developers. In exchange for a tax exemption for a specified number of years, the developer would build and maintain a certain percentage of the housing as affordable. According to Amanda Burden, “The challenge for the new mayor is to persuade communities to accept additional height and density, so that more affordable housing can be accommodated and that can be a big challenge for him. It certainly was for us” (quoted in Eddings 2013). ­These issues played themselves out differently in the vari­ous developments. One prob­lem was that some developers ­were given tax-­exempt status but did not deliver on affordable housing. The Atlantic Yards (­later, Pacific Park) in Brooklyn proj­ect is one example. In this proj­ect the developers, city officials, and community representatives came to a CBA that called for a certain amount of low-­income housing in exchange for greater building density (higher buildings) (Oder 2019). A developer, Forest City Ratner Companies, arranged with city and state officials to work with the Empire State Development Corporation to use eminent domain to assem­ble the property. This meant that “[Forest City] Ratner could avoid ­going through the city’s Uniform Land Use Review Pro­cess, which would have forced the developer to face review and votes by local community boards, the borough president, the City Planning Commission, and the city council” (Angotti, n.d.). The community or­ga­nized, however, and the developer, city officials, and community representatives agreed to a CBA (Oder 2019). Ratner then for the most part ignored the CBA, saying it would not build 50 ­percent of the two-­ and three-­bedroom units as affordable housing as it had agreed; rather, the developer would build only 20 ­percent of the units to be affordable (Oder 2019). This move generated a good deal of cynicism among housing advocates; as one noted, “This proj­ect is immoral ­because tax-­exempt bonds and subsidies should not be used to reward, buttress and facilitate eminent domain abuse, crony capitalism, government-­sponsored mono­poly building and grossly out-­of-­scale development” (M. D. D. White 2012). The Atlantic Yards is not the only large-­scale development that provided ­limited affordable housing, but it is one of the biggest examples of how the Bloomberg administration failed to hold developers to their agreements. The city not only displace renters; manufacturing lost out as well. As Jonathan Bowles noted at the time, “The city’s plan to rezone 175 blocks in Greenpoint and Williamsburg ­will likely push out more than a hundred woodworking companies, specialty food manufacturers and other industrial businesses. According to the New York Industrial Retention Network (NYIRN), ­these

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companies employ roughly 2,800 ­people” (2005, 9). Rezoning meant welcoming mixed use instead of manufacturing. The loss of manufacturing remained a major source of disagreement for many New Yorkers. But the rezoning resulted in thousands of units of new housing built.

Racial and Ethnic Rezoning The Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at NYU conducted an analy­ sis of racial and ethnic changes in the major US Census years: 1990, 2000, and 2010 (Furman Center 2011, 34). The city’s racial and ethnic mix changed over this period. Whites made up 43.2 ­percent of the population in 1990 but only 33.3 ­percent in 2010. Whites represented 35 ­percent of the population in 2000, however, meaning that the white exodus had definitely slowed. African Americans also showed a decline, from 28.7 ­percent to 25.5 ­percent from 1990 to 2010. The proportion of Asians and Latinos had increased. The Furman Center’s analy­ sis clearly showed that “In white-­black neighborhoods, the black shares declined and w ­ ere replaced mostly by white residents” (Furman Center 2011, 34, emphasis in the original). This is largely a reflection of the changing neighborhoods in Harlem, in which gentrification had forced African Americans out while whites moved in. The Furman Center study also showed that the city had become less segregated: “The share of neighborhoods that we classify as majority white declined, showing some pro­gress ­toward desegregation” (2011, 34, emphasis in the original). This movement ­toward desegregation reflects the movement of whites into minority neighborhoods, which can result in gentrification. The younger generation is well represented by whites in Brooklyn and Manhattan. “­There is a noticeable upward shift in the white ­percent for ­children, especially in Manhattan, between 2000 and 2010, suggesting more parents are staying in the city longer,” notes William Frey, a demographer with the Brookings Institution. “This pattern is even more noticeable in Brooklyn, where, as well, t­ here is a notable increased share of whites in the late 20s and 30s, indicating an even stronger 2000–2010 draw of white young adults and families” (quoted in Roberts 2011). Zoning is key when examining race and class. Mayor Bloomberg downzoned areas of Queens and Staten Island, where white homeowners resisted any attempts to increase neighborhood density. In Queens a hundred civic associations formed the Queens Civic Congress to lobby the city council and mayor to stop any density increase in their neighborhoods (Harris 2004). As the Furman Center notes, “upzoned lots tended to be located in census tracts with a higher proportion of non-­ white residents than the median tract in the City. Downzoned lots, on the other hand, ­were more likely to be located in tracts with a higher share of non-­Hispanic

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white residents than the City median, and contextual-­only rezoned lots w ­ ere located in areas with still higher shares of non-­Hispanic white residents” (Furman Center 2010). The mayor’s plan was to increase density in areas closest to transit options. But the Furman Center disputed the mayor’s results. The city’s PlaNYC articulated “a goal of creating housing by continuing publicly initiated rezonings that pursue transit-­oriented development” (City of New York 2007, 19). The Furman Center found that from 2003 to 2007, 73 ­percent of the upzoned lots w ­ ere close to mass transit. But the study also found that the majority (59 ­percent) of the downzoned lots ­were close to mass transit (Furman Center 2010). This is evidence against the mayor’s stated desire to increase density primarily in lots close to mass transit. Another consideration involving race is the portion of economic activity attributed to minorities and how that changed over time. As a report from the city’s Office of the Comptroller notes, “The decline in Black-­owned businesses is connected to both their declining share of the city population and their heavy presence in the retail sector, which experienced significant business turnover, particularly during the ­Great Recession.” The report found that “from 2007 to 2012, the number of Black-­owned retail businesses fell from 2,294 to 558 and Accommodations and Food Ser­v ices businesses from 524 to 463” and that, in 2007, “Black-­owned businesses represented 13 ­percent of all businesses in the Bronx and 5 ­percent in Queens. By 2012, t­ hose figures had plummeted to 6 ­percent and 3 ­percent, respectively” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2017b). Certainly Black-­ owned businesses had not increased as ­others had. A similar trend can be found with low-­income youth. ­Those from eigh­teen to twenty-­five who ­were out of school and out of work (OSOW) did find increased “employment from 2000 to 2015. The rate of OSOW youth decreased from 23.6 ­percent to 17.2 ­percent across the city” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2017). ­These percentages varied by income, however: “Over 20 ­percent of youth in low-­income areas w ­ ere OSOW, while only 13.5 ­percent of youth in high-­income areas w ­ ere OSOW” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2017). Mediated by both race and class, the economic boom had uneven effects across the city.

Chapter Summar y Mayor Bloomberg embraced long-­term planning that was entirely new to modern New York. As Kathryn Wylde, president of the city’s largest business advocacy group, Partnership for New York City, has reflected, “[The Bloomberg administration has] said that we have to have a strategy, we have to have tactics

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for achieving it, and the 21st ­century economy is something we have to fashion in a proactive way” (City Limits 2005a). Economic development has led to thousands of new jobs and brought in thousands of new residents. In addition, Bloomberg’s emphasis on combating climate change set a city that, ­after all, is surrounded by ­water on the road to protecting itself in the uncertain f­ uture of global warming. Most amazingly in this day and age of tax cuts and antigovernment slogans, Bloomberg achieved public-­private partnerships that greatly benefited all New Yorkers; this was especially true of his initiatives for parks. The mayor’s contribution to higher education and technology w ­ ill benefit countless New Yorkers long into the ­future; over time, the applied sciences proj­ ects ­will produce thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in economic impact. The tech sector has for the first time made New York City a serious competitor with other innovation hot spots, such as Boston and Silicon Valley. From 2009 to 2017, the rate of job growth in the city outperformed both the nation and New York State (NYS OSC 2018, 3). Bloomberg’s emphasis on technology meant that computer systems ­were updated and government pro­cesses became more efficient throughout city government. Bloomberg left it to his successors to deal with gentrification and rising rents that forced out lower-­income families, as well as the reduction in the number of Black-­owned retail businesses. Yet his rezonings ­were in many ways successful. The mayor’s rezoning efforts meant that New Yorkers could at last enjoy the waterfront throughout all five boroughs, as manufacturing no longer dominated the ­water’s edge. Bloomberg made sure that parks and housing overlooked the w ­ ater. The transformation was staggering: bicyclists could ­ride around Manhattan without once encountering traffic, and runners found parkland accessible throughout the five boroughs. Such a transformation brought with it an issue concomitant with urban growth: a lack of low-­income housing. Neither Bloomberg nor his key director of economic development sufficiently addressed the growing gap between low-­income housing need and availability. Bloomberg would respond that it was worth noting that the prob­lem arose from economic growth, not urban decline.

5 THE STAGGERING GROWTH IN HOMELESSNESS

In fiscal year 2014, twelve years ­after Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office, the Co­ali­tion for the Homeless stated that 53,615 ­people, 22,712 of them ­children, ­were residing in New York City’s temporary shelter system. At the start of Bloomberg’s administration in 2002, the city emergency shelters had ­housed 31,063 individuals (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2014). Bloomberg had overseen the largest increase in the number of homeless ­people in temporary shelters since the ­Great Depression (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2020). The growth in temporary shelters meant that the city did not have many ­people living on the streets. The mayor did bring many homeless ­people off the streets, reducing the number of ­people living on the street by 28 ­percent (Leopold 2014). Even so, his plans to decrease the overall numbers of homeless p ­ eople ­were totally inadequate—­yet it is hard to see how he could have done better without more financial support from the state and a change in federal policy. It would be a ­mistake to see the city’s prob­lems as purely local without considering the role of state and federal decision making. ­There are four princi­ple reasons why the city had so many homeless p ­ eople. First, the federal government ­stopped building public housing in the 1970s and switched to providing tax credits to developers as incentives to set aside some portion of their buildings as affordable housing (see chapter 6). Second, single-­room occupancy buildings (SROs) began to dis­appear in the 1970s as developers used tax credits to turn their buildings into luxury apartments (­Sullivan and Burke 2013). SROs had h ­ oused thousands of ­people in poverty, who ­were then turned out into the street. The city used J-51, a city tax abatement program that created incentives for landlords to 106



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convert SROs to market-­rate apartments (­Sullivan and Burke 2013). Third, the state emptied the large ­mental hospitals, and many of their thousands of former patients became homeless. “At pre­sent [2018], the total adult inpatient census in the state psychiatric network, excluding forensic cases, numbers 2,267; in 1955, it numbered 93,314” (Eide 2018). The federal government contributed to releasing thousands of mentally ill ­people onto city streets through the passage of federal law. The Community M ­ ental Health Centers Construction Act provided federal funding to create community-­based ­mental health facilities, but such facilities did not open in sufficient quantities. Federally, Medicaid was provided to fund health care for the poor, but Medicaid could not be used to pay for care in ­mental hospitals or ­mental health centers (Amadeo 2020). Fourth, Bloomberg’s emphasis on development in areas of the city that had previously been neglected resulted in low-­income ­people being blocked out of the rental market ­because of rising rents (see chapter 6). While the real estate interests ­were responsible for the conversion of SROs, the federal government cut funds for public housing and encouraged urban renewal policies that did not take sufficient account of the needs of the poor (see chapter 6). The federal and state governments ­were working together when they put ­people with serious psychiatric prob­lems on the streets. It now has become a case of supply and demand. ­There are simply not enough low-­income housing units for ­those who need them. This chapter first explains the rights of homeless p ­ eople in New York. It then documents the strategies put into effect by Mayor Bloomberg and his commissioner of the Department of Homeless Ser­vices (DHS), Linda Gibbs, and examines their strategies within the context in which they had to operate. The chapter ends with conclusions about the administration’s policies concerning the homeless.

The Rights of the Homeless in New York City Most Americans do not have a ­legal right to housing; but New Yorkers do. “At least eight states have constitutional provisions or statutes that courts have interpreted to impose a mandatory duty to care [for] the needy” (McKittrick 1988). The New York State Constitution differs from most other state constitutions in that Article XVII, Section 1 mandates that “the aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and ­shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.” This section was added to the state constitution in 1938 in response to the G ­ reat Depression (NYS Constitution 2014). The constitution does

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not specify the extent of the state’s obligation; rather, “New York courts have interpreted that provision as creating a basic obligation of the State to provide in some mea­sure for the needy” (Haywood 2002, 157). In Tucker v. Toia, the New York State Court of Appeals “explained the rationale ­behind this provision and the commitment it represents to all persons residing in New York State: the provision for assistance to the needy is not a m ­ atter of legislative grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our Constitution” (Haywood 2002, 193). On October 2, 1979, ­lawyers for ten thousand homeless men filed suit against New York City, “alleging a shortage of shelter space and substandard shelter conditions, and grounding their claims in the New York State Constitution” (Haywood 2002, 157). In Callahan v. Carey the court found for the plaintiffs, preliminarily enjoining city officials to provide adequate emergency shelter. In the injunction the court was very clear, construing Article XVII, Section 1 of the constitution as affording all persons the right to shelter. This court case entered a new phase when the parties signed a consent decree in 1981, shortly ­after the lead plaintiff, Robert Callahan, died of exposure on the streets of New York City (Hirsch 1990). A consent decree is a court order in which the parties to the lawsuit—in this case, the American Civil Liberties Union, representing the ten thousand homeless men, and New York City—­enter into a voluntary agreement that stipulates what remedial actions the defendant w ­ ill take, without having to admit fault or guilt. Elected officials often enter into consent decrees b ­ ecause they believe that plaintiffs have a good case and that an agreement between the parties would be easier to implement than what­ever remedy a trial judge would demand. Or elected officials may be suffering from negative publicity and seek to limit media exposure by agreeing to a consent decree. A consent decree is binding on f­uture elected officials u ­ ntil the agreed-­upon plan of action has been fulfilled. Usually a special master, a judge, is assigned to oversee the consent decree. Then ­either party can return to the special master if it is dissatisfied. For example, the plaintiffs could claim that the city was not fulfilling its agreement, or the city could claim that the agreement was fulfilled and thus the consent decree was no longer necessary. Other court cases followed that broadened the categories of protected p ­ eople from homeless men to homeless ­women and then to families. In 1982, homeless ­women in Eldredge v. Koch ­were found to be “entitled to the same shelter rights and standards as men” (Haywood 2002, 167). And then in McCain v. Koch, destitute families receiving emergency housing aid challenged arbitrary denials of shelter, and t­ hose who did receive aid challenged the quality of the accommodations provided by the city (Haywood 2002, 168). As Bradley Haywood notes, “Mayor Giuliani unsuccessfully challenged the consent decree, proposing regulations that would have treated shelter as another form of public assistance, rather



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than an absolute right, subjecting it to the same unyielding eligibility requirements as cash assistance, including workfare. T ­ hese regulations survived state constitutional challenge in McCain v. Giuliani. Subsequent courts have enjoined the City from implementing them, finding that the regulations would impermissibly alter the terms of the consent decree and expose the targets of the decree—­the physically, mentally and socially dysfunctional—to the very conditions from which it was designed to protect them” (Haywood 2002, 172). During the Bloomberg administration, several more issues ­were debated in court, but the final determination remained that ­people who are homeless have a right to shelter.

Strategies to Address Homelessness: The First Year, 2002 When Michael Bloomberg became mayor, he appointed Linda Gibbs as commissioner of the DHS. DHS oversees “about 240 shelter facilities . . . ​with an annual operating bud­get of $955,300,000 and over 1,950 employees. . . . ​The shelter system includes 67 shelters for single adults; 154 Tier II shelters, cluster-­sites (previously scatter-­sites) and ­hotels for families with ­children ­under age 18 and pregnant ­women; and 18 Tier II and non-­Tier II facilities for adult families. Only nine shelters—­four for families with c­ hildren and five for single adults—­are directly operated by DHS” (Durham and Johnson 2014). Most shelters are usually run by nonprofits with contracts from the DHS; the contracts require support ser­v ices as well as shelter for the clients. Tier I shelters are for single adults and have no private rooms. Tier II shelters are for families, with private rooms, three meals a day, and support ser­vices. Families can also be placed in cluster sites, which are apartments in private buildings or commercial ­hotels (Alexander 2018). Gibbs inherited a mess. The administration of former mayor Rudolph Giuliani had not made homelessness a priority, and the DHS was a reactive, data-­starved insular agency. But Gibbs was a seasoned public servant, and in a few months, and with a g­ reat deal of consultation, she had a strategic plan that would transform the agency into one with a data-­driven, knowledge-­sharing culture. For the first time in modern times, the commissioner a­ dopted a “housing first” philosophy rather than having staff primarily address prob­lems that can contribute to homelessness, such as drug addiction and poor job skills. Emphasis was now put on permanent housing first. Gibbs did this through prevention—­ concentrating on methods to keep p ­ eople from entering the shelter system if they had other options. She stressed client responsibility rather than seeing clients as victims. She sought out more permanent housing, and challenged McCain v.

110 CHAPTER 5

Koch, which was forcing the city to spend countless hours on l­egal compliance with rules she considered objectionable (Hirsch 1990). She emphasized data-­ driven management, establishing objectives with timelines and creating tools, such as GPS maps to show locations of where the homeless had last lived. Gibbs created a system of per­for­mance mea­sures for the shelter system, the Per­for­mance Incentive Program, which evaluated the nonprofits r­ unning the shelters by determining the amount of time it took for the homeless to receive in­de­pen­dent housing, the average length of stay, and the rate of homeless ­people who returned to the shelters. Nonprofits with the greatest success rates received bonuses. The plan led to positive results within a few years (Smith and Grinker 2005, 29). Bloomberg and Gibb’s first announcements, soon a­ fter being sworn in in January 2002, concerned safety and security in the homeless shelters; they w ­ ere roundly applauded for ­these statements. The homeless ­were not using the shelters ­because the facilities w ­ ere unsafe. Even though the city’s resources w ­ ere tight, due to the impact of 9/11, the mayor increased the bud­get to provide additional guards and security apparatus at the shelters (Fries 2002). The first crisis the administration dealt with regarding the homeless was the horrible condition of the Emergency Assistance Unit (EAU), the one intake unit where homeless families could apply for shelter, which was located in the Bronx. The increase in demand for shelter space meant that dozens and sometimes hundreds of homeless families ­were staying overnight in the EAU b ­ ecause ­there was no room in the shelters. The deplorable conditions of the EAU are well documented in Thomas Main’s book Homelessness in New York City (2016). “Rebecca Chew, who managed the old EAU and ­later the fa­cil­i­ty that replaced it, described the old EAU as follows: It was a 20-­story brick building. It was pretty overcrowded I would say [with] clients waiting inordinate amounts of time for ser­v ice. We would have to walk over ­people who ­were sleeping on floors, benches. . . . ​It would be so chaotic that ­people would literally spill out into the neighborhood to get a breath of fresh air” (2016, 152). The court had decreed that making ­people stay overnight on the floor of an intake unit was illegal. So the Bloomberg administration attempted to deal with the summer increase in homeless families by repurposing a closed jail for the homeless a few blocks from the EAU. This decision outraged many advocacy organ­izations, as well as Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Helen Freedman, who threatened to hold public officials in contempt. The mayor dropped the idea of using a jail to ­house the homeless. By 2004 the Bloomberg administration had created a new intake fa­cil­i­ty, Prevention Assistance / Temporary Housing, in place of the EAU; it was a far cleaner and more efficient building, with up-­to-­date technology. Regardless of this innovative work, however, by the end of Bloomberg’s first year in office, rec­ord numbers of homeless ­people—­thirty-­eight thousand—­were



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seeking shelter, an increase from 31,063 in January 2002 (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2017). The mayor and DHS commissioner Gibbs received both praise and condemnation for how the administration was h ­ andling the homeless prob­lem. Gibbs had succeeded in keeping the shelters safer, but to h ­ ouse the increasing number of homeless families she had resorted to one of the most expensive options, renting apartments from private landlords throughout the city—­a pro­ cess known as scatter-­site or cluster-­site housing. The average cost of such apartments was ninety-­seven dollars a night, or $3,000 a month. Almost one-­ fourth of the 9,100 homeless families ended up in t­hese apartments (Markee 2015). ­There ­were other issues. Activists in the HIV/AIDS community condemned the mayor for ignoring the increased number of homeless p ­ eople with the disease. The HIV/AIDS Ser­v ices Administration (HASA) within HRA was at loggerheads with the Bloomberg administration. The HRA commissioner, Verna Eggleston, was seeking to reor­ga­nize HASA and make it more efficient and included the AIDS community in ­those discussions (Isett et. al. 2011). Yet, the AIDS community became quite alarmed when the Bloomberg administration sought to reduce costs. The mayor in early 2003 sought to cut costs at HASA by contracting out “the jobs of 29 case man­ag­ers to nonprofit organ­izations” rather than keeping case man­ ag­ers in ­house (Ryan 2003). This privatization was rebuffed by the AIDS community. Since Local Law 49 “created in 1997 strictly guaranteed the rights of HASA Clients and mandates specific case manager-­to-­client ratios,” it is doubtful that the city would have won in court (Ryan 2003). At the same time, housing advocates w ­ ere encouraged by the fact that Bloomberg had put additional resources into the DHS and made the shelters safer. And in addition to Gibbs’s strategic plan, the mayor had announced a five-­year plan to build affordable housing (see chapter 6). The strategic plan worked at the time: by the end of 2003 the DHS had moved almost six thousand families into permanent housing, more than twice the number in 2002 (Gibbs 2007).

Strategies to Address Homelessness: The Remainder of Bloomberg’s First Term, 2003–2006 Certainly, the first term was the most successful of Bloomberg’s three terms in dealing with the homeless. Gibbs implemented a long-­range plan, succeeded in limiting the number of court ­orders, developed a successful prevention program, and agreed to a joint city/state supportive housing initiative.

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Implementing Long-­Range Planning One of Gibbs and Bloomberg’s long-­term strategies to reduce homelessness was to mitigate the demands placed on the system by the courts. On January 17, 2003, Bloomberg and L ­ egal Aid Society president Daniel Greenberg announced an agreement approved by Justice Freedman that announced the formation of a three-­member ­Family Homelessness Special Master Panel (SMP) (Main 2016, 148). The court granted the SMP broad evaluative and adjudicatory powers for the next two years (Bloomberg 2003). SMP issued several reports before its final report in 2007 recommending the settlement of the court decree. The city had some breathing room in which it could work through the SMP and avoid constantly responding to court ­orders. In November 2003 the SMP would produce a report on f­ amily homelessness, F ­ amily Homelessness Prevention Report, as part of its court mandate to evaluate the f­ amily shelter system (Main 2016, 150). In addition to creating the SMP, the city won in the Appellate Division’s reversal of a lower court ruling in Callahan v. Carey in June 2003 regarding the right to establish the first-­ever standards for client responsibility; that is, single adults who ­were homeless had to assume some responsibility for their situation. As Bloomberg and Gibbs announced in a press release, “We are also gratified that the Court recognized that the 1981 consent decree did not take away the critical ability of the City to set reasonable conditions for continued receipt of ­these impor­tant shelter benefits. The decision w ­ ill allow the City to offer t­ hose seeking shelter a better, safer alternative” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2003b). In November 2003 Bloomberg named a task force to study the prob­lem of homelessness. The mayor asked the chair of the Association for a Better New York, William C. Rudin; a se­nior vice president of the United Way of New York City, Lilliam Barrios-­Paoli; and his own chief of staff, Peter Madonia, to cochair the extensive pro­cess of seeking solutions (Jeantet 2013). “The trio then reached out to more than 70 other participants encompassing a wide range of industries—­ shelter ser­vices, homeless advocacy, supportive housing, c­ hildren ser­vices, ­mental health, the judicial system and real estate” (Jeantet 2013). The task force laid the foundation for a five-­year action plan called Uniting for Solutions beyond Shelter in June 2004 with sixty recommended initiatives (Rosegrant 2007; City of New York, n.d.). T ­ hese initiatives included preventing homelessness, discharge planning, rapid rehousing, creating more supportive housing (twelve thousand units), and providing social work and counseling support to ­people without homes. It was good news for the chronically homeless and for the supportive housing community that operated such housing. Nonetheless, the 2004 report received a mixed reaction: “Conceding that his group was thrilled with the mayor’s ‘shift from just emergency solutions to prevention,’ Arnold S.



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Cohen, president and chief executive of the Partnership for the Homeless, said: ‘We are concerned the mayor is not investing in any new initiatives. The source of the money is the already existing system’ ” (Kaufman 2004d). A weakness of the plan was that it lacked implementation schedules. On June 16, 2004, Maureen Friar, executive director of the Supportive Housing Network (SEN) of New York and a member of the coordinating committee, warned, “It feels a l­ ittle bit like the emperor had no clothes. . . . ​The plan has a lot of words without any goals we can mea­sure to see what ­we’ve done next year. How can we mea­sure results? It is disappointing that it is this general and out of sync from how the mayor has approached work in education and other areas he cares about” (Kaufman 2004a). It is significant that, shortly a­ fter voicing her criticism, Friar lost her position as executive director of SEN. An anonymous interviewee stated that Bloomberg was furious; the mayor never forgave Friar for t­ hose remarks and refused to work with SEN (pers. comm. with author, February 5, 2014). The development of supportive housing depends on close working relationships between the supportive housing community and the city, so frayed relationships are problematic. The incident also demonstrated Bloomberg’s thin skin and his unwillingness to forgive negative comments.

Preventing Homelessness Gibbs continued with her strategic plan in emphasizing prevention. In 2004 the Bloomberg administration established the homeless prevention network HomeBase in cooperation with seven nonprofit organ­izations in geographic areas that had the most homeless families. Beginning with six storefront offices throughout the five boroughs, HomeBase staff offered customized assistance to families and individuals to create a personalized housing stability plan (Messeri et al. 2011, 5). The organ­ization offered a full array of ser­v ices, including “­family and landlord mediation, ­legal assistance, short-­term financial assistance, m ­ ental health and substance abuse ser­v ices, child care, and job search assistance” (Messeri et al. 2011, 6). HomeBase was a success story. Since its inception, it has served nearly thirty-­ five thousand families and individuals throughout the city. In 2006 it was named one of the top fifty government programs demonstrating innovation by the Ash Institute for Demo­cratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University. A research study led by Peter Messeri of Columbia University concluded, “Our best estimates are that HomeBase reduced shelter entries by between one and two for ­every ten families it served” (Messeri et al. 2011, 36). In addition to working with HomeBase, the DHS partnered with the courts and the United Way. In 2005 the Housing Help Program (HHP), a court-­based

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homelessness prevention program, was created by United Way of New York City in partnership with the Civil Court of the City of New York and the DHS. This “three-­year pi­lot program sought to address the challenges facing families struggling to avoid eviction and homelessness” (Seedco 2010, 1). The program targeted ­house­holds at the highest risk of eviction and shelter entry and provided comprehensive ­legal and social ser­v ices to keep families stably h ­ oused. An evaluation of the HHP by the nonprofit Seedco showed that the program was 30 ­percent more effective at preventing shelter entries than traditional community-­based anti-­eviction l­egal ser­v ices. Seedco concluded, “Between January 2005 and November 2008, HHP served 1,388 families, or roughly 76% of all eligible families facing eviction during this time (and about 6% of the total population of the target zip code). HHP prevented a loss of housing for 91% of clients and prevented an eviction judgment for 86%, despite accepting all income-­eligible clients regardless of each case’s ­legal merit (unlike many comparable homelessness prevention programs). The shelter entry rate for HHP clients is 5.7%, lower than that of comparable programs” (2010, 2). Clearly, prevention programs have worked.

Creating Supportive Housing Supportive housing is permanent housing with on-­site social ser­v ices for ­those who are chronically homeless and have serious addiction and/or m ­ ental health prob­lems. In 1990 with the New York/New York I Agreement (NY/NY I), the city and state agreed to fund the development of thousands of new supportive housing units. The first of three such agreements, NY/NY I was responsible for creating over five thousand units. On-­site supportive ser­v ices addressed the needs of homeless single adults, including p ­ eople suffering from ­mental illness and HIV/ AIDS, families with special needs, and youth aging out of foster care. All tenants ­were low-­income, and many units ­were rented to homeless ­people residing in the city’s emergency shelter system. “In 1999, a second agreement, NY/NY II, was signed, adding 2,320 units of housing; t­ hese units ­were developed by New York City and New York State ­under the terms of the agreement” and ­were in place during the Bloomberg administration (CUCS, n.d.). In November 2005 Bloomberg signed NY/NY III, in which the state and city committed $1 billion to the creation of an additional nine thousand units of supportive housing over ten years (CUCS, n.d.). Two studies have documented that supportive housing is more cost-­effective than temporary shelters (Wilbur and Branca 2006; Culhane, Metraux, and Hadley 1997). Moreover, it can provide a permanent solution for the homeless, which shelters do not. Some homeless ­people, once stabilized in supportive housing, eventually leave to rent their own apartments (Wilbur and Branca 2006, 2).



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Subsidizing Permanent Housing On January 8, 2004, the mayor announced in his annual State of the City Address, “We’ve helped the homeless: during the last fiscal year, we placed a rec­ord number of homeless New Yorkers—20,000 men, ­women and ­children—in permanent housing. Let me tell you something more impressive. This past summer, for the first time in modern memory, no one slept on the floors of the Emergency Assistance Unit all summer long (Bloomberg 2004a). This was certainly the high point for the mayor and Gibbs with regard to managing the prob­lem of homelessness. ­After this, the Bloomberg administration changed its policies, and the number of homeless families and single ­people increased dramatically. ­Under Bloomberg’s pre­de­ces­sors Ed Koch, David Dinkins, and Rudolph Giuliani, the main program designed to ­house the homeless in permanent housing had been “the Emergency Assistance Rehousing Program (EARP) through which families received priority for available Section 8 vouchers and landlords renting to them received a bonus payment from the city. In addition, homeless families received priority referrals for housing in NYCHA [New York City Housing Authority] public housing apartments. Both of ­these programs had been in place since the late 1980s” (Champeny 2012). Federal Section 8 rental vouchers are essentially rent subsidies paid by the federal government and administered by local agencies throughout the country. They are authorized by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to assist “very low-­income families, the el­derly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market” (US HUD 2020). “Section 8 housing is the dominant form of federal housing assistance” (US HUD 2020). In the United States, more than 1.4 million h ­ ouse­holds use the vouchers (US HUD, n.d.). “Section 8 tenant-­based rental assistance follows participating individuals and families, regardless of ­whether they move [while subsidized]” (US HUD, n.d.). “The PHA [Public Housing Authority] pays the landlord the difference between 30 ­percent of the ­house­hold’s adjusted income and the unit’s rent” (US HUD, n.d.). For de­cades Section 8 housing had been an effective way to move families out of shelters and keep them permanently ­housed. But ­there was a drawback: landlords could refuse to accept Section 8 vouchers, so clients needed to search and search to find landlords willing to take them. EARP was also cost-­effective for New York taxpayers, since it would have cost the city $36,000 a year to shelter a homeless ­family (Routhier 2012). NYCHA administers about eighty-­five thousand of the 130,000 vouchers given out in New York City; the remaining vouchers are distributed by the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (NYCHA, n.d.). In addition, a statewide program run by the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal distributes a few thousand Section 8 vouchers.

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In­de­pen­dent studies determined that federal Section 8 vouchers w ­ ere a good deal for the homeless and the city. In 2005 the DHS asked the Vera Institute of Justice to study the use of Section 8 vouchers by the homeless. The institute showed that “among dif­fer­ent types of subsidized housing, NYCHA and non-­EARP (Emergency Assistance Rehousing Program) Section 8 placement ­were associated with the lowest risk of return to shelter” (Smith et al. 2005). In 2012 New York City’s In­de­pen­dent Bud­get Office (IBO) conducted an analy­sis of the use of Section 8 vouchers. The analysts concluded, “Based on our models, if 2,500 families ­were placed into Section 8 or NYCHA the shelter census would then fall by about 450 and if 5,000 families ­were placed the census would be reduced by about 900. . . . ​ ­Family shelter costs would be reduced by a total of $14.7 million with 2,500 placements and $29.4 million with 5,000 placements” (Champeny 2012, 4).

Changing Direction And then came the big switch. In December 2004, surprising many ­people, Commissioner Gibbs announced ending the use of Section 8 vouchers for the homeless and ending the priority referrals to NYCHA ­because the federal government was reducing the number of Section 8 vouchers available. As would be noted in 2006, “The share of federal vouchers in use in New York has fallen over the past few years, from 96 ­percent in 2004 to a projected 90 ­percent in 2006. 11,841 vouchers ­were cut in New York over the past two years” (CBPP 2006, 2). The decline in the number of federal Section 8 vouchers continued throughout the Bloomberg administration, and “the number of ­house­holds assisted through the two voucher programs fell from 130,129 during the first four months of city fiscal year 2013 to 127,901 in the first four months of this fiscal year” (NYC IBO 2014). In addition, the Bloomberg administration ended the policy of referring homeless families to NYCHA apartments based on a belief that offering priority placement in public housing had unintended consequences, and that t­ here was a lengthy waiting list. The thinking was that if families who w ­ ere doubled up in apartments knew that they could bypass the long waiting list for public housing, then ­these families would leave their current homes and enter the shelter system. As Gibbs commented, “We d ­ on’t want p ­ eople to think that the best way to get housing is to bundle their ­children up and take them to the EAU” (quoted in Kaufman 2004c). ­There was also a huge waiting list for NYCHA apartments that was bypassed ­every time the agency gave an apartment to the homeless. This 180-­degree turn shocked the homeless advocacy community. In place of Section 8 housing referrals, the city offered its own housing program, the Housing Stability Plus (HSP) program. A five-­year program, it provided



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­TABLE 5.1  Number of homeless during Bloomberg’s first term YEAR

TOTAL HOMELESS

TOTAL HOMELESS ­CHILDREN

2002

31,063

13,088

2003

38,464

16,711

2004

38,317

16,361

2005

36,630

15,094

2006

31,554

11,996

Source: Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2017. Note: January numbers used except for 2012, for which February was recorded.

incentives for the homeless to become self-­sufficient. This effort turned out to be wholly inadequate.

Results of The First Term The policies set in place by the Bloomberg administration at first resulted in a decrease in the number of homeless. Working with HomeBase for prevention, providing supportive housing, using Section 8 vouchers, and placing ­people with NYCHA all contributed t­ oward a drop in the number of homeless individuals from 2003 to 2006, as shown in ­table 5.1. But that trend ended when the Bloomberg administration s­ topped relying on Section 8 vouchers and NYCHA and created HSP.

Strategies to Address Homelessness: Bloomberg’s Second Term, 2006–2010 The many court cases litigating the city’s treatment of the homeless fi­nally found a resolution. On September 17, 2008, the city, the state, and the ­Legal Aid Society reached an agreement. Judge Jacqueline Silberman of the Supreme Court, New York County, issued a final judgment that the McCain v. Koch litigation be closed. That “included the following party stipulations: (1) all motions and claims for relief [would] be dismissed with prejudice; (2) all ­orders [would] be vacated; and (3) all aspects of the McCain litigation would be closed and no further proceedings or motions be brought” (Koerner 2008–9). In return, the city would stop challenging ­legal rulings that homeless ­people had a right to shelter. All parties had agreed that any homeless person had a right to shelter. As Steven Banks, the chief l­awyer of the ­Legal Aid Society, a primary party in the McCain case, commented, “The import

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­TABLE 5.2  Number of homeless during Bloomberg’s second term YEAR

TOTAL HOMELESS

TOTAL HOMELESS ­CHILDREN

2007

35,112

14,210

2008

35,097

14,966

2009

36,598

15,523

2010

39,066

16,346

Source: Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2017. Note: January numbers used except for 2012, for which February was recorded.

of the settlement, and in a sense Ms. McCain’s life, is that no m ­ atter who the mayor is now or in the f­uture, tens of thousands of homeless c­ hildren and their families are entitled to a roof over their heads” (quoted in Hevesi 2001). In the mayor’s second term, the number of homeless p ­ eople increased, as shown in ­table 5.2.

Housing Stability Plus and the Advantage Program Advocates for the homeless had been asking the city for years to supplement federal dollars with local funding. Their desire became a real­ity when Mayor Bloomberg introduced HSP in 2005, reducing the use of Section 8 federal vouchers and referrals of the homeless to NYCHA. T ­ hese advocates ­were immediately disappointed, however. The city provided five-­year rent subsidies for the homeless with the caveat that each year the subsidies would decrease by 20 ­percent so that, ­after five years, p ­ eople would be self-­sufficient. Homeless p ­ eople who entered the program would be put on public assistance, meaning that if they worked, their public assistance grant would be reduced or even eliminated as they earned more income (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2011). Again the state interfered to the detriment of the city’s program. The state had not agreed that ­those on public assistance would be eligible for the state’s Work Support Program, so public assistance was all that was available. By 2007, over nine thousand families had been placed in apartments through the HSP program; due to the state’s decision, t­ hese individuals could not work and keep their welfare benefits (Lamport 2007). Three prob­lems afflicted this program. First, tenants ­limited their work hours ­because more income would make them ineligible for public assistance and, by extension, the rent supplement. Second, landlords became unwilling to rent to HSP tenants ­because whenever a tenant was cut from public assistance for breaking the rules, the landlord would not be paid. The city was notorious for cutting ­people from its rolls, and consequently landlords quickly became disenchanted. Third, it became impossible for homeless families placed in the HSP program to earn enough money to pay the increased rents. Without allowing ­people to work,



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HPS did not function properly, and in June 2007 the DHS s­ topped accepting new applicants for the program. In 2007 the Bloomberg administration created the Advantage New York program as a new and improved alternative to HSP. Advantage New York grew to serve over fifteen thousand tenants by 2011, as was noted in Zheng v. City of New York in 2012.1 In the Advantage program, tenants could work without losing welfare benefits, and landlords ­were assured that changes in a tenant’s public assistance status would not disrupt payment of the rent subsidy over the course of the lease. But tenants received only two years of rent subsidies. Then Advantage ended, and the reason it ended belonged to the State of New York (Secret 2011).

Strategies to Address Homelessness: Bloomberg’s Third Term, 2010–2014 ­ here was clear disappointment among the Bloomberg administration over the T state withdrawal from financing permanent housing units, and then came the withdraw of the federal funds.

Canceling Subsidies for Permanent Housing The Advantage New York program was paid for in equal parts by the city, state, and federal governments. In 2011, “its projected cost for the next fiscal year was $140 million, with the state and federal governments contributing $92 million of that. But the state, citing fiscal constraints, pulled its support, and with it cut off the federal matching dollars” (Secret 2011). Advocates had denigrated the Advantage program and testified before the New York State legislature that it was not working. They said that two years was not enough time for a f­ amily in transition from homelessness to be able to pay the full rent of a New York City apartment. The NYC comptroller, John C. Liu, also issued an audit documenting flaws in the implementation of Advantage (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2010). Governor Andrew Cuomo took advantage of t­hese complaints to withdraw state funding. Astonishingly, Cuomo also had language placed in the legislation that would prohibit the city from using other state funds to continue the program (Stewart and Yee 2016). The city would also lose the federal funds once the state withdrew. As a result, the city would have to fund the program on its own. The mayor was furious with the advocates for criticizing the only program he had to provide permanent rent subsidies to the homeless. Bloomberg canceled the Advantage program in 2011, stating that the city could not possibly afford to operate it without state and federal aid. One of the largest advocacy organ­izations, the

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Co­ali­tion for the Homeless, went to court to stop the Bloomberg administration from closing the program (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2011). The advocates lost. Consequently, over the next year, as leases expired, many of the Advantage families returned to the shelters, and the number of p ­ eople who w ­ ere homeless increased, as shown in t­ able 5.2. In November 2011 Bloomberg launched the most aggressive attack on New Yorkers’ ­legal right to shelter since the years of Mayor Giuliani and Governor George Pataki. Bloomberg’s administration proposed tightening shelter eligibility rules for homeless single adults. The ­Legal Aid Society sued on behalf of the homeless. In 2013 the mayor lost in court and on appeal (Callahan v. Carey)—­ not on the merits of the case but b ­ ecause the administration had ignored regulations requiring public comment.

Expanding Cluster-­Site Housing In the 1980s and 1990s, homeless families had been ­housed in “welfare ­hotels,” privately owned ­hotels that ­were turned into apartments for the homeless. The landlords ­were paid $36,000 a year for each apartment rented to a homeless f­ amily. This was known as scatter-­site housing (ICPH 2017). ­Under pressure from the courts and advocates for the homeless, ­these welfare ­hotels ­were closed, and Tier II shelters w ­ ere opened. T ­ hese shelters w ­ ere owned and operated by nonprofits and provided social ser­v ices on-­site. In August 2000, during the Giuliani administration, the DHS ­housed a growing number of homeless families once again in private apartments. By the end of the first year of the Bloomberg administration, this program had grown to 2,086 apartments or 21 ­percent of all homeless families in the system (ICPH 2017). In 2007 the city phased out the scatter-­site housing program and phased in what was known as a cluster-­site housing program, which offered social ser­v ices but retained private landlords. By 2011 the number of cluster-­site apartments was 1,824 (ICPH 2017). The prob­lems with ­these cluster sites w ­ ere similar to ­those of scatter-­site housing: landlords made so much money on t­ hese apartments ($3,000 a month per unit) that they sought to evict other tenants who w ­ ere not paying as much. The city’s reliance on cluster-­site apartments was incredibly costly and had the unintended consequence of driving other tenants out of the buildings.

Penalizing the Homeless Bloomberg and Gibbs proposed eligibility requirements for t­ hose who wished to enter the shelter system. In effect, they sought to turn off the spigot. Christine Quinn, the Speaker of the New York City Council, took Bloomberg to court and



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­TABLE 5.3  Number of homeless during Bloomberg’s third term YEAR

TOTAL HOMELESS ­CHILDREN

TOTAL HOMELESS POPULATION

2011

39,483

15,535

2012

42,805

17,162

2013

50,135

21,034

2014

53,615

22,712

Source: Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2017. Note: January numbers used except for 2012, for which February was recorded.

won. As Quinn explained at the time, “DHS’ proposed policy would have needlessly put thousands of homeless New Yorkers on the streets by requiring them to provide proof they have nowhere ­else to stay. This was a wrong-­headed policy that puts a burden of proof on p ­ eople who could least shoulder it” (quoted in NYC Council 2013). Bloomberg’s act was seen as n ­ eedless punishment of the homeless, and it both­ered many New Yorkers. The growth in homeless continued to grow in Bloomberg’s third term (see t­ able 5.3).

A Lack of Federal and State Support Throughout the Bloomberg administration, the state and federal governments remained unaccountable. The pressure increased on the Bloomberg administration, but rarely did the advocates point their ire to the state­house or the US Congress.

State Support Bloomberg invested more in the DHS than he did in many other parts of the city’s bud­get. He increased city tax levy funds for the homeless from $237.7 million to $420.5 million from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2012, an increase of 77 ­percent. In comparison, the city’s tax levy funding for the entire city bud­get increased only 65.6 ­percent, as shown in t­ able 5.4 (NYC OMB 2002b, 2012). In contrast to city funding, state funding dramatically decreased. New York State invested $163.9 million in DHS’s bud­get in fiscal year 2002, but by fiscal year 2012, this amount was $109.7 million, a reduction of 33.1 ­percent. The state actually increased the overall revenue to the city by 42.9 ­percent, from $7.9 billion to $11.3 billion (NYC OMB 2002b, 2012). In addition to providing inadequate funding, the state prevented the city from giving homeless ­people rental assistance. Cuts in state funds and court ­orders

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­TABLE 5.4  Department of Homeless Ser­vices expense bud­get summary (FY 2002–­FY 2012) DHS

Total personnel ser­vices

2002 MODIFIED

2012 MODIFIED, 6/28/2012

FY 2002–­FY 2012 % CHANGE

$96,424,397

$118,259,749

22.60%

Total non-­personnel ser­vices

$452,389,641

$789,889,706

74.60%

Less intracity sales

−$12,945, 563

DHS net total expense bud­get

$535,868,475

$908,149,455

69.50%

$237,653,382

$420,535,603

FUNDING SUMMARY

City funds Other categorical

77.00% −100.00%

$36,000 $163,869,518

$109,661,284

−33.10%

$10,990,201

$4,553,000

−58.60%

Federal—­other

$123,319,374

$336,010,055

172.50%

Intracity sales

 ____________

$37,389,513

Total

$535,868,475

$908,149,455

69.50%

1,593

1,899

19.20%

State Federal—­community development

Positions

Source: New York City Office of Management and Bud­get 2002b and 2012.

meant that Bloomberg had to allocate more city dollars to homeless ser­vices. The choice—to hire more teachers, firefighters, or police officers or to build more temporary shelters—­was constantly before the mayor. But Bloomberg’s decisions ­were complicated by the fact that the city had to replace lost state and federal dollars with city tax levy dollars. Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio, lobbied the governor to delete the language in the state bud­get that prohibited the city from using state funds for a rent subsidy program (Taylor and Kaplan 2014). The governor initially refused but ­later relented as the economy improved. The difficulty the city had maintaining funding for the Advantage program reflects the power that the federal and state governments had and continue to have over New York City’s homeless policy. Not ­until the 2014–15 state bud­get was the restrictive language eliminated “that explic­itly prohibits any social ser­v ice district with a population over five million from being reimbursed for shelter supplements other than ­those to prevent eviction [during de Blasio’s term]. . . . ​The City is now able to leverage federal funding through Temporary Assistance Funding for Needy Families (TANF) and State funding through Safety Net (SA) ­towards a rental assistance program for the



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homeless” (NYC Council 2014, 2). The state’s change of heart was too late for Mayor Bloomberg, but it would certainly benefit New Yorkers ­under de Blasio’s administration.

Federal Support The federal government invested a g­ reat deal of money in temporary shelters through the DHS, increasing its funding from $123.3 million to $336.0 million, an increase of 172.5 ­percent. The federal commitment to temporary housing was far greater than that to other city departments, which received only a 19.5 ­percent increase in federal dollars. See t­ able 5.4 (NYC OMB 2002, 2012). Federal aid ­today mostly goes for temporary shelter and other ser­vices associated with the condition of homelessness. “The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, the watershed event in federal support, authorized a l­ ittle more than a billion dollars over a two-­year period for changes in seven existing programs and creation of fifteen new programs providing aid to homeless ­people” (Rosenthal and Foscarinis 2006, 322). Given the conservative nature of the 1980s president and legislature, the initial funding went to “emergency shelter and food,” and not “preventive relief and long-­term solutions” (Rosenthal and Foscarinis 2006, 322). The McKinney-­Vento Act broadened over the years and included protection for homeless ­children to ensure access to the public schools. In 2002, with the passage of No Child Left ­Behind, more teeth ­were placed in the law. Homeless students had to be admitted to the local public school. Any documents students needed could be obtained ­later (NCH 2006). On May 20, 2009, President Barack Obama signed the Homeless Emergency and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act, which amended and reauthorized the McKinney-­Vento Homeless Assistance Act with substantial changes. T ­ here ­were five basic changes (Leopold 2019). The first change was helping homeless ­people get into permanent housing faster by authorizing “funds for rapid re-­housing assistance” (Leopold 2019). The second change was to create a “federal strategic plan to end homelessness” (Leopold 2019). The third change was to expand the definition of homelessness to “include p ­ eople at imminent risk of homelessness” (Leopold 2019). The fourth change was to create “system-­wide per­for­mance mea­sures for homeless Continuums of Care (CoCS)” and, with that, “creation of community per­for­mance mea­sures,” and ­there was a fifth change of to establish “coordinated entry systems” (Leopold 2019). Clearly collecting data and distributing it are helpful to all involved in helping the homelessness, but it does not help ­house ­people permanently.

124 CHAPTER 5

Prob­l ems with Mayor Bloomberg’s Strategies ­ here ­were several prob­lems with the strategies a­ dopted by Bloomberg; the most T controversial was refusing to shelter the homeless if they had other places to stay.

State Actions in Ending Subsidizing Rents for the Homeless Ending the Advantage program and losing so much state and federal aid lay squarely with the governor, state legislature, and advocates as described above. Now, for the first time in many years, the homeless had no assistance from the city in moving from temporary shelter to permanent housing except for the small supported-­housing programs.

Refusing to End Renting Privately Owned Apartments Bloomberg’s use of privately owned apartments to temporarily ­house the homeless was extremely expensive. Funds could have been used to contract with nonprofits to build more Tier II housing units, which usually offer private rooms and three meals a day, but the city continued to place families in privately owned apartments. ­After April 2011, when the Bloomberg administration ended the Advantage program, the number of families sleeping each night in privately owned apartments (cluster-­site housing) increased from 1,577 to 2,587 families, an increase of 64 ­percent (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2014). The prob­lem continued into the next administration.

Denying the Right to Shelter The right to shelter in New York is guaranteed by the courts, but that depends upon how homelessness is defined. Gibbs sought to limit the number of homeless ­people by insisting that if they had relatives, the homeless could live with them, and by insisting that they take an apartment offered to them by DHS. Gibbs called it “personal responsibility” (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2013). Throughout Bloomberg’s tenure the city sought to reduce the number of families applying for shelter by claiming they ­were not homeless; rather, they had lived somewhere e­ lse (Kolker 2002). In a New York Times article by Linda Richardson, Anna Lou Dehavenon, a prominent social anthropologist, commented about the Bloomberg administration’s homeless policies: “ ‘The city assumes the families could go back



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to Mama, to aunts, to Grandma; they assume the families can go back to apartments like this,’ [Dehavenon] says, sweeping a hand around the sprawling, art-­ filled residence. . . . ​‘Although this policy would decrease the official counts of the shelter population before the next election, it (denying the right to shelter) would increase real a­ ctual homelessness substantially,’ she says. ‘In fact, most of t­hese families would be forced to seek shelter in other p ­ eople’s apartments and public spaces’ ” (L. Richardson 2005). In addition, the mayor sought to evict homeless families from shelters if they engaged in gross misconduct or failed to accept apartments offered to them. The state worked with Bloomberg to limit options for the homeless. In 2005 the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance changed the requirements for homeless families seeking temporary shelter while waiting for their applications to be approved. The new guidelines stated that housing applicants would only be assured of a short-­term shelter if they had been victims of abuse or evicted. The L ­ egal Aid Society appealed the guidelines in court, where the regulations ­were overturned (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless, n.d.) A ­family could be ejected from the shelters for missing appointments or if the ­family’s welfare case was closed. A year l­ater, the Co­ali­tion for the Homeless and the ­Legal Aid Society got help from the state legislature, which passed a law ending any rent requirement of shelter residents and instead requiring that t­ hose living in the shelters while working participate in a shelter savings plan (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless, n.d.). Throughout Bloomberg’s tenure, if families came from relatives’ homes, the Bronx Intake Unit would often deem that the ­family was not in need of a shelter and that ­family should return to live with t­ hose relatives. In 2011 Bloomberg sought to extend this policy from families to single adults, many of whom w ­ ere mentally ill or other­wise suffering health prob­lems. Both the city council and the ­Legal Aid Society filed lawsuits to restrain the administration from implementing ­these requirements. In 2012 State Supreme Court justice Judith Gische “blocked the change in eligibility rules for single adults seeking entry into New York City’s homeless shelters” (Saul 2012). “Gische faulted the city’s failure to vet its new policy before the public and the city council, in violation of the requirements of the city charter” (Saul 2012). The city appealed, insisting that homeless adults had to prove that they had no other housing option. Fi­nally, in November 2013, the Court of Appeals ruled against the Bloomberg policy: single adults did not have to prove that other housing was not available to them (Co­ali­tion for the Homeless, n.d.). ­Under the Bloomberg administration, if a ­family had previously been denied shelter ­because relatives could take them in, then the ­family was denied shelter

126 CHAPTER 5

on subsequent occasions. As Annie Karni (2014) notes, “Even on very cold days ­those families that had previously been denied shelter would be turned away from a city-­run shelter even on a ‘Code Blue’ night—if the temperature dropped below 32 degrees for more than four hours.” This policy was reversed in the first week of de Blasio’s mayoralty when the deputy mayor for health and ­human ser­ vices, Lilliam Barrios-­Paoli, changed the policy to welcome “any ­family seeking shelter on cold nights, regardless of eligibility” (Karni 2014).

