Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings: Volume IX 9781138856561, 9781315719511, 1138856568

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments: Volume IX and Volume X
General Introduction: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949, Volumes IX and X
Introduction: The Writings of Mao Zedong, August 1945–September 1949, Volumes IX and X
Note on Sources and Conventions
1945
Prepare to Deal with the Civil War Situation That Is Certain to Arise (August 4, 1945)
Prepare to Join with the Forces of Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao to Set up the Hunan-Guangdong Border Base Area (August 4, 1945)
Telegram to Marshal Stalin (August 9, 1945)
Comrade Mao Zedong Makes a Declaration Regarding the Fact That the War of Resistance Against Japan Has Entered Its Final Stage (August 9, 1945)
Speech at the Second Session of the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 9, 1945)
The Central Committee’s Resolutions Regarding Our Party’s Tasks after Japan’s Surrender (August 11, 1945)
Xinhua News Agency Reporter Criticizes and Condemns the “Chiang Kaishek Order” for Provoking Civil War and for Destroying World Peace (August 12, 1945)
We Must Do All We Can to Seize Communications Lines and the Cities Along Those Lines (August 12, 1945)
Regarding Central China’s Deployments in Preparation for the Civil War (August 12, 1945)
The Situation Following Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and Our Course of Action (August 13, 1945)
Telegram from Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] Resolutely Rejects Chiang Kaishek’s Erroneous Order (August 13, 1945)
We Definitely Must Have an Absolutely Superior Force during Campaigns; We Cannot Fight Recklessly (August 13, 1945)
Extensively Occupy the Countryside, Do Not Fight for the Big Cities (August 15, 1945)
Telegram by Chairman Mao in Reply to Chiang Kaishek (August 16, 1945)
Chiang Kaishek, the Enemy of the People, Has Sent Out a Signal for Civil War (August 16, 1945)
Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] Sends a Telegram Demanding That Chiang Kaishek End the Civil War (August 16, 1945)
Dispatch Nine Regiments to the Three Eastern Provinces (August 20, 1945)
Reply to a Telegram from Chiang Kaishek (August 22, 1945)
The New Situation and New Tasks Following Victory in the Anti-Japanese War (August 23, 1945)
Telegram in Reply to Chiang Kaishek (August 24, 1945)
Current Party Policy and Work Agenda for the New Fourth Army (August 24, 1945)
Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation (August 25, 1945)
Make Every Effort to Capture Many Medium-Sized and Small Cities (August 25, 1945)
Address at the Politburo Meeting before Attending the Chongqing Talks (August 26, 1945)
The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender (August 26, 1945)
During the Period of Mao Zedong’s Attendance at the Chongqing Talks, He Will Be Replaced by Liu Shaoqi in the Role of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 27, 1945, 3:00 P.M.)
Chairman Mao’s Statement on Arriving in Chongqing (August 28, 1945)
Talk at the Office of the Eighteenth Army Group in Chongqing (August 29, 1945)
Eleven Points Regarding the Negotiations with the Guomindang (August 30, 1945)
Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Talks between the Two Parties (September 2, 1945)
An Inscription Celebrating Victory in the War against Japan (September 3, 1945)
Talk with Dagong Bao Reporters (September 5, 1945)
Chairman Mao Makes Remarks in Chongqing Expressing the Hope That the Negotiations Will Come to a Successful Conclusion (September 13, 1945)
Hasten to Send People to Shanghai and Other Places to Establish Newspapers (September 14, 1945)
Speech at the Consultative Conference Reception (September 18, 1945)
Answers to Questions Raised by Reuters News Agency Correspondent Campbell (September 27, 1945)
To Liu Yazi (October 4, 1945)
To Liu Yazi (October 7, 1945)
Speech at a Party Held in the Auditorium of the Military Affairs Commission (October 8, 1945)
Report on the Progress of the Chongqing Negotiations (October 11, 1945)
Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping (October 12, 1945, 1:00 P.M.)
Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Geng (October 16, 1945)
Seizing Victory in the Pingsui Campaign Is of Great Significance (October 16, 1945)
Telegram to the Comrades of the Central Bureau of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Region (October 17, 1945)
On the Chongqing Negotiations (October 17, 1945)
Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan’an Party School (October 17, 1945)
Telegram to Chen Geng, and for the Information of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, and Xiao Ke (October 19, 1945)
Local Troops Should Be Transferred to Replenish the Field Army (October 19, 1945)
The Current Policy for Developments in the Northeast (October 19, 1945)
The Current Situation and the Tasks for the Next Six Months (October 20, 1945, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.)
On the Warfare in Shandong and Central China (October 22, 1945)
Isolate and Then Annihilate the Forces of Fu Zuoyi in Jining (October 24, 1945)
Speech at the Seventh Branch School of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (October 25, 1945)
Transfer Our Forces to the Northeast as Rapidly as Possible (October 25, 1945)
Dispositions for the Pinghan Campaign (October 27, 1945)
Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping (October 29, 1945)
Additional Points for the Negotiations with the Guomindang (October 29, 1945)
Zhao Erlu Is to Proceed to Lincheng (October 30, 1945)
Prepare to Pin Down Wang Zhonglian’s Troops, Which May Move North as Reinforcements (October 30, 1945)
Annihilate the Enemy Facing Us and Then Attack the Reinforcements (October 30, 1945)
Telegram to Zhou Enlai (October 31, 1945)
Amass the Greatest Force to Annihilate the Present Enemy (October 31, 1945)
Rapidly Set Off for the Lincheng Area (October 31, 1945)
November Operational Preparations (November 1, 1945)
Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da (November 2, 1945, 10 P.M.)
The Process of Winning the Pinghan Campaign (November 2, 1945)
Method for Dealing with Captured Officers and Soldiers (November 3, 1945, 11 P.M.)
Yang and Su’s Column Should Replace Its Losses and Then Leave for Jinzhou and Shenyang (November 3, 1945, 3:00 P.M.)
There Is Ample Reason for Our Side to Initiate a Counteroffensive (November 3, 1945)
Telegram to Zhou Enlai (November 3, 1945, 11:00 P.M.)
North China, the Northeast, and Other Areas Must Be Returned to People’s Self-Governance (November 3, 1945)
Great Victory in the Battle of Self-Defense by Our Forces in Southern Hebei (November 4, 1945)
Commence Military Transport Work against the Northwest and Northeast Troops (November 4, 1945)
Deployment to Increase Troops in the Northeast (November 4, 1945)
A Chinese Communist Party Spokesperson Denounces Wu Guozhen’s Shameless Lies and Presents Ironclad Evidence Regarding the Repeated Attacks by the Guomindang Army (November 5, 1945)
The Three Big Problems of Accepting Surrender, the Puppet Troops, and Self-Governance Must Be Resolved before Communications Can Be Restored (November 5, 1945)
Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of Self-Defense (November 7, 1945)
The Present Orientation Regarding Propaganda and Negotiations (November 7 and 8, 1945)
Treat Mobilizing the Masses and Creating the Battlefield as the Most Urgent Strategic Tasks in the Northeast at Present (November 10, 1945)
Make Creating Battlefields a Strategic Task (November 11, 1945)
The Situation after the Victory over Japan and Some Work Policies for the Future (November 12, 1945)
Fighting on Internal Lines, Wipe out the Guomindang’s Three Armies One by One (November 15, 1945)
Yan’an Authority Commenting on the National Assembly Says Unilateral Action by the Guomindang Authorities Reveals Determination to Launch a Large-Scale Civil War (November 16, 1945)
Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas in 1946 (December 15, 1945)
Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Work in the Northeast (December 28, 1945)
Letter to Situ Meitang (December 28, 1945)
To Huang Qisheng (December 29, 1945)
1946
To Cai Bo and Others (January 8, 1946)
Notice on Halting Domestic Military Conflict (January 10, 1946)
To Liu Yazi (January 28, 1946)
Directive of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1946)
The Reactionaries Are Expanding Their Anti-Soviet and Anti-Communist Activities under the Instigation and Encouragement of the Authorities of the Guomindang Government (February 26, 1946)
Remarks at the Farewell Party for General Marshall (March 5, 1946)
Telegrams Regarding Ye Ting’s Admission to the Party (March 7, 1946)
To Hong Yu (March 12, 1946)
Circular Requesting That All Areas Report on Industry and the Labor Movement (March 12, 1946)
Four Points in an Analysis of the Current Situation (March 15, 1946)
Pay Strict Attention to Policy When Entering and Garrisoning Areas in the Northeast (March 17, 1946)
Control with All Our Might the Two Cities of Changchun and Harbin and the Entire Length of the Chinese Eastern Railway (March 24, 1946)
Policy Orientation on the Question of Industry and the Labor Movement (March 24 and 28, 1946)
Policy toward Armed and Unarmed Guomindang Personnel (March 30, 1946)
Take Strict Precautions against Sudden Attacks by the Enemy during This High Tide of Reactionary Activity (April 5, 1946)
On Countering Large-Scale Attacks in the Northeast by Chiang Kaishek and the United States (April 5, 1946, noon)
Achieving Victories in the Battles at Siping and Benxi Is Key at Present (April 6, 1946)
Supplementary Directive Regarding the Problem of Engaging in Battle in the Northeast (April 8, 1946)
Some Problems in Correcting Errors in Our Mass Work (April 11, 1946)
When Conducting Operations in the Northeast, It Is Necessary to Take the Whole Situation into Account and Make Plans for the Long Run (April 12, 1946)
Defend Siping and Benxi So as to Give Us an Advantage in Negotiations (April 13, 1946)
Rapidly Destroy the Enemy in the Northeast and Seize the Upper Hand before the Cessation of Hostilities (April 15, 1946)
Attack the Beiping-Shenyang Railway and Conduct Guerrilla Warfare North of Shenyang (April 16, 1946)
You Are Expected to Be Prepared to Handle Any Incident (April 18, 1946)
Paying Respects to the Martyrs Who Died on April 8 (April 19, 1946)
Military and Political Deployments in the Northeast after the Occupation of Changchun (April 19, 1946)
Concentrate a Superior Force to Launch Several Large Decisive Battles South and North of Siping (April 19, 1946)
Rapidly Transfer Troops from Southern Manchuria Northwards to Engage in Battle; Preparations Should Be Made to Defend the City of Changchun (April 20, 1946)
Make the Utmost Effort to Secure Victory in Battle in the Siping and Gongzhuling Areas (April 20, 1946)
The Changchun Forces Should Rapidly Divide into City Garrison and Field Army Units (April 21, 1946)
Deployment for Military Operations to Annihilate the New First Army (April 21, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
We Should Transfer Many of Our Forces Northward to Defend Changchun and Chahar (April 21, 1946)
Opinions on Military Work and Local Work in the Northeast (April 23, 1946)
Defend Benxi to the Last and Work against Time until a Ceasefire is Reached (April 26, 1946)
We Must Be Cautious in Utilizing Fresh Troops (April 28, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
Resolutely Defend Siping and for the Present Do Not Launch Any Large-Scale Offensives (April 30, 1946, midnight)
Troops in the Central Plains Military Region Should Attempt a Transfer within the Rules of the Agreement (April 30, 1946)
Immediately Prepare to Launch an Attack against the Pinggu Line, Nankou, and Other Areas (April 30, 1946)
Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation (April 1946)
Directive on the Problem of Military Training (May 1, 1946)
Struggle Resolutely in Siping and Benxi to Secure a Peace That Will Be Favorable to Us (May 1, 1946)
We Agree with the Policy Adopted by the Central Plains Bureau Regarding Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 2, 1946)
Strike at the Enemy at an Opportune Moment During Mobile Warfare (May 3, 1946)
Keeping a Hold on Benxi Will Demoralize the Enemy (May 3, 1946)
Keep up Efforts to Destroy the Section of the Railway between Jinzhou and the Shanhai Pass (May 3, 1946)
Opinions on the Campaign in Rehe (May 3, 1946)
Views on Cutting off the Enemy’s Line of Retreat and Surrounding and Annihilating the Enemy in Siping (May 4, 1946)
Main Points of the Speeches by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi on Land Policy (May 8, 1946)
Step up Preparations against Fu Zuoyi’s Attacks (May 9, 1946)
Attend to Other Work While Arranging for the Eastern Rehe Campaign (May 10, 1946)
Cut off the Retreat of the Enemy Army at Siping and Pin Down the Enemy Reinforcements at Benxi (May 12, 1946, 9 P.M. to 11 P.M.)
Quickly Send Troops to Watch for an Opportunity to Occupy Western Jinzhou (May 13, 1946)
The Guomindang’s Plot for Civil War and Our Countermeasures (May 15, 1946)
The Various Forces in Rehe Are Expected to Actively Coordinate with Our Army to Battle in the Northeast (May 15, 1946)
We Hope for a Study of Techniques for Destroying Tanks (May 18, 1946)
Firmly Defend Siping, but When This Becomes Impossible, Abandon It on Your Own Initiative (May 19, 1946)
To Nie Rongzhen and Wang Jiaxiang (May 19, 1946)
In the Northeast, Work in the Countryside and the Small and Medium-Sized Cities Should for Now Still Be Given Priority (May 19, 1946)
Local Retaliation Adopted toward Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 19, 1946)
Military Deployments after the Withdrawal from Siping (May 19, 1946)
To the Xin’an Tour Group (May 20, 1946)
For the Time Being, Do Not Engage in Battle at Dongming (May 21, 1946)
Our Policy after Forfeiting Siping (May 21, 1946)
Letter to Yu Guangsheng (May 22, 1946)
Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from Representatives of the China Democratic League (May 23, 1946)
Actively Prepare for Battle and Strengthen Work among the Diehard Army (May 26, 1946)
The Main Force in the Northeast Should Not Fear Losing Territory and It Should Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (May 27, 1946)
The Battle to Defend Siping Cannot Represent Our General Battle Strategy (May 27, 1946)
Prepare to Deal with the Guomindang’s Offensive against Shanxi-Suiyuan and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (May 27, 1946)
Make Ample Preparations to Counter the Guomindang’s Large-Scale Offensive (May 29, 1946)
Purchase TNT in Large Quantities and Emphasize Training for Attacking Cities (May 29, 1946)
It Will Be Advantageous to the Shandong Military Region to First Annihilate the Armies of Wu Huawen et al. (May 30, 1946)
It Is Unnecessary to Give Notice before Attacking and Seizing Tai’an and Other Places (May 31, 1946)
The United States Is Transporting Large Numbers of Chiang’s Troops to the Northeast to Extend the Civil War (June 1, 1946)
The Central Plains Forces Must Seek Their Own Path to Salvation and Prepare to Break out of the Encirclement
First Seize Tai’an and Other Cities, and Then Consider Attacking Ji’nan (June 1, 1946)
We Agree to Adopt an Overall Policy of Mobile Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare in the Northeast (June 3, 1946)
Battle Deployments for Datong, Kouquan, Shuo County, Ningwu, and Other Places (June 4, 1946)
Increase Troop Strength, Completely Control the Lüliang Region (June 4, 1946)
Prepare All Conditions for Using Mobile Warfare to Destroy the Enemy Forces Attacking Chengde (June 5, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
During the Ceasefire Period, the Northwest Troops [of the Democratic Allied Army] Should Rest and Reorganize, Replenish Their Ranks, and Be on Guard against Enemy Raids (June 6, 1946, noon)
Rest, Reorganize, Conserve Strength, and Prepare to Shatter the Enemy’s Attack (June 6, 1946)
First Take Shuo County and Ningwu, Then Take Shanyang and Daiyue; Make Sure Not to Disturb Fu Zuoyi (June 9, 1946, 9:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M.)
Authoritative Person in Yan’an Declares Opposition to the Byrnes Bill to Assist Chiang Kaishek (June 16, 1946)
Telegram to Zheng Weisan, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen (June 19, 1946)
Military Dispositions for Dealing with a Major Assault by Chiang Kaishek (June 19, 1946)
Prepare to Capture Ningwu and Other Cities (June 20, 1946)
The Question of Whether Chengde Should Be Defended or Abandoned Should Be Considered (June 21, 1946)
Statement Opposing the U.S. Bill to Provide Military Assistance to Chiang Kaishek (June 22, 1946)
Strategic Plans for the Taihang and Shandong Regions after the Overall Situation Has Fallen Apart (June 22, 1946)
The Northeast Should Prepare to Shatter Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive When the Negotiations Fall Apart (June 22, 1946)
Give Proper Treatment to Guomindang and American Personnel on the Military Mediation Operational Teams (June 22, 1946)
We Agree That the Forces from the Central Plains Military Region Should Break Out Immediately (June 23, 1946)
First Attack Places Such as Huairen, Then Watch for a Chance to Capture Datong (June 23, 1946)
Reply to the Telegram from the American Sailors’ Union (June 24, 1946)
Break out of the Encirclement by Separate Routes and Protect the Security of the Military Mediation Teams (June 25, 1946)
Telegram of Appreciation and Solicitude to Ma Xulun and Others (June 25, 1946)
All of the Guomindang’s Initiatives Are to Fight; for the Time Being, There Is No Hope for Peace (June 25, 1946)
Basic Tasks for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region Following the Guomindang’s Major Assault (June 28, 1946)
Unmask the Enemy at the Appropriate Moment (June 30, 1946)
The Reactionaries’ Schemes Will Ultimately Fail (June 30 and July 7, 1946)
Action to Be Taken by the Central Plains Military Region after Breaking Out of the Encirclement (July 3, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
First Fight Several Victorious Battles on the Interior Lines and Then Shift to the Exterior Lines (July 4, 1946)
Telegrams in Reply to Distinguished Personages of Various Circles in Chongqing (July 5, 1946)
The Tactical Orientation to Be Adopted after Issuing the “July 7th” Declaration (July 6, 1946)
The Fundamental Policy toward the United States and Chiang Is Not to Compromise but to Struggle (July 6, 1946)
Notice Regarding Study and Propagation of the Central Committee’s “July 7th” Declaration (July 8, 1946)
If the Guomindang Does Not Completely and Permanently Cease Hostilities, We Will Not Do So Unilaterally (July 9, 1946)
Suggested Revisions to the Resolution of the Northeast Bureau on the Situation and Tasks in the Northeast (July 11, 1946, noon)
Pay Attention to Strengthening the Disciplinary Education of the Troops (July 12, 1946)
The Central Plains Army Should Pin Down the Enemy by Flexible Mobile Action on the Exterior Lines (July 13, 1946)
Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Li Gongpu (July 13, 1946)
The Significance of the Central Plains Army’s Success in Breaking out of the Encirclement (July 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
The Strategic Task of the Central Plains Army Is to Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (July 15, 1946)
Study the Combat Method of Chen Geng’s Army in Amassing Forces to Destroy the Enemy One by One (July 16, 1946)
Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Wen Yiduo (July 17, 1946)
Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Defeat of Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive by a War of Self-Defense (July 20, 1946)
Fight Flexibly and Establish Base Areas in Eastern and Western Hubei and Southern Henan (July 24, 1946)
Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Tao Xingzhi (July 25, 1946)
It Is Better to Lose Some Places Than to Be Forced to Fight (July 30, 1946)
Talk with Anna Louise Strong (August 1946)
Actively Fight in the Taihang Mountains and Eastern China to Assist the Central China Forces (August 9, 1946)
Arrange for Several More Battles in Central Jiangsu (August 13, 1946)
Do Not Deploy Equal Military Strength in All Campaigns and Combat (August 22, 1946)
Liu and Deng Should Replenish Fifteen to Twenty Regiments as a Main Force (August 25, 1946)
Storm and Capture Weak Positions and Then Displace and Annihilate the Enemy (August 27, 1946)
The Battle Experience of the Central China Field Army (August 28, 1946)
Guiding Principles for Annihilating the Enemy in Shandong and Central China (August 29, 1946)
Eliminate the Enemy’s Third Division at an Opportune Moment (August 29, 1946)
Drawing in Chiang’s Army to Reinforce Central Jiangsu Will Greatly Benefit the Overall Situation (August 31, 1946)
Letter to Xi Zhongxun (September 2, 1946)
Deploy Immediately to Destroy Liu Zhi’s Forces (September 3, 1946)
Arrangements for Action Following Elimination of the Third Division (September 4, 1946)
After the Third Division Is Eliminated, Find an Opportunity to Dispose of the Enemy Troops near Dongming (September 5, 1946)
Dispatch Local Troops to Harass the Brigade Attacking Shan County (September 5, 1946)
The Main Force That Has Taken Part in Battle Should Assemble for Rest and Reorganization; Troops That Were Not Used Should Annihilate a Unit of the Enemy Forces in Dongming (September 7, 1946)
Resolutely Overcome All Thoughts of Retreating; Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (September 10, 1946)
Notification Regarding the Battle Experience of Liu and Deng’s Army (September 13, 1946)
Order of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission Regarding Amassing a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One (September 16, 1946)
Letter to Chen Jinkun (September 22, 1946)
Letter to Lu Dingyi (September 27, 1946)
Chairman Mao Meets with American Journalist Steele and Answers Questions about the Current Situation (September 29, 1946)
Letter to Fu Dingyi (September 30, 1946)
A Summary by the CPC Central Committee on Work in July, August, and September of 1946 (October 1, 1946)
Issues Relating to the Current War Situation and the Negotiations (October 10, 1946, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.)
On the Problem of Selecting Students to Be Sent to Learn How to Operate Tanks (October 13, 1946)
Assemble the Full Forces of the Shandong and East China Field Armies and Eliminate the Enemy Moving Eastward North of the Huai River (October 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
Adopt the Method of Besieging a City and Destroying the Relief Forces to Eliminate the Enemy’s Effective Strength (October 24, 1946)
The Enemy Is Strong and We Are Weak, So We Must Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (October 25, 1946)
Expand Your Forces and Make the Capture of the Whole of Hainan Island Your Goal (October 30, 1946)
The Fighting inside the Shanhai Pass Will Soon Reach a Turning Point That Will Benefit Our War in the Northeast (November 1, 1946)
Congratulatory Telegram to Marshal Stalin Celebrating the Twenty-Ninth Anniversary of the Soviet Union (November 6, 1946)
Guiding Principles for Work in the Rural Areas of the Southern Provinces (November 6, 1946)
The Method for Handling Captured Officers (November 8, 1946)
Campaigns and Tactics Both Require Concentrating the Fighting Forces to Ensure Victory (November 9, 1946)
Letter to He Kaifeng (November 14, 1946)
Directive on Chiang Kaishek’s Recent Moves of Attacking Yan’an and Convening the “National Assembly” (November 18, 1946)
Winning Requires Successfully Forming a United Front (November 21, 1946)
The Overall Situation Will Improve if the Enemy Forces Advancing to the North Can Be Eliminated within a Month or Two (December 1, 1946)
Guiding Principles for Fighting in the Eastern Hebei Area (December 4, 1946)
Conversation with Three Western Journalists (December 9, 1946)
Telegram to Overseas Chinese Associations in Siam (December 25, 1946)
Fight More Small Battles and Make Destruction of the Enemy’s Effective Strength Your Objective (December 26, 1946)
1947
Congratulatory Speech on the Occasion of the New Year (January 1, 1947)
Strive to Annihilate Three to Four Brigades in Each Battle (January 2, 1947)
Go All-out toward the Goal of Fighting a War of Annihilation (January 5, 1947, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
Congratulatory Telegram on the First Anniversary of the Insurrection by the Central China Democratic Allied Army (January 8, 1947)
Encircling Cities and Attacking Reinforcements Are an Important Way to Annihilate the Enemy (January 11, 1947)
To Chen Jinkun (January 16, 1947)
Capture Zaozhuang and Prepare to Eliminate Ou Zhen’s Forces (January 17, 1947)
Telegram to Chen Yi and Su Yu (January 17, 1947)
Go All-Out to Annihilate Ou Zhen’s Army and Open a Route to Advance South (January 18, 1947)
When Sufficiently Prepared, Attack Ou Zhen Again (January 19, 1947)
To Fight Ou Zhen, Amass Fifty Regiments on One Battlefield (January 21, 1947)
A Spring Festival Appeal to Cadres and Residents of the Districts and Villages (January 24, 1947)
Two Conditions for Fighting a Large-Scale Battle of Annihilation (January 25, 1947)
The General Principle Should Be to Increase Attacks on the Weaker Enemies and Isolate the Stronger Enemies (January 27, 1947)
Ideas on How to Smash Chen Cheng’s Attack Plan (January 28, 1947)
We Should Lure the Enemy to Penetrate Deeply and Fight a Major Battle of Annihilation in Southern Shandong (January 31, 1947)
Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1947)
Suggestions on How to Thoroughly Crush Chen Cheng’s Attack on Southern Shandong (February 3, 1947)
You Must Wait until the Enemy Enters the Tancheng-Linyi Region before Fighting the First Battle (February 4, 1947)
Attack the Weaker Enemies First, Then the Stronger Enemies; Strive for an Advantage (February 6, 1947)
Construct Defensive Fortifications in Linyi to Facilitate Annihilating the Enemy (February 6, 1947)
Questions on Setting off for Laiwu and Xintai to Fight (February 7, 1947)
Elimination of Hao Pengju’s Forces Should Be Considered in Connection with the Overall Strategic Plan (February 9, 1947)
Carrying Out the Jiaoji Campaign Requires Full Preparation (February 23, 1947)
Our Army’s Plan of Action Following the Laiwu Campaign (February 24, 1947)
Assemble the Main Forces and Ride the Crest of Victory to Capture the Jiaoji Railway (February 25, 1947)
Facilitating the Annihilation of the Enemy Should Be a Criterion for Considering Battle Operations (March 6, 1947)
The Defense of Yan’an Mainly Depends upon Fighting on the Exterior Lines (March 6, 1947, 9:00 P.M.–11:00 P.M.)
An Order Regarding the Defense of Yan’an (March 16, 1947)
Prepare to Fight a Second Battle after the Fight at Qinghuabian (March 26, 1947)
We Agree with Your Policy and the Arrangements for Actively Annihilating the Enemy (March 27, 1947)
We Need to Smash Hu Zongnan’s Army in Order to Change the Situation in Northern Shaanxi (March 27, 1947)
Moving the Central Military Commission Apparatus (March 29, 1947)
The Work of the Central Work Committee Is to Be Carried Out under the Direction of Liu Shaoqi (March 30, 1947, 3:00 P.M.–5:00 P.M.)
Adopt the Battle Tactic of Ambushing from the Front and Both Flanks (April 2, 1947)
Temporarily Avoid Fighting, Conceal Yourselves, and Wait for an Opportunity (April 3, 1947)
Questions on a Plan of Action for the Northwest Field Operations Corps (April 6, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)
After Resting and Reorganizing for a Few Days, Carry Out Extensive Surprise Attacks on the Enemy’s Rear (April 8, 1947)
Circular of the CPC Central Committee on Establishment of the Work Committee of the Central Committee and Other Matters (April 9, 1947)
By Waiting Patiently, We Can Find an Opportunity to Wipe out the Enemy (April 15, 1947)
The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theater (April 15, 1947)
First Hit the Weak, Then Hit the Strong; You Fight Your Battles, I’ll Fight Mine (April 22, 1947)
Arrange to Annihilate the Enemy Forces That May Flee from Wayaobao (April 26, 1947)
Wang Shitai’s Unit Should Ensure That the Enemy’s Food Supply Lines Are Cut (April 26, 1947)
Attack Wayaobao or Panlong Only If You Have Complete Confidence (April 30, 1947)
We Can Maintain the Initiative If We Capture Panlong within a Week (May 4, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)
Operational Arrangements after the Capture of Panlong (May 4, 1947, 5:00 P.M.)
As Long as You Have Patience, There Is Sure to Be an Opportunity to Annihilate the Enemy (May 4, 1947)
Is It Possible to Finish off the Enemy’s 144th Brigade? (May 5, 1947)
It Is Better to Launch an Attack When the Enemy Is Dispersed and Exhausted (May 5, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)
Conceal Yourselves and Rest and Reorganize before Heading for Guanzhong and Longdong (May 5, 1947, 11:00 P.M.)
Do Not Be Impatient or Disperse Our Forces; Lure the Enemy in Deep and Seize Opportunities for Combat (May 6, 1947)
Slow Down the Enemy’s Movement and Cover the Fighting in Qinghuabian (May 6, 1947)
Arrangements for Destroying the Frontline Troops in Gu Zhutong’s Apparatus (May 8, 1947)
Chiang Kaishek’s Strategy of Driving Our Army North of the Yellow River Will Come to Naught (May 11, 1947, 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.)
Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from the Inner Mongolia People’s Congress (May 19, 1947)
Our Combat Orientation in the Northeast and the Situation within the Pass (May 20, 1947)
General Policy for Conducting Operations on the Shandong Battlefront (May 22, 1947)
Deployments for the Westward Campaign of the Chen [Geng]-Xie [Fuzhi] Column (May 24, 1947)
The Central Plains Army Has Played an Enormous Strategic Role (May 28, 1947)
An Authoritative Person of the Chinese Communist Party Discusses the Current Situation (May 30, 1947)
We Agree That Liu and Deng’s Entire Army Should Rest and Reorganize, and Cross the River at the End of the Month (June 3, 1947)
All Large-Scale Actions to Sabotage Railroads Must Come to a Halt (June 4, 1947)
Make All Preparations to Seize the Great Northwest (June 6, 1947)
June 1947 Should Be the Month in Which to Begin a Comprehensive Counterattack (June 14, 1947)
Do Not Fight Battles in Which You Are Not Assured of Victory (June 22, 1947, 3:00 P.M.)
Bibliography
About the Editors
Index

Citation preview

Volume IX From the JapaneseVolume Surrender VIII through the CPC’s Defense in the Civil War, FromStrategic Rectification to Coalition Government August 1945–June 1942–July 19451947

This volume was prepared under the auspices of the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University This volume was prepared under the auspices of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies Harvard University

Completion of the translations in Volume IX and Volume X of Mao Zedong’s pre-1949 writings was supported by grants from: Department of History, Harvard University Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University Harvard-Yenching Institute

The Cover Mao’s Handwritten Manuscript “Instructions on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of Self-Defense” (November 7, 1945)

Volume IX From the Japanese Surrender throughVolume the CPC’s VIIIStrategic Defense intothe Civil War, From Rectification Coalition Government August 1945–June 1942–July 19451947

Stuart Schram and Cheek , Editors Editors JosephR.Fewsmith andTimothy Nancy Hearst, Nancy J. Hodes, Associateand Editor Stuart R. Schram Roderick M. MacFarquhar , Chief Editors

} An EAst GAtE Book

M.E.Sharpe Armonk, New York London, England

Designed cover image: Mao’s Handwritten Manuscript “Instructions on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of Self-Defense” (November 7, 1945) First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Joseph Fewsmith and Nancy Hearst; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Joseph Fewsmith and Nancy Hearst to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-138-85656-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-71951-1 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents Acknowledgments: Volume IX and Volume X General Introduction: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949, Volumes IX and X Introduction: The Writings of Mao Zedong, August 1945–September 1949, Volumes IX and X Note on Sources and Conventions

xxvii xxix xxxvii xcvi

1945 Prepare to Deal with the Civil War Situation That Is Certain to Arise (August 4, 1945)

3

Prepare to Join with the Forces of Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao to Set up the Hunan-Guangdong Border Base Area (August 4, 1945)

5

Telegram to Marshal Stalin (August 9, 1945)

8

Comrade Mao Zedong Makes a Declaration Regarding the Fact That the War of Resistance Against Japan Has Entered Its Final Stage (August 9, 1945)

9

Speech at the Second Session of the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 9, 1945)

11

The Central Committee’s Resolutions Regarding Our Party’s Tasks after Japan’s Surrender (August 11, 1945)

13

Xinhua News Agency Reporter Criticizes and Condemns the “Chiang Kaishek Order” for Provoking Civil War and for Destroying World Peace (August 12, 1945)

16

We Must Do All We Can to Seize Communications Lines and the Cities Along Those Lines (August 12, 1945)

19 v

vi Contents

Regarding Central China’s Deployments in Preparation for the Civil War (August 12, 1945)

21

The Situation Following Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and Our Course of Action (August 13, 1945)

23

Telegram from Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] Resolutely Rejects Chiang Kaishek’s Erroneous Order (August 13, 1945)

34

We Definitely Must Have an Absolutely Superior Force during Campaigns; We Cannot Fight Recklessly (August 13, 1945)

36

Extensively Occupy the Countryside, Do Not Fight for the Big Cities (August 15, 1945)

37

Telegram by Chairman Mao in Reply to Chiang Kaishek (August 16, 1945)

39

Chiang Kaishek, the Enemy of the People, Has Sent Out a Signal for Civil War (August 16, 1945)

40

Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] Sends a Telegram Demanding That Chiang Kaishek End the Civil War (August 16, 1945)

44

Dispatch Nine Regiments to the Three Eastern Provinces (August 20, 1945)

48

Reply to a Telegram from Chiang Kaishek (August 22, 1945)

50

The New Situation and New Tasks Following Victory in the AntiJapanese War (August 23, 1945)

51

Telegram in Reply to Chiang Kaishek (August 24, 1945)

58

Current Party Policy and Work Agenda for the New Fourth Army (August 24, 1945)

59

Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation (August 25, 1945)

61

Make Every Effort to Capture Many Medium-Sized and Small Cities (August 25, 1945)

64

C ontents vii

Address at the Politburo Meeting before Attending the Chongqing Talks (August 26, 1945)

65

The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender (August 26, 1945)

68

During the Period of Mao Zedong’s Attendance at the Chongqing Talks, He Will Be Replaced by Liu Shaoqi in the Role of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 27, 1945, 3:00 P.M.)

72

Chairman Mao’s Statement on Arriving in Chongqing (August 28, 1945)

73

Talk at the Office of the Eighteenth Army Group in Chongqing (August 29, 1945)

74

Eleven Points Regarding the Negotiations with the Guomindang (August 30, 1945)

76

Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Talks between the Two Parties (September 2, 1945)

79

An Inscription Celebrating Victory in the War against Japan (September 3, 1945)

83

Talk with Dagong Bao Reporters (September 5, 1945)

84

Chairman Mao Makes Remarks in Chongqing Expressing the Hope That the Negotiations Will Come to a Successful Conclusion (September 13, 1945)

86

Hasten to Send People to Shanghai and Other Places to Establish Newspapers (September 14, 1945)

87

Speech at the Consultative Conference Reception (September 18, 1945)

88

Answers to Questions Raised by Reuters News Agency Correspondent Campbell (September 27, 1945)

89

To Liu Yazi (October 4, 1945)

92

To Liu Yazi (October 7, 1945)

93

viii Contents

Speech at a Party Held in the Auditorium of the Military Affairs Commission (October 8, 1945)

94

Report on the Progress of the Chongqing Negotiations (October 11, 1945)

96

Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping (October 12, 1945, 1:00 P.M.)

98

Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Geng (October 16, 1945)

100

Seizing Victory in the Pingsui Campaign Is of Great Significance (October 16, 1945)

101

Telegram to the Comrades of the Central Bureau of the Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Region (October 17, 1945)

103

On the Chongqing Negotiations (October 17, 1945)

105

Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan’an Party School (October 17, 1945)

112

Telegram to Chen Geng, and for the Information of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, and Xiao Ke (October 19, 1945)

122

Local Troops Should Be Transferred to Replenish the Field Army (October 19, 1945)

124

The Current Policy for Developments in the Northeast (October 19, 1945)

125

The Current Situation and the Tasks for the Next Six Months (October 20, 1945, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.)

126

On the Warfare in Shandong and Central China (October 22, 1945)

128

Isolate and Then Annihilate the Forces of Fu Zuoyi in Jining (October 24, 1945)

130

Speech at the Seventh Branch School of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (October 25, 1945)

131

C ontents ix

Transfer Our Forces to the Northeast as Rapidly as Possible (October 25, 1945)

135

Dispositions for the Pinghan Campaign (October 27, 1945)

136

Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping (October 29, 1945)

138

Additional Points for the Negotiations with the Guomindang (October 29, 1945)

139

Zhao Erlu Is to Proceed to Lincheng (October 30, 1945)

140

Prepare to Pin Down Wang Zhonglian’s Troops, Which May Move North as Reinforcements (October 30, 1945)

141

Annihilate the Enemy Facing Us and Then Attack the Reinforcements (October 30, 1945)

142

Telegram to Zhou Enlai (October 31, 1945)

143

Amass the Greatest Force to Annihilate the Present Enemy (October 31, 1945)

144

Rapidly Set Off for the Lincheng Area (October 31, 1945)

145

November Operational Preparations (November 1, 1945)

146

Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da (November 2, 1945, 10 P.M.)

149

The Process of Winning the Pinghan Campaign (November 2, 1945)

150

Method for Dealing with Captured Officers and Soldiers (November 3, 1945, 11 P.M.)

152

Yang and Su’s Column Should Replace Its Losses and Then Leave for Jinzhou and Shenyang (November 3, 1945, 3:00 P.M.)

153

There Is Ample Reason for Our Side to Initiate a Counteroffensive (November 3, 1945)

155

Telegram to Zhou Enlai (November 3, 1945, 11:00 P.M.)

156

x Contents

North China, the Northeast, and Other Areas Must Be Returned to People’s Self-Governance (November 3, 1945)

157

Great Victory in the Battle of Self-Defense by Our Forces in Southern Hebei (November 4, 1945)

159

Commence Military Transport Work against the Northwest and Northeast Troops (November 4, 1945)

162

Deployment to Increase Troops in the Northeast (November 4, 1945)

164

A Chinese Communist Party Spokesperson Denounces Wu Guozhen’s Shameless Lies and Presents Ironclad Evidence Regarding the Repeated Attacks by the Guomindang Army (November 5, 1945)

166

The Three Big Problems of Accepting Surrender, the Puppet Troops, and Self-Governance Must Be Resolved before Communications Can Be Restored (November 5, 1945)

170

Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of Self-Defense (November 7, 1945)

172

The Present Orientation Regarding Propaganda and Negotiations (November 7 and 8, 1945)

175

Treat Mobilizing the Masses and Creating the Battlefield as the Most Urgent Strategic Tasks in the Northeast at Present (November 10, 1945)

177

Make Creating Battlefields a Strategic Task (November 11, 1945)

179

The Situation after the Victory over Japan and Some Work Policies for the Future (November 12, 1945)

180

Fighting on Internal Lines, Wipe out the Guomindang’s Three Armies One by One (November 15, 1945)

187

Yan’an Authority Commenting on the National Assembly Says Unilateral Action by the Guomindang Authorities Reveals Determination to Launch a Large-Scale Civil War (November 16, 1945)

189

Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas in 1946 (December 15, 1945)

191

C ontents xi

Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Work in the Northeast (December 28, 1945)

195

Letter to Situ Meitang (December 28, 1945)

199

To Huang Qisheng (December 29, 1945)

200

1946 To Cai Bo and Others (January 8, 1946)

203

Notice on Halting Domestic Military Conflict (January 10, 1946)

204

To Liu Yazi (January 28, 1946)

205

Directive of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1946)

206

The Reactionaries Are Expanding Their Anti-Soviet and AntiCommunist Activities under the Instigation and Encouragement of the Authorities of the Guomindang Government (February 26, 1946)

211

Remarks at the Farewell Party for General Marshall (March 5, 1946)

214

Telegrams Regarding Ye Ting’s Admission to the Party (March 7, 1946)

215

To Hong Yu (March 12, 1946)

217

Circular Requesting That All Areas Report on Industry and the Labor Movement (March 12, 1946)

218

Four Points in an Analysis of the Current Situation (March 15, 1946)

219

Pay Strict Attention to Policy When Entering and Garrisoning Areas in the Northeast (March 17, 1946)

222

Control with All Our Might the Two Cities of Changchun and Harbin and the Entire Length of the Chinese Eastern Railway (March 24, 1946)

223

Policy Orientation on the Question of Industry and the Labor Movement (March 24 and 28, 1946)

225

Policy toward Armed and Unarmed Guomindang Personnel (March 30, 1946)

227

xii Contents

Take Strict Precautions against Sudden Attacks by the Enemy during This High Tide of Reactionary Activity (April 5, 1946)

228

On Countering Large-Scale Attacks in the Northeast by Chiang Kaishek and the United States (April 5, 1946, noon)

229

Achieving Victories in the Battles at Siping and Benxi Is Key at Present (April 6, 1946)

230

Supplementary Directive Regarding the Problem of Engaging in Battle in the Northeast (April 8, 1946)

232

Some Problems in Correcting Errors in Our Mass Work (April 11, 1946)

234

When Conducting Operations in the Northeast, It Is Necessary to Take the Whole Situation into Account and Make Plans for the Long Run (April 12, 1946)

236

Defend Siping and Benxi So as to Give Us an Advantage in Negotiations (April 13, 1946)

238

Rapidly Destroy the Enemy in the Northeast and Seize the Upper Hand before the Cessation of Hostilities (April 15, 1946)

239

Attack the Beiping-Shenyang Railway and Conduct Guerrilla Warfare North of Shenyang (April 16, 1946)

241

You Are Expected to Be Prepared to Handle Any Incident (April 18, 1946)

242

Paying Respects to the Martyrs Who Died on April 8 (April 19, 1946)

243

Military and Political Deployments in the Northeast after the Occupation of Changchun (April 19, 1946) 

244

Concentrate a Superior Force to Launch Several Large Decisive Battles South and North of Siping (April 19, 1946)

246

Rapidly Transfer Troops from Southern Manchuria Northwards to Engage in Battle; Preparations Should Be Made to Defend the City of Changchun (April 20, 1946)

248

Make the Utmost Effort to Secure Victory in Battle in the Siping and Gongzhuling Areas (April 20, 1946)

249

C ontents xiii

The Changchun Forces Should Rapidly Divide into City Garrison and Field Army Units (April 21, 1946)

251

Deployment for Military Operations to Annihilate the New First Army (April 21, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

253

We Should Transfer Many of Our Forces Northward to Defend Changchun and Chahar (April 21, 1946)

254

Opinions on Military Work and Local Work in the Northeast (April 23, 1946)

255

Defend Benxi to the Last and Work against Time until a Ceasefire is Reached (April 26, 1946)

256

We Must Be Cautious in Utilizing Fresh Troops (April 28, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

257

Resolutely Defend Siping and for the Present Do Not Launch Any Large-Scale Offensives (April 30, 1946, midnight)

258

Troops in the Central Plains Military Region Should Attempt a Transfer within the Rules of the Agreement (April 30, 1946)

259

Immediately Prepare to Launch an Attack against the Pinggu Line, Nankou, and Other Areas (April 30, 1946)

260

Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation (April 1946)

261

Directive on the Problem of Military Training (May 1, 1946)

263

Struggle Resolutely in Siping and Benxi to Secure a Peace That Will Be Favorable to Us (May 1, 1946)

264

We Agree with the Policy Adopted by the Central Plains Bureau Regarding Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 2, 1946)

266

Strike at the Enemy at an Opportune Moment During Mobile Warfare (May 3, 1946)

267

Keeping a Hold on Benxi Will Demoralize the Enemy (May 3, 1946)

268

xiv Contents

Keep up Efforts to Destroy the Section of the Railway between Jinzhou and the Shanhai Pass (May 3, 1946)

269

Opinions on the Campaign in Rehe (May 3, 1946)

270

Views on Cutting off the Enemy’s Line of Retreat and Surrounding and Annihilating the Enemy in Siping (May 4, 1946)

272

Main Points of the Speeches by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi on Land Policy (May 8, 1946)

274

Step up Preparations against Fu Zuoyi’s Attacks (May 9, 1946)

276

Attend to Other Work While Arranging for the Eastern Rehe Campaign (May 10, 1946)

277

Cut off the Retreat of the Enemy Army at Siping and Pin Down the Enemy Reinforcements at Benxi (May 12, 1946, 9 P.M. to 11 P.M.)

278

Quickly Send Troops to Watch for an Opportunity to Occupy Western Jinzhou (May 13, 1946)

279

The Guomindang’s Plot for Civil War and Our Countermeasures (May 15, 1946)

280

The Various Forces in Rehe Are Expected to Actively Coordinate with Our Army to Battle in the Northeast (May 15, 1946)

282

We Hope for a Study of Techniques for Destroying Tanks (May 18, 1946)

283

Firmly Defend Siping, but When This Becomes Impossible, Abandon It on Your Own Initiative (May 19, 1946)

284

To Nie Rongzhen and Wang Jiaxiang (May 19, 1946)

285

In the Northeast, Work in the Countryside and the Small and Medium-Sized Cities Should for Now Still Be Given Priority (May 19, 1946)

286

Local Retaliation Adopted toward Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 19, 1946)

287

C ontents xv

Military Deployments after the Withdrawal from Siping (May 19, 1946)

288

To the Xin’an Tour Group (May 20, 1946)

289

For the Time Being, Do Not Engage in Battle at Dongming (May 21, 1946)

290

Our Policy after Forfeiting Siping (May 21, 1946)

291

Letter to Yu Guangsheng (May 22, 1946)

292

Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from Representatives of the China Democratic League (May 23, 1946)

293

Actively Prepare for Battle and Strengthen Work among the Diehard Army (May 26, 1946)

294

The Main Force in the Northeast Should Not Fear Losing Territory and It Should Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (May 27, 1946)

295

The Battle to Defend Siping Cannot Represent Our General Battle Strategy (May 27, 1946)

296

Prepare to Deal with the Guomindang’s Offensive against Shanxi-Suiyuan and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (May 27, 1946)

297

Make Ample Preparations to Counter the Guomindang’s Large-Scale Offensive (May 29, 1946)

298

Purchase TNT in Large Quantities and Emphasize Training for Attacking Cities (May 29, 1946)

299

It Will Be Advantageous to the Shandong Military Region to First Annihilate the Armies of Wu Huawen et al. (May 30, 1946)

300

It Is Unnecessary to Give Notice before Attacking and Seizing Tai’an and Other Places (May 31, 1946)

302

The United States Is Transporting Large Numbers of Chiang’s Troops to the Northeast to Extend the Civil War (June 1, 1946)

303

xvi Contents

The Central Plains Forces Must Seek Their Own Path to Salvation and Prepare to Break out of the Encirclement (June 1, 1946)

304

First Seize Tai’an and Other Cities, and Then Consider Attacking Ji’nan (June 1, 1946)

305

We Agree to Adopt an Overall Policy of Mobile Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare in the Northeast (June 3, 1946)

306

Battle Deployments for Datong, Kouquan, Shuo County, Ningwu, and Other Places (June 4, 1946)

307

Increase Troop Strength, Completely Control the Lüliang Region (June 4, 1946)

309

Prepare All Conditions for Using Mobile Warfare to Destroy the Enemy Forces Attacking Chengde (June 5, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

310

During the Ceasefire Period, the Northwest Troops [of the Democratic Allied Army] Should Rest and Reorganize, Replenish Their Ranks, and Be on Guard against Enemy Raids (June 6, 1946, noon)

312

Rest, Reorganize, Conserve Strength, and Prepare to Shatter the Enemy’s Attack (June 6, 1946)

313

First Take Shuo County and Ningwu, Then Take Shanyang and Daiyue; Make Sure Not to Disturb Fu Zuoyi (June 9, 1946, 9:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M.)

