Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice 1138485918, 9781138485914

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Maps
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Strategic framework
Stronger vs. weaker side
Maritime strategy in peacetime
Maritime strategy in a war
Notes
Chapter 2: Defense vs. offensive
Importance
Defense vs. offense
Active vs. passive defense
Defensive and offensive
Land vs. sea
Notes
Chapter 3: Prerequisites
Notes
Chapter 4: Disputing sea control
Operating environment
Characteristics
Dynamics
Main methods
Methods of combat employment
Notes
Chapter 5: Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter
The roots
The concept
Active fleet-in-being
Passive fleet-in-being
Semi-activefleet-in-being
Seeking a decisive encounter
Notes
Chapter 6: Weakening of the enemy’s naval forces over time
Offensive mining
Notes
Chapter 7: Counter-containment
Strategic diversion
Tying up enemy forces
Notes
Chapter 8: Destroying the enemy’smilitary-economic potential at sea
Requirements
Main methods
Tenets
Notes
Chapter 9: Attack on the enemy’s coast
Notes
Chapter 10: Defense of the coast
Elements
Notes
Chapter 11: Defense/capturing of important positions/basing areas
Notes
Chapter 12: Defense/capturing a choke point
Notes
Select bibliography
Books
Monographs
Articles
Index

Citation preview

Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial

This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea.  Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyzes the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyzes in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control – avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-­containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy’s military-­ economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world’s navies are currently of small or medium-­ size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy.  This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history.  Milan Vego is ADM R.K. Turner Professor of Operational Art at the Naval War College, Rhode Island, U.S.A., and the author of a dozen books including, most recently, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Routledge 2017). 

CASS Series: Naval Policy and History  Series Editor: Geoffrey Till  ISSN 1366-9478 

This series consists primarily of original manuscripts by research scholars in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chronological limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of important articles as well as reprints of classic works.  54 Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century Christian LeMiere  55 Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice Milan Vego  56 India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security Edited by Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan  57 Piracy in Southeast Asia: Trends, Hot Spots and Responses Edited by Carolin Liss and Ted Biggs  58 Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, (Second Edition) Milan Vego  59 US Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of American Maritime Power Sebastian Bruns  60 Modern Maritime Piracy: Genesis, Evolution and Responses Robert C. McCabe  61 Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-­First Century (Fourth Edition) Geoffrey Till  62 Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice Milan Vego  For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Cass-­Series-Naval-­Policy-and-­History/book-­series/CSNPH 

Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial  Theory and Practice 

Milan Vego 

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN  and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017  Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business  © 2019 Milan Vego  The right of Milan Vego to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.  Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.  British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library  Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Names: Vego, Milan N., author. Title: Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial : Theory and Practice / Milan Vego. Description: First edition. | London ; New York, NY : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. | Series: Cass series: Naval policy and history, ISSN 1366-9478 ; 62 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018040896 (print) | LCCN 2018041186 (ebook) | ISBN 9781351047715 (Web PDF) | ISBN 9781351047708 (ePub) | ISBN 9781351047692 (Mobi) | ISBN 9781138485914 (hardback) | ISBN 9781351047722 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Naval strategy. | Access denial (Military science) Classification: LCC V163 (ebook) | LCC V163 .V43 2019 (print) | DDC 359.4–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018040896 ISBN: 978-1-138-48591-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-04772-2 (ebk)  Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear 

Contents

List of maps Preface List of abbreviations Maps

vi vii x xii

  1 Strategic framework

1

  2 Defense vs. offensive

55

  3 Prerequisites

75



  4 Disputing sea control

104

  5 Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter

124

  6 Weakening of the enemy’s naval forces over time

169

  7 Counter-­containment

190

  8 Destroying the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea

218

  9 Attack on the enemy’s coast

245

10 Defense of the coast

266

11 Defense/capturing of important positions/basing areas

286

12 Defense/capturing a choke point

301



315 322

Select bibliography Index

Maps

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

The English Channel (Canal la Manche) and its approaches The North Sea The Baltic Sea The Gulf of Finland, 1942 The Mediterranean Sea, 1939 The Adriatic Sea, 1914–1918 The Black Sea The Solomons Archipelago – New Guinea

xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix

Preface

This work is a sequel to the book Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice published in 2016. The need to have a book on the strategy and operations of a weaker side at sea seems obvious. A major reason is that there are no major works that coherently and comprehensively explain and analyze sea denial and related methods of disputing control of the sea. With the probable exception of Julian S. Corbett and Raoul Castex, classical naval thinkers focused almost exclusively on sea control. The reason was that they were first and foremost advocates of a big blue-­water navy. Some of the major navies, such as, for example, the French Navy, developed theories of how to confront and prevail in a war against a much stronger navy, such as was the Royal Navy. However, these theories were mostly based on a false reading of history and were too narrow in their scope. The great majority of navies in the past were inferior in strength to major navies. Hence, they were strategically on the defensive and disputed control of the sea. The situation would be similar in the future, because out of some 115 navies today, most are small. However, disputing sea control is not limited to small or moderate size navies. In some cases, a major sea power might be forced to shift to strategic defense. Full knowledge and understanding of sea denial and methods of disputing control of the sea is needed for both major and small navies. A doctrine for the operational level of war by a major navy will be unsound if it exclusively focuses on sea control while sea denial is given short shrift or, even worse, ignored. And any naval doctrine should be based on historical experience and the proper vision of future war at sea. The work consists of twelve chapters. Chapter 1, “Strategic framework,” explains the meaning and relationship of the weaker and stronger side at sea, respectively. This chapter explains in some detail maritime/naval strategies of weaker powers in peacetime and, in time of war, theaters of effort, and strategic distribution of naval forces. For a very good reason the emphasis is on maritime/ naval strategies in peacetime. Most of these strategies would be applied in a war. Also, the initial phase of war would be conducted with a fleet built in peacetime. And its size and composition would be based on the maritime/naval strategy developed in time of peace. Whether a maritime/naval strategy will be offensive or defensive or a combination of these two depends largely on one’s actual or perceived naval strength, and the naval strength of the potential enemies. Hence,

viii   Preface Chapter 2, “Defense vs. offensive,” explains and analyzes in some detail differences between defense on land and at sea, active versus passive defense, the shift from strategic offensive to defensive and vice versa, and the strategic relationship between war on land and at sea. The next chapter, Chapter 3, “Prerequisites,” explains and assesses arbitrarily selected general requirements or prerequisites a weaker side must fulfill to successfully contest control of the sea by a stronger side. These prerequisites superficially resemble those desirable for a stronger side in obtaining and maintaining sea control. Yet there are also some significant differences because of opposite strategic/operational objectives and methods used to accomplish them. Some of the prerequisites are physical, such as favorable geographic positions, bases of operations, and optimal size/ composition of one’s naval forces. Others, such as sound naval theory and doctrine, multi-­service cooperation (or jointness), and offensive spirit are people­related. For the most part they are hard or impossible to quantify with any degree of precision.  Chapter 4, “Disputing sea control,” describes in some detail general characteristic of the operating area and their effect on the combat employment of one’s naval forces and aircraft, and the dynamics of disputing control of the seas. This chapter also briefly describes main methods of disputing sea control and methods of combat employment. Each of the eight chapters that follow describes and analyzes in some detail the respective methods of contesting control of the sea.  In Chapter 5, “Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter,” most attention is given to both theoretical and practical aspects of avoiding a decisive action by a weaker side. This chapter also explains that sometimes a weaker side, while being strategically on the defensive, might go operationally onto the offensive and seek a decisive encounter. For some reason this option for a weaker but relatively strong side was rarely discussed by naval classical thinkers and their successors. The next chapter, Chapter 6, “Weakening of the enemy’s naval forces over time,” explains some theoretical features of weakening the enemy’s forces over time or “attrition.” It describes differences between attrition in land warfare and attrition conducted by a weaker side at sea. This chapter also describes and analyzes the employment of surface ships, aircraft, submarines, mines, and special forces in weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time.  Chapter 7, “Counter-­containment,” explains methods a weaker side would use in countering a formally declared or undeclared naval blockade of a stronger side. The next chapter, Chapter 8, “Destroying the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea,” explains the theory and selected historical examples of privateering, commerce raiding, and commercial blockades conducted by a weaker side at sea. Chapter 9, “Attack on the enemy’s coast,” describes and evaluates methods used by a weaker side to destroy or degrade the enemy’s military-­ economic potential on the coast (but excluding elements of maritime trade ashore).  The last three chapters are devoted to methods of disputing sea control that are inherently joint. The army has a dominant role in defense of the coast, defense/capturing of important positions and basing areas, and defense/capturing

Preface   ix of a choke point. However, the army alone cannot be successful unless fully supported by the navy and air force. Chapter 10, “Defense of the coast,” looks at how both weaker and stronger sides must ensure security of the coastal and rear area and the adjacent sea/ocean against major enemy attack from across the sea, from the air, and from land. Not only the weaker but also the stronger side would dispute control of the sea in littoral waters. The difference is that the stronger side would have a greater chance to defend the coast than would a weaker side. Chapter 11, “Defense/capturing of important positions/basing areas,” shows how this activity is an integral part of defense of the coast. In some cases. A side strong on land would rely on the army and air force to capture important positions and basing areas of a weaker side on land. Finally, Chapter 12, “Defense/ capturing a choke point,” explains and analyzes the main aspects of defense of a strait/narrows or choke point against enemy attack by land and sea. It also describes the employment of ground forces, supported by air forces and the navy, by a land power in capturing a major choke point. This work required the active participation and support of several individuals. I am greatly in debt to Mr. Andrew Humphrys, Senior Editor, Military, Strategic and Security Studies at Routledge for his approval of the project, his support over many years, and his great patience in dealing with my numerous delays in submitting the manuscript. My thanks are also due to Dr. Geoffrey Till, Series Editor, Naval Policy and History, for giving his approval for the book proposal and firm support for my work on several other book projects published by Taylor & Francis. Many thanks also for the great work of Ms. Bethany Lund-­Yates of Taylor & Francis, Ms. Phillippa Clubbs, Project Manager at Wearset Publishing Services, and Ms. E.C. Gathercole, who copy-­edited the manuscript.

Abbreviations

AA ANZAC AOK A/S ASBM ASCM ASDIC ASM ASW bc B.d.S. B.E.F. BRT BUMS RKKA C2 CINC CINCPac CNO COMINCH EEZ EM ESM GRT HF HWT ID IED IGHQ IJN IO JCS

Anti-­Air  Australian and New Zealand Corps  High Army Command (Armee Oberkommando) Anti-­Submarine  Anti-­Ship Ballistic Missile Anti-­Ship Cruise Missile  Anti-­Submarine Detection Investigation Committee  Anti-­Ship Missile  Anti-­Submarine Warfare  Before Christ  Commander, Battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe) British Expeditionary Force  Brutto Register Ton  Combat Regulations of Naval Forces of Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Boevoy Ustav Morskikh Syl Raboche-­Krest’yanskaya Krasnaya Armiya)  Command and Control  Commander-­in-Chief CINC of the Pacific Fleet  Chief of Naval Operations  Commander in Chief, United States Fleet  Exclusive Economic Zone  Electromagnetic Electronic Support Measures Gross Register Ton  High Frequency  Heavy Weight Torpedo  Infantry Division  Improvised Explosive Device  Imperial General Headquarters  Imperial Japanese Navy  Information Operations Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Abbreviations   xi JTF LACM LCG LCI LCT LSM LST LVT MAD MAS MCM MGB ML MRBM MT MTB MTL MTM OKH OKM OKW OTH POA RAF RCS RKKA RKKF RPG SAM SC SDV SKL SLC SLOC SRBM SSK SSN Stavka UAV UNCLOS USSR USV UUV

Joint Task Force Land Attack Cruise Missile  Littoral Combat Group  Landing Craft, Infantry Landing Craft, Tank Landing Ship, Medium Landing Ship, Tank Landing Vehicle, Tracked  Magnetic Anomaly Detector Torpedo Armed Motorboat (Motoscafo Armato Silurante) Mine Counter-­Measures  Motor Gun Boat  Motor Launch  Medium Range Ballistic Missile Tourist Motorboat (Motoscafo Turismo) Motor Torpedo Boat  Slow Tourist Motorboat (Motoscafo Turismo Lento) Tourist Motorboat, Modified (Motoscafo Turismo Modificato) Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Marine )  Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)  Over-­The-Horizon (Radar)  Pacific Ocean Area Royal Air Force  Radar Cross Section  Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Raboche-­Krest’yanskaya Krasnaya Armiya)  Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet (Raboche-­Krest’yanskaya Krasnaya Flota) Rocket-­Propelled Grenade  Surface-­to-Air Missile  Submarine Chaser  Swimmer Delivery Vehicle  Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung)  Slow-­Running Torpedo (Siluro a Lenta Corsa) Sea Lines of Communication  Short Range Ballistic Missile Conventional-­Powered Attack Submarine  Nuclear-­Powered, Attack Submarine  High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Unmanned Surface Vehicle  Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 

PORTLAND

ST. NAZAIRE

LORIENT

DARTMOUTH

LYME BAY

CHERBOURG

ISLAND OF WIGHT

PORTSMOUTH

NANTES

HARWICH

DIEPPE FECAMP LE HAVRE

RAMSGATE DOVER FOLKESTONE OSTENDE

LE TOUQUET

BOULOGNE

ANTWERP

FRANCE

DUNKERQUE CALAIS

BREMERHAVEN

GERMANY

WILHELMSHAVEN EMDEN

BRUNSBUETTEL

BELGIUM

NETHERLANDS

ROTTERDAM

AMSTERDAM

Map 1  The English Channel (Canal la Manche) and its northern approaches.

BREST

PLYMOUTH

BRISTOL

LONDON

LOWESTOFT

SOUTHEND-ON-SEA

ENGLAND

TEXEL

TERSCHELLING

HELGOLAND

Maps

THE NORTH SEA 5°W

0°

5°E

10°E

Faeroe Is.

NORWAY Bergen

Shetland Is. 60°N

60°N

Orkney Is. Scapa

Flow

Inverness Aberdeen Dundee Rosyth

NORTH

Firth of Forth

Edinburgh

A

SEA

Sunderland

55°N

SK

AK RR E G

55°N

IRISH SEA

K Ca iel na l

Hartlepool

Kiel

Kingstonupon-Hull

Terschelling

Emden

Den Helder Ijmuiden

Yarmouth Hook of Harwich s Holland me a LONDON Th er Riv Bristol Channel Chatham s es Portsmouth Dover ungen C. Gris-Nez D Beachy Plymouth Boulogne Head

50°N

Cherbourg

Guernsey I. Jersey I. I. De Bas Ushant I. Brest

E lb e

R. Ems

Texel

R.

Rotterdam

GERMANY

BELGIUM

50°N

Le Havre R.

Se ine

NORMANDY

BRITANNY Lorient St. Nazaire

BAY OF BISCAY 5°W

FRANCE 50

R. Gir on de

Map 2  The North Sea.

0

50

100

SEA MILES

0°

5°E

10°E

Map 3  The Baltic Sea.

Map 4  The Gulf of Finland, 1942.

Map 5  The Mediterranean Sea, 1939.

Map 6  The Adriatic Sea, 1914–1918.

Map 7  The Black Sea.

Map 8  The Solomons Archipelago – New Guinea.

1 Strategic framework 

Naval or maritime strategy provides a framework for the employment of one’s naval forces both in peacetime and in time of war. It is subordinate to the country’s grand strategy and military strategy. Maritime strategy is conducted continuously in both peacetime and time of war. It can be offensive or defensive or a combination of the two. Normally, the stronger side would have an offensive maritime strategy, while the weaker side would be strategically on the defensive. Because war at sea is an integral part of a war as a whole, the decision about whether to be strategically on the offensive or the defensive would depend on the content of the political strategic objective and military strategic objective. 

Stronger vs. weaker side  In a war between a major sea power and land power or a major and minor sea power, it is obvious which side is stronger and which one is weaker. For a land power the main source of power is normally the army. For example, France, Spain, Imperial Russia, Germany, and Austria–Hungary were weaker powers at sea in a war with a major sea power. Their focus was on fielding a large army. France, for instance, always provided greater resources to its army than to the navy. Sometimes, France even allowed its navy to decay. By the end of the time of Cardinal Jules Raymond Mazarin (1602–1661) as Chief Minister (1642–1661), the French Navy had practically ceased to exist. It consisted of only fewer than twenty seaworthy ships. This situation changed for the better under Jean-­Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), Minister of Finances (1661–1683). He greatly increased naval construction. French naval strength rose rapidly and reached some 250 ships, including sixty-­eight first rate ships (armed with no fewer than fifty guns).1 Generally, in a war between a sea power and a land power victory usually depends on the effective and successful transfer of power from sea to land and vice versa. A land power can defeat maritime power only by taking to the sea.  Determining the stronger and weaker side is more difficult in the case of a war between relatively strong sea powers or two major land powers. In general, the weaker the enemy, the less damage a stronger sea power can inflict on the

2   Strategic framework weaker opponent. Hence, the weaker sea power generally has less to risk and more to gain by a war against a stronger sea power.2 A weaker power is unlikely to open hostilities unless it sees that war is inevitable and its geographical position gives it a definite strategic advantage.3 Very often the difficulties of the weaker side are exaggerated, and the chance of success almost ignored.4  Whether maritime strategy is defensive or offensive depends heavily on real or assumed naval combat potential (prior to war) or naval combat power (in a war). Generically, naval strength consists of a mix of the physical elements and those that are hard or impossible to quantify. It is also dependent on whether one’s forces operate from a favorable or unfavorable geographic position. Determining one’s naval strength is difficult because of so many elements which must be properly evaluated. It is largely an art rather than a science. The problem is even more complicated when it comes to determining relative naval combat potential (in peacetime) or naval combat power (in a war).  The most common method used in assessing naval combat potential is by counting the number of ships and aircraft or the numerical strength. Clearly, there is a great advantage to being numerically stronger than one’s opponent. For one thing, the larger fleet can be employed in conducting a greater variety of missions and in various parts of a given theater. Ship losses are felt less keenly than if a fleet is numerically small. Generally, the larger the forces’ size, the higher the probability of a successful outcome of a naval action. There is no such thing as being too strong if one’s aim is to achieve a quick and decisive victory. At some point, sheer numbers are simply overwhelming. Yet in some cases, numerically inferior forces can be more effective than much larger but poorly led and trained forces. For example, in the era of sail, the Royal Navy was not always numerically stronger but was a far more effective fighting force than its opponents because of its much better seamanship, high morale, inspiring leadership, and aggressive spirit.  The overall numerical strength of naval forces is often a poor indicator of its ability to perform its assigned missions in both peacetime and time of war. The numbers alone do not show the increased combat capabilities of individual platforms due to the impact of modern technologies. A navy might be numerically large but could be composed of mostly smaller combatants. The numbers do not reveal whether one’s ships are optimally suited for operating in a certain sea/ ocean area. They also do not tell whether a navy is balanced or unbalanced.  The advantages of numerical superiority are considerably reduced if one’s naval forces must be distributed among two or more widely separated theaters. For example, the former Soviet Navy had very large aggregate numerical strength but had to maintain four fleets in widely separated sea areas. Two of these fleets (the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet) did not have a direct access to the open ocean. None of them were able to operate within supporting distance of each other. Just looking at numerical superiority also ignores the fact the missions of the navies might differ considerably. A navy disputing control of the sea does not need to have a large number of heavy combatants. Yet it can be more successful than its much stronger blue-­water opponent. 

Strategic framework   3 Another metric used in evaluating naval combat potential has been aggregate tonnage for the main types of surface combatants (i.e., battleships, heavy and light cruisers, and destroyers) and submarines, and for the fleet. Generally, the larger the ship’s displacement, the higher its firepower. Yet aggregate tonnage and/or numbers do not show many other critically important tangible factors of combat potential such as age, type and size of ships, lethality and effective range of weapons, whether ships are single, dual or multipurpose, effectiveness of sensors, speed, range, and endurance, quality of maintenance, and availability of spare parts. The aggregate tonnage numbers do not reveal whether one’s naval leadership is predominantly focused on technology and tactics but lacks the necessary knowledge and skills to employ forces at the operational and strategic levels of war.  Other methods of measuring naval combat potential/power have been the number/caliber of main guns and torpedoes, and the aggregate weight of broadside shells in pounds/kilograms. More recently, new measurements have included the number of missile launchers, aim points (in the case of aircraft carriers), and information.  The most vocal proponents of information technologies repeatedly asserted that netting of one’s naval forces would result in a significant increase of one’s combat potential. They argued that supposedly platform-­centric warfare generates only “combat power,” while network-­centric warfare generates “increased power.” They claimed that power in the information era comes from information, access, and speed, while in the industrial era it came from mass.5 Information dominance would lead to what they call “demassification.” Substituting information and effects for mass would, in their view, reduce the need to concentrate one’s forces within specific geographical locations. This would, in turn, increase the tempo and speed of movement throughout the battle space, complicating an opponent’s targeting problems.6 The most vocal advocates of network-­ centric warfare also believed that widely geographically dispersed forces, combined with shared situational awareness and speed of communications, would allow much smaller forces to defeat much larger enemy forces, and very quickly. However, claims by the network-­centric warfare advocates that relatively smaller forces can cover geographical areas because of their quick and flexible deployability are not empirically supported.7  Estimating one’s and the enemy’s naval combat potential by evaluating only materiel is grossly inaccurate. Any fleet is composed of many physical (tangible) and “intangible” (imponderable) elements. The tangible elements – such as the number of ships, submarines, aircraft, firepower, mobility, logistics, and effectiveness of weapons/sensors – are for the most part measurable in some way. In contrast, intangibles are generally hard or even impossible to quantify with any degree of precision. Intangibles pertain for the most part to human elements, such as quality of leadership, morale and discipline, training, and command and control. Some of these elements, such as training and combat readiness, can be evaluated only in very broad terms (low, medium, high). Other intangible elements – such as leadership, will to fight, morale and discipline, unit cohesion,

4   Strategic framework combat motivation, and soundness of doctrine – are, in contrast, extremely difficult to quantify. Also, difficult to evaluate are the degree and effectiveness of close cooperation among services, or “jointness.” The effectiveness of a naval force is also affected by the physical environment, weather, and seasonal factors.  The boundaries between tangible and intangible factors are fluid and ever changing.8 This is especially true in the case of forces employed at the operational and strategic levels of war. Additionally, friction and the uncertainties (“fog of war”) are ever present. Tangible factors can be properly or improperly evaluated. They can also be changed over time. They can be intentionally or unconsciously erroneously reported. They can be wrongly understood because of various psychological factors such as fear, hate, and lack of confidence, fatigue, and nervous stress. Tangible elements can also be falsely evaluated.  The number or size of enemy forces or weapons/equipment might be accurately observed but falsely reported or evaluated. They can be also accurately reported but without providing a proper context. Information received might be accurate but wrongly interpreted by commanders and their staffs. This can happen intentionally or unintentionally. It can be caused by incompetence, lack of operations security, or even treason. The commander can falsely evaluate the enemy’s capabilities or intentions. Misunderstandings between commanders and subordinates are frequent occurrences in combat; they cannot be predicted or quantified. The breakdown of weapons or technical equipment can occur at any time. The effects of atmospheric influences cannot usually be measured precisely. Except in some rare cases, natural events cannot be accurately predicted. Hence, the unreliability of humans and technology considerably affects the performance of the opposing naval forces in a war. 

Maritime strategy in peacetime  Generally, maritime strategy provides the most important input to the development of one’s operational and tactical doctrine. It also largely determines the fleet’s current and future size/composition. Normally, a weaker side at sea would develop and adopt defensive naval strategy in peacetime. However, in some cases a weaker side might make a shift to offensive maritime strategy. This would be accompanied by a large naval construction program. Yet offensive strategy in peacetime does not mean that such a strategy would be applied by a weaker side in wartime.  Generally, the main elements of maritime strategy in peacetime are as follows:  • • • • • • •

Determining naval strategic objectives.  Preserving/enhancing the country’s maritime strategic positions.  Preserving/building naval alliances/coalitions.  Providing a vision of the character of the future war at sea.  Determining the theater of the main and secondary efforts.  Distributing one’s naval forces among theaters.  Determining the future size/composition of one’s naval forces. 

Strategic framework   5 Major land powers such as France, Germany, or Russia traditionally maintained an offensive strategy on land and a defensive strategy at sea. For example, in the Third Anglo-­Dutch War (1672–1674), the political objectives of Louis XIV (1638–1715) were to increase the power and security of France by conquering the Spanish Netherlands. Charles II of England (1630–1685) wanted to secure his own position by introducing Catholicism and absolute monarchy to England. Louis XIV would help Charles II with money and men to subjugate England while Charles II would aid Louis XIV with a fleet and army to conquer the United Provinces. In the first year of war, which started in March 1672, the Dutch neutralized the actions of the allied fleet and prevented a landing on their coast. However, the French army overran a large part of the United Provinces. Only the Dutch flooding of the country made it possible to stop the French advance on a line extending from the Scheldt to the Zuyder Zee. In the second year of the war, the military objective of the allies was to turn that line by landing an English army in the rear of the Dutch defenses. The objective of the Dutch was to prevent any such landing by attacking or threatening to attack the allied fleet which covered the transit of the army and its supplies over sea.9  The battle of Barfleur & La Hougue (May 19–24 and May 29–June 4, 1692), during the War of the Augsburg League (1688–1697), resulted in a decisive Anglo-­Dutch victory over the French fleet. Although France repaired its losses, its sea spirit was gone.10 The navy ceased to play any significant role in French policy. Its morale and maintenance declined. The French ships rarely left port. Officers and crews grew rusty in navigation, gunnery, and seamanship. Commerce warfare was an indirect product of the defeat in 1692. The French Navy used warships for commerce raiding rather than risk them in a decisive battle.11 However, a noted French Navy captain (later rear admiral) and theorist, René Daveluy (1863–1939) argued that the real reason for the decline of French sea power was the “poverty of the French treasure.” He wrote that one year after the defeat at Barfleur & La Hougue the French Navy still had some seventy ships-­ of-the-­line in service. But it was true that the French Navy later went into decline.12  After 1692, the French Navy became skeptical of the value of a naval battle. By the middle of eighteenth century, the art of preserving one’s ships in a battle had become firmly welded into French doctrine.13 In essence, France repudiated command of the sea on the “shaky” assumption that certain objectives on land, such as capturing England or the West Indies, could be accomplished without defeating the enemy fleet. In short, the conquest of territory had become a more important objective of naval strategy than destruction of the enemy at sea. The colonies were militarized, especially Canada, but without securing lifelines to metropolitan France. French Canada existed not because of brilliant French strategy but because the British lacked any ambition to capture it.14 Under the administration of Cardinal André-Hercule de Fleury (1653–1743), who was the First Minister (1726–1743), the French Navy sank to the lowest ebb.15 After the end of the War for the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the entire French Navy had only twenty-­two ships-­of-the-­line. Some sixty years earlier it had 120.

6   Strategic framework The French privateers made few captures. They were relentlessly pursued by the British ships and almost all were destroyed.16 Both King Louis XIV (reigned 1643–1715) and his grandson Louis XV (1710–1774) preferred a policy of continental expansion. Because of this, they starved the French Navy of funds. Commerce was also obstructed by the court and French commercial developments were checked. One of the staunchest supporters of a strong navy was François Joseph de Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville (1700–1770). However, he failed to convince Louis XV to devote more resources to the navy. Louis XV told him: “My dear Choiseul, you are as mad as your predecessors.”17  After unification of Germany in 1871, the German Navy was predominantly a defensive force. Its main mission was deterring a potential naval blockade, defense of the coast, and, if possible, interfering with enemy overseas trade.18 In the 1880s, the German Navy planned in case of a major European war to be on the offensive in the Baltic against Russia and on the defensive in the North Sea against the French Navy. The Germans hoped to prevent a French naval blockade by using “sortie corvettes” (Ausfallkorvettes) and torpedo boats.19  Just prior to World War I, the German naval strategy in the North Sea was defensive. The German high naval command firmly believed that the Royal Navy would blockade the German Bight (Deutsche Bucht) at the outbreak of hostilities. Hence, a decision was made to keep the German battle fleet at its bases until the British were exhausted and at the opportune moment to go on the offensive. At the same time, operational orders for the High Seas Fleet envisaged damaging the enemy fleet by offensive forays.20  Prior to World War I, Russia’s naval strategy in the Baltic was defensive. The Russian main objectives in wartime were to prevent German penetration into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland by using mines, torpedoes, and coastal artillery.21 The Russians were not confident that they could achieve dominance in the Baltic. The strategic assumptions of the Russian Naval General Staff were that the Tsar and Ministry of Foreign Affairs would maintain peace with Germany until the Russian naval construction program was completed.22  Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1918, the newly organized German Navy (Reichsmarine) was small and barely capable of defending the country’s coast and coastal sea traffic. The German naval strategy was purely defensive. For example, in 1920, the Reichsmarine’s main missions were ensuring security and surveillance of the coastal area and offshore waters, defense against attempts at annexation of the coastal area by “small maritime countries” (presumably Poland), and security of coastal sea routes, especially links with East Prussia.23 After the mid-­1920s, the Reichsmarine considered France and Poland and possibly Soviet Russia as its most likely opponents in a future war. War with Britain was not considered as a serious possibility. As early as April 1933, the new chancellor and Nazi leader Adolf Hitler stated that England would never again be considered as a potential adversary for the German Navy. In line with this, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), commander in chief (CINC) of the German Navy (1928–1943) intended to build a fleet that would not again unilaterally challenge Britain but would complement Germany’s policies on the continent.24 

Strategic framework   7 In 1934, the German naval operational planning was focused on war against France. The weight of the main effort would be on land. Hence, naval and air warfare had to directly or indirectly support that effort.25 In such a war it was necessary to obtain sea dominance in the Baltic. The reason was that, as in World War I, the Baltic would serve as the strategic rear for the war in the North Sea. The principal missions of the German Navy in the Baltic would be protection of sea routes to Eastern Prussia, defense of the long Baltic coast and securing iron ore imports from northern Sweden. The Danish Straits in combination with mine barriers were considered as an ideal operating area for a defender. The energetic measures put in place by the Germans would achieve a remarkable success there. But the situation would change if France brought heavy ships into the Baltic prior to the outbreak of hostilities.  The Reichsmarine’s main strategic tasks were protection of vital overseas sea communications and keeping open import routes to German ports. If necessary, the entire German fleet would be employed for these tasks. Most of the German imports were carried on ships sailing in the northern Atlantic and the North Sea. The Baltic had less importance for German overseas trade. Based on this situation the Germans intended to attack French troop transports from North Africa and thereby reduce pressure on the German army. They also planned to attack French overseas trade.26  To support the new strategy, Admiral Raeder proposed in March 1934 a new Ship Replacement Plan (Schiffbauersatzplan). The program called for a fleet of eight pocket battleships, three 15,000-ton carriers, eighteen cruisers, forty-­eight destroyers, and seventy-­two U-­boats by 1949. This plan was based on Raeder’s belief that he and Hitler shared the same view about England.27 In April 1936 Raeder intended to have a fleet air arm of sixty-­four squadrons with 800 aircraft by 1942.28 On December 21, 1937, he added six battleships and two carriers to the naval construction plan. Raeder calculated that by 1944 the Kriegsmarine would have 324 ships in service.29  In the meantime, the German naval strategy was greatly affected by the Anglo-­German naval agreement signed in June 1935. The Germans voluntarily agreed to limit their fleet to 35 percent of the British Navy. In 1935, the Royal Navy had in service twelve battleships, three battle cruisers, eight carriers, nineteen heavy cruisers, thirty-­five light cruisers, nineteen flotilla leaders, 150 destroyers and fifty-­four submarines. In contrast, the Kriegsmarine then had in service only three modern “pocket” battleships (Panzerschiffe), six light cruisers and twelve torpedo boats.30  The agreement with Britain was also favorable for the Kriegsmarine, because it offered the opportunity to build a modern and “suitable fleet for Germany’s conditions.”31 Germany was allowed total tonnage of 421,000 tons (versus 144,000 tons under the terms of the Versailles Treaty), while the Royal Navy’s total was 1,200,000 tons.32 Under the terms of the agreement, the Kriegsmarine’s allowed tonnage was raised to 183,750 tons for large surface combatants, 47,000 tons for carriers, 51,380 tons for heavy cruisers, 119,000 tons for light cruisers (67,270 tons) and destroyers, and 23,900 tons for U-­boats (45 percent of the British). In 1935, the Germans started construction on or laid down two new

8   Strategic framework 26,000-ton “pocket” battleships, two 10,000-ton heavy cruisers, sixteen 1,625ton destroyers (laid down in 1934 and 1935), and twenty-­eight U-­boats (twenty 250-ton, six 500-ton, and two 750-ton).33  Admiral Raeder wrote in his memoirs that German hoped that England would never be the enemy of Germany and under some conditions might even become an ally.34 He believed that the new agreement would allow building the fleet in support of Germany’s “continental” policy as Hitler promised to him during their first official meeting. Raeder assumed that Britain would embark on the fleet build-­up after 1936 when the Washington naval treaty of 1922 was to expire. There were some early indications then that the treaty would not be renewed.35 Hitler believed that the naval agreement with Britain would preclude war with Britain. Hence, that possibility was not considered in strategic assessments made by the Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Marine – OKM) and Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung – SKL) in the years ahead.36  For the British, the agreement secured decisive superiority for the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine. Also, both sides had agreed to regular exchanges of information about their respective naval construction programs. From the British perspective, the weakest part of the agreement was that the Germans could build up their U-­boat force. This concession was rationalized by the Admiralty by saying that the threat of the U-­boats could be overcome by new submarine detection sensors (ASDIC) and that the Germans accepted limitations under international law on the employment of U-­boats. In political terms, the agreement was aimed at buying time and reducing Germany’s threat to Europe and Britain.37  In 1935, the German naval operational planning focused on a dual-­front war: against France and Soviet Russia.38 In contemplating the character of the future war at sea the Germans believed that there would be no period of tensions prior to the outbreak of the hostilities. The future war would be protracted. In the Baltic theater, the main tasks of the Kriegsmarine would be protection of troop transports to Eastern Prussia and sea routes to Sweden and the North Sea plus defense against Russian attacks. In the North Sea theater, the Kriegsmarine would focus on defense of the German Bight and import routes from the Atlantic. The main operating area for the heavy surface forces would be the northern part of the North Sea and the northern Atlantic. Light forces and aircraft would not be employed there because of their inadequate range.39 The German naval forces would operate in the central Atlantic only in the event of Italy becoming an ally. Then the Italian Navy would attack French Mediterranean troop transports. The Germans also envisaged the possibility of carrying out surprise attacks on the French-­controlled North African coast by using pocket battleships and cruisers. However, only U-­boats would be deployed to operate in the Mediterranean.40 The objective was to cause strategic and tactical dispersal of the enemy forces by exerting pressure on the enemy’s “exterior positions.”41 The Germans also built only a modest number of U-­boats until late 1938 because the High Naval Command accepted Hitler’s view that Great Britain should not be regarded as the probably enemy.42 

Strategic framework   9 Between the mid-­1920s and mid-­1930s, Soviet naval strategy was predominantly defensive. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the Russian Civil War (1918–1921), naval forces of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) consisted of 223 warships. This number included one battleship, twenty-­four destroyers and torpedo boat destroyers, and thirteen submarines.43 Most of these ships were obsolete. Because of the steadily deteriorating economic conditions, the size of the Soviet naval forces was greatly reduced in the 1920s. The navy also went through great turmoil because the Bolsheviks drastically reduced the number of officers from the Imperial Russian Navy. This resulted in a significant reduction of the quality of professional expertise and training. In the early 1920s, the principal missions of the RKKF were defense of the country’s sea borders, defense of sea communications, and support of the Red Army.44 Because of the extremely poor economic conditions in the country, the Soviet naval forces began to receive greater resources only after 1925. However, the Red Army leaders were strongly opposed to any major increases in the size of naval forces. They wanted to allocate most of the country’s resources to building up the army and air forces.45  The Soviet military strategy in 1933–1937 contemplated “active defense of the Soviet Union’s land and sea borders.” The Soviet naval forces would be directed to “conduct series of coordinated blows by submarines, torpedo boats and naval air forces and backed by a pattern of minefields and strong coastal artillery, to defeat an enemy’s attack from the sea, and [provide] support to the army.”46  One part of the Soviet Second Five-­Year Plan (1933–1937) was a large naval construction program. This program underwent several major changes. The final plan envisaged construction of eight cruisers, thirty-­two destroyer leaders and destroyers, 355 submarines of various sizes, 194 torpedo boats, four monitors, and six minelayers. This program was later scaled down by reducing the number of destroyer leaders and submarines.47 The Second Five-­Year Plan officially ended on December 31, 1937. By then, only the first destroyer leader, sixteen patrol ships, six minesweepers, and 262 torpedo boats and submarine chasers (SCs) had been completed. The Soviets achieved more success in submarine construction. By the end of 1937, nineteen large (out of sixty-­nine planned), seventy-­two medium (out of 200), and fifty-­two small (out of 100) submarines had been completed. The Soviet submarine force with 143 boats was then the largest in the world.48  A weaker but relatively powerful opponent of a major sea power might also shift to an offensive strategy in peacetime. This could be result of faulty decisions or a radical change of the strategic situation, overconfidence of the highest politico-­military leadership or simply personal ambition, or a combination of these and some other reasons. For example, prior to 1914, the German naval strategy was based on the ideas of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office. Tirpitz considered England as Germany’s most dangerous enemy at sea.49 In his later famous service memo (Dienstvorschrift) No. IX: “General Views on the Composition of Our Fleet

10   Strategic framework Regarding Type and Classes of Ships” on June 15, 1894,50 Tirpitz argued that command of the sea can be obtained only by the fleet encounter not “cruiser (commerce) warfare.”51 This represented a major shift from a strategic defensive to a strategic offensive position.52 He advocated offensive actions to bring about “the earliest possible initiation of a battle” (to reach a decision).53 To be successful, such an offensive would require the German Navy to have about 30 percent superiority. Tirpitz was unable to obtain such superiority over the Royal Navy. His solution was to build the so-­called “risk-­fleet” (Risikoflotte) publicly unveiled in the Second Naval Law (June 14, 1900).54  In case of a major war in Europe, Tirpitz planned to concentrate the High Seas Fleet in the south-­central part of the North Sea to fight a decisive battle. His reasoning was that even if the High Seas Fleet was defeated it could possibly inflict such large losses on the enemy fleet as to make Britain to think twice before incurring a risk which could leave her at the mercy of a third rate naval power or coalition. Tirpitz believed that Britain as the attacker would require no fewer than ninety heavy ships to be deployed in the North Sea. Germany would need to build sixty capital ships.55 Tirpitz’s intent was to force the British to concentrate their forces in the North Sea and thereby deprive them of strategic freedom of action in other maritime theaters. He planned to intensify naval construction to such a degree that Britain, with its global interests and commitments, would be unable to keep up the pace over a prolonged period. This, in turn, would force Britain to offer Germany concessions in terms of bases, colonies, and markets rather than risk naval Armageddon.56  The fatal flaw of the Tirpitz risk-­fleet concept was that it rested on highly questionable psychological assumptions. The result of Tirpitz’s efforts was that German naval strategy was thrown into a state of confusion. From the originally envisaged strategic offensive the German Navy retained only the “tactical will to battle.” It mistakenly focused all its training and efforts on preparing for fighting a decisive battle with the Royal Navy.57 In the meantime, and unknown to the Germans, the British changed their strategy. The increased threat of mines, torpedo boats and U-­boats forced the British to shift operational planning to a “risk-­free” distant blockade. By exploiting their favorable strategic positions, the British intended to cut off German sea routes beyond the effective range of the German fleet. This change in the operational plans led to the deployment of a major part of the Grand Fleet to Scapa Flow.58  The Austro-­Hungarian Navy was numerically much weaker than its potential opponent in wartime, the Italian Navy. Yet it adopted an offensive strategy in the Adriatic prior to 1914. It envisaged at the beginning of a war a surprise and all-­out attack with the major part of its fleet against the Italian naval bases, merchant shipping, and coastal railroads/tunnels. The main objective was to obtain sea control and thereby provide support to the army on the coast. Another objective was to demoralize the Italian population. However, the Austrians believed that sea control would be obtained only under the most favorable circumstances.59  To complicate matters, Austria–Hungary was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy. As part of the alliance, the Austro-­Hungarian fleet

Strategic framework   11 would cooperate closely with the Italians. This was stipulated in the naval conventions signed in 1900 and renewed on June 23, 1913. After some revisions made in August, the convention became fully effective in November 1913.60 The agreement envisaged that the combined fleets would be led by a commander in chief (Austro-­Hungarian admiral Anton Haus). The objective of the combined fleet was “securing of naval control in the Mediterranean through the swiftest possible defeat of the enemy fleet.”61 At the outbreak of war, fleets of each power would sail to the vicinity of Messina, Sicily to unite and complete provisioning. Afterward, the combined fleet would search and destroy as soon as possible the French fleet, before the arrival of the Russian (Black Sea) fleet.62 It was left to the discretion of the CINC of the combined fleet whether to conduct simultaneously with the main action an attack on the French troop transports or part of the enemy coast.63 After defeating the enemy fleet, the combined fleet would support the landing of some 100,000 Italian troops in southern France.64 At the same time, the Austro-­Hungarian fleet would be strategically on the defensive in the Adriatic.65 This was clearly contrary to the Austro-­Hungarian Navy’s plans prepared prior to 1913.  In the late 1930s, the German naval strategy shifted from defensive to offensive. In a staff study Fundamental Thoughts on Naval Warfare (Grundsätzliche Gedanke der Seekriegsführung) on February 2, 1937, Admiral Raeder contemplated “energetic” employment of German naval forces to exert strategic pressure on the superior enemy forces. Hence, a more favorable balance of forces would result. This became the basis for the Kriegsmarine’s operational thinking.66 On February 3 in his meeting with Hitler and field marshal Werner von Blomberg (1878–1946), Minister of War and CINC of the Armed Forces, Raeder explained the Kriegsmarine’s strategy in case of a war. He stated that “Atlantic warfare” (Atlantikkriegführung) and war in distant ocean areas were integral parts of the entire war. The objective would be to secure control of sea communications by hitting the enemy decisively and thereby contribute to the overall strategic objective.67  A major change in the German policy came on May 24, 1938 when Hitler reversed his previous more benign views on England.68 He issued instructions to count England as a possible enemy in addition to France and Soviet Russia.69 In June 1938, Raeder directed the SKL to explore the possibility of war with England.70 Raeder and his staff prepared a staff study on German naval warfare in 1937/38 that served as the basis for combat instructions in 1938.71 Because of Germany’s unfavorable geographic position and British superiority, the Germans decided to focus on conducting commerce warfare on the ocean by using “pocket” battleships, heavy cruisers, and U-­boats.72  Admiral Raeder believed that in case of a major war, concentration of all available forces for the struggle against England would be necessary. The construction of U-­boats and production of aircraft must have unconditional priority. In his concept, the Luftwaffe would mine approaches to the British ports and destroy transportation facilities so that the Kriegsmarine could conduct trade warfare with the U-­boats and surface ships, supported by naval aircraft. The

12   Strategic framework objective would be to force the enemy to institute convoying and thereby reduce his naval strength in home waters. Raeder also believed that “war against economy” (Wirtschaftskrieg) could not be limited only to belligerents but would also include attack on the neutral shipping.73  The Germans were aware of their inferiority at sea in case of a war with Britain. Hence, Hitler wanted Germany to have a much larger navy to be used as global instrument of power. In early November 1938, Hitler requested that a formidable force of battleships be built. Raeder revised the existing naval construction program. The result was the “Z(iel)-plan” that envisaged a numerically and qualitatively much larger Kriegsmarine. The Z-­plan was formally approved by Hitler in January 1939. By 1946, the Kriegsmarine would have in service no fewer than six new class 50,000-ton battleships, three new class 10,000-ton pocket battleships, four 20,000-ton aircraft carriers, five 10,000-ton heavy and sixteen 8,000-ton light cruisers, twenty-­two 5,000-ton scouting cruisers, sixty-­ eight destroyers, and ninety (destroyer-size) torpedo boats. Initially, the Z-­plan envisaged construction of 260 U-­boats (twenty-­seven 2,000-ton; sixty-­two 750-ton Type IX; one hundred 500-ton Type VII; and sixty 250-ton Type II).74 In the summer of 1939, the number of U-­boats was increased to 300.75  On August 4, 1939, the SKL directed that in the event of a war, the Kriegsmarine would cut off enemy sea communications by using all available forces. The enemy naval forces would be attacked only if that would contribute to war on commerce.76 Just before the invasion of Poland, Hitler’s Directive No. 1 on August 31, 1939 stated that if England and France declared war, the Kriegs­ marine would concentrate on commerce destruction especially against England. The Luftwaffe was directed to prepare for air attacks against British import shipping.77  At the beginning of war with Britain and France on September 3, 1939, the Kriegsmarine was unprepared for a protracted war at sea. It was grossly inferior to the combined strength of the British and French Navies. It had only two battle cruisers (referred to as battleships) and three pocket battleships vs. twenty-­two British and French battleships, zero vs. seven carriers, two vs. twenty-­two heavy cruisers, six vs. sixty-­one light cruisers, and thirty-­four vs. 255 destroyers.78 The Kriegsmarine had then in service only six heavy surface ships: two battleships, three pocket battleships, and one heavy cruiser. They were the only units capable of conducting sustained operations on the open ocean. The remainder of the fleet consisted of only six light cruisers, twenty-­two destroyers, and twenty (destroyer-­size) torpedo boats. Under construction were four battleships, two aircraft carriers, four heavy cruisers, sixteen destroyers, and ten torpedo boats. Out of fifty-­seven U-­boats, only twenty-­two were suitable for employment in the Atlantic.79 Raeder wrote that the Kriegsmarine lacked aircraft carriers and accompanying escorts for large surface combatants. It did not have an adequate number of long-­range reconnaissance aircraft. Germany also lacked advanced naval bases overseas. In Raeder’s view, the enemy’s advantages could be neutralized only by unity in planning operations and decisiveness in their execution.80 

Strategic framework   13 By the mid-­1930s, the Soviets started to adopt offensive naval strategy. This change was the result of both external and internal developments. By 1934, Stalin had overcome much of the opposition to his personal dictatorship. The Soviet surface forces were inadequate to counter the German and Italian naval presence off the Spanish coast during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). In the mid-­1930s Japan and Italy revoked naval treaties they had once signed. Britain and Germany signed a naval agreement in 1935 that allowed Germany to greatly expand its fleet. In addition, the United States, Great Britain, and France adopted new naval construction programs. Stalin’s megalomania played a rather significant role in his decision to embark on a huge naval build-­up including gigantic shipyard construction.81 Another reason was his wish to increase the international prestige and power of the Soviet Union.82 All these events in combination played a leading role in Stalin’s decision in late 1935 to build a big-­ship navy.83  In February 1936, two alternative plans for a large ocean-­going navy were prepared: one by the RKKA general staff ’s naval experts and one by the staff of the commander of naval forces. On April 15, the navy high command presented its first draft of the fleet program to be completed by 1947. It included the building of no fewer than fifteen battleships, twenty-­two heavy cruisers, thirty-­one light cruisers, 162 destroyers and destroyer leaders, 412 submarines, and many small vessels and auxiliaries.84 In June 1936, the number of battleships was increased to twenty-­four and the number of light cruisers reduced to twenty. The revised plan also included construction of 182 destroyers and 344 submarines. By August 1939, the fourth or fifth modification of the plan envisaged construction of about 700 combat ships plus several hundred auxiliaries.85 By July 1940, the Soviet naval building program was drastically scaled down. The number of battleships was reduced to ten, battle cruisers from sixteen to eight, and cruisers to only fourteen. However, for the first time, the Soviets included in their plan the construction of two small aircraft carriers, both to be assigned to the Pacific Fleet.86  Between the end of the 1920s and 1941, the Soviets started construction of 533 naval vessels. By June 22, 1941, some 312 ships (with 243,200 tons) were complete. This number included 206 submarines, four cruisers, seven destroyer leaders (large destroyers), thirty destroyers, eighteen patrol ships, thirty-­eight minesweepers, one minelayer, eight river monitors and 477 combat craft (torpedo boats, armored boats, SCs, etc.). By then, 220 ships were still in various stages of construction.87  In the Baltic, the Soviet Baltic Fleet was numerically and qualitatively stronger than the Kriegsmarine. However, its plans in the fall of 1939 were purely defensive. Its main missions, which underwent only slight changes by 1941, were defense of Leningrad from the sea, preventing enemy penetration into the Gulf of Finland, defense against enemy amphibious landing, support of the coastal flank of the Red Army, operations against an enemy fleet at sea, and operations against enemy maritime communications. At the same time, the Soviet naval strategy in the Black Sea was also predominantly defensive.

14   Strategic framework Specifically, the Black Sea Fleet was responsible for preventing enemy mine­ laying and submarine operations, conducting operations against enemy maritime communications, transport of troops and military supplies, anti-­amphibious defense, support of the maritime flank of the Red Army offensive operations, and defense of Soviet maritime communications.88  From 1946 to 1953, Stalin’s pre-­war big-­navy views were confirmed and strengthened by the experiences of World War II.89 Stalin and the Soviet leadership did not abandon the pre-­war plans for an ocean-­going navy. The first naval construction program, for 1946–1955, was submitted in mid-­summer of 1945. It envisaged the building of nine battleships, twelve battle cruisers, thirty heavy cruisers, sixty light cruisers, nine large carriers, six light carriers, 222 destroyers, 168 large, 204 medium, and 117 small submarines, 738 torpedo boats, 476 landing ships/craft, 644 minesweepers, 546 patrol ships, and 495 SCs. By 1955, some 85 destroyers, 223 submarines, 48 patrol ships, 247 submarine chasers, 250 minesweepers, and 730 torpedo boats had been completed.90  A weaker side at sea might adopt in peacetime an offensive strategy aiming to improve its highly unfavorable maritime strategic position such as lack of free and unimpeded access to the open ocean or larger narrow seas in time of war. Clearly, this is chiefly the responsibility of national policy and strategy not maritime strategy. However, the threat of using one’s naval forces to obtain concessions is the key prerequisite for the success of such a policy and national strategy. For example, Imperial Russia and the former Soviet Union made considerable and consistent efforts to obtain control of the straits allowing access to the North Sea/northern Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Mediterranean. But the Russians exerted perhaps the greatest, although ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to get access to the to the Mediterranean by obtaining control of the Black Sea’s sole exit, the 235-mile long Turkish Straits (the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles). From the beginning of the eighteenth century to 1914 Russia fought eleven wars against Turkey that cumulatively lasted some thirty years. Turkey was allied with Russia only twice: in 1798 and in 1833.91 The main cause of most of these wars was Russia’s attempts to obtain control of the Straits. It was after the Berlin Congress in 1878, that Imperial Russia ended its efforts to obtain control of the Straits by using force. Throughout the nineteenth century Britain and France blocked all Russian attempts to gain control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. They considered that the Russian military power would pose a great threat to their interests in the Mediterranean.92  Russia resumed its quest to obtain control of the Straits after Turkey, on October 28, 1914, entered the war as Germany’s ally. In March 1915, Russia demanded and obtained the consent of Britain and France to its control of the Turkish Straits after the victorious end of war.93 Yet this treaty never came into effect because Russia collapsed in February 1917 and ended in a revolution in October of that year.94  Between 1918 and 1935 the status of the Straits was discussed by major European powers and revised twice: in the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. The latter treaty was revised at the

Strategic framework   15 international conference in Montreux, Switzerland in July 1936 (the new convention became effective on November 9, 1936). Among other things, the Montreux Treaty restored Turkish sovereignty over the Straits. Turkey was free to remilitarize the Straits zone. Freedom of commerce was guaranteed both in peace and in war, and even if Turkey was belligerent. However, transit of commercial shipping and warships of the non-­Black Sea powers was restricted to no more than 30,000 tons, and warships to 15,000 tons, respectively, at one time. Transit of all warships had to be preceded by a notification to the Turkish government.95 Belligerents were prohibited from using the Straits except when acting under the authority of the League of Nations, or when acting in accordance with a regional pact to which Turkey was a party and which was registered at Geneva under Article XVIII of the Covenant. Turkey was authorized to close the Straits in case of a war of aggression, subject to a two-­thirds vote of the League Council. The duration of Montreux Convention was twenty years and it might be revised every five years.96 However, Soviet Russia refused to sign the convention.97  The Soviets did not make any formal request for revision of the Montreux Convention during World War II. However, they raised the Straits issue for the first time on November 30, 1943 at the Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1) (codenamed Eureka). Stalin mentioned the Straits and Russia’s needs to get access to “warm water” ports. Both Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed that it would be necessary to make some revisions to the Montreux Convention.98 During Churchill’s visit to Moscow in October 1944, Stalin was more forceful in pressing Soviet demands. Among other things, he complained that Turkey should not have the authority to unilaterally close the Straits. He forced the U.S. and Britain to have the Straits question on the agenda at the Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945). Stalin asserted that the Montreux Convention was obsolete because Japan was one of the signatories. He also mentioned that “it was impossible to accept the situation in which Turkey had a hand at Russia’s throat.”99 At the Allied Conference in Potsdam (July 17–August 2 1945), Stalin and his foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov again pressed territorial demands on Turkey. The Soviet formal proposal for revision of the Montreux Convention included a demand for joint control of the Straits and provision for Soviet military bases.100 During the conference, the British and the Americans were unwilling to agree with the Soviet demands to have bases in the Straits.101  The Soviet demands for territorial concessions and control of the Straits inflamed political and public opinion in Turkey. In December 1945, Stalin reiterated Soviet demands for revisions of the Montreux Convention at the Allied foreign ministers conference in Moscow.102 All three powers agreed that they should approach Turkey.103 Moscow’s aim was clearly to prohibit any presence of the warships of the non-­Black Sea countries and to secure free access of the Soviet warships to the Mediterranean.104  The Soviets intensified their pressure on Turkey in the spring and summer of 1946. Britain and United States became staunch defenders of Turkish

16   Strategic framework territorial integrity and sovereignty in face of almost constant Soviet threats. On March 19, Moscow announced that it would not renew the Turco-­Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-­Aggression (signed in 1925). In June 1946, the Soviets presented the Turkish ambassador in Moscow with demands for bases in the Straits, for joint revision of the Montreux Convention, and for the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan (northeastern Turkey) to the Soviet Union. Ankara rejected all these demands.105 To strengthen Turkey’s resolve, the U.S. sent the 58,000-ton (full load) battleship Missouri to visit Istanbul on April 5–9, 1946. This was the first time that an American battleship anchored at the Bosporus.106  On August 7, 1946, Moscow sent to Ankara a diplomatic note regarding revisions of the Montreux Convention. This move was accompanied with large-­scale movement of the Soviet troops in Transcaucasia and Bulgaria and naval exercises in the Black Sea.107 The Soviet demands were based on Turkey’s supposed violations of the agreement by favoring the Axis powers during war. All the Soviet claims were factually false.108 Moreover, Moscow proposed that the Straits should be always open to merchant shipping and to warships of the Black Sea powers but closed to the warships of non-­Black Sea powers except in special circumstances.109 The power to formulate the regime of the Straits should be left to Turkey and the Black Sea powers. The Straits should be defended by the “common means” of Turkey and Soviet Union.110  The Soviet move caused strong and quick reaction by the United States and Britain. On August 19, 1946, the United States challenged the Soviet contention that the Straits regime was the exclusive concern of the Black Sea powers. It called for a multilateral conference to revise the Montreux Convention.111 Britain’s reaction was like that of the United States. On August 22, Turkey echoed the British and U.S. response. It categorically denied the Soviet allegations that Turkey had allowed the Axis powers to use the Straits against the Allies.112 It firmly rejected the Soviet demands for joint control of the Straits as being incompatible with the maintenance of Turkey’s sovereignty and security. On September 24, Moscow responded by repeating the same allegations against Turkey. It also reiterated the special rights of Black Sea powers and insisted on Turkey’s acceptance of joint control of the Straits.113 On October 9, the British and U.S. governments reiterated their position and so did Turkey on October 18. Moscow never responded to the Turkish note of October 18 and took no further actions in relation to the Straits issue.114 A major power can greatly improve its maritime position in peacetime by laying claims to some strategically located but disputed islands or archipelagoes. Such efforts would require clarity of objectives and synchronized use or threat of use of all sources of national power. For example, the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) laid claims to almost the entire South China Sea. Some 40 percent of the world’s trade passes through the South China Sea.115 The Chinese claims are based on the so-­called U-­shaped “nine-­dash line” published for the first time by the nationalist government in Taiwan in 1947.116 This line encompasses some 80 percent (some observers think 90 percent) of the South

Strategic framework   17 China Sea. The Chinese claim that this line is based on historical ownership. However, the Chinese have never properly explained their claims.118  The area delineated by the “nine-­dash line” includes the Paracel (Xisha) and the Spratly (Nansha) archipelagoes, plus several other isolated islands/reefs. The Paracels consist of some 130 small coral islands and reefs. They are spread over an area of some 5,800 square miles with a land area of only 3 square miles. The Paracels are claimed by Vietnam, China, and Taiwan. China seized control of the Paracels from South Vietnam in 1974.119 The Spratlys consist of about 750 uninhabited islands, islets, and cays, and some 100 reefs, encompassing a total land area of only 0.77 square miles. They are spread over some 164,000 square miles.120 The Spratlys are claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam and in part by Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.121 They are occupied in part by these countries but not by Brunei.122 The Chinese went so far as to claim the James Shoal, located some 1,500 nautical miles from Hainan, as the southernmost part of their territory. This shoal is a sandbank lying some 72 feet under the surface.123  The Pratas (Dongsha) Islands, some 210 miles southeast of Hong Kong, consist of three small islands with a combined surface area of 590 acres. They are claimed by China and Taiwan. The Scarborough Reef, some 130 miles away from Luzon, is claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and partly by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.124 The Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan and administered by Japan.125 “The Chinese have some valid claims on the Paracels but so have the Vietnamese. China’s claims on the Spratly are very different matter.”126  The P.R.C. claims that it has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil.127 However, the area inside the “nine-­dash line” exceeds what is claimable as territorial waters under customary international law of the sea and as reflected under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea) of December 1982.128 The P.R.C. presented for the first time a map of its claims to the U.N. in 2009. Afterward, the P.R.C. started to press its territorial claims in the South China Sea.129 Many of the land features that China claims in the South China Sea would not qualify as islands under article 121 (3) of UNCLOS. Hence, they cannot be used for claims for an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). P.R.C. could probably claim an EEZ for some large islands in the Spratlys plus Woody Island in the Paracels and Pratas Island (currently controlled by Taiwan).130 In short, the P.R.C.’s interpretation of the EEZ runs counter to what is stipulated by UNCLOS. P.R.C. and some twenty-­six other countries assert that EEZ gives rights over not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities. However, the United States and all most of other countries reject such claims.131  Since 2014, the P.R.C.’s policy has become openly expansionist. Despite promises not to militarize the area it did just the opposite.132 The Chinese embarked on an unprecedented industrial-­scale land reclamation project. During 2014, the P.R.C. started massive dredging and construction work to transform seven small and 117

18   Strategic framework low-­tide elevation reefs in the Spratlys into substantial artificial islands. In 2015, Chinese personnel started constructing extensive infrastructure including airstrips, deep water port facilities, and housing for troops on the new artificial islets.133 The Chinese can conduct surveillance of the entire South China Sea. The militarized Spratlys contained several airstrips, hardened facilities for diverse types of aircraft, radar posts, and anti-­air defenses sites. Port facilities can refuel and replenish significant numbers of naval coast guard and maritime militia vessels.134  The P.R.C.’s ultimate objective is to gain strategic control of the shipping lanes in the South China Sea. Beijing used a broad range of political, economic, information, and military resources. Beijing applied what is called a “salami-­ slicing” strategy. It carried out a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself was casus belli to gradually change the status quo in P.R.C.’s favor.135 One Chinese scholar used the term “cabbage” strategy. Control over disputed islands/ islets is consolidated by wrapping those islands, like the leaves of a cabbage, in successive layers of occupation and protection formed by fishing boats, the Chinese coast guard, and then finally Chinese naval ships.136 

Maritime strategy in a war  In time of open hostilities, the relative importance of maritime strategy would be reduced. The focus would shift to planning and execution of major naval/joint operations and maritime campaigns and tactical actions. Maritime strategy would also be modified or altered to fit the changes in the strategic situation. The principal elements of maritime strategy in wartime are as follows:  • • • • • • •

Accomplishing/changing/modifying naval strategic objectives.  Providing forces and resources for accomplishment of naval strategic objectives.  Determining new theaters of the main/secondary efforts.  Building new naval alliances/coalitions.  Capturing more favorable maritime strategic positions.  Creating favorable strategic conditions for cessation of the hostilities at sea.  Post-­hostilities naval construction programs. 

Sea denial is one the principal strategic or operational objectives of a weaker side at sea. It should be not confused with sea control. Very often it is contended that the stronger navy, by obtaining sea control, also somehow conducts sea denial. This might be technically true, because obtaining control means at the same time denying that control to the opponent. However, there are fundamental differences between sea control and sea denial. Obtaining or gaining sea control is a positive object while denying that control is a negative object. Moreover, there is a considerable difference in methods used to obtain sea control and for denying control of the sea.  Sea denial can be described as preventing partially or completely the enemy’s use of the sea for military and commercial purposes. Actions to deny control of

Strategic framework   19 the sea are carried out in case of a war at sea, not in peacetime. Like sea control, denial of control of the sea in a war between two strong opponents can also exist in various degrees. In terms of the space factor, a weaker side can deny general and/or local sea control. It can deny partially or completely control of one or more physical mediums (sea surface, subsurface, and the air). In terms of the time factor, sea denial can be only temporary not permanent. And in terms of force, denying control of the sea can be limited or conditional. Actions and measures aimed at denying control of the sea are collectively called disputing (or contesting) sea control.  In a war with a major sea power, a minor sea power would be strategically on the defensive from the very outset of the hostilities. Things are more complicated in the case of a war between two approximately equally strong opponents. Then both sides might go strategically on the offensive or one side might opt to be strategically on the defensive. If both sides go on the offensive at the beginning of the hostilities, then after a certain time one side will suffer larger losses and most likely shift to a strategic defensive. Also, a major sea power could be forced to go strategically on the defensive in case of simultaneous hostilities against strong opponents in two different maritime theaters. In such a case, the stronger side would be strategically on the offensive in the theater of main effort and on the defensive in the secondary theater.  Theoretically, it is also possible that a stronger side at sea could be forced to go on the defensive because it failed to concentrate its forces in the theater of main effort or because of lack of aggressiveness or some political considerations. A major sea power might also be forced, at least temporarily, strategically onto the defensive in case of a war with two or more strong opponents in a single theater, as the example of the Royal Navy in the American War for Independence (1775–1783) illustrates. After France concluded an alliance with Spain in April 1779, the Royal Navy lost its superiority in European waters.  A major sea power would normally have much greater degree of control on the open ocean than in the peripheral seas or enclosed/semi-enclosed seas. A land power with relatively strong fleet can successfully contest control by a major sea power closer to its home waters. For example, the German Navy prevented the Royal Navy to project its power in the Baltic in both world wars. Moreover, it successfully disputed control in the North Sea. In World War I, the weaker but active Austro-Hungarian Navy prevented the British and French Navy to control Adriatic during the entire war.137  Experience provides several examples showing how critical it is for both a stronger and a weaker sea power to possess not only local but also a certain degree of general control of the sea. It also shows the absolute need for a weaker sea power to be active. For example, in the Second Punic War (218–201 bc), Carthage was the weaker side. The Mediterranean was then almost entirely controlled by the Romans. This was the reason that Hannibal Barca (247–183/181 bc) mounted an invasion of Italy across the land not the sea. The Romans sent an army to Spain to harass Hannibal’s long lines of communication. They also isolated Hannibal’s ally Philip V of Macedon (238–179 bc).138

20   Strategic framework The Carthaginians were able to obtain local control in certain parts of the Mediterranean. Yet they lacked general control and without it they were unable to sustain Hannibal’s forces in mainland Italy or carry out large-­scale landing on the Italian coast. Carthage had control of Spain but did not control Sicily or the Balkans.139  Despite the significant superiority of the Roman fleet, the Carthaginian fleet was very active. During the war there were no naval battles of importance. After victory at Cannae, the Carthaginian commander Bomilcar was able to land some 4,000 men and some elephants in Italy as reinforcements to Hannibal. He played hide and seek with the Romans and conducted a diversion in Sicily. The Sicilians rose in rebellion against Rome. The Carthaginians landed supplies at Syracuse. Bomilcar sent dispatch vessels for Hannibal between Carthage and Italy. Finally, in 201 bc, Hannibal withdraw his army in safety to Carthage.140  A good example of numerically weaker but qualitatively stronger sea power was England’s struggle for sea dominance against Spain in late sixteenth century. When Queen Elizabeth I of England (1533–1603) came to power France and Scotland were the greatest danger to her rule not Spain. In fact, she owed her throne to support received from Philip II of Spain (1527–1598). The long-­ standing friendship between England and Spain had mutual advantages for both countries because it was based on common interests. Anglo-­Spanish relations began to steadily deteriorate after the Counter-­Reformation (1545–1648). The growing power of Spain was a danger to the protestant powers led by England. Another cause of estrangement was economic – the expansion of English overseas trade.141 Britain’s strategy was to identify and attack the weakest points in Spain’s defenses.142 For example, in 1585, Francis Drake (1540–1596) successfully attacked Santo Domingo (the administrative capital of the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean) and Cartagena (one of the treasure fleets’ assembly ports).143  Tensions between Spain and England led to the war in 1585 which did not end until 1604. In March 1586, Philip II decided to stop England’s interference in the Spanish Netherlands and colonial possession in the Caribbean by overthrowing Queen Elizabeth I. He directed Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma (1545–1592), governor general of the Spanish Netherlands to prepare his army to invade England. Between April and June of 1587, the Spanish naval preparations suffered a serious setback because of Francis Drake’s successful raid on Cádiz in which some thirty-­three Spanish ships were destroyed. The Spanish fleet commander, Marquiz Santa Cruz, died in January 1588 and was replaced by the less capable (no naval or army experience) Duke of Medina Sidonia. His deputy was Admiral Diego Rodriguez de Valdés.144  In 1588, the strategic situation was not very favorable for Spain. The Spanish fleet was still in a war with the Ottoman Navy in the Mediterranean. Spain was unable to secure a sea route to the Netherlands. All ports and river estuaries were in the hands of the Dutch. The Spaniards were unable to establish a base of operations near England. This was the reason that the entire Armada had to be assembled in Spain’s ports.145 After January 1588, the Spaniards intensified their naval

Strategic framework   21 preparations and the invasion fleet, known as the “Grand Armada” sortied out from Lisbon on May 20, 1588. It stopped in Corunna to take refuge from bad weather and repair some ships. The Armada consisted of some 130 ships, 8,500 sailors, and 19,000 troops.146  The Armada sortied out from Corunna on July 12, 1588 and headed toward the English Channel. The plan was to reach the Spanish Netherlands and embark an additional 30,000 troops and then invade England. However, the British were ready. From July 21 to July 28, the British fought and won eight major engagements. Despite losses Medina Sidonia still intended to reach and join the Duke of Parma after refitting at Dunkerque or Bruges. Because of the unfavorable winds he was forced to return to Spain by sailing northward and around Scotland and Ireland. In August–September, the Armada suffered further losses from severe weather and starvation. Some sixty-­three ships were known to be lost. The English sank or captured fifteen ships; nineteen ships were wrecked on the Scottish and Irish coasts; the fate of thirty-­three ships was unknown. The remnants of the Armada reached the Spanish ports in September 1588.147  The defeat of the Armada was a great blow to Spain’s prestige. The wound to Spanish pride was deep and lasting.148 The Spaniards organized a second Armada in 1596 but it was destroyed in storms. Some twelve months later the third Armada of 136 ships tried to land in England. This attempt also failed because of the stormy weather. The English fleet was then in bad shape after an expedition against Cádiz. If any of these attempts had been successful, the English would have been hard pressed to repulse the attack at sea or on land.149  The American War for Independence (1775–1783) showed the need for a sound naval strategy and sufficient strength to have any success in confronting a much more powerful sea power. Yet the American Navy was small and played a minor role in the hostilities. One cannot speak of any well thought out naval strategy. Rather, the Americans adjusted to the prevailing conditions.150 The nascent American Navy was unable to provide effective assistance to the army on the coast, to convoy merchant ships or even to reconnoiter the British fleet. It essentially only ferried diplomats and supplies across the Atlantic.151 Command of the sea gave an enormous advantage to Britain. Among other things, the British army could be transported to any place along the east coast. Such mobility was lacking to the Americans. They had to rely on primitive land communications. Command of the sea enabled the British to capture New York and other important ports. The lack of command of the sea was the main reason that the Continental Army was unable to achieve decisive victories.152  In the War of 1812 (actually June 18, 1812–February 18, 1815), the American Navy was distinctly weaker force than the Royal Navy. The Americans were strategically on the defensive on the open ocean but on the offensive in the war on the Great Lakes. The American Navy was utterly unprepared for war against the British Navy on the open ocean. It consisted of only fourteen ships including three large frigates with forty-­four guns; the remaining ships were sloops or brigs. The major deficiencies of the American Navy were lack of organization for its sea-­going forces and inadequate shore support. However, a more fundamental

22   Strategic framework problem was the lack of strategy. The U.S. Navy Department and most ship’s commanding officers favored offensive action. They were also firm believers in the value of commerce raiding. However, the ship’s captains went out to the sea without receiving definitive instructions at all. In contrast, the British Navy was formidable. It consisted of some 600 fighting ships. Some 25 percent of this total was ships-­of-the-­line carrying at least sixty guns. However, the major part of the British Navy was deployed in the European waters. Only a relatively small number of the ships-­of-the-­line was available in North American waters.153  Because of the huge British superiority, the American Navy had very limited options on the open ocean. Clearly, blockade of the British Isles was impossible. There was no chance of successfully engaging the Royal Navy in a battle. Hence, the American ships fought several actions involving single ships against British single ships. In most of these actions, the Americans were highly successful. These victories raised the U.S. Navy’s prestige and probably sustained American morale. They also largely contributed to the postwar legend that the United States defeated Britain.154  The lack of success of the American commerce raiding was due to the effective British actions to protect their shipping. The British captured or destroyed several American commerce raiders. They established a close blockade of the American ports on the east coast. The British rendered escape for even smaller ships difficult. The British used a strict convoy system, thereby reducing the number of unaccompanied British merchant vessels on the open ocean.155  The Royal Navy safeguarded the main overseas commercial routes and swept American shipping from the ocean. The British also steadily tightened their blockade of the American ports. After the first weeks of the war, the American Navy was unable to provide any significant protection to American commerce. The presence of American commerce raiders and privateers provided little protection to the American shipping. The American Navy lacked the ships-­of-the-­ line to lift the blockade of the U.S. east coast.156  The Americans were far more active in the war on the Great Lakes. For the most part of the war they were on the offensive. However, the lack of strategic thinking and realistic assessment of the situation were the main reason for the failure to achieve any lasting strategic objective. Among other things, the American frontier leaders falsely believed that a few thousand raw militiamen would be sufficient to quickly overrun Spanish Florida in the south and British Canada in the north. In the north, the Americans also failed to properly evaluate the importance of the main lines of land communications and some key strongpoints. Specifically, they did not realize that the key for success in the invasion of British Canada was control of water communications that supplied the Canadian frontier from Montreal to Lake Superior; otherwise, conquest of the Canadian wilderness would be much more difficult if not utterly impossible.157  Control of the Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie determined the fortune of war on northern frontier. The St. Lawrence–Great Lakes water route was the only feasible line of military communication through Upper Canada–Ontario. If that line was under British control, the upper Mississippi Valley would be open to invasion

Strategic framework   23 at a dozen points. The focal points for defense or control of Upper Canada were Montreal and the head of navigation on the St. Lawrence, and possibly Kingston (where the chief British naval depot was) at the foot of Lake Ontario.158  The St. Lawrence–Great Lakes waterway was the key to a successful invasion of Canada. The American objective should have been to break this line as near its source as possible; control of Lake Champlain by the American forces would make it relatively easy to obtain control of Montreal. Command of Lake Ontario would have placed all of Upper Canada west of Kingston in American hands. Success at either of these two points would have destroyed the British military power in the northwest and thereby resulted in the accomplishment of the main strategic objective of the war in the north. Yet the Americans largely ignored or neglected these strategic realities. They made belated efforts to obtain control of the Great Lakes. They also divided their available forces between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. For some reason, the Americans did not realize that control of Lake Ontario would at the same time result in obtaining control of Lake Erie.159  In the American Civil War (1861–1865), the Southern States (Confederacy) were distinctly inferior in naval strength to the Northern States or the Union. By mid-­1862, the Union Navy had established a blockade of the entire coast of the Southern States. All but three ports of the Confederacy were controlled by the Union forces.160 The Confederate States adopted a defensive naval strategy. However, Mr. Stephen R. Mallory, the Confederates’ Navy Secretary, believed that the best defense is offensive. He proposed aggressive commerce raiding upon the ocean. The ships for the Confederate Navy were built exclusively for speed. They were armed with one or two guns and able to stay for a long time at sea. Such cruisers would raise havoc with Northern commerce. Another objective was to break up the blockade and if possible to carry the war to the Northern seaboard.161  In a war between two relatively strong sea powers separated by vast oceanic distances, a power closer to the scene of action and having more coherent naval strategy has a major advantage, as the example of the U.S. Navy in the American-­Spanish War of 1898 illustrates. The U.S. Navy also had the more modern force and was much better trained than the Spanish Navy. The Spanish fleet had to transit some 4,000 nautical miles before reaching its operating area in Cuba. Spain also made a faulty assessment of the strategic situation resulting in an unsound naval strategy. Prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-­American War in April 1898, the Spanish government must have been aware of U.S. views on Cuba. The United States quite openly sympathized with the rebels in Cuba. Spain had essentially two options in defending Cuba: to greatly strengthen defense of the coast and bays/harbors and deploy permanently a large army, or to deploy strong naval forces in the area. Clearly, successful defense of Cuba required obtaining control of the sea. Spain, then, would be able to retain control of Cuba only by building a powerful navy.162 Yet the Spanish Navy was in a sorry state in terms of both materiel and training of its personnel. The striking power of the fleet resided in four 7,000–9,000-ton battleships (two of them were obsolete) and four 2,000–4,000-ton armored cruisers.163 

24   Strategic framework The problem was compounded by the Spanish government’s utter lack of urgency in preparing for the hostilities. Among other things, it failed to provide any guidance to the senior naval commander, Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete (1839–1909) prior to his sortie from Cádiz to Cuba. On April 4, 1898, Cervera wrote to the Navy Minister, Admiral Segismundo Bermejo y Merelo (1832–1899), that “having no instruction it would seem well that I proceed to Madrid to obtain them and to fix upon a plan of campaign.” Admiral Bermejo replied, “In the midst of this international crisis, it is impossible to formulate anything precise.”164  On April 7, Cervera was directed to proceed to the Cape Verde Islands.165 Just before leaving Cádiz, Cervera once again protested the lack of instructions. He wrote: [A]llow me to insist the necessity of agreeing upon a general plan of campaign, to avoid fatal vacillations. The government doubtless has its plan, and it is indispensable that I should be informed of it, to be able to cooperate with it efficiently.166  Cervera arrived at the Cape Verde Islands on April 14. He again asked Bermejo, “I request precise instruction for the contingency of war not having been officially declared at my departure.” He got the reply, “I am unable to give you more precise instructions.”167 Bermejo never specified the objectives to be accomplished by Cervera’s squadron. Instead, Cervera was given full freedom to decide whether to proceed to Cuba or Puerto Rico, blockade U.S. harbors, or wait for a decisive battle.168 On April 29, Cervera left St. Vincent and the Cape Verde Islands and headed for Puerto Rico.169 On May 14, he arrived at Curaçao to take coal for his squadron. He also decided to change his destination and instead of Puerto Rico head for Santiago de Cuba where he arrived on May 19.170 On July 3, Cervera followed the government’s orders and tried to escape but all his six ships were either destroyed or forced ashore in the battle of Santiago de Cuba.171  The Spanish government never considered that the key prerequisite for further operations was to obtain control of the sea. It fragmented available forces by dividing them into two detachments instead of concentrating all forces under Cervera’s command. It also made a serious error in appointing Admiral Cervera as the senior commander. Cervera did not believe in the success of his mission. He considered the government plans as being suicidal. Cervera warned the government on February 25, 1898: “to carry out any serious operation in a naval war, the first necessity is to secure control of the sea.”172  Experience shows that a major land power must have sufficient capabilities at sea to effectively challenge a major sea power and provide support to its forces on the land front. Rome in the First Punic War (264–241 bc) was a unique case of a major land power becoming a major sea power too during the hostilities. The entire war revolved around whether Rome or Carthage would control Sicily. Carthage was a dominant sea power in the Mediterranean; its

Strategic framework   25 greatest source of wealth was the monopoly of commerce in the ancient world. Carthage encompassed some 600 square miles of arable land. It controlled a major part of North Africa, Spain (population 3 million), and the western half of Sicily (population 1 million). It also had five colonies on Sardinia. Its total population was estimated at 4 to 5 million.173 The Roman army crossed into Sicily but there was no fleet to cover the passage. The Romans used only small boats and a few borrowed triremes.174 The Roman objective was to expel Carthaginians from Sicily. To accomplish that objective, they had to obtain sea dominance and thereby prevent the Carthaginian forces on Sicily from receiving troop reinforcements.175  Carthage did not want to lose Sicily and sent an army. Agrigentum (Agrigento today) was made a strongpoint. It took the Romans some seven months of hard fighting to capture Agrigentum in 262 bc. In the meantime, the Punic fleet pillaged Italy’s coast and brought war close to Rome.176 The Romans quickly realized that they would never be able to capture Sicily if the powerful Carthaginian fleet could with impunity traverse the sea, supplying forces with stores or bringing reinforcements.177 The Roman Senate decided to build a fleet of about 100 quinqueremes and twenty triremes to confront the Carthaginians at sea.178 The Carthaginians were unable to fight a war in mainland Italy because they lacked a strong army. By the time they raised a sufficient number of troops, the Romans were able to redress the imbalance in naval strength.179 Control of the sea was the key prerequisite for obtaining control of Sicily. It was Rome, a land power, that won the war and it was Rome which made better use of sea power.  In most of its wars with England, France was the weaker side at sea. The reason was that its principal focus was on the European continent not the sea. Hence, it maintained a very large army. The French Navy was considered as good only to provide escort to army convoys or as an adjunct for the French Army. The French confined themselves to a war of convoys and combined operations, under conditions possessing all the elements which militate against success of such undertakings.180 The French neglected opportunities for a decisive action against the British Navy. For some reason they believed that such a victory might imperil the accomplishment of “ulterior object.”181 The French strategy was aimed at neutralizing the British fleet but without endangering its own. Tactically, the French wanted to avoid a decisive battle at sea or, if it became unavoidable, to escape at the first possible opportunity. The moral effect on admirals and subordinates can only be imagined. The French could not understand that the decisive defeat of the enemy navy would do more to secure trade and cover expeditions than anything else. The French believed that provided their fleet was sufficiently trained to maintain good order in battle to carry out instantly and accurately certain maneuvers, it could avoid any serious losses.182  In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), France and Spain were in a war against England, Austria, and the Dutch Republic. France and Britain became involved in 1744. France had an army of 300,000 men and Britain only 29,000 men. However, the French army was useless in the struggle in America and Asia because its navy was unable to carry troop contingents to either of

26   Strategic framework these continents.183 War on land took place in Italy and Flanders. In Italy, a combined Franco-­Spanish army tried to conquer Lombardy, which was defended by Austrians and Sardinians aided by the British Mediterranean Fleet. The English, Austrian and Dutch troops defended Flanders. However, fortresses were falling to Louis XV’s army rapidly.184 In May 1745, the allied army suffered a heavy defeat at Fontenay, Belgium. Afterward, four fortified places (Tournai, Ghent, Bruges, and Oudenarde) were quickly overrun in succession. Ostend was besieged. The allied troops fell back to cover Antwerp. There was “consternation in England after the loss of Fontenay.” The bulk of the British army was abroad.185 England had its local troubles. Ireland was quiet but the Jacobites186 caused some difficulties in Scotland. Prince Charles Edward Stuart (1720–1788), Jacobite pretender to the British throne, was a refugee in France where he had come from Italy. He sought the support of Louis XV for a landing in Scotland.187 Prince Charles escaped from Nantes and landed at Moidart, Scotland where the clans flocked to his standard. The French Minister of War Marc-­Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy d’Argenson (1696–1764) said: Never had the opportunity been fairer for a general rising … for there are no more than 13,000 men in the three kingdom supposing all the corps to be complete, and if they are going to send the six battalions (abroad ) as it said they are … the whole of the three kingdoms will find themselves protected by five thousand men at the most and no ships, all their fleet being at sea.188 However, Prince Charles and his army were defeated in the battle of Culloden in April 1746.  Because of its numerical weakness, the French Navy was forced strategically onto the defensive. Nevertheless, it made three attempts to go on the offensive: plans to invade England in 1744; an attack on Canso, Acadia (Nova Scotia today) in May 1744; and the Duke d’Anville’s expedition to recapture Louisburg and Acadia in June–October 1746. It also prepared to invade England in 1745 and support the uprising in Scotland.189 An attempt to surprise and destroy the British Mediterranean Fleet by the French fleet from Toulon with the Spanish fleet also failed.190 The French Navy limited its actions to protection of the country’s maritime trade, damaging English trade, and bringing troop reinforcements to the colonies.191  By 1748, the French had conquered Flanders and were in a position to invade Holland. Italy had been barely saved from the Bourbon armies. However, despite all these successes on land, France was economically in a very bad shape. Its trade was ruined, and manufacturing industries were idle. The French were starving. Louisburg – the key strongpoint in French Canada – was captured by the British. Hence, France was happy to make peace with Britain.192  By 1756, the state of the French Navy was greatly improved compared with what it was at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. However, the navy was not considered to be a key element of French policy. It was not a major “defensive bulwark” for defense of metropolitan France and the French colonies.193 

Strategic framework   27 In the Seven Years War (1756–1763), France failed to make a clear decision to seek a result in one theater and put all efforts into the war at sea. The only exception was in the Mediterranean where the French captured Minorca in 1756. Afterward, the French limited their naval actions only in support of colonies. France also expanded the war on land in Europe.194 The French strategy in North America was to gain time until the war in Europe had been settled in favor of France. New France (which encompassed the French colony of Canada and was renamed the Province of Quebec in 1763) was well placed to resist any British effort to roll up the interior approaches to Quebec and Montreal. The access to the interior could be obtained only by two water routes: Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River from the upper Ohio to Lake Ontario. And these the French could control by a series of fortified posts. From the sea, Quebec was approached three times by the British but without success. Most of the French leaders were unduly optimistic (except for the Commander of the French forces in New France, Louis-­Joseph de Montcalm). They continued to put their faith in the natural hazards of the St. Lawrence River navigation.195 France was defeated because its navy was inadequate.196  In the American War for Independence, France came eventually to actively support the American colonists. This war was unique in the eighteenth century. It was Britain – a major sea power – which was forced to fight the war predominantly on land while France – a major land power – contributed only a small number of troops in support of the American colonists. Britain was unable to find allies, except for auxiliary troops in Prussia.197  The French primary objective was to weaken Britain by depriving it of its monopoly in trade to America. Hence, France was very reluctant to attempt a serious invasion of Britain which might lead to expansion of the war.198 Another reason for the limited strategic objective was the weakness of the French royal finances. France did not have the bureaucracy for taxation. Hence, the government had to resort to massive borrowing. In the Seven Years War the cost of maintaining armies in Germany had severely limited the naval war against Great Britain. To fund a full-­scale war, France had to preserve peace in Europe at any cost. The threat of bankruptcy forced France in 1781 to consider a compromise peace in case the present campaign failed. By the end of 1782, the desperate state of finances forced France to seek peace at almost any price.199  France was also unable to expand its fleet beyond a certain point. The lack of naval supplies such as timber and masts was not a critical problem, at least after 1778 when the replenishment of the royal dockyards was sufficiently advanced for France to enter war directly. However, naval expansion was restricted chiefly by the shortage of trained officers and sailors. France was able to provide manning for only about seventy ships-­of-the-­line. When France tried in 1781 to exceed that number, poor discipline and sloppy seamanship made French ships easy prey for the British. Prior to 1782, the French Navy lost only four ships-­ofthe-­line from all causes. But in 1782 alone it lost fifteen ships-­of-the-­line.200  When the news of American rebels’ victories in the battles of Saratoga on September 19 and October 7, 1777 came, France had almost completed the

28   Strategic framework replenishment of its dockyards and the rebuilding of its fleet. It speeded up negotiations with Spain to join the alliance with the Americans. However, Spaniards refused to abandon their neutrality. The Spaniards blamed the delay on the need to await the return of the treasure fleet bringing gold and silver from the western hemisphere.201 However, the real reasons were very different. Spain had little incentive to support American independence. It was protected by the Pyrenees Mountains in the north. Spain’s possessions in Italy were secure because of the treaty with the Austrians. Hence, France had little success in appealing to the need to weaken Britain and change the balance of power in Europe. Spain was also concerned that the American colonists might inspire rebellion in its possessions in the western hemisphere, and it was aware that its colonies were vulnerable to British attack. Hence, Spain’s entry into the war would be obtained only if France could promise the return of Jamaica, Florida, Gibraltar, and Minorca. The British took Jamaica from Spain in 1655 and Florida in 1763. Spain also wanted to reclaim Gibraltar and Minorca, lost to the British in 1704 and 1708, respectively.202 The French government decided to complete negotiations with the American colonies without waiting for the Spaniards. The Franco-­American alliance was signed in February 1778. A secret article was appended giving Spain the right to join the alliance.203 France entered the war in 1778 to redress the balance of power in Europe by reducing the strength of Great Britain. Its strategy was to support American rebels while drawing Spain into the war so that the combined French and Spanish fleets could confront Britain with overpowering strength.204 In 1778, the French main fleet of twenty-­seven ships-­of-the-­line plus four more arming was based in Brest.205 It was led by Admiral Louis Guillouet, Count d’Orvilliers (1708–1792). The principal mission of the squadron at Brest was to divert British attention away from the Americas with operations in the English Channel.206 Yet this fleet was sufficient only to dispute not to obtain command of the Channel. Admiral Jean Baptiste Charles Henri Hector, Comte d’Estaing (1729–1794) at Toulon commanded twelve ships-­of-the-­line and five frigates. For the French, the European waters offered little prospect of victory and bringing Britain to the negotiating table. However, they believed (falsely) that a major French force operating in the Americas would be able to defeat the British forces. This was the reason that d’Estaing was directed to sail to the Americas on April 13, 1778.207 Admiral d’Orvilliers received two sets of vague and contradictory orders. He was told that “under whatever circumstances the King’s fleet may be placed, his Majesty’s orders … are that his ships attack with the greatest vigor, and defend themselves, on all occasions, to the last extremity.” Later he was informed that the King, having learned the strength of the British fleet, relied upon his [d’Orvilliers’] prudence as to the conduct to be followed at a moment when he had under his orders all the naval forces of which France could dispose.208

Strategic framework   29 In fact, the French wanted to maintain their fleet in action in a commanding position flanking the Channel approaches as a cover for attacks on British trade and as a protection for their own. The French ships would go to the sea, but they were to avoid action with the Grand Fleet unless they were superior in numbers and the risk incurred was slight; such a policy was not a recipe for a victory. Fate might destroy the British fleet, but the French would never do so.209  France should have subordinated everything to the concentration in European waters at the earliest possible moment and thereby achieved naval superiority. The principal objective should have been destruction or neutralization of the enemy Channel Fleet. The British used routes in the Channel for almost all their commerce and for sending essential supplies and reinforcements to overseas possessions. These routes were flanked by the major French naval base at Brest.210 In the war of Austria against the Kingdom of Sardinia (or Piedmont–Sardinia or Savoy–Sardinia) and France (or the Second Italian War of Independence) in 1859, Austria was a weaker side at sea. The Austrian fleet was on the strategic defensive. It was grossly inferior to the combined fleets of France and Piedmont. The French fleet had thirty-­one screw-­propelled ships-­of-the-­line (almost equal to that of the British Navy). On May 3, only four days after the Austrian army invaded Piedmont, France entered the war. Within two weeks the first squadron of French and Sardinian vessels arrived in the Adriatic. Commander of the Austrian Navy, Archduke Ferdinand Max (1832–1867) assumed a defensive posture. He moved screw-­propelled ships to Pola (Pula today) with the best sailing and paddle ships. The remaining naval vessels were dispersed among the islands and ports on the mainland coast. Two old sailing ships and three of the steamers leased from the Lloyd (commercial shipping) company were sunk to block the entrance of Venice. The allies did not reach full strength until weeks later. In July 1859, the Allied fleet occupied the island of Lussin (Lošinj today) as a base for the amphibious assault on the mainland coast. By then the war had already been decided by the Austrian defeats at Magenta on June 4 and Solferino on June 24.211  Sea power played a minor role in the outcome of the Franco-­Prussian War of 1870–1871. Both France and Prussia were predominantly land powers. France declared war against Prussia on July 15, 1870. The French had substantial superiority over the navy of the North German Confederation. They had some 281 ships, including-­thirty-four armored vessels. The Germans had only thirty-­ nine ships and only five ships were armored. The French Navy had 76,000 men while the North German Confederation had 28,000.212 The North German Federation Navy played only a minor role in the war.213 It deployed few ships to defend Wilhelmshaven and watch Hamburg; other ships were dispersed in the Baltic to defend the coast.214  The French established a blockade of the Prussian coast in the Baltic and interdicted German maritime traffic. However, the Prussian successes on land made the blockade increasingly irrelevant and in the winter of 1870/1871, the French recalled their ships from the Baltic and tried to blockade the German coast in the North Sea. However, the blockade was difficult to maintain because of engine breakdowns in many French ships. The success of the French blockade

30   Strategic framework was debatable. There was some effect on German maritime trade because some 200 German ships were captured by the French. Many German ships remained at their ports. However, the effect of the French blockade on war on land was small.215  In the Russo-­Turkish War of 1877–1878, Russia was a dominant land power but the much weaker side at sea. It was prohibited by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 from maintaining any navy. In 1877, Russia had only a few obsolete armored ships and several small craft. In contrast, the Turkish Navy had fifteen armored ships, seven armored gunboats or monitors, and numerous small craft.216  The Russian Navy was used from the beginning of war in April 1877 for support of the army. It was engaged against the enemy Danube River Flotilla. The Russians also used mines extensively. The Russian army field guns were very effective against the Turkish ships. They sank one 2,540-ton armored corvette while the Russian Navy sank one 400-ton monitor. The Turks withdrew the river flotilla after July 16, when the Russians captured two monitors (although seven Ottoman river monitors remained in service and undamaged).217 Although numerically inferior, the Russian Navy kept the much stronger Turkish Navy on the defensive. The Russians were especially aggressive in using their torpedo boats. The threat of torpedo attacks kept the largest Turkish warships in port.218  In the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905, Russia was numerically superior to Japan on land and in overall naval strength. However, it was unable to deploy and sustain larger land forces in the Far East because of the vast distances to the heart of its power in Europe. Likewise, it was able to deploy only a fraction of its naval forces to the Far East. The Russian naval forces in the Far East were also poorly led and trained.  The main cause of the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905 was the clash over who would become a hegemon in the Far East: Russia or Japan. This war is an example of how a weaker power – Japan – forced its will upon a much greater power – Russia. Overthrowing Russia was clearly beyond Japan’s ability. Corbett wrote that the real object of the Russo-­Japanese War was, in the abstract, unlimited.219 Japan could convert its intangible objective of asserting its national prestige into the purely concrete form of a territorial objective: preventing Russia from dominating Manchuria and thereby preventing the absorption of Korea into the Russian Empire. Japan’s ability to maintain Korean territorial integrity would be the outward and visible sign of its ability to assert itself as a Pacific power.220  In 1904, the Russian occupation of Manchuria alarmed both Japan and England. If Russia gradually occupied Korea, then this would pose extreme danger to Japan. Like Britain, which was unwilling to accept control of Belgium and the Netherlands by other major European power, for Japan it was unacceptable to tolerate Russia’s control of Korea. If the Russian fleet was based in Korea, it would have a direct link with Russia via the Siberian railway. This railway reached Port Arthur (acquired in 1897) (Lüshun City today) in 1903 and could be easily extended to Korea. Then the Russians would dominate the Sea of Japan and threaten Japan. Vladivostok was the Russian base for more than fifty years. It was a good base and connected to the Siberian railway.221

Strategic framework   31 For Russia, the national strategic objective was primarily defensive – to retain its possession in the Far East. The initial mission for the Russian naval forces was to support the army in defending Vladivostok and Port Arthur and aid in retaining Russian possessions in the Far East.222 The Russian fleet detachment in Port Arthur was directed to obtain control of the Yellow Sea.223 Yet this objective was highly unrealistic.  Strategically, the territorial integrity of Korea for Japan was as important as the integrity of the Low Countries was for Britain. To make conquest secure, not only must the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must be permanently isolated by the sea. This required destruction of the Russian fleet and this in turn entailed the reduction of Port Arthur by military means.224  The Japanese national strategic objective was to drive Russia out of Korea and Manchuria to secure for Japan a position of political and economic preponderance in those territories. The military strategic objective was to drive Russia out of Manchuria and Korea. The assumed naval strategic objective was to obtain and maintain control of the adjacent sea area (Yellow Sea/Sea of Japan) to support the army in driving out Russia.225 For the Japanese, if the Russian First Pacific Squadron had to be destroyed, everything else was secondary in importance.226 The Japanese had two options: (1) to delay or (2) to strike at once. If they delayed their attack until spring 1904, the army would have more favorable weather conditions for the land campaign. Delay would allow the Russians to strengthen their fortifications and increase their forces in the Far East. One Russian battleship and two cruisers were already in the Red Sea and on the way to the Far East. The Japanese had also to decide whether to obtain command prior to sending troops to the mainland or to cover troop movement with the fleet before destroying the enemy fleet.227  The Japanese were not impressed with the Russian fleet-­in-being at Port Arthur. They carried out a surprise attack on the Port Arthur fleet detachment while at the same time employing their fleet to cover the initial troop movement against Korea.228 Admiral Mahan was apparently very impressed with the Japanese strategy during the war. He wrote that the Japanese strategy was marked by “accuracy of diagnosis, concentration of purpose, and steadiness of conduct, which was so strikingly wanting in their opponents.”229  Despite Tirpitz’s declared shift to an offensive strategy, the German naval strategy in World War I was a combination of defense and offense. In the North Sea, the German High Seas Fleet took a defensive posture. The Grand Fleet established a distant position, not a close blockade as was widely expected by the Germans. The High Seas Fleet faced a situation for which it was not prepared either materially or psychologically. It became bottled up in the German Bight (Deutsche Bucht). Hence, it was unable to fight the decisive battle for which it had been prepared for almost two decades. It was also unable to reach the enemy in Scapa Flow, who was able to cut off all German communications with impunity. The Germans tried to lure the Grand Fleet by conducting raids on the east coast of Britain. After the battle of Jutland in 1916, the Germans put all their hopes in the conduct of unrestricted U-­boat warfare.230 

32   Strategic framework In the North Sea, the German primary objective was to obtain local sea control of the German Bight and its approaches and to dispute control elsewhere in the North Sea. The German strategic objectives in the Baltic were to obtain general and when necessary local sea control. By controlling the Baltic, Germany would secure the flow of raw materials from the Scandinavian countries, and especially import of the vital Swedish iron ore. By depriving Russia of supplies, German control of the Baltic would speed up its collapse. In case of the High Seas Fleet being defeated in a decisive battle with the Grand Fleet, then the British ships would be able to operate in the Baltic. Operating from the Russian bases they would enhance morale and material support to the Russian armies. Control of the German Bight was vital for the conduct of German commerce warfare by U-­boats.231  The German naval strategy in World War II was focused on the war against Allied shipping between Britain and North America. Admiral Raeder recognized that the numerically inferior German forces could not achieve sea dominance in the northern Atlantic. However, he hoped that the Germans could obtain local and limited control and thereby gradually obtain sea dominance. Raeder believed that the enemy would be forced either to significantly strengthen the defenses of his convoys, at the price of weakening his position in home waters and the Mediterranean, or to reduce the frequency of convoys.232 By employing German heavy ships over a wide ocean area the enemy would be forced to fragment his naval strength. This, in turn, would allow the Germans to mass forces against enemy weak points.233 However, Raeder’s concept was deeply flawed. Even if the Germans were able to gradually obtain sea control in northern Atlantic they would not be able to maintain that control for very long.  The German strategy in the Mediterranean in World War II was never fully developed. The reason was that Hitler and the high-­ranking generals were more focused on the problem of Soviet Russia and war on the eastern front than on expanding the war at sea. In contrast, Admiral Raeder and the SKL had great doubts about the wisdom of invading England and Soviet Russia. They believed that the way to defeat Britain was to expand “Atlantic warfare to the Mediterranean.” In 1940–1941, Raeder tried very hard to convince Hitler to adopt a peripheral maritime strategy in the Mediterranean. Hitler briefly adopted one element of that strategy prior to the invasion of Soviet Russia: the capture of Gibraltar and gaining bases in northwest Africa and on the Spanish/Portuguese Atlantic islands.  Defeat of France in June 1940 made it possible for Hitler to contemplate the capture of northwest Africa. He and Raeder discussed it on June 20, 1940, prior to armistice negotiations with France about German naval bases in Morocco, Senegal, and the Spanish and Portuguese islands.234 On July 11, Hitler and Raeder discussed future battleship design and the new German base on the Canary Islands. On July 15, 1940, Hitler demanded (without consulting Spain) from France eight airbases near Casablanca to be selected by a special German commission. Hitler also demanded the use of the railway to Rabat to outfit these bases.235 

Strategic framework   33 Raeder and the SKL wanted to weaken Britain’s position in the Mediterranean. They believed that the capture of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal would lead to the expulsion of Britain from the Mediterranean. This, in turn, would allow the Italian fleet to shift from a strategic defensive to an offensive and, in combination with the German U-­boats, conduct trade warfare in the Atlantic. At the same time, withdrawal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean would ensure the safety of supplies from Italy to North Africa.236  At the staff meeting on July 31, 1940, Hitler maintained that the invasion of England could still take place in 1940. More importantly, he decided to destroy Soviet Russia in the spring of 1941. However, the most immediate issue was the capture of Gibraltar and Spain’s entry into the war. For Hitler, Gibraltar became the key issue because invasion of Soviet Russia might make northwest Africa vulnerable to a British or perhaps American attack.237  The Germans decided that the foothold in northwest Africa should be obtained prior to the invasion of Soviet Russia. Because Vichy France rejected German demands for bases at Casablanca, it became imperative to obtain the active participation of Spain in the war. Capture of Gibraltar would provide an indirect route to northwest Africa. This became more urgent because of other political developments. In August 1940, French Equatorial Africa defected from Vichy France and joined General Charles de Gaulle’s “Free French” movement. The Germans were then concerned that the French north and northwest of Africa might defect too.238  By early September 1940, the German Naval High Command (OKM) considered Gibraltar as part of its emerging Mediterranean strategy. Admiral Raeder did not believe in the success of the invasion of England (operation Seelöwe – Sea Lion). He and the SKL considered the Mediterranean to be the most favorable place to deliver a decisive blow to Britain. They questioned the value of having German bases on the Atlantic islands because they would divert German forces from the more important Mediterranean theater.239 Raeder and the SKL hoped to reconcile German and Spanish strategic objectives. Also, Germany had to gain active French participation in the war against Britain.240  At a meeting with Hitler on September 6, 1940, Admiral Raeder proposed intensification of the war in the Mediterranean. The main objectives would be to capture the Suez Canal and Gibraltar. In Raeder’s view, capture of Gibraltar would threaten British supply traffic from southern Atlantic. He considered invasion of England as too risky. Control of the Mediterranean was a prerequisite for the Axis powers’ position in southeast Europe, Asia Minor, Arabia (Arabian Peninsula), Egypt, and Africa. Dominance in the Mediterranean would secure unlimited sources of raw materials and create a strategically favorable initial position for further actions against the British Empire. For Raeder, war in the Mediterranean was not a sideshow but the main theater in a war against England.241  Hitler was convinced that Britain was already beaten. Hence, he had different views than OKM on the importance of Gibraltar. His focus was on capturing the Atlantic islands. Hitler wanted to send more troops to Spanish Morocco. Spain

34   Strategic framework already had seven divisions there. Despite the opposition of the High Command of the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH) or Army General Staff. Hitler wanted to move two divisions plus one panzer division to Spanish Morocco after the capture of Gibraltar. The German troops would invade the French zone if it tried to defect from the Vichy government.242  On September 20, 1940, Raeder again met with Hitler. Although the main topic was the pending invasion of Soviet Russia, Raeder tried to convince Hitler to adopt his Mediterranean strategy. He asserted that in the last few months, the British had deployed naval forces from home waters and brought troops to the Mediterranean. Italy was the main attack objective for Britain. The Italians did not seem to realize that, because they refused Germany’s offer of help. Raeder insisted that the Germans should make an all-­out effort to clear up the situation in the Mediterranean before Americans came to Britain’s aid. Both Gibraltar and Canary Islands must be occupied. The British might seize the Canary Islands to compensate for the loss of Gibraltar. Furthermore, the Suez Canal must be captured by the Italians and from there Palestine and Syria up to Turkey’s border must be controlled. If Germany achieved these objectives in the Mediterranean than the question of Soviet Russia would look very different. It would be a question of whether it would be necessary to move against Soviet Russia from the north. An offensive against the Suez Canal by the Italians would secure Italy’s territories in East Africa. Italy would be able to conduct war in the Indian Ocean and also take actions against India.243 Raeder also believed in the need to control northwest Africa because England could with the help of De Gaulle’s movement and America build attacking position against Italy. Raeder argued that Germany should cooperate with Vichy France. The French should facilitate the use of their naval forces in defense of the French colonial possessions and Raeder also wanted to establish German air bases in northwest Africa.244  For the capture of Gibraltar, a prerequisite was the entry of Spain into the war.245 However, Francesco Franco’s (1892–1975) fascist regime in Madrid raised exorbitant economic and materiel demands as a price for entering the war.246 By mid-­September 1940, the Germans agreed in principle to the Spanish requirements. Among other things, they accepted Spain’s formal control of Gibraltar, and control of the major French naval base at Oran, Algeria, and French Morocco. Yet the Germans wanted to have air bases at Casablanca, and two ports on Morocco’s Atlantic coast plus one base on the Spanish Canary Islands.247  Hitler met with Franco at Hendeye on October 23 to discuss Spain’s entry into war. Discussion with Franco was very difficult for Hitler. Although Franco was willing to enter the war, he demanded firm written guarantees for gaining control of French Morocco. However, Hitler feared that French northwest Africa would defect from Vichy France if Spain gained control.248 Hence, he refused to give any written guarantee to Franco. Hitler promised Franco that Spain would extend its control to the French territories in northwest Africa provided that France could be compensated by acquiring still unconquered British territory. At the same time, Hitler expressed desire that Germany would obtain from the Spaniards control of the ports of Agadir and Mogador and even

Strategic framework   35 Casablanca in French Morocco. Hitler was able to persuade Franco to sign a secret treaty, formally becoming one of the Axis powers. Franco also formally agreed that Spain would enter war against Britain. Yet, significantly, he refused to set any date for Spain’s entry into the war. Moreover, Spain would become a belligerent only after the Germans provided the necessary military support.249 In other words, Hitler failed to obtain Franco’s firm commitment to enter the war on Germany’s side.  On October 22, Hitler had a meeting with the French Vice Premier Pierre Laval at Montoire. Two days later, he met with Vichy’s France President Marshal Philippe Petain (1856–1951) also at Montoire.. Both Petain and Laval promised on October 22 and 24, 1940 that France would defend the French empire against its former allies. Hitler came back impressed by Petain. He was convinced the French would maintain their colonial possessions against the Free French. Hitler was more irritated with Franco’s insistence on written guarantees. However, he remained confident that Spain would enter the war and provide Germany with a bridge to Africa via the Strait of Gibraltar. Hitler believed that the capture of Gibraltar (operation Felix) had to be executed in February 1941. This meant that the German forces had to start movement from occupied France to Spain in January 1941.250  Hitler believed that once Gibraltar was captured, the German forces stationed in French Morocco would prevent its defection from Vichy. If Spain controlled that area, it would immediately defect from Vichy France. After the peace treaty was signed, Spain would receive its “just rewards” in Morocco. Hitler revealed to a Spanish official that that he wanted to capture Gibraltar only so as to have German troops in Morocco. The Spaniards, who had a different objective, quickly cooled to the entire idea of entering war.251  At the meeting with Hitler on November 14, 1940, Raeder warned of the pending British offensive in Libya and Abyssinia. Further delay in Germany’s action in the Mediterranean could lead to consolidation of the British position in the theater. It might make it difficult to force the British Mediterranean Fleet to leave the area. With increased cooperation between Britain and America, Germany’s strategic objectives should be to obtain and secure decisive raw material and food supplies based on the economic resources of Europe/Africa and under German leadership. Hence, control of the eastern Mediterranean meant securing oil imports for Spain, Italy, and France and also the supply of food for Spain. It also meant Axis dominance in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, and bringing raw materials from these countries into the German-­Italian-Spanish-­French economic area. Control of the western Mediterranean by the Axis would secure a supply basis in North Africa and communications with Spain. France and Germany would jointly prevent further defection of the French colonies from Vichy France and create an initial position for an attack on the British colonies in West Africa.252  Raeder’s basic idea was that the expected involvement of the United States on the side of Britain would be prevented by dominance of the Mediterranean and its forward area in northwest Africa and Near East. He argued for creating the “autarchic bastion” so that the Axis powers could be successful in a

