Maximilien Robespierre: Nationalist Dictator 9780231886314

Table of contents :
PREFACE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. EARLY INFLUENCES AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER II. THE PATRIOT, POLITICIAN, AND PACIFIST
CHAPTER III. THE JACOBIN ORGANIZER
CHAPTER IV. THE FORMATION OF JACOBIN OPINION
CHAPTER V. TOWARDS THE TOTALITARIAN STATE
CHAPTER VI. CENTRALIZATION versus FEDERALISM
CHAPTER VII. NATIONALIST SPELLBINDING
CHAPTER VIII. THE DICTATOR'S TOOLS
CHAPTER IX. THE JACOBIN BLOOD PURGE
CHAPTER X. JUSTICE AND THE JACOBINS
CHAPTER XI. JACOBIN DICTATORSHIP
CHAPTER XII. EMOTIONALISM AND NATIONALISM
CHAPTER XIII. THE FESTIVAL OF THE SUPREME BEING
CHAPTER XIV. EVERY MAN A SOLDIER
CHAPTER XV. JACOBINISM LOOKS ABROAD
CHAPTER XVI. ROBESPIERRE: NATIONALIST DICTATOR
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
APPENDIX
INDEX

Citation preview

MAXIMILIEN ROBESPIERRE: NATIONALIST DICTATOR

BY

JAMES MICHAEL EAGAN, A. M. INSTRUCTOR COLLEGE

OF

IN

HISTORY

NEW

ROCHELLE

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY

NUMBER 437

NEW

YORK

1938

COPYRIGHT,

1938

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PRESS

PRINTED I N T H E UNITED STATES OF A M E R I C A

CO MAE

PREFACE T H I S study of Robespierre as a nationalist dictator presupposes that several definitions are agreed upon. First, in calling Robespierre a nationalist dictator, no attempt has been made to prove him the prototype of contemporary dictators. -In many respects, the problems which Robespierre faced were distinctly those of the eighteenth century rather than of the twentieth. The economic situation with which Robespierre coped was far different than that facing contemporary dictators. Yet, in other respects, Robespierre stood on the threshold of the twentieth century. He helped to effect the transition from eighteenth-century humanitarian nationalism which found its base in loyalty to the patriot king, the customs of the past, and devotion to established institutions such as the Church and the family. Yet, humanitarian nationalism as it was preached in the eighteenth century was highly critical of economic, social and political abuses. Its thought was humane, cultural, social, and revolutionary. Since Robespierre was in his youth a humanitarian nationalist, some study of his social and revolutionary thought has been included in this work. For this reason, the study must necessarily transcend the limits set by the title. A certain amount of biographical material has also been included in tracing the transition from humanitarian nationalism to a more violent revolutionary type of nationalism, Jacobin nationalism.

This study is primarily one of Robespierre as a Jacobin, nationalist. In using the term nationalist, the author is quite aware of the distinction between patriotism, which is a laudable devotion to one's country, and nationalism, which verges on chauvinism. Although there is no sharp dividing line between patriotism and nationalism, there is little doubt in the author's mind but that in the days of the Terror, Robespierre was acting as a nationalist rather than as a patriot. Fully to comprehend this distinction, some definition of Jacobinism is necessary. 7

8

PREFACE

Jacobinism replaced the loyalty to the King with loyalty to the nation alone. It made the nation a greater tyrant than the king had ever been. A s it developed in the revolution, Jacobinism represented a blind devotion to France, intolerant of internal dissent, extremely suspicious of everything which might destroy centralization of government. Jacobinism did not hesitate to use force and militarism to achieve its own view of what the revolution stood for. Although Jacobins began as men of reason, they eventually came to look upon their cause with a zeal which was largely emotional. This, in turn, led them to adopt agencies of nationalist propaganda at home and armies abroad with which to spread their ideas. Yet, in its essence, Jacobinism declared itself to be democratic and republican, thus distinguishing itself from contemporary dictatorships. But the purpose of this study is not to compare, but to present suggestive material for comparison. This study owes much to the helpful advice of Dr. Shepard B. Clough and Dr. Jacques Barzun, who read the manuscript and proof. Their keen critical faculties and insight into the deeper implications of the study have been generously contributed to the work. Professor Carlton J . H . Hayes in his courses and seminar gave both inspiration and knowledge as well as suggestions for organization of the material. Professor Charles D. Hazen contributed much to my thought on the French Revolution itself. C. T. Muret and Professor J . A . Bédé made many excellent and helpful suggestions in the correction of the proof. Finally, to my wife must go my thanks for the encouragement so necessary for the completion of the work. JAMES M . E A G A N N E W ROCHELLE, N E W APRIL 23,

1938

YORK

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE

7

CHAPTER I Early Influences and Philosophy

11

C H A P T E R II The Patriot, Politician, and Pacifist

32

C H A P T E R III The Jacobin Organizer

52

CHAPTER IV The Formation of Jacobin Opinion

65

CHAPTER V Towards the Totalitarian State

89

CHAPTER VI Centralization versus Federalism

97

CHAPTER VII Nationalist Spellbinding

111 CHAPTER VIII

The Dictator's Tools

118 CHAPTER

IX

The Jacobin Blood Purge

129 CHAPTER X

Justice and the Jacobins

138 CHAPTER

XI

Jacobin Dictatorship

149

CHAPTER XII Emotionalism and Nationalism

165

CHAPTER XIII The Festival of the Supreme Being

172 9

IO

C O N T E N T S PAGE

CHAPTER

XIV

Every Man a Soldier

183 CHAPTER

XV

Jacobinism Looks Abroad

196 CHAPTER XVI

Robespierre : Nationalist Dictator

214

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

224

NOTE

APPENDIX

235

INDEX

241

CHAPTER I EARLY INFLUENCES AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY N o figure of the French Revolution has aroused so much controversy as that of Robespierre. T o some, he represents all that was evil in the Revolution; to others, he is the savior and protector of democracy and the rights of man. In the present author's mind, there is little doubt that all explanations fit into an intelligible pattern centering about Robespierre's nationalism. None of the standard authors has attempted to fit the facts into this pattern. Yet, the possibility of discovering in Robespierre's personal, social, political, and economic activities an intelligible pattern is perfectly real. N o figure of any consequence in the Revolution kept his ideas free from the growing nationalist sentiment of the French people. Professor Hayes, an authority on the phenomena of nationalism, has pictured the French Revolution as one of the most significant steps in the development of modern nationalism. Robespierre was certainly the most articulate and probably one of the most influential of the advocates of the new nationalism. F r o m 1789 until his death in 1794 he never delivered a harangue without some mention of la Patrie and les Patriotes. H i s sole explanation for every move was that France demanded it. This so increased Robespierre's prestige and power that he became actually, if not theoretically, the first nationalist dictator, the prototype in aims, methods and personality of later nationalist dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler. True his dictatorship was brief, its methods were those of a political bungler, but the fact remains that it was one of the first nationalist dictatorships to appear in modern history. The problem of presenting a clear-cut picture of Robespierre as a national dictator is by no means an easy one. The first difficulty is that of reconciling Robespierre's own high opinion of himself, his extreme personal conceit and egotism, with the 11

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contemporary English view of him as Satan incarnate. Yet the facts seem fairly clear that he was but one among the Jacobin nationalists. Barere and Carnot certainly guided Jacobin activities with as firm a hand as did Robespierre, but they made him. their spokesman. H e was a symbol rather than a cause. Then, too, his nationalism differed only in unessential respects from that of the Girondists and Dantonists whom he so vociferously denounced as enemies of the nation. His triumph over them was the result simply of the better political organization and more violent methods of the particular faction to which he belonged. Another difficulty which presents itself is one connected with his personal ambition. H e constantly pretended to altruistic motives. Yet he was obviously an egotist and his nationalism may well have been a personal egotism imperfectly sublimated into a national egotism. Perhaps he utilized patriotism to satisfy his personal ambition, unconsciously but none the less actually. Or perhaps his devotion to Rousseau and to " pure " patriotism brought out and developed a personal ambition. This difficulty once recognized, may be dismissed from further consideration, for we are dealing with Robespierre's actual nationalism and not with the motives behind it. There is also the difficulty about Robespierre's verbosity. He talked often and at great length. Indeed, he was a talker rather than a doer. His talk was apt to be muddy, even incoherent, and as often in denunciation of persons who differed with him as in praise of principles or in support of specific measures and policies. It is very difficult, yet vitally necessary to find in his words a true picture of his nationalist thought. Yet another difficulty lies in the fact that Robespierre's thought changed somewhat during the exciting times in which he was a public figure. This change of mind was always closely in accord with variations in public opinion. Finally, there is the difficulty of dealing with a person who was not only verbose but also " incorruptibly m o r a l " . Such thoughts as, " W e have been guided in stormy times by the

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love of good and by a sentiment for the needs of the nation rather than by any exact or precise rules of conduct ", illustrate his smugness. His republic was to be filled with moral, honest citizens, thriving upon " greatness of the s o u l " . Little wonder that he was called the " Incorruptible ". His problem consisted in making all other Frenchmen as " g o o d " and as " unselfish " as he was. W i t h all these difficulties in mind, we shall now proceed. W e are not writing a life of Robespierre, nor a history of the French Revolution. O u r purpose is much more modest, simply to present the nationalist thought of Robespierre in its origins and development, from the time when he was an obscure lawyer in Artois, infatuated with the writings of Rousseau, through the period of the Constitutional Monarchy (1789-1792) when his nationalism was " constitutional " and stridently " humanitarian " up to the days of the Convention and the Republic when he personified the intolerant Jacobin nationalism that made him for a few months virtually the first nationalist dictator of France. There has always been a certain air of mystery about the personality of Robespierre. Shy but never modest, he showed the greatest desire to talk long and monotonously. Yet, he was always a hesitant nervous speaker. H e disliked crowds and preferred to work alone. But he became the " tribune of the people " and the organizer of the most powerful political party of the Revolution: the Jacobins. " The Friend of the People " , he hated the aristocracy and played up to the mob whenever it was necessary for political reasons. Y e t , he never gave in to the prevalent sans-culotte style of the day. T o the last, he wore the dress of a modest member of the bourgeoisie. Calm and coldly calculating, he sometimes overreached himself both in speech and act when the safety of la Patrie seemed to him to be at stake. Unemotional in private life, he shook with rage at enemies of France and launched into paeans of joyous* praise of the fatherland.

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" H e will g o f a r f o r he believes everything he says " , Mirabeau is once supposed to have said of Robespierre. W h e t h e r Robespierre did believe everything he said is difficult to ascertain, but he certainly appeared sincere and gave the impression that he was the final and immutable authority on matters of truth. H i s life was a lonely one and he might well have turned out to be a misanthrope instead of what he was : a lover of the people. T h i s apostle of the people's cause w a s born somewhat untimely on M a y 6, 1758 in the little town of A r r a s . H i s father, François Robespierre, w h o was reputed to be of noble lineage, had seduced Jacqueline-Marguerite Carraut, the daughter of a brewer. Maximilien-Marie-Isidore was the result of this misalliance. Born under such inauspicious circumstances, the child's life w a s made more unhappy by the death of his mother, and the practical abandonment of the children by his father. T h e children were left to the care of relatives w h o never failed to remind the sensitive Maximilien of his lowly position in life. A c c o r d i n g to his sister, Charlotte, he " rarely shared the games and pleasures of his comrades. H e liked to meditate in silence and passed hours in reflection " , 1 H i s spare time was spent in making lace and in caring f o r pigeons. Maximilien received his early education in the College of A r r a s . T h e Bishop of St. W a a s t was so impressed by his qualifications that he chose him as one of the scholars to be sent to the Collège Louis-le-Grand at Paris. It was said that if he did not have genius, he at least had patience and strength of character. Rather morose, he neglected everything f o r study, finding an outlet only in a rhetoric course taught by a M . H é r i v a u x , w h o believed in the enlightened philosophy of the eighteenth century. 2 M . H é r i v a u x ' admiration of the classics was communciated to his star pupil, Robespierre. It was hinted, too, that 1 Mémoires

de Charlotte

Robespierre

sur ses deux

frères,

edited

by

Laponneraye, second edition, Paris, 1835, pp. 46, 47. 2 Le Blond de Neuvéglise, La Vie et les crimes de Robespierre, Augsbourg,

1795. PP- 46, 47.

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the head of the school, Abbé Audrein, did not counteract the ideas which his pupils obtained in clandestine reading. Robespierre, according to L e Blond de Neuvéglise, read the philosophy of Montesquieu and Rousseau, unhampered by school authorities. In later years, Camille Desmoulins, a fellow scholar of Robespierre, was to write that not long ago they had suffered because of the servitude of their country. They had, he wrote, derived the holy love of liberty and equality from the same source. Robespierre excelled in the study of the classics. In 1772, he won second prize for a Latin essay; in 1774, another Latin composition took first prize. So outstanding was his scholarship that he was chosen to address K i n g Louis X V I on the occasion of the latter's return from his coronation at Reims. W h e n Robespierre finished his Latin Oration, Louis X V I is said to have smiled at him. H e might not have done so, however, had Robespierre delivered the first draft of his speech which was severely edited by the Masters because of its unorthodox sentiments. 3 Robespierre's feelings were certainly influenced by his study of the classics. Brutus was to him a republican hero ; the ancient Greeks furnished the best example of how courage and genius could unite to produce a free people. This classicism was fused in Robespierre's mind with another element, romanticism. His sister, Charlotte, described how Robespierre was very much attracted to the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 4 " Divine man ", he wrote, " you have taught me. A t a tender age, you made me appreciate the dignity of my nature and caused me to reflect upon the great principles of the social order. . . . I saw you in your last days and this memory is a source of precious joy to me. I contemplated your august face. I saw printed thereon the deep sorrows which the injustice of man had inflicted upon you." Charlotte insisted that he had met Rousseau, but she did not know just when. 5 3 Hamel, Eroest, Histoire de Robespierre, Paris, 1862, I, 17. 4 Robespierre, Charlotte, Mémoires, Pièce Justificative, No. I. 5 Ibid., p. 52-

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By the time he left Louis-le-Grand, Robespierre had become attracted to his philosophy, and his mind was astir with the glories of Greek and Roman patriots. He decided to become a lawyer, and wrote to Dupaty, a prominent Parisian barrister, " I want to be a lawyer. I know how many qualities are needed for fame in that profession. One at least I can claim to possess: keen ambition and an unqualified desire for success." On July 3 1 , 1780, he became a Bachelor of Law; on May 15, 1781, he received his license; and on August 2 he was admitted to the bar of Paris. Beginning at Arras, Robespierre built up a legal practice which was successful on the whole but far from financially remunerative. His first case on February 27, 1782, dealing with a marriage contract, was lost. He had only two others until his appointment as an Episcopal Judge on March 9, 1782. In his two years of practice, he had but twenty-six cases while three competing lawyers had respectively sixty-five, fifty-seven, and thirty-three to their credit. The registers of the Council of Artois from 1782 to 1790 further attest to his moderately sized practice. In 1783 he had eighteen cases, winning twelve and losing six. In 1784, of thirteen cases, he won ten and lost one, with the decision reserved in the remainder. His practice further diminished in 1785 with but twelve cases, only four of which were won, two lost, and decision reserved for the rest. The next year he won fourteen out of twenty-two cases and lost two. Eight of the twenty-four cases in 1787 were settled out of court, twelve were decided in his clients' favor and four were lost. In like fashion, eleven of his seventeen cases in 1788 were settled outside of court, one was lost and five won. The year the Estates General were summoned, Robespierre had only sixteen cases and lost three of them. The register showed but one case for 1790. This practice hardly distinguished him as foremost in the rank of lawyers even in the small town of Arras. A study of his cases shows that Robespierre always tried to go behind the letter of the law, to see just what rational principles were involved. Thus going from particulars, he built a

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case around universal principles. In this, he was guided more often than not by oratory rather than by specific facts of the case. The principles upon which he based his pleadings were those of the humanitarian enlightened philosophy of the day. He told his adoring sister Charlotte that " The duty of pleading the cause of the weak against the strong is that of every heart not poisoned by egoism and corruption. My life's task will be to aid those who suffer and to pursue with vengeful words those who, without pity for humanity, enjoy the sufferings of others." Robespierre's practice of the law had a definite effect upon the development of his thought. His interest in humanity, in the abused rights of all sorts of people, led him to formulate a more definite philosophy about the rights of man. He began to consider more seriously ways in which society might be reformed through the law. A s this program developed, it gradually appeared to him that the King and the nation were best fitted to undertake reforms. Illustrative of all this was Robespierre's most famous case, that of the lightning rod.8 The facts of the case were simple. A wealthy lawyer of Saint-Omer had become very enthusiastic over the discoveries of Franklin and had installed a lightning rod on his house. This met with the disapproval of several of his unenlightened and less philosophical neighbors who claimed that it attracted lightning to the neighborhood. Robespierre was in his element. B y defending the lightning rod, he was pleading the cause of its proponent, Franklin. Robespierre gloried in the opportunity of appealing to the spirit of Galileo and Descartes, of hailing the arts and sciences as the highest objects to which the human race could aspire, and of acclaiming Franklin as its benefactor. The case appeared to be of national importance to Robespierre who urged the Judges to " hasten to rescind a decision which would shame you in the eyes of every enlightened nation; remove the scandal; blot out the stain inflicted upon our country; and when foreigners wish to cite this 6 Counson, Albert, Franklin et Robespierre, Paris, 1930.

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case to defame our learning, see that we shall be able to replyto them. This decision which you so maliciously quote was no sooner known to the judges than they hastened to reverse it." A s a further illustration of his humanitarianism might be cited his reluctance to condemn a murderer brought before him as Episcopal Judge. According to Charlotte, " M y elder brother returned home with despair in his heart and ate nothing f o r two days. H e kept repeating, ' I know he is to blame. He is a rascal . . . but to kill a man. . . .' " Although Charlotte claimed Maximilien handed in his resignation because of the incident, the Almanack d'Artois carried his name until 1790. N o r did his colleague, Guffroy, who knew of the incident mention any resignation. Although the number of his cases was small, Robespierre took obvious delight in letting the world know about his pleadings. V e r y early in his career, he showed a tendency to appeal to a wider public than the immediate one of Artois. H e published his defense in the lightning-rod case, winning applause even in the Mercure de France of June 21, 1783. In 1784 he published a Mémoire pour François Déteuf demeurant aux village de Marchiennes contre le grand prieur et religieux de l'Abbaye d'ArchivesJ His Réplique pour Dame Marie Sommerville, veuve de M. George Mercier 8 was also spread about Arras. The same year a Mémoire justificatif pour M. François Page, orfèvre à Béthune et Marie Angélique Prévost, sa femme9 was published and distributed about town. These memoirs built up Robespierre's local reputation as a defender of the oppressed. 10 A n analysis of their contents shows the direction which his philosophy was taking. Cases involving downtrodden humanity appealed to him more and more. Especially so did the plight of François Déteuf accused 7 Imprimerie de la Sablonnière, Arras, 1784, 24 pp. 8 Imprimerie Nicolas, Arras, 1786. 9 Veuve Michel Nicolas, Arras, 1786, 79 pp. 10 Full accounts of Robespierre's legal cases can be found in Vellay and; Barbier, Oeuvres complètes de M. Robespierre, Paris, 1916, 2 v.

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of robbery by Dom Brongniard, a monk of the Abbey of Archives. Robespierre charged that the allegation was brought because Déteuf's sister had resisted advances of Dom Brongniard. The poor and oppressed were fighting against rich and powerful adversaries. With quixotic zeal, Robespierre had to enter the list also. He was careful to point out, however, that the regularity of the other monks was not in question. The idea that he was the defender of all the oppressed grew in Robespierre's mind. With it went the feeling that France should set an example to the whole world in politeness and humanity. When Mary Sommerville, a widow of a former Governor of South Carolina, was arrested and imprisoned for nonpayment of debts, Robespierre offered his services. Through him, she praised the mildness of the legal system of the French, the wisdom of their constitution, the energy and the grandeur of their character. Concluding, she said, " Oh, Frenchmen, they boast of your politeness and humanity. I believed in France when I preferred to live here rather than in my own country ". All of Robespierre's pleadings were suffused with highflown rhetoric urging adherence to the spirit of the law rather than to its letter. His pleadings in the Sommerville case were illustrative of this. " True souls, noble souls ", he said, " enlightened men whom the idea of injustice irritates, who do not imagine that an oppressed stranger can claim in vain the sacred principles of the rights of man and of justice before the magistrates of a generous and polite nation." 11 Two traits quite distinctive of Robespierre's temperament stand out very clearly in these early cases. First, was his feeling that he was irrevocably right. He had " obtained the approbation of magistrates and all men who knew how to feel and think ". Secondly, was his conviction of being oppressed. " I know too well", he lamented, " at what a price the right to defend unfortunates is purchased. I pay a thousand times over, but I joyfully do so. . . . I shall adhere to the saying, ' Do what you will, come what may '." Such a conviction was strengthened 11 Vellay and Barbier, Oeuvres complète de Robespierre, Part I, II, 3S9.

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by the judicial suppression of the Mémoire pour M. François Page, orfèvre à Béthune et Marie-Angélique Prévost, sa 12 femme. Robespierre's violent condemnation of usury offended the Judges but their action re-enforced his belief that he suffered for the oppressed. Robespierre's developing political thought was evident in the legal memoirs. Defending a Professor Boutrone against charges brought by his Rector, Robespierre elaborated his republican thought, applying it even to the sphere of the University. " The University is not ", he declared, " a despotic state whose rector is monarch. It is, rather, a little republic whose subjects are the students and whose Senators are the professors. T h e head of this Senate cannot reduce any of its members to servitude. His authority is but the simple preëminence of the head of a company over its members." Robespierre's democratic and republican opinions were brought out most clearly in the case of Hyacinth Dupond. A t seventeen, this person had enlisted in the army only to desert and be sentenced to death. H e escaped to Denmark and Sweden. Twenty-four years passed without news of him until he appeared to claim his share of an uncle's estate. His brother obtained a lettre de cachet which resulted in Hyacinth's imprisonment for ten years. Freed in 1786, he brought suit for damages. Robespierre seized upon the occasion as a fitting one to publish another Mémoire denouncing this "injustice without example even in the history of that horrible system of lettres de cachet ". Robespierre had Dupond say, " M y misfortunes began with the reign of a prince whose virtues promised happiness to France. . . . I left cells whose unfortunate inhabitants have ceased to doubt if there are laws and customs. M y ear, so long accustomed to hearing only sighs of grief and cries of despair, has been greeted by the acclamations of a people, excited by a movement which seems to announce a revolution in customs and the reign of law. M y eyes have seen the most sublime of all spectacles : that of a sovereign who has escaped a frightful conspiracy 12 Veuve Michel Nicolas, Arras, 1786, 79 pp.

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against justice, seeking refuge among his people to find the truth, so difficult to secure on thrones . . . and finally calling upon all the talents, and upon the virtues which illustrate this superb monarchy and uphold it on the verge of ruin, to strengthen it on the firm foundations of law made for men, the inalienable rights of nations and the sacred authority of kings." While wholly respectful of the King, Robespierre was, nevertheless, insistent that a protest should be raised which would " reach the throne and be heard by the nation ". It is worthy of note that at this early stage of his career, Robespierre referred to the King and the Nation as separate entities. The Mémoire could hardly be classed as an attack on the King. Quite the reverse, Robespierre launched into panegyrics of praise of the King as leader of the nation. Speaking of Louis XVI, he said, " Oh august monarch, you share with a small number of kings the glory of being worthy of hearing the truth through your zeal in inquiring. And you, generous nation, which alone among the peoples of the earth has recovered without revolution, without bloody catastrophe, through your own maganimity and the virtuous character of your king, the inalienable rights which have been violated throughout the centuries in almost every country of the world." He spoke of " that holy liberty which each of us holds immediately from the Eternal Giver ". Robespierre went on to elaborate the fact that the " Infinite Being who created man for sublime ends and who gave him faculties worthy of these ends, destined him for a society most proper to develop those precious faculties." From this, it followed that " all forms of society, all kinds of government under whatever name they are designated are good if they achieve this end. And they are essentially wicked when they contradict it. That is the basis of the social contract of which so much is spoken. It is not the work of a free and voluntary convention of men. Its fundamental conditions, written in heaven, were determined by the Supreme Legislator for all time. He is the source of all order, of _all happiness and of all justice." The Infinite Being had then ordained that Liberty was the basis of

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human society: " Whoever dares to use the authority of the laws to oppress anyone whom the law protects is not the oppressor of any one person, he is the oppressor of the laws, an enemy of Id Patrie." France was fortunate, Robespierre said, in having a prince worthy of cherishing and protecting liberty. He had found in his nation the elevation and energy necessary. Robespierre's peroration ran, " Oh what a glorious day, Sire, when the principles engraved in your Majestic heart, proclaimed from your august lips, will receive the inviolable sanction of the worthiest nation of Europe. On that day, not content with assuring this benefit to your nation, you will abolish all other abuses which are the fatal source of so many crimes and evils." Louis XVI, he believed, would offer France " a new deal " by giving men happiness through legislation founded upon virtue. The lack of virtue, he said, was the reason for the existent low state of all humanity, a situation wherein the enormous fortunes of a few citizens were founded upon the ruin and misery of everyone else. He urged the King " to look beyond the courtiers, the magnificent palaces, and to see the artisans, the laborers in despair, that multitude of citizens . . . which forms the body of every nation disputing ceaselessly about the avidity of the taxes, about justice, and the harshness of the rich ". This Memoire also evinced Robespierre's interest in the people. Hitherto he had concentrated on oppressed individuals. Now, the people, the " body of the nation ", as he called it, so sacred and so majestic in the eyes of reason, was almost forced by the excess of its misery to forget the dignity of man and the principles of morals. Louis XVI, he pointed out, could end these evils with the aid of another Sully and a group of citizens whom the " choice of the nation will call to second his glorious designs." All classes would work together in perfect harmony to reconcile politics and morals. The liberty and happiness of the people would be joined forever with that of kings. Robespierre's pleading in the Dupond case was indicative of the trend of his thought. It might not be amiss to inquire just

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what circumstances or study led him to this frame of mind. First of all, his fondness for the classics undoubtedly infused him with a patriotic spirit, particularly a love for the simplicity of ancient Sparta and the institutions of republican Rome. E v e r y plea before the bar was shot through with classical allusions. Secondly, the fact that his law practice brought him into contact with many of the lowly and oppressed made him actually aware of the necessity for some change. That awareness, perhaps, was sharpened by the fact that his law practice was not financially remunerative. Thus early in his career, he acquired a " persecution complex " , believing that his activities on behalf of his humble clients had rendered him suspect to all the other lawyers of the town. One incident confirmed him in this belief. T h e lawyers of A r r a s formed an association to discuss and seek solution of legal problems, but Robespierre was not chosen among the twenty. In a Lettre addressee par un avocat au Conseil d'Artois a son ami, avocat au parlement du Douai, he complained of how younger lawyers were repressed. Robespierre's interest in philosophy probably had as great an effect in shaping his thought as did the practice of the law. It is impossible to assay separately the influence which each had, because Robespierre looked upon law from a philosophical angle and upon philosophy from a legal point of view. He found in the law an outlet for the conclusions reached in his study of philosophy and literature. His interest in philosophy was considerably heightened by his membership in the Academie d'Arras, a society founded in 1773 for the purpose of learning the principles, the genius, the taste and the delicate shades of meaning of the French language and to appreciate its history ". Robespierre entered the Academy in 1783 just after his successful pleading in the lightning-rod case. His first contribution was on The Origin, Injustice and Inconvenience of the Prejudice which attaches Disgrace to the Relative of a Criminal. Launching into a general discourse on equality, he asserted that inequality arose from faulty government. Taking a despotic state as example, he pointed out that there was little

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else than the will of the prince to which appeals f o r equality might be made. O n the other hand, in a republic, virtue or love of laws and the nation safeguarded everyone. Virtue, then, as recommended to L o u i s X V I and the nation was love of France and its laws. " It demands " , he explained, " that all special interests, all personalities, yield to the general welfare. Each citizen, being part of the state is obliged to watch over the safety of his country whose rights are entrusted to him. H e should spare no one when the safety of the republic demands his punishment." T h i s definition of virtue Robespierre asserted came f r o m Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws. It demanded that all inequality such as attaching shame to the relatives of a criminal was characteristic of a state which had no virtue, where nobility depended upon birth. Robespierre's remedies were not very radical. H e would not attempt to replace the monarchy with a republic. Instead, he wished to effect certain legal reforms such as the use of the same methods of punishment f o r nobles as f o r others. H e would open the road to honors and fortune f o r deserving relatives of criminals. T h i s Discours sur les peines infamantes shows that as early as 1783, Robespierre had in mind a popular government of virtue or patriotism, a state in which personal and material interests would be submerged in the interest of all. T h e Discours could very well have been made ten years later so well developed were the ideas of Robespierre in 1783. " V i r t u e produces happiness as the sun gives forth l i g h t " ; " Nothing is useful which is not h o n e s t " ; " E v e r y unjust law, every harsh institution which offends natural right, directly contradicts its purpose, which is the conservation of the rights of man and the tranquility of citizens " ; these were the dicta which showed that Robespierre was a firm believer in a republic of virtue to be obtained through legal monarchical forms. Robespierre in 1783 w a s a humanitarian nationalist of the type described by P r o fessor Hayes. 1 8 Being " enlightened " in the eighteenth century 13 The

Historical

chapter II.

Evolution

of Modem

Nationalism,

N e w York, 1931,

EARLY

INFLUENCES

AND

PHILOSOPHY

25

sense of the word, Robespierre believed that he could serve France well with a nationalism based upon reason. The world would benefit by a " regeneration " in France which would bring about international peace and secure human progress. The Robespierre of 1783 was a humanitarian nationalist interested in the slow evolution of a republic of virtue through existing institutions. " W e daily repeat this equitable maxim ", he wrote, " I t is better to spare a hundred guilty persons than to sacrifice one i n n o c e n t P u n i s h m e n t of an innocent man was a " disgrace to all society". Robespierre found it particularly disgraceful in a country where the people were otherwise just, humane, and enlightened, with polite customs, wise laws, and sublime institutions, where the rights of humanity and the principles of social happiness were respected, and where the arts and sciences were carried to a degree of perfection unknown to the rest of the universe. W i t h all its imperfections, there was little doubt but that Robespierre considered France a virtuous state in 1783. It is interesting, also, to note that he addressed his plea for further virtue, not to the nation, but to the king. Robespierre was influenced in the formation of his ideas by the milieu of the eighteenth century. Montesquieu and Rousseau had a definite influence upon him. H i s debt to the latter has been generally acknowledged; the contributions of Montesquieu to his political thought are not so well-known. Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws and his Persian Letters had a great influence in the eighteenth century; and Robespierre, with his legal training, would naturally turn to him as a source. Robespierre's idea of virtue, which later became the basis of his thought, was first defined by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, B. V , c. ii. " Virtue in a republic is " , according to Montesquieu, " a most simple thing; it is love of the republic; it is a sensation, and not a consequence of acquired knowledge; a sensation that may be felt by the meanest as well as by the highest person in the state. W h e n the common people adopt good maxims, they adhere to them more steadily than those whom we call gentle-

26

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

men. . . . The love of our country is favorable to a purity of morals, and the latter is again conducive to the former ". Again, in his statements on democracy, Montesquieu declared, " In republican governments, men are all equal; they are also equal in despotic governments; in the former, because they are everything ; in the latter, because they are nothing ".14 In planning for a highly centralized form of government, Robespierre did so with a particular regard for the " protection of the laws " which Montesquieu espoused.15 In his scheme for a national system of education, Robespierre was merely following Montesquieu's dictum that virtue or love of country was the greatest part of a democracy. " Everything therefore depends on establishing this love in a republic, and to inspire it ought to be the principal business of our education." 16 Montesquieu, too, did not believe in the extremes of liberty. Liberty to him was simply the power of doing everything the laws permitted,17 not everything one wished to do.18 Hence Robespierre, in following Montesquieu, could set up legal limits to the freedom of individuals. Yet according to Montesquieu, liberty should never be abridged for personal interests. As he said in his Persian Letters, " In this happy country, cupidity was a stranger ". Or again, " The Greek politicians who lived under a popular form of government recognized no other force than that of virtue. Today, we hear only of manufactures, commerce, finance, wealth, and luxury ". Rousseau, too, emphasized the same idea: " In a free and peaceable nation, establish simple customs, turn your people to agriculture and the arts necessary to life, make wealth despicable and form courageous and disinterested souls." 14 Spirit of Laws, B. VI, c. i. 15 Ibid., B. VIII, c. iii. . 16 Ibid., B. V, c. v. 17 Ibid., B. XII. c. xix. Montesquieu wrote, " I must own, notwithstanding, that the practice of the freest nation that ever existed induces me to think that there are cases in which a veil should be drawn for a while over liberty, as it was customary to cover the statues of the gods." 18 B. XI.

EARLY

INFLUENCES

AND

PHILOSOPHY

2J

Both Montesquieu and Rousseau looked to the state to assure •economic and social as well as political equality. Montesquieu, in praising contemporary Paraguay, thought that a regime where equality of labor prevailed was a happy one. In his Spirit of the Laws, B. X X I I I , X X I X , he said that the state " owes to all citizens, in exchange for their work, the assurance of the necessities of life ". In his Social Contract and his Constitution for the Corsicans (1765) Rousseau upheld the same point of view. Montesquieu had a great effect upon Robespierre in his stress upon the necessity of morality and religion. Montesquieu's influence upon Robespierre was not as direct a s that of Rousseau. Robespierre in his Dedication to JeanJacques Rousseau acknowledged his debt to the most " eloquent and virtuous of men ". " Your example, he said, " is always before my eyes, your admirable confessions . . . will show to posterity . . . a prodigy of virtue. I wish to follow in your venerated footsteps. May I leave a name which the centuries to come will not forget. Happy shall I be, if in the perilous career of the revolution just beginning, I remain constantly faithful to the inspiration I drew from your writings." It remains to be seen just what this inspiration was. First, Rousseau's ideas about the general will and social contract were taken over wholeheartedly by Robespierre. As the latter put it, «very citizen brought to the general group a share of public power and of sovereignty which he held.19 This corresponded nicely with Rousseau's thesis that government is the result of a contract entered into by the people which might be changed whenever the general will should so desire.20 Rousseau further declared in his Political Economy, an article in the Encyclopedia, that " the general will is also the most just, and the voice of the people is indirectly the voice of God." The common people, according to both Rousseau and Robespierre, were closest to this spirit. They were the most virtuous. It was the 19 Défenseur de la Constitution, No. 4. 20 Schatz, Richard, J. J. Rouseaiis Einftuss auf Robespierre, Leipsig, 1905; Meynier, Albert, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Révolutionnaire, Paris, 1910.

28

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

duty of the state, both believed, to develop republican virtue. As Rousseau said, " It is not enough to say to the citizen ' be g o o d H e must be taught to be so. . . . Love of country is the most efficacious means of so doing because . . . every man is virtuous when his own wish conforms entirely to the general will. . . . It is certain that the greatest examples of virtue have been produced by love of country. This kind and lively feeling joins love of self to all the beauty of virtue and gives it the energy which . . . makes it the most beautiful of passions." 21 Obviously, Rousseau did not mean that " love of country " was exactly synonymous with virtue but rather that it was a valuable adjunct of " virtue ". Montesquieu, however, had defined " virtue " as " love of country and Robespierre apparently derived his own definition from him rather than from Rousseau. If Robespierre obtained some of his principles from Montesquieu, it was from Rousseau that he received his enthusiasm for la Patrie and his confident belief in the French people. Rousseau, though a cosmopolite, was not averse to enthusiastic praise of patriotism and of the French people.22 In his Considerations on the Government of Poland, he declared that patriotism kept the Poles alive.23 All ancient legislators, he affirmed, were guided by the same spirit. " All sought bonds attaching their citizens to the nation and they found them in special customs; in religious ceremonies which were by their nature always exclusive and national; in amusements which brought many citizens together; in exercises which increased their vigor, their strength, and their pride; in spectacles which recalled to them the history of their ancestors, their misfortunes, victories, virtues, and which . . . inflamed them with a lively emotion." 24 21 Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Vaughan, Cambridge, 1915, I, 250.

Rousseau,

translated by C. E.

22 In his Nouvelle Heloise, Part II, Letter X X I , Rousseau wrote, " The Frenchman is essentially good, open, hospitable, beneficient". 23 Vaughan, op. cit., II.

24 Vaughan, op. cit., II, 429.

EARLY

INFLUENCES

AND

PHILOSOPHY

29

Rousseau's statements about education in the Considerations on the Government of Poland had a definite influence upon Robespierre. Rousseau declared that education was the root of the whole matter. " It is education he said, " which ought to stamp on the soul of your citizens the print of their nationality and so guide their tastes and opinions that by inclination, by passion, by necessity, they will be patriots." The first object of such education was to train citizens for the state.25 Therefore, Rousseau wished education to be withdrawn from the control of the Church. The main object of education was not merely to impart knowledge, but to form character. Patriots graduated from state schools would naturally incline towards making their state coterminous with their nationality. The idea of national self-determination advanced by Rousseau was readily adopted by Robespierre in calling for the union of France and Avignon. Rousseau's plan for graduating the service of the state from the lowest to the highest and distributing medals and honors to virtuous citizens, undoubtedly had a great effect upon Robespierre. Both insisted that private ambition should be served only in and through the service of the state and both declared that diligence, probity and public spirit were the duties of every citizen. Rousseau was careful to point out that foreign aid, notably foreign alliances, could do nothing for Poland. The regeneration of the " national spirit" alone could save the fatherland. Much of Robespierre's later work lay in putting such precepts into action. Rousseau and Robespierre had other ideas in common. Rousseau recommended short terms for public office in order that many citizens might try their hands at governing. Robespierre was following this principle when he voted to bar all 25 Vaughan, op. cit., II, 437-438. "A child in opening its eyes ought to see the nation and should see nothing but that till he dies." Or again, p. 438, " The law should regulate the subject matter, the order and the form of its studies. The student should know every part of his country, every great man." In his Political Economy, Rousseau urged the state to take over some of the duties of the father. Robespierre, in Le Moniteur (May 9, 1794), declared that the state had the sole right to raise its children.

30

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

members of the National Assembly f r o m seats in the Legislative Assembly. A g a i n , Rousseau believed that the common people were more virtuous than the wealthy. Robespierre opposed the " Mark-of-Silver L a w limiting the right of suffrage, f o r precisely the same reason. In his view of the duties of a representative, Robespierre followed Rousseau closely; the deputies o f the people were not its representatives, but only its commissioners. In his idea of " the people Robespierre was enlightened by Rousseau. " T h e people " , said Rousseau, " is the sanest part of a republic, the only part which will not propose anything detrimental to the welfare of all ", 2 6 Robespierre was more likely to associate the term " people " with his own group. Thus, he spoke of nobles and priests " directing their e f f o r t s against these societies, the Jacobins, that is, against " the people H e added, " N o one has given us a more just idea of the people than Rousseau, because no one loved it more ", 2 S Perhaps Robespierre was referring here, not to any definition of the people by Rousseau, but simply to Rousseau's faith inman. In Emile, Rousseau asserted that " Nature makes man happy and good. Society makes him depraved and miserable Robespierre echoed the same thought, in his statement, " M a n is good as he comes f r o m the hand of nature ". 2 B Robespierre and Rousseau were both humanitarians, interested in the w e l f a r e of all peoples as well as of the French.. Circumstances attendant upon the Revolution changed Robespierre's humanitarian ideas into something quite different,, although he continued to pay lip service to broadly humanitarian ideals. Rousseau's religion of nature, a civil religion as explained in his Letter to Voltaire ( A u g u s t 18, 1 7 5 6 ) , was closely akin to Robespierre's idea of the Supreme Being. It was. in defense of such a Supreme Being that Rousseau, never bloody or cruel, was willing to g o to great lengths. In his Sociat, 26 R o u s s e a u , Lettre de la Montagne, 27 H a t n e l , Robespierre,

I I , 139.

28 Laponneraye, Oeuvres, I, 225. 29 Ibid., I l l , 189.

I I , 204.

EARLY

INFLUENCES

AND

PHILOSOPHY

31

Contract, B. I V , c, viii, he had written, " I f anyone recognizing the existence of the Supreme Being, the immortality of the soul, and the sanctity of the laws, should conduct himself as an unbeliever, let him be punished with death. H e has committed the greatest of all crimes." In purging the nation of all dissident elements, Robespierre might find justification in Rousseau's description of factional interests : " W h e n special interests begin to be felt and little groups influence the great, the common interest suffers. Unanimity reigns no more and the general will is no longer the will of all," 30 so, too, Robespierre, in July, 1794, declared, " I abhor every kind of government where factions reign ", 3 1 A g a i n , he said, 32 " T h e Convention must crush all party spirit." A s f o r himself and his party, Robespierre insisted that the Jacobins " belong to no party, w e serve no faction . . . ours is the general will." 33 In his use of nationalist propaganda through a national army, a national theater, national customs and ceremonies, Robespierre was following both the spirit and the letter of Rousseau, 8 4 as we shall see. 30 Social

Contract, B, I V , i.

31 Le Moniteur,

J u l y 14, 1794.

32 Ibid., M a r c h 8, 17933 3 Défenseur 34 Infra,

de la Constitution,

Chapter V I I .

no. 10.