314

Authoritative Person in Yan’an Declares Opposition to the Byrnes Bill to Assist Chiang Kaishek (June 16, 1946)

315

Telegram to Zheng Weisan, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen (June 19, 1946)

317

Military Dispositions for Dealing with a Major Assault by Chiang Kaishek (June 19, 1946)

318

Prepare to Capture Ningwu and Other Cities (June 20, 1946)

320

The Question of Whether Chengde Should Be Defended or Abandoned Should Be Considered (June 21, 1946)

321

C ontents xvii

Statement Opposing the U.S. Bill to Provide Military Assistance to Chiang Kaishek (June 22, 1946)

323

Strategic Plans for the Taihang and Shandong Regions after the Overall Situation Has Fallen Apart (June 22, 1946)

325

The Northeast Should Prepare to Shatter Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive When the Negotiations Fall Apart (June 22, 1946)

327

Give Proper Treatment to Guomindang and American Personnel on the Military Mediation Operational Teams (June 22, 1946)

328

We Agree That the Forces from the Central Plains Military Region Should Break Out Immediately (June 23, 1946)

330

First Attack Places Such as Huairen, Then Watch for a Chance to Capture Datong (June 23, 1946)

331

Reply to the Telegram from the American Sailors’ Union (June 24, 1946)

332

Break out of the Encirclement by Separate Routes and Protect the Security of the Military Mediation Teams (June 25, 1946)

333

Telegram of Appreciation and Solicitude to Ma Xulun and Others (June 25, 1946)

334

All of the Guomindang’s Initiatives Are to Fight; for the Time Being, There Is No Hope for Peace (June 25, 1946)

336

Basic Tasks for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region Following the Guomindang’s Major Assault (June 28, 1946)

337

Unmask the Enemy at the Appropriate Moment (June 30, 1946)

339

The Reactionaries’ Schemes Will Ultimately Fail (June 30 and July 7, 1946)

340

Action to Be Taken by the Central Plains Military Region after Breaking Out of the Encirclement (July 3, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

342

First Fight Several Victorious Battles on the Interior Lines and Then Shift to the Exterior Lines (July 4, 1946)

344

xviii Contents

Telegrams in Reply to Distinguished Personages of Various Circles in Chongqing (July 5, 1946)

345

The Tactical Orientation to Be Adopted after Issuing the “July 7th” Declaration (July 6, 1946)

346

The Fundamental Policy toward the United States and Chiang Is Not to Compromise but to Struggle (July 6, 1946)

348

Notice Regarding Study and Propagation of the Central Committee’s “July 7th” Declaration (July 8, 1946)

349

If the Guomindang Does Not Completely and Permanently Cease Hostilities, We Will Not Do So Unilaterally (July 9, 1946)

350

Suggested Revisions to the Resolution of the Northeast Bureau on the Situation and Tasks in the Northeast (July 11, 1946, noon)

352

Pay Attention to Strengthening the Disciplinary Education of the Troops (July 12, 1946)

356

The Central Plains Army Should Pin Down the Enemy by Flexible Mobile Action on the Exterior Lines (July 13, 1946)

357

Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Li Gongpu (July 13, 1946)

358

The Significance of the Central Plains Army’s Success in Breaking out of the Encirclement (July 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

359

The Strategic Task of the Central Plains Army Is to Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (July 15, 1946)

361

Study the Combat Method of Chen Geng’s Army in Amassing Forces to Destroy the Enemy One by One (July 16, 1946)

363

Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Wen Yiduo (July 17, 1946) 365 Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Defeat of Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive by a War of Self-Defense (July 20, 1946)

366

Fight Flexibly and Establish Base Areas in Eastern and Western Hubei and Southern Henan (July 24, 1946)

369

C ontents xix

Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Tao Xingzhi (July 25, 1946)

371

It Is Better to Lose Some Places Than to Be Forced to Fight (July 30, 1946)

372

Talk with Anna Louise Strong (August 1946)

373

Actively Fight in the Taihang Mountains and Eastern China to Assist the Central China Forces (August 9, 1946)

376

Arrange for Several More Battles in Central Jiangsu (August 13, 1946)

378

Do Not Deploy Equal Military Strength in All Campaigns and Combat (August 22, 1946)

379

Liu and Deng Should Replenish Fifteen to Twenty Regiments as a Main Force (August 25, 1946)

380

Storm and Capture Weak Positions and Then Displace and Annihilate the Enemy (August 27, 1946)

381

The Battle Experience of the Central China Field Army (August 28, 1946)

382

Guiding Principles for Annihilating the Enemy in Shandong and Central China (August 29, 1946)

384

Eliminate the Enemy’s Third Division at an Opportune Moment (August 29, 1946)

386

Drawing in Chiang’s Army to Reinforce Central Jiangsu Will Greatly Benefit the Overall Situation (August 31, 1946)

388

Letter to Xi Zhongxun (September 2, 1946)

390

Deploy Immediately to Destroy Liu Zhi’s Forces (September 3, 1946)

391

Arrangements for Action Following Elimination of the Third Division (September 4, 1946)

392

After the Third Division Is Eliminated, Find an Opportunity to Dispose of the Enemy Troops near Dongming (September 5, 1946)

393

xx Contents

Dispatch Local Troops to Harass the Brigade Attacking Shan County (September 5, 1946)

394

The Main Force That Has Taken Part in Battle Should Assemble for Rest and Reorganization; Troops That Were Not Used Should Annihilate a Unit of the Enemy Forces in Dongming (September 7, 1946)

395

Resolutely Overcome All Thoughts of Retreating; Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (September 10, 1946)

396

Notification Regarding the Battle Experience of Liu and Deng’s Army (September 13, 1946)

399

Order of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission Regarding Amassing a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One (September 16, 1946)

401

Letter to Chen Jinkun (September 22, 1946)

405

Letter to Lu Dingyi (September 27, 1946)

406

Chairman Mao Meets with American Journalist Steele and Answers Questions about the Current Situation (September 29, 1946)

407

Letter to Fu Dingyi (September 30, 1946)

409

A Summary by the CPC Central Committee on Work in July, August, and September of 1946 (October 1, 1946)

410

Issues Relating to the Current War Situation and the Negotiations (October 10, 1946, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.)

416

On the Problem of Selecting Students to Be Sent to Learn How to Operate Tanks (October 13, 1946)

418

Assemble the Full Forces of the Shandong and East China Field Armies and Eliminate the Enemy Moving Eastward North of the Huai River (October 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

419

Adopt the Method of Besieging a City and Destroying the Relief Forces to Eliminate the Enemy’s Effective Strength (October 24, 1946)

421

C ontents xxi

The Enemy Is Strong and We Are Weak, So We Must Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (October 25, 1946)

422

Expand Your Forces and Make the Capture of the Whole of Hainan Island Your Goal (October 30, 1946)

423

The Fighting inside the Shanhai Pass Will Soon Reach a Turning Point That Will Benefit Our War in the Northeast (November 1, 1946)

424

Congratulatory Telegram to Marshal Stalin Celebrating the Twenty-Ninth Anniversary of the Soviet Union (November 6, 1946)

426

Guiding Principles for Work in the Rural Areas of the Southern Provinces (November 6, 1946)

427

The Method for Handling Captured Officers (November 8, 1946)

429

Campaigns and Tactics Both Require Concentrating the Fighting Forces to Ensure Victory (November 9, 1946)

430

Letter to He Kaifeng (November 14, 1946)

431

Directive on Chiang Kaishek’s Recent Moves of Attacking Yan’an and Convening the “National Assembly” (November 18, 1946)

432

Winning Requires Successfully Forming a United Front (November 21, 1946)

433

The Overall Situation Will Improve if the Enemy Forces Advancing to the North Can Be Eliminated within a Month or Two (December 1, 1946)

438

Guiding Principles for Fighting in the Eastern Hebei Area (December 4, 1946)

440

Conversation with Three Western Journalists (December 9, 1946)

441

Telegram to Overseas Chinese Associations in Siam (December 25, 1946)

447

Fight More Small Battles and Make Destruction of the Enemy’s Effective Strength Your Objective (December 26, 1946)

448

xxii Contents

1947 Congratulatory Speech on the Occasion of the New Year (January 1, 1947)

453

Strive to Annihilate Three to Four Brigades in Each Battle (January 2, 1947)

455

Go All-out toward the Goal of Fighting a War of Annihilation (January 5, 1947, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)

456

Congratulatory Telegram on the First Anniversary of the Insurrection by the Central China Democratic Allied Army (January 8, 1947)

459

Encircling Cities and Attacking Reinforcements Are an Important Way to Annihilate the Enemy (January 11, 1947)

460

To Chen Jinkun (January 16, 1947)

462

Capture Zaozhuang and Prepare to Eliminate Ou Zhen’s Forces (January 17, 1947)

463

Telegram to Chen Yi and Su Yu (January 17, 1947)

465

Go All-Out to Annihilate Ou Zhen’s Army and Open a Route to Advance South (January 18, 1947)

466

When Sufficiently Prepared, Attack Ou Zhen Again (January 19, 1947)

467

To Fight Ou Zhen, Amass Fifty Regiments on One Battlefield (January 21, 1947)

468

A Spring Festival Appeal to Cadres and Residents of the Districts and Villages (January 24, 1947)

469

Two Conditions for Fighting a Large-Scale Battle of Annihilation (January 25, 1947)

470

The General Principle Should Be to Increase Attacks on the Weaker Enemies and Isolate the Stronger Enemies (January 27, 1947)

471

C ontents xxiii

Ideas on How to Smash Chen Cheng’s Attack Plan (January 28, 1947)

472

We Should Lure the Enemy to Penetrate Deeply and Fight a Major Battle of Annihilation in Southern Shandong (January 31, 1947)

474

Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1947)

476

Suggestions on How to Thoroughly Crush Chen Cheng’s Attack on Southern Shandong (February 3, 1947)

484

You Must Wait until the Enemy Enters the Tancheng-Linyi Region before Fighting the First Battle (February 4, 1947)

486

Attack the Weaker Enemies First, Then the Stronger Enemies; Strive for an Advantage (February 6, 1947)

487

Construct Defensive Fortifications in Linyi to Facilitate Annihilating the Enemy (February 6, 1947)

489

Questions on Setting off for Laiwu and Xintai to Fight (February 7, 1947)

490

Elimination of Hao Pengju’s Forces Should Be Considered in Connection with the Overall Strategic Plan (February 9, 1947)

491

Carrying Out the Jiaoji Campaign Requires Full Preparation (February 23, 1947)

493

Our Army’s Plan of Action Following the Laiwu Campaign (February 24, 1947)

494

Assemble the Main Forces and Ride the Crest of Victory to Capture the Jiaoji Railway (February 25, 1947)

496

Facilitating the Annihilation of the Enemy Should Be a Criterion for Considering Battle Operations (March 6, 1947)

497

The Defense of Yan’an Mainly Depends upon Fighting on the Exterior Lines (March 6, 1947, 9:00 P.M.–11:00 P.M.)

499

An Order Regarding the Defense of Yan’an (March 16, 1947)

501

xxiv Contents

Prepare to Fight a Second Battle after the Fight at Qinghuabian (March 26, 1947)

503

We Agree with Your Policy and the Arrangements for Actively Annihilating the Enemy (March 27, 1947)

504

We Need to Smash Hu Zongnan’s Army in Order to Change the Situation in Northern Shaanxi (March 27, 1947)

505

Moving the Central Military Commission Apparatus (March 29, 1947)

507

The Work of the Central Work Committee Is to Be Carried Out under the Direction of Liu Shaoqi (March 30, 1947, 3:00 P.M.–5:00 P.M.)

508

Adopt the Battle Tactic of Ambushing from the Front and Both Flanks (April 2, 1947)

509

Temporarily Avoid Fighting, Conceal Yourselves, and Wait for an Opportunity (April 3, 1947)

510

Questions on a Plan of Action for the Northwest Field Operations Corps (April 6, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)

511

After Resting and Reorganizing for a Few Days, Carry Out Extensive Surprise Attacks on the Enemy’s Rear (April 8, 1947)

513

Circular of the CPC Central Committee on Establishment of the Work Committee of the Central Committee and Other Matters (April 9, 1947)

515

By Waiting Patiently, We Can Find an Opportunity to Wipe out the Enemy (April 15, 1947)

517

The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theater (April 15, 1947)

519

First Hit the Weak, Then Hit the Strong; You Fight Your Battles, I’ll Fight Mine (April 22, 1947)

521

Arrange to Annihilate the Enemy Forces That May Flee from Wayaobao (April 26, 1947)

522

Wang Shitai’s Unit Should Ensure That the Enemy’s Food Supply Lines Are Cut (April 26, 1947)

523

C ontents xxv

Attack Wayaobao or Panlong Only If You Have Complete Confidence (April 30, 1947)

524

We Can Maintain the Initiative If We Capture Panlong within a Week (May 4, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)

525

Operational Arrangements after the Capture of Panlong (May 4, 1947, 5:00 P.M.)

527

As Long as You Have Patience, There Is Sure to Be an Opportunity to Annihilate the Enemy (May 4, 1947)

528

Is It Possible to Finish off the Enemy’s 144th Brigade? (May 5, 1947)

529

It Is Better to Launch an Attack When the Enemy Is Dispersed and Exhausted (May 5, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)

530

Conceal Yourselves and Rest and Reorganize before Heading for Guanzhong and Longdong (May 5, 1947, 11:00 P.M.)

531

Do Not Be Impatient or Disperse Our Forces; Lure the Enemy in Deep and Seize Opportunities for Combat (May 6, 1947)

532

Slow Down the Enemy’s Movement and Cover the Fighting in Qinghuabian (May 6, 1947)

535

Arrangements for Destroying the Frontline Troops in Gu Zhutong’s Apparatus (May 8, 1947)

536

Chiang Kaishek’s Strategy of Driving Our Army North of the Yellow River Will Come to Naught (May 11, 1947, 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.)

537

Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from the Inner Mongolia People’s Congress (May 19, 1947)

539

Our Combat Orientation in the Northeast and the Situation within the Pass (May 20, 1947)

540

General Policy for Conducting Operations on the Shandong Battlefront (May 22, 1947)

543

Deployments for the Westward Campaign of the Chen [Geng]-Xie [Fuzhi] Column (May 24, 1947)

545

xxvi Contents

The Central Plains Army Has Played an Enormous Strategic Role (May 28, 1947) 

547

An Authoritative Person of the Chinese Communist Party Discusses the Current Situation (May 30, 1947) 

548

We Agree That Liu and Deng’s Entire Army Should Rest and Reorganize, and Cross the River at the End of the Month (June 3, 1947) 

552

All Large-Scale Actions to Sabotage Railroads Must Come to a Halt (June 4, 1947) 

553

Make All Preparations to Seize the Great Northwest (June 6, 1947) 

554

June 1947 Should Be the Month in Which to Begin a Comprehensive Counterattack (June 14, 1947) 

555

Do Not Fight Battles in Which You Are Not Assured of Victory (June 22, 1947, 3:00 P.M.) 

557

Bibliography  559 About the Editors  562 Index563

Acknowledgments

Volume IX and Volume X

Almost three years ago Rod MacFarquhar asked me to see to it that the final two volumes of Stuart Schram’s monumental ten volumes of translations of Mao Zedong’s pre-1949 writings be completed. Although I agreed, I had little knowledge about the state of the project, what would be required, or how much over my head I would be. All I knew about these volumes was that at some point during the project, which began in 1989, Stuart had made the decision to omit many of Mao’s military telegrams from these two volumes and he had commissioned Arthur Waldron of the University of Pennsylvania to write an introduction on the Civil War period. Because I have no idea about what transpired prior to my commitment to Rod, in the following I am only able to acknowledge the help of those with whom I worked directly. To everyone else, you should know who you are, and your work is gratefully acknowledged. I therefore thank: -- The History Department of Harvard University, Liz Perry and the HarvardYenching Institute, and the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies for providing much-needed funding. Michael Szonyi worked tirelessly to put together this final funding package to ensure that the project could be brought to completion. -- Joe Fewsmith who, however reluctantly, upon the request of Rod agreed to provide assistance in this undertaking. Despite his other commitments and his own work (including publication of two substantial books of his own during the period that these volumes were being prepared), when the translations were finally completed, he read through the entire two volumes, pointing out many translation and factual errors. -- Tim Cheek, the editor of Volume 8, who provided much advice about earlier conventions and how the previous volumes had been compiled. -- Stacy Mosher, originally recruited by Rod, who, with her inimitable language skills, went through all the translations that had been completed under Rod and Stuart and made substantial language corrections and added many useful factual footnotes. With the exception of Victor Seow and Kyle Jaros, who were both recruited for this project by Rod, I am unable to locate the names of the many other people who xxvii

xxviii Acknowledgments

provided help with some of the early translations for these two volumes. Among those whom I recruited, I sincerely thank: Tarryn Chun, Charlotte Cotter (library assistant at the Fairbank Center), Bridget Nichols, Evan Randall, and Weichu Wang. In Beijing, Shi Weitong and Lu Hua, both of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also assisted with some of the translations. Despite their own pressing commitments, Han Gang and Huang Jiangjun, both top Mao specialists in China, provided much indispensable help, making suggestions, providing additional documentation, and reviewing the entire table of contents and the citations to the original sources to ensure that all of the items are of relevance, that nothing of importance is omitted, and that the earliest known sources are noted. Finally, in Hong Kong and Boston, Dong Yifu, using his fully bilingual skills, very generously helped to beautify some of the language in the translations. I have now completed putting together this work that I inherited from Stuart and Rod, and the publication of these two final volumes, some thirty-plus years after inception of the project, marks the end of this series on Mao’s Road to Power. Nancy Hearst January 28, 2022

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949, Volumes IX and X Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao’s writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao’s ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese Revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century. The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century, and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter. Mao’s native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority, and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus, on the one hand, the Hunan Army of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But, on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenth-century reformers, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the 1911 Revolution was arguably as great as that of Sun Yatsen.1 In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy.

1.  Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao’s writings, especially those of the early period contained in Vol. I of this series. See, regarding Zeng, pp. 10, 72n, 122, and 131n. On Tan, see “Zhang Kundi’s Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong,” September 1917, pp. 138–139. On Huang, see “Letter to Miyazaki Tōten,” March 1917, pp. 111–12. xxix

xxx  GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Apart from Mao’s strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that these were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values, but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the “antiquated” and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, “Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought.”2 In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: how could China develop an advanced civilization, and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese? As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao’s early exposure to “Westernizing” influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them. Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This “new thought tide,” which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward, and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party’s first leader, for the Western values incarnated by “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy,” he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources. In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work, and that Russia’s proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed.3 Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship, and the other half to deciding what to do with it, and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From beginning to end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import. To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the extent that, 2.  Letter of August 23, 1917, to Li Jinxi, Vol. I, p. 132. 3.  See his letter of January 21, 1921, to Cai Hesen, Vol. II, pp. 35–36.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xxxi

although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always “planted his backside on the body of China,”4 ideology alone did not exhaustively determine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong’s most remarkable attributes was the extent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx’s dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world, but to change it. It is reliably reported that Mao’s close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan’an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. To such detailed historical analyses based on economic and social facts, he preferred The Communist Manifesto, of which he saw the message as “Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng!” (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!) In other words, for Mao, the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history. Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior, or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some pre-capitalist stage of development (whether “Asiatic” or “feudal”). And, by placing the polarity “oppressor/oppressed” at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression, and the oppression of China by the imperialists, were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle. Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a “united front” or alliance with Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922–1923, and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923–1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kaishek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was to be found in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants.

4.  Mao Zedong, “Ruhe yanjiu Zhonggong dangshi” (How to Study the History of the Chinese Communist Party), talk of March 30, 1942, to a Central Committee study group, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Mao Zedong wenji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 2, pp. 399–408.

xxxii  GENERAL INTRODUCTION

By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was not enough. A Red Army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolution, and so he put forward the slogan: “Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.”5 In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party, and soon became known as the “commander-in-chief.” This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The “Chinese Soviet Republic,” established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kaishek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced to embark in 1934 on the Long March. There were periods during the years 1931–1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, dominated in substantial measure by the Moscow-trained members of the so-called “Internationalist Faction.” At other times, he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army, and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks.6 Such enquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party’s tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating. The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of Mao’s rivals for the leadership. In meetings of the Politburo held in December 1934, in the course of the Long March, Mao was supported for the first time in over two years by a majority of the participants.7 At the conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, Mao began his comeback in earnest. Soon he once again played a dominant role in decisions regarding military operations, though his rise to unquestioned dominance in the Party was a long process which reached its culmination only in 1945. In the course of the northward march from Zunyi to Shaanxi, Mao was driven at times by the continuing threat from Chiang Kaishek’s campaigns of “Encirclement and Suppression” to advocate that the Red Army should fight its

5.  See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Vol. III, pp. 31 and 36. 6.  See, in particular, in Vol. III, the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations, pp. 296–418 and 594–655, and in Vol. IV, the circular of April 2, 1931, on investigating the situation regarding land and population, pp. 54–55, and the texts of 1933 on the “Land Investigation Movement,” pp. 408–526 passim. 7.  See Vol. IV, pp. xciii–xciv.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xxxiii

way to the borders of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet aid and protection.8 Once the survivors of the Red Army had established themselves in Shaanxi Province in 1936, Mao’s perspective began to change, and a vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victims of oppression came progressively into play. For a time, Mao’s line called for overthrowing the traitorous running dog Chiang Kaishek in order to fight Japan, but soon the growing threat of Japanese aggression and strong Soviet pressure in favor of collaboration with the Guomindang led to a fundamental change in the Party’s policy. The Xi’an Incident of December 1936, in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader, was the catalyst which finally produced a second “united front.” Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China, or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937–1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China. During the years in Yan’an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party, and in particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published while he was struggling for survival a few years earlier. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926. While Mao attained a dominant and unchallengeable position in the Party only in the mid-1940s, the year 1938 was of crucial importance in his rise to power. In May and June, he produced two of his most important and influential military writings, “Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War” and “On Protracted War.” Meanwhile, it had been decided in March 1938 to send an emissary to Moscow to seek instructions from the Comintern in the face of the acute rivalry between Mao and Wang Ming, who had recently returned to China. In September the reply came back that the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, “with Mao Zedong as their head,” should strive for close unity.9 Having been thus anointed by Georgi Dimitrov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, Mao delivered in October 1938 his report “On the New Stage,” in which he put forward

8.  See the Introduction to Vol. V, pp. xliv–xlv, and also, in Vol. V, the “Resolution of the Central Committee on Problems of Military Strategy” of December 23, 1935, pp. 77–83. 9.  See Vol. VI, p. xlix.

xxxiv  GENERAL INTRODUCTION

the call for the “Sinification of Marxism,” making it very plain that he was the one who best understood this imperative. By this term he meant the modification not only of the language, but of the substance of Marxism in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and to Chinese realities. In 1939 and 1940, while paying lip service to the role of the Guomindang in China’s struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao began increasingly to suggest that a successful Chinese Revolution would only be possible under Communist leadership. By 1941, he made plain that in his view, no one else was capable of carrying out this enterprise, and he attacked those in the Party who, in his view, preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The “Rectification Campaign” of 1942–1943 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such “Internationalists,” or to eliminate them from positions of influence. When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could out-vote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong’s thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China’s history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine. In 1939–1940, when Mao put forward the slogan of “New Democracy,” he felt it necessary to define it as a regime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Even as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a “People’s Democratic Autocracy.” In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people’s interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a “powerful state apparatus.” In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall’s attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang, and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949. In March 1949, Mao declared that though the Chinese Revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xxxv

the twenty-seven years under Mao’s leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments—the chiliastic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for “military communism,” which underlay the Cultural Revolution—both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao’s road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also cultivated in Mao himself, and in the Party, attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems. Revolution in its Leninist guise loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese Revolution was, with the Russian Revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of Communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, the impact of Mao is still a living reality in China almost four decades after his death. Following the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao’s political and ideological heritage was heavily stressed by the Chinese leadership, and elements of a new Mao cult even emerged. While that tendency has faded in recent years, the symbolic importance of Mao as the creator of the new China has thus far largely ruled out serious criticism of the Chairman. Though the ultimate outcome of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modern world, while retaining China’s own identity, still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China’s first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao’s ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations. ————————— Stuart Schram died on July 8, 2012, at the age of 88. This volume and the previous ones in the series Mao’s Road to Power, along with his earlier works on Mao, are eloquent testimony to Schram’s widespread reputation as the greatest Western expert on the late Chairman’s life and thought. The original translations of the texts for the final three volumes in this series, VIII, IX, and X, were almost entirely prepared under Schram’s editorship. A tribute to Professor Schram can be found in The China Quarterly, No. 212, December 2012. As a result of Schram’s failing health, Roderick MacFarquhar assumed editorial responsibility for the remaining three volumes in this series. Timothy Cheek

xxxvi  GENERAL INTRODUCTION

took on a far larger role than anticipated in the editing of Vol. VIII. Professor MacFarquhar died on February 10, 2019. A tribute to Professor MacFarquhar can be found in The China Quarterly, No. 238, June 2019. Nancy Hearst and Joseph Fewsmith collected the final materials, added the outstanding translations and footnotes, and prepared these last two volumes for publication. The Introduction to Vols. IX and X was prepared by Arthur Waldron, under the guidance of Professor Schram.

Introduction1 The Writings of Mao Zedong, August 1945–September 1949, Volumes IX and X In these two volumes, Volume IX and Volume X, Mao’s Road to Power reaches its destination with the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China by Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong on October 1, 1949. The road had been, as Mao himself prophesied four years earlier, one with “twists and turns.”2 The turning point had been the remarkable and unexpected total victory of Mao’s Party in the brutal Civil War, which had been initiated by the Nationalists who smelled a quick victory and nearly won it in mid-1946. It may be said to have ended on December 16, 1949, when a militarily defeated Chiang Kaishek, with his son Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] and their entourage, boarded a DC-4 aircraft, heavily loaded with fuel, in Chengdu, Sichuan, to fly for the last time over the cloud-shrouded land of his birth, successfully reaching Songshan Military Airport in Taiwan due to the brilliant dead-reckoning of his navigator and close aide, Major Konsin Shah.3 In the wake of the victory, Mao’s decisive rise, as we have already seen in the previous two volumes, reached a level widely compared to that of emperors in dynastic China. This was in keeping with the way Mao proclaimed it: he was not simply another head of state of the Republic of China, founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1911. Rather, he was the founder of a new state—in Chinese the phrase is to jianguo—that superseded the Republic. This introduction will not attempt to be comprehensive. It will focus first of all on Mao Zedong’s contributions, particularly as manifested in the materials collected here. Second, it will present an outline of a strategic analysis of the struggle.

1.  To my former student and colleague Yifei Zhang (張一飛) I express profound gratitude for an indispensable contribution to the initial drafting of this Introduction. Dedicated to my wife Xiaowei, to our sons Charles and Teddy, and to my sister Dorothy, with all my love. 2.  “On the Chongqing Negotiations,” October 17, 1945, below, pp. 105–11. 3.  Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 185. 

xxxvii

xxxviii Introduction

The future of this depends on free research by Chinese in China, which is not yet possible. Insights we have, but no genuinely definitive work is yet possible.4 As will be seen, this last stage of the road was particularly difficult for Mao. His first-hand experience of modern, mechanized warfare was extremely limited. He did not personally witness the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945), nor did he participate directly in the fighting of the Civil War (1946–1949). From the 1920s to the 1930s, however, Mao had already formed a view, or perhaps more accurately two, not fully compatible, views of war, that did not change much, if it all, during the remainder of his career. One we may call “revolutionary,” for its essence was that a great, latent power existed in the Chinese people, accumulated over millennia of oppression, that would at some point burst forth to sweep away the causes of their suffering. The second we may call “methodical,” for it rested on his theory of “revolutionary base areas,” wherein the Party prepared itself and its followers-to-be for struggle in a systematic way. Only by building one base at a time and creating new bases as appropriate until they became dominant, thought Mao, could one be assured of a stable foundation for the newness that was yet to come. These two views share a firm belief in the ideological awakening of the population as a prerequisite to successful attainment of power. This may come as a blinding flash with spontaneous, irresistible warfare. Or it may be the product of steady development of the base areas, defended and expanded by means of irregular guerrilla warfare. Although he did not invent this approach, his writings, most importantly On Guerrilla Warfare (1937) and On Protracted War (1938),5 came to define it. Both the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Civil War were fundamentally conventional, a category of war about which Mao knew very little and had little to say. In both, the key events had little to do with adherence to Mao’s guidance—although he provided a great deal, whether heeded or not—but rather

4.  The most important Western-language studies of the Chinese Civil War are those by Professor Harold M. Tanner, of the University of North Texas, in particular Where Chiang Kai-shek Lost China: The Liao-Shen Campaign, 1948 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015) and The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China: Siping, 1946 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Steven I. Levine, of the University of Montana, notably, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) and other works; also Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). Other references will be mentioned in the following footnotes. Much material has appeared in Chinese, and some in Japanese as well. However, the topic is not yet mature and much of the writing is spotty. It is impossible for this Introduction to even summarize what is now known. 5.  Arthur Waldron and Edward O’Dowd, eds., Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla Warfare, tr. Samuel B. Griffith, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation Publishers, 1992). On Protracted War is most easily found on the Internet, at https://www​.marxists​.org​/reference​/ archive​/mao​/selected​-works​/volume​-2​/mswv2​_09​.htm

Introduction xxxix

with the speed and resourcefulness with which various forces responded to unanticipated challenges. During the anti-Japanese war, this proved to be logistics. Although Nationalist government forces were immense (approximately 200 divisions) and supplied with food and munitions, they were in the fight by impressive use and modification of transport methods and networks that dated back to dynastic times. This remarkable ingenuity allowed China not to win, but to mire the Japanese for eight years in what they had imagined would be a matter of three months of decisive campaigning. This signal accomplishment decisively limited Japan’s ability to fight elsewhere in Asia, not to mention to link up, perhaps in India, with Axis forces from the West. The astonishing Chinese achievement gave shape to the difficult, two-front, global war, even while greatly increasing its chances to succeed.6 During the Civil War, the Communists, for the first time and with remarkable speed, created structured field armies, with tanks and artillery from the guerrilla bands of their very limited war with Japan, as well as command and control capabilities through which was coordinated the implementation of a strategy that, although reactive and improvised, proved superior to that of the initially more sophisticated and better-equipped Nationalists. A prototypical example of Mao’s “revolutionary” model is found in his 1927 analysis of Hunan Province after a very brief visit. He wrote: [S]everal hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves.7 Until Mao’s death, when they began inconspicuously chipping away at it, Chinese historians had no choice but to write variations of this received version. Interestingly, many Western historians did the same, though in their case it was by choice. Thus, we have not only a hard-bound French-language cartoon history of China that in the first few panels shows perhaps the hand of history passing China directly from the imperial Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to Mao and the Communists, thus completely omitting a very rich near half-century of history but

6.  See the fundamental work by Singaporean scholar Jennifer Yuk-lum Yip (葉鬱琳), forthcoming. 7.  The indispensable Marxists Internet Archive makes the whole text available at https://www​.marxists​.org​/reference​/archive​/mao​/selected​-works​/volume​-1​/mswv1​_2​.htm. The celebrated quotation is from the first paragraph.

xl Introduction

also The Origins of the Chinese Revolution: 1915–19498 by the eminent French scholar Lucien Bianco, which follows likewise. Though Bianco subsequently changed his mind in many ways, this first book is still widely read. Indeed, the non-specialist view even now is often that China was conquered by a “peasant revolt.” Few today would share either Mao’s understanding, or that of its Western counterpart, based on Mao to a large extent, that made “agrarian revolution” an academic cliché from the 1950s to the 1970s. It even fooled McGeorge Bundy into resting the fundamental strategy of the administration of John F. Kennedy and his successors (until that of Richard Nixon) on the idea that the Republic of Vietnam faced an “insurgency” rather than, as has now been conclusively demonstrated, an invasion from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the north. The decision for an invasion, which was ready to be launched by 1959, was informed by clandestine travels to the South, during the immediately preceding period, of North Vietnam’s most powerful official, Lê Duân, which convinced him that South Vietnamese grievances were insufficient to power a revolt and thus indicating that conquest was the only option. This up-ending of conventional wisdom we owe to years of archival research by Professor Lien-Hang T. Nguyen whose work is as important intellectually as that of Professor Fritz Fischer for Germany in World War I.9 Professor Edward McCord has demonstrated conclusively that the disorder Mao glimpsed in Hunan (his was a very brief investigation) was not the product of social or class unrest but rather caused by wars involving the province that had been fought shortly beforehand.10 Professor Bianco has dramatically modified his views. Now the Chinese landscape is one punctuated by agrarian uprisings, leading to no final “revolution,” because the Communist Party neglects them.11 As for Mao’s insistence on “base areas,” that is clearest in these volumes’ many translated letters, instructed from Yan’an, far from the battlefield, in which he opposes rapid advance, notably across the Yangzi River and south, until the gendi (bases) have been consolidated. His commanders ignored him. Instead, they defeated the Nationalist government in conventional warfare. Political mobilization of the masses was not a major factor in the actual fighting. As the late Professor Marius B. Jansen, one of the greatest of Asian scholars, was fond of putting it: “The military victory came first; the revolution followed.”12

8.  Les origines de la révolution chinoise 1915–1949 (Paris: Gallimard, 1967; tr. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971). 9.  Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 10.  Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 11.  Peasants without the Party: Grass-Roots Movements in Twentieth-Century China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). 12.  To this author, and others, on countless occasions.

Introduction xli

Mao Zedong was nevertheless the indispensable figure in the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. He was the face and voice of his Party, though he was rarely seen. His greatest success was to convince many Chinese and foreigners that he was the democratically inclined and incorruptible leader for which China had long been waiting. On September 27, 1945, Mao was interviewed by a Reuters reporter in Chongqing. The reporter had submitted written questions to the Communist leader: “What is the Chinese Communist Party’s understanding and definition of the concept of a free and democratic China?” Mao replied, also in writing: A free, democratic China will have the following characteristics. Its governments at all levels, including the central government, will all be chosen through universal, equal, and secret voting … [based on] Lincoln’s principle “of the people, by the people and for the people,” … will guarantee the independence, solidarity, and unity of the country and its cooperation with other democratic powers.13 This deeply misleading statement was taken as definitive by many Chinese and foreigners alike, not surprisingly given the formality with which it was presented. General George C. Marshall was a brilliant and critically minded soldier. Yet he was sent to China (in 1945–1947) to accomplish what can only be described as a typically naïve and impossible American mission, namely, the reconciliation of Mao and Chiang in a single government, and not surprisingly he was out of his depth. He departed convinced the problem was that Mao was a democrat, while Chiang was a dictator.14 No less than Clement Attlee affirmed of the Communists, “you have here a government that is incorruptible” during an important visit in 1952.15 Attlee, a great prime minister, was no less intelligent than Marshall. Yet he too made embarrassingly erroneous judgments. At the time, many, indeed most of the intelligentsia would have agreed. John K. Fairbank of Harvard, in his life perhaps the most famous China scholar, told this author “I have supported [the CPC] since the 1940s.” Only with the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre did the scales fall from his eyes.16

13.  “Answers to Questions Raised by Reuters News Agency Correspondent Campbell,” below, pp. 89–91. 14.  Steven I. Levine, “A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria,” Diplomatic History 3, no. 4 (1979): 349–375. 15.  Tom Buchanan, East Wind: China and the British Left, 1925–1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 151. A thoroughly engaging account of this trip, really more about England than about China, is provided in Patrick Wright, Passport to Peking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 16.  See my review, “Fairbank, China Unbound,” Free China Review 42, no. 10 (1992): 38–46. Having read this, Fairbank’s widow, the peerless Wilma Canon Fairbank, wrote a precious letter to this author, saying, “at last someone understands John.”

xlii Introduction

For reasons that combine ignorance, the ghastly state of China when Japan surrendered, deception, self-deception, confusion, and intentional propaganda efforts, the delusion that the CPC would bring a better China, or indeed had already done so, dominated American policy through the Kissinger years. Only in this century has its falsity from the start begun to be accepted by the academic and intellectual mainstream in the West. This complete misunderstanding was nearly unanimous in official American circles during the period covered here, a fact that must be borne in mind. Though Mao had much to say about war, in fact he had little relevant experience and even less by way of insight. Nor was he on the scene fighting. This absence, however, if anything, increased the attention paid to him. For many, particularly those on the left, he was considered a great mind and a prophet. His gnomic utterances and rare epiphanies helped form the myth that is still intertwined with the events of the war on which some of his comments are gathered here. To his thought was imputed great importance. His military was imagined as potentially decisive, owing to the supposed military insights on which it was based. This writer’s own teachers were not exempt. In 1994, almost two decades after the Chairman’s death (September 9, 1976), Mao’s long-time personal physician, Dr. Li Zhisui, published a memoir that reveals Mao as a deeply troubled man, ignorant and lonely, who took refuge in endless sexual relations with young, uneducated women who revered him as a god, and slept only thanks to massive evening doses of phenobarbital.17 At one point, Harvard Professor Benjamin Schwartz told this writer, in effect, that if he had known, at the start of his career, what Dr. Li Zhisui would later publish, he never would have “wasted” thirty years studying Mao as a philosopher. The U.S. government was not immune either. Many blamed the difficulties of World War II on Chinese President Chiang Kaishek, who was systematically caricatured as incompetent and accused of personal corruption. In fact, little was known of Mao. From 1944 to 1947 Washington sent the U.S. Army Observation Group, better known as the “Dixie Mission,” to Yan’an to make contact. Led by Colonel David Barrett, a thoroughly trained and long-experienced “China hand,” the effort proved inconclusive.18 During both wars and long thereafter, some Western authors and officials imagined Mao as a sort of Prester John situated in China’s far Northwest, who would have defeated Japan and led postwar China to friendship with the United States, if only we had not been blinded to his fundamental nationalism by our ignorant anti-Communist prejudices. Thus, the popular writer Barbara Tuchman writes that in 1945 “the Communists’ rise and the Kuomintang’s demise” were

17.  Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994). 18.  David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1970).

Introduction xliii

“both by then inevitable.”19 Had we only chosen correctly, decades of ChineseAmerican conflict would have been avoided. This myth, almost a consensus, was enormously influential. It did much to guide the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. It was finally demolished in 1997 by the China-born scholar and Cornell emeritus professor Chen Jian.20 Mao spent most of his time, from the end of the Long March in October 1935 until his assumption of power in Peking in 1949, in the relatively inaccessible city of Yan’an. In Yan’an, he presided absolutely over the Chinese Communist movement; there, in November 1939, he married his fourth and final wife, the actress Jiang Qing. In Yan’an, Mao was, above all, safe. As the late Professor James T.C. Liu, whose arms still bore the deep scars inflicted by Japanese torture, explained to this author, the city was remote, located in the northwest province of Shaanxi, some 573 miles west southwest of Beiping and 970 miles northwest of Shanghai, but, most importantly, roughly 500 miles south of the border with Mongolia, which was firmly under Moscow’s control, and thus effectively the border with the Soviet Union. This meant that if they should come under attack, the Communists could rather easily flee to the USSR. In Bao’an Mao met American journalist Edgar Snow, with whom he had long conversations during the latter’s June–October 1936 visit. These are recounted in Snow’s enormously successful book, Red Star Over China, which made the Communists and their leader suddenly famous not only in the West but also at home as well, disguised in Record of a Leisurely Journey to the West.21 Enormously influential, the book is still often read. From 1942 to 1944, Mao delivered lectures in Yan’an on subjects ranging from poetry to warfare, and carried out his first formal “rectification campaign.” In May and June of 1938 Mao delivered three lectures On Protracted War, broadly addressing the war with Japan, which had begun on July 7, 1937. These provide as good an exposition as exists of Mao’s general approach to, if not most of the features of, the Civil War that was taking shape during the War of Resistance Against Japan. One must remember that although he was a supremely intelligent man, Mao’s education had been patchy at best. He knew no foreign languages. Unlike nearly all his colleagues, he had never studied in Europe, the United States, or even the USSR, where excellent schools specialized in training foreign Communists. These included the celebrated Communist University of the Toilers of the East (Moscow, 1921–1930)—among whose alumni were Ho Chi Minh, Liu Shaoqi,

19.  Notes From China (New York: Collier, 1972), pp. 79–80. 20.  “The Myth of America’s ‘Lost Chance’ in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 77–86. 21.  First English edition: London: Victor Gollancz, Left Book Club, 1937; First Chinese edition: 西行漫記 (Yan’an and the Communist Base Areas, date uncertain); New edition: (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2005).

xliv Introduction

Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo]; the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University (1925–1930); the International Lenin School (Moscow, 1926–1938); and others. These institutions provided, fully paid for, a rigorous training in a broad curriculum, with thorough study of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, a type of education Mao had never encountered. They also provided networks of international and Soviet contacts of a sort Mao never possessed. Mao in fact never left China until immediately after his 1949 victory. At that time, he traveled by rail to Moscow (4,735 miles; 6 days) to consult Stalin. Mao arrived on December 16, 1949; he met with Stalin for the first time that very night; on February 14, 1950, the two leaders concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance. Mao departed February 17. Moscow was the closest approximation of a “Western” city Mao had ever seen. Nor did Mao ever experience anything like a twentieth-century style modern war, as many of his colleagues and rivals had in Europe during World War I. Mao’s ideas about war, perhaps not surprisingly, focused on political and social aspects, while ignoring almost completely any questions of armament, logistics, and strategy. In this, he was unlike his brilliant near-contemporary Jiang Baili (Jiang Fangzhen), a polymath and professional soldier, whose works, such as Guofang lun (Treatise on National Defense)22—almost exactly contemporary to Mao’s On Protracted War—display a command of the most modern military technology and thought, on a level comparable to the best Westerners or Japanese but applied to China. Mao mentions no battles in his lectures On Protracted War, not even the battle of Shanghai (August 13–November 26, 1937), la guerre à l’outrance in which over a million soldiers fought and perhaps 150,000 perished, which had ended a few months before Mao spoke. The entire Chinese army executed a close-run escape from tightening Japanese encirclement, thanks to a “dare to die squad” (gansidui) of perhaps 400 men, all of whom perished as they covered the retreat on the narrow road to Nanjing, the Chinese capital, from an egg warehouse that commanded the route. Mao’s puzzling omission has been largely rectified through celebration of such extraordinary heroism by the most ambitious film yet made in China, namely, The Eight Hundred (2020), the release of which was delayed by a year for censoring (eleven minutes were finally cut). Eight hundred was the common number at the time, though all were aware the reality was half that. The film cost over US$80 million, was the first filmed entirely in IMAX, featured dozens of stars, and recorded box office receipts of US$450.4 million. In spite of the cuts, the notyet-forbidden national flag of China (now known as the “Taiwan flag”) makes appearances, perhaps the most moving of which sees the mayor of Shanghai, on behalf of the city’s people, solemnly presenting that flag, reverently folded, to a

22.  (Shanghai: Dagongbao, 1937).

Introduction xlv

Chinese girl scout, acting with great sensitivity and wearing the uniform of the time. When this author walked the area of the battle of Shanghai in the 1980s, no memorialization was evident of this vast battle—twice the size of Leipzig (October 16–19, 1813), the largest battle until World War I—or the intense patriotism and sacrifice associated with it. (The casualty exchange ratio through the war was roughly three Chinese dead for every one Japanese.) That this film about how Chiang Kaishek (he was in the battle) and his forces (half of which were Guomindang, the rest were units that accepted his leadership) should have been made at all under communism, let alone prove a sensation in China comparable perhaps to Gone with the Wind (1939) in the United States, tells us much about rapidly changing Chinese views of her last century’s history, under way even as this Introduction about Mao is being written, and of great importance—but beyond our scope. The battle of Shanghai at the end of 1937, as well as its seemingly incongruous cinematic celebration under the Communist regime in China, illustrate two facts. The first is how completely wrong Mao’s general theory was about the actual course of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and, as we shall see, the Civil War as well. The second is that the long-standing CPC position that avoids mention of the two hundred–division government-led coalition that stopped the Japanese, while suggesting that Mao’s forces had in fact somehow defeated the invasion, is simply no longer accepted. In its place, a far more accurate account is being permitted to emerge, perhaps because Communist ideology is no longer the actual basis of rule. A new amalgam is being constructed based on Chinese ethnic solidarity and antiforeignism—particularly hatred of the Japanese that began before the disastrous Chinese defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).23 Mao’s assessment of war in general, as exemplified in On Protracted War, was at root social and political, having little to say about actual military questions. For Mao, victory was above all a dialectical social process, in which the concealed advantages of the initially weaker and less-developed party gradually emerged, as revolution transformed society, to dominate the misleading strength at the start of the more industrial and seemingly advanced party. Unlike Japan, China was a populous and resource-rich country, though as Mao was fond of saying, incorrectly, “semi-colonial and semi-feudal,” while Japan was “imperialist” (in this respect, Mao is certainly correct).24 23.  S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 24.  This was one of Mao’s favorite formulae: see, for example, On Protracted War, paragraph 9. China was never a colony of any imperial power, one of only three Asian states that stayed sovereign (the others were Japan and Thailand). After shouldering the immense cost of the Indian Empire, the British had no desire to take on another such burden. Their concern was to grow rich in China, as some foreigners and Chinese did, not to administer the country, which was a drain on the government if not on the traders. Even

xlvi Introduction

Mao’s strategy was based on his desire to keep his movement alive. He expected that the war would begin with massive victories by the aggressor to be countered by rapid and fluid guerrilla attacks on rear areas and flanks. This was not the case, as the battle of Shanghai showed: depending upon the verdict on the battlefield, that battle could have won the war for either China or Japan. The Chinese government committed its finest German-trained divisions to the struggle, fighting so effectively that Japan was obliged to bring about her victory by landing more troops, well into the battle, at Hangzhou to the south, thus creating a pincer. (China had no navy, so she could not prevent these critical reinforcements from August to October 1937.) Mao expected heated fighting as the balance of power shifted. In fact, after the battle of Nanjing (December 1–13, 1937), the Chinese government took refuge in the southwestern city of Chongqing. Major fighting continued elsewhere, but in Chongqing, beyond the impassable three gorges of the Yangzi River, the government was secure from ground attack,

more, the foreign imperial powers were concerned about maintaining a balance among themselves in China so as to avoid colonial competition disrupting Europe. The two exceptions were Russia and Japan, both of which sought actual political control over Chinese or over Chinese-claimed territories. With the exception of those two, China escaped true war for territory, by granting privileges, such as “extraterritoriality” (immunity from Chinese jurisdiction) and small “concessions”—bits of territory ceded, like Hong Kong Island, or leased, like Hong Kong’s New Territories, or rented, like Macau until the late nineteenth century, to foreign control. This process was humiliating, just as the German taking of Alsace and Lorraine was for France in 1871. That taking did not make France a “colony” of Germany, however, any more than the various territorial and other concessions by the Chinese made her “colonial.” For China, this seeming weakness avoided what could have been catastrophic war. In France, the toleration of German annexation (opposed by Bismarck) fed a desire for la revanche that contributed to World War I. In modern China, a similar emotion exists: the desire to avenge the (greatly exaggerated) “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi). Nor was imperial China feudal. Rather, it was a series of highly centralized dynastic regimes in which all legitimacy and power, including at the local level, proceeded, in theory, from Heaven (tian), through the intermediation of the emperor, who was the “son of Heaven” (tianzi), in other words, from the top-down. In this, China was even less feudal than the highly centralized French Empire of the eighteenth century, which had been assembled by increasingly amalgamating local powers under the king, while removing (though never completely) the power of the nobility. Feudalism correctly refers to the division of local power among nobles, effectively supreme in their domains, who were responsible for the (costly) maintenance of small numbers of mounted warriors or knights, which was paid for by levies on the agricultural produce of their subject serfs. In times of war, the distant king would muster his army from among these nobles, a fact that gave them immense power. Most of traditional China was too poor to support landlordism. Farmers lived at subsistence level and overwhelmingly were freeholders, as no agricultural surplus existed for the landlords to appropriate. An attempt to do so would have led to starvation. The exception was the fertile and wellwatered South and Southeast, where productivity was high enough that even if landlords took a portion of the farmers’ crop, the farm families could still survive. Thus, paradoxically, only the wealthiest regions could support landlordism. Even in the wealthiest regions, however, local power was in the hands of officials sent from the capital.

Introduction xlvii

though relentlessly bombed. At the immense Yangzi riverine metropolis of Wuhan was fought a four-month battle (June 11–October 27, 1938), with perhaps 1,200,000 killed or wounded.25 Later, as such large-scale fighting exhausted itself, the situation in the plains of North and East China, where the great battles had been fought, becomes difficult to assess. Thus, the Communists reported intense guerrilla warfare, but when, early in 1945 through “Operation Spaniel,” the Office of Strategic Services secretly sent a group of true “China hands” to the vicinity of Fuping, in Hebei province, an area of supposed warfare, they found only Japanese and Chinese collaborationist troops, peacefully coexisting.26 When the Communists discovered them, the Americans were arrested. Strong evidence also exists that during this period of lull in North China Mao sent about 1,000 agents to make contact with the Japanese in order to sell secret military materiel (to which he had access through the Second United Front).27 Mao also discounted the importance of weapons, taking as his example the Italian conquest of Abyssinia//Ethiopia (1935–1937), attributing the Ethiopian failure to faulty political mobilization. In fact, Italy owed her “victory” entirely to massive use of deadly chemical agents, delivered by air, in areas the Italians could not reach. Here weapons were decisive. Ethiopia had, after all, defeated Italy in 1896.28 In addition, although the Soviets turned over many Japanese weapons, Mao greatly overestimated Soviet aid (he had not yet met Stalin), which in fact was small and which ended after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 23, 1939) when Moscow aligned with Berlin, followed by the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (April 13, 1941). American supplies during the actual fighting were minimal,

25.  Stephen R. MacKinnon, Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees and the Making of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 26.  See Francis B. Mills, Robert Mills, and John W. Brunner, OSS Special Operations in China (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2002); Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2011), p. 222. 27.  See Homare Endo, Mao Zedong goujie Rijun de zhenxiang: Laizi Ridie de huiyi yu dang’an (Deer Park, NY: Mingjing chubanshe, 2016). Professor Endo’s work is available in Japanese and Chinese. A complete English-language manuscript exists, with full references, including to Japanese military archives, but it has not yet found a publisher. This author’s opinion is that Endo, whose Chinese is native owing to a childhood there, and who has spent much time visiting the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was alerted to this story by Chinese participants. All had been imprisoned for life at the war’s end, but some found their way out and shared the story with friends, including those historians, who told her. They would have been aware that she could explore Japanese archives, thus documenting the story that was suppressed in China. This might also explain why a professor in her seventies should, instead of resting, suddenly turn her full attention to this entirely new topic. 28.  See Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (London: Zed Books, 1986).

xlviii Introduction

especially compared to aid to the USSR of US$11.6 billion, or about US$180 billion in today’s (2021) dollars. Franklin Roosevelt imagined Stalin as a true ally, both during and after the war. His mother Sarah Delano came from a family that had made a fortune as drug-dealers in China. Silly stories from that branch of the family were all FDR knew, or cared to know, of China. FDR’s performance at the Cairo Conference (November 22–26, 1943), when the U.S. President met Chiang Kaishek, was such a disaster, owing to his complete ignorance married to his standard and useless charm and cigarette-holder routine, that his top aides, General Joseph Stilwell and John Paton Davies, departed in their limousine at the conclusion, faces in their hands, in tears.29 Soviet ambitions in China were to occupy or annex much of the land that China claimed, notably Manchuria, to maintain a military presence, and to create a client Chinese state. Only the third of these was not already on the Russian agenda, but achievement was interrupted by the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), which could well have ended in a Russian victory had the state been stable. The strategy of Minister of War General Alexei Kuropatkin was sound, but it depended on an ability to protract that, faced with uprisings, Moscow did not possess. In Yan’an, as the struggle with Japan was drawing to a close, Mao clearly expected a renewal of war with the Nationalists. He envisioned this resembling very much the defensive guerrilla struggle to maintain the base areas that had been interrupted by the war with Japan, writing on August 4, 1945, that “[A]fter the defeat of the Japanese bandits and the outbreak of civil war, it will be very difficult” to preserve positions in the plains, and he counselled a return to the mountains.30 Expecting a protracted struggle, he sent guerrilla forces south, to take up positions for a prolonged revolutionary war.31 He reiterated his long-standing belief in rural base areas and an avoidance of the urban areas until the last stage of conflict.32 Mao gives no inkling in his writings at this time that he had so much as imagined a larger-scale conflict, or a conventional conflict, or most importantly, a decisive conflict, let alone one in which he emerged victorious. We will see that throughout the war the Communist leader never really abandoned his fundamental beliefs about revolutionary warfare nor did he wholeheartedly embrace

29.  John Paton Davies, Jr., China Hand: An Autobiography (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) provides a splendid description of this and much more. Davies perhaps understates his own hopes for the Chinese Communists, but he nails conclusively FDR’s culpable errors and ignorance. 30.  “Prepare to Deal with the Civil War Situation That Is Certain to Arrive,” August 4, 1945, below, pp. 3–4. 31.  “Prepare to Join with the Forces of Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao to Set up the Hunan-Guangdong Border Base Area,” August 4, 1945, below, pp. 5–7. 32.  “Extensively Occupy the Countryside, Do Not Fight for the Big Cities,” August 15, 1945, below, pp. 37–38.

Introduction xlix

the mechanized conventional maneuver warfare through which his subordinates would deliver him to victory. Other thoughts were stirring, however, by August 1945. Most Chinese wanted peace; neither they nor foreign observers could understand why it could not be achieved. Those who did not want, or perhaps better did not expect, peace, such as Chiang, furthermore, did not see any reason to continue following the script of the 1930s’ guerrilla warfare. Half-believing that they had defeated Japan— they had at most heroically avoided defeat while the United States and the Soviet Union took down the island empire—and with the massive army that had been created for that task, the Nationalists must have wondered whether they might not now make short work of the Communists. Campaigns against Communist base camps in the West resumed as soon as the war was over. This Washington deplored, seeking instead reconciliation and peace between her Chinese ally and his Communist rival. Mao therefore reentered the Chinese national scene at a time when all was in flux. He arrived on August 28, 1945, in Chongqing to take part in the ongoing negotiations between his Party and the Nationalists of Chiang Kaishek, orchestrated by American ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley. These would later lead to the failed attempt to create a coalition government orchestrated by the mission of American General George C. Marshall. Much had changed, yet much remained the same. The bloody war with Japan (1937–1945) had wrought terrible damage on China, yet the basic political rivalries that had dominated the prewar period were not resolved, with the Nationalists and the Communists appearing neither likely, nor even capable, of coming to a peaceful resolution. Japan, empire-builder and nemesis of positive political change in China for half a century, was utterly defeated and out of the picture. Two new great powers had appeared on the scene: the Soviet Union, whose armies occupied Manchuria, discord over which had triggered the war, and the United States, which having largely bypassed China in the campaign against Japan, nevertheless sought a decisive role in the postwar period. These two powers, however, had not agreed on the future of Asia as they had, in such detail, for Europe. Their behavior proved contradictory and erratic, meaning that not only did no internal solution present itself to China’s dilemmas, but also nor did any external, imposed solution. Mao presented himself well, even agreeing to peace and cooperation in the much-heralded Chongqing Accords of October 10, but inwardly he was puzzled. These accords, widely hailed and jointly toasted by the unlikely and smiling pair of Mao and Chiang, as Mao notes in his essay “On the Chongqing Negotiations” (October 17, 1945), affirmed “the principles of peace and unity,” “recognized certain democratic rights of the people,” and “agreed that civil war should be averted.” For these words, the Communists abandoned eight of their base areas in central China—a bitterly felt sacrifice, no doubt—still without reaching any resolution of the issues of the other “Liberated Areas” and the future of the Communist armed forces. Would they be independent and sovereign, or would they come under the central government? Mao’s rationale for signing the

l Introduction

accords comes across as cloudy. Nailing down what proved to be the crux of the matter by noting that the Chinese people detested the idea of more fighting, Mao had a blurred vision of the future. “If the Guomindang launches a civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we will have all the more reason to repel its attacks through a war of self-defense.” Certainly no one wanted war after the eight-year nightmare of the Japanese invasion. Estimates vary, but its cost had been enormous. Recent Chinese figures estimate damage to property at perhaps US$100 billion; as for the human cost, recent official estimates put it at three million combat casualties, eighteen million civilian casualties, and ninety-five million refugees.33 In one way, however, the war had benefited Mao’s Party. Membership in the Communist Party grew from 30,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940 to 1,211,128 in August 1945, when the Seventh Party Congress met.34 As the peace talks proceeded, American officials and foreign reporters were seemingly ubiquitous in Chongqing. American troops were scarce, however, on Chinese soil. Washington’s wartime strategy had shifted three times. First had come the concept of a continental thrust north from Burma, with air power clearing the way and striking ahead of the troops. This plan was scotched by the Ichigo Offensive of April–December 1944, which bottled up Burma and sliced the east coast of China into pieces controlled by Japan, thus blocking the intended route of the invasion. Fear that this highly successful Japanese operation might actually succeed in defeating the Chinese had another important result: Washington sent Colonel David D. Barrett and his colleagues to Yan’an as the U.S. Army Observation Group, better known as the “Dixie Mission” (mentioned above) from July 1944 to March 11, 1947, well after the end of the fighting, and thus providing an avenue of communications between the Chinese Communists and the U.S. government. Then came “Operation Causeway,” during which Taiwan would be invaded, in preparation for a landing on Kyushu. The butcher’s bill on (relatively) tiny Okinawa (463 square miles; 12,000 American dead in 82 days, March–June 1945) led to this plan being set aside in favor, more and more, of the hope that atomic weapons delivered by air from island bases would prove decisive—as they were when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively. Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 15. The use of offshore air power to defeat Japan saved many lives, but it meant that nowhere near enough American troops to deal with the situation were in China at the moment of surrender, quite a different situation from that in the European theater.

33.  Arthur Waldron, “China’s New Remembering of World War II: The Case of Zhang Zizhong,” Modern Asian Studies 30, No. 4 (1996): 945–78, at 948–49. 34.  Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1949 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 361.

Introduction li

The Soviet Union, by contrast with the United States, had a massive military presence. On August 9, armies under Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky had begun to pour into Manchuria, which they soon secured completely. This operation was in accordance with the agreements made at the Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945), at which China had not been represented. Some of these agreements were kept secret from the Chinese: they said nothing of Chinese sovereignty over the area, instead envisioning a postwar future one way or another in association with the Soviet Union. No less reliable a reporter than Edgar Snow had begun to prepare public opinion for this change in the map just as the war’s end was approaching. In the widely read People on Our Side there appeared a significant passage, almost certainly derived from his Soviet contacts, explaining how Soviet Siberia must naturally seek a warm water outlet and a short overland route to it. Vladivostok is not ice free, but Dairen and Ryojun [present-day Lüshun] [in south Manchuria] are … This feature of Manchuria is probably no less interesting to the Soviets than it was to old Russia.35 Soviet war memorials in the Northeast in fact make no mention of China: the dead soldiers are described as having fallen “for the motherland.”36 At the conclusion of the bloodiest war Japan and China had ever seen, even the problem that had caused it, disagreement over the status of Manchuria, was not resolved. Washington and Moscow failed to resolve this issue between themselves, but they imposed a settlement on the others, as they did so successfully at the termination of the war in the West.37 This failure left initiative, fatefully, in local hands. As will be seen, the issue of Manchuria led the Nationalists to initiate full-scale war—in utter defiance of American wishes, though perhaps not to the surprise of the USSR. In Europe, Stalin restrained the towering figures of wartime communism, such as Jacques Duclos and Palmiro Togliatti, from attempting to seize power in France or Italy, for example. In Asia, no such leash was placed on clients by the Great Powers. As they made their fateful moves, neither Mao, nor Chiang, dependent upon the United States, took adequate notice of the interests or possible reactions of their putative allies. Poor planning for termination of the war meant that, unlike in Europe, the Asian Communists (and their enemies) had much freedom of movement: indeed, they were able to draw their allies into conflicts that neither would probably have chosen. Thus, even before the Chinese Civil War began, troops of the Mongolian People’s Republic occupied much of Inner Mongolia (then, as now, claimed by China) to accept the surrender of the

35.  Edgar Snow, People on Our Side (New York: Random House, 1944), pp. 203–204. 36.  This author’s personal observations. 37.  Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

lii Introduction

Japanese troops there. Some sources say that this operation was carried out by Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal on his own (Mongols believe this); others say that this was a Soviet operation, joined by Peng Dehuai and CPC units.38 Such an action would have been unthinkable in Europe, whether by a Walter Ulbricht or a Charles de Gaulle. They knew their places. But instead of hard-headed building of good fences, the United States in Asia never considered how or whether European imperial domination should or could be re-imposed: to do so would have risked splitting the alliance. This was nevertheless a defining issue for the following decades. Nor did the United States have any comprehension of actual Soviet policy goals. It wasted efforts on quixotic attempts to negotiate conflict away, and in China somehow to bring together Mao and Chiang, whose mutual detestation is difficult adequately to convey, in a coalition government. Thus publicly, to the swarms of diplomats and reporters in Chongqing, Mao positioned himself as an unqualified democrat, offering freedom and justice to Chinese people trodden down by the Guomindang dictatorship. On September 27, he memorably limned his promised democratic China to the Reuters correspondent, as we have noted above. Behind this façade and having made concessions for peace, China’s future ruler was preparing for possible civil war. His thinking had begun to change by mid-August 1945, owing to the arrival of Soviet troops in Manchuria. During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) Mongols had made use of the northwest territory of the Ordos, not far from Yan’an, as a base from which they could move quickly eastwards through the steppe, unobstructed by the mountains of China proper, until they threatened Beiping. Now, due to the Soviet presence in the Northeast, such a game-transforming strategic move was possible for the Communists. Even before he departed for the peace talks at Chongqing, Mao had taken the first steps to implement this strategy. On August 30, he ordered that the forces in Yan’an relocate to the secure and strategically advantageous territory in friendly hands, although three days later he stated that no such decision had yet been made.39 In a handwritten document, he specifically ordered that the movement not be made known. In his remarks to the Politburo on the eve of his departure for Chongqing, he referred again to the strategic opportunity created by the Soviet position.40 Clearly, the issue was very much on his mind.

38.  Jürgen Domes, P’eng Te-huai: The Man and the Image (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 43. 39.  “Dispatch Nine Regiments to the Three Eastern Provinces,” August 20, 1945, below, pp. 48–49; “The New Situation and New Tasks Following Victory in the Anti-Japanese War,” August 23, 1945, below, pp. 51–59. 40.  “Address at the Politburo Meeting before Attending the Chongqing Talks,” August 26, 1945, below, pp. 65–67.

Introduction liii

In the weeks that followed, substantial Communist forces were moved to the Northeast, by rail and by air. In this, they were helped by Soviet and American forces, the latter having become friendly with the Communists during the period of the “Dixie Mission.”41 In dealing with the Americans, the Communists concealed the full extent of their relationship with the Soviet Union, which even today is murky historically.42 Manchuria has an area of roughly 307,000 square miles, bigger by far than Texas or France, or about the size of Turkey. Bordered on three sides by Sovietcontrolled territory, with mountains dividing it from the Beiping area of China, which can be reached only by a narrow corridor between mountains to the west and sea to the east, it is a natural fortress, well-endowed, moreover, with both industrial and agricultural resources. Soviet troops provided a further shield. So, in 1945, the territory was an ideal location for an independent Communist Chinese state. It was what the Communists had sought when, also with Soviet aid, they had proclaimed a Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin, Jiangxi, on November 7, 1931. The Communists did not envision themselves, in the near term, ruling all of China, but they did expect a civil war. What they wanted was their own state; their own “Red China.” It only had to be independent, secure, and self-sufficient. Manchuria, where the Japanese had established Manchukuo, could make an excellent “Red China.” As if to demonstrate that their ambitions, for the moment, went no further, the Communists, once in Manchuria, concentrated their attention on consolidating power, driving out the Guomindang, establishing Party committees, and so forth—and, significantly, not concentrating on developing military forces to contest control of all of China, or even adequate to defend themselves.43 Historically, however, Manchuria in modern times has been a major piece in the game of all-Chinese politics. The territory was the homeland of the Manchu people who, in the seventeenth century, established there a Chinese-style government for their empire, which came to include China when they conquered the Ming dynasty in 1644. In the twentieth century the territory had been occupied first by Russia, then ruled by Chinese general Zhang Zuolin, and then his son, finally to be effectively annexed by Japan in 1932, which subsequently created there what it claimed was a Manchu national state, Manchukuo —and it was this action, the seemingly definitive alienation of Manchuria from China—that began the dozen plus years of Sino-Japanese war that did not end until 1945. Given this strategic history, joint Soviet-Chinese Communist occupation of Manchuria could only be alarming to any would-be central government of China,

41.  “Yingxiang Zhongguo qiantu he mingyun de yici zhanlüe kongyun.” Manuscript by Professor Niu Dayong, Department of History, Peking University, 2008. 42.  The best treatment of this period is found in Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004). 43.  Levine, Anvil of Victory.

liv Introduction

even if not coupled with the secret agreements made at Yalta. The Nationalist government began desperate talks with Moscow, which yielded, on August 15, a treaty providing for a Soviet withdrawal from the territory, although the USSR did retain base rights at Port Arthur and some other strategic points. At this time, the strategic alternatives open to both sides became clear. The evidence is overwhelming that the Communists sought above all to consolidate a not-so-miniature “Red China” under Soviet protection and patronage in the former Manchukuo. Think of the potential state as an Asian East Germany, although nearly eight times larger. I have argued elsewhere that the emergence of such a state might have permitted an effective partition of China that would have avoided the Civil War, and such a Communist state, owing to Soviet proximity and influence, might well have followed the same trajectory as Moscow’s East Germany—which is to say substantial development but not enough to keep up with its larger rival—and, therefore, quite likely to lead to collapse and merger with China in 1989, similar to how East Germany merged with West.44

The Strategic Defeat of the Nationalists, 1946 The end of serious Nationalist resistance in China was marked, as we have seen above, by Chiang Kaishek’s departure on December 16, 1949, from Chengdu in Sichuan for Taipei, on the former Japanese island-colony of Taiwan. This move from Sichuan late in the war surprised the Communists, who had expected him to lead a last stand in the west. Intending to deny him Taiwan, the Communists first launched an attack on the small (not quite 6 square miles in area) Nationalist-held island of Jinmen (Quemoy), about 6 miles east of Xiamen (Amoy) on the Chinese coast, but 116 miles west of Taiwan.45 Chiang had plenty to do in the rest of the territory that he claimed, and his forces were strong enough, in fact, to tolerate a much-smaller Soviet-backed Communist rival state isolated in the Northeast and with less than one-tenth of China’s total area. His best option, then, would have been to allow this unwelcome development while working to improve his own relations with the USSR

44.  “China without Tears: If Chiang Kai-shek Had Not Gambled in 1946,” in What If? ed. Robert Cowley (New York: Putnam, 1999), pp. 377–400; “Zhongguo meiyou yanlei: Jiaru Jiang Jieshi meiyou jinxing 1946 nian neichang jueding mingyun de dubo” (China without Tears: If Chiang Kaishek Hadn’t Taken the Fate-Determining Gamble in 1946), tr. Yue Jianyong, Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu 16, no. 2 (2009): 122–131. 45.  Jinmen blocks the exit from the harbor of Xiamen, an almost indispensable base for any attack on Taiwan. For this reason, Jinmen had to be secured at the beginning of any such campaign. The Communists attempted this on October 25–27, 1949, while Chiang was still in China. But the Communists’ sea-borne landing at Guningtou was annihilated. This bloody engagement was the last serious Communist attempt to take Taiwan, though seventy-two years later vows to conquer the island are still hurled from the mainland.

Introduction lv

so as to obtain indirect leverage over the Communists through the Soviets, who would in any scenario be the ultimate rulers of the area. Next, he might have rehabilitated Zhang Xueliang, who had ruled the area until the Japanese conquest and could probably have wrested control back from the Communists and made Manchuria his satrapy, nominally loyal to the central government. Zhang, however, had blotted his copy book by the kidnapping of Chiang during the Xi’an Incident (1936) and had been the general’s personal prisoner ever since. In any case, Chiang was never one for compromise or a gradual approach. Furthermore, he was as convinced that the Communist base areas must be extirpated as Mao was that they must be developed. Nor was Manchuria just any base area: historically, this was the springboard for conquest of all of China. To leave it in Communist hands seemed unwise. With Soviet troops withdrawing, the weak Communist forces in the Northeast would be no match for Chiang’s battle-hardened military, with its tanks, artillery, and air force. The Americans, moreover, were not working with the Soviets to control Chiang and Mao, respectively, by a firm territorial division, which neither gentleman wanted. Rather, they were chasing the chimera of a coalition government for all of China, which could only have disquieted the Nationalist leadership. Chiang’s style was to seek victory through one carefully timed, decisive blow. (This author has been told in China that until 1989, a group of People’s Liberation Army [PLA] officers met regularly to discuss Chiang’s generalship compared to Mao’s. Unanimously, they gave high marks to the Nationalist leader.) Chiang no doubt remembered how successful he had been with the Northern Expedition in the late 1920s, striking at a time when other forces were disorganized. In 1937 he might also have won in Shanghai, had not the Japanese brought in reinforcements. Such were probably the calculations that led Chiang Kaishek to gamble on a quick military solution to the problem of the Communists by defeating them in their new Manchurian home. With this in mind, Chiang secured agreement from the Soviets that they would withdraw from Manchuria by May 1946. Given that Moscow had just moved the Chinese Communists to this area, which the Soviet army had occupied and control of which Moscow still coveted, this decision seems puzzling. Perhaps the most reasonable interpretation is that Stalin assumed that, should the Nationalists invade, the Americans would never permit them to lose. In such a case, the Communists could escape to the Soviet Union, where a “Red China” could be established pending further developments. Stalin was an intelligent and logical man, and he understood that his relationship with the United States was far more important than that with the Chinese Communists. As we shall see, however, he did not understand the inscrutable Americans. Chiang’s planned defeat of the Communists in Manchuria would be accomplished using the tools of modern war, with which his forces had been increasingly equipped and ever-better trained during the eight years of struggle with Japan. Armored columns and artillery would quickly slice up the central axis of

lvi Introduction

Manchuria, south to north. Time would not be wasted on costly attritional land battles. Instead, troops would leapfrog over the enemy by air, quickly securing and supplying the key cities—Shenyang (also called Mukden [in Manchu] and Fengtian [in Chinese]), Changchun, and Harbin. Claire Chennault, the air-power visionary, had always been his man, and not Joseph Stilwell who favored boots on the ground.

The Course of the Fighting The Nationalist re-occupation of Manchuria got under way in the autumn of 1945.46 Nationalist troops landed by sea at Huludao (formerly Jinxi) and Yingkou on October 30. They reached Shenyang and the landing ports in the southernmost part of the territory around November 20. Soviet troops were expected to complete their withdrawal within the following week. The Nationalists asked the Soviets to prevent the Chinese Communists from opposing their entry, but the Soviets responded that this was not a matter for them to decide and rather for the Chinese people themselves to decide.47 Interestingly, Mao instructed that only former members of the Japanese army in Manchukuo could be killed. Bloodshed was to be avoided in connection with the Nationalist movement into Manchuria.48 The Communists were initially totally outclassed and outfought, though, as will be seen, during three years of Civil War they demonstrated an astonishing flexibility and adaptability that would prove the key to their victory. Communist commander Lin Biao hastily recruited Eighth Route Army veterans and former troops of the Japanese-run Manchukuo regime that managed to inflict a series of setbacks on the slowly advancing Nationalist forces. Lin failed to reckon, however, with the high morale, greater firepower, and vastly superior training of the Americanized troops of the Nationalists’ New First and New Sixth armies, all veterans of the long, successful campaign against the Japanese in Burma. By May 1946, they were bearing down hard on Lin Biao’s men. An American military observer noted that in spite of their initial successes, Lin Biao and the other Communists were engaged in a kind of unfamiliar warfare

46.  For the Manchuria Campaign, see Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lishi ziliao congshu bianshen weiyuanhui, Liaoshen zhanyi (The Battle of Liaoning-Shenyang) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1993). The authoritative work in English, more balanced and rigorous, is Tanner, The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China. 47.  See Donald G. Gillin and Ramon H. Myers, eds., Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau, tr. Dolores Zen, with the assistance of Donald G. Gillin (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), which skillfully ties the fighting to the (ultimately fruitless) negotiations. Tanner, with access above all to Chiang Kaishek’s diary, provides a fuller and more nuanced account, in The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China, pp. 165–191. 48.  “Pay Strict Attention to Policy When Entering and Garrisoning Areas in the Northeast,” March 17, 1946, below, p. 222.

Introduction lvii

that they were ill-equipped to wage. The tide rapidly turned against them: the Nationalist thrust northward looked unstoppable. Soon the Nationalists were closing in on Changchun, in central Manchuria, the second of the three key cities in the region. Zhou Enlai judged that the entire Communist position would be imperiled should Changchun be lost. To stop the accelerating advance, Lin decided to stake everything on holding a key rail junction, Siping, formerly Sipingkai, just to the south, and where the Nationalist forces would be drawn into a trap by guerrilla tactics that could defeat them.49 Following a protracted artillery exchange that reduced the city of Siping to rubble, the Communists mounted one “human sea” assault after another against the Nationalists, who retaliated with their considerable firepower. As Lin Biao’s casualties soared into the thousands and tens of thousands, … according to the Nationalists, he threw into the battle 100,000 unemployed factory workers from Changchun. A Communist participant had this to say about the battle: In order to stop the Kuomintang … [the communist party] … used all its noncombatant political working staff, its local comrades and even high school students. They literally just threw them at the Kuomintang’s crack troops. It was a massacre; more than five thousand noncombatants, who had never had any military training, were killed or wounded. By May 18 nearly 40,000 communist troops, at least half of Lin Piao’s army, were dead, while others were surrendering to the Nationalists by the thousands, including Lin Piao’s chief of operations, which suggests the dimensions of the communist defeat. Meanwhile, another Nationalist force, after destroying communist forces garrisoning the city of Fu-shun, was threatening Lin Piao’s flank. Consequently, during the night of May 18 Lin Piao withdrew what was left of his army and fled north, closely pursued by Nationalist forces who advanced at the rate of 30 miles day [sic], just about as fast as they could move. A neutral Chinese reporter who was in daily communication with Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai] and other communist leaders said they were panic-stricken by what had happened at Ssu-ping [Siping], and Chou En-lai told General Marshall that the Communists would evacuate Ch’ang-ch’un if the Nationalists stopped at that city … The Nationalists had advanced almost one hundred miles in only three days. So impressed were the Russians by the strength of Chiang’s armies in Manchuria that they renewed their overtures to his government. Meanwhile, Lin Piao’s retreating army showed signs of disintegrating, as evidenced by the massive surrender of its soldiers. So rapid and overpowering was the Nationalist advance that the Communists surrendered

49.  Gillin and Myers, Last Chance, pp. 49–51.

lviii Introduction

cities without a fight and even failed to destroy an important railroad bridge across the Sungari [Songhua] River. By June the Nationalists had advanced another two hundred miles and were within striking distance of Harbin, the only major Manchurian city still in communist hands, which, according to a U.S. authority, Lin Piao was on the verge of evacuating. Its loss would compel Lin Piao to withdraw his army into the Soviet Union and leave the Nationalists in possession of Manchuria except those parts of the countryside the Communists could hold onto.50 Harbin was and remains a city of paramount strategic significance owing to the junction there of the main north-south and west-east railways in Manchuria: namely, the South Manchurian railway, built by the Japanese, which connects the city to Changchun, Shenyang, and China within the passes, and the Russian-built Chinese Eastern railway, which provides a short-cut from west to east, connecting the Trans-Siberian railway to the naval base at Vladivostok. Harbin and its environs could have been a base area, a “Red China” in the far north, 177,000 square miles in area and having long borders with the USSR, had Chiang been willing to accept Zhou Enlai’s offer to abandon the Civil War only if that city and the province of which it is its capital, Heilongjiang, could remain theirs.51 But Chiang was not willing. At the end of the first week of June 1946, to all intents and purposes Chiang Kaishek had won the Civil War.52 Nothing within their own power could save the Communists, yet saved they were by diplomacy. General George Marshall ordered Chiang to halt, as he was jeopardizing the peace process. On June 6, Chiang Kai-shek, with his troops poised for the assault on Harbin less than twenty miles away, suddenly halted their advance and agreed to observe a fifteen-day truce, later extended to nearly one month. When his incredulous commanders begged him to reconsider, telling him that Harbin in Nationalist hands ensured a total victory over communist

50.  Ibid., pp. 50–51. 51.  Westad, Decisive Encounters, p. 41. 52.  Tanner, The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China, p. 219 examines the same idea and finds it “highly unlikely,” as “all of the many other factors that contributed to the Guomindang’s weakness” would not magically have disappeared had the offensive been allowed to succeed. His point is well-taken. The problem is to specify what those “other factors” were. One seeks to write history as it happened. Counterfactual thinking does not rewrite history, but it can be powerfully illuminating, as this author learned during a decade teaching at the Naval War College. Mindful of Professor Tanner, my point is intended to illuminate strategy above all. If the Communists had fled to a safe “Red China” in the USSR, the Civil War would certainly have unfolded differently. Mao, after all, favored consolidating the base areas, not sweeping, rapid campaigns.

Introduction lix

military forces in Manchuria, he became very angry. To Tu Yü-ming, his supreme commander in Manchuria, Chiang said, “You say that taking the city will be easy, but if you knew the reasons why we can’t take it, then you would understand why taking it is not easy at all.”53 The culminating point of victory, to use the strategic term, had been forfeited. How had this extraordinary reversal taken place? Not Stalin but the American George Marshall, one can argue, had defeated Chiang’s strategy. In doing so, he put the Nationalists in an impossible situation whereby their best troops would be trapped in Manchuria, while the Nationalist war with the Communists, if it were to be won at all, would succeed not by strategy but by hard pounding—without the participation of the best Nationalist troops. Marshall was not the first, nor would he be the last, American to sink into the quicksand of Chinese politics and war. In 1945 he was following, to his best ability, the American policy—if it merits such a serious designation—of reconciling Mao and Chiang in some sort of coalition government. Poor Marshall believed that Mao was a convinced democrat—he had taken the Reuters interview and consummately effective Communist propaganda too seriously (as had many Chinese, who would be dismayed by developments once Mao was in Beiping and Chiang was powerless and safely beyond 100 miles of water in Taiwan). Much research will be needed before historians grasp the origins and course of America’s confused Asia policy. We will leave that question unanswered, except to note that this muddle was already clear at Cairo and before. At its root was Roosevelt’s misjudgment of the Soviet Union as well as his utter incomprehension of Asia, which led him not to seek mastery of the situation but to avoid even considering it. President Harry Truman had sent Marshall to mediate between Mao and Chiang. Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., provides a summary of subsequent developments that lacks Tanner’s command of detail, but provokes strategic analysis.54 Marshall reported on his meeting with Mao. “I had a long talk with Mao Tse-tung, and I was frank to an extreme. He showed no resentment and gave me every assurance … [the Communist troops in Manchuria] were little more than loosely organized bands.”55 (American intelligence, it would appear, was poor or nonexistent—not for the last time.) Then Marshall wrote to Chiang. “Under the circumstances of the continued

53.  Gillin and Myers, Last Chance, p. 51. Tanner observes correctly that the Communists left some troops to the rear of Du’s [Tu Yüming] advance, hoping to cut off his communications to the south, as they did. Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the impact of even a partial Communist withdrawal to the Soviet Union. 54.  The World Turned Upside Down: America, China, and the Struggle for Global Leadership (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), notably pp. 38–39. 55.  Ibid., p. 38.

lx Introduction

advance of the government troops in Manchuria, I must … repeat that … a point is being reached where the integrity of my position is open to serious question. Therefore, I request you again to immediately issue an order terminating advances, attacks, or pursuits by Government troops.”56 I will quote Prestowitz’s summary in full: With no real choice, Chiang agreed to a fifteen-day ceasefire that Marshall later extended to four months. Chiang desperately needed American financial aid and was thus not able to withstand Marshall’s pressure. The result, however, was that the CPC gained control over an area larger than Germany, with long land borders and rail links to the Soviet Union, Moreover, while Washington was pressing Chiang to halt his armies and negotiate with Mao, Stalin was training Mao’s forces and providing refuge at Port Arthur and Dalian, which the USSR had gained in the Big Three talks at Yalta. The Soviets also turned tens of thousands of Japanese POWs over to Mao to help with training and maintaining the communist armies. Mao himself compared this base to a comfortable chair, with Russia as a solid back and North Korea and Mongolia as armrests. This was essentially game, set, and match for the CPC. As Jung Chang notes: “Marshall’s diktat was probably the single most important decision affecting the outcome of the civil war. Lin Biao concurred in private that this was a fatal mistake on Chiang’s part.”57 In strategic terms, the challenges of the rest of the Civil War were now clear. The ceasefire deprived Chiang of the possibility of a clear-cut victory, halted his momentum, and stranded many of his best troops in the distant Northeast. Chiang had taken an immense risk in dividing his forces. The risk had not paid off. Now his best strategy would be to concentrate in the old Nationalist heartland of East and East-Central China, near Shanghai and Nanjing. To do that would require, however, a withdrawal from the Northeast almost as speedy as the advance had been. Communications and logistics were difficult in the Northeast. The railroads could be cut, roads were seasonal at best, while air transport, Chiang’s favorite, would become vulnerable should the Communists obtain anti-aircraft weapons and artillery capable of closing airfields. That such a withdrawal might be strategically imperative on the morrow of so impressive a near-victory, however, simply was not intelligible to the Nationalist leadership or, for that matter, anyone else.

56.  Ibid., pp. 38–39. 57.  Ibid., p. 39.

Introduction lxi

The result was that the Civil War changed in character from the blitzkrieg that had come within an ace of driving the Communists to the USSR and into a prolonged attritional struggle, in which compact, mobile, and ever-better-equipped Communist forces always held a tactical advantage over the overstretched and difficult to supply Nationalists. Chiang had nearly created a victory in the Northeast, but what he got was a wasting stalemate that lasted until 1948 when the Communists began to gain the upper hand and vitiated the possibility of a Nationalist shift to an alternative strategy for victory. The adversary in the Manchurian struggle, which would continue stagnant and attritional until the very near end of the entire conflict, was the Communist Fourth Field Army. It was originally created for the purpose of conquering Manchuria, a process that ultimately led to the transformation of CPC forces into an increasingly sophisticated regular army. Isolation in Manchuria from other CPC forces also led to greater autonomy over operational decision-making and planning. Of all the field armies, it was certainly the best-equipped and best-trained at the beginning of the Civil War. The reason for this is inextricably linked to the importance and benefits of seizing Manchuria at the time of Japan’s surrender. While a great deal of industry in Manchuria had been removed and looted by the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists gained the benefit of acquiring a great supply of Japanese arms. Communist success in the surrender and transfer of these arms was in part aided by the Soviets who were, of course, nearby and strategically inclined to favor a Communist victory in the territory that was of great importance to them (and continues to be so to Russia today). These arms included artillery pieces that the primitive industries in Yan’an would have been utterly incapable of producing, but that the newly created artillery schools and trained graduates required. Acquisition of these comparatively sophisticated arms was integral to the transition of the Communist guerrilla force into a regular army. Battles of Communist field armies in northwestern, central, and eastern China played a key role in delaying and denying Nationalist access to the Northeast. The eventual victory of the Fourth Field Army in Manchuria would signal the war’s end. It not only eliminated the best Guomindang troops but also created an important and powerful strategic momentum that propelled the Communists south of the Yangzi and eventually to control of all of China. The Fourth Field Army drew on troops from the other field armies; in some instances, the best-trained and best-equipped of those other armies. The Fourth Field Army also had the advantage of being staffed by commanders and leaders recently returned from studies in the Soviet Union and recently graduated from newly created CPC artillery schools. These troops were organized as the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army on October 31, 1945, but they were renamed the Northeast Democratic Allied Army in November. They were commanded by Lin Biao, with Peng Zhen serving as the initial chief commissar. Lin’s goals in the Northeast were to delay Guomindang forces, incorporate new arms and improve training on their utilization, organize new troops, and suppress

lxii Introduction

“bandits” (remnants of the former forces of the Japanese-created “Manchu homeland” [Manchukuo, 1932–1945], numbering some 270,000). The Communists suffered setbacks in Manchuria throughout early 1946, but they enjoyed the benefit of an early arrival. Most battles from January to March resulted in Communist losses and retreats, and Lin’s forces were steadily pushed to the western, northern, and eastern fringes of the area. However, events demonstrated key Guomindang weaknesses. The advanced and mechanized Guomindang troops performed poorly in the melting snow and mud of the Manchurian spring climate. They were unable to operate well outside of the population centers, and they lost large amounts of equipment. Importantly, even though Lin lost important southern cities, he was able to maintain control over Harbin, with its direct railway connection to the USSR, as a center of operations. As we have seen, Guomindang forces began general offensives against the CPC in July 1946 with a high degree of success. While Communist armies to the south disintegrated, or fought defensive and delaying battles, Communist forces elsewhere in Manchuria continued to expand their influence over the rural populace and to train and develop new forces. Battles fought in October and November gave the Communists a strategic initiative, as the posture of the Guomindang became less dynamic and more defensive. The Communist army continued a speedy pace of development. In particular, new artillery components, as well as armored and anti-aircraft forces, were created. These forces used weapons and expertise captured from the Nationalists, left behind by the Japanese, or assimilated from bandits and former Manchukuo forces. The CPC’s strategic focus in Manchuria, which grew to be comprehensive, strongly valued the education of its forces. By March 1947, the CPC had created a Northeast Artillery School, serving as a hub for the new artillery forces, a Military and Political School, and a Medical University, as well as additional training centers and vocational schools for engineering, foreign languages, logistics, aeronautics, automotive and mechanical technologies, and communications and topographical surveys. Forces transferred from armies to the south augmented the Northeast Democratic Allied Army to reach some 460,000 by the end of April. A strong policy of the army was to preserve and protect the railways. From May to the end of November 1947, the army began a series of six offensives against Guomindang forces, attacking areas and transportation links between the key cities of Jilin, Shenyang, and Changchun and seeking to isolate these centers. These offensives faced difficulties and failed to meet their objectives due to the firepower and fighting capability of the Guomindang troops and their tactical advantage due to their air forces. However, these offensives allowed the Communist forces to continue expansion and consolidation of territories before the winter. On January 1, 1948, the Communist forces in Manchuria were renamed the Northeast PLA, with a Northeast Military District and a Northeast Field Army. Lin Biao became the chief commander and commissar, and Gao Gang became second commander and commissar. New offensives in the first quarter of the year across all three Manchurian fronts eventually culminated in

Introduction lxiii

the seizure of Siping on March 13, a city that switched hands numerous times throughout the conflict. From July 1947 to November 1948, in order to sustain a long and costly series of offensives, Communist forces in Manchuria continued to massively expand their regular and artillery forces. Prisoners were reeducated to join the Communist forces, and conscription of rural farmers ballooned Communist ranks. By September, Lin had control over some 700,000 regulars, and by the time that the Northeast Field Army achieved victory in Manchuria, it had seized 1,600 small-sized artillery pieces, such as mortars, and 600 larger artillery pieces, such as howitzers. It also had more than 100 pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, numerous tanks and armored vehicles, and thousands of other vehicles. Training for use and employment of artillery fire at the regiment, battalion, and company levels improved a great deal. The Liaoshen (Liaoning-Shenyang) Campaign from September 12 to early November of 1948 served as a closing chapter and a tragic end for more than 470,000 Guomindang forces stationed in Manchuria.58 Lin’s strategy, centered on isolating the Guomindang forces in Shenyang, Changchun, Heishan, and Jinzhou, prevented the Guomindang from linking up or reinforcing one another or defeating the Communists piecemeal. This involved the use of illusions and tricks aimed at misdirecting the enemy’s beliefs about the point of attack. Forces in Jinzhou, Heishan, and Shenyang were surrounded and defeated, while forces in Changchun and elsewhere defected to the Communist side. On November 9, the 140,000 Guomindang forces remaining in Huludao evacuated Manchuria. The Communist forces in Manchuria then, from the end of November to the end of January, alongside the North China Field Army moved south to participate in the Pingjin (Beiping-Tianjin) Campaign, to be discussed below. Guomindang forces in the Pingjin Campaign were arranged in four garrisons at Kalgan/Zhangjiakou, Xinbao’an, Beiping, and Tianjin, with roughly 500,000 Guomindang troops under the command of Fu Zuoyi. The North China Field Army concentrated on the former two garrisons and the Northeast Field Army concentrated on the latter two. As in Manchuria, techniques included surrounding and destroying garrisons piecemeal. Whereas Tianjin proved to be a bloody and violent battle, troops in Beiping peacefully surrendered and incorporated themselves into the Communist forces. The Northeast Field Army became the PLA Fourth Field Army in March 1949, with Lin Biao serving as chief commander and Luo Ronghuan serving as chief commissar. The PLA Second, Third, and Fourth Field armies crossed the Yangzi River in April. In mid-May the Fourth Field Army captured Wuhan, then, proceeding on a path more or less directly south, captured Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi in August, November, and December, respectively. It then proceeded,

58.  See Tanner, Where Chiang Kai-shek Lost China.

lxiv Introduction

from March to May 1950, to attack and conquer Hainan Island as well as islands in the South China Sea. The stalemate in the Northeast would continue until 1948, and as we have just seen, eventually prove fatal. But it was protracted. In the meantime, both sides sought to restore movement, each in their standard styles. In 1947 Chiang boldly reached for victory again, this time by directly attacking and capturing Communist headquarters in Yan’an. The Communists returned to irregular and guerrilla warfare, both to avert total defeat in the Northwest and to begin to undermine the long-term Nationalist position in the Northeast by cutting the lines of communication. The most conspicuous features of the year 1947 appeared to be Nationalist victories. At the end of June, the final battle of Siping ended when the Communists withdrew. Two months later, a three-pronged offensive against the main Communist bases in Shaanxi succeeded in taking Yan’an, which Chiang Kaishek duly inspected and visited on August 7–8. To many observers, a complete Nationalist victory appeared to be very close. But, in fact, the opposite was the case. With his bold offensives in the Northeast and the Northwest, Chiang continued to over-extend his forces, pushing them far beyond his ability to supply them, and thus rendering them vulnerable to constant attritional harassment, division, and destruction. In fact, neither of Chiang’s initiatives achieved victory. Like the Germans in World War I, who twice reached the Marne but never Paris, Chiang was unable to achieve his strategic objectives. In the Northeast the Communists had wisely withdrawn from an attritional conflict that was not their style, but they had maintained forces outside of the main cities, and they had active sanctuary beyond the Songhua in Harbin, which the Nationalists never reached. The stage was set for a Communist comeback. In the Northwest, they had captured the enemy capital to be sure, but not the real center of gravity, which was the Communist leadership. General Hu Zongnan’s three columns failed to converge exactly as planned. As Joseph W. Esherick describes it: [I]n the great pincer movement to catch the Communist forces between an army coming north and east from Yan’an and another moving south out of the Nationalist stronghold in Yulin, the southern force was deceived by feints and delayed by harassing Communist guerillas. When the Communist general Peng Dehuai met the northern force in the critical battle of Shajiadian [Mizhi county], in August, the southern army was still forty kilometers away. The Guomindang forces were defeated and passed through Yangjiagou on their retreat. While it may not have been clear at the time, the decisive battle for northern Shaanxi had been fought, and the Communists had emerged victorious. The result was that Mao, Zhou, and the others made the narrowest of escapes. This was no sure thing. As Esherick observes in a footnote,

Introduction lxv

[H]ad the Guomindang’s southern army, led by Liu Kan, arrived a day earlier, the planned pincer movement might have succeeded and thus defeated Peng Dehuai. That would have left Mao and other key Chinese Communist Party leaders surrounded, perhaps changing the course of Chinese history [italics added].59 Shajiadian was felt by many to be the moment when the war was lost. The Communist victory there was won by Peng Dehuai, but later official writing indicates, as is often the case with successes, that he was acting under the personal direction of Mao Zedong.60 The Northwest Campaign was the high point for the First Field Army. Its history can be traced back to the guerrilla and regular forces located in the provinces of northwestern China, comprising Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia, at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Originally united on August 11, 1945, this army was primarily composed of soldiers from He Long’s Second Front Army as well as guerrillas and militia. Throughout the Civil War, it remained the most poorly equipped Communist force, in comparison to the other field armies, but it was led by the resourceful and brilliant Peng Dehuai, who served as chief commander and commissar throughout most of the conflict. During most of 1946 and early 1947 the CPC forces in the Northwest, defending the dusty and mountainous heartland of the CPC with perhaps 26,000 regulars, faced, as we have seen, a serious threat from Hu Zongnan. But the evacuation of Yan’an was completed by March 13 and the Party leadership was saved. Following the loss of Yan’an, the Northwest Field Army fought three short campaigns between late March and April, meeting moderate successes and bringing some stability to the situation in the Northwest. The Nationalists, meanwhile, dedicated increasing numbers of men to garrison and suppression duties, which drained their offensives. For Peng Dehuai’s forces, these two months were a period of growth to perhaps 45,000. At the end of July, the name of his organization was simplified to the Northwest Field Army, but the core leadership of commanders, commissars, and chiefs-of-staff remained unchanged. Starting in August 1947, these revitalized CPC forces began a general offensive against the Guomindang. The Northwest Field Army won the Yulin Campaign after fighting to September, and subsequently went on to victory in the Yanqing Campaign in mid-October. By this time, its force strength reached 75,000, an impressive increase to nearly three times its original strength at the beginning of the year. The winter period over the next three to four months was calm. Starting

59.  Joseph W. Esherick, “Revolution in a ‘Feudal Fortress’: Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, Shaanxi, 1937–1948,” in North China at War: The Social Ecology of Revolution, 1937– 1945, ed. Feng Chongyi and David S.G. Goodman (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 59–91, at p. 75; p. 90, note 103. 60.  Domes, P’eng Te-huai, p. 140.

lxvi Introduction

from February to April 1948, Peng Dehuai led this group to impressive successes, eventually recapturing Yan’an on April 21. The rest of the year proved to be less successful for Peng, for while Hu Zongnan’s forces remained contained in the Northwest, decisive encounters eluded both. In February 1949, Peng Dehuai’s Northwest Field Army was formally renamed the PLA First Field Army. In May, this new force launched new offensives against Hu Zongnan, growing rapidly to 340,000 by June and capturing Xi’an. Between July and September, Peng led his troops deep into regions of the Northwest far from Shaanxi in pursuit of the Guomindang. A series of hard-fought campaigns, especially a bloody and brutal campaign to secure Lanzhou, eventually led to victory against Hu Zongnan and Ma Zhanshan. This left vast swaths of vital territory—Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces—in the hands of the CPC. Occupation of Xinjiang [East Turkestan] began shortly thereafter. The Shandong Campaign was the exception, the protracted battle that linked several theaters and whose success or failure would be well-nigh determinative for related actions by both sides. The reason for this was Shandong’s location. Bordered on the north by Hebei and on the south by Jiangsu, with massive mountain topography forcing transport into a relatively narrow corridor, the province is the indispensable bridge between North China, and Central and South China. The Jingpu railway, which links Peking to the port of Nanjing, is of cardinal strategic significance. It passes through Shandong. If the Nationalists could hold a logistical corridor linking North and South, then they would be able to redeploy troops from Manchuria to Central China, creating a military mass that was beyond the power of the Communists to defeat. If, on the other hand, the Communists could sever the link and divide Nationalist forces in the North from those in the Center and South, then Chiang would almost certainly face doom due to the impossible logistics as much as due to the innovative tactics of the Communists. In 1946, there was heavy fighting in Shandong. The Communists were always able to maintain control of the eastern peninsular section of the province from which they could move to the western transportation corridors and cut off the Nationalists. Bitter fighting in Shandong was enough in itself to prevent the redeployment south of Nationalist troops from the Beiping region as well as from Manchuria. Communist success culminated early in 1948 with the fall of the key transportation hub of Ji’nan, which effectively and irretrievably divided Chiang Kaishek’s forces. This decisive cutting of Nationalist lines of communication was the work of the PLA Third Field Army, which originated from among the Communist forces operating in Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui at the end of the Sino-Japanese War. In October and November 1945 these forces were organized into the Shandong and Central China Field armies. Chen Yi served as chief commander of both armies, with Su Yu also playing a key role as second in command. Both field armies were eventually, in mid-1947, incorporated into the East China Field Army. From 1945 to 1947, these forces were constantly threatened with annihilation and defeated by disproportionately better-trained and better-equipped

Introduction lxvii

Guomindang forces seeking to open routes to Beiping and the Northeast. In the face of superior mechanized and aerial assaults between July and December, 1946, these forces employed small unit tactics of harassment and ambush. Their foremost targets were weakly defended garrisons and lines of communication and transport, mainly railways. The large-scale engagements during this period, at Gaomi and along the main east-west rail artery, the Longhai railway, witnessed a series of setbacks for the Communists. It seemed at the end of 1946 that the Nationalists were well on their way to assuming complete control over eastern China. The Communist army, however, had sea lines of communication which enabled supplies to be brought to them via the tip of the Shandong peninsula, so they were not trapped. In the first half of 1947, Chen and Su were able to score a series of victories against garrisons in southwestern Shandong. From January to June, the Communists in Shandong were able to capture important pieces of equipment, including tanks and artillery. For the most part, they eluded or successfully destroyed certain portions of the Nationalist eradication campaigns that hunted them. They enjoyed better intelligence, local support, and logistical organization. A particularly serious eradication effort forced Chen to relocate from southwestern to eastern Shandong. The geography of mountains, forests, and densely populated towns and villages impeded the use of Guomindang armored, mechanized, and air forces, as did the Communist propensity to act at nighttime. As a result, the Guomindang failed to eliminate Chen or the bulk of his forces. Through the last quarter of 1947, the Reorganized East China Field Army was able to greatly expand and strengthen its abilities. During the winter, it trained in the use of the captured artillery, and by March 1948, it had reached force figures of 400,000 men. Beginning in the same month, the East China Field Army began to methodically capture cities throughout the Shandong peninsula. Nationalist garrisons did not engage in any eradication campaigns or large-scale reinforcements as they had in the previous year to help relieve the sieges. By September 1948, the East China Field Army had mostly completed the conquest of Shandong province, save for a few remaining enclaves. The battle for Ji’nan in September proved to be particularly bloody and brutal. There is no doubt that the East China Field Army’s best-known accomplishment during the Civil War is its participation in the Huai-Hai Campaign (to be described below). In that decisive test of arms, it worked in conjunction with the Central Plains Field Army to trap and eliminate more than 500,000 Guomindang forces. Su Yu made important contributions to the formulation of the campaign strategies. The Third Field Army name was officially bestowed on the East China Field Army in February and preparations for the conquest of the south began shortly thereafter. During the Communist offensives across the Yangzi into southern China, the newly named Third Field Army was tasked with capturing the cities of Nanjing and Shanghai, which occurred on April 23 and May 25, respectively. Chen Yi’s forces then continued to conquer the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian, which lasted until October 1949.

lxviii Introduction

The victory in Shandong set the stage for the decisive battle of the war, the Huai-Hai struggle (see below). The basic logic of the battle was as follows: with many of their best forces trapped in Manchuria and the route south in Communist hands in Shandong, the Nationalists decided to implement a fundamentally new strategy based on consolidating strength in the South, the area where they had long been in control while the Communists had been scarce. The task for the Communists was to spoil this operation. Specifically, they had to prevent the convergence and union of the Nationalist armies around the rail junction of Xuzhou, where the Longhai railway that runs west from Shanghai crosses the Jingpu railway that runs south from the old capital. At the beginning of September 1948 Mao’s attention was evidently still focused on the Northeast. Two major campaigns there were approaching a decision, one in Shandong and the other in Manchuria. Things were going well, the Chairman considered. In a review of the situation at the time, he dared, perhaps for the first time, to envision “the fundamental overthrow of the Guomindang”— does he mean in fact a military victory?—but by no means immediately. The base areas would have to be established and so forth. This would take three years, or until July 1951.61 In fact, things moved much more quickly. Although this resulted in success, rapid and unexpected developments strained Communist capabilities to the utmost, while the bitter argument over strategy established a basis for intraParty arguments that would continue long after victory had been achieved.

The Battle of Huai-Hai The pivot of all these developments was the battle of Huai-Hai.62 In effect, the last stand of the Nationalists, involving between one and two million men, was bitterly fought between November 6, 1948, and January 10, 1949, over an area centering on the rail junction at Xuzhou and extending to the three cities of Huaiyin, Huaian, and Haizhou, from which comes its name. Had the Nationalists been able to achieve even a stalemate in this battle, a de facto division of China or even a comeback might have been the result. The destruction of fifty-six Nationalist divisions eliminated any such prospect as it opened the way for the Communists to reach Shanghai and beyond. The defection to the Communist side of four and a half Nationalist divisions nudged forward the political and military bandwagon that would roll to victory within twelve months. The decisive battle was one for which neither side was prepared. The tenacious defense of the Northeast manifested a growing Nationalist understanding of the stakes and a determination to prevail, but determination alone could not

61.  “Operational Principles for the Liaoning-Shenyang Campaign,” September 7, 1948, in Vol. 10, pp. 348–50. 62.  See Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lishi ziliao congshu bianshen weiyuanhui, Huaihai zhanyi (The Battle of Huai-Hai) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988).

Introduction lxix

repair the long and difficult strategic situation of its isolated garrisons there. The loss of Ji’nan on September 24, 1948, made the situation untenable. Without even the possibility of breakout or resupply, the Nationalist position crumbled. Within two months, the entire Northeast was in Communist hands, Shenyang falling on November 2, 1948. For the first time, the Red army outnumbered the Nationalist army by approximately 3,000,000 to 2,900,000. The situation was far worse than the initial Nationalist strategy had ever imagined possible, and it afforded few strategic choices. Chiang and his armies had to arrest the Communist momentum and close the door to Shanghai and the South. Doing so was eminently possible militarily. The requisite for saving the Central Plains was coordinated action carried out by the strong armies then controlling the three major cities of Wuhan (Bai Chongxi), Xi’an (Hu Zongnan), and Xuzhou (Liu Zhi). Coordination, however, had never been the Nationalists’ strong suit. For the Communists, the challenge was just the opposite. Not only was the situation far better than they had ever dared to hope, more importantly it was far better and very different from anything they had seriously considered strategically. Until the fall of 1948, their theory of progress, if not of victory, had regarded the Northeast as the strategic key. Indeed, they seem to have mirrored Chiang’s initial conviction that the deciding battles of the war would be fought in the Northeast and thus they concentrated their forces accordingly. Perhaps they were hedging against defeat in China beyond Manchuria by retaining the wherewithal to make the former Manchukuo the new Chinese Soviet Republic. The Communists were further wrong-footed by the unexpected Nationalist decision to cease reinforcing failure in Shandong and the Northeast and instead to write off lost forces and prepare for a new battle in Central China. This shift in the strategic center of gravity about 1,000 miles south took the Communists to territory where they had few bases and little familiarity, but where the Nationalists were strong. No time could be lost, and the question of what strategy to adopt was both pressing and unclear. Strategic authorship of the eventual victory has traditionally been ascribed to Mao Zedong himself, both by official Chinese historiography and by foreign authors who, for lack of other sources, had until recently little choice but to follow.63 As a note to this text in the English edition of the Selected Works puts it, “The concept of operations set forth by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this telegram led to complete success; in fact, the campaign proceeded more smoothly than expected, and the victory was therefore quicker and greater.”64 The actual story is rather more complex, as documents in this volume and new research demonstrate. The first step for the Communists was to ponder the Nationalist dispositions. These were anchored in the East by a group army of 600,000 men, commanded by Liu Zhi already at Xuzhou. Historically, this city has been one of the strategic

63.  The key document is his “The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign,” October 11, 1948, Vol. X, pp. 397–99. 64.  Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 4:280.

lxx Introduction

pivots of China, lying about halfway between Tianjin to the north and Shanghai to the south, on the roughly 700-mile-long railway line that connects them and at the key point where that line is crossed by the west-to-east line that runs all the way from Xi’an to the sea, also a distance of about 700 miles. To the southwest, about 300 miles distant, was the group army of Bai Chongxi, based at the central Yangzi River port of Wuhan, also the terminus of the inland railway trunk line from Beiping and regularly a point of great strategic importance (the mutiny of Qing troops there in 1911 began the train of events that brought down the dynasty). Hu Zongnan, with a third group army, was about 400 miles due west along the railway line at the ancient city of Xi’an, which had been the capital of the Tang, one of China’s legendarily powerful dynasties. In addition to the formidable military array, the Nationalists were hastening to reinforce and consolidate. Chiang merged his Central China Pacification Command and his Xuzhou Pacification Headquarters and offered the new supreme post to Bai Chongxi, a gifted general who knew the terrain and might well have won the battle—but Bai declined. New troops moved with Huang Baitao toward Xuzhou from the west. From the south came the 120,000 men of the Twelfth Group Army under Huang Wei. To be sure, the Nationalists had been hurt badly and depleted by the Northeast Campaign. But a formidable force was nevertheless taking shape on some of the most strategic ground in China. Rightly employed, it might have still been able to turn the tide of battle. Against this, the Communists had only limited forces. The armies that had just won so brilliantly in the Northeast and Northwest were, alas, still there, far from the developing decisive battle. Therefore, the military burden fell, at least initially, on the East China Field Army (the development of field armies will be discussed below) under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu, two of its ablest commanders, and the Central Plains Field Army under the equally skilled leadership of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. Because even when combined these forces only totaled about 600,000 men, which is to say equal to just one of the three Nationalist group armies, head-on battle was not an option. The most plausible approach to victory was to divide the Nationalist forces and then defeat them in detail. Best would be to strike immediately since they were not yet linked together. This was not how Mao Zedong saw things, however. The Chairman was still thinking in terms of a prolonged guerrilla war that would eventually lead to a victory through extensive but limited attrition and the gaining of positional advantages against the cities. The possibility of actually defeating the Nationalist forces then assembling was not congenial to his way of thinking. Hence the instruction issued by the Central Military Commission on September 25, 1948.65 65.  “It Is Essential to Launch the Huai-Hai Campaign,” September 25, 1948, Vol. X, pp. 374–75.

Introduction lxxi

This envisioned three sets of battles. The first would be against Huang Baitao, to the east on the railway line, before his army could reach Liu Zhi at Xuzhou. The second would be in the area of the Grand Canal running south just outside Hongzi and the Gaoyu lakes into the vicinity of the Yangzi near Yangzhou and Nanjing. The third set of operations would be carried out near Lianyungang at the railway’s eastern terminus on the Yellow Sea. “If you fight effectively,” the instruction read, “you may be able to destroy more than ten enemy brigades, open the connection between Shandong and northern Jiangsu, and force a portion of the enemy’s troops to disperse to defend the Yangzi.” In other words, the initial Central Military Commission concept for the campaign had two components: the first, relatively modest attrition (ten brigades); the second, logistical, having to do with opening the way to planting forces nearer the Yangzi River. The next stage, too, was not envisioned as decisive. Once these battles had been completed, the next move “will be to advance and engage in battle on the Xuzhou-Pukou front”—which is to say along the whole 200-mile stretch of railway that connects Xuzhou in northern Jiangsu to Pukou in the province’s very south, just across the river from Nanjing (which, in the days before railway bridges, was reached by ferry). What we see here is Mao remaining loyal to his principles. Put bluntly, the Chairman still believed in rural revolution and guerrilla tactics, as he would throughout his life. Having made Shandong into a Swiss cheese of base areas, Mao saw the next step to be doing the same in Jiangsu. By October 11, the strategic concept had changed somewhat.66 Huang Baitao’s army remained a primary objective. But in order to facilitate that attack, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping were to “swiftly deploy an offensive on the Zhengzhou-Xuzhou line” and so tie down the defenders. This set of instructions does not give any hint that Mao understood the opportunity for a strategic decision that was emerging. His eyes were not on victory but on the next step: “in autumn [of 1949] the great majority of your forces can most likely engage in battle to cross the [Yangzi] river.” The attack on Huang Baitao, to the east of Xuzhou, had originally been suggested by Su Yu in a telegram sent on September 24, the day before Mao issued his first instructions about the battle. Mao had liked it and so adopted it. But Mao did not understand—as Su did—that any attempt to destroy Huang Baitao would be no easy guerrilla hit-and-run operation. It would raise the stakes of the battle, and, in the words of Lanxin Xiang, “force Chiang Kai-shek to prepare for a major strategic gamble in the area along the railway.”67

66.  “The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign,” October 11, 1948, Vol. X, pp. 397–99. 67.  Lanxin Xiang, Mao’s Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), p. 163.

lxxii Introduction

In the event, the battle did not disappoint. General Huang seems to have sensed what was coming and had begun moving toward Xuzhou when the attack began on November 8, but he was delayed for a critical two days when waiting for one of his five armies, which had just withdrawn from Haizhou to the east. The route of the march crossed the Grand Canal by a single iron bridge, where the scene was “extremely chaotic and every unit scrambled for the right of way, sometimes force was used to ensure their success.” Only one pontoon bridge was built, and this slowed the retreat. Finally, the retreat route was cut off when “three and a half divisions led by Generals Zhang Kexia and He Jifeng [both secret Communist Party members] belonging to Liu [Zhi’s] command defected at the critical moment and at the critical spot between Xuzhou and Huang’s headquarters.”68 It would take more than this setback, however, to defeat General Huang. He concentrated his forces, denying any flank or opening to the enemy, and relied on “a whole network of over a dozen villages complete with ramparts and trenches.” Communists were not good at fighting this sort of battle. The first Communist attack brought disaster. After enormous losses were incurred, they hurriedly changed their tactics from mobile war to trench war without adequate time for preparing the transition … It took almost two weeks and heavy losses for Su to overcome Huang’s resistance. True to his words and character, General Huang Baitao held his position to the last minute and was killed in action.69 Such attritional pounding was not at all what Mao had envisioned a month or so earlier, nor, to be fair, was it what the Nationalists had expected either. As wars do, this one had taken its own shape, unanticipated by the combatants. What then was the next step? The obvious target for the Communists was Huang Wei’s army to the southwest, on the Jingpu railway heading for Xuzhou. Characteristically, however, Mao did not focus on a single objective. Instead, in his almost conversational dispatch of November 19, 1948,70 he mentions a whole series of intermediate objectives, and only in his fourth paragraph does he begin to discuss a possible attack on Huang Wei. The issue was forced on November 23 when Deng Xiaoping attacked Huang Wei, having obtained Mao’s “complete support” for this departure from the script when Huang created a salient in his attack. Deng’s attack was not successful. He had underestimated his adversary and had attacked with light forces, allowing three days for victory. This was against Nationalists who had created “numerous

68.  Ibid., pp. 172–173. 69.  Ibid., p. 173. 70.  “Operational Principles for the Next Step in the Huai-Hai Campaign,” November 19, 1948, Vol. X, pp. 458–60.

Introduction lxxiii

concentric rings of strongholds and trenches, and deployed numerous tanks, trucks and heavy guns,” not to mention artillery and air support. Deng used poor tactics such as “badly coordinated human-wave attacks from several directions.” The whole operation appeared to be headed for possible disaster by the beginning of December.71 The campaign turned toward a successful conclusion in mid-December only because Su Yu trusted his intuition over Communist intelligence reports. The attack on Huang Wei made it logical for the Nationalists to abandon Xuzhou in order to destroy the attackers. This was decided under Du Yuming, the far abler general who had replaced Liu Zhi. Communist effectiveness depended upon knowing Du’s planned direction of march. The Communists had long had an agent, General Guo Rugui, who was no less than director of operations for the Nanjing Ministry of National Defense. He reported that a withdrawal to the east had been agreed upon at a meeting of himself, Chiang, and Du. But Du distrusted Gu, and he had secretly agreed at a later meeting with the Generalissimo that he would in fact move west. Su’s intuition told him the same thing in the battle of deception and counter-deception, so he concentrated his forces to the west, to attack the Nationalists as they were redeploying and therefore vulnerable. Even with this brilliant stroke, however, the operation stretched Communist capabilities to the limit. Du had 300,000 men. Su faced the task of somehow encircling them while still providing enough support to poor Deng Xiaoping, still besieging Huang Wei, to prevent his defeat. Had Huang managed to break out, or Du managed to bloody Su, the tide of battle would have shifted powerfully against the Communists. Su succeeded once again through a combination of tactical and psychological acumen. Du Yuming could have split his troops to make separate breakthroughs against Su, whose troops were thinly deployed. But Su in effect bluffed, fighting boldly, “using scattered small units to form a thin net from all directions to chase and surround the enemy in a nonstop movement.” This worried Du enough to make him cautious, which in turn made him lose the battle.72 In the end, the dominoes all fell in the same direction, albeit in something like slow motion. With substantial help from Su Yu, Deng finally defeated Huang Wei on December 15. Du’s forces had not arrived in time. By December 16, they had been isolated to the southwest of Xuzhou. Here things rested with severe winter storms and lack of supplies wearing down Du, while Mao dealt, as will be seen, with Fu Zuoyi and his huge, isolated garrison in Beiping, obtaining a surrender and a powerful psychological victory. The final battle of Huai-Hai began with a general Communist attack on Du’s army on January 6, 1949. Defeat came four days later.

71.  Xiang, Mao’s Generals, pp. 176, 178. 72.  Ibid., p. 179.

lxxiv Introduction

In the sixty years since the battle ended, authorship of victory has been much contested in China for political reasons. While Mao was alive, he was honored as the strategic genius behind this decisive success. The risky decision to attack Huang Wei, in particular, was singled out as inspired generalship, for it forced Chiang Kaishek to commit sufficient forces to the battle so as to render it decisive should he lose, as he did. As Lanxin Xiang makes clear, however, Su Yu, and not Mao, was the author of that move, which Mao approved only when Deng Xiaoping insisted. Was Deng, then, the key player? One might have thought so in the 1980s when Mao was dead, and Deng was in command in Beijing. A play about the battle called Juezhan Huaihai (1987) clearly restored, not to say over-gilded, Deng’s reputation.73 As Xiang points out, however, Deng had in fact miscalculated his move, insisting on acting alone so that the glory of victory would be his and nearly bringing disaster on the whole campaign. Deng was in fact saved by Su Yu. As for Mao, the victory at Huai-Hai was more in spite of his leadership than because of it. Long years of resisting superior Japanese and Guomindang forces had disposed Mao toward a low-risk strategy, combined with a theory of victory that depended more on society and revolution than on battle. As we have already noted several times, Mao seems to have genuinely believed that the base area and guerrilla strategy employed in the 1930s was sound and that it could be applied against the Nationalists, hence his initial position after the victories in Shandong and the Northeast. Base areas had been the keys there, he imagined, so they should be spread south to the Yangzi River, and then move on. Mao was true to his Communist beliefs. He had not seen, and did not understand, the nature of a vast conventional war with decisive victories and defeats, won on the battlefields, that would deliver to him power over all of China, quite unexpectedly, just ten months after the battle had ended. The victory at Huai-Hai was in fact chiefly due to the Second Field Army and its leaders, partners Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. The foundation of the Second Field Army lay in the development of forces located in the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border District (an area straddling southern Shanxi, southern Hebei, eastern Shandong, and northern Henan) after the Sino-Japanese War. Communist forces in this area enjoyed the benefit of assimilating well-armed defectors from troops of the puppet government as well as the typical Communist regulars and guerrillas. In addition to Huai-Hai, this army would eventually advance into Sichuan, Tibet, and China’s southwestern areas. Forces were placed under the overall leadership of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping in August 1945 as the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military District. The Shangdang Campaign, which occurred less than a month later in early September, is a testament to Liu’s military skills. His victory in this campaign was nearly total, and it

73.  See Daniel Southerland, “Chinese Play Shows Failings of Once-Revered Mao,” The Washington Post, December 3, 1987, p. A29.

Introduction lxxv

provided the Communists with both arms and defectors. This is perhaps the first example of the Communists using regular battlefield tactics involving large-scale maneuvers during the Civil War, all the more impressive considering its early date. Total forces in the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military District would have numbered some 120,000 men before the Guomindang general offensives in July. Through the period of September 1946 to March 1947, Liu’s forces fought important battles to divert Nationalist offensives away from Chen Yi’s beleaguered East China Field Army’s forces in Shandong—in total some six different campaigns. Victory in these encounters further augmented Liu’s forces with captured arms and munitions. Standard Communist techniques in these battles usually involved surrounding small numbers of defending forces and ambushing or encircling the relief columns that arrived to assist. Captured and defected Guomindang troops at this time were either persuaded or forcefully compelled to demonstrate and instruct in the use of newly acquired weapons, especially artillery. These Communist forces thus began to acquire knowledge in the employment of comparatively complicated artillery techniques of supporting fire, and they were able to concentrate fire against defenses and fixed positions. Former Guomindang troops also educated Communist troops on the creation of defensive fortifications, such as fox holes, tunnels, and trenches. Along with these more technical aspects to create a regular army, former guerrillas were rigorously drilled and instilled with a sense of military discipline. Liu and Deng organized their troops into columns. By March 1947, there were nine columns of about 25,000 men each, making a total number of some 200,000 regular forces in the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military District. In late spring of 1947, Guomindang forces were concentrated mostly toward the west and east of northern Henan, engaging in offensives against Peng Dehuai in Shaanxi and Shanxi, and against Chen Yi in Shandong. In effect, this created a gap south of Liu and Deng’s forces, marked by the border of the Yellow River dividing Nationalist and Communist territories. In July, Liu and Deng crossed the Yellow River with four columns, leaving the rest of their troops to protect against reinforcements. In light of their new location, these troops south of the Yellow River subsequently became the Central Plains Field Army. The Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military District passed to the command of Xu Xiangqian and largely became a materiel and personnel replacement zone for the Central Plains Field Army. Xu Xiangqian had some autonomy to create new columns and, in particular, to assist the North China Field Army of Nie Rongzhen. Xu’s skilled leadership made great contributions to wresting Shanxi from the control of Nationalist-aligned General Yan Xishan, who had been the leading power in Shanxi since the 1920s. Liu and Deng’s destination was the Dabie Mountains area, situated between Anhui and Hubei. There they were able to create a new area of operations deep inside of Nationalist-controlled territory. Other columns from Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu journeyed south to join them in late autumn of 1947 and again in early 1948. From a base for operations in the Dabie Mountains, Liu could menace the industrial center of Wuhan as well as important rail arteries linking China north to south and

lxxvi Introduction

east to west. This threat kept large numbers of Guomindang troops positioned in the south, reducing pressure on other Communist armies to the north. Offensives against the Dabie Mountains in early 1948 failed to dislodge or eliminate Liu’s forces. As a consequence, from March to July Liu used the opportunity to dispatch his forces to the north and east. The gaps between Communist zones in Dabie, Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu, and Shandong were erased. Meanwhile, the East China Field Army completed, as has been seen, the conquest of Shandong by September. These two field armies then moved south toward the Huai River and Longhai railway, setting the stage for the Huai-Hai Campaign. The situation in China in early November improved immensely for the Communists. The Guomindang had lost Manchuria, and captured arms began moving south into Shandong. Guomindang forces began dedicating large numbers of troops to areas just north of the Huai River, in total more than 500,000 troops located in four different cities and towns but primarily concentrated in Xuzhou. In preparation for the Huai-Hai Campaign, the Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army adopted strategies first to eliminate routes of escape to the west and south. The Guomindang armies then became increasingly confined and squeezed into their initial staging cities, unable to break out or link up with one another. These two CPC field armies made excellent use of artillery to destroy the Guomindang armies piecemeal, and they employed fortifications to repulse enemy counterattacks. Large numbers of surrenders and defections occurred. At the campaign’s close in January 1949, more than three-fifths of the Guomindang surrendered, the rest having retreated or having been destroyed. Of the 202 total divisions in the Guomindang military at this time, 56 had been eliminated through the course of the campaign. The results of the Huai-Hai Campaign provided the CPC with control of all Chinese territories north of the Yangzi River. In February 1949, the Central Plains Field Army was officially reorganized as the Second Field Army. The conquest of southern China began with Yangzi crossings in late April. Elements of the Second Field Army served separately to help capture Nanjing and Shanghai. Other elements moved farther into the Southwest and worked in conjunction with Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army to conquer Nanchang and Wuhan in May, Hunan in July, and Guangdong by late October. The Second Field Army proceeded with a simultaneous attack into Guizhou and Sichuan, primarily opposed by the forces of Bai Chongxi. The former province fell to the Communists in October; Chongqing was captured at the end of November. Although the Guomindang resisted fiercely, Chengdu’s fall in late December signified an end to resistance on the continent.

The Beiping-Tianjin (Pingjin) Campaign The end of the Huai-Hai Campaign increased pressure on the Nationalists to redeploy their forces south of the Yangzi River. The destruction of five major Nationalist armies and the capture or death of key commanders dealt further

Introduction lxxvii

injury to Nationalist morale. In particular, Chiang Kaishek’s standing within the Nationalist military suffered. The Communists began to position themselves for offensives of great scope in the southern, central, and western areas of China. As we will repeatedly stress, Communist victory was owed in very large measure to the ability to catch on to and exploit advantageous battlefield developments. By this point, too, the Communists were gaining confidence. They had surprised themselves with a series of extraordinary successes. Their morale was high, and their logistical structure functioned well. Most importantly, perhaps, their command structure was smaller and less complicated than that of the Nationalists. They operated with a greater strategic clarity. By comparison, Nationalist command seemed disorganized and convoluted, and Nationalist leaders seemed to have little of the ability to cooperate that distinguished their Communist counterparts. Defections by members of the Communist underground occurred at key moments throughout the campaign, assisting and ensuring the success of the encirclements. As the Huai-Hai Campaign was approaching its climax, China’s former capital of Beiping and its port of Tianjin fell to the Communists as well.74 Like the victory at Xuzhou, this one also flowed from a growing realization among Mao’s generals that, after the success in Ji’nan and even more in Manchuria, a rapid victory against the Nationalists was in fact within sight, to be achieved by a mixture of conventional and guerrilla warfare in North and Central China. Manchuria was isolated, and events there no longer had any effect on the war’s eventual outcome. Beiping and Tianjin were besieged. The Huai-Hai battle, which overlapped with events in the old capital region, to which we will now turn, looked set to remove the last Nationalist hope, which would be to concentrate in such a way as to firmly hold Central and South China. Increasingly, it was becoming clear that the Nationalist forces were being divided into three parts, in Manchuria, around Beiping, and around Xuzhou. If the Nationalists could be prevented from pulling their forces together, then victories could be achieved in three distinct theaters. This was in fact how the war was won. Mao seems to have grasped these possibilities while at the same time distrusting them. As we have mentioned, he always envisioned victory as coming much more slowly, as a result of the systematic planting of base areas in southern China and the launching of revolutionary and guerrilla activities from them. He also feared Chiang Kaishek’s resourcefulness. He worried lest a premature campaign against Beiping, or a too rapid climax of the Huai-Hai battle, might lead Chiang to withdraw his forces by sea, to the heartland around Shanghai, as Wu Peifu had done in the early winter of 1924–1925. (Such a move would have potentially won the Huai-Hai battle for the Nationalists, while creating an augmented army

74.  See Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lishi ziliao congshu bianshen weiyuanhui, Pingjin zhanyi (The Battle of Beiping-Tianjin) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991).

lxxviii Introduction

in Central China that would have been difficult to defeat.) Mao thus counseled caution to his generals. He wrote: In order not to prompt the bandits of Chiang to quickly decide to ship his troops in the Beiping [Peking]–Tianjin area south by sea, we are going to order … to spare the remainder of Du Yuming’s armies … This plan is beyond the enemy’s range of expectations, and it will be very difficult for it to discern the plan before you complete your final dispositions. At present, the enemy is probably anticipating that you will attack Beiping … The enemy always underrates the energy of our army and overrates its own strength, even though at the same time, it is like a bird startled by the mere twang of a bowstring [i.e., it may decline battle in Beiping and move south, which we do not want].75 About a month later, Mao continued to locate victory not in the area of Central and South China. He wrote on January 8, 1949: As regards the military aspects, we have exceeded in half a year what we had planned to achieve in a full year … The balance of class forces in China has fundamentally changed … The liberal bourgeoisie has found a way out with us, and very few of them are still following the Guomindang … The advantages of waging war in the south are: The Guomindang’s army is already without its main forces, and we have a powerful army; the Guomindang has lost its prestige and especially after we take Nanjing and Wuhan [emphasis added], its prestige will be totally ruined. Mao was worried also by American attempts to rescue the situation by supporting some sort of coalition or third force. It was necessary to explain to the Communist cadres heading south that the United States “sends its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and to organize the so-called opposition faction to destroy our revolution from within.”76 In fact, the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign proved decisive. Victory was snatched up from the military stagnation to which Mao’s counsels would have led by a combination of Communist boldness in attacking Tianjin against strong Nationalist resistance, and the disinclination of the supreme commander Fu Zuoyi either to fight an all-out battle for the old capital or to move south, but rather to reach

75.  “Telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou about the Concept of Operations for the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign,” December 11, 1948, Vol. X, pp. 494–98. 76.  “The Current Situation and the Tasks of Our Party in 1949,” January 8, 1949, Vol. X, pp. 541–46.

Introduction lxxix

a negotiated settlement. Tactically, the campaign marked the first time that the Communists employed the sort of conventional mobile tactics that would serve them so well as the war approached its end. November 1948 found the Communists wrapping up their victory in Manchuria to the north of the old capital region, while opening the Huai-Hai Campaign to the south. In October 1948 Chiang Kaishek had gone to Beiping to direct operations in Manchuria, but he was unable to get his generals to work together. The Nationalist command structure “was in shambles.”77 Where troops withdrawn from Manchuria would go—140,000 had left Huludao by sea—was unclear. The time was propitious to strike, taking full advantage of Nationalist disorganization and lack of a strategic plan. The Central Military Commission therefore directed Lin Biao to secure Zhangjiakou, the strategic gateway to the old capital from the west and the northwest as well as the cities of Beiping and Tianjin, earlier than had been expected. Lin held a planning conference in Shenyang to discuss these issues, but Mao, worried lest the Nationalists recover the strategic initiative after their catastrophe in Manchuria, ordered Lin Biao’s forces to cut short their rest and to move to the North China Plain. He outlined a plan for a sixty-day campaign to put the Nationalists once again on the defensive. The Nationalists were strong in the old capital region. Fu Zuoyi commanded fifty divisions, roughly 500,000 men, which he deployed to defend the crucial routes to the old capital from Manchuria. These included the passes north of Qinhuangdao, the port and railhead that control the land passage to Manchuria via the Shanhai Pass, and Gubeikou, just to the north of Beiping. Total Communist forces were larger: they numbered 800,000 if one included those Nationalists who had surrendered during the Northeast Campaign. Liu Bocheng’s Second Field Army was deployed in a blocking position to halt, so it was hoped, any attempted Nationalist retreat to the south. Such a retreat would have been Fu and Chiang’s best strategic option. Communist forces were scattered, thus making a breakout a realistic possibility. Had one been made, the Communists who had just been rushed to the old capital area would have been hard-pressed to redeploy yet again in the south in time to prevent a Nationalist concentration near Shanghai. Furthermore, by abandoning Beiping and Tianjin they would have perilously exposed the rear of their southward moving army, rendering it vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Should the Communists have opted not to pursue, however, they would have wasted crucial time garrisoning the old capital and carrying out mopping-up operations. Fu might have withdrawn to the west toward Zhangjiakou and its mountainous terrain, ideal

77.  Larry M. Wortzel, “The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign of 1948–1949: The Strategic and Operational Thinking of the People's Liberation Army,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 56–72.

lxxx Introduction

for the defensive. From there he would likewise have menaced the flanks of any Communist army moving south. But dealing with the threat would require that the army move in precisely the opposite direction to what was required strategically. In a worst-case scenario, the hitherto neutral General Yan Xishan, whose move to support Chiang had sealed the victory of the Northern Expedition, might have joined forces with Fu, creating an even more serious strategic situation. Communist forces advanced on three axes: from the west, from the north, and from the east. To the west, Fu had sent three corps to defend the BeipingZhangjiakou railroad line. To the north, another Communist force advanced on the old Qing imperial summer capital of Chengde, from which a road led directly to Beiping. Fu should have secured this city. In 1924 it was the treacherous failure of the “Christian General” Feng Yuxiang to guard this route that had compromised Wu Peifu’s entire strategy and led to his collapse. Similarly, Communist seizure of this critical point now meant that the Nationalist defenses to the north had to be anchored on Gubeikou. Finally, on the east coast, twenty divisions under Lin Biao attacked Tianjin, Dagu, and Qinhuangdao—the ports that had permitted Wu Peifu to make an orderly retreat in 1924. Fu’s passivity and failure to anticipate these moves, regularly played out at earlier times in Chinese history, left his massive army in Beiping and Tianjin without strategic depth. He was surrounded, cut off from the Nationalists’ main forces and without a route to join them. In other words, he faced exactly the same predicament that the Nationalists had created for themselves in Manchuria. Nevertheless, there was a fight, particularly at Tianjin, and in this, tactics made a real difference. As Col. Larry Wortzel points out, this campaign was in certain respects the “most decisive” of the Civil War because it saw the Communists convert to maneuver warfare, using motorized units, artillery, and armor, and also because of the way that the military, political, economic, and psychological components of strategy were combined in it. By late 1948, the situation in northern China was beginning to appear more unsustainable for the Nationalists. In October and November, it was quickly becoming apparent that the Nationalist forces around Beiping and Tianjin would be isolated. Through early November, Chiang Kaishek began pushing for a withdrawal to the south by these forces, so that they could be relocated to the defense of the Yangzi River. Meanwhile, the regional commander, Fu Zuoyi, became attracted to the idea that these forces would be able to withdraw to the west, into Suiyuan (an administrative and geographic region that is today included in Inner Mongolia). This disagreement and indecision probably prevented the formulation of a common vision for the Nationalist troops located in the area. In order to achieve near-total control in North China, open paths of movement south from Manchuria, capture significant urban centers, and destroy large portions of enemy troops, the Communist Central Military Commission began to formulate plans to use the Northeast Field Army and the North China Field Army to eliminate Nationalist forces in the area around Beiping. After the end

Introduction lxxxi

of the Liaoshen Campaign, Nationalist command in the central Hebei area, controlling some 500,000-plus troops, was known as the North China Pacification Headquarters, located in Beiping. Events in past Chinese history highlighted the importance of defending the approaches to the northern capital. The 800,000 battle-hardened soldiers of the Northeast Field Army waiting eagerly in Manchuria begs a comparison to the barbarians of ancient times who tested their strength against the capital’s defenders, seeking to break through this strategically important area and surge onto the North China Plain and the heartland of China. The speedy resolution of the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign (which the Central Military Commission initially expected to last for months as opposed to weeks) allowed the Northeast Field Army to swiftly move to the Yangzi River. Moreover, it resulted in the capture of a key historic and symbolic center of power, establishing some sense of the old dynamic and struggle between the northern and southern dynasties that has appeared throughout Chinese history. Communist commanders Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen coordinated to surround and defeat the Nationalist forces located in the east and west of Beiping, respectively. The Pingjin Campaign lasted from November 29 to January 31. During the 1920s and 1930s Fu Zuoyi served under Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan. Throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War, Fu Zuoyi was involved in operations in the western hinterland of the old capital. His defection during the Pingjin Campaign was rewarded after the war with political postings. He later served as a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and as Minister of Water Resources. In fact, Fu had begun discussing the possibility of surrender with Communist agents as early as the beginning of November. Communist leaders hoped that they would be able to block the retreat of Fu Zuoyi’s troops by sea to the east and by land to the west. They could thus destroy another sizable portion of Nationalist troops, making a viable defense of the Yangzi much more challenging. Communist battle plans made preparations to sever rail and communication links between Beiping and Tianjin, surround garrisons near the extreme fringes of the Nationalist defensive lines, and thus cut off routes of retreat, and then deal with the defenders of Tianjin. Beiping was to be isolated and dealt with last. Lin Biao’s troops were originally meant to be enjoying a long period of rest after their efforts in the Liaoshen Campaign. But Mao called on them to quickly move south out of Manchuria. In order to shroud the movement of such a large number of Communist forces, radio transmissions and broadcasts were used to mislead the Nationalists. New China News Agency and radio sent out messages of fake celebrations, training, and rest being enjoyed by the Northeast Field Army. As with previous campaigns, the Communist troops moved by night to avoid detection. Lin’s troops began to move out of Manchuria on November 23, their passage being facilitated by food, housing, and infrastructure repair services from the mobilized citizenry.

lxxxii Introduction

From November 29 to December 1, advance elements of the Northeast Field Army and the North China Field Army attacked villages to the west of Wanquan (Kalgan/Zhangjiakou), cutting off routes of retreat to the west into Suiyuan. Fu Zuoyi remained uninformed of the mass of the Northeast Field Army rapidly forming against him. As a result, he failed to make adequate preparations in the east and began to move reinforcements to the west, hoping to defend Wanquan against the North China Field Army, which was mistakenly seen as the primary threat. By December 4, sixteen Nationalist divisions were redeployed along the railway west of Beiping. They regained some towns to the west of Wanquan. Amongst the troops redeployed farther west were the Thirty-fifth, Sixteenth, and 104th armies. The Thirty-fifth was redeployed to Wanquan, and the Sixteenth and 104th were redeployed along the railway between Wanquan and Beiping. On December 5 and 6, the Communist Second and Third Army Groups began to cut rail and transportation links connecting the towns and villages between Wanquan and Beiping. These forces also began the process of encircling these towns and the Nationalist garrisons stationed within them. Most importantly, the Second Army Group captured the town of Xinbao’an, which commanded a central or midway position between Beiping and Wanquan, effectively cutting links between the two centers. Advance elements of the Northeast Field Army captured Miyun, a town to the north of Beiping, appearing for the first time within the Great Wall. In response, Fu Zuoyi further reorganized his forces, moving troops from Tianjin to Beiping in fear of a major assault against Beiping. Fu withdrew forces from the villages outside of Beiping into the city. He further ordered troops deployed in the west to break out and reestablish links with one another, which initially had limited successes due to the sparse defenses of the North China Field Army in some areas. Fu ordered the Thirty-fifth Army to return to Beiping along the railway. The Nationalists’ Ninety-fourth, Ninety-second, and Sixty-second armies moved to Beiping from Tianjin. On December 8, the Thirty-fifth Army made advances until it reached Xinbao’an, after which it was surrounded by the North China Second Army Group. These Communist forces defeated efforts by the 104th Army to link up with the Thirty-fifth Army, only separated by a distance of four kilometers. On December 7, the Third Army Group of the North China Field Army completed the encirclement of Wanquan and the forces within it (the Eleventh Army Group and the 105th Army). On December 10, portions of the Northeast Field Army began to stage major attacks east of Xinbao’an, severing another link along the rail line running west from Beiping. These forces seriously damaged the Nationalists’ Sixteenth Army and also threatened the rear of the Nationalists’ 104th Army, which retreated to the north, only to be decimated on December 11. By this time, Fu Zuoyi had finally realized he would soon face offensives by the full force of the Northeast Field Army. He adopted a policy of isolated defense,

Introduction lxxxiii

naming Li Wen, who eventually fled to Nanjing when learning of his superior’s eventual defection, as commander of the Beiping garrison and Hou Jingru as commander of the Tianjin garrison. Fu again changed force allocations, putting efforts into protecting Tianjin and the port of Tanggu and withdrawing forces from the surrounding villages. Fu also sent the Sixty-second Army back to Tianjin. Meanwhile, Communist forces, seeking to block the sole remaining route of retreat and escape for the Nationalists, pinpointed the enemy in Tanggu as their primary target for elimination. Their secondary target was Xinbao’an. The Communists opted to prolong attacks and delay elimination of enemy forces in other regions (even in the Huai-Hai area), fearing that rapid destruction of the Nationalist forces would prompt a speedy withdrawal of the Pingjin forces through Tanggu. This intermediate period was a missed opportunity for all the Nationalist forces to retreat toward Tanggu and escape to the south. On December 17, the Northeast Field Army completed the encirclement of Beiping. On December 20, it cut links between Tianjin and Beiping, surrounded Tianjin, and cut links to Tanggu. The North China Second Army Group proceeded on December 21 to attack the 16,000 soldiers of the Nationalist Thirty-fifth Army who were locked in Xinbao’an. Although the defenders enjoyed well-established defenses, overwhelming firepower and infantry assaults led to their destruction on December 22. A break-out attempt the following day by forces in Wanquan (Kalgan/ Zhangjiakou) eventually ended in failure as well. Although these Nationalist forces attempted to escape to Guisui or Hohhot, the North China Third Army Group eventually trapped them in a mountain gorge northwest of the city. They were eliminated during a particularly gruesome snowstorm. While the commander of the Nationalists’ Eleventh Army Group led a small force to escape, some 54,000 Nationalist soldiers were killed on December 24. All Nationalist forces on the rail lines west of Beiping and in Zhangjiakou were defeated. The North China Second and Third Army Groups then proceeded to reinforce the Communist forces surrounding Beiping. Tanggu’s formidable defensive geography of salt pans, rivers, and coastline prevented the Communists from using their mobility advantages to encircle the Nationalist forces from all sides. The Communists therefore set their sights on Tianjin. However, Tianjin held impressive defenses. Approximately 380 large-scale reinforced concrete pillboxes and numerous tall buildings with commanding vantage points and firing positions formed supporting and overlapping fields of fire and strong defensive points. A 45-kilometer-long moat, 10 meters wide and 3 to 4 meters deep half-filled with water, surrounded the city. The moat itself was surrounded with barbed wire, abatises, and landmines. Inside the moat was a 6-meter-tall earthen wall, topped with barbed wire, electric fencing, and lined with pillboxes every 30 meters. The geography of the city consisted of depressions crisscrossed with rivers. Defenders of the city numbered some 130,000 men,

lxxxiv Introduction

organized in ten divisions (the Eighty-sixth and Sixty-second armies plus local forces). The Communists deployed 340,000 men with 538 pieces of heavy artillery, 30 tanks, and 16 armored vehicles to crack these defenses. Liu Yalou was assigned frontline command. From January 3 to 12 Communist forces eliminated opposition outside of the city. On January 14 they began their assault on the city. An initial artillery barrage was followed by carefully advancing engineers and tanks supported by artillery fire, breaking through the forward defenses and establishing pontoon bridges. Communist forces attacked from the east and west, along the weakest lines of Nationalist defense, and then they proceeded to dissect Nationalist defenders into ever smaller zones. The Communist forces captured the city on January 15. On January 17, the five Nationalist divisions stationed in Tanggu (the Seventeenth Army Group and the Eighty-seventh Army) withdrew south by sea. After the capture of Tianjin, the only Nationalist forces that remained in the theater were concentrated in Beiping. These included more than 250,000 men in 25 divisions. As the situation grew more hopeless for him, Fu Zuoyi began to discuss surrender and incorporation of his troops into the PLA. On January 14, Mao presented a statement “On the Present Situation”78 that stipulated conditions for a Nationalist surrender throughout the country. With the Communist underground in Beiping playing a key role in communicating with and ultimately convincing him, Fu Zuoyi signed a document of surrender with the Communists on January 21 and began to withdraw from the city on January 22. His troops awaited inspection and incorporation into the Communist forces at designated locations outside Beiping. The PLA entered the city on January 31, marking the end of the Pingjin Campaign. The 64-day campaign resulted in 40,000 Communist casualties, and 520,000 Nationalists were killed, wounded, or captured.79

The Bandwagon Winter of 1948 and spring of 1949 witnessed the military victory of which Mao had dreamed, but in a form he could never have imagined. Sun Zi counseled against “besieging walled cities,” but in Manchuria well-equipped Communist armies had successfully done just that to the Nationalist forces holding Changchun, Shenyang, and other key positions. When the Nationalists attempted to break out, the Communists prevented them from unifying. The result was a devastating Communist strategic victory that came just at the end of 1948. As it was taking shape, vast conventionally armed Communist armies became embroiled in

78.  “Statement on the Current Situation by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” January 14, 1949, Vol. X, pp. 548–51. 79. Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting, p. 63.

Introduction lxxxv

Huai-Hai, dividing and besieging, as they had in the Northeast but more actively and bloodily, once again frustrating Nationalist strategy and scoring a second dramatic success. Caught between these theaters, the vast and militarily useless garrisons at Beiping and Tianjin decided not to fight to the end. Suddenly it was obvious not only that the Communists might eventually win but that they had actually won. With this, the undecideds rushed to the aid of the victor, and in April and May Communist forces were carried to Shanghai and south of the Yangzi as much by a rolling bandwagon as by any military campaign. The Nationalists no longer had any credible possibility of success, and they lacked any good place to make a stand on the Chinese mainland. Chiang retreated first to Sichuan and then settled on an island bastion, Taiwan, to which he flew, leaving China proper for the last time on December 16.

How Did the Communists Win? The simple fact is that either side, Communist or Nationalist, plausibly could have won the Civil War. Chiang could have won in 1946 had he been permitted to continue his offensive in Manchuria; he could also have won in 1947 if he had captured the Communist leadership during the Yan’an Campaign; he still could have achieved at least a partial victory in 1948 had he been able to successfully concentrate his forces near Shanghai, and, in particular, if Fu Zuoyi had been willing to withdraw. But Marshall told Chiang to stop short of Harbin, Hu Zongnan missed Mao and his colleagues, and Fu opted to negotiate his own surrender with the Communists. The Communists of course did win, a victory that is also very much the story of the flipside of the contingencies just mentioned. The “play of chance and probability,” as Clausewitz puts it, is critical to the outcome of every war.80 As will be seen, the regular role of contingency in determining winners and losers in war does not mean that reason has no role: Clausewitz immediately follows the words just quoted with the phrase “within which the creative spirit is free to roam,” and he turns to consideration of the wisdom or folly of generalship and the conditions of military effectiveness. We will do the same presently, by sketching some of the ways in which the Communists secured victory by superior strategy and organization, expressed, most importantly, in the remarkable construction, on the basis of an army that had fought a very limited and ineffective guerrilla effort against the Japanese, of something like today’s PLA: a huge force, well-equipped with modern weapons, competently administered and commanded, and able to fight a combined arms war. Before we discuss the real reasons that the Communists won, we must dispose of one phantom explanation: namely, that the war was somehow of a 80. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

lxxxvi Introduction

new kind, not a clash of arms so much as a clash of classes, not of armies but of an aroused populace against an entire exploiting stratum—in a word, that it was a revolution. The Communist victory certainly enabled the Communist Party to carry out massive changes in China—revolutionary changes, if you will—but those came after the military victory. The victory can only be understood by a conventional military analysis. Nearly everyone, scholar or not, dislikes this approach to studying war for it seems to ignore that great simplifier, “deep causes,” which make possible a verdict on an entire conflict without exhaustively studying the campaigns. The actors are social groups: both serious scholars Suzanne Pepper and Odd Arne Westad devote far more attention to the allegiances of the urban bourgeoisie than they do to the battlefield details—as if those allegiances made much difference at all. The Chinese people were ready for change when the war ended, but they would not insist on it. Had Chiang won, they would have fallen into place, but when the Communists won, many acquiesced, not least because they believed his democratic manifestoes and they found it hard to imagine that the bright new faces of the Communists could be any worse at governing than the Nationalist officials with whom they had already been acquainted for nearly twenty years.

The Phantom of Revolutionary Guerrilla War Before considering the resourcefulness and remarkable innovations that were in fact the key to the Communist victory, we must rid ourselves of a persistent interpretative phantom, which is the phantom of revolutionary guerrilla war. This is the idea that the Communists and the Nationalists were really very different when it came to fighting: that they were not simply distinct groups of people, eager for power and organized in Leninist fashion, but actually incarnated distinct social forces. Truth be told, the Communist military contribution was rather small compared to that during the eight years of war against the Japanese invasion that immediately preceded the Civil War. While the great group armies of the Nationalists and their allies engaged the enemy in long, wasting battles, the Communists scarcely fought. The official history of the PLA, used in Chinese military academies, lists a grand total of only nine engagements against the Japanese during the entire period from 1937 to 1945. Undoubtedly, the figure is low, but not unindicative. Figures on what the Communists did achieve are difficult to come by but displays at the National Museum of the War of Resistance outside Beijing indicate, for example, that the Communists only destroyed something like six Japanese tanks during the entire war.81 This fact of non-resistance would appear to have divided

81.  Wang Qingkui, ed., Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanyi jicheng (Chinese People’s Liberation Army Campaign Integration) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1983), 1:1–2; this author’s personal visit.

Introduction lxxxvii

the Communist leadership in ways that continued to play out long after it came to power. The decision to avoid main-force struggles against the Japanese, in favor of limited guerrilla activity to prepare for the inevitable confrontation with the Nationalists, was made by Mao and announced at the Luochuan Conference of August 22–25, 1937. Tony Saich writes that it seems that there were some mild disagreements with Mao’s views from military personnel such as Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, who favored a more active engagement with the Japanese troops than Mao’s dispersal of troops behind enemy lines … Mao’s aim was to preserve and develop the strength of the Red Army.82 Mao’s dislike of Peng Dehuai, for example, may perhaps be traced back to this time. His Hundred Regiments Offensive of August 1940 had inflicted genuine damage on the Japanese, eliciting a brutal response and leading to criticism of Peng by Mao and other Communist leaders. The effective rehabilitation of Peng was not signaled until the December 1978 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. At the end of the war with Japan, the Communists did not surge back into China proper from distant Yan’an where they had spent the war, far from the Japanese and close to the Soviet border. Rather, they moved behind Soviet troops into Manchuria, where, as has been seen, they did not prepare at all for defense, oversight of which would have cost them the war had Chiang not been pressured to end his Northeast offensive. The origins of postwar factionalism in the wholehearted willingness or not of individual Communist leaders to fight the Japanese is an important and potentially powerful explanatory fact that casts a largely unacknowledged but palpable shadow over much of contemporary Chinese historiography, especially with respect to Mao. But it is beyond the scope of these volumes to do more than to point it out. For us, the point is that from the scattered, lightly armed, irregular militia that existed as the anti-Japanese war ended in 1945, the Communists were able, once engaged in a “you die I live” (你死我活) showdown with the Nationalists, to construct, in a matter of months and years, a large, organized, well-armed, and tactically competent army: in effect, to create the PLA that we know today. Not only that: the Communists repeatedly showed themselves to be far more flexible and imaginative when dealing with the ever-changing challenges and opportunities of war than were the rather hidebound, over-officered, Nationalists, with their strategic vision that at once soared too high to the realms of air power and blitzkrieg, while failing to deal with the genuine challenges of day-to-day command and strategy. 82.  Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 667.

lxxxviii Introduction

The idea was widespread in the 1940s that China was heading not for Civil War but for social revolution, whatever that diagnostically twentieth-century term may mean. British Christian Socialist intellectual, R.H. Tawney, boldly diagnosed China’s ills as ultimately caused by the impacts of foreign contacts on her agriculture, which created an explosive source of grievances. His important book, Land and Labor in China, first published in 1932 and drawing on a good deal of Chinese sociological research as well as Tawney’s already well-developed viewpoint, helped form the minds of several generations of visitors and scholars.83 From this flowed the idea of guerrilla warfare that would be successful because it tapped authentic social grievances in the countryside. Some rural violence is authentic to be sure, but much of it, not least in China, had been orchestrated politically to appear to be what it was not: a spontaneous uprising of oppressed people against their oppressors.84 In the 1930s, the idea that irregular military activities were carried out by politically aroused workers and farmers became widespread. The battle of Guadalajara in Spain (March 8–16, 1937), which saw lightly armed loyalists destroy Italian tank columns comparable to those the Japanese employed, seemed to confirm strategies of ambush and deception. Likewise, the way that loyalist Madrid, guarded by worker militias, had resisted Franco’s siege since November 1936 gave heart to the Nationalist defenders of Wuhan when the Japanese besieged it in July 1938. Thus Zhou Enlai, the Communist representative to the Nationalist government, opined to the great English journalist Freda Utley that “the Wuhan cities could be held for a very long time, perhaps permanently, if a strategy of luring and outflanking the Japanese forces were adopted, and advantage taken of the hills, defiles, and lakes.”85 Utley eloquently expressed the romantic sense that an aroused people could never be defeated by technology alone. The courage of the Chinese soldier is a marvel and a mystery. Is it the hardship of his life from childhood which gives him that uncomplaining patience? Is it the fatalism of an ancient civilization? Some Westerners harden themselves to the sight of misery in China by inventing a theory that the Chinese nervous system is not the same as ours, that they don’t feel the same. I cannot believe this. Look at the sensitive Chinese hand, the mobile face, the intelligent eyes, the finely made bodies. One thing,

83.  R. H. Tawney, Land and Labor in China, with a preface by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 84.  Arthur Waldron, “Managed Spontaneity in Rural Political Violence in China,” in Political Violence: Belief, Behavior, and Legitimation, ed. Paul Hollander (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 127–142. 85.  Freda Utley, China at War (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1939), pp. 78–79.

Introduction lxxxix

at least is sure: to conquer such a people is wellnigh impossible, however badly they are officered and led, and however great the enemy’s superiority in arms.86 Taken literally, this is an extraordinary claim, quickly disproven. Both Wuhan and Madrid fell not long thereafter (on October 25, 1938, and March 26, 1939, respectively). As it turned out, Japan’s conventional forces had no more difficulty overcoming Wuhan’s defenses than Franco’s forces did with Madrid’s—for as his biographer, Paul Preston (no admirer) suggests, the Spanish insurgent leader probably could have taken Madrid earlier but chose to prolong the civil war in order to kill as many of his adversaries as possible in the rest of the country, thus making postwar rule easier.87 From various fastnesses in China the Communists fought the Japanese just as the Nationalists had during the 1930s, by surprise and deception, in classic Sun Zi fashion, winning the admiration of several U.S. military figures who came in contact with them (mostly Marines who were then busy rethinking their mission as a service and looking to commando and irregular operations). Among this impressive constellation of American thinkers were Colonel Evans Carlson, Major General Merritt A. Edson, and most importantly Brigadier General (as he would become on the day he left the service) Samuel B. Griffith, the legendary warrior (Navy Cross for Guadalcanal) and intellectual (he spent his retirement at Oxford University translating Sun Zi and Mao into English versions that are still widely used, and calling on the then nuclear-based U.S. military to look again at special operations). These thinkers systematized the inchoate ideas of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as they thought it was being practiced in China, creating a standard interpretation to be applied to the Civil War, and would influence all subsequent historiography as well. Griffith considered the guerrilla form of warfare that the Communists were developing in China to be no less revolutionary than the nuclear form then being worked on in Los Alamos. It might even be superior. As he wrote in his introduction to Mao’s text, It is often said that guerrilla war is primitive. This generalization is dangerously misleading and true only in the technological sense. If one considers the picture as a whole, a paradox is immediately apparent, and the primitive form is understood to be in fact more sophisticated than nuclear war [italics added] or atomic war or war as it was waged by conventional armies, navies, and air forces.88

86.  Ibid., p. 99. 87.  Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 229–232. 88.  Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, tr., with an Introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith USMC (Ret.) (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 7.

xc Introduction

Many people wanted Chiang to adopt such tactics of popular mobilization and faulted him for not doing so (even though many Nationalists did fight as guerrillas) and for instead concentrating on regular forces. The explanation, as they saw it, for this faulty choice was social. Chiang represented China’s propertied elite: the Shanghai businessmen and the rural landlords. To genuinely unleash the Chinese masses against the Japanese, as it was imagined the Communists were doing, was unacceptable to that constituency, for even if it should bring victory over Japan, it would be a victory won through revolutionary mobilization, in which they would lose their power and their property, and perhaps their lives. The actual fighting of the Civil War demonstrated that militarily, the guerrilla uprising was an intellectual chimera. As we have seen, the Communists won not by transforming conventional war but rather by mastering it. The belief that events in China vindicated the guerrilla and mass revolutionary approach, nevertheless, was widely adopted. The most common interpretative approach to the Civil War, then, is derived from Tawney, who of course reflected much opinion and scholarship of his time. We may call this the social interpretation of the conflict. As Barrington Moore, Jr., puts it in his introduction to the 1966 edition of Land and Labor, the thesis was that the result of the impact of the West was “to intensify severely latent tendencies toward peasant rebellion and in time to create a genuine revolutionary movement, led and exploited by Communists, but the product of specific Chinese conditions.”89 That such should have been the definitive characterization of the last stages along Mao’s road to power served him well. Little, in fact, distinguished the way his armies fought from the ways of his adversaries. But rhetorically, the Communists and their admirers opened up an immense distinction through which they wheeled the apparatus of Marxist military analysis into the history of Chinese warfare. This was no doubt an intellectually satisfying exercise, but as we have seen, it was fundamentally incorrect. From a political point of view, however, Mao really had to be different, if he were not to be bracketed, sooner or later, as just another militarist, a warlord like his predecessors in the Beiyang government or perhaps even Chiang Kaishek. Communist rule promised to be qualitatively different from that which had preceded it. Mao presented himself as a leader of a fundamentally new type, and he was widely accepted as such. This process of differentiation, which fundamentally was a matter of using different words to describe the same or similar phenomena depending upon whether the Communists or their opponents were the protagonists, began even before Mao won power, in the misleading presentation and understanding of the Civil War.

89.  Tawney, Land and Labor, p. 4 of unnumbered Introduction.

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Mao Zedong, from Civil War to National Leader Mao became China’s paramount leader as the result of the Civil War. It is true that a major cult of personality had already enveloped Mao at Yan’an in the late 1930s, when, for example, the melody “The East Is Red,” comparing the Chairman to the rising sun (based on the local northern Shaanxi love song “Sesame Oil”), was composed and widely sung.90 As Civil War leader, Mao remained far away from the fighting, as we have seen, in Yan’an, emerging only in 1945 for the abortive peace talks and in 1949 to assume power. In contrast, Chiang seemed constantly on the move, meeting with his generals, inspecting fronts, and so forth. Given the distances and times required for communications, it is therefore difficult to imagine that Mao really had much day-to-day control over how the campaigns were fought. Even his real, as opposed to literary, role in planning strategy is open to doubt, as in the relatively well-studied Huai-Hai Campaign. This is not to say that Mao was not the supreme decision maker of the Communists, not to mention, already by the war with Japan, the focus of a substantial cult of personality. Without his determination to win, it is easy to imagine most of the other Communist leaders coming to peace terms. But not Mao. His sense of destiny was very much the driving force behind Communist persistence in the Civil War. That said, however, it must be recognized that Mao’s practical role in winning the war was minimal. As we have seen, from beginning to end he believed that revolutionary guerrilla warfare, founded on an ever-expanding network of base areas, would be the key to victory. In the actual fighting, where one army of conscripted farmers faced another indistinguishable army, on terrain equally unfamiliar to both, base areas were almost irrelevant. What counted was the ability to wage modern warfare. The remarkable achievement of the Communists was to acquire this ability, both by learning and by creating institutions with such rapidity as to enable them to beat the Nationalists at their own game.91 Chiang Kaishek started with heavy armor and an air force. His plan in Manchuria was to use air drops to keep his garrisons supplied. In 1945 or 1946, such an approach was plausible. The Communists were helpless against armor and aircraft. But in short order they established artillery schools and, presumably with Soviet aid (the Soviets have for centuries been masters of artillery), had soon acquired the capability to shoot down Nationalist aircraft and to close runways with artillery bombardment. Just as American submarines had, in the last years of the World War II, destroyed Japanese surface shipping, thus stranding immense

90.  See Curt Kraus, Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle over Western Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 91.  These issues are thoroughly considered in Christopher R. Lew, The Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1945–1949: An Analysis of Communist Strategy and Leadership (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009).

xcii Introduction

garrisons on distant South Pacific islets, so the Communist ability to cut the web of air supplies put Chiang’s garrisons on the defensive locally, while rendering them irrelevant to the larger national scene by immobilizing them. Perhaps the most important Communist innovation, however, was the field army system. As we have mentioned in connection with the campaigns in which they distinguished themselves, the scattered irregular forces that had periodically harassed the Japanese were swept up into a well-organized national command structure that had enough autonomy to react to local conditions, while at the same time it was closely enough tied to the center for its moves to be coordinated in a way that proved difficult for the Nationalists. Overall, four major field armies were created. So important were the field armies that one scholar, William Whitson, has argued that much of the factional politics of the first decades of Communist rule derived from the personnel structures of the field armies.92

Conclusion Precisely because Mao had so little to do directly with the actual fighting and victory in the Civil War, it was essential, if he was to retain his prestige in the new China, that he make it appear that his theories and his leadership had in fact been crucial. The texts in these volumes reveal much of his wartime leadership style: distant, apodictic, yet constantly meddling in what was a victory won by his subordinates. Later, Mao would have to explain the war in revolutionary terms precisely because otherwise he could not be able to claim it or distinguish himself from the other leaders. His leadership style on coming to power was similar.93 Few, however, thought of Mao as a future leader of all of China. That role seemed (until about 1948) almost certain to be filled by Chiang, and even leftwing writers such as Han Suyin lauded Chiang lavishly. In Destination Chongqing she recounts movingly how she heard of the toll the war with Japan had taken on the once youthful leader (he was 40 when the Northern Expedition triumphed in 1927; Mao, by contrast, was 55 when he took power in 1949): Oh, Suyin … he [Chiang] has become older! He has deep lines about his mouth, but his eyes are the same. [He] made me see the plain, bare room, the huge desk piled with papers, and seated at the desk the man who bears the burden of China's destiny. One man alone. The ultimate responsibility is his. In the crowded anteroom, high officers in flashing uniform and a host of lesser persons waited to see him. To each he gave a few minutes, coming to the point without waste of time or indirection. And each one, leaving the inner office, carried with him the memory

92.  William Whitson, The Chinese High Command (New York: Praeger, 1973). 93.  I owe this point to my colleague, Mr. Yifei Zhang.

Introduction xciii

of deep-set brown eyes, challenging, inspiring with a burning faith and conviction in the justice of the cause.94 Nor was Chiang’s extraordinary wife neglected: Many people have written of Chiang Soong Mei-ling, her American education, her work, her wit, her beauty, her patriotic devotion. Everyone has heard of her courage, when she took plane [sic] and flew to the northwest, into the stronghold of revolt where the Generalissimo was held a prisoner in Sian [Xian], to live or die with him. She has proved it again a hundred times over, staying at his side through this war, braving air raids and hardship with him. This is what the world sees—a beautiful, spirited woman, a heroine of New China.95 This was the romanticized China and Chinese leadership of the War of Resistance Against Japan, in which Chiang was the overwhelming figure, although the Communists—rarely Mao alone—were beginning to come into view. In 1943 Chiang was the cynosure of Roosevelt’s eye, if not of Churchill’s, at the Cairo Conference. His magnificent writings show, along with his greatness, that Churchill was an imperialist and racist to his fingertips. He scarcely attempted to conceal his contempt for Chiang Kaishek. He was worried by the way that: the President, who took an exaggerated view of the Indian-Chinese sphere was soon closeted in long conferences with the Generalissimo. All hope of persuading Chiang and his wife to go and see the Pyramids and enjoy themselves [emphasis added] till we returned from Teheran fell to the ground, with the result that the Chinese business occupied first instead of last place. The President, in spite of my arguments gave the Chinese the promise of a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months.96 Fortunately, “Operation Buccaneer,” promised, mind you, by the President of the United States, and which might have transformed the situation in China, was cancelled, and the Allied planners returned to such vital issues as Sicily and Italy, leaving China to twist in the wind—at least until the panic of 1944 caused by the Ichigo Offensive, that led, as we have seen, to American liaison with the Communists.

94.  (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1942), p. 220. 95.  Ibid., pp. 113. 96.  Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 5: Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 328.

xciv Introduction

Had there been a “cessation of America’s unqualified commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, ... the three years of civil war might have been ... averted.”97 As we have seen, even in 1948 Mao was not envisioning anything like real success until 1951. Chiang, to be sure, had a circle of powerful detractors, many associated with General Stilwell and his circle—from which Tuchman takes her headings—and Mao his champions. But as long as the war with Japan was the dramatic event, Chiang was the dominant figure. By 1947 the Cold War was beginning, however. Presentations became more ideological and dogmatic. China’s war with Japan was displaced by a new drama of agrarian revolution and fundamental social reform. This was on the agenda precisely because it had not been wholly achieved in the war that brought Mao to power. That was a conventional battle, in which common soldiers and officers were indistinguishable by background, distinguishable only by loyalty, won not on a great purifying wave of popular uprising but by a spider’s web of compromises spun between the three great victories that destroyed Guomindang hopes. As a result, upon coming to power Mao had to make himself known through a pervasive cult of personality as well as through the implementation of the sorts of social changes that the “revolutionary” war was supposed to have achieved. That Mao felt some pressure to conform, at least initially, to expectations that he would be democratic is seen in the structure of his first governments. These appeared to be coalitions, although they were under Communist control. But Mao was always forthright about his dictatorship. Less than five years after his democratic pronouncements, in March 1949, Mao told a Party meeting that “We do not use the system of parliaments of the bourgeois republics but rather the soviet system of the proletarian republics.”98 Three months later, criticism elicited one of his characteristic bursts of rhetoric: You are autocrats! My dear sirs, you are right, that is just what we are. All the experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people’s democratic dictatorship, which one could also call the people’s democratic autocracy, the two terms meaning the same thing, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have that right.99 Arguably Mao’s “bait and switch” tactics created a need to win through domestic campaigns the mandate for “social revolution” that the war, with its numerous

97.  Notes From China (New York: Collier, 1972), pp. 79–80. 98.  “Conclusions at the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” March 13, 1949, Vol. X, pp. 615–26. 99.  “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the TwentyEighth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party,” June 30, 1949, Vol. X, pp. 696–707.

Introduction xcv

compromises, deals, and misrepresentations, had not provided—and this was very much Mao’s agenda for the rest of his life. Put another way, even though China lay at Mao’s feet in the autumn of 1949, he was by no means politically triumphant. Most writers have tended to portray Mao as mighty, unchallenged; fortified with a new Mandate of Heaven, not to mention the adulation of the great Chinese masses. But this was far from the truth. The Faustian bargains of the Civil War haunted Mao throughout his period of rule, perhaps even from the start. Dr. Li Zhisui portrays him and his colleagues in late summer 1949, already victorious, but waiting, almost hesitating, in the Fragrant Hills for the auspicious moment to enter the awe-inspiring city of Peking.100 As for the true Forbidden City, residence of the emperors—it seems Mao never visited it in his entire career (though he lived next door, as it were, in Zhongnanhai).101 One wonders why. In the end, as with other figures who similarly gained and held power through force yet imagined they were transforming their societies, everything he thought he had changed, perhaps for all time, began to collapse as soon as he died in 1976. The Civil War had decided far less than anyone had imagined at the time. Arthur Waldron Lauder Professor of International Relations Department of History University of Pennsylvania

100.  Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, p. 48 ff. 101.  Personal communication from Endymion Wilkinson.

Note on Sources and Conventions

The purpose of this series is not to lay down which was the “real” Mao, but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life, and the revised tests which were produced in the 1950s, or in Xuanji (1960) under Mao’s close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of the series, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner: 1. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version of the text in question. 2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in the Xuanji version are printed in italics. 3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao, or under his authority, in the 1950s or in Xuanji (1960) are shown in the footnotes. Mao Zedong ji meticulously indicates all changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation and style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunction yu by the more colloquial he, both meaning “and”). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgment is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repetition in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out of the account variants we regarded as trivial. For more details, please see the Note on Sources and Conventions in previous volumes of this series.

xcvi

1945



Prepare to Deal with the Civil War Situation That Is Certain to Arise (August 4, 1945) To Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], and Chen [Shaomin]:1 We received your telegram of July 21. You are correct to anticipate problems in the future. 1. We predict that the Japanese aggressors will be defeated next winter, giving you one more year to prepare. You must prepare everything within this period to deal with the certain arrival of a civil war situation; otherwise, you will be forced to act during a state of crisis and suffer losses as a result. 2. After the defeat of the Japanese bandits and the outbreak of civil war, it will certainly be very difficult for you to retain your present territory on the plain. You should now think about expanding and developing base areas in the Tongbo Mountains, the Dabie Mountains, western Hubei, southern Hubei, eastern Hubei, and northern Xiangfan. This is an extremely difficult task, so you must plan prudently in advance. You should have a few base areas. Among them, the eastern Hubei, southern Hubei, western Hubei, and northern Xiangfan base areas can grow gradually out of the current base areas; the base areas in Dabie and Tongbo already now have considerable scale. In the future we may be able to concentrate our main forces to take over part or a large part of them as their major base area, and the other places can be satellites. Now, it is very important to try your best to increase our strength in southern Henan and to merge as soon as possible with Wang [Shusheng] and Dai [Jiying].2 Please consider whether the division headquarters and the regional Party committee should be moved to southern Henan. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 812–13, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zheng Weisan (1902–1975, native of Hubei) was secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Region Party Committee, and Chen Shaomin (1902–1977, native of Shandong) was deputy secretary. Li Xiannian (1909–1992, native of Hubei) was commander of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army and commander and political commissar of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui-Hunan-Jiangxi Military Region. 2.  Wang Shusheng (1905–1974, native of Hubei) and Dai Jiying (1906–1997, native of Hubei) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Henan Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-2

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4 Mao’s Road to Power

3. Strengthen mass work, the militia, military training, financial work, and the preparation of cadres. We hope you can summarize your experience with these five items at the enlarged meeting. You should stress the items you are not very good at. Fighting is not the only task of the military; it also has the tasks of carrying out mass work and engaging in production and becoming self-reliant. You must see to it that this is properly resolved. The relationship between officers and soldiers in the army as well as the relationship between the army and the people should be resolved properly in military training. It is not a matter of lacking cadres to do local work, but rather a problem of the lack of emphasis on the military’s task of helping the local levels with mass work. Putting emphasis on this and changing the army’s work style will make more cadres available for local work. 4. Self-reliance should be practiced in all things. Do not depend on any outside assistance. From now on, the starting point of your work must be to prepare psychologically and in terms of strength to deal with the danger of civil war in the future. The Central Committee

Prepare to Join with the Forces of Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao to Set up the Hunan-Guangdong Border Base Area1 (August 4, 1945) To the Guangdong Region Party Committee: We received your telegram of July 30.2 1. Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao3 set out from southern Hubei in July with a force of 3,000. They are now between Xiangtan and Hengshan and will arrive at the Hunan-Guangdong border in one month. Wen Niansheng and Zhang Qilong4 have reached Henan with a force of 6,000. They will arrive at the Hunan-Guangdong border in four months. 2. You should immediately begin strengthening the armed forces and the leadership of every unit in Beijiang5 and Xijiang. Moreover, you should send out a strong and capable detachment from the East [River] Column under the command of a capable comrade, equipped with a radio and a large number of local work cadres. It should arrive in the Yizhang-Lechang area on the Hunan-Guangdong border within fifteen to thirty days and prepare to join forces with the two Wangs to set up the Hunan-Guangdong border base area.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 814–16, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The telegram from the Guangdong Regional Party Committee describes the current situation in the Liberated Areas of Guangdong. 3.  Wang Zhen (1908–1993, native of Hunan) and Wang Shoudao (1906–1996, native of Hunan) were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Hunan People’s Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army. 4.  Wen Niansheng (1907–1968, native of Hunan) was commander of the Third Guerrilla Detachment of the Eighth Route Army. Zhang Qilong (1900–1987, native of Hunan) was political commissar of the Second Guerrilla Detachment of the Eighth Route Army. 5.  The North River (Beijiang) is the northern branch of the Pearl River in northern Guangdong. It joins the West River (Xijiang) at Sanshui. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-3

5

6 Mao’s Road to Power

3. Are you in radio contact with the main forces of the Pearl River Column,6 which have arrived between Guangning and Sihui and are moving to the Huaiji, Lian county, Liangshan, and Yangshan area? Who is the commander and what is their troop strength? What is the distribution and location of the enemy and the diehard troops in this region? We hope you will tell us everything as soon as possible. This region (Xiaobeijiang) is extremely important, and you should strengthen your leadership there. 4. After the landing of the Allied forces and the withdrawal of the Japanese aggressors to the north, your situation on the plain will become extremely difficult. You should start thinking about this right now and make detailed and appropriate preparations in both spirit and deployment. All our forces in Guangdong should choose appropriate places in the regions where they are maneuvering and nearby, go deep into mass work, train cadres, and be prepared for a long-term struggle in the future; otherwise, you will become bewildered in times of crises and suffer setbacks. These regions include Xiaobeijiang, Lechang, Nanshi, Beijiang, Dongjiang, Zhujiang, Xijiang, Zhonglu,7 Gao-Lei-Qin-Liang,8 Qiongya, Chaoshan, and so on. Each region should have organizations of regular forces, guerrillas, and militiamen. They should try their best to merge with the masses, resolutely reduce rent and interest rates, assuage the suffering of the people, be prepared for a longterm struggle, not be afraid of civil war, and never make concessions to the Guomindang. Every region should have radio communications with the others and should have as large a radio appliance reserve as possible. Of the aforementioned regions, one should be the central base area to be used as the location for establishing the Guangdong Military Region agencies and the regional Party committee. We hope you will tell us which region would be best. 5. The Central Committee has sent you 200 cadres (which are led by Wu Jinnan9 and are marching southward with Wen Niansheng’s troops) and has asked Wang Zhen et al. to go to the Hunan-Guangdong border to set up a base area and to cooperate with you in the campaign. Apart from that, you and the

6.  The Pearl River Column of the Guangdong People’s Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army was formed in January 1945 and included all forces subordinate to the Pearl River Headquarters. Lin Qiangyun (1892–1986, native of Guangdong) was the commander and Liang Jia (1912–2009, born in Kaiping, Guangdong) was the political commissar. 7.  The Zhonglu region included the counties of Taishan, Heshan, Kaiping, Xinhui, Enping, Gaoming, Xinxing, Yangjiang, and Yangchun. 8.  This region included the prefectures of Gaozhou, Leizhou, Qinzhou, and Lianzhou, now known as Gaozhou county and Haikang county in Guangdong, and Qinzhou city and Hepu county in Guangxi. 9.  Before joining the southbound detachment, Wu Jinnan (1909–1999, native of Guangdong) served as assistant director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army’s Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia rear corps.

August 1945 7

comrades in each region have to be self-reliant in all respects, depend on the people, struggle independently, show creativity, and never rely on outside assistance. Even the Wang Zhen division is only playing a cooperative role. Do not harbor a dependent mentality. 6. You must finish arranging the aforementioned plan within six months. You should pay particular attention to making psychological preparations and have a dauntless spirit. The Central Committee

Telegram to Marshal Stalin (August 9, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency Dispatch, Yan’an, August 9) Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu have just sent a telegram to Marshal Stalin. The original text is as follows: Dear Marshal Stalin: On behalf of the Chinese people, we warmly welcome the declaration of war against Japan by the government of the Soviet Union. The 100 million people and their army in the Liberated Areas of China will spare no efforts to cooperate with the Red Army and the armies of other allies to wipe out the vicious Japanese invaders. Mao Zedong Zhu De [1886–1976, native of Sichuan]

1

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 51, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 10, 1945. 8

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-4

Comrade Mao Zedong Makes a Declaration Regarding the Fact That the War of Resistance Against Japan Has Entered Its Final Stage1 (August 9, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, August 9) On the changes resulting from the Soviet Union’s declaration of war on Japan, Mao Zedong, chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, made the following declaration: The Chinese people heartily welcome the Soviet government’s declaration of war on Japan on August 8. The Soviet Union’s action will significantly shorten the war against Japan. The war is already in its last stage, and the time has come to inflict final defeat on the Japanese aggressors and all their running dogs. Under these circumstances, all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people should launch a nationwide counteroffensive in close and effective coordination with the operations of the Soviet Union and other Allied countries. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the other people’s armed forces should seize every opportunity to launch extensive attacks on all the invaders and their running dogs who refuse to surrender, annihilate their forces, capture their arms and materiel, vigorously expand the Liberated Areas, and reduce the areas under enemy occupation. We must boldly form armed work teams to penetrate deep into the rear of the enemy-occupied areas by the hundreds and by the thousands, organize the people to destroy the enemy’s communication lines, and fight in coordination with the regular armies. We must boldly mobilize the tens of millions of people in the occupied areas, immediately organize underground forces, prepare armed uprisings, and annihilate the enemy in coordination with the troops attacking from without. Meanwhile, the consolidation of the Liberated Areas must not be neglected. Among the 100 million people there, and among the people in all other areas as they are liberated, we should universally implement a reduction of rent and interest this winter and next spring, increase production, build up the people’s

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 305–6, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 10, 1945. This document is included in the 1953 edition of Xuanji. 1.  Has Entered Its Final Stage → Has Entered the Last Round with the Japanese Invaders. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-5

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political power and armed forces, intensify militia work, strengthen army discipline, persistently develop the united front of all sectors of the population, and guard against a waste of manpower and material resources. Some areas (e.g., some of the coastal areas) should also focus on splintering the enemy’s “mopping up” for the time being. All this is designed to put more punch into our offensive against the enemy. Everyone in the country must be on guard against the danger of civil war and strive to bring about the formation of a democratic coalition government. A new stage in China’s war of national liberation has arrived, and all the people in the country must strengthen their unity and struggle for ultimate victory.

Speech at the Second Session of the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party1 (August 9, 1945) On August 9, 1945, Mao chaired the second meeting of the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the Yangjialing Central Auditorium. The meeting passed the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues” and the “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” both of which were amended according to the opinions suggested at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee and the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party. The meeting focused on the current situation. Mao Zedong elaborated on the situation after Soviet entry into the war and the Party’s policies and tasks. He said: “Participation in the war by the Soviet Union brought the War of Resistance Against Japan to its final stage. We are planning to issue a statement. We have four tasks: to cooperate in combat, to prevent civil war, to centralize and unify, and to negotiate with the KMT. Now it is a pleasure to cooperate with the Soviet Red Army in combat. How exactly we will cooperate will have to await the start of the war. What we have to do now is deploy cadres, develop an offensive, prepare dozens of brigades for battle, and devise a plan. The problem of defense is to solve the “mopping up” operations. Because our Liberated Areas generally no longer exist and the enemy only exists in some areas, we should extensively develop an offensive, which relates to preventing civil war. We must also launch an all-out offensive against the Japanese army. This is not adventurism, for we must learn to fight on a larger scale. If we do not launch an all-out strategic attack, we will be making a mistake. Of course, we must be cautious in battle. Chiang Kaishek is now in charge of defending against Japan, and this kind of defense will generally be difficult to prevent. Chiang is in the middle, so we should act on the left and on the right. Our main policy during the first period is to take over the Japanese puppets, expand the localities, and develop our strength. Then, during the second period it will be possible to go back and deal with the threat of civil war. In terms of cadre distribution, finance, urban work, equipment distribution, etc., we must consider the issues of centralization and unification, with the big cities under the management of the central government. Based on the agreement of

Our source for this text is Nianpu, pp. 618–19. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-6

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the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, we should prepare to continue the KMT-CPC negotiations, and these negotiations should be resolved on an international basis (which is not everything). After Soviet entry into the war, there may be some changes in American policy, but America is certain to rely on Chiang Kaishek. Thus, we will face long-term trouble with both the United States and Chiang. The danger of civil war will increase with the collapse of Japan.

The Central Committee’s Resolutions Regarding Our Party’s Tasks after Japan’s Surrender1 (August 11, 1945) 1. Japan announced its surrender after the Soviet Union entered the war, and the Guomindang has since been actively preparing to recover the lost territory from among the areas we have liberated, to take by force the fruits of victory in this War of Resistance. This impending conflict will be extremely violent. 2. Under such circumstances, our Party’s tasks can be divided into two stages. A. At the present stage, we should primarily focus our efforts on forcing the enemy and the puppet regime to surrender to us. Regarding those who do not surrender, we should launch attacks in accordance with specific conditions and destroy them one after another. We should vigorously expand the extent of our Liberated Areas and occupy all the large cities, small towns, and vital traffic lines that we can and indeed must occupy. We should seize weapons and resources and go all-out to arm and equip our basic masses. There should not be any tentativeness in any of this. For this purpose, leaders in every area should immediately assemble the majority of our army and should disengage from their dispersed guerrilla warfare. These troops should, according to the categories of A, B, and C, be reorganized into regiments, brigades, or divisions and be turned into extra-regional regulars. These regulars are to act together to guarantee our army’s triumph when dealing with both the enemy and the puppet regime. After dealing with the enemy and the puppet regime, our main force should be brought together for reorganization and training to improve its combat readiness and to prepare it for civil war. However, all areas should retain sufficient local troops and guerrilla bands and should go all-out to give local cadres command of the troops in the interest of local defense. Local militiamen should

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 1–3, where it is reproduced from published original materials preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this resolution on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-7

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be allowed to retain their guns, and their arms by no means should be centrally mustered. At this stage, there must be sufficient forces in areas such as Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia], Shanxi-Suiyuan, Taiyue, Henan, Hubei, central Anhui, western Zhejiang, Hunan, and Guangdong to guard against the Guomindang’s offensive. All other forces will be used to deal with the enemy and the puppet regime. As for areas with special situations, the Central Committee has already issued specific instructions. B. It is possible that the Guomindang will mount a large-scale offensive against us at a future stage. Our Party should prepare to mobilize forces to deal with this civil war. The quantity, scale, and scope of our forces will depend on the situation. The duration of the first stage may be very short in some areas, such as the Yangzi Delta, Henan, Hubei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan, and we should make an adequate assessment of this. 3. We should immediately strengthen our work in urban areas, particularly our work in cities that our Party may and indeed must seize. We should dispatch many capable cadres to these cities. These cadres should then quickly learn how to manage urban finances, banking, and economics. They should use whomever they can engage in urban work and to deal with the maintenance of law and order in the cities. They are to resolutely suppress the resistance of reactionaries, but they should refrain from killing rashly. The focus should be on the use of military strength and the employment of cadres; otherwise, nothing can be accomplished. 4. We should grasp the [Party’s] policy and none of our actions should depart from [the interests of] the masses. Although it is necessary to expand our army, this should not be done at the expense of the people’s financial capabilities. While it is also necessary to accumulate material resources, we cannot look out only for the interests of the army and disregard the interests of the people, and we certainly must not work against the interests of the people. Central control and strict discipline are necessary while we seize strongholds and capture cities. We should train the cadres immediately and quickly strengthen the army’s political work. 5. Militiamen are human resources for our army, and those who defend the rural areas are also these militiamen, so we must quickly expand the militia organization. 6. During this winter and the coming spring, we must go all-out to reduce rent for the multitudes (those who have already had their rents reduced will not be affected). We should reduce rent uniformly in all Newly Liberated Areas, devote ourselves to rousing and organizing the masses, establish local Party organizations and local governments, and promote local cadres to rapidly establish our Party’s foundation among the basic masses and rapidly consolidate all Newly Liberated Areas. However, we are never to infringe upon the interests of the middle peasants (for they also constitute the basic masses).

August 1945 15

As for the rich peasants, aside from reducing rent, which is a part of feudal exploitation, we should not further attack them. Even landlords should be allowed to make a living. It is far too soon to confiscate and redistribute land. If there are areas where land has already been redistributed, make no further changes. But we need to provide relief for landlords, draw rich peasants to our side, and compensate middle peasants for their losses. Ignoring these matters will break our rural united front and isolate our Party to the advantage of the Guomindang. 7. We will consider resuming negotiations with the Guomindang based on the new developments in the international and domestic situations. Yan’an will temporarily adopt a conciliatory attitude regarding criticism from the United States and the Guomindang. Nevertheless, those in every area should harbor absolutely no illusions about Chiang Kaishek [1887–1975, native of Zhejiang] and should expose his fraudulence among the people and prepare psychologically for the threat that Chiang Kaishek might unleash a civil war. However, at the present stage, we should concentrate our main efforts on dealing with the enemy and the puppet regime and on striving to achieve the greatest victory with bravery, resolution, and thoroughness; we must not divert our attention. At the same time, we should continue to provide help and assistance to the American personnel who are in a difficult situation. We should still prepare mutually beneficial coordination for the landing of the American troops and show our good intentions to the American people and to democrats within the government. Nonetheless, the possibility of a Scobie2 peril has yet to pass. 8. It is hoped that those in every area will consider implementing this policy, taking local conditions into account.

2.  Lieutenant-General Ronald Scobie (1893–1969), commander of the British troops, was sent to Greece following the defeat and withdrawal of the German and Italian forces in 1944. His mission was to prevent a one-sided seizure of power in Athens by the Communist ELAS guerrillas, but Mao regarded his role to be to support the Greek reactionaries against the Greek People’s Liberation Army, which had long been resisting the German invaders.

Xinhua News Agency Reporter Criticizes and Condemns the “Chiang Kaishek Order” for Provoking Civil War and for Destroying World Peace1 (August 12, 1945)2 (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, August 12) Today a Xinhua News Agency reporter issued a comment on the comment by the spokesperson of the Guomindang Central Propaganda Department and on Chiang Kaishek’s “Order.” The reporter said: A spokesperson of the Guomindang Central Propaganda Department has described the order issued by Commander-in-Chief Zhu De3 on August 10 from the Yan’an General Headquarters that set a time limit for the surrender of the enemy and the puppets as “a presumptuous and illegal act.” This comment is absolutely preposterous. Its logical implication is that it was wrong of Commanderin-Chief Zhu De, acting in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and with the enemy’s declared intention of surrendering, to order his troops to effect the surrender of the enemy and the puppets, and that on the contrary it would have been right and legitimate to advise the enemy and the puppets to refuse to surrender. No wonder that even before the enemy’s actual surrender, Chiang Kaishek, China’s fascist ringleader, autocrat, and traitor to the people, had the audacity to “order” the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to “stay where you are, pending further orders,” thereby tying their hands and letting the enemy attack them. No wonder this same fascist ringleader also dared to “order” the so-called underground forces (who are, in fact, puppet troops “saving the nation by a devious path” and Dai Li’s4 secret police who collaborate with the Japanese

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9 (2nd ed.), pp. 307–10, where it is reproduced from an August 13, 1945, Jiefang ribao article. 1. ​t​he “Chiang Kaishek Order” for Provoking Civil War and for Destroying Peace → Chiang Kaishek for Inciting Civil War 2.  This should read August 13. 3.  Commander-in-Chief Zhu De → by Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Army Group. 4.  Lieutenant General Dai Li (born Dai Chunfeng, 1897–1946, native of Zhejiang) was head of Chiang Kaishek’s Military Intelligence Service. 16

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-8

August 1945 17

and the puppets) as well as other puppet troops to “be responsible for maintaining local order,” while forbidding the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to “presumptuously take action on your own” against the enemy and the puppet forces. This transposition of the enemy and the Chinese is in truth a confession by Chiang Kaishek; it gives a vivid picture of his overall psychology, which is one of consistent collusion with the enemy and the puppets and of liquidation of those who are not of his ilk. However, the people’s anti-Japanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas will never be taken in by this venomous scheme. They know that Commander-in-Chief Zhu De’s order is precisely the resolute fulfillment of the provision in paragraph two of the Potsdam Declaration: “prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.” In contrast, Chiang Kaishek’s so-called “order” is a precise violation of the Potsdam Declaration, which Chiang himself signed. One only need make this comparison to see at once who is not “adhering faithfully to the provisions of the common agreements of the allies.” The Xinhua News Agency reporter said: Both the comment by the spokesperson for the Guomindang Central Propaganda Department and Chiang Kaishek’s “order” are from beginning to end provocations to engage in civil war. At a moment when attention at home and abroad is focused on Japan’s unconditional surrender, their aim is to find a pretext for shifting to civil war as soon as the War of Resistance comes to an end. In reality, the Guomindang reactionaries are pitifully stupid. They have sought their pretext in Commander-in-Chief Zhu De’s order for the surrender and disarming of the enemy and the puppet troops. Can this really be considered a clever excuse? No. The fact that they seek a pretext in this way only proves that the Guomindang reactionaries are fonder of the enemy and the puppets than they are of their fellow countrymen and that they hate their fellow countrymen more than they hate the enemy and the puppets. The Chunhua Incident5 was plainly an invasion of the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] Border Region by troops under Hu Zongnan [1896–1962, native of Zhejiang] to provoke civil war, yet the Guomindang reactionaries said it was a “rumored offensive” by the Chinese Communist Party. The Guomindang reactionaries easily found a pretext in the Chunhua Incident, but Chinese and foreign public opinion saw through it at once. As a result, [the reactionaries] are saying that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should not disarm the enemy and the puppet troops. In the eight years of the War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have suffered bitterly from attack and encirclement by both Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese. And now, with the War of Resistance about to come to an end, Chiang Kaishek is hinting to the Japanese (and to his beloved puppet troops) that they should not surrender their guns to the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army but “only to me, Chiang Kaishek.” One

5.  The Chunhua Incident, also known as the Yetai Mountain Campaign, was a series of battles fought by the Guomindang and the Communists near the Communist base in Shaanxi. The Communist forces declared victory on August 10, 1945.

18 Mao’s Road to Power

thing, however, Chiang Kaishek has left unsaid: “… so that I can use these guns to kill the Communists and destroy peace in China and in the world.” What will be the result of telling the Japanese to hand over their guns to Chiang Kaishek and telling the puppet troops to “be responsible for maintaining local order”? The result can only be that a merger of the Nanjing and Chongqing regimes and cooperation between Chiang Kaishek and the puppets will replace the “Sino-Japanese collaboration” and the cooperation between the Japanese and the puppets, and that Chiang Kaishek’s “anti-Communist national reconstruction” will replace the “anti-Communist national reconstruction” of the Japanese and of Wang Jingwei [1883–1944, born in Sanshui, Guangdong]. Is this not a violation of the Potsdam Declaration? Can there be any doubt that the crisis of a civil war will be exacerbated the moment the War of Resistance ends? We now appeal to all our countrymen and to the Allied countries to come forward unanimously and to join with the people of the Liberated Areas to resolutely prevent a civil war in China that will endanger world peace. Regarding who ultimately has the right to accept the surrender of the Japanese and the puppets, the Xinhua News Agency reporter said: Relying solely on their own efforts and the support of the people, the anti-Japanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas, to whom the Guomindang government refused all supplies and recognition, have succeeded independently in liberating vast territories and more than 100 million people. They have resisted and pinned down 56 percent of the invading enemy troops in China and 95 percent of the puppet troops. Without these armed forces, the situation in China could never be what it is today! In truth, within China’s borders only the troops in the Liberated Areas have the right to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppet forces. As for Chiang Kaishek, his policy has been to look on with folded arms and sit around and wait for victory; indeed, he has no right at all to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppets. We declare to the three Allied powers, to all fellow countrymen, and to the people of the whole world: The Supreme Command in Chongqing cannot represent the Chinese people and the Chinese armed forces that actually fought Japan. The Chinese people demand the right of the anti-Japanese armed forces of China’s Liberated Areas under Commander-in-Chief Zhu De to directly send representatives to participate in acceptance of Japan’s surrender and the exercise of military control over Japan by the four Allied powers and to take part in a future peace conference. If this demand is not met, the Chinese people will deem it most improper.

We Must Do All We Can to Seize Communications Lines and the Cities Along Those Lines1 (August 12, 1945) To all departments of the Central Committee, branch departments, and local Party committees: Considering the comparative strength of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, it has been decided that the Party must fight to occupy communications lines as well as the large and small cities along those lines, as follows: 1. Taiyuan, including the Tongpu railway to the north2 2. Guisui3 including the Pingsui railway to the east4 3. The Beining railway5 4. The Zhengtai railway6 5. The Daoqing railway7 6. The Baijin railway8 7. The Deshi railway9

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 6–7, where it is reproduced from a photocopy of the original that is preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The Tongpu railway bisected Shanxi Province from Datong in the northeast to Fenglingdu, near Puzhou, in the southwest. 3.  Modern Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. 4.  The Pingsui railway ran from modern Beijing to Suiyuan, which is modern-day Baotou in Inner Mongolia. It is now called the Jingbao line. 5.  The Beining railway ran from modern Beijing to Shenyang by way of Tianjin. It is now a section of the Jinghe line. 6.  The Zhengtai railway ran from Zhengding to Taiyuan. It is now the Shitai line. 7.  The Daoqing railway ran from Hua county, Daokou town, Henan, to Boai county, Qinghua town, Hebei. 8.  The Baijin railway ran from Baiwa in Qi county, Shandong, to its unfinished end in Jincheng. 9.  The Deshi railway ran from Dezhou, Shandong Province, to Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-9

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8. 9. 10. 11.

The Pinghan railway to the north of Zhengzhou10 The Longhai railway to the east of Zhengzhou11 The Jinpu railway12 The Jiaoji railway13 (if the American army lands in Qingdao, then occupy its eastern section).

The above should be fought for and occupied. As for the Pingsui railway’s easternmost point (Baotou), the Tongpu railway, south of Taiyuan, the Longhai railway, west of Zhengzhou, and the Pinghan railway, south of Zhengzhou, and all large cities and important lines of communications south of the Yangzi River, we basically have no plans to occupy them. Rather, we will focus on occupying the vast countryside, and we must actively prepare to deal with Chiang Kaishek’s attack. Until the cities and the important communications lines are captured, the countryside will remain the base area of the Party.

10.  The Pinghan railway ran from Beiping to Hankou. It is now a section of the Jingguang line. 11.  The Longhai railway ran from Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province, to Lanzhou, Gansu Province. Its name comes from Long, an alternative name for Gansu, and Haizhou, the former name of Lianyungang. 12.  The Jinpu railway ran from Tianjin to Pukou. It is now a section of the Jinghu line. 13.  The Qingdao-Ji’nan, or Jiaoji, railway ran through Shandong Province from Qingdao, on Jiaozhou Bay, to the provincial capital of Ji’nan.

Regarding Central China’s Deployments in Preparation for the Civil War1 (August 12, 1945) To the Central China Bureau: We received your telegram.2 In light of the comparative strength of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, Central China’s deployments will be changed as follows: 1. The forces south of the Yangzi3 are to expand in all directions from their present position, seize the vast countryside and several county towns, and prepare the battlefront for civil war. We do not plan to occupy the large cities south of the Yangzi, and other than face-to-face interactions with the people, the Party organization will continue to adopt covert policies. The forces in eastern Zhejiang will continue to expand in their original area. In the event

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 4–5, where it is reproduced from the published original material preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The Central China Bureau’s telegram stated that (1) Owing to the occupation of Nanjing by the forces of the New Fourth Army of Jiangsu and Zhejiang and their preparedness to repulse the attacks of the invading Nationalist military forces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian, (2) and due to the withdrawal of three units of the Seventh Division of the New Fourth Army to go south and cross the Yangzi to take Wuhu city, Anhui, (3) the main force of troops in eastern Zhejiang belonging to the New Fourth Army of Jiangsu and Zhe­jiang should control the Shanghai-Hangzhou railway to prevent the diehard Guomindang troops from occupying Shanghai. In addition, the Pudong troops should enter Shanghai. (4) Regarding the cities of Shanghai and Hangzhou, aside from deploying the main force of the section’s troops, it is essential to seize and occupy the city by mobilizing the masses. (5) The Seventh Brigade of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army should control Pukou, the Eighth Brigade should assist sections of the Jiangsu and Zhejiang Army in dealing with the puppet troops in central Jiangsu, and the Tenth Brigade should assist by reclaiming Huaiyin and Lianshui and moving toward Huaibei. (6) The Second and Fourth Divisions of the New Fourth Army should take the railway from Xuzhou south to Pukou. The telegram also recommended that the Eighth Route Army should take responsibility for the work of reclaiming Xuzhou. 3.  This refers to the forces of the New Fourth Army’s Zhejiang-Jiangsu Military Region, under Commander Su Yu (1907–1984, native of Hunan) and Political Commissar Tan Zhenlin (1902–1983, native of Hunan) (who had not yet arrived). DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-10

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that they suffer setbacks during the civil war, they should prepare to move south of the Yangzi. 2. After victory in the civil war south of the Yangzi (that is, after winning several major battles), there should be a sustained expansion from the original area. This is all quite possible. However, should setbacks in the civil war make it impossible to hold the present areas, prepare to enter Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi and to create a new front there. On this point, a small number of leaders should be prepared psychologically to absolutely not retreat north of the Yangzi. Alternatively, after the outbreak of the civil war, we could first dispatch a few troops to enter and then clamp down on and secure the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Region. 3. The forces north of the Yangzi are to remain north of the Yangzi. Do not dispatch these troops south of the Yangzi because their task is to do everything they can to occupy the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway and all cities north of the Yangzi, east of the Jinpu [railway], and north of the Huai River, as well as to exterminate the puppet armies, to prepare to engage in a war against Li Pinxian and He Zhuguo,4 and to have their core troops coordinate with the Eighth Route Army to occupy the Longhai railway. The Central Committee

4.  Li Pinxian (1890–1987, native of Guangxi) and He Zhuguo (1897–1985, native of Guangxi) were military region commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the Guomindang’s Tenth War Zone.

The Situation Following Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and Our Course of Action1 (August 13, 1945) These are days of tremendous change in the situation in the Far East. The surrender of Japanese imperialism is now a foregone conclusion. The decisive factor in Japan’s surrender is the Soviet Union’s entry into the war. One million Red Army troops are entering China’s Northeast and these forces cannot be resisted. Japanese imperialism can no longer continue the fight. The Chinese people’s hard and bitter War of Resistance is crowned with victory. As a historical stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan has come to a close. Under these circumstances, at present what are the relations among the different classes in China, and what are the relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party? What will they be in the future? What is our Party’s course of action? These are questions of great concern to the people of the entire country and to all members of our Party. What about the Guomindang? Looking at its past, one can discern its present; looking at its past and present, one can see its future. In the past, this party carried out a counterrevolutionary civil war for ten whole years. During the War of Resistance, it launched three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns, in 1940, 1941, and 1943.2 In each of these instances, the Party was prepared to turn the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 8–22, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong xuanji (1991, second edition), Vol. 4, pp. 1123–35. It also appears in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1123–36. 1.  This is a speech Mao Zedong gave at a meeting of Yan’an cadres. This speech uses Marxist-Leninist methods of class ideology to analyze the fundamental Chinese political situation in the post–War of Resistance period. In addition, it proposes a strategy for the proletarian revolution. This text, like Mao’s opening speech to the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, points out that China had two paths in the wake of victory over Japanese imperialism: it could become a new China or remain the old China. 2.  The first campaign was from the winter of 1939 until the spring of 1940. The Guomindang army under Hu Zongnan attacked and captured the Eighth Route Army garrisons in the cities of Chunhua and Xunhua, and three other garrisons in the Shaanxi-NingxiaGansu border area. Yan Xishan (1883–1960, native of Shanxi) attacked the New Fourth Army in Shanxi and Zhu Huaiyong (1892–1968, native of Hubei) raided the Eighth Route Army in the area around the Taihang Mountains of Hebei, and so forth. The second camDOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-11

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attack into a countrywide civil war. It was only due to the correct policy adopted by our Party and the opposition of the people throughout the country that these attempts failed. As everyone knows, Chiang Kaishek, the political representative of China’s big landlords and big capitalists, is a most brutal and treacherous fellow. His policy has been to look on and wait for victory with folded arms, to conserve his forces, and to prepare for civil war. Indeed, the victory he has been waiting for has arrived, and now this “chairman”3 is ready to “come down from the mountain.”4 During the past eight years, we have changed places with Chiang Kaishek: Formerly we were on the mountain and he was by the water.5 During the War of Resistance, we were behind enemy lines and he went up to the mountain. Now he is coming down from the mountain, coming down to seize the fruits of victory. During the past eight years, the people and soldiers of our Liberated Areas, with no aid whatsoever from the outside and relying solely on their own efforts, liberated vast swathes of our national territory and resisted the bulk of the invading Japanese forces and practically all of the puppet troops. It was through our determined resistance and heroic struggle that the 200 million people in the Great Rear Areas6 were saved from being trampled underfoot by the Japanese aggressors, and the regions inhabited by these 200 million people were saved from Japanese occupation. As Chiang Kaishek was hiding on Mount Emei, the guards who were guarding his front were none other than those of the Liberated Areas—the people and soldiers of the Liberated Areas. In defending the 200 million people of the

paign was in January 1941. Guomindang troops received orders from Chiang Kaishek to “round up the whole gang” of more than 9,000 New Fourth Army troops that from January 6 to 14 were being transferred north of the Yangzi. He ordered that the New Fourth Army be disbanded and that Commander Ye Ting (1896–1946, native of Guangdong) be put on trial. The third campaign was in March 1943, when Chiang Kaishek published China’s Destiny and began an anti-Communist public-opinion offensive. During June and into July, the Guomindang transferred a large number of Henan defense forces to prepare a lightning strike in the border regions. 3.  Here Mao is referring to Chiang by his formal title of weiyuanzhang, meaning “chairman” [of the Military Affairs Commission]. As in previous volumes, we translate this expression literally, instead of following the common English parlance of the time that referred to Chiang by the title of “generalissimo.” 4.  This “mountain” is Mount Emei, Sichuan, but points more generally to the mountainous regions of northwestern and southwestern China, where Chiang Kaishek and a large portion of the troops under his control went into hiding after Wuhan was invaded by the Japanese in 1938. 5.  Prior to the War of Resistance, the revolutionary bases under the command of the Chinese Communist Party were established primarily in mountainous regions, whereas the centers of Chiang Kaishek’s control were in the large coastal and river cities. 6.  This refers to the region under the control of the Guomindang. During the War of Resistance, people commonly referred to the expansive regions not yet invaded by the Japanese and under the control of the Guomindang in northwest and southwest China as the “Great Rear Areas.”

August 1945 25

Great Rear Areas, we concurrently protected this “chairman” and gave him the time and space to sit around and wait for victory with folded arms. Time: eight years, one month. Space: an area inhabited by 200 million people. These were the conditions we provided for him. If not for us, he could not have stood by looking on. So is the “chairman” grateful to us? No, not he! This fellow has never known what it is to be grateful. How did Chiang Kaishek climb to power? By the Northern Expedition, by the First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and by the support given to him by the people who had not yet seen through him. Once in power, Chiang Kaishek, far from being grateful to the people, struck them down in one blow and plunged them into a bloodbath of ten years of civil war. You comrades are familiar with this segment of history. During the present War of Resistance, the Chinese people once again defended him. This war is now ending in victory and Japan is on the point of surrender, but Chiang is not at all grateful to the people. On the contrary, thumbing through the accounts of 1927, he seeks to act in the same old way. Chiang Kaishek says there has never been any “civil war” in China, only “bandit suppression.” Whatever he wishes to call it, the fact is that he wants to start a civil war against the people; he wants to slaughter the people. Until a civil war breaks out throughout the country, many people and many of our Party comrades will not have a very clear understanding of this issue. Since a civil war has not yet emerged on a large scale, since it is not yet widespread or out in the open, and since there are not many battles, many people think, “Well, there may not be a civil war after all!” Many others are afraid of a civil war. Their fear is not without reason. There were ten years of fighting and then another eight years of the War of Resistance; if the fighting continues, where will it all end? It is quite natural that such fears should arise. With regard to Chiang Kaishek’s plot to launch a civil war, our Party’s policy has been clear and consistent, that is, we resolutely oppose a civil war, we are against a civil war, and we hope to prevent a civil war. In the days to come, we shall continue, with the utmost effort and greatest patience, to lead the people in preventing a civil war. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be soberly aware that the danger of a civil war is extremely serious because Chiang Kaishek’s policy is already established. Chiang Kaishek’s policy is to engage in a civil war. Our policy, the policy of the people, is opposed to a civil war. The opponents of a civil war only consist of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people—it is a pity they do not include Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang. Here one side does not want to fight and the other wants to fight. If neither side wanted to fight, then there would be no fighting. Now, since only one side is opposed to a civil war and this side is not yet strong enough to place a check on the other side, the danger of civil war is extremely grave. Our Party pointed out in good time that Chiang Kaishek would stick to his reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war. Before, during, and after the Seventh Party Congress, we did fairly adequate work in calling the people’s attention to the danger of a civil war so that the people, our Party members, and our troops would be prepared psychologically well in advance. This is a very important

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point, and it makes a world of difference whether or not there was such preparedness. In 1927, our Party was still in its infancy and was unprepared psychologically for Chiang Kaishek’s counterrevolutionary surprise attack. Consequently, the fruits of victory won by the people were soon lost, the people had to endure long-term suffering, and a bright China was plunged into darkness. This time things are different; our Party has acquired the rich experience of three revolutions and much greater political maturity. Time and again, the Party Central Committee has clearly explained the danger of a civil war, so the people, all Party members, and the troops led by our Party are in a state of preparedness. Chiang Kaishek always tries to wrest every ounce of power and every ounce of gain from the people. As for us, our policy is to give him tit-for-tat and to fight for every inch of land. We act following his fashion. He always tries to impose war on the people, one sword in his left hand and another sword in his right hand. We likewise take up swords, following his example. We arrive at this method only after investigation and study. Such investigation and study are very important. When we see the other fellow holding something in his hands, we should do some investigating. What does he hold in his hands? Swords. What are the swords for? For killing. Whom does he want to kill with his swords? The people. After coming up with these findings, investigate further—the Chinese people, too, have hands and they can take up swords; they can forge a sword if there is none handy. The Chinese people have discovered this truth after a long period of investigation and study. Warlords, landlords, local bullies and evil gentry, and the imperialists all have swords in their hands and are out to kill. The people have come to understand this and so they act in the same fashion. Some of us neglect such investigation and study. Chen Duxiu, for example, did not understand that one can kill people with swords.7 Some say that this is a clear everyday truth; how can a leader of the Communist Party fail to know it? But you can never tell. Chen Duxiu did not engage in investigation and study and so he did not understand this, hence we called him an opportunist. He who does not engage in investigation and study has no right to speak, and accordingly we deprived Chen Duxiu of such a right. We have adopted a course that is different from that of Chen Duxiu and we have enabled those people suffering from oppression and slaughter to take up swords. If ever again anyone wants to kill us, we will act in this fashion. Not long ago, the Guomindang sent six divisions to attack our Guanzhong subregion,

7.  Chen Duxiu (1879–1942, native of Anhui), was one of the main leaders of the May Fourth New Culture movement. After the May Fourth movement, he accepted and promulgated Marxism, becoming one of the important founding leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. During the first six years after the Party was established, Chen was the primary leader. The reference to Chen Duxiu’s rightist-opportunism points to 1927, when he advocated cooperation and compromise with the Guomindang. When Chiang Kaishek turned against the Chinese Communist Party, the latter was unprepared to mount an effective resistance. On August 7, 1927, the CPC Central Committee held an emergency meeting and removed Chen Duxiu from his leadership position in the Party.

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and three of the divisions moved in and seized a 20 by 100 li area. We acted in their fashion and wholly, thoroughly, and completely wiped out the Guomindang troops in this 20 by 100 li area.8 Our policy is to give tit-for-tat and to fight for every inch of land; we will never let the Guomindang easily seize our land and kill our people. Of course, to fight for every inch of land does not mean following the old “Left” line of “not abandoning a single inch of land in the base area.” This time we abandoned an area of 20 by 100 li. Abandoned in late July, it was retaken in early August. After the Southern Anhui Incident of 1941, the Guomindang Liaison Staff Officer once asked me what we intended to do. I answered, “You are here in Yan’an all the time and you don’t know? If He [Yingqin] goes for us, we’ll go for him. If he stops, we’ll stop too.”9 At that time, Chiang Kaishek was not named, only He Yingqin. Today we say, “If Chiang goes after us, we’ll go after him. If Chiang stops, we’ll stop too.” We will act following his fashion. As Chiang Kaishek is now sharpening his swords, we must sharpen our swords as well. The rights that the people have won must never be given up lightly. Rather, they must be defended by fighting. We don’t want a civil war. However, if Chiang Kaishek insists on forcing a civil war on the Chinese people, the only thing we can do is to take up arms and fight him in self-defense to protect the lives, property, rights, and well-being of the people in the Liberated Areas. This will be a civil war that he forces on us. If we do not win, we will blame neither heaven nor earth, but only ourselves. However, let no one think that the people can be easily robbed or defrauded of the rights they have won; that is impossible. Last year an American correspondent asked me, “Who has given you the power to act?” I replied, “The people.” Who else indeed, if not the people? The ruling Guomindang has not given us any power. It does not recognize us. We take part in the People’s Political Council in the capacity of a “cultural organization,” as

8.  On July 21, 1945, troops from the Guomindang’s Temporary Fifty-ninth Division under the command of Hu Zongnan attacked Yetai Mountain in Chunhua county in the Guanzhong subregion of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and then continued to raid the surrounding border regions. The CPC’s border region troops initiated a counterattack on August 8 and reclaimed the area of Yetai Mountain. 9.  The Guomindang Liaison Staff Officer, an official dispatched by the Guomindang to Yan’an, was responsible for maintaining contact between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. On November 19 and December 8, 1940, Chiang Kaishek issued telegrams under the names of He Yingqin (1890–1987, native of Guizhou), the chief-of-staff of the Guomindang Military Affairs Committee, and Bai Chongxi (1893–1966, born in Guilin), assistant chief-of-staff, ordering that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army positions south of the Yellow River withdraw to the north. This was followed by the Southern Anhui Incident, during which the Guomindang attacked the New Fourth Army as it withdrew to the north, and the Communists waged a counterattack. Although he names He Yingqin as the initiator of the upsurge in anti-Communist sentiment, Mao is actually referring to Chiang Kaishek.

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stipulated by its rules.10 But we say we are not a “cultural organization;” we have an army and we are a “military organization.” On March 1 of this year Chiang Kaishek stated that the Communist Party would have to turn over its army before it could acquire legal status. Chiang Kaishek’s statement still stands. We have not turned over our army and so we have no legal status and we are “defying human and divine laws.” Our duty is to hold ourselves accountable to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must conform to the people’s interests, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected—that is what being accountable to the people means. Comrades! The people want liberation, and therefore entrust power to those who can represent the people and who work faithfully for it, that is, for us Communists. As representatives of the people, we must represent the people well and not act like Chen Duxiu. Confronted by counterrevolutionary attacks against the people, Chen Duxiu did not adopt a tit-for-tat policy of giving and did not fight for every inch of land; as a result, within only a few months in 1927, the people lost all the rights they had won. This time we must be on our guard. Our policy is completely different from that of Chen Duxiu; no trickery can fool us. We must be clearheaded and have a correct policy; we must not make mistakes. To whom do the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance belong? It is very obvious. Take a peach tree, for example. When the tree yields peaches, they are the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick the peaches? Ask who planted and watered the tree. Chiang Kaishek who was squatting on the mountain did not carry a single bucket of water and yet he is now stretching out his arm from afar to pick the peaches. “I, Chiang Kaishek, own these peaches,” he says. “I am the landlord, you are my serfs, and I will not allow you to pick any peaches.” We have refuted him in the press.11 We say, “You never carried any water, so you have no right to pick the peaches. We, the people of the Liberated Areas, watered the tree day-in-and-day-out and we have the greatest right to gather the fruit.” Comrades! The victory of the War of Resistance has been won by the people with bloodshed and sacrifice; it should be the victory of the people, and the fruits of the War of Resistance should go to the people. As for Chiang Kaishek, he was passive in resisting Japan but active in his anti-communism. He was a stumbling block in the people’s War of Resistance. Now this stumbling block is coming forward to

10.  The People’s Political Council was a consultative body established by the Guomindang in 1938. Members of the People’s Political Council were appointed by the Guomindang, and most were also members of the Guomindang. In April 1938, the Nationalist government promulgated the Regulations of the People’s Political Council. The third item stipulates: “One who has served in a cultural organization or an economic organization for more than three years and has prestige, or one who has labored on behalf of the nation and has become famous for his labor” may become a member of the People’s Political Council. Members of the Chinese Communist Party were appointed to the People’s Political Council on this basis. 11.  See August 13 [sic], 1945, “Xinhua News Agency Reporter Criticizes and Condemns the “Chiang Kaishek Order” for Provoking Civil War and for Destroying World Peace” in this volume.

August 1945 29

monopolize the fruits of victory. He wants victorious China to relapse into her old prewar state, and he does not tolerate the slightest change. This gives rise to struggle. Comrades! It is a most serious struggle. That the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance should go to the people is one thing, but who will eventually receive the fruits of victory and whether it will be the people who will get the fruits of victory is another thing. Don’t be too sure that all the fruits of victory will fall into the hands of the people. Chiang Kaishek will grab a lot of big peaches, such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and other big cities. He has ganged up with U.S. imperialism and in such places they have won the upper hand, whereas so far the revolutionary people mainly occupy only the rural areas. Another bunch of peaches will be contested by both sides. These are the medium and small towns situated along the section of the [Da]tongPu[zhou] railway north of Taiyuan, the middle section of the Bei[ping]-Sui[yuan] railway, the Bei[ping]-Liao[ning] railway, the section of the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway north of Zhengzhou, the Zheng[ting]-Tai[yuan] railway, the Bai[kui]Jin[cheng] railway, the De[zhou]-Shi[jiazhuang] railway, the Tian[jin]-Pu[kou] railway, the Qing[dao]-Ji[nan] railway, and the section of the Longhai railway east of Zhengzhou. These medium and small towns must be contested; they are the medium and small peaches watered by the people of the Liberated Areas with their sweat and blood. It is difficult to say now whether these places will fall into the people’s hands. Only two words can be said now: struggle hard. Are there places that are certain to fall into the hands of the people? Yes, there are. They are the vast rural areas and the numerous towns in the provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Rehe,12 most of Shanxi, Shandong, and the northern part of Jiangsu, with villages linked together and with about a hundred towns in one area, seventy to eighty in another, forty to fifty in a third—altogether three, four, five, or six such large and small areas. What sort of towns? Medium and small towns. We are sure of them; we have the strength to pick these fruits of victory. This will be the first time in the history of the Chinese Revolution that we have gained this fruit. Historically, it was only after we smashed the enemy’s “third encirclement and suppression” in the latter half of 1931 that we had as many as twenty-one county towns in the Central Base Area in Jiangxi, but there was not a single mediumsized town among them. With twenty-one small towns linked together, the total population at its height reached 2,500,000. Relying on this base, the Chinese people were able to continue the struggle for such a long time, win such major victories, and smash such major “encirclement and suppression” campaigns. We were later defeated, for which we should blame not Chiang Kaishek but ourselves for

12.  Chahar Province was located in what is now northwestern Hebei Province extending into the Xilin Gol Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. In 1949 it became part of Hebei and northern Shanxi, but it was fully disbanded in 1952. Rehe Province was located in what is now northeastern Hebei Province, southwestern Liaoning Province, and southeastern Inner Mongolia. It was dissolved in 1955.

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not fighting well enough. This time, if scores of big and small towns are linked in a single contiguous area, and if there are three, four, five, or six such areas, then the Chinese people will have three, four, five, or six revolutionary bases, each larger than the Central Base Area in Jiangxi, and the situation for the Chinese Revolution will be very promising indeed. If one looks at the situation as a whole, the stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan is over, and the new situation and task is a domestic struggle. Chiang Kaishek talks about “building the country.” From now on, the struggle will be over what sort of country to build: a new democratic country of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat, or a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under a dictatorship of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. This will be a most complicated struggle. At present, it takes the form of a struggle between Chiang Kaishek, who is trying to usurp the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance, and ourselves, who oppose his usurpation. If there is any opportunism during this period, it will be in failing to struggle hard and in voluntarily presenting Chiang Kaishek with the fruits that should go to the people. Will an open and total civil war break out? That depends on domestic and international factors. The domestic factors chiefly consist of our strength and the degree of our political consciousness. Given the general trends in the international and domestic situations and public sentiment, is it possible, through our own struggles, to localize the civil war or to delay the outbreak of a nationwide civil war? There is this possibility. Chiang Kaishek will face many difficulties if he tries to unleash a civil war. First, in the Liberated Areas there are one hundred million people, one million troops, and more than two million people’s militia. Second, the politically conscious people in the Guomindang areas are opposed to a civil war, and this imposes a check on Chiang Kaishek. Third, there is also a segment of the Guomindang that is not in favor of a civil war. The situation today is vastly different from that in 1927. In particular, the condition of our Party today is vastly different from what it was in 1927. In those days, our Party was still in its infancy and it did not have a clear head or experience in armed struggle or a tit-for-tat policy. Today the level of political consciousness in our Party is very much higher. Apart from our own political consciousness, that is, the political consciousness of the vanguard of the proletariat, there is the question of the political consciousness of the masses of the people. When the people are not yet politically conscious, it is entirely possible that their revolutionary gains may be handed over to others. This has occurred in the past. Today the level of political consciousness of the Chinese people is very much higher. The prestige of our Party among the people has never been so great. Nevertheless, among the people, and chiefly among those living in the Japanese-occupied and Guomindang areas, there are still a good many who believe in Chiang Kaishek and have illusions about the Guomindang and the United States, illusions that Chiang Kaishek is working hard to spread. The fact that a segment of the Chinese populace is not yet politically conscious shows that much remains to be done in our propaganda and organizational work.

August 1945 31

It is not easy to achieve a political awakening of the people. It requires much earnest effort on our part to rid their minds of wrong ideas. Just as we sweep our rooms, we should sweep backward ideas from the minds of the Chinese people. Dust never vanishes by itself without sweeping. We must carry out extensive propaganda and education among the masses so they will understand China’s actual situation and trends and will have confidence in their own strength. It is up to us to organize the people. As for the reactionaries in China, it is up to us to organize the people to overthrow them. Everything reactionary is the same; if you don’t hit it, it won’t fall. This is also like sweeping the floor; as a rule, where the broom does not reach, the dust will not vanish by itself. There is a river called the Jiezi, south of the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] Border Region. South of the river is Luochuan and north of the river there is Fu county. North and south of the river are two different worlds. The south is under the Guomindang; since we have not reached there, the people are unorganized and there is much filth and rot. Some of our comrades put their faith only in political influence, fancying that problems can be solved merely by influence. That is blind faith. In 1936, we were in Bao’an.13 Forty to fifty li away, there was a fortified village held by a landlord despot. The Party Central Committee was then in Bao’an, and our political influence could be considered very great indeed, but the counterrevolutionaries in this village obstinately refused to surrender. We swept to the south, we swept to the north, but all in vain. Not until our broom swept right into the village did the landlord cry out, “I give up!”14 That is how things are in this world. Bells don’t ring until you strike them. Tables don’t move until you shift them. Japan would not surrender until after the Red Army of the Soviet Union had entered the Northeast. The enemy and the puppet troops never handed over their arms until our troops fought them. Only where the broom reaches can political influence produce its full effect. Our broom is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. With broom in hand, you must learn to sweep; don’t lie in bed, fancying that a gust of wind will somehow rise up and blow all the dust away. We Marxists are revolutionary realists and we never indulge in idle dreams. There is an old saying in China, “Rise at dawn and sweep the courtyard.”15 Dawn is the breaking of a new day. Our forefathers told us to rise and start sweeping at the very break of day. They were giving us a task.

13.  The CPC was based in Bao’an, a county in northern Shaanxi, from July 1936 to January 1937, when it moved to Yan’an. 14.  The landlord despots mentioned here refer to fortress of Danba in the southwestern part of Bao’an county. There were more than 200 households in this very strategically located fortified village. The major landlord gentry and the chief of the local militia, Cao Junzhang ([?]–1937, native of Shaanxi [?]) led more than 100 armed men to occupy this village for a long period of time. The Red Army surrounded them and attacked many times but without success. In August 1936, the aggressors inside the village collapsed under siege by the local militia commanded by the Red Army, and by December the fortress of Danba was liberated. 15.  This is a quote from Maxims for Managing the Home by the late Ming and early Qing author Zhu Bolu (1617–1976, born in Kunshan, Jiangsu).

32 Mao’s Road to Power

Only by thinking and acting in this way will we benefit and find work to do. China has a vast territory and it is up to us to sweep it clean inch by inch. What should be the basis of policy? Our policy should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one’s own efforts. We are not alone; all the countries and people of the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless, we stress regeneration through our own efforts. Relying on the forces that we ourselves organize, we can defeat all Chinese and foreign reactionaries. Chiang Kaishek, in contrast, relies entirely on the aid of U.S. imperialism, which he looks upon as his mainstay. The trinity of dictatorship, civil war, and selling out the country has always been the basis of his policy. U.S. imperialism wants to help Chiang Kaishek wage a civil war and turn China into a U.S. dependency, and this policy, too, was established long ago. But U.S. imperialism, while outwardly strong, is inwardly weak. We must be clear-headed; that is, we must not believe the “nice words” of the imperialists or be intimidated by their bluster. An American once told me, “You should listen to [Patrick] Hurley and send a few men to be officials in the Guomindang government.”16 I replied: “It is no easy job to be an official bound hand and foot; we won’t accept this. If we become officials, our hands and feet must be unfettered and we must be free to act; that is, a coalition government must be set up on a democratic basis.” He said, “It will be bad if you don’t accept this.” I asked him, “Bad in what way?” He said, “First, the Americans will curse you; second, the Americans will back Chiang Kaishek.” I replied: “If you Americans, sated with bread and sleep, want to curse the people and back Chiang Kaishek, that is your business and I will not interfere. What we have now is millet plus rifles; what you have is bread plus cannons. If you want to back Chiang Kaishek, back him, back him as long as you want. But remember one thing: To whom does China belong? China definitely does not belong to Chiang Kaishek. China belongs to the Chinese people. The day will surely come when you will find it impossible to back him any longer.” Comrades! This American was trying to scare us. Imperialists are masters at this sort of stuff, and many people in colonial countries do get scared. The imperialists think that all people in the colonial countries become scared, but they do not realize that in China there are people who are not afraid of that kind of stuff. In the past, we openly criticized and exposed the U.S. policy of aiding Chiang Kaishek to fight the Communists; it was necessary, and we shall continue to do this. The Soviet Union has sent its troops; the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressor. Such an event has never happened before

16.  The American referred to here is Colonel David Dean Barrett (1892–1977) of the U.S. Army Observation Group that was sent to Yan’an under an agreement between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States army in 1944. Patrick Hurley (1883– 1963), who was appointed U.S. ambassador to China in November 1944, supported Chiang Kaishek’s policies. On April 2, 1945, at a State Department press conference in Washington, DC, Hurley declared that he was unwilling to work with the Chinese Communist Party. He was removed from his position in November 1945.

August 1945 33

in Chinese history. Its influence is immeasurable. The propaganda organs of the United States and Chiang Kaishek hoped to sweep away the Red Army’s political influence with two atom bombs. But it cannot be swept away; it is not so easy. Can atom bombs decide wars? No, they can’t. Atom bombs could not make Japan surrender. Without the struggles waged by the people, atom bombs on their own are of no avail. If atom bombs could decide a war, then why was it necessary to ask the Soviet Union to send its troops? Why did Japan not surrender when the two atom bombs were dropped on her, and why did she surrender as soon as the Soviet Union sent its troops? Likewise, some of our comrades believe that the atom bomb is all-powerful; that is a big mistake. These comrades show even less judgment than a British peer. There is a certain British peer called Lord Mountbatten.17 He said the worst possible mistake is to think that the atom bomb can decide a war. These comrades are more backward than Mountbatten. What has influenced these comrades to think that the atom bomb is something miraculous? Bourgeois influence. Where does it come from? From their education in bourgeois schools and from the bourgeois press and news agencies. There are two world outlooks and two world methodologies: the proletarian world outlook and methodology and the bourgeois world outlook and methodology. These comrades often cling to the bourgeois world outlook and methodology and often forget the proletarian world outlook and methodology. The theory that “weapons decide everything,” the purely military viewpoint, a bureaucratic style of work divorced from the masses, individualist thinking, and the like—all these are bourgeois influences in our ranks. We must constantly sweep away these bourgeois things from our ranks just as we sweep away dust. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war decided Japan’s surrender, and the situation in China is now entering a new period. Between the War of Resistance and the new period there will be a transitional stage. The struggle during this transitional stage is to oppose Chiang Kaishek’s usurpation of the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance. Chiang Kaishek wants to launch a nationwide civil war, and his policy has been established; we must be prepared for this. No matter when this nationwide civil war breaks out, we must be well prepared. Even if it comes early, say, tomorrow morning, we should be prepared. That is point one. In the present international and domestic situations, it is possible that for a time the civil war may be localized and restricted in scale. That is point two. Point one is what we should prepare for, point two is what has existed for a long time. In short, we must be prepared. Being prepared, we will be able to deal properly with all kinds of complicated situations.

17.  Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979) was Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Command. On August 9, 1945, he released a statement welcoming the Soviet Union’s participation in the Anti-Japanese War. He said it would be a great mistake to think that the atom bomb would bring an end to the war in the Far East.

Telegram from Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] Resolutely Rejects Chiang Kaishek’s Erroneous Order1 (August 13, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency Dispatch, Yan’an, August 14, 9:00 A.M.) Commanderin-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] have just sent a telegram to Chiang Kaishek, resolutely rejecting his erroneous, unreasonable order, which goes against the interests of the nation. The telegram reads as follows: For the perusal of the honorable Chairman Chiang Kaishek. We received two Central News Agency dispatches through Chongqing radio, one carrying the order you sent us and the other carrying your order to the officers and men in the various war zones. Your order to us reads, “All units of the Eighteenth Army Group should stay where they are, pending further orders.” In addition, it talks about things such as the order forbidding us to take over the arms of the enemy. Your order to the officers and men in the various war zones was reported as follows in the Central News Agency dispatch from Chongqing, dated August 11: “Today, the Supreme Command sent telegrams to the officers and men in the various war zones, ordering them to step up the war effort in accordance with the existing plans,2 and orders actively pushing forward without the slightest let-up.” We find these two orders contradictory. According to the first, our units should “stay where they are, pending further orders,” and should no longer attack or fight. Why do you tell us not to fight at this moment when the Japanese

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 53–54, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 14, 1945. According to Xuanji (1960) and Nianpu, Vol. 3, Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. Apart from the introductory note and the signatures at the end, the variants between this version and that in Xuanji are trivial and are not indicated here. 1. Telegram from Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] [1898–1974, born in Xiangtan] Resolutely Rejecting Chiang Kaishek’s Erroneous Order → Telegram from the commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Army Group to Chiang Kaishek 2.  plans, → military plans, 34

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-12

August 1945 35

aggressors have not yet actually surrendered, when on every hour and at every minute they are killing Chinese people and fighting Chinese troops as well as Soviet, U.S., and British troops, and when the Soviet, U.S., and British troops in turn are fighting the Japanese aggressors on every hour and at every minute? As to the second order, we consider it very good. “Step up the war effort and actively push forward without the slightest let-up”—that’s more like it! But what a pity that you have given this order only to your own troops and not to us, and that you have given us something quite different. Zhu De issued an order on August 10 to all anti-Japanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas to the effect precisely that they should “step up the war effort.” His order further said that while stepping up their war effort, they must order that the Japanese aggressors surrender to them and they must take over the arms and other equipment of the enemy and the puppet troops. Isn’t this very good? Undoubtedly it is very good; undoubtedly it is in the interests of the Chinese nation. But to “stay where they are, pending further orders” is definitely not in the national interest. We feel you have given an erroneous order, one so wrong that we have to inform you that we firmly reject it. Your order to us is not only unjust but also runs counter to China’s national interests and only benefits the Japanese aggressors and the traitors to the motherland. Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Army Group, Zhu De Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Peng Dehuai

We Definitely Must Have an Absolutely Superior Force during Campaigns; We Cannot Fight Recklessly1 (August 13, 1945) Central China Bureau: We received your telegram of the 12th.2 We agree that you should concentrate your main forces to fight Li Pinxian and He Zhuguo,3 and help the Eighth Route Army seize the Longhai railway4 and Xuzhou only if forces are available. While fighting Li [Pinxian] and He [Zhuguo], do not fight recklessly or prematurely, creating a confrontation or simply routing them. You must have ample forces for absolute superiority on the battlefield; you must also make ample preparations for mobilization so that when the enemy has advanced to a spot that is advantageous to us, we can surround him and wipe out one of his columns, and then proceed to attack the balance of his forces. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 26–27, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The telegram from the Central China Bureau proposed combining the Second, Third, and Fourth divisions of the New Fourth Army to concentrate on fighting the Guomindang army led by Li Pinxian and Hu Zhuguo in the Tenth War Zone along the Jinpu line. 3.  Li Pinxian and Hu Zhuguo were the commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the Guomindang’s Tenth War Zone. 4.  This refers to the section of the Longhai railway that connected Yungang and Xuzhou. 36

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-13

Extensively Occupy the Countryside, Do Not Fight for the Big Cities (August 15, 1945) To Wen [Niansheng] and Zhang [Jilong], and for the information of Wang [Shusheng] and Dai [Jiying], Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian]:1 1. You can restore the original designation [of the military unit]. 2. Our area of operations lies between Zhengzhou, Wushi, and Shuidong; our task is not to fight for the big cities but to occupy the broad countryside. 3. Sun Lianzhong’s2 Eleventh War Zone army should start moving east and seize the Zheng[zhou]-Luo[yang]-Xuchang line. You, Wang, and Dai must open up the eastern front, wait until the army of the stubborn enemy firmly holds the weakly defended rear of the Zheng-Luo-Xu line, and then advance west to the Shaanxi-Henan border, drawing in the enemy’s army so it cannot move eastward. 4. The battalion dispatched to Lake Hong must still advance southward. 5. The [Guomindang’s] Thirty-eighth Army has still not contacted the [Communist] Central Committee.3 Please advise by telegram whether or not

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 30–31, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Wen Niansheng was commander of the Eighth Route Army’s Third Guerrilla Detachment, and Zhang Jilong (1900–1987, native of Hunan) was political commissar of the Second Detachment. Wang Shusheng and Dai Jiying were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Henan War Zone. Zheng Weisan was acting secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui (E-Yu-Wan) Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Li Xian­nian was a committee member of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui (E-Yu-Wan) and commander of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, serving jointly as political commissar and commander of military operations in the Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Hunan, and Jiangxi theaters. 2.  Sun Lianzhong (1893–1990, native of Hebei) was commander of the Guomindang’s Eleventh War Zone. 3.  The Guomindang’s Thirty-eighth Army was originally part of the Seventeenth Route Army under the command of Yang Hucheng (1893–1949, born in Pucheng county, Shaanxi). Its troops were heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party, and they joined it in holding the front line during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Following uprisings in July 1945 and May 1946, the Seventeenth and Fifty-fifth divisions in SeptemDOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-14

37

38 Mao’s Road to Power

they can endure the hardship, and whether it is more advantageous to stay in Henan or to go to Shanxi. 6. Of the 200 cadres moving toward Guangdong, aside from those heading south in disguise, the others should amass at Taihang to prepare for proceeding south by detour. Mao Zedong

ber 1946 became the Thirty-eighth Division of the Northwest Democratic Allied Army, under the command of Kong Congzhou (1906–1991, native of Shaanxi) and with Wang Feng (1910–1998, native of Shaanxi) as political commissar.

Telegram by Chairman Mao in Reply to Chiang Kaishek1 (August 16, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency, Yan’an, August 17) Chairman of the Nationalist Government, Chiang Kaishek, sent a telegram on the 14th to Mao Zedong, chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, inviting the latter to Chongqing to discuss state affairs, but without mentioning the scope or content of the discussion. On August 16, Chairman Mao sent a reply to Chiang, asking Mr. Chiang to state his views regarding Commander-in-Chief Zhu’s specific opinions on state affairs contained in his telegram to Chiang. Mao said he will then consider the issue of whether to meet Chiang. Chairman Mao’s telegram is as follows: For the perusal of Honorable Chairman Chiang in Chongqing: May I direct your attention to the following: I am apprised of your message.2 Commander-in-Chief Zhu De sent you a telegram today stating our humble opinions.3 I will consider the issue of meeting you after you state your views. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, p. 251. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of Xinhua News Agency. 2.  The message arrived on August 14. 3.  This message was sent to Chiang Kaishek on behalf of the commander-in-chief of the Fourteenth Army. News of Mao Zedong’s reply to Chiang Kaishek and to Commanderin-Chief Zhu De’s telegram to Chiang was publicized by Xinhua News Agency on the same day. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-15

39

Chiang Kaishek, the Enemy of the People, Has Sent Out a Signal for Civil War1 (August 16, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, August 16) A spokesman for Chiang Kaishek, commenting on the Communist Party’s alleged violation of Chairman Chiang Kaishek’s order to Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, said at a press conference in Chongqing on the afternoon of August 15, “The orders of the Chairman must be obeyed,” and “Those who violate the orders are enemies of the people, and they will be punished according to military discipline.” A Xinhua News Agency correspondent has stated: This is an open signal by Chiang Kaishek for an all-out civil war. On August 11, at the critical moment when the Japanese invaders were finally being wiped out, Chiang Kaishek issued an order of national betrayal forbidding the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all other armed forces of the people to fight the Japanese and the puppet troops. Of course, this order absolutely cannot and should not be accepted. Soon thereafter, through his spokesperson, Chiang Kaishek proclaimed that the armed forces of the Chinese people were “enemies of the people,” and that he was going to “punish them according to military discipline.” This shows that Chiang Kaishek has declared civil war against the Chinese people. Chiang Kaishek’s civil-war plot did not, of course, begin with his order of August 11; it was his consistent plan throughout the eight years of the War of Resistance. During those eight years, Chiang Kaishek launched three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns, in 1940, 1941, and 1943, each time attempting to develop the attack into a nationwide civil war; only the opposition of the Chinese people and of public figures in the Allied countries prevented the fruition of this design, much to Chiang’s regret. He was thus forced to postpone the nationwide civil war until the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, thus leading to the order of August 11 and the statement of August 15. For the purpose of unleashing a civil war, Chiang Kaishek had already invented many

Our source for the original version of this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 313–17, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 14–17, 1949. In Vol. 4 of Xuanji where this text appears in revised form, it is stated that Mao drafted this document on behalf of Xinhua News Agency. 1.  Chiang Kaishek, the Enemy of the People, Has Sent out the Signal for Civil War → On a Statement by Chiang Kaishek’s spokesman. 40

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-16

August 1945 41

terms, such as “alien party,” “traitor party,” “rebel army,” “traitor areas,” “bandit areas,” “defiance of military and government orders,” “feudal separatism,” “undermining the War of Resistance,” and “endangering the state”; and he had alleged that, since in the past there had been only “suppression of the Communists” in China and not a “civil war,” there would be no “civil war” in the future either, and so on and so forth. The slight difference this time was the addition of a new term, “enemy of the people.” But people will perceive that this is a foolish invention, for whenever the term “enemy of the people” is used in China, everyone knows to whom it refers. There is one person in China who betrayed the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yatsen [1866–1925, native of Guangdong] and the Great Revolution of 1927. He plunged the Chinese people into ten years of a civilwar bloodbath, thereby inviting aggression by Japanese imperialism. Then, scared out of his wits, he took to his heels and led a group of people in flight all the way from Heilongjiang to Guizhou Province. He became an onlooker, sitting around and waiting for victory with folded arms. Now that victory has come, he tells the people’s armies to “stay where they are, pending further orders,” and he tells the enemy and the traitors to “maintain order” so that he can swagger back to Nanjing. One need only mention these facts for the Chinese people to know that we are talking about Chiang Kaishek. After all he has done, can there be any doubt as to whether Chiang Kaishek is an enemy of the people? There is indeed some doubt: The people say “Yes”; the enemies of the people say “No”; that is the only dispute. Among the people it is becoming less and less a matter of doubt. The problem now is that this enemy of the people wants to start a civil war. What are the people to do? The Xinhua News Agency correspondent says: The policy of the Chinese Communist Party regarding Chiang Kaishek’s launch of a civil war is clear and consistent, that is, to oppose it. As far back as the time when Japanese imperialism began to invade China, the Chinese Communist Party demanded an end to civil war and unity against foreign aggression. In 1936–37, the Party made tremendous efforts, forced Chiang Kaishek to accept its proposal, and carried out the War of Resistance Against Japan. During the eight years of the War of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party never once relaxed its efforts to alert the people and to check the danger of a civil war. Since last year, the Chinese Communist Party has time and again called the people’s attention to the vast plot being hatched by Chiang Kaishek to unleash a nationwide civil war as soon as the War of Resistance ended. The Communist Party, like the rest of the Chinese people and all the people in the world concerned about peace in China, holds that a new civil war would be a calamity. But the Communist Party maintains that a civil war can still be prevented, and it must be prevented. To prevent a civil war, the Communist Party has advocated the formation of a coalition government. Now that Chiang Kaishek has rejected this proposal, a civil war may break out at any moment. But there is definitely a way of checking this move by Chiang Kaishek. The people’s democratic forces must strive to expand resolutely and rapidly; the people must liberate the major cities under enemy occupation and disarm the

42 Mao’s Road to Power

enemy and the puppet troops; and if an autocrat and traitor to the people dares to attack them, the people must act in self-defense and resolutely strike back to frustrate the designs of the instigator of a civil war. That is the way, the only way. The Xinhua News Agency correspondent calls on the whole nation and the whole world to repudiate the utterly hypocritical and shameless lie asserting that a civil war in China can be averted if Chiang Kaishek forbids the Chinese people from liberating the enemy-occupied big cities, forbids them from disarming the enemy and the puppet forces, and forbids them from establishing democracy, and if Chiang himself goes to these major cities to “inherit” from the enemy and the puppet regimes (not to smash them). This is a lie, the Xinhua News Agency correspondent points out, and this lie obviously runs counter to the national and democratic interests of the Chinese people, and it also flies in the face of all the facts in modern Chinese history. It must always be remembered that it was not because the big cities were in the hands of the Communist Party rather than in his own hands that Chiang Kaishek waged the ten-year civil war from 1927 to 1937; on the contrary, since 1927 none of the big cities have been in the hands of the Communist Party, and they all have been in the hands of Chiang or have been yielded by him to the Japanese and the traitors. This is the very reason why the civil war lasted for ten years on a nationwide scale and has continued on a local scale to this day. It must always be remembered that the ten-year civil war was stopped, and that the three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns and countless other provocations during the War of Resistance (up to and including Chiang Kaishek’s recent invasion of the southern part of the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] Border Region) were checked, not because Chiang Kaishek was strong, but rather because, relatively speaking, Chiang Kaishek’s strength was not great enough, whereas the Communist Party and the people were relatively strong. The ten-year civil war was stopped not by the appeals of public figures and entities throughout the country who desired peace and feared war (such as the former “League for the Abolition of Civil War” and similar bodies), but by the armed demands of the Chinese Communist Party and the armed demands of the Northeast Army under Zhang Xueliang [1901–2001, born in Anshan] and the Northwest Army under Yang Hucheng. The three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns and countless other provocations were not beaten back by unlimited concessions and submission by the Communist Party; they were beaten back by the Communist Party’s persistence in a just, stern attitude of self-defense—“We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.” If the Communist Party had been utterly powerless and spineless and had not fought to the finish for the interests of the nation and the people, how could the ten-year civil war have ended? How could the War of Resistance Against Japan have begun? And once it began, how could it have been resolutely carried out to achieve victory today? How else could Chiang Kaishek and his ilk be alive now, issuing orders and making statements from mountain retreats so far from the front lines? The Chinese Communist Party is firmly opposed to civil war. In the Crimea, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain declared themselves in favor of establishing

August 1945 43

“conditions of internal peace” and forming “interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.”2 That is exactly what the Chinese Communist Party has persistently advocated—the formation of a “coalition government.” Carrying out this proposal can prevent a civil war. But there is one precondition—strength. If all the people unite and increase their strength, a civil war can be averted.

2.  This refers to the Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference (also called the Yalta Agreement), February 4–11, 1945, signed on February 11, 1945.

Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] Sends a Telegram Demanding That Chiang Kaishek End the Civil War1 (August 16, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, August 17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Anti-Japanese Army of China’s Liberated Areas, General Zhu De, has sent a telegram to Chiang Kaishek regarding six points demanded by the country. The text is as follows: For the perusal of Honorable Chairman Chiang Kaishek in Chongqing: At a time when our common enemy, the Japanese government, has accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and announced its surrender but has not yet actually surrendered, I hereby present to you the following statement and demands on behalf of all the anti-Japanese armed forces and all 260 million people in China’s Liberated Areas and the Japanese-occupied areas. With the War of Resistance Against Japan coming to a victorious close, I call your attention to the fact that in the China war theater today, namely, in the vast occupied areas abandoned by you and seized by the enemy and the puppets we have, against your will and through our eight years of bitter fighting, recaptured nearly 1,000,000 square kilometers of territory; liberated more than 100,000,000 people; organized more than 1,000,000 regular troops and more than 2,200,000 people’s militia; established nineteen large Liberated Areas in the nineteen provinces of Liaoning, Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong; and encircled most of the cities and towns, vital communication lines, and sections of the seacoast seized by the enemy and the puppets since the July 7th

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 55–59, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 14–17, 1945. Nianpu, Vol. 3, p. 6, confirms that Mao drafted this telegram. As in the case of the telegram of August 13, the variants as compared to Xuanji are not extensive or important, but we have noted one or two of the more significant variants. 1.  Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] Sends a Telegram Demanding that Chiang Kaishek End the Civil War → Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Army Group to Chiang Kaishek. Like the telegram of August 13, this telegram was drafted on behalf of Zhu De by Mao Zedong. 44

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-17

August 1945 45

Incident of 1937,2 except for a few areas. In addition, in China’s Japanese-occupied areas (with a population of 160 million) we have organized extensive underground forces to strike at the enemy and the puppets. In the fighting, we continue to resist and encircle 69 percent of the Japanese troops invading China (not counting those in the Northeast) and 95 percent of the puppet troops. Your government and armed forces, in contrast, have all along followed a policy of looking on with folded arms, sitting around and waiting for victory, conserving your forces and preparing for a civil war, and you have not only refused recognition and supplies to our Liberated Areas and armies, but you have encircled and attacked us with a huge force of 940,000 men. Although all the troops and civilians in China’s Liberated Areas have suffered enough from being attacked by the enemy and the puppet forces on the one side and by your troops on the other, we have never in the least weakened in our determination to persevere in unity and democracy in the War of Resistance. The people of China’s Liberated Areas and the Chinese Communist Party have many times proposed to you and your government that a conference of all parties be convened and that a nationwide democratic coalition government be formed in order to end the internal strife, mobilize and unite the people’s anti-Japanese forces throughout China, lead the War of Resistance to victory, and ensure peace after the war. But our proposals have invariably been rejected by you and your government. We are extremely dissatisfied with all of this. The enemy nation will soon sign its surrender, but you and your government have continued to ignore our opinions, issuing a most outrageous order to me on August 11, and ordering your troops to press against the Liberated Areas on a massive scale under the pretext of disarming the enemy; the danger of a civil war is therefore more serious than ever, thus compelling us to make the following demands on you and your government: 1. I demand that you consult with us so that we may reach common views before you, your government, and your Supreme Command accept the surrender of the Japanese and the puppets and conclude any post-surrender agreements or treaties. You and your government have aroused the dissatisfaction of the people and cannot represent the broad masses or any of the people’s antiJapanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas. We reserve our right to speak out if the agreements or treaties include, without our prior consent, anything that concerns the people’s anti-Japanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas and the Japanese-occupied areas. 2. All of the people’s anti-Japanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas have the right, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and the measures laid down by the Allies for accepting the enemy’s surrender, to accept the surrender of the Japanese and the puppet troops 2.  That is, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, generally considered the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

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3.

4. 5.

6.

encircled by us, to take over their arms and materiel, and to assume responsibility for carrying out all stipulations laid down by the Allies after Japan’s surrender has been accepted. On August 10, I ordered the armed forces of China’s Liberated Areas to make an all-out effort to attack the enemy troops and to be prepared to accept their surrender. On August 15, I ordered the enemy commander-in-chief, Yasuji Okamura, to surrender with his troops; this order, however, applied only to the sphere of operations of the armed forces in the Liberated Areas, and not to any other area. I consider my orders very reasonable and very much in the common interest of China and the Allies. The broad masses and all the anti-Japanese armed forces in China’s Liberated Areas and the Japanese-occupied areas have the right to send representatives to participate in the Allies’ acceptance of the enemy surrender and in the work of dealing with the enemy nation after its surrender. China’s Liberated Areas and all the anti-Japanese armed forces have the right to select their own delegation to participate in the future peace conference and any meetings of the United Nations concerning Japan. I ask you to prevent a civil war. The way to do this is for the armed forces of the Liberated Areas to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppet troops that they have encircled, while your armed forces accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppet troops that you have encircled. Not only is this an established practice in all wars, it is particularly imperative in order to avert a civil war. If you act otherwise, it will lead to adverse consequences. I am now giving you a serious warning about this matter and I ask that you not treat this warning casually. I ask that you immediately abolish the one-party dictatorship, call a conference of all parties to set up a democratic coalition government, dismiss corrupt officials and all reactionaries from their posts, punish traitors, abolish the secret services, recognize the legal status of the various parties (the Chinese Communist Party and all democratic parties that up to now you and your government have regarded as illegal), annul all reactionary laws and decrees that suppress the liberties of the people, recognize the popularly elected government and the anti-Japanese armed forces of China’s Liberated Areas, withdraw your troops encircling the Liberated Areas, release the political prisoners, and carry out economic and other democratic reforms.

Apart from this, I sent you a telegram on August 13 in reply to your order to me of August 11, and presumably you have received it. I now declare again that your order was completely wrong. On August 11, you ordered my troops to “stay where they are, pending further orders” and no longer to attack the enemy. However, not only was it true on August 11 but it is equally true even today (August 16)3 that the Japanese government has surrendered only in words and not

3.  August 16 → August 17

August 1945 47

in deeds; no instrument of surrender has been signed and no actual surrender has taken place. My view is completely in accord with that of the Allies, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. On August 11, the very day you issued your order to me, the British Army Command on the Burma front announced that the war with Japan was still in progress. [Chester W.] Nimitz [1895–1966], the commander of the U.S. forces, declared that not only did a state of war continue but a war with all its devastating consequences must be carried on. The Far Eastern Command of the Red Army of the Soviet Union announced, “The enemy must be ruthlessly smashed.” On August 15, Colonel-General [Aleksei] Antonov,4 chiefof-the-General Staff of the Red Army, made the following statement: The message concerning Japan’s surrender issued by the Japanese Emperor on August 14 is only a general declaration concerning unconditional surrender. An order to the armed forces to cease hostilities has not yet been issued and the Japanese troops are continuing their resistance. Hence there is still no actual surrender by the armed forces of Japan. The surrender of the armed forces of Japan can be considered to have taken place only from the moment the Japanese Emperor orders that his armed forces discontinue hostilities and lay down their arms and when this order is carried out in practice. In view of the above, the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East will continue their offensive operations against Japan. It can be seen that you alone, of all the high commanders of the Allied forces, have given an absolutely erroneous order. I consider that your error stems from self-interest and is of an extremely serious nature; that is to say, your order serves the interests of the enemy. Therefore, taking my stand regarding the common interests of China and the Allies, I shall firmly and completely oppose your order as long as you do not openly admit your error and countermand this erroneous order. At present, I am still ordering the armed units under my command to carry out determined attacks on the enemy in coordination with the armed forces of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union5 until the enemy actually ends hostilities and surrenders its arms and all the territory of the motherland has been fully recovered. I declare to you that as a patriotic soldier, I cannot act otherwise. With regard to the above, I request your early reply. Zhu De

4.  ColonelGeneral Aleksei Antonov (1896–1962) was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Soviet army in February 1945. 5.  Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union → The Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain

Dispatch Nine Regiments to the Three Eastern Provinces1 (August 20, 1945) To the Shandong Sub-bureau, Pingyuan Sub-bureau, Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu) Sub-bureau, and for the information of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (JinCha-Ji) Sub-bureau: The Soviet Red Army currently occupies the Northeast, and the Guomindang is attempting to take the Northeast. On our side, apart from three large regiments under Li Yunchang,2 that are deep in Liaoning and the eastern Hebei and HebeiChahar areas, both of which have forces deep in Rehe,3 the Central Committee has decided to move two regiments from Shandong (including the detachment commanded by Wan Yi4), one from Hebei-Shandong-Henan, and one from central Henan. In all, four regiments will be put under Wan Yi’s command and will leave for the Three Eastern Provinces.5 The two Shandong regiments should prepare to complete preparations within ten days and set off immediately through Hebei to meet up with the two regiments from Hebei-Shandong-Henan and central Hebei, and then to advance to the Rehe border to await orders. Each regiment must have no fewer than 1,500 personnel. The task of advancing toward the Three Eastern Provinces must be explicitly announced (to take advantage of the period when the Soviet army is occupying the Northeast and the Guomindang is attempting to take the Northeast). We must deploy the necessary local cadres. It is hoped that the northeastern cadres concentrated in the Three Areas will join with Wan Yi in going [to the Northeast]. We must have excellent discipline. Please inform us of the situation upon deployment and setting off. Furthermore, one regiment will be deployed from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and three regiments will be deployed from the Shanxi-Suiyuan [Jin-Sui] Military Region, and the Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 45–46, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  Li Yunchang (1908–2008, native of Hebei) was commander and political commissar of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Eighth Route Army. 3.  Rehe Province encompassed what is now northeastern Hebei, southwestern Liao­ ning, and the southeastern portion of Inner Mongolia until it was dissolved in 1955. 4.  Wan Yi (1907–1997, native of Liaoning) was deputy commander of the Binhai Military Region and captain of the Binhai Detachment of the Eighth Route Army. 5.  Also known as the Three Northeastern Provinces, referring to Manchuria. 48

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-18

August 1945 49

central government will dispatch one regiment of cadres, for a total of five regiments that will advance toward the Three Eastern Provinces under the leadership of Lü Zhengcao and Lin Feng.6 Inform Wan Yi of the above, but do not publish this in the newspapers. The Central Military Commission

6.  Lü Zhengcao (1905–2009, native of Liaoning) was commander of the Eighth Route Army in the Jin-Sui Military Region. Lin Feng (1906–1977, native of Heilongjiang) was political commissar.

Reply to a Telegram from Chiang Kaishek1 (August 22, 1945) Express, Chongqing For the attention of Honorable Mr. Chiang: I have received your brief message. Your sincerity is greatly appreciated. I, your humble servant, am very willing to meet with you to discuss the great task of peacefully establishing the country. As soon as a plane arrives, Comrade Enlai will immediately depart for Chongqing to pay respects to your office. I, your younger brother, am also preparing to set out for Chongqing. I will soon meet with you to receive your instructions. I respectfully send you this reply. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 61, where it is reproduced from Chongqing tanpan jishi (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1983). 50

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-19

The New Situation and New Tasks Following Victory in the Anti-Japanese War1 (August 23, 1945) I. The situation now is that China has already completed the stage of war against Japan and has entered the stage of peaceful reconstruction. The whole world, including Europe and the East, has entered the stage of peaceful reconstruction. It is certain that a third world war will not erupt at present. We could have entered the stage of peaceful reconstruction under two possible situations, one in which we had taken some major cities, and the other in which we had not. At present, we have not. We strove to enter certain major cities, such as Beiping, Tianjin, and Taiyuan, before entering the stage of peace, but we did not succeed. There are two reasons. The first is that the Soviet Union, for the sake of international peace and under the restraints of the Sino-Soviet Treaty,2 was not able to help us and could not properly have done so. Armed with rifles, we would have had difficulty capturing the large Japanese-occupied cities without foreign aid. The Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed after the Japanese announced their surrender, and the content has not yet been published, but in general [it stipulates] that the area into which the Soviet army can move troops is limited to the Three Northeastern Provinces. Entry into Rehe and Chahar is temporary.3 If the Soviet Union had openly helped us, the United States would have had to openly help Chiang, largescale war would probably have erupted, and peace would be unattainable. The second reason is that Chiang Kaishek, using his legal status, requires that the invading Japanese army surrender only to the Guomindang army. We want partial

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 4–12, where it is reproduced from a photocopy of the stenographic record of Mao’s talk. 1.  This speech and the concluding remarks were given by Mao Zedong at a large meeting held by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. 2.  The “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance” was signed in Moscow by the Nationalist government and the Soviet Union on August 14, 1945. 3.  Chahar Province was located in what is now northwestern Hebei Province, extending into the Xilin Gol Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. In 1949 it became part of Hebei and northern Shanxi, but it was fully disbanded in 1952. Rehe Province was located in today’s northeastern Hebei Province, southwestern Liaoning Province, and southeastern Inner Mongolia before it was dissolved in 1955. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-20

51

52 Mao’s Road to Power

rights to receive the surrendering troops, but we cannot obtain them because we do not have legal status. Although we still wish to raise this issue of surrender rights with the Guomindang, in reality it is hopeless. Because of these two points, we were unable to obtain the fruits of victory for which we have worked with all our might. We can only recognize this fact, which is not for want of trying. We can only enter the stage of peace without having taken any major cities. This is the first point. Second, concerning the status of Chiang Kaishek. His advantage is in his legal status and in the major cities. His disadvantages are that he is confronted by the strong and powerful Liberated Areas, he faces internal contradictions, and he cannot satisfy the people’s livelihood or demands for democracy. Third, concerning our status. Our advantage is that our credit for resisting Japan is something Chiang Kaishek cannot erase, and our Party’s stature in the hearts and minds of the entire nation is higher at present than it ever was at the time of the revolution or the civil war; the existence of the vast Liberated Areas is something Chiang Kaishek is in no position to constrain; our Party’s guiding principle is to struggle for democracy and the people’s livelihood; we can solve problems that Chiang Kaishek cannot solve. Our disadvantages are that we have not taken any major cities, we do not have a mechanized army, and we do not have a legal status. Fourth, one reason why we have not been able to take any major cities and do not have a mechanized army is that we have not received foreign aid; another factor is that our work in the cities and our work in the armies (directed toward the collaborationist armies and the Guomindang army) has not been done well. Of course, even if this work had been done well and we had taken Beiping and Tianjin, we still might not have been able to hold them. But it is a fact that our work has not been done well, so we have not been able to block the Guomindang’s actions in taking the major cities. Fifth, can peace be achieved or not? Can civil war be avoided or not? Our slogan now is peace, democracy, and unity; in the past, the slogan was War of Resistance, unity, and progress. Peace can be achieved because the Chinese people need peace, and the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain want peace [and] do not approve of China fighting a civil war. In the past, China was confronted with a formidable enemy, and now the wounds and scars can be seen everywhere. There have been serious losses in the Liberated Areas at the front; the people need peace and our Party needs peace. Also, the Guomindang is temporarily unable to muster the resolve to fight a civil war because it has not played its cards right and its military strength is dispersed. Hu Zongnan4 now has only three armies encircling us (three other armies have gone to Shanxi, three armies are in Henan, and we don’t know the whereabouts of one army); we extended a fist, so

4.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.

August 1945 53

there was nothing he could do. At the same time, the Guomindang army has many internal contradictions. This time it captured a million guns from the invading Japanese armies, probably giving rise to new contradictions. The Guomindang Central Army and the miscellaneous warlord armies total 2 million strong. To this must be added 800,000 captured puppet troops, making a total of 2.8 million. No matter what, the Guomindang Central Army is weaker than the Japanese armies plus the collaborationist armies, and our army can still expand. The Guomindang has these troubles, coupled with the existence of the Liberated Areas, the fact that the Chinese Communist Party will not be so easily obliterated, and the fact that China’s people and the rest of the world oppose the Guomindang engaging in a civil war. Because of all of this, a civil war can and must be avoided. The three great slogans of peace, democracy, and unity that our Party has raised have a realistic basis and they can garner great sympathy nationally and internationally. Sixth, Chiang Kaishek’s overall policy of exterminating the Communist Party has not and will not change. If he should possibly adopt a short-term peaceful stance, it is because of the above conditions. He still has to heal his wounds and increase his strength in order to exterminate us in the future. We should take advantage of this temporary time of peace. Seventh, the conditions we have demanded, that is the fourteen articles of the “Present Urgent Demands,”5 should be passed if everyone agrees, and then they should be revised by the Secretariat. Of the fourteen articles, all but the third, fourth, and fifth are old demands emphasizing issues concerning democracy and the people’s livelihood. Right now, the most realistic is the first article, for which

5.  The Fourteen Articles of the “Present Urgent Demands” were written by Zhou Enlai (1898–1976, born in Huai’an Jiangsu) on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and prepared and edited for presentation to the Guomindang by Mao Zedong. The articles were: (1) To recognize the government selected by the people and the anti-Japanese army in the Liberated Areas. (2) To withdraw the attacking and besieging Guomindang armies in the Liberated Areas in order to avoid harming the people of the nation and to avoid disturbing international peace with a civil war. (3) To delimit the areas where the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Anti-Japanese Column will accept a Japanese surrender. (4) To permit the anti-Japanese army and representatives from the Liberated Areas of China to participate in all important matters dealing with the Japanese surrender. (5) To permit a representative chosen by the Liberated Areas of China to participate in future peace conferences and United Nations conferences dealing with the Japanese. (6) To severely punish Chinese traitors and to disband the puppet armies. (7) To release the patriotic political prisoners. (8) To extend relief to suffering comrades. (9) To acknowledge the legality of each political party. (10) To disband espionage agencies. (11) To eliminate all laws obstructing the people’s freedom and censorship regulations concerning publications. (12) To organize local democratic coalition governments in all recovered areas. (13) To reorganize the armed forces fairly and reasonably. (14) To immediately convene a political conference of all parties and unaligned representatives to discuss urgent measures following the War of Resistance, formulate a program for a democratic coalition government, and prepare for a National People’s Congress elected by free and universal suffrage.

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both sides fought hard, that is, to recognize the Liberated Areas and the Liberation army. The third, fourth, and fifth articles demanding participation in dealing with all important work after the surrender of Japan and participation in the surrender of the Japanese troops had to be brought up, but apart from hope to participate in the peace conference and the United Nations conference, as in San Francisco, all the rest are hopeless. The debate concerning the first article will undoubtedly be extremely heated. Both sides will probably alternate between fighting and stopping, to the point that it will probably be necessary to hit Chiang Kaishek hard in order to force him to compromise since he will never be prepared to satisfy our demands. In the past, after years of debate, he only recognized our formation of twelve divisions in order to capture the major cities first and then to bargain with us afterwards. Now that the Japanese have gone and the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party are face to face, these problems cannot drag on any longer. Eighth, we had originally decided to put a hold on criticizing the Guomindang, but because Chiang Kaishek ordered us to be on garrison duty and await orders after Japan announced its surrender, we had no alternative but to criticize him once again. From now on, we should gradually ease up a bit. Thereafter, our policy will still be: “If Chiang opposes us, we’ll also oppose him; if Chiang stops, we’ll also stop,” in order to reach unity through struggle and to work toward [a position] that is reasonable, advantageous, and restrained. It is impossible to imagine that, under Chiang Kaishek’s extreme pressure, we will achieve our status without undergoing struggle. Ninth, the offensive of the last two weeks [against the Japanese] was necessary. It concentrated our armies and inspired popular enthusiasm, and the number of county towns under our control reached 134. From now on, we must remain on the offensive for a time, seize even more small and medium-sized cities, mobilize the masses, and train and consolidate our troops. The Liberated Areas have expanded in terms of both population and troops; how are we to resolve our financial difficulties and the problems of food and clothing? In the future, we must reduce staff and increase production. This coming winter we must train and consolidate our armies and we must make clear to Chiang Kaishek and the United States that fighting a civil war is not an advantageous posture for us to adopt so as to achieve a more-favorable outcome more favorable in the negotiations. We must not relax our attitude, for if we relax, our negotiations will not succeed. Tenth, the two important elements of peacetime work—city work and army work—are extremely important. In the past, we have not done them well; from now on, we must exert all our effort to do this work conscientiously. If we do not master these two tasks, the ultimate liberation of the Chinese people will not be possible. Eleventh, at the time of the Seventh Party Congress, we spoke of the long-term twists and turns and we prepared for the emergence of the greatest difficulties; now we must undertake them. At present, it is possible that China will establish a government on a nationwide scale led by the bourgeois class but including the

August 1945 55

participation of the proletariat class. If China establishes a coalition government, there are several forms it might take. One of these forms is the present dictatorship with a certain amount of democracy, which could last for quite a long time. Regarding this form of coalition government, we still want to participate in it, and our participation would be to brainwash Chiang Kaishek, not to decapitate him. By going along this circuitous route, the Party will become even more mature in all aspects, the Chinese people will become more aware, and thereafter we will be able to build a New Democratic China. China, with its 450 million people, is more equivalent to a Europe; many countries in Europe have not yet been victorious or are not completely led by Communist parties. We must prepare to make some compromises. We must prepare to tackle the greatest difficulties, such as foreign countries offering no assistance, the army having to be reduced because of negotiations, internal discord, and so forth. Right now, the situation in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang is extremely dangerous. But one decisive point is our internal unity; as long as we are united, the enemy cannot prevail over us. Twelfth, we should prepare to publish a Central Committee declaration assuming a new posture of peace, democracy, and unity. Zhou Enlai should immediately go to Chongqing to take part in the negotiations and return after two days of negotiations, and I will go after receiving Hurley.6 This cannot be put off; we should go. Furthermore, I reckon there will not be any great danger. Thirteenth, all Liberated Areas should make long-term strategies. This most recent concentration of military forces was good, but it is not appropriate in excessively centralized places. We should adjust according to the food, clothing, and armament conditions. The Liberated Areas may need to undergo further administrative streamlining. In fighting battles we absolutely want the advantage; we should not fight those over whom we are not sure of being victorious. As long as we hold the army in our hands, there will be a way. We must not increase the burden on the people; this winter, we will undertake a large-scale reduction in rents, and next spring we will undertake production. As long as we stand firm and keep clear heads, we need not fear any rain or storm.

II. Everyone’s opinions are very good. Today’s overall policy is that which was established during the Seventh Party Congress. The guiding principle of the Seventh Party Congress is one of opposing civil war. At that time, there existed a threat of civil war, but now that the Guomindang has a great many difficulties, there will not be a large civil war at least this year, and peace will be possible. Under these circumstances, should we attack or should we retreat? Of course, in the main we should still attack; this is an attack in the midst of peace. But there can be a partial

6.  Patrick Hurley was the U.S. ambassador to China at that time.

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retreat as well. Chiang Kaishek will not completely recognize one hundred million people and ten million troops in the Liberated Areas. We should prepare to make some concessions and compromises on numbers in order to obtain legal status, exchanging localized concessions for nationwide legal status and conserving our energy to build up our strength as we greet the new era. We must be prepared for these kinds of compromises. On the other hand, we must still be prepared to take the offensive in our open work7 and to take advantage of a parliamentary forum to launch attacks; we must learn how to carry out a lawful struggle. This is a new environment for us, different from the time of the Northern Expedition, the civil war, or the War of Resistance Against Japan because this is a time of peace. We absolutely must use this kind of time to educate all of China’s people and to strengthen ourselves. Only after studying how to do many different tasks will we have the ability to undertake work at the national and major city level. The problem of opportunism does not exist. The fact that the Soviet Red Army has not crossed the pass8 is not our subjective problem. If the Japanese army does not turn over its guns to us, we have already fought for them in the past. And as for whether enlarging our territories is left-opportunism, it is not. Some areas we occupied and then withdrew from; if we had known what we know today, perhaps we would not have occupied them in the first place. This way of thinking is incorrect; in the areas from which we retreated, the masses still received an education. When setting targets, we want to set our sights a bit higher, but when it comes to actual living and working, we want to set our sights a bit lower. After having undergone three periods of war, a time of peace has arrived, and now we must prepare how to undertake work in the cities. What about work in the Northeast? It has been decided to send cadres there, but at this point we have not decided whether to send troops. It depends on the situation; there is a possibility that we will not be able to send troops. If the negotiations are unsuccessful and the Guomindang attacks us, should we fight? We should fight, but we must fight victoriously. Should we convene a Liberated Area People’s Representative Conference? If peace is realized, then we should convene a conference of peace, democracy, and unity. Am I going to Chongqing? Today’s conference has decided that I will go rather than not go. However, the opportune time for me to go will be decided by the Politburo and the Secretariat. Consequently, our reply telegram to Hurley 7.  The Chinese expression is hefa gongzuo, literally “lawful work,” i.e., work permitted by law, but the term commonly employed by Communist parties has long been “open work.” The most authoritative discussion of this topic by a leading figure in the Chinese Communist Party, and perhaps by a member of any Communist party, is “On Open and Secret Work,” in Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch’i (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), Vol. 1, pp. 293–302, by Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969, native of Hunan). 8.  I.e., Shanhaiguan (Shanhai Pass) separating the Three Northeastern Provinces from China proper.

August 1945 57

states that Zhou Enlai will be sent first. If Hurley and Shao Lizi9 propose it, I will go with them. This way is a bit better. It has been decided that Liu Shaoqi will occupy my post when I go to Chongqing and that Chen Yun and Peng Zhen10 will act as alternate members of the Secretariat so that the Secretariat will still have five members to conduct meetings after Zhou Enlai and I leave. We will not raise the question of how to divide up the territory because we want recognition of all of our Liberated Areas, but Chiang Kaishek will want to raise this issue. Comrade Bo Gu11 proposed condensing the Fourteen Articles into six articles. This is a good idea, but it is up to the Secretariat to consider and decide upon it.

9.  Shao Lizi (1882–1967, born in Shaoxing, Zhejiang) was a negotiator for the Guomindang. 10.  Chen Yun (1905–1995, native of Jiangsu) and Peng Zhen (1902–1992, native of Shanxi) became members of the Politburo during the First Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in 1946. 11.  Bo Gu (aka Qing Bangxian) (1907–1946, native of Jiangsu) was a member of the Central Committee.

Telegram in Reply to Chiang Kaishek1 (August 24, 1945) Express, Chongqing For the attention of the Honorable Mr. Chiang: I have received your brief message. Your sincerity is greatly appreciated. I, your humble servant, am very willing to meet with you to discuss the great task of peacefully establishing the country. As soon as the plane arrives, Comrade Enlai will immediately depart for Chongqing to pay respects to your office. I, your younger brother, am also preparing to set out for Chongqing. I will soon meet with you to receive your instructions. I respectfully send you this reply. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 63, where it is reproduced from Chongqing tanpan jishi (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1983). 58

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-21

Current Party Policy and Work Agenda for the New Fourth Army (August 24, 1945) To Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], and Lai [Chuanzhu],1 and to be forwarded to Su [Yu] and Ye [Fei]2: All telegrams have been received. 1. The current political situation has changed. The stage of war with Japan is over and the stage of peaceful reconstruction has begun. 2. Our Party’s slogan is: Peace, democracy, unity. 3. In the large cities, work for peace, democracy, and unity; improve the status of our Party and do not adopt a policy of military occupation. 4. Strive to occupy small cities and the countryside. 5. At present, the Central Committee is negotiating with Chongqing to avoid a civil war and to advance our country’s peaceful reconstruction. 6. Chiang Kaishek is beset by difficulties; in addition, he is facing pressures from both within the country and without, so he may agree to a peaceful reconstruction of the country. 7. To wipe out this stubborn enemy resolutely, thoroughly, neatly, and completely when he attacks, the main forces of our troops along the Yangzi River must be assembled for on-site training and consolidation and they must recover and conserve their strength. (Do not strike lightly, strike to win. Destroy one portion of the enemy army at a time; crush it piece by piece.) Win a few major victories and our reputation will grow in the region. This

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 13–14, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. 1.  Rao Shushi (1903–1975, born in Linchuan, Fuzhou) was deputy secretary of the Central China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and political commissar of the New Fourth Army. Zhang Yunyi (1892–1974, native of Hainan) was deputy commander of the New Fourth Army. Lai Chuanzhu (1910–1966, born in Ganxia District of Ganzhou) was chief-of-staff of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Military Region of the New Fourth Army. 2.  Su Yu was Party secretary of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Region, and commander and political commissar of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Military Region of the New Fourth Army. Ye Fei (1914–1999, born in the Philippines) was deputy commander of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-22

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will be extremely helpful in the negotiations with the Guomindang and the enemy will not take you lightly. 8. Use long-term planning for everything and rely on the support of the people. 9. Try to purchase ammunition from the enemy and the puppet regime, more and faster is better. At the same time, maintain a long-term strategy of collecting abandoned military equipment and materiel from the areas vacated by the enemy and the puppet regime. Mao Zedong

Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation (August 25, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency, Yan’an. Telegram of the 26th. On the 25th of this month, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published a declaration on the current situation. The following is the complete text of the declaration.): Compatriots throughout China! With the surrender of Japan, the sacred War of Resistance Against Japan waged perseveringly by our entire nation during the past eight years has come to a triumphant end! The war of the entire world against fascism has also been victorious. Across China and throughout the entire world, a brand-new era, an era of peaceful reconstruction, has finally arrived! The Communist Party believes that in this new historical period, the most important tasks that our entire nation faces are to consolidate domestic unity, guarantee domestic peace, realize democracy, and improve the people’s livelihood to provide a foundation for bringing about the unification of the whole country and building an independent, free, and prosperous new China based on peace, democracy, and unity. We shall also cooperate with Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and all the Allies to consolidate a lasting world peace. Compatriots throughout China! Victory in the Anti-Japanese War has eliminated fascist tyranny, enslavement, and invasion and has opened prospects for the peaceful development of mankind. This is the result of the combined efforts of the four major Allies—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China; this is the result of the concerted efforts by all the soldiers and civilians in our country. We are convinced that our compatriots throughout the country can certainly transfer the brave and unwavering spirit manifested in the Anti-Japanese War to the great cause of building the country. The hundred million people in the Liberated Areas of China have offered their utmost effort and sacrifice in the war. 1

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 321–23, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 27, 1945. Substantial extracts from this declaration are included in Nianpu, Vol. 3, pp. 13–14, but they are not explicitly attributed to Mao. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-23

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This has been generally recognized both domestically and internationally. In the coming period of peaceful reconstruction, to fulfill your great duty, you should continue to serve as models in the nation's democratic reconstruction and as the main force of peace and unity. The path of struggling for an independent, free, and strong new China is not, however, without obstacles, difficulties, and obstacles. The Japanese imperialist invaders have not yet enacted the Potsdam Declaration. They have not yet abandoned their intention to revitalize the militarism that drove them to invade. They are still wantonly carrying out their plot to sow discord and to enslave and split China. Their running dogs in China—those Chinese Quislings—are right now executing their Japanese masters’ instructions. They put on camouflage to continue to instigate a civil war, sabotage unity, and obstruct democracy. These plots of theirs have not been smashed, nor have their crimes been punished. On the contrary, they have been encouraged and they continue to run amuck. Therefore, the various dangerous activities conducted by the Chinese Quislings and the other reactionary elements are greatly threatening China’s peace, democracy, and unity. The Chinese people must seriously guard against and smash the enemy’s conspiracies. The Communist Party believes that at present we must urge the National Government to immediately carry out several emergency measures to lay a foundation for peaceful reconstruction in the future. These emergency measures include: 1) Recognizing both the elected governments and the anti-Japanese armies in China’s Liberated Areas; withdrawing the army encircling and attacking these Liberated Areas to bring about immediate peace and to avoid a civil war. 2) To manifest justice and equity, designating the areas in which the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Anti-Japanese Column will accept the Japanese army’s surrender and further authorizing them to participate in all matters relating to the handling of Japan. 3) Severely punishing the Chinese traitors and dissolving the puppet army. 4) Fairly and reasonably reorganizing the army, undertaking demobilization, providing relief for victimized countrymen, and decreasing taxation to alleviate the people’s hardships. 5) Recognizing the legal status of the various political parties and factions, abolishing all laws and decrees that hamper the people’s freedom of assembly, association, speech, and publication, dismantling the secret police apparatus and releasing the patriotic political prisoners. 6) Immediately calling a meeting of representatives from all political parties and unaligned personages to discuss important postwar issues, drafting a democratic administrative program, ending the period of political tutelage, establishing a democratic coalition government for the entire country, and preparing for a national assembly through free and unfettered general elections.

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The Chinese Communist Party declares that we are willing to seek common ground for agreement with the Guomindang and other democratic parties to find a speedy resolution to all urgent pending problems and to work for long-term unity in the realization of Mr. Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles. Fellow countrymen! The War of Resistance has been victorious! A new era of peaceful reconstruction has begun! We must hold firmly to peace, democracy, and unity, and strive for an independent, free, rich, and powerful new China! The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Make Every Effort to Capture Many Medium-Sized and Small Cities (August 25, 1945) To the Plains Sub-bureau:1 The point of our telegram2 of the 24th was that if you can wipe out the enemy and the puppets in the medium-sized and the small cities, do so. If you cannot wipe them out, let them concentrate, if possible, in the major cities, so we can occupy the many small and medium-sized cities to deal with the approaching new situation. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 47, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The Central Military Commission’s August 24 telegram to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Region, the Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu) Region, the Plains (Pingyuan) Region, and the Shandong Region stated that the enemy had accepted the restrictions under the conditions of surrender and was not permitted to surrender to the Communist forces; as a result, the Central Military Commission had determined that for the time being cities and major transportation routes in northern China would be difficult to seize and occupy. The railways were to be sabotaged to besiege the major cities and seize the small cities and to increase the difficulties for the Guomindang to seize the fruits of victory. 64

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-24

Address at the Politburo Meeting before Attending the Chongqing Talks (August 26, 1945) Based on reactions from various places, some comrades in the Party are experiencing some anxiety because we cannot enter the major cities, He Yingqin1 has not allocated us a place to receive the surrender and disarmament [of the Japanese troops], and the Soviet Red Army will not cross into the region south of the Northeastern Provinces. Actually, in the recent past we have had some major victories. There are no longer any traces of Chiang Kaishek in Chahar and Rehe provinces; most of the area between the Yangzi and the Huai rivers, Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan provinces could all be within our grasp. The indignation of our comrades is understandable, but they should make some careful calculations. After this telegram of ours2 is sent out, it can resolve this problem. The question of my going to Chongqing was discussed last night by seven Politburo comrades along with Comrade [Wang] Ruofei,3 and they decided I should respond to Wedemeyer’s telegram4 and go to Chongqing. In this way, we can completely gain the initiative. In going to Chongqing I must fully consider the possibility that Chiang Kaishek may press me under duress to come to terms,

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 15–17, where it is reprinted from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  He Yingqin was chief of the General Staff of the Guomindang army, commander-inchief of its General Headquarters, and the highest commanding official within the Chinese war zone to accept Japan’s surrender. 2.  The reference is to the Central Committee circular of the same date, “The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender,” in this volume. 3.  Wang Ruofei (1896–1946, native of Guizhou) was secretary of the Chongqing Work Committee responsible for the daily work of the southern bureaus. He accompanied Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Chongqing for the negotiations on August 28, 1945. 4.  This is in reference to Mao Zedong’s August 25 telegram responding to General Albert Wedemeyer (1896–1989, born in Omaha, Nebraska), commander of the U.S. Army in the Chinese war zone. The telegram said, “I have received three invitation telegrams from Committee Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], and Ambassador [Patrick] Hurley has twice expressed his desire to come to Yan’an. This sincerity has truly moved me. Owing to this, I welcome Ambassador Hurley to come to Yan’an to meet us and then to fly with General Zhou Enlai and me to Chongqing to respond to Committee Chairman Chiang’s treaty and to quickly discuss these matters of great importance.” DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-25

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but it is still for me to sign the deal. One naturally must make certain concessions when negotiating, and only under conditions that will not hurt the fundamental rights and interests of both sides can an agreement be reached. The first area where we are prepared to make concessions is the base area from Guangdong to Henan, the second is the base area south of the Yangzi, and the third is the base area north of the Yangzi. This all depends on the circumstances of the discussions, and concessions can be considered under favorable conditions.5 We must have the advantage from the Longhai railway northward to Outer Mongolia. We also need to have the upper hand in the Northeast, where the high-ranking administrative officials belong to the Guomindang, and if we send cadres there, we can certainly make an issue of it. If these conditions are still not met, we will not accept the agreement under duress, and I am prepared to go to jail. In the history of our Party, except for the He Ming Incident,6 we have never casually surrendered our guns, so we certainly must not be frightened. If I am put under house arrest, it is nothing to be afraid of. I would actually like to get some things done there. Right now, the Soviet Red Army will not cross the [Shanhai] Pass, and the U.S. Army will not land [on our shores]. Ostensibly, China will solve its own problems, but in reality, three countries7 are involved in the situation, three countries that are not willing to let China fight a civil war, and this international pressure is not favorable to Chiang Kaishek’s autocratic rule. The Sino-Soviet Treaty8 benefits the Chinese people, and the occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces by the Soviet Red Army has a major influence. So I can and must go to Chongqing. I can send a cable to Chiang Kaishek saying that I am going to go, and the newspaper can publish the news tomorrow.9 The core of the Party’s leadership is still in Yan’an, and there will not be any disruptions within the Party. In the future we can have even more comrades go outside. As long as there is a center on the inside, the center on the outside can be protected. We will not move from Yan’an without good reason. In the future, when the National Assembly meets, whether or not the Communist Party members will vote for Chiang Kaishek as president will depend

5.  The territories that the Central Committee felt could be conceded were the eight anti-Japanese base areas of Guangdong, Zhejiang, southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, central Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and Henan (not including northern Henan). 6.  During the peace talks in July 1937, the 1,000-strong Minnan Red Army Independent Third Regiment of Workers and Farmers commanded by He Ming (1903–1939, born in Wanning, Guangdong), acting secretary for the Chinese Communist Party’s special committee on the Fujian-Guangdong border, was surrounded and annihilated by Guomindang troops. 7.  The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. 8.  This is a reference to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed by the Guomindang government and the Soviet Union in Moscow on August 14, 1945. 9.  On August 27, 1945, Liberation Daily announced that “Chairman Mao has decided to proceed to Chongqing to discuss the great plan for establishing a unified nation.”

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on the situation. Chiang Kaishek is an enemy of the Communist Party, but we cannot avoid forming a partnership with him. Due to four conditions—our strength, the will of all China’s people, Chiang Kaishek’s own difficulties, and the intervention of foreign countries—this trip to Chongqing might solve some problems.

The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender1 (August 26, 1945) Comrades on the Party Committees of the Districts and Bureaus: The speedy surrender of the Japanese invaders has changed the entire situation. The Soviet Red Army is advancing with caution so as not to wreck the peace in the Far East (this is absolutely right), and Chiang Kaishek has monopolized the right to accept the surrender. These two points generally determine that for the time being (for one stage) the major cities and the important lines of communication will not be in our hands. Nevertheless, in northern China we should still fight hard, and fight with all our might to take all we can. During the past two weeks our army has recovered fifty-nine cities of various sizes and vast rural areas; including those already in our hands, we now control 175 cities, thus winning a great victory. In northern China, we have recovered Weihaiwei, Yantai, Longkou, Yidu, Zechuan, Yangliuqing, Bikeji, Bo’ai and yesterday we recovered Zhangjiakou, Pingdiquan, and Fengzhen. The might of our army has shaken northern China, and together with the sweeping advance of the Red Army2 and the Outer Mongolian forces to the Great Wall, this has created a favorable position for our Party. In the coming period, we should continue the offensive and do our best to capture the [Bei] ping–Sui[yuan] railway, the northern section of the [Da]tong–Pu[zhou] railway, and the Zheng[ding]–Tai[yuan], De[zhou]–Shi[jiazhuang], Bai[kui]–Jin[cheng], and Dao[kou]–Qing[hua] railways, and also to cut up the [Bei]ping–[Liao]ning, [Bei]Ping–Han[kou], [Tian]jin–Pu[kou], Jiaoji[Qingdao–Ji’nan], Longhai, and Lu-Ning[Shanghai–Nanjing] railways. We should gain control of whatever we can, even if only temporarily. At the same time, according to the CPCCC Directive of August 22, the necessary forces should be employed to take as many

Our source for this text is Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dang’anguan, eds., Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanzheng wenjian xuanbian (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988), pp. 13–14. 1.  The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender → On Peace Negotiations with the Guomindang — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 2.  Red Army → Soviet army 68

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-26

August 1945 69

villages, county towns and higher administrative centers, and small towns as possible. For example, a highly favorable situation has been created because the New Fourth Army has occupied many county towns lying between Nanjing, Lake Taihu, and the Tianmu Mountains, and between the Yangzi and the Huai rivers, because our forces in Shandong have occupied all of the Eastern Shandong Peninsula and because our forces in the Shanxi–Suiyuan (Jin-Sui) Border Region have occupied many cities and towns north and south of the [Bei]ping–Sui[yuan] railway. After another period of offensive operations, it will be possible for our Party to control most of the areas north of the lower Yangzi River and the Huai River, most of Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan, all of Rehe and Chahar (so as to welcome the advance of the Red Army and the Outer Mongolian forces), and part of Liaoning. At present, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain all disapprove of civil war in China; at the same time, our Party has put forward the three great slogans of peace, democracy, and unity, and is sending Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei to Chongqing to meet Chiang and to discuss3 the great issues of unity and national reconstruction. Thus, it is possible that the civil war plot of the Chinese reactionaries may be frustrated. Besides, if they were to wage a civil war, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain might intervene. Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favorable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defense to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely (we do not strike rashly, but when we do strike, we must win). We must never be cowed by the bluster of reactionaries. The Guomindang has now strengthened its position by recovering Shanghai, Nanjing, and other places, reopening sea communications, taking over enemy arms, and incorporating the puppet troops into its own forces. Nevertheless, it is riddled with a thousand gaping wounds, torn by innumerable inner contradictions, and beset with great difficulties. It is possible that following the negotiations the Guomindang, under domestic and foreign pressures, may conditionally recognize the status of the Party. Our Party may likewise conditionally recognize the status of the Guomindang. This would bring about a new stage of cooperation between the two parties (plus the Democratic League, etc.) and of peaceful development. In such an event, our Party should strive to master all methods of legal struggle and intensify its work in the Guomindang areas in the three main spheres of the cities, the villages, and the army (all weak points in our work there). During the negotiations, the Guomindang is sure to demand that we drastically reduce the size of the Liberated Areas, cut down the strength of the millions in the Liberation Army, and stop issuing currency. On our side, we are prepared to make whatever concessions that are necessary and that do not damage the fundamental interests of our Party.4 Without such concessions, we cannot 3.  meet Chiang and discuss → discuss with Chiang Kaishek 4. our Party. → the People.

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expose the Guomindang’s civil-war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as well as5 the middle-of-the-roaders within China, and cannot obtain in exchange legal status for our Party and a state of peace. But there are limits to such concessions; the concessions are based on the principle that they must not damage the fundamental interests of our Party.6 If the Guomindang still wants to launch a civil war after our Party has taken the above steps, it will be placing itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and our Party will be justified in waging a war of self-defense to crush its attacks.7 But we must at all times firmly adhere to, and never forget, these principles: unity, struggle, and unity through struggle; to wage struggles with good reason, with advantage, and with restraint; and to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one. In Yue, Xiang, E, Yu8 and some other provinces, our Party forces are in a more difficult position than they are in northern China and in the area between the Yangzi and the Huai rivers. The comrades in those places are much in the thoughts of the Central Committee. But the Guomindang has many weak spots and its areas are vast; our comrades will be fully able to deal with the situation, provided they make no major mistakes in military policy (movements and operations) and in the policy of uniting with the people, and provided they are modest and prudent, not conceited or rash. In addition to receiving the necessary directives from the Central Committee, the comrades in these areas must use their own judgment to analyze the situation, solve their problems, surmount difficulties, be self-reliant, and expand their forces. When the Guomindang is unable to do anything with you, in the negotiations between the two parties it may be compelled to recognize your forces and agree to arrangements that are advantageous to both sides. But you definitely must not rely on the negotiations and you must definitely not hope that the Guomindang will be kind-hearted because it will never be kindhearted. You must rely on your own strength, on the correct guidance of activities, on brotherly unity within the Party, and on good relations with the people. Firmly rely on the people, that is your way out. The Central Committee has decided to send over 1,000 cadres led by Comrade Lin Feng9 to the Northeast. The Army led

5.  Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as well as → international public opinion and 6. our Party. → the People. 7. ​i​ts attacks. → its attacks. Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favorable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defense to wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely (we will not fight rashly, but we must win when we do fight). We must never be cowed by the bluster of the reactionaries. 8.  Yue, Xiang, E, Yu → Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, Henan 9.  Lin Feng was then political commissar of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Command Area of the Eighth Route Army. After the founding of the PRC, he served as vice-chairman of the 2nd and 3rd Standing Committees of the National People’s Congress.

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by Comrade Fang Yi10 should advance to the border of Rehe and await orders there. If we are allowed to advance to the Northeast, we can continue. If not, the army can expand forces in Rehe, thus fostering a strong Rehe base area (Rehe and Chahar are not covered by the Sino-Soviet Treaty). To sum up, our Party is confronted with many difficulties that must not be ignored and all Party comrades must be well-prepared psychologically. But the general trend in the international and domestic situations is favorable to our Party and to the people. As long as the whole Party is united as one, we shall be able to overcome all difficulties step by step. Central Committee

10.  Fang Yi was a prominent leader in economic and technological affairs after the founding of the PRC.

During the Period of Mao Zedong’s Attendance at the Chongqing Talks, He Will Be Replaced by Liu Shaoqi in the Role of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party1 (August 27, 1945, 3:00 P.M.) To all bureaus and all district Party committees: The stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan is drawing to a close, and a new period of striving to build peace has already begun. Relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must be adjusted to avoid civil war. The Central Committee has decided that Mao and Zhou [Enlai] should attend the Chongqing talks. During Mao’s absence from Yan’an, Comrade Liu Shaoqi will act as chairman, and comrades Chen Yun and Peng Zhen will act as alternate secretaries. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, p. 18, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 72

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-27

Chairman Mao’s Statement on Arriving in Chongqing1 (August 28, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, August 30) Comrade Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, arrived in Chongqing on the 28th. After disembarking from the plane, he made the following statement: I have come to Chongqing on this occasion at the invitation of the Chairman of the Nationalist Government, Mr. Chiang Kaishek, to discuss the great plan for national reconstruction. Now that the Anti-Japanese War has ended in victory, China is entering a period of peaceful reconstruction. This is a crucially important moment. At present, the most urgent tasks are to guarantee internal peace, carry out democratic politics, and consolidate national unity. The various outstanding problems in the country’s political and military affairs should be solved in a reasonable way on the basis of peace, democracy, and unity, in the hope that we can realize national unification and build an independent, free, rich, and powerful new China. I hope that all anti-Japanese political parties and noble-minded patriots in China will unite and strive to accomplish the above tasks together. I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Chiang Kaishek for the invitation.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, p. 325, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, August 30, 1945. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-28

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Talk at the Office of the Eighteenth Army Group in Chongqing (August 29, 1945) Reporter: Group Leader Major Yang Xiang of the directly subordinate Special Agents Team Original reporting time and place: September 1, Chongqing On August 29, Mao Zedong summoned the senior officers of the traitor and puppet armies in Chongqing to a talk at the office of the Eighteenth Army Group at Hualong Bridge. The content of the talk is presented below under the various topics. 1. Views regarding conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty: The Soviet Union has four goals in concluding a treaty with China. They are: a) To prevent a revival of Japanese fascism and conspiracies of the British and American reactionaries. b) To delimit the Sino-Soviet boundary to prevent China from using border problems as an excuse to act against the Soviet Union in the future. c) It is absolutely necessary that the Soviet Union befriend China. Without the treaty, China will definitely become an important anti-Soviet base. d) As for the Soviet Union’s hopes for, and aid to, the Chinese Communist Party, although it is clearly stated in the treaty that future supplies from the Soviet Union will go to the Guomindang government, and this appears to be unfavorable to the Communist Party, as a matter of fact, the Soviet Union will support the Chinese Communist Party even more actively in the future and will help it establish a democratic new China. The present visit to Chongqing by this person (as Mao called himself)1 for discussions with the Guomindang was also suggested by the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union expects that the Communist Party and the Guomindang will have a chance to collaborate.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 65–66. Submitted on September 1, 1945, and reproduced from “Youguan Mao Zedong yu Chongqing dishiba jituan­jun banshichu tanhua neirong baogao,” in Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: Dui Ri kangzhan shiqi diqibian zhanhou Zhongguo (er) (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1981). 1.  This and other superfluous parenthetical explanations of terms such as “this person” and “this party” were added to the transcript by the Guomindang editors. 74

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-29

August 1945 75

Although this type of government does not correspond to the Soviet Union’s ideal, it is preferable to a serious civil war. 2. Predictions regarding the talks with the Guomindang: On this occasion, both parties are in fact quite sincere. But while the forecast for the talks is relatively optimistic, no one should have excessively high expectations. In my view, Chairman Chiang has two goals for the talks: a) He anticipates that this (i.e., the Communist) Party will accept his conditions. Regarding himself as the leader of the country, he is inclined to lean gradually toward a path of autocracy as soon as the country achieves peace. b) If the talks do not reach an agreement, a civil war will be inevitable. Caught in this situation, both sides will certainly suffer great losses. The reasons this person (as Mao called himself) talked to him on the present occasion were that, on the one hand, it was suggested by the Soviet Union; on the other hand, the aim was to stop Chiang’s attempt to win over public opinion at home and abroad. While we are willing to make some concessions on the conditions put forward by this (i.e., the Communist) Party, such as abandoning the proposal for a coalition government, we will not change any other important principles concerning the talks. 3. From now on, the new orientation of this (Communist) Party will follow the principle of promoting a “democratic” movement throughout the country. Consequently, we will shift our emphasis from working in the countryside to working in the cities. In the future, underground comrades everywhere will be able to work in semi-openness to win the sympathy of the masses for the Communist Party. 4. The tactics adopted for these talks: As we expect to achieve some results from the talks, we shall adopt the following method: On the one hand, conduct direct talks with Chiang; on the other hand, try to win over and unite with the left wing of the Guomindang, such as Sun Ke,2 and people of the Democratic League such as Zhang Lan.3 With additional help that may be obtained from American Ambassador Hurley,4 I anticipate rather fruitful results. Presented by Secretary Zhang Zhen [张镇] (seal), September 1, 1945

2.  Sun Ke (1819–1973, aka Sun Fo, native of Guangdong) led the left wing of the Guomindang and advocated cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party. He represented the Guomindang in the negotiations with Zhou Enlai. 3.  Zhang Lan (1872–1955, native of Sichuan) was chairman of the China Democratic League from its founding in 1941 until his death in 1955. 4.  Patrick J. Hurley was appointed U.S. ambassador to China in late November 1944, but he resigned in November 1945 due to controversy over his support for Chiang Kaishek.

Eleven Points Regarding the Negotiations with the Guomindang (August 30, 1945) To Liu [Shaoqi], and for transmission to the Central Committee: I am making known, via telegram, eleven points that Zhou [Enlai] will submit orally1 on the fourth [of September] to four representatives of the Guomindang, Zhang [Qun], Zhang [Zhizhong], Wang [Shijie], and Shao [Lizi].2 They are as follows: 1. Realize the unity of the whole country based on peace, democracy, and unity; establish an independent, free, rich, and powerful new China, and thoroughly implement the Three People’s Principles. 2. Support Mr. Chiang [Kaishek] and recognize Mr. Chiang’s position of leadership in the whole country. 3. Acknowledge the equal and legal status of the two parties, the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all democratic parties that resisted the Japanese, and establish an orientation of long-term cooperation and peaceful reconstruction of the country. 4. Acknowledge the contributions and the legality of the army and the local governments in the Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan. 5. Harshly punish Chinese traitors and disband the puppet army. 6. Re-draw the district boundaries in the surrendered area and participate in accepting the surrender. 7. End all armed clashes; each unit should remain where it is for now and await further orders. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 20–22, where it is reproduced from the original manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  These points for the talks were drafted by Zhou Enlai. They were apparently originally to be raised with the Guomindang representatives on September 4, 1945, but were raised in advance on September 3. 2.  Zhang Qun (1889–1990, native of Sichuan) was head of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government’s Military Affairs Commission. Wang Shijie (1891–1981, native of Hubei) was the head of the Nationalist Government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shao Lizi was secretary general of the Guomindang’s War Zone Party Committee under the Military Affairs Commission. 76

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-30

August 1945 77

8. During the process of ending partisan politics, rapidly adopt essential measures leading to the democratization of politics, the nationalization of the army, and steps toward the equalization and legitimization of the political parties. 9. The essential measures for democratizing politics: a. Let the Nationalist Government hold a political conference to consult party and nonparty representatives on affairs of state and to discuss various issues, including the broad outline for uniting to reconstruct the country, the principles of democratic administration, the participation of the various parties in the government, the reelection of the National Assembly, demobilization, and dealing with the aftermath of the War of Resistance. b. Establish a provincial system and trust the local governments. In establishing provincial governments in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the provinces of Rehe, Chahar, Hebei, Shandong, and Shanxi, please appoint persons selected by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to be chairmen and commissioners and organize the provincial governments. In other provinces, including Suiyuan, Henan, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and all the Northeastern provinces, as well as the four special cities of Beiping, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Shanghai, please appoint persons selected by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to be the vicechairmen, vice-mayors, and commissioners. c. Vigorously carry out policies of local self-government and general elections from bottom to top. d. Establish a nationwide amnesty. e. Carry out emergency relief. 10. The essential measures for nationalizing the army: a. Develop a plan for impartially and rationally reorganizing by stages the standing armies nationwide. The regular army in the Liberated Areas has reached 1,200,000 troops. They will also be gradually reorganized into sixteen armies and forty-eight divisions. b. Re-divide the military regions and establish a system of conscription and recruitment. The aforementioned sixteen armies should be garrisoned in the Huai River valley and the areas north of the Longhai railway. c. Safeguard the personnel system by appointing former military personnel as officers at all levels in the aforementioned reorganized armies. d. Military personnel from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as well as from the localities shall participate in the work of the Military Affairs Commission and of all relevant departments. e. Establish a Beiping Field Headquarters and a Northern China Political Committee. Appoint someone from the Chinese Communist Party as director.

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f. Reserve officers shall receive readiness training from regional facilities. g. All militia in the Liberated Areas will be organized into local selfdefense corps. h. Set up a fair and reasonable supply system. i. Establish a political education plan. 11. The essential measures for equalizing and legitimizing the political parties: a. Release political prisoners. b. Guarantee all kinds of freedoms. Abolish all unreasonable prohibitions. c. Abolish secret agents. Mao

Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Talks between the Two Parties (September 2, 1945) I. The Chinese Communist Party’s version: Eight comments of principle on the talks between the Guomindang and the Communist Party This morning (September 2), Chairman Mao invited Wang Shijie over to have a talk at the Cassia Garden. Comrades Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei were present. Chairman Mao put forth eight comments of principle on the talks between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. 1. When a result has been achieved in the talks between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, a political conference should be held with the participation of representatives from various political parties and unaffiliated personages. 2. As regards the problem of the National Assembly, if the Guomindang insists that the mandate of the old delegates is still valid, the Communist Party will be unable to come to an agreement with the Guomindang on this. 3. The people should be granted the freedoms normally enjoyed by the people in a democratic country. The laws currently in force should be annulled or modified according to this principle. 4. The various political parties should be given legal status. 5. All political prisoners should be released, and this point should be included in the joint statement. 6. The elected authorities in the Liberated Areas and the recovered areas must be recognized. 1

Our source for these two versions of Mao Zedong’s comments is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 67–71, where it is reproduced from “Zhengfu daibiao Wang Shijie yu Mao Zedong tanhua jilu,” in Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: Dui Ri kangzhan shiqi diqibian zhanhou Zhongguo (er) (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1981). DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-31

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7. The armies of the Chinese Communist Party should be reorganized into forty-eight divisions, with their field headquarters and political committee established in Beiping and headed by Communist generals who will be responsible for directing the armies in the regions of Shandong, Jiangsu, Hebei, Chahar, Rehe, and Suiyuan. 8. The Communist Party should participate in accepting regional surrenders. Afterwards, Comrade Zhou Enlai continued to hold discussions with Wang Shijie. That evening, Chairman Mao Zedong had a talk with Chiang Kaishek at Chiang’s official residence on the following subjects: the number of Communist armies to be reorganized, the settlement of the armies, the Liberated Areas, the political conference, and the old delegates of the National Assembly.

II. The Guomindang’s version: Talk with Wang Shijie The results of today’s talks: Because no written notes were made during the talks, the following is Wang Shijie’s own record after the talks. During the talks, Mao, Zhou [Enlai], and Wang [Ruofei] were all present, but Mr. Mao presided over all the talks. 1. Regarding the problem of the political conference, Mao’s proposals were as follows: a. When the current talks between the two sides reach an agreement, the government will exchange opinions informally with personages of other political parties. b. After the exchange of opinions, Chairman Chiang will invite a number of personages of other political parties and groups and unaffiliated individuals (the numbers and identity of the participants can be decided by Chairman Chiang) to hold a conference with the government and the Communist representatives. The objective of this meeting is to endorse the results of the talks between the government and the Communist Party within an extremely short time. This meeting, which can be called a political conference, need not meet very often. It can be convened in the future as required. 2. Regarding the National Assembly, Mao’s views were as follows: As for the National Assembly, if the government insists that the mandate of the former delegates must remain valid, then the Communist side will not be able to conclude an agreement with us, but the Communist Party may not refuse to participate in the National Assembly for this reason. 3. Regarding freedom, Mr. Mao entirely agreed with the following words (I note the gist):

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“After the end of the Anti-Japanese War, as regards freedom of the person, and of belief, speech, publication, assembly, and association, we should give the people the freedoms normally enjoyed by people in all democratic countries. The laws and regulations currently in force should be abolished or revised in accordance with this principle.” 4. Regarding political parties, Mr. Mao declared that the various political parties should be given legal status. He also said, however, that he does not oppose making a law governing the forming of political associations, provided only that the right to form associations should not be restricted. I (here and below, this refers to Wang Shijie) said that we should take warning from the history of France regarding the proliferation of numerous minor parties. He [Mao] said that the situation in China would not lend itself to following the French path. 5. On the question of the release of political prisoners, Mr. Mao said that this must be included in the joint statement. I said that the government intended to deal with this matter on its own accord, and I was afraid it will not be willing to include this item in the joint statement. But I said he could submit to the government a list of those whom he thought should be released. 6. With regard to the so-called “administration of the Liberated Areas,” I said I feared that with regard to this matter, the government could at best make a promise along the following lines: “As for former administrative personnel working in the recovered areas during the Anti-Japanese War (I did not agree to use the term “Liberated Areas”), the government may allow some of them to continue their service in local government, depending on their abilities and achievements. They will not be discriminated against because of their association with different political parties and factions.” Mr. Mao did not object to the above opinion; he only continued to ask about the treatment of locally elected groups in areas of this type. I said I feared that the system could not be different. 7. As regards the Communist armies: a. Mr. Mao said that the Communist armies should be reorganized into forty-eight divisions. I refused to discuss this matter, and I merely asked him to consider two points: The number of twelve divisions had been decided by the central government before the army reduction, and in the last few months the central government has cut its army by more than eighty divisions. b. On the question of the command of the army: Mr. Mao declared that it would be appropriate to place the Beiping Field Headquarters in the hands of the Communist commanders, who under the orders of Chairman Chiang would command the Communist armies in the Shandong, Hebei, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan regions.

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I said that this was not feasible. But it would be possible to have Communist commanders in the central government’s Military Commission. 8. Regarding acceptance of the Japanese surrender: Finally, Mr. Mao said that although the Nanjing Surrender Acceptance Army cannot appoint additional Communist army personnel because of the limitations set by the Allied powers, certain Communist commanders must be appointed to carry out acceptance of the regional surrender in their respective areas.

An Inscription Celebrating Victory in the War against Japan (September 3, 1945) Celebrate the victory in the Anti-Japanese War! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

1

Our source for this text is Xinhua ribao, September 3, 1945. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-32

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Talk with Dagong Bao Reporters (September 5, 1945) Dagong bao published Comrade Mao Zedong’s talk on September 6. Mr. Mao Zedong met with our reporters yesterday afternoon and made the following statements: In the five days since I arrived in Chongqing, I have been discussing issues of unity with the central government. At present, we have not yet achieved concrete results to reassure my fellow countrymen. All I can say now is that a civil war can definitely be avoided. If we do not unify our political and military commands, there will be no end of trouble. The unification of the political and military commands must, however, be built on a basis of democratic politics. Only a political conference consisting of representatives of the various political parties and nonaligned individuals can begin to resolve the country’s present situation; only a democratic and unified coalition government can bring happiness to all of China’s people. What democracy means is that the people have power. The situation in the border areas and the Liberated Areas is different from that in the other areas. They have governments elected by the people, they have self-defense armies, and they do not have watch-group heads [baojia zhang]. The watch-group heads rule over the people and are most undesirable. The other result of the discussion is that the National Assembly will be postponed. As for the question of delegates, the two sides have not yet been able to reach agreement. The Communist Party is not in favor of retaining the former delegates; in principle, we propose holding general elections. Finally, Mr. Mao commented on the Sino-Soviet Treaty: This treaty is a guarantee of peace in the Far East. Some people think that it has an unfavorable influence on our country’s democratic movement. But actually, it is just the opposite; let’s wait and see. Some others are surprised that the Soviet Union has taken the Nationalist government as its partner, but actually, there is nothing but the Nationalist government that can be taken as a partner. The treaty does not, however, restrict the Soviet Union’s right to criticize Chinese politics; public opinion can still have its own voice. Several days ago, the Soviet Union’s Red Star newspaper published a commentary saying that China should 1

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 327–28, which reproduces the text from the pamphlet Wei heping er fendou (Xinhua ribaoshe, November 1945). 84

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-33

September 1945 85

move toward democratic politics; it has high hopes for the union of the two parties. China has gained a strong and powerful neighbor, and we need not worry about being invaded by other countries. Mr. Mao expressed the hope that the discussions would soon yield results.

Chairman Mao Makes Remarks in Chongqing Expressing the Hope That the Negotiations Will Come to a Successful Conclusion (September 13, 1945) (United Press International, Chongqing, September 13) Chairman of the Communist Party, Mao Zedong, said this afternoon: The policy of the Communist Party is to establish peace and democracy in China. That is why I have come to Chongqing. Regarding the negotiations between the two parties, Mr. Mao said, I cannot comment on the talks with the leaders of the Guomindang. He said, “For China, the most important thing is peace.” Mr. Mao said: The Communist Party hopes for a good result. “This way, China will be able to make the transition from the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan to the period of peaceful reconstruction. I am persuaded that this is the wish not only of all the people of China but also of the entire world.” Mr. Mao said, the Communist Party will make every effort to reach the above-mentioned goal. (Reuters, Chongqing, September 13) The leader of the Communist Party, General Mao Zedong, today delivered his first public announcement since the beginning of the talks between the Guomindang and the Communists two weeks ago, saying: The people of the whole country are hoping for peace, and since coming to Chongqing I have made every effort to achieve peace. We Communists hope that the talks will yield satisfactory results so that China will be able to move on from the War of Resistance to a period of peaceful reconstruction. Mr. Mao said that at present, both sides have promised not to publicize the situation regarding the talks, but he hopes for the success of the talks. He also said: I hope that during the talks, there will be no clashes between the Communist armies and the Guomindang armies. The Communist Party would rather retreat than clash with the Guomindang army, but it will continue to fight the enemy and puppet armies. 1

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 329–30, which reproduces two versions of Mao’s remarks published in Jiefang ribao, September 14, 1945. 86

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-34

Hasten to Send People to Shanghai and Other Places to Establish Newspapers1 (September 14, 1945) To the Central Committee, and for transmission to Zhang [Yunyi], Rao [Shushi], Li [Xiannian], and Lin Ping2 1. The Shanghai Xinhua ribao and other daily newspapers published in the name of the masses in places such as Nanjing, Wuhan, and Hong Kong should be published as soon as possible. According to the laws of the Guomindang, we can publish first and then register. The earlier the better, the later the worse. 2. Fan Changjiang, Qian Junrui, A Ying, Mei Yu,3 and any other people in Central China who can work openly in places such as Shanghai should go there quickly. In addition to the daily newspapers, other newspapers, magazines, news agencies, bookstores, printing houses, theaters, cinemas, schools, factories, and all such places need people. Those who are nearby should first go straight to Shanghai, where their work will be of the greatest significance in the coming time of peace and of even greater significance than at present in the Central China Liberated Area. We must resolutely make the greatest effort to carry this out. 3. Report to us in a timely fashion by telegram on the progress of the work to facilitate coordination. Mao [Zedong], Zhou [Enlai]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 23–24, where it is reproduced from the original manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai sent this telegram while they were in Chongqing for the negotiations. 2.  Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander of the New Fourth Army. Rao Shushi was acting secretary of the Central China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and political commissar of the New Fourth Army. Li Xiannian was political commissar and commander of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army. Lin Ping (1908– 1984, born in Xingguo, Jiangxi) was Party secretary of the Guangdong region. 3.  Fan Changjiang (1909–1970) was editor of the Central China Xinhua ribao and of Central China’s Xinhua publications. Qian Junrui (1908–1985) was director of the New Fourth Army’s Political Propaganda Department. A Ying (born Qian Xingcun, 1900–1977) was an author and member of the Standing Committee of the Central China Literary Cooperative. Mei Yu, aka Mei Yi, 1913–2003, was Party secretary of the Shanghai Cultural Committee. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-35

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Speech at the Consultative Conference Reception (September 18, 1945) On September 18, members of the People’s Political Consultative Conference in Chongqing held a tea party to welcome Comrade Mao. At the party, Comrade Mao delivered an address. In brief, he said: Today is the anniversary of the September 18th Incident,1 and we should first celebrate our victory. After the eight-year War of Resistance, victory has finally come. The Northeast in particular was occupied by the enemy for fourteen years, ever since the September 18th Incident. Today, it has also been liberated. I personally feel very excited to be here today. But most of all, I am honored by the opportunity to meet at this time with all of you gentlemen, friends, and elders. Recalling the War of Resistance period, although it was a time of extreme hardship, we have now passed safely through it thanks to the united efforts of the entire country. Chairman Chiang has specially invited me to Chongqing to discuss national affairs with him and his intentions are greatly appreciated. From now on, there should be a new era of peaceful development and peaceful national reconstruction. We must unite as one and resolutely avoid civil war. Any other orientation would be wrong. Therefore, the various political parties and groups should all unite under the aforementioned principle and thoroughly implement the Three People’s Principles to build a modernized new China.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, p. 331, where it is reproduced from the pamphlet Wei heping er fendou (Xinhua ribaoshe, November 1945). 1.  The Mukden or Manchurian Incident, on September 18, 1931, marked the Japanese invasion of Northeast China. 88

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-36

Answers to Questions Raised by Reuters News Agency Correspondent Campbell (September 27, 1945)1 During Chairman Mao’s stay in Chongqing for the negotiations from August 28 to October 11, 1945, Mr. Campbell,2 correspondent for Great Britain’s Reuters News Agency in Chongqing, submitted twelve questions in written form, and Chairman Mao answered them one by one. The original article was published in Xinhua ribao in Chongqing on September 27. —The editor 1. Question: Is it possible to avoid civil war by relying on agreements rather than armed force? Answer: Yes, it is possible, because it corresponds to the interests of the Chinese people as well as to the interests of the political party now in power in China. At the moment, China needs only one basic policy: peaceful reconstruction of the nation, and no other policy. Consequently, civil war in China must be resolutely avoided. 2. Question: What concessions is the Chinese Communist Party prepared to make to reach an agreement? Answer: If the condition of realizing peace, democracy, and unity throughout the country is met, the Chinese Communist Party is prepared to make major concessions, including reducing the Liberated Areas and cutting down the number in its armed forces. 3. Question: What kind of compromises or concessions does the central government have to make to meet the demands of the Chinese Communist Party? Answer: The position of the Chinese Communist Party can be found in the latest declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. This declaration requires that the Guomindang government recognize the popularly elected government and the people’s army in the Liberated

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 333–36, where it is reproduced from the 1947 edition of Mao Zedong xuanji. It also appears in Xinhua ribao, September 27, 1945. 1. This is the date on which the interview was published in the Chongqing Xinhua ribao. It also appeared on October 8, 1945, in Jiefang ribao. 2.  This journalist, referred to by the Chinese characters “Ganbei’er,” has not been identified. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-37

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Areas, to allow them to participate in the acceptance of Japan’s surrender, to severely punish Chinese traitors and puppet armies, to reconsolidate and reorganize the armed forces on a just and reasonable basis, to guarantee the people’s rights and freedoms, and to establish a democratic coalition government. 4. Question: Do you feel there is hope that the talks will lead to an agreement, even if it is only a temporary one? Answer: I have full confidence in the outcome of the talks, and I think that with the joint efforts and mutual concessions of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, the result of the talks will not be merely a temporary agreement but an agreement that can guarantee long-term peaceful reconstruction. 5. Question: If the talks break down, is it still possible that the problems between the Guomindang and the Communist Party can be resolved by means other than bloodshed? Answer: I do not believe that the talks will break down. The Chinese Communist Party will under all circumstances maintain its orientation of avoiding a civil war. Of course, there will be difficulties, but they can be overcome. 6. Question: What is the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party toward the Sino-Soviet Treaty? Answer: We are in complete agreement with the Sino-Soviet Treaty, and we hope it will be thoroughly implemented, because it is beneficial to the people of both countries and to world peace, especially peace in the Far East. 7. Question: After the surrender of Japan, do you intend to continue occupying the areas you now occupy? Answer: The Chinese Communist Party demands that the central government recognize the popularly elected government and the people’s army in the Liberated Areas. The significance of this point lies in the fact that it only demands that the government implement the policy of local autonomy to which it agreed long ago, thereby safeguarding the political, military, economic, and educational democratic reforms carried out by the people in these localities during the war. These reforms are completely in conformity with the ideals of Mr. Sun Yatsen, the founder of the Guomindang. 8. Question: Once a coalition government is established, to what degree are you prepared to cooperate with Chiang Kaishek? Answer: If a coalition government is established, the Chinese Communist Party will make the utmost efforts to cooperate with Chairman Chiang to build an independent, free, rich, and powerful new China, and will thoroughly implement Mr. Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles. 9. Question: (a) How many Communist Party members in North China will your actions and decisions affect? (b) How many of them are armed? (c) What are the other places where Chinese Communist Party members are active?

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Answer: The overall orientation for the actions of Communist Party members is determined by the Party’s Central Committee. The Chinese Communist Party now has more than 1.2 million members, and the number of people enjoying a democratic life under the leadership of the Party is already well over 100 million. These people have already formed, on a voluntary basis, an army of over 1.2 million and a militia of over 2.2 million. In addition to the provinces in North China and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, they are active in Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and other provinces. Members of the Chinese Communist Party are to be found in every province of the country. 10. Question: What is the Chinese Communist Party’s understanding and definition of the concept of a free and democratic China? Answer: A free and democratic China will have the following characteristics: Its governments at all levels, including the central government, will all be chosen through universal, equal, and secret voting, and they will be responsible to their electors. They will carry out Mr. Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles, Lincoln’s principle “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter. They will guarantee the independence, solidarity, and unity of the country and its cooperation with other democratic powers. 11. Question: What are the overall policies of the Chinese Communist Party for reconstruction and recovery in a multi-party coalition government? Answer: Apart from military and political democratic reforms, the Communist Party will propose to the government an outline for economic and cultural construction. The major objective of this outline will be to reduce the burdens of the people, improve their livelihood, carry out land reform and industrialization, reward private enterprises (except those branches with monopolistic characteristics, which should be managed by the democratic government as state enterprises). Under the principle of equality and mutual benefit, foreign investment should be welcomed, and international trade should be developed. Mass education should be promoted, illiteracy should be eliminated, and so on. All of this is also consistent with Mr. Sun Yatsen’s legacy. 12. Question: Do you support nationalization of the military and elimination of the private armies? Answer: We totally agree with the nationalization of the military and the elimination of the private armies. The common precondition for these two things is democratization of the state. As a matter of fact, what is commonly referred to as the “Communist Army” is an army the Chinese people organized voluntarily, and its sole purpose is to defend the motherland. This is a new type of army. It is completely unlike the old-style armies in the past belonging to individuals. Its democratic character provides us with valuable lessons for genuine nationalization of the Chinese army, and it will set an example for improving China’s other armies.

To Liu Yazi1 (October 4, 1945) My esteemed elder brother Mr. Yazi, I have read with respect your poem and your instructions, and I sense deeply your unwavering will to help others. Is Mrs. Liu’s ailment improving? In such a serious situation, only relatives can understand the pain and feel it themselves; the expression “discouragement” is inadequate to explain it. In terms of the current situation, the items you have inquired about have not yet at the moment reached the stage of a concrete solution. Much of what appears in the newspapers is very unreliable. Earlier I offered you two phrases: The future is bright, but the road is tortuous. Our generation should mainly think of the term “tortuous” (that is, difficult), which corresponds to the present situation, for this will help us avoid worries in case of disappointment. Moreover, it will definitely not be easy to overcome these difficulties. I sincerely hope that you, Sir, take a similar attitude. There are other things worth discussing, but please allow me to tell you about them later and not go into them one-by-one here. Your poem, Sir, is both courageous and powerful; in despising Lu You and Chen Liang,2 it moves and excites people. Unfortunately, I can only read it without doing anything about it. But adding me to your tens of thousands of readers will be no disgrace to you, Sir, and is a matter of pride for me as well. Respectfully wishing you Prosperity, peace, and good fortune. Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 261–62, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Liu Yazi (1887–1958, native of Jiangsu) was a poet and steadfast advocate of democracy. He was an early member of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui) and a committee member of the Guomindang’s Central Inspection Committee. He was removed from the party in 1941 after criticizing Chiang Kaishek’s role in the Wannan Incident. He joined the China Democratic League in Chongqing in 1944. 2.  Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 261–62, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 92

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-38

To Liu Yazi (October 7, 1945) My esteemed elder brother Mr. Yazi, I have read all your repeated instructions. Your last letter, expressed in such noble words, is the most moving. Going to the battlefield empty-handed can sometimes work, but it has drawbacks as a routine method. This, I believe, you know as well as the palm of your hand. At present, it is still too early to publish articles and speak out. Such things as the selection of personnel are still beyond discussion. It is better to forget them for the time being. When I first came to northern Shaanxi and saw the heavy snow, I composed a ci.1 It seems to somewhat resemble your style, so I would like to present it to you now for your criticism. Respectfully wishing that your path may be peaceful, Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 263, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  The reference is to Mao’s poem “Snow, to the tune of ‘Spring in [Princess] Qin’s garden,’” composed in February 1936. For the text, see Vol. V, pp. 118–19. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-39

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Speech at a Party Held in the Auditorium of the Military Affairs Commission (October 8, 1945) On October 8, Mr. Zhang Zhizhong held a grand party in the auditorium of the Military Affairs Commission in honor of Comrade Mao Zedong. At the beginning of the party, Minister Zhang addressed the audience as host (speech omitted here). This was followed by a speech by Comrade Mao Zedong. He said: On this visit to Chongqing, I would like first of all to thank Mr. Chiang for his invitation and for more than forty days of excellent hospitality. My thanks also go to tonight’s host, Mr. Zhang Wenbai,1 for preparing this magnificent banquet, and to all of you from all walks of life who have come here tonight. The talks on this occasion are of great interest to the people of the whole country, to our friends all over the world, and to the governments of all the Allied countries. The reason is that these talks have not been merely concerned with matters of interest to the two parties but they have also dealt with issues affecting the interests of all of China’s people. As regards the circumstances of the talks, we can, as Mr. Zhang has just said, be optimistic. Following the overthrow of fascism both in the East and in the West, the world is a bright world, and China is a bright China. During the past thirty years, the world has experienced two world wars. The nature of the Second World War is different from that of the First World War. During this war, both the world and China made rapid progress. The goal of the present talks is to carry out peaceful reconstruction. There is only one road for China today and that is peace. Peace is all that counts, and any other intention is wrong. (applause) The talks have been carried on in a friendly atmosphere. Regarding the issues about which we could not reach agreement at the talks, we agreed to continue resolving them through discussion and not in any other way. Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 337–38, where it is reproduced from the text published in Jiefang ribao, October 9, 1945. A virtually identical text, taken from Xin Zhonghua bao, is reproduced in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 31–32. It differs from the version translated here only by the omission of the final two sentences: “Long live new China! Long live Chairman Chiang!” A shorter version, containing more significant variants and taken from Chongqing tanpan jilu (Chongqing chubanshe, 1983) and Zhang Zhizhong, Huiyi Chongqing tanpan appears in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 73–74. 1.  Zhang Wenbai, also known as Zhang Zhizhong (1890–1969, born in Chaohu, Hefei), was the head of the Guomindang’s Military Affairs Commission. 94

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Peace, democracy, and unity, and achieving unification based on peace, democracy, and unity—this orientation conforms to the demands of all China’s people and to the demands of people all over the world and of the governments of the Allied countries. Peace and cooperation should be lasting. We should all be of one mind, have no other intentions, and plan for long-term cooperation! (applause) Let all of China’s people, parties, and factions work together during the coming decades under the leadership of Chairman Chiang to fully implement the Three People’s Principles and build an independent, free, rich, and powerful new China! It cannot be denied that there are difficulties, and it would be wrong not to point this out. The people of China are facing difficulties at present, and they may also face many difficulties in the future. But the Chinese people are not afraid of difficulties. If the Guomindang and the Communist Party, uniting with the other parties and factions, are not afraid of difficulties, however great the difficulties may be, unite as one around the orientation of peace, democracy, and unity, then under the leadership of Chairman Chiang and based on thorough implementation of the Three People’s Principles, every difficulty can be surmounted. (loud applause) Long live new China! Long live Chairman Chiang! (prolonged applause)

Report on the Progress of the Chongqing Negotiations (October 11, 1945) [In presiding over the Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee and reporting on the progress of the Chongqing negotiations, Mao said:] The minutes of the Chongqing talks were drafted by Comrade Enlai, and they were slightly revised in accordance with the opinions of the KMT. In the minutes, the issue of the National Assembly and the issue of the Liberated Areas were not resolved. What is important to us is the issue of peace and the issue of the Liberated Areas. Chiang Kaishek has not recognized the chairmen of several provinces in the Liberated Areas and he has only recognized those below the provincial level. We are proposing that we maintain the status quo and resolve this issue in the future. Before Hurley returned to the United States, he demanded that we surrender the Liberated Areas, saying that either we recognize Chiang Kaishek’s demands or the negotiations will break down. I said that I would neither recognize Chiang’s demands nor let the negotiations break down. The problem is complicated and we still need to have some more discussions. Originally, a communiqué was to be issued after the number of troops was resolved, but later it was said that a communiqué would only be issued after the issue of the Liberated Areas was resolved. That’s why things paused for a few days. The Democratic League says we adopted a very restrained approach. In this way, we launched an offensive, and within ten days Enlai engaged people from various fields, including culture, women, industry, journalism, the small political parties, and the democratic factions under the KMT. We abided by the agreement whereby the negotiations’ situation could be verbally stated, but it could not be published in the newspapers. We made it clear that we want peace; however, the other side could not say that. But such words can be heard in the rear, where the desire for peace is very strong. But the KMT cannot offer peace, and its policy is not firm or clear. Our course is clear and our approach is very low-key. Public opinion made it necessary that a communiqué on the talks be issued. The first advantage of the minutes of this meeting is that the two parties formally signed an agreement on an equal basis, which is unprecedented in history. Second, the six agreed-upon 1

Our source for this text is Nianpu, Vol. 3, pp. 33–34. 96

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articles are all beneficial to the Chinese people. For example, in terms of local autonomy, after the minutes were published, we proposed that the provincial governments be elected. This was on the basis of the words of Sun Yatsen. There will also be freedom of speech, assembly, press, and so on. I was planning to leave on the 9th, but Chiang Kaishek convinced me to spend Double-Ten.1 Zhang Zhizhong said that the minutes of the talks must be published. We have been given so much face by being here, so we should do something. The issue of the Liberated Areas must be subject to struggle. I said to Wang Yunsheng:2 “We are criticizing the KMT, but we are also leaving room for it. We do not intend to start anew.” After listening, Wang Yunsheng said that for many years there has been no policy about writing editorials, but there would be such a policy in the future. Chen Lifu3 stated that he had been the first to advocate the signing of the SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Many people are saying that the CC faction sabotaged the negotiations. I think that deep down many figures in the CC faction, including Chen Lifu, were wavering.4

1.  October 10, in commemoration of the Revolution of 1911. 2.  At the time, Wang Yunsheng (1901–1980, born in Tianjin) was editor-in-chief of the Chongqing Ta Kung Pao. 3.  Chen Lifu (1900-2001, native of Zhejiang) was education minister under the Nationalist government. 4.  After Mao Zedong completed his report, the participants at the meeting unanimously approved the “Minutes of the Meeting between the Government and the Representatives of the Communist Party of China.”

Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping1 (October 12, 1945, 1:00 P.M.) 1. It will take least one month for our main forces in Shandong and Central China to move to the region of Hebei, Rehe, Liaoning, and the Northeast. After each unit arrives, it will take at least another two to three months for them to arrange the battlefields, familiarize themselves with the topography, and complete preliminary preparations. Consequently, it is our serious strategic task at the moment to impede and delay the northward march of the diehard armies. In order to gain time, we should gather our local military corps, guerrilla units, and militia along the vital communication lines in our central regions to coordinate with a small number of our main forces to stop, attack, and cut off the diehard enemy along the railway lines and highways, use land mines extensively to blow up the enemy, destroy communication lines, dismantle fortified castles, level and destroy city walls, and delay, exhaust, and wear down the diehard enemy and the puppet troops so as to facilitate the appropriate amassing of our main forces and to seize the opportunity to wipe out one or several divisions of every group of the diehard enemy and puppet troops. Depending on the results of the above plan and the situation at the time, you can decide whether your main forces should go to eastern Hebei for a decisive campaign. 2. The Sixteenth Army, which is marching northward along the Tongpu railway, has amassed along the Yuci and Taigu front. Under enemy cover crossing the Zhengtai railway, it is difficult to find an opportunity to wipe out a division or regiment. As far as the Thirty-second and Seventh divisions of the Third Army are concerned, we still have an opportunity to wipe out some units of their forces. It seems that the nearly 50,000 troops in the main forces and local forces in Taiyue District2 will be enough to deal with them. Amass a main force of 15,000 to 20,000 to wipe out one or two regiments each time. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 373–74. 1. Liu Bocheng (1892–1986, native of Sichuan) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997, native of Sichuan) were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. 2.  Taiyue District was a military district under the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, situated in the Taiyue and Zhongtiao mountains in southern Shanxi Province. 98

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If we fight two or three campaigns like this, the Third Army will not be able to advance. It is also possible that the Sixteenth Army will be pinned down along the Zhengtai railway and that part of it will be exposed to our attacks. Our Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan3 districts may be able to amass a main force of more than 60,000, and under the direct and unified command of Liu and Deng can deal with the diehard enemies that are marching northward along the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway. Strive to wipe out part or most of it. Please consider the above suggestions and let us know what you think.

3.  The Taihang and Ji-Lu-Yu (Hebei-Shandong-Henan) districts were two military districts subordinate to the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. The Taihang Military District was located in the northern Taihang Mountains between Qi county and Siting in Shanxi, and Handan and Shijiazhuang in Hebei. The Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District included areas east of the Beiping-Hankou railway and the Hebei-ShandongHenan border area.

Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Geng1 (October 16, 1945) Because of our campaign against Yan [Xishan]’s troops in Shangdang2 (which was essential), Hu [Zongnan]’s3 diehard Sixteenth Army was able to pass successfully and the Third Army is also pressing northward. If these two armies can reach Shijiazhuang and amass there, they will try their best to fight through to the [Bei] Ping-Han[kou] railway from both the north and the south (the part between Gaoyi and Tangyin). Assisted by air and sea transportation, they will enter Beiping and Tianjin and our plan to move forces to the Northeast and to amass in Hebei, Rehe, and Liaoning will be greatly threatened. Hence, apart from giving stern orders to Zhao Erlu4 and the others, asking them to take active steps to wipe out, stop, and attack the Sixteenth Army, we ask you to use all possible means to stop the Third Army from marching northward and to wipe out most or even all of it. We suggest that all the local military corps and most of the county and district forces move toward Tongpu step by step in a planned way without delay and control one or several parts of Tongpu (try your best to get the militia to cooperate). If it is impossible to wipe out this army, you should adopt the strategy of mobile defense, stopping and attacking it repeatedly to gain enough time for our main forces to transfer and to recover from exhaustion. Select one or two regiments from among the main forces that have suffered fewer casualties and are less exhausted to serve as the vanguard in coordination with the local military corps in carrying out the aforementioned actions.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 374–75. 1.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. Chen Geng (1903–1961, native of Hunan) was field commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Fourth Column. 2.  Shangdang refers to the area in southeastern Shanxi centered in Changzhi, which formerly belonged to Shangdang Prefecture. 3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 4.  Zhao Erlu (1905–1967, native of Shanxi) was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi (JiJin) Military Region. 100

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Seizing Victory in the Pingsui Campaign Is of Great Significance1 (October 16, 1945) To all comrades in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) and Shanxi-Suiyuan (Jin-Sui) bureaus; and for the information of the Northeast and Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) bureaus: The Pingsui Campaign that is about to commence affects our Party’s position in the north as well as our struggle for nationwide peace, and it is extremely significant. Chiang Kaishek ordered Fu Zuoyi to amass more than 50,000 troops along the Guisui-Jining-Datong line. As soon as ground, air, and sea transport could concentrate military strength in Beiping, Tianjin, Qinhuangdao, and other places, they were to coordinate with Fu’s troops in attacking Zhangtan [Zhangjiakou] as well as Shenyang and Chengde. With the aid of the Japanese bandits and in cooperation with the puppets Wang Ying and Li Shouxin,2 Fu forcibly occupied Bikeji, Guisui, Wuchuan, Jining, Fengzhen, Taolin,3 Liangcheng, Qingshuihe, and other places in Suiyuan that either were within our original Liberated Areas or were recovered by us not long ago. They also seized our Xinghe and Shangyi and are advancing toward Zhangtan. Although we have now recovered Xinghe and Shangyi, all the other places remain in the hands of the diehard puppets, who are actively preparing to attack Zhangtan and are scheming to cut off our routes in the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 33–34; it also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 57–59. 1.  The Pingsui Campaign was also known as the Suiyuan Campaign. After Japan surrendered, Fu Zuoyi (1895–1974), the commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone based in western Suiyuan, mustered the main forces under his control and incorporated more than 60,000 puppet soldiers into his army. He advanced on Guisui (Hohhot) and the already liberated cities of Wuchuan, Taolin, Fengzhen, Jining, and Xinghe, while plotting to seize Zhangjiakou and control the Beiping-Guisui railway. 2.  Wang Ying (1894–1950, native of Hebei) was originally commander of the puppet forces at Suixi. After the War of Resistance Against Japan ended, his section was absorbed by Fu Zuoyi into the Twelfth War Zone, and he was temporarily made commander-in-chief of the Eleventh Calvary Group. Li Shouxin (1892 –1970, native of Inner Mongolia) was originally commander of the Mongolian puppet army. After the War of Resistance Against Japan ended, Chiang Kaishek incorporated him into the Guomindang army. 3.  Taolin county was abolished in 1954 and placed under the administration of the Left Flank Back Banner and Right Flank Central Banner of Chahar in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-44

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Northeast, North China, and the Northwest. There is therefore ample reason for this Pingsui Campaign to be fought for the recovery of lost territory and to open up lines of transport. We hope you can boost morale and resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and completely annihilate the stubborn anti-Communist and anti-popular diehard puppet armies, thus fulfilling your sacred task. After the victory of the Pingsui Campaign, the main forces should rapidly prepare to shift toward eastern Hebei and the area west of Beiping and carry out their critical new task. With the required number of competent troops, head south from Datong and destroy the forces of Rebel Yan.4 Upon reaching the vicinity of Taiyuan, depending on the situation, consider once again the question of seizing Taiyuan, for Rebel Yan not only colluded with the Japanese invaders over a long period but recently carried out an even more major attack on the Shangdang Liberated Areas. Although he suffered a serious counterattack in our Shangdang Campaign,5 which destroyed more than 30,000 of his main forces, his remaining troops are still more than 60,000 strong. Rebel Yan is heartless and maniacal and has organized thousands of the Japanese invaders to prepare to attack his own countrymen. Because of this, short of impeding speedy assistance to the Northeast, it is altogether necessary and reasonable to do everything possible to thoroughly annihilate the forces of Rebel Yan. The Central Committee

4.  Rebel Yan refers to Yan Xishan (1883–1960, born in Wutai county, Xinzhou), commander of the Guomindang’s Second War Zone. 5.  In mid-August 1945, Yan Xishan amassed thirteen divisions and joined with the Japanese puppet forces to invade Xiangtan, Chunliu, Changzhi, Lucheng, and other liberated regions in southeastern Shanxi. A counterattack by the Communist forces from September 10 until October 12 resulted in the annihilation of eleven divisions and an advance column, totaling more than 35,000 troops, including Commander Shi Zebo (1899–1986, born in Xianxian, Hubei) and other senior officers. Because Changzhi once belonged to Shangdang Prefecture, this campaign was called the Shangdang Campaign.

Telegram to the Comrades of the Central Bureau of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Region1 (October 17, 1945) Under your leadership, we have fought a victorious Shangdang Campaign,2 which has created the possibility for our troops to win a similar or an even greater victory next time. Of all the forces under your command, apart from using all the forces of Taiyue District to fight the campaign along the Tongpu railway and win a well-deserved victory, you must muster all your strength in the Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu) regions to obtain a victory in the Pinghan Campaign.3 The forthcoming new Pinghan Campaign is for the purpose of opposing an attack by the main forces of the Guomindang and to achieve a peaceful situation. Whether we win or lose, this campaign will be of critical importance to the overall situation. You should be prepared to strive to wipe out half or more of the 80,000 diehard enemy troops through consecutive battles over a period of a month and a half or more. Only in this way can we resolve this problem. We hope you will use the experience of the Shangdang Campaign, mobilize all the forces in the two regions of Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu), put

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 375–76. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 60–61. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  See the note in “Seizing Victory in the Pingsui Campaign is of Great Significance,” October 16, 1945, in this volume. 3.  In September 1945, Guomindang troops advanced on Handan, the central city of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area to quickly disable the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway. On October 24, the main forces of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District surrounded the Guomindang forces south of Handan, including the Thirtieth, Fortieth, and New Eighth armies. On October 30, Gao Shuxun (1897–1972, born in Zhili), deputy commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone and commander of the New Eighth Army, led an uprising by his troops and some 10,000 Hebei troops. On November 2, the campaign ended. More than 20,000 Guomindang troops were killed, and Ma Fawu (1894–1992, native of Hebei), deputy commander of the Eleventh War Zone and commander of the Fortieth Army, was captured. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-45

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them under the direct command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping,4 carefully and accurately organize each and every one of the battles, and achieve victory in a second Shangdang Campaign. Of the 80,000 diehard enemy troops, several armies have a strong fighting capacity, and you should not underestimate them. But since the diehard enemy troops have just arrived in a strange place, they are not familiar with the geography or the local situation, they belong to different units, and they will have difficulty with logistics. They are eager for victory and are inclined to underestimate our army. All these factors provide us with a very good opportunity, which must be seized. We sincerely hope that you will encourage our troops and the people to unite as one, miss no opportunities, and guided by the spirit of the Shangdang Campaign, achieve victory in the Pinghan Campaign.

4.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District.

On the Chongqing Negotiations (October 17, 1945) Let us talk about the current situation. That is what our comrades are interested in. This time the negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in Chongqing have lasted for forty-three days. The results have already been published in the newspapers.1 The representatives of the two parties are continuing to negotiate. The negotiations have borne fruit. The Guomindang has accepted the principles of peace and unity, recognized certain democratic rights of the people, and agreed that a civil war should be averted and that the two parties should cooperate in peace to build a new China. On these points, agreement has been reached. There are other points on which there is no agreement. The question of the Liberated Areas has not been resolved and that of the armed forces has not really been resolved either. The agreements reached are still only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. Facts have shown that very great efforts must still be made before the agreements can be turned into reality. On the one hand, the Guomindang is negotiating with us, while, on the other hand, it is vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas. Not counting the forces surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, 800,000 Guomindang troops are already directly engaged in these attacks. Wherever there are Liberated Areas, fighting is going on or is in the process of being prepared. The very first article of the “October 10 Agreement” is on “peace and national reconstruction”; don’t these words on paper contradict reality? Yes, they do. That is why we say it still requires effort on our part to turn what is on paper into reality. Why does the Guomindang mobilize so many troops to attack us? Because long ago it made up its mind to wipe out the people’s forces, to wipe us out. Best of all, it would like to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, to worsen our situation and to improve its own. Peace, although written into the agreement, in fact has not been realized. In Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xuanji (1991, second edition), Vol. 4, pp. 1156– 66, and Xuanji (1960), pp. 1155–64. A variant edition is entitled “Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan’an Party School,” October 17, 1945 (Wuhan: Gang’ersi Wuhan daxue zongbu, Zhongnan minyuan geweihui xuanchuanbu, Wuhan shiyuan geweihui xuanchuanbu, 1968), Vol. 2, pp. 74–75. See the following document, “Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan’an Party School.” 1. This is in reference to the meeting minutes that were signed and agreed upon by representatives of both the Guomindang and the Communist Party on October 10, 1945. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-46

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places such as the Shangdang area2 of Shanxi Province there is fighting on a fairly large scale. The Shangdang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyue, and Zhongtiao mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yan Xishan3 sent thirteen divisions to grab it. Our policy was established long ago – to give tit-fortat, to fight for every inch of land. This time we gave tit-for-tat, fought, and did a very good job of it. In other words, we wiped out all thirteen divisions. Their attacking forces had 38,000 men and we deployed 31,000 men. Of their 38,000 men, 35,000 were killed, 2,000 fled, and 1,000 scattered. Such fighting will continue. They want desperately to grab our Liberated Areas. This seems difficult to explain. Why are they so anxious to grab them? Isn’t it good for the Liberated Areas to be in our hands, in the hands of the people? Yes, but that is only what we think, what the people think. If they thought so too, there would be unity and we would all be “comrades.” But they will not think this way; they will oppose us stubbornly. They cannot see why they should not oppose us. It is quite natural that they should attack us. For our part, we cannot see why we should let them seize our Liberated Areas. It is also quite natural that we should counterattack. When two “can’t-see-whys” come together, they fight. Since there are two cannot-seewhys, why have they negotiated? And why have they concluded the “October l0th Agreement”? In this world, things are complicated, and they are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects, not just one. In Chongqing, some people think that Chiang Kaishek is unreliable and deceitful and that negotiations with him can lead nowhere. I was told so by many people I met, including some members of the Guomindang. I told them that what they said was justified and well-founded and that we were firmly convinced by eighteen years of experience4 that this would be the case. The Guomindang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting, and sure to break with each other, but that is only one aspect of the matter. Another aspect is that many other factors are bound to lead Chiang Kaishek to have misgivings. Among these factors, the three main ones are the might of the Liberated Areas, the opposition to a civil war by the people in the Great Rear Area, and the international situation. In our Liberated Areas there are 100 million people, one million troops, and two million people’s militia, a force no one dares to underestimate. Our Party’s place in the nation’s political life is no longer what it was in 1927, nor what it was in 1937. The Guomindang, which has always refused to recognize the equal status of the Communist Party, is now forced to do so. Our work in the Liberated Areas

2.  Shangdang is the region of Shanxi centered in Changzhi in the southeast. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, this mountainous region was the base area for the Eighth Route Army’s 129th Division and it was part of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan liberated region. 3.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Guomindang’s Second War Zone. 4.  That is, the experience since the split between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party in 1927.

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has already influenced all of China and the whole world. The people in the Great Rear Area desire peace and need democracy. When in Chongqing, I profoundly sensed the warm support given us by the broad masses of the people. They are dissatisfied with the Guomindang government and they place their hopes in us. I also met many foreigners, including Americans, who sympathize with us. The broad masses of the people in foreign countries are dissatisfied with the reactionary forces in China and sympathize with the Chinese people’s forces. They also disapprove of Chiang Kaishek’s policies. We have many friends in all parts of the country and around the world; we are not isolated. Those who oppose civil war in China and stand for peace and democracy include not only the people in our Liberated Areas but also the masses in the Great Rear Area and throughout the world. The subjective desire of Chiang Kaishek is to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. He therefore must be a little realistic. He is being realistic, and we are realistic too. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him. We arrived in Chongqing on August 28. On the evening of the 29th, I told the Guomindang representatives that China has needed peace and unity ever since the September 18th Incident in 1931.5 We asked for peace and unity, but it did not materialize. Peace and unity materialized only after the Xi’an Incident of 19366 before the outbreak of the War of Resistance on July 7, 1937. For eight years we fought together against Japan, but the civil war never ended; there were continuous frictions, great and small. To say that there was no civil war is deceptive and does not square with the facts. During the past eight years we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate. At our Party’s Seventh Congress we declared that “we are willing to resume negotiations with the Guomindang authorities as soon as they are willing to renounce their present erroneous policies and agree to democratic reforms.” In the negotiations we declared that first, China needs peace and, second, China needs democracy. Chiang Kaishek could find no reason to object and he had to agree. On the one hand, the policy of peace and the agreement on democracy published in the “Summary of the Conversations” are words on paper and do not yet exist in reality. Instead, they have been determined by a variety of forces. The forces of the people in the Liberated Areas, the forces of the people in the Great Rear Area, the international situation – the general trend has forced the Guomindang to accept these things. How to give “tit-for-tat” depends on the situation. Sometimes not going to the negotiations is tit-for-tat, and sometimes going to the negotiations is also tit-fortat. We were right not to go before, and we were also right to go this time; in both cases, we have given tit-for-tat. We were right to go this time, for we squelched

5.  The Mukden Incident, when Japan invaded Manchuria. 6.  This was the incident in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped by his subordinates Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001, born in Anshan) and Yang Hucheng for the purpose of forcing changes in the Guomindang’s policies toward Japan and the Chinese Communist Party.

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the rumor spread by the Guomindang that the Communist Party does not want peace and unity. They sent three successive telegrams to invite us and we went. But they were totally unprepared, and we had to make all the proposals. As a result of the negotiations, the Guomindang has accepted the general policy of peace and unity. That is fine. If the Guomindang launches a civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we will have all the more reason to repel its attacks through a war of self-defense. Now that the “October l0th Agreement” has been concluded, our task is to uphold the agreement, to demand that the Guomindang honor it, and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight, we will wipe them out completely. This is the way things are: If they attack and we wipe them out, will that bring satisfaction? Wipe out some, some satisfaction; wipe out more, more satisfaction; wipe out the whole lot, complete satisfaction. China’s problems are complicated, and our minds must also be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we fight back, fight to win peace. Peace will not come unless we strike hard blows at the reactionaries who dare to attack the Liberated Areas. Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas.7 It is a great pity to concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity? Because these Liberated Areas have been created and arduously built up by the people, with sweat and blood. We must therefore explain matters clearly to the people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas we are going to concede. Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Guomindang will feel uneasy. They are returning to Nanjing, and some Liberated Areas in the south are right by their beds or in their corridors. So long as we are there, they will not be able to sleep easily and will therefore fight for those places at all costs. Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Guomindang’s plot for a civil war and will win us the sympathy of the numerous centralist elements at home and abroad. All the propaganda organs in China, except Xinhua News Agency, are now controlled by the Guomindang. They are all rumor factories. Concerning the current negotiations, they have spread the rumor that the Communist Party only wants territory and will make no concessions. Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for the peace and democracy that the people of the whole country need. In our past dealings with Chiang Kaishek, we also made concessions, and even larger ones. In 1937, to bring about the nationwide War of Resistance, we voluntarily dropped the name “Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government,” changed the name of our Red Army to “National Revolutionary Army,” and altered our policy of confiscating the land of landlords to a policy of reducing rent and interest. This time, by conceding certain areas in the south, we have completely squelched

7.  This refers to the bases in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Sunan, Wannan, Wanzhong, Hunan, Hubei, and Henan that the People’s Army established during the Anti-Japanese War.

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the Guomindang’s rumors before the people of China and the whole world. It is the same with the problem of the armed forces. Guomindang propaganda has been saying that the Communist Party is just scrambling for guns. But we have said we are ready to make concessions. First, we proposed cutting our present armed strength to forty-eight divisions. As the Guomindang has 263 divisions, this means our strength would be about one-sixth of the total. Later, we proposed a further reduction to forty-three divisions, about one-seventh of the total. The Guomindang then said they would reduce their armed strength to 120 divisions. We said we would reduce by the same proportion to twenty-four or even twenty divisions, which would still be only one-seventh of the total. In the Guomindang army, the proportion of officers as compared to soldiers is unduly large and the complement of a division is under 6,000. By the Guomindang’s standards, we could form 200 divisions out of our 1,200,000 men. But we are not going to do so. The Guomindang can therefore say nothing more and all their rumors are bankrupt. Does this mean that we are going to hand over our guns to the Guomindang? Not that either. If we hand over our guns, won’t the Guomindang have too many? The arms of the people, every gun, and every bullet, must be kept and not be handed over. The above is what I want to say to the comrades about the present situation. The developments show many contradictions. In the negotiations between the Guomindang and our Party, why is there agreement on some questions and not on others? Why does the “Summary of Conversations” speak of peace and unity, while fighting is actually still going on? Some comrades just cannot understand such contradictions. What I have said is meant to answer these questions. Some comrades cannot understand why we are willing to negotiate with Chiang Kaishek, who has always been anti-Communist and against the people. Was our Party right or wrong to decide at its Seventh Congress that we would be willing to negotiate with the Guomindang, provided it changed its policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese Revolution will be a long one, and victory can only be won step by step. China’s future depends on our efforts. The situation will remain in flux for six months or so. We must redouble our efforts so that it develops in a direction favorable to the people of the whole country. Now, a few more words about our work. Some comrades present will be leaving for the front. Many, full of enthusiasm, are vying with one another for the opportunity to work at the front, and this active and fervent spirit is very valuable. But there are also a few comrades who have mistaken ideas, who do not think of the many difficulties to be overcome but believe that everything will be plain sailing at the front and that they will have an easier time than in Yan’an. Are there people who think that way? I believe there are. I advise such comrades to correct their ideas. If one goes to the front, it is to work. What is work? Work is struggle. There are difficulties and problems in those places for us to overcome and solve. We go there to work and struggle to overcome these difficulties. A good comrade is one who is more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is difficult. Difficult work is like a load placed before us, challenging us to

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shoulder it. Some loads are light, some are heavy. Some people prefer the light over the heavy; they pick the light and leave the heavy to others. That is not a good attitude. Some comrades are different; they leave ease and comfort to others and carry the heavy loads themselves; they are the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts. They are good comrades. We should all learn from their communