Marx's Resurrection of Aristotle [1st ed. 2020] 3030570347, 9783030570347

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
Methodological
Linguistic
Revision
The Enlightenment Left
1: The Tyranny Greece Over Marx
Part One: Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation
1. Subjective Consciousness
2. Philosophy Confronts the World
3. Socrates and the Need for Political Participation
4. Hegelian Logical Categories
(a) Negation
5. Praise for Aristotle
1. The Rheinische Zeitung and Letters to Arnold Ruge
(a) Introduction
(b) The Enlightenment Center and Enlightenment Left
(c) “Debates on the Law of the Theft of Woods”
(d) Marx’s Rejection of Natural Laws
(e) The Hegelian Left
(f) Ludwig Feuerbach
(g) Aristotle’s Subsumption of Marx
(h) “Civil Society”
(i) The Tyranny of Greece and Rome Over Marx
Part One
Part Two Catalogue of Renaissance and Eighteenth-Century Poets and Playwriters
Part Three Syllabus of Scholars of Greek and Roman Philosophy and Law
Part Two: The Tyranny of Greece and Rome Over Marx: The Pre-Paris Period
Part Three: Tyranny of Greece and Rome over Marx in His Paris Period
Part Four: The Paris Manuscripts
1. Human Requirements and the Division of Labor under the Rule of Private Property
2. The Power of Money
3. Antithesis of Capital and Labor. Landed Property and Capital
4. Private Property and Communism
5. The Preface
6. Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole
Part Five: Marx in London
1. The Critique of Political Economy
2. The Grundrisse
(a) Humankind as a Political Animal
(b) Equivalence
(c) Reciprocity
(d) Constitutive Subject
3. The Manuscripts of 1861–1863
(a) Substance
(b) Essence
(c) Actual-Potential
(d) Soul
(e) Originative Agency
(f) Constitutive Subject
(g) End and Realization
(h) Aristotle’s Theory of Production
(i) Marx’s Theory of Labor
1. Family and Community
2. Household
3. The Organic Process of Production
4. Intercountry Trade
5. Money
6. Value
7. Retail Trade
8. Profit
9. The End of Equivalence
10. Need and Ability
11. Aristotle’s Condemnation of Capitalism
(a) Subjectivity
(b) Subject-Object
(c) Substance
(d) Subsumption
(e) Alienation
(f) Transformation
(g) Being and Becoming
1. Bibliographical
2. Self-Identification
(a) The Very Early Marx
Aeschylus
Cicero
1. The Philosophical and the Ethical
2. The Very Early Marx and the Early Marx
3. The Early Marx
2: The Restoration of Civic Humanism
1. Psychology
2. Ethics
1. Sustenance
2. Chrematistics
3. Politics
1. Impulse
2. Social life
3. Family
4. Tribes
5. Village
6. The State
1. Civil Society
2. Participation
3. Justice
4. Distributive Justice
(a) Distribution
(b) Justice
1. Proportion
2. Stability
3. Proportional Equality
1. Naturalism
2. Man as a Social Animal
3. Needs
4. Civil Society
(a) The History of Subordination
(b) The Introduction to the Process of Production
5. Government
6. State
7. Class
8. Constitution
9. Citizenship
10. Marx’s Revaluation of the Production-Distribution Calculus
(a) Justice
(b) Distributive Justice
(c) Proportionate Equality
1. Reciprocity
2. Requital of Service
11. How the Civic Humanist Tradition Continued into Marx
(a) Citizenship
(b) A New Calculus of Production and Distribution
1. Communism Versus the Republic
2. Just Distribution and Proportionate Equality
3. The Rebirth of Civic Humanism
3: Pneumatology of Labor
1. The Soul
2. Property
(a) Origins
(b) Forms
(c) Class
(d) Anti-Plato and Marx
3. The Method of Explanation
4. Family, Tribe, Village, State
5. Revolution
6. Ethics
(AA) Proportion
(BB) Rectification
(CC) Reciprocity
(DD) Mutual Recognition
(EE) Liberality
(AA) Discontinuity
(BB) Continuity
1. The Soul
(CC) Logic
1. Subject-Object
2. Actual-Potential
3. Realization
4. Particular-Universal
(DD) Method of Explanation
(EE) History
(FF) Associationism
5. Associationism
6. Master-Slave
4: Marx’s Pneumatology of Labor and His Methodology of Explanation
(a) Theory of Pneumatics
1. Subject-Object
2. Substance-Essence
3. Actual-Potential
4. Immanence
5. Theory-Practice
(b) Method of Explanation
1. Organic
2. Universal-Particular
3. Form-Content
4. Dialectic
5. Syllogism
1. Objectification
(a) Theory of Production
1. Metabolism
2. Metamorphosis
3. Appropriation-Consumption
4. Determination
5. Realization
6. Actual-Potential
7. Transformation: Metastasis
8. Subject-Object
9. Substance-Essence
10. Form-Content
(b) Method of Explanation
1. Method
2. Organic
3. Universal-Particular
4. Development
5. Immanence
6. Subsumption
7. Abstract-Concrete
8. Negation
9. Function
10. Precondition
11. Syllogism
1. Ontology
2. Historicity
3. Pneumatics
4. Teleology
5. Constitutive Subject
6. Need
1. Metaphysics
(a) Theory of Production
1. Constitutive Subject
2. Substance-Essence
3. Actual-Potential
4. Subject-Object
5. Appropriation-Consumption
6. Metabolism
7. Transformation
8. Valorization
9. Commoditization
10. Alienation
11. Moment
(b) The Theory of Explanation
1. Method
2. Precondition
3. Anatomy
(a) Anatomy
(b) Totality: Whole and Parts
(c) Function
(d) Universal-Particular
4. Abstract-Concrete
5. Subsumption
(a) Social-Productive
(b) Form-Content
6. Immanence
7. Relation
(a) Physical
(b) Social
8. Form-Content
5: Aristotle and Hegel as the Co-authors of Das Kapital
1. Aristotle’s and Classical Humanism’s Influence on Marx
(a) “Zoon Politikon,” Humankind as Social Beings
(b) The Linear View of History, or Anti-dialectical Materialism
(c) Materialism
(d) Production, Consumption, Distribution and Exchange
2. The Ancient Commune
3. The Hegelian Logical Categories Which Served as the Explanatory Methodology of Marx’s Theory of Production
(a) The Phenomenology of Production in Hegel, Marx, and Aristotle
(b) The Hegelian Logical Categories Which Served as the Explanatory Methodology of Marx’s Phenomenology of Production
(a) The Process of the Movement of Consciousness
1. Subject-Object
2. Process
3. Implicit-Explicit
4. Actual-Potential
5. Universal-Particular
6. Negation-Determination
(b) The Structure of Social Formations
1. Anatomy
2. Whole and Parts
3. Form-Content
4. Relationship
5. Sublation-Subsumption
6. Metabolism
7. Appropriation-Externalization
8. Productive Consumption
(c) Dialectic and Syllogism
(a) The Process of Production
1. Subject-Object
2. Process
3. Implicit-Explicit
4. Actual-Potential
5. Universal-Particular
6. Negation-Determination
7. Anatomy
8. Whole and Parts
9. Form-Content
10. Realization
11. Sublation-Subsumption
12. Metabolism
13. Appropriation-Consumption
14. “Productive Consumption”: Need
15. Syllogism
The MEGA (2)
6: The Ethical Basis of Communism
(a) Plato’s Continuity with Aristotle
(b) Plato’s Discontinuity from Aristotle
1. Private Property
2. Class
3. Party
4. State
(c) Marx’s Communism as It Existed in Plato
3A
3B
1. Civil Harmony
2. Governance
3. State
1. Will
2. Property
3. Value
4. Practical Mind
(a) Need
(b) Psychology
(c) The Industrial Productive Process
5. Civil Society
6. Ethics
7. Political Economy
8. Poverty
9. Welfare State
3. Marx
1A. Natural Law and Natural Rights
Section 1B. Materialism and Naturalism
Section 1C. Historicism
Section 2A. The End of Transcendence
Section 2B. The Overthrow of Political Economy
Section 3A. The Substitution of the Subject
Section 4. Marx and the Resurrection of Aristotle
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle Norman Levine

Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle

Norman Levine

Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle

Norman Levine Apartment 3206 Phoenix, AZ, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-57034-7    ISBN 978-3-030-57035-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57035-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and ­transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 The Tyranny Greece Over Marx  1 2 The Restoration of Civic Humanism115 3 Pneumatology of Labor163 4 Marx’s Pneumatology of Labor and His Methodology of Explanation203 5 Aristotle and Hegel as the Co-authors of Das Kapital259 6 The Ethical Basis of Communism303 Bibliography339 Index347

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Introduction

As a means of clarifying later portions of this book, it is necessary to introduce three clarifications. These clarifications fall under three categories: Methodological and Linguistic; Revisions; The Enlightenment Left.

Methodological Marx’s The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 no longer exists as a single text. The research of Jürgen Rojahn1 documents that The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 was a construction of the Soviet scholar David Ryazanov. The first publication of The Economic-­ Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 appeared in the 1932 Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA I and MEGA II). But these manuscripts did not form a complete text, but were rather a compilation of disparate drafts written by Marx in 1844 and compiled into a single text by Ryazanov. Therefore, in the remainder of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle I will not employ the term The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 but rather use the term The Manuscripts as a means of illuminating their fragmented nature. However, one essay in The Manuscripts, “Critique of  Rojahn, Jürgen, “Die Marxschen Manuskript aus dem Jahre 1844  in der neuen Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,” Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, Vol. 24 (1985), pp. 647–663. 1

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the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole,” is a totality in itself and will be referred to in later portions of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle. Similarly, The German Ideology was initially published in 1932  in MEGA I and was edited by V.V. Adovatskii. However, recent research by Tervel Carver and Inge Taubert/Hans Pelgar2 establish that the first chapter, the “I, Feuerbach” chapter was also a creation of Ryazanov. Replicating his editorial imagination in The Manuscripts Ryazanov compiled the “I. Feuerbach” from scattered comments and diffused notations by Marx. However, the invalidation of the “I. Feuerbach” chapter does not extend to chapter two, or “The Leipzig Council.” Contrary to the “I. Feuerbach,” chapter two, the “The Leipzig Council,” is a complete, self-contained chapter. Therefore, in Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle I will not employ the term The German Ideology, but rather “The Leipzig Council.”3

Linguistic Chapter 3 of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle is entitled “The Pneumatology of Labor.” This chapter is devoted to the distinguishing Marx’s theory of labor as a pneumatology from seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century economics. Whereas Marx understood the stages of the modes of production as expressions of the pneumatology of labor, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century economics explored the laws of economic development. A complete discussion of this difference is found in Chap. 4. However, at this point I want to acquaint the reader with the linguistic distinctions that will appear in Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle. I inform the reader about these linguistic distinctions as a form of preparation so when the reader confronts these terms they will be forewarned about their individual meanings. The term “pneumatology of labor” will only be used in reference to Marx’s theory of production. A synonym for the pneumatology of labor  Rojahn, Jürgen, “Marxismus-Marx-Geschichtswissenschaft-1844,” International Review of Social History, Vol. 28 (1983), pp. 2–49. 3  Carver, Terrell, “The German Ideology Never Took Place,” History of Political Thought, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Spring, 2010), pp. 107–127. 2

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is the phrase the phenomenology of labor. These phrases are used to particularize Marx’s theory of production, to isolate its uniqueness. The history of the theory of production is divided into two parts: economics and the organic mode of production. The term “economics” will be used to explain the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of production. Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith were examples of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century economists, and within this text economics will be used as synonyms for seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century Political Economy. Economics was the study of the theory of production derived from natural law, mechanistic materialism, or the Enlightenment Center. Contrary to economics was the theory of production deriving from Aristotle, which is called the organic form of production. In Athenian Greece, the household was the center of production and agriculture was the basis of the household. In the household mode of production, the subject and object enjoyed a reciprocal relationship. The subject, the laborer, had unhindered access to the object, nature, a reciprocal relationship existed between subject and object, or production was carried on for use and not for exchange. Aristotle and Marx were representative of the organic mode of production and it was from this perspective that Marx wrote his critique of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Political Economy.

Revision The year 2016 witnessed the publication of my book, Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin.4 Pages 108 to 116 of this book contain an analysis of Marx’s The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Chapter 1 of my new book, Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle, puts forth a more detailed study of Marx’s dissertation. In the years separating the publication of Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin and the appearance of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle alterations evolved in my assessment of Marx’s dissertation. I take this moment to outline these revisions. A description of these modifications will equip the reader to  Levine, Norman, Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

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better understand the redrafting and reconstruction of Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin and Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle. Marx’s definitive enrollment into Left Hegelianism takes place in 1842 and his journalism, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung” is the clearest documentation of this conversion and allegiance. This statement amounts to a revision of the interpretation put forth in my previous book Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin. In that book I stated: “The 1841 Dissertation confirms Marx’s conversion to the Left Wing form of Hegelianism.”5 I take this opportunity to revoke that assertion. Left Hegeliansim, as previously stated, was basically a combination of two philosophic tendencies: subjective consciousness and critique. Subjective consciousness was an expression of the principle that self-­ consciousness was the ground of truth. The ultimate criteria for the establishment of truth was the commitment, the affirmation of the subjective consciousness of a subject. Secondly, this autonomy of consciousness must be joined by critique, the turning of subjective consciousness against a reality of the external. Critique was the negative weapon in the hands of subjective consciousness to uncover and reveal the flaws of reality. Left Hegelianism only existed when critique became the major function of consciousness. The union of critique, Bruno Bauer, and subjective consciousness, Hegel, is only fashioned by Marx in “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung.”6 The union of the ideas of Bauer and Hegel was only initially demonstrated in the 1842 article in the “Kölnische Zeitung.” Only then does Marx fully recreate philosophy as an unbounded negativity against the external world. By uniting critique with subjective consciousness Marx turned Left Hegelianism into a negation of the external. Whereas Hegel employed philosophy to affirm reality, Left Hegelianism turned philosophy into a tool to invalidate reality.

 Ibid., p. 175.  Marx, Karl, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung” in Karl Marx-Fredrich Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), Vol. I, pp. 184–202. 5 6

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The Enlightenment Left The term “Enlightenment Center” refers to the broad pan-European cultural development of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The Enlightenment Center was based upon the principles of Natural Law and Natural Rights. Some of the leading spokespersons of the Enlightenment Center were Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and John Locke. These men were some of the leading advocates of the principles of Political Science and Political Economy. The Enlightenment Left was essentially a French development and was a rejection of the Enlightenment Center. The Enlightenment Left were eighteenth-century communists who rejected the idea of private property and state. The Enlightenment Left saw private property as the beginning of class domination and the state as the epitome of class dictatorship. In contrast to the Enlightenment Center, the Enlightenment Left called for the destruction of the state and the replacement of the state by civil society. Some of the members of the Enlightenment Left were Gabriel Bonnet de Mably, Etienne-Gabriel Morelly, Gracchus Babeuf, Theodore Dezamy, Comte de Saint-Simon, and Jean-Jacque Rousseau. The Enlightenment Left agreed with the Enlightenment Center’s conception of the Historicism of the modes of production. The Enlightenment Left agreed that a primitive form of society existed before the state. However, they disagreed with the Enlightenment Center’s interpretation of this primitive society. According to the Enlightenment Center this primitive society was a state of perpetual warfare. Thomas Hobbes, a member of the Enlightenment Center, in his book The Citizen,7 described the primitive state as a constant state of warfare. The Enlightenment Center upheld the principles of natural jurisprudence, which advocated that natural law dictated that humanity advance, transcend primitive society, and construct a state because a state granted greater security and social cooperation than the primitive society. The Enlightenment Center conceived the state as the apex of political inventiveness, it was both necessary and an improvement.  Hobbes, Thomas, The Citizen, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

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The Enlightenment Left rejected Enlightenment Center’s view of primitive society and the state. The refutation of the Enlightenment Center’s view of primitive society is found in Morelly’s Code of Nature. Rather than the Hobbesian view of inherent warfare, Morelly presented primitive society as exhibiting inherent sociability. Based upon an anthropological perception Morelly presented primitive society as operating in terms of the instinctive human need for sociability. Humans were not inherently selfish and antagonistic, but on the contrary, driven by the need for mutual recognition and social interconnection. Whereas the Enlightenment Center extolled private property and the state, seeing the state as the defender of individual rights to private property, the Enlightenment Left condemned both private property and the state. The Enlightenment Left adhered to the ideas of Rousseau, although Rousseau was not himself a representative of the Enlightenment Left, contained in his essay “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality” that private property destroyed the equality of primitive society and was the origin of the dictatorship of the state. Adhering to this vision of the inherent sociability of primitive society, the Enlightenment Left called for the abolition of private property and the reinstitution of the communism of primitive society. The revolutionary creed of the Enlightenment Left advocated a dual revolution, the extinction of both private property and the state as a means of returning to a civil society. The embodiment of the Enlightenment Left doctrine of a dual revolution was Gracchus Babeuf in his opposition to the Jacobins. Babeuf renounced Robespierre and Saint-Just because they only fought for a political revolution, the demolition of the bourgeoisie class state by the introduction of universal suffrage. Babeuf attacked Robespierre and Saint-Just because they stopped short of the social revolution, or the extinction of private property. A communist revolution could only be achieved by a dual revolution, or community could only be achieved by the eradication of both state and private property. The Enlightenment Left led a revolt against the lexicon of the Enlightenment Center. The principle of equality replaced the idea of right; the concept of need substituted for the idea of profit; the concept of a society based upon mutual reciprocity superseded the ideas of class

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and state. The Enlightenment Left created a new vocabulary for the discussion of social governance and distribution. Marx was a continuation of the Enlightenment Left. His absorption of the Enlightenment Left theory fell into four categories: (a) His rejection of both private property and the state as the outcome of private property; (b) His acceptance of the principle of the inherent sociability of the human species and that this mutual reciprocity formed the foundation of “civil society”; (c) This “civil society” based on mutual reciprocity would become the governing order, or the government would be a manifestation of a society denuded of private property; (d) The supersession of the model of the Jacobin Revolution which was merely a political revolution and the embrace of the theory of a two-stage revolution, simultaneously both a political and social revolution. The above description of the Enlightenment Left is merely intended to introduce the reader to this concept in an attempt to allow them greater insight when the phrase is used again in later chapters of this book. The author will present a more comprehensive view of the Enlightenment Left in a forthcoming book on this subject.

1 The Tyranny Greece Over Marx

Part One: Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation In order to properly access the influence Aristotle and Greek philosophy exerted upon Marx, it is also necessary to study Hegel’s analysis of Greek philosophy contained in Volumes I and II in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.1 Marx’s 1841 doctoral dissertation, On the Differences Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, is a refutation of the historiography of Greek philosophy as presented by Hegel in Volumes I and II. However, in order to locate Marx’s initial absorption into the study of Aristotle and Greek philosophy, it is first necessary to return to Marx’s 1837 letter to his father. At the age of 19, while a student at the University of Bonn, Marx wrote to his father that he was abandoning his initial desire to study law, Butler, Eliza Marian, The Tyranny of Greece Over Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1935). Butler’s book presents the tyranny of Greece over Germany as extending to Adolf Hitler. I disagree that German Fascism was an expression of Greek Humanism. Nevertheless, I do believe that a tyranny of Greece over Germany was prevalent in the works of Hegel, Marx, extending to Friedrich Nietzche, and then declining in Western culture.  Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E.F.  Haldane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska press, 1995). 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Levine, Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57035-4_1

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the profession of his father. Instead Marx embarked upon the pursuit of philosophy. He wrote to his father that he authored a 24-page manuscript entitled “Cleanthes, or the Starting Point and Necessary Continuation of Philosophy.”2 This work is now extinct. However, it is important to point out that Cleanthes was a Greek Stoic philosopher who lived from 330 BC to 230 BC. Cleanthes was the successor of Zeno and was the second head of the Stoic school in Athens. Marx comments on Stoicism at length in his 1841 dissertation. Marx’s knowledge of Greek and Latin was confirmed in this 1837 letter to his father. He wrote: “At the same time I translated Tacitus’ Germania and Ovid’s Tristia, and began to learn English and Italian by myself.”3 Prior to entering the University of Bonn, Marx was a student at the Gymnasium in Trier. His Certificate of Maturity from the Trier Gymnasium noted that Marx already knew Latin, Greek, and French.4 Marx’s proficiency in languages, particularly in Latin and Greek, was already established before he commenced his dissertation studies. Fortified by his command of Greek, Marx’s 1837 letter to his father certifies his first acquaintance with Aristotle. In that letter Marx wrote: “I translated in part Aristotle’s Rhetoric.”5 In addition, Marx’s 1837 letter draws attention to his involvement with Hegelian philosophy when Marx wrote: “While I was ill, I got to know Hegel from beginning to end, together with most of his disciples.”6 Lastly, this letter also confirms Marx’s acquaintance with Bruno Bauer, the beginning of his association with the Left Wing Hegelians.7 The 1837 letter was the moment of the fusion of Aristotle and Hegel in the thought of Marx. In 1837 Marx transferred from the University of Bonn to the University of Berlin. While at the University of Berlin, Marx took courses from

 Karl-Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), Vol. I, p. 18. 3  Ibid., p.17. 4  Ibid., pp. 643–644. 5  Ibid., p. 79. 6  Ibid. 7  Ibid., p. 20. 2

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Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Eduard Gans, and Bruno Bauer.8 His interest in Greek Humanism continued because in late 1839 he took a course of Euripides’s Iphigenia in Aulis and was graded as “diligent” by the professor.9 Marx completed his doctoral dissertation and received his Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1841 from the University of Jena.10 In July of that year he planned to enlist as a Privat-Docent at the University of Bonn and begin an academic career. However, in the autumn of 1841 Bruno Bauer, a young Hegelian, was banned from teaching at the University of Bonn and consequently Marx surrendered his academic ambitions and started his career in journalism. In August 1841 Marx’s fiancé, Jenny von Westphalen, wrote to Marx and in that letter referred to him as a “Hegelian gentleman.”11 The following pages will offer an analysis of Marx’s doctoral dissertation, On the Differences Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. However, before embarking upon this analysis it is first required to comment upon the disappearance of the manuscript. Marx’s original copy of the manuscript is lost, and what remains is an incomplete copy in the hand of an unknown person. In addition to this incomplete copy written by an unknown person, there also exist notebooks by Marx. The notebooks are not a text, but rather references to books Marx utilized in his research. These notebooks contain comments Marx wrote as he explored the writings of Plutarch, Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, and Sextus Empiricus and the opinions of these ancient authors on the writings of Democritus and Epicurus. Lastly, Marx did read the surviving works of Democritus and Epicurus in themselves. Nevertheless, regardless of the incompleteness of Marx’s dissertation, what survived of his dissertation does allow the contemporary reader to ascertain an accurate assessment of his evaluation of the history of ancient Greek philosophy, in addition to Marx’s judgment of Hegel’s presentation of ancient

 Ibid., pp. 699–700.  Ibid., p. 700. 10  Ibid., p. 705. 11  Ibid., p. 707. 8 9

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Greek philosophy as put forth in Volumes I and II of his Lectures of the History of Philosophy. In Volume I, Hegel begins his discourse on the history of philosophy with the pre-Socratic Ionian school. Thales was the major representative of the Ionian school and Thales was a spokesperson of Ionian materialism when he claimed that water was the substance of the universe. For Hegel Thales was the first to “begin the history of philosophy.”12 Pre-Socratic philosophy quickly advanced to the Eleatic School, composed of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno. A Platonic Idealist, Hegel extolled the Eleatic School because “thought thus becomes for the first time free for itself in the Eleatic School.”13 In particular, Hegel singled out Parmenides of the Eleatic School as a “striking figure in the Eleatic School”14 and went on to praise Plato for writing his dialogue Parmenides, which expounded the idea that Mind was the determining influence on human evolution.15 The Eleatic School, presupposing the determinative influence of Mind in social development, continued in the work of Heraclitus. In Volume I, Hegel admitted “there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.”16 In addition, Hegel asserted that Heraclitus was a leading advocate of the dialectic.17 However, the dialectic of the school of Heraclitus was not the dialectic of Plekhanov and Engels. The dialectic of Heraclitus was a precursor of the dialectic of Spinoza, or the dialectic in Heraclitus meant negation, or definition. Dialectic in ancient Greece, as we shall see in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, meant contradiction in order to define or contradiction in order to isolate the differentia specifica.18 Pre-Socratic philosophers progressed into the philosophy of Leucippus and Democritus. For Hegel, Leucippus was “the originator of the famous atomic school”19 and Democritus perpetuated Eleatic atomic theory.  Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. I, ibid., p. 171.  Ibid., p. 243. 14  Ibid., p. 249. 15  Ibid. 16  Ibid., p. 279. 17  Ibid., p. 278. 18  Ibid., pp. 282–285. 19  Ibid., p. 300. 12 13

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Following Eleatic philosophy, Democritus denied the supremacy of sense perception; he was not an empiricist. Democritus derived his theory of atomism from rational speculations. Based on the logic of Mind, Democritus maintained that the atoms fell in a straight line and this was a major point of dispute between Democritus and Epicurus. Whereas Democritus maintained that the atoms fell in a straight line, Epicurus critiqued Democritus and argued that atoms swerved as they fell, or the theory of declination. In Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the pre-Socratic school advanced to the Socratic school of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and the Socratic school was the apex of Classical Greek philosophy. Following the Socratic school, in the Alexandrian age, Greek philosophy fell into decline, or the Stoic and Epicurean and Sceptical schools were all symptoms of decline. In particular, Hegel criticized Epicurus because of his belief that sense perception was the ground of ideas. Hegel always denounced empiricism, and as of late 1830  in his The Philosophy of Mind, he wrote: “Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or representation, is capable of grasping the truth of things, and that the assertion of Epicurus that the true is what is sensed, must be pronounced a complete perversion of the nature of mind.”20 The Alexandrian age was an introduction to the Augustian age, or in Hegel philosophy continued its decline throughout the Roman Empire. Marx’s dissertation, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, was a direct refutation of Hegel’s history of Greek philosophy. In his dissertation, Marx agreed with Hegel that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, or the “wise men,” represented the epitome of Greek thought. But Marx refuted Hegel and claimed that Epicurus, the Sophists, and the Sceptics were also symbols of the greatness of Greek philosophy. The Alexandrian age, in which Epicurus, the Sophists, and the Sceptics wrote, was an age of philosophical greatness. For Marx, the decline of ancient philosophy only commenced in the Augustian age or Caesar’s imperial Rome. The major thesis of Marx’s dissertation was to negate Hegel’s presentation of the history of Greek philosophy, but this should not be 20

 Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 224.

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interpreted as meaning that Marx embraced empiricism without qualification. Marx’s relation to Hegel was composed of two areas: (A) areas of discontinuity; (B) areas of continuity. In relation to Marx’s dissertation, I will first address the areas of discontinuity. 1. In terms of the area of disassociation, Marx refuted Hegel’s interpretation of the historiography of Greek philosophy. In addition, Marx did not agree with Hegel’s denunciation of empiricism and sense perception. In terms of political theory, Hegel was a Prussian Monarchist and rejected the Aristotelian idea of a Republic and the communal structures of the polis. In contradiction, Marx called for the overthrow of the state and the refounding of government on the basis of a communal structure. 2. In terms of the areas of continuity, I will divide this section into the following five subdivisions: (1) Subjective Consciousness; (2) Philosophy Confronts the World; (3) Socrates and the Need for Political Participation; (4) Hegelian Logical Categories; (5) Praise of Aristotle. With the exception of the praise for Aristotle, the areas of continuity in Marx were grounded in terms of logical categories. The following discussion of the abovementioned five subdivisions will be entirely drawn from the surviving pages of Marx’s doctoral dissertation.

1. Subjective Consciousness Following Hegel in extolling the freedom of self-consciousness, Marx praised Epicurus as one of the first to advocate the freedom of self-­ consciousness. Even though Marx and Hegel disagreed in their evaluation of Epicurus, Marx traced the continuity of the doctrine of subjective consciousness from Epicurus to Hegel to Bruno Bauer. In his dissertation, Marx wrote: “Therefore: just as the atom is nothing but the natural form of abstract, individual self-consciousness, so sensuous nature is only the objectified, empirical, individual self-consciousness, and this is the

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sensuous.”21 Later on in his dissertation, Marx returned to the same theme regarding the transcendence of self-consciousness when he wrote: “If abstract-individual-self-consciousness is posited as an absolute principle, then, indeed, all true and real science is done away with, inasmuch as individuality does not rule within the nature of things themselves.”22 The ultimate goal in life for Epicurus was the achievement of ataraxy, or inner peacefulness. Ataraxy was a life lived without inner turmoil or distress. Self-consciousness must subordinate itself to the ethical goal of life, or ataraxy. Therefore, self-consciousness possessed the authority to deny anything that withheld the goal of ataraxy. Consequently, Epicurus denied the existence of meteors. According to Epicurus, the belief in meteors introduced elements of uncertainty and anxiety in human life and for this reason self-consciousness possessed the ethical duty to deny the existence of meteors. In addition, contrary to Democritus, Epicurus upheld the theory of the declination of the atoms. Democritus held that atoms fell in a straight line, but Epicurus maintained that atoms swerved as they fell. Declination allowed Epicurus to explain the large formations of matter, rocks, or planets. When atoms experienced declination, this explained how large formations of matter evolved because as individual atoms collided, the atoms interconnected, fused, into large bodies of matter. Epicurus employed the freedom of subjective consciousness to advance the theory of declination. Atomic theory was first asserted by Democritus, and Epicurus, building upon the theory of Democritus, used his axiom of subjective consciousness to explain the existence of matter through declination. According to Epicurus, the explanation of the natural world must accord with the laws of self-consciousness. Marx was an advocate of Epicurus’s theory of self-consciousness because it was the inception of a long evolution of self-consciousness that flowed into Hegel, the Left Hegelians, Bruno Bauer, and Marx’s entrance into Bauer’s Doctors Club.

 Marx, “The Doctoral Dissertation”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. I, ibid., p. 65. 22  Ibid., p. 72. 21

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2. Philosophy Confronts the World Marx embraced the Epicurean principles of the freedom of self-­ consciousness because it was the ground of the confrontation between philosophy and the external social reality. In Volume II of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel asserted that thought was the creation of the world. Hegel wrote: “It is the creation of the world, in it everything has its determinate form in regard to everything else, and this constitutes the substance of things. Since, in the third place, substantiality or permanency in the faculty of thought is determination, its production, or the flowing out of all things from it, is of such a nature that it remains filled with all things, or likewise absorbs all immediately.”23 The Epicurean idea of the freedom of self-consciousness, the confrontation between self-consciousness and the social, was the substructure of Hegel’s, Kant’s and Marx’s adoption of critique. Hegel applied the concept of critique to the fields of philosophy, ethics, and culture; however, Marx expanded the notion of critique to include politics. In Marx, critique meant the confrontation between subjective consciousness and the state. Marx arrived in Paris in 1844 and wrote his The Manuscripts. In the Preface to these manuscripts, Marx wrote: “I have already announced in the Deutsche-Franzosische Jahrbücher the critique of jurisprudence and political science in the form of a critique of the Hegelian philosophy of laws.”24

3. Socrates and the Need for Political Participation Hegel’s Volume I of Lectures on the History of Philosophy contains extensive comments on the thought of Socrates. For Hegel, Socrates was the epitome of the “wise man.”25 According to Hegel, the forefather of Socrates was Anaxagoras. In the period prior to the rise of the Socratic school, Anaxagoras was the first to  Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. I, ibid., p. 420.  Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works Vol. III, ibid., p. 231. 25  Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. I, ibid., pp. 474–475. 23 24

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proclaim that Thought was the substance of the world. Anaxagoras advanced the idea that Thought was the generative principle in the evolution of humanity.26 Being was an outgrowth of thought, or vous.27 Based upon the supremacy of the vous, Anaxagoras propounded the supremacy of self-consciousness. Socrates perpetuated this principle and advanced the principle of the freedom of subjective consciousness, or the freedom of subjective consciousness attained its zenith in the thought of Socrates.28 For Hegel, Socrates was the symbol of the “wise man.”29 For Hegel, an individual became a “wise man” by his participation in politics. Hegel applauded Socrates for his participation in Athenian politics. Socrates was a symbol of the unification between philosophy and political engagement, or philosophy’s confrontation with the world. The greatness of Athenian Greece was an expression of the Socratic model, or the engagement of the “wise man” into the political. Hegel maintained that the modern world, Europe during the Enlightenment, was a period of decline from the greatness of Classical Greece because Enlightenment individuality replaced the Athenian involvement in the state, or man as a political animal. However, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy was published in 1830, the era of the Hohenzollern Monarchy. Consequently, when Hegel advocated political participation in 1830 he was calling for the loyalty to and obedience to Prussian absolutism. Marx’s relation to the Socratic Model in Hegel was composed of both continuity and discontinuity. From the point of view of continuity, Marx agreed with Hegel in the adherence to the Socratic Model. Like Socrates, the philosopher must critique the world. Marx’s discontinuity with Hegel arose because he did not want philosophy to justify political autocracy. Philosophy was not the handmaid to Monarchy. Marx was awarded his doctorate in philosophy in 1842. The Prussian autocracy denied him a teaching position at the University of Bonn because of Marx’s association with Bruno Bauer and the Left Hegelians.  Ibid., p. 320.  Ibid., p. 329. 28  Ibid., pp. 384–389. 29  Ibid., pp. 474–475. 26 27

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Following his blockade by the Prussian autocracy, Marx started his career in journalism and went to work for the Rheinische Zeitung, a newspaper of Liberal opposition to the Prussian Crown. In 1841 Marx was a Liberal and he unleashed his philosophic attack on the Prussian Crown. Marx turned philosophy against the world. He restricted the Socratic Model, or the “wise man” no longer used philosophy to improve the state but rather the “wise man” must use philosophy to oppose, to Liberalize, the Hohenzollern Monarchy. The “wise man” in 1841 was a political reformer, not yet a revolutionary. The “wise man” operated from the Anaxagorian-­ Socratic principle of the freedom of self-consciousness.

4. Hegelian Logical Categories On the logical level Marx borrowed Hegelian categories, but, on the historical level, Marx employed these categories to disprove Hegel’s interpretation of Democritus and Epicurus and the passage of Greek philosophy. The Hegelian logical categories that Marx used in his dissertation were three, Negation, Essence-Appearance, and Abstract-Concrete, and the following paragraphs in this chapter will discuss each of these separately.

( a) Negation In the dissertation Marx also utilized three other Hegelian logical categories as synonyms for negation and these additional categories were repulsion, contradiction, and self-determination. In order to logically establish the declination of the atoms, Marx took advantage of the Hegelian concept of negation. Epicurus negated the Democritean concept that atoms fell in a straight line and this negation was the ground of the Epicurean theory of the declination of the atom.30 A synonym for negation was repulsion. Self-consciousness employed repulsion in order to establish its individuality, or individuality came into existence when self-consciousness was distinguished from the Other.  Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. I, ibid., p. 49.

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Repulsion was the activity of securing the freedom of self-consciousness.31 Contradiction was employed by Epicurus to validate his theory of declination. Epicurus’s concept that atoms swerved when they fell was a contradiction of the properties of the atoms as understood in ancient Greece. Nevertheless, Marx maintained that Epicurus was justified in employing the concept of declination because it was the only means by which Epicurus could explain the formation of atoms into masses of matter. Marx justified Epicurus’s use of Hegelian logical categories as instruments in accounting for the coagulation of atoms into masses.32 The logics of negation, repulsion, and contradiction were the causes of self-determination. Self-determination or individuality could not emerge unless negation, repulsion, and contradiction did establish its separateness, its distinctiveness from the surrounding world.33 Marx used Hegelian logical categories to establish the superiority of Epicurus over Democritus. In so doing, Marx negated Hegel’s preference for Democritus over Epicurus.

5. Praise for Aristotle In order to properly grasp the influence Aristotle exerted upon Marx, it is first necessary to study the influence Aristotle exerted on Hegel. Not only did Hegel himself exercise an enormous influence on Marx, but Marx’s esteem for Aristotle was a reiteration of Hegel’s esteem for Aristotle. Hegel’s admiration of Aristotle was most clearly expressed in Volume II of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. In that book, Hegel wrote: “The fulness with which I have set forth the principle content of the Aristotelian philosophy is justified both by the importance of the matter itself, because it offers to us a content of its own, and also by the circumstances already mentioned that against which no philosophy have

 Ibid., p. 52.  Ibid., p. 54. 33  Ibid., p. 52. 31 32

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modern times sinned so much as against this, and none of the ancient philosophers have so much need of being defended as Aristotle.”34 In addition, Volume II of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, which was published between 1833 and 1836 after Hegel’s death in 1830, contains Hegel’s most extended commentary on the works of Aristotle. The discussion at this point will focus on Hegel’s analysis of Aristotle’s understanding of the dialectic and the syllogism. The book of Aristotle that Hegel refers to when discussing the differences between the dialectic and syllogism were the Analytica Priora, the Analytica Posteriora, the Topica, and the Metaphysics.35 Aristotle’s most extended discussions of the dialectic and syllogism are to be found in his Analytica Priora36 and Analytica Posteriora.37 In both these studies, Aristotle drew a distinction between the dialectic and the syllogism. Within the domain of logical categories, the function of the dialectic was to contradict. Contradiction established identity, or contradiction meant to exclude, and exclusion was the step that led to the attainment of particularity. Whereas contradiction meant the conquest of a particularity, the syllogism was the advancement to a new individuality. The syllogism was not limited to negation, but rather was dedicated to an advance, or the overcoming of a universal in the progress toward a new individuality. The equation for the syllogism was Universal-Particular-Individual. In the syllogism, a Universal was contradicted by a Particular, but then advanced to a higher stage of a new Individuality. Whereas the dialectic meant negation, or termination, the syllogism meant fusion, or blending, which was an advance to a higher Individuality, from which a new process of reasoning emerged. In Hegel’s Logic, which is the first volume of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which was published in 1830, Hegel initiated his discussion of the differences between the dialectic and the syllogism.  Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. II, ibid., p. 224.  Ibid., p. 217. 36  Aristotle, Analytica Priora, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), pp. 65–82. 37  Ibid., pp. 119–136. 34 35

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Pages 244–256 offer an in-depth analysis of the syllogism,38 while pages 115–118 describe the uniqueness of the dialectic.39 In Hegel, the dialectic and syllogism were two separate logical forms. Hegel displayed a high regard for Aristotle, however, for Hegel the peak of ancient Greek philosophy was Plato. Hegel was an Idealist, for him the originative force in human evolution was Mind, and he looked upon Plato as the initiator of the primacy of Mind. Plato’s theory of the Idea was the historical precursor of Hegel’s theory of Mind. Both Plato and Aristotle considered thought, consciousness, as the causal agent of social development. The continuity and discontinuity in the Hegel-Marx relationship is evidenced in their disparate evaluations of Plato and Aristotle. In terms of continuity, both men revered Plato and Aristotle. In terms of discontinuity, while Hegel placed Plato at the summit of Greek thought, Marx placed Aristotle at the summit of Greek thought. The discontinuity arose because Hegel perpetuated Platonic Idealism, while Marx perpetuated Aristotle’s naturalism. Marx’s esteem for Aristotle was displayed in both his doctoral dissertation itself and his Notebooks to the dissertation. This esteem took two forms, exhortation and bibliographical. These exhortations were displayed on two occasions in the dissertation and on one occasion in the Notebooks. In the dissertation, Marx referred to Aristotle as “Greek philosophy’s Alexander of Macedon,”40 and a page later stated that Greek philosophy “reached its zenith in Aristotle.”41 In the Second Notebook to his dissertation, Marx described Aristotle as “the acme of ancient philosophy.”42 On the bibliographical side, Marx’s dissertation itself contained an extensive list of footnotes, listing the sources he consulted as he did research for his doctorate. In this bibliography Marx noted the following books of Aristotle he read: On the Soul, On the Heavens, On Becoming  Hegel, The Logic, Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 244–256. 39  Ibid., pp. 115–118. 40  Marx, Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. I, ibid., p. 34. 41  Ibid., p. 35. 42  Ibid., p. 34. 38

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and Decaying, Metaphysics, and the Physics. In addition to the above citations, Aristotle’s Rhetoric must be included, which he stated he translated in German in his 1837 letter to his father. Finally, in Marx’s Sixth Notebook he notes that he read Aristotle’s On the Nature of Animals. Absent from Marx’s dissertation bibliography is a mention to Aristotle’s Topica, Analytica Priora, and Analytica Posteriora. These were books of Aristotle that Hegel mentioned in Volume I of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. But the fact that Hegel mentions these three works and that Marx did not can be explained by the areas of Aristotelian thought Hegel and Marx were investigating. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel studied the logical structures of the thought of Aristotle, and consequently he concentrated on these three works because they were definitive sources of Aristotle’s logic. Conversely, Marx’s dissertation dealt with the scientific theories of Heraclitus and Epicurus, and therefore Marx was most concerned with the scientific speculations of Aristotle. The differences in the goals of their research led Hegel and Marx to concentrate upon different aspects of Aristotelian philosophy. In addition, in his dissertation Marx does not comment on the Politics nor the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Again, in the dissertation, Marx was consumed with the scientific theory of Aristotle. Nevertheless, it is certain that Marx knew the Politics and The Nicomachean Ethics because he refers to them frequently in his post-dissertation writings and, as further pages in this book document, they exercised a predominant influence on the shaping of Marx’s political theory. Marx’s knowledge of Classical Philosophy, both Greek and Roman, was not only limited to Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, and Epicurus. The Notebooks to his dissertation illustrate the comprehensive nature of his grasp of Classical Greek and Roman philosophies and cultures. Marx left behind seven Notebooks. The First Notebook contains citations from the work of Diogenes Laertius, which were contained in a book by Pierre Gassendi. This Notebook not only draws upon the work of Diogenes Laertius but also references Aristotle’s Metaphysics and in addition Aristotle’s Physics.43  Ibid., pp. 405–416.

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The Second Notebook refers to Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, and to Plutarch’s book That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible. Plutarch’s interpretation of Epicurus drew major denunciations from Marx. Plutarch’s critique of Epicurus was based on the assertion that the Epicurean notion of change, of the constant uncertainties introduced into mind by the persistence of time, made ataraxy, or inner peace, unattainable. Marx rejected Plutarch’s critique, and instead argued that the Epicurean notion of the freedom of subjective consciousness offered sufficient grounds for the realization of ataraxy.44 In addition, Marx’s Second Notebook alludes to the work of Pierre Gassendi and Ludwig Feuerbach. Marx was critical of the work of Gassendi because he doubted how Gassendi’s Christianity, his belief in divine intervention and the immortality of the soul, could be reconciled with the Epicurean ideal of secular ataraxy. More importantly, the Second Notebook also makes reference to Feuerbach’s book History of Modern Philosophy. Marx’s 1841 dissertation was Marx’s first reference to Feuerbach.45 The Fourth Notebook centers upon a discussion of Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things. Marx applauded Lucretius for two reasons: first, he believed that Lucretius had a better grasp of Epicurean philosophy than Plutarch; second, because Marx appreciated Lucretius’s adherence to sense perception since, in this regard, Lucretius perpetuated the Epicurean tradition.46 Marx’s Fifth Notebook is a commentary on how Seneca and Clements of Alexandria interpreted Epicurus.47 His Sixth Notebook again returns to the work of Epicurus. In addition, it contains a citation of Plato’s Timaeus.48 The Seventh Notebook is a compilation of quotations that Marx took from Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, which deals with Epicurus.49  Ibid., pp. 417–422.  Ibid., p. 423. 46  Ibid., p. 469. 47  Ibid., p. 478–488. 48  Ibid., p. 497. 49  Ibid., pp. 503–509. 44 45

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This brief summary of Marx’s dissertation and Notebooks demonstrates his comprehensive knowledge of both Greek and Latin philosophy, history, and culture. The following pages in this chapter will make evident how Marx’s extensive knowledge of Greek and Roman history influenced his thought throughout his lifetime. Prior to his matriculation at the University of Bonn, the young Marx attended the Gymnasium in Trier. One of the examination papers Marx wrote at the Gymnasium was entitled “Does the Reign of Augustus Deserve to Be Counted Among the Happier Periods of the Roman Empire?”50 In this examination paper, the young Marx praised the Augustan Age of Rome, and this was an opinion he reversed in his 1841 doctoral dissertation, which identified the Augustan Age as one of decline. The young Marx’s Certificate of Maturity from the Gymnasium at Trier further certifies that he was competent in Greek, Latin, and French.51 It is important to take note of Marx’s Gymnasium studies because of the impact they exerted throughout his life. A recent study by Professor Anthony Grafton describes Gymnasium studies in early nineteenth-­ century Germany as concentrating on philological studies and the interpretation of singular classical texts. The German Gymnasium in the 1830s was dedicated to an anti-Enlightenment and anti-French Revolutionary formula, remaining focused on philology and textual interpretation.52 The above references to the young Marx’s training at the Trier Gymnasium are worthy of attention because they provide the academic background for the research he did in later life. The mature Marx, the Marx of the Grundrisse, the 1864–1865 Manuscripts and Das Kapital, was an inexhaustive researcher. His philological and textual studies at the Trier Gymnasium trained him to study the origins of capitalism, the economic and intellectual precedents of capitalism, with the same detail that he studied Democritus, Epicurus, Plato, and Aristotle. Marx’s dissertation did not terminate the tyranny of Greece over Marx. Aristotle’s subsumption of Marx continued until Marx’s death. The following pages of this chapter will record the history of this subsumption  Ibid., pp. 639–642.  Ibid., pp. 634–644. 52  Grafton, Anthony, From Humanism to the Humanities (London: Duckworth, 1986). 50 51

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and this history will be divided into the following subdivisions: (1) The Rheinische Zeitung and Letters to Arnold Ruge; (2) The Parisian Period; (3) The London Period; (4) The Grundrisse; (5) The 1863–1864 Manuscripts; (6) Das Kapital.

1. The Rheinische Zeitung and Letters to Arnold Ruge This subdivision will be divided into the following parts: (a) Introduction; (b) The Continuation of the Tyranny of Greece over Marx in the Rheinische Zeitung and Marx’s Letters to Ruge; (c) The Enlightenment Center and the Enlightenment Left; (d) Debates on the Laws of the Theft of Woods; (e) Marx’s Rejection of Natural Law; (f ) The Hegelian Left; (g) Feuerbach; (h) Aristotle’s Subsumption of Marx; (i) Civil Society.

( a) Introduction Marx was editor of the Rheinische Zeitung from 1842 until his resignation from the paper on March 17, 1843.53 Under his editorship, the Rheinische Zeitung was a Liberal newspaper. Marx had not yet converted to communism. As a Liberal, Marx defended the principle of a free press. He defended the free press against the censorship of Hohenzollern Monarchy. As a Liberal, Marx did not call for the overthrow of the Prussian Monarchy, but rather its reform. According to Marx, the failures of the Prussian Monarchy resulted from the Crown’s unity with the Lutheran Church and the Feudal Estates of the Landed Nobility. This Triple Alliance empowered the Prussian government to exercise censorship of the press. In particular, it allowed the Prussian state to define the conditions for divorce. In his November 1842 article, “The Divorce Bill,” Marx critiqued the Prussian Divorce Law because it granted the power to define marriage to the state. For Marx, marriage was not a Church or State institution, but rather a moral decision made by free individuals.54 It is important to note that Marx was 53 54

 Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. I, ibid., p. 376.  Ibid., pp. 274–276.

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anti-Feudal Estates, but not yet anti-class. Marx identified the Feudal aristocracy as a decadent institution, but in 1842 he had not classified them in political economic terms as a class. In the Rheinische Zeitung Marx again displayed his loyalty to Hegel’s theory of philosophy. In 1842, philosophy for Marx confronted the world, or the task of philosophy was to render the world more philosophical.55 The fact that philosophy must transform the world evolved out of the principle of the freedom of consciousness, or consciousness must be free in order to carry out its mission of remaking the world.56 The freedom of consciousness was a synonym for the freedom of subjective consciousness, a principle embraced by Hegel. Finally, the freedom of subjective consciousness served as the ground of criticism. In Marx’s articles on “Debates on Freedom of Press”57 and his “Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung”58 and “In Connection With the Article ‘Failures of the Liberal Opposition in Hanover,’”59 Marx repeatedly extolled the importance of criticism. By 1842, Marx embraced the value of critique and continued the employment of critique in his 1844 Paris Manuscripts. A line of continuity ran from the Rheinische Zeitung to his Paris Manuscripts. In two articles in the Rheinische Zeitung, “Communism and the Augsberg Allgemeine Zeitung” and “Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung: Editorial Note,” Marx disavowed any interest in communism.60 In the “Editorial Note,” Marx copied a statement from the Aachener Zeitung stating that communism did not exist in Germany, but did exist in England and France. It is not surprising that after his resignation from the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx first went to Kreuznach and then moved on to France to start his exile. The fact that Marx was neither a revolutionary nor a communist in 1842 is further evidenced by his relation to Robespierre and the French  Ibid., “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung”, p. 195.  Ibid., “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction”, p. 131. 57  Ibid., “Debates of Freedom of Press”, p. 159. 58  Ibid., “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung”, p. 185. 59  Ibid., “In Connecting with the Article Failures of Liberal Opposition in Hanover”, p. 265. 60  Ibid., “Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung” and “Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung” Editorial Note, pp. 215–223. 55 56

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Revolution. In his article “Comments on Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction” Marx made the following comments: “laws giving no objective standards are laws of terrorism, such as were invented owing to the emergency needs of the state under Robespierre and the corruption of the state under the Roman Emperors.”61 Furthermore, Marx’s opposition to the radical extremes in the French Revolution was again articulated in his November 30, 1842 letter to Arnold Ruge. In this letter, Marx denounced “The Free” because they represented a “licentious, sansculotte-like” style in their writings and programs.62 Marx’s Liberalism was further collaborated in his letters to Arnold Ruge in that year. His November 30, 1842 letter to Ruge documented Marx’s opposition to radicalism. First, Marx rejected communism.63 Second, Marx denied any association with Edward Meyer and “The Free.”64 This letter also contains a defense of the German poet Georg Herweg. Marx’s 1842 letter repeats the assessment Marx made of Meyer and Herweg in an earlier article he wrote for the Rheinische Zeitung in 1842. In that article entitled “The Attitude of Herweg and Ruge to “The Free” Marx again defended Herweg and Ruge and critiqued “The Free.”65 Herweg was a German poet and a moderate democrat, a close friend of Marx, and in 1843 Marx wrote to Ruge that he hoped to edit a newspaper in Zurich, Switzerland, with Herweg.66

(b) The Enlightenment Center and Enlightenment Left A more comprehensive discussion of this topic is to be found in my book Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin.67 In particular see pages 121–157 as

 Ibid., “Comments on Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction”, p. 119.  Ibid., Marx to Arnold Ruge, Nov. 30, 1842, p. 394. 63  Ibid., To Arnold Ruge, Nov. 24, 1842, p. 394. 64  Ibid., “The Attitude of Herweg and Ruge to ‘The Free’”, p. 287. 65  Ibid., “To Arnold Ruge, January 25, 1843”, p. 396. 66  Ibid. 67  Levine, Norman, Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 121–157. 61 62

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these will provide a more complete background to the following brief introduction. The term “Enlightenment Center” refers to such thinkers as John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Hobbes. The primary principle of their political theory was the adherence to ideas of natural rights and private property. In addition, they defined the state as an organization deriving from and meant to protect natural rights and private property. Conversely, the Enlightenment Left was composed of such men as Gabriel Bonnet Mably, Abbe de Morelly, Simone Linguet, Gracchus Babeuf, Phillip Bournarrati, Theodor Dezarny, and Wilhelm Weitling. All these men abandoned the theory of natural rights and private property and sought to find a new justification for social governance. They found this new justification in the concept of human association and social communities. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was an ambiguous figure. Like the Enlightenment Center, he adhered to the principle of natural rights and private property. But Rousseau was also influenced by Classical Greek political theory. Aristotle divided the individual between “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon,” of man as active citizen and man as the producer of the household. Following Aristotle, Rousseau divided man between homme and citizen, or man as a private being and man as a political being. By highlighting the citizen, Rousseau was resurrecting the Aristotelian principle that man had a duty, and was an active agent in the governing of a social government. This Rousseauist theme of citizen, of universal participation in government, was a major proponent of the Enlightenment Left and therefore it is required to include Rousseau as a member of the Enlightenment Left. Marx himself calls upon Rousseau for assistance in his battles for the freedom of the press. In his 1842 article, “Debates on Freedom of the Press,” Marx employs Rousseau’s citizen as a weapon against the bourgeois of the Prussian state censorship. Marx wrote: “We are faced with the opposition of the bourgeois, not of the citizen.”68 According to Marx, the  Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. I, ibid., p. 169.

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citizen stood for the freedom of the press, while the bourgeois had not risen to this goal.

(c) “Debates on the Law of the Theft of Woods” This article was published in the Rheinische Zeitung in October 1842. The article is an attack on the Prussian landed Aristocracy. It demonstrated how these feudal estates monopolize forests, even fallen trees. Based upon the property rights of these medieval feudal estates the poorer peasants are forbidden to acquire even fallen trees. Marx does not refer to living, standing, growing trees, but rather to dead trees, or dead limbs that have fallen off living trees. According to Prussian law, poor peasants were denied any access to these fallen dead trees or branches. The Feudal Estates rights prevented the poor peasants from scouring the forests for fallen wood to heat their frozen homes during the frigid winters. In the course of his attacks on the Feudal Estates, Marx also introduces the ideas of value and class in his writings. The essay, “Debates on the Laws of the Theft of Woods” is the first time that Marx equips himself with the concepts of value and class. Marx’s use of the concept of value in this essay is unsophisticated. He does not use value in the Malthusian, Ricardian, or Smithean sense. In this essay, Marx presents value as an expression of private property, or as a right of private property and not as a manifestation of human labor.69 In addition, Marx does utilize the concept of class. In his attack upon the landed aristocracy, Marx refers to the poor peasant as a class.70 Consequently, Marx’s 1842 article is the first time that Marx alludes to the concept of class struggle. However, Marx does not mention the proletariat. In 1842, he was not familiar with the industrial working class.

69 70

 Ibid., “Debates on the Law of the Theft of Woods”, ibid., p. 229.  Ibid., pp. 242, 230, 233, 234.

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(d) Marx’s Rejection of Natural Laws The essay “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law,” which was published in the Rheinische Zeitung in August 1842, is an important document because it is a severe refutation of the doctrine of natural rights and of those in the Enlightenment Center who embraced natural rights theory. The essay, “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law” was specifically an attack on the work of Gustav Hugo who was a follower of Friedrich Karl Savigny. Marx was also familiar with the natural law theory of Savigny. In his 1837 letter to his father, Marx notes that he read Savigny’s book on The Right of Possession.71 In addition, in 1836 when Marx was a student at the University of Berlin, he took a course from Savigny on the Roman Pandects and was graded by his professor as “diligent.”72 In “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law,” Marx rejected the natural law theory of the Enlightenment Center. In addition, he rejected the right of private property as put forth in natural law theory.73 Marx described the natural law theory of Hugo as a form of positivism. It was a total surrender to empiricism and, according to Marx, consequently an abandonment of rationality. Based upon Hugo’s advocacy of natural law empiricism, Marx condemned the Enlightenment Center for its surrender to empiricism and its disregard of human rationality. One consequence of this flight from human rationality was the loss of critique. The critique of the world was the purpose of rationality and by foregoing critique, Hugo and the Enlightenment Center also deserted the role of philosophy.74 Marx wrote: “Has not Hugo proved that man can cast off even the last letter of freedom, namely, that of being a rational being.”75 In addition, Marx claimed that “Hugo’s natural law is the German theory of the French ancien regime.”76 Furthermore, Marx claimed that  Ibid., “Letter From Marx to His Father in Trier”, p. 15.  Ibid., p. 699. 73  Ibid., pp. 203–204. 74  Ibid., p. 205. 75  Ibid., p. 209. 76  Ibid., p. 206. 71 72

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“other Enlighteners of the eighteenth century” also defended the ancien regime.77 In this same denunciation of Hugo and the Enlightenment Center, Marx also drew an analogy between natural law theory and the French Revolution. He claimed that the dissolution of the ancien regime by the National Assembly was a precedent for the overthrow of the theories of natural rights and private property. Marx wrote: “In the National Assembly, on the other hand, the dissolution appears as the liberation of the new spirit from old forms, which were no longer of any value or capable of containing it.”78 This does not mean that in 1842 Marx embraced the Robespierrean dimension of the French Revolution, but it does mean he went as far as the National Assembly. “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law” was an introduction to Marx’s 1843 Paris Manuscript “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.” In the “Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law,” Marx was still within the bounds of Hegelian logic in that he still accepted the duty of rationality and critique to confront the world. In 1842, the obligation of philosophy was to censor the world. However, in Marx’s 1843 “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” Marx turned philosophy as a negation of Hegel’s theory of the state. While Marx persisted in his endorsement of Hegelian logic, he relinquished any loyalty to Hegel’s political theory.

(e) The Hegelian Left The first indication of Marx’s contact with Bruno Bauer and the Doctors Club is found in his 1837 letter to his father, while Marx was a student at the University of Berlin. In that letter Marx informs his father that he joined the Doctors Club in Berlin and that Bruno Bauer was a member of the Doctors Club. The Doctors Club witnessed the birth of the Hegelian Left.79

 Ibid., p. 205.  Ibid., pp. 205–206. 79  Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. I, ibid., “Letters From Marx to His Father in Trier”, pp. 19–20. 77 78

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From 1837 until Marx’s movement to Paris in 1843 Marx adhered to the Hegelian Left of Bruno Bauer. This defense of Bauer was exhibited in his Rheinische Zeitung article of 1842. In that article Marx protected Bauer against the assaults of a conservative German philosopher Otto Friedrich Gruppe. Marx’s defence of Bauer was simultaneously a defence of academic freedom.80 Marx’s allegiance to Bauer was also articulated in his correspondence with Arnold Ruge. In his July 9, 1842 letter to Ruge, Marx applauded Bauer’s opposition to “The Free,” a position to which Marx subscribed. In addition, Marx’s March 13, 1843 letter to Ruge overflowed with praise for Bauer. In that letter Marx asserted that Bauer’s review of the book Die Geschichte des Lebens Jesu “is delightful.”81 In the same letter Marx claimed that Bauer’s the “Sorrows and Joys of the Theological Mind” “seems to me not a very successful rendering of the section in the Phenomenology: The Unfortunate Consciousness.”82 The Hegelian Left of Bruno Bauer focused on the battle between philosophy and theology. Bauer’s embrace of Hegelianism rested on the use of philosophy to critique religion. Although an adherent of the Hegelian Left from 1837 until 1843, Marx disassociated himself from the Hegelian Left soon after his arrival in Paris. Marx separated himself from the Hegelian Left because he could no longer believe that the critique of philosophy should be confined to religion. In Paris Marx decided to extend philosophical critique to Political Theory and Political Economy. The extension of philosophical critique to politics was the opening of Marx’s critique of Hegelian politics, as initially expressed in his Paris “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.”

(f ) Ludwig Feuerbach Marx’s familiarity with the work of Ludwig Feuerbach dates from his 1841 doctoral dissertation. In that work, Marx cites Feuerbach’s History  Ibid., “Yet Another Word on Bruno Bauer and Die Akademische Lehrfreiheit”, pp. 211–214.  Ibid., “Marx Letter of Marx 13, 1843 to Arnold Ruge”, p. 400. 82  Ibid. 80 81

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of Recent Philosophy.83 Two years later, in this March 13, 1842 letter to Arnold Ruge, Marx drew reference to Feuerbach’s “Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie.”84 During his Rheinische Zeitung period, Marx’s relation to Feuerbach was divided into two parts: (1) approval; (2) disapproval. From the perspective of approval, Marx was indebted to Feuerbach for his attacks upon religion. Feuerbach employed philosophy to critique religion.85 From the perspective of disapproval, Marx censored Feuerbach for not expanding the critique of philosophy beyond religion to politics. In his March 13, 1843 letter to Ruge Marx stated: “Feuerbach’s aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he refers too much to nature and too little to politics. That, however, is the only alliance by which present-­ day philosophy can become truth.”86 Marx’s duality to the work of Feuerbach mirrors his ambiguity to the work of Hegel. In relation to Feuerbach, Marx applauded Feuerbach’s allegiance to philosophy, but reprimanded Feuerbach for only applying philosophy to religion and not to the state. In relation to Hegel, Marx adopted Hegelian logical categories, but applied them to a critique of both Idealist philosophy and politics, or Hegel’s concept of the state.

(g) Aristotle’s Subsumption of Marx Previous pages in this current chapter and the later Chap. 2, “The Restoration of Civic Humanism” provide a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s concept of civil society. To go into detail on Aristotle’s concept of civil society at this point would be repetitious. However, the next subdivision on “Civil Society” will outline the historical evolution of the concept of “civil society” from Cicero, to Machiavelli to Rousseau to Marx. Therefore, as a preparation for the next subdivision, it is necessary to offer a brief outline of how Aristotle’s theory of “civil society” was the birthplace of its  Marx, Karl, “The Difference Between The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, ibid., p. 94. 84  Marx, Karl, March 13, 1843 Letter to Arnold Ruge, ibid., p. 400. 85  Marx, Karl, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Rheinische Zeitung”, ibid., p. 197. 86  Marx, Karl, March 13, 1843 letter to Arnold Ruge, ibid., p. 400. 83

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later evolution into the thought of Cicero, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Marx. The basis of Aristotle’s concept of “civil society” rested upon his belief that the human species were inherently social beings. The species required community. The species was driven by the instinct of associationism. For Aristotle, associationism meant that the species was genetically political. Aristotle refers to humans as “political animals,” meaning that the species desired to live in political communities. In ancient Athens this community was the polis. The political community was predicated upon active citizenship, or citizen participation in the governance of the polis. Citizens were expected to participate in the governance of the polis and this participation would generate collaboration and cooperation. In Aristotle “civil society” meant collaboration and cooperation. A society, a polis, was civil because the citizens of that community were in concert with the other for the mutual benefit of each. Marx’s exhortation of Aristotle of his interpretation of the course of the Greek and Roman history was again clearly expressed not only in his doctoral dissertation, but also during his Rheinische Zeitung period. Not only did his Rheinische Zeitung period again display his admiration, but also denunciation of the Roman Empire and any authoritarian state. Marx’s 1842 contribution to the Rheinische Zeitung, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung” contains sentences which reflect these two principles of Marx. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to quote from this article. First, in relation to Aristotle, Marx wrote: “Greece flourished at its best internally in the time of Pericles, externally in the time of Alexander. In the age of Pericles the Sophists, and Socrates, who could be called the embodiment of philosophy, art, and rhetoric supplanted religion. The age of Alexander was the age of Aristotle, who rejected the eternity of the ‘individual’ spirit and the God of positive religions. And as for Rome! Read Cicero! The Epicurean, Stoic or Sceptic philosophies were the religions of cultured Romans when Rome had reached the zenith of its development.”87  Marx, Karl, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Rheinische Zeitung”, ibid., p. 189.

87

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In addition to Marx’s acclimation of Aristotle this paragraph is also a reiteration of Marx’s historiography of the ancient world. Marx again critiqued Hegel’s interpretation of the ancient world because Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy claimed that the Alexandrian world was one of decline. The above quotation from Marx certifies that the Alexandrian world was only of greatness and this greatness continued into the Roman Republic and Cicero. The decline of the ancient world only begins for Marx in the period of Augustus, or the replacement of republican government by the Roman Empire. Republics were the political form of philosophical greatness. Secondly, a later portion of this paragraph encapsulates Marx’s denunciation of authoritarian states. “It was not the downfall of the old religions that caused the downfall of the ancient states, but the downfall of the ancient states that caused the downfall of the old religions. And such ignorance as is found in this leading article proclaims itself the ‘legislator of scientific research’ and writes ‘decrees’ for philosophy.”88 In this quote, Marx stated that the cause of the decline of philosophy, of free thought, is authoritarian governments. The Hohenzollern Monarchy and its policy of press censorship will cause the downfall of Prussian philosophy and free thought. Marx attacked the oppressive nature of the state in its authoritarian form. For Marx a republican form of government was the ground of free thought and philosophy. His veneration for the Aristotelian republic was again expressed in his March 20, 1842 letter to Arnold Ruge in which he wrote: “The central point is the struggle against constitutional monarchy as a hybrid which from beginning to end contradicts and abolishes itself. Res publica is quite untranslatable into German.”89 Marx claimed that philosophy could only flourish in a republic. He understood Aristotle’s “civil society” as the substructure of cultural greatness.

88 89

 Ibid.  Marx, Karl, March 20, 1842 letter to Arnold Ruge, ibid., p. 383.

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(h) “Civil Society” The following discussion of Marx’s concept of “civil society” during the period of his doctoral dissertation and the Rheinische Zeitung will focus on the work of Cicero, Machiavelli, and Rousseau because they are specifically alluded to in his dissertation. Four works of Cicero are cited in Marx’s dissertation and they are On the Nature of the Gods,90 On the Ends of Good and Evils,91 The Tuscalen Disputation,92 and On Fate.93 In addition, Marx’s Seventh Notebook on Epicurean Philosophy contains two pages of citations from Cicero’s work On the Highest Good and Evils.94 Marx quoted paragraphs from this work because Cicero extolled the Epicurean idea of the “wise man.” In short, Marx looked upon Cicero as supporting his own conclusion that Epicurus was superior to Democritus.95 Cicero was a defender of the Roman Republic. As a Stoic and Epicurean, Cicero denounced the egoistic pursuit of wealth. He looked upon endless private acquisition of wealth as destructive of the moral basis of a republic. Furthermore, Cicero looked upon a republic as based upon a social spirit, as founded upon the principle of associationism, as the inherent desire in the human species to form communities and political organization. He wrote, “For what is a State but an association, or partnership in justice.”96 In Cicero “res republica” referred to the common good, or a state founded on the mutual collaboration and cooperation of its citizenship. In this regard, “res republica” championed the active political participation of all its citizens. Marx agreed with the moral and ethical principles of Cicero’s ideal of “civil society,” but he disagreed with Cicero over the political structure of  Marx, Karl, “The Difference Between The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, ibid., p. 77. 91  Ibid., p. 80. 92  Ibid. 93  Ibid., p. 81. 94  Ibid., pp. 507–508. 95  Marx, Karl, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung”, ibid., p. 189. 96  Ehrenberg, John, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 26. 90

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the Roman Republic. For Cicero, the Roman Republic was a state composed of classes whose distinctions were derived from the ownership of property. For Cicero, a “civil society” was coexistent with class, property, and state. For Marx, a “civil society” could only be achieved upon the abolition of property, class, and state. Nevertheless, Marx perpetuated the moral aspects of Cicero’s “civil society,” or Marx’s communist society could only function on Roman Republican moral values. These Roman Republican virtues of associationism, collaboration, and community were also the moral operative principles of communism. The work of Niccolo Machiavelli continued the discourse on “civil society” and Marx knew of the work of Machiavelli. In his “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung,” Marx wrote: Earlier, however, Machiavelli and Campanella, and later Hobbes, Spinoza, Hugo Grotius, right down to Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel, began to regard the state through human eyes and to deduce its natural laws from reason and experience, and not from theology. In so doing, they were as little deterred as Copernicus was by the fact that Joshua bade the sun stand still over Gideon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon. Recent philosophy has only continued the work begun by Heraclitus and Aristotle.97

It should be noted that in the above paragraph Marx alludes to Machiavelli, but does not specify which book of Machiavelli he read, The Prince or The Discourses. It is probable that Marx read both of these works, but my following comments on Machiavelli will be drawn totally from The Discourses. In addition, Machiavelli’s The Discourses, which like Cicero defends the Roman Republic, relies on much of its information from the work of Titus Livy. In neither his doctoral dissertation nor the Rheinische Zeitung does Marx mention Titus Livy. Similar to Marx’s relation to Cicero, Marx’s relation to Machiavelli contained both continuities and discontinuities. This discussion will begin with the discontinuities. Machiavelli’s The Discourses was an analysis of the Roman Republic and this republic was composed of class, property, and state. Marx was a 97

 Marx, Karl, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung”, ibid., p. 201.