A ­Limited Number of Beds for Homeless Youth In 2009 Bloomberg formed the Commission for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning Runaway and Homeless Youth, which attempted to address the root c­ auses of homelessness among LGBTQ youth (Siciliano 2012). But three years l­ater, when announcing his proposed 2012 bud­get, “Bloomberg cut funding for homeless youth, slicing more than $7 million from the 2013 bud­get for New York City’s Runaway and Homeless Youth Ser­v ices” (Siciliano 2012). According to Carl Siciliano, executive director of the Ali Forney Center, which assists homeless LGBTQ youth, “A 2008 census revealed that t­here are 3,800 youths without stable housing or parental care, yet the city provides merely 250 youth shelter beds” (2012). The city had shelter beds for fewer than 10 ­percent “of the city’s homeless youth, and waiting lists for all shelter beds, but especially at LGBTQ-­friendly facilities” (Siciliano 2012). ­Those who ran the shelters said ­those waiting lists w ­ ere growing. As Siciliano then noted about the proposed cuts, Mayor Bloomberg has a perplexing history when it comes to sheltering homeless youth. In 2009 he created a commission to study the needs of homeless LGBT youth and make recommendations for how the city might better respond to t­ hose needs. I was one of 26 members of that commission. We called for additional shelter beds and more support for street outreach efforts and drop-in programs. However, since the commission’s report was released in 2010, Mayor Bloomberg has repeatedly attempted to gut the grossly inadequate ser­vice infrastructure for homeless youth, proposing cutting shelter beds, drop-in programs, and street outreach efforts by at least 50 ­percent. Last spring he proposed eliminating 160 of the city’s 250 youth shelter beds. (2012) The city council restored the funding. It is far cheaper to keep homeless youth in shelter beds than it is to pay for the cost of a prison term or a hospital stay. But in his last term Mayor Bloomberg cut social ser­v ices, pointing out that the 2008 recession made bud­get cuts inevitable.



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Aging Out of Foster Care Many homeless youth are t­ hose who no longer qualify for foster care. In New York, youth can remain in foster care u ­ ntil age twenty-­one, although many choose to leave the system between the ages of eigh­teen and twenty-­one. Approximately eleven hundred youth are discharged from foster care each year. Foster care youth enter homeless shelters at a rapid rate. According to a report on foster care by Dennis Culhane of the University of Pennsylvania, 15 ­percent enter New York City’s shelters within three years, and one out of five youth in the shelter system ­were previously in foster care (cited in Hilliard 2012, 15). Since no city agency tracks what happens to youth who age out of foster care, the Center for an Urban ­Future conducted a series of interviews with ­those youth. The center’s researchers found that many of ­these youth ­were unemployed and at risk of homelessness (Hilliard 2012, 6). In 2006, the city’s Administration for ­Children’s Ser­v ices opened Preparing Youth for Adulthood (PYA) to help foster teen­agers’ shift to adulthood. PYA was largely funded by closing the Office of Youth Development (OYD) in 2008, which had responsibility for older foster care youth. As Tim Hilliard notes, “The closure of OYD was mentioned in­de­pen­dently by a number of knowledgeable insiders as a sign of declining resources and lack of a commitment to supporting older foster youth” (2012, 22).

Denying Food Contributions to the Homeless On March 18, 2012, the Bloomberg administration ended the twenty-­year practice of accepting food donations from the public for homeless shelters. This alienated countless New Yorkers who had been involved for years in collecting and donating the food. It turned out that a new interagency task force had written new regulations about what could be served at vari­ous city facilities, and ­there was an emphasis on serving sizes as well as salt, fat, and fiber content. As CBS New York reported, the mayor commented, “ ‘For the ­things that we run ­because of all sorts of safety reasons, we just have a policy it is my understanding of not taking donations.’ Told that his administration had recently enacted the policy, the mayor was Grinch-­like: ‘If they did in the past, they ­shouldn’t have done it, and we s­ houldn’t have accepted it’ ” (CBS New York 2012). From the mayor’s responses to questions, it was clear that he had no knowledge of this new city regulation, a consequence of his management style. Very few mayors, if any, would ever allow such a major change that affected so many New Yorkers without analyzing the consequences first or at least being informed before the change occurred. But Bloomberg allowed his agency heads g­ reat latitude, sometimes to his detriment and the detriment of New Yorkers.

128 CHAPTER 5

Denying Religious Organ­izations the Right to Operate Volunteer Shelters For many years, over a hundred churches and synagogues had arranged to provide shelter to the homeless. T ­ hese religious organ­izations w ­ ere each associated with “one of eight city drop-in centers,” which gave referrals and rides to ­these shelters (Kaufman 2008). This small effort to help the less fortunate was effective, as on any given night, several hundred ­people had a safe and warm place to stay (Kaufman 2008). But in 2008 the Bloomberg administration de­cided to stop sending ­people to religious organ­izations that did not have shelters open e­ very night of the year. This change of policy caused several programs to close (Kaufman 2008). Four months ­later, “the city announced that effective in June, it would no longer send clients to shelters that did not serve hot meals before bed, and that even the smallest shelters would have to arrange transportation for their guests” (Kaufman 2008). The churches and synagogues ­were furious. As Sylvia Friedman, speaking on behalf of the Friends Shelter, commented, “With the rising number of homeless, how Mayor Bloomberg could come up with such a stupid and insipid plan is beyond my comprehension. And our shelters are safe and ­people depend upon them” (Friedman, pers. comm., 2012). The Bloomberg administration’s motivation for ­these policy changes was to make the system more efficient; officials wanted to send ­people to shelters that had large capacity, but they did not take into account the impact of such a change on homeless clients.

Prob­lems of Coordination across Agencies It was common knowledge that families who w ­ ere homeless w ­ ere coming from specific geographic areas and had suffered housing difficulties. In addition, homeless families ­were coming from certain types of housing. The IBO provided an analy­sis, as shown in t­ able 5.5. Close coordination was needed between the agency responsible for serving the homeless and the agency involved in rent regulation and in public housing. Of ­those entering the homeless system, 43 ­percent came from rent regulated housing, so obviously more attention needed to be paid to prob­lems with the city’s rent regulated housing (see chapter 6). But this was not the purview of Gibbs as commissioner of the DHS; nor was it the purview of the deputy mayor for health and ­human ser­v ices when Gibbs was promoted to that position. It belonged to the portfolio of Dan Doctoroff, deputy mayor for economic development and rebuilding. It was common knowledge that landlords w ­ ere forcing out low-­income tenants in rent regulated apartments so the landlords could charge new tenants



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TABLE 5.5  Families entering shelter by housing category, 2002–2012 NUMBER OF ENTRIES

SHARE OF ENTRIES

Rent regulated housing

32,166

43%

Un­regu­la­ted housing

29,610

39%

Public housing (NYCHA)

12,261

16%

1,609

2%

Specialized fa­cil­i­ty

Source: NYC IBO 2014. IBO analy­sis of data obtained from the Department of Finance, DHS, the New York State Division of Homes and Community Renewal, and NYCHA.

market rates. A prevention program might have sent ­lawyers into housing court to stem the tide of evictions. In addition, NYCHA was sending 16 ­percent of its evicted tenants to the homeless shelters. Gibbs worked hard at interagency cooperation, but Doctoroff paid l­ittle attention to low-­income housing; his self-­ laudatory book Greater Than Ever: New York’s Big Comeback (2017) contained one line about NYCHA. He was strictly focused on his affordable housing plan for Bloomberg’s commitment to build or renovate 165,000 units of housing using private developers. Doctoroff did not understand the consequences of the engine of economic development that he was driving through the city. His book reads as if no one was out t­ here telling him—­over a twelve-­year period—­that too many low-­income ­people ­were losing their housing.

Response to Criticism Gibbs as deputy mayor had a power­ful response to advocates for the homeless who continually criticized and sued the city for its failure to ­house homeless ­people. Her arguments w ­ ere that federal and state governments must contribute financial resources, and they had refused. Pointing to the Advantage program, she criticized the state withdrawing its funding for permanent housing. In addition, Gibbs’s argument that t­ hose seeking shelter must assume some responsibility remains the one most disliked by advocates. Gibbs also wanted ­those homeless who ­were working to contribute to the cost of shelter, which was the case elsewhere in the state, though not in the city. Gibbs’s point was that the Advantage program was gone, the state and federal government ­were no longer supporting permanent low-­income housing, and judicial interference made administering programs for the homeless more difficult and was incredibly time-­consuming. She also established guidelines for shelter residents to develop and follow in­de­pen­dent living plans as part of the agency’s client responsibility policies (Durham and Johnson 2014, 4). Advocates accused

130 CHAPTER 5

Gibbs of blaming the victim, calling it client responsibility (Kolker 2002). But Gibbs remained in a difficult position. She had no control over housing policy in the city; that belonged to Doctoroff. It was as if she had been given authority to control a river but was not permitted to examine prob­lems with the tributaries upstream.

Chapter Summar y Bloomberg began his administration by dealing with homelessness with energy and thoughtfulness, but when the environment changed—­when the strategies of using Section 8 vouchers and NYCHA housing no longer worked—­the administration did not respond effectively. Both Bloomberg and Gibbs insisted that p ­ eople who claimed to be homeless w ­ ere not necessarily truly homeless. At the same time, the administration ­adopted bizarre strategies that alienated constituents, such as insisting that volunteers who ran small homeless shelters comply with stringent rules, ending voluntary food contributions to shelters, and seeking deep cuts to assistance to specific homeless populations, such as homeless youth and ­people with HIV/AIDS. Although t­ here is evidence that long-­term rental subsidies make a big difference for homeless families, the mayor and Commissioner Gibbs resisted paying for long-­term rental subsidies a­ fter the state withdrew its funding. The three-­year ­Family Options Study conducted by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development indicated that having priority access to long-­ term housing subsidies produces substantial benefits for families; long-­term rent subsidies “reduced by more than one-­half most forms of residential instability, improved multiple mea­sures of adult and child well-­being, and reduced food insecurity” (US HUD 2016a, 11). Since the state and federal governments w ­ ere not interested in financing long-­term rent subsidies, and the federal government had reduced the number of Section 8 vouchers, the city would have had to finance long-­term rent subsidies, and the mayor was unwilling to do so. The policy and fiscal environment beyond New York City’s borders is problematic. The city is not an entity unto itself; it is subject to the same social and economic forces that all large cities face. During parts of Bloomberg’s tenure, ­there was a recession that left New Yorkers unemployed and unable to pay their rent. Michael Calaghan, executive director of Nazareth housing, a nonprofit offering both shelter and permanent housing, said, “If you want to be about honest numbers, the families coming into the system b ­ ecause of HSP, ­because of Advantage, ­they’re coming in ­because t­ here is no living wage, ­because of climbing rents” (Asher 2011). At the same time, t­ here was a federal government that long ago had gotten out of the housing business and would not reenter it. Federal dollars w ­ ere



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available for temporary shelter, but l­ ittle federal money was available for permanent housing. The state government, led by Governor Cuomo, may have expressed interest in housing the homeless but, in response to harsh fiscal conditions, withdrew funding, particularly from the Advantage program. Faced with federal and state cutbacks, Bloomberg could have chosen to continue to invest in the Advantage program with city money. Advocates for the homeless are not without blame ­here; they had to be somewhat naive to go to Albany and testify before the state legislature about the inadequacies of the Advantage program and then become outraged at Mayor Bloomberg for ending the program a­ fter the state legislature cut the funding. It is almost as if the advocates trusted the state legislators to do the right t­ hing: to adjust the Advantage program rather than eliminate it. If they had some understanding of the extent to which the state legislature was still dominated by rural and suburban interests, and thus did not necessarily have the city’s best interests in mind, ­these champions of the homeless might have ­adopted a dif­fer­ent strategy. The city suffers from a dearth of low-­income housing. Regardless of which strategies the Bloomberg administration a­ dopted to deal with homelessness, fundamentally most homelessness results from a lack of affordable housing. The data clearly show that large numbers of homeless families come from three situations: rent regulated apartments, specific geographic areas of the city, and NYCHA (Smith and Grinker 2005). Although some homeless ­people have all sorts of health prob­lems, and thus need supportive ser­vices, many simply lack housing. In effect, what Gibbs stated quite clearly was that the Bloomberg administration would not invest in housing vouchers for the poor without more state and federal financial support. The administration’s position was that affordable housing was a state and federal function as well as a city responsibility and the city should not be required to commit to such an undertaking on its own. Indeed, that is a key question: Can a local government, even a city as well off as New York City, afford to build housing for the poor without state or federal help? Dif­fer­ent answers to this question divided the Bloomberg administration from advocates who wished to provide the homeless with permanent housing. The mayor ended the policies of previous mayors, who had provided apartments to the homeless through Section 8 vouchers and public housing, and then he did not fund the two programs he had created (Advantage and HSP) to take the place of Section 8 federal vouchers ­after the state withdrew its funding. The prob­lem of homelessness is a structural one, not a personal one. It lies mainly in a lack of low-­income housing, a prob­lem that neither Bloomberg nor his successor has been able to overcome.

6 THE LACK OF LOW-­I NCOME HOUSING

When it came to low-­income housing, Mayor Michael Bloomberg celebrated successes and suffered defeats. He built or renovated 165,000 units of affordable housing during his three terms, a rec­ord surpassed only by Mayors Fiorello La Guardia and Ed Koch (Plitt and Spivack 2019; Schwartz 2019, 365). To accomplish this feat, Bloomberg created a highly sophisticated system of financing, which included funding the New York City Housing Trust Fund. He established the New York City Acquisition Fund, which built affordable though not necessarily low-­income housing. He provided developers financial incentives through vari­ous federal and state programs for developers who built housing with at least 20 ­percent affordable units. But it is in housing policy that Bloomberg suffered his greatest defeat. Bloomberg lost more low-­income housing than he built (see t­ able 6.1; Fernandez 2009). Several centers gave him the data and pos­si­ble ave­nues to increase low-­income housing, but he ignored them. City Limits magazine, the Community Ser­v ice Society (CSS), the Hunter College Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, and the Pratt Center for Community Development all told the story of how the city was losing low-­income housing faster than it was building it, and ­these same organ­izations explained ways in which Bloomberg could slow the losses (Bach and W ­ aters 2014, 23). But Bloomberg, the lover of data, ignored the data. He allowed the Rent Guidelines Board (RGB) to give landlords permission for large rent increases, refused to pay for attorneys to represent low-­income renters in housing court, refused to provide financial aid to the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), ended the use of Section 8 vouchers for homeless families, and refused to fund the Advantage New York program ­after the New York State 132



The Lack of Low-­I ncome Housing

133

legislature eliminated funding for it. And, most impor­tant, Bloomberg allowed luxury housing to be built time and again without any kind of affordable or low-­ income housing inclusion. The list goes on, and the list remains problematic for his successor. Yes, his successor, Mayor Bill de Blasio, has made some improvements, but only around the edges: mandatory inclusion of affordable housing for developers building luxury buildings (but only when neighborhoods ­were rezoned for greater residential density) and some low-­income tenants could now get attorneys to represent them in housing court (Samuel Stein 2017, 775). In his speech to the National Low Income Housing Co­ali­tion in February 2006, ­after reelection to a second term, Bloomberg announced his plans to support affordable housing. He acknowledged that the need for affordable housing was enormous given the continued growth in population and skyrocketing property values. He concluded that the way to solve this prob­lem was to “harness private market forces and private sector methods for the greater public good” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2006c). His strategy was to create traditional public-­private partnerships, but then to take t­hings one further step, investing public dollars and public land as “catalysts that prompt the market to create affordable housing” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2006c). He called this proposal the New Housing Marketplace Plan (NHMP). The prob­lems w ­ ere that he was relying on the private sector, which had no interest in low-­income housing, and that his plan did not address low-­income housing. It addressed affordable housing. The CSS stated that affordable housing was not the same ­thing as low-­income housing and concluded that the mayor had focused on affordable housing (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 23). In Bloomberg’s New Housing Plan, 68 ­percent of the units ­were affordable to t­ hose earning less than 80 ­percent (about $50,000 for a f­ amily of four) of Area Median Income (AMI; about $65,000) and the remaining 32 ­percent of units served moderate and middle-­income New York families (Office of the Mayor 2006c). Unfortunately, the AMI includes the city’s suburbs, with the result being that the city’s residents’ AMI is lower than that calculated by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). For example, “HUD calculated median income for a f­ amily of four in New York in 2010 was $79,200. Yet, the a­ ctual median income for a four-­person ­house­hold in New York City was only $62,799, over twenty ­percent lower” (ANHD 2011, 27). As the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) concluded ­after studying Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan, “While the City has committed to and developed a significant number of affordable housing units ­under the Bloomberg administration, about two-­thirds of New Housing Marketplace units are too expensive for the majority of local neighborhood residents” (2011, 2). Now consider low-­income housing. In contrast to the mayor’s definition of affordability, the CSS defined low-­income housing as “a f­amily of four with an

134 CHAPTER 6

i­ ncome at 200 ­percent below the federal poverty line” (Bach and W ­ aters 2014, 23). This would be below $32,500. “From 2002 to 2011, ­there was a 39 ­percent drop in the total number of apartments—­including public, subsidized, and private-­market housing—­affordable to a f­amily with an income at 200 ­percent of the federal poverty line. This loss [represented] more than 385,000 units” (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 24). What is not well known is that the city did not make up ­these rules. The city does not have home rule when it comes to rental housing; the state and federal governments have a g­ reat deal to say about low-­income housing (Schwartz 2019, 360). It is the US Congress that created the definitions of AMI. In addition, the state has control of most rent regulation laws, not the city. The governor and state legislature had continually weakened the rent regulation laws that the city was bound to follow for many years. The state and the federal governments have also continually cut funding for NYCHA, which h ­ ouses over four hundred thousand low-­income tenants (see t­ able 6.2). Before any New York City mayor is blamed for the rise in homelessness, it is necessary to understand the abysmal role the federal and state governments have played in the loss of low-­income housing (Bloom 2008, 251). This chapter reviews the prob­lem of insufficient low-­income housing in New York City with few rental options for ­those in poverty. It considers Bloomberg’s NHMP and its limitations, and, notably, it explains the external economic and ­legal constraints on the city’s low-­income housing plans. The chapter concludes with recommendations for the f­ uture.

The Low-­I ncome Housing Prob­l em What Bloomberg did not say in his 2006 speech was that the lack of low-­income housing throughout the nation lay at the feet of the federal government, the state, and the real estate sector. Amer­ic­ a had built low-­income housing for forty years, from the 1930s to the 1970s (Pappas 2013). Then the federal government stepped back, and private developers took over; they used “federal housing tax credits, sold them to corporations” and used ­those proceeds “to build low-­income housing” (Garbarine 2001). At this time the homeless population began to rise substantially. Although many reasons w ­ ere given for the lack of sufficient low-­income housing, such as the loss of single-­room occupancy (SRO) buildings b ­ ecause of the many co-op and condominium conversions that occurred at that time, vacancy decontrol, and rising land and construction costs, the fact remains that the only time this country built a large number of low-income housing units was when the federal government did so. “The collapse of the housing industry ­during



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the Depression paved the way for public housing” and ­later vouchers (von Hoffman 2012, 54). So much more profit can be made building luxury housing. Why then would private developers be interested in building low-­income housing? Policymakers and elected officials are indulging in an illusion when they think that developers would build sufficient low-­income housing with financial incentives. Of course tax benefits can give developers an incentive to build low-­income housing, but the housing built has not met the need (Plitt and Spivack 2019). And tax incentives have even been misused to build luxury housing. Largely due to federal and state policy no longer providing sufficient funding for public housing, New York City mayors (like t­hose in many modern American cities) face a daunting task: providing enough low-­income housing to millions of New Yorkers (Freeman 2002). New York governors and the state legislature could have improved state rent regulation laws that existed for the city and ended the deregulation of vacant regulated apartments that was allowed u ­ nder state law (Schwartz 2019, 360); the governors could have eliminated the 20 ­percent increase landlords can charge for vacant stabilized apartments; they could have ended permanent rent increases for improvements, and they could have funded NYCHA adequately (Freeman 2002). Additionally, the federal government has reduced its commitment to public housing for the past forty years. None of t­ hese actions happened during the mayor’s terms in office; the city had been left to fend for itself for years before and during the Bloomberg administration. A major shift occurred five years ­after Bloomberg left the mayoralty, when the state legislature and the governor revised the rent stabilization and rent control laws to the benefit of tenants. Such a massive positive change came too late for Bloomberg’s rec­ord of wins and losses. New York City lacks sufficient housing for all its citizens, the majority of whom (64 ­percent) are renters. Although the number of housing units in New York City was 3.35 million in 2014, the largest number of units since the first survey was conducted in 1965; the vacancy rates remained incredibly low, at 3.45 ­percent. For units ­under $800 per month, the vacancy rate was 1.8 ­percent (NYC RGB 2015). New Yorkers in poverty had a difficult time finding housing in such a tight market. In addition, new apartment buildings had fewer bedrooms as developers catered to a younger, more affluent generation that did not yet have c­ hildren. In New York City, market-­driven housing development favored the well-­to-do and ­those without ­children. Even though the city built or renovated 165,000 units—­which ­were affordable and not necessarily low-­income—in his twelve years as mayor, the city suffered a net loss of low-­income housing (Schwartz 2019, 365). This result highlights the under­lying prob­lem with the mayor’s low-­income housing plan: he was losing low-­income housing far faster than he was building it. And he knew it b ­ ecause critics ­were telling him so.

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Rental Options Since ­those in poverty cannot pay market rents, renters are l­ imited to some form of government-­regulated housing. The major programs that serve ­these renters are as follows: • rent controlled and rent stabilized apartments • subsidized rent ° public housing funded in part by HUD ° federal Section 8 vouchers to be used in the private market • nonprofits and supportive ser­v ices • tax incentive programs in which private and nonprofit developers agree to build some percentage (often 20 ­percent) of affordable housing in return for federal tax breaks of vari­ous kinds Another program of subsidized housing is New York City’s Mitchell-­Lama housing program, but t­hese units h ­ ouse middle-­income renters and so are not discussed ­here.

Rent Controlled and Rent Stabilized Apartments As we have learned ­earlier, the New York State Constitution gives local governments a l­imited form of home rule—­that is, local governments can pass and implement legislation, but they cannot ignore state law, which can overrule local regulations (Scharff 2011, 1556). The implementation of rent regulation took place in Amer­i­ca ­after both world wars (Cavadias 2017). Gradually most states ended rent control, but it still remains in several states, including New York, where it exists in New York City and its suburbs. The New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) is responsible for overseeing rent controlled and rent stabilized apartments. The DHCR, a state agency, is the enforcement arm, not the city. The city has a smaller enforcement area; it is only responsible for the safety of residents in their units as well as harassment and discrimination. Rent regulation has two categories in New York City. The first category is “the rent control program [applied] to residential buildings constructed before February 1947 in municipalities that had not declared an end to the postwar rental housing emergency” (NYS DHCR, n.d.). Approximately forty thousand units ­were ­under rent control. The second category is apartments ­under “rent stabilization if they ­were in buildings of six or more units built between February 1, 1947, and December 31, 1973” (NYS DHCR, n.d.). In 1970 ­there ­were 1.265 million rent stabilized apartments in New York City and 350,000 rent controlled



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units, for a total of 1.615 million units (Sternlieb and Hughes 1973, 23). During the Bloomberg administration, the total number of ­these rent regulated apartments in New York City was slightly over a million—1,025,214 (see t­able 6.1). Although the state controlled the laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms governing rent regulated housing, New York City operated the Rent Guidelines Board (RGB), which determined rent increases for all rent stabilized units (NYS DHCR regulates rent increases for rent control apartments). The RGB consisted “of nine members, all of whom ­were appointed by the mayor. Two members ­were appointed to represent tenant interests . . . ​two are appointed to represent owner interests. . . . ​The five remaining members represented the general public” (NYC RGB, n.d.-­a). It was the state that had enforcement power. The state legislature and the New York City Council, through their respective agencies, the state’s DHCR and the city’s RGB, ­were responsible for losing hundreds of thousands of rent regulated housing units through continually tightening regulations, allowing vacancy decontrol, and increasing rents to force out lower-­income tenants (MRNY 2011). The DHCR has been cited by the State Comptroller’s Office for its slowness in enforcement: “tenants who file complaints with the Office of Rent Administration (ORA) in New York State Homes and Community Renewal (HCR) wait, on average, ten months for their complaints to be resolved” (NYS OSC 2014b, 1). Further, the state reduced staffing in ORA: “ORA had 287 employees, down from 408 in 2000. Examiner staffing decreased by thirty-­three p ­ ercent, from 119 in 2000 to 80 in 2014” (NYS OSC 2014b, 5). The state deliberately reduced staffing in ORA to make enforcement in a timely manner almost impossible. ­Under vacancy decontrol, if a rent stabilized apartment rented for more than a certain amount, or if the h ­ ouse­hold income of the occupants exceeded a certain amount, the landlord could charge the market rate for the unit as soon as the unit became vacated. This, of course, encouraged landlords to harass tenants out of their apartments (Rajasekaran, Treskon, and Greene 2019). Kenny Schaeffer of the Metropolitan Council on Housing explains how the state dramatically reduced the number of apartments in the rent control stabilization program: “In 1971 the monthly shelter allowance for someone on welfare in the city was $215 and the median rent was $215. Rent control was working.” But Republican governor Nelson Rocke­fel­ler (1959–73) changed that by vacancy decontrol legislation in 1971. As Schaeffer (2011) notes, “Rocke­fel­ler and his housing commissioner, Charles Urstadt, de­cided to break the system. They passed a law taking away the city’s home rule over rent and eviction laws . . . ​and passed another law [commonly called the Urstadt law], complete vacancy decontrol.” U ­ nder the Urstadt law, landlords w ­ ere given a three-­month win­dow in which vacancy decontrol would be in effect. The act deregulated “vacant apartments renting for more

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than $2,000 a month as well as occupied apartments at that rent whose tenants failed to certify that their incomes w ­ ere below $250,000 a year” (MRNY 2011). As Art Shulman (1993) explains, “From July, 1971 through December, 1973, approximately 300,000 rent controlled units w ­ ere decontrolled and approximately 88,000 rent stabilized apartments w ­ ere destabilized.” The loss continued over many de­ cades ­under many administrations. (During Bloomberg’s successor Bill de Blasio’s reign, the state legislature eliminated vacancy decontrol and passed a series of rent regulation laws protecting tenants) (Schwartz 2019, 360). The next shift that wreaked havoc on rent regulated units took place during Governor Mario Cuomo’s terms of office (1983–1994), when the state legislature capitulated to real estate interests and agreed to continue vacancy decontrol for three months from July 7 to October 1, 1993 (Collins 2001, 37). Then the New York City Council followed the state legislature’s lead and extended vacancy decontrol in­def­initely (Collins 2001, 37). A year l­ater the state legislature took control, and it, too, chose to continue vacancy decontrol. Real estate interests won over tenant interests as tremendous pressure was placed on state legislators by developers (Rochabrun and Podkul 2016). “Within three years, four hundred thousand units had been deregulated” and become market-­rate apartments (Schaeffer 2011). It worked like this: landlords made improvements to their apartments, eventually ­those apartments rented above $2,000, and then the landlords ­were allowed to decontrol ­those apartments once the tenants left. As Alan Oser (1995) explains, “This so-­called luxury vacancy decontrol law, enacted in 1993, has cleared the way for the deregulation of vacated apartments that ­were renting well below $2,000 when they ­were occupied.” Governor Pataki (1995–2006) contributed to weakening the state rent regulation laws. In 2003, in the waning hours of the eve­ning as the rent regulation law was expiring, Pataki and Republican legislators produced legislation that provided a vacancy bonus and preferential rents. The vacancy bonus allows landlords to raise the rents of rent stabilized apartments by about 20 ­percent. This encourages landlords to harass tenants to force them to leave. Preferential rents for rent stabilized apartments allows the landlords to offer a temporarily lower rate. Yet, at the same time the landlords register a higher rent than the state allows (MCH, n.d), which the state, charged with enforcement, never notices. When the tenant’s lease is up, the landlord reverts the rent to the higher rent. Such loopholes allow landlords to raise rents faster, and once a rent equals $2,733, the landlord deregulates the rent stabilized apartment ­after the current tenant leaves (Housing Justice for All 2018, 14). The governorship changed often. Bloomberg had to deal with four dif­fer­ent governors. ­After George Pataki stepped down as governor, Eliot Spitzer was elected governor. He lasted fewer than fifteen months before a scandal resulted in his res-



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ignation (2007–8). His lieutenant governor, David Paterson, completed Spitzer’s term (2008–10). Then came Andrew Cuomo (2011–­pre­sent). Mayor Bloomberg had a good relationship with Governor Pataki. Spitzer was short-­lived, and Paterson was well meaning. Andrew Cuomo had been secretary of housing and urban development during the administration of President Bill Clinton. Hence, city residents expected housing help from Cuomo with his background in housing. But Cuomo had a reputation of being difficult to relate to. Bloomberg worked to get along with Cuomo, and certainly Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio, has had a terrible relationship with Cuomo. Regardless of who was governor, the legislature weakened rent regulation. As Cohen pointed out: “­There are many f­actors that can legitimately deregulate a rent stabilized unit upon vacancy, meaning the owner can ask what­ever he or she wants in rent” (M. Cohen 2015). Monthly rents had to stay below $2,000 monthly (threshold) before 2011, and a­ fter 2011, the threshold became $2,500 (Cohen 2015). The number of rent controlled units declined from forty-­three thousand to forty thousand from 2005 to 2008. During this same period the number of rent stabilized units fell by twenty-­two thousand (NYC Office of the Mayor 2009). Raising this threshold to $2,500 in 2011 helped to keep some apartments rent regulated. The threshold ­rose to $2,774.76 by 2018 (Myers 2019). DHCR’s enforcement approach was not effective in stopping rent fraud and the deregulation of apartments. “Landlords openly charged and registered illegal rents b ­ ecause they knew that the DHCR would do nothing about it” (Podkul 2017). The DHCR has a rec­ord of a unit’s rent history as reported by the landlord, and it is this rec­ord that the DHCR relies on in enforcement issues. But in the document released to the tenant explaining the unit’s rent history, the DHCR has this sentence: “DHCR does not attest to the truthfulness of the own­er’s statements or the legality of the rents reported in this document” (Podkul 2017). The responsibility lies with the tenant to prove that the landlord had inflated the rent history and thus could not charge as much as he or she intended. Few low-­income tenants can afford to fight landlords whose l­ awyers in housing court, with no opposing counsel, can easily prove documents to be false. During Bloomberg’s time in office, the city lost over fifty-­five thousand rent stabilized apartments and almost twenty-­one thousand rent controlled apartments; the sum of ­these numbers is nearly equal to the number of new housing starts in Bloomberg’s housing plan (see t­ able 6.1). State laws regarding rent regulated housing have sunset provisions, so e­ very few years, depending upon the legislation, the state legislature must pass them again (Barbanel 2019). In 2011 the legislature passed a bill that had some tenant protections but continued the practice of vacancy decontrol (Cavadias 2017). Throughout the Bloomberg administration landlords used vacancy decontrol to

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TABLE 6.1  Housing stock in New York City during the Bloomberg administration UNITS

2002

2011

DIFFERENCE

Owner occupied

997,003

1,014,940

17,937

Rent controlled

59,324

38,374

(20,950)

Rent stabilized

1,042,397

986,840

(55,557)

804,973

961,886

156,913

Market rate & and other units* Public housing Total housing units

178, 075

185,534

7,459

3,081,772

3,187,574

105,802

Source: Furman Center 2012. *This category includes market rate, Mitchell-­Lama, in rem, and other subsidized housing units.

turn rent regulated apartments into market-­rate apartments. It was not u ­ ntil 2019 that the situation changed when the state fi­nally took action. In the summer of 2019, with Demo­crats in control of the state legislature, the legislature passed the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019, which was the largest expansion of tenants’ rights since rent control was created (Barbanel 2019). Vacancy decontrol was abolished. Rent stabilized apartments would remain so forever; no longer could tenants be priced out of housing. Other provisions made it easier for tenants to fight landlords on overcharges or capital construction costs. By the end of 2019, tenants who fought eviction in housing court won far more than before the act was passed (Barbanel 2019). The loss of rent regulated apartments may now be diminished thanks to the action of the state legislature.

Public Housing through the New York City Housing Authority The largest resource for poor New Yorkers is public housing built by the federal government and maintained by NYCHA. This agency was created by Mayor La Guardia, who dedicated the first public housing development in 1935 on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. NYCHA is a public authority created through state legislation with board members appointed by the mayor (Bloom 2008). “Now over four hundred thousand New Yorkers reside in NYCHA’s 334 public housing sites around the five boroughs,” making the city the largest landlord in the city (NYCHA 2017, 2). NYCHA’s combined public housing and Section 8 programs “occupy 12.0 ­percent of the City’s rental apartments and serve 7.3 ­percent of the City population” (NYCHA 2017, 10). NYCHA receives funding from four sources: federal Section 8 voucher payments, federal public housing operating subsidies, rent paid by public housing tenants (30 ­percent of income), and transfers from the public housing capital bud­get (NYCHA 2017, 10). As of March 2019, 181,090



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families are on the waiting list for a public housing apartment and 138,705 are on the waiting list for federal Section 8 housing vouchers (NYCHA 2019). In addition to public housing, the federal Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 amended the US Housing Act of 1937 to create the Section 8 voucher program, and Section 8 vouchers have become the dominant form of federal assistance to low-­income ­house­holds (Semuels 2015). The Section 8 program affects a significant portion of New Yorkers, with 8 ­percent using vouchers and thousands more being on a waiting list to obtain an NYCHA apartment. Tenants using Section 8 vouchers pay up to 30 ­percent of their income for rent, while the rest of the rent is paid with federal money (Garcia 2018). “Up to 20 ­percent of voucher funds can be used for subsidies—­called project-­based vouchers—­that are tied to a par­tic­ul­ar property rather than a par­tic­u­lar f­amily and thus can help pay affordable housing developers for the construction or rehabilitation of housing for low-­income families” (Pomeroy and Phinney 2016, A-52). Vouchers are sometimes also used to help with mortgage payments, enabling low-­income families to purchase homes (NYS DHCR 2020). NYCHA administers most of the federal funding for Section 8 vouchers in the city; this agency operates the largest Section 8 rental assistance program in the nation. In 2010 it administered about 101,000 vouchers (NYCHA 2010, 4), but in July 2013 it administered only about 98,907 vouchers as of July 2013 (NYC DCP 2014, I-124). ­There is also a project-­based Section 8 program that is for par­tic­u­ lar buildings. Again, tenants pay 30 ­percent of their income in rent. Currently, ­there are 4,350 units in project-­based apartments. As Kathryn Garcia has noted, “NYCHA receives two-­thirds of its revenues from federal sources. The bud­get assumes a proration ­factor of 92.5 ­percent for the public housing operating subsidy, based largely on historical trends. This is approximately $77 million less than what NYCHA is eligible for. The $3.51 billion in revenues includes $1.17 billion for Section 8 vouchers, $944 million in federal subsidy for public housing, $1.05 billion in rent from residents, and $288 million in City funds” (2018, 2). Section 8 vouchers are also provided by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (DHPD) and statewide by the DHCR. Each agency awards vouchers and administers the program separately and distinctly (NYCHA 2010). Over the years the state provided ­little to no funding. In 1998 Governor Pataki ended operating subsidies to fifteen state-­financed NYCHA developments (Klein and Torres 2016, 16). The state went from a high of $34 million in state funds before 1998 to a low of $4.7 million in 2013 during the Andrew Cuomo administration. This was the last year of the Bloomberg administration (Jarrett Murphy 2018). The state did distribute Federal Emergency Management Administration funds as well as other federal housing funds to localities around the

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state, including the city. Governor Spitzer provided a boost to NYCHA’s finances indirectly: “On August 15th, Governor Elliot Spitzer signed a bill that w ­ ill equalize the shelter allowance paid to public assistance recipients living in public housing to what it pays for ­those who live in private housing. The bill ­will phase in the increase over three years. Once fully phased in, NYCHA ­will see an increase in annual revenue of $47 million. Since the bill was effective immediately, IBO [the New York City In­de­pen­dent Bud­get Office] proj­ect that NYCHA’s revenue for 2007 ­will increase by almost $9 million” (Niblack 2007). This was the limit of state support. HUD had cut NYCHA’s bud­get over the last ten years; NYCHA was deprived of approximately $714 million in operating subsidies due to HUD’s reimbursement rates (NYC Council 2011, 3). “By 2013, the cumulative operating subsidy loss since 2001 had mounted to nearly $1 billion” (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 9). Losses in federal funds for capital improvements ­were proportional. With t­ hese cutbacks, NYCHA reduced the number of Section 8 vouchers, which meant fewer vouchers for homeless families. “As a result of all ­these cutbacks, NYCHA has had a deficit e­ very year since 2001” (NYC IBO 2006, 5). This was not an issue that Bloomberg addressed in a comprehensive way. NYCHA also had a terrible rec­ord with maintenance and renovations. The city comptroller found that 2 ­percent of NYCHA’s units w ­ ere vacant b ­ ecause of major maintenance or renovations: “As of October 13, 2005, NYCHA had 3,552 units temporarily off the rent roll—­approximately two p ­ ercent of all NYCHA-­managed apartments. Of t­ hese, 3,073 (87 ­percent) ­were off the rent roll for capital renovations” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2006a). The city comptroller also found that maintenance issues worsened during Bloomberg’s tenure: “In 2002, sixty ­percent of public housing apartments had at least one deficiency. By 2011, seventy-­ nine ­percent of public housing apartments had at least one deficiency” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2014c).

Nonprofit and Supportive Ser­vices New York City has numerous nonprofits in the city that build and renovate low-­ income housing. Close to forty of ­these are nonprofit community development corporations (CDCs) that focus on rejuvenating a specific neighborhood. Some are involved in advocacy, education, and training, and some build and renovate low-­ income housing. During President Jimmy Car­ter’s administration, “in 1978, the federal Community Reinvestment Act made it easier for low-­income communities to access capital from financial lenders and this further encouraged housing development by CDCs” (Chronopoulos 2017, 939). In the South Bronx, “between 1977 and 1981, SEBCO [South East Bronx Community Organ­ization] in partnership



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with developer Jerome Chatsky developed twenty-­six buildings comprising . . . ​ 1,070 housing units” (Chronopoulos 2017, 939). Then, during President Ronald Reagan’s administration, the funding was cut: “The federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated many tax incentives for the production of rental housing, and this undermined the Koch administration’s expectation that the city’s Housing Development Corporation (HDC) would finance large portions of its housing plan” (Chronopoulos 2017, 942). CDCs strug­gled to find funding through state and federal sources, foundations, and donations b ­ ecause the Koch administration used private developers that qualified for the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which states administer—­often with city agencies involved. The LIHTC became the leading financial method for producing affordable housing. CDCs continue to provide low-­income housing using a patchwork of financing: in Manhattan the Abyssinian Development Corporation in Harlem built low-­income housing; in Brooklyn, the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, the first CDC in the nation, has built or rehabilitated twenty-­two hundred housing units; in the Bronx, the Bronx Shepherds Restoration Corporation upgrades existing housing. Many of ­these CDCs are involved in the supportive ser­vices model, such as Housing and Ser­ vices Inc. in Manhattan. Many nonprofits build very low-­income housing units for t­ hose who, for what­ ever reason, cannot function by themselves in an apartment. The housing is accompanied by support services—­usually social workers who can connect residents with job search assistance, veterans’ benefits, health and dental care, and childcare, among other ser­v ices. One of the most successful nonprofit housing developments for low-­income ­people came about through the combined efforts of the state and city. ­There have been three state-­city agreements to provide low-­income housing with supportive ser­v ices using nonprofits as part of the development. The first of ­these for supportive housing, the New York / New York I Agreement (NY/NY I), was signed by Mayor David Dinkins and Governor Andrew Cuomo in 1990. “Between 1990 to 1998, it provided housing and ser­v ices to 5,225 homeless ­people with ­mental illness” (Housing Resource Center, n.d.). Five hundred additional units w ­ ere added to NY/NY I in 1993, and “in 1999, a second agreement (NY/ NY II) was signed; adding 2,320 units of housing; ­these units have been developed by New York City and New York State u ­ nder the terms of this agreement, and ­were rolled out through 2004” (Housing Resource Center, n.d.) This agreement was also for single adults with serious m ­ ental illness. The last agreement, NY/NY III, was signed in 2005 by Mayor Bloomberg. NY/NY III had a wider scope, furnishing nine thousand new units over ten years to homeless families, homeless young adults, and t­ hose with m ­ ental illness or substance abuse prob­ lem (Housing Resource Center, n.d.).

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In 2015, NY/NY IV was being negotiated with Mayor de Blasio and Governor Cuomo involved. But ­little agreement existed. The governor proposed reducing the number of units from nine thousand to five thousand. In addition, he proposed a fifty-­fifty financing split between the state and the city, while ­under past agreements, the state had paid 80 ­percent of the cost (Spina 2015). T ­ here was no agreement. In 2016 Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio announced separate commitments to build more supportive housing (Network 2016). Cuomo announced in 2016 that the state would create the Empire State Supportive Housing Initiative (ESSHI) that would spend $20 billion over five years to create or preserve one hundred thousand affordable and six thousand supportive housing units (Buckshon 2019). Mayor de Blasio announced that the city would build fifteen thousand supportive housing units (Network 2016). ­There is another way to or­ga­nize using nonprofits: community land trusts (CLTs), which did not have encouragement during the Bloomberg administration. CLTs can make housing affordable by retaining owner­ship of the land, which helps ensure that any buildings remain permanently affordable. During the Bloomberg administration, ­there was only one CLT in the city; now ­there are twenty. The city council has passed legislation codifying CLTs and allowing the city to enter into agreements with them (Savitch-­Lew 2018).

Tax Incentive Programs The most common form of a tax incentive program “is the Low-­Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), a federal tax credit administered by state agencies. Most affordable housing that gets built receives an allocation of tax credits” (Blumenthal, Handelman, and Tilsley 2016). What do developers get in return? “To receive tax credits, a proposed development must dedicate at least ­either 20 ­percent of its apartments to ­people who earn less than half of the area median income or 40 ­percent of its apartments to ­people who earn less than 60 ­percent of area median income” (Blumenthal, Handelman, and Tilsley 2016). Twenty ­percent of a proj­ect’s units must remain affordable to low-­income ­house­holds for a period of time agreed upon between the New York City Housing Finance Agency and the building owner. This is usually fifteen to thirty years. In effect, the federal government is subsidizing private developers to build affordable rental housing. A tax credit means a reduction in the income tax the building owner may owe. Yet, even if a proposal meets t­ hese conditions, tax credits a­ ren’t guaranteed. States allocate tax credits through a competitive pro­cess that varies by state and in most places has many more applications than available credits (Blumenthal, Handelman, and Tilsley 2016). Developers e­ ither use the credits or sell them to investors to raise capital for real estate proj­ects, which, in turn, reduces the debt or equity



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contribution that would other­wise be required of developers. With lower financing costs, tax credit properties can potentially expand the supply of affordable rental housing (Keightley 2019, 1). Nonprofit developers who do not need tax credits sell their tax credits to investors. “From 1986 to 2007 (the latest year for which national data are available), the LIHTC helped to finance 1.4 million units nationwide, with 5 ­percent of t­ hose in New York City. . . . ​By the end of 2010, 80,400 units had been financed in New York City. Nearly all (93%) of ­those units remain affordable” (Begley et al. 2011, 40). With LIHTC, the federal requirement is that rates be reduced for a predetermined number of years, a­ fter which rates return to the complete control of the ­owners. Developers can opt out of the program a­ fter the agreed-­upon number of years (Begley et al. 2011). At that point, the o ­ wners may charge market rates. In most cases the o ­ wners have the option of renewing their tax-­exempt status if they keep 20 ­percent of their apartments rent regulated. In good times, when landlords can make ­great profits from luxury housing, they tend to opt out of rent regulation. In their Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy study of affordable housing, Begley and colleagues note that “in economic booms, property ­owners have greater incentive to leave subsidy programs ­because they (or new ­owners to whom they sell the property) may be able to command higher rents than the subsidy programs allow” (2011, 19). Another tax subsidy program is New York’s 421-­a, enacted in 1971 when Mayor John Lindsay used tax incentives to encourage housing construction during a time of ­little development and slow housing growth (Velsey 2015). An exclusion zone was attached to the legislation in 1985 to prevent developers from getting tax exemptions for building in major portions of Manhattan which had considerable growth without needing 421-­a tax incentives (Velsey 2015). The city operated the program and could change the law if it was agreed to by the state. This program partially exempted the property from property taxes to incentivize construction of multifamily rental housing. Developers must agree to keep generally 20 ­percent of the units “affordable to low-­income ­house­holds for up to twenty-­five years” (NYC DHPD 2017). The New York City Real Estate Board strongly endorsed the program, while many affordable housing advocates wanted to eliminate it, since few affordable units w ­ ere built even though developers received large tax reductions. The CSS estimates that the city lost over $1 billion a year in taxes from developers using the 421-­a program (Bach and ­Waters 2015, 3). Mayor Bloomberg named a commission in 2006 to suggest changes to the law. The commission reported out its findings, and ­after lengthy discussions and hearings with the city council, the city agreed to changes in the law that ensured that developers would receive tax incentives only in certain areas of the city. In December 2006, the mayor signed a new 421-­a law that encouraged more affordable

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housing. His changes to the program offered developers twenty-­five years of tax exemption in exchange for 20 ­percent affordable housing (NYC Office of the Mayor 2006b). This change required agreement with the state legislature. Then came the debate with the state legislature in which legislators maintained that “421-­a ­will remain a relic of the past ­unless significant revisions are made. The program continues to misallocate public funds by giving away too much in tax incentives for not enough public benefit in return” (Cohen 2008, 821). The program was fi­nally renewed in 2016 u ­ nder Mayor de Blasio. The new law expanded all exemptions to thirty-­five years, roughly doubling their cost to the city. Tom W ­ aters, an affordable housing expert at Community Ser­vice Society, claimed that “the 421-­a tax exemption program for real estate developers is an extraordinarily wasteful giveaway, and the latest proposal to revive it . . . ​makes it even worse” (­Waters 2016). ­Waters calculates that the changes in 421-­a by the governor and state legislature “would cost the city $2.4 billion a year in [lost] revenue without bringing about a remotely comparable increase in affordability benefit” (2016). The 421-­a program remains highly questionable as a source for partially financing low-­income housing. Most impor­tant, to finance low-­income housing developers would need to look for several sources of funding and the financing of multiple sources takes time. Other monies can come from foundations and state housing trust funds. All of that takes coordination. It is no won­der that developers wish to only finance market-­rate housing units.

Inclusionary Zoning Another means of motivating developers to build affordable housing is inclusionary zoning (IZ). This is a land use technique for developing mixed-­income communities by encouraging or requiring developers to build a percentage of affordable units along with high-­end units in exchange for tax incentives for most developments (Thaden and Wang 2017). Some cities with high land and construction costs have enacted mandatory IZ. First instituted during the Koch administration, voluntary IZ was brought to scale in 2005, when the city council passed a voluntary IZ law a­ fter many community-­based organ­izations sought more affordable housing in the large tracts of land that the Bloomberg administration was rezoning (Williams 2015, 9). The IZ program was administered by the DHPD. The impact of IZ was ­limited: “Of the 2,888 affordable units incentivized between 2005 and 2013 (out of a projected 10,000), almost all ­were in the West Chelsea and Greenpoint/Williamsburg rezonings” (Goldberg 2015, 59). IZ had not been well designed. First, the “apartments w ­ ere not affordable to most New Yorkers, let alone t­ hose with the greatest need. Most of the apartments went to ­house­holds



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making 80 ­percent of the metropolitan AMI, or $66,400, as of 2013” (Stein 2017, 774). As Samuel Stein notes, “AMI for the entire metropolitan area—­suburbs included—is much higher than AMI for the city alone; 80% of city median income is just $38,994” (2017, 774). Second, the added density bonus did not allow developers to recoup the costs of building 20 ­percent affordable units (Goldberg 2015, 60). Third, in some areas land costs w ­ ere so high that developers ­were not interested in building affordable housing even with tax incentives. De Blasio changed IZ to mandatory IZ, but only in areas that ­were being rezoned for increased capacity Although IZ was now mandatory, the mandate did not apply to developers ­unless they wanted greater capacity and thus had to apply for rezoning.

Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan In the latter part of his first term, Bloomberg made a major commitment to affordable housing. He released the NHMP, in which he outlined “four key components of the 10-­year plan: finding new land for affordable housing, creating incentives to develop housing for new populations, harnessing the private market to create affordable housing, and preserving government-­assisted affordable housing” (NYC DHPD 2004, 3).