36   Strategic framework protracted war with Anglo-­American sea powers. The Axis powers would then intensify naval war in the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean as well as conducting further offensive strikes against the British Empire. Raeder did not believe that Soviet Russia would attack Germany. He argued that the German-­Russian commercial relations should continue. All energies should be put into the “trade war” against the British homeland.253  The plan for operation Felix was prepared by the beginning of December 1940. After the capture of Gibraltar the German troops would be deployed to Spanish Morocco. Defense of the Atlantic coast of north and west Africa would be conducted in cooperation with the French troops. West African positions would be used by the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Occupation of the Atlantic islands would be facilitated by having control of Gibraltar.254  By the beginning of December 1940 Hitler was ready to put more pressure on Franco to enter war by January 10, 1941 so that the Germans could start moving their forces to Spain from France.255 However, the Germans suffered a setback because in the evening on December 7, 1940, Franco refused Germany’s official request to enter the war by January 10, 1941. He cited Spain’s economic difficulties.256 This decision was very disappointing for the Germans. However, Hitler viewed the Spanish refusal entirely in terms of northwestern Africa. Thus, he accepted Spanish refusal to enter war calmly.257  German and French political and military officials met, largely at the behest of Laval, in Paris on December 10, 1940. The French revealed to the Germans their designs on reconquest of French Equatorial Africa. They fully accepted the possibility of hostilities with Britain. This led Hitler to cancel operation Felix on December 10, 1940. However the situation changed abruptly on December 13, when Petain arrested Laval. This reinforced Hitler’s view that France was untrustworthy. He believed that Laval was dismissed under pressure from Marshal Maxime Weygand, the Germanophobic Delegate General in Algiers. This was the reason that Hitler returned to operation Felix in January 1941 as a means to station troops in Morocco and thwart Weygand’s purported plans to defect from Vichy.258  Clearly, if Germany had any hope of capturing Gibraltar before the invasion of Soviet Russia, the support of Spain was absolutely necessary. Raeder and the SKL were still committed to their Mediterranean strategy. They contemplated U-­boat attacks on Gibraltar. However, without the active participation of Spain, Hitler rejected these plans. Germany renewed its efforts in January 1941 to entice Spain into war against Britain. The Germans gave a de facto ultimatum to Franco to enter war within forty-­eight hours. An indignant Franco refused to bow to Germany’s pressure. The deadline passed without any further German action.259  Hitler needed the full participation of Spain for the successful execution of operation Felix. Germany’s situation was complicated because of the enormous requirements for preparing an invasion of Soviet Russia. To make the situation worse, Hitler had to deal with a crisis in the Balkans because of Italy’s setbacks in the war against Greece. The Spanish dictator knew all that and was confident that he could resist Hitler’s pressure with impunity. In February 1941, the Spanish

Strategic framework   37 general staff sent along a memo to the German embassy in Madrid about Spain’s military requirements to enter war. The list included 8,000 tons of aircraft fuel, and 56,000 tons of automobile gasoline. Spain also required delivery from Germany of some 16,000 railway cars and 13,000 trucks. These exorbitant demands finally convinced the Germans that they did not have the slightest intention of entering the war against Britain.260 Preparations for operation Felix stopped in February 1941. The entire problem of Gibraltar was deferred to a more distant future.261  Raeder and the SKL clearly failed to convince Hitler of the wisdom of defeating Britain first instead of invading Soviet Russia. If implemented, peripheral maritime strategy in the Mediterranean would have changed the course of the war but probably not its outcome. Germany was fully capable of capturing Gibraltar and obtaining a foothold in French northwest Africa and the Canary Islands provided that Spain entered the war on Germany’s side. Gibraltar and the Suez Canal were never captured by the Axis forces. Hence, strategic control of the Mediterranean remained in Allied hands. This, in turn, allowed the Allies to maintain their position in the eastern Mediterranean, send reinforcements to Egypt, and keep Malta alive.  In the summer of 1940, Raeder and the SKL felt confident that the importance of the Kriegsmarine would be raised from the last position in the Wehrmacht to the first. As results of the conquests in 1940, Germany’s initial strategic position was greatly improved. The SKL had some utopian ideas about the size/composition of the Kriegsmarine in the aftermath of war. It contemplated a core fleet composed 60–80 large combat ships (battleships), 15–20 carriers, 100 cruisers, and 500 U-­boats, For trade protection and rear service it was envisaged that there would be in service 115 cruisers, 250 destroyers, 100 (destroyer-size) torpedo boats, 400 minesweepers/craft, 20 minelayers, 20 anti-­air (AA) cruisers, and 150 SCs. These numbers were so unrealistic that the size of the “core” fleet was reduced to 25 large combat ships, 8 carriers, 50 cruisers, and 400 U-­boats. The “support service” would consist of 150 destroyers, 50 (destroyer-size) torpedo boats, 250 minesweepers, 100 S-­boats, 20 minelayers, 20 AA cruisers, and 100 SCs.262  No navy, no matter how strong, could ensure superiority in the entire world’s oceans in case of a war in several theaters or even a single large theater such as the Pacific Ocean. Hence, it might be forced onto a strategic defensive in one theater, while being on a strategic offensive in another theater. A strong alliance of two or more weak sea powers in widely separated parts of a single theater or several theaters might pose a serious threat to the vital interests of a dominant sea power. Then a dominant sea power would find itself weak in at least one of the areas concerned.263 A solution then would be for the strong sea power to seek an alliance/coalition with another weak sea power in a selected part of the theater of main effort. Corbett wrote that the strongest naval power, if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible to exert a drastic offensive anywhere without temporarily reducing its force in certain areas to a point relatively so low as to permit of nothing than the defensive.264 

38   Strategic framework A dominant sea power might be forced strategically on the defensive by selecting faulty strategic objectives and thereby misdistributing its forces, as Britain did in the American War for Independence. At the beginning of the war, the Royal Navy was numerically stronger than either the French or the Spanish Navy. It also held a much more favorable base of operations in home waters. However, the need to ensure adequate concentration for the offensive in the West Indies forced the Royal Navy to reduce its forces in home waters.265 During the first three years of the war, the Royal Navy reigned supreme in North American waters and the West Indies. The only threat to British shipping was posed by American privateers. British troops were transported in convoys with suitable escorts. There was no threat from a powerful enemy fleet. However, the course of war radically changed after British general John Burgoyne, with 3,500 troops, surrendered to the American rebels in the battle of Saratoga on October 7, 1777. This event greatly increased difficulties for the British and emboldened the American rebels.266 Moreover, it led France to formally recognize the United States and sign a treaty of alliance on February 6, 1778.  France formally declared war on Britain on March 17, 1778. This declaration did not come as a surprise to the British. On paper, Britain had a stronger navy. Yet the British failed to intercept the French naval vessels and convoys sailing from French Atlantic ports to the Americas. This, in turn, imposed an extra burden on the British naval forces in the main theater of war.267 Also, Admiral d’Estaing could sail undisturbed with twelve ships-­of-the-­line from Toulon to the American waters in April 1778. The British forces were not ready to sail for America until the beginning of July 1778. At that time, the Royal Navy had only six ships-­of-the-­line in American waters. Hence, the weaker side was able to obtain numerical superiority in a theater that was considered critically important for Britain.268  The strategic situation drastically worsened for Britain in March 1779 when London learned that Spain was fitting out warships at El Ferrol. France was reportedly preparing thirty-­three ships-­of-the-­line at Brest. Spain’s policies changed from being a neutral mediator to an active supporter of France. Spain joined France against Britain by signing a secret Treaty of Aranjuez on April 12, 1779.269 However, Spain did not become formally allied with the American colonists.270 The effect was that the Royal Navy became almost immediately the weaker side in home waters. Both parties agreed that Spain would send a combined fleet to capture the roadstead of St. Helen’s (Isles of Scilly). Both fleets were to assemble off Cizarga Island, some 20 miles west of La Coruña, and from there proceed to St. Helen’s. The French would land some 50,000 men in England. These troops would assemble at Le Havre and St. Malo. They would also capture the Isle of Wight as a base for further operations on the mainland of England.271  In May 1778, British intelligence estimated that there were twenty-­eight ships-­of-the-­line based at Cádiz. By April 1, 1779, their number was increased to thirty-­four.272 At the beginning of 1779, the British had in service some eighty ships-­of-the-­line. However, only thirty-­nine of them were in service in the

Strategic framework   39 Channel Fleet. The Royal Navy also had 108 smaller ships ranging from 50-gun ships to storeships based in home waters. The Admiralty calculated that some thirty-­six ships, including twenty 74-gun ships-­of-the-­lines would be commissioned in 1779.273 France was able to persuade Spain to enter the war by promising to help it recapture some lost territories. It also secretly promised to continue war until Spain recaptured Gibraltar and to help in obtaining a variety of other Spanish objectives. The French Navy could not survive without the Spanish Navy’s help.274 Spain believed that only occupation of part of England would force Britain to return Gibraltar. A secret clause in the Convention of Aranjuez put Gibraltar into the very center of the French and Spanish strategy against Britain.275  France and Spain had different strategic objectives. Spain was not interested in waging a protracted war to undermine the British economy. It also wanted to end the war in a single campaign. Hence, Spain demanded that France join Spain in invading England. In contrast, France’s strategic objectives were limited to capturing Portsmouth and did not extend to advancing on London.276 The French believed that an attack on the British naval base at Portsmouth would not only damage the British naval power but also cause panic which, in turn, would wreck the British credit system.277 If that proved to be impossible, France devised a strategy that would satisfy both its own and Spain’s strategic needs, and exploit the British weaknesses. The French and Spanish navies operating largely independently would put pressure on different area of the far-­flung British Empire in the hope of achieving decisive superiority somewhere. However, this strategy contained two great dangers: (1) it would necessarily lead to a war of attrition which French and Spaniards might not have the strength to endure; and (2) it would put pressure on the Spanish Navy which, although invaluable as fleet-­inbeing, was ill-­equipped by training and leadership to meet the British independently in combat.278  The French plan was to concentrate some fifty French and Spanish ships-­ofthe-­line off Coruña by mid-­May 1779. The combined fleet would then try to obtain command of the Channel. Afterward, the fleet would provide cover for some 20,000 troops assembled in Normandy to transit the Channel and land on the Isle of Wight.279 The French ships would shell and burn down the Portsmouth dockyard. Secondary attacks might be launched against the ports of Bristol and Liverpool, and the victualling depot at Cork. If the attack on the Isle of Wight failed, then the naval base of Plymouth might be attacked.280 Time was a critical factor in the success of the Franco-­Spanish landing. The Spaniards wanted their fleet to return home by the end of August, that is, before the onset of bad weather in the English Channel. This would allow four months for concentration of the French and the Spanish fleets, their training in combined maneuverings, and obtaining command of the English Channel.281  Initially, the Spaniards planned to contribute twenty ships-­of-the-­line and send another twenty ships-­of-the-­line to blockade Gibraltar. The French fleet was planned to sail in mid-­May 1779. However, Admiral d’Orvilliers informed Foreign Minister Charles Gravier de Vergennes (1719–1787) that the fleet would

40   Strategic framework not be ready until the end of May. To forestall any appearance of the British fleet off Ushant, the French fleet under Admiral d’Orvilliers sailed from Brest on June 3 in haste, without adequate stores and short of men.282 By June 11, d’Orvilliers’ squadron reached Cizarga Island. D’Orvilliers waited six weeks for the Spaniards.283 Spain declared war on Britain on June 21, 1779.284 D’Orvilliers was joined there with two ships-­of-the-­line from Toulon. After some further delays the Spanish squadron of eight ships-­of-the-­line from El Ferrol and under Admiral Luis de Córdova y Córdova (1706–1796) joined d’Orvilliers on July 2.285 The Franco-­Spanish fleet consisted of sixty-­six ships-­of-the-­line.286 Hence, it was numerically much stronger than the British Channel Fleet. On July 20, the Franco-­Spanish fleet sailed northward to the Channel.287  The French and Spaniards made an unsound decision to join their fleets. The better course of action would have been to employ the Spanish fleet in different theaters, specifically the West Indies and the Mediterranean. That would, in turn, force the British to fragment their naval strength.288 If the Spanish fleet attacked the British possessions in the West Indies then the British would be forced either to detach forces to the West Indies or risk everything in a decisive battle in home waters.289 At the same time, the French would probably be able to mass their forces at the selected point for a decisive blow. Such a course of action could have been successful because the British made a wrong decision by abandoning their traditional strategy of blockading the French and the Spanish naval bases. Hence, both the French and the Spanish were able to deploy their forces in any sea/ocean area and at very small risk of British interference.291 Yet throughout the war, the French grand strategy was based on dispersion of the French forces. France suffered greatly from an infirmity of purpose.291  In the meantime, on June 16, the British admiral Charles Hardy (1714–1780), commander of the Channel Fleet, left St. Helen’s with thirty ships-­of-the-­line to take up a watching position upon French squadron at Brest. On the same day, Britain declared war on Spain. On June 22, Hardy, after reaching Ushant, was informed that the French squadron had sailed eighteen days before. Hence, on June 25, he returned to the Lizard Peninsula292 On July 8, the Admiralty directed Hardy to execute his original orders and to keep as far to the westward as to prevent the fleet being driven into port again. Hardy left Torbay on July 14 and reached Ushant on July 21. He learned that the Spanish squadron from Coruña had joined d’Orvilliers and the Cádiz squadron was at sea. Afterward he returned toward Lizard Peninsula, but westerly winds forced him to head for Plymouth where he awaited further orders. On July 28 the Admiralty repeated their orders of July 8, and again on July 29. They believed that the enemy intended to invade England and carry out attacks on the Leeward Islands and East India convoys in the Channel.293  By the time the Franco-­Spanish fleet reached the English Channel on August 7 it had missed the British Jamaica convoy of over 200 vessels. The combined Franco-­Spanish fleet was unable to remain in the Channel without a secure and sheltered port once fall gales started.294 On August 12, the British squadron was 34 miles south-­southeast of Scilly and working against a strong westerly wind. Three days later, it reached a position 47 miles west by south of Scilly.295 

Strategic framework   41 On August 15, the allied fleet sighted Lizard Point.296 The next day, d’Orvilliers was directed to abandon his position off Portsmouth/Isle of Wight and to prepare to cover a landing at Falmouth, Cornwall. He was to maintain the new position until November to secure control of northern and southern approaches to the English Channel. However, d’Orvilliers informed his superiors that his fleet was not able to fight a battle let alone survive it.297, 298  D’Orvilliers was greatly surprised to learn on August 25 that the enemy fleet was at sea and not in harbor as he expected. Afterward, the council of war was convened which decided unanimously that the allied fleet should either seek the enemy fleet in the Channel or remain in a waiting position. The reason for this decision was increased poor health among French sailors and a shortage of provisions and water. The council also decided to terminate the mission on September 8 and then, in accordance with orders received by the Spanish admiral, separate as soon as convenient.299 However, on August 26, the French government suddenly changed its plans and decided to land the army at Falmouth instead of the Isle of Wight. On August 29, the combined fleet was driven westward by a gale. It was sighted by the British and lured up the Channel. Its supplies were exhausted, and sickness reduced the companies of many of the ships to less than half of their original strength.300  In early September, d’Orvilliers decided to return to Brest. On October 3, the French and Spaniards abandoned their plans for an invasion of England.301 This was the most serious attempt by the combined fleet to strike a decisive blow in home waters. Afterward, war in Europe centered upon the destruction of commerce and the reduction by the Allies of Gibraltar and Minorca. In each of the next three years, the French and Spanish fleets combined to cut off the Rock or to threaten Britain. Each year Gibraltar was relieved and the threat to Britain melted to nothing.302  In 1780, the French and the Spaniards inflicted considerable damage on British commerce but avoided a fight with the Royal Navy – the only force that always stood against the ambitions of the French and Spanish rulers. Three times the allies threatened the English Channel with superiority so overwhelming that no British fleet could seriously challenge them. However, each time “weak leadership, divided councils, bad cooperation, lack of enterprise, and general ineffectiveness led to a failure.”303  At the beginning of 1781, France at last gave some strong help to the colonists. The French troops had already reached America and Admiral François Joseph Paul de Grasse (1722–1788) was on his way with a large fleet and a convoy of troops and stores.304 On September 28, 1781, George Washington (1732–1799), commanding the American-­French troops, won a great victory at Yorktown. This undermined the British will to continue the war in America. Yet war continued undiminished. Spain contributed indirectly to victory at Yorktown – by besieging Gibraltar. It also forced the British to spend much of their effort on reinforcing and replenishing Gibraltar. Each British convoy was strongly defended by the Royal Navy’s ships. The British were also burdened with Minorca until the Spaniards captured it in February 1782. Spain provided enough

42   Strategic framework ships to give the allies occasional superiority in numbers close to British home waters and this threatened British trade and threatened renewal of an attempted invasion.305  Because of these threats British naval reinforcements were too few and too late to save Cornwallis at Yorktown. Spain was also able to create another diversion by opening a new front in North America by recapturing west Florida. In the battle of Pensacola in March–May 1781, the Spanish troops were assisted by their squadron based in Havana. The capture of Pensacola aided the American war effort by cutting the British supply route to the Indian tribes threatening the Carolina frontier. The Spaniards also provided money to Count Jean-­Baptiste de Rochambeau (1725–1807) for troops serving as the Spanish auxiliaries. They even helped in drafting Rochambeau’s plans.306  The Dutch Navy also (but to a lesser extent) contributed to the victory of the American colonists. The Netherlands was forced into war against its will at the end of 1780. Its navy was obsolete. In 1781 it consisted of only fourteen ships-­ of-the-­line. The next year, it had nineteen. However, the Dutch Navy opened a new front for the British – the North Sea. This, in turn, forced the British to devote some resources to defending their interests in that theater. The Island of St. Eustatius served as a hub for the Dutch smuggling with the American rebels. The British captured it in February 1781. The British also captured Trincomalee, Ceylon in January 1782. Yet these two actions fragmented the British forces.307  After France began active cooperation with American colonists the British objective should have been to prevent France sending aid in the form of ships of war, or troops, or supplies to colonies. If that had happened, the French would have had a tough time honoring their commitments and that might have prevented Spain from joining France. Instead, Spain was free to invest Gibraltar and Minorca and the Spanish fleet reached the West Indies. France and Spain were free to concentrate at will a superior force against Britain. This situation was worsened later when Holland enter the war against Britain.308 Despite some successes, the French and Spaniards would have been more successful if they had adopted a better strategy. The French Navy was then at the peak of its effectiveness. The Spanish Navy was a serious force to be reckoned with. Britain was engaged in a war on land with the American colonists some 3,000 miles away from home territory. The Franco-­Spanish fleet had a chance to strike at the time and place of their choosing. However, they mistakenly chose to attack peripheral points of the British strength in the West Indies and besieged Gibraltar.309 Although, the allies emerged with some benefits from the war, they missed some large gains at the expense of Britain. Neither the policy of France and Spain nor their admirals were focused on the main objectives of naval warfare – securing maritime preponderance as the first step to further operations. General George Washington (1732–1799) complained that his French allies provided poor naval support. They did not make a sustained effort to obtain command of the North Americans waters. Their presence in the Chesapeake Bay at the time of the battle at Yorktown was accidental rather than planned. Naval

Strategic framework   43 efforts were also wasted by minor actions in the West Indies which Britain was unable to defend. Spain’s effort to recapture Gibraltar was strategically sound. However, the ultimate success depended on establishing and maintaining a naval blockade. Yet such a blockade could not be maintained while the British fleet roamed unwatched and unbeaten.310 

Theater of effort/fleet distribution  One of the key elements of military or naval strategy is determination of the theater of main and theater(s) of secondary effort. For a war at sea, the principal political and military strategic objectives would dictate determination of the theater of main effort. For example, for the French Navy in the eighteenth century, the theater of main effort was usually the Bay of Biscay/English Channel, while the western Mediterranean was the theater of secondary effort. For the Russian Navy in the Crimean War (1854–1856), the main theater was the Black Sea; the Baltic was the theater of secondary effort.  The Naval Convention of the Triple Alliance of June 1913 stipulated that in a case of a general European war, the western Mediterranean would be the principal theater. The secondary theater of effort would be the Adriatic. Hence, the best ships would be deployed in the western Mediterranean. In the Adriatic, the allied fleets would be on a strategic defensive. The Austro-­Hungarian and German ships would join at the Bay of Cattaro (Kotorski Zaliv today) and Italian ships at Brindisi.311 In World War I, the Tyrrhenian Sea/the Ionian Sea and Central Mediterranean were the theater of main effort for the Italian Navy while the Adriatic was its theater of secondary effort.  In World War I, the German Navy’s theater of main effort was the North Sea, while the Baltic was the theater of secondary effort. In World War II, the northern Atlantic was the main theater for the Kriegsmarine while other theaters were of secondary importance.  The relative importance of the strategic objectives, in case of a war, would determine size/composition of one’s naval forces and their distribution among the theaters. For a navy that must conduct war in two or more theaters, the major part of its forces should be assigned to the theater of main effort, and the remainder of forces to a theater of secondary efforts. Obviously, the most capable and combat ready forces should be deployed in the theater of main effort. For instance, the German Navy was faced with the task of distributing its strength between two narrow seas: the Baltic and the North Sea. In the 1890s, the Germans considered France as their main enemy while Britain would stay neutral in a war. By 1900, a new Naval Act envisaged a large construction program aimed primarily at challenging the British supremacy at sea. Thus, all the plans of the German Navy prior to 1914 were aimed against the British Navy as the main opponent and the North Sea was selected as the principal maritime theater. This change of policy also reflected the fleet distribution of the German Home Fleet (Heimatflotte) [renamed as the High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) in February 1907]. In August 1914, the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea consisted of twenty-­six battleships (including fourteen

44   Strategic framework dreadnoughts) organized in six battle squadrons, four battle cruisers, twenty-­one cruisers, about ninety destroyers and torpedo boats, and seventeen U-­boats. In the Baltic, the Germans had only nine cruisers, ten destroyers and torpedo boats, four U-­boats, and about thirty miscellaneous ships. In the Mediterranean, the Germans had deployed one battle cruiser and cruiser each and a patrol ship (Missionschiff ) at Constantinople.312  The Imperial Russian Navy was confronted with a perennial problem of how to divide fleets operating in several widely separated maritime theaters. The strength and composition of each fleet varied over time due to different strategic objectives to be accomplished in each theater. In 1881, the Russian policy was aimed at gaining naval superiority in the Baltic over Germany and in the Black Sea over Turkey. Yet the Russians decided to maintain a strategically defensive posture in both theaters.313 This was clearly disconnected from the stated objectives of the naval strategy. In 1910, the Baltic Fleet was the largest all Russian fleets. It was composed of eight battleships, four battle cruisers, nine light cruisers, thirty-­six destroyers and torpedo boats each, and twenty submarines. In comparison, the Black Sea Fleet was much smaller. It consisted then of three battleships, three light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and six submarines.314  On the eve of the German invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the Soviet Baltic Fleet was clearly numerically much stronger than forces available to the Kriegsmarine. It consisted of two battleships, two heavy cruisers, two destroyer leaders, twelve new destroyers, seven old destroyers, seven torpedo boats, sixty-­ five submarines, six minelayers, thirty-­three minesweepers, one gun boat, and forty-­eight motor torpedo boats.315 In contrast, the Kriegsmarine had in the Baltic only ten minelayers, five U-­boats (undergoing training), three “obstacle breakers,” (Sperrbrecher – auxiliary mine destruction vessels), twenty modern minesweepers, thirty minesweepers and anti-­submarine (A/S) trawlers, sixteen motor minesweepers, and two motor launches for sweeping shallow-­laid mines.316  A relatively strong sea power might be inferior in the main theater but the stronger side in the secondary theater. For example, in 1914–1918, the Imperial German Navy was inferior to the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea (main theater) but was superior to the Russian Navy in the Baltic (secondary theater). A major sea power fighting a war in two or more theaters would be unable to maintain superiority in all theaters. Hence, it would deploy stronger forces in the theater of main effort and keep weaker forces in secondary theaters. Or a relatively strong sea power might be inferior in the main theater but the stronger side in the secondary theater.  A stronger side at sea might misdistribute forces among the theaters, because of lack of time, and/or large distances separating various theaters, or unsound strategic decisions. For example, prior to the outbreak of the Russo-­Japanese War in 1904, the Imperial Russian Navy was numerically stronger than the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Russian Navy had in service twenty-­seven battleships, eight armored cruisers, and fourteen protected cruisers.317 The Russians failed to concentrate their best and most modern ships in the Far East as the risk of war was increased. Three of their most modern ships were in the Far East but

Strategic framework   45 were sent back to Kronshtadt to be refitted instead of the work being done at Port Arthur or Vladivostok. Although they were second class ships, if left in the Far East they would have added to the Japanese difficulties; more modern armored vessels were left in the Baltic.318  In the Far East the Russians deployed seven battleships, four armored cruisers, eight light cruisers and thirty-­five torpedo craft. In the Baltic were built or nearing completion nine battleships, five light cruisers, twenty torpedo boats plus coast defense ships and old units. The Black Sea Fleet consisted of only old ships because of constraints on the passage of the Turkish Straits.319 If the Baltic Fleet joined the First Pacific Squadron, the Russians would have superiority over the Japanese fleet.320 Clearly, the fleet distribution between the Far East and the Baltic was faulty. The Russians were not prepared for war. They sent a strong fleet to the Far East to intimidate the Japanese. However, they did not send enough forces to ensure numerical superiority in the Far East.321 To make the situation worse, the First Pacific Squadron was also divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. In Vladivostok were based three armored cruisers while the remainder of the fleet was based in Port Arthur. The major part of the Russian fleet in the Far East should not have been based in Port Arthur, a base that could be easily blockaded from both land and sea, unless the intention was to engage the Japanese fleet. Port Arthur was too small to accommodate all the ships of the First Pacific Squadron. If the Russians had a much smaller force in Port Arthur than they had, that force would be sufficiently strong to tie most modern ships of the Japanese fleet in the Yellow Sea. At the same time the Vladivostok detachment, strengthened by several battleships, would have posed a serious threat to the Japanese mainland. Admiral Mahan argued that the entire Russian fleet in the Far East should have been concentrated in Vladivostok where it flanked enemy communications.322  The Japanese fleet consisted of six new battleships, eight armored cruisers, sixteen protected cruisers and about thirty-­five torpedo boats.323 The fundamental problem for the Japanese was how to overcome Russian forces much stronger than their own. The Japanese fleet held another advantage because it occupied a central position between the Russian fleet detachment in Port Arthur and Vladivostok. From very beginning of the war, the Japanese fleet was superior in the decisive theater – the Yellow Sea.324  Maritime strategy provides both the framework and the direction for the conduct of war at sea. No maritime campaign of major naval/joint operations should be planned, even less executed, unless contributing directly to the accomplishment of a given military/naval strategic objective. Whether maritime strategy is offensive or defensive is largely based on the assessment of one’s naval combat potential. Sometimes it might be even a matter of perception of one’s naval strength. Very often too much emphasis is given to purely physical elements of one’s and the enemy’s naval combat potential/power while the elements attributed to the human factor are given short shrift. Maritime strategy is conducted continuously and across the full range of operations; perhaps, its importance is relatively much higher in time of peace. It is in peacetime when maritime strategy dictates development of doctrine for the operational level of

46   Strategic framework war and education/training. It also largely determines the fleet composition, forces’ distribution, and naval construction program. In time of open hostilities, the importance of maritime strategy is relatively reduced because the focus shifts to the employment of one’s forces in combat. However, no war can ultimately have been won by violating the tenets of sound maritime strategy. 

Notes    1 Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 58.    2 Kappa, “The Strategy of a Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1937), p. 624.    3 Anonymous, “Strategy of the Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928), p. 310.    4 Anonymous, “War from the Aspect of the Weaker Power,” Part I, The Naval Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (May 1920), p. 152.    5 Paula R. Kaufman, “Sensors Emerge as More Crucial Weapons Than Shooters,” IEEE Spectrum Online, July 16, 2003.    6 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Military Transformation Strategic Approach (Washington, DC: Office of Force Transformation, December 2003), p. 32.    7 Aldo Borge, The Challenges and Limitations of “Network Centric Warfare:” The initial views of an NCW skeptic (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2003), p. 6.    8 August Winter, “Wägbares und Unwägbares bei der Entstehung von Führungsentschlüssen” (I) Wehrkunde 3 (March 1965), p. 117.    9 Reginald N. Custance, A Study of War (Port Washington, NY/London: Constable, 1924), pp. 31–32.  10 Graham, Empire, p. 61.  11 Graham, Empire, p. 63.  12 René Daveluy, The Genius of Naval Warfare, Vol. I: Strategy, 2nd ed. of A Study of Naval Strategy, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1910), p. 101.  13 Graham, Empire, p. 109.  14 Graham, Empire, p. 114.  15 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 193.  16 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 194.  17 Herbert W. Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength, and Other Essays (London: Longmans, Green, and Co. Ltd., 1928), p. 168.  18 David H. Olivier, German Naval Strategy 1856–1888 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2012, first published 2004 by Frank Cass), p. 118.  19 Olivier, German Naval Strategy, p. 119.  20 Oscar di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst (Berlin: Verlag “Offene Worte,” 1938), p. 191.  21 Evgenii F. Podsoblyaev, “The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905–1914,” translated by Francis King and John Biggart, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2002), p. 63.  22 Podsoblyaev, “Russian Naval General Staff,” p. 66.  23 Rolf Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches 1919–1939 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1972), pp. 46–47.  24 Holger H. Herwig, “The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 88–89. 

Strategic framework   47 25 Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches, pp. 151–152.  26 Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches, pp. 152–153.  27 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 89; Marcus Faulkner, “The Kriegsmarine and the Aircraft Carriers: The Design and Operational Purpose of the ‘Graf Zeppelin,’ 1939-1940,” War in History, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 2012), p. 498.  28 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 94.  29 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 91.  30 Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 1: Bis zum Flottenabkommen mit England 1935 (Tübingen-Neckar: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1967), pp. 25–26.  31 Rolf Bensel, “Die deutsche Flottenpolitik von 1933 bis 1939: Eine Studie über die Rolle des Flottenbaus in Hitlers Aussenpolitik,” Marine Rundschau Beiheft 3, Vol. 55, No. 4 (April 1958), p. 30.  32 Bensel, “Die deutsche Flottenpolitik,” pp. 30–31. 33 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 1, pp. 25–27.  34 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 1, p. 24.  35 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 1, p. 26.  36 Bensel, “Die deutsche Flottenpolitik,” p. 32.  37 Bensel, “Die deutsche Flottenpolitik,” pp. 28–29.  38 Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches, p. 189.  39 Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches, p. 190.  40 Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches, p. 190.  41 Güth, Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches, p. 181.  42 Kurt Assmann, “Why U-­Boat Warfare Failed,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (July 1950), p. 663.  43 Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes 1935–1953 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 8.  44 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, pp. 11–12.  45 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, p. 20.  46 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, pp. 41–42.  47 Cited in Gunnar Åsalius, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921–1941 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), p. 127.  48 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, pp. 54–55.  49 Werner Rahn, “Strategische Optionen und Erfahrungen der deutschen Marineführung 1914 bis 1944: Zu den Chancen und Grenzen einer mitteleuropäischen Kontinentalmacht gegen Seemächte,” in Werner Rahn, ed., Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument Internationaler Sicherheit (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), p. 199.  50 Rahn, “Strategische Optionen und Erfahrungen,” p. 199.  51 B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. 54.  52 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 76.  53 Werner Rahn, “German Navies From 1848 to 2016: Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Cooperation,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Autumn 2017), p. 16.  54 Simpson, Development of Naval Thought, p. 54.  55 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 77.  56 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 78.  57 Simpson, Development of Naval Thought, p. 55.  58 Rahn, “Strategische Optionen und Erfahrungen,” p. 201.  59 Milan Vego, The Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, 1904–1914 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, September 30, 1981), pp. 516–517. 

48   Strategic framework 60 Jon K. Hendrickson, Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), p. 141.  61 Paul G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation 1908–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 254.  62 Milan N. Vego, Austro-­Hungarian Naval Policy 1904–14 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996), p. 127.  63 Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, p. 254.  64 Vego, Austro-­Hungarian Naval Policy, p. 127.  65 Vego, Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, p. 592.  66 Gerhard Bidlingmaier, “Die strategischen und operativen Überlegungen der Marine 1932–1942,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vol. 13, No. 6 (June 1963), p. 314.  67 Richard Lakowski and Werner Wunderlich, Zwischen Flottenschlacht und Zufuhrkrieg: Die Enwicklungen des Seestrategischen Denken im Imperialistischen Deutschland in Vorbereitung des Zweiten Weltkrieges (East Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1978), p. 149.  68 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 92.  69 Rahn, “Strategische Optionen und Erfahrungen,” p. 216.  70 Herwig, “Failure of German Sea Power,” p. 92.  71 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1: 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970), p. 33.  72 Rahn, “Strategische Optionen und Erfahrungen,” p. 216.  73 Klaus Schröder, “Die Gedanken des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine zum Kampf gegen England im Atlantik und im Mittelmeer 1939–1940,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 67, No. 5 (September–October 1970), pp. 260–261.  74 Rahn, “Strategische Optionen und Erfahrungen,” p. 218; Bidlingmaier, “Die strateg­ ischen und operativen Überlegungen,” p. 317.  75 Walther Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab und die obersten Marinebehörden in Deutschland 1848–1945 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1958), p. 209.  76 Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, 1957), p. 137.  77 Friedrich Ruge, Der Seekrieg: The German Navy’s Story 1939–1945 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 49–50.  78 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 1, p. 173.  79 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, pp. 132–133.  80 Anlage 2: “Betrachtungen zur Weiterführung des Atlantikhandelskrieges mit Überwasserstreitkräften,” June 1941, I SKL Teil CVII: Überlegungen des Chefs der SKL und Niederschriften über Vorträge unde Besprechungen beim Führer, Januar 1941–December 1941, RM 7/182, Bundesarchiv-­Militärchiv (BA-­MA). Freiburg, i. Br., p. 3.  81 Milan L. Hauner and Bruce A. Elleman, Stalin’s Big Fleet Program (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College), p. 48.  82 Hauner and Elleman, Stalin’s Big Fleet Program, p. 3.  83 Hauner and Elleman, Stalin’s Big Fleet Program, p. 52.  84 Cited in Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, p. 63.  85 Milan L. Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-­Fleet Program,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2004, pp. 107–108.  86 Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-­Fleet Program,” p. 113.  87 V.I. Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte (Dresden: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976) (translated from the Russian by Helmut Förster, et al., Boyevoy put’ Sovetskogo-­Voyenno-Morskogo Flota, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 3rd and enlarged ed., 1974), p. 171. 

Strategic framework   49   88 V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981) (translated from the Russian, Sovetskoye Voyenno-­Morskoye Iskusstvo v Velikoy-­Otechestvennoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1973), pp. 18–19.    89 Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968), p. 57.    90 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, p. 185.    91 Samuel Kucherov, “The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits,” The Russian Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1949), p. 206.    92 Leo Pasvolsky, “Freedom of the Straits: The Emptiest of Phrases,” Advocate of Peace Through Justice, Vol. 85, No. 8 (August 1923), p. 295.    93 William A. Renzi, “Britain, Russia, and the Straits, 1914–1915,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1970), p. 14.    94 T.E.M.M., “Russia, Turkey and the Straits,” The World Today, Vol. 2, No. 9 (September 1946), p. 396.    95 Ahmed Sükrü Esmer, “The Straits: Crux of World Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (January 1947), pp. 295–296.    96 Harry N. Harwood, “The Strait after the Montreux Conference,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (October 1936), p. 201.    97 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 295.    98 Anthony R. De Luca, “Soviet-­American Politics and the Turkish Straits,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 2 (Autumn 1977), p. 510.    99 De Luca, “Soviet-­American Politics,” p. 511.  100 Cited in Geoffrey Roberts, “Moscow’s Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943–8,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 2011), p. 76.  101 De Luca, “Soviet-­American Politics,” p. 512.  102 Roberts, “Moscow’s Cold War,” pp. 76–77.  103 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 297.  104 J.C. Hurewitz, “Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Reevaluation of the Origins of the Problem,” World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4 (July 1962), p. 606.  105 De Luca, “Soviet-­American Politics,” p. 512.  106 Jonathan Knight, “American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 3 (Autumn 1975), p. 454.  107 De Luca, “Soviet-­American Politics,” p. 516.  108 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 297.  109 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 298.  110 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 299; Roberts, “Moscow’s Cold War,” p. 77.  111 Dean Acheson, “Text of the United States Note to the Soviet Union concerning the Question of the Turkish Straits, August 19, 1946,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1947), pp. 88–89.  112 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 299.  113 Esmer, “The Straits,” p. 300.  114 Roberts, “Moscow’s Cold War,” pp. 77–78.  115 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 14, 2014), p. 2.  116 Cited in Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream: Empire Building along The New Silk Road (London: ZED Books, 2017), p. 205.  117 O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 8.  118 Miller, China’s Asian Dream, pp. 202–203.  119 Kelsey Broderick, Chinese Activities in the South China Sea (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, May 2015), p. 3.  120 Miller, China’s Asian Dream, p. 201. 

50   Strategic framework Broderick, Chinese Activities in the South China Sea, p. 3.  O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 2.  Miller, China’s Asian Dream, p. 201.  Broderick, Chinese Activities in the South China Sea, p. 3.  O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 2.  Miller, China’s Asian Dream, p. 201.  O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 11.  O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 10.  Miller, China’s Asian Dream, p. 206.  M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2011), p. 294.  131 O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 4.  132 Miller, China’s Asian Dream, p. 209.  133 Ross Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea: Strategy Options for the Trump Administration (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2016), p. 18.  134 Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism, p. 24.  135 O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p.  11; Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism, p. 1  136 Cited in O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, p. 11.  137 M.G. Cook, “Naval Strategy,” lecture, Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, VA, March 2, 1931, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series I, Box 003, Naval Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 12.  138 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 627.  139 E.T. Salmon, “The Strategy of the Second Punic War,” Greece & Rome, Vol. 7, No. 2 (October 1960), p. 132.  140 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 627.  141 G.J. Marcus, A Naval History of England, Vol. I: The Formative Centuries (Boston, MA/Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 68–69.  142 Anonymous, “War,” p. 162.  143 Stephen W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application (London: Collins, 1962), p. 27.  144 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 bc to the Present (New York: Harper & Row, 2nd revised ed., 1986), p. 466.  145 Marcus, Naval History of England, Vol. I, p. 159.  146 Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 465–466.  147 Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 466–467.  148 Marcus, Naval History of England, Vol. I, p. 111.  149 Paul M. Kennedy, Aufstieg und Verfall der Britischen Seemacht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1978), p. 32.  150 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 10.  151 Jonathan R. Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War for American Independence,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988), p. 65.  152 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 12.  153 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, pp. 76–77.  154 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 78.  155 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 78.  156 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 79.  157 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 74.  158 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 74.  159 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, pp. 74–75.  160 Bern Anderson, “The Naval Strategy of the Civil War,” Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 1962), p. 17.  121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

Strategic framework   51 161 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 136.  162 René Daveluy, War on the Sea, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1908), pp. 110–111.  163 Daveluy, War on the Sea, p. 113.  164 Daveluy, War on the Sea, p. 118.  165 David Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (Lincoln, NE/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), p. 65.  166 Daveluy, War on the Sea, p. 118.  167 Daveluy, War on the Sea, p. 118.  168 Trask, War with Spain in 1898, p. 67.  169 Trask, War with Spain in 1898, p. 111.  170 Trask, War with Spain in 1898, p. 116.  171 Trask, War with Spain in 1898, p. 266.  172 H.W. Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd, 1926/Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprinted 1969), pp. 123–124.  173 William L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 bc) to Actium (31 bc) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1937, reprint 1964), p. 266.  174 Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare, p. 269.  175 Nigel Bagnall, The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage, and the Struggle for the Mediterranean (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Thomas Dunne Books, 2005), p. 64.  176 Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare, p. 270.  177 Daveluy, War on the Sea, p. 31.  178 Adrian Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London: Cassell & Co., 2000), p. 97.  179 Bagnall, Punic Wars, p. 66.  180 N.Mcl. Kemp, “French Naval Strategy and Tactics in the Eighteenth Century,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1934), p. 722.  181 Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 722.  182 Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” pp. 724–725.  183 Richmond, National Policy, p. 166.  184 “The Attempted Invasion of 1745,” The Naval Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (February 1915), p. 76.  185 “Attempted Invasion,” p. 77.  186 The Jacobites were supporters of Roman Catholic King James II of England (James VII in Scotland) whose aim was to unify England, Ireland, Scotland, and France.  187 “Attempted Invasion,” p. 76.  188 “Attempted Invasion,” pp. 77–78.  189 Rudolph Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, Vol. II: Von 1739–1793 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried und Sohn, 1911), p. 110.  190 “Attempted Invasion,” p. 75.  191 Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen, Vol. II, p. 110.  192 Richmond, National Policy, p. 172.  193 Richard Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650–1830 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 205.  194 Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen, Vol. II, p. 201.  195 Graham, Empire, pp. 154–155.  196 Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen, Vol. II, p. 203.  197 Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen, Vol. II, p. 219.  198 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 61.  199 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 61.  200 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” pp. 61–62.  201 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 63.  202 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p.  62; Piers Mackesy, The War for America 1775–1783 (Lincoln, NE/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. 279. 

52   Strategic framework 203 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 63.  204 David Syrett, The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary War (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1998), p. 68.  205 Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, p. 242.  206 Syrett, Royal Navy in European Waters, p. 68.  207 Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, p. 242.  208 Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 734.  209 Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 734.  210 Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 731.  211 Lawrence Sondhaus, The Habsburg Empire and the Sea: Austrian Naval Policy, 1797–1866 (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1989), pp. 191–192.  212 Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1, p. 58.  213 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2001), p. 102.  214 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 301.  215 Cited in Olivier, German Naval Strategy, pp. 64–65.  216 Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1, pp. 61–62.  217 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 123.  218 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 125.  219 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 66.  220 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 67.  221 Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1, p. 164.  222 John L. Hall Jr., Naval Operations of the Russo-­Japanese War (Newport, RI: Operations Department, Naval War College, March 27, 1939), p. 13.  223 “A Survey of Modern Naval Warfare,” The Naval Review, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (November 1926), p. 827.  224 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 67–68.  225 Hall, Naval Operations, p. 9.  226 Hall, Naval Operations, p. 12.  227 Hall, Naval Operations, p. 21.  228 Hall, Naval Operations, p. 21.  229 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), p. 421.  230 Simpson, Development of Naval Thought, pp. 56–57.  231 K.G.B. Dewar, “Battle of Jutland: Lessons and Basic Causes,” The Naval Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (April 1960), p. 147.  232 Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, Operationen und Taktik: Auswertung wichtiger Ereignisse des Seekrieges, Heft 3: Die Atlantikunternehmung der Kampfgruppe “Bismarck” – “Prinz Eugen,” Mai 1941 (Berlin: M.Dv. No. 601, October 1942), RMD/601, BA-­MA, p. 5.  233 SKL to Gruppe West, Gruppe Nord, Flottenkommando, B.d.U.-Op, “Weisung für weitere Unternehmungen von Überwasserstreitkräften,” April 2, 1941, Bismarck-­ Operation, Band I-­Rheinübung, Heft 1: Vorbereitende Weisungen und Operationsbefehle-­März-Mai 1941, RM 7/1700, BA-­MA, pp. 3–4.  234 Norman J.W. Goda, “The Battle of the Rock: A Reassessment of German Motives for the Capture of Gibraltar in the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 298–299.  235 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 299–300.  236 Schröder, “Die Gedanken des Oberbefehlshabers,” p. 268.  237 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 300–301.  238 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 301–302.  239 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 303. 

Strategic framework   53 240 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 303–304.  241 Lothar Gruchmann, “Die ‘verpassten Strategischen Chancen’ der Achsenmächte im Mittelmeerraum 1940 bis 1941,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1970), pp. 452–453.  242 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 303.  243 Cited in Gruchmann, “Die ‘verpassten Strategischen Chancen,’ ” p. 463.  244 Cited in Gruchmann, “Die ‘verpassten Strategischen Chancen,’ ” p. 463.  245 Schröder, “Die Gedanken des Oberbefehlshabers,” p. 269.  246 Reportedly, Hitler told the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano in September 1940 that the Spanish Foreign Minister Ramón Serrano Suñer had requested, among other things, delivery of 400,000–700,000 tons of grain in 1941, to fulfill all Spain’s needs in fuel, and the Spanish army’s needs in weapons/equipment. Germany would also hand over to Spain the whole of French Morocco and help Spain to revise the border south of Rio de Oro. Donald S. Detwiler, “Spain and the Axis during World War II,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1971), p. 43.  247 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 301.  248 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 305.  249 Detwiler, “Spain and the Axis during World War II,” p. 45.  250 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 305–306.  251 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 306.  252 Gruchmann, “Die ‘verpassten Strategischen Chancen,’ ” p. 464.  253 Gruchmann, “Die ‘verpassten Strategischen Chancen,’ ” p. 464.  254 Gruchmann, “Die ‘verpassten Strategischen Chancen,’ ” p. 468.  255 Detwiler, “Spain and the Axis during World War II,” p. 47.  256 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 306.  257 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 307–308.  258 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” pp. 307–308.  259 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 308.  260 Detwiler, “Spain and the Axis during World War II,” pp. 48–49.  261 Goda, “Battle of the Rock,” p. 308.  262 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, p. 238.  263 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 635.  264 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 189.  265 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 189.  266 Anonymous, “Strategy,” p. 305.  267 Anonymous, “Strategy,” p. 307.  268 Anonymous, “Strategy,” p. 305.  269 John B. Hattendorf, “The Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being’ in Historical Perspective,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2014), p. 49.  270 “America and the Atlantic,” The Naval Review, Vol. XI, No. 4 (November 1923), p. 610.  271 “Conduct of the Channel Fleet in 1779 against Superior Force,” The Naval Review, Vol. XI, No. 1 (February 1923), p. 32.  272 Syrett, Royal Navy in European Waters, p. 68.  273 Syrett, Royal Navy in European Waters, pp. 65–66.  274 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 62.  275 Syrett, Royal Navy in European Waters, p. 69.  276 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 63  277 Mackesy, War for America, p. 279.  278 Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 63  279 Mackesy, War for America, p. 279.  280 Mackesy, War for America, p. 280.  281 Mackesy, War for America, p. 280.  282 Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 738. 

54   Strategic framework 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312

313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324

“Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 32.  “America and the Atlantic,” p. 610.  “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 34; Mackesy, War for America, p. 280.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 738.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 738.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 737.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” pp. 731–732.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 737.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” pp. 731–732.  “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 32.  “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 33.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 738.  “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 36.  Mackesy, War for America, p. 281.  Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, p. 244.  “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 36.  “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 36.  Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, p. 244.  Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, p. 244.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” pp. 738–739.  Kemp, “French Naval Strategy,” p. 739.  “America and the Atlantic,” p. 611.  Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 64.  Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” p. 64.  Dull, “Mahan, Sea Power, and War,” pp. 64–65.  Anonymous, “Strategy,” p. 307.  Charles E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, Their Relations and Interdependence (London/Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905, reprinted by Nabu Public Domain), p. 53.  Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, p. 54.  Hendrickson, Crisis in the Mediterranean, p. 143.  N.B. Pavlovich, The Fleet in the First World War, Vol. I: Operations of the Russian Fleet (New Delhi/Washington, DC: Amerind Publishing Co./The Smithsonian Institution and the National Science Foundation, 1979) (translated from the Russian, Flot v Pervoy mirovoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1964), p. 74.  Pavlovich, Fleet in the First World War, p. 11.  Pavlovich, Fleet in the First World War, p. 32.  Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 12.  Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 12.  Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 188.  Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1, p. 165.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 17; Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 188.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 11.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 18.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 18.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 19; Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 188.  Elwin F. Cutts, Operations for Securing Command of the Sea Areas, Part 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 8–9, 1938), p. 11. 

2 Defense vs. offensive 

The terms defense and offensive at sea should be clearly defined; otherwise it would be very difficult to understand all the complexities of disputing control of the sea. Like war on land, naval warfare can be conducted by using defense, offensive, and a combination of these. Generally, defense is easier to understand in land warfare but less so in a war at sea. In general, defense can be defined as a series of actions and measures aimed at denying to the enemy control of an area, position or place/location, and/or at preventing destruction/neutralization of one’s forces. Clausewitz insisted that defense is the strongest form of fighting. Among other things, defense is superior since attack itself cannot exist without some measure of defense. Defense has all material advantages except for morale.1 A major advantage of an offensive is that the attacker determines the objective and then selects a method of accomplishing it.2 The defender is in a bad position because he must deduce the attacker’s intent. He must find proper ways and means to defend his gains.3 Among its weaknesses, the offensive often requires great superiority of one’s forces over the defender. Clausewitz wrote that the weaker the motives for action, the more they will be overlaid and neutralized by the disparity between attack and defense.4  Defense at sea and on land have many similarities but also considerable differences. The physical medium in which naval combat is conducted is vastly different from the terrain on land. Generally, and unlike the armies, naval forces are not tied to positions that need to be captured, defended, or neutralized. However, this is not always true. For example, in 1942–1945, the Japanese drew successive lines of defense in the Pacific which had to be defended to the utmost. After the loss of the Marianas, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) prepared four variants of the Sho-­Go (Victory) plans on July 24, 1944. The Sho-­Go plans were aimed at preventing the enemy from obtaining a foothold within the inner defensive perimeter running from Home Islands to Nansei-­shotō, Taiwan, the Philippines, Timor, Java, and Sumatra.5 Specifically the following plans were prepared: Sho-­1: Defense of the Philippines; Sho-­2: Defense of southern Kyūshū, Nansei-­shotō, and Taiwan; Sho-­3: Defense of Honshū and Shikoku, and, depending on the situation, the Ogasawara Group (Bonin Islands); and Sho-­4: Defense of the Hokkaidō area.6 

56   Defense vs. offensive War at sea is also conducted on the surface and subsurface and in the air, while war on land is two-­dimensional. Generally, the fighting on land is much more intense than at sea because the opposing forces are in almost continuous contact with each other. The intensity of one’s hatred of the enemy is also generally much higher in land than in naval or air warfare. The pauses in fighting on land are usually much shorter than those in war at sea. Hence, war at sea approximates the absolute form of war in general.7  The terrain on land is often full of obstacles of various kinds. It greatly complicates protection of lines of supplies, especially in the enemy’s territory with a hostile population. In contrast, the sea is flat and except for islands in the littorals free of physical obstacles. The armies are generally highly dependent on roads and railroads for their logistical sustainment and bringing up reinforcements. Hence, the more the attacker advances into the depth of the enemy’s territory the longer his lines of communications and the more forces need to be detached for their defense and protection. In contrast, defense of sea routes is conducted sporadically. Also, the warships are designed to operate independently in all weather conditions and for extended periods. Thus, they must carry sufficient stocks of fuel, food, ammunition, repair parts, and consumable materiel.  Julian S. Corbett observed that both on land and at sea defense means “taking certain measures to defer a decision until military or political development so far redress the balance of strength that we are able to pass to the offensive.” He wrote that “in the operations of armies the most usual means employed are holding of positions and forcing our superior enemy to exhaust his strength in attacking them.” The “idea of military defence is dominated by the conception of entrenched positions and fortresses.” This is not the case in naval warfare. At sea, “the main conception is avoiding decisive action by strategical or tactical activity so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation develops in our favour.” In “the golden era of the Royal Navy the key of naval defence was mobility not rest.” The “idea was to dispute the control by harassing operations to exercise control at any place or at any moment as we saw the chance, and to prevent the enemy exercising control in spite of his superiority by continually occupying his attention.” The “idea of mere resistance was hardly present at all.” Everything was “counter-­attack, whether upon the enemy’s force or his maritime communications.”8  Depending on the scale of the objective to be accomplished, strategic, operational, and tactical defense is differentiated. Normally, the weaker side at sea would be strategically on the defensive. Denying control of the sea can be strategic or operational in scale. A classic example of the strategic defensive at sea was the first phase of the First Anglo-­Dutch War (1652–1654).9 In 1650, Dutch ships carried nine-­tenths of the English trade. England’s war objective as specified in the Navigation Act of 1651 was to eliminate Dutch ships carrying cargo to England’s ports. Another objective was to exclude Dutch ships from fishing in the English waters.10 For the Dutch, the strategic objective was purely defensive – protection of their shipping. They used almost their entire fleet in defense of convoys. Their stubborn defense of convoys led to many bloody battles. Four

Defense vs. offensive   57 major battles were fought in the First Anglo-­Dutch War alone. The result was that Dutch maritime trade was paralyzed. At the beginning of the war, the Dutch also lost their entire fishing fleet.11 

Importance  Not surprisingly, naval classical thinkers had different views on the importance of offensive and defensive in a war at sea. For example, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan did not like the expression “Defense is a stronger form of war than Offense is.” He believed that such a statement might be misleading, and it must be qualified. Mahan wrote that the true meaning of that statement is that “in a particular operation or even in a general plan, the party on the defense, since he makes no forward movement for the time, can strengthen his preparations, make deliberate and permanent disposition.” The party on the offensive, being in continual movement, is more liable to make a mistake of which the defense may take advantage.12  Mahan noted that “the defensive is simply making the best of a bad bargain; doing not the thing it would like to do, but the most that can be done under the circumstances.”13 He emphasized that a navy must be used in offensive action, both tactically and strategically. Mahan asserted that any proposal to employ “a navy as an instrument of pure passive defense is found faulty upon partial examination and these various results all proceed to the one fundamental fact that the distinguishing feature of naval force is mobility while that of passive defense is immobility.”14 He contended that the main advantages of defense are essentially those of deliberate preparation, shown in precautions of various kinds. In assuming the defensive, you take for granted the impossibility of your own permanent advance and the ability of the enemy – to present himself before your front in superior numbers; unless you can harass him on the way and cause loss enough to diminish the inequality. Unless such disparity exists, you should be on the offensive.15 The disadvantage of defense is evident. It is not only the enforced attitude of a weaker party, but it “labors under the further onerous uncertainty where the offensive may strike when there is more than one line of operation open to him, as there usually is.”16  Corbett wrote that in a war at sea “command is in dispute. Experience shows that power too weak to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude.”17 In his view, “although the essence of defence is mobility and an untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and resistance, yet there are also defended, or defensible positions are not excluded. But they are only used in the last resort.”18 Corbett observed that “a fleet may retire temporarily in waters difficult to access where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a fortified base, it is practically removed from the board and cannot be tackled at all by a fleet alone.” A “fleet

58   Defense vs. offensive withdrawing to such as position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior object, which is the control of sea communications, while on land an army in a good position may even for a prolonged period cover the ulterior [ultimate] object, which is usually the territory.”19  The French Navy captain (later rear admiral) and theorist René Daveluy (1863–1939) wrote that the “offensive is the weapon of the strong; the defensive of the weak. This is true in land warfare. Armies enter hostile territory separate from their bases. Part of their forces is distributed and other keeps guard of their communications.”20 Naval defense is very different. “Its numerical inferiority cannot be remedied by fixed defense. It only secures assistance of coastal batteries in the interior of roadsteads or in the channels … but roadsteads and channels are not fields of battle.” He falsely asserted that defense at sea falls within the scope of tactics not strategy.21 Daveluy wrote that the army can assure safety of the territory and impose on the enemy the law of the stronger. The navy “cannot take possession of the land;. it exists to guard maritime interests.” In a war, the navy “always retains the mission of protecting wealth that is afloat.” This wealth is the greater part of the national capital. The Navy must also guard the sea against enemy invasion of the home country or colonies. It is “necessary to strive to get the upper hand, and this leads to attacking in the adversary’s country the interests that one protects in his own. This is the offensive side.”22 Daveluy asserted that “the force that immobilized itself in a harbor is inevitably blockaded.” The blockaded fleet “does not do any harm to the enemy and he does not prevent the latter from doing harm.”23 He observed that the maritime defensive, from whatever point of view regarded offers only disadvantage. It may be imposed; it never should be voluntarily adopted. On the one side as on the other, we are led to choose the offensive to seek the enemy with the object of fighting him. But the two parties will not do this by the same methods.24  The U.S. rear admiral and theorist Bradley A. Fiske (1854–1942) wrote that naval defense like military defense is not only passive defense but contains an element of “offense” as well. When defense contains a large measure of the element of offense then it is called offensive-­defensive. The dividing line between defense and offense is very vague. It is made vaguer because offense has certain decisive advantages over defense (unless defense has the advantage of position). When a defending force throws off its defensive attitude entirely and advances boldly then it is said to have “assumed the offensive.”25 For Fiske, naval defense was composed of three elements: (1) defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion; (2) defense of trade routes traversed by ships carrying the exports and imports of the country; and (3) defense of national policy, including defense of the nation’s reputation, honor and prestige. In his view, defense of the coast is the easiest problem and defense of national policy the most difficult. Defense of coast is near home while defense of national policy

Defense vs. offensive   59 might require one to “assume the offensive” and “go even to the far distant coast of the enemy – as the Russian fleet went to Tsushima, where it met its death.” Fiske asserted (erroneously) that in general terms, “in nearly all naval wars the fleet has been used more for the defense of the nation’s policy than for the actual defense of the coasts or the trade routes.”26  The German vice admiral and theoretician Edward Wegener (1904–1981) (son of vice admiral Wolfgang Wegener) apparently confused strategic defense and offensive. For him strategic offensive is struggle against enemy sea mastery (Seeherrschaft) and replacing it with one’s own sea dominance. Such an offensive is aimed at taking on both the enemy fleet and the position and replacing it with one’s own sea control. In his view, naval strategic defensive is the state when one side has waived the struggle for sea dominance and its advantages are left to the enemy. Then it does not make any difference whether the reason for this is lack of equivalent fleet or lack of position or both.27 

Defense vs. offense  Clausewitz’s dictum that “attack [is] the weaker and defense the stronger form of war” is not fully applicable to naval warfare (or war in the air either).28 For one thing, the stronger navy must be on the offensive to obtain and then maintain sea control. The accomplishment of that objective is the key prerequisite for providing support to friendly forces on land and for carrying out all other tasks using one’s naval forces. A stronger side must be on the offensive to search for and destroy or neutralize the enemy fleet, blockade the enemy’s coast or a strait/ narrows, attack enemy installations/facilities on the coast, and conduct amphibious landings.29 Control of the sea can be obtained only through offensives and in the first place in home waters.30 A strategic defensive at sea should include elements of the offensive. Disputing or contesting sea control encompasses not only offensive actions aimed at attriting the enemy’s fleet but also actions aimed at lifting the enemy’s blockade of one’s coast; defense and protection of one’s coastal installations/facilities, naval bases, and ports; and defense against the enemy’s landings.31 It also includes defense of a strait/narrows and important positions on the coast.  Corbett had a much better understanding than Mahan of the relationships between defense and offense in a war at sea. For him, offense and defense were not mutually exclusive but are in fact complementary. All wars consist of both offensive and defensive actions.32 Corbett suggested replacing the terms offensive and defense with the term positive and negative object, respectively. However, even these terms were problematic. There were many wars in which positive methods were used to secure negative objects. For example, in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) “our [British] object was mainly to prevent the Mediterranean becoming a French lake by the union of the French and Spanish crowns.” However, the method “by which we succeeded in achieving our end was to seize Gibraltar and Minorca.” In practice this was a positive method. In the Russo-­Japanese War (of 1904–1905) “the main objective of

60   Defense vs. offensive Japan was to prevent Korea from being absorbed by Russia. That aim was preventive and negative.” For Japan, “the only effective way of securing her aim was to take Korea herself, and so far the war was in practice positive.” In the majority of wars, “the side with the positive object acted generally on the offensive and the other [side] generally on defensive.”33 

Active vs. passive defense  Clausewitz observed that (in land warfare) “defense is not an absolute state of waiting and repulse.” It always includes “pronounced elements of offensive.” He pointed out that at the strategic level there is a “constant alternation and combination of attack and defense.” Hence, “it follows that every attack has to consider the defense that is necessarily inherent in it.”34 It is wrong not to challenge the enemy when inferior in numbers. It is not possible to ultimately defeat the enemy without fighting.35 Hence, defense must not be passive but active; otherwise it would eventually kill one’s offensive spirit.36 Clausewitz wrote that “the defense often changes form and ought to pass during the core of action from parry to riposte … to conserve his part in directing the conduct of war, the defender must return the blows he received.”37 These views also largely apply to naval warfare. A strategic defensive at sea should include elements of the offensive. For example, the German High Seas Fleet was tactically on the offensive but strategically on the defensive in the North Sea for the most part of World War I. In the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and until August 1942, the U.S. Navy was on the strategic defensive. Yet its carrier forces conducted many raids against the Japanese island positions in the central and southern Pacific in the spring of 1942. At the same time, the U.S. submarines attacked Japan’s merchant ships carrying vital supplies of oil, rubber, and other raw materials and bringing reinforcements and supplies to the Japanese newly occupied positions.  The greatest danger in remaining on the defensive for too long – to conserve one’s strength for a future counter-­offensive – is that it may adversely affect the willingness of the subordinate commanders to exercise the initiative. Defense must avoid sliding into passivity to which abusive interpretation of the fleet-­inbeing inexorably leads.38 From the morale standpoint alone, the side on the defensive should always be seeking to achieve minor tactical successes that constantly engage the attention of the enemy and inflict losses upon him, thereby cumulatively accomplishing the larger objective. The true spirit of the defensive means to be constantly ready to meet the enemy but to risk losses only when there exists a reasonable chance for commensurate gain.39  In a war at sea, a weaker side should use every opportunity to inflict losses on the stronger enemy and cause fragmentation of the enemy naval strength.40 Passivity in war at sea is the most useless form of defensive.41 Hence, the weaker side should not rest idly and thereby allow the enemy to have the initiative. Some method must be found of disputing enemy command and inflicting damage which the weaker power has suffered. In most wars, the struggle has not been

Defense vs. offensive   61 confined to the sea, and the state which was the weakest in ships has been often strongest on land. In such a case the weaker side at sea may focus its attention onto the army and try to obtain a satisfactory peace by wining victory on land.42  Corbett wrote that counter-­attacks from a general defensive attitude have been regarded as a true offensive. The British attacks against the Spanish Armada and the brilliant counter-­strike of Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff (1827–1871) at Lissa (Vis today) were such examples. Defense got a bad name by being confused with the term “arrested” defense where the superior power with the positive object backed by the spirit would use its material superiority with sufficient activity and perseverance. Against such a power an inferior enemy can always redress his infirmity by passing to a bold and quick offensive, thus acquiring momentum, both moral and physical, which more than compensates for his lack of weight.43  Admiral Raoul Castex observed that defensive elements are present in an offensive.44 An inferior side should always try despite its inferiority to be as active and aggressive as possible.45 He recognized that except in a situation where one’s naval strength is overwhelming, it is simply impossible to be “superior at a chosen point without being weaker, and therefore on the defensive elsewhere.” The defensive is often combined with the offensive in time as well as in space.46 Castex believed that defense on land principally relies on positional warfare and fortifications. These have a role in a naval defensive through the intervention on the coast. However, the principal element of the naval defensive is the activity of the weaker naval forces. The idea of what he called a “maneuver” consists of avoiding decisive battle while unceasingly harassing the enemy by limited offensive whenever and wherever one finds a favorable opportunity. Short, rapid, intermittent tactical offensives that avoid coming to grips with superior forces should be used in naval warfare. The weaker side should always seek to exploit opportunities for minor offensive actions while at the same time abstaining from them if conditions are unfavorable.47  Castex wrote that although one’s naval forces can and sometimes even must exploit coastal positions for refuge, defense and resupply, dependence on land must be temporary. As long as the defender utilizes these positions, he yields the sea to the enemy, leaving at his mercy what ought to be protected and failing to upset the enemy operations. A defending fleet that finds itself on the coast should strive to leave it as soon as possible and as soon as a proper occasion for action appears on the horizon.48  For Castex, the strategy of active defense has a great advantage because it preserves the offensive spirit.49 The side on the defensive would avail itself of all its resources. The first, “passive resource is geography” or “strategic terrain because tactical terrain is virtually nonexistent in naval war. The most important geographic characteristics are obviously the location of coasts and position in relation to the theater of operations. It is in these positions that the defender

62   Defense vs. offensive anchors his counter attacks when he has freedom to act and his retreats when he is pressed.” The “local peculiarities allow construction of defended anchorages as permanent peacetime bases.”50  Castex argued that “geography is purely passive and useless unless exploited by counterattacks that interfere with the enemy activities. These counterattacks will be limited in scope; without excessive pretensions; and based on certain prerequisites that are not always fulfilled.” These prerequisites would “reflect the relative weakness of the defensive itself.” Corbett called these attacks “minor counterattacks.”51 Castex wrote that the “division of forces and selection of objective may be even more important on the defensive than in other situations.”52 He believed that “the defender profited from a previously unknown freedom of movement. Technological advances have rendered military or commercial blockades much more open and much less effective than in the past.” The exception was a blockade in 1914–1918 when the blockading side (Entente Powers) benefited from “particularly advantageously geography. The blockaded side can escape more easily, and once out cannot be easily caught because it has a speed and variety of routes in the days of sail.” An inferior enemy “may travel safely for a long time if the need to renew his fuel supplies done not put an end to his roaming.”53  The German vice admiral and theorist Curt von Maltzahn (1849–1930) wrote that defensive cannot be passive. Pure defensive is not combat. Such a defense is incorporated in coastal defense and fortifications which extend only to the range of guns.54 The German naval theoretician Vice Admiral Otto Groos (1882–1970) wrote that “defensive at sea does not mean that fleet withdraw to its bases and leave the field to the enemy.” It should instead use “strategic or tactical measures to avoid decisions and remain combat ready until the moment comes when conditions for its employment are more favorable.” A weaker fleet should, even on the defensive, pose “constant threat to the enemy and carry out effective forays.”55 The Italian Vice Admiral and theoretician Oscar di Giambardino observed that a navy cannot dig in as can a numerically weaker army but must operate at great distances. Even a weaker fleet can operate strategically. Defense at sea cannot be static. Clearly, it is much easier for a stronger fleet to go on the offensive than it is for an inferior force. A stronger fleet can allow its major force to react against an attack by an inferior force. An inferior force must be skillful to avoid static defense.56 

Defensive and offensive  A major navy facing serious threats in two adjacent maritime theaters would normally maintain a combination of offensive and defensive postures as long as the threat in the principal theater is not neutralized or eliminated. Depending on the strategic objective, such a navy might take an offensive posture in the main theater and be on the defensive in the secondary theater. For example, in the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905, the Japanese fleet assumed the strategic

Defense vs. offensive   63 offensive. The objective was to obtain control of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. After the defeat of the Russian First Pacific Squadron, the Japanese assumed the strategic defensive and awaited the arrival of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron, which eventually was decisively beaten in the battle of Tsushima in May 1905.57  Generally, a stronger fleet should not be on the defensive both in home waters and overseas. For example, the Royal Navy violated the principle of the offensive during the American War for Independence by being on the defensive everywhere. It remained on the defensive in home waters (which was prudent), but at the same time it tried to defend all the vulnerable points in the Americas. The result was predictable: Britain lost not only the North American colonies but also much of the West Indies, and Minorca (Balearics) in the Mediterranean as well. Even the security of Gibraltar and Britain itself was endangered by the French. In home waters, too, it was indecision and the defensive-­mindedness of the French rather than British actions that saved England from an invasion from across the sea.58  A weaker but relatively strong side at sea might be strategically on the defensive but operationally and tactically on the offensive in the theater of main effort. It would normally be tactically on the offensive in the theater of secondary effort. For example, in World War I, Germany’s naval strategy was offensive in the Baltic and defensive in the North Sea. The German Navy’s final operations order for war in 1914 stated that the main objective in the North Sea would be to inflict damage on the British patrolling and blockade forces in the Heligoland Bight by a mine and U-­boat offensive extending to the British coast. After the balance of forces had changed in their favor, the Germans planned to engage the Grand Fleet under favorable circumstances in a general fleet action.59  In World War I, control of the German Bight was vital for the German conduct of U-­boat warfare against enemy commerce. For the British it was critical to intercept the U-­boats as they left their bases and before they reached the British sea routes. However, the presence of the High Seas Fleet rendered that impossible. There was a protracted struggle between British minelayers and German minesweepers. The British knew the position of the swept channels and the U-­boats had to be escorted on their way to/from their operating area. From 1917 and until the end of war, the main tasks of the High Seas Fleet were to support mine clearing forces on the U-­boat routes up to some 150 miles from the Jade Bay. If that support collapsed or was seriously weakened in a decisive battle in which the High Seas Fleet suffered defeat, the entire U-­boat offensive would collapse with it. It would also have speeded up the downfall of Germany.60  In the last two years of World War I, the Imperial German Navy combined strategic offensive and defensive. With unrestricted U-­boat activity, the German Navy was strategically on the offensive. At the same time the High Seas Fleet shifted more toward a strategic defensive. The reason for defensive employment of the High Seas Fleet was personnel problems and the enemy mining. However, this strategy was not fully justified. The High Seas Fleet had the opportunity to attack the enemy’s northern convoys. It was also able to engage in the struggle

64   Defense vs. offensive for winning public opinion. However, the High Seas Fleet with its limited radius of action was not suited for long distance forays.61  In the Baltic, the German objectives were to obtain control of western and central parts of the Baltic.62 Control of the Baltic allowed Germany to counter the effects of Entente’s blockade. It ensured the safety of supplies from Sweden, and especially imports of vitally important Swedish iron ore. At the same time, Germany’s control of the Baltic contributed to Russia’s collapse in 1917. If the High Seas Fleet had been decisively defeated, then the British squadron might have entered the Baltic and operating from the Russian bases opened a road of moral and material support to the Russian armies.63 For Germany, it was critical to secure the Baltic because it would not be able to maintain fronts in the west and east by having a threat on the northern front. Hence, naval strategy in the North Sea and in the Baltic was part of a single whole. Also, the accomplishment of the missions in each theater rested on the same fleet – the High Seas Fleet.64  Corbett wrote that in operations from the strategic defensive the weaker side must avoid decision. Its main methods are frequent small-­scale attacks aimed at leading the stronger side into a war of attrition and permanent readiness. To be successful, the weaker side should change its methods. One method often used in the past was commerce warfare to force the stronger side to fragment its strength in protection of its maritime trade.65  Castex wrote that a “counter-­offensive is aimed at manageable fractions of the enemy fleet and/or against his communications and coast. In principle, anything is good that in any way harms the enemy military, materially, economically, and psychologically.”66 He wrote that materially defensive operations will be minor. “One will certainly hurt the enemy and inflict losses on him. One will ‘dispute’ the mastery of the sea.” There is “the dispute between equals and dispute between semi-­equals when one does not reject or is unable to reject a decisive battle.”67 This “situation belongs to the offensive and does not have a defensive component.” It is how command was disputed in the days of Admiral Anne Hilarion de Tourville (1642–1701), during the American War of Independence, or to a lesser degree by Admiral Étienne Eustache Bruix (1759–1805) in 1799, by Napoleon I (1769–1821) in the events leading up to Trafalgar, and by the Germans in the North Sea during World War I. “This kind of dispute leaves or can leave the command of certain zones in suspense, giving them equally to the two enemies with appropriate consequences for control of coasts and communications.”68  Castex observed that in a dispute between the weak and the strong the former works mainly through minor counter-­attacks and through a combination of actions of questionable value to modify a position of very marked numerical inferiority. Examples include commerce warfare in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the Seven Years War (1756–1763), the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) after the battle of Trafalgar; the exploits of Confederate raiders, and the German U-­boat war in World War I. “In all these cases the dispute, even if energetically and intelligently handled, failed either to achieve the necessary freedom of surface

Defense vs. offensive   65 communications or, despite the losses inflicted on the enemy, to deprive the enemy of them.” It was an inconvenience to the enemy, sometimes serious “but not to shake off his yoke and transform the situation. Such is the frequent fate of naval defensives.”69  Castex argued that more “decisive results can only be attained by a true offensive which must include a clash of surface forces.” The “difference between a true offensive and minor counter-­attacks” is that the latter are “offensive of the second or third order; they are expedients.” They only “appear to reduce the gap between the defensive and the offensive, but the real difference remains unchanged.”70 Castex observed that purely defensive strategy risks undermining morale and incapacitating the defender for later actions. As waiting ceases to be a brief suspension for later actions and becomes a definitive posture, the defensive engenders over time an increasingly severe state of psychological decay. Extended periods of passivity create a paralysis that survives even material improvement that would allow decisive operations and causes forces to remain on the defensive even after their resources have become sufficient for action.71  A shift from strategic offensive to defensive usually occurs in the aftermath of some major defeat at sea. For example, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) went (although not formally) on the strategic offensive after December 1941. After the failure to capture Port Moresby in May 1942 and a major defeat in the battle of Midway in June 1942, the Japanese shifted to the strategic defensive. They focused on defense of selected defensive points, specifically Manila, Singapore, and Surabaya. These positions would be used as the main advanced bases. Other minor strongpoints were Hong Kong, Davao (Mindanao), Batavia, Tarakan, and Balikpapan in eastern Borneo, Menado (north Celebes), Makassar (south Celebes), Ambon (off southwest Ceram Island), in the Moluccas, Penang, and Rabaul. Defense of the Mandates was included as part of the defensive perimeter which extended from the western Aleutians, through Ogasawara Gunto (the Bonin Islands) to Wake, the Marshalls, the Gilbert Islands, Bismarcks, and New Guinea. The areas to be defended “at all costs were the Southern Resources Area (the Netherlands East Indies), Borneo, and Malaya.” The Japanese planned to secure defense of all these areas by March 1944.72  Defense of the strongpoints in the defense perimeter would be based on close cooperation of the base air forces (land-­based naval aircraft) and the IJN. The Japanese planned to apply active defense. The U.S. Pacific Fleet would be destroyed either at its advanced bases or after luring it into action under favorable conditions. The Japanese operations against the enemy’s sea lines of communications would be aimed to prevent reinforcement of men and supplies. The Japanese also planned to increase protection of their sea routes.73 However, the Japanese never really developed a defensive strategy. Instead, they pinned all their hopes on the idea that over time the American public would get sick of the struggle.74 

66   Defense vs. offensive In May 1943, the Japanese adopted a new defense plan (codenamed Z-­operation) that envisaged establishing a defensive line perimeter stretching from the Aleutians to Wake Island, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, Nauru and Ocean Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago.75 The main positions in the perimeter would be reinforced and local commanders were responsible for defense. Local defense forces would be composed of cruisers/destroyers and land-­based naval aircraft based at Truk, the Marshalls, the Gilberts and the Bismarck–Solomons area. Search and reconnaissance would be conducted by submarines and base air forces. Active defense would be carried out by raiding the enemy advanced bases and U.S. carrier forces. Mobile Fleet would be based at Truk.76  The IJN’s planning for defense of the central Pacific started in August 1943. After the death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943) in April 1943, the new CINC of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Mineichi Koga (1885–1944) directed that after August 15, 1943 all operations would be designated “Third Phase Operations of the War.”77 This new “operational” policy was formally adopted in September 1943. It envisaged the employment of the entire Combined Fleet against the U.S. Pacific Fleet. They objective would be to destroy the enemy fleet in “a single blow.”78 The IGHQ planned destruction of the enemy forces after the enemy launched attacks in the central Pacific and the Philippine area. The operation was planned for mid-­1944.79  By September 1943, the Japanese were driven out the Aleutians. They also suffered heavy losses in ships and aircraft during the struggle in the Solomons. Hence, the vital defense area was reduced to the line from Kuriles to Marianas, the Carolines, Sumatra, Java, and Timor.80  The Japanese also drafted plan Y to complement Z-operation. This plan focused on defense of the line from the Andamans to Nicobars, Sumatra, Java, and Timor. If this line was threatened, the main strength of the Combined Fleet would move to either the Philippines or Singapore. If there were a simultaneous threat to the areas under Z-operation, then only part of the carrier forces would be employed. In the area under Y-­plan were established “expeditionary” fleets with headquarters at Manila, Surabaya, and Ambon. All of them were attached to Southwest Area Command in Singapore. Each of these fleets was composed of smaller surface combatants. Initially, they were supported by one air flotilla with some 150 aircraft based mainly in Celebes with detachments in Manila and in northern Sumatra. In the fall of 1942, two more air flotillas were added.81  The IGHQ in its directive No. 209 issued on March 25, 1944, outlined the IJN’s “operational policy” in the Third Phase Operations of the War. Among other things, the IGHQ directed that the IJN’s operations should shift from offensive to defensive. The IJN’s “operational” objectives were as follows: destruction of the enemy’s naval and air forces that penetrated the East Asiatic waters; disruption of the enemy’s shipping routes; and making all-­out efforts to secure Japan’s victory in the war. The priority would be given to air operations, surprise attacks, interception within the effective range of the land-­based aircraft; intensified war against enemy sea communications; defense and protection of transport ships, and air defense of Home Islands.82 The major part of the

Defense vs. offensive   67 Combined Fleet’s surface strength would be concentrated in the Inner South Seas Area. Any attack of the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be countered with the entire strength of the Combined Fleet (codenamed Z-­operation).83  Plan Z was in effect until May 1944 when it was modified and the new A-­Go plan came into effect. By then the Japanese had lost control of the Gilberts and the Marshalls while the enemy neutralized the Bismarcks and Truk and bypassed them. The Combined Fleet was reorganized on February 25, 1944. The outer defense zone was drawn from the Marianas Palau along the line Sumatra–Java– Timor–western New Guinea. The battle fleet was moved to the Singapore area. The A-­Go plan stipulated that decisive action would be avoided unless the fleet was at full strength after losses suffered in the southern Pacific.84  A shift from the strategic offensive to the defensive could be a result of a major victory but one which did not decide the war’s outcome. For example, after the defeat of the Russian First Pacific Squadron, the Japanese obtained command of the Yellow Sea. However, they did not ensure full command because the Russian Second Pacific Squadron was on its way from the Baltic to the Far East. Admiral Tōgō decided to shift temporarily onto the defensive and take a favorable position in the Sea of Japan. Tōgō won a decisive victory over that squadron in the battle of Tsushima in May 1905.85 In the aftermath, the Japanese obtained full control of both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.  In general, success of a defensive relies on superiority of counter-­attack. And superiority of defensive over offensive is based on superiority of counter-­ offensive.86 A weaker side at sea would normally try to dispute control in certain sea or ocean areas for the duration of a war. After the stronger side at sea is sufficiently weakened over time, the weaker side might try to obtain sea control. These efforts might be a coordinated offensive on the land front.87 A shift from the strategic defensive to the offensive could be a result of decisive successes on the land front. For example, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet went on the strategic offensive once the Red Army started its long-­awaited offensive against the Wehrmacht in the aftermath of the battle of Stalingrad in January 1943. Likewise, the Soviet Baltic Fleet took the offensive after the Soviet forces lifted the siege of Leningrad and began their advance along the eastern coast of the Baltic in September 1944.  The most important Allied decisions on strategy in Europe and the Pacific were made at the conference held from December 22, 1941 to January 24, 1942 (codenamed Arcadia). The participants at the conference were the British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff and their American counterparts. Among other things, the conference participants established organization for coalition warfare.88 Both sides agreed that despite the entry of Japan into the war, Germany remained the principal enemy. Germany’s defeat was the key for the ultimate victory. Once Germany was defeated, the collapse of Italy and defeat of Japan would follow. This meant that “the only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted from operations against Germany.”89 Expressed differently, the Allies would be strategically on the

68   Defense vs. offensive offensive in Europe and on the strategic defensive in the Pacific and the Far East. Specifically, western Allies agreed that in the Pacific and Far East, the main objectives were to maintain the security of Australia, New Zealand, and India, to support China, and to gain “points of (ad)vantage” from which an offensive against Japan could “eventually be developed.”90  The Allied strategy in the Pacific was radically changed in the aftermath of the great and unexpected victory of the U.S. Pacific Fleet over the Japanese Combined Fleet in the battle of Midway on June 4–6, 1942. Yet the U.S. Navy was not strong enough to advance across the central Pacific. Likewise, advance by way of the Aleutians where the danger was considered remote and strategic gain small, was discarded. The pre-­war decision to concentrate Allied resources against Germany did not preclude offensive actions in the secondary theater. The U.S. pre-­war plan Rainbow 5 envisaged for a limited offensive by the Pacific Fleet. The U.S. Navy leadership did not interpret the strategic defensive as a mandate for inaction. Both Admiral Ernest J. King (1878–1956), Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)/CINC of the United States Fleet (COMINCH) and Chester W. Nimitz (1885–1966), CINC Pacific Ocean Area (POA) and CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPac) were eager to exploit every opportunity to strike at the enemy. However, these actions were conducted with small forces and were hit and run affairs. They did not have more than nuisance value.91  For the U.S. planners the problem was selection of the objective to be accomplished with limited forces available and within the strategic concept for the Pacific.92 Only in the south and southwest Pacific was the danger real and imminent. The Japanese advanced along the New Guinea coast and down the Solomons ladder. By May 1942 they reached Tulagi. The Japanese abandoned Tulagi after the failure of the Port Moresby–Solomons operations to capture Port Moresby by the sea. Also, there was still a danger that they might attempt to capture Port Moresby by the overland route (by crossing the 13,250-foot high Owen Stanley Range). There was little doubt that the Japanese would try to gain control of Papua, the Coral Sea, and Torres Strait. If they remained in control of the Solomons, then Australia and the lines of communication would be endangered. Hence, the choice of objectives narrowed down to an operation in the southern Solomons. If successful, such an operation would open the way for a drive to Rabaul, the major Japanese base in the south Pacific. Rabaul is only 700 miles away from Truk. By capturing Rabaul it would make it possible for the Allies to support a drive across the central Pacific and to initiate an offensive that would eventually bring the forces of MacArthur and Nimitz to the Philippines.93  Already in February 1942, Admiral King conceived the operation to capture the Tulagi–Guadalcanal area. He wanted Tulagi to serve as an additional base to protect the America–Australia–New Zealand sea route. Its capture would be a starting point for a drive to seize the Solomons archipelago and reach Rabaul, New Britain.94 By April 16, 1942, the U.S. Navy’s staff in Washington, D.C. prepared a four-­phase plan for the entire war in the Pacific. In the first phase, the Allied forces would secure positions in the south and southwest Pacific for an

Defense vs. offensive   69 offensive, while engaging in minor actions “for purposes of attrition.”95 Admiral King was willing to join forces with the army. He also accepted and supported a strategy that gave priority to Europe. Yet he put much more emphasis on the importance of holding a strong position in the Pacific than general Marshall did; King wanted much stronger actions and larger forces than the U.S. Army was willing to provide.96  After long and extensive debate, the U.S. JCS approved a decision on July 2, 1942 for operations in the Solomons and New Guinea area. It was a compromise solution between General MacArthur and Admiral King. The final agreement was reached between General Marshall and Admiral King on June 29 and 30.97 The first major operation (called “Task 1”) was the landing on Guadalcanal (operation Watchtower). The ultimate objective was “seizure and occupation of the New Britain–New Ireland–New Guinea area” including the principal enemy base Rabaul.98 The first offensive was limited in scale. It consisted of two parallel thrusts, one in the southwest Pacific area along the north coast of New Guinea and the other in the south Pacific through the Solomons area. Operations in New Guinea were conducted predominantly by the army while the Navy had a dominant role in the Solomons area.99  The time required to shift from strategic defensive to offensive is usually short if the enemy fleet has suffered a major defeat. It is generally much longer if the enemy forces must have weakened over time. For example, it took the Allies more than six months to obtain control of Guadalcanal after they landed on August 7, 1942. After the end of struggle for Guadalcanal (February 7, 1943) it took the Allies another five months before launching another major landing on the island of New Georgia (operation Toenail) (June 30, 1943). 

Land vs. sea  In general, the overall posture and progress of the war on land would determine whether one’s naval forces would be on the strategic offensive or defensive. In some cases, the side on the strategic offensive on land has failed to use its naval forces offensively. For example, in the first few weeks of war, the German Navy missed the opportunity to attack enemy ships carrying the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) across the Channel.100 The German generals were confident that they could destroy the British forces after they landed and hence did not want to risk the High Seas Fleet to accomplish the same objective.101 In war plans, the Germans did not consider it vital to capture the French coast on the English Channel. Yet this mistake was realized in October 1914 when fire by the British ships contributed to stopping the advance of the German troops on the coast.102 The Germans planned to send U-­boats to help the army, but they could not be employed because of the shallowness of the water off the coast. The Germans were able to send a fleet and use torpedo boats to lay mines. The risk would not be higher than their later raid against Yarmouth.103 The primary objective of the German land offensive in 1914 should have been capturing the French Channel coast and Atlantic ports and thereby improving the strategic situation for a

70   Defense vs. offensive decisive struggle with Great Britain. Yet that concept was completely missing on the German side.104  Normally, a side on the strategic defensive on land would also be on the defensive at sea. For example, in the Crimean War (1854–1856), Russia was strategically on the defensive in both the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. In their war with Nazi Germany in June 1941 the Soviets, despite their rather great margin of superiority in naval strength over the German–Finnish forces in the Baltic, decided to be essentially on the defensive. They focused on the defense of the Bay of Riga and complete closure of the Gulf of Finland from Hanko (Hangö) to Odensholm–Reval (Tallinn today). Submarine and air warfare would be conducted in the central part of the Baltic. Cruisers and destroyers would be used for mining, while heavy and older ships would defend the straits off the eastern coast of the Baltic.105 Except for occasional forays by its submarines into the open waters of the Baltic, the Soviet Baltic Fleet was bottled up in the Kronshtadt Bay and on the defensive until the summer of 1944, when the advance of the Red Army along the Baltic coast allowed the fleet to play a more prominent role in the war.  If one side is much stronger on land than at sea, ground forces would normally be on the offensive while the naval forces would be strategically on the defensive. For example, in the initial phase of World War I, the Germans went strategically on the offensive in Belgium and France while their High Seas Fleet was on the strategic defensive in the North Sea. There were also examples when a side strategically on the offensive on land did not use its naval forces during the entire war. The Russo-­Turkish War of 1876–1877 shows how the lack of command of the sea considerably limits the ability of one’s army and forces to successfully operate on the coast. The Russians did not have any fleet in the Black Sea and therefore were unable to obtain command of the sea. All the supplies for the Russian army had to come overland via a single line leading from Russian territory down the lower Danube to Galatz (Galați today). At the same time, Turkish command of the sea meant that the Russian attempt to seize Constantinople and to advance in the Caucasus had to be made overland, for there was no other possibility for landing troops by sea. This led to fierce and costly fighting in the siege of Pleven, Bulgaria (July 20–December 10, 1877). The Russian victory at Pleven had a decisive impact on the war’s outcome.  In World War I, the Grand Fleet, although much superior to the German High Seas Fleet, was, mainly for political reasons, also on the strategic defensive. The main tasks of the Royal Navy were protection of communications and cutting of enemy imports. For accomplishing these tasks no offensive was necessary. The main method used was a distant blockade of Germany by closing northern and southern exits from/to the North Sea and by exerting pressure on neutral countries bordering Germany.106 The fact that the opposing fleets remained essentially on a strategic defensive throughout the war was probably the main reason for the lack of decisive results in the North Sea for either of the great protagonists.107 In contrast, the Kriegsmarine was distinctly inferior to the Soviet Baltic Fleet in 1941 but went strategically on the offensive together with the Army and the

Defense vs. offensive   71 Luftwaffe. The main missions of the Kriegsmarine in the Baltic in 1941 included protecting Germany’s coast; preventing Soviet naval forces from operating on the open waters of the Baltic; and defending and protecting Germany’s maritime traffic, particularly the ore traffic from Sweden.108  Any war at sea, consists of both offensive and defensive actions. These actions have many similarities with those conducted in a war on land. Yet there are also significant differences mainly because of the characteristics of the physical environment. A war at sea is also fought in three physical dimensions or mediums. Hence, interplay between offense and defense is both more complex and more dynamic than in a war on land. A weaker side at sea should always try to be active and tactically or even operationally be on the offensive; otherwise, there will be no hope of eventually shifting to the offensive. Passivity in a war is also invariably bad for morale and the will to fight of one’s forces. Whether a weaker side would be strategically on the defensive or the offensive greatly depends on the situation on the land front. Ultimately, a war as a whole is won or lost on land. It is there where the humans live. 

Notes    1 Ihno Krumpelt, ed., Die Grossen Meister der Kriegskunst: Clausewitz-­MoltkeSchlieffen (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1960), p. 179.    2 Alfred Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See: Lehre vom Seekriege (Hannover/Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1913), p. 106.    3 Krumpelt, Die Grossen Meister der Kriegskunst, p. 180.    4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York/London/Toronto: Everyman’s Library, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 94–95.    5 Imperial General Headquarters High Command Record, Mid-­1941–August 1945, Japanese Monograph No. 45, Chapter VII: Fourth Phase of the War (July–December 1944), (Tokyo: General Headquarters Far East Command-Foreign Histories Division, 1950), p. 151.    6 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I: Background to the War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1995), pp.  90–91; “SHO Operations and Taiwan Air Battle” (Admiral Soemu Toyoda, The End of the Imperial Navy), Folder G-­14, Box 9, RG 23: World War II, Battle Evaluation Group (BEG), Naval Historical Collection (NHC), Naval War College, Newport, RI., p. 2;.    7 Spenser Wilkinson, “Strategy in the Navy,” The Morning Post, August 1909, available at www.clausewitz.com/readings/Wilkinson/WILK.htm, p. 6.    8 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 190.    9 Reinhold Gadow, “Strategische Verteidigung in der Seekriegsgeschichte,” Wehr und Wissen, No. 2, 1936, p. 94.  10 Gadow, “Strategische Verteidigung in der Seekriegsgeschichte,” p. 95.  11 Gadow, “Strategische Verteidigung in der Seekriegsgeschichte,” p. 95.  12 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), p. 277.  13 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 277.  14 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 132.  15 Mahan, Naval Strategy, pp. 279–280.  16 Mahan, Naval Strategy, pp. 279–280. 

72   Defense vs. offensive 17 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 188.  18 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 190.  19 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 190–191.  20 René Daveluy, The Genius of Naval Warfare, Vol. I: Strategy, 2nd ed. of A Study of Naval Strategy, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1910), p. 45.  21 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 45.  22 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 46.  23 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 47.  24 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 295.  25 Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988; 1st published by Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY, 1916; 2nd. ed. 1918), pp. 107–108.  26 Bradley A. Fiske, “Naval Defense,” The North American Review, Vol. 203, No. 723 (February 1916), p. 221.  27 Edward Wegener, “Die Tirpitzsche Strategie,” in Herbert Schottelius and Wilhelm Deist, eds., Marine und Marinepolitik 1871–1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972), p. 242.  28 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 634–635.  29 Alfred Stenzel, Seekriegsgeschichte in ihren wichtigsten Abschnitten mit Berücksichtigung der Seetaktik, 1st Part (Hannover/Leipzig: Mahn’sche Buchhandlung, 1907), p. 96.  30 Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See, p. 107.  31 Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See, p. 96.  32 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 26.  33 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 26–27.  34 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 634–635.  35 Hein-­Peter Weyher, Der Begriff “Seestrategie” und Seine Deutung in den Westlichen Kriegstheorien Des 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Abteilung Marine, July 1967), p. 9.  36 Otto Groos, Seekriegslehren im Lichte des Weltkriegs: Ein Buch für den Seemann, Soldaten und Staatsmann (Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), p. 20.  37 Cited in Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories, Selections translated and edited with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 344.  38 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 344.  39 Staff Presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas (Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 8–9, 1938), pp. 22–23.  40 Oscar di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst (Berlin: Verlag “Offene Worte,” 1938), p. 188.  41 Di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst, p. 186.  42 Anonymous, “Naval Strategy,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928), p. 281.  43 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 29.  44 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 336.  45 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 344.  46 Castex, Strategic Theories, pp. 336–337.  47 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 345.  48 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 345.  49 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 355.  50 Castex, Strategic Theories, pp. 346–347.  51 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 348.  52 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 352.  53 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 352. 

Defense vs. offensive   73 54 Freiherr (Curt) von Maltzahn, “Der Kampf gegen die Seeherrschaft,” (beginning of January 1898), Handakte bzw. Privatakte von Vizeadmiral Kurt Assmann (1935–1943) der von London zurückgegebenen Marine-­Akten, Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt-­ Dokumentenzentrale, RM 8/1120, Bundesarchiv-­Militärchiv (BA-­MA). Freiburg, i.Br., p. 3 or 5.  55 Di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst, p. 187.  56 Di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst, pp. 186–187.  57 M.G. Cook, “Naval Strategy,” lecture, Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, VA, March 2, 1931, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series I, Box 003, Naval Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 8.  58 Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, with contributions from John Hattendorf et al., 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 116.  59 Ivo N. Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 422.  60 K.G.B. Dewar, “Battle of Jutland: Lessons and Basic Causes,” The Naval Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (April 1960), p. 147.  61 Gadow, “Strategische Verteidigung in der Seekriegsgeschichte,” p. 98.  62 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1914–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 45.  63 Dewar, “Battle of Jutland,” p. 147.  64 Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Holger H. Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 25.  65 Weyher, Der Begriff “Seestrategie,” pp. 32–33.  66 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 345.  67 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 353.  68 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 353.  69 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 354.  70 Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 354.  71 Castex, Strategic Theories, pp. 354–355.  72 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 88.  73 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 88.  74 Samuel Eliot Morison, “Thoughts on Naval Strategy: World War II,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1998, Vol. LI, No. 1 (reprint from Naval War College Review, March 1968), p. 59.  75 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 88.  76 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 89.  77 Japanese Monograph No. 117: Outline of Third Phase Operations (February 1943 to August 1945) (Tokyo: General Headquarters Far East Command – Foreign Histories Division, 1950), p. 5.  78 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 13: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), p. 213.  79 Japanese Monograph No. 90: The A-­Go Operation, May–June 1944 (Tokyo: General Headquarters Far East Command – Foreign Histories Division, 1950), p. 3.  80 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 89.  81 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 89.  82 Japanese Monograph No. 117: Outline of Third Phase Operations (February 1943 to August 1945), pp. 2–3.  83 Japanese Monograph No. 117: Outline of Third Phase Operations (February 1943 to August 1945), p. 6.  84 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, p. 90. 

74   Defense vs. offensive   85 Cook, “Naval Strategy,” p. 8.    86 Holger May, “Verteidigung ist mehr als Defensive,” Truppenpraxis, No. 5 (May) 1994, p. 436.    87 Castex, Strategic Theories,, pp. 344–345.    88 Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, U.S. Army in World War II series, The War in the Pacific subseries (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1962; updated 1989), p. 138.    89 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 139.    90 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 139.    91 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 289.    92 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 289.    93 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 290.    94 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 5: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), p. 12.    95 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 290.    96 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 308.    97 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 303.    98 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 5: Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 12.    99 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. I, pp. 103–104.  100 B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. 56.  101 Lambi, Navy and German Power Politics, p. 422.  102 Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, 1957), p. 59.  103 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, p. 60.  104 Groos, Seekriegslehren im Lichte des Weltkrieg, p. 30.  105 Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmans Verlag, 1958), p. 11.  106 Gadow, “Strategische Verteidigung in der Seekriegsgeschichte,” p. 99.  107 Cook, “Naval Strategy,” p. 9.  108 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1: 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970), pp. 366–367.

3 Prerequisites 

Success in disputing control of the sea will be wanting unless several prerequisites are met. They superficially resemble those required for obtaining and maintaining sea control. Yet disputing control of the sea is conducted by using different methods than those for obtaining and maintaining sea control. Also, most combat actions in disputing control are conducted in the littoral waters. Generically, the main prerequisites for success in disputing sea control are as follows: (1) favorable geostrategic position; (2) advantageous base of operations; (3) sound naval theory; (4) sound operational/tactical doctrine; (5) realistic combat training; (6) adequate and diverse naval forces; (7) sound operational organization/C2 (command and control); (8) close cooperation of services; (9) basing/deployment area control; (10) information dominance; and (11) offensive spirit. Obviously, it is difficult for a weaker side at sea to possess all these prerequisites developed to the fullest.  The chances of success in disputing sea control are much greater if one’s naval and air forces operate from a favorable geostrategic position. However, in most cases a weaker side initially occupies an unfavorable geostrategic position. In a few cases, a weaker side has been able to turn its initial positional disadvantages into a more favorable position during the hostilities. A major land power, such as Russia or Germany, may have a superior position on land but a poor position on the sea. In contrast, some small sea powers, such as, for example, Denmark or Korea, have a very favorable maritime position but lack sufficient naval strength to obtain full control of the adjacent sea area.  Germany has a highly unfavorable position in the North Sea for a war with Britain. Already in 1903, the German Admiral Staff had pointed out the need to have close relationships between Germany and Holland and Denmark. Obviously, Denmark was much more important for the Germans because it controlled one shore of the Danish Straits (Skagerrak and Kattegat).1 If the political leadership had not tried to improve Germany’s maritime position peacefully then it would have been necessary for the army to go on the strategic offensive. This meant that in a war against France, one of the most important operational objectives was to capture the French Channel coast. Yet for some reason the German Admiralty Staff failed to put that argument to the Great General Staff.2 

76   Prerequisites In World War I, Germany’s communications overseas through the northern and southern exits of the North Sea were controlled by their potential enemies: Britain and France. The Grand Fleet based at Scapa Flow (Orkneys) was only about 575 miles away from the main base of the High Seas Fleet in the Jade Bay. After the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, the Grand Fleet closed both the northern and southern exits from the North Sea for German surface ships. Only U-­boats and occasionally auxiliary cruisers were able to get access to the northern Atlantic by transiting the northern exit. If the Germans controlled the French coast on the Channel, they would probably force the Grand Fleet to redeploy its forces to the south, thereby increasing German chances of employing their surface forces in the northern part of the North Sea and possibly even in the northern Atlantic.  In contrast, the Germans possessed a more favorable strategic position in the Baltic. Denmark was formally neutral. Hence, the British forces would have great difficulties interfering with Germany’s maritime traffic within the Baltic Sea.3 Admiral Mahan noted that the Kiel Canal (opened in 1895) provided an “interior line between the Baltic and North Sea against the natural channels passing round Denmark, or between Danish islands.”4 Germany’s position in regard to Russia would have been considerably improved by capturing the Åland Islands (guarding the western entrance to the Gulf of Finland) and capturing the Latvian port of Libau (Liepāja today). Yet the Germans missed these opportunities.5  The German vice admiral and theorist Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956) was a strong advocate of the need for Germany to obtain a favorable strategic geographic position to successfully prosecute the war at sea. For Wegener naval strategy is the science of geographic position. Offensive naval strategy aims to acquire a superior geographical position, while a defensive naval strategy aims to preserve what he called “positional stagnation.”6 It can have “no other objective than acquiring a geographical position from which to initiate struggle for the arteries of maritime traffic.”7 Wegener believed that successful conduct of war at sea depends first on the presence of the fleet and second on strategic position. Obviously, without a fleet, there is no war at sea. Lack of favorable strategic position would preclude operations against the enemy’s vital trade arteries. He asserted that then war at sea would end despite the existence of a fleet.8  Wegener wrote that one could fight all the battles in the North Sea that one wanted to – provided they were offered – but geography upon which everything depended, will not be altered in the slightest, and freedom of the sea would remain far beyond our [German] reach.9 He contended that no fleet action in the North Sea could be decisive. Yet that argument was simply false. If, for example, the Germans had won the battle of Jutland in 1916, they would have obtained freedom to use the northern exit from the North Sea. 