CHAPTER II THE PATRIOT, POLITICIAN, AND PACIFIST ROBESPIERRE found the ladder of political success easier to climb when he played upon the theme of patriotism. In this respect, he was like so many contemporary politicians who find that appeals to the welfare of the country assure them of popular support no matter how thin their political programs may be. Robespierre understood the principle of the patriot politician as early as 1788 when he became a member of the Third Estate at Artois. H e found himself surrounded by gentlemen who spoke in classical Greek and Roman terms about " breaking their chains and leaving the state of servitude " and of " the Estates General being the assembly of the Nation ". In a pamphlet entitled, A la Nation Artésienne sur la nécessité de réformer les états d'Artois,1 Robespierre used the same phraseology in speaking of the " sacred and inalienable rights " of the French people and of the necessity of their awakening to " regenerate France ". Install a democratic patriotic administration, he urged, and commerce, industry, and agriculture would be instantly revived. But this could be done only by fanning the " sacred fire of patriotism ". 2 Robespierre declared that a few aristocrats had entered into a conspiracy to deprive the people of France of food and liberty. T h e master politician was at work here, mingling a patriotic and a materialistic appeal to the people. Early in his career, Robespierre had mastered the phrases and the dominant ideas which made him a political master. Patriotism in 1789 as in 1793 was the central theme, although it underwent a radical change. 1 Archives départementales, no publishers, place or date of indicated. • 2 Ibid., 32

p. 66.

publication

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND PACIFIST

33

Robespierre used the same technique in securing his election to the Estates General meeting at Versailles. Le Blond de Neuvéglise, whose bias is evident but whose work is the chief source for Robespierre's early activities, lends color to this assertion.3 According to Le Blond, Robespierre went about his task with the technique of a finished politician. His brother, Augustin, went from village to village, portraying Maximilien as an affectionate patron of the people, sworn to avenge their outraged rights. Even this failed to secure his election but Robespierre begged another unsuccessful candidate to transfer his votes. Then he delivered a speech while his aides circulated about, distributing slips of paper with Robespierre's name written on them. The scheme worked and Robespierre was elected. Although he had insufficient funds with which to proceed to Versailles, Robespierre, according to Le Blond, took along a generous supply of his printed pamphlets to be distributed among groups most likely to be impressed. If this statement is true, Robespierre was not unfamiliar with the art of propaganda. Robespierre's solicitude for the " people " of Arras was made quite evident in the pamphlets and documents which he distributed so freely. He busied himself with the cahier of the shoemakers of Arras who protested about the high cost of leather and the export of raw materials needed for home manufacturing. In the general cahier of the Estates of Artois, he inserted an article declaring that the " unfortunate citizens of Arras have been oppressed for a long time ", 4 Another pamphlet of seven pages appeared in March, 1789 with no author or printer indicated. The pamphlet entitled, Avis aux habitants des campagnes is written in the style of Robespierre and has 3 The identity of Le Blond de Neuvéglise who wrote La vie et les crimes de Robespierre is unknown. J. M. Thompson in his Robespierre, London, 1935, I, xxi-xxiv, asserts that Le Blond de Neuvéglise was a real person, not an Abbé Proyart as has been commonly supposed. 4 Paris, J. A., La Jeunesse de Robespierre et la convocation des états généraux en Artois, Arras, 1870.

34

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

him. 5

been attributed to It declared that all Frenchmen were soon to become citizens ; were going to have a nation. It called for a union of nobles, clergy and people and looked forward to the day when the first two groups might belong to the nation. Another pamphlet, Les ennemis de la patrie démasqués par le récit de ce qui s'est passé dans les assemblées du Tiers état de la Ville d'Arras showed the technique of the patriot politician. This pamphlet was a typical sample of his rhetoric, his emotional appeal, his genuine or feigned fear of conspiracy, and his self-righteousness. " O, you who are citizens ", he declaimed, " who burn with that sacred fire of patriotism to which is bound the hope and the safety of the nation, unite to oppose the fearful conspiracy hatched against it. O citizens, our country is in danger. . . . W h a t do I care if they try to punish me for my zeal in upholding the public causes, . . . if they wish to make martyrs of the people's defenders." This emphasis upon the people and the nation was brought out more clearly once Robespierre joined the Estates General at Versailles in May, 1789. In his first speech, he called upon the clergy to join the " friends of the people ". 6 This clever move to divide the upper estates won him much recognition. One of Robespierre's most interesting comments which showed his preoccupation with the idea of the nation was called forth during a discussion on the inviolability of correspondence. Robespierre took the stand that the safety of the nation was above any individual right : " W h e n a nation is in danger . . . what is a crime at other times becomes a praiseworthy act. Help given conspirators is treason to the people." Robespierre steadily demanded more prerogatives for what he called the " nation " or the " people ". O f t e n he used these two terms interchangeably. T o him, the people composed the nation. T h e nation was always right. " One cannot corrupt 5 Quérard, Monographie

bibliographique

and Paris, op.

cit.

6 Rouaoet, Gustave, " Robespierre à la constituante en juillet 1789," révoltttionmires, X , 162 ff, 289 ff.

Armâtes

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

PACIFIST

35

a nation for the same reason that one cannot poison the whole ocean."

In a journal published by him entitled, Lettres

Commettons,

à ses

N o . 12, Robespierre defined " people " as " the

majority of the nation without excluding the most numerous, the most unfortunate, and the purest part ".

He

defined

" sovereignty " as " the power belonging to the nation to regulate its destiny ". T h e nation, he pointed out, possessed " all the rights each man possesses ". 7 Robespierre,

the patriot

politician,

did not confuse

the

government and the nation. H e declared that " the nation was above any of its officers, even the king, because no one could be as infallible or as disinterested as the nation."

8

Robespierre's definition of the people and the nation particularly was more carefully delineated in his Discours semblée nationale sur la pétition

du peuple

avignonnais,9

à

l'AsCon-

sidering a request of the people living in the Papal territory of A v i g n o n to j o i n the French nation, Robespierre declared that such a union was but natural. " W h a t , " he questioned, " is the title of the Pope to A v i g n o n ? W h a t is the bond of union between him and the people of A v i g n o n ? " " None whatever," he assured the Assembly. O n the contrary, the people

of

A v i g n o n belonged to the French nation, never having been separated f r o m it legally. Besides, being part of a nation, A v i g n o n could never be sold or alienated by a ruler. Robespierre then went on to define what he meant by a nation. " A nation is a society of

men united f o r their common interest under

common laws and government ". 1 0 " A law "., he defined as a " condition of society determined by the general will of the associated ". A government was " the organization of public authority established f o r the maintenance of laws ". Thus, a people could change its laws and government freely, so that the 7 Lettres

à ses Commettons,

I I , no. 2.

8 Ibid., I I , no. 2.

9 Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1790. 10 Discours

à l'assemblée

nationale sur la pétition du peuple

avignonnais.

36

ROBESPIERRE : NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

people of Avignon were not hindered in joining the French. The nation, he was careful to point out, was quite distinct from the ruler. The Pope and his other possessions, for example, never formed a common nation because there were differences of language, customs, laws, and institutions. On the other hand, common language and customs made the union of France and Avignon imperative. Robespierre added that Avignon would strengthen the frontiers of France and might be a source of conspiracies against France if not annexed, but that none of these selfish thoughts had anything to do with the natural union. " Not conquest, but union is desired ", and said he, " union is necessary to preserve humanity, justice and patriotism". French principles demanded it. He ended by proposing that: "The National Assembly declares that the city of Avignon and its territories are part of the French Empire and that all its decrees will be dispatched there to be executed as in the rest of France." The union was achieved. In speaking of patriotism as love of the land, he gave vent to his emotions as he exclaimed, " Yes, this delightful land which we inhabit, this land which nature caresses with predilection, was destined to be the domain of liberty and happiness ; this people, sensitive and proud, was truly born for glory and virtue. Oh my country, if fate had caused me to be born in a strange and distant country, I should have addressed continual prayers to the heavens for your prosperity. I should have wept at the recital of your combats and virtues. My attentive soul would have followed every movement of your glorious revolution. I am French. I am one of your representatives. . . . Oh sublime people, receive the sacrifice of my being. Happy is he who was born in your midst. Happier is he who can die for your happiness." 11 Patriotism, to Robespierre, was something warm and moving. The patriot was the common man " terrible in defeat and modest in victory ". 1 1 Bûchez et Roux, Histoire Paris, 1834-1838, X X X I , 6.

parlementaire

de la révolution

française,

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

PACIFIST

37

Belief in the infallibility and supremacy of the people's will was evident in Robespierre's opposition in 1790 to a suspensive veto for the king. " One man's will cannot be above the general w i l l " , Robespierre declared, " that would mean the nation is nothing and that man is everything ". The will of the nation could not be contradicted. Robespierre went on to explain that a monarchy was simply a type of government in which the executive power was entrusted to one person. Governments of all kinds were founded by the people and for the people. Those who governed were but the delegates of the people. These definitions of the " people " and the " nation " fail to give Robespierre's feelings about them. A s he said, " It is not the empty name but the character of the citizens that constitutes a republic ". The first duty of any legislator was the recognition that the " people is good ". Devotion to the cause of the people, to the nation was most essential. This love of one'§ country Robespierre called virtue, a " high minded devotion which subordinates all private interests to the welfare of the whole community ". Virtue in turn could be developed by a belief in the people. Thus, the more democratic the state became, the more virtuous or patriotic it grew. Patriotism was the key to all problems confronting the state. Robespierre had one pat formula for everything, " Prosecute the conspirators; protect patriotism, even in its errors; enlighten patriots and raise the people to the height of its rights and destiny. If you do not adopt this rule you lose all." Robespierre was not the last politician to discover that patriotism was the salvation of the nation, and of his own political career. He was careful to describe the precise nature of patriotism as " ardent by its very n a t u r e " . " W h o can love the nation coldly? " he queried. " If it accepts public charges without repugnance it does so only at such times when Socrates drinks the hemlock or Cato is assailed by stones or when the Gracchi die under the knives of patricians. It never lives for an instant in a soul where a vile sentiment is conceived or a cowardly action is formed."

38

ROBESPIERRE : NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

A s he explained in Number Eight of his journal Défenseur de la Constitution, " Patriotism is neither inconsequential nor light nor turbulent as in the case of prejudices and passions. It is as sweet, proud, calm, and intrepid as reason and is like the truth from which it is derived. Patriotism is only virtue in all its glory and human nature in all its dignity. It appears exaggerated only to cowardly and degraded men. . . . " More than that it is a " profound horror of tyranny; compassionate zeal for the oppressed ; a most sublime and holy love of humanity ; and the generous ambition to found the greatest republic of the world ". It was a " natural passion . . . tender, imperious, irresistible, tormenting and delicious ". W i t h such a definition of virtue, is there any wonder that France was Robespierre's one and only love ? Patriotism, however, was not selfish. It " does not seek frivolous distinctions or honors created by pride or prejudices. It loves glory but never courts it exclusively." T h e politician was concerned with the type of government best suited to the virtuous nature of a people. Robespierre found that a democratic government was best because " the fundamental principle of democracy is virtue, the love of country and its laws ". 1 2 Could democracy exist without virtue? Could virtue be present in a state other than a democratic one ? The answer to both questions was, " N o ". Robespierre showed that he understood patriotism as being closely connected with political power. In a monarchy, no one could be virtuous except the monarch because he was the only one who possessed political power. " W h a t is la Patrie if "it is not a country where everyone is a citizen and has a share in the sovereignty? ", he asked. He pointed out that an aristocratic state was a nation only for those patrician families who possessed the sovereignty : " A democracy exists only where the State is truly a nation of all the individuals who compose it and when it can count as many defenders interested 12 Rapport sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la convention nationale dans l'administration intérieure de la république, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1794.

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

PACIFIST

39

in its cause as it has citizens." This was why free peoples were superior to others, he asserted. Thus, " everything which tends to arouse love of country, to purify customs, to elevate souls, to direct the passions of the human heart toward the public interest" ought to be encouraged. O n the other hand, " anything which leads to selfishness, which awakens a taste for petty things by despising the great, should be rejected ". Such was the high sounding definition of virtue or patriotism which Robespierre placed before his people. Continuous emphasis upon virtue made Robespierre's speeches sound like a never ending fourth of July oration. Beneath the surface, however, lay the technique which every dictator uses today: the appeal to democracy, the assertion that all citizens should be patriotic and democratic at the same time. Every contemporary dictator rules in the name of patriotism and the people. Robespierre was one of the first to discover the magic of the phrases. H e was one of the first patriot politicians. The Robespierre who emerged from the obscurity of the petit bourgeois circle of Arras in 1789 was a humanitarian, a liberal and a patriot, all in due moderation. H e had no particular desire to overthrow the K i n g nor to set up a revolutionary government. His sole purpose was to effect a gradual change in the political and social system so that the people might have a greater degree of freedom, equality, and participation in the government. " T h e sacred fire of patriotism " would clear the way for political and social reforms. The firm conviction that France was going to effect these changes was indicated in a statement Robespierre made before leaving A r r a s for Versailles. W h e n the election of a mayor of Arras was discussed, Robespierre upheld the right of any citizen to hold the position. A noble laughingly remarked that if Robespierre's proposal were accepted, even Languillette, the cobbler, could be mayor. Robespierre seriously pointed out that Languillette was a citizen and the equal of anyone before the law. 13 Before leaving for Versailles, Robespierre addressed him13 Paris, op. cit., p. 336.

40

ROBESPIERRE : N A T I O N A L I S T

DICTATOR

self to Languillette, " Remember what I am going to say to you, my dear friend ", he requested. " Everything is going to change in France. Y e s , before long this poor Languillette . . . will be well off. The Languillettes will become mayors and the mayors will be Languillettes." This equality was extended to all classes and religions. Robespierre made a special effort to defend non-Catholics, Jews, and actors on December 23, 1789. A l l these, he felt, should have the right to act as representatives of the nation. Each could do his part in making the nation greater. Actors, he pointed out, could help to make theatres become public schools of patriotism. A s for the Jews, they would do their share when there was some incentive. None of these classes could have their sacred rights taken from them. H e urged that negroes be given equal political rights, declaring that he would rather lose the colonies than have liberty destroyed. Robespierre even talked vaguely about some degree o f equality of wealth. He supported a motion asking for the reduction of ecclesiastical benefices so that the clergy might return wealth to the people. But he bore no particular ill-will against the clergy. He even requested higher pensions f o r monks dispossessed of their wealth. Robespierre understood this equality in a broad political sense. W h e n a law was introduced disqualifying all those w h o did not pay at least one silver mark in taxes, he objected that liberty would be secured only when all Frenchmen voted. H e was the first to combat any proposal to restrict the rights of the people. " Give the people its rights " became one of his favorite exhortations. It was Robespierre who demanded the immediate release of all prisoners arrested under the lettres de cachet. " It is better ", he said, " to be lenient to one hundred guilty persons than to punish one innocent one ". This liberalism and humanitarianism was extended to punishments. O n May 30, 1791, Robespierre delivered a speech on the necessity for the abolition of the death penalty. First he declared it essentially unjust and said that it caused more trouble

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

PACIFIST

41

than it prevented. Men, he said, could not be certain of their judgment in such cases. F a r better, he believed, to let a man wipe out his crimes by acts of patriotism. In matters such as freedom of the press, Robespierre showed the same liberal attitude. In a speech at the Jacobin Club on M a y 11, 1791, he praised the value of a free press as a means of organizing public opinion against the forces of tyranny. Even the A b b é Raynal was forgiven for criticizing the Assembly and suggesting the return of the royal prerogative. Freedom of speech, universal suffrage, jury trial, and the removal of social barriers, all were heartily approved by Robespierre. A s a pure patriot and democrat, Robespierre was responsible for the measure which rendered members of the National Assembly ineligible for election to the Legislative Assembly. He argued that patriotism was sufficient to make amends for any judicial or legislative inexperience. Ineligibility for the next assembly, Robespierre thought, would make each member think more about his country, about the nation as a whole. It would prevent his catering to the inhabitants of a particular district to secure re-election. He felt that the nation would be safest if many had a chance to serve France in a legislative capacity. Actually, this move proved to be most unfortunate in turning out of office all those in closest contact with the problems facing the nation. Robespierre tried to apply Rousseau's teachings to a unit larger than a city-state. Robespierre was forced by events to curtail much of the liberty and frëdom he strove for in the early days of the revolution. His faith in humanitarian and liberal nationalism did not disappear entirely. Rather was it kept alive in the belief that once the emergency was over, France might be given a government in which liberty, democracy and equality were the basic principles. This state would then live in complete harmony with all nations. But in the meantime, a government had to be instituted in which nationalism would be fostered so that internal and external enemies would be crushed. Robespierre found himself in the same predicament in which a Stalin, a Hitler, or a

42

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

Mussolini are placed today. All protest that they wish to govern in accordance with the general will of the people. But emergencies have a way of arising which force that general will to be crystallized in the thought and activity of one man be he a Robespierre, or any contemporary dictator. Liberty, democracy, freedom must be curtailed. This was the theory behind Robespierre's assumption of power. Robespierre's blueprints of his ideal state were always in the back of his mind. In 1793, he put them on paper in a Constitution. First he desired a society in which all classes would co-operate harmoniously for the will of the nation. 14 Here any contemporary dictator would nod his head in acquiescence. N o doubt many of the provisions in Robespierre's Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen would also meet with the approval of any contemporary dictator as long as they remained as Robespierre kept them, on paper. A s Robespierre stated in his Preamble, the sole purpose of the Declaration of Rights was to place these rights before the eyes of the people so that they would never be oppressed by tyrants. The object of this ideal state would be to safeguard these natural and inalienable rights of men. The most important of these was self-preservation and freedom which belonged equally to all men. Freedom included the right of peaceful assembly and the right to publish one's opinions through the press or in any other way. It is interesting that law in this ideal state would prohibit only what was harmful to society and could require only what was useful to it. Limitations upon the law, not upon the freedom of the individual were recognized. Such law was the free expression of the will of the people. " The people ", according to the Declaration, " is sovereign. The government is its work and its property, Public officials are its agents." A s for the dangers of dictatorship, the Declaration went on to state, " N o section of the people can exercise the powers of 14 Archives parlementaires, L X I I I , 197 ff.

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

PACIFIST

43

o f the whole. . . ." More than that, minorities were to have the right to express themselves with perfect freedom. Particularly interesting was the provision in this Declaration that " the people can change its government and recall its representatives whenever it pleases ". " A n y a c t " , the Declaration went on, " infringing on a man's freedom, safety, or property . . . is arbitrary, null and void." A n y attempt to enforce such an act might be resisted by force. Finally, the Declaration stated, " T h e people has a right to know everything done by its deputies: " they must render it a faithful account of their conduct and submit to its judgment ". Robespierre's ideal state would consist of a nation composed of small sections each with a voice in the general will. But the nation was to be above the sections because it expressed the general will of all. Throughout this picture of the ideal state ran the idea, " the people is good and its delegates are corruptible ". Only love of country and sovereignty of the people could safeguard the nation against despotism. In his description, Robespierre spent more time discussing means of limiting the power of the government than in increasing it. H e discussed on May 10, 1793, means of lessening governmental power either through a balance of power or a tribunal. 15 H e disapproved of a system of checks and balances. Privilege groups utilized such a system of checks and balances for their own use. For a like reason, he rejected the institution of a tribunal: " The people should not have to seek their rights by bargaining with quarelling masters " . A tribunal supposed that the people were in bondage. Only one tribunal would Robespierre trust, that of the French people itself. According to Robespierre, the government of the ideal state would be limited to making useful laws for society. It would not interfere in private affairs. Local communes would be allowed to run their own affairs. Every minority would be heard. 15 Archives

parlementaires,

L X I V , 428 ff.

44

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

Representatives of the nation would have short terms and be held strictly responsible to the nation. " The nation " he said, " has the right to know the conduct of its deputies. If possible, the Assembly should deliberate in the presence of the whole people. A vast and majestic edifice seating 12,000 spectators would house the Assembly. Under the eyes of such a great number of witnesses neither corruption nor intrigue nor perfidy would dare to show itself." The general will alone would be consulted. The nation, rather than the government, would possess police power. Journalists were especially invited to watch the work of the Assembly so that the whole nation might be informed. Then, when representatives went home, they would be judged by the section which chose them. A s Robespierre said, " Publicity is the support of virtue ". " Just laws " , Robespierre pointed out, " will never clash with the general will because they are the expression of i t " . W h e n law was based upon public interest, the people itself would be its support; its force would be that of all its citizens. The army and the police were simply the people in arms, carrying out the general will and defending the government from attacks without. But only in case of misuse of the law would it conflict with the general will. Robespierre's ideal state was to be a peaceable, a free, and a virtuous one. In this state, the general will would be all powerful. It would be the will of a society with no struggle between classes. Everyone would be a citizen. All would have the same interests, namely, the pursuit of virtue and liberty. Relics of the past such as royalism, tyranny, warfare between classes could be eradicated by good laws, political education, and if need be, by revolt and intimidation. Then there would be but one faith, one people, one will, personified in a peaceful and law-respecting society. T h e government would preserve the rights of man. Such was the ideal national state and society envisioned by Robespierre. W i t h this achieved, the French nation could spread its principles abroad, regarding all nations as brothers.

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

PACIFIST

45

This liberal democratic constitution of Robespierre was never put into effect. Perhaps one of the reasons why it was so liberal was the necessity of outbidding the Girondists whose liberalism and democracy constituted a threat to Robespierre's reputation as a " defender of the people ". H o w could he protect the people if his opponents were more democratic than he? Closely coupled with Robespierre's humanitarian nationalism was his belief in pacifism and internationalism. In May, 1790, he manifested an attitude of complete neutrality when England and Spain seemed to be on the verge of war. He declared that he had no interest in the question whether the K i n g or the Assembly had the right to declare war. " The French nation ", he pointed out " is content to be free. It does not wish to engage in any war and wishes to live with all nations in that spirit of fraternity commanded by nature. It will be to the interest of nations to protect the French nation because the liberty and happiness of the whole world finds its source in F r a n c e " . Nationalism was thus closely linked with internationalism. Nationalism had much to do with Robespierre's opposition to the war. This may seem a paradoxical statement especially in view of the fact that the patriots led by Brissot demanded a war to " free the universe from its chains and to spread abroad the principles of F r a n c e " . From November, 1791, to September, 1792, Robespierre opposed the idea of war on the grounds that the nation was not sufficiently consolidated at home to be able to wage war abroad. Throughout that period, he emphasized the fact that France must first eliminate all enemies within the country and must prepare for war. Then, and only then, could the French prepare to spread their principles abroad. The controversy between Brissot and Robespierre reminds one of the argument between the internationalist Trotsky and the nationalist Stalin. Both Robespierre and Stalin insisted upon national unification first and then, perhaps, a war to spread their principles. Robespierre never dreamed of renouncing war completely. He admitted that, like Brissot, he favored a war under-

46

ROBESPIERRE : NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

taken to extend the reign of liberty. " I f I were ruler of France . . . , I should have sent an army to Brabant long ago. I should have shaken Liege and broken the chains of Batavia. These expeditions would be much to my liking . . . [but] I would not have permitted more formidable enemies closer to u s to be protected and to survive amidst the gravest dangers." But in the circumstances in which he found his country, Robespierre wondered if a war would yield all the results promised. Perhaps if Frenchmen knew who proposed the war, how it was to be conducted, and why there was to be a war, they might know the answer. To this he added that " The idea of a foreign war has been favored for a long time by the internal enemies of our liberty. The prospect of a war pleases the émigrés, the ministry, the intriguers at the Court, that numerous faction which has always been in opposition to the principles of equality and respect for the rights of the people. Who could say that the Court would propose a measure as decisive as the war without linking it with its previous policy. . . . Do you wish us to adopt their principles when the ministry will join the émigrés to fight the patriots ? It is useless to cite the example of the American Revolution because the Americans did not have to fight under the English flag against their own generals. Does the Court propose to overthrow the throne of Leopold ? It has constantly preached respect for foreign governments. The same Court has hindered the revolution in Brabant and seeks to designate as the savior of the country the General who . . . declared himself against the cause of the people of Brabant." " But suppose ", Robespierre queried, " that the country, fired by the rhetoric of its orators, does declare war. In that case, you propose to conquer Germany. At first you believe that you will lead our triumphant army among neighboring peoples ; you will take cities, establish directories, and national assemblies. You think that this thought is 'sublime as if the destiny of empires were regulated by figures of rhetoric. It is your idea that our generals are only the missionaries of the Constitution ;

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

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47

our camps but schools of public l a w ; the satellites of foreign monarchs, f a r f r o m raising any obstacle to the execution of this project, rush toward us, not to fight but to listen." French armies invading the neighbors of France might be regarded not as saviors bringing the g i f t of French liberty, but as agents of the dynastic rulers of France, pursuing the old dynastic ambitions of the Bourbons. Foreigners were more familiar with those ambitions than with the ideas of the French Constitution. A c c o r d i n g to authoritative sources, Robespierre said, foreigners were not sighing loudly for the Constitution and the armies of France. H e pointed out that " T o attempt to give it [the French Constitution] to foreign nations before we secured it ourselves would be to enslave ourselves and the whole w o r l d ; it presupposes the exaggerated and absurd idea that the moment a people gives itself a Constitution, all other nations respond instantly to the same signal. W o u l d the example of America . . . be sufficient to break our chains if the times and the happiest circumstances had not led to this Revolution? " T h e Declaration of Rights, moreover, was not " the light of the sun which enlightened all men instantly; it was not the lightning which struck all thrones simultaneously ". " It is far easier " , Robespierre said, " to write it on paper or to engrave it in stone than to fix it in the hearts of men where its sacred character

can

not

be affected by

ignorance,

passion

and

despotism ". Once more, however, Robespierre clearly indicated that he did not plan to renounce w a r or the spread of French influence abroad. H e declared, " I do not pretend that our revolution will have no future influence on the fate of the globe. Perhaps this may come about sooner than it seems. . . . M a y God forbid that I renounce such a sweet hope. But I say this cannot be today. I say that the time to execute such an enterprise is when it is desired. . . . "

16

Such a revolution according to Robes-

16 Vellay, Charles, Discours et rapports de Robespierre, Paris, 1908, p. 123.

48

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

pierre could take place slowly. It had to begin among the nobles, the clergy and the wealthy. When it was in accord with the desires of the people, they would support it. Thus had the nation been freed in France. Other countries had not yet progressed so far, and the upper classes still held the people in " ignorance and chains ". The movements in some of Leopold's states and particularly in Brabant were independent of the French Revolution. According to Robespierre, " a century separates the thought of the French and the people of the Austrian L o w Countries and Brabant ". A s for the " philanthropic effervescence " of Anarcharsis Clootz, who had pleaded for war, this self-styled " Orator of the Human Race," Robespierre said, should remember that the Greek Anarcharsis fell in the mire while observing the stars: " the modern Anarcharsis, seeing the great achievements of our Constitution, watching the angel of liberty descend from the sky to lead our legions and to exterminate all the tyrants of the universe, had not seen the precipice into which the French people might fall." Robespierre prescribed fewer agreeable descriptions and wiser counsel. Once a war had been embarked upon to avenge national honor, Robespierre believed that the aristocrats would use it as a pretext to destroy the patriot party. T h e soldiers would be separated from the citizens, and, under the imposing names of military discipline and honor, the blind spirit of obedience to absolute monarchy would be substituted for love of country. Military leaders would have power of life and death over patriots. The moderate party, under the guise of patriotism, would betray the people with patriotic speeches. Robespierre's sole purpose in opposing the war was to " advance the public spirit and to serve France. It is not the courage of the French I mistrust; it is the perfidy of their enemies within ". 1T These two speeches of January 2 and 11, 1792, were received at the Jacobin Club with the greatest joy. They were printed 17 V e l l a y , C h a r l e s , Discours

et Rapports

de Robespierre,

p . 131.

PATRIOT,

POLITICIAN

AND

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49

and distributed to all members of the Society. Invitations were sent to affiliated societies encouraging them to reprint them and to spread the truths of the speeches in any w a y they could.

A

subscription was then taken up f o r the purpose of printing still more copies. T h e paper Révolutions text

de Paris

reproduced the

complete. 18

T h e Annales

patriotiques

found it a " most sublime piece of

eloquence ", 1 9 T h e Orateur du peuple declared that the discourse of Robespierre should be in every home to teach the children that " Robespierre is striving f o r the public good and the maintenance of liberty". 2 0 W r i t i n g to his father on January 12, Camille Desmoulins said the speech of Robespierre "electrified" us. " T h i s speech " , he wrote, " will be read in all the sections, in all the clubs and in the houses of all patriots " . Its delivery found " N o t only the galleries of women, but half the Assembly . . .

in tears. . . . "

21

Robespierre declared that Frenchmen had to be suspicious of the Court's desire f o r w a r because it would betray the people in order to serve royal interests. 22

A s f o r the popular enthusi-

asm f o r war, he lamented seeing " a great crowd of people dancing in an open plain covered with grass and flowers ; playing with their weapons and filling the air with their shouts of j o y and songs of war. Suddenly the ground sinks beneath their feet, the flowers, the men, the weapons disappear, and I can see nothing but a gaping chasm filled with victims. Fly, fly while there is still time.

..."

Robespierre's opposition to the war was realistic, based upon a knowledge of the internal condition of France rather than upon any dread of the horrors of war or any repugnance to use 18 Révolutions de Paris, no. 130, pp. 17-39; no. 131, pp. 67-83. 19 Annales patriotiques,

J a n u a r y 13, 1792.

20 Orateur du peuple, no. 18, I X . 21 V e l l a y , C h a r l e s , Discours 22 Troisième

et Rapports de Robespierre,

p.

m .

discours sur la guerre prononcé dans la séance du 26 janvier

1792. According t o Aulard, La société des Jacobins, III, 342, note 1, it was

on the 25 not the 26 of January.

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ROBESPIERRE : N A T I O N A L I S T

DICTATOR

it as an instrument of national policy. When, on April 20, 1792, Louis X V I asked for a declaration of war, the Assembly granted the request unanimously. Robespierre became enthusiastic at the Jacobin Club and believed that France should conquer Brabant, the Netherlands, Liege, Flanders and southern Germany. Carried away by his oratory, he declared, " Our sole purpose henceforth must be the execution of this useful enterprise; we must have a war of the people, not a war of the Court; the French people must arise and arm itself both to fight outside France and to watch over internal despots " (General Applause). H e vigorously denied Brissot's statement that he had opposed the war by pointing out that he [Robespierre] had said it should be waged, after the enemies within had been conquered. 23 In his first issue of the Défenseur de la Constitution, Robespierre again pointed out that the war was a holy one carried on in the name of Liberty, Equality, and the People. He urged everyone to serve the interests of France and humanity in waging the war. This war for " humanity " had a decided effect in changing Robespierre from a humanitarian to a Jacobin nationalist. Convinced that the country was being tricked into a war before it had attained national unity, his humanitarian principles were blinded by his love of France. Quite correctly, he saw intrigues on every side. Brissot and his followers were stirring up a war spirit without regard for the unprepared and weakened condition of the nation. The Court, aware of this, planned a war to betray France to the foreigners. In his search for a remedy, Robespierre offered some of the sanest advice of his career, in warning against embarking upon a war to spread French principles abroad before they were put into practice at home or before peoples of other nations had been educated to appreciate a love of liberty and virtue. His interest in the welfare of the universe was still alive but he now believed that the universe could best be saved by preserving the French nation. 23 A u l a r d , La Société

des Jacobins,

I I I , 546.

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POLITICIAN

AND

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51

The affairs of other nations concerned him slightly, but the state of virtue within France was of great importance to him. A s a result, he became suspicious, intolerant of all internal dissent and developed a hatred of outsiders who wished to interfere in the affairs of his country. Robespierre, in theory, retained his belief in the virtues of a society of nations, each free and equal, all co-operating for the general good. His Declaration of Rights declared that " Men of all countries are brothers and the different peoples ought to help one another according to their ability, like citizens of a single s t a t e " . Robespierre's belief in a community of nations was not restricted to a vague desire for peaceful co-operation. Should any one person or nation " oppress " another, the offender became the enemy of all. Going even further in his Declaration of Rights, in Article 36, he declared that, " Those who make war on a people to arrest the progress of liberty and to destroy the rights of man deserve to be attacked by all, not as ordinary citizens but as brigands, rebels and assassins". Robespierre was never an absolute pacifist but rather a firm believer in strong action on the part of the majority of nations in order to preserve the general peace. There was a slight selfish aspect of this assertion as it was made in 1793. Robespierre regarded France as the oppressed nation for whose liberty all should fight. The tragedy of pacifists who wage war to end war consists in the fact that such a war often results in stamping out the very liberty for which they are fighting. Y e t the fact stands out clearly that Robespierre opposed the war chiefly on the grounds that it would lead to autocracy or dictatorship in some form. In order to counteract absolutism, he was ready to set up his own form of autocracy for the " duration of the w a r " . The step from Robespierre, the pacifist, to Robespierre, the belligerent, calling for a conquest of all Europe was not a very long one.

CHAPTER III T H E JACOBIN ORGANIZER liberal, humanitarian, and pacifist attitude won him many supporters but this alone was not sufficient to raise him above his fellows. The key to his political success was rather to be found in his work as an organizer of the Jacobin party. He helped to make it the one party in the state.1 A determined and strongly organized system of political clubs rose to power through appeals to patriotic spirit. Robespierre declared that dictatorship of the popular will was necessary because of internal dissensions at home and foreign war abroad. Robespierre and the Jacobins attacked their enemies not as mere opponents but as criminals seeking dominant power at home or as spies paid by hostile foreign powers. While they loudly called for liberty for themselves, they denied it to their opponents on the grounds that they had an " alien " philosophy. Actually the difference between the philosophies of Jacobins, Girondists or Dantonists was so slight as to be practically unnoticeable. In practice, however, Robespierre and the Jacobins distinguished themselves by their willingness to use force and by appeals to direct action. Their similarity here to the tactics of Fascists, Nazis, or Communists is too great to pass by without remark. The Breton Club met at Versailles usually in a café. Mirabeau, Sieyes, Barnave, Pétion, Abbé Grégoire and the Lameths were among its first members. Robespierre was said to have joined the group soon after its formation. 2 Grégoire's Mémoires3 and the Analyse de la Révolution française * indicated that the Breton Club had formed a strong popular party ROBESPIERRE'S

X Brinton, Crane, The Jacobins, New York, 1930. 2 Montjoie, Histoire 3 Pp. 154-155. 4 I, 380, 49. K2

de la Révolution

de France, Part II.

THE

JACOBIN

ORGANIZER

53

by June 20, 1789. Droz 6 said there were ¡00 deputies at the Breton Club on the night of the Tennis Court Oath. A f t e r October, 1789 when the Assembly was transferred to Paris, the Breton Club moved to Paris. It rented the library of the Convent of the Jacobins and changed its name to that of the Société de la Révolution, but in February, 1790, it took the name of the Société des amis de la constitution,6 The meetings of the Club were held in secret but Alexandre de Lameth said that journalists were admitted to obtain useful material for publication.7 Barnave in February, 1790 drew up a rule abolishing all secrecy. Dubois-Crancé 8 noted that the Club decided to take the Jacobin Chapel and to use it for the instruction of the people. By their own definition the Jacobins were a " Society established near the National Assembly including a great number of deputies of different. provinces, a Society offering a common center for all those which will be established in the realm The phrase " will be established " indicated that the society intended to found branches for the propagation of its principles. The part which Robespierre played in encouraging the spread of these provincial clubs was no slight one. He aided in the formation and encouragement of these clubs through visits by himself and his friends and through the circulation of his speeches. A manuscript letter of Robespierre in the Archives of Versailles tells of his sending to the Club a book whose theme was " very important in its relation to the most sacred rights of men and the first principles of liberty An additional note informed the Club that he was also sending one of his discourses on the juries, begging the members to inform him of the reception of this pamphlet. A second letter is in answer to a query from the Club of Versailles as to his opinion of 5 Histoire du règne de Louis XVI,

P a r i s , i860, I I , 169.

6 Duloire, J . A., Histoire de Paris, Paris, 1825, V , 490. 7 Histoire

de l'assemblée constituante, I, 422, note 4.

S Analyse de la Révolution française, p. Si. 9 Mémoires de la société des sciences morales de Seine-et-Oise, 1849, I I , Lettres inédites de Robespierre communiquées à la société par A. J. Le Roi.

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NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

the principles of the Société des amis de la constitution de SaintOmer. Robespierre declared that he had not been in close touch with that particular club, but believed it contained several excellent citizens. H e went on to say that he had received a very patriotic address from them on the subject of his speech on the National Guard. " A s for the general spirit which reigns in that department he wrote, " it has become better since the Société des Amis de la Constitution opened their sittings to the public. . . Robespierre was, apparently, convinced that propagation of these principles could best be secured through local clubs. A t the end of this letter, it is worthy of note, Robespierre mentions again his distribution of several works which he gave to further the patriotism of the Club " always convinced that liberty and public welfare are attached to the propagation of principles ". Robespierre's connection with the Versailles Club was very close. Through its influence, he was named judge of the tribunal of the district of Versailles. A few months later in June, 1791, he was named district attorney of the criminal tribunal of the Seine district. T h e Club of Versailles asked him to keep his first position. Although in June, 1791, Robespierre was pressed f o r time, he sent a thousand-word letter to the Versailles Club, explaining that the wishes and fears of patriots forced him to take a position he would rather have refused. But Robespierre did not intend to drop his connection with the Versailles Club. " If you approve of my conduct ", he wrote, " let me know the day and hour of your meetings so that I may discuss with you more in detail the matters which interest us ". His letter concluded with the statement that loving his country so warmly, he was no less attached to the particular happiness of the V e r sailles Club. " I offer to each and everyone my zeal, my voice, my resources and even my life ", he wrote. Robespierre's interest was not confined wholly to the Versailles Club. The Club at Paris was greatly interested at this time in arousing spirit and obtaining support for its measures. In his Mémoires, Grégoire wrote that whenever a matter of

THE

JACOBIN

ORGANIZER

55

interest was before the National Assembly, all affiliated societies discussed it and flooded the Assembly with demands for the project. Thus it appeared as though all France were behind it. 10 Robespierre shewed an active interest in the establishment of such affiliates. One of his last acts before leaving for Arras in 1791 was to sign a letter sent out by the Club at Paris. This enclosed the prospectus of a training school for Jacobin agents to be established at Paris. The scheme included lectures on morality and the Constitution which were to be printed and sent to patriotic schools and societies " where they will be read aloud to specially summoned meetings of all local inhabitants He was also one of twelve lecturers appointed to teach the clubs in person and was among the group of six lecturers who " undertook the noble work of instructing and catechizing children on the Constitution " . Some of his speeches were delivered before the Société fraternelle du faubourg Saint-Antoine. Here and there evidence of Robespierre's connection with the growth of these clubs can be discovered. The Intermédiarie des chercheurs et curieux of June 20-30, 1934 published a note without reference to its source to the effect that " on May 12, 1791 at 9 P. M . Roberspierre (sic) a member of the National Assembly took a cab on the Quai des Grands-Augustins and forgot two manuscripts upon leaving. One was on the Liberty of the Press ; the other, on the Foundations of Popular Societies throughout the Empire. Please return these manuscripts either to M . 1 Robespierre or to M . Lanthenas. . . ." These manuscripts apparently belonged to M . Lanthenas. Such documents were published and are to be found in the Bibliothèque nationale.12 Another document entitled Des sociétés populaires considérées comme une branche essentielle de l'instruction publique 10 Mémoires, I, 387. 11 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, Paris, 1889-97, H l , 267, 418. 12 De la liberté indéfinie de la presse et de l'importance de ne soumettre la communication des pensées qu'à l'opinion publique, addressé et recommandé à toutes les sociétés patriotiques, populaires et fraternelles de l'empire français, Paris, 1791, 8° Lb 3 9 9992.

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was published in 1792. 13 Just what connection Robespierre had with these manuscripts it is impossible to say. It is interesting to note, however, that Robespierre was at least acquainted with people such as Lanthenas who were strongly imbued with the desire to propagate Jacobin principles and to build up a centralized system of Jacobin Clubs controlled from Paris.1'* Lanthenas also kept abreast of Robespierre's thought, particularly with regard to the spread of patriotism. A pamphlet printed in 1793 15 dealt with the means of attaching public opinion, morals, and progress of all knowledge to the national republican government. Robespierre changed, as we shall see, from a believer in the freedom of the press to one of strict censorship. Lanthenas, too, in August, 1793, published a pamphlet on the Necessity of intrusting to a certain number of learned and virtuous citizens the surveillance of morals and public education,16 Lanthenas showed the same interest as Robespierre in joining government and religion. T h e question is, was Lanthenas an echo of Robespierre or did he precede him, contributing to his thought as the Revolution progressed? Lanthenas urged the construction of huge auditoriums where lectures could be given before the greatest possible number of patriotsso that they might feel the " delicious sentiment of the majesty of the People ". Lanthenas urged, " Let missionary patriots propagate it ; let national festivals arouse the inhabitants of all departments; let everyone ' Read, Explain, Teach ' " so as to bring about a " Universal Regeneration ". H e was quite explicit about the role that the clubs were to play. Instead of merely denouncing people, they should engage in widespread teaching. Youths, adults, and all 138° Lb8« 5786. 14 François Xavier Lanthenas, a doctor, was connected with Roland as First Commissioner of Public Instruction of the Minister of Interior. In September, 1792, he became a member of the Convention. 15 8° Lb 88 214. 16 Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1793, 8° Lb 88 376. 17 Italics Lanthenas'.

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classes of society, particularly the workers' should be taught by national educators coming from local clubs. These should be increased by having the National Assembly establish clubs in every locality, linking their activities with the national educational system. Lanthenas urged that the clubs keep the title " Popular Society ". Every such local club would be joined by correspondence with the central society at Paris. The latter would meet frequently to discuss means of sending out propaganda to its units. Wherever possible, the organization of the club would correspond closely to the government. Finally, Lanthenas concluded, " The people always knows best. Its voice is that of God, but the people must be instructed." The ideas of Lanthenas were the same as those of Robespierre but Lanthenas expressed them in a more concrete form, especially in their connection with the use of Jacobin Clubs as propaganda agencies. Robespierre's chief activity in connection with the Club was his attempt to make it as popular as possible and to spread its influence by affiliating other clubs to the society at Paris. The ties between the mother Club and the affiliates would be strengthened through correspondence so that wishes of the Parisian Club might be known throughout the nation. Information might then circulate freely, especially when it revealed " plots ". Robespierre's aim was to make the Jacobin Clubs one great police force. T o secure the enrollment of as many as possible, the Society, on February 8, 1790, declared that it would no longer be secret and closed but would become the " mother society of all those which will be established in the realm ". Robespierre did his utmost to foster these new clubs. Time and again he upheld the necessity of these clubs corresponding on matters of public interest especially when it revealed plots throughout the nation. Through this correspondence, he proposed that clubs be opened to more members by abolishing exclusion for non-payment of dues. Robespierre's interest in the Jacobin Club increased. From November 28, 1791 to April 20, 1792, he spoke on an average

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of three times a week at the Club in Paris. H i s success in that time can be ascribed to his close Identification with the aims of the Jacobin Club. Michelet wrote, " I f Robespierre's voice seems suddenly to have g r o w n louder, it is because he is no longer an individual w h o is speaking, but a whole people, the members of the Jacobin Clubs ", 1 8 F o r Robespierre was chiefly responsible f o r the preservation of the Jacobin Clubs in 1 7 9 1 . A f t e r the flight of the K i n g in June, Robespierre began to scent conspiracy everywhere against the nation and himself. T h e Jacobins at Paris hastened to i n f o r m their affiliates that the K i n g had acted upon the suggestion of some traitors. Robespierre declared that the K i n g ' s flight had destroyed his constitutional safeguards. U p o n this, he was accused of republicanism, but Robespierre hastened to point out that any government under which men enjoyed freedom w a s a republic. T h e " massacre of the Champ de M a r s " brought about by the desire of the disenfranchised classes to secure a " new executive power " caused a split within the Jacobin Club. T h e moderates withdrew to the nearby Feuillant convent. Robespierre emerged as the leader in refusing to join the Jacobins with this Feuillant group. H e hastened to inform the affiliated societies of his reasons, swaying them to the orthodox Jacobin point of view and saving them f r o m internal strife and disruption. T h i s was no slight task because about 400 local clubs had joined the Feuillants. T h r o u g h a judicious use of correspondence and propaganda, Robespierre w o n back many of

the local societies. B y

September, the

Jacobins had so increased their power that the membership in Paris rose f r o m 700 to 800 and 500 new local clubs sought affiliation with the mother society at Paris. A t the end of September, Robespierre, the incorruptible, was recognized as the leader of the Club. W h e n the Assembly convened, Robespierre at the top of his fame as Jacobin leader, received a tumultuous 18 Michelet, Jules, Histoire de la Révolution française, Paris, 1883-1887,

III, 4-

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welcome from both the Parisians and the native Jacobins of Arras. As savior of the Jacobin Club from its aristocratic and moderate enemies, Robespierre strengthened them by his constant contact with the local societies. Le Blond de Neuvéglise 19 maintained that Robespierre controlled Artois through the Jacobin Club. Le Blond further stated that Robespierre's great reception at Arras was the result of the efforts of the Jacobin Club, led by Robespierre's close friend, Joseph Le Bon. Robespierre journeyed then to Lille where in one night he converted all Jacobins to his point of view. According to Le Blond, too, all Jacobin societies of the region received their instructions from the central Club at Paris. This " Tribunal of Public Conscience ", as Robespierre styled it, enabled him to rule all France through control of a handful of men. These were Le Blond's accusations, colored by hatred, perhaps, but interesting in that they do indicate Robespierre's work in molding these local societies into a shape conforming to that of Parisian Jacobin desires. To appreciate Robespierre's work here, the role and organization of the clubs in the departments must be understood.20 Grégoire in his Mémoires21 wrote that when a matter was before the National Assembly, all affiliated societies discussed it and flooded the Assembly with demands for or against the project. This, said Grégoire, made the Assembly believe that all France thought as the Parisian Jacobins did. The affiliated societies arose as governing bodies outside the political structure set up by the Constituent Assembly. Their purpose was to overcome the traditional regionalism and decentralization by maintaining closer contact with the mother society at Paris. Robespierre did his best to increase membership in the Club as a means of acquiring the correct point of 19 La vie et les crimes de Robespierre,

p. 133.

20 Brugerette, J., Le club des Jacobins, Paris, 1904 ; L. de Cardinal, La Province pendant la Révolution, Paris, 1929.

211, 387.

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view. T h e y might then insist upon their representatives making the National Assembly " k n o w the truth " . Representatives on mission were also to help found popular societies. 22 T h e propaganda sent out f r o m Paris was successful in enlarging the number of clubs. B y the spring of 1794, there were over a thousand Jacobin societies, according to Aulard, while Cardénal placed the number at 2,007. 23 T h e y existed, not only in every town and hamlet of France, but also, in conquered regions of the Netherlands and Italy. Jacobin Clubs were to be found in Constantinople and in Charleston, South Carolina. These numerous Jacobin Clubs underwent the same purgings that N a z i , Fascist or Communist parties g o through today. E a c h time that Robespierre disagreed with some faction such as the Brissotins, the Feuillants, or the Dantonists, a call was sent out to all affiliated societies urging them to purge through a scrutin

épuratoire

themselves

of all such dissident elements. 2 *

Robespierre cautioned the clubs time and again upon the necessity of restricting their membership to " pure patriots ". It is interesting to note, the purest of all patriots were those not encumbered with the wealth of this world. Previous to A u g u s t 10, 1792, the clubs which had formerly consisted chiefly of active citizens, largely professional people and members of the middle class, opened their ranks to artisans and small farmers. These clubs were encouraged by Robespierre to believe that they had a monopoly of patriotism. In order to be reputed a good citizen and an ardent patriot, it was necessary to possess a Jacobin card and to make a yearly contribution to the club. T h e list of those excluded f r o m membership in the clubs g r e w progressively larger. A l t h o u g h any male over eighteen years of age, strongly imbued with love of country might belong, persons such

as

nobles,

foreigners,

profiteers,

speculators,

priests,

former t a x farmers and members of the magistracy of the old 22 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, I V , 193.

23 Cardénal, op. cit., pp. 41, 42. 24 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, I I I , 49.

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regime were barred. Single men between the ages of thirty-five and fifty were likewise excluded. Those fortunate enough to be admitted were still subject to frequent challenges of their patriotism. The continuous purgings reduced membership until only those in accord with the Jacobins at Paris remained. The Cherbourg Club went through five purges reducing its membership from 300 to 171. This " vomissment politique " was directed by a representative on mission sent from Paris who presented a certificate of civic virtue when the ideas emanating from Paris were agreed to. Sometimes, a committee on purification might first set up more rigid standards and purify itself. Then it was in a position to purge the local club. O f t e n a questionaire was given to an individual member asking him the amount of his wealth in 1789; his proof of civic virtue; and whether he had speculated in assignats. Dubois-Crance formulated a simple question for these purifications: " W h a t have you done to deserve to be hanged if the counter-revolution triumphs? " Little wonder that records of these Jacobin Clubs disappeared. The Jacobin Clubs' activities were much the same as those of similar units to be found in any one-party state. Nearly all clubs had large funds available for propaganda. 25 Robespierre urged members to take an active part in the education of children through the use of republican catechisms. Women were anxious to share such work but Robespierre opposed their taking part in deliberations beyond singing patriotic songs. Often club meetings were held in churches and a " civic " bell called members to discuss activities or to read the latest speech sent them by the Jacobins at Paris. A close connection with Paris usually secured for a poor club a subsidy from the Committee of Public Safety which had a large secret fund for such propaganda. Sometimes the representative on mission had sums at his disposal for worthy clubs. Often, the wealthy supplemented these contributions through gifts. N o t all of the Clubs were composed of poor but deserving patriots. The Club of 25 C a r d i n a l , op. cit., p. 82.

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Montauban was composed of rich merchants and manufacturers who met in a palace. There seemed to be no end to the activities in which those clubs engaged. Most clubs published some form of journal which, as the Jacobins gained power, became semi-official. All members subscribed to journals published by members of the Parisian Club. Robespierre's papers Le Défenseur de la Constitution and his Lettres à mes Commettons were widely read outside of Paris. Through these papers, the Jacobins molded public opinion. In response to requests from the mother society, petitions were sent into the Legislative Assembly or the National Convention which had a tremendous effect upon the members deliberating there. It seemed as though all France was calling for a certain measure whereas it might be the wish merely of a few Jacobins at Paris working through the party organization. Robespierre was the first to sense the importance of such party organization and unanimity. Throughout his career, he fought for the individual and collective rights of these clubs to exist; to spread their propaganda; and to exert their influence upon the government both local and national. This part of his work has been less generally known than his work in the Convention or as a member of the Committee of Public Safety. Yet it is the activity which deserves greatest attention, because through it Robespierre organized a system of government and police outside the regular channels of government. The continual purges finally resulted in the one-party state. Robespierre's claims as modern dictator rests upon his party activities rather than upon any personal dictatorship. Any dictatorial power he did exercise was merely part of the Jacobins' dictatorial position. Robespierre's role as protector and defender of the Jacobins, however, was no slight one. The efficiency and power of the Jacobins depended upon the preservation of the political power of the local clubs. Not the least of this power was the right to petition the national government. The Declaration of Rights protected them in this respect by recognizing the right of peace-

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able assembly and the formation of groups. Article X L I I of the municipal law of December 14, 1789, gave all active citizens the right to assemble for the formulation of grievances. The National Assembly recognized the right of free association. Buttressed by such legal guarantees, the local societies exercised considerable influence by February, 1791, when Foucauld de Sardimalie presented a bill to suppress all patriotic societies. Robespierre was among the first to protest and the bill failed. Another attack upon the political influence of the clubs took the form of a motion introduced on May 10, 1791 to deny societies the right to present their petitions. This right was to be restricted solely to individuals. A g a i n Robespierre rushed forward to the defense of the club and fought the issue just as fiercely as he did an attempt to give city governments some control over the clubs. W h e n the National Assembly passed a bill in October, 1791, dissolving the clubs, Robespierre was most influential in securing its repeal. Robespierre was at his best when he could denounce the enemies of the Jacobins in the person of Lafayette. The " hero of two worlds " had dared to assert that the Jacobins were usurpers of the people's power. Robespierre had no desire to see the actual or potential power of the Jacobins revealed. Just as a Hitler, a Mussolini or a Stalin would today deny any desire of their respective parties to dominate the people, so Robespierre tried to minimize the aims of the Jacobins. H e declared that they were simply citizens united to instruct themselves in matters pertaining to the safety of the nation. Their sole power, he pointed out, was that of opinion. But Robespierre might also have added that he considered this most important. He minimized the amount of correspondence between the mother society and the capital and even stated that he was not enthusiastic about such societies because he " disliked crowded meetings " . But, he pointed out, the love of public welfare was dominant there. Unable to content himself with such moderate statements, he went on to claim that the Jacobins had foiled

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every plot directed against the people; that they had been the strongest supporters of liberty and public tranquility. Robespierre in his defense of the clubs gave as his reason for their existence the fact that " tyrants and conspirators " were abroad in the land. The " soldiers of liberty the Jacobins, were necessary to combat them. This argument that conspiracies were ever present was used time and again to justify placing further power in the hands of the Jacobins. Robespierre, as well as contemporary dictators, found this argument of " emergency " a very convenient one. Going behind the argument, the activities of Robespierre while the Legislative Assembly was in session in 1 7 9 1 and 1792 present another picture of Robespierre as the organizer and defender of the Jacobins. His title of the " Savior of the J a c o b i n s " was especially significant in the light of future activities.

CHAPTER IV THE FORMATION OF JACOBIN OPINION ROBESPIERRE'S defense of the Jacobins was important but his formation of Jacobin opinion was even more so. W i t h the possible exceptions of Danton, Robespierre was most responsible for the formation of opinion and the decisions taken by the Jacobins. Robespierre shaped the public mind through his speeches at the Jacobin Club and through correspondence with clubs throughout the country. His journalistic activities had an even greater effect upon public opinion when the Jacobin Clubs undertook to spread copies of his newspapers. While the Legislative Assembly met in 1791 and 1792, Robespierre devoted most of his time to keeping in touch with clubs and friends in all parts of France and in editing his journal, Le Défenseur de la Constitution. H e was able in this way to propagate the nationalist spirit and to assist materially in binding all Jacobin Clubs into one party. A Ministry of Public Enlightenment or a Ministry of Public Culture could hardly do a better job than Robespierre in whipping patriotism into usable political form. Through his letters ran the theme : " Spread the ideas and sentiments of patriotism among our citizens " 1 and incidentally, become good Jacobins. Typical of his propaganda style was a letter written to the Jacobin Club of Lille. " Gentlemen, if I knew a great number of citizens such as you, I could count upon the regeneration of my country. Y o u r patriotism will render signal services to your fatherland; the sacred flame which you possess will spread everywhere. . . . T h e patriotic grief inspired in you by degrees, . . . alone makes you dear to all friends of liberty. It softens my own grief to a certain extent, while your encouragement fortifies my zeal for the great cause of the people." 1 Correspondance,

pp. 49, 50. 65

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Mere exhortation, however, was not the sole contribution of Robespierre. A s the letter indicates, these local societies addressed inquiries to Robespierre and he in return replied, stating his own point of view. F o r example, he wrote, " I am taking the liberty, Gentlemen, of sending you a brochure entitled, Address to the Belgian People which I drew up and which has been adopted by several deputies of this part of France. It appeared likely to aid the spirit of patriotism in your locality. If you agree, you might have it reprinted. O r else, if you wish to avoid the expense, I shall send you some copies I published at my own expense. I am adding to it a motion on the restitution of common lands and another work which the slanders of my enemies made necessary. I can send you copies of all these if you judge them useful for public affairs. I have the honor to be, with all appreciation due to your patriotism, Gentlemen, your very humble and obedient servant. D E ROBESPIERRE "

2

Robespierre's correspondence showed that he always maintained an active interest in the affairs of local clubs, especially those at Versailles, Arras, Lille, and Marseilles. In this, he was guided by his brother, Augustin, who wrote telling him which of his measures pleased or displeased certain groups. Robespierre showed particular solicitude for the embryonic Jacobin Club at Avignon, telling it, " whatever the reasons which have delayed your formal reunion with us, you are French. Y o u are so, because you wish to be and because the French people so desire it. It is not new lands we need but free and virtuous men." 3 More interesting than Robespierre's own letters, however, are some of the replies which he received. A representative response came from a correspondent whose name was scratched out on the original manuscript. 4 Apparently the writer was secretary 2 Archives communales de Lille, carton 211 du legs. Gentil, dossier 7065. , 3 Révolutions de France et de Brabant, no. 59, pp. 331-332, edited by Camille Desmoulins. 4 Archives nationales, F 7 4433, Plaquet 2, no. 8.

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of a club near the border. Dated January 6, 1792, and addressed to M. Robespierre, Attorney General of Paris, it was a reply to a letter written by Robespierre. It showed very clearly how the ideas of Robespierre were spread abroad. The meetings of the club were conducted in French and German. W h e n Robespierre's speech was read, the French-speaking members greeted it with tremendous applause and decreed that it should be printed in both French and German and spread about in great numbers. The club bore the expense of sending it to affiliated societies. The replies to Robespierre's letters were not only interesting in showing the response he received, but they also showed that local clubs put his pleas for greater patriotism into actual practice by exercising greater control over local affairs. They showed that each club regarded itself as an " eye ", the symbol of the Club, to be kept steadily fixed upon local officials. In the letter referred to, the Committee of Correspondance of the club reported that it was in trouble with officials of the department because it asked for the death penalty for all conspirators. Local members also demanded the publication of the accounts of the municipal government. They wished to know the opinions of the Jacobins at Paris on this matter. These local clubs were suspicious of anyone who might be an enemy of the people. While Robespierre denounced leading " traitors " at Paris, the clubs throughout the provinces were busy condemning every possible enemy in sight. Their letters referred to bankers enriching themselves by speculation in assignats. Every new society formed in a town was carefully scrutinized for evidence of unfriendliness. The town mayor was often criticized for unpatriotic acts. Clubs near the border wrote to Robespierre with accounts of military movements in Germany while there were frequent postscripts to the effect that somebody was trying to corrupt the army. Practically every letter began or ended with many words of praise for Robespierre's work, often urging him to " carry

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light to the four corners of the globe ". 5 Others paid homage to his patriotism which " extends everywhere Robespierre seemed to have developed considerable personal feeling for informers such as Aigoin of Montpellier.7 " A f t e r my country, I love men such as you " , Robespierre wrote. 8 Sometimes he praised whole clubs like those of Marseilles, whose " virtues patriotism and courage are above all slanders " . Even Madame Roland wrote to Robespierre on September 27, 1 7 9 1 , declaring, " Y o u have done much, sir, to expound and spread these principles of liberty and equality ". She predicted that Robespierre had a great career before him. Robespierre was becoming steadily more popular with the Jacobins at Paris. His correspondence and the distribution of his speeches had made him a national figure. In December, 1 7 9 1 , Augustin wrote to Maximilien for several copies of his speech against the executive veto. On Christmas Eve, the leader of the Club of Strasbourg, Simond, wrote to Robespierre applauding his stand on the royal veto and furnishing him with local information about the state of patriotism. The same Simond, on February 6, 1792, wrote to him saying that his speeches on the war had been read and wildly applauded at the club. On March 7, 1792, the Club of Caen wrote, thanking Robespierre for his defense of it. In April, 1792, Pétion asked him to do all he could to unite the Jacobins. Robespierre, through his careful defense of the Jacobin Clubs had helped them to become the strongest organization in France. When the Committee of Public Safety was organized, it found its chief agents in these Jacobin Clubs, many of which continued to pour information and suggestions into the ears of the everlistening Robespierre. The Jacobin party had become the party of patriots, the only political force in all France. 5 Archives nationales, F 7 4433, Plaquet no. 90. 6 Ibid., no. 10. 7 Archives nationales, F7 4577, dossier Aigoin. 8 Bibliothèque nationale fonds français, nouvelles acquisitions, 312, fol. 139.

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The Jacobin party became ever more exclusive in the years 1793 and 1794. Foreigners were excluded and finally the Jacobins at Paris refused to admit any new societies to affiliation. Everyone was afraid of a counter-revolutionary plot. The clubs attempted to prevent this by continual spying upon every individual suspect and by education of the mass of the people. A t Aiguesvives the club was known as the School of Patriotism. Robespierre himself went out to the clubs in the neighborhood of Paris in order to instruct the people. Most of the clubs had committees to look after such instruction. Following the example of Robespierre and the Jacobins of Paris, they distributed brochures and pamphlets in profusion. One suggested sending up a balloon to spread its publication. A l l sent " civic missionaries " throughout the countryside. The affiliation of the clubs was closest among those near Paris, but every good patriot on a visit to Paris, went to the Jacobins and often had the good fortune to hear Robespierre. The patriot then carried the " sacred fire " back to his local club. This zeal was kept up by much correspondence between Paris and the provinces. The Archives nationales contain many of these missives from Jacobin Clubs to Robespierre with either praise, accusations or information of some sort. 9 A few such communications picked at random suggest the watch Robespierre kept over many sections of the country in 1793 and 1794. A letter of July 28, 1793, sent by one, Linelly, an engineer to Robespierre proposed a new way of hastening the arrest of traitors by giving all their possessions to the republic. 10 Another of August 18 addressed to M. Robertspierre(itc)by one Herrill asked Robespierre to denounce the administrators of the district of Coutance. A letter from the Committee of Surveillance of the districts asked Robespierre to make suggestions about the virtue and talents of particular candidates. 11 A citizen named Balbidatz of Paris wrote, on August 21, 1793, demanding that nationales, F 7 4433.

9 Archives 7

10 Ibid., F 4433, no. 12, Plaquet 2. 11 Ibid., no. IS-

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only patriots be admitted to the clubs and public places. He wished formal instruction from the Committee of Public Safety for this. Soulet wrote denouncing aristocrats to Robespierre. A certain Effemme wrote in March, 1794, asking for a moment of Robespierre's precious time. H e wanted advice on the way to avenge truth and oppressed virtue. His friends, good patriots, were in jail. H e had complained to the Jacobin society and written to Paris. N o w , as a last resort, he was writing to Robespierre. While he was about it, he complained to Robespierre that the local administration was composed of young fellows who were more interested in pleasure than in their duty. The Popular Societies being established throughout the countryside, he wrote, were directed by schemers who disturbed tranquility instead of preaching good customs, making known the enemies of the republic, and instructing the people. H e said that many aristocrats were in the local Committee of Surveillance and the revolutionary government. Take this letter, multiply it by the hundreds, and one gets an approximate idea of the number and variety of complaints which were sent to Robespierre. A t times, it must have seemed to him that every tenth citizen in France was busy revealing some local or even widespread plot against the nation. F o r example, on Bastille Day, 1793, a citizen wrote relating the evils besetting his fellow citizens, chief of which was a group of " aristocrats " whom he listed for Robespierre's convenience. Even a prisoner in the Luxembourg, Beyerle, sent him his works on philosophy and the history of patriotism, apparently trying to convince Robespierre of his orthodoxy. Letters from wives, relatives or friends asking the release of prisoners were legion in the collection. Robespierre, himself, drew up a list of good citizens. 12 Most of those listed were civil, naval, and military officials. T h e typical comment beside each name was "a good republican and an honest man ". These were, apparently, the prerequisites for holding office in the new regime. 12 Archives

nationales, F 7 4435, Plaquet 2, no. 42.

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This list of patriots might have been designed for a plan to force Jacobinism upon the people if popular education failed. Among Robespierre's papers to be found in the Archives Rationales is a document 1 3 (undated) written in a hand which closely resembles that of Robespierre. Entitled, " Observations Submitted to the Patriotic, Democratic and Republican Minds of the Committee of Public Safety ", it contained a plan for even greater surveillance and centralization of government through Jacobin control. It provided for a system of secret police controlled by the central government. " The Secret Agents of the Committee of Public Safety " it read, " ought to be chosen from the most ardent, the most enlightened, the most prudent and discreet patriots ". Two such agents should be sent to each department with a thorough knowledge of the locale and a wide acquaintance with people of all professions and callings. They should first discover the public spirit within the department, and then reveal conspiracies. The agents were to work secretly and harmoniously for the public weal. They were to travel simply as though on personal affairs just as the farmers general had done to discover fraud. The document propose that these agents be given a recommendation to the representatives on mission in the departments without letting the latter know who they were. The secret agents were to be given authority to seize papers, read them or send them directly to the Committee of Public Safety. One of the benefits pointed out was that it would be economical. Each agent could watch the other lest either show a tendency to turn traitor. As the document explained, " Their functions will be infinitely useful and salutary because traveling sometimes on foot, sometimes in public carriages, living in common taverns with sans-culottes, at other times in great hotels . . . they will know the public spirit perfectly ". Sometimes they would travel cheaply, at other times they would journey in a carriage and six with plotters and administrators, who would talk freely, thinking that no persons on mission 13 F 4 4433, Plaquet 2, no. 42.

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were about. Each agent would keep a journal of his operations and would send in a report every two or three days. " In this way, the Committee of Public Safety will be perfectly informed about everything ". It would know the spirit of its generals, officers, soldiers, functionaries, and all citizens. The report added optimistically that quick progress for the public welfare and confusion of the republic's enemies would undoubtedly result. O f course, only patriots of probity and intelligence could be used. A patriot without probity, it added, was a monster, while a patriot without knowledge was capable but liable to be indiscreet. Above all, no personal interest could enter into such an agent's makeup. H e must be a " pure patriot". The question naturally to be asked is, was this plan Robespierre's? It did not go through the mail for it bears no address, date or place of origin nor any trace of sealing wax. It might have been communicated to Robespierre personally but how would this explain the handwriting? The further query, " W a s it ever put into practice? " is very difficult to answer. The Committee of Public Safety records no decree establishing such a system of secret police. But then, its secrecy would forbid any such formal decree. The Committee of Public Safety always had a large sum of money to spend as it pleased and the pay for such agents might well have come from such a source. Perhaps the list of patriots drawn up by Robespierre 1,4 was prepared f o r such a scheme. His comment on many names read, " A good Republican and an honest man " would certainly fit the requirements for the secret agents. The choice of civil, military and naval officials for the list would assure men of wide acquaintance and knowledge of the departments. These, however, are merely conjectures. Whether the plan was ever introduced must remain, for the present at any rate, an unsolved problem. The clubs furnished, unofficially, just the sort of information and police service that the central government desired. From January, 1792, the Parisian Jacobins had been sending 14 Supra, p. 70.

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out a circular every two weeks. Beside the printed word, the spoken one had much influence. A certain adventurer named Dorfeuille went from club to club spreading the Jacobin point of view. After federalism had been conquered, there were very few non-Jacobin Clubs. The bonds with the- mother society were tightened in March, 1793. The Jacobins sent out a circular to show the necessity of building up new means of communication. The mother society offered to receive all visitors from departments with a special card and to send to the departmental clubs all journals chosen by the Parisian Jacobins. Robespierre expressed annoyance over the number of impure societies bear" this sacred name ". The result was an even more careful selection of truly Jacobin societies. The section clubs of Paris, for example, fell under the disapproval of Robespierre, and a motion was passed that no member of the Jacobins could belong to them. The Jacobin Club became an intermediary between the government and the rest of the nation. One of the prerequisites for membership in the clubs became the ability to denounce. Many of these clubs had a Committee of Research or Surveillance which under the Revolutionary government had an official organization and standing. A law of September 17, 1793, charged them with the duty of listing suspects and examining papers. These powers were often extended by the representatives on mission. The Popular Societies watched the authorities and the Committees of Surveillance watched the Popular Societies. Sometimes the members of the Committees were jurors, often judges and almost always witnesses who appeared before the Revolutionary Tribunal to testify against a traitor. The number of denunciations increased tremendously in 1793 as the number of accusations of lèse-nation and lèse-patrie grew. Often accusations developed from legitimate protests of citizens against abuses by functionaries or representatives. Often, no doubt, personal grudges entered into the complaints. These clubs had a predominant influence, too, within the administration. The Club at Paris sent out circulars relative to

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the choice of members of the revolutionary tribunals. The Convention soon felt the force of its Jacobin representatives and the law of the Convention giving the clubs the right to denounce gave them the legal power to wield their influence. The Committees of General Security and of Public Safety were in constant contact with them and the clubs continually sent in letters of confidence at crucial moments. The Popular Societies really stood between the government and the people. Acting on the first by motions, on the second by instruction, the clubs constituted the principal support of the Revolution. A n d it should be remembered that Robespierre was a guiding genius in the organization of these clubs. The clubs were further protected by a law of July 25, 1793, which gave them official protection by imposing heavy penalties upon detractors. Under this law, the clubs took over more and more administrative power with no one to hinder them. The Prefects of departments were usually Jacobins and the Clubs sometimes had greater power than they. They often bought grain, when the administration lacked the money, and agitated for restrictions on the sale of meat so that the army might be fed. Through the formation of Jacobin opinion, Robespierre exercised a dictatorship more real than any power vested in him by government office. He first helped to form public opinion and then proceded to recognize it as the general will. A Ministry of Popular Culture exercises just such a dictatorship over public opinion. T h e forces of the Industrial Revolution in communication have given such ministries a degree of power which would make Robespierre turn an envious green. But Robespierre with the aid of imperfect printing presses was able to exercise a dictatorship as real as that of any dictator today in the field that really counts: control of public opinion. Robespierre did not confine himself solely to education of the Jacobins. He sought a wider field, that of educating all public opinion to his point of view. Here, he might have joined hands with dictatorships, as they exist today when the " enlight-

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enment " of the people becomes the basis upon which dictatorial power rests; when virtual " wars of propaganda " are fought to win all to the dictator's point of view. Robespierre wished to educate the Jacobins so that they might go out and teach all Frenchmen. H e regarded education as one of the most potent forces in uniting a nation. Education necessarily played a great part in a state where all depended upon the people. In his plans for enlightenment of the citizen, Robespierre believed that there should be.a particular kind of education. F r o m his speeches, it was quite evident that this would be patriotic with love of country as the basis for the curriculum. In his zeal for patriotic enlightenment, Robespierre sometimes accompanied Jacobins who went into the various parts of Paris on Sundays to eluci-^ ¿ate the principles of a truly national state. 15 Indeed, every speech he made was delivered as a lecture to inform the common people of their rights and duties to the nation; of plots against their country; or was an exhortation for them to arise and win battles for France. Robespierre desired, not only informal education, through his speeches, but also formal schooling. T o the question who was to receive this education, he replied, " Everyone ". In Article 14 of his Declaration of Rights, he stated that " Society ought to encourage the progress of public intelligence, with all its might, and bring education within the reach of every citizen ". Mere words, however, would not do this, as Augustin Robespierre observed. 16 " W e must have a system of education ", he wrote, " which will spare the Republic its present misfortunes. . . . The . . . task is perhaps more difficult than one imagines. . . ." Robespierre himself said, " The people will become easier to lead as the human mind acquires greater activity, light and philosophy." 17 Robespierre's idea of public life envisioned very little private life. Children were not only to be supervised by the state, they 15 Supra,

p. 55.

16 Letter to Buissart, July 15, 1793, Correspondance, 17 Villiers, Pierre, Souvenirs

d'un deporte,

pp. 172-173.

Paris, 1802, p. 87.

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were to be taken from their parents and raised by the state. Patriotic training and martial activities were to be the bases of the new curriculum. To further these views, on July 3, 1793, Robespierre proposed that six commissioners be named to present, eight days hence, a plan for education and public instruction. 18 On July 10, Robespierre became a member of the Committee himself. 19 On July 1 3 , he read and approved a plan of education written by Lepeletier, who was assassinated shortly after it was.drawn up. Robespierre stated that the Committee's plan was not yet prepared, but that Lepeletier's plan made by the " genius of humanity " was considered adequate. On July 29, however, Robespierre presented his own plan for national education.20 This differed only slightly from that of Lepeletier. In brief, it called for " truly national " , compulsory, public education for both boys and girls in the elementary grades. Its aim was to " regenerate the nation " , to make a " new people " by " truly republican " education. Secondary education was to be provided for those who wished it. The cost of educating all children would be paid by a graduated tax. Specifically, the plan called for the state to raise all boys from five to twelve and all girls from five to eleven. 21 This national education would be offered to all equally. Every child would receive the same type of clothing, food, instructions and care. The purpose of this universal education was, as stated in Article 4, "to strengthen the bodies of children, to develop them by gymnastic exercises, to accustom them to handwork, to harden them to all sorts of fatigue, to shape their character and spirit by useful instructions, and to give them the knowl18 Archives parlementaires, L X V I I I , 154. 19 Guillaume, J., Procès-verbaux Convention nationale, II, 30.

du Comité d'instruction publique de la

20 Guillaume, J., op. cit., II, 161-170. 21 In Lepeletier's plan, which Robespierre approved, nationalistic education of pre-school children was to be provided through singing of patriotic lullabies by mothers and recital of heroic tales.

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edge necessary to every citizen whatever his profession might be ". Robespierre mentioned no nationalistic motives, but would not such Spartan training give France hardy soldiers and patriotic citizens? Certainly the welfare of the nation was to be cared for when, having finished the elementary course of education, the children entered the " divers professions useful to society " . A select group of students were to enter secondary schools maintained by the nation. There, they were to study all human knowledge and fine arts. These were to be preserved and enriched by the Republic and taught by teachers paid by the nation. The courses were to be divided into two degrees of instruction : institutes and lycées. A s for the organization of primary education, which Robespierre called " National Education," schools were to be established in every canton. Unless parents turned the child over to the school, they were to lose their rights as citizens and be forced to pay double taxes while they kept the child away. Here, Robespierre inserted his measures for increasing the population. 22 Mothers of four children were to receive 100 livres, parents of each child above that number were to be rewarded with double the sum, while those having above eight children were to receive 300 livres. A booklet of instructions was to be issued to each person signifying an intention of marriage, so that children might be reared as healthy citizens. The author of the best booklet was to receive 24,000 livres and was to be cited as having deserved well of his country. There was to be a varied curriculum. Children were to spend their time in study, manual training, and gymnastic exercises. Besides the three " R ' s ", their minds were to be " cultivated " by memorizing several patriotic songs and the " most striking tales of the history of free peoples and of the French Revolution." They were also to receive instruction about their Constitution, their country, universal morals and domestic and 22 Infra,

p. 187.

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rural economy. The girls were to be taught civic songs and the " lessons of history proper to the development of the virtues of their sex." Boys were to be given manual training suitable to their age in shops within or near the school. All were to be trained in work on the soil. Girls were likewise to be employed in mending and sewing. The profit gained from the salé of articles produced by the children was to be distributed by giving nine-tenths for the support of the school and one-tenth to the children for their own use. Any child not finishing his tasks was to be punished by delaying his meal and making him eat alone. Robespierre also approved of Lepeletier's advice that time spent in punishment should be taken up by gymnastic exercises and military practice. The state was to insist upon training in self-reliance. No servants were to be hired for work about the schools or dormitories. The children were to perform all household service. They were to live frugally and sanely. Food and clothing were to be simple. Children were to sleep on hard beds. Thus, they would be prepared for any situation in later life without feeling the need for comforts or luxuries. Managers of the schools were to be the old or the infirm who could no longer earn their living. National education, in other words, was to be a means of distributing national relief. Every care was to be taken that education be as inexpensive as possible. The state needed most of its funds for national defense. Whenever possible, schools were to be located in confiscated houses of the religious, in the homes of émigrés or in public buildings. The expenses of the schools, such as teachers' salaries and rewards to mothers were to be paid by the nation. Current expenses were to be met through the sale of articles produced by the children; any personal funds the children possessed; and a graduated tax upon all persons living in the canton. Male teachers were to be paid 400 livres; women, 300 livres, plus lodging and board amounting to " twice the amount of food allotted to the oldest school child ". The nation was to

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reward them further by placing their profession in the highest rank. Those who rendered the " greatest services to the nation " were to be entitled to its esteem and recognition. National education was not to be left wholly in the hands of teachers, however. Robespierre proposed that a council of fifty-two parents supervise every school. Each member was to stay at the school for seven days so that in the course of a year, some parent would be at the school every day. A t the end of the year, the council was to make a report on the school. The teacher whose school had the least number of deaths in his department was to be rewarded with the sum of 300 livres. Teachers were to be similarly rewarded for the greatest number of articles produced per child. The legal status of the children was clear. From the ages of five on, they belonged to the nation. " The obligation of intrusting the children, as young citizens, to France to be instructed by it in principles of equality and the Republic, is a duty of every father and citizen " ran the report. " The nation will adopt all orphans," it continued. The report then listed subjects for a number of elementary books which were to be written. A m o n g these, was one which should develop the " germ of civil virtue and republican sentiments " by presenting a " summary of the Constitution, of morals and of rural and domestic economy, as well as the most remarkable tales of the history of free peoples and the French Revolution." This was to be a truly national work. So, too, were the instructions given for a book on discipline and " moral means for developing virtues and finding out talents ". Every author of such a textbook was to receive 40,000 livres and was to be adjudged worthy of la Patrie. Other solutions for educational problems were to be submitted to the Committee of Public Instruction and were to be rewarded by the national government. This plan for education had several nationalistic aspects. The system of education was to be a national one, since it was to be maintained by the state. Textbooks were to be written for the national government. The subjects taught were chiefly those

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dealing with the glories of France so that virtue might be developed. The children were to be trained in order that they might become,hardy and useful citizens, skilled in the arts of peace, but ready to fight for the nation, if necessary. Fine arts and belles lettres were not to be neglected. France, after all, was the most enlightened nation of the age. N o mention was made of education dealing with the customs of other countries. Only the " history of free peoples " was to be taught. Did this not restrict education to those countries which followed French principles? Robespierre's financial provision for education was very meagre. Perhaps this was so because with the nation at war, money was needed more for defense than for education. Perhaps the one costly feature was the plan to adopt all children from the ages of five to twelve. This idea attracted the greatest criticism. The children would become literally enfants de la Patrie to be molded by the nation along nationalistic lines. Many parents would, of course, object to having their children taken away by the state, Robespierre met this charge on August 13, although he was no longer a member of the Committee on Public Instruction. 23 H e pointed out that the poor citizen could neither feed nor instruct his children. The Republic, then, had to assume that obligation. The purpose of the plan was " to seize children at the time when they receive the most decisive impressions, at the time when they begin to form habits." It had to prepare men who would be ready to enter society and be worthy of the Republic. It was untrue that children were to be removed from their parents. They were to remain at home for the first five years, before being given to la Patrie, he pointed out. A s for support, republican virtue favored the plan, while its opponents were labeled the rich and the prejudiced. 24 23 Upon his appointment to the Committee of Public Safety on July 27, Robespierre was automatically disbarred from membership in the Committee on Public Instruction. Since he had already introduced a measure on education, however, he was allowed to defend it. 24 Even though modified on August 13, the scheme was rejected by the

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Robespierre took part in spreading nationalist propaganda himself. H i s active correspondence with the Jacobin Clubs has already been mentioned. 25 Wherever he went or to whomever he wrote, Robespierre always brought or sent his latest speech with suggestions for reprinting or distributing copies of it. Robespierre was his own best propagandist and advertiser. W h e n out of public office, he published a newspaper, Le Défenseur de la Constitution,26 a weekly appearing every Tuesday. In his prospectus, he stated that the purpose of the paper was to direct true patriotism to a common end. Truth and justice would guide his pen, he wrote, as he addressed himself directly to the " h u m a n r a c e " . In September, 1792, the paper became the Lettres de M. Robespierre, Membre de la Convention Nationale de France à ses Commettons, published every Friday chez Pierre Jacques. Robespierre was careful to point out in this first number that his " constituents " were the people of all France. Besides his journalistic endeavors, Robespierre engaged also in what his notes called the "distribution of sound literature." 27 His own speeches of course, fell under this heading. H i s " Report on the Principles of Moral Politics," was " printed, sent to all constituted authorities, to all popular societies, to the armies, and translated into all languages ". 2 S Committee of Public Safety orders signed by Robespierre listed copies of patriotic and reliable journals which were to be sent to the departments. 29 These included the Moniteur, Les Annales patriotiques, La Gazette nationale de France, l'Histoire des religions, and Un Essai de gravures à joindre â l'Emile de J. J. Rousseau. Robespierre's speeches were to be " printed and reprinted and Assembly as t o o expensive and as interfering w i t h the parent's right t o exploit his child's labor. 25 Supra. 26 Chez Duplain, Paris, 1792. 27 Carnet, p. 69. 28 Vellay, op. cit., p. 323. 29 Comité de salut public, I X , 620, 621.

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spread abroad by all possible means for the safety of the country and the glory of the National Convention." 30 Besides this widespread distribution of his speeches and of patriotic journals, Robespierre desired to shape the public spirit by encouraging the writing of patriotic literature. "Suppress all dishonest journalists. Circulate healthy literature ", read the note in his Carnet. Robespierre proposed to accomplish the latter through the use of a Government press and the grant of subsidies to patriotic journals. 31 The first step in this direction was taken on the very day Robespierre became a member of the Committee of Public Safety. A regular correspondence was to be maintained between the Committee and the representatives in the provinces. The decree commanded the publication of all laws and state documents in Italian for the benefit of Corsican patriots.32 This was followed on August 3 by a decree ordering the publication of a journal whose object was " to develop and expand the principles of republican customs and of liberty, to arouse the courage of the French against the foreign enemy, to fortify them against the schemes of foreign governments and to unmask conspirators." 33 On August 8, Garat and Rousselin, close friends of Robespierre, were made editors of the Feuille de Salut Public.31 Besides this, the old type manifesto was used against enemies of the nation. Robespierre's order on October 23, declared, for example, that " i t is necessary to enlighten the French and all peoples on the schemes of the criminal faction which disturbs the Republic. . . ." Then it went on to decree that " 50,000 copies of an indictment of this faction be printed and sent to all popular societies, to all municipalities, and dis30 Ibid., p. 63331 A u l a r d , " L a P r e s s e officieuse sous la T e r r e u r , " Études et Leçons SUT la Révolution française, series 1, 1893, pp. 226-240. 32 Comité de salut public, V , 392-93. 33 Ibid., p. 459. 34 Ibid., p. 506.

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tributed to ail parts of the Republic and among all foreign nations." 35 Subsidizing patriotic journals was another means used to unite the nation. A n order signed by Robespierre on October 9 gave over the house of an émigré to the printing presses of the journal, the Anti-fédéraliste, published by Robespierre's friends, Payan, Fourcade and Julian. 36 This subsidy was extended on November 13 to the Moniteur, the Journal universel, the Père Duchesne and the Journal des hommes libres. The decree ordered that 50,000 livres be paid the Moniteur for distribution of copies to the popular societies. This amount was to cease if the Moniteur were not written " in sympathy with the republican revolution and the principles of liberty and equality". 3 7 During the winter of 1793-1794 thousands of copies of these papers and patriotic speeches were distributed by the government, chiefly among the troops at the front so that the army might be " regenerated ". Altogether, 450,000 livres were spent in purchasing and distributing copies of journals, of the Constitution and the Rights of Man, and of patriotic hymns. 38 Robespierre did not sign the particular bill subsidizing the Père Duchesne, probably because he disliked Hébert, the editor. A decree of August 2, 1793 put at the disposition of the Committee of Public Safety a sum of 50,000,000 livres. The Committee was to use this money secretly. Most of it went for police work, but here and there can be found records of where some of the money went. The sum of 100,000 livres was given to the Jacobins at Paris, who, presumably had incurred heavy debts. On Robespierre's proposal, 9,000 livres were given to the Jacobins of Lorient; 5,000 to those at Le H a v r e ; 6,000 to the Club of Grenoble; and 3,000 to those at L a Rochelle. 35 ibid., VII, 583. 36 Comité 37

Ibid.,

3 8 Annales

du salut

public,

V I I , 583.

V I I I , 388-89. révolutionaires,

X , 112.

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The Committee of Public Safety had as one of its purposes the desire to influence public opinion through the press. A decree of August 8, 1793 signed by Couthon, Barère and Robespierre discussed plans which the Committee had for a journal of its own which would " develop and spread principles of republican customs and liberty ; excite politics and the intrigue of foreign governments ; and unmask conspirators ". N o such paper ever appeared as openly published by the Committee so perhaps the Committee gave secret funds to a journal already in existence. A t any rate, no trace was ever found in its papers of either the paper or of funds disbursed. 39 Robespierre's interest in journalism had also a negative aspect : that of censorship. A l l journalists who opposed his ideas were labeled as unpatriotic " imposters " and hence to be suppressed. The public spirit could be educated only through the proper type of nationalistic material. A t the Jacobins on August 14, 1793, he urged all patriotic citizens to " fall upon those odious journalists, whose every word is stimulus to crime and whose existence becomes more pernicious to society every day '.40 H e called upon all " citizens, zealous for the happiness of their nation . . . to confound these cowardly slanderers and make truth and patriotism triumph." 41 O n September 8, at the Jacobins, he invited Prudhomme, who complained of persecution by the press, to write an article on, " The crimes of editors or journalists, who are in the pay of foreign powers." 42 A s the revolution progressed and as he became more suspicious, Robespierre's censorship of the press tightened proportionately. Besides utilization of manifestoes, the publication of an official journal, and subsidizing existing journals to foster national spirit, Robespierre made use of the popular societies, particularly the Jacobins, in promoting civic spirit. A t first, he 39 Aulard, Études, XI, 232, said that the paper was La Feuille du salut public, published by a society of men of patriotic letters. 40 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V, 350-351. il Ibid., 351. 42 Ibid., 392.

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favored a National Assembly seated in great halls where all citizens might listen and become aware of national problems. The closest approach to this was the Jacobin Club. Robespierre maintained that attendance at the Jacobins was a f o r m of political and national education. Hence, it was not surprising that the Committee of Public S a f e t y should devote some of the 50,000,000 livres appropriated it by the Convention, f o r the payment of debts incurred by the Jacobin Clubs. Signed by Robespierre, this decree read : The Committee of Public Safety, considering that the popular societies are the foundation of the republican revolution, constant propagators of the public spirit, untiring defenders of liberty and equality, considering that the first revolutionary impulses arose from the Jacobins at Paris, that from this center of opinion at different periods of the Revolution, public spirit has arisen, been upheld and propagated by the energetic and varied correspondence of that Society which has become necessary for the strengthening of liberty . . . decrees that . . . 100,000 livres . . . will be placed at the disposal of the club to meet its needs and enable it to serve the Republic and the progress of the Revolution. 43 One of the primary functions of the Jacobins was to spread this " sound literature " spoken of at its sessions. Here, as with journalists, Robespierre was careful that only patriotic literature be accepted and printed. W h e n Julien reported adversely on the measure of the Committee, Robespierre had the report suppressed. 44 In order to make certain that only approved speeches, were published, he secured the appointment of a Commission at the Jacobins to examine every speech. 45 A n o t h e r agency used by Robespierre to propagate national principles, w a s the representative on mission. Order a f t e r order signed by Robespierre appropriated sums of the Committee f o r representatives w h o were to " propagate public spirit, watch 43

Comité de salut public,

VIII, pp.

432-33.

44 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, V I , 460. 4 5 Ibid., 631.

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over the enemies of the Republic and establish Jacobin Clubs in the department ". 48 In speaking of the necessity of spreading the knowledge of French principles, Robespierre discussed the value of distributing propaganda to the inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands. " T o beat the tyrants ", he said, " we should count on our presses as well as our artillery. W h y have we neglected this force, the power of the press?" 4 7 In another instance, he recommended that the decree which he sponsored be printed, translated into all languages, spread throughout the Republic and published in foreign countries to attest to the universe the principles of the French nation and the attacks of its enemies ".4f> When Robespierre made his speech on the Supreme Being, the instructions were given that it be sent to all troops, all constitutional bodies, and all popular societies. It was to be printed on placards and posted in the streets and camps, translated into every language, and published throughout the world ". Robespierre could not understand why France, placed, he said, in the center of Europe did not communicate and excite movements just as despots did.49 Robespierre realized that national spirit could be aroused through means less conventional than speeches and manifestoes. He believed that the theatre was a potent force for arousing good patriots. First of all, only patriotic plays were to be produced. On August 29, Robespierre signed an order of the Committee demanding that Pamela, a play by François de Neufchâtel be submitted to the Committee before appearing in Paris. 50 On August 30, after having been censored, it was allowed to be performed, but a Captain of the Dragoons appeared at the club on September 2 to complain of its reactionary 46 F o r e x a m p l e s e e t h e o r d e r in Comité 4 7 B û c h e z e t R o u x , Histoire 4 8 Ibid.,

I X , 146.

X I V , 352-353.

parlementaire,

X X V , 46.

X X X , 248.

4 9 B û c h e z e t R o u x , Histoire 5 0 Comité

de salut public,

parlementaire,

de salut public, V I , 164.

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sentiments. Robespierre thereupon demanded that the theatre be closed and the author jailed. A n order drafted by him on December 22, 1793 prohibited the production of a play by Bourdon entitled, Le Tombeau des imposteurs et l'inauguration du temple de la Venise, and " all others of the same tendency ". A similar play by Maréchal, was anti-clerical, and so was a means of dividing the nation. A farce called La Sainte Omelette was likewise forbidden. 51 Robespierre did not confine his educational activities to mere censorship of unpatriotic plays. H e favored the establishment of a national theatre. The Committee of Public Safety, with his approval, sanctioned Fauchett's plan for the reorganization of the Opera, in the following decree: 5 2 The Provisional Executive Council considering that the national entertainment called the Opera or Academy of Music is nearly bankrupt, that this establishment provides a living for 1,200 sansculotte families; that a subsidy to it is really a loan to the profit of public spirit; that, in a free country, the stage ought to be purified and become, under national supervision, a means of public education; and that, at the same time, rich men and foreigners should be taxed for the support of the Arts; decrees that there shall be paid out of the special funds at the disposal of the Council, a sum of 150,000 livres, under the head of indemnities of public aid, on the following conditions: ( 1 ) that the management of the Opera be changed and modelled on principles of economy and patriotism, (2) that the management shall purchase republican works, (3) that none but patriotic plays shall be produced, (4) that the repertory shall be purified, (5) that one performance every week shall be given free of charge for the people, and (6) that the management shall find employment in various subordinate posts for relatives of volunteers serving at the front. 53 Propaganda became a means of education, both at home and abroad, while the press and the stage became mere tools of the 51 Révolution française, L I X , 278. 52

Comité de salut public, V I I , 295-296.

53 Robespierre favored this plan in the Convention and at the Jacobins.

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government and were forced to be patriotic." Robespierre envisioned a cultural society completely dominated by the state. " Artists in uniform " is not a concept new to the twentieth century. 64 One other aspect of education, the holding of national festivals, public gatherings and processions, was planned by Robespierre. But since these partook of nationalistic religious festivals, they are treated under " Emotionalism and Nationalism."

CHAPTER V TOWARDS THE TOTALITARIAN STATE ROBESPIERRE the humanitarian, liberal patriot and politician would have shuddered at the thought of an authoritarian or totalitarian state. Such a system of government would crush the very liberty and equality which he had argued for at such great length. His seemingly firm belief in the virtues of democracy and republicanism would hardly seem compatible with a nationalist dictatorship. Yet, in the brief period from 1789 to 1794, Robespierre turned from a liberal humanitarian pacifist into a nationalistic zealot eager to include all political, social and economic power within the state. The circumstances which brought this about and the processes of reasoning which led Robespierre to believe himself fundamentally consistent are interesting not only for an understanding of Robespierre. They also shed much light upon the manner in which present democracies become dictatorships. Robespierre found that parliamentary government, especially as it developed in the Legislative Assembly, failed to solve the external and internal problems of the country quickly enough. A firm believer in democracy, he reached the conclusion that it could secure a better trial if its practice were reserved until France was internally strong and externally victorious. He was willing to forego liberty and equality and to emphasize fraternity. Later, Napoleon was to come to much the same conclusion. Robespierre and his colleagues needed a philosophical justification for everything and so they naturally turned to Rousseau, their guiding spirit. Ordinarily, one would expect scant comfort from Rousseau for such a doctrine. Y e t dictatorship must have an ideology, a fundamental philosophy, or it cannot survive. Robespierre and the Jacobins evolved a philosophy of totalitarianism based upon Rousseau who had argued- that the collective will was everything. I f the people is sovereign, the 89

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government is merely the work of the people. Robespierre argued that the people could revoke any act or recall any official whose views were contrary to the general will. On the face of things, this theory sounded democratic and republican. Actually, he came to regard the " people ", however, as the Jacobins and the " general will " as their desires. Through control of Jacobin opinion, through efficient organization and regimentation of the clubs, Robespierre molded the " general will " of the Jacobins so that his ideas became the ideas of the people. He could thus actually believe that in the process of centralization of the government, he was acting as a true democrat and that a republic, not a totalitarian state, would be the outcome. Just as Stalin, Hitler or Mussolini today assert that they are " democratic dictators ", so Robespierre believed he represented the will of the people. The difficulty arose in that Robespierre, like contemporary dictators, through efficient organization and regimentation of the clubs and through propaganda could mold the general will so that his ideas become those of the people. Anyone who criticized his ideas ran the risk of being called not a personal enemy but an enemy of the people, a traitor to the nation. This dislike of criticism brought with it a love for direct action ; the desire to construct a centralized state; and finally resulted in placing the state above all. The creation of a totalitarian state was but the logical consequence of Robespierre's thinking. He was aided in accomplishing it by the multitude of enemies existing at home and the dangers which threatened France from abroad. Contemporary dictators have had less reason than Robespierre in setting up a dictatorship based upon the plea of an emergency. The belief that the nation had to be unified under one central system of government grew upon Robespierre in 1792. In the Prospectus of his Défenseur de la Constitution,l he declared 1 Par Maximilien Robespierre, député à l'assemblée Chez Duplain, a weekly appearing every Thursday.

constituante,

1792,

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"that " the general will becomes powerless, and patriotism, without system, without unity, and with no determined purpose, moves weakly and fruitlessly or sometimes seconds with blind impetuosity the devilish plans of enemies of our liberty ". Only one means according to the Prospectus remained to save the state. The zeal of all good citizens had to be directed to a single purpose. All dissension within France had to be placed before the eyes of the nation. This striving for unity, for a common purpose, was indicated in all of his struggles with the factions. In 1793, his desire for a " single will " seemed justified in the light of conditions in France. Jacobins and Girondists were at each other's throats; speculators profited immensely with inflationary assignats; the people of the cities grumbled at their lack of voice in affairs. Parliamentary government, with its multiplicity of parties and lack of a strong executive, seemed to Robespierre to be a failure in June, 1793. This was a reasonable conclusion in view of its inability to deal with problems confronting it. Robespierre was faced with the problem of how to adjust the government so as to be invulnerable from attack either from minorities within or from enemies abroad. H e had declared that " the first object of every Constitution should be to defend public and private liberty against the government itself ". The problem was, how could he preserve individual liberty while keeping the government free from attack ? His only solution, and that a weak one, was one adopted by his prototypes today. During the emergency, individual rights were to be forgotten and all power concentrated in the government. A f t e r dangerous conditions ceased to exist, the state might return to some form of decentralized government. T h i s inability to solve the problem of government was Robespierre's greatest failure. H e never did realize when an " emergency " had ceased to exist and continued to manufacture new ones after the original causes had disappeared. But Robespierre should not be blamed too much for his inability to solve the difficulty. Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, faced with a similar

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situation, responded in the same fashion. Indeed, even democracies when troubled by civil wars or dangerous foreign struggles revert to some form of dictatorship. The test comes when it is necessary for the dictator to relinquish his power. Robespierre never realized when that moment had arrived. Among the papers found in the possession of Robespierre at his death was a document written by him, apparently about the time of the events of May 31-June 2, when the Girondists were removed from the National Convention. 2 In it, he explained the necessity for unity. " There must be one will " , he said. " It must be either republican or royalist. If it is to be republican, there must be republican ministers, republican newspapers, republican deputies, and a republican government. The internal dangers come from the bourgeoisie. In order to defeat them, we must rally the people. Everything has been so planned as to place the people under the yoke of the bourgeoisie and to send the defenders of the Republic to the scaffold. The middle classes have triumphed at Marseilles, Bordeau, and Lyons. They would have triumphed in Paris, too, but for the present insurrection. 3 This rising must continue until the measures necessary for saving the Republic have been taken. The people must ally itself with the Convention and the Convention must make use of the people. The insurrection must gradually spread from place to place on a uniform plan; the sans-culottes must be subsidized by the state and remain in the towns. They must be supplied with arms, roused to anger, and enlightened. Republican enthusiasm must be inflamed by all means. In foreign affairs, alliance with small powers is impossible until we have a single national will." In his notebook, Robespierre sketched what he considered to be the " four essential points of government " which he believed 2 Courtois, E d m e B., Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l'examen des papiers trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices, 1795, Pièce justificative, no. 44. 3 M a y 3 1 - J u n e 2, 1793?

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would unify the nation. These were: ( i ) Food and provisions, (2) W a r , ( 3 ) Public opinion and conspiracies, and ( 4 ) Diplomacy. There was good reason to believe that Robespierre thought the time had come for concerted action, away from democracy. He urged all patriotic deputies to assemble in the Jacobin Club to agree upon means of securing public safety. In the June 14, 1793 debate on meetings of the Primary A s semblies, he declared himself against an "excess of democracy" in the form of unlimited hours of meeting for the Assemblies. Such a rule would give schemers an opportunity to prolong the meetings so that the poor would have to leave for work, and the rich could remain behind to conspire against them. When, on June 15 there was discussion as to the direct or indirect election of ministers, Robespierre preferred to have them chosen indirectly. A t the Jacobins on June 14, he declared, " The people is sublime, but individuals are weak. . . ." In political turmoil, in a revolutionary tempest, " there must be a center of operations. The people as a whole cannot govern themselves; this center of operations ought to be in Paris ". Perhaps Robespierre here was lauding the Committee of Public Safety which had come into being in the spring of 1793 to conduct foreign relations, control the armies and, most of all, to arouse the spirit of the French. Robespierre found much to commend in the Committee of Public Safety, convinced that it desired the " safety of the Republic ". I f the Committee's work were to be performed well, it had to be done secretly. Robespierre based his argument for secret proceedings on the grounds that the Committee's rooms were too small to admit a great crowd and that foreign spies would be the chief spectators. 4 During debates at the Jacobins, Robespierre added another contribution to his belief in stronger government, by insisting upon the substitution of the term " French people " because " Republic " characterized the government, while " people " was 4 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, V , 264.

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the real sovereign. He could talk about " people" and the " nation" without making any appreciable distinction. Byeliminating reference to any one specific type of government such as a republic, he could, in the name of the people, substitute any other type that he wished. Robespierre seemed to be satisfied with the democratic constitution of 1793 but he did not believe that it was practicable in the existing state of France. On the very day that it was enacted, he proposed at the Jacobin Club, that discussion on great revolutionary measures be held every day. One of his first acts in this respect was to urge that the manufacture of arms be hastened. This was, however, merely a superficial, though important measure to be taken. Going deeper into revolutionary actions, Robespierre said that " moral reformation " would purify the nation. " Make laws " , he said, " for the benefit of the people, lay the foundations of public education, purify national morality: otherwise, you will only perpetuate the government of ' traitors ' ". This seemed to weigh heavily upon Robespierre's mind. He spoke of it again on July 9, urging that strict measures be taken against officials who raised the standard of revolt. Another sign that Robespierre, in his thought, was tending in the direction of greater authority and discipline was to be found in a catechism discovered among his papers and published by Courtois. 5 In this memorandum, Robespierre inquired as to the most pressing problems and supplied his own answers. What is our aim? [Robespierre asked, and then answered] It is the use of the Constitution for the benefit of the people. Who are likely to oppose us ? The rich and corrupt. What methods will they employ ? Slander and hypocrisy. What factors will encourage the use of such means ? The ignorance of the sans-culottes. The people must, therefore, be instructed. 5 Printed in full in Mathiez, Robespierre terroriste, Paris, 1921, "Le Carnet de Robespierre," pp. 56-78.

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What obstacles are there to its enlightenment? The paid journalists, who mislead it every day by shameless misrepresentations. What conclusion follows? That we ought to proscribe these writers as the most dangerous enemies of the country, and circulate good literature abundantly. The people: what other obstacles is there to its instruction? Its destitution. When, then, will the people be educated? When it has enough bread to eat, and when the rich and the government cease bribing treacherous pens and tongues to deceive it; when their interests are identified with those of the people. When will this be? Never. What other obstacles are there to the achievement of freedom? The war at home and abroad. By what means can the foreign war be ended ? By placing republican generals at the head of our army, and by punishing those who have betrayed us. How can we end the civil war? By punishing traitors and conspirators, especially those deputies and administrators who are to blame; by sending loyal troops under patriot leaders to conquer the aristocrats of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, the Vendee, the Jura and all other districts where the banner of royalism and rebellion has been raised; and by making a terrible example of all the criminals who have outraged liberty and caused the blood of patriots to flow. Robespierre's remedies for the situation, then, were the use of patriots in all government positions and the extermination of all traitors and conspirators. The rich, the corrupt, the journalists, were to be curbed. T o combat their influence, the people was to be educated through the publication of " sound literature ". While this catechism did not necessarily imply that Robespierre was veering towards dictatorship, it did hint that stronger measures should be used to secure patriots in all government positions. Such patriots could be found only in the Jacobin Clubs. T h u s did the one-party-state evolve with Jacobins placed everywhere in all government positions. The

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Nazi, Fascist, and Communist monopoly of office within their states was anticipated only too well by Robespierre. The assassination of Marat gave Robespierre the opportunity he was waiting for. True, Charlotte Corday could hardly be looked upon as a dangerous enemy of the state. But because she was Girondist in sympathy, the assassination could be very conveniently laid at the door of that club. Robespierre by 1793 had evolved a plan for greater centralization of government which ran counter to the federalist desires of many Girondists.

CHAPTER VI CENTRALIZATION versus FEDERALISM ROBESPIERRE and his closest associates, Saint-Just and Couthon, were primarily interested in centralizing the government through the breakdown of opposing parties ; the destruction of local loyalties; and through tightening the bonds between the local Jacobin Clubs and the mother society at Paris. They proposed to do this by establishing a revolutionary dictatorship based upon force. Opposed to this was the idea that France could prosper best under a federalist system with each region enjoying some degree of autonomy while all were loosely held together by the federal government. While Louis X V I reigned, Robespierre was in favor of local autonomy and regionalism. Local Jacobin Clubs also preferred federalism because once having captured the town government, they could rule as they wished under orders from the Club at Paris, without paying particular regard to the monarchy. Once the monarchy had fallen, however, in September, 1792, Robespierre and the Jacobins did not relish the thought of France becoming a number of small states or autonomous cities bound to the central government solely by a slight sacrifice of their sovereignty. Such a system as had grown up had encouraged revolts against the central government in Lyons, Toulon and the Vendée. A f t e r August 10 they toyed with the idea of federalism. They had insisted on the local nature of military units. The Jacobins preferred to have all cities look to Paris for leadership. B y 1793, the Jacobins looked upon the nation as a whole. Some provincial clubs, however, were still bound by the local point of view. Some of the Clubs broke away from the mother society on the issue. 1 1 Dubreuill, " Le Fédéralisme," Annales

révolutionaires,

XI, 323-336.

97

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There were other factors which endangered the centralization of Jacobin power in Paris. From January, 1793 on, the Jacobins had a difficult time keeping their affiliates in line. A number of the clubs disliked the Parisians. Some even disagreed with Robespierre. T h e provincial clubs looked forward to peace after the execution of the King. Instead, the Jacobin-Girondist quarrel filled the air with mutual recriminations. Many provincial clubs believed that this was largely a personal struggle in which they had nothing to gain by participating. The remedy for this situation was another épuration or purge. The Club at Orleans retained only 130 of 800 members. W i t h the purge completed, many affiliated societies took a more active part in the Girondist struggle by bringing pressure against them upon the Convention. 2 Keeping the Jacobin Clubs in line, purging them of the Federalist idea, was but one aspect of the Jacobin task at Paris. T h e other, the struggle against the Girondists, was also waged against federalism, although how greatly inclined the Girondists were toward federalism, it is difficult to say. A t any rate, the Girondists hurled the charge of " dictatorship " against their opponents, while the Jacobins answered with the cry of " federalism ". Robespierre's first speech on September 25 in the Convention was one alleging that the Girondists had " the intention o f turning the French Republic into a congeries of federal republics which would always be at the mercy of civil disorder or foreign attack. Let us declare that the French Republic is a single state under a single system of constitutional laws. Only the certainty of the strongest possible union between all parts of France can enable us to repulse our enemies with energy and success." The great Jacobin fear was that France might, under the pressure of foreign war, split into a number of individual units 2 Dubreuill, L., " L'idée regionaliste sous la révolution," Annales révolutionnaires, 1919 and Wallon, H . , La révolution du 31 mai et le fédéralisme en 17Ç3, Paris, 1869.

CENTRALIZATION

VERSUS

FEDERALISM

ÇÇ

which would engage in civil war. France would then lose all the fruits of the Revolution. The monarchists would again be able to rear their heads and the foreign enemies of France would find no difficulty in conquering France. The Girondists, although probably not any more attached to federalism than Robespierre or the Parisian Jacobins, did try to use some of the anti-Parisian feeling of the provinces as a means of attacking Robespierre. They tried to fill Paris with volunteers, the fédérés, from the provinces. These by November, 1792, numbered 16,000 and went about shouting for " Marat's head and Robespierre's ". Robespierre was calm, however, and those fédérés not sent to the front were won over to the Jacobins. With the fall of the Gironde on June 2 in Paris, its members fled to the departments. There, Robespierre claimed they fostered federalist ideas, encouraging a break from the Parisian government. Whether this was true or not, federalism did seem to be gaining in June, 1793. Lyons, Bordeaux, and Toulon were centers of opposition to the nationalist government. T o the northwest, Paris faced rebellion in Normandy and Brittany ; to the southeast, in the Garonne valley ; to the south, in the regions from Montpellier to Marseilles, and to the east, in the Lyonnais and Franche Comté. Here assuredly were very concrete attacks upon the idea of national unity. Robespierre's part in this drive for a truly national state was no slight one. In his notebook, Robespierre jotted down a suggestion for " the organization of a revolutionary tribunal and all other measures for the punishment and suppression of rebels." 3 Secondly, he desired censorship of the press so that sound literature might educate public opinion. All dishonest journalists would be suppressed. More important, his notebook revealed plans for spreading the news of the true situation to dififerent parts of the Republic through correspondence with local officials, with popular societies, and with the representatives. " What is needed most ", he wrote, " is methodical work based 3 P. 70.

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upon the assumption that there are varying degrees of patriotism in the departments ". His measures were conceived so that all might be raised to the highest degree of patriotism. The greatest of these problems was the immediate repression of the rebels. The first remedy applied by the Convention was the use of armed force. The leading towns in revolt were defeated. Deputies were sent on mission by the Convention to render the departments more amenable to suggestions for unification. Fouche at Lyons and Carrier at Nantes enforced the ideas of national unity with a ferocity found only in extreme patriots. Augustin, Maximilien's younger brother, advised a more conciliatory policy, writing that it was useless and dangerous to punish all the people or to encourage patriots to denounce one another. Maximilien seemed to incline more to the view of his brother. He urged Ysabeau and Tallien to " punish traitors and royalists promptly and severely, especially the chiefs and principal agents of Girondist intrigues. . . . D o not be deluded by the signs of patriotism they a f f e c t " . But the people, " the sans-culottes of Bordeaux have been faithful to the unity of the Republic ", and should be treated leniently. 4 Robespierre did not believe that France demanded the terroristic measures used by Fouche and Carrier. Robespierre confided to his notebook that constant surveillance over the entire country was necessary so that counterrevolution might be stamped out. 5 H e noted as a " Principal measure of Public S a f e t y : f j t will be better to send throughout the Republic a small number of strong commissioners, supplied with sound instructions, and above all, with good principles, to restore public opinion to unity and republicanism. This is the only means of bringing the Revolution to an end in the interests of the people. These commissions will have as their special duty the discovery and inventory of men worthy of serving the cause of liberty." More definitely, he stated that 4 Correspondence, 5 Cornet,

p. 72.

p. 194.

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IOI

he wished 120 commissioners: two for each army and two for each department. " It will be b e s t h e noted, " to put one strong man with another whose patriotism is less certain. They should be renewed or changed quite frequently. There should be general instructions for all and an active correspondence directed on a single plan, but adapted to the needs of different districts." 8 These commissioners would have definite duties in ferreting out conspirators and counter-revolutionaries. They would start at the top with the Revolutionary Committees. " T o purge the Revolutionary Committees ", he wrote in his notebook, " there must be a list of all those who are on such Committees with their names, social position and addresses. . . . W e need data especially on the president and secretaries of each Committee. Secondly, the list of counter-revolutionary leaders in each district must be revised and action taken against them. Thirdly, all deputies who are at the head of conspiracies must be apprehended at any cost, and all such individuals must be promptly punished. Lastly, there must be a list of all suspect prisoners and a decree that those who provide refuge for conspirators or outlaws shall suffer the same penalties as they do." Robespierre's scheme was to have commissioners serve as a unifying force in the nation. The representatives on mission and national agents, but above all, the Jacobins could keep the government informed about each official and every bureau o f the administration. Robespierre regarded these measures as: purely temporary expedients to crush conspirators. Once that was done, the ideal state could be put into operation. Denunciation, a severe penal code, and a Revolutionary Tribunal were the three agencies Robespierre proposed to use in unifying the nation by exterminating conspiracies. O f these, his notebook showed he believed the Revolutionary Tribunal was the most important. But instead of hundreds of such tribunals, as they were first established in 1793, he desired a 6 Ibid., pp. 70, 71.

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centralized one in Paris. The Committee of Public Safety could thus use it as the force behind its orders. In December, 1793, he wrote that the " Revolutionary Tribunal must be supervised and its organization be reformed ". Who were the conspirators whom Robespierre wished to bring before the Revolutionary Tribunal? The Queen might have been one of the chief figures, but Robespierre showed little interest in her trial as an act of national vengeance. He did protest against the extreme charges of Hébert, not from a kindly motive, but because he believed such moves would sway public opinion in her favor. Robespierre's chief attack was directed against the Girondists whom he condemned with the charge of Federalism. The Revolutionary Tribunal was brought more closely under the control of the Committee of Public Safety by dividing the Court into four sections which sat concurrently. Judges and jurors were chosen by the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security. The trial of the leading twentyone Girondists lasted from October 24 to October 30, 1793. Public opinion seemed to favor the accused and the Jacobins felt that the trial should be finished quickly lest a prolonged scene arouse too much sympathy for the Girondists. Osselin, a Jacobin, on October 29, proposed to rid the tribunal of formalities which stifle the conscience and hinder conviction " . He sought a law which " would give the jury the power to state that they had sufficient information " . Robespierre considered this too vague and proposed instead " to decree that after three days discussion the president of the tribunal shall ask the jury if its conscience is sufficiently enlightened. If they answer in the negative, the trial shall go on till they declare that they are in a position to pronounce sentence " . The effect of this suggestion, when enacted as a decree, was to convince the jury that it was ready to pronounce sentence. The twenty-one Girondists were condemned to death, but even more important, this decree of Robespierre resulted not only in the removal of these

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IO3

Girondist enemies f r o m the scene, but also speeded up trials and led to a greater number of convictions. 7 Robespierre wished to hasten the process o f revolutionary justice in yet another way. H e objected in the Convention on October 24 to written warrants f o r the arrest of

suspects.

This was to be done, he said, so that virtuous men might denounce

counter-revolutionaries

without

fear o f

reprisal.

" Humanity " , Robespierre declared, " wishes the people to be saved and the country to triumph, but it also desires that crimes and tyranny be punished without pity. . . . This is not the time to paralyze the national energy. . . .

Be human, then, for

innocence and patriotism, but be unbending to all enemies of la Patrie."

8

T h e number of denunciations which Robespierre personally delivered in the Convention increased. Carra, editor of the Annates

patriotiques,

was denounced f o r intrigues with D u -

mouriez and f o r proposing to offer the throne of Louis X V I to the D u k e of Y o r k . Carra, f o r the good o f France, had to die within a short time. 9 T h e safety of the nation also demanded that Thibault, a representative and " constitutional " bishop, be attacked by Robespierre because he had protested against the arrest of some commissioners. Robespierre accused Thibault of being an agent paid by Pitt to sow royalist propaganda. In Robespierre's eyes, the bishop was the guiding spirit of a plot to divide the whole nation. 10 T h e " F o r e i g n P l o t " , along with the accusation o f " Federalism " , became one of the chief means of removing dissenters f r o m the scene. Another tendency which Robespierre manifested all through

1793 was to

promote

" direct action ". T h i s was the process of bringing culprits to speedy trial without the superfluity of witnesses or evidence; of cutting through parliamentary red tape and the slow action of 7 Mathiez, The French Revolution, New York, 1928, p. 399. 8 Archives

parlementaires,

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 297.

L X X V I I , 493-494.

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local officials by direct, personal control emanating from the Committee of Public Safety and the Revolutionary Tribunal. He personally saw to it that the Revolutionary Tribunal had sufficient work to do. The " widow " of Marat, Simonne Evrard, presented herself before the Convention on August 8. Speaking in a style suspiciously like that of Robespierre, she protested against the use of Marat's journal L'Ami du Peuple by R o u x and Leclerq. She exhorted the legislators to " avenge their country, avenge honesty, misfortune, and virtue by striking the most cowardly of all their enemies." 11 Robespierre followed the speech with a request that, " the Committee of General Security examine the conduct of the two, because the memory of Marat ought to be defended by the Convention and by all patriots ". Within a brief time, R o u x was imprisoned. Nor would Robespierre listen to any proposal to limit the powers of the tribunal. W h e n on August 25, representatives of the Société des femmes républicaines révolutionnaires asked for the release o f a prisoner and the limitation of extraordinary tribunals, Robespierre assured them that the Convention, being composed of true patriots, knew what it was doing. His notebook recorded shortly afterwards, " Dissolution des femmes républicaines révolutionnaires." A group from the Departmental Directory of Seine and l'Oise protested against the punishment of several of its members. Robespierre pointed out that the nation could be saved only through prosecution of conspirators, warning them that the nobles of Bordeaux had spread falsehoods against the unity of the republic. 12 Robespierre was ably assisted by other Jacobins such as Saint-Just, Billaud-Varenne and Danton in constructing the theory and practice of a nationalistic centralized state. A f t e r the Terror, there grew up the belief that Robespierre alone was responsible for the totalitarian state which crushed out all dissent. Actually, it was the work, not of one man, but o f several men, all working in close agreement. 11 Archives

parlementaires,

12 Ibid., L X X , 527, 528.

L X X , 527, 528.

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Saint-Just, Robespierre's closest friend, expounded his ideas about centralization on October 10. H e asked for a new organization of the government to enforce the revolutionary laws. Under this, everyone not openly in favor of the Republic would be punished. " Y o u have to punish, not only traitors, but even the indifferent; you must punish all those who remain passive within the republic and do nothing for it. . . . Those who cannot be governed by justice must be ruled by iron. . ,", 1 3 he exclaimed. H e urged the Convention to declare that the Government was revolutionary until peace was secured. The democratic and liberal constitution of June would be left in the cedar chest which reposed before the Convention and the practice of democracy would be put aside in favor of a dictatorship by a few patriots. The Committee would have control over every division of the government, particularly of the districts which would be the center of the new organization. All resistance would be crushed by the central revolutionary army which would be quartered in detachments on recalcitrant communes at the expense of the rich. There was nothing in this proposal that Robespierre had not already enunciated, either at the Convention, at the Jacobins, or written in his notebook. Billaud-Varenne also voiced ideas which were akin to those of Robespierre on the centralization of the administration. He proposed that all authorities give an account of their acts every ten days and be subject to strict penalties for infractions of duty. Representatives on mission and the Committee of Public Safety could replace all suspected authorities without election. All representatives on mission would be directly responsible to the Committee. Danton further proposed the establishment of national agents appointed by the Committee to replace elected officials. This was enacted into the law of 14 frimaire and became the provisional constitution of the Republic for the duration of the war. It established a dictatorship based upon nationalism in 13 Archives parlementaires, X L , 426.

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complete abrogation of the principles of Robespierre's ideal state and the Constitution of June, 1793. The law of 14 frimaire was, however, the logical consequence of Robespierre's belief in a powerful contralized government ruled by chosen patriots to save the nation. The new government, or rather the legitimization of the dictatorial one existing, was to be a nationalistic one. Such a government was legitimate, because it was based " upon the most sacred of all laws, public safety; upon the most irrefragable of all titles, necessity ". Both public safety and necessity demanded that everyone be nationalistic. " Pure and disinterested patriotism must be employed," ran instructions of the Committee to the popular societies.14 " Patriotism must be a marked characteristic of everyone. Republican spirit and a very pronounced love of France are the first conditions for the employment or designation of citizens for public functions of all kinds. Keep from your lists all those men who are cold, egotistical or indifferent to the Republican revolution. The law of Athens would have stricken them with death. National opinion will strike them among us with political death. . . . The Republic, one and indivisible, can best be served, defended, and administered by those who love it with as much warmth as constancy. ... La Patrie interrogates you; let truth answer." The letter then listed the data to be secured about those who " are destined to form the hope of France " : " First name, proper name, age, place of residence, situation before the Revolution, situation since the Revolution, civic actions, moral character, physical character, works by him, functions he can perform, observations." Robespierre's nationalistic ideas were further carried out by instructions of the Committee of Public Safety to representatives on mission.15 " Y o u have been sent ", they read, " to spread liberty, to open a way for the Revolution which finds obstacles 14 Comité de salut public, VIII, 392-39415 Comité de salut publie, IX, 161-163.

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IO7

in the remains of monarchy and the debris of federalism. . . . The Convention charges you with the completion of the purification and the reorganization of constituted authorities." They were to correspond with the Committee every ten days. Speed was the prime requisite. They concluded with the exhortation : " W o r k e r s of the Republic, let us each do our share of the work entrusted to us. If we wish to finish our task, do not let one obstruct the labors of another." 16 The Committee's instructions sent out to the Revolutionary Committees indicated certain nationalistic tendencies. Just who was responsible f o r the original d r a f t i n g of these instructions is unknown because the Committee of Public Safety met in secret and Robespierre left no specific documents to prove he wrote them. But all these instructions were signed by Robespierre and reflected his previous utterances on the subject. The instructions b e g a n : Sentinels of liberty, la Patrie gives you new weapons against its enemies. The law of frimaire assures you of the execution of the revolutionary laws and indicates their spirit. The French people is going to assume the attitude of Hercules. It awaits that robust government which will strengthen every part of it, which distributing revolutionary life in its veins, will awaken its energy and its force. Following the new organization decreed by the National Convention, all authorities become revolutionary armies, whose position is different but who, moving in a given direction, act with energy against all conspirators and offer an unbroken front to them. The instructions then indicate t h a t supreme power was vested in a series of Committees with the Committee of Public Safety at the top, but with the real execution of revolutionary laws in the hands of the local committees. " Approach this terrible duty as one sanctified, with an honest heart and pure hands ", the instructions advised. " Execute national vengeance with dignity but do not use it to satisfy personal hates. Be so great that not 16 Ibid., IX, pp. 162, 163.

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even the eyes of your enemies can discover a single stain. Let the monsters, seeing you, be struck, both by terror and respect." Their particular duty was to report to the Committee of General Security every ten days on the execution of the laws in their district. The Presidents and Secretaries of the revolutionary committees were to be renewed every fifty days and could only be re-elected after an intervening month. Any union of these committees was strictly forbidden : " that was the defect which federalism used to betray patriots." "The body politic", it went on to explain, " like the human body, becomes a monster if it has several heads. The sole power which should regulate all is the Convention ". It concluded that " The revolutionary order which releases the storm of terror upon hydra-headed conspirators, ought to bring virtue, and consequently yourselves in port, while the storm rages over guilty heads and crushes them." 17 The same nationalistic spirit which permeated the Committee's instructions to representatives on mission and to Revolutionary Committees ran through the instructions of the Committee to the Departments. It urged them to make a useful sacrifice for the public good and for themselves by rejecting all those who would work for the detriment of the nation : " You honor yourselves in giving to our country. . . . Men are nothing, France is everything : it commands, you must obey." The instructions exhorted, " Freemen, if the Republic has your affections, if you bear it in your heart, this day will be the most beautiful of your whole life, when you raise public interests above the ruins of your own interests and weaknesses. . . ." What were the national duties of the departments ? To " recall the debt of the citzens to the State; strengthen the national bonds ; watch over every means of betterment ; trace new routes for commerce; give it a national character by impressing grandeur upon it and taking out the mercantile fangs . . . ; fertilize the soil ; increase its products ; . . . add to the gifts of 17 Comité de salut public, I X , 168.

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IOÇ

nature by the benefits of industry; double this last and thus increase the sum total of happiness . . . ; be in a word, makers of public prosperity. Such is the imposing summary of your duties." The districts were bound similarly to the Committee at Paris by the substitution of national agents for district officials. 18 Each district was to submit a list of good patriots and those suspected: " Y o u are the sentinels of the Revolution; the government sees through your eyes ; you are charged with the instruction of its religion. . . . This thought must occupy all : la Patrie not only has her affections, but also, her rewards. . . ." Instructions to the Communes stated that the nation had declared war against conspirators and all the enemies of the people with revolutionary laws. The Communes were to exercise " national vengeance " in enforcing these laws. Similar instructions to the Military and Revolutionary Tribunals emphasized that " republics were founded on virtue and the repression of crime. T h e sword of the law entrusted to you should not remain idle " , the Committee warned. L a w s had been laxly kept before, but if their duties were strictly enforced, judges and jurors could allow that " sublime perspective to fill them with holy ardor ". They would then have deserved well of France. 19 A s spokesman of the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre elaborated the principles behind the revolutionary government on December 25, 1793. 20 In this speech, he said that there was no paradox between his desire for an ideal state, and the establishment of a revolutionary regime. H e remarked that the foreign enemy could be easily conquered, but the crushing of internal intrigues and the triumph of the principles which would bring about public prosperity were more important and more difficult problems to solve. 1 8 Comité de salut public, I X , 1 7 3 , 1 9 Comité de salut public, I X ,

174.

184.

2 0 Rapport sur les principes du gouvernement révolutionnaire fait au nom du comité de salut public par Maximilien

Robespierre,

Paris, 1793.

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Robespierre justified the centralization of government on the grounds that the nation needed a strongly organized rule in times of emergency. He did not propose to " keep the constitutional ship in the dock forever ", but he was afraid to send it forth on such a stormy sea. The dictatorial power vested in such agencies as the Committee of Public Safety, the Revolutionary Tribunal, and enforced by the representatives on missions and the local Jacobin Clubs was to be but a temporary affair.

CHAPTER NATIONALIST

VII

SPELLBINDING

ROBESPIERRE became adept at a species of nationalistic spellbinding which every dictator must use in order to secure and maintain power. He must have, not only an ideology, but a personal appeal as well. Robespierre's was emotional rather than physical. His appearance of intense sincerity; his reputation as the " Incorruptible " swayed those who listened to him, just as Mussolini and Hitler by physical force and emotional appeal move their audiences. A l l haye one common trait: the use of nationalistic spellbinding, sometimes pure rhetoric, but always using patriotic slogans and watchwords. Robespierre used such propaganda to justify a highly centralized state functioning through spies and the activities 'of a revolutionary tribunal. The dominant theme of Jacobin propaganda was expressed in the one sentence, " France demands it " . No other explanation was needed for Jacobin patriots. A n y of Robespierre's speeches would serve as an illustration of this. His Rapport sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la convention nationale dans l'administration intérieure de la république delivered to the Convention on February 5, 1794 was but one example of his powers of rationalization and oratory. He began by saying that the country finally had a fixed policy. A s for motives, he declared, " W e have been guided in stormy times by the love of good and the needs of the nation rather than by any exact theory or precise rules of conduct. . . ." Robespierre stated here the way in which any dictator excuses use of harsh or dictatorial methods. He also held out to them the immediate reward that every dictator offers, prestige. " The French nation and its representatives must be respected in every country of the universe . . .", he proclaimed. H e promised, too, the eventual return of liberty and equality. But most of all, Robespierre promised the people a nation which would assure the well-being of every111

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one and where each individual would enjoy prosperity. Here, he came closest in his appeals to a modern dictator in promising a material heaven to every patriot who supported him. H e even threw out a hint about a state where, " Commerce is not the monstrous source of opulence for a few families, but the basis of public wealth for all". Once started on this series of promises, there was no stopping Robespierre. One cannot escape the conclusion that in describing the ideal national state, Robespierre sometimes let his tongue move faster than his brain. His descriptions ran as follows: We wish to substitute morals for egotism, honesty for love of honor, principles for conventions, duties for good wishes, the rule of reason for the tyranny of fashion, the hatred of vice for the scorn of unhappiness, pride for insolence, grandeur of the soul for vanity, love of glory for love of gold, good people for " good company," the charm of happiness for the boredom of luxury, the grandeur of man for the pettitness of the great, a magnanimous, powerful, happy, people for a lovable, frivolous and miserable one; that is, we must substitute all the virtues and miracles of the republic for all the vices and ridiculousness of a monarchy. . . . Let France . . . eclipse the glory of all free peoples; let it become the model of nations; the terror of oppressors; the consolation of the oppressed; the ornament of the universe. . . . That is our ambition, our end. His advice about the way to accomplish all this was simple: " everything which arouses love of country, which purifies customs, which elevates souls and directs the passions of the human heart toward public interest ought to be encouraged ". At other times, Robespierre appealed to the Frenchman's love of his land. His panegyrics of praise of the glories and beauty of France could hardly be surpassed by any contemporary politician. He appealed to the emotions of his audience. Robespierre even glossed over the Terror with explanations of its patriotic aspect. First of all, he denied that any tyranny existed in France. Tyranny, he said, did not live in a nation governed by patriotic or virtuous officials. A patriot,

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Robespierre always insisted, could do no wrong. But in times of stress, he declared that the first principle to be followed was: rule of the people by reason, and rule of enemies of the people by terror. Going on to explain what he meant by this, Robespierre said, " The mainspring of popular government in revolution is patriotism and terror; patriotism without terror is in danger of death ". He was especially specific in defining terror as, " prompt, severe, inflexible justice, an emanation of virtue; it is less of a particular principle than it is a consequence of a general principle applied to the most pressing needs of the country ". Terror, said, Robespierre, was not a mainspring of despotic government. "Does your government resemble despotism?" he asked. Robespierre answered for his own satisfaction. " Yes, just as the sword which shines in the hands of heroes of liberty resembles the arms of the tyrant's satellites so . . . the government of the Revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny." Just what this meant in actuality, it is difficult to say. Tyranny, whether the tyranny of liberty or of despotism, actually amounted to the same thing. Only the subtle mind of a dictator such as Robespierre could detect the difference. That such a difference did exist in his mind can be discovered in his words: " Let tyranny reign one day and not one patriot will be left the next day ". Everything, apparently, depended upon who exercised the tyranny. His interpretation of " Justice " was a case in point. As Robespierre explained, the fury of despots could never be called Justice; the Justice of the people could never be styled barbarism or rebellion. Whoever did not hate crime could not love virtue. Robespierre maintained that this tyranny of liberty was the epitome of justice and humanity. He said, " We must have grace for the innocent, mercy for the weak, for the unfortunate, and for humanity, but mercy for rascals [royalists], never!" The people of the ; country were divided into two classes, said Robespierre. On one ¡side, there were the peaceable people, good patriots. They were [citizens of the republic. On the other side, there were royalists

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and conspirators, but these were enemies, not citizens of France. And those who attempted to interpose their " parricidal mercy between these rascals and the avenging sword of national justice " resembled them. Were they excited about thousands of heroes, the élite of the nation who died for France? No, their pity was only for the widow of a general who betrayed the nation thrice. He explained that they could listen calmly to the tale of horrors committed by tyrants against the defenders of liberty; to stories " o f our women horribly mutilated; of our children murdered at the breasts of their mothers; of prisoners expiating their touching and sublime heroism by horrible torments. They call the tardy punishment of several monsters steeped in the purest blood of our country horrible butchery." Robespierre thought that France had had enough of such misplaced sympathy. Such feeling for the enemies of the country became decidedly unhealthy. If he had little sympathy for those who advocated moderation, Robespierre had even less for those ultra-terrorists who would use the Terror for their own ends. " Punish the rascal who dares to abuse the sacred name of liberty . . . by bringing grief or death to the patriot hearts," he exclaimed. He did not doubt that this abuse had existed but there was little doubt in Robespierre's mind but that it had been exaggerated by the aristocrats. If one virtuous man in the whole republic was persecuted by the enemies of liberty, the government's duty was to find him and avenge the wrong promptly and forcefully. But should severity be abolished because counter-revolutionaries wronged patriots ? Robespierre thought that it demonstrated its necessity. In other words, he declared, the internal and external situation of France was such that the Terror had to be continued. The operations of the government were hindered, foreign spies infested France, and two kinds of internal enemies menaced the nation. Of the latter, he said, " They march by different roads and under flags of other colors, but they march to the same

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destination: the disorganization of popular government, the ruin of the Convention; and the triumph of tyranny. One of these factions urges us to weakness, the other to excess. One would turn Liberty into a Bacchante, the other into a prostitute." The followers of these parties were sometimes good but misguided citizens, but the leaders belonged to the cause of aristocracy, always a foe of patriots. One of these parties was the moderates; the other the ultra revolutionaries, but both were united against the " sacred principles of the revolution." They were the enemies of the nation and could be known by their characteristics. First of all, they were hypocrites. They were moderates or furious patriots according to circumstances. What they would be was decided the day before by Prussian, English, Austrian, even Russian Committees. H e related that: they oppose energetic measures and exaggerate when they cannot prevent them. Severe to innocence, they treat criminals indulgently. They accuse the guilty who are too poor to buy their silence or are not important enough to deserve their zeal but they always take care not to defend slandered virtue. They sometimes unearth plots already discovered, tear the mask from traitors, unmasked or even beheaded but they hide living and accredited traitors. Always ready to favor the opinion of the moment, they are less careful in enlightening it. . . . Constantly prepared to> adopt strong measures, provided they are inconvenient, they disparage those which have only advantages or else add amendments to render them useless. . . . Full of fire for great resolutions which signify nothing, they are more than indifferent to those which will honor the cause of the people and save our country. They use the form of patriotism much, but would rather wear red bonnets than perform a good deed. Robespierre, as a good patriot, hated the foreign enemies outside France less than the enemies within France who assumed the guise of patriotism. The worst enemy of France, to him, was the false patriot: the aristocrat " who founds popular

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societies, the fanatic who attacks religion, the royalist who cheers republican victories, the noble who professes a love of equality, and the tyrant who scatters flowers on the tomb of defenders of victory." The greatest crime was this mockery of patriotism. The prime use of Terror should be to exterminate such hypocrites. The problem was, however, how to distinguish these false patriots from the true. Simply, Robespierre answered, by their contrary attitude when the safety of the nation was at stake: Ask them to act: they talk. Ask them to deliberate: they are all for instant action. The country is at peace: they oppose every change. It is at war: they desire to reform everything. You propose measures against sedition: they remind you of Caesar's clemency. You propose to rescue patriots from persecution: they urge the severity of Brutus. The country needs peace: they display the spoils of victory. It requires war: they praise the pleasures of peace. Do we have to defend our territories: they wish to chastise tyrants beyond land and sea. Do fortresses have to be retaken: they wish to assault churches and pull down the heavens. Do we need to strengthen our cause by the faithfulness of allies: they declaim against all the governments in the world and propose to accuse the Great Mogul himself. Does the people go to the Capitol to give thanks to gods for its victories: they chant lugubriously about our past reverses. Do we need new victories: they sow hatred, divisions, persecution and discouragement among us. Must we realize the sovereignty of the people and concentrate its force by a firm and respected government: they find that the principles of government injure the sovereignty of the people. Do the rights of the people oppressed by government have to be restored: they speak only of the respect for law and obedience due constituted authorities. They have found an admirable expedient to second the efforts of republican government: disorganize, degrade completely, make war on patriots who helped to win our success. Do you seek means of feeding your armies: they are full of greed . . . : they shudder patriotically over public misery and announce the famine. The desire to prevent evil is always the motive for them to increase it.

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" Such a situation ", he concluded, " ought to be worthy of your attention, especially if you reflect that you have to combat the tyrants of Europe at the same time; that you must keep 120,000 men under arms; and that the government must continually repair all the evils which the innumerable multitude of our enemies wrought during the course of five years." The important question w a s : what was the remedy for all these evils? " W e know of none o t h e r " , Robespierre replied, " than the development of that general source of energy in the republic, virtue." Indication of an abuse was enough to destroy it. Virtue would rally all good citizens, would take hope from conspirators, assure the progress of France, confound the intrigues and slanders of kings, and honor the cause and character of the French in the eyes of all peoples. " Give ", he exhorted, " the representatives of the French people this new token of your zeal to protect patriotism by your inflexible justice for the guilty and by your devotion to the cause of the people. Proclaim within and without the Republic the principles of political morality which we have developed. . . ." Nationalism was part of the T e r r o r ; its success would be assured if a greater degree of nationalism were developed. Then, the principle of political morality, nationalism, could be spread abroad. Such was the gist of Robespierre's advice. This type of nationalist spellbinding has been quoted at length to show the arguments Robespierre used to advance the Terror. A l l of them were based more on emotion than upon reason; all denied any desire for personal power; all concealed the construction of a bureaucratic state which might become dangerous to liberty and democracy. Yet, in founding a " tyranny of patriotism and liberty ", Robespierre offered no sounder explanation than that to be found in this patriotic rhetoric. It was a tribute to his powers of spellbinding and to the efficient organization of the Jacobin party that it was applauded and supported throughout France.

CHAPTER VIII T H E DICTATOR'S TOOLS nationalist dictator uses certain tools to retain himself and his associates in power. Censorship, suspicion, fear, hatred, and dislike of criticism, these are the dictator's stock in trade. They have a remarkable effect in welding a nation together during an emergency. They almost appear to be inevitable concomitants of life under a nationalist dictatorship, either in Robespierre's day or in the contemporary world. Robespierre, in common with all dictators who derive their power from the people, was somewhat loath to let the public speak freely on political matters. Throughout the early years of the Revolution, he spoke long and loudly in defense of freedom of the press. This essential liberty, it developed, was to be preserved only so long as it protected Robespierre. During the days of the Legislative Assembly when Robespierre had little political power and when other political factions were as strong as the Jacobins, he pleaded for the right to put his criticism of the government into print. But when Robespierre felt that the Jacobins had secured sufficient control of the government, he •denied the same right to his political opponents on the grounds that they were publishing libel and slander, and were openly -working against the welfare of the nation. When Garat, a friend of Robespierre, told him that the 'Girondist newspapers of the departments had asserted that Robespierre and his friends were dictators, Robespierre rushed to the tribune of the Jacobins where he had plead so eloquently for free speech and a free press. He denounced " this faction of slandering journalists " who endangered every virtuous man. Urging the Jacobins to " unveil this conspiracy", he also begged the Committee of Public Safety to take severe measures against the " infidel journalists ", the most dangerous enemies of France. All journalists regarded this as an indication of future repression. Grandville, the editor of the Parliamentary 118 EVERY

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Reports in Le Moniteur wrote to Robespierre stating that he thought his paper was in danger. 1 Grandville hastened to say that he had always taken the Jacobin part. A s an example, he cited the fact that he had printed Louvet's attack upon Robespierre only in part, while Robespierre's answer was printed in full. Robespierre was not seeking such an innocuous person as Grandville. H e was out for bigger game in the form of his political opponents. O n March 10, 1793, he proposed a decree which would make it easier for him to attack those who criticized his policy in print. H e proposed that " the Revolutionary Tribunal be charged with the prosecution of writers who attack the principles of liberty; who arouse the people over the death of a tyrant . . . [and] those who wish to cause civil war by designating Paris as ' suspect' to the departments ". This proscription of journalists was widened by a law of suspects passed on September 17, 1793. This defined suspects as: those who by their conduct or their writings had shown themselves to be friends of tyranny, of federalism, or who were enemies of liberty. Under the terms of this law, any writer could be hailed before the Revolutionary Tribunal and be condemned to death, if Robespierre or any other Jacobin disliked his attitude. These acts were enforced as political measures. Camille Desmoulins finally fell as a result of articles printed in his newspapers. The Jacobin Clubs acted as " eyes " throughout France as the multitude of denunciations of journalists which Robespierre read amply showed. This censorship was extended, not only over the press, but over the stage as well. Only plays agreeable to the Jacobins were permitted. Free speech became a thing of the past. Every Frenchman had to think along the lines of Jacobin thought or the faintest words of discontent found their way to the Committees of General Security or of Public Safety. Censorship laid its leaden hand upon all France so completely that, for a brief period of time, the Jacobins exercised complete 1 Correspondance,

p. 175.

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control of the press, of speech, and of the right of assembly. Criticism of the government practically ceased. Robespierre and the Jacobins through the exercise of censorship succeeded in setting an example of dictatorial control which Napoleon was to follow later and which contemporary dictators imitate. Robespierre was not slow to discover that censorship is necessary in a dictatorship because the dictator must be infallible. There must be one will: the general will which coincides with his own. Many wills lead to confusion and criticism : a dangerous thing when the basis of power is infallibility. Robespierre's use of censorship was but one aspect of his growing distrust of his fellow-men. He had started out with a belief in mankind. He ended with a profound distrust of nearly everyone except Saint-Just and Couthon. Suspicion, hatred, and Jacobin nationalism went together. The discovery of plots, either genuine or fictitious, became a burning preoccupation with him. Robespierre showed an unmistakable dislike of any criticism of the governmental policy of weeding out conspirators. Julien de Toulouse reported against the policy of the government in the south. In a speech " burning with energy and patriotism ", Robespierre declared that the report was counter-revolutionary. He declared that the taking of Lyons only half fulfilled the hopes of patriots. There were so many rascals left unpunished; so many traitors who had escaped from the national vengeance ; so many innocent persons felled by their blows. " No ", he exclaimed, " their memory must be avenged. Either these monsters must be unmasked and exterminated or I must perish." 2 This feeling that centralization had to go on or he would " perish " was always with Robespierre. This attitude of suspicion was directed against conspirators, foreigners, and officials of the government. Among the more notable foreigners under suspicion was Thomas Payne. In Robespierre's notebook was the note, " Demand that Thomas 2 Aulard, La société

des Jacobins,

V , 458.

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Payne be accused for the interest of America as well as France ". 3 Barère followed this with a decree aimed at Payne, forbidding any foreigner to represent the French people. The purification was also extended to the clubs which drew up lists of good patriots and bad Frenchmen. In like manner, Robespierre warned patriots to watch over meetings of the Sections, and " to concentrate most severe attention upon those who compose them ".* The Section of the Invalides, he pointed out, admitted men who were known as aristocrats. He demanded that " each Popular Society purify itself with the greatest care, and that the Jacobins accord their affiliation or correspond only with those who have submitted to rigorous proof." 5 Robespierre's ideas about crushing conspirators were writ large upon the statute books. The Law of Suspects passed on September 17, 1793, declared that all " suspected " persons were to be arrested. It then went on to define specifically those who were suspects : first, those who, by their conduct or by their writings, had shown themselves to be friends of tyranny, of federalism and enemies of liberty; second, those who were unable to justify their means of existence and unable to perform their civic duties ; third, those who had been refused certificates of good citizenship, who did not possess the official cards issued to patriots; fourth, all public officials suspended or removed from their functions by the National Convention or its commissioners, and not reinstated ; fifth, those former nobles, husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, sons or daughters, brothers or sisters, or agents of the émigrés who had not manifested their devotion to the Revolution; sixth, those who emigrated from July 1, 1789 to April 8, 1792 whether they had returned to France in accordance with a law of the latter date or earlier. Revolutionary committees were established along the lines indicated by Robespierre. Each local Committee drew up a list 3 Carnet,

p. 65.

4 A u l a r d , La société 5 Ibid.,

V , 504.

des Jacobins,

V , 504.

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of suspects, and issued warrants for arrests. A national list of suspects was then compiled by the Committee of General Security which could proceed against the life of persons named on the list at any time. Perhaps the greatest share of the work done in bringing the country to view problems as Robespierre and the Jacobins saw them was done not by the regularly constituted organs of government, but by the Jacobin Clubs in the departments. These were not all originally of the Parisian Jacobin point of view, but national agents on mission, through a process of " regeneration " had made most of them so by August, 1793. These national agents were in many cases aided by secret agents of the Ministry of Interior who did their best to ferret out points of view not corresponding to those of the Jacobins at Paris. The Jacobins in the provinces became truly worthy of their insignia which was an ever watchful eye. They became even more suspicious of each other. Robespierre and his cohorts employed the usual methods of dictatorship in unifying France through fear, suspicion, hatred, and force. The continual process of ferreting out conspiracy engendered these feelings to such an extent that one by one the associates of Robespierre were swallowed up by the monster which the Jacobins had created. Finally, even Robespierre discovered that he had created a monster in the agencies of the Terror. Denunciation, a severe penal code, and a centralized Revolutionary Tribunal geared at a high speed with no provision for witness or defense were the Jacobin means of exterminating conspiracies. Fear played the greatest part in the whole process. Marat in his L'Ami du Peuple, sneered at " the alarms of a deputy [Robespierre] whose fears drive him into a frenzy of patriotism ". Robespierre's fears led him to invent new means of attacking those whom he called traitors. A civil tribunal was instituted to try crimes of lese-nation and Robespierre demanded that it try cases of generals who were suspected of not doing their utmost for France. When proof of Dumouriez's treason was

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"found in March, 1793, the popular reaction against it was enough to force the enactment into law of Robespierre's proposals. The number of enemies of the people constantly increased. Anyone found wearing a royalist cockade or engaging in counter-revolutionary activity was outlawed. Emigration was to be punished by death. Every commune was to have its Vigilance Committee disarm all suspects. Émigrés were banished forever and all civil and property rights taken from them. Besides fear, Robespierre believed that hatred was a most "valued asset of the patriot. He was thus wholly in accord with the spirit of dictatorship which always requires an enemy either genuine or manufactured. 6 Hatred was to play an important part in Robespierre's terroristic regime. Patriots were to resume " with all their energy that immortal and vigorous hatred which they showed for the name of Kings ". They should manifest a " holy antipathy " for royalists by banishing all relatives of the Capets from France. Marie Antoinette became the focal point of Robespierre's hatred for a time. He had her hailed before the Revolutionary Tribunal for her attacks " upon the liberty and safety of the state ". Robespierre was also influential in keeping the Dauphin imprisoned as a dangerous enemy of the state. It is rather interesting to note that while Robespierre was denouncing enemies of the people and of liberty, the Jacobin party was perfecting its organization and machinery to crush " internal dissenters ". The great outcry against " aristocrats " and " foreign spies " served a double purpose. It diverted attention from the growing strength of the Jacobin party and gave it a convenient excuse for the removal of all who disagreed in the slightest with its constantly changing idea of government. Robespierre never tired of urging faithful departments to fall upon " gangrenous " or " corrupted " departments. He continually called upon the nation to " arise and exterminate its enemies, respecting only the national representatives ". Later, Robespierre withdrew even the latter qualification. & Archives

parlementaires,

LX, 606.

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Suspicion, fear, hatred, all played a prominent part in Robespierre's attack upon the Girondists. Prevarication could also join the list because in assailing the Girondists, Robespierre had little actual proof of any crimes they had committed. His charges were based almost entirely upon innuendo and rumor. W h e n General Dumouriez was formally accused of treason, Robespierre hastened to conclude that Roland and other Girondist leaders were implicated. H e presented nothing to prove this but substituted vague statements about " patriots with knives [presumably Girondists'] placed at their hearts " and the " imperturbable resolution to prefer death to slavery ". In the Convention, he asserted, but did not prove, that Brissot had a definite connection with Dumouriez and demanded a decree of accusation. H e also hinted that the Committee of Public Safety was composed of " disguised royalists, aristocrats and enemies of freedom " J Another typical accusation which he hurled at the Girondists was the "international plot t h e o r y " . O n April 10, 1793, he scented a Girondist attempt to impose a king and an aristocratic constitution upon France through foreign warfare and internal dissension. His oratory upon this occasion is but one of many samples of Robespierre's high-sounding condemnation. Speaking of the international plot, he said, " I t ' s soul is P i t t ; its body is the bourgeoisie who fear for their property and the nobles who hope to recover their privileges ". 8 This " foreign plot " accusation was hurled against the Dantonists and Hebertists as well. Robespierre continued to denounce the Girondists who, early in 1793, retained a majority in the Convention. Many of them were his former friends and associates. Petion, who had written to Robespierre, " Nothing can ever part us " , found himself now called a " w r e t c h " and a " t r a i t o r " . Harsh-sounding names almost invariably accompanied Robespierre's accusations. 7 T h i s was the first Committee of Public S a f e t y set up on March 25, 1793, ajid replaced on April 6 by a more permanent Committee of the same name. 8 Archives

farlementaires,

L X I , 522 ff.

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Often they were his substitute for definite proof. Under such a system, invective rather than proof became customary court procedure. Robespierre's denunciation of " corrupting" influences was never-ending. Sometimes, his opponents would turn the tables and accuse Robespierre or his associates in the same terms. The Girondists, for example, issued a warrant for the arrest of Marat on the grounds that he was responsible for " pillage, murder, and attempts to dissolve the Convention " . This gave Robespierre an opportunity to indulge in some histrionic pleading that the Girondists were conspirators obviously trying to pillory him. He admitted that such a friend as Marat might commit an error, but a crime, never! How odd that Robespierre never granted his opponents the likelihood of honest error. Robespierre did not hesitate to appeal to mob action. When Marat was to be tried before a judge and jury entirely composed of Jacobins, the members of the Party marched through the streets proclaiming the patriotism of Marat. Little wonder that the judge and jury acquitted Marat to the great applause of the " people " . This desire to be dramatic sometimes verged upon the ridiculous. Ordinarily, Robespierre would have loudly condemned anyone such as Lazowski, a rich Pole, who had become a Jacobin, but when Lazowski was assassinated after having been criticized by the Girondist, Vergniaud, Robespierre hailed the Pole as a " Hero of Liberty and the Republic " . " Weep for your brother he told those assembled at the Jacobins, and added, " Avenge him " . This was greeted with great applause. The funeral of Lazowsky became the occasion for another great spectacle. The artist David designed costumes for it; the composer Gossec wrote patriotic music, and patriotic eulogies were in order. Robespierre's terroristic activities were often questionable. Whenever the Girondists tried to use occasions for a dramatic show as Robespierre did, he distorted their opposition. Many Girondists on May i , 1793, claimed that the Communes had

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discriminated against them in the military draft. They marched through the streets shouting, Vive la loi and A has la Montagne. This sounded to Robespierre like, Vive le roi and A bas les Jacobins et la commune de Paris. H e pictured this as a " very alarming revolt which had been stifled at birth ". Having stirred the people to the desired pitch, Robespierre was accustomed to withdraw for a while. In May, 1793, the sections of Paris formed an insurrectional committee to plan a. rising similar to that of August 10. Delegates from the Jacobin Clubs took possession of the T o w n Hall on May 31, while other deputations presented demands to the Convention. In words almost identical with those of Robespierre, they demanded, " justice for patriots " by calls for impeachment of Ministers, removal of nobles from command of the a r m y ; the dismissal of aristocrats from government offices; the arrest of suspects; and the disenfranchisement of all but the people. Included were a number of measures designed to ally the government more closely with the material welfare of the people. These provided for a subsidy based on taxes to reduce the price of bread; the manufacture of arms for the sans-culottes; financial relief for the aged and infirm, and for the families of soldiers at the front. Robespierre emerged when the shouting was over to demand the abolition of the Committee of Twelve which was Girondist and to assert smugly that " Perhaps this will be the last day on which patriotism must fight tyranny ". The process of removing his Girondist enemies was relatively simple. Robespierre harbored grudges and retained memories of slights in his mind longer than any other revolutionary figure. He piled up accusation after accusation until the opportunity came to pour them forth. W h e n the Girondist, Vergniaud, as an example, interrupted one of Robespierre's harangues with the statement, " Be finished", Robespierre turned upon him and shouted, " Yes, I will finish, and with you. Y o u , who, after the revolution of August 10 tried to secure the death of its organizers; you who worked constantly for the

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destruction of Paris; you who wished to spare the tyrant; you who plotted with Dumouriez, and obstinately persecuted those patriots whose lives he was seeking; you, whose criminal reprisals have provoked among your victims, the indignant protests you would label as a crime." From denunciation of individual members to declamations against the whole Girondist party, was an easy step. The Insurrectionary Committee arrested Madame Roland. The Jacobin, Hanriot, leader of the National Guard, aided by 80,000 Jacobin patriots proceeded to shut up the Convention in its hall, and the arrest of twenty-seven Girondist leaders followed. Certain conclusions can be reached as to the motives behind Robespierre's terroristic moves against the Girondists. Although he attacked them from September, 1792, until May 30, 1793, with the solemn declaration that the safety of France was at stake, he never made clear just how the Girondists endangered the state. He offered no proof that they were aristocrats, royalists, or spies in the pay of Pitt. His assertion that the Jacobins had a monopoly of patriotism was hardly true. The Girondists were equally fond of their country. There was little economic reason for the struggle. True, the Girondists did believe in the physiocratic doctrine of laisses faire, while Robespierre gradually evolved the idea of state economic control to meet the emergency. Yet, was not this desire for economic dominance another aspect of Robespierre's eagerness to have the Jacobins control all? An analysis of the causes of the rivalry hardly shows it to be a " class " struggle. Both Jacobins and Girondists drew their support from the middle class. The Girondists, it is true, were slower than the Jacobins in offering an economic program which claimed it could feed the poor and save the nation. But when the Jacobins did secure power, they showed as little ability as the Girondists in dealing with the food problem. A superficial observer might remark that the struggle was one of idealist versus realist. But who could have been more of an idealist, in certain respects, and more of a realist in others, than Robespierre? Was it a

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struggle between democracy and dictatorship ? Robespierre constantly said it was, yet he himself was never certain where his sympathies lay. On the surface, Girondist versus Jacobin might have been a fight between Jacobin Paris and Girondist provinces. The fact that Robespierre drew much of his support from the Parisians made him believe more firmly in their patriotism, but there was no hard and fast dividing line between the two. Fundamentally, the clash took place because it was one between a type of humanitarian nationalism exemplified by the Girondists, and a new, extreme kind of nationalism: that of the Jacobins. The Jacobin nationalists pursued policies that were Machiavellian. The Girondists used milder methods or, perhaps, were not as effective as Robespierre and his friends in their use of the agencies of machtpolitik. The Jacobins' use of fear, censorship, suspicion, hatred, and prevarication could hardly be excelled in the contemporary world. Interesting enough, while Robespierre used these methods based upon trumped-up charges and innuendo, emotional appeals and hysteria, he remained as calm as ever in his highly ethical statements about his " principles ".

CHAPTER IX THE JACOBIN BLOOD PURGE THE terms suspicion, fear, hzttred, deceit, could be applied to a description of the Jacobin attack upon the Girondists. T o these were added personal jealousy when the assault upon the Dantonists took place. Nothing illustrated more clearly the fanatical nature of Jacobin nationalism than the assault upon Camille Desmoulins and Danton. The charges made against the Hébertists could be understood when their attitude towards Christianity was taken into consideration, although many Jacobins espoused religious ideas similar to those of Hébert. The Robespierrists linked the Hébertists and the Dantonists as one group conspiring with Pitt against France. This was the usual accusation of " foreign plot " which was hurled against practically all accused. There was no fundamental reason why Robespierre should have demanded the execution of the Dantonists. They were as patriotic as he. A m o n g the first to advocate a strong government and the inauguration of the Terror, they were popular with the sans-culottes. Many of the bourgeoisie had accepted the Dantonists. It was not Danton's patriotism or lack of it which irritated Robespierre. It was his personality and character. 1 Robespierre's charges against the Dantonists throw some light upon contemporary blood purges in Germany and the Soviet Union. F o r the most part, the charges against the offending faction are 1 On this point see Mathiez, Études Robespierristes, I, La Corruption parlementaire sous la terreur, Paris, 1917; II, La Conspiration de l'étranger, Paris, 1918; Robespierre terroriste, Paris, 1921 ; Danton et la paix, Paris, 1919; L'Affaire de la Compagnie des Indes, Paris, 1920; Autour de Danton, Paris, 1926; and The Fall of Robespierre, London, 1927. For the opposite view of Danton, see Aulard's Études et leçons, I, 137-188, 268-281 ; II, 39-106III, 51-240; I X , 4S-70; French Revolution, III, 79-151. The struggle between Danton and Robespierre is described in W . B. Kerr, The Reign of Terror, Toronto, 1927. 129

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trumped-up. Opponents are convicted, not on the grounds that they differ from the prosecution; that would give an appearance of tyranny and would make it appear as if the Jacobins, the National Socialists or the Communists were seeking their own ends. The charges brought up in court are usually those of corruption, of traitorous plans or espionage for a foreign power. These charges are seldom proven but an agency such as the Revolutionary Tribunal rushes the case to its conclusion without benefit of defense or witness. The attack upon Danton fitted this formula perfectly. Danton not only had the temerity to differ with Robespierre; he affronted him with his personal approach to the problems of the day. Danton was energetic when emergencies demanded it, but he was incapable of the unbending perseverance of Robespierre. Danton found it impossible to remain aroused over long periods. By nature, he was less suspicious of internal dissent than was Robespierre who questioned the patriotism of some of Danton's closest friends such as Chabot, Delaunay, Basire, and Philappeau. Danton was also desirous of relaxing the Terror, while Robespierre felt that more stringent measures were necessary to save France. Danton, too, was willing to consider negotiations for peace, but Robespierre believed that the war was now necessary to spread French principles abroad. Robespierre suspected that the Dantonists were not as " incorruptible " as he. Julien de Toulouse, for example, had written a report protesting against the work of the Committee of Public Safety in the provinces. 2 H e had benefited somewhat by dubious connections with the contractor, d'Espagnac, and his private life was hardly above reproach. Fabre d'Eglantine enriched himself during Danton's period of power. Chabot, a former Capucin, had married the wealthy sister of the banker, Frey, a fact which greatly offended the sans-culottes among the Jacobins. 2 Supra, p. 120.

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These Dantonists were also involved in the financial scandal of the French East India Company. Julien, Chabot, Delaunay, and Basire acted as " bulls " and " bears ", raising and lowering the stock of the company to their financial advantage. They finally presented to the Convention a measure dissolving the Company. W h e n this was approved they falsified the act so that much of the capital invested went to them. 3 Fabre d'Eglantine's signature was affixed to the decree and everything seemed to have worked well. Danton's other associates were also somewhat suspect. Osselin had an émigrée as his mistress. Phillippeau, a representative on mission in the Vendée, had quarreled with the generals there and been recalled by the Committee of Public Safety. Bourdon de l'Oise was also suspicious and resentful because he had been recalled from the Vendée. Altogether, Robespierre believed that the Dantonists could scarcely be ranked among the purest patriots of the Jacobin Club. Jacobin justice began to be dealt the Dantonists on November 9 when the Committee of Public Safety arrested Osselin. Chabot, fearing that his turn might be next, demanded that deputies should not be arrested without first being heard at the bar of the Convention. This was enacted into a decree and was greeted with strong disapproval at the Jacobins as a means of delaying the purification demanded by the nation. The Committee of Public Safety ended the matter by having the Convention rescind the decree. Chabot, in the meantime, denounced the corruption of the East India affair, asserting that he had entered it merely to discover who the malefactors were. The Committee of Public Safety accepted his information, but refused to believe in his innocence and so Delauney, Basire and he were arrested. Danton was, as yet, free from suspicion. In October, disgusted with what seemed to him to be the excesses of the Terror, he had left Paris. A n accusation had been made, however, in the Committee of Public Safety that one of Danton's agents in 3 M a t h i e z , L'affaire

de la Compagnie

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Normandy had asserted his leader did not look unfavorably upon the restoration of royalty. At any rate, Danton remained away from the scene of affairs until the arrest of Basire, Chabot and Delaunay. He then returned to Paris, perhaps with the thought of relaxing the Terror and replacing the Robespierrists by a more moderate faction. With him came Camille Desmoulins, the hero of July 14 and founder, with Danton, of the Cordeliers Club. An able journalist, with a brilliant revolutionary record, Desmoulins advocated in the columns of the Vieux Cordelier, the abandonment of the Terror and the return to more humane methods. His greatest strength lay in his plea for " clemency ". " You wish to exterminate all your enemies by the guillotine," he wrote. "Was there ever greater folly? Can you send a single individual to the guillotine without making ten enemies among his family and friends? " Philippeau did his share by attacking the incompetency and harsh actions of terrorist generals and agents of Hébert in the Vendée, while Danton denounced extreme actions and demanded " justice " in the Convention. However much Robespierre disliked these attacks by Danton upon his ideal revolutionary state, he kept silent until the Hébertists, whom Robespierre regarded as the greatest enemies of la Patrie, were removed from the scene.4 The Dantonists looked with similar aversion upon the Hébertists and so the wise policy was to eliminate the Hébertists with the aid of Danton and then to turn upon the Dantonists. When various accusations were made against Danton by the Hébertists in December, Robespierre defended his rival although in circumspect terms. 5 He agreed that Danton's conduct should be examined publicly, but minimized the accusations that Danton was an émigré because he had spent some time in England, and that he wished to act as regent for " Louis X V I I ". He did not believe that Danton had been severe enough towards Dumouriez and the Brissotins, but then, he said, all patriots were slandered occasionally. He both recommended and warned 4 Supra,

sectio.

5 Aulard, La société

des Jacobins,

V, 543-44-

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Danton in his declaration that " as a family man, he deserves nothing but praise. A s to politics, I have this to say. One difference of opinion between us led me to watch him carefully and sometimes with indignation. But if he did not always agree with me, was I to fear that he was betraying the country? Not at all; he always seemed to me to be serving it zealously." W i t h the Hebertists out of the way, Robespierre could turn to the business of attacking the Dantonists. Danton himself remained unharmed, but his friends were the object of repeated attacks which finally led to their arrests. Robespierre now definitely considered the Dantonists to be enemies of la Patrie, because they proposed a form of government not based upon virtue. This seemed to be all the more true as Robespierre watched the activity of Camille Desmoulins, his friend since college days. Desmoulins began his new journal, the Vieux Cordelier, two days after Robespierre's cautious warning to Danton. Its purpose was to attack the Hebertists, but actually, Desmoulins proposed to advocate Danton the " veteran Cordelier " , as successor to Robespierre's power. O n December 15, Desmoulins sent to press his third issue which attacked Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety by comparing the Law of Suspects and the government of France under the Committee with the autocratic rule of the Roman Empire. It asserted that those in charge of the government were influenced unduly by the extremists. These charges were too fundamental for Robespierre to brush aside. If believed, they would result in the overthrow of the government. Robespierre connected the government with the welfare of France and considered any assault upon it as an attack upon the nation. H i s reply to the Dantonists was made in his speech on the principles of revolutionary government delivered on December 25. H e explained that the safety of France demanded a revolutionary government endowed with great powers to repulse invaders and crush internal dissent. The Terror should be increased rather than diminished so that a constitutional regime might be inaugurated. " Only good patriots deserve public pro-

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tection, and the punishment of the people's enemies is death," was his ultimatum. H e then went on to insinuate that Danton and Desmoulins were involved in the plots of Prussia and England. The vital point of his speech, however, was a demand for more severe agencies to repress enemies of the nation. He believed that too many prominent criminals were escaping, because of delays in the laws. H e urged new regulations for the Revolutionary Tribunal so that it might function more speedily and with greater precision. Robespierre hated the Hébertists because they operated under the guise of patriotism; he fought the Dantonists because they were humanitarians. Only nationalism which conformed to his ideal was satisfactory. This attitude was shown clearly in his speeches at the Jacobins in January. He said, " F o r my part, I am accusing no one. . . . I only wish to hold to the truth. 6 The purpose of the revolution is the triumph of innocence. . . . Let us abandon intrigue and busy ourselves only with the interests of la Patrie." Such concern demanded close scrutiny of Philippeau, Bourdon and Fabre. Philippeau, he said, for example, was the author of a Moral and Religious Catechism of whose patriotism he was doubtful. 7 Robespierre looked upon the activities of Camille Desmoulins as unhealthy for the safety of the country. Here, personal considerations were subordinated to Robespierre's patriotic desire to deliver France from internal and external enemies. Desmoulins, by this time, was beginning to regret his denunciation of the Jacobin government. His fifth number of the Vieux Cordelier was evidently an apology for the others. Robespierre, however, was not willing to consider it as such. A t the Jacobins, on January 7, he declared that Camille Desmoulins had published an issue which would console the aristocrats. 8 T h e latter would probably distribute thousands of copies of the journal to the departments. Robespierre did not want to treat 6 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, 7 Ibid., p. 596. 8 Ibid., p. 597.

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Desmoulins as a major criminal. But he did not wish, however, that his " blasphemous, counter-revolutionary libels " go unpunished. H e preferred ridicule to any harsh penalty; " Camille has the naivete of La Fontaine. H e confused the Philippics of Demosthenes with the Philippotides of Philippeau ". " I hope ", he remarked, " that Desmoulins will be treated like a spoiled child, who has good traits, but who has been led astray by bad companions. But he must do penance for all his wrongdoing by leaving his evil companions." Robespierre realized that this public penance was difficult, but Desmoulins had, after all, pained patriots and given joy to aristocrats. He concluded with the request that the writings of Desmoulins be burned in the Jacobin Club. The speech was frequently interrupted by applause and bursts of laughter. Perhaps hurt more by this treatment than by outright denunciation, Desmoulins cried out, " Burning is no answer." The phrase was a quotation from Rousseau, but here, as elsewhere, Robespierre applied the teachings of Rousseau only when they suited his own sentiments. Desmoulins lost his life through that phrase. Robespierre ceased his half jocular manner and declared, " Very well, I retract my last motion. . . . Let the Club withold its wrath no longer since he refuses to withdraw his diatribes and dangerous principles. The man who holds to these perfidious writings so strongly is probably more than just misled." Desmoulins was a tool of a rascally faction, he said. H e ended by demanding that Desmoulin's journal be read aloud. Patriots would answer all objections. Desmoulins was stunned by the sudden denunciation. " But Robespierre ", he exclaimed, " I do not understand you. How can you say that my paper is read only by the aristocrats ? The Convention, the Mountain, has read it. Are they composed solely of aristocrats? You condemn me here, but did I not come to your home and read the first issue of my paper to you? Did I not beg you, in the name of friendship, to indicate the policy I should f o l l o w ? " Robespierre hedged by replying, " You did not show me all your numbers. I only saw one or

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two. I did not read the others because I preferred not to be involved in a quarrel of any kind. If I had read them, I should have been accused of dictating your policy." Coming from Robespierre, this was a lame excuse. Danton felt that the argument between the two was becoming dangerous. He advised Desmoulins that Robespierre's lectures were a bit severe, but that they were meant in a friendly way. Turning to Robespierre, Danton said that Desmoulins should not be judged too harshly because the freedom of the press was at stake. This had little effect upon Robespierre. Desmoulins was already tried and convicted in his mind. All that was necessary was to persuade the Jacobins that Desmoulins was really guilty. This was not a difficult task in view of the patriotic spirit which Robespierre had aroused. A few issues of Desmoulins' journal, Le Vieux Cordelier, were read aloud at the Jacobins and Robespierre stopped the reading by saying, " Our opinion of Camille must be already made up. You see in his writings revolutionary principles side by side with the maxims of a thoroughly pernicious reaction. In one passage, he raises the courage of patriots, in another he increases the hopes of aristocrats. . . . In one phrase, he deals a mortal blow at our enemies; then, with biting sarcasm, he destroys the best patriots. H e is a strange mixture of truth and falsehood, of statesmanship and ridiculousness, of sensible ideas and of selfish and absurd plans. Whether the Jacobins save or drive out Desmoulins does not matter. H e is only an individual. What really matters is the triumph of liberty and truth. In this whole discussion, there has been too much talk about individuals and too little about public welfare. I have no quarrel with anyone. In my view, Camille and Hébert are equally wrong. . . . " At this point, Fabre d'Eglantine arose and attempted to leave the Club. Robespierre turned upon him. Fabre had been quite active in unburdening his guilty conscience by denouncing to Robespierre the men involved in the India Company affair.* 9 Supra, p. 131.

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The Incorruptible had learned, however, that his associate was one of those involved in the affair. To have associated with a false patriot was bad enough, but to have acted upon his advice was too much for Robespierre. H e objected to his being allowed to speak and continued, discussing the two types of plots which had as their object the confusion of Montagnard patriots. Their duty should be to reveal such attempts. Concluding, he said, " I declare to all true Montagnards that victory is within your reach, that there are only a few serpents left for us to crush ". At this, the Jacobins applauded vigorously, and cried out, " They will be ", 10 Continuing, he asserted, " W e shall attend, not to any individual, but to France. I suggest that the Club cease to discuss the issues of Camille Desmoulins' journal and I demand that this fellow [Fabre d'Eglantine], who never appears without a lorgnette in his hand, and is so clever at expounding theatrical plots, explain himself here, and we shall see how he fares." Fabre's protest that there was no charge to answer was met with the cry, " To the guillotine! " Robespierre moved that Fabre's name he removed from the list of the Club. 10 Aulard, La societe des Jacobins, V, 601-603.

CHAPTER X JUSTICE A N D T H E JACOBINS " JUSTICE

" was one of the terms Robespierre had used with so much reverence in the early days of the Revolution. Justice meant impartial and humanitarian treatment of all sides of the case by a sound and unprejudiced authority. As an enlightened lawyer, he had clamored for this kind of justice. In the transformation from humanitarian to Jacobin nationalism, his notion of justice also underwent a change. It became a terrible instrument with which the enemies of the Jacobins might be struck hard and suddenly. The new crimes of lèse-nation or lèse-patrie facilitated the removal of " traitors " upon whom no obvious crimes could be hung. The list of " suspects " was continually lengthened so that eventually any one who disagreed with Robespierre and his associates could be arraigned before the Revolutionary Tribunal. That body in time became a purely Jacobin court unwilling to listen to defense or witnesses from outside the party. By eliminating the hearing of evidence, it speeded up revolutionary justice and facilitated the purging of the party. One of the clearest instances of the way in which Jacobin justice was administered was the trial of Danton and Desmoulins. The removal of names from the membership list of the Jacobins practically became a death sentence. Trial by regular government agencies was merely a formality. The Jacobin consideration of the case, as could be seen in the instance of Desmoulins, was dominated by Robespierre's determination to rid the party and the nation of enemies. Desmoulins could hardly, upon the basis of the evidence presented, be proven to be an enemy of France. It is true that two months later when he was arrested, proofs of a seventh number of his journal were found in which Desmoulins attacked Robespierre's most fundamental belief, that of a republic of virtue. 1 One can hardly 1 Annales révolutionnaires, 138

II, 622 ; Révolution

français, X L I , 408.

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escape the conviction that terroristic methods were used in this case because of personal differences as to how France was to be saved. The same held true of Robespierre's attack upon Danton. In his condemnation of Robespierre on 8 thermidor, BillaudVarenne remarked that when he first denounced Danton, Robespierre arose in a fury and said that " I was trying to destroy the best patriot in the c o u n t r y " . In February, 1793, when Danton's wife had died during his absence on mission to Belgium, Robespierre had written a letter of condolence declaring that he was Danton's tender and devoted friend. " I shall love you unto death ", Robespierre had said. 2 But the two had differed on policies of the Terror. In January, 1794, Danton at Robespierre's home, said that the innocent as well as the guilty had perished. A t this, Robespierre queried, " W h o told you that a single innocent person has perished? " T o which Danton replied in amazement, " W h a t do you say, not a single innocent person guillotined?" The remark was of more than passing significance. Robespierre, by this time, felt that the safety of the nation depended upon the continuance of the Terror. This feeling showed the dictator's reluctance to admit that the " emergency " ever ceased to exist. Danton, too, was intimating that those behind the policy of the Terror might err. Since Robespierre's conception of the Terror was its infallibility in all matters of justice, Danton was seriously questioning a fundamental tenet of Robespierre's nationalist philosophy that the " nation could do no wrong ". Danton's chief fault was that for which the Girondists were convicted. He had retained more traces of humanitarian nationalism than had Robespierre. Even at the time of his arrest, Danton showed no inclination to increase the violence of the times by any show of resistance. " Y o u must resist", a friend advised, and Danton answered, " That means the shedding of blood and I am sick of it. I would rather be 2 Correspondence, p. 160.

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guillotined than guillotine ". N o r would he run away. " Where shall I g o ? " he queried, " Y o u do not carry your country on the sole of your shoe ". The Jacobin nationalists had reached the point where they did not accord even the most common show of decency to their former associates. The arrest and trial of Danton was the most flagrant violation of the rules of fair play manifested throughout Robespierre's career. It indicated to what extent the incorruptible patriot was willing to go in order to rid the party of someone who differed with him on matters of policy. The Committee of Public Safety secretly drew up a list of " conspirators " which lumped together persons of such varied honesty and patriotism as Desmoulins and Danton, Philippeau and Westermann, Hérault de Séchelles and Fabre d'Eglantine. Men such as Chabot, Delaunay, and Basire who had been implicated in the East India Company scandal were included in the list along with the " foreign agents " , Gusman and the brothers Frey. Listed in one batch, all were to be tried as though guilty of one common crime. Robespierre hoped that in this way, it might be assumed that Danton was the associate of the others on the list. Robespierre was afraid that if Danton were tried alone, he might be permitted to speak in defense of himself. Danton was a powerful orator and could sway public opinion to his side. When Danton and Desmoulins were jailed on March 25, 1794, there was much popular sentiment in their favor. Even the Convention wavered, until Robespierre denounced Danton as a " rotten i d o l " . A f r a i d to do otherwise, the Convention agreed. In the presence of the Jacobins' authority, it had virtually abdicated. Robespierre showed the reluctance any dictator has towards letting an opponent, especially one on trial for his life, speak. W h e n Danton was brought to trial on March 30, Robespierre defeated attempts to allow him to speak for himself. Legendre proposed that the Dantonists should be permitted to be heard at the bar of the Convention, but Robespierre's influence led to the rejection of the motion. Danton's arrest, he said, was.

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necessary for the safety of the nation. As for Danton's reputation for patriotism, Robespierre said that a man's activity within a particular period should be no criterion of his patriotism. His whole political record was the test. The Dantonists were false patriots who had preferred personal and foreign interests to the welfare of the nation. As for any fear that these plotters might ensnare him, Robespierre said, " What do these dangers matter to me? My life belongs to my country; my heart is free from fear and if I died, it would be without reproach or disgrace." Nor did ties of friendship restrain Robespierre. " I was a friend of Pétion ", he said. " When he was denounced, I abandoned him. I was attached to Roland. H e betrayed us, and I accused him. Danton wished to take their place and he is now nothing more to me than an enemy of la Patrie." The reason which Robespierre gave for refusing to allow Danton to speak was clothed in patriotic verbiage. " The motion just made would be dangerous for France, because it is an attack upon liberty. Liberty is outraged if one citizen is favored more than another. To allow these plotters to speak when others were refused would destroy equality. The dignity of the national representatives must be upheld in supporting these principles." Specious though the reasoning was, the Convention could do little other than reject the motion. It had virtually abdicated. The supreme illustration of Robespierre's exaggerated nationalism, however, was to be found in the comments which he made for the revision of Saint-Just's accusation of Danton and his followers. 3 The notes began with remarks about Danton's associates. Chaumette had repressed freedom of worship. Fabre had intrigued with Dumouriez. Fabre, in particular, had planned to " give a tyrant to France ". This faction, composed of Hébert, Proly and Ronsin hid behind claims of exalted patriotism, hop3 Mathiez, Robespierre terroriste, Dantonistes," pp. 78-118.

" Les Notes de Robespierre contre les

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ing to discredit it and to crush leading patriots. So far, Robespierre had not gone far astray, but one would hardly believe that Robespierre had read the first two numbers of the Vieux Cordelier in view of the note that Fabre, who had planned counter-revolution, inspired Desmoulins. " The name of the journal was meant to win public support for the leaders of the group which concealed its plots under the name of Veterans of the Revolution. Danton corrected the proofs. He admits that he made alterations in the text," Robespierre remarked. Robespierre's treatment of Camille Desmoulins was more generous than that of the others. He described Desmoulins as " fitted by his vanity and his quick imagination to become a lieutenant of Fabre and Danton." They had led him into crime.. Desmoulins had shown patriotic spirit in censoring Mirabeau,. Barnave, Lafayette and Lameth after he had acclaimed them. Robespierre's treatment of Danton was more harsh and showed the fanatical nature of some of his charges. Danton and Fabre,. he declared, lived with Lafayette and the Lameths. Yet,. Lafayette had been known as a patriot at that time. Robespierre also alleged that Danton had been paid by Mirabeau to drop his legal career. The friends of Mirabeau had boasted loudly of having kept Danton silent. While Mirabeau was alive, Danton had never spoken against him. These charges, were absurd. Since he was not a member of the National Assembly, Danton would hardly have had an opportunity to speak against Mirabeau. For this reason, Mirabeau would not have had to purchase his silence. Robespierre then recalled that he had dined with Danton during the first months of the Revolution. Danton had reproached him for not working with Barnave and the Lameths. Yet, it was hardly possible that Danton had begun to plot against the nation that early. Robespierre's charges were unfounded in some instances, others were merely rather cruel taunts or harsh jeers. The latter was true of his assertion that Danton tried to imitate Fabre as an actor as shown by the useless and ridiculous actions when he wept at the tribune and

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then in Robespierre's home. This was apparently a reference to a last-minute attempt to reconcile Danton and Robespierre. It was rather unjust to accuse Danton of insincerity for what was probably an emotional outburst. 4 Strangely enough, Robespierre charged Danton with something he himself might have assailed. " Danton has one trait ", he said, " which proves he has an ungrateful and black soul. He favored the latest issues of Desmoulins by alleging that liberty of the press was at stake. Then, when Danton went to Robespierre's house, he spoke scornfully to me about Desmoulins, attributing his faults to a shameful private vice. . . ." " This man [Danton] breaks men whom he has used. . . . He has never defended a patriot, never attacked a conspirator, but he praised Fabre at the last electoral assembly. H e pretended that the connection between Fabre and the aristocrats . . . was planned with the intention of spying upon the secrets of the aristocrats." The statement that Danton broke men was, of course, extreme. Danton's personality was an easygoing one, not given to a suspicious attitude. The assertion that Danton had allowed Fabre to scuttle the national treasury was probably true as far as Fabre was concerned. Whether Danton advanced 10,000 francs, as Robespierre alleged, was doubtful. 5 A s Minister of Justice, he asserted Danton had freed Adrien Duport and Charles Lameth who were arrested in connection with the " massacre of the people " on A u g u s t 10, 1792. Danton had also rejected Robespierre's plan " to crush conspiracy and to prevent Brissot from renewing his plots under the pretext that France should be concerned only with the winning of the war ". Yet, if Danton did try to check the September Massacres, was it not to his credit? The charge clearly illustrated the difference in the points of view of Danton and Robespierre. Danton believed France could be saved by concentrating on the w a r : Robespierre was convinced 4 M a t h i e z , Autour de Danton; 5 M a t h i e z , Autour de Danton.

Robespierre

terroriste, p. 95.

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that the nation could be preserved only by crushing all internal dissent. Since Danton had proposed the opposite, it constituted a crime in the eyes of Robespierre. Then, too, Robespierre charged that Danton's conduct of the war was faulty. He had sent Fabre on mission to Dumouriez and Kellermann to reconcile them when everyone knew they were too friendly for the good of the Republic. It was true that Danton had supported the treacherous Dumouriez, but Robespierre himself had not been antagonistic to him at first. Robespierre also insisted that Danton had declared that the Girondists were not enemies. He had alleged that Brissot's plans were innocent. From all this, we need not necessarily infer that Robespierre and Danton differed so radically. Much of the attack upon Danton, it must now be admitted, was hardly supportable from either the point of view of logic or fact. Robespierre's arguments sounded particularly weak because he was accusing a man whose patriotism was perhaps better known than Robespierre's. The accusations assumed a strange aspect, then, when Robespierre placed as his most serious charge the statement that Danton did not believe in virtue, that he was not patriotic enough. Danton had told Robespierre that " Public opinion is a prostitute ". And Robespierre remarked that " the word virtue made Danton laugh ". Another allegation Robespierre made was that Danton consorted with rascals and openly tolerated vice. He believed that the cause of the Jacobins frightened many away because of the severity of its principles. This was hardly a criminal charge. It merely illustrated that any difference between Robespierre and his opponents was magnified into a crime of lèse-nation. Sometimes Robespierre's charges verged on the ridiculous. An instance of this may be found in the remark, " One must not forget Robert's teas at which Orléans mixed the punch, and Danton and Wimpfen made up the party ". Robespierre also had the custom of referring to an event of the early days of the Revolution without reference to the circumstances of

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that incident. F o r example, he referred to the way in which Danton favored the election of Orléans to the Convention. It was then no crime to push the candidacy of an aristocrat whose leanings were decidedly popular. It was, however, in 1794. Perhaps Danton was right even when he advocated the election of Orléans. It might have made the Republic more presentable in the eyes of the monarchs of Europe. The thought was characteristic of Danton's compromising attitude; its rejection was an example of the rigidity of Robespierre's mind. Returning to the charge that Danton was unpatriotic, Robespierre asserted that Danton had started off vigorously, but had soon allied himself with Mirabeau and the Lameths. H e dropped from sight until the massacre of the Champ de Mars when a petition which he sponsored resulted in the death of 2,000 patriots. Danton then retired to Arcis, living peaceably there, abandoning the public cause. In every crisis, he fled. During the Legislative Assembly, he said nothing; in the struggle between' Montagnards and Girondists, he sided with the latter at first, then switched to the former, but when his friends pointed out that Robespierre was the butt of slander, he said, " If he wishes to die, let him. W e do not have to share his fate ". While patriots prepared for the events of August 10, Danton rested at Arcis. The night before, he came to Paris, but wished to sleep and had to be dragged from his bed to his Section. W h e n the insurrection was already decided, he was eloquent. Robespierre seemed to have forgotten that he had acted after a similar fashion on August 10. A f t e r having lodged these complaints against Danton's career as Minister of Justice, Robespierre turned to his activities as a member of the Convention. H e declared that Danton had disavowed Marat and declined to speak for Robespierre. Y e t Danton's record in the Convention showed that this was untrue. Danton's silence, wrote Robespierre, was bad enough but his desire to conciliate the " strict " republicans and the Girondists was too much. H e never spoke energetically except when he spoke of himself. He threatened his enemies on the right with

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vengeance while speaking of making peace. During crucial moments, he was either silent or absent. H i s friends said that it was because of his obesity or his amours. But he was alive when it came to defending Dumouriez or praising Beurnonville. W h e n patriots discovered treason in the army, he distracted their attention by concentrating on new levies of troops. This was particularly unkind of Robespierre. Raising new levies of troops was as essential to the preservation of the state as unearthing treason within the state. Here again, Robespierre demonstrated his belief that anything contrary to what he regarded as essential to the state was a crime. Danton had opposed the death of Louis X V I , 6 although he had voted for it. Then, too, Robespierre said that Danton had " viewed the revolution of May 31 with horror. H e had tried to turn it aside from its purpose by demanding the patriot, General Hanriot ". Danton had indeed demanded an inquiry into his conduct, but the matter had gone no further. Robespierre asserted that not being able to accomplish his purpose, Danton had attempted to laugh it off by treating Hanriot to a drink saying, " Let's have a glass together and think no more about it ", and then slandered the General the next day. The whole affair sounds more like Danton's carefree attitude toward what he thought to be a political error rather than any calculated plot against patriots. Another charge, that Danton wished to dissolve the Convention and to establish the Constitution of 1793 was hardly true. Robespierre here attributed to Danton a speech made by Delacroix on August 11, 1793. In citing Danton's remark that French colonies should be ceded to the Americans so that they would be their allies, Robespierre forgot that he had advocated the same. H e also accused Danton and Delacroix of having a decree passed which caused the loss of the colonies. While it was true that Delacroix had moved for the abolition of slavery 6 M. G. Rouanet, " Danton et la mort de Louis X V I , " Annales tionaires, V I I I , 1-33, and Mathiez, Danton et la paix.

révolu-

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on February 5 with the support of Dan ton, Robespierre had likewise supported the idea. Robespierre's accusation that Danton was involved in plots against France was scarcely credible. He had been " assured " that when Dumouriez planned an attack upon the nation in March, 1793, Danton had gone to Pache and proposed revolt, saying that finances might be easily taken care of as he " had his hand in the Belgian Treasury " . His charge that Danton had proposed peace and the dissolution of the Convention could have been easily disproven. When Danton proposed peace on August 2, 1792, the Convention was not yet in existence. Altogether, the charges against Danton had no solid foundation. Robespierre the humanitarian nationalist, would have given little credence to them. But Robespierre, the Jacobin nationalist, accepted them as irrefutable proof of Danton's complicity in plots against the nation. He would use any means to secure his end. Perhaps, the welfare of France did not require the death of Danton, but Robespierre believed it did and he trumped-up accusations accordingly. Robespierre himself might have been indicted on the same charges of association with Mirabeau, Dumouriez, Petion, Buzot, Roland and the Lameths. 7 The trial was as great a farce as the charges. In the Convention, Robespierre had as much as said that Danton was already condemned. There was every precaution that the Dantonists would not be given an unbiased hearing. There were no witnesses. Accusation and proof rested largely upon Robespierre's charges. When, on the second day of the trial, Danton launched into an eloquent defense, the Court was adjourned and the following day was taken up with charges against the small fry. Saint-Just then secured a decree from the Convention which declared that any person accused of conspiracy, who resisted or insulted national justice was to be forbidden the right of self-defense. Some of the jurors were also convinced 7 Gensonne pointed this out.

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that Dan ton was an " implacable enemy of the Republic ",8 while others were brought to that belief by a secret document shown them by the President and District Attorney. 9 All of the prisoners, with the exception of one were then declared guilty. Robespierre and the nation had triumphed once more. The trial of Desmoulins and Danton has been cited at length to show the terroristic methods of deceit, suspicion, and fear which Robespierre had used. None of the evidence presented justified the execution of the Dantonists. It showed the farce which revolutionary justice had become. Even though people whom Danton knew were implicated in financial scandals, it was no sign that Danton was a traitor. The Dantonists' greatest fault in Robespierre's eyes was the fact that they were still humanitarian and liberal. They had not yet reached the point where every principle had to be sacrificed for the nation. They were unprepared to sink every loyalty before the state. Like the Girondists, the Dantonists were just one step behind in the process of " regeneration " which led to a fiercer Jacobin nationalism. This, coupled with personal animosity, led to the Jacobin purge of their most patriotic element: the Dantonists. 8 Poumdes de la Siboutie, Souvenirs, p. 26. 9 Madelin, Danton, p. 310.

CHAPTER X I JACOBIN DICTATORSHIP THE dictatorship which the Jacobin party exercised was brief and imperfect. Like contemporary dictatorships, while one man, a Fiihrer or a Duce, stands out as supreme, actually the party rather than any one individual is responsible for the dictatorial rule. Without the Communist, the National Socialist or the Fascist parties, Stalin, Hitler or Mussolini would exercise little dictatorial power. Robespierre ruled only as long as discipline and unity could be preserved within the Jacobin party. The power which he actually exercised as a public official was by no means dictatorial. The Jacobin dictatorship was first established outside the regular government and then it gradually seized power. Once the Girondists, Hebertists, and Dantonists were removed, one would suppose that the vigilance of Robespierre and the Jacobins might be relaxed. Such was not the case, however, for Robespierre, under the guise of patriotism, worked with his Jacobin associates to consolidate the power of the party. After the execution of the Girondists and Dantonists, the Jacobins became the sole party in the state. The way was cleared for the exercise of dictatorial powers. The question may well be asked, did Robespierre wish to be a dictator ? Robespierre denied any such ambition. H e merely wished a highly centralized form of government in order to rid France of its enemies. By some coincidence, he was able to divine just who those enemies were and by another coincidence it happened that France's enemies were his personal enemies. It is difficult to believe that Robespierre deliberately plotted a course which would eventually make him dictator of France. It is much more likely that he was an opportunist who seized upon the chance to rid the Jacobins of opposing parties and elements. As this process continued, the Jacobins became the 149

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sole party in the state composed of a nucleus of the " purest patriots " , that is, those who agreed with Robespierre. One qualification must be made. Robespierre never exercised complete dictatorial powers. There were other Jacobins equally powerful who did not stand out because they preferred to let Robespierre be their mouthpiece. Jacobins such as Barere were more astute in concealing their motives and they might possibly have used Robespierre as a shield for their own activities. Again the problem which confronts us is whether much of this centralizing work was not performed by Saint-Just, Couthon, Le Bon or Maximilien's brother, Augustin. Saint-Just, Robespierre, and Couthon worked together in such secrecy that it is impossible to say which was the original formulator of ideas. The dictatorial powers which Robespierre wielded were those of the Jacobin party. France labored under a Jacobin dictatorship, not that of any one man. Robespierre never reached the point of complete party control. He never secured complete power in the Committee of Public Safety, nor did that body ever become the one directing force of all France. Robespierre's dictatorship was brief and imperfect. The reasons for his exercise of it may have been personal, but Robespierre insisted that he wished it only because conditions within France demanded it. Somehow, Mirabeau's remark, " He will go far for he believes everything he says " , seems to fit the case. Robespierre's sincerity of purpose dominated all his statements. A s for the actual extent of his dictatorship as a member of the Committee of Public Safety, the exact share of Robespierre in the Committee's work, remains a mystery. Some indication of his unfailing diligence can be found in the correspondence which passed through his hands and his careful notes thereon. The general policy of the Committee after the fall of the Dantonists was to centralize the agencies of the Terror. Decrees of May, 1794, abolished a i r revolutionary tribunals established in the departments. Henceforth, all conspirators were to be tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal at Paris. The members of the Committee were to see that the public spirit of ¿he Jacobins

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was maintained. T h e press was severely censored and only patriotic pieces were played in the theatres. The Festival of the Supreme Being disavowed all violent dechristianization and gave the Committee an opportunity to regulate political and religious festivals. The next step in this evolution toward greater power was taken with the outbreak of a feud between the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security. Amar, the head of that Committee had fallen under the disapproval of Robespierre before, because of his connection with the Girondists. Vadier, the other dominant member of the Committee of General Security, hated the Church and particularly the Festival of the Supreme Being. There was bound to be a conflict between the two Committees if Robespierre's past actions were indicative. Within the Committee of Public Safety, too, Robespierre by no means enjoyed complete control. Billaud-Varenne had several quarrels with Robespierre, particularly over Danton and Camille Desmoulins. Billaud-Varenne had hinted in May, 1794 that the people might well guard their virtues against men in high position. H e was also greatly opposed to Robespierre's cult of the Supreme Being. Billaud-Varenne found a common ally in Collot d'Herbois whose excesses as a representative on mission had been disapproved by Robespierre. A n d Fouche was a close friend of Collot d'Herbois. Robespierre's collaborator, Saint-Just, was also on very bad terms with Carnot whom Saint-Just accused of " nearly losing the victory of Fleurus ". Saint-Just had also opposed Carnot's desire for a military expedition against Holland. Robespierre had engaged in arguments with Carnot over the arrest of two officials. A s for the other members of the Committee, Prieur de la Marne and Jeanbon Saint-Andre, they were constantly on mission while Robert Lindet buried himself in his work and argued with no one. Barere was the dubious member of the group. A n ardent nationalist, he signed most of the extreme decrees and in many cases, it is doubtful whether Robespierre or Barere was more

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influential in drawing up the decrees. With such an alignment, it would be extremely hazardous to assert that Robespierre was the " dictator " of the Committee of Public Safety. Far from it, he had many personal enemies within it. Robespierre's dictatorship was exercised in the ever-watchful eye which he kept upon the enforcement of the Committee's decrees, in his careful scrutiny of cases to be tried, and in his constant care to see that the Jacobins everywhere kept patriots at a high standard of patriotism as Robespierre interpreted it. But even here, too much blame could not be placed upon Robespierre. The accusers of Robespierre usually forget that he was absent from the meetings of the Committee of Public Safety during the forty-five days when most of its victims were condemned. This absence, however, did not denote that Robespierre took no part in the proceedings of the Committee. The Archives nationales series of papers which were found in Robespierre's home disclose the fact that the papers of the Committee were sent to Robespierre who read and made notes upon them. During the period of his absence 1285 persons were condemned to death, and only 278 acquitted. The numbers in prison rose to 7800, too, during Robespierre's absence. It must be admitted that the decrees signed by Robespierre at his home were hardly ones utilizing dictatorial power. One of 27 prairial dealt with revolutionary taxes; others called on artists to give the ramparts of Paris the character of monuments; one dealt with the exportation of unworked silk; another dealt with a citizen in jail for non-payment of debt. Of twelve such decrees, all were harmless with the exception of the last signed on the first of thermidor ordering 180 citizens to be brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal to be tried immediately. Robespierre, Collot d'Herbois, and Barere signed this decree. Evidence for the use of dictatorial power can hardly be found in these twelve decrees in the light of what the rest of the Committee was doing at the time. Those seeking more definite evidence to support the theory of Robespierre's personal dictatorship would find it, perhaps, in

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his advocacy of the law of 22 prairial (June 10). The law was drawn up by Couthon and approved by Robespierre 1 and then sent directly to the Convention without allowing the consultation of either the Committee of Public Safety or the Committee of General Security. It denied prisoners assistance of counsel; did away with witnesses; allowed no sentence except acquittal or execution and had a very wide interpretation of the word " treason ". It also removed the immunity from arrest which representatives enjoyed. Robespierre was anxious that it be forced through the Convention. W h e n a deputy suggested that time be allowed for its consideration, Robespierre spoke against an adjournment as dangerous to the nation on the grounds that there were still many conspiracies afoot. The severity of the law, he remarked, would be feared only by conspirators. A g a i n on 23 prairial, when Bourdon de l'Oise asked that the inviolability of representatives be included in the law of 22 prairial, Robespierre declared that he could see no reason for it. The Dantonists and the Hebertists were still abroad in the land, he asserted, and absolute unity was necessary: " T h e Convention, the Mountain, and the Committee of Public Safety are all the same. Every representative of the people who sincerely loves liberty, who is determined to die for France, is from the Mountain. . . . The Mountain is simply the height of patriotism. A Montagnard is a pure, reasonable, and sublime patriot." T h e Mountain, he said, would never permit the formation of another party certain to be led by conspirators. A simpler plea for dictatorial one-party rule could hardly have been made and the law of 22 prairial was certainly conducive to such government. Robespierre asked that the government be given such powers to save France. W a s he a sublime patriot or a hypocrite blindly grasping for power? O n 13 messidor, Robespierre was busy at the Jacobins denouncing a new conspiracy to cause the downfall of the nation by killing patriots. He had a new definition for a humane man namely one who pursued enemies of the nation 1 Correspondance, pp. 389, 395.

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with rigor and justice. In this he had his following. A voice cried out, "Robespierre, you have all France with you ". Again, on 21 messidor, Robespierre complained at the Jacobins of the lack of enforcement of a decree which put virtue and probity as the order of the day. H a d it been enforced, he declared, liberty would have been perfectly established. " W e thought . . . that this decree . . . would impose upon public officials the duty of exercising virtue and of not deviating from the obligations which bind them to France," he insisted. Such a reign of virtue would undoubtedly be looked for when the law of 22 prairial became operative. A s for all good patriots of the proper persuasion, they would remain unharmed, for " the nation watches over patriots ". Robespierre said, " I am trying to snuff out the germs of division and to prevent the formation of two parties in the Convention ". Peace, happiness, virtue, these were the things for which he was striving. Robespierre hoped one-party rule would bring continued surveillance and suspicion would bring the millenium. Robespierre did not invoke support for his plan on the grounds that it was reasonable or just, but merely because it was virtuous. H e seemed to have gone mad with the idea of virtue, giving it as a reason for every measure. H e called upon the members of the Convention to support him because they were virtuous; upon the members of the two Committees, and upon the citizens, whose " indefatigable watchfulness alone will save the republic ". Finally, he invited everyone to denounce oppression and to reveal foreign plots. Robespierre, apparently, never tired of hearing his own voice. H e certainly never wearied of using the same reason for all his acts: the nation demanded everything he did. Another aspect of this state of virtue which the Jacobins and Robespierre would impose upon France was to be found in the laws of ventose. Robespierre and Saint-Just both naturally desired to attach as many Frenchmen to the cause of the nation as possible. W h a t simpler method than to make the tie an economic one, preferably through the occupation of national land?

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The idea might have been expressed in Robespierre's remark that " Ambition is the desire to merit glory and serve France ". 2 More explicitly, in his speech on Moral Principles, he spoke of a state " where the government assures the well-being of every individual and where each individual proudly enjoys the prosperity and glory of his country. Robespierre, it must be admitted, did not have radical ideas about the distribution of land or of wealth of any sort. Rather, he was at all times bound by the traditional middle class view of the sanctity of private property. If he did support any view which might be interpreted as favorable to a socialistic state, it was merely, in the author's opinion, an attempt to outbid the Hébertists for the support of the sans-culottes. These ideas were derived from another source. They were the work of Saint-Just. 3 O n 8 ventôse, Saint-Just proposed a decree which would register all suspects and their property. On 13 of ventôse, all Communes were to draw up a list of indigent patriots, and the Committee of Public Safety was to propose means of indemn i f y i n g the unfortunates with the property of the Revolution.' 1 If this plan were to be put into effect, a new class of proprietors bound to the nation by very real ties would be the result. The plan was never executed, perhaps because there was too much opposition to it or because the Committee of Public Safety was too busy to effect such a far-reaching change. Saint-Just's plan offered nothing to the poor but not indigent peasant and offended the bourgeoisie whose purchase of land was stopped. Barère stole the thunder of Saint-Just on 22 ventôse by proposing a general law of assistance. The Committee of Public S a f e t y exercised a dictatorial control over the economic life of 2 V e l l a y , Oeuvres,

p p . 325-326.

3 F o r a discussion of the decrees of ventôse consult Georges Lefebvre, Questions

agraires

Collection

de documents

au temps

française,

Paris,

de la Terreur,

inédits

1933, a n d

sur

publiés

et

annotés,

économique

de la

Révolution

M a t h i e z , Annales

historiques

de la

Révolution

française, May-June, 1928. 4 V e l l a y , Oeuvres

Documents

l'histoire

de Saint-Just,

I I , 248.

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France during the war. Just what share Robespierre had in this activity is unknown. Robespierre was greatly interested in the production of arms and munitions; he took an active part in combating speculators and profiteers; he talked vaguely of a nation with plenty to eat and wear. He regarded the rich as enemies of France. But his actual share in economic control of the nation is dubious. The ventôse decrees were the work of Saint-Just. The charge which Robespierre's accusers flung at him most often was that he used the police power of the Committee of Public Safety to secure dictatorial power for himself. Here, if anywhere, the accusations of dictatorship should be either proven or disproven. A decree of April 16 had given the Committee of Public Safety the power to supervise " all the authorities and public agents cooperating with the administration " and to demand a strict account from all such agents with the duty of prosecuting any of them found plotting or misusing the powers entrusted to them. The Committee had then established a Bureau de surveillance administrative et de police générale. The point at issue is to decide the share Robespierre had in developing the powers of this newly formed Bureau. Robespierre, on 8 thermidor declared, " I was placed in charge temporarily of a Bureau of Police, recently and weakly organized by the Committee of Public Safety. My short administration was limited to thirty arrests. I tried to free persecuted patriots and to check a few enemies of France. Could one believe that the phrase, general police, could be used as a pretext to place upon my shoulders the full responsibility for all the operations of the Committee of General Security, for all the errors of constituted authorities, for all the crimes of my enemies?" Robespierre was on the defensive here, but it is well to compare his defense with the assertions of his enemies. Vadier charged that Robespierre instituted the general police merely to diminish the power of the Committee of General

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Security. 5 Barère, in accusing Robespierre on 11 thermidor said that " Saint-Just and Robespierre were drawn away by constant work and journalistic activity, making the government lax. They found us vulgar enough to save the country in detail and reserved for themselves the pretensions and luxuries of government. They supervised only a part of the general police organized by themselves." 6 Cambon maintained that the Committee of Public Safety found its chief organ of centralization in the Bureau of Police, 7 while Vadier asserted that the Bureau was one of the chief causes of tension between the Committees. 8 The historian Wallon in his Histoire du Tribunal révolutionnaire de Paris,9 considered the Bureau of Police to be Robespierre's chief agency of power. T h e actual reports of the Bureau are to be found in the Archives nationales, F 7 4437, comité de surêté général. Rapports au comiteé de salut public. Floréal-thermidor, An II. T h e work of the Bureau began on April 23, but on 2 messidor (June 20) the Committee of Public Safety gave it a more definite organization. A central office and four sub-sections were to work under a director, two officials, and ten other officers. This staff was to work from 8 : 30 A . M . to 3 : 30 P. M. and to continue in the evening, if necessary. They were to do their work " thoroughly and correctly ", a phrase which might have issued from the pen of a Robespierre or a Saint-Just. The duties of the Bureau obviously required very close application. National agents, Jacobin Clubs, and suspicious citizens throughout France sent in their complaints or suspicions. The Bureau must have been swamped with information. The number of denunciations from Jacobin Clubs showed that they maintained a watchful eye. Notations on this correspondence gave a clue as 5 Le Moniteur, no. 311. 6 Ibid., no. 314. 7 Ibid. 8 Biblithéque national, 9 III,

263-279.

Fonds française,

nouvelles acquisitions, no. 20804.

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to who the reader and real Director was. 10 Saint-Just wrote the notes from April 23 to 28. H e then went on mission and Robespierre read and made notes until M a y 31. Saint-Just, as the notes show, worked on the accusations on June 1 but Robespierre read them from June 2 until June 9. On June 30, both Saint-Just and Robespierre read the communications. Robespierre's notes are not seen after that date. This did not necessarily mean that Robespierre severed his connection with the Bureau. H e may have read over reports brought him by SaintJust. It was in this latter period that the Board carried on its most deadly work and, as in the case of the Committee of Public Safety, this marked the period when Robespierre withdrew from active work, outwardly, at any rate. H i s work in connection with the Bureau did show, however, that his energies were devoted to controlling the country through the use of" force and that patriotism was the keynote of it all. T h e complaints which poured into the Bureau were indicative of the patriotic tone which the Jacobins had set. The children of ex-nobles were forbidden to become druggists because of the possible danger. The mayor of Montrouge was reputed to have said at the festival of the Supreme Being, " The rabble has no shirt, see how it dances ". Another complaint against a citizen stated that he had said he would rather spend a quarter hour with a pretty woman than to have 10,000 republics. He was to be arrested because such a man could hardly be a good patriot. Another report described " unpatriotic proposals" made by a tailor's apprentice of fifteen who was drunk with wine rather than love of France. 1 1 Continued reports poured into the Bureau dealing with the morals of generals and other officials. Complaints were lodged chiefly against the Hebertists rather than the Girondists or Dantonists. But then it became customary to call every official suspected of misusing his office a Hebertist. The reports coming in from the Jacobin Clubs indicated the part they were taking 10 Augustin Lejeune was the nominal director. 1 1 Archives

nationales,

F 7 3822.

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in maintaining their regime. The Jacobins of Autun instructed the Convention " that it name enlightened patriots to go into the villages every day to preach love of France and to watch the farmers. It asks that all popular societies be invited to do the same in sending missionaries into the country ". T h e complaints also showed much opposition to holidays on the tenth day instead of the usual Sabbath. In many places there was conflict between patriots and staunch Catholics who insisted on celebrating religious as well as national holidays. Robespierre's notes on these complaints showed his keen interest in police work. Often, he ordered a national agent to verify some accusation such as the one that a conspiracy of nobles and priests was forming. His notes indicated that he regarded the Bureau of Police as a clearing house, sending some reports to the Committee of General Security; others on military matters directly to Carnot; or on supplies, to Lindet. The notes indicated, too, that Robespierre had a saner perspective than many accusers. Time and again, he asked for more precise information about denunciations. O r perhaps, he merely wanted certain convictions. Another fact brought out in the notes was the extreme centralization of revolutionary justice. Every case of interest to Robespierre demanded that the accused be brought to Paris, either under arrest or merely for further questioning. The Committee of Surveillance of Strasbourg, for example, accused Jews of lowering confidence in the assignats. Robespierre's note called for their arrest. Again on 25 floreal when the Committee of the Section of the Commune of Annerville denounced a Claude Michel for having delivered an unpatriotic speech, Robespierre wrote, " W h y denounce suspects instead of arresting them? Answer this point." His notes for the same day indicated the desire to increase the tempo of revolutionary justice and his anger at denunciations which might hinder it by their vagueness. A n accusation bearing no district name received his inquiry, " W h y not? " T o another, denouncing a man by implication was appended the statement, " W h e n one denounces, one must name ".

IÔO

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In notes of floréal ( A p r i l - M a y ) , it is interesting to notice that the Bureau sent most of its cases to the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security. On the whole, the denunciations were sent by National Agents, Jacobin Clubs, local committees of surveillance, individual citizens, and by various revolutionary committees. In turn, the documents were referred by Robespierre to the Committee of Public Safety and of General Security, to the Committee of Supplies, and to Collot d'Herbois. Many more were sent on to Representatives on Mission, to Lindet, and to Herman of the Revolutionary Tribunal. Perhaps it was Robespierre's legalistic training which made him so meticulous. H e checked on the spirit of Jacobin Clubs in their denunciations of generals, but when a citizen complained of being arrested because of Jacobin intrigues, Robespierre ordered that he be hailed before the Committee of Public Safety. Robespierre's desire for detail, too, seemed more in the interest of speedy action than justice. A traveler sent in an accusation telling how he saw a count living in his chateau as in the old days. Robespierre seemed to be much more careful about the name of the person accused than of the one doing the accusing. A s the month wore on, Robespierre became extremely cautious. A National A g e n t denounced a pharmacist for saying that the Committees of Public Safety and of General Security had denounced Hébert, knowing he was innocent. Robespierre's note read, " Bring him under heavy guard to the Committee of Public Safety " . Even dangerous writings came within his purview. When the municipality of Rennes denounced two dangerous pamphlets, Robespierre demanded, " Bring me these ". H e was also careful in checking on national agents, one of whom was accused of living with some ex-nobles. Robespierre's orders were to arrest him and his fellow-lodgers. A s 22 prairial neared, Robespierre's notes called more frequently for " prompt measures ". A f t e r 22 prairial, most of the cases were sent to the Committee of General Police.

JACOBIN

DICTATORSHIP

l6l

Robespierre seemed to grow more exacting as time passed. When the accusation was such as to displease him, he often asked for information about the character of the accuser. Such was not true, however, in the case of the accusations which satisfied him. Sometimes he grew petulant. When an accusation was signed by a procureur of a district, Robespierre wrote, " There is no procureur of a district " and appended the remark that the man was either a rascal or a fool, asking that the Committee of General Police ascertain which. What conclusion can be drawn from all this evidence of Robespierre's unrelenting toil at the Bureau of Police? That he exercised dictatorial control through it? This might be true to a certain extent, but it is well to note that Robespierre acted in most cases merely as a clearing house agent, sending out the accusations to various individuals and groups within the government. He did little through the Bureau of Police alone. The actual orders of the Bureau were usually drafted or signed by other members of the Committee of Public Safety. Those not so drafted were usually signed by members other than the triumvirate of Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just. Knowing the dissensions within the Committee of Public Safety, it is hardly possible that he exercised such control over them as to be completely responsible for sending 1,800 persons to the guillotine from the beginning of May to the end of July. Nor did the Bureau of Police diminish the powers of the Committee of General Security. The only power removed from this Committee's jurisdiction was the supervision of public officials. The number of arrests by the Committee did not abate during the period of the Bureau's activity. Robespierre, we might conclude, belonged to a dictatorial government which he did his share to develop, both through the organization of the Jacobin Clubs and the creation of a psychology favorable to it. He certainly did not exercise personal dictatorship. But again, what dictator ever does stand alone? Dictatorship then, as today, was the dictatorship of a group of men, of a party, rather than of any one man.

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Not even within his own immediate group did Robespierre exercise a personal dictatorship. Couthon and Saint-Just were away much of the time on mission enforcing the ideas of the Jacobin government. Their own ideas about patriotism and Jacobin rule were so much akin that it was difficult to tell where the thoughts of Robespierre began and where those of his two aides ended. Robespierre remained the central agent of the triumvirate at Paris, however. It was he who advanced most of the revolutionary legislation and enjoyed the greatest prestige. It can hardly be said that they were the forces behind the scenes using Robespierre as a puppet. Robespierre's personal pride was too great for that. Rather, the triumvirate was composed of three men with but a single aim : the unification of France. Of the three, however, Robespierre's personal pride stood out the most and if any of their schemes were calculated simply for personal power, Robespierre would be the easiest target for such an accusation. Not only through the triumvirate, but also through other such trusted aides as Hermann of the Revolutionary Tribunal did Robespierre advance Jacobin principles. Nor was there evidence that in so doing he was the most extreme of Jacobin nationalists. 12 Napoleon claimed he saw a letter from Robespierre to his brother, Augustin, on mission to Toulon in which Maximilien said that the excesses of certain revolutionaries " dishonored the revolution and would kill it ". When informed by Jullien of Paris of the excesses of Carrier at Nantes and Tallien at Bordeaux, Robespierre had them recalled. Barras and Fréron were likewise recalled from a mission in the Midi after " republican " excesses. It may be questioned, however, as to whether Robespierre had them recalled for humanitarian reasons or to prevent the growth of their power, thus making them possible rivals for his position. Or perhaps, he desired to prevent excesses which would cjiscredit the republic and lose it supporters. The last seems to be the most likely answer in the light of his usual behavior. Thus the mass murders at Lyons by Fouché fell 12 Mathiez, Annales

Historiques

de la Révolution

française,

I, 97 ff.

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163

under his disapproval, probably for the same reason. The District Attorney Fouquier-Tinville, was hardly a tool of Robespierre. 13 Before 9 thermidor, Fouquier-Tinville told Martel that he disliked Robespierre's despotism at the Committee of Public Safety, but he himself never seemed to have suffered from it by Robespierre's direct orders. The two appeared to have seldom come into contact. Robespierre's dictatorship was one of the mind rather than of any tangible power which he used. His association with such ardent patriots as Saint-Just and L e Bas, showed how such a dictatorship might work. 14 W h e n L e Bas was sent on mission, his wife, Elizabeth, said to Robespierre, " Poor friend. W e know your heart. Y o u did all you could for my husband and myself, but you placed the interests of France above all." 15 When L e Bas and Saint-Just went on mission in October, 1793 to the army of the Rhine, they brought with them some of the spirit of Robespierre. Saint-Just, for example, wrote out a list of instructions for the representatives on mission which could have been penned by Robespierre. Couthon, Augustin Robespierre or Le Bas, so similar were the thoughts of the associates. The document advised such a representative on mission to " Be a father and friend of the soldiers. K n o w each one. Sleep in the field. Live in camps. Eat alone and frugally. Don't be too friendly with generals ", 1 6 O n this mission, L e Bas and Saint-Just made extensive use of the Jacobin Clubs in carrying out their orders. 17 Saint-Just took a particular interest in levying contributions on the rich to care for patriotic indigents. Perhaps he had the laws of ventôse in mind. W h e n the news circulated that 12,000 soldiers lacked shoes, he ordered all shoes to be removed from the feet of 13 Mathiez, Annales révolutionnaires, igi7, p. 238. 14 Stéfane-Pol, Autour de Robespierre ; Le Conventionnel Le Bas, Paris, 1901.

15 Ibid., p. 131. 16 Archives nationales, A F , I I , 249. 17 Ibid., A F , II, 135-

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aristocrats of Strasbourg by 10 A . M . of the following morning. Saint-Just and L e B a s also busied themselves telling French women to stop wearing clothes cut in German styles and when coats were scarce, those of the inhabitants of Strasbourg were requisitioned. A n order of December 29, 1793 18 provided that " there will be formed in each commune or canton of Bas-Rhin a free school where all shall be taught in the French language. T h e department will levy a sum of 660,000 livres on the rich to organize this establishment and render an account of it to the C o n v e n t i o n " . A f t e r another mission in M a y , 1794, L e Bas returned to Paris to take charge of the École de Mars where he spent his time in turning out virtuous soldiers. 19 T h e conduct of L e B a s and Saint-Just has been cited also to show that the kind of Jacobin ideas espoused by Robespierre when put into practice by overzealous patriots resulted in extremes which Robespierre himself would probably not have approved. O n the one hand, he was supported by extreme patriots; on the other, he w a s opposed by fanatics such as F o u c h é whose enmity he had incurred by attempting to check their fiendish attempts to wipe out all dissent. It was this latter group which eventually brought about the downfall of Robespierre. 18 Ibid. 19 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, V I , 239 ff.

CHAPTER X I I EMOTIONALISM A N D

NATIONALISM

tried to create a religion which would be closely associated with the state. The nation was to become imbued with certain divine attributes the most important of which was infallibility. Patriotic prayers and pleas were to be addressed to it. It was to have its martyrs, its high priests, its shrines in patriotic monuments. Unbelievers were to be cast out as heretics while those gifted will the faith were promised rich rewards, not in any spiritual thereafter, but in a material heaven created by the state itself. ROBESPIERRE

Robespierre was the first to invoke the worship of the nation ; the first to weave a religious cult about the nation. This was hardly strange, in view of the fact that the ardor with which he attached himself to the cause of France was basically emotional. Robespierre always felt the need of some Divine Being whom he could invoke and lean upon in moments of emergency. When he ceased to be a Catholic, Robespierre became a Deist, after the fashion of Rousseau. Robespierre's God, however, was more of a personal one, a God who looked after the affairs of men and nations. H e was never carried away by the excesses of anti-clericalism. Time and again, he urged moderate treatment of the clergy. This attitude eventually won Robespierre the support of many patriots who had been alienated by the anti-clerical acts of leading revolutionists. Robespierre believed that religion was essential to the welfare of the state, and that God looked with particular solicitude upon the affairs of the French nation. Even when it was regarded as "superstitious" to utter some words of belief in God, Robespierre continued to assert his belief in " Providence " or the "Eternal Being" who watched over the French Revolution. Besides, he asked, how could he personally have accomplished such superhuman tasks without the assistance of God? 1 When 1 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, I V , 699-701. 165

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Santhonax, a Girondist, cried out, " A truce of monkery ", Robespierre found that the Girondists were worse than unpatriotic ; they were irreligious. Throughout the Revolution, Robespierre opposed the policy of dechristianization. His notebook called for " indefinite adjournment of the decree on the calendar ", 2 This referred to the introduction of the republican calendar which marked the beginning of the dechristianization movement. Even at the height of the movement, Robespierre wrote, " Punish seditious and unpatriotic priests, but do not proscribe the title of priest itself". 3 Robespierre drew up a circular for the Jacobin Clubs urging them to lessen the damage caused by religious troubles.4 " Keep in mind ", he wrote, " that conscience probably cannot be dictated to. Some men are superstitious in good faith, partly because they are weakminded, and partly because only a few have thought the matter out. . . . A forceful remedy will turn them into fanatics." Persuasion was to be employed for antireligious fanatics, but instructions to a representative on mission also hinted that force might be used against members of the Jacobin Club of Lille who indulged in "revolutionary exaggerations, particularly those concerning objects of worship". 5 Although Robespierre did not desire to have people think of him as a defender of the Catholics, to the very last he defended their freedom of worship. " H e who wishes to prevent the saying of mass is more fanatical than he who says it " was his stand. 6 H e decried a " religion of atheism ". Atheism, he remarked, was aristocratic, while the idea of a Great Being watching over the oppressed was thoroughly democratic. Admitting that he had been a poor kind of Catholic " ever since he went to College ", he disclosed that he had grown closer to 2 P . 62. 3 Comité de salut public, V I I I , 58-594 Correspondance,

pp. 212-213.

5 Correspondance,

pp. 224-226.

6 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V, 528.

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the moral and political idea : " If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him ", 7 Robespierre's devotion to the Divine Being led him into one of his most bitter struggles : that with the Hébertists. In defending himself against the charge of being a Catholic, Robespierre shouted, " W e shall not tolerate those counter-revolutionaries whose only claim to merit is that they are anti-religioUs. W e shall tear the masks of patriotism f r o m their hideous faces." 8 Robespierre discovered that the Hébertists were not only atheists, but aristocrats and foreign spies as well. A n archarsis Clootz, self-styled " advocate of the human race " , came in f o r particularly heavy attacks on this score. 9 T h e reply of the Hébertists was an attempted insurrection against the Committee of Public S a f e t y in March, 1794. T h i s was practically suicide and the majority were beheaded as atheists and agents of Pitt. Robespierre looked upon the fight f o r religious toleration as more than a domestic issue. W h e n France was accused by foreign countries as a country without religious principles, Robespierre replied with a Réponse aux manifestes des rois ligué contre la république. H e called those persons liars who declared that the French Republic had substituted worship of men f o r God. H e tried to stress the complete liberty of worship which prevailed in France, while the atheists, he said, w h o sought to destroy, it were agents of Pitt. T h e Committee was so moved by his pleas that it decreed liberty of worship necessary f o r the safety of the nation. Robespierre thus felt that this was necessary, not only because of his belief in God, but also, because the nation needed a God whose chief attribute was virtue; one w h o watched over the French with especial care. " W h o " , he questioned, " has ever tried to nationalize atheism? I f you attack religion, you attack the morality of the people. I f its faith is torn f r o m it, 7 A quotation f r o m Voltaire, Êpitre à l'auteur du livre des trois imposteurs.

8 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V, 535-5379 Ibid., p. 549-

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you will see a thousand little cults grow up which will destroy the unity of the nation." Then too, Robespierre's Supreme Being silenced " the most imperious passions with love of the nation ". Robespierre had already intrusted the cause of the French people to God in the words: " A l m i g h t y God! This cause is Y o u r own. Defend Yourself and those eternal laws which are graven in Y o u r hearts. . . . Let the nations awake to the sound of the thunderbolt with which Y o u will strike tyrants and traitors ". 1 0 Robespierre was at the height of his power when he appeared before the Convention on M a y 7, 1794, to make clear his idea of God in his Report on the Relations between Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles. Perhaps no oration of his showed as much polish and thought as this one in which he proclaimed his belief in a national God. Louis Blanc wrote that Robespierre showed none of his usual nervousness as he spoke. H e was elucidating the principles which guided his conduct. A f t e r a brief survey of progress in the arts and sciences, he found social and political advance lagging far behind. The reason, he discovered, was in the lack of public morality. Only the French had advanced " two thousand years ahead of the rest of humanity " in this respect. H e then launched into panegyrics of praise of the French people, giving the impression that prayers to the Supreme Being were, apparently, patriotic aspirations. H e encouraged Frenchmen to assume a " generous, egotism " which consisted of looking after their own welfare so that the rest of humanity might benefit. This was to be a substitute for brotherly love. One interesting feature of Robespierre's religious ideas was his belief that the French alone were impeccably moral. Despotism, he said, was based upon immorality, while virtue was the essence of republicanism. T o illustrate this, he pointed out that the Englishman had sold his conscience to the K i n g , while 10 Buchez et Roux, Histoire parlementaire, X I V , 440. The French Revolution, Robespierre asserted, and the creation of the earth were both the work of divine wisdom.

;

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169

;

Pitt calmly read out lists of sums appropriated for slander, corruption, even for the manufacture of counterfeit money. In like manner, Robespierre found all his opponents: Brissotins, Girondists, and Dantonists sadly lacking in morals. This attitude explains much about Robespierre's fanatical attack upon his opponents. He believed that God and the forces of truth and justice were behind him in his interpretation of events. Those who disagreed with him were not only traitors; they were heretics. It also explains his attitude toward foreign powers. Nations disagreeing with France were obviously in league with the devil. Only France possessed the final, immutable and eternal truth handed down to it by a God obviously pro-French in his sympathies. This concept was, of course, not a new one to the French people. H e harped upon it and made Frenchmen so acutely aware of its implications that it has borne fruit in the contemporary Frenchman's outlook upon the world. The religion of nationalism has hardly been confined to the French: democracies as well as dictatorships today possess a firm belief in their " mission " ; in the " gospel truth " which their ideology professes. The Englishman calls upon Providence to the tune of " God Save the King ", while the American no less proudly boasts that his country and institutions are the special creation of the Almighty.

Robespierre's belief in the Supreme Being was confused with his belief in humanity and the civilizing mission of the French. Pitt's agents were not only the tools of the devil, but they were also the forces of barbarism. Robespierre declared that a Frenchman could always conquer his enemies by consulting " the need of France and the interests of humanity ". Robespierre's identification of moral principles with the nation was not evident to every Frenchman. Merely declaring belief in God was not enough. Robespierre felt that it had to be indoctrinated through a system of public education. For the ritual of the Catholic church, he would substitute a series of national festivals. " The greatest of all spectacles is that of an assembled, free people ". The remarkable thing about Greek

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national festivals, he thought, was not the games. It was the spectators themselves, the conquerors of Asia whom " republican virtues had raised above the rest of mankind ". Frenchmen could outdo the Greeks by holding national and local festivals. Under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the Frenchman might learn to love his country better, arouse more enthusiasm for law and liberty, and, incidentally, learn to hate traitors with more ardor. The nature of these festivals could be determined by the title given to them. Since " Nature " had given Frenchmen their country, it would enjoy the most beautiful holiday. " August Liberty " would come next in the celebration while " Sweet and Holy Equality" would share honors with "Humanity crushed beneath the feet of enemies of the French Republic ". A " sacred and fraternal banquet" would celebrate the " Festival of the Human Race ". Other festivals were calculated to honor past and present heroes of France and its imitators in the struggle for liberty. The greatest celebration of all was reserved for the " martyrs " who had died fighting for French liberty. Bara was the most important of these. As a boy of thirteen, he had destroyed a bridge under the fire of rebel soldiers. Wounded, he had cried out, " I am dying. It does not matter. I die for liberty ". " Worthy child ", Robespierre said, " how proud is France to have born you. Greece and Rome would have proudly honored you. Citizens, carry his ashes to the temple of glory. . . . Avenge him by ruining all enemies of France ". 11 Frenchmen were also to do homage at the " sacred grave " of Bara. Robespierre had in mind an even greater number of festivals. One of " Glory" would counteract a festival of " Misfortune ". Everyone would take part on such festive occasions, including "brave defenders of France; venerable old men; tender students of the nation growing up to extend its glory 11 A note in Robespierre's handwriting revealed that his hero was Agricol Viala and that when his mother heard of his tteath, she wept bitterly. When told that he had died for France, she ceased crying.

EMOTIONALISM

AND

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I7I

and reap its reward; young women to whom victory would soon return lovers and brothers; and mothers whose husbands and sons raised the Republic above the ruins of thrones ". The cult of nationalism made Robespierre feel that he was a " moral force ". It was much more comforting to him to believe that men were guillotined in defense of religious principles than because they differed with him personally or politically. It also had a distinctly utilitarian purpose. Once a god of the nation had replaced the God of the Church, patriotism, which to Robespierre was itself emotional, would be greatly stimulated; the Jacobins would become the hierarchy and Robespierre the high priest of the new cult.

CHAPTER XIII THE FESTIVAL OF THE SUPREME BEING A s an expert propagandist, Robespierre w a s well aware of the value attached to the w e a r i n g of buttons, medals, tricolored caps, and other patriotic symbols. H e k n e w only too well the eifect that spectacles and demonstrations had upon a people excited by speeches, and pamphlets stressing the beauties of patriotism and the j o y of dying f o r France. T h e French Revolution had succeeded in arousing patriotic f e r v o r through mass assemblies and exhibitions. Robespierre determined to try his hand at w h a t he considered would be the greatest of these, the festival of the Supreme Being. H e went before the Convention w i t h the proposal of the f o l l o w i n g decree in 1 7 9 4 : Article I. T h e French people recognize the existence of the Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. Article II. It recognizes that the best way of worshipping the Supreme Being is to do one's duties as a man. Article III. It considers that the most important of these duties are: to detest bad faith and despotism, to punish tyrants and traitors, to assist the unfortunate, to respect the weak, to defend the oppressed, to do all the good one can for one's neighbor, and to behave with justice towards all men. Article I V . Festivals shall be instituted to remind men of the Deity, and of the dignity of their state. Article V . These festivals shall be named after the glorious events of our Revolution, the virtues which are most dear to men, and most useful, and the chief blessings of nature. Article V I . T h e French Republic shall celebrate every year the anniversaries of July 14, 1789, August 10, 1792, January 21, 1793, and May 31, 1793. Article V I I . It shall celebrate, on successive decadis, the following festivals: T h e Supreme Being and Nature; the Human R a c e ; the French People; the Benefactors of Mankind; the Martyrs of Freedom; Liberty and Equality; the Republic; the Liberty of the W o r l d ; Patriotism; Hatred of Tyrants and Traitors; 172

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SUPREME

BEING

173

Truth; Justice; Modesty; Glory and Immortality; Friendship; Temperance; Courage; Good Faith; Heroism; Impartiality; Stoicism; Love; Conjugal Fidelity; Fatherly Affection; MotherLove ; Filial Piety; Childhood; Youth; Manhood; Old A g e ; Misfortune; Agriculture; Industry; Our Ancestors; Posterity; Happiness. Article V I I I . The Committees of Public Safety and of Education are instructed to present a scheme for the organization of these festivals. Article IX. The National Convention invites all those whose talents are worthy of serving the cause of mankind to the honor of assisting in the establishment of these festivals by submitting hymns or civic songs, or anything else likely to contribute to their "beauty or utility. Article X . The Committee of Public Safety shall award distinction to such works as appear to it calculated to achieve these objects, and shall reward their authors. Article X I . Freedom of worship is confirmed in the terms of the decree of 18 frimaire. Article X I I . Any meeting of aristocrats, or any that contravenes public order, shall be suppressed. Article X I I I . In the event of troubles caused by or arising out of any form of public worship, all those who excite them by fanatical preaching or counter-revolutionary suggestions, and all those who provoke them by unjust of uncalled-for acts of violence, shall be equally punished, with all the rigour of the law. Article X I V . A separate report shall be prepared, dealing with the detailed arrangements consequent upon the proposed decree. Article X V . There shall be celebrated, upon 20 prairial next, a national festival in honour of the Supreme Being. This decree called for a God whose chief attribute was nationalism. The Supreme Being was a God, who had endowed the French with a sublime mission to spread their principles throughout the world. The aristocrats, who were not patriotic, were placed in the same position as Jews and Protestants under the old regime. The cult of the Supreme Being was not at all tolerant of those who dissented.

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Perhaps the greatest tribute which Robespierre's speech could have won was the popular approbation and support it received even from his follower, Couthon, who had previously taken joyin blasphemy. 1 Couthon made amends by demanding that Robespierre's speech be placarded on every wall of Paris and translated into every known language so that the whole world might know what Frenchmen really believed. Payan had the Commune pass a vote of congratulation. Maréchal, the apostle of atheism, wrote a hymn in honor of the Supreme Being.2 At the Jacobins, Lequino applauded the sublimity of Robespierre's principles, only to be reminded that he had written two> books disproving the existence of the Supreme Being. The Jacobins were placated, however, by Lequino's explanation which proved virtue to be the motive of his actions. 3 Article I of the decree was written in gold upon the former temples of reason and was read aloud in the same buildings. Robespierre's Supreme Being was especially popular in those regions where fear of foreign invasion or ecclesiastical trouble demanded worship of patriotism. In other sections, difficulty was encountered in differentiating the Supreme Being from the atheistical or rationalistic cults it replaced. Robespierre was not in favor of attempts to promulgate his religious beliefs by strict penalties for non-adherents. Perhaps he suspected an attempt to discredit his proposals by exaggeration. At the Jacobins on May 15, Julien de la Drome proposed that any person who did not believe in the Supreme Being should be exiled. Robespierre opposed this, declaring that virtue, truth, and nature did not need such support : " The French people and all the people of the universe have recognized the principles of the Convention. What matters a few conspirators seeking to slander it ? Can they prevail over the French people, the human race and nature " ? 4 True, Rousseau had proposed 1 Révolution

française,

2 Annales historiques,

LI, 255, 311. I, 212.

3 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V I , 116-117.

4 Ibid., pp. 133-135-

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175

such punishments, but this principle would cause too much terror among imbeciles and the corrupt. H e believed it better to leave this principle in the writings of Rousseau and not attempt to put it into practice. In discussing Lequino, he said, " W h e n we dreamed of consolidating the foundations of virtue and patriotism, w e had no desire to become persecutors ", 5 T h e Supreme Being, to w h o m Robespierre appealed, seemed to watch over him with particular care as preparations were being made to celebrate the great festival. O n M a y 23, a man named Admiral, w h o had waited all day to shoot Robespierre, fired at Collot d'Herbois, f o r lack of a better target. O n the next evening, a y o u n g woman by the name of Renault, called at the Duplays, where Robespierre was staying " t o see what a tyrant looked like " . A l t h o u g h she carried two knives, it was doubtful whether she really intended to kill Robespierre. T h e opportunity f o r Robespierre to vaunt the protection accorded him by the Supreme Being was not to be lost, however. A t the Jacobins on M a y 25, there was much hysteria over this new " plot " of the English to kill the " most ardent defender of la Patrie ".

Collot d'Herbois and Robespierre rejoiced at the

sympathetic statements of their confrères. Robespierre, in particular, looked upon himself as a " martyr " f o r his country. " W h e n the tyrannical powers of Europe band together to stifle our immortal Revolution, an ardent partisan of the sacred rights of man need not think he will live long ", he declared. " I do not believe in the necessity of living ; I trust only in virtue and Providence " . H e was more ready than ever to persecute enemies of the people. Attempts at assassination, had, apparently, made Robespierre a saint of the new cult of patriotism. Providence would give patriots the faith with which to fight all enemies of France, he said. T h e speech was followed by " unanimous and prolonged applause, f o r the true bravery, the grandeur of a republican soul, the greatest devotion to the cause of liberty and the most pronounced philosophy ". 5 A u l a r d , La société des Jacobins, V I , 135.

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A t the Convention, Robespierre officially thanked the " Eternal Author of Things " and lent an accent of piety to his joy. " Let us rejoice he said, " and give thanks to the Heavens since we have served our nation well enough to be judged worthy of the poignards of t y r a n n y " . Robespierre, however, wanted no rivals in his " martyrdom " . A t the Jacobins, Rousselin proposed voting civic honors to the locksmith who aided Collot d'Herbois, but Robespierre would have none of it and Rousselin was ejected from the Club. The " parricides " were brought to trial. They were so-called because they had attempted to murder the " father of the Revolution " . Altogether, fifty-four people were guillotined for complicity in the affair. Renault's relatives were included, although in 1788 Robespierre had declared that relationship to a criminal was no crime in itself. The guillotine even claimed Nicolle, the little servant girl of a mistress of a Hebertist. When Nicolle was led to the guillotine there were cries of " No children ", 6 but Robespierre had ceased to be a humanitarian. The Supreme Being had protected his life, because France demanded it. No sympathy could be bestowed upon those who were suspected of thwarting the will of Providence. Worship of the Supreme Being had become fanatical, the very crime with which it had charged Catholicism. Robespierre wished the French people to see the close connection between the worship of the Supreme Being and worship of the nation. He proposed that the feast days of the Supreme Being be identical with the national holidays of the French Republic. Especially elaborate preparations were under way for the greatest feast of all, that of the Supreme Being. Everything was under Robespierre's general supervision with the artist David in charge of the execution of the plans. David took Rousseau's Lettre sur les spectacles as a model.7 The plans called for the construction of a mountain on the Champ de Mars. There was to be room enough on its summit for the 6 Kerr, The Reign of Terror, p. 451. 7 Ward, Somerset, Robespierre, N e w York, 1934, p. 301.

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whole Convention, orchestras and the standard bearers of the armed section. A pillar fifty feet high stood on the summit beside a grotto, some steep pathways, an oak tree nearly one hundred years old, some candelabra holding torches, four Etruscan tombs and a temple of twenty columns. Songs were written for the occasion and music masters traveled about the city, teaching them to the crowds assembled at the street corners while the children were sent to the Academy of Music. The task of teaching so many people might have been difficult but for the fact that the hymns to the Supreme Being were sung to the air of the national anthem, the Marseillaise. David drew up a detailed program of the part to be played by every group in the festival. Even the beauty of the day and the brilliance of the sun were stipulated in these Details of the Order to be Observed,8 Such instructions were given as: " Already the sounds of martial music are echoing on every side, and thus the peace of slumber is succeeded by an enchanted awakening. . . . At the sight of the beneficient sun . . . friends, brothers, husbands and wives, children, old men, and mothers, embrace one another. Doorways are decorated with garlands and verdure; the chaste wife bedecks with flowers the locks of her beloved daughter; the son presents arms vigorously; the old man, with tears in his eyes, rejuvenates his courage in presenting the sword to the defender of liberty." According to David's Order, " at the sound of drums, armed youths form battalions. Mothers, carrying bouquets of roses, leave their sons and husbands. Fathers accompany their sons, sword grasped in one hand, an oak branch in the other. A salvo of artillery announces the time for departure from the Tuilleries ". David's description of the songs the people were to sing was " like the rumble of a troubled sea which the winds of the South raise and prolong to an echo heard in distant valleys and forests ". There were to be other songs, however, which would be " masculine and warlike ". The plans of the festival were 8 Le Moniteur,

June 7. i"94, PP- 1053-1054.

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elaborated in the greatest detail with specific instructions as to formation, routes to be followed, songs to be sung, and sentiments to be felt. A sudden obstacle arose when it was discovered that the M a n a g i n g Committee had chosen Marie-Joseph Chénier, a well-known Girondist, to write the words for the hymn to the Supreme Being. Robespierre rejected the words and an unknown poet named Desorgues contributed an ode adapted to the composer's melody. T h i s was to be sung by soloists and choruses of the National Institute of Music and the Opera. T h e mass of the people, however, were to do most of the singing and music teachers rushed about town, teaching crowds on street corners. Robespierre, himself, was well prepared f o r the great day. O n June 4, the Convention elected him as President so that he might have the m a j o r role. A f t e r weeks of preparations by all Paris, the great day arrived on June 8, 1794. Bugles awakened everyone at five in the morning. Robespierre donned his long blue coat, encircled by a wide tricolored scarf, a waistcoat of piqué with points, dimity breeches and parti-colored stockings. W h i l e waiting at Vilate's house, he gazed upon the people assembled f o r the festival and murmured half-aloud, " This is the most interesting part of humanity. O h nature, how sublime and delicious is your power. H o w tyrants will pale before the idea of this holiday ! "

9

A s he walked towards the Tuilleries, he

carried a bouquet of artificial flowers. Behind him marched the deputies, bedecked in like fashion with their tricolored plumes w a v i n g gaily in the light breeze of a beautiful June day. The procession wended its w a y to the Tuilleries where an amphitheatre had been constructed. T h e deputies seated themselves in the center of this, while Robespierre advanced to a chair decorated with the national colors of France. T h i s chair stood upon a tricolored rug, - in the center of the semicircle, and f r o m it, Robespierre could see the crown of the central dome of the 9 Pierre, Constantin, Hymnes et chansons de la Revolution, Paris, 1904,

op. 308 ff.

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Palace flaunting a huge Phrygian cap from which a tricolored banner six yards long floated. H e stood in silent contemplation of the scene before him. On two sides of the amphitheatre were actors and musicians of the Opera. At the foot were drums and beyond stood the people, framing the representative groups. Then he addressed the waiting assembly: " F r e n c h Republicans, first people of the world. The day has arrived that the French people consecrate to the Supreme Being. Never has the world which H e has created offered such a spectacle worthy of His regards. H e sees a whole nation, fighting the oppressors of the human race, suspend the course of its heroic work to raise its thoughts and vows towards the Great Being who gave it the mission to undertake it and the force to express it. W a s it not He who engraved on the heart of man the code of justice and equality? Did H e not decree the existence of the Republic, and give liberty, faith, and justice to all peoples ? It was H e who created man to arrive at happiness through virtue which is the love of France." H e then waxed eloquent over the beauties of patriotism " O generous ardor of the nation, naive and pure joy of young citizens. . . . O majesty of a great people, happy in the feeling of its force and glory. The day has arrived of the union of the first people of the world! " 10 " The Supreme Being," he went on, " created the universe to proclaim His power. H e made men to help and love one another, and to be happy through virtue. . . . It is H e who sublimates the most imperious and most tender sentiments before the sublime love of la Patrie. All that is good is His work because it is Himself. Evil belongs to depraved men who oppress their fellows. The Author of Nature has bound all mortals by a great chain of love and felicity. . . . French Republicans, you must purify the earth that they [tyrants] have soiled, and recall the justice that they have banished. Liberty and virtue issued forth together from the Divinity. One cannot live among men 10 Buchez et Roux, Histoire

parlementaire,

X X X I I I , 178.

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without the other. . . . People, deliver us to Him, to the just transports of joy. Tomorrow, once more, we shall combat vices and tyrants. We shall give to the world the example of republican virtues. . . ." He then advanced to a huge canvas statue of Atheism and applied a torch. Wisdom emerged from the flames with a somewhat smutty face owing to the proximity of the blaze. After the people had gazed upon the face of the Goddess until properly edified, Robespierre proceeded to deliver the sermon he had prepared for the occasion. In this, he accused kings of desiring to assassinate humanity. But the French need not fear their " sacrilegious " plots. " Heroes of la Patrie ", he said, "" your generous devotion is not utter folly. If the satellites of tyranny can assassinate you, it is not within their power to annihilate you." Frenchmen could link their transitory lives with God himself and immortality, if they believed in the Supreme Being. " Crush the impious league of kings by the grandeur of our character more than through the force of arms, he urged, "Frenchmen, since you combat kings, you are then worthy of honoring the Divinity." He concluded with the prayer, " Being of all beings, Author of Nature, the brutish slave, the base tool of despotism, the cruel and perfidious aristocrat, outrages Thee by invoking Thee, but the defenders of liberty can abandon themselves confidently to Thine eternal heart. Being of all beings, we have no unworthy prayers to offer Thee. Thou knowest the creatures of Thy hands; their needs no more escape Thine eyes than their most secret thoughts. The hatred of bad faith and tyranny burns in our hearts together with the love of justice and our country. Our blood flows for the cause of humanity. Here is our prayer, here is our sacrifice, here is the worship we offer Thee." The people listened in rapt admiration to this exposition. When the sermon was concluded, the procession was formed once again with Robespierre marching twenty paces in advance, while behind him walked the deputies and the people who chanted, " Father of the Universe " and several other verses

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to the Deity to the air of the national anthem. The scene was brightened by the multitude of tricolors which were waved in time to the music. In the midst of the procession was drawn a float representing Liberty seated in the shadow of an oak tree and surrounded by agricultural emblems in true Rousseauean fashion. An even greater display of antique busts, flowers, garlands, and flags greeted the eye as the procession approached the Champ de Mars. The mountain, the oaks, the grotto, the temple, and the classical columns made an impressive appearance as the people gazed reverently upon them. Poetry, dedicated to France and to God, was read, and the exercises concluded with the singing of nationalist hymns while the leader of the orchestra patriotically beat time with the tricolor. If there was any doubt about the patriotic character of the festival, the words and music to be sung soon dispelled it. 11 The procession, too, was calculated to arouse patriotism. The march to the Champ de Mars, renamed the Field of Reunion, was replete with patriotic symbols. A hundred drums and three military bands followed a detachment of cavalry and its trumpeters. Artillerymen, old men and youths, and a Car of Agriculture drawn by eight oxen brought up the rear. A figure of Liberty holding a club in her hand 12 sat beneath an oak tree on this car. The Convention followed the float. All were encircled by a tricolored ribbon, " carried by childhood adorned with violets, youth adorned with myrtles, manhood with oak leaves, and old age with vine branches." Every deputy carried a bouquet. Twenty steps in front of the procession marched Robespierre, the High Priest of the Supreme Being. The procession wended its way slowly past the site of the guillotine which had been removed for the occasion, and under a triumphal arch at the end of the Avenue de l'Ecole Militaire to the Field of Reunion. 11 See appendix, pp. 235-40. 12 Italics mine.

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The deputies ascended the Mountain while various groups assembled at the foot. Desorgues' and Gossec's composition, " Father of the Universe," was then sung. The choir sang some verses to the Deity to the tune of the Marseillaise, while trumpets marked the rhythm and the Conductor beat time with a flag. A t last, cannon roared out in salute and following the instructions to David, children threw flowers into the air, old men blessed the young, mothers thanked the Supreme Being for their fertility, and young girls vowed to marry no one who had not served the nation. The Festival of the Supreme Being was over. A s Aulard in his Christianity and the French Revolution 13 said, " In reality, there was no profound change in the new national and philosophic worship which had been installed in the place of Catholicism—nay, in its own temples. It was the fatherland that was worshipped more and more, whether under the name of the Supreme Being or of Reason, and very soon the two cults, which the people could not distinguish from one another, became lost and merged in patriotism." 13 P9

winning; the minority criticizes and the majority is corrupt. Vile and insolent people, your so-called representation is for sale. You know it and admit it. You settled your government by the Englishman's favorite maxim; the talents of your deputies are a commodity like the wool of your sheep or the iron in your factories. And you dare to talk of morality and freedom! How can those insignificant men whose principal merit consists in knowing the tariff of the British conscience dare to accuse the National Convention of corruption and insult the virtues of the French people? The continuation of the war was the sole means of wiping out this insult to the French national honor. " Generous people " , ran Robespierre's avowal, " we swear that you will be avenged. Before they make war on us, we shall exterminate all our enemies; the house of Austria will perish before France; London will be free before Paris becomes enslaved. The destinies of the Republic and those of the tyrants of the earth have been weighed in the eternal balance. . . . Frenchmen, let us forget our quarrels and march against the tyrants, conquer them, you by your arms, and we by our laws. Let traitors tremble; let the last cowardly emissary of our enemies disappear; let Frenchmen triumph and innocence reassure itself. Frenchmen, fight, your cause is holy, your courage is invincible, your representatives know how to die; more than that, they know how to conquer." One might also question whether the French would know how to cease conquering. The speech of December 5 was not that of a humanitarian internationalist. Rather it was that of a nationalist moved by a " holy mission " . The attitude of hatred which Robespierre nourished contributed to a war of conquest. His activities at the Jacobins were directed especially against foreigners, particularly the English. He demanded that all property of immigrants in France be confiscated. He called for the ejection of all foreigners from the Convention and the patriotic societies. Finally, he ordered the accusation of such well known aliens as Thomas Payne and Anarcharsis Clootz. The Jacobins entered into the spirit of this with alacrity. A t the Club on January 2 1 , 1794, they celebrated the anniversary of Louis' execution by burn-

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ing portraits of the kings of Prussia and France and then stamping upon the ashes. Robespierre was appointed to a Committee whose purpose was " to draw up an accusation of all tyrants On January 7, he requested that the Jacobins devote a session " to discussion of the crimes of the English government and the vices of the British Constitution ", 1 2 A f t e r listening on January 28 to a speech on these crimes, Robespierre declared that all speakers on that subject had missed the point. Their purpose, he said, should be to enlighten the English people and to impress upon the soul of the French profound indignation against the English government. Appeals should not be addressed to the English people. They should simply be the attentive witness of Jacobin discussions of republican virtues and French glory. The English people could take from the French constitution only that which suited its needs. T h e French made an error in throwing it, so to speak, into the face of the English. Besides, he explained, the English people could not be taught by addressing it directly because tyrants had raised a moral barrier of calumny, and a thick f o g of prejudice and passion between the French and other peoples. Moreover, the English people, he remarked, could hardly understand the French. " Y o u deceive yourselves ", he stated, " if you think that the English people are as moral and enlightened as yourselves. On the contrary, they are two hundred years behind you. A n d they hate you, because for centuries the policy of their government has been to arm the English against the French and to use war as a means of defeating the opposition party. It does not follow that the English will never have a revolution. They will, because they have been oppressed and ruined. The revolution will be the work of the French fleet and it will come about because the British Ministry is corrupt. Pitt will be overthrown, because despite his inflated reputation, he is an imbecile." 12 11 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V , 617. 12 Ibid., p. 596. 13 Ibid., pp. 630-31.

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The discussion continued on January 30, 1794. Robespierre began by objecting to the publication of a speech which contained the phrase, " Only when the peoples leagued against us seek peace on their knees, will we consent to make i t " . He wished the phrase stricken from the record, because, he stated that " on their knees or standing, we shall accord peace to other peoples only when they have broken their chains. There can be neither peace nor truce with corrupt and jealous peoples " . The war, apparently, would continue until all Europe was converted to French principles. Resuming his discussion on the English, Robespierre listed the reasons why he hated the English government and people: no distinction could be made between the English people; they were all bad, he assured the Jacobins. The sympathy felt for the English people was merely something like the feeling of the Girondists for the liberty of Belgium, while the Girondists neglected the happiness and tranquility of France. " Assure your own liberty before you busy yourselves with that of others", he said, amid great applause. Further approval greeted his statement, " I do not love the English, because they recall to me the idea of an insolent people daring to make war on a generous one which has regained its liberty ". His second reason for not liking the English was because they entered Toulon to proclaim a king; because the English government, perfidious even to its own people, dared to proclaim that in war,, no faith nor rule of honor need be kept with the French, because they were rebels who had crushed the holiest of wars beneath their feet. " A s a Frenchman, as a representative of the people, I declare that I hate the English people. (Applause). I will increase the hatred of my compatriots against it as much as I can. What do I care what they think! My only hope is in our soldiers and in the deep hatred which the French have for the English " . He did feel some pain, however, in seeing a great number of people governed by such insolent rascals. Perhaps the English and French could be friendly, if the English, following

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the French example, destroyed their despotic government. But until then, Robespierre vowed " implacable hatred " of them. Englishmen could not fight anyway, Robespierre asserted. " We shall see ", he vaunted, " whether a nation of shopkeepers is as good as a nation of farmers; whether their few ships are as powerful as our fertile lands. There is one thing more despicable than a tyrant. It is a nation of slaves. (Applause). They say that King George is an imbecile. That is very true ; but his agents are even more so. Pitt is corrupt ; his employers are so to a greater degree. There is an opposition party : good luck to it ! When Parliament meets, we shall see how capable it is. If the representatives support the govèrnment, the English people are not worth the trouble of governing. We need not concern ourselves any longer with such a despicable nation. We neither love nor fear it. The best thing to do would be to plunge it again beneath the ocean from which it arose. As for us, let us build up our navy, gather our forces on all sides and peaceably achieve a revolution begun so happily. I reiterate my profession of faith : I detest the English people with all my heart as long as it is shamefully enslaved by despots. Free, it might once more secure the right to my admiration." 14 The frequent applause which interrupted this speech indicated that Robespierre's remarks had not fallen upon barren ground. The fruit of his efforts was the continuation of a war rapidly becoming one of plunder and conquest. It was a far cry from Robespierre's note, " We must arm, not to reach the Rhine ; that is eternal war ; but to dictate peace without conquest." Nor did Robespierre put into effect his promise of support to smailer states. The Committee of Public Safety sent three agents to Poland and these guaranteed French intervention, if the Polish revolt became less aristocratic and more popular, but Robespierre believed Kosciuzko to be too aristocratic. Perhaps more realistically, he feared the intervention of Russia should France interfere in Poland. National preservation came before a struggle to liberate other nations. The Committee did 14 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V, 630-35.

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seek an alliance with Turkey, perhaps believing that Poland could be freed if the Coalition were defeated. Robespierre was not interested in aiding smaller nations, because he wished, first, to protect France. His desire to do that engaged all his attention. H e saw foreign plots and attempts to divide the nation everywhere. " Is the stranger who comes in your midst, adorned with a bonnet rouge to strike at your heart, less to blame than the Austrian who plunges a bayonet into the breast of defenders of liberty? " 16 he asked, and answered, " A spy sent by foreign powers to get our secrets . . . is a thousand times more guilty than the automaton armed by kings to assassinate your brothers." Even plans for peace, as Danton discovered to his sorrow, were regarded by Robespierre as foreign plots. Robespierre's foreign policy was dictated by hatred and suspicion. H e could consider no peace proposals with such hateful enemies. The war had to be fought to a finish. The principles of France, if not its boundaries, had to be spread throughout Europe. France was, to Robespierre, the bearer of a higher civilization than any of its enemies. A war of conquest was necessary to give Europe the principles of the revolution. Therein lay the tragedy of Robespierre. Liberty, equality and justice had to be spread abroad by the sword, if necessary. N o other type of government except a republic would do, even though France itself might have to abandon its own principles for a " democratic dictatorship " in order to give all Europe the blessings of democracy. 15 Aulard, La société des Jacobins, V, 550.

CHAPTER

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ROBESPIERRE, Saint-Just and Couthon had helped to create the machinery of the Terror. They had centralized the government in Paris, and vested its control in the Jacobins. Through constant " purgings " they had eliminated all voices of discontent outside the Jacobin party. Within the party, all agreed with the triumvirate. The only problem that remained was the control of the " lunatic fringe " who wished to extend the agencies of the Terror even further. Robespierre had incurred the hatred of figures such as Barère, Fouché, and Vadier in urging that some check be put upon revolutionary excesses. Now, he found himself in the same position in which a Roland, a Danton, a Hébert, or a Desmoulins had been placed. All had helped to create a monster in the form of exaggerated nationalism which ultimately devoured them. Not that Robespierre wished to curb the nationalist activities of the Terror or to abrogate the prairial decrees. He had no desire to relent his attitude toward the aristocrats or foreigners. But he did wish to check the extreme activities of national agents like Fouché who took great pleasure in mass murders of suspected dissenters. It might have been a faint reawakening of Robespierre's humanitarianism, though that is unlikely. By 1794 Robespierre had reached the point where his humanitarianism was expressed in sending all enemies of France to the guillotine. More likely, it was an attempt to check the growing power of men such as Fouché who might seize control of the government. On the other hand, the group opposed to Robespierre was led on by the fear that unless they succeeded in undermining his power, the machinery of the Terror would crush them. The nationalistic fervor which engendered such suspicion, hatred, and. fear had reached the point where it could no longer be controlled. In the end, both Robespierre and the opposition fell before it. Behind the movement of Vadier and 214

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Fouché there was to be found much discontent with Robespierre's latest plans for France. T h e laws of ventóse had irritated those peasants who were not indigent and had, perhaps, frightened those who gained property during the revolution or bourgeoisie who wanted to buy land. 1 The laws provided that land would be taken away from " enemies of the Revolution ". But then anyone might become an " enemy of the Revolution " , if Robespierre should again change his idea of what the Revolution was. The Robespierrists believed only in their interpretation of the Revolution. There were, however, as many interpretations of the Revolution as there were factions. By eliminating all groups, the Robespierrist interpretation of the Revolution had prevailed for a brief time and had become " the Revolution." The machinations through which the opposition brought Robespierre's downfall need not concern us here. The first sign of an attack appeared when Vadier attempted to drag Robespierre into the Théot case in order to make him appear ridiculous. Robespierre and his friend Payan of the Commune of Paris became suspicious. Payan suggested that Robespierre had not gone far enough. 2 Instead of mere physical centralization of the government, all opinion should be forced to conform to one standard, that of the Jacobins. This was just what Robespierre and the Jacobins had been doing all along. W h a t Payan apparently meant was that greater force should be used in putting such standardization into effect. W h a t Robespierre had in mind was another purge along the same lines as those which rid France of the Girondists, Federalists, Dantonists and Hébertists. Robespierre withdrew from active work on the Committee in order to prepare an indictment against his accusers. He ceased making notes on the papers of the Bureau of Police on June 30. He spoke at the Jacobins only on June 11 and July 9, but he did not speak in the Convention between June 19 and 1 Supra, p. 1542 Correspondance, p. 443.

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July 26. T h e register of the Committee of Public S a f e t y bore his name for every day f r o m July 1 to 26, but his signature appeared only three times on decrees. H i s withdrawal made his enemies more suspicious than ever. A m o n g his Notes were to be found denunciations of Dubois-Crance, Delmas, Thuriot, Bourdon de l'Oise, and Leonard Bourdon. 3 Robespierre felt that it was necessary to protect himself against their onslaughts and delivered his speech of 8 thermidor (July 9 ) against the new factions. A g a i n , Robespierre did not attack his adversaries directly. H e seldom did. T h e whole speech was merely an explanation of republican virtue, patriotism. H e did his best to distinguish between true patriotism, that of the Robespierrists; and false patriotism, that of his opponents. T h e r e was not, in the speech of July 9, any attempt at the introduction of a new mode of attack. A s always, patriotism was to be the reason, or disguise, given f o r removing his enemies. Robespierre began by stating that the French Revolution was the first to have been founded on the rights of humanity and the principles of justice. It differed f r o m all other revolutions in its stress upon virtue which alone could save the Republic. H e denied that the patriots had been too severe against conspirators seeking to ruin France. A g a i n he harped upon the idea that patriots were really friends of all humanity in trying to save the fatherland. A n d once more, he insisted, " T h e y do not attack m e ; it is the nation they assault ". B u t there was a simple remedy f o r all these ills: a belief in virtue which was a " n a t u r a l passion . . . tender, imperious, irresistible, tormenting and delicious " . I t was a " p r o f o u n d horror of t y r a n n y ; compassionate zeal f o r the oppressed, that most sublime and holy love of humanity . . .; that generous ambition to found upon the earth the greatest republic of the world " . A s f o r himself, he w a s but a servant of the state, not a dictator; and when they attacked him, it was really France they were seeking to ruin. " I am just a martyr of the Republic " was his cry. 3 Courtois, Rapport No. LI.

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A s for the revolutionary government, it was the " rapid and sure march of justice ". None of the features of it which were slightly discredited could be attributed to him, he said. The Revolutionary Tribunal was not instituted by him alone; he minimized his share in the work of the Bureau of Police; and declared he preferred his status as a representative to that of a member of the Committee of Public Safety. Still, he said, there was need of action. The war was not yet w o n ; conspiracies were still a f o o t ; the army was torn by dissension. There was need of " purifying " the revolution once more. A n d the guiding principle as always, he declared, was virtue. " There is only one remedy ", he said, " for all our ills: it consists in obedience to the laws of nature which intend every man to be just, and to live a virtuous life, the foundation of all society." Virtue equaled patriotism: patriotism equaled obedience to the laws of nature: obedience to the laws of nature equaled virtue. A n d virtue, it is needless to add, meant support of the government as conceived by Robespierre. A good patriot, in the end always supported the government; a bad patriot only pretended to. Distinguishing between the two was easy enough: " A sentiment written in the hearts of all patriots is a touchstone by which they can recognize their friends." In other words, party loyalty would decide who were patriots and since Robespierre was a model patriot, they would necessarily conform to his standard of patriotism. One can hardly read the speech of July 9 without feeling that this was a supreme example of Robespierre's use of patriotism. Not high and mighty ideals or principles motivated this speech, but a desire to save his own position; to oust men who were conspiring against him and who had fastened upon him the title of " dictator ", which could hardly be applied to him alone, was behind this pompous explanation of virtue. The speech of July 9 did not stir the Convention just as it fails to move the reader of the present day. The rift widened within the Committee of Public Safety as Robespierre and Carnot broke openly over " military despot-

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ism ". Robespierre insisted that quarter should be refused to English or Hanoverian troops. Carnot would not enforce the decree. Barere on July 22 and 23 did make an attempt to bring Robespierre and his opponents within the Committee together by putting forward a plan to work out the ventose decrees. Robespierre refused to be conciliated. There was too much suspicion on all sides. On July 26, Robespierre delivered his last speech to the Convention, 4 reiterating his old stand about virtue, " the sacred love of la Patrie " and his denial of dictatorship. Again, there was the plea for a purification of the government with unification under the control of the Convention. N o novel ideas were to be found here, just the use of more force and greater virtue. A t the Jacobins that evening, he appeared to realize he was beaten. 5 H e seemed to shrink from immediate action and preferred to think of martyrdom instead. Robespierre still believed that the " mass of the Convention is pure " ; that is, adhered to his policies, and, apparently, had some hope that he could outmanoeuvre such politicians as Collot, Tallien, Carnot, Barere, and Fouche, the latter the most dangerous of all. Billaud-Varenne and Vadier made a last desperate attempt to sway the Convention and won. W i t h the Convention openly hostile to him, Robespierre, spurred on by the consciousness of defeat, attempted to regain the control which was fast slipping from him. A dramatic scene ensued when Saint-Just, the colleague of Robespierre, attempted to speak. The Convention refused to listen, and tumult filled the air, rising to even greater proportions, when Robespierre began to speak, faltered, and then sat down, while the deputies cried out that " the blood of Danton chokes him ". If the spectre of Danton was hovering over the Convention, it must have smiled sardonically, as one by one, Robespierre and his fellows were outlawed and carried off to prison. He still had a few friends left, however, and these managed to transfer 4 Le

Monitcur,

5 Annates

July 29, 1794-

historiques,

I, 497.

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2IÇ

him to the Hôtel de Ville, from which they planned to sally forth to attack the Convention. For once in his life, Robespierre seemed to be lethargic, and the opportunity was lost when the soldiers of the Convention arrived to arrest the group with great violence. Wounded and welcoming death, Robespierre was brought to the scaffold where, on his account, so many had preceeded him. To the very last, Robespierre and his compatriots insisted that they were acting solely for the benefit of France. To the last, the Jacobins at the Club were faithful to Robespierre.6 The Commune of Paris, the " purest patriots of all ", defended the Robespierrists. A final appeal was made to the armies in the name, not of the government, but of the " French People ", and to the patriots of the Section des Piques to act for the nation. But Barras and Bourdon attacked Robespierre with their soldiers and all was over.7 The agencies and emotions which Robespierre had helped to create destroyed him. Maximilien Robespierre was one of the first modern nationalist " democratic " dictators.8 Beginning as a humanitarian nationalist imbued with the liberal thought of eighteenth century philosophy, the events of the war changed him into an intolerant Jacobin nationalist, fanatically eager to preserve France and to spread its civilization abroad. He turned from a belief in a family of nations living peaceably together to a Europe completely under the domination of France. Gradually, he placed the idea of the nation above everything else. Private life became the concern of public officials. He insisted that every individual should think and act as the nation wished. Those who did not were silenced either by prison or the guillotine. When Camille Desmoulins cried out, " Burning is no answer ", he 6 Michon, Annales historiques, I, 499 ; the Archives nationales, F 7 4433, contains the documents centering about the last hours of Robespierre. 7 Archives affaire du 9

nationales, thermidor.

F 7 4432, Police générale

comité de surêté

générale,

8 Robespierre was " democratic " in the sense that he believed he ruled in accordance with the popular will.

220

ROBESPIERRE : NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

was attacking one of the major Jacobin means of cementing the nation. Jacobin power lay in the organization and efficiency of their clubs for which Robespierre was partly responsible. They were the true dictators of France during Robespierre's brief exercise of power, just as the Communist party, the Nazi, and the Fascist parties control the destinies of their respective nations today. Every Jacobin, Nazi, Fascist or Communist exercised some share of the government's dictatorial powers. The Jacobins, like their prototypes today, would be the first to deny that they were governed by the personal will of a single dictator. A leader was necessary and Robespierre eliminated enough of his opponents to claim that position. To the very end he believed that he voiced the will of the nation. This was true in so far as he created the general will through use of fear, propaganda, and appeals to patriotism. It was true also as long as Robespierre's " nation " or " people " consisted solely of Jacobins who agreed with his ideas. Robespierre was democratic in the sense that Mussolini, Hitler, or Stalin are democratic today. H e believed that not a majority, but the totality of the nation was behind him. Whether an honest vote would prove this to be true, is a matter of doubt, just as it would be in a dictatorial country today. But the fact remains that every nationalistic dictator believes himself to be much more representative than the elected representative of a country ruled by parliamentary government. This partly explains Robespierre's intense dislike of the English as a country ruled by despots. With Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, he believed that parliamentary democracy was too prone to corruption and bribery, while a government ruled according to the tenets of nationalism would govern in the interests of the whole nation, rather than in behalf of any particular group. This assertion that pure democracy can alone be found in a nationalist dictatorship was made first by Robespierre and echoed by contemporary dictators. Democracy as Robespierre interpreted the term meant not political democracy, but equality

ROBESPIERRE : NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

221

among patriots. Robespierre in common with present-day dictators believed that the abridgment of rights was necessary for the duration of the " emergency ", which somehow never ceased to exist in the dictator's mind. Robespierre differed from modern dictators in his lack of economic appeal, but this was largely owing to the fact that the Industrial Revolution has created problems not present in the days of the French Revolution. Robespierre's appeal was chiefly nationalist. H e spoke vaguely of a material paradise, he promised the French a united nation and the fulfillment of their historic civilizing mission. This type of appeal is an essential part of the program of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. Modern dictatorship may be an attempt to introduce the efficiency of the Industrial Revolution into government, and it may be an attempt to eliminate class warfare. But modern dictators, though their aims and methods may differ somewhat from those of Robespierre, resemble him in their use of patriotic appeals and their desire to unite the nation and make it supreme. Robespierre differed from modern dictators somewhat in the nature of the " enemies " he fought. H e did not have a " bourgeois ", a " capitalist" or a " proletarian class " to fight as a major enemy, but he did have the nobles and the clergy to assail. And there were as many " foreign spies " to root out as contemporary dictators find today. Like a modern Stalin or Hitler, these necessary purges often eliminated many personal enemies whose ideas differed from those of the Robespierre faction in the Jacobins. Another point of similarity is the way in which the majority of people in Robespierre's time was willing to surrender itself to a degree of repression hardly ever found in the old regime in return for the dictator's promises. A determined minority in all cases was able to seize power with popular consent after which the dictator eliminated the agencies with which he could be checked by the people. Courts became the tool of a new " revolutionary justice ". Everything done legally because the law "was the will of the dictator after legislative groups were abol-

222

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

ished or rendered impotent. All nationalist dictators are alike in their use of terror and propaganda. Robespierre's dictatorship might not have been so brief had he had the agencies of modern communication to aid Jacobin propaganda and to help him bring speedy retribution upon the heads of " spies " or " traitors ". Robespierre was a forerunner of the contemporary dictator in his faith in nationalistic education and his belief in a whole nation at war. His proselytizing desire to carry French principles abroad through propaganda and conquest was a manifestation of Jacobin nationalism which modern dictators have not been loath to follow. The war with established religion fought by contemporary dictators and their belief in a cult of nationalism had its counterpart in Robespierre's Supreme Being, a God who watched eagerly over the French. Dictators from Robespierre to the present have not secularized the nation so much as they have created a cult of nationalism. Robespierre for the brief period of his dictatorship was " the Revolution ". In that respect, he helped to create the state as we know it today. While he fostered and developed the spirit of Jacobin nationalism, he also unified France and protected it from internal and external dangers. H e helped to raise a beaten nation to a position of prestige and a degree of internal unity satisfactory to the majority of the nation. Had Robespierre not appeared as a leader of the Jacobins, France might have gone down to defeat or suffered internal disruption. In that case, Robespierre deserves greater credit than we have ever given him. But while he did preserve the nation, he unleashed an exaggerated nationalism which could be utilized by more capable men than he. Robespierre claimed that he put Rousseau's principles into practice. Napoleon went further and attempted to practice what Robespierre had preached. The " nation in arms " became a necessity to the " Little Corporal". The " nation in school", nationalistic ritual, and propaganda were quickly adopted by Napoleon. Even Robespierre might have been

ROBESPIERRE:

NATIONALIST

DICTATOR

223

astonished by the censorship which Napoleon was able to clamp upon France. But above all, Napoleon appealed to the nationalism which the Jacobins had helped to arouse. Napoleon, too, saw the day when his power was no more, but Jacobin nationalism as preached by Robespierre continued. Beneath the seeming complacency of the Restoration in France, the ideas of the Revolution were kept alive. Thiers, Guizot and Michelet created a legend and a myth of the Revolution. The Napoleonic Legend from 1830 to 1848 fostered a belief in the nationalism which Robespierre had preached. Louis Napoleon's success was proof that the spirit of Jacobin nationalism was not dead. The French Republic is existing proof that Robespierre built upon a strong foundation. O f all the revolutionaries, Robespierre would be most at home in the contemporary world. H e would recognize the technique of revolution. H e would see no discrepancy between the program of a dictator and its actual practice. H e would understand the frequent changes of mind while one single appeal, nationalism, was kept. The frequent " purgings ", so necessary to preserve party uniformity, would not be incomprehensible to him. H e possessed the key to an understanding of the " dirty swirl of contemporary affairs ". For Maximilien Robespierre was the first nationalist dictator of modern times.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE T H I S Bibliographical Note makes no pretence at being a complete study of all the works written about Ropespierre. It has been confined to those works which have an immediate bearing upon the problems of Robespierre's nationalism. Since none of the biographies of Robespierre deals directly with the problem, recourse was had to his speeches and correspondence. Most of his principal speeches were to be found in the Bibliothèque nationale and much of his correspondence in the Archives nationales. The chief guides to the study of Robespierre in the Archives nationales are: L'État sommaire des versements Faits aux Archives par les ministres et les administrations qui en dépendent, Tome premier, Fascicule quatre; Charles Schmidt, Les Sources de l'histoire de France depuis 1789 aux Archives nationales, Paris, Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907; and Pierre Caron, Manuel pratique pour l'étude de la Révolution française, Paris, Picard, 1912. The Etat sommaire par série de documents conservés aux Archives de 1891 lists all series. Series F, Etat sommaire des versements des ministères, F7, Police générale, Ministère de l'Instruction publique et des Beaux Arts, 1923 contains an index to much Robespierre material and correspondence. Other materials can be found in the Inventaires Manuscrits of the Salle de Travail at the Archives nationales. The following series are of value for Robespierre's work:

F 7 4332 Détenus dans les prisons de Paris, an III-IV. F 7 4330 Inventaire des papiers de la Commune de Paris, An III. Société des Amis de la Constitution: séances du Conseil. 1790 An III. F 7 4432-4433 Papiers relatifs au 9 thermidor. F 7 4785-4824 Cartes de sûreté délivrées par les comités révolutionnaires des sections de Paris 1792-1795. F 7 4435-4438 Papiers de la Sûreté générale. F 7 4437 Bureau de police. This contains the notes of Robespierre on Bureau reports. F 7 4436A Comité de salut public. Minutes of arrest. F 7 3821-3822 The Bureau of Police reports not found under F 7 4437. F 7 4551-4575 Alphabetical list of those arrested. F 7 2202-2210 Copies of several letters and decrees of the Comité de Sûreté générale for Prairial and Thermidor. FIa69-71,73-76,79-80 Comité de salut public. Information on agriculture, arts, commerce, food, and public aid not found in Aulard. AF I I *221 Bureau de Police. AF II *222-223 Bureau de Police. Correspondence of national agents with the Bureau of those arrested and replies. A guide to works on Robespierre and the Revolution in the Bibliothèque nationale is to be found in Martin, André and Walter, Gerard, Catalogue de l'histoire de la Révolution française, Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, 1936. 224

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

225

A. Tuetey Repertoire général des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française (Paris, 1890-1910), I I volumes. Maurice Tourneux, Bibliographie de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française (Paris, 1890-1913), 5 volumes. The chief manuscript works of Robespierre in the Bibliothèque nationale are to be found in the Nouvelles acquisitions françaises du départment des manuscrits pendant les années 1891-1910. Répertoire alphabétique des manuuscrits latins et français (Paris, 1910). The Description historique et bibliographique de la collection de feu M. le comte de la Bédoyère . . . sur la Révolution française, l'Empire, et la Restauration, rédigé par France (Paris, 1862), volume VI, no. 312 contains letters of Robespierre and volume I I contains Fouquier-Tinville's letters to Robespierre and also letters of Madame Roland to Robespierre. Robespierre's printed speeches and pamphlets in the Bibliothèque Nationale are to be found under the following code numbers: Lb 39 6607 A la Nation artésienne, sur la nécessité de réformer les États d'Artois, Nouvelle edition, in-8. Lb 39 8189 Avis au peuple Artésien, par M. de Robespierre, Paris, imp. de Potier de Lille, in-8. Lb 40 2253 Société des amis de la constitution. Discours prononcé par M. Robespierre à la société le jour de l'installation du tribunal criminel du département de Paris. Paris, Imp. du Patriote français, in-8, 1792. Lb 40 2284 Société des amis de la liberté ... et de l'égalité. Discours de M. Robespierre sur le parti à l'égard de Louis XVI. séance du 5 déc. 1792, Paris, imp. de Duplain. Lb 39 3482 Lettre de M. de Robespierre à M. de Beaumets, Paris, imp. de Potier de Lille, 1790, in-8. Lb 39 5224 Adresse de M. Robespierre aux Français, Paris, Paquet, 1791, in-8. Lb 39 5733 Observations sur la nécessité de la réunion des hommes de bonne foi contre les intrigants, proposées à tous les Français par Jérôme Pétion, maire de Paris et M. Robespierre, accusateur public du département de Paris, Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1791, in-8. Lb 40 594 Discours sur la liberté de la presse prononcé à la société des amis de la constitution, le 11 mai 1791, Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Lb 40 597 Discours de M. Robespierre sur le licenciement des officiers de l'armée, 10 juin, 1791. Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Lb 40 628 Discours de M. Robespierre à l'assemblée nationale sur la présentation de la constitution au roi. Imprimé par ordre de la société des amis de la constitution, 3 septembre 1791, Paris, Imp. du Patriote français, in-8. Lb 40 656 Société des amis, séante aux Jacobins, à Paris. Discours de M. Robespierre sur le parti que l'assémblée nationale doit prendre relativement a la proposition de guerre annoncée par le pouvoir exécutif,

22Ó

Lb

Lb

Lb

Lb

Le

Le

Le

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

prononcé à la société, le 18 décembre 1791, Paris, Imp. du Patriote français, in-8. 40 686 Discours de M. Robespierre sur les moyens de sauver l'État et la liberté. Société des amis de la constitution, 10 février, 1791, Paris, Imp. du Patriote français, in-8. 40 720 Discours de M. Robespierre sur l'institution d'une nouvelle garde pour la convention nationale, prononcé dans la séance du 2 octobre 1792, Paris, Imp. de Duplain, in-8. 40 751 Société des amis de la liberté et de l'égalité séante aux ci-devant Jacobins Saint-Honoré . . . Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. 21 avril 1793, Paris, Imp. Patriotique et Républicaine, in-8. 40 753 Société des amis de la liberté et de l'égalité, Discours de M. Robespierre sur la constitution 10 mai 1793, Paris, Imp. Patriotique et Républicaine, in-8. 2 687 Le Défenseur de la Constitution par M. Robespierre, député à l'assemblée constituante, Paris, Imp. de Duplain, 1792, Juin à Septembre, 1792. 12 nos. in one volume, in-8. 2 688 Lettres de M. Robespierre, membre de la convention nationale de France à ses commettons, Paris, Imp. de Duplain, 1792, Septembre 1792 à 15 mars 1793. 2 vols. in-8. 29 129 Motion de M. de Robespierre au nom de la province d'Artois et des provinces de Flandre, de Hainaut, et de Cambraisis pour la restitution des biens communaux envahis par les seigneurs, (no place of publication, no date).

Le 29 1101 Discours de M. Robespierre, député du département du Pas de Calais à l'assemblée nationale sur la pétition du peuple avignonnais. Imprimé par ordre de l'assemblée nationale 18 novembre 1790, Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1790, in-8. Le 29 1456 Discours sur I'organization des gardes nationales, Paris, Imp. Nationale, no date, in-8. Le 29 1506 Discours de M. Robespierre à l'assemblée nationale, Imprimé par ordre de l'assemblée nationale 16 mai 1791, Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Le 29 1515 Second discours prononcé à l'assemblée nationale le 18 mai 1791 par M. Robespierre, député du département du Pas de Calais, sur la reéligibilité des membres du Corps législatif, Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1791, in-8. Le 29 1554 Peine de Mort, Discours de Robespierre prononcé à l'assemblée nationale le 30 mai 1791, Paris, Prevot, in-8. Le 29 1640 Dernier discours de M. Robespierre sur la fuite du roi. 14 juillet 1791, Paris, Imp. de Voland, in-8. Le 29 1701 Discours par M. Robespierre sur la nécessité de révoquer les décrets qui attachent l'exercise des droits du citoyen à la contribution du marc d'argent, 11 août 1791, Paris, l'Imprimerie du Creuset, in-8. Le 38 245 Discours sur le gouvernement représentatif par M. Robespierre,

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

227

prononcé à la tribune de l'assemblée nationale, 10 mai 1793, Paris, Prévôt, in-8. Le 38 351 Projet de décret sur l'éducation publique par le citoyen Robespierre, lu dans la séance du 29 juillet 1793 Imprimé par ordre de l'assemblée nationale, Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Le 38 650 Rapport fait au nom du comité de salut public par Robespierre le 23 nivose, l'an II de la république, Imprimé par ordre de la Convention. Nationale, Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Le 38 622 Rapport sur les principes du gouvernement révolutionaire, Fait au nom du comité de salut public par M. Robespierre, Imprimé par ordre de la Convention, Le 5 nivose, an II. Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Le 38 688 Rapport sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la convention nationale dans l'administration intérieure de la république, fait au nom comité du salut public, le 18 pluviôse, an II, Imprimé par ordre de la convention nationale, Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Le 38 742 Rapport fait à la convention nationale au nom de ses comités de sûreté générale et de salut public sur la conjuration ourdie depuis plusieurs années par les factions criminelles pour absorber la Révolution française dans un changement de dynastie et contre Fabre d'Eglantine, Danton, Philippeau, Lacroix et Camille Desmoulins, prévenus de complicité dans ces factions, et d'autres délits personel contre la liberté par Saint-Just. Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1794. Le 38 643 Projet rédigé par Robespierre du Rapport fait à la convention nationale par Saint-Just contre Fabre d'Eglantine, Danton, Philippeau, Lacroix, et Camille Desmoulins, manuscrit inédit, Paris, (no publisher), 1841. Le 38 787 Rapport fait au nom du comité de salut public par M. Robespierre sur les rapports des idées religieuses et morales avec les principes républicains et sur les fêtes nationales. Séance du 18 floréal, an II, Imprimé par ordre de la convention nationale, Paris, Imp. National, 1794, in-8. Le 38 798 Convention nationale, Discours de M. Robespierre, prononcé dans la séance du sentidi 7 prairial, an II, Imprimé par ordre de la convention nationale, Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1794, in-8. Le 38 869 Discours prononcé par Robespierre à la convention nationale au peuple réuni pour la féte de l'Etre Suprême, 20 prairial, an II . . . Second discours . . . au moment où l'athéisme consumé par les flammes, à disparu, et où la sagesse apparaît à sa place, Paris, Imp. de Chaudrillie, 1794, in-8. Lb 41 3914 Département de Seine-et-Marne, Recueil contenant, 1, Rapport du comité de salut public du 18 floréal sur les fêtes nationales, 2, Discours de Maximilien Robespierre prononcé le 20 prairial, S, Hymnes des citoyen Marie Joseph Chenier, Liegard fils . . . et Gueniet, Paris, Imp. de Tarbe et Lefevre-Compigny, an II, in-8.

228

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

Lf 112-11310 Principes de l'organisation des jurés et réfutation du système proposé par M. Duport au nom des comités de judicature et de constitution par M. Robespierre, député . . . à l'assemblée nationale, Paris, Imp. Nationale, in-8. Ln 27 9117 Éloge de Gresset, discours qui a concouru pour le prix proposé par l'Académie d'Amiens, en l'année 1786, par M. Robespierre, avocat en Parlement, Londres et Paris, Royez, 1786, in-8. There is no one collection of Robespierre's works which is adequate. V. Barbier and C. Vellay began such a collection in 1910 for the Revue Historique de la Révolution française but the Œuvres complètes de M. Robespierre publiées d'après les sources originales never went beyond Robespierre's legal pleadings. Leseur began the publication of Robespierre's works for the Sociétés des études Robespierristes but never went beyond Robespierre at Arras and his legal pleadings. I t does, however, contain a description of Robespierre's early literary and poetic works. Some of the chief speeches are to be found in Charles Vellay Discours and rapports de Robespierre, Paris, E. Fasquette, 1908. The Correspondence of Robespierre is to be found in Georges Michon Correspondance de Maximilien et Augustin Robespierre, Paris, Alcan, 1926 published by the Société des études Robespierristes. Full reports of his chief activities are to be found in the following sources: Le Moniteur universal; journal officiel de l'empire français 5 mai, 1789— 31 décembre 1868. The volume for 1789 is a reprint. Archives parlementaires de 1787 a 1860, recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises, Paris, Dupont, 1862-1914, 127 v. Bûchez, P. J. et Roux, P. C. Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française, Paris, Paulin, 1834-1838, 35 v. Aulard, A. La Société des Jacobins: recueil de documents pour l'histoire du club des Jacobins de Paris, 6 v., Paris, 1889-1897, in the Collection de documents relatifs à l'historié de Paris pendant la Révolution française, publiée sous le patronage du conseil municipal. Recueil des actes du comité de salut Public avec la correspondance officielle des représentants én mission et le registre du conseil exécutif, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1889 Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France 26 v. Guillaume, James, ed. Procès verbaux du comité d'instruction publique de la convention nationale le ministère l'instruction publique, ministère de Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France. Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1891-1907, 6 v. Some additional material is to be found in Courtois, E. B. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargée de l'examen des papiers trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1795. Papiers inédits trouvés chez Robespierre Supprimés ou omis par Courtois. Collection des memories relatifs à la Révolution française, Paris, Boudouin Frères, 1828. 3 v.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

229

Laponneraye, Mémoires de Charlotte Robespierre sur es deux frères; précédés d'une introduction et suivis de pièces justificatives, Paris, Chez l'éditeur, 1835. Besides these source books, a considerable amount of material is to be found in the following reviews: Annales révolutionnaires 1908-1924 published by the Société des études robespierristes and continued under the title Annales historiques de la Révolution française edited by Mathiez, Laurent, and Lefebvre; La Révolution française, revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine published by the Société de l'histoire de la révolution ; the Revue historique de la Révolution française edited by Charles Vellay; and the Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine. Biographies of Robespierre are legion but the purpose of the present list is merely to indicate those of most value for the present study: Aulard, Alphonse, Les grandes orateurs de la Révolution française, Paris, F. Rieder, 1914. Belloc, Hilaire, Robespierre, New York. C. Scribner's Sons, 1914. Hamel, Ernest, L'histoire de Robespierre d'après des papiers de famille, des sources originales et des documents inédits, Paris, Lacroix, 1863-65; 3 v. M. Le Blond de Neuvéglise, La Vie et les crimes de Robespierre surnommé le tyran depuis sa naissance jusqu' à sa mort, Augsbourg, 1795. Lewes, G. H. The Life of Maximilien Robespierre with extracts from his unpublished corresponence, Philadelphia, Carey and Hart, 1849. Paris, J. A. La Jeunesse de Robespierre et la convocation des Etats généraux en Artois, Arras, Rousseaux-Leroy, 1878. Thompson, J. M. Robespierre, Oxford, Blackwell, 1935, 2 v. Ward, Somerset, Robespierre, a study in deterioration, New York, Macmillan, 1934. SECONDARY W O R K S

Early Influences and Philosophy Champion, Edme, J. J. Rousseau et la Révolution française, Paris, Colin, 1830. Elton, Godfrey, The Revolutionary Idea in France, New York, Longmans, Green, 1923. Espinas, Alfred, La philosophie du XVIII'e siècle et la révolution, Alcan, Paris, 1898. Hyslop, Beatrice F., French Nationalism in 1789 according to the general • cahiers, New York, Columbia University Press, 1934. Meynier, Albert, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Révolutionnaire, Paris, Alcan, 1909. Mornet, Daniel, Les Origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française, Paris, A. Colin, 1933. Schatz, Richard, J. J. Rousseaus Einflusz auf Robespierre, Leipzig, Noske, 1905.

23 o

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

Vaughn, C. E., editor, The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Cambridge University Press, 1915, 2 v.

Rousseau,

The controversy between Aulard and Mathiez has thrown much light upon the struggle between Danton and Robespierre. On this point see: Aulard, Études et Leçons, I, pp. 137-188, 268-281; II, 39-106 III, 51-240; IX, 45-70 and his Historique politique de la Révolution française, fifth edition, Paris, 1921. His Christianity and the French Revolution, London, Benn, 1927, gives a good account of revolutionary ideas about religion. For another point of view see: Mathiez, La Politique de Robespierre et le 9 thermidor expliqués par Buonarroti, Paris, Le Puy, 1910. , Autour de Danton, Paris, Payot, 1926. , Autour de Robespierre, Paris, Payot, 1925. , Contributions à l'histoire religieuse de la Révolution française, F. Alcan, Paris, 1907 Études Robespierristes, Part One. , La Corruption parlementaire sous la Terreur, Paris, A. Colin, 1917. , Part Two La Conspiration de l'étranger, Paris, A. Colin, 1918. , La Révolution et les étrangers, Paris, La Renaissance du Livre, 1918. , Danton et la paix, Paris, La Renaissance du livre, 1919. , L'Aflaire de la Compagnie des Indes, Bibliothèque d'histoire Contemporaine, Paris, Alcan, 1920. -, Robespierre terroriste, Paris, La Renaissance du livre, 1921. Contains Robespierre's Notebook. , La Vie chère et le mouvement social sous la Terreur, Paris, Payot, 1927. , The Fall of Robespierre, London, Williams and Norgate, 1927. , Girondins et Montagnards, Paris, Firmin-Didot et Cie, 1930, fifth edition. , Le Dix Août, Paris, Hachette, 1931. , After Robespierre, the Thermidorian Reaction, New York, Knopf, 1931. The list of general works is necessarily limited to those touching directly upon the subject. Of these the most important are Thiers, Histoire de la Révolution française, Paris, 1823-27; Mignet, Histoire de la Révolution française depuis 1789 jusqu' à 1814, Paris, 1824; Michelet, Précis de l'Histoire moderne, Paris, 1827; Lamartine, Histoire des Girondins, Paris, 1847; Louis Blanc, Histoire de la Révolution française, Paris, 1847; Michelet, Le Peuple, Paris, 1846; Aulard, Études et Leçons sur la Révolution française, nine series, Paris, 1893-1924: Lord Acton, Lectures on the French Revolur tion, London, 1910; Histoire politique de la Révolution française, Paris, 1922; Sagnac and Pariset in La visse, Histoire de France contemporaine, Paris, 1920; and Lefebvre, Guyot and Sagnac, La Révolution française, Paris, 1930.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

23I

SPECIAL W O R K S D E A L I N G W I T H T H E T O P I C ARE:

Barthou, Louis, Le neuf Thermidor, Paris, Hachette, 1926. Belloni, Georges, Le Comité de sûreté générale de la Convention nationale, Paris, L. Arnette, 1924. Brinton, Crane, The Jacobins, New York, Macmillan, 1930. Brugerette, J., Le club des Jacobins, Paris, Librairie Blond et Cie, 1904. Bruun, Geoffrey, Saint-Just, Apostle of the Terror, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1932. Buffenoir, Hippolyte, Les Portraits de Robespierre, étude iconographique et historique, souvenirs, documents, témoignages avec quatre portraits inédits, Paris, E. Lerroux, 1909. Cardinal, L. de., La Province Pendant la Révolution, Histoire des Clubs Jacobins, 1789-1795, Paris, Payot, 1929. Caron, Pierre, Paris pendant la Terreur, Rapports des agents secrets du ministre de l'intérieur, Société d'histoire contemporaire, Paris, Publications, no. 50, 61, 2 v. Coûtant, Paul, De Robespierre à Fouché, Paris, Flammarion, 1906. Curtis, Eugene Newton, Saint-Just, Colleague of Robespierre, New York, Columbia University Press, 1935. Gosselin, Louis L. The Tribunal of the Terror, a study of Paris in 1798-96 translated by Frederick Lees, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1909. , Le mysticisme révolutionnaire; Robespierre et la Mère de Dieu, Paris, Perrin et Cie., 1926. Hayes, Carlton J. H. Essays on Nationalism, New York, Macmillan, 1926. , The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, New York, Richard R. Smith, 1931. Hericault, Charles, La revolution de thermidor, Robespierre et le Comité de salut public, Paris, Didier, 1878, second edition. Jacob, Louis, Joseph Le Bon, la Terreur à la frontière, Paris, Mellottée, 1933. Kerr, W. B. The Reign of Terror, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1927. Lamartine, Alphonse de, Histoire des Girondins, Paris, Hachette, 1913. Ording, Arne, Le Bureau de police du Comité de Salut Public, etude sur la Terreur, Videnskaps-akademi i Oslo skrifter, II, Historiskfilosofisk klasse Oslo, 1930 v. 6, pp. 1-195. Pierre, Constant, Les hymnes et chansons de la Révolution, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1904. Recueil d'hymnes républicaines qui ont paru à l'occasion de la féte à l'Être suprême, Paris, Barba, 1794. Richard, Camille, Le comité de salut public et les fabrications de guerre sous la Teneur, Paris, E. Rieder, 1921. Saviné, A. Le 9 thermidor d'après les documents d'archives et les mémoires, Paris, L. Michaud, 1907.

232

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

Sempell, Charlotte, Maximilian Robespierre doktrinärer revolutionär Verlagdr, Berlin, Emil, 1931. Stefané-Pol, Autour de Robespierre, Le Conventionnel Le Bas, Paris, C. Flammarion, 1901. Tiersot, Julien, Les Fêtes et les chants de la Révolution française, Paris, Hachette, 1908. , Histoire de la Marseillaise, Paris ( Delagrave, 1915. Villat, Louis, La Révolution et l'Empire, Paris, Les Presses universitaires de France, 1936, 2 v. Wallon, Henri, Le Tribunal révolutionnaire, 10 mars 1793-81 mai 1796, Paris, Pion, Nourrit et Cie, 1900. Walter, Gérard, Robespierre, Paris, Gallimard, 1936. A list of periodical articles touching directly or indirectly upon Robespierre's nationalism would be too lengthy to include here. Instead, a few of the articles of major importance follow: Aulari, " Le comité de salut public," Révolution française, XVIII, pp. 5, 125, 232, 434; XIX, p. 27. , "Le club des Jacobins," Révolution française, XXIII, p. 106. , "La politique religieuse du comité de salut public," Révolution française, X X X , p. 97; X X X I , p. 91. , "La Presse officieuse sous la Terreur," Études et Leçons sur la Révolution française, I, X I . Bergounioux, "La popularité de Robespierre en 1789," Annales Révolutionnaires, VIII, p. 720. Combet, Joseph, "Les arrêtes de Robespierre Jeune dans les Alpes Maritimes," Annales Révolutionnaires, IX, p. 315. Compagnac, " Robespierre et la politique étrangère," Nouvelle Revue, v. 60, pp. 193, 299; v. 61, p. 29. Counson, " Franklin et Robespierre," Mélanges Baldensperger, Paris, Champion, 1930. Dommanget, " Robespierre et les cultes," Annales historiques, I p. 193. Dubreuill, "L'idée régionaliste sous la Révolution," Annales révolutionnaires, v. 11, p. 323. Eude, " L a Commune robespierriste," Annales historiques, X, p. 414; v. 11,. p. 323, 528; v. 12, p. 132. Ganges, "Robespierre, dictateur," Revue mondiale catholique, CXXXIV,. p. 21. Guillaume, Le personnel du comité de salut public," Révolution française,. XXXVIII, p. 297. , "Le personnel du comité de sûrete générale," Révolution française,. XXXVIII, p. 124, 299. Héritier, " Robespierre, ou le ' Saint de la Démocratie '," Revue des Questions Historiques, CIX, p. 313. La Forge, " La Liberté de la presse pendant la Révolution française,"' Révolution française, I, p. 41.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

233

Lefebvre, " La rivalité du comité de salut public et du comité de surêté générale," Revue historique, CLXVII, p. 366. Leleu, " Robespierre et le société populaire de Lille," Révolution française, XII, p. 42. Lemoine, " L'origine du club des Jacobins," Révolution française, LXXXVII, p. 17. Levi, " Saint-Just et Robespierre," Révolution française, LXXII, p. 387. Levy-Schneider, " Les démêlés dans le comité de salut public," Révolution française, XXXVIII, p. 97. Le Roi, " Lettres inédites de Robespierre," Mémoires de la Société des sciences morales de Seine-et-Oise, Versailles, II. Madelin, Louis, " Le Règne de la Vertu, la dictature de Robespierre," Revue des Deux-Mondes, February, 1911. Mathiez, " Robespierre et la réunion d'Avignon," Annales historiques, III, p. 583. , " Comptes rendus des séances des Jacobins en 1791," Révolution française, L X X X I X , p. 151. " Le carnet de Robespierre," Annales révolutionnaires, X, p. 1. " L'opposition entre les Girondins et les Montagnards," Annales révolutionnaires, XV, p. 177. " Robespierre et l'Armée," Annales révolutionnaires, VIII, p. 131. " Les divisions dans les comités de gouvernement," Revue historique, CXVIII, p. 70. " Robespierre terroriste," Annales révolutionnaires, v. 12, p. 177. " La Révolution française et la théorie de la dictature," Revue historique, CLXI, p. 304. ' Le comité de salut public et le complot de l'étranger," Annales historiques, III, p. 305. "Le décrets de Ventôse," Annales historiques, V, p. 193. " Robespierre à la commune le 9 thermidor," Annales historiques, I, p. 289. " Robespierre jeune en Franche-Comté," Annales révolutionnaires, VII, p. 309; VIII, p. 79. " Robespierre et Joseph Le Bon," Annales historiques, I, p. 1. " Babeuf et Robespierre," Annales révolutionnaires, IX, p. 370. " Robespierre et Aigon," Annales révolutionnaires, XII, p. 33. " Fouquier-Tinville et Robespierre," Annales révolutionnaires, IX, p. 237. " Defense de Robespierre," Annales historiques, I, p. 193. "Les origines du comité de sûreté générale," Révolution française, XXVIII, pp. 257, 340. Michon, " Robespierre et la guerre," Annales révolutionnaires, XII, p. 265. , " Les Séances des 8 et 9 thermidor," Annales historiques, I, p. 497. Richard, " Robespierre, Saint Démocrate," Annales historiques, XIII, p. 192. Rouanet, " Robespierre d'après les comptes rendus parlementaires en 1789," Annales révolutionnaires, VIII, p. 336.

234

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

, " Robespierre à la constituante en julliet 1789," Annales révolutionnaires, X, pp. 162, 289. Salier, " Robespierre, ses principes, son système politique," Revue des questions historiques, LX, p. 135. Schroeder, " Robespierre, homme de lettres," Revue du dix-huitième siècle, III, p. 149. Teo, " Le Club Breton," Révolution française, XXXVI, p. 385. Vaillandet, " L e s Séances des Jacobins," Annales historiques, VI, p. 551. , " Robespierre et les Jacobins de Versailles," Annales historiques, VIII, p. 49.

APPENDIX The New York Public Library has a copy of the songs sung at the Festival of the Supreme Being. They are not found to be in the Bibliothèque Nationale and are not mentioned in histories of of the music of the period.1 The following are typical selections: Hymne A L'Etre Suprême Père de l'Univers, suprême intelligence Bienfaiteur ignoré des aveugles mortels, Tu révélas ton être à la reconnoisance Qui seule éleva tes autels Ton temple est sur les monts, dans les airs, sur les ondes, Tu n'as point de passé, tu n'as point d'avenir, Et sans les occuper tu remplis tous les mondes, Qui ne peuvent te contenir. De la haine des rois anime la Patrie Chasse les vains désirs, l'injuste orgueil des rangs, Le luxe corrupteur, la basse flatterie, Plus fatale que les tyrans. Dissipe nos erreurs, rends-nous bons, rends-nous juste, Règne, règne au-delà du tout illimité Enchaîne la Nature à les décrets augustes Laisse à l'homme la Liberté. Hymne à L'Etre Suprême Chanté par les Enfans. 0 Dieu puissant, invisible à nos yeux, Mais qu'en tes oeuvres l'on contemple! 0 toi dont l'espace est le temple, Qui dans ta mains tiens la terre et les cieux! 1 Recueil d'hymnes (républicaines sic qui ont paru à l'occasion de la fête à l'Être supreme qui à été célébrée décadi 20 prairial, l'an second de la république françoise ; précédé des discours de Maximilien Robespierre, président de la Convention nationale au peuple réuni. Avec figure représentant la montagne au champ de la réunion Paris: Barba l'an second de la République 1794 purchased January 5, 1916. 235

236

APPENDIX

Vers toi, dont il a reçu l'être, Le Français élève sa voix! Où sont-ils ceux qui t'osoient menacer? Qui, sous le manteau du civisme, Vils professeurs de l'athéisme, Du coeur de l'homme espéroient t'effacer? C'est à l'instant e leurs naufrages, Qu'ils ont vu, dans tous les esprits, Leur noms voués à d'éternals mépris Le tien à d'éternals hommages. Quand donc jamais des (sic) prodiges plus grands Ont-ils signalé ta puissance ! N'as tu pas délivré la France D'un joug antique et de ses vils tyrans ! De leur famille, avec audace, S'élvoit l'arbre déstesté: Tu l'as proscrit . . . et de la Liberté C'est l'arbre qui croît à sa place, Lorsque vingt rois, pour nous perdre aujourd'hui, Unissent le fer et l'intrigue Contre leur détestable ligue Que de bienfaits nous prouvent ton appui ! Tu couvres nos armes de gloire Et nos champs de riches moissons. . . . Tu fais, pour nous, combattre les saisons, Et la nature et la victoire. Par le cit. J. M. Deschamps. La Réunion des Patriotes Air: Valeureux Liégeois Le Républicain Doit pour le certain. E t ses jours et sa vie

APPENDIX

237

Paire le bien, Tout ne coûte rien Pour sa chère Patrie Veillons toujours nos ennemis, Il faut en purger la terre entière, Réunissons-nous, mes amis Et couvrons-nous tous de gloire. Le Républicain, etc. Nos troupes remplies de valeur Poudroyeront tous les despotes Nous aussi dans l'intérieur Nous exterminerons leurs cohortes, Le Républicain, etc. Nous ne pouvons qu'être vainqueurs, Ah! qu'elle est belle notre cause! Elle n'est fondée que sur l'honneur. Les droits de l'homme, rien autre chose. Le Républicain, etc. Aristocrates, sachez-le bien Que si vous n'êtes pas tranquilles Yous perdrez le goût du pain On vous guillotinera, on vous raccourcira Comme toute votre clique "Votre tête sautera, le Citoyen chantera, Vive la République. Par un citoyen de Bievre la Montagne. A la Liberté Air de la Piété Filale: Jeunes Amans

Tout citoyen régénéré Se montre en brave Patriote, Et chacun de nous ajuré D'honorer le bon Sans-Culotte,

238

APPENDIX

0 Liberté, rends nous la paix, Termine ces sanglantes guerres. . . . Fais que l'univers, désormais, Ne forme qu'un peuple de frères. Par le citoyen Person. Couplets Patriotiques Air: Du Camp de Grand-Pré Quand les rois de la terre Sont ligués contre nous, Pour les mettre en poussière, Français, unissons-nous ; Que le tonnerre gronde Qu'il se fasse sentir Sur ces tyrans du monde Pour les anéantir. Rendons tous nous hommages A ce grand Comité1 Dont les mesures sages Sauvent la Liberté Que les complots atroces Soient connus désormais; Que leurs auteurs féroces Soient punis à jamais. Il nous faut du Sapêtre Citoyens, hâtons-nous; Pour le faire paraître, Français, travaillons tous; Car le Peuple se lasse De se voir outragé De leur coupable audace, Il faut qu'il soit vengé.

Par le Citoyen Mireur. 1 Comité de salut public.

APPENDIX

Hymne à la Raison Air: Allons, enfans de la Patrie Arrache à l'orgueilleux Papisme Son masques et ses poignards sanglans Etouffe les cruels serpens Enfantés par le fanatisme. . . . The Marseillaise Aux Féroces Anglais Air: Allons: enfans de la Patrie Anglais sanguinaire et barbare Tu voulois nous donner des fers, La vengeance qui se prépare, Va faire frémir l'univers. Bientôt tes odieux rivages Seront couverts de nos soldats Ils seront suivis en trépas, De la terreur et des ravages. Aux armes, citoyens, punissons les forfaits Marchons, exterminons ces féroces Anglais. Affreux Pitt, ta scélératesse Va recevoir son châtiment; Déjà la foudre vengeresse Menace ton dernier instant Il faut que le crime s'expie; Qu'un vil tyran soit détrôné ; Beauvais est mort assassiné Entendez son sang qui nous crie: Aux armes, citoyens, etc. Plus de paix, éternelle guerre A ces insulaires si fiers ; Que leurs noms maudits sur la terre Le soient encors dans les enfers. Que les chefs de leur flotte impie, Sous nos coups tombent les premiers.

24O

APPENDXX

Accourez tous, jeunes guerriers, Pour écraser la perfidie. Aux armes, citoyens, etc. Il est tems (sic) de franchir les ondes Qui nous séparent d'Albion Trop long-tems on vit les deux mondes Plier sous son ambition C'en est fait; les sceptres chancellent: Vers un rivage détesté, Au nom sainte de l'humanité Deux cent mille Anglais nous appellent, Aux armes, citoyens. [No composer.] Air: Valeureux

Français

Dieu Bénis la révolution Oh, bénis notre indépendance! Bénis le drapeau d'union Conserve, conserve, la France Bénis les braves Parisiens, Ne cessant d'exposer leur vie Perdant leur fortune et leurs biens Pour la gloire de la patrie etc.

INDEX A Antoinette, 123 Archives Nationales, 69, 71 Aulard, 182 Avignon, 35-36 B Barère, 12, 84, 121, 151-152, 155, 157, 214, 218 Barnave, 52 Billaud-Varenne, 104-105, 139, 218 Breton Club, 52-53 Brinton, 184 Brissot, 45, 50 Bureau of Police, 156-158, 161 C Caraot, 12, 151, 217-218 Carrier, 100 Catholicism, 166 Chenier, Marie-Joseph, 178 Clootz, Anarcharsis, 48, 209 Committee of General Security, 156157, 160 Committee of Public Safety, 61-62, 68, 71-72, 81, 84, 106-107, 109-110, 118, 124, 150-151, 156, 159, 163,167, 183, 188-189, 190, 192, 194, 212 Commune of Paris, 219 Couthon, 84, 150, 161-163, 174, 191 D Danton, 104-105, 129, 131, 138, 140144, 146-147, 151, 218 Dantonists, 12, 52, 131-133, 149, 153, 158, 169 David, 176-177 Declaration of Rights, 42-45, 47, 51 Défenseur de la Constitution, 50, 62, 65 81 90 Desmouiins, 15, 49,129,132-138, 142, 151, 219 Dumouriez, 103, 122, 124, 127, 132, 147 E East India Company, 131, 136, 140 d'Eglantine, 130, 136-137, 141-143 Estates General, 34 F federalism, 97-98, 103 fédérés, 99 Feuillants, 58

Fouché, 100, 151, 162, 164, 214, 218 Fouquier-Tinville, 163 Franklin, 17 G Girondists, 13, 52, 91-92, 96,102, 125, 127-128, 144,147, 158, 169 H Hébert, 83, 102, 129, 133, 141, 153, 158 d'Herbois, 152, 175 J Jacobin Club, 13, 31, 41, 48-49, 52, 55, 60-62, 64-67, 69, 72-75, 84, 89, 95, 97-98, 110, 123, 126, 149, 157, 166, 214 L Lanthenas, 55-57 Lafayette, 63 Le Bas, 163-164 Le Blond de Neuvéglise, 15, 33 Le Bon, 59 Lefebvre, 184 Legislative Assembly, 30 Lepeletier, 76 lèse-nation, 73, 122 Lettres à mes Commettans, 62, 81, 203 lightning-rod case, 17-18 Louis XVI, 15, 21-22, 50, 146 M Marat, 125 Mark-of-Silver Law, 30 Maximum, Laws of, 183 Mirabeau, 14, 52, 142 Montesquieu, 15, 25-27 N Napoleon, 162, 222-223 Nation, 21, 34-35, 94 National Assembly, 30 Nationalistic Education, 75, 80 P Patriotism, 32-34, 36, 39, 60, 106, 112-113, 153, 179, 189, 220 Payne, 120-121, 209 Pétion, 52, 124, 141,147 Pitt, 197-198, 210 Police, Bureau of, 215, 217 241

24 2

INDEX

R Revolutionary Tribunal, 101-102, 104, 110, 119, 138, 152 Robespierre, Augustin, 100, 150, 162163, 190 Robespierre, Charlotte, 14-15, 18 Robespierre, Maximilien - Marie Isidore, 11-12, 14, 16, 29, 31-32, 39, 51-52, 65, 75, 85, 89, 95, 105, 115, 117, 129, 135, 138, 140-144, 151152, 156, 159, 161, 165, 167, 175, 178, 189, 196, 200, 211, 217, 224 Roland, Madame, 127 Roland, 141, 147 Rousseau, 13, 15, 26-31, 41, 174-176, 185 S Saint-Just, 104-105, 120, 141, 147,

150, 154, 157, 161-164,183, 190-191, 194, 214 Sieyes, 52 Société des amis de la constitution, 53-54 Société de la Révolution, 53 Sommerville, 19 Supreme Being, 30, 151, 168, 172, 183, 222 T Terror, 113, 116, 139 theatrical censorship, 86-87 totalitarianism, 89 V ventôse, laws of, 154-155, 183-184, 215 virtue, 24-25, 39, 138, 154

VITA THE author was born on November 17, 1909 in Beacon, N. Y . He attended Columbia College, receiving a Bachelor of Arts there in 1932 and a Master of Arts in 1933. He participated in the seminar of Professor Hayes on Nationalism and that of Professor Hazen on the French Revolution. He has taught History at Notre Dame College, Staten Island, and for the past two years has taught Modern European History at the College of New Rochelle, New Rochelle, N. Y . He has contributed book reviews to the Historical Outlook and contributed articles and biographies in Modern European History to the Columbia Encyclopedia.