Financing Methods To achieve his goals the mayor had four agencies coordinate their efforts: the Department of Citywide Administrative Ser­v ices, the DHPD, the New York City Economic Development Corporation, and NYCHA. His financing methods included the following: • Adding new dimensions to the HDC, a public purpose nonprofit entity that developed and owned large sites. “The HDC uses tax-­exempt or municipal private bond capacity beyond the city’s cap on its annual allocation of bonds and serves as the bond issuer for the city. Thus, the HDC “­will expedite the development of public land, and retain long-­term owner­ship to ensure permanent affordability” (NYC DHPD 2014, 7). As the NYC DHPD notes, “A City-­controlled entity would enable more flexible underwriting par­ameters, which w ­ ill help reduce the upfront cost of construction” (2014, 7). The mayor restructured the HDC to issue far more bonds and provide subsidies and low-­cost loans for affordable

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housing. By 2014 the HDC had issued over $22 billion of mortgage revenue bonds, and in 2013 it issued $1.9 billion, an amount unparalleled in the department’s thirty-­year history (NYC HDC 2014). • Using the NYC Housing Trust Fund in 2006 and placing the $130 million surplus from Battery Park City in it. From this fund the city provides subsidies to nonprofit and for-­profit organ­izations to preserve or create “forty-­three hundred units of affordable multifamily housing for hard-­to-­ reach ­house­holds,” which are defined as ­those earning below 30 ­percent or between 60 ­percent and 80 ­percent of the buildings with at least ten units, 20 ­percent of which must be for low-­income h ­ ouse­holds (NYC DHPD, n.d.). • Establishing the New York City Acquisition Fund, working with nine major foundations and nonprofit lenders to leverage even greater loans from major private lenders. “At the heart of the loan fund is $40 million put up by several foundations. The goal is for this money never to be spent: it covers the bank loans to affordable housing developers in case of a default” (Anderson 2006). “­Because of this guarantee, banks can make loans to affordable developers that would cover up to 115 ­percent of the cost of a piece of property at a very low interest rate, so that a developer could then hold on to the land while applying for subsidies” (Anderson 2006). The NYC Acquisition Fund has in its short life created or preserved 13,393 units of affordable housing (NYC Acquisition Fund 2019). • Reviewing all land owned by the city and state to find property that could be made available for affordable housing. Bloomberg sought to remove outdated barriers to development through enforcing IZ, in which tax breaks would be given to developers in return for their building affordable housing along with market-­rate housing (Stein 2017). Bloomberg did what he did best: he created a plan by engaging many stakeholders in its design, and he put in place coordinated government structures to ensure the plan’s success. The plan evolved during his second term, when the mayor announced he would preserve seventy-­three thousand units of housing and build ninety-­two thousand units. In 2010, he announced a switch in emphasis—­ building only sixty thousand units and preserving 105,000 (Arden 2011). The emphasis on renovation meant that apartments which already had tenants in them would be renovated. Therefore, the preservation of such a large number of units meant that fewer new ­people would become renters. The financing of NHMP came mostly from the city. Of the $5.6 billion allocated to NHMP from 2004 to 2011, “84 ­percent of this money came from three sources: the city’s capital bud­get ($2.7 billion), the HDC’s corporate reserves ($1.1



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billion), and the city’s expense bud­get ($1.1 billion)” (Furman Center and Moelis Institute 2013, 2). The city’s capital bud­get is funded in part by the federal HOME Investment Partnership program (30 ­percent) during 2004 to 2011. But in 2012 the federal government cut the program by 45 ­percent (Furman Center and Moelis Institute 2013, 4). The change in the city’s expense bud­get was similar. Seventy-­one ­percent came from the federal Community Development Block Grant, which has been reduced each year since 2011. Clearly the financing of ­future affordable housing units ­will be left to the city.

Battery Park City “The Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) is a New York State public benefit corporation” created in 1968 to develop and maintain the ninety-­two acres of landfill created by the building of the original World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan (BPCA, n.d.). The original plan called for using seventy-­nine acres for the construction of 14,100 apartments. “By 1969, [Mayor] Lindsay reached an agreement with other city officials that two-­thirds of the 15,000 apartments set to rise at Battery Park City would be for p ­ eople with low or moderate incomes, which in ­today’s terms mean annual incomes up to about $45,000 for a ­family of four” (Lipton 2001). The state took over Battery Park City in a 1980 joint agreement in which the state owned BPC in exchange for the state backing BCP’s bonds (NYC IBO 2004b, 1). The city did receive some payments in lieu of taxes; however, the agreement permitted the city to regain Battery Park City if it assumed obligation for the BPCA’s debt. Yet once the state had taken over the BPCA, not one unit of housing was built for low-­income ­house­holds (NYC IBO 2004b, 1). The city gave away the opportunity to build a large amount of affordable housing. By 2014 ­there ­were over eighty-­four hundred market-­rate apartments in the complex. New York City gets two revenue streams from the BPCA: • PILOT payments (payments in lieu of taxes) of $112 million in fiscal year 2014 • excess revenues, known as 7(A)(ii) monies, which totaled $46 million in fiscal year 2014 (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2014a) ­ hese monies represent any surplus that remains ­after other operating and debt T ser­v ice costs and other specified needs at the BPCA. Decisions about excess revenues are made by joint agreement among the mayor, city comptroller, and governor. The board is appointed by the governor. In the wake of the 1975 fiscal crisis, Mayor Koch faced rebuilding the city. During this pro­cess he recognized that the city owned one hundred thousand units of housing, properties owned by the city b ­ ecause the ­owners did not pay their

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taxes (Petro 2013). It was ­these properties that Koch would renovate and use for affordable housing. In 1986 Governor Cuomo and the mayor agreed that BPCA surplus would be used for low-­income housing built elsewhere in the city. T ­ hese monies ­were “ ‘Joint Purpose Funds,’ to be used for proj­ects as determined jointly by BPCA, the mayor and the city comptroller” (NYC IBO 2004b, 1). Using $400 million raised with bonds, the city built or renovated about fifteen hundred apartments in Harlem and the Bronx. In 1989 Koch signed an additional agreement to use $600 million in surplus revenues from the BPCA over a period of years for housing. The ­actual number of units that Koch built or renovated is unclear; estimates range from 185,000 to 250,000 units (Soffer 2010; Hutchins 2014). In 1990 Mayor Dinkins took office facing a huge fiscal crisis. During Dinkins’s tenure, none of the funds from the BPCA surplus w ­ ere used for affordable housing. In 1999 Mayor Giuliani came ­under enormous pressure to use the surplus funds for affordable housing, yet he refused. Housing advocates noted that Mayor Giuliani has flagrantly ­violated a 1989 agreement between the city and the state-­run authority requiring the city to spend the BPCA’s surplus on housing for low-­and moderate-­income New Yorkers. The deal completed a $1 billion commitment by the authority for affordable housing, $400 million in bonds and $600 million from its cash surplus. But just $143 million in bond financing has gone to affordable housing. The authority has sent $277 million to the city so far, but none of it has been dedicated to housing. Instead, the mayor simply put the money into the city’s general fund, increasing the city’s already huge bud­get surpluses. (Weikart and Pasanen 2001) Giuliani instead used the funds to solve his bud­get prob­lems, saying that the agreement allowed the city to spend BPC funds in other ways. In a letter to the New York Times, Koch, who had negotiated the agreement with Governor Cuomo, said, “The city should not use, as it is d ­ oing, the escalating Battery Park City Authority surplus funds for general purposes. ­Those funds ­were earmarked in an agreement entered into by Gov. Mario M. Cuomo and me to provide financing for affordable housing” (Koch 2001). The funds w ­ ere to be used for affordable housing ­unless the city was suffering a fiscal crisis, specifically if needed “to maintain fiscal stability . . . ​or existing city ser­v ices.” Only ­under ­these circumstances could the city divert Battery Park City revenues to other uses (ANHD 2012, 8). At first Mayor Bloomberg followed Giuliani’s strategy. In 2004 Bloomberg announced that since the $600 million of surplus BPCA funds had been used up for affordable housing, he would use the next surplus to help finance the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center and the New York Jets Stadium on the West Side of Manhattan instead of for affordable housing (NYC Office of the Mayor 2004a). BPCA



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chair James Gill commented, “­After fulfilling our commitment of providing $600 million to the City of New York for low-­cost housing, the Battery Park City Authority is proud to work with Governor Pataki, Mayor Bloomberg and Comptroller Thompson for the joint purpose of expanding the Jacob Javits Center and providing economic opportunity for Manhattan’s West Side” (quoted in NYC Office of the Mayor 2004a). This proposal made advocates for affordable housing furious. The state ended Bloomberg’s plans for the West Side stadium; it was never built. In 2006, u ­ nder public pressure, Bloomberg changed his position. For the first time in twenty years, the city used the BPCA surplus for affordable housing. The mayor created the New York City Housing Trust Fund, which, with the agreement of the governor, would be funded by $130 million in BPCA revenues (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2014a). The fund would be used for an additional forty-­ three hundred affordable housing units. In 2009, however, Governor Paterson wanted the surplus to bridge his bud­get gap (Shapiro 2009). State Senator Liz Krueger suggested a compromise: “The state would get $200 million, the city could get $200 million as well, with half ­going ­toward its general bud­get and half ­going ­toward affordable housing” (Shapiro 2009). In 2010 approximately $70 million of BPCA revenues, the largest share of the recently established Housing Trust Fund, would be “directed ­towards the provision of subsidies to target income ranges that are currently the most difficult to reach, which ­were ­house­holds earning below 30 ­percent of area median income and ­house­holds earning between sixty to eighty ­percent of area median income” (NYC DHPD 2014, 10). Bloomberg was the first mayor since Koch to use the BPCA surplus for affordable housing.

Rezoning Bloomberg rezoned 40 ­percent of the city’s total landmass (Doctoroff 2017, 75). The administration divided rezoning into four categories according to the goal: converting manufacturing areas to mixed use (residential and office), promoting greater density in commercial areas (upzoning), controlling commercial development in residential areas (balanced zoning), and limiting commercial development in residential areas (downzoning) outside of Manhattan. The prob­ lem came when upzoning occurred in low-­income areas and downzoning in middle-­and upper-­class areas. As Leo Goldberg (2015) explains, “Homeowner mobilizations produced down zonings particularly in Staten Island, eastern Queens and southern Brooklyn. Meanwhile, development interests spurred rezonings in commercial and industrial areas as well as gentrifying neighborhoods, inducing a sharp increase in housing costs and residential dislocation.” In effect,

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as Bloomberg proceeded to rezone large parts of the city, he allowed developers to concentrate on low-­income areas while he protected parts of Queens and Staten Island.

The Limitations of Bloomberg’s Plan Bloomberg’s plans w ­ ere quite inadequate to the task of building sufficient low-­ income housing, and a large part of the reason was the role of federal and state governments as well as his neglect of NYCHA, which was barely mentioned in his plan.

The Failure of Rent Regulation The New York State policy of vacancy decontrol was a disaster. Thousands of apartments had been decontrolled since 1971, which meant thousands of renters had to pay an ever increasing share of their salary on rent, and ­these apartments continued to be decontrolled u ­ ntil 2019. Meanwhile, the city raised rents in rent stabilized apartments ­because the city controls the Rent Guidelines Board, which sets increases in rent stabilized housing annually (Mironova and ­Waters 2019). City officials cannot control state law, but they are responsible for the decisions of the RGB, whose members are appointed by the mayor. During the Bloomberg administration in 2003, the RGB voted to increase one-­year leases by 4.5 ­percent and two-­year leases by 7.5 ­percent; in 2011 it voted “to increase rents 3.75 ­percent for one-­year leases and 7.25 ­percent for two-­year leases”; and in 2012 it voted to “increase rents 1.75 ­percent for one-­year leases and 3.5 ­percent for two-­year leases” (NYC RGB, n.d.) Such increases meant that rents would reach the $2,000 ceiling and then become decontrolled. If the mayor had appointed members who represented tenants’ interests, t­ here would have been fewer rent increases and thus fewer vacancy decontrols. But as Daniel Doctoroff, the deputy mayor for economic development and rebuilding, notes, “We could have sided with the tenants’ organ­izations and skewed the results to lower the rent increases, but we chose not to, reasoning that the long-­term result would be inadequate investment in buildings and, more ominously, the introduction of uncertainty into the system, which would have negative consequences for new investment in affordable housing. Obviously, we could have produced more affordable housing to try to keep pace with the unexpected demand the incredible population growth fostered. That would have required more money, and our commitment was already huge” (2017, 85–86). Doctoroff goes on to lay the c­ auses of the unavailability of affordable housing to national and global economic forces b ­ ecause income is not keeping



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up with housing inflation. He avoids responsibility for not building sufficient low-­ income housing. But the answer could lie closer to home. The state is primarily responsible for the prob­lem, since the city operates u ­ nder the state’s rent regulations. New York City would have less of an affordable housing crisis if the state had not led the way in deregulating rent controlled and rent stabilized apartments—­though, indeed, the city council contributed to the fiasco. As recent mayors scrambled to find the money to build affordable housing and as the state and the city failed to protect tenants, more low-­income housing was lost each year. The city is l­ imited in protecting tenants in rent regulated apartments by state law. The Metropolitan Council on Housing sought to repeal the state’s Urstadt Law (1971), named ­after Governor Rocke­fel­ler’s housing commissioner, Charles Urstadt, which deprived “New York City of home rule over rent regulation” (Schaeffer, n.d.) ­Until 2019 the state legislature had repeatedly weakened tenant protections, and it tightened restrictions on the city when it renewed the rent laws in 2003, specifically to forestall a local law that would have reformed the RGB. Of course, it cannot be assumed that the city would have enacted stricter regulations. During the first year of progressive Mayor de Blasio’s tenure, the RGB voted for increases in rent (1 ­percent for one-­year leases) rather than a rent freeze (NYC RGB, n.d.). ­Later, u ­ nder pressure from Mayor de Blasio, the RGB froze rents for two consecutive years for one-­year leases but implemented 2 ­percent increases for two-­ year leases—an incremental win at best. Housing advocates called freezing rents for one-­year leases a win for the de Blasio administration, but two-­year leases ­were not frozen, and rents for the next year w ­ ere to increase 1.5 ­percent for one-­year leases (NYC RGB, n.d.). Tenant organ­izations said that their expectations ­were so low that they applauded a progressive mayor who slowed down but did not stop the rent increases. Fi­nally, in 2019 the state legislature produced more progressive tenant legislation and eliminated vacancy decontrol although rent increases remain a possibility.

Ignoring the Prob­lems at the New York City Housing Authority It is to Mayor Bloomberg’s credit that he combined forces with Governor Cuomo to pass state legislation that changed NYCHA’s board structure and composition (Foreman 2013). ­Until 2013 NYCHA had a five-­member board with most members getting full-­time compensation. As Jeff Foreman (2013) notes, “Two of the board members had received annual salaries of $187,000 and an assigned NYCHA driver. Chairman John Rhea’s compensation was over $200,000.” U ­ nder the new structure, ­there is a seven-­member board, and only the chair is allowed to be

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compensated; that position pays $197,300. Other board members are volunteers, paid only “a stipend not to exceed $1,500 a month based on $250 for each four hours of time required. If the stipend exceeds $200 a month, the additional amount ­will be reported as income. And t­here would be no assigned d ­ rivers” (Foreman 2013). Bloomberg’s rec­ord with the NYCHA was mixed: • In 2006, he provided a one-­time payment of $100 million to offset deficits (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 11). • In 2010, the twenty-­one public housing developments developed by the city and state ­were federalized. In effect, Bloomberg helped NYCHA persuade federal officials to absorb t­ hese developments and provide additional federal funding of $55 million for NYCHA (Bach and W ­ aters 2014, 10). Yet, at the same time, • “In 2002, during the post-9/11 fiscal crisis, Mayor Bloomberg reduced the subsidy for six developments to $13 million from $30 million and in 2003, eliminated it entirely, leaving NYCHA to cover the operating gap on its own” (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 11). • Bloomberg refused to eliminate the $70 million payment that NYCHA had to make to the New York Police Department, “$29 million for PILOT payments in lieu of property taxes, and close to $2 million for special sanitation ser­v ices” (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 12). • In 2003, Bloomberg “reduced the Department for the Aging (DFTA) bud­get by transferring to the Authority the $29.4 million annual cost of operating 105 NYCHA se­nior centers” (Bach and ­Waters 2014, 11). • Bloomberg could have seriously tackled the maintenance backlog. NYCHA has an enormous need for capital improvements and repairs. Its prob­lems stem from lack of funds and terrible mismanagement. In 2012, the New York Daily News exposed the backlog as well as other issues, such as NYCHA “sitting on $42 million but had yet to install cameras or any other security” (Burke, Smith & Lesser 2012; Smith 2012). ­Every apartment that was unavailable due to needed repairs represented a homeless ­family that could have been ­housed. • Late in his tenure, Bloomberg advocated using NYCHA’s unused space for market-­rate housing. Profits would be used for NYCHA’s renovation needs. He retreated when housing advocates objected to taking away the open space. Nicholas Bloom (2019), an expert on public housing, has urged the city to change the zoning requirements so that development



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rights could be transferred to developers. “A growing number of policy experts believe that the New York City public housing authority would benefit just as much from a more aggressive program to transfer development rights for cash. They are right” (Bloom 2019). This would increase the potential revenues. The state has abandoned NYCHA, leaving the city to cope with the costs; the federal government has severely cut its subsidy. Unfortunately, NYCHA buildings needed considerable investment, and this was something the Bloomberg administration did not address. NYCHA was simply not on Bloomberg’s radar. Doctoroff wrote a four-­hundred-­page book celebrating the achievements in economic development during the Bloomberg administration. When he discussed affordable housing, he wrote one sentence about NYCHA, nor does it appear in the index. Shortly a­ fter Bloomberg left the mayoralty, elevated levels of lead w ­ ere found in the ­water pipes within NYCHA buildings. In 2015 the controversy became so contentious that the US attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, obtained a court order requiring NYCHA to turn over extensive documentation of all communications, including work o ­ rders and field manuals. The inquiry focused on ­whether or not false claims had been submitted to HUD. Resignations of top NYCHA officials followed, as did extensive negotiations between HUD and city officials. In 2019 a consent agreement was signed subjecting NYCHA to federal oversight but without any additional federal funding (US HUD 2019). Stanley Brezenoff, a highly respected public servant, had been called in by Mayor de Blasio to lead the NYCHA renovation efforts; he resigned in protest, stating, “Where the hell is HUD and money? . . . ​The City and NYCHA have all the responsibility, ­limited authority and all of the financial burden, . . . ​that in a nutshell is why I am against [the court decree]” (quoted in Goodman 2019). One won­ders if Bloomberg could have cut a better deal. Certainly he failed to address repairs and renovations at NYCHA during his twelve-­year tenure. ­Whether or not that would have prevented the city being on the hook for billions of dollars of repairs is unknown. But the state and federal government avoided their responsibilities and the city is left with the bill. Also, ­there is the issue of about race and NYCHA. The trend is clear. “As in other cities, public housing became minority housing” (Bloom 2016). In all of its programs, only 3.1 ­percent of renters in NYCHA are white, roughly 3.1 ­percent Asian, and 54.9 ­percent are Hispanic and 36.6 ­percent are Black (NYU Furman Center 2019). This remains fairly unchanged in all the boroughs except Staten ­Island, which has 20 ­percent white renters. The city is the largest landlord in the city for low-­income renters—­that is, through NYCHA. During the de Blasio

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a­ dministration, Bloom points out, the city came up with $220 million in subsidies to save Stuyvesant Town, a mostly middle-­class, white residential population, but not funds for NYCHA, mostly ­people of color, except ­under court order (Bloom 2016). This subsidy did not occur during the Bloomberg administration, but it gives some understanding of what the city w ­ ill do for the white population.

Limiting Section 8 Vouchers The lack of federal support had a direct impact upon NYCHA. Following the federal sequestration funding cuts in 2013, most state and local housing agencies had ­little choice but to sharply reduce the number of families receiving housing vouchers. By December 2013, at the end of Bloomberg’s term, “nationwide agencies ­were assisting about 70,000 fewer families than they had a year e­ arlier” (Rice 2014). In 2009 NYCHA chair John Rhea announced that, due to federal bud­get cuts, no more Section 8 vouchers would be distributed and, further, that vouchers for three thousand ­house­holds searching for apartments would be recalled (2010, 12). He said that HUD had instructed authorities in 2008 and 2009 to use up their reserves to meet the shortfalls in vouchers that Congress had created with federal cutbacks. But NYCHA had a huge deficit and could not use its reserves for the Section 8 vouchers. The announcement created a firestorm among housing advocates and public officials. As discussed in chapter 5, the absence of vouchers had a terrible impact on homeless individuals and families. ­Will Fischer from the Center for Bud­get and Policy Priorities found that “Housing vouchers have been found to sharply reduce homelessness, housing instability, and overcrowding among program participants” (2015). The Bloomberg decision not to use Section 8 vouchers to help the homeless was directly related to the deficit at NYCHA, which was directly related to the lack of federal support for public housing.

The Failure of Inclusionary Zoning New York’s IZ program was voluntary. As a result, IZ generated fewer than three thousand new affordable units from 2005 to mid-2013, according to an analy­sis by Seth Ullman, Michael Freedman Schnapp, and Brad Lander, a New York City councilman (Lander 2013). IZ may mean integrated housing in other states, but in New York City, it meant “affordable units within the same community district or within a half-­mile radius” (Barron 2014). The Inclusionary Housing Program was disappointing with regard to affordable housing due to the poorly written city legislation that created the program (Surico 2014b). ­Under the program, approvals w ­ ere routed through the DHPD and not the city’s Planning Office. The DHPD allowed developers to provide sepa-



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rate entrances for renters who qualified for affordable housing. A good example was 40 Riverside Boulevard: Two towers ­were built, one smaller to accommodate the 20 ­percent of units rented at affordable rates and the other larger to hold the market-­rate units. Two entrances existed—­one quite lavish and the other unremarkable. The news reports called the entrance to the smaller building the “poor door” (Surico 2014). How did such blatantly disrespectful treatment of less affluent tenants come about? An amendment to the Inclusionary Housing Program in 2009 allowed developers to “expand their buildings by upwards of 20 ­percent (and therefore, increase their profits) if at least 20 ­percent of the units ­were dedicated to affordable housing” (Surico 2014). When the press discovered the “poor doors” in 2014, ­there was considerable outcry, and blame was laid at the feet of the mayor. Yet it was the city council that passed the 2009 inclusionary law unanimously. ­Later, in 2019 the city council passed a mandatory IZ law requiring developers who wished tax abatements to offer affordable units u ­ nder certain conditions. ­There are 507 cities and towns that have a­ dopted mandatory IZ laws: “More than eighty ­percent of existing IZ programs are mandatory policies, requiring developers to comply with affordability requirements as part of the approval pro­cess for market rate proj­ects” (Stromberg and Sturtevant 2016). One mandatory inclusionary program in Napa, California, has been held up as an example of a mandatory IZ that worked. “The progressive program [required] a mandatory set-­aside of 10 ­percent affordable units in all new developments without any incentives provided to the developer” (Lerman 2006). As Brian Stromberg and Lisa Sturtevant (2016) note, “The majority (fifty-­three ­percent) of local IZ programs requires units to be affordable to h ­ ouse­holds with incomes between fifty-­one and eighty ­percent of the local area median income (AMI).” T ­ here are issues around the regulation of private property: “­There is no ­free lunch when it comes to the provision of affordable housing. Based on recent land use decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, cities need to be very careful in crafting inclusionary zoning policies to avoid litigation around the taking of private property rights” (Lerman 2006, 407). Certainly Bloomberg could have chosen to seek changes in local law. De Blasio mandated IZ through the city council for many new residential buildings but only in neighborhoods that ­were being rezoned for increased density, and that limits the amount of mandated IZ. Consequently, the number of units built with the mandated IZ requirement was only two thousand b ­ ecause of restrictions limiting the use of public subsidies (Kully 2020). The issues around IZ have yet to be solved.

The Limitations of Tax Incentive and Credit Programs Mayor Bloomberg believed the real estate industry would help solve the prob­lem of insufficient affordable housing. “LIHTC is the only major funding source for

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producing and preserving affordable rental housing” (Scally, Gold, and duBois 2018, vi). LIHTC is widely popu­lar, but it has serious limitations. “Units are not required to be permanently affordable . . . ​investors take their money out of the property once tax benefits end (now 30 years)” (Scally, Gold, and duBois 2018, vi). Further, since the maximum rent that can be charged is based on the AMI, LIHTC housing remained unaffordable to many low-­income (­under 30 ­percent AMI) renters. In the city, officials noted that “market-­rate buildings have only provided about 6,470 affordable apartments since 2004, subsidized through zoning bonuses and tax exemptions” (Barbanel 2013). It needs to be fixed at the federal level.

The Failure of Affordability The mayor’s NHMP to build 165,000 housing units was successful, but advocates for affordable housing w ­ ere quick to point out that the units created w ­ ere not ­really that affordable. By definition, 68 ­percent of the units had to be affordable to renters earning less than 80 ­percent of the AMI (about $50,000 for a ­family of four), and the remaining 32 ­percent of units served middle-­income New York families (Bloomberg 2006). But a disproportionate number of units went to ­people with moderate incomes. In addition, the mayor shifted the mix of new construction and maintenance or renovation of existing units. Although Bloomberg was on track to meet his overall goal of 165,000 units, his “original ten-­year plan projected that more than half of NHMP housing would be newly constructed housing rather than the preservation of existing affordable units, while the revised plan lowered the city’s goal to thirty-­six ­percent of units to be new construction due to the weak housing market” (NYC IBO 2012). The IBO pointed out that the shift in emphasis to preservation over new construction meant that a larger share of units would lose their affordability restrictions more quickly. Thus, ­these units would be let at higher rents (NYC IBO 2012). This happened ­because preservation units often have shorter regulatory agreements than do newly constructed ones. And in preservation units, tenants often already occupy the apartments, so the newly renovated apartments are not available to the low-­income population. The 421-­a rule is a developer’s dream. A typical example is the building One57, a luxury apartment complex overlooking Central Park, which saw its property tax bill cut by 95 ­percent thanks to 421-­a (Barkan 2015). “Each year New York foregoes $1.07 billion in tax revenue through the 421-­a program” (­Waters and Bach 2015, 9). How many Section 8 vouchers could t­ hese tax revenues pay for? ­There is no way to track the number of affordable units that have been created and still exist through the 421-­a program, but it is estimated to be very small. “ANHD estimates that only 12,748 of the 153,000 residential units receiving 421-­a exemptions in 2013 w ­ ere subject to affordability requirements” (Williams 2014).



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Another example is the rezoning of Williamsburg in Brooklyn, which succeeded in trading manufacturing plants for high-­rise buildings along the waterfront. Unfortunately, few apartments w ­ ere designated for low-­income tenants. The mayor’s vision was to recapture the waterfront for high-­rise residential construction, with parkland surrounding t­ hese upscale buildings. When Jane Jacobs (2005) wrote the mayor and city council in 2015, urging them to consider the community’s plan for Williamsburg and rejecting the city’s plan, she concluded that “the proposal put before you by city staff is an ambush containing all t­ hose destructive consequences, packaged very sneakily with visually tiresome, unimaginative and imitative luxury proj­ect towers.” Both the city council and mayor ignored Jacobs’s letter, and now what we see along the waterfront in Williamsburg are tall luxury apartment buildings. The ­people in t­ hose neighborhoods before the rezoning can no longer afford to live in them a­ fter the rezoning. As Katie Goldstein of the advocacy organ­ization Tenants and Neighbors comments, “What ­we’re seeing now is r­ eally just city-­sponsored gentrification in t­ hese neighborhoods that have already been experiencing displacement pressures” (quoted in Raskin 2018). In 2019, a study of changes in population in Greenpoint and Williamsburg documented the dramatic increase in the white population as compared to other racial and ethnic groups. Due to the rezoning in 2005, from 2000 to 2010 the white population increased by almost thirty thousand ­people, and the Asian population by almost three thousand ­people, while the Latino population declined by over fourteen thousand ­people and the Black population remained roughly the same, increasing by only a few hundred (Cabello 2019). Gentrification took place in many neighborhoods. Not far from Williamsburg lay the Fort Greene neighborhood, which held a large middle-­class Black population as well as public housing. During the Bloomberg administration white families moved into Fort Greene, an attractive area that “is located right next to downtown Brooklyn with numerous transportation lines and a desirable commercial infrastructure, ­because western and northern Brooklyn have become among the most desirable sections of New York, and the built environment of Fort Greene is attractive” (Chronopoulos 2016). The demographics reflect this population shift: “In the area of Fort Greene without public housing, the percentage of whites increased by 113.8 ­percent in the 2000–2014 period, surpassing that of blacks, which declined by 35 ­percent.” Additionally, “Approximately 75 ­percent of black stores in Fort Greene closed in the first de­cade of the 21st ­century” (Chronopoulos 2016). Bloomberg might have dismissed t­hese prob­lems as prob­lems of growth, but the demographics reflected a serious population shift that favored whites over minorities in many neighborhoods. Affordability worsened ­after the 2008 recession: “Between 2007 and 2011, as the median ­family income in the city dropped by 6.8 ­percent, the median monthly

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rent went up by 8.6 ­percent. Thirty-­one ­percent of New Yorkers spent more than half their income on rent, as t­hose not lifted up by New York’s booming, knowledge-­intensive fields felt the squeeze” (Florida 2013). Many New Yorkers found it very difficult to find housing they could afford. The solution is one that Bloomberg refused to consider. Bakry Elmedni, in an article on housing affordability, points out that if government would provide low-­ income residents with subsidies, it might ­house far more ­people than government providing all sorts of subsidies to developers (2018, 11). But Bloomberg remained committed to private developers receiving tax incentives in return for building some affordable units. Bloomberg had a faith in market-­driven solutions that failed to produce sufficient low-­income housing.

Reducing AIDS Funding Bloomberg pursued lowering subsidies for low-­income ­people with HIV/AIDS. In 2010, housing advocates succeeded in getting a bill passed by both legislative chambers that would place a ceiling of 30 ­percent on the proportion of earnings that low-­income ­people with HIV/AIDS (about twenty-­six thousand) would have to spend on rent (NYS Senate 2010). Such a law would have paralleled the treatment of other low-­income ­people who receive subsidies from the city or state. ­After pressure from Mayor Bloomberg, however, Governor Paterson vetoed the bill (Cardwell 2010). The mayor argued that offering housing assistance to low-­ income p ­ eople with HIV/AIDS, which cost $150 million, would become even more expensive if the bill became law. According to the mayor, the program would increase costs by 10 ­percent (Buckley 2012). But the data w ­ ere in dispute. “Ginny Shubert of Shubert Botein Policy Associates, an analy­sis and advocacy group based in New York, calculated that the new law would cost the city and state an extra $19 million a year but result in $20 million in annual savings. Ms. Shubert, who supported the bill, said the savings would come from evicting fewer tenants, covering fewer rental arrears, and paying for less emergency housing. Keeping a subsidized tenant in an apartment costs twenty-­four dollars a day, she explained, but paying for emergency housing costs about $55 daily” (Buckley 2012). What was so odd about the mayor’s stance was that he lost a ­great deal of goodwill by opposing the 30 ­percent rule, which would affect so few p ­ eople and cost so l­ ittle. Bloomberg had a gift for alienating p ­ eople over very small ­things.

Ignoring Debt-­Ridden Property During the 1980s New York City owned thousands of housing units ­because building ­owners deserted their buildings outright or lost them to the city as the



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city tried desperately to force recalcitrant landlords to make essential repairs (Soffer 2010, 304). Mayor Koch sought to return ­these buildings to the private sector, often in return for tax breaks. This policy continued ­under Mayors Dinkins and Giuliani. It was Mayor Bloomberg’s misfortunate to witness the end of ­these vital resources to h ­ ouse the poor. In August 2005 he announced that the DHPD would send out a proposal to developers for the last 248 city-­owned lots: “Preference w ­ ill be given to developers who commit to building more affordable housing than the required minimum” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2005b). Bloomberg faced the end of the era when selling city-­owned lots to developers created affordable housing. ­There ­were no lots left, and he had to plan accordingly. ­Every year, however, the city closes on debt-­ridden properties for which taxes have not been paid. Mayor Giuliani left serious prob­lems for l­ater mayors by creating a private trust to sell debt-­ridden properties instead of foreclosing on ­those properties. As John Krinsky (2016) notes, “For the last twenty years, [the city] has given up its own power to foreclose on much of this property and to preserve it for affordable housing and to meet other community needs in ­favor of selling this right to a bank-­managed, private trust.” When homeowners’ or landlords’ tax or ­water bills are delinquent, the city places a lien on their properties and then sells packages of tax liens to a for-­profit trust at a discount; the trust then sells shares to investors, who are rewarded through interest rates that range from 9 ­percent (compounded daily) on smaller properties to 18 ­percent (compounded daily) for multifamily buildings (Kahrl 2015). The result is a deeply predatory pro­cess in which homeowners are dispossessed and housing is turned over to speculators en masse (Samuel Stein 2017, 9). Instead the city could keep four thousand properties a year on average, using a variety of funding mechanisms to offer them to developers and nonprofits that would build low-­income housing to the homeless or other low-­income ­people (Krinsky 2016). Although it is understandable that city officials do not want to return to the days when the city owned hundreds of thousands of properties, certainly the city has enough experience to h ­ andle a smaller number of units. It is imperative that t­ hese tax-­lien sales be s­ topped and the city returns to a community-­oriented approach in contrast to that of private developers, who are only interested in turning properties into high-­end properties.

Ignoring the Potential of Battery Park City Charles J. Urstadt was a state housing commissioner and served as chair of the BPCA from 1968 to 1979 and as BPCA vice chair from 1998 to 2010. Urstadt pointed out in Crain’s Business that since 1983, the city had the right to acquire the BPCA—­its assets and liabilities—­for one dollar. The development is complete, and the authority is no longer needed to operate it. The city could provide all the

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ser­v ices needed. If the city did this, it could end the $25 million expense for operating costs, it could stop the state from taking $130 million of the authority’s profits to ease its deficits, and it could sell the BPCA or sell bonds to fund an affordable housing program. If the city sold the land beneath the office and retail complex, the sale could yield several billion dollars (Urstadt 2014). No mayor has taken advantage of this situation—­not Ed Koch, not liberal David Dinkins, not conservative Rudolph Giuliani, not the apo­liti­cal politician Mike Bloomberg, and, as of yet, not the progressive Bill de Blasio. Yet Bloomberg, ­after a failed attempt to use the surplus funds for the New York Jets stadium, did use the surplus from the BPCA for housing, which is more than his pre­de­ces­sors did. The mayor had Governor Spitzer sign a settlement agreement that allowed the city to use BPCA surplus funds for affordable housing. In 2010 the city comptroller, the mayor, and the BPCA came together to direct $400 million to desperately needed affordable housing in New York City, continuing the tradition of using the authority’s surplus revenues for affordable housing (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2014b). The $400 million commitment included $200 million of excess revenues projected to flow from the BPCA. To date, over $160 million of that funding has been provided. According to the comptroller’s office, “Excess revenues from BPCA have now surpassed the projections made in 2010, and the $200 million revenue target for affordable housing w ­ ill be reached and exceeded in the current City fiscal year 2015, two years ahead of schedule” (NYC Office of the Comptroller 2014b).

Alternative Models Besides NYCHA, ­there are at least two models of low-­income housing that Bloomberg ignored: CLTs and l­imited equity cooperatives. Both involve owner­ship rather than rentals and both eliminate private developers. A CLT is a nonprofit collective owner­ship of a property that is focused on long-­term affordability. The board of directors is made up of the homeowners (or leaseholders, if they rent) and sometimes local officials. The trust owns the land permanently and the units are ­either owned or leased; the buildings cannot be sold for a profit. ­There are a few CLTs in NYC and also an alliance of ­those interested in CLTs, the NYC Community Land Initiative. The other model is a limited-­equity cooperative financed in part by the NYC Housing Development Fund Corporation. A cooperative is “a demo­cratically governed corporation with a shared owner­ship structure. In housing cooperatives, the corporation holds the title to the property and residents own a share in that corporation” (HCPS 2019, 28). Both models can be affordable to low-­income residents and be permanent, unlike a developer using tax in-



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centives to build affordable housing. Yet neither involves developers, so such models ­were not considered by the Bloomberg administration.

External Economic Restraints The mayor faced a dramatic loss in city revenues—­first in the aftermath of 9/11 and then again during the recession that began in 2008. With reduced revenues, it became more difficult for the mayor to build low-­income housing. In effect, once the downturn occurred in 2008, ­there ­were more ­people seeking shelter and fewer ­people leaving the shelter system b ­ ecause ­there was so l­ittle low-­income housing. Bloomberg built affordable housing, but not enough—­and not enough of it was truly low-­income.

The Federal Government and Affordable Housing The federal government at one point built low-­income housing. During the ­Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roo­se­velt began the first large-­scale program to help Americans with their housing needs. In June 1933 he created the Public Works Administration’s Housing Division as part of the National Industrial Recovery Act, funding the “first housing proj­ects through low-­interest loans to limited-­ dividend corporations, by awarding loans to limited-­dividend corporations, by awarding grants to state or local agencies, or my building proj­ects on its own” (Lusignan 2002, 36). This was the first time that the federal government became “directly [involved] in the business of building safe, clean, modern housing to meet the needs of the country’s most disadvantaged citizens” (Lusignan 2002, 36). In 1937 Roo­se­velt, with Congress’s help, passed the US Housing Act, which expressed a renewed commitment on the part of the federal government to provide “decent, affordable housing for Amer­i­ca’s urban poor” (Lusignan 2002, 36). The Housing Act, also known as the Wagner–­Steagall Act, “created the federally funded, locally operated public housing program that exists t­ oday” (Lusignan 2002, 37). It created the US Housing Authority (USHA) to provide “direction, financial support, and technical and design assistance to local housing authorities,” giving them some ability to make decisions in light of local community conditions (Lusignan 2002, 37). The USHA “spurred local public housing authorities to construct more than 370 proj­ects, which ­housed nearly 120,000 families at a cost of approximately $540 million” (Lusignan 2002, 37). All that President Roo­se­velt accomplished in building low-­income housing was vigorously resisted by conservatives who thought that providing decent housing for low-­income ­people was simply a handout that would weaken their character.

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President Harry S. Truman built on Roo­se­velt’s legacy, signing the Housing Act of 1949, which sought to alleviate the severe housing shortage that resulted from the postwar baby boom. This law would initiate the largest federal involvement in slum clearance and urban development that the nation had seen, as hundreds of cities received funding to replace slums with large public housing proj­ects. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office, private developers, who had long opposed federal intervention in housing construction, succeeded in replacing the urban redevelopment program with urban renewal in the form of the Housing Act of 1954. Now renovation, repair, and rehabilitation w ­ ere given priority instead of (or alongside) clearance and rebuilding schemes. “Since many of the best-­known proj­ects involved de­mo­li­tion of buildings and displacement of their residents, urban renewal became synonymous with a clearance proj­ect of any sort. Noting the disproportionate numbers of minority groups who w ­ ere displaced by redevelopment proj­ects, critics cried out that urban renewal ­really meant Negro removal” (von Hoffman 2008, 46). President Lyndon B. Johnson expanded the public housing program. The 1965 Housing Act included the Rent Supplement Program, which helped renters to acquire more moderate-­income-­ priced housing. “In short, the new law grants to local housing authorities the power to lease private homes or apartments for the use of low-­income tenants and, hence, to abandon the concept of the ‘housing proj­ect’ and to scatter subsidized tenants about the city. . . . ​The local housing authority would pay the differential to the owner of the dwelling” (Friedman and Krier 1968, 614). Two years ­later, HUD developed a pro­cess known as the Turnkey Program, which allowed housing authorities use private developers to build public housing proj­ects (von Hoffman 2010, 7). Then Johnson pushed Congress to pass the 1968 Housing Act, which resulted in a major time for construction of public housing, almost doubling such units across the country. In addition, Senators Robert F. Kennedy and Jacob Javits pushed through a 1966 amendment to the Economic Development Act that provided private developers with incentives payments to invest in poverty areas. President Richard Nixon ended support for public housing. He placed a moratorium on most subsidized housing assistance, essentially ending funding for public housing. Gerald Ford assumed the presidency in 1974 and had to deal with many prob­ lems, including ­those plaguing HUD. During Ford’s term the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 created block grants, which represented “the consolidation and decategorization of twelve major HUD categorical programs into a single revenue-­sharing type of block grant” (Frez and Specht 1976, 276). The act also was the beginning of the “Section 8 program, which in 1974 provided housing vouchers to veterans who ­were homeless or vulnerable” (Guerra, n.d.). Section 235 of the law was designed “to shift the focus of federal housing



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policy away from dispensing aid to local housing authorities for building public housing to providing direct supply-­side subsidies to the private sector to stimulate home owner­ship for nonwhites and the poor” (Gotham 2000, 14). When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he began a serious retrenchment in all federal assistance, including housing. “Appropriations for HUD’s subsidized housing programs fell from a peak of $32.2 billion in fiscal year 1978 to $9.8 billion in fiscal year 1988. ­After adjusting for inflation, this constituted a decline of more than 80 ­percent” (Bratt 1997). Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA ’86), “which simplified the tax code, closed loopholes, eliminated many tax shelters, raised revenues and created one of Reagan’s lasting legacies—­LIHTC. TRA ’86 also included the low-­income housing tax credit (LIHTC), which became very popu­lar with private developers” (Novogradac 2016). The era of private developers involved in affordable housing had begun. In the 1990s, with Bill Clinton as president, came one of the worst federal housing policies—­the Faircloth Amendment (1998) to the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1988, presented by Republican senator Lauch Faircloth from North Carolina. The amendment blocked HUD from supporting any new subsidized public housing construction that created a net increase in public housing stock, even if funds ­were available (US HUD 2016a). This was called the Faircloth Limit, and it meant that the conservatives had won the ­battle they had fought since the 1930s: they had fi­nally put the last nail in the coffin of public housing. NYCHA has been l­imited to 180,343 subsidized units ever since (US HUD 2016a). President George W. Bush signed into law the Housing and Economic Act of 2008, in which Congress created the National Housing Trust Fund, which could have been used for preservation, production, rehabilitation, and operation of rental housing so long as 75 ­percent of the money was used for low-­income ­house­holds. But the program was not funded in the federal bud­get. Meanwhile, states, cities, and counties created their own housing trust funds similar to ­those of the federal government. More than seven hundred trust funds in forty-­one states are in place ­today, generating hundreds of millions of dollars each year for affordable housing. When the federal government avoids solving a prob­lem, states and local governments can choose to step in. The 2008 recession ruined any plans President Barack Obama might have had to build affordable housing. His administration did create the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, a public-­private partnership in which public housing can be transferred by housing authorities to private nonprofit owner­ship. The program remains extremely decentralized, so the quality of owner­ship depends upon the details in the contracts of each RAD conversion. RAD seeks to privatize the nation’s public housing stock. In a 2014 letter to the president, Representative Maxine W ­ aters of California stated, “I am writing

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­TABLE 6.2  US Department of Housing and Urban Development allocations to New York City, FY 2002–­FY 2013 (in constant dollars) PROGRAMS

2002

2013

DIFFERENCE

CDBG

$317,797,529

$155,708,779

$(162,088,750)

Home

$168,939,655

$57,811,908

$(111,127,747)

HOPWA

$71,920,898

$53,533,071

$(18,387,827)

ESG

$11,330,573

$10,921,293

$(409,280)

Total

$569,988,655

$277,975,051

$(292,013,604)

Source: NYC OMB 2002b and 2013. Notes: CDBG = Community Development Block Grants; Home = Home Investment Partnerships; HOPWA = Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS; ESG = Emergency Solutions.

to express my concerns about the expansion of the new demonstration program at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). . . . ​While created with the intention of preserving the nation’s stock of deeply affordable rental housing, I believe HUD’s Rental Assistance Demonstration . . . ​may very well do more harm than good in diminishing a crucial public asset. . . . ​Moreover, the preservation of the public interest in properties converting to for-­profit owner­ ship is left up to the discretion of the HUD Secretary and can be redefined at any time” (­Waters 2014). ­Waters clearly understood that too much power had been given to the HUD secretary. As of 2017, Congress has reduced funding for public housing and Section 8 vouchers, including financing fewer tax credits ­under the LIHTC. No ­matter how many laws have been passed, no ­matter what Congress and the president have claimed is the intent, the federal government has withdrawn funding year ­after year. Such consistent funding decreases put more and more strain on cities’ resources. As can be seen in t­ able 6.2, in constant dollars HUD allocations w ­ ere reduced by almost $300 million during the Bloomberg administration.

New York State and Affordable Housing Although the sheer number and complexity of the state’s affordable housing programs make it difficult to establish just how much housing the state built during the Bloomberg administration, it is pos­si­ble to establish some trends. The state did establish a state Housing Trust Fund similar to the city’s fund. According to the state comptroller’s office, “Each year since 1985, the Program has appropriated between $25 million and $39 million to be used in conjunction with other State, Federal, or private financing for low-­income housing proj­ects. Generally, the Program provides up to $125,000 per unit, or a total of up to $2.4 million



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per proj­ect” (NYS OSC 2014a, 1). “During the five-­year scope of the audit, about $209 million in program funds ­were awarded for 111 housing proj­ects, developing more than 5,850 housing units across the state. Of the forty-­five proj­ects that have been completed, twenty-­eight proj­ects (totaling $53 million) received full disbursement, and seventeen (totaling $31 million) received partial disbursement” (NYS OSC 2014b). The state also joined with the city to build supportive ser­vices units as described ­earlier. The DHCR had administered LIHTC. If developers agreed to build 20 ­percent affordable units, they qualified for tax-­exempt bonds. It was not ­until Bloomberg had completed his third term that Cuomo agreed to lower the amount of the subsidies so that only the affordable units would be eligible for the tax-­exempt bond financing. Prior to 2014, developers could finance more than half of an 80/20 building through the program, “meaning much of the benefit was g­ oing t­ oward the market-­rate portion of construction” (Anuta 2014). Now only the 20 ­percent of affordable units w ­ ere eligible for tax-­exempt bond financing. In addition, the state provided tax breaks for billionaires through the 421-­a tax subsidy. New construction in Midtown Manhattan was ineligible for 421-­a ­unless the development included on-­site affordable units. Five buildings did not meet this criterion. But fear not, the state legislature and governor came to the rescue: Cuomo proceeded to sign legislation making the five buildings eligible for the 421-­a subsidy. State legislators ­were in a box ­because the same bill renewed the tax break for co-op and condominium o ­ wners, which many legislators from the city had to support. As one of the most respected state senators, Liz Krueger, explained, “This is a perfect example of what goes wrong in the wheeling-­dealing of the backrooms of Albany” (quoted in Beekman 2013). ­These tax breaks represent millions of dollars that the city could have used for rent subsidies. But the state’s role in vacancy decontrol remained the most devastating set of public policies that reduced affordable housing in the city over a period of fifty years. In addition, the state constantly cut funding to NYCHA. In 2001 New York State provided $6.4 million in capital funds rather than the $15 million it had given in the past. Then, in 2007, it terminated even that paltry amount. It was not ­until de Blasio took office that capital funds ­were offered. As of 2018, no state funds had yet materialized (NYC Council 2017, 10).

Chapter Summar y Bloomberg, the data maven, ignored the data. As Mary K. Cunningham of the Urban Institute explains the shortcomings of Bloomberg’s plans, “More affordable housing requires the 3 p’s: preserving the affordable housing we already have,

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producing more affordable housing, and protecting tenants from abuse and an un­regu­la­ted market” (2019). Bloomberg ignored the three p’s. Yes, Mayor Bloomberg deserves some credit for his affordable housing initiatives: • He committed the city’s resources to build 165,000 units of housing. • He restructured the HDC to issue hundreds of millions of bonds. • He created the city’s Housing Trust Fund, which was incredibly successful. • He created the New York City Acquisition Fund, bringing on board dozens of foundations and banks and building or renovating over thirteen thousand units of affordable housing. • Unlike his pre­de­ces­sors (though ­under pressure), he used BCPA surpluses for affordable housing. • He restructured NYCHA so that the board would be more accountable to public officials and would be paid far less than before. • He announced that he would build 80/20 housing on NYCHA land, upsetting housing advocates who objected to taking land from NYCHA for market-­rate housing. • He created the new Supportive Housing Agreement to build more supportive housing. • He implemented major rezoning that changed the face of the city, and about 40 ­percent of the city was rezoned during his tenure (McQuilkin, n.d.). For the first time in many years the city had control over its waterfront, and Bloomberg sought to open the waterfront to new residential, recreational, and commercial uses. With t­ hese changes came some affordable housing. Yet Bloomberg totally ignored the data that demonstrated not enough affordable housing was being created to meet the enormous need. He fell short in several areas: • His affordable housing plan did not contain sufficient low-­income housing, and he renovated far more low-income housing units than he built. • He was slow to recognize NYCHA’s resource needs. • He failed to protect tenants by naming pro-­landlord appointees to the RGB. • He failed to hire attorneys for tenants facing eviction in housing court. • To meet ­people’s needs, affordable units must be permanent and not based upon the method of financing, but Bloomberg would never agree to that. Units ­under LIHTC, 80/20, IZ, and so forth must keep their



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affordable status for the life of the building rather than for twenty to thirty-­five years. • He ignored the pattern of gentrification that was taking place in many neighborhoods. • He ignored models, such as NYCHA, CLTs, and limited-­equity cooperatives that did not include developers. • He needlessly alienated ­people. In many ways Bloomberg was his own worst ­enemy. He established a pattern of ignoring the plight of vari­ous groups while at the same time building robust systems to improve life for all New Yorkers. For example, he challenged the HIV/ AIDS community for no reason. He could have been a hero to t­ hose with the disease and their allies; instead he became a villain. Mayor Bloomberg claimed to consider the data always, yet many groups carefully documented that he was losing more low-­income housing than he was creating, and he ignored ­those reports. The best of this long list comes from May 2012, when the Hunter College Department of Urban Affairs and Planning released a report, Where ­Will New Yorkers Live? Overhauling NYC’s Housing Policy (Bromley et al. 2012), that laid out a plan to address the enormous loss of low-­income housing. ­There is another explanation for Bloomberg’s inattention. The mayor delegated, and gave his commissioners and deputy mayors wide latitude. Doctoroff did not make a major commitment to affordable housing; he assumed that the 165,000 units of affordable housing to be renovated or built ­were what could be afforded. Bloomberg’s management style handicapped his own ability to create the needed solutions. When we put affordable housing in the context of national public policy, it must be recognized that less funding comes from the federal government e­ very year; cities must rely on their own resources and appeal to their respective states. Bloomberg recognized this and put together a housing plan that caused more affordable housing to be built than u ­ nder any New York City mayor since La Guardia except Koch, who had a large amount of city-­owned land to build on. Yet ­because of state laws governing rent control and rent stabilization, and ­because of Bloomberg’s own unwillingness to tackle such issues, the mayor failed, losing hundreds of thousands of low-­income housing units. The power in New York State can be dramatic. Three years ­after Bloomberg left the mayoralty, the Demo­crats gained control of the state legislature. And two pieces of legislation made a positive difference for affordable housing in the city. First, the state legislature eliminated vacancy decontrol and added protections for tenants; second, the 421-­a program was improved so that developers could no longer get tax exemptions for building luxury housing and would get more penalties

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for violations. Both of ­these state actions ­will improve the low-­income housing situation. ­These improvements ­were not available to Bloomberg; rather, they required state action. Several courses of action could be effective in prioritizing the building of low-­ income housing: • Now that vacancy decontrol has been eliminated, the city needs to gain enforcement powers from the state for all rent regulated housing. The state has done a terrible job of enforcement; the city could do better so that landlords do not chase tenants out of their homes. • Ensure that pro-­tenant appointees are named to the RGB. Any mayor could have put tenant advocates on the RGB. • Link new and renovated buildings that the city has financed in any way to permanently affordable housing—­without exception. • Take control of Battery Park City; buy it back and then sell part of it and use ­those funds to build affordable housing. • Stop selling off properties to private trusts. Instead the city must keep foreclosed property and create a CLT for all foreclosed property. CLTs are vehicles “for permanently affordable development managed by mission-­driven organ­izations” (Wolf-­Powers 2019). Stop the sale to developers and allow nonprofits to help tenants keep their housing, e­ ither through renting or purchase, while the city continues to own the land. • Encourage rent subsidies. In 2019 the state created a rent subsidy program; the city could create such a program to subsidize low-­income families. • NYCHA has been abandon by the state. Bloomberg was right to advocate for the construction of market-­rate buildings on NYCHA property and using all profits for NYCHA buildings. The city could do this without asking permission from any state or federal official. • Extend attorney access in housing court to all tenants to decrease evictions. ­ hese types of actions at the local level can improve the number of units availT able to low-­income ­people. Of course, the state could do more. The state took action on housing in 2019—­too late for Mayor Bloomberg. The state legislature passed rent regulations protecting tenants and redesigned 421-­a to provide tax exemptions to developers to build affordable housing. Currently the state legislature is considering a bill to provide rent assistance to needy tenants through the new Home Stability Support Program. Several advocacy organ­ izations are lobbying for this initiative. If this bill becomes law, New York w ­ ill for the first time supplement low-­income families’ rents.



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When we see the enormous need for housing in New York City, it is tempting to blame local officials, saying they should have tried harder. But the public needs a better understanding of the city’s de­pen­dency on state and federal law, regulations, and funding. If the city must finance affordable housing b ­ ecause the state and federal government are providing less money and other­wise taking housing away, then the city has hard choices to make. It remains to be seen ­whether ­future mayors can achieve more than Bloomberg did. Chris McNickle writes of Bloomberg’s “highly competent management” (2017, 309). Although Bloomberg created impor­tant institutions to help in the financing of affordable housing, ­there was very ­little that was well managed in the loss of low-­income housing in the city. Bloomberg failed. Yet, his successor, Bill de Blasio—­regardless of what his press releases might say—­has also failed. New York City has ten thousand more homeless ­people now than it did in the Bloomberg era. Yes, we need a mayor who takes more drastic steps—­namely, taking back Battery Park City; forging a mayoral co­ali­tion to promote local control of rent regulation and taking it away from the decision making of the state legislature; insisting that the state build public housing; ceasing the sale of city properties to a private trust; creating community land trusts; and providing rent vouchers. Unfortunately, policymakers, including the progressive de Blasio administration, are not giving ­these ideas serious consideration. But we also need a state and federal government that invests resources in low-­income housing. Without help from the federal and state governments, ­there ­will be serious limits to what any mayor can achieve. And such help is not in sight.

7 ANTIPOVERTY INITIATIVES

Many New Yorkers remain in poverty; the number of New York City residents who live in poverty (a l­ ittle ­under 1.7 million) is enormous (Levitan 2003). T ­ here was a small improvement during the Bloomberg administration. As the 2015 report The New York City Government Poverty Mea­sure, 2005–2015 notes, “The citywide poverty rate fell to 19.9 ­percent from 20.6 ­percent in 2014. The share of the population living at or near the poverty rate declined to 44.2 ­percent. This is statistically significant and the lowest since 2010” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2015). Another mea­sure of poverty is the percentage of income spent on housing: in 2009, approximately 68 ­percent of poor renters and 35 ­percent of low-­income renters paid 50 ­percent or more of their monthly income ­toward rent (­Legal Ser­vices NYC 2009, 4). What­ever the metric, ­there is no doubt that millions of New Yorkers live in poverty. To complicate ­matters, the city must increasingly deal with this prob­lem by itself. The federal and state governments claim that they provide millions to help ­those in poverty, but the real­ity is that the city must increasingly pick up the tab (see ­table 7.1). This trend has serious consequences. New York City has ­limited resources, and if it must pick up more of the cost of public assistance, then it has less money to meet other needs.

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Reduction in New York State’s Aid to the Poor President Bill Clinton signed a welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), in 1996, which aimed to devolve policymaking to the state and local governmental levels and limit federal welfare payments to sixty months (Schaefer 2017). “PRWORA shifted federal welfare policy to requiring work of almost ­every adult that joined the welfare rolls” (Sawhill and Haskins 2002). PRWORA ­limited benefits of welfare, often called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). It also emphasized “placement in private-­sector jobs or government workfare” in return for welfare benefits, although “wages are too low to enable families to escape poverty and avoid material hardship” (Boushey 2002). “New York’s version of TANF is called ­Family Assistance (FA)” (Fender et al. 2002). In New York, cash assistance came from three sources: the federally funded TANF; New York State’s Safety Net Five Year (SA) for families that had hit the five-­year limit for TANF; and the state’s Safety Net Assistance (SNA) for adults without ­children. In the case of New York City, the last two are funded 71 ­percent by the city and 29 ­percent with state funds (Lopatto 2019a). If a f­ amily’s income fell below the poverty line, that ­family could receive federal cash assistance for five years, as long as other criteria ­were met; for example, recipients who ­were able to do so had to find work or w ­ ere assigned work by the city to participate in work activities. What distinguished New York was then Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s commitment to a very strong “work first” philosophy—­that is, to move welfare recipients to work programs and deny welfare recipients the opportunity for education and training (Nightingale 2002). T ­ here was also a financial incentive to get p ­ eople off welfare. “New York is relatively unique among our study states in another way—­counties and New York City are required to provide 25 ­percent of the funding for many programs from local resources” (Fender et al. 2002, 19). Since states had ­great flexibility in designing TANF programs, they varied widely in their program designs. New York State used this flexibility to reduce programs serving the poor. While George Pataki was governor (1995–2006), he sought to limit public assistance in a myriad of ways (Nightingale et al. 2002). In 2004 the state reduced the public assistance grant to ­house­holds with a member who received the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which was run by the Social Security Administration for low-­income ­people who are el­derly or disabled. This reduction in public assistance was blatantly illegal, but the challenge to the new regulation took two years to wend its way through the state courts. In

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Doe v. Doar (2006), the courts ruled that the state could not reduce public assistance grants to individuals living in ­house­holds with a child in which a ­family member was receiving SSI. Thousands of dollars w ­ ere restored to t­ hose affected. Governor Pataki sought to limit education and training programs for welfare recipients. Two-­year training programs ­were no longer approved; short-­term programs only became the norm, which in New York State meant one year (McCormick 2004). The state required welfare recipients to be fingerprinted, and before ­going to their assigned work program, welfare recipients had to be drug tested. If families exceeded the sixty-­month time limit on federally financed TANF assistance, SNA would take the place of TANF, financed with state and local funds for two more years (Lopatto 2019a). Arizona and New York w ­ ere the only states in the nation that required Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recipients to be fingerprinted. A ­ fter endless hearings and testimony, Governor Andrew Cuomo ended the practice in 2012 (Cuomo 2012a). The implementation of TANF by the state and city ­were quite stringent while Giuliani was mayor. In the 1990s they [saw] themselves as taking the lead in workfare in the country The state and the city both enacted workfare programs before Congress passed the PRWORA in 1996. ­Under its workfare provisions, New York City has put to work the largest number of welfare recipients of any metropolitan area in the United States” (McCormick 2004, 334). In New York City, welfare recipients who did not find work ­were required to work in unpaid Work Experience Programs (WEPs) in order to receive their welfare checks. Many counties in other parts of the state provided paid WEPs for t­hose who could not find work. The city started a program, NYC Way, in 1995, “which combined workfare with a more rigorous eligibility and address verification program. This helped cut city welfare rolls and related financial obligations” (McCormick 2004, 333). As Timothy Casey notes, “­Because of the emphasis upon work, welfare recipients left college for work. City University (CUNY) reports that the number of welfare parents in the CUNY system has declined from about 26,000 to about 13,000” (1998, 14). The Giuliani administration became infamous for denying welfare recipients a college education. Giuliani sought get-­tough policies, including work requirements and strict eligibility rules (Nightingale et al. 2002). Overall, Pataki and Giuliani managed to reduce welfare caseloads from 1,141,000 in FY 1994 to 560,000 in FY 2001 (NYC Office of the Comptroller 1994, 2001). The state imposed sanctions if the welfare recipient did not comply with work requirements; t­hose ­sanctions basically amounted to losing the adult share of the welfare benefits. The Welfare Law Center and the L ­ egal Aid Society sued the city on behalf of all TANF recipients to force the city to include education or training within work requirements. “In a case originally filed in 1996 as Davila v. Hammons,” notes Lynn McCormick, “the plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction against the city in



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March 1997 in the Supreme Court of New York County. The city appealed this decision—in what was now the case of Davila v. Eggelston—­and agreed to a settlement favoring the plaintiffs in 2003” (McCormick 2004, 352n6). This settlement came during the Bloomberg administration, which was not as draconian as the Giuliani administration when it came to policies governing welfare recipients. If welfare recipients w ­ ere at work, t­ hese recipients with c­ hildren required childcare, and New York State required counties to offer childcare to all welfare recipients who ­were working. ­Unless the city could provide sufficient seats, the working poor lost out to welfare recipients in obtaining childcare slots. This was the situation Bloomberg faced when he was elected in the fall of 2001.

Mayor Bloomberg’s Antipoverty Programs To understand Bloomberg’s views on reducing poverty, one must refer to what he actually said: “Our anti-­poverty work has focused on job creation, education, public health, justice, affordable housing, social ser­v ices, and policies that help working families, like the local Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Care Tax Credit we a­ dopted” (Bloomberg 2013c). The mayor believed that poverty was best reduced through a multifaceted approach that included more jobs, better education, a stronger public health system, a more effective criminal justice system, and far more affordable housing. His strategy was not to increase the number of p ­ eople receiving welfare but to do just the opposite: he deliberately held welfare rolls down. Bloomberg’s strategy was comprehensive; he believed that if he could increase jobs, improve education, and build enough affordable housing, he could increase the number of ­people working and they would move out of poverty.

Welfare Reform ­ here ­were two HRA commissioners who w T ­ ere in place for several years during Bloomberg’s three terms—­Robert Doar and Verna Eggleston. Both endorsed work components coming first in any welfare program rather than training and education. Eggleston, in par­tic­u­lar, sought to make HRA more responsive to its clients (Kaufman 2004b). The first commissioner u ­ nder Bloomberg was Eggleston, who avoided comments about the previous administration’s policies while changing the direction. She only commented once in public about the Giuliani administration, soon ­after she was appointed, as reported by City Limits: “Then it [welfare reform] would have to be dealt out heavy-­handedly like we saw the last administration do, with the only target and the only goal to reduce the numbers,’ she said at a forum on welfare at New School University. ‘But if we want to do it in

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a compassionate way, as this administration, as my mayor has asked me to do, then it must be inclusive’ ” (City Limits 2005b). Many ­people credit the Bloomberg administration with having far more humane policies than the draconian ones advocated by Giuliani. Eggleston expanded outreach efforts to help p ­ eople eligible for food stamps apply for and receive them, and by the end of her tenure, the number of recipients neared 1.1 million. In addition, Eggleston lobbied the state “to expand education and training options for single, childless welfare recipients” (City Limits 2005b). She commented, “We ­shouldn’t be in a position where ­we’re regulating what someone’s self-­sufficiency looks like. Every­body’s level . . . ​is dif­fer­ent. I ­will not put down a gauntlet and [say] Our ­thing is work first. It’s more than that” (City Limits 2005b). Eggleston embraced using technology to make government ser­v ices more efficient and effective, and she applied this thinking to antipoverty programs in the form of the Department of Health and ­Human Ser­v ices (HHS) proj­ect HHS–­ Connect (see chapter 4). In an evaluation of social ser­v ices during the Bloomberg administration, Dennis Smith and William Grinker note that “a more sharply focused HRA u ­ nder Commissioner Eggleston has prob­ably come the farthest in the universal application of data usage and per­for­mance mea­sure­ment at a management level” (2005, 23). Yet Eggleston sent out mixed signals. Early in the Bloomberg administration, she refused to ask for a federal waiver that would have offered “the city the flexibility to provide food stamps to the jobless beyond the current federal limit of three months in a three year period” (Bern­stein 2002b). Her administration also told the New York City Council that Bloomberg did not approve of a bill that would “give welfare recipients better access to education and job training” by trading required work hours for a variety of training (Kaufman 2004b). T ­ hese two actions w ­ ere problematic and signaled that the mayor and his new HRA commissioner wanted to follow Giuliani’s path of work and self-­sufficiency to alleviating prob­lems of poverty. Bloomberg did not object to the tougher approach, and this reflected the mayor’s management style: he would support his commissioners even though he had clearly signaled to Eggleston that he desired compassion. The prob­lem with this management style was that commissioners might be making the wrong decisions, particularly in areas where the mayor was not particularly knowledgeable. But he stood by them. Except for t­ hose two early actions, Commissioner Eggleston implemented innovative solutions to tough prob­lems. She sought to change the welfare program for the better by creating a new program to help t­ hose welfare recipients with disabilities find work. The Wellness, Comprehensive Assessment, Rehabilitation and Employment (WeCare) program was designed to help welfare recipients find



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work or gain federal disability benefits if they could not work. Launched early in the Bloomberg years, WeCare was a move away from the punitive years of the previous administration. The program was charged with fixing prob­lems ­those with disabilities had in order for them to find work or to get them federal benefits. Eggleston also greatly reduced participation in WEPs, which w ­ ere seen by many as exploitative programs requiring welfare recipients to work in city agencies for no money and next to ­union workers who ­were well paid, with benefits. At the height of the WEP program during the Giuliani administration, seven thousand welfare recipients worked without pay cleaning public parks. Commissioner Eggleston greatly reduced this program and transferred the three thousand workers remaining to the Parks Opportunity Program, which included a day of training in an employment field of their choice as well as providing minimum wage. Eggleston sought to place welfare recipients in other city agencies, which would include training for placement in ­those agencies. It was a far more creative solution than Giuliani’s program of telling welfare recipients that they needed to rake leaves in the park. Eggleston changed the city’s practice of paying contractors to place a welfare recipient in a job and then paying the contractor a very small additional fee if the welfare recipient was still on the job six months ­later. She reversed the size of the payments, and the “six-­month retention rates have risen to 72 ­percent from 65 ­percent” (Kaufman 2004b). Eggleston also redesigned welfare centers and started with the Harlem center “designed to shrink ­those [long welfare] lines” (Kaufman 2004b). This led Alan B. Siskind, chairman of the ­Human Ser­v ices Council of the city, to say, “She is very sensitive to the needs of clients.” “Frankly, I am impressed with the energy that has gone into making this agency more responsible” (Kaufman 2004b). Unfortunately, Eggleston is remembered for urging the mayor to veto an education and job training bill, and for denying food stamps over time to single adults. Eggleston resigned in 2007, and Robert Doar, who had been the commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, was appointed for the duration of Bloomberg’s reign from 2007 to 2013. Doar continued the policy of “work first” but emphasized and promoted the two programs Earned Income Tax Credit and SNAP. Over time, Governor Andrew Cuomo cut the state’s funding to social ser­v ices (see t­ able 7.1). As can be seen in ­table 7.1, the city must make up the difference when the state and federal governments reduce funding. This pattern of leaving the prob­lem to local governments to solve is now common throughout the country: mayors everywhere must make hard choices about what ser­vices should be funded, expanded,

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­TABLE 7.1  Funding for public assistance

Federal funding* State funding All local funding Total

FY 2002

FY 2013

% CHANGE, FY 2002–­FY 2013

$297,789,355

$278,269,493

−6.6%

$69,262,357

$30,390,004

−56.1%

$69,594,900

$128,452,281

84.6%

$436,646,612

$437,111,778

0.1%

Source: All statistics taken from annual reports on New York State temporary assistance programs, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, 2002–13. *Includes TANF, 265 Safety Net, SNAP, 261 Fund, Welfare to Work block grant.

or cut. In New York City, the mayor, in most cases, chose to cover the gap left by federal and state funding reductions. Welfare had become increasingly expensive for the city. Regardless of the Bloomberg team’s intentions, it was clear that the administration held down the welfare rolls. The mayor listened to his HRA commissioners, who continued to reduce welfare rolls in much the same way the Giuliani administration had. Welfare rolls dropped from 459,159 of ­people on cash assistance in 2002 to 339,203 in 2014 at the end of Bloomberg’s reign (Lopatto 2019b). ­These numbers do not include SNAP and SSI. Part of that drop is attributed to the Bloomberg policy of denying applicants welfare benefits.

The Commission on Economic Opportunity In his first term, Bloomberg’s attention was primarily on the city’s recovery from 9/11. In his second term, however, he turned his attention to poverty. In March 2006 Bloomberg appointed the thirty-­two-­member Commission on Economic Opportunity to advise him on an antipoverty strategy; Geoffrey Canada, president of Harlem ­Children’s Zone, and Richard Parsons, then president of Time Warner, chaired the commission (Gibbs and Doar 2016a). The commission created a four-­part plan of attack: determine the scope of poverty; identify types of solutions; establish the inter-­agency infrastructure needed; and develop a rigorous system of evaluation (Gibbs and Doar 2016a). At the end of 2006 the mayor sought to implement the commission’s recommendations, which advocated five targeted strategies: breaking the cycle of poverty by improving the life chances of ­children ­under five; investing in the education of at-­risk young adults; helping disengaged young adults find ­career paths; empowering working adults to achieve financial stability; and creating opportunities for low-­wage workers to expand their skill sets (Morrison 2007).



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The Center for Economic Opportunity The mayor created a structure to develop, implement, and monitor the recommendations of the Commission on Economic Opportunity that sought to lift ­these groups of New Yorkers out of poverty. That structure was the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO) in the mayor’s office, headed by executive director Veronica M. White (NYC CEO 2013, 14). A public-­private partnership, it had an annual $100 million Innovation Fund that was bankrolled by the city and foundations. An extraordinary venture, with its permanence and its orga­nizational place within the mayor’s office, the CEO had one charge—to fight poverty: “When we launched the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO) in 2006, its mission was to fight poverty through innovative programs with a mandate for data-­driven accountability and results. But in order to find what works in solving difficult prob­lems, you must have the freedom to try new t­ hings with the understanding that some ­things might fail while o ­ thers succeed. The Center has launched more than 60 antipoverty programs since its creation, and each one has been carefully monitored and rigorously evaluated” (NYC CEO 2013, 1). One of ­those recommendations was to develop an alternative mea­sure of poverty that would result in counting more p ­ eople as poor than when using the federal methodology. The federal government defined a ­family as being in poverty if it had an annual income that was three times the cost of basic groceries (Mark Levitan, pers. comm., 2013). Bloomberg agreed to a less archaic formula that included all the costs that ­people incur—­housing, health, groceries, and the like. He hired Mark Levitan to mea­sure poverty in this more comprehensive way. As Levitan ­later reflected, “To the mayor’s credit, he did not flinch when I told him that I thought a more accurate methodology would demonstrate that more New Yorkers ­were in poverty than had been previously thought. He agreed to do it ­because my methodology would be more accurate, and he ­wasn’t worried about the outcome” (Levitan, pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, that was the result of Levitan’s analy­sis—­that 23 ­percent of New Yorkers live in poverty as compared to the federal poverty level, which was closer to 19 ­percent (NYC Office of the Mayor 2008). And this reflected Bloomberg’s thinking that in order to solve prob­lems, the prob­lems first needed to be mea­sured. The center had many supporters. As Richard Buery, president of the ­Children’s Aid Society at the time, commented, “Mayor Bloomberg has pioneered innovative approaches to tackling Amer­i­ca’s opportunity gap and his Center for Economic Opportunity is perhaps the only institution of its kind in the country: a city-­run action tank which is constantly developing, implementing, and evaluating new ideas in the war on poverty, with an eye ­towards expanding t­hose initiatives that work and learning from ­those that ­don’t” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013d).

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In 2010 the CEO received a multiyear, multi-­million-­dollar federal Social Innovation Fund grant to expand “five of the most promising programs and establish them in seven other cities across the country” (NYC CEO 2018). ­Every program was to be evaluated internally or by MDRC, a nationally known evaluation com­ pany. ­These programs ­were the City University of New York (CUNY) Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP), which supported community college students with academic help and financial aid; Financial Empowerment Centers; Jobs-­ Plus, which provided jobs for public housing residents; School-­Based Health Centers (SBHCs) and Connecting Adolescents to Comprehensive Healthcare (CATCH); and the Young Men’s Initiative (YMI), which provided ser­vices in the areas of education, employment, health, and justice (NYC CEO 2018). AC C EL ER AT ED S TU DY I N A S S O C I ATE PR O GR AM S

ASAP improved the graduation rates, from 41 ­percent to 51 ­percent (Social Programs that Work 2020). “CUNY Chancellor Matthew Goldstein announced a plan to scale up the program from 1,300 students to over 4,000 by 2014 using CUNY funding. According to CUNY ASAP’s website, 1,567 new students ­were recruited across all six participating community colleges in August 2012 and 1,800 additional students w ­ ere recruited for fall 2013” (Gais et al. 2014, 19). The program became nationally known when “President Obama mentioned ASAP by name in a 2015 address regarding a proposal to offer f­ ree tuition for more community college students.” By 2016 the program had a spring enrollment of eight thousand students (Jurney 2016). JO BS -­P L US

Jobs-­Plus, a federal program brought to the city by the CEO, sought to increase earnings and employment among public housing residents through job training and placement. It was first pi­loted at the city housing development the Jefferson Houses in East Harlem and succeeded in getting five hundred job placements for its participants. As Kahliah Laney, David Giles, and Jonathan Bowles note, “This initiative alters traditional public housing rent rules—to include a time-­limited rent freeze—so that increased earnings ­won’t cause an increase in rent. This is key ­because in the past many low-­income individuals shied away from taking even a low-­wage job b ­ ecause the income they received from work would lead to higher rents and also jeopardized their ability to continue receiving public assistance, Medicaid and other government benefits” (Laney, Giles, and Bowles 2013, 11). The mayor expanded this program to twenty-­three public housing sites.



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S C HO O L - ­B A S E D H E A LTH C E N TE R S A ND CONNECTI NG A D O L ES C EN TS TO C O M PR E H E N S I V E HEAL TH CAR E

SBHCs and CATCH ­were also not new but w ­ ere enhanced and strengthened by the CEO. State-­funded programs offered ­limited ser­vices, but CEO offered a wide range of ser­v ices; “the CEO-­funded sites w ­ ere funded at higher levels in order to provide reproductive health care, including risk reduction counseling, sexually transmitted disease (STD) testing and treatment, HIV testing, f­amily planning counseling, pregnancy testing, and dispensing of contraceptives, including emergency contraception” (NYC DHMH 2009). By 2014, students had “access to over 126 SBHCs and CATCH operating in 278 high schools across the five boroughs. All of ­these centers provided access to health education and counseling, pregnancy testing ser­v ices, and STD screening in safe environments. . . . ​A study comparing similarly situated schools showed that high schools with no pregnancy prevention programs had a 57 ­percent increase in pregnancy rates, while ­those with SBHC programs had a decline of about 30 ­percent in pregnancy rates. Use of health ser­vices [increased], with a 27 ­percent and 40 ­percent rise in sophomores and se­niors using SBHC ser­v ices, respectively” (NYC DOHMH 2009). F I N A N C I A L E M POW E R M E N T C E N TE R S

“In 2008, Bloomberg announced that the City of New York would pi­lot Financial Empowerment Centers within the Department of Consumer Affairs as part of a broad effort to test and refine new approaches to alleviating poverty” (NYC CEO 2013). The centers provided low-­income residents with “­free, one-­on-­one financial counseling by trained professionals and integrated counseling into the delivery of municipal ser­v ices” (NYC CEO 2013) The focus was on making work pay by expanding supplemental income, helping p ­ eople sign up for public health insurance, and helping them apply for the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. According to one study, this program “helped clients reduce debt by a total of $1.3 million in 2010, $3.5 million in 2011, and $7 million in 2012” (Laney, Giles, and Bowles 2013, 14). The number of ­people “seeking out the office’s ser­vices also increased each year, with the number of counseling sessions g­ oing from 9,422 in 2010, to 10,296 in 2011, and to 11,100 in 2012” (Laney, Giles, and Bowles 2013, 14). As Bloomberg commented, “Over the past four years, our professional counselors have conducted over 28,000 individual sessions, helping New Yorkers pay down over $7 million in debt—­and increase their savings by over $900,000. We’ve also helped many clients recover from incidents of identity theft and, perhaps most importantly, open mainstream bank or credit u ­ nion accounts” (2012a).

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T H E YO UNG M E N ’ S I N I TI ATI V E

The YMI is a collection of “programs carried out by more than a dozen city agencies and departments” and financed by city funds, Bloomberg Philanthropies, and the Open Society Foundation (NYC YMI 2014). The program has four areas of concentration: education, employment, health, and justice. As Nan Marie Astone and colleagues (2016) have noted, “YMI 1.0 focused on Black and Latino men from sixteen to twenty-­four years of age. YMI 2.0 programming includes addressing literacy of ­children in kindergarten through grade three, which aligns with the My B ­ rother’s Keeper Community Challenge.” The need was enormous: Black and Latino young men had 50 ­percent greater rates of poverty, 25 ­percent lower graduation rates, and ten times higher incarceration rates than young white men. In the area of education, the administration focused on changing school discipline codes so that Black and Latino boys ­were not suspended as quickly. Within two years, school suspensions dropped 23 ­percent and school-­based arrests dropped 34 ­percent (NYC YMI 2014). In employment, the administration focused on paid internships, job placement, education, and training. The CUNY Fatherhood Acad­emy, located at LaGuardia Community College, helped f­ athers develop job skills and parenting skills and get their GEDs. In a study of the acad­emy, Marla McDaniel and colleagues (2014) note that “the overall 61 ­percent pass rate among the 80 HSE enrollees who took the exam exceeds the proportion for all black test takers (40.7 ­percent), all Latino test takers (48.8 ­percent), and all 19-­to 24-­year-­olds (56.4 ­percent) in New York in 2012.” Employment programs achieved a 77 ­percent placement rate. To promote more equitable treatment by the justice system, the administration ­adopted an advocate-­intervene-­mentor program for youth on probation who ­were in danger of being incarcerated due to a probation violation. ­There was a 38 ­percent drop in juvenile detention and a 61 ­percent drop in juvenile placement (McDaniel et al. 2014). In addition, gains ­were made in public health; teen pregnancy rates declined 15 ­percent and gun vio­lence dropped 28 ­percent. Richard Buery, the deputy mayor for strategic policy initiatives, and the leader of the YMI, created NYC Men Teach, a historic effort to recruit one thousand men of color to become public school teachers (Buery 2019). One aspect of the YMI is particularly moving: some adolescent boys ­were being sent to upstate detention centers, far from their families, and the mayor brought together an advisory board that lobbied to change state law to end the practice of assigning most adolescents to t­ hese faraway detention centers (see chapter 9).



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The Administration for ­Children’s Ser­vices and EarlyLearn NYC The Bloomberg administration sought to improve the quality of preschool childcare and also standardize it in a new program called EarlyLearn NYC that was quite ambitious. Certainly, the administration began the right way. As Julia Gelatt and Heather Sandstrom (2014) explain, The first step to implementing EarlyLearn was a review of the child care system and a strategic report outlining proposed changes to the city’s contracted care system, published in 2005. ACS [the Administration for ­Children’s Ser­vices] then completed a community needs assessment to determine the level of need for early childhood education in each neighborhood and the availability of providers. A ­ fter ongoing research, consultation, and consideration, ACS and DOE [the Department of Education] signed an interagency agreement in 2007 to allow providers operating child care and Head Start programs to receive UPK [Universal Pre-­ Kindergarten] dollars through a streamlined application pro­cess. A ­ fter meeting with child care advocates, ACS released a white paper on the full EarlyLearn program in February 2010 and a concept paper in April 2010. ACS also met with providers and advocates and conducted extensive calculations to determine a fair payment rate. Following standard procurement pro­cesses, a comment period was opened on the concept paper and feedback from that pro­cess was incorporated into a request for proposals (RFP) issued in May 2011. This type of planning was typical of the Bloomberg administration. The mayor was a planner, and his administration reflected this. The city provided preschool childcare to two distinct groups: families on public assistance and poor working families. As required by the federal government, the city had to provide childcare for all families on federal public assistance through TANF, but was not required to provide childcare for poor working families (Nancy Kolben, pers. comm., 2019). The HRA administered childcare for families on public assistance while the ACS administered the childcare program for poor working families. The ACS also administered an after-­school childcare program and Head Start. In 2007 the Bloomberg administration moved the after-­ school childcare program from the ACS to the Out-­of-­School Time program at the Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD) (NYC OMB 2008). It also took the program for families on public assistance at the HRA and combined it with the program for poor working families ­under the direction of

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the ACS. Now all the programs for preschool childcare w ­ ere ­under the direction of the ACS, and all after-­school programs ­were ­under the direction of the DYCD. Most preschool childcare programs in the city ­were provided by ­either individual providers or hundreds of nonprofit organ­izations that contracted with the ACS and ­were funded by federal, state, and local dollars. The ACS administered several programs: first, informal care for up to three ­children with an unlicensed provider financed by vouchers to the parents; second, group ­family day care from three to twelve ­children with a licensed provider financed by vouchers or contracts; third, center-­based childcare in a licensed fa­cil­i­ty financed mainly by contracts; and fourth, the Head Start program, also in a licensed fa­cil­i­ty funded by the federal government and financed by contracts (Lopatto 2005). The funding of t­ hese programs had multiple sources; by far “the two most impor­tant sources of childcare funds ­were city funds” ($261 million in fiscal year 2012), and the state and federal Child Care Block Grant (CCBG) for $470 million in fiscal year 2012 (Lopatto 2005). CCBG was 1997 state legislation responding to the federal government’s changing welfare requirements. As Paul Lopatto and Shari Westman (2010) note, “The CCBG combines the state’s allocation from the federal Child Care Development Fund, any surplus Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) funds that the state decides to dedicate to child care, and smaller amounts of state child care funds” (Lopatto and Westman 2010). What the Bloomberg administration sought to do was integrate the licensed providers in group homes or childcare centers, which ­were funded in a variety of ways with the federally funded Head Start program. In effect, the administration sought to blend the funding between Head Start programs and the childcare centers and ­family networks funded by the state and city into a new program, EarlyLearn NYC. T ­ hese licensed providers had an enrollment of about forty-­eight thousand ­children. But 60 ­percent of ­these ­children ­were using vouchers and remained untouched by EarlyLearn. Many parents preferred the vouchers, which provided year-­round care and a longer day than childcare centers. In addition, EarlyLearn had another goal: to pay providers based on enrollment rather than capacity. The childcare history in the city was that the city paid for providers for the number of ­children that they could take care of, and the city sought to change that to the number of c­ hildren actually enrolled. This would save thousands of dollars. Yet as one interviewee explained, “I ­don’t know what ­those bureaucrats ­were thinking—­this is an immigrant city. Immigrants often sent their ­children back to their country for vacations. So, the centers w ­ ere penalized for poor attendance during ­those periods. ­There was an unintended consequence with the city’s policy of paying by attendance rather than enrollment; that is the centers wanted to enroll fewer immigrant ­children so they would keep attendance up” (anonymous, pers. comm., 2017).



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­Under the new EarlyLearn NYC initiative, all childcare providers at the city’s centers w ­ ere required to go through a new RFP pro­cess. But the smaller providers had a ­great deal of trou­ble filing a new proposal, and as a result, many longtime nonprofits closed their doors with the consequence that parents faced confusion, misinformation, and loss of their favorite childcare providers. The combination of t­ hese programs resulted in a loss of capacity for the centers. As a 2010 memorandum from the Day Care Council of New York noted, “­There are approximately 570 early childhood programs including child care, Head Start and ­family child care networks ­under contract with ACS at this time. To reduce the system to 350 contracts translates into a potential loss of capacity for numerous communities and jobs within the system” (DCCNY 2010). And, indeed, this did occur. Lopatto (2017) explains that “total average enrollment in subsidized child care [including vouchers] declined by more than 13,600 from 112,311 ­children in 2012 to 98,677 in 2016.” Part of this decline resulted, however, from federal cuts to Head Start. Looking just at EarlyLearn, Gelatt and Sandstrom (2014) explain that “before EarlyLearn, the ACS contracts created slots for approximately 48,500 ­children; ­under EarlyLearn, the initial capacity was 43,500 seats and current capacity is 37,150 seats.” The intention of the ACS administrators was clear: to improve the quality of day care in the city by merging all programs and providing “­family support ser­ vices including nutrition, health and m ­ ental health ser­v ices; child assessments to track c­ hildren’s pro­gress; support ser­vices to ­children with special needs; and increased professional development for center staff” (NYC ACS 2012). Yet three dif­fer­ent funding streams existed, and the “improvements” meant that the teachers and directors who would be working together would have three dif­fer­ent salary scales and three dif­fer­ent ­unions on-­site. In addition, nonprofits would only be paid for the c­ hildren who actually enrolled, not the capacity of the program. The complexity of the implementation was formidable. Moreover, the implementation was not phased in; it did not begin with a demonstration proj­ect to work out the kinks. Childcare contracts ­were simply redistributed across the city. Long-­ term providers ­were denied new contracts; new nonprofits without a history of providing childcare ­were endorsed. The implementation resulted in fewer slots. Fury erupted among parents who lost the traditional centers for their c­ hildren. Providers, who lost contracts, ­were angry and sought out their elected officials—­ particularly city council members, who reacted by placing additional dollars in the bud­get for providers rejected from the RFP pro­cess. Such an outcome of fewer seats in EarlyLearn did not support Bloomberg’s strategy to get p ­ eople out of poverty through working since parents cannot work if they need to be home with their ­children. But it did support improved early childhood education.

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The Department for the Aging In the last five years of the Bloomberg administration, the Department for the Aging (DFTA) was a success story in large part b ­ ecause of its commissioner, Lilliam Barrios-­Paoli, who revitalized se­nior centers. The DFTA “supported a wide range of se­nior ser­v ices both directly and through contracts with community-­ based organ­izations.” ­These ser­v ices include “case management, home care, respite ser­v ices for caregivers, meals, l­egal counseling, health promotion, home energy and weatherization assistance, employment opportunities, and transportation” (NYC DFTA, n.d.). Se­niors accessed most of t­ hese ser­v ices at the centers operated by nonprofits (Barrios-­Paoli, pers. comm., 2017). A significant new direction was the establishment of Innovative Se­nior Centers, described on the agency’s website as “providing enhanced programming, including robust wellness programs, additional access to healthcare ser­v ices, arts and cultural programs, as well as new technological and volunteer opportunities” (NYC DFTA, n.d.). The commissioner closed fifty-­three very small centers and redesigned the remaining 256 larger centers, which among other functions served as a place to meet and eat lunch and as a hub for meal delivery to the homebound (Salas and Turetsky 2011). Barrios-­Paoli did this by meeting city council members on countless occasions to win their support, with the blessings of the mayor and of deputy mayor Gibbs, and with the help of the Office of Management and Bud­get (Barrios-­Paoli, pers. comm., 2017). What the DFTA teaches us is that the mayor gave his commissioners wide latitude. When the commissioner is a particularly innovative man­ag­er, as ­were Dr. Frieden and Barrios-­Paoli, the result was a well-­managed agency. But if the commissioner was not capable of thinking outside the box, then the agency remained ­running u ­ nder old policies or offering fewer ser­v ices.

Pros and Cons of Bloomberg’s Approach to Ser ving the Poor Mayor Bloomberg’s interest in poverty differed from that of his pre­de­ces­sor, Rudolph Giuliani, who deprived thousands of ­people in poverty of any form of public assistance. “They thought it was impossible to reduce welfare,” Giuliani claimed in an essay; “I removed 640,000 p ­ eople from the welfare rolls” (2007, 12). State senator Liz Kruger said of Giuliani’s welfare policies, “The data show that he moved them off of welfare, but he did not move them out of poverty. The easiest t­ hing in the world to do is close a welfare case. The question is what happened to the ­house­hold when you closed their welfare case. Many ended up not being able to



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pay their rent, putting themselves at greater risk for eviction and homelessness” (quoted in Toy 1998). As a press release from the Office of Mayor Bloomberg notes, “The average increase in poverty in the nation’s other major cities has been 36 ­percent. And across the ­whole nation, the increase has been 28 ­percent. H ­ ere in New York City—­zero. And that’s a­ fter . . . ​the deepest national recession since the ­Great Depression.” He added, “How have we done it? By focusing on the areas that are directly related to poverty, including education, housing, health, employment and crime” (Bloomberg 2013c). On the plus side, in a profile of Bloomberg in Esquire magazine, Joel Berg, head of the New York City Co­ali­tion Against Hunger, noted that “at least Bloomberg admitted that poverty was a prob­lem,” adding, “­Don’t forget his ‘greenmarket’ program to bring fresh food into the ghetto.” And Tony Butler of Bread & Life Mission in Brooklyn noted that Bloomberg “has a good focus on financial education for the poor.” He also appreciated “the new rule allowing ­people to apply for food stamps at outreach facilities like Bread & Life instead of schlepping downtown” (J. H. Richardson 2011). Yet even though Bloomberg was acknowledged as not actually hostile t­ oward the poor, he still left many with the impression that he did not care about this issue—­despite the creation of vibrant programs ­under the CEO to help ­people escape poverty. ­There are several reasons Bloomberg did not get the credit he deserved.

Most Center for Economic Opportunity Programs Remained Pi­lots Only The CEO led the way in innovative and rigorous ways to end poverty, but most of the pi­lot programs that ­were successful had no way to scale up. As Thomas Gais and colleagues explain, “Some officials in city government, and some advocates, believe CEO’s programs are too small to make real pro­gress in reducing poverty. . . . ​ ‘Scaling up’ successful programs does not always happen, meaning that many effective programs still reach only a small share of the total population that would benefit from the programs’ implementation. CEO has not fully overcome the difficulties in changing the major investments and operations of large city bureaucracies” (2014, ix). Bloomberg chose instead to cut city agency positions for several years, particularly ­after the 2008 recession (see chapter 3). Thus, even if agencies wanted to implement the pi­lot programs on a large scale, they ­were unable to do so. When the mayor received an award from Harvard for the Center for Economic Opportunity, Joel Berg, executive director of the New York City’s Co­ali­tion Against Hunger, said the award was “mostly undeserved. . . . ​If NYC had a police department or a fire

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department that helped less than half of one ­percent of ­people in need, ­those commissioners would be replaced by noon. . . . ​The only reason that the city gets any credit for its poverty efforts is that the standards of our elites when it comes to fighting poverty are so abysmally, absurdly low” (2012). The pi­lot programs developed by the CEO showed promise, but the city had millions of residents in poverty, and the programs ­were far too small to meet the need.

WeCare The HRA is the city agency responsible for implementing policies around welfare and food stamps. Verna Eggleston, commissioner of the HRA from 2002 to 2007, established WeCare to prepare the “55 ­percent of current welfare recipients who w ­ ere completely or partially unable to work” to find employment (Chan 2007). “Eggleston reported in October 2006 that 45,543 WeCare participants had been deemed employable with limitations but that only twenty-­five hundred of them had actually obtained an unsubsidized job” (Chan 2007). Yet given the multitude of prob­lems each welfare recipient had in WeCare, perhaps it worked just fine. WeCare recipients who did not find work w ­ ere ­those who ­were too sick to work. Many poverty advocates thought Eggleston was far better than the commissioners during the Giuliani administration. “That was an administration that was dedicated to not even letting ­people apply for assistance,” explains Don Friedman, a se­nior policy analyst at the Community Ser­v ice Society of New York. “The edge was softened considerably ­under her administration” (quoted in Loew 2007).

Denying Poor ­People Welfare Bloomberg continued the Giuliani administration’s policy of denying applications for public assistance. When Robert Doar took over in 2007, he continued to insist that welfare recipients work. The mantra of the Bloomberg welfare program was to “nurture a job-­producing economy and require work in welfare, but also reward work with earnings supplements that make wages go further” (Doar 2014). Although ­those are successful sound bites, the real­ity is that thousands of deserving ­people ­were denied welfare during the Bloomberg administration (see t­ able 7.2). The next mayor, Bill de Blasio, promptly overturned this policy. “In an average month, more than seventeen thousand HRA clients w ­ ere in sanction status, meaning that their benefits had been reduced or terminated due to an alleged failure to comply with work requirements” (testimony of the L ­ egal Aid Society, in NYS Senate 2015, 956). “Too often the sanction pro­cess was initiated without attention to the under­lying facts and circumstances” (956). This lack



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­TABLE 7.2  Trends in temporary assistance (welfare) in New York State and New York City: FY 2002–­FY 2014 FY 2002

FY 2013

FY 2002–13

NYS

NYC

NYS

NYC

Applications approved

347,564

256,912

366,844

253,638

5.5%

−1.3%

Applications denied

278,492

89,562

298,483

158,317

7.2%

76.8%

Case closings

341,170

229,457

327,917

192,497

−3.9%

−16.1%

22,457

15,329

29,620

20,571

31.9%

34.2%

Sanctions

NYS

NYC

Source: All statistics from annual report on New York State temporary assistance programs: New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, 2002–13.

of concern was born out by the number of sanctions ­later found to be unjustified. The L ­ egal Aid Society has testified that “the sanctions threatened and imposed against New York City residents often prove to be baseless only ­after a costly Fair Hearing is requested and often prepared for by the City and the State. Of the State Fair Hearings requested by City residents, approximately 70 ­percent ­were favorably resolved (reversed, settled, correct when made and withdrawn). In contrast, the withdrawal rate in the rest of the State was about half that, or 29%” (NYC Bar 2013, 49). “The high sanction rate, coupled with the high rate at which sanctions are resolved at State Fair Hearings, suggests that ­those sanctions ­were wrongly imposed in the first place or at the very least could have been prevented” (testimony of the L ­ egal Aid Society, in NYS Senate 2015, 57). What is not well known is that the city received help in the form of a state law and regulation that required sanctions for public welfare recipients who failed to meet work requirements. This state law was not eased ­until 2015 during the de Blasio administration (Cuomo 2015). In 2015 Governor Cuomo signed a bill that created a conciliation pro­cess that enabled welfare recipients to reengage with work requirements before being sanctioned (Cuomo 2015). Again, Bloomberg’s administration followed state law when it sanctioned welfare recipients, and that state law was changed only ­after Bloomberg left office.

Withholding the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program from Adults without Dependents Although SNAP card distribution did increase, the mayor refused to extend the cards to adults without dependents. Bloomberg did not join all other social ser­ vices districts in New York State and forty-­three other states that began to accept

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the federal SNAP card waiver for adults without dependents who ­were unemployed or underemployed. Steven Banks pointed out that “in addition to providing federal assistance to address hunger, this policy change provides an economic benefit when this federal assistance is spent in neighborhoods in all five boroughs and averts unnecessary fair hearings resulting from hard-­to-­administer rules that have applied in the absence of this waiver” (2014, 8).

Allowing Center 71 to Deny Applicants Welfare Mayor Giuliani had set up the notorious Center 71, and the Bloomberg administration did not dismantle it (Banks 2014). In many instances, sanctions against a welfare recipient resulted in a transfer to “Center 71, where HRA sent sanctioned families from all over the city” (Banks 2014). H ­ ere poor ­people ­were subjected “to increased eligibility call-­ins, and a ‘demonstrated compliance’ program required ten consecutive daily appointments to endure lectures and engage in make-­ work activities in order to have public assistance benefits reinstated” (Banks 2014). Clients who missed appointments w ­ ere required to begin again, “continuing the cycle of hardship and leading to more unnecessary appointments; many clients w ­ ere transferred to Center 71 per the HRA’s Overcrowding Action Plan (Banks 2014). Center 71 would be closed ­under Mayor de Blasio (Banks 2014).

The HIV/AIDS Ser­vice Administration The Bloomberg administration proposed bud­get cuts to the HIV/AIDS Ser­v ice Administration (HASA), a division of the HRA. “HASA provided an array of welfare aid, including housing assistance, to approximately thirty thousand lower-­ income New Yorkers with HIV/AIDS, as well as fifteen thousand of their ­family members” (Ryan 2003). “A Gay City News special investigation found that the agency had wasted millions of taxpayer dollars on exorbitant rents to h ­ ouse clients in “medically inappropriate” single-­room-­occupancy ­hotels (Ryan 2003). Furthermore, HASA suffered “from mismanagement that endangered the health and well-­being of its most needy clients,” according to the report (Ryan 2003). When the mayor sought to respond to t­ hese criticisms by restructuring the agency, contracting out its administration to nonprofits, the program’s clients protested. In another move that prompted criticism, Bloomberg wanted to change Local Law 49, which was enacted in 1997 to protect the rights of HASA clients and mandated case management ratios (Ryan 2003).



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A Lack of Investment in Social Ser­vices Whereas Mayor Giuliani had dramatically cut full-­time social ser­v ices positions, Mayor Bloomberg had a mixed rec­ord in this area. See ­table 7.3 for a comparison of staffing levels ­under the two mayors. Bloomberg invested in the Department of Homeless Ser­vices ­because ­these expenditures w ­ ere court mandated. Other than that, few increases in spending occurred. The innovative programs implemented in the DFTA meant that more positions ­were allocated in this agency during Bloomberg’s third term, but they did not offset the losses during his first two terms. Overall, ­there was a small net loss of positions across all social ser­v ices during Bloomberg’s three terms. As can be seen in ­table 7.3, during Bloomberg’s terms of office, staffing was reduced in the ACS, which oversaw the placement of foster c­ hildren, served ­children in the juvenile justice system, and provided subsidized childcare. Yet the ACS was successful in gaining more placements of foster ­children, and the number of c­ hildren in foster care was greatly reduced during Bloomberg’s tenure.

TABLE 7.3  Full-­time positions in social ser­vices ­under Mayors Bloomberg and Giuliani BLOOMBERG

GIULIANI

POSITIONS

2013

2002

Administration for ­Children’s Ser­vices

6,018

7,525

−20.0%

7,525

—­

Department of Social Ser­vices

13,780

12,349

11.6%

12,349

22,966

−46.2%

Department of Homeless Ser­vices

1,827

1,514

20.7%

1,514

3,047

−50.3%

Department of Juvenile Justice

—­

734

734

626

17.3%

Department for the Aging

285

395

−27.8%

395

336

17.6%

Department of Youth and Community Development

355

217

63.6%

217

123

76.4%

22,265

22,734

−2.1%

22,734

27,098

−16.1%

Total social ser­vices

% CHANGE

2002

1994

% CHANGE

Source: NYC Office of the Comptroller 1994, 2002, and 2013. Note: The Department of Juvenile Justice was integrated into the Administration for C ­ hildren’s Ser­vices (ACS). ACS was created out of the Department of Social Ser­vices.

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Thus, it is pos­si­ble that the reduced number of ­children needing ser­vices accounts for some of the reduction in staffing.

Loss in Childcare Slots EarlyLearn NYC remains a terrific idea with laudable goals. It was also a valuable illustration of the detailed planning that the Bloomberg administration conducted. Yet ­there ­were unintended consequences. The administration reduced the number of childcare slots in the city; from 2006 to 2012, the number of slots fell from 116,355 to 95,977 (see t­ able 7.4). ­There ­were several prob­lems with EarlyLearn NYC. First, the program was not phased in. Instead of experimenting with several districts or one borough, the administration went citywide and had no time to work out the kinks. Second, EarlyLearn did “not choose existing providers—­they chose odd agencies; they could have done a much better job. They did not visit the nonprofits; they just read proposals. The goal was glorious but not the result” (Nancy Kolben, pers. comm., 2019). The ACS graded the day care centers to award new contracts, and “many ­TABLE 7.4  New York City child care enrollment has declined 2006 AVERAGE

2012 AVERAGE

CHANGE

40,077

28,148

(11,929)

12,355

11,632

(723)

6,721

4,417

(2,304)

59,153

44,197

(14,956)

8,621

14,496

5,875

6,802

15,249

8,447

 Informal

41,779

22,035

(19,744)

Total enrollment

57,202

51,780

(5,422)

(6,054)

 

LOW-­INCOME

Center-­based  ­Family and group ­family  Informal Total enrollment

 

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

Center-­based  ­Family and group ­family

 

COMBINED LOW-­INCOME AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

48,698

42,644

 ­Family and group ­family

Center-­based

19,157

26,881

7,724

 Informal

48,500

26,452

(22,048)

116,355

95,977

(20,378)

Total enrollment

Source: Biscone 2012. Note: The figures for 2006 and 2012 are averages of monthly figures for that fiscal year; t­hese numbers do not include Head Start enrollment.



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day care centers in Hispanic, Asian, and African American communities received low scores and would have been shut down had the city council not balked at the cuts. The Campaign for ­Children fi­nally got city council agreement to fund nearly $100 million of child care and $50 million of afterschool programming for one year” (Gelatt and Sandstrom 2014). But this was not sufficient to stop all the cuts. Third, the Bloomberg administration projected cuts in the EarlyLearn bud­get for 2012, but the city council provided additional funding to save the program from the cuts (Kolben, pers. comm., 2019). Fourth, providers w ­ ere required to match 6.7 ­percent of EarlyLearn funds, and reimbursement was based on enrollment rather than capacity. Small providers had difficulty meeting such requirements; large providers had more resources to raise additional funds. Bloomberg’s successor, Bill De Blasio, reversed this policy and funded centers based on their capacity. Fifth, pay disparities among teachers in the dif­fer­ent programs created incentives for teachers in the EarlyLearn nonprofits to leave to teach in DOE programs. It meant that the childcare system was left with the lowest paid teachers. In addition, parents would often use childcare providers rather than the DOE programs ­because the childcare programs operated all day, ­until 5:00 or 6:00 P.M., while DOE programs ended at 3:00 P.M. Sixth, the finances w ­ ere tricky. Although a tax credit provided families with some relief, New York City’s tax credit differed from the federal and state credits. In the federal and state system, ­there was no income cap, and expenses ­were covered for ­children up to twelve years of age. In the city’s program, on the other hand, only families making less than $30,000 per year could get the tax credit, and expenses for ­children up to three years of age. Lastly, since 60 ­percent of the preschool childcare parents w ­ ere using vouchers, their ­children ­were untouched by the educational benefits of EarlyLearn. In summary, EarlyLearn NYC sought to improve the education of c­ hildren in childcare, but the implementation of the program resulted in fewer slots even though the city council provided additional funding to alleviate part of the impact. Parents found the reor­ga­ni­za­tion incredibly disruptive and confusing. Yet the EarlyLearn program resulted in better-­qualified staff and better programming.

Failure to Redesign and Fund the Advantage New York Program for the Homeless As was discussed in chapter 5 on homelessness, Mayor Bloomberg ended the use of Section 8 vouchers for the homeless and instead developed Housing Stability Plus, a ­limited five-­year program that would provide incentives for the homeless to

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become self-­sufficient. When that program did not reduce the number of p ­ eople in shelters, the Bloomberg administration created the Advantage New York program, which was funded by federal, state, and local government. The program helped the homeless—­mostly homeless families—­leave city shelters by providing temporary rent subsidies for two years. The mayor ended this program, however, ­after the state eliminated its share of funding, in turn ending federal participation. All in all, the cost was about $210 million in 2011, and the city’s share of the program’s cost was about $114 million (Turetsky 2013). Advocates for the homeless opposed the Advantage program ­because it offered assistance for such a l­imited time frame. The number of homeless ­people continued to rise, and stays in the shelter system increased in length ­after the city eliminated the program in 2011.

Management Style Mayor Bloomberg did not micromanage. His hands-­off approach worked well for areas about which he knew a g­ reat deal, such as economic development and health; but it was not a good management strategy to use for areas in which he had l­ittle knowledge, such as social ser­vices and education. One former commissioner said in confidence that Bloomberg was uncomfortable with social ser­vices; he simply did not understand this function of government. The mayor empowered his commissioners to innovate, and they sometimes did so to the detriment of his policies and his popularity—­and sometimes even without his knowledge. But he would back his commissioners, and this loyalty could sometimes be foolhardy.

The Mayor’s Inability to Compromise Bloomberg could sometimes be stubborn in defense of his beliefs, and this could have good and bad outcomes. T H E V ETO O F TH E C I TY C O U N C I L’ S S I C K L EAV E BI L L

In 2013 the city council passed a bill requiring employers to give workers paid sick leave, something that was championed by Speaker Christine Quinn. The mea­ sure would provide an estimated one million workers with up to five paid sick days annually (Moore 2013). Hundreds of thousands of o ­ thers would get unpaid sick leave, meaning they could not be fired for staying home if they w ­ ere ill. Bloomberg vetoed the bill ­because it would impose significant new costs on employers. He considered it bad for the city’s economy, claiming it would have “deleterious effects on businesses” (Moore 2013). The mayor argued that employers would cut other benefits to afford sick leave, and some might be discouraged from hir-



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ing additional workers. The mayor’s intransigence on this issue made many furious. The city council modified the bill in hopes that the mayor would accept some version of sick leave, but in the end he refused. The city council overrode his veto anyway. The strategy of playing hardball made sense, since it motivated the city council to alter the bill and made it less expensive in an effort to gain the mayor’s approval. One would think, however, that the mayor—­knowing that the city council would override his veto—­would accept the final compromise and move on, but he did not. T H E V ETO O F TH E C I TY C O U N C I L’ S M I NI M U M WAGE BI L L

In 2011 Bloomberg vetoed a minimum wage act and a prevailing wage bill. Again the city council passed t­hese acts over his veto. The minimum wage law would require employers who receive more than $1 million in taxpayer subsidies to pay their workers at least ten dollars an hour with benefits or $11.50 an hour without benefits. The prevailing wage law would increase wages to twenty dollars an hour for certain ser­v ice workers in buildings whose o ­ wners receive more than $1 million in subsidies or in which the city leased a certain amount of space. As Mayor Bloomberg explained his vetoes, “The way to raise wages and salaries is not for government to impose legislative mandates. It is for government to foster broad-­ based economic growth that gives ­people opportunities to climb up the economic ladder. That is what we have been working so hard to do over the last ten years, and why w ­ e’ve not only created jobs that have produced rec­ord levels of employment, w ­ e’ve invested in programs that help ­people learn the skills they need to advance and earn promotions” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012c). But a few months ­earlier the mayor had supported an increase in the living wage at the state level: “While we would prefer the federal government to act to keep us competitive, this year we w ­ ill join Speaker Shelly Silver in pushing for a responsible raise in the minimum wage” (quoted in Taylor and Kaplan 2012). The mayor’s point was that if the city raised the minimum wage by itself, without the state and the nation also raising it, then the city would be at a disadvantage in trying to attract businesses.

Disastrous Public Comments Bloomberg’s willingness to insult the voters was legend, and over his three terms in office, the mayor seemed to increase the frequency of disparaging remarks. ­After the New York Times published an emotional, five-­part series on a homeless eleven-­year-­old girl named Dasani who was growing up with her parents in a horrible city shelter, Bloomberg did not say he would immediately renovate the shelter.

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Instead he said, “This kid was dealt a bad hand. I ­don’t know quite why. That’s just the way God works. Sometimes, some of us are lucky, and some of us are not” (quoted in Campbell and Barkan 2013). Many New Yorkers found his comments offensive. Any other politician would deplore the conditions in the shelter and immediately set about renovating the building, as well as taking a personal interest in Dasani’s plight, but Bloomberg refused to address the dismal conditions in the temporary shelter. On his weekly radio show, he once said about parents who w ­ ere protesting the closing of their low-­performing schools, “Unfortunately ­there are some parents who just come from—­they never had a formal education, and they ­don’t understand the value of education” (quoted in Santos 2012). Parents strongly objected to his characterization of their interest in their c­ hildren’s education.

Chapter Summar y The Bloomberg administration identified promising practices to eliminate poverty and developed innovative programs, funding most on a small scale. Sometimes ­these programs, such as the Young Men’s Initiative, ­were highly successful. T ­ hese innovative programs all had two features in common: all w ­ ere data driven, and all underwent rigorous evaluation. The Nelson A. Rocke­fel­ler Institute of Government’s evaluation of the CEO noted that the center “creates an alternative policy pro­cess within city government—­a pro­cess more accommodating than typical government pro­cesses to innovation, rigorous evaluation, cross-­agency cooperation, and evidence-­based choice. That is, rather than trying to inject innovation, evidence, and integrated problem-­solving into traditional government procedures, CEO constituted a new type of entity and set of pro­cesses to perform ­these functions. The products of ­these processes—­innovative and tested programs—­are then made available to be picked up and expanded by city agencies and diffused to other governments through a variety of dissemination activities, including replications in other cities” (Gais et al. 2014, 7). If ­these programs had been implemented by a liberal mayor, many policy wonks would have praised that mayor, but the policy wonks continually criticized Mayor Bloomberg for ignoring the plight of the poor and embracing the rich. This criticism came about not just ­because of his policies but ­because of his public remarks about poor ­people. Throughout his mayoralty, Bloomberg alienated potential supporters with his words. This comment he made late in his third term about raising taxes, reminding New Yorkers who footed the tax bill, was typical: “Well, if you want to drive



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out the 1 ­percent of the ­people that pay roughly 50 ­percent of the taxes, or the 10 ­percent of the ­people that pay 70-­odd ­percent of the taxes, that’s as good a strategy as I know. That’s exactly the way to do it, and then our revenue would go away, and we w ­ ouldn’t be able to have cops to keep us safe, firefighters to rescue us, teachers to educate our kids” (HuffPost 2012). Comments such as ­these elicited derision from liberals. When the mayor was proud of the slight decrease in the proportion of t­ hose in poverty, Joel Berg, executive director of the New York City Co­ali­tion Against Hunger, commented, “a growing number of poor homeless ­people ­were not counted,” and he predicted that the overall poverty rate would rise next year. Besides, he said, “I ­don’t think a million and a half ­people in poverty is a ­great victory” (Roberts 2009). When Berg was asked what Mayor Bloomberg was ­doing right and what he was ­doing wrong, he answered, “Generally he is ­doing right with most ­things relating to public health and generally d ­ oing wrong with most t­hings relating to poverty. . . . ​ The main reason ­behind poverty is in­equality of wealth and lack of economic opportunity. The mayor has done nothing to address that” (Piccone 2011). But Bloomberg’s response was to point to one of his favorite statistics: “Out of the 20 largest American cities, New York was the only one that ­hasn’t seen a boost in its poverty rate since 2000” (quoted in E. Pearson 2013). Bloomberg failed to keep the voters’ confidence that he could mitigate the prob­lem of poverty. His public relations failure was due to his unwillingness to compromise and his inability to admit that an error needed to be corrected. B ­ ecause of his management style, the public often perceived him as not caring about the poor, despite the evidence-­based programs he fostered. “Yet,” Jonathan Bowles asserts, “­under Bloomberg, the city has launched several groundbreaking social programs that have produced impressive results or demonstrated significant promise, including the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO), the Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE) and the Young Men’s Initiative (YMI). The administration also pioneered new approaches to social policy, including a greater emphasis on evidence and data, more interagency collaborations, and a dramatic expansion of efforts to leverage private resources” (2013). The unfortunate part of this story is that so much of what the mayor began at the CEO was incredibly useful, but b ­ ecause he did not take most of the programs to scale and his policies around welfare w ­ ere conservative, he did not get credit for what he did accomplish. Berg said it all: “It’s strange ­because his instincts on other ­things are so good. . . . ​On guns, on religious tolerance, on immigration, he’s ­great. But on poverty, he has a blind spot” (quoted in J. H. Richardson 2011). ­Whether critics are conservative or liberal, they cannot deny that the mayor had several successes in fighting poverty:

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• He created an environment that fostered some of the most innovative programs in the country to try to move p ­ eople out of poverty. • His technology advances meant welfare recipients ­were saved time and countless visits through improved rec­ord keeping; paperwork was reduced and the procurement pro­cess simplified and standardized. • He did keep poverty low in New York City relative to other cities (Gibbs and Doar 2016b). • ­Today his innovative programs continue to be duplicated in other cities. Bloomberg’s views ­were clear. He believed that poverty could be fought through education: “Let’s start with education—­because that’s where fighting poverty ­really begins. You ­can’t break the cycle of poverty without giving ­children a top-­ quality education that challenges them to be their best and prepares them to pursue their dreams.” And, as regards jobs, he added, “The best antipoverty program ever is: A job. And ­we’ve created jobs for ­people on all rungs of the economic ladder, outpacing the nation in job growth in the pro­cess. Our city has gained back more than 300 ­percent of jobs lost during the national recession and ­there are more private sector jobs h ­ ere than ever before” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013d). But Bloomberg failed in several re­spects: • He cut social ser­v ice agency bud­gets, curtailing ser­v ices to vulnerable populations. • He seemed reluctant to tackle welfare programs with the same ingenuity that he applied to the CEO. • He was unwilling to step in with agency heads when their efforts at innovation ­were problematic, such as when the EarlyLearn NYC program reduced the number of childcare slots. • He expressed an astonishing lack of empathy ­toward ­people in poverty. ­These issues ­were problematic throughout his mayoralty. Lastly, the devastating role of the federal and state governments must be included. State funding for welfare assistance was reduced 56 ­percent during Bloomberg’s administration; federal government reduced welfare assistance 6 ­percent (see ­table 7.1). Constant cuts to federal TANF funds and state funds meant that the city had to make up the difference. Any shifts at the state and federal levels can make a big difference in the city. Too late for Bloomberg, the state enacted a minimum wage of fifteen dollars an hour in 2016 to be phased in by 2021. As James Parrott, the director of economic and fiscal policies at the New School’s Center for New York City Affairs, has commented, “My informed sense is that the rise in the minimum wage is the biggest f­ actor ­because it affects one-­third of



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all New York City workers, and it has more than doubled in the past five years. . . . ​ And data from other sources . . . ​show unpre­ce­dented wage gains for the lowest-­ paid third of the workforce” (quoted in Anuta 2019). So with one act of the state legislature, poverty in New York City was reduced from over 20 ­percent in 2013 to 17 ­percent in 2018 (Anuta 2019).

8 SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN EDUCATION REFORM

Michael Bloomberg knew a g­ reat deal about public health. When he became mayor, he recruited the best public health man­ag­er in the nation, Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, and made him commissioner of the New York City Department of Health and ­Mental Hygiene. In contrast, Bloomberg knew ­little about the city’s educational system and the Department of Education (DOE). When he became mayor, he did not seek out a nationally recognized highly qualified educator; instead he hired Joel Klein, an antitrust litigator (Elwick 2014, 6). A ­ fter he forced Klein out in 2011, Bloomberg made the disastrous appointment of Cathie Black, a publishing executive, who had no experience in education and lasted ninety-­five days. He had qualified alternatives, such as his deputy chancellor for school support and instruction, Eric Nadelstern, or his deputy chancellor for per­for­mance and accountability, Shael Polakow-­Suransky, both of whom had proven track rec­ords, ­were knowledgeable about the city’s school system, and had led the education innovation at the DOE. But Bloomberg insisted on looking beyond the education arena. So much for data-­driven decision making. It would not have occurred to the mayor to hire someone who knew nothing about public health for the New York City Department of Health and M ­ ental Hygiene, yet he hired a man­ag­er who knew nothing about education to manage the nation’s largest education system. This decision so lacks fundamental logic that it is difficult to understand. The reason it made sense to the mayor was that a market-­based ideology had infiltrated educational policy since the years of President Ronald Reagan. Bloomberg believed in the market-­based reforms that w ­ ere 200



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sweeping the country—­charter schools, school choice, high-­stakes testing, holding teachers accountable for student achievement, and closing failing public schools. ­These reforms spoke to the mayor as a business person, and heading up education in New York City, he wanted a believer in market-­based reforms, not an educator steeped in conventional philosophies. To understand the wave of reform that so appealed to Bloomberg, we need to understand where it started. Market-­based reforms grew out of the school reform movement that began in 1983 with the publication of A Nation at Risk (US National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). This was a po­liti­cal document issued by the commission, “a group convened by Ronald Reagan’s secretary of education, Terrell Bell” (Ansary 2007). A Nation at Risk was in many ways a disaster for this country; its claim that the United States was falling ­behind other nations was based on incorrect data comparing US educational statistics to ­those of other countries in which a far smaller proportion of students attended secondary school (Ansary 2007; Rothstein 2008a). The report claimed that SAT scores ­were falling; it failed to point out that a larger proportion of secondary students ­were taking the SAT and, thus, as less academically capable students w ­ ere taking the test, overall scores would, of course, decline (Ansary 2007; Rothstein 2008a). The Sandia Report is a compelling rebuttal to A Nation at Risk. “In 1990 Admiral James Watkins, the secretary of energy, commissioned the Sandia Laboratories in New Mexico to document” the claims of decline made in A Nation at Risk with solid data (Ansary 2007). But the Sandia Report found the opposite: “To our surprise, on nearly e­ very mea­sure, we found steady or slightly improving trends” (quoted in Ansary 2007). The government buried the report. The attack on schools was prompted by a changing economic environment in which Amer­i­ca had to compete against the growing economic might of China, Eu­ rope, and Japan. When the United States began falling short in the 1970s and 1980s, instead of seeking to better understand our economic institutions, our leaders declared the answer to be better education of the workforce. The schools w ­ ere not the prob­lem, however; the prob­lem was that the economic landscape had changed. Amer­i­ca was losing its manufacturing base for two major reasons. First, technology was replacing workers at a very fast clip. Certainly, “productivity growth has been the largest contributor to job displacement over the past several de­cades” as fewer workers produced more products (Hicks and Devaraj 2015, 7). Second, due to improved technology, capital could easily be offshored to employ less educated, cheaper workforces to produce manufactured products. “The propensity of U.S. multinational companies to move production to foreign affiliates rather than to export from the United States has been tied to weak export growth, expansion of the trade deficit, and anemic hiring in domestic manufacturing” (House­man 2014).

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Conservative thinkers and politicians, and organ­izations, such as the US Chamber of Commerce, did not acknowledge t­ hese prob­lems, saying instead that we needed a better educated workforce (National Education Policy Center 2002). According to this line of thought, our economic prob­lems, including the loss of many blue-­ collar jobs and the uncertain economic f­utures faced by many families, w ­ ere the fault of the schools (Rothstein 2008b). Poverty increased dramatically in the Reagan years: in 1973 the poverty rate for t­hose ­people below 125 ­percent of the poverty level was 15.8 ­percent, thanks to President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty—­the lowest it had been since 1959, when it was 31.1 ­percent. During the Reagan years it climbed back up to 20.3 ­percent in 1983. In 2014 the poverty rate was 19.4 ­percent (US Bureau of the Census 2020). To demand that the schools be responsible for educating ­children in poverty ignores the complicated circumstances of families in poverty. It is easier to blame the school system then it is to fix the economy (Rothstein 2008b). President George W. Bush continued the theme of “fix the schools” by signing the No Child Left B ­ ehind Act in 2001. This law, which had bipartisan support, called for common standards and the closing of failing schools. It had a devastating effect on schools as all fifty states proceeded to implement many untested reforms in elementary and secondary education that resulted in teachers leaving the system, c­ hildren taking numerous standardized tests (to no purpose), and countless schools closing (Rothstein 2008b). Richard Rothstein of the Economic Policy Institute said it best, noting that A Nation at Risk was flawed in three ways: “(1) it claimed that student per­for­mance was declining, but it was not; (2) it claimed that the nation’s economic prob­lems ­were the fault of the schools, and they ­were not; and (3) it ignored the social and economic conditions” of students that can have a positive or negative effect on learning (2008a). Rothstein further stated that A Nation at Risk’s “irresponsible and out-­of-­proportion condemnation of public schools led to a quarter-­century frenzy of ill-­considered reforms, culminating in the No Child Left ­Behind law” (Rothstein 2008b). During this time of ill-­conceived changes in educational policy on the national stage, Bloomberg became a mayor with a focus on education: “As the global economy continues to move from one driven by manual l­abor to one driven by knowledge and ideas, we have to move with it—as a m ­ atter of fact, we have to lead that change. And the ­simple fact is we cannot do that without outstanding public schools” (Bloomberg 2012b). Embracing the trend of market-­based thinking, he talked to very few educators; rather, he spoke to ­those similar to himself. Like many reformers, Bloomberg believed he knew best. This is not to say that the mayor got every­thing wrong. We cannot simply throw up our hands and say it is useless to fix the schools in the inner city since



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so many ­children come from poverty. We need to tackle both poverty and education reform. Indeed, Bloomberg tackled education like he tackled poverty, by exploring unconventional options to see w ­ hether they would work. Yet, unlike his experiments on poverty—­which for the most part remained just that, experiments—­his changes to education policy w ­ ere taken to scale. Although some of the mayor’s changes ­were major failures, some of his policies ­were quite successful and pushed an educational system that did not change easily in a positive direction.

Organ­i zing the System In 2014, the New York City public school system was huge, with over one million students, over eigh­teen hundred schools, over seventy-­five thousand teachers, and a $21 billion bud­get (NYC Office of Operations 2014, 179). As discussed in chapter 2, Bloomberg was passionate about improving the education system. In the first year, he convinced the state legislature and governor to centralize education ­under the mayor rather than continue a decentralized system with a separate board of education. ­Because of this state law, Bloomberg had control. David Bloomfield, a professor at Brooklyn College and the Gradu­ate Center of the City University, explained that the city council has l­ittle oversight over the DOE. Bloomfield pointed out “the law as written views the city’s education department as a single school district ­under the aegis of the state education department, which, in turn, grants the mayor the right to appoint a chancellor and set a bud­get. That means council members ­can’t pass laws governing education policy like they can for transportation or the police” (Barkan 2019). ­After gaining control of the system, Bloomberg moved the education headquarters from Brooklyn to Tweed Court­house directly ­behind City Hall. He also named Joel Klein chancellor, as discussed in chapter 2.

The First Reor­ga­ni­za­tion: Centralizing the System The mayor and Chancellor Klein announced their plan to reform the educational system, the ­Children’s First Initiative, in December 2002. The plan had four goals: 1. The mayor and chancellor wanted a strong public-­private partnership to support initiatives. To this end, their Leadership Acad­emy for principals was privately funded, they encouraged relationships between corporations and schools, and they raised millions of dollars in private funds. 2. They wanted to end teacher tenure and base pay raises on performance—­a highly unpop­ul­ar initiative in a ­union town.

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3. They wanted to redesign learning by putting cutting-­edge technology in classrooms that tailored lesson plans to individual learning needs. 4. They wanted to create “200 new schools over the next three years—­ including 100 new charter schools” (Bloomberg 2010b). The mayor and chancellor ­were bringing in private-­sector money and ideas to redesign the school system. They would promote school choice by increasing the number of charter schools, and they would hold public schools—­and, in par­ tic­ul­ar, teachers—­more accountable for student achievement. To achieve ­these goals the mayor negotiated with the governor and the New York State legislature to gain complete control of the city’s school system from the state (Gewertz 2002). For years the school system had been a fiefdom of thirty-­two community school districts, as well as large divisions managing high schools and special education. The state legislature replaced this fragmented system with a chancellor hired by the mayor and the thirteen-­member Panel for Educational Policy dominated by the mayor, who appointed the majority of the panel’s members. If members disagreed with an educational policy, the mayor simply dismissed them (Gotham Gazette 2004). The chancellor hired private con­sul­tants to help with planning. Among t­ hese “experts,” educators ­were few and far between. As Daniel Voloch notes, “The planning for the ­Children First initiative was funded by $4 million in private philanthropic funds, half of which, according to Reckhow [Research Group], came from venture philanthropist, Eli Broad, who boasted, ‘From the first day Joel Klein took office, literally, we met with him’ ” (2015, 6). Eli Broad, cited in Fortune as one of seven most power­ful philanthropists, advocated for school choice and funded charter schools. The planning for C ­ hildren First was contracted out to McKinsey and Com­pany, one of the largest management consulting companies in the world. According to Voloch, “Reckhow notes that ­there are very few publicly available documents on the ­Children First planning pro­cess and quotes ‘news coverage which reported that aside from five open parent meetings, the plan has come together in long private meetings’ ” (2015, 6). Although numerous groups w ­ ere formed to explore vari­ous aspects of the school system, the planning was kept in the hands of a small group of con­sul­tants and philanthropists around the chancellor. To achieve the announced goals, Klein reor­ga­nized the schools into a highly centralized system, with one reading and one math program for all elementary schools (Fruchter and McAlister 2008, 4). With the abolition of community school boards, the school system was divided into ten instructional regions and six support regions. Of course, since the support regions, responsible for contracts and finance, ­were separate from the instructional regions, school principals ended up



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constantly g­ oing back and forth between the two (Fruchter and McAlister 2008, 4). The chancellor wanted to keep the instructional regions from becoming too power­ful, but at the same time, school principals had to constantly negotiate instruction and bud­get separately. If principals visited the regional office to seek instructional ser­v ices, they often found that the issue could not be resolved without visiting the support center miles from the regional office. It was an administrative nightmare for school principals, who ­were constantly bounced between the two orga­nizational structures when seeking guidance or solutions to prob­ lems (Fruchter and McAlister 2008, 5). In 2004 Klein hired Eric Nadelstern, a deputy superintendent in the Bronx. Nadelstern, a highly successful principal of an alternative school before cofounding Bronx International High School, had years of experience in developing small schools. Shael Polakow-­Suransky, who had cofounded Bronx International High School with Nadelstern, also joined the central administration, becoming the deputy chancellor for the Office of New Schools and then deputy chancellor for per­ for­mance and accountability. Nadelstern came to central administration with the idea of promoting an “autonomy zone.” Principals who wished could apply to be in the autonomy zone, which would be a network of schools in which the principals would be left alone as long as they met their per­for­mance targets; ­there would be no curriculum mandates and no looking over the principal’s shoulder (Nadelstern 2013, 16). Klein ­adopted his idea, and Nadelstern became chief executive of the autonomy zone. “In the first year, ­there w ­ ere twenty-­nine schools in the zone,” noted Clara Hemphill and colleagues. “In the second, t­here ­were forty-­eight. By the third year, ­there ­were 321” (2010). Enacting the autonomy zone resulted in some successes, which in turn led to the second reor­ga­ni­za­tion.

The Second Reor­ga­ni­za­tion: The Decentralization of the System In 2007 Chancellor Klein announced that the second phase of the reor­ga­ni­za­tion would take place (Voloch 2015, 7). It would be based on what Nadelstern had accomplished with the autonomy zone. In effect, Klein completely reversed himself: accountability and decision making w ­ ere to be devolved to schools, supposedly with no more centralization. The reforms that Klein now introduced ­were intended to provide schools with flexibility, yet while holding them more accountable. One key ingredient was per­for­mance contracts for principals. In addition, data-­driven decision making would result in schools being given grades on report cards. Lastly, the mayor had negotiated a teachers’ contract, which gave principals more authority for teacher hiring and allowed school-­based bud­geting using a computer system already developed and in use named Galaxy.

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“The regions ­were disbanded, and ­every school leader was given the choice to affiliate with one of three types of school support organ­izations” (Childress et al. 2008, 4): 1. Empowerment support organ­izations (ESOs): The empowerment zone was converted into the ESO, and “additional schools could become empowerment schools by signing per­for­mance contracts and forming self-­managed networks” (Childress et al. 2008, 4). 2. Learning support organ­izations: “Most similar to the old regional structure but not or­ga­nized geo­graph­i­cally, four learning support organ­izations offered schools ser­v ice, support, and oversight through four centers run by the DOE” (Childress et al. 2008, 4). 3. Partnership support organ­izations (PSOs): “Schools that partnered with external nonprofit organ­izations for support and ser­vices ­were part of this structure and signed per­for­mance contracts. A number of schools w ­ ere already partnered with external organ­izations, and the new structure would formally give ­those organ­izations additional support responsibilities, hold them accountable for school results, and open up the option to additional schools and nonprofits. PSOs had the same level of autonomy granted to the school operators in the ESOs” (Childress et al. 2008, 4). In this reor­ga­ni­za­tion, masterminded by Nadelstern, the administration broke with the tradition of linking schools geo­graph­i­cally. This was an in­ter­est­ing idea. It gave principals choices about whom they would share ideas with and how they would purchase professional development resources. Of course, giving principals more authority in return for holding them accountable only worked if the principals truly had control. They did have more control in the sense that they could choose a network, and that network could provide a ­great deal of advice. Unfortunately, the school support organ­izations’ potential for success was undermined by grading schools with crude mea­sures of success, using a new financing model that distributed resources inequitably and created unintended consequences, and putting intense pressure on teachers to succeed in improving student achievement. The DOE changed the school allocation formulas in a scheme called Fair Student Funding (other­wise known as weighted student funding). As the DOE explained, this system was based on four guiding princi­ples: “School bud­geting should fund students fairly and adequately, while preserving stability at all schools; dif­fer­ent students have dif­fer­ent educational needs and funding levels should reflect t­hose needs as accurately as pos­si­ble; school leaders, not central offices, are best positioned to decide how to improve achievement; and school bud­gets should be as transparent as pos­si­ble so that funding decisions are vis­i­ble



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for all to see and evaluate” (quoted in Voloch 2015, 8). Thus, the new allocation formula was intended to fund the child, not the school. For many years before Mayor Bloomberg’s terms, schools had been funded through a formula that took into account a district’s average teacher salary. This meant that districts with more experienced teachers received more dollars ­because salary was dependent upon se­niority and certifications. Some districts received more funding than ­others, and the distribution of money looked inequitable. ­Under the old formula, of course, dollars bought only so many teachers, paraeducators, and ­others, and t­ hose numbers ­were equitable across districts ­because of staffing ratios and limits on class size. Thus, the dollars may not have been equitable, but the educational resources purchased for students had been fairly so. All this now changed. Another change occurred in the way school per­for­mance was managed. James Liebman from Columbia Law School joined the chancellor’s team as chief accountability officer, director of the DOE’s Division of Accountability and Achievement Resources. He was charged with creating a per­for­mance management system with rubrics that would be used to hold schools accountable for their results. In addition, he would design techniques for capacity building for schools that ­were not able to create robust structures by themselves. Liebman’s philosophy was “to provide ways for schools to build their capacity to be relatively self-­sufficient in evaluating themselves ­every day and in solving their unique per­for­mance prob­lems and, when necessary, in asking for the specific help they need” (quoted in Childress et al. 2008, 5). In effect, Liebman was developing each school as a learning organ­ization, a school in which “the professionals in them ­were constantly learning with one another about how to solve per­for­mance prob­ lems. Hence, accountability is about capacity building” (Childress and Clayton 2008, 5). Unfortunately, the Division of Accountability created a pro­gress report for each school with four major components (school environment, student achievement, student pro­gress, and closing the achievement gap), each of which would be graded from A to F and published, scores that upset many parents, teachers, and city council members (Haimson 2007). This model incorporated the idea of student pro­gress so that schools with high populations of disadvantaged students would not be penalized. The result was a model that “was one of the most complex grading systems in the country, which compared schools serving similar student populations and focused on how much pro­gress students made each year on exams—­not just their overall per­for­mance” (Hernandez 2013). T ­ hese letter grades ­were not well received, as many city residents felt that giving a grade to a school based mostly on test scores was too simplistic and “often resulted in large swings of grades from one year to another” (Childress et al. 2008, 11). ­These swings in grades indicated poorly designed mea­sures. The grades meant that

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grades ­were emphasized rather than the capacity building that might be ongoing in the schools. Liebman’s team designed an annual quality review, a pro­cess first promoted when community school districts (CSDs) w ­ ere in place. Tony Alvorado, superintendent of CSD 2, led quality review teams in evaluating ­every school in his district e­ very year. Copying his methods, by June 2007, “140 con­sul­tants had conducted ­these reviews across all 1,456 schools” (Childress et al. 2008, 5). In addition, Liebman implemented the concept of Inquiry Teams in each school. Derived from the work of Lizabeth Gewirtzman, a former CSD 2 educator who was by then teaching at Baruch College, an Inquiry Team consisted of the principal and three or four teachers; they would identify a struggling group of students and, using data from the systems being developed, create an instructional approach for ­those students (Gewirtzman, pers. comm., September 24, 2017). When a survey was conducted of all the schools about the Inquiry Teams, 85 ­percent of the respondents said they found the exercise useful and wished to continue it (Childress and Clayton 2008, 9).

The Third Reor­ga­ni­za­tion: Further Decentralization Joel Klein resigned in November 2010, forced out by an increasingly dissatisfied mayor. That year the city’s schools received terrible news: the New York State achievement test results w ­ ere quite poor. What had happened? Since 2003 reading and math achievement results had improved each year. This was ­great public relations for the mayor, who took credit for ­these increases in his 2007 State of the City Address: “The pro­gress ­we’ve made is strong and clear: On-­time graduation rates are now the highest t­ hey’ve been in more than twenty years; reading and math test scores have risen substantially. Our Black and Hispanic students are closing the racial and ethnic per­for­mance gap that has long been the shame of our school system” (Bloomberg 2007b). Diane Ravitch explained the results: “In 2006, significant numbers of New York City students scored at Level 1 (the lowest) and w ­ ere subject to retention. By 2009, very few students ­were at Level 1. . . . ​Why did the number of students at Level 1 plummet? ­Because the state lowered the bar and made it easier for students to reach Level 2. On the 6th-­grade reading test in 2006, students needed to earn 41 ­percent of the points to obtain a Level 2; by 2009, students in that grade needed only 17.1 ­percent” (Ravitch 2010, 79). In 2010, however, the New York State Education Department made the tests more difficult. The result was that test scores ­were dismal that year as they ­were across the state. Thus, Bloomberg and Klein now had much to explain to parents. In April 2010, in a clear signal of dissatisfaction with Klein, the mayor appointed Sharon L. Greenberger, a Bloomberg corporate operative, as the DOE’s



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chief operating officer, over Klein’s objections. But before he left, Klein reor­ga­ nized the school system one more time. In 2010, the administration established “sixty non-­geographic, self-­selected, self-­governing networks of twenty-­five to thirty schools each. Instead of proximity, the new networks [­were] based on common philosophies as determined by principals, allowing them to provide mutual support” (Nadelstern 2013, 3). Establishing the networks was the closest that New York City ever came to changing the fundamental structure of its school system. Fi­nally, instructional support and operational support w ­ ere combined: “The networks are managed by six ‘cluster leaders,’ one of whom oversees a few remaining School Support Organ­izations that are run by universities and nonprofits” (Hemphill et al. 2010, 24). Many ­people objected to the “nongeographic” organ­ization. In a report, the Annenberg Institute for School Reform asserted, “Autonomy, per se, is no guarantee of improved performance—it may work well for schools that already have high capacity, but is less successful for struggling schools. Even strong schools have many needs that are beyond their control, and many are under-­resourced” (Fruchter et al. 2015, 2). The question of autonomy was a serious one. In some ways, claiming that schools would have autonomy was a cruel joke. The u ­ nions had all sorts of working conditions written into their contracts, covering school staff from janitor to teacher to principal. At the same time, central administration remained dictatorial. The ability for a principal or a school-­based leadership team to follow their own ideas about teaching and school culture was definitely curtailed. If you asked a principal how long it took to get a contract for professional development through the system, the answer was eigh­teen months. If you asked a principal if he or she could reassign all the teachers in the school to cut class size, the answer was no (state regulations and ­union contracts forbid it). If you asked a principal how long it took to get air-­ conditioning into the classrooms, the answer was forever. In New York City, one-­ fourth of the classrooms—11,500 rooms—­were not air-­conditioned. Students ­were still forced to try to concentrate in ninety-­to one-­hundred-­degree heat from May through September (Ocasio 2017). With all the money spent during the Bloomberg administration, schools still existed without air-­conditioning; this continued u ­ nder the administration of the next mayor, Bill de Blasio. Another serious prob­lem was that the schools lost the buffer of community school districts. During the school autonomy period, schools ­were inundated with visits from the state education department, the comptrollers’ offices, politicians, and many other officials (anonymous, pers. comm., March 24, 2016). School district offices once had filtered t­hese requests for information and access, but no more. T ­ here was no administrative apparatus between the individual schools and the central headquarters of the state and city departments of education and, hence,

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between individual schools and countless outside agencies and monitors. The idea of autonomy falls short when it meets the sheer breadth of the New York City system: over seventy-­five thousand teachers, over a thousand schools, and billions of dollars. Add to this complexity a rigid state education department and an activist federal educational agency, and autonomy remains a dream. Three major reorganizations in nine years had an enormous impact. Early on, policymakers had warned the Bloomberg administration that major changes could affect school stability. Norm Fruchter, the director of the New York University Institute for Education and Social Policy, said he was surprised that city and state test scores did not plummet all around, given the magnitude of the transition: “The structural changes that ­were introduced in the system ­were so comprehensive and sweeping that they introduced an enormous amount of instability” (quoted in Gootman 2004). Fruchter was commenting about the first reor­ga­ni­ za­tion; then ­there ­were two more.

What W ­ ere the Results? Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure saw some successes in education, but ­there ­were also failures, and in some areas, ­things just did not change much. Some outcomes cannot be evaluated.

Successes In his January 2008 State of the City Address, Bloomberg “announced plans to create a task force that would focus on better preparing New York City high school students for technical ­careers” (Bloomberg 2008b). Such education had traditionally been seen as a dead end, but technical c­ areers offered a chance at financial security. The task force, The Mayoral Task Force on C ­ areer and Technical Education Innovation (CTE) made several recommendations to improve c­ areer and technical education (CTE): “stronger industry partnerships, higher graduation rates, and easier transfer of credits amongst programs” or between schools (Surico 2014a). The mayor created CTE schools focused on twenty-­first-­century skills. Polakow-­Suransky led this effort. Among t­ hese schools ­were • the Acad­emy of Software Engineering high school, which teaches coding and prepare ­children for ­careers in technology (Acad­emy for Software Engineering, n.d.); • a six-­year high school created in partnership with IBM and CUNY, Pathways in Technology Early College High School (P-­Tech), which was



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highlighted as a national model by President Barack Obama in a State of the Union Address (Ark 2020); and • a six-­year high school, Energy Tech, in partnership with two major utilities, Consolidated Edison and National Grid, that would prepare students for c­ areers in the energy industry and earn them an associate’s degree (Evelly 2013). ­ ere Mayor Bloomberg excelled. He understood the link between technical H training in high school and a successful c­ areer ­later in life According to former DOE chancellor Dennis Walcott, “In 1960, ­there ­were eigh­teen ­career and technical education schools, then called vocational schools, citywide. In 2002, ­there ­were still eigh­teen. ­Today, ­there are forty-­six. Now, t­here are over 140,000 students actively enrolled in CTE programs across the five boroughs” (Surico 2014a). This was a clear achievement for the Bloomberg administration. The Community Ser­v ice Society studied the outcomes of CTE high schools. The report concluded that “students who attend CTE schools are more likely to gradu­ate compared to students who attend non-­CTC schools” (Treschan and Mehrotra 2014, 10). In addition, students had higher gradu­ate rates than public high school students in general but lower college-­going rates. And “attending a CTE school is also associated with significantly higher gradu­ate rates for Blacks and Latinos, males in par­tic­u­lar” (Treschan and Mehrotra 2014, 12). Three years ­after Bloomberg left office, New York State cut the funding to some CTE programs ­because of changes in the federal Perkins Act that funds vocational education. Yet, NYS had created the prob­lem. It turns out that the state takes as long as eight years to license some CTE programs, and federal funding can only be allocated to licensed programs (Elsen-­Rooney 2020). Once again the state had jeopardized the work of the city. Another success was Bloomberg’s commitment to education as demonstrated by an investment of resources. New York City more than doubled spending on education, far outpacing the state and nation. It was an amazing commitment to the school system. Nothing is more attractive to teachers than to be paid a living wage, and through collective bargaining, Bloomberg achieved success far beyond previous mayors. He paid teachers much more than previous administrations had paid them. New teachers’ base salaries increased by 37.2 ­percent, from $33,186 before Bloomberg to $45,530 at the end of his tenure (see chapter 4). Better pay meant teachers ­were less likely to leave for suburban schools, and thus, Bloomberg improved teacher retention rates. In 2003 the attrition rate for teachers was 25 ­percent, which was much higher than the national rate of 10 ­percent; even worse, “42 ­percent of teachers left within three years” (NYC Council 2004, 1). By 2011, however, “the proportion of teachers leaving the system a­ fter their first year

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had decreased from one-­third of new teachers to one-­fifth of that population, and only 2 of 172 new principals in 2011 chose to leave the system. Retention ­after three years had improved for both groups” (Kelleher 2014, 42). While teachers’ pay went up, their automatic path to tenure ended, and this was another success for the mayor. Nearly four years ­after he first proposed changes, he managed to get tenure policies changed. In June 2011, “57 ­percent of teachers received tenure,” down from 97 ­percent in December 2010, before the rules changed (Santos 2012). This statistic is incredibly impor­tant. New York City schools had the reputation of hiring any person who had a degree, even if that person lacked specific training in education. Then, ­after three years, t­hose teachers would get tenure. Bloomberg ­stopped the indiscriminate awarding of tenure to new teachers. Teachers became more qualified. In a study of teaching qualifications in New York, Donald Boyd and colleagues found that the “gap between the qualifications of New York City teachers in high-­poverty schools and low-­poverty schools has narrowed substantially” between 2000 and 2005 (2008, 1). In 2000, “teachers in the highest-­poverty decibel of schools had math SAT scores that on average w ­ ere forty-­three points lower than their counter­parts in the lowest poverty decibel of schools. By 2005 this gap had narrowed to twenty-­three points” (Boyd et al. 2008, 18). This improvement is partially b ­ ecause uncertified teachers w ­ ere no longer being hired and also b ­ ecause of the Teacher Fellows Program sponsored by the DOE. Boyd and colleagues (2008) also found that this “increase in the quality of the teaching workforce led to improved student learning.” Bloomberg also won principals more flexibility in r­ unning their schools. Language in a 2005 collective bargaining agreement allowed principals to choose their teachers; before, teachers ­were chosen for schools according to a se­niority system. Now the principals had far more “authority to build a team of high-­quality teachers” (Daly et al. 2008). In a similar vein, “the New York City Leadership Acad­emy was established in 2003 to recruit and train outstanding principals to lead the city’s public schools” (Corcoran, Schwartz, and Weinstein 2012, 233). The fourteen-­month Aspiring Principals Program (APP) sought to train new principals specifically for schools in poor areas. An early evaluation by New York University’s Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and ­Human Development found that the APP principals performed about as well as other new principals. If anything, “they narrowed the gap with comparison schools in En­glish language arts but lagged ­behind in mathe­ matics” (Corcoran, Schwartz, and Weinstein 2012, 233). When Bloomberg funded a leadership acad­emy for the schools, he issued a wake-up call to the numerous gradu­ate programs in CUNY that had provided most of the public school teachers in the city system. T ­ here was now serious competition, since t­here was another route to certification if a teacher wished to be a principal. This was a very exciting



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idea. T ­ oday the New York City Leadership Acad­emy is an in­de­pen­dent nonprofit training principals from other cities.

A Mixed Bag: Test Scores and Other Student Outcomes The Research Alliance for New York City Schools reported an increase in graduation rates from 51 ­percent in 2003 to 69 ­percent in 2011 (Kemple 2013, 2). Yet numerous educators say the reason graduation rates increased was that officials at small high schools concentrated on getting students to accumulate course credits t­ oward graduation, even if ­those credits ­were not academically strong (anonymous, pers. comm., May 5, 2015). Although this allegation is impossible to document, it cannot be ignored. It is pos­si­ble, however, to document that the state education department made it easier for students to gradu­ate. As Ravitch notes about changes in the Regents Examinations that students needed to pass in order to gradu­ate with a Regents diploma, “The public prob­ably assumed that a student who received a 65 (passing grade) had correctly answered 65 ­percent of the questions. But in algebra, a student would receive a passing score of 65 if he earned only 34.5 ­percent of the pos­ si­ble points. To win a 65 on the biology Regents, the student needed to earn only 45 ­percent of the pos­si­ble points. With this intricate conversion formula, the Regents diploma was turned into a goal that almost e­ very student could reach. By making it easier to pass the Regents exams, state officials helped increase the graduation rate” (2010, 158). Although the mayor bragged about the graduation rate increase, it is a consideration that standards ­were lowered in order to achieve an increase. Likewise, claims that New York City students graduated better prepared for college than before ­were met with mixed results. The Regents examination scores in reading and math, good indicators of ­whether students need remedial courses in college, showed improvement, “with 13 ­percent of students meeting the standard in 2005 and 21 ­percent in 2011” (Kemple 2013, 5). But a study by the Annenberg Institute found that “only 13 ­percent of the city’s Black and Latino students gradu­ate high school prepared for college, compared with 50 ­percent of white students and 50 ­percent of Asian students” (Fruchter et al. 2012, 6). The study also found that the single most impor­tant variable that affected ­whether students ­were prepared for college was their demographics: Students in heavi­ly Black and Latino neighborhoods w ­ ere much less likely to be prepared for college than students from other neighborhoods. T ­ hese findings w ­ ere anathema to the Bloomberg administration, which held that teachers, not demography, are the most impor­tant variable in a student’s education. On the other hand, results of Advanced Placement examinations told a positive story. Between 2002 and 2012, “the number of high school students taking

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Advanced Placement exams grew from 17,165 to 32,471, an increase of 89 ­percent” (NYC DOE 2013). “The overall pass rate held steady at about 56 ­percent,” but “the number of African American students passing one or more tests ­rose 49 ­percent between 2008 and 2012,” and “the number of Hispanic students who passed increased by 46 ­percent” (NYC DOE 2013). This was good news for the mayor. ­There was more good news with the announcement of National Assessment of Educational Pro­gress results: “Between 2003 and 2011, New York City schools made small but significant overall gains on the National Assessment of Educational Pro­gress, also known as ‘The Nation’s Report Card’ or NAEP. Although NAEP is not tied to state standards and thus is less closely aligned to curriculum than state standardized tests, the test remained consistent between 2003 and 2011. This makes it easier to judge w ­ hether students are making pro­gress. The city’s . . . ​ students, including subgroups, generally outperformed [students in] other large cities on the NAEP Trial Urban District Assessment and showed improvement over time” (Kelleher 2014, 8). Detailed NAEP scores can be found in appendix 2. Scores on state standardized tests seemed to have gone up as well. On a radio show in October 2004, the mayor bragged, “What is encouraging is that for two or three years in a row now, the tests have gone in the same direction—up. So, ­there’s reason to believe ­we’re headed to the correct place” (quoted in Medina 2010). But in 2010 New York State announced that the results of the state’s standardized tests for the past several years w ­ ere not valid b ­ ecause the tests w ­ ere too easy. In other words, scores had gone up, but only ­because getting a good score had become easier. The state changed the norms, making the tests harder, and New York City students’ achievement scores declined precipitously. The results ­were similar around the state. The results of the tests in 2010 w ­ ere a disaster for the Bloomberg administration, since the mayor and Klein had used test scores as support for a number of educational initiatives, such as closing schools, retaining students, grading schools from A to F, determining annual bonuses for teachers and principals, and awarding or withholding teacher tenure. The mayor was unhappy, and Klein left shortly thereafter. It is impor­tant to pause and consider the mayor’s role. Mayor Bloomberg had rules for successful management: • • • • •

“Recruit the best ­people you can find Support them Provide incentives for good work Protect them from outside interference Hold them accountable for the highest standard of per­for­mance” (Nadelstern 2013, 15)



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But in all of ­these the mayor failed. It took him two terms in office to understand that Joel Klein was not the educator management guru he had portrayed himself as. The successes the schools did have w ­ ere a result of the policies and programs that Jim Liebman, Eric Nadelstern, Shael Polakow-­Suransky, and other educators put in place. But the mayor still refused to appoint an educator as chancellor, a decision that resulted in educators leaving the administration. Bloomberg told the top city educators in a meeting ­after Klein had left that he was not appointing anyone from the department as chancellor ­because all of them ­were co-­opted (anonymous, pers. comm., 2018). This was quite an insult to the educators who had taken on the rigid, cumbersome, educational bureaucracy with Joel Klein, and over the next few months, they left. The brief experiments in successful nongeographic networks and increased school autonomy ended, and this was disappointing. The next administration would bring back the community school districts, though in a diluted form.

Failures Within a year of Joel Klein’s appointment in 2002, the mayor admitted that too many high schools ­were reporting violent incidents. ­There was a breakdown of discipline, and the school system had reacted slowly ­because so many educators had left the system. Klein acknowledged that the first extensive reor­ga­ni­za­tion of the school system, in which his administration had centralized the disciplinary pro­cess, had brought on a breakdown of discipline in the schools. This breakdown in discipline occurred before Klein recruited educators to the central DOE administration. Instead of fixing the prob­lem by examining what had worked well before, Chancellor Klein announced the beginning of Operation Safe Schools, “which flooded schools with 420 additional school safety officers—­the first major increase since the 1998 compromise that had put police officers in schools” (Fruchter and McAlister 2008, 6). In 2004 the DOE and the New York Police Department launched the Impact Schools Initiative, which deployed additional police to certain schools. Bloomberg’s 2003 disciplinary plan, Impact Schools, called for an immediate, consistent response to even the most minor violation of a school’s disciplinary policy. “Total school suspensions increased from 28,449 in the 2001–2 school year to 73,943 in 2008–9” (Miller et al. 2011, 15). Such zero-­tolerance policies have been widely discredited as “discriminatory and in­effec­tive” (NYCLU 2013a). Although many organ­izations and individuals objected to this criminalization of youth, it was New York State chief justice Judith Kaye who succeeded in focusing all stakeholders on changing t­ hese policies. Kaye published a report in 2013 sponsored by the New York State Permanent

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Judicial Commission on Justice for ­Children, with Advocates for ­Children of New York (NYC SJPTF 2013). The report documented that thousands more students ­were being suspended than in the past. The data further show that the overwhelming majority of suspensions and arrests ­were for minor offenses, such as insubordination or h ­ orse­play, and not the violent misbehavior that merits suspension or arrest. In fact, between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2012 “New York City saw an unpre­ce­dented decline in violent crime in the schools of 37 ­percent” (NYC SJPTF 2013, 2). Through reor­ga­niz­ing the schools in 2002, the DOE created the conditions for a serious security risk in the schools; the response was then to bring more security into the schools, resulting in far more suspensions than had previously occurred, many for minor incidents. In other words, the first year of Klein’s reign was a disaster for student safety. The administration also failed ­children when it imposed a single reading curriculum, Balanced Literacy, and a single math curriculum, Everyday Math, on all elementary schools. The former had serious flaws, and the latter was highly controversial. The US Department of Education stepped in, forcing the school system to add a phonics-­based program to the reading curriculum; the federal government threatened to withhold the city’s share of Reading First funds if the phonics component was not included (Fruchter and McAlister 2008). This centralization of curriculum ended for a while when school autonomy was ­adopted. But ­after Eric Nadelstern left the DOE in 2011, the administration once again began to dictate curriculum (Nadelstern, pers. comm., May 21, 2016). Although Bloomberg did increase funding for education, the monies ­were not always used in the most effective way. The Fair Student Funding program distributed dollars to schools based on the number of students. ­There ­were now strong incentives for principals to seek the retirement of experienced, higher-­paid teachers and replace them with newer teachers given lower salaries; the principals could use the savings for other needs. Of course, veteran teachers might often have delivered better results in the classroom. It remained unclear w ­ hether Klein ever understood the complexity of the finance formulas. Klein instituted a “hold harmless” clause to avoid penalizing t­ hese schools and their teachers and students. A “hold harmless” clause means that schools receiving more funds ­under the old formula would continue to receive t­ hose funds and not be subject to the Fair Student Funding formula. Thus, Fair Student Funding remained unfair, as documented by Daniel Voloch, then a CUNY gradu­ate student: Despite the intention of Fair Student Funding to create a transparent and equitable system, the percentage of Fair Student Funding that a school receives varies anywhere from 81 ­percent to 134 ­percent. Of the 451 high school bud­gets examined, 8.5 ­percent (n = 38) ­were fully funded, with



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the median funding amount being 86.19 ­percent. Furthermore, ­there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the percentage of Fair Student Funding a school receives and its percentage of low-­income students, percentage of En­glish language learners and the size of the school. That is, the higher the percentage of low-­income students, the higher percentage of En­glish language learners, or the larger the school, the lower the percentage of Fair Student Funding the school receives. (Voloch 2015, v, emphasis in the original) Yet another poor decision was to end the practice of social promotion through a policy of third grade retention, based on the results of standardized testing, with intensive summer school remediation offered to students whose test scores indicated insufficient skills. Klein l­ater extended retention to grades five, seven, and eight. A half c­ entury of research had demonstrated that such retention programs produced l­ ittle positive effect on students’ subsequent academic pro­gress, as well as a plethora of negative effects. One research study condemning retention policies resulted from Robert Hauser’s work at the Center for Demography and Ecol­ ogy at the University of Wisconsin. As Hauser concluded, “­There is no evidence for claims that new retention policies w ­ ill be coupled with effective remediation of learning deficits that would be worth their cost or would offset the well-­ established long-­term negative effects of retention” (1999, 2). He added, “­There is no positive example of such a system in the United States, past or pre­sent, whose success is documented by credible research” (Hauser 1999, 4). Unfortunately, data that did not fit with the Bloomberg administration’s ideology w ­ ere ignored. The mayor also misstepped in his enthusiastic endorsement of the philosophy ­behind the federal No Child Left ­Behind Act, which encouraged school districts to close poorly performing schools and allow students to choose dif­fer­ent schools. The Bloomberg administration was in total agreement. Moreover, the mayor was enthralled with the small-­school movement, and closing some large schools was the key to opening small schools. “The administration phased out over 140 schools between 2003 and 2012” (NYC WGST 2012, 4). While this might seem like a positive mea­sure, t­ here ­were several prob­lems: • Prob­ably the most disturbing result of this policy was the special needs of ­those students in failing schools. The Working Group offered a g­ reat deal of evidence that the struggling schools Bloomberg closed ­were overloaded with special needs students (NYC WGST 2012, 4). • The DOE intensified the challenges for struggling schools by assigning disproportionate numbers of high-­needs students to t­ hose schools without providing the support and assistance t­ hose schools needed, and that “such assignment policies undermined struggling schools’ instructional capacity,

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reduced staff confidence and morale, lowered student achievement indicators, and increased suspensions and other mea­sures of behavioral disorder,” all of which contributed to the data the DOE uses to target ­those schools for closing (Arvidsson, Fruchter, and Mokhtar 2013, 6). • Schools proposed for closure had “relatively high concentrations of En­glish language learners and special education students, as well as students from eco­nom­ically disadvantaged h ­ ouse­holds.” Closed high schools had higher concentrations of African American students than other high schools in their boroughs (Murphy 2010). • Schools in close proximity to a closing school ­were forced to take in the students who did not get into the small schools, resulting in over enrollment. A report from the Center for New York City Affairs studied “thirty-­four large high schools in Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx (defined as t­ hose with more than 1,400 students in school year 2007–08) and found that twenty-­six saw their enrollments jump significantly as other high schools ­were closed. In several cases, enrollment increases ­were greater than twenty p ­ ercent. Of ­these twenty-­six schools, nineteen saw their attendance decline and fifteen saw their graduation rates decline between the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2007. Fourteen saw both attendance and graduation rates decline” (Hemphill et al. 2010, 3). As seasoned reporter Gail Robinson (2012) noted, “For almost ten years, the administration has squeezed its toughest students into a dwindling pool of schools and then penalized ­those schools for not ­doing a good job. It has focused on ­little schools and charter schools and shut or ignored many big schools, especially ones that are not elite or in affluent neighborhoods.” Did closing ­these failing high schools help ­those students who transferred to small schools? The Research Alliance for New York City Schools conducted a study of twenty-­nine schools closed by the Bloomberg administration and demonstrated that students did not necessarily benefit significantly by transferring from a closed school: “While our study shows that students who likely would have attended the closed schools fared better elsewhere, they still did not fare well. On average, just fifty-­six ­percent of t­ hese students graduated from high school within four years, and less than half earned a Regents diploma.” In addition, the study “provides evidence of systematic gains among a broad swath of low-­performing schools, including t­ hose that avoided closure” (Kemple 2015, 50). Why put students, parents, and staff through the pain of closing a school when schools could make gains without a closure? Most of all, how could anyone develop a system that required students to stay in an identified failing school for three or four years ­until it was closed? Why not just fix the failing school with the students in it?



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By the fall of 2013, New York City was home to “183 charter schools (mostly elementary schools) serving seventy thousand students, or about 6 ­percent of the system’s enrollment” (Kelleher 2014, 28). In 2003–4 t­ here ­were only “twenty-­two charter schools in NYC” (Voloch 2015, 26). This increase is not necessarily an achievement. Charter schools have dif­fer­ent student populations and mixed achievement rec­ords. It is easier “to educate a child who is not disabled and is fluent in En­glish” (Domanico 2015, 16). The pro­cess of opening schools that accept high-­achieving students is called creaming, and it is clear that even though many charter schools are choosing students through a lottery, in general, the charter schools manage to cream. Another way of creaming is simply to force out students who do poorly and not refill ­those students’ seats. The result is that higher grades have fewer students but better students. The New York City In­de­pen­dent Bud­get Office (IBO) has demonstrated that many charter schools do not refill seats ­after expelling or urging poorly performing students to leave. Data from the IBO conclude that the charter schools had “fewer special education students (14 ­percent, compared to 18 ­percent in the public schools, and fewer English-­language learners (6 ­percent, compared to 11 ­percent in the public schools” (Domanico 2015, 16). And, of course, few charter schools had students who w ­ ere homeless. Charter schools received funding from local and state governments. In addition, many ­were backed by venture cap­i­tal­ists from Wall Street and thus had considerably more resources than the public schools. Consequently, many charter schools offered longer school days and summer instruction. The KIPP Acad­emy, invited to begin a school in Harlem by Klein, had an academic calendar that included “an extended year with a mandatory summer session of three weeks of instruction during July. From September through June the school day w ­ ill begin at 7:30 A.M. and end at 5:00 P.M. with an extended school week that includes classes on Saturday from 9:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2003a). Instead of providing more resources to the public schools to extend the school day and provide instruction in the summer, it was cheaper to support charter schools that could raise their own private funds. But ­those funds are not necessarily wisely spent. In audits by the NYS Comptroller’s Office, t­ hese audits “have exposed some form of internal control deficiency or mismanagement in 95 ­percent of their audits” (Center for Popu­lar Democracy / Alliance for Quality Education 2014, 1). In addition, charter schools often took over space in public buildings, so the public school already in the building had to share its classrooms and other facilities with a charter school: “In 2005, nineteen ­percent of the City’s students attended school in a building housing more than one school. By 2013, this had risen to thirty-­two p ­ ercent—­more than 300,000 students” (Wulach and Kemple, n.d.). An elementary school principal would get a call from DOE saying that the fifth

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floor, which held the m ­ usic, arts, and library programs, was being given to a new charter school (Lee 2014). DOE would then renovate the fifth floor, often with new paint, fixtures, and air-­conditioning, which the remainder of the school did not have, and “the principal was left to find space within the remaining building for all of the programs that no longer had space on the fifth floor” (Lee 2014). Bumping public school students in ­favor of charter school students and then renovating the space had severe consequences. The public school students and faculty ­were profoundly demoralized when they saw the beautiful spaces other students ­were enjoying in the same building. The public school students saw that “the charter school students had new books and supplies, t­ hings that public school students rarely got” (Lee 2014). ­Needless to say, the two or more schools placed in one building did not relate well to one another. ­There remained ­little evidence that, despite sometimes taking resources away from public schools, most charter schools furthered students’ education any better than did most public schools (Fuller and National Journal 2015). But some charters are quite successful due in part to a longer school day (Fuller and National Journal 2015). While the Bloomberg administration encouraged charter schools to open in the city, it ignored the obvious inequities between charter schools and public schools, and this is a legacy that continues t­ oday.

Definitive Evaluation Is Elusive As noted, Bloomberg promoted the creation of small schools. MDRC, which conducts research into social policy and provides assistance to social programs, examined the small public high schools created by the Bloomberg administration. “Between 2002 and 2013 New York City had opened 337 new, small high schools” (Kelleher 2014, 27). In 2013, as MDRC found, “Small high schools in New York City continue to markedly increase high school graduation rates for large numbers of disadvantaged students of color, even as graduation rates are rising at the schools with which SSCs [Small Schools of Choice] are compared. For the full sample, students at small high schools have a graduation rate of 70.4 ­percent, compared with 60.9 ­percent for comparable students at other New York City high schools” (MDRC 2013; see also Bloom and Unterman 2013). This contradicted Kemple’s findings of a smaller graduation rate (see above). The question remains, what does it mean to gradu­ate? Are students who gradu­ ate ready for college or technical training? Some teachers thought that small schools provided ave­nues for students “to get additional course credits (credit recovery) easily without learning what is essential to succeed in college or any other form of postsecondary education” (Gootman and Coutts 2008). Yet, Ray Domanico, a well-­respected education researcher in the city, commented about



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small schools: “Studies conducted by MDRC and the NYU Research Alliance for NYC Schools confirmed that the new schools produced beneficial results for students who other­wise would have been relegated to the failing schools they replaced” (Domanico 2019). Another policy that is difficult to evaluate is centralization. School decentralization was never fully implemented in the city, but the decentralization that had existed before Bloomberg’s terms in office was terribly flawed. It allowed ­every politician in the city to have a piece of the patronage machine involved with the city’s school system. It is simply not pos­si­ble to overstate the extent of the corruption. What district superintendent is ­going to turn down a city or state politician who sends him or her the résumé of the politician’s niece or a friend? (Nadelstern 2012, 18). Centralization ended that form of corruption, but it had its own patronage machine. Chancellor Klein was notorious for hiring gradu­ates from the best colleges, t­ hose recommended by friends, as if coming from the “best” college somehow made a person worthy (anonymous, pers. comm., October 10, 2018). Outside con­sul­tants w ­ ere hired without any sense of the need for educational credentials. What corporate board would tolerate three reorganizations of the entire com­ pany in nine years? It is inconceivable. Can any of us imagine the Ford Motor Com­pany changing its entire supply chain and production line three times in a de­cade? Of course not. And yet a $21 billion organ­ization, the DOE, did just that. ­There ­were two groups of ­people around Klein during two periods. In the first two years, ­there ­were ­lawyers and philanthropists; ­later came educators. So, at first, Klein, who most likely had l­ittle idea how to run such a huge system, created a top-­down, totally centralized school system. Within a year, the schools w ­ ere bedlam, as could be seen by the level of vio­lence in the schools. Then along came the educators, and something very in­ter­est­ing happened. Klein embraced school autonomy and decentralization, and with that shift in ideology came the second and third reorganizations. It is not known ­whether nongeographic networks could have been successful over a longer period of time. First, the upheaval caused by multiple reorganizations obscured the effects this reform might have had. Also, the next mayor, Bill de Blasio, and his DOE chancellor, Carmen Fariña, did not support nongeographic networks and returned to geographic districts. Thus, the experiment was short-­lived. What is known is that many principals liked the networks in which they could consult with other principals who had similar philosophies. It could very well be that what ­matters may be hiring the best principals and teachers, paying them a competitive wage, supporting them, and allowing both principals and teachers the autonomy to be successful. Unfortunately, this is one of the few times in the city that principals experienced any form of their own decision making.

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Chapter Summar y Education is complicated, but we know what the best systems look like. They do not involve the dictation of pedagogy by a central administration; small, un­regu­ la­ted charter schools; and a punitive testing environment. First, if you want to change educational outcomes, then focus on poverty. Two of the top countries in educational achievement are Japan and South K ­ orea (Pearson Education 2015); t­hese countries have markedly lower poverty rates for ­children than does the United States. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD, n.d.), the United States has a “relative poverty rate for ­children of 20.6 ­percent, while South ­Korea has a relative child poverty rate of 8.0 ­percent.” According to UNICEF, the relative child poverty rate in Japan is 14.9 ­percent (Adamson 2012).1 Kenneth K. Wong and colleagues (2007) have found that mayoral control may improve educational outcomes a l­ittle bit, but a reduction in child poverty improves educational outcomes a lot. Using a mixed-­methods approach to explore the impact of mayoral control on educational outcomes, the authors found that while mayoral control can “bring a change of 0.1 standard deviation in elementary reading and math scores [and is] associated with a 0.2 standard deviation increase in high school reading and math,” ­these positive impacts are not found when the mayor has unchecked control, as was the case in New York City during the Bloomberg administration. As they explain, “full appointment power without oversight is inversely related to achievement” in both high school reading and mathe­matics. It is also impor­tant to note that while mayoral control can lead to better outcomes in certain cases, “a one-­percentage-­point reduction in child poverty improves test scores by 0.5 standard deviations. In comparison with the governance changes just discussed, this is nearly three times greater in magnitude” (Wong et al. 2007, 94, 97). In other words, to improve educational outcomes, focus on poverty. Second, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL 2016) conducted a study of the top ten educational systems in the world to determine what they had in common,2 and what it found was not new. NCSL concluded that all of ­these systems do the following: 1. “Place a high priority on ­children’s health and being prepared to learn. A ­great deal of early childhood support is provided to families in several of the ten systems. Schools with a high percentage of poor c­ hildren receive more resources. 2. Have high teaching standards. Teachers are paid quite well. Just as impor­tant, teachers are required to be masters of their subjects. Rigorous screening practices help ensure that only the best teachers are hired.



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3. Put in place a rigorous c­ areer and technical education program. Students can choose an applied education track rather than a traditional academic track. 4. Use a comprehensive, systemic approach. The vision is a national one, but the implementation is left to states or provinces.” Let us look at Mayor Bloomberg’s rec­ord with re­spect to the above four strategies: 1. Place a high priority on ­children’s health and being prepared to learn. The mayor did not provide sufficient support for early childhood education even thought his staff had created a strong program (EarlyLearn). He cut child-­care slots in the city (see chapter 7). He did, however, have a strong interest in public health. To the extent that he improved the city’s public health and expanded school-­based health centers, he may have affected ­children positively. 2. Have high teaching standards. One of Bloomberg’s biggest accomplishments was to increase teachers’ salaries dramatically. This was very impor­tant. T ­ oday ­there are far more prospective teachers willing to teach in New York City as compared to the nearby suburbs b ­ ecause the city’s salaries have been substantially raised. Attracting and retaining teachers has become easier. The mayor also created alternative teacher certification tracks to compete with CUNY as one way to raise the admission and graduation standards for prospective teachers. In addition, he made it harder for teachers to get tenure, and making job security less of a given can improve the quality of teaching. Yet his attempt to link teachers’ pay and ­careers to student achievement was crude and ill considered; none of the best school systems use such policies. The best school systems control the beginning of the hiring pipeline—­educating and hiring the teachers. And, unfortunately, the state and the universities have far more to say about educating teachers than does the city. 3. Put in place a rigorous c­ areer and technical education program. Another of Bloomberg’s biggest accomplishments was providing more links between high school students and secondary education in technical schools and universities. The mayor understood the importance of making this connection with the fastest-­growing sectors of the economy, including health care, computer science, and the construction trades. Many jobs in ­those fields ­don’t require a college degree, but they do require technical skills that high school programs typically ­don’t offer. ­Because New York City has failed to strengthen and expand c­ areer and technical education, few students are given the option to pursue programs that would give

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them the skills that are an entry ticket into ­these industries (Bloomberg and Dimon 2016). 4. Use a comprehensive, systemic approach. The state has developed Common Core standards. But in New York City, for the most part, the only comprehensive systematic approach was punitive. Blaming teachers and principals when they had so ­little control over the system was limiting. Nonetheless, central administration continued to blame the schools if they d ­ idn’t perform to expectations on state standardized tests. But what if it is not the schools? What if the tests themselves are problematic ­because the tests are not keyed to what the students are taught or the state changes the standards? What if the schools are not as autonomous as the policymakers claim they are? The schools are not ­free to reallocate teachers ­because of ­union contracts and DOE and state regulations. Additionally, the schools do not control procurement; it is thus impossible for a principal to hire con­sul­tants in a timely ­matter, let alone buy adequate equipment when needed. What if poor educational results are the symptom and the cause is poverty? ­After all, schools work very well for middle-­class c­ hildren in this country (Ravitch 2010). The worry is for t­ hose kids in poverty. And we h ­ aven’t gotten that right yet. Bloomberg’s ideology ­favors market forces. But the limits of the f­ree market are clear. ­There are winners and ­there are losers. And when we carry that thinking to our schools, we divide our students into winners and losers. T ­ here is a better way brought to us by comparative research into the world’s best education systems. 1. Put a high priority on being prepared to learn. Pay far more attention to early childhood education. The mayor began to improve the quality of childcare with the EarlyLearn NYC program but failed to increase the number of slots available to preschool-­age ­children. 2. Promote high teaching standards by controlling the pipeline. Although Bloomberg could have done a lot more, he did more than any other mayor in modern times to attract and retain teachers and to improve the overall quality of teachers. But he could have demanded that CUNY’s teacher preparation programs demonstrate that they only admit high-­ quality students and only certify students who have demonstrated a high degree of competency in their subjects. Of course, this would have required changes in the state laws that regulate primary and secondary education and in the universities that hire professors. Bloomberg improved teachers’ salaries, but he needed to reduce their teaching load so that they would have time to collaborate with o ­ thers. He also should have created internships for new teachers so that no first-­year teacher



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would be left alone in the classroom but would work with an experienced teacher. 3. Implement a rigorous c­ areer and technical education program. Bloomberg succeeded in opening new technical education schools, and he did it by forming a task force to study the issues and give recommendations. This was typical Bloomberg strategy: get the best ­people together and study the issues, make recommendations, and implement them. And it worked. Bloomberg did not believe that ­every student should go to college; instead, he promoted the idea that ­every student should learn a skill. He wanted to link ­every student to an academic and vocational goal. For example, he started a grade nine through grade fourteen high school involving a relationship with IBM such that students could work for the com­pany when they completed their studies, and they graduated with an associate’s degree (Bloomberg 2010b). 4. Use a comprehensive and systematic approach. A city can only do so much; what is needed is a New York State Department of Education that is far less regulatory and more visionary. It is highly doubtful that given the federal system of government the United States can ever have a national education system. This country ­will continue to have fifty state education systems not including the territories, but at the least New York State government could get out of the business of regulating school closures and into the business of setting standards. 5. The choice is not between tackling poverty and investing in education. We need to do both. Most of the ten countries studied by the NCSL had low poverty rates, but both Hong Kong and Singapore have high rates of poverty, similar to ­those of the United States, yet both have high educational achievement rates. Many large cities in this country have high poverty rates for Blacks and Hispanics. We need to understand how two countries with high poverty rates can nonetheless have strong student success. Jennifer Eberhardt describes key ele­ments that can improve student per­for­mance in poverty areas; she notes, “Two key studies of m ­ iddle school pupils used specific exercises that ­were found to enhance students’ send of competence and connectedness and improve academic per­for­mance in lasting and mea­sur­able ways” (2019, 211). Eberhardt’s research connects the psychological state of the student with the pro­cess of learning. Mayor Bloomberg did many t­ hings right. He took on improving the schools, something no previous New York City mayor had the nerve to do. He allowed principals much more authority in exchange for accountability. His administration increased teachers’ salaries dramatically, which helped schools enormously

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and could then better attract and keep teachers. The administration fi­nally got the ­union to agree that se­nior teachers could not use se­niority to transfer to open positions, a change in policy that gave principals more freedom to choose their teachers. By establishing a competitive principal training acad­emy, Bloomberg challenged the institutions that trained teachers and principals to do a far better job. Dozens more c­ areer and technical education programs w ­ ere created and collaborations with universities started. ­These structural changes ­were useful and productive, and they remain so t­ oday. The mayor’s critics have focused on his dictatorial methods and his inability to dramatically improve student achievement. Unfortunately, the mayor appointed a chancellor who knew l­ ittle about education. Joel Klein reor­ga­nized the school system three times in a de­cade, and so many changes in so l­ittle time can destabilize an organ­ization. Bloomberg wanted to succeed in improving the school system more than anything ­else, and he was the first and only New York City mayor to have the courage to tackle substantive reform of the educational system. And, in some ways, he did succeed. Giving autonomy to schools remained popu­lar, but the de Blasio administration destroyed that autonomy. But other positive structural changes, such as hiring principals from outside the regular system, reducing teacher se­ niority in hiring, and increasing teacher salaries, endured and cannot easily be changed. Mayor Bloomberg gets the last word: “I spoke on Martin Luther King Day at a number of dif­fer­ent places, and I said all of the ­battles are meaningless if our ­children ­don’t have the skills to understand and to participate and to be a part of the ­Great American Dream. Education is one of the basic civil rights” (Bloomberg 2012b).

9 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

When Michael Bloomberg announced his run for president in 2019, one of his first public appearances was at a large Black megachurch, Christian Cultural Center, in Brooklyn, where he apologized to the community for his rec­ord on “stop and frisk” (Porterfield 2019). Stop-­and-­frisk was a practice by the NYPD of stopping ­people on the street—­usually young men of color—to question and search them. As Bloomberg explained, “I got something impor­tant ­really wrong. I ­didn’t understand back then the full impact that stops w ­ ere having on the Black and Latino communities. I was totally focused on saving lives, but as we know, good intentions ­aren’t good enough” (Porterfield 2019). While an impor­tant part of the picture, ­there is more to the story of Bloomberg’s rec­ord on crime and punishment.

Juvenile Justice Early on, Mayor Bloomberg focused on young ­people. His Center on Economic Opportunity had as a major focal point helping low-­income teen­agers gradu­ate from high school and go on to college or further training (see chapter 7). He also centered on abysmal reports of mistreatment of juvenile delinquents in upstate New York facilities and sought to improve programs for juvenile offenders (ages seven to fifteen). In the early 2000s, ­there was a wave of reports citing widespread maltreatment of juvenile offenders in many states. The Annie E. Casey Foundation put a spotlight on the way juveniles ­were treated in correction facilities across the country (Mendel 2011). In 2007 the US Department of Justice’s 227

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Civil Rights Division investigated four upstate facilities for juvenile offenders regarding use of excessive force. The division documented “instances of excessive force by state employees resulting in youth suffering concussions, broken bones, knocked-­out teeth, and other serious injuries. Force was applied as a form of discipline in response to the most minor infractions, such as refusing to stop laughing when ordered, staring at a staff member, or sneaking an extra cookie. Investigators concluded that conditions in ­these facilities amounted to a violation of residents’ constitutional rights” (TFTJJ 2009). The city’s juvenile offenders w ­ ere being sent to upstate facilities far from their families. Countless families reported that t­hese state facilities physically abused their ­children and had poor supervision and terrible education (CCLP 2018). The facilities ­were substandard and overly expensive. The state and city split the high costs of inefficient staffing rules. Guards required one year’s notice prior to a fa­ cil­i­ty closing. In addition, state law required the New York State Office of ­Children and ­Family Ser­vices to keep facilities fully staffed for a period of time, even though the number of youth in the facilities dropped dramatically (CCLP 2018). Yet the money spent was largely in­effec­tive: “75 ­percent of youth ­were rearrested within three years, and 89 ­percent of boys and 81 ­percent of girls w ­ ere rearrested by the age of twenty-­eight” (CCLP 2018). In addition, t­hese juvenile offenders found that their educational credits were not accepted by the New York City Department of Education. Then governor David Paterson formed a task force that published its report in 2009, Charting a New Course: A Blueprint for Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State, which concluded, [New York State’s juvenile justice] system has relied on a punitive, corrections-­based model to meet ­these responsibilities (keep the public safe and to care for and rehabilitate young ­people). On both counts this model has failed . . . ​of all youth released from state custody between 1991 and 1995, 75 ­percent ­were re-­arrested, 62 ­percent w ­ ere reconvicted, and 45 ­percent ­were re-­incarcerated within three years of their release. . . . ​ Youth are placed in facilities that are located hundreds of miles away from the support networks of their families and communities. ­These institutions are often sorely under-­resourced. . . . ​In some facilities, youth are subjected to shocking vio­lence and abuse. (TFTJJ 2009) The task force documented in 2009, 53 ­percent of youth admitted to the state’s institutional facilities ­were ­there for a misdemeanor (TFTJJ 2009). Young p ­ eople ­were taken hundreds of miles away from their families to be held in violent state correction facilities for misdemeanor infractions.

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In 2010, Mayor Bloomberg and the Rev. Al Sharpton visited the Fin­ger Lakes Residential Center, a controversial juvenile justice center hundreds of miles from the city (Bloomberg and Sharpton 2012). Two years ­later, with the help of state officials and Sharpton, the mayor had put into place a juvenile justice reform plan, Closer to Home, which closed upstate juvenile justice centers (Murphy 2019). Young ­people, if incarcerated, would be placed nearer their families and communities. Closer to Home was a total overhaul of New York City’s juvenile justice system (Murphy 2019). The program earned high marks for reducing the use of detention and placement, increasing community-­based alternatives, and lowering recidivism rates (Mader 2014). Then Bloomberg folded the Department of Juvenile Justice into the Administration for C ­ hildren’s Ser­v ices (ACS), allowing the new Department of Youth and ­Family Justice to draw on the ACS’s expertise with ­children. The changes came from all levels of government. Gladys Carrion headed the New York State Office of ­Children and ­Family Ser­v ices from 2007 to 2013 ­under Governor Andrew Cuomo, and was a fierce advocate for improved quarters for juvenile offenders. Together, Bloomberg and Carrion marked g­ reat success in decriminalizing juveniles and bringing them closer to home. Bloomberg opened “five new sites serving youth in ‘Closer to Home,’ a signature component of the Young Men’s Initiative and a sweeping reform of the juvenile system that transfers responsibility for the majority of New York City juvenile offenders to the City, so that the young p ­ eople can be rehabilitated, educated, supervised and, when necessary, confined near their families and in their communities” (NYC Office of the Mayor 2012d). Starting with forty-­five adolescents in 2012, the Closer to Home program grew by 2014 to serve 329 adolescents in a network of small, low-­security, group homes in the city; youth (ages fifteen and u ­ nder) received supportive social ser­v ices and educational help (Mader 2014). In 2013, limited-­security facilities ­were to be opened for ­those at a higher security risk but, due to challenges from neighborhood residents, they did not open ­until 2016 (Kramer 2018). The facilities ­were operated by nonprofits, and all teen­agers received intensive therapy, as well as schooling. “ACS released 836 young ­people into aftercare from 2014 to 2016, and during that same time, only sixty-­four youth had their aftercare revoked for violations” (CCLP 2018). “The 177 youth enrolled in school during the 2016–17 school year earned an average of 9.3 credits (up from 6.3 during the 2013–14 school year) and passed 91 ­percent of their courses (up from 68 ­percent during the 2013–14 school year)” (CCLP 2018). Among ­middle school students eligible for promotion, 93 ­percent ­were promoted at least one grade level (CCLP 2018). This first

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evaluation since much of the Closer to Home program was implemented indicates that the program was both a state and city success.

Stop-­a nd-­Frisk In 1968 the US Supreme Court ruled that, given reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed, police could stop and frisk a citizen. This ruling superseded the old standard requiring probable cause for such police action. New York City’s version of stop-­and-­frisk began with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Bloomberg expanded the policy, which led to thousands of young men of color being s­ topped by the police and searched for no legally justifiable reason; they w ­ ere ­stopped and frisked for simply walking down the street while Black. According to Floyd v. City of New York (2013), the number of stops per year during the Bloomberg administration more than doubled, from 314,000 in 2004 to a high of 686,000 in 2011 (see figure 9.1). Bloomberg hired Raymond Kelly as police commissioner, a job he had also held ­under Mayor David Dinkins. Bloomberg and Kelly embraced the CompStat system,1 which put pressure on local precinct captains to increase quality-­of-­life arrests. The Village Voice ran a series about the pressure caused by CompStat on one police precinct in the city, for which the paper won the New York Press Club’s Gold Keyboard award for outstanding investigative reporting. The series “exposed the downgrading of crime, ­orders that led to pos­si­ble civil rights violations, and

800,000

Number of stops

700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 # of people

300,000 200,000 100,000

Year

FIGURE 9.1  Stop-­and-­frisk in New York City Based on data from the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU, n.d.).

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

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the constant pressuring of officers to make quotas for arrests, summonses, and stop-­and-­frisks” (Ortega 2011). A retired police captain explained where he thought stop-­and-­frisk came from. It started with a “stop and question” policy. The “frisk” part of the equation was not used u ­ nless a weapon was suspected or ­there was reasonable suspicion of a pos­si­ble crime. But this all changed in the 1990s with Giuliani as mayor: When I was a rookie thirty-­one years ago, we ­were taught that police have a “common law right of inquiry,” meaning we could ask questions about almost anything we see on the street. But ­unless t­ here ­were ­factors elevating a situation to reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed, a person could choose not to answer and walk away. When Compstat was developed ­under then Police Commissioner Bill Bratton, high-­ranking police officials widely incorporated the “stop, question and frisk.” The NYPD also started to keep meticulous track of such stops through paperwork that was alien to us back in the day. Although the procedure had been on the books since the beginning of time, it was now embraced like a child holding a new toy on Christmas morning. And it worked, with crime dropping during the Giuliani era. But, like every­thing ­else with Compstat, “if it a­ in’t on paper, it a­ in’t.” When I was at that podium in the mid-­nineties, captains had all kinds of enforcement numbers we could use as ammo to show the bosses how wonderful we ­were. Crime, though declining, was still relatively high, especially when compared to ­today’s numbers. That changed in the new millennium, with crime falling to its lowest levels in de­cades. But we still had to show results. Stop-­and-­frisk became a means for us to show that we ­were still fighting crime. (Naspretto 2012) Stop, question, and frisk became stop-­and-­frisk in relatively short order. All it took was the motivation to satisfy ­those who gathered data. Indeed, ­there was ­little awareness in the Bloomberg administration of the unintended consequences of pressuring precinct captains to continually improve their numbers even when crime was low. Michelle Alexander has identified stop-­and-­frisk as one ele­ment of the mass incarceration that followed the 1960s civil rights movement: “The pro­cess of marking black youth as black criminals is essential to the functioning of mass incarceration as a racial caste system,” she writes. “Imprisonment . . . ​now creates far more crime than it prevents, by ripping apart fragile social networks, destroying families, and creating a permanent class of unemployables” (Alexander 2010 195, 224). Bloomberg failed to understand the severe harm caused by this policy. For the mayor it was a hyperrationalized calculation: “I think we disproportionately stop

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whites too much and minorities too l­ ittle. It’s exactly the reverse of what they say. I ­don’t know where they went to school, but they certainly ­didn’t take a math course. Or a logic course” (quoted in Fermino 2013). Such privileged comments by the mayor displayed a profound lack of sympathy for the hundreds of New Yorkers who ­were subjected to humiliating harassment. This rhe­toric inflamed the public rather than calming it. Senator Tim Scott, an African American Republican, spoke on the floor of the US Senate, describing the humiliation of his seven police stops in one year and closing his speech with the wisdom and insight that Mayor Bloomberg took too long to understand: “I simply ask you [the American p ­ eople] this: recognize that just ­because you do not feel the pain, the anguish of another, does not mean that it does not exist. To ignore their strug­ gles, our strug­gles, does not make them dis­appear. It simply leaves you blind and the American ­family very vulnerable” (quoted in Bennett and Steward 2017). The re­sis­tance to Bloomberg and Kelly’s stop-­and-­frisk policy came from several sources: the Black and Latino community, liberals, the New York City Council, and the courts. In June 2013 the city council passed two legislative acts to stop the policy. The council created an inspector general’s office with subpoena power to oversee the NYPD and mandated to make policy recommendations to the department. In addition, a bill was passed allowing p ­ eople to sue over racial profiling by police officers. This law opened state courts to individual claims of bias-­based policing. The inspector general bill passed by a council vote of 40 to 11; the racial profiling bill passed by a vote of 34 to 17. Both bills w ­ ere passed, over Bloomberg’s veto, fewer than two weeks ­after a federal judge ruled stop-­and-­frisk unconstitutional. Why did Bloomberg cling to stop-­and-­frisk for so long? For the mayor, data spoke loudly, and his data indicated crime was ­going down, and therefore the practice worked. As Commissioner Kelly writes, “It’s hard to prove a negative, so we may never know for certain how many weapons ­weren’t carried, how many muggings ­didn’t occur, how many shootings or burglaries w ­ ere avoided, how many ­people ­weren’t killed b ­ ecause of t­ hose street stops. . . . ​Street stops certainly w ­ eren’t the only reasons for the steep decline [in crime], but they just certainly played a role” (Kelly 2015, 274). Of course, ­there is no agreement among the research community as to why crime diminished—­not just in the city but across the United States. Using “FBI numbers, the violent crime rate fell fifty-­one ­percent between 1993 and 2018. . . . ​Like the violent crime rate, the U.S. property crime rate ­today is far below its peak level. FBI data shows that the rate fell by fifty-­four ­percent between 1993 and 2018” (Gramlich 2019). A similar decline occurred in New York City. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2014, major felony offenses fell from a high of 184,652 to 106,722 (NYPD, n.d.). According to the mayor, young men expected the police ­were ­going to stop them, so they s­ topped carry­ing guns, and he believed

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that this was why ­there ­were fewer gun incidents in the city. Researchers have pointed to numerous other explanations for the drop in crime: mass incarceration, economic growth, decrease in alcohol use, more police officers, proliferation of guns or increased gun control, reduction in the number of unwanted ­children, reduction in lead’s toxic effects, the use of antidepressants, and—of course—­the proliferation of cell phones. In other words, researchers could not agree. Although Bloomberg had reconsidered the practice in 2012 and the NYPD had greatly reduced the number of stops, a federal judge fi­nally ­stopped Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly in 2013 (see figure 9.1). Shira Scheindlin, a district judge of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, ruled that stop-­and-­frisk ­v iolated the Fourth and ­Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. The judge appointed a monitor to oversee stop-­and-­frisk policies, and the court, in Floyd v. City of New York, cited startling statistics: “The New York City Police Department . . . ​made 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012. Over eighty ­percent of ­these 4.4 million stops ­were of Blacks or Hispanics . . . ​six ­percent of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons. Eighty-­eight ­percent of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement action.”2 Judge Scheindlin quoted New York Times columnist Charles Blow in her conclusion: “The idea of universal suspicion without individual evidence is what Americans find abhorrent and what black men in Amer­i­ca must constantly fight. It is pervasive in policing policies—­like stop-­and-­frisk, and . . . ​ neighborhood watch—­regardless of the collateral damage done to the majority of innocents. It’s like burning down a h ­ ouse to rid it of mice.” The judge conveyed the outrage of so many Black men, s­ topped time and time again for walking down the street in their own neighborhoods. The federal appeals court granted the city’s motion to stay Scheindlin’s remedial appointment of a monitor. The appeals court also removed the judge from the case, citing several newspaper articles in which the judge gave interviews that “ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for U.S. judges” (Center for Constitutional Rights 2013). But Scheindlin’s decision was not overturned. Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio, withdrew the appeal the Bloomberg administration had filed, and thus Scheindlin’s decision stood. In fact, during the Giuliani and Bloomberg years, the NYPD went further than “stop and frisk,” setting up barriers outside certain communities. The police ­stopped cars entering or leaving ­those neighborhoods to question, to search anyone suspicious, and in general to make the community aware that they ­were watching. As one Black professional put it, “I worked on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. ­Every night when I drove home to Harlem, I made sure to keep on my tie and suit jacket. When I was s­ topped, as I invariably was on many nights

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by the police at the barricade on 110th street, I had my ID ready and even my business card so they knew I was legitimate.” He then laughed and said, “what­ ever legitimate means” (anonymous, pers. comm., March 8, 2016). Bloomberg and Kelly slowed down stop-­and-­frisk beginning in 2012. In 2013, the practice became part of the election debate on who would succeed Bloomberg. Gemar Mills, the principal of Malcolm X. Shabazz High School in Newark, New Jersey, has summarized his views on both sides of the issue: “I think t­ here’s value ­there,” he explains. “Maybe a gun gets off the street, a life gets saved, maybe drugs get confiscated—­that’s the pro. But then ­there are the side effects” (quoted in Bergner 2014). The controversy over stop-­and-­frisk may never be over. How much it contributed to a decline in crime is unknown. Mayor Bloomberg failed to understand the severe harm caused by this policy. As Michelle Alexander (2010) notes, “For black youth, the experience of being ‘made black’ often begins with the first police stop, interrogation, search or arrest.” The policy cost Bloomberg support and connections he had cultivated during his early years of reaching out to all groups, with his willingness to listen to every­one and his initiatives to fight poverty. This goodwill, respected and appreciated, was undermined as New Yorkers argued over his stop-­and-­frisk policies.

Alternatives to Incarceration At the same time thousands of ­people ­were being ­stopped and frisked, the Bloomberg administration created far more opportunities for alternatives to incarceration including conditional discharge. As James Austin, Michael Jacobson, and Inimai Chettiar (2013) explain, “The prosecutor reaches an agreement with the defendant early on in the pretrial pro­cess that if the defendant agrees to enter into treatment (usually drug treatment) and complete that program without incurring subsequent arrests, the original charges are dropped.” During the Bloomberg administration, conditional discharges went from fourteen thousand to almost twenty thousand a year. New York City has a large variety of incarceration alternatives: the Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Ser­vices, the Center for Community Alternatives; the Center for Employment Opportunities, the Fortune Society, the Osborne Association, Palladia, Proj­ect Greenhope, and the ­Women’s Prison Association. As Austin and colleagues (2013) note, “The declines in New York State’s prison population as well as the New York City jail population are due largely to a reduction in the number of p ­ eople being arrested for felony level crimes. Greater use of non-­prison sanctions by New York City courts also contributed to the decline.”

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The Depar tment of Corrections Bloomberg succeeded in lowering the population in New York City’s jails, and “the city’s falling incarceration rate—­the percentage of residents ­behind bars—is an overlooked achievement” of his administration (quoted in Karni 2013). “The rate fell 26 ­percent in the city from 2001 to 2012, even as it ­rose 3 ­percent nationwide. . . . ​ We’ve kept our city safer while locking up fewer ­people,” Bloomberg once said. “The bottom line ­here is that the murder rate ­here and other crime rates have come down dramatically more than anybody could have possibly predicted” (quoted in Karni 2013). But ­those who ­were incarcerated ­were subjected to unreasonable risk of vio­ lence. Most prisoners w ­ ere held in ten facilities on Rikers Island. Fights and assaults within the facilities increased during Bloomberg’s term. In 2012, Preet Bharara, the US attorney in Manhattan, had notified the city that his office would conduct an investigation into the treatment of adolescents in Rikers Island (city prison). Bharara released its findings in 2014, calling for major changes in policies and procedures in the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC). The seventy-­nine-­page report noted that “a deep-­seated culture of vio­lence is pervasive throughout the adolescent facilities at Rikers, and DOC staff routinely utilizes force not as a last resort, but instead as a means to control the adolescent population and punish disorderly and disrespectful be­hav­ior” (US Department of Justice 2014, 4). Bharara’s report addressed adolescents at Rikers Island, but reports circulated that vio­lence was pervasive throughout the prison, including the adult population. The prob­lems within the DOC ­were not addressed during the Bloomberg administration. Once Bharara had notified the Bloomberg administration that his office was conducting an investigation, the city had two and one-­half years before a report was issued. Time was available to address the issues of vio­lence. ­There could be several reasons b ­ ehind the increase in vio­lence at Rikers, such as gangs and out-­ of-­control corrections officers. But what stands out in the report is the staffing. The number of uniformed correction officers fell from 10,636 in 2002 to 8,991 in 2013 (NYC Office of Operations 2002, 123, and 2013, 24). At the same time, the number of prisoners dropped from 13,934 in 2002 to 11,827 in 2013. Meanwhile, the level of vio­lence, in terms of fights and assault infractions, increased from 5,473 in 2002 to 7,622 in 2013 (NYC Office of Operations 2002, 124, and 2013, 20). T ­ hese prob­ lems ­were not addressed by the Bloomberg administration. Bloomberg continued to cut staffing at Rikers throughout his mayoralty. ­There was one experiment that Bloomberg conducted during this time. He invited Goldman Sachs “to finance a social impact bond to decrease recidivism for

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adolescents in Rikers” (Goldman Sachs, n.d.). Social impact bonds are contracts between one level of government and a provider with the private investors. “The private investors provided the capital, not the city. If the ser­v ice organ­ization achieves its agreed on targets, then the government ­will pay the investors back the principal. If the ser­v ice organ­ization fails to meet its targets, the governor has no obligation to pay back the investors” (Goldman Sachs, n.d.). So Bloomberg announced that the city would issue its first social impact bond using MDRC to oversee proj­ect implementation. MDRC hired the Osborne Association and Friends of Island Acad­emy to run the program (MDRC, n.d.). The Vera Institute conducted the evaluation, which was a bust. The intervention was discontinued ­after three years b ­ ecause the proj­ect was not meeting the goal of reducing recidivism (Berlin 2016). Bloomberg demonstrated interest in the experiment but did not seem to pay attention to the increasing vio­lence in the city’s largest jail.

Counter terrorism Beginning his mayoralty in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Bloomberg established the position of deputy commissioner for intelligence and counterterrorism. The deputy commissioner oversees two bureaus, the Counterterrorism Bureau and the Intelligence Bureau. “The Intelligence Bureau’s investigators gather intelligence in support of terrorism investigations and have disrupted dozens of terrorism threats against New York City. The Counterterrorism Bureau supplies over a hundred detectives to the FBI-­NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force, which focuses on counterterrorism prevention” (Weiner 2013, 6). As Assistant Commissioner Rebecca Weiner explains, “We counted 29 publicly disclosed plots against New York City since 2001. From 2001 through 2009, t­ here ­were 12. Two of them ­were the product of lone actors, and 10 w ­ ere externally directed. Since 2010, we have seen 17—14 of which can be attributed to lone actors, versus 3 that ­were externally directed” (quoted in Cruickshank 2019). But the Counterterrorism Bureau also put the Muslim community u ­ nder strict surveillance, a program that created a wellspring of resentment in some New Yorkers. Bloomberg’s early bridge-­building work in reaching out to all groups, his willingness to listen to every­one, and his initiatives to fight poverty ­were overshadowed by the intensive monitoring of so many Muslim organ­izations and mosques. Bloomberg’s supporters said he should boast about cops’ antiterrorism work on his watch, while detractors said that Muslims ­were victims of Bloomberg’s surveillance campaign. The Bloomberg administration defended its surveillance practices; it provided a list of twelve ­people arrested or convicted on terrorism-­related charges in the United States who w ­ ere once members of Muslim student associa-

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tions (Khalid 2012). And the administration denied that it had ever sent undercover police into any mosque (Terbush 2011). ­There ­were, in fact, Muslims who defended him. Bloomberg had “engaged with the Muslim community more than any other mayor in this city,” said Commissioner of Immigrant Affairs Fatima M. Shama, noting she was the first Muslim hired to that position. Shama pointed out that Bloomberg holds an annual Iftar dinner to mark the fast breaking during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (quoted in Kane 2010). And the New York chapter of the Council on American-­ Islamic Relations, a Muslim civil rights organ­ization, praised Bloomberg for “defending the rights of Muslims and other Americans to build h ­ ouses of worship” (quoted in Kane 2010). Almost three thousand New Yorkers perished on 9/11. As a result, many called for a strong antiterrorism unit to secure the city.

The Overreach in Furtherance of Public Order In 2004, Bloomberg sought to have the national conventions of both the Demo­ cratic and Republican Parties in the New York City. He succeeded with the Republicans, and then took a hard line on demonstrators who sought to protest the convention. Over a four-­day period, eigh­teen hundred protestors ­were arrested for disorderly conduct and kept in dirty conditions on Pier 57 on the Hudson River (NYCLU 2014). New York City law requires t­ hose arrested to be arraigned within twenty-­four hours, which the city failed to do. Hundreds w ­ ere kept for two days on the pier, and many of t­ hose arrested sued for being denied the right to assem­ble peacefully. As Traci Yoder and Nathan Tempey note, “While over 1,800 ­people ­were arrested and detained at the 2004 RNC [Republican National Convention] in New York City, only seventy-­five (less than five p ­ ercent) ­were actually convicted of a crime” (2013, 6). T ­ hese mass arrests so early in the Bloomberg administration made some New Yorkers furious with Bloomberg. “Bob Curley—­a ­lawyer from Philadelphia was arrested near Fulton Street with his son Neal, then sixteen, and held sixteen hours: “ ‘I was pretty shocked when it happened,’ he said, describing the moment he was taken into custody. “I said to my son this ­isn’t the Amer­i­ca I grew up in.” Curley “thought the arrests in 2004 w ­ ere meant to ‘discourage dissent’ and felt vindicated by Judge [Richard J.] ­Sullivan’s decision” that the arrests ­were illegal (Weiser 2012). But the suit had gone on for years, and was not settled u ­ ntil Bloomberg’s successor took over; the city paid $18 million in a no-­fault settlement (NYCLU 2014).

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Gun Control Mayor Bloomberg’s gun control work is legendary. In 2005 he signed four bills that increased the age of gun owner­ship from eigh­teen to twenty-­one, prohibited gun dealers from selling more than one gun to a single person, raised civil penalties from $10,000 to $25,000 for violating the ban on possessing assault weapons, and held dealers responsible for any injury or death in the course of a crime if ­there was any illegal gun purchase. In 2006, Bloomberg and Boston mayor Thomas Menino cofounded Mayors against Illegal Guns. The co­ali­tion has since grown to a bipartisan group of more than one thousand current and former mayors from the smallest towns to the biggest cities in nearly ­every state (Everytown, n.d.). In a study mea­sur­ing the change in firearms-­related deaths and injuries between 2000 and 2011, the New York City Department of Health and ­Mental Hygiene reported the city’s reduction in gun vio­lence vastly outpaced that of the rest of the nation. The study showed a dramatic decline: the city experienced 524 gun-­ related hom­i­cides in 2000, reduced to just 366 by 2011 (NYC DHMH 2013). Bloomberg took his commitment to fight gun vio­lence with him when he left the mayoralty. He helped create an organ­ization called Everytown for Gun Safety that gives large contributions to Demo­crats r­ unning for office who are in support of gun control. His work in ­Virginia, along with Emily’s List, turned the state legislature Demo­cratic in 2018. Bloomberg’s tenacity on the issue of gun control has won him many supporters in many cities. When he announced his run for the presidency at the end of 2019, he had established himself as a credible candidate with support from mayors across the country.

Chapter Summar y Bloomberg’s strengths and weaknesses are born of the same sources: his analytics, his sharp vision, his confidence, and the courage of his convictions. The mayor administered a corporate regime that required law and order, encouraged business to flourish, and allowed New York City residents to feel safe. He looked at the data and agreed with his police commissioner that stop-­and-­frisk was winning the war on crime. Bloomberg did not apologize for stop-­and-­frisk ­until he ran for president. In the beginning of his tenure, he had been a healer; by the end of his administration, he was a lightning rod for controversy mainly b ­ ecause of the policy. A federal court found that stop-­and-­frisk ­v iolated the Fourth and F ­ ourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Another federal court found that the NYPD had no probable cause for the arrest of almost all of the eigh­teen hundred pro-

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testors it apprehended during the RNC. Bloomberg represented a conservative, corporate mayor demanding strict law and order even if his enforcement v­ iolated the constitutional rights of offenders. His use of the stop-­and-­frisk policy could not be blamed on New York State, as policing is a local issue; this was one area in which the city had home rule. At the same time, Bloomberg ­adopted a far more progressive strategy to provide opportunities for young ­people. He sought a safe, closer-­to-­home treatment for juvenile offenders. The one area where the state and the city could have collided was on juvenile offenders, but t­ here he and state officials built a joint cohesive strategy. This is similar to the pattern the mayor set in his educational policies: he approached the major players, convincing the state legislature and governor to give him control over the city’s educational system. In both cases he demonstrated that the state and city could work together quite successfully. Bloomberg demonstrated a commitment to programs concerning youth. He brought juvenile offenders closer to home. He created the Young Men’s Initiative to provide extensive educational opportunity for young ­people of color. He opened c­ areer and technical schools that provided close linkages to skilled jobs in technology. His wish to be known as the educational mayor, regardless of his ­actual success in that area, represented his commitment to young p ­ eople.

  C ONCLUSION The Limits of Power In the 1970’s, the city lost control. We cut back ser­vices in this city by firing police officers, teachers, firefighters and ­every other type of municipal worker. So much so, that crime went out of control, trash ­wasn’t picked up, the schools got worse, the fires ­didn’t get put out. We can not ever let that happen again in this city. —­Michael R. Bloomberg, quoted in “The Bloomberg Budget—in His Own Words”

When Bloomberg took office in 2002, less than four months ­after the attack on the World Trade Center, many thought New York had no ­future as a world city. But over the past twelve years, ­there has been a transformation in the city’s school system, physical environment, streets, parks and economy. We now have an all-­time rec­ord of 3.4 million private sector jobs, 405,398 of which have been created since December 2001. New York City is responsible for almost ten ­percent of all of the new jobs added in the United States during the past dozen years. —­Mitchell L. Moss, “A ­Great Mayor Says Goodbye”

Michael Bloomberg governed differently; he actually brought business discipline and analytics to the business of r­ unning a global city. As Clarence Stone instructs, analy­sis of any mayor’s terms in office must reach beyond the division of pluralist versus class analy­sis (2019). Bloomberg’s governance broadened the tent to include co­ali­tions that previous New York City mayors had ignored. New Yorkers expected him to create an economic development co­ali­tion, but he also created co­ali­tions for public health, environment, and antipoverty initiatives to build consensus for his public policies. When Bloomberg announced his run for the presidency in November 2019, it brought mixed reactions from New Yorkers. The business community was enthusiastic. “Bloomberg was a long-­term thinker, and made investments for the ­future, and that’s what Amer­ic­ a needs right now,” concluded Kathy Wylde of the Partnership for New York City, the city’s largest business advocacy group. “I’m enthusiastic that ­there’s a strong counterweight to the extremes. . . . ​He ­really laid the groundwork for two de­cades of economic growth in all five boroughs” (quoted 240



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in Durkin 2019). New York’s left was not so enthusiastic. Public advocate Jumaane Williams spoke for many when he observed of Bloomberg’s three terms in office, “The rich got richer h ­ ere, and the poor got poorer. . . . ​The question is not w ­ hether his policies w ­ ere successful. Who w ­ ere they successful for?” (quoted in Durkin 2019). The division in the evaluation of Bloomberg’s imprint on the city remains stark and ­bitter. So it is best to begin with facts.

Governance One of Mayor Bloomberg’s greatest contributions was his enthusiastic embrace of all p ­ eople regardless of ethnicity, race, or religion—­especially a­ fter the trauma of 9/11 and especially ­after the caustic divisiveness of his immediate pre­de­ces­sor, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Contrary to playing on racist and ethnic biases, “Bloomberg opposed a City Council resolution to close the New York offices of the Palestine Liberation Organ­ization during his first months as mayor” (Jewish Telegraphic Agency 2002). In 2002 Bloomberg “stood ­behind a controversial appointment to the city’s ­Human Rights Commission, Omar Mohammedi, even as Demo­cratic officials and Jewish groups, such as the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-­ Defamation League, called for Mohammedi’s ouster” (Siegel 2007). This was Bloomberg the courageous leader at his finest. He was the first elected official in the country to tell New Yorkers and all Americans that no one had a right to stop Muslims from building a community center a few blocks from Ground Zero. Many elected officials followed his lead, including President Barack Obama. Former mayor Ed Koch said it best: “Mayor Bloomberg was superb. . . . ​When he saw Al Sharpton the first days of this administration walking down the steps, he walked over to him and shook his hand. That was the right ­thing to do. But Rudy [Giuliani] would never do that” (quoted in Farrell 2013). Setting the right tone also meant that Bloomberg insisted on effective government. From the start he a­ dopted best practices from business and government. The mayor’s emphasis, out of the gate, upon data-­driven decision making was impor­tant and new. As Twitter’s founder, Jack Dosey, explained, Bloomberg “actually continued to simplify city government in relationship to its p ­ eople and provided simpler interfaces to go to government to get something done and vice versa” (quoted in Byers 2013). The tone changed over time, however. By his last term, Bloomberg lost support as he stubbornly clung to his racist, degrading, and damaging stop-­and-­frisk police policy. Many voters resented his pursuit and acquisition of a third term, despite New York City Charter restrictions against it (Marist Poll 2008). Unions became ­bitter about u ­ nion givebacks in pension and health benefits (Barbaro

242 CONCLUSION

2009). And inflexibility in his management style caught up with him. The city was weary, the mayor was cranky, and a consensus formed that it was time for Mike Bloomberg to find new and dif­fer­ent challenges.

Financing the City Bloomberg took the reins of government immediately ­after the 9/11 attack, during the 2008 recession, and through Hurricane Sandy. ­After each of ­these crises he balanced the budget—an impressive achievement. Indeed, when Bloomberg took office on January 1, 2002, he faced a $5 billion deficit, but twelve years ­later he left the city a $1.9 billion surplus. The fiscal year ended with a surplus in ten out of his twelve years in office (see t­ able 3.6, in chapter 3). His strategy of raising property taxes brought tax revenues when the city badly needed them. State constraints forced Bloomberg to raise the most regressive tax, the property tax. He successfully lobbied the state to increase the more progressive income tax. And thanks to ­those early tax increases, the mayor had a cushion when the 2008 recession struck, and that helped the city recover quickly (Bloomberg 2009a). Bloomberg a­ dopted one set of strategies before the 2008 recession and a second set ­after it. Before the 2008 recession (which fell halfway through his second term), he provided city workers generous salary increases. A ­ fter the 2008 recession, however, he grew increasingly constrained in his approach to broad tax increases (Brecher 2010). By his third term, Bloomberg cut city ser­v ices rather than increase taxes. In his third term he became much tougher in ­labor ­union negotiations and he strongly pushed the city council to reduce city agencies’ bud­ gets. His many cuts to the social ser­v ices agencies w ­ ere done without serious efforts to mitigate the impact of ­those cuts. Any mayor who takes on the u ­ nions in a strong u ­ nion city like New York is bound to face pushback. This mayor was certainly correct that pensions and health benefits w ­ ere reducing the city’s choices about where to invest its resources, particularly since the federal and state governments ­were providing fewer resources. Bloomberg’s innovative strategy to offset the continued loss of resources was to or­ga­nize mayors in other New York cities and, together as a united front, approach the New York State legislature and governor (Cuomo 2012b). This worked in reducing pension costs; the mayor won a new tier with lower pension benefits. Bloomberg’s activism in organ­izing statewide supported his belief that, regardless of state constraints, mayors working together could overcome some state limits. Bloomberg’s statewide activism proves Clarence Stone’s contention that “local politics ­matters, but it is ­shaped by the political-­economy context” (1987, 5).



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But statewide activism did not work when he sought to drastically reduce the constraints of New York State’s Civil Ser­v ice Law during his third term. Bloomberg wanted more flexibility in hiring and more power to transfer and fire civil servants. His position set him as a polar opposite to former New York City mayors, such as Fiorello La Guardia and Robert Wagner Jr., who supported civil ser­ vice law and regulations. His attack on civil ser­v ice rules and law failed. Yet, this campaign was classic Bloomberg, reflecting his willingness to take unpop­u­lar stands—­a rare impulse in a politician. ­Every mayor ­faces a fractured governance landscape, and this mayor had to deal with numerous state restrictions on his actions. For example, he could not raise taxes, except the property tax; he could not even increase the number of security cameras on city streets; he could not implement congestion pricing in Midtown Manhattan—­all t­ hese acts required the state’s permission. In addition, the state would impose mandates that cost the city money. As Koch once noted, “The area that always concerned me was that in Albany, they would impose higher pension costs to be borne by the city out of its own monies. Huge dollars, hundreds of millions” (quoted in C. Smith 2008). New York State public authorities owned vast stretches of the city but ­were unaccountable to mayoral authority. In effect, the mayor had ­little control even over significant stretches of the city’s geography. In many ways Bloomberg was the ultimate pragmatic mayor. And this is what Stone contends: “An exclusive focus on structural requirements obscures the range of efforts, strategies, and value choices that community actors make in meeting ­those requirements” (1987, 16). Yet, other than La Guardia, no mayor faced greater challenges or changed the city so fundamentally as did Mike Bloomberg. He protected and grew the city’s resources unlike any previous New York City mayor. His successors enjoyed rich revenue streams gained from increased taxes and economic expansion brought by Bloomberg’s pro-­growth strategies.

Growing the City and Protecting the Environment The only mayor comparable to Mayor Bloomberg in economic development was Fiorello La Guardia, who enjoyed the po­liti­cal equivalent of a blank check from President Franklin Roo­se­velt. Mayor Bloomberg certainly did not have a blank check; he had to persuade the ever skeptical state and federal governments to invest in New York, and he had to lead New Yorkers to believe that the city could be restored, and all while conquering three major catastrophes—9/11, the 2008 re-

244 CONCLUSION

cession, and Hurricane Sandy. And he had to increase taxes so that his mayoralty and t­ hose coming a­ fter him would have sufficient resources to retain a decent quality of life for New Yorkers. And he did. In higher education, Bloomberg’s bold public policy strategy of linking commerce and education spurred dramatic growth in the city’s technology sector, creating a new and potent pillar in the city’s economy. The same held true for secondary education, in which his innovations dramatically grew ­career training and technological high schools. Years l­ater his strategy paid off as job growth in the technology sector dramatically increased. Bloomberg’s pro-­growth policy aligned closely with his emphasis on improving the city’s technological infrastructure. The 311 information call system stands out as an impor­tant achievement early in his ­career. The mayor invested in several other technological advances, such as merging the 911 emergency system among first responders, the computerized building codes revision, the Department of Health and ­Human Ser­v ices’ HHS-­Connect proj­ect, and the revitalized technological infrastructure for the city’s Economic Development Corporation. Bloomberg’s co­ali­tion building ­toward improving the environment and promoting green policies remains a notable achievement. He linked urban economic development to public health and air pollution. It was not just the one million trees planted during his tenure; it was his PlaNYC; his energy efficiency program; his demands that his administration create plans to combat the next Hurricane Sandy, even though it came ­toward the end of his mayoralty; his success in limiting carbon emissions; and his establishing a long-­term sustainability office to track green initiatives. Bloomberg’s rezoning efforts allowed New Yorkers at last to enjoy the city’s vast waterfront throughout all five boroughs. Manufacturing no longer dominated the ­water’s edge, and Bloomberg made sure that parks and housing w ­ ere overlooking the ­water. The transformation was staggering: bicyclists could r­ ide around Manhattan without fighting traffic, and runners found parkland accessible throughout the five boroughs. Such a transformation highlighted the ever-­growing issue created by urban growth: the absence of affordable housing. But it was an issue of economic growth, not of urban decline. Another area in which Bloomberg excelled was public health. The mayor succeeded in stabilizing the finances of the city’s health and hospital system. His accomplishments in public health policy remain exceptional: putting an end to smoking in restaurants and bars, eliminating the use of trans fats in food ser­v ice establishments, and improving air quality through the use of clean heating oil and using low sulfur diesel fuel for school buses. Bloomberg set the bar high for other mayors who would follow.



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Harvey Molotch has described the city as a growth machine; indeed, this was the Bloomberg strategy. The prob­lem remained that growth did not benefit all sectors. Bloomberg’s theme of building partnerships with the private sector meant, as Molotch observes, “an increasing suspicion that in many areas, at many historical moments, growth benefits only a small proportion of local residents” (1976, 318). Certainly the increase in homelessness evidenced the real­ity that not every­one benefited from Bloomberg’s growth machine.

The Staggering Growth in Homelessness Homelessness is a challenge across the United States. Cities everywhere have thousands of citizens living in tents—or worse. ­There are no tent cities in New York City. B ­ ecause of court rulings based on a state constitutional obligation to care for the needy, New York City is required to ­house ­people who are homeless. By the end of Bloomberg’s mayoralty, more than fifty-­one thousand ­people w ­ ere living in shelters as compared to 31,063 when he took office. Mayor Bloomberg failed to reduce homelessness; indeed, the increases w ­ ere dramatic. While he managed to provide shelter off the street, he failed to move homeless p ­ eople into permanent homes. The fact that state and federal actions prevented Bloomberg from fully implementing his policies is unmistakable, but his response was counterproductive. When faced with federal and state cutbacks in the Advantage New York program, the mayor summarily ended the program. He could have continued this impor­ tant program with city money, but he did not. Advocates for the homeless testified at the state legislature about the inadequacies of the Advantage program and then ­were understandably outraged when Mayor Bloomberg ended it. It is as if the advocates naively trusted the state legislators to do the right t­ hing—­improve or replace the Advantage program rather than eliminate it. But the state legislature was still dominated by rural and suburban interests, and did not necessarily have the city’s best interests as a priority. Astonishingly, Governor Andrew Cuomo and the state legislature made sure that no other state funds could be used for permanent housing ­unless so directed by the state. This was a pivotal moment for the Bloomberg administration’s approach to homelessness. If only Bloomberg had continued the Advantage program with city funds, more homeless families would have been in permanent homes and the city may not have suffered such a dramatic increase in homelessness. The city suffered from an eternal dearth of low-­income housing. Regardless of the strategies the Bloomberg administration a­ dopted, most homelessness

246 CONCLUSION

f­undamentally resulted from a lack of affordable housing. Although this may seem so obvious as to not require proof, it is a common fallacy that homeless ­people are themselves to blame for their lack of housing. But the data clearly show that large numbers of homeless families came from three venues: rent regulated apartments, specific geographic areas of the city, and the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). Although the Bloomberg administration set up the homeless prevention network HomeBase, with centers to help homeless ­people in hard-­pressed areas, ­little was done to end evictions from rent regulated apartments or from NYCHA buildings. The prob­lem of homelessness is a structural one, not a personal one. It lies mainly in a lack of decent affordable housing, and in this essential understanding the Bloomberg administration fell short. Bloomberg’s management weakness is unambiguous. One reason Bloomberg miscalculated the growth in homelessness was the way he structured his city departments. Linda Gibbs, his commissioner of homeless ser­v ices, had no way to influence NYCHA or the Rent Guidelines Board. She established HomeBase in specific geographic areas, but she could not put l­awyers in housing court. T ­ hese strategies ­were outside of Gibbs’s portfolio even ­after she became a deputy mayor. In contrast, Bloomberg gave Daniel Doctoroff, his deputy director for economic development, wide-­ranging freedom to do what he saw fit. Agencies that dealt with housing reported to Doctoroff. Responsibility without authority is an impossible position to effect change, as Bloomberg himself well knew. Gibbs or­ga­nized interagency meetings, but to no avail. Bloomberg could have and should have dealt with what was falling between the cracks among agencies but he did not. The mayor’s answer to t­ hose who complained about the lack of low-­income housing gives perspective to his thinking: “In this city 8.5 million ­people are living on average 2.5 years longer than they did twelve years ago. Imagine if it went the other direction! Our prob­lems h ­ ere now are all prob­lems of success. You say ­people ­can’t afford to live ­here, ­there are no vacancies. Our prob­lem now is that every­one wants to go to our public schools. Traffic? If you ­don’t want traffic, go to Detroit” (quoted in Burke 2013). Bloomberg knew that the city had gone through incredibly difficult financial crises during his mayoralty, first a­ fter 9/11 and then the 2008 recession. Given t­ hese difficult circumstances, by 2013 he was relieved that he could talk about prob­lems of growth rather than stagnation and decline. But it was still his job to deal with ­those prob­lems. He could have been far more aggressive, progressive, and creative in tackling homelessness through building far more low-­income housing. This was a failure.



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Lack of Low-­I ncome Housing The frequent refrain is that the power of New York State over the city is just an excuse that mayors use to explain why they have failed at some policy. Nothing could be more misleading. Five years a­ fter Bloomberg left office, Mara Gay wrote an end-­ of-­year editorial in the New York Times about the strongest tenant protections in a quarter ­century when the state legislature passed a law protecting rent regulated units. The estimate was that at least thirty-­five thousand fewer tenants w ­ ere saved from eviction since June of that year (Gay 2019). As a consequence of this tenant protection state law, fewer ­people needed shelter. This one action by the state legislature prevented many thousands from the misery of homelessness. This is the power of state government compared to city government (see chapter 6). New York State and the federal government are responsible for much of the lack, and loss, of low-­income housing, but it is the city’s residents who must live with the consequences. The state did not commit resources to the city’s housing prob­lems even as the state retained control of rent regulations. Compounding the prob­lem, the federal government cut millions of dollars from public housing. Consequently, NYCHA has operated in deficits for the last two de­cades. The state s­ topped funding NYCHA. We easily condemn local elected officials who must prioritize countless demands on a ­limited bud­get, but we forget that the city is a creature of, and subordinate to, the state, and as such is not the master of its own destiny. It is the federal and state governments that ended or drastically reduced funding public housing, but it is the city that is left to strug­gle without the needed resources. Yet Bloomberg still had options about low-­income housing that he refused to exercise. He ignored the “three p’s”: preserving, producing, and protecting. The city never tried to take back Battery Park City, wrestle control of rent regulation from the state, cease the sale of city properties to a private trust, provide city rent vouchers, or allow tax incentives only for ­those housing units that remained permanently affordable. Lastly, he ignored the consequences of his growth strategy and did not protect areas predominantly occupied by Black residents, such as Fort Greene, from gentrification. Unfortunately, policymakers, both conservative and progressive, have not given t­ hese ideas serious consideration. Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio, has provided attorneys for some low-­income tenants who face eviction in housing court, but has yet to stop the sale of city-­owned property to a private trust. De Blasio committed to renovating NYCHA housing, although his commitments have come only ­after outrage over lead poisoning led to a court decree and pressure from state and federal government. The state and federal governments have yet to commit any funding to aid in the NYCHA renovations. New York City is left to pick up the tab—­a move so outrageous that Stan Brezenoff, hired to remedy NYCHA’s many structural issues, resigned, demanding to know “Where is the state and the

248 CONCLUSION

federal government?” (quoted in Goodman 2019). Bloomberg was boxed in by the state and federal governments. Without more funding he could not produce sufficient low-­income housing. Without the state enforcement of rent regulations, landlords could continue to drive out tenants, and did so with a greedy vengeance. The legacy wrought by the abject abandonment by the state and federal governments still haunts New York City years ­after Bloomberg left the mayoralty.

Antipover ty Initiatives Mayor Bloomberg might have been leading a corporate regime, but his interests ­were much broader. He believed that poverty is reduced through a multifaceted approach: increased jobs, improved education, a stronger public health system, a better criminal justice system, and affordable housing. His strategy was not to provide support for poor ­people by broadening access to public benefits b ­ ecause that would increase the welfare rolls and increase the pressure on the city’s financial resources. Quite the opposite: he deliberately followed Giuliani’s policy of keeping impediments to access public assistance. His strategy was a comprehensive one: if he succeeded in increasing jobs, improving the educational system and building enough affordable housing, he could reduce the number of p ­ eople in poverty. While this strategy did not reduce the number of ­people in poverty, he did manage a small improvement in poverty rates over his three terms in office while, in the rest of the nation’s cities, the poverty rate increased. Ultimately, Bloomberg’s rec­ord on poverty is mixed. He began very robust programs, such as Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (a higher education initiative), opened the Office of Financial Empowerment, expanded school-­based health centers, and established the Center for Economic Opportunity, which remains a significant department to build ongoing, long-­term initiatives. But his continuing resource reduction of welfare agencies undermined success and remain power­ful indicators that he did not appreciate how welfare policies could aid poor ­people’s well-­being. Nor did he understand that, as the leader, he sometimes had to disagree with his commissioners, question their judgment, challenge his staff, and seek new strategies.

Successes and Failures in Education Reform Mayor Bloomberg took on improving the schools, something no other New York City mayor had the nerve to do. And in some ways he did succeed. First, his ad-



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ministration increased teachers’ salaries dramatically, which helped school officials attract and retain good and experienced teachers. T ­ hese salary increases ­were one of the most impor­tant actions any mayor could take to improve education in the city. Improved salaries attract quality teachers and allow the city to compete with the suburbs. Second, school principals w ­ ere given more authority in exchange for increased accountability. The Bloomberg administration fi­nally got the u ­ nion to agree that se­nior teachers could not use their se­niority to transfer to open positions, a change in policy that gave principals more freedom to choose their teachers and their assistant principals. Third, he was one of the few mayors to lengthen the school day and the school year. Fourth, he built dozens more ­career and technical education programs and started collaborations between the private sector and universities. Fifth, he gained control of the school system by convincing the governor and state legislature to drastically change state law so that Bloomberg had exclusive control of the city school system. T ­ hese structural changes ­were useful and productive and, for the most part, remain so t­ oday. Bloomberg’s critics certainly focused on the mayor’s domineering style. At no point did he provide ave­nues for input from parents, alienating stakeholders who could have proven useful allies. Unfortunately, the mayor appointed a chancellor who knew ­little about education: Joel Klein, a businessman, who reor­ga­nized the school system three times in a de­cade, creating destabilization and questionable pro­gress. Bloomberg did not learn from his m ­ istake and choose another noneducator, Cathie Black, as the chancellor to replace Klein, even though he had knowledgeable educators at the Department of Education who had proven track rec­ords. Bloomberg had a blind spot when it came to the concept of appointing educators to run the education system. Bloomberg’s support of charter schools continues to bitterly divide New Yorkers. Many New Yorkers want choice: if the public school is terrible, parents want to be able to send their c­ hildren to another school. For policymakers, advocates, and elected officials, the issues are power and resources: charter schools drain scarce resources from public schools. Bloomberg bet the farm on raising state test scores. The mayor’s critics focused on his inability to significantly improve student achievement. H ­ ere the state made all the difference. From 2002 ­until 2010, test scores, in both elementary and secondary schools, slowly ­rose in the city. Bloomberg took credit, convinced that his emphasis on testing, holding principals and teachers accountable for t­ hose scores, was working. Then state officials changed the scoring on the tests, causing city test scores to drop. Bloomberg, who emphasized data-­driven decision making, faced data manipulated by the state education department that was difficult to refute. Even though he succeeded in increasing graduation rates and increasing the number of students taking Advanced Placement courses and earning more

250 CONCLUSION

course credits, his own emphasis on test scores meant that when the state changed the state norms, he failed, by his own mea­sure­ment, in improving the schools for the next generation.

Crime and Punishment Although not the authoritarian Giuliani, Bloomberg was still a “law and order” mayor. He infuriated many New Yorkers with his stop-­and-­frisk policy, and did not listen to the many voices that told him that this invasive, degrading and damaging pro­cess had a devastating effect on young ­people of color. During his tenure, this issue deeply divided the city’s residents along racial lines. He only changed his position years ­after he left the mayoralty when he ran for president in 2019, and this appeared opportunistic. He also did not address the rising vio­lence in the city’s jails. Nevertheless, his commitment to young p ­ eople of all races and economic backgrounds was strong. He wanted young p ­ eople to succeed and found innovative policies and strategies to help them. For example, he worked closely with the state and brought back juvenile offenders to the city from upstate facilities. The mayor reduced the number of p ­ eople held in the city’s jails, and he promoted a national campaign to take guns off the streets. In effect, his rec­ord on crime and punishment represented both a corporate regime that wished to preserve order and a progressive regime that wanted to provide opportunities for ­those caught up in the criminal justice system. Although policing belongs to the local jurisdiction, Bloomberg made a difference in the lives of young p ­ eople by working closely with state actors. Unfortunately, he used data to make his decisions about stop-­and-­frisk rather than listening more closely to ­those subjected to the wrong-­headed police policy. Again, he stubbornly allowed his commissioner to make the policy with the result of incredible anger on the part of ­people of color subjected to stop and frisk, a policy ultimately found unconstitutional in a federal court challenge.

The Lasting Bloomberg Imprint Bloomberg’s rec­ord and legacy can be viewed through the limits he faced by the constraints of state government, the circumscribed authority imposed by federal and state courts, his own management style, the scope of his co­ali­tion building, his relationships with communities of color, and the vision and innovation he brought to government.



The Limits of Power

251

The state and federal government provided ever fewer resources, forcing the city to finance far more ser­v ices than it had in the past. New York State switched its emphasis from funding social ser­v ices to funding education, leaving the city to pick up the social ser­vices tab. State constraints often l­ imited Bloomberg’s public policies, as did the judiciary. As Benjamin Barber asserts, “The ­legal and fiscal jurisdictions of states over municipalities means that it is the state and not the municipality that determines how t­ hese urban resources are taxed and how revenues are distributed” (2011, 322). Bloomberg battled the constraints of state power far more successfully than most, through organ­izing mayors in the state to garner fiscal support. He did not achieve his goals in housing and homelessness due in large part to his inability to surmount ­these external limits. However, in education, he bought into the conservative reform movement that attacked public education. And in issues around law and order, he refused to listen to the many complaints about his rigid stop-and-frisk policy. Bloomberg did not adjust his management style to fit his new job as mayor. He gave far too much latitude to his commissioners. Doctoroff has said that Bloomberg once told him, “My philosophy is to pick p ­ eople smarter than me and let them do their job. My role is to support them” (Doctoroff 2017, 26). Although this was a welcomed change from early regimes that micromanaged agencies and treated commissioners as messengers, it brought its own prob­lems. When commissioners, such as education chancellor Joel Klein, made major errors, Mayor Bloomberg did not pull the plug soon enough. This was particularly the case in education and welfare ser­vice agencies, about which the mayor knew too l­ ittle and in which he trusted his commissioners too much. And as data driven as he was, Bloomberg sometimes ignored the data in front of him. His belief that somehow agencies could thrive while undergoing annual bud­get cuts in positions (which came with no data to support it) was wishful thinking. If he had seriously considered the data, he could have seen the ­mistake. He could not justify the loss of child-­care placements and the turmoil created for working parents when EarlyLearn NYC was implemented with fewer child-­care slots. He failed to pay attention to the data that quite clearly showed he had major gaps in low-­income housing starts. He was unresponsive to criticism of his policies ­toward NYCHA. He ignored the growing vio­lence at Rikers Island. And he failed to monitor his tone, which grew increasingly sarcastic and caustic over time. Richard Greenwald (2013), dean of St. Joseph’s College in Brooklyn, said it best: One won­ders what Bloomberg could do, or rather could have done, if he had paid more attention to his tone and messaging in terms of class.

252 CONCLUSION

In the end, like all mayors of a big city, he could never please all. But his policies have led to investments in New York by tech companies and universities that bring not just excitement and talent, but even, one suspects, a­ ctual jobs. His stance on gay marriage, gun control, and support for the arts, has given him a national platform. Even his educational policies, which one can fairly say are a mixed bag, have shown improvements for the city’s students. Yet, for many New Yorkers struggling to survive in a city that is getting more and more expensive, Bloomberg has come to be defined solely by this tone deafness. This is a common theme about Bloomberg. Tony Butler, a former Franciscan monk, operates the Bread & Life Mission in Brooklyn and serves over a half million meals a year to poor ­people. Butler met Bloomberg when he came for a tour of Bread & Life, and provides a harsh assessment of Mayor Bloomberg: “­There are two kinds of p ­ eople when it comes to the poor. One kind says ‘What’s wrong with them?’ And the other says ‘What’s wrong with us?’ Bloomberg looks like a ‘What’s wrong with them?’ kind of guy” (quoted in J. H. Richardson 2011). Bloomberg did not question his growth ideology. He established a corporate regime focused on rezoning the city and reclaiming the waterfront. In addition, he succeeded in creating formal and informal co­ali­tions outside the economic development arena to achieve his goals. B ­ ehind Bloomberg’s success includes the co­ali­tions built around critical policy areas other than economic development. He established an environmental co­ali­tion, an antipoverty co­ali­tion, and a public health co­ali­tion, all of which w ­ ere quite successful in implementing innovative public policies. However, he ignored issues with his growth strategy—namely, the gentrification of many city neighborhoods that resulted in Black residents leaving and White residents moving in. Michael Bloomberg governed New York City as a pragmatic cap­i­tal­ist who believed in a robust private sector and a strong, vibrant public sector. Bloomberg supported the private sector through his commitment to developing the city’s technology sector and rezoning much of the city. He rejected the traditional liberal approach to social issues; instead he suppressed the welfare rolls and supported the stop-­and-­frisk policy of the New York Police Department. But he never rejected the public sector, as so many conservatives do ­today. Quite the opposite: he supported an activist municipal government. Bloomberg certainly belonged to the progressive reform movement of the city’s history given his attention to poverty, education, affordable housing, public health, and job creation. His success in improving the public health of New Yorkers became a national model. He raised taxes in the progressive tradition. In his first term, he brought the city together, healing racial, religious, and ethnic strife. Bloomberg’s leadership proves



The Limits of Power

253

Stone’s theory that a corporate regime can have a very large umbrella and address concerns of all its citizens. Bloomberg accomplished just that. By addressing the issues of poverty and education, he succeeded in tying his strategies to economic opportunity. Yet, growth can be a mixed blessing, and that is something that Bloomberg did not acknowledge. As John Logan and Harvey Molotch note, “Residents of declining cities, as well as p ­ eople living in more dynamic areas, are often deceived by the extravagant claims that growth solves prob­lems. ­These claims demand a realistic evaluation” (1987, 56). Although Bloomberg insisted on data-­driven decision making, he did not adjust his policies when the data brought bad news. Bloomberg witnessed the decline in low-­income housing and the subsequent growth in homelessness during his administration yet clung to the same positions: build low-­income housing, but not enough of it; build market-­rate housing without requiring sufficient set-­asides; stop using Section 8 vouchers for the homeless, but replace it with nothing; look at the data from housing court on the number of p ­ eople being evicted, but refuse to provide attorneys in housing court; and watch NYCHA residents as they are evicted from their homes ­going directly to shelters, but instead of stopping the evictions, open more shelters. Although Stone’s urban theory does not sufficiently appreciate state interference of local mayors’ intentions, he has, with Robert Whelan and William Murin, fairly described the strength a leader can bring to the po­liti­cal arena: “The actions of individual leaders should be seen as efforts to mobilize and sustain the use of resources. For that reason, po­liti­cal leaders do not operate in­de­pen­dent of the social structure or of the nature of the economy. At the same time, social structures and economies ­don’t devise and install po­liti­cal arrangement. That is the role of po­liti­cal leaders. Po­liti­cal leaders must work with the resources they can mobilize (and anticipate what competing leaders might be able to mobilize). At the same time, they are not confined to a single pattern of arrangements. Leadership is in part a creative exercise” (1986, 203). Bloomberg responded with energy and skill to the catastrophes of 9/11, the 2008 recession, and Hurricane Sandy. Any one of ­these traumas could have buried New York City, let alone all three events in succession. As time passes, even given his well-­documented failures, Bloomberg’s mayoralty w ­ ill be far more appreciated than when he completed his last term. Notwithstanding his failures, New York City was rewarded by Michael Bloomberg’s stewardship and continues to reap the benefits of his vision. Yet, it is unclear ­future city officials have learned the lesson that state and federal governments dictate policies making it very difficult for mayors to succeed in their goals. It should not be the city’s responsibilities to divide its l­imited resources to cover state and federal responsibilities.

254 CONCLUSION

Michael Bloomberg governed with incredibly strong and principled leadership skills. “Leadership is about ­doing what you think is right and then building a constituency b ­ ehind it,” he explained. “It is not ­doing a poll and following from the back. What leaders should do is make decisions as to what they think is in the public interest based on the best advice that they can get, and then try and build a constituency and bring it along” (quoted in Bennet 2012). New York City’s 108th mayor’s remarks about the uproar over an Islamic cultural Center being built a few blocks from Ground Zero reflect the strength of his leadership. In a speech Bloomberg gave at Grace Mansion as he hosted the last iftar, or fast-­ breaking dinner, of Ramadan, he concluded, “Let me declare that we in New York are Jews and Christians and Muslims, and we always have been. And above all of that, we are Americans, each with an equal right to worship and pray where we choose. ­There is nowhere in the five boroughs that is off limits to any religion” (quoted in Prothero 2010). Michael Bloomberg understood leadership, and he led with confidence and courage. Ultimately, his support of the right of Muslims to worship and his rejection of hate, rather than calling for equal treatment of all religions, is his most significant and positive legacy.

Appendix 1 THE NUMBER OF HOMELESS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2002–2014

YEAR

TOTAL HOMELESS POPULATION

TOTAL HOMELESS ­CHILDREN

2002

31,063

13,088

2003

38,464

16,711

2004

38,317

16,361

2005

36,630

15,094

2006

31,554

11,996

2007

35,112

14,210

2008

35,097

14,966

2009

36,598

15,523

2010

39,066

16,346

2011

39,483

15,535

2012

42,805

17,162

2013

50,135

21,034

2014

53,615

22,712

Source: Co­ali­tion for the Homeless 2017. Note: January numbers used except for 2012, for which February was recorded.

255

Appendix 2 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATION PRO­G RESS TEST SCORES IN READING AND MATHE­M ATICS FOR GRADES FOUR AND EIGHT

The most objective test scores come from the National Assessment of Education Pro­gress (NAEP). ­These test scores, as reported by the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES), demonstrated improvements in both reading and mathe­matics for New York City students over a ten-­year period.1

Reading The average score for students in New York City in fourth grade reading in 2013 (224) was greater than their average score in 2002 (215), and the difference was statistically significant. Students in New York City who performed below \the NAEP Basic level\ in fourth grade reading ­were at 30 ­percent in 2013. This percentage is significantly lower than that in 2002, at 39 ­percent. The average score for students in New York City in eighth grade reading in 2013 (256) was significantly greater than their average score in 2003 (252). Students in New York City who performed below the NAEP Basic level in eighth grade reading w ­ ere at 33 ­percent in 2013. This percentage was lower than that in 2003, at 38 ­percent, and the difference was statistically significant.

257

258

Appendix 2

Mathe­m atics The average score for students in New York City in fourth grade mathe­matics in 2013 (236) was significantly lower than their average score in 2003 (226). Students in New York City who performed below the NAEP Basic level in fourth grade mathe­matics ­were at 23 ­percent in 2013. This percentage was lower than that in 2003, at 33 ­percent, and the difference was statistically significant. The average score for students in New York City in eighth grade mathe­matics in 2013 (274) was significantly higher than their average score in 2003 (266). Students in New York City who performed below the NAEP Basic level in eighth grade mathe­matics w ­ ere at 39 ­percent in 2013. This percentage was lower than that in 2003, at 46 ­percent, and the difference was statistically significant. In other words, according to the NCES, ­there was real change in achievement levels from 2003 to 2013. The Bloomberg administration put pressure on the educational system and got positive results.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Vacancy decontrol was a tool to bring apartments to market rate rather than have t­ hose units be rent regulated. Before 2019, when a regulated apartment reached a certain rent rate ­under a par­tic­ul­ar tenant, state law required that the rent on that apartment be reverted to market rate rents as soon as that tenant left. 3. CREATING LONG-­T ERM FISCAL HEALTH

1. See New York Constitution, Article IX. It is quite easy for the state legislature to pass laws governing only New York City. It is true that the state legislature must apply uniform laws to all local governments of equal size (special laws can be passed on request of two-­ thirds of the local legislative body or the chief executive officer with a majority of the local legislature). But such a law is meaningless, since the state legislature simply states that proposed legislation applies to all cities with a population over five million. T ­ here is only one city in the state that qualifies ­under that rule—­New York City. 4. GROWING THE CITY AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

1. See, for example, Angotti 2008; Berg 2007; the discussion of the Hudson Yards in Brash 2011; and Sorokin 2018. 2. Rohit T. Aggarwala, director of long-­term planning and sustainability from 2006 to 2010; Adrian Benepe, commissioner of NYC Parks and Recreation from 2002 to 2012; Patricia E. Harris, first deputy mayor; Cass Holloway, deputy mayor for operations; Robert C. Liever, deputy mayor for economic development from 2007 to 2010; Janette Sadik-­Khan, commissioner of the Department of Transportation from 2007 to 2013; and Edward Skyler, deputy mayor for the Department of Operations. 5. THE STAGGERING GROWTH IN HOMELESSNESS

1. Plaintiffs sued the city to stop the city from ending the Advantage Program. The appellate court ruled that the trial court correctly found that the Advantage rent subsidy program for the homeless was simply a social ser­v ices program, and that defendants did not intend to be bound contractually (Zheng v. City of New York 2012). 8. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN EDUCATION REFORM

1. A child is “living in relative poverty in a ­house­hold in which disposable income, when adjusted for ­family size and composition, is less than 50 ­percent of the national median income” (Adamson 2012). 2. The educational systems ­were ­those of Alberta, Canada; Estonia; Finland; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Ontario, Canada; Poland; Shanghai, China; Singapore; and Taiwan.

259

260

NOTES TO PAGES 230–233

9. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

1. CompStat is an NYPD management tool that uses the most recent data to make decisions about where resources should be placed and what type and how many resources should be used. 2. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (2013). https://­casetext​.­com​/­case​ /­floyd​-­v​-­city​-­of​-­ny​-­2. APPENDIX 2

1. Source: NCES 2014.

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Index

Abyssinian Development Corporation, 143 Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP), 180, 248 Adler v. Deegan (1929), 15 Administration for ­Children’s Ser­v ices (ACS) (NYC), 53, 56, 127, 183–85, 191–92, 229 Advanced Placement courses (education), 213–14, 249 Advantage Program (homelessness), 4, 118–20, 124, 129–31, 132, 193–94, 245, 259c5n1 affordable housing: advocates for, 102, 145, 158; Bloomberg’s approach to, 4, 17, 20, 22, 32, 102, 111, 129, 131–34, 146–53, 167–71, 252; city council and, 102; criticism of Bloomberg on, 32, 102, 105, 150–52, 156, 158, 161–63, 168; economic development and, 83, 85, 102, 105; federal government and, 106, 131, 163–66, 169; homelessness and, 129, 131, 245–46; infrastructure and, 102; low-­income housing distinguished from, 6, 132–33, 168; poverty and, 175, 248; previous mayoral decisions and, 169; public-­private partnerships and, 22, 102, 141; rent policies and, 136; rezoning initiatives and, 102–3, 146–47, 244; state government and, 131, 153, 166–67; tax incentives for, 143–44, 146, 170. See also low-­income housing; New York City Housing Authority African Americans. See Black community Age-­Friendly NYC (2009), 80 Aggarwala, Rohit T., 82 AIDS/HIV ser­v ices, 22, 111, 114, 130, 160, 190 Alexander, Michelle, 231, 234 Alvorado, Tony, 208 Ambler, Village of Euclid v. (1926), 78–79 antipoverty initiatives. See poverty Applied Sciences NYC initiative (2010), 80, 88 Area Median Income (AMI) (housing), 133–34, 144, 151, 157 arts and cultural initiatives: Bloomberg’s support for, 17, 40–41, 99–100, 252; bud­get of NYC and, 40, 100; commission on, 41, 99; economic development and, 77, 99–100; education and, 220; film and theater in, 99;

poverty and, 186; previous mayoral decisions and, 99; public-­private partnerships and, 17 Asian community, 103, 155, 159, 193, 213 Aspiring Principals Program (APP), 212 Astone, Nan Marie, 182 Atlantic Yards (Brooklyn), 85, 102 Austin, James, 234 Bagley, Katherine, 92 Banks, Steven, 25, 117, 190 Barber, Benjamin, 14, 16–17, 251 Barclays Center (Brooklyn), 85 Barrios-­Paoli, Lilliam, 30, 41, 112, 126, 186 Barron, David, 1, 13 Battery Park City, 27, 45, 148–51, 161–62, 170–71, 247 Battery Park City Authority (BPCA), 149–51, 161–62, 168 Beame, Abraham, 19, 31 Bell, Terrell, 201 Benepe, Adrian, 82, 92 Berg, Joel, 187–88, 197 Bern­stein, Andrea, 47 Bharara, Preet, 98, 155, 235 BigApps Competition, 98 Black, Cathie, 200, 249 Black community: Black-­owned businesses, 104–5; Bloomberg’s outreach to, 7–8, 12, 25–26, 227; childcare and, 193; criminal justice and, 7; education and, 7, 208, 211, 213–14, 218, 225; gentrification and, 103, 159; leaders in, 12, 25–26; low-­income housing and, 155, 159; poverty and, 26, 182, 225; previous mayoral decisions and, 7, 25; rezoning initiatives and, 103; stop-­and-­frisk policy and, 8, 12, 35, 230, 232–33 blackout of 2004, 30 Bloom, Nicholas, 154–56 Bloomberg, Michael R: business background of, 1–2, 21; education of, 21; election of, 1, 24; lack of po­liti­cal experience of, 1; national recognition of, 2; philanthropy of, 34, 40–41, 182; presidential run of, 8, 227, 238, 240, 250; wealth of, 40. See also mayoral approach of Bloomberg; specific topics 311

312 Index

Bloomberg Businessweek, 48 Bloomberg financial terminals, 40 Bloomberg L.P., 21, 27, 30, 40 Bloomberg Philanthropies, 182 Bloomfield, David, 203 Blow, Charles, 233 Board of Estimate v. Morris (1989), 13–14 Bollinger, Lee, 88, 96 Bowers, James, 14 Bowles, Jonathan, 83, 102, 180, 197 Boyd, Donald, 212 Bratton, Bill, 231 Brewer, Gale, 98 Brezenoff, Stanley, 155, 247–48 Broad, Eli, 204 the Bronx: Bloomberg’s approach to, 2, 84–85; economic development in, 78, 83–85; education in, 205, 218; homelessness in, 29, 110; infrastructure in, 2, 28, 84; low-­income housing in, 142–43, 150; parks and green space in, 84, 89–91; revitalization proj­ects in, 2, 84–85; rezoning policies in, 84, 104; South Bronx in, 78, 84–85, 142; Yankee stadium in, 84 Bronx Intake Unit, 29, 110, 125 Bronx Terminal Market, 83–84 Brooklyn: affordable housing in, 85; arts and culture in, 85–86; Bloomberg’s approach to, 2, 85–86; economic development in, 78, 83, 85–86; education in, 218; gentrification in, 159; infrastructure in, 2, 28, 85; low-­income housing in, 102, 143, 159; parks and green space in, 37, 50, 85, 89–91; revitalization proj­ects in, 2, 85–86; rezoning policies in, 79, 82, 85, 151, 159; sports teams in, 85 Brooklyn Bridge Park, 37, 83 Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation, 50 Brooklyn Nets, 85 bud­get of New York City: arts and cultural initiatives and, 40, 100; balancing initiatives in, 9, 43, 49–50, 74; Bloomberg’s approach to, 3, 9, 14, 20–21, 34, 38–40, 43–50, 54–55, 73–75, 242–43, 251; “bud­get dance” in, 57, 100; business community and, 19–20; city council and, 45–47, 57; civil ser­v ice reform and, 56–57, 243; commissioners and, 31; commuter tax and, 39, 48, 50; criminal justice and, 32, 35, 47, 52, 55, 66; criticism of Bloomberg on, 49–50, 251; cuts to, 31–32, 35, 38, 47–48, 52t, 55t, 57t, 72–75, 126, 242; deficits in, 38, 46–48; economic development and, 19, 52, 74, 77, 83, 244; education and, 6,

39, 51–52, 55, 72, 74, 206–7, 216, 219, 244, 251; federal government and, 20, 43–45, 47, 72–73, 72t, 251; first term of Bloomberg and, 45–48, 50t, 54t, 60–61, 242; fiscal crises generally, 19–20, 43–44, 74; fiscal crisis of 1975 and, 19, 38, 46–48, 74, 76, 149; health care and, 52, 55, 60–61, 70–71; HIV/AIDS ser­v ices and, 160; homelessness and, 116, 119, 121–22, 121t, 124, 126, 130; Hurricane Sandy and, 43, 73, 242; income tax and, 44, 50; ­labor ­unions and, 19, 39–40, 43, 45–46, 59–70, 242; layoffs and, 47; limits of mayoral power and, 14, 19–20, 43–45, 243; living wage policies and, 32, 60; low-­income housing and, 4–5, 132, 145–49, 163–66; parks and green space and, 55; pensions and, 3, 15, 44, 60, 67–71, 74; poverty and, 172t, 177, 177t, 179, 184, 186–87, 196, 198; previous mayoral decisions and, 34, 47–48, 52, 60, 74; progressive taxes and, 44, 242; property taxes and, 14, 39, 41, 44–45, 48, 50, 54–55, 242–43; public health and, 9–10, 73–74; quotes by Bloomberg on, 34, 38–39, 48, 72, 74–75, 76; race and, 16; salary for productivity increases and, 40–44, 46, 60, 75; sales tax and, 43–44, 49–50; second term of Bloomberg and, 54–55, 55t, 67, 242; September 11 attacks and, 38, 43, 46, 50, 54, 73, 163, 242; social ser­v ices and, 48, 55, 59, 73–75, 126, 242, 251; state government and, 3, 14–15, 19, 20–21, 43–49, 72–73, 121–23, 242–43, 247, 251, 259c3n1; surpluses in, 43, 43t, 54, 57, 57t, 59, 73, 242t; tax increases and, 3, 20–21, 38–39, 41, 43–50, 50t, 54t, 59, 73–75, 242–43, 252; technological initiatives and, 55; third term of Bloomberg and, 55–59, 67–68, 74–75, 242; 2008 recession and, 3, 43, 54, 62, 67, 73–74, 163, 242; welfare programs and, 20–21 Buery, Richard, 179, 182 Building Resiliency Task Force, 81 Burden, Amanda, 30, 82, 102 Bush, George W., 165, 202 Butler, Tony, 187, 252 C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, 80, 93 Calaghan, Michael, 130 Callahan, Robert, 108 Callahan v. Carey (1979), 15, 108, 112, 120 Campaign for ­Children, 193 Canada, Geoffrey, 178 ­career and technology education (CTE), 6, 210–11, 223–26 Carey, Callahan v. (1979), 15, 108, 112, 120

Index

Carey, Hugh, 19 Car­ne­gie Corporation, 40 Carrion, Gladys, 229 Carroll, Maurice, 49 Car­ter, Jimmy, 142 Casey, Timothy, 174 CBA (Community Benefits Agreement), 85, 102 Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad, City of Clinton v. (1868), 15 Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO), 179–81, 187–88, 196–97, 248 Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence (CIDI), 98 Center on Economic Opportunity, 227 Center 71 (welfare programs), 190 Central Park Conservancy, 37, 90, 92 charter schools. See education Chatsky, Jerome, 143 Chettiar, Inimai, 234 Chew, Rebecca, 110 Child Care Block Grant (CCBG), 184 childcare ser­v ices, 32, 60, 143, 175, 183–85, 191–93, 192t, 198, 224 ­Children’s First Initiative (2002), 203–4 ­Children’s ser­v ices. See Administration for ­Children’s Ser­v ices CIDI (Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence), 98 Citi Field (Queens), 86 Citizens Bud­get Commission (CBC), 47–48, 59–60, 71 The Citizens Union, 57 city council: affordable housing and, 102; Bloomberg’s relationship with, 14, 45–46, 55; bud­get of NYC and, 45–47, 57; economic development and, 82; education and, 203; homelessness and, 126; limits of mayoral power and, 45; low-­income housing and, 159; NYC charter and, 55; parks and green space and, 90; poverty and, 194–95; rent policies and, 138; stop-­and-­frisk police policies and, 232 City Planning Commission (CPC), 14, 82, 102 City Reform League (NYC), 18 City University of New York (CUNY), 19, 174, 180, 210, 212, 223–24 CityTime, 98 civil ser­v ice reform, 19, 56–57, 75, 243 Civilian Complaint Review Board, 7 class analy­sis (urban theory), 8–11, 240 Climate Change: Bloomberg’s approach to, 22, 79–81, 92–93, 105; economic development and, 80, 105; environmental initiatives and, 93;

313

Hurricane Sandy and, 22, 80; infrastructure and, 80; panel on, 22, 79–81; parks and green space and, 79–80. See also environmental initiatives Clinton, Bill, 139, 165, 173 City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad (1868), 15 Closer to Home, 229–30 Co­ali­tion for the Homeless, 106, 120, 125 coalition-­building approach of Bloomberg, 5–6, 10, 12, 240, 252 Coan, Ronald, 17, 77 Cohen, Arnold S., 112–13 Cohen, David, 35 Cohen, Michelle, 139 Columbia University, 88, 96 Commission on Economic Opportunity, 178–79 Common Core standards (education), 224 community advocates, 45–46, 59, 82 Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), 85, 102 community development corporations (CDCs), 142–43 community land trusts (CLTs), 144, 162, 169–71 Community Reinvestment Act (1978), 142 Community Ser­v ice Society, 132, 211 commuter tax, 39, 48, 50 CompStat system (criminal justice), 230–31, 260n1 congestion pricing for automobiles, 2–3, 13, 21, 45, 93, 101, 243 Connecting Adolescents to Comprehensive Healthcare (CATCH), 180–81 consent decrees, 15, 108–9, 112, 155 Construction Opportunity Commission, 22, 28 Continuums of Care (CoCS), 123 Cooper, Amanda, 60 Cooper, Peter, 18 Cornell Tech Campus (Queens), 86, 95–96 Cornell University, 95–96 Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association, 69 Council of Urban Professionals, 26 Council on American-­Islamic Relations, 237 counterterrorism: Bloomberg’s approach to, 34–35, 236–37; commissioners and, 236; criticism of Bloomberg on, 35, 236; Muslim community surveillance for, 35, 236–37; quotes by Bloomberg on, 27; September 11 attacks and, 236–37 Counterterrorism Bureau, 35, 236 CPC (City Planning Commission), 14, 82, 102 Crew, Rudy, 7

314 Index

criminal justice system: alternatives to incarceration and, 234; Bloomberg’s approach to, 2–3, 7–9, 26, 34–35, 227, 234–35, 238, 250; bud­get of NYC and, 32, 35, 47, 52, 55, 66; civilian oversight of, 7; correctional facilities and, 227–28; crime reduction and, 2, 34–35, 232–33, 235; criticism of Bloomberg on, 18, 23, 32, 235, 237; data-­driven policies and, 238, 250; departments of, 7–8, 32, 35, 61, 66, 154, 215, 227, 231–33, 235–36, 238, 252; education and, 215–16; gun control and, 2, 238; jail population decrease in, 235; juvenile justice in, 21, 26, 191, 227–30, 239, 250; ­labor ­unions and, 65–67, 66t, 74; mass incarceration and, 231, 233; Muslim community surveillance and, 35, 236–37; poverty and, 175, 248; prison vio­lence and, 235, 250, 251; public-­private partnerships and, 236; quotes by Bloomberg on, 35; race and, 7–8, 16, 26, 231, 250; recidivism rates and, 235–36; Rikers Island and, 32, 235, 251; state government and, 3, 228, 250; use of force in, 32, 228, 235. See also stop-­and-­frisk policy Cultural Advisory Commission, 41 Cultural Affairs Department, 99–100 cultural initiatives. See arts and cultural initiatives Cunningham, Mary K., 167 Cuomo, Andrew: Bloomberg’s relationship with, 67, 72, 139, 153, 167; bud­get of NYC and, 72; de Blasio and, 52, 72, 139, 144; homelessness and, 119, 131, 245; juvenile justice and, 229; ­labor contracts and, 67; low-­income housing and, 138–39, 141, 143–44, 150, 167; pensions and, 67–70; poverty and, 174, 177, 177t; rent policies and, 138; welfare programs and, 189 Cuomo, Mario, 68, 138 Curley, Bob, 237 data-­driven policies: Bloomberg’s use of, 2, 16–17, 20–23, 29, 41, 132, 241, 251, 253; criminal justice and, 238, 250; criticism of Bloomberg on, 22, 200, 249–50, 253; data manipulation in, 249–50; economic development and, 76–77; education and, 200, 205, 217, 249–50; homelessness and, 109–10, 123, 246, 253; low-­income housing and, 22, 132, 167, 169; poverty and, 179; stop-­and-­ frisk policy and, 232. See also technological initiatives Davila v. Eggelston (1997), 175

Davila v. Hammons (1996), 175 Day Care Council of New York, 185 DC 37 (District Council 37), 60–63, 62t de Blasio, Bill: bud­get of NYC ­under, 59; childcare ­under, 193; Cuomo and, 52, 72, 139, 144; economic development ­under, 81; education ­under, 52, 209, 215, 221; effects of Bloomberg’s policies on, 52, 59, 81, 125, 138, 233; homelessness ­under, 122–23, 126; ­labor ­unions ­under, 68, 74; low-­income housing ­under, 133, 138, 144, 146, 153, 156, 171, 247; mayoral strategy of, 9, 171; pensions ­under, 74; poverty ­under, 188–89; race ­under, 156; rent policies ­under, 153; rezoning initiatives ­under, 147, 157; state government ­under, 52, 122–23; stop-­and-­frisk policies ­under, 233 Decency Commission, 41 Deegan, Adler v. (1929), 15 Dehavenon, Anna Lou, 124–25 Department for the Aging (DFTA), 154, 186, 191 Department of Corrections (DOC), 32, 235–36 Department of Education (DOE), city, 36–37, 52, 183, 193, 200, 203, 206–7, 212, 215–20, 225, 228 Department of Education (DOE), US, 216 Department of Homeless Ser­v ices (DHS), 5, 53, 107, 109, 111, 113–14, 116, 119–24, 121t, 123t, 191 Department of Housing Preservation and Development (DHPD), 60, 98, 115, 141, 146–47, 156–57, 161 Department of Parks and Recreation, 90, 92 Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD), 183–84, 191 Detectives’ Endowment Association, 67 Diallo, Amadou, 7 Dillon, John F., 15 Dinkins, David: bud­get of NYC ­under, 39; fiscal crisis limiting policies of, 20, 150; homelessness ­under, 115; low-­income housing ­under, 143, 150, 161–62; mayoral approach of, 20; patronage system ­under, 31; police criticism of, 7; progressivism of, 20 District Council 37 (DC 37), 60–63, 62t Division of Homes and Community Renewal (DHCR), 136–37, 139, 141, 167 Doar, Robert, 98, 175, 177, 188 Doctoroff, Daniel, 5, 28, 30–31, 78, 82, 84, 87, 128–30, 152–55, 169, 246, 251 Doe v. Doar (2006), 174 Domanico, Ray, 220–21 Dorsey, Jack, 241

Index

EarlyLearn NYC, 183–85, 192–93, 198, 223–24, 251 Earned Income Tax Credit, 175, 177, 181 East River Science Park, 88–89 Eberhardt, Jennifer, 225 Eblem-­Health, 72 economic development: affordable housing and, 83, 85, 102, 105; arts and cultural initiatives and, 77, 99–100; Bloomberg’s approach to, 2–3, 9, 12, 17–23, 27, 46, 53, 76–88, 101–5, 243–45, 252–53; bud­get of NYC and, 19, 52, 74, 77, 83, 244; city council and, 82; Climate Change and, 80, 105; corporate subsidies and, 83; criticism of Bloomberg on, 101–5, 252; data-­driven policies and, 76–77; displacement as a result of, 101–3; education and, 95–97, 105, 252–53; environmental initiatives and, 92–94, 244; federal government and, 77; health care and, 94–95; homelessness and, 129; Hurricane Sandy and, 77, 80–81, 243–44; infrastructure and, 79–80, 83; low-­income housing and, 88; negative consequences of, 101–4; Olympic Games bid and, 78, 82, 84–86, 88–89; parks and green space and, 79, 83, 88–92; poverty and, 22, 77, 101–2, 104, 252–53; previous mayoral decisions and, 83–84; proj­ects involving, 83–88; public health and, 93, 244; public-­ private partnerships and, 12, 82–83, 105; quotes by Bloomberg on, 27, 79; race and, 96, 103–4; rezoning initiatives and, 78–79, 82, 101–3, 244; September 11 attacks and, 76–77, 83, 87, 243–44; small businesses and, 53; state government and, 12, 77; structures to enforce long-­term success of, 76, 81; technological initiatives and, 22–23, 80, 87–88, 95–99, 105, 244; transportation and, 100–101; 2008 recession and, 76–77, 243–44, 246; university partnerships and, 86, 88, 95–97. See also infrastructure Economic Development Act, 164 Economic Development Corporation (EDC), 28, 83, 97, 147, 244 education: Advanced Placement and, 213–14; arts and cultural initiatives and, 220; autonomy in, 205, 209–10, 215, 216, 221, 224, 225–26; Bloomberg’s approach to, 3, 5–6, 9, 16, 20–21, 35–36, 105, 200–203, 210–15, 223–26, 239, 248–50, 252–53; bud­get of NYC and, 6, 39, 51–52, 55, 72, 74, 206–7, 216, 219, 244, 251; charter schools in, 6, 52, 204, 219–20, 222, 249; city council and,

315

203; class size and, 207, 209; commissioner of, 200, 251; Common Core standards in, 224; community colleges and, 52, 55; community school districts in, 209–10, 215; criticism of Bloomberg on, 6, 10, 36, 202–3, 215–20, 226, 249–50; data-­driven policies and, 200, 205, 217, 249–50; department of, 36–37, 52, 183, 193, 200, 203, 206–7, 212, 215–20, 225, 228; economic development and, 95–97, 105, 252–53; evaluation of schools and, 206–7; federal government and, 123, 202, 214, 216, 249; graduation rates and, 6, 211, 213, 217, 220; health care and, 222–23; higher education and, 95–97, 209, 210–11, 244; history of, 201–2; homelessness and, 123; international perspective on, 201, 259c8n2; ­labor ­unions and, 36, 39, 63–65, 209, 211, 224, 226; limits of mayoral power and, 3, 35, 51, 222, 225; market-­based reforms in, 200–203, 224; national assessments in, 257–58; networks of school systems in, 209, 221; nonprofit organ­izations and, 206, 209; overview of, 222–26; parental role in, 6, 36, 249; poverty and, 174, 177, 180–82, 183, 185, 198, 202–3, 222, 224, 225, 259c8n1; pre-­K education program and, 52, 183–85; previous mayoral decisions and, 38, 248–49; princi­ples in, 6, 36, 205–6, 209, 212, 221, 225–26, 249; public health and, 223; public-­private partnerships and, 37, 203–4; quotes by Bloomberg on, 64–65, 210, 214, 226; race and, 7, 16, 20, 26, 96, 182, 208, 211, 213–14, 218, 225, 239; recommendations for improving, 224–25; reor­ga­ni­za­tion of system of, 6, 203–10, 221; school choice and, 200, 204; school support organ­izations and, 206, 209; special needs students in, 217–18; standardized tests in, 201–2, 207, 213–15, 217, 222, 224, 257–58; state education tests in, 3, 5, 13, 21, 208, 249; state government and, 3, 5, 13, 21, 35, 51–52, 203, 208, 211, 224–25, 249–50; STEM initiatives and, 96; student per­for­mance in, 201–2, 204, 213–15; teaching force in, 6, 36, 39, 64–65, 204, 211–12, 223–26, 249; teaching standards in, 216, 222–25; technological initiatives and, 6, 20, 95–97, 205, 210–11, 223–26, 239; violent incidents in, 215; welfare programs and, 32; zero-­tolerance policies in, 215. See also Department of Education Eggelston, Davila v. (1997), 175 Eggleston, Verna, 32, 111, 175–77, 188 80/20 rule (housing), 167–68

316 Index

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 164 Eldredge v. Koch (1982), 108 Elmedni, Bakry, 160 Emergency Assistance Rehousing Program (EARP), 115–16 Emergency Assistance Unit (EAU), 29, 110, 115–16 Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB), 19 Emily’s List, 238 Empire State Development Corporation, 45, 102 Empire State Supportive Housing Initiative (ESSHI), 144 environmental initiatives: Bloomberg’s approach to, 2–3, 5, 9, 13, 20, 92–94, 252; carbon footprint decrease and, 93; Climate Change and, 93; congestion pricing and, 2–3, 13, 21, 45, 93, 101, 243; economic development and, 92–94, 244; environmental impact reviews and, 82, 84; infrastructure and, 20, 93; parks and green space and, 91; public health and, 93, 244; quotes by Bloomberg on, 93; state government and, 44–45, 93; tree planting initiatives and, 93. See also Climate Change Environmental Protection Department, 53 ethnicity. See race and ethnicity Village of Euclid v. Ambler (1926), 78–79 Everytown for Gun Safety, 238 Fair Student Funding, 206, 216–17 Faircloth, Lauch, 165 Faircloth Amendment (1999), 4, 165 ­Family Assistance (FA), 173 ­Family Homelessness Prevention Report, 112 ­Family Homelessness Special Master Panel (SMP), 112 ­Family Options Study, 130 Fariña, Carmen, 221 Farley, Tom, 94 Fatherhood Acad­emy (CUNY), 182 FBI-­NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force, 236 Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), 141 federal government: affordable housing and, 106, 131, 163–66, 169; aid to NYC by, 72–73, 72t, 77, 106, 121–23, 123t, 134t, 163, 166t, 173; Bloomberg’s relation to, 3, 8–10, 17, 20, 23, 72, 250–51, 253; bud­get of NYC and, 20, 43–45, 47, 72–73, 72t, 251; economic development and, 77; education and, 123, 202, 214, 216, 249; health care and, 71; homelessness and, 4, 106, 115, 119, 121–23, 129–31, 245; limits of mayoral power and,

2–5, 23; low-­income housing and, 4–5, 106–7, 115, 129, 134–35, 134t, 140, 143–44, 149, 163–66, 171, 247–48; Medicaid and, 32, 48, 107, 180; poverty and, 172–74, 172t, 176, 177–80, 183–84, 198; section 8 vouchers and, 4, 115–16, 141, 164, 166; September 11 attacks and, 45, 73; stop-­and-­frisk policy and, 233; welfare programs and, 20, 32 Ferrer, Fernando, 67 Fields, C. ­Virginia, 34 Fifth Ave­nue Presbyterian, 33–34 finances. See bud­get of New York City Financial Empowerment Office (OFE), 248 firefighters, 46, 60–61, 67, 69–70, 74, 87, 122, 197, 240 Fischer, ­Will, 156 Five Borough Economic Opportunity Plan (FBEOP), 78 Flake, Floyd H., 26, 34 Florida, Richard, 99 Floyd v. City of New York (2013), 230, 233 Ford, Gerald, 164 Foreman, Jeff, 153 Fratello, Jennifer, 8 Freedman, Helen, 110, 112 Frey, William, 103 Friar, Maureen, 113 Fried, Linda, 95 Frieden, Thomas, 22, 29–30, 36, 94–95, 200 Friedman, Don, 188 Friedman, Sylvia, 128 Friends of Island Acad­emy, 236 Fruchter, Norm, 210 Frug, Gerald, 1, 13, 45 Fund for Public Schools, 37 Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 103–4, 145 Gais, Thomas, 187 Gallucci, Marta, 92 Garcia, Kathryn, 141 Gay, Mara, 247 Gelatt, Julia, 183, 185 gentrification, 103, 105, 159, 169 Gewirtzman, Lizabeth, 208 Gibbs, Linda, 81, 98, 107, 109–11, 113, 116, 120, 124, 128–30, 186, 246 Giles, David, 180 Gill, James, 151 Gische, Judith, 125 Giuliani, McCain v. (1982), 109 Giuliani, Rudolph: arts and cultural initiatives ­under, 99; Black community and, 25;

Index

Bloomberg contrasted with, 7, 24–26, 41–42, 60, 74, 76, 83–84, 175–77, 186, 241; bud­get of NYC ­under, 38, 47, 74, 150; criminal justice ­under, 7, 20, 65; culture war and, 41; economic development ­under, 83–84; homelessness ­under, 29, 33–34, 109, 115, 120; ­labor ­unions ­under, 46, 68; low-­income housing ­under, 150, 161–62; parks and green space ­under, 177; patronage system ­under, 31; pensions ­under, 69–70; poverty ­under, 20, 32, 173–77, 186, 188, 191, 248; public relations ­under, 34; race ­under, 7, 25–26; social ser­v ices ­under, 191, 191t; stop-­and-­ frisk policies ­under, 230, 233; support for police by, 7; technological initiatives ­under, 99; welfare programs ­under, 190 global recession. See 2008 recession, ­under T Goldberg, Leo, 152 Goldman Sachs, 235–36 Goldstein, Katie, 159 Goldstein, Matthew, 180 Good Jobs First, 83 Gootman, Elissa, 26 Governing New York City (Sayre and Kaufman), 11 Gracie Mansion (official mayoral residence), 33–34 ­Great Depression, 9, 19, 106–7, 163, 187 Green, Mark, 1, 24, 33, 46 green space. See parks and green space Greenberg, Daniel, 112 Greenberger, Sharon, 208–9 Grinker, William, 176 Ground Zero (September 11 attacks), 2, 14, 27, 41, 45, 50, 78, 83, 87, 241, 254 gun control, 2, 20, 41, 233, 238, 252 Hammons, Davila v. (1996), 175 Harlem center, 177 Harper, James, 18 Harris, Patricia E., 30, 82, 87 Hauser, Robert, 217 Haywood, Bradley, 108–9 Head Start (education), 183–85 Health and ­Human Ser­v ices Department (HHS), 97, 176, 244 Health and ­Mental Hygiene Department, 36, 53, 200, 238 health care: Bloomberg’s restructuring of, 35, 70–71, 94–95; bud­get of NYC and, 52, 55, 60–61, 70–71; criticism of Bloomberg on, 94–95; economic development and, 94–95; education and, 222–23; federal government

317

and, 71; homelessness and, 107; increasing costs in, 71; ­labor ­unions and, 60, 64, 71; ­mental health and, 107, 112–14, 185; pensions and, 70–71; poverty and, 181; public-­private partnerships and, 72; state government and, 71–72, 94–95. See also public health Hemphill, Clara, 205 Herszenhorn, David, 64 HHS-­Connect, 97, 176, 244 The High Line (park), 89, 92 Hilliard, Tim, 127 HIV/AIDS ser­v ices, 22, 111, 114, 130, 160, 190 HIV/AIDS Ser­v ices Administration (HASA), 111, 190 Holloway, Coswell, 81–82 Holman, Mirya, 13 Home Stability Support Program, 170 HomeBase, 113, 117, 246 Homeless Assistance Act (1987), 123 homelessness: Advantage Program and, 4, 118–20, 124, 129–31, 132, 193–94, 245; advocates for, 29, 111, 118, 120, 124, 194; affordable housing and, 129, 131, 246; Bloomberg’s approach to, 2–4, 9, 21, 29, 106–11, 129–31, 245–46; bud­get of NYC and, 116, 119, 121–22, 121t, 124, 126, 130; ­causes of, 4, 9, 32, 106–7, 109, 126–27, 128, 128t, 130–31, 134, 246; chronic forms of, 112; city council and, 126; client responsibility approach to, 112, 124, 130; cluster-­site approach to, 111, 120; commissioners and, 109–10; consent decrees and, 108–9, 112; court decisions and, 15, 29–30, 33–34, 108, 112–13, 117–18, 120–21, 124–26, 245; criticism of Bloomberg on, 5, 22–23, 29–30, 110, 113, 121, 124–30, 246, 253; data-­driven policies and, 109–10, 123, 246, 253; decrease in options for, 124–25; demographics of, 107–8; department of, 5, 53, 107, 109, 111, 113–14, 116, 119–24, 121t, 123t, 191; dramatic increase in, 106, 110, 118, 118t, 120, 120t, 171, 245–46, 253; education and, 123; families affected by, 110–12, 115, 120, 125–26, 128, 128t; federal government and, 4, 106, 115, 119, 121–23, 129–31, 245; first term of Bloomberg and, 111–17; ­Great Depression and, 106–7; growing crisis of, 4; health care and, 107; HIV/AIDS ser­v ices and, 111, 114, 130; House Stability Plus program and, 118–19; housing first approach to, 109; LGBTQ community and, 7, 126; limits of mayoral power and, 3, 131, 245; low-­income

318 Index

homelessness (continued) housing and, 3–4, 9, 32, 106–7, 109–14, 129, 131–34, 171, 245–46; ­mental illness and, 107, 114, 125, 143; nonprofit organ­izations and, 109–10, 113–14; population of, 106, 117, 117t, 118, 118t, 120–21, 120t, 121t, 124, 255; poverty and, 193–94; prevention of, 112–14; previous mayoral decisions and, 29, 109, 115, 120, 131; quotes by Bloomberg on, 115, 127; religious organ­izations and, 5, 33–34, 128; rent policies and, 121–23, 131; rights of homeless persons and, 107–9, 112, 117, 124–26; second term of Bloomberg and, 117–19; section 8 vouchers and, 115–16, 118, 130–31, 132, 193–94, 253; September 11 attacks and, 110; shelter system for, 29, 106, 109–11, 114, 117, 120, 124–30, 245; single-­room occupancy (SRO) buildings and, 134; social ser­vices and, 112; state government and, 3, 13, 106–9, 114, 115–16, 119–25, 129–31, 132–33, 245; subsidizing permanent housing for, 115–16, 118–21, 124, 130; supportive housing and, 4, 111–14, 117, 143–44, 168; temporary housing for, 121–23, 124–25; third term of Bloomberg and, 119–21; welfare programs and, 120; youth affected by, 126–27, 130 Homelessness in New York City (Main), 110 Horo­witz, Larry, 34 housing. See affordable housing; low-­income housing; New York City Housing Authority Housing Act (1937), 141, 163 Housing Act (1949), 164 Housing Act (1954), 164 Housing Act (1965), 164 Housing Act (1968), 164 Housing and Community Development Act (1974), 115, 141, 164 Housing and Economic Act (2008), 165 Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (US), 130, 133, 136, 142, 155–56, 164, 166, 166t Housing Development Corporation (HDC), 143, 147–48, 162, 168 Housing Help Program (HHP), 113–14 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (2019), 140 Housing Stability Plus (HSP) program, 4, 116–19, 130–31, 183, 193–94 Housing Trust Fund (NYC), 132, 148, 151, 168 Housing Trust Fund (NYS), 165–66 HPD. See Department of Housing Preservation and Development HRA. See ­Human Resources Administration

Hudson Yards, 88, 101 ­Human Resources Administration (HRA), 5, 22, 175, 183, 188, 190 Hurricane Sandy: Bloomberg’s decisiveness and, 22, 30, 81; bud­get of NYC and, 43, 73, 242; Climate Change and, 22, 80; damages from, 30, 81; economic development and, 77, 80–81, 243–44; infrastructure and, 80–81; preparedness mea­sures resulting from, 22, 80–81 Hurricane Sandy ­After Action (2013), 81 Impact Schools Initiative (2004), 215 Inclusionary Housing Program, 156–57 inclusionary zoning (IZ), 146–48, 156–57, 168–69 In­de­pen­dent Bud­get Office (IBO), 50, 100, 116, 142, 158, 219 Information Ser­v ices Department, 54 infrastructure: affordable housing and, 102; Bloomberg’s approach to, 2, 20, 27–28, 37, 76, 83–88; building codes and, 97; capital investment in, 28; Climate Change and, 80; criticism of Bloomberg on, 76; economic development and, 79–80, 83; energy-­ efficiency rules for buildings in, 2; environmental initiatives and, 20, 93; Hurricane Sandy and, 80–81; low-­income housing and, 28; parks and green space and, 20, 37; public-­private partnerships and, 37; quotes by Bloomberg on, 76; revitalization initiatives of, 2; September 11 attacks and, 27–28; state government and, 44–45. See also economic development Innovative Se­nior Centers, 186 Intelligence Bureau, 236 Islam. See Muslim community Islamic cultural center near Ground Zero, 7, 26–27, 41, 241, 254 Jacob K. Javits Convention Center, 88, 101, 150–51 Jacobs, Jane, 159 Jacobson, Michael, 234 jails. See criminal justice system Javits, Jacob, 164 JFK International Airport, 50 Jobs-­Plus, 180 Johnson, Lyndon B., 164, 202 Johnson, Valarie, 13 Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division (US), 227–28 juvenile justice system, 21, 26, 191, 227–30, 239, 250

Index

Kalikow, Peter, 40 Kamlet, Mark, 85, 96 Karni, Annie, 126 Kaufman, Herbert, 16 Kaye, Judith, 215–16 Kelly, Raymond, 8, 35, 230, 232–34 Kelo v. New London (2005), 101 Kemple, James, 220 Kennedy, Caroline, 37 Kennedy, Robert F., 164 Key, V. O., 11–12 Kleiman, Neil, 101–2 Klein, Joel, 36, 200, 203–5, 208, 214–16, 219, 221, 226, 249, 251 Koch, Ed: affordable housing ­under, 169; on Bloomberg, 241; criminal justice ­under, 20; economic development ­under, 20; federal government and, 143; homelessness ­under, 115; low-­income housing ­under, 132, 149–50, 161–62; patronage system ­under, 31; pensions ­under, 68; poverty ­under, 20; public relations ­under, 34; public-­private partnerships ­under, 37; rezoning initiatives ­under, 146; state government and, 243; welfare programs ­under, 20 Koch, Eldredge v. (1982), 108 Koch, McCain v. (1983), 108–10, 117–18 Krinsky, John, 161 Krueger, Liz, 151, 167, 186 Kubler, Daniel, 14 Kutter, Robert, 47 La Guardia, Fiorello: affordable housing ­under, 169; Bloomberg compared to, 9, 18, 75, 77, 243; bud­get of NYC ­under, 243; civil ser­vice reforms ­under, 19; economic development u ­ nder, 77, 243; federal government and, 77; low-­income housing ­under, 132, 140; progressivism of, 19; social reforms ­under, 19 ­labor ­unions: Bloomberg’s approach to, 16, 39–40, 45–46, 57, 59–61, 64–67, 66t, 70–71; bud­get of NYC and, 19, 39–40, 43, 45–46, 59–70, 242; criminal justice and, 65–67, 66t, 74; criticism of Bloomberg on, 68, 70–71, 74–75, 241–42; education and, 36, 39, 63–65, 209, 211, 224, 226; health care and, 60, 64, 71; ­labor contracts and, 39–40, 45, 59–71, 62t; limits of mayoral power and, 16, 45, 60; pensions and, 60, 67–71; poverty and, 17; previous mayoral decisions and, 46; quotes by Bloomberg on, 64–65; salary for productivity increases and, 46, 60, 66–67, 74; September 11 attacks and, 16; state government and, 60, 67, 70

319

LaGuardia airport, 50 Lam, Diana, 36 Laney, Kahliah, 180 Latino communities, 7, 26, 35, 103, 159, 182, 211, 213, 227, 232 Lavie, Peretz, 86 Leadership Acad­emy (NYC), 37, 203, 212–13, 249 Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), 84 ­Legal Aid Society, 117, 120, 125, 174, 189 Levin, Anna Hayes, 82 Levin, Kate D., 99–100 Levitan, Mark, 179 LGBTQ community, 7, 126 Liebman, James, 207–8, 215 Lieutenants Benevolent Association, 67 Liever, Robert C., 82 limits of mayoral power: Bloomberg’s mayoral approach and, 3–4, 9–10, 13–14, 16–18, 22–23, 251, 253; bud­get of NYC and, 14, 19–20, 43–45, 243; city council and, 45; commissioners and, 45; education and, 3, 35, 51, 222, 225; federal government and, 2–5, 23; historical pre­ce­dents on, 15; homelessness and, 3, 131, 245; ­labor ­unions and, 16, 45, 60; low-­income housing and, 3, 5, 136, 171, 247–48; overview of, 3–5, 13, 23, 44–45, 247–54; previous analy­sis of, 8; state government and, 2–5, 15, 23, 52; urban theory and, 8–9, 13, 15–17, 253 Lindsay, John, 19, 84, 145 Liu, John C., 119 living wage policies, 32, 60–61, 195, 211 Logan, John, 11–12, 253 Lopatto, Paul, 184–85 Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), 143–45, 157–58, 165–68 Lowenstein, Ronnie, 60 Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, 14 low-­income housing: advocates for, 111, 145, 150, 153–54, 158, 160; affordable housing distinguished from, 6, 132–33, 168; alternative models for, 162–63; Bloomberg’s approach to, 3–4, 9, 20, 32, 132–35, 139, 142–43, 157–58, 161–62, 167–70, 246; bud­get of NYC and, 4–5, 132, 145–49, 163–66; city council and, 159; commissioners and, 22; commissions on, 145, 169; court decisions and, 132–33; criticism of Bloomberg on, 4–6, 10, 18, 20, 22–23, 32, 132, 145–62, 167–68, 170–71, 246–48, 253; data-­driven policies and, 22, 132, 167, 169;

320 Index

low-­income housing (continued) departments on, 60, 98, 115, 141, 146–47, 156–57, 161; economic development and, 88; federal government and, 4–5, 106–7, 115, 129, 134–35, 134t, 140, 143–44, 149, 163–66, 171, 247–48; gentrification and, 103, 105, 159, 169; history of, 134–36, 163–65; HIV/ AIDS ser­v ices and, 160; homelessness and, 3–4, 9, 32, 106–7, 109–14, 129, 131–34, 171, 245–46; infrastructure and, 28, 132; landlords and, 118–19, 132, 138–40, 160–61; limited-­equity cooperatives and, 162–63, 169; limits of mayoral power and, 3, 5, 136, 171, 247–48; luxury buildings and, 133, 135; nonprofit organ­izations and, 142–44, 162–63; poor door scandal and, 157; poverty and, 106–7; previous mayoral decisions and, 132, 141–43, 150–51, 161–62; public-­private partnerships and, 4, 6, 133–35, 165–66, 170; quotes by Bloomberg on, 246; race and, 155–56, 159; rent policies and, 4, 6, 9, 32, 107, 132, 136–40, 152–53, 247; rezoning initiatives and, 6, 103, 133, 146–47, 151–52, 156–57, 159, 168; section 8 vouchers and, 4, 115–16, 156, 158, 166; September 11 attacks and, 163; shortage of, 22, 104–5, 107, 132, 134–35, 137t, 139, 139t, 158–61, 169, 246–48, 253; single-­room occupancy (SRO) buildings and, 106–7, 134; state government and, 3–5, 32, 45, 129, 132–40, 143, 146, 153, 166–67, 169–71, 247–48; supportive housing and, 4, 111–14, 117, 143–44, 168; tax incentives for, 132, 135, 144–47, 157–59, 161, 167, 169, 170; 2008 recession and, 159–60, 163, 165; vacancy decontrol and, 9, 137–40, 152–53, 167, 169–70. See also affordable housing; New York City Housing Authority Madonia, Peter, 112 Malanga, Steve, 61 Manhattan: Bloomberg’s approach to, 27, 87–88; economic development in, 14, 83, 87–88; infrastructure in, 14, 78, 87–88; Lower Manhattan in, 1–2, 14, 27, 82–83, 87; low-­income housing in, 88; parks and green space in, 89, 91; rezoning initiatives in, 88, 103; September 11 attacks and, 83, 87; stadium proposed in, 3, 13, 21; technological initiatives in, 87–88 Markowitz, Marty, 85 mass incarceration, 231, 233 mayoral approach of Bloomberg: business background informing, 2, 16–17, 20–21,

24–25, 27, 29–30, 40–42, 47, 194–95, 200–201, 240–41, 252; co­ali­tion building in, 5–6, 10, 12, 240, 252; combination of economic and social reforms in, 8–9, 18–22, 28, 41–42, 252; commissioners in, 5, 9, 21–22, 29, 30–32, 38, 41, 94, 176, 251; communicator aspects of, 33–34; as conservative and liberal, 41, 252; court decisions and, 15, 21, 251; culture war and, 41; engineering background informing, 27, 78; first election and, 1, 24–25, 40; first term and, 41, 45–48, 50t, 54t, 60–61, 109–17, 252; hands-­off approach of, 22, 31–32, 41, 194, 251; healer aspects of, 25–27, 41–42, 238; ideological neutrality of, 2, 16–17, 20; inability to compromise in, 194–95; innovative aspects of, 35–38; judicial appointments in, 31; lack of knowledge on government in, 25, 29, 41; leadership qualities of, 9–10, 16, 21, 33, 93–94, 238, 248, 252–54; legacy of, 9–10, 18, 28, 42, 76, 81, 250–54; limits of mayoral power and, 3, 9–10, 13–14, 16–18, 22–23, 251, 253; management style of, 29–33, 41, 176, 214–15; neoliberalism and, 20, 31–32; outreach emphasized in, 7–8, 12, 25–27, 35, 227, 236–37, 241; overview of, 20–23, 75, 240–42; personality traits in, 18, 33; planner aspects of, 27–28, 104, 183; pragmatism of, 16–17, 75, 243, 252; previous mayors compared to, 2, 16, 18–26, 31, 34, 42, 243; progressivism of, 18–22; public relations in, 24–25, 30, 33–34, 40–42, 49, 195–96, 251–52; quotes by Bloomberg on, 1, 21, 25–26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 75, 240, 251, 253–54; quotes on, 4, 17, 23, 25–26, 30, 33, 41, 47, 92, 240–41, 251–52; salary for productivity increases and, 40–44, 46, 60, 66–67, 74–75; second term and, 54–55, 55t, 67, 70, 94–95, 117–19, 178, 242; self-­financing and, 17, 40–41, 48; shortcomings of management style in, 5, 8, 10, 22–23, 29–32, 127, 242, 246, 251, 253; State of the City Addresses and, 1, 35, 76, 83, 89, 115, 208, 210; strengths and weaknesses as same source in, 238; third term and, 55–59, 67–68, 71, 74–75, 119–21, 242; traditional politicians contrasted with, 30. See also specific topics and persons mayoral power. See limits of mayoral power Mayors against Illegal Guns, 238 McCain v. Giuliani (1982), 109 McCain v. Koch (1983), 108–10, 117–18 McCall, H. Carl, 7, 25

Index

McCormick, Lynn, 174–75 McDaniel, Marla, 182 McNickle, Chris, 23, 100, 171 MDRC (education evaluation com­pany), 180, 220–21, 236 Medicaid, 32, 48, 107, 180 medical care. See health care Menino, Thomas, 238 ­mental health, 107, 112–14, 185 ­mental illness, 43, 107, 114, 125 Messeri, Peter, 113 Metropolitan Council on Housing, 137, 153 Metropolitan Museum of Art, 40 Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), 40, 45, 100–101 Mets stadium, 47, 86 Mills, Gemar, 234 Mitchel, John Puroy, 19 Mohammedi, Omar, 241 Mollenkopf, John, 12 Molotch, Harvey, 11–12, 245, 253 Morris, Board of Estimate v. (1989), 13–14 Moss, Mitchell, 41, 78, 240 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 30 Mullins, Ed, 68 Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), 19, 64 Municipal ­Labor Committee, 60, 62, 64 municipal power. See limits of mayoral power Murin, William, 253 Muslim community: Bloomberg’s outreach to, 7, 26–27, 35, 236–37, 241; criticism of Bloomberg on, 35, 236–37; quotes by Bloomberg on, 27, 35; surveillance for counterterrorism of, 35, 236–37 Nadelstern, Eric, 200, 205–6, 215–16 A Nation at Risk (1983), 201–2 National Action Network, 25 National Assessment of Education Pro­gress (NAEP), 214, 257–58 National Housing Trust Fund, 165 National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), 163 National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), 97 National Low Income Housing Co­ali­tion, 133 Nazareth housing, 130 Nelson A. Rocke­fel­ler Institute of Government, 196 neoliberalism, 11, 17, 20 New Housing Marketplace Plan (NHMP), 133–34, 147–52, 158 New London, Kelo v. (2005), 101

321

New Stapleton Waterfront Development Plan (2013), 86 City of New York, Floyd v. (2013), 230, 233 City of New York, Zheng v. (2012), 119 New York City: charter of, 13–14, 55–56, 241; corporate regimes in, 19; federal government and, 19; ­Great Depression and, 19; history of mayors in, 18–22; mayoral power in, 14–16, 18–22; nativism in, 18; social reformers in, 18–19; state control of, 14–16; Tammany Hall’s power in, 18; waves of immigration to, 18; World War II and, 19. See also bud­get of New York City; city council; specific burroughs and departments New York City Acquisition Fund, 132, 148, 168 New York City Bar Association, 31 New York City Co­ali­tion Against Hunger, 187, 197 The New York City Government Poverty Mea­sure, 2005–2015, 172 New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, 36, 54 New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA): Bloomberg’s lack of focus on, 5–6, 32, 142, 153–56, 168, 251, 253; consent decrees and, 155; creation of, 140; cuts to, 142, 167; eviction policies of, 32; federal government and, 134, 140–42, 154, 156; funding for, 134, 141–42, 153–55, 247; homelessness and, 115–17, 246; lead in ­water pipes of buildings and, 155; low-­income housing and, 6, 140–42, 153–54, 167–70; maintenance issues of, 142; race and, 155–56; restructuring of, 153, 155, 168; section 8 vouchers and, 140–42, 156; state government and, 134, 140, 141–42, 153–55, 167, 170, 247 New York City Housing Finance Agency, 144 New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC), 22, 79–81 New York Industrial Retention Network (NYIRN), 102–3, 102–3 New York Leaders for Pension Reform, 70 New York Police Department (NYPD), 7–8, 35, 61, 66, 154, 215, 227, 231–33, 236, 238, 252 New York State. See state government New York State Constitution, 14–15, 44, 68, 107–9, 136 New York State Court Officers Association, 67 New York Stock Exchange, 47 New York University (NYU), 85, 96 New York/New York I Agreement (NY/NY I), 114, 143

322 Index

New York/New York III Agreement (NY/NY II), 114, 143 New York/New York III Agreement (NY/NY III), 114, 143 New York/New York IV Agreement (NY/NY IV), 144 NIEM (National Information Exchange Model), 97 9/11. See September 11 attacks 1975 fiscal crisis, 19, 38, 46–48, 74, 76, 149 Nixon, Richard, 164 No Child Left ­Behind (2002), 123, 202, 217 nonprofit organ­izations, 109–10, 113–14, 142–44, 162–63, 184–85, 206, 209 North, Robert, 68 NYC Community Land Initiative, 162 NYC Men Teach, 182 NYC2012 (development plan), 78 Oak Hill Capital Partners, 31 Obama, Barack, 123, 165, 180, 211, 241 Oddo, James, 50 Office of Environmental Remediation, 93 Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE), 197, 248 Office of Long-­Term Planning and Sustainability (OLTPS), 81 Office of Management and Bud­get, 47, 70, 186 Office of Rent Administration (ORA), 137 Office of Youth Development (OYD), 127 OLTPS (Office of Long-­Term Planning and Sustainability), 81 Olympic Games NYC bid, 78, 82, 84–85, 88–89 Open Data concept (2012), 98 Open Society Foundation, 182 Operation Safe Schools, 215 Orr, Marion, 13 Osborne Association, 234, 236 Oser, Alan, 138 out of school, out of work (OSOW) youth, 104 Out-­of-­School Time program, 183 Pacific Park (Brooklyn), 85 Pagano, Michael, 14 Panel for Educational Policy (PEP), 35, 204 parks and green space: Bloomberg’s approach to, 79, 89–90; bud­get of NYC and, 55; city council and, 90; Climate Change and, 79–80; criticism of Bloomberg on, 89–92; department of, 90, 92; economic development and, 79, 83, 88–92; environmental initiatives and, 91; infrastructure and, 20, 37; poverty and, 177; public-­private partnerships

and, 89–90, 92, 105; quotes by Bloomberg on, 89, 92; renovations of, 90–92; rezoning initiatives and, 79; Staten Island and, 90–91; technological initiatives and, 88–89; 2008 recession and, 89 Parks Opportunity Program, 177 Parrott, James, 198–99 Parsons, Richard, 178 Partnership for New York City, 104–5 Pasanen, Glenn, 43–44 Pataki, George: Bloomberg’s collaboration with, 3, 14, 37–39, 46, 48, 50–51, 72, 74, 86, 139, 151, 160; bud­get of NY ­under, 38–39, 46, 48, 50, 72, 74; economic development ­under, 86; education ­under, 174; homelessness ­under, 120; low-­income housing ­under, 151, 160; pensions ­under, 69–70; poverty ­under, 173–74; presidential ambitions of, 46; reelection of, 39, 46, 48; rent policies ­under, 138; World Trade Center site and, 14 Paterson, David, 70–72, 139, 151, 160, 228–29 Paulson, John, 90 pensions, 3, 15, 44, 60, 67–71, 74 Per­for­mance Incentive Program, 110 Perkins Act (2006), 211 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 173–74 Peterson, Paul, 12 philanthropy of Bloomberg, 34, 40–41, 182 PlanIT, 28 PlaNYC, 22, 79, 81–82, 90, 93, 101, 104, 244 pluralism (urban theory), 8–11, 13, 240 Polakow-­Suransky, Shael, 200, 205, 210–11, 215 Police Benevolent Association (PBA), 65–66 police ­unions, 65–66, 74 policing. See criminal justice system; stop-­and-­ frisk policy po­liti­cal economy analy­sis (urban theory), 8 Po­liti­cal Influences (Banfield), 11 Pope, Carl, 92–94 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 45, 50, 87, 100 poverty: advocates for, 32; affordable housing and, 175, 248; antipoverty initiatives and, 9, 16, 20, 173, 175–86, 198, 224; arts and culture initiatives and, 186; Bloomberg’s approach to, 7, 9, 16–18, 20, 22, 32–33, 41, 77, 172, 175–87, 194–97, 248; bud­get of NYC and, 172t, 177, 177t, 179, 184, 186–96, 198; childcare and, 183–85, 191–93, 192t, 198, 224; city council and, 194–95; commission on, 22, 178–79; commissioners and, 176–78, 186, 248; court decisions and, 173–75;

Index

criminal justice and, 175, 248; criticism of Bloomberg on, 32–33, 41, 186–98, 248, 252; data-­driven policies and, 179; economic development and, 22, 77, 101–2, 104, 252–53; education and, 174, 177, 180–82, 183, 185, 198, 202–3, 222, 224, 225; employment programs and, 182, 198; federal government and, 172–74, 172t, 176, 177–80, 183–84, 198; financial empowerment centers and, 181; health care and, 181; HIV/AIDS ser­v ices and, 190; homelessness and, 193–94; immigrants and, 184; ­labor ­unions and, 17; low-­income housing and, 106–7; nonprofit organ­izations and, 184, 185; OSOW youth and, 104; parks and green space and, 177; population of persons in, 172, 179, 186–87, 188–89, 188t, 196–99; previous mayoral decisions and, 32, 173–76, 186, 188; public health and, 175, 181, 248; public-­private partnerships and, 179; quotes by Bloomberg on, 175; race and, 3, 7, 26, 182, 193, 225; se­nior ser­v ices and, 186; state government and, 17, 172, 172t, 173–75, 177, 177t, 198; technological initiatives and, 198; welfare programs and, 173–78, 186, 188–89, 198, 248; work first approach to, 173; working families and, 183–84; youth and, 182–84. See also welfare programs power. See limits of mayoral power Power at Ground Zero (Sagalyn), 87 Preparing Youth for Adulthood (PYA), 127 Pressman, Jeffrey L., 13, 18 Prevention Assistance / Temporary Housing, 110 prisons. See criminal justice system private-­public partnerships. See public-­private partnerships pro-­growth reforms. See economic development Prospect Park Alliance, 90 Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), 60, 60, 65, 65 public health: Bloomberg’s approach to, 5, 20–21, 36–37, 74, 95, 175, 197, 200, 223, 240, 244, 252; bud­get of NYC and, 9–10, 73–74; commissioners and, 41, 94, 200; economic development and, 93, 244; education and, 223; environmental initiatives and, 93, 244; poverty and, 175, 181, 248; sanitary grading system and, 21; smoking ban and, 2, 21, 37, 94–95, 244; sugary drink ban and, 94; technological initiatives and, 36; trans fat ban and, 2, 21, 94–95, 244. See also health care

323

public housing. See low-­income housing Public Policy Forum, 25 public-­private partnerships: affordable housing and, 22, 102, 141; arts and culture initiatives and, 17; Bloomberg’s emphasis on, 6, 17, 36–37, 82, 92, 245; criminal justice and, 236; economic development and, 12, 82–83, 105; education and, 37, 203–4; health care and, 72; infrastructure and, 37; low-­income housing and, 4, 6, 133–35, 165–66, 170; parks and green space and, 89–90, 92, 105; poverty and, 179; previous mayoral decisions and, 37 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (1988), 165 Queens: affordable housing and, 86; arts and cultural initiatives in, 40, 83; Bloomberg’s approach to, 86; bud­get of NYC and, 49; economic development in, 83, 86; infrastructure in, 86; parks and green space in, 49, 90–91; rezoning initiatives in, 79, 103, 151–52 Queens Civic Congress, 103 Quinn, Christine, 80–81, 120–21, 194 race and ethnicity: Asian community and, 103, 155, 159, 193, 213; Bloomberg’s approach to, 6–8, 16–18, 20, 25–27; bud­get of NYC and, 16; criminal justice and, 7–8, 16, 26, 231, 250; criticism of Bloomberg on, 6–8, 26; demographic changes and, 103–4, 155–56, 159; economic development and, 96, 103–4; education and, 7, 16, 20, 26, 96, 182, 208, 211, 213–14, 218, 225, 239; gentrification and, 103, 105, 159; Latino communities, 7, 26, 35, 103, 159, 182, 211, 213, 227, 232; low-­income housing and, 155–56, 159; poverty and, 3, 7, 26, 182, 193, 225; rezoning initiatives and, 16, 103–4, 159; segregation and, 103; September 11 attacks and, 16, 26; stop-­and-­frisk policy and, 7–8, 12, 16, 35, 230, 232–33, 250; technological initiatives and, 96. See also Black community; Muslim community Ravitch, Diane, 208, 213 Reagan, Ronald, 4, 73, 143, 165, 200–202 Real Estate Board (NYC), 48, 145 Regents Examinations, 213, 218 Regime Politics (Stone), 11 religious organ­izations, 5, 33–34, 128 Rengifo, Andres F., 8 Rent Guidelines Board (RGB), 132, 137, 152–53, 168, 170, 246

324 Index

rent policies: affordable housing and, 136; Bloomberg’s approach to, 137; city council and, 138; deregulation of apartments and, 138–39; history of, 136; homelessness and, 121–23, 131; housing stock and, 137, 137t; landlords and, 138–40; low-­income housing and, 4, 6, 9, 32, 107, 132, 136–40, 152–53, 247; rent control program and, 4, 6, 9, 135–40, 153, 169; rent stabilization program and, 6, 135–40, 152–53, 169; rental fraud and, 139; state government and, 137–40; vacancy decontrol and, 4, 137–40, 152–53, 167, 169–70, 259n1 Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, 165–66 Republican National Convention (2004), 51, 237 request for proposal (RFP), 71, 99, 183, 185 rezoning initiatives: affordable housing and, 102–3, 146, 244; Bloomberg’s approach to, 103–5, 168; economic development and, 78–79, 82, 101–3, 244; inclusionary zoning (IZ), 146–48, 156–57, 168–69; low-­income housing and, 6, 103, 133, 146–47, 151–52, 156–57, 159, 168; parks and green space and, 79, 105; race and, 16, 103–4, 159 Rhea, John, 153–54, 156 Rich, Wilber, 14 Richardson, Linda, 124 Rikers Island, 32, 235, 251 Roberts, Lillian, 62 Robinson, Gail, 218 Roo­se­velt, Franklin  D., 4, 19, 77, 163, 197, 243 Roo­se­velt Island, 80, 86, 95 Ross, Timothy, 97–98 Rothstein, Richard, 202 Rudin, William C., 112 Sadik-­Khan, Janette, 30, 37–38, 82, 94 Safety Net (SA), 122, 173 Safety Net Assistance (SNA), 173–74 Sagalyn, Lynne, 3–4 Salazar, Ken, 89 Salomon ­Brothers, 21 Sandia Report (1990), 201 Sandstrom, Heather, 183, 185 Sandy. See Hurricane Sandy Saving Gotham (Farley), 94 Sayre, Wallace, 11, 16 SBI (South Bronx Initiative), 84 Schaeffer, Kenny, 137 Scheindlin, Shira, 233 School-­Based Health Centers (SBHCs), 180–81, 223

schools. See education Schragger, Richard, 15 Science and Resilience Institute, 89 Scoppetta, Nicholas, 30 Scott, Tim, 232 section 8 vouchers: federal government and, 4, 115–16, 141, 164, 166; homelessness and, 115–16, 118, 130–31, 132, 193–94, 253; low-­income housing and, 4, 115–16, 156, 158, 166 Seedco, 114 September 11 attacks: Bloomberg’s mayoral reactions to, 1–2, 16, 24, 26–27, 45–46, 73, 241–42; bud­get of NYC and, 38, 43, 46, 50, 54, 73, 163, 242; counterterrorism and, 236–37; economic development and, 76–77, 83, 87, 243–44; effects of, 1–2, 16, 24, 27, 46, 73; federal government and, 45, 73; Ground Zero of, 2, 14, 27, 41, 45, 50, 78, 83, 87, 241, 254; homelessness and, 110; infrastructure and, 27–28; ­labor ­unions and, 16; low-­ income housing and, 163; race and, 16, 26. See also World Trade Center Sergeants Benevolent Association, 68 Sexton, John, 85 Shama, Fatima M., 237 Sharpton, Al, 25–26, 229, 241 Sheekey, Kevin, 30 Shubert, Ginny, 160 Shulman, Art, 138 Siciliano, Carl, 126 Silberman, Jacqueline, 117 Silver, Sheldon, 101, 195 Silverstein, Larry, 87 single-­room occupancy buildings (SROs), 106–7, 134, 190 Siskin, Alan B., 177 Skorton, David, 86 Skyler, Edward, 82 Small Business Incubator, 97 Small Business Ser­v ices Department, 53, 98 Smith, Chris, 31 Smith, Dennis, 176 Smoke ­Free Air Act (1995), 37 smoking ban, 2, 21, 37, 94–95, 244 Social Innovation Fund, 180 social ser­v ices, 48, 53, 55–59, 73–75, 97, 112, 126, 191, 191t, 242, 251 South Bronx Initiative (SBI), 84 Spitzer, Eliot, 72, 138–39, 142, 162 State Civil Ser­v ice Commission (SCSC), 56–57 state government: affordable housing and, 131, 153, 166–67; aid to NYC by, 73, 121–23,

Index

173–75, 198; Bloomberg’s relation to, 3, 8–10, 17, 20–21, 23, 52, 72, 93, 113–15, 250–51, 253; bud­get of NYC and, 3, 14–15, 19, 20–21, 43–49, 72–73, 121–23, 242–43, 247, 251; civil ser­v ice reform and, 56–57, 243; congestion pricing rejected by, 2–3, 13, 21, 45, 93, 101, 243; criminal justice and, 3, 228, 250; economic development and, 12, 77; education and, 3, 5, 13, 21, 35, 51–52, 203, 208, 211, 224–25, 249–50; education tests of, 3, 5, 13, 21, 208, 249; environmental initiatives and, 44–45, 93; health care and, 71–72, 94–95; homelessness and, 3, 13, 106–9, 114, 115–16, 119–25, 129–31, 132–33, 245; infrastructure and, 44–45; ­labor ­unions and, 60, 67, 70; limits of mayoral power and, 2–5, 15, 23, 52; low-­income housing and, 3–5, 32, 45, 129, 132–40, 143, 146, 153, 166–67, 169–71, 247–48; New York State Constitution and, 14–15, 44, 68, 107–9, 136; poverty and, 17, 172, 172t, 173–75, 177, 177t, 198; rent policies and, 137–40; sports stadium rejection by, 3, 13, 21; stop-­and-­frisk policy and, 239; street camera increase rejected by, 3, 15, 21, 45, 243; transportation and, 45, 101; welfare programs and, 20–21 State of the City Addresses by Bloomberg, 1, 35, 76, 83, 89, 115, 208, 210 Staten Island: Bloomberg’s approach to, 86–87; economic development in, 86–87; infrastructure in, 83, 86–87; low-­income housing in, 155; parks and green space in, 90–91; rezoning initiatives in, 79, 103, 151–52 Staten Island Railroad, 86 Stein, Samuel, 147 Steiner, Douglas C., 96 Steinhauer, Jennifer, 34 Stone, Clarence, 8, 11–13, 16–17, 240, 242–43, 253 stop-­and-­frisk policy: Bloomberg’s reversal on, 8, 227, 232, 238, 250; Bloomberg’s support for, 7–8, 35, 230, 232–33, 238, 241, 252–53; city council and, 232; court decisions and, 230, 232–33, 238; criticism of Bloomberg on, 23, 230–32; data-­driven policies and, 232; decreasing use of, 233–34; disputed effectiveness of, 8, 232–34; federal government and, 233; harms of, 3, 35, 227, 231–32, 234, 250; history of, 230–31; lack of prob­ably cause and, 7–8, 230–31, 238–39; previous mayoral decisions and, 230–31; quotes by Bloomberg on, 231–32; race and, 7–8, 12, 16,

325

35, 227, 230–33, 250; state government and, 239; stops per year and, 230, 230t. See also criminal justice system street camera increase proposal, 3, 15, 21, 45, 243 Stromberg, Brian, 157 structuralism (urban theory), 11–13, 16–17 Sturtevant, Lisa, 157 ­Sullivan, Richard J., 237 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 32, 174, 177–78, 189–90 Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 173–74, 178 Supportive Housing Agreement, 168 Supportive Housing Network (SEN), 113 Sweeting, George, 50 Swope, Christopher, 30 Tammany Hall, 18 tax policies. See bud­get of New York City Tax Reform Act (1986), 143, 165 Teacher Fellows Program, 212 teaching. See education technological initiatives: Bloomberg’s promotion of, 2, 22–23, 27–28, 41, 88, 97–99, 105, 252; bud­get of NYC and, 55; economic development and, 22–23, 80, 87–88, 95–99, 105, 244; education and, 6, 20, 95–97, 205, 210–11, 223–26, 239; infrastructure and, 97–99, 244; parks and green space and, 88–89; poverty and, 198; public health and, 36; quotes by Bloomberg on, 28; race and, 96; social ser­v ices and, 97–98; STEM initiatives and, 96; 311 city information number and, 2, 21, 28, 97, 244. See also data-­driven policies Tempey, Nathan, 237 Temporary Assistance Funding for Needy Families (TANF), 122, 173–74, 183–84, 198 terrorism. See counterterrorism Tewell, Thomas K., 33–34 Thompson, William, 17, 62 311 city information number, 2, 21, 28, 97, 244 Tighe, Mary Ann, 48 Times Square, 17, 37, 94 Toia, Tucker v. (1976), 108 tourism, 2, 28, 77, 87, 89 Toussaint, Roger, 40 trade ­unions. See ­labor ­unions trans fats ban, 2, 21, 94–95, 244 Transit Union Local 100, 40 transportation, 27, 30, 45, 54, 79–80, 100–101 Transportation Department, 30, 54

326 Index

Trone, Jennifer, 8 Truman, Harry S., 164 Tucker v. Toia (1976), 108 Turetsky, Doug, 60 Turnkey Program (housing), 164 “Two ­Faces of Power” (Bachrach and Baratz), 11 2008 recession: bud­get of NYC and, 3, 43, 54, 62, 67, 73–74, 163, 242; economic development and, 76–77, 243–44, 246; low-­income housing and, 159–60, 163, 165; parks and green space and, 89 Ullman, Seth, 156 Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), 79 ­unions. See ­labor ­unions United Federation of Teachers (UFT): Bloomberg’s relationship with, 36, 61, 63–65, 65t, 74; bud­get of NYC and, 39, 63–64; compensation of educators and, 39; criticism of Bloomberg by, 63, 74; endorsements by, 39, 64, 67; ­labor contracts and, 61, 63–65, 65t; state government and, 51 United States government. See federal government United Way, 112–14 Uniting for Solutions beyond Shelter, 112 Universal Pre-­Kindergarten (UPK), 183 university partnerships, 86, 88, 95–97 Urban Fortunes (Logan and Molotch), 11 urban theory: Bloomberg’s mayoral approach and, 11–18, 20, 252–53; capitalism in, 11, 17; class analy­sis approach in, 8–11, 17; classic studies in, 11; interest group analy­sis in, 11; internal constraints in, 16; leadership in, 253; limits of mayoral power and, 8–9, 13, 15–17, 253; pluralist approach to, 8–11, 13, 240; polity approach in, 11–13, 16; structuralist approach in, 11–13, 16–17; urban regimes in, 12–13 Urstadt, Charles, 137, 153, 161 Urstadt Law (1971), 137, 153 US Chamber of Commerce, 202 US Housing Act (1937), 141, 163 US Housing Authority (USHA), 163

Wagner-­Steagall Act (1937), 163 Walcott, Dennis, 211 Wallace Foundation, 37 ­Waters, Maxine, 165–66 ­Waters, Tom, 146 Watkins, James, 201 WeCare program, 176–77, 188 Weiner, Rebecca, 236 Weingarten, Randi, 63–64 Welfare Law Center, 174 welfare programs: bud­get of NYC and, 20–21; commissioners and, 251; criticism of Bloomberg on, 18, 23, 32, 175, 178, 198, 248, 252; education and, 32; federal government and, 20, 32; homelessness and, 120; poverty and, 173–78, 186, 188–89, 198, 248; previous mayoral decisions and, 186; reduction of rolls in, 32, 175, 178, 186, 188–89, 190, 248, 252; reform of, 173–78; social safety net in, 20–21; state government and, 20–21. See also poverty Westman, Shari, 184 Whelan, Robert, 253 White, Veronica, 90, 92, 179 Who Governs (Dahl), 11 Williams, Jumaane, 241 Williamsburg (Brooklyn), 102, 159 Wolf, Michael, 79 Wong, Kenneth K., 222 Work Experience Programs (WEPs), 174, 177 Work Support Program, 118 Workforce Reform Task Force, 56, 74–75 World Trade Center (WTC): Bloomberg’s role in rebuilding, 3–4, 7, 14, 87; Ground Zero and, 2, 14, 27, 41, 45, 50, 78, 83, 87, 241, 254; Islamic cultural center near site of, 7, 26–27, 41, 241, 254; Memorial Foundation for, 3, 50, 87; quotes by Bloomberg on, 87; state government and, 3–4, 14. See also September 11 attacks World Trade Center Memorial Foundation, 87 Wylde, Kathryn, 48–49, 99, 104, 240

vacancy decontrol, 4, 9, 137–40, 152–53, 167, 169–70, 259n1 Vallone, Peter, 50 Vera Institute of Justice, 116, 236 Voloch, Daniel, 204, 216–17

Yankee Stadium, 47 Yankees, 47, 84 Yaroni, Allon, 97–98 Yates, Douglas, 15–16 Yoder, Traci, 237 Young Men’s Initiative (YMI), 40, 180, 182, 196–97, 229, 239

Wagner, Robert, Jr., 19, 243 Wagner, Robert F., 4

Zheng v. City of New York (2012), 119 zoning. See rezoning initiatives