Prerequisites   77 Wegener wrote that “one cannot alter geography – what is lost through battle may be regained only by battle. But what is lost through geography can only be regained through geography.”10 In his view, no tactical offensive is capable of transforming a defensive operational plan into an offensive one. A strategic offensive “serves to change the strategic position while a strategic defensive serve to adhere and to stagnate in the strategic position.”11 Hence, regardless of how many sorties the High Seas Fleet undertook it would remain on the strategic defensive. By adhering to the strategic position in the Heligoland Bight, the fleet had as its mission the defense of the Heligoland Bight. However, “the British did not attack our (German) position there so the fleet with its sorties was constantly defending something that was not threatened.”12  For Wegener, the single biggest weakness of Germany’s maritime position was that the base of operations in the Heligoland Bight was located far away from the enemy sea communications. Scotland’s position “dominated all international trade routes,” including the German routes, while the “German position in the Heligoland Bight commanded nothing.” Hence, a strategic defensive aimed at preserving “a worthless strategic position” was useless.13 Wegener believed that it was “impossible from Germany’s position in the Heligoland Bight to reach, much less to bring under Germany’s control, the vital arteries of international commerce, which lay in the Atlantic.” Wegener wrote that the German failure to “undertake the geographical advance toward the Atlantic – thus meant nothing more or nothing less than the renunciation of any type of naval war.”14  Russia occupies a semi-­central geostrategic position regarding the surrounding seas and oceans. It borders with four enclosed sea theaters; the White Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Okhotsk Sea. The fleets are separated by extremely long distances and hence cannot support each other. Tsarist Russia tried repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) to overcome the natural disadvantages of its maritime position by obtaining control of the straits guarding the entrance to the warm waters of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In contrast, Russia’s access to the open ocean in the Far East is relatively more favorable, because the Kamchatka Peninsula borders the open waters of the northern Pacific. However, the peninsula lacks well-­developed road and railroad links with the mainland. It is for all practical purposes an island.  In the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905, Russia’s position in the Far East was unfavorable compared to that of Japan. Moscow and Vladivostok are separated by some 5,600 miles. The single-­track railroad interrupted at Lake Baikal was the only means of transport for men and materiel from the center of the Russian power to the Far East. The Japanese fleet also occupied a central position between the Russian fleet detachments at Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The two territories in Russia’s dispute with Japan, the Liaotung Peninsula and Korea, were isolated at the end of poor lines of communications. Likewise, the two main bases in the Far East, Port Arthur and Vladivostok, were separated from each other by about 1,250 miles of water.15 For the most part, this route was open to Japanese attack. For the Japanese, in contrast, it was sufficient to capture

78   Prerequisites Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula and thereby to accomplish their primary war objective. However, a prerequisite for this was to obtain control of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. The Russians would have posed a serious threat to the Japanese Home Islands only if they obtained control of the Sea of Japan – a practical impossibility. Geography and poor infrastructure in Vladivostok led the Russians to select Port Arthur as their main naval base in the Far East. Yet Port Arthur lacked facilities to support more than a part of their First Pacific Squadron.16  Russia’s position in the Baltic was greatly weakened in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7, 1917 (October 25 old style calendar). Between 1918 and 1939, the Soviets controlled only Leningrad (St. Petersburg today) and its immediate surroundings in the Gulf of Finland, or about 95 miles of coast.17 This situation changed in June 1940, when Soviet troops annexed all three Baltic states and acquired several good bases for their Baltic Fleet.  The Soviets greatly strengthened their naval position in the Baltic in the aftermath of World War II by their de facto control over Poland and East Germany. However, access to the open waters of the oceans, except in the Arctic, was still controlled by potentially hostile powers. Hence, the country’s maritime flanks were largely open to attack by Western carrier-­borne aircraft and amphibious forces. After the East European Revolution of 1989, the Soviets/Russians lost control of East Germany. By the end of 1991 they had left their naval bases on the Island of Rügen and at Świnoujście in Poland. By then all three Soviet Baltic republics had reestablished their independence. The Russian position in the Baltic is much weaker today because it controls only the eastern part of the Bay of Kronshtadt (Neva Bay) and the coastline of the Kaliningrad Oblast (District) (formerly Germany’s province of Eastern Prussia).  France occupies a very strong semi-­central strategic position on land. However, its position regarding adjacent seas/ocean is less favorable. It faces two large bodies of water: the Bay of Biscay in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The Bay of Biscay offers unhindered access to the Atlantic. France also controls one shore of the Strait of Dover. In contrast, France’s position in the Mediterranean is much weaker, because all three sea exits are controlled by other powers. France had to maintain strong naval forces in both the Atlantic/English Channel and the Mediterranean. The 224,000 square mile Iberian Peninsula separates the Bay of Biscay and the western Mediterranean. The French Navy was divided between the Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters. In the era of sail, the major part of the French fleet was based at Brest; the rest was in Toulon. Between 1688 and 1805 there was a recurring difficulty in joining the fleet detachments from Brest and Toulon in good time. So long as England did not have (until 1665) a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean, the main operating areas for the French fleet were the English Channel and the southwest approaches to England. This problem became acute after England established a squadron in the Mediterranean. To make the situation even more difficult, the British established themselves in Gibraltar in 1704 and Minorca in 1708. Almost every projected descent upon England depended on the junction of the fleet

Prerequisites   79 squadrons from Toulon and Brest. In the era of the kings Louis XIV (1638–1715) and Louis XV (1710–1774), the French Navy would usually direct the Toulon squadron to join the squadron at Brest. The distance between Toulon and Brest via the Strait of Gibraltar is about 1,645 nautical miles. Separation of the French battle squadrons offered the British fleet the opportunity to prevent their coming together. Very often, the Brest squadron was forced to fight the British alone. The British fleet either took station off Ushant to await the Toulon squadron or a superior squadron was sent to Gibraltar to intercept it.19  The Netherlands occupies a semi-­central strategic position on land. It had a highly unfavorable geographic position in its three wars with England in the seventeenth century. England flanked all the Dutch trade routes to/from the North Sea. The prevailing westerly and northwesterly winds enhanced that advantage. They facilitated British fleet movements and often penned the Dutch ships in their harbors. The British commanders had a better-­than-average chance of having the weather gage.20  Austria/Austria–Hungary bordered the eastern shore of the Adriatic, one of the several small seas in the Mediterranean. The main feature of the eastern Adriatic littoral is a large limestone belt that runs from the vicinity of Fiume (Rijeka today) southeastward for about 350 miles. The Dinaric chain ranges from 2,300 to 6,000 feet in height and varies in width between 40 and 60 miles. Toward the southeast the Dinaric range broadens and raises in general elevation, creating a significant obstacle for communication between the Pannonian plain and the Adriatic coast. The eastern shore of the Adriatic runs in a general direction from northwest to southeast. It is highly irregular and backed by steep and high mountains.  Between 1878 and 1914 the Dual Monarchy’s coastline stretched between Porto Buso (in Grado Lagoon, northwest of Grado, Gorizia, Italy) and the Bay of Spizza (Spič, Montenegro today), about 370 miles. Some 1,230 islands and islets fronted the shore. They are mostly extended in the direction of the shore and flanked by channels elongated in the same direction. They are predominantly oblong in shape, rocky and hilly. The heavily indented coast offered numerous roomy natural harbors and anchorages. This, in turn, provided significant advantages to the Austro-­Hungarian Navy in disputing control of the Adriatic, especially close to its shores. However, the Adriatic’s sole exit, the 45-mile wide Strait of Otranto was controlled by Italy and the Ottoman Empire (until 1912). This precluded offensive employment of the Austro-­Hungarian surface ships beyond the confines of the Adriatic. The Austro-­Hungarian sea routes to/from the Mediterranean could be easily cut off at the very beginning of hostilities.  Italy’s mainland (the Apennine Peninsula) with Sicily occupies a commanding position in the central Mediterranean. It divides the Mediterranean into two almost enclosed parts. Italy borders with two seas: the Tyrrhenian Sea in the west and the Adriatic Sea in the east. One leg of the Apennine Peninsula faces the 1.9- to 3.2-mile wide Messina Strait, while the other leg borders the Strait of Otranto. Italy’s two largest islands are the 9,300-square mile Sardinia and the 18

80   Prerequisites 9,930-square mile Sicily. In the past, whoever controlled the southern part of the Italian peninsula held the key to Sicily. Any power that controlled Sicily also occupied a commanding position in the central Mediterranean.  Approximately midway between Sicily and Tunisia is the small island of Pantelleria. In World War II, Pantelleria was valuable as an air and submarine station. The Italian cruisers/destroyers and torpedo boats based on Sicily and Sardinia could also be effectively employed against Allied traffic to/from Malta. The distance from Sicily to Cap Bon is only 90 miles. A cruiser or destroyer required about three hours to transit the distance from Sicily to the North African coast. An Italian bomber needed only some 30 minutes to fly the same distance.21 Italy also controlled Libya and the islands of Rhodes and the Dodecanese in the eastern Mediterranean. They were acquired in the Turco-­Italian War of 1911–1912 (and recognized by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1923).22  The initially unfavorable strategic position could be radically improved at the beginning of a war and/or during the ensuing combat. For example, in the interwar years (1919–1939), the Germans realized that one of the principal reasons for the defeat of their U-­boats in World War I was the lack of bases allowing free access to the open waters of the Atlantic. Admiral Wegener wrote that if Germany controlled Norway, Britain would not be able to maintain the blockade line from the Shetland Islands to Norway but would have to withdraw approximately to the Shetland–Faeroes–Iceland line. In 1914, Germany would have a better position if did not voluntarily at the beginning of war block the Belts and gave up the use of Skagerrak. Even better positions would be obtained if Denmark and Norway were made allies.23  Nazi Germany obtained a favorable strategic position through its conquest of Denmark and Norway in April–June 1940. The Germans eliminated the possibility of having another blockade like the Northern Barrage in World War I. Germany weakened the British positions in the Shetland–Faeroes–Iceland passage.24 The Germans also obtained a favorable position for war against British maritime traffic by capturing bases on the Dutch coast and the French Atlantic coast. These bases were subsequently used by the Luftwaffe against England’s ports and especially naval forces, and by the U-­boats.25  The Germans acquired very favorable positions in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean in May 1941. Additionally, their Italian ally controlled a dozen Dodecanese islands. The Axis powers were able to secure not only important sea communications in the Black Sea but also the Turkish Straits and the flow of traffic in the Aegean. By controlling the islands of Crete, Leros, Cos, and Samos in the Aegean, they also provided additional protection to the German position in the Balkans.26 The newly acquired positions potentially allowed the Axis to threaten forays against the British naval base in Alexandria and greatly reduce freedom of movement for the British naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean Yet these hopes were not fulfilled. Despite control of the key positions in the Aegean the Axis was faced with a serious and continuing threat primarily from the British submarines. They achieved great successes against German-­Italian traffic by using torpedoes and mines.27 This is an example of

Prerequisites   81 favorable positions meaning little if inadequate forces for their defense are available.  The strategic position and physical features of the littoral area greatly affect the length and directional orientation of the base of operations for one’s naval forces and aircraft. For example, in 1914, the German base of operations was highly unfavorable. It stretched along a narrow strip of coast between Emden and the Kiel Canal. The High Seas Fleet was based mainly in Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven. It was concentrated for action in the Jade Bay. The High Seas Fleet was unable to reach the Atlantic by either of the two exits of the North Sea. That would require operating beyond its comparative safety.28  In 1914–1918, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy operated from a long base of operations. A multitude of offshore islands facilitated quick rebasing of surface ships. The base of operations for the Austro-­Hungarian Navy ran from Trieste in the north to Pola, and then to Sebenico (Šibenik today) in central Dalmatia and Bay of Cattaro. The main naval base in Pola was only about 75 miles away from the country’s border with Italy. It was favorably located for light forces and U-­boats operating in the northern and central part of the Adriatic. Centrally located Sebenico allowed the Austro-­Hungarian surface ships to operate in any part of the Adriatic.  The Bay of Cattaro was almost ideally located for operations in the southern part of the Adriatic. However, its main disadvantage was that it was almost entirely dependent on supply by sea. During World War I, the Bay of Cattaro served for offensive actions of the German and Austro-­Hungarian U-­boats in the Mediterranean. It was also used for forays by the Austro-­Hungarian light forces in the southern part of the Adriatic in World War I. In January 1916, the Austro-­ Hungarian troops occupied the major part of Albania. This included the coast from the estuaries of the Bojana River in the north to Vjosë River in the south. The Austro-­Hungarian troops failed to capture the critically important port of Valona (Vlorë today), guarding the eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto.  In contrast, Italy’s position within the Adriatic in 1915–1918 was much less favorable than that of Austria–Hungary. Italy’s eastern coast is poorly indented and fronted with only a few islands. The Italians had only two major naval bases – Venice and Brindisi – but lacked a major base in the central part of their Adriatic coast.29  In September 1939, the German base of operations in the North Sea stretched for about 120 nautical miles. In the Baltic, Germany controlled about 745 miles of the coast.30 By June 1940, Germany’s position in the northern Atlantic and the Arctic was considerably enhanced. The Germans had control of the 1,200-mile long Norway coastline. Norway has many good natural harbors. The adjacent waters are deep and were mostly unsuitable for mining in World War II. The nearest British base, in the Shetland Islands, was about 170 miles from Bergen, while Scapa Flow is 240 miles from Stavanger. The route through the Norwegian Leads was protected by the Luftwaffe and coastal gun batteries and minefields. At the same time, German opportunities to raid Allied shipping in the north Atlantic and the Barents Sea were greatly enhanced. Northern Norway’s fjords

82   Prerequisites provided bases for attacks by the German Luftwaffe and U-­boats against convoys bound for northern Russia.31  After the Germans occupied Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) countries and France in May to June 1940, their base of operations was extended by another 900 nautical miles.32 It stretched for about 2,420 nautical miles (from Kirkenes, Norway to Bayonne, France). The German surface ships and land-­based aircraft used naval bases and airfields located only a few hundred miles or less away from the main Allied trade routes. Control of the French Biscay coast also shortened by about 1,500 miles the transit distance for the U-­boats to their operating areas in the northern Atlantic. Not only was British/Allied shipping in the English and Bristol channels constantly subjected to Luftwaffe attacks, but the usefulness of the main British dockyards in Portsmouth and Plymouth was much reduced.33  By the summer of 1944, the loss of the Atlantic bases forced the Germans to use bases in the North Sea for their U-­boats. However, these bases were within effective range of Allied bombers. This in turn made it critically important for the Germans to retain control of their bases in the Baltic that served as the training area for the crews and for testing of the new U-­boats. The German Navy strongly insisted on defense of the coastal flank of the Army Group North. In the Hela Peninsula–Libau area was concentrated more than one half of the training for the U-boats in late 1944. Especially critical was to retain control of the Bay of Danzig. The loss of training facilities in that area would result in drastically scaling down the number of fully trained crews. It would have also reduced significantly training procedure for U-boats.34 In World War II, the Italian Navy faced a similar situation to that of the German High Seas Fleet in World War I. The British controlled the two most important exits: the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. However, the extreme narrowness of the Mediterranean at several points and the fact that a battle fleet cannot be spread out and still remain superior added to the British difficulties.35 The Axis powers’ ability to interrupt the British/Allied trade in the central and eastern part of the Mediterranean in 1940–1943 was largely due to the string of naval and air bases from Crete to Sardinia and along Libya’s coast that flanked the main route from Gibraltar and Alexandria to Malta. The centrally located major naval base at Taranto and its relative nearness to the scene of action played a great role for the Italian Navy in both world wars. Taranto is only about 320 nautical miles away from Malta, 145 nautical miles from Valona, and 520 nautical miles from Tunis.  The lack of good bases invariably proved a source of grave weakness for the employment of forces. For example, the selection of Port Arthur in 1897 as a large base for the Russian fleet in the Far East was in retrospect a big mistake. Although the port was ice free, its communications with China’s and Russia’s Far Eastern ports were dangerously close to Japan. Moreover, Port Arthur was located too far from Russia’s center of power in the Far East. The Russians were unable to sustain communication with that base by either land or sea.36 When the Russians tried to obtain a more favorably located base in the Korea Strait in 1899 the Japanese threatened war. Russia was not ready to fight and backed down.37 

Prerequisites   83 One of the main reasons for the poor performance of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in 1941 was the loss of its basing area. Within ten weeks after June 22, 1941, the German army, with the support of the Luftwaffe captured all the Soviet bases/ ports, except Leningrad and its immediate vicinity. Likewise, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet lost all its large bases by July 1942. Shortly after the fall of Sevastopol, the Germans seized Novorossiysk so that the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was left with only three small naval bases (Tuapse, Poti, Batum) on the Caucasian coast that were not capable of providing support for major surface combatants and submarines.38  Optimally, both a weaker and stronger side at sea should have fully developed their theory on disputing sea control already in peacetime; otherwise their operational/tactical doctrine and combat training would be deeply flawed. Yet major sea powers usually focused almost exclusively on obtaining and maintaining sea control while giving short shrift to sea denial. Some major navies, such as, for example, the German, French, and the Soviet navies, developed theories for disputing sea control. However, none of them were sound. The reasons were false reading of the character of the future war at sea and/or overemphasis of the new naval technological advances.  Ideally, a theory of disputing control of the sea should be based on empirical evidence from recent history and correct lessons learned or identified. It should not be developed predominantly or, even worse, exclusively on the basis of new and largely unproven technologies. It is also a major error to develop a naval theory based on the harsh budgetary restrictions of the moment. In both cases, theory would be disconnected from the operational realities. Another error is to develop a naval theory heavily influenced by purely political considerations.  In the mid and late nineteenth century, the French Navy was one of the leaders in adapting its organization and naval construction to the new naval technological advances. At the same time, the French Navy also developed a new theory on the character of the future war at sea. Perhaps one of the most influential French theoreticians was Captain Baron Louis-­Antoine Richild Grivel (1827–1883). In 1869, Grivel wrote a book (De la guerre maritime avant et depuis les nouvelles) in which he contended that new technologies opened a new way of warfare at sea. For him, a maritime strategy aimed at the fleet action made no sense.39 Grivel believed that it was a waste of time and resources for France to counter Britain’s superiority in naval construction. Hence, it should not build and maintain a large battle fleet.40 He classified war at sea into three categories: war on the high seas, on the coast, and against maritime commerce. Grivel properly understood relationships between the war on the high seas and the coast. Without control of the high seas, one would lack freedom of action to carry out war on the coast. By gaining control of the high seas, one’s enemy would be forced to be on the defensive. Then the victor would have the option either to attack the enemy coast or his commerce. For Grivel control of the sea (he did not use the term “command of the sea”) was a prerequisite to attack the enemy’s and defend one’s own coast and commerce.41 

84   Prerequisites Grivel also asserted that in a war with a continental power like Prussia, France would be able to obtain control of the sea. However, this would not be the case in a war against a major sea power like Britain. He believed that the French policy of trying to obtain superiority over Britain in numbers of ships, their design, and combat training was an illusion.42  Grivel was the true founder of the French Jeune École (Young School) for his advocacy of coastal and commerce warfare.43 The Young School dominated the French Navy between the mid-­1870s and the early 1900s. It was almost entirely based on exaggerated advantages of the modern technologies and mislearned lessons from the Austro-­Italian War of 1866. Another reason for the acceptance of the Young School theories was France’s dismal economic situation in the aftermath of the war with Prussia in 1870–1871. Only after 1890 did the French economy begin to improve, albeit slowly.44 The Young School had an extremely negative effect on naval construction. It also caused great dissent and poisoned relationships within the French naval officer corps.45  The leading proponent of the Young School was Vice Admiral Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile Aube (1826–1890). He had never commanded a modem warship before joining the Squadron of Evolution in 1883. Aube became the French Navy Minister in 1886. In 1883, Admiral Aube met a young journalist, Gabriel Charmes, who eventually became the single most important voice in support of Aube’s ideas.46 Charmes was a talented writer but not a sailor. He knew nothing about naval technology. Charmes was on board a 46-ton gun boat that survived a heavy storm off Villefranche, in the Gulf of Genoa. He became greatly impressed with the seakeeping capabilities of torpedo boats. Based on that single experience Charmes declared such an “autonomous” boat armed with 5.5-inch guns as the boat of the future.47 He argued for the design of a defensive torpedo boat, armed with several light automatic guns, a spar torpedo, and fitted with a ram. A flotilla of defensive torpedo boats would be accompanied by a supply ship and converted merchant ships for scouting.48 Some more traditional admirals and naval experts were critical of the claims by the Young School proponents. Among other things, Charmes was criticized for his lack of knowledge on naval matters.49  The Young School advocates made several false assumptions on the character of the future war of sea. Among other things, they claimed that rapid developments in the technological, economic and political conditions of the nineteenth century led to drastic change in warfare and especially war at sea. Modern technology such as artillery, shells, mines, torpedoes, steam, armor, and improvements in land transportation, made an effective close naval blockade impossible. The future war at sea would consist of commerce warfare (guerre de course) conducted by fast cruisers, raids against important positions on the enemy coast, and defense of one’s own coast.50  Admiral Aube believed that command of the sea, obtained through a naval battle or blockade, became highly problematic. For him, a naval battle, as exemplified by the battle of Lissa in July 1866, was nothing more than a melee (a scuffle) – an orderless and senseless destruction of materiel and human lives

Prerequisites   85 unrelated to the success achieved. However, the fact was that the battle of Lissa was decisive because the Austrians obtained control of the Adriatic. It also resulted in a more favorable peace settlement for Austria despite its defeats on land. Aube believed that naval blockade had also become ineffective because any cruiser can break through a blockading line in the night and in bad weather.52 The French Young School proponents confidently predicted that mines and automotive torpedoes would make effective blockades impossible in the future.53  Proponents of the French Young School aimed to deny control of the sea to the enemy. But at the same time, they did not intend to use control of the sea once it was obtained.54 Instead, they believed that in a future war, the weaker fleet would rest in its bases and refuse combat. The stronger fleet would be forced to do the same for fear of torpedoes.55 Aube adopted the familiar German scheme of multiple mobile defensive forces on land and sea operating from several fortified “garrison” bases. So, dispersed fleet forces would attain superiority over any part of the enemy blockading force.56  Admiral Aube was a strong advocate of conducting ruthless attacks on the enemy’s coast as a preliminary phase of a war to influence enemy public opinion and, through threat of war, weaken over time the enemy’s will to resist militarily and economically.57 The Young School proponents believed that they had found a new concept for attack on and defense of the coast, consisting of a network of “sleeping” torpedoes and fortifications, combined with sporadic actions by ram ships, floating batteries and gunboats, and high-­speed torpedo boats supported according to local conditions by armored ships.58 The fleet should consist of a large number of high-­speed 70-ton and 20-knot gunboats/torpedo boats, and 50-ton “defensive” boats supported by armored ships.59 Aube’s plan was initially to have twenty cruisers and many “autonomous” torpedo boats organized in flotillas.60 They also envisaged construction of coastal cruisers armed with two 140-mm guns, auxiliary cruisers and a large number of the 17-knot supply ships.61  Advocates of the Young School also noted that the British paid little or no attention to the need to fortify the country’s coast and ports. Hence, that vulnerability could be exploited by the French Navy by conducting surprise torpedo attacks on ports and by indiscriminate shelling of the enemy’s coast.62 The destruction of Italy’s coastal towns would be the chief method of warfare against Italy.63 Another objective was to negatively affect the enemy’s morale. At the same time, they claimed (falsely) that the ever-­increasing effect of scientific advances and machines made the role of moral factors in warfare irrelevant.64  Admiral Castex was an outspoken opponent of the Young School. He wrote that the proponents of the French Young School believed that “torpedo boats and the powerful explosive (the torpedo) of which they ingeniously granted us the monopoly would revolutionize the principles of war and give birth to a new strategy.”65 In his view, the Young School proponents had it all backward. They did not develop strategy and decide what kind of platforms and weapons they would need to accomplish the new strategic concept. Instead, they embraced first the technologies and then rationalized this by creating a new strategic concept. 51

86   Prerequisites Moreover, their new theory of naval war lacked any empirical evidence because it was entirely based on the new and unproven technologies.66  Castex wrote that the Young School represented the negation of organized naval forces and naval battle. Their advocates had a strange belief that the main objective in a war at sea is not the same as on land – destruction of the enemy forces. Negating the importance of a naval battle was converted into the system. Commerce raiding was considered as the only type of naval operation. The only offensive operations were bombardment of the enemy coast. Castex asserted that the advocates of the Young School childishly believed that the enemy fleet did not exist. The operation to defend the littoral area envisaged dispersal of some sixty-­six coastal cruisers and 496 torpedo boats based on geometrical formulae. Yet Castex believed that the positive side of the Young School was highlighting the importance of numbers of ships, high speed, and specialized weapons.67  Many European naval theorists and several navies were influenced by the ideas of the French Young School. One reason was to save sorely needed financial resources for naval construction.68 For example, the Italian naval strategy and construction program was greatly affected by some ideas propounded by Admiral Aube. After laying down six battleships, Italy did not build any battleships between 1881 and 1885. It built instead protected cruisers and a large number of torpedo boats in the 1880s.69  The Italian naval theoreticians were influenced by the ideas of the French Young School and also the Italian theorists of land warfare. Until the late nineteenth century, Italian naval theoreticians focused almost exclusively on tactics. This began to change in the late 1890s when several theoreticians started to deal with naval strategic issues. One of the most influential Italian theorists in the first decade of the twentieth century was Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) Giovanni Sechi (1871–1948), professor of military art at the Naval Academy in La Spezia. His main work was Elements of Maritime Art (Elementi di Arte Militare Marittima) published in two volumes in 1906. In this work, Sechi described and analyzed all the fundamental issues of naval strategy. He also explained political and economic aspects of war at sea. Castex pointed out that Sechi focused on coastal warfare and combined operations but inadequately explained the importance of the organized naval forces and naval battle in the struggle for control of the sea. In second volume of his work, Sechi explained preparations for war at sea and questions of personnel and materiel. Secchi paid special attention to the importance of logistics. Another important theoretician of the Italian School was Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) Romeo Bernotti who wrote Foundations of Naval Strategy (Fondamenti di Strategia Navale) in 1911, Naval Power in the First World War (Il Potero Marittimo Nella Grande Guerra) in 1920, and Naval War (La Guerra Marittima) in 1923.70  The Austro-­Hungarian Navy also accepted many of Admiral Aube’s ideas. The reasons were political, military, and fiscal. In the aftermath of the Austro-­ Italian War of 1866, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy became, although temporarily, the fourth largest in Europe. The Navy was a junior service and therefore had a much smaller budget than the Army’s. This situation was bound to worsen after

Prerequisites   87 1882 when the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), included Italy in his Dual Alliance (Germany and Austria–Hungary, created 1879). The Triple Alliance was bound to reduce the tensions in the Adriatic. Therefore, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy would receive even smaller funds compared with the Army.71 Admiral Maximilian Doublebsky von Sterneck (1829–1897), commander of the Austro-­Hungarian Navy (1883–1897) enthusiastically embraced the ideas of the French Young School. In the late 1870s and early 1880s he added to the fleet four 800- to 1,000-ton “torpedo ships” and the first ten torpedo boats.72 In the late 1880s, two 4,000-ton and 19-knot “ram” cruisers were built. Their design reflected the thinking of the French Young School.73 Yet Sterneck came to doubt one of Aube’s cardinal beliefs that torpedo boats can operate “autonomously.”74  In 1891, Sterneck proposed a new fleet construction program calling for nine battleships, six ram cruisers, twelve light cruisers and destroyers each, and seventy-­two torpedo boats. Sterneck never really abandoned the main ideas of the French Young School until the end of his tenure, although such ideas went out of fashion in other navies.75 His policies were not reversed until 1904 when the new Navy commander, Admiral Rudolf Montecuccoli (1843–1922) embarked on a large construction program aimed at building a blue-­water fleet.  The French Young School also had a significant effect on the German Navy during the era of General Georg Leo von Caprivi (1831–1899) as the head of Admiralty Staff (1883–1888). He focused on the construction of protected cruisers to be used for defense of Germany’s interests in colonies. Caprivi agreed with Aube’s views on the decisive role of torpedoes. Hence, he dramatically increased the number of torpedo boats in the German Navy. Caprivi rejected “cruiser” (commerce) warfare as irrelevant for Germany.76 Yet many German officers were firm believers in the value of cruiser warfare even before the era of the French Young School. Admiral Aube only reinforced their arguments.77  In March 1884, Caprivi issued a paper entitled “Memorandum Concerning the Further Development of the Imperial Navy” (Denkschrift betreffend die weitere Entwicklung der Kaiserlichen Marine). This document was the product of discussion in the Admiralty Staff and the input of Caprivi’s advisers. Caprivi believed in the need to have a strong battle fleet. His intent was to use torpedo boats as coastal defense ships and for blockade breaking. Caprivi did not believe that the German Navy was able to conduct operations on the open ocean. He was also not convinced of the success of commerce warfare given the then state of technology. Caprivi argued that the steamers were able to outrun the raiders. In his view, the prospect for the success of commerce raiding was becoming progressively unfavorable.78  For Caprivi, the main mission of the German Navy was to secure the country’s coast from the threat of invasion and to maintain the flow of commerce to the German ports and prevent the enemy from establishing a blockade. Caprivi asserted that torpedo boats were ideal for such a role because they were cheap, fast, and readily available.79 He refused the Admiralty Staff ’s advice on commerce warfare. However, that idea did not die in the German Navy. Many

88   Prerequisites German naval officers, politicians, and navalists were fascinated with the idea of the French Young School on commerce warfare.80  Under the influence of the French Young School, the Germans developed their unique theory of the “small war on the high seas” (Der kleine Krieg auf hoher See). The first and one of the most influential German naval theoreticians was Captain Alfred Stenzel (1832–1906), professor at the Naval Academy (Marineakademie) at Mürwick. Stenzel argued that if the weaker power conducts small war on the high seas against a stronger power then its cruisers must have at least a secure base of operations. This was an absolute necessity for a small sea power which had diverse interests overseas and it needed to be in the waters where that sea traffic was mainly concentrated. The fleet must have fixed station ports as bases of operations for cruisers or squadrons, and to serve as ports for prizes and a port of refuge for merchant vessels.81  Stenzel wrote that the small war on the high seas is perhaps the most important form of offensive for small fleets in a struggle with an overpowering enemy. Such a fleet must acquire fixed station harbors despite all the obstacles and setbacks. Cruisers employed in the small war should have high seaworthiness and speed, and longer endurance than the ships of any other navy. He asserted that the covert and energetic employment of individual ships in the small war on the high seas, and “coastal vehicles, such as torpedo boats and U-­boats” in the “coastal war” (Küstenkrieg) offer the strategically weaker defender the possibility to go on the offensive, However, he emphasized the importance of the fleet. Employing all the forces together is necessary for “large warfare” (grosse Kriegführung) – the battle.82  The Imperial German Navy’s plan for operations in accordance with the Cabinet order of July 30, 1914 presented by Admiral Hugo von Pohl (1855–1916) provided, in the event of declaration of war by England, brief instruction to the Commander of the North Sea Fleet to wage “small war” (Kleinkrieg) for the time being against the English until the Germans had effected such weakening of their fleet that they could safely send their own. If the enemy appeared before satisfactory progress had been made to a successful battle, a pitched engagement might be undertaken.83 Small war on the high seas as practiced by the Germans in World War I included actions with light forces.84  The main error of the small war was that it rested on one-­sided decisions and a belief that it could lead to equalization of strength with the stronger opponent. However, a weaker side must remain at sea and would suffer losses in materiel and that would work to its disadvantage.85  In the 1920s, two schools of thought emerged in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) naval forces on how best to employ the fleet in defense of the Soviet state. A group of former tsarist officers and theoreticians propounded the so-­called “Old School.” The leading proponents of the Old School were the former tsarist Admiral Nikolai L. Klado (1862–1919) and Soviet Naval Academy professors Boris B. Gervais (1878–1934) and Mikhail A. Petrov. Both Klado and Gervais advocated the Mahanian command of the sea strategy for the Soviet naval forces. They believed that the weaker navy should dispute command of the

Prerequisites   89 sea so as to make it difficult for the stronger enemy to exercise control. The weaker fleet should weaken enemy forces over time to equalize its strength with the enemy forces. The enemy’s blockading forces would be reduced by using submarines, mines, coastal artillery, land-­based aircraft, and light forces to eventually create favorable conditions for going on the offensive.86  In November 1926, proponents of the Old School drew up a plan envisaging a fleet composed of four battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, twenty-­six destroyers, and forty submarines, plus many small vessels.87 The main ideas of the Old School were unrealistic because it was simply impossible to build such a fleet in view of the very poor state of the Soviet economy in the 1920s.88  After the mid-­1920s, the RKKA fully embraced Marxist–Leninist teachings on war and revolution. The emphasis was on the unity of the armed forces. The army was the most important service. This in practice meant that the army would dominate Soviet military strategy. Theories of command of the sea as propounded by Mahan were denounced as capitalistic and unacceptable to the RKKA’s naval forces.89  Incompatibility between the strategic concepts advocated by the proponents of the Old School and the all-­too-evident deplorable conditions of the Soviet naval forces, combined with the inability of the country’s economy to build and maintain a fleet composed of modern surface combatants, led to the emergence of the “Soviet Young School.” The leading proponents of the Young School were Ivan S. Isakov, A.P. Aleksandrov, Ivan Ludri, Konstantin Dushenov, and A. Yakimychev. The Young School’s ideas were based on a mixture of Marxist– Leninist teachings on dialectic materialism and the principles of so-­called “partisan” (guerrilla) warfare. In contrast to the proponents of the Old School, they believed that the submarine had replaced the battleship as the capital ship of the navy. For them, battles like those of Tsushima in 1904 and Jutland in 1916 were things of the past.90  The proponents of the Soviet Young School asserted that submarines and aircraft could not be contained because they could escape blockading forces. Hence, both the concept of the naval blockade and that of general engagement between battle fleets as advocated by Admirals Mahan and Colomb for contesting command of the sea had become obsolete, along with the theory of command of the sea itself. In their view, the advent of submarines and aircraft had made a big ship obsolete, or at best made it able to play only the subordinate role of providing combat support to the light strike forces. The Young School advocates heavily criticized their former mentors for advocating the Mahanian strategy.91  The Young School proponents intended to have a navy composed of light forces, submarines, mines, and land-­based naval aircraft. They advocated employing submarines jointly with air forces against large surface ships.92 Such a fleet would be cheaper to build and maintain.93 Despite the shared name, the Soviet Young School’s ideas were not identical to the ideas of the French Young School of the 1880s. A major difference was that the Soviet Young School advocated defensive naval strategy while the French Young School propounded offensive strategy.94 

90   Prerequisites Ultimately, the Young School ideas were accepted by the Soviet political leadership. The Young School was dominant from 1932 to 1936.95 The proponents of the Old School were removed from the naval educational institutions. During Stalin’s purges in the late 1930s, many of them paid with their lives for the “obduracy of their reactionary thoughts.”96 The proponents of the Soviet Young School adopted so-­called “small war at sea” strategy as a basis for naval doctrine. The focus was on defense of the coastal area by relying on a series of so-­called “mine-­artillery” positions supported with light forces.97 The Combat Regulations for RKKA’s naval forces issued in 1930 (BUMS-­30) represented the victory of the Young School ideas. The BUMS-­30 stipulated that the RKKA’s naval forces were responsible for defending the interests of the working people, have to be ready for brave and decisive fight against the enemy, directed at the defense of the coasts of USSR and to support the operations of the land forces of the Red Army and covering from the sea, on rivers and on interior seas.98 In 1931, the Soviets planned to gradually defeat the enemy by using offensive and defensive forms of naval warfare. Combined naval combat arms supported by coastal artillery and minefields would be used in defeating the stronger enemy.99 The Soviet proponents of a blue-water navy based on Mahan’s teachings were marginalized after Stalin and the highest political-military leaders embraced theories of the Young School. They were publicly accused of holding views contrary to the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and revolution.100 After the end of World War I, some younger Italian naval officers urged the abandonment of large surface ships in favor a large fleet of submarines and naval aviation. A more moderate group advocated the creation of a balanced fleet to include aircraft carriers, and a land-­based naval air arm. It doubted the value of submarines in the Mediterranean and stressed the need for torpedo boats. However, the most conservative group that included senior admirals remained firmly attached to battleships. They were suspicious of the value of aircraft and submarines.101 Nevertheless, all three groups agreed that Italy must dominate the Adriatic and project its power into the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.102  Sound naval theory is the main prerequisite for developing a sound doctrine for sea denial. The heart of such a doctrine should be one or more operational concepts. Each of these should aim to accomplish an operational objective through the conduct of a major naval/joint operation. A stronger side at sea should be prudent and prepare separate operational concepts for sea control and sea denial. The operational concept for disputing control of the sea should be based on the proper assessment of the operating area and a realistic vision of the future war in the littorals. Properly written, it should describe in broad and simple terms how one’s forces should be deployed, employed, and sustained. It should not directly refer to a specific potential opponent at sea or a sea/ocean area in which one’s operational concept will be applied in case of hostilities. It should be general, simple and flexible. It should ensure speed of action and

Prerequisites   91 surprise. It should pose a threat to the enemy from multiple physical mediums (sea, air, and land) and thereby considerably limit his options. It should also provide for operational deception and thereby greatly enhance the chances of surprising the enemy. It should integrate both offensive and defensive information operations (IO) capabilities. An operational concept should be also articulated clearly and succinctly.  The theory of disputing sea control should be part of a much broader theory of littoral warfare. This, in turn, should be a separately developed but at the same an integral part of the theory of naval warfare as a whole. However, a major problem is the lack of a coherent theory of littoral warfare. Classical naval thinkers – notably Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914), Vice Admiral Philip H. Colomb (1831–1899), Sir Julian S. Corbett (1854–1922) Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956), and Vice Admiral Raoul Castex (1878–1968) – generally drew no distinction between warfare conducted on the open ocean and in the littorals. Yet all of them discussed from a historical perspective many naval encounters that occurred in the littorals. Mahan, in his Naval Strategy: Compared with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911), discussed in some detail many aspects of what would be considered today operational-­level warfare in the littorals. Colomb, in Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (1891), provided numerous historical examples of war in the littorals in his analysis of what he called “the struggle for the command of the sea” and “attacks on the territory from the sea.”103 Corbett, in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy made many references to the role of naval forces during the Anglo-­Dutch Wars (1652–1654, 1665–1667, and 1672–1674) in the English Channel and North Sea, the British blockade of the French fleet in Atlantic ports and the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy’s support of the army of General Arthur Wellesley (later field marshal, First Duke of Wellington) (1769–1852) during the Peninsular War (1808–1814), and the naval actions in the Yellow Sea during the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905. Wegener’s focus, in his The Naval Strategy of the World War (1929), was on explaining the Imperial German Navy’s failure to obtain freedom of action beyond the confines of the North Sea during World War I.104 Castex wrote the five-­volume Strategic Theories (1929–1935), in which he paid a great deal of attention to historical analysis of warfare in the littorals. Among other things, Castex analyzed the German operations in the North Sea and the influence of geography in naval warfare.105  A well-­known Anglo-­Irish Colonel (later honorary major general) Charles E. Callwell (1859–1928), was perhaps one of the first influential proponents of joint warfare in the littorals. In his work Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, he described and analyzed in detail naval bases and fortresses and their capture by fleet forces, land operations against enemy fleets and merchant shipping, and the benefits of having “maritime command” against an enemy stronger on land. He also compared maritime and land lines of operations. Callwell explored the influence of “maritime command” on military lines of operation in the coastal area. A major part of his work was focused on amphibious landings,

92   Prerequisites and siege of “maritime fortresses.” Callwell also devoted a long chapter to the influence of inland waters and waterways upon military operations.106 The Italian naval theoreticians in the late 1890s and early 1900s also paid great attention to the problem of warfare in the littorals. The leading Italian theoretician on littoral warfare was Rear Admiral Giulio Gavotti with his two-­volume Naval Littoral War (Guerra Navale Littoranea) in 1900.  Sound doctrine is the key prerequisite for realistic combat training for both attacks on and defense of maritime trade. Experience shows that a lack of training in peacetime cannot be easily if it all corrected in time of war. The German success in attacking enemy shipping would have been much greater if the Luftwaffe had devoted more time to practicing attacks against ships at sea in pre-­war years. Prior to 1939, the German Luftwaffe was ill-­prepared for its naval missions in wartime. Although the Luftwaffe leadership recognized that the combined attacks by bombers and torpedo bombers would be the most effective in attacking ships, such attacks were not practiced prior to the war. The Luftwaffe was also strangely uninterested in the need for cooperation with the Kriegsmarine.107 With the sole exception of the fleet reconnaissance units, the Luftwaffe pilots were poorly trained in navigation over the sea. Hence, they were unprepared for carrying out anti-­shipping missions. The first step in remedying this shortcoming came on April 1, 1939, when the Luftwaffe created a post of a “general for special employment” (General z.b.V. – zur besonderen Verwendung) within the staff of the 2nd Air Fleet who was responsible for anti-­ shipping missions. Afterward, the first two Combat Wings (Kampfgeschwader – K.G.) (K.G. 26 and K.G. 30) composed of the He.111 torpedo bombers and the Ju.88 bombers were formed.108 These two wings became part of the new 10th Air Division in September 1939. By February 1940, this division was expanded and became the X Air Corps which was specially trained for conducting anti-­ shipping missions.109  Sound naval doctrine should provide direction for the fleet composition optimally suited for disputing control of the sea. Generally, determining the proper size and the composition of the fleet and each component of its battle force is not an exact science. Many assumptions regarding the current and projected threats and the budgetary sources must be made for many years ahead. These assumptions might be reasonably accurate or might be partially or even completely wrong. In general, the broader framework set by national military and maritime strategy should dictate the navy’s size and composition. It is simply wrong to determine force level first and based solely on the fiscal realities and then validate such a decision by conducting the force level studies.110 The budgetary limitations should come into play only after the force level is determined by the analysis of the current and projected military/maritime strategic situation. Based on the fiscal realities there will almost invariably be a gap between the desired and affordable force level. The fleet’s size and composition is also contingent on adequate naval construction capacities. Afterward, these competing, and often contradictory, demands must be reconciled by either scaling down or radically modifying the naval strategic objectives or

Prerequisites   93 increasing/reducing one’s financial resources; otherwise, the resultant force level might be either too low (which is most likely) or too high with respect to the actual requirements.  A naval theory and doctrine based exclusively on technology and influenced by economic considerations usually led to unsound naval force planning. The resulting fleet structure was heavily tilted toward a large number of smaller and less costly but also much less capable platforms and weapons. For example, advocates of both the French and the Soviet Young Schools created fleets that in fact were not capable of successfully denying control of the sea. The French Young School theorists considered the advent of steam and invention of the self-­ propelled torpedo as dramatic technological advances offering opportunities to the weaker sea power. Aube “discovered” torpedoes in 1883, upon his return to the Mediterranean Fleet. This only reinforced his belief that ironclads were worthless.111 Aube drew another wrong conclusion that the battleship, the key factor in obtaining one’s command of the sea, was unnecessary for the French Navy.112  The physical environment in the littorals requires a differently composed naval force from that employed on the open ocean. Large surface combatants such as aircraft carriers and cruisers, and nuclear-­powered attack submarines (SSNs) are increasingly vulnerable to the ASCMs (anti-­ship cruise missiles) launched by aircraft, conventionally-­powered attack submarines (SSKs), small surface combatants, and coastal ASCM batteries. Optimally, a medium navy for disputing control of the sea should be composed predominantly of advanced SSKs, light frigates, and multipurpose corvettes. A small coastal navy should be composed of corvettes and a large number missile/torpedo/gun combat craft. These forces should be supported by land-­based attack aircraft and fighter-­ bombers. A weaker side should have large inventories of advanced mines and coastal ASCM/gun batteries. Additionally, it should operate small explosive boats, midget submarines, and aerial/surface/underwater unmanned vehicles (UAVs/USVs/UUVs).  A major land power can also use its non-­naval capabilities in disputing control of the sea by a superior sea power. These defenses include space, air, and ground-­based radars, and over-­the-horizon (OTH) radars, bombers, fighter-­ bombers, and multipurpose attack aircraft carrying anti-­ship missiles (ASMs/ ASCMs). Non-­naval capabilities also might include short-­range and medium-­ range tactical ballistic missiles (SRBMs/MRBMs) and anti-­ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) plus highly integrated air defenses.  The key for success in disputing sea control is to have a simple and streamlined operational command organization. An operational command with the fewest possible intermediate levels of command should already have been established in peacetime. Such a command structure should also be highly flexible, thereby allowing quick changes in command organization.113 Naval forces and forces of other services should be subordinate to the operational commander. Command organization should be highly centralized and thereby ensure the most effective employment of naval forces and forces of other services and their

94   Prerequisites operational support (intelligence, IO, fires, logistics, and protection). Excessively centralized organization with too many intermediate levels of command would invariably slow down information flow and cause constant delays in making timely decisions.  In general, a weaker side in the littorals might establish a maritime theater command incorporating all the services deployed in the littoral area. Directly subordinate to it should be several maritime or naval district commands; and each of these would consist of several maritime or naval combat sectors (zones). A weaker side might organize its sea-­going combat forces into several joint task forces (JTFs), each capable of carrying out diverse missions. For a coastal navy operating in the littorals, one option is to organize its sea-­going forces into what can be arbitrarily called “littoral combat groups” (LCGs). Composition of each group would vary depending on the type of the mission (e.g., anti-­surface warfare, anti-­submarine warfare (ASW), mining, mine counter-­measures (MCM, defense of maritime traffic, support of amphibious landings, support of the army’s coastal flank). Light frigates or multipurpose corvettes can serve as flagships for an LCG.  Command and control of naval forces operating in the littorals is generally more challenging than in war on the open ocean. Because of the small size of the area and the high intensity of combat, changes in the tactical and operational situation will be rather sudden and drastic. Hence, the main prerequisites for success will be the commander’s freedom to act through exercising the largest possible degree of local initiative. This means that true German-­style mission command should be applied by the operational commander. Because of the widely open spaces, the netting of one’s surface ships, aircraft, and submarines is potentially more rewarding in the waters off a relatively open continental landmass, such as the coast of Africa, or in the Indian Ocean. Yet the weaker side at sea could obtain greater benefits by netting its sea-­going and shore-­based forces and obtain a real- or near-­real-time picture of the situation in the initial phase of hostilities. It can also effectively integrate employment of all naval forces and forces of other services in denying access to its littorals by the stronger side.  Modern war at sea is joint (multi-­service) and often combined (multinational) warfare. Hence, not only the stronger but also the weaker side should ensure closest cooperation or jointness of its naval forces with forces of other services. This is accomplished by the unity of command. Among other things, jointness allows an operational commander to have more options in the employment of subordinate forces. Multi-­service forces allow a creative operational commander to combine their diverse but complementary capabilities in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways and thereby generate a greater effect on the enemy.114 For example, land-­based aircraft could be employed not only in striking enemy ports and port-­related facilities but also in attacking convoys and individual merchant ships. Submarines could be employed in attacking ships at sea and in their ports and in destroying ship-­related facilities ashore. Any navy based in the littorals should exercise a sufficient degree of control of its basing and deployment area. This is especially critical for naval forces

Prerequisites   95 operating in an enclosed or semi-­enclosed sea. Without securing control of one’s basing and deployment area first, a weaker side would be unable to prepare and execute tactical actions and, in some cases, major naval/joint operations. The aim is to obtain a sufficient degree of security for coastal traffic both in coastal waters and ashore, and to create preconditions for the successful deployment of one’s naval forces.115 Ideally, control of one’s basing and deployment areas should be established in peacetime and then maintained and possibly expanded in time of hostilities. The weaker side at sea should make all efforts to achieve information superiority over the stronger side in disputing control of the sea. This superiority is manifested in one’s ability to make quick and sound decisions and be assisted by technical capabilities in collecting, processing, and disseminating an uninterrupted flow of information while at the same time exploiting or denying an enemy’s ability to do the same. Because even the most advanced information technologies are readily available on the market, the ability of the weaker side at sea to achieve information superiority is much greater than it was in the past. But, properly understood, information superiority is primarily achieved by having much better educated and trained commanders and their staffs. And here the advantage would not necessarily belong to the stronger side at sea.  A weaker navy should possess offensive spirit. To obtain and then maintain the initiative, one’s forces must be continuously on the offensive. No successful defensive has brought the final defeat of the enemy forces unless followed by offensive action. The offensive not only ensures freedom of action but also enhances the morale of friendly forces and depresses that of the adversary. The initiative depends largely upon leadership exercised throughout the chain of command. Despite superficial similarity, aggressiveness is not identical to the offensive. One can be on the defensive but display aggressiveness, by conducting offensive tactical actions. On the other hand, the principle of the offensive is incompatible with lack of aggressiveness, or passivity. Lack of aggressive spirit in a navy has invariably resulted in deficient performance and even major setbacks in a war against a stronger enemy. For example, in the eighteenth century, the main reason for the consistent lack of success by the French Navy was its lack of offensive spirit. The French considered an outcome of battle as a success if they preserved their ships. By the mid-­ eighteenth century the art of sparing ships had become firmly welded into French strategic doctrine. In March 1756, before departing Toulon, Rear Admiral Roland-­Michel Barrin de La Galissonière (1693–1756) received the following instruction: The object that he [La Galissonière] must keep always foremost in mind is the preservation of the forces which His Majesty has detailed for this expedition. It is with this end in view, that His Majesty wishes him to direct all operations necessary to attain the required objectives. The intention of His Majesty is that neither this squadron nor his troops should be risked against superior forces.116 

96   Prerequisites In the American War for Independence (1775–1783), the French would have been more successful if their navy had been imbued with offensive spirit. Tactically, the French commanders were more focused on damaging British ships (destroying masts, sails, and rigging) and hence reducing their maneuverability instead of sinking them. They were satisfied to see their convoys safe when more decisive action might have been successful in reducing materially the enemy forces that threatened the convoy.117  In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the Spanish Navy performed poorly. There was little activity in European waters except for troop transports to Italy in 1741 and battle of Toulon in 1744. It took a long time to make the Spanish fleet ready for sailing prior to the battle of Toulon although the French provided materiel, crews, and officers. In the West Indies the situation was similar. In 1740, the Spaniards concentrated in these waters eighteen ships-­ of-the-­line. However, only one-­third was assigned to cover threatened positions in Central America. Six ships-­of-the-­line were lost at Cartagena; the rest were idle. In 1748, the Spaniards did not make any effort to go on the offensive off Santiago de Cuba. Yet because of the British errors they were successful in conducting small-­scale actions.118  One example of extreme passivity was the behavior of the Russian Baltic Fleet during the Crimean War (1854–1856). The Russians had a fleet of twenty-­ seven ships-­of-the-­line with smaller craft, including fifty to sixty gunboats, while their British opponent had only nine steamships of the line and six sailing ships-­ of-the-­line. Yet, the Royal Navy roamed freely along the Russian Baltic coast, while the Russian ships remained passive in their harbors.119  In the Austro-­Italian War of 1866, the Italian fleet was greatly superior in number of ships and materiel to the Austrian Navy. However, it suffered a decisive defeat at the hand of a smaller but more aggressive enemy. The Italian government had a very clear objective in the war. The Italian naval minister directed fleet commander Admiral Carlo Pellion di Persano (1806–1883) that the principal objective must be to obtain mastery of the Adriatic by clearing that sea of the Austrian squadron. The Italian squadron, of twelve modern armored ships and twenty-­three wooden frigates and dispatch vessels, set sail from Ancona on July 16 to attack Austrian shore fortifications on the island of Lissa but without securing command of the sea first. Moreover, the Italian admiral, Persano, acted halfheartedly in the attack on Lissa’s fortifications.120 The ensuing battle off Lissa on July 20 showed how a passive and defensive policy forced upon the Italian fleet, by the incompetence of its admirals or otherwise, led to its demoralization and ultimate destruction.  In the first few months of World War I, the German High Seas Fleet was (perhaps surprisingly) rather passive in the North Sea. The German High Naval Command (and most officer corps) expected that the Grand Fleet would institute a close blockade of the German Bight at the very beginning of the hostilities. After that did not happen, the German naval strategy was derailed.121 This inactivity had significant psychological consequences. The High Seas Fleet was “disheartened and the inferiority complex was strengthened.”122 

Prerequisites   97 Inactivity or passivity on the part of a stronger fleet often allows an inferior force to achieve its objective. For example, the inactivity of the Italian Navy in the winter of 1915–1916 allowed the Austrians to take the initiative with their inferior force. Every place of any importance upon the Adriatic coast of Italy was made to feel the presence of the Austro-­Hungarian ships or aircraft. The Italians rarely succeeded in bringing these raiders to action. Moreover, in the first four months of the war the Austrians, at a price of only two U-­boats and a few aircraft, inflicted losses on the Italian fleet: two cruisers, one destroyer, two torpedo craft, three submarines, and two dirigibles, in addition to damaging the British light cruiser Dublin. Thus, the Austro-­Hungarian Fleet attained a psychological ascendancy in the Adriatic. It played the part of the weaker force with conspicuous success. Not only did it succeed in weakening the Italian fleet, but it also immobilized a force considerably superior to itself. Indeed, at one point the Italian heavy ships were not allowed to leave their bases.123 But, strangely enough, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy showed an unaccustomed lack of offensive spirit during the evacuation of the Serbian army from Albania in January– February 1916. Its large ships made no move. Interference with embarkation and convoys was left to a few U-­boats and light forces.124  The Soviets were surprisingly passive in the Baltic in 1941. The Germans, as it turned out, took too much care for the possibility of Soviet attack. Thus, they laid too many minefields, which considerably restricted the maneuvering of their own forces and shipping. This also caused some losses for German forces from their own mines.125  Perhaps the actions of the Black Sea Fleet are more illustrative of a profound lack of aggressiveness than those of the Baltic Fleet. By the beginning of hostilities in June 1941, the Black Sea Fleet was numerically ten times as strong as the Axis forces in the area. And even during the rest of the war the Soviets retained at least four times greater numbers. Moreover, the Soviet naval forces occupied a very favorable base of operations. Yet the Soviets were only modestly successful.126 The Soviets failed to use their naval forces offensively against the German positions before the large-­scale attack on Sevastopol in the summer of 1942. This Soviet lack of offensive spirit was even more surprising in that the Crimea was accessible to ships on both sides, and the targets on land were within effective range of Soviet shipboard guns. Also, Soviet airfields on the Crimean peninsula and in the Kuban area (Taman Peninsula) allowed the use of fighter aircraft to provide cover for warships. Repeated firing on the German positions by ships would probably have been effective in preventing large-­scale attacks and in delivering a strong attack against the German armored force trying to penetrate the Soviet positions on the southern coast. This might even have stopped the German attack. As it turned out, the Soviet ships were not used at all against the German flanks.127  Likewise, it was a mystery for the Germans during their evacuation of the Crimea in the spring of 1944 why the Soviets were so passive at sea. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet had then in service one battleship, four cruisers, and six destroyers. Yet, the Soviets did not try to use these ships to cut off the Axis transport

98   Prerequisites route between the Crimea and Romanian ports. This was even more surprising, because the Soviets were then in full control of Odessa and several smaller Ukrainian ports. The very presence of a strong Soviet naval force in the area would have simply prevented the Germans from any large-­scale evacuation effort.128 The Soviets were unable to achieve a complete cut-­off of the Axis maritime traffic along the Ukrainian coast, or a blockade of the Turkish coast and the Danube estuary, until the end of war.129  In the Iraq–Iran War of 1980–1988, the Iraqi Navy showed a remarkable lack of aggressiveness. Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities in 1980, the Iraqi Navy retreated to Umm Qasr, Basra, and the Khor Abdullah waterway and never sent significant forces into the Gulf until the 1988 cease-­fire.130 The Iraqis failed to use their naval forces and those captured from Kuwait in the Gulf War 1990–1991. Not surprisingly, almost the entire Iraqi Navy was wiped out in the first two weeks of the war.131  Prerequisites for success in disputing or obtaining and maintaining control of the seas are in some ways identical. The need to have sound and all-­ encompassing naval theory and corresponding doctrine, sound operational-­level command organization/C2, jointness, and offensive spirit are generally the same for both a stronger and weaker side at sea. Yet a weaker side should enhance each of these prerequisites to reduce the superiority of the stronger opponent at sea. The initial geostrategic position of a land power is more unfavorable than the position occupied by a major sea power. This situation can be radically changed for the better by either having an alliance with a power occupying a favorable maritime position and/or conquest. Sound naval theory should be general, flexible, and comprehensive. This means that it is not definitive but open-ended. Hence, it should be based on some constants derived from a proper study of naval/military history. A naval theory that is general in its nature would ensure both flexibility and durability in its application. The biggest test of naval theory is the reality of war. Any time theory conflicts with reality, it must be changed, modified or some of its elements even abandoned. Sound naval theory must encompass the entire spectrum of conflict, that is, not only high-intensity conventional war but full range of operations short of war. Selected aspects of naval theory are part of any sound naval doctrine; the other major input is the vision of future war at sea. And the latter is heavily affected by new naval technologies. Too much emphasis either on historical precedents or new technologies would result in a faulty naval doctrine. A doctrine for operational level of war, should include not only main methods for obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control but also main methods for disputing control of the sea. Otherwise, a navy would be materially and mentally ill-prepared for the realities of war at sea A fleet optimally suited for disputing control of the sea should have very different composition than a fleet for obtaining/maintaining sea control on the open ocean. A sound operational command structure should be established already in peacetime. A single operational commander should have full authority and responsibility for the employment of all multi-service forces in the theater. Disputing control of the sea would require relatively much high degree of

Prerequisites   99 cooperation between navy and other services than in the struggle for sea control. The main reason is that combat actions aimed to deny control of the sea would mostly take place in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Basing/deployment control is relatively much more important for a small or medium sea power than for an out-­of-the-­area major sea power. Information dominance has emerged as a critical prerequisite for both obtaining and disputing sea control. At the same time, it provides a great opportunity for the weaker side at sea to balance the superiority in raw power of the stronger side. Finally, regardless of odds, a weaker side at sea must be active in disputing control by the stronger side. This means that offensive spirit must pervade the entire navy; otherwise, no success will be achieved. 

Notes    1 Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, 1957), p. 24.    2 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, p. 25.    3 Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Holger H. Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 24 (originally published by E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1929).    4 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), p. 32.    5 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 24.    6 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, pp. 31, 37–38.    7 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 30.    8 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 36.    9 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 37.  10 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, pp. 31, 37–38.  11 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, pp. 21–23, 26.  12 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, pp. 21–22.  13 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 23.  14 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 36.  15 John L. Hall Jr., Naval Operations of the Russo-­Japanese War (Newport, RI: Operations Department, Naval War College, March 27, 1939), p. 14.  16 Donald Macintyre, Sea Power in the Pacific: A History from the 16th Century to the Present Day (London: Military Book Society, 1972), pp. 130–131.  17 Ritter von Niedermayer, “Nord- und Ostsee. Eine wehrpolitische und strategische Betrachtung,” in Th. Arps, R. Gadow, H. Hesse, and D. Ritter von Niedermayer, eds., Kleine Wehrgeographie des Weltmeeres (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1938), pp. 95–96.  18 Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 33.  19 René Daveluy, The Genius of Naval Warfare, Vol. I: Strategy, 2nd ed. of A Study of Naval Strategy, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1910), p. 51.  20 J.R. James, “The Dutch Navy and National Survival in the Seventeenth Century,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988), p. 25.  21 Hector C. Bywater, “The Changing Balance of Forces in the Mediterranean,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 16, No. 3 (May–June 1937), p. 372. 

100   Prerequisites 22 Gordon East, “The Mediterranean Problem,” Geographical Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1938), p. 92.  23 Otto Groos, Seekriegslehren im Lichte des Weltkrieges. Ein Buch für den Seemann, Soldaten und Staatsmann (Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), p. 53.  24 Admiral Norway, B.Nr. gKdos 295 AI Chefs, January 8, 1942, “Die militärische Lage Norwegen” Aufgaben und Schlussfolgerungen für die Kriegsmarine,” Kriegstagebuch 1. SKL Teil CIIa Nordsee-­Norwegen Januar 1942–Dezember 1942 RM 7/127, Bundesarchiv-­Militärchiv (BA-­MA), Freiburg, i.Br., p. 4.  25 Kriegstagebuch der B-­Leitstelle (3.SKL B), 1.1.1941 3./SKL B (B-­Leitstelle Kriegstagebuch 3./SKL B B-­Dienst 1 Januar 1941–31 Dezember 1941, RM 7/104, BA-­MA, p. 4.  26 Grossadmiral Dönitz Schlussansprache auf der Tagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar am Freitag dem 17. Dezember 1943, Anlagen Allgemeinen Inhalts, June 1943–Dec 1943, Kriegststagebuch Vol. 8, Juni–Dez 1943, I Seekriegsleitung-­Teil B, V, RM 7/98, BA-­MA, p. 35.  27 Betrachtung über die seestrategische und militärische Lage im Mittelmeer nach dem Stand vom 10.1.1942, I SKL Teil C XV, Deutsche Kriegführung im Mittelmeer Januar 1942–Dezember 1942, RM 7/235, BA-­MA, p. 28.  28 Bernard Brodie, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 95–96.  29 Giuseppe Fioravanzo, “La Vittoria Navale nella Guerra, 1915–18,” Rivista Marittima, 1969, p. 6.  30 Dieter Seebens, Grundlagen, Auffassungen und Pläne für eine Kriegführung in der Ostsee 1935–1939 (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1971), pp. 6, 13.  31 T.K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952), p. 229.  32 Besprechungpunkt für Vortrags beim Führer, September 3, 1939–December 27, 1940, 1. SKL, RM 7/1596, BA-­MA, p. 188.  33 John Creswell, Sea Warfare 1941–1945, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 50.  34 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945 Vol. 2: 1942–1945, (Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1975), pp. 448, 462.  35 Brodie, Layman’s Guide, p. 104.  36 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 188.  37 David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp.  120–121; Macintyre, Sea Power in the Pacific, pp. 126–127.  38 Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 77.  39 Douglas C. Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare: The Coercive Response of the Weak?” Naval War College Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2013), p. 100.  40 David H. Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: German and French Maritime Strategies in the late Nineteenth Century,” in Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine, eds., Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Paper # 40, 2013), p. 93.  41 Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871–1904, edited by Stephen S. Roberts (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 19.  42 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 20.  43 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 21.  44 Volkmar Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine: Strategie und Politik 1875–1900 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1971), p. 5. 

Prerequisites   101 45 Lawrence Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury: The Austro-­Hungarian Navy and the Jeune Ecole,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 56, No. 4 (October 1992), p. 597.  46 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 589.  47 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p.  160; Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 589.  48 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p.  160; Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 589.  49 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 169.  50 Harald Fock, “Seestreitkräfte in Küsten- und Randmeergebieten (I),” Wehrkunde, No. 11 (November 1974), p. 583.  51 Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine, p. 17.  52 Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine, p. 17.  53 Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p.  103; Arne Roksund, The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), p. xi; Dirk Bejga, Der “Schlieffen” und “Tirpitzplan,” Dogmen unfehlbare Siegesrezepte für einen kurzen Krieg? (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, January 31, 1998), p. 17.  54 Bejga, Der “Schlieffen” und “Tirpitzplan,” p. 17.  55 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 166.  56 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 157.  57 Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine, pp. 156–157.  58 François-Emmanuel Brézet, “Lehren der Geschichte und technischer Fortschritt am Beispiel der Entwicklung der Doktrin der Jeune École in Frankreich,” in Jörg Düppler, ed., Seemacht und Seestrategie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1999), pp. 144–145.  59 Brézet, “Lehren der Geschichte,” pp. 144–145.  60 Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine, pp. 156–157.  61 Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine, pp. 20–21.  62 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 589.  63 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 162.  64 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 589.  65 Cited in Roksund, Jeune École, p. xiv.  66 Oscar di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst (Berlin: Verlag “Offene Worte,” 1938), p. 153.  67 (Raoul) Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, Vol. I (Belgrade: Vojno-­izdavački Zavod, 1960), translated from Raoul Castex, Théories Stratégiques, Vol. I (Paris: Société d’Editions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1929), pp. 62–63.  68 Cited in David H. Olivier, German Naval Strategy 1856–1888 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2012, first published 2004 by Frank Cass), p. 135.  69 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2001), p. 149.  70 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, pp. 65–66.  71 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 588.  72 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 591.  73 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 595.  74 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 594.  75 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 597.  76 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914, p. 146.  77 Olivier, German Naval Strategy, p. 130.  78 Olivier, German Naval Strategy, pp. 146–147.  79 Olivier, German Naval Strategy, pp. 147–148.  80 Olivier, German Naval Strategy, p. 148. 

102   Prerequisites   81 Alfred Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See: Lehre vom Seekriege (Hannover/Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1913), pp. 247–248.    82 Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See, p. 248.    83 Anonymous, “War from the Aspect of the Weaker Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (May 1920), p. 164.    84 Di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst, p. 156.    85 Di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst, p. 156.    86 Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy 1956–1986, Book 1 (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), pp. 5–6.    87 Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 23.    88 Eric Morris, The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality (New York, NY: Stein and Day Publishers, 1977), p. 19.    89 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 95.    90 Morris, Russian Navy, pp. 20–21.    91 Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine, pp. 7–8.    92 Cited in Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 79.    93 Morris, Russian Navy, pp. 20–21.    94 Ranft and Till, Sea in Soviet Strategy, pp. 94–95.    95 Robert W. Herrick, Fifty Years of Theory and Practice of Soviet Naval Strategy (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1968, 3rd printing 1976), p. 23.    96 Morris, Russian Navy, pp. 20–21.    97 Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine, p. 6.    98 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, p. 29.    99 Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet, p. 30.  100 Morris, Russian Navy, pp. 20–21.  101 Brian R. Sullivan, “A Fleet in Being: The Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861–1943,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988), p. 115.  102 Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” p. 115.  103 Philip H. Colomb, Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1891; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 48–107; Vol. 2, pp. 245–492.  104 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, pp. 35–37, 44–68.  105 Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories, trans. and ed. Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 127–283, 266–289.  106 Charles E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, Their Relations and Interdependence (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905; repr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp.  65–109, 126–147, 195–262, 309–322, 343–430.  107 The Air Ministry (A.C.A.S.I.), The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933–1945) (London: Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248, 1948; reprinted by Public Records Office, 2001), p. 44.  108 Air Ministry, Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, p. 97.  109 Air Ministry, Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, p. 100.  110 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, updated April 8, 2008), p. CRS-­25.  111 Sondhaus, “Strategy, Tactics, and Policy of Penury,” p. 589.  112 Brézet, “Lehren der Geschichte,” pp. 144–145.  113 Valerie R. Hockgraver, CJTF and the Pathway to the Littoral (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997), p. 13. 

Prerequisites   103 114 Michael C. Vitale, “Jointness by Design, Not Accident,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995, p. 27.  115 Petar Žonja, “Održavanje povoljnog operativnog rezima u malim morima,” Mornarički Glasnik (Belgrade), 1 (January–February 1972), p. 33.  116 Cited in Graham, Empire, p. 148.  117 Anonymous, “Strategy of the Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928), p. 308.  118 Rudolph Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, Vol. II: Von 1739–1793 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried und Sohn, 1911), p. 121.  119 Woodward, Russians at Sea, p. 104.  120 Gabriel Darrieu, War on the Sea: Strategy and Tactics, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1908), pp. 89–90.  121 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1914–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 44.  122 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 46.  123 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 332.  124 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: Naval Operations, Vol. IV: June 1916 to April 1917 (London: Longmans, Green, 1928), p. 121.  125 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945 Vol. 1: 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a.M., Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwissen, 1970), p. 419.  126 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, p. 298.  127 Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmans Verlag, 1958), p. 251.  128 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 282.  129 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, p. 298.  130 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security 1984–87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Ltd., 1987), p. 102.  131 Albert Lord, “Rolle und Beitrag der Seestreitkräfte,” in Hartmut Zehrer, ed., Der Golfkonflikt: Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus Militärischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), pp. 196–198.

4 Disputing sea control 

Sea denial is accomplished by conducting a series of combat actions and measures over time. This is collectively called disputing (or contesting) sea control. In a war between two strong opponents disputing sea control might last for the entire duration of the hostilities at sea. The great majority of combat actions in disputing sea control would take place in the littorals not on the open ocean. Naval warfare in the littorals has much in common with war conducted on the open ocean. However, there are also some significant differences because of the extremely complex, dynamic, and challenging physical environment. The peculiarities of the physical environment in the littorals offer many challenges – but also opportunities – in the employment of one’s naval forces and aircraft. 

Operating environment  The term littoral1 is often used but is not always properly defined or understood. In its simplest definition, littoral means a “coastal region” or “pertaining to a shore.”2 In geographic terms, littoral pertains to a coastline of both land and near-­shore waters between extreme high and low tides. Yet, on the one hand, this term is too broad and imprecise, and, on the other, it overlooks a wide range of relevant geographical conditions.  Littorals encompass areas bordering the waters of an open, peripheral sea, large archipelagoes, and enclosed and semi-­enclosed seas. The littorals bordering the open ocean, such as the coasts of North and South America, Africa, and India extend outward from the shoreline to a point which marks the farthest extent of the continental shelf. The width of the continental shelf may vary from less than 100 miles off the west coast of North and South America to nearly 800 miles out from the Arctic coast of North America and Eurasia. In most areas, the width of the continental shelf averages 200 to 500 miles. Depth of water on the continental shelf averages some 250 feet.3  Peripheral (marginal) seas are parts of an ocean bordering with the continental landmass and partially enclosed by peninsulas, island chains, or archipelagoes, such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. A peripheral sea, as, for example, with the Coral Sea, can also border a large archipelago.4 Peripheral seas lie on downward-­sloping portions of the continental shelf and are uniformly

Disputing sea control   105 deep. Littorals also include large archipelagoes completely or partially surrounded by open ocean, such as the Malay (or Indonesian) and Solomon Archipelagoes.  The most complex physical environment for employment of naval forces and aircraft belongs to enclosed and semi-­enclosed seas, popularly called “narrow seas.”5 An enclosed sea such as the Baltic or the Adriatic lies wholly within the continental shelf and is surrounded by a landmass except for a strait that connect it to an ocean or another enclosed or semi-­enclosed sea. Because of their restricted communication with the open ocean, enclosed seas have small tidal ranges or are tideless.6 Enclosed seas are also called continental seas if they rest on shallow depressions, as do the Sea of Azov and the Baltic Sea. In contrast, a semi-­enclosed sea (or partly enclosed sea) stretches contiguously to a continent and relates to the open ocean by two or more straits/narrows, as does the North Sea. Semi-­enclosed seas are characterized by large tidal ranges.7  In the military meaning of the term, a narrow sea is a body of water that can be controlled from one or both sides in a war. Hence, this term can be properly applied to all enclosed and semi-­enclosed seas with their exits, waters of large channels such as the English Channel (Canal La Manche) and narrows/channels such as the Sicilian Narrows. It is in a narrow sea where a blue-­water navy would potentially have most difficulties in projecting its power ashore.  The operating areas in the littorals differ considerably from the open ocean in terms of their size, distances, hydrography, oceanography, and the proximity of the landmass. The oceans are characterized by huge size and distances measured in thousands of miles; the Atlantic Ocean covers an area of some 41.0 million square miles and varies in width from 1,770 miles (between Brazil and Liberia) and 3,000 miles (between the east coast of the United States and North Africa). Oceans are uniformly deep, except for the waters off the continents. In contrast, a typical narrow sea presents a much smaller area to be controlled or defended. For example, the Baltic Sea covers 163,000 square miles. It extends along its north–south axis for about 1,060 miles and has an average width a little over 120 miles. The Black Sea encompasses some 157,916 square miles. It extends for some 350 miles from north to south, and 610 miles from east to west.8 The Persian (Arabian) Gulf is about 615 miles long and between 40 and 220 miles wide, with an area of about 92,600 square miles.9 With its 950,000 square miles, the Mediterranean Sea is the largest of all narrow seas. It extends west to east more than 2,400 miles, and its maximum width is about 1,000 miles. The Mediterranean encompasses several smaller narrow seas (the Tyrrhenian, Ionian, Adriatic, and Aegean).  In an enclosed or semi-­enclosed sea theater, the distances separating various points on the opposing shores are relatively short. For example, in the Baltic Sea, the distance between Kiel and Helsinki is about 720 miles; the port of Tallinn (formerly Reval) is only about 253 miles away from Stockholm; some 265 miles separate Copenhagen and Rostock. In the North Sea, the British port of Hull is only about 320 miles away from the German port of Emden. Ostend is some 240 miles away from Hull. The German port of Cuxhaven lies about 545 miles from Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. 

106   Disputing sea control Short distances in many narrow seas considerably affect the employment of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. Transit times for ships and submarines are short. Because of the short distances, high sustained speed for a surface combatant is not as critical a requirement as it is for transiting long ocean distances. The smallness of the area combined with short distances allows employment of not only large but also small surface ships and submarines. They can be deployed and redeployed to another area at short notice and within hours. In a narrow sea, submarines can, by conducting attacks in various part of the theater, create an impression that a larger number of them are present than is the case.10  The short distances in a typical narrow sea also allow the use of all types of fixed-­wing aircraft and helicopters. Short flying times allow more sorties and a longer time over the target. Aircraft can be quickly deployed and redeployed between various points. The probability of achieving surprise is also greatly enhanced, especially if aircraft approach targets at low altitudes or over land. In addition, a damaged aircraft has a much better chance of reaching the safety of its base than if operating over the open ocean. Finally, short distances allow the side that is stronger in the air to dominate a theater to a far greater degree than on the open ocean.  The single biggest difference between the open ocean and the littorals is density of surface and air traffic. Narrow seas are characterized by the presence of large numbers of friendly, potentially hostile, and neutral commercial vessels, warships, and auxiliaries. In peacetime, the waters close to the coast are typically crowded with fishing vessels, resource exploitation, and scientific vessels plus numerous recreational craft. Obviously, density of traffic in the littoral waters would be drastically reduced in wartime because only ships carrying troops/materiel and cargo for the needs of the war effort plus some fishing vessels would operate.  All narrow seas are connected to the open ocean or another narrow sea by a single or several straits/narrows, also called “choke points.”11 Density of shipping at the approaches to and within the international straits is higher than on the open ocean. There are several thousand straits in the world, but only some 120 have some international importance.12  Several of them, notably the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, and Singapore Strait, are considered global choke points of the world’s trade. International straits are both the hubs and the most vulnerable segments of sea communications, linking enclosed or semi-­enclosed seas with other sea or open ocean areas. In some cases, a choke point can be avoided but sailing through an alternate choke point would incur longer distance and transit time. International straits have extremely large economic, political, and military importance.  Straits/narrows hold the key to control of naval and commercial movements from/to a given enclosed sea theater. A side controlling both sides of a strait can employ naval forces and establish coastal defenses to prevent an attacker from entering a given enclosed sea theater. The location, length, width, and depth of a choke point largely determine its military importance. A strait that, like the Strait of Hormuz or the Danish Straits, is the only access to an enclosed sea has much greater importance than other straits. 

Disputing sea control   107 The length of important straits can greatly vary, from the 1,150-mile long Mozambique Channel, to the Strait of Tiran (Gulf of Aqaba), which is only 3.5 miles long. The Persian Gulf is linked to the Arabian Sea by the Strait of Hormuz, which is 120 miles long and 60 down to 24 miles wide.13 The 550-mile long Strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.  Some international straits are very narrow and thereby greatly affect a ship’s speed and maneuverability. For example, the Strait of Malacca is only about 1.7 miles wide at its narrowest point, as is the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait. Narrow and shallow straits also add to the navigational hazards. Some straits are deep, as for example are the Strait of Gibraltar (1,100 feet) and Strait of Lombok (1,000 feet). Other major straits are shallow. For example, the Strait of Malacca is only about 70–120 feet deep while the Bosporus and Dardanelles are 110 and 160 feet deep, respectively.14 Navigation through some important straits might be very difficult because of strong currents. For example, the current in the Shimonoseki Strait (between Honshū and Kyūshū) is up to eight knots. The San Bernardino Strait (between Bicol Island, Luzon and Samar) has a tidal current of 4 to 8 knots.  The configuration and physical features of the coast affect in important ways the length and directional orientation of a base of operations, the organization of surveillance, and coastal defense. The employment of naval forces and aircraft in a narrow sea is greatly affected by the length of the coastline, the number and size of natural harbors, the terrain, the presence of offshore islands, the abundance or scarcity of natural resources, and inland communications. For example, Dalmatia’s coast is about 1,056 miles long and is fronted with 1,185 islands. Its total coastline length including islands is some 3,565 miles.  On elevated or mountainous coasts, communications are often scarce or entirely lacking. If a mountain chain runs close and parallel to the coast, as along Dalmatia’s coast, then the roads and railroads usually run in the same direction. A steep, rocky, and highly indented coast, or one with fjords separated by rocky headlands and numerous rivers, makes longitudinal communications difficult, while rocky beaches make it difficult to carry out conventional, large-­scale amphibious landings.  Generally, a low-­lying coast is favorable for the development of the road/ railroad network, which can in turn greatly reduce the need for coastal shipping. Conversely, a coast with poor land communications means greater reliance on coastal shipping to transport military and commercial cargo. Land traffic can easily be interrupted for lengthy periods, especially if the principal roads or railways run close and parallel to a coast backed by steep, high mountains.  A flat coast with few or no offshore islands is generally favorable to landings by sizable forces. It also facilitates the movement of forces into the interior. For example, the Jutland Peninsula’s northwestern coast consists of long, wide beaches of packed sand, while the southeastern coast is suitable for only small landings during mild weather. Generally, coral reefs and very shallow water extending far from shore favor defense against conventional amphibious assaults. Swamps and marshes in the coastal area can considerably impede or canalize vehicular traffic, especially heavy armor and mechanized forces. 

108   Disputing sea control Offshore islands are potentially a great obstacle to any attacker. At the same time, however, they require larger forces for defense. For example, Finland’s coast is fronted by some 790 islands larger than 0.4 square miles, plus some 178,500 islets; off Sweden’s coast there are about 98,370 islands/islets. The Stockholm archipelago alone consists of about 30,000 islands/islets. Sweden’s coastline, including islands, stretches for some 37,755 miles. Large archipelagoes, as in the Aegean, include many uninhabited islands, which greatly complicate the problem of defense. In contrast, a long coast without offshore islands, such as the Iranian coast in the Arabian Gulf, is highly vulnerable to attack from the sea.  Narrow passages between islands can be blocked by mines and coastal missile/gun batteries. Numerous islands canalize the movements of the enemy landing forces. Several island chains running parallel with the mainland coast extend the defensive depth of the coastal area. A multitude of offshore islands offers the possibility of dispersing bases and thereby making them less vulnerable; small surface combatants can change bases or anchorages in hours. Protected bays or channels offer refuges for ships, and islands conceal the movements of surface ships and troop transports.15  If islands extend transversely from the coast, as off Dalmatia’s coast, the channels separating them are usually wide and deep, allowing quick, concealed, and relatively easy deployment and redeployment of naval forces. An archipelago, such as the Aegean (1,415 islands) or the Malay (25,000 islands, between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans), also allows great flexibility in the selection of lines of operation and easy and secure “castling” (leapfrogging) of naval forces. It also provides excellent opportunities for using mines in the defense of naval bases, commercial ports, and sea traffic. In general, the more numerous the islands, the more difficult the detection of small surface combatants.  Most narrow seas are characterized by shallow water (less than 200 fathoms deep). For example, about 60 percent of the Baltic Sea is less than 150 feet deep. The depth of water in the Gulf of Finland varies from 110 to just over 300 feet. The average depth of the Adriatic Sea is about 650 feet.16 In the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, the mean depth is about 80 feet, and the water is rarely deeper than 300 feet; the deepest water is found off the Iranian coast, while depths off Saudi Arabia’s coast average 110 feet. Maximum depth in the Yellow Sea is 460 feet, and the mean depth is only 150 feet.17  The shallowness of water in a typical narrow sea affects the performance of surface ships and submarines. The speed of large surface ships must be considerably reduced when transiting very shallow waters (10- to 40-foot depths). In confined waters, such as channels, a ship’s speed can be reduced by up to 60 percent. The effects of water depth are rather significant for surface ships at speeds higher than 25 knots. For example, at 30 knots in 80-foot depths, wave resistance is almost three times greater than in 115-foot water and five times more than in deep water (more than 1,200 feet).18 A surface ship proceeding at 5, 10, 15, or 20 knots requires minimum depths of 13, 56, 125, and 220 feet, respectively.19 

Disputing sea control   109 Safe operations by a submarine require certain clearances above the mast and under the keel. Normally, an SSN should have a minimum of 50 feet of water under its keel; an SSK needs from 35 to 40 feet. This figure does not include the much greater depth required for a submarine to maneuver in evading attack. Depending on the water transparency, a submarine may need to operate several dozen feet farther down to prevent detection from the air. At periscope a sub­ marine’s keel depth is from 50 to 65 feet, depending on sea state and periscope/ mast extension. Reportedly, the periscope depth for an American SSN is less than 100 feet (from the keel).  The shallow water also adversely affects the performance of acoustic sensors and weapons. On the open ocean, the water’s depth, salinity, and temperature are the principal factors determining the propagation of underwater sound. In contrast, in a typical narrow sea, the shallowness of the water, the changing character of the seabed, and the proximity and configuration of the coast play a dominant role. Propagation of underwater sound is highly unpredictable. Sound transmission in shallow water is principally affected by the characteristics and the flatness of the bottom, the depth of the water, and the thermal gradients in the surface layers.20  Shallow water facilitates the use of all types of mines. For example, bottom mines for use against enemy submarines can be laid to a depth of about 660 feet, yet their effectiveness diminishes significantly below 230 feet. Rocket-­propelled rising mines can be used down to 650 feet. Anti-­submarine rising mines fitted with rocket-­propelled torpedoes may be laid in water depths exceeding 3,300 feet. Modern moored mines could be laid at depths from 15 feet to, depending on their size, 5,000 feet or even more. Pressure influence mines cannot be laid at depths greater than 100 to 165 feet; otherwise they would be ineffective against enemy surface ships.21  The character of the seabed can either facilitate submarine operations or make them very difficult. In general, a smooth sea floor allows submarines to lie on the bottom during a pursuit. The presence of shipwrecks can provide a hiding place. An SSK can use bathymetry, bottom composition, topography, and nearby wrecks to hide from pursuers.22 It would be difficult to detect if it settled on the seabed in less than 100 feet of water, switched off its engines, and shut all seawater inlets. A bottom-­lying SSK looks to sensors like a sunken ship; only a human operator can tell the difference. An SSN, however, cannot sit on the sea bottom, for fear of clogging vital inlets to condensers.23  In general, electronic sensors when used close to a coast are prone to degradation due to a variety of climatic, electromagnetic (EM), and atmospheric anomalies, the presence of a large landmass, man-­made clutter, and the proximity of multiple EM sources.24 The performance of radar, electronic support measures (ESM), and communications systems varies with temperature, pressure, humidity, cloud formation, and storm activity. Another problem is the presence of many cellular telephone networks and such commercial land-­based emitters as television, commercial aircraft, and ships. This, in turn, creates substantial difficulties in using ESM sensors to sort out and identify emitters or signals of interest. 

110   Disputing sea control

Characteristics  Warfare in the littorals has certain characteristics not found on the open ocean. These distinctions are especially pronounced in narrow seas. The operating areas of both enemy and friendly forces encompass not only littoral waters but also coasts, offshore islands, and parts of the hinterland within the effective range of naval weapons. Littorals lie on the flanks of friendly forces operating along the coast. This requires protection by naval forces. At the same time, coastal flanks are highly vulnerable to attacks from across the sea. For example, in the Italian campaign in 1943–1945, the flanks of the Allied armies were on Italy’s western and eastern coasts. In the German–Soviet war, the strategic flanks of both sides were the Baltic and Black Seas.25 Likewise, during the Korean War (1950–1953) the coasts of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Sea of Japan (Eastern Sea, for the Koreans) and the Yellow Sea (Western Sea) represented the flanks of both the United Nations’ and the North Korean/Chinese ground forces.  In contrast to the open ocean, the threat to one’s forces steadily increases as they approach the enemy coast. The ability of a weaker side at sea to challenge control by a stronger side is generally much higher in a typical narrow sea than on the open ocean. The reason is that the weaker side can successfully integrate its sea-­going and land-­based forces. This, combined with a high degree of combat training and morale and skillful leadership, can greatly if not completely preclude the effective employment of large forces of surface combatants by a stronger navy.  A force approaching the littorals can be detected hundreds of miles away and then attacked first by land-­based aircraft and submarines. It will encounter more intensive and possibly more lethal attacks as it enters the effective range of the enemy small surface combatants, armed helicopters, UAVs, mines, midget submarines and coastal ASCM/gun batteries. The weaker side can reach out much further and more strongly than expected, catching the attacking force off guard.26  In contrast to war on the open ocean, combat actions in the littorals can encompass a major part, or even the whole of, a theater, as the North Sea in 1914–1918 and the Solomons Campaign of 1942–1944 illustrate. Numerous actions between small surface combatants took place in the English Channel in 1940–1944, the Sicilian Narrows in 1940–1943, the Black Sea in 1941–1944, and the Adriatic in 1943–1945.  For a stronger side, complete control of a typical narrow sea cannot be obtained if its weaker adversary exists and is active. For example, the state of disputed control in the North Sea prevailed from August 1914 to almost November 1918. The Germans also effectively controlled the southeastern part of the North Sea. The Royal Navy never obtained control of the Baltic, which remained essentially a “German lake.” Likewise, control of the Adriatic was successfully contested by the Austro-­Hungarian Navy throughout the entire war.27  Lines of operation in a typical narrow sea are generally short. Hence, one’s forces can be deployed or redeployed rather quickly. For example, in the struggle for control of the English Channel in 1940–1944, lines of operation for the

Disputing sea control   111 German forces varied from about 84 nautical miles at the latitude of Brest to only 18 at the narrowest part of the Channel.28  Generally, sea routes in enclosed sea theaters are fewer in number and much shorter than on the open ocean. If a coast is fronted by islands or an archipelago, they are few. Few, if any, alternatives are available and they are rigidly laid. In all but name, sea routes resemble the land lines of communications. The multitude of shipping routes also requires greater efforts to protect them against the submarine attacks.  In a typical narrow sea, shipping routes assume very different patterns: they run along the coast (i.e., longitudinally), from one shore to the opposite one (laterally), or central-­longitudinally from/to sea exit(s) to ports of destination. Longitudinal sea routes, from one port to another along one’s coastline within the effective range of coastal defenses, are generally easier to protect. Where coastal waters are deep, like off Norway, longitudinal sea routes can run very close to shore. It is even easier to protect longitudinal sea routes if the coast is fronted by several island rows, as is case along the Dalmatian coast. However, longitudinal sea routes are long and few. Hence, they are highly vulnerable to an enemy’s attack. Attackers can choose parts of the route that are exposed or poorly defended, and choose their time. They have a much greater diversity of targets, because coastal routes would be used by many types of commercial and military shipping.29  Lateral sea routes are shorter and more numerous than are coastal routes. However, they are also much more vulnerable to an enemy attack because they run across the high seas, where their defense is difficult; they can be secured usually only near the ports of origins and destination. Friendly ships using lateral routes would be unable to maneuver and seek protection closer to their own coast.30 Central-­longitudinal sea routes such as the route from Gibraltar to Malta and Alexandria, run through the middle of a given narrow sea from/to the sea exit. They usually have the largest traffic volume. They would require much greater effort by a stronger side to obtain full control.  The restricted maneuvering space in a typical narrow sea, especially with shoals and reefs, is even more confined if one or both opponents lay mines. For example, in the English Channel the operational areas for both the German and British forces were much reduced by, aside from the many navigational hazards, extensive mined areas. Most of the mine barriers laid by both sides were in the middle of the English Channel.31 The smallness of the sea area would force the opposing naval forces to be concentrated rather than dispersed. This would facilitate their mutual support but at the same time they would be more vulnerable to enemy attack.  The small size of the typical narrow sea allows both the attacker and the defender to keep a large part of the theater under constant observation. Even the weaker side can conduct continuous reconnaissance throughout the theater. Hence, large surface ships would have difficulty remaining undetected.32 Smaller hostile ships, however, can take advantage of the high density of shipping traffic combined with the presence of offshore islands and islets to conceal their

112   Disputing sea control presence.33 The presence of noncombatants also makes identification of targets much more complicated than on the open ocean.  In the littorals, shipborne radars would detect low-­flying aircraft or ASCMs at much shorter distances than their nominal maximum effective ranges because of the presence of land clutter.34 The Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 illustrated significant problems in the performance of shipborne radars for detection/ identification of low-­flying targets in the presence of land clutter.35 Very often false targets are created, and actual targets masked.  Detection, classification, and tracking of aerial targets in the littorals are also difficult because of the high intensity of commercial air traffic. The proximity of the landmass can cause detection ranges to be much shorter than expected. Airborne radars might have great difficulties in detecting aerial targets if they fly very low and over terrain with highly reflective properties. At the same time a low-­flying aircraft would have its radar detection range greatly reduced and for the same reason.  Detection of submarines and mines in the littorals is much more complex and uncertain than on the open ocean. This is largely the result of the prevalent shallowness of water, peculiarities of hydrographic and oceanographic conditions, and high ambient noise. In shallow water, sound propagation is generally difficult to predict, because of great seasonal and daily variations of sea temperature, salinity, waves, tides and currents, any influx of fresh water, and the reflection and absorption due to variations of the seabed. In addition, natural and human-­ made ambient noise compounds the problem of hunting for submarines in shallow waters. The submarines are detected at much shorter range than on the open ocean.  One of the major problems in using acoustic sensors in shallow water for classification of contacts is a high false-­alarm rate. An indented coast fronted by numerous islands and islets makes classifying sonar contacts extremely difficult. In general, the longer a sonar’s detection range, notably for passive sonar, the greater the problem; the number of contacts increases approximately as the square of detection range.36 Many false sonar contacts result from the high irregularity of the sea bottom; submerged cliffs and slopes may resemble submarines lying close to or on the bottom.37 False contacts result in not only wasted time but unnecessary expenditure of fuel, sonobuoys, and weapons.38 If the sea bottom is composed of metaliferous rock, magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD) often produce false alarms.39 As a result of all the above, the detection range of submarines by surface ships is much shorter in shallow water than on the open ocean, especially against quiet SSKs. An SSK that is motionless or moving at less than 5 knots and is positioned near wrecks or rocky pinnacles is almost impossible to detect with acoustic sensors.40 Also, submarine-­versus-submarine detection ranges are very short because of their improved stealth features, meaning, again, much shorter reaction times.41  In comparison to war on the open ocean, warning and reaction time in the littorals is much reduced by short distances. This is especially the case in narrow seas with islands where small surface combatants can hide and attack suddenly

Disputing sea control   113 at short range. ASCMs can be launched from concealed positions behind islands, the terrain being used to mask their trajectories, leaving very little time for targets to react.  In the littorals, surface ships are especially vulnerable to attacks by anti-­ship missiles and torpedoes. Supersonic ASCMs fly at very low altitude and can conduct complicated evasive maneuvers in the terminal phase of their flight. For example, an ASCM flying at Mach 2.5 and at low altitude would be detected at a range of 15 miles; it would take only 33 seconds to reach its intended target. Advanced ASCMs can be programmed to escape detection by abruptly changing direction and attacking a different target in the same general area. A target would have great difficulty countering ASCMs fired simultaneously or in a short interval by a combination of aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and coastal sites. The same challenge of short reaction time applies to heavyweight torpedoes. A typical distance for launching a heavyweight torpedo from a submarine is between 5.7 and 9.2 miles. However, this distance is considerably shorter when torpedoes are launched by a small surface combatant or a submarine in an ambush position.  One of the key features of naval combat in the littorals is frequent and radical change in the tactical and operational situation. The situation on the surface greatly depends on those in the air and on land. Control of a given part of the theater will be directly related to the size of forces present, and the duration of their presence.42 The high speeds of modern surface combatants and their ability to combine maneuver and “fires,” together with the features of the physical environment, potentially allow one side to achieve surprise. The weaker side may not operate in the way one thinks it would, using asymmetric responses to neutralize or even nullify the advantages normally enjoyed by a blue-­water navy. The weaker side would try to inflict large losses on the stronger side.  In general, in the littorals, frequency of contact between opposing forces would be much higher than on the open ocean.43 Missions of small surface combatants would be short, because of their short range and low endurance. For example, a combat mission for a missile craft could vary from several to about a dozen hours. The duration of a mission by a small surface combatant would depend not only on its endurance but also on the length of night hours. The latter depends on the time of year and geographic latitude of operating area.  In a typical narrow sea, large surface combatants would face increased danger not only from the aircraft and coastal batteries, but also from submarines. This was shown in World War I. For example, after the torpedoing of the 25,600-ton French battleship Jean Bart in December 1914, the Strait of Otranto became dangerous for the French fleet, and ships withdrew farther away, to the Ionian Islands. The blockade was greatly limited because of an absence of advanced bases. Fuel and food were obtained in Cephalonia and Zante from merchant ships and on the open sea, and later at anchor. Because of the threat of U-­boats, the French fleet moved even farther away to the Gulf of Morea, near Cape Matapan and the island of Kythira (off the southeastern tip of the Peloponnese Peninsula), and even Crete.44 Hence, the French blockade became broader and

114   Disputing sea control broader. The French wanted to keep the Strait of Otranto under observation by using cruisers. However, after the 12,400-ton armored cruiser Léon Gambetta was torpedoed in April 1915, that idea was abandoned too. The French situation dramatically improved only after Italy entered the war on May 23. After that, French forces were able to use the bases of Taranto and Brindisi. In 1916, bases at Argostoli and Corfu were used for the first time.45  The French and British ally Italy had a similar experience in July 1915 when two German U-­boats sank two armored cruisers: the 9,830-ton Amalfi and the 7,350-ton Garibaldi. This had a chilling effect on the employment of the Italian battle force in the Adriatic. The Italians used only two major naval bases – Brindisi and Venice – some 400 nautical miles from each other. This, in turn, precluded mutual support of heavy surface ships. Hence, the Italians essentially lost control of surface to the weaker force – the Austro-­Hungarian Navy.  Today, in a war between two strong opponents, surface combat in an enclosed or semi-­enclosed sea would be – thanks to long-­range, highly precise, and ever more lethal weapons, such as ASCMs or LACMs (land attack cruise missiles), advanced heavyweight/ASW torpedoes, and other smart weapons – most likely decisive. The presence of major surface combatants would be even more risky than in past wars. Most surface encounters would be fought at close range. The encounters would be sudden, short, and violent. Fast combat craft would carry out their attacks from ambushing positions close to the coast and offshore islands. Because of their small size and silhouette, hostile fast combat craft would be detected at much shorter range than their much larger counterparts. In a war between two strong opponents, the intensity of surface and air combat, and with it consumption of fuel and ammunition, would be very high. As a result, logistical sustainment would be critically important to success.  Perhaps the most critical factor for success in littorals is to have air superiority over a major part of the theater. In a typical narrow sea, land-­based aircraft would have an absolutely key role in obtaining control of surface, the subsurface, and the air. Land-­based aircraft can fly more sorties within a given timeframe in a typical enclosed or semi-­enclosed sea than on the open ocean. In a sea with many offshore islands and islets, land-­based aircraft can strike from bases flanking the transit routes of the enemy ships. Aircraft can also be serviced and maintained relatively easily, thereby allowing many of them to be kept operational at any time. They would pose a constant threat to the survivability of all ships, but especially major surface combatants. The threat of strikes from the air could completely paralyze one’s naval forces.46  In a typical narrow sea, surface combatants and merchant vessels would operate at very high risk unless reliably protected by carrier- and/or land-­based aircraft. Air power might even have a decisive role in the outcome of a war at sea. The effectiveness of land-­based aircraft in attacking enemy surface ships at sea, and especially in the littorals, was demonstrated for the first time in European waters in World War II. For example, the Luftwaffe was instrumental in the successful German invasion of Norway in April to June 1940. The Royal Navy failed in its effort to deny the use of the sea to the Germans in the first five

Disputing sea control   115 days of the campaign. The inability to control the coastal waters off Norway because of the intensity and high effectiveness of the Luftwaffe attacks made the Allied ships’ operations hazardous and difficult in the extreme unless protection was provided by Allied fighters based ashore.47  During World War II in the Mediterranean, land-­based aircraft on both sides played a major role in controlling the communications.48 Although aircraft were unable to obtain a real command they prevented naval forces of both sides from obtaining control in the central Mediterranean.49 The Luftwaffe’s effectiveness in attacking the enemy’s surface ships at sea was on full display during the final phase of the struggle for the island of Crete in late May 1941. The British Navy was extensively employed in embarking and then transporting Allied troops from Crete to Alexandria, Egypt. During this evacuation effort, Allied ships were subjected to massive attacks from the Luftwaffe’s VIII Air Corps. One effect of these attacks was that the Allies were forced to abandon their efforts to evacuate troops from Crete’s northern coast.50  Because of the threat from the air, most surface actions in the littorals would take place at night or in severe weather. For example, prior to 1942, British coastal forces operating in the English Channel and the North Sea were highly vulnerable to attack by the Luftwaffe aircraft during the day unless they were provided with effective fighter cover.51 Hence, most of their missions were conducted during the night. By the summer of 1942, the Luftwaffe’s superiority over the Channel had ended. The German S-­boats (Schnellbooten – fast boats) based on the occupied coasts of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were able to operate only at night. During short summer nights the S-­boats concentrated their attacks against convoys in the Strait of Dover and the approaches to Plymouth while in the long winter nights, S-­boats based in the Netherlands extended their missions up to the estuary of the Humber River (east coast of northern England).52 From August 1942 to July 1943, when the majority of German shipping moved along the coast from the Scheldt River estuary southward through the Channel toward southern France, all actions by German surface forces were conducted during the night. This required a high degree of navigational skill because most navigational lights had been shut down. Yet despite all defensive measures, there were frequent attacks by the British coastal forces, mostly motor gunboats (MGBs) and motor launches (MLs). The British had a fairly good knowledge of the German routes and used radar to select ambush positions on routes.53 The British coastal forces too had to operate mostly at night, because a great threat from Luftwaffe aircraft remained.54  Land-­based aircraft also pose a mortal threat to the survival of merchant ships in the littoral waters. For example, after the fall of France in June 1940 the situation in the Mediterranean changed dramatically. The sea route from the Sicilian Narrows as far as the area between Crete and Cyrenaica was within easy bombing distance of the Italian Air Force’s bases in Sardinia, Sicily, and North Africa. After Crete was captured by the Germans in May 1941, the convoy route to Malta was double-­flanked by the Axis bases on Crete and Cyrenaica to the

116   Disputing sea control south. With the Luftwaffe in Crete to the north of “Bomb Alley,” and Cyrenaica to the south, it was no longer practicable for the Allies to send convoys from Alexandria to Malta.55 

Dynamics  In a war between two strong opponents, disputing control of the sea is a highly dynamic process. In the littorals, the strategic situation would be largely determined by the extent and intensity of war on land. Corbett observed that in a war command of the sea is normally in dispute.56 Disputed sea control occurs when the opposing sides possess roughly equal strength and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is no significant change in the ratio of forces or a change of the initiative to either side.57 A power too weak to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude.58  Defense alone never can result in obtaining sea control. However, a prolonged defense can prevent the stronger side from securing positive results and thereby give one’s forces enough time achieve their objectives ashore.59 It is an error to believe that if one side loses command of the sea then it will pass to the other side. The most common situation in a war at sea between two strong opponents is that neither side has the command and a state of uncommanded sea prevails.60  Corbett wrote that when the command is in dispute the general conditions might give a stable or unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent.61 He believed that it is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won, pure naval strategy comes to an end.62 However, Corbett made a gross error here because maritime strategy is conducted continuously in peacetime and in time of war.  In a war between two strong opponents, a state of disputed sea control might exist, in which the opposing sides possess roughly equal strength, there is no meaningful change in the ratio of forces, and the initiative does not shift to either side.63 Such a situation is characterized by an almost continuous struggle for control, which when achieved is usually maintained for only a brief time and then lost and then obtained again. Disputed sea control is characterized by large losses on both sides. For example, in 1940–1944, both the British and the Germans almost uninterruptedly fought to obtain full control of the English Channel. For most of the war, however, that control was elusive for both sides. Both the British and the Germans successfully contested control by the other.  In 1940–1943, the British Mediterranean Fleet, based at Alexandria and Gibraltar, controlled large parts of the surface in the eastern and western Mediterranean, respectively. Disputed control of the sea surface, subsurface and the air prevailed in the central Mediterranean. The Luftwaffe/Royal Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica Italiana) and the British Royal Air Force (RAF )

Disputing sea control   117 fought for control. The Axis’ submarines contested Allied control of the surface at both ends of the Mediterranean. At the same time, both the Allies and the Axis had to maintain communications in the central Mediterranean. The British lines of communication were less frequently traveled than those for the Axis. They were also much longer and more exposed to the enemy attack from the air and by submarines.64 Yet this state of disputed control did not prevent either the Allies or the Axis from running convoys when and where needed. The tracks of the Allied and Axis convoys crossed each other at almost right angles. The Axis powers used the sea more frequently than the Allies did, because their communications were much shorter. To attack Axis communications in the central Mediterranean successfully, the joint employment of the Allied light forces, submarines, and aircraft was a prerequisite – and that was not done. In addition, British submarines were too large to work safely and effectively in the Mediterranean.65  Another example of contested sea control was the situation that existed at the sea approaches to Guadalcanal from August 1942 to February 1943. The outcome of the struggle for that island depended on whether the Allies or the Japanese could establish control of the adjacent sea area to reinforce and supply their respective troops on the island. After the battle of the eastern Solomons on August 24, 1942, a virtual exchange of control of the sea surface took place every twelve hours. Because of the much more effective land-­based aircraft, the Allies dominated waters around the island and the air from sunrise to sundown. However, at night the Japanese sent reinforcements and supplies by using light cruisers and destroyers (called the “Tokyo Express” by the Americans). The Allies interfered often with the “Tokyo Express” but these attempts proved to be expensive.66  When control of the sea is in dispute both sides operate at elevated risk. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a long time. It may be lost from time to time and then regained. In littoral waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed. Each side will try to control certain parts of the sea/ocean and exploit the benefits of that control. Normally, neither side will make a considerable effort in those parts of the sea where a failure seems certain or success would be too costly, or where command would bring no real naval, military, or diplomatic advantage.67 One side usually controls one or more parts of a given theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part or parts. Control of a specific sea area for each side is usually limited in time.  A stronger side might have a high degree of control on the open ocean but much less control close to the continental landmass. Complete control of a narrow sea cannot be obtained if the opponent, however weak, exists and is active. For example, during World War I, the British Grand Fleet never had control of the eastern and southeastern parts of the North Sea. Likewise, control of the Adriatic was essentially in the hands of the Austro-­Hungarian Navy throughout the entire war.68 

118   Disputing sea control

Main methods  There is no collective agreement as to the main methods used by a weaker side to deny control of the sea. For example, Corbett wrote that command of the sea is disputed by what he called “defensive fleet operations – ‘fleet-­in-being’ ” and “minor counter-­attacks.”69 However, Corbett is in error here. Fleet-­in-being is only one among many main methods of disputing sea control. It cannot be considered, in properly understood operational terms, as “defensive fleet operation.” Corbett also confused “main methods” of disputing sea control, such as “fleet-­inbeing,” and methods of combat employment, such as “minor counter-­attacks.” Generically, the main methods of disputing sea control are as follows:  • • • • • • • • • • •

Avoiding a Decisive Encounter.  Seeking a Decisive Encounter.  Weakening the Enemy Naval Forces Over Time.  Counter-­Containment.  Destroying Military-­Economic Potential at Sea.  Attack on the Enemy’s Coast.  Defense of the Coast.  Defense of Important Positions/Basing Areas.  Capturing Important Positions/Basing Areas.  Defense of a Choke Point.  Capturing a Choke Point. 

Each of these main methods should be used in combination with others. For example, avoiding a decisive encounter should be combined with efforts to weaken enemy naval forces over time and destroy the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea. On the open ocean, and even in a large enclosed sea such as the Mediterranean or the Caribbean Sea, a weaker side can successfully contest command by the stronger side. This is a much more formidable task in a narrow sea. For example, a stronger side can relatively easily blockade the sea’s only exit and exercise strategic control of a given enclosed sea. This task is more complicated in a semi-­enclosed sea such as the North Sea or the Yellow Sea because of the relatively open passages to the adjacent ocean. To exercise control of the sea, a major navy must operate within the confines of a narrow sea. This, in turn, will provide even a small coastal force the opportunity to challenge a major navy. Land-­based aircraft, small surface combatants, and mines are ideal means to contest the command of the stronger opponent at sea. Also, a country guarding one shore, or even better both shores, of a strategically important waterway can use all the services of its armed forces to make it difficult if not impossible for a major navy to obtain any degree of control within a given narrow sea. 

Methods of combat employment  The main methods of combat employment of one’s naval and other forces in disputing sea control are tactical in size. Corbett wrote that “minor counter-­attacks”

Disputing sea control   119 would be the main methods of the weaker fleet to dispute control by the stronger fleet. He defined a “minor attack” as “an attack with a limited object directed against some enemy interest e.g. fighting forces, arsenals, dockyards, ports. It should go hand in hand with fleet-­in-being.”70 Corbett wrote that for “the weaker of two belligerents minor-­attack has always exercised a certain fascination.” The aim is to reduce “the relative inferiority by putting part of the enemy force out of action. Such hopes were rarely realised.”71  Generically, major/minor tactical actions are the principal methods of combat employment of one’s naval forces and aircraft in disputing sea control. These actions would be conducted on the surface, the subsurface, in the air, and in many cases also on land. Naval tactical actions are normally an integral part of a major naval/joint operation. Yet, in disputing control, these actions are conducted for the most part independently. However, these actions must be fought as an integral part of a given operational framework; otherwise, one’s efforts and time would be wasted. Generally, disputing control of the sea would be conducted by major or minor tactical actions at sea, subsurface, in the air, and on the coast. For example, during the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War of October 1973 the Israelis and the Egyptians or Syrians fought two naval battles. In the night of October 6/7, a force of five Israeli missile boats patrolled off Syria’s coast, some 200 miles from their home base. The Israeli boats identified and then sank with gunfire one Syrian torpedo boat. The same force then swept the Syrian coast off the port of Latakia and sank one Syrian minesweeper with gunfire, before detecting three Syrian missile boats and one minesweeper. In the subsequent missile exchange, all three Syrian missile boats were sunk within 25 minutes.72 In the night of October 8/9, six Israeli missile boats approached the Egyptian coast to shell the military installations and coastal defenses in Damietta. Around midnight, four Egyptian missile boats engaged them. Three of the Israeli missile boats launched their missiles, and within 40 minutes three Egyptian boats were sunk; the fourth was out of range and escaped to safety.73  A weaker side at sea can also use unconventional and asymmetric tactical methods to inflict losses on its stronger opponent. One relatively new method involves so-­called “swarming” attacks, in which many small, fast boats, hidden in coves on the coast or among islands, would launch massive missile strikes against large surface combatants or commercial vessels. Success would primarily depend on delivering almost simultaneous attacks/strikes by many small boats from different directions, to overwhelm the enemy’s missile defenses. For example, the Iranians reportedly intend to use “swarming” attacks against the U.S./coalition naval forces operating in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and especially when transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Swarming attacks would be conducted at short ranges, perhaps not greater than 6,500 feet.74  Another swarming tactic that could possibly be effective against large surface combatants would use UAVs/USVs/UUVs, either independently or in combination with massive attacks by small, fast, missile-­armed craft. The danger that swarming attacks might pose to major surface combatants, especially in confined

120   Disputing sea control waters like the Strait of Hormuz, should not be underestimated by a blue-­water navy, including the U.S. Navy.  The weaker side at sea will have few if any opportunities to plan and execute major fleet-­versus-fleet operations. However, naval forces would play a dominant role in planning and execution of a major naval/joint operation in defense of friendly military-­economic shipping. A defensive joint/combined operation would be planned and conducted in defense of a strategically/ operationally important choke point, large island/archipelago or small peninsula, and basing area.  The ability of a weaker side at sea to challenge control by a stronger fleet is generally much higher in a typical narrow sea than in the open ocean. The small size of the area, short distances, shallow waters, and presence of a large number of offshore islands, together with a fleet that is composed of both offensive and defensive components and is offensively minded and skillfully directed, leads to an ability to dispute control with the stronger fleet. The lack of large surface combatants could be compensated for by coastal and midget submarines, missile­armed corvettes and fast attack craft, and mines. Air superiority obtained by land-­based aircraft is a critical factor for the success of the weaker side in the littorals. Also, the weaker navy cannot accomplish diverse tasks in such sea areas without close cooperation with the army and coastal defense forces. The key for success in disputing sea control in the littorals is to have all forces under a joint command and thereby ensure the closest cooperation among the navy and other services in planning, preparing, and executing major operations – and even tactical actions. The ability of a weaker but properly balanced navy to dispute control of a blue-­water navy within an enclosed sea theater or at the approaches of a sea’s only exit is much higher today than in the past. Hence, blue-­water navies can neglect these problems only at their peril. 

Notes    1 The word “littoral” is from Latin noun “litus,” “litoris” meaning “shore.”    2 David F. Tver, Ocean and Marine Dictionary (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1979), p. 182.    3 Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd, Brown-, Green- and Blue-­Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present (Westport, CT/London: Praeger, 2002), p. 66.    4 Archipelago is defined as “a chain or cluster of islands closely scattered in a body of water” (usually an ocean but it could be a sea or lake); they are often of volcanic origin; the word comes from the Greek arkhi (leader) and pelagos (sea) or “chief sea.”    5 The use of the term “narrow seas” had its origins in the claims of the English kings to “sovereignty of the sea” around the British Isles in the thirteenth century; they had possessions in France and directed their admirals to police the “Narrow Seas” – the area of the Strait of Dover and the English Channel; in 1336, King Edward III reportedly referred to his predecessors as “Lords of the English Sea on every side;” cited in Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, translated by Michael Byers (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2000), p. 131. The first written reference to “narrow seas” was supposedly in Christopher Marlowe’s play “King Edward II,” written in 1590 or 1591; Edward II (1321–1326) reportedly said “The haughty Dane commands

Disputing sea control   121 the narrow seas” (pertaining at that time to the St. George Channel between Dover and Calais); cited in William Shakespeare, The Plays of William Shakespeare, First Part of King Henry VI with an Introduction by George Brandes (London: William Heineman, 1904), p. xi.    6 Charles H. Cotter, The Physical Geography of the Oceans (New York: American Elsevier, 1966), p. 71.    7 Cotter, Physical Geography of the Oceans, p. 72.    8 N.B. Pavlovich, The Fleet in the First World War, Vol. I: Operations of the Russian Fleet (New Delhi/Washington, DC: Amerind Publishing Co./The Smithsonian Institution and the National Science Foundation, 1979) (translated from the Russian, Flot v Pervoy mirovoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1964), p. 271.    9 Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 2.  10 Živan Nikolić and Petar Đjorđević, “Protivpodmornička borba u uskim morima,” Mornarički Glasnik (Belgrade), No. 1 (January–February 1971), p. 27.  11 This term is also used in reference to a geographical feature on land such as a defile, valley, or bridge; in generic terms it refers to a point of obstruction, congestion, bottleneck, or hazard.  12 Cited in B. Fabiani, Die seestrategische Bedeutung von Inseln und Meerengen unter Berücksichtigung der gegenwärtigen militaerstrategischen Bedingungen und der Entwicklung des Seevölkerrechte (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, October 31, 1980), p. 22.  13 Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 2.  14 Mark H. Huber, Chokepoint Control: Operational Challenges For Blue-­Water Navies (Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 2003), pp. 4–5.  15 Bogislav Pantović and Delimir Kolec, “Značaj razuđenosti obale i naseljenosti otoka u koncepciji opštenarodne odbrane i društvene samozaštite na jadranskom pomorskom vojištu,” Mornarički Glasnik, No. 5 (September–October 1981), pp. 609–610.  16 Zdenko Simičić, Pomorsko Ratovanje U Litoralnom Prostoru RH (Zagreb: Ministarstvo Obrane Republike Hrvatske, Glavni Stožer OS RH, Hrvatsko Vojničko Učilište “Petar Zrinski,” Ratna Škola OS RH “Ban Josip Jelačić,” August 2002), p. 39.  17 Wu Rigiang, “Survivability of China’s Sea-­Based Nuclear Forces,” Science & Global Security, 19.91–120, 2011, p. 100.  18 Leo Lazauskas, The Hydrodynamic Resistance, Wave Wakes and Bottom Pressure Signatures of a 5,900 tons Displacement Air Warfare Destroyer (Adelaide: Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Adelaide, South Australia, July 31, 2007), p. 4.  19 “When Does Shallow Water Become a Problem?” Hydrocomp Technical Report 124, 2003, p. 1.  20 Technical Report, Division 6, NDRC, Principles and Applications of Underwater Sound (Washington, DC: NDRC, 1946; reprint, Department of the Navy, Headquarters Naval Material Command, 1968), pp. 40–41.  21 Cited in Paul A. Lluy, Mine Warfare: An Old Threat Presents New Challenges for NATO’s Post–Cold War Navies (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995), p. 14.  22 Naval Doctrine Command, Littoral Anti-­Submarine Warfare Concept, May 1, 1998, p. 15; accessed at www.fas.org/man/dod-­101/sys/ship/docs/aswcnpct.htm.  23 Norman Friedman, “Littoral Anti-­Submarine Warfare: Not as Easy as It Sounds,” Jane’s International Defence Review, June 1995, pp.  2–3; accessed at www8.janes. com/JDIC/JDET/documentView.do?docld=/content/janesedata/mags/i….  24 “Sensing in Clutter: Improving Littoral Situational Environment,” Jane’s Navy International, posted April 23, 2009, pp. 2–3; accessed at http://search.janes/com/Search/ printFriendlyView.do?doId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jni/….