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communist and Machiavelli was not and therefore Marx called for the overthrow of property, class, and state. A second discontinuity relates to the comparison between the Roman Republic and Athens. Whereas Machiavelli extolled the Roman Republic, Marx extolled Aristotle’s Athens and Alexander the Great. In terms of continuities, Machiavelli and Marx agreed in their denunciation of boundless wealth. Like Aristotle, Machiavelli excoriated excessive acquisition. Like Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicureans, Machiavelli saw the danger of greed. On this point as well, Marx was in agreement with the Classical Humanist tradition. In The Discourses, Machiavelli considered a Republic as the highest form of government and looked upon the Republics of Sparta and Rome as exemplifications of this model.98 Machiavelli recognized, however, that in the Roman Republic deep class divisions existed. On the economic level patricians and plebians confronted each other and on the political level clashes existed between consuls and tribunes. In addition, Machiavelli was aware that class struggles appeared in the Roman Republic. He drew attention to the class struggles which erupted between the patricians and plebians in terms of the Agrarian Laws and to the political stances of the Gracchi Brothers. Machiavelli did not favor property redistribution and therefore was an opponent of the Gracchi Brothers.99 On this point, another contradiction existed between Machiavelli and Marx. Whereas Machiavelli censored the Gracchi, Marx looked upon them as harbingers of the coming of the proletarian revolution. In his The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx looked upon the Gracchi as the classical precursors of the Jacobian Revolution.100 Machiavelli was also aware of the Classical Greek tradition of a dictatorship. In The Discourses, Machiavelli defined a dictatorship as an office created during a government crisis. The dictator would be given supreme powers by a vote of the Senate, his powers would be limited to the period of the crisis and as soon as the crisis was overcome his term of office was  Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Discourses, trans. Leslie J.  Walker, S.J (London: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 122–123. 99  Ibid., pp. 202–203. 100  Marx, Karl, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 16. Also see Norman Levine, Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin, ibid., pp. 78–79, 92–95. 98

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terminated.101 Machiavelli perpetuated the Classical Greek and Roman idea of a dictatorship and introduced it to Renaissance thought. Machiavelli was thus a point of transition through which the concept of dictatorship passed into Marx. When Marx used the term dictatorship, he was referring to the Classical model of a temporary emergency situation to overcome a crisis and then to be annulled. In order to overcome the social and political instability that would result from class struggles, both economic and political, Machiavelli advocated a “civic life,”102 or a sociopolitical life functioning in terms of “civic proceedings.”103 When Machiavelli used the terms “civic life” and “civic proceedings,” he meant a sociopolitical organization operating in terms of the “common good.”104 The achievement of the “common good” could be attained by the inclusion of the masses in the decision-making process.105 Machiavelli was not an advocate of democracy, but he did understand that popular and plebeian participation was vital for the preservation of a republic.106 He understood that the stability of a state was predicated upon the participation of the plebeians. In order to be secure, a state must ensure that the interests of the populace were heard in the bodies of the government. A stable republic must overcome the dangers of economic inequality. Machiavelli recognized the socioeconomic inequality was a cause of political revolutions. The Discourses called for equality,107 but this did not mean that Machiavelli was an egalitarian. Rather, when Machiavelli called for equality he meant participation by the citizenry of a republic.108 The city of the Classical World that Machiavelli most admired was Sparta under Lycurgus. The constitution of Sparta inspired by Lycurgus was a combination of three structural elements, Monarchy, Aristocracy,  Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Discourses, ibid., pp. 194–195.  Ibid., p. 173. 103  Ibid., p. 238. 104  Ibid., p. 275. 105  Ibid., p. 233. 106  Ibid., p. 225. 107  Ibid., pp. 243–244. 108  Ibid., pp. 108–110. 101 102

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and Democracy, and the meaning of Democracy in this context meant citizenship participation. Machiavelli’s admiration for the Spartan constitution arose from the fact that it allowed for plebian engagement, while simultaneously incorporating an aristocracy and Monarchy to restrain the plebian class and prevent a descent into total Democracy. Machiavelli understood excessive wealth as a danger to a Republic. He was a defender of private property, but recognized that an inordinate concentration of wealth was a danger to a Republic. The concentration of excessive wealth in the hands of an elite led to the curtailment of the rights of the plebians and thus the origination of class warfare.109 Excessive wealth led to unbounded greed and greed was the cancer of a Republic. Machiavelli admired the Roman Republic because it was governed from the perspective of virtue, and he extolled the statecraft of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus because these rulers were guided by the principles of virtue.110 Although excessive wealth was a danger, moderate wealth could be a benefit because the virtuous property owner could encourage welfare program for the poor. The virtuous property owner could use his wealth to ameliorate the misfortune of the poor, “such as giving pecuniary assistance or protection against the powerful.”111 Machiavelli’s protestations against exorbitant private property, his advocacy of plebian political participation, were indications that political decision making must be directed to the “common good.”112 Machiavelli pointed to the greatness achieved by Athens after the polis tyranny of Pisistratus. He also drew reference to the greatness of the Roman Republic once it liberated itself from the domination of kingships. Machiavelli wrote: “for it is not the well-being of individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community. And it is beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all that promotes it is carried out; and, however much this or that private person may be the loser on

 Ibid., p. 245.  Ibid., pp. 165–166. 111  Ibid., p. 224. 112  Ibid., p. 275. 109 110

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this account, there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in consequence.”113 To achieve the Republic whose purpose was the common good required the existence of the “wise man.”114 In referring to the ideal of the “wise man,” Machiavelli resorted to the Classical philosophical tradition of the Stoics and Epicureans. Previous paragraphs in this chapter indicated Stoics, Cicero, and Epicureans exhorted the image of the “wise man.” However, whereas Cicero and the Epicureans limited the “wise man” to the attainment of ataraxy, or inner harmony, Machiavelli expanded the mission of the “wise man” to the statesman who pursued the “common good.” The evolution of the concept of “civil society” advanced from Machiavelli to Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. The following discussion of the idea of “civil society” in the thought of Rousseau will focus on “The Social Contract,” which Marx specifically mentioned in his April 1842 article “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law.”115 The subtitle to this discussion of Rousseau’s political philosophy is “The Tyranny of Greece and Rome Over Rousseau.” Similar to Marx, the Classical World exerted an enormous influence on Rousseau, as the following pages will establish. However, just as discontinuities existed between Marx and Machiavelli over the Classical Heritage—Marx concentrated upon the Greek whereas Machiavelli focused on the Roman Republic—so these discontinuities continued between the work of Marx and Rousseau because Marx was predisposed to the Greeks whereas Rousseau perpetuated the Machiavellian preference for the Romans. Rousseau’s admiration of the Roman Republic was clearly expressed in Book IV of The Social Contract, particularly chapters Four, Five and Six of this work. In Chapter Four, “The Roman Comitia,” Rousseau outlined how the Republic of Rome was politically constructed to allow for the mass participation of the citizenry. The population of Rome was initially  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 232. 115  Marx, Karl, “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law”, Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, ibid., p. 205. 113 114

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composed of tribes, but these tribes were later restructured into curia. These curia were subsequently gathered into an assembly, or comitia, and there were three comitia: the Comitia Centuriata was the assembly of the aristocracy, the Comitia Curiata represented the largest percentage of the Roman population, and the Comitia Tributa was the chief advocate of the Roman population. Rousseau’s praise for the Roman Republic derived from the Republic’s encouragement of the population’s active participation in government. This is what Rousseau meant by a “civil society,” or civility.116 Most importantly, Rousseau singled out the Comitia Tributa. He referred to the Comitia Tributa as “the strongest support a good constitution can have,”117 and that the “Comitia Tributa were the most favourable to popular government.”118 The tribunes were advocates of the Roman plebeians, or the Comitia Tributa were the supporters of the poorer classes of Rome. A “civil society” for Rousseau meant the participation of all classes in the political process, and this meant that the plebeians, or the proletariat, must have their voices represented in the decision-making process. Rousseau was aware of class divisions and identified the conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat in the Roman Republic. He wrote: “This condition, being that of the patricians, was honored by all men; the simple and laborious life of the villager was preferred to the slothful and idle life of the bourgeoisie of Rome; and he who, in the town, would have been but a wretched proletarian, became, as a laborer in the fields, a respected citizen.”119 Rousseau’s regard for the Classical World, and, in this instance to Greek civilization, was espoused in his esteem for the Ephors of Sparta. Rousseau’s recognition of class struggle, of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, was manifested in his regard for the Ephors. In Sparta, the Ephors defended the right of the Sovereign, by which Rousseau meant the universal citizenry, against those who wished to  Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, “The Social Contract” in The Social Contract and the Discourses, trans. G.D.H. Cole (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 278–288. 117  Ibid., p. 288. 118  Ibid., p. 286. 119  Ibid., p. 280. 116

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repress or dominate the citizenry.120 In terms of the world of the Renaissance, Rousseau also applauded the Venetian Council of Ten as the Council of Ten also defended the rights of the underprivileged against the nobility of Venice.121 In addition, The Social Contract alludes to the Classical form of dictatorship and Rousseau defined dictatorship in accordance with Aristotle and Machiavelli. For Rousseau, the dictatorship of the ancient world was called into existence by the Comitia because of an emergency, prevailed only for the duration of the emergency and when the emergency ceased the dictatorship was terminated.122 The Classical World’s definition of dictatorship lived in the works of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Marx. Unfortunately, the Classical Tradition became extinct soon after the death of Marx and never passed on into the mind of Stalin. In addition, Rousseau’s reverence for Greece was also displayed in his continuation of the Aristotelian idea that the human species essentially possessed a political instinct, or desire to live in communities. For Rousseau, as for Aristotle, the human species was inherently a social animal controlled by the drive for association, whether this drive exhibited itself in family, tribe, or state.123 Rousseau was an expression of eighteenth-­ century anthropology. Based on eighteenth-century anthropological studies Rousseau recognized that the human species had a pre-state existence, that the species lived in a primitive society that was organized in terms of families and tribes. This instinct lead to the creation of political society and the state was also a derivation of associationism. Rousseau idealized primitive society, he looked upon political society as a decay of primitive society, and he saw the origin of private property as the onset of the decay of primitive society and the beginning of the decadence of political society. Even though Rousseau blamed private property for the decay of primitive society, he nevertheless defended the right of limited private property in the political community.

 Ibid., pp. 288–289.  Ibid. 122  Ibid., pp. 290–292. 123  Ibid., p. 190. 120 121

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Rousseau’s adherence to the doctrine of associationism was the ground for his refutation of natural law theory. In particular, he denounced the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius, preeminent spokespersons of natural rights theory. In The Social Contract, Rousseau judged Aristotle as superior to Hobbes and Grotius.124 Rousseau looked upon natural rights theory as the reason of the decadence of the Enlightenment states and in particular ridiculed the eighteenth-century British parliamentarian system for its belief that the House of Commons was a true defender of the social contract and the common good.125 Marx also rejected natural rights doctrine. Rousseau was one of the first to employ the term “alienation.” In The Social Contract, Rousseau wrote: “To alienate is to give or sell. Now a man who becomes a slave of another does not give himself; he sells himself, at least for his subsistence, but for what does a people sell itself?”126 Rousseau was cognizant of the fact that a system of the dictatorship of private property resulted in the coming-to-be of alienation. Again, he prefigured Marx. The Tyranny of Aristotle over Rousseau was also enunciated in Rousseau’s essay “A Discourse on Political Economy.” In this essay, Rousseau has recourse to the first book of Aristotle’s Politics.127 There is no guarantee that Marx himself ever read Rousseau’s “A Discourse on Political Economy.” Marx does not mention this work during the period of his doctoral dissertation and editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung. Nevertheless, given Marx’s familiarity with the works of Rousseau, it is reasonable to assume he was knowledgeable of this important essay of Rousseau. Book One of Aristotle’s Politics is a diatribe against excessive acquisition. As previous paragraphs indicated, Aristotle defended the individual possession of limited amounts of private property, but in Book One of the Politics Aristotle denounced exorbitant wealth. Economic activity in ancient Athens revolved around the household and within that context  Ibid., p. 183.  Ibid., p. 263. 126  Ibid., p. 184. 127  Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, “A Discourse on Political Economy”, ibid., p. 131. 124 125

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economic activity should be directed at the fulfillment of needs, and not toward unrestrained acquisition.128 Just like Aristotle, Rousseau condemned the unbridled acquisition of wealth. Rousseau was a member of the Enlightenment Left and the Enlightenment Left was a severe critic of the natural rights theory of the Enlightenment Center. In addition, he was a transition point in the passage of the Aristotelian ideal of “civil society” into Marx. Marx’s “civil society” was a fusion of Aristotle and Feuerbach. Whereas Aristotle defined humanity as a political animal, Feuerbach defined humanity as a “species being.” “Civil society” in Aristotle meant a political association, while “civil society” in Feuerbach meant “species being,” or in Feuerbach “civil society” was the outcome of “species being.”

(i) The Tyranny of Greece and Rome Over Marx This section is a bibliography and is divided into three divisions. Part One will archive the Greek and Roman authors Marx read in preparation for his doctoral dissertation and his Rheinische Zeitung period in order to demonstrate the degree to which the Classical World shaped Marx. Part Two is a catalogue of those Renaissance and eighteenth-century poets and playwriters Marx read as a demonstration of his regard for the masterpieces of European literature. Part Three is a syllabus of the German scholars of Greek and Roman philosophy, who Marx footnoted in his dissertation and who provided him with the historical background against which to put forth his own evaluation of Greek and Roman thoughts.

P  art One Greek and Roman authors Marx referred to in his dissertation, and writings for the Rheinische Zeitung and in his Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction. 1. Aeschylus. Prometheus Bound. 128

 The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 1–38.

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2. Anacharis. 3. Athenaeus. Banquet of the Learned. 4. Antisthenes. Succession of Philosophers. 5. Aristotle. Physics, Metaphysics, On Becoming and Decaying, On the Heavens, On the Soul, On the Generation of Animals, The Rhetoric. In addition, it is probable that Marx also read Aristotle’s The Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. 6. Cato. 7. Cicero. On the Nature of the Gods, On the Highest Goods and Evils, On Fate, Tusculan Disputations. 8. Clement of Alexandria. The Miscellanies. 9. Demetrius. Men of the Same Name. 10. Democritus. 11. Diogene Laertius. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Greek Philosophers. 12. Epicharmus. 13. Epicurus. On the Highest Good. 14. Euripides. 15. Eusebius. Preparation for the Gospel. 16. Pierre Gassendi. Animadversiones. 17. Heraclitus. 18. Herodotus. Historical. 19. Hesiodus. Theogonia. 20. Juvenal. Satires. 21. Homer. The Iliad. 22. Lucrians. Dialogues of the Gods. 23. Lucretius. On The Nature of Things. 24. Ovid. Tristia. 25. Plato. The Republic, Timaeus, Parmenides. 26. Plotinus. Enneads. 27. Plutarch. Reply to Colotes, On The Sentiments of Philosophers, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, On the Creation of the Soul. 28. Seneca. Works. 29. Sextus Empiricus. Against Professors, Outlines of Pyrrhonism. 30. Simplicius. Scolia en Aristotle.

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31. Socrates. 32. Solon. 33. Johannes Strabaeus. Physical Selections, Ethical Selections. 34. Tacitus. Germania Historiae. 35. Terence. Andria. 36. Tentullianus. De Carne Christi. 37. Themistius. Scholia en Aristotelem. 38. Thucydides. The Peloponnesian Wars. 39. Virgil. The Aeneid.

 art Two Catalogue of Renaissance and Eighteenth-Century P Poets and Playwriters 1 . Cervantes, Miguel de. Don Quixote. 2. Goethe, J.  W. Faust, Rechenschaft, Reineke Fuchs, Verschiedenes über Kunst, Der Zauberlehrling. 3. Lessing, G.E. Laokoon, Eine Parabel. 4. Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. De l’esprit des lois. 5. Rousseau, J.J. Du contract social. 6. Schiller, F.W. Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, Die Worte des Glaubens. 7. Shakespeare, W. Julius Caesar, King Henry IV, King Lear, King Richard III, The Merchant of Venice, A Midsummers Night Dream, Othello, Troilus and Cressida. 8. Sterne, Laurence. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy. 9. Voltaire. Oeuvres completes de Voltaire.

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 art Three Syllabus of Scholars of Greek and Roman P Philosophy and Law 1. Baur, F.C.  Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus. 2. Cramer, A.W. Der verborum significatione tituli. 3. Heineccius, J.  G. Elementa iuris Civilis, Secundum ordinem Pandectarum. 4. Hegel, G.W.F.  Encyclopedia der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Phänomenologisch des Geistes, Vorlesungen über der Geschichte der Philosophie. 5. Lauterbach, W.A. Pandertanum. 6. Muhlenburch. Ch. Fir. Doctrina pandertanum. 7. Ritter, Heinrich. Geschichte der Philosophie Alter Zeit. 8. Savigny, Friedrich Carl von. Das Recht des Besitzes. 9. Schaubach, J.K. Ueber Epikur’s Astronomische Begriffe. 10. Thibaut, A.F.J. System des Pandekten-Rechts. 11. Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf. Elementa Logices Aristotelicae, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre: Aristotle Kategorienlehre. 12. Wenig-Ingenheim, J.H. Lehrbuch Des Gemeinen Civilrechts. 13. Winckelmann, J. Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums.

 art Two: The Tyranny of Greece and Rome P Over Marx: The Pre-Paris Period Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law was written in the summer of 1843. Marx resigned his editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung in March 1843, married Jenny von Westphalen in June, and went to live with the Westphalen family in Kreuznach. In this Contribution, Marx counterposed the decadence of Feudal Landed Monarchy against the glories of ancient Greece and Rome. Marx

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used Aristotle to refute Hegel. He used Aristotle’s “res publica” as the antithesis to Hegel’s political Monarchy.129 Marx exalted the “res publica” because it recognized “civil society” as subject. “Civil society” was sovereign and, in this regard, Marx perpetuated Rousseau. Sovereignty, the power of legislation, resided in “civil society.”130 But “civil society” in itself was an expression of “species being,” or “species being” was the essence of “civil society.”131 Marx drew a connection between Aristotle and Feuerbach, or Feuerbach’s “species being” was the foundation of Aristotle’s “res publica.” Although Feuerbach introduced a new element into Aristotle’s “civil society,” a continuous line of progression connected Aristotle to Machiavelli to Rousseau to Feuerbach to Marx. The idea that “civil society” was sovereign, first enunciated in Rousseau’s The Social Contract, was employed by Marx to refute the notion of political emancipation. For Marx, the political was synonymous to state and the state was an instrument of the propertied. The emancipation of “civil society” from the state could never be achieved because the state was controlled by property, and property would never surrender its control over “civil society” because of property’s exploitation of “civil society.” Marx consequentially abandoned the idea that the emancipation of “civil society” and “species being” could be accomplished though the political: he searched for another organ of emancipation and discovered it in the concept of social emancipation. While political emancipation led to reform, it nevertheless allowed the powers of Monarchy, Aristocracy, Church, and private property to be maintained. According to Marx, social emancipation, on the other hand, meant that the exploitation of “civil society” and “species being” would be terminated. From this perspective, Marx’s “Contribution” was another attack on Hegel’s definition of the state. Marx recognized that Hegel’s Philosophy of Law did call for areas of reform. Hegel was not blind to the need to  Levine, Norman, Marx’s Discourse with Hegel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  Marx, Karl, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. 3, p. 32. 131  Ibid., p. 73. 129 130

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address the issue of poverty. Nevertheless, the reforms advocated by Hegel continued to perpetuate the existence of Monarchy, Aristocracy, Church, and Private Property. Hegelian reform was contained within the political, and the political was merely a codename of the state. Hegel also advocated the right of private property and consequently the law of primogeniture. For Marx, primogeniture was the political legalization of the state and therefore the state “is here therefore the continuation of private property.”132 Marx’s distinction between political and social revolutions acted as the foundation for his evaluation of St. Just, Robespierre, and the Jacobian Revolution. Marx was an advocate of the Jacobins because they carried the concept of political revolution to its highest form. The advances made by the Jacobin political revolution superseded all previous political revolutions. But the revolutions of St. Just and Robespierre suffered from shortcomings because they did not advance to a social revolution. St. Just and Robespierre allowed the exploitation of “civil society” to persist. For Marx, there was only one kind of revolution which would free “civil society” from exploitation and this was the “social revolution” which could only be led by the industrial proletariat because the industrial proletariat was the subject. Marx’s glorification of Greece and Rome was further evidenced in his diagnosis of private property in Rome, which fell into two parts, negative and positive. On the negative side, Marx recognized that private property existed in Rome, both in the Republic and the Empire. Private property in Rome was defined as jus utendi et abutendi, the right of use and of disposal.133 As Rome expanded and acquired imperial conquests these new territories were also seen as private property. In addition, the existence of private property in the Roman Republic led to the class struggle between the patricians and the plebeians. Although the Roman Republic was admired by Marx, the Greco-Roman antiquity familiarized Marx with the historical evolution of class struggles. On the positive side of private property in the Roman Republic, Marx wrote:

 Ibid., p. 65.  Ibid., p. 108.

132 133

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For the rest, private property as a whole, as in general with the classical nations of antiquity, asserts itself as public property, either as in good times, as in expenditure by the republic, or as luxurious and general benefits (baths, etc) for the poor.134

Marx was here referring to the moral responsibility of the propertied classes in the Athenian polis and Roman Republic to provide for the free entrance of the plebeians to religious festivals, civic celebrations, public meals, and public baths. In addition, Marx was also referring to the “ager publicus” of the Gracchi Brothers. The “ager publicus” were lands conquered by the Roman Republic and then portions of these territories were made available, became public lands, to be farmed by “civil society.” Finally, another positive aspect of private property in the Roman Republic was the separation between public office and property ownership. Marx wrote: “State dignities are never hereditary in Rome, i.e., private property is not the dominant political category.”135 In other words, the ability to serve in public office was not dependent on the ownership of property. In his Contribution, Marx emerged as a democrat, but not yet a communist. The Contribution is a critique of private property, but not a call for its abolition. Marx’s Contribution was written in the spring and summer of 1843 but it was only in On the Jewish Question, written in the autumn of 1843, that Marx begins his conversion to communism. Furthermore, Hegel’s Philosophy of Law also provided Marx with vital insights into the various dimensions of the state. The dimensions were “civil society,” constitution, legislation, government, and state. According to Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, the evolution of the state evolved in these five stages. A social community, “civil society” was the initial ground of the state. The next stage was the writing of a constitution, or the procedures by which this social community was to be governed. The third stage was legislation, or the passing of laws, which were in accordance with the constitution. The fourth stage was government, or the administration of these acts of legislation. For Hegel, the fifth stage was the state or the universal idea that synthesized all previous four stages. 134 135

 Ibid., p. 110.  Ibid.

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Hegel’s five-stage division of the state bequeathed to Marx the definition of communism. Marx called for the abolition of the state, but this did not mean the abolition of “civil society,” constitution, legislation, or governance. These four previous stages, “civil society,” constitution, legislation, and government, were interdependent, but self-sustaining, and would still survive the extinction of the state. Communism for Marx was not anarchy. In communism, “civil society,” constitution, legislation, and government would still exist, but “civil society” would be the primary subject and sovereign once the dictatorship of private property over the state was terminated. Marx’s pre-Parisian journey into the supremacy of Greece and Rome over a Feudal Monarchy was further evidenced in his 1843 letters to Arnold Ruge. Marx and Ruge were planning to resurrect the banned Rheinische Zeitung in Paris under the new title of Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher. Prior to leaving for Paris, Marx wrote to Ludwig Feuerbach requesting that Feuerbach contribute articles to the planned Deutsche-­ Französische Jahrbücher. Marx’s solicitation of contributions from Feuerbach was an indication of Marx’s embrace of Feuerbach’s notion of “species being.”136 Written from Cologne, Marx’s May 1843 letter to Ruge stated that the desire for freedom, “the self-confidence of the human being,” vanished from the world with the end of Greek civilization.137 Furthermore, Marx praised Aristotle above the political theory of the Prussian Monarchy. German political thought did not present the human as inherently a political being and thus alienated the German citizen from the political domain. In contradiction Aristotle defined the human as an instinctive political animal and therefore championed citizen participation in political decision making, or the legislative and governmental process.138 In the same letter to Ruge Marx outlined his early acquaintance with political economy. “The system of industry and trade, of ownership and exploitation of people” only gave birth to the “suffering of human

 Ibid. p. 111.  Ibid., pp. 349–351. 138  Ibid., p. 137. 136 137

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beings.”139 Private property was a Philistine world, which “thoughtlessly consumes” at the expense of “civil society.”140 Marx’s September 1843 letter to Ruge evidenced his continued radicalization. In that letter, Marx called for the continued expansion of the role of critique and enlarged the role of critique beyond the limitations of both Hegel and Bauer to include the “ruthless criticism of all that exists.”141 The enlargement of the role of criticism in Marx led to his engagement with socialist literature. In the September 1843 letter Marx acknowledged his first reading of the writings of Etienne Cabet’s Voyage en Icarie, Theodore Dezamy, and Wilhelm Weitling as well as Francois Fourier and Pierre Proudhon. However, regardless of his knowledge of these radical authors, Marx did not at this point adhere to communism. Marx drew a distinction between socialism and communism and he admitted that communism was a “dogmatic abstraction.”142 In spite of his rejection of communism, Marx understood communism as a “special expression of the humanistic principle.”143 In his correspondence with Ruge, Marx remained bound to the Aristotelian tradition and wrote: “As for human beings, that would imply thinking beings, free men, republicans.”144 The Athenian polis still controlled Marx’s political thought. Marx was still in Kreuznach when he wrote On the Jewish Question and this essay was a statement of his transition from an Aristotelian republican to a communist. The central theme of On the Jewish Question was a definition of emancipation. The tyranny of Greece and Rome over Marx was displayed in Marx’s speculations. In order to define emancipation, Marx was compelled to resort to four Aristotelian concepts, association, “civil society,” need, and the union of “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon.” Marx adhered to the belief that humans possessed a natural instinct for association, “on the  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 141. 141  Ibid. 142  Ibid., p. 142. 143  Ibid., p. 143. 144  Ibid. 139 140

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association of man with man,”145 and, in this regard, copied the Aristotelian idea that humans were inherently political animals. The instinct for association was the engine for the creation of “civil society,” or “species being” was congenitally social, the union of Marx and Aristotle. In addition, in order for “civil society” to sustain itself it must produce to meet “practical needs.”146 When Marx asserted that “practical needs” were the purpose of production, he copied that assertion made by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle stated “for if men did not need one another’s goods at all, or did not need them equally, there would be no exchange or not the same exchange.”147 Finally, a prevailing theme in On the Jewish Question is Marx’s continued recourse to the Aristotelian idea of the difference between “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon.” The distinction between “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon” was replicated in Rousseau’s book The Social Contract in which Rousseau recognized the distinction between homme and citoyen. Even though Rousseau replicated Aristotle’s distinction between “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon,” Marx aimed his critique at Rousseau. Marx admonished Rousseau because the French philosopher accepted the distinction between “homme” and “citoyen.”148 For Marx, the distinction between “homme” and “citoyen” destroyed the nature of “civil society.” In order for “civil society” to be sovereign, homme and citoyen, the “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon,” must be unified. Feuerbach achieved this unification in his concept of “species being.” In his search for a return to Aristotle, the union of “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon,” Marx made a critical study of Liberal eighteenth-­ century revolutions, both the American and French Revolutions. These two revolutions were examples of what Marx classified as political revolutions. Marx’s research into the history of Liberal political revolutions led him to a vast archive of documentation. In regards to the French and American Revolutions, Marx read the following works: (1) Declaration of the  Ibid., p. 134.  Ibid., p. 162. 147  Ibid., p. 174. 148  The Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), p. 1011. 145 146

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Rights of Man and the Citizen, 1791149; (2) Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1793150; (3) The French Constitution of 1795151; (4) The Constitution of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of New Hampshire.152 In addition, Marx knew the works of Alexis de Tocquevitle, Democracy in America and Thomas Hamilton’s Man and Manners in North America.153 Finally, in regard to the French Revolution, Marx read the work of Philip Buchez and Pierre Roux-Lavergne’s, Histoire Parlementaire de la Revolution Française.154 For Marx, the history of Liberal revolutions proved that all these upheavals were failures because they were merely political and thus sustained the separation between “homme” and “citoyen.” The only way to supersede the schism between “homme” and “citoyen” was the invention of a new mode of revolution, or the social revolution. A synonym for the social revolution, the triumph of “civil society,” was permanent revolution, and a permanent revolution could only be commanded by the proletariat. Marx’s critique of Liberal eighteenth-century revolutions was a continuation of his denunciation of the theory of natural rights. The doctrine of natural rights was merely an extension of the corrupt desire for greed and self-satisfaction. Ultimately, the defence of natural rights led to the justification of private property, and in On the Jewish Question Marx condemned the right of private property.155 Natural rights pitted ego against ego and was an abnegation of “species being.” Private property only continued the civil war between vainglorious atomic individuals. Marx’s theory of emancipation not only began with his critique of the state, politics, and natural rights but also his critique of religion. Marx was cognizant of the alliance between the Lutheran Church and the Prussian Monarchy, of the Papal support of Feudalism and Kingship, and  Marx, Karl, “On the Jewish Question”, Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. III Ibid., p. 154. 150  Ibid., p. 164. 151  Ibid., p. 161. 152  Ibid., p. 163. 153  Ibid., p. 161. 154  Ibid., p. 151. 155  Ibid., p. 165. 149

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thus he understood religion as an anchor of repressive states. Therefore, the first stage toward the full emancipation of humankind was the overthrow of religion. Atheism was a necessary precondition for emancipation. For Marx, the primary cause of human enslavement was property and the practices unleashed by the ownership of property, such as huckstering, egoism, and the addiction to the pursuit of money. Complete emancipation could only be accomplished when these social causes of oppression were overthrown. Marx then identified the social conditions of private property, huckstering, and the addiction to the accumulation of money as Judaism. In so doing, Marx was criticizing Bauer’s understanding of emancipation. Whereas Bauer understood emancipation as the overcoming of religion, Marx understood emancipation as the extinction of those social conditions which caused enslavement. Bauer sought a private approach to the emancipation, the extinction of religious belief, whereas Marx sought a social definition of emancipation, the termination of all those social conditions which were the causes of oppression. Bauer used Judaism as a religious belief, whereas Marx used the term Judaism as the social practice of capitalism. On the Jewish Question was written as a critique of Bauer’s individualistic approach to religion and emancipation. Marx understood Judaism as a synonym for capitalism and therefore the end of capitalism could only be attained by the elimination of the social practices associated with Judaism. In contradistinction to Bauer, Marx affirmed that the emancipation of the Jew could be a result of the emancipation of society from capitalism. Only when huckstering, the craving for wealth, was annihilated could the Jew find emancipation. Total emancipation was what Marx identified as the permanent revolution; the revolution was permanent, ongoing, until every source of the expropriation of the “species being” was annihilated. On the Jewish Question was a fusion of Marx’s atheism with his definition of full social emancipation. It was not directed at the Jew in-himself and thus was not anti-Semetic. It related to the social practices in which the Jew was imprisoned because of the Christian enslavement of Judaism.

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In addition, On the Jewish Question was an example of Marx’s rejection of the Hegelian Idealism of the State and Politics, and his embrace of Hegelian logical categories. Marx employed the Hegelian logical category of “alienation” to denounce the concept of the state. Marx wrote: “Political emancipation is at the same time the dissolution of the old society on which the state, alienated from the people, the sovereign power, is based.”156 The repression Marx suffered under the Prussian Crown, his disdain for English political economy, his growing awareness of the French critique of capitalism in the works of Proudhon, Fourier, Cabet, and Dezamy, his admiration of St. Just and Robespierre, and the French Revolution, meant that the only possible location for his exile was in Paris.

 art Three: Tyranny of Greece and Rome over P Marx in His Paris Period A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction was written in Paris and was a radicalization of Marx’s earlier Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Hegel’s idea of critique was limited to the realm of philosophy while in the Introduction Marx expanded the role of critique to a negation of politics and the embrace of a proletarian revolution. The Tyranny of Greece and Rome in Marx’s historical calculations was again manifested in his prophecy regarding the oncoming of the proletarian revolution in Germany. In general, Marx saw the proletarian revolution as the final gravestone of the European ancien regime. The French Revolution of 1789 was merely a prelude to the proletarian revolution: “If I negate the German state of affairs in 1843, then, according to the French computation of time, I am hardly in the year 1789, and still less in the focus of the present.”157 In analyzing the collapse of the ancien regime, Marx took recourse to the aesthetics of Greek theatre and drew a distinction between ancient tragedy and comedy. The ancien regime was 156 157

 Ibid., p. 163.  Ibid., p. 165.

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tragic because it was a conflict between a decadent world and a new world that was just coming into being. Tragedy was the portrayal of a prominent figure who was confronted by his inevitable overthrow. Marx wrote: “The modern ancien regime is only the comedian of a world order whose true heroes are dead.”158 Marx compared the ancien regime “to the tragically wounded to death in Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound.”159 But ­comedy followed tragedy and the disappearance of the ancien regime was comedy, and Marx drew a comparison between the end of the ancien regime and the Roman Lucian’s Dialogues. In addition, Marx used the ancient world as a source to critique the Hegelian addiction to philosophy: “as the ancient peoples went through their pre-history in imagination, in mythology, so we Germans have gone through our post-history in thought, in philosophy.”160 In order to achieve greatness again the modern world must become practical and practicality was the proletariat. Finally, Marx contrasted Rome and the German Holy Roman Empire, for as Rome was glorified because all the gods of the ancient world were recognized in the Roman Pantheon; the German Holy Roman Empire was disgraced because it embodied “all the signs of all political forms.”161 Compared to the Greco-Roman world the ancien regime was decadence. The Introduction was further evidence of Marx’s knowledge of revolutionary movements. Previous paragraphs drew attention to Marx’s studies in the French and American revolutions. However, the Introduction specifies Marx’s study of religious revolutions. In the Introduction, Marx made reference to Luther and the German Reformation. According to Marx, these revolutions failed because they were merely religious, or theoretical. Just as the Reformation failed because it was a product of the “brain of a monk, so all revolutions must fail if they only remain “in the brain of a philosopher,”162 that is, Hegel. In addition, the German Peasant War proved to be a failure because it was not motivated by class struggle

 Ibid., p. 176.  Ibid., p. 179. 160  Ibid. 161  Ibid., p. 180. 162  Ibid., p. 184. 158 159

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but it “came to grief because of theology.”163 It was captured in the brain of a theologian, Martin Luther. The Introduction was both a continuation and a transcendence of the ideas put forth in On the Jewish Question. In that essay, Marx explored the meaning of emancipation and in order to achieve this he recognized the need to pass beyond a political revolution and conquer a social revolution. But On the Jewish Question did not identify the engine of this social revolution. The Introduction was Marx’s first recognition that a social class must be the propellant force of a social revolution. Only an economic class in society could realize a social revolution and in addition, Marx singled out the proletariat as the class in society that could lead the social revolution.164 Furthermore, the Introduction demonstrated an additional advance beyond On the Jewish Question. In On the Jewish Question, Marx recognized the evils of private property, huckstering and hedonistic acquisition, but did not directly call for the abolition of private property. In the Introduction, Marx for the first time called for the termination of private property and the end of capitalism.165 The proletariat, the leader of the permanent revolution, was the fulfillment of the social revolution. Simultaneously, the social revolution was the triumph of “civil society.” The extinction of private property and the state was the pathway for the governance of “civil society.” Finally, the governance of “civil society” was the resurrection of Aristotle. Marx’s second venture into a career in journalism, his co-editorship with Arnold Ruge in the publication of the Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbücher also ended in failure when this journal lost its financial backing. However, Marx continued to write and so he sought a German journal and his next article was published in the Vorwarts, in August 1844. The title of this article was “Critical Marginal Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform’ by a Prussian.” Marx’s article was an announcement of his break with Arnold Ruge. While Ruge judged the Silesian workers uprising of June 1844 as a futile effort and looked upon  Ibid., p. 182.  Ibid., p. 182. 165  Ibid., p. 186. 163 164

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the Prussian kingship as the organ of social reform, Marx on the contrary denounced the Prussian Monarchy as a stalwart defender of the decadent ancien regime and defended the Silesian workers strike as the onset of the proletarian revolution. The lens through which Marx interpreted the proletarian uprisings in Lyon in 1831 and the Silesian uprising in 1844 was through the perspective of Greece and Rome. Marx drew a comparison between the “civil society” of the ancient world and “civil society” under the modern state. The criteria he used in making this comparison was the existence of slavery. Whereas in the era of the ancien regime “civil society” was a slave to the modern state, in the ancient world slavery was a support of “civil society.” Marx recognized that slavery existed in Athens and Rome, but did not see ancient “civil society” and slavery as “riveted to each other,”166 but saw them as “classic opposites.”167 But in the modern state “civil society” was “riveted in its enslavement to the state.”168 Marx again applied Greece and Rome as criteria by which to evaluate the French Revolution and Robespierre. On the one hand, Marx saw the failures of the French Revolution as arising from its basically political nature, not a social revolution. Again resorting to Greece and Rome and employing the term “classic” as a synonym for Greece and Rome, Marx evaluated the French Revolution as the “classical period of political intellect.”169 In addition, Robespierre was aware that the antithesis between poverty and wealth were barriers to the achievement of democracy. Marx resorted to Sparta to explain Robespierre’s failure to overcome the class conflict between wealth and poverty. Robespierre was still enslaved to a political revolution and thus could only resort to “spartan frugality”170 as a means to overcome the destitution of the underclasses. Finally, the social revolution advocated by Marx was a victory for Aristotle. Marx defined the social revolution as the restitution of the  Ibid., p. 187.  Ibid., p. 198. 168  Ibid. 169  Ibid., p. 199. 170  Ibid., p. 199. 166 167

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human community. While the political revolution rendered the human community still isolated from political involvement, the social revolution would restore the human community as the source of governance. “Human nature is the true community of men.”171 In this sentence, Marx allied Feuerbach and Aristotle by drawing a similarity between species being and “civil society.” The “social revolution” would restore the governance of “civil society” as demanded by Aristotle and thus the social revolution was the restitution of the Athenian polis. The “Critical Marginal Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform’ by a Prussian” offered an anatomy of the stages of a social revolution that remained permanent throughout Marx’s life. This article was Marx’s first and last draft of what he meant by the proletarian revolution. The first stage was the emergence of a social class, but this new class must be different from the bourgeoisie. The class of the bourgeoisie were propertied and only demanded a political revolution as exemplified in the French Revolution. This new class in society must be drawn from layers below the bourgeoisie, or from the newly engendered factory working class brought into existence by the Industrial Revolution and which was propertyless. This new class was the proletariat. The second stage in Marx’s redefinition of revolution was the awareness by the proletariat that its emancipation was dependent upon its passage beyond a political revolution to a social revolution and a social revolution entailed the abolition of private property and the overthrow of the state. The third stage of the revolution was the incorporation of socialism. Marx was not yet a communist, but he did advocate the writings of Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Eugene Buret, and particularly Wilhelm Weitling, as establishing the principles of a socialist “civil society.” Marx’s proletariat radicalization led him to begin his studies into political economy as he saw English political economy particularly as a justification for capitalism and private property. In his “Critical Marginal Notes,” Marx critiqued Thomas Malthus because Malthus argued that the growth of population would exceed the means of subsistence and

171

 Ibid., p. 204.

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thus produce poverty. In order to refute Malthus, Marx called upon the help of the French Catholic socialist Eugene Buret.172 The “Critical Marginal Notes” also draws reference to Marx’s 1844 Introduction to his 1843 “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.” Just as the Introduction was Marx’s extension of the Hegelian notion of critique to include the political, so Marx’s “Critical Marginal Notes” was an extension of the Hegelian notion of critique to embrace the invalidation of political economy. Comments on James Mill, Clemens D’economie Politique was written in the first half of 1844 and represents Marx’s immersion into political economy, a transition to be fully realized in his Paris Manuscripts. Comments on James Mill, Clemens D’economie Politique was also a demonstration of how Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was the prototype upon which Marx fashioned his theory of production. The fundamental principle in the Nicomachean Ethics was that economic behavior should be governed by ethical principles and Marx adopted and applied this Aristotelian idea. In Marx’s essay, he outlines seven principles, all derived from Aristotle, upon which he believed productive activity should be based. These principles were: (1) Reciprocal173; (2) Equivalent174; (3) Mutual Recognition175; (4) Mutual Need176; (5) Mutual Value177; (6) Communal Nature178; (7) Need.179 The concept of the reciprocal was fundamental to Marx’s theory of economics. Production and exchange must be reciprocal, or reciprocal benefits must be exchanged between the producer and the laborer. Reciprocity meant that both agents in the process of exchange must receive proportionate rewards. The elimination of disproportionate rewards would end exploitation. In addition, the concept of the  Ibid., p. 194.  Ibid., p. 228. 174  Ibid., p. 221. 175  Ibid., p. 226. 176  Ibid. 177  Ibid., p. 227. 178  Ibid., p. 228. 179  Ibid., p. 218. 172 173

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reciprocal established the grounds for mutual need and mutual recognition. The agreement that exchange should be reciprocal was additionally the recognition that each party in the exchange had mutual need, each must eat to survive. The exercise of the reciprocal through the practice of mutual need inevitably led to the establishment of mutual recognition and mutual recognition was the premise of community. This was the humanization of economics. Marx’s theory of value was to evolve into a theory of labor, but in his 1844 essay, he critiqued the political economic theory of value as represented by James Mill, and replaced it with a concept of value derived from the mutual recognition of the sanctity of each individual. In a community, the end of production was the satisfaction of need, and Marx’s 1844 essay on James Mill was the first time that Marx singled out need as the absolute purpose of production, an idea that continued in his work thereafter and reached a fulfillment in his 1875 essay, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” in which he identified the exchange carried on the basis of the reciprocity of need and ability as one of the primary goals of communism. The fulfillment of needs was the product of labor and in his essay on James Mill, Marx identified labor as a property that belonged to the individual. In 1844, Marx saw labor as a property and not yet as substance. It was only in the Paris Manuscripts that Marx identified labor as substance. Finally, the essay on James Mill is witness to Marx’s faithfulness to both Feuerbach and Aristotle. In relation to Feuerbach, Marx wrote that human need became “the mediator between you and the species,”180 a direct reference to the Feuerbachian concept of “species being.” When Marx refers to the “communal nature”181 of humankind, he is reiterating the Aristotelian ideas that humans were inherently social animals, or associationism, and the Aristotelian idea of “civil society.” These seven categories which Marx adopted from Aristotle were clearly outlined in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The prevailing purpose of Aristotle was to subsume economic behavior under the control of ethics and Marx replicated this Aristotelian ambition.

180 181

 Ibid., p. 228.  Ibid.

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As a means of emphasizing this continuity between Aristotle and Marx, it is necessary to discuss ten additional Aristotelian concepts: (1) Proportion; (2) Equivalence; (3) Proportionate Requital; (4) Proportionate Equality; (5) Reciprocal; (6) Reciprocity; (7) Mutual Recognition; (8) Proportionate Distribution; (9) Distribute Justice; (10) Labor as the Source of Value. In Aristotle, the terms proportionate and commensurate were synonyms. When Aristotle used these terms he was applying the ethical standard of the mean to economic activity. In other words, economic exchange must be conducted on the principle of the mean, or all members involved in an economic exchange must be the recipients of a proportionate advantage. Aristotle was not an egalitarian; he did not believe that all citizens of the polis must possess absolutely equal possessions or incomes. Nevertheless, he was opposed to excessive inequality and embraced the idea that economic benefits must be commensurate, they must meet the mean, they must result in all members of the exchange receiving proportionate gain. Some members of the exchange would receive more, and some less, but the gain of all members would be commensurate and the mean would be achieved.182 Another term frequently used by Aristotle was “equivalence” and this also corresponded to the words proportion and commensurate. Equivalent meant that all participants in an economic exchange received comparable, not equal, advantages.183 Furthermore, the ethical principle of the mean in proportionate requital meant that all members of an exchange received a recompense proportionate to the other participants in the exchange.184 The phrase proportionate requital was an analogy for the expression proportionate equality and Aristotle defined equality as the commensurate.185 Aristotle’s notion of economic proportionality and commensurability was the ground for his social principle of the reciprocal. Economics as the basis of the social and economic proportionality was the raison d’être of

 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics”, in The Basic Writings of Aristotle, ibid., pp. 1011–1013.  Ibid., p. 1010. 184  Ibid. 185  Ibid. 182 183

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his social doctrine of the reciprocal.186 The locution of the reciprocal meant that all members of a society were conscious of the reciprocity which united the citizens of a “civil society.” Reciprocity engendered mutual recognition and mutual recognition was the cohesive that bound “civil society” together. Without the mutual reciprocity of all members, the community could not function, could not remain a republic.187 Aristotle’s dedication to the arithmetic of proportionality, or the mean, was the ground for his adherence to the principle of proportionate distribution.188 Just as economic exchange was based on proportionate requital, so economic distribution should be based on proportionate distribution, and this meant that the objects produced by “civil society” must be distributed proportionally, or that no inhabitant would live in poverty, or that the produce of a “civil society” would be circulated with equivalence and commensurability. Ethics was the essence of Aristotle’s theory of distribution. Indeed, Aristotle employed the term “distributive justice”189 in seeking to explain his theory of distribution. To function properly, distribution must be ethical because it must bestow upon all equivalent justice. Aristotle’s subsumption of Marx was also demonstrated by the fact that Aristotle introduced Marx to the study of the theory of production. Long before the James Mill essay and his rejection of Classical Political Economy, Marx became acquainted with the concepts of use and exchange value, and labor from his study of the Nicomachean Ethics. In that work, Aristotle recognized that produced objects exchanged and drew the distinction between use and exchange. Production for use meant that the object produced would satisfy a need, while production for exchange meant that a produced object would be exchanged for a different object such as money. Aristotle identified value as the magnet between use and exchange, or use and exchange could function because each of these activities possessed an equivalent value, or gravitational pull.190  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 1013. 188  Ibid., p. 1007. 189  Aristotle, “The Politics”, in The Basic Writings of Aristotle, ibid., p. 1138. 190  Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics”, in The Basic Writings of Aristotle, ibid., pp. 1012. 186 187

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Aristotle also recognized the significance of labor. On the one hand, labor was the basis of association, or the existence of use and exchange were the bonding agencies for species association, or the origin or human societies. On the other hand, labor was the source of use and exchange value, or without labor, use and exchange could never come into being. However, even though Marx was acquainted with these terms from his knowledge of the writings of Aristotle, he applied different meanings to this ancient Greek theory of production. Marx united Aristotle and Hegel. Whereas Aristotle used terms like labor, value, and exchange merely as methodological procedures, Marx injected these terms with the Hegelian concept of substance. In Aristotle, labor was the source of association, or of productive connections, whereas in Marx, labor was substance, or the Hegelian idea of an inherent quality, or pneumatic energy. In addition, whereas Aristotle understood value as the calculus of exchange, Marx interpreted value as the embodiment of labor. In Marx, if labor was substance then value was the enshrinement of substance. Hegel was also the father of Marx’s concept of value. Whereas Marx transformed the Aristotelian ideas of labor and value, he merely incorporated the Aristotelian ideas of use and exchange. Marx accepted in an unmodified form Aristotle’s concepts of use and exchange and these unmodified forms also transitioned into eighteenth-century political economy against which Marx rebelled. Not only did Hegel empower Marx with the tools by which to transform the Aristotelian concepts of labor and value, but Hegel also assigned Marx with the logical tools by which to critique Political Economy. Marx’s essay on James Mill is replete with references to the Hegelian categories of alienation, estrangement, and objectification. In addition, although not specifically mentioned there are suggestions in this essay that Marx also alluded to the Hegelian concepts of subject-object and master-slave. Marx’s essay on James Mill was a point of transition to his Paris Manuscripts. The James Mill essay was an announcement of Marx’s concentration upon a critique of Political Economy. In addition, there are implied references that Hegel’s concept of the master-slave

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relationship formed the principle of Political Economy.191 Lastly, there are also implied references to the Hegelian concept of the subject-object relationship in Marx’s description of the species productive process devoid of any contamination by Political Economy.192 Marx’s James Mill is also a demonstration of his cohesion between Feuerbach and Aristotle. Reverting to Feuerbach, Marx saw the foundation of social community as arising from “species activity,”193 or “species being.” This “species activity” was the creation of “the human community, the social entity”194 and when Marx used these terminologies he was referring to the Aristotelian principle of the social being of humankind, or “civil society.” The following quotation from James Mill is proof of Marx’s alliance between Feuerbach and Aristotle: “The community of men, or the manifestation of the nature of men, their mutual complementing the result of which is species-life, truly human life, this community….”195 Marx then proceeds to attack Political Economy or capitalism, for destroying the vision of both Feuerbach and Aristotle. The James Mill essay was not only an attack on Mill, but also Adam Smith and Destutt de Tracy. Marx’s beginning immersion into the study of the evils of Political Economy was evidenced by his usage of the terms value, commodity, division of labor, use, and exchange relationships. The James Mill essay was a preface to his Paris Manuscripts.

Part Four: The Paris Manuscripts In revealing the influence of Classical Greek and Roman philosophy exerted upon Marx, it is not necessary to comment on every piece of literature that Marx wrote. This editorial premise will be applied in the forthcoming analysis of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts. (For a more detailed explanation of the reasons for referring to these writings as the Paris  Marx, Karl, “Comments on James Mill Elements d’Economie Politique”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, Vol. III, p. 227. 192  Ibid., p. 220. 193  Ibid., p. 216. 194  Ibid., p. 217. 195  Ibid. 191

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Manuscripts and not The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 the reader should read the Introduction to this work.) The Paris Manuscripts provides documentation of Marx’s complete dedication to the study of Political Economy and his critique of Political Economy employing Aristotle as his major assault weapon. Even though there is a decrease in Marx’s recourse to Greece in the Manuscripts as a result of Marx’s drowning in the study of Political Economy, this decrease was not a total disappearance. Greece persisted as a criteria in the Manuscripts, as it was the standard by which private property and capitalism were judged and condemned. The following discussion of The Manuscripts will be limited to six sections of this work and this discussion will be presented in the following order: (1) Human Requirements and the Division of Labor under the Rule of Private Property; (2) The Power of Money; (3) Antithesis of Capital and Labor. Landed Property and Capital; (4) Private Property and Communism; (5) The Preface; (6) Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole.

 . Human Requirements and the Division of Labor 1 under the Rule of Private Property In this section of The Manuscripts, Marx presents Greece as the criteria by which to denounce private property and capitalism. In order to accomplish this discreditation Marx resorted to Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound. Whereas the proletariat under the domination of capital is little more than an animal covered in filth in Greek tragedy, humankind was presented in a godlike fashion.196 Whereas Greek tragedy dignified the struggle of the human species to seek dignity, the stranglehold of private property reduced the species to a subservient animal. In addition, in this same essay Marx drew a contrast between the Greek view of the human species under the kingdom of private property. The Greeks were aware that humans were part of nature, or naturalism, and since all humankind were creatures of nature, all of humankind were naturally united by this  Marx, Karl, “Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works Vol. III, ibid., pp. 306–307. 196

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universal commonality. Conversely, under the kingdom of private property each individual was seen as a tool of private property, as a producer of wealth, and therefore individuals did not share any commonality and were separated as atomics, as examples of natural rights.197 Marx referred to this Greek sense of naturalistic commonality as associationism and in so doing made Aristotle a presence in the Paris Manuscripts.198 Furthermore, Marx’s essay also called upon Aristotle to define the end of economic production. Marx references the Nicomachean Ethics when he defined the purpose of production as the satisfaction of need.199 Marx also wished to resuscitate the Aristotelian principle of making productivity an ancillary of ethics. Marx condemned private property because this economic system interpreted ethics as the justification of greed and egoistic acquisition. In opposition to the ethics of private property, Marx wished the restoration of Aristotle who subordinated productive activity to the ethical principle of production carried on in an association to meet universal needs.200

2. The Power of Money Just as Marx had recourse to Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound as a symbol of the nobility of the human species, so he alluded to William Shakespeare and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as a means of outlining the depravity of capitalism. Marx’s allusions to Shakespeare and Goethe in the essay The Power of Money is another demonstration of how his knowledge of the classics of literature served as a standard by which to offer judgments on capitalism. From Shakespeare, Marx quoted from the Timon of Athens to demonstrate how gold became a new god in the pantheon of capitalism. Similarly, Marx quoted from Goethe’s Faust to demonstrate how the natural need for species association is destroyed by the combat

 Ibid., p. 312.  Ibid., p. 313. 199  Ibid., pp. 306–307. 200  Ibid., p. 310. 197 198

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over property, or the selfish greed for property serves to sever each individual from their membership in the species.201

 . Antithesis of Capital and Labor. Landed Property 3 and Capital In this essay, Marx portrayed capitalism as the commoditization of the productive process. Capitalism not only turned the product of production into a commodity, but, in addition, transformed the laborer himself into a commodity. In his analysis of this debasement, Marx again had recourse to both Aristotle and Hegel. In his reference to Aristotle Marx wrote that in Greece, “labor still has a seemingly social significance, still the significance of the real community,”202 but commoditization destroyed the community by destroying mutual reciprocity. In his reference to Hegel, Marx employed the terms “being-for-itself ” and “being-in-­ itself.”203 For Marx commoditization destroyed the “being-for-itself,” or the self-conscious laborer associated to the community, and debased this laborer into a “being-in-itself,” or an atomized laborer isolated within his own individuality.

4. Private Property and Communism This essay is a declaration of Marx’s initial embrace of communism. Throughout this essay Marx refers to the works of Charles Fourier, Claude Henri Saint-Simon, Etienne Cabet, Robert Owen, and Francois Villegardelle, all members of the Enlightenment Left. Marx defined communism as the transcendence of socialism, or socialism was the first stage beyond capitalism while communism was the concluding stage. Marx appealed to Hegel to substantiate the progress from socialism to communism. Citing the Hegelian logic of the negation, Marx saw socialism as the negation of capitalism and communism as the negation of  Ibid., p. 323–324.  Ibid., p. 286. 203  Ibid. 201 202

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socialism. The “negation of the negation” was “the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation.”204 Communism in Marx was a return to the “civil society” of the polis. Aristotle defined “civil society” as emerging from the inherent need for species association or mutual reciprocity, and Marx identified need as the ground of associationism. Need was a basic instinct of the species and therefore the human species was inherently social. When Marx defined humankind as social animals, he reiterated the Aristotelian claim that humankind was a “zoon politikon.”205 Communism was the restoration of the “zoon politikon.” Indeed, in Private Property and Communism, Marx explicitly cites Aristotle: “Now it is certainly easy to say to the single individual what Aristotle has already said: you have been begotten by your father and your mother: therefore in you the mating of two human beings—a species act of human beings—has produced the human being.”206 Marx’s communism was a fusion of Feuerbach and Aristotle. Marx married Feuerbachian naturalism to Aristotle’s associationism. Naturalism was the anthropological proof of associationism. Feuerbach’s “species being” was an expression of naturalism and naturalism was the substructure of “civil society.” Marx wrote: “I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.”207 With this sentence Marx made a synthesis between Feuerbach and Aristotle and defined communism as the restitution of the “zoon politikon” and “zoon oikonikon.”

5. The Preface Marx’s Preface was an extension of the tactic of critique beyond the limits established by Hegel. Marx carried critique beyond an assault on Hegel’s philosophy of state into a critique of political economy. But the critique launched by Marx was composed of two arsenals, one Hegelian and the second Feuerbachian. From Hegel, Marx borrowed the weapon of  Ibid., p. 306.  Ibid., pp. 296–297. 206  Ibid., p. 305. 207  Ibid., p. 298. 204 205

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critique but in the Preface he unified Hegelian critique and Feuerbachian naturalism. “It is only with Feuerbach that positive, humanistic and naturalistic criticism begins.”208 Marx added a naturalistic armory of critique and by naturalism Marx meant viewing the human as a “species being.” Marx aimed the rifle of “species being” as a weapon to demolish Political Economy. Marx looked upon Feuerbach as a correction to Hegel’s “transcendentalism twisted into theological caricature.”209

 . Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy 6 as a Whole In this essay, Marx embarked upon a critique of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind. According to Marx, in this book Hegel announced a theory of labor. Hegel was one of the primary inventors of the theory that labor was the genesis of historical evolution. However, this theory of labor in Hegel was solely situated in Mind. In Hegel, Mind was the origin of both philosophical and social movement. According to Marx, labor as Mind led to human alienation, labor as Mind estranged humankind from its naturalistic being as a member of “civil society.” Consequently, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind was similar to the errors of Political Economy. Both Hegel and Political Economy were apologists for human self-alienation. For the Phenomenology of Mind Marx substituted a phenomenology of labor. It was the labor of the species being that was the kinetic energy of production. Not only did Marx invent the phenomenology of labor but he also associated this phenomenology with naturalism. As previous paragraphs indicated, Marx understood naturalism as affirming that humankind was a social being and Marx identified this naturalism with humanism210 which was another reference to Classical Greece. In addition, for Marx, naturalism was a synonym for “species being,”211 and “species being” was an analogue for “civil society.”  Ibid., p. 232.  Ibid., p. 233. 210  Ibid., p. 337. 211  Ibid. 208 209

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This last essay of the Paris Manuscripts was another exhibition of how Marx used Hegelian logical categories in order to critique Hegelian transcendentalism. Marx employed Hegelian terms such as alienation and estrangement as a means to show the emptiness of Hegelian transcendentalism. Similarly, Marx employed the Hegelian terms alienation and estrangement as a means to expose the inhumanity of Political Economy.

Part Five: Marx in London This chapter will continue to follow the trail of Aristotle’s subsumption of Marx and it will carry forward the story to Marx’s residence in London. Marx resettled in London in June 1849. Continuing his transition to the study of Political Economy that was evidenced in his Paris Writings, On James Mill and the Manuscripts of 1844, in London Marx specialized in the study of Political Economy. In this study of the Aristotelian domination of Marx, it is not necessary to investigate all the writings of Marx since the strength of Aristotle’s influence on Marx can be unquestionably substantiated through an analysis of the following four manuscripts of Marx, the Critique of Political Economy, the Grundrisse, the Manuscripts of 1861–1863, and Das Kapital.

1. The Critique of Political Economy The proper manner in which to read The Critique of Political Economy is to see it as a critique of eighteenth-century Political Economy from the perspective of Classical Greece and Rome. Aristotle, Plato, Horace, and Cato were condemning the majority of eighteenth-century political economists. The first chapter of The Critique of Political Economy is entitled “The Commodity” and was the first time Marx identified the commodity as representing the essence of capitalism. This central concept of the 1859 Critique continued into Marx’s 1867 Das Kapital in which the first chapter is entitled “Commodities.”

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Marx’s concept of the commodity evolved out of his discourse with Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle drew a distinction between use and exchange value. Use value referred to the satisfaction of needs, or how a produced object met the needs of the producer. Exchange value referred to exercise of exchange, the relationship between buyer and seller out of which a profit was produced for the seller. While Aristotle recognized the necessity of use, needs must be met, he denounced exchange because it was the ground of profit which was the initial step to greed and luxury. The central concern of Aristotle’s theory of production was the satisfaction of need through the availability of useful objects. Aristotle did speak of value, but not value as labor. Value in Aristotle was the importance an object possessed in the satisfaction of needs or as the ground for establishing the exchange of objects. Value did not relate to money or labor, but rather to the mutual interest in conducting an exchange or satisfying a need. Building upon the Aristotelian formula of use and exchange, Marx constructed his theory of the commodity. The commodity did not relate to the satisfaction of use, need, but rather totally to exchange, or the production of profit. The commodity was that object totally dedicated to the realization of profit, or money, and therefore capitalism was the commoditization of the human productive process. In chapter one of the Critique, “The Commodity,” Marx relies on Aristotle’s The Politics to supply him with definitions of use and exchange value.212 While use related to need, exchange related to barter and profit. In the same chapter, Marx also drew attention to Aristotle’s anthropological knowledge again drawing upon The Politics. Marx noted that in primitive societies, no need existed for exchange. According to Aristotle, production in primitive societies was totally devoted to the satisfaction of needs, or use. No surpluses were produced, production was confined to needs, and therefore no surpluses or barter came into existence.213 Furthermore, Marx also depended upon Plato and Aristotle to supply him with a definition of money. In the Critique, Marx indicated that  Marx, Karl, Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya (New York: International Publishing, 1972), p. 27. 213  Ibid., p. 50. 212

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Plato’s The Republic set forth two definitions of money: money as a standard of value and money as a token of value. Additionally, Marx understood Aristotle as supporting Plato’s definition of money. Marx footnoted Aristotle’s The Politics as offering a Platonic definition of money as the arithmetic of barter. Marx again praised Aristotle because in The Politics Aristotle made reference to the commodity, or Aristotle was one of the earliest authors to acquaint Marx with the concept of the commodity.214 Aristotle also made Marx aware of two equations which captured the function of the commodity. Again drawing reference to The Politics Marx praised Aristotle for isolating two circuits in the circulation process. One was the Commodity (C)—Money (M)—Commodity’ (C’) and the second was the Money (M)—Commodity (C)—Money’ (M’) circuit. In the first circuit, the commodity existed primed, or with an increased substance. In the second circuit, money existed primed, or with an increased presence of money. When money became value under capitalism, then the equation Money (M)—Commodity (C)—Money’ (M’) became the calculus of capitalism.215 Just as Aristotle primarily introduced Marx to the notions of use and exchange value, and to the idea of the commodity, so the ancient Greeks and Romans educated Marx to condemn wealth and the hoarding of money. In relation to the Greeks Marx cited Xenophon and Anacharis. In regard to Xenophon, Marx cited Xenophon’s condemnation of the hoarding of money. Xenophon ridiculed those hoarders, the people who lavished in wealth, who never had the moral strength to say enough.216 Similarly, Marx refers to the calculations of Anacharis who reduced the importance of money to simple calculation and the luxury of an aristocracy. In relation to Rome, Marx cited the writings of Cato the Elder, Horace, and Pliny. Cato the Elder warned against engaging in both selling and buying, or becoming absorbed in all aspects of the exchange process.

 Ibid., p. 217.  Ibid., p. 137. 216  Ibid. 214 215

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While it was necessary to sell, to expand that economic activity to include buying was the entrance to corruption.217 In parallel to Cato the Elder, Horace also condemned the connection of use and exchange.218 Horace noted that economics based on exchange was the doorway to hoarding and the decadence of luxury.219 Lastly, Pliny in his book Natural History wrote that the hunger for money led to madness. Avarice was a step into ethical decline.220 In his condemnation of the economics of the commodity, Marx not only resorted to the ancient classics, but also to the classics of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. In regard to the Renaissance, Marx again called upon William Shakespeare. In this 1859 writing, Marx calls upon Shylock in the Merchant of Venice as an example of the corruption of greed.221 The Critique also contains a citation to the John Mandeville’s Voyage and Travels, which demonstrated how hoarding became the foundation of authoritarianism and imperialism and how a monarch used his monopoly of money as the ground upon which to build his empire.

2. The Grundrisse The Grundrisse was a testament of Marx’s full absorption into the critique of eighteenth-century Political Economy. As such, it represented Marx’s transition away from his earlier concentration on Aristotle and Classical Humanism. The Grundrisse was a preparation for the writing of Das Kapital. The focus of the mature Marx in the writing of the Grundrisse was the phenomenology of labor. Nevertheless, Aristotle was still a presence in this work, particularly in the chapter on “Money.” In addition, the Grundrisse was the outgrowth of two previous books of Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy and the Critique of Political Economy. In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx used Aristotle’s theory of the difference between use and exchange value to censure Pierre Proudhon, and in his  Ibid., p. 218.  Ibid. 219  Ibid., p. 133. 220  Ibid., p. 132. 221  Ibid., p. 222. 217 218

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Critique, Marx used Aristotle’s concept of the commodity to undermine eighteenth-century Political Economy. Furthermore, Marx’s repudiation of eighteenth-century Political Economy was not only limited to this economic doctrine, but was also intended as a negation of the Enlightenment Center. For Marx the Enlightenment Center included both eighteenth-­ century Political Science and Political Economy, therefore to invalidate the Enlightenment Center was simultaneously to annul both Political Economy and Political Science.222 In his analysis of money, Marx makes use of the Aristotelian concepts of use and exchange and the commodity. Aristotle became the source of Marx’s critique of capitalism. According to Marx, the existence of capitalism was dependent upon the supremacy of exchange value. Under capitalism, exchange value annihilated use value. Based upon this presupposition, it was then possible to map the stages of development that led to the creation of money. Stage One was the predominance of exchange. Stage Two was the invention of the commodity, or the commodity was the necessary condition upon which exchange could take place. Stage Three was circulation, or circulation was the medium through which the commodity traveled. Stage Four was money, or money was the instrument which facilitated circulation and was thus the realization of the commodity and exchange. Stage Five was value, or in the process of exchange money became value. Stage Six of capitalism meant the boundless accumulation of money. The above six stages comprised the essence of capitalism.223 When Marx put forth this essence of capitalism, he was merely describing one mode of production. The theme of Marx’s discussion of the phenomenology of labor was to trace the historical periods of this phenomenology. Although the phenomenology of humankind’s metabolistic relations to nature was universal, this universality manifested itself in different periods, and these periods were what Marx referred to as modes of production. In summary, Marx depicted four major modes of

 Ibid., p. 117.  Marx, Karl, The Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 186–189. 222 223

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production, the Asiatic, the Greco-Roman, the Medieval, and the Capitalist. Notebook Two of the Grundrisse, “The Chapter on Capital,” offers illuminating insights into why the Greco-Roman mode of production, predicated on use, was superior to the capitalist mode of production predicated on exchange. But prior to discussing the Greco-Roman Republican mode of production, Marx found it necessary to refer to the period of communal production as a means of establishing the origins of production based upon use. The communal mode of production was a form in which the objective conditions of labor were accessible to all the inhabitants of a commune. When Marx referred to the objective conditions of labor he meant the metabolism that existed between humankind and nature. For Marx, an organic relation existed between humankind and nature, humankind was subject and nature was the object and through the labor of humankind unity was established between the subject and object. During the communal mode of production, agriculture was the major source of useful objects. Laborers during the communal mode of production were free laborers because the objective conditions of labor were freely available to them. In the period of the agricultural commune, production was designed for useful objects, or objects were produced to be useful and to be useful meant the power to satisfy needs. Historically, however, communal production for use was eventually supplanted by production for exchange. In order for production for exchange to become predominant, two other factors were necessary, circulation and money. It was first necessary for circulation to exist and with the becoming-to-be of circulation it was required to have a medium which made circulation possible. Circulation was the mechanism upon which exchange was based and money was the instrument through which exchange could be realized. The unity of circulation, money, and exchange brought about the dissolution of communal production.224 The next evolutionary stage in the history of the modes of production was Athens and the Roman Republic. The saving grace of Athens and the Roman Republic was that no large-scale industry existed in either of  Ibid., pp. 502–509, 494–495.

224

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these ancient civilizations.225 Classical Athens and the Republic of Rome were predominantly agrarian, even though small-scale production did exist. Classical Athens and the Roman Republic remained agricultural and thus communal production still persisted. Marx drew attention to the preservation of the agrarian laws and the “ager publicus” as proof of the existence of communal production in Republican Rome.226 As proof that production was predominantly performed for the purpose of use, Marx called attention to the writings of Cato and Brutus to be found in the work of Cicero. Cato and Brutus understood the need to exchange at the highest interest rates, but the desire for profit was always constrained in the Republic of Rome. For Cato, Brutus, and Cicero, wealth was not an end in itself, but if exchange did exist its end must be the creation of the best citizen.227 Consequently, since the objective conditions of labor for the most part existed in Athens and Republican Rome, free labor also continued to exist. Labor had not yet become a commodity, did not yet become a property to be sold in an exchange relationship.228 The Roman Empire witnessed the decline of the Republic of Rome. First, the despotism of the Caesars overthrew the previous republican government.229 Second, in the society of the Roman Empire consumption became the end-in-itself. In the Empire wealth dominated, exchange was triumphant, trade flourished and communal production was reduced to a secondary status. Just as the history of Greece and Rome exerted a presence in the Grundrisse so did the philosophy of Aristotle. Previous paragraphs called attention to Aristotle’s presence in the Critique of Political Economy. That work drew attention to the Aristotelian concepts of use and exchange, of money, of the commodity and the equation of money-­ commodity-­money’ as the calculus of exchange. The Grundrisse expands the importance of Aristotle in the calculations of Marx. In the Grundrisse, this expansion of Aristotle’s influence on Marx can be encapsulated into  Ibid., p. 510.  Ibid., p. 837, 410. 227  Ibid., p. 487. 228  Ibid., p. 513. 229  Ibid., p. 651. 225 226

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four categories: (a) Humankind as a political animal; (b) Equivalence; (c) Reciprocity; (d) Constitutive Subject.

(a) Humankind as a Political Animal In the Grundrisse Marx identified humankind as political animals.230 As political animals members of the human species are inherently drawn into communities. The species achieves objectivity in the community because the production of useful objects chains it to the community, or the community becomes its substance. Where the objective conditions of labor exist there also comes into existence the unity of subject and object. The subject, the political animal living in a community, enjoys unrestricted access to the objective conditions of labor, to that natural objectivity which allows the subject to produce sustenance.

( b) Equivalence Equivalence meant that produced objects satisfied needs. Objects that satisfied needs were equivalent because members in an exchange of useful objects had their needs met. Both received a gain and neither was extorted or turned into a commodity. Equivalence was the basis of communal production.231

( c) Reciprocity Since communal production was designed to satisfy the needs of both participants then communal production was reciprocal. Since all members in the transmission of useful objects had their needs satisfied then this transmission was based on mutual gain, or was reciprocal. In order for there to be mutual gain there also must be reciprocal dependence, or

 Ibid., p. 496.  Ibid., pp. 241, 294.

230 231

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each participant in the transmission of useful objects was dependent on the other for the fulfillment of their needs.232

(d) Constitutive Subject Communal production was also the condition of the constitutive subject. For Marx, communal production witnessed the unity of the subject and object.233 The Hegelian concept of alienation, the separation of subject and object, never came into existence in communal production because communal production derived from the unity of subject and object. Hegel did not exist in Greece. Lastly, Marx’s embrace of the subject-­ object unity required his embrace of the Aristotelian idea of the constitutive subject.234 Furthermore, Marx’s condemnation of surplus labor, in distinction to necessary labor, was supported by the ethics of Greek Humanism. For Marx, necessary labor was that labor time expended in the production of objects of use. Surplus labor was that labor time expended in the production of objects for exchange. Surplus labor was the labor exploited by a commercial operation in order to gain a profit. In the Grundrisse Marx utilized the ethics of Greek Humanism to call for the abolition of surplus labor and the reduction of necessary labor so the laborer would reclaim time in order to develop his intellectual and artistic faculties. The termination of surplus labor, the reduction of necessary labor would provide the laborer with more time to develop his own individual capacities.235 The advancement of individual intellectual abilities was one of the ideals of Greek Humanism, because higher intellectual capacities was a necessary condition for a free individual. Marx looked upon machine production as the primary factor in the reduction of necessary labor. Industrial production should not be aimed at the enlargement of surplus labor, but to the reduction of necessary labor so the laborer could become a free  Ibid., pp. 243–244, 276.  Ibid., pp. 295–296, 323. 234  Ibid., p. 496. 235  Ibid., p. 706. 232 233

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human being in the Greek sense and not enslave the laborer to the capitalist search for luxury.236 In Marx’s attack on surplus labor he relied on the support of the Enlightenment Left. The four members of the Enlightenment Left that Marx singled out were Robert Owen, Robert Bray, Frederick Morton Eden, and Charles Fourier. In Robert Owen’s Six Lectures Delivered at Manchester (1837) Owen drew attention to how industry revolutionized production. The communal mode of production of the Greeks and Republican Rome was replaced by the factory mode of production. Although the industrial mode of production increased output, it also led to the enslavement of labor because it increased surplus value. Owen recognized the ills of industrialized labor, the ills of the factory, the expansion of surplus labor, but welcomed a future when labor would be liberated from industrial capitalist exploitation. Owen advanced the idea of the reduction of both surplus and necessary labor, and thus the expansion of disposable time to the laborer.237 In addition, Marx made reference to Owen’s Essays on the Formation of the Human Character. In these essays Owen condemned industrial production because it was totally directed at the production of wealth and therefore minimalized the value of the human spirit.238 Marx also made reference to Robert Bray’s Labors Wrongs and Labors Remedy. In this work, Bray explored the interconnection between money and profit and how both contributed to the devaluation of labor.239 Frederick Morton Eden was the author of a three-volume work entitled The State of the Poor, or a History of the Laboring Classes in England from the Conquest.240 In this work, Eden described how wealth was the product of expropriated labor and that poverty could only result from expropriated labor. Eden was one of those early thinkers who educated Marx to the fact that both wealth and poverty were the outcomes of expropriated labor, or of the class warfare between the rich and the poor. Although  Ibid., p. 709.  Ibid., pp. 712, 770. 238  Ibid., p. 771. 239  Ibid., p. 871. 240  Ibid., pp. 735–737, 788. 236 237

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Marx did not agree with the final conclusion of Charles Fourier, he applauded Fourier for calling for the termination of capitalism. Disagreeing with Fourier, Marx did not believe that production could become a social game, but in agreement with Fourier Marx embraced the need to replace capitalism with a new mode of production.241 In Marx’s attack on capitalism and the pursuit of luxury, he again called upon Classical and Renaissance literature for substantiation. In the Grundrisse he references Virgil’s The Aeneid and its condemnation of the worship of gold. Marx also referred to Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens as a classic denouncing the admiration of greed.242 The Grundrisse also uses Classical and Renaissance culture to condemn the addiction to money. Lastly, Marx described how capitalism was propelled by lust, the sensuous needs to absorb as much surplus labor as possible and refers to Goethe’s Faust as illustrating the insatiable appetite for money.243

3. The Manuscripts of 1861–1863 These 1861–1863 Manuscripts were a prelude to Das Kapital. They are notebooks which contained all the ideas and theories Marx was to refine and organize in Das Kapital. In order to properly understand these vast and complex 1861–1863 Manuscripts it is necessary to provide the philosophical background out of which these manuscripts emerge. Marx’s primary goal was to write the phenomenology of production. His goal was to map how the phenomenology of labor progressed throughout the stages of the history of the human species. Marx described these stages as modes of production. In general Marx isolated four historical modes of production and they were the Asiatic, the Classical World of Athens and Republican Rome, the Feudal Period of Europe, and the Industrial Revolution. Essentially, Marx wrote a historicism of the modes of production. The 1861–1863 Manuscripts are anthems to Marx’s phenomenology of labor. But it is impossible to understand Marx’s phenomenology of  Ibid., p. 712.  Ibid., p. 163. 243  Ibid., p. 704. 241 242

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labor without first analyzing Aristotle’s The Soul and Metaphysics. After an inquiry into The Soul and Metaphysics, it will be possible to understand the origins of Marx’s theory of labor, which formed the central hypothesis of his 1861–1863 Manuscripts and Das Kapital. Aristotle asserted that the “Soul” was composed of three parts, the nutritive, sense perception, and mind. The combination of these three factors produced movement, or movement was the action initiated by these three potencies. The “Soul” was the originative force of movement, it was the substance of existence. The primary lever in originating movement was the appetitive. The human animal required sustenance to survive. Appetite produced need and need originated the movement to seek ends to gratify the appetite. Mind was that ability to produce a strategy which resulted in the satisfaction of need. Mind provided a map by which to achieve the end of meeting need. For Aristotle, the “Soul” was actuality. The “Soul” as actuality meant that the “Soul” provided movement in order to achieve the potential, or end, or the “Soul” was the actuality of the human species. It created the potential for the survival of the species. The appetitive part of the “Soul” was also the basis of production. In order to satisfy the appetitive needs it was necessary to produce, and production could take the form of fishing and hunting, shepherding, or agriculture. Different forms of production. Aristotle’s concept of the “Soul” was the ground for his recognition of the power of human subjectivity. The source of movement in the sociopolitical world was human subjectivity, and this was exactly was Aristotle meant by the constitutive subject. The naturalistic human was the subject and the subject was the primary constitutive agency in the formation of the sociopolitical world.244 While “The Soul” was an introduction to Marx’s phenomenology of labor, The Metaphysics, in particular Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine offer the culmination of Marx’s theory of labor. In order to present this argument in absolute precision the ensuing discussion will be divided into nine parts: (a) Substance; (b) Essence; (c) Actual-Potential; (d) Soul;

 Aristotle, “The Soul”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, id. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), pp. 535–607. 244

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(e) Originative Agency; (f ) Constitutive Subject; (g) End and Realization; (h) Aristotle’s Theory of Production; (i) Marx’s Theory of Labor.

( a) Substance Aristotle was a critic of Plato. He rejected the Platonic conclusion that ideas were substances. For Aristotle, substance was the identity of an object, it was the “is” of an object. Substance was cause, it was that which predicated.245 Aristotle substituted Platonic metaphysics with naturalism.

( b) Essence Essence was the predication of substance. Essence was the activity of substance, of the coming-to-be of substance. It was substance reproducing itself.246

( c) Actual-Potential Movement or production in Aristotle was the transmission from the actual to the potential. Actuality was substance, or the inherent in a subject. The potential was the coming-to-be of the actual. However, because the potential was the realization of the actual in the real world the potential lost the purity of the actual, it was stained by the reality of the real world.247

( d) Soul In Aristotle the “Soul” was substance. It was the cause of motion in the human animal. It was the origin of productive activity.248  Aristotle, The Metaphysics, ibid., pp. 810–811.  Ibid., pp. 788, 790–791. 247  Ibid., pp. 820–821. 248  Ibid., pp. 801, 815, 821. 245 246

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(e) Originative Agency The Soul was the agent for the origination of movement. The appetites, sense perception, and mind were the agents of movement.

(f ) Constitutive Subject Aristotle’s concept of the constitutive subject was an amalgam of his principles of the “Soul” and originative agency. The constitutive subject was causal; it was the essence of motivation and production. Aristotle’s belief in the constitutive subject was a further illustration of his embrace of naturalism. The propelling force of the constitutive subject was the “Soul,” and the “Soul” was a composite of the naturalistic elements of appetite, sense perception and mind.

(g) End and Realization For movement to proceed there must be an end. The end provided the purpose, or motivation, of movement. The purpose of movement could only be realized when the end was achieved.249

(h) Aristotle’s Theory of Production Aristotle drew a distinction between production in nature and production in the “Soul” of the human species. Production in nature, the growth of grass or fruits, were automative processes of nature. Production in the human species required a causal agent, a constitutive subject. If an agent was to produce something out of nature this act required appetite, sense perception, and mind. There must be need and there must be a strategy by which to satisfy this need. Mind was the producer of this strategy. Since Mind was the producer of this strategy, and Mind was an element

 Ibid., pp. 826, 830.

249

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of the constitutive subject, the constitutive subject was the source of productivity.250

(i) Marx’s Theory of Labor Just as Aristotle conceived of the constitutive subject as the source of production, so Marx conceived labor as the source of production. In Marx, human labor was the constitutive subject. While the Metaphysics provided the foundation for Marx’s phenomenology of labor, Aristotle’s Politics provided Marx with the underpinnings of his theory of use and exchange as well as his theory of surplus value. In Volume 3.1 and the 1861–1863 Manuscripts Max draws reference to Aristotle’s The Politics. Page 16 of Volume 3.1 indicates that Marx’s theory of value was based on Chapter 9 of The Politics. In order to understand the origins of Marx’s theory of surplus value it is therefore necessary to first analyze Aristotle’s concepts of use and exchange and value.251 The Politics served as the basis of Marx’s denunciation of capitalism. It also was the scaffolding for Marx’s theory of the modes of production. Once again, to present these arguments with precise clarity the following discussion will be divided into 11 parts: (1) Family and Community; (2) Household; (3) The Organic Process of Production; (4) Intercountry Trade; (5) Money; (6) Value; (7) Retail Trade; (8) Profit; (9) The End of Equivalence; (10) Need and Ability; (11) Aristotle’s Condemnation of Capitalism.252

1. Family and Community In The Politics, Aristotle designated the family and primitive community as the original modes of production. In the family and primitive community the productive process took place between the human species and  Ibid., pp. 791–793.  Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.1, p. 16. 252  Aristotle, The Politics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ibid., pp. 1137–1139. 250 251

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nature. The processes of production were shepherding, the fisherman, and the hunter. An immediate interchange was between the human species and nature. In addition, no private property existed and Aristotle advanced the idea that communism existed during the primitive stages of human evolution. During the period of the family and community the end of production was the satisfaction of needs. The form of labor that existed was necessary labor, or labor whose purpose came from the gratification of need. Exchange did not exist. Rather than exchange, the transmission of useful objects was conducted on the basis of barter. The process of barter involved the transfer of produced objects to satisfy need. Barter and exchange were two different entities. While barter was the transfer of objects to satisfy needs, exchange was the transfer of objects to garner a profit.

2. Household The second historical mode of production was the household and this was the mode of production, which Aristotle esteemed. In the household mode of production exchange and circulation came into existence. A single household could not produce all the objects necessary to satisfy its needs. One household specialized in agriculture while another household specialized in the production of clothing. In order to satisfy the needs of both households an exchange must take place, each participant in the exchange must have their needs met. The household mode of production witnessed the coming-to-be of exchange, but this was an exchange based upon equivalence. The exchange between households was equivalent since each participant satisfied their own needs. Exchange during the household mode of production was based on reciprocal needs, or exchange evolved out of the reciprocity of need.253

 Ibid., pp. 1136–1139, 1140.

253

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3. The Organic Process of Production The Family-Community mode of production and the household mode of production were both examples of the organic process of production. During the Family-Community and household periods the production process was organic, and this meant that the constitutive subject enjoyed unhindered access to the materials of production from which subjects could satisfy their needs. In an organic process of production the constitutive subject, the laborer, possessed unrestrained access to the object, nature, out of which the constitutive subject, the laborer, could manufacture products which filled the needs of the subject, the unity of subject and object.

4. Intercountry Trade Aristotle recognized that the progress of the productive process meant the different countries must engage in exchange. One country, because of its climate, could grow fruit. Another country, because of its location near to the sea, had access to fish. The needs of one country for fruit and another country for fish were the conditions of intercountry exchange and circulation. Just as there was a mutuality of need between households, so there was a mutuality of need between regions and countries.254

5. Money Money was the medium of trade, or interregional or intercountry exchange could not take place without an instrument that facilitated this trade and this instrument was money. Money was a symbol of the mutual reciprocity of needs; it was not yet limitless acquisition.255

254 255

 Ibid., pp. 1138.  Ibid.

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6. Value Aristotle’s The Politics recognized the existence of economic value. In The Politics, value is defined as that calculation which enabled exchange. Value was that arithmetic which made possible the meeting of the reciprocity of needs. Although Aristotle was one of the originators of the concept of value his definition was centuries removed from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Political Economy theories of surplus value. In the Political Science of the Enlightenment Center, surplus value was defined as the incremental increase of value arising from more efficient production, or surplus labor. Aristotle had no awareness of surplus labor or factory production, therefore value for him was the meeting of reciprocal needs.256

7. Retail Trade Aristotle denounced retail trade. He saw this mode of production driven solely by the desire for the acquisition of money. In retail trade the purpose of exchange was corrupted. In the Family-Household exchange was performed to satisfy need while in retail trade exchange was distorted as the acquisition of wealth.257

8. Profit The retail trade gave birth to exchange for profit, and the hunger for profit was the womb for the limitless desire for the acquisition of money and for Aristotle this limitless desire was the pollution of the soul.258

 Ibid.  Ibid. 258  Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.1, pp. 48–58. 256 257

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9. The End of Equivalence The equation Work-Commodity-Work (W-C-W) was Aristotle’s calculation of equivalence. In Aristotle’s calculation, W-C-W, a produced object, or commodity, was exchanged in order to satisfy the need of another member of the family-community. The W-C-W formula was the equation for equivalence because each participant in the exchange gained equivalence because each participant received an equal reward which allowed him/her to continue their productive activities. Under capitalism, the W-C-W formula was revolutionized and was redefined as work-­ commodity-­work’; or the end result was the magnification of work to include a profit. The symbol of work’ signified that work was incrementalized to include profit and profit was the death of equivalence. The formula W-C-W’ was the mathematics of inequality.

10. Need and Ability For Aristotle the principle of exchange must be based on the interconnection between need and ability. The satisfaction of need was dependent upon the expansion of ability. The well-being of a mode of production, in ancient Greece agriculture, grew out of the progress of ability to meet the enlargement of needs. Ability was the originative energy which was the source of the improvement of the mode of production and consequently the satisfaction of need.

11. Aristotle’s Condemnation of Capitalism Obviously, capitalism did not exist in the ancient Greece of Aristotle. However, the moral and ethical principles he advocated were total refutations of capitalism. Aristotle’s ethical standards were based on the notion of the medium, or moderation. Excessive greed was the source of corruption and the termination of true citizenship. Capitalism transgressed the criteria of the medium and was thus the breeding ground of moral and political decay.

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This foregoing analysis of Aristotle’s The Soul, The Metaphysics, and The Politics now positions the reader to better understand the 1861–1863 Manuscripts. In Volume 3.1 of these manuscripts Marx offers profound insights into the productive process. In particular, Part One of Volume 3.1, “The Transformation of Gold into Capital,” puts forth penetrating insights into the historicism of the productive process. Part E of the section, “The Transformation of Gold into Capital,” is called “The Labor Process,” and in this section Marx outlined the major principles of the ancient Greek mode of production (see note 258). The Greek mode of production according to Marx was an example of “productive consumption.”259 The term “productive consumption” was a synonym for the idea of the organic method of production, by which Marx meant the unhindered access of the laborer to the necessary materials of production. The organic concept of production referred to the unity of subject and object, the laborer and the materiality out of which the constitutive subject produced and object.260 Furthermore, the section “The Labor Process” makes frequent use of the term “the potentiality of labor.”261 When Marx referred to the “potentiality of labor” he drew a connection with the concepts of actual-­potential contained in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. As previously pointed out, Aristotle conceived of the actual as the originative agency of movement while the potential was the realization of the originative agency in the material world. Marx took the Aristotelian concept of potentiality and transplanted it from metaphysics to the realm of labor. The concept of potentiality is frequently used by Marx throughout the 1861–1863 Manuscripts to describe the movement of human activity, or one aspect of his human activity which became labor in the industrialized world. When Marx used the term potential to describe the labor process in the industrialized world he resurrected the Aristotelian logic of actual to potential. For Marx, the actual was the constitutive subject.

 Ibid., p. 55.  Ibid., p. 56. 261  Ibid., p. 57. 259 260

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In the 1861–1863 Manuscripts the section following the “The Labor Process” is called the “Process of Valorization.”262 In this section Marx again returns to the Greeks as a means to understand valorization. In the Greek world valorization did not exist, because the primary definition of production in Athens was equivalence. Valorization was the acquisition of value beyond the equivalent, or valorization was the surpassing of equivalence. The means by which this surpassing came to fruition was surplus labor, or labor that superseded the necessary labor of the constitutive subject. Capitalism was the outcome of surplus labor. The Greeks not only served as the basis for Marx’s understanding of valorization, but also of his initial recognition of the division of labor. Chapter 3 of the 1861–1863 Manuscripts is entitled “Relative Surplus Value,” and this chapter contains a section called “On the Division of Labor.”263 The section “On the Division of Labor” is an extended commentary on the Greek understanding of the division of labor. In general, the Greeks praised the division of labor because they saw it as a means of increasing ability. When a laborer specialized in a particular stage of production this specialization served to enhance his abilities. The enhancement of abilities led to the increase in productivity and the increase in productivity led to an increase in the capacity to satisfy needs. Marx’s description of the process of production in Greece and under capitalism was a unity of Aristotle and Hegel. In the 1861–1863 Manuscripts, although heavily tilted toward the Greeks, Hegel continued to be a presence. Marx frequently used the word subsumption in these 1861–1863 texts, and subsumption was a philosophical strategy of Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind. In Aristotle the process of production resulted in the interweaving of abilities and needs, whereas in capitalism the process of production was directed at surplus value. Marx described this absorption of the process of production by capitalism as a subsumption.264 Capitalism subsumed the Greek organic process of production and a Hegelian logical category was used by Marx to explain the extinction of Aristotle.  Ibid., p. 158.  Ibid., pp. 237–291. 264  Ibid., p. 92. 262 263

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Marx’s debt to the Greeks passed from Aristotle to Plato. In the “Division of Labor” section of the 1861–1863 Manuscripts Marx turns to Plato as a source for further elaboration of the concept of the division of labor. In particular, Marx draws upon Chapter Two of Plato’s Republic.265 In these pages Marx displayed his knowledge of the Greek language as he copied extensive quotations from Plato’s text. Need played a predominant role in both Plato’s theories of the state and the division of labor. The coming-to-be of the state was founded on need. The primitive human species had a need for association and safety and so the species was driven to bring a state into existence.266 In addition, once in a state need also called upon the expansion of abilities. In the peaceful and prosperous atmosphere of the state needs also expanded and thus abilities must sequentially increase to meet newly created needs.267 In The Republic, the algorithm of need and ability was Plato’s definition of communism. In Plato, communism meant the mutual reciprocity of needs and abilities. The Republic established this definition and Marxism was its replication. Marx’s dependence on the Greeks expanded beyond Aristotle and Plato. In Volume 3.1 of the 1861–1863 Manuscripts he also alluded to the work of Plato, Homer, Thucydides, Pericles, Xenophon, Diodor, and the Roman Republican Sextus Empiricus. Pages 254 to 258 are replete with quotations from the Latin and Greek sources Marx used and demonstrated Marx’s familiarity with both these classical languages.268 Of the seven ancient authors mentioned above, five were cognizant of the division of labor, while two did not embrace this idea. The five who adhered to this concept were Homer, Sextus Empiricus, Xenophon, Diodor, and Plato, while the two who denied the division of labor were Thucydides and Pericles. The denial of the division of labor was set forth by Thucydides and Pericles. Both these men understood production to be carried out for subsistence only, and did not fathom the need for a division of labor to  Ibid., pp. 254–266.  Ibid., p. 257. 267  Ibid., pp. 258–259. 268  Ibid., pp. 254–259. 265 266

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enhance production. Neither Thucydides nor Pericles grasped the importance of commodity exchange, both were concerned with only household production, and therefore both remained unaware of the need of the division of labor to produce the commodity.269 Of the five who were cognizant of the division of labor, Plato, because of his centrality, will be discussed last. Marx did single out Homer’s “The Odyssey” as displaying a knowledge of the division of labor and referred to the Roman Republican Sextus Empiricus, who reaffirmed the view of Homer.270 Marx also went into a more thorough explanation of the thought of Xenophon on the division of labor. Recognizing the importance of markets, exchange, Xenophon described the development of the division of labor as a result of the expansion of market exchange. He concentrated on the production of useful objects and saw the division of labor as increasing the skills of the laborer and this increase in the skills of the laborer resulting in greater productivity.271 In addition, Marx referred to Diodor, who was a Greek historian who lived between 60  BC and 30 BC. Diodor wrote a book entitled Historical Bibliography and Marx copied a long citation from this book. Diodor wrote about Ancient Egypt. Egypt, according to Diodor, was a caste system: nevertheless, the division of labor was still operative in this caste system.272 Plato was the most important of the five advocates of the division of labor. Plato began his theory of production from the principle of need. The human species must have its needs met if it were to survive. A primary need of the species was for safety, so its existence could be protected. In order to guarantee its safety the species supported the evolution of the state. But even after the state was created species needs continued to expand and in order to keep abreast of this expansion of needs it was necessary to enlarge abilities. The expansion of abilities led to the improvement in the quality of production. Plato exhorted the division of labor because it led to the expansion of ability and consequently to satisfaction of need. Plato saw that the division of labor increased the boundaries of  Ibid., p. 255.  Ibid., pp. 254–255. 271  Ibid., p. 255. 272  Ibid., p. 259. 269 270

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human progress, but Plato did not see that the division of labor could lead to the reduction of necessary labor time. Plato had not surmised the difference between necessary and surplus labor.273 As a further barometer of the influence of Greece over Europe, Marx outlined how the Greek conception of the division of labor flowed into the Political Economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Marx called upon the works of William Petty, Adam Ferguson, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, Nicolas Babbage, Francis Wayland, and Simon Sismondi to show how Plato was the breeding ground of seventeenthand eighteenth-century Political Economy.274 Volumes 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6 of the 1861–1963 Manuscripts are predominantly devoted to an analysis and critique of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Political Economy. However, Volume 3.6 contains illuminating insights into his preparation for the writing of Das Kapital, his Aristotelian definition of communism, and his unification of Aristotle and Hegel. All of the volumes in the 1861–1863 Manuscripts were notebooks in Marx’s preparation for the writing of Das Kapital. However, pages 2214–2288 present Marx’s clearest summary of his masterpiece. On page 2288 of Volume 3.6 Marx offered the following definition of communism: “Finally, the dissolution of the form of a common essence, in which the worker is an organ of this naturalistic common essence acted at the same time as an owner or possession of his means of production.” This sentence demonstrates that Marx defined communism as a return to the organic mode of production. In the organic mode of production there was an unhindered access between subject and object, or between the constitutive subject and nature from which he consumed the materials to manufacture the subsistence for he/she. When Marx embraced the organic mode of production he revivified Aristotle’s vision of the labor process, or in Greece the essential part of the labor process was based on the immediate access of humankind to nature in order to produce. Although Marx adapted Aristotle’s theory of the organic mode of production, it was still necessary for him to find an energy by which to  Ibid., pp. 255–259.  Ibid., pp. 261–266.

273 274

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propel this mode of production through the ages of history. Marx found this propellant in the logic of Hegel, or Hegel provided Marx with logical categories by which to explain how the loss and reconstitution of the mode of production was evidenced in the saga of history. In order to explain the unification of Aristotle in Hegel the following analysis will be divided into seven subdivisions; (a) Subjectivity; (b) Subject-Object; (c) Substance; (d) Subsumption; (e) Alienation; (f ) Transformation; (g) Being and Becoming. All these seven logic categories are present in Hegel’s The Science of Logic and The Phenomenology of Mind.

( a) Subjectivity The relation between Aristotle and Hegel on the notion of subjectivity was divided between continuity and discontinuity. In terms of continuity, both Aristotle and Hegel understood subjectivity as the source of movement. In terms of discontinuity, whereas Hegel looked upon Mind as subjectivity, Aristotle viewed the “Soul” as subjectivity. In terms of the issue of subjectivity, Marx was in agreement with Aristotle.275

( b) Subject-Object The subject-object relationship was central to Hegel’s logic. He saw the subject-object relationship as the mutual reciprocity between Mind and reality as a form of productive consumption.276 The subject-object relationship was also decisive to Aristotle’s understanding as the relationship of the Soul to nature. When Aristotle referred to the constitutive subject he understood the species subject as the agency which consumed the object, nature, in order to produce life sustaining materials.

275 276

 Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.6, p. 2265.  Ibid., p. 2284.

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( c) Substance Substance in Hegel was Mind. Substance was that which originated movement, or essence.277 Aristotle also possessed a belief in substance, but in Aristotle substance was the “Soul.” Marx inherited the idea of substance from both Aristotle and Hegel, but in Marx substance was labor.

( d) Subsumption In Hegel subsumption was an act of conquest. Subsumption in Hegel referred to a process through which one frame of reference absorbed and consequently annihilated another frame of reference.278 For example, when Christianity subsumed Greek paganism, or when Idealism subsumed Religiosity. The Hegelian concept of subsumption played an important role in the thought of Marx, although in Marx subsumption took on an economic form. In Marx capitalism subsumed Feudalism, or industrial production subsumed agriculture. The logic of subsumption was absent from the thought of Aristotle.

( e) Alienation Hegel was one of the originators of the concept of alienation. But the term alienation Hegel meant a disconnection, a rupture between a subject and his/her object. Hegel was an Idealist and the alienation he referred to was the divorce between Mind and the reality created by Mind. The concept of alienation was parallel to the theory of actual-­ potential. In Hegel, the actual was the original source of motivation, it was purity, while the potential was the entrance of actual into the real world, which was corrupt, and the potential became original motivation that was tainted. Similarly, alienation was the sundering of the subject from that which it beget. Marx took the Hegelian concept of labor and translated it to the mode of production. Alienation in Marx was the  Ibid., p. 2284.  Ibid., p. 2375.

277 278

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disconnection between the laborer and the product he/she produced. Alienation was one of the sources of capitalism because the dispossession of labor from the laborer was stolen by the capitalist, or capitalism was the dispossessed labor of the laborer. In Marx alienation would end with the overthrow of capitalism. For Marx, the commodity was the prime example of alienation, because the commodity only came into existence when the organic produce of production came to an end, when the subject no longer enjoyed unhindered access to the materials of production. Aristotle did not possess a concept of alienation. Aristotle lived during a period of the organic mode of production, the free access of the subject to nature, and because of this free access history did not teach Aristotle of the alienation of the subject from his object.

( f ) Transformation Hegel makes frequent reference to the idea of transformation and in Hegel transformation meant the continual process by which Mind recreated the world. Since Mind was the original source of motion its transformative powers were perpetual, motion never ceased, and the movement of Mind was the source of the unending metamorphosis of the world. Demonstrating his indebtedness to Hegel-Marx made repeated use of the concepts of transformation and metamorphosis in order to describe the historicity of the modes of production.279

(g) Being and Becoming In Hegel, Mind was the actual which inherently was modified into the potential. Process was embedded in Hegelian philosophy and this process was captured in the Hegelian phrases Being and Becoming, or the movement of the “In-Itself ” into the “For-Itself.” Being was the “is” and Becoming was the process of the realization of the “is.” Hegel was a historicist, but the historiography he mapped was the movements of Mind. In Volume 3.6 of the 1861–1863 Manuscripts Marx borrowed the 279

 Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.1, pp. 84–85.

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Hegelian dialectic of Being and Becoming, and he used these terms to capture the transformations of process of production. Feudal agriculture was a Being, a temporary “is,” but Becoming witnessed the metamorphosis of feudalism into capitalism. History was Becoming, and this was the premise upon which Marx charted the evolution of the modes of production.280 Marx employed Hegelian logical categories to explain the temporal passage of the modes of production. It was impossible to transition from Aristotle’s theory of production to capitalism without utilizing Hegelian logic. The entirety of the 1861–1863 Manuscripts is an encyclopedia of books Marx read in his explorations into the history of capitalism. Most of this vast library was devoted to the criticism of the advocates of Political Economy, such as David Ricardo, Robert Malthus, and Adam Smith. In addition, the Manuscripts contain many of the members of the Enlightenment Left, and this school of social thinkers were those who challenged the major principles of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Political Economy which was a component of the Enlightenment Center. The Enlightenment Left was the voice of the exploited proletariat during the rise of the industrial factory system. In addition, the Enlightenment Left also advanced theories of psychology, social conditioning, and anthropology which negated the principles of the Enlightenment Center. Marx drew inspiration from the Enlightenment Left and this movement equipped him with principles which prepared the way for his commitment to communism. The following sentences will list those members of the Enlightenment Left to which Marx referred to in the complete 1861–1863 Manuscripts. In Volume 3.1 Marx referred to (1) Thomas Hodgskin, Popular Political Essays281; (2) Bernard Mandeville282; (3) Robert Owen.283 In Volume 3.2 Marx referred to (1) J.F. Bray, Labors Wrongs and Labors Remedies284; (2) William Godwin285; (3) Richard  Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.6, p. 2269.  Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.1, p. 279. 282  Ibid., pp. 283–284. 283  Ibid., p. 208. 284  Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), Vol. 3.2, p. 657. 285  Ibid., p. 6. 280 281

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Jones, An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth and the Sources of Taxation.286 The tyranny of Aristotle and Plato over Marx continued into the writing of his masterpiece, Das Kapital. Before discussing the presence of Aristotle and Plato in this work it is important to note that the first chapter of Volume I is entitled The Commodity. Marx first mentioned the commodity as the fundamental principle of capitalism in his 1859 Critique of Political Economy, and Das Kapital was based upon this insight. Aristotle makes his initial appearance in Das Kapital in Chapter One. In his analysis of the commodity Marx returns to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The commodity in ancient Greece bore no resemblance to the capitalist form of the commodity. In ancient Greece commodities were exchanged on the basis of equivalence. The producer and buyer exchange on the basis of commensurability, no profit emerged. Marx resorted to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as a means of demonstrating the revolution in the nature of the commodity brought into existence by capitalism.287 The presence of Aristotle persisted in Volume I of Das Kapital into Chapter Two, “The Transformation of Gold Into Capital.” In this chapter, Marx again referred to Aristotle in order to draw the distinction between exchange and chrematistics. In Aristotle’s The Politics, exchange meant commensurability, the exchange between two participants of two approximately equal products. On the other hand, chrematistics was the retail trade in which exchange was conducted for a profit. Aristotle condemned chrematistics since it was based upon profit it inevitably led to greed and for Aristotle greed was the cause of moral corruption.288 In a later section of this chapter Marx again referred to a page in The Politics where Aristotle condemned the profiteer, the person involved in chrematistics who profited from interest. Interest was merely gold producing a profit from gold, and according to Aristotle this was a contradiction of the natural state of humankind.289 In an earlier chapter in Volume I,  Ibid., p. 343.  Marx, Karl, Das Kapital (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1988), Ester Band, pp. 73–74. 288  Ibid., p. 167. 289  Ibid., p. 179. 286 287

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“Capital: The Process of Exchange” Marx again quoted from The Politics and in this quotation Aristotle applauded exchange carried out with the purpose of satisfying need, or that which was useful.290 However, Marx’s references to Aristotle in Volume I were not only limited to the questions of production and exchange, but also alluded to the political dimensions of Aristotle’s thought. In the second chapter of Volume I, “Kapital: Cooperation” Marx again drew attention to Aristotle’s The Politics. He noted that Aristotle thought of humankind as political animals and by political Aristotle meant a species naturally endowed with an instinct for sociability. In the same footnote Marx also drew attention to Benjamin Franklin, who according to Marx portrayed a similarity to the Classical World because Franklin presented humankind as an instinctive producer of the instruments which facilitated labor.291 Marx’s esteem for Aristotle never wavered. In Chapter 13 of Volume I, “Capital: Machinery and Great Industry” Marx once again called Aristotle “the greatest thinker of the Classical World.”292 Volume I of Das Kapital was not only constrained to the praise of Aristotle, but also included acclaim for Plato. In Chapter 12 of Volume I, “The Division of Labor and Manufacture,” Marx draws upon Plato’s The Republic. For Marx Plato was the first to draw attention to the division of labor as the source of greater specialization and consequently of greater productivity.293 In Volume I, Chapter 4, “The Transformation of Gold Into Kapital,” Marx alludes to the work of Theodore Mommsen, his 1856 book Roman History. Mommsen debunked the idea that capitalism existed in Athens and Republican Rome. Mommsen claimed that neither the usurer nor surplus labor existed in Athens or the Republic of Rome294 and that the farmer in the Roman Republic, working according to the organic mode of production, enjoyed lighter labor and stress than the slave.295 Furthermore, the agricultural production in Athens and Republican  Ibid., p. 100.  Ibid., p. 346. 292  Ibid., p. 430. 293  Ibid., p. 387. 294  Ibid., p. 182. 295  Ibid., p. 185. 290 291

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Rome was based on the organic mode of production of the commune. Capitalist production dissolved the commune thereby introducing the slavery of capitalist production, but the commune of the Classical World remained as a potential model for the onset of communism.296 But the tyranny of Greece and Rome over Marx was not limited to the works of Aristotle and Plato, but included many other renowned authors of the classical world. In Volume I, Marx called upon these figures to offer additional substantiating evidence that the division of labor improved productivity. In Chapter 12, “The Division of Labor and Manufacture,” Marx again alluded to Homer’s Odyssey as offering an example of the division of labor. The cooperation and specialization of the various crewmembers onboard a naval vessel was the basis of a safe voyage.297 Marx also drew attention to Thucydides who also looked upon naval travels as examples of the benefits of the division of labor.298 Xenophon was an additional figure Marx cited. Xenophon singled out the production of clothing as an illustration of the efficiency of the division of labor, one worker cutting the cloth and another worker sewing the cloth into a jacket.299 Isocrates looked to the caste system of Egypt as a positive example of the division of labor. The Egyptians recognized that no singular caste could produce well-crafted objects and so they assigned to different castes a specialized division of labor which eventuated in the production of objects of a higher quantity and quality.300 Marx also called upon the work of Diodor to again shed light upon the division of labor in Egypt. Diodor’s study of Egypt concurred with the findings of Isocrates. Diodor also found the assignment of a specialized form of labor to particular castes produced objects of higher quantity and quality.301 Volume II of Das Kapital primarily deals with the process of the capitalist circulation of commodities. Therefore Volume II is devoid of any reference to Classical Greece because the Greeks did not produce  Ibid., p. 354.  Ibid., p. 387. 298  Ibid. 299  Ibid., p. 388. 300  Ibid., p. 389. 301  Ibid., p. 360. 296 297

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commodities: their mode of production was divorced from the production of objects leading to circulation whose end was profit. Nevertheless, Volume II, “The Process of Circulation in Capital,” does contain references to the Enlightenment Left. In Chapter 13 of this volume, “Production Time,” Marx quotes from Thomas Hodgskin’s Popular Political Economy. In this passage Hodgskin maintained that agricultural workers were imprisoned in their necessary labor. Hodgskin drew a distinction between agricultural labor and manufacturing labor. Whereas the machinery in manufacturing labor allowed for the reduction of necessary labor, the lack of machinery in agriculture in the eighteenth century enslaved the farmer to necessary labor, or surplus of labor was a derivative of industry.302 In addition, Marx also alluded to Simon Linguet and Gabriel Mably. Both Linguet and Mably were enemies of the Physiocrats and when Marx attacked the Physiocratic system he called upon Linguet and Mably to substantiate his own critique.303 Volume III of Das Kapital, which was compiled from the notebooks of Marx by Friedrich Engels, witnessed the reappearance of Aristotle and Rome as well as the continuation of the Enlightenment Left. Chapter 23 of Volume III, “Capital: Interest and the Profit of the Entrepreneur” contains a quotation in Greek, in which Marx interjected a German translation, from The Politics. In this quotation, Marx drew a similarity between the nineteenth-century capitalist and the slave in ancient Athens. Slavery in the ancient world was confined to the household, while in the capitalist era slavery was expanded to include the entire proletariat. In the paragraph that followed this quote Marx pictured the capitalist as a Feudal Lord, or a person who was anointed to exploit the working class, or capitalism enshrined the master-slave relationship.304 In addition Marx also called upon the history of Rome as a model against which to understand the essence of modern capitalism. Like Greece, Rome served as the model from which Marx derived his condemnation of capitalism. However, to fully understand Marx’s recourse to Rome as a comparative standard to understand the industrial world, it is  Marx, Karl, Das Kapital (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1988), Ester Band, p. 389.  Ibid. 304  Marx, Karl, Das Kapital, ibid., Britte Band, p. 398. 302 303

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necessary to divide the history of Rome into two periods, the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire. In the Roman Republic, similar to Athens, the mode of production was based upon the organic model of labor, the metabolism between the species and nature. In the Republic, the class divide between patricians and plebeians existed, but the relationship between these two classes was not filled by conflict or subordination. The Roman Empire witnessed the overturning of the Roman Republic. The Roman Empire launched upon a campaign of foreign conquests and this imperialism brought riches to Imperial Rome. Eventually these newfound riches fomented luxury and greed and the loss of Aristotle’s virtuous citizen.305 As a consequence, the harmonious relationships between patricians and plebeians was destroyed and the organic mode of production overthrown. The usurer of the Roman Empire destroyed the Roman Republic. The usurer became the new royalty of Imperial Rome and as a result the plebeians were reduced to slavery.306 The usurer became the Knight of Imperial Rome as well as the slave owner of the plebeians.307 The Enlightenment Left also reappears in Volume III. In Chapter 5 of Volume III, “Economy in the Functioning of Constant Capital,” Marx refers to Linguet. Just as Linguet pointed out how the indebted laborer in Rome became the source of wealth of the Roman usurer, so Marx drew the analogy of the eighteenth-century laborer as the source of the development of constant capital.308 Thomas Hodgskin makes his appearance in two chapters of Volume III. In Chapter 23, “Interest and Entrepreneurial Profit,” Marx quotes from Hodgskin’s book Labor Defended Against the Claims of Capital to establish that the unpaid laborer is the source of interest and interest is one of the foundations of capitalism.309 In a later chapter in Volume III, “The Manifestation of Capitalist Relations in the Form of Interest Becoming Capital,” Marx again points to Hodgskin as one of the first to uncover the dependency of capitalism upon usurer interest.310 Chapter 36 of Volume III, “Pre-Capitalist Economic  Ibid., p. 437.  Ibid., p. 609. 307  Ibid., p. 610. 308  Ibid., p. 95. 309  Ibid., pp. 402–403. 310  Ibid., p. 412. 305 306

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Formations,” abounds with references to the Enlightenment Leftists St. Simon and his followers Pere Enfantin and Constantin Pecqueur. St. Simon in his book The New Christianity, and his followers, Pere Enfantin and Constantin Pecqueur all pointed to the usurers practices of the modern banking system as examples of the expropriation of labor.311 Robert Owen also appears in the Chapter “Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations” and Marx refers to Owen as disagreeing with St. Simon and his followers. In a footnote added to the original Marx text by the editor Fredrich Engels the explanation offered by Engels for this difference between St. Simonist School and Owen is that Owen lived prior to the conquest of the Industrial Revolution and the coming-to-be of class warfare.312 Richard Jones also enjoys a presence in Volume III and appears in Chapter 13, “The Unfolding of the Inner Contradiction of Capital.” Jones was one of the first to point out that even though the rate of profit falls the rate of accumulation under capitalism increases. Marx praised Jones’s book An Introductory Lecture on Political Economy because this lecture was one of the first to draw attention to the decline of the rate of profit under capitalism because of the introduction of machinery and the principle of the decline of the rate of profit was indispensable to Marx’s theory of the ultimate decline of capitalism.313 Marx again alludes to Jones in Chapter 45, “On Absolute Groundrent,” in which Marx calls upon Jones book An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth and the Sources of Taxation.314 Jones reasserts himself in Chapter 46, “Farm Rent, Factory Rent and the Price of Labor.” Marx referred to a Jones article in the Edinburgh Review in which Jones challenged the idea that agricultural chemistry in itself could overcome the limitations of the size of agricultural fields as a means of overcoming the decrease in agricultural production. Soho Square in itself, even with agricultural chemistry, could not in-itself produce enough food to satisfy the needs of England.315  Ibid., pp. 618–619, 622.  Ibid., p. 619. 313  Ibid., p. 276. 314  Ibid., p. 768. 315  Ibid., p. 789. 311 312

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Whereas the Enlightenment Left Provided Marx with the psychology, environmentalism, and anthropology with which to negate eighteenth-­ century Political Economy and Political Science, Ancient Athens and the Roman Republic provided Marx with the models upon which communism could be constructed. These two legacies are the substance of Marxism. In addition, two concluding comments are required and they are divided into two parts: (1) Bibliographical; (2) Self-Awareness.

1. Bibliographical The scholarship on Marx recognizes that the Marx of Das Kapital possessed encyclopedic knowledge of the seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century studies of Political Economy and Political Science. Marx’s studies at the Gymnasium in Trier, and at the universities of Bonn and Berlin equipped him with the investigative tools he was to later apply to the study of Political Economy and Political Science. Early nineteenth-­ century German educational institutions stressed detailed textual analysis, massive bibliographical referencing and these were skills Marx transferred into his preparation for the composition of Das Kapital. His Classical Studies were the foundation for his exploration into the evolution of capitalism.

2. Self-Identification Some of Marx’s favorite literature were the works of Shakespeare, Aeschylus, Homer, and with the Stoic Ethic of Cicero. He was deeply influenced by Classical and Renaissance aesthetics. Marx suffered painful turmoil during the composition of Das Kapital—poverty, illness, social isolation—but he overcame these hardships and completed the manuscript for his masterpiece. For Marx, his education in the traditions of Classical tragedy and Shakespearean aesthetics provided him with the self-identification which propelled him to the completion of his life’s work.

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The following analysis of the influence of Classical and Shakespearean aesthetics exerted upon Marx will be divided into two periods: (a) The Very Early Marx, the Marx of his Dissertation, 1841; (b) The Early Marx, the Marx who was denied a position as a university professor and who began a career as a journalist until his departure from Germany to Paris and the writing of the 1844 Paris Manuscripts.

(a) The Very Early Marx Aeschylus This chapter has exhaustively documented the presence of Classical Humanism in Marx’s dissertation. At this point it is necessary to isolate one Greek dramatist who Marx called upon to substantiate the role of philosophy that Marx embraced in his dissertation. In the “Foreword” to his dissertation Marx defined philosophy as critique.316 In 1841 Marx was still an adherent of the Hegelian Left and defined philosophy as a weapon of negation against the contemporary sociopolitical world. As a means of achieving aesthetic justification for his critique, Marx called upon Aeschylus and his epic Prometheus Bound. Marx uses Prometheus’s rebellion against Zeus as a symbol of philosophy’s mission and courage to critique the contemporary nineteenth-­ century German world. Marx equated Prometheus with critique, or Left Wing Hegelianism. Marx quoted from Aeschylus’s play: “In simple words I hate the pack of gods.”317 Marx saw critique as a refutation of the existing world just as Prometheus defied the laws of Zeus. Both philosophy and philosophers must display Prometheus’s courage in their attacks on sociopolitical structures of a society. A page later in the “Foreword” Marx again sought confirmation from Aeschylus. Marx wrote: “Prometheus is the most eminent saint and martyr in the philosophical calendar.”318 Marx appealed to Prometheus Bound to provide validation to philosophical critique. Classical epics  Marx, Karl, “Foreword”, Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, p. 30.  Ibid., p. 30. 318  Ibid., p. 31. 316 317

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became an interpretative tool in Marx’s campaign to turn philosophy against the world. The Promethean image still lived on into the Early Marx, or the Marx of 1842–1844. In 1842, Marx began his journalistic career with the Rheinische Zeitung, but the Prussian authorities suppressed the newspaper in 1843. A now unknown artist painted a picture as an illustration of how an authoritative state suppressed a free press.319 The picture was a representation of the enchained Prometheus, a symbol of elimination of free journalism. Although Marx did not paint this picture, it was printed in the Rheinische Zeitung and was an artistic representation of the feelings of not only Marx, but the entire editorial board of this buried newspaper. Classical Greek tragedy provided a symbol, which portrayed the extinction of a free press in the authoritarian Prussian kingdom.

Cicero Marx’s relation to Cicero must be divided into two parts: (1) The Philosophical and the Ethical; (2) The Very Early Marx (1839–1841) and the Early Marx (1842–1844).

1. The Philosophical and the Ethical On the philosophical level Cicero was an opponent of Marx. In his dissertation Marx found Epicurus superior to Democritus. Marx found the critical theory of Epicurus of the declination of the atoms superior to the Democritean rationalization that atoms fell in a straight line. In his writing on national philosophy Cicero was an advocate of Democritus. Whereas Marx was a member of the school of Epicurus, Cicero was a member of the school of Democritus. However, on the ethical level Marx was an adherent of Cicero. In his four essays, “On the Nature of the Gods,” “On the Highest Goods and Evils,” “The Tusculan Disputations,” and “On Fate” Cicero expounded the virtues of civic involvement, political engagement, courage in the face 319

 Ibid., p. 374.

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of adversity, and dedication to ethical principles. Cicero was a champion of civic republicanism.320

2. The Very Early Marx and the Early Marx The Ciceronian influence upon Marx will be most adequately represented by adopting a chronological approach to this subject. Therefore, this section in itself will be divided into the following four temporal sections: (a) The 1839 Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy; (b) The 1841 Doctoral Dissertation; (c) The 1841 Notes to the Dissertation; (d) The 1842 article “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung.” (a) The 1839 Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy The Notebooks, written in the hand of Marx in preparation for his dissertation, must be interpreted from two perspectives, the Philosophical and the Ethical. From the Philosophical perspective these Notebooks demonstrated Cicero’s attack on Marx. Marx, an advocate of Epicurus, copied out in hand Cicero’s refutation of Epicurus. “For instance, Epicurus saw that if the atoms travelled downward by their own weight, we should have no power to do anything, since the motion of the atoms would be determined by necessity. He therefore invented a device by which to avoid necessity (a point which has apparently escaped the notice of Democritus): he said that the atom, while travelling vertically downward by weight and gravity, makes a slight swerve. To assert that is more shameful than not to be able to defend what he wants to defend.”321 In regards to Epicurus, Cicero supported Plutarch. In Plutarch’s book, to which Marx also alludes to in his “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy,” which is entitled That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, Plutarch sided with Democritus against Epicurus. Consequently, on the  Ibid., pp. 77–101.  Marx, Karl, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, p. 504. 320 321

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Philosophical level Cicero allied with Plutarch in a combined assault on Marx. However, from the Ethical perspective Marx found a collaborator in Cicero. One section of the “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy” is drawn from a Cicero manuscript entitled “On the Highest Goods and Evils.” Marx copied out the following quote from the Ciceronian essay: “Let such a man moreover have no dread of a supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection … and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term ‘the Telos’, the highest, ultimate or final goal. It must therefore be admitted that the chief good is to live agreeably.”322 On the Ethical level, the message Cicero bequeathed to Marx was a life lived in accordance to an “ultimate purpose.” Human existence was synonymous with misfortune, but it was the focus on the final goal which empowered the individual to overcome the inevitability of hardship. Marx’s “Seventh Notebook” to his “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy” indicates that Marx read Cicero’s “On the Nature of the Gods” and “Tusculan Disputations.”323 Two years later, in the footnotes to his 1841 Dissertation, Marx made note of two additional texts of Cicero that he read, and these were “On the Highest Goods and Evils”324 and “On Fate.”325 Within the context of this book it is only necessary to discuss the “Tusculan Disputations.” In Book 5 of the “Tusculan Disputations” Cicero focused on the concept of virtue. The first four books of the “Tusculan Disputations” dealt with the issues of death, pain, grief, and emotional disturbances. In Book 5 Cicero advances the idea that virtue is the primary means to overcome these hardships. Following Aristotle, Cicero defined virtue as behavioral patterns, psychological practices which propelled life forward. Virtue was synonymous with purpose, a goal which sustained the meaning of life.  Ibid., p. 508.  Ibid., p. 501. 324  Ibid., p. 80. 325  Ibid., p. 81. 322 323

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This inner resolution not only surmounted depression, but also encouraged social activism. A civic republican, Cicero advocated political engagement. The possession of an inner purpose was the instrument by which to transcend the turmoil of existence. Cicero, a Stoic, was one of those who taught Marx how to sustain himself through the suffering of his composition of Das Kapital. Marx’s esteem for Cicero flowed from the Very Early Marx 1839–1841, into the Early Marx, 1842–1844. In his 1842 contribution to the Rheinische Zeitung, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung,” Marx wrote: “Greece flourished at its best internally in the time of Pericles, externally in the time of Alexander. In the age of Pericles, the Sophists and Socrates, who could be called the embodiment of philosophy, art, rhetoric supplanted religion. The age of Alexander was the age of Aristotle, who rejected the eternity of the “individual” spirit and the God of positive religions. And as for Rome. Read Cicero.”326 In his “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung” Marx was a champion of the freedom of the press.327 Cicero supplies Marx with the ethic of heroism by which to deny Prussian authoritarianism.328 Homer was also a presence in the 1839 “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy” of the Very Early Marx. In Book Two of these 1839 notebooks Marx referred to the heroes of Homer as “cheerful, strong, integral characters.”329 The presence of Homer persisted into the 1842 Early Marx. In his April 1842 letter to Arnold Ruge Marx again protested against the Prussian Protestant Church and universities for their repression of free thought. In his struggle against Prussian autonomy Marx called upon Homer’s Iliad, or Marx used the heroes of the Iliad as symbols of protest against authoritarianism. In this letter Marx wrote: “Nothing but wars

 Ibid., p. 327.  Ibid. 328  Ibid., p. 328. 329  Ibid., p. 475. 326 327

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and debauchery, says Thersites, and if the university here cannot be reproached with wars, at least there is no lack of debauchery.”330 In addition, Marx also called Virgil and Cervantes as allies in his struggle for the freedom of the press. His “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction” during the Early Marx of 1842, he quoted from Virgil’s Aeneid: “I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts.”331 Marx called upon Virgil to warn advocates of the free press that they must continue their fight against Prussia even though the latest Prussian censorship instruction did cease “improper restrictions.”332 Virgil became Marx’s cohort. In the same article Marx also called upon Cervantes’s Don Quixote for support. Marx interpreted Sancho Panza as a symbol of the repression of the free press. Sancho Panza was deprived of food by the Spanish Court in order to incapacitate him so he could not perform his duties. The free press, like Sancho Panza, was to be deprived of the nourishment it required to perform its duties.

3. The Early Marx Shakespeare is an absence in the Very Early Marx, but an important figure in the Early Marx, 1842–1844. This discussion of the imagery, the symbolic representations that the Shakespearean classics provided to Marx will be divided into the following four subdivisions: (a) Anti-­ Capitalism; (b) Shakespeare’s Defence of Critique; (c) Greatness and Deceit and Defeat; (d) The Decadence of Property. (a) Anti-Capitalism Marx’s initial recourse to Shakespeare occurs in his article, “Debates on the Law of Thefts of Wood,” which was published in the Rheinische Zeitung in October 1842.333 This article was an attack upon the Rhine Provence Assembly which gave license to the aristocratic landowners to expropriate trees and wood from the poorer farmer. The “Debates on the  Ibid., p. 388.  Ibid., p. 109. 332  Ibid. 333  Marx, Karl, “Debates on the Law of Thefts of Wood”, ibid., pp. 224–263. 330 331

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Law of Thefts of Wood” was one of Marx’s first attempts, after he was denied a professorship at a Prussian university, to become a champion of the exploited poor peasant. In his attacks upon the greed of the landed aristocracy he invoked the assistance of Shakespeare. Marx summoned “The Merchant of Venice” as a dramatic illustration of the capitalist acquisition of the Prussian aristocracy, and Shylock became a symbol of the unfettered greed of this royal class.334 In the “Debates on the Law of Thefts of Wood,” Marx extracts two quotes from “The Merchant of Venice” as a means of illustrating how Shylock represented the capitalist spirit and both these quotes were taken from Act IV, Scene I of this Shakespearean play.335 In the first quote336 Shylock asserts his right to take a pound of flesh from Antonio’s body because of Antonio’s failure to repay Shylock for a load Shylock gave to Antonio.337 Marx portrayed Shylock as a symbol of capitalist usury. In the second quote338 Marx quotes a lengthy passage given by Portia also from Act IV, Scene I. In this passage Portia refers to a “pound of flesh” and succeeds in having the Court of Venice condemn Shylock for the sin of usury. Marx’s condemnation of capitalism did not stop with “The Merchant of Venice” but also included Shakespeare’s “Timon of Athens.” In Marx’s Paris Manuscripts of 1844 he again sought Shakespeare’s assistance. In the section entitled “The Power of Money” in these 1844 Paris Manuscripts Marx copied a long quote from “Timon of Athens.”339 In this quote Timon extols the quest of gold, and this insatiable hunger for money inevitably condemns Timon to lifelong imprisonment in a cave.340 In addition to Shakespeare Marx called upon additional literary classics to support his denunciation of capitalism. In the section, “The Power  Ibid., p. 236.  Shakespeare, William, “The Merchant of Venice”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ed. William Aldis Wright (New York: Garden City Books, 1936), p. 468. 336  Marx, Karl, “Debates on the Law of Thefts of Wood”, ibid., p. 256. 337  Shakespeare, William, “The Merchant of Venice”, ibid., p. 470. 338  Ibid. 339  Marx, Karl, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. III, p. 323. 340  Shakespeare, William, “Timon of Athens”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 1172. 334 335

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of Money” in the 1844 Manuscripts Marx referred to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust.341 The passage that Marx quotes from Faust was a statement by Mephistopheles that the horses he owned were his property and therefore he could ride as fast as he desired, even though it might be dangerous to the horse, because every part of the horse, even its leg, were his own property.342 Goethe also supported Marx’s denunciation of unbridled private property. Marx’s recourse to Goethe as an ally in his struggle against capitalism was not contained to the 1844 Paris Manuscripts. It has a long history beginning with the Very Early Marx. In an 1837 book of verse dedicated to his father Marx referenced Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Wandering Years as well as Faust. In this poem Marx pointed out how Faust was cognizant of the fact that debt could lead to “the Devil and Hell.”343 Marx’s dependence upon Goethe continued into the Early Marx of 1842–1844. In his 1842 “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy” Marx categorized Aristotle’s definition of reason as a continuous rational activity seeking objectification. As a literary substantiation of Aristotle’s theory of reason Marx referred to Goethe’s Faust and compared the wandering scholar to the ceaseless activity of reason.344 In his 1842 article, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction,” Goethe again became a presence. In this article Marx was advocating the freedom of the press and he alluded to Goethe’s The Crane as an illustration of how Prussian censorship could lead to the deterioration of the soul.345 In his 1842 article on “Debates on Freedom of the Press,” Marx once again called upon Goethe for intellectual support. In this article Marx again disputed Prussian press censorship and found supportive affirmation in Goethe’s the Doctrine of a Magician.346 Marx’s opposition to Prussian autocracy  Marx, Karl, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., p. 323. 342  Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Faust, trans. Philip Wayne (New York: Penguin Press, 1949), p. 91. 343  Marl, Karl, “Early Literary Experiments”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, p. 579. 344  Ibid., p. 436. 345  Ibid., p. 112. 346  Ibid., p. 155. 341

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was again demonstrated in his 1842 article, “Debates on the Law of Thefts of Woods.” In this article Marx called upon Goethe’s Reineke Fuchs to express his own distress at the capitalist exploitation of the poor farmer carried out by the Rhine Provincial Assembly.347 Goethe again makes an appearance in Marx’s 1843 letter to Arnold Ruge. In this letter Marx laments the suppression of the Rheinische Zeitung. He compares the despotic officials of the Prussian Monarchy to maggots and then calls upon Goethe to confirm that these officials were comparable to animals.348 Classical German literature as represented by Goethe supplied Marx with the psychological heroism to oppose Prussian dictatorship. (b) Shakespeare’s Defence of Critique Shakespeare became a champion for Marx in Marx’s defence of a free press. In the 1842 journalism of the Early Marx he wrote a column in the Rheinische Zeitung entitled, “Communal Reform and the Kölnische Zeitung.” In this article Marx criticized the Provincial Assembly because it separated the agrarian areas from the urban areas in terms of voting procedures. The distinction between the countryside and the city would reduce the importance of the vote of the peasantry. In 1842 Marx struggled against vote restriction. In an effort to weaponize his argument Marx called upon Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part One. Falstaff was the aesthetic symbol for Marx’s attack on the Provincial Assembly.349 Marx predicted that the policy of voter restriction would fail just as Falstaff’s army disintegrated while Falstaff attempted to support the Prince of Wales against Hotspur.350 Marx found in Shakespeare an advocate of critique. Marx’s struggle for the freedom of the press was again displayed in his Rheinische Zeitung articles of 1843 entitled, “The Ban on the Leipziger

 Ibid., p. 246.  Marx’s Letter to Arnold Ruge, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. III, p. 134. 349  Marx, Karl, “Communal Reform and the Kölnische Zeitung”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, p. 268. 350  Shakespeare, William, “King Henry IV, Part I”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ed. William Aldis Wright, ibid., p. 505. 347 348

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Allgemeine Zeitung”351 In these articles Marx again protested the ban of the Liberal Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung. In his effort to ward off the suppression of a Liberal newspaper Marx once more appealed to Shakespeare. Marx again returned to King Henry IV, Part One. Marx takes a quote from the play, which admonished the hot-headed Hotspur, synonym for the Prussian autocracy, for his impetuous rebellion against King Henry IV.352 Hotspur is eventually killed and Marx offered this as a warning to the audacity of the Prussian autocracy. Throughout 1842–1843 the Rheinische Zeitung was under constant attack by the conservative forces in Prussia. One source of these attacks was the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung. Marx’s article “Polemical Articles of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung” was a counterattack upon the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung.353 In Marx’s counterattack, he again called upon Falstaff in King Henry IV, Part One.354 In the quote cited by Marx he elicited Falstaff as critic of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung. According to Falstaff this newspaper lacked not only honesty, but honor.355 Marx borrowed the Shakespearean symbol of deception, Falstaff, as a mechanism to reveal the deceit of the Prussian autocracy. (c) Greatness and Deceit and Defeat In Marx’s battle against press censorship he called upon the heroes of the French Revolution. In his 1842 article in the Rheinische Zeitung, “Debates on Freedom of the Press,” he insinuated that the Prussian autocracy itself might experience a French Revolution. He drew attention to one of the great orators of the French Revolution, Mirabeau.356 To  Marx, Karl, “The Ban on the Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 311–330. 352  Shakespeare, William, “King Henry IV, Part I”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ed. William Aldis Wright, ibid., p. 498. 353  Mark, Karl, “Polemical Articles Against the Allgemeine Zeitung”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., p. 359. 354  Marx, Karl, “Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. III, p. 87. 355  Shakespeare, William, “King Henry IV, Part I”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ed. William Aldis Wright, ibid., p. 508. 356  Marx, Karl, “Debates on Freedom of the Press”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, p. 139. 351

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validate Mirabeau’s greatness Marx summoned Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream. He quoted the phrase, “Well roared, lion” as an expression of Mirabeau’s greatness and as a prophecy of the overthrow of the Prussian Monarchy (see note 354). Marx’s employment of A Midsummer Night’s Dream as a critique of the Prussian Monarchy was not limited to his 1842 essay, “Debates on Freedom of the Press” but extended to his 1843 “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.” The Young Marx of 1843 was no longer involved in the journalistic battle to preserve the freedom of the press, but after he was denied a position at a Prussian University, and after the extinction of his journalistic career with the Rheinische Zeitung, he turned to a critique of the Prussian theory of the state as represented in Hegel’s The Philosophy of Law. The Marx of mid-1843 was on the cusp of abandoning Germany for Paris and his search for a philosophical foundation of communism. Liberalism was a thing of the past. In this moment of transition Marx wrote the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” which was the opening salvo of his critique of political philosophy. Hegel’s The Philosophy of Law was the primary target of Marx’s refutation of the contemporary German philosophy of the state, Marx’s initial attempt to draw an Enlightenment Left distinction between state and civil society, and in this enterprise Marx found it necessarily to call upon Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream.357 Marx used this Shakespearean comedy to reveal the deceit of Hegel, or the Prussian Monarchy, in claiming that the Prussian state was not totally sovereign, but allowed for particular areas of local autonomy. Marx quotes from A Midsummer Night’s Dream as a means of revealing the hypocrisy of Hegel in claiming that the ideal state was both a sovereign, but simultaneously limiting its own sovereignty. The appeal Marx makes is to Act Four, Scene I, in which Snug claims to be both a lion and not a lion.358 A Midsummer Night’s Dream exposed the deceit of Hegel and Prussian autocracy.  Marx, Karl, “Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. III, p. 87. 358  Shakespeare, William, “A Midsummer Night’s Dream”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 409. 357

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Shakespeare’s appearance in the works of Marx did not wait until the 1843 Young Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” but made its first appearance six years earlier in Marx’s Early “Literary Experiments” of 1837. The 19-year-old Marx sketched a humanistic book entitled Scorpion and Felix,359 and in this novel referred to Shakespeare’s “Richard III” and “Troilus and Cressida.” In this novel Marx was indebted to Shakespeare’s Richard III’s call for a horse360 to symbolize the defeat of the female character’s desire to fantasize herself as voluptuous. In addition, Marx also appealed to Shakespeare’s “Troilus and Cressida” in which the Trojan Ajax is criticized for placing his mind in his stomach and Marx used this analogy to defeat the idea that the flesh should rule over his romantic love for Jenny von Westphalen.361 (d) The Decadence of Property The Shakespearen play that the Young Marx 1842–1844 most frequently alluded to was “King Lear,” which is called upon four times during this period. For Marx, “King Lear” was a symbol for the denunciation of private property. Lear uses property as a device to win the love of his three daughters. Lear learns that property does not bring love, but rather family decomposition. His three daughters are lured into a dispute over the property. One daughter, Cordelia, joins forces with the King of France and goes to war against England, thus illustrating how greed can lead to family disruption and political discord. In this regard, “King Lear” and the “Merchant of Venice” send the same message as Lear and Shylock are dramatic representations of how property destroys the bounds of family and civil society. In the journalism of the 1842–1844 period, Marx employed “King Lear” to denounce those organs of the Prussian Monarchy which sought to abolish the free press. “King Lear” served two purposes, as an attack on  Marx, Karl, “Scorpion and Felix”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., Vol. I, p. 617. 360  Shakespeare, William, “King Richard III”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 156. 361  Shakespeare, William, “Troilus and Cressida”, ibid., pp. 828–830. 359

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private property and as a voice which revealed the tyranny of the Prussian Monarch. The opening performance of “King Lear” occurred in Marx’s 1842 article, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung.” In this article it is not Lear who Marx quotes, but Lord Cornwall who is the husband of Lear’s daughter Regan.362 In the “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung” Marx is fighting for a free press and the salvation of Left Hegelianism and he called upon Lord Cornwall to denounce those who lie and are corrupt.363 King Lear makes his own appearance in Marx’s 1842 article, “The Polemical Tactics of the Augsburg Newspaper.” As previously mentioned in this chapter Marx attacked the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung for its negation of the freedom of the press and its attacks on the Rheinische Zeitung.364 Marx reached out to King Lear to offer a condemnation of the lies and treachery of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung.365 A page later in the “The Polemical Tactics of the Augsburg Newspaper” Marx again exercised a recourse to King Lear.366 As a means of demonstrating the duplicity of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung Marx exploits Lear’s madness as an illustration of the repression of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung.367 On the next page of the “The Polemical Tactics of the Augsburg Newspaper” Marx again turns to King Lear.368 He once more resorts to Lear to denounce the Augsburg newspaper. He condemns the Augsburg newspaper as a distorted Cupid who he could never admire because of its  Marx, Karl, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung,” in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., p. 194. 363  Shakespeare, William, “The Tragedy of King Lear”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 997. 364  Marx, Karl, “Polemical Tactics of the Augsburg Newspaper”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., p. 289. 365  Shakespeare, William, “The Tragedy of King Lear”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 1015. 366  Marx, Karl, “Polemical Tactics of the Augsburg Newspaper”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., p. 290. 367  Shakespeare, William, “The Tragedy of King Lear”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 1014. 368  Marx, Karl, “Polemical Tactics of the Augsburg Newspaper”, in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works, ibid., p. 291. 362

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treachery.369 From the ancient Athenian culture and the Roman Republic Marx was instructed about an ethics which would serve as the substructure of a communist society. The ancient Athenian culture, the Roman Republic, and the classical theatre of Shakespeare helped determine the psychology of Marx by teaching him that courage could overcome hardship.

 Shakespeare, William, “The Tragedy of King Lear”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ibid., p. 1015. 369

2 The Restoration of Civic Humanism

In order to more thoroughly understand the rebirth of Classical Humanism in Marx, it is necessary to trace the continuity of Athenian-­ generated ethics from Aristotle to Marx. This discussion of the resurrection of Aristotelian ethics in Marx will be divided into three parts: (1) Psychology; (2) Ethics; (3) Politics.

1. Psychology Marx’s ethical principles were expressions of his philosophical naturalism. Traditional interpretations of Marx presented him as a materialist, as a product of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century mechanistic materialism. This materialist view was supported by Friedrich Engels, Georgi Plekhanov, and Joseph Stalin and led to a gross distortion of Marx’s method of social explanation. The origin of Marx’s naturalism will be clarified in studying the influence of Aristotle on the 22-year-old-Marx, the young Marx who was in the process of writing his doctoral dissertation in 1840.

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Marx’s doctoral dissertation On the Difference Between the Philosophy of Nature in Democritus and Epicurus1 documents that Marx read Aristotle’s “The Soul.” Whereas Aristotle employed the term Soul, Marx transferred these antique insights into early nineteenth-century psychology. “The Soul” of Aristotle did not bear any resemblance to the Christian idea of the soul. The Christian soul was an everlasting entity that ascended to heaven after the death of the body. For Aristotle, the soul was that function of the animal organism which provided the organism with nutrition, sensation, and motion.2 Aristotle wrote: the “affections of the soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life.”3 The soul was energy, motivation, drive, or as Aristotle wrote, “soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.”4 Aristotle was primarily focused on the natural body, either animal or human. He was concerned with the self-generating impulses of animal life and how these impulses shaped the environment surrounding the species. He was not primarily concerned with how the world external to the species imprinted sense impressions upon the species. Marx continued the Aristotelian naturalist tradition and in so doing resituated the species within a form of production. The motivational drives of the human species were propelled by the awareness of an end. Aristotle’s investigation into the capacities of the soul was essentially a study of motivation. He was attempting to discover the origins of species action, why the species embarked on a course of self-generated outreaches. According to Aristotle, this cause of motivation was end, the desire to attain a specific purpose. “The Soul” contains this phrase: “all things that exist by nature are means to an end.”5

 Marx, Karl, “On The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 25–108, 403–516. 2  Aristotle, “The Soul”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 566. 3  Ibid., p. 538. 4  Ibid., p. 555. 5  Ibid., 600. 1

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When Marx translated Aristotle’s “The Soul” into early nineteenth-­century psychology, he adapted the Aristotelian notion of end. When Marx described the activities of the nineteenth-century proletariat he interpreted their activities as motivated by ends, purpose. Marx not only psychologized the Aristotelian concept of ends and purposes, but also the Aristotelian axiom of the actual and the potential. For the Athenian philosopher, actuality was the “is” of a being, while potentiality was the realization of the actual. Human predication moved from the actual, the idea of an end, to the potential, the result of the attempt to realize the actual, that which was uncorrupted by reality. Marx also absorbed the paradigm of actual-potential and he used this Aristotelian logic to describe the industrial labor process. The proletariat moved from the actual to the potential, or the process of production witnessed raw materials being transformed into a utility. For Marx, the entire process of production under industrial capitalism conformed to the actual-potential formula created by Aristotle. For Aristotle, the species was dynamic. Marx’s psychology was also predicated on a view of human nature as inherently active. The history of the productive process, from hunting to the factory, was predicated upon the psychology of motivation. Aristotle’s teleology of action was based on the subject-object paradigm. The subject was the actual, the subject was the energy of human prius. The object was the potentialization of the human prius, it was the outcome of human energy and drive. The subject-object relationship was the formula employed by Aristotle to describe the mental and physical productive process of the human species. Focusing on the Industrial Revolution, concerned with the creation of value by the industrial proletariat, Marx conceived the proletariat in Aristotelian terms. For Marx, the proletariat was the subject, and the telos of the proletariat led to the creation of value, or the object. The labor process under capitalism replicated the subject-object relationship. Aristotle’s philosophy divided into two parts: the theoretical and the practical. When Aristotle wrote on physics, Physics, or astronomy, On the Heavens, he ventured into the area of theoretical philosophy, but when he wrote The Nicomachean Ethics, The Politics, he entered into the area of practical philosophy. The area which exerted the most significant

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influence on Marx was Aristotle’s practical philosophy, and in terms of practical philosophy Marx was most influenced by Aristotle’s ethics and political theory.

2. Ethics The fundamental principle of Aristotle’s ethics and politics was his conviction that the human species is “by nature a political animal.”6 By the term “political” Aristotle meant that the human species was instinctively social, or that the instincts of the human species was to live in a community. Aristotle outlined a four-stage theory of historical evolution: the first stage was family; the second stage an association of families, or the tribe; the third a village; the fourth a polis.7 Indeed, Aristotle additionally asserted that in the first stage “members of the family originally had all things in common.”8 Aristotle was one of the founders of the idea that communism was a form of social organization during the primitive stage of human development. Aristotle possessed a theory of historical evolution. From the perspective of fourth-century BC Athens, Aristotle maintained that the human species progressed from primitive communism to private property. Aristotle possessed a historiography of sociological and productive forms. He understood the nature of human evolution and understood that different productive forms gave rise to different social and state forms. In this regard Aristotle was an ancient precursor of Marx. Ethics found its embodiment in the state, or the state was that political organization which generated the greatest degree of cooperative interrelations between the citizens of the polis. The family level of political evolution witnessed warfare and turmoil, the village level of political evolution was also afflicted with warfare and conflict. However, political evolution only reached its epitome when the interrelationships between the inhabitants  Aristotle, “The Politics”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 1129. 7  Ibid., pp. 1128–1129. 8  Ibid., p. 1138. 6

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were harmonious, mutually cooperative and this was the state. The state was both the outcome of social cooperation and the guardian of social cooperation. Citizenship was a product of the state. The natural sociability of the human species was the cause for the establishment of communities. The communities eventually developed organs of rule, or government. When Aristotle wrote that humans were essentially “political” animals he meant that humans were most fulfilled, were happiest, in communities provided by governments. The highest form of government was the state, and the social nature of humankind reached its perfection in the state. Another indication of species sociability was the need for friendship. Ancient Greece was a historical time zone when the value of women was minimalized. Wives gave birth to children and nurtured the household, but were not the source of either intellectual or emotional enhancement. The only human relationship which increased the happiness of the other was the male-male bonding, or homosexuality. Regardless of sexual preference, the importance that Aristotle assigned to friendship as a contributor to human happiness indicates his awareness of the importance of interpersonality, social interconnection, in the genesis of species happiness. Aristotle’s awareness of the human instinct for sociability was an indication of his anthropological sensitivities. Sociability was an inherent impulse in the human species, and Aristotle foreshadowed the anthropology of Ludwig Feuerbach. Perpetuating the sociability of Aristotle, Feuerbach wrote of a “species being,” an instinct that pushed individuals into communities. Feuerbach’s “species being” exerted an enormous influence on Marx. A centuries-long continuity ran from Aristotle to Feuerbach to Marx, and Marx’s advocacy of communism rested upon the anthropological axioms of instinctive human sociability. The highest ethical principle for Aristotle was the principle of happiness, but the principle of happiness required three preceding stages before it could be realized: (1) ethics; (2) virtue; (3) the good. 1. Ethics were moral principles. The ethical person acted in terms of moral principles. Citizenship was a moral duty and the ethical person was also a person who participated in the government of the polis.

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Caring for the household was a moral principle and the ethical person devoted himself to providing sustenance for his household. 2. Virtue was self-discipline. Virtue meant the adherence to ethical principles. Virtue meant a regime, a behavioral pattern, which adhered to the ethical. 3. The Good was the result of ethics and virtue. Good behavior could only be achieved as a result of combining the ethical and virtue. Happiness was the outcome of ethics, virtue, and the achievement of the good. A person was Happy when he was Good. In addition, there were also socioproductive preconditions for the attainment of happiness, or happiness was not only moral-psychological, but also required an organic mode of production. The most desirable productive agency in the Greek city-state was the household. For Aristotle, the household was the epitome of productive formations. By household Aristotle meant a family organism, a composite of husband, wife, and children. The organic mode of production of the household was devoted to agriculture, or the raising of lambs, or cattle. The fundamental purposes of the productive pursuits of the household was the provision of sustenance for the family. Building upon his belief in male domination, Aristotle assigned to the father monarchical control over the household. The household was owned privately. Aristotle was not a communist and defended the right of private property. Although Aristotle was aware of the evolution from primitive communism to Athenian private property, he nevertheless justified private property as the indispensable substructure of psychological well-being and ethics. However, the justification of private property still left the question open as to its purpose. According to Aristotle, there were two possible goals: (1) sustenance; (2) chrematistics.

1. Sustenance Productive activity whose end was the provision of sustenance was the preferred form of labor for Aristotle. It was the form of productive activity that most closely corresponded to the agriculture and herding of the

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household. The male head of the household was not driven by the desire for profit, but rather for sustenance. The male wished to provide for his family, maintain his independence, and strengthen his autonomy as a citizen. Self-determination was the ground of the freedom of the citizen.

2. Chrematistics Chrematistics was a productive activity whose purpose was the acquisition of profit. The Athenian citizen who manufactured a piece of jewelry and then sold that jewelry for a profit was engaged in chrematistic activity. He was involved in the retail trade, or trading activities of various dimensions. Aristotle was opposed to chrematistics because its goal was not sustenance, but profit. Its goal was not the provision of sustenance, but the acquisition of riches. Aristotle condemned chrematistics on moral grounds. Chrematistics led to self-aggrandizement, to excessive pride. In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlined the behavioral patterns of an ethical life. Ethical existence only emerged from the virtue of moderation, temperance, the mean. To possess the possibilities of ethical behavior an individual must be guided by the psychological attributes of restraint, sobriety, the seeking of the medium. Only the practice of moderation could provide the psychological grounds upon which ethical decisions could be made. Aristotle’s denunciation of chrematistics extended to his condemnation of wealth. Aristotle recognized the importance of productive activities, the indispensability of the household, in creating the conditions for ethical and political independence, but he drew a distinction between temperate property ownership, the household, and wealth. By wealth, Aristotle meant the outcome of greed and self-indulgence. Wealth was the result of limitless acquisition and in the capitulation to inexhaustible acquisition. The addict of wealth was consumed in selfishness and isolated himself from the gratification of community. Aristotle’s condemnation of wealth was an ancient precursor of Marx’s attack on capitalist acquisitiveness. A voice of Greek Humanism, Aristotle introduced into Western civilization the moral denunciation of wealth and Marx continued this aspect of Athenian ethics.

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However, it is vital not to confuse wealth and liberality. Whereas wealth meant self-indulgence, liberality meant social generosity. Liberality was an act of social beneficence. The productive basis of Liberality was the household, or the proprietor of the household who was fortunate enough to earn an amount of money in excess of his needs and expenses for sustenance. The proprietor of the household possessed a surplus, and rather than consume this surplus to satisfy a desire for luxury, or intemperance, he donated this surplus to the needy in the polis. Liberality meant social responsibility, or commitment to the city-state, because the liberal citizen donated his productive surplus in order to benefit a less fortunate family in the city-state. Liberality was Aristotle’s form of socialist social welfare. Contemporary social welfare provides the impoverished with food, housing, and, as a consequence, the opportunity to participate in the activities of society. In Aristotle, Liberality meant that the wealthy should provide the poverty stricken with specified meals and the opportunity to participate in pagan religious ceremonies. The only difference between Liberality and social welfare was the source of financial support. In the end of social welfare, it is the state that supplies the financial underwriting. In Aristotelian Liberality it was the socially prosperous who contributed the financial underwriting. Previous paragraphs discussed that the achievement of happiness in Aristotle was the result of several virtues, or behavioral regimes. In addition to the behavioral regimes already outlined there were other forms of conduct that were preconditions and these were mainly psychological. These psychological factors were (1) anti-hedonism; behavioral temperance and moderation; social conscience and responsibility; friendship, or emotional satisfaction by means of involvement with an Other, another man; (2) respect for the community, or the duty to ensure the preservation of the community through social involvement; citizenship, the fulfillment of duties to preserve the political structures, the acceptance of responsibilities to maintain the polis.

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3. Politics One of the basic intentions of Aristotle’s The Politics was to provide a formula for the prevention of political revolutions. He designed his writings as a counterstrategy to Marx. Fundamental to Aristotle’s political philosophy was his understanding that the process of productivity was the decisive force in historical evolution. Aristotle contributed the theory of productive determinism to Marx. In order for Aristotle to prepare the way for Marx it was necessary for him to advance in fourth-century BC Greece a genetic theory of history. Aristotle’s The Politics initiated a theory of historical progress, of genetic development, which brought forth different forms of production in which each form was more advanced than the previous one. Aristotle divided these productive forms into two branches: (1) the household, or the organic mode of production, and (2) chrematistics. Previous paragraphs clarified that household productivity was directed at sustenance, while chrematistic productivity was directed at profit. However, even household productivity evolved through genetic stages of growth. History brought forth five organic modes of production and these were “the pastoral, farming, the freebooting, the fishing and the life of the chase.”9 History also brought forth different modes of chrematistics, or forms of acquisition. These modes of acquisition were exchange, trade, the invention of currency.10 Evolving out of these new productive forms were various sociopolitical forms. The foundation of sociopolitical existence were modes of production, and Aristotle isolated six basic forms of sociopolitical aggregations and these were (1) impulse; (2) social life; (3) family; (4) tribe; (5) village; (6) the state.

 Barker, Ernest., The Politics of Aristotle, ed. Ernest Barker (Oxford University Press: New York, 1962), p. 20. 10  Ibid., pp. 22–25. 9

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1. Impulse Aristotle maintained that the human species possessed an “immanent impulse”11 to live in association with other members of the species. This “immanent impulse” was the substance of society. Its most elementary form was the husband-wife relationship. In addition, friendship, male-­ on-­male bonding was another expression of the “immanent impulse.”

2. Social life Even though Aristotle employed the phrase social life, he actually meant “civil society.” Writing in the great city of Athens, Aristotle utilized a concept that 2100  years later was made famous by Adam Ferguson, J.J. Rousseau, and Karl Marx. In The Politics, Aristotle wrote: This consummation, however, will not be reached unless the members inhabit one and the self-same place and practice intermarriage. It was for this reason [i.e. to provide the necessary conditions] that the various institutions of a common social life—marriage—connections, kin-­ groups, religious gatherings, and social pastimes generally—arose in cities. But these institutions are the business of friendship [and not a polis] which consists in the pursuit of a common social life. The end and purpose of a polis in the good life, and the institution of social life are means to that end.12 For Aristotle, social life was a precursor to the state. Social life was composed of those elementary human connections, which made tribes, villages, and states possible. This was exactly what Marx meant by “civil society.” For Ferguson, Rousseau, and Marx, “civil society” related to those emotional and physical attributes, which created a peaceful association of the human animal; “species being” was the substructure of “civil society.”

 Ibid., p. 7.  Ibid., p. 120.

11 12

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Even though Aristotle employed a different terminology, he was thinking in the spectrum of Marx. Even though the language was different, the concept of “civil society” was an active ingredient in Classical Philosophy. Aristotle assisted in creating an awareness in Marx that a realm of social organization, “civil society,” existed outside of the boundaries of the state. Not only were these bonds of social organization independent of the state, but these social organizations were strong enough to provide “civil society” with governance in distinction to a state.

3. Family The family was a natural outcome of the “immanent impulse.” Men and women were pulled together by the “immanent” magnetism and not only were the earliest families an exemplar of the philosophy of Aristotle, but also Feuerbach’s theory of “species being.” The family was the earliest historical form of association, or the drive for the social was the most initial propellant of human life. The family was a product of two developments that coalesced. One development was the “immanent” sexual drive which drew male and female together, and a second development was the productive progress into the agricultural stage. The conquest of agriculture connected with the birth of the family brought the household into existence. The cultivation of farmlands could be accomplished from a single dwelling, and the raising of children could be conducted from a single dwelling, and this aggregation was the genesis of the household. The productive mode of the household was sustenance. The creation of the household was also the condition which generated private property. The head of the household, the male, claimed the agricultural land as his own property, he could dispense it according to his will. Aristotle did not believe that humans possessed equal intelligence, or equal talents. He believed that superior intelligence and talents assigned to the possessor of these abilities the right to make decisions. People were not equal, some were superior to others, and the superiority of talent was the ground for the monopolization of decision making.

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Aristotle defended the master-slave relationship. His defense of the master-slave relationship extended beyond the house-wife, proprietor-­ servant relationships. Aristotle justified subordination, and he justified subordination on the basis of intelligence. Superior intelligence bestowed upon the possessor of superior intelligence the right to rule.

4. Tribes The nomadic existence of the tribe created the opportunity for a new productive mode, trade, and trade was a form of chrematistics. Trade allowed for the coming-to-be of retail production. A tribe could take the fur of an animal it recently killed on its itinerary and contact another tribe or household. In the course of its contact with another tribe, or a household, the first tribe could sell that fur to the second tribe, or the household. The sale of the fur brought a profit, and the productive activity of the tribe was no longer sustenance, but chrematistics.

5. Village Villages possessed an accumulation of people larger than the household, or the tribe. Villages were stationary like the household. However, they could follow either the productive mode of sustenance or the productive mode of chrematistics. Most villages adopted both forms of productive activity and therefore surpassed both the household and tribe in gathering a surplus, or wealth gathering. Given both its productivity, based upon the division of its labor, the village witnessed the origination of class. The village was the scene of the first division of labor, sustenance, and chrematistics. This division was the origin of class since one portion of the village population was engaged in sustenance and another portion in chrematistics. The emergence of classes brought about the conditions for social conflict. The fact that a variety of occupations existed, the fact that some occupations earned a greater income due to the productive functions they performed, perpetuated jealousy and animosity. Class conflicts arose

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based on inequality and in order to control these class hostilities it was necessary to create social organizations to mediate these class embitterments. The village was the womb of government. Realizing the necessity of overcoming these class conflicts villages invented social organizations whose purpose was the pacification of this potentially explosive class warfare.

6. The State This section will analyze the ethical basis of government in Marx. There is a difference between state and government in both Aristotle and Marx, and at this point I will focus on the ethical nature of state and government in Aristotle and the ethical nature of government in Marx. In Marx, the state by definition was an instrument of class domination. In order to properly understand Aristotle’s conception of state and government some introductory remarks are required. As a means to understand Aristotle’s political philosophy within the context of Western civilization, it is necessary to contrast Aristotle to the political theory of natural rights. In this manner, Aristotle will be more clearly contrasted and defined, the nature of Classical Humanism will be more clearly specified, and the line of continuity regarding the interdependence between politics and ethics stretching from Aristotle to Marx will be drawn into sharper focus. Natural rights theory maintained that nature endowed the human species with rights, or certain privileges, which made its existence possible. If life was to be sustained, these rights must be accommodated. In the political domain, natural rights meant “life, liberty,” freedom of association, free speech, free thought, voting rights, and the process of civil justice. On the productive level, natural rights meant the freedom to own property. Liberty was the condition out of which private property was granted legality and constitutional guarantees. Individualism was the primary substance of natural rights theory. In the course of Western civilization, the individual rights theory triumphed over Greek communitarianism. The victory of bourgeois capitalism provided the ground for the triumph of natural rights theory in

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the West. Private property was one stimulus for bourgeois capitalism and the triumph of natural rights theory was one consequence of the universalization of private property. Unhindered by ethics, Democracy was the political outcome of natural rights theory. The idolization of individualism found its state expression in Democracy. Aristotelian humanism was opposed to natural rights theory. In his The Politics, Aristotle made the following assertions: (1) “man by nature is a political animal”;13 (2) “a social instinct is implanted in all men by nature.”14 According to Aristotle, humankind did not inherit rights from nature, but rather an instinct for community. Social association was the law of nature rather than rights. Deriving from his rejection of rights and individualism, Aristotle was not an advocate of Democracy. Of the various forms of government diagnosed by Aristotle, Democracy was assigned a low rank. The excessive individualism of Democracy made it subject to financial corruption and therefore moral decay. Nevertheless, Aristotle did defend the right of private property. The organic mode of production was constructed on private property and the household was the force that underwrote ethical activity. Aristotle’s defense of private property meant that he did not advocate communism. Indeed, the theory of communism was widely debated in the Athenian world. In The Politics, Aristotle drew attention to the works of Phaleas of Chalcedon and wrote: “In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established.”15 Aristotle’s rejection of communism was also manifest in his critique of Plato. On the epistemological level, Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of ideas, and in terms of political science, Aristotle also  Aristotle, “The Politics”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 1184. 14  Ibid., p. 1185. 15  Ibid. 13

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denied Plato’s advocacy of communism for the Philosophic Kings. The Politics is replete with attacks on Plato for his defense of communism in The Republic. Aristotle’s relationship to Marx was ambiguous. Marx was both a democrat and a communist, but Aristotle was neither. But Aristotle supplied Marx with ethical principles which served as the substructure for Marx’s theory of communism. Aristotelianism flowed into Marx from at least two directions, ethical and the government-state duality. At this juncture, the focus will concentrate on the Aristotelian ethical inheritance in Marx. Aristotle was a counterrevolutionary and consequently was anti-­ Marxist. Whereas Marx devoted himself to devising strategies for the promotion of revolutions, Aristotle focused on strategies for the prevention of revolution. In order to provide scientific justifications for his anti-­ Marxism, Aristotle was compelled to investigate the causes of revolution. Aristotle recognized that the major causes of revolution was social inequality. He offered an early version of Marx’s analysis of social classes. The class divisions in society were constructed on the basis of the unequal distribution of property. In The Politics, Aristotle divided Athenian society into three classes. “Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean—So that one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically; the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like slaves. Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this; for good fellowship springs from friendship; when men are at enmity with one another, they would rather not even share the same path.”16 In particular, Aristotle took special notice of the social degradation of the working classes. He drew attention to the fact that in Greek history prior to fourth-century BC Athens the working classes had no share in government. Poverty was the outcome of the lack of property. Social well-being derived from the possession of property. Whereas the absence of property was the cause of poverty, the possession of property was the generator of 16

 Ibid., pp. 1220–1221.

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the middle classes. In addition, the middle classes were the substructure of a stable polis. The middle classes possessed a moderate degree of property and therefore they were free from class animosity against the rich. Furthermore, they were better educated than the poor and were thus equipped to be a good citizen in the polis, to properly execute government responsibilities. The middle class was the decisive, the determinate element in a society that was nonrevolutionary. Based on his historio-sociological analysis, Aristotle invented a strategy to deter revolutions. The strategy fell into two parts. First, make the middle classes the majority in a state. Second, in order to expand the middle classes, the widespread distribution of property must become a policy of the state. The state should encourage a wide distribution of moderate amounts of property throughout its borders, thereby making the middle class the majority class in the polis. In order to achieve the end of a middle-class state, Aristotle needed to devise a political policy. Since this chapter is devoted to the ethics of Aristotle, I will concentrate on those ethical principles Aristotle hoped would assist in the origination of the middle-class state. These ethical principles were (1) civil society; (2) participation; (3) justice; (4) distributive justice.17

1. Civil Society The primary principles of Aristotle’s social and political philosophy was his conviction that humankind was innately both a social and political animal. Sociability, the need for community, was the controlling drive of human motivation. Regarding the instinct for community, Aristotle wrote in The Politics: “Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community.”18 Regarding the need for political association, Aristotle wrote in The Politics: “And, therefore, men, even when they do not require one another’s help, desire to live together—And also for the sake

 Ibid., p. 1181.  Ibid., p. 1180.

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of new life—mankind meet together and maintain the political community.”19

2. Participation Participation in the activities of “civil society” was required in order for the commune to function appropriately. Participation meant that an inhabitant of the commune must share in the government, the administrative duties, of “civil society.” The assumption of administrative duties was an ethical virtue. Administrative responsibilities must be distributed equally throughout the population of the “civil society” in order to ensure the proper functioning of the commune. When “civil society” advanced into the state then participation developed into citizenship. According to Aristotle, “Man is born for citizenship.”20 A citizen was a male who actively participated in the function of government of the polis. Citizenship was the epitome of polis duty and responsibility, because the citizen was an adjunct in the process of making laws and administering justice. The duty of the citizen demanded that the male rotate in the offices of the government of the polis. The circulation of government duties necessitated that citizens periodically service in various governmental positions. Another duty of the citizen was to educate themselves. In order to more proficiently fulfill the duties of a polis office a good education was a prerequisite. Aristotle recognized the division of the citizen into two parts. The “zoon oikonikon,” the productive man, was the individual man absorbed in his own household and devoted to provision of the necessities of life to his wife and children. Aristotle also recognized the “zoon politikon,” the political man, who was obligated to perform political duties in the state. Without the participation of the “zoon politikon,” the citizen, the state could not properly function and would decay.  Ibid., p. 1184.  Aristotle, “The Nicomachean Ethics”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 942. 19 20

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Human existence in Aristotle was a dichotomy; it consisted of a duality between the “zoon politikon” and the “zoon oikonikon.” Such a duality would destroy the existence of a unified human essence. Such an internal contradiction would result in self-alienation, the estrangement of man from both himself and his society. In order to overcome this incongruity, Aristotle called for the unification of the “zoon oikonikon” and the “zoon politikon.” Such a cohesion would produce both psychological and ethical benefits. In the psychological dimension, such a unity would prevent the self-­ alienation of man. The oneness of the “zoon oikonikon” and the “zoon politikon” would create a sense of the unity of life, of the wholeness of the self. In the ethical dimension, the unity of “zoon oikonikon” and “zoon politikon” would create the unity between the self and society. Active participation in the politics of the polis was the ground of the unity between humans in both “civil society” and the state. This unity was the ethical because it contributed to a sense of mutual benefit, of reciprocal gain and such mutuality was the basis for a peaceful resolution to conflicts. Citizenship not only meant participation, but in addition a respect for justice. To be a good legislator required that the lawmaker appreciate the complexities of justice. Justice was an ethic and thus the proper administration of justice belonged in the domain of ethics.

3. Justice The aim of Aristotle was to unify justice and politics. A fusion of justice and politics witnessed the birth of an ethical politics. Aristotle’s theory of ethics favored practical philosophy. He was mostly concerned with human actions internal to a social setting. Practical philosophy when allied to the just was a manifestation of the good. The good was an ethical principle and if political action could attain the “good” then political action reached the standard of the ethical. Justice was the proportionate. Justice was the allotment of commensurate shares. For example, the legislature took upon itself the duty to distribute portions of newly acquired land to a section of the citizens of the polis. The legislature distributed these lands to the citizens

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proportionally. It did not give to its citizens exact equal acres of land. Rather, it distributed to its citizens proportionate acres of land, or acres which were comparable in size. Proportionality was not equality, but comparability. Justice was aimed at the intermediate. It did not totally vanquish one of the contestants, an absolute denial to any of his claims thereby giving rise to embitterment and the eagerness for revenge. Rather, the intermediate opened room for both contestants to receive some recognition, a proportion, of their claims. Justice was a form of equivalence. The equivalent was not the equal. Equivalence allotted a degree, a portion, to each legal claimant. Neither claimant received the totality of their petition. Equivalence was equity, not equality. A disputant was treated with equity if he received a portion that was equivalent to the legality of his claim. Aristotle maintained that “the unjust is what violates the proportion.”21 Deriving from the notion of proportionality and equivalence, Aristotle’s theory of ethics stressed the concepts of reciprocity, mutuality, and the commensurate. Again displaying the amalgamation of ethics and politics, Aristotle defined reciprocity in the following terms: “There will then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker’s work is to that of the farmer’s work for which it exchanged.”22

4. Distributive Justice Aristotle’s concept of distributive justice enjoyed enormous historic influence and in order to properly understand the concept of distributive justice, it is necessary to divide this principle into two parts: (a) distribution; (b) justice.

21 22

 Ibid., p. 1007.  Ibid., p. 1011.

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(a) Distribution One of Aristotle’s major political ends was a stable polis, he wished to prevent a political revolution. His studies of the origins of revolutions in other Greek city-states demonstrated that a middle-class minority was the primary cause for a political uprising. The middle classes arose from the ownership of moderate amounts of property. To enlarge the middle classes, to make them the majority element in the population of the polis, it was necessary to distribute property as widely as possible in the city-­ state households. The act of property distribution was an act of class propagation. To distribute was to create because to endow a family with a household was to birth a new family belonging to the middle class.

(b) Justice Generating a new constituent of the middle class was an act of justice for three reasons: (1) proportion; (2) stability; (3) proportional equality.

1. Proportion The distribution of property was proportionate, or properties allotted to families by the city-state were equivalent, or all dispersed properties were in the mean. None of the allocated properties were of a size disproportionately large to the other properties given to other families. None of the allocated properties were so inequitable as to give rise to a member of the Oligarchy.

2. Stability The generation of a dominant middle class was simultaneously the begetting of political stability. The middle classes were not motivated by anger, avarice, jealousy, and so engendered a peaceful and well-balanced social structure.

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3. Proportional Equality Previous paragraphs in this chapter documented that Aristotle did not believe in equality. However, he was an advocate of proportionate equality. The private property possessed by the middle class was modest, but not equal. Rather, the properties held were equivalent, or fell within the mean. Limited differences in the properties possessed was Aristotle’s understanding of proportionate equality. The owners of property were all equal in that they all possessed unequal, within limits, shares of property. Proportionate equality was the socioeconomic principle of a Republic. Although the Republic best represented the union between politics and ethics, it was not the sole form of the state Aristotle identified. In The Politics, he isolated three additional forms of state and these were Monarchy, Oligarchy, and Dictatorship. Aristotle rebuked both Monarchy and Oligarchy because they empowered a small number of citizens with legislative power. Monarchical government gained legitimacy because of its appeal to the abundance of property. Oligarchy gained legitimacy because of the power of money. A small number of families who gained exorbitant wealth due to chrematistics were able to exploit their riches and gain dominant legislative power. The prevailing ethical principle of Oligarchies was avarice and limitless acquisition, and Aristotle denounced the moral corruption of Oligarchies. Aristotle also denounced Democracy and did so on two grounds. First, the population in democracies were mostly subject to poverty and this inclined them to unrest and violent actions. Poverty-stricken democracies were the most likely candidates for political revolutions and as earlier pages indicated Aristotle firmly opposed political insurrections. Dictatorship existed in Greece, but prior to the lifetime of Aristotle. Dictators in ancient Greece did not stem from the tradition of Monarchy or Aristocracy because Dictators were elected and their tenure in office rested upon the assent of the population. Tyranny was the nature of government instituted by the Dictator, but they were elected by the citizens of the polis for the purpose of overcoming a temporary political crisis. Aristotle presented a historiography of state forms. The four modes of states depicted by Aristotle were products of socioproductive conditions.

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Democracies were the outcome of productive depression, of the poverty of the majority. Republics were results of productive prosperity and the wide distribution of property. Oligarchies emerged from the monopolization of property among a minority of the population, or a situation in which wealth was dominance. Monarch was also the consequence of the superiority of wealth. Within the limited parameters of the chapter it is impossible to trace the historical evolution of the ethics-politics fusion from Aristotle until Marx. However, the thesis advanced here regarding the continuity of the ethics-politics fusion connecting Aristotle and Marx will be strengthened by a slight detour. It will add to the substantiality of this argument if Hegel is allowed entrance into the analysis. Hegel was influenced by Aristotle. Hegel did influence Marx. Hegel was a connecting link between Aristotle and Marx. Hegel’s The Philosophy of Right is an analysis of this ethics-politics fusion.23 The third part of this book is a study of ethical life and Hegel traces the development of ethics in a three-stage process: the family, “civil society,” and state. Preceding his analysis of ethical life Hegel included a chapter on morality. Although the search for the good experiences its origin in the single individual, morality, it is only in human and sociopolitical interactions that the value of ethics experiences its genesis. For Hegel, as for Aristotle, ethics is only a feature of a social-political environment, family, and “civil society,” and it only reaches its fulfillment in the state. Hegel presented a historiographic view of ethics. The nature of ethics altered depended upon the historical period in which it was located. Hegel believed in a theory of historical forms, all sociophilosophical phenomena were determined by the historical period and circumstances in which they were situated by time. History was the eternal clock and the hours on the clock were similar to forms, or modes, or they were shapes shaped by their place in time. Morality was a mode that corresponded to an essentially pre-social form of existence. Ethics was a creation of the

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1942), pp. XIII–XIV. 23

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temporal arrival of the social. The state was the apex of the social and the ethicopolitical. The transformation of ethical modes was ultimately caused by historical evolution, but the ultimate force of social determination did not negate the existence of any substance in the begetting of ethics. For Hegel, the substance of morality and ethics was human will. To become ethical the will must be contoured by the social. Hegel was not an advocate of natural rights theory. He did not believe in the natural rights theory of Locke, Hume, or Rousseau. Nature did not implant an indestructible right in every being. Conversely, rights and ethics were consequences of the human will. Rights were the manifestation of the human will once humans evolved into social beings. Will was the primary substance while right was a historical product of the exertions of this potency. The primacy of the will in Hegel was an expansion of his dedication to the principle of subjective activity. When Hegel sought to explain all forms of species, or social motivation, he located the point of origin in subjective activity. In this respect also Hegel was influenced by Aristotle. In The Philosophy of Mind, Hegel wrote: “The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussion on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole work of philosophical value on this topic.”24 Hegel praised Aristotle so profusely because in his book, Aristotle placed subjective activity as the cause of all societal movement. Aristotle described the causal equation as the progression from actual to potential, the purity of actual desire to the modifications necessary for the realization in the potential. Hegel altered Aristotle’s equation of the actual-potential and substituted the concept of will. Just as Aristotle used actual-potential to describe subjective activity, so Hegel employed will to describe subjective activity. The stage of “civil society” played an enormously important role in Hegel’s theory of socioproductive teleology that lay between family and state. Just as Aristotle wrote on “social life,” or “civil society,” so Hegel understood the evolutionary importance of “civil society.” In Hegel, “civil society” was that socioproductive mode which switched from human 24

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. Miller (Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1971), p. 3.

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need to the satisfaction of these needs by capitalism and manufacturing, and the inception of “civil society” organizations devoted to justice, such as the police, legal courts, and social corporations. Just as Aristotle in his The Politics pictured a stage of socioproductive telos just prior to the emergence of the state, so Hegel in his The Philosophy of Right pictured a stage of historical evolution that was a social mode that predated the state. The concept of “civil society” ran from Aristotle to Hegel and was an indispensable inheritance of Marx. Marx’s theory of communism could not exist without “civil society.” Aristotle and Hegel set the stage for communism in its Marxist form. Even though Aristotle and Hegel agreed on the centrality of the ethicopolitical they were separated by disagreements over the mode of the state. Aristotle was a Republican, but Hegel was a Monarchist. Aristotle sought a state in which the predominant class was a middle class, based on the ownership of a moderate amount of property, while Hegel campaigned for the continuation of Aristocracy. Whereas Aristotle looked upon large class divisions as the source of political revolutions, Hegel argued for the perpetuation of large class divisions based upon the possession of bureaucratic expertise. While Aristotle favored the rotation of government positions which would allow the middle class to alternate in government offices thus expanding the idea of citizen participation, Hegel advocated a system in which skill and proficiency were the prerequisites for bureaucratic activity. Simultaneous with these areas of difference were areas of agreement. Both supported the private ownership of property. Neither favored a democratic state. Both were sensitive to the plight of the impoverished. Hegel supported the governmental policies to relieve the distress of the poor. He was an early advocate of Bismarckian social welfare policies. Aristotle supported the virtue of liberality, privately subsidized charity, in which the more prosperous Athenian voluntarily donated money so sustenance could be distributed to the poverty stricken. However, Classical Greek Humanism was a philosophical program larger than the ethicopolitical. If one just speaks of the ethicopolitical the line of evolution runs from Aristotle-Hegel-Marx. But if one enlarges the perspective, if one speaks of Classical Greek Humanism, the line of influence runs directly from Aristotle to Marx. If one seeks to account for the

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rebirth of Classical Humanism in Marx, the major thesis of this book, then it is necessary to draw a direct line, excluding Hegel, from Aristotle to Marx. My discussion of Marx’s resurrection of Classical Greek Humanism is divided into the following eleven parts: (1) Naturalism; (2) Man as a social animal; (3) Needs; (4) Civil Society; (5) Government; (6) State; (7) Classes; (8) Constitution; (9) Citizenship; (10) Marx’s Revaluation of the Production-Distribution Calculus; (11) How the Civic Humanist Tradition continued into Marx.

1. Naturalism Aristotle was an advocate of naturalism, or the belief that the human species was one part in the whole anatomy of animal existence. Aristotle anticipated Darwin because he saw the human species as a part of the total evolution of animal life. In his major work on “The Soul,” the work Hegel considered a masterpiece, Aristotle wrote: “Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.”25 Further on in “The Soul,” Aristotle repeated his theme of naturalism: “That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.”26 From the biological perspective, the human species was a part of the totality of animal existence. Since the human species was biologically a member of animal existence this supplied Aristotle with the anatomical justification to designate humankind as naturalistic. The single feature separating humans from the remainder of the animal species was the Soul. The Soul supplied the human animal with “the power of self-­ nutrition, sensation, thinking and motivity.”27 Aristotelian naturalism was far removed from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materialism. While Aristotelian naturalism  Aristotle, “The Soul”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 555. 26  Ibid. 27  Ibid., p. 558. 25

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understood the human species as inherently active, as instinctively interacting with its environment, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materialism was absorbed in sense impressions and external stimuli. Materialism positioned humankind as reactive, as responsive to external stimuli. According to materialism it was sense impressions caused by external forces that brought about human activity. Naturalism presented a different picture. The interaction between the human species and the external world was engendered by the innate capacity of the species for self-motivation. In describing the interaction between the species and the external, Marx applied the metabolic image. Humans required food to sustain themselves and so an exchange between the species and nature was necessary for the acquisition of food. The relation between acquisition and nature was founded on a productive model. Marx portrayed this productive relation between the human and nature as a metabolism, as an action of intervention with nature which returned sustenance to the human. Metabolism was the essence of Marx’s anthropology.

2. Man as a Social Animal Marx was in total agreement with Aristotle regarding the inherent sociability of the human species. This element of Classical Humanism was reinforced in the nineteenth century in the work of Ludwig Feuerbach who exerted a great influence on the young Marx. A line of evolution regarding the inherent sociability of the human species ran from Aristotle to Feuerbach to Marx. Aristotle replaced political theory with anthropology. Aristotle rejected the vocabulary of natural law and natural rights which supported the claims of possessive individualism. Adopting the language of anthropology, Aristotle exercised the vocabulary of need, and need was the instinctual foundation of sociability. Need was vacancy and vacancy could only be fulfilled by the input of an other. This input was the substance of sociability.

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3. Needs Previous paragraphs documented that Aristotle divided the process of production into two parts: the art of the household and the art of acquisition. In The Politics, he offered a critique of the art of acquisition because it was solely designed for the greatest possession of wealth and was the productive foundation of unethical behavior. The prioritizing of needs also assumed ethical status. Whereas the art of acquisition was driven forward by the excess of greed, the productions of the household was an expression of the temperate. The household was inherently moderate and the mean for Aristotle was the guarantee of virtue. Following Aristotle, Marx also advocated the end of natural right and its replacement by need. According to Marx, to distribute in terms of rights inevitably led to inequality because the talents of the producers differed. Because the output of individuals were unequal in accordance with the inequality of talent to distribute in terms of rights invariably led to inequality in distribution because those of greater talent would have more rights to acquire because of their greater productivity. In two works from his later period, Marx advanced his theory of distribution in terms of need, rather than rights. In his “Critique of the Gotha Program” Marx wrote: “Secondly, whatever is dedicated to the collective satisfaction of needs, like schools, health service, etc. In comparison with present day society this part will expand significantly from the outset, and will grow proportionately as the new society develops.”28 Just as Marx invented a new form of the process of production, he also invented a new mathematics for distribution.

4. Civil Society Previous paragraphs in this chapter acknowledged that Aristotle never used the term “civil society.” However, Aristotle did employ the term “society,” and he defined “society” in exactly the same form that the age  Marx, K., “Critique of the Gotha Program”, Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2006), p. 212. 28

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of Adam Ferguson, Hegel, and Marx defined “civil society.” The characteristics which Aristotle assigned to “society” were in perfect correspondence with the characteristics which Ferguson, Hegel and Marx ascribed to “civil society.” This book will use the term “civil society” when describing Aristotle’s version of “society,” and this discussion of Aristotle’s “civil society” will be divided into two parts: (a) History of Subordination; (b) The Introduction to the Process of Production.

(a) The History of Subordination Aristotle recognized that classes were constituents of “civil society,” and that classes could either be cooperative or develop antagonism and frequently form the troops of revolution. Aristotle was an originator of the class analysis of societies, states, and revolutions. Subordination for Aristotle was modeled on a master-slave paradigm, which began a centuries-long migration out of Humanist Athens and found a nineteenth-century home in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit. In chapter two of that masterpiece, “Self-Consciousness,” Hegel wrote about “Lordship and Bondage.”29 Hegel used the master-slave imagery of Aristotle to present a graphic of the struggle of consciousness to freedom, or “lordship.” Freedom, or independence, or “lordship,” was the moment at which a Self achieved its independence when it freed itself from the control, “bondage,” to another consciousness. The master-slave paradigm also found a nineteenth-century dwelling in the work of Marx, who applied Aristotle’s vision to capitalist domination. Whereas Hegel applied the master-slave model to the evolution of consciousness, Marx applied this model to the process of production. Marx’s transformation resulted in presenting the proletariat as the slave and the capitalist as the master. For Aristotle the master-slave relationship experienced its origin in the human Soul. In his essay, “The Soul,” Aristotle outlined his theory of subordination. The human Soul was composed of three parts: animal, nutritive, rational. The rational part was superior and therefore the  Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology Of Spirit, trans. A.V.  Miller (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1977), p. 111. 29

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rational was privileged with the power to rule. Since the rational was superior to the animal and nutritive it claimed the right to govern the other capacities. Aristotle’s theory of subordination was justification for his defense of slavery. However, the slavery he validated was not the slavery of the cotton plantation, but the obedience of the household servant. The enslavement Aristotle approved was the domination of the household male over the household servant, and this household subordination was just because the household male had greater intelligence than the household servant.30 Previous paragraphs in this chapter documented that Marx read Aristotle’s The Politics. In Book I, Chapter 3 to 6 of The Politics, Aristotle outlines his justification for household slavery, the historical master-slave relationship.31 Aristotle placed geographic boundaries around slavery, limiting this form of labor to the “civil society” environs of the polis. In his “Notes on Adolph Wagner” written between 1879 and 1880, Marx demonstrated his knowledge of Aristotle’s The Politics by offering a brief critique of Aristotle’s theory of slavery. Marx wrote: “—while on the contrary, Aristotle erred by having considered the slave economy as non-­ transitory.”32 Marx considered Aristotle’s interpretation of slavery to be incorrect because Aristotle circumscribed it within the walls of the polis and did not foresee that slavery could be imperialized into geographic areas around the globe as was proven by nineteenth-century colonialism.

(b) The Introduction to the Process of Production The first stage of Marx’s references to Aristotle occurs in his 1837 letter to his father in which he stated that he translated Aristotle’s “Rhetoric.”33 The next stage occurs in his 1840 doctoral dissertation, On the Differences  Aristotle, “The Soul”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 554–557. 31  Aristotle, “The Politics”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 1130–1134. 32  Marx, K., “Notes on Adolf Wagner”, Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2006), p. 232. 33  Marx, K., “Letter to His Father”, Marx-Engels-Werke, Band I, Seite. p. 59. 30

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Between the Democritean and the Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.34 In his doctoral dissertation, Marx critiqued the atomic theories of Democritus and Epicurus and consequently this second stage of his relation with Aristotelian was concerned with Aristotelian physics and natural science and in this regard Aristotle’s Metaphysics played the largest role. However, after receiving his doctoral degree the interests of the young Marx shifted from atomism to the pneumatology of labor and this shift contoured Marx’s third stage of Aristotelian study. Marx’s immersion into the pneumatology of labor occurred in the late 1850s as he began to generate his theory of capitalism and so his third stage of Aristotelian immersion concentrated upon Aristotle’s writing on the process of production. Since Aristotle’s writings on the process of production finds its most articulate expression in The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics, these are the books of Aristotle that Marx most frequently refers to during the period of the formation of his theory of capitalism. Another book of Aristotle was The Metaphysics, but The Metaphysics most decisively influenced Marx’s theory of human action and this subject will be dealt with when discussing Marx’s theory of labor. At this point, since the discussion focuses upon analyzing the influence that Aristotle exercised on the development of Marx’s pneumatology of labor, it is necessary to concentrate on The Nicomachean Ethics, and particularly The Politics. Aristotle’s most detailed excursions into the process of production are contained in The Politics. In Chapter One of The Politics Aristotle summarized his theory of the process of production. Marx’s acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Aristotle in terms of his introduction to the process of production was most clearly expressed in August 1861. In that year, Marx was in the process of outlining Das Kapital. As part of this process Marx jotted down thoughts and ideas in many notebooks. In his August 1861 notebook “Capital in General,” Marx made the following comment on Aristotle’s The Politics: “At this point my presentation is the most indebted to the works of Aristotle in  Marx, K., “On the Difference Between The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, Marx-Engel-Werke, Band 40, Seite 16–373. *For further discussion of Marx on Democritus and Epicurus see Norman Levine, Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin (Palgrave Macmillan; Basingstoke, 2016), pp. 108–118. 34

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The Politics, Chapter I, Part 9.”35 Chapter One of The Politics contained Aristotle’s most complete exposition on the nature of production and chrematistics. Aristotle drew a distinction between production and chrematistics. Production concerned the workings of the household, while chrematistics concerned the procurement of money. Production was concerned with the provision of sustenance, ensuring the preservation and well-­ being of the family, while chrematistics was directed at the acquisition of greater amounts of profit. Aristotle also recognized that an object of production, in the context of family, tribe, village, or polis, assumed two capacities. The producer of a coat manufactured an object which contained a use. The use of a coat was to keep a person warm. In addition, a coat could be used in exchange. In the context of a family, tribe, village, or polis, a person other than the producer of the coat would have a need for the coat and wish to buy the coat from the producer. This act of purchase was a manifestation of exchange.36 The creation of exchange also originated retail trade.37 By retail trade Aristotle meant the generation of a profit for the producers. If the producer could exchange a coat, sell the coat for more money than was needed for its production, this exchange produced a profit. In order for exchange to take place a medium of exchange was necessary. A measure was required by which to evaluate the object of exchange and this measure was money. The measure established equivalence. Once the measure of equity was established exchange was simplified because the calculation of equivalency was facilitated. The concept of value was another important outgrowth of the retail trade and money. In order to calculate the measure of exchange, in order to equate the proper balance between cost of production and purchase, a concept of value was necessary. Value became a synonym of measure, value was a calculus which permitted the construction of equivalence,  Marx, K., “Verwandlung von Geld in Kapital”, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (Dietz Verlag; Berlin, 1976) Ban II, 3.1, p. 16. 36  Aristotle, “The Politics”, The Basis Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 1137, 1139. 37  Ibid., p. 1138. 35

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and the retail trade was enormously benefited by the concept of value, as exchange could grow when equivalence was more easily attained.38 Aristotle was suspicious of all these tools of chrematistics. Use, exchange, the retail trade, money, value were all strategies for chrematistics and Aristotle’s suspiciousness toward them arose because the goal of all was wealth and accumulation. Moreover, the two worst chrematistic strategies were usury and interest. These two chrematistic strategies were not accrued in accordance with productivity, but rather in terms of money. In usury and interest money begat money and human interchange was simply negated. In his attack on usury and interest payments, Aristotle sounded like Shakespeare. The Politics prepared the way for Shakespeare’s “The Merchant of Venice” and also laid the basis for Marx’s Das Kapital.

5. Government The productive substructure of “civil society” was the village, and the village was composed of households and retail trading. In order for the production of the household and the chrematistics of the retail trade to operate some form of social organization was necessary. Examples of these social organizations were the police, or courts. The police was the agency whose purpose was the prevention of, or punishment, for crimes. The courts were the agency which upheld the laws, which determined whether an individual action adhered to, or broke the law. The police and the courts preserved the peacefulness of “civil society.” A community came into existence when agencies for peace and lawfulness were formulated. A community was formed when the inhabitants of the village lived cooperatively. A synonym for cooperative community was the commune. A “civil society” was the commune. Government was a product of “civil society” since an agency was required to supervise the police and courts. Furthermore, an additional agency was needed to supervise the productive and chrematistic activities of the commune. The aggregate of these administrative bureaus was government, or  Ibid.

38

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government was the authority which preserved the cooperative ethos of the commune. Governance was a need of the commune, but government was distinct from the state.

6. State The state inherited government from “civil society.” Government was a necessary precondition for the existence of both “civil society” and state. The disappearance of the state still allowed both government and “civil society” to exist. Government and “civil society” were not dependent on the state, rather the state was an expression of government and “civil society.” The uniqueness of the state in contrast to “civil society” was ethics. The state was not only an amalgamation of all the functions of “civil society” but also a symbol of the highest ethical principles. The state was a realization that the inherent social nature of the species could eventuate in ethical life. Aristotle maintained that the purpose of life was ethical existence and also recognized that the individual could not attain ethical being unless that life was in an ethical state. The Politics contains these sentences: “It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sale of exchange:—The end of the state is the good life—Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship.”39 The issue of the state constituted a dividing line between Marx and Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle called for the perpetuation of the state because it nurtured ethical activity, Marx called for the overthrow of the state because it was an instrument of class oppression. The disagreement over the nature of the state did not mean that Classical Humanism did not survive in Marx. As later paragraphs in this monograph will demonstrate Classical Humanism was a defining principle in Marx’s communism, but he needed to find a political instrument different than the state 39

 Ibid., pp. 1139–1140.

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which would supply the governmental apparatus to nurture the ethics of Classical Humanism in his communist society. Marx located this government apparatus in “civil society.” Communism meant both “civil society” and government and it was these two societal organizations which would act as the incubator for the rebirth of the virtues of Classical Greek Humanism.

7. Class Class played a vital role in Aristotle’s political science. He was one of the first to recognize that class was determined by property. A defender of the rights of property, Aristotle focused on the relationship between four social classes and the degree of property owned. In diagnosing the relationship between property and class, Aristotle delineated four types of classes: Monarchy, Oligarchy, Republic, and Democracy. The Monarchical class combined royal title and large possessions of property. This class associated a royal bloodline and disproportionate degrees of property. The Oligarchic class did not possess a royal bloodline, but it did possess disproportionate degrees of property. Since the power of the Oligarchic class derived from property, the Oligarchic class was devoted to chrematistics. A Republic was a form of government in which the middle classes controlled the reigns of power. Aristotle preferred a class structure in which ownership derived from moderate degrees of property. Aristotle believed that classes arising from the ownership of moderate proportions of property formed a middle class and that middle classes were politically moderate. Aristotle preferred Republics because they were most in accordance with the virtue of temperance and mean. Consequently, Republics were most closely associated with the ethical. Democracy was admonished by Aristotle. In a Democracy, the majority of the population did not possess property. Since they did not possess property they did not possess the virtue of moderation. The unpropertied majority in a Democracy was inclined to social upheaval, to revolution as a means of obtaining property and therefore political rights.

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8. Constitution The constitution was the written procedures of the state and “civil society.” The destruction of the state meant the eradication of the state constitution, but it did not simultaneously entail the destruction of the constitution of “civil society.” Since “civil society” existed independently of the state the destruction of the state and the constitution of the state would still leave “civil society” and the constitution of “civil society” in existence.

9. Citizenship Aristotle’s definition of mankind as a “political animal” was founded on the belief that men must have the opportunity to participate in the administration of the state. Only a man who took an active part in the administration of the state was a citizen, and Aristotle preferred a Republican form of government because it increased the possibility of a citizen to participate in the administration of the state. Only a person who assumed his political obligations was in truth a citizen. Aristotle wrote: “And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office—he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfills our definition of a citizen.”40 Citizenship was synonymous with political participation. Civic participation resulted in two mutually beneficial outcomes: (1) the state received an advantage by the participation of the talented citizen; (2) the citizen gained in honor because of his devotion to the state. As a means of increasing the opportunities for participation, states should adopt the principle of rotation in office. The tenure of office holdings should be brief and this curtailment of the time a citizen would hold an office would increase the availability of rotation. In addition, rotation not only related to the shortening of the tenure of an office but also to the availability of different officers. For example, the rotation of officers could

40

 Ibid., p. 1178.

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mean that the good citizen could serve as a judge, or a legislator, or a police official. Rotation not only referred to duration, but also to vocation. Active involvement in the politics of a community or state was a virtue. Virtue for Aristotle was a strategy, a method of behavior, aimed at the realization of the good. The smallness of the ancient polis made such involvement a more accessible possibility.

 0. Marx’s Revaluation 1 of the Production-Distribution Calculus Marx’s philosophy of communism was based on his reformulation of the production-distribution mathematics. Marx redefined the production-­ distribution equation on an ethical basis. In so doing he totally overturned the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories of natural law and rights. In order to decisively advance this thesis it is necessary to divide this section into the following three subdivisions: (a) Justice; (b) Distributive Justice; (c) Proportionate Equality. After the analysis of Aristotle’s definition of these three terms the discussion will return to Marx as a means of demonstrating how Marx recalibrated the mathematics of the relation between production and consumption.

(a) Justice Aristotle’s definition of justice stands in radical contrast to the concept of justice originating in natural law theory. Whereas natural law prioritized individuality and rights, Aristotle began his speculation regarding justice from the conjecture of the social. Natural law entertained the idea that the human species could live outside of the social, whereas Aristotle began from the assumption that the species was inherently social. Justice in Aristotle was an instrument of social equilibrium and this meant that the execution of justice must be proportionate. Justice was not absolutist, but rather an equivalent. Justice must recognize the equity

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of competing claims and ensure that the legal decisions to be reached were based on a proportionate recognition of these competing claims. Justice was a social instrument to achieve the mean. A society functioning in terms of a mean avoided the extremes of sociopolitical unrest which was the source of social chaos.

(b) Distributive Justice Aristotle employed both the term and the purpose of distributive justice in both his The Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics. In The Politics, he wrote: “And whereas justice implies a relation to persons as well as to things, and a just distribution, as I already said in the Ethics implies the same ratio between the persons and between the things.”41 In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote: “This then, is what the just is—the proportional:—the unjust is what violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly has too much; and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is good.”42 The policy of distributive justice was motivated by a specific purpose. The end toward which it was driven was toward the creation of a majoritarian middle class. Unlike Marx, Aristotle did not believe in expropriating property from the wealthy. Aristotle was not a revolutionary and was opposed to insurrection which would forcibly expropriate property from the aristocracy. Nevertheless, abiding by the execution of justice, Aristotle favored polis policies which directed the distribution of property to as wide a portion of the population of the polis as possible. Wide distribution, the inception of a majoritarian middle class, was just because it was the ground of the good life.

 Ibid., p. 1187.  Ibid., p. Aristotle, “The Nicomachean Ethics”, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 1007. 41 42

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(c) Proportionate Equality In Aristotle, production was subordinate to ethics. The previous discussion of distributive justice concerned the ownership of property and how Aristotle subjected the ownership of property to ethical principles. The term “proportionate equality” was used by Aristotle when he dealt with the problem of exchange. It is important to note at this point that Aristotle’s discussion of proportionate equality was contained in his Nicomachean Ethics. Proportionate equality was composed of two parts: (1) reciprocity; (2) requital of service.

1. Reciprocity Aristotle’s theory of reciprocity related to the exchange of commodities. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote: “But in association for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together—reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal return.”43 In his considerations of the ethics of exchange Aristotle did not rule out profit. It was just for one person in the process of exchange to acquire a profit if his commodity was superior in quality to that object attained by his partner in the exchange. However, the profit must be proportionate, or it must be moderate, it must be temperate.

2. Requital of Service The theory of the requital of service does not deal with the exchange of commodities, but rather with the exchange of service. On this issue Aristotle wrote: “—to promote the requital of services; for this is characteristic of grace—we should serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and should another time take the initiative in showing it.”44  Ibid., p. 1010.  Ibid.

43 44

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Aristotle encouraged the interchange of services. He recognized the inherent sociability of the species and was aware that sociability was predicated on the requital of labor. The requisite entailed the exchange of generosity and friendship and the requital of services was the basis of sociability. Both reciprocity and requital were pillars of the polis. Aristotle wrote: “For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together.”45 But the reciprocity and requital of service were also examples of proportionate equality. However, proportionate equality did not mean that in the exchange reciprocity and requital would be exactly the same quantity of commodities and sociability that were interchanged. Corresponding to Aristotle’s definition of the general concept of equality, proportionate equality meant commodities and sociability which were approximate. Proportionate equality did not mean an absolute equivalence, perfect correspondence, but a moderation of dissimilarity.

 1. How the Civic Humanist Tradition Continued 1 into Marx I will divide this section into two parts: (a) Citizenship, (b) A New Calculus of Production and Distribution.

( a) Citizenship Previous paragraphs discussed the importance of citizen participation. Although Aristotle was not a democrat, he favored a Republic because it was based on a majority of middle-class households. The fact that a polis rested upon a middle-class majority meant that more citizens enjoyed the opportunity to partake in government. Marx’s vision of the highest stage of communist society replicated the Aristotelian vision. The destruction of both the state and class based on possession meant that in the highest stage of communist society the citizenship of the commune would be totally responsible for the legislation and administration of the 45

 Ibid.

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commune. Marx preferred a communal “civil society” because the commune opened opportunities for participation to all citizens. Such participation was an education in ethics for two reasons: it provided an opportunity for the communal citizen to fashion the government of the commune, and this legislative opportunity taught the participants that the unification of ethics and politics could lay within their power. In the early 1870s Marx wrote an essay, which unequivocally stated that participation was a vital constituent of the higher stage of communist society. In 1871 he delivered an address to the International Workingmen’s Association entitled “The Civil War in France,” and the address was a commentary on the Paris Commune of 1871. The Paris Commune served as a model for Marx’s vision of government in the highest stage of communist society. Marx wrote: The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by the universal [manhood] suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time—So were all the branches of the administration. From the members of the commune downwards, the public service had to be done at workmen’s wages—Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the state was laid in the hands of the Commune.46 According to Marx in the Paris Commune the government and administration of Paris was lodged in the citizenship of the proletariat. The Paris Commune served as a model of the highest stage of communism because the government and administration became acts of democratic participation. Proletarian participation was Marx’s definition of the “social republic”47 and the “social republic” was also Marx’s definition of the higher stage of communism. In the “Civil War in France,” Marx defined different forms of republics, the “bourgeois republic,” the “parliamentary republic,” but  Marx, K., “The Civil War in France”, Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2006), p. 184. 47  Ibid., p. 183. 46

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each of these republics were only different forms of class capitalist rule. The only form of republic, which was commensurate with communism, was the “social republic” and the “social republic” was the actualization of universal proletariat citizenship participation. Marx was an embodiment of the civic republican tradition, which ran from Aristotle to Machiavelli to Rousseau. The civic republican tradition was predicated upon the theory of a “civil society,” a fundamental principle in the works of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. Marx differed from Aristotle, Machiavelli and Rousseau in one crucial aspect because he called for the overthrow of the state. The state continued in the works of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau, but Marx’s extinction of the state preserved the existence of “civil society,” and “civil society” was the substructure of the “civil republic,” or universal citizen participation. Marx saw the state as the major barrier to universal citizen participation. In this regard the book by David Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, is extremely relevant. Although Leopold does not include Marx’s doctoral dissertation he does focus on the post-doctoral dissertation works of the Young Marx and perceptively recognizes Marx’s association with the civic republican tradition of Western political theory.48

(b) A New Calculus of Production and Distribution In order for the arguments regarding the continuity of Greek Humanism in Marx to be accurately defined, it is necessary to divide this section into three parts: (1) Communism Versus the Republic; (2) Just Distribution and Proportionate Equality; (3) The Rebirth of Classical Humanism.

1. Communism Versus the Republic Marx was a communist and Aristotle was a Republican. Marx wished to extinguish all property, while Aristotle praised the possession of property because it was the cause of political moderation. In spite of these differences, Marx and Aristotle both possessed a profound ethical concern over 48

 Leopold, David, The Young Karl Marx (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2007).

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the property issue. The fact that they disagreed over the consequences of property did not mean they could not agree on the ethical issue arising out of private ownership. Aristotle’s praise of moderate property did not prevent him from seeing both the political and moral dangers of excessive property. In regard to the excessive degrees of property, Aristotle warned about two political and moral dangers that could result from the extremes of property ownership. One danger arose from the concentration of property and the second arose from the deprivation of property. The monopoly of property was the cause leading to the rise of both Monarchial and Oligarchic governments and both these forms of government witnessed the monopolization of political power in the hands of the Monarchial and Oligarchic classes. Aristotle’s antipathy toward Democracy arose from the fact that he thought the propertiless masses were given to social violence. Their lack of property meant that this propertiless class suffered from envy and anger toward the monopolistic classes and this psychological distress easily exploded into political revolution. Aristotle looked upon Democracy as a political danger because the frustration of masses could quickly explode into violent upheavals. In order to avoid the dangers of the monopolization of property and the deprivation of property, Aristotle had recourse to two politico-­ productive strategies: distributive justice and proportionate equality. These politico-productive tactics were constructed on the expectation that a wider allocation of moderate property would generate a moderate middle class whose politico-productive preferences were temperate, nonradical, socially reciprocal.

2. Just Distribution and Proportionate Equality Marx dealt with the issue of the criteria for productive distribution in his “Critique of the Gotha Program.” In his Critique, Marx not only

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repudiated Aristotle, but also Ferdinand Lassalle, who was the founder of the German Socialist Workers Party in 1875.49 Marx rejected Aristotle’s program for the distribution of productive goods because he did not believe that property should be the substance of distribution. Marx rejected Lassalle’s theory of distribution because he did not believe that equality should be the measure of distribution. Lassalle’s Gotha Program placed labor as the measure of distribution. The calculus of distribution in Lassalle was its quantity of labor expended by the proletariat in their time of production. Marx put forth a decisive critique of Lassalle’s theory regarding the substance of distribution. Lassalle assumed that labor was equal, that each proletariat would contribute an equal measure of time to the labor process. The founder of the German Socialist Workers Party maintained that since the measure of time invested in labor would be equal so the distribution of goods produced by labor would be equal if they were distributed according to the measure of labor contained in the productive process (see note 49). Marx rejected Lassalle’s equation making the quantity of labor time the measure of distribution. Marx’s critique evolved from the fact that he believed that labor time was not a universal standard of equality. Marx maintained that some proletariats were more intelligent than others, that some were stronger than others, more productive than others, and that some were more psychologically inclined to work better in groups and this led to greater cooperation and therefore productivity. Based upon all these differentiations, Marx did not believe that labor was equal in itself and therefore he maintained that the output of labor was not equal. Consequently, Lassalle’s theory of distribution would lead to inequality.50 A synonym for labor in Marx was the word abilities. Like labor, abilities described the productive power of the human species. While labor was a more inclusive term relating to the overall capacities of human productive actions, abilities was a more specific term which focused on the separate human capacities, such as strength, intelligence, creativity,  Marx, K. “Critique of the Gotha Program”, Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2006), p. 213. 50  Ibid., p. 214. 49

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and motivation. Ability was more specific, but the terms labor and abilities were both designations of human productive powers. Inequality existed in both labor and ability. Marx also rejected Lassalle’s idea that equality was the proper measure by which to calculate the degree of distribution. Marx faulted Lassalle for not grasping that the application of a standard of equality to an unequal substance, labor, would only produce an unequal result. Marx recognized that the application of an unequal measure to an unequal substance would result in unequal distribution. The error in Lassalle’s equation was the relativity of the substance, the fact that it was not absolute. Marx also negated the idea that distribution should be executed on the basis of rights. The concept of right according to Marx was a bourgeois invention and therefore was intended to deceive the proletariat. Although right on the surface appears as a universal applicability, on its deeper level, it was individual inequality and the bourgeois arithmetics of unequal distribution.51 Marx’s theory of distribution was based on an absolute standard. In his “Critique of the Gotha Program,” Marx stated his absolute standard: “In a higher phase of communist society, after the subjection of individuals to the division of labor, and thereby the antithesis between mental and physical labor has disappeared; after labor has become not merely a means to live but the foremost need in life; after the multifarious development of individuals has grown along with their productive powers, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the limited horizon of bourgeois right be wholly transcended, and society can inscribe on its banner: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.”52 According to Marx, needs were absolute calculus of distribution, or the distribution of productive goods should be consigned according to the measure of needs. Food, warmth, sleep, clothing, and housing were universal needs; they were unalterable in terms of human survival. The

 Ibid., pp. 214–215.  Marx, K., “The Civil War in France”, Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2006), p. 188. 51 52

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adaptation of needs as the universal measurement of distribution would be a preventative to the fomenting of inequality.

3. The Rebirth of Civic Humanism The collapse of the Roman Empire brought an end to this first period of Classical Humanism. The termination of the Roman Empire brought a thousand-year episode of the Middle Ages, Feudalism, when faith in Christ and the subordination to an Aristocracy supplanted the antique dedication to free self-consciousness. The Renaissance witnessed short-­ lived affirmation of Classical Greek and Roman culture but this was quickly swept away by the Reformation and Luther took unyielding preference over Aristotle and Plato. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were drowned in the Wars of Religion and it was only in the 1641 Peace of Westphalia that the carnage of Faith yielded to the avarice of trade. The seventeenth-century revolution in commerce shifted the center of cultural discourse from religion to the acquisition of wealth. The major cultural trope was no longer the surest way to salvation, but rather the speediest course to wealth and luxury. In this regard the works of C.B. MacPherson and Paul A. Rahe are significant. MacPherson’s book, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism is a study of how seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Political Theory established the dominance of economic greed and individual acquisition. The Political Theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provided the philosophical justification for capitalism.53 In addition the three-volume work of Paul A. Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern is an encyclopedic discussion of the history of political theory from ancient Greece to the American Revolution and Thomas Jefferson. One major theme in this exhaustive study is the revolution against Classical Greece, perpetuated by the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment political speculation.54 In contradiction to the arguments advanced by MacPherson and Rahe three  MacPherson, C.B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). 54  Rahe, Paul, A., Republics: Ancient and Modern (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 3 Vols. 53

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other contemporary students of political philosophy published works outlining the continuity of the ethics of Classical Humanism in modern political discourse. John Pocock’s book The Machiavellian Moment is enormously significant in this regard. He studies the revival of Classical Humanist thought in early sixteenth-century Florentine thought. In particular, Pocock singles out Machiavelli’s The Discourses as an example of how Greek Civic Humanism influenced Italian Renaissance political theory.55 Not only did Pocock reintroduce ancient ethics into the discourse on wealth and virtue, but Pocock also reintroduced Marx. Pocock asserted that concern over ethics and greed were major occupations for Marx. Pocock was one of the earliest scholars to reconnect Aristotle and Marx.56 Another work which reexamined the continuity between Civic Humanism and Marx is Istvan Hont’s The Jealousy of Trade.57 In terms of the Civic Humanist tradition, Hont’s work is an advance beyond Pocock because Hont carries the debate further by showing how Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations was an outgrowth of the productive concerns of the ancient polis. Smith was one of the originators of Liberalism and Liberalism debated the ancient polis’s contradiction between political equality and economic equality. The Wealth of Nations looked upon cosmopolitan trade as the answer to the disparity between political equality and economic equality. Following the tradition of Civic Humanism, Smith recognized the potential antagonism between political and economic equality. However, Smith maintained that cosmopolitan trade would overcome this antagonism. The productive surpluses produced by global commerce would in itself be sufficient to erase any disequilibrium between the political and economic. Prosperity was the dream of Liberalism. The removal of tariffs, the elimination of all tariffs to free trade, would eventuate in sufficient economic largesse as to eradicate any chasm between the political and the

 Pocock, J., The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton University: Harvard University, 2010).  Ibid., pp. 497–504. 57  Hont, I., The Jealousy of Trade (Bellman Press: Harvard University, 2010). 55 56

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productive. Liberalism productivity contained a utopian ideology, the canon that affluence was the solution to all social ills. The utopianism of Adam Smith, as well as the Enlightenment, did not survive the Industrial Revolution. The coming to be of the factory manufacture, the emergence of class conflict, the birth of the proletariat, did not erase the dichotomy between politics and the process of production, but only served to exacerbate them. A warfare of classes annotates the history of the nineteenth century. Consequently, a great divide separated the political and the productive process, or great class divisions proved endemic to capitalism society. The divergence between the political and the process of production was the hallmark of bourgeois society. Bourgeois capitalism was the culminating result of the exploitation of the proletariat. Every age requires a historical prophet and just as Locke was the prophet of the bourgeois revolution, so Marx was the prophet of the proletarian revolution. Just as Locke, even though against his intent, solidified the contradiction between the political and the process of production, so Marx established that the elimination of the disparity between the political and the process of production could only be arrived at by a return to the classical Greek unity of ethics and the process of production. Only after the publication of MEGA II did Marx’s complete attachment to the ethics of Classical Humanism become explicit. Only after the distortions of Plekhanov, Engels, and Stalin were eliminated does Marx’s attempt to define communism as a continuation of Athenian ethics become revealed. A third author who made enormous contributions to the rebirth of Aristotle in Marx is George E. McCarthy. In particular, in two works, Marx and the Ancients (1990)58 and Marx and Social Justice (2017).59 McCarthy painstakingly details the ethical concepts of Aristotle that Marx adopted. However, there are differences between the works of Pocock, Hont, and McCarthy. Whereas Pocock was writing from the perspective of political theory, and Hont was writing from the perspective 58 59

 McCarthy, G.E., Marx and the Ancients (Rowman and Littlefield; Savage, 1990).  McCarthy, G.E., Marx and Social Justice (Haymarket Books: Chicago, 2017).

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of political economy, McCarthy approaches the relationship between Athenian civic humanism and Marxism from a philosophical viewpoint. McCarthy’s book Marx and Social Justice focuses upon the continuity of the Aristotelian philosophical principles of social ethics and distributive justice in Marx. Neither Aristotle nor Marx were advocates of an equality of distribution, but rather of an equivalence of distribution. For Marx, social harmony was the result of the mutuality between needs and abilities, and whereas needs were the universal, abilities were unequal and therefore the distribution of products corresponded to the inequality of abilities. However, this inequality accorded to the mean, the moderate and this inequality equated into the equivalent. In addition, McCarthy’s book Marx and Social Justice correctly evaluates Marx’s evaluation of the Paris Commune of 1871. Within the context of the nineteenth century, the Commune represented Marx’s vision of the highest stage of communism. Insightfully, McCarthy draws attention to this fact and thereby brings clarity as to Marx’s conception of the political structure of a future communist society. Furthermore, David Leopold’s book The Young Karl Marx is a significant contribution to the Marx-Aristotle continuity. Leopold’s study focuses on the early Marx, but does not go further back to Marx’s dissertation, The Differences Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Regardless of this vacancy Leopold was one of the first to recognize that Marx’s vision of a communist society was an evolution out of Aristotle’s concept of “civitas.” Leopold wrote: “a striking (and broadly Aristotelian) picture of the complex co-operation (in pursuit of the common good) which characterizes the political community of the future as both a condition for, and product of, human flourishing.”60

 Leopold, David, The Young Karl Marx, ibid., p. 296.

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One purpose of this chapter is to reveal the latent Marxism embedded in Aristotle’s political philosophy and ethics. Aristotle himself was not a communist, but within the capitalist world of the nineteenth century his theories of politics and ethics were major intellectual forces which directed Marx to embrace communism. Aristotle was the actual and Marx the potential. Aristotle enabled Marx to become Marxism. At this point it is important to note that this present chapter is not my first attempt to present Marx’s political ethics as a continuation of the ethics of Greek Classical Humanism. I draw the reader’s attention to my 2016 book, Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin. Specifically, Chapter Two, “Marx and the Civic Humanist Tradition,” interprets Marx’s political ethics as a continuation of both Aristotle and what I referred to as “The Enlightenment Left.” In Marx’s Rebellion Against Lenin, I focused on the perpetuation of Aristotleian sociopolitical ethics in Marx. Obviously, there were major differences between these two men. Marx sought the extinction of private property, while Aristotle favored the widening of moderate degrees of private property. Marx was a communist while Aristotle was a social democrat. Regardless of these distinctions, Marx continued the Aristotelian © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Levine, Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57035-4_3

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tradition of synthesizing ethics and politics, and ethics was defined as the improvement of the socioeconomic conditions of the majority of the population in either the Greek polis or the modern nation-state. The “Enlightenment Left” represented the rebirth of Aristotelian Humanism in the eighteenth century. The “Enlightenment Left” was represented by Theodore Dezamy, Gracchus Babeuf, Wilhelm Weitling, Gabriel Mably, and Étienne-Gabriel Morelly. The ethical focus of all these men was the creation of social harmony and the chief means of this harmony was the elimination of private property. In terms of property rights, they disagreed with Aristotle. In terms of ethical principles, the gestation of social harmony, and unification, they were eighteenth-­ century children of fourth-century BC Athens. Just as Aristotle was reborn in the “Enlightenment Left,” so Aristotle and the “Enlightenment Left” were resurrected in Marx. The Aristotle-“Enlightenment Left” heritage originated Marx’s rejection of the Hobbes-Locke-Hume Natural Rights tradition. It is impossible to understand Marx’s theory of private property unless one first takes account of his assault on the Natural Law paradigm and the contract tradition. Marx recognized he must overthrow the cosmology of the capitalist-­bourgeois universe. A complete understanding of Marx’s philosophy can only be gained if it is viewed as a negation, a replacement of the capitalist-bourgeois worldview. Rather than in Aristotle, capitalist-bourgeois ideologists located their genealogy in the Stoics. Capitalist-bourgeois theorists also returned to the Ancient Greeks, but their icon was not Aristotle, but the Stoics, in particular, the Natural Law tradition of the Stoics. The Natural Law tradition advanced the belief that universal law existed and that these universal laws were applicable to all humans. One of these universal principles was the doctrine of natural rights, or universal principles that were individualized. The doctrine of individual rights was merely a personalization of universal natural laws. One expression of natural rights theory was private property. Capitalist-­ bourgeois ideology maintained that the principle of natural rights was applicable to the realm of property and that it was a law of nature for property to be possessed by private individuals. Unforeseen by Zeno, the

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law of natural rights became an indispensable justification for capitalist-­ bourgeois individual property. Private property was idealized within the capitalist-bourgeois world. The aim of individual productive process became the possession of increasing degrees of property, or wealth. Acquisition became the motivating end of the process of production. The idealization of rights and property elevated individuality to the highest level of social respect and acknowledgment. The capitalist-­ bourgeois world deified individuality. Individual personhood took precedence over social engagement and consciousness. The Self replaced Aristotle’s social ethics as the highest value. The doctrine of individual success created the separation between the public and private man. Whereas Aristotle sought to unify the individual household with the concern of the public domain, the capitalist-­bourgeois world maximized the separation between the public and private individual. Acquisition only emerged when total concentration was expended on the private. In order to legitimize the rule of private property, the capitalist-­ bourgeois world required scientific justification. A science, a study of society, was needed in order to prove that private property, free markets, and individual acquisition were the necessary presuppositions for a prosperous and improving national society. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the birth of a new science of society, and this science was called Political Economy. Dominating European governmental speculations, the new science of Political Economy maintained that free trade, limited government, private property, and acquisition were all fundamental principles of a well-functioning society. Political Economy provided academic-scholarly validation that the capitalist-bourgeois order was not only justified, but the premise of widening prosperity. Political Economy originated as an authentication of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Marxism can only be fully comprehended when it is seen as a rebellion against the capitalist-bourgeois philosophy and culture. Marx sought an alternative and found this alternative in classical Greek Humanism.

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In order to understand Marx’s recourse to Aristotle, a brief summary of Aristotle’s politics and ethics is required. Only by initially understanding Aristotle will it be possible to understand Marx’s recourse to Aristotle. In addition, subsequent pages in this chapter will also investigate the political philosophy of Hegel, as well as his commitment to the principle of the constitutive subject. Hegel was a transition point in the evolutionary itinerary of Aristotle into Marx. Hegel evaluated Aristotle as the greatest of all ancient Greek philosophers. Hegel was himself influenced by Aristotle and Hegel himself influenced Marx. An examination of Hegel’s evaluation of Aristotle will serve two purposes: (1) illuminate the reception of Aristotle in nineteenth-century Germany; (2) help the reader better understand Marx’s own reception of Aristotle by comparing the consensus and disagreements of Hegel and Marx in their individual interpretations of Aristotle. My discussion of Aristotle will be divided into six sections: (1) The Soul; (2) Property; (3) The Method of Explanation; (4) Family, Tribe, Village, State; (5) Revolution; (6) Ethics.

1. The Soul Aristotle’s essay “The Soul” exerted an enormous impact on Western philosophy. In the Philosophy of Mind, the ethical volume of “The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,” Hegel wrote: “The books by Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole work of philosophical value on this topic.”1 In Aristotle, the Soul was divided into three parts: reason, nutrition, and sensibility. Reason was that part of the soul which inspired thought, which was the spring of the human intellect. The nutritive was that part of the human constitution that activated the appetitive needs of the species. The division of sensibility animated the sense perceptions of sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste.  Hegel, G.W.F.  The Philosophy of Mind, Vol. III, trans. A.V.  Miller (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1971), p. 3. 1

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Aristotle’s characterization of “The Soul” illustrated his adherence to naturalism. He did not portray humankind as a machine. Rather he portrayed the human species as a member of the animal species which initiated interactive involvement with the external environment. Naturalism looked upon the human species as possessing the power of modification, the power of restructuring the external. Aristotle employed the phrase master-slave to describe the relationship between reason and the nutritive-sensible. Reason was the master and the nutritive-sensible was the slave. Aristotle lived in a specific form of a slave society. Slavery was a legal institution in fourth-century Athens. But the form of slavery operative in fourth-century Athens was household slavery, that is, the ruler of the slave was the husband-wife who owned the slave. Athenian slavery was not the planation slavery of the Confederate South. The slave in Athens washed clothing, prepared meals, but did not harvest the cotton during the tropical climate of the southern United States, or the Caribbean, or Cuba. Aristotle took the social reality of household slavery and applied it to the divisions of the Soul. Just like the household’s husband-wife dictated the activities of the household slave, so the power of reason dictated the activities of both the nutritive and the sensible. Aristotle created a new linguistic image. He brought into existence a new cultural analogy that was subsequently employed to describe all conditions of inequality. The master-slave image became the cultural idiom to portray all forms of sociopolitical inequality. Aristotle’s idiom was adopted in the early nineteenth century by Hegel, only Hegel modified the idiom from master-slave to lordship and bondage. In his 1807 The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel chose the phrase “lordship and bondage” to pictorialize the struggle between two selfhoods to achieve “mutual recognition.”2 Whereas Aristotle employed the master-­ slave image to pictorialize the combat of the domination of the Soul, Hegel used the conjunction “lordship and bondage” to visualize the struggle for recognition between two forms of consciousness. Although Hegel focused on the domain of consciousness, he nevertheless found the  Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1977), pp. 111–119. 2

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Aristotelian idiom as a perfect analogy by which to portray the warfare over the reciprocity of recognition. Marx also perpetuated the Aristotelian image. Marx, like Aristotle and Hegel, focused on the issue of domination. But Marx was closer to Aristotle than Hegel in employing the master-slave idiom. Marx’s basic preoccupation was not the theory of consciousness, but with the process of production and politics, therefore akin to Aristotle. Master-slave in Marx referred to the domination of capitalism over wage-labor. Although capitalism did not exist in fourth-century BC Athens, Aristotle was aware of the production-political dimension of the idiom he created. Master-­ slave not only referred to the labor of the slave in the household, but also to the universal question of subordination of all kinds, to submit to the demands of a monarch or an oligarch.

2. Property Property played a central role in Aristotle’s political theory. Property was the determinative agent in Aristotle’s typology of state forms. A full discussion of Aristotle’s theory of property is necessary in order to understand his theories of the state, ethics, and his method of sociohistorical explanation. My analysis will be divided into the following parts: (a) Origins; (b) Forms; (c) Class; (d) Anti-Plato and Marx.

(a) Origins The account Aristotle asserted regarding the origins of property must itself be divided into two parts: form and content. Aristotle lived in an agricultural age. Farming was the major source of productivity. Economic exchange and inter-polis trade existed but they were secondary to agriculture. Within these productive process horizons, property predominantly took the form of farming. Aristotle looked upon the household as the major manifestation of property and the household which surrounded

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the farmer was the agricultural homestead. The content of property was occupation. The ownership of a property belonged to the family that occupied the parcel of land.3 Aristotle did not focus on labor. In an age of agriculture he was concerned with the occupation of a family in a portion of land. He did not experience an age of manufacture and industrial productivity.

(b) Forms For the most part, Aristotle concentrated on the agricultural household. This household was composed of four elements: husband, wife, children, and the slave. The process of production in the household was dedicated to agriculture and was not involved in any form of trade or exchange. Aristotle considered the household as the breeding ground of Athenian civic virtue.4 The term chrematistics was the ancient Greek vocabulary for trade and exchange, involving the transfer of goods from one household to the market. It involved a household purchasing a farming instrument from a household that made farming instruments. The medium of exchange was money and the end of exchange was profit. For the most part, trade for Aristotle meant retail trade, and retail trade encompassed a household totally absorbed in the productive process for profit. Aristotle criticized both exchange and the retail trade on ethical grounds. The ends of the activities of exchange and the retail trade was profit, the acquisition of money. Those activities that were aimed at profit were the grounds of greed and intemperance. The desire for wealth was morally corrupting. Virtue involved temperance and the mean, while the search for wealth involved avarice and limitless self-gratification. The agricultural household was the breeding ground for ethical activity. Even though Aristotle morally denounced exchange and the retail trade, they enlightened him about three economic forms which were  Aristotle, “The Politics”, in the Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (Random House; New York, 1941), pp. 1130–1131. 4  Aristotle, ibid., pp. 1139–1142. 3

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inherited by both Hegel and Marx. The Greek Humanist tradition was the birthplace for the economic forms of use value, exchange value, and value. Use values were objects that were produced to meet a personal or household need. The production of a farming instrument brought forth a use value because the farmer needed that instrument in order to grow wheat. Without this use value the farmer could not supply the polis with food. Exchange values were objects involved in exchange, or the retail trade. The production of jewelry was not a use value but an object to assist in the beautification of the female. Exchange value did not relate to need, but to profit. The woman who paid a large amount of money to acquire jewelry that enhanced her beauty did not produce value, but only produced a profit because she paid an excessive amount of money to the retail trader. In addition to use and exchange, Aristotle also formulated the concept of value. For Aristotle, value was the commensurate. Value was that relationship which formed the equivalent. Trade would not take place unless both traders felt that they received equivalent, proportionate, advantages from the exchange. Value in Aristotle was that which created mutual advantage.5 Aristotle passed the economic form of exchange, use, and value to Marx. Aristotelian and Marxist forms were identical, but the content differed. Aristotle did not provide a content to the concept of value. Equivalence and commensurability were not contents, but only a measure. The content of Marx’s theory of value was labor. Although Aristotle supplied Marx with the forms of exchange, use, and value, he did not supply Marx with the substance of value.

 Aristotle, ibid., pp. 1137–1138.

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(c) Class In Aristotle, property was not only determinative of the form of economic enterprise, but also of social class. Just as the household and chrematistics were determined by property, so also was social class. In Aristotle’s The Politics, social class was defined by the degree of possession of property. That group which was in occupation of the largest proportion of property constituted the monarchical class; the group which was in occupation of the next significant proportion of property, as well as blood lineage, was the aristocracy; and that group which occupied small measures of property was the Republican class. Property and blood lineage not only determined class, but also forms of state. Aristotle maintained that only four basic political structures existed and these political structures originated in class, or the basis of monarchy was the monarchical class, the basis of aristocracy was the domination of the aristocratic class, the basis of a Republic was the control of the middle class, and the basis of democracy were those who were propertyless. The class which Aristotle believed brought the greatest benefit to a political organization were the middle classes. By the term middle class, Aristotle referred to a group within a society that possessed property, but in moderate amounts. Therefore, the moderate class was not consumed with greed, avarice, and the instinct for domination, which corrupted the monarchial and oligarchic classes. The moderate classes who understood the benefits of property were inspired to wish that their neighbor also possessed limited property. The middle class were advocates of social equity. The middle class was Republican. Aristotle did not advocate the abolition of private property. Conversely, he supported the idea of the extension of moderate measures of private property because the occupants of this measure of private property were inclined to favor Republics and not monarchy or oligarchy or democracy.

(d) Anti-Plato and Marx Aristotle’s The Politics was a critique of his contemporary Plato, particularly Plato’s embrace of communism for the elite classes. The governing

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class in Plato’s Republic shared property in common, and Aristotle attacked Plato on this issue. In particular, Aristotle ridiculed Plato’s idea of the communism of wives. Whereas Aristotle negated Plato, Marx negated Aristotle. Aristotle ensured that the issue of communism became a permanent part of the political discourse in the West, it was part of his legacy, but on this issue Marx was Aristotle’s opponent.

3. The Method of Explanation Aristotle’s The Politics was an early expression of comparative political science. In his analysis of states, Aristotle compared the governments of Crete, Sparta, Athens as well as many others. His method of explanation derived in part from comparing different types of government in the expectation that the comparison would reveal the specific and unique characteristics of each state. Aristotle’s method of explanation sought political morphologies.6 Aristotle was not primarily concerned with economic or cultural formations, but concentrated upon political morphologies. Aristotle’s method of explanation extended from morphology to degeneration. Just as Aristotle depicted the primary typologies of state, so his method of explanation permitted him to depict the four forms into which Monarchy, Aristocracy, Republics, and Democracies degenerated. Monarchy declined into the form of tyranny. The basic reason for the deterioration of Monarchy was the monopolization of property. Tyranny occurred when royal families controlled the majority of property in a state.7 A second form of political degeneration was the eclipse of Aristocracy into Oligarchy. This type of degeneration was also caused by the increased concentration of property into a few hands. Oligarchy was not tyranny. In Oligarchy the ruling families were not centralized in a royalty, but rather to a wider class dispersion of wealth.

 Aristotle, ibid., p. 1233.  Aristotle, ibid., pp. 1237–1238.

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The form of decline for Republics was into Democracy. Aristotle was not a champion of Democracy. Aristotle condemned Democracy because it was the rule of those who did not possess property and who were also devoid of an education. Property imposed the virtue of moderation and temperance upon the occupants and consequently those who did not possess property were given over to extremes and radicalisms. Since democracy did not incorporate the virtue of the mean, temperance, it was susceptible to political extremism.8 Aristotle’s awareness of the weaknesses and potential decline of his four morphologies of state did not assume the question of his preference. If Monarchies, Aristocracies, Republics, and Democracies were all susceptible to decline, Aristotle must still propose a typology of state he preferred. The state Aristotle advocated was a moderate class Republic. The occupant of property, because of his concern for his property, was educated to be moderate, to seek the mean in the resolution of problems confronting the state. Property was the breeding ground of moderation. Therefore, one of the aims of the state must be the distribution of property throughout as wide an extent of the population as possible, without universalization. Moderation was the ground of political stability.9 Aristotle was also aware of the political form of a dictator.10 Dictatorship arose out of political chaos, the failure to achieve political moderation. Dictatorships, however, were emergency arrangements. They were chosen to overcome political turmoil. But constitutional limits or boundaries curtailed the Classical Humanist form of dictatorship. First, dictators were elected. Second, their term of office was limited, or when the emergency subsided the dictatorship disappeared. Aristotle’s method of explanation, his analysis of sociopolitical morphologies, was limited to states. In order to recommend the best form of state for Athens, Aristotle first needed to analyze the state forms of Crete and Sparta. But his method of explanation was reborn in the eighteenth  Ibid., pp. 1200–1230, 1239–1248.  Aristotle, “The Rhetoric”, in the Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (Random House; New York, 1941), pp. 1346–1353. 10  Aristotle, The Politics, ibid., pp. 1194–1201. 8 9

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and nineteenth centuries. Aristotle bequeathed a sociological methodology to history. Within the development of Historicism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hegel retained the form, but substituted a different content, or substance. The typologies Hegel investigated were civilizations. The morphologies diagnosed by Hegel were cultural universes, such as the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, the Medieval, and the German.11 But when Hegel studied these cultural morphologies he was concerned with their spiritual content. Hegel perpetuated Aristotle’s method of explanation, he retained the concentration on typology, but he replaced politics with the Idea. Marx also continued Aristotle’s method of explanation. But Marx, following Hegel, retained the quest for typologies, but substituted a different capitalist-bourgeois content. Marx was not primarily concerned with politics, or the Idea, but with the productive process, labor. In Marx, the factor that determined a totality was not politics or the Idea, but human labor.

4. Family, Tribe, Village, State According to Aristotle the state was the final result of a four-stage evolutionary process. The state was a historical product, a synthesis of various social forces. The primary force in the evolution of the state was the human instinct for association. In The Politics, Aristotle wrote: “and that man is by nature a political animal.”12 However, the term “political animal” should be translated as social animal. In another section of The Politics, Aristotle wrote: “A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature.”13 The essential quality, the fundamental instinct, which Aristotle ascribed to the human species, was its need for sociability.

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956).  Aristotle, The Politics, ibid., p. 1129. 13  Ibid., p. 1130. 11 12

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Before proceeding to Aristotle’s four-stage theory of the development of the state it is necessary to clarify my usage of the term “civil society.” Aristotle never used the phrase “civil society.” The closest he came to the use of “civil society” was his reference to “civic life” in Book I, Chapter Five of The Politics.14 But Aristotle does use the word “society” and I made the decision to replace his “society” with “civil society.” I did this for two reasons: (1) to draw attention to the fact that Aristotle recognized that the state was not eternal, that forms of social existence pre-dated the genesis of the state; (2) to underline the fact that a line of continuity existed between Aristotle’s “civil society” and the eighteenth- and nineteenth-­century explorations of the concept of “civil society.” The ancient concept of “society” remained a factor in the political theory of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Enlightenment. Marx is rendered more explicit by the renaissance of this Aristotelian concept. The first stage was the family. The family was the outgrowth of the psychology of association. The instinct of association drew male and female together and their association was the birthplace of children and the household. The second stage of the evolution of the state was tribal existence. This level appeared because of the gravitational pull of association. Household productivity improved when families lived together in a cooperative alliance. The division of labor came into existence within the tribe and some families specialized in hunting and fishing, while other families concentrated on agriculture. The third stage was the emergence of the village. The Politics described the genesis of the village in the following terms: “But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than a supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village.”15 The village was “the first society” or in the language of the Enlightenment, the first “civil society.” Aristotle recognized that a “civil society” existed prior to the state. In addition, villages, the division of labor, required some form of government and legal rules, and government and law came into being in a pre-state “civil society.” 14 15

 Ibid., p. 1128, 1188, 1171.  Ibid., p. 28.

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The fourth stage of evolution culminated in the state. The Politics described the coming into being of the state in the following terms: “When several villages are united in a single community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them and the nature of a thing is its end.”16 When Aristotle wrote “that the earlier forms of society are natural” he affirmed that government and laws were operative prior to the state. Government and constitution were not dependent on the state and government and constitution were functioning parts of “civil society” which preexisted the state. Government was the institutional structure of a state. Government was the procedures of the state and the state’s movement to the ethical. Constitutions were the rules of a government. Constitutions were written instructions on the activities of government. Government and constitution were co-dependent. States were also evolutions out of the government-constitution. States would not exist without government-constitution, but states had a separate existence independent of government-constitution. The extinction of the state would not automatically mean the extinction of government and constitution. The extinction of the state meant that “civil society,” the village, would continue to exist and since “civil society” was dependent on government and constitution, these two forms would also continue to function in a pre-state “civil society.”

5. Revolution Another inheritance Aristotle passed down to Marx was the recognition of, and analysis of, revolution. Aristotle did not live in an industrial age, but an agricultural one. The proletariat had not yet appeared in history. Consequently, when Aristotle identified class as the primary agent of  Ibid., p. 1129.

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revolution it was necessary for him to identify a class other than the proletariat as the engine of revolution. The primary cause of this class warfare was a sense of social inequality. The primary reason for this sense of social inequality was the inequality of property. A revolutionary class arose in the Greek polis when members of the aggrieved class felt their possession of property was decreasing while the property of the Oligarchs and Monarchists grew. Aristotle was not a defender of equality. Instead, he advocated for equity. Equality meant that all families in the polis should have the same degree of property, whereas equity meant that families in the polis should possess proportionate distribution in terms of the commensurate degrees of property. In The Politics, Aristotle wrote: “Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion— for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion.”17 Aristotle recognized that different forms of states were subject to different forms of revolution. Revolutions in Democracies were a different species than revolutions in Oligarchies. The ideological nature of Democracies rendered them more prone to political upheavals. Democracies advocated the ideology of equality. The ideology of equality held that every male was equal, meaning that every male should enjoy the same numerical degree of political, social, and economic powers. This ideology fomented revolution. Uprising occurred because the demos turned to class warfare as an instrument to attain the numerical equality of political, social, and economic powers. Aristotle’s diagram of the democratic revolution was easily applicable to the age of the proletariat. The causes of revolutions in Oligarchies did not concern the struggle over equality, but over jealousies. In The Politics, Aristotle described the Oligarchical typology of revolution in the following terms: “Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts: either a) he practices upon the oligarchs themselves for, although the oligarchy are quite small in number, there may be

17

 Ibid., p. 1234.

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a demagogue among them—; or b) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people.”18 In addition to inter-Oligarchic rivalries, Oligarchic revolutions arose from the unquenchable desire for the increase in power. Oligarchic revolutions could be vehicles for the transition of a state from an Oligarchy to a Tyranny. The corruption of power could act as the force motivating an Oligarchy to eliminate all other contenders and become an individual tyrant. Aristotle was aware that race could also be a cause of revolution. Race could replace property as the drive for equality and the corruption of power. Aristotle wrote: “Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit; − Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution.”19 As someone who looked upon the state as the apex of ethical institutions, Aristotle condemned revolutionary activity because they could lead to the destruction of the state. Therefore significant sections of The Politics were devoted to the outlining of antidotes to revolution. Predominantly, Aristotle settled upon two strategic immunizations against revolutions. First, a large moderate class was the primary immunization against revolution. Middle classes were temperate, moderate, and not consumed by jealousy or ambition. Generally, the middle classes were well educated and intellectually were aware of the blessings of a cohesive, integrated state. Since the state was indispensable to an ethical mode of existence, to good citizens, and the support of friendship, the middle classes were predisposed to support the state. However, the middle class was the product of a prior social condition. Private property was the precondition of the middle class. Private property created class and the extension of private property to as wide a dimension of the population as possible would bring into existence a middle class which was desirous of political stability, and this was Aristotle’s anti-revolutionary strategy.  Ibid., p. 1242.  Ibid., p. 1237.

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6. Ethics Ethics in Aristotle meant the unity of the public and private man. In the capitalist-bourgeois world, the focus is on the Self, the gratification of the needs and wishes of the I.  However, in the Classical world of fourth-­ century BC Athens, Aristotle designated the ethical as a life devoted to achieving the synthesis between the personal and the civic. The Aristotelian synthesis lived on in the thought of Marx. In fourth-century BC Greece, the private man was the “zoon oikonikon” and the public man was the “zoon politikon.” The” zoon oikonikon” was the private man because it referenced the head of the household, the male laboring to produce sustenance for his wife and children. The “zoon oikonikon” was the moderate property owner of the Republic. The “zoon politikon” was the public man, the agent who was actively engaged in administering the government of the polis. The “zoon oikonikon” and “zoon politikon” were two distinct aspects of human psychology. Aristotle advocated for their unity. The unity of the “zoon oikonikon” and the “zoon politikon” was an ethical act because it was a bridge allowing the polis to become a Republic, the highest form of government. In order to present an accurate account of Aristotle’s ethics of the unity of the public and private it is necessary to provide a detailed exposition of his ethical philosophy. Athens in the fourth century BC had a population of approximately 500,000. Half of this population were slaves, leaving the citizen population to about 250,000. However, half of this citizen population were females who were excluded from political participation and because of these two subtractions the number of citizens, males, who were empowered to enter into political activities was limited to approximately 125,000. If the functions of the Athenian state were to continue, the political involvement of the male citizen was indispensable. In addition, from the point of view of philosophy, if the Republican form of the state was to survive, a form of government Aristotle championed, the involvement of the male citizen was a condition of survival. Furthermore, there were the military needs of the polis. Slaves and women could not enter into the military and consequently the armed forces could only be staffed

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by the citizens, or male. The theory of the unity of the public and private man was a recognition of the required human resources necessary for preservation of the Republic. Taking into account the numerical resources needed for the preservation and administration of the polis, Aristotle rejected the idea that an ethical life could be achieved through the medium of self-gratification. The Nicomachean Ethics was filled with criticisms of greed and avarice. Aristotle denounced all forms of excess. Pleasure was not defined as the excessive.20 Recognizing that pleasure was a physiological need of the human animal, Aristotle did not seek to extinguish the need for pleasure. In addition, he did not wish to surrender to it. So he adopted a compromise: the mean. The mean meant moderation.21 Aristotle recognized that temperance was an initial step toward ethical existence.22 By temperance Aristotle meant the intermediate. Temperance was the mean, or the mean was that guide which allowed the individual to control his impulses. The critical element in Aristotle’s theory of the mean was the concept of proportion. A synonym for the mean, proportion, meant an equivalent, the comparable. Aristotle’s theory of justice, as I shall explain in greater detail in later sections of this chapter, did not mean absolute justice. When two households contested the ownership of property, justice was achieved when proportionality was upheld. Justice was attained when warring parties received proportionate, equivalent shares of the property over which they were combatant.23 Aristotle’s theory of proportionality meant that he did not believe that justice was equality. He did not believe that every man in the polis should possess equal shares of property. Rather, Aristotle believed in equity, and this meant that citizens in the polis of Athens possessed property in proportionality. To achieve equity meant that citizens must possess commensurable, comparative degrees of property. Equity was not absolute, it was  Aristotle, “The Nicomachean Ethics”, in the Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (Random House; New York, 1941), pp. 980–984. 21  Ibid., pp. 959–963. 22  Ibid., p. 958. 23  Ibid., pp. 1006–1007. 20

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not democratic; but it placed citizens in a symmetrical relationship. In an ideal Republic, citizens owned symmetrical degrees of property. The principle of proportion led into the issue of distribution and the question of distribution itself divided into two categories: the distribution of rewards and the distribution of property. The distribution of rewards related to the rewards assigned to citizens who made a sociopolitical contribution to the polis. For example, a wealthy Oligarch who served in the military should receive from the polis the same reward or recognition as a Democrat, or owner of a single household received for his service in the military. The wealth of the Oligarch should not entitle an Oligarchy to a greater degree of praise and esteem from the polis. The principle of distributive justice, when applied to the recognition of merits, of public acknowledgment, was based on the concept of equality. All men, regardless of social status or wealth, should receive equal degrees of recognition for their civic contribution.24 However, Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice when applied to the issue of property was determined by his political philosophy. In order to understand his theory of distributive justice in relation to property, it is necessary to review his sociological analysis of the causes of stability and instability. Property could be the cause of class warfare. According to Aristotle, the aim of the polis was to create a social class that was politically moderate. Aristotle advocated the moderate and equivalent property ownership because the ownership of property was the basis of political moderation.25 Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice was composed of two parts: strategies and equity. From the strategic perspective, distributive justice was a plan to ensure that the middle classes were determinant. From the perspective of equity, distributive justice meant symmetry, or the possession, not of equal amounts of property, but of proportionate amounts of property. The discussion of distributive justice will be compartmentalized into five parts: (AA) Proportion; (BB) Rectification; (CC) Reciprocity; (DD) Mutual Recognition; (EE) Liberality. 24 25

 Ibid., p. 1006.  Ibid., p. 1006–1007.

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(AA) Proportion Previous sections of this chapter discussed Aristotle’s theory of virtue. For Aristotle virtue was the temperate, the mean. Aristotle made his theory of virtue the foundation of his theory of distributive justice. Just as virtue derived from the mean, so distributive justice evolved out of the mean. One aspect of distributive justice was proportionality. The principle of proportionality meant that property must be distributed proportionately and proportionately meant that the dissemination of property must be conducted toward the end of ensuring that the majority of the population in the polis possessed equivalent degrees of property.

(BB) Rectification A second form of distributive justice was rectification and rectification concerned an exchange which left one actor in the exchange at an extreme and unjustified disadvantage. One agent in an exchange suffered a loss that exceeded the mean. Rectification was an aspect of distributive justice which overthrew the excessive, and reestablished the commensurability of an exchange. Rectification displayed distributive justice in a legal form, as a judgment that the gains and losses resulting from economic exchange must be equivalent.26

(CC) Reciprocity Reciprocity differed from rectification because it is not a corrective, but rather a requital of service.27 Reciprocity was a form of distributive justice because it was a rule of social intercourse affirming that the services, productivity, of an individual would be requited, returned, to that producer

 Ibid., p. 1008–1010.  Ibid., p. 1010–1014.

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in equal measure. Reciprocity was based on a requital, repayment of equal measure to the person who originated the expenditure of a productivity. Aristotle’s theory of reciprocity was an antique anticipation of Marx’s theory of labor. In The Politics, Aristotle wrote: There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker’s work is to that of the farmers work for which it exchanges.28

Aristotle stated that in the exchange between farmer and shoemaker the amount of “work” each producer expended should be equivalent. If the shoemaker expended 10 hours of “work” in the production of shoes, the shoemaker should receive in return the equivalent of 10  hours of work. There should be no expropriation of the time of “work.” Marx’s theory of labor was an exact duplication of Aristotle’s principle of reciprocity. The labor of the proletarian should not be expropriated by a capitalist and turned into profit for the capitalist. If the labor of the proletariat was stolen by the capitalist, the laborer, the originator of value, would not be fully reciprocated for his labor. Only a minor part of his labor would be reciprocated to him and the proletariat would not receive commensurate reciprocity, and would suffer exploitation.

(DD) Mutual Recognition Distributive justice was also embodied in the principle of mutual recognition. The distribution of mutual recognition meant that each citizen of a polis was cognizant of and respected the activities of all other citizens of the polis. Mutual recognition was inseparable from mutual respect, the gratitude each citizen of the polis extended to other citizens of the polis for their contributions to the stability and ethics of the polis. Mutual recognition established the equivalence of citizens. To evaluate the contribution of citizens as mutually significant was a sociopolitical tactic to establish equivalence and social equivalence was the ground of 28

 Ibid., p. 1011.

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social harmony. It was a preventative measure against class antagonism and warfare. Mutual recognition was also an expression of social friendship. In his The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asserted that friendship was not only the greatest bond between male citizens but also one foundation for social justice. Aristotle wrote: For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice and friendship too; at least men address as friends their fellow-voyager and fellow soldiers; and so too those associated with them in any form of community, and the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them.29

(EE) Liberality Aristotle’s concept of “liberality” did not conform to the above four categories of distributive justice. It did, however, conform to his definition of virtue, and it is appropriate to comment on his definition of virtue as “liberality” at this point because it does relate to his political preoccupation of avoiding political instability by increasing social cohesiveness. In his essay Rhetoric, Aristotle wrote: “Next comes liberality; liberal people let their money go instead of fighting for it, whereas other people care more for money then for anything else—liberality disposes us to spend money for others goods—.”30 In Aristotle’s time, the liberal was that citizen who practiced social charity and beneficence. The liberal was that citizen who contributed to social welfare programs. Whereas Marx was a communist, Aristotle was a social democrat. Aristotle advocated the use of public or private money to satisfy the needs of the underprivileged. Liberality was not only ethical, but also a preventative against class warfare. Aristotle was a social democrat because he understood that the removal of the economically impoverished would remove the possibility of insurrection. As a means to overcome the threat of revolution, Aristotle  Ibid., p. 1013.  Aristotle, “The Rhetorics”, ibid., p. 1354. Also see The Nicomachean Ethics, ibid., pp. 984–989.

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recognized the need to provide civic or private finances to abolish the economic deprivations. In the fourth-century BC Athens such a program was referred to as civic liberality, as social ethics, but in the nineteenth century they were referred to as social democracy. Furthermore, Aristotle’s politics was shaped by his ethical principles. The end of politics was ethical existence. The purpose of political thought was to construct a state which resulted in an ethical life, which created the possibility of an ethical being. The Nicomachean Ethics outlined the purpose of The Politics and the process of production. The determining role of ethics was also demonstrated in Aristotle’s analysis of human happiness. One crucial element in Aristotle’s definition of happiness, or human fulfillment, was his doctrine of the unity of the “zoon politikon” and the “zoon oikonikon.”31 The symbiosis of the public and private man was a source of happiness because it was ethical. It was ethical because the synthesis of the public and private man meant that the male contributed to the stability of the polis as well as provided intellectual guidance and control over his wife, children, and slave. The fulfillment of all these roles was the source of happiness for the male because it proved that he lived his life virtuously. Happiness was the result of virtue. In his time, Aristotle sought the unity of these two parts of the human personality. In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment, Rousseau, sought to overcome bourgeois alienation, the complete absorption into “zoon oikonikon,” self-aggrandizement. Rousseau revived Aristotle’s call for the public-psychological unity of the human personality, the marriage of the private and the public as a means of overcoming alienation. Classical Humanism as represented in the work of Aristotle signified the supremacy of the ethical. The ethical was the ultimate end and all other philosophical disciplines were subordinated to the ethical. The pneumatics of labor, household management, political philosophy, must all be fashioned as means to the ethical. This was the challenge Classical Humanism bequeathed to later ages of Western Civilization. The central thrust of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle is the continuity between Aristotle and Marx. In the movement of Greek Humanism into 31

 Aristotle, The Politics, ibid., pp. 1127–1130.

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nineteenth-century Europe, Hegel was a figure of transition. Hegel was greatly influenced by Aristotelian thought, Aristotle was a significant presence in all his writings, and consequently Hegel was a major contributor to the preservation and empowerment of Aristotelian philosophy in the nineteenth century. As a means of highlighting the agreements and disagreements between Hegel and Aristotle this section of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle will be divided into seven parts: (AA) Discontinuity; (BB) Continuity; (CC) Logic; (DD) Method of Explanation; (EE) History; (FF) Associationism; (GG) “Civil Society.”

(AA) Discontinuity For Hegel, Mind was the determining force. Hegel recognized that sense perception was a part of human psychology, he was aware of the evolutionary progress of savage to civilized humankind, but he ascribed the motivating force in this developmental ascent to Mind. Idealism was the philosophy which assigned to Mind the determinate power to shape the external world and thus any comprehension of the external world must begin by first analyzing the powers and motivation of Mind. Aristotle’s Naturalism placed greater emphasis on natural and sociological forces in determining the course of human evolution. In the final analysis, Mind was decisive. But in the process of decision making, it was necessary to account for the roles of biological and sociological conditions. Whereas Hegel saw the human as a particularization of the Idea, Aristotle presented the human as a biological creature, which possessed Mind. The nineteenth-century dispute between Idealism and Naturalism was a continuation of the fourth-century BC dispute between Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle was critical of Plato because Plato’s Idealism, and rather than adopt the Platonic Idea Aristotle embraced the empirical Athenian school of philosophy. Even though Hegel was influenced by the intellectual contributions of Aristotle, he remained a Platonist. Hegel remained loyal to the principle that Idea, although he defined Idea differently than Plato,

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composed the centrality of the human. In the Plato-Aristotle divergence, Hegel proved loyal to Plato. Marx, on the other hand, embraced Aristotle.

(BB) Continuity 1. The Soul Hegel’s high esteem for Aristotle displayed itself in his praise for Aristotle’s essay The Soul. In his The Philosophy of Mind, Hegel wrote: The book of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps, even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books.32

Aristotle’s The Soul is a study of human motivation. It is an attempt to delineate the causes of human action. In his investigation Aristotle delineated three causes for human motivation: (1) mind; (2) nutrition; (3) sensibility. For Aristotle, nutrition and sense perception were important impulses for human action, but the deciding factor was mind. The human soul for Aristotle was a composite of these three agencies. Aristotle offered a pneumatic interpretation of human subjectivity. Although the following pages will analyze additional aspects of Aristotelian thought that Hegel adopted, the Aristotelian heritage that superseded all others was the principle of the constitutive subject. In addition, the most important philosophical principle that Marx adopted from Aristotle and Hegel was also the principle of the constitutive subject. In Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx the notion of subjectivity was raised to a defining philosophical principle. However, the concept of the constitutive subject must be divided into two parts: (a) motivation; (b) substance. 32

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, p. 3.

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All three thinkers, Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx, were all in agreement that the subject was the source of motivation. However, Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx disagreed over the substance of the subject. What allowed the subject to be constitutive? For Aristotle, this substance was The Soul and The Soul was a combination of sensibility, nutrition, and mind. For Hegel, this substance was the Idea, or Hegel perpetuated the Idealism of Plato. However, for Marx, this substance was labor. Marx interpreted labor as the constitutive substance of the human productivity.

(CC) Logic Hegel also adopted Aristotlian logical categories, which expressed the principle of the constitution subject. The science of pneumatics required logical substantiation. The science of pneumatics acquired four fundamental forms in Hegel: (1) Subject-Object; (2) Actual-Potential; (3) Realization; (4) Particular-Universal. All these four forms were employed by Aristotle. The logical categories used by Hegel in his works exceeded these four but I will limit myself to the above four because of the demands of space and because they are sufficient in themselves to prove Hegel’s continuation of the science of pneumatics created by Aristotle.

1. Subject-Object The Subject was the Soul, the kinetic energy. The constitutive subject did not remain imprisoned in the Self, but interjected itself into the external world. The external world was the Object. The pneumatic Subject intervened in the external Object and contoured the external Object into an instrument or medium that supported, sustained, the existence of the Subject. While an object was merely externality, an objectivity was an object transformed into a utility by the force of the constitutive subject. Kinesis created objectivity, or an external constituted by articles contoured by the subject out of the need of the subject.

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2. Actual-Potential The original pneumatic powers were the actual, or the actual were the native powers of the constitutive subject. The actual was the start of pneumatic powers before these productive powers transmitted themselves into the object. Furthermore, the actual was a manifestation of substance. In both Aristotle and Hegel, substance meant the inherent quality of a “this.” Every “this” possessed an essential quality and such an essential quality was the definition of a “this.” Substance supplied identity and definition. Actuality was that kinetic power which allowed substance to be realized. Actuality was that power which did not allow substance to remain static. Actuality was the realization process of substance, and energy which allowed substance to enter the process of realization, its evolution to potentiality. The potential was the objectivity created by the actual. The potential was an expression of the actual in externality. An actual could not fully come into existence as itself because when actuality entered into the external it was contaminated with that externality, thinghood.

3. Realization Realization was the maturation process of the actual. Realization was the process through which the actual passed in order to achieve its end, potentiality. The realization process consisted of three stages: (1) substance; (2) the actual; (3) the potential. The realization process was the evolution into potentiality.

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4. Particular-Universal The particular was the individual. The particular took two forms, as a materiality and a constitutive subject. This chapter will deal with the particular as a constitutive subject. Within the pneumatological world the particular was the isolation of the constitutive subject. The particular was singularity, it was a subject, and regardless of its propensity, it never expanded beyond its subjectivity. The universal was the expression of the particular. If the particular was the containment of the constitutive subject the universal was the universalization of the constitutive subject. Universalization was the conquest of the external by the subject, the transformation of the external into a production of the particular. All the logical categories, subject-object, actual-potential, realization, and particular-universal, were also incorporated by Marx. From the perspective of logic, Aristotle and Hegel are constitutive presences in Marx’s method of explaining socio-productive formations.

(DD) Method of Explanation Although the method of historical explanation in the works of Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx differed in many ways, they were similar in at least one vital denomination: they were all comparative. One of the advantages of a comparative method of explanation was that it allowed for individuality. A comparison permitted the investigator to isolate the distinctive feature of each historical form. Once the particularity was signified, the differing characteristic of a historical form could be determined. Aristotle employed a comparative methodology in arriving at his theory of the best form of the state. Aristotle compared the states of Athens, Sparta, and Crete in his search for the best form of state. In addition, he compared different forms of government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Republic, in his effort to arrive at what he considered as the highest form of state. The comparative methodology of Aristotle was conducted on

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two levels, the comparison of state, Athens, Sparta, Crete, and the comparison of forms of government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Republic. The purpose of Aristotle’s comparative method was to compare in order to select.

(EE) History The concept of history was a unifying bond between Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx. All three believed that the efforts of the human species led to the evolutionary progress of society.33 This evolutionary progress was manifested as a series of stages. Although progress was continuous, the movement upward displayed itself in stages and each stage was an advance over the prior stage. Nevertheless, although Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx all agreed on the general principle of evolutionary progress, they disagreed over the substance of this societal advance. The substance of Aristotle’s theory of history was politics. In Aristotle, the advance to the state passed through four stages: 1) primitive, 2) family, 3) tribe, and 4) polis, and the polis was the state. The driving force in this evolution was the belief that a wellstructured state was one of the foundations of both an ethical and happy life. The substance of Hegel’s theory of history was the will which achieved the unity of subject-object, the particular and the universal. The substance of the progress of history was the constitutive subject, or the drive of the subject to unify with the object. The particular for Hegel was the constitutive subject and the universal was the synthesis of the subject into the universal. In Aristotle, this was the polis while in Hegel it was the nation. Whereas Aristotle found the infrastructure of unity in the 150,000 citizen population of the polis, Hegel found that infrastructure in the modern nation. Hegel wrote in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a period of exploding nationalism. In his Philosophy of History, he essentially divided global history into four nationalistic universes, the 33

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956).

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Chinese, the Greek, the Roman, and the German. Nations in the nineteenth-­century sense did not exist for Aristotle, but nations as the unity of an ethnicity was a major historical development in nineteenth-­ century Europe. Nationalism was the substance which facilitated the elevation of particularity into the universal. Another objectivity which allowed the constitutive subject to find universality was race. Hegel lived during a period which witnessed the development of anthropology. In his book The Philosophy of Mind, Hegel devoted pages 39 to 51 to a discussion of anthropology as the science existed in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.34 Marx’s attitude toward the principle of evolutionary progress must be divided into two parts: (AAA) Congratulatory; (BBB) Denunciatory. (AAA) Historical advancement was most evident and applauded by Marx, particularly in the areas of the natural and industrial sciences because they increased humanity’s control over nature and heightened the potential for increased productivity. For Marx, the substance of historical progress resided in the process of production and the fulfillment of needs. (BBB) However, Marx denounced all societies in which the unequal distribution of property gave license to one minority social class to subordinate the majority of impoverished laboring classes. Marx denounced capitalist society because it distorted the substance of historical progress, which meant increased production to meet needs. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the notion of history became a major epistemological category for interpreting the development of societies. Historicism meant that it was impossible to understand the sociopolitical unless the sociopolitical was interpreted as in constant movement, in evolutionary modification. Marx applied Historicism to the history of the process of production.

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, pp. 39–51.

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(FF) Associationism Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx all agreed that humankind shared an instinct for association. They all denied the idea of a noble savage. However, although they agreed on the existence of an associationist instinct they disagreed, similar to the category of History, as to the substance of associationism. The Politics possessed Aristotle’s clearest expression of association: “— that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another’s help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of meaningful life—mankind meet together and maintain the political community.”35 When Aristotle wrote “that man is by nature a political animal” he meant that humankind possessed an instinct for sociability. One instinct in humankind was the desire for association, or the desire to live in communities with other members of the human species. The purpose of this sociability was the construction of a political entity which would benefit all the members of this community.36 Aristotle’s concentration on instinct, inherent desire, was an expression of his naturalism. Hegel did not marry associations with the political, but rather with the will. The end of associationism was “civil society,” and “civil society” also contained an end. The purpose of “civil society” was to perform as the first stage in the evolution of the state. An Idealist, Hegel interpreted human associationism as an expression of the philosophical movement by the constitutive subject to the universal. Hegel’s The Philosophy of Mind outlined the history of Mind as evolving through three levels, Mind Subjective, Mind Objective, and Mind Absolute, or the pathway from the individual Will to the universal. This Idealist format was the foundation of his psychology, or Hegel’s psychology duplicated the philosophical evolution from the particular to the universal. 35 36

 Aristotle, The Politics, p. 1130.  Ibid., pp. 1128–1129.

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The origin of associationism lay in the particularity of the genus. Human psychology began with the genus and the evolutionary process moved the genus into the species. The progress from the genus into the species was the transcendence of the particular, the first stage in the evolution to the universal. This immanent development continued into the family, broadened into the gens,37 and culminated in “civil society.”38 Although the historical process continued beyond “civil society” and was finalized in the state, the realization of “civil society” was an entrance into the universal. Psychology imitated philosophy and the psychological need of association, the need to expand selfhood into family, gens, and “civil society” was a psychological recapitulation of Idealist philosophy. Using the logic of philosophy, Hegel recognized that humans possessed an instinct to transcend the Self, overcome psychological individuality, and unify with the associationism of “civil society.” The substance in Hegel was philosophy in its transubstantiation as psychology. Hegel was concerned with how psychology was the actualization of philosophy. Nevertheless, associationism was a step to the universal. A comparison of the theory of associationism in the philosophies of Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx must recognize an insurmountable difference that separated Marx from both Aristotle and Hegel. Whereas both Aristotle and Hegel saw the purpose of associationism as founding the basis of the state, Marx called for the extinction of the state, and thus for Marx the end of associationism could not be the ascent of the state. Although previous paragraphs recognized that the ascent to the state was the ultimate goal of Hegel’s psychological associationism, my prior discussion of Hegel ceased at his conception of “civil society” for two reasons: (1) because it established the basis for a comparison between Marx and Hegel in their understanding of “civil society”; (2) because the stage of “civil society” was sufficient in itself to illustrate Hegel’s commitment to psychological associationism. For Marx, the purpose of associationism was the progressive evolution to “civil society.” The chapter in Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle entitled  Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, ibid., “Anthropology”, pp. 28–152.  Ibid., pp. 173–174.

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the “Destruction of the State” will provide an exhaustive discussion of the reasons Marx called for the abolition of the state. Therefore, it is only necessary at this point to analyze associationism in Marx and how this instinct evolved into “civil society.” For Marx, the state was the subsumption by capitalism of “civil society.” Capitalism was the assassin of “civil society.” Like Hegel, Marx lived in the nineteenth century which was a century of nationalism. Marx accepted the stage theory of progress and he described the evolution of nations as a process of five gradations of the forms of production: (1) hunting and fishing; (2) pasturage; (3) agriculture; (4) commerce; (5) industry. Whereas Aristotle saw the force of evolution in the need for a stable and secure state, and Hegel saw the kinesis of evolution in the mental need for universality, Marx identified the pneumatic form of progressive evolution in the history of the process of production. The substance of the forms of productivity in Marx was the instinct of “species being.” Marx maintained that associationism was an inherent quality of the human animal and this naturalistic associationism derived from the Being of the human species. Ludwig Feuerbach was the originator of the concept of “species being.” In his book The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach was the first to claim that the universality of humankind was not an originally Christian ideal, but a concept evolving from the species, that the qualities of the species were in themselves universal. Naturalistic qualities were cosmopolitan. The biology of humankind was the ground of cooperation. Anthropology replaced Creationism. Marx adopted the Feuerbachian idea of “species being” and this became the substance of his concept of “civil society,” or “civil society” was merely the socialization of “species being.” “Civil society” was immanently peaceful because it was an objectification of the universality of “species being.” Feuerbach’s concept of “species being” had two additional manifestionations: (W) The concept of “I and Thou”; (Y) The Question of Property. (W) Feuerbach himself moved from the principle of “species being” to the idea of “I and Thou.” By the idea of “I and Thou,” Feuerbach meant that an inherent bonding existed between members of the species. Since

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“species being” was a universality then each member of this universality immediately felt connected to the other. Although Marx did not employ the concept of “I and Thou,” he was influenced by the Feuerbachian presentation of this fusion. Rather than “I and Thou,” Marx wrote about mutual recognition and reciprocal recognition. By the terms mutual recognition and reciprocal recognition, Marx meant exactly what Feuerbach meant by “I and Thou,” the commitment that two individualities were mainly expressions of a singular Self. (Y) Feuerbach did not extend the concept of “I and Thou” to the question of property. He was not a communist. He did not believe that the principle of “species being” was the basis for the negation of private property. Conversely, Marx did extend the substance of “species being” to the negation of private property. Clearly, there were many additional reasons for Marx’s refutation of private property, but the substance of “species being” was one of them. Whereas private property divided the species, the common ownership of property would remove any barrier to the realization of the universality of “species being.” Perpetuating the Aristotelian heritage Hegel also presented “civil society” as the foundation of the state. Hegel helped pass the heritage on to Marx. One of Marx’s earliest writings, composed in the summer of 1844 was entitled, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” and was a strong critique of both Hegel’s theory of the state and Hegel’s idea of “civil society.”39 Regardless of the fact that Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” was a refutation of Hegel’s theory of “civil society and state, it did document the fact that the young Marx was definitely influenced by Hegel’s thought on “civil society” and state. Marx remained unshakably committed to the principle that the state evolved out of “civil society.” According to Marx, a result of the overthrow of the state brought about the triumph of “civil society” because “civil society” would replace the state. The passage from “family” to “civil society” played an important role in Hegel’s Idealism. Even though an advance beyond the family, “civil  Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”, Karl Marx–Friedrich Engels: Collected Works (International Publishers; New York, 1975), Vol. III, pp. 3–129. 39

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society” still belonged to the realm of particularity. Within Hegel’s Idealism, the pneumatic force was the propulsion from the particular to the universal. “Civil society” was important to Hegel because it was a stage in the kinesis to universality, and the union of the particular and universal was the ethical for Hegel. From the point of view of the process of production however, Hegel recognized that “civil society” was also the womb of bourgeois society. When Hegel separated himself from his Idealism, when he approached “civil society” from the perspective of political economy, he recognized that “civil society” at this historical period was synonymous with bourgeois society and Hegel castigated bourgeois society. Hegel’s denunciation of bourgeois society arose from the fact that it was mired in individualistic particularity. Bourgeois society enthroned the pursuit of private interest. Bourgeois society approved and justified self-gratification and greed. It was thus the antithesis of universality or the ethical.40 A synonym for particularity was will, or will was the psychological appearance of particularity. Will, as first pointed out by Kant and Rousseau, or the psychological engine of individuality, was the propelling force of bourgeois-capitalist society. Hegel’s attack on bourgeois-capitalist society was just as vehement as Marx’s excoriation of bourgeois-capitalism. They both looked upon bourgeois-­capitalism at the denigration of humanity. However, Hegel could escape from bourgeois-capitalism because “civil society” was an early stage in the immanent rational progress of the universal. The inherent kinesis of Idealism would transform bourgeois-capitalism into the universal, the state, and the state was the ethical. A naturalist, Marx did not possess this Hegelian Idealist option of escape. For Marx, the only avenue of escape from the particularity and self-interest of the bourgeois-­ capitalist world was to demolish it. Idealism offered an escape for Hegel, but for the Naturalism of Marx the only escape was the overthrow of the bourgeois-capitalist order. The major force which propelled the immanent development from “family” to “civil society” was productivity, or the “system of needs.”41 40 41

 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), pp. 105–110.  Ibid., pp. 126–128.

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When Hegel wrote about the “system of needs,” he demonstrated his awareness of the importance of political economy. A major theoretical development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hegel recognized that this new social science must be employed as a means to understand historical evolution. The “system of needs” meant that a major feature of “civil society” in its early bourgeois-capitalist form was the “need” to satisfy the “needs” of the members of that society. “Needs” meant the requirements for human survival, such as food, water, warmth, clothing, and safety. “Civil society” was that governance which supplied the fulfillment of the “needs.” The “system of needs” required a division of labor.42 The “division of labor” meant that in order to satisfy the multiplicity of humanity’s survival needs, production must be divided into separate divisions. In order to supply the “need” for food, a class of farmers must eventuate. In order to supply the “need” for water, a class of builders of dams was required. The “system of needs” was based on the “system of universal mutual dependence.”43 The phrase “mutual dependence” meant that a farmer possessed the “need” for a rake and the artisan who manufactured the rake permitted the farmer to raise wheat. “Mutual dependence” existed between the farmer and artisan because the artisan allowed the farmer to live by supplying him with a rake and the farmer allowed the artisan to live because he supplied him with food. By the phrase “mutual dependence,” Hegel meant interpersonal reciprocity. The artisan satisfied the need of the farmer and the farmer satisfied the need of the artisan. A requital of needs occurred. Need inspired production and productivity satisfied needs, or a complimentary exchange. In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel revealed the metaphysical substructure of his theory of complimentary exchange in the sentence: “It is only in this way that there is a genuine link between the particular which is effective in the state and the universal.”44 As I pointed out in previous sections of this chapter, Hegel’s hypothesis that “civil society” was the foundation of the state was adopted by Marx.  Ibid., pp. 128–134.  Ibid., p. 128. 44  Ibid., p. 127. 42 43

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Nevertheless, there were three major differences between Marx and Hegel over the nature of “civil society” and these were: (Z1) The Abolition of the State; (Z2) The Administration of Justice, Police, and Corporations; (Z3) Political Economy. (Z1) The Abolition of the State Marx believed that the state and “civil society” were separable. For Marx, the destruction of the state would not destroy the existence of “civil society.” Rather “civil society,” following the destruction of the state, would create its own forms of governance. “Civil society” would generate governmental organs which would regulate its behavior. Hegel never dealt with the possibility of the abolition of the state. Hegel’s The Philosophy of Right presented the state as the culmination of sociopolitical evolution. Hegel’s principle of the immanent movement from the particular to the universal looked upon the state as the end, the purpose of progressive evolution. In addition, Hegel was a conservative and loyal to the Prussian Crown. Hegel was also an opponent of the French Revolution, Robespierre, and St. Just, and his political theorizing would never allow him to speculate on the possibility of the abolition of the Crown, a position adhered to by the Hegelian Right. (Z2) The Administration of Justice, Police, and Corporation The Philosophy of Right states that the administration of justice, the police, and the organization of political economic corporations existed in “civil society.”45 Hegel asserted that these three functions were inherent to “civil society.” The state simply continued and perfected these functions which originated in “civil society.” Marx refuted these Hegelian attributions to “civil society.” For Marx, the administration of justice, the police, and corporations were all administrative apparatuses which were generated by the state. The state created these organizations as a means to strengthen the domination of the propertied classes. “Civil society” for Marx was uncontaminated by class rule. To Marx it was a contradiction to affirm in the Hegelian manner that organizations, justice, police, corporations, which matured in the state, could be transferred into a postrevolutionary “civil society.” The “civil society” which 45

 Ibid., pp. 134–153.

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became dominant after the overthrow of the state would create its own system of justice, police, and corporations. In Hegel, justice, police, and corporations were existent conditions of “civil society.” In Marx, justice, police, and corporations were possibilities of “civil society,” or “civil society” would originate these three functions so they would correspond and compliment a post-state form of “civil society.” (Z3) Political Economy The Philosophy of Right also demonstrated Hegel’s awareness of political economy. In the section entitled “The System of Needs” which was a subdivision of the chapter on “Civil Society,” Hegel wrote: “Political economy in the science which starts from this view of needs and labor, but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships and mass-­ movements in their complexity and their qualitative and quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which has arisen out of the condition of the modern world.”46 The task of Hegel in the realm of political economy was to subsume it under the principles of ethics.47 Hegel knew the work of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Jean-Baptiste Say, but rather than enter into a dialogue with these men over the theory of value Hegel sought to co-opt them into the domain of ethics. Conversely, Marx also sought to abolish political economy and replace it with the study of the pneumatology of labor. In addition, after asserting the necessity of the decline of necessary labor under capitalism, Marx again referred to Aristotle. The passage from Aristotle that Marx quoted expressed Aristotle’s belief in the increase in the abilities of the producer. In this regard, Aristotle was a student of Plato, who also advanced the idea of the increase in abilities of workers. A line of continuity existed between Plato and Aristotle, who Marx called “the greatest thinker of antiquity,” regarding the capacity of the worker to advance their abilities.

 Ibid., p. 126.  Karl, Marx, Das Kapital, Vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 444.

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5. Associationism In addition to Marx’s comments dealing with Aristotle’s theories regarding the process of production, Chapter 13 in Volume I of Das Kapital, Marx also reflected upon Aristotle’s political theories. In this chapter dealing with “Cooperation” Marx quoted from Aristotle’s The Politics in which Aristotle stated that humankind was both a social and political animal (see note 46). Like Aristotle, Marx maintained that the human species possessed an inherent drive for associationism, for the need of the other. The human needs for associationism manifested itself in two forms, in society and in the state. However, for Aristotle, the state was not the expression of class, or the state was not an instrument for the perpetuation of class dominance. For Aristotle, the state was an association of equivalents, an ethical entity inspired by the reciprocity, not domination, between the citizens. Marx’s theory of communism was deeply influenced by Aristotle’s concept of associationism. Marx called for the overthrow of the state, not society, because the state was always an instrument of class control. But the overthrow of the state was not simultaneously the overthrow of society. In communism society still existed and it was by means of the instinct of associationism that citizen equivalence must originate forms of governance.

6. Master-Slave Marx was not always in complete agreement with Aristotle, and this difference was illustrated in their contradictions over slavery. Whereas Aristotle defended slavery, Marx condemned it. Since Marx died before he was able to complete Volumes II and III of Das Kapital, this responsibility fell onto the shoulders of Friedrich Engels and Engels coordinated the manuscripts left behind by Marx into Volumes II and III. Regardless of the method used by Engels to coordinate these Marx manuscripts, the manuscripts themselves were largely the words of Marx.

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Chapter 23 of Volume III of Das Kapital is entitled “Interest and the Achievement of Subjection.” In this chapter, Marx is referring to the subjection of the proletariat under capitalism. In his study of the subjection of the proletariat under capitalism, Marx again referred to Aristotle’s Republic. He criticized Aristotle for his defense of slavery and categorized it as an example of the master-slave relationship. Whereas Aristotle understood the master-slave relationship as the social expression of the mastery of mind over the body, borrowing the Aristotelian model Marx changed the substance. In Marx, the substance was not mind, but labor. Under capitalism, it was the capitalist who subjected the proletariat. The capitalist lived on surplus labor and as master the capitalist turned the proletariat into a slave, or expropriated surplus value from the slave. Capitalism was the master-slave relationship in the era of the endless accumulation of surplus labor. Aristotle passed on the master-slave relationship first to Hegel and then secondly to Marx. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit, which Marx knew, contains a chapter entitled “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage.” When Hegel used the term “Lordship and Bondage” he was referring to Aristotle’s concept of master-slave. In Hegel, self-consciousness was master. Self-consciousness was the in-itself which turned external objectivity into a for-itself. Self-­ consciousness superseded external objectivity, self-consciousness subjected external objectivity under its supervision. Whereas Hegel transferred the master-slave relationship into self-consciousness, Marx transferred the master-slave relationship into the struggle for labor. In addition, Hegel also adopted the idea of purposeful activity from Aristotle. In the preface to The Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel discussed the idea of purposeful activity. He wrote: “Still in the sense in which Aristotle too, defines Nature as purposive activity, purpose is what is immediately at rest, the unmoved which is also self-moving, and as such is Subject.” Whereas Aristotle assigned purposeful activity to Nature, Hegel assigned it to Spirit. Marx absorbed the concept of purposeful activity from both Aristotle and Hegel, only in Marx, purposeful activity was defined as the process of production. In Marx the purposeful activity of humankind was survival and flourishing and in order to persevere the human species must develop the pneumatics of production.

4 Marx’s Pneumatology of Labor and His Methodology of Explanation

The origins of Marx’s theory of value lie primarily in two works of Aristotle, The Metaphysics and “The Soul.”1 In order to completely understand the evolution and transformation of the theory of value it is necessary to return to its genesis in Aristotle. However, the historical development of the theory of value from Aristotle to Marx experienced a crucial point of transition, the philosophy of Hegel, and this chapter will also interpret the significance Hegel played in the formation of Marx’s theory of value. In both his The Metaphysics and “The Soul,” Aristotle expounded a pneumatology of labor. In both these works, Aristotle focused on the human-social worlds and he put forth a theory of movement, which forces brought about changes or alterations in the human-social consciousness. Aristotle’s theory of pneumatics was also a theory of production. The changes empowered by an originative energy produced modifications in both the human and the social galaxies. An active principle, a principle that caused motion, was also productive because the

 Aristotle, “The Soul”, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 558. 1

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motion that it caused eventuated in a transfiguration of the external environment. In a metaphysical sense, Aristotle’s theory of pneumatics was also a theory of Becoming. By describing how agency led to the remodeling of the agent’s environment Aristotle embraced a theory of Becoming. For Aristotle, the human-social world was not static, it was not inert, but a surrounding in constant transposition. The human subject was the center of this Becoming. “The Soul” offered a more concrete analysis of Aristotle’s theory of pneumatics. In order to penetrate more deeply into Aristotle’s theory of production, it is first necessary to define three terms: subject, attribute, and predication. For Aristotle, the originative energy for change must arise from a subject, and this subject must be the human animal. “The Soul” contained references to many Greek philosophers, but Aristotle particularly singled out Plato and Pythagoras. Aristotle attacked Plato because Plato classified the Idea as the source of motion. Plato’s Ideas were metaphysical principles, completely separated from all naturalistic embodiments. Plato’s Idealism was rebuked by Aristotle on the grounds that motion could not originate in non-naturalistic objects. Similarly, Aristotle also rebuked Pythagoras and his theory of mathematics. Equations were non-­ naturalistic and thus were unable to generate motion. Numbers were not subjects, and thus were immobile. For Aristotle, subjectivity did not automatically imply consciousness. Subjectivity was synonymous with urge, drive, propellant. The urge, drive, propellant of a subject led to the alteration of the surrounding environment. Urge, drive, propellant led to the externalization of this force, and this objectification brought about the modification of the surrounding circumstances. In this sense, the subject predicated. Predication meant that the subject imposed its own substance on the external. Another term for predication was attribution, which meant that a subject shaped the external according to its own being. Predication and attribution were synonyms. “The Soul” was an illustration of Aristotle’s theory of pneumatics. However, in order to understand “The Soul” it is first necessary to grasp Aristotle’s naturalism. For Aristotle, the human species was a part of the

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naturalistic world, which was divided into two parts: the animal and the human. The animal species was composed of two biological parts, nutritive and sense perception. But the animal species was separated from the human species because it lacked the power of reason and it was devoid of a soul. The absence of the power of reason deprived the animal of comprehending external reality, thus rendering the animal incapable of any predicative intervention into the external. The absence of a soul deprived the animal of any possibility of unifying those biological parts, of providing these animal parts with a purpose, or end. The human species did possess a soul, or the human did possess an agency which unified the nutritive, sense perception, and thinking. The soul integrated these three naturalistic functions and thus bestowed on the human the power of purpose and end. Equipped with the power of purpose and end the human was empowered to intervene into externality. This intervention was simultaneously the energy of predication, or the beginning of the productive power of shaping the environment in accordance with human needs. The soul was the first level of Aristotle’s theory of pneumatics. The actuality of the soul related to its kinetic energy, the implicit dynamic of the soul. The potentiality of the soul related to its externalization, the object brought into reality. Actuality related to possibility, while potentiality related to reality, or the limits imposed upon the actual by externality.2 Aristotle’s Metaphysics superseded “The Soul” in his analysis of motion. Whereas “The Soul” basically concentrated on human subjective action, The Metaphysics broadened Aristotle’s search into a more universal generalization of value. The Metaphysics presents a complete Theory of Production, or a metaphysics of Becoming which concentrated on the principle of causation. In The Metaphysics, Aristotle wrote, “Since anything which is produced is produced by something (and this I call the point of production)—For to make a ‘this’ is to make ‘this’ out of the substratum in the full sense of the word.”3  Ibid., pp. 559–561.  Aristotle, “The Metaphysics”, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 794.

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A deeper appreciation of Aristotle’s theory of production will be acquired by a more detailed analysis of Aristotle’s critiques of Plato, the Atomists, and Pythagoras. These attacks display Aristotle’s refutation of both Idealism and Materialism. The source of movement in Plato was initiated in the supernatural realm of Ideas. Plato’s Ideas were metaphysical entities, existing independently of the naturalistic universe, but which provided models of behavior and choice for earthly humans. Plato’s Idealism situated the models for human activity and choice in Idealistic forms which were only available to human thought. These Platonic Ideas were transcendental Forms. The transcendental realm in Plato was nonhistorical. The Greek Atomists also presented a picture of the universe that was immobile. Atoms were Materialisms which never changed. Although atoms did coagulate into an incalculable variety of different shapes the atoms themselves did not alter. Any Materialism, which presupposed the unalterability of matter, imprisoned itself into a philosophy of inertness. Aristotle rebuked the Materialism of Democritus because his theory of atoms, although it permitted the innumerable combination of atoms, nevertheless validated the principle that the unchanging materiality of the cosmos was the cause of the nonhistorical principle of the universe. Aristotle also critiqued the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers as an example of the camp of immobility. Numbers were eternal and as such were themselves stationary. Numbers only calculated, they did not cause and therefore mathematics was, according to Aristotle, another category of Materialism. Numbers did not originate motion, they were only measurements. Aristotle’s Naturalism was devoted to the study of the human species. In addition, the human animal was inherently a social creature. Humans naturally possessed an instinct for social life. Aristotle’s The Politics unequivocally states that humans possess an inherent social instinct. In The Politics Aristotle wrote, “Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature and that man is by nature a political animal—Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.”4 In Aristotle the terms “social”  Aristotle, “The Politics”, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 1129.