122   Disputing sea control 25 Dragoslav Simonić, “Organizacija i Upotreba Avijacije Na Uskim Morima,” Vojno Delo, No. 5 (September–October 1951), p. 3.  26 Opher Doron, “The Israelis Know Littoral Warfare,” Proceedings, March 2003, p. 67.  27 M.G. Cook, “Naval Strategy,” lecture, Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, VA, March 2, 1931, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series I, Box 003, Naval Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 12.  28 Klaus Liedtke, Gefechte bei der Sicherung der Küstengewässer: Eine Auswertung der Gefechtberichte-­See des Befehlshaber der Sicherung “Westˮ von August 1942 bis Juli 1943 (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, April 28, 1971), p. 4.  29 Tomislav Bolfek, “Dejstva na pomorskim komunikacijama u uskom moru (I deo),ˮ Mornarički Glasnik, No. 4 (July–August 1974), p. 499.  30 Bolfek, “Dejstva na pomorskim komunikacijama u uskom moru (I deo),ˮ p. 500.  31 Liedtke, Gefechte bei der Sicherung der Küstengewässer, p. 4.  32 Frank J. Murphy, Littoral Warfare: Adapting to Brown-­Water Operations, CSC 1993, pp. 3–4, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1993/MFJ.htm.  33 “Sensing in Clutter,” p. 4.  34 Fr. Lürssen Werft (Shipyard), “Naval Craft, Weapon and Sensor Systems,” Information & Security: An Information Journal 13 (2004), p. 67.  35 “Sensing in Clutter,” pp. 4–5.  36 Ralph Klingbeil and John Shannon, “Analysis of Network-­Enabled ASW Concepts of Operations,” paper, 2004 Command & Control Research and Technology Symposium, The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies (San Diego, CA: Space and Warfare Systems Center, 2004), p. 7.  37 D.S. Stovel, New Horizons: Anti-­Submarine Warfare as Critical Today as It Was During the Cold-­War Era (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, CSC 28/CCEM 28, 2002), p. 5.  38 Klingbeil and Shannon, “Analysis of Network-­Enabled ASW,” p. 7.  39 Göran Larsbrink, “Antisubmarine Warfare in Shallow Waters,” Naval Forces 1 (2000), p. 66.  40 Multiplying the Effectiveness of Naval ASW: Exploiting Developments in Low Frequency Active Sonar to Improve Operational ASW Capability during Naval Operations (Dartmouth, Nova Scotia: Ultra Electronics Maritime Systems, Inc., 2009), p. 1.  41 Stovel, New Horizons, p. 7.  42 Ante Paić, “Komandovanje na pomorskom vojištu (operativni aspekti),” Mornarički Glasnik, No. 3 (May–June 1973), p. 373.  43 Harald Fock, “Seestreitkräfte in Küsten- und Randmeergebieten (II),” Wehrkunde, No. 12 (December 1974), p. 632.  44 R(aoul) Kasteks, More Protiv Kopna (Sea Against Land), Vol. I (Belgrade: Geca Kon, A.D, 1939), translated from French, Raoul Castex, Théories Stratégiques, Vol. I: La Mer Contre La Terre), p. 49.  45 Kasteks, More Protiv Kopna (Sea Against Land), p. 49.  46 Günther Pöschel, “Über die Seeherrschaft (III),” Militärwesen (East Berlin) 8 (August 1982), p. 59.  47 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 178–179.  48 Bernard Brodie, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 105.  49 Brodie, Layman’s Guide, p. 106.  50 Karl Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940–1945, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter D. Lang, 1981), pp. 219–220.  51 Peter Scott, The Battle of the Narrow Seas: A History of the Light Forces in the Channel and North Sea, 1939–1945 (London: Country Life Ltd., 1974), p. 71. 

Disputing sea control   123 52 Gerhard Gross, “Die Führungsmittel für den deutschen Schnellboot-­Einsatz im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May–June 1962), p. 131.  53 Liedtke, Gefechte bei der Sicherung der Küstengewässer, p. 5.  54 Scott, Battle of the Narrow Seas, p. 5.  55 S.W.C. Pack, Sea Power in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Struggle for Sea Power in the Mediterranean from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (London: Arthur Barker, 1971), p. 92.  56 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 188.  57 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 91.  58 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 188.  59 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 188.  60 Eric Grove, the Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 12.  61 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 91.  62 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 77.  63 Pöschel, “Über die Seeherrschaft (II),” p. 71.  64 Brodie, Layman’s Guide, pp. 106–107.  65 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I, p. 305.  66 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942–February 1943 (1949; repr., Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), pp. 113–114.  67 R.K. Turner, Background of Naval Strategy (lecture delivered before the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, VA, February 16, 1938), p. 5.  68 Cook, “Naval Strategy,” p. 12.  69 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 149.  70 Kappa, “The Strategy of a Weaker Naval Power,” Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1937), p. 630.  71 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 204.  72 Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, October 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), p. 264.  73 Herzog, War of Atonement, p. 266.  74 Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 7.

5 Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter 

A weaker side in disputing sea control may try to preserve its offensive capabilities by avoiding a decisive encounter with the superior enemy either until the balance of forces turns to its favor or for the duration of hostilities at sea. Sometimes a stronger side may opt to avoid employment of the most capable part of its fleet because of political reasons or a profound lack of aggressiveness. A weaker side would in most cases try to avoid a decisive encounter. However, there have been several notable examples when a weaker side went operationally on the offensive while being strategically on the defensive. It sought a decision either at the very beginning of war or after achieving a favorable correlation of naval strength.  A weaker side can prevent defeat by a much stronger opponent by refusing to mass its forces in large numbers and doing everything possible to avoid a decisive encounter, or what is called to keep “fleet-­in-being.” Generically, fleet-­inbeing can be described as a strategy which denies the stronger side temporarily or permanently an opportunity to be defeated in a decisive encounter and thereby prevents the stronger enemy from fully exercising control of the sea.  Admiral Colomb was the first influential theorist to draw attention to the idea of fleet-­in-being as a broad strategic principle. He wrote that fleet-­in-being has come into general use to denote something that in naval affairs corresponds to a “relieving army.” Colomb claimed that the U.S. forces had been deterred from capturing Santiago de Cuba in 1898 because of the presence of the Spanish squadron.1  Admiral Mahan commented that the Spanish squadron after leaving European waters represented fleet-­in-being – the existence of which, though inferior, on or near the scene of operations is a perpetual menace to the various more or less exposed interests of the enemy, who cannot tell when blow may fall and who is therefore compelled to restrict his operations, otherwise possible, until that fleet can be destroyed or immobilized.2  In contrast to other theoreticians, Mahan differentiated between what he called a “fortress fleet” (passive fleet-­in-being) and (active) fleet-­in-being. They

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   125 are antipodes of each other. In the fortress fleet concept all emphasis is on the fortress and making the fleet subsidiary. The fleet has no reason for existence except for saving the fortress. In the (active) fleet-­in-being concept, the fortresses are discarded entirely except for providing possibly a momentary refuge for the fleet while coaling, repairing, or refreshing. In each case, “cooperation between the two arms, fleet and coast-­works, is characterized by a supremacy of one or the other, so marked as to be exclusive.”3 Mahan noted that fortress fleet was a dominant concept in Russian military and naval thought.4  Mahan observed that fleet-­in-being “attributes naval force itself, independent of other factors, an importance and efficacy which in my judgment are exaggerated. It tends, for instance to discard fortification, or to undervalue its advantages to national defense and to maritime warfare.” He also believed that Colomb overrated “the proper deterrent effect upon over-­seas operations exercised by an anvil force, when it is strong, though inferior.”5  Mahan wrote that some of Colomb’s followers claimed that the mere existence of a strong though inferior fleet within a moderate distance should put a stop to an intended crossing until that fleet had been destroyed. This conclusion can be historically supported but Mahan pointed out that to show that course has frequently been followed, does not show that course to be correct; just as the Japanese contrary procedure in the late war, though successful, does not prove conclusively and for all time that it would be right thing to act as they did.6 Mahan asserted that one school of thought “expresses the extreme view that the presence of a formidable force, even though inferior, near the scene of operations will produce as momentous effect upon the enemy’s action.” It has gone so far “as to argue that it will stop an expedition; or should do so if the enemy be wise.”7 Mahan believed that these views were historically unsound. Such a fleet-­ in-being should not be accepted by an enemy as a sufficient deterrent under ordinary circumstances. For example, the Russian fleet-­in-being in Port Arthur did not stop the Japanese troop transports. Yet the “Japanese recognized the danger of such a fleet and consistently took every step to neutralize it.”8  In contrast to Mahan, Corbett was highly supportive of the fleet-­in-being concept. He wrote that “for a maritime power a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the fleet actively in being, not merely in existence, but in active vigorous life.”9 He explained that in land warfare “it is always possible in theory to strike at your enemy army if you have the strength and spirit to overcome the obstacles and face the risks. This is not the case in naval warfare.” At sea the enemy may withdraw his fleet into a defended port where it is absolutely out of your reach without the assistance of an army. No amount of naval force and no amount of offensive spirit can avail you. The result is that in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert itself. If you are in superiority that justifies vigorous

126   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter offensive and prompts you to seek out your enemy with a view to a decision, the chances are that you will find him a position where you cannot touch him. Your offence is arrested, and you find yourself in what, at least theoretically, is the weakest general position known to war.”10  He also noted that the mere existence of a fleet, even an inferior one, even one locked in harbor, ought to block any seaborne attack and to compromise any exploitation by the enemy of his domination of communications.11  Colonel Charles E. Callwell wrote that a defensive attitude has certain especial advantages in naval warfare which are not so apparent in operations on land. A fleet which declines to encounter the enemy on the high seas retires into a defended port and awaits its opportunity. There it can refit, it can replenish its stores and it runs no risks from wind or weather; and all this time the hostile war vessels are out in the open, cruising and on the watch, to be ready to act should it decide to issue from the fortress.12  Admiral Castex had generally unfavorable views of the fleet-­in-being concept. He noted that the concept of fleet-­in-being was born out of an erroneous understanding of the situation. Castex asserted that it is “excessive temerity for the inferior party to sail out into battle and destruction, one cannot found great hopes of the method of the fleet in being against an active, enterprising adversary who is knowledgeable of his profession.” Castex argued that the errors of the integral doctrine of the fleet-­in-being concept consist of the belief that the mere existence of such a fleet suffices to produce an effect, even if said fleet is moribund, and that it will necessarily paralyze a superior enemy who is master of the sea.13  The U.S. strategist Bernard Brodie (1910–1978) wrote that the battle fleet can secure command of the sea either by destroying the enemy fleet in battle or by denying it access to the seas which it wishes to control; the first of these alternatives is obviously preferable. The fleet inferior in fighting strength would usually refuse to offer itself for destruction. In land warfare, a great superiority in strength is usually enough to force a decision. Yet a fleet which elects to refuse battle does not by that fact cease to be a threat. It is likely at any time to leave its base for destructive sorties. The strategy of avoiding battle but retaining the maximum possible threat value is known as fleet-­in-being. Such a fleet requires watching. Its threat can be countered only by keeping a superior force constantly ready to intercept and engage should it advance too far from its base. In other words, if one is unable to destroy the enemy fleet, one must always be on guard to deny its access to those areas where it can do significant damage.14 

The roots  The fleet-­in-being, except in its name, has been practiced since ancient times. However, its modern usage originated in 1690 with the British admiral Arthur

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   127 Herbert, 1st Earl of Torrington (1648–1716). He was defeated in the battle of Beachy Head (for the French the battle of Bévéziers) on July 10, 1690 by the French admiral Tourville. This battle took place during the War of the Grand Alliance (1689–1697). The war broke out because of the attempt by the French king Louis XIV (1638–1715) to restore to the British throne King James II (1633–1701) of England and Ireland (he was also King James VII of Scotland), who reigned from 1685 to 1688 but was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. William III (1650–1702) (also known as William of Orange; he became king of England in 1689) went at the head of his best troops to Ireland to engage the French troops. A squadron of seven sails under Admiral Sir Claudesley Shovel (1650–1707) had been detached into the Irish Sea to protect William III’s communications. Another squadron of sixteen British and Dutch ships-­of-the-­line in Gibraltar under Admiral Henry Killigrew (1652–1712) was directed to take down the trade and to keep an eye on the slightly inferior French squadron at Toulon led by Admiral François Louis de Rousselet, Marquis de Châteaurenault (1637–1716).15 The British assumed that Châteaurenault would probably try to sail for Brest and join the main squadron under Admiral Tourville. Killigrew had orders to follow Châteaurenault if he transited the Straits. Yet Killigrew failed to bring Châteaurenault to action and instead of following him immediately went into Cádiz to complete his arrangements for forwarding his outward-­bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring home.16  Torrington commanded the Channel Fleet with about thirty ships-­of-the-­line (divided among the ports of Downs, Portsmouth, and Plymouth) plus some twenty-­two Dutch ships-­of-the-­line under Admiral Cornelis Evertsen.17 Tourville had seventy ships-­of-the-­line after Châteaurenault joined him. On June 12, Torrington concentrated his two divisions at Downs and Portsmouth. The next day, Tourville appeared off the Isle of Wight.18 The challenge for Tourville was to obtain control of the Channel before the enemy forces were concentrated and comprehensively defeat them. The French gained a major advantage by mobilizing and concentrating their fleet before the British and Dutch did.19  Torrington sortied out to seek a battle with Tourville. However, after finding the French fleet was superior in numbers, he held a council with his admirals. The entire council agreed that it was not possible to concentrate the squadrons in the Irish Sea and off Cádiz for an even fight. Hence, Torrington’s Anglo-­ Dutch squadron would temporarily assume a defensive posture at the mouth of the Thames until the other two squadrons (Killigrew’s and Shovel’s) joined them.20 Torrington’s intent was to retire even all the way to the Gunfleet, Essex, in the Thames estuary where he could have a good chance of repelling the French attack. In his view, to accept battle would only play into the enemy’s hands.21 Torrington, in his immortal phrase, wanted “to keep his fleet in being.”22 In his view a temporary defensive was the only way to obtain command of the sea while risking a battle with numerically inferior forces was the “best way to lose it.”23 Torrington believed that as long as he could keep his fleet intact the French would not dare to invade England across the Channel.24 

128   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter Torrington was convinced that in case of a general action he would meet a certain and crushing defeat. For the British government the greatest concern was not a possible French invasion across the Channel but the dire situation in Ireland. It wanted to cut off sustainment of the French forces in Ireland.25 There was also a fear that the French might extend operations to Scotland. This situation could not be resolved except by securing a general command of the sea. Torrington replied to the government about its anxiety for the ships to the westward and the Mediterranean convoy whose danger was their expressed reason for preventing him from moving his squadron to the Gunfleet. He asserted that “while we observe the French they cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we are beaten all is exposed to their mercy.” However, the government dismissed Torrington’s objections and directed him to engage the French fleet. By then Torrington had been pressed back as far as Beachy Head (west of Eastbourne, southern England). It was no longer possible for him to sail westward. Being on the windward side he attacked Tourville’s squadron.26 This led to Torrington’s defeat in the ensuing battle.27  Torrington lost about a dozen ships (mostly Dutch). The main reason for his defeat was that Admiral Evertsen misunderstood Torrington’s signals and attacked the van of the French fleet at close quarters.28 Torrington refused to give the French the chance of a really decisive encounter and disengaged as soon as a drop in the wind allowed. He slowly retired eastward and drew the French fleet into following him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore.29  Naval classical thinkers had different views on Torrington’s actions prior to the battle of Beachy Head. For example, Admiral Colomb caused controversy by stating that Lord Torrington went no farther than to assert that while he observed the enemy fleet with but that inferior fleet he was not so weak as to be unable to offer battle in advantageous circumstances.30 Colomb wrote that Torrington had to take other factors into consideration, that is, the army over in Ireland with the king, a large disaffected population ready to welcome the French, and the considerable detached force of Killigrew and Shovel. Hence, the “risk of being beaten became disproportionately great.”31  In Colomb’s view, Torrington had two options. First, to avoid any fighting and merely wait and watch. He would then “render the great French armament powerless and entirely defeat its ends.” The second option was to “decline to be drawn into the battle because the moment it attempted anything in the way of a landing or an attack upon the shore” this would give to Torrington “exactly the advantage which was required to make his attack successful.” In his letter to Nottingham on June 26, Torrington made it perfectly clear that he proposed to abandon nothing, unless he was forced to do so. He was ready, rather than risk a battle at such immense disadvantage, even to retire behind the Gunfleet. For there, amongst shoals, his fleet was secure, and while he was there the very utmost the French could do would be to lie off the Thames and blockade it.32

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   129 Colomb observed that “a fleet in being, even defeated, even reduced and shut up behind unmarked sand banks was sufficiently powerful virtually to paralyze on sea as well as land the action of an apparently victorious fleet.”33 Mahan disagreed with Colomb and observed that “it was not the beaten and scattered Anglo-­Dutch fleet which guaranteed Britain against invasion. It was the softness or inertia of Tourville and the lack of French transports.” The fact was that the victorious Tourville failed to exploit his success by conducting a pursuit. He was apparently content with sailing from one end of the English Channel to the other and executing a minor action at Teignmouth (14 miles from Exeter, Devon) before returning to Brest. Tourville and the French government lacked an overall plan.34 Mahan therefore clearly believed that it was the weakness or inertness of Tourville or the unreadiness of the French transports that prevented invasion of England.35  Corbett wrote that “nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as we understand them now” than Torrington’s concept of fleet-­inbeing. He argued that the British government failed to properly grasp Torrington’s intent. The Earl of Nottingham, who headed the government, mistakenly believed the British fleet being safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was “in being.” Yet that was actually not Torrington’s intent.36 Because of his misapprehension, Nottingham produced from Queen Mary II (1662–1694) an order saying “we apprehend” that “the consequences of you’re retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the wind give battle to the enemy than retreat further than necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy.” It was then left to Torrington’s discretion to proceed westward to complete his concentration, provided that “you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they may have opportunity of making attempt upon the shore or in the rivers of Medway or Thames, or get away without fighting.”37  Corbett wrote that Nottingham and his colleagues in the Government “had information which led them greatly to underestimate Tourville’s strength.” In his view, Torrington’s course of action was “not only safer, but was calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end.” In contrast, the Government’s plan would “achieve nothing but a negative result.” In the best case, the battle with superior Tourville’s fleet would “only have left the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy positive result.38 In Corbett’s view, Torrington’s concept goes not further than this, that where the enemy regard the general command of the sea necessary to his offensive purposes you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using fleet defensively refusing what admiral Nelson called a general battle and seizing every opportunity for a counterstrike.39  A well-­known and highly influential British vice admiral and theorist Herbert W. Richmond (1871–1946) agreed with Corbett. He observed that

130   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter So long as he [Torrington] had an active fleet prepared to seize any opportunity of slipping past the French and joining the score of [English] ships to the west, Tourville, despite his superior numbers, could not commit him to a major operation.40 Richmond further observed that an inferior fleet could not prevent a raid and could not be an absolute or complete safeguard, only a temporary one. In his view in a situation where a superior enemy fleet needs to obtain a rapid and decisive victory, to disable completely an inferior fleet to carry out an invasion or some other larger objective, the inferior fleet can have a deterrent effect. It does this by avoiding action until conditions might be more favorable as the English eventually did in that war two years after Beachy Head in 1692, as well as afterward.41  The German-­American theorist Herbert Rosinski (1903–1962) wrote that Mahan apparently misunderstood that Torrington’s intent was a passive retreat to safety. Yet this was opposite to what Torrington had actually intended – an aggressive defense. In fact, Mahan’s understanding of Torrington’s intent was like that which Queen Mary II and her council expressed in 1690 and which led to Torrington’s dismissal, trial, and imprisonment in the Tower.42 

The concept  In general, by avoiding a decisive encounter a weaker fleet retains the maximum possible threat value. Its threat can be countered only by keeping a superior force constantly ready to intercept and engage it, should it move too far from its bases. A stronger fleet must watch over enemy bases. It also must devote a considerable amount of energy and effort to making sure that the weaker fleet does not elude the blockading force if it chooses to come out.43 The fleet-­inbeing might compel the enemy to adopt some form of blockade. And a mistake on his part may lead to the destruction of an isolated part of his forces. Skillfully handled, a fleet-­in-being can prevent the superior fleet from taking full advantage of its preponderant strength. However, the constant evasion of battle produces a frame of mind that is ill-­suited to accepting the risks which must be taken if a war is to be won.44 In the past, an inferior fleet accomplished some positive results by attacking the enemy coast or elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Some inferior fleets, in contrast, tried to deny a stronger enemy the benefits of its superiority by harassing actions and avoiding any large encounter at sea. Yet there were also cases where a weaker fleet did nothing except ensure its own survival in the face of a much superior force.  The fleet-­in-being concept can be applied from the strategic to the tactical level of war. The higher the level of war, the larger the forces that must be employed as a fleet-­in-being. Fleet-­in-being can be adopted either permanently or temporarily. The main prerequisites for success of the fleet-­in-being are favorable geographic positions, relatively large, survivable, and credible naval combat potential, and an opposing commander who is unable or unwilling to act aggressively. 

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   131 The main reasons for adopting the fleet-­in-being concept can be (1) general and permanent inferiority; (2) temporary inferiority; (3) timidity or lack of aggressive spirit; (4) situation on the land front; and (5) political considerations. A weaker fleet would usually adopt the fleet-­in-being concept permanently, that is, from the very start to the end of the hostilities. For example, during the Peloponnesian War (431–404 bc), the Spartans generally avoided a battle with the Athenian fleet except when they had a decisive numerical superiority.45  The French Navy in its numerous wars with the British Navy in the eighteenth century consistently underestimated the importance of naval battle. It instead focused attention on the ultimate objective, usually conquest of enemy territory. In other words, the French did not put the major part of their efforts into defeating the enemy fleet – the operational center of gravity in modern terms – as the quickest and the most effective way to accomplish the ultimate objective on land. The French objective was to keep their fleet intact by avoiding battle so that at a critical moment a surprise concentration might secure a temporary superiority in the vital theater. The reason for this was that the French fleet was numerically weaker than the British and the prospects of victory were remote. However, if the French had focused on naval battle instead of the objective on land, they would have been probably more successful. Hence a weaker power must increase its own strength and weaken the enemy’s until it has a reasonable hope of victory.46  Both fleets and armies, simply by their existence, may for a time produce an effect upon the morale of their opponent. However, sooner or later it will become clear that their existence alone will not produce the desired material effect.47 Optimally, the fleet-­in-being concept should be temporary. It can be argued that strategically or operationally, such a fleet has little or no value. A relatively strong navy, as was the German High Seas Fleet, might temporarily adopt the fleet-­in-being concept in the hope of reaching parity with its stronger opponent during the hostilities. A major sea power might be forced temporarily to act as fleet-­in-being because of a loss of the major part of its striking force in the initial phase of war, as the example of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in 1941–1942 shows. The purpose then could be to avoid further losses and gain time to reconstitute one’s naval offensive strength.  A superior fleet can also use the active “fleet-­in-being” concept because of either over caution or timidity as shown by Admiral Heihachirō Tōgō’s actions in the initial phase of the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905. The strategic problem then confronting Japan appeared to be simple: the Russians had divided their battle fleet between the European and Asiatic waters. Russian fleet detachments in Port Arthur and Vladivostok were barely adequate for their stated purpose. Consequently, the Japanese were presented with a godsent opportunity to destroy the Russian fleet in the Far East early in the war – a chance that Admiral Tōgō, however, refused to take. The purported reason was that although the Japanese fleet would have been victorious, it would have suffered some losses, making it in Tōgō’s judgment unable to meet the expected arrival of the Russian Baltic Fleet. While this course of action seems to have been justified by

132   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter events, Admiral Tōgō’s critics were perhaps correct in claiming that the fleet actions preceding the Battle of Tsushima cost the Japanese two of their six battleships, and that a vigorous offensive in the first few days of the war would probably have won a decisive victory at no greater cost.48 

Active fleet-­in-being  Historically, three main methods of fleet-­in-being were used: active, passive, and semi-­active. In all of them, the weaker side is strategically on the defensive. However, in active fleet-­in-being the weaker side would be tactically or even operationally on the offensive. Corbett wrote that an active fleet-­in-being seizes every favorable opportunity to inflict damage on its enemy. Expressed differently, an active fleet-­in-being exists when the enemy considers general command of the sea as a prerequisite to project power ashore. However, it is possible to deny to the enemy such a command by refusing what Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758–1805) called a “regular battle.” At the same time, the weaker side should seize every opportunity for a counter-­strike.49 Admiral Castex wrote that a weaker fleet must avoid passivity and instead carry out constant attacks against enemy shipping and the coast, thereby causing the stronger fleet to disperse its strength.50 In theory, an active fleet-­in-being can eventually defeat a stronger fleet and thereby secure command of the sea. However, the history of past wars at sea shows that such successes achieved by a markedly weaker force have been rare indeed. By adopting an active fleet-­in-being concept, the weaker side would be strategically on defensive, but tactically and/or operationally on the offensive. The main methods in conducting active fleet-­in-being are attacks and strikes aimed at destroying enemy ships at sea and at their bases/ports, plus raids against enemy forces and installations/facilities ashore.  At the strategic level the main purpose of an active fleet-­in-being can be as follows:  • • • • •

Tie the enemy forces in one theater and thereby enhance the chance of success by one’s forces in another theater.  Preserve control in the theater of secondary effort.  Gain time to reconstitute one’s naval combat potential.  Delay/prevent defeat of one’s army.  Enhance the country’s bargaining position in the aftermath of a war. 

An active fleet-­in-being can be used to tie the enemy forces in one theater and thereby enhance the chance of success by one’s forces in another theater. For example, during the American War of Independence (1775–1783) the British admiral Richard Kempenfelt (1718–1782) used a so-­called “flying squadron” as a check and restraint upon the enemy’s fleet movement and prevented a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise have done. With great skill, such a squadron would hover near the enemy, keep him at bay to command his attention and oblige the enemy to think of nothing but being on their guard against

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   133 your attack. This means assuming the defensive in home waters in the English Channel while taking the offensive in distant waters, such as the West Indies.51 Between April 1775 and March 1778, when France declared war against Britain, the British shipping in North America’s waters was endangered only by the American privateers. Commercial ships and troop transports were convoyed and provided with escorts. All this changed on October 17, 1778, when General John Burgoyne was forced to surrender at Saratoga with 3,500 men. This significantly increased the British difficulties and emboldened the American rebels. The French declaration of war did not come as a surprise. The British government gave the highest priority to defense of its colonies in North America. The French had the opportunity in 1778 to achieve close to naval parity by uniting their Brest and Toulon squadrons for a decisive battle. Instead, Admiral d’Estaing took his Toulon squadron to North America. The British dispatched Vice Admiral John Byron (1723–1786) with twenty ships to chase d’Estaing across the Atlantic. Yet for the next eighteen months neither of these squadrons had a strategic effect in North America.52  On March 18, 1779, Admiral Augustus Keppel resigned in protest at the treatment by the Admiralty.53 The Admiralty in turn had to find an experienced war-­ fighting admiral for the Channel Fleet. Finally, Admiral Charles Hardy (1714–1780) was selected. However, he was a political admiral but had not been sea for many years. Hence, the Admiralty decided to help him out by promoting two captains to the rank of rear admiral. One of them was Captain Richard Kempenfelt who became Hardy’s captain of the fleet (or precursor of the modern chief of staff ). The Channel Fleet also had some difficulties putting out to sea because of the shortage of seamen.54  The Channel Fleet was considerably weaker than the British fleet in the West Indies. The reason was that the British Cabinet made a deliberate (and wrong) decision to obtain victory in the West Indies rather than in the European waters. This decision might have been justified by Admiral George Rodney’s victory on April 12, 1782 at the Island of Saints (Îles des Saintes, French Antilles) which prevented the loss of Jamaica. However, at the same time, that decision made Britain more vulnerable in home waters. The British reduced their naval strength in the eastern Atlantic and the North Sea. This, in turn, made the Royal Navy unable to maintain control of the western approaches to the English Channel with an adequate number of the ships-­of-the-­line. It was unable to prevent a possible French invasion of Britain, protect British maritime trade, and prevent the French squadron at Brest from escaping. In addition, war with the Netherlands (1780–1784) required ships for blockading the Dutch coast. The British ships in the North Sea had also to intercept merchant ships carrying naval contraband stores to France. War with Spain required a blockade of the Spanish ports. All this had to be done but at the same time avoiding a decisive battle. The Royal Navy met these demands by shuttling ships back and forth between the North Sea and the Channel as the situation required and by maintaining superior ship to ship capabilities.55  The Franco-­Spanish fleet was greatly superior in numbers to the Royal Navy in European waters; The British Channel Fleet had to protect Britain against

134   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter invasion and to secure the arrival and departure of the large convoys. These convoys connected Britain with overseas and forces in America and Gibraltar and in the East and West Indies. The British squadrons on foreign stations were barely equal to the enemy. The Channel Fleet consisted of thirty-­five ships-­ofthe-­line facing the French squadron of thirty ships-­of-the-­line at Brest and the Spanish fleet of thirty-­six ships-­of-the-­line in Cádiz. On three occasions the combined Franco-­Spanish fleet appeared in the Channel. It had a superiority of two to one. And on each occasion it failed to achieve any material result either against the British fleet or against the British convoys covered by the fleet.56  Ultimately the British strategy was not as successful as it should have been. The Channel Fleet was able to protect England. However, Britain lost the North American colonies and many West Indies possessions. Gibraltar came very near to starvation. Minorca was lost. The British failed to capture Cape of Good Hope. The British East Indies Station detachment under Admiral Edward Hughes (1720–1794) was barely a match for the French squadron under Admiral Pierre André de Suffren (1729–1788). The essential reason for this strategic failure was that the British tried to be strong in several places where their enemies were strong. The British fought where their enemy wanted to fight, that is, far from home, which was the most difficult for the British. The British lost the initiative by expending their efforts in the areas where the enemy could most hurt British interests.57  Corbett and Mahan disagreed on Kempenfelt’s actions. Corbett asserted that When you know the enemy’s designs to do something effectual you must endeavor to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and where if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be formed sufficient to face the enemies at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere.58 Corbett wrote that it was on these lines that war was conducted. The West Indian area, which lay the enemy’s principal objective, were treated as the offensive theatre and the home waters as the defensive. Inferior as was the Channel Fleet to the home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to prevent their achieving any success. Kempenfelt demonstrated “the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant and convincing manner.” By being in command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off Ushant to seize a favorable opportunity for action, which resulted in his capturing a

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   135 convoy of military stores essential to the French operations in the West Indies, under the nose of [Luc Urbain de Bouëxic, count] de Guichen with an escort of nearly twice his force.59  In contrast to Corbett, Mahan pointed out that assuming that the navies, as the guardians of the communications, were the controlling factors in the war, and that the source, both of the navies and of those streams of supplies which are called communications, was in the mother countries, and there centralized in the chief arsenals, two things follow: first, the main effort of the Power standing on the defensive, of Great Britain, should have been concentrated before those arsenals; and secondly, in order to such concentration, the lines of communication abroad should not have been needlessly extended, so as to increase beyond the strictest necessity the detachment to guard them.60 Mahan contended that the British dispositions on the American continent and in the West Indies were faulty. At home, the safety of England herself and of Gibraltar was gravely endangered. Minorca was lost, and temporarily the French obtained “mastery of the Channel which Napoleon I claimed would make him beyond all doubt master of England.”61  Sometimes, the purpose of the fleet-­in-being could be to tie the major part of the enemy forces in the theater of main effort and thereby preserve control in the theater of secondary effort. For example, in the aftermath of the Heligoland action on August 28, 1914, the morale of the High Seas Fleet suffered. Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl (1857–1933) requested great latitude in using his fleet. He was rebuffed and told that the fleet must be kept in being so as to preserve command of the Baltic and to release the coastal defense troops for the active army. The German Naval Staff minutes stated that “The fleet must therefore be held back and avoid action which might lead to heavy losses.” However, that should “not prevent favorable opportunities being used for damaging the enemy.”62 This was a question purely of geographical position. The High Seas Fleet was able to operate either in the North Sea or in the Baltic. In contrast, the British were unable to use surface combatants in the Baltic. The Germans in fact controlled the Baltic because of the cover provided by the High Seas Fleet merely sitting in its bases. But this example was very special. The German fleet was able to intervene either in the Baltic or the North Sea. If the British tried to dominate the Baltic then their forces in the North Sea would be reduced, allowing the Germans to dominate that area.63  Admiral Wegener observed that the German High Seas Fleet could do more than simply defend the Heligoland Bight, which was so worthless. Above all this purely defensive operation plan ran counter to the need to conduct a war in which England had opened up the issue of sea power and had thus become our principal adversary.

136   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter Wegener furthermore claimed that our [German] fleet perseverance in the Heligoland Bight transformed the High Seas Fleet into a fleet-­in-being. Yet in the North Sea, fleet-­inbeing cannot achieve tactical success capable of altering the situation but could have suffered a reverse that would have altered the situation in a negative way.64 It might have also endangered the German position in the Baltic and with that “our holding out on land and the U-­boat war” and thereby affected the entire outcome of the war. “We could not have won anything, but we would have lost everything.” In his view, the High Seas Fleet managed to fulfill the mission of fleet-­in-being that geographic position imposed, preserving the German last asset – the Baltic.65  A strong navy that suffered major losses in the initial phase of a war might opt for active fleet-­in-being to gain the time to reconstitute its naval combat potential. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars, the French Navy, by avoiding a general action, kept command in dispute until Napoleon I was able to build naval strength either through alliances with other European powers or through new construction that Napoleon I considered adequate for shifting onto the offensive.66 In the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S. Navy went on the strategic defensive. The strategic concept adopted by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH)/Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was essentially an active fleet-­in-being in the Pacific. The U.S. broad strategic objectives in the Pacific were to: (1) defend Hawaii and the western hemisphere not by passive defense but by carrying out carrier raids against Japanese outposts in the central and south Pacific; (2) establish bases in the south Pacific as strong points to protect Allied line of communications between the western hemisphere and Australia, from which the first offensive would be undertaken against Japan. King had to divide his carrier forces between covering Hawaii and sea lanes between Samoa and New Caledonia in the southern Pacific.67 The majority of actions against the Japanese were conducted by U.S. submarines. They were the only force capable of operating close to the Home Islands and throughout the Japanese-­controlled areas in the Pacific. The U.S. submarines attacked Japan’s merchant ships carrying the vital supplies of oil, rubber, and other raw materials and bringing reinforcements and supplies to its newly occupied positions. In January–March 1942, the U.S. carrier groups and cruisers/destroyers conducted a series of strikes and bombardments of the Japanese strong points in the central and southern Pacific.68  An active fleet-­in-being might be successful in delaying/preventing defeat of one’s army. For example, the French Navy in the Seven Years War (1756–1763) avoided a decisive encounter with the Royal Navy. Corbett wrote that the French “by avoiding offensive operations likely to lead to a decision, and confining themselves to active defence were able for five campaigns to prevent our

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   137 reducing Canada, which was the (principal) object of the war.”69 If the French sought the decision “in a great fleet action in the first campaign and had the result been against them, we [British] would certainly have achieved our object in half the time.”70 Supposedly, the French avoidance of decisive battle in North America prolonged war for three years during which time they could conceivably count on territorial gains in Europe to serve as bargaining pawns for peace. The failure of the British Navy to bring the French to a decisive battle was the main reason for establishing a close naval blockade off Brest. This required many British ships-­ofthe-­line to maintain the blockade and thereby increased opportunities for French commerce raiders to inflict damages on British shipping.71  One of the German objectives in the North Sea in avoiding general fleet action with the Grand Fleet in 1914–1916 was not to weaken Germany’s position at sea and thereby indirectly enhance the chances of their army being defeated against Russia in the Baltic theater. The preservation of the High Seas Fleet was the cardinal article in the Kaiser’s policy.72 In his memorandum of February 1, 1915, Wegener argued that the Germans must avoid a decisive or even major naval engagement in the North Sea because such an engagement would probably so weaken our fighting forces that the political significance of our fleet would disappear. Given the tremendous British superiority, even a brilliant German victory would leave total sea control of the North Sea and Baltic in the hands of that part of the English fleet not engaged in the battle [and would also leave relatively] strengthened the Russian Baltic Fleet. Wegener wrote that “so long as the German fleet existed, England would not dare to penetrate the Baltic Sea.” However, if the High Seas Fleet was destroyed then the German supplies from the Nordic Kingdoms (Denmark/Sweden) would be cut off, Russia would receive all requisite supplies, and the danger of English and Russian landings could be increased. This would, in turn, force the German army to detach from the main front several army corps (100,000 men) and England would force the neutral Nordic Kingdoms, and certainly Denmark to abandon their neutrality.73  Sometimes one’s fleet must be preserved so as to enhance the country’s bargaining position in the aftermath of a war and thereby obtain more favorable terms in a political settlement. For example, the German emperor William II, decided not to risk the battle fleet in any offensive action. Admiral Ingenohl received from the beginning orders that stressed the importance of preserving the fleet. Admiral Tirpitz objected to that policy; however, his views were dismissed because the entire conduct of naval war was in the hands of the Admiralty Staff (Admiralstab) and directly responsible to the emperor.74 The emperor and the chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-­Hollweg (1856–1921), considered an intact fleet a valuable bargaining tool in the peace negotiations.75 Another

138   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter reason for the inactivity of the High Seas Fleet was that the German Great General Staff considered that the main mission of the German Navy was to protect the army flank and rear against possible British and Russian landings. The generals kept the navy on a tight leash during the transport of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) to France. They were (mistakenly) confident that they could win on land so why risk ships to achieve that objective.76  In operational terms, the main purpose of an active fleet-­in-being can be to:  • • • • • •

Postpone a decisive clash until one’s forces reach parity with the enemy’s forces.  Postpone a decisive clash until a better opportunity.  Threaten/carry out a large-­scale invasion.  Deter/prevent a large-­scale enemy seaborne invasion or an attack on one’s coast.  Deter enemy forces from interfering with one’s amphibious landing.  Tie down a major part of the enemy’s forces to defend/protect maritime shipping in a secondary theater. 

An active fleet-­in-being can be used to postpone a decisive clash until reaching parity with the enemy’s forces. This objective can be accomplished by weakening the enemy’s fleet and air strength over time. The main method of combat forces’ employment is to carry out major and minor tactical actions. A weaker fleet could complete many tactical actions aimed at gradually weakening the stronger fleet. This method is often the only hope for a weaker fleet trying to change an unfavorable balance.77 The operational objective would be to equalize naval strength in a given theater and thereby create favorable conditions for a weaker fleet to engage the stronger fleet on its own terms. For example, in August 1914, the High Seas Fleet consisted of thirteen dreadnoughts and three battle cruisers. The Grand Fleet then had in service twenty-­eight dreadnoughts and four battle cruisers. However, Britain would add eleven and Germany only two new dreadnoughts. Clearly, the High Seas Fleet was not large enough for a decisive engagement but it was too large to be squandered in reckless offensive operations.78 Kaiser Wilhelm I (1859–1941) stipulated in his war orders in August 1914 that the German objective was to go on the offensive and inflict damage on the British forces monitoring or blockading the German Bight by “ruthless” mining, and if possible by “a submarine offensive carried as far as the British coast.” After an equalization of strength was attained, the entire fleet would be concentrated and under favorable conditions would fight a major battle (Schlacht). In case of “favorable conditions” the German fleet must exploit the opportunity to carry out strikes before equalization of forces was achieved.79 However, this plan was based on mistaken and incomplete assumptions. Among other things, it erroneously assumed that the British would establish close watch on or blockade the German Bight. The Germans also overrated the effectiveness of untried mines and U-­boats.80 Admiral Reinhard Scheer (1863–1928), commander of the High Seas Fleet (1916–1918), believed that his

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   139 fleet had to strike when the circumstances were favorable. Therefore, it should seek a major battle with the Grand Fleet only when a state of equality had been achieved by guerrilla warfare methods. The High Seas Fleet had to hold back and avoid actions, which might lead to heavy losses.81 After equalization of forces was achieved, the High Seas Fleet would engage in a general fleet action under favorable conditions. If favorable opportunity for a decisive encounter was offered sooner it should be made use of.82 The High Seas Fleet conducted numerous major and minor tactical actions in the North Sea from the onset of hostilities in August 1914 until the battle of Jutland in late May 1916.83  Despite pressure to go on the offensive, the High Seas Fleet remained on the strategic defensive and acted tactically.84 Decisive actions against the U-­boats could not be undertaken during the entire war because of the presence of the German battle fleet in the area.85 Admiral Scheer observed that the British fleet stayed far north and did not dare to attack the German coast and stamp out the U-­boat danger at its source. Escorts that might have been valuable in the Atlantic were deployed in the North Sea. The German strategy of fleet-­in-being in fact forced sufficient strategic dispersal of the Royal Navy to deny the British the full rewards of their naval superiority.86  In a case in which the balance between the opposing forces is changing constantly one or both sides might seek to postpone a decisive clash by waiting for a better opportunity. In the past, the use of the active “fleet-­in-being” concept was aimed at postponing a decisive battle until a time when the correlation of forces was at least equal to the stronger fleet. For example, in the Peloponnesian War, during operations on the coast of Ionia in 412–411 bc, the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets watched each other from the adjacent ports of Samos and Miletus some 20 miles apart. They postponed decisive encounters for several months. This was caused by personal, political and economic reasons. The Peloponnesians were dependent for supplies of money and food on the Persian satrap Tissaphernes (445–395 bc). He wanted war to be protracted and thereby exhaust both Greek opponents. This equilibrium was not upset until Astyochus the Lacedaemonian was relieved by Spartan commander Mindarus and the supplies from Tissaphernes failed. Afterward Mindarus shifted his base from Miletus to the Hellespont where Pharnabazus the rival Persian satrap promised to supply corn to Athens from the Euxine, and forced a battle on the Athenians, who were obliged to follow and fight.87  During the war between Rome and the Seleucid Empire in 192–190 bc, King Antioch III the Great (241–187 bc), invaded Greece with some 10,000 men in 192 bc. He was elected head of the Aetolian League. In 191 bc, he was defeated by the Romans in the battle of Thermopylae and forced to withdraw to Asia Minor. Praetor Gaius Livius Salinator (254–204 bc), the Roman naval commander, used the island of Samos as his main base. His intent was to force the Dardanelles with his fleet. He was prevented from doing that by the presence of the enemy fleet in the port of Ephesus (Selçuk, today), on the Ionian Sea. Livius was compelled to keep watching the enemy fleet-­in-being at Ephesus. Antioch’s fleet was too weak to challenge the Roman fleet and the only thing to do was to wait for the Phoenician squadron to arrive and redress the balance in naval strength. This cautious policy

140   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter by King Antioch was probably wise. However, the inactivity of Antioch III’s fleet also allowed Livius to assemble all his ships. The new Praetor Lucius Aemilius Regillis did not have a great deal of patience with a protracted close blockade of Ephesus. He conducted several attacks on the enemy coast. These attacks, although costly, led several Greek city states (Miletus, Halicarnassus, Myndus, and Cnidus) to side with Rome. In 191 bc, the Romans defeated Antioch III’s fleet led by Polyxenidas (a Rhodean in Antioch III’s service) in the battle of Corycum (Cape Koraka today). The Romans had some eighty ships while Antioch III’s fleet had about ninety ships. Polyxenidas lost twenty-­nine ships plus thirteen that were captured. The Roman losses were only three ships. Ultimately, Antioch III was defeated by Consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus in the battle at Magnesia (Manisa today) ad Sipylum in Lydia (some 40 miles northeast of Izmir) in the fall of 190 bc.88 Also in 190 bc, Antioch III’s fleet led by Polyxenidas was utterly defeated by the Romans in the battle at Myonessus (near Teos). During the Third Anglo-­Dutch War, except for the battle at Solebay [May 28 (new style)/June 7 (old style) 1672], the Dutch never put to the sea with the deliberate intent of engaging in a battle. The odds were too high against them. They applied what Admiral Mahan called strategic use of their navigationally dangerous coast girded with shoals. The Dutch did not only retire behind shoals but waged offensive–defensive warfare. When the wind was fair for the enemy fleet to attack, Michael de Ruyter (1607–1676) kept under cover of his islands or at least on ground where the enemy dared not follow. However, when the winds were favorable for attacks, he turned and fell upon them. Although they suffered setbacks on land, the United Provinces were saved by de Ruyter’s actions. England withdrew from the war on satisfactory terms, but Holland backed by Spain and Prussia continued war against France for another four years.89  Instructions received from their governments to Prince Rupert of the Rhine (1619–1682) and de Ruyter were very different. For Prince Rupert there was no mention of a battle while for de Ruyter the battle was in the forefront.90 Specifically, instructions for Prince Rupert sent on April 26/May 6, 1673 said among other things that he should repair at Portsmouth, and there, as soon as you shall have embarked the mariners and soldiers … belonging to that fleet and army, which you are in command as General … you shall embark … and sail towards the coast of Holland or Zealand, as you shall think most convenient, and then either attack any of the States’ ships there lying in harbour, or, if you find it more for our service, you shall land where you think most proper and there attack what places you shall judge likely to be carried.91 De Ruyter received instructions from the Prince of Orange on April 25/May 7, 1673 which read as follows: The Lieutenant Admiral [de Ruyter] will proceed without delay … to the Wielingen – where he will await the other ships ordered to join him. As soon as they shall arrive … he will at once put to sea and will take post with

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   141 the fleet at or near the entrance of the Thames or in such other position as he shall judge proper…. There he is enjoined to act against the enemy, either by delivering battle, or by attacking them in their ports … or wherever he shall be able to meet their vessels, which he will try to destroy; or by sinking ships in their channels and rivers. Lastly, he will do his duty as a good general…. And will use the forces under his command as he shall find most advantageous to the State.92 When one compares these two instructions it is obvious that the allies believed that the Dutch being the weaker side would not attack.93  On May 20/May 30, 1673, the Prince of Orange and the Admiral’s War Council unanimously decided to keep the fleet in Schooneveldt to watch the enemy and on being attacked by him, or seeing him disposed to make a descent on the coast of the United Provinces to resist him vigorously, to oppose his designs and to burn or destroy his ships in every possible way.94 This led to the dual battle of Schooneveldt on May 28/June 7 and June 4/14, 1673. The narrow waters of Schooneveldt had neutralized Rupert’s superiority in ship numbers. Ruyter’s counter-­attack was so successful that Rupert was prohibited from repeating the attempt. The Dutch went back to their own ports. They made good their losses but the allies at anchor in the open seas off the Dutch coast were unable to do so.95 In the battle of Schooneveldt on June 7/14, 1673, de Ruyter, instead of being passive, counter-­attacked, while in the second battle he took the initiative and attacked. In the battle of Texel on August 11/21, 1673 he maneuvered into a favorable position and then attacked. The battle of Texel proved to be the most decisive. That victory accomplished not only the military, but also the national political objective. The Dutch ports were opened for trade. Ultimately, the “Anglo-­French alliance was broken up” too.96  In 1758, during the Seven Years War (1756–1763), the French attempted to relieve the pressure of the British sea power by threat of an invasion. In 1758, the plan of French Foreign Minister Étienne-François, Count de Stainville, Duke Choiseul (1719–1785) was to land at three places in Britain. The main army of 30,000 men assembled in the Quiberon Bay at Morbihan, north of the Loire estuary, would land in Scotland. A second army detachment at Ostend would land at the Thames estuary. Another smaller army contingent at Dunkirk would land in Ireland. The plan was that the Brest squadron of twenty-­two ships-­of-the­line and the Toulon squadron of twelve ships-­of-the-­line would assemble at Morbihan Bay to cover the expedition.97 However, instead of July, the fleet was not ready until November 1759. On August 18, 1759, the Toulon squadron was intercepted by the British admiral Edward Boscawen (1711–1761) with thirteen ships-­of-the-­line in the Strait of Gibraltar. In the ensuing fight, one French detachment fled to Lagos (western Algarve coast, Portugal) but the British destroyed it (although it was in a neutral country).98 

142   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter In the battle of Quiberon Bay on November 20, 1759 (Bataille des Cardinaux for the French), the Brest squadron was beaten but not destroyed. It was allowed to escape in bad weather. French admiral Hubert de Brienne Count de Conflans left Brest, which was watched by Admiral Edward Hawke (1705–1781). After Hawke heard about the escape he took his twenty-­seven ships-­of-the-­line from Torbay in southern England and reached his opponent on November 20, 1759 at Quiberon Bay. At the anchorage were a large number of islands and dangerous reefs. Conflans believed that it was impossible that the British would follow. However, Hawke was convinced that where the French ships could sail, the British ships could sail too.99  In some cases, a weaker side at sea might attempt to threaten/carry out a large-­scale invasion, but at the same time avoiding a decisive encounter, as the experiences of the French Navy in the Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) illustrate. The Treaty of Campo Formio signed between France and Austria on October 18, 1797 left England isolated. On December 13, 1797, the French Directory issued orders to concentrate the French fleet at Brest and be ready to sail out on April 20, 1798. The Directory’s intent was to land French troops in Ireland. The next day, General Napoleon Bonaparte and the minister of the navy agreed on the general plan to concentrate the fleet.100 On February 8, 1798, Bonaparte left Paris to inspect facilities at Boulogne and ports to the east. At the same time General Louis Desaix (1768–1800) and Jean-­Baptiste Kléber (1753–1800) inspected other ports for the same purpose. On February 12, the Directory ordered Admiral François-Paul Brueys d’Aigalliers (1753–1798) to proceed from Corfu to Toulon instead of to Brest. Brueys on his own initiative sailed on February 24 and reached Toulon on April 2. Hence, plans to concentrate the fleet at Brest failed. On February 21, Bonaparte returned to Paris. After conferring with generals Desaix and Kléber, he reported two days later to the Directory that it would take several years before France achieved superiority at sea.101  Bonaparte believed that invasion of England without mastery of the sea would be a very bold and most difficult operation. It could be carried out either by evading the hostile squadrons blockading Brest or the Texel or by crossing to Kent or Sussex in small vessels during the long nights of winter. In Bonaparte’s view any attempt to cross in launches during the calm weather of summer was impracticable, because the enemy’s opposition would be insurmountable.102 He also believed that landing in England could be successful only if passage was made by surprise. Because of the lack of naval preparations Bonaparte concluded that invasion of England could not be carried out until 1799.103  In his memo submitted to the Directory on April 13, 1798, Bonaparte proposed to have ready by September 1798 a fleet of thirty-­five ships-­of-the-­line and some 400 small transports at Dunkirk plus a Dutch fleet of twelve ships-­ofthe-­line at Texel. After the expedition to Egypt it would be possible to redeploy fourteen ships-­of-the-­line from the Mediterranean to Brest. By September– November 1798, some fifty ships-­of-the-­line would be assembled in Brest. This would allow some 40,000 troops to be available to land at any desired point in

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   143 England. If the enemy is stronger, a naval battle should be avoided. Bonaparte proposed that these troops should threaten to sail out of Boulogne while the Dutch squadron with 10,000 troops would pose a threat of landing in Scotland. In his view England could be invaded within the October to December 1798 timeframe.104  In the same memo (of April 13) Bonaparte wrote that the expedition to Egypt would force England to detach six ships-­of-the-­line to the East Indies and to deploy some twenty-­two to twenty-­five ships-­of-the-­line at the entrance to the Mediterranean; sixty ships-­of-the-­line off Brest; twelve ships-­of-the-­line off Texel; or a total of 103 ships-­of-the-­line. This number did not include those ships deployed in the Americas and East Indies or the ten to twelve 50-gun ships off Boulogne. In April 1798, out of 104 British ships-­of-the-­line in commission only fifty-­eight were available for service in the European waters outside of the North Sea, of which twenty-­ four were with St. Vincent off Cádiz. In addition, four ships-­of-the-­line were under repairs and could be manned when ready and eight more were expected to be ready in about three months, but no crews were available to man them. If no detachments were made, the number of the British ships against the French fleet at Brest would be thirty-­four and might be shortly thirty-­eight ships.105  Ultimately, Bonaparte recognized the impossibility of destroying British armed forces. Hence, he changed strategy to one aimed at weakening Britain by preventing its trade with the continent. France had to turn its entire attention to the Rhine and occupy Hanover and Hamburg or send an expedition to the East and threaten British trade with the Indies. If none of this was feasible then the only option was to make peace with England.106  The purpose of a fleet-­in-being could be also to deter/prevent enemy forces from carrying out a large-­scale enemy seaborne invasion or an attack on one’s coast. For example, the presence of the High Seas Fleet deterred the Royal Navy from landing an army on the Pomeranian coast in the Baltic in World War I. In 1915, both Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral John Fisher (1841–1920), First Sea Lord, advocated that the ultimate objective for the Royal Navy was to obtain access to the Baltic and turn the German flank in the west by landing a large military force for the occupation of Schleswig-­Holstein. This meant infringing Denmark’s neutrality or active Danish participation plus landing a Russian army on the unprotected coast in Pomerania. Churchill urged Fisher that to do that he must capture Borkum and blockade the German Bight, Yet Fisher disagreed. He never submitted his “Baltic Scheme” to Admiral John Jellicoe (1859–1935), CINC of the Grand Fleet for his remarks. No detailed plans were ever drafted for any of the projects nor was Fisher asked for the opinion of the War Office.107  In the fall of 1917, Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord, instructed the Admiralty’s Plans Division to study the prospect of sending the British fleet to the Baltic to relieve the German naval pressure on the Russians. The intent was to have Admiral Roger Keyes (1872–1945) command the force. However, the Plans Division assessed negatively the prospect for such an operation and Jellicoe agreed. Afterward, Jellicoe wrote:

144   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter The principal reason was the prolonged occupation of the Baltic was not practicable unless the High Seas Fleet was first put out of action, or unless the Elbe was blocked, and sufficiently formidable force sent to the Baltic to reinforce the Russian fleet, and to hold the Great Belt against the High Seas Fleet. An immense amount of mine sweeping would be required and the ships guarding the Belts would be subject to heavy air and submarine attack by day and in narrow water, and to destroyer attack by night.108  In some cases, a major continental power can use its inferior fleet to deter enemy forces from interfering with its landing. For example, France on several occasions in the eighteenth century and during the Napoleonic Wars used its fleet to threaten a battle and thereby allow the army to land ashore. Napoleon I planned to transport an army across the Channel without fighting. Not by accident, but because he doubted the possibility of French victory, he directed the French fleet to avoid a major battle with the British fleet in 1803–1805.109 Napoleon I’s plan was to seize a favorable opportunity during the long winter nights and cross the Channel by avoiding British ships without fighting. However, experience in 1803–1804 showed that the invasion flotilla was unable to do this. If unsupported it did not have any hope of success against the British ships. Hence, a supporting squadron of ships was necessary to obtain command for a few hours to make safe passage for the invasion troops.110  In late 1804, France’s relationship with other European powers was very tense. Napoleon I’s army had to meet threats on the continent. Hence, it was not available for the descent on England. Napoleon I also changed his principal strategic objective in the winter of 1804/1805 from the destruction of the army in England to capturing British Overseas Territories and interrupting maritime trade. Napoleon I still did not want the French Navy to seek a decisive encounter at sea. One result of change of French strategy was the raid with five ships-­ofthe-­line from Rochefort to the West Indies in January through May 1805. It produced only small rewards.111  By the spring of 1805, the political situation on the continent was improved for Napoleon I. His army became available for other expeditions. Hence, Napoleon I reverted to his original military strategic objective – the destruction of the British army in England. He directed Admiral Honoré Joseph Antoine Ganteaume (1755–1818) to put to sea with twenty-­one ships-­of-the-­line from Brest and then proceed to El Ferrol and attack the British blockading ships. After four French and some Spanish ships joined him, he would proceed to Martinique, where the Toulon squadron of eleven ships-­of-the-­line led by Admiral Pierre-­Charles Villeneuve (1763–1806) and the Rochefort squadron of five ships-­of-the-­line under Admiral Édouard Thomas Burgues de Missiessy (1756–1837) would join him too. Ganteaume would then at once return with the entire force to home waters. He would avoid the normal route and not encounter and attack any ship awaiting him off Ushant, but would proceed to Boulogne to cover the invasion fleet. Napoleon believed that Ganteaume’s combined fleet would force the British to employ at least thirty ships-­of-the-­line in pursuit.

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   145 Thereby, the British would significantly reduce their naval strength in the English Channel.112 Ganteaume was directed that in case Admiral Villeneuve did not join him, he should proceed to position off Ushant and Boulogne or to El Ferrol. He would be joined by the French and Spanish ships and without entering El Ferrol they would proceed to a position off Boulogne. Or if he believed that the conditions were favorable he would proceed directly to Boulogne, calling off Cherbourg.113  Villeneuve was directed to put to sea from Toulon and with his squadron reinforced off Cádiz by the French and Spanish ships-­of-the-­line then to proceed to Martinique and join Ganteaume. If Ganteaume was not there he would wait forty days. If the meeting was not effected, Villeneuve would proceed to Santo Domingo and thence to the Canary Islands, where he would wait for Ganteaume for twenty days and finally proceed to Cádiz.114  Napoleon I’s plans for the employment of the French fleet to cover the invasion of England were only partially executed. The Rochefort squadron escaped British patrols in January 1805 and headed to the West Indies where it would join with the Toulon squadron.115 After arriving in the West Indies, Missiessy achieved some successes. He captured most of the island of Dominica, but the British garrison continued its resistance. He raided some islands and exacted ransoms. On his return to Martinique, Missiessy received information that Villeneuve had failed to break out from the Mediterranean. He was directed to return to home waters. After landing remaining troops and supplies at San Domingo, he sailed back to Europe.116  On March 24, Ganteaume reported that the British blockading force was reduced to only fifteen ships-­of-the-­line. He requested permission to sail out. Napoleon I rejected his request. The reason was that Napoleon I wanted Ganteaume to escape but without fighting. Hence, the chance for Ganteaume to sail for the West Indies was lost. Several weeks later, the British blockading force off Brest was considerably strengthened. This, in turn, precluded any attempt by Ganteaume’s squadron to sortie out. It remained blockaded in Brest.117  On March 30, 1805, Villeneuve sailed out from Toulon with eleven ships-­ofthe-­line. He avoided the watching squadron under Admiral Nelson. On April 9, Villeneuve drove away the British squadron off Cádiz whence Admiral Federico Carlos Gravina y Nápoli (1756–1806) with seven ships-­of-the-­line put to sea to join him. He arrived at Martinique on May 14 and found that Missiessy had sailed for San Domingo and Europe. Two days later when the last Spanish stragglers joined him, his force consisted of twelve French ships-­of-the-­line and six Spanish ships-­of-the-­line.118  The increased doubt about whether Ganteaume could evade the watching enemy squadrons led Napoleon I and the Navy Minister Vice Admiral Denis Decrès (1761–1820) to amend the instructions for Villeneuve. He was instructed that if by thirty-­five days after the arrival of Rear Admiral Charles René Magon de Médine (who carried Napoleon I’s instructions) no news had been received of Ganteaume, he had to return directly to El Ferrol and attack the British squadron of seven or eight ships-­of-the-­line. He would find ready to join him on signal

146   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter fifteen French and Spanish ships-­of-the-­line. Afterward, with a joint fleet of thirty-­five ships-­of-the-­line, Villeneuve would proceed to Brest, avoiding as far as possible the watching enemy squadron of eighteen or nineteen ships-­of-the-­ line. He would join with twenty-­one ships-­of-the-­line under Ganteaume without entering the port and then move up with the entire force northward and appear off Boulogne. Napoleon I referred to a concentration off Boulogne but did not say anything about the battle with the British fleet. That idea was introduced by Decrès. It was apparently contrary to Napoleon I’s intent as he on April 30 wrote to Decrès that he preferred to concentrate at Martinique or even at the Canarias and thus avoid any kind of battle rather than raise the blockade of Brest.119  In the meantime, on April 20, 1805, Napoleon I learned that Nelson had been reported south of Sardinia. Three days later Villeneuve avoided Nelson and reached Cádiz where he joined Gravina’s detachment. Farther orders were drafted confirming those already sent and informing Villeneuve that Nelson had left for Egypt. However, this information was false. Napoleon I also urged Villeneuve to attack the enemy coast but at the same time warned him such attacks were secondary in importance. These new instructions together with a letter dated May 1 emphasized that El Ferrol was the port to make for on return. He was also informed that copies of these instructions carried by Admiral Magon were sent by one frigate which left Rochefort on May 3 and reached Martinique on May 30. Admiral Magon arrived there on June 3.120  While in 1804 Napoleon I believed that he would need only six hours to make the passage, by late August 1805 he believed that twenty-­four hours would be needed. By September 1806, Napoleon I endorsed Admiral Ganteaume’s option that a fortnight was necessary. Hence, to achieve the overseas land expedition, Napoleon I’s military objective at sea was not the destruction of the Royal Navy in a battle but a temporary superior concentration in the English Channel. This would be followed by evading the British squadrons and by bringing about their partial dispersion.121 Napoleon I intended to use an army of 130,000 men, with 400 guns and twenty days’ supplies to embark from four ports close to Boulogne as a center and cross the 36 miles of the Channel to a favorable stretch of coast between Dover and Hastings, some 70 miles from London. The transport flotilla would consist about 2,000 smaller flat-­bottomed sailing vessels with auxiliary oar propulsion. These boats were 60 to 80 feet long and 8 feet in draft. They carried 100–150 men and two to four guns. Large open boats would be also used for the transport of horses. Napoleon I believed that he needed control of the English Channel for two to fifteen days.122  Napoleon I believed that French victory at sea was not possible. Hence, he never issued to Villeneuve definitive orders to fight a battle. Only once (on July 20) did he direct Admiral Ganteaume that his single objective was the overseas land expedition to destroy the British army. With that in view he conceived a concentration without a battle in the narrow seas (the English Channel) whereas the British Admiralty believed the combined Franco-­Spanish fleet was likely to be destroyed. Napoleon I’s efforts at sea ultimately failed because the Franco-­ Spanish navies, as instruments of war, were less effective than the British and

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   147 the operations were based upon evading battle which was only possible if the British Navy was misused.123  The French admiral and theorist Jean Pierre Edmond Jurien de La Gravière (1812–1892) wrote about the French method of fleet-­in-being. Napoleon I turned his eyes from the sea and decided to pursue England elsewhere than upon the sea. He undertook to rebuild his fleet, but without giving it any part in the struggle. The squadrons were assembled in the Scheldt, in Brest roads, and in Toulon. However, to the very end Napoleon I refused to give this navy full of ardor and self-­reliance and opportunity to measure its strength with the enemy. He kept the French ships only to oblige France’s enemies to conduct blockade and thereby exhaust their finances.124  In short, Napoleon wanted to avoid general fleet action and to keep command of the sea in dispute until either through alliances or otherwise he had assembled a force which he deemed sufficient to warrant the return to the offensive. Eventually, that force proved unequal to the task. Yet when it failed, and the command passed to England, he had time to consolidate his power so that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to affect his ability to continue the struggle for nine more years.125  A small but powerful surface force can be sometimes used to effectively tie down a major part of the enemy’s forces to defend/protect maritime shipping in a secondary theater. For example, the German battleship Tirpitz, deployed in northern Norway in 1942–1944, tied down significant forces of the British Home Fleet and Royal Air Force (RAF ). It had the same effect as an active fleet-­inbeing. The British Prime Minister. Churchill aptly observed that Tirpitz “exercises a vague general fear and menaces all points at once. It appears and disappears causing immediate of these reactions and perturbations in the other side.”126 The presence of the Tirpitz and other heavy surface combatants in the northern area tied down a large part of the British Home Fleet to provide distant cover and support to the convoys to northern Russia.127  Hitler was greatly concerned that the Western Allies intended to capture Norway and thereby provide more effective aid to the embattled Soviet Russia. The loss of Norway would also lead to the cutting off of the vitally important flow of iron ore and nickel from Sweden.128 Hitler’s views were shared by Admiral Raeder and the SKL. On October 10, 1941, Hitler issued his instruction (Führerweisung) No. 37 that assigned new missions to the Wehrmacht in northern Norway. The Kriegsmarine was directed to attack enemy sea traffic to Murmansk and protect German traffic in the Arctic.129  At his meetings with Admiral Raeder on December 29, 1941 and January 12, 1942, Hitler argued that the enemy’s threat to Norway required redeployment of the heavy ships as a deterrent against the enemy’s amphibious landings. He considered Norway to be the “Schicksalzone” (“Zone of Destiny”) of the entire war.130 In Hitler’s view, every German heavy surface ship that was not in Norway was in the wrong place. Raeder fully agreed with that assessment.131 He

148   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter ordered deployment of additional air and naval forces to Norway.132 The Tirpitz was directed to deploy to northern Norway in early 1942. Additionally, the Brest combat group of two battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and a heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) would be redeployed to Norway as well.133  The Tirpitz took part in the major forays against the Allied convoys for northern Russia. In the first, the Tirpitz and three destroyers sortied out on March 6, 1942 (operation Sportpalast) to attack PQ12 and QP8 convoys. The attack failed because the Tirpitz did not find PQ12 convoy; only one straggler from QP8 convoy was sunk by the German destroyers. On its return to Trondheim, the Tirpitz was attacked by the British carrier aircraft but suffered no losses.134 The next attempt was aimed at destroying PQ17 convoy in July 1942 (operation Rösselsprung – Knight’s Gambit). The Germans envisaged the employment of two combat groups in the attack: the Trondheim group (Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, two destroyers, and three destroyer-­size torpedo boats) and the Narvik group (Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and six destroyers).135 The entire operation was aborted while the Tirpitz group was already at sea in the evening of July 5. The main reason was that the Germans believed that the combat groups had been sighted, and it was not worth the risk to encounter the enemy carrier force.136 Another reason for the cancelation was that by then PQ17 was widely scattered and the chances of success by heavy ships were small.137 

Passive fleet-­in-being  In the passive fleet-­in-being, the weaker side is both tactically and operationally on the defensive. Passive fleet-­in-being exists when a weaker force not only holds back but also inflicts little if any damage on the stronger fleet. Such a course of action is usually futile because it prevents a superior force only temporarily from seeking a decisive encounter. A fleet that immobilizes itself in a harbor is inevitably blockaded. The blockading force has all the advantages. The blockaded force does not harm the enemy. At the same time, the morale of a weaker side is gradually undermined, and its defeat prepared.138 In short, there are no advantages of adopting passive fleet-­in-being.139 In the past, the concept often degenerated into a passive, almost defeatist attitude of keeping one’s fleet simply in existence, and vaguely hoping that the threat of that existence will stop the enemy from doing something. Such an attitude ignores the fact that simple existence is not a threat unless it is backed by action.140  Passive fleet-­in being is usually adopted by a weaker side at sea. However, in some rare cases, a stronger side might also adopt a similar strategy. In both cases, the ultimate objective is to preserve the major part of one’s naval strength from destruction. Experience shows that there have been few cases when a stronger side has adopted a passive fleet-­in-being strategy either because of a profound lack of aggressiveness or some political calculation. Passivity might be permanent or only temporary.  In the past, an inferior fleet avoided a decisive clash by taking refuge in its base, protected by fortifications. If such a base was besieged by the enemy

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   149 troops, usually the fleet shared its fate with the army, as was the case with the Russian First Pacific Squadron bottled up in Port Arthur in 1905. In other cases, the blockaded fleet was forced to sail out as, for example, was the Spanish squadron in Santiago de Cuba in 1898. The Spanish squadron was destroyed on July 3, 1898 by the superior U.S. naval squadron waiting outside of port.141  During the Crimean War (1854–1856), the Russian Navy practiced a typical “passive” fleet-­in-being. The Russians had two battle fleets – one in the Black Sea and one in the Baltic. Both fleets shut themselves up in harbors as soon as the Franco-­British fleets arrived on the scene.142 The Russian Baltic Fleet consisted of thirty-­one ships-­of-the-­line, ten steam-­powered frigates, twelve frigates, two corvettes, twenty-­one paddle steamers, six screw steamers and eighty rudder gunboats with 30,000 men.143 The British deployed in the Baltic only forty-­four ships (including four screw ships-­of-the-­line, seven sailing ships-­of-the-­line, three screw frigates, and eight paddle steamers) with 2,022 guns and 21,800 sailors and marines.144 Yet the Royal Navy roamed freely along the Russian Baltic coast, while the Russian ships remained passive in their harbors.145 In the spring of 1854, the French fleet in the Baltic consisted of eight sailing ships-­of-the-­line, six sailing frigates, and three steamers, plus 2,500 marines embarked.146  The Russians reinforced the defense of Sevastopol during the crisis preceding hostilities with the Western powers. Coastal defenses consisted of 657 guns; 571 guns were used for the defense of anchorage, and the remainder for defense on the land side. In Sevastopol were based fourteen ships-­of-the-­line, seven frigates, eight steam-­powered frigates, four corvettes, and eleven steamers plus a considerable number of small ships. These ships carried a total of 2,000 guns (some sources say 1,000 guns). For protection of the fleet, the Russians had some 150 to 250 coastal guns.147  The Franco-­British troops landed in the Crimea on September 14, 1854. This put the Russian fleet in immediate danger. On September 21, Admiral Aleksandr S. Menshikov (1787–1869), commander of both army and naval forces, directed Vice Admiral Vladimir Kornilov (1806–1854), who was responsible for the defense of Sevastopol, to block the entrance to Sevastopol by using the oldest ships-­of-the-­line and frigates. Approaches to Sevastopol from the north would be defended by the Russian troops composed of sailors. However, Menshikov’s orders ran into strong opposition by the navy. Admiral Kornilov wanted, after consulting other senior commanders, to go to sea and destroy the Franco-­British squadron near Cape Lukul (southwestern coast of Crimea) or to cut off enemy supplies. His alternate plan was to tie the Russian ships to the enemy ships and blow them up.148  Menshikov repeated his orders on September 23. Afterward, five old ships-­ofthe-­line and two frigates were sunk in the fairway at the entrance of Sevastopol. The remaining ships on the southern shore were put in readiness for the expected combat. In February 1855, another six ships-­of-the-­line were sunk. Hence, the anchorage became essentially a lake, and the sailors became land troops.149  In the summer of 1855, the Russian troops made several unsuccessful attempts to break through the Franco-­British lines around Sevastopol. After the

150   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter death of Admiral Pavel S. Nakhimov (1802–1855) in June, the chances of Russian naval action became remote. On September 7, Western allies began final bombardment of the port. The Russians abandoned the city on September 8–9. The remaining six ships-­of-the-­line were sunk; only two dismasted corvettes and nine, mostly small, steamers remained in the port. The steamers remained manned until September 12 when they were also scuttled. The port of Sevastopol became impassable because of the sheer number of sunken ships.150 The Russian fleet at Sevastopol did not even try to attack French warships used as troop transports. Its two new coastal defense ironclads (“Popovka” – named after Vice Admiral Andrey A. Popov) never showed at sea.151  The Russian First Pacific Squadron based at Port Arthur in 1904–1905 was another example of a passive fleet-­in-being. The Russians were forced to destroy their ships and the Japanese were able eventually to land in Manchuria.152 At the beginning of hostilities, the Russians moved their ships into the inner harbor. They showed no sign that they were about to venture out to sea. The Japanese for their part did little to destroy the Russian fleet detachment in Port Arthur. They did not realize that the combat readiness of the Russian ships was too low owing to lack of training and low morale. The Japanese feared for the safety of the troop and supply convoys on which their entire military strategy was based. If the Russian First Pacific Squadron was intact and able to come out, the Japanese were forced to retain their entire battle fleet in the area. This left the detachment in Vladivostok unguarded and free to threaten Japan’s northern coasts. The unpreparedness of the Port Arthur garrison was such that, had the Japanese taken immediate advantage of their temporary naval superiority to land an army and take the defense from the rear, the base would have quickly fallen.153  By withdrawing their fleet detachment to Port Arthur, the Russians gave up command of the sea to Admiral Tōgō. The Japanese controlled lines of supply to their army in Manchuria. To exercise command, Tōgō blockaded the enemy fleet from the sea on the Korean coast near Chemulpo, sending Admiral Hikonojō Kamimura (1849–1916), commander of 2nd Fleet, to the Strait of Korea and the Sea of Japan to contain armored cruisers based in Vladivostok.154  After the first indecisive action, the Japanese fleet obtained temporary control of the Yellow Sea and thereby secured safe passage for the troops to Korea. Within a month of the outbreak of the war, the Japanese landed troops at Chinampo (Namp’o today, some 31 miles southwest of P’yŏngyang) on the eastern side of the Gulf of Korea and three months later landed right at the head of that gulf. All this took place despite the presence of Russian fleet detachments: one 200 miles away, and the other only 60 miles distant.155  However, the Russian fleet detachment at Port Arthur did not remain entirely passive. The reason was the defeat of the Russian army sent to relieve Port Arthur in the battle of Talissu on June 15, 1904. The Russian government at this late date decided that the squadron at Port Arthur must go on the offensive. Not surprisingly, Admiral Vilgelm K. Vitgeft (1847–1904), commander of the First Pacific Squadron, disagreed with the viceroy’s orders. Nevertheless, Vitgeft hurriedly prepared the forces and initiated mine sweeping. There was no record that

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   151 he prepared any plan or issued orders for the sortie. Vitgeft’s intent was to spend one night at sea and then attack the Japanese fleet at Elliot Islands, Gulf of Chihli. He apparently did not think about what the enemy could possibly do. The only message he sent was that he was convinced that “with the help of God and St. Nicholas the fleet would try to do its duty and defeat the enemy.”156  The Russian ships started to sail out from Port Arthur at dawn on June 23. And because of poor training, not until noon did they clear the harbor. Vitgeft’s force consisted of six battleships, one armored cruiser and some light vessels. Tōgō was informed by his destroyers about the Russian sortie. He was ready to intercept the enemy’s force. Tōgō had available four battleships, four armored cruisers, and light forces.157 Vitgeft observed the enemy force at 20:00. Some three hours of daylight remained. However, Vitgeft was not a man of action. After some 30 minutes of indecision, Vitgeft finally decided to return to Port Arthur. His reason was fear of an enemy destroyer attack in the night. Tōgō sent his destroyers into attack but they were unsuccessful.158  By early August 1904, the Japanese Third Army occupied positions that allowed indirect fire on the Russian ships in the inner harbor.159 On August 8, 1905, the tsar ordered Vitgeft to break through to Vladivostok. Two days later, the Russians put out to sea with five battleships, four light cruisers, and eight destroyers. One damaged cruiser (Bayan) was left behind. Six torpedo boats would accompany the fleet through the night and then return to Port Arthur. In the fleet there was depression and foreboding. This was exemplified by Admiral Vitgeft’s parting words: “Gentleman, we shall meet in the next world.” The Russian officers and men did not have confidence in Vitgeft. Most ships landed their secondary batteries to reinforce land defenses. Their shells were duds.160 Vitgeft only sent the messages: “Clear for action” and “The fleet is informed that His Majesty has ordered us to proceed to Vladivostok.”161 In the ensuing battle of the Yellow Sea, the Japanese achieved a decisive result. Admiral Vitgeft was killed on board his flagship, battleship Tsarevitsch. The remaining Russian ships headed back to Port Arthur. Many Russian ships were badly damaged. Most were out of the ammunition for main batteries that cannot be replenished. The Russians were completely demoralized. Admiral Tōgō withdrew to the Strait of Korea.162  The Russian concept of the “fleet-­in-being” was deeply flawed. The major part of the Russian fleet in the Far East should not have been based in Port Arthur, a place that could be easily blockaded from both land and sea, unless their intention was to engage the Japanese fleet. A smaller force would have still been able to threaten Japanese control of the Yellow Sea sufficiently to require them to keep the most modern part of their fleet there. At the same time the Vladivostok squadron, strengthened by several battleships, would have posed a serious threat to the Japanese Home Islands.  In retrospect, the Japanese were probably overly concerned with the threat posed by the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. Moreover, the Japanese General Staff seemed to be greatly influenced by the action of the three Russian armored cruisers from Vladivostok, which had made a foray into the Strait of Korea just

152   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter about the time that the Port Arthur squadron was making a sortie. After sinking two Japanese troop transports and damaging another, the Vladivostok squadron cruised up the Japanese coast and captured and sank several other merchant ships. It eventually escaped unharmed, aided by the thick fog, and returned to Vladivostok.163 

Semi-­active fleet-­in-being Another less discussed but viable variant is semi-­active fleet-­in-being. The weaker side might withhold the employment of its most valuable forces because of the substantial risk of losing them or lack of air cover or adequate logistical support/sustainment. At the same time, the weaker side would fully employ the remainder of its forces to deny control to the stronger side. For example, the decision of the Italian government to enter the war on the side of the Entente in May 1915 spared the Italian Navy the possibility of having to fight the Royal Navy. In contrast, a naval war against Austria–Hungary offered the probability the Italians Navy could bottle up the opponent in the Adriatic. The Italians had considerable naval superiority. However, the Italian naval command chose to be passive, relying on the army to win the war on its own. It wanted to husband its battleships for the next war with the French.164 The Italian passivity was clearly expressed in a series of letters from the chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Paolo Thaon di Revel (1859–1948), to Inspector General Vice Admiral Luigi Amadeo di Savoia, Duke of Abruzzi (1873–1933) in July and August 1915. Not only did Admiral de Revel warn against the use of the battle fleet, but he urged caution in the employment of light forces as well. He advised that excessive activity by destroyers and torpedo boats should be avoided. The ships should not be used in bad weather (because of possible damage). The Italian warships should be preserved as much as possible for a protracted war. A decisive action could come but only after a prolonged wait. The Italian battle fleet would remain in Taranto in case the Austrians ever attempted to operate in the Mediterranean. Essentially, the Italian Navy limited its actions to only submarines and torpedo craft.165  This was the reason for the remarkable inactivity of the Italian fleet. During the war no large-­scale action by major surface combatants took place in the Adriatic. No significant amphibious landings were conducted. The Italians also refused to take part in operations with the French and British navies. The Italian Navy did not detach ships for service outside the Adriatic. It ended the war without significant combat experience. It was also quite uncertain what lessons to draw from the British and German surface actions and employment of submarines in the North Sea and the Atlantic.166  Prior to 1914, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy was numerically inferior to the Italian Navy. However, it was well known for the high quality of its officers and men, high morale, and combat training.167 Yet until the entry of Italy into war in May 1915, the Navy’s CINC Anton Haus (1851–1917) decided to preserve his battle fleet for possible war against Italy (which was then the nominal ally of

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   153 Austro-­Hungary). Consequently, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy was not very active in confronting the actions of the British and French navies in the Adriatic. It could be argued that this decision was unsound. It is usually better to fight one enemy at the time than to wait.168  After the entry of Italy into war, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy’s battle fleet, except for taking part in a major operation against Italy’s eastern coast on the night of May 22/23, 1915 (when Italy officially entered the war), remained in the main naval base Pola under the protection of forts and minefields. The Austro-­ Hungarian Navy remained strategically on the defensive for the duration of the war. There was no fleet action involving battleships. Admiral Haus did not fail to realize the disadvantages resulting from such a passivity.169 However, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy conducted numerous tactical actions with light forces (light cruisers and torpedo boats) and seaplanes, such as attacks on the enemy patrols in the Strait of Otranto, raids on the Italian east coast and Italian-­occupied Albanian coast, escorting convoys, and attacks on the Italian transports.170  At the beginning of the war in the Mediterranean in June 1940, the first Italian operational plans reflected the unpreparedness of the Navy for war with Britain and France. The principle of the “fleet-­in-being” was the guiding idea of the Italian High Naval Command (Supermarina). The Italian Navy’s missions were limited to the protection of the coast and defense of convoys. The Italian fleet-­inbeing pertained only to the heavy surface ships, while submarines and special force units would be employed offensively.171 Capturing key positions in the Mediterranean, such as Malta, Crete, Suez/Alexandria, and Gibraltar, was not beyond Italian capabilities. However, such bold actions were never attempted. One reason for that was a belief that war would end soon and these positions would be acquired without a struggle.172  In late June 1940, the Royal Navy virtually stripped Malta of offensive capabilities. It also redeployed surface ships to Gibraltar and Alexandria. The Italians possessed numerical superiority over the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. The British had five battleships and two aircraft carriers. The Italians had only two battleships and no aircraft carriers. However, four new battleships would enter service between July and October 1940.173 The Italians had marked superiority in heavy cruisers of seven to zero; light cruisers, twelve to ten; destroyers, fifty-­seven to thirty-­five; torpedo boats, seventy-­one to zero; and submarines, 115 to twelve. The Italians also had in service 1,796 versus 620 British aircraft.174 However, Italian cruisers and destroyers were poorly trained for night fighting. The Italian submarine was too large for the Mediterranean. They were also not technically advanced. Neither could they be compared in quality of tactical training to the German U-­boats. The Italian submarines lacked useful detection devices. From the very beginning the Italian Navy had great shortages of fuel. The Supermarina warned the country’s leadership that the Navy’s losses would be “unbearable.”175 Already in April 1940, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari (1876–1966), Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, argued against the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini’s idea for an all-­out naval offensive. In his view, the Italian Navy was not ready

154   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter for war. Cavagnari warned that going on the offensive would mean that Italy would reach the peace table without a fleet. He feared an encounter with even a part of the British Mediterranean Fleet. Cavagnari observed that the British fleet would be deployed at Gibraltar and Suez and “we will be strangled inside the Mediterranean.”176 The results of poor training of the Italian Navy were shown in the action off Calabria’s coast on July 9, 1940 when two Italian and three British battleships clashed during a convoy operation. The Italian battleships did not score any hit because of poor gunnery. After the British damaged one battleship (Cavour), the Italians broke off the action. Cavagnari did not support the idea of landing on Malta, because the island’s defenses were “formidable.” He also wanted to avoid “distasteful” cooperation with the Italian army and the air force. Cavagnari convinced chiefs of other services that Malta could be neutralized. Hence, direct attack was unnecessary. In August 1940, Cavagnari was directed by Mussolini to send the two newest battleships (Littorio and Vittorio) to sea to interdict supplies to Malta and to Alexandria. However, Cavagnari ordered withdrawal before contact was established. After the battle of Matapan on March 27–29, 1941, Mussolini directed the Italian fleet not to engage in actions beyond the effective range of land-­based aircraft. He also ordered the Italian air force and the navy to effectively cooperate.177 After March 1941, Cavagnari declined on several occasions to employ battleships in a fleet action. The Italians also did not react to the British attacks on Tripoli and Sardinia.178 In a relatively recent example, the Argentine Navy applied the passive fleet-­inbeing concept to its surface forces but actively employed (although unsuccessfully) its submarines. After the sinking of 12,240-ton (full load) light cruiser Belgrano (ex-­U.S. Brooklyn class) by the British nuclear-­powered attack submarine HMS Conqueror on May 2, 1982, the Argentines withdrew the entire TF 79 (including one aircraft carrier, two guided-­missile destroyers, two destroyers, and three missile-­armed frigates) into the shallow water of the mainland to avoid further submarine attacks.179 This led to a dramatic change in the situation because the British did not have to worry about the Argentine surface forces. Until the end of war in on June 14, 1982, essentially only Argentine land-­based aircraft contested British control of the sea around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.  In a typical narrow sea, the weaker but properly balanced navy today could apply an active fleet-­in-being concept with probably greater success than some navies had in the past, by employing its light forces, land-­based aircraft, advanced SSKs, and “smart” mines. The best-­suited platforms for conducting small-­scale tactical actions in sea areas with many offshore islands are multipurpose corvettes, and/or missile and torpedo-­armed combat craft. Combat craft should be used in large numbers and during night and severe weather to have greater chances of success. Mines are one of the most effective weapons to gradually weaken enemy forces operating in littoral waters. Land-­based aircraft, including helicopters, and coastal and midget submarines could inflict significant losses on the stronger fleet within their effective range.  Smaller surface combatants and submarines can be based in underground shelters and thereby made largely immune from the enemy attack. The littoral

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   155 areas with the coast backed by steep and rocky mountainous terrain and deep water offshore allow construction of bases underground for small surface combatants such as missile and torpedo craft, minesweepers, and submarines. Such shelters should allow strong defenses against enemy attack from the air. They should be built at places with slow currents, low tides, and moderate winds plus sufficient depth of water to allow maneuvering of submarines and surface ships/craft.  In World War I, the Germans built protective structures for their U-­boats against aerial attacks at Bruges, Belgium. These structures were of sheet metal, 230 by 65 feet, overhanging the mooring points. They were later reinforced by wooden beams, planks and earth, but provided protection only against splinters. Eventually, such shelters provided protection against light bombs. By the beginning of World War II, the Germans already had plans to provide more robust protection for their U-­boats. The aim was to not only provide shelter for U-­boats from aerial attack but also allow the carrying out of minor repairs.180  The Germans built during World War II many hardened shelters (pens) for their U-­boats deployed in Norway and on the French Atlantic coast. On the French Atlantic coast, the Germans built U-­boat pens at Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Pallice/La Rochelle, and Bordeaux.181 Eight U-­boat flotillas were based on the French Atlantic coast, or half of the entire U-­boat strength in the battle for the Atlantic.182 The Germans constructed U-­boat pens to be impenetrable to even the most powerful bombs. The pens initially had 11-foot thick concrete rooves. They were later modified with inter-­crossed anti-­detonation beams and their thickness was increased to 23 feet. A number of the 20-mm AA guns were installed on the top of the pens’ rooves.183 Lorient was the most important U-­boat base in France. It was built in stages and became fully operational on December 20, 1941. The Keroman-­I complex consisted of a slipway and five pens, while Keroman-­II had seven pens. Lorient was able to accommodate up to twenty-­eight U-­boats at the same time; Brest had fifteen pens; St. Nazaire, fourteen; La Pallice, ten; and Bordeaux, eleven.184 Additional U-­boat pens were constructed in Bergen and Trondheim, Norway. The Germans also constructed two U-­boat pens each at Hamburg and Kiel, a pen at Heligoland, and two pens (incomplete) at Bremen.  Modern shelters for ships and submarines are usually built of concrete and fitted with heavy steel doors that provide a total protection against any air attack, even including one involving nuclear weapons. They also can include a range of repair facilities and allow ship crews accommodation for several weeks. Sweden built along its coast probably the most extensive and sophisticated underground shelters, able to accommodate even destroyer-­size ships. Its largest underground facility at Muskö (a part of naval base Berge), in Harsfjarden Bay, the Stockholm archipelago, some 25 miles south of Stockholm, was capable of providing the full range of services for surface combatants and submarines. Muskö had three docks and was able to handle fast attack craft, submarines, and destroyers. Muskö was closed after 2004 when the Swedish Navy decided to use only two major naval bases, at Karlskrona and Berga. China is reportedly building a secret

156   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter underground naval base at Sanya, on the southern tip of Hainan. The massive 60-foot high tunnel entrances are being built into hillsides. Reportedly, the base could provide cover up to twenty nuclear-­powered submarines.185 

Seeking a decisive encounter  In the past, a weaker side sought to wrest command of the sea from a much stronger opponent by seeking a decisive naval battle. In the modern era, the same objective can be accomplished by defeating the stronger fleet in a major fleet-­ versus-fleet operation. As an example from the past, at the beginning of the First Punic War (264–241 bc), the Romans were a weaker side at sea. Nevertheless, they sought and won decisive victories. The Romans were aware of their inadequate sea power and lack of nautical skills. However, they were innovative and found the way to exploit their superiority in close combat on land and apply it to combat at sea. They developed (possibly with the assistance of the Syracuse craftsmen) a grappling machine and added a boarding bridge or corvus.186 The Romans greatly improved the training of their crews. But their ships were slower and less maneuverable than the Carthaginian ships.187 The Romans achieved their first victory over the Carthaginian fleet in the battle of Mylae (Milazzo today, on the northern coast of Sicily) in 260 bc. It was also the first battle in which the Romans used the corvus.188 Despite this victory, the Roman army was unable to get a decisive result on Sicily. Another, much more decisive Roman victory was the battle of Cape Ecnomus (Poggio di Sant’Angelo, Licata, Sicily) in the summer of 256 bc. This was the largest naval battle of the entire First Punic War.189 The battle of Cape Ecnomus did not decide the outcome of the war but only created the conditions for the Roman army to ultimately control Sicily.190  In the War of 1812, the Americans were a weaker side in war with Britain. They were strategically on the defensive on the open ocean, but their strategy on the Great Lakes was offensive. In contrast to the open ocean. the Americans obtained control of the Great Lakes area by conducting several small-­scale but decisive actions. The victory of Commodore Oliver H. Perry (1785–1819) over the British squadron on Lake Erie on September 10, 1813 forced withdrawal of the British troops from the Detroit frontier. Continued supremacy on Lake Erie kept the territory further to the west in American hands during the rest of the war. Commodore Thomas MacDonough (1783–1825) won a great victory on Lake Champlain over the British squadron on September 11, 1814, which stopped the advance of the British army to the south from Canada. It also opened the way for a counter-­attack on Lower Canada. However, this did not happen because of the timely arrival of fresh British troops from home.191  Another example of a weaker side seeking a decisive encounter was the Austrian victory against the Italian fleet in the battle of Lissa on July 20, 1866. Italy was allied with Prussia in its Third War of Independence. It declared war  on Austria on June 20, 1866. However, only four days later, the Italian army suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the smaller but better led Austrian

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   157 army in the battle of Custoza (near Villafranca de Verona). The outcome of war between Prussia and Austria was determined by a decisive Prussian victory in the battle at Königrätz (Sadowa) on July 3. Yet war with Italy continued.  In the aftermath of defeat at Custoza, the Italian government and public felt the urgent need for a victory at sea. The reasons were to avenge defeat at Custoza and obtain more favorable armistice conditions.192 On July 13 the Italian government directed fleet commander Admiral Persano to obtain control of the Adriatic and then blockade Trieste, thereby ensuring its capture by the army. Persano sailed out with his fleet but stayed away from Pola. After five days he returned to Ancona without engaging the enemy fleet. This finally forced the Navy Minister Agostino Depretis (1813–1887) to come to Ancona and in person order Persano to sortie out without a delay. This time he was directed to capture the island of Lissa in the central Adriatic. Afterward, the island would serve as a base of operations against Dalmatia and support the planned landings in Istria.193  Finally, on July 16, Persano sailed from Ancona with some thirty-­four ships, including all twelve modern ironclads plus troop transports, in the direction of Lissa.194 Persano’s decision was to destroy Lissa’s coastal defenses preliminary to the landing on the island. On July 18 and 19, Persano attacked the Lissa fortifications. His heavy ships exchanged fire with the enemy coastal batteries. The Italian bombardment caused heavy damages to the Austrian fortified positions on Lissa. Persano was ready to land troops on Lissa at 0700 on July 20, just when one of his ships observed the approaching enemy fleet.195  In the meantime, the Austrian fleet commander, Rear Admiral Tegetthoff received orders to remain close to the man naval base at Pola and thereby provide cover for the defense of Venice and Trieste.196  Tegetthoff first received information on the enemy fleet off Lissa on July 18. Initially, the Austrians believed that the Italian fleet was trying to divert their attention from Istria and that the Italian army intended to advance to the Isonzo River and capture Trieste. However, on July 19, based on the information received from Lissa, the Austrians became persuaded that the Italian fleet’s actions were not a diversion, but their real intent was to capture Lissa. Tegetthoff received a message from the War Ministry that he was free to act according to his own views and to sail out against the Italian fleet at Lissa.197  At 1300 on July 19, Tegetthoff sailed out from the Fasana (Fažana today) Channel, near Pola. His fleet consisted of seven armored frigates, one screw wooden ship-­of-the-­line, five frigates, one corvette, seven gun boats, two screw schooners, one scouting steamer, and one sidewheel steamer (for signal relay).198 Tegetthoff was well aware that his fleet was numerically and in gunnery inferior to the Italian fleet.199 However, he was unlike his opponent, Admiral Persano, being far more aggressive. He was eager to seek a decisive encounter with the Italian fleet.200  In the ensuing clash, the Italians were decisively beaten. Two Italian ironclads were sunk and two others heavily damaged. Some thirty-­eight Italian officers

158   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter and 574 men were killed; four officers and thirty-­six men were wounded and nineteen captured. The Austrians did not lose a single ship. They had only three officers and thirty-­five men killed, and fifteen officers and 123 men wounded. Tegetthoff was unable to pursue the Italian fleet because he had lower speed.201 On October 2, 1866, Austria and Italy agreed to a cease-­fire. The peace treaty was signed on October 3. The victory at Lissa was the main reason that Austria gave up control of only Venice but retained control of Istria and Dalmatia.202  The largest naval action of World War I was the battle of Jutland (Skagerrak battle for the Germans) on May 31–June 1, 1916. In retrospect, the battle of Jutland had many elements of a major fleet-­versus-fleet operation. Both the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet were strategically on the defensive. However, it was the High Seas Fleet that tried to break the stalemate and went operationally onto the offensive.  Admiral Scheer took command of the High Seas Fleet in January 1916.203 He was a more aggressive commander than his predecessor (Admiral Hugo von Pohl). Scheer decided to seek a general fleet action. Initially, he planned to deploy all three Battle Squadrons (Schlachtschiffgeschwader) and the Scouting Force (Aufklärungkräfte) plus the rest of the torpedo boat flotillas southwest of Dogger Bank and Flamborough Head (50 nautical miles from Flamborough). On May 13, he decided to delay execution of the plan from May 17 to May 23.204  In Scheer’s final plan, the main body of the High Seas Fleet would sortie from Wilhelmshaven at about midnight on May 30 and then proceed northward, staying well off the Danish coast. It would arrive the next afternoon off the western entrance to the Skagerrak. Afterward, the Scouting Force of Admiral Franz von Hipper (1863–1932), which was composed of battle cruisers, would head north and advertise his presence by steaming close to the Norwegian coast in broad daylight. Scheer with the main body would sail about 50 miles to the rear. Scheer was confident that as soon as the British learned the whereabouts of the German battle cruisers they would send their battle cruisers on a high-­speed dash across the North Sea to cut off the German return to their home base. Scheer’s plan was to attack the enemy battle cruisers jointly with the Scouting Force next morning (May 31).205 He hoped to obtain timely information about the sailing out and the subsequent movements of the Grand Fleet from the U-­boats deployed off the British bases. The U-­boats would pick up and destroy a few large enemy ships. There was also the possibility of intercepting and destroying detached enemy squadrons.206  The German fleet was numerically inferior to the British Grand Fleet in the operation. Scheer had under his command sixteen dreadnoughts, six pre-­ dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers, eleven light cruisers, and sixty-­one destroyers. Jellicoe commanded a fleet consisting of twenty-­eight dreadnoughts, nine battle cruisers, twenty-­six light and eight armored cruisers, seventy-­eight destroyers, one seaplane carrier and one minelayer.207 Scheer was convinced that the better night fighting and gunnery of his fleet would make up for numerical inferiority.208 The Germans also hoped to inflict larger losses than the enemy might inflict on their fleet.209 

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   159 In the ensuing clash on May 31/June 1, 1916, the British lost fourteen ships (three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers, eight destroyers/torpedo boats) and 6,100 men (out of 60,000), while the German losses were eleven ships (one pre-­ dreadnought battleship and battle cruiser each, four light cruisers, and five destroyers/torpedo boats) and about 2,550 men (out of 36,000).210 This battle consisted of several major and many smaller inconclusive encounters between the Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet. Neither fleet was able to deliver a crippling blow to the other. The Germans won a tactical victory in terms of losses in materiel and personnel inflicted on the Grand Fleet. However, the battle was undoubtedly an operational victory for the Grand Fleet.211 The situation in the North Sea remained the same as prior to the battle of Jutland.  The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) sought a “decisive battle” with superior Allied forces in defense of the Marianas in June 1944 and the Philippines in October 1944. Despite losses suffered in the Midway operation in June 1942 and the Solomons Campaign August 1942–December 1943, the IJN remained a formidable force. Its morale and will to fight remained high. The Japanese shifted to a strategic defensive in the summer of 1943. They were determined to exert all-­out efforts in defense of their strong points in the central Pacific, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies.  The Japanese made detailed plans for defense of the central Pacific after August 1943 (Z-­operation). However, Z-­operation was not executed when the Allied forces invaded the Gilberts in November 1943 and the Marshalls in January to February 1944. The main reason was that the carrier forces were then in Singapore undergoing intensive training. The Japanese estimated the carrier force would not be ready for combat until April 1944.212 In April 1944, the Japanese slightly modified the existing plans (dubbed A-­Go operation).213 A decision was made that the defense line connecting the Marianas, Truk and Biak must be held at all costs.214  The Japanese activated their plan for A-­Go operation (June 13–22, 1944) two days before the Allied landing on Saipan, Marianas on June 15 (operation Forager). The clash between the opposing carriers’ forces on June 19–20, 1944 resulted in a decisive victory for the U.S. Fifth Fleet. However, its operational objective was not consolidated because the much-­weakened enemy fleet was not pursued and escaped to fight another day. Out of nine carriers, six Japanese carriers survived. However, their fighting strength was emasculated because so many pilots were lost. The U.S. claimed that the Japanese lost 476 planes and 445 aviators.215 The Japanese brought back only thirty-­five serviceable planes.216  In operational terms, the Japanese A-­Go operation (battle of the Philippine Sea for the Americans) was a major fleet-­versus-fleet operation. The Japanese were strategically on the defensive, but operationally on the offensive. Their objective was to deny control of the sea approaches to the Marianas. In contrast, the Allies were strategically on the offensive, but operationally on the defensive. Their objective was to capture the Marianas by conducting a major amphibious landing operation on the island of Saipan. The landing was conducted over the uncommanded sea. After the landing, the main mission for the

160   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter U.S. Fifth Fleet was defensive – providing distant cover and support to the Allied troops on Saipan.  The battle for Leyte in October 1944 was another Japanese major fleet-­versusfleet operation conducted from a strategic defensive and against much superior enemy forces. The enemy penetration of the New Guinea defense line and invasion of the Marianas in June 1944 convinced the Japanese High Command of the need to fight a decisive battle to protect the inner defense area. The Japanese expected that the next objective for the enemy would be the Philippines. At the same time, they had to prepare contingency plans for the defense of Taiwan or Nansei-­shotō, or possibly even the Home Islands.217  The basic strategic principle was that the IGHQ would designate as the “decisive battle area” whichever part of the inner defense area was attacked by the enemy’s main strength. Afterward, all available Japanese sea, air, and ground forces would be quickly concentrated to destroy the enemy forces. The prospective areas of the “decisive battle” were Home Islands, Nansei-­shotō, Taiwan, and the Philippines.218  The climactic events in the Leyte Operation were a series of air and naval battles and engagements from October 24 through 27. For Allied forces, these clashes were part of a supporting major naval operation, while for Japanese naval and land-­based air forces they amounted to a major offensive naval operation in defense of the Philippines. The battle for Leyte consisted of four related major battles: in the Sibuyan Sea (October 24), Surigao Strait (October 25), off Samar (October 25), and off Cape Engano (October 25), plus numerous strikes and attacks by both sides.219 The battle in the Sibuyan Sea was not planned by either side but occurred because of the sequence of events and decisions made by Admiral William F. Halsey (1882–1959), commander of the U.S. Third Fleet. The battle of Surigao Strait was planned by both sides. In contrast, the battle off Samar was not planned by either side, although the Japanese anticipated that their First Diversionary Attack Force would be opposed by an enemy force guarding the eastern approaches to Leyte Gulf. The Japanese had a general plan to engage U.S. carrier forces in case they were successfully diverted northward, but the exact place where that engagement would take place was not predetermined. In contrast, the battle in the Sibuyan Sea was not planned by either side.  The defeat of the Japanese Navy in the battle for Leyte on October 24–27, 1944 sealed the fate of the defending troops on Leyte. and created the preconditions for the eventual Allied invasion of Luzon. It also significantly affected Japan’s ability to prosecute the war, because all the links with the Southern Resources Area and the Home Islands were cut off. In all, the Japanese lost three battleships, four carriers, ten cruisers, and nine destroyers, totaling 306,000 tons. The Allies lost one light and two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort, or 37,000 tons.220 The Japanese on their part claimed that the enemy losses in the battles of October 24–27 were forty-­one transports, three aircraft carriers, two battleships, seven cruisers, five destroyers, ten destroyers or cruisers, three unidentified vessels, and eighty-­seven aircraft. Their own losses were given as one battleship and one destroyer.221 The Japanese were unable to

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   161 replace the losses in materiel. The remainder of the IJN did not pose any serious threat to Allied control of the sea.  The fleet-­in-being concept is perhaps one of the most important methods in disputing sea control. The weaker side should do everything possible to avoid any large-­scale physical concentration of its forces which would provide the stronger side the opportunity to plan and execute a major fleet-­versus-fleet operation. No positive results can be expected by remaining defensive at all levels of war. Hence, the weaker side must be active tactically, and if possible operationally while being strategically on the defensive. Among other things, an active fleet-­in-being will prevent a state of despair and low morale in one’s forces. Clearly, the methods of active fleet-­in-being used in the past must be changed or abandoned. New methods must be found and then skillfully executed. The key prerequisite for maintaining credible and effective combat potential is to have an all-­encompassing defense of one’s forces. This cannot be achieved without the closest cooperation with other services, and air force. The fleet-­in-being concept should always be applied in combination with other methods of disputing control of the sea; otherwise, success will be found wanting.  In a favorable situation, a weaker side might go operationally on the offensive although remaining strategically on the defensive. The chances of inflicting major losses on the stronger side are much greater if a weaker side carries out a major fleet-­versus-fleet operation at the very beginning of hostilities. The main requirements of success are enough offensive strength, high morale, a high level of combat training and combat readiness, aggressiveness, and the operational thinking of the commanders and their staffs. 

Notes    1 John B. Hattendorf, “The Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being’ in Historical Perspective,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 44–45.    2 David Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (Lincoln, NE/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), pp. 111, 113.    3 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), p. 385.    4 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 391.    5 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 428.    6 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 429.    7 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 398.    8 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 399.    9 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 45.  10 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), pp. 140–141.  11 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 192.  12 Charles S. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, Their Relations and Interdependence (London/Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905), p. 60.  13 Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories, Selections translated and edited with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 341, 343. 

162   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter 14 Bernard Brodie, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 88–89.  15 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p.  192; cited in Clark G. Reynolds, “The U.S. Fleet-­in-Being Strategy of 1942,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 1994), p. 104.  16 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 192.  17 Geoffrey Callender, The Naval Side of British History (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1924), pp. 127–128.  18 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 193.  19 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 191–192.  20 Philip H. Colomb, Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated, Vol. 1 (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1891; repr., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 153; Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, with contributions from John Hattendorf et al., 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 113.  21 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 194.  22 Callender, Naval Side of British History, p. 128. There are some questions about the authenticity of that phrase because Torrington’s remarks were published for the first time in 1710, some twenty years after the event; but regardless of whether Torrington ever uttered these words, the phrase took on a life of its own; Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 44.  23 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 194.  24 Cyprian Bridge, Sea-­Power and Other Studies (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1910), p. 48.  25 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 193.  26 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 196.  27 Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 153; Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p.  113; William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott, A History of Sea Power (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1942), pp. 253–254.  28 Callender, Naval Side of British History, p. 129.  29 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 196–197.  30 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 44.  31 Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 116.  32 Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 116.  33 Cited in Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 340.  34 Cited in Castex, Strategic Theories, p. 340.  35 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” pp. 44–45.  36 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 194.  37 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 195. 38 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 195–196.  39 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 201.  40 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 46.  41 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 46.  42 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 46.  43 M.G. Cook, “Naval Strategy,” lecture, Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, VA, March 2, 1931, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series I, Box 003, Naval Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 10.  44 Anonymous, “Naval Strategy,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928), p. 281.  45 John F. Charles, “The Anatomy of Athenian Sea Power,” Classical Journal 42, No. 2 (November 1946), p. 90.  46 Anonymous, “Naval Strategy,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928), pp. 280–281. 

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   163 47 Anonymous, “Fortifications and Coast Defence,” The Naval Review, Part I, Vol. II, No. 1, 1914, p. 61.  48 John Creswell, Naval Warfare: An Introductory Study, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Chemical Publishing Co., 1942), pp. 87–88.  49 Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. I: To the Battle of the Falklands 1914 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), p. 226.  50 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 115.  51 Reynolds, “U.S. Fleet-­in-Being Strategy of 1942,” p. 106.  52 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” pp. 47–48.  53 “Conduct of the Channel Fleet in 1779 against Superior Force,” The Naval Review, Vol. XI, No. 1 (February 1923), p. 31.  54 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” pp. 48–49.  55 Hattendorf, “Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being,’ ” p. 51.  56 “Conduct of the Channel Fleet,” p. 30.  57 Kappa, “The Strategy of a Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1937), p. 630.  58 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 198–199.  59 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 199–200. 60 Cited in Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 629.  61 Cited in Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 629.  62 Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), p. 22.  63 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 627.  64 Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Holger H. Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 55.  65 Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. 55.  66 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 189.  67 Reynolds, “U.S. Fleet-­in-Being Strategy of 1942,” p. 112.  68 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), pp.  261–264; John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 398; Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, U.S. Army in World War II series, The War in the Pacific subseries (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1962; updated 1989), pp. 214–215.  69 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 188.  70 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 189.  71 Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 149.  72 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 188.  73 Appendix A: “Reflections on Our Maritime Situation. First Squadron Memorandum, February 1 1915,” in Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, pp. 133–134.  74 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 42–43.  75 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 43; “On the Principles of Naval Strategy,” (from Marine Rundschau, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1927), The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (May 1928), p. 511.  76 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 43.  77 Staff Presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas (Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 8–9, 1938), p. 32–33. 

164   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   78 Holger H. Herwig, “The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 81–82.    79 Chef des Admiralstabs der Marine an Chef der Flottenstreitkräfte, July 30, 1914, Gerhard Granier, editor, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg-­ Dokumentation, Vol. 1 (Koblenz: Materialien aus dem Bundesarchiv, Heft 9, 1999). p. 67.    80 Reginald N. Custance, A Study of War (Port Washington, NY/London: Constable, 1924), p. 43.    81 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 118.    82 Chapter VI: The German Operations in the North Sea (1914–1916), Vol. II, Extracts from Raoul Castex, Théories Strategiques; translated from French by O.K. Smith and assisted by E.J. Tiernan (Newport, RI: Naval War College, April 1939), p. 6.    83 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 118.    84 Hans Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches Mittel zur Erzielung eines Kräfteausgleiches, dargelegt an geschichtlichen Beispielen,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 43, No. 4 (April 1938), p. 240.    85 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 9.    86 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 119.    87 Cited in Custance, Study of War, pp. 30–31.    88 Cited in J.G. Barnish, “Naval Operations in the Eastern Aegean: 191–190 B.C.” The Naval Review, Vol. XLV, No. 2 (April 1957), pp. 165–166, 168–169.    89 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 628.    90 Custance, Study of War, p. 33.    91 Custance, Study of War, p. 32.    92 Custance, Study of War, pp. 32–33.    93 Custance, Study of War, p. 33.    94 Custance, Study of War, p. 34.    95 Custance, Study of War, p. 37.    96 Custance, Study of War, p. 42.    97 Alexander Meurer, Seekriegsgeschichte in umrissen: Seemacht und Seekriege vornehmlich vom 16. Jahrhundert ab (Leipzig: Verlag v. Hase & Koehler, 1925), pp. 273–274; P.W. Brock, “Anson and His Importance as a Naval Reformer,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (August 1929), p. 514.    98 Meurer, Seekriegsgeschichte in umrissen, p. 275.    99 Meurer, Seekriegsgeschichte in umrissen, p. 275.  100 Reginald N. Custance, “A Study of War – X,” The Naval Review, Vol. XII, No. 3 (August 1924), p. 382.  101 Custance, “Study of War – X,” p. 382.  102 Custance, Study of War, p. 17.  103 Custance, “Study of War – X,” p. 383.  104 Cited in Custance, “Study of War – VIII,” pp. 384–385.  105 Custance, “Study of War – X,” p. 385.  106 Custance, “Study of War – X,” p. 383.  107 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 191.  108 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 4: 1917: Year of Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 243.  109 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 115.  110 Custance, Study of War, p. 18.  111 Custance, Study of War, p. 19.  112 G.J. Marcus, The Age of Nelson: The Royal Navy in the Age of Its Greatest Power and Glory 1793–1815 (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 250.  113 Custance, Study of War, p. 20. 

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   165 114 Custance, Study of War, p. 21.  115 Marcus, Age of Nelson, p. 247.  116 Marcus, Age of Nelson, p. 249.  117 Marcus, Age of Nelson, p. 250.  118 Custance, Study of War, p. 21.  119 Custance, Study of War, pp. 22–23.  120 Custance, Study of War, pp. 23–24.  121 Custance, Study of War, p. 19.  122 Stevens and Westcott, History of Sea Power, pp. 220–221.  123 Custance, Study of War, p. 28.  124 Cited in Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 626.  125 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 189.  126 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 119.  127 Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B.Nr. Gkdos. 740/42 Chefs Aop, Seekriegsleitung, Chef des Stabes to Admiral Fricke, May 28, 1942, “Geleitzugkämpfung,” RM7/1024, Bundesarchiv-­Militärchiv (BA-­MA). Freiburg, i.Br. p. 5.  128 Friedrich-­Wilhelm Müller-Meinhard, “Der Einfluss der Feindlagebeurteilung auf Operationsplanung, Entschlussfassung und Operationsführung (I),” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 67, No. 9 (September 1970), p. 516.  129 Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–1945. Dokumente des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 2nd revised ed., 1983), p. 163.  130 Müller-Meinhard, “Der Einfluss der Feindlagebeurteilung,” p. 517.  131 Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys: A Naval Staff History with preface by Malcolm Llewellyn-­Jones (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), p. 2.  132 Naval Staff, Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 12.  133 Naval Staff, Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, pp. 13–14.  134 “Convoys to Russia, 1942,” Supplement to The London Gazette of Friday, 13th October 1950, p. 5141.  135 Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B.Nr. Gkdos. 770/12 Chefs Aop, June 4, 1942, “Operative Weisung für Einsatz der Drontheim-­und Narwik-­Gruppe gegen einem PQ-­Geleitzug,” (Deckname Rösselsprung), Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942–July 1942, RM7/1024, BA-­MA, pp. 1–2.  136 July 5, 1942, I SKL, Teil A, K.T.B. July 1–31 1942, RM 7/38, BA-­MA, p. 58.  137 Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, July 20, 1942, “Abschlussbericht,” Akte VIII, 13 Rösselsprung (PQ 17) Mai 1942–Juli 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-­MA, p. 241.  138 Custance, Study of War, p. 29.  139 Gabriel Darrieus and René Daveluy, War on the Sea and Extracts from the Genius of Naval Warfare, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1920), p. 342.  140 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 625.  141 Trask, War with Spain in 1898, p. 266.  142 Hobart Pasha, “Systems of Offense and Defense in Naval Warfare,” The North American Review, Vol. 127, No. 265 (November–December 1878), p. 26.  143 Hermann Kirchhoff, Seemacht Der Ostsee: Ihre Einwirkung Auf die Geschichte Der Ostseeländer Im 19. Jahrhundert (Kiel: Verlag von Robert Cordes, 1908), p.  190; Wilhelm Treue, Der Krim Krieg und seine Bedeutung für die Enstehung der modernen Flotten, 2nd revised/enlarged edition (Herford: Mittler, 1980), p. 39.  144 Treue, Der Krim Krieg und seine Bedeutung, p. 94.  145 David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 104.  146 Treue, Der Krim Krieg und seine Bedeutung, p. 96. 

166   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180

181 182

Treue, Der Krim Krieg un seine Bedeutung, pp. 60–61.  Treue, Der Krim Krieg un seine Bedeutung, p. 62.  Treue, Der Krim Krieg un seine Bedeutung, p. 62.  Cited in Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2001), p. 6.  Pasha, “Systems of Offense and Defense,” p. 26.  Darrieus and Daveluy, War on the Sea and Extracts, p. 343.  Donald Macintyre, Sea Power in the Pacific: A History from the 16th Century to the Present (London: Military Book Society, 1972), pp. 141–142, 151.  John L. Hall Jr., Naval Operations of the Russo-­Japanese War (Newport, RI: Operations Department, Naval War College, March 27, 1939), p. 26.  John Creswell, Naval Warfare: An Introductory Study (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1936), p. 103.  Hall, Naval Operations, pp. 29–30.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 30  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 31.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 31.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 32.  Hall, Naval Operations, p. 32.  Hall, Naval Operations, pp. 35–36.  Macintyre, Sea Power in the Pacific, pp. 141–142, 151.  Brian R. Sullivan, “A Fleet in Being: The Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861–1943,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988), p. 114.  Paul G. Halpern, The Battle of the Otranto Straits. Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in WWI (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 7.  Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” p. 114.  Milan N. Vego, The Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, 1904–1914 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, September 30, 1981), p. 672.  Anthony E. Sokol, “Naval Strategy in the Adriatic Sea during the World War,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 63, No. 8 (August 1937), p. 1084.  Nicholas U.N. Stankovich, “The War in the Adriatic 1914–1918,” The Naval Review, Vol. XI, No. 3 (August 1923), p. 464.  Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 287.  Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1: 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970), pp. 294–295.  Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, p. 294.  Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” pp. 120–121.  Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” p.  121; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, p. 293.  Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, pp. 293–294.  Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” p. 121.  Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” pp. 122–223.  Sullivan, “Fleet in Being,” pp. 122–223.  Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the “Malvinas”: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War (London: Viking, 1989), p. 116.  Jean Kessler, “U-­Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay,” in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law, eds., The Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945: The 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference (London: Greenhill Books/Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 253.  Kessler, “U-­Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay,” p. 253.  Kessler, “U-­Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay,” p. 254. 

Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter   167 183 Kessler, “U-­Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay,” p. 255.  184 Kessler, “U-­Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay,” p. 256.  185 Thomas Harding, “Chinese Nuclear Submarine Base,” Daily Telegraph, May 1, 2008, p. 1.  186 A 12-foot pillar of wood with a pulley on the top was fitted to the prow of every Roman vessel. The bridge was 28 feet long and 4 feet wide. It could be hoisted up and swung round in a desired direction. At the end of the bridge was a long pointed spike which when the corvus was released drove itself into the deck of the opposing vessel, so locking both ships together; Nigel Bagnall, The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage, and the Struggle for the Mediterranean (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Thomas Dunne Books, 2005), pp. 61–62.  187 Adrian Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London: Cassell & Co., 2000), p. 109.  188 The Roman fleet of some 140 ships faced 130 Carthaginian ships. The Carthaginians lost some fifty ships and withdrew; William L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 bc) to Actium (31 bc) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1937, reprint 1964), p. 276.  189 Goldsworthy, Punic Wars, p. 114; Bagnall, Punic Wars, p. 66.  190 Bagnall, Punic Wars, p. 67.  191 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 75–76.  192 David S.T. Blackmore, Warfare on the Mediterranean in the Age of Sail: A History, 1571–1866 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2011), p. 326; Hans Hugo Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht 1848–1914. Die k.k. österreichische Kriegsmarine (Munich: Amalthea, F.A. Herbig Verlagbuchhandlung GmbH, 2002), p. 72.  193 Lawrence Sondhaus, Austrian Naval Policy, 1797–1866 (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1989), p. 254.  194 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, p. 72; Sondhaus, Austrian Naval Policy, p. 255.  195 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, p. 75.  196 Sondhaus, Austrian Naval Policy, p. 252.  197 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, p. 75.  198 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, pp. 76–77.  199 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, pp. 75–76.  200 H.W. Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd, 1926/Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprinted 1969), p. 45.  201 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, p. 80.  202 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, pp. 83–84.  203 Elmer B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds., Seemacht: Eine Seekriegsgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, rev. ed. (Hersching: Manfred Pawlak, 1986). Originally published as The Great Sea War: The Story of Naval Action in World War II (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 358.  204 Der Krieg in der Nordsee, Vol. 5: Von Januar bis Juni 1916, D. Groos, ed. (Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925), pp. 189–190 205 Keith Yates, Flawed Victory: Jutland 1916 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 118–119.  206 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 3: Jutland and After (May 1916–December 1916) (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 37.  207 Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 3: Jutland and After, pp. 37, 39.  208 Friedrich Ruge, “German Naval Strategy across Two Wars,” Proceedings, Vol. 81, No. 2 (February 1955), p. 155.  209 Herbert Schottelius and Wilhelm Deist, eds., Marine und Marinepolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1871–1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972), p. 238. 

168   Avoiding/seeking a decisive encounter 210 Geoffrey Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War (New York: Scribner’s, 1968), p. 242.  211 Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 3: Jutland and After, p. 205.  212 Japanese Monograph No. 117: Outline of Third Phase Operations (February 1943 to August 1945) (Tokyo: General Headquarters Far East Command – Foreign Histories Division, 1950), pp. 15–16.  213 The same code name given to the Japanese successful invasions in the first phase of the war in the Pacific; hence, it was believed the new A-­Go operation would be equally successful; John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 555.  214 Japanese Monograph No. 117, p. 16.  215 Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior. A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 303.  216 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 13: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), p. 309.  217 Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section, Directive No. 435, July 26, 1944, Folder G-­4, Box 9, RG 23: World War II, BEG, NHC, Naval War College, Newport, RI, p. 1.  218 Imperial General Headquarters High Command Record, Mid-­1941–August 1945, Japanese Monograph No. 45, Chapter VII: Fourth Phase of the War (July–December 1944), p. 151.  219 The initial popular designation of the naval battle on October 24–26 was the “second battle of the Philippine Sea.” The name was officially changed to the “battle for Leyte Gulf.” The new name was suggested by Admiral Nimitz and approved by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. The Navy Department press communiqué on February 3 used the new name for the first time; Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet: Dispatches and Related Records, Folder: Iceberg Dispatches, Timetable, King II (Leyte) Dispatches Nov 4, 1944 Box 135, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.  220 Elmer B. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 306.  221 GHQ, SWPA, Military Intelligence Section, G-­2, Special Intelligence Bulletins, No. 540, October 29/30, 1944, p.  3; November 20/21, Ultra Intelligence, October 1–December 28, 1944, No 511–599, SRH-­203, Part 5, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL., p. 3. 

6 Weakening of the enemy’s naval forces over time 

Perhaps one of the most often used methods in disputing sea control is for a weaker side to carry out numerous tactical actions aimed at gradually weakening the stronger side at sea. These actions are often an integral part the efforts by a weaker side to avoid a decisive encounter. This method is often the only hope for a weaker fleet to change an unfavorable correlation of forces.1 A weaker but offensively minded side should carry out a series of actions at sea, subsurface, and in the air aimed at weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time. These actions should be conducted in combination with other methods of denying control of the sea. An inherent pitfall for a weaker side at sea is to unwittingly stumble into a pure war of attrition.2 A weaker side at sea is usually numerically much smaller than its stronger opponent. It would be unable to sustain larger losses in personnel and materiel in a war of attrition. A loss of a single major surface combatant or submarine would be much more acutely felt by a weaker side than by its much stronger opponent. However, a weaker side can avoid costly attritional warfare by conducting strikes beyond the effective range of the enemy’s defenses. An alternative to traditional attrition is to exhaust the enemy and undermine his will to fight.  Attrition can be defined as force-­on-force combat aiming to gradually reduce the enemy’s combat potential/power over time. In traditional or “pure” attritional warfare, the primary objective is to destroy/neutralize the enemy’s personnel and weapons/equipment. This is achieved through the cumulative effect of one’s superior firepower and/or numbers.3 The secondary objective is to weaken the enemy’s morale and will to fight. This objective can be accomplished by inflicting high losses on the enemy. The enemy should be convinced that his further resistance is useless and would only result in more losses.4 Attrition implies that one’s forces can survive the effects of the enemy’s firepower.5  Attrition warfare consists of three main elements: maneuver, firepower, and protection. The maneuver is primarily intended to obtain a better firing position not to outmaneuver the enemy as it is in decisive warfare (application of operational art). It is only tactical in scale. No operational maneuver is applied in attrition warfare. Firepower is intended to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s physical component of combat potential/power. It is more important than a maneuver. Protection is aimed to prevent any effects of the enemy’s firepower

170   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time on one’s forces. It aims to absorb the enemy attack with the least losses possible.6  Attrition consists of two interrelated components: physical and psychological. They are closely related and each affects the other. Physical attrition is aimed at destroying/neutralizing tangible elements of the enemy’s combat potential/ power. Obviously, the numerically larger force can sustain higher losses. It has greater chances of ultimately accomplishing its objectives than a weaker side can have. Physical attrition generally requires large forces. And a lot of time. Pure force-­on-force combat is usually conducted by using simple but repetitive methods. It inherently lacks creativity. This, in turn, would allow an agile enemy to adjust to one’s methods.7  In morale attrition, the objective is to erode the enemy’s will to fight over time. This can be achieved by inflicting steadily large losses on the enemy in terms of materiel/personnel. The implied objective is to convince the enemy that further resistance is fruitless and would only result in unsustainable losses. Another method is to conduct highly intense and sustained offensive information operations (IO).8 Deception and psychological warfare are perhaps the two most important components of IO aimed at undermining the enemy’s will to fight.  There are some important differences between attrition in war on land and at sea. On land, one’s firepower is simply pitted against the enemy’s firepower. It is essentially a force-­on-force combat. Tactical maneuver plays little or no role in delivering fire because the opposing forces are generally in close and often more or less continuous contact. In contrast, the opposing forces at sea are separated by large distances. Tactical maneuver is used not only to obtain a better position for delivering fire, but also to outmaneuver the enemy. However, a force armed with long-­range, precise, and lethal ASCMs/LACMs can use maneuver with fire. Then a firing platform is essentially motionless but missiles are launched at variety of widely separated targets.  A weaker side might focus on exhausting (a state of extreme fatigue, tiredness, and being used up) the enemy instead of attrition. Then the objective is not to destroy/neutralize but to gradually degrade (or erode) enemy forces. It is also often intended to erode other sources of the enemy power. Attrition and exhaustion are closely related because both aim to reduce the enemy capabilities over time.9 In contrast to exhaustion, attrition usually results in inflicting much larger losses on the enemy and in shorter time. At the same time it might result in large losses for friendly forces unless the enemy is attacked beyond the effective range of his defenses. The exhaustion method properly applied would avoid high losses for friendly forces. At the same time, more time would be needed to achieve the same objective than in a pure attrition.  Both attrition and exhaustion methods require the weaker side to use its forces offensively. Freedom of action by the subordinate commanders is greatly encouraged. The actions against the enemy’s forces are easy to plan and execute. Almost any naval vessel or aircraft can be employed. Logistical support/ sustainment is also simple. However, if not planned and conducted properly, a

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   171 weaker side might suffer prohibitively high losses that cannot be easily, if at all, replaced. The single biggest disadvantage of both physical attrition and exhaustion is the long time needed to accomplish a given objective.  Theoretically, attrition/exhaustion can be conducted at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of war. The weaker side at sea simply cannot allow attrition at the operational and strategic levels. The losses of materiel and personnel would be prohibitively high. In contrast, the exhaustion method can be successfully conducted not only at the tactical but also at the strategic and operational levels of war.  The principal methods of combat employment aimed at weakening enemy naval forces over time are minor and major tactical actions at sea, subsurface, and in the air. They should be conducted within a given operational framework; otherwise, one’s efforts and time would be largely wasted. In terms of the weight of the main effort, weakening of the enemy’s naval forces over time can aim to:  • • •

Reduce the enemy combat power prior to a decisive encounter.  Equalize the enemy combat power prior to a decisive encounter.  Reduce the enemy’s combat power during the hostilities. 

A weaker side at sea could be effective in weakening the enemy fleet prior to a decisive encounter by conducting a series of small-­scale attacks. For example, the English Navy made extensive use of minor attacks to reduce the combat power of the Spanish Navy prior to the main encounter with the Armada. In one notable example, Francis Drake (1540–1596) conducted a raid on Cádiz on April 29–May 1, 1587, while the Spanish squadron was still fitting out. However, Drake’s raids had the opposite effect. The Spaniards reorganized the Armada and attempted to land in England.10  The British conducted a series of small-­scale but intensive attacks against the much stronger but far less mobile Spanish Armada in 1588. If Duke Alonso Pérez de Guzmán Medina Sidonia (1550–1619), the Spanish commander, had attacked at once as he advanced up the Channel, he might possibly have compelled English Admiral Charles Howard (1536–1624) to accept a close action and have thereby achieved victory by virtue of superior numbers. However, Howard and his second in command, Admiral Drake, repeatedly outmaneuvered and outthought their much more powerful opponent. During the Armada’s advance toward the English Channel in mid and late July 1588, Howard and Drake avoided a decisive encounter by using smaller but much faster ships. They carried out small-­scale and swift attacks at close range at places and times of their own choosing. They forced Sidonia to fight on their own terms. The Spaniards were forced to either attack the enemy or move up the Channel but not both.11  A relatively strong side could apply active fleet-­in-being concept aimed to equalize one’s strength prior to a decisive encounter and then at an opportune time seek a decisive encounter, as the German High Seas Fleet did in 1914–1916. Between August 1914 and May 1916, the Germans harassed the British and conducted numerous minor and major tactical actions aimed at reducing the Grand

172   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time Fleet’s margin of superiority to such an extent that eventually the High Seas Fleet could go on the offensive.12 The High Seas Fleet held back and avoided actions which might have led to heavy losses. Yet this did not prevent favorable opportunities for inflicting losses on the Grand Fleet.13 The Germans also used mines and, whenever possible, their U-­boats for offensive actions off the British coast.14 The Germans hoped that successful attacks on the Entente’s trade routes might force the British into diverting some of their naval strength, thereby making the Grand Fleet more vulnerable to sudden ambushes by the German light forces.15  In most cases, a weaker side would carry out tactical actions aiming to erode the enemy’s combat power during the entire course of a war. Tactical actions can be conducted symmetrically and asymmetrically. The most effective would be asymmetric attacks conducted by diverse forces. One’s surface forces would be employed in close cooperation with other naval combat arms and combat arms/branches of other services.  In both world wars, the losses of surface ships from all causes were rather high. For example, in World War I, the Royal Navy lost in the engagement with the German and Austro-­Hungarian forces 254 surface combatants with 651,907 tons (displacement). This number included thirteen battleships, three battle cruisers, three aircraft carriers, thirteen cruisers, twelve light cruisers, three flotilla leaders, sixty-­four torpedo boat destroyers, fifty-­four submarines, five gunboats and torpedo boats, eleven torpedo boats, five monitors, eighteen sloops, two patrol boats, and two minelayers.16  In World War II, surface forces played a significant role in disputing control of the sea in the Solomons, the central Mediterranean, the English Channel, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. For example, during the Solomons Campaign in the southern Pacific thirteen major surface actions were fought between August 9, 1942 and November 25, 1943. All battles but three took place in the night. The Japanese (who were much better than the Allies at night fighting and the use of gunnery and torpedoes in combination) won six, lost four, and three were draws.17 No fewer than seven naval battles and engagements were fought for Guadalcanal alone. A clear majority of naval encounters occurred during the Japanese attempts to bring in fresh reinforcements and supplies or to bombard the Allied positions on the coast.  During the struggle for Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943), both sides suffered rather heavy losses in surface ships. The Allies lost twenty-­four ships (two aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, fourteen destroyers) with 126,240 tons. The Japanese also lost twenty-­four ships (two battleships, one light carrier, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, eleven destroyers, and six submarines) with 134,839 tons.18  In the entire Solomons Campaign the Japanese losses (including fighting off New Guinea’s coast and the Bismarck Archipelago) amounted to two battleships, one small aircraft carrier, three heavy and light cruisers each, and thirty-­ six destroyers. In addition, Japanese naval air strength was so severely depleted that fleet aircraft carriers could not be properly manned. A more fundamental problem for the Japanese was the fact that new construction was unable to make

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   173 up for the losses. No more battleships or heavy cruisers were built by the Japanese, and no more than half of the lost destroyers were ever replaced.19  Because most of the major actions took place at night, both sides customarily and grossly exaggerated their successes. The Japanese believed that they were more successful than they were. This, in turn, led them to continue with their efforts in supporting their ground forces and thereby incurring ever larger losses, especially in destroyers. For the Allies, exaggerated reports of their encounters with the Japanese cruisers and destroyers boosted their morale but also led them to think (falsely) that they were overcoming their deficiencies in night fighting.20  Originally, the primary mission of submarines was defense of one’s coast and ports and conducting long-­range scouting for the battle fleet. It was believed that radio would allow a submarine the means to provide early warning of enemy fleet movements. At that time the submarines had better endurance at sea than most destroyers.21 However, shortly after the outbreak of war in August 1914, it was realized that submarines could be successfully employed in sinking enemy merchant vessels. Their potential against surface warships was shown on September 22, 1914 when a single U-­boat torpedoed and sank three old British armored cruisers (Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue) of the 7th Cruiser Squadron at Broad Fourteens (south of Dogger Bank) off the Dutch coast. Some sixty-­two officers and 1,397 men perished; 777 men survived.22 The British believed that five or six U-­boats were involved in the attack because within one hour six torpedoes were fired;. The subsequent inquiry into the attack claimed that the disaster could have been avoided had the senior officer complied more closely with the general instructions from the Admiralty. However, his conduct was amply atoned for by the exemplary conduct he displayed during the attack.23  In World War I, the British lost some 350 naval vessels from U-­boats (including five battleships, five cruisers, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, four submarines, one torpedo boat, twenty-­two Q-­ships, and eleven armed merchantmen).24 This number also included some 230 naval auxiliaries (193 colliers, 35 oilers, and 2 tugs). The performance of submarines in sinking enemy surface ships was even better in World War II. For example, the German U-­boats sank two British battleships, three carriers, two auxiliary carriers, one auxiliary catapult ship, four cruisers, and thirty destroyers.25  Land-­based aircraft have many advantages over surface ships in attacking enemy surface combatants. They have long range, high speed, and can carry variety of bombs and missiles. They can be deployed and redeployed from one to another part of a given theater at short notice. For example, in the first four weeks after the Allied invasion of North Africa, the Luftwaffe moved additional units from the Russian front, the Arctic, and western Europe to the Mediterranean. By December 12, 1942, the German air strength had been increased from 400 (290 in Sicily and 110 in Sardinia) to 1,220 (of which 850 were based in Sicily, Sardinia, and Tunisia). Some 400 aircraft were moved from the Russian front and the Arctic. This number included 150 anti-­shipping aircraft moved from north Norway.26 

174   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time The high effectiveness of land-­based aircraft in sinking surface ships was demonstrated in World War II. For example, the Royal Navy’s losses in World War II from the German aircraft were eight cruisers, one auxiliary catapult ship, and forty-­three destroyers (including three destroyers sunk by German or Italian aircraft).27 Four British destroyers were sunk by Italian aircraft.28  The first display of the threat land-­based aircraft posed to surface ships was during the German invasion of Norway in April–June 1940 (Weserübung Nord); the Luftwaffe moved a large force of heavy bombers and dive-­bombers to southern and central Norway. By mid-­April, it had concentrated six squadrons of Ju.88s at Vaernes and Kjeller (Oslo); thirteen squadrons of medium-­range bombers at Vaernes, Kjeller, and Fornebu; three squadrons of Bf.110 fighter-­ bombers at Vaernes; and three squadrons of Bf.109 fighters at Kristiansand. The Luftwaffe’s tasks included attacks against enemy ships at sea and reconnaissance. It achieved only modest success in attacks on shipping; only one naval transport was sunk on its way to central Norway. The Germans sank only one British destroyer in early April. British naval ships were repeatedly attacked until the final evacuation in May. The disappointing results for hitting ships at sea were largely due to the still-­poor quality of the existing bombsight. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe’s repeated attacks had rather large psychological effects on the Royal Navy. Admiral Sir Charles Forbes (1880–1960), CINC of the Home Fleet, directed that all surface operations south of Bergen should be abandoned. The healthy respect for the Luftwaffe also affected the positioning of the carriers Ark Royal and Glorious during their support of Allied troops ashore around Trondheim in late April 1940.29 Forbes later acknowledged that “the scale of air attack that would be developed against our military forces on shore and our naval forces off the Norwegian coast was grievously underestimated when the operations were undertaken.” The Royal Navy failed in its effort to deny the use of the sea to the Germans in the first five days of the campaign. The inability to control the coastal waters off Norway because of the weight of the Luftwaffe attacks made the Allied ships’ operations hazardous and difficult in the extreme unless protection was provided by Allied fighters based ashore.30  In contrast to the war in the Atlantic, the struggle for control of the Mediterranean in World War II depended essentially on airpower and, therefore, on the possession of land bases from which to operate bombers and fighter aircraft. Thus, the islands of Sicily and Sardinia occupied critically important positions for the employment of the Axis bombers in the central Mediterranean. Malta’s importance as an air base also became equal to its importance as a naval base. By May 1941, the Germans controlled Greece and the Aegean islands, although Crete remained a threat to their southern flank. The Allies still controlled the sea while the Germans had practically undisputed control of the air.  The Luftwaffe was very effective in attacking enemy surface warships in the Mediterranean. Two reasons for that were the favorable geographic positions of the air bases used by the Luftwaffe’s heavy bombers and dive-­bombers, and the short distance to their objective area. In January 1941, the Germans moved their highly trained X Air Corps to Sicily. Its most important task was to attack the

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   175 British Navy, particularly in Alexandria but also in the Suez Canal and the Sicilian Narrows. By mid-­January the Germans had 150 bombers and dive-­ bombers, two dozen twin-­engined fighters, and a few reconnaissance aircraft based on Sicily. In February, X Air Corps was reinforced by single-­engined fighters. The Italian air force deployed forty-­five bombers and dive-­bombers and seventy-­five fighters on Sicily. In addition, some seventy bombers and twenty-­ five Italian fighters were based on Sardinia. These aircraft were employed for attacks on the British Force H based at Gibraltar and the convoys sailing westward.31  The Luftwaffe’s aircraft based on the Sicilian airfields conducted heavy and sustained attacks against Allied convoys and forces of direct and distant cover in the central Mediterranean and the island of Malta. In one notable attack against the Allied convoy to Malta on January 10–11, 1941 (operation Excess), Ju.87 dive-­bombers and Ju.88 bombers, assisted by Italian torpedo and high-­ level bombers heavily damaged the British aircraft carrier Illustrious, while one cruiser (Southampton) was sunk. The effect of the Luftwaffe’s attacks was so great that Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet, reported to the British Admiralty that if such attacks continued, not only  would Mediterranean convoys have to be suspended but also the fleet itself would operate by day within range of dive-­bombers only at considerable risk.32  The Luftwaffe’s effectiveness in attacking the enemy’s surface combatants at sea was on full display during the final phase of the struggle for the island of Crete in late May 1941. The Royal Navy was extensively employed in embarking and then transporting Allied troops from Crete to Alexandria, Egypt. During this evacuation effort, Allied ships were subjected to massive attacks from the Luftwaffe’s VIII Air Corps. One effect of these attacks was that the Allies were forced to abandon their efforts to evacuate troops from Crete’s northern coast.33 Admiral Cunningham, pointed out that in three days he had lost two cruisers and four destroyers, while one battleship, two more cruisers, and four destroyers had been severely damaged.34 The Luftwaffe bombers and dive-­bombers sank three cruisers, six destroyers, five motor torpedo boats (MTBs), and several smaller ships.35 In addition, two battleships, one aircraft carrier, six cruisers, and seven destroyers were damaged. Some thirty-­two Allied transports, supply ships, and fleet auxiliaries with about 128,500 tons were sunk or had to be abandoned, and twelve ships with 94,500 tons were lost at sea.36 Admiral Cunningham informed the Admiralty in London that the scale of the enemy air attacks prevented his ships from operating during daylight hours in the Aegean or off the coasts of Crete; hence, the British Navy could no longer guarantee that it would prevent seaborne landings without incurring losses, which might lead to sacrificing the command of the eastern Mediterranean.37  The struggle for Crete in May 1941 showed, among other things, that in the modern era, sea control could not be obtained without the control of the air. The answer to enemy air power could only be one’s own airpower.38 During the entire World War II, the Royal Navy lost eight cruisers, one auxiliary catapult

176   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time ship, and thirty-­nine destroyers from the attacks by the Luftwaffe; four destroyers were sunk by the Italian aircraft, and four were sunk by German or Italian aircraft.39  In the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, the Argentine air force and land-­ based naval aircraft were extensively employed to contest sea control by the two British carrier forces and their escorts deployed around the Falkland Islands. The Argentine land-­based Skyhawk attack aircraft, Mirage 3 fighters, and Dagger (Mirage 5s sold by Israel to Argentine) multirole fighter aircraft operated at distances of about 440 to 500 miles, or at their extreme ranges.40 The first Argentine air attack led to the sinking of one frigate (Sheffield) on May 4. More intensive air attacks started on May 12 and continued, varying in intensity, until the end of that month. In fact, the most intensive air attacks were carried out within nine days after the British landing at San Carlos on May 21.41 By the end of the war, the Argentines had inflicted heavy losses on the British task force around the Falklands. The British lost two Type 42 and Type 21 frigates each (Sheffield, Ardent, Antelope, and Coventry).42 Among warships, moderate damage was suffered by two frigates and minor damage by six frigates (one of them was sunk in another attack) and three amphibious ships.43 The Argentine airpower was severely weakened by the loss of twenty-­eight attack and fighter aircraft (sixteen Skyhawk, ten Daggers, and two Mirage 3s) and one bomber (a Canberra).44 The Argentine air attacks posed the only real threat to the British landing on the Falklands.45  A weaker side can use some unconventional air attacks in destroying enemy surface combatants. For example, the Japanese started to use the suicide bomber (Kamikaze – “divine wind”) in an organized way against Allied ships during the battle for Leyte in October–December 1944. This was considered by the Japanese as the only way to overcome Allied superiority in the air and at sea. Yet Allied radio intercept operators erroneously concluded that the Japanese would rely less on suicide bombing in the future because of mounting losses in the air.46 By the end of October, the special attack units of the Fifth Base Air Force carried out twenty suicide missions varying in size from one to eight aircraft. Some twenty-­eight suicide planes hit their intended targets. Because of its steadily declining strength, the Sixth Base Air Force also adopted suicide-­ bombing tactics. Between November 1 and 15, both base air forces carried out twenty-­one suicide missions; nineteen aircraft successfully attacked their targets. On November 1, the enemy suicide bombers attacked the Allied covering force operating off Leyte Gulf composed of three battleships, one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and thirteen destroyers. Although the Allied AA shot down ten to fifteen enemy aircraft, the Japanese sank one ship, severely damaged three, and inflicted light damage on one destroyer.47 Reportedly, about 30 percent of the suicide bombers hit their targets. This was a much higher rate of hits than in conventional bombing.48  During November 1944, the army air force organized eighteen special attack units in the Home Islands. All of them were deployed to the Philippines. The first special attack units went into action for the first time on November 11. In

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   177 the meantime, the Fourth Air Army organized provisional special attack units from its forces deployed in the Philippines.49 This unit sank or damaged twenty-­ three Allied ships. In contrast, the Army lost twenty-­four aircraft in conventional attacks but only six enemy ships were hit.50  The most intensive use of the Japanese conventional aircraft and suicide bombers was during the Allied invasion of Okinawa between April and June 22, 1945 (operation Iceberg). The Japanese differentiated between mass suicide attacks with large numbers of aircraft, called “kikusui” (“floating chrysanth­ emum”), and individual suicide attacks known as kamikazes. The first suicide attack was on April 6 when about 700 aircraft (including 355 kamikazes) flew from Kyūshū to raid enemy shipping off Okinawa. Some 400 Japanese aircraft broke through the Allied defenses.51 They attacked the Allied task force off Amami Ōshima (Satsunan island group, north of Okinawa). The Japanese claimed that at least four enemy carriers were hit.52 Most of the Japanese attacks were against picket ships. Reportedly about 300 Japanese aircraft were shot down.53 The next day, the Japanese sent some thirty kamikazes against the enemy task force of three carriers plus escorts. The Japanese source claimed that some nineteen kamikazes hit the carriers.54  In the second general attack on April 12, some 125 naval kamikazes and sixty army aircraft attacked the Allied task force cruising east of Okinawa.55 Another detachment of twenty aircraft attacked the same force. This was followed by the attack of some forty-­five torpedo planes in the night of April 12/13.56 About eighty Japanese aircraft were shot down. However, those that penetrated the Allied defenses sank two and damaged fourteen ships (including heavily damaging two battleships).57  The third general attack was carried out by 220 army and navy aircraft in the night of April 15/16. A separate detachment of 100 aircraft attacked the enemy task force of Kikai (Kikajima) island (Satsunan group).58 These attacks resulted in damage to five enemy ships, including the carrier Intrepid.59 In the fourth general attack in the night of April 28/29, only sixty aircraft took part. More than half of the attacking planes were shot down.60 The fifth general attack with some 280 aircraft was carried out on May 4.61 In this attack five U.S. ships were sunk and eleven damaged. All but one was caused by suicide-­bombing attacks.62  In the sixth general attack, on May 11, some 240 Japanese aircraft attacked Allied ships around Okinawa.63 Between May 11 and 14, three U.S. flagships (carriers Enterprise and Bunker Hill and battleship New Mexico) were hit and put out of action.64 Afterward and until May 24, the Japanese conducted only sporadic attacks with suicide bombers.  The seventh general attack in the night of May 24/25 was carried out by both the army and navy aircraft. The number of suicide attacks was reduced after the end of May 1945.65 The final eighth and ninth Japanese efforts against Allied task groups off Okinawa took place on May 27 and June 7. However, only a few aircraft took part in these attacks.66  Between April 6 and June 22, 1945, the Japanese used some 1,465 aircraft (860 Navy and 605 Army) in carrying out mass suicide attacks. At the same

178   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time time, some 1,900 individual suicide attacks were conducted against the Allied forces around Okinawa.67 In addition, the Japanese carried out 5,000 conventional bombing attacks.68 According to other sources, between April 6 and June 22, the Japanese conducted ten mass suicide attacks with 1,485 aircraft plus 450 kamikaze attacks.69 The total number of all attacks is not known but according to the Japanese sources some 3,700 naval aircraft were involved. This number included fighter escorts and conventional bombers. Presumably the sorties of the army aircraft were at least as half as large as those of the Japanese Navy.70  The Allied losses from the suicide attacks amounted to twenty-­seven ships sunk and 164 ships damaged.71 The American sources stated that the kamikazes caused some 80 percent of the Allied losses from all causes. They sank twenty-­ four ships/craft and damaged 202 more. These losses would probably have been much larger if the Japanese Navy and the Army had cooperated more closely.72 From the Japanese conventional air attacks, the Allies lost only a single ship while sixty-­three more were damaged.73 Adopting suicide bombing was in fact an admission of weakness by the Japanese. There was simply not sufficient number of well-­trained pilots for such missions. Also, the Japanese production of aircraft rapidly declined in 1945. During the Okinawa operation, the Japanese lost some 7,830 aircraft. These losses were ten times higher than the Allied losses.74 But despite some claims to the contrary, the suicide bombers clearly inflicted substantial losses on the Allied forces around Okinawa.  Destruction and neutralization of the threat posed by enemy submarines is one of the most critical and yet most difficult and time-­consuming tasks. The struggle against submarines is an inherently force-­to-force or attritional type of naval warfare. This means that ultimate success in defeating the threat posed by the enemy submarines can be achieved only over time. The reason is that submarines, unlike surface ships, are not employed in large numbers in a given area of a maritime theater. This is even more pronounced in a typical narrow sea, where submarines would be employed individually. Their employment in groups would be rare. No single platform or weapon system can be a panacea to such a complex problem as is ASW. Hence, success in ASW cannot be achieved without synchronized employment of diverse naval maneuvering forces and stationary systems.  In the past, submarines were more effective in attacking surface combatants than in attacking enemy submarines. Only a few submarines were sunk by other submarines. For example, in World War I, the Royal Navy lost four submarines from the German U-­boats.75 And in World War II, only three British submarines were sunk by the German U-­boats.76 This situation changed in the aftermath of World War II so that today attack submarines are considered as the most effective ASW platform. One of their great advantages is that they operate in the same acoustic environment as hostile submarines. They are also very stealthy platforms. Attack submarines have long passive-­detection ranges. They can operate beyond and below the effective range of enemy ASW weapons.  In both world wars, the stronger side used aircraft in combating threats posed by the submarines of a weaker side. In the future, the ability of a weaker side to

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   179 neutralize the threat posed by the SSNs/SSKs of a stronger side will be much greater than it was in the past.  Naval special forces are normally used for attacks on enemy naval bases and ports. However, there have been a few instances in which they were employed against surface ships at sea. In the first of such actions in the night of June 10/11, 1918, two Italian MAS (“motoscafo armato silurante” – “torpedo-­armed motorboat”)77 attacked the Austro-­Hungarian guard ship 7,400-ton Mars (formerly the battleship Tegetthoff ) and the dreadnought 21,690-ton (full) Szent István near the island of Premuda in the northern Adriatic. The Italian boats were on a mission to measure depth of water and search for mines when they unexpectedly encountered the enemy ships. One MAS attacked Mars, but no torpedo hits were scored; the other MAS was more successful in the attack on Szent István. The ship sank at about 0600 on June 11, after receiving two torpedo hits. Some ninety men went down with the ship. Both MAS escaped.78  In World War II, the Italian X Flotilla MAS79 (Decima Flottiglia MAS) was perhaps the most effective part of the Italian Navy. The great majority of attacks by MAS were conducted against enemy bases and ports. However, they were used on several occasions against the enemy naval and merchant vessels at sea. For example, two Italian MAS scored two torpedo hits and heavily damaged the British 11,930-ton (full) light cruiser Manchester off Cape Bon, Tunisia on August 13, 1942. The cruiser was later scuttled. It was part of the direct screen for the Allied convoy to Malta (operation Pedestal).80  In the final phase of the Pacific War, the IJN began to use the human torpedoes (Kaitens – “return to heaven” or “heaven shaker”), the 20-ton midget submarines (Kairyu – “sea dragon”), 30-knot suicide boats (Shinyo – “sea quake”), and suicide divers (Fukuryu – “crouching dragon”) against Allied ships. The idea of using human torpedoes originated with some younger submariners during the struggle for Guadalcanal in early 1943.81 The Kaitens were converted 24-inch Type 93 (“Long Lance”) torpedoes. The first training base for Kaitens was established in Ṓtsujima, Tokoyama Bay (some 50 miles southwest of Hiroshima, Inland Sea) on July 10, 1944.82 The Japanese directed four submarines carrying twenty Kaitens and five conventional submarines to attack the Allied invasion force off Okinawa. However, all but two submarines failed to return. One submarine was damaged in an air attack shortly after leaving its home port. The only surviving submarine (I-­58) never penetrated the enemy’s defense zone.83  After much internal debate, the Kriegsmarine followed the lead of the Italian, Japanese, and the Royal Navy and organized its first special naval commando unit called “Small Combat Means Unit” (Kleinkampfmittel-­Verband) at Heilligenhafen, Kiel Bay in January 1944.84 The Germans developed and put in service three models of one-­man midget submarine (Marder – Marten in English, Molch – Salamander, and Biber – Beaver), two models of 2-man midget submarine (Hecht – Pike, and Seehund – Seal), a radio-­controlled motor boat (Linse – Lentil), and a long-­range pattern torpedo (Dackel – Dachshund).85 The German midget submarines achieved few successes against enemy surface ships. On July 7, 1944, they sank one Polish cruiser (Dragon) and one destroyer, both at Seine Bay.86 

180   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time

Offensive mining  Offensive mining is normally conducted in enemy-­controlled waters or in disputed sea/ocean areas. Early offensive mining can disrupt enemy plans more effectively than any other naval weapon. Mines are one of the most effective weapons to destroy or neutralize enemy surface combatants and submarines. They are unique attritional weapons because if properly used they only inflict losses on the enemy. For example, during the Russo-­Turkish War of 1877–1878, the Russians neutralized a major part of the Turkish fleet by mining selected parts of the Danube estuary. Although only one Turkish ship (an ironclad) was sunk, the Russians obtained the initiative in the war.87 In the Russo-­Japanese War of 1904–1905, some 6,300 mines were laid. About 55 percent of all ships lost were due to mines.88 The Japanese suffered heavy losses from the mines. On May 14, 1904, two of six Japanese battleships struck mines laid in their patrol area off Port Arthur. Both ships were lost, or one-­third of the Japanese battleship strength.89 In World War II, the Royal Navy lost from the German mines one cruiser and twenty-­two destroyers.90  The best results in offensive mining are achieved by laying mines off approaches to the enemy naval bases/ports, fleet anchorages, the river estuaries, and the operating areas of the enemy surface ships/submarines. For example, from the very beginning of World War I, the Germans began to lay mines off the British ports, the river estuaries, and in the operating area of the Grand Fleet. The Germans had large stocks of the moored mines. The North Sea was very favorable for laying such mines because of its predominantly shallow waters. On the first day of the war, a German minelayer laid 180 mines some 30 miles off the seaside resort of Southwold, Suffolk. The minelayer was quickly sunk by the British destroyers. However, the British light cruiser Amphion struck one of these mines on August 6, 1914 and sank with the loss of 151 men. In the first two months of the war, the British lost not only Amphion but also the dreadnought Audacious off Ireland’s coast (when it ran onto a mine laid by a German auxiliary cruiser), one gunboat, one submarine, and eight fishing trawlers, plus thirteen merchant ships (with 35,000 tons), and seventeen fishing vessels.91 After summer 1915, the Germans focused on using U-­boats and auxiliary cruisers for mining in enemy waters. Small cruisers did not lay mines west of the Dogger Bank. The U-­boats and mines represented one of the greatest threats to the Grand Fleet. The British naval command took these threats seriously.92  The German use of mines in the Baltic in 1914–1915 was not as effective as it was in the North Sea. In 1914, the German minelayers laid mines off western Finnish ports, the Åland Sea, and the Bay of Riga. However, the Russians were able to clear most of the German mines. In 1915–1917 the Germans became steadily more skillful in laying offensive mine barriers in the Baltic.93 The German 417-ton UC II-­class minelaying submarines were very effective in penetrating ports considered safe by the Russians and laying mines. Their mining resulted in significant losses for the Russians. For example, on November 19, 1916, the Russian armored cruiser Kursk ran onto a German mine at Hogland

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   181 (Suursaari, Gulf of Finland). Although heavily damaged it reached Kronshtadt. The Russian large minelayer Ladoga ran into a mine in the Åland Islands after it laid some 800 mines at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. Several Russian destroyers, minelayers auxiliary ships were sunk or damaged by the German mines.94  In contrast, the Russians were skillful and very effective in the offensive use of mines in the Baltic from October 1914 and until January 1915. The Russian admiral Nikolai von Essen (1860–1915), the commander of the Baltic Fleet was very energetic and keen to use mines to the maximum. Admiral Essen also planned a foray with the entire fleet or part of it up to the German coast to lure the enemy to fight around the Central Position (in the Gulf of Finland). However, the Russian high command did not approve Essen’s proposal. The Russian battleships could not be used outside the Gulf of Finland because their employment required permission from the tsar. Hence, the Russians actively used only cruisers and torpedo boats and mines.95  The Russians laid offensive mine barriers on the routes to the German ports; one barrier complemented the other. This, in turn, forced the German Navy to deploy its forces to Swinemünde (Świnoujście today).96 From October 31, 1914 to February 15, 1915, the Russians laid some, 1,600 mines in the area between Memel (Klaipėda today) and the Cape Arkona (island of Rügen).97 For example, on October 7, 1914 Russian torpedo boats laid a mine barrier west of Windau (Ventspils today). On October 31, 1914, one destroyer (Novik) laid some fifty mines off Cape Rixhöft (Rozewie today), Pomerania. Torpedo boats laid mines some 15 nautical miles west of Memel.98 In the night of November 18/19, 1914, the Russian minelayer Amur laid large mine barriers some 25 miles from Bornholm. Cover was provided by three Russian ships south off Gotland. One day later, torpedo boats laid mines some 7 nautical miles north of Bruesterort, Eastern Prussia. The last mining foray was on January 31, 1915 when some 140 mines were laid some 30 nautical miles south of Rixhöft.99  The Russian mines were responsible for the sinking of one German armored cruiser and light cruiser each, two destroyers, four patrol craft, and fourteen steamers. The Russian mines were also responsible for inflicting damage on four cruisers, three destroyers, and two minesweepers.100 The Russian mining also surprised the Germans.101 For example, on November 17, 1914, the armored cruiser Friedrich Karl struck two mines off Memel and after five hours sank. A steamer sent from Memel for help also ran into the Russian mines and sank.102 In December 1914, the Germans lost three steamers and one minesweeper from the Russian mines. On January 25, 1915, the light cruiser Augsburg ran into the mine barrier east of Bornholm. Another light cruiser (Gazelle) struck a mine north of Arkona. Although damaged, both cruisers were saved. However, the Gazelle was so heavily damaged that it was not worth putting it back into service.103  By using mines, the Russians put half the German cruisers in the Baltic out of service. Their success would have been even greater if the Russian mines had been fitted with larger explosive heads. However, after the death of Admiral

182   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time Essen in the spring of 1915, the Russian mining was not as intensive as it was during his command of the Baltic Fleet.104  In the Black Sea, the Russian fleet was numerically inferior to the Turkish fleet. However, it was not passive. In 1914, the Russians mined the entrance of the Bulgarian port of Varna, making it more difficult for merchant ships to use that port. One mine barrier was laid by a torpedo boat flotilla (in fact, 1,200-ton destroyers) in October 1914. Four destroyers laid some 240 mines on the night of November 4/5, 1914. Two mine barriers totaling 857 mines were laid on the night of December 21/22, 1914. One Russian submarine laid sixty mines off the Bosporus on July 10, 1915, aiming to block the Bosporus–Sevastopol and Bosporus–Zonguldak routes. However, these mines proved to be ineffective because they were laid too far from the entrance. The German battle cruiser Goeben ran onto the Russian mines on December 26, 1914. The German cruiser Breslau was damaged by a mine on August 18, 1915.105 Only the inefficient explosive heads saved the German ships from being sunk.106  Experience shows that success in offensive (or defensive) mining is considerably enhanced if certain tenets are applied. Perhaps, one of the most important tenets is that mines should be laid in large numbers. Only a massive use of mines can be effective. During World War I, the Germans laid some 43,000 mines. This included 25,000 in the North Sea and around the British Isles. These mines accounted for the loss of forty-­six warships (including five battleships and three cruisers).107 The German, Austro-­Hungarian, and Turkish mines were responsible for the loss of the thirty Entente submarines, thirteen large surface ships, thirty-­one destroyers, thirteen torpedo boats, three minelayers, thirty-­four minesweepers, and 294 gunboats and patrol boats.108  The enemy’s efforts to destroy or neutralize large minefields are extremely time-­consuming and require large forces. Experience shows that the best results are achieved by commencing mining with a massive attack followed by frequent, moderate-­sized mining, rather than an occasional large mining effort.109 The best results can be achieved if a new type of mine is laid in large numbers and over a large sea/ocean area. The aim is then to inflict large losses before the enemy can devise effective countermeasures. For example, the Germans were the first to lay magnetic influence mines in World War II. (The British were the first to use magnetic mines operationally, in August 1918.) However, the Germans used initially only a small number of these mines. On November 20 and 21, 1939, the Germans used nine He.50 floatplanes to mine the Thames River estuary. These aircraft dropped only forty mines in two days. During the third attempt, two mines were dropped in shallow water, enabling the British to recover them and afterward devise countermeasures.110  Mines should be laid over a wide area, thereby putting the maximum burden on the enemy’s mine defenses. However, this should not be carried to an extreme. One must balance properly the need to limit the enemy’s movements and inflict large losses on his forces with avoiding excessively mining a certain area and thereby unduly limiting the movement of friendly forces or even endangering the safety of one’s own shipping. For example, the first German mine

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   183 barrier (codenamed Wartburg) in the war against Soviet Russia was laid from the tip of Öland to the Lithuanian coast between June 18 and 21, 1941. The Swedes (under German pressure) laid in their territorial waters a mine barrier to supplement the Wartburg barrier. On the night of June 21/22 the Germans mined the approaches to the Soviet-­controlled bases of Libau, Windau, Soelosund, Moonsund, and the Irben Strait (Bay of Riga). As it turned out, the Germans did too much mining, because the Soviets showed no desire to break out from their home bases. Moreover, the Wartburg barrier made the movement of German forces much more difficult. By the end of 1941 the German-­laid mines had caused the loss of at least ten German merchant vessels and two minesweeping craft. This example shows that offensive mining should not be taken to extremes, because too many mines in an area required for transit of one’s surface ships or submarines might restrict their freedom of maneuver and also sometimes cause unnecessary losses.111 Mining large sea areas greatly complicates the enemy’s ability to counter the mine threat, and sometimes it can lead to serious strain or even a breakdown of the entire effort.  Much of the effectiveness of any new weapon lies in its surprise introduction and large-­scale employment before an enemy can develop countermeasures. Tactical surprise can be achieved if a mine detonates unexpectedly or if the enemy discovers a mine barrier in an unexpected place, or if the enemy is unaware of the type of firing mechanism and mine. This, in turn, could force the enemy to conduct only a mine hunt or to use several types of sweep gear and sweep the area consecutively – a time-­consuming proposition. Then the enemy might be forced to carry out only control sweeps in the mined area. Consequently, the mine threat would remain relatively high for the enemy’s forces operating in the area. One method of achieving a tactical surprise is to keep secret the anti-­sweep devices fitted on the moored and bottom influence mines. The same effect can be achieved by using single mines or lying simulated mine barriers to deceive the opponent. If the enemy detects such a mine or barrier, he must assume that a mined area with a certain mine density exists. This forces him to assign additional MCM forces. The true character of the simulated mine barriers or individual mines is recognized by the enemy relatively late and even then the real position of mine barriers remains unclear.112  A weaker but relatively strong side should lay mines in multiple theaters. The objective should be not only to inflict losses but also tie and put stress on the enemy MCM forces. For example, in World War I, the Germans did not lay mines off the enemy coast only in the North Sea and the Baltic but also in the Black Sea, White Sea, and off the U.S./Canadian east coast. In June 1915, one German auxiliary cruiser (Meteor) laid 285 mines at the entrance to the White Sea. The aim was to interfere with the British ammunition supplies to Russia. At least ten vessels, including one British 14,600-ton auxiliary cruiser and former ocean liner, the Arlanza, were damaged. A number of the British minesweepers had to be sent to clear mines in the White Sea. In August, the German U-­boats laid seventy-­two mines in the White Sea. However, these mines were not very effective against Russian shipping.113 

184   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time In May 1918, the Germans deployed six U-­boats (U-­151, U-­156, U-­140, U-­117, U-­155, U-­152) off the U.S./Canadian east coast. They did not only attack merchant shipping but also laid mines off approaches to major ports and on the shipping routes. Between June and September 1918, the U-­boats laid mines off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina; south of Nimble Shoal lightship, Chesapeake Bay; Fenwick Island Shoal Lightship, Delaware; south of Barnegat (northern tip of Long Beach Island, New Jersey); Winter Quarters Shoal, Virginia, North Carolina, at the entrance to New York City; and in the approaches to Halifax, Nova Scotia.114  Offensive mining should be conducted covertly. Covertness can be greatly enhanced by laying mines at night, in poor visibility, and in bad weather. However, sometimes gross lack of operations security might have highly adverse consequences for a side that laid mines in enemy waters. For example, on August 17, 1914, one small German steamer laid some 200 mines at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. This was observed by the Russians. The next day the Russians not only detected the German mines but incorporated them as part of their “1st Position” in defense of the Gulf of Finland.115  Deception should be used whenever possible to mislead the enemy about the time and extent of mining efforts. Then the enemy might not be able to counter the mine threat effectively and/or in a timely manner, because of the lack of sufficient MCM forces deployed in the mined area. One’s naval capabilities are not infinite. Hence, land-­based aircraft and helicopters should also be employed in one’s mining effort.  Diverse types of mines should be used to complicate the enemy’s efforts to neutralize their threat. Mining should be conducted by using surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. Diversity of platforms greatly complicates the task of enemy intelligence in accurately and promptly identifying the mine threat. For example, in World War I, the Germans used both surface ships and U-­boats to mine British coastal waters in the North Sea. They repeatedly mined the entrances off British ports on the North Sea coast. Several thousand mines were laid each year, and no part of the British coast was free of German mines.116 The most effective method is the use of several types of mines to exert the greatest possible strain on enemy minesweeping forces. One’s mining effort should be continuous, thereby tying up large enemy forces to counter the mine threat. The value of persistent minelaying over a large sea area was shown in all maritime theaters in World War II. Mines should be also laid at carefully selected points of an ocean/area, such as naval bases/ports, river estuaries, and straits/narrows, and off important parts of the enemy’s coast.  In mining a certain sea/ocean area over time, different patterns should be used – that is, one should avoid laying mines repeatedly at the same time and place; otherwise, the enemy will be able to neutralize the effectiveness of one’s mining efforts. The effectiveness of persistent minelaying over a large sea area was evidenced in all maritime theaters in World War II. Experience shows that one’s mining should be combined with other forms of attacks against enemy shipping

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   185 at sea and major ports/anchorages. Hence, mining should be combined with attacks against merchant shipping at sea and against ports and ship-­related facilities ashore.  Weakening of the enemy’s forces over time is closely related to avoiding a decisive encounter with superior forces. It is the main method in applying active fleet-­in-being. It should be extensively applied from the very beginning of hostilities at sea. The focus should be on weakening those enemy forces that are employed for obtaining and maintaining sea control. A weaker side should avoid pure attritional warfare in a war with much stronger enemy forces. Instead, it should employ its forces beyond the effective range of the enemy defenses. This means outmaneuvering the enemy and employing long-­range, highly precise, and lethal weapons. The primary forces for carrying out long-­range strikes are attack aircraft/bombers and attack submarines. A weaker side should use offensive mining extensively to inflict large losses on enemy surface ships and submarines. It should also use diverse unconventional forces creatively in inflicting large losses on the stronger side.  A much weaker side at sea should avoid attrition and rely on exhaustion in weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time. It should also use IOs creatively to weaken the enemy’s morale and will to fight. However, IOs by themselves cannot be effective unless combined with inflicting large losses on the enemy’s materiel and personnel. The opportunities for a weaker side to gradually weaken stronger forces over time are much greater today than they were in the past. 

Notes    1 Staff presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas (Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 8–9, 1938), pp. 32–33.    2 From the Latin “atterere” – to rub against.    3 Cited in Alexander Hagelkvist, Theories of Warfare (Stockholm: Swedish National Defense University, 2015), p. 32.    4 J. Boon Bartholomees Jr., “The Issues of Attrition,” Parameters, Spring 2010, p. 13.    5 Cited in Hagelkvist, Theories of Warfare, p. 33.    6 Hagelkvist, Theories of Warfare, p. 34.    7 Bartholomees, “Issues of Attrition,” p. 12.    8 Bartholomees, “Issues of Attrition,” p. 13.    9 Bartholomees, “Issues of Attrition,” p. 9.  10 Kappa, “The Strategy of a Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1937), p. 631.  11 Michael Lewis, The Spanish Armada (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), pp. 109–111. 12 Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. I: To the Battle of the Falklands 1914 (London: Longmans, Green, 1920), p. 163.  13 Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, with contributions from John Hattendorf et al., 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 118.  14 Raoul Castex, “The German Operations in the North Sea (1914–1916),” chap. 6 in Théories Stratégiques, Vol. 2, trans. R.C. Smith, assisted by E.J. Tiernan (Newport, RI: Naval War College, April 1939), p. 6.  15 Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 119. 

186   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time 16 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. V (London: Longmans, Green And Co., 1931), p. 431.  17 Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), p.  295; David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun. Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 501. 18 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 5: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1949, reprint 1974), p. 372.  19 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War. The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 1: 1st June 1943–31st May 1944 (London: Her Majesty Stationery Office, 1960), p. 231.  20 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 6: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942–1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), pp. 195–196.  21 Jan S. Breemer, Defeating the U-­boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper # 36 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), p. 8.  22 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.  55–56; Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. I, p. 182.  23 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. I, p. 182.  24 R.H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002, first published 1931 by Constable & Co. Ltd.), p. 335.  25 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 2: 1st June 1944–14th August 1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 439–442.  26 Air Ministry (A.C.A.S.I.), The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933–1945) (London: Air Ministry, Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248, 1948; reprinted by Public Records Office, 2001), p. 145.  27 Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol III, Part 2, pp. 439–442.  28 Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol III, Part 2, pp. 441–442.  29 Maurice Harvey, Scandinavian Misadventure: The Campaign in Norway 1940 (Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Spellmount, 1990), pp. 196–197.  30 Stephen W. Roskill, History Of The Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 178–179.  31 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I, p. 420.  32 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I, pp. 421–422.  33 Karl Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940–1945, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter D. Lang, 1981), pp. 219–220.  34 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I, p. 443.  35 Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940–1945, Vol. 1, p. 220.  36 Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940–1945, Vol. 1, p. 446.  37 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 443.  38 Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940–1945, Vol. 1, pp. 220, 447.  39 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 439–442.  40 Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the “Malvinas”: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War (London: Viking, 1989), p. 85.  41 Middlebrook, Fight for the “Malvinas,” p. 174.  42 Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 2, War and Diplomacy (London/New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2005), p. 485.  43 Middlebrook, Fight for the “Malvinas,” pp. 174–175. 

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   187 44 Freedman, Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 2, p. 484.  45 Middlebrook, Fight for the “Malvinas,” p. 175.  46 GHQ, SWPA, Military Intelligence Section, G-­2, Special Intelligence Bulletins, No. 557, November 15/16, 1944, Appendix 1, p.  ii; Ultra Intelligence, No 511–599, October 1–December 28, 1944, SRH-­203, Part 5, AFHRA.  47 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, “Operations in Pacific Area-­November 1944,” June 1, 1945, M233, Reel 12, U.S. Navy Strategic Planning: Its Evolution and Execution, 1891–1945, Admin. And Operational History, p. 61. Other sources stated that during the Leyte– Samar operation (November 21–29), kamikazes attacked forty-­five ships; they sank four ships (one escort carrier, destroyer, LCI, and SC each) and inflicted extensive damage on twenty-­four other ships. In the battle for Ormoc (December 7–12), the kamikazes attacked ten ships, sinking two ships (one destroyer, LCT, troop transport), one LSM was abandoned, and four ships suffered extensive damage. In the Mindoro operation (December 13–30), eighteen ships were attacked; five ships were sunk (two LSTs, one PT boat, an LCI, and a troop transport) and nine ships suffered extensive damages. During the Lingayen operation (January 2–13, 1945), the Japanese suicide bombers attacked fifty-­five ships; they sank one escort carrier, ammunition ships, and a minesweeper (converted destroyer), while twenty-­six suffered extensive damage. Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI: The Advance to Japan (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995), pp. 260–262.  48 Charles A. Willoughby et al., Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. I, Part II: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Compiled from Japanese Demobilization Bureaux Records) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1966, Facsimile Report, 1994), pp. 568–569.  49 Willoughby et al., Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. I, Part II, p. 568.  50 Willoughby et al., Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 568–569.  51 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 194.  52 Toshiyuki Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” in David C. Evans, ed. and trans., The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Japanese Naval Officers, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 462–463.  53 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 194.  54 Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” p. 464.  55 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 195.  56 Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” p. 465.  57 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 195.  58 Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” p. 465.  59 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 195.  60 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 195.  61 Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” pp. 466–467.  62 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 196.  63 Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” pp. 466–467.  64 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 196.  65 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 195.  66 Yokoi, “Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,” p. 467.  67 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific 1945 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 233.  68 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 356.  69 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 196.  70 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific 1945, pp. 233, 235.  71 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 196.  72 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 356. 

188   Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   73   74   75   76   77

  78   79   80   81   82   83

  84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   95   96   97

  98   99 100 101

Ministry of Defence (Navy), War With Japan, Vol. VI, p. 196.  Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 356–357.  Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 335.  Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 442–444.  An MAS was a wooden craft with a gasoline engine. Its maximum speed was 22–25 knots and it had an effective range of some 125 nautical miles. It was armed with two torpedoes and had a crew of eight. The first MAS was ordered in April 1915; Paul G. Halpern, The Battle of the Otranto Straits: Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in WWI (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 10.  Walter S. Zapotoczny, Jr., Decima Flottiglia MAS. The Best Commandos of the Second World War (Charleston, SC: Fonthill Media LLC, 2017), p. 18.  Established at Leghorn on March 15, 1941.  Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 103.  Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 167.  Boyd and Yoshida, Japanese Submarine Force, p. 169.  Kennosoke Torisu and Masataka Chihaya, “Japanese Submarine Tactics and the Kaiten,” in David C. Evans, ed. and trans., The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Japanese Naval Officers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd ed., 1986), p. 448.  C.D. Bekker, K-­Men. The Story of the German Frogmen And Midget Submarines (Maidstone, Kent: George Mann, 1973), p. 17. Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War. The War at Sea, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 2: 1st June 1944–14th August 1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Service, 1961), pp. 454–454. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 440, 442.  Andrew Patterson Jr., “Mining: A Naval Strategy,” Naval War College Review 23, No. 9 (May 1971), p. 54.  Gunther Linke, Taktik der Überwasserkräfte, Teil V/1: Grundlagen fuer den Einsatz von Überwassershiffen zum Minenelegen (Charakteristik der Seeminen und ihrer Einsatzmittel) (Dresden: Military Academy, “Friedrich Engels,” 1988), p. 8.  Raymond A. Spruance, Sea Power. Lecture delivered at West Point, April 5–7, 1938, Naval Historical Collection, File 2047, Naval War College, Newport, RI, p. 23.  Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 439–442.  Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, pp. 71–72.  Friedrich Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege 1914 bis 1918: Ihre Erfolge und Misserfolge,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1927), p. 294.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 289.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 290.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 263.  Werner Rahn, “The Naval War in the Baltic, 1914–1918: A German Perspective,” in The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905–1918, ed. Michael Epkenhans and Gerhard P. Gross (Potsdam: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 2010), 85.  N.B. Pavlovich, The Fleet in the First World War, Vol. I: Operations of the Russian Fleet (New Delhi/Washington, DC: Amerind Publishing Co./The Smithsonian Institution and the National Science Foundation, 1979) (translated from the Russian, Flot v Pervoy mirovoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1964), p. 117.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 263.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 264.  Evgenii F. Podsoblyaev, “The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Policy, 1905–1914,” translated by Francis King and John Biggart, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2002), p. 68.  Pavlovich, Fleet in the First World War, p. 117. 

Weakening the enemy’s naval forces over time   189 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

111

112 113 114 115 116

Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 265.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 265.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” pp. 265–266.  Hermann Lorey, “Der Minenkrieg im Schwarzen Meer. Eine kritische Betrachtung,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1933), pp. 212–213.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 266.  Cited in Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 72.  Gerhard Freiherr von Ledebur, Die Seemine (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1977), p. 186.  V. Dotsenko, “Miny v lokal’nykh voynakh” [Mines in Local Wars], Morskoy Sbornik 2 (February 1987): 17–18.  Cited in John S. Chilstrom, Mines Away! The Significance of US Army Air Forces Minelaying in World War II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 1993), pp.  1–2; E.P. Flynn, Mine Warfare – Dormant by Design or Neglect (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1961), p. 7.  Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970), p.  418; David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p.  210; Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuro­ päischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1958), p. 11.  M. Adam, “Some Aspects of the Employment of Mine Weapons in Modern Naval War,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 8 (August 1984), p. 73.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 290.  Friedrich Ruge, “Minen an der amerikanischen Küste,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 39, No. 9 (September 1934), pp. 393–398.  Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 289.  Thomas H. Robbins, The Employment of Naval Mines (Newport, RI: staff presentation, Naval War College, March 20, 1939), p 14.

7 Counter-­containment 

A weaker but relatively strong side would normally resort to counter-­containment in the face of the containment of its forces by a stronger side. These efforts would be carried out for the duration of the hostilities. Counter-­containment cannot be successful unless combined with offensive actions aimed at inflicting large losses on the stronger enemy.  The main methods used in counter-­containment are (1) naval counter-­ blockade, (2) strategic diversion, and (3) tying up the enemy forces at sea or on the coast. Naval blockade is one of the main methods used by a stronger side to obtain and maintain sea control. It is usually combined with a commercial blockade. Likewise, a weaker but relatively strong side at sea would normally resort to conducting a naval counter-­blockade combined with a commercial blockade.  The principal methods in countering an enemy naval blockade are:  • • • •

Lifting the enemy naval blockade.  Breaking through the blockading line.  Forcing a defended choke point.  Weakening the enemy’s blockading forces. 

Actions to lift the enemy naval blockade primarily aim to allow one’s naval forces free access to the open ocean or another narrow sea so that they can more effectively dispute control of the sea. Another objective is to restore the country’s links to overseas commerce. In the modern era, the efforts of one’s naval forces to lift a blockade cannot be successful without the participation of friendly ground troops and air forces. A stronger side would not be forced to lift a blockade unless it was suffering considerable losses at sea. Theoretically, this could be achieved by winning a decisive naval battle (in the past) or a major fleet-­ versus-fleet operation.  The odds of a weaker side lifting a blockade are high in a war against a much stronger enemy. However, in a war between two quite strong powers the loss of several ships, or even a single powerful ship, might be sufficient to lift the blockade. For example, in the Second Schleswig War (February 1–October 30, 1864), Prussia was a weaker side at sea. On March 15, 1864, the Danish government declared a blockade of the Prussian coast in the Baltic. Two days later,

Counter-containment   191 the Danish fleet appeared off the island of Rügen. One of the main Danish objectives was to blockade the port of Swinemünde. The Danish blockade in the Baltic was sufficiently strong as to keep the Prussian Navy bottled up in its ports. The Prussian attempts to break through the blockade in March and April from Danzig (Gdańsk today) and Swinemünde failed.1 Danes captured fifteen prizes and four neutral blockade runners. They also extended the blockade to Germany’s North Sea coast. The ports of Hamburg and Bremen were closed to shipping.2 The Danish blockade of the Elbe and Weser river estuaries led to the battle of Heligoland on May 9, 1864 between the Danish squadron (two wooden frigates and one corvette) under Commodore Edouard Suenson, and the Austrian squadron (two Austrian wooden frigates, three Prussian gunboats) under Commodore Wilhelm von Tegetthoff.3 Although the Austrian squadron suffered heavier losses, the Danish fleet was unable to pursue the Austrian squadron (because of steering damage, one corvette was disabled). On the morning of May 10, the Austrian ships (Austria was then Prussia’s ally) entered Cuxhaven. The coast from the Elbe estuary was free for traffic.4 The Danish fleet was forced to withdraw to the Skagerrak and the blockade of the German coast was lifted.5  A blockaded fleet could try to obtain access to the open waters by breaking through the enemy’s blockading line. The chance of this working is greatly enhanced if one’s coast is highly indented and fronted with many offshore islands or archipelagoes. The longer the coastline, the larger the forces the stronger side would need to enforce the blockade. And the greater the chances for a weaker side to obtain freedom of action for its surface combatants and submarines. In the era of close blockade, the blockading force was usually stationed close to a blockade port or naval base. For example, in many wars with France, the British Navy blockaded the main French bases on the Channel (Cherbourg, Brest), in the Bay of Biscay (Rochefort, Quiberon Bay), and in the Mediterranean (Toulon). The French squadrons or individual ships attempted, and often successfully, to escape the British ships maintaining close blockade of these bases and ports.  In the War of 1812, the British had by 1813 a sufficient number of ships on station to enforce a blockade of the U.S. east coast. The U.S. Navy was essentially confined to its ports. Occasionally, however, the U.S. warships escaped their ports.6  In the American Civil War (1861–1865), President Abraham Lincoln declared on April 19, 1861 a blockade of the Confederate States from South Carolina to Texas. Eight days later he issued another declaration extending the blockade to Virginia and North Carolina.7 The blockading line extended from Alexandria, Virginia to the Rio Grande in Texas or 3,500 miles. It encompassed some 190 harbors. The river estuaries and indentations and the Mississippi River and its tributaries accounted for another 3,615 miles.8 The Union’s blockade was initially aimed against the Confederates’ commercial vessels and blockade runners. The Confederacy did not have the navy to effectively challenge the Union’s blockade. The plan of Confederate States’ Navy Secretary Stephen Mallory

192   Counter-containment (1812–1873) to neutralize the northern blockade involved overcoming the numerical superiority of the Union Navy by building more advanced ironclads that would drive away the Union’s wood-­built warships. Mallory ordered a damaged ship (Merrimac) to be converted into an ironclad. He also ordered two new ironclads each to be built at Memphis and New Orleans. This program was later supplemented by more ironclads.9 In Mallory’s view, if they were unable to break up the Union’s blockade, the ironclads could operate in coastal waters as mobile forts for the defense of important ports. Hence, the ironclads would be used in a dual role: to prevent the Union’s landings and to engage the Union’s blockading forces. The ironclads complicated the Union forces’ attack on the Hampton Roads and the Mississippi River.10  During the war, the Confederates had in service or under construction twenty­six ironclads. All but one was built or converted in Confederacy yards. Half of the ironclads saw action. Three of them were destroyed on the Mississippi to prevent capture and two were captured by the Union Navy. These ironclads did some damage to the Union forces maintaining the blockade, but the results were inconclusive.11  Breaking through the enemy’s blockading line has become increasingly more difficult since the advent of aircraft and submarines. The threat of aircraft and submarines to one’s surface ships is extremely serious today. The key for enhancing survival of one’s surface ships in trying to break through the block­ ading line is to possess a sufficient degree of local air superiority plus an adequate number of advanced submarines.  In both world wars, submarines of a weaker side tried repeatedly to reach the open waters of an ocean or narrow sea by forcing a defended choke point (which equates to a penetration maneuver) such as the Strait of Dover, the North Sea’s northern exit, the Denmark Strait, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Otranto, and the Gulf of Finland. Most of these choke points were also the key positions for a stronger side to establish and maintain a distant naval/commercial blockade.  The Dover Barrage, between Dover and Calais, was established in February 1915. It consisted of both deep and shallow minefields with indicator nets and flare drifters.12 Nine indicator nets were laid from Goodwin to the Outer Ruytingen in September 1916. The Dover Barrage experienced some serious technical difficulties due to unfavorable oceanographic conditions and bad weather. Among other things, the indicator nets could not stand up to the strong currents and stormy weather and were repeatedly cut loose. There were plans to make the nets much stronger but that was not done because material was diverted to the Dardanelles in 1915. The mines had weak moorings and many broke loose even in moderately bad weather. However, one of the most serious problems was that the British failed to organize patrolling by mobile forces properly. Until late 1917, patrols kept their watch only in daylight hours, and during the good weather, that is, from May to November.13  The mine-­net barrage in the Strait of Dover did not prevent U-­boats from reaching southwestern approaches. For example, from the beginning of 1917 until the end of November 1917, U-­boats made 153 passages.14 By December

Counter-containment   193 19, 1917, the Germans had lost only two U-­boats trying to transit the Strait of Dover.15 However, this situation drastically changed in early 1918 when the British established new patrolling methods in the Strait of Dover. Existing buoys and nets were not replaced when they became loose and broke adrift in stormy weather. As a result, many small boats were released for patrolling duties. After the beginning of 1918, the British assigned much larger numbers of ships to patrol the Strait and used brilliant illuminations in the deep minefield between Folkestone and Cap Gris-­Nez. Some eighty to a hundred ships were patrolling the Strait day and night at any given time. Drifters and trawlers were assigned areas north of the barrage, while destroyers were divided into two groups: East and West Barrage Patrols.16 Three U-­boats were sunk from mines between January 19 and February 8; another U-­boat was depth-­charged and sunk by a British destroyer on January 26. But more important was the psychological effect of the new patrolling pattern in the Strait of Dover. It became too risky for crews in the German U-­boats attempting to transit the Strait. The combination of the intensive patrolling by air and sea and the illumination forced the U-­boats to sail at night and dive into a deep minefield.17 The increased effectiveness of the barrage was combined with almost incessant Allied air attacks on Flanders U-­boat bases.18  After March 1918, the Flanders U-­boats started to use the Strait of Dover less and less. From the beginning of June, the German U-­boat flotillas based in Belgium showed little interest in attempting the increasingly dangerous passage through the Strait of Dover. They steadily focused their attacks on the nonconvoyed merchant ships off the British east coast, north of the Humber River. During June 1918 only a single U-­boat left Flanders for the Strait of Dover, and there were nine U-­boats in July. By early September, the Germans completely abandoned sending their U-­boats through the Strait of Dover. During the war, about a dozen U-­boats were destroyed while trying to cross the Dover Barrage. In addition, two heavily damaged U-­boats were put out of commission.19  Because the Strait of Dover was closed, the Flanders Flotilla U-­boats began to use the northern route between the Faeroes and the coast of southern Norway. The 240-mile Northern Barrage, between the Orkneys and Hardanger Fjord (Norway), was established primarily through a U.S. initiative between March and early June 1918. It aimed to restrict the movements of German U-­boats from the North Sea into the Atlantic. The barrage was constantly renewed and supplemented at the outer ends of the German-­swept channels. Initial requirements called for about 200,000 mines, though only about 15,100 British and 56,000 American mines were laid.20 The American-­designed antenna mines were set too deep and hence were ineffective against the surfaced U-­boats. This new type of mine was introduced into service without being properly tested. The antenna mines tended to be set off prematurely. The deep minefield was of little value without a mobile patrolling force that would compel the U-­boats to dive into the minefield. In addition, there was a need to have a naval base and air base on the adjacent Norwegian coast.21 However, Norway was a neutral country. The Norwegians did not mine their territorial waters, and that was the only effective

194   Counter-containment way to extend the mine barrage and prevent U-­boats from skirting it by sailing close to Norway’s coast. Finally, after much diplomatic pressure, the Norwegian government announced on September 29 that starting October 7 the Norwegian waters would be mined. Mining never took place because the war was then almost over.22 The effectiveness of the Northern Barrage is hard to evaluate because there is no agreement on how many U-­boats were destroyed. The number ranges from two to six. The British Admiralty’s postwar list cited three U-­boats destroyed plus three more “probable.”23  The Austro-­Hungarian and German U-­boats based in the Bay of Cattaro and Pola, Istria, had to transit the heavily defended Strait of Otranto prior to reaching the open waters of the Mediterranean. In September 1915, the French and British Navies blockaded the 45-mile wide Strait of Otranto. Initially, drifters and nets were used to block the passage of U-­boats.24 After Italy entered the war in May 1915, the British Admiralty requested from the Italians that they establish patrols of trawlers and fishing boats with nets. It also offered fifty trawlers and some anti-­submarine nets. The Italians agreed but then did not do anything because of the lack of crews and guns.25 However, the Otranto Barrage was steadily reinforced between 1915 and 1918. It was patrolled by a large number of motor launches, light cruisers, and destroyers. Sporadically, the Allied submarines conducted diving patrols.26 The Otranto Barrage eventually stretched from the end of the deep minefield off Taranto to the island of Fano (Othonoi today), northwest of Corfu. It was completed by September 30, 1918.27  The Strait of Otranto is very deep – 300 to 500 fathoms (1,800 to 3,000 feet). The only favorable feature was the absence of high tides and strong currents. Despite all the efforts, the Otranto Barrage was very ineffective. The U-­boats slipped through on the surface at night, or between the gaps in the nets or sometimes by diving below.28 They were able to withstand pressure from 180 to 250 feet and simply dive under the barrage.29 From April through August 1918, 121 U-­boats passed the Strait, or twenty-­four passages per month. The barrage force carried out fifty-­eight attacks, mostly with depth charges, but achieved only two kills.30  In the first few months of World War II, the British tried to keep German U-­boats from transiting from their basing area in the North Sea to the open waters of the Atlantic. For example, in September 1939, the Royal Navy instituted a blockade of the English Channel, the Strait of Dover, and the North Sea’s northern exit between the Shetlands and southern Norway, through which passed the deployment routes of the German U-­boats. In the first weeks of September 1939, the British laid some 6,600 mines in the Strait of Dover to prevent the exit of German U-­boats and to protect the flank of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.).31 Yet none of the attempts were successful.  In July 1940, the British tried but failed to block the passage of German U-­boats from the North Sea to the northern Atlantic by mining the area between the Faeroes and Iceland. The new barrage absorbed 90,000 mines and tied up many destroyers as escorts for minelayers and as a screen for the Home Fleet.32 Throughout World War II, the Royal Navy and Coastal Air Command

Counter-containment   195 maintained a blockade of the North Sea’s exits. However, not a single U-­boat was lost to mines.33 The entire effort was a huge waste of time and resources.  The Allies established very strong anti-­submarine (A/S) defenses in the Strait of Gibraltar in World War II. The objective was to prevent German U-­boats and Italian submarines from entering or exiting the Mediterranean. Out of ninety-­two U-­boats directed to transit the Strait, eighty-­one attempted the passage and three U-­boats were sunk by the Allied aircraft before reaching the Strait. Of the seventy-­eight that reached the Strait, no fewer than sixty-­two were successful in entering the Mediterranean. Between June 1940 and the end of 1941, all thirty Italian submarines directed to enter to the Atlantic did so successfully. Also, all thirteen Italian submarines reentered the Mediterranean.34  In 1942–1944, the Soviets made extraordinary and persistent efforts with their submarines to break through the strong German–Finnish defenses in the Gulf of Finland. After the start of their invasion of Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941, the German troops advanced rapidly along the Baltic coast, and by early September 1941 they reached the gates of Leningrad. The Soviet Baltic Fleet, including more than twenty submarines, was bottled up at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, in the Bay of Kronshtadt.35 The Germans and Finns controlled both the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Finland. They used mines extensively, and surface patrols plus aircraft (in daylight) to prevent the Soviet submarines from reaching the open waters of the Baltic.  According to a Soviet source, by mid-­September 1941, the Soviets had deployed seventeen submarines in the Gulf of Finland for attacks against enemy shipping while four other submarines were deployed in the open waters of the Baltic.36 The first wave of eight Soviet submarines successfully forced the mine barriers and coastal patrols in mid-­June 1942. Afterward, these submarines operated in the western part of the Gulf of Finland, off the coast of Sweden and Pomerania. The second wave came in mid-­August, with a group of seven boats; and three boats followed in early September 1942. During the breakthrough, one Soviet submarine was sunk and two damaged after running into the German– Finnish minefields. The submarines which reached the open sea sank five ships with only 10,000 tons. The third wave of eighteen Soviet submarines crossed the German–Finnish mine barriers in two groups in late September and early November 1942. Four outward-­bound Soviet submarines were lost to mines, while three other boats were sunk by the Finnish submarines. In addition, at least two Soviet submarines were damaged by mines while returning to their bases. Those submarines that reached the open waters of the Baltic destroyed only six ships of 12,000 tons. Three other ships of 12,000 tons were lost to mines presumably laid by Soviet submarines. In 1942, the Soviet submarines that successfully penetrated the German–Finnish defenses in the Gulf of Finland carried out attacks on the Germans and the Finns, and on the neutral shipping. They sank a total of twenty-­three ships with 52,000 gross register tons (GRT) and damaged another sixteen ships. These losses were not high when viewed in the context of the total German–Finnish sea traffic. For example, from June 19, 1942 to February 8, 1943, the Finns escorted some 2,110 ships. In seven attacks by the Soviet

196   Counter-containment submarines, only two steamers were lost. The German monthly sea traffic was on average 720,000 GRT. It increased to 1.5 million GRT in August 1942, but later decreased to about 300,000 GRT in January 1943. The loss of Soviet submarines in 1942 was substantial. Out of twenty-­five submarines that attempted to exit the Gulf of Finland, at least ten boats were sunk. Only two or three boats were able to reach the open waters of the Baltic.37  In 1943, the Soviets completely reorganized their submarine force of twenty-­ five boats based at the Bay of Kronshtadt. They made new attempts to penetrate the German–Finnish defenses in the Gulf of Finland.38 The Germans reported that in April–May, they destroyed five enemy submarines. The Finns claimed to have sunk five enemy submarines in May to June 1943. Despite these large losses, in June 1943 the Soviets sent more submarines to cross the net-­mine barriers in the Gulf. The Finns reported destroying two submarines in June and one in August, while the Germans claimed to have sunk five enemy submarines. Afterward, the activity of the Soviet submarines was limited to the laying of defensive minefields and the landing of secret agents.39  The only hope for the Soviets being able to operate their submarines in the Baltic was that the Red Army might lift the siege of Leningrad and make advances along both shores of the Gulf of Finland. After the start of the Soviet great offensive that lifted the siege of Leningrad on July 8, 1944 and the subsequent advances in Estonia and other Baltic states, Germany’s position in the Gulf of Finland simply collapsed. By October 9, 1944, the Soviets already had ten submarines operating in the Baltic and by October 18, nine more operated in the Gulf of Finland. In the next few months, five more Soviet submarines were operating in the Baltic. Between October 23 and December 16, 1944, the Soviets claimed to have sunk thirty-­three enemy steamers.40 An example of a successful forcing of a strongly defended choke point was the operational redeployment of the German Brest combat group of two battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from Brest through the English Channel to their bases in the North Sea on February 11–13, 1942 (operation Cerberus). Hitler wanted the Brest group to be redeployed to Norway. He was greatly concerned with the possible British invasion of Norway. However, Admiral Raeder was opposed to taking away the Brest group from the war in the Atlantic. Hitler agreed that the Brest group tied up significant enemy forces but only if it remained undamaged. He would reconsider leaving the group in Brest if it did not suffer damage for four to five months. Yet, Hitler did not believe that this would be the case. Hence his decision was to redeploy the entire Brest group to Norway.41  Hitler also believed that the penetration maneuver (Durchbruch) of the Brest group could only be successful by surprising the enemy. The Strait of Dover should be transited during daylight hours. Hitler also believed that the enemy aircraft based in the southeastern part of England would not as effective as the Navy’s SKL and commander of battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe – B.d.S.) assumed. Hitler compared the situation with the Brest group with a cancer patient: “without a surgery the patient would be finished,

Counter-containment   197 while the surgery, although ‘radical remedy’ would give the chance to the patient to stay alive.” Hence in his view, “Canal March” (Kanalmarsch) must be carried out.42 The Brest group sortied out from Brest in the night on February 11/12, 1942. It was escorted by one destroyer flotilla (six destroyers) from Brest. During its movement through the English Channel, the Brest group was successively escorted by 2nd Torpedo Flotilla (five destroyer-­size torpedo boats) at Le Havre; 3rd Torpedo Flotilla (five ships) at Dunkirk; and 5th Torpedo Flotilla (five ships) at Vlissingen.43 After entering the area controlled by the Naval Group North, escort was provided by three S-boats (Schnellboote) flotillas (2nd, 4th, and 6th) based at Boulogne and Ijmuiden.44 Air cover was provided by about 175 fighters and heavy bombers of the 3rd Air Fleet.45 The Brest group passed through the Strait of Dover at daylight on February 13 (X + 1 Day). Air cover was provided initially by the 3rd Air Fleet’s Me.110 and later Me.109 fighters.46  The British detected the Brest group first when it reached La Touque river estuary (Normandy). The British reacted by carrying out a relatively large number of uncoordinated attacks by torpedo aircraft, torpedo boats, and destroyers. However, in these attacks only one enemy patrol ship was sunk, while two torpedo boats were damaged. The British attacks were successfully repulsed by the strong defenses of the Brest combat group and their escorting forces and the Luftwaffe. After passing through the Strait of Dover, the Scharnhorst run into two mines and Gneisenau into one mine. Although damaged both ships reached Wilhelmshaven and the Elbe estuary, respectively.47  The main reasons for the British failure were poor interservice cooperation and lack of coordination among combat arms and, not least, that the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Channel. The geography also favored the German ships in defending against attacks by enemy surface ships and aircraft. The Germans achieved a significant operational success. Both battleships and the heavy cruiser were eventually deployed to Norway. In operational terms, the movement of the Brest group was a rare example of a combined operational redeployment/penetration in naval warfare. It also had many elements of a major naval/joint operation conducted in the littoral waters.  Forcing a strongly defended strait using surface ships is difficult if not impossible, if effective air cover is not provided. The chances are generally greater in forcing a wide and lightly defended passage. For example, the German heavy ships and auxiliary cruisers had to transit the Denmark Strait and the passage from Iceland via the Faeroes and Shetland to the Norwegian coast to reach the waters of the northern Atlantic. The occupation of Norway and France in 1940 gave Germany a much more favorable position for the conduct of war at sea.48 The German surface ships were protected in the fjords by the Luftwaffe. Their starting points for forays into the northern Atlantic were only 400 to 600 nautical miles away. The Luftwaffe aircraft were also within their effective range to attack the Home Fleet at its bases.49 Yet the British still controlled the northern exits from the North Sea and the western shore of the Strait of Dover. The German position in the Arctic worsened after the British invaded Iceland in

198   Counter-containment May 1940. The defense of Iceland was turned over from Britain to the United States (still formally a neutral country) in July 1940. All the passages for the German forces from the Arctic southward were within striking range of the British aircraft based in northern Scotland, the Orkneys/Faeroes/Shetlands. The German ships based in the occupied part of France in the Bay of Biscay were within effective range of the British heavy bombers. Yet control of the southwestern approaches to the Strait of Dover was heavily contested.  For the German surface ships, the break points for entering the northern Atlantic were the Denmark Strait, the Iceland–Faeroes passage, and the Faeroes–Shetland passage. In operational terms, these three passages were “decisive points.” The 300-mile long and 180-mile wide (at its narrowest point) Denmark Strait separates Iceland from Greenland. Its depth varies from 98 to 295 fathoms.50 Depending on the time of the year, the ice-­free passage in the Denmark Strait was only between 80 and 60 miles.51 The 306-mile wide Iceland–Faeroe passage was generally ice-­free. Its depth varies from 290 to 540 fathoms. The sea distance between Shetland and the Faeroes is about 207 miles, and the depth of water in the passage is from 120 to 370 fathoms. The unobserved transit of the German surface ships through these passages was a prerequisite for the success of their subsequent employment on the enemy convoy routes in the Atlantic. Long daylight hours at higher latitudes in the summer made it difficult to conceal movements of the surface ships. It also made it easier for the enemy to find and destroy German supply ships and tankers. From late fall to early spring, long nights encompass large parts of the area. Long nights were favorable for the employment of the German surface ships and U-­boats. The extended hours of darkness greatly limited aircraft contact duration and the employment of torpedo bombers and bombers. On the other hand, long nights favored employment of U-­boats. By weighing advantages and disadvantages it appeared that the time between May and September was an unfavorable time for a breakout into the Atlantic. The best time was between November and February.52  From the very beginning of World War II, the British started to increase the number of ships for monitoring the northeastern approaches. The aim was early detection of the movements of the German heavy surface ships and auxiliary cruisers from the Arctic and into the northern Atlantic. The British established surface patrols and conducted air reconnaissance of the North Sea and the Danish Straits.53 The main forces of the Home Fleet were put in readiness. One group of ships, composed usually of battleships and cruisers, was put onto two to four hours readiness. Their mission was to attack the enemy forces near the Shetlands. One to two bomber wings were assigned to attack and weaken the enemy forces. Another group of cruisers/destroyers were on eight to twelve hours readiness at their bases or readiness areas. They were intended to reinforce patrolling forces. They were reinforced by forces assigned for screening convoys.54 The line Iceland–Shetland– Faeroes was also patrolled by converted fishing trawlers and later auxiliary cruisers. They were complemented by one to two cruisers of the Northern Patrol. In early 1940 there were only two patrol ships to monitor the Denmark Strait and four ships to control the Faeroe–Iceland gap.55 

Counter-containment   199 After the fall of 1940, the British started gradually to strengthen their patrols in the northeastern approaches. At least two cruisers were deployed to patrol the Denmark Strait, and one cruiser and three auxiliary cruisers to the Iceland–Faeroes gap. At least one battleship, five cruisers, and five destroyers were in readiness for action. In the winter of 1940/1941, the British laid mine barriers between the Faeroes and Iceland. The mine barrier west of the Orkneys was extended. The mine barrier off the northwest tip of Iceland was aimed at forcing the enemy to sail within the ice boundary.56  In 1940–1941, the German surface ships made several successful penetrations of the north Atlantic through the area around Iceland. For example, in October 1940, the “pocket” battleship (Panzerschiff ) Admiral Scheer made transit through the Denmark Strait undetected. In December 1940, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper also broke through to the open ocean in the same general area. Between March and December 1940 no fewer than seven disguised merchant armed cruisers also reached the northern Atlantic unobserved by the enemy. The Admiral Scheer operated in the south Atlantic and the Indian Ocean for six months before returning to the Denmark Strait. The Admiral Hipper operated briefly in the north Atlantic before entering Brest.57  The battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst under Admiral Günther Lütjens, commander of the fleet, sortied out from Kiel on January 22, 1941 to attack British shipping in the north Atlantic (operation Berlin). Six days later, they encountered two enemy cruisers east of Iceland. However, by a skillful maneuver Lütjens moved away to the north. After refueling, he made another attempt to break out. The German battleships encountered in a blinding snowstorm one enemy cruiser (Naiad).58 They broke off contact and sailed at high speed northward. Both battleships refueled from a waiting tanker in the Arctic. In their second attempt to break out they were successful. The German ships were not observed until February 8 when they attacked an HX (fast eastbound convoy from Halifax, Nova Scotia) convoy. One of the major reasons that the British did not detect the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was that the German ships were fitted with more advanced search radars. In contrast, the British cruiser (Naiad) was fitted with an early version of search radar which had shorter range than the radar fitted on board the German battleships.59 Afterward, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau operated on the HX convoy routes.60 They sank twenty-­two ships with some 115,000 tons before returning to Brest on March 28, 1941.61  In the spring of 1941, both the SKL and the Naval Group North believed that the possibilities of a successful penetration of the Denmark Strait had been significantly reduced, to Germany’s disadvantage, during 1940. But on the other hand, with patience and the use of direction finders it was possible for the German surface ships to sail through the Denmark Strait.62  The principal factor in ensuring undetected transit through the Denmark Strait was to conduct gap-­free air reconnaissance of the area. Precise knowledge of ice boundaries was also required to ensure the safety of the German battleships during the transit. However, the Germans were unable to have continuous air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait because of both an inadequate number of

200   Counter-containment long-­range maritime patrol aircraft and difficult weather conditions. In the spring of 1941, only a single 2,200-mile range Fw.200 Condor maritime patrol aircraft was available. However, the Germans intended to have after June 1941 two Fw.200s and, later, the new Messerschmitt long-­range reconnaissance aircraft used by the Air Leader Atlantic (Fliegerführer Atlantik) (at Bordeaux-­Mérignac). Yet the SKL concluded that air reconnaissance alone could not ensure absolute security for surface ships trying to break out into the north Atlantic.63  The SKL agreed with the Naval Group North’s proposal to deploy several U-­boats in the Denmark Strait. After that the number of U-­boats in service was increased. However, the SKL also noted that diverting U-­boats to this task would weaken the overall effort against enemy merchant shipping in the northern Atlantic. Hence, their employment must be reduced to the minimum.64  The operation by the Bismarck combat group (battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen) on May 18–27, 1941 (Unternehmen Rheinübung – the Rhine Exercise) was to break through the Denmark Strait and then operate against the Allied HX convoys.65 The SKL considered the northern Atlantic “north of latitude 40° north as the main operational area in the war against (enemy) supplies” (Zufuhrkriegführung) because in winter weather enemy reconnaissance and employment of aircraft carriers was more difficult or even precluded.66  The Bismarck group was detected by two British cruisers in the Denmark Strait in the early evening on May 23. Both cruisers tracked the Bismarck group through the night on May 23/24. In the early morning, the Bismarck group encountered the British force of one battle cruiser (Hood) and one battleship (Prince of Wales). In the ensuing battle in the Denmark Strait, the British battle cruiser was sunk while the battleship suffered some damage. The Bismarck also suffered damage that reduced its speed and thereby negatively affected its ability to escape its pursuers.  The pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck on May 27, 1941 was one of the largest major fleet-­versus-fleet operations in European waters in World War II. Between May 24 and 27, the British used five battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, four heavy and seven light cruisers, twenty-­ one destroyers, eight submarines, and fifty aircraft in hunting the Bismarck combat group.67 The Germans directly employed the Bismarck group, six escort tankers, and one supply ship. In support of the operation were used three destroyers, two patrol ships, two (mine) obstacle breakers (Sperrbrecher), one minesweeper flotilla, thirteen U-­boats, one Italian submarine, and three Luftwaffe air groups.  A weaker side might use its surface forces only in challenging the blockade of a stronger sea power. The objective then would be usually to gradually weaken the blockading forces and thereby enhance the chances of other forces, primarily submarines, breaking through the blockade. This is what the Germans did in their attacks against the Anglo-­French blockading force in the Strait of Dover and the Austro-­Hungarian Navy against the Allied blockading forces in the Strait of Otranto in World War I. 

Counter-containment   201 The Germans carried out several forays with their destroyers and torpedo boats against Anglo-­French forces patrolling the Dover Barrage. However, despite some tactical success, they did not significantly weaken the enemy’s defense in the Strait of Dover. For example, the German attack on the Dover Barrage on February 25, 1917 differed from the previous attacks. The Germans decided to disperse their forces instead of massing them. They selected three enemy groups for their attack: (1) enemy forces on the route from England and Hook; (2) the Downs Anchorage; and (3) the outpost forces on the Channel barrage. All the enemy forces would be attacked almost simultaneously. The German forces consisted of the 2nd Z (Zeebrugge) Half Flotilla (five ships) and the 6th Flotilla (six ships) of destroyers/high-­seas torpedo boats.68  The British forces guarding the Dover Barrage were clearly superior to the German raiding force. The commander of the Dover Patrol (Rear Admiral Reginald Bacon) had under him a striking force of two light cruisers off Deal (in the Downs), and two monitors guarding the northern and southern entrances. At Dover were two flotilla leaders and nine destroyers, while five other destroyers patrolled the Strait.69  After reaching the enemy patrols, the Germans encountered some British destroyers at 2300 on February 25. The British commander of the Dover Patrol reacted quickly and directed additional destroyers at Dover to sortie out. The Germans focused their attacks on the line of armed drifters across the northern entrance to the Downs from North Foreland to the North Goodwin light vessel. The German action was very short. They quickly withdrew without accomplishing much of anything. The Germans later realized that they faced great odds in accomplishing their mission.70  The German flotillas based in Zeebrugge conducted another raid on the Dover Barrage in the night of March 17/18, 1917. On March 17, 1917, the British Admiralty received several messages that some enemy action was likely in the southern part of the North Sea. The British commander made a change in his dispositions; four destroyers patrolled the barrage. In the Downs were one light cruiser, the flotilla leader and four destroyers. Two monitors were at anchor off Ramsgate, at the northern entrance to the Downs. One flotilla leader and five destroyers were in reserve at Dover. The Admiralty correctly deduced that the Germans planned to attack the Dover Barrage.71  The Germans divided the operating area into three combat sectors. In the central sector (west of Sandettie Bank) were assigned the 6th Flotilla (three ships), the 11th Half Flotilla, and the 12th Half Flotilla (four ships). The 1st Z Half Flotilla (five ships) was assigned slightly eastward of the 6th Flotilla (east of Sandettie Bank). The attack on the Downs Anchorage was assigned to 2nd Z Half Flotilla (four ships). It was unusual that the Germans assigned an attack on the stronger enemy forces at the Downs to the weakest of these three detachments.72  The German torpedo boat flotillas left Zeebrugge between 1800 and 2000 on March 17. They reached the Dover Barrage at 2235 In the first clash one British destroyer was torpedoed and sank. Another British destroyer was also

202   Counter-containment torpedoed.73 A German detachment approached the coast near the North Foreland. The northern entrance to the Downs was guarded by a line of drifters spread between Broadstairs Knoll and the North Sand Head. At 0030 on March 18 the Germans sank another British destroyer. Before the British were able to intervene with other forces the Germans withdrew. This was the second time that the German destroyers had attacked the barrage and inflicted relatively large losses.74  The British were concerned that the Germans might be emboldened and follow up with another raid. This was the reason that this attack led to a change of the British dispositions in defense of the Strait of Dover.75 The Germans deployed a new destroyer force to Flanders in the last week of March 1917. It was composed of the 5th and 6th Half Flotillas. However, it took almost one month before these flotillas were ready to raid the Dover Barrage. The order for the new raid were issued on April 20. This time the Germans planned only to attack patrolling forces in the Strait, not those at the Downs. Another change was that the overall commander would control his forces from ashore.76  The forces assigned to the raid consisted of the 5th Flotilla and one boat of the 6th Half Flotilla (six ships). This force would operate north and west of the Sandettie Bank–Colbart line. Their mission was to attack enemy patrolling forces and bombard Dover when opportunity arose. In the sector south and east of Sandettie Bank would operate the Z Half Flotilla with two boats of the 6th Flotilla (six ships). Their mission was to attack enemy patrolling forces and bombard Calais if feasible.77  For some reason the Admiralty did not have any indication of the impending German raid on the Dover Barrage. Hence, the British dispositions in the Strait were unchanged.78 The German force sortied out from their base between 1800 and 1900 on April 20. The first action was the bombardment of Calais by the Z Half Flotilla at 2310. Shortly afterward, Dover was also attacked. The 5th Flotilla reached the Dover Barrage at about 15 minutes past midnight. In the encounter with the British destroyers, two German destroyers were sunk, while the British had two destroyers damaged with some loss of life.79 This raid also showed the Germans that they could not conduct such an action in the future without significant losses. Admiral Bacon found an effective method of inflicting large losses on the raiding forces. In the aftermath, the Germans avoided actions against patrolling forces for several months. Yet on April 24, a group of German destroyers briefly shelled Dunkirk.80  The Austro-­Hungarian light forces based in the Bay of Cattaro conducted a relatively large number of raids in 1915–1917 against the Allied forces guarding the Otranto Barrage. Yet despite some tactical successes they were unable to either lift or substantially weaken the blockade of the Adriatic Sea’s only exit. The main reason for this lack of success was that the Austrians did not use their heavy ships, which stayed safely at their bases. They also focused on destroying enemy armed drifters and transports, instead of cruisers and destroyers.  The Austrian forces employed against the Entente’s patrols and transports in the Strait of Otranto were based in Bay of Cattaro. The CINC of the

Counter-containment   203 Austro-­Hungarian Navy, Admiral Anton Haus, was very reluctant to commit any forces to raiding the Otranto Barrage. He was literally forced by the High Army Command (AOK) to deploy in the Bay of Cattaro two light cruisers, six Tatra-­ class destroyers, and six 74 T-­class torpedo boats plus one tanker.81 The Bay of Cattaro lacked resources for basing battleships. Hence, for offensive actions against the Otranto Barrage, the Austrians had to use small cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, U-­boats, and seaplanes. However, surface ships and U-­boats had a small radius of action. The distance from the Bay of Cattaro to the Strait of Otranto is about 130 nautical miles. The winter nights were not long enough to provide cover to the Austrian ships during their return to the Bay of Cattaro. There was also great danger that the numerically larger French–Italian forces based at Brindisi and Valona might cut off the lines of retreat for the Austrian ships.82  The Austrians conducted five raids in 1915, nine in 1916, and ten in 1917. In several raids the Austrians inflicted some losses on the enemy forces. For example, in the night of November 23/24, 1915, one light cruiser and four destroyers made a foray against the Otranto Barrage and conducted reconnaissance along the Albanian coast. They sank one Italian motor schooner and one small steamer, each carrying supplies for the Serbian army in Albania.83  In the night of May 31/June 1, 1916, two destroyers and three torpedo boats left Cattaro for the Strait of Otranto. Their mission was to observe the evacuation of the enemy troops from Valona, harass transport steamers, and attack escorting ships. For cover was assigned one small cruiser (Helgoland) in Cattaro. One Austrian destroyer sank one enemy steamer near Saseno Island. The Austrians returned to Cattaro without further contact with the enemy ships.84 In the night of July 9/10, 1916, one small cruiser (Novara) sortied out from Cattaro to attack jointly with U-­boats the fishing steamers on the Valona–Otranto and Valona–Santa Maria di Leuca lines. For support of the operation two armored cruisers (Sankt Georg and Kaiser Karl VI) were assigned. One U-­boat (U 17) was stationed off Brindisi. The Austrian ships sighted in the morning of July 10 some 25 nautical miles west of Cape Linguetta four fishing steamers. The Austrian cruiser opened fire and sank two steamers. Shortly before turning away and heading to Cattaro, the Austrian ships sighted the Italian cruiser Quarto. The Austrian seaplanes attacked Quarto and two Italian destroyers that sortied out from Valona, but their attack was unsuccessful.85  Many Austro-­Hungarian raids against the Otranto Barrage were not successful because the enemy ships were either not found or not encountered. For example, in the afternoon of April 3, 1916, one small cruiser (Novara) and two U-­boats (U 5, U 6) sortied out from Cattaro. The mission was to attack patrolling steamers on the Brindisi–Saseno line or, if the enemy was not found, on the Otranto–Saseno line. One U-­boat (U 6) would take a position off Saseno and tie patrolling fishing steamers. Another U-­boat (U 5) had a similar mission off Brindisi. However, the entire mission failed because the enemy ships were not found.86  On July 3, 1916, one small cruiser (Helgoland) with three destroyers and three torpedo boats sortied out from Cattaro to attack enemy patrols in the Strait of Otranto, Because of the heavy weather, torpedo boats were unable to maintain

204   Counter-containment a speed of 20 knots. The Austrian force observed three enemy ships, probably destroyers, in poor visibility. Their subsequent search for destroyers was unsuccessful and they returned to Cattaro.87 On September 26, 1916, four destroyers from Djenoviḉ, Bay of Cattaro, sortied out to attack enemy transports between Valona and Brindisi. They also intended to surprise enemy submarines patrolling on the Brindisi–Durazzo line. In Cattaro, one small cruiser (Aspern) and three torpedo boats were in readiness to provide support. The Austrian naval seaplanes were tasked to reconnoiter the sea area in the direction of Brindisi. However, this foray was not successful because the enemy ships were not found. In the night of October 4/5, 1916, three Austrian torpedo boats made a foray to the Strait of Otranto. However, they did not encounter any enemy ships.88  One of the more successful raids on the Otranto Barrage was conducted on December 22/23, 1916. The 4th Torpedo Group (four Huszár-class destroyers) (Scharfschütze, Reka, Velebit, Dinara) sailed out from Djenoviḉ, and steered toward the Strait of Otranto. Their mission was to attack the enemy patrols and transports in the Strait of Otranto. The order by the Cruiser Flotilla commander was to sail according to the plan. By 0300 they would reach the latitude of the island of Saseno and by 0615 the latitude of Cape Rodoni. After reaching the vicinity of Dulcigno (Ulcinj today), they would sail close to the coast. At 0500, one small cruiser (Helgoland) and three torpedo boats would be in readiness to provide cover for the returning torpedo group. The entire operation was executed as planned and the Austrian ships destroyed several fishing steamers.89 The Allied losses would have been larger if not for the presence of six French destroyers near the drifters. They were en route from Brindisi to Otranto to escort transports. The French and Italian groups ran into each other during the night. An Italian destroyer (Abba) rammed one French destroyer (Casque). Shortly afterward, the same Italian destroyer was rammed by a French destroyer (Boutefeu). All three destroyers were damaged and towed to Brindisi. This mishap was the reason that the Austrian destroyers were able to withdraw without any losses.90 This foray was a clear tactical success for the Austrians.91  From March to May 1917, the Austrians carried out six raids with destroyers against the Otranto Barrage. However, except for one, no enemy ships were encountered.92 The largest and the most successful raid was conducted in the night of May 14/15, 1917. It was later known as the battle of Strait of Otranto. The Austrians used not only their light force but also U-­boats and naval aircraft. The Navy’s CINC, Admiral Maximilian Njegovan (1858–1930) (he replaced Admiral Haus in February 1917), decided to make a greater attempt to lift the blockade of the Strait of Otranto on May 14/15, 1917. The plan envisaged a double attack: one on armed drifters and the other on the Italian transports (they sailed during the night from Valona to Italy). Because the ships would operate far south of Brindisi, there was a great danger that their withdrawal might be cut off by a stronger enemy force.93  Each of three cruisers was assigned separate sectors for their attack against the enemy forces patrolling the Strait of Otranto. Their sectors ranged from

Counter-containment   205 fourteen to 42 nautical miles west of Fano island. After the attack they would join at the position 15 nautical miles west of Cape Linguetta at 0715 on May 15 at the latest and then withdraw at high speed to the Bay of Cattaro. The destroyer group would operate separately from the cruisers. They would sortie out from the Bay of Cattaro and by 0900 reach position off Dulcigno. Afterward, they would steer toward a position some 15 nautical miles west of the island of Saseno and then search for and attack enemy transports. The destroyer group would synchronize their movements so as to join the cruisers at 0615 and then steer toward the Bay of Cattaro.94 The attacks by the cruiser and destroyer groups would be carried out almost simultaneously.95  The Austro-­Hungarian planners also envisaged three U-­boats sailing out on May 14 and taking part in the operation. One U-­boat (U 4) would lie off Valona; one U-­boat (U 27) would take a position some 25 nautical miles east of Brindisi; and one German U-­boat (UC-­25) would lay mines off Brindisi and then take a waiting position. All three U-­boats were directed to attack enemy ships from their waiting positions.96 The seaplanes based in the Bay of Cattaro and Durazzo would provide reconnaissance for the cruiser and destroyer groups during their return. They would also attack any enemy force coming out of Brindisi.97 Support would be provided by one armored cruiser (Sankt Georg), one destroyer, and four torpedo boats in the Bay of Cattaro. They would sortie out if necessary.98  The two destroyers sailed out from the Bay of Cattaro at 1820 on May 14.99 They were followed at 1945 by the cruiser group. The weather was mild and with good visibility. All groups reached assigned positions as planned.100  The Allied armed drifters did not have any protection by larger surface ships. The only regular patrols were conducted by submarines. At the time of the Austro-­Hungarian attack, there were seven groups of drifters; each group had on average seven vessels. These groups were evenly spaced between Fano Island and Santa Maria di Leuca. Small destroyers patrolled the Otranto Barrage.101  The Austro-­Hungarian cruisers passed through the line of drifters between Cape Santa Maria di Leuca and Fano Island. Their attack started at 0330 on May 15 and continued until after sunrise.102 During the encounter with the enemy forces, the Austro-­Hungarian force of three small cruisers and two destroyers sank one enemy destroyer, one ammunition ship and fourteen drifters. They also badly damaged one flotilla leader, one transport, and three to four drifters. The German U-­boat (UC-­25) sank one enemy destroyer. The British 5,275-ton light cruiser Dartmouth was damaged by running into one of its mines laid off Brindisi. This cruiser came safely back to port but was out of service for months. The Austro-­Hungarian small cruiser Novara was damaged but was ready for sea within eight days.103  All Austro-­Hungarian ships returned to the Bay of Cattaro. They were enthusiastically welcomed by the crews of other vessels.104 This operation was well planned and executed. It was a tactical victory for the Austrians. However, it was not converted into an operational success, that is, forcing the Allies to substantially weaken their patrols in the Strait of Otranto. The Austro-­Hungarian

206   Counter-containment Navy remained, except for its U-­boats, confined in the Adriatic Sea. Destroying or heavily damaging armed drifters was not sufficient to achieve an operational objective. But destroying a large number of the enemy cruisers and destroyers was not possible without employing the Austrian battleships.  After May 1917, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy conducted a few relatively large actions aimed at weakening the enemy patrols in the Strait of Otranto. They used not only destroyers and torpedo boats but U-­boats and naval aircraft in support. All forays took place in the night. For example, in the evening on October 18, 1917, one light cruiser (Helgoland) and destroyers of the 1st Torpedo Division sailed out from the Bay of Cattaro and steered to a position at the latitude of Valona. Their mission was to attack enemy transports on the Valona–San Cataldo route (southeast of Brindisi) and the Valona–Brindisi route. The Austrian group was split into two. The Helgoland and one destroyer sailed toward Brindisi, while the remaining destroyers sailed in the direction of San Cataldo. Two U-­boats (U 40 and U 32) were in a waiting position off Saseno and Brindisi. However, neither group sighted transport ships. They were joined off Valona. Two destroyers returned to the Bay of Cattaro, while the Helgoland and the remaining destroyers steered toward Cape Spitze Mendres (Rt Mendra today, Montenegro). During the return, several Italian naval aircraft from Brindisi attacked Helgoland but did not score any hit. The cruiser was also unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine.105  On November 12, 1917, the Novara with three torpedo boats sailed from Cattaro to attack enemy transports on the Valona–Brindisi route. However, because of bad weather the torpedo boats had to return to the Bay of Cattaro. The Novara reached a position some 25 miles off Brindisi but also had to return because of bad weather. Again, another foray of three torpedo boats on November 22 was aborted because of bad weather. In the afternoon of December 13, 1917, three destroyers sortied out from the Bay of Cattaro to attack enemy convoys in the Strait of Otranto. In the night of December 13/14 they encountered the superior force of the enemy destroyers and they were directed to return to the Bay of Cattaro.106  The Austrians planned a major effort to weaken the patrols on the Otranto Barrage in June 1918. This operation for the first time included the battle fleet in support. The operation was planned by Rear Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya (1868–1957), the fleet commander. Because of the employment of the battle fleet, Admiral Horthy had to obtain permission from the emperor Charles I.107 The striking group of fast units would attack enemy patrols in the Strait as well as the Italian naval air station at Otranto. A force of distant cover support would be composed of battleships and accompanying escorts. The employment of the battleships was based on the experiences of the battle of Otranto in mid-­May 1917. The Austrians expected that the attack by the striking group would trigger a strong enemy reaction.108 The operational plan envisaged the attack group composed of two light cruisers (Novara, Helgoland) and two destroyers plus four torpedo boats. The support group was composed of the Viribus Unitis (with two destroyers and four torpedo boats); the Prinz Eugen (with two destroyers and four

Counter-containment   207 torpedo boats); the Erzherzog Ferdinand Max (with one destroyer and five torpedo boats); the Erzherzog Friedrich (with two destroyers and three torpedo boats); the Tegetthoff (with one destroyer and four torpedo boats); and the Szent István (with five torpedo boats). Clearly, this task organization was faulty because each battleship had a separate group of escorts. The result was that no group was adequately protected. The operation would be supported by six U-­boats (four German). Three U-­boats would be deployed off Brindisi and three off Valona. Each group would include one German U-­boat minelayer. The operation would be supported by about ten naval aircraft (including two scouting planes). They would engage enemy aircraft based at Brindisi and Otranto.109  The operation plan was to assemble the light cruisers and torpedo boats of the striking group and three Erzherzog-­class battleships in the Bay of Cattaro. The “receiving group” (Aufnahmegruppe) of four dreadnoughts of the Viribus Unitis class would sail out separately in two squadrons and at twenty-­four hour intervals from the main base at Pola.110  The operation started after the I Squadron (Geschwader) composed of the battleship Viribus Unitis with Admiral Horthy on board, and the battleship Prinz Eugen with five torpedo boats sortied out from Pola in the evening of June 8, 1918. The I Squadron anchored at Tajer (the island of Sestrica Vela, west of Zadar) the next day. It sailed out on June 9, and in the morning next day entered Slano (21 miles northeast of Dubrovnik). The II Squadron with the battleships Szent István and Tegetthoff, escorted with one destroyer and six torpedo boats, left Pola not on June 9 as planned but the next day. Because of that delay the II Squadron had to increase speed to 17.5 knots. However, on June 11, the Szent István had to reduce speed to only 12.5 knots. In the morning on June 11, the Szent István group was in the vicinity of the island of Premuda. It was then unexpectedly attacked by two Italian MAS (torpedo boats) and hit with two torpedoes, and later sank.111 Because of the loss of this modern battleship, Admiral Horthy aborted the entire operation. The factor of surprise was lost. Horthy had to consider that the enemy would react with his large ships based in Tarent and Corfu. Another reason for Horthy’s decision was the high likelihood that enemy motor boats and submarines might be deployed off the Bay of Cattaro. The Austro-­Hungarian ships at the Bay of Cattaro might suffer losses when they sortied out. The I and II Battle Squadrons were directed to return to Pola.112 

Strategic diversion  In general, strategic diversion is used to reduce unbearable military, political or moral conditions. Regardless of its purpose, however, the methods of conducting a strategic diversion are essentially the same: weaken the pressure at one’s own vulnerable place by applying pressure at the vulnerable or sensitive place of the enemy.113 Diversion and concentration of one’s forces have diametrically opposite purposes. Concentration aims to mass one’s forces against the enemy’s forces with the objective of eliminating the remainder of the enemy force and possibly attaining force superiority. Yet it does not mean that all available forces

208   Counter-containment must be deployed in a given sea or ocean area. Generically, military diversion is aimed at drawing the enemy’s attention and/or forces from the main to a secondary area of interest. In terms of scale of the objective, tactical, operational, and strategic diversion can be differentiated. Strategic diversion should have a marked impact on the course and even outcome of a war as whole. Like strategic concentration, strategic diversion is conducted once. Strategic diversion could be used by both a weaker and a stronger side at sea. Obviously, because of the great disparity in initial naval strength, a weaker side would derive greater benefits from a successful strategic diversion. In military terms, the weaker but skillfully led and offensively minded navy could greatly enhance its chances of success in the theater of main effort by conducting a strategic diversion. Strategic diversion is aimed at diverting the enemy’s attention and forces from the theater of main effort to a secondary theater. Another objective is to pose a threat in several theaters and thereby cause the enemy to disperse its forces. This would indirectly reduce the enemy’s available strength in the theater of main effort. It does not necessarily aim to attain a qualitative balance of naval strength in the weaker side’s theater of main effort.  The fundamental problem facing a weaker side at sea, however, is that strategic diversion alone, no matter how successful, would not secure the successful outcome of a war.114 Yet if successful, strategic diversion could greatly facilitate the weaker fleet in home waters to achieve decisive results. The main prerequisite for success is that the forces used for strategic diversion do not exceed the size/combat potential of the enemy forces to be diverted.  The principal purpose of a strategic diversion could be as follows:  • • • • • •

Achieve a more favorable ratio of forces in one’s main theater.  Reduce enemy pressure in home waters.  Reduce enemy pressure on the land front.  Pose a threat in another theater.  Disperse the enemy’s available naval strength.  Reduce enemy economic pressure. 

A weaker but relatively strong side could use strategic diversion to achieve a more favorable ratio of forces in the main theater. If a substantial diversion must be created, the effort must be made in the theater where the enemy cannot afford to fail.115 Strategic diversion could be planned to reduce enemy pressure in home waters. This can be accomplished by diverting stronger enemy forces from exerting too strong a pressure on one’s forces in home waters, or to reduce significantly the presence of the stronger fleet in one’s main theater of effort.116 For example, in 1756 during the Seven Years War (1756–1763), a strong French troop contingent embarked on transports in Brittany tied down the British fleet while the French covertly prepared and armed a second troop contingent in Toulon. The deception was highly successful. The French achieved complete surprise and captured the Balearics with Fort Port Mahón, and thereby gained control of the western Mediterranean.117 

Counter-containment   209 Strategic diversion can be aimed at reducing enemy pressure on the land front. An example of using a feint for strategic purposes was the German deployment in September 1914 of a battle squadron composed of six old battleships in the central Baltic. Although the Russians suffered a defeat in the battle of Tannenberg (August 26–30), they continued their offensive in Galicia. The fleet demonstration took place on September 29, 1914. However, it apparently did not have any significant effect on the fighting 500 miles away. A sortie by the German battle squadron in October 1914 was interrupted by the false report that the Grand Fleet was about to attack the German coast.118  A major land power weaker at sea can use strategic diversion to pose threat in another theater. For example, during the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), the French had several strategic options from which to choose: invade England, fight a decisive battle to defeat the enemy fleet, cut off the British lifelines overseas, or attack Britain’s overseas possessions to undermine its source of power and position in the world.119 Napoleon I tried all four options, but without success. In 1797–1798, the deficiencies of the French fleet prevented Napoleon Bonaparte from invading Britain. Therefore, he decided to use strategic diversion to threaten England in India, which was the key to Britain’s world position. As a preparatory measure, the French secured routes in the Mediterranean by reaching an agreement with Sardinia, disarming Venice, and capturing the Ionian Islands. The Toulon squadron made preparations for transporting an army from Toulon to Egypt. Rumors were spread of the pending invasion of England across the Channel to preserve the element of surprise, provide cover for the real plans, and tie down strong British forces in the English Channel.120  Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-­Périgord (1754–1838) wrote to the Directory in February 14, 1798 that “England cannot intimidate us” and that an expedition to Egypt would be the best means of ending the war.121 After inspecting the flotillas in northern ports, Napoleon Bonaparte rejected the plan of an invasion of England. On February 23, 1798, he wrote to the Directory, “To effect an invasion of England without having mastery of sea is the oldest and most difficult operation which has been undertaken.” He recommended to the Directors to keep up all appearance of an invasion until the navy was able to cover it and meanwhile ruin British commerce either by occupying northwest Germany or by an eastern expedition.122  The subsequent French expedition to Egypt (May 1798) was a surprise for the British. The French captured Malta in early June 1798 (and retained control until September 1800). Napoleon Bonaparte became master of Egypt within six weeks after he landed near Alexandria in early July 1798. However, Nelson’s victory at Aboukir on July 25 destroyed all French hopes of obtaining mastery of the Mediterranean. Sea routes cannot be maintained without mastery of the sea. However, their ultimate failure cannot diminish the cleverness of the French in planning these actions.123  Napoleon I constantly thought in terms of diversions. His concept comprised four elements: (1) imposing naval preparation from Texel to Genoa; (2) posing of the threat of invasion of England; (3) subjugation of the last British ally on the continent

210   Counter-containment (Portugal); and (4) encouragement of the League of the Armed Neutrals. On January 27, 1801 Napoleon Bonaparte confidently wrote that he intended to exclude England from the continent and undertake great expeditions whether to Ireland or Brazil and India or Surinam, Trinidad, or several expeditions in the Mediterranean. Napoleon I relied primarily on land pressure to drive the British fleet out of the Mediterranean. After the collapse of the Portugal and Armed Neutrality schemes, he ordered construction of the ships for invasion of England at all ports from Antwerp to Quiberon.124 Egypt was Napoleon Bonaparte’s great preoccupation, though. He stirred up trouble for England in Portugal, in the Baltic, and in the Strait of Dover. Yet these diversions were not successful because England saw through them judging by its actions at Copenhagen (attack on the Danish fleet on April 2, 1801), in the Mediterranean, and above all in persistent blockades of Brest and Cádiz.125  A weaker side might use war against enemy maritime commerce as a strategic diversion to disperse the enemy’s available naval strength. This is achieved by conducting commerce raiding in several theaters and thereby forcing the stronger side to commit substantial forces for finding and destroying commerce raiders. In the process, the stronger side would be forced to fragment its available naval strength. For example, the German Admiralty Staff ’s instructions in 1914 stated that the objective of cruiser warfare was to damage enemy trade, protect the German commerce, and tie down the greatest possible enemy forces. The ships engaged in cruiser warfare would if necessary take offensive action against equally strong or weaker enemy naval ships.126 The Germans hoped that successful attacks on the Entente’s trade routes might force the British to divert some of their naval strength and thereby make the Grand Fleet more vulnerable to ambushes by light forces. Containment of the High Seas Fleet required the presence of British ships that otherwise could have been doing something else. Also, decisive actions against U-­boats, such as laying an effective mine barrier off the German coast, could not be undertaken during the entire war because of the presence of the German battle fleet in the area.127  In August 1914, the Germans had ten large surface ships deployed overseas (one battle cruiser, two armored cruisers and seven small cruisers). Specifically, two armored cruisers (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau) and two small cruisers (Emden, Nürnberg) in East Asia; one small cruiser (Königsberg) in East Africa; two small cruisers (Karlsruhe, Dresden) in the Atlantic; one small cruiser (Leipzig) on the west coast of America; and one battle cruiser (Goeben) and one and small cruiser (Breslau) in the Mediterranean. All these ships, except those in the Mediterranean, would conduct cruiser warfare in case of a general war. To protect their maritime commerce, Britain and France employed, in the first few months of World War I, four battle cruisers, two old battleships, and seventeen armored cruisers, thirty-­nine large and small cruisers, on all seas.128  At the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, the Germans had two small cruisers (Emden, Königsberg) in the Indian Ocean; two small cruisers (Karlsruhe, Dresden) in the Atlantic, and one small cruiser (Leipzig) in the Pacific.129 For the German East Asia Squadron (Ostasiengeschwader), Japan’s declaration of war against Germany on August 25, 1914, made its situation more

Counter-containment   211 complicated. Their main base was Tsingtao, China. For the success of cruiser warfare, it was critical to keep the enemy uncertain about the real intent.130 The East Asia Squadron kept the enemy in the dark about their duration in the area and the intent. From August through October 1914, the entire enemy maritime traffic in the Pacific was affected by the presence of the German commerce raiders. At a certain point, the enemy traffic even stopped.131 Initially, this squadron of six ships tied forty-­seven enemy ships of the British, Japanese, French and Russian Navies in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.132  On November 4, 1914, Admiral Jellicoe was directed to detach two battle cruisers (Invincible, Inflexible) from the Grand Fleet to join with the East Asia Squadron (four armored and two small cruisers) under Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart. This squadron was directed to operate in the south Atlantic. To monitor the movements of the German East Asia Squadron, one battle cruiser (Australia) and one small cruiser were sent from San Diego, California. The Japanese sent two armored cruisers and one battleship. To prevent the German squadron from transiting through the Panama Canal and then to the West Indies, two British armored cruisers and two French cruisers were deployed. In the north Atlantic one battleship (Glory) and two armored cruisers were ready for combat.133  Based on the successes in World War I, the Germans in the interwar years envisaged the employment of surface commerce raiders in a future war. In September 1939, the Kriegsmarine had six commerce raiders in service. They were intended not only to inflict damage on the British and Allied commerce but also, in combination with heavy surface ships, to “tie up the enemy forces … by forcing him to form convoys … even in distant waters and frighten neutral shipping.” All these raiders were still active in April 1941. They operated on major trade routes in the south and central Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean.134  In August 1939, the British fully expected that the Germans would make use of surface raiders. Hence, they deployed cruisers in the Indian Ocean, the south Atlantic, the American and West Indies stations, and in the Pacific. The north Atlantic would be reinforced by the French “Force de Raid” and later also by British cruisers. If the German pocket battleships operated in the Atlantic, the British envisaged sending reinforcements to the cruisers in the Halifax, West Indies and Pernambuco areas.135 By the end of October 1939, eight “forces” or hunting groups were formed. Six of these groups were British and two were French. Their operating areas were North America/West Indies (Force F ), the southeast coast of America (Force G); the Cape of Good Hope (Force H); Ceylon (Force I); Pernambuco (Force K); Brest (Force L); Dakar (Force M); and the West Indies (Force N).136 Most of these groups were composed of cruisers/ destroyers and some had one carrier or battleship.137  Sometimes the main purpose of a strategic diversion could be predominantly economic – to weaken or reduce the enemy’s economic pressure on a country. A strategic diversion could be used to reduce unbearable political or moral conditions. Regardless of its purpose, the methods in conducting a strategic diversion are, however, essentially the same: weaken the pressure at one’s own vulnerable place by applying pressure at the vulnerable or sensitive place of the enemy.138 

212   Counter-containment

Tying up enemy forces  Another method of counter-­containment is to use one’s naval strength to tie up considerable enemy forces on land or to use superior strength on land to tie a stronger side’s naval forces to a theater of secondary effort. Strong positions supporting comparatively weak naval forces may have a similar effect on a fleet trying to establish at a distance from its home base. For example, in the Seven Years War, the principal British objective was the conquest of Canada. To effect the capture of Quebec, amphibious landing was necessary. The British controlled Halifax. They also had a stronger fleet. However, the French controlled the fortress of Louisburg that was close to their maritime communications to St. Lawrence. The British attempt to capture Quebec was delayed for three years because it took the British two seasons to reduce Louisburg. They were unwilling to commit to a major operation as long as Louisburg remained a threat to their lines of communication. The British forces outside of St. Lawrence were contained by the threat of Louisburg. However, French reinforcements to Louisburg were impossible because the British contained the French fleet in home waters.139  Naval forces can generate strategic effect by tying large enemy forces up on the land front. If a substantial diversion should be created, then the focus of one’s efforts must be made in an area where the enemy cannot afford to fail.140 For example, in the American War of Independence (1775–1783), the greater part of the British Army was contained on the continent of Europe, and the British Navy was kept occupied in distant parts of the world due to American efforts to persuade Spain and France to declare war against Britain. Containing British forces away from the American continent was probably of greater benefit to the colonists than the troops and ships that came to their direct aid.141  Counter-­containment requires a weaker side to be at least tactically on the offensive. Hence, it is incompatible with the “purely” passive fleet-­in-being strategy. In the past, a weaker side used several methods in countering a naval blockade by the stronger side. Obviously, these methods cannot be used in the same way today. Since the advent of submarines and aircraft, a stronger side conducts mostly a distant or semi-­distant naval blockade. This, in turn, provides the weaker side much greater freedom of action within an enclosed or semi-­ enclosed maritime theater. Except for submarines, a weaker side had great difficulties getting surface ships outside the blockaded area. However, the abilities of a weaker side to neutralize the effects of a naval blockade are probably greater today than they were in the past. Advanced submarines and land-­based attack aircraft and bombers can be effectively used to ensure the security of one’s surface forces in breaking out of the blockade zone. The possible exception is a small narrow sea the exits of which are firmly controlled by a stronger side. Forcing a strongly defended choke point will remain a difficult problem to overcome, unless a weaker side controls one shore of a given choke point. Strategic diversion remains a viable option for a weaker side. Strategic deception can greatly enhance the possibility of a successful strategic

Counter-containment   213 diversion and thereby create equality or even achieve superiority in the theater of main effort. A major land power can successfully use strategically or operationally important positions to tie up considerable naval forces of a stronger side in the secondary theater of a weaker side. And a weaker side can use its naval forces to pin down a substantial number of the enemy troops on the coast. Counter-­containment should never be used alone or in isolation, but it forms part of a collection of methods for disputing control of the sea. It is also inherently not only the navy’s but a joint forces’ responsibility. 

Notes    1 David H. Olivier, German Naval Strategy 1856–1888 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2012, first published 2004 by Frank Cass), pp. 55–56.    2 Cited in Olivier, German Naval Strategy, p. 56.    3 Hans Hugo Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht 1848–1914. Die k.k. österreichische Kriegsmarine (Vienna: Amalthea, 2002), pp.  58–59; H.W. Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd, 1926/Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprinted 1969), p. 41.    4 Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht, p. 60.    5 Cited in Olivier, German Naval Strategy, p. 56.    6 Spencer C. Tucker, Blue & Gray Navies: The Civil War Afloat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. xvii.    7 Tucker, Blue & Gray Navies, p. 79.    8 Tucker, Blue & Gray Navies, p. 80.    9 Bern Anderson, “The Naval Strategy of the Civil War,” Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 1962), p. 17.  10 Jay W. Simson, Naval Strategies of the Civil War: Confederate Innovations and Federal Opportunism (Nashville, TN: Cumberland House Publishing Inc., 2001), pp. 129–130.  11 Anderson, “Naval Strategy of the Civil War,” p. 18.  12 James A. Meacham, “Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders,” Naval War College Review 19, No. 10 (June 1967), p. 88; Eric J. Grove, ed., The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945 (a revised edition of the Naval Staff History, Vols. 1A [Text and Appendices] and 1B [Plans and Tables]) Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, The Navy Records Society, 1997), p. 150.  13 Jan S. Breemer, Defeating the U-­boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper # 36 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 26.  14 R.H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002, first published 1931 by Constable & Co. Ltd.), p. 222.  15 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath (January 1918–June 1919) (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 41.  16 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, p. 41.  17 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, p. 41.  18 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, p. 65.  19 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, pp. 65–66.  20 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. V (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931), p. 207; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, p. 66. The British estimated that because of the great depth of water in the area about 400,000 mines would

214   Counter-containment be required to prevent transit of U-­boats. However, the invention of the Mk 6 antenna mines by the United States allowed for the reduction of the total number of mines for the barrage; these mines were laid in the deep sections of the barrage, while the British chemical-­horn H mines were used at both ends of the barrage; Meacham, “Four Mining Campaigns,” p. 89.  21 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, pp. 68–69.  22 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, p. 72.  23 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, Victory and Aftermath, p. 73; Grove, Defeat of the Enemy Attack, p.  149; Meacham, “Four Mining Campaigns,” pp.  90–91; Gregory K. Hartmann, with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 53.  24 Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War 1914–1918, p. 264.  25 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 330–331.  26 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5: Victory and Aftermath, p. 32.  27 Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War 1914–1918, p. 265.  28 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 331.  29 Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, pp. 264–265.  30 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5: Victory and Aftermath, p. 35.  31 Hartmut Waltz, Die Problem moderner Minelegeplanungen vor dem Hintergrund historischer Erfahrungen in der Nordsee 1939–1944 (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, October 1985), p. 9.  32 Arthur J. Marder, “The Influence of History on Sea Power, The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914–1918,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 (November 1972), p. 430.  33 Grove, Defeat of the Enemy Attack, pp. 151–152.  34 Grove, Defeat of the Enemy Attack, p. 144.  35 According to a German source, the Soviet Baltic Fleet had in service some sixty-­ five submarines of various classes on June 22, 1941; Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 12. Between June 22 and September 1, 1941, the Soviets lost some twelve submarines in combat, five were scuttled, and two were damaged; Jürgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two, 2nd rev. and expanded ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 69–72, 77, 81.  36 V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981) (translated from the Russian, Sovetskoye Voyenno-­Morskoye Iskusstvo v Velikoy-­Otechestvennoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1973), p. 223. 37 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 56.  38 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p.70.  39 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 71.  40 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 110.  41 Percy Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch Des Oberkommandos Der Wehrmacht, Vol. II: 1. Januar 1942–31 Dezember 1942 (Herrsching: Manfred Pawlak, Verlagsgesell­ schaft mbH, 1982), p. 156.  42 Schramm, Kriegstagebuch Des Oberkommandos Der Wehrmacht, p. 156.  43 Marinegruppenkommando West, B.Nr. gKdos. 2633/42 A1 Chefs, Operative Weisung für Marsch der Brestgruppe durch das Kanal nach Osten, February 1, 1942, RL 7/115, Bundesarchiv-­Militärchiv (BA-­MA). Freiburg, i.Br. pp. 2, 4–5.  44 Marinegruppenkommando West, Operative Weisung für Marsch der Brestgruppe durch das Kanal nach Osten, February 1, 1942, pp. 2, 4–5. 

Counter-containment   215 45 Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945, p. 122.  46 Operationsbefehl des Befehlshaber der Schlachschiffe für den Marsch der Brestgruppe von Brest bis zur Deutschen Bucht,” date N.A. February 8, 1942, RL 7/115, BA-­MA, pp. 6, 12.  47 Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945, p. 122.  48 Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 2: Von 1935 bis Spandau 1955 (Tübingen, Neckar: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1957), p. 260.  49 Herbert Henning, Analyse den Kampfes der Seestreitkräfte um Meerengen im Verlaufe des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Dresden: Militärakademie “Friedrich Engels,” 1967), p. 25.  50 Marineleitung, Handbuch für Island, die Färöer und Jan Mayen, 4th ed. (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1934), p.  134; Pub. 180, Sailing Directions (Planning Guide) Arctic Ocean, 11th ed. (Springfield, VA: National Geospatial-­Intelligence Agency, 2014), p. 1.  51 B.B. Schoefield, Loss of the Bismarck (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972), p. 16.  52 Annex: “Gedanke zur weiteren Kriegführung,” Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit “Bismarck” und “Prinz Eugen” (Deckbezeichnung: “Rheinübung”), April 22, 1941, RM 7/132, BA-­MA, pp. 78–79.  53 Henning, Analyse den Kampfes der Seestreitkräfte, p. 23.  54 Henning, Analyse den Kampfes der Seestreitkräfte, p. 23.  55 Henning, Analyse den Kampfes der Seestreitkräfte, p. 24.  56 Henning, Analyse den Kampfes der Seestreitkräfte, p. 25.  57 Donald P. Steury, “Naval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the Sinking of the Bismarck: A Study in the Integration of Intelligence into the Conduct of Naval Warfare,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War (April 1987), p. 214.  58 Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945, p. 49.  59 Steury, “Naval Intelligence,” pp. 214–215.  60 James P. Levy, The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet in World War II (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire/New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 79.  61 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 2, pp. 262–263; Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945, p. 55.  62 Seekriegsleitung, April 13, 1941, Durchbruchsmöglichkeiten von und nach dem Atlantik, RM 7/1058, BA-­MA, p. 1.  63 Seekriegsleitung, Durchbruchsmöglichkeiten von und nach dem Atlantik, pp. 2–3.  64 Seekriegsleitung, Durchbruchsmöglichkeiten von und nach dem Atlantik, p. 2.  65 Burkard von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 58–59.  66 Der Ob.d.M und Chef der SKL, “Weiterer Einsatz der Überwasserstreitkräfte (Schlachtschiffe, Kreuzer)” 17.7. 1941, Heft 10 Denkschriftensammlung (Ib), RM 7/825, BA-­MA, p. 33.  67 Werner Rahn, Part 3: “Der Seekrieg im Atlantik und Nordmeer,” in Horst Boog et al. eds., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 6: Der globale Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941–1943 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1990), p. 379.  68 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 353.  69 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 353.  70 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, pp. 354–355. 71 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 361.  72 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, pp. 361–362. 

216   Counter-containment   73 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, pp. 362–363.    74 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 365.    75 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 368.    76 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 372.    77 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 373.    78 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 373.    79 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 378.    80 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 378.    81 Paul G. Halpern, The Battle of the Otranto Straits: Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in WWI (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 7.    82 Hans Hugo Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I (Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1933; reprint by Akademischen Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz), p. 360.    83 Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 208–209.    84 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 361.    85 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 362–363.    86 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 360–361.    87 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 361–362.    88 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 363.    89 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 367–368.    90 Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, p. 285.    91 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 368.    92 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 297.    93 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 297.    94 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 376.    95 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 297.    96 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p.  376; Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 297.    97 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p.  392; Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 298.    98 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 376.    99 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 377.  100 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 379.  101 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 298.  102 Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, p. 359.  103 Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. IV, p. 305; Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, p. 363.  104 Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, p. 363.  105 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, pp. 548–549.  106 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, pp. 549–550.  107 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 553.  108 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 553. 

Counter-containment   217 109 110 111 112 113 114 115

116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141

Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 554.  Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 554.  Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, pp. 555–557.  Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 560.  Hans Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches Mittel zur Erzielung eines Kräfteausgleiches, dargelegt an geschichtlichen Beispielen,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 43, No. 4 (April 1938), p. 239.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” pp. 238–239.  Staff Presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas, Part II (Continued) and Part III (Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 14, 1941); Box 31, Strategic Plans Division Records, NWC Presentations, Studies, etc. (Series II-­B), Naval … Panama, Naval Historical Collection, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, pp. 58–59.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” p. 239.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” p. 246.  David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York/ Washington, DC: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 166–167.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” p. 245.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” pp. 245–246.  J. Holland Rose, “Napoleon and Sea Power,” Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1924), p. 141.  Cited in Rose, “Napoleon and Sea Power,” p. 141.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” pp. 245–246.  Rose, “Napoleon and Sea Power,” p. 145.  Rose, “Napoleon and Sea Power,” p. 146.  Kupfer, “Der Kreuzerkrieg auf den Weltmeeren und sein Einfluss auf den Hauptkriegsschauplatz,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 41, No. 2 (February 1936), p. 58.  Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, with contributions from John Hattendorf et al., 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), p. 119.  Kupfer, “Der Kreuzerkrieg auf den Weltmeeren,” p. 57.  Kupfer, “Der Kreuzerkrieg auf den Weltmeeren,” p. 60.  Kupfer, “Der Kreuzerkrieg auf den Weltmeeren,” p. 59.  Kupfer, “Der Kreuzerkrieg auf den Weltmeeren,” p. 60.  Gerhard Bidlingmaier, “Die strategischen und operativen Überlegungen der Marine 1932–1942,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vol. 13, No. 6 (June 1963), p. 314.  Kupfer, “Der Kreuzerkrieg auf den Weltmeeren,” pp. 61–62.  Volage, “The Disguised Commerce Raiders of World War II,” Naval Review, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (November 1951), p. 398.  Grove, Defeat of the Enemy Attack, p. 215.  Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea, Vol. I: The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), p. 114.  Grove, Defeat of the Enemy Attack, p. 215.  Fuchs, “Die Diversion als strategisches,” p. 239.  Staff Presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas, pp. 24–25.  Staff Presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas, pp. 58–59.  Staff Presentation, Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas, p. 59.

8 Destroying the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea 

Destroying the enemy’s and defending/protecting one’s own military-­ economic potential at sea is one of the principal strategic objectives for naval forces in time of war. However, this objective cannot be accomplished without close cooperation with other services. Likewise, destroying the enemy’s military-­economic potential on land is inherently a multi-­service (or joint) effort. In any protracted war, a side which is weaker at sea but strong on land will try to destroy or weaken the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea. This effort will be relatively more successful against a major sea power highly dependent on the flow of sea commerce than against a major land power which is not overly dependent on the maritime trade for its economic well-­being. Destroying the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea is an indirect attack on the enemy’s naval strength. Both a weaker and a stronger side at sea will try to destroy or weaken each other’s military-­economic potential at sea and on land. However, there will be a big difference in the extent and intensity of their efforts. For a weaker side, destruction or weakening of the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea is far more critical than for a stronger side. Yet by itself the destruction of the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea has never been decisive. It must be combined with other methods of disputing control of the sea that are more directly aimed at destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s naval strength.  A variety of terms is used in referring to destruction of the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea, such as “commerce warfare,” “attack on merchant shipping,” and “attack on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)” (or anti-­SLOC). However, none of these terms accurately reflects the realities of a war at sea. Perhaps the most misleading term is anti-­SLOC. One does not attack imaginary lines but shipping. For most of naval history, attack on the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea was conducted against shipping at sea; the ships in ports were attacked only sporadically. All that radically changed after the advent of aircraft when not only ships at sea, but also ports, and other elements of maritime trade ashore, became vulnerable to attack from the air. The term “maritime trade warfare” is more all-­encompassing but not entirely accurate. In time of a protracted war at sea, the majority of enemy shipping would be used for the needs of the wartime economy and transport of

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   219 troops/equipment and sustainment of ground forces ashore, not for conducting traditional trade. The term “destroying the enemy’s military-­economic potential at sea” is unwieldy but is both comprehensive and accurate.  In generic terms, the principal objective in an attack on enemy maritime trade is to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s ability to use its military and commercial shipping and ship-­related industries ashore in support of the war effort. A collateral objective of an attack on maritime trade is to inflict hardship on the enemy population by depriving it of food, fuel and other commercial goods and thereby to weaken or even seriously undermine the enemy population’s morale and support for war.  The principal methods of combat employment in the conduct of maritime trade warfare are major and minor tactical actions at sea surface, subsurface, in the air, and ashore. Major naval/joint operations aimed at destroying the enemy’s maritime trade would be conducted sporadically and usually during hostilities at sea. In the littorals, such operations would be conducted with the participation of the combat arms of two or more services. Campaigns aiming to destroy or defend maritime trade, such as were conducted by both sides in both world wars, are unlikely in the future, unless there is global war.  In the past, the degree of success in one’s attack on the enemy’s maritime trade was commonly expressed in terms of the total tonnage sunk/damaged or the reduction of shipping volume as a percentage in a given maritime theater. Some navies expressed the desired effect on the flow of the enemy shipping traffic by using more nuanced terms (e.g., interfering, hampering, curtailing, interrupting, and cutting off ).1 Today, the situation is more complicated because not only enemy traffic flow, but also other elements of maritime trade located ashore must be destroyed or neutralized. Success in destroying or neutralizing each element of maritime trade will require different methods of assessment.  Attack on maritime trade is usually highly effective against an island nation, but less so against a continental country rich in resources and with well-­ developed land communications with neighboring countries. In theory, an attack on the enemy maritime trade should end in a complete destruction of the enemy’s maritime trade. Yet this is rarely achieved in practice. 

Requirements Success in the attack on the enemy maritime trade will be considerably enhanced by having sound theory, doctrine, training, and operational command organization/ C2. Sound theory for maritime trade warfare should already have been developed in peacetime; otherwise, it is not possible to develop a sound doctrine. The very heart of such a doctrine should be operational or tactical concepts for attack on the enemy’s, and defense and protection of one’s own, maritime trade. The first theories of maritime trade warfare emerged in the late nineteenth century in France and Germany. For obvious reasons, Britain was much more concerned with defense and protection of its maritime trade. One of the key elements of the French Young School was war on enemy maritime trade.

220   Destroying military-economic potential at sea The founder of what became known as the French Young School, Captain Louis-­Antoine-Richild Grivel laid the foundations for Admiral Aube’s ideas on commerce warfare. Grivel concluded that the only way to defeat Britain was to attack its commerce. He wrote that commercial warfare is “the most economical form of war for the poorer fleet; is at the same time the one best suited to restore peace promptly, in that it strikes directly … at the very source of prosperity of the enemy.”2 Grivel argued that France should conduct war with cruisers against British seaborne commerce and if necessary such a war could be sustained indefinitely.3 In his view, this objective could be achieved in two to three years of continued commerce raiding.4  Admiral Aube believed that the power of England was greatly exaggerated. In his view, “twenty cruisers of superior speed, thrown onto the world trade routes and commanded by men resolved to wage merciless war – true war – would be sufficient to strike her to the heart.”5 France should attempt to ruin the British economy by attacking weak points and using surprise actions.6 Aube’s objective in waging commerce warfare was not to starve England but rather to trigger a commercial panic that would bring about social collapse. He erred in asserting that panic among the populace was more important than the destruction of (merchant) ships.7 Aube confidently asserted that an attack on the British seaborne trade would cause social discontent and disrupt trade with India and other colonies.8  Admiral Aube believed that the French Navy had but one function – defense of the colonial empire against England. This would be accomplished by ruthless commerce-­destruction on the high seas and by coastal defense.9 In his view, commerce warfare would not only be aimed against the enemy trade at sea but would also include the enemy’s ports. Hence, there would be a need to conduct surprise raids to interrupt the enemy’s supply lines. All these actions would be aimed at destroying the enemy’s sources of riches and thereby making it impos­ sible for the enemy to continue with the war.10 Aube believed that the only real activity would be commerce warfare which would be merciless.11 In 1885, Aube proposed the employment of torpedo boats as the primary platforms for war against enemy commerce.12 Torpedo boats would simply sink the enemy merchant vessels without warning. That, in turn, would lead to the loss of large numbers of British ships with their cargoes and experienced crews.13 The French Young School proponents did not make any distinction between contraband (goods to be used for war purposes) and non-­contraband. By sinking a ship without warning, the French threatened any and all goods coming to Britain regardless of whether they were raw materials or manufactured goods or intended for military or civilian purposes.14 Aube’s recommendations would in practice represent a serious violation of the then existing international law. But Aube and his supporters firmly believed that war against enemy commerce at sea must be conducted without regard to existing international law. Aube’s vision of the war indeed included a conscious violation of the law of the sea and state-­monopolized commerce de guerre.15 He explained that

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   221 War is the negation of law. It … is the recourse to force – the ruler of the world – of an entire people in the incessant and universal struggle for existence. Everything is therefore not only permissible but legitimate against the enemy.16 The ruthlessness of the French Young School in commerce warfare shocked many observers as an atavistic throwback to the past in an era devoted to the rule of law, the inviolability of private property, and the right of free trade for neutrals.17 The majority of critics of Admiral Aube had problems with his advocacy of commerce raiding or unrestricted torpedo boat warfare against all enemy shipping and his Darwinian contempt for international law.18 In fact, the idea of using torpedo boats as commerce raiders was condemned by every officer who seriously considered the question. They believed that such piracy would only be the signal for a general league of neutrals against France.19 Moreover, Aube, Charmes, and their supporters were harshly criticized by another influential proponent of the Young School, Vice Admiral Siméon Bourgeois (who was one of the leading experts on submarines and torpedo boats). Bourgeois asserted that violation of international war would lead neutrals to become enemies. Moreover, he wrote that such callous disregard of human life was morally unacceptable.20 The German theory of “small war on the high seas” initially focused on the destruction of enemy maritime trade. In Captain Alfred Stenzel’s view, the objective of the small war was the destruction or interruption of the enemy sea trade. The object of attack was the enemy or whatever was being used for the war – regardless of whether it belonged to the state or was private property – and unprotected merchant ships. The warships were always the attackers. The extent of a war theater (Kriegsschauplatz) was the world’s ocean – it was open to both parties. For Stenzel, there were no defenders in such a war.21  Like Admiral Aube and his followers, Stenzel did not differentiate between state property and private commerce. Consequently, he did not agree with that part of the international law that made a clear distinction between these two. Stenzel also disagreed with the Prussian king William I’s declaration at the beginning of the Franco-­Prussian War in which he stated that Prussia made war on the French government not on French citizens. In his view, war against enemy sea commerce should aim to stop the flow of arms to the enemy and attack enemy shipping as a source of wealth. However, in contrast to the French Young School, Kleinkrieg aimed to deny the enemy the means to purchase arms or raw materials on the open markets. The objective was to destroy both the ships and their cargoes. Stenzel argued that commerce raiding cannot be successful without safe ports from which to operate. These ports would also provide a place to bring prizes. The Germans envisaged commerce raiding being carried out around the globe.22  During general Leo von Caprivi’s era as the commander of the German Imperial Navy (1883–1888), the Admiralty Staff ’s Council debated the problem of how to win the war through commerce raiding. The German methods were significantly different than those of the French Young School. In contrast to the

222   Destroying military-economic potential at sea French, the Germans realized the importance of international law and their country’s unfavorable geographical position regarding trade routes. For the French Young School’s proponents, sinking of merchantmen was a means to an end. The aim was to ravage the enemy’s economy and instill in the enemy merchant classes despair of pursuing hostilities to their financial ruin. For the Germans, commerce destruction was a physical act of denying to the enemy the sinews of war and helping the army in pursuit of victory. It was not intended to be used as a psychological means, but as a purely physical one.23  The objective of the small war was primarily destruction of supplies for the wartime needs. In this respect, the small war had far-­reaching importance. Stenzel stated that during the Franco-­Prussian War in 1870 hundreds of field guns and tens of thousands of rifles were imported by sea and they enabled France to continue the war. Second, the objective of the small war was sea traffic (used for trade) as a source of riches. And third, it was aimed against enemy property as possession.24  Prior to 1914, the ideas of the “small war” were widely accepted among German naval officers. The war on commerce was intended to indirectly weaken the British fleet. This, in turn, would force Britain to employ many detachments for the protection of its maritime commerce. The High Seas Fleet would support war on British commerce by preventing the Royal Navy from detaching forces for the protection of commerce. War on British sea commerce might even paralyze British economic life. Admiral Tirpitz intended to establish a squadron composed of the most modern and fastest large and small cruisers, to be based at Wilhelmshaven. The squadron would not be subordinate to the Fleet Commander (Flottenkommnadant) (who was also commander of the High Seas Fleet).25  In the interwar years, the German Reichsmarine further developed the theory of commerce warfare based on the lessons of World War I. In the late 1930s, the German Wehrmacht used the concept of the “war on economy” (Wirtschafts­ krieg). It was a part of the general struggle of the nation and conducted by a general strategy. The objective of the war on economy was protection and advancement of one’s own and paralyzing the enemy’s sources of strength. Economic sources of strength include the economy in general and war industries, plus economic relations with other countries. The components of economic war were foreign policy, economy, finances, propaganda, armed forces (Wehrmacht), and sabotage.26 The economic war consisted of production war, trade war, and finance war.27  Trade war (Handelskrieg) aimed to destroy the enemy’s trade relations and limit his options for having self-­sufficiency in war supplies and replacements. The political foundations for controlling enemy trade were based on his alliance system – not limited to only trade partners but also including the enemy’s neighboring countries involved in trade.28 In the German concept, each service of the Wehrmacht had a role to play in a war on the enemy’s trade. For the Kriegs­ marine, war on the enemy trade had a dominant role. The intensity of war at sea would depend on the enemy’s dependence on seaborne supplies. War on the enemy’s trade would also determine the importance of war at sea for the war’s

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   223 outcome. The German army could achieve only partial objectives in a war on enemy trade. The Luftwaffe would attack trade routes on land and at sea, and port terminals and naval bases in cooperation with the Kriegsmarine.29  The Germans differentiated the following types of war on enemy trade at sea: (1) cruiser warfare (Kreuzerkrieg); (2) U-­boat warfare; and (3) mine warfare. War on the enemy sea trade would be aimed at damaging the enemy’s shipping; control of neutrals; disputing trade frontiers; blockade of the enemy coast; preventing enemy fishing; and destruction of the enemy’s bases, radio stations, and undersea cables.30  By 1939, the Kriegsmarine’s concept of the Handelskrieg envisaged the employment of all forces in attacking enemy maritime traffic, that is, U-­boats, cruisers, pocket battleships, auxiliary cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats. Smaller commerce raiders would be employed in distant waters. For the Germans it was critical to have the initiative. The enemy maritime shipping would be attacked at multiple points, thereby fragmenting the enemy’s naval strength in his defense against U-­boats and “pocket” battleships.31  The Kriegsmarine’s trade warfare against England was outlined in the Instruction No. 1 issued by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – OKW) and signed by Hitler on August 31, 1939. The SKL believed that all means were to be used, not only U-­boats, surface ships, torpedo boats, and mines, but also the Luftwaffe. This was the only strategic way to proceed. Yet the fact was that the number of U-­boats was inadequate for the task. Hence, the emphasis was on the construction of new U-­boats. For the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance in support of U-­boats and for the protection of surface combatants was especially important. The OKW’s Instruction No. 1 also directed the Luftwaffe to prepare for interfering with the British maritime traffic, armament industry, and troop transports to France.32 The Luftwaffe would exploit favorable opportunities for an effective attack against any concentration of the British fleet units, especially battleships and carriers. However, the Luftwaffe’s weight of main effort was not at sea but on land.33 

Main methods The main methods used in the past by a weaker side at sea for destroying enemy shipping at sea were: • • • •

Privateering (historic). Commerce raiding. Commercial counter-­blockade. Offensive mining. 

In the sailing era and the early era of steam, the main methods of attack on enemy merchant shipping were privateering and commerce raiding (guerre de course – “war of the chase”).

224   Destroying military-economic potential at sea Privateering was used both by the weaker and the stronger fleet, while commerce raiding was generally used by the weaker fleet. Although similar in many ways, there is also a great difference between privateering and commerce raiding. Privateering was conducted by privately owned ships and for profit. In contrast, commerce raiding was organized and conducted by the navies. Common to both methods is that attacks on enemy merchant shipping are conducted sporadically. Starting in the twelfth century and for several centuries afterward, both strong and weak sea powers extensively used privately owned ships or “privateers” in attacking the enemy’s trade. They were granted so-­called “letters of marque” (from the French term) granting them the rights of to seize and sell enemy merchant ships and cargo, but they would outfit the privateer ships at their own expense.34  Privateering was aimed at bringing the anarchy of retaliation under the rule of law. A privateer was a merchant vessel converted into a commissioned vessel capable of capturing small prizes.35 The governments generally encouraged and protected piratical ventures against one another during the late middle ages. Most of the English privateers were based in the coastal communities of Devon, Cornwall, and southwestern English counties while the French privateers operated from the ports in Brittany.36 Privateering was practiced by the Dutch in their struggle against Spain (1568–1648). The forays by the Dutch “sea beggars” in the 1560s were conducted from the port of Emden (then part of the Dutch province of Friesland), La Rochelle, and Dover. They attacked not only the Spanish but also ships of other countries. They were joined by the English privateers from the West Country.37 One of the best known and most effective British privateers was Francis Drake (1540–1596). He sacked towns in the Spanish colonies, destroyed fishing fleets, and captured a bullion fleet.38 Drake’s pillaging of the Spanish colonies and vital treasure fleets had a shattering effect on public opinion in Spain.39  Privateers were very successful in inflicting losses on enemy merchant shipping. For example, by the end of the Third Anglo-­Dutch War (1672–1674), which became the Franco-­Dutch War, the French privateers, especially from Dunkirk, attacked Dutch trade in the Channel and the North Sea. This was made easier because the Dutch fleet operated in the Mediterranean.40  The French Navy Secretary Louis Phélypeaux, Count de Pontchartrain (1643–1727) wanted war on commerce to be independent from other aspects of war at sea. He believed that destruction of the enemy commerce would accomplish war objectives more cheaply than by the use of squadrons.41 Pontchartrain started in 1684 to issue government ships to private persons for privateering.42  During the War of the Augsburg League (War of the Grand Alliance) (1689–1697), England lost some 4,000 merchant ships to the French actions. Most of these ships were captured by privateers.43 Initially, the French used single ships in attacking the English merchantmen. St. Malo, Dieppe, Dunkirk, and Le Havre were the main bases for privateers. England was not prepared for this new kind of warfare. Hence, it lacked a methodical defense against the French privateers. In 1693, for several months English commerce with the

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   225 Levant was almost completely stopped. In London and Amsterdam insurance rates were increased by 30 percent.44 Commerce warfare by the French played a major role in convincing England and the Dutch Republic to settle for a compromise peace.45 Louis XIV embraced war against enemy commerce because that meant that he did not need to build a large navy. By encouraging and stimulating private initiative and issuing lettres de marque the enemy merchant ships would be legitimately captured and sold for profit. Thereby, the French state would shift the cost of naval warfare onto private persons.46  In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the French initially attempted to obtain command of the sea by conducting “squadron warfare.” The combined Franco-­Spanish fleet engaged the Anglo-­Dutch fleet in the battle of Málaga on August 24, 1704. The battle was a tactical draw. However, the battle of Málaga was an operational victory for England because it saved Gibraltar. Afterward, France made the most persistent and untiring attacks on the British merchant marine chiefly by using privateers.47 Between 1702 and 1707, the British lost thirty men-­of-war and 1,146 merchant ships to privateers; 300 of these were recaptured.48 The French and Spaniards lost eighty men-­of-war, 1,346 merchant vessels and 175 privateers. After 1707 the effect of the French privateering was greatly reduced.49 Like the French, Dutch privateering peaked during the War of the Spanish Succession. At beginning of war, the Dutch State General vigorously encouraged privateering and counter-­privateering. Within a year of the beginning of war, forty-­seven Dutch privateers had been commissioned from Middleburg and Flushing. They carried 1,004 guns, thirty-­six mortars and some 6,670 men. In addition, there were twenty-­five double-­manned ships for commerce or privateering and five more privateers with 750 men and 120 guns were under construction at the end of 1703.50 In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), France resorted again to privateering. The French privateers destroyed 1,878 British ships and the Spanish privateers another 1,360 or a total of 3,238 British ships.51 Despite these losses, the British merchant fleet was larger at the end of war than it was at its beginning.52 For more than year after 1744 the French Navy did not conduct any serious operation against the British. In the Mediterranean, the French were highly successful in cutting supplies to the British fleet. These attacks nearly drove the British fleet from the Mediterranean because of the lack of supplies. At the same time, the French were successful in protecting their own maritime trade.53  In the Seven Years War (1756–1763), the British lost some 2,500 merchant ships, mostly from French privateers. Nevertheless, the British merchant marine at the end of war was much stronger than at its beginning-­some 8,000 vessels. The British captains generally refused the orders of the French escorts.54 Generally, the French captured small British ocean-­going vessels and coastal ships. In contrast, the British destroyed more valuable French ships.55  In the American War of Independence (1775–1783), both sides used privateers in attacking each other’s merchant shipping. American privateers captured

226   Destroying military-economic potential at sea 3,087 British ships, but leaving 2,208 ships. They also captured some ninety British privateers (seventy-­five remained in American hands). The American privateers and the Continental Navy captured some 16,000 British seamen compared to 22,000 British soldiers taken by the Continental Army. In contrast, the British captured 1,135 American merchantmen (twenty-­seven were retaken or ransomed) and captured 216 American privateers.56  In the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), the threat of the French privateers did not reach serious proportions until 1797 and then gradually declined until 1802. Between 1793 and 1797, the French privateers captured 2,266 British ships.57 Other sources claim that the privateers captured only 1,375 British merchant vessels.58 However, these losses were statistically small. In 1795, Britain had 16,728 merchant ships and 17,885 in 1800.59 Between 1793 and 1800 more British ships (2,967) ships were lost from natural causes.60 Not surprisingly, the French privateers were unable to make a decisive impact on the war’s outcome. They were not supported by organized naval forces. At the same time the British captured 43 French privateers. By 1798 some 22,000 French sailors were in British captivity.61  To protect their commerce, the British used patrolling by light naval vessels, and convoying. Merchant ships were assembled according to their destination in ports designated in advance. Some convoys consisted of 300, 500 or even 1,000 vessels.62 During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the number of attacks by French privateers rose slowly until 1807 and then again declined.63  In the War of 1812, the Americans used both privateers and warships in attacking the British merchant ships in many parts of the Atlantic. At the beginning of the war, the Americans had only one ship-­of-the-­line and five frigates. The U.S. Navy was too weak to fight the Royal Navy. Hence, attack on the enemy merchant shipping was the only viable option. The American objective was to attack British merchant ships in all part of the Atlantic and thereby stretch the British Navy deployed off the U.S. east coast.64 Out of twenty-­two ships of the American Navy, eighteen were engaged in commerce warfare and they took 165 prizes. There were 526 registered privateers but only 200 engaged on the high seas. They took 1,344 prizes.65 The employment of the U.S. warships and privateers had a large effect on the British naval deployments. The strength of the Royal Navy was increased from twenty-­three warships (including one ship-­ of-the-­line and five frigates) in mid-­1812 to 120 in late 1814 (including twelve ships-­of-the-­line and twenty-­nine frigates).66  Privateering was formally abolished by the Declaration of Paris signed by all major European powers on April 16, 1856. However, the United States, Spain and Mexico refused to ratify the Declaration of Paris because their navies were small. Hence, they wanted privateering to remain legal.67 Among other things, this declaration stated that “privateering is and remains abolished.” The neutral flag carrying enemy goods, except for contrabands of war, would not be liable to capture as if under the enemy flag. A blockade, to be binding, must be effectively maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.68 In other words, Declaration of Paris stipulated that any attack on

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   227 the enemy’s commerce must be under the direct control of the state. Also, there would be more clear distinction between those who used violence for private gain and those who did so for reasons of state.69  Privateering was used by the Confederate States during the American Civil War (1861–1865). Fort Sumter surrendered on April 13, 1861. Two days later the President of the Confederate States, Jefferson Davis (1808–1889) responded with a proclamation that Abraham Lincoln’s proclamation meant an invasion of the South. It was the duty of the Confederate government to repel the invasion. Hence, each side became committed to war because of two presidents’ proclamations. Jefferson Davis called for volunteers to get a letter of marque, the privateers to prey on northern commerce at sea. Lincoln replied with a naval blockade of Confederate States.70 However, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen R. Mallory forced all privateers to be part of a voluntary navy. After the Confederate Congress created the regular navy on April 18, 1862, the volunteer navy remained separate but under the general jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy.71  Another method of making sporadic attacks on the enemy merchant shipping is commerce raiding (guerre de course). In the past, Britain’s enemies on the continent, frustrated in their attempts to obtain command of the sea or to invade the British Isles, usually turned to commerce raiding.72 Although the objectives of privateering and commerce raiding are almost identical the means used are very different. In contrast to privateering, commerce raiding is purely directed against enemy merchant shipping. This is often the most logical course of action for a weaker fleet.73  The main objective of commerce raiding is to whittle away the strength and resources of the stronger power. As practiced by the French, commerce raiding was an expansion of privateering.74 A fleet conducting commerce raiding essentially prolonged the hostilities. This happened even if the weaker navy was eventually defeated.75  Commerce raiding does not aim to economically ruin the stronger side, but to inflict as much damage as possible on its maritime trade. It succeeds even when conducted on a very small-­scale by pushing up marine insurance rates and freight costs. It also might lead the enemy to abandon some of its economic activity. This, in turn, allows the non-­belligerents to pick up trade, thereby injuring the enemy’s long-­term trade prospects. Commerce raiding also reduces the enemy’s revenues and the credit available to wage a war. Hence, in some case it can have strategic significance.  Naval classical thinkers differed on the role and importance of commerce warfare. For example, Admiral Mahan wrote The harassment and distress caused a country by serious interference with the commerce will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and it is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous

228   Destroying military-economic potential at sea delusion, when presented in rather fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people. Especially it is misleading when the nation against whom it is to be directed, possesses, as Great Britain did and is one of two requisites of a strong sea-­power: a widespread healthy commerce and a powerful navy.76  Sir Julian S. Corbett wrote that interference with enemy trade is not only a means of exerting secondary economic pressure but is also a primary means toward overthrowing the enemy’s power of resistance. He asserted that wars are not decided exclusively by military and naval force. Finances are scarcely less important. In his view “when the things are equals, it is the longer purse that wins” and anything which we are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy’s finance is a direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end against a maritime state is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade.77  Admiral Castex noted that chief among minor counter-­attacks are guerre de course directed against the enemy’s communications, which, as we explained above, is likely to pay high return in terms of manoeuvre. History is full of examples of such minor counterattacks from the ancien regime, the Revolution, and the Empire, of the Confederate States in the American Civil War, and of the Germans in 1914. All of these used guerre de course against an enemy whose superior naval power they could not challenge in a direct struggle for mastery of the sea. But those who practiced this form of warfare generally committed the mistake of not integrating it in a more general system of war. Notably they failed to use it as part of a manoeuvre designed to produce favorable conditions for the clash of fleets.78  The origins of commerce raiding go back to the late seventeenth century when the French king Louis XIV’s master strategist Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban argued that France simply cannot wage a successful war simultaneously on land and against the English–Dutch coalition at sea. He recommended to Louis XIV to reduce the size of the Navy from ninety to forty ships-­of-the-­line, reduce the Mediterranean galley fleet, and disband a number of marine infantry companies.79 In his memo Memoirs sur la Course in November 1693, Vauban laid down his reasoning that France should shift away from a high-­cost strategy of directly confronting the navies of England and the Dutch Republic to a low-­cost strategy of attacking their seaborne economy.80 Originally, commerce raiding was based on small and fast frigates and schooners. They would attack only enemy merchant ships but avoid encounters with men-­of-war.81  During the American Civil War (1861–1865), the Confederates conducted rather extensive commerce warfare against the Northern States. The objective

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   229 was to disrupt the North’s commerce to the point that its businessmen would put pressure on to negotiate an end of war rather than risk an economic disaster.82 The Confederate agents in Britain secured contracts for eighteen vessels; seven of them were used as commerce raiders and the remaining ships became blockade runners.83 The most successful commerce raider was Alabama which took sixty-­four prizes and sank one Union warship.84 Confederate commerce raiders captured or sank 257 merchant ships totaling some 100,000 tons or about 5 percent of the North’s merchant shipping. Within fourteen months of January 1863, the Union Navy was forced to employ seventy-­seven ships and twenty-­ three chartered vessels in searching for Confederate raiders.85 Many American owners decided to sell their ships to foreigners.86 In 1863, some 348,000 tons of merchant shipping went under a foreign flag. During the entire war, some 775,000 tons of merchant ships were sold.87 Legal problems prevented much of this tonnage from later returning to the U.S. owners.88 The Union’s merchant marine was reduced from 2.5 million tons in 1861 to only 1.1 million tons in 1865.89 These losses resulted in prohibitive insurance rates and diversion of business to neutral shipping.90 Fewer than two dozen commerce raiders sank more shipping than did all the Confederate gunboats, ironclads and naval batteries combined.91 The Confederate captains were skillful in avoiding clashes with the Union’s warships. The loss of a few naval vessels would not materially weaken the stronger naval power but loss of ships for Confederates might seriously cripple their commerce destroying ability. The principal objective of commerce raiding was destruction of the enemy commerce not naval vessels.92 Yet Confederate commerce raiding had no practical effect on the Union’s war effort. The naval blockade was not slackened. Although the Union Navy had to use quite a substantial number of ships in its search for Confederate privateers, enough ships were left to maintain an effective naval blockade.93  The German Navy conducted commerce raiding for the first time during World War I. The origins of the German Navy’s use of commerce raiders are found in the Wars of German Unification (1864; 1866; 1870–1871) and the actions of the Confederate raiders during the American Civil War.94 Prior to 1914, the Germans envisaged using armored/light cruisers and auxiliary cruisers for commerce warfare. For the Germans, the single biggest problem was providing logistical support and sustainment to commerce raiders deployed in several widely separated areas of the world’s oceans. Germany lacked an adequate number of bases overseas. Commerce raiders had to be at sea for a long time. The Germans studied the problem in detail. Among measures considered were husbanding fuel by sailing at cruising speed, stopping at night time or during the day when there were no enemy ships, and towage by commercial ships. The Germans had to avoid even the use of neutral ports. For refueling places they selected some remote and rarely visited islands. These isolated places could only be used for repairs of engines or boilers.95  The Germans commissioned fifteen auxiliary cruisers during World War I.96 The cruisers intended for commerce raiding were organized in four separate forces: the East Asia Squadron, with two armored cruisers (Scharnhorst,

230   Destroying military-economic potential at sea Gneisenau) and three light cruisers (Emden, Nürnberg, Leipzig) the Eastern African Squadron with one light cruiser (Königsberg, replaced with one small cruiser, Geier, in June 1914) plus one survey vessel (Möwe); the East America Station with one light cruiser (Dresden; to be relieved by Karlsruhe); and the Pacific (or Australia) Station with only a single small cruiser (Geier, which came from the East Africa Station). The Germans also converted faster steamships (17 knots and faster) into auxiliary cruisers. However, that limited their number to only thirteen. The plan was to arm these cruisers with 4.1-inch guns, taken from the battleships broken up.97  The German principal objective in employing auxiliary cruisers was to paralyze enemy maritime trade. The Germans hoped to force Great Britain to deploy its cruisers and armed merchant cruisers to protect trade routes in various parts of the world’s oceans. This, in turn, would reduce the British naval superiority in the North Sea and thereby enhance the chances of the High Seas Fleet in fighting a decisive battle.98  Shortly after the beginning of the hostilities in August 1914, the Germans deployed the first four auxiliary cruisers to their respective operating areas. They relied on a chain of support established already in peacetime in several neutral countries. Afterward, they were sustained by supply ships sent from Germany. By their very presence in various ocean areas, the German auxiliary cruisers delayed and paralyzed the Entente’s shipping.99 The Germans actually employed ten auxiliary cruisers in World War I. They sank 104 ships, some 357,000 tons.100  Theoretically, commerce raiding could be conducted by either a weaker or stronger side at sea. Yet, in practice commerce raiding is the logical course of action for a weaker fleet.101 As already stated, it is purely aimed at inflicting losses on enemy merchant shipping. Encounters with the enemy warships must be avoided. Commerce raiding, even if conducted on a small scale, will force the stronger side to fragment its naval strength. This, in turn, could potentially considerably weaken a stronger navy’s presence in the theater of main effort.  A blockaded country often resorts to commercial counter-­blockade. The objective is then to inflict losses as large as possible on the maritime trade of a stronger sea power. In contrast to a commercial blockade by a stronger side, a commercial counter-­blockade is not combined with a naval blockade. A weaker fleet is usually not very effective in crippling an enemy’s commerce to the degree to which a blockade has ruined its own maritime trade. Nevertheless, such a fleet is always a potential menace whenever the superior force allows it to be uncovered and free to move.102 Commerce raiding is usually an integral part of commercial counter-­blockade. For example, the British blockade of the coasts of France from Brest to the mouth of the Elbe in 1806 was answered by Napoleon I’s commercial counter-­blockade. On November 21, 1806, Napoleon I issued the “Berlin Decrees,” aiming to shut the European continent to British manufactured goods and British trade. They were followed by the “Milan Decrees” on December 17, 1807. The blockade stretched from Spain to Russia. The ultimate objective was to weaken Great Britain and force it to accept peace.103 All trade and correspondence with the British Isles was prohibited All

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   231 goods of British origin or belonging to British subjects would be seized. Moreover, any vessel sailing from Great Britain and arriving in a French port should depart without discharging. The cargo would be seized if the captain tried to conceal such a call.104 Britain responded to the Berlin Decrees by declaring all French ports under blockade. It also demanded that neutral shipping submit to British controls.105  Napoleon I soon found out that the continental blockade was difficult to implement. His decrees were extremely unpopular with other European countries. They were impossible to enforce. The number of custom officials was insufficient. They were also badly paid, and bribery was widespread.106 Among other things, Napoleon I increased the number of customs officers from 23,000 in 1806 to 35,000 in 1813. However, the number of smugglers was five times larger.107 To enforce the continental blockade Napoleon I was forced to expand French power to Spain and Portugal, to occupy part of Germany, and finally to invade Russia. The French counter-­blockade, however, failed in its stated purpose, because it frittered away France’s resources and ultimately doomed Napoleon I’s attempt to establish his domination on the continent.  In World War I, the German response for an increasingly effective blockade of the Entente’s powers was to use an ever larger number of U-­boats in attacking enemy merchant shipping. Prior to 1914, Great Britain was heavily dependent on seaborne trade for the uninterrupted functioning of its economy and for maintaining the living standards of its population. A major part of Britain’s needs in cotton, silk, petroleum, rubber, jute, and hemp came from overseas.108 Some three-­quarters of the iron ore used in the British foundries was produced domestically. However, some 40 to 50 percent of its needs in pig iron ore was imported from Spain. Also, metalized manganese ore was largely imported. Britain’s needs in copper, tin, lead, and zinc came overwhelmingly from overseas. Some 6 to 7 million tons of timber were imported every year (one-­third of that amount was required by the colliers).109 In 1909–1913, on average every year Britain imported nearly two-­thirds in nutrient value of its foodstuffs.110  The foundation of the British seaborne trade was a large and efficient merchant marine. On July 1, 1914, the British merchant marine consisted of 8,587 steamers and 653 sailing vessels totaling 19,250,000 tons. Together with its overseas dominions, the British had a merchant marine of some 21 million tons or 43 percent of the world’s shipping. The British-­flag ships carried half of the world’s seaborne trade (52 percent in terms of value).111 In 1913, British ports handled 47,000 incoming and 61,000 outgoing ships. And out of these some 26,000 and 31,000 ships respectively were under the British flag. Total cargo imported was 55 million tons and exported/re-­exported some 100 million tons (including 76 million tons of coal).112  Like other major navies of the day, the German Imperial Navy contemplated using its U-­boats for scouting and defense of the coast and naval bases/ports. It was only during the war that their main mission was changed to attacking enemy merchant shipping. At the beginning of the war, the Germans had in service only twenty-­four U-­boats. They did not start a serious effort against the Entente’s113

232   Destroying military-economic potential at sea shipping until early 1915.114 The Germans mounted a more intensive effort by their U-­boats from October 1916 to January 1917.115 They decided to start unrestricted warfare on January 9, 1917 and this formally went into effect on February 1. The U-­boats were free to sink any ship without warning. After February 1917 the Entente’s losses in shipping rose dramatically. By April 1917 Britain was in a great crisis. Ships were sunk faster than they could be replaced. What saved the situation was the decision in April 1917 to introduce convoys for all ocean-­going ships.116 Until spring 1918, the Allies and neutrals lost on average 400,000 tons of shipping per month. Worldwide ship construction compensated for only about half of these losses. Not until after April 1918 did the losses start to fall below 300,000 tons. And it was only in May 1918 that Prime Minister David Lloyd George could confidently announce that although the U-­boats continued to be a threat, they were no longer a danger.117  The largest losses inflicted by the German U-boats on the Allied and neutral shipping were after January 9, 1917 when the Germans declared unrestricted U-­boat warfare. From January 1917 through October 1918, the German U-­boats sunk 9,822,000 tons (of which 6,623,000 were sunk in 1917).118  Although the German U-­boats failed ultimately to accomplish their objective of crippling the enemy’s maritime trade, they inflicted substantial shipping losses. During the entire war (July 28, 1914 to November 11, 1918) the German  U-­boats had sunk 11,153,000 tons of the enemy shipping. This included 2,990 British ships with 6,635,000 tons. In addition, the U-­boats sank 578 fishing craft with some 53,000 tons. A total of 12,723 civilian lives were lost.119 During the war, the Germans built 390 U-­boats; 178 boats were destroyed in combat and 176 surrendered to the Entente Powers.120 Some 5,410 men (including 515 officers) or about 30 percent of the U-­boat personnel’s strength were lost too.121  As in World War I, the Germans responded to the British blockade in September 1939 with a counter-­blockade. Already by May 1939, Hitler’s instructions to the Kriegsmarine emphasized that the Kriegsmarine would attack enemy merchant ships on the oceans. Close cooperation with the Luftwaffe was considered essential.122 On August 4, 1939, the SKL directed that in case of a war, the Kriegsmarine would cut off enemy sea communications by using all available forces. The enemy naval forces would be attacked only if that would contribute to war on the enemy’s commerce.123 Just before the invasion of Poland, Hitler’s Directive No. 1 on August 31, 1939 stated that in the case of Britain and France declaring war, the Kriegsmarine would concentrate on commerce destruction, especially against England. The Luftwaffe was directed to prepare for air attacks against British import shipping.124  Initially, the German war on the British maritime commerce was almost entirely conducted by U-­boats. Yet between November 1940 and February 1941 the number of U-­boats at sea was smaller than at any other period of war. Some twenty-­four boats were operational but only about ten were in the operating area at any time.125 By June 1940, the situation for U-­boats was greatly improved because of the newly obtained bases in Norway and France. By using bases in

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   233 France their transit distance to the operating areas was reduced by some 450 nautical miles. Also, the British anti-­submarine (A/S) defenses were weak. However, these advantages could not be exploited because the number of U-­boats at sea was small. Between June 1, 1940 and March 1, 1941, seventy-­two U-­boats entered service while losses amounted to only thirteen boats. However, the number of frontal U-­boats was reduced by February 1941 to only twenty-­two boats. The crews of the major part of the remaining U-­boats were undergoing training.126 Yet despite their numerical weakness, U-­boats were highly successful in destroying enemy shipping. From June 1940 to March 1941, U-­boats sank 381 ships with 2,042,027 BRT.127  As part of the commercial counter-­blockade, the Germans employed not only U-­boasts but also auxiliary cruisers, heavy surface ships, light forces, the Luftwaffe, and mines. In the employment of auxiliary cruisers, the main objective was not the tonnage of the enemy ships destroyed, as it was for the U-­boats, but tying enemy forces up to relieve pressure in home waters and inflicting damage on the enemy.128 In March 1940, the Germans started auxiliary cruiser operations in distant waters.129 By early 1941 two German auxiliary cruisers were deployed in each of the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.130 The majority of the German auxiliary cruisers were modern ships. Their average size was 6,000 tons. All of them had high endurance. They were usually armed with six 5.9-inch guns, four to five small caliber guns, and twin or triple above water torpedo tubes.131 German commerce raiding with auxiliary cruisers peaked in the first quarter of 1941. By end of March 1941, seven auxiliary cruisers then in service achieved spectacular results. They sank or captured some eighty ships with 494,291 BRT.132 The average monthly sinking was 100,000 tons or half of the monthly average from all enemy actions during that period. The auxiliary cruisers continued their attack on Allied shipping throughout 1941 but afterward their activity was greatly reduced.133 In 1939–1945, the German auxiliary cruisers sank by guns/torpedoes some 125 ships with 823,080 tons.134  Command and control of the German auxiliary cruisers was highly centralized. The SKL determined the operating areas of auxiliary cruisers and exercised overall command. However, each commanding officer was given wide latitude in his assigned operating areas.135 Special high-­frequency (HF ) radio communications were used. The ship’s captains were obliged to send detailed reports about their activities back to Berlin.136  Because all its attention was focused on support of the campaign in Norway and preparations for invasion of England (Plan Seelöwe – Sea Lion), the Kriegsmarine was unable to start operations with heavy surface ships against British shipping in the spring and summer of 1940. Admiral Raeder’s views on the employment of heavy surface ships were heavily influenced by his personal experiences in World War I. The leadership of the former Imperial German Navy were heavily criticized for their failure to actively employ the battle line during the war. Raeder was determined that under no circumstances would an analogous situation develop in the employment of heavy surface ships in a new war. In the employment of heavy surface ships against enemy maritime traffic,

234   Destroying military-economic potential at sea the German objective was destruction not of the enemy warships but of enemy merchant ships. This required that their own ships remain undamaged if possible. Hence, encounters with equally strong or superior forces had to be avoided.137  The Germans used three pocket battleships, two battle cruisers, and several heavy cruisers as commerce raiders. They achieved significant results in attacking British and Allied merchant ships in the Atlantic. In September 1940, the Germans attempted for the first time to employ one of their heavy surface ships, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper to attack British traffic in the Atlantic. However, that attempt failed because of Admiral Hipper’s engine problems.138 In the next attempt, pocket battleship Admiral Scheer had to delay its sortie until October 29, 1940 because of engine problems. On October 29, 1940, Admiral Scheer left Gotenhafen (Gdynia today) for the Atlantic. It operated in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean.139 It returned to Kiel on April 1 after 161 days and 46,000 nautical miles on cruise. It had sunk seventeen ships with 113,233 BRT.140 It also forced the enemy to assign large forces for the protection of convoys.  In the meantime, Admiral Hipper made a foray to the Atlantic from November 30 to December 27, 1940. It returned to Brest because of repeated engine problems.141 In its second foray, Admiral Hipper left Brest on February 1 and returned to Kiel on March 28. During its cruise it sank seven ships with 32,896 BRT and heavily damaged two other ships with some 9,900 BRT.142  While Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper were at sea, on January 22, 1941 the SKL sent battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to attack shipping in the Atlantic (operation Berlin). Their two-­month cruise was highly successful, with some twenty-­two ships with 115,622 BRT either sunk or captured.143 This number also included sixteen independently sailing enemy ships with 80,000 BRT. Both battleships returned to Brest on March 22.144  From July 1940 to March 1941, the German heavy surface ships sank or captured forty-­seven ships with 256,496 BRT. Obviously, their performance was far behind the auxiliary cruisers.145  By the spring of 1941, German battleships, heavy cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers were operating in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans.146 Admiral Raeder believed that good opportunities existed in 1941 to destroy enemy shipping in the Atlantic by using surface ships in coordination with U-­boats.147 The employment of heavy surface ships in the fall of 1940 and winter of 1941 confirmed Admiral Raeder’s and the SKL’s view that their concept was valid. They had high hopes for future successes after the entry into service of the Bismarck and Tirpitz: the strongest battleships in the world would be available in a few months and would greatly increase prospects for the successful conduct of Atlantic warfare. At the same time, Raeder and the SKL did not have any illusion that a day would come when operations with heavy surface ships in the Atlantic would became prohibitively risky. Hence, the intent was to intensify the employment of heavy surface forces while the opportunity to do so still existed.148 Moreover, it was only a matter of time before the United States entered the war.149 The foray of a combat group composed of the battleship

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   235 Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen into the Atlantic in late May 1941 was intended as commerce raiding operation. This attempt failed because the Bismarck was sunk, though Prinz Eugen escaped to Brest. The sinking of the Bismarck had a major effect on the future employment of the German battleships in the north Atlantic. Raeder wrote that prior to May 27, 1941, he had considerable freedom of action in determining employment of heavy surface ships if there were no negative effects on the actions of other services of the Wehrmacht. Because of the loss of the Bismarck, Hitler in his instructions greatly limited that freedom. Among other things, Hitler prohibited sending of the heavy ships to conduct commerce warfare in the Atlantic.150 During the entire war, the German heavy surface ships sank 104 Allied merchant ships with 498,447 tons.151  Both the auxiliary cruisers and heavy surface ships required an extensive and vulnerable logistics support structure; otherwise, they would not have been able to operate for an extended time on the open ocean. The initial geographic positions in 1939 were unfavorable for the employment of the German surface ships, as in 1914. The radius of the German surface ships was greatly extended by fitting fuel firing boilers. However, for a longer stay in the operating area the German ships had to rely on tankers. The SKL carefully deployed tankers in distant parts of the operating area; the SKL was very skillful in establishing that organization. It functioned well until summer 1941.152 The Germans built or chartered relatively large numbers of supply ships. They were sent to various waiting positions in the northern or southern Atlantic and Arctic. For example, in support of the ill-­fated Bismarck’s foray into the Atlantic in May 1941, available to Naval Group West were one supply ship, three requisitioned tankers (carrying fuel, munitions, and food), and three tankers in reserve.153 For logis­ tical support were assigned two supply ships and four (originally five) tankers.154 They were deployed in waiting positions in the north Atlantic: one supply ship between the Azores and Little Antilles and another 400 nautical miles west of Fayal, Azores; two tankers some 120 and 200 nautical miles south of Cape Farewell, Greenland, respectively. One tanker was deployed some 450 nautical miles northwest of and another about 700 nautical miles southwest of Fayal.155  In the aftermath of the foray of the Bismarck combat group, the British were successful in learning through decoding of the Enigma message about the location of the German supply ships in the northern Atlantic. These ships were located and then attacked and sunk. The Germans lost five ships on June 3 and 4 alone. All of them were lost at their waiting positions. The Germans believed that the enemy had knowledge of the number and routes of the German supply ships and then acted on that knowledge. They speculated that possible reasons were reports by enemy agents at bases on the German occupied territories, shipboard reporting services and direction finding, tapping of long-­range communications in the occupied areas, or the capture of secret documents on board some ships. However, the Germans firmly believed that it was impossible for the enemy to penetrate their codes.156  During World War II, Germany and its allies attacked Allied maritime trade in almost all ocean areas, and in adjacent seas to the Atlantic Ocean. However,

236   Destroying military-economic potential at sea their weight of main effort was in the northern Atlantic. By May 1945, the Allies had lost about 5,150 ships with 21,570,720 tons in all the theaters. The greatest losses were in the north Atlantic, 2,232 ships with 11,899,730 tons.157 The German, Italian, and Japanese submarines were responsible for sinking of 2,828 ships and 14,687,231 tons.158  In a relatively more recent example, the Israeli counter-­blockade in the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War of 1973 was based on Sharm el-­Sheikh and the Sinai coast of Suez. This affected the Egyptian economy to a greater degree than previously believed. The Morgan oil fields in the Gulf of Suez and those on the Egyptian coast produced about 8 million tons of oil per year out of a total of 10 million tons produced by Egypt. Part of this production was exported and accounted for 20 percent of Egyptian hard currency earnings; the remainder was shipped to the pipeline at Ras Sadaat and thence to Cairo. To make up for the oil lost due to the war, Egypt depended on Saudi Arabia and Libya. However, these supplies were not always forthcoming and were in any case debited against Egypt’s credit. A further economic threat was the fact that the Gulf of Suez ports were Egypt’s outlets to East Africa and to Asia, no less than the port of Eilat was for Israel. This threat was increased because the Israelis were able to operate freely in the Gulf of Suez because of their position along the Sinai coast, and particularly at Sharm el-­Sheikh.159  In the Iran–Iraq War the Iranians declared on September 22, 1980 that all waterways near their coasts were a war zone, and that they would not allow any merchant ship to carry cargo to Iraqi ports. The Iranians were largely successful in preventing the resupply of Iraq through the Strait of Hormuz. However, the Iraqis were able to use the Jordanian port of Aqaba and Saudi Arabia’s ports in the Red Sea and thereby minimize the effects of the Iranian blockade in the Arabian Gulf. Iraq was also successful in sending some oil to the world market via pipelines through Syria and Turkey. Meanwhile, Iran succeeded in exporting some oil from ports on the lower reaches of the Gulf, apparently beyond the capabilities of the Iraqi Navy to take any type of preventive action.160 On October 1, 1980, the Iranians closed the Shatt al-­Arab estuary, where some seventy merchant ships were berthed. An additional eight merchant ships were at the Iraqi main naval base of Umm Qasr. Access to these vessels was impossible until the end of hostilities in 1988 and many of them became the targets of attack by both sides in the conflict.161 In October 1980 the Iranians carried out a series of air attacks that resulted in damage to Iraqi oil fields. Their naval commando raids struck the oil outlets of Mina al Bakr and Khor al Amaya as well as port facilities at Al-­Faw, Basrah, and Umm Qasr.162  Offensive mining is one of the most effective and cheapest methods for a weaker side to destroy or damage merchant shipping in the enemy’s controlled littoral waters. Mines are the only naval weapons to some extent capable of altering geographical circumstances by making certain areas impassable to enemy ships. A mine-­dangerous area is normally treated with profound respect by the enemy and avoided as if it were a piece of land.163 Offensive mine barriers can be laid at the approaches to enemy ports, in assembly areas of convoys, at

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   237 approaches to a choke point, at focal points of enemy shipping, and on the routes use by coastal shipping. Offensive use of mines can be intended to force the enemy to abandon use of more protected sea routes and force him to use those that are more open to attack by friendly forces.  Mines were used extensively against enemy merchant (and naval) ships in both world wars. For example, in World War I, some 310,000 mines were laid by all belligerents. The Germans laid about 45,000, and their allies Austria–Hungary and Turkey another 6,900 mines.164 The majority of these mines were laid for defense purposes. The Germans then used surface ships and U-­boats to mine British coastal waters in the North Sea and on the west coast. They repeatedly mined the entrances off British ports on the east coast. Several thousand mines were laid each year and no part of the British coast was free of German mines.165 The German auxiliary cruisers also laid mines in distant areas of the world’s oceans. Their mines were responsible for loss of some 141,000 tons of Allied shipping.166 The German mines accounted for the loss of 259 merchant ships with 673,000 tons. In addition, they damaged 854 merchant ships with 432,000 tons and sixty-­three fishing vessels.167  In World War II, out of 5,150 ships with 21,570,000 tons of the Allied merchant ships sunk from all causes, some 534 ships with 1,406,000 tons (or 6.5 percent of the total) were lost to enemy mines.168 

Tenets In attacking an enemy’s maritime trade, the chances of success are greatly increased by a skillful application of several tenets. For success in attacking maritime trade, one’s forces should pursue a single objective. This, in turn, requires selection of the proper weight of main effort. Unless one possesses overwhelming strength, the pursuit of multiple objectives in quick succession or simultaneously should be avoided. The consequences of a lack of focus on the proper objective are shown in the failure of the German offensive against British coastal shipping in 1940–1942. The Germans failed to adhere to a single objective long enough to produce decisive results. They often frittered away their available strength by bombing land targets of doubtful value, and with little effectiveness. By the end of 1942 the Germans did not have the strength to make a sustained effort. In addition, the German weakness caused repeated abandonment of their objectives just when results were beginning to be obtained.169 Yet the Luftwaffe’s attacks against coastal shipping forced the British to keep many fighter aircraft and escorts permanently in home waters at a time when they were desperately needed in the Mediterranean and in the Far East and escorting the Atlantic convoys.  Attacks against the enemy’s maritime trade should be conducted systematically and against selected elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Whenever possible, these attacks should be carried out with multi-­service forces. Attacks on selected elements of enemy maritime trade should be conducted continuously; otherwise, the results will be found wanting.170 For example, in the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988, the Iraqis misused their superiority in the air in conducting

238   Destroying military-economic potential at sea attacks on merchant shipping bound for the Iranian ports in 1980–1987. The Iraqi air force had during 1984 hit only 3.6 percent of shipping per months against the average traffic of 3,000 ships.171 The Iraqi air offensive against shipping was graduated and sporadic, which robbed the offensive of its potential for achieving its principal objective.  Attacks on the enemy’s maritime trade should be spread over a relatively large sea/ocean area so that the enemy is not given an opportunity to recover or react quickly. For example, in both world wars, the Germans attacked the enemy’s shipping both in European waters and in several oceanic theaters. This, in turn, forced the British and their allies to commit significant forces to dealing with the threat posed by the German raiders. In World War II, the German offensive against Allied shipping in coastal waters forced the British to keep many fighter aircraft and escort vessels permanently in home waters at a time when they were desperately needed in the Mediterranean, the Far East, and, later, the Atlantic. This indirectly had repercussions on the British ability to defend Malta, the ordeal of which might have been shortened if reinforcements had been sent in time.172  In attacking enemy maritime trade, the focus should be on those elements that will generate a ripple (or cascading) effect on the entire maritime transportation system. Hence, the bottlenecks of enemy maritime trade should be identified early on, preferably in peacetime. One of the most effective ways to attack enemy maritime trade is to destroy or inflict heavy damage on the enemy’s ship repair facilities. Enemy ships that cannot be repaired are out of service, and the effect is the same as if they were sunk. This effect-­based thinking could be of major help in properly identifying the key nodes and links of enemy maritime trade and thereby preparing and executing sound operation plans.  The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 is an example of how an attack against enemy shipping should not be conducted. Neither side ever tried to commit all its forces to stop enemy oil shipments. Iraqi attacks against shipping bound to and from Iranian ports lacked consistency and persistence. The Iranians were allowed plenty of time to recover after each new round of air attacks. And each time, the Iranians used a cease-­fire or a new peace initiative to reduce the level of Iraqi attacks on its cities and shipping traffic.173  The best results are achieved by using diverse forces – the navy plus the forces of other services – in attacking enemy maritime trade. This is especially important in the enclosed and semi-­enclosed sea theaters where not only large ships, submarines, and land-­based fixed-­wing aircraft, but also light forces, armed helicopters, midget submarines, “smart” mines, coastal missile/gun batteries, and unmanned aerial/surface/subsurface vehicles (UAVs/USVs/UUVs) can be effectively used. Additionally, the army can assist the navy by capturing important positions, ports, and ship-­related faculties/installations.  Destruction of the enemy’s military-­economic potential is an indirect attack on the stronger side’s naval strength. It should be an integral part of the overall efforts by a weaker side at sea to destroy or weaken the stronger on both land and at sea. Hence, it is not purely a naval problem. All other services, and land-­based aircraft should be used jointly with naval forces in attacking selected

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   239 elements of the enemy’s maritime transportation. An attack on the enemy maritime trade is inherently attrition warfare. The great majority of actions will be tactical in size. Major naval/joint operations will be conducted only at the opportune time. Control of the air is the main prerequisite for success in the attack on the enemy maritime trade, especially in narrow seas. Operational intelligence on the enemy’s maritime transportation should be comprehensive, reliable, and timely. It should be already fully organized in peacetime. Commerce raiding remains a viable method in destroying enemy merchant shipping at sea. However, these methods alone will not be successful, unless they are combined with attacks on the ship-­related elements of maritime trade ashore. Commerce raiding has never by itself brought victory. Germany tried that twice in the twentieth century. It came very close to achieving the ultimate objective. Yet each time, Germany’s effort fell short. Attacks on maritime trade must be combined with efforts to defeat the enemy’s organized naval strength; otherwise, all the results will remain elusive, as they were in the past. 

Notes    1 “Interfering” means reducing shipping traffic by about 10 to 15 percent; “hampering” is aimed at reducing enemy maritime transport volume by 25 to 30 percent; the enemy maritime trade is “curtailed” if reduced to 50 to 60 percent in terms of volume; “interruption” means a serious disruption of enemy maritime trade in a given sea or ocean area; this is accomplished by reducing the maritime traffic volume by 60 to 80 percent; “cutting off ” maritime traffic means at least 80 percent losses in bottoms and a corresponding reduction in the capabilities of loading and off-­loading shipping terminals; then the enemy forces and civilian economy function only by drawing on existing stockpiles of material; this objective can be normally accomplished only by instituting a full naval and air blockade; Vojnopomorski Školski Centar, Skripta Iz Operatike RM, V Lekcija (Projekt) Zajedničke Operacije Vidova (Split, 1970), p. 11; Lehrbuch: Operative Kunst der Seestreitkräfte, Teil II/1: Seeoperationen und gemeinsamen Handlungen der Flottenkräfte und Truppen der Front in Küstenrichtung (Dresden: Militärakademie “Friedrich Engels,” 1981) (translated from the Russian Operativnoye iskusstvo voyenno-­morskogo flota by Gerhard Regner et al.), p. 100.    2 Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871–1904, edited by Stephen S. Roberts (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 20.    3 Douglas C. Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare: The Coercive Response of the Weak?” Naval War College Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2013), p. 100.    4 David H. Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: German and French Maritime Strategies in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine, eds., Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Paper # 40, 2013), p. 93.    5 Stephen Cobb, Preparing for Blockade 1885–1914: Naval Contingency for Economic Warfare (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013), p. 89.    6 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 103.    7 Cobb, Preparing for Blockade, p. 89.    8 Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin.” p. 95.    9 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 157.  10 Volkmar Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine. Strategie und Politik 1875–1900 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1971), p. 19. 

240   Destroying military-economic potential at sea 11 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 166.  12 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 165.  13 Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin,” p. 98.  14 Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin,” p. 99.  15 Bueb, Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine, pp. 156–157.  16 Cited in Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 104.  17 David H. Olivier, German Naval Strategy 1856–1888 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2012, first published 2004 by Frank Cass), p. 135.  18 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815–1914 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2001), p. 142.  19 Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, p. 169.  20 Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin,” p. 99.  21 Alfred Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See: Lehre vom Seekriege (Hannover/Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1913), pp. 246–247.  22 Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin,” p. 101.  23 Olivier, German Naval Strategy, p. 131.  24 Stenzel, Kriegführung zur See, p. 247.  25 P. Chack, “The German Strategy in the Distant Seas,” The Naval Review, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (August 1926), p. 502.  26 Abschrift W Wi Ic, 2. Referentenentwurf zur Werhmachtdienstvorschrift “Die Kriegführung,” Teil I, Abschnitt IV, 3-Wirtschaftskrieg, December 15, 1937, RM/732, Bundesarchiv-­Militärchiv (BA-­MA). Freiburg, i.Br., pp. 1–2.  27 Abschrift W Wi Ic, 2. Referentenentwurf zur Werhmachtdienstvorschrift “Die Kriegführung,” p. 5.  28 Abschrift W Wi Ic, 2. Referentenentwurf zur Werhmachtdienstvorschrift “Die Kriegführung,” p. 10.  29 Abschrift W Wi Ic, 2. Referentenentwurf zur Werhmachtdienstvorschrift “Die Kriegführung,” p. 12.  30 Abschrift W Wi Ic, 2. Referentenentwurf zur Werhmachtdienstvorschrift “Die Kriegführung,” p. 12.  31 Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 2: Von 1935 bis Spandau 1955 (Tübingen, Neckar: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1957), pp. 173–174.  32 Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg, Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, 1957), pp. 133–134.  33 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, pp. 134–135.  34 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 85.  35 Alexander Tabarrok, “The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Privateers,” The Independent Review, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Spring 2007), p. 566.  36 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 86.  37 Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 63.  38 Kappa, “The Strategy of a Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1937), p. 631.  39 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 632.  40 (Raoul) Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, Vol. I (Belgrade: Vojno-­izdavački Zavod, 1960), translated from Raoul Castex, Théories Stratégiques, Vol. I (Paris: Société d’Editions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1929), p. 139.  41 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 139. 42 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 139.  43 Gary M. Anderson and Adam Gifford Jr., “Privateering and the Private Production of Naval Power,” Cato Journal 11, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1991), p. 102.  44 René Daveluy, The Genius of Naval Warfare, Vol. I: Strategy, 2nd ed. of A Study of Naval Strategy, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1910), p. 192. 

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   241 45 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 91.  46 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 90.  47 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 633.  48 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 193.  49 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 141.  50 G.N. Clark, “War Trade and Trade War, 1701–1713,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (February 1929), p. 39.  51 Rudolph Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, Vol. II: Von 1739–1793 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried und Sohn, 1911), p. 108.  52 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 92.  53 “The Attempted Invasion of 1745,” The Naval Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (February 1915), p. 75.  54 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 633.  55 Rittmeyer, Seekriege und Seekriegswesen, Vol. II, p. 199.  56 Spencer C. Tucker, Blue & Gray Navies: The Civil War Afloat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. xv.  57 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 147.  58 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 197.  59 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 147.  60 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 147.  61 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 148.  62 Daveluy, Genius, Vol. I, p. 197.  63 Patrick Crowhurst, The French War on Trade. Privateering 1793–1815 (Aldershot, Hampshire: Scolar Press, 1989), p. 31.  64 Kevin D. McCranie, “Waging Protracted Naval War: U.S. Navy Commerce Raiding During the War of 1812,” in Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine, eds., Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Paper # 40, 2013), pp. 57, 59.  65 McCranie, “Waging Protracted Naval War,” p. 66.  66 McCranie, “Waging Protracted Naval War,” p. 67.  67 McCranie, “Waging Protracted Naval War,” p. 67.  68 Cited in Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 95.  69 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 96.  70 Bern Anderson, “The Naval Strategy of the Civil War,” Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 1962), p. 12.  71 Jay W. Simson, Naval Strategies of the Civil War: Confederate Innovations and Federal Opportunism (Nashville, TN: Cumberland House Publishing Inc., 2001), p. 135.  72 Stephen W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application (London: Collins, 2nd ed., 1981), p. 41.  73 Graham, Empire, p. 63.  74 Graham, Empire, p. 63.  75 Kappa, “Strategy,” pp. 633–634.  76 Kappa, “Strategy,” pp. 634–635.  77 Cobb, Preparing for Blockade, p. 84.  78 Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories, Selections translated and edited with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 348–349.  79 Cited in Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 89.  80 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 89.  81 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 85.  82 Ivan Musicant, Divided Waters: The Naval History of the Civil War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p.  325; Spencer C. Tucker, “CSS Alabama and Confederate Commerce Raiders during the U.S. Civil War,” in Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine, eds., Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Paper # 40, 2013), p. 73. 

242   Destroying military-economic potential at sea   83   84   85   86

Tucker, “CSS Alabama,” p. 74.  Tucker, “CSS Alabama,” p. 86.  Tucker, “CSS Alabama,” p. 86.  H.W. Wilson, Battleships in Action, Vol. 1 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd, 1926/Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprinted 1969), p. 36.    87 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 152.    88 Tucker, “CSS Alabama,” p. 86.    89 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 152.    90 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 162.    91 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” pp. 99–100.    92 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 163.    93 Anderson, “Naval Strategy of the Civil War,” p. 18.    94 Olivier, “Two Sides of the Same Coin,” p. 95.    95 Chack, “German Strategy in the Distant Seas,” p. 503.    96 Paul Schmalenbach, German Raiders: A History of Auxiliary Cruisers of the German Navy 1895–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977), p. 24.    97 Chack, “German Strategy in the Distant Seas,” pp. 504–505.    98 Schmalenbach, German Raiders, p. 15.    99 Schmalenbach, German Raiders, p. 15.  100 Schmalenbach, German Raiders, p. 137–138.  101 Roskill, Strategy of Sea Power, p. 41.  102 Herbert Richmond, Naval Warfare (London: Ernest Benn, 1930), p. 67.  103 Silvia Marzagalli, “Napoleon’s Continental Blockade: An Effective Substitute to Naval Weakness?” in Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine, eds., Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counterstrategies, 1805–2005 (London/New York; Routledge, 2006), p. 25.  104 Marzagalli, “Napoleon’s Continental Blockade,” 27.  105 Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare,” p. 93.  106 Marzagalli, “Napoleon’s Continental Blockade,” pp. 29–30.  107 Cited in Marzagalli, “Napoleon’s Continental blockade,” pp. 28–29.  108 Charles Ernest Fayle, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Seaborne Trade, Vol. I: The Cruiser Period (London: The Imperial War Museum, Department of Printed Books in Association with the Battery Press, Nashville, TN, originally published, 1920, reprinted 1997), p. 4.  109 Fayle, History of the Great War, Vol. I, p. 4.  110 Specifically, Britain imported some 70 percent cereals, 40 percent of meat; 64.5 percent butter; 80 percent of cheese; 50 percent of eggs; 49.5 percent margarine; 36 percent vegetable (other than potatoes), 73 percent of fruits, and 100 percent of sugar; cited in Fayle, History of the Great War, Vol. I, p. 3.  111 Fayle, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Seaborne Trade, Vol. I, p. 6.  112 Fayle, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Seaborne Trade, Vol. I, p. 5.  113 From “understanding,” or “agreement” in French; it was an alliance among France, Russia, and Great Britain. This alliance was supplemented by agreements with Belgium, Japan, Greece, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, and Japan plus the Czechoslovak Legion. The United States became one of the Entente’s associated powers after its entry into the war in May 1917.  114 Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport, RI: Newport Paper # 16, Naval War College Press, March 2000), p. 6.  115 Jan S. Breemer, Defeating the U-­boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper # 36 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), p. 38. 

Destroying military-economic potential at sea   243 116 Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), p. 9.  117 Breemer, Defeating the U-­boat, p. 62.  118 John Terraine, The U-­Boat Wars 1916–1945 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1989), pp. 119, 141–142.  119 R.H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002, first published 1931 by Constable & Co. Ltd. in 1931), p. 333.  120 Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 351.  121 John Terraine, U-­Boat Wars 1916–1945, pp. 119, 141–142.  122 J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 2: September 1939–June 1941 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), p. 81.  123 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, p. 137.  124 Ruge, Der Seekrieg: The German Navy’s Story 1939–1945 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 49–50.  125 Ruge, Der Seekrieg, p. 155.  126 Bernd Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung bis zum Frühjahr 1941,” in Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, and Hans Umbreit, eds., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 2: Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1979), p. 345.  127 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” p. 348.  128 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” pp. 351–352.  129 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, p. 142.  130 Eric J. Grove, ed., The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945 (a revised edition of the Naval Staff History Volumes 1A [Text and Appendices] and 1B [Plans and Tables]) (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, The Navy Records Society, 1997), p. 221.  131 Schmalenbach, German Raiders, pp. 138–141.  132 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” pp. 351–352.  133 Volage, “The Disguised Commerce Raiders of World War II,” Naval Review, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (November 1951), p. 400.  134 Schmalenbach, German Raiders, pp. 138–141.  135 Grove, Defeat of the Enemy Attack, p. 225.  136 Volage, “Disguised Commerce Raiders,” p. 400.  137 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, pp. 136–137.  138 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” p. 353.  139 Ruge, Der Seekrieg, p. 163.  140 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” p.  355; Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, pp. 143–144.  141 Ruge, Der Seekrieg, p. 164.  142 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” pp. 356–357.  143 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” p.  358; Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea, Vol. I: The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), p. 550.  144 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, p. 145.  145 Stegemann, “Die zweite Phase der Seekriegführung,” p. 358.  146 Gerhard Bidlingsmaier, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten im ozeanischen Zufuhrkrieg. Strategische Konzeption und Führungsweise der Seekriegsgeltung, September 1939–Februar 1942 (Neckargemünd: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1963), p. 156.  147 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 2, p. 263.  148 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, pp. 145–146.  149 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 2, p. 258.  150 Raeder, Mein Leben, Vol. 2, p. 271. 

244   Destroying military-economic potential at sea 151 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 2: 1st June 1944–14th August 1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), p. 479. 152 Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, p. 137.  153 Versorgungschiffe für nächste Atlantikoperation,” I SKL-­Teil CIIb: Westraum-­ Atlantikküste-Flottenoperationen, Januar 1941–Dezember 1941KTB Tel C Iib Bd 1 20.1–23.12 1941, RM 7/132, BA-­MA, p. 36.  154 Annex “Unternehmung der Kampfgruppe ‘Bismarck’ zum Handelskrieg im Atlantik,” I SKL Teil CVII: Überlegungen des Chefs der SKL und Niederschriften über Vorträge unde Besprechungen beim Führer, Januar 1941–December 1941, RM 7/182, BA-­MA, p. 135.  155 Jochen Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck (Herford: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 4th improved and enlarged ed., 1960), p. 41.  156 Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, Seekriegsleitung, B.Nr. 1.Skl. I a 1078/41 op Chefs, “Flottenoperationen, Versorgungen in See, Ohne unmittlebarem Vorgang,” June 30, 1941, RM 7/132, BA-­MA, p. 92.  157 Appendix ZZ, Table II: “Merchant Ships Losses Due to Enemy Action by Theatres,” Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 479.  158 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 305.  159 Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 269.  160 William L. Dowdy, “Naval Warfare in the Gulf: Iraq versus Iran,” Proceedings, 6 (June 1981), pp. 115–116.  161 Martin S. Navias and E.R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran–Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988 (London/New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), pp. 32, 44.  162 Navias and Hooton, Tanker Wars, p. 28.  163 Friedrich Ruge, Sea Warfare 1939–1945: A German Viewpoint, translated by M.G. Saunders (London: Cassell, 1957), p. 13.  164 Gerhard Freiherr von Ledebur, Die Seemine (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1977), p. 185.  165 Thomas H. Robbins, The Employment of Naval Mines (Newport, RI: staff presentation Naval War College, March 20, 1939), p. 14.  166 Schmalenbach, German Raiders, p. 140.  167 Cited in Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 72.  168 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War At Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, The Offensive, Part 2: 1st June 1944–14th August 1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), p. 479.  169 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea, Vol. II. The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 261.  170 Kappa, “Strategy,” p. 634.  171 Jasjit Singh, “Iran–Iraq War” Strategic Analysis, August 1985, p. 487.  172 Roskill, War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. II, p. 261.  173 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security 1984–87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (London: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1987), p. 68.

9 Attack on the enemy’s coast 

A weaker but offensively minded side at sea would carry out sporadic and mostly small-­scale attacks against selected enemy targets on the coast. In its essence, attack on the enemy coast is partially related to the efforts to weaken a stronger enemy’s naval strength over time. Attack on the enemy coast is also one of the methods of active fleet-­in-being. In operational terms, attack on the enemy coast by a stronger side is an integral part of exercising (or exploiting) sea control, while for a weaker side such attacks are part of disputing control of the sea. A weaker side would generally face considerable difficulties in carrying out diverse attacks on a strongly defended enemy coast.  The main objectives in conducting attack on the enemy’s coast are destruction/ neutralization of enemy surface ships/submarines and merchant vessels singly or in groups at their bases/ports, naval/military facilities/installations, civilian infrastructure, and important military-­economic centers deep into the enemy’s territory. The ultimate objectives of these actions are to force a stronger side to commit larger forces in defense of a vulnerable part of its coast and thereby disperse its available naval strength. An attack on the enemy coast by supporting forces might be a part of a deception either to facilitate attack against a more important objective or to lure the enemy’s fleet to engage one’s superior forces. In some cases, the primary purpose of these attacks could be predominantly psychological – raising the morale of one’s forces and depressing the morale of the enemy population living in the coastal area. In planning and execution, great care should be taken that each action against the enemy coast directly or indirectly contributes to the overall operational objective in a given theater.  The main methods of combat employment of one’s naval forces in attacking the enemy’s coast are attacks, strikes, and raids. These actions are conducted primary by naval forces. However, in many cases land-­based aircraft may take place in such actions. Attacks on the coast are conducted from the sea surface, subsurface, and the air. In some cases, such attacks can be conducted from land by using medium- or short-­range ballistic missiles (MRBMs/SRBMs) or long-­ range ASCMs/LACMs. Generally, attacks on the coast by a weaker side are risky because its forces often operate within the effective range of the enemy’s defenses. Hence, the attacker should approach the objective area covertly and carry out the strikes or a raid, followed by a quick withdrawal from the area. To

246   Attack on the enemy’s coast have any lasting effect, attacks on the enemy coast should be conducted often and at high intensity.  A weaker side would use surface ships, land-­based aircraft, submarines and special forces in carrying out surprise and small-­scale attacks on the enemy ports. Such attacks would rarely lead to decisive results. The exception is raids resulting in the sinking of or heavy damage to the enemy’s large surface combatants. However, if conducted often and over a large area, they might force the stronger side to reinforce the defense of some important ports. Perhaps their greatest value is to create a sense of ever-­present danger for the enemy’s populace in the coastal area.  Since ancient times, surface ships have often conducted attacks or raids aimed at destroying or damaging enemy naval and commercial ships in their bases/ ports and anchorages. In the past, the principal forces were surface ships. For example, the increasing rivalry with Spain in the 1580s led the English queen Elizabeth I to allow the use of privateers in attacking poorly defended Spanish colonial possessions. On September 14, 1585, privateer Francis Drake left England to attack Spanish possessions in the West Indies. He captured Havana but then withdrew. His first expedition failed.1 After returning to England in the summer of 1586, Drake started almost immediately to prepare another expedition. The British learned about large Spanish preparations for invasion in many Spanish ports after Mary Stuart was executed in February 1587.2 The biggest Spanish weakness was that the Armada was fitted out in sixteen ports. Initially the Spanish ships sailed in small groups to join other ships at some place such as Lisbon which was the largest and most strongly defended port. Drake chose a position near Lisbon with a fleet of few ships but greatly superior to the Spaniards in gun power. He was able to prevent Spanish concentration by snapping each squadron as it arrived.3  Land-­based and/or carrier-­based aircraft are the most effective platforms for conducting attacks, strikes, and raids. For example, in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. fast carrier groups conducted a series of attacks on the enemy strongholds in the central and south Pacific. In mid-­February 1942, Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), temporarily transferred Task Force 11 (TF 11), based on the carrier USS Lexington, to Admiral Herbert F. Leary, commander of the ANZAC (Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) Area. Leary’s ANZAC Squadron (composed of cruisers/ destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral John G. Crace, Royal Navy), together with the commander of TF 11 U.S. Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, was directed, along with the U.S. B-­17 heavy bombers based at Townsville, northeastern Australia, to strike the Japanese naval and air base at Rabaul, New Britain.4  On February 20, TF 11 reached a point about 350 miles south of Rabaul, where Japanese land-­based aircraft detected it. In the ensuing aerial encounters the Japanese lost eighteen aircraft and the Americans only two.5 However, the element of surprise had been lost, and hence the carrier attack on Rabaul was abandoned.6 A major effect of this aborted raid was that Admiral Shigeyoshi

Attack on the enemy’s coast   247 Inoue, commander of the Fourth Fleet at Truk (Chuuk today), central Carolines, delayed invasion of Lae-­Salamaua, New Guinea (SR operation) until March 8.7  On March 7, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPac), received information from Admiral Leary that an enemy convoy of one cruiser and several destroyers and transports had been sighted off Buna. The next day, Leary informed Nimitz that an enemy force of eleven warships, including four cruisers or destroyers, had started shelling Salamaua and Lae in the early morning, followed by a landing. Also, searches conducted by the Royal Australian Air Force revealed that only three transports were at Rabaul and no ships were at Gasmata (on the southern coast of New Britain). Yet on the previous day twenty-­eight ships had been sighted at Rabaul.8  Nimitz reacted quickly and directed TF 11 with two carriers (Yorktown, Lexington) to join in the Gulf of Papua and attack the enemy ships at Salamaua and Lae. An attack against the Japanese forces from the position eastward of Salamaua and Lae would not ensure surprise, because these waters were patrolled by enemy ships. The position in the Gulf of Papua also offered more security from the repeated attacks by enemy aircraft at Rabaul and Gasmata (southern coast of New Britain). It additionally would allow a lower speed of approach and withdrawal for aircraft and thereby preserve fuel. A major disadvantage of the attack from the Gulf of Papua was that the carrier aircraft had to fly some hundred miles over poorly charted terrain and high mountain ranges often obscured by clouds.9  The plan also envisaged that a special group of four heavy cruisers and four destroyers under Admiral Crace, would remain in the vicinity of Rossel Island (the easternmost island of the Louisiades) to cover carrier operations in the Gulf of Papua – and intercept any enemy surface force striking at Port Moresby – and to cover the arrival of the Allied troops in New Caledonia.10  On March 10, some 104 Allied aircraft attacked Japanese shipping in the Huon Gulf from a position about 50 miles southwest of Port Moresby.11 The Allied aircraft achieved complete surprise by approaching through the 7,500-foot pass over the Owen Stanley Range.12 Japanese sources cited losses as four transports sunk, three ships damaged moderately and three lightly, eleven fighter aircraft lost, and 130 men killed and 245 wounded. Among damaged ships were one seaplane tender, two light cruisers, and one destroyer.13 Allied postwar sources claim much larger Japanese losses: thirteen out of eighteen transports sunk or damaged, of which several had to return to Japan for repairs.14 About 400 Japanese were killed in the attack.15 The losses in shipping could not be replaced quickly. That was one reason that Admiral Inoue postponed the Port Moresby–Solomons operation for a month; another reason was the increased Allied air strength over New Guinea.16  A weaker side has often used unconventional platforms to attack enemy warships and merchant vessels singly or in groups at their bases/ports and various facilities/installations. They were conducted by using primitive submersibles, midget submarines, one- or two-­manned torpedoes, fast torpedo boats, and explosive boats. Such forces were specially selected and highly trained. Most of

248   Attack on the enemy’s coast these attacks did not have a major impact on the stronger side. However, even if the attacks were unsuccessful they forced the stronger side to provide more forces for the defense of bases/ports. They also generally had a negative effect on the enemy’s morale.  The first example of an attack by using a submersible was during the American War for Independence on August 13, 1777. Then an American inventor, and native of Connecticut, used his primitive submersible, called “Turtle,” and, loaded with powder, attacked the 28-gun British frigate Cerberus maintaining a blockade of New London, Connecticut. This attack failed to inflict damage on the Cerberus because the British sailors detected the devices in time. However, one mine exploded on board a nearby schooner which sank almost immediately.17 Another attack was against a British ship at Niantic Bay, Connecticut, in 1778. The Turtle twice penetrated the New York harbor but failed to put any explosive charge under the British naval vessels.18 During the American Civil War, the Confederate submarine Hunley sank the Union corvette Housatonic off Charleston.19  The Italian Navy was one of the pioneers in using unconventional craft in attacking enemy ships at naval bases/ports. During World War I, the Italians developed small and fast torpedo boats (MAS). One of the first attacks was on the Austrian main naval base Pola in the night of November 1/2, 1916. Then, one torpedo boat and one MAS were escorted by a destroyer as far as Fasana Channel (west of Pola). The torpedo boat and MAS were able to penetrate the harbor through a gap in the wire barricade. The MAS fired two torpedoes, hitting the barracks ship (an obsolete battleship). However, none of the torpedoes exploded. Both Italian boats left the port, escorted by four destroyers. In another attack on the night of December 9/10, 1917 two torpedo boats towing two MAS left Venice in the direction of Trieste (then part of Austria–Hungary). Some 10 miles off Trieste, the MAS were dropped off. In the early morning on December 10, one MAS penetrated the harbor and fired two torpedoes. One torpedo hit, heavily damaged, and sank the battleship Wien. Torpedoes fired by the other MAS exploded prematurely. Both MAS left port and safely returned to Venice.20  On February 10, 1918, the Italian MAS attacked merchant ships at the Austro­Hungarian port of Buccari (Bakar today). Three MAS escorted by two destroyers successfully penetrated the harbor. All three of them fired torpedoes but none of the six torpedoes scored a hit. Most of them were entangled in the nets. All MAS taking part in the attack safely returned to their home base.21  The Italian Navy renewed its interest in using “assault means” (mezzi d’assalto) in 1935. By 1940, the Italians had developed several types of manned torpedoes. The best known was the SLC (siluro a lenta corsa – “slow-­running torpedo,” also called “Maiale” – “Pig”). They also designed two types of the 32-knot “modified tourist motor boats” (MTM – “motoscafo turismo modificato,” also called “Barchini”).22 The nucleus of these forces was organized as the 1st Flotilla MAS at La Spezia in July 1939.23 In 1940, the Italians tried to find a way to bring SLCs into the proximity of an enemy base. The solution found was to use a conventional submarine to carry on board cylinders for two or three SLCs.24 

Attack on the enemy’s coast   249 All naval special forces were organized in the 10th MAS Flotilla (X Decima MAS) led by commander Junio Valerio Borghese on March 15, 1941. Surface and subsurface attack craft were organized in two separate sections. The new flotillas also operated a school for divers at Leghorn and a school for “torpedo pilots” at Bocca di Serchio.25  In 1940–1943, the Italian special forces conducted a relatively large number of attacks and raids against the British naval bases at Gibraltar, La Valetta (Malta), Soudha Bay (Crete), and Alexandria. Only a small number of these attacks were aimed against enemy naval vessels. Most attacks were conducted against Gibraltar (eight), Alexandria (four), and Malta (two).26 Several attacks were conducted against ports in North Africa and also in the Black Sea. The 10th Flotilla MAS was probably the most successful unit of the Italian Navy in World War II. It was credited with the sinking of 312,983 tons of warships and merchant ships.27  The planned attack on Gibraltar in the night of September 29/30, 1940 (operation B.G. 1) was aborted when the parent submarine (Sciré) was only some 50 miles away from Gibraltar. The reason was that the Italian high naval command (Supermarina) learned that the British Force H had left the base.28 A second attack on Gibraltar planned for October 28/29, 1940 (operation B.G. 2) also ended in failure.29 In another attack planned for May 25/26, 1941 (operation B.G. 3), all three teams lost their SLCs.30 In the next attack on Gibraltar on September 20, 1941 (operation B.G. 4), the Italian SLCs were more successful. They sank two tankers (2,445-ton Fiona Shell and 8,145-ton Denhydale) and heavily damaged an armed merchant vessel (10,893-ton Durham).31 In 1942, the Italians carried out two attacks on Gibraltar. In the attack on July 14 they sank three British steamers (1,569 tons, 1,495 tons and 3,900 tons).32 In the attack on September 15, the Italians sank one 1,887-ton British steamship.33 In an attack on May 8, 1943, the Italians sank three British steamers (7,190 tons, 7,540 tons and 4,875 tons). And in the last attack, on August 6, 1943, they sank one British 5,975-ton steamship and one 9,944-ton Norwegian tanker.34  One of the most successful attacks was on the British base at Soudha Bay, Crete. The attack was originally planned for January or February 1941.35 On March 25, 1941, two destroyers (Crispi, Sella) carrying six explosive boats (MT – “motoscafi turismo”) sailed out from Stampalia (Astipaleia today), Dodecanese islands. The plan was that the destroyers would launch the explosive boats some 10 miles from the entrance of Soudha Bay. The latest information indicated the presence of only one cruiser and eight transports. However, by the time the operation started more ships were at Soudha Bay. They included one large cruiser (Gloucester), one small AA cruiser (Calcutta), one destroyer (Hasty), two support ships (Cherryleat, Dountana) and three tankers (Desmoulen, Marie Maersk, Pericles).36 The cruiser York arrived at 1400 on March 25. The attack started at 0500 just before dawn on March 26. Two MTs attacked the 9,000-ton York while the remaining MTs attacked the tanker Pericles.37 They sank both the York and Pericles.38 

250   Attack on the enemy’s coast The Italians also selected the main British naval base at Alexandria for attacks by the 10th Flotilla MAS. The first attack on Alexandria planned for the night of August 29/30, 1940 (operation G.A. 1) failed because the parent submarine (Irida) was sunk by a British aircraft.39 The second attempt to attack Alexandria planned for September 28/29, 1940 (operation G.A. 2) also failed because the British fleet left for Tobruk. The parent submarine (Gondar) was subsequently sunk by a British destroyer.40  The most successful was the attack on Alexandria on December 19, 1941 (operation G.A. 3). It was carried out by the submarine Sciré carrying three SLCs. The Italians knew that the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were in harbor. They were the main objective of the attack. A secondary objective was to set the fuel depot on fire.41 British intelligence picked up the information about the pending operation against Alexandria. Admiral Cunningham warned the fleet that an attack from the air, or by boats or human torpedoes, might be expected in calm weather.42 Nevertheless, three SLCs penetrated the harbor and planted limpet mines that eventually sank two battleships (the 33,260-ton Queen Elizabeth and the 32,590-ton Valiant), one 2,400-ton destroyer Jarvis, and one 7,550-ton tanker.43 This action led to a dramatic, although temporary, change of the operational situation in the Mediterranean. The British had only three light cruisers left in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Because of the entrance of Japan into the war, no additional battleships or aircraft carriers were available. Fortunately for the British, because the battleships did not capsize, about two months passed before the Italians realized what their combat swimmers had accomplished.44  Another Italian attack with explosive boats was planned for late June 1941. On May 25 and in the night May 27/28, the MAS carried reconnaissance of La Valetta. At sunset on June 28, a force of eight MTs and one MT towed by MAS headed for La Valetta. They encountered bad weather. One MT was damaged and sent back to Augusta. Because of the severe weather and engine malfunctions the entire attack was aborted. The groups returned to Augusta.45  In a new attempt planned for the night of July 25/26, 1941 (operation Malta-­2), the SLCs were transported by “slow tourist boats” or MTL (“motoscafo turismo lento”). In support was one 32-knot sloop. Two MAS escorted and towed the MTLs. The Italian air force carried out night bombing. The fighter aircraft would cover the withdrawal of the attacking force. The planned date for the attack was July 26, 1941.46 The attack on La Valetta was unsuccessful because of the heavy British defenses. The Italian losses were sixteen men killed in action and eighteen men taken prisoner.47  After the Allied invasion of North Africa, the 10th Flotilla MAS carried out an attack on the port of Algiers on December 12, 1942. They sank four steamships (of 7,174 tons, 1,490 tons, 4,590 tons, and 7,041 tons) and one U.S. military transport (7,190 tons).48  The Italians also operated in the Black Sea. On June 26, 1942, they attacked the port of Sevastopol, then under German siege, and sank one 13,000-ton Soviet transport, one 3,000-ton freighter, one 840-ton Srednyaya-­class submarine (S-­32), and one 577-ton Schuka-­class (Sch-­306) submarine.49 

Attack on the enemy’s coast   251 The Japanese Navy tried using the Kaitens in attacking Allied ships in their bases.50 The Kaitens were used for the first time in the attack on the Allied ships at the Ulithi Atoll in the western Carolines (dubbed GEN operation). Three parent submarines (I-­36, I-­47, I-­37) sortied out from Ṓtsujima island on November 8, 1944.51 Each carried four manned torpedoes on deck. The parent submarines approached the entrance of the Ulithi Atoll in the early hours of November 20. The anchorage’s gate had not been not closed after three cruisers and four destroyers left for Saipan.52 One parent submarine launched one Kaiten and another submarine launched four Kaitens. The 25,425-ton oiler Mississinewa (AO-59) was hit and blown up. The defenders detected some of the Kaitens and attacked them. However, both parent submarines (I-­36, I-­47) escaped the attack and returned to their home base.53 The third submarine (I-­37) proceeded to Palau. It was detected at the western entrance of the Kossol Passage and was sunk by two U.S. destroyer escorts before it launched its Kaitens.54  The second GEN operation envisaged employment of six parent submarines against several Allied bases in the Pacific. Specifically, two (I-­36, I-­48) would attack Ulithi Atoll; one (I-­36), Hollandia; one (I-­53), Palau; one (I-­56), the Seadler Harbor, Manus; and one (I-­58), Guam. All parent submarines sortied from the Inland Sea in December 1944. The day of the attack (X-­Day) was January 12, 1945. Ulithi Atoll was attacked by four Kaitens; four explosions were heard. Four Kaitens were also fired against anchorage in Hollandia, and flames were sighted. At Palau, three Kaitens were launched; one blew accidentally, and two explosions were heard. The submarine (I-­56) off Seadler Harbor was unable to launch Kaitens because of the presence of the strong enemy forces. Another submarine (I-­58) launched four Kaitens near Apra harbor, Guam and saw black smoke from two separate attacks. The sixth parent submarine (I-­48) headed for Ulithi but its sortie was delayed until January 9. It never reached Ulithi. It was sunk by enemy ships on January 22.55 Despite great efforts, these attacks inflicted little damage and no Allied ships were sunk.56 The Sixth Fleet (Submarines) Headquarters exaggerated the successes of the Kaitens. It claimed that eighteen enemy ships were sunk including one converted aircraft carrier, nine large transport ships, one oil tanker, one cruiser, and six other large ships.57  Few submarines were available to oppose the Allied invasion of Iwo Jima on February 19, 1945. Admiral Shigeyoshi Miwa (1892–1959), commander of the Sixth Fleet (Submarines), ordered four submarines to sortie out from the Inland Sea to attack Allied forces off Iwo Jima. Between February 20 and 23, one Ro-­class submarine and three Kaitens parent submarines (one carrying four and two carrying five Kaitens each) were involved. Only one submarine (Ro-­43) was able to launch an attack, with conventional torpedoes, damaging one enemy destroyer on February 21, according to Japanese records. All submarines carrying Kaitens failed to launch any of them. Two of these submarines were sunk. The fourth parent submarine of this group also failed to launch Kaitens. The entire operation was canceled on March 6 because of strong enemy anti-­ submarine defenses.58 

252   Attack on the enemy’s coast After 1945, naval special forces were used on several occasions in attacking enemy ships in ports or naval bases. For example, on the first night of the Six-­ Day War (June 5, 1967) two Israeli frogmen teams were transported by a submarine and put ashore, one team at Port Said (a major Egyptian port), and the other at Alexandria. The Israelis assumed that the Egyptians had four missile craft and three anti-­submarine-warfare craft (in fact, frigates) at Port Said. The small group of Israeli frogmen penetrated the harbor but were unable to locate any of the ships for which they were looking. They discovered two tankers, but these were not attacked, the Israeli explanation being that the ensuing explosion would have killed many civilians. So, the frogmen returned without anything being accomplished. The other team of six frogmen was transported by a submarine to a point just south of the Ras el Tin naval base at Alexandria and successfully penetrated the anchorage, where they reportedly sank a number of ships, including one Osa-­class missile craft. The Egyptians claimed that in the attacks a dry dock and one small ship were damaged slightly. Eventually all six frogmen were captured by the Egyptians. The results for the Israelis were disappointing. However, the Egyptians, fearing another attack, on June 6 evacuated Port Said and moved their ships to Alexandria.59  During the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War in October 1973, the Israeli frogmen penetrated Port Said. In the Gulf of Suez, patrol craft penetrated two Egyptian anchorages and entered the main port of Adabia. In the northern part of the Red Sea, the Israeli naval commandos penetrated the Port of Hurghada and destroyed, with no loss to themselves, two of the four Egyptian Komar-­class missile craft deployed in the Red Sea. They also destroyed a jetty inside the harbor. These attacks forced the Egyptians to remove their remaining missile craft from the base and that strengthened the Israeli Navy’s control of the Red Sea.60  A weaker side has often resorted to bombardments of military and civilian facilities/installations on the enemy coast. In the past, surface ships were often used to attack a civilian residential area and thereby create fear and lower the morale of the population in the coastal area. In some cases, bombardments were used as a tactical diversion to enhance the success of some other action such as minelaying. Attacks on the enemy coast were also aimed at forcing the enemy to fragment its available naval strength by redeploying forces in the threatened area. In some cases, they could even lead to a strategic redistribution of enemy naval forces.  During World War I, the Germans conducted several relatively large raids on the British east coast. For example, four German battle cruisers bombarded Yarmouth on the Norfolk coast on November 3, 1914. The raid was considered by the British as a diversion. Indeed, the Germans used coastal bombardment as cover for minelaying by other forces.61  The Germans carried out a larger raid on the ports of Scarborough and Hartlepool on Yorkshire’s coast in December 1914. The German plan was to take advantage of the absence of two British battle cruisers (Invincible, Inflex­ ible) and bombard these two cities at daylight on December 16. At the same time one light cruiser (Kolberg) would lay mines off Filey. The remaining three ships

Attack on the enemy’s coast   253 of the Scouting Division and two destroyer flotillas would be employed for scouting and screening duties. The battle fleet would provide support to the Scouting Division. It would be in a position about half way across the North Sea at daylight. Yet the planned foray was clearly contrary to the emperor’s orders to avoid battle action. Admiral Pohl hoped that the raid would lure part of the Grand Fleet from the north to run over the newly laid minefield. The reason for this foray was to raise the morale of the German battle fleet which was passive in the first few months after the beginning of the war.62  At about 0300 on December 15, Admiral Hipper left Jade Bay with his 1st Scouting Division composed of four battle cruisers (Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann, Derfflinger) and one heavy cruiser (Blücher). He also commanded 2nd Scouting Division, which was composed of light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas. The battle fleet at Cuxhaven sortied out about 1500 the same day and the entire force was joined north of Heligoland.63  As planned, at about 0800 on December 16, 1914, two German battle cruisers (Von der Tann, Derfflinger) and one light cruiser appeared off Scarborough. They opened fire on the coastguard station and some empty barracks. At one point they were only 1 mile from the coast.64 The German ships also heavily bombarded Falsgrave – a suburb of the town – and its wireless station. They did not inflict any damage except to the neighborhood. The remaining force of two battle cruisers (Seydlitz, Moltke) plus one heavy cruiser (Blücher) bombarded Scarborough. One part of this force turned northward for Hartlepool, which was defended by 6-inch coastal guns.65 They opened fire on Hartlepool. The British coastal gun batteries did some damage to one battle cruiser (Moltke) and the heavy cruiser (Blücher). They had to withdraw because of the damage. However, the British civilian casualties were heavy: 86 killed and 424 wounded. The business area of Hartlepool was seriously damaged.66  After the northern group of the German ships had completed bombardment of Scarborough they steamed north. Two German battle cruisers (Derfflinger, Von der Tann) bombarded the undefended port of Whitby.67 At that time the British had in the southern part of the North Sea the 5th Battle Squadron, two destroyer flotillas at Harwich, and two new light cruisers (Arethusa class), plus one scouting cruiser (Fearless).68  The British Grand Fleet reacted strongly to the German raid on the Yorkshire coast. The British Admiralty directed concentration of the Harwich force and the Grand Fleet.69 The Grand Fleet’s battle squadrons headed at high speed toward Scarborough. At some point the opposing battle cruisers were only some 150 miles apart or three hours of sailing time.70 Yet the German battle cruisers skillfully got away.71  Admiral Jellicoe was at sea. With his two remaining battle squadrons he planned joining forces between Aberdeen and the Skagerrak. After learning that the enemy force had got away he ordered his whole fleet to meet at daybreak. This concentration took place as planned. But after sailing some 50 miles toward the German Bight, Jellicoe was informed by the Admiralty that radio traffic indicated that the High Seas Fleet had returned to its bases. After spending several

254   Attack on the enemy’s coast hours in tactical exercises, Jellicoe sailed northward toward Scapa and dispersed the squadrons to their stations.72  The British were profoundly disappointed with the results of their foray. Two of the most effective British battle squadrons and an adequate number of scouting ships operating in a limited sea area had failed to bring to action an enemy who was operating in close conformity with the British estimate of the situation – and, the British had already had contact with the enemy advanced screen.73  The news that a German squadron had bombarded the east coast with impunity aroused the British population as never before in the war.74 The Admiralty acknowledged that it was impossible to provide absolute security against occasional enemy raids against Britain’s coast. Reportedly, the German true objective was to fragment the Grand Fleet’s strength. Admiral Fisher had evidence (from an Italian officer in Berlin) that the German idea was “that these raids will greatly demoralize us and cause us to risk our ships and divide them up….”75 Yet the Admiralty did not radically change its dispositions – except to alleviate public anger. Admiral Beatty argued for many weeks to redeploy his battle cruisers from Cromarty to Rosyth or the Humber so as to reduce the distance to the enemy bases. This, in turn, would improve the chance of intercepting enemy forces. On December 20, 1914, the Admiralty finally approved Admiral Beatty’s request to move his battle cruisers and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Rosyth as their permanent base. This transfer was made on December 21. Beatty’s battle cruiser squadron joined the 3rd Battle Squadron and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Rosyth.76  After Admiral Reinhard Scheer took over command of the High Seas Fleet, he initiated a bolder approach. His predecessor had made only five forays with the High Seas Fleet in 1915. None of them was further than 120 miles from Heligoland. Even Pohl acknowledged that none of these forays was effective. Scheer’s staff prepared in February 1916 a memorandum entitled “Guiding Principles for Sea Warfare in the North Sea.” The key points in that document were: (1) the existing ratio of strength ruled out the High Seas Fleet seeking a decisive encounter; (2) systematic and constant pressure must be exerted on the British fleet to force it to give up its waiting attitude and send some of its forces against the German fleet; and (3) the German pressure should take the form of U-­boat warfare against commerce, mine warfare, attacks on the British–Scandinavian trade, aerial warfare, and the active employment of the High Seas Fleet.77  On March 5–6, 1916, Admiral Scheer took the major part of the High Seas Fleet out of the German Bight for the first large foray. He sailed south to a position at Texel at the latitude of Lowestoft – the furthest south the High Seas Fleet ever sailed in the war. The objective was to engage and destroy any British light forces sent to chase away the Zeppelins as they were sent ahead to bomb targets on England’s coast. The only result of this foray was a few enemy ships sunk by U-­boats operating off Lowestoft. The combined force of the Grand Fleet was out but there was no contact.78 Scheer’s second sortie was a raid on Lowestoft on April 25, 1916. His probable objective was a sudden bombardment followed by a quick withdrawal

Attack on the enemy’s coast   255 before encountering superior enemy forces. This demonstration would coincide with the German support of the Irish nationalists for Easter Sunday. At about noon on April 24, the High Seas Fleet sortied out from Jade Bay. The German battle cruisers were led by Admiral Friedrich Boedicker (1866–1944) (he replaced the ailing Hipper). The British Admiralty was aware of the departure of the High Seas Fleet but did not know what its objective was. Things became clearer after an intercepted enemy radio signal indicated that the objective was Yarmouth. At 1550, the entire Grand Fleet was directed to be in readiness to sortie out at two hours’ notice. At 1905 it sortied out. By 2400 on April 24, the battle fleet and battle cruisers were steaming south. Soon afterward, the Harwich force of three light cruisers and eighteen destroyers proceeded along the coast (twelve destroyers from the same force were sent on April 22 to operate off Flanders’ coast).79  At 0130 on April 25, four battle cruisers of the 1st Scouting Division (the fifth battle cruiser, Seydlitz, struck a mine near Nordernay Gap (East Frisian islands) and had to return to Jade Bay), screened by the 2nd Scouting Division (four light cruisers and two destroyers), took a position some 65 miles east of Lowestoft and then turned westward. Scheer and the battle fleet remained in support west of Terschelling (some 70 miles off the British coast). At 0350, Boedicker’s screen sighted the Harwich force. The British force maneuvered so as to entice the Germans away from Lowestoft. Yet the Germans decided to go ahead with their plan. At 0410, the German battle cruisers opened fire on Lowe­ stoft. After only 10 minutes, the Germans ceased firing and steamed northward. They destroyed some 200 houses but only a few people were killed. At 0442, the German battle cruiser opened fire on Yarmouth but only for a few minutes. Admiral Boedicker had a great opportunity to cut off and destroy the much weaker Harwich force. However, at 0455, Boedicker turned eastward and left the area. He was very concerned that a larger enemy force was in the area. At 0520, when his battle cruisers were only some 30 miles away from the enemy force, Scheer changed course and headed at high speed toward Jade Bay.80  The Lowestoft raid had some strategic consequences because it led to a redistribution of the Grand Fleet. The Admiralty intended to concentrate the Grand Fleet in the Forth, where the battle cruisers had been based since the end of 1914. With the exception of the Harwich force and local patrols there were no other forces in the south to oppose enemy raids, bombardments, or a surprise sweep along the east coast. The British battle fleet at Scapa Flow was too far away to bring the enemy to action.81 There was a lot of discussion about whether to move a major part of the fleet from Scapa Flow to Rosyth or the Firth of Forth. Finally, a decision was made on May 12, 1916 to develop the Firth of Forth as a primary base. Top priority was given to the outer defenses of the Forth. They were completed in 1917 and in April 1918 the battle squadrons moved to the Forth, which became the main base of the Grand Fleet.82  One of the largest attacks by a fleet against the enemy coast was the Austro-­ Hungarian Navy’s attack on the Italian eastern coast in the night of May 23/24, 1915. This attack was carried out shortly after the Italian declaration of war

256   Attack on the enemy’s coast against Austria–Hungary and Germany. Until May 1915, Italy was nominally allied with Germany and Austria–Hungary. However, Austria–Hungary always regarded Italy with suspicion because of Italy’s pretensions toward South Tyrol, Istria, and Dalmatia. The Austro-­Hungarian Navy was a weaker side in overall strength. Its major combatants included eighteen battleships and seven cruisers and scouting vessels. The Italian Navy had twenty-­three battleships and ten cruisers.83 However, the Austrians had superiority in the Adriatic because the Italians had to divide their fleet between two theaters.  The Austrians prepared an operation plan for an attack on Italy’s coast in case of war in May 1910 during the tenure of Admiral Rudolph Montecuccoli as the CINC of the Austro-­Hungarian Navy. Montecuccoli envisaged two variants of the plan. In the first option (Alternative I) naval forces and the army demolition team would destroy the railway tunnel at Pantelleone and the railway bridges over the rivers Savio and Fano. The raiding force would consist of three obsolete battleships (Monarch-­class), one large cruiser (K.u.K. Maria Theresia), one armored cruiser (Kaiser Franz Joseph), two small protected cruisers (Zenta-­ class), two destroyers (Huszár-class), and two high-­seas torpedo boats. Four steamers would carry eight companies plus one demolition team. The plan envisaged bombardment of the Italian torpedo stations at Porto Corsini, Rimini, and Pesaro by battleships. The cruisers would provide cover for landings, bombard Cattolica, and lay mines off Po Primera.84 The destroyers would land a small demolition party to destroy the railway bridge at Cesano, bombard the railway bridge over the Arzilla River, and lay mines off Senigallia. The high-­seas torpedo boats would land parties for demolition of the railway tracks at Fano-­ Pesaro and Riccione-­Rimini.85  The second option (Alternative II) was prepared for a situation when the large surface combatants would not be available. The raid against the Italian coastal railroad at Savio and Fiorenzuola would be conducted with only two steamers carrying landing parties and escorted with two destroyers.86  Plans for the attack on the Italian coast in May 1915 were considerably changed compared to those prepared in 1910. The Austrian objectives were to damage the Italian coastal railroad and thereby slow down the movement of the Italian troops to the front on the Isonzo River. Another objective was psychological – to adversely affect the morale of the Italian populace in the coastal area. The Austrians assumed that the Italians would have superiority in the northern Adriatic at the beginning of hostilities. Hence, a decision was made to employ almost the entire Austro-­Hungarian surface fleet.87  The plan for the attack on the Italian coast envisaged bombardments of the port of Corsini by one cruiser (Novara), one destroyer, and four torpedo boats. Rimini would be bombarded by one battleship (Sankt Georg) and three torpedo boats. Senigallia would be attacked by one battleship (Zrinyi) and three torpedo boats. The port of Ancona would be attacked by three (Battle) Ship Divisions (I, III, IV), one battleship (Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand), four destroyers, twenty torpedo boats, and three seaplanes. One battleship (Radetzky) and three torpedo boats would attack targets in the estuary of the Potenza River. In addition, the

Attack on the enemy’s coast   257 Austrians envisaged an attack on Venice by the seaplanes. They also established three scouting lines: Pedaso–Port Tajer with two cruisers (Szigetvár, Saida) and two destroyers; Pelagosa (Palagruža today)–Lagosta (Lastovo today) with one scout cruiser (Admiral Spaun) and three destroyers; and Pelagosa–Cape Gargano with one scout cruiser (Helgoland, Admiral Spaun) and three destroyers.88  The planners also prepared detailed plans to prevent a surprise Italian attack on the Austrian coast at the beginning of hostilities, on May 19. One scout cruiser (Helgoland) and four destroyers were deployed on the line Cape Gargano–Pelagosa island, while one scout cruiser (Admiral Spaun) with four destroyers were deployed on the line between Pelagosa and Lagosta. The Austrians also used the seaplanes to reconnoiter deployment of the Italian ships at their bases in the Adriatic. A group of torpedo boats was used to reconnoiter the port of Ancona while one U-­boat searched for mines. For protection of the port of Trieste from the Italian attack, the Austrians deployed two U-­boats in the Gulf of Trieste. One U-­boat was stationed off the island of Lissa and another U-­boat was deployed off the Montenegrin coast.89  The Austrians believed that the attack on the Italian coast could only be successful if surprise was achieved and it was carried out shortly after the declaration of war. By May 23, the Austro-­Hungarian Fleet was concentrated at Pola. The news of the breakup of relations between Italy and Austria–Hungary was learned in Pola 1600 on May 23.90 The operation started at 1900 when two cruisers (Szigetvár, Saida) and torpedo boats sortied from Pola. At 1930, the fleet commander shifted his flag to the battleship Habsburg. Other groups of ships sortied out from Pola.91 In the attack on Ancona, the Austrian ships fired torpedoes at the piers, and bombarded port facilities, the shipyard, barracks, aqueduct, and coastal batteries.92 The battleship Radetsky and two destroyers separated from the main body and shelled the railway some 20 miles south of Ancona.93 The battleship Viribus Unitis also took part in the attack. Ancona suffered heavy damage from the bombardment. Some sixty-­eight people were killed and 150 were wounded.94 The Austrians also used three seaplanes in their attack on Venice’s fortifications.95 The Sankt Georg and two destroyers attacked the railway line at Rimini.96 The battleship Zrinyi bombarded the railway station at Senigallia. A group of two cruisers (Saida, Szigetvár) and two destroyers shelled coastal targets between Pesaro and Porto Civitanova. Another group of two scout cruisers (Helgoland, Admiral Spaun) and eight destroyers sailed out from Sebenico and attacked targets near the ports of Vieste, Manfredonia and Barletta, and on the Tremiti Islands.97  After learning about the Austrian attacks, the Italian high naval command ordered large ships based at Brindisi to sortie out. The units of the V (Battle) Ship Division reached the latitude of Santa Maria de Leuca when they received information that the Austrian ships had left the Ancona area. Afterward, they returned to Brindisi.98  In the Adriatic, both the Austro-­Hungarians and the Italians avoided using their battle fleet. Because of its short distances, the Adriatic became a theater for the employment of torpedo units, submarines, minelayers and minesweepers, and seaplanes.99

258   Attack on the enemy’s coast The Austro-­Hungarian Cruiser Flotilla carried out a relatively large number of minor attacks on the Italian coast throughout the war. Most attacks were conducted against the Italian coastal railway line, train stations, and various government buildings. The U-­boats were increasingly used in support of such attacks. In most cases, attacking forces consisted of a group of two light cruisers and several destroyers and torpedo boats. These attacks were conducted only if there was some chance of success.100  For example, two scout cruisers (Novara, Admiral Spaun), four destroyers and torpedo boats each reconnoitered the sea area off Venice in the night of June 17/18, 1915 but did not encounter any Italian ships. They were not more than 10 nautical miles away from Venice. Both cruisers and one destroyer shelled the signal station in the Tagliamento River estuary. The next day, one armored cruiser (Sankt Georg) opened fire with heavy guns at the bridge over the harbor canal at Rimini. One light cruiser (Szigetvár), escorted by two torpedo boats, shelled a bridge at Fano and a signal station at Pesaro. Security for forces operating against the Italian coast was provided by two scout cruisers (Saida, Helgoland), three destroyers, and four torpedo boats near the island of Sestrice , Curzola (Korčula today) archipelago.101  On July 23, 1915, the 1st Torpedo Flotilla attacked a 100-mile long stretch of the Italian coast from the Aso River to Campomarino. One scout cruiser (Saida) and two destroyers shelled the railway bridge over the rivers Aso and Tenino plus bridges at Menochio and Egydio. One destroyer shelled the train station at San Benedetto and another destroyer shelled Grottamare. One scout cruiser (Helgoland) bombarded a train station at Ortona, while three destroyers fired on train stations at Campomarino and Termoli.102 Four days later, two scout cruisers (Novara, Admiral Spaun), and two destroyers and three torpedo boats, attacked the railway line from Ancona to Pesaro.103  In December 1915 and in the early 1916, the Austrian light forces based in the Bay of Cattaro were very active in supporting the Austrian army on the Albanian front. For example, on the night of December 4/5, 1915, one light cruiser (Novara), four destroyers and three torpedo boats sailed out from the Bay of Cattaro and proceeded to San Giovanni di Medua. Two other destroyers patrolled the Boyana River estuary. Two destroyers and torpedo boats each shelled the enemy port. The scout cruiser (Novara) had a duel with the coastal batteries. This action ended in the sinking of three enemy steamers and five sailing ships; five other smaller sailing ships were slightly damaged. On the way back to the Bay of Cattaro, the Austrian ships destroyed one grounded French submarine near the Boyana River estuary.104  In another example, in the morning of February 3, 1916, one armored cruiser (Sankt Georg), a scout cruiser (Helgoland), and a destroyer plus three torpedo boats shelled the train stations at Ortona and San Vito. They caused some damage and destroyed a railway bridge.105 On June 23, 1916 two destroyers based at Sebenico plus three seaplanes attacked military objects in Giulianova. In the early morning on August 1, 1916, two destroyers sailed from Cattaro and shelled, for about 38 minutes in the early morning of August 2, coastal

Attack on the enemy’s coast   259 installations and a factory near the port of Molfetta. Security from the enemy submarines was provided by one light cruiser (Aspern) and two torpedo boats. The Austrian destroyers safely reached Cattaro after skillfully outmaneuvering the Franco-­Italian division of destroyers.106  On August 26, 1916, the group composed of two armored cruisers (Sankt Georg, Kaiser Karl VI), three destroyers, and four torpedo boats (the Georg group) and another group composed of two cruisers (Novara, Helgoland) and two destroyers (the Novara group) sortied out and headed toward the Italian coast. The purpose was a demonstration to ensure success of the employment of five Austrian U-­boats (U 4, U 11, U 15, U 16, and U 17). These two groups approached the Italian coast on August 29 and remained in the area for about four hours. However, no contact was established with the enemy forces because of the bad weather and very poor visibility. Both groups returned safely to their home bases.107  In 1917, and until the end of war, operations by the Austrian cruiser/destroyer flotillas south of Venice became increasingly rare.108 The Italians greatly strengthened their defenses on the east coast, bringing in new coastal batteries and establishing new naval stations. The main train stations were protected by armored trains. The Italians also laid defensive minefields off the endangered parts of their eastern coast.109 For example, on November 28, 1917, six destroyers and eight torpedo boats attacked coastal targets near Senigallia, Porto Corsini, and Rimini. They shelled a train south of the Metauro River estuary. The Austrian ships were attacked by enemy naval aircraft but there were no hits. On December 7, 1917, six destroyers and five torpedo boats sailed out in two groups from Pola and toward the Italian coast. They joined off Fano. Both groups were attacked by enemy naval aircraft and a submarine. One Austrian destroyer was hit but the torpedo did not explode. Both groups returned to Pola without losses.110 In 1918, there were only a few Austrian attacks on the Italian coast. They were mostly unsuccessful. For example, on April 6, 1918, one scout cruiser (Novara) and two destroyers sortied for Cattaro and steered toward Pescara. They were directed to return to their home base. without accomplishing anything. On May 7, 1918, four destroyers sailed toward Lissa and then toward the Italian coast. Their mission was to attack trains running between the stations of Mutignano and Silvi. One of the destroyers would land a party to set demolition charges. However, that was unsuccessful and the entire mission failed.111  Sometimes a weaker side which still has considerable power projection capabilities could strike targets deep in the enemy’s strategic depth. The objective then can vary from inflicting damage to significant political and/or economic centers to degrading air defense capabilities to raise one’s own and depress the enemy’s morale. For example, the air raid on Tokyo on April 18, 1942 (popularly known as the “Doolittle Raid”) was primarily intended to raise the Allied morale in the aftermath of stunning Japanese victories in South Asia and the southern Pacific.112 In January 1942, Admiral King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH), and his staff decided to plan for a diversionary raid on

260   Attack on the enemy’s coast Japan. King decided to use Hornet (CV-­8) for carrying sixteen B-­25 long-­range heavy bombers of the 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle. These bombers would take off from the carrier but would after bombing land on airfields controlled by the Chinese nationalist government. The Enterprise (CV-­6) under Halsey would accompany in support of the raiding force. Both carriers plus four accompanying cruisers, eight destroyers, and two oilers, were part of TF-­16 under Halsey’s command.113 The heavy bombers would be launched at 450 miles from their targets on April 18. By decoding the enemy radio messages, the U.S. planners knew that the Japanese carriers were still far south of Japan and would not interfere with the raid.114  Both carrier groups joined on April 13. In the morning of April 18, one Japanese picket fishing boat some 720 miles east of Tokyo detected the enemy formation.115 The same morning Halsey launched sixteen B-­25s on board his carriers from a distance of about 670 miles off Tokyo.116 Thirteen B-­25s reached the city around noon and dropped their bombs. They encountered few Japanese fighter aircraft. The anti-­aircraft fire was intense but inaccurate. Three other B-­25s were assigned targets in Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe. The U.S. bombers inflicted slight damage on their intended targets. Out of sixteen B-­25s all but one (which flew to Vladivostok and was impounded by the Soviets) reached China; four of them crash landed and the crews of the remaining planes bailed out.117  For Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943), CINC of the Combined Fleet, Tokyo – the seat of the emperor – must be kept safe from air attack. It amounted to an obsession.118 Both the navy and the army had failed in their duty to safeguard the homeland and the emperor from the enemy attack. Admiral Yamamoto regarded it as a “mortifying personal defeat.” The Japanese admirals and generals, suffering great loss of face, now overreacted and made several strategic decisions that proved fatal for Japan.119 Specifically, they adopted Yamamoto’s argument to extend the defense perimeter into the eastern Pacific.120 Although on April 5 Naval General Staff had reluctantly agreed to the operation, the time of its execution was still debated. The enemy raid on Tokyo made Yamamoto even more determined to press for an early execution of the operation. Yamamoto decided that such a raid could not be allowed to happen in the future. He decided that there must be no delay in taking the offensive to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s carrier forces and to push the defensive patrol line eastward to Midway and the western Aleutians. Even the most vocal opponents of the plan were now put on the defensive. The threat from the east was greater than the threat from Australia. On May 5, the plan was submitted to Admiral Osami Nagano (1880–1947), Chief of the Navy General Staff at IGHQ. Acting on behalf of the emperor, he then directed Yamamoto to “carry out the occupation of Midway and key points in the western Aleutians in cooperation with the army.”121 At the same time, the Army and Navy General Staffs signed a joint central agreement for cooperation between the two services. The Army promised to provide a detachment of one infantry regiment, reinforced to participate in the land operation. The troops would be withdrawn after the completion, leaving defense of the newly acquired positions to the Navy.122 Another consequence of the raid on

Attack on the enemy’s coast   261 Tokyo was that the Japanese retained four army pursuit groups to defend the Home Islands for the rest of 1942 and 1943 although these aircraft were badly needed in the Solomons and elsewhere.123  Today, not only a stronger but also a weaker side could conceivably carry out massive strikes with ballistic missiles, land-­based bombers, and long-­range LACMs against selected targets on the coast and in the strategic depth of the enemy defenses. For example, medium- or short-­range ballistic missiles (MRBMs/SRBMs) can be used in attacking enemy bases/ports, and elements of the shore establishment.  A weaker side at sea should never stay passive, regardless of the disparity of strength with a stronger side. Ideally, it should carry out intensive and diverse attacks against selected targets on the enemy coast during the entire war. The most effective results can be expected when one’s naval forces are employed with the closest cooperation of other services. The majority of actions against the enemy coast will be tactical in size; major naval/joint operations would be rare. Because of the new technological advances, the opportunities of a weaker side to inflict significant damage on the enemy coast are much greater today than they were in the past. The stronger side must be put under increased pressure so that it is forced to commit ever larger forces in defense of the coast. Attacks on the enemy coast by a weaker side are not decisive for a war’s outcome. However, by being constantly on the offensive, a weaker side can maintain high combat readiness of its forces and high morale. Moreover, it will indirectly contribute to the successful defense of its own coast. 

Notes    1 J.R.E. Wainwright, “The Spanish War 1585–1588,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (August 1936), p. 542.    2 Wainwright, “Spanish War,” p. 544.    3 Wainwright, “Spanish War,” p. 5.    4 World War II series, The War in the Pacific subseries (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1962; updated 1989), p. 215.    5 Frederick D. Parker, A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians (Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1993), p.  5, available at www. centuryinter.net.    6 Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, U.S. Army in World War II series, The War in the Pacific subseries (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1962, updated 1989), p. 215.    7 Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, trans. Steven Bullard (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 2007), p. 34.    8 United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway, December 1941 to June 1942 Including Makin Island Raid 17–18 August (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 15, 1943), p. 61.    9 United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Battle Experience, p. 62.  10 United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Battle Experience, p. 62. 11 Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, p. 45. 

262   Attack on the enemy’s coast 12 Parker, Priceless Advantage, p. 6.  13 Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, p. 41; Japanese Monograph No. 37: 18th Army Operations, Vol. I, prepared by Headquarters United States Army, Japan; distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, in Donald S. Detwiler, War in Asia and the Pacific 1937–1949, Vol. 7: The Southern Area (Part II) (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1980), p. 4.  14 John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 398.  15 Morton, Strategy and Command, pp. 214–215.  16 Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, p. 398.  17 Christian M. McBurney, “Bushnell’s Mine Nearly Sinks a Ship,” Journal of the American Revolution, February 3, 2014, pp.  5–6, 8–10; accessed at https:// allthingsliberty.com/2014/02/bushnells-­mine-nearly-­sinks-ship/.  18 A.C. Davidonis, “Harbor Forcing Operations,” Military Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1944), p. 81.  19 Barry M. Gough, “The Crimean War in the Pacific: British Strategy and Naval Operations,” Military Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 1973), p. 81.  20 Walter S. Zapotoczny Jr., Decima Flottiglia MAS: The Best Commandos of the Second World War (Charleston, SC: Fonthill Media LLC, 2017), pp. 16–17.  21 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, pp. 17–18.  22 Aldo Cocchia, compiler, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV: I Mezzi D’Assalto (Rome: Ufficio Storico Nella Marina Militare, 1964), pp. 5–20.  23 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. 26–28.  24 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. 27–31.  25 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, p. 90.  26 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. ix–x.  27 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 136.  28 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp.  73–74; Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, The Black Prince and Sea Devils: The Story of Valerio Borghese and the Elite Units of the Decima MAS (Cambridge, MA: Das Capo Press, 2004), pp. 59–60.  29 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. 75–77.  30 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, p.  75; Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. 101–103.  31 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, pp.  88–89; Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 134.  32 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 135.  33 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 135.  34 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 136.  35 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, p. 91.  36 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, p. 92.  37 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, pp. 70–71.  38 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. 97–98.  39 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, pp. 63–64.  40 Cocchia, La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV, p. 64.  41 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, p. 95.  42 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, p. 89.  43 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 134.  44 S.W.C. Pack, Sea Power in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Struggle for Sea Power in the Mediterranean from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (London: Arthur Barker, 1971), p. 194.  45 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, pp. 78–79.  46 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, pp. 79–80. 

Attack on the enemy’s coast   263 47 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and Sea Devils, p. 84.  48 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, pp. 135–136.  49 Zapotoczny, Decima Flottiglia MAS, p. 135.  50 Kennosoke Torisu and Masataka Chihaya, “Japanese Submarine Tactics and the Kaiten,” in David C. Evans, ed. and trans., The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Japanese Naval Officers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd ed., 1986), p. 447.  51 Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 169–170.  52 Torisu and Chihaya, “Japanese Submarine Tactics and the Kaiten,” p. 446.  53 Boyd and Yoshida, Japanese Submarine Force, pp. 169–170.  54 Boyd and Yoshida, Japanese Submarine Force, p.  170; Torisu and Chihaya, “Japanese Submarine Tactics and the Kaiten,” p. 446.  55 Boyd and Yoshida, Japanese Submarine Force, p. 170.  56 Torisu and Chihaya, “Japanese Submarine Tactics and the Kaiten,” p. 170.  57 Boyd and Yoshida, Japanese Submarine Force, p. 170.  58 Boyd and Yoshida, Japanese Submarine Force, pp. 171–172.  59 Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 94–95, 263–264.  60 They also helped to secure an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Suez wells to Israel; Ze’ev Almog, “Israel’s Navy Beat the Odds,” Proceedings, March 1997, p. 107.  61 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 230.  62 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 131.  63 Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), p. 23; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp. 131–132.  64 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 31.  65 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 32.  66 Some 300 houses, seven churches, ten public buildings, and five hotels were also damaged. Three ships were hit in the docks and shipyards. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, pp. 34–35.  67 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 35.  68 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 21.  69 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 43.  70 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 35.  71 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 42.  72 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 43.  73 Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. II, p. 43.  74 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 147.  75 Cited in Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 148.  76 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 148. 

264   Attack on the enemy’s coast Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 420.  Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 421.  Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 424.  Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, pp. 424–425.  Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 439.  Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2: The War Years, p. 435.  Hans Hugo Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I (Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1933; reprint by Akademischen Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1967), p. 185.    84 Milan Vego, The Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, 1904–1914 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, September 30, 1981), pp. 567–568.    85 Vego, Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, p. 569.    86 Vego, Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, p. 570.    87 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 194.    88 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 197.    89 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 195.    90 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 195.    91 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 197.    92 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 199.    93 Camillo Manfroni, Storia Della Marina Italiana Durante La Guerra Mondiale 1914–1918 (Bologna: Nicola Zanicelli, 1925), p. 40.    94 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 203.    95 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 215.    96 Manfroni, Storia Della Marina Italiana, p. 39.    97 Manfroni, Storia Della Marina Italiana, pp. 40–41.    98 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 217.    99 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 221.  100 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 402.  101 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 221–222.  102 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 235.  103 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 223.  104 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 246–247.  105 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, p. 243.  106 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I, pp. 402–403.  107 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, pp. 406–407.  108 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, p. 496.  109 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, pp. 498–499.  110 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. II, pp. 496–497.  111 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, pp. 497–498.  112 Paolo E. Coletta, “Launching the Doolittle Raid on Japan, April 18, 1942,” The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 62, No. 1 (February 1993), p. 83.  113 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), pp. 392–393.  114 Coletta, “Launching the Doolittle Raid on Japan,” p. 83.  115 Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumya, Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan. The Japanese Navy’s Story (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1955), p. 66.  116 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun, pp. 392–394, 398.  117 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun, pp. 395–396.  118 Fuchida and Okumya, Midway, p. 65. 

  77   78   79   80   81   82   83

Attack on the enemy’s coast   265 119 “Battle of the Coral Sea,” Navy (April–June 1992), p. 4, reprinted as annex in Gary Brown and David Anderson, Invasion 1942? Australia and the Japanese Threat, Parliamentary Research Service Background Paper 6, 1992 (n.p.: Department of the Parliamentary Library, April 29, 1992), p. 4.  120 Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, p. 46.  121 Fuchida and Okumya, Midway, pp. 71–72.  122 Fuchida and Okumya, Midway, p. 72.  123 Coletta, “Launching the Doolittle Raid on Japan,” p. 85.

10 Defense of the coast 

Defense of the coast is conducted by both weaker and stronger sides at sea. It is an integral part of sea denial. However, disputing control of the sea is conducted from one’s coast and out to a certain distance seaward. The primary role is played by the army and air forces not naval forces. It might be surprising that a stronger side must conduct sea denial in defense of its own coast; otherwise, it cannot be successful in the struggle for sea control. There are, however, considerable differences in the way a weaker and stronger side defend their respective coasts. Because of its inferiority, defense of the coast for a weaker side is much more critical but also more difficult than for a stronger side. A stronger side at sea has much greater capabilities for defense of its coast than a weaker side. Also, once a stronger side has obtained sea control, it will exercise it by projecting power on the shore of a weaker side. It can do that at place and time of its own choosing.  Defense of the coast is a broad term referring to direct or indirect defense and protection of one’s coastal area (a part of the littoral bordering with the coastline), offshore islands/archipelagoes, and adjacent waters from the enemy’s attack across the sea and from the air. It consists of the seaward area (or forward coastal area; Küstenvorfeld in German), the coastline, and the rear area. Seaward area extends from the coastline to a certain distance outward. The coastline encompasses the beaches and a very narrow strip of land. Beyond the coastal strip is the rear area.  Since ancient times, navies have played an important if not critical role in defense of the coast. One’s naval forces can be used either as no more than an adjunct to defenses on the coast or as a mobile force. If one’s fleet is too tightly tied to defenses on the coast, then the enemy has the initiative. One’s fleet is robbed of its ability to concentrate or disperse as the situation requires. Experience shows that the fleet should be used as a mobile striking force in defense of the coast. The fleet will then, with the support of air forces, be able to engage the enemy naval forces threatening one’s coast and carry out attacks against enemy naval bases/ports and conduct offensive mining.1  Most naval classical thinkers focused on the role of the navies in the struggle for sea control. They also paid great attention to projecting naval powers ashore. The problem of defending the coast for either the weaker or the stronger side

Defense of the coast   267 was given short shrift. Some theoreticians firmly believed that a navy is an offensive force and should not be too tightly tied to – or should not take part at all in – the defense of the coast. For example, Admiral Mahan wrote that the method of the navy is offensive while its function is defensive. The method of the coastal fortress is defensive, but its function is offensive.2 For Mahan, every proposal to use a navy as an instrument of pure passive defense is found faulty upon particular examination; and these various results all proceed from the one fundamental fact that the distinguishing feature of naval force is mobility, while that of a passive defense is immobility.3 By “employing able-­bodied seafaring men to defend harbors you lock up offensive strength in an inferior, that is, in a defensive fashion.” Mahan asserted that by “giving up the offensive the navy gives up its proper sphere, which is also the most effective.” It is “also injurious to the morale and skill of seamen to keep them thus on the defensive and off the sea.”4, 5  Like Mahan, Admiral Colomb was also a firm believer that the objectives of a naval war are control of the sea or sea superiority. In his view, any power which tries to accomplish some other objective, such as, for example, an attack on enemy ports or exclusively the protection of the merchant marine, would find itself a weaker and beaten sea power.6  Other theoreticians, such as, for example, Corbett, believed (erroneously) that defense against an enemy seaborne invasion was part of exercising sea control. He wrote that “in methods of exercising command are included all operation not directly concerned with securing command or preventing it being secured by the enemy.”7  Castex commented that many naval authors in discussing naval warfare believed that a navy’s objectives were to secure the invulnerability of the country’s own coast and to attack the enemy coast. They also claimed that the real role of a navy was to destroy enemy maritime trade or to ensure the success of a seaborne invasion.8 Castex also believed that the primary objective of a navy is to eliminate an enemy’s organized forces, not defense of the coast.9  Successful defense of one’s coast is the main prerequisite for obtaining or disputing control of the sea. The navy’s basing/deployment area must be made secure. Strong defenses on the coast can deter or prevent the stronger fleet from attacking the coastal flank of one’s ground forces. For example, in 1914, the planned British attack on the Flandrian coast did not take place because the German marines deployed modern defenses from the Yser River estuary to the Dutch border. These defenses also provided flank protection to the German army operating on the coast.10 A strongly defended coast ensures uninterrupted functioning of naval/military shore establishment and maritime industries.  By offensive actions against the enemy’s coast one’s naval forces not only put the enemy under pressure but indirectly protect one’s own coast. For example, in World War I, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy conducted numerous raids on the Italian and Albanian coast, and the Otranto Barrage. These actions put the

268   Defense of the coast stronger Entente forces onto the defensive. The Entente navies and the Italian Navy also had to commit considerable forces to guard the Otranto Barrage. In this way, the Austro-­Hungarian Navy also protected Dalmatia’s coast. The Allied navies’ attacks on the Austro-­Hungarian coast were rare except in the south and extreme north of the Adriatic.11  A weaker but relatively strong fleet deployed in the main theater can indirectly preclude a stronger fleet’s mounting a major landing in one’s theater of secondary effort. For example, the British abandoned the plan to attack Borkum, Sylt, and the Pomeranian coast in the Baltic in World War I. The reason was the existence of the High Sea Fleet in the North Sea.12  In defense of the coast, the attacker enjoys many advantages over the defender. He usually has the initiative and can choose the place and time of attack. The morale factor is always on the side of the attacker. The defender is prone to take counsel of his fears, and to imagine every possible, instead of only reasonable, forms of attack. The fear of enemy attack can tie up a significant part of the navy, as was the case in the Spanish-­American War of 1898. The population on the U.S. East Coast clamored for protection, forcing the government to hold back the fleet. This happened even though the U.S. coast was heavily fortified.13  The longer the coastline is, the more difficult it is to defend it successfully. This is especially true if one’s coast is fronted with a large number of offshore islands or archipelagoes. Obviously, it is not possible to assign sufficient forces to defend the entire country’s coast. Regardless of one’s strength, the weight of the main effort should be on retaining control of the most critically important positions and basing areas. For example, in World War II, the Germans had to defend some 3,100 miles of coast, extending from North Cape to the Franco-­ Spanish border, against possible Allied landing.14 Hitler issued an order on December 14, 1941 to extend the Atlantic Wall from the Franco-­Spanish border to Norway.15 Afterward, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) issued orders that Hitler had decided to build on the coast a new Westwall (Western Wall), with minimum use of the permanent troops, for defense against enemy landing. The Germans did not have previous experience in building defense lines on the coast. The Atlantic Wall encompassed the coast of Norway, north Jutland, the German and Dutch coast, the Belgian coast, and the French Atlantic coast, especially Normandy and Bretagne.16  Defense of the coast also requires disproportionately large forces. For example, during the Crimean War (1854–1856), the Russians had in the Baltic some 200,000 troops to defend the coast.17 In 1944, the German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, CINC of the West, was responsible for the defense of some 1,615 miles of coastline. He had under his command thirty-­seven divisions (including twenty-­three infantry divisions, ten panzer divisions, and one airborne division) organized in thirteen army corps. These forces had in their inventories 1,143 panzers, 230 assault guns, and 775 field guns.18  Defense of the coast should be fully established already in peacetime. In wartime, the main objectives are to secure control of basing/deployment areas;

Defense of the coast   269 secure an uninterrupted flow of coastal sea traffic; prevent large-­scale enemy seaborne landings; and prevent major attacks on important coastal facilities/ installations and military-­economic centers deep into one’s territory. The principal methods of combat employment of one’s naval forces in defense of the coast are attacks and strikes and other tactical actions. A major joint/combined operation might be planned for repulsing an enemy’s amphibious landing or for defense of a major naval base/port. 

Elements  Defense of the coast can be generically divided into:  • • •

Seaward defense zone.  Coastal defense zone.  Rear defense zone. 

These zones overlap and are complementary to each other. The seaward defense zone (or coastal forward zone) extends from one’s coastline to several dozen or even hundreds of nautical miles outward. Its defense should be primarily the navy’s responsibility. However, other services will also take part in the defense of the seaward zone. The forward boundaries of the seaward zone depend primarily on the distances of offshore islands/archipelagoes from the mainland and the effective range of one’s coastal surveillance radars and land-­based aircraft. However, the depth of the seaward defense zone is usually greater than the ability of a weaker side to effectively ensure full protection and safety of naval forces and aircraft and coastal shipping operating within a given zone.  The ultimate objective of seaward defense is to prevent surprise attack and ensure safety of one’s naval forces, commercial shipping, naval/air bases/ports, and coastal facilities/installations. This objective is operational in scale. It is accomplished over time by a series of related tactical actions at sea, subsurface, and in the air. These actions should be conducted by local sea defense forces and in accordance with a common plan. Optimally, local sea defense forces should be composed of light forces, SSKs, and land-­based aircraft and helicopters, plus unmanned vehicles.  The main prerequisite for effective employment of local sea defense forces is reliable and continuous coastal reconnaissance conducted both in peacetime and in time of war. Coastal reconnaissance is an integral part of much broader maritime reconnaissance. It aims to detect, locate, identify, and monitor potentially hostile or enemy surface ships, aircraft, submarines, and minelaying within a given seaward defense zone. It is conducted by coastal surveillance posts, land-­ based aircraft, small surface combatants, submarines, unmanned vehicles (UAVs/USVs/UUVs) plus commercial vessels and even fishing boats. Coastal surveillance starts after a hostile platform or force is detected and classified. Its primary purpose is to continuously observe and promptly report the enemy activities. Tracking is a method of surveillance aiming to systematically

270   Defense of the coast collect and relay data on the potential targets. Tracking can be conducted by a single surface ship, submarine, or fixed-­wing or rotary-­wing aircraft, or a group of them.  In combat, the principal responsibilities of the local sea defense forces are as follows:  • • • • • • • •

Anti-­submarine defense.  Anti-­combat craft defense.  Air defense.  Defense and protection of coastal sea traffic.  Defensive mining.  Mine defense (mine counter-­measures).  Commando raids defense.  Defense against terrorist acts. 

Anti-­submarine defense in the seaward defense zone has some similarities with the open ocean ASW. However, its scale is much smaller and it is purely tactical. The objective is to promptly detect and prevent attacks by enemy submarines on surface ships/submarines and individual merchant ships and convoys, naval bases/ports, and coastal facilities/installations. Small ASW ships/craft and shipboard/land-­based helicopters are optimally suited for anti-­submarine defense in the seaward defense zone. These forces should be used in combination with stationary coastal and bottom surveillance systems laid in straits/narrows and in the approaches to naval bases and major ports. Mines can be highly successful in preventing the movement of enemy submarines out of their bases/anchorages and for protection of one’s naval bases/ports and coastal shipping routes. Anti-­ submarine defense should include whenever possible combat arms of other services. For example, land-­based aircraft can carry out strikes against the enemy’s submarine bases, submarine shipyards and repair facilities, submarine depots, command posts, and submarine-­related research facilities/installations.  In the littorals, hostile enemy combat craft pose a serious threat to the survival of one’s larger surface combatants. This is especially true in the confined waters of an archipelago or a strait. Anti-­combat craft defense should be focused on timely detection and then destruction or neutralization of the enemy ASM/ ASCM-­armed combat craft at sea. However, optimally they should be destroyed at their bases. Defensive measures should include cover and concealment of one’s forces and coastal facilities/installations.  Air defense of the seaward defense zone is an integral part of territorial air defense. Hence, it should be primarily the responsibility of the air force. Yet it cannot be effective without the full participation of the navy and other services. One of the major threats to survival of one’s naval forces are ASM/ ASCM-­carrying aircraft and submarines armed with ASCMs/LACMs and heavyweight torpedoes (HWT). The main advantages of ASCMs over torpedoes are their longer range, high speed, high precision, and lethality. If fired from short range the ASCMs are difficult to counter because they allow very

Defense of the coast   271 little time to detect, classify, and conduct countermeasures. They are more versatile in their employment than are torpedoes. The most advanced ASCMs can be used against either ships or targets on land. They can also be fired not only by submarines, surface ships, and aircraft but also by coastal batteries. However, because of their low flying altitude ASCMs are more vulnerable to the enemy antimissiles and close-­in quick-­firing guns. They also cause less severe damage than torpedoes because they hit the hull above the water or in the superstructure.  Defense against ASCMs/LACMs should be an integral part of territorial air defense. It should be multilayered. Coastal reconnaissance/surveillance should provide continuous coverage and surveillance of the entire seaward defense zone. Land-­based aircraft should provide the first-­line defense against ASCMs. The last line of defense is represented by close-­in point-­defense quick-­firing guns and antimissiles. All layers of defense should be supported by electronic warfare or soft-­kill defenses. The experience of the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 showed that the inner-­layer defenses have the most critical role in defense against ASMs. In littorals endowed with a large number of islands, the ASCMs/ LACMs are fired from a short distance, thereby giving very little time to the target to react.  Purely defensive actions and measures should be limited to point defense against ASMs/ASCMs. However, the threat of hostile missiles cannot be limited to defense only. Offensive actions are aimed to destroy/neutralize missile platforms and missile-­related facilities and storage dumps ashore.  One of the most important responsibilities of local sea defense forces is to ensure the safety of coastal sea traffic from the attacks of the enemy submarines, aircraft, and mines. Coastal sea traffic should be conducted by using many smaller but fast ships (speed higher than 15 knots) sailing independently. Their transits from one port to another should be completed under the cover of night. This method is especially suitable on a coastal sea route guarded by many offshore islands and dotted by many small ports/harbors separated by short distances from each other.  Generally, convoying is more complicated in a typical narrow sea than on the open ocean because the opponent can easily obtain timely information regarding the ports of departure, the assembly areas, and the convoy’s composition and route. A convoy should not be too large. In World War II, the most suitable size for a coastal convoy was up to ten ships. Today, because of the much greater threat from the air, a coastal convoy should consist of only a few ships. One solution is to reduce the number of ships in a coastal convoy but increase the number of convoys. One advantage of a coastal convoy is that the distance to the next port can be transited during a single night. Each convoy should be defended by a direct screen composed of small surface combatants such as multipurpose corvettes and fast attack craft. Coastal shipping should also be protected by coastal ASM/ASCM/gun batteries and surface-­to-air missiles (SAMs)/anti-­aircraft (AA) gun batteries, defensive minefields, and intermittent patrols of small surface ships and land-­based multipurpose helicopters. 

272   Defense of the coast The safety of one’s coastal shipping is considerably enhanced by obtaining at least local and temporary control of the air in the seaward defense zone. For example, the arrival of the German X Air Corps at the airfields of Reggio Calabria and the Sicilian fields (Catania, Comiso, Trapani, Palermo) was intended to protect the Axis sea and air routes to northern Africa. The Axis fighters provided convoy protection only during daytime, retired before twilight, and returned only after dawn.19 After the X Air Corps was redeployed from Sicily to Russia, the Italian convoys sailing to Libya in July to December 1941 had very little air cover during daylight hours. Hence, the Italians suffered increasingly great losses from attacks by the Allied aircraft based on Malta.20  Defensive mining is intended to deny the enemy access to the operating areas of one’s surface ships/submarines, naval bases/ports, convoy assembly areas, and coastal shipping routes. Defensive mine barriers are usually larger than offensive mine barriers in physical scope and in the number of mines laid. They also consist of simpler types of mines. Defensive mine barriers require the establishment of mine-­free lanes for naval vessels and friendly shipping. Sometimes, another route should be made available to take the traffic around the minefield. These safe areas require monitoring by other forces to ensure that they are not also used by the enemy.  Defensive mine barriers laid in one’s coastal waters must be defended with coastal missile/gun batteries and light forces. For example, in the Korean War (1950–1953) the North Koreans extensively used mines and counter-­fire with coastal gun batteries that were deeply tunneled into the rocky hills of the Korean coast and were often able to defy the overwhelming strength of U.N. forces operating close to the coast.21  Generically, positional, flanking, anti-­submarine, and anti-­landing mine barriers are differentiated. A positional mine barrier is usually laid in the approaches to one’s naval bases/ports, bays/gulfs, straits/passages, operating area of naval forces, and convoy assembly areas, and off critically important stretches of one’s coast.  Mines were extensively used for protecting the approaches to one’s naval bases/ports and basing areas. For example, in the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Russians extensively used contact mines at Kronshtadt, St. Petersburg, and Sevastopol.22 They mined the anchorage of Kronshtadt and bays used by the Anglo-­French fleet.23 One of two British ships reconnoitering the Bay of Kronshtadt ran onto a mine. It suffered some damage. Afterward, the British became more cautious in their operations off Kronshtadt and St. Petersburg because of the presence of the Russian mines. In the Black Sea, the Russians used mines off Yenikale and Sevastopol. However, Anglo-­French ships passed through the barriers without suffering any damage.24  During the American Civil War (1861–1865), Confederates mined many of their ports, river estuaries and bays. Thereby, they created great difficulties for the employment of the Union ironclads and gun boats. In the first year of war, the Union forces did not suffer any losses from mines. However, after 1862, the Union forces lost thirty to thirty-­five ships with 10,000 tons. These losses included fourteen gun boats, three monitors, and one frigate.25 

Defense of the coast   273 In the first month of World War I, the Germans mined the Ems, Jade, Weser, and Elbe estuaries. Yet the Germans made a mistake in laying mines deep inside Jade Bay where the anchorage of the High Seas Fleet was. The result was limited freedom of movement for the battle fleet. One armored cruiser (York) struck a mine in a thick fog at Schillig anchorage on November 4, 1914. The Germans also laid a defensive mine barrier off Heligoland in September 1914. The purpose was to enhance the security of the German Bight. During the war, this defense barrier was steadily extended until finally it was part of the mine belt which stretched from the Dutch islands to Horns-­Riff. Together with the offensive barrier off England’s coast this presented a considerable obstacle for British surface forces.26  In October 1914, Admiral Jellicoe, CINC of the Grand Fleet, became very concerned with the threat posed by the German U-­boats and mines that de facto forced his fleet not to operate in the southern part of the North Sea. He wrote to the Admiralty that the Germans cannot rely with certainty upon having their full complement of submarines and minelayers present in a fleet action, unless the battle is fought in the waters selected by them in the southern part of the North Sea … my object will therefore be to fight in the northern portions of the North Sea.27 By the end of August 1914, Jellicoe had decided not to seek action inside the area bounded by the latitude of Horn Reefs and longitude 5° east. He proposed an extension of the zone and stated that the fleet ought to operate in the areas south of latitude 55° 30′ north and east of longitude 4° east, except under exceptional circumstances.28  The Russians were very effective in using mines to protect their basing areas in the Baltic in World War I. In October 1914, they laid their first mine barrier in the Bay of Riga. After the attack of the German army in the summer of 1915, these barriers were reinforced to protect the flank of the Russian 12th Army. By the end of 1915, the Russian defenses extended from Bornholm to Memel and south of Gotland. The Russian mining was skillfully executed. One barrier was so laid that it reinforced the effectiveness of the other barrier. The effect of the Russian mining was that German freedom of action was greatly reduced.29 Because of the revolution in Russia in February and October 1917, the defenses of the Bay of Riga were neglected. During the successful major German landing in the Bay of Riga in October 1917 (operation Albion) the Russian ships and batteries remained largely passive. The Germans’ losses during the operation were entirely due to the Russian mines. They lost one torpedo boat and several minesweepers. Two battleships (Bayern, Grosser Kurfürst), one transport, and two other small ships were damaged.30  At the beginning of the war in the Black Sea in October 1914, the Russians laid defensive mine barriers off Sevastopol and Odessa to provide protection against the Turkish raids. However, they were unable to prevent bombardments by the former German battle cruiser (Goeben) and Turkish cruisers.31 

274   Defense of the coast The Soviets used mines extensively to protect bases in the Baltic in the initial phase of war with Nazi Germany in 1941. However, they were not as effective as their predecessors were in 1914–1915. The Soviets laid about 8,000 mines in 1941. In the first few weeks after June 22, 1941, they laid mine barriers in the Bay of Riga. Some 2,150 mines were laid at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland between Hanko (Hangö) and the island of Odensholm (Osmussaar today). The Soviets also laid some mines off Libau, Latvia, and the Dvina River estuary in July. By the end of September, the Soviet laid mines off the southern entrance of Moonsund. Yet most of the minefields were not properly protected. Nevertheless, a total of eighteen German and three Finnish warships and ten merchant ships sank as a result of Soviet mines.32  A positional mine barrier laid on the flanks of important stretches of one’s coast or operating area is called a flanking mine barrier. In both world wars, flanking mine barriers were widely used to protect the coastal flank of ground forces and/or coastal shipping. For example, in the northern Adriatic in World War I, both the Austrians and the Italians protected their extended coastal flanks against enemy submarines by laying mines. After the Germans and Austrians gained control of a major part of Albania in February 1916, intensive traffic between the Austrian and Albanian ports was protected by extended flanking defensive mine barriers.33  After the beginning of World War II, the Kriegsmarine became greatly concerned with the enemy penetration of the German defenses at sea. The Commander of Scouting Forces used cruisers, destroyers, and (destroyer-size) torpedo boats and minelayers to lay the flanking Westwall mine barrier. By September 24, 1939, this barrier stretched from the Dutch waters to west of Norway 34  After the end of their campaign in France in June 1940, the Germans laid many flanking mine barriers in the English Channel to protect their coastal shipping. After 1942, these barriers were not adequately protected, because of the growing inferiority of the Luftwaffe. The effectiveness of these mine barriers was reduced because of the strong currents and high tides and often high sea state. After September 1943, the Germans laid new mine barriers on the flanks of their coastal routes. The longevity of these barriers was about eighty days.35  Germany and its allies in the Black Sea heavily relied on mining to prevent enemy surface ships and submarines from attacking their coastal convoys. The first defensive mine barriers were laid off Romania’s coast between Constanţa and the Danube river estuary on June 15, 1941.36 After June 22, 1941 and in the next few months, an additional mine barrier was laid off the Romanian and the Bulgarian coast. At the entrance of the Bosporus were laid anti-­submarine mines. Hence, at least theoretically, the German–Romanian convoys were protected from Bugaz (Zatoka today) in Ukraine to the Turkish Straits. Yet there were gaps in the flanking barrier off the Bulgarian coast and off the Danube estuary, so that the Soviet submarines were able to attack convoys. The Germans suspected that the Soviets in fact had information about the gaps in mine barriers laid off Burgas, Varna, Constanţa, the Danube estuary, and Bugaz. In 1943, the so-­called “Western Wall” (Westwall) mine barrier from Cape Kherson (southern

Defense of the coast   275 Ukraine) to Cape Saint George (Sfîntu Gheorghe, Romania) was laid to protect traffic from the Crimea to the Romanian ports. Yet because of the inadequate quantities of mines this project was not completed. Also, because of the winter storms and ice the existing mine barriers off the coast had to be renewed in 1943. In addition, five deep mine barriers were laid against Soviet submarines off Sulina, Yevpatoria, and the Bosporus.37  In 1941–1944, the Axis forces in the Black Sea laid about 20,000 mines. However, many barriers were laid too close to the coast while the passages free of mines were too narrow. Several Axis ships were lost on these barriers. Yet, the German defensive mining prevented the Soviets from inflicting even larger losses.38  An anti-­submarine barrier is intended to destroy hostile submarines or prevent their penetration into one’s surface ships’ operating area or merchant shipping traffic area, or to protect naval bases and ports. Such a mine barrier can be established either close to one’s controlled shores or beyond the range of one’s coastal missile/gun batteries. The effectiveness of an anti-­submarine mine barrier is greatly increased if it comprises a mix of diverse types of moored and bottom influence mines. A/S mine barriers can be laid separately or be part of positional or flanking mine barriers.  An anti-­landings mine barrier is aimed at protecting a certain part of one’s coast against the enemy’s major amphibious landings. Such a barrier in effect extends seaward defenses. Its main purpose is to prevent or make it more difficult for the enemy landing ships/craft to land troops, or to disorganize the enemy’s fire support during the landing, and thereby gain time for one’s anti-­ amphibious defenses.39 As part of the beach defenses, mines are used to isolate the landing zone and adjacent coastal waters and to prevent the enemy’s surface combatants from penetrating these zones. In an anti-­landing mine barrier, strips should be left free of mines to allow the movement of friendly forces.  Mines are used extensively as a part of defenses against large-­scale enemy amphibious landings. For example, in the Black Sea in 1943, the Germans laid several anti-­landing barriers off Yalta, Feodosiya, and Novorossiysk, as well as in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.40 In defense against possible Allied invasion across the English Channel, from August 1943 to January 1944, the Germans laid a very large number of anti-­ landing mines off France’s coast. Sixteen minefields, each about 5 miles long were laid between Boulogne and Cherbourg. They were sporadically renewed. The Germans did not believe that these minefields would be very effective. So, they supplemented them with “hasty mines” laid by the ships available after the Allied invasion. These minefields would not have any free channel for the Germans ships. The German also had a plan to lay thirty-­six minefields between Zeebrugge and Granville.41 Thanks to field marshal Erwin Rommel’s efforts, the number of mines on the Normandy beaches increased from 20,000–30,000 in 1943, to 100,000–300,000 in 1944.42  One of the most dramatic examples of how a small navy can temporarily deny control of the sea to a much stronger fleet was the U.S. setback at Wönsan in

276   Defense of the coast October 1950. The North Koreans received from the Soviets large quantities of contact and influence mines, and torpedoes, as well as technical support and training in using them. Most of these deliveries arrived in July 1950 by rail. Within three weeks in August about 3,000 Soviet-­made mines were laid at the approaches to the ports of Wönsan and Chinampo. These minefields were laid in excellent patterns and were integrated with coastal defenses.43 The U.N. planned an amphibious landing at Wönsan in October 1950 to speed up the advance of the Republic of Korea’s I Corps along the coast. The troops of the First Marine Division, embarked on amphibious ships, arrived off Wönsan on October 19, 1950. The sweeping of the channel started on October 10 and was expected to be completed within ten days. The U.S. Navy encountered great difficulties, however, in sweeping the mines. It also suffered high losses. The landing was delayed. On October 18, it was decided to carry out an unopposed assault because the South Korean troops had made more rapid progress along the coast than originally anticipated. The embarked troops were unable, however, to land until October 25 because of the unswept mines in the channel.44  Mine defense or mine counter-­measures (MCM) aims to: prevent the enemy from laying mines in the operating areas of one’s naval forces or transit routes of commercial shipping, and in coastal waters; cause enemy mines to detonate without inflicting losses on one’s naval vessels or commercial ships; remove enemy mines for subsequent deactivation and/or destruction; divert one’s ships to use routes free of enemy mines; and permanently or temporarily alter the characteristics of one’s ships to reduce the danger from influence mines. MCM requires a disproportionately larger and more consistent effort, in terms of number of ships, materiel, personnel, and organization, than mining.  MCM can be defensive or offensive in their main purpose. Defensive MCM are intended to detect, classify, localize, neutralize, and destroy enemy mines. They consist of a series of active and passive measures. Active defensive MCM are designed to reduce the effectiveness of minefields by removing mines, destroying them in place, or neutralizing them. This is achieved by minesweeping and/or mine hunting. The main purpose of minesweeping is to clear a certain area of enemy mines and eventually to destroy the mines. In contrast to minesweeping, mine hunting is conducted to eliminate mines or to verify the presence or absence of mines in a given sea area. Mine neutralization renders a mine inoperative by using an explosive charge sized and placed either to damage the mine mechanism or to rupture and flood the case by overpressure. Mine clearance is used to clear channels, straits/narrows, and other restricted waters as a complementary measure to create passages through mine barriers. Countermining (or countercharging) is a method of rendering a mine inoperative by using an explosive charge to damage the mine’s firing mechanism or to rupture and flood the mine’s casing by generating overpressure.  Offensive MCM is aimed at preventing or neutralizing enemy minelaying capabilities in a given sea or ocean area. Normally, efforts should be made to destroy or disable enemy mines before they are laid. Specifically, offensive MCM is directed at destroying enemy minelaying platforms at sea or in their

Defense of the coast   277 bases, and mine production and storage facilities on the coast. One’s forces could conduct offensive mining of enemy ports and thereby prevent enemy surface minelaying platforms from existing and laying mines. Offensive MCM also includes strikes by one’s land-­based or carrier-­based aircraft against selected mine-­related targets on the coast or in the country’s interior. The most effective are strikes against critical mine-­related nodes, specifically mine production, loading, and transportation facilities. Accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence is critical for ultimate success in conducting offensive MCM.  Defense against enemy commando raids and terrorist acts against ships, bases/ports and coastal facilities/installations is a critically important part of seaward defense. Ideally, it should be organized and rehearsed already in peacetime. The enemy commandos might act individually or in groups. Threats to the security of bases/ports are diverse. Surface threats include powerboats with low radar cross section (RCS), sailing boats, rubber inflatables, and jet-­ski-type vehicles. They can carry out surprise attacks on warships or commercial vessels by using short-­range missiles and rocket-­propelled grenades (RPGs). Subsurface threats can come from conventional submarines, mini submarines, mines, swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), combat (open or closed circuit) swimmers, and bottom-­crawling vehicles. Other threats include limpet mines and underwater improvised explosive devices (IEDs), attached to a ship’s hull or a pier’s structure, bottom-­placed, or suspended underwater. Potential threats to port security from the air are low-­flying small aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Waterside security includes protection of port facilities and vessels from hostile incursions from the surface, the subsurface, and the air. It requires the seamless integration of sensors and the human element to ensure effective surveillance of the surface and subsurface of a port and its approaches, reliable detection and tracking, and then timely responses to preclude attacks against ships and port facilities/installations. Very often naval bases are collocated within a large port. Thus, naval and commercial vessels use the same traffic channels and, often, anchorages.  Specially organized coastal defense forces are normally responsible for defense of the coastline zone. These forces consist of the chain of coastal observation posts, and stationary and mobile coastal missile/gun batteries surface-­toair-­missile (SAM) batteries, and small caliber AA guns. Most of the guns should be capable of firing against surface targets. For example, the Germans had along their Atlantic Wall some had some 1,000 guns of all calibers but only some sixty were capable of fighting surface targets.45 An integral part of coastal defense forces is a chain of coastal observation/radar posts.  Coastal defense forces are intended to provide initial defense of the beaches against enemy surprise seaborne/airborne landings, terrorist attacks, and commando raids. They are usually numerically small. Experience has shown that coastal defense can prevent commando raids but not large-­scale enemy landings.46 Hence, they must be fully supported by ground forces and other services.47 

278   Defense of the coast The rear defense zone extends from one’s coastline to a certain distance in the interior. Among other things, the size of this zone depends on the geographic characteristics of the littoral area, the urbanization of the area, and the size and type of military forces deployed in the littoral area. The depth of the rear area depends on the attacker’s power projection capabilities inland and deployment pattern of naval and air forces.48 The need to neutralize the threat posed by the ever-­increasing range and speed of modern aircraft has led to the steadily greater depth of one’s seaward and rear coastal defense zone. Ground forces supported by air forces bear the sole responsibility for rear area defense.  The greatest test of coastal defense is to prevent the enemy from building a bridgehead on the coast.49 This means having an effective anti-­amphibious defense. A stronger side has many advantages in planning and execution of major amphibious landings. Among other things, it can select the place and time of landing at a number of places on the coast. It can tie defending troops to a selected area. This is especially true if the defender does not have significant naval forces. It can conduct an amphibious feint, that is, pose a threat of landing with that landing perhaps never being carried out.50  Clearly, a weaker side cannot successfully defend the entire coast against enemy landings and raids. Hence, it must determine which parts of the coastal area and offshore islands are the most critical for defense. Optimally, the most important parts of the coast that have beaches suitable for enemy naval landings should be prepared for anti-­amphibious defense in peacetime. These defenses require not only large forces but also the highest degree of cooperation among the services. The key prerequisite for success against large landings is sea and air superiority in the threatened coastal sector and quick containment and reduction of the enemy at the bridgehead.51  The principal objective in anti-­amphibious defense is to prevent the enemy from landing and if that fails to defeat him in battle ashore. Regardless of the scale of the enemy landing, anti-­amphibious defense is inherently a joint and often combined effort. Repulsing a major landing would require the planning and execution of a major joint/combined operation.  Ground forces and coastal defense forces would normally have the most important role in anti-­amphibious defense. However, they cannot be successful without the full support of the navy and air force. The main missions of naval forces and air forces would be quickly detecting, localizing, and attacking the enemy amphibious force and their direct screen, as well as forces of distant cover and support, during the transit at sea phase of the operation. They would also provide support to ground forces during the debarkation phase of the landing and during battle ashore.  In practice, most of the major landings conducted by a stronger side have been successful. One of major reasons for this has been great superiority at sea and in the air. For example, for the defense of Normandy in June 1944, the Allies had an enormous superiority at sea and in the air. The German ships had already been detected by the enemy radars ashore during their sortie out.

Defense of the coast   279 Because of the overwhelming Allied air superiority, the Germans laid mines only during the night hours.52  At the beginning of June 1944, the Naval Group West had under its command only three destroyers, five torpedo boats, thirty-­four S-­boats, and 163 minesweepers.53 Based in France under the commander of the U-­boats were thirty-­ seven U-­boats.54 They were able to use submarine pens despite intensive Allied bombing. However, the Luftwaffe was unable to provide cover for the U-­boats sailing out. Admiral Dönitz and Theodor Krancke, commander of the Naval Group West, were determined to use the Kriegsmarine in repulsing the enemy landing, regardless of the high risks. Dönitz ordered at the end of March 1944 that fifteen U-­boats should immediately be sent as reinforcements to France. However, this order was rescinded in mid-­May when it appeared to Dönitz that the threat of the enemy landing had faded. He then directed these U-­boats to be employed in the Atlantic.55  One of the most critical important elements of anti-­amphibious defense is a multilayered system of anti-­landing obstacles at the approaches to possible landing beaches. For example, in anticipating a major enemy landing on the French coast, the Germans made great efforts after 1943 to strengthen their beach defenses. In the last year before the invasion of Normandy, construction of coastal defenses and the Atlantic Wall received increased attention.56 Rommel’s Army Group B consisted of two armies, the 7th and 15th plus troops deployed in the Netherlands. The weight of main effort for defense was between Calais and the estuary of Seine River. The defenses consisted of some 15,000 fortified points and numerous obstacles. Despite enemy air attacks and sabotage by the French resistance the Germans constructed by the turn of 1943/1944 some 12,250 fortifications on the French west coast and 1,940 fortifications on the French Mediterranean coast. There were also some 500,000 beach obstacles, and 6.5 million mines to prevent enemy landing, plus artillery of all calibers to complement the barriers.57  Field marshal Rommel intended to greatly increase the depth of the beach defenses on France’s Channel coast. He envisaged four successive belts of obstacles to extend seaward from the high-­water mark. Logs were embedded in the sand below the high-­water mark to impale landing craft. Many logs were topped with mines. The Belgian and Czech anti-­tank obstacles were adopted for use against landing craft.58 The Kriegsmarine developed both an anti-­invasion coastal mine known as KMA and a pressure-­activated naval mine known as Oyster. This mine was unsweepable. The Germans also planned the use of small craft to stack an invasion force and to lay so-­called “lightning barriers” (Blitz-­Sperren) to block the landing beaches.59 Against enemy airborne landing with gliders, the Germans erected poles topped with captured shells activated with trip wires strung between the poles (they were known as “Rommel Asparagus”).60  Anti-­amphibious defenses could be fixed or mobile or a combination of these two. In the past, coastal fortifications were the key for successful defense of one’s coast. Fortifications had a major role in land warfare. Among other things,

280   Defense of the coast they allowed inferior forces in numbers and training, or even in morale, to hold out successfully for a long time against stronger forces. Fortresses placed astride roads and railways can delay considerably the advance of an enemy army. They had to be captured or forces had to be left behind to watch or even surround garrisons.61 Land fortifications had a direct influence in denying certain routes to an advancing army, but not so for navies. Clearly, fortifications were unable to prevent naval movements. The open ocean cannot be dominated by the guns of a fortress.62  In 1942, the Japanese established forward fixed beach defenses on Betio island, Tarawa Atoll (Gilberts archipelago). There was simply not enough space on the island to conduct mobile anti-­amphibious defense. The Japanese established all around defenses on the beaches. They had four Vickers 8-inch guns (captured in Singapore). They used 13-mm heavy dual-­purpose machine guns as the basic beach defense weapon on the northern part of the island and both sides of the eastern tip. The 7.7-mm heavy machine guns were the backbone of the beach defenses on western and southwestern sides of the island.63 The defenders had forty-­one heavy guns and forty-­two automatic weapons. Pillboxes were placed some 50 yards away from the water line and at 20- to 50-yard intervals.64 The Japanese planted anti-­personnel and anti-­tank mines on both the reef and the beaches. Fortunately for the U.S. marines, the mines on the lagoon beaches were not yet armed.65 The beach barricade covered almost the entire island. It consisted of a coral block sea wall, partly also made of tree stumps or coconut logs, wired and stapled.66 At the edge of the beach, a coconut log seawall doubled as an anti-­tank obstacle was intended to prevent tracked landing vehicles LVTs (Landing Vehicle, Tracked or “amphtrac”) getting to the beach. Behind the seawall was a gun emplacement of either reinforced concrete or alternating layers of coconut logs and coral sand. They were resistant to all but direct hits from major caliber naval guns or aerial bombs.67  During the Korean War (1950–1953) literally “hundreds of thousands of North Koreans built and manned the beach defenses along every stretch of coastline that conceivably could be used for an amphibious invasion.” Behind the beach defense were the Chinese Communist forces acting as a reserve. They were so positioned as to be able to move quickly to reinforce the beach defenses.68  In mobile defense, the critically important parts of the coastal strip are held by only a part of the available forces. The strongest, most mobile, and combat ready forces, usually armored and mechanized forces, are held in reserve at some distance from the beaches. They are intended to intervene at the most critical points and times to block and then destroy the enemy landing forces. A major advantage of mobile defense is that the defender can concentrate its forces at the point of decision instead of fragmenting it across the expanse of coastline. The defender limits the enemy’s ability to plan supporting fire in advance. A major disadvantage is that by allowing the attacker to establish a bridgehead it is virtually impossible to dislodge him.69  Prior to the Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943 (operation Husky), the Italians made little progress in strengthening their grossly inadequate beach

Defense of the coast   281 defenses. They started to construct a belt of fortifications some 12 to 15 miles behind the beaches. They would be used to contain the enemy forces if they succeeded in establishing a bridgehead.70  The Italian Sixth Army was responsible for the defense of Sicily. It was organized into two army corps with six coastal divisions, two coastal brigades, and four mobile divisions.71 However, the Italian coastal battalions were poorly trained and led. Soldiers belonged to the older age groups. They also covered defense sectors of up to 25 miles in length. There was great scarcity of anti-­naval guns. There was only a single anti-­tank gun for each 5 miles of the coastline.72  The German forces on Sicily were relatively small, some 30,000 troops but were excellently trained and commanded. There were two German divisions: 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (formerly Division Sizilien) and the Hermann Göring Division. Both were capable of mobile operations.73 They were deployed in the central part of the island but within striking distance of the landing beaches. In operational terms, they were the enemy’s true operational center of gravity for the attacker. The German divisions were intended to act as an operational reserve in case of the enemy landing.  Prior to the Allied landing on Leyte in October 1944, the Japanese army doctrine directed commanders to annihilate an attacker at the beach. However, lack of success of such fixed defense in the previous enemy landings and successful use of cave tactics at Biak and Marianas forced the Army General Staff to reconsider the entre concept of the beach defense. In the new concept, initial main lines of defense would be established inland beyond the range of the enemy’s heavy shipboard guns. Defense positions in depth were intended to delay an enemy advance after landing. A strong reserve force would be held back for counter-­attack.74  The commander of the 16th Infantry Division on Leyte did not mine the beaches or erect underwater obstacles. He stopped work on the fortified positions and began building new defense positions further inland. Because he had initially only a small number of troops under his command, he had limited ability to conduct counter-­attacks. Successful defense of Leyte depended on the ability to shift forces from Luzon and transport reinforcements to Leyte.75  Rommel held very different views on the defense of Normandy than his nominally superior field marshal Rundstedt, CINC of the West, and General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, commander of Panzergruppe West (I SS Panzer Corps with 1st, 12th, and 17th SS Panzer Divisions and Panzer Lehr Division).76 His experience in North Africa convinced him of the folly of trying to mass armor if the enemy has air superiority.77 Rommel’s Army Group B had inadequate training and a lack of mobility. The Luftwaffe was unable to challenge successfully the enemy air superiority. This meant that mobile operations were impossible.78 In his view, the only chance for a successful defense was to fight for the strongest possible natural position, the pillboxes, entrenchments, wires, and mines of the Atlantic Wall and the waters of the Channel.79 Rommel focused almost exclusively on fortifications that Rundstedt never contemplated. Neither did Hitler mention fortifications in his directive in November 1943. Rommel

282   Defense of the coast believed that the battle would be decided on the water edge and within the first forty-­eight hours after the enemy landing.80 He wanted to defend the beaches with infantry and panzer divisions because with the enemy air superiority it would not be possible to deploy German divisions far from the beaches to promptly repulse enemy invasion.81  In contrast, Rundstedt and General Schweppenburg believed that the best chance for defeating the enemy landing was to keep Panzergruppe West in reserve and further from the landing beaches. Rundstedt was not opposed to defeating the enemy on the beaches. He did not fundamentally reject the idea of the Atlantic Wall. However, he believed that in a modern war, fixed defense positions had lost their previous value. Both Rundstedt and Schweppenburg argued that in case of an enemy breakthrough on the beaches, the German forces could successively carry out counter-­strikes and defeat them.82  Rundstedt was a firm believer in mobile anti-­amphibious defense and put great stress on having strong reserves. However, Hitler’s insistence on having linear fortress-­like defenses on the beaches forced Rundstedt in his planning to reconcile fixed and mobile defense. Despite his clear preference for mobile warfare, Rundstedt never doubted that both fixed and mobile defense belong together and should be interchangeably applied.83  Schweppenburg believed that Rommel’s concept would doom his panzer divisions to be committed piecemeal and possibly pinned down behind the beaches. He wanted to keep his panzer divisions far from the beaches, even as far away as Paris. Schweppenburg’s views were clearly based on his experiences on the eastern front where the Germans had air superiority.84  In the end, the OKW reached a compromise. Rommel and General Johannes Blaskowitz, commander of Army Group G, each received control of three panzer divisions. The remaining three panzer divisions and one panzer grenadier division became operational reserve under Schweppenburg. However, these divisions could not be committed without the direct approval of the OKW.85 In other words, Hitler would issue such an order.  In preparing for the defense of Okinawa, the Japanese general Mitsuru Ushijama, commander of the 32nd Army on Okinawa, expected an enemy landing on the island. He issued his first plan for defense on July 19, 1944. Ushijama planned to annihilate the landing at the water’s edge. However, if that failed he planned to withdraw to defensive positions established in depth throughout the island. Ushijama considered three divisions plus one brigade as adequate for defense of Okinawa.86  On November 13, 1944, Ushijama was directed by IGHQ to reassess the situation on the island. One of his infantry divisions (9th ID) was transferred to Formosa (where it did not contribute to the defense of either the Philippines or Okinawa). Ushijama decided to give up defense of the Hagushi Plain (where the most likely landing beaches were located) so that he could establish a strong defensive position across the island north of Naha, Shuri, and Yonabaru. Any enemy landing north of that position would be unopposed by the army. Landing south of that position, he would be met at the water’s edge to prevent enemy

Defense of the coast   283 attack against the main defense position. Ushijama also forwent defense of the most likely landing beaches. His new plan for the defense of Okinawa envisaged abandoning the newly constructed airfields at Yontan and Kadena. Ushijama received permission to destroy the airfields in March 1945. Both were destroyed by the end of that month.88  Defense of the coast is the primary responsibility of the army and coastal defense forces. Yet experience also shows that defense of the coast cannot be successful without full and effective involvement of the navy and air force. This is especially critical for a much weaker side at sea because the outcome of a war depends on its ability to fully integrate all participating forces and prevent the enemy’s large-­scale landing. Naval forces contribute most directly to defense of the coast by successfully organizing and conducting coastal reconnaissance and surveillance, ensuring the security of the seaward defense zone, and participating in defense of bases/ports and anti-­amphibious defense. But perhaps equally if not more important is that naval forces fully engage enemy forces beyond the seaward defense zone. This also includes intensive and sustained attacks on the enemy coast. In this way, naval force might deter if not make it very difficult for a stronger side to project its power onto the friendly shore.  87

Notes    1 Paul Strelis, Küstenverteidigung (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1963), p. 2.    2 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), p. 433.   3 Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 153.   4 Mahan, Naval Strategy, pp. 152–153.    5 Cited in Anonymous, “Fortifications and Coast Defence,” The Naval Review, Part I, Vol. II, No. 1, 1914, p. 61.    6 (Raoul) Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, Vol. I (Belgrade: Vojno-­izdavački Zavod, 1960), translated from Raoul Castex, Théories Stratégiques, Vol. I (Paris: Société d’Editions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1929), p. 223.    7 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 223.   8 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 223.    9 Kasteks, Strategijske Teorije, p. 226.  10 Strelis, Küstenverteidigung, p. 5.  11 Viša Vojno Pomorska Akademija, Odbrane Obale (Split, 1964), p. 2.  12 Strelis, Küstenverteidigung, p. 4.  13 Anonymous, “Fortifications and Coast Defence,” p. 109.  14 Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944: Der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1982), p. 22.  15 Lars Hellwinkel, Hitler’s Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), p. 127.  16 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, pp. 21–22.  17 P.F.D. Tennant, “The Anglo-­French Baltic Expeditions in the Crimean War,” The Naval Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (January 1958), pp. 138–139.  18 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 98.  19 Raymond de Belot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939–1945, trans. James A. Field Jr. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 95, 155. 

284   Defense of the coast 20 Marc A. Bragadin, “Mediterranean Convoys in World War II,” Proceedings 76, No. 2 (February 1950), p. 147.  21 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Mason, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957), p. 283.  22 Gerhard Freiherr von Ledebur, Die Seemine (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1977), p. 12.  23 Von Ledebur, Die Seemine, p. 53.  24 Von Ledebur, Die Seemine, p. 54.  25 Von Ledebur, Die Seemine, pp. 54–57.  26 Friedrich Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege 1914 bis 1918: Ihre Erfolge und Misserfolge,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1927), p. 258.  27 Bernard Brodie, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 95–96.  28 Russell Grenfell, Sea Power in the Next War (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1st published 1938; reprint by Facsimile Publisher, Delhi, 2016), p. 29.  29 Von Ledebur, Die Seemine, pp. 177–178.  30 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 260.  31 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” pp. 260–261.  32 Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmans Verlag, 1958), pp. 41–42.  33 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 261.  34 Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, and Hans Umbreit, eds., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 2: Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart/Munich: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1979), pp. 162–163.  35 Hans Wegmüller, Die Abwehr der Invasion: Die Konzeption des Oberbefehlshabers West 1940–1944 (Freiburg i.Br.: Verlag Rombach, 1986), pp. 105–107.  36 Horst Boog, Richard Lakowski, Werner Rahn, Manfred Zeidler, and John Zimmermann, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 10/1: Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches 1945, Part 1: Die Militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht (Stuttgart/Munich: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 2008), p. 228.  37 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 295–296.  38 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 295–296.  39 Gunther Linke, Taktik der Überwasserkraefte, Teil V/1: Grundlagen für den Einsatz von Überwassershiffen zum Minenelegen (Charakteristik der Seeminen und ihrer Einsatzmittel) (Dresden: Military Academy “Friedrich Engels,” 1988), p. 45. 40 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 295–296.  41 Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: Cross-­Channel Attack (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), p. 250.  42 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 68.  43 Andrew Patterson Jr., “Mining: A Naval Strategy,” Naval War College Review 23, No. 9 (May 1971), p. 56; Cagle and Mason, Sea War in Korea, pp. 145, 148–150.  44 Patterson, “Mining: A Naval Strategy,” p. 56; Cagle and Mason, Sea War in Korea, pp. 145, 148–150.  45 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 94.  46 Hans-­Jörg Monitor, “Neuzeitliche Küstenverteidigung. Betrachtungen zu ihrem Aufbau,” Wehrkunde, No. 2, 1965, p. 89.  47 Strelis, Küstenverteidigung, pp. 2–3.  48 Monitor, “Neuzeitliche Küstenverteidigung,” p. 90.  49 Strelis, Küstenverteidigung, p. 1.  50 Viša Vojno Pomorska Akademija, Odbrane Obale, p. 4.  51 Monitor, “Neuzeitliche Küstenverteidigung,” p. 89. 

Defense of the coast   285 52 Detlef Vogel, “Deutsche und allierte Kriegführung im Westen,” in Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel, editors, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 7, Part 2, Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive. Strategische Lufkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943–1944/4. Strategische Lufkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943–1944/45 (Stuttgart/Munich: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 2001), p. 485.  53 Vogel, “Deutsche und allierte Kriegführung im Westen,” p. 485.  54 Vogel, “Deutsche und allierte Kriegführung im Westen,” p. 485.  55 Vogel, “Deutsche und allierte Kriegführung im Westen,” p. 486.  56 Vogel, “Deutsche und allierte Kriegführung im Westen,” p. 465.  57 Vogel, “Deutsche und allierte Kriegführung im Westen,” pp. 466–467.  58 Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), p. 67.  59 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, pp. 68–69.  60 Cited in Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 66.  61 Anonymous, “Fortifications and Coast Defence,” The Naval Review, Vol. II, No. 1 (February 1914), p. 59.  62 Anonymous, “Fortifications and Coast Defence,” p. 60.  63 Ministry of Defence, Naval Historical Branch, War With Japan, Vol. IV: The South East Asia Operations and Central Pacific Advance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995), p. 48.  64 Ministry of Defence, Naval Historical Branch, War With Japan, Vol. IV, p. 50.  65 Cited in Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 123.  66 Ministry of Defence, Naval Historical Branch, War With Japan, Vol. IV, p. 50.  67 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 124.  68 Cagle and Mason, Sea War in Korea, p. 390.  69 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 5.  70 Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1986), p. 76.  71 Garland and McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 80.  72 Garland and McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 79.  73 Garland and McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy p. 81.  74 Cited in Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 109.  75 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 109.  76 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 56.  77 Harrison, The European Theater of Operations: Cross-­Channel Attack, p. 249.  78 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 53.  79 Harrison, United States Army in World War II, p. 248.  80 Cited in Harrison, United States Army in World War II, p. 249.  81 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 52.  82 Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944, p. 53.  83 Wegmüller, Die Abwehr der Invasion, pp. 82–83.  84 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, pp. 65–66.  85 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 66.  86 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 158.  87 Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, p. 158.  88 Cited in Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge, pp. 158–159.

11 Defense/capturing of important positions/basing areas 

Defense of the coast also encompasses defense of some important positions and major naval/air bases and ports. In the littorals, a weaker side at sea could capture important enemy positions and basing areas by relying almost exclusively on the army and air force. In most cases, the navy would take part in both defense and offensive operations by the army and air force.  In organizing defense of the coast in peacetime, it is critically important to assess all aspects of the situation and then determine those parts of the coast which are critically important for defense and those that are not. This, in turn, will affect the size and mix of forces assigned to the defense of the coast. The actual situation in wartime would require reassessment of the situation and a shift in the weight of the main effort in defending one’s coast. Very often what was considered a critical position might become less so; and the opposite is also true. Fortified ports or large coastal cities, small peninsulas, and large islands or archipelagoes play a major role in defense of the coast. They would normally be defended by the army but with strong support from one’s naval forces and air forces.  In the past, a fortified city occupying a key position with regard to the surrounding terrain and sea often played a major role in the outcome of a campaign or even a war. For example, in the Seven Years War (1756–1763), the principal British objective was the conquest of Canada. This meant the capture of Quebec by an amphibious assault. The British possessed Halifax. However, the strongly fortified French port of Louisburg lay close to their lines of communication to St. Lawrence. The British attempt to seize Quebec was delayed for three years because it took the British two seasons to reduce Louisburg. They were unwilling to commit themselves to a major operation in Canada so long as Louisburg remained a threat to their line of communications. In other words, the British forces were contained outside of St. Lawrence by the French forces defending Louisburg. At the same time, the French were unable to reinforce Louisburg because the British blockaded their bases in the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay. The effect was to contain the French fleet in their home waters.1  In the War of 1812, the British had on Lake Ontario an excellent harbor at Kingston, while the Americans used the less valuable Sackett harbor. The opposing flotillas fought for control of these two fortified places. Mahan observed that

Defense/capturing of important positions   287 contrary to usual condition of naval warfare, the two ports not the fleets depending upon them, were the decisive elements of the Ontario campaign. A decisive victory in action between the opposing flotillas did not necessarily ensure finality of outcome as long as these two dockyards were untouched.2  Prior to 1914, the Germans heavily fortified their basing area in the German Bight. The defense front was only 120 nautical miles long.3 The key defense positions were the islands of Heligoland, Borkum and Sylt. This area encompassed the main naval base at Wilhelmshaven and smaller bases at Emden and Cuxhaven. Emden was protected by the island of Borkum. The entrance to Wilhelmshaven was defended with strong coastal batteries. The estuary of the Weser River and the port of Bremerhaven were defended at Gesteminen with coastal batteries on both banks of the river. The approaches to the estuary of the Elbe and the entrance to the Kiel Canal were defended by the fort of Cuxhaven.4 All the naval bases related to rail, river, and land communication. The entire defense area was divided into three defense sectors: (1) the Ems estuary with the naval base at Emden; (2) Jade Bay with the naval base at Wilhelmshaven and the island of Wangerooge (Frisian Islands); and (3) the Elbe estuary with the naval base Cuxhaven and the entrance to the Kiel Canal.5  In preparing for the enemy invasion of the German-­controlled Western Europe, Hitler put great hopes in fortified positions to tie up the enemy forces and thereby slow down their advance. By the spring of 1943, Hitler realized that it was impossible within a given time to build the 15,000 planned fortified objects. Hence, he directed that at least specially threatened coastal segments at Pas de Calais should be well fortified. Hitler also directed that the ports of Ijmuiden, Hook von Holland, Dunkirk, Boulogne, Le Havre, Cherbourg, St. Malo, Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, Gironde-­North, Gironde-­South, and the Channel Islands Guernsey, Alderney, and Jersey should be declared as fortresses. They had to be specially reinforced and that required substantial forces. For example, in March 1944, some 115,000 troops were deployed in the fortified ports.6 On August 5, 1944, OKW directed CINC of the West that fortified enclaves must be held at all cost so as to gain time for countermeasures and tie down enemy forces.7  The Allied planners assumed that by the end of operation Overlord the Allies would be in possession of the ports of St. Malo, Lorient, Brest, Quiberon Bay, St. Nazaire, and Nantes. The British anticipated a quick capture of the Seine River ports (Rouen, Le Havre, and Caen), and even the Channel ports. After the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead in late August 1944 (which ended operation Overlord), the Allies needed to rapidly pursue retreating German forces and not allow Germans the time to recover. With the exception of Cherbourg, the Allies did not have available any large port. Most of the logistical supplies until the end of August came across the beaches plus minor ports such as Granville, Cancale, and Isigny.8 The Allies needed large ports so that they could better supply the advancing armies. This, in turn, required use of several French ports in Brittany and on the Channel coast. 

288   Defense/capturing of important positions In the American sector, the Allies estimated that there were some 35,000 Germans defending Brittany’s ports (excluding St. Malo). This number included 10,000 field forces, and 25,000 miscellaneous garrison troops. At Brest the Germans had about 16,000 troops (half of whom were field troops), 3,500 at Lorient, and 9,500 at St. Nazaire.9 The most important and the largest port in Brittany was Brest. In 1944, Brest had a population of 80,000. To use ports at Quiberon Bay, St. Malo and Nantes, the Allies had to secure the waters off Brest.10  The VIII Army Corps had responsibility for Brittany.11 The attack on Brest started on August 25. Three Allied IDs (2nd, 29th and 8th ) took part in the attack.12 However, by the end of August, Brest and other ports in Brittany would not be needed for supplying Allied forces. Hence, plans to capture Lorient and St. Nazaire were scrapped. Some 15,000 German troops in Lorient and 12,000 at St. Nazaire were contained until the end of war.13  The Allied troops encountered stiff resistance by the German defenders of Brest. In laying siege to Brest, the Allies conducted a series of actions against some seventy-­five strongpoints. The VIII Corps received continuous and highly intensive support from IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands and the RAF and heavy bombers of the U.S. Eighth and Ninth Air Force. Brest was captured on September 19. The Americans suffered some 9,830 casualties. Some 38,000 Germans (more than 20,000 were combat troops) went into captivity.14 In retrospect, the better solution would have been to contain Brest and use the major part of VIII Corps to join in the pursuit of the retreating German forces across the Seine River.  Sometimes a weaker side has to defend a major bay/gulf because of its critical importance as a naval training area. For example, in World War II, the principal area for the training of the German U-­boat crews was in the Baltic. Loss of control over the Baltic would have had immediate and drastic effects on the German ability to prosecute U-­boat warfare. By the summer of 1944, the loss of the Atlantic bases forced the German Naval Staff to continue the U-­boat war from its bases in the North Sea. However, all these bases were within effective range of Allied heavy bombers. This, in turn, made it critical for the Germans to retain control of their bases in the Baltic that served as the training area for the crews and for testing of the new U-­boats. The German Naval Staff insisted on holding the coastal flank of the Army Group North. The Hela Peninsula–Libau area accounted for 50 to 60 percent of all the German U-­boat training. Some 25,000 sailors were based there. The loss of the Bay of Danzig would have reduced the training of twelve to fifteen U-­boat crews per month. Moreover, all the other training procedures would have had to be reduced by as much as 50 percent.15  Very often in a war, retreating friendly forces would be contained in a bridgehead on the coast and facing the prospect of being encircled and eventually destroyed. The only hope of avoiding that is to have effective support by one’s naval forces and air forces. In the past, the navies provided fire support and brought badly needed supplies to defenders of a bridgehead on the coast. They also played

Defense/capturing of important positions   289 a major role in the evacuation of troops and civilians from a bridgehead. For example, the final evacuation of Japanese troops from Guadalcanal, lower Solomons, started on the night of February 1/2, 1943 when several destroyers embarked the first elements of the Japanese garrison on the island. During five successive nights, a total of 12,000 Japanese troops were evacuated.16  In the final phase of the struggle in the Solomons, in mid-­August 1943, the Japanese decided to evacuate all the islands of the Solomons chain except Buka, Bougainville, and the Shortlands. The American capture of Vella Lavella greatly concerned the Japanese, because that island flanked the route by which the garrison of 10,000 men on Kolombangara had to be evacuated. Japanese fears proved to be well grounded, because the Americans at once blockaded Kolombangara. Nevertheless, roughly 9,000 Japanese troops were successfully evacuated from Kolombangara, mostly by motor barges moving at night.17  The situation for the German forces in southern Russia deteriorated in the summer of 1943. By early September the Germans faced a very difficult situation in the northern part of the Sea of Azov. Their forces on the Crimea and the Kuban bridgehead faced a danger of being cut off. The Soviet offensive resumed on September 1. Two days later, Hitler decided to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead.18 On September 4, a decision was made to prepare withdrawal of Army Group A. Three days later, the Germans began evacuation of their 17th Army and the Romanian divisions.19 By early October, the front stabilized temporarily on the Dnieper River and Melitopol. Between September 7 and October 9, the Kriegsmarine and the army pioneers transported to Crimea 184,800 German troops (including 156,310 wounded), 50,139 Romanians and 28,486 Russian volunteers plus 15,471 tons of military materiel. This was done despite intensive Soviet attacks from the air and the presence of mines.20 There was also an air evacuation of 15,660 soldiers.21  The Germans used during the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead some 240 “naval ferry barges” (Marinefährprahm – MFP) and motor boats. They organized four large convoys protected by U-­boats, and torpedo boats to ferry troops from the Kerch Strait to Sevastopol. Despite Soviet claims to the contrary, the Germans lost only three MFPs (from aircraft), and five artillery carriers, while four MFPs were cut off and destroyed by their own crews.22  After the retreat of 17th German Army to the Crimea, the Soviets deployed their gun batteries on the Kerch Strait. This forced the Germans to discontinue sending supplies through the strait, and to organize evacuation of their remaining ships and craft (operation Wiking). About 240 ships and craft were transferred to Sevastopol in three large convoys on October 8–10, 1943. The last German ships to leave the area laid mines at the southern exit of Kerch Strait.23 The last ship reached Sevastopol on October 10. The German losses were a single army assault boat from the air attack and one MFP sunk by a Soviet submarine.24  During the withdrawal of the Army Group North in the summer and fall of 1944, the Germans deployed their “pocket” battleships and heavy cruisers with great success in support of their troops on the coast by bombarding Soviet forward tank columns and gun positions. The bombardments from the sea helped

290   Defense/capturing of important positions to stop Soviet armies advancing on Courland along the southern shore of the Bay of Riga in the fall of 1944. On several occasions, one or two of the German pocket battleships and cruisers along with a few destroyers and S-­boats shelled the large Soviet units preparing to attack, helping the Germans to avoid a potential disaster.25 One of the most remarkable efforts to supply troops on a coast was undertaken by the Kriegsmarine in the Baltic in the fall of 1944 and winter of 1945. By October 1944, the retreating Germans had formed a large bridgehead on the Courland Peninsula (Latvia) stretching from the ports of Libau to Windau. The Courland Bridgehead (Kurland Brückenkopf ) contained two armies (16th and 18th) of the Army Group North with twenty-­six divisions plus some other units and 600,000 men. These troops held the bridgehead from October 15, 1944 to the end of the war on May 8, 1945.26 More remarkably, the German troops were supplied all the time, and four of the besieged divisions were eventually transported across the sea to Germany.27  In the closing months of World War II, the Germans had to evacuate a large number of troops and civilian refugees in the Baltic because of the fast Soviet advance from the north and the east. However, the Germans waited too long, because of Hitler’s obstinacy, to prepare an orderly withdrawal of their troops from the Baltic. By the end of February 1945, the German front in Pomerania collapsed. Yet the Germans held the beachheads around Danzig (Gdańsk) and Gotenhafen for four weeks. A smaller beachhead was formed around the Pomeranian town of Kolberg (Kolobrzeg), which enabled the Germans to organize and execute what was probably the largest evacuation across the sea in history. Some of the German civilian refugees were taken by the ships, while some walked to Danzig across Frisch Nehrung (Mierzeja Wiślana today) and the Vistula Delta. The Germans used all available ships, including large liners.28  From January 2 to May 8, 1945, the Germans evacuated 679,541 persons from the ports of Königsberg, Pillau, Danzig, Gotenhafen, and Hela, in eastern/ western Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg to Schleswig-­Holstein or Denmark. This number included 345,477 wounded, and 181,775 soldiers. The total number of evacuees was 1,206,377 women, men, and children. The German losses were only 30,000 persons or 2.5 percent of the total.29 The single major Soviet success was the sinking of the German 25,500 GRT hospital ship Wilhelm Gustloff with 10,580 people on board (including 8,960 civilians) by a Soviet submarine (S-­13) on January 30, 1945. Some 9,340 people perished with the ship. The German efforts to evacuate such a large number of civilians and troops in the face overwhelming odds was unprecedented in naval/military history. Hitler gave approval for full-scale evacuation too late; otherwise, the number of the evacuees reaching safety would have been much greater. The Soviets possessed an enormous superiority on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Yet they showed surprising lack of energy and aggressiveness. In contrast, the Kriegsmarine skillfully used its small ships and craft in supplying almost uninterruptedly the Courland beachhead. There was never any lack of targets for Soviet submarines and aircraft30 

Defense/capturing of important positions   291 A superior side on land would often use its army and air forces to capture important maritime positions and thereby greatly enhance the opportunities for naval forces to contest control of the sea. For example, the Germans in the initial phase of war with Soviet Russia were inferior in naval strength in the Baltic, while they did not have a single ship in the Black Sea. In 1941–1942, the Germans captured the vitally important Crimea Peninsula in the Black Sea. By mid-­September 1941 the German–Romanian troops reached Perekop and thereby directly threatened Crimea. To capture Crimea, the Germans massed the 11th Army led by General Erich von Manstein (1887–1973) in the northern part of the Kherson (outskirts of Sevastopol).31 They finally captured the Crimea apart from the large naval base at Sevastopol. The Germans launched their attack on the fortress, aimed at destroying three Soviet armies (the 47th, 44th and 51st Army) on the Kerch Peninsula (operation Trappenjagd). The Soviets were completely surprised. After a few days of fighting, eight Soviet divisions were encircled. By May 16, the Germans had captured the city of Kerch. Two days later the bulk of the Soviet troops stopped fighting. The German final attack on Sevastopol began on June 7, 1942. Stalin in mid-­June rejected the proposal that the fortress be evacuated. The rest of the Soviet troops  withdrew to Kherson on July 1, where they expected to be embarked on  the Soviet warships but the expected help from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet never came.32 It was the Soviet turn to recapture the Crimea Peninsula in 1944. By early November of 1943, the German troops on the Crimea had been cut off on the landside because of Soviet troop advances to the Dnieper River. For political and military reasons, Hitler ordered defense of the Crimea. The German forces consisted of the 17th Army with five infantry divisions and two assault gun brigades plus three Romanian mountain divisions, two infantry, and two cavalry  divisions. In addition, the Luftwaffe deployed one fighter and one fighter‑bomber group, one short‑ and one long‑range reconnaissance squadron, and one AA division, while the Kriegsmarine operated twenty-­three coastal gun batteries.33 The Soviet offensive to retake the Crimea began on April 8, 1944. At that time about 130,000 German troops and 70,000 Romanian troops were on the peninsula. Another 10,000 were cut off in the Yalta Hills but were evacuated by naval barges. On May 7, 1944, Hitler finally gave the order to evacuate the Peninsula. By May 11, only about 20,000 German troops remained on the Crimea. Two days later the last German ship left the Chersonnes Peninsula.34  In only four weeks about 130,000 Romanian and German soldiers had been evacuated by sea. The German losses on the Crimea were 78,000 men killed or captured. Some 190 German warships (mostly barges) and merchant vessels took part in the evacuation from the Crimea. The shipping volume was sufficient to evacuate 123,000 men one way. The distance from Sevastopol to the Romanian port of Constanţa, the main debarkation port, is some 200 nautical miles. The Axis losses were surprisingly low.35 The German Navy performed extraordinarily well in carrying out the evacuation effort. Despite their numerical

292   Defense/capturing of important positions superiority on the ground, in the air, and at sea the Soviets were unable to hinder embarkation of troops at Sevastopol.36 A navy cannot sustain its combat strength and effectiveness unless it possesses an adequate basing area from which to deploy, redeploy, and to which, when necessary, to retreat. A weaker side at sea retains its value if it possesses a sufficient number of well-­protected bases.37  Defense of naval bases/ports is one of the prerequisites to employment of one’s naval forces to obtain or dispute control of the sea. Protracted defense of even a small naval base might require commitment of much larger forces, and perhaps even more important, a lot of time. For example, the Soviets offered a stiff defense of a small naval base at Hanko (Hangö, on the southeastern coast of Finland), which had been leased for thirty years under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 13, 1940 that ended the Soviet–Finnish War, for almost four months (September–December 1941). This fortress was manned by a force of 25,300 troops. The Finnish attack started on June 29.38 However, the Finnish forces were numerically smaller than the defenders.39 Hanko was supplied by sea, partly by Soviet submarines and partly by smaller ships and craft.40 During the siege the Soviets suffered high losses – some 5,000 men killed in action. However, their stubborn defense of Hanko contributed greatly to the stability of the Soviet defenses of the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland.41 The Soviet High Command (Stavka) directed Hanko’s garrison commander on October 23, 1941 to leave the peninsula.42 The evacuation started three days later. To ensure secrecy, convoys sailed in the night and in bad weather.43 The weather in the Gulf of Finland was stormy. The duration of the night was about fourteen hours. This practically prevented the enemy from using its aircraft. It also reduced the effectiveness of the enemy coastal artillery.44 The 61st Aviation Brigade was responsible for reconnaissance of the Gulf of Finland and the northern part of the Baltic. Three Soviet submarines were deployed to observe enemy traffic in the Gulf of Finland south of the island of Russarö. Approaches to Hanko and the route from Kronshtadt to Gogland (Suursaari in Finnish), some 110 miles west of Leningrad, were made secure by the Baltic Fleet. The Soviets considered enemy mines as the greatest danger to their evacuation effort. On the island of Gogland was established a base for minesweepers, tugs, and salvage vessels, plus a repair shop.45 Hanko was supplied partly by submarines. The Soviets used four large and three small convoys. They suffered heavy losses: three destroyers and at least ten small warships were sunk. On the last day of evacuation, on December 3, one 7,500 GRT steamer was lost. Some 4,000 men were killed from the explosion onboard, but 2,000 men survived.46 The Soviets claimed that eighty-­eight ships took part in the evacuation.47 This number included one destroyer leader, six destroyers, two minelayers, three patrol craft, two large transports, four medium transports, eight base minesweepers, several smaller minesweepers, and twelve “small hunters” (A/S patrol craft).48 The Soviets suffered high losses in their evacuation of troops from Hanko. Some twenty-­five ships including three destroyers, five torpedo boats, seven patrol craft, and two

Defense/capturing of important positions   293 transports were sunk. About 4,900 men (or 17.8 percent) of all personnel evacuated by ship were lost.49 The Baltic Fleet played an important role in the initial defense of Leningrad in 1941. By August 8, the Germans attacked the city’s main defense line on the Luga River. Already on July 5, 1941, the Baltic Fleet had organized the defense of Leningrad’s sea approaches. Anti-­landing defenses were established in the Kronshtadt Bay. The Peipus Lake Flotilla was created. The Baltic Fleet prevented penetration of the enemy naval forces east of the island of Gogland. In addition to the army guns, fire support was provided by three groups of ships: (1) a group of destroyers, gunboats, and coastal guns, between Leningrad and the island of Izhora; (2) a group composed of two cruisers (Petropavlovsk, Maxim Gorki) and destroyers in the commercial port of Leningrad and in its western entrance; and (3) a group composed of two battleships (Marat, Oktjabrskaya Revolutsiya) and one cruiser (Kirov), plus several destroyers and gunboats in the Oranienbaum–Kronshtadt area.50 A prolonged defense of a major naval base can greatly slow down an advance by enemy ground forces along the coast. A well-­organized defense of naval bases would force the attacker to commit substantial forces and much time and effort. This is especially the case in an area favorable for amphibious landings. For example, the Soviets conducted a protracted defense of their naval bases and major ports during the speedy German advance along the Baltic and the Black Sea coasts in the summer of 1941, thereby slowing down the German advance. The newly acquired base of Reval (Tallinn today) in Estonia was defended by the Soviets between August 20 and 27, 1941. The defense of Tallinn was relatively short but had great importance for the defense of Leningrad. The German forces reached the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland on August 7, 1941. They attacked Tallinn on August 20.51 On August 29, despite the German artillery fire and the Luftwaffe attacks the Soviet evacuated their troops from Tallinn to Kronshtadt – a distance of some 170 miles.52 In the Black Sea, the Soviets defended the port of Odessa from mid-­August through mid‑September 1941 against the German–Romanian forces. Initially, the Germans used eleven divisions in attacking Odessa.53 The port of Odessa was not fortified before the war. Hence, its defense was only possible with the help of the Black Sea Fleet. Odessa was defended (Primorskaya Armiya) by the Coastal Army on land. The war council of the Black Sea Fleet, in its directive issued on June 27, gave instructions to the commander of Odessa naval base for the organization of the defense of the city. The plan for the defense of Odessa was actually issued in a directive of the Soviet High Command (Stavka) to the Commander of Southwest Direction and the commander of South Front (army group in western terms), with copies to the commanders of Southwest Front and the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet was ordered to defend Odessa as long as possible.54 On August 4, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet was directed to organize defenses against land attack. On August 19, Odessa Defense Region was established.55

294   Defense/capturing of important positions The Romanian positions were fired on by Soviet cruisers and destroyers as they approached Odessa. Shortly after the beginning of the German–Romanian attack, the Soviets brought at least two of their divisions and a large quantity of weapons/ammunition across the sea into the city.56 The Soviets claimed that during the siege of Odessa they brought in 66,000 reinforcements (this number included 25,000 men transported on board the Black Sea Fleet ships).57 Facing the prospect of losing all the troops defending Odessa, the Soviets decided to evacuate them to Crimea. Between October 1 and 16 some 86,000 soldiers, 150,000 civilians and much valuable materiel were brought to safety.58 While the best divisions were brought to Sevastopol, enough Soviet troops remained to continue a stubborn defense of the Odessa. The final evacuation took place on the night of October 15/16, 1941 when the Soviets extricated some 35,000 soldiers from Odessa.59 The Romanians discovered this after Soviet transports were already near Sevastopol (and attacked from the air). Only 6,000 Soviet troops were taken prisoners.60 The Soviet defense of Odessa considerably slowed down the German advance along the coast. Some five divisions held their ground against an army of 160,000 men from five army corps and twenty-­one divisions. They practically paralyzed the attackers.61 The Black Sea Fleet made a significant contribution to the defense of Odessa. Its ships maintained links between Odessa and ports on Crimea and the Caucasus by bringing fresh reinforcements and providing fire support.62 The Soviets offered even greater resistance in their defense of Sevastopol, their main naval base in the Black Sea. The Germans captured Sevastopol after about 290 days of siege (October 30, 1941–July 7, 1942). Soviet surface ships and submarines kept the garrison supplied throughout this siege.63 By mid-­ September 1941, the German–Romanian troops had reached Perekop and thereby directly threatened Crimea. The Germans massed the 11th Army under General Erich von Manstein in the northern part of the Kherson.64 The Soviets started to prepare defense positions around Sevastopol on July 4, 1941. The Sevastopol Defense Area was a part of the Coastal Army.65 The garrison also included two infantry regiments and one battalion of sailors plus the personnel of some naval schools.66 The outer or forward defense extended some 9.3 to 10.5 miles away from the city. It stretched for 31 miles and was up to 1.2 miles deep. It ran some 3 miles north of the Kacha river to 3 miles east of Balaklava. The 22-mile long main defense line ran from the mouth of the Kacha River to Balaklava. It was established at 6.2 to 7.5 miles from the city. The 18-mile long rear defense line was 1.9 to 3.7 miles from the city. It ran just outside of the anti-­tank ditch. Behind this line were dug-­in artillery and machine guns.67 Sevastopol was heavily fortified. It had some fortifications from the Crimean War (1853–1856). The backbone of defenses consisted of twelve naval gun batteries (forty-­two guns) ranging from 15-mm to 305-mm caliber. They were in armored turrets and concrete emplacements. Defenses also included 200 AA guns ranging from 85-mm to multiple machine guns. In addition, there were

Defense/capturing of important positions   295 eight armored batteries of guns removed from two old cruisers. AA defenses were reduced to 100 guns to protect the eastern approaches to Sevastopol.68 Defense on the ground consisted of five rifle divisions, one cavalry division, two naval infantry brigades, and several “independent” regiments.69 The ships of the Black Sea Fleet transported troops to Sevastopol and Kerch. They also shipped weapons and equipment not needed for defense from Sevastopol and Kerch to Caucasus.70 The first German attack started on November 11 and ended ten days later. The Soviets brought on board ship to Sevastopol 19,000 fresh troops and 4,000 tons of ammunitions/weapons.71 After the weather improved, the Germans started their second attack along the entire 27 miles long front on December 17.72 The Germans gained ground, but stiff Soviet resistance prevented them from capturing the port. Afterward, they laid siege to Sevastopol. The Germans used heavy guns and massive attacks by the Luftwaffe to inflict heavy losses on the defenders. At that time, there were twelve ships of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol plus eight others under repair. These ships were used to provide fire support to the Sevastopol defenders. To relieve pressure on Sevastopol, the Zakavkasky Front and Black Sea Fleet were directed by Stavka to plan for the landing of two armies (44th and 51st) on the Kerch Peninsula at Feodosiya. This landing was supported by the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Flotilla, and the Kerch naval base. The Black Sea Fleet supported the landing at Feodosiya with two cruisers, six destroyers, eighteen minesweepers, and fourteen transports. They also brought in some 22,000 troops with their weapons from Novorossiysk and Tuapse.73 The ships of the Black Sea Fleet took an active part in the defense of Sevastopol. From January to May 1942, they provided fire support to defenders at Sevastopol and on the Crimean front. Some fifteen naval vessels took part in the defense of Sevastopol and fourteen others in support of the Crimean Front.74 They escorted ships bringing troops and materiel to Sevastopol. From December 1941 to January 1942, there were 215 supply trips to Sevastopol, including seven with naval vessels. In February and March, the ships made eight-­four trips (including twenty-­four with naval vessels). The ships continued to bring troops and weapons until June 1942. In May and June, Sevastopol was supplied by six submarines and eleven torpedo boats, plus some armed landing barges.75 The Germans, with superiority on the ground and complete command of the air, began their final attack on the fortress on June 7, 1942. By then, the Soviet forces defending the city consisted of seventy battalions organized in seven rifle divisions, three naval infantry brigades, and other formations. They had only forty tanks but 600 guns. The attackers had seven German and two Romanian divisions, supported by 700 guns (mostly medium and heavy caliber). The Germans did not have panzers but had assault gun battalions. The attackers were supported by VIII Air Corps (seven bomber, three dive bomber, and four fighter groups), and seventeen Flak (AA) batteries.76 The defense perimeter of Sevastopol had been reduced in the German attack in December 1941. It extended for some 16 miles across. The Germans had high

296   Defense/capturing of important positions confidence in their superiority in combined arms tactics. They accepted the great risk in attacking the well-­entrenched and tough enemy. The VIII Air Corps had full control of the air. The Germans made rapid progress. The Luftwaffe’s air superiority proved to be decisive. The Black Sea Fleet brought in reinforcements and supplies but only during the night. According to the Soviet sources, some 4,000 tons of supplies were shipped to Sevastopol. The remnants of the Soviet Coastal Army withdraw to the Khersonnes Peninsula. However, there were no Soviet ships waiting to bring them to safety. On July 4, some 30,000 defenders surrendered. The Germans took some 90,000 men as prisoners and captured 460 guns. They also suffered relatively high losses – 24,000 men. In the final attack on Sevastopol, the Germans used 46,000 tons of ammunition and 20,000 tons of bombs.77 By the beginning of August 1942, German troops had reached Krasnodar and threatened to capture Novorossiysk. On August 17, the commander of the Soviet 47th Army became responsible for the defense of Novorossiysk. Both the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet took part in the defense of Novorossiysk. The sea defense consisted of units from the naval base at Novorossiysk, coastal artillery, and naval aviation. By the end of August 1942, the Germans captured Anape. This made the situation for Novorossiysk more difficult. During heavy fighting, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet provided fire support and transported troops and civilians from Novorossiysk to the Poti and Batumi. On September 7, the Germans penetrated the defense of Novorossiysk and captured a large part of the city. However, a large part of Novorossiysk was still in Soviet hands.78 The city was captured on September 11. By mid-­October 1942, the Soviet troops in Tuapse faced a critical situation. On October 27, the Germans advanced to the vicinity of Tuapse. The Black Sea Fleet used two cruisers, one destroyer leader, destroyers, and torpedo boats to transport within five days three guard rifle brigades and one mountain division from Poti to Tuapse. On October 31, the German troops stopped their attacks and shifted to defense. The Germans carried out a second and a third attack in late November. However, these attacks failed. The defense of Tuapse was conducted from September 25 to December 20, 1941. The Germans were forced to stop their advance. Some 10,000 Black Sea Fleet sailors also fought on the land front 79 In 1943, after their defeat at Stalingrad, the Germans were strategically on the defensive. In the second half of March 1944, the Soviet armies advanced westward along the Black Sea coast. By the end of March 1944, the Soviet troops reached Odessa. The seaborne evacuation began on April 1 and ended ten days later. All available shipping space and operational naval units were used and all other supply traffic to the Crimea was suspended. The weather was favorable.80 The German evacuation of Odessa required eighteen steamers to make twenty-­six trips, twenty-­four tugs and similar craft in sixty trips, and twenty-­five naval barges in seventy-­six trips. There was never a shortage of targets for the Soviets. Surprisingly, the Soviet Black Fleet did not take advantage by preventing evacuation by sea after the Red Army cut off all land

Defense/capturing of important positions   297 communications to the German defenders at Odessa. This omission enabled German naval forces to transport most of the defenders to safety. The Germans evacuated 24,300 troops (including 9,300 wounded) and civilian refugees to the Romanian ports.81 With the exception of one barge, all the ships (with 81,000 tons) were taken away from Odessa, including four ships under construction, twenty-­seven barges, thirteen fuel barges, twenty-­nine river barges, and twenty miscellaneous craft.82 The last German unit left on the evening of April 9. The port was mined, and its installations destroyed.83 The entire effort was highly improvised but highly successful. A weaker side at sea but superior on land can use its army, with the support of the air force and some support from naval forces, to capture enemy naval/air bases in the coastal area. If it loses its bases, even a stronger side at sea would be unable to obtain or maintain sea control. For example, one of the main reasons for the poor performance of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in 1941 was that because of the rapid German advance along the coast, all the Soviet bases and ports, except the Leningrad–Kronshtadt area and its immediate vicinity in the Baltic, fell into German hands within ten weeks after the war started. Likewise, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet lost all its large bases by July 1942. Shortly after the fall of Sevastopol, the Germans seized Novorossiysk so that the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was left only with the small naval bases of Tuapse, Poti, and Batum on the Caucasus coast that were not capable of providing support for major surface combatants and submarines.84 In retrospect, if the Germans had focused their efforts on capturing the few remaining Soviet naval bases in the eastern part of the Black Sea, as part of their summer offensive of 1942, they would probably have forced the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to self-­destruct or be interned in Turkey. However, these ideas were apparently lost on the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), although the Soviets were aware of the threat.85 Obviously, neither ground forces nor air forces can obtain or maintain control of the sea alone. This objective can be accomplished only by one’s naval forces. For example, the Kriegsmarine maintained and exercised control of the Baltic, except for occasional forays of the Soviet submarines, in the Baltic in 1941–1944. The German and the Finnish navies established tight control of the Gulf of Finland. In defense of the coast, it is critically important to select which positions should be strongly defended, and which should be held with minimum forces. A weaker side cannot be ultimately successful in disputing sea control without retaining control of some critically important positions, such as a small peninsula, large island or archipelago, and naval/air basing area. Defense of positions is closely related to defense of naval/air bases. Threats to one’s bases and ports today are potentially much greater and more diverse than they were in the past. A weaker side at sea is often strong on land. Hence, its army, with the  full support of its air force, might capture enemy naval bases in its offensive operations along the coast. This, in turn would greatly facilitate the navy’s efforts to dispute and possibly even obtain control of the sea in a littoral area.

298   Defense/capturing of important positions The army had in the past, and will have in the future, primary responsibility for the defense of important positions and naval/air basing areas. However, experience has shown that modern warfare requires full and effective support from other services. Optimally, a single maritime operational commander should be responsible for all the plans and their execution in preparing for and defending important positions and basing areas. The operational commander should have full authority and responsibility to sequence and synchronize all elements of operational support (intelligence, information operations, fires, logistics, protection) with combat operations. At the same time, subordinate tactical commanders should have sufficient freedom of action that they can exercise the initiative. This means that the true mission command should be applied throughout the chain of command.

Notes   1 Elwin F. Cutts, Operations for Securing Command of the Sea Areas, Part 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, July 8–9, 1938), p. 55.   2 Charles E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, Their Relations and Interdependence (London/Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905), p. 395.   3 Boris Karpov, Obalska Odbrana (Belgrade: Vojno-­izdavački Zavod, 1957), p. 52.   4 Karpov, Obalska Odbrana, pp. 54–55.   5 Karpov, Obalska Odbrana, p. 56.   6 Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944: Der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1982), pp. 23–24.   7 Lars Hellwinkel, Hitler’s Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), p. 145.   8 Martin Blumenson, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), p. 631.   9 Blumenson, The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, p. 634. 10 Blumenson, The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 633–634. 11 Blumenson, The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, p. 634. 12 Blumenson, The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, p. 641. 13 Blumenson, The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, p. 656. 14 Blumenson, The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, p. 653. 15 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 2: 1942–1945 (Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1975), pp. 448, 462. 16 Samuel E. Morison, The Two-­Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p.  214; Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. II, The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 417. 17 Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III, The Offensive, Part 1: 1st June 1943–31st May 1944 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960), p. 233. 18 Horst Boog, Richard Lakowski, Werner Rahn, Manfred Zeidler, and John Zimmermann, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 10/1: Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches 1945, Part 1: Die Militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht (Stuttgart/Munich: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 2008), p. 240. 19 Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 112.

Defense/capturing of important positions   299 20 This included 74 tanks, 21,000 motor vehicles, 28,000 horse-­drawn vehicles, 1,200–1,800 guns 75,000 horses, 6,500 cattle, and 115,000 tons of military equipment; Dietrich von Conrady, “Die Kriegsmarine und der letzte Kampf im Sewastopol im Mai 1944,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vol. 11, No. 6 (June 1961), p. 314; Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 112. 21 Boog, Lakowski, Rahn, Zeidler, and Zimmermann, Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, p. 240. 22 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 113. 23 Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlg, 1958), p. 265. 24 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 113. 25 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 49. 26 Albert Seaton, The Russo-­German War 1941–45 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971), p. 526.  27 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 49. 28 Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), p. 432. 29 Boog, Lakowski, Rahn, Zeidler, and Zimmermann, Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, p. 272. 30 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 51. 31 V.I. Chkalov et al., Der Kampf der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte (Dresden: Militär­ verlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976) (translated from the Russian by Helmut Förster et al., Boyevoy put’ Sovetskogo-­Voyenno-Morskogo Flota, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 3rd and enlarged ed., 1974), p. 393. 32 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 251, 253. 33 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 275. 34 Between April 14 and 26 about 80,000 troops and 2,500 tons of material were carried from the Crimea to Constanţa; by May 12, about 26,000 soldiers and 6,100 wounded had been evacuated, while about 8,100 men had been lost; in addition, some 16,000 men including 1,000 wounded were transported by air to Romania; Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 130. 35 Some twelve German warships and auxiliaries, one Romanian craft, seven steamers, seven tugs, and twenty-­one miscellaneous craft were sunk, mostly by Soviet air attacks; however, the losses of personnel were relatively high – 6,000 to 9,000 men; Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 280–282; Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p.  132; Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 2: 1942–1945 (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1975), pp. 398–399. 36 Von Conrady, “Die Kriegsmarine und der letzte Kampf,” pp. 320, 330. 37 Oscar di Giamberardino, Seekriegskunst, trans. E. Mohr (Berlin: Verlag “Offene Worte,” 1938), p. 99. 38 V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981) (translated from the Russian, Sovetskoye Voyenno-­Morskoye Iskusstvo v Velikoy-­Otechestvennoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1973), p. 66. 39 David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York/ Washington, DC: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 216–217; the Luftwaffe sank three Soviet destroyers and a number of smaller warships and transports; Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 79. 40 Woodward, Russians at Sea, pp. 216–217; the Luftwaffe sank three Soviet destroyers and several smaller warships and transports; Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 79. 41 Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations, pp. 68–70. 42 A. Kolpakov, “Evakuatsiya Hanko,” Morskoy Sbornik (Moscow), No. 11 (November 1991), p. 41.

300   Defense/capturing of important positions 43 V.I. Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte (Dresden: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976) (translated from the Russian by Helmut Förster et al., Boyevoy put’ Sovetskogo-­Voyenno-Morskogo Flota, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 3rd and enlarged ed., 1974), p. 311. 44 Kolpakov, “Evakuatsiya Hanko,” p. 41. 45 Kolpakov, “Evakuatsiya Hanko,” p. 42. 46 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 23. 47 Kolpakov, “Evakuatsiya Hanko,” p. 46. 48 Ammon, “Operatsiya Baltiyskogo Flota Po Evakuatsii Garnizona Hanko,” Morskoy Sbornik (Moscow), No. 11 (November 1976) p. 25. 49 Kolpakov, “Evakuatsiya Hanko,” p. 46. 50 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, pp. 313–315. 51 Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations, pp. 56–57. 52 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 302. 53 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 386. 54 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 385. 55 Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations, p. 70. 56 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 67. 57 I.D. Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” Morskoy Sbornik (Moscow), No. 12 (December 1969), p. 23. 58 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 66; the Soviets claimed that some 120,000 men were evacuated from the city on board ships; Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” p. 23. 59 Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations, p. 75. 60 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 66. 61 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 67. 62 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 386. 63 Woodward, Russians at Sea, pp. 216–217; the Luftwaffe sank three Soviet destroyers and a number of smaller warships and transports; Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 79. 64 Chkalov et al., Der Kampf der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 393. 65 Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” p. 25. 66 Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations, p. 77. 67 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p.  395; Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), p. 106. 68 Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, pp. 105–106. 69 Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, p. 77. 70 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 397. 71 Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” p. 26. 72 Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, p. 108. 73 Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” pp. 25–27. 74 Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” p. 27. 75 Eliseev, “Sily Flota i Bazy v Boevykh Deystviyakh,” p. 28. 76 Albert Seaton, The Russo-­German War 1941–45 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), p. 263. 77 Seaton, Russo-­German War 1941–45, pp. 263–264. 78 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, pp. 420–421. 79 Achkasov et al., Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte, p. 421. 80 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 127. 81 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 127. 82 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 127. 83 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, pp. 127–128. 84 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 77. 85 Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, p. 123.

12 Defense/capturing a choke point

A weaker side at sea which nevertheless controls one or both shores of some international strait or narrows would enjoy superior geographic position against a would-­be attacker. A strait is a unique operating area. Success in both defense and offense cannot be achieved without the closest cooperation of the army, the navy, and the air force. Generally, denying control of an international strait is a defensive operational objective for a weaker side at sea. Defense of an international strait would normally require planning and execution of a major defensive joint/combined operation. A weaker side at sea which is superior on land can capture a choke point by using its ground forces and air force with little or no participation of the navy. The main methods in denying control of a choke point are: • • • • •

Preventing the enemy’s naval movements. Preventing the enemy’s movement of military/commercial shipping. Support of the army in defending a choke point. Ensuring safety of transport of friendly troops. Preventing transport of the enemy’s troops.

A major objective of a weaker side is to prevent movement of the enemy’s surface ships and/or submarines through a strait/narrows or wide passage. Then, a weaker side controlling the sea’s single exit might be in a situation to prevent the stronger side from forcing the entrance from a larger narrow sea or the open ocean. Another possibility is that a stronger side is a riparian state of an enclosed/semi-­enclosed sea and forces a choke point to reach the open waters of an ocean or another narrow sea. For example, prior to 1914, the Russians anticipated that the German main forces would attempt to penetrate the Gulf of Finland shortly after the beginning of hostilities. They were determined to make an all-­out effort to prevent the Germans from threatening their capital St. Petersburg. The Russian main defenses were mines and coastal artillery. The entire defense revolved around “Central Position,” composed of a series of mine barriers with some 2,200 mines between Porkkala– Udde and Vargö. These mines were laid by four minelayers on July 30, 1914. The entire fleet was used as a cover for this operation. Because of malfunctioning, ten mines exploded shortly after being laid.1

302   Defense/capturing a choke point The Russians planned to complement Central Position with “1st Position” at the latitude of Dagö (Hiiumaa today). It would be composed of several mine barriers and coastal artillery batteries within the Gulf of Finland. However, the 1st Position was only partially established by the beginning of the war.2 In July 1914, the Russians laid some 2,200 mines at the Central Position and the 1st Position. Between August and December 1914, Central Position was reinforced with additional mines. In 1915, the main defense position shifted to the 1st Position. The number of mines was increased to 4,000.3 However, a major part of these mines was destroyed in the winter months because of the heavy ice. Hence, mine barriers had to be replenished in the spring. The Russian mines in the Gulf of Finland were responsible for the sinking of seven new torpedo boats of the German X Flotilla on November 10, 1916; only three boats came back safely.4 In World War I, the Russians established strong defenses in the Gulf of Finland aimed at preventing penetration by German surface ships. The objective was to delay the German forces for at least fifteen days at the Porkkala–Reval line. The Russian sea defenses consisted of heavy guns ranging from 120 mm to 305 mm plus 3,925 mines. By 1917, the number of mines laid was increased to 10,840.5 For the first line of defense of the Nargen–Porkkala passage the Russians envisaged the employment of eleven submarines. The main forces consisted of four battleships, nine cruisers, twenty destroyers, and eleven torpedo boats.6 The Russians also deployed on land the 6th Army with two army corps, one guard brigade, three infantry divisions, one guard, and one regular cavalry brigade. Defenses centered on three forts: Reval, Kronshtadt, and Helsinki.7 The fleet would use naval bases at Reval and Helsinki for attacking German ships advancing into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and for withdrawal.8 At the beginning of the war in August 1914, the Russians did not have any defense position on the Åland Islands or in the Bay of Riga. The first mines in the Irben Strait were not laid until October 1914. Additional mines were laid in the summer of 1915. They were intended to provide protection from German attack from the northwest. The first German attempt to penetrate the Irben Strait on August 8, 1914 failed. The Germans lost several minesweepers and one ship (Thetis) was damaged. However, the Russian forces defending the mine barriers were unable to prevent German minesweeping work.9 On August 18, 1915, the Germans made a second attempt to enter Bay of Riga. The Germans were more successful in their second attempt to break through the Irben Strait on August 18, 1915.10 The ratio of forces (German had large surface ships) was unfavorable for the Russians. The Germans were able to penetrate the Russian mine barriers (they used one minesweeper division for clearing the mines) and penetrated the Bay of Riga. The Germans destroyed two Russian gunboats while the Germans lost two boats from the mines.11 In the aftermath, the Russians renewed mining of the Irben Strait.12 To make any new penetration of the Irben Strait impossible, the Russians established in the Irben Strait a series of barriers and protected them with 305-mm coastal guns. They also reinforced the heavy forces in the Bay of Riga. The security of the routes around Dagö and Oesel (Saaremaa today) was greatly

Defense/capturing a choke point   303 enhanced by deepening the waterway in the Moonsund so that it could be used by old battleships and cruisers. Yet the German U-­boats were able multiple times to penetrate these barriers.13 Prior to 1914, the Turks established strong defenses on the Dardanelles. The 40-mile long Dardanelles is 3.7 miles wide at its entrance. It narrows at Canakkale to only 1,600 yards. Afterward, it steadily broadens out until the Sea of Marmora is reached 23 miles further on. A strong current flows from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, which makes maneuvering difficult for ships. The 50-mile long Gallipoli peninsula borders with the Bay of Saros. Its narrowest part is 2.8 miles across at Bulair Isthmus. The peninsula widens to 12.4 miles for a distance of 37 miles at Bei Kapa Tepe. Then it abruptly narrows down to 6.2 miles and continues to Cape Hellas.14 The narrowness of the Straits exposed enemy ships to guns mounted on both northern and southern shores. The Turkish mine barriers were covered by some eighty heavy guns.15 Most guns were French and German 9-inch (210-mm) and 11-inch (280-mm) and some obsolete 13.5-inch guns.16  At the time of the Anglo-­French naval attack on March 18, 1915, the Turkish defenses of the Dardanelles consisted of eighty-­two guns in fixed positions plus some 230 mobile guns and howitzers. The new XV Corps headquarters and reconstructed 3rd ID were deployed in the Straits.17 After Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany on October 29, 1914, the British and the French planned to destroy the Turkish fortifications in the Straits by using battleships and cruisers. They depended on slow minesweeping trawlers to sweep mines ahead of the battleships.18 The Anglo-­French fleet assigned to force the Straits was commanded by Admiral Sackville Carden (1857–1930). The bombardment force consisted of nineteen battleships, thirteen cruisers, thirty-­two destroyers and torpedo boats, one seaplane carrier and balloon ship each, a few submarines with their depot ship, twenty-­nine minesweeping and net laying trawlers, plus a variety of minor servicing craft.19 On February 19, 1915, the Anglo-­French ships bombarded three Turkish outer forts on the Asian side (Helles, Orkanic, and Kum Kale) and one outer fort (Sedd-­el-Bahr) on the European side. These forts had two 11.2-inch, two 10.2inch and four 9.4-inch guns supported by two 9.4-inch guns at Helles. Kum Kale on the Asian side had slightly stronger armament than Sedd-­el-Bahr and was supported by two 9.4-inch guns at Orkanic.20 The Anglo-­French fleet consisted of two modern battleships (Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon) and nine old battleships. They carried eight 15-inch, thirty-­eight 12-inch, six 10-inch, ten 9.2-inch, fourteen 7.5-inch, and sixty-­seven 6-inch guns. However, this firepower superiority was largely illusory because of the limitations in range finding and fire control. Accurate fire was not likely. Admiral Carden also had under his command four light cruisers and sixteen destroyers.21 Because of severe gales, the Anglo-­French bombardment of the Dardanelles was not resumed until February 25. The experience gained on February 19 led to changes in using shipboard guns. The battleships engaged Sedd-­el-Bahr, Helles, Orkanic and Kum Kale at long range in the morning of February 25. These forts

304   Defense/capturing a choke point seemed to be silenced. In the night of February 25/26, twenty-­five trawlers protected by destroyers swept a 4-mile channel inside the Narrows. They did not find any mines. The allies landed small demolition parties at Sedd-­el-Bahr and Kum Kale on February 26. However, the allied ships were not entirely successful. They destroyed only about 35 percent of the heavy guns at Sedd-­el-Bahr and Kum Kale. The remainder would have been ready in a few days if they had not been blown by the demolition charges.22 The key intermediate defenses in the Dardanelles were the forts at Dardanos, with five 5.9-inch guns, on the Asiatic side and Beikush, with three 5.9-inch, on the European side. The Turks also had thirty-­six mobile howitzers hidden on both sides of the Narrows. Their fire was controlled by forward observers. Mobile howitzers were intended to protect defensive minefields blockading the approaches to the Narrows.23 The seven forts on the European and the Asiatic side of the Narrows were much more formidable than those at the entrance. They were difficult to hit. Anchoring was impractical. These forts had a total of sixty-­ one guns (six 14-inch, five 11.2-inch, six 10.2-inch, thirty-­four 9.4-inch, and ten 8.2-inch) and they were reinforced by the minefields. However, by March 18, the Allied ships had reduced the number of these guns to forty-­five.24 The Allied bombardment started on February 26. Three battleships (Albion, Triumph, Majestic) bombarded Dardanos. Some ships were hit by the Turkish guns, but strong gales again interfered. The bombardment was delayed until March 1. The new attack on Dardanos was also unsuccessful. It became clear that the forts in the Narrows could not be suppressed until the minefields were cleared. This required suppressing intermediate defenses. This necessitated, in turn, occupation of the Peninsula.25 In the night of March 7/8, the Turks laid (unobserved by their enemies) some twenty-­six mines in the Gulf of Grenko. These mines were laid at different depths and were controlled from the shore.26 They were laid in the same area where Anglo-­French ships fired on the Turkish forts. The British minesweepers cleared only a few mines.27 Bombardment and efforts to sweep minefields continued until March 13. Seven trawlers were used. In the meantime, the British Admiralty became impatient with slow progress in suppressing the Turkish defenses in the Dardanelles. On March 11, it sent a message to Admiral Carden that the time had come to overwhelm the forts in the Narrows at decisive range by the fire of the larger number of guns great and small that can be brought to bear on them. Under cover of the fire, the guns at the forts might be destroyed by landing parties and as much as possible of the minefield swept up.28 By mid-­March, the Narrows had been swept at the entrance. The allies believed that the waterway was safe for the employment of large ships.29 At 1000 on March 18, 1915, eighteen Anglo-­French battleships entered the Dardanelles. Initially all went well. However, at 1400, the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine and sank in 2 minutes. Out of 710 men on board, 640 lost their lives. At 1605, after reaching 5 miles from the entrance, Inflexible ran into

Defense/capturing a choke point   305 a mine. It was so damaged that it had to be beached.30 Ten minutes later the battleship Irresistible struck a mine too. At 1750, it had to be abandoned. It was clear that battleships could not remain within the Narrows and the general recall was hoisted. Yet at 1805 the battleship Ocean ran into a mine and was abandoned at 1930. It sank during the night.31 Forcing the Straits was a heavy defeat for the Anglo-­French fleet. Three battleships were sunk. The Inflexible was put out of action for long time. Two French battleships were so badly damaged that they had to be sent away for repairs. At that time there were some 350 unswept mines. Hence, continued action would result in more heavy losses.32 The British did not foresee the danger from mines or the amount of opposition that could be expected from mobile guns and their effect on minesweeping. British intelligence was faulty because it greatly underestimated the Turkish defenses in the Straits. The allied naval authorities were deluded in thinking that the enemy’s resistance would not immediately be very effective, as the successful action of one light cruiser (Doris) off the Syrian coast late in December 1914 and early 1915 showed.33 The Allied failure showed the great effectiveness of mines in blocking the enemy’s naval movements through a choke point. The Turks were highly successful in using mines in combination with coastal guns and searchlight installations. The allies tried to sweep the mines several times during the night and once in daylight. The British sent minesweepers at night, but they were detected by the Turkish searchlights.34 In the end, all the efforts to sweep the Turkish mines were unsuccessful. The Anglo-­French effort to force the Dardanelles with heavy surface forces on March 18, 1915 failed in part because of defensive minefields laid by the Turks. A small Turkish steamer avoided a British destroyer patrol and laid a new line of mines well outside the main minefield, dropping them parallel to the shore in Eren Keui Bay. The new line was undiscovered and unsuspected while the fleet advanced past it to engage the forts. These mines were responsible for sinking three out of eighteen Anglo-­French battleships, while three more battleships were badly damaged. Afterward, the British admiral John M. de Robeck (1862–1928) (Admiral Carden was relieved due to poor health in early March) ordered a general withdrawal from the Narrows and that ended the naval effort in the Dardanelles.35 Prior to World War I, the Danish Straits (Skagerrak and Kattegat) had a major effect on the German plans for defense of their coast and their vitally important maritime trade with the Scandinavian countries, and Sweden in particular. The prerequisite for that was that Denmark and/or Sweden remain neutral in a war between Germany and a major out-­of-the-­area power, such as France or Britain. However, at the outbreak of war in August 1914, the Germans mined the southern exit from the Belts. This mining was aimed at preventing transit of the British forces into the Baltic. After several British submarines transited the Sund and operated in the Baltic, the German mine barriers were greatly strengthened and made more effective.36 The German High Command allowed the Danes to close the exits of the Belts and the Sound with mines. It was reportedly thankful for the protection it provided their control of the Baltic. But the fact was that the

306   Defense/capturing a choke point security of the Baltic rested solely upon the High Seas Fleet. Danish power would have collapsed the moment the German fleet did not stand behind it. The effect of this action was that trade routes passing behind the barrier were removed from German reach under the guise of Danish neutrality. England received a trade route for free – without deploying even a single fishing trawler.37 In an enclosed sea, the most effective method of neutralizing enemy submarines is to blockade the sea’s sole exit or exits in the case of a semi-­enclosed sea. In World War I, a combination of fixed defenses (mines, anti-­torpedo nets, indicator nets, etc.) and patrols by smaller ships and drifters was used to prevent enemy submarines from forcing a strait. In World War II, in addition to patrols by small ships and craft and mines, patrol and reconnaissance aircraft were extensively used to search for enemy submarines. Perhaps the most successful effort in World War II to prevent enemy submarines from operating in open waters was the German–Finnish mining of the Gulf of Finland in 1941–1944. A major reason for this success was the geography and the military situation on the land front. The 12,000-square mile Gulf of Finland extends for some 250 miles from the Hanko Peninsula to Leningrad. Its width varies from about 43 miles at its western entrance to some 81 miles on the line connecting the cities of Kotka (Finland) and Meriküla (Estonia) at the longitude of the island of Lavansaari (Moshchnyy today). The gulf is only about 7.5 miles wide at Bay of Kronshtadt. The Gulf of Finland is relatively shallow and is thus very favorable for mining. The deepest part of the Gulf, at its entrance, is 260 to 330 feet. The depths in the Bay of Kronshtadt are only about 20 feet. The average depth of the Gulf of Finland is 125 feet. The depths off the Gulf ’s southern shore are about 330 feet, while the depths of the northern coast do not exceed 200 feet. The Gulf of Finland is usually frozen between November and late April. It is often completely frozen in late January. In 1941–1944 it was critical for the Germans and the Finns to prevent the Soviet submarines from freely operating in the open waters of the Baltic. The German war industry was heavily dependent on the uninterrupted flow of iron ore and other materials from Sweden to the German ports in the Baltic. For the Germans, the price of a successful Soviet submarine offensive in the Baltic would have been high: cutting off the iron ore traffic from Sweden and shale oil from Estonia, cutting off supply routes to Finland and Army Group North, and interrupting vitally important U-­boat training in the Baltic.38 The Germans laid three mine barriers in the Gulf of Finland on the night of June 21/22, 1941: (1) Apolda, between Örö and Takhona; (2) Corbetha, between Kallbådagrund and Pakerort; and (3) Juminda, between Cape Juminda and Kallbåda.39 In May 1942, the Germans reinforced the existing mine barriers and laid the Nasshorn 1–5 barrier (with 1,915 mines) between Porkkala and Naisaar. Another mine barrier, Seeigel 1–8 (2,500 mines) was laid southeastward of Suursaari. Also, in 1942, the Finns laid mine barriers Rukajärvi A-­C (560 mines) on June 15–30, Ontajärvin I-­II (120 mines) on July 29 and August 26, and Norppa barrier west of Someri.40

Defense/capturing a choke point   307 In the summer of 1942, the Germans reinforced the A/S forces by employing SCs, M-­boats, and K-­boats for patrols west and south of the Seeigel and west of the Nasshorn mine barriers. At the same time, the Finnish patrol boats protected Rukajärvi mine barrier.41 In the fall of 1942, the Germans laid a new barrier, codenamed Lachs (Salmon) 1–8 in the fairway off the Aspö skerries while the Finns laid another barrier, Wisepakka (167 mines), in the Åland Sea.42 In 1942, the Germans and the Finns laid 12,875 mines and mine obstructors in the Gulf of Finland and its western approaches. They also used small patrol craft and aircraft at daylight to protect their mine barriers. In December 1942, the Germans laid a double anti-­submarine net between Porkkala and Nargen Island.43 No Soviet submarine was able to break through the German–Finnish defenses in the Gulf of Finland.44 In 1944, despite the deteriorating situation on the land front, the Germans continued with their efforts to strengthen their A/S defenses in the Gulf of Finland. Beginning in late May and by the end of summer they laid 7,600 mines and 2,800 mine obstructors. Most of the supplementary mines were laid in the Seeigel mine barrier. The German aim was not only to prevent the breakthrough of the Soviet submarines but also to protect the flank of the German troops ashore. This new net-­mine barrier was 17 nautical miles long and stretched between Hungerburg and the island of Suur-­Tytärsaari. In May 1944, the Germans completed partial barrier A (1,630 mines and 950 mine obstructors) in the western part of Narva Bay and the 9-nautical mile long barrier B (600 mines and 200 mine obstructors) between Suursaari and Suur-­Tytärsaari. Both barriers were intended to block the exit of the Soviet submarines.45 The Finno-­German defenses of the Gulf of Finland proved to be extremely successful in that the Soviet submarines tried repeatedly and largely unsuccessfully to cross mine barriers in the Gulf of Finland to operate in the open waters of the Baltic. By mid-­1944, the Soviet activities in the Gulf of Finland were limited to operations of small surface ships. The Soviets had a total of thirty-­four submarines but seven of them were non-­operational. They learned that it was suicidal to send their submarines against the German–Finnish mines and mobile defenses in the Gulf of Finland.46 One side in a war at sea might be unable to employ surface forces in the theater of main effort because of its decision to make one of the sea’s exits impassable to both commercial vessels and warships. For example, shortly before the outbreak of the Six-­Day War, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the Suez Canal to be made impassable by sinking barges and a few Egyptian merchant vessels. The Egyptian action effectively bottled up about 30 percent of Egypt’s navy (two destroyers and six torpedo craft) in the Red Sea, where it was small threat to the Israelis.47 At the same time, any redeployment of the Egyptian surface ships and submarines from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and vice versa was made impossible. Theoretically, a weaker side might blockade a choke point from within an enclosed sea theater to prevent any outside force from entering that theater. This, in turn, might create favorable conditions for maintaining sea control in an

308   Defense/capturing a choke point enclosed sea theater. In some ways, this method is a form of self-­blockade, especially if no further offensive actions are planned or executed.48 In some cases, a weaker power at sea might close an international strait and prevent the enemy’s military/commercial movement. The objective is then to cause economic damage and dislocation. For example, in the Yom Kippur/ Ramadan War of October 1973, the Arabs closed the Red Sea’s only exit, the Strait of Bab el-­Mandeb, to Israeli shipping. Thus, in a single stroke, the Israeli oil imports from Iran were cut off and Israel became entirely dependent on oilfields in the southwestern part of Sinai. Moreover, the Israeli Navy lacked the range and combat power to break the blockade of the straits. Likewise, the Israeli aircraft based in Sinai lacked sufficient range to attack targets in the Bab el-­ Mandeb area.49  At the same time, the Israelis conducted a counter-­blockade of the Sharm el-­Sheikh and Sinai coast of the Gulf of Suez. This considerably affected the Egyptian economy. The Morgan oil fields in the Gulf of Suez and those on the Egyptian coast produced about 8 million tons of oil per year out of a total of 10 million tons produced by Egypt. Part of this production was exported and accounted for 20 percent of Egyptian hard currency earnings; the remainder was shipped to the pipeline at Ras Sadaat and thence to Cairo. To make up for the oil lost due to war, Egypt depended on Saudi Arabia and Libya. However, these supplies were not always forthcoming and were in any case debited against Egypt’s credit. A further economic threat was the fact that the Gulf of Suez ports were Egypt’s outlets to East Africa and to Asia, no less than the port of Eilath was for Israel. This threat was increased as the Israelis were able to operate freely in the Gulf of Suez because of their position along the Sinai coast, and particularly at Sharm el-­Sheikh.50 In the past, the navy has often been used in providing support to the army in defense of a strait/narrows. Today, all services of the armed forces would take part in such a defense. This, in turn, would require planning and execution of a major defensive joint/combined operation. Because of the much-­reduced space, all straits are favorable places for the employment of small surface combatants, various unmanned vehicles, “smart” mines, and coastal missile/gun batteries. Straits with deep water allow the employment of SSKs and midget submarines. The density of shipping traffic would make it very difficult to differentiate friendly from hostile ships. The highly indented coast of some straits, such as the Strait of Hormuz, can provide a sanctuary for combat craft. They can launch missile strikes against large surface combatants with little or no warning. Straits are also ideal environment for using “swarming” tactics against the enemy’s large surface combatants. Advanced mines laid in large numbers can make hostile transit of large enemy ships prohibitively risky. A great advantage for a weaker opponent is that the much reduced space in a strait allows massing of its forces. They would also operate along multiple and much shorter lines of operation and lines of retreat. In contrast, the blue-­water force transiting the strait can use only a single line of operation and a single line of retreat. Another advantage for the weaker force is that sometimes it can obtain and

Defense/capturing a choke point   309 maintain sea control of a strait and its approaches by employing non-­naval forces alone, such as land-­based bombers and attack aircraft, and strong coastal defenses. Since ancient times, straits have been used by a weaker side to transport troops or to prevent transport of the enemy’s troops. They have also been used for evacuation of one’s troops and civilians. For example, the Germans and Italians organized a brilliantly planned and executed evacuation of their combat forces on Sicily across the 2.5- to 6.0-mile wide Strait of Messina in August 1943 (operation Lehrgang). By the beginning of August 1943, the Germans were in almost complete control of the defenses of the Strait of Messina. The Germans and Italians established strong AA defense on both sides of the Strait. The Germans mounted forty-­one heavy and fifty-­two light AA guns on the Sicily side and eighty-­two heavy and sixty light AA guns on the mainland side of the Strait. The Italians manned two 100-mm and 149-mm gun batteries.51 The area over which the Allied aircraft had to fly was covered with 120 heavy and 112 light enemy AA guns on both sides of the Strait of Messina. Preliminary evacuation of the German troops from Sicily started on August 1 and in the next ten days some 12,000 men and 4,500 vehicles plus 5,000 tons of equipment crossed the Strait to mainland Italy. The full-­scale evacuation started on August 11 and ended six days later.52 In only seven days (August 11–17) the Germans evacuated from Sicily across the Strait of Messina 39,600 troops with 9,065 vehicles, twenty-­seven tanks, ninety-­four guns, 1,100 tons of ammunition, and 970 tons of gasoline plus 62,000 Italian troops.53 They used nine Siebel ferries (shallow-­draft catamaran landing craft), seven ferry barges, one naval ferry, twelve landing boats, forty-­one assault boats, and fifty small rubber boats. The evacuation of the Italian troops was entirely directed and executed by the Italian naval command for Messina-­Calabria.54 The Axis losses were fifteen landing barges, six minesweepers, plus a large number of small craft.55 Before the two converging Allied columns entered the city of Messina on August 17, the last Axis ferry had left the port.56 The Germans conducted another successful evacuation of their troops from Sardinia to Corsica. In late August 1943 about 25,000 troops, 2,300 vehicles, and 5,000 tons of supplies were carried across the Strait of Bonifacio to Corsica with virtually no interference from Allied navies or aircraft. Hitler ordered the evacuation of Corsica on September 12 and by October 3, as the French troops approached Bastia, the German evacuation from Corsica had ended. By then, about 6,250 troops, 1,200 prisoners of war, over 3,000 vehicles, and nearly 5,000 tons of stores had been evacuated by sea. At the peak of the evacuation, the Germans used fifteen steamers and 120 barges, landing craft, and miscellaneous craft, losing eighteen ships and craft of all types totaling 17,000 tons.57 The evacuation of the Axis troops from Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica in the summer and fall of 1943 was superbly organized and executed. One cannot but admire the German organization, and flexibility that allowed them to shift their naval and air forces so rapidly from one mission to another; and all this at very short notice and in a time of almost complete Allied superiority at sea and in the air.

310   Defense/capturing a choke point The weaker side at sea might attempt to capture a major strait by relying on the army and air force as the German capture of the Danish Straits in April 1940 shows. Part of Hitler’s instruction of March 1, 1940 for occupation of Denmark (Weserübung Süd) was very broad. Among other things, it directed the forces assigned to invade Denmark to quickly secure the most important points and advance up to Skagen. Forces on the east coast should advance from Funen and capture initial positions on the island of Seeland (Zealand in Danish).58 The Kriegsmarine would support the army by securing communications Nyborg–Korsör and quickly capture the Little Belt. It would also prepare to establish coastal defenses.59 The German invasion went according to plan. The 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 170th ID moved from their assembly area. On April 7, the elements of the 198th ID moved to Kiel, Travemünde and Swinemünde.60 The German troops crossed the border at about 0525 on April 9. The 170th ID plus some other units were assigned the western sector. Their objective was to capture the Jutland Peninsula. In the east, the 198th ID’s objective was to capture Zealand, Falster, Moen, and Bornholm islands.61 The 170th ID moved northward in several groups up to Skagen.62 At 0730, one parachute platoon and battalion of the 69th infantry regiment transported by air took possession of Aalborg airfields.63 X Air Corps heavily bombed the large airfield at Vaerlöse near Copenhagen. The Germans also captured airfields at Esbjerg and Oksboel.64 At 0800, the Danish army stopped its resistance. The Germans advanced northward encountering no or weak resistance. At 1100, Group 3 (mostly minesweepers) entered Esbjerg, followed next morning by Group 11 landing troops at Tyborøn. Group 7 loaded at Kiel one reinforced infantry battalion for landing at Korsør, while one (destroyer-­size) torpedo boat and two minesweepers landed troops at Nyborg. On the west coast of Funen, Group 9 (one steamer plus some small craft) landed troops at Middelfart. These troops would secure a bridge across the Little Belt. One battalion from Warnemünde crossed to Gjedser aboard two train ferries. Group 8 (one motorship, one icebreaker, and two patrol craft carrying one infantry battalion) landed at Copenhagen. Their mission was mainly political and psychological.65 By the evening of April 9, occupation of Jutland and Zealand was practically complete.66 On April 10, one infantry battalion landed on the island of Bornholm.67 The same day, the invasion of Denmark ended. The Germans obtained full control of one shore of Skagerrak and Kattegat, and thereby won strategic control of the Baltic. A weaker side at sea but stronger on land sometimes misses the opportunity to enhance its geostrategic position by not capturing some important choke point. For example, Austria–Hungary failed to seize control of one shore of the Strait of Otranto in 1915–1916. Because of the strategic importance of the Strait of Otranto, the Austro-­Hungarian High Command planned (but its attempt failed) to capture the Albanian port of Valona. By controlling Valona, the enemy’s control of the Strait of Otranto would be significantly weakened. On November 15, 1916, Admiral Haus, in a written response to a question from Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852–1925), Chief of the Austro-­Hungarian General Staff, stated that the capture of Valona by itself would not have any significant effect on naval warfare. Haus rationalized his response by stating that the Italians carried out only

Defense/capturing a choke point   311 two light air attacks from Valona against the Austrian-­controlled port of Durazzo. In his view the Austrians had air superiority. The vicinity of Valona to the Austro-­ Hungarian front would facilitate attacks by the Italian small torpedo boats. He explained that theoretically the capture of Valona was important for surveillance and for making it difficult for the enemy to use Strait of Otranto. However, he believed that in practice the enemy barrage was ineffective. Admiral Haus claimed that the barrage did not prevent a single one of many U-­boats or torpedo boats from transit the Strait despite the presence of many enemy patrol vessels. Also, several enemy patrol vessels were destroyed by the Austrian cruisers, destroyers, U-­boats, and aircraft.68 Haus used ridiculous arguments in rationalizing his views on the importance of capturing Valona and thereby gaining control of one shore of the Strait of Otranto. Among other things, he claimed that possession of Valona by the Italians was the reason that they suffered significant losses from the Austro-­ Hungarian U-­boats and mines. He implausibly claimed that the possession of Valona did not provide any advantages to the Italians but only disadvantages and large losses. Haus wrote that “there is a difference between practice and theory; between abstract strategic principle and concrete reality.” He erroneously claimed that the Austrian fleet and even less individual ships cannot be prevented from exiting the Adriatic “whether Valona is controlled by the Italians or not.” The Austrian merchant ships had freedom of movement in the Adriatic.69 Haus also asserted that whether Valona “is fortified as is now” or had much stronger permanent fortifications “practically does not matter” for the Austrians.70 Admiral Haus, intentionally or not, did not understand that a war at sea is largely a war of positions. Control of Valona would deny Italy and its allies full control of the Strait of Otranto. It would greatly facilitate the Austrian efforts to break up the enemy blockade and allow greater freedom of action not only in the Adriatic but also in the Mediterranean. A weaker side at sea controlling one or both shores of an international strait can exercise significant influence on the operational or even strategic situation in a given maritime theater. This is especially true if a strait is the sea’s only exit. Normally, defense of a major strait is an operational objective. Retaining its control, as the Turkish defense of Gallipoli/Dardanelles in 1915 shows, might even have a strategic effect on the course of a war. It would require the planning and execution of a major joint/combined operation. Experience shows that capturing a well-­defended strait with naval forces alone has rarely been successful. The advantages are largely on the side of a defender. A weaker side, by properly integrating and employing its multi-­service capabilities, can, however, pose a formidable obstacle to a stronger side trying to force the strait short of capturing it by major amphibious landing. In a war between two strong opponents, struggle for control of a major strait would require the commitment of large forces from all services, and a lot of time. A major land power can overcome its disadvantage in naval strength by capturing a major strait from the land side. Obviously, such a major operation would require full and effective army–air forces cooperation.

312   Defense/capturing a choke point

Notes   1 Friedrich Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege 1914 bis 1918: Ihre Erfolge und Misserfolge,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1927), p. 259.   2 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 259.   3 Gerhard Freiherr von Ledebur, Die Seemine (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1977), p. 176.   4 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 260.   5 Boris Karpov, Obalska Odbrana (Belgrade: Vojno-­izdavački Zavod, 1957), pp. 9–10.   6 Karpov, Obalska Odbrana, p. 13.   7 Karpov, Obalska Odbrana, p. 9.   8 Karpov, Obalska Odbrana, p. 13.   9 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 260. 10 Von Ledebur, Die Seemine, pp. 177–178. 11 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 260. 12 Von Ledebur, Die Seemine, pp. 177–178. 13 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 260. 14 Andreas W. Stupka, “Gallipoli – der vergessene Kriegschauplatz,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschritft, No. 6 (November–December 2015), p. 670. 15 Gerhard Regner and Manfred Arnold, Platz, Ziel und Aufgaben der offensive Seeblockade im Rahmen von Seeoperationen der verbundeten Ostseeflotten und gemeinsamen Handlungen der Flottenkräfte mit den anderen Teilstreitkräften im Gebiet der Ostseemeerengen (Dresden: Militärakademie “Friedrich Engels,” 1977), p. 34. 16 Edward J. Erickson, “Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 65, No. 4 (October 2001), p. 985. 17 Erickson, “Strength against Weakness,” p. 992. 18 Ellis A. Johnson and David A. Katcher, Mines against Japan (White Oak, Silver Spring, MD: Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 1947; repr., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 3. 19 A.W.C., “The Immortal Gamble,” Naval Review, Vol. LIII, No. 2 (April 1965), p. 147. 20 K.G.B. Dewar, “The Dardanelles Campaign,” Part I, Naval Review, Vol. XLV, No. 2 (April 1957), p. 152. 21 Dewar, “Dardanelles Campaign,” p. 152. 22 Dewar, “Dardanelles Campaign,” pp. 152–153. 23 Dewar, “Dardanelles Campaign,” p. 153. 24 Dewar, “Dardanelles Campaign,” p. 155. 25 Dewar, “Dardanelles Campaign,” p. 153. 26 Johnson and Katcher, Mines against Japan, p. 3. 27 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 262. 28 Dewar, “Dardanelles Campaign,” p. 154. 29 A.W.C., “The Immortal Gamble,” p. 146. 30 Gregory K. Hartmann, with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy, updated ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 29. 31 A.W.C., “The Immortal Gamble,” p. 146. 32 A.W.C., “The Immortal Gamble,” p. 146. 33 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 216–217. 34 Johnson and Katcher, Mines against Japan, p. 3. 35 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1930; repr., 1964), pp.  157–158; Robert C. Duncan, America’s Use of Sea Mines (White Oak, MD: U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 1962), p. 67.

Defense/capturing a choke point   313 36 Ruge, “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege,” p. 259. 37 Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Holger H. Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 27. 38 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 2: 1942–1945 (Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1975), p. 453. 39 Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1958), pp. 13–14. 40 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 49–50. 41 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 53. 42 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 50. 43 “The Soviet Navy in World War II,” Part IV: “Soviet Submarines Operations, 1941–1945,” ONI Review, No. 1, 1953, p. 14. 44 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, pp. 70–71. 45 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 77. 46 Meister, Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, p. 80. 47 Randolph Churchill and Winston Churchill, The Six Day War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 98. 48 Günther Pöschel, “Über die Seeherrschaft (III),” Militärwesen 8 (August 1982), p. 62. 49 Walter Jablonsky, “Die Seekriegführung im vierten Nahostkrieg,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 71, No. 11 (November 1974), p. 656. 50 Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, October 1973 (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 269. 51 In addition to AA defenses, the Germans deployed three naval landing craft flotillas, a fortress battalion, a mainland battalion of the 1st Parachute Division, the 771st engineer landing battalion, two engineer construction battalions, a Luftwaffe construction company, signals, transport, and administrative units, and part of the 616th naval artillery regiment; C.J.C. Molony et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 5: The Campaign in Sicily and the Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, in Sir James Butler, ed., History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973), p. 165. 52 Molony et al., Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 5, pp. 166–168. 53 Gerhard Schreiber, “Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzugs und der Krieg in Italien 1943 bis 1945,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44. Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2007), p. 1114; other sources cited 17,000 tons of ammunition; Marc Antonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957), p. 273. 54 Molony et al., Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 5, pp. 165–166. 55 Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 273. 56 Field Marshal Alfred Kesselring put the figure at 60,000 men; Gilbert A. Sheppard, The Italian Campaign 1943–45 (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968), p. 69. 57 In the meantime, the German airlift from Corsica took out 21,000 men and 350 tons of stores. The Germans lost fifty-­five aircraft, most of them due to Allied bombardment of the Italian airfields; Stephen W. Roskill, History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 1: 1st June 1943–31st May 1944, pp. 187, 151. 58 Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–1945: Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 2nd revised ed., 1983), p. 48. 59 Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung, p. 48. 60 The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, CMH Pub 104–123, facsimile ed. 1989), p. 59.

314   Defense/capturing a choke point 61 Walther Hubatsch, “Weserübung”: Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940. Nach amtlichen Unterlagen dargestellt mit einen Anhang: Dokumente zum Norwegenfeldzug 1940 (Aachen: Muster-­Schmidt Verlag, 2011), p. 92. 62 Hubatsch, “Weserübung,” p. 91. 63 German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945, p. 59. 64 Hubatsch, “Weserübung,” p. 91. 65 German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945, pp. 58–60. 66 Hans-­Martin Ottmer, “Weserübung:” Der Deutsche Angriff auf Dänemark und Norwegen im April 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), p. 73. 67 German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945, p. 60. 68 Hans Hugo Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, Vol. I (Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1933; reprint by Akademischen Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1967), pp. 363–364. 69 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg, Vol. I, p. 364. 70 Sokol, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg, Vol. I, p. 365.

Select bibliography

Books Achkasov, V.I. et al. Der Kampfweg der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte (Dresden: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976) (translated from the Russian by Helmut Förster, et al., Boyevoy put’ Sovetskogo-­Voyenno-Morskogo Flota, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 3rd and enlarged ed., 1974) Åsalius, Gunnar. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921–1941 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005) Assmann, Kurt. Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, 1957) Bagnall, Nigel. The Punic Wars. Rome, Carthage, and the Struggle for the Mediterranean (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Thomas Dunne Books, 2005) Blackmore, David S.T. Warfare on the Mediterranean in the Age of Sail. A History, 1571–1866 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2011) Boog, Horst editor et al. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 6: Der globale Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941–1943 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1990) Boyd, Carl and Yoshida, Akihiko. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995) Bragadin, Marc’ Antonio. The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957) Brodie, Bernard. A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942) Bueb, Volkmar. Die “Junge Schule” der französischen Marine. Strategie und Politik 1875–1900 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1971) Cagle, Malcolm and Mason, Frank A. The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957) Callender, Geoffrey. The Naval Side of British History (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1924) Callwell, Charles E. Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance. Their Relations and Interdependence (London/Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905) Castex, Raoul. Strategic Theories, Selections translated and edited with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993) Chkalov, V.I. et al. Der Kampf der sowjetischen Seekriegsflotte (Dresden: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976) (translated from the Russian by Helmut Förster, et al., Boyevoy put’ Sovetskogo-­Voyenno-Morskogo Flota, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 3rd and enlarged ed., 1974)

316   Select bibliography Churchill, Randolph S. and Churchill, Winston S. The Six Day War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967) Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York/London/Toronto: Everyman’s Library, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) Cobb, Stephen. Preparing for Blockade 1885–1914. Naval Contingency for Economic Warfare (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013) Cocchia, Aldo compiler. La Marina Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. XIV: I Mezzi D’Assalto (Rome: Ufficio Storico Nella Marina Militare, 1964) Colomb, Philip H. Naval Warfare. Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated, Vol. 1 (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1891; repr., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990) Corbett, Julian S. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations, Vol. I: To The Battle Of The Falklands December 1914 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920) Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918) Creswell, John. Naval Warfare. An Introductory Study (New York: Chemical Publishing Co., 2nd revised ed., 1942) Custance, Reginald N. A Study of War (Port Washington, NY/London: Constable 1924) Daveluy, René. The Genius of Naval Warfare, Vol. I: Strategy, 2nd ed. of A Study of Naval Strategy, translated by Philip R, Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1910) Daveluy, René. War on the Sea, translated by Philip R. Alger (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1908) Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978) Elleman, Bruce A. and Paine, Sarah C.M. editors. Commerce Raiding. Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Paper # 40, 2013) Evans, David C. editor and translator. The Japanese Navy in World War II. In the Words of Japanese Naval Officers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press; 2nd ed., 1986) Fayle, Charles Ernest. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Seaborne Trade, Vol. I: The Cruiser Period (London: The Imperial War Museum, Department of Printed Books in Association with the Battery Press, Nashville, TN, originally published, 1920, reprinted 1997) Fiske, Bradley A. The Navy as a Fighting Machine (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. First published 1916 by Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York; 2nd ed., 1918) Freedman, Lawrence. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 2, War and Diplomacy (London/New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2005) Gatchel, Theodore L. At the Water’s Edge. Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996) Giamberardino, Oscar di. Seekriegskunst (Berlin: Verlag “Offene Worte,” 1938) Gibson, R.H. and Prendergast, Maurice. The German Submarine War 1914–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. First published 1931 by Constable & Co. Ltd.) Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Punic Wars (London: Cassell & Co, 2000) Graham, Gerald S. Empire of the North Atlantic. The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958)

Select bibliography   317 Groos, Otto. Seekriegslehren im Lichte des Weltkriegs. Ein Buch für den Seemann, Soldaten und Staatsmann (Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929) Grove, Eric J. editor. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945 (A revised edition of the Naval Staff History Volumes 1A [Text and Appendices] and 1B [Plans and Tables]) (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, The Navy Records Society, 1997) Grove, Eric. The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990) Gundelach, Karl. Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940–1945, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter D. Lang, 1981) Güth, Rolf. Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches 1919–1939 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1972) Hagelkvist, Alexander. Theories of Warfare (Stockholm: Swedish National Defense University, 2015) Halpern, Paul G. The Battle of the Otranto Straits. Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in WWI (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004) Halpern, Paul G. The Mediterranean Naval Situation 1908–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) Harding, Richard. Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650–1830 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990) Hartmann, Gregory K. with Truver, Scott C. Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy, updated ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991) Hendrickson, Jon K. Crisis in the Mediterranean. Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014) Herrick, Robert Waring. Soviet Naval Strategy. Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968) Herzog, Chaim. The War of Atonement, October 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975) Hubatsch, Walther. Der Admiralstab und die obersten Marinebehörden in Deutschland 1848–1945 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1958) Hubatsch, Walther. Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–1945. Dokumente des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen; 2nd revised ed., 1983) Karpov, Boris. Obalska Odbrana (Belgrade: Vojno-­izdavački Zavod, 1957) Kennedy, Paul M. Aufstieg und Verfall der Britischen Seemacht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1978) Kirchhoff, Hermann. Seemacht der Ostsee: Ihre Einwirkung auf die Geschichte der Ostseeländer im 19. Jahrhundert (Kiel: Verlag von Robert Cordes, 1908) Krumpelt, Ihno editor. Die Grossen Meister der Kriegskunst. Clausewitz-­MoltkeSchlieffen (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn) Lakowski, Richard and Wunderlich, Werner. Zwischen Flottenschlacht und Zufuhrkrieg. Die Enwicklungen des Seestrategischen Denken im Imperialistischen Deutschland in Vorbereitung des Zweiten Weltkrieges (East Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1978) Lambi, Ivo N. The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984) Lundstrom, John B. The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976) Mackesy, Piers The War for America 1775–1783 (Lincoln, NE/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1964) Mahan, Alfred T. Naval Strategy. Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911)

318   Select bibliography Manfroni, Camillo. Storia Della Marina Italiana Durante La Guerra Mondiale 1914–1918 (Bologna: Nicola Zanicelli, 1925) Marcus, G.J. A Naval History of England, Vol. I: The Formative Centuries (Boston, MA/ Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961) Marder, Arthur J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 2: The War Years. To the Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) Marder, Arthur J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 3: Jutland and After (May 1916–December 1916) (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) Marder, Arthur J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, Vol. 4: 1917: Year of Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) Meister, Jürg. Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmans Verlag, 1958) Meurer, Alexander. Seekriegsgeschichte in Umrissen. Seemacht und Seekriege vornehmlich vom 16. Jahrhundert ab (Leipzig: Verlag v. Hase & Koehler, 1925) Miller, Tom. China’s Asian Dream. Empire Building along the New Silk Road (London: ZED Books, 2017) Ministry of Defence (Navy). War With Japan, Vol. I: Background to the War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995) Ministry of Defence (Navy). War With Japan, Vol. VI: The Advance to Japan (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995) Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959) Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 5: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975) Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 13: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953) Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific 1945 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1960) Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command. The First Two Years, United States Army in World War II series, The War in the Pacific subseries (Washington, DC: Army Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989) Musicant, Ivan. Divided Waters. The Naval History of the Civil War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) Newbolt, Henry. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Naval Operations, Vol. V (London: Longmans, Green And Co., 1931) Olivier, David H. German Naval Strategy 1856–1888 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2012. First published 2004 by Frank Cass) Ose, Dieter. Entscheidung im Westen 1944. Der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-­Anstalt, 1982) Pavlovich, N.B. The Fleet in the First World War, Vol. I: Operations of the Russian Fleet (New Delhi/Washington, DC: Amerind Publishing Co./The Smithsonian Institution and the National Science Foundation, 1979) (translated from the Russian, Flot v Pervoy mirovoy Voyne, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1964) Raeder, Erich. Mein Leben, Vol. 1: Bis Zum Flottenabkommen mit England 1935, Vol. 2: Von 1935 bis Spandau 1955 (Tübingen-Neckar: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1956, 1957)

Select bibliography   319 Rahn, Werner editor. Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol Nationaler Einheit zum Instrument Internationaler Sicherheit (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005) Richmond, Herbert W. National Policy, and Naval Strength, and Other Essays (London: Longmans, Green, and Co. Ltd., 1928) Richmond, Herbert W. Naval Warfare (London: Ernest Benn, 1930) Rittmeyer, Rudolph. Seekriege und Seekriegswesen in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, Vol. II: Von 1739–1793 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried und Sohn, 1911) Rodgers, William L. Greek and Roman Naval Warfare. A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 bc) to Actium (31 bc) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1937; reprint, 1964) Rohwer, Jürgen and Hümmelchen, Gerhard. Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945. The Naval History of World War Two (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press; 2nd revised, expanded ed., 1992) Rohwer, Jürgen and Monakov, Mikhail S. Stalin’s Ocean-­Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes 1935–1953 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) Ropp, Theodore. The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871–1904, edited by Stephen S. Roberts (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987) Roskill, Stephen W. History of the Second World War. The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. I: The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954) Roskill, Stephen W. History of the Second World War. The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 1: 1st June 1943–31st May 1944 (London: Her Majesty Stationery Office, 1960) Roskill, Stephen W. History of the Second World War. The War At Sea, Vol. III: The Offensive, Part 2: 1st June 1944–14th August 1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961) Roskill, Stephen W. The Strategy of Sea Power. Its Development and Application (London: Collins, 1962) Ruge, Friedrich. Der Seekrieg. The German Navy’s Story 1939–1945 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957) Ruge, Friedrich. The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979) Salewski, Michael. Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1: 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970) Salewski, Michael. Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945 Vol. 2: 1942–1945 (Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1975) Schottelius, Herbert and Deist, Wilhelm editors. Marine und Marinepolitik im kaiser­ lichen Deutschland 1871–1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972) Sokol, Hans Hugo. Des Kaisers Seemacht 1848–1914. Die k.k. österreichische Kriegs­ marine (Munich: Amalthea, F.A. Herbig Verlagbuchhandlung GmbH, 2002) Sokol, Hans Hugo. Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18, 2 Vols. (Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1933; reprint by Akademischen Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1967) Sondhaus, Lawrence. The Habsburg Empire and the Sea. Austrian Naval Policy, 1797–1866 (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1989) Sondhaus, Lawrence. Naval Warfare 1815–1914 (London/New York: Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2001) Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939) Stenzel, Alfred. Kriegführung zur See. Lehre vom Seekriege (Hannover/Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1913)

320   Select bibliography Stenzel, Alfred. Seekriegsgeschichte in ihren wichtigsten Abschnitten mit Berücksicht­ igung der Seetaktik, 1st Part (Hannover/Leipzig: Mahn’sche Buchhandlung, 1907) Syrett, David. The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary War (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1998) Till, Geoffrey. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, with contributions from John Hattendorf et al., 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984) Trask, David. The War with Spain in 1898 (Lincoln, NE/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1981) Treue, Wilhelm. Der Krim Krieg und seine Bedeutung für die Enstehung der modernen Flotten (Herford: Mittler, 2nd revised/enlarged edition, 1980) Vego, Milan. Austro-­Hungarian Naval Policy 1904–14 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996) Vego, Milan. The Anatomy of Austrian Sea Power, 1904–1914 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, unpubl., Ph.D. Diss., September 30, 1981) Wegener, Wolfgang. The Naval Strategy of the World War. Translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Holger H. Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989) Wegmüller, Hans. Die Abwehr der Invasion. Die Konzeption des Oberbefehlshabers West 1940–1944 (Freiburg i.Br.: Verlag Rombach, 1986)

Monographs Fabiani, B. Die seestrategische Bedeutung von Inseln und Meerengen unter Berücksicht­ igung der gegenwärtigen militärstrategischen Bedingungen und der Entwicklung des Seevölkerrechte (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, October 31, 1980) Henning, Herbert. Analyse den Kampfes der Seestreitkräfte um Meerengen im Verlaufe des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Dresden: Militärakademie “Friedrich Engels,” 1967) Liedtke, Klaus. Gefechte bei der Sicherung der Küstengewässer. Eine Auswertung der Gefechtberichte-­See des Befehlshaber der Sicherung “West” von August 1942 bis Juli 1943 (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, April 28, 1971) Weyher, Peter. Der Begriff “Seestrategie” und Seine Deutung in den Westlichen Kriegstheorien Des 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Abteilung Marine, July 1967)

Articles Anderson, Bern. “The Naval Strategy of the Civil War,” Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 1962), p. 17 Anonymous. “Naval Strategy,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928) Anonymous. “Strategy of the Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (May 1928) Anonymous. “War from the Aspect of the Weaker Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (May 1920) Bensel, Rolf. “Die deutsche Flottenpolitik von 1933 bis 1939. Eine Studie über die Rolle des Flottenbaus in Hitlers Aussenpolitik,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 55, No. 4 (April 1958) Bidlingmaier, Gerhard. “Die strategischen und operativen Überlegungen der Marine 1932–1942,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vol. 13, No. 6 (June 1963) Davidonis, A.C. “Harbor Forcing Operations,” Military Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1944) Dewar, K.G.B. “Battle of Jutland. Lessons and Basic Causes,” The Naval Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (April 1960)

Select bibliography   321 Doron, Opher. “The Israelis Know Littoral Warfare,” Proceedings (March 2003) Fock, Harald. “Seestreitkräfte in Küsten- und Randmeergebieten (II),” Wehrkunde, No. 12 (December), 1974 Fuchs, Hans. “Die Diversion als strategisches Mittel zur Erzielung eines Kräfteausgleiches, dargelegt an geschichtlichen Beispielen,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 43, No. 4 (April 1938) Gadow, Reinhold. “Strategische Verteidigung in der Seekriegsgeschichte,” Wehr und Wissen, No. 2, 1936 Haghshenass, Fariborz. “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare” (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008) Hattendorf, John B. “The Idea of a ‘Fleet In Being’ in Historical Perspective,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2014) Hauner, Milan L. “Stalin’s Big-­Fleet Program,” Naval War College Review (Spring 2004) Herwig, Holger H. “The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988) Kappa. “The Strategy of a Weaker Naval Power,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1937) Kemp, N.Mcl. “French Naval Strategy and Tactics in the Eighteenth Century,” The Naval Review, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (November 1934) May, Holger. “Verteidigung ist mehr als Defensive,” Truppenpraxis, No. 5 (May) 1994 Morison, Samuel E. “Thoughts on Naval Strategy. World War II,” Naval War College Review (Winter 1998), Vol. LI, No. 1 (reprint from Naval War College Review, March 1968) Pasha, Hobart. “Systems of Offense and Defense in Naval Warfare,” The North American Review, Vol. 127, No. 265 (November–December 1878) Peifer, Douglas C. “Maritime Commerce Warfare. The Coercive Response of the Weak?” Naval War College Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2013) Pöschel, Günther. “Über die Seeherrschaft (III),” Militärwesen 8 (August 1982) Rahn, Werner. “German Navies from 1848 to 2016. Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Cooperation,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Autumn 2017) Reynolds, Clark G. “The U.S. Fleet-­in-Being Strategy of 1942,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 1994) Ruge, Friedrich. “Die Verwendung der Mine im Seekriege 1914 bis 1918. Ihre Erfolge und Misserfolge,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1927) Schröder, Klaus. “Die Gedanken des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine zum Kampf gegen England im Atlantik und im Mittelmeer 1939–1940,” Marine Rundschau, Vol. 67, No. 5 (September–October 1970) Simpson III, B. Mitchell editor, “The Development of Naval Thought. Essays by Herbert Rosinski” (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977) Sokol, Anthony E. “Naval Strategy in the Adriatic Sea during the World War,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. No. 63, No. 8 (August 1937) Strelis, Paul. “Küstenverteidigung” (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1963) Stupka, Andreas W. “Gallipoli – der vergessene Kriegschauplatz,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschritft, No. 6 (November–December 2015) Sullivan, Brian R. “A Fleet in Being: The Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861–1943,” The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988)

Index

A-Go operation (Japan) 67, 159–160 Admiral Hipper (ship) 199, 234 Admiral Scheer (ship) 199, 234 aggressive spirit 2, 57, 95–98, 131 air forces 10–11, 66, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 114–116, 154, 197–198, 199–200; attacking enemy coasts 246–247, 259–261; attacks on shipping 173–178; coastal defense, role in 270–271, 272; suicide bombers 176–178 American Civil War (1861–1865) 23, 191–192, 227, 228–229, 272 American-Spanish War (1898) 23–24 American War for Independence (1775–1783) 19, 21, 27–28, 38, 41–42, 63, 96, 212, 225–226, 248; active fleetin-being, use of 132–135 Anglo-German naval agreement (1935) 7–8 Antioch III 139–140 Arcadia conference (1941–1942) 67–68 Argentina 154, 176 attrition 169–171 Aube, V Adm Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile 84–85, 86, 87, 220–221 Austria/Austria-Hungary 10–11, 29, 191; attacking enemy coasts 255–259; base of operations 81; failure to capture an important choke point 310–311; geostrategic position 79; naval construction programs 87; Otranto Barrage, raids on 202–207; semi-active fleet-in-being 152–153; theory on disputing sea control 86–87 Austro-Italian War (1866) 96, 156–158 Barfleur & La Hougue, battle of (1692) 5 basing areas and important positions 286–300; attacks on, during invasion of

Europe 1944 287–288; capturing important maritime positions 291–292; naval bases/ports, defense of 292–297; naval training areas, defense of 288; supplies for troops 290; troop evacuations 288–289, 290, 291–293, 294, 296–297 Beachy Head, battle of (1690) 127–130 Bermejo y Merelo, Adm Segismundo 24 Bernotti, Lt Com Romeo 86 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von 137–138 Bismarck (ship) 200, 234–235 blockades 6, 10, 22, 23, 29–30, 43, 58, 59, 62, 70, 85, 113–114, 137, 148, 190; blockading forces, weakening of 200–207; breaking through the enemy’s blockading line 191–192; commercial counter-blockade 230–236; forcing a defended choke point 192–200; lifting the enemy naval blockade 190–191 Bonaparte, Napoleon see Napoleon I Bourgeois, V Adm Siméon 221 Brest combat group 148, 196–197 Britain 42; attack on the Dardanelles (1915) 303–305; faulty strategic objectives 38–39, 42; German attacks on coasts 252–255; as Germany’s most dangerous enemy at sea 9–10, 11; naval wars with United States 21–22; and privateering 224–226; struggle for sea dominance against Spain 20–21 Brodie, Bernard 126 Callwell, Charles E. 126; Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance 91–92 Canada 22–23, 27, 212, 286

Index   323 Cape Ecnomus, battle of (256 bc) 156 Caprivi, Gen Georg Leo von 87 Carthage 19–20, 24–25 Castex, V Adm Raoul 61–62, 64–65, 85–86, 126, 132, 228, 267; Strategic Theories 91 Cavagnari, Adm Domenico 153–154 Cervera y Topete, Adm Pascual 24 Charmes, Gabriel 84 Châteaurenault, Adm François-Louis Rousselet 127 China 16–18, 155–156 choke points (straits), defense/capture of 106–107, 301–314; failure to capture an important choke point 310–311; forcing a defended choke point 192–200; main methods 301; major defensive joint/combined operations 308–309; neutralizing enemy submarines 306–307; preventing movement of military/commercial shipping 307–308; preventing the enemy’s naval movements 301–305; reliance on army and air forces 310; troop transportation 309 Churchill, Winston S. 15, 67, 143, 147 Clausewitz, Carl von 55, 59, 60 coastal areas 85, 86, 90; air defense 246–247, 270–271, 272; antiamphibious defense 278–283; anticombat craft defense 270; anti-submarine defense 270, 275; attacking enemy coasts 245–265; bombardments 252–261; coastal defense zone 277; coastal sea traffic, safety of 271–272; defense against commando raids and terrorist acts 277; defense of the coast 266–285; defensive mining 272–277; explosive boats 249–250; fortifications 279–280; Kaitens 250; local sea defense forces 269, 270; mobile defense 280–283; naval role in coastal defense 266–268; naval special forces 249, 252; objectives of attacks 245; rear defense zone 278–283; reconnaissance 269; seaward defense zone 269–277; submersibles, use of 248; surface ships, use of 246; surveillance 269–270; torpedo boats 248; tracking 269–270; see also basing areas and important positions

Colomb, V Adm Philip H. 89, 124, 125, 128–129, 267; Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated 91 Combined Fleet 11, 66–67, 68, 260 commerce raiding/war see militaryeconomic potential at sea, destruction of commercial blockade 190, 192; commercial counter-blockading 230–236 convoys 22, 25, 32, 40, 41, 56–57, 94, 96, 115–116, 117, 134, 148, 175, 199, 226, 232, 271–272 Corbett, Julian S. 30, 37, 56, 57–58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 116, 118–119, 125–126, 129, 132, 134–135, 228, 267; Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 91 corvus 156, 167n186 counter-attacks 60, 61–62, 64–65 counter-containment 190–217; blockading forces, weakening of 200–207; breaking through the enemy’s blockading line 191–192; Brest combat group, redeployment of 196–197; Dover Barrage 192–193, 201–202; forcing a defended choke point 192–200; German-Finnish defenses, Gulf of Finland 195–196; lifting the enemy naval blockade 190–191; north Atlantic 198–200; Northern Barrage 193–194; Otranto Barrage 194, 202–207; Strait of Gibraltar 195; strategic diversion 207–211; tying up enemy forces 212–213 Crimean War (1854–1856) 70, 96, 149–150, 268, 272 Cuba 23–24 Cunningham, Adm Andrew B. 175 Custoza, battle of (1866) 157 Daveluy, René 5, 58 decisive encounters 124–168; active fleetin-being 131–148; equalizing strength prior to a decisive encounter 171–172; fleet-in-being, concept of 130–132; fleet-in-being, explanation of 124–126; fortress fleet concept 124–125; origins of fleet-in-being 126–130; passive fleetin-being 148–152; seeking a decisive encounter 156–161; semi-active fleet-inbeing 152–156; weakening the enemy prior to a decisive encounter 171 Declaration of Paris (1856) 226–227

324   Index defense vs. offensive at sea 55–74; active vs. passive defense 60–62; arrested defense 61; commerce war 64–65; counter-attacks 60, 61–62, 64–65; defense and offensive combined 62–69; defense at sea and on land, differences of 55–56; defense, disadvantages of 57–58; defensive and offensive in war at sea, importance of 57–59; definitions 55; geography, importance of 61–62; land and sea combined 69–71; mutual relationship between defense and offense 59–60; offensive-defensive strategy 58–59; scale of the objective, influence of 56–57; shift from strategic defensive to the offensive 67–69; shift from strategic offensive to defensive 65–67 Denmark 75, 76, 80, 137, 190–191, 305–306, 310 Dönitz, Adm Karl 279 d’Orvilliers, Adm Louis Guillouet, Count 28–29, 39–40, 41 Drake, Sir Francis 20, 171, 224, 246

secondary effort 135–136; seeking a decisive encounter 156–161; semiactive fleet-in-being 152–156; tying enemy forces in one theater to aid success in another theater 132–135 fortifications 279–280, 287 France: avoidance of decisive sea battles and naval inadequacy 25–30, 131, 136–137; commercial counter-blockade, use of 230–231; cooperation with Spain against Britain (1779) 38–43; deterring enemy forces from interfering with landings 144–147; geostrategic position 78–79; naval offensive spirit, lack of 95–96; naval strength 1, 5–6; privateering 224–225, 226; strategic diversion, use of 209–210; theory on disputing sea control 83–86; threats to invade Britain 141–143, 144–147, 209; Young School 84–86, 87, 88, 93, 219–220, 221, 222 Franco, General 34–35, 36–37 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) 29–30, 221, 222

Elizabeth I 20, 246 Essen, Adm Nikolai von 181–182 exhausting the enemy 170–171

Ganteaume, Adm Honoré Joseph Antoine 144–145, 146 Gavotti, R Adm Giulio 92 geographical aspects 61–62, 75–81 Germany 114–115; active fleet-in-being, use of 135–136, 137–139, 147–148, 171–172; attacking enemy coasts 252–255; base of operations 81–82; basing areas and important positions, capture/defense of 287–288, 289–290, 291–292, 293–297; Brest combat group, redeployment of 196–197; capture of Danish Straits (1940) 310; coastal defense 268, 273, 274–275, 278–279, 281–282; commerce raiding 229–230; commercial counter-blockade, use of 231–236; Dover Barrage, raids on 192–193, 201–202; fleet distribution 43–44; geostrategic position 75–77, 80–81; German-Finnish defenses, Gulf of Finland 195–196; Luftwaffe 10–11, 92, 114–115, 173, 174–176, 197, 199–200; naval losses 181; naval special forces 179; naval strength 12, 43–44; neutralizing enemy submarines 306–307; offensive mining 180–181, 182–184; offensive strategy in peacetime 9–10, 11–12; peacetime maritime strategy 6–8; S-boats 115; sea

Falklands War (1982) 154, 176, 271 First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654) 56–57 First Punic War (264–241 bc) 24–25, 156 Fisher, Adm John 143 Fiske, R Adm Bradley A. 58–59 fleet-in-being: active fleet-in-being 131–148, 171–172, 245; concept of 130–132, 161; defending and protecting maritime shipping in a secondary theater 147–148; defensive structures 154–156; delaying/ preventing defeat of armies 136–137; deterring enemy forces from interfering with landings 144–147; deterring/ preventing large-scale seaborne invasions 143–144; enhancing bargaining positions in the aftermath of war 137–138; explanation of 124–125; gaining time to reconstitute naval combat potential 136; invasion, threats of 141–143; origins of 126–130; passive fleet-in-being 148–152; postponing a decisive clash 137–141; preserving control in theaters of

Index   325 control 19; seeking a decisive encounter 158–159, 171–172; small war on the high seas theory 88, 221–222; strategic diversion, use of 210–211; theory on disputing sea control 87–88; troop evacuations 289, 290, 291–292, 296–297, 309; U-boats 8, 12, 63, 82, 155, 173, 184, 192–195, 231–233, 279; war on economy concept 222–223; World War I naval strategy 31–32, 60, 63–64, 69–70, 96; World War II naval strategy 32–37, 70–71; Z(ie)l-plan 12 Giambardino, V Adm Oscar di 62 Gibraltar 33, 34, 35, 36–37, 39, 41–42, 249 Gneisenau (ship) 196–197, 199, 210, 234 Grand Fleet 10, 19, 29, 31–32, 63, 70–71, 76, 96, 117, 138–139, 158, 159, 172, 180, 210, 211, 253–255 Grivel, Capt Baron Louis-Antoine Richild 83–84, 220 Groos, V Adm Otto 62 Guadalcanal 117, 172 Hannibal 19–20 Hardy, Adm Charles 40, 133 Haus, Adm Anton 11, 152–153, 203, 310–311 Heligoland, battle of (1864) 191 Herbert, Arthur 1st Earl of Torrington 126–130 High Seas Fleet 6, 10, 31–32, 43–44, 60, 63–64, 77, 81, 96, 143, 144, 171–172, 210, 222, 230, 254–255, 305–306; as a fleet-in-being 135–136; inactivity of 137–139; at Jutland (1916) 158–159 Hipper, Adm Franz von 158, 253 Hitler, Adolf 6, 8, 11, 12, 32–36, 147–148, 196–197, 268, 282, 287 Horthy, R Adm de Nagybánya, Miklós 206–207 Howard, Adm Charles 171 information: information dominance 3, 75, 95, 99; information operations (IO) 170 Ingenohl, Adm Friedrich von 135, 137 Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) 98, 236, 238 Italy 10–11, 26, 34, 43, 96, 97; attacking enemy coasts 248–250; base of operations 81, 82; coastal attacks by Austria-Hungary 255–259; coastal defense 280–281; geostrategic position 79–80; naval construction programs 86; naval special forces 179; semi-active

fleet-in-being 152, 153–154; theory on disputing sea control 86, 90; war with Austria 96, 156–158 James II 127 Japan 68–69, 246–247; active fleet-inbeing, use of 131–132; attacking enemy coasts 250; coastal defense 280, 281, 282–283; A-Go operation 67, 159–160; naval losses 172–173; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) 30–31, 45, 59–60, 62–63, 77–78, 131–132, 150–152, 180; seeking a decisive encounter 158–161; Sho-Go plans 55; strategic defensive naval policy 65–67; suicide bombers 176–178; Tokyo air raid (1942) 259–261; troop evacuations 289; Y-plan 66; Z-operation 66, 67, 159 Jellicoe, Adm John 143–144, 211, 253–254, 273 Jutland, battle of (1916) 158–159 Kamikaze 176–178 Kempenfelt, Adm Richard 132–135 Killigrew, Adm Henry 127 King, Adm Ernest J. 68–69, 136, 246, 259–260 Korean War (1950–1953) 272, 275–276, 280 La Gravière, Jean Pierre Edmond Jurien de 147 Leyte, battle for (1944) 160–161 Lissa, battle of (1866) 84–85, 156, 157–158 littoral warfare 154–155; air superiority 114–116; characteristics of 110–116; choke points (straits) 106–107; coastal features and islands 107–108; combat employment methods 118–120; dynamics of 116–117; enclosed/semienclosed seas 105–106; frequency of contact between opposing forces 113–114; lines of operation 110–111; main methods 118; major/minor tactical actions 119–120; maneuvering space 111–112; operating environment 104–109; peripheral seas 104–105; sea routes 111; shallow waters 108–109, 112; swarming attacks 119–120; theory of 91–95; warning and reaction time 112–113 Louis XIV 5, 6, 79, 127 Louis XV 6, 26, 79, 225

326   Index Mahan, Adm Alfred T. 31, 45, 57, 76, 89, 124–125, 129, 130, 135, 227–228, 267, 286–287; Naval Strategy Compared with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land 91 Málaga, battle of (1704) 225 Maltzahn, Curt von 62 maritime strategy, framework for 1–54; alliances and coalitions against dominant sea powers 37–43; claims to disputed islands and archipelagos 16–18; faulty strategic objectives 38–43; general control of the sea, importance of 19–24; maritime strategy in peacetime 4–18; offensive strategy in peacetime 9–16; power close to the scene of action, importance of 23–24; sea capabilities of land powers 24–31; stronger vs. weaker side 1–4; theater of effort/fleet distribution 43–46; wartime strategy 18–43 Midway, battle of (1942) 65, 68 military-economic potential at sea, destruction of 218–244; commerce raiding 22, 23, 64–65, 84, 86, 87–88, 210–211, 224, 227–230; commercial counter-blockade 230–236; diverse forces, use of 238–239; main methods 223–237; maritime trade warfare theory 219–223; offensive mining 236–237; principal objectives and methods 219; privateering 224–227; ripple effects 238; single/multiple objectives 237; small war on the high seas theory 221–222; spreading attacks over large areas 238; systematic attacks 237–238; war on economy concept 222–223 mines 30, 109, 154, 180–185, 193–194, 199, 236–237, 270; and coastal defense 272–277; covert operations 184; deception 184; diverse types of 184; laying in large numbers 182; mine barriers 182–183, 272, 274–275, 301–302, 306–307; mine countermeasures (MCM) 276–277; mining large areas 182–183; in multiple theaters 183–184; patterns of mining 184–185; tactical surprise 183 missiles 93, 113, 114, 119–120, 245, 252, 261, 270–271 Montreux Convention 14–16 morale 60, 85, 148; morale attrition 170 Mussolini, Benito 153, 154 Mylae, battle of (260 bc) 156

Napoleon I 64, 135, 136, 142–143, 144–147, 209, 209–210, 230–231 Napoleonic Wars (1802–1815) 136, 142–143, 144–147 naval forces 131–148; active fleet-inbeing 131–148; aggregate tonnage 3; attrition 169–171; basing and deployment areas, control of 94–95; coastal defense role 266–268; combat potential, assessment of 2–4; combat training 90–93; enemy forces, weakening of 169–189; enemy’s combat power, erosion of 172–179; equalizing strength prior to a decisive encounter 171–172; exhausting the enemy 170–171; fleet composition 92–93; fleet-in-being, concept of 130–132; fleet-in-being, explanation of 124–125; fleet-in-being, origins of 126–130; information superiority 95; naval doctrine 90–93; naval special forces 179, 249, 252; numerical strength 2; offensive mining 180–185; offensive spirit 95–98; operational command organization 93–94; passive fleet-in-being 148–152; seeking a decisive encounter 156–161; semi-active fleet-in-being 152–156; weakening the enemy prior to a decisive encounter 171 Nelson, Adm Horatio 129, 132, 146, 209 Netherlands 42, 56–57, 140–141; geostrategic position 79; privateering 224, 225 network-centric warfare 3 Nimitz, Adm Chester W. 68, 247 Njegovan, Adm Maximilian 204 Norway 80, 81, 114–115, 147–148, 155, 174, 193–194, 196, 197, 268 offensive at sea see defense vs. offensive at sea offensive spirit 60, 61–62, 75, 95–99, 125–126 Peloponnesian War (431–404 bc) 131, 139 Persano, Adm Carlo Pellion di 96, 157 Philip II 20 Philippine Sea, battle of (1944) 159–160 Prinz Eugen (ship) 148, 196, 200, 206–207, 235 privateering 224–227, 246 Prussia 29–30, 190–191 Quiberon Bay, battle of (1759) 142

Index   327 radar 93, 109, 112, 199 Raeder, Adm Erich 6, 7, 8, 12, 32–33, 34, 35–36, 37, 147–148, 196, 233, 234, 235; Fundamental Thoughts on Naval Warfare 11 Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) 142–143, 209, 226 Richmond, Herbert W. 129–130 Roman Empire 24–25; corvus 156, 167n186; war with Seleucid Empire (192–190 bc) 139–140 Rommel, FM Erwin 279, 281–282 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 15 Rosinski, Herbert 130 Royal Navy 2, 7, 8, 10, 19, 22, 38–39, 70, 110, 114–115, 146, 153, 194–195, 226; active fleet-in-being, use of 132–135, 143–144; defensive strategy 63; losses 159, 172, 174, 175–176, 178, 180 Rupert of the Rhine, Prince 140–141 Russia 14, 70, 96; base of operations 82; coastal defense 272, 273; fleet distribution 44–45; geostrategic position 77–78; naval inadequacy 30–31; naval strength 44–45; offensive mining 180, 181–182; passive fleet-in-being, use of bc 149–152; peacetime maritime strategy 6; preventing the enemy’s naval movements at a choke point 301–303 Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) 30–31, 45, 59–60, 62–63, 70, 77–78, 131–132, 150–152, 180 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) 30, 180 Ruyter, Michael de 140–141 Scharnhorst (ship) 196–197, 199, 210, 234 Scheer, Adm Reinhard 138–139, 158, 254–255 Schooneveldt, battle of (1673) 141 sea control: air superiority 114–116; base of operations 81–83; basing and deployment areas, control of 94–95; choke points (straits) 106–107; coastal features and islands 107–108; combat employment methods 118–120; disputing sea control, characteristics of 110–116; disputing sea control, dynamics of 116–117; distinction from sea denial 18–19; enclosed/semienclosed seas 105–106; favorable geostrategic position 75–81; frequency of contact between opposing forces 113–114; general control of the sea, importance of 19–24; information superiority 95; lines of operation

110–111; littoral warfare, theory of 91–93; main methods of disputing sea control 118; major/minor tactical actions 119–120; maneuvering space 111–112; naval doctrine 90–93; and offensive/ defensive strategy 59; offensive spirit 95–98; operating environment for disputing sea control 104–109; operational command organization 93–94; peripheral seas 104–105; prerequisites for disputing sea control 75–103; sea routes 111; shallow waters 108–109, 112; small war on the high seas theory 88, 221–222; swarming attacks 119–120; theory on disputing sea control 83–90; warning and reaction time 112–113 sea denial 266; distinction from sea control 18–19; doctrine for 90–91 Sechi, Lt Com Giovanni, Elements of Maritime Art 86 Second Punic War (218–201 BC) 19–20 Second Schleswig War (1864) 190–191 Seven Years War (1756–1763) 27, 136–137, 141–142, 208, 212, 225, 286 Sicily 20, 24–25, 79–80, 156, 174–175, 280–281, 309 Six Day War (1967) 252 small war on the high seas theory 88, 221–222 Solomons Campaign 172–173 sonar 112 Soviet Union: base of operations 83; coastal defense 274; fleet distribution 44; geostrategic position 78; naval bases/ ports, defense of 292–296; naval construction programs 13, 14; naval offensive spirit, lack of 97–98; naval strength 2, 9, 44; offensive strategy in peacetime 13–16; Old School 88–89, 90; peacetime maritime strategy 9; Second Five Year Plan (1933–1937) 9; shift from strategic defensive to the offensive 67; submarines 195–196; theory on disputing sea control 88–90; troop evacuations 292–293, 294; Turkish Straits issue 14–16; World War II naval strategy 70; Young School 89–90 Spain 28; cooperation with France against Britain (1779) 38–43; entry into World War II 34–35, 36–37; naval offensive spirit, lack of 96; Spanish Armada 20–21, 61, 171, 246; war with United States (1898) 23–24

328   Index Stalin, Joseph 13, 14, 15 Stenzel, Capt Alfred 88, 221, 222 Sterneck, Adm Maximilian Doublebsky von 87 straits see choke points (straits) strategic diversion 207–211; achieving a more favorable ratio of forces in the main theater 208; dispersing the enemy’s available strength 210–211; posing a threat in another theater 209–210; reducing enemy pressure in home waters 208; reducing enemy pressure on the land front 209; weakening/reducing the enemy’s economic pressure on a country 211 Stuart, Prince Charles Edward 26 submarines 8, 9, 12, 63, 82, 89, 109, 136, 184, 250, 279, 306; anti-submarine defenses 192–196, 270, 275; defeating the threat from 178–179; defensive structures 155–156; detection of 112; as part of commercial counter-blockade 231–233; sinking enemy surface vessels 173 Tegetthoff, R Adm Wilhelm von 61, 157–158, 191 Texel, battle of (1673) 141 Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674) 5, 140–141, 224 Tirpitz, Adm Alfred von 9–10, 137, 222 Tirpitz (ship) 147, 148, 234 Tōgō, Adm Heihachirō 67, 131–132, 150, 151 torpedoes 84, 85, 87, 93, 113, 220; human torpedoes 179, 248, 250 Tourville, Adm Anne Hilarion de 64, 127, 129, 130 Triple Alliance 87; combined fleet 10–11, 43 Turkey 30, 180; defense of the Dardanelles (1915) 303–305 Turkish Straits 14–16

United States: active fleet-in-being, use of 136; air attacks on Japanese targets 246–247; commerce raiding 22, 23, 228–229; naval wars with Britain 21–23; privateering 226, 227; Rainbow 5 plan 68; shift from strategic defensive to the offensive 68–69; Tokyo air raid (1942) 259–261; war on the Great Lakes 22–23, 156; World War II naval strategy 60 Ushijama, Gen Mitsuru 282–283 Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de 228 Villeneuve, Adm Pierre-Charles 144–146 Vitgeft, Adm Vilgelm K. 150–151 War of 1812 21–23, 156, 191, 226, 286–287 War of the Augsburg League/Grand Alliance (1689–1697) 127–130, 224–225 War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) 25–26, 96, 225 War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) 59, 225 Wegener, Edward 59 Wegener, V Adm Wolfgang 76–77, 80, 135–136, 137; The Naval Strategy of the World War 91 William I, Kaiser 137–138 William III 127 Y-plan (Japan) 66 Yamomoto, Adm Isoroku 260 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War (1973) 119, 236, 252, 308 Young School: France 84–86, 87, 88, 93, 219–220, 221, 222; Soviet Union 89–90 Z-operation (Japan) 66, 67, 159 Z(ie)l-plan (Germany) 12