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and “political” are synonyms. They both meant the natural instinct of the species to form associations. In Aristotle the social and political referred to the different stages of associations. The social instinct referred to the initial drive to form an association. The political instinct referred to the need for an association to organize forms of government. Although Aristotle never employed the term “civil society,” I maintain that he possessed an embryonic form of the concept. The term “civil society” played an enormous role in the seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-­century European political philosophy. It was a powerful concept in the political philosophies of Adam Ferguson, Ludwig Feuerbach, George W.F. Hegel, and through these men to Karl Marx. Aristotle was cognizant of a stage of social evolution that was in accordance with what Ferguson-Feuerbach-Hegel-Marx understood by “civil society.” Consequently, even though Aristotle never employed the phrase “civil society,” he was aware that social evolution created such a stage. In The Politics Aristotle wrote the following sentences: “But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must he either a beast or a god, he is not part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men of nature, and yet he who founded the state was the greatest of all benefactors.”5 “What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society.”6 “It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime, and for the sake of exchange.”7 Aristotle adheres to an evolutionary theory of political development. The state was the apex of this political advancement. However, as all evolutionary processes, the state was preceded by earlier developmental stages. Aristotle designated the precursor of the state as “society,” or “social life.” By “society” he meant a level of social evolution composed of families, the organic mode of production, but no political structure or state. “Society” or “social life” was that form of association, which promoted the perpetuation of the species, but was devoid of any political structures.

 Ibid., p. 1130.  Ibid., p. 1171. 7  Ibid., p. 1181. 5 6

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This is exactly what Ferguson-Feuerbach-Hegel-Marx meant by “civil society.” In the writings of Ferguson-Feuerbach-Hegel-Marx, all these philosophers understood “civil society” as antecedent to the state, but as an ancestor, which provided the conditions making possible the creation of the state. Aristotle’s conviction that a “civil society” existed conformed perfectly with his historical interpretation of human society. Aristotle advanced a four-stage theory of historical evolution. The Politics contains a brief outline of his theory of historical progression. “But when several families are united and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed in the village when several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficient, the state will come into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state.”8 Aristotle’s theory of history consisted of four stages: (1) family; (2) tribe; (3) village; (4) state. Aristotle’s “civil society” was a component of the third level of historical evolution, the village. It was a preparation for the construction of the state. Aristotle was one of the creators of the Western concept of history. The concept of historicity found its origin in Greek thought and Aristotle was a major contributor to this cultural endowment. Aristotle’s concept of history derived primarily from three principles, two sociological and the third philosophical. The sociological principles were patterned on his theory of “civil society,” or the social conditioning of life. “Civil society” underwent constant transformation, it was tied to temporality, its permutations were grounded in the inherent adjustability of “civil society.” A second sociological rule was the principle of forms. As “civil society” modified in accordance with the transmutation of the socio-productive environment, new forms of social life emerged. History, for Aristotle, was the study of the evolution of unique historical shapes, and these could be forms of “civil society,” or different social forms. States took different  Ibid., pp. 1128–1129.

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forms, which were an outgrowth of the different shapes of the underlying “civil societies.” The philosophical principle, which underlies Aristotle’s theory of history, was his view of the human species, predominantly the male, as inherently a creative force. Aristotle propounded a theory of production and his view of the labor of humanity eventuated in a theory of pneumatology. To understand Aristotle’s theory of pneumatology it is first necessary to understand his concept of the Soul. Previous paragraphs indicated that Aristotle divided the biology of the human species into three parts, the nutritive, the sensibilities, and reason. The soul was that substance which unified all these three powers and this act of unification provided the species with a purpose. By providing unity to the three naturalistic functions of the human anima the soul also equipped the species to seek an end. Consequently, the soul was the substance of motivation, it empowered the species with motion, and this motion propelled the species to an end.9 Aristotle’s theory of history was based on a theory of pneumatics. Predicated upon the soul, Aristotle understood the human species as the originator of action. All creativity, all the modifications of the social and economic environments were generated by human kinesis. Aristotle’s theory of pneumatology brought forth a theory of production. The human species, possessed with a soul, was capable of producing its own social forms. The social-political-productive forms under which the species lived were outcomes, results of human productivity. Aristotle searched for cause. In his “The Soul” and Metaphysics he sought for the causes of human agency which was directed to a goal. He concluded that the cause, or the source, for origination led back to the soul, or humanity was naturally kinetic. Productivity was a synonym for labor. The species lived in a world which was a result of its own pneumatology, or subjective activity, labor. The following paragraphs present a dictionary of key Aristotelian logics. It is necessary to define these logics of Aristotle because they were later employed by both Hegel and Marx.  Aristotle, “The Metaphysics”, pp. 826–831.

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These vocabularies coalesce under two general categories: (a) Theory of Pneumatics; (b) Method of Explanation. Category A, Theory of Pneumatics, will include the following lexicon: (1) subject-object; (2) substance-essence; (3) actual-potential; (4) immanence; (5) theory-­ practice. Category B, Method of Explanation, will include the following lexicon: (1) organic; (2) universal-particular; (3) form-content; (4) dialectic; (5) syllogism.

(a) Theory of Pneumatics Aristotle’s theory of Pneumatics was constructed on a productive model. The human was a kinetic force which modified the external. The thesaurus of the theory of production was a vocabulary of creativity.

1. Subject-Object The subject, the human, was an agent which intervened in externality. The subject was a cause, a force of predication which sculptured the external. The object was that which was shaped by the kinetic subject. Objectivity was a history of forms which were imaginations, projections of the subject. Many synonyms captured the pneumatics of the subject; these synonyms were desire, will, impulse, focus, drive, catalyst.

2. Substance-Essence Substance related to the innate. Substance was “is,” it was the inherent quality of a subject. Essence was continuity. Essence was the unfolding of substance, it was the coming-to-be of substance.

3. Actual-Potential The actual was the original substance of a human. The actual was a promise, it was a possibility that had not yet entered the external world. The

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potential was the actual in the external world. However, when the actual was brought into the external world, by the will, it lost its promise and possibility. The movement of the actual to the potential was the process of realization, or actualization. Reality was the power that brought realization to the actual, or realization was the externalization of the actual.

4. Immanence Immanence referred to the power of essence. Essence was the unfolding of substance and immanence referred to the inevitability of essence. Essence must be realized and immanence was the power, the inner force, which attained the purpose of essence. The following synonyms captured the essence of immanence: force, impulse, purpose, becoming, course, agency.

5. Theory-Practice Aristotle drew a distinction between theory and practice. Theory related to the domain of the philosophical, it was concerned with the procedures of mind. Practice related to subjectivity, it was concerned with the predications and attributions of the subject. Aristotle’s theory of production was an expression of human practice, or practice was the activity by which the subject predicated the external. Aristotle’s “The Soul” and The Metaphysics were basically studies of the origin of human practice.

(b) Method of Explanation 1. Organic Aristotle employed the organic method of explanation. When Aristotle explained social or political events, he envisioned them as totalities, or the explanation of a sociological phenomena could only be understood if presented as an organic unit. According to Aristotle, explanation only

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occurred when a social or political event was presented as a unit, a totality of parts.

2. Universal-Particular Aristotle’s theory of explanation also rested upon the fusion of the universal and particular. The understanding of a sociopolitical occurrence could only be attained if it were presented in its particularity and universality. For Aristotle, to understand meant to grasp how a particular shaped a universal, or conversely to grasp how a universal defined the particular. A synonym for the universal-particular method of explanation was the genus-species paradigm. Within this paradigm the genus was the universal, and the species was the particular. The genus-species paradigm recapitulated the universal-particular method because in order to fathom the genus it is necessary to grasp the species and in order to comprehend the species it was necessary to simultaneously comprehend the genus.

3. Form-Content The term form-content was an amalgam of the potential and the kinetic. The form was the potential as it was molded by the social. It was an inactive materiality without a purpose. It was a potential waiting for an end. The content was the end. Content supplied the form with a purpose. Content referred to the function implanted on a form by the pneumatic power of the subject. The form-content logic created two possibilities: did the power of attribution merely provide a shape to a form, or did it penetrate into a form? Does the power of production contour the form, or does it enter the form? This question is raised here because it concerns how Marx and Hegel integrated the form-content methodology. When Marx defined the form-content method he adopted the contour definition, however, Hegel applied the penetration method. Later sections of this chapter, those dealing specifically with Hegel and Marx, will explore the divergences between Hegel and Marx in greater detail.

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4. Dialectic The discussion of the following two Aristotelian methods of explanation, dialectic and syllogism, will not be drawn from either “The Soul” or Metaphysics, but rather from his books, Analytica Priora and Topica. These two books were not devoted to an analysis of the theory of pneumatics, but rather to an analysis of logical categories. In the Topica, Aristotle provided the following definition of dialectical reasoning: “Dialectical propositions—which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted; also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinion that are taken to be generally accepted, and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts.”10 The dialectic was a logic of contradictions. In a logical situation where propositions A and B existed the dialectic sought to negate A or B. The dialectic was a logical method to supersede the contrary opposition by invalidating one side of the contradiction, and thereby established the validity of the surviving contradiction.

5. Syllogism In the Analytica Priora, Aristotle defined the syllogism in the following terms: The demonstrative premise differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premise is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements— whereas the dialectical premise depends on the adversary’s choice between two contradictions. But these will make no difference to the production of the syllogism in either case—while a dialectical premise is the giving of a choice between two contradictions—but when he is syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted—the difference between syllogistic demonstrative—.11

10 11

 Aristotle, “The Topics”, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 196.  Aristotle, “Analytica Priora”, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 65.

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Dialectical logic does not assert, it chooses between two contradictions by negating one of them. Syllogistic logic does assert, it does select, between two possibilities. The origin of a syllogism arises from the opposition between a universal and a particular. In the dialectic, one aspect of the opposition, either universal or particular, would be terminated. In the syllogism, there is no termination, but rather a fusion of the universal and particular into an amalgamated thesis. The syllogism gives rise to a new assertion. Although Aristotle himself did not possess a theory of value in the style of Hegel and Marx, he did inject in the Western philosophical tradition ingredients, which Hegel and Marx did employ in their creation of a theory of value. Aristotle embedded the principle of subjective prius into Western thought, but he himself did not derive a theory of value from his theory of the pneumatics of production. Value for Aristotle was not a product of subjective kinetics, but rather a demonstration of external exchange forces. Value was an expression of chrematistics and chrematistics totally devoid of subjective intervention. Chrematistics were fields of exchange enterprises that Aristotle completely distrusted, which he saw as the foundation of greed and which he judged as immoral. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote: “This is why all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable—All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, or as said before. Now this unit is in truth demand, which holds all things together—but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand. And for the future exchange—Money is as it were our surety. For it must be possible for us to get what we want by bringing the money.”12 For Aristotle, exchange was facilitated for the most part by money. The economic mode of exchange was not value, or a form brought into existence by the pneumatics of production. Although Aristotle was a founder of the theory of subjective production, he did not extend that postulate to exchange value. Aristotle was an enormous influence on Hegelian philosophy and Hegel acknowledged indebtedness to the Athenian prophet. In his The Philosophy of Mind, Hegel wrote:  Aristotle, “The Nicomachean Ethics”, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 1011.

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The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussion on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea of principle, not those of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of these Aristotelian books.13

Just as Aristotle regarded the Soul as the prius of human creativity, so Hegel judged the Mind as the prius. Hegel’s Mind took the place of Aristotle’s Soul, but in Hegel reason displayed the same productive energy as Aristotle’s Soul. Hegel’s Mind predicated the external and objectivity was produced by the constitutive subject: an appreciation of the actualities ofthe subject was the initial stage in any attempt to understand the subject. Aristotle’s theory of Pneumatics was the foundation for Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Aristotle’s theory that the Soul was the originative energy, the inspiration for Hegel’s theory regarding Mind, or the agency of predication. In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel described the attribution of mind as “an interfering of the reality and the individuality.”14 Phenomenology of Spirit reiterated this theme of the originative energy of Mind with these words: “Consciousness must act merely in order so that what it is in itself may become explicit for it.”15 In order for Hegel to realize his intellectual revolution, it was first necessary for him to redefine philosophy. He must first determine philosophy as the instrument by which Mind objectified itself in order to prove that externality was merely the projection of Mind. Hegel negated philosophy as a logic of the law of thought. He repudiated philosophy as the study of eternal Ideas, or philosophy in the form of Platonism. He also repudiated the empirical philosophy because it was imprisoned within the stagnation of sense impressions. In the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Volume I, he negated all forms of metaphysics because this historical stage of philosophy turned into Dogmatic  Hegel, G.W.F. The Philosophy of Mind, “Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences”, trans. A.V. Miller (Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1971), p. 3. 14  Ibid., p. 246. 15  Ibid., p. 240. 13

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Metaphysics, distorted philosophy into an Ontology, but Being as eternal, not subject to temporality.16 Hegel’s recreation of philosophy rested upon two fundamental principles: (1) objectification; (2) temporality.

1. Objectification For Hegel, the inherent prius was Mind. Whereas Aristotle judged Soul to be the originative kinesis, Hegel looked upon Mind as the primal agency. The immanent tendency of Mind was to objectify itself or for Mind to enter the external world. The drive of Mind to create a product in the external world was the movement from the in-itself to the for-itself, the evolution from the implicit to the explicit, the movement from the actual to the potential. Mind needed to predicate an object outside itself so Mind could learn its own powers. Will was different from Mind. Whereas Mind was an embodiment of intellectual capacities, Will was an expression of human preference and Will could claim possession of a Materiality. The difference between Mind and Will defined itself in relation to the question of property. Whereas Mind could not establish the ownership of property, Will could determine such ownership. Whereas Mind could shape a property, contour the externality of a property, only Will could enter or surround it. The construction of an external object did not only demonstrate the pneumatic power of self-consciousness, but was also a means for Mind to educate itself about its own powers. The self-knowledge of Mind was awarded to Mind by its study of the modes it itself brought into existence. The demand of the ancient gods to “Know Thyself ” was fulfilled by Mind’s self-observation. These stages in the kinesis of Mind laid the basis for Hegel’s redefinition of philosophy. Since Mind was defined by its predications, then philosophy must be defined as phenomenology. Consequently, Hegel’s phenomenology was a theory of production, since philosophy was the  Hegel, “Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences”, ibid., pp. 54–55.

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analysis of the phenomena externalized by Mind, then philosophy was a theory of pneumatics. Hegel’s theory of pneumatics also served as the basis of a theory of history. Phenomenology was temporal. The production of phenomenon was temporal since creation must succeed each other in time. Knowing Mind meant observing the products of Mind in their temporal development, or history was the process of comprehending the metamorphosis of the products of Mind. Hegel did not invent the modern science of history. The origins of the modern conception of history was a product of the European Enlightenment. Major figures in the development of history were the Scots Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and James Steuart. Hegel took this seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concept of history and elevated it to a central motif in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western philosophy. For Hegel, history was an evolutionary process. He focused on the history of cultures, or civilizations. His The Philosophy of History deals with universal history and was divided into four parts, The Oriental World, the Greek World, the Roman World, and the German World.17 His three volume Lectures on the History of Philosophy was also divided into three categories: Part One, Greek Philosophy, Part Two, Philosophy of the Middle Ages, and Part Three, Modern Philosophy.18 Social evolution was a basic premise of Hegel’s theory of history and the evolutionary process was progressive. In order to comprehend these historical forms it was necessary to approach them as organic in nature. A historical form was an organism and the method of analysis to be employed was to analyze them in terms of whole and parts, the whole must be understood as a totality of parts, and the parts must be understood as expressions, as manifestations of the whole. Hegel’s preference for the organic method of interpretation was definitively expressed in the “Preface” to The Phenomenology of Spirit, in which he wrote: “Yet, at the same time their fluid nature makes them  Hegel, G.W.F. The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Doren Publications; New York, 1956), pp. XV–XVI. 18  Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldan (University of Nebraska Press; Lincoln, 1995), 3 vols. 17

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moments of an organic unit in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.”19 The motivating energy for this historical teleology was Mind. Subjective agency was the cause of the production of its historical phenomenology.20 Hegel’s theory of pneumatics, the origination of phenomenon, rested upon the premise of the constitutive power of subjectivity. Phenomenon were the products of interfusion, or the penetration of substance into objectivity, or objectivity was merely an image of subjective substance extending itself into essence. Hegel unified his theories of historical stages with his theory of constitutive agency. All of his historical studies described this discipline as a teleology of three stages. Hegel used the logic of the syllogism as offering the most accurate portrayal of historical progress. In his The Philosophy of Mind, Hegel portrayed the evolution of Mind as progressing in three stages: (1) Mind Subjective; (2) Mind Objective; (3) Mind Absolute.21 In his The Philosophy of Right, he described the evolution of political theory as progressing in three stages: (1) Abstract Right; (2) Morality; (3) Ethical Life.22 In his Philosophy of Nature, which is the second part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Hegel divided Nature into three parts: (1) Mechanics; (2) Chemistry; (3) Organics. The third tier, Organics, was the realm of animal and human life. The Phenomenology of Spirit contains two chapters which were descriptions of the power of interfusion. These chapters were “The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity”23 and “Individuality Which Takes Itself To Be Real In and For Itself.”24 Both chapters concentrate upon the phenomenological instincts of Mind  Hegel, G.W.F.  The Philosophy of Spirit, trans. A.V.  Miller (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1977), p. 2. 20  Ibid., p. 246. 21  Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, ibid., p. 20. 22  Hegel, G.W.F. The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1942), pp. XIII–XIV. 23  Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 221–235. 24  Ibid., pp. 236–262. 19

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and both chapters contain Hegel’s reflections on work and labor. Both chapters analyze the transition from constitutive subjectivity to work and labor. Hegel’s theory of originative kinesis was not limited to the objectifications of labor. Hegel’s phenomenology unified the different realms of consciousness and political economy.25 Hegel referred to the process of the unification of the subject and the object as “interfusion.”26 Hegel maintained that the individual could not subsist in its isolated Selfhood, but that its continued existence was dependent upon its connection with a universal. This process of “interfusion” was the moment when self-consciousness guaranteed itself continuity. It was the moment when self-consciousness synthesized with the social world, or “interfusion” was the inception of the historical.27 Not only was Mind the force that brought about the unity of subject and object, or historic existence, but Will also contained the same power. Will, by establishing preference, also initiated end and purpose. In order to fulfill its preference, Will must be driven forward by end or purpose, and the fulfillment of end was realization.28 Hegel’s awareness of the pneumatic power of Mind was not limited to the sphere of philosophy, or historiography, but extended to the domain of political economy. Hegel translated the concept of the constitutive subject into a theory of needs, work, and labor. In order for the human species to survive, its biological needs must be gratified. In fact, the gratification of biological needs was the precondition for the productivity of Mind. Work took two forms, individual and social. Individual work was the primitive, the hunter who killed animals only to satisfy his own needs, or that of his family. Individual work did not require social interaction. Social work was the productive activity of an individual within a group, and it did require social intercourse. Social work was the ground of communities, the advancement of the Self into a universality.

 Ibid., p. 212.  Ibid., p. 246. 27  Ibid., p. 239. 28  Ibid., p. 241. 25 26

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In describing human productivity, Hegel also employed the term labor. Labor, an originative drive, created objects or things which had shapes. The “Individuality Which Takes Itself to Be Real in and for Itself ” in The Phenomenology of Spirit recognized that labor was a prime source of sociability. To labor in the production of clothing, tables, required the laborer to surround their individuality and collaborate toward a purpose agreed upon by all the involved producers. Work and labor were one basis of social being, or social being, a universality, was an outcome of work and labor. “Civil society” was the culmination of social being. “Civil society” was the ascent of individuality to the universal. In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel presented “civil society” as a stage in the development of ethical life, or “civil society” was a precondition for ethical life, and ethical life achieved its full realization in the State. The chapter, “The System of Needs,” in The Philosophy of Right, was the first stage in Hegel’s anatomy of “civil society.”29 By the term “System of Needs,” Hegel meant the interdependence of individuals which developed from the power of seeking sustenance. In the “System of Needs,” Hegel refers to the work of Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, and David Ricardo.30 Hegel was familiar with the origin of the science of Political Economy. He recognized the importance of Political Economy to this theory of the State, and his reading in Political Economy formed one of his introductions to the concept of labor. Labor, or work, performed two functions; it was the means to satisfy needs, it was also the means for the establishment of mutual interdependence and this social reciprocity was the ground of ethics. Hegel was also aware that labor, work, led to class and class divisions. Labor must adapt to different productive functions, some labor must be devoted to agriculture, some labor to fishing, other labor to manufacturing. The differentiations in labor led to classes or class referred to individuals whose efforts were designed to achieve different productive outcomes.31

 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 126.  Ibid., p. 127. 31  Ibid., p. 129. 29 30

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The differentiation of productive ends led to class divisions. Workers involved in agriculture were unified by their mutual labor efforts and this unification was the ground of the agricultural class. Similarly, workers whose labor was devoted to manufacture, furniture, for example, were united by the common manufacturing experience and formed the industrial class.32 Hegel was familiar with capitalism. He was a defender of private property, and also recognized that a specialized class gained control of the greater portion of private property. This class which owned the greatest share of private property was the capitalist class. According to Hegel, the function of this capitalist class was to provide the opportunity for all to develop their skills and education to the highest levels. The purpose of the capitalist class was the increase in economic production so that all would benefit.33 In addition, Hegel recognized the political economic category of value. In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel wrote: “Through work the raw material directly supplied by nature is specifically adapted to these numerous ends by all sorts of different processes. Now this formative change confers value on means and gives them their utility, and hence man in what he consumes is mainly concerned with the products of men. It is the products of human effort which man consumes.”34 Through his study of Smith, Say, and Ricardo, Hegel developed a theory of value. It is important to recognize that Hegel’s theory of value differed from Aristotle’s theory of value. Aristotle’s associated value with chrematistics, or value was an expression of exchange. In Hegel, value was the outcome of labor. In Hegel, value was the result of a “formative change” created by human labor. The constitutive agent in the formation of value was labor. Hegel’s political economy was a continuation, a projection of his theory of Mind. Hegel’s theory of production was predicated upon the conviction that Mind was the originative force in the universe. When Hegel transferred from the realm of philosophy to the realm of political economy, labor  Ibid.  Ibid., pp. 129–130. 34  Ibid., p. 129. 32 33

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became the originative kinesis. Mind was the dynamic force in the production of religion, or philosophy. In the sphere of political economy the dynamic force was labor. Hegel looked upon the relation between the human species and nature as a metabolic process. In order to survive or produce, the human species must consume nature. The human species must produce its own subsistence from the materiality provided to it by nature. But this process of consumption was simultaneously also a process of subsumption. As soon as the human species ingested an object of nature, it instantaneously subsumed that object because the inherent pneumatics of the species produced an object of a higher level. The process of subsumption succeeding the process of consumption results in the transformation of the object into a higher form. Hegel’s The Philosophy of Right is an exemplification of the immanent telos of the constitutive subject to the universal. In The Philosophy of Right, this theological ascent is composed of three stages: (1) Abstract Right; (2) Morality; (3) Ethical Life. Abstract Right is the stage of individual right. In the second stage of the entelechy, Morality, the individuality became aware that it possessed a Will, and possession of a Will instructed the individual that it had the power to choose. Morality was grounded in the Will’s awareness that it could select alternative avenues of action. The recognition, that the Will had choice, was the basis of the alternative between good and evil and thus the origin of individual morality. In the third stage, Ethics was created by moral choices, or Ethics became existent when the good was universally selected by Will. The third stage in the entelechy of the Ethical was itself divided into three immanent stages: the Family, “Civil Society,” and the State. The structure of The Philosophy of Right was syllogistic. The syllogistic model was also the structure adopted in Hegel’s The Philosophy of History, and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. The Encyclopedia was partitioned into three parts and separate volumes: The Logic, The Philosophy of Nature, and The Philosophy of Mind. The Philosophy of History was divided into four parts: The Oriental World, the Greek World, the Roman World, and the German World. Even though there are four subdivisions in The Philosophy of

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History, its structure was syllogistic because the major emphasis is on the Greek, Roman, and Modern culturo-political worlds. It is vital to draw a distinction between the dialectic and the syllogism when diagnosing Hegel’s method of explanation. The dialectic was a logic of negativity, or it eliminated an alternative proposition, and by eliminating a competing proposition, it simplified decision making. A syllogism was both fusion and advance. In a syllogism, two competing propositions did not seek to vanish the other, but rather to integrate them and out of this integration, an advance, a new synthesis, was achieved. The contradiction between the dialectic and the syllogism is alluded to at this point to emphasis Hegel’s preference for the syllogism or an instrument in the analysis of culturo-logico-politico-historico-evolution. Hegel did not extend his method of explanation to political economy. This was the specialization of Marx. Hegel applied the syllogism to the culturo-­ logico-­ politico-historico-evolution, whereas Marx borrowed Hegelian exploratory methodology, the syllogism, and applied it to pneumatic modes of activity. My discussion of Aristotle contained a summary of the vocabulary used by Aristotle in his presentation of his philosophy. This summary was employed to highlight central Aristotelian concepts and also establish the ground for demonstrating the presentation of Aristotelian ideas in both Hegel and Marx. In the following paragraphs, I will set forth a lexicon of key Hegelian vocabularies as a means of establishing the continuity in specific areas of Aristotelianism in Hegel. Corresponding to the discussion of Aristotle, the following analysis of the Hegelian glossary is divided into two categories: (a) Theory of Production; (b) Method of Explanation.

(a) Theory of Production The Theory of Production will include the following lexicon: (1) Metabolism; (2) Metamorphosis; (3) Appropriation-Consumption; (4) Determination; (5) Realization; (6) Actual-Potential; (7) Transformation; (8) Subject-Object; (9) Substance-Essence; (10) Form-Content

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1. Metabolism Hegel viewed the relationship between humanity and nature as a metabolic process. The survival of the animal and human species depended upon the fulfillment of needs such as food, water, shelter, and clothing. In order to satisfy these needs, the animal and human species must interact with their natural surroundings.

2. Metamorphosis The metabolism of the human species was the basis of the metamorphosis of externality. The pneumatics of the human species was the energy causing the metamorphosis of their externality.

3. Appropriation-Consumption The metabolic process contained two stages. In the first stage, in order to conduct a metamorphosis of externality, it was necessary for the pneumatic impulse to appropriate this externality. The pneumatic force must first appropriate this externality, make it a slave of its will. In the second stage, the productive agent must consume the externality. After the pneumatic agency appropriated the object, it must then consume it so the agency could remodel it.

4. Determination The terms “labor,” “posit,” “end,” “purpose,” and “construction” were synonyms for the word determination. The pneumatic agency in Hegel was Mind and the term determination referred to the end or purpose of Mind. Consciousness exerted itself to fulfill an end and determination referred to the shapes imposed on externality by Mind. Except for very few occasions, only when he discussed political economy, Hegel did not utilize the term labor. For Hegel, labor was a term that was only overwhelmingly referential to the industrial

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manufacturing process. Regardless of Hegel’s prejudice, Mind labored. The predicative process Hegel referred to when he wrote of determination was perfectly translatable into labor. Marx realized this and consequently substituted the term labor for the Hegelian determination.

5. Realization Realization pertained to the achievement of the ends of Mind’s pneumatic process. Realization was the achievements of the existence of a purpose.

6. Actual-Potential Synonyms for the concepts of actual-potential are: in-itself; for-itself; implicit-explicit; being-for-self and being-for-another; esoteric-exoteric. The actual was a notion of Mind that was untouched, totally separated from external materiality. Since it was completely cut off from external materiality, it was an in-itself, an implicit, a being-for-itself. The terms “in-itself,” “implicit,” and “being-for-itself ” were designed to describe a notion, an idea, which was totally self-contained. But the constitutive agency moved the actual into external reality. The nature of the constitutive agency required that the actual find an existence into external materiality. When the actual entered the external materiality it was corrupted by this physicality. The purity of the actual could not be maintained in the external and the actual became the potential, or the esoteric became the exoteric.

7. Transformation: Metastasis Transformation referred to the outcome of the movement from actual to potential, and the process of determination. In the movement from the actual to the potential, the in-itself was transformed or the in-itself underwent a change of identity. The implicit became the explicit, or its identity was no longer the isolation from the external, but rather its incorporation

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into the external. The transformation of the actual to the potential concerned the redefinition of its identity, it was no longer a notion, but rather a reality, no longer an aspiration, but a causal factor in the material world.

8. Subject-Object The subject-object relationship was a synopsis of Hegel’s theory of production. Hegel’s theory of pneumatics proceeded in four stages: (1) the subject; (2) objectification; (3) the object; (4) alienation, or self-­ estrangement. The subject in Hegel was the constitutive agency, or Mind. The subject was the impulse, that in-itself, which moved outward toward reality. Objectification designated the movement from the in-itself into the external. Objectification was a description of the process by which the being-in-itself acquired a form. The object was the realization of the process of objectification. The realization of the object is confirmed by the object’s participation in reality, or the object was defined as a causal energy in the evolution of the external.

9. Substance-Essence In Hegel, substance was the in-itself. Substance was the constitutive agency. Substance was the being-for-itself which sought to become an object. Essence was the continuity of Substance. In order for Substance to enter into reality, it must possess continuity, it must sustain itself. Temporality must be an attribute of Substance, and this temporality was essence. Essence is what was propelled out of the Substance enabling it to reappear in a multiplicity of objects. The realization of the process of objectification into an object contained a tragic element. The actualization of objectification created alienation. The entrance of the object into reality caused a total separation of the object from the pneumatic subjectivity and this separation was alienation.

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10. Form-Content Synonyms for Forms were shapes, modes. Forms related to the externality of an object, whereas content related to its inner substance. Forms were the materiality of objects. In themselves, Forms were static. They were the productive outcomes of Mind, but in themselves they possessed no agency, they were not constitutive. Content referred to the essence of forms. Content referred to the behavior of a Form in a situation in which it was surrounded by a multitude of contrasting Forms. The Form-Content logic played an enormously important role in Hegel’s analysis of history, or sociopolitical-ethical structures. Hegel considered the Oriental, Greek, Roman, Medieval, Modern passages of history as Forms, or they all were entities inhabited by different Contents.

(b) Method of Explanation This analysis of Hegel’s method of explanation is divided into 11 subdivisions: (1) Method; (2) Organic; (3) Universal-Particular; (4) Development; (5) Immanence; (6) Subsumption; (7) Abstract-Concrete; (8) Negation; (9) Function; (10) Precondition; (11) Syllogism.

1. Method Hegel’s method of explanation corresponded to his theory of pneumatics. This correspondence was divided into two parts: (a) Anti-Positivism; (b) A Recapitulation of His Theory of Production. (a) Hegel rejected the positivism of the natural sciences. He rejected the idea that the natural sciences could discover the cosmic laws of the universe. Similarly, since natural science could not discover the operative laws of the universe, so they were incapable of uncovering the operative principles of history.

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(b) Hegel’s method of explaining historical events corresponded to his theory of Mind. The continued productivity of Mind required a method that could account for perpetual transformation. The natural sciences were opposed to this necessity because their ultimate purpose was the discovery of the external laws of nature. History was different from Nature. Hegel’s method of explaining historical events must accord with temporality. Time was a precondition of history and therefore a method to understand history must be predicated on temporality.

2. Organic The organic itself contained four subdivisions: (A) whole and parts; (B) totality; (C) anatomy; (D) system. The organic image was the indispensable tool of social analysis for Hegel. The organic image meant that a historical period must be diagnosed as a whole that was divided into parts. When Hegel adopted the organic viewpoint, he applied the anatomical image to society. Hegel explained social formations in biological terms, or he saw historical forms as anatomies which must be defined as whole, but deconstructed into parts. Historical development was the result of the conflict between whole and parts. A new historical stage was reached when a new anatomical form was attained, when a new reciprocity between whole and parts became dominant.

3. Universal-Particular The universal-particular coupling was a synonym for whole and parts. The concept of negativity was a primary force in Hegel’s logic. Negativity meant cancellation, or annulment. The universal-particular, when used as a method of explanation in the realm of history, was the application of the logic of negative-positive to the sociological realm. The particular was a negation of the universal, while the universal was also a negation of the

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particular. Even though a historical organism was dependent upon the existence of the universal-particular, this same historical system reflected an antithesis, a contradiction, between the whole and parts. The balance between the universal and particular was the ground for the preservation of the historical form, but it was simultaneously the antithesis between whole and parts, which was the force for the disruption of the historical form.

4. Development Hegel’s theory of explanation was a predication of the idea of development. Movement was an outcome of his theory of inherent antithesis. The opposition of two abstractions, whole and parts, led to development. Opposition could never be reconciled and so one contradictory force must be nullified and this nullification was the basis for an advance to a higher stage. Development was the process by which contradictions were overcome.

5. Immanence Synonyms for immanence were: teleology (telos), inherent tendency, entelechy. Immanence meant inherent tendency. The constitutive power in Hegel was Mind, and Mind sought to realize itself. Mind possessed a drive, a power toward this self-realization and this drive was immanence. Immanence endowed Mind with teleology. The persistent, prevailing continuity of Mind to attain its purpose gifted Mind with a teleological power. Teleology was progressive, it was always ascending because the movement to an end always contained a climbing into the upward stages of that end. Immanence introduced entelechy. If the inherent tendency of Mind was to objectify itself, then the sociohistorical universe illustrated an entelechy. Hegel’s philosophy of history was grounded upon entelechy, the telos of Mind to reveal history, or the replication of Mind.

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6. Subsumption A synonym of subsumption was metamorphosis. Subsumption meant the absorption of an object into a more powerful agency. Subsumption meant the loss of identity by a lesser object when it was consumed by a stronger capacity. Consumption involved metamorphosis, because a new definition was imposed upon an object after it was consumed by the stronger functionary. An illustration of subsumption was the transformation of an individual in the course of a political revolution. When the individual lived in a democracy, he possessed the right of free speech and he was outspoken and self-expressive. Suddenly a revolution succeeded and imposed a dictatorship. The individual was now silent, secretive, suppressing his private opinions. The success of the revolutionary dictatorship subsumed him and compelled a transformation of his identity. Subsumption was a major force in Hegel’s philosophy. Historical stages were the agencies of subsumption. Individuality was an object that was constantly subsumed by the passage of historical forms.

7. Abstract-Concrete The abstract was primary. In the advancement of thought, the achievement of generality was the most significant stage. The abstract was universality, and the rise to the level of universality opened limitless horizons. The concrete evolved out of the abstract. The concrete was the particularization of the abstract. The first step in philosophic speculations was to grasp the abstract, and then specify the abstract into the concrete. In this process, the concrete would be defined in greater clarity because the background of the abstract, or universal, would render its particularity more visible.

8. Negation Synonyms for negation were nullification and contradiction.

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Negation did not mean to obliterate. Neither negation, nullification, or contradiction meant destruction. Hegel employed negation in the sense of Spinoza. Negation meant to limit. Negation meant to establish a border, a boundary, to an object, or idea. The establishing of a border, or a boundary, was to postulate a limit, or limitation was a part of definition. The setting forth of what an object or idea was not was the same as setting forth what an object or idea was nonbeing established the pneumatics of being.

9. Function Synonyms for function were relationship and mediation. Function was the purpose of an action. Function was an activity which allowed an end to be realized. In Hegel, negation possessed a function. The function of negation was to establish a Being, and if Being was put forth, then the purpose of negation was achieved and function was the realization of the purpose of negation. For Hegel, the understanding of the complexity of a society meant to comprehend the multiple interrelationships of that society. A society, a universal, was a multitude of individual parts and each of these parts interacted with each other. A part was not isolated and could only be understood when seen in its relationship with another part. Furthermore, the meaning of a part was transformed by the nature of a relationship, and so a part could only be assigned different meanings as a consequence of its changed relationship with multiple other objects. Function was a relationship which either fulfilled the purpose of a subjective agent, or negated that purpose.

10. Precondition A synonym for precondition was presupposition. Precondition referred to the emergence of factors which permitted a social reality to appear. A social reality, an historical epoch, could only

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enter into existence by passing through two stages: (1) precondition; (2) realization. Precondition related to development and the teleology of movement possessed an end. In order for a historical development to realize its purpose, it must pass through necessary presuppositions, or states which permitted a historical era to advance to its fulfillment. Preconditions were those factors which allowed for the teleology of a historical era to reach its realization.

11. Syllogism Previous paragraphs in this chapter introduced the vital role played by the syllogism in Hegel’s method of explanation. At this point, the discussion will remind the reader of the importance of the syllogism in Hegel’s method of explanation. It took precedence over the dialectic. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right passed through three stages: Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life. Abstract Right was Universality, or U; Morality was the Particular, or P; Ethical Life was the synthesis; the progressive stage over U and P, or a new individuality, or the I. The syllogism was the transcendence of contradiction, it created a new synthesis from contrasting themes. Abstract Right Universality, or U, was dialectically opposed by the Particularity of Morality, or P, but this dialectical nullification was transcended by the syllogistic fusion of Ethical Life, or I. The dialectic was the unreconciled conflict between Abstract Right, U, and Morality, P.  The syllogism was the resolution of this conflict and an advance to the higher synthesis into I, or a new Individuality, or spiritual ascent. Before proceeding to my discussion of Marx, it will contribute to the meaning of this chapter to briefly comment on the continuity between Hegel and Marx as analyzed in the work of Georg Lukacs. In the 1920s, Lukacs was a devoted advocate of the revolutionary heroism of Nicolai Lenin, see his Lenin,35 and in the 1960s he rebelled against Stalinism and was a founder of the Hungarian Reform Movement, and in 1972 he  Lukacs, Georg, Lenin: A Study of His Life and Thought (Luchterhand; Vienna, 1924).

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published his ground-breaking Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, which was one of the first books to establish the continuity between Hegel and Marx36 A prior book to the Lukacs masterpiece was Herbert Marcuse’s 1932 Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit37 My book, Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle is a continuation, concentrating on Lukacs, of the Marcuse-Lukacs tradition. I will discuss Lukacs’s thesis of the continuity between Hegel and Marx under the following six categories: (1) Ontology; (2) Historicity; (3) Pneumatics; (4) Teleology; (5) Constitutive Subject; (6) Need. In analyzing these six categories, I will apply a form-content methodology.

1. Ontology In terms of form, Hegel and Marx both adhered to an ontology. Both agreed that the development of the world was controlled by a universal principle. Being and Becoming were words employed by both Hegel and Marx to describe the movements of their ontology. The purpose of ontology in both Hegel and Marx was the origin of Lukacs’s title to his masterpiece, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins.

2. Historicity In terms of form, both Hegel and Marx were in agreement over the nature of historicity. The ontology of Mind in Hegel was the basis of historicity, while in Marx the ontology of social labor was the basis of historicity. However, when relating historicity to substance, Hegel and Marx were in total disagreement. The cause of historicity in Hegel was Mind, whereas the cause of historicity in Marx was social labor. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind described the evolution of human history as a result of the activity of Mind. Becoming was Mind. Marx’s Das Kapital

 Lukacs, G. Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen seins (Hermann Luchterhand; Darmstadt, 1972).  Marcuse, H.  Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit (Klostermann: Berlin, 1932). 36 37

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maintained that the movement of human history was propelled by human labor. Becoming in Marx was labor.

3. Pneumatics In terms of form, both Hegel and Marx were in agreement that history was driven forward by a pneumatic force. A pneumatic energy resulted in production and both Hegel and Marx recognized that history was the outcome of a pneumatic kinesis. Hegel and Marx stood opposed as to the in-itself of this pneumatic propellant. While Hegel maintained that the in-itself of the pneumatic energy was Mind, Marx proposed that this pneumatic force was social labor.

4. Teleology Both Hegel and Marx agreed on the existence of teleology in terms of form. Purpose, end, and goal were the impetus of human action. In terms of substance, large divisions separated Hegel and Marx. In Hegel, teleology was Mind’s search for an end. Mind sought a direction. Conversely, in Marx teleology was driven by social labor, or the end of social labor was production, or the procurement of objects, which fulfilled human needs. Lukacs built on the teleological perspectives of both Hegel and Marx. In Part Two of his Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, entitled “Die Arbeit,” Lukacs employed the phrase “teleological positivity.”38 By the phrase “teleological positivity,” Lukacs meant work, and work which had a goal. As a Marxist, “teleological positivity” in Lukacs referred to work, which possessed the purpose of fulfilling need.

 Lukacs, G. Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen seins, p. 13.

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5. Constitutive Subject On the basis of form, both Hegel and Marx were aware of the existence of the constitutive subject. In both Hegel and Marx the constitutive subject was the kinesis of historical evolution. But differences existed between the two men over content. Whereas in Hegel the constitutive subject was Mind, in Marx the constitutive subject was human labor. In Marx, the constitutive subject was the motility of history. Again, Lukacs’s work, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, added to the Hegel-Marx idiom of the constitutive subject. In Part Two of this masterpiece, “Die Arbeit,” Lukacs demonstrates how the principle of the principle of constitutive subject dates back to the ancient philosopher Aristotle. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle did not use the term “constitutive subject,” but rather dynamics.39 By the term “dynamics” Aristotle, like Hegel and Marx, referred to the inherent, the immanent, impulse of the human species to reconstruct the external world.

6. Need In terms of form, production in Hegel was primarily directed at increased manufacturing capacity. In terms of substance, production to meet needs was not a major concern for Hegel, whereas it was the centrality of Marx’s speculations of labor. The substance of labor in Marx was the satisfaction of human needs. For Marx the satisfaction of needs was the essential goal, whereas the increase in productive capacity was a means for the satisfaction of needs. Just as it was impossible for Hegel to arrive at a theory of value without first redefining his philosophy, so it was impossible for Marx to arrive at his own theory of value without first redefining political economy. This was a task he, for the most part, embarked upon in his 1846–1847 The Poverty of Philosophy, his 1846 letter to P.V. Annenkov, and his 1865 letter to J.B. Schweizter.

39

 Ibid., p. 44.

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In particular, in Chapter II, “The Metaphysics of Political Economy” in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx attacks classical political economy as a form of metaphysics.40 Marx’s demolition of classical political economy, essentially Pierre Proudhon, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith, was derived from two principles: (1) Metaphysics; (2) The Proper Adaptation of Hegel.

1. Metaphysics Marx’s attack on classical political economy as a form of metaphysics derived from the fact that classical political economy had not integrated the idea of history into its paradigm. Marx’s critique of Proudhon differed from his attack on Smith and Ricardo. Marx’s refutation of Proudhon concentrated on Proudhon’s excessive abstractionism. Proudhon fused “all producers into one single producer, all consumers into a single consumer, and sets up a struggle between these two chemerical personages.”41 Proudhon overgeneralized, or idealized, because he did not take account of the historical, sociological separations between individual producers, or consumers. Proudhon treated producers and consumers as singular identities, or unified totalities and consequently, overlooked individual particularities. When Proudhon employed this uniform approach he negated history, or history dealt with metamorphosis, with differentiation.42 Adam Smith and David Ricardo committed the same error. They grounded their political economy on the universality of labor. For Smith and Ricardo, labor was a constant, a permanence. Marx rejected Smith and Ricardo because they also negated history. They denied the fact that labor possessed a historicity, that labor assumed different modes depending upon the socioeconomic conditions which surround it. Marx’s task was to accomplish for political economy what Hegel accomplished for philosophy. Hegel transformed philosophy by amalgamating it with history. Movement, history became the presupposition  Marx, K. The Poverty of Philosophy (International Publishers, New York, 1963), pp. 179–202.  Ibid., pp. 103–126. 42  Ibid., p. 42. 40 41

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of philosophy. Marx Hegelianized political economy, or he made history the presupposition of political economy: Every production, the modes of labor, manufacture, and consumption could only be understood as historical movements. Marx’s reconstruction of political economy on the basis of Hegel’s historicity also entailed Marx’s incorporation of Hegelian logical categories. Explaining the historicity of political economy necessitated those logical categories that were themselves rooted in historicity. Marx’s revolution in the redefinition of political economy was preparation for his revolution in the definition of historical stages. Whereas Hegel defined history as the advance of cultural forms, Oriental, Greek, Roman, German, Marx defined history as the telos of productive stages: primitive communism, hunting and fishing, agriculture, mercantilism, and industrialism. Similarly, Marx’s revolution in the concept of labor, his nullification of Smith and Ricardo, was a preparation for his revolution in the theory of value. In order to grasp Marx’s redefinition of the theory of value, it is first necessary to understand Marx’s knowledge of the history of the idea of value. In the context of his book, it is necessary to account for the concept of value in Aristotle. In Das Kapital, Marx affirmed his indebtedness to Aristotle when he praised the Greek in the following terms: “The two particularies of the equivalent form we have just developed will become still clearer if we go back to the great investigator who was the first to analyze the value-form, like so many other forms of thought, society and nature. I mean Aristotle.” “Aristotle therefore himself tells us what prevented any further analysis: the lack of a concept of value. What is the homogenous element, i.e. the common substance which the house represents from the point of view of the bed, in the value expression for the bed? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. But why not? Towards the bed, the house represents something equal in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the bed and the house. And that is—human labor.”43 Aristotle was aware that in order for objects to be exchanged there must be a homogeneous element, or a common element in two objects which made exchange possible. Two laborers would not exchange objects 43

 Marx, K. Das Kapital, trans. Ben Faukes (Vintage Books; New York, 1977), Vol. I, p. 151.

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they produced unless they both traded equivalents. Neither of the laborers wanted to suffer a loss. In addition, Aristotle was the beneficiary of Marx’s commendation earlier than Das Kapital. In The Critique of Political Economy, 1859, Marx expressed his indebtedness to both Aristotle and Plato. Indicating his awareness of the study of the organic mode of production in ancient Greece, Marx wrote: “In antiquity writers, who were able to observe only the phenomena of metallic currency, among them Plato and Aristotle, already understood that gold coin is a symbolic token of value.”44 Therefore, the objects must possess commensurable factors; there must be some form of equivalence in the objects so they could be exchanged. Aristotle did not identify labor as the commensurable factor, but he was aware of the principles of equivalence and commensurability which were fundamental to his theory of chrematistics. Aristotle invented the idea of equivalence, but did not see labor as the source of equivalence. Aristotle expounded his doctrine of equivalence in his The Nicomachean Ethics. In Book 5, Chapter 5 of The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explained his concept of commensurability.45 Marx knew The Nicomachean Ethics and absorbed the ideas of equivalence and commensurability from Aristotle. The only addition that Marx made to this Aristotelian invention was to make labor the substance of equivalence and commensurability.46 Furthermore, not only did Marx derive his ideas regarding commensurability from Aristotle, but also the notions of use value and exchange value. In terms of his derivation of use value and exchange value from Aristotle, Marx was more explicit. The first chapter of the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Part II, volume 3.1 is entitled, “The Production Process of Capital: The Transformation of Gold in Capital.” Written in 1861, the chapter analyzed the transformation of gold into capital, or the valorization process. Marx proposed that the inherent tendency of capitalist production was the insatiable  Marx, K.  A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. S.W.  Ryazanskaya (International Publishers; New York, 1972), p. 117. 45  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 1010–1011. 46  Marx, K. Das Kapital, Vol. I, pp. 124–129. 44

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acquisition of valorized gold, or capital. On page 16 of this volume, Marx wrote: “The above description closely corresponds to what Aristotle wrote in Book 1, Chapter 7 of The Politics.”47 In Book 1, Chapter 9 of The Politics, Aristotle was concerned with the acquisition of wealth, and he identified two chrematistics which assisted in the acquisition of wealth, use value, and exchange value. In The Politics, Aristotle wrote: “For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter.”48 The most important contribution Aristotle bestowed upon Marx, however, was the concept of the constitutive subject. For Aristotle, the originator of production was the constitutive subject, or the substance of the subject was to externalize itself in objects. It is important to distinguish between the constitutive subject and substance when diagnosing Aristotle’s theory of production. The constitutive subject was the individual, a drive, impulse of the individual to externalize itself. The term “substance” referred to this inherent telos on the part of the individual to produce. In Aristotle, substance referred to an instinct in the subject to project itself into the external. In addition, another area in which Aristotle influenced the thought of Marx regarded the issue of the inherent sociability of the human species. In his The Politics, Aristotle made the following statement: “Hence, it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal.”49 Aristotle’s use of the phrase “political animal” was equivalent to “social being.” The phrase “political animal” comes from Book I, Chapter II of The Politics and was part of Aristotle’s discussion of the inherent need of the human species to live in communities. Marx found support for his idea that humankind was basically a social animal, and on this point a line of continuity connected Aristotle, Feuerbach, Rousseau, and Marx.  Marx, K. Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (Dietz Verlag; Berlin, 1978), Vol. II, Book 3, p. 16.  Aristotle, The Politics, ibid., p. 1138. 49  Ibid., p. 1127. 47 48

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Feuerback’s principle that humankind possessed a “social being” was a continuation of Aristotle’s “political animal,” and Marx adopted both Feuerbach and Aristotle. Marx rejected the individualism of Natural Law theory, Locke and Hume, and was a representative of the Aristotle-­ Feuerbach-­Rousseau school of thought. In The Politics, Aristotle offered the following account of value: “For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried out, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purpose of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time, they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to make its value.”50 Value for Aristotle meant equivalence. Value was the measurement of exchange because if two objects were equivalent the process of exchange was facilitated. In Aristotle, value did not derive from labor, but from equivalence which facilitated exchange. Conversely, in Marx value was a product of labor. In Marx, labor was that form of the constitutive subject that functioned in the pneumatic sphere. Labor entered into the object it produced and therefore labor was the source of the value of the produced object. In addition, Aristotle and Marx had contradictory definitions of substance. Aristotle envisioned substance as a species quality. The instinct of an individual to fabricate an object was an inherited capacity of the individual and therefore composed a substance. In Marx, substance did not relate to a species quality. In Marx, substance was the result of labor. Substance was the insertion of labor into an object. Marx himself confirmed the equivalence between labor and substance. Chapter One of Das Kapital, Volume I, concerns the definition of the commodity. In Marx, the commodity form played an indispensable role in the function of capitalism. Marx needed to account for the origin of the commodity and, in his definition of the commodity, he presented the commodity as the substance of human labor. “However, let us remember that commodities possess an objective character as values only in so far as  Ibid.

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they are all expressions of an identical social substance, human labor, that their objective character as values is therefore purely social.”51 Marx’s attack on natural law as a procedure for explaining social development, not the activities of nature itself, was combined with his rejection of Materialism. Marx denied the idea that it was possible to explain human behavior as a reaction to external stimuli. An Aristotelian, committed to the idea of the constitutive subject, Marx’s theory of production was a refutation of Materialism. For Marx, Aristotle, Hegel, the substance of the individual was the formation of external objects. History was a vast storehouse of human productivity. In the Grundrisse, Marx unambiguously rejected Materialism. He wrote: “Accusations about the materialism of this conception. Relation to naturalistic materialism.”52 One of the earliest scholars of Marx who perceptively identified Marx as a naturalist in contradistinction to materialism was Ágnes Heller. In her book, The Theory of Need in Marx,53 published in English in 1976, which was a translation of her 1974 German book, Bedeutung und Funktion des Begriffs Bedürfnis im Denken von Karl Marx, Heller correctly recognized that human need was the driving force of the productive process of the human species. The fulfillment of need was a naturalistic enterprise as opposed to materialism, which was a study of the laws of nature. Heller was a student of George Lukacs, who was one of the leaders of the protest against the dialectical materialism of Stalinism. Heller perpetuated this rebellion and her Marxist naturalism was a negation of Soviet Materialism. In order to fully grasp Marx’s rebellion against the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political economy and Idealism, it is necessary at this point to allude to his rejection of Hegelian historiography. Marx’s refutation of Hegelian historiography will contribute to properly grasping Marx’s invention of a new system of explaining productive development. The Idealism of Hegel explained historical evolution in terms of particular forms. Hegel adopted a form-content method in analyzing the evolution of history. Essentially, Hegel depicted historical forms, or  Marx, K., Das Kapital, Vol. I, p. 138.  Marx, K., Grundrisse (Penguin Press; New York, 1993), p. 102. 53  Heller, A., The Theory of Need in Marx (Verso Press; London, 2018). 51 52

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totalities, and these forms were the Oriental, the Greek, the Medieval, and the Germanic. These forms, however, required a context, a cultural definition, and the cultural identity. Hegel maintained these forms were expressions of Mind. The Chinese form was defined by Confucianism, the Greek form was characterized by the invention of a subjective philosophy, the Medieval form was identified by the religion of Jesus, and the German form by the birth of Idealist philosophy. Marx transformed Hegel’s historiography of cultural forms. Marx adopted the concept of a historical form, but the content was not philosophy, but the method of production. Marx’s overthrow of political economy, his overthrow of Hegel’s categorization of historical forms, opened the horizon for him to develop a new method of investigating the evolution of the methods of production. In his search for a new method of understanding the development of the methods of production, Marx’s primary goal was not the prioritization of capitalism. The underlying thrust of Marx’s efforts was to reconstruct the study of the methods of production, and did not evolve from a curiosity regarding capitalism. Within the framework of a universal theory of production and living in the nineteenth century where capitalism became the dominant productive paradigm, Marx concentrated on the capitalist mode of production. Marx specialized on the capitalist mode of production because he assumed this was the best demonstration of his general theory of the historicity of the modes of production. Capitalism was only one illustration of pneumatic output in the history of production. Marx’s notebooks and published writings are filled with descriptions of past pneumatic forms of production. The time between 1861 and 1863 were years in which Marx prepared for the writing of the 1867 Volume I of Das Kapital. During these years of gestation, Marx wrote notebooks in which he explored and advanced his concepts regarding the development of capitalism. These 1861–1863 manuscripts employed the terms Being and Becoming. These were Hegelian terms, but Marx provided them with new sociological meanings. Marx’s redefinition of the Idealist terms Becoming and Being was another instance of his reformulation of Hegel.

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For Marx, Becoming was a synonym for historical movement. When Marx used the term Becoming, he meant that the transformation of society was perpetual. Marx was not referring to an existential condition, but the naturalistic, ceaseless process of history.54 Marx redefined the Hegelian concept of Becoming in sociological terms. Marx redefined Becoming into transformation. In applying the concept of transformation to the progression of forms of productions, Marx outlined the following stages, which were a diagram for his theory of pneumatics. Stage One: A form of production, mercantilism. Stage Two: The introduction into this form of production of new instruments of production. Stage Three: These new instruments of production then subsumed the initial form of production. Subsumption means domination and when the new instruments controlled production, this conquest introduced a new form of production, which was capitalism. Stage Four: Capitalism then transforms every aspect of production into the purpose of capitalism, which is the production of surplus value. In this new form of production, every denomination of that society accepted the purpose, assumed its end, was the accumulation of surplus value. Marx transformed Hegelian Being by the same mechanism. Being was not an existential eternality, but rather a moment. Historical Becoming ensured that Being would be subsumed into the continuous process of production. When it was subsumed it would no longer be Being, but rather a moment in a ceaseless production process. Previous pages in this chapter compared the vocabulary of Aristotle and Hegel regarding the theory of Production and the theory of Explanation. This chapter will now discuss Marx’s vocabulary regarding his theory of Production and theory of Explanation. This exploration of Marx’s lexicon in his Theories of Production and Explanation is executed in order to compare the pneumatics of Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx. The comparison of Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx is intended as a method of contrast, and by contrasting to more decisively isolate the distinctiveness of Marx.

54

 Marx, K., Grundrisse, p. 102.

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Similar to my discussion of Aristotle and Hegel, this scrutiny of Marx’s Doctrine of Pneumatics is divided into two parts: (a) Theory of Production; (b) Theory of Explanation.

(a) Theory of Production This analysis of the vocabulary of Marx’s Theory of Production will be divided into the following 11 parts: (1) Constitutive Subject; (2) Substance-Essence; (3) Actual-Potential; (4) Subject-Object; (5) Appropriation-Consumption; (6) Metabolism; (7) Transformation-­ Interfusion-­ Metamorphosis; (8) Valorization; (9) Commoditization; (10) Alienation; (11) Moment.

1. Constitutive Subject It is necessary to apply a form-content analysis to properly grasp the transformation of the principle of constitutive subject in the thinking of Marx. From the perspective of form, Marx continued the Aristotle-Hegelian concept of the constitutive subject. The originator of the production or modification of external materiality was the individual. Marx’s theory of the constitutive subject was remodeled as his studies in the modes of production advanced. The notions of class, the proletariat, substituted for the concept of individuality. Regardless of these modifications, the form of the constitutive subject supplied the transformative function. The source, the originator of the remodeling of the external materiality was class. All of the following categories of Marx’s theory of pneumatics derived from his embrace of labor as the kinetic force of external modification. Just as the Greeks claimed that human reason, and the Judeo-Christians claimed that God, and the Enlightenment claimed that natural law, were the substructure of social activity, so Marx substituted labor.

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2. Substance-Essence In Aristotle and Hegel, the idea of substance related to the inherent quality of an object, or person. Substance was the quality which identified an object, it was the “is.” In Aristotle and Hegel, essence was the continuity of the substance. Whereas substance was the initiation, essence was the continuity, the outcome of the substance. Marx overthrew the Aristotelian-Hegelian definition of substance-­ essence. In Marx, labor became substance. Labor was the kinetic energy, or the origin of all productive activity. In Marx, labor was the sociological presupposition of all external modifications. In addition, essence in Marx was also a synonym for labor. Marx used the terms substance and essence interchangeably because both found their ultimate ground in labor.

3. Actual-Potential In Marx, the word actual related to the original capacity of labor. Actuality referred to a subjective ability that lie separated from external materiality. Actuality lacked potentiality; it lacked objectification because it had not achieved contact with external materiality. However, the inherent movement of the actual into the external materiality created the possibility of the achievement of objectivity. Actuality referred to a state in which the subject created an object. Potentiality was actuality in a materialized form. Nevertheless, the movement from the actual to the potential could not be attained without a subject. The subject was the agency of transition, the power that made it possible to migrate into the materialized universe.

4. Subject-Object Synonyms for the subject-object relationship are the terms realization, actualization, objectification, and materialization.

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The terms actual-potential-subject-object refer to moments of a continuous process through which a subjective capacity assumes a material form. The productive process traces the ascent from a subject-kinetic energy to a physical object, or an object is the materialization of pneumatics.

5. Appropriation-Consumption A synonym for appropriation-consumption are the terms acquisition and accumulation. The succession of actual-potential-subject-object could not advance without appropriation. In order to produce a materialization, it was necessary for the material to be present. If the pneumatic process was to achieve success it was necessary for it to first consume the material which it was to transform. The process of production requires a simultaneous process of appropriation. If the purpose of the production process was objectification, it was a precondition that a process of consumption supply productivity with the materiality upon which to construct an object.

6. Metabolism Marx identified the relationship between the human species and nature as a metabolic relationship. In order to survive, the human species must satisfy its needs. The species required food, water, clothing, and shelter in order to perpetuate its existence. In order to produce objects to fulfill its needs the human species required materials upon which it could impose its constitutive energy. Raw materials were the supply upon which the production process imprinted itself, contoured an object that fulfilled its needs. The source of this supply was nature. Nature was the inert materiality upon which the pneumatic agency imprinted itself thus producing objects which satisfied human needs. For Marx, the relationship between human species and nature was metabolism. It embodied a mutuality. Nature supplied the inert

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materiality while the human species supplied pneumatic energy which altered the inert materiality into an object which sustained life.

7. Transformation Synonyms for transformation were the terms “metamorphosis” and “interfusion.” For Marx, the productive process was a transformative movement. An object, the wool from a sheep was made into a jacket, but in the manufacturing process the original wool was transformed. In the manufacture of a shovel the original iron ore was transformed into steel and the steel contoured into a shovel. Marx also utilized the term “metamorphosis” to describe the transformation process of production. A jacket could not become a jacket without the sheep’s wool, but sheep wool must undergo a metamorphosis, and human labor was the energy making this metamorphosis possible. Another term used by Marx in describing the process of transformation was intefusion. When Marx used this term he alluded to the interconnection between the constitutive subject and objectivity. Interfusion was a descriptive term because it captured the fusion between the originative agent and the object.

8. Valorization Valorization was the purpose of capitalism. The end of the capitalist mode of production was the increased valorization of a commodity. Marx defined value as the labor time committed to the production of a commodity. If it took 5 hours to produce an object, these 5 hours of labor time formed the value of this object. If the worker labored for 8 hours, 3  hours in addition to the 5  hours needed to manufacture the object, these additional 3 hours were labeled by Marx as surplus-labor because they were hours the laborer worked, but for which he was not paid. The capitalist could take this object, containing 3 hours of unpaid labor, or surplus value, and sell it on the market and receive a profit.

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The purpose of capitalism was the expansion of this period of unpaid labor. If the capitalist could expand their period of unpaid labor, from 3 to 5 hours, he would increase his profit. Valorization meant the expansion of unpaid labor. It was the telos of capitalism because if the capitalist could magnify his unpaid labor, he would consequently magnify his profit, his greed, and his wealth.

9. Commoditization The definition of commoditization requires that it be divided into four parts: (a) capital; (b) capitalism; (c) capitalized; (d) commodity. (a) Capital referred to a specific mode of production. Capital in itself contained no end or purpose. It was a mode of production which superseded agriculture or mercantilism. It was a mode of production which evolved out of a technological revolution, the development of machines and the factory system. (b) Capitalism was the purpose of capital. When capital was directed at the production of surplus value capital became capitalism. When valorization became the telos of capital a transformation process took place: capital was transformed into Capitalism. (c) Capitalized. When a product had been valorized it became capitalized. To be capitalized meant to be implanted with a quantity of surplus value. (d) Commodity. The commodity was the fulfillment of capitalized. The commodity was the object produced by capital and into which surplus value was injected by labor. The commodity was the interfusion of a produced object, capital, and the valorization of that object by human labor. The commodity fulfilled two functions: it satisfied needs and assisted trade. When the commodity satisfied needs, it was a use value. One function of the commodity was to sustain the life of all members of a population by satisfying the life needs of those members. A second function of the commodity was the facilitation of trade, and when the commodity

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fulfilled this function it became an exchange value. Exchange was a necessary function to a productive system if that system was to survive; farmers must send their wheat to cities in exchange for fertilizer which enabled the growth of wheat, and exchange value facilitated this trade between wheat and fertilizer. Without exchange value, the transference of goods became impossible. The survival of capitalism could only be actualized by the social domination of the commodity. The triumph of capitalism was reached when every aspect of society was viewed as a commodity.

10. Alienation A synonym for alienation was self-estrangement. Labor suffers contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, it was the source of value and, on the other hand, it was the victim of commoditization. However, the fulfillment of labor was also its separation from the constitutive agent. The realization of labor ultimately resulted in a commodity. But, the commodity was the realization of exchange and this meant that it was detached from the constitutive subject. The mechanism of exchange was devoted to excessive valorization, the components of the market, and these were isolated from the constitutive subject. When the object of labor was absorbed by forces distinct from labor this was self-estrangement. Alienation referred to a circumstance in which an object, or product of labor, fell under the control of forces of a different nature and purpose than labor.

11. Moment Moment was an instant in the process of production, or the historical process in general was composed of moments. Any process was a constellation of moments, or moments were means to particularize all forms of Becoming.

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(b) The Theory of Explanation My discussion of Marx’s Theory of Explanation is divided into the following eight parts: (1) Method; (2) Precondition; (3) Anatomy; (4) Abstract-Concrete; (5) Subsumption; (6) Immanence; (7) Relation; (8) Form-Content.

1  . Method Marx took Hegelian logical forms and socialized them. For example, Marx reconstructed the Hegelian logical form of immanence. In Hegel, immanence referred to the inherent drive of Thought, or immanence was the continuity, the succession of Thought to its realization in reality. In Marx, immanence still referred to an inner motivation. But in Marx the subject of immanence was not Thought, but productive activity. For example, capital possessed an immanence, a drive to capitalization, but this drive was a productive force, the purpose after a specific mode of production. Marx’s “Introduction” to his 1857 The Grundrisse offers excellent insights into his method of explanation. The Grundrisse was a composite of seven notebooks outlining Marx’s struggle for self-clarification, efforts to refine his theoretical quest as he advanced toward the writing of Das Kapital. It is therefore an irrefutable guide to his intellectual intention. A primary task of the “Introduction” was to isolate the object of his social investigation. Marx defined his object in the following sentence: “Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition.”55 In his establishment of society as the subject of his investigation, Marx again demonstrated his loyalty to Aristotle. The “Introduction” to the Grundrisse also contains this sentence:

 Ibid., p. 84.

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The human being is in the most internal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.56

For Marx, society conditioned individuality. According to natural law traditions, human evolution commenced with the isolated individual being in a jungle. Robinson Crusoe was the anthropological image of the natural law tradition. Marx’s rejection of the natural law tradition was reaffirmed when he ridiculed both Daniel Defoe and Rousseau and their image of the natural man. Marx selected Aristotle over Defoe and Rousseau and in so doing predicated society as the initial subject of social analysis and man as determined by a social community. The subject of Marx’s investigation was society, but a particular aspect of society. Marx’s primary object of investigation was social production. His initial concern was to determine how the human species which lived in societies produced the objects necessary to sustain its life. Marx’s purpose was to write a history of production as this was a new discipline in distinction to philosophical history. Rather than a law, Marx postulated a method. In the Grundrisse “Introduction,” Marx isolated four principles of the productive process: production, distribution, exchange, and circulation. The understanding of a mode of production, evolved from the study of the interconnection of these four principles of production. The different interrelations of these four principles of production produced different modes of production. The confluence of these potentialities altered through time. The temporality compelled distinctive coagulation of the four potentialities. The method of explanation itself accepted this temporality, as method was different from law. Method accepted this temporality and was equipped to account for the alternation in mutual interaction. Marx’s theory of production was nonlinear. Depending upon the temporal moment, the four potentialities could combine into a mode of production, which was regressive. It was a possibility that external forces

56

 Ibid., p. 83.

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could compel the four potentialities into a composite which indicated decline.

2. Precondition A synonym for precondition was presupposition. The socialization of Hegelian methodology was again manifest in Marx’s analysis of the transition of modes of production. The movement of one mode of production into another mode of production was not automatically linear. Rather, the historical change was dependent. In order for modes of production to undergo historical change, it was necessary for precondition, or presupposition, to exist. These preconditions were the combinations of the four potentialities. In order for a mode of production to change, a different combination of the four potentialities must exist. Transitions did not occur without preparations. An existent must be present before a previous mode transpositioned into a new mode. Possibility opened the advance to actuality. Precondition was possibility.

3. Anatomy This discussion of Anatomy will be divided into the following parts: (a) Anatomy; (b) Totality: Whole and Parts; (c) Function; (d) Universal-Particular.

(a) Anatomy Marx’s clearest statement of his method of explanation is located in the “Introduction” to The Grundrisse. “Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly

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still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance within it. Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The institution of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc.”57 Marx drew an analogy between social formations and anatomy. Just as an ape was an interrelated organism, so a social formation also functioned in terms of biological unity. Social systems preserved themselves because, like biological animals, they were able to harmonize the singular elements with the organic universality.

(b) Totality: Whole and Parts Marx’s application of the anatomical image to a social formation also incorporated the epistemology of totality, whole, and parts. Similar to an organism, Marx interpreted a social formation as composed of whole and parts. The whole was the dominant energy, the prevailing function, which underwrote the preservation of the whole. The parts were the particular, the individual elements, within the whole that functioned to preserve the whole. The relation between whole and parts was based on mutual sustainability: the parts required the whole because the whole supplied the parts with a unitary purpose to preserve the whole, and the whole required the parts because the parts supplied the oneness out of which the whole emerged.

(c) Function Function was a vital component in Marx’s explanatory epistemology. Function meant performance. In relation to a social organism, function meant the action performed by a part, a particularity, which contributed to the preservation of a totality. Functionality meant purpose, the operation of a particularity, which was a factor in its continuity of the totality. 57

 Ibid., p. 105.

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(d) Universal-Particular The universal-particular played two roles in Marx’s method of explanation. One role was a function it performed in relation to the organic image and a second role was the function it fulfilled in relation to Marx’s logic. Universal-particular possessed two identities: one anatomical and the second as a process of negation. This discussion will first examine its application to the organic method of explanation. The universal-particular was another logical maneuver by which to comprehend a social anatomy. The universal was a synonym for totality, or the in-itself, the essential quality of a social organism. The particular were the elements, the singularities, of a whole which sustained the whole because they performed activities which fulfilled the purpose, end, teleology of the whole. In its second role as a process of negation, the universal-particular played the role of contradiction. In terms of Marx’s epistemology, the particular negated the universal. The particular demonstrated that a universal was an impossibility. In its negative form, the contradiction between universal-particular was the basis of both Hegel’s and Marx’s definition of the syllogism. Within the syllogism the particular negated the universal and consequently opened the way to a new synthesis. The synthesis was a new construction of the universal and particular.

4. Abstract-Concrete In the description of a social anatomy Marx employed the terms abstract-­ concrete as synonyms for universal-particular. Abstract-concrete also were references to the totality and singularity of a social organism. It was first necessary to arrive at the generality, the in-itself of a social totality. Only after arriving at the abstract was it possible to accurately depict the concrete because the concrete was only an expression of the abstract.

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5. Subsumption Synonyms for subsumption are absorption, reconstruction, and reformation. To properly understand Marx’s usage of subsumption it is necessary to divide it into two parts: (a) Social-Productive; (b) Form-Content

(a) Social-Productive The social-productive definition of subsumption referred to the absorption of one social-productive system by another. The term “subsumption” referred to the ingestion, the osmosis, of one mode of production by another. This definition of the term “subsumption” specifically avoided the terms higher and lower. The use of terms such as higher and lower tends to support a linear progressive view of the productive process and this is a concept contrary to Marx’s historical perception. Marx did not maintain a linear view of the productive process. For Marx there were epochs of decay, situations in which a lower productive process, for various reasons, subsumed a higher level of the productive process. As an example, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the mode of exchange was Mercantilist. In this mode of exchange, the national governments exerted control over the operation of exchange. Capitalism, however, superseded Mercantilism. This meant that the capitalist form of exchange of trade replaced the Mercantilist form. This subsumption meant that the operations of trade now assumed a Capitalist form. Entrepreneurship replaced government planning. Banks were no longer run by royal families, but by individual project seekers. While the forms of trade remained the same, the ends of trade were reconstructed. Unlike Mercantilism, the purpose of banking was now the enrichment of the individual entrepreneur. Productive individualism, private acquisition, and accumulation were the principles of the Capitalist mode of production which subsumed the Mercantilist mode.

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(b) Form-Content The form-content mode of explanation can be applied to the process of subsumption. In the subsumption process, forms remained the same: ships remained ships, factories remained factories, and banks remained banks. However, the content, the end, and the purpose of these material bodies were transformed. The content was no longer the enrichment of the Royal Family and Nobility, but rather the enrichment of bourgeois individuals. Subsumption gestated the origin of a new class, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. The exploration of the logic of subsumption played a huge role in Marx’s theory of explanation. Marx was not primarily interested in material objects, but he was primarily concerned with function. His diagnosis of Capitalism was primarily concerned with ends. When Capitalism subsumed Mercantilism this subsumption reformulated the purpose of productive function. As a result of this reconstruction the purpose of production was no longer the preservation of Monarchy, but the accumulation of wealth in the bourgeoisie.

6. Immanence Synonyms for immanence are tendency, telos, teleology, and entelechy. For Marx, productive organizations were empowered with an immanence by human agents. Capitalism was created by human purpose, supplied with an intent. Capitalism fulfilled that intent, completed the purpose instilled by human activity, and, in its realization of this intent, achieved its immanence. Capitalism possessed an immanent movement. This movement was teleological, or it was movement to an end. The prevailing end of Capitalism was the endless enhancement of surplus value and the entelechy of Capitalism was consequently the continuous accumulation of surplus value. In addition, every individual component of the Capitalist system, labor time, imperialism, was controlled by this teleology.

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7. Relation Synonyms for relations were mediation and means. The definition of relation in Marx concerned objective identification, the principles by which an object was defined. It was a question of what forces attributed meaning. Two processes exist for the attribution of meaning: (a) physical; (b) social.

(a) Physical An object can be assigned meaning by its physical objectivity. An automobile can be assigned meaning because of its assistance in transportation. Meaning can be attributed to an antibiotic because of its power to fight a disease. Marx accepted this physical attribution of meaning, but it was not his primary definition.

(b) Social Marx’s preemptive definition of meaning was the social context of an object. The meaning of an object was determined by the social function performed by the object. Social totalities were composed of many particularities and these particularities contributed to the maintenance of the social organism. The relation that a particular object held in the preservation of a mode of production attributed meaning to that object. Immanence was the inherent tendency to augment the continuity of a social totality. That relationship was the meaning of the object. When a relationship bestowed continuity on an object, the relationship acquired meaning, or the meaning was its success in preserving that object, a social organism.

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8. Form-Content In Marx’s theory of explanation, the term form-content referred to the difference between object and function. Form related to the object. Form was the material outcome of the production process which moved from potential to actual, or form was the actualization. Content was function. Every objectification was created for a purpose and content was a synonym for purpose. Objects were not static. They fulfilled an end which was imposed on them in the process of creation. For Marx, labor implanted a purpose into the objective forms it created. Content was that implanted labor.

5 Aristotle and Hegel as the Co-authors of Das Kapital

The “Introduction” to the 1857–1858 Grundrisse is entitled “Production, Consumption, Distribution, Exchange (Circulation).” For Marx, these were the four fundamental categories in the pneumatics of production. In the “Introduction,” Marx made his preoccupation clear when he wrote: “The object before us, to begin with, material production.”1 The purpose of the philosophy of Marx was the study of the pneumatology of labor and how this pneumatology assumed unique forms in which it was historically located. The “Introduction” was intended as an outline of these arguments. Within the confines of his chapter, Marx’s phenomenology of production will be divided into three parts: (1) Aristotle’s and Classical Humanism’s Influence on Marx; (2) The Ancient Commune and Civil Society; (3) The Hegelian Logical Categories, which served as the Explanatory Methodology of Marx’s Theory of Production.

 Marx, K., The Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Penguin Books, 1973), p. 83.

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 . Aristotle’s and Classical Humanism’s 1 Influence on Marx This section in itself will be divided into four segments: (a) “Zoon Politikon,” Humankind as Social Beings; (b) The Linear View of History, or Anti-dialectical Materialism; (c) Naturalism; (d) Production, Consumption, Distribution, and Exchange.

(a) “Zoon Politikon,” Humankind as Social Beings Marx’s critique of the concept of individuality acclaimed by Political Science and Political Economy derived from its vision of man as a “Robinsonades,” Daniel Defoe’s “Robinson Crusoe,” as one who lived all alone in the jungles of the globe. The individuality of the seventeenthand eighteenth-century Enlightenment envisioned humankind as “not arising historically but posited by nature.”2 The seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century Enlightenment pictured humankind as atoms, as particles emitted by the laws of nature. Marx received the contradiction of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-­ century view of human nature from Aristotle. In the “Introduction,” Marx adopted the Aristotelian view of humankind as a “zoon politikon,” a naturally political being. Marx wrote that humankind was “an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society,”3 or man was inherently a social being, an example of Feuerbach’s “species being.” In addition, Marx made this comment: “The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.”4 Two clarifying comments are necessary regarding this quote. First, the term “political animal” is a translation because in the Grundrisse Marx used the Greek phrase of “zoon politikon.” Second, the concept of political

 Ibid.  Ibid., p. 84. 4  Ibid. 2 3

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animal was directly drawn from Aristotle’s The Politics and demonstrated the influence Aristotle exerted on Marx. Marx’s intellectual quest thereafter was the realization of Aristotle’s vision of humankind. This attempt was the meaning of Marx’s esteem for “civil society.” Previous chapters indicated that Aristotle employed the term “society” and not “civil society” when referring to the instinctive associationism of humankind. From a nineteenth-century perspective, Marx’s substitution of the term “civil society” carried the same meaning as Aristotle’s “society.” The term “civil society” was a frequent current in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political philosophy, most notably appearing in the work of James Steuart and Adam Ferguson, members of the Scottish Enlightenment that Marx often quoted. Marx took the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concept of “civil society” and redefined it from an Aristotelian perspective. Marx’s conversion to the Aristotelian principle of “zoon politikon” also meant that Marx converted to the Aristotelian formula that associationism was a primary drive in the human species. By associationism, Aristotle meant that humankind possessed an inherent drive toward sociability. Associationism meant that human beings were driven by a psychological necessity to form communities. The ancient commune was a necessary outgrowth of the inherent drive to associationism.

( b) The Linear View of History, or Anti-dialectical Materialism Classical Humanism, as represented by Aristotle, not only provided Marx with the vocabulary necessary to refute the Enlightenment idea of individualism, but also enabled Marx to refute the Stalinist idea of the linear movement of history, or dialectical materialism. According to the dialectical materialism of Soviet Russia, history moved in a linear direction, and the material means of production determined all forms of social expression. Cultures, the arts, were determined by the material means of production that developed in a linear progression. In the Grundrisse, Marx wrote: “In the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their flowering are out of proportion to general

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development of society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its organization. For example, the Greeks compared to the moderns or also Shakespeare—that is, that significant forms within the realm of the arts are possible only at an undeveloped stage of artistic development. If this is the case with the relation between different kinds of art within the realm of the arts, it is already less puzzling that it is the case in the relation of the entire realm to the general development of society.”5 This paragraph draws a distinction between the productive forces of society and artistic forms, or a distinction between the productive forces and philosophical development. The productive forces developed in terms of their own internal relations. Forms of art, as signified by Greek tragedy and Shakespeare, were independent of the development of the productive forces. Forms of art, forms of philosophy, were conditioned by their own internal relations. Therefore, the forms of art and philosophy were independent of the forces of production. Marx did not believe that the forms of art and philosophy were determined by the productive forces, but that the arts and philosophy progressed in terms of their own internal relations. Rather than a singular unilinear historical path there were at least two. The arts and philosophy were determined by their own internal relations, while the productive forces were determined by their own internal relations. Forms of consciousness were not imitations, copies, but perfect correlations of the forces of production. Marx himself confirmed this interpretation when he wrote in the Grundrisse: “The uneven development of material production relative to e.g. artistic development. In general, the concept of progress not to be conceived in the usual abstractness.”6 Marx’s knowledge of the arts of Classical Humanism equipped him with the weaponry to refute dialectical materialism and Stalinism.

 Ibid., p. 110.  Ibid., p. 104.

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(c) Materialism The Grundrisse also contains this sentence: “Accusations about the materialism of this conception. Relation to naturalistic materialism.”7 In order to understand Marx’s statement it is necessary to draw a distinction between Materialism and Naturalism. By Materialism, Marx meant the tools of manufacture. He meant the instruments for the making of objects necessary for life, or instruments of manufacture be they industrial, handicraft, or agricultural tools in the productive process. Materialism was the external, the object upon which the subject labored. The term “Naturalism” had two meanings in Marx of the 1856–1857 Grundrisse. First, Naturalism referred to the social forms of human integration, or the social forms assumed by the associationist instincts of the human species. Secondly, Naturalism meant the social forms by which the human species related to the materialism of the productive process. Naturalism and Materialism, although separated, were also interconnected. Naturalism was the subject that related to the object, Materialism, or manufacture. Marx’s Naturalism was composed of two parts: naturalism as associationism and the origination of society and Naturalism as the integration of social forms and the Materialism of the productive process: the Hegelian subject-object relationship. The two manifestations of Naturalism were the primary concerns of Marx’s phenomenology of labor. Therefore, it is proper to refer to Marx as incorporating Naturalism in his philosophy of production.

( d) Production, Consumption, Distribution and Exchange These four categories were operative procedures. They were categories within Marx’s philosophy of production because they were the operative procedures within every form of social production. Marx divided the

 Ibid.

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social modes of production into five classifications: tribal, clan, village, city, and manufacture. Production and consumption existed in the tribal stage of the pneumatics of labor. The tribal acquisition of the means of subsistence was essentially hunting and fishing. This access to the objects of sustenance made the tribal families self-sufficient and therefore eliminated the need to distribute or exchange. The clan mode of production was predominantly agricultural. The land upon which the clans labored were communal, immediately accessible to all members of the commune. Needs were predominantly met by the products of the soil and their distribution and exchange were not required. The village and city were combinations of production, consumption, distribution, and exchange. The development of urbanity meant that dwellers of villages and cities were dependent upon agricultural labor for their food, while the agricultural laborers were dependent upon the village and city laborers for their clothing and tools. Urban centers became the core of manufacture and the agricultural classes were dependent upon these products of manufacture. To fulfill the needs of the urban and agricultural classes, distribution and exchange became necessary and a division of labor was born. The urban products must be distributed to the agricultural class while the food of the agricultural class must be exchanged to the urban classes. The Industrial Revolution created an unprecedented form of manufacture. The invention of steel mills, factories, and railroads created a form of manufacture that was unique in history, and this form of manufacture was under the control of capitalism. It also created a form of labor that was unique in history, the proletariat. According to Marx, the unparalleled characteristic of industrial manufacture was the subsumption of the industrial working class under capitalism. Subsumption meant the total separation between subject and object. It meant the complete separation, alienation of the worker, the subject, from the object of his labor. The laborer became merely an object under the domination of the capitalist. Industrial manufacture not only witnessed the subsumption of the worker, but also the creation of the commodity. Production was transformed from the meeting of needs to the acquisition of profit, and the

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commodity form was the major instrument for the acquisition of profit. The commodity form was enhanced by the development of distribution and exchange. In particular, exchange was that operational procedure which magnified the possibilities of the commodity and simultaneously the possibilities of profit. The Grundrisse was an introduction to Marx’s manuscripts of 1861–1863. The issues raised in the Grundrisse were more comprehensively discussed in the 1861–1863 manuscripts. A supportive factor in Marx’s philosophy of production was his pneumatology of labor. The paradigm for the pneumatology of labor was the subject-object relationship. The subject was the laborer and the object was nature, or the means of production. Nature, or the means of production, stood as objectivity to the human subject, or the labor necessary to abstract the requirements for survival from nature, or the means of production. The survival of the human species was dependent upon the metabolism between the subject and object, the laborer and nature. Marx conceived the relationship between the laborer and nature as one of consumption and production. In order to survive, the laborer must consume nature. It was impossible to produce from nothing, thus nature supplied the subject with the material necessary to produce the objects of survival. In the Grundrisse, Marx used the following sentences to describe the pneumatology of labor. “Production is consumption, consumption is production. Consumptive production. Productive consumption.”8 In his analysis of the relation between production and consumption, Marx again turned to Aristotle. In order for production to be justified a need must be met. To emphasize this point Marx resorted to Aristotle’s Metaphysics which employed the term potentiality. Marx wrote: “A railway on which no trains run, hence which is not used up, not consumed, is a railway only potentially, and not in reality. Without production, no consumption; but also without consumption, no production—.”9 Aristotle’s logic of potentiality empowered Marx to explain the co-­ dependence between production and consumption. Both production  Ibid., p. 91.  Ibid.

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and consumption were mere potentials unless production received its realization in consumption and consumption was made a possibility through production. The entelechy of the metabolism between man and nature was need. The human species could not survive without the satisfaction of its needs. Productive consumption was the mechanism for the fulfillment of human needs, or needs were the purpose of productive consumption. Marx’s definition of communism was based upon the subject-object relationship.

2. The Ancient Commune Communism was that form of society in which the subject-object relationship was unimpeded. In communism, the subject-object relationship was immediate, or no external force interceded in the relationship between the laborer and the object of his labor. In the section of The Grundrisse entitled “Forms which precede capitalist production (Concerning the process which precedes the formation of the capitalist relation or of original accumulation),” Marx applied his definition of communism to the tribe, the clan-commune, village, city, and manufacture. Marx’s strategy was to investigate how each of these productive forms realized his principles of communism. Marx used anthropology as the experimental ground to prove that communism existed in the past and could be reborn in the future. The principle of communism could be recreated after the revolution against capitalism. The application of Marx’s philosophy of communism to anthropology was made clear in this statement from The Grundrisse and because of its importance it is necessary to quote at length: “In both forms, the worker relates to the objective conditions of his labor as to his property; this is the natural unity of labor with its material presupposition. The worker thus has an objective existence independent of labor. The individual relates to himself as proprietor, as master of the conditions of his reality. He relates to the others in the same way and—depending whether this presupposition is posited as proceeding from the community or from the individual families which constitute the commune—he relates to the

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others as co-proprietors, as to so many incarnations of the common property, or as independent proprietors like himself, independent private proprietors—beside whom the previously all-absorbing and all-predominant communal property is itself posited as a particular ager publicus (state property) alongside the many private land owners.”10 From this anthropological perspective, the tribe, or the earliest form of human society, was not an example of the commune, or communism. The tribe, a combination of families, gained its sustenance from hunting and fishing, and not from agriculture. The members of the tribe were not workers, they did not produce, but rather consumed animals. The tribe owned no property, but migrated in pursuit of animals. They did not exercise the production-consumption relation. They were not examples of the subject-object relationship in which the subject imprints its in-­ itself upon the object. Tribes did not have communes, they were not settled, they were not agricultural and did not produce sustenance from nature, and since all the members of the tribe were hunters or fishermen there was no division of labor except between the sexes and for all these reasons tribal existence were not examples of communism. The commune arose with the emergence of the village and then the city. A distinguishing feature of the village and city was the division of labor. The inhabitants of the village or city were producers, they produced shoes and tools. They were the primitive working class. But these workers required food and so the land surrounding the village and city was communal, it was open to those inhabitants of the village or city who preferred agricultural production. The land surrounding the village was communal land, it was immediately accessible to all members or the village and city. The ancient commune was this synthesis of communal land and the village, or city workers who could privately own their tools or manufacture. Communal property created the conditions for the unity and production and consumption. The workers of the commune who were devoted to agriculture needed to produce. However, in order to produce they must consume and they must consume from nature.

10

 Ibid., p. 471.

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In the commune the unhindered accessibility to the objects of production produced the unity between the subject and the object. The subject enjoyed a total freedom to the object. This is exactly what Marx meant by the organic mode of production. In Marx communism was synonymous to the organic mode of production because communism would recreate the unity of subject and object, the unhindered access of the laborer, the subject to the products of his labor, the object. This freedom of access was the condition of the unity between production and consumption. It created the paradigm of production-­ consumption. Communism for Marx rested upon the metabolism between man and nature, or the means of production as the “inorganic body of man.” Consequently, the ancient commune served as an example for Marx’s communism. The ancient commune was an example of the organic mode of production. From this perspective, Marx could proclaim the superiority of the Greek world over nineteenth-century capitalism. In The Grundrisse, Marx wrote: “This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side it is really loftier in all matters when closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar.”11 Marx’s admiration of Aristotle and the Greek world was also expressed in his embrace of the ancient commune. The commune was a representation of Aristotle’s concept of associationism, of the instinct of the human species to integrate into a society. Associationism was the substance of the commune. Aristotle’s principle of the constitutive subject was also the genesis of Marx’s development of the phenomenology of labor. In Aristotle the subject was constitutive, the subject was the prius of the modification of reality to meet the needs of the human species. In Marx, labor was the phenomenological agent, for the intervention into the external. Even though Marx and Aristotle disagreed over the agent, in Aristotle it was human subjectivity, while in Marx it was labor, they were both in  Ibid., p. 476.

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agreement that a constitutive subject was the engine of the species intervention into externality. In The Grundrisse Marx explored the dual meaning of property, or property existing in the commune as opposed to property existing under capitalism. In the commune, property meant that the communal lands were accessible to all. A member of the commune was a property owner because the commune lands were freely available to him as a member of the commune. On the contrary, under capitalism property was defined on an individual basis. Individuality replaced associationism, or communal existence. Consequently, under capitalism individualism formed the definition of property, or property was only an attribute of individual possession.12 Communism was a feature of the entire ancient world, only it assumed different characteristics in terms of the societies in which it was embedded. The Roman form of communism had distinct features in comparison to the Greek. The Roman form was a combination of individual private property and the communal. The individual private property possessor was an urban dweller.13 But alongside the urban individual private property possessor was communal property, or the “ager publicus,” which was property that belonged to the state, but which was accessible to all members of the commune.14 Peasants had a double existence, on the one hand, as workers in the lands of the proprietor, small-owning peasants and, on the other hand, as communal members, because of their access to the “ager publicus.”15 Regardless of these differences the “ager publicus” was an example of state-sponsored communism. In addition to the “ager publicus” there also developed in Rome a second form of communal ownership, the “territorium.” The Roman village was the center of small craft production, but as the village expanded it acquired control of the surrounding countryside and this expansion was known as the “territorium.” Like the “ager publicus,” the “territorium” allowed free access to the members of the village commune to farm on  Ibid., p. 477.  Ibid. 14  Ibid. 15  Ibid. 12 13

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this land and thus the “territorium” was a communal property of the village.16 However, the Roman Republic fell victim to warfare and conquest. It became imperialist and embarked upon enormous colonization. Consequently, the Roman Republic experienced the “development of slavery, the concentration of land possession, exchange, the money system,” or the Roman Empire.17 These productive revolutions brought about the existence of the money system and with the money system the addiction to wealth. Exchange relationships, the development of money conquered the communal and the substructure of the Roman Republic and the ancient world dissolved.18 The Asiatic form of the commune differed from that of Greece and Rome. Marx used the term “oriental despotism” as a synonym for the Asiatic form.19 In “oriental despotism,” the commune existed on the village level. All inhabitants of the village possessed democratic access to the agricultural land surrounding the village and thus they were communal lands. In the Asiatic form, however, a despot ruled over the communal villages within the kingdom. A compromise was reached between the oriental despot and the communal village in which the communal village was allowed to maintain its communal independence and in return the village must pay tribute to the despot.20 The Asiatic form was a combination of oriental despotism and the communal system of the village. The German form of the commune differed from the Greek, Roman, and Asiatic. Whereas the city, or village, was the foundation of the Greek, Roman, and Asiatic form, the German form on the productive level arose from individual families. In the German form the agriculturalist was not a citizen of a village or city, but rather an individual agriculturalist with unlimited access to the land which surrounded his residence. The communal nature of the German form arose because of its need for an assembly. The independent members of the German agricultural community  Ibid., p. 475.  Ibid., p. 103. 18  Ibid., p. 472. 19  Ibid., p. 494. 20  Ibid., p. 488. 16 17

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met together to vote decisions on issues which affected all the independent families. These meetings were assemblies and the communal nature of the German form was an expression of the assemblies. The German form was a combination of private property and a politics which was communal. Production was carried forward on the conditions of private property, but the private property was subsumed under the power of the communal assemblies.21 As an illustration of the depth of Marx’s research into ancient communal systems the Grundrisse made passing reference to the unique systems of Mexico, Peru, the early Celts, and the “few clans of India.”22 Nevertheless, even though Marx did not discuss these forms in detail the fact of his knowledge of these four unparalleled communal systems was testimony to the depth of knowledge regarding ancient communism. The section in the The Grundrisse entitled “Four which precede capitalist production (Concerning the process which precedes the formation of the capital relation or of original accumulation)” proved that communism was a reality within history. The task of Marx was to find a form of communism which corresponded to the mode of production of the post-­ Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. A continuity existed between The Grundrisse and the 1861–1863 MEGA. Whereas the Grundrisse set forth the basic principles of communism, the MEGA notebooks were studies of the productive form of capitalism which made communism impossible. If a form of communism which corresponded to the post-Industrial Revolution forms of production was to be brought into existence the productive forms of capitalism must be overthrown. The commune also constituted a part of what Marx meant by “civil society.” The commune meant the unity of subject and object, the organic mode of production, the immediate access of the force of production, human labor, to the objects of labor, and the external materials upon which human labor objectified itself. Although “civil society” had additional meanings beyond the uninterrupted synthesis of the subject-object

21 22

 Ibid., p. 484.  Ibid., p. 473.

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relationship, Marx’s pneumatology of labor did form a vital part of Marx’s definition of “civil society.”

 . The Hegelian Logical Categories Which 3 Served as the Explanatory Methodology of Marx’s Theory of Production This section is divided into three parts: (a) The Phenomenology of Production in Hegel, Marx, and Aristotle; (b) The Hegelian Logical Categories which served as the Explanatory Methodology of Marx’s Theory of Production; (c) The Syllogism.

( a) The Phenomenology of Production in Hegel, Marx, and Aristotle Hegel’s phenomenology of production was most clearly expressed in his Philosophy of Mind, which constituted Part Three of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.23 In the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel also employed the term “pneumatology” to refer to the productivity of consciousness. Hegel wrote: “Pneumatology, or, as it was called, Rational Psychology, has already been alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing metaphysics of the subject— or pneumatology, which is concerned only with abstractly universal determination, with the supposedly unmanifested essence, the in-itself of mind.”24 By the term “pneumatology,” Hegel referred to the powers of Mind to reshape external nature. Pneumatology was a synonym Hegel employed to capture the productive activity of Aristotle’s constitutive subject. Deriving from Aristotle, Hegel also expounded a pneumatology of consciousness, or consciousness was the prius which imposed its own  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, trans. William Wallace (Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1971), p. 3. 24  Ibid., pp. 2–3. 23

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architectural form upon the external, the “in-itself ” becoming the “for-­ itself.” Hegel’s pneumatology was an expansion of Aristotle’s constitutive subject. The fact that Hegel and Marx both articulated a Phenomenology of Production and a Phenomenology of Labor were not indicative of a total agreement of these matters. Although they both adhered to a Pneumatology of Labor and a Pneumatology of Production the differences concerned the issues of substance and alienation. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production was based on the subject-object relationship. In Hegel, human consciousness was the subject and the object was the universe of culture and the political state. The substance of this subjective creativity was consciousness. The object of this creative prius was culture and the state, but they were products alienated from the subject. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production led to an alienated world, since culture and the state were separated, and possessed qualities distinctive from consciousness. The state was a collective, it subsumed individual subjectivity, and as such it was an alienation from individual subjectivity. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Labor also situated the agency of production in human consciousness. Hegel’s phenomenology was predicated upon a subject-object model and the motivating force propelling this predication was consciousness, which moved from the actual to the potential, from the “in-itself ” to the “for-itself.” But when consciousness moved from the actual to the potential, from the “in-itself ” to the “for-itself,” it suffered the trauma of alienation. When consciousness intermingled with externality it moved from the actual to the potential, it moved from the “in-­ itself ” to the “for-itself,” but was corrupted by its entrance into the external and suffered from the alienation of its “in-itself.” Marx disagreed with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production and the central issue concerned the question of substance. Whereas Hegel looked upon consciousness as substance, Marx perceived labor as substance. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production resulted in the alienation of the object from the subject, from the actual to the potential. Marx’s Phenomenology of Production was aimed at the reunification of subject and object. With the overthrow of capitalism, which alienated the human subject from the object of his labor, the reunification of subject and object

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would be achieved. The members of a communist society would live in conditions, which were based on the immediate unity of labor and the objects of labor, the unity of consumption and production, and the realm of alienation would cease. Similarly, differences separated Hegel’s Pneumatology of Labor from Marx’s Pneumatology of Labor. The substance of Hegel’s Pneumatology of Labor was consciousness, or consciousness was substance. Again, Hegel’s Pneumatology of Labor resulted in alienation because consciousness was contaminated by externality, consciousness had to share itself with externality. The contamination, this loss of consciousness as control led to alienation. In contradiction to Hegel, Marx’s principle that the Pneumatology of Labor was predicated on the substance of human labor led to the integration of subject and object. Since labor was substance the object, external nature, was automatically an embodiment of the subject. No distinction separated the subject from the object when labor was the substance because the objective conditions of labor were totally accessible to the subjectivity of the laborer. Labor was the constitutive subject. Aristotle lived on in both Hegel and Marx. Hegel was the point of transition of Aristotle into Marx.

( b) The Hegelian Logical Categories Which Served as the Explanatory Methodology of Marx’s Phenomenology of Production Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production pivoted on the concept of process. It was a reflection of the idea of development, or how the subjective consciousness evolved into the external object. Hegel’s primary concern was to detail how subjective consciousness progressed into a product, a culture, or a state. This was the major theme of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, whose opening chapter deals with consciousness and whose concluding chapters reveal how religion, art, and philosophy were progressions out of, and results of, consciousness. From this perspective, the logic of the syllogism was critical to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production. The theory of creativity in Hegel passed through a three-stage process. The first stage was consciousness, the

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second stage was the object, and the third stage was the product. In this syllogism the object was nature, or the external world which stood in opposition to consciousness, and the product was the result of the intervention by the subject into the object. Consequently, the Hegelian syllogism was captured in the equation of U-P-I, or Universal-Particular-Individual. The syllogism was the logical methodology of the continuity between consciousness and the product through the intermediary of the object. Marx’s logic of critique took the following syllogistic form: M-C-M’. The purpose of capitalism was the greater acquisition of money, or wealth. Thus the process of capitalism began with money, M, and continued through the capitalist use of money to produce a commodity, C, through the expropriation of the laborer’s labor, and continued through the sale of the commodity for increased money, M’, or the profit of the capitalist, or surplus value. In addition to the syllogism Marx adopted additional logical categories from Hegel. This chapter only deals with 12. At this point, the discussion concentrates on how these categories were employed by Hegel to describe the progress of the Idea from subject to object and subsequent paragraphs will then describe the manner in which Marx adapted these categories to explain the functioning of historical modes of production. The discussion of these categories is separated into two subdivisions. Subdivision A is entitled The Process of the Movement of Consciousness, and Subdivision B is entitled The Structure of Social Formation.

(a) The Process of the Movement of Consciousness This subdivision is itself separated into the following six parts: (1) Subject-­ Object; (2) Process; (3) Actual-Potential; (4) Implicit-Explicit; (5) Universal-Particular; (6) Negation-Determination.

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1  . Subject-Object The subject-object relationship was central in the philosophy of Hegel. Subjectivity was the starting point of the creative activity of consciousness. The realization of the creative process was the object. Consciousness must realize itself and the process of its fulfillment was the birthing of an object that it expropriated from the external. The external stood in opposition to the subject, and this subject must penetrate into and modify this external in order to originate an object. The syllogism was the equation, which characterized Hegel’s theory of the creativity of consciousness, and this syllogism took the following form: Subjectivity-The External-The Object.25

2  . Process Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production was dependent upon the concept of process. The Phenomenology of Production was a reflection of the theory of development, or how subjective consciousness evolved into an external object. Synonyms for the concept of process were the terms “end” and “purpose.” Consciousness possessed a purpose and that purpose was the appropriation of the object in order to result in a product. The end and purpose of consciousness was its movement forward, its culmination in culture or politics. For Hegel this meant Becoming, the movement of consciousness out of subjectivity to its realization as social Being.

3  . Implicit-Explicit The implicit was the drive of consciousness to progress from subject to production. The implicit referred to the inherent quality of Being, or consciousness. The explicit was the manifestation of the implicit. The explicit was the expression of the implicit in externality.  Ibid., pp. 168–169, 180–181.

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Synonyms for the implicit-explicit were the terms “in-itself ” and “for-­ itself.” The “in-itself ” was the implicit, the self-determination of consciousness, or the Self. The “for-itself ” was the explicit, or the external objects wanted by the “in-itself ” for the satisfaction of the Self. The satisfaction of the Self were those products manufactured by the “in-itself ” for the gratification of the “in-itself.” A second synonym for the implicit-explicit was the Esoteric-Exoteric. The esoteric referred to the inherent in Being, or consciousness, while the exoteric referred to those productions given existence by the creativity of consciousness. The movement from the implicit to the explicit was also a demonstration of Hegel’s concept of immanence. Consciousness inherently progressed from the implicit to the explicit and this inherent movement was immanence. The process of consciousness was to inherently move to objectivity and this inherence was the immanence, the destiny of consciousness. Hegel encapsulated the process from the implicit to the explicit as teleology. Since the innate movement of consciousness was to restructure objectivity, Hegel interpreted this drive as a teleology.26

4  . Actual-Potential The concept of actuality played an enormously important role in the philosophy of Hegel. For him, consciousness was the actual and meant the immanent propulsion of consciousness to objectify itself. The concept of potentiality was initiated by Aristotle, but Hegel was the moment of transition from Aristotle into Marx. For Hegel, the actual referred to the initiating force of consciousness. The actual was the original power of consciousness prior to its entrance into the external, or the actual was immanence. Potentiality referred to the actual after the actual entered externality. After consciousness projects itself into the external world, it was contaminated by externality. It can never again achieve the uncontaminated immanence of the “in-itself.”  Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology Of Spirit, trans. A.V.  Miller (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1977), p. 156. 26

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However, Aristotle was one of the originators of the concept of potentially. In Book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle wrote: “As to the thing which have the source of their becoming within themselves they are potentially all that they will be of themselves if nothing external prevents. That is, the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be in something other than itself and undergo change. But when the seed has by its initiation became a certain sort, then it is potentially a man.”27

5  . Universal-Particular The immanence of reason was to seek the universal. Generality was the original basis of reason. It was necessary to seek the totality, the inclusive, before it was possible to make distinctions, and these distinctions were singularities broken off from the universal. Particularities were singularities. Particularities were condensations of the universal, they were perspectives which allowed the species to understand the multiplicity of the external. The particular was the perspective from which it was possible to grasp the plethora of appearances in the social and natural universes, which descended from the universal.

6  . Negation-Determination In Hegel, negation meant reconstruction. Negation meant the power of consciousness to first deny an object of externality and then to remake that object. Denial meant the power of consciousness to accept an object of externality and then after the denial to proceed to the reconstruction of that object. The object could be either material or a mental concept. However, determination required negation. Before it was possible to re-architecture an external object it was first necessary to attain its abolition. Determination was a refashioning, it concludes the process of abolition caused by negation and remodels the object into a more advanced and perfected image.  Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 190. 27

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(b) The Structure of Social Formations This subdivision is divided into the following eight parts: (1) Anatomy; (2) Whole and Parts; (3) Form-Content; (4) Relationship; (5) Sublation-­ Subsumption; (6) Metabolism; (7) Appropriation-Externalization; (8) Productive Consumption.

1  . Anatomy In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel wrote: “Also, since philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality, which includes within itself the particular it might seem that here more than in any of the other sciences the subject-matter itself, and even in its complete nature, were expressed in the aim and final results, the execution being by contrast really the unessential factor. On the other hand, in the ordinary view of anatomy—.”28 In this statement, Hegel compared a philosophical system to anatomy. Using a biological model, Hegel compared a philosophical system to both the animal and human body. Such systems were composed of particular organs which contributed to the sustenance of the totality of the animal.

2  . Whole and Parts The anatomical image allowed Hegel to perceive a philosophical system as composed of whole and parts. The whole of a system was its generality, the totality of the organism while the parts of the system were the specific organs, particulars, which allowed the total organism to maintain its existence.

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology Of Spirit, trans. A.V.  Miller (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1977), p. 1. 28

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3. Form-Content Employing the universal-particular paradigm, Hegel maintained that form determined content. A philosophical system was a form. The system of empiricism, the dependence on sense perception, was a philosophical form. Similarly, the philosophical system of Idealism, the principle that Mind was the determinate influence on process, was a philosophical form. Form was the force which determined the content. Mind produced the universal, Mind produced form and the form then sculptured the content.

4. Relationship In the two previous categories, Whole and Parts and Form and Content, the notion of relationship was critical. All these categories drew their meanings from the logic of relationship, or relationship was the reason by which whole and parts, form and content, could exist. Another expression of the concept of relationship was the encounter between the “I” and “Thou.” Such a relationship existed in interpersonal encounters, but the co-determination of individualities who engaged with each other was encaptured in the concept of “I-Thou” and “I-Other.”

5. Sublation-Subsumption For Hegel the universal possessed the power to absorb the particular. Hegel entitled this power of absorption as sublation, or subsumption. The terms “sublation” and “subsumption” described the power of the universal to lift the particular into the universal and thus redefine the nature of the particular, or extinguish the particularity of the particular. Similarly, Hegel’s logical category of whole and parts also displayed the same operating procedure as the universal-particular. The whole enjoyed the power of ingesting the parts, of imposing a holistic definition onto the parts. This process of osmosis was again referred to by Hegel as sublation, or subsumption.

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The syllogism of form and content was also an arena for the manifestation of sublation and subsumption. The universal, or form, contained the power to ingest the content, or the particular, and in so doing provide the content with an alternative meaning, an I, or Individual.

6. Metabolism Hegel viewed the relationship between human activity and nature as a metabolism. The materiality of nature was needed if human survival was to continue and human activity was necessary in order to abstract these indispensable materials from nature and restructure them as human subsistence. The concept of metabolism was based on the principle of co-­ dependency. Nature presented subjective activity with an object and subjective activity restructured nature into objects necessary for the continuation of human existence.

7. Appropriation-Externalization The concept of metabolism was based on the unity of appropriation and externalization. In order for human subjectivity to continue, it was necessary for it to appropriate nature. In order for human subjectivity to persevere, it was necessary for that subjectivity to consume objects which resulted from the appropriation of nature. Appropriation related to the process of absorbing, the internalization of nature, as the first stage in the production process so that an object could be brought into existence and subsequently externalized so it became an object of consumption.

8. Productive Consumption Hegel laid the grounds for the Marxian concept of productive consumption. If production was to continue it was necessary to consume. If

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subjectivity was to produce it was required that this subjectivity have access to the materials of consumption.

(c) Dialectic and Syllogism Hegel employed both the terms “dialectic” and “syllogism,” but each of these terms had different meanings. The term dialectic incorporated the meaning of negation, or extinction. The term dialectic referred to the process by which a B, a countervailing proposition, totally replaced an A, or the original proposition. In contradiction, a syllogism was a logical category which alluded to transformation. The syllogism was composed of a Universal (U), Particular (P), and Individual (I). In the syllogism, the P did not extinguish the U, but transformed it, provided it with a new shape, the I. Both the U and P continued in the I, but in a modified form, or I was an amalgam of both U and P. The syllogism captured the purpose and end of Hegel’s philosophical mission. The goal of Hegel was to describe how reason, or subjective consciousness, progressed into Absolute Mind, and the syllogism allowed him to illustrate this advance. The Philosophy of Mind was divided into three sections: Section I is entitled Mind Subjective, Section II is entitled Mind Objective, and Section III is called Absolute Mind. This process can be encapsulated in the syllogism Universal (U)–Particular (P)– Individual (I). The Universal is Mind Subjective, the Particular is Mind Objective and the Individual is Absolute Mind. The syllogism embodied the logic of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Production.29

(a) The Process of Production Marx’s explanation of the history of production was based upon his adoption of Hegelian logical forms. Marx employed Hegelian logical categories in order to explain his Philosophy of Production and Pneumatology  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, pp. 25–302.

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of Labor. It is impossible to understand Marx’s Grundrisse, his MEGA (2), and his Das Kapital unless their functions are perceived from the perspective of Hegelian logical categories. As a means of establishing Marx’s dependency on the Hegelian categories of logic the following procedure will be followed. The previous section on Hegel listed 13 logical categories employed by Hegel. This present discussion will now analyze how Marx utilized these same logical categories of Hegel.

1  . Subject-Object Previous paragraphs established that Marx and Hegel had antithetical definitions of the concept of substance. Whereas Hegel defined substance as consciousness, or Mind, Marx defined substance as labor. Following upon this contrasting definition of substance were contrasting definitions of subjectivity. Whereas Hegel defined subjectivity as consciousness, or Mind, Marx defined subjectivity as labor. For Marx, the subject was labor, but it performed in exactly the same manner as the Hegelian subject, or consciousness. In Marx, the end of the production process was the generation of the objects which sustained the existence of the species. The means by which labor produced these objects was to intervene in the external. Marx’s theory of the process of production received its logical underpinning from the syllogism. Marx’s subject-object paradigm copied the syllogistic form of U-P-I, in which subjective labor’s intervention into the external produced the objects necessary for the preservation of life.30 Lastly, value was a product of labor. In The Grundrisse Marx wrote: “Now how is its value determined? By the objectified labor contained in the commodity. The commodity exists in his vitality—since the worker here confronts capital as a worker, i.e. as a presupposed perennial subject.”31 Value was the incarnation of labor. Value was labor which was subsumed by different social relationships and assumed different forms 30 31

 Marx, K., The Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Penguin Books, 1973), p. 275, pp. 331–333.  Ibid., p. 301.

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imposed upon it by these various social relationships. Under the relationships of capitalism value adopted the form of use value and exchange value. “Value is nothing but objectified labor, and surplus value (realization of capitalism) is only the excess above the part of objectified labor which is necessary for the reproduction of laboring capacity.”32 The representation of value as labor was the ground from which Marx refuted David Ricardo, Mercantilism, and the Physiocrats. Both the Mercantilists and Ricardo conceived value as money, while the Physiocrats conceived value as exchange value. In Ricardo, the Mercantilists and the Physiocrats values were conceived as a thing, a material object. Conversely, Marx conceived value as the transubstantiation of labor.33 A further discussion of value is included in the subsequent section dealing with the MEGA (2) and will concern Marx’s derivation of the concept of value from Aristotle.

2  . Process Process was an axial concept in Marx’s method of explanation. Process was that logical form which described the multiple transformations of labor. Production was a process. Production passaged through three stages. First, for an object to be produced a material source must be consumed. Second, after the consumption of the external materiality this materiality must be transformed. Third, the transformed materiality must be formed into a product, or an object, which sustained life. Production was a passage through three stages and each stage was a moment.34 Circulation and exchange were in themselves processes. Circulation was the passage from the initial product to the object which fulfilled the need of the Other. Exchange was the process by which the use value of an object became an exchange value: by which a product, which was originally purchased because it fulfilled a subject’s need for that object, was  Ibid., p. 311.  Ibid., pp. 270–274. 34  Ibid., pp. 511–512. 32 33

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then sold in order to obtain a profit, or money. Process was an analysis of how an object was transformed. Process itself was composed of two particularities. Movement was inherent in process, or there cannot be a process without movement.35

3  . Implicit-Explicit In Marx, labor was substance and therefore labor generated the process from the implicit to the explicit. Beginning from its implicitness labor was propelled by its inherency to shape an object and this shaping was its realization in the explicit. Labor embodied the Aristotelian principle of the constitutive subject. The process of labor from the implicit to the explicit found a synonym in the logical form of the “in-itself ” and the “for-itself.” In Marx, the “in-­ itself ” was labor and the “for-itself ” was the object produced by labor to satisfy need. In the Grundrisse, in the “Chapter on Capital,” Marx made note of the reciprocity between the “in-itself ” and the “for-itself ” as well as the “for-another.” The reciprocal force which bonds all these separate agencies together was need. The “in-itself ” and “for-itself ” satisfied the need of labor to realize itself and the satisfaction of the “for-another” was labor’s production to satisfy the need of the Other.36 The movement from the implicit to the explicit was proof for Marx of the inherent movement of labor. Since labor possessed the inherent drive to expand from the implicit to the explicit, Marx ascribed immanence to labor.

4  . Actual-Potential In Max, labor as essence was also the actual and the process of the realization of labor led to the potential, or the object. Marx was dependent on the idea of potentiality. In the “Introduction” to the Grundrisse, he wrote: “A railroad on which no trains run, hence 35 36

 Ibid., p. 414.  Ibid., p. 91.

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which is not used up, not consumed, is a railway, only potentially and not in reality” (see note 36). Later in The Grundrisse Marx again employed the concept of potentiality. He wrote: “That is to say that labor is of course in each single case a specific labor, but capital can come into relation with every specific labor; it confronts the totality of all labor potentially.”37 The movement of the actual to the potential was crucial to Marx’s methodology of explanation. Since labor was substance it was also the actual. But the end, the purpose of the actual was to seek realization in the potential, or objectivity. Thus, in order to explain the metamorphosis of labor, Marx was compelled to adopt the logic of actual to potential.

5  . Universal-Particular The logic of universality presupposed that the particular could only be understood from the perspective of the universal. Universality established the ground from which it was possible to grasp the particular since the particular was only a reflection of the universal. Marx applied the logical category of the universal-particular in his Analysis of Capitalism. In The Grundrisse Marx defined capitalism as the universal form of production in bourgeois society. Since capitalism was the universal then all other features of capitalist production were particularities. For example, under capitalism money could only be understood as a particularity, or money was transformed under a capitalist system into wealth. Similarly, under the universality of capitalism exchange was seen as a particularity. Under capitalism, exchange was redefined as use value and exchange value and the end of activity in the capitalist system was the accumulation of exchange value because exchange value could be transformed into money, or profit.38

 Ibid., pp. 296–297.  Ibid., pp. 252–259.

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6  . Negation-Determination Marx borrowed the principle of Spinoza that to negate was to determine. The art of negation was also the initiation of determination, or negation was a creative force. Negation was the process of contradiction, or an object that stood before consciousness was negated, or found to be imperfect. The negation of an object was the condition out of which a new determination was formed. The negative was the basis of progress because it was the basis of improvement.39 A synonym for negation-determination was the category of thesis-­ antithesis. Whereas the negation-determination began with the act of contradiction, the category of thesis and antithesis began with the objective and then the act of contradiction through the antithesis. Regardless of these different starting points the logical categories of negation-­ determination and thesis-antithesis contained the same principle of inherent contradiction. They both illustrated the power of consciousness to refute the external, be the external either social or nature, and the result of that refutation was the coming-to-be of a new form. Contradiction was the inherent result of the subjectivity of consciousness. The inherent potential of consciousness was to externalize itself and this process of externalization inevitably led to the contradiction of the existent externality. Consciousness always contradicted so it could re-­ produce itself in a reborn object.

7  . Anatomy Marx’s method of social analysis was based upon the anatomical model. He moved from the universal, the totality of the animal system, to the particular, or the individual organs, which sustained the universal. In the “Introduction” to The Grundrisse, Marx penned these now-famous words: “Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is 39

 Ibid., p. 90.

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already known. The bourgeois society thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc.40 Marx’s method of explanation rested upon the organic model. An investigation into a social system did not proceed from the empirical method of the particular to the general, but rather from the Hegelian method of proceeding from the universal to the particular and this Hegelian method found its naturalistic expression in the organic model. In The Grundrisse, Marx wrote: While in the completed bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes every other in its bourgeois economic form, and everything posited is thus also a presupposition, this is the case with every organic system. This organic system itself, as a totality, has its presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the organs which it still lacks. This is historically how it becomes a totality. The process of becoming this totality forms a moment of its process, or its development.41

8  . Whole and Parts Labor was the universal and consequently was also the whole. The objects created by labor were the parts, the particularities which sustained the whole. The logical categories of whole and parts were strategies in Marx’s anatomical methodology of explanation. Additionally, Marx’s paradigm of whole and parts also contained three additional logical categories, and these were moments, mediation, and relations. The movement from whole to parts, or the reverse from parts to whole, was a process. The movement from whole to parts was similar to the movement of the universal to the particular, they both were processes. The processes were not immediate, were not instantaneous, but were coagulations of moments.

 Ibid., p. 105.  Ibid., p. 450.

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Each moment was therefore a mediation. Each moment mediated the relationship between whole and parts. The labor process resulted in the production of a use value, but the realization of the use value was merely the outcome of the mediation of the moments of the production process. The whole and parts continuism was also an expression of Marx’s concept of relation. The process of labor was determined by its relation to the productive process. Hunting and fishing required a specific form of the labor process, agriculture required a different form of the labor process and manufacturing also required a different form of the labor process. The coming-to-be of these different forms exemplified Marx’s meaning of relations. The form of labor employed in hunting and fishing production was determined by the relation of labor to hunting and fishing, and the form of labor employed in agriculture was determined by the relation of labor to agriculture. Relations imposed forms. Different forms of labor were outcomes of the different relations labor assumed in the various modes of production.

9  . Form-Content Form determined content, or content was a presupposition of form. Forms were social and intellectual procedures that were instantiations of the process of production. Forms were social and intellectual procedures which were derived from the productive process. The forms which emerged from the production process of agriculture differed from the forms that emerged from the production process of manufacturing.42 Contents were determined by form. Value, a form, determined the contents of use-and-exchange value. Value was universal and divided itself into two contents: Use value was the form of value as an object of utility and exchange value was an object as a commodity.43 Neither form or content were eternal, metaphysical constructs. Rather both form and content were sociohistorical products, products of a historical mode of production. 42 43

 Ibid., p. 218.  Ibid., p. 267.

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1  0. Realization For Marx, labor possessed an end, and this goal was the production of an object. When labor achieved its end it realized itself, or realization was the fulfillment of purpose.44 The realization process was simultaneously a process of transformation. In order to consummate its end labor must be transformed, it must be transformed from the constitutive subject into an object.

1  1. Sublation-Subsumption The Grundrisse outlined how a mode of production could sublimate an object or social function. For example, capital sublimated labor, or capital transformed labor into wage labor. Sublation meant incorporation, or the power of capital, or any process of production, to absorb or modify any particularity within its area of domination.45 Synonyms for sublation were the terms “subsumption” and “subjugation.” Both these terms were related to the power of a dominant mode of production to assimilate and transform different contents within the universality of a mode of production. Capital exercised the powers of sublation, subsumption, and subjugation. Capital was an example of how a dominant mode of production possessed the power to absorb, to incorporate money, or the entire process of circulation and transform these objects into functions which supported the purposes of capital.46

1  2. Metabolism The Grundrisse described the process of production as a metabolism. Previous paragraphs indicated that Marx applied an organic model as a

 Ibid., pp. 324, 328, 359.  Ibid., p. 408. 46  Ibid., p. 158. 44 45

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means to understand a social system. Similarly, he used the organic model as a means to understand the process of production. The labor process was a metabolism because its ground was the interconnection between labor and the external from which the object was abstracted.47 Metabolism was the reciprocity between labor and the external. The metabolism instantiated metamorphosis. When the external was modified by labor it experienced a metamorphosis. Through the reciprocity of labor and the external, the object produced developed out of the metamorphosis of the external.

1  3. Appropriation-Consumption For Marx, the process of production was dependent upon the process of appropriation.48 By the term of appropriation, Marx meant the process by which labor ingested externality because of labors depending on the external to carry out its impulse to produce. An object could not be produced without labor initially appropriating the external. A synonym for appropriation was the term “consumption.” In Marx, the process of production was grounded in the perpetual metamorphosis between consumption, assimilation, and objectification.

14. “Productive Consumption”: Need In The Grundrisse, Marx set forth a definition of the process of production as “productive consumption.”49 The precondition for production was consumption. A presupposition for the production of an object was the consumption of a materiality from the external upon which to labor. The kinesis behind “productive consumption” was need, or “productive consumption” was a response to need. Unless the human species

 Ibid., p. 225.  Ibid., pp. 196, 298. 49  Ibid., p. 300. 47 48

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experienced need no requirement existed for it to produce and therefore to consume.50

1  5. Syllogism Marx adopted both the dialectic and the syllogism from Hegel. However, Marx changed the substance of both the dialectic and the syllogism. Whereas Hegel presumed substance to be Mind, Marx presumed substance to be labor. Although the substance of the dialectic and syllogism were contradictory in the thought of Hegel and Marx, nevertheless Marx applied the same logical procedure of dialectic and syllogism to the process of labor. In Marx, dialectic meant the termination of a specific aspect of the productive process. A moment of labor, or the productive process, was brought to an end. Conversely, the syllogism in Marx related to the continuity and transformation of the labor process. Marx presupposed that the labor process was the substance of history and therefore the process of labor was unending. The Hegelian form of the syllogism was Universal-Particular-Individual (U-P-I), but Marx transformed the Hegelian equation into Money-­ Commodity-­Money’ (M-C-M’). In Marx the syllogism captured the essence of capitalism, or under capitalism money was used to obtain a commodity and then to sell that commodity for a profit, or M’. The first chapter of Volume One of Das Kapital is devoted to a discussion of the commodity. The syllogism of M-C-M’, the Universal as money, the Particular as the commodity, and the Individual as M’, or the valorization of Money, was the logical process through which Marx perceived the essence of capitalism. In The Grundrisse Marx acknowledged his utilization of the syllogism. He wrote: “The production, distribution, exchange and consumption from a regular syllogism, production as the generality, distribution and exchange the particularity, and consumption the singularity in which the whole is joined together. This is admittedly a coherence, but a shallow  Ibid., pp. 243, 260.

50

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one. Production is determined by general natural laws, distribution by social accident, and the latter may therefore promote production to a greater or lesser extent; exchange stands between the two as a formal social movement; and the concluding act, consumption, which is conceived only as a terminal point, but also as an end-in-itself, actually belongs outside economics except in so far as it reacts in turn upon the point of departure and initiates the whole process anew.”51 In the “Chapter on Capital” in The Grundrisse, Marx again iterated his dedication to the syllogism. In a section in the “Chapter on Capital” Marx employed the syllogism to logically capture the essence of capitalism, or capitalism could only be understood through the lens of the syllogism. Marx divided Capitalism into three parts. Capital “in-itself ” was the Generality, or the Universal. But the Universality was contradicted by the Particularity, which Marx described at this moment in 1856–1857 as the “Accumulation of Capitals.” However, the contradiction of the Generality by the Particularity led to Singularity, which was “capital as credit.” Marx presented this syllogism as capturing the essence of capitalism in its totality.52 Marx’s dependency on the syllogism will be confirmed in the forthcoming analysis of the MEGA (2). However, in the context of this book it is first important to draw attention to Aristotle’s discussion of both dialectical and syllogistic logics. In analyzing Aristotle’s definitions of the dialectical and syllogistics logics emphasis will be placed on three of his writing: the Topica, and the Analytica Priora, and the Analytica Posteriora. It is vital to point out no absolute proof exists that Marx read any of these three works of Aristotle. In Marx’s bibliography of the works of Aristotle he read these three works are not mentioned. Nevertheless, Hegel did reflect on the syllogism and the dialectic in his “Part One” of The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, or The Logic, and this book Marx read. However, in the earlier chapters of The Logic, in Hegel’s discussion of the dialectic he did not refer to Aristotle, but for the most

51 52

 Ibid., p. 320.  Ibid., p. 257.

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part to Plato.53 Later in The Logic, Hegel did comment on the syllogism and in this analysis he makes frequent reference to Aristotle.54 Aristotle’s Topica was devoted to discussion of the dialectic. Aristotle defined the dialectic as a method of contradiction.55 Aristotle defended the dialectic as contradiction because contradiction was a mean to discover difference,56 and the establishment of difference allowed for proper identification. The establishing of differentia permitted the arrival at the certitude of identification, or individuality.57 Aristotle’s first discussion of the syllogism took place in his Analytica Priora.58 One of the most important aspects of the Analytica Priora was Aristotle’s isolation of two fundamental mechanisms of all syllogisms, the conflict between the Universal and Particular (U-P).59 Aristotle drew a distinction between the dialectic and the syllogism. Whereas the dialectic was primarily concerned with contradiction, the syllogism was primarily concerned with continuity, the overcoming of the contradiction between the Universal and Particular into a new identity of the Individual. The Analytica Posteriora was a further discussion of the syllogism. The purpose of the syllogism was to establish a new attribution. The syllogism was a logical form, which overcame the contradiction between the Universal and Particular, and thereby resulted in a new predication, an Individual.60 The syllogism thus subsumed the dialectic. Whereas the dialectic was limited to contradiction, the syllogism was an expansion of negation into a new predication.

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 117–119.  Ibid., p. 245–256. 55  Aristotle, Topica, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), p. 190. 56  Ibid., pp. 198–206. 57  Ibid. 58  Aristotle, “Analytica Priora”, The Basis Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 65–76. 59  Aristotle, “Analytica Posteriora”, The Basis Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 119–130. 60  Ibid., pp. 113–119. 53 54

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The MEGA (2) The Grundrisse was written between 1857 and 1858, and three years later in 1861 Marx commenced the writing of his MEGA (2). Although only three years separate The Grundrisse from the MEGA (2), significant differences distinguish these works. Both these works were not singular texts, but rather compilations of notebooks in which Marx explored his understanding of capitalism. Nevertheless, a significant difference defined each of these works. The Grundrisse was a generalization of capitalism. It established the universal principle by which capitalism subsumed all the separate functions of the process of production. Conversely, the MEGA (2) moved from generalization to the particular, it was divided into chapters. In the MEGA (2), Marx isolated particular aspects of capitalism, such as “The Transformation of Gold in Capital,” “Value as the Potentiality of Labor,” and “The Valorization Process.” In MEGA (2), Marx instantiated particular aspects of the capitalist process of production and provided a short chapter diagnosing each of these aspects. Clearly, the MEGA (2) was an advance beyond The Grundrisse and an advance toward the writing of Das Kapital. In the following discussion of MEGA (2), the predominant focus will be to illuminate the influence of Aristotle, Plato, and Greek Humanism upon Marx. However, and without submergence into detail, it must be noted that neither MEGA (2) nor The Grundrisse can be properly understood without the awareness that Hegelian logic formed the explanatory substructure for Marx’s understanding of capitalism. Previous sections already singled out the Hegelian logical categories that existed in The Grundrisse. Therefore, it would be redundant to again list these Hegelian logical categories in the following analysis of MEGA (2). Nevertheless, it is vital to re-assert that Hegel provided the logics upon which Marx’s interpretation of capitalism rested. The first chapter of MEGA (2) Volume 3.1 “The Transformation of Gold Into Capital,” Marx utilized the following syllogism: Gold (G)-Commodity (C)-Gold (G’) valorized. In this syllogism the commodity must be understood as a manifestation of labor. In subsequent pages

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of the MEGA (2) Volume 3.1, Marx altered the G-C-G’ syllogism into the formula M-C-M’. Both syllogisms possessed the exact same intent. Within the capitalist world money is a replacement for gold because gold was a form of exchange in the ancient world.61 The syllogism M-C-M’ encapsulated the valorization process, which was the essence of capitalism. The teleology of capitalism was the accumulation of greater amounts of money. In the syllogism M-C-M’ the moment of M was the emergence of a new Individuality, M, money after its valorization. However, the emergence of a new Individuality, valorized money, was made possible by the intermediary of the commodity. The commodity was both a use value and an exchange value. A commodity was capable of fulfilling two purposes, in fulfilling a human need, use value, or in being exchanged for a greater amount of money than was expended in its production. The concentration of capitalism was the production of exchange value because it was in the process of exchange that a commodity experienced its valorization. The centrality of the commodity in the understanding of capitalism was made evident in the fact that the first chapter of Volume I of Das Kapital was an analysis of the commodity. In the syllogism of capitalism, M-C-M’, the M’ was not only the appearance of a new Individuality, but also an illustration of transformation. The original Universality was transformed into a new Individuality, M’. The point of transition between the original Universality, U, into a new Individuality, M’, was the commodity, or the Particular (P). The commodity, forced into the world of exchange, was transformed and existed in this world of exchange as a new Individuality, M’. The transformation process was an example of how a Universal, M, underwent a process of metamorphosis and concluded its journey as an Individual, I. The syllogism in Marx was not an instance of negation, but rather a description of the process of production, the production of an Individual object, M’, which set the stage for a new moment of production. The dominant explanatory calculus in Marx was the syllogism and not the dialectic. Indeed, the only time the word dialectic was used in MEGA  Marx, K., Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Dietz Verlag; Berlin, 1976), Band 3.1, 3.1, pp. 5–29. 61

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(2) appeared in Volume 3.6, page 2267.62 In this context Marx was referring to the contradiction, or dialectic, in the bourgeois concept of property. On the one hand, the capitalist bourgeois defended the sanctity of their own private property. Dialectically, on the other hand, the capitalist bourgeois denied the right of the proletariat to defend their own private property, or the capitalists asserted their right to appropriate the private property of the worker, their labor. The dialectic was only used in the MEGA (2), Volume 3.6, to illustrate the contradiction in the capitalist definition of property, proclaiming their own, but denying the workers control of their own property. The syllogism migrated from Aristotle to Hegel to Marx. However, the influence of Aristotle on Marx extended beyond the syllogism. It was clearly evident in the evolution of Marx’s theory of value. In the first chapter of MEGA (2), Volume 3.1, Marx discussed the “Transformation of Gold into Capital.” Marx examined the syllogism M-C-M’ in explaining how the C, the commodity, was the passage to M’, the Individual, or the accumulation of wealth. Toward the end of this analysis, Marx wrote: “On this issue it is necessary to discuss the presentation set forth in Aristotle’s The Politics, Book I, Chapter 9.”63 Book I, Chapter 9, of Aristotle’s The Politics is devoted to the definition of acquisition. For Aristotle acquisition assumed two forms: meeting the needs of survival and the process of acquiring wealth.64 In the world of Political Economy and Marx, a synonym for Aristotle’s acquisition is the term production. Two forms of the process of production existed for Aristotle, the household and the retail, or chrematistics. The household was the natural form of production. Aristotle lived in pre-manufacturing stage of society when agriculture was the primary means of production. During the household stage, production was carried out primarily to meet family needs, the provision of sustenance. However, historical development passed from the household into the village, or the human needs for  Ibid., Band 3.6, p. 2267.  Ibid., Band 3.1, p. 16. 64  Aristotle, “The Politics”, The Basis Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 1136–1137. 62 63

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association led to the expansion of the household into a village. The second form of production arose from the association of families in the village. This second form was chrematistics, or the retail trade, or the exchange of produced objects for a profit. Aristotle recognized that the stage of chrematistics gave rise to the commodity; or the commodity was the form which gave birth to profit.65 These two forms of production witnessed the generation of two forms of exchange: exchange for use and exchange for profit. Exchange for use meant the passing of a produced object to satisfy the need of an Other without a profit for the producer. Exchange for use was the form most natural to the stage of the household. The purpose of exchange for profit, or chrematistics, was aimed at the accumulation of money. Exchange for profit was merely a strategy for the burgeoning of wealth. Of the two forms of exchange, Aristotle extolled exchange for use and denounced exchanged for profit.66 Aristotle did employ the term “value.” “Of this the value was simply determined by their size and weight.”67 Value in Aristotle was merely a quantitative measure. Marx, as previously mentioned, replaced measure for substance and this substance was labor. Aristotle maintained that the accumulation of wealth was a sign of moral decay. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identified the primary purpose of human action as the achievement of virtue and justice.68 Marx does not specifically mention Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the entirety of the MEGA (2). However, as previous pages indicated Marx did allude to the Nicomachean Ethics in his dissertation. Previous chapters in Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle drew attention to how Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice influenced Marx’s theory of communism. Therefore, it is appropriate to further investigate how Aristotle’s ideas of reciprocity, the commensurate, and the equivalent impacted Marx. It is best to begin with a quotation from the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle wrote: “That demand holds things as a single unit is shown by  Ibid., pp. 1138–1140.  Ibid., pp. 1140–1142. 67  Ibid., p. 1138. 68  Aristotle, “The Nicomachean Ethics”, The Basis Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (The Modern Library; New York, 2001), pp. 982–984. 65 66

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the fact that when men do not need one another, i.e. when neither needs the other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange, as we do when someone wants what one has oneself, e.g. when people permit the exportation of corn in exchange for wine. This equation therefore must be established. And for the future exchange—that if we do not need a thing now we shall have it if ever we need it—money is as it were our surety; for it must be possible for us to get what we want by bringing the money.”69 Aristotle believed that exchange must be based on reciprocity. There must be a proportionate “requittal of services.”70 Aristotle meant that in exchange there must be mutual gain, or the proportionate satisfaction of the agents involved in the exchange. Both seller and buyer must receive reciprocal advantages, not a “precisely equal return.”71 The idea of reciprocity not only established the justice of exchange, but also had political ramifications. Aristotle wrote: “For it is by proportionate requittal that the city holds together.”72 Aristotle understood that the proportionate distribution of goods through exchange was the basis of political stability. Aristotle saw the dangers of class warfare, of how social inequality led to political unrest and possible revolution. His principle of the reciprocity of exchange was a mechanism to prevent the fragmentation of the polis into rich and poor, or for the maintenance of the republic. In the Nicomachean Ethics, a synonym for reciprocity was the commensurate. Both participants in the process of exchange must receive commensurate rewards. Commensurate did not mean equal, but rather balanced. Another synonym for reciprocity was equivalence. By the term “equivalent,” Aristotle meant that both agents in the process of exchange should be rewarded with advantages that were in accord to the medium. When Aristotle wrote of the productive process he recognized need as the propellant force. The underlying force that motivated exchange was need, not money. Aristotle consequently applied moral strategies to the

 Ibid., p. 1011.  Ibid., p. 1010. 71  Ibid., p. 1012. 72  Ibid., p. 1013. 69 70

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answering of need. The moral strategies were reciprocity, commensurability, equivalence, the medium. The centrality that the Greek Humanist tradition exerted upon Marx is further illustrated by Marx’s regard for Plato. In MEGA (2) Volume I, Marx copied many quotations from Chapter Two of Plato’s Republic. Not only did Marx quote from this Platonic masterpiece, but additionally made many comments on the thoughts of Plato. Chapter Two in Plato’s Republic was essentially a discussion of the division of labor. The importance that Marx placed on Plato’s discussion was illustrated by the fact that Marx set forth a brief history of the influence the theory of the division of labor exerted in European political economy. William Petty was the first to display the influence of Plato. Most importantly Plato also influenced the eighteenth-century Adam Smith’s concept of the division of labor.73 Although Marx recognized the philosophical importance of Plato’s concept of the division of labor, Marx was not above, from the point of view of his own critique of capitalism, of criticizing Plato’s conception. Marx applauded Plato for drawing attention to the fact that the division of labor increased skills. The enhancement of human skills was the ground out of which the quality of the produced object was raised. Marx’s criticism entered at this point. Plato did not understand the nature of the commodity and consequently did not appreciate the division of labor as a tool for exchange. In Plato, the division of labor only concerned the production of use, the quality of objects. Secondly, the division of labor increased quality but not labor time. Living in a capitalist society Marx was concerned with the reduction of necessary labor as a means to increase the profit of the capitalist. Living in an agricultural age, Plato was unaware of the drive to shorten labor time. Plato was concerned with skill, with ability, and not with labor time.74 Plato’s applause for the increase of abilities laid the foundation for his calculus of the advance of production. The advancement of society derived from the enhancement of ability to

 Marx, K., Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Dietz Verlag; Berlin, 1976), Band 3.1, pp. 239–248. 74  Ibid., pp. 256–259. 73

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meet the growth of need. As the needs of society grew enhanced abilities were required to satisfy these newly developed needs.75 As a means of highlighting the vital influence Classical Humanism exerted upon Marx, it is important to point out that Marx in MEGA (2) Volume I referred to other Greek writers in addition to Plato. Marx alluded to the work of Thucydides, who did not comment on the division of labor, but only to exchange as a means of acquiring subsistence. Marx also referred to the writings of Xenophon who also referred to the acquisition of skills as a means to satisfy need. Marx also mentioned Homer.76 The contributions of Aristotle and Plato laid the foundation for Marx’s definition of communism. In this sense Marx’s communism was the resurrection of Classical Humanism. Both Aristotle and Plato agreed that the process of production should be realized in the satisfaction of needs, or the fulfillment of needs was the purpose of production, not the amassing of wealth. Aristotle condemned the pursuit of wealth and called this pursuit of wealth chrematistics and condemned chrematistics as moral decay. Marx supported Aristotle’s denunciation of the pursuit of wealth and Marx’s embrace of Aristotle on this point is again expressed in the MEGA (2) Volume 3.5.77 Marx expanded the insights of Aristotle beyond the confines of the ancient polis. Chrematistics became the dominant preoccupation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political economy and capitalism. The conquest of chrematistics announced the extinction of Classical Greek Humanism. In addition, Marx condemned the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century subsumption of ethics by economics. Marx praised Civic Humanist tradition because it elevated ethics over economics. Aristotle also provided Marx with the concept of distributive justice, the principle that every member of a political community should receive a proportionate share of the objects brought forth by the productive process. Aristotle bequeathed to Marx the difference between exchange and use circulation, or the ethical principle that the end of circulation was the  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 255. 77  Marx, K., Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Dietz Verlag; Berlin, 1976), Band 3.5, p. 1602. 75 76

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satisfaction of need. In addition, Aristotle bequeathed to Marx the morality of reciprocity, commensurability, and equivalence. The guides to production were based on the moral principles of the proportionate distribution of goods all members of a polis should receive adequate shares, commensurate shares, of the productive process of the polis so all life could be sustained and revolutionary class conflict avoided. Plato bequeathed to Marx the concept of the division of labor, the increase in abilities as a result of the division of labor, and the equivalence between abilities and needs. The division of labor led to the specialization of labor, of workers who could grow more adept in a specific function of the productive process. This specialization of labor resulted in the enlargement of human abilities. A worker acquired enhanced abilities by concentrating upon a particular function within the process of production. Due to the increase in abilities, and the dominant morality of meeting need, Plato’s equation for distribution was the movement from abilities to need.

6 The Ethical Basis of Communism

The following discussion of Greek political theory begins with a brief analysis of Plato’s The Republic, which was written in 380 BC, Plato’s The Laws, which was published after his death by his associate Philip of Opus, and Aristotle’s The Politics, which was written between 335 and 322 BC. In the context of this chapter it is necessary to precede Aristotle and return to Plato. Classical Humanism was a dominant influence on Marx and in order to illustrate the centrality of the fusion of ethics and political theory in Greek Classical Humanism, it is best to begin with Plato. In Plato’s The Republic the foundation of the state was ethics. Political theory in classical Athens prioritized the state. The legitimization of a form of state derived from its embodiment in and facilitation of ethical principles. However, a difference existed between justice and ethics. Justice was one component of ethics. Justice was a particular within the generality of ethics. For example, another component of ethics was temperance, the moderation of human behavior. Within Classical Humanism justice was the essence of political theory. As Aristotle pointed out in his The Nicomachean Ethics, Plato advanced the idea that justice was the mean. Any legal judgment, and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Levine, Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57035-4_6

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productive exchange, must be based on the principle of temperance, or the median. This meant that no person involved in a legal decision, or in an exchange of goods, should suffer excessive consequences. Both Plato and Aristotle advocated a life of moderation. They maintained that a life lived in terms of behavioral temperance was the best strategy for happiness. Excessive behavior, intemperate desires, would add to dissatisfaction and discontent. The proper behavioral strategy for the happy life was temperance, or the mean between extremes. In The Republic Plato applied his theory of justice to productive exchange. His aim was to show that productivity should be conducted in terms of justice. Plato wrote: “So if one man gives another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for his own advantage.”1 For Plato productive exchange should be conducted in such a manner that both seller and buyer gain advantages. Plato’s theory of productive exchange was predicated upon the equation of reciprocal advantages. The producer makes a profit in accordance with the mean. The buyer satisfies a need because he can purchase according to a mean. The mean promotes exchange and the mean facilitates the reciprocity of gain. Plato’s theory of productive exchange was constructed upon the principle of commensurability. The gain of the producers and the need of the buyer must be commensurable, or the notion of productive equivalence. In addition to his theory of the ethical state, Plato’s The Republic advocated for the division of labor.2 The precondition for the division of labor was the specialization of labor. Competency in labor increased productivity and competency in labor was itself a result of the mastery of one particular skill, or vocation. The result of the division of labor was the satisfaction of greater quantities of need. Plato supported the division of labor because by increasing the amount of commodities it led to the greater satisfaction of needs and therefore the elimination of wants.3

 Plato, The Republic, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M.  Cooper (Cambridge; Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 1008. 2  Ibid., pp. 1009–1015. 3  Ibid., ibid. 1

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Plato’s The Republic was a mixture of communism and private property. The Guardians of The Republic, the political leaders, lived in a communist community. The remaining population of The Republic held property privately. The practice of communism for the Guardians was designed to erase any jealousy or personal animosity, which might arise over the conflicts regarding property. Communism was the fulfillment of justice because by disposing of the conflicts arising from the jealousies of property it increased the possibility that justice would be the sole motivation for making political decisions. The discussion of The Laws must be divided into three parts: (a) Plato’s Continuity with Aristotle; (b) Plato’s Discontinuity from Aristotle; (c) Marx’s Communism as It Existed in Plato. Before proceeding to this discussion it is important to note that similarities and dissimilarities existed between The Republic and The Laws, but it is impossible to fully analyze these issues within the parameters of this book.

(a) Plato’s Continuity with Aristotle Neither Plato nor Aristotle began their political speculations from the doctrine of rights. They stood opposed to the natural rights theory of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment Center. Rather than speak in terms of rights, both Plato and Aristotle spoke of community. Their central concern, although they disagreed on how this end was to be achieved, was a community of mutual reciprocity built on the principle of proportionate equality. On this point they were both in agreement with Marx. Plato and Aristotle were also in total accord over the issue of wealth. Plato’s The Laws denounced wealth because it led to moral corruption, the pursuit of wealth was predicated on self-absorption, the capitulation to pleasure.4 Not only did Plato denounce wealth, but also the medium which led to the acquisition of luxury. Plato admonished chrematistics, or trade conducted for profit. Plato recognized the need for exchange, but  Plato, “The Laws”, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M.  Cooper (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 1423. 4

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like Aristotle divided exchange into two parts: the exchange for use, the agricultural household, or exchange for profit, or chrematistics.5 The aim of government was not the pursuit of individualism, or wealth, or pleasure, but the creation of virtue.6 Plato also upheld the principle of moderation as a tactic to achieve happiness. The best avenue to achieve virtue, or the good, was the principle of the median. The avoidance of excesses, either the extremes of self-hate or self-glorification, was the most advantageous in the attainment of happiness.7 Plato and Aristotle were in total agreement on the issues of proportionate equality, wealth and chrematistics, and the ethical principle of moderation. Plato, Aristotle, and Marx were also unanimous regarding proportionate equality and chrematistics, or the limitless possession of property, but this unanimity did not extend to the ethical. Marx did not write an ethics, but a theory of the modes of production and thus his preoccupation with labor did not permit him to indulge in ethical speculations. The purpose of the state in Plato and Aristotle was the ethical person, while the purpose of communism in Marx was the satisfaction of need.8 Plato and Aristotle shared similar evaluations of the soul. Both Plato and Aristotle conceived the soul as the source of motion, and motion was the source of social and historical evolutions. However, dissimilarities existed as well. Plato was a Theist and maintained that the Deities possessed souls, and he advanced this argument in order to account for the movement of the solar system. The Greek Deities possessed souls because this was the only way to account for the movement of the planets. Conversely, Aristotle did not maintain that the Greek gods possessed souls, rather he limited the soul to the human species. Like Plato, Aristotle needed to account for movement, but Aristotle limited his search for the origins of sociohistorical movement to the soul of the human species. Regardless of these dissimilarities, Plato contributed to the idea of the  Ibid., p. 1392.  Ibid., p. 1404. 7  Ibid., p. 1403. 8  Ibid., pp. 1410–1411. 5 6

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constitutive subject. Although Plato attributed the soul to the Greek gods, his did originate the principle that the soul was the origin of movement and thus laid the foundation for the constitutive subject. Aristotle removed the gods from this equation and defined the soul of the species as a combination of motivational, biological, and mental components. Whereas Plato defined the soul in Theistic terms, Aristotle defined the soul in naturalistic terms and thus set forth a naturalistic interpretation of the constitutive subject. Marx continued the traditions of Plato and Aristotle, but he redefined the constitutive subject. In Marx, the constitutive subject was productive labor, or the origin of historical movement.

(b) Plato’s Discontinuity from Aristotle In his The Republic and The Laws Plato refuted Aristotle’s The Politics. In his The Politics, Aristotle identified three forms of the state, Monarchy, Oligarchy, and Democracy, and claimed that a fusion of Oligarchy and Democracy would create the best form of a state, or a Republic. Plato’s negation of the Monarchial, Oligarchical, and Democratic forms of the state derived from his condemnation of four building blocks of these three state forms: (1) Private Property; (2) Class; (3) Party; (4) State.

1. Private Property Plato was not against private property, but the inequality of private property. He recognized that the disproportionate allocation of property, the huge chasm between wealth and poverty, was the cause of political instability. The disparity in the distribution of property was the cause of the disharmony in a state, the divisiveness which led to absence of proportion, or the median.9

 Ibid., p. 1498.

9

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2. Class Property was the basis of class which had two denominations: social and political. Class as a social denomination isolated the wealthy from the impoverished and class as a political denomination gave rise to political parties.10

3. Party Political parties were organizations of property owners, or those devoid of property. Political parties sought to advance the interests of the wealthy, or the poor. Political parties were the instruments of class warfare.

4. State States were merely the expression of class warfare. Aristotle’s three forms of state, Monarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy, were merely manifestations of class conflict, or what Plato referred to as “party rule.”11 Plato’s censure of these three forms of the state, Monarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy, led him to advance a new form of a state, and this search was the format of The Laws. The major theme of this utopia was to describe a state in which the unequal distribution of property did not lead to class, and the absence of class prevented the rise of political parties. The Laws was a prophecy of a state based upon the proportionate distribution of property, the absence of class, and the absence of political parties. Plato did not want to abolish the state. The Laws was intended to find a substitute for the state, and this replacement was the educational autocracy. In Plato, state education was primary, and the authoritarian Guardians were empowered to establish this educational curriculum. This regime of education commenced at the early stages of a young citizens life, and these courses included the liberal arts, music, participation in chorus, participation in dance, theater, gymnastics, military training  Ibid., p. 11.  Ibid., p. 1420.

10 11

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for both males and females. The purpose of this dictatorship of education was to ingrain in the young person the overwhelming need for cooperation, of social harmony. Plato’s educational dictatorship was based on the presupposition that when the young citizen was taught to act on the basis of social harmony that the need for class and political party would evaporate. The aim of the Platonic state was to produce virtue, and one aspect of virtue was social mutual reciprocity. Morality was primary and social harmony was the highest ethical achievement. Plato was not a communist, and he believed that private property should be maintained. But Plato was a socialist and argued for the equal distribution of property. In his ideal state, Plato wanted to limit the number of households to 5040 and each of these households would possess an equal amount of private property.12 In addition, there would be a total cancellation of debts.13 Religious services and civic festivals would be open to all citizens.14 Communal meals would be the civic norm.15 In order to ensure the maintenance of common meals the food supply would be regulated as a means to ensure an adequate distribution of food so the common meals could be preserved.16 In addition, productive exchange would be controlled.17 As a means of avoiding chrematistics gold would be banned.18 In Plato’s organic mode of production exchange would be conducted on the basis of use and exchange for profit, gold, would be annihilated. Lastly, The laws recognized the need for the specialization of labor because the division of labor led to a higher level of productivity in the Greek organic mode of production.

 Ibid., pp. 1373–1374.  Ibid., pp. 1491–1493. 14  Ibid., p. 1503. 15  Ibid., p. 1509. 16  Ibid., p. 1510. 17  Ibid., p. 1422. 18  Ibid., p. 1508. 12 13

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(c) Marx’s Communism as It Existed in Plato This section must be divided into two parts: (3A) Plato’s Negation of Marx; (3B) Plato as an Antecedent to Marx.

3A Plato wished to have private property limited in accordance to the principle of proportionate equality, but he nevertheless recognized the legality of private property. In contradiction, Marx sought the abolishment of all property. Plato advocated for the continuation of the state. Plato rejected the Monarchist, Oligarchic, and Democratic forms of the state. However, the state he advanced was an educational dictatorship administered by authorian Guardians on the assumption that an educated population was the most efficient instrument for the achievement of virtue. Conversely, Marx called for the abolition of all state forms.19

3B Plato claimed that the disproportionate distribution of property was the basis of sociopolitical classes. The end of classes would be the result of proportionate equality. Marx also called for the end of sociopolitical classes. Whereas Plato called for the extinction of classes through the instrument of proportionate equality, Marx called for the extinction of classes by means of the extinction of all property. Although there was disagreement over the means to achieve the end, Plato was a precursor of Marx’s call for the end of classes and class warfare. Plato called for the termination of classes because classes were the cause of political upheavals. The clash of political parties was the exact antithesis to the social harmony that Plato proclaimed was the essence of the state. Marx agreed with Plato that party based upon classes was the seed  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 17, 109, 113, 375–449. 19

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of social turmoil. Marx’s communism did uphold popular representation, democratic participation in government, but not participation based upon property, which only gave birth to class warfare. Plato placed emphasis upon the community and not individuality. Community was the basis of social harmony. Plato stood in opposition to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century individualism, or the Enlightenment Center. Marx’s adherence to the doctrine of community over individualism was another illustration of Platonic inheritance to Marx. For Plato, the two principles which made community a possibility were proportionate equality and mutual reciprocity. A combination of these two principles were the grounds of social harmony, and thus social virtue. Although Marx rejected the principle of proportionate equality, since he called for the annulment of private property, he did adhere to the Platonic principle of mutual reciprocity. For Marx, the equation of “from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs” was the exemplification of mutual reciprocity. Continuing the tradition of Plato, Marx regarded the concept of mutual reciprocity as the nucleus of social harmony, or what Marx called communism. Aristotle was a student of Plato. At the age of 18 in 368 BC, Aristotle was sent to Athens, where he studied with Plato at the Academy for 20 years. Plato died in 348 BC, and Aristotle embarked upon his independent philosophical itinerary. Nevertheless, a continuity persisted between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and this continuity was the substance of Classical Greek Humanism. For Aristotle, in order to realize justice it was first necessary for the subject to possess virtues. As a precondition for justice, virtue was a behavioral norm, which selected acts of justice. But it is first necessary to isolate these behavioral norms for they were antecedent to the just. One behavioral norm, to which Plato was in total agreement, was the abstention from luxury. The virtuous person denied themselves excessive behaviors, self-indulgence, and external passions. Virtue laid the basis for just acts, because it eliminated hedonism making it possible for the individual to make choices on the basis of moderation, which was the substance of justice.20 20

 Ibid., p. 69.

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One form of virtue that Aristotle acclaimed was liberality. By the term “liberality” Aristotle meant the wealthy citizen, who generously distributed his wealth to the poor. Aristotle was opposed to excessive wealth, but recognized its existence and praised the prosperous person who did not devote all his income to his own gratification, but was generous and donated portions of his prosperity to the poor. The liberal was a person who was aware of the suffering of the impoverished and distributed his monetary surplus to lessen the deprivation of the downtrodden.21 Justice was built on the criteria of the mean.22 Justice was moderation or the temperate. The dispensing of justice, according to Aristotle, must be the median, or the perpetuator and the victim would be punished, or rewarded with moderation. Neither the perpetuator nor the victim, after a judgment was rendered, should be left with a feeling of abuse, or persecution. Aristotle applied his theory of justice to the following three areas: (1) household management; (2) class structure of the polis; (3) the theory of exchange. (1) The management of the household was the male’s earliest application of the theory of justice. The male manager of the household must avoid luxury and material excessiveness. His productive ambitions must be guided by the principle of moderation and temperance. He must provide for his family, and if possible distribute any surplus to the poor of the polis. (2) The adherence of the household to the principle of temperance had vital consequences for the class structure of the polis. Aristotle preferred a Republican form of government and this meant a class structure that was devoted to the mean. A government of moderation, anchored in the median, was less exposed to revolution and political turmoil. A government whose practical axioms were moderation and equivalence was less susceptible to chaos. Aristotle’s theory of justice was thus the basis of his political theory and a foundation of the Civic Republican tradition.

 Ibid., pp. 289–323.  Ibid., p. 279.

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(3) In addition, Aristotle’s theory of justice was the ground of his concept of productive exchange. According to Aristotle, productive activity must also be governed by the ethical principle of justice. From the perspective of this book, Aristotle’s theory of justice in productivity has the most significant impact. In order to demonstrate Aristotle’s fusion of productivity and justice it is necessary to quote extensively from his The Nicomachean Ethics. 1. “Therefore, the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction.”23 2. “But in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together—reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the bases of precisely equal return. For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together.”24 3. “If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other; they must therefore be equated.”25 Based upon the quotes the following seven conclusions are justified. Economic exchange was a transaction which took place between a seller and buyer, a recipient. The recipient was a person in need. Exchange was a transaction between a person with an excess of objects and a person who had a need for that kind of object. The sale, or exchange, of the object was an act of mutuality. The sale of the product met the needs of the producer because it relieved him of a surplus of a particular object. The purchase of the particular object fulfilled the need of the buyer. Buying was a tactic for the satisfaction of needs. Exchange was a process of mutual beneficiality. It was mutual because producer and purchaser both satisfied individual needs in a singular act. An act of exchange was  Ibid., p. 285.  Ibid., p. 283. 25  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.  Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), p. 148. 23 24

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an example of mutual requital. Each member in the exchange received a requital proportionate to their needs. Each member in the exchange gained an equal advantage because each was requited to the degree needed to satisfy their needs. Aristotle’s paradigm of exchange was based on the ethical principle of proportionate equality. The needs of the producer were different than the needs of the consumer, and the needs of the consumer also differed from the needs of the producer. But exchange was a single act which satisfied both the needs of producer and consumer and therefore was a proportionate equality. Because of the ethical substructure of exchange in Aristotle, buying and selling were never an exploitative activity. The relationship between the producer-purchaser was not an attempt to subjugate the purchaser. In Aristotle, the relationship of exchange was not capitalist-proletariat, which was a relationship in which the purchaser could only prosper by expropriating the producer. In capitalism, the capitalist only gained by stealing the labor of the working class, whereas in Aristotle, producer and purchaser achieved mutual advantages through their productive interaction. Aristotle’s theory of exchange rested upon the principle of commensurability. Both agents in the exchange experienced the mutuality of gain. The advantages of exchange should be reciprocal in that both producer and purchaser experienced equivalent gain and the satisfaction of need. For Aristotle, exchange engendered complementary advantages. Exchange was the reciprocity between talent and need, or Aristotle rendered talent and need mutually reinforcing them. Exchange generated interdependence between the talented and the needy. Because of this interdependence, this interconnection, exchange in Aristotle was the source of mutual advantage. Social classes were dependent on each other and the dependency of social classes, the advantages of productive interdependence, was a major force for the stability of the state. Aristotle’s principles of exchange was a manifestation of his theory of justice because they exemplified the ideas of interconnected advantage. Each participant in the act of exchange must emerge as mutual beneficiaries. The relationship between talent and need must conclude with an

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equivalence of gain. Economic exploitation and excessive greed were excluded from Aristotle’s principles of exchange. Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice was an extension of his idea of justice. The principle of distributive justice was the foundation of his concept of the Republic, to enlarge the middle classes in the polis on the principle that the middle classes were politically moderate due to their possession of moderate, but satisfactory quantities of property. These equivalent proportions of property would create a moderate, satisfied middle class and in a Republic where the middle class was dominant was the ground of social and political moderation and lack of radical factionalism. Just as Aristotle’s theory of exchange was constructed on the principle of mutual requital, his theory of the state was additionally based on the principle of mutual requital. In order to demonstrate the existence of mutual requital as a formative agent in Aristotle’s theory of the state, it is necessary to recognize that Aristotle understood the state as a combination of three parts: (1) Civil Harmony; (2) Governance; (3) State.

1. Civil Harmony Aristotle recognized that the state was the result of an evolutionary process. The first stage of his developmental process was civil harmony. The ruling principle at the civil stage was the natural associationism of the human species. The instinctive drive to come together in communities was the basis of the civil order. The natural desire for survival, the awareness that survival was more attainable in communities, was the propulsion to form the civil order. The civil order operated upon the principle of associationism. The inhabitants of the civil order recognized the need to interconnect productivity and need. The fulfillment of need sustained life and as a consequence the productivity of the commune must be distributed to satisfy the needs of all the members of the commune. The communal order was a civil order because it functioned in terms of the laws of mutual reciprocity, or the social practice, which directed the outcome of productivity toward the satisfaction of the needs of the members of the civil order.

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2. Governance Aristotle recognized that governance was divided into two parts: (a) constitution; (b) governance. The constitution was the written laws of governance. The constitution was the written procedures that a government must follow. The government was that agency, which put the constitution into effect. The government was that agency which supplied will, and as will the government was that force which realized the constitution.

3. State The state, or polis, was sovereign. As the will, the polis made decisions. The state decided which rules of the constitution-government should be put into effect. The decisions of the state were made by elected representatives. The decisions were expressions of the will of the polis as articulated by the active citizens who were assembled as a congress. However, significant differences separated the levels of civil harmony, constitution-government, and state. Each could exist separately. As the first stage in the development of the state the civil harmony would continue to exist even if the state disappeared. Civil harmony was the beginning of the evolution of the state and was thus independent of the state. Civil harmony preexisted the state, it was not dependent on the state, and would therefore continue to exist if the state should be extinguished. A constitution could exist even though it was never put into effect. A constitution could exist merely as a written document. A government required a constitution. A government could not exist, however, without a sovereign. Without a will, a government would be stagnant, but it would not disappear. It would exist, but without purpose. A government did not derive its existence from the state. A state could not exist without both a constitution and a government. However, a state could disappear, suffer evaporation, without a corresponding disappearance of civil harmony, constitution, and government.

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The interrelationship between civil harmony, constitution, and government and state relates to the logic of dependence. Civil harmony was the origin of the state and therefore had no dependency on the state. It was the state that drew its existence from civil harmony. The constitution-­ government was not dependent on the state in terms of the functioning of its administrative apparatus. If the state was destroyed what the constitution-­government would lack was an end, the will of representation. But the lack of will would not incur the disappearance of constitutive-­ government, because constitutive-government was not dependent upon the state. The uniqueness of Classical Greek Humanism was its attempt to found a politics and culture, which derived from the ethical. The distinctive property of Classical Greek Humanism was its assumption that the ethical was the only foundation upon which a stable political community could be founded, as well as comradely intersubjectivity between the inhabitants of a state. Classical Greek Humanism injected into Western civilization this dream regarding civic communitarianism. It was this heritage, adjusted to the Industrial Revolution, that Marx hoped to regenerate. Although the central focus of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle is the influence Aristotle exerted on Marx, this book will also provide an overview of the young Marx’s engagement with Hegel. Two figures who exercised the predominant influence upon Marx were Aristotle and Hegel. Therefore, the delineation of what of Aristotle and Hegel Marx accepted and what of Aristotle and Hegel Marx rejected will contribute to the analysis of Aristotle’s influence on Marx. The role played by Hegel in the transition of Aristotle into Marx, both in terms of continuity and discontinuity, will shed great illumination on the Aristotle-Marx bonding. Chapter Four, “The Phenomenology of Labor” of Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle outlined how Hegel perceived the state as the result of ethical evolution. The purpose of this segment of Chapter Six, “The Ethical Basis of Communism,” is to establish that Hegel interpreted productivity as an expression of ethics. However, this does not mean that Hegel himself was a communist. In fact in The Philosophy of Right, Hegel denounced communism.

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“At this point, equality could only be the equality of abstract persons as such, and therefore the whole field of possession, this terrain of inequality, falls outside it.” “The demand sometimes made for an equal division of land, and other available resources too, is an intellectualism all the more empty and superficial in that at the heart of particular differences there lies not only the external contingency of nature but also the whole compass of mind, endlessly particularized and differentiated, and the rationality of mind developed into an organism.”26 Hegel established ethics as the foundation of productivity, but denied that ethics could be the foundation of communism. Marx followed Hegel in maintaining that ethics was the foundation of productivity, but Marx separated himself from Hegel over the question of communism because Marx believed that ethics was also the foundation of communism. Nevertheless, Hegel was an exponent of the welfare state, which did have an ethical substructure. Hegel’s determination of productivity as an ethical discipline will proceed according to the following nine parts: (1) Will; (2) Property; (3) Value; (4) Practical Mind; (5) Civil Society; (6) Ethics; (7) Political Economy; (8) Poverty; (9) Welfare State.

1. Will Hegel’s political theory is predicated on the concept of the will. Hegel’s speculative philosophy was built on the notion of immanent development, the inherent drive of the idea to advance from the particular to the universal. Will was the particular, the subjective, the individual, and it possessed an immanent energy driving it from the subjective to the universal, or ethical. Hegel’s concept that the will was the origin of the social stood in contrast to Aristotle’s theory of associationism. According to Aristotle, all members of the human species were motivated by the associative instinct which drove the species to form the social.  Ibid., p. 44.

26

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Hegel’s concept of the will as the basis of human social life was also at variance with Marx. Following Feuerbach, Marx believed the human species to be inherently social, to be a “species being.” For Marx and Feuerbach, it was not necessary for the social to be created because the social was a precondition of human existence. Hegel’s privileging of will as the primary psychological drive of the human species committed him to a preoccupation with the subjective, the individual, and personality. A basic theme in Hegel’s political philosophy was tracing the steps through which the subjective, individual, and personality advanced to the universal. One step forward toward the universal was the advance from the will to right. Will required a justification to act. The approval bestowed upon will was right, or right was the recognition of will’s power to act. Right was the legal approval or property. Right was the permission given to will to take occupancy of an object. Hegel applied the syllogism of subject and object to the productive realm.

2. Property An object became private property when subjects put their “will into the thing.”27 Property was occupancy of the will. Property was an important step in the advance to the ethical. Hegel published The Philosophy of Right in 1820 and exhibited a knowledge of the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Jean-Baptiste Say. The study of political economy was exploding in the 1820s, it was a relatively new science revealing aspects of socio-productive life previously unexplored, and Hegel was cognizant of this intellectual development.28 He subsumed political economy into his speculations regarding the state.

27 28

 Ibid., pp. 126–151.  Ibid., p. 132.

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3. Value Hegel’s knowledge of political economy was again manifested in his recognition of the theory of value. Whereas Aristotle did not possess a theory of value, Marx did. Hegel’s theory of value cannot be compared to Aristotle, but can be compared with Marx. For Hegel, value was equated with utility, or the ability of an object to fulfill a need. This meant that several objects possessed the capacity to satisfy a particular human need, and thus value could be universal, or could be the capacity of a diversity of objects to satisfy human needs. Value was a capacity, potential possessed by a plurality of objects.29 Conversely, value for Marx was labor. For Max, value was the objectification of labor, while for Hegel value was the capacity to overcome need. In Marx, value was not possessed by an object, but by the producing person. Hegel did not see value as related to human productivity, but rather value was the consequence of an action by an object which led to the surmounting of need.

4. Practical Mind Hegel’s three-volume Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences was published in 1830. The second and third volumes of the Encyclopedia were entitled The Philosophy of Nature and The Philosophy of Mind. Although the first volume of the Encyclopedia, The Logic,30 did make reference to practical mind, it was The Philosophy of Nature and The Philosophy of Mind, which continued a more comprehensive analysis of both the practical and theoretical approach to the activity of mind. For the most part, Section 4 will only deal with practical mind as discussed in both The Philosophy of Nature and The Philosophy of Mind. In Hegel, the topic of practical mind concerned the metabolism between man and nature, man as a constitutive subject. The underlying theoretical principle in the conditioning activity of practical mind was  Hegel, G.W.F., The Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 8–15. 29 30

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the subject-object paradigm. Practical mind concerned the interrelationship between the subject, man, and the object, nature and his social environment. An analysis of the practical mind thesis was an illustration of the constitutive subject, the center of activity, and the impact subjectivity exerts on external natural and the social environment. The productive process in Hegel proceeded on three levels: (a) Need; (b) Psychology; (c) The Industrial Productive Process.

( a) Need At the level of need nature became an object, which supplied sustenance to the human species. Fish, animals, and agriculture were provided by nature, and the life of humankind was sustained by this supply. The relation of humankind to nature was thus a metabolism. The human species extended subjectivity and labor to nature and nature compensated the subject with objects which supplied the continuity of life. Nature itself became an object. At the level of need the subject-object relationship became a metabolism, a biological image that correctly pictured nature as the provider of the materials that were required for species preservation.31

( b) Psychology In the second level of the productive process, need advanced to motivation. Once basic needs were satisfied, the motivation of the constitutive subject was increased and appeared as impulse and urge. However, impulse and urge soon matured into purpose. This transformation was represented as an immanent development. In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel wrote: The basic determination of the living being seized on by Aristotle, that it must be conceived as acting purposefully, − in which the living being is to  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.W. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 388–389. 31

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be treated as its own end (Selbstzweck). The difficulty here comes mainly from representing the teleological relationship as external, and from the prevalent opinion that an end exists only in consciousness. Instinct is purposive activity acting unconsciously.32

The end of purposeful activity was the sustaining of individual existence and this act of preservation was the basis of consumption. In order to survive the individual required sustenance and in order to fulfill this need the personality needed to consume. The object which supplied the personality with the sustenance for survival was nature. The relationship between personality and nature was modeled upon the subject-object paradigm. The relationship between the subject and nature was metabolistic, a relationship of mutual benefit; nature grew more productive and abundant because of the purposeful activity expended on it by the purposeful activity of the personality, and the personality sustained its existence due to the reciprocal productivity of nature. Hegel referred to this productive reciprocity between the species and the external in biological imagery, as “organic” or a “digestion.” The productive paradigm Hegel employed to express the metabolistic relationship between the species and nature was repeated in Hegel’s depiction of “mind subjective” in his Philosophy of Mind. As Hegel moved from the physical universe to the social universe he utilized the same explanatory methodology. In Hegel’s Encyclopedia, “Mind Subjective” was a stage just prior to “Mind Objective,” and “Mind Objective” concerned the relationship between the personality and the productive. “Mind Subjective” was concerned with human psychology, the function of the human mind on the subjective level just prior to its entrance into the external. However, for Hegel “Mind Subjective” was a functional replica of the productive process that governed the personal determinations of nature. A universal form of production immanently developed out of the organic world into the socio-productive political universe.33  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 25–291. 33  Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.  Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), p. 126. 32

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(c) The Industrial Productive Process The explication of Hegel’s theory of production was located in his The Philosophy of Right. Hegel’s philosophy of production is complex and requires a separate study. Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle is not the site for such a comprehensive study. At this point the discussion focuses on the manner in which Hegel’s theory of production acquired an ethical foundation. An ethical foundation of production was the precondition for an ethical foundation to the state. The Industrial Revolution revolutionized the nature of production. The productive process was no longer limited to the individual personality, as was the rule in hunting, fishing, and agricultural modes of production, but with the development of industrial factories to hundreds of personalities laboring in cooperation. The objective would become synonymous with cooperative labor. Personality was replaced with class. In addition, the production process of the Industrial Revolution created a new basis of social connectivity. In The Philosophy of Right Hegel described the new connectivity in the following manner: “Civil society contains three moments; (a) The mediation of needs and one man’s satisfaction through his work and the satisfaction of the needs of all others— the system of needs.”34 The satisfaction of needs was always the motivating force in Hegel’s theory of production. However, in the primitive or agricultural stage, needs were associated with individuality, whereas in the Industrial Age, needs were associated with class. In the Industrial Age, one group of laborers toiled in coal mines, while another group toiled on railroads, while an additional group struggled as dock workers in sea ports. Needs were no longer personal, but universal in the sense that all the industrial working class were held prisoner to similar needs. The interconnection of need was the foundation of a new form of society. The productive process in the nineteenth century was designed to meet the universality of need. This interdependence of production was  Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V.  Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 213. 34

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the substance of civil society. The concept of “civil society” was essentially formed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Hegel borrowed this concept to describe the mutuality of need, and their satisfaction resulting from the productive process. From the literary point of view, Hegel inserted the language of the Industrial Revolution into his exposition. In his masterpiece, The Phenomenology of Spirit, in the chapter “The Actualization of Self-­ Consciousness” he wrote: “The labor of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labor of others. As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work of his conscious object; the work becomes, as a whole, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.”35 In this passage, Hegel demonstrated not only his adoption of such terms as “work” and “labor” but also his principle that the mutuality of need led to the mutuality of cooperation. When Hegel referred to human activity within the sphere of production, he no longer employed terms such as subjective activity or will, but rather the industrialized terms such as “work” and “labor.” In defining the productive process in industrialized societies Hegel surrendered to the necessity of adopting the vocabulary of the factory. From the sociological point of view, Hegel recognized the new division within “civil society” as industrial production. Even though “civil society” was a whole, Hegel recognized the components which constituted the whole. Class was one component, civil servants a second, and business corporations a third. “Civil society” was not uniform, but an amalgamation of various divisions caused by the specialization of labor. The diversification of the productive process in industrialized society caused labor to become specialized, expertise was required, and this compartmentalization was the basis of class fragmentation.

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 257–258. 35

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Nevertheless, mutual need overcame class fragmentation. Mutual need overcame subjectivism. The interrelationship of the productive process led to the interconnection of the laboring classes. Hegel referred to the “system of needs” in his 1820 The Philosophy of Right. In addition, in his 1830 Philosophy of Mind, the third volume of the Encyclopedia, Hegel included a section entitled “The System of Wants,”36 which was essentially a restatement of his earlier “System of Needs.” Regardless of the slight difference in titles both sections were indications of Hegel’s recognition that the industrial productive process created interconnections between the laboring. The “System of Needs” and “System of Wants” caused the end of productive subjectivism. The individual producer was replaced by the interdependent producers, or proletariat.

5. Civil Society The end of the “system of needs” and “system of wants” was “civil society.” Hegel recognized that the outcome of productive reciprocity and mutuality created a new form of society, a society that was civil or cooperative because it was inherently interdependent. As previous paragraphs indicated, the concept of “civil society” had a long tradition within Western political philosophy. In the eighteenth century the Scot Adam Ferguson and the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau were major exponents of the concept of “civil society,” but Hegel supplied this concept with a new substance. The substance of “civil society” for Hegel was the mutual dependence, which was a feature of the productive process in the Industrial Revolution. By mutual dependence, Hegel meant that the survival of the “I” in nineteenth-century production was dependent upon the productivity of the “Thou.” The emergence of “civil society” became the genesis of two additional cultural and political upheavals: ethics and the state.

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.  Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), p. 133. 36

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6. Ethics In the Christian tradition, ethics was interwoven with personal salvation, or the individual desired to be good because the personality that attained the good was rewarded with an eternal afterlife. The productive revolution of the nineteenth century negated the ethics of individuality and substituted an ethics of reciprocal beneficence. Mutual reciprocity meant that the survival of each was dependent upon the labor of all. The interfusion of needs required the interfusion of productive activity. Arising out of the revolution in production was a revolution in ethics, or ethics must mirror the productive. The ethics of subjectivity was replaced by mutual cooperation. Since the productive process was now characterized by interdependence so the ethics of productive was characterized by mutual cooperation. Personality was replaced by the social prerogative.

7. Political Economy A result of the Industrial Revolution was the birth of a new social science, Political Economy. The genesis of the new science of Political Economy was an example of immanent development. Political Economy was an immanent development out of the Industrial Revolution because history required a historical explanation of the meaning of the Industrial Revolution. Hegel was cognizant of the importance of Political Economy. He paid respects to the new science in both The Philosophy of Right and The Logic. In the 1820 The Philosophy of Right Hegel stated: Political Economy is the science which starts from this view of needs and labor but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships and mass-­ movements in their complexity and their qualitative and quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which has arisen out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords the interesting spectacle (or in Smith, Say, and Ricardo) or thought working upon the endless mass of

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details which confront it—It is to find reconciliation here to discover in the sphere of needs this show of rationality lying in the thing and effective there.37

In the 1830 Logic Hegel wrote: The recent science of Political Economy in particular, which in Germany is known as Rational Economy of the State, or intelligent national economy, has in England especially appropriated the name of philosophy.38

For Hegel, Political Economy was a philosophical reformulation of the productive process. These reformulations of the productive process necessitated a reconstruction of the ethical which was based on the principles of collaboration and collectivity. The ethics of the new productive process must supersede the personality and embrace the concern for the other productive collaborator. Just as the new productive process was universalized so must ethics be universalized and be extended from the personality to the social. Socialization became the new presupposition of ethics. The state emerged out of political economy. When ethics was introduced into political economy this development meant that ethics would become a political principle of the state. The equation which accounted for the ethical existence of the state took the following form: political economy was the foundation of the state, ethics was a component of political economy, therefore ethics became an inherent ingredient of the state.

8. Poverty One result of the new productive system of the Industrial Revolution was widespread poverty. Hegel was aware of the impoverishment issue and from paragraph 238 to paragraph 256  in The Philosophy of Right he

 Hegel, G.W.F., The Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 11.  Hegel, G.W.F., “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law”, in Hegel: Political Writings, ed. Lawrence Dickey and H.B. Nisbit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 167. 37 38

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confronted the poverty issue. The strategy he adapted to confront the poverty issue was the ethical. Hegel was an early advocate of the welfare state. He arrived at this position because ethics demanded that the suffering of the poor must be mitigated. Institutionally, the only agency equipped to mitigate the impoverishment was the state.

9. Welfare State Hegel dedicated many paragraphs to a discussion of the welfare state. In The Philosophy of Right, the following paragraphs were specifically devoted to the programs of the welfare state: paragraphs 236 to 245, paragraph 261, and paragraph 301. Hegel recognized that it was the ethical responsibility of the state to mitigate hunger, illness, illiteracy, and homelessness and to take actions to preserve the integrity of the family. The welfare state was a product of the nineteenth century. Hegel was a monarchist and a conservative and a demonstration that conservatism inspired by ethics could be an advocate for the welfare state. Hegel looked upon ethics as a means to avoid the upheavals of class warfare. An opponent of the French Revolution, Hegel looked upon ethics as the best defense against the revival of Robespierre and St. Just. Ethics was a counterrevolutionary ideology. The Natural Law and Natural Rights politicosocial theory was an expression of practical philosophy, which, according to Hegel, drew its logical justification from empiricism. But empiricism for Hegel was a deficient philosophy. It was based on sense perception. Empiricism and sense perception were both erroneous, because they were devoid of the universal. For Hegel, truth could only derive from the universal. Therefore, practical philosophy could not produce the truth because it was not based on the universal. Hegel stood in opposition to many of the central principles of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment. He was anti-­natural law, anti-natural rights, anti-practical philosophy, anti-private will, and anti-individuality. His position on all these major issues put him in

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conflict with the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In terms of Rosseau, Hegel opposed the Frenchman’s adherence to the concept of a general will which was the basis of the social contract. For Hegel, the will, no matter what form of the will, was never a legitimate basis for the state. The loyalty to an organic totality was the basis for a state. Hegel’s opposition to the principle of individuality was decisively expressed in his essay, “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,” which was published in two consecutive parts in December 1802 and May 1803 in the Kritische Journal der Philosophie. Hegel’s essays were an Idealist refutation of the theories of Natural Law and Natural Rights. They were Idealist rebellions against the Enlightenment. Individuality was a social cancer, according to Hegel and individuality was a major principle of Natural Law-Natural Rights theory. Unrestrained individuality corrupted bourgeois capitalist society turning it into a burlesque of atomic subjectivity and evaporating any sense of organic mutuality. In “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,” Hegel wrote: This universal private life, and the situation in which the nation consists solely of a second class, immediately establishes the formal legal relationship which fixes and posits absolutely, individual separate existence. And indeed the most complete structure of a system of law bound on this relationship has formed and evolved out of such corruption and universal degradation. This system of property and law which owing to the fixation on individuality, consists no in anything absolute and eternal, but wholly in the finite—.39

Hegel’s preference for the syllogism found an early expression in his “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law.” This essay contained the following statement: The concept of this sphere in the real practical realm; on the subjective side, feeling or physical necessity and enjoyment; on the objective side, work and possession, and this practical realm, as it can occur according to its concept (assumed into indifference), in the formal unity or the law possibly 39

 Ibid., p. 171.

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in it, above these two is the third, the absolute or the ethical. But the reality of the sphere of relative unity, or of the practical and legal, is constituted in the system of the laters totality as a class of its own.40

The above paragraph was composed of two parts: the dialectical and the syllogistic. The dialectical part was composed of two sections: the subjective and the objective. The subjective part was “physical necessity” or human needs which sustained life. The objective side was “work and possession” or those human activities which met human needs and sustained life. The dialectic, the clash between subjective and objective was limited, it preserved life but it was incapable of reaching a third, or higher level. The third level was the ethical and the dialectic was incapable of reaching this tier. This third tier, the absolute or ethical, could only be reached by the employment of the syllogism. The conflict of the dialectic, need and work, must be subsumed into the absolute, or need and work must be unified in the ethical. The ethical was the transcendence of the bourgeois dialectical conflict between need and work into the unity of the syllogism. Complementary, mutual reciprocity was the ethical as well as the logic of the syllogism. Hegel’s preference for the syllogism was simultaneously an assertion of his preference for the organic, the whole always superseded the particular. The syllogism was a totality and always was superior to both the dialectic and the particular. While the dialectic always left a particular, the syllogism always brought forth a unity. Not only was the “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” essay an affirmation of the logical superiority of the syllogism and organicism, but these 1802–1803 essays also illustrated Hegel’s early familiarity with Political Economy. In particularity, Hegel was educated regarding the existence of class division based on property.41 Furthermore, Hegel also was acquainted with the facts of inequality and the need for social

 Ibid., p. 142.  Ibid., pp. 147–150.

40 41

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welfare to overcome the deprivations caused by the inequality of the distribution of property.42 The most important advance that Hegel attained through his study of political economy was his embrace of the concept of “mutual dependence.” Hegel’s “mutual dependence” theory meant the each particularity within a capitalist society was dependent upon the Other for the satisfaction of their needs, or the universal gratification of needs could only be attained by means of mutual collaboration. In “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,” Hegel wrote: These are physical needs and enjoyments which, put again on their own account in a totality, obey in their intertwining one single necessity and the system of the universal mutual dependence in relation to physical needs and work in the amassing [of wealth] for these needs. And this system, as a science in the system of so-called political economy.43

Hegel’s doctrine of “universal mutual dependence” was synonymous with the theory of mutual reciprocity. Every member of a society was dependent upon the other. The farmer who needed a rake in order to continue farming must purchase the rake from the producer while the producer of the rake must purchase his sustenance from the farmer. Each was doomed without the existence of the Other.

3. Marx Marx’s intent was the deconstruction of the Enlightenment Center and its substitution with the Enlightenment Left. The major goal of this insurrection in European culture was to combine the ethics and philosophy of Greek Humanism with the communism of the Enlightenment Left. In order to more accurately detail Marx’s uprising against the Enlightenment Center the following sections are divided into four parts: (1A) Natural Law and Natural Rights; (1B) Materialism and Naturalism; (1C) Historicism; (2A) The End of Transcendence; (2B) The Overthrow 42

 Ibid., p. 143.

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of Political Science and Political Economy; (3A) The Substitution of the Subject; (4) Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle.

1A. Natural Law and Natural Rights Marx broke with the Stoic cosmology of natural law. The movement of atoms and the laws of nature were not the determining influence on human behavior. Marx replaced natural law with social relationships, or the conditioning of human behavior was determined by social relationships. The overthrow of natural law was coupled with the overthrow of natural rights. The Enlightenment Center upheld the principle of natural rights, meaning that natural law embedded in every individual specific sociopolitical rights. Based upon the principle of natural law and natural rights the Enlightenment Center encouraged individualism. Rights belonged to the individual, they were not generated from society, and therefore individuals were independent of society, and the individual also transcended the social. Marx rejected French Enlightenment individualism. In this domain, Marx returned to the associationism of Greek Humanism and Aristotle. A basic principle of Aristotle was the instinctive associationism of the human species because the state could not be explained without this inherent drive.

Section 1B. Materialism and Naturalism The French Enlightenment Center was also materialistic. For the most part, the science of the Enlightenment Center was devoted to discovering how external forces shaped human and social behavior. The Enlightenment Center regarded human actions as responses to sense perception. Atoms struck the human animal and the sense impressions released by these atomic contacts caused specific forms of human behavior. The

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philosophy of sense perception understood human behavior as reactions to these atomic collisions. When the French Enlightenment Center transferred to Germany it underwent a significant modification. The German Enlightenment was Idealistic and it glorified the activity of mind. Hegel was a leading representative of the German Enlightenment and for Hegel, Kant, and Fichte human reason was the determinative force in historical development. Just as Marx negated the Materialism of the Enlightenment Center, he negated the Idealism of the German manifestation of the Enlightenment. According to Marx, the kinesis of social evolution was neither Materialism nor Idealism, but the constitutive subject. Marx made the naturalistic subject a primary causal agent in the progress of society.

Section 1C. Historicism However, one concept that spanned both the French and German Enlightenments was the concept of Historicism, which was the belief that progress was an indispensable tool for comprehending human history. From the perspective of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a study of human events provided irrefutable proof that human society demonstrated progress. The exploration of the globe, the revolutions in technology, and the improvement of human life because of the increase in productive capacity, all were indications of progress. Historicism was a code, an equation for the comprehension of the human past and present, which incorporated two methods of interpretation: (1) to understand the course of human events it was necessary to interpret its history as movement; (2) to understand the course of human events it was necessary to view this history as progressive, or the saga of human actions led to the improvement and progress of human life and thought. In order to properly define Marx’s intent at a cultural transformation Section 2 will be devoted to an analysis of those seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century cultural traditions Marx sought to demolish. After a scrutiny of Marx’s cultural amputations, Section 3 will outline the substitutions Marx made to replace these amputations.

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Section 2A. The End of Transcendence During the Enlightenment, Political Theory was bequeathed a metaphysical existence. The creation of the ideal State was taken to be the entrance into sociopolitical harmony. Detailed investigations into natural law and natural rights were assumed to be the proper strategies to arrive at the ideal State. Within this transcendence of the political, the State exercised supreme importance. The State, constructed on the basis of natural law and natural rights, was the realization of the transcendence of the political. Hegel envisioned the State as the actualization of the I and Thou, man as citizen and man as the private person. When politics was conceived as the transcendent, “species being” was subsumed under politics, or politics was conceived as essence. Human identity was determined by the metaphysics of the political.

Section 2B. The Overthrow of Political Economy The Transcendence of Political Economy was also a delegitimization of property and class. Natural rights sanctified private property because it interpreted private property as a natural right. To deny the right of private property was simultaneously to delegitimize the Ancient Stoic principle of natural rights and the Enlightenment was incapable of embarking upon that venture. The validation of natural rights was also the validation of class. The right to possess property, irrespective of the dimensions of that property, was the foundation of social class. Political Economy subsumed the individual exactly as Political Science subsumed the individual. Both Political Science and Political Economy were instruments of transcendence and as such they destroyed the creativity of the subject. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries turned Political Science and Political Economy into metaphysics and when this transformation occurred the subject was evaporated. The concentration upon property shifted attention from the phenomenological. The search for the laws of production and consumption rendered the subject as insignificant. Social movement was determined by

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the laws of political economy and not by the subjective self-determination. Marx’s predominant intellectual effort was not to write Political Economy. Obviously, when Marx sought to analyze the productive behavior of capitalism, it was necessary for him to explore the science of Political Economy. But Political Economy was not his basic goal. Marx’s predominant purpose was to write the history of production. In writing the history of production it was necessary for Marx to describe the different modes of production that history brought forth. Human history spanned thousands of years and as the method of production was transformed each method gave rise to different modes. A method of production referred to means of production, fishing, hunting, cattle raising, agriculture, and each method gave rise to different modes. A mode of production was the “civil society,” which organized the method, the procedures of production. Marx rebelled against the laws of political economy. He did not seek to eternalize these laws. He did not seek to hypostatize these laws. Rather, he wished to demonstrate how history triumphed over these laws. Production was continuous, it was simply an outcome of the activity of “species being” and consequently could only be understood as a historical phenomenon. Marx wished to make graphic the various modalities of this historical process. Marx’s commitment to the history of production was also a demonstration of his embrace of Historicism. An outgrowth of the seventeenthand eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Historicism was the conviction that the epic of all of humanity could only be grasped as a historical progress. Although Marx was in general an opponent of the Enlightenment Center, he did in fact adopted the Historicism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Historicism provided him with a substructure upon which to build his teleology of production. Marx’s rebellion against seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European culture arose from his negation of the Transcendence of Political Science and Political Economy and his substitution of these two metaphysics by subjectivity. The Marxist insurrection arose from his overthrow of the hypostatic and its replacement by the subjective. Aristotle’s concept of the constitutive subject exerted the definitive role in Marx’s transition to

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the subjective. The concept of the constitutive subject was the agency which abolished the Transcendence of Political Science and Political Economy from the thought of Marx. The constitutive subject was the link between Greek Humanism and Marx’s method of explanation.

Section 3A. The Substitution of the Subject Marx eliminated the transcendence of the State by his substitution of the subject. Marx terminated the Enlightenment enslavement to Political Science and Political Economy, by substituting the subject for Natural Law and Natural Rights. The disappearance of the Transcendence of Political Science and Political Economy meant the liberation of subjectivity. When natural law and natural rights ceased to be determinate, this vacuum allowed subjectivity to assert itself. The State was not a product of Political Science, but “civil society” was a result of subjectivity and with the overthrow of Political Science, “civil society” replaced the State. “Civil society” was the expression of the inherent instinct for human associationism. In this regard, Aristotle and Feuerbach were in agreement. For Aristotle, the human species was governed by an instinct for sociability and Aristotle interpreted this human characteristic as proof that humankind was an inherently “political species.” Feuerbach continued this Aristotelian tradition and described humankind as a “species being,” as controlled by an instinctive drive to live in communities. Marx exemplified this Aristotelian-Feuerbachian tradition and maintained that under communism “civil society” would replace the state. For Marx, “civil society” would not possess property or class-based-on property, but it would have government. For Marx, state and government were two distinct entities. “Civil society” would be administered, or the productive and distributive functions of “civil society” would be organized and regulated. The institutions that administered the organizational and regulatory responsibilities of “civil society” was government. Labor was the emission of the constitutive subject. Labor was the process by which the objectification of the constitutive subject was realized. On the issue of labor, Marx unified Aristotle and Hegel. Following Aristotle, Marx interpreted the constitutive subject as the source of the

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energy of intervention into the external. Following Hegel, Marx interpreted labor as the integration between the subject and the object. Labor was that mediation which empowered the subject to sculpt the object to conform with the subjects self-image. Das Kapital was a phenomenology of labor. Just as Hegel portrayed the objective world as the outcome of the phenomenology of Mind, so Marx envisioned the history of production as the phenomenology of labor. Essence was labor and the objective was merely the projection of labor. Therefore, essence was the objective. If essence was labor, and labor was the producer of the objective, then the objective was essence. The “species being” inhabited its own essence. The uniqueness of the constitutive subject was the self-creation of its own environment. If labor was essence then the objective was also essence. Marx’s phenomenology of labor meant that the constitutive subject lived in its own essence and also possessed the pneumatics to create its own social universe.

Section 4. Marx and the Resurrection of Aristotle Marx’s commitment to the constitutive subject demonstrated that his embrace of Aristotle was composed of two parts: (1) the constitutive subject was the pneumatics of production; (2) the history of production and Greek Ethics. 1. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle designated the human subject as the source of motion and therefore the subject was constitutive. The subject was the source of the constitution of social productivity. Marx’s adoption of Aristotle’s constitutive subject was the basis of his philosophic revolution, of his insurrection against the Enlightenment Center. Indebted to Aristotle, Marx situated subjectivity on the engine of the history of production. Marx’s revolution was based on the replacement of subjectivity for the State, Natural Law, Natural Rights, the Transcendence of Political Science, and the Transcendence of Political Economy. Marx made subjectivity the pneumatics of production. Marx’s primary philosophical purpose was writing the history of production.

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Production concerned Becoming, the perpetuality of Becoming. Production necessitated reproduction. Production was dependent upon consumption. The fulfillment of production required the consumption of the objectivity supplied by nature. The pneumatics of the subject required an object on which to labor. In order to produce an object the subject required an object on which to labor. Reproduction was thus the rescue of a former production from its death. Reproduction was an act of revival, the salvation of a past product from extinction. 2. A second aspect of Marx’s treason against the Enlightenment Center was his fusion of the pneumatics of production with Greek Ethics. Just as Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics understood production, the distribution of manufactured objects, as a manifestation of ethics, so Marx understood the highest phase of communism as an expression of ethics. In Aristotle, ethics derived from the principle of the mutuality of benefits. Aristotle desired that productive activity be conducted on the principle of reciprocal advantage. In Marx’s “Critique of the Gotha Program,” he situated Aristotle as the prophet of communism, or Marx envisioned production in communism as operating on the principle of mutual reciprocity. Marx’s equation of the correspondence between ability and need, the reciprocal gratifications of ability and need, was a restatement of Aristotle’s ethic of equivalent advantage. Marx’s revolution in European culture was based on substitution and repositioning. Marx eliminated the dominance of the State, Natural Law, Natural Rights, the Transcendence of Political Science, and the Transcendence of Political Economy and replaced them with Greek Ethics and the constitutive subject. The act of repositioning amounted to a revolution in European culture, the introduction of a new philosophic age.

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Index

NUMBERS, AND SYMBOLS

1839 Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy, 102–105 1861-1863 Manuscripts, 65, 75–113, 242, 265 A

Actual-potential, 76, 77, 84, 90, 117, 137, 188, 189, 210–211, 223, 225, 244, 245, 277–278, 285–286 Alienation, 36, 49, 58, 64, 65, 73, 89–91, 185, 226, 244, 249, 264, 273, 274 Anthropology, 35, 92, 99, 119, 140, 192, 195, 266 Aristotle, ix, 1, 11–40, 78–79, 83–89, 115, 163, 203, 259–303

Analytica Priora, 12, 14, 213, 293, 294 The Metaphysics, 4, 12, 14, 38, 76, 79, 84, 144, 203, 205, 209, 211, 213, 235, 236, 265, 278 The Nicomachean Ethics, 14, 38, 46, 54, 55, 57, 61, 66, 93, 117, 121, 144, 151, 152, 180, 184, 185, 214, 238, 298, 299, 303, 313, 337, 338 On Becoming and Decaying, 13–14, 38 On the Generation of Animals, 38 On the Heavens, 13, 38, 117 On the Soul, 13, 38, 137, 166, 187, 215 Physics, 14, 38, 117

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Levine, Marx’s Resurrection of Aristotle, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57035-4

347

348 Index

The Politics, 14, 36, 38, 66, 67, 79, 82, 84, 93, 94, 96, 115, 117, 123, 124, 128–130, 135, 138, 141, 143–147, 151, 171, 172, 174–178, 183, 185, 193, 201, 206–208, 239, 240, 261, 297, 303, 307 The Rhetoric, 2, 38, 143, 184 Topica, 12, 14, 213, 293, 294 Associationism, 26, 28, 29, 35, 36, 55, 61, 63, 186, 193–202, 261, 263, 268, 269, 315, 318, 332, 336 B

Babeuf, Gracchus, xi, xii, 20, 164 Bauer, Bruno, x, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 23, 24, 45, 48 Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus, 40 Sorrows and Joys of the Theological Mind, 24 Being and Becoming, 89, 91–100, 233, 242 C

Carver, Terrell, viii Chrematistics, 93, 120–123, 126, 135, 145, 146, 148, 169, 171, 214, 221, 238, 239, 297, 298, 301, 305, 306, 309 Cicero, 3, 15, 25–29, 33, 38, 71, 101–102 On Fate, 28, 38, 101, 103 On the Highest Goods and Evils, 28, 38, 101, 103

On the Nature of the Gods, 15, 28, 38, 101, 103 Tuscalan Disputations, 28, 38, 101, 103 Citizenship, 26, 28, 32, 83, 119, 122, 131, 132, 139, 149–150, 153–155 Civil society, xi, 17, 28–37, 124, 130–131, 175, 207, 259, 325 Classes, xi, 18, 126, 148, 165, 171, 220, 264, 307, 308 Commensurability, 56, 57, 93, 170, 182, 238, 300, 302, 304, 314 Comments on James Mill, Clemens D’economie Politique, 54 Commodity, 59, 62, 65–69, 71, 72, 83, 87, 91, 93, 95, 96, 152, 153, 240, 247–249, 264, 265, 275, 283, 289, 292, 295–298, 300, 304 Constitutive subject, 72–79, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89, 166, 187–193, 215, 219, 222, 233, 235, 239–241, 244, 247, 249, 268, 269, 272–274, 285, 290, 307, 320, 321, 333, 335–338 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, 23, 24, 37, 40, 49, 54, 110, 111 Introduction, 23, 49, 54 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 196 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 238n44

 Index  D

Das Kapital, 16, 17, 65, 68, 75, 76, 88, 93–96, 99, 104, 144, 146, 201, 202, 233, 237, 238, 240, 242, 250, 259–302, 337 Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher, 44, 51 Dezamy, Theodore, xi, 45, 49, 164 Dictatorship, xi, xii, 30, 31, 35, 36, 44, 108, 135, 173, 230, 309, 310 The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, 1, 3, 5, 144, 162 Distributive justice, 130, 133, 150–152, 156, 162, 181–184, 298, 301 E

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 30 End-realization, 77, 78 Equity, 133, 145, 150, 171, 177, 180, 181 Equivalence, 56, 57, 72, 79, 80, 83, 85, 93, 133, 145, 146, 153, 162, 170, 183, 201, 238, 240, 299, 300, 302, 304, 312, 315 Essence, 41, 57, 65, 69, 76–78, 88, 90, 96, 132, 140, 210, 211, 218, 226, 227, 245, 272, 285, 292, 293, 296, 303, 310, 334, 337 Ethics, 8, 55, 57, 61, 73, 104, 113, 115, 118–122, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 135–137, 147, 148, 151, 152, 154, 160–166, 168,

349

179–202, 220, 222, 301, 303, 306, 317, 318, 325–328, 331, 338 Exchange, ix, 46, 123, 168, 207, 260, 263–266, 304 Exchange value, 58, 66–69, 170, 214, 238, 239, 249, 284, 286, 289, 296 F

Family, 35, 40, 79–80, 111, 118, 120–123, 125–126, 134–137, 145, 166, 169, 172, 174–177, 191, 194, 196, 197, 207, 208, 219, 222, 255, 264, 266, 267, 270, 271, 297, 298, 312, 328 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 15, 17, 24–25, 37, 41, 44, 46, 53, 55, 59, 63, 64, 119, 125, 140, 195, 196, 207, 239, 240, 260, 319, 336 The Essence of Christianity, 195 History of Modern Philosophy, 15 Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie, 25 G

Gesamtausgabe, vii, 238 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 39, 61, 75, 107, 108 Der Zauberlehrling, 39 Faust, 39, 61, 75, 107 Rechenschaft, 39 Reineke Fuchs, 39, 108 Verschiedenes über Kunst, 39

350 Index

The Good, 119, 120, 124, 132, 136, 147, 150, 151, 222, 306, 326 Greek Humanism, 3, 73, 121, 155, 165, 185, 295, 331, 332, 336 Grundrisse, 16, 17, 65, 68–75, 241, 250–252, 259–263, 265, 266, 268, 269, 271, 283, 285–288, 290–293, 295

The Philosophy of Nature, 218, 222, 320, 321 The Philosophy of Right, 136, 138, 198–200, 218, 220–222, 232, 317, 319, 323, 325–328 The Science of Logic, 89 Hobbes, Thomas, xi, 20, 29, 36 “Homme” and “citoyen,” 46, 47 Hume, David, xi, 20, 137, 217, 240 I

H

Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich, x, 1, 136, 166, 203, 259–302, 317 The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 12, 166, 215, 218, 222, 272, 293, 320 Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 27, 217 The Logic, 4, 12, 222, 272, 293, 294, 320, 326, 327 The Phenomenology of Mind, 64, 85, 89, 233, 337 The Phenomenology of Spirit, 142, 167, 202, 215, 217, 218, 220, 279, 324 The Philosophy of History, 191, 217, 222–223, 229 Philosophy of Law, 41, 43, 110 Philosophy of Mind, 5, 137, 166, 187, 192, 193, 214, 218, 222, 272, 282, 320, 322, 325

Immanent impulse, 124, 125, 235 Inherent sociability, xii, xiii, 140, 153, 239 J

Jacobins, xii, 42 Justice, 28, 56, 57, 127, 130–133, 150–152, 180, 184, 199–200, 298, 299, 303–305, 311–315 L

Labor, viii, 117, 168, 203, 259, 304 The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung, x, 18, 26, 29, 102, 104, 112 Letters to Arnold Ruge, 17–40, 44, 104, 108 Letter to his father, 1, 2, 14, 22, 23, 143 Liberality, 122, 138, 181, 184–186, 312 Locke, John, xi, 20, 137, 161, 240

 Index 

Seventh Notebook, 15, 28, 103 Sixth Notebook, 14, 15

M

Mably, Gabriel Bonnet de, xi, 20, 96, 164 Malthus, Thomas, ix, 53, 54 The Manuscripts, vii, 8, 60, 65, 75–113 Master-slave, 58, 96, 126, 142, 143, 167, 168, 201–202 Materialism, ix, 4, 115, 139, 140, 206, 241, 261–263, 331–333 Mode of production, ix, 69, 70, 74, 75, 80–84, 88–91, 94–97, 120, 123, 128, 207, 238, 242, 244, 247, 248, 250–252, 255, 257, 264, 268, 271, 275, 289, 290, 306, 309, 323, 335 Monarchy, Aristocracy, Republic and Democracy, 172 Morelly, Etienne-Gabriel, xi, xii, 164 Mutual reciprocity, xii, xiii, 57, 62, 63, 81, 86, 89, 305, 309, 311, 315, 326, 330, 331, 338 N

Naturalism, 13, 60, 63, 64, 77, 78, 115, 139–140, 167, 186, 193, 204, 206, 241, 260, 263, 331–333 Natural Rights, xi, 20, 22, 23, 36, 37, 47, 61, 127, 128, 137, 140, 141, 164, 165, 305, 328, 329, 331, 332, 334, 336–338 Notebooks Fifth Notebook, 15 First Notebook, 14 Fourth Notebook, 15 Second Notebook, 13, 15

351

O

On the Jewish Question, 43, 45–49, 51 Organic mode of production, ix, 88, 91, 94, 95, 97, 120, 123, 128, 207, 238, 268, 271, 309 P

Paris Commune, 154, 162 Paris Manuscripts Antithesis of Capital and Labor. Landed Property and Capital, 60, 62 Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole, vii–viii, 60, 64–65 Human Requirements and the Division of Labor under the Rule of Private Property, 60–61 The Power of Money, 60–62, 106–107 The Preface, 8, 60, 63–64, 279 Private Property and Communism, 60, 62–63 Participation, 6, 20, 26, 28, 31–34, 44, 101–102, 130–132, 138, 149, 153–155, 179, 226, 308, 311 Pelgar, Hans, viii The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law, 22, 23, 33

352 Index

Plato, 4, 5, 13–16, 38, 65–67, 77, 86–88, 93–95, 128, 129, 159, 171, 172, 186, 187, 200, 204, 206, 238, 294, 295, 300–338 The Laws, 303, 305, 307, 308 Parmenides, 4, 38 The Republic, 38, 67, 86, 94, 129, 172, 300, 303–305, 307 Timaeus, 15, 38 Polis, 6, 26, 32, 43, 45, 53, 56, 63, 118, 119, 122, 124, 130–132, 134, 135, 143, 145, 150, 151, 153, 160, 164, 170, 177, 179–183, 185, 191, 299, 301, 302, 312, 315, 316 Political animal, 9, 26, 37, 44, 46, 72, 94, 118, 119, 128, 130, 149, 174, 193, 201, 206, 239, 240, 251, 260–261 Political revolution, xii, xiii, 31, 42, 46, 51–53, 123, 134, 135, 138, 156, 230 The Poverty of Philosophy, 68, 235, 236 Private property, xi–xiii, 20–23, 32, 35, 36, 41–45, 47, 48, 51, 53, 60–63, 80, 107, 111, 112, 118, 120, 125, 127, 128, 135, 163–165, 171, 178, 196, 221, 269, 271, 297, 305, 307, 309–311, 319, 334 Property and Communism, 60, 62–63

Proportional equality, 134–139 Proportionality, 56, 57, 133, 180, 182 R

Reciprocal, ix, 54–57, 72, 80, 82, 132, 156, 196, 285, 299, 304, 313, 314, 322, 326, 338 “Res publica,” 27, 41 Retail trade, 79, 82, 93, 121, 145, 146, 169, 170, 298 Rheinische Zeitung, 10, 17–40, 44, 101, 104, 105, 108–110, 112 Ricardo, David, ix, 92, 200, 220, 221, 236, 237, 284, 319, 326 Robespierre, Maximilien, xii, 18, 19, 42, 49, 52, 199, 328 Rojahn, Jurgen, vii Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, xi, xii, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33–37, 39, 41, 46, 124, 137, 155, 185, 197, 239, 251, 325, 329 A Discourse on Political Economy, 36 Du contract social, 39 The Social Contract, 33, 35, 36, 41, 46 S

Shakespeare, William, 39, 61, 68, 75, 99, 105, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 146, 262 Julius Caesar, 39 King Henry IV, 39, 108, 109 King Lear, 39, 111, 112

 Index 

King Richard III, 39, 111 The Merchant of Venice, 39, 68, 106, 111, 146 A Midsummers Night Dream, 39, 110 Othello, 39 Troilus and Cressida, 39, 111 Smith, Adam, ix, 20, 59, 88, 92, 160, 161, 200, 217, 220, 221, 236, 237, 300, 319, 326 Social life, 123–125, 137, 206–208, 319 Social revolution, xii, xiii, 42, 47, 51–53 Social welfare, 122, 138, 184, 330–331 “Species being,” 37, 41, 44, 46–48, 53, 55, 59, 63, 64, 119, 124, 125, 195, 196, 260, 319, 334–337 St’ Just, xii, 42, 49, 199, 328 Subjectivity continuity, 89 discontinuity, 89 Subject-object, 58, 59, 73, 89, 117, 188, 190, 191, 210, 223, 226, 244–246, 263, 265–267, 271, 273, 275, 276, 283–284, 321, 322 Substance, 4, 8, 9, 55, 58, 67, 72, 76, 77, 89, 90, 99, 124, 127, 137, 139, 140, 157, 158, 170, 174, 187–189, 191–196, 202, 204, 209–211, 218, 226, 227, 233–235, 237–241, 245, 268, 273, 274, 283, 285, 286, 292, 298, 311, 324, 325 Subsumption, 16, 17, 25–27, 57, 65, 85, 89, 90, 195, 222, 227,

353

230, 243, 250, 255–256, 264, 280, 281, 290, 301 Sustenance, 72, 76, 120–123, 125, 126, 138, 140, 145, 179, 220, 264, 267, 279, 297, 321, 322, 331 T

Taubert, Inge, viii Telos, 103, 117, 138, 222, 229, 237, 239, 248, 256 Transformation, 89, 91, 92, 137, 142, 190, 203, 208, 222, 223, 225–226, 228, 230, 238, 243, 244, 247, 248, 282, 284, 290, 292, 296, 321, 333, 334 Tribe, 34, 35, 118, 123, 124, 126, 145, 166, 174–176, 191, 208, 266, 267 U

Use value, 21, 66, 69, 170, 238, 239, 248, 284, 286, 289, 296 V

Value, 18, 21, 23, 29, 54, 55, 57–59, 66–69, 74, 79, 82, 85, 117, 119, 136, 137, 145, 146, 165, 166, 170, 183, 187, 200, 202, 203, 205, 214, 215, 221, 235, 237–241, 243, 247–249, 256, 275, 283, 284, 286, 289, 296–298, 318, 320 Verwandlung von Geld in Kapital, 145n35

354 Index

121, 122, 126, 135, 136, 141, 146, 158–160, 165, 169, 172, 181, 239, 248, 256, 270, 275, 286, 297, 298, 301, 305–307, 312, 331

Village, 118, 123, 124, 126–127, 145, 146, 174–176, 208, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270, 297, 298 Virtue, 29, 32, 101, 103, 119–122, 131, 138, 141, 148, 150, 160, 169, 173, 182, 184, 185, 298, 306, 309–312 Vorwarts, 51 Z W

Wealth, 28, 30, 32, 36, 37, 48, 52, 61, 67, 71, 74, 82, 97,

Zoon oikonikon, 20, 45, 46, 63, 131, 132, 179, 185 Zoon politikon, 20, 45, 46, 63, 131, 132, 179, 185, 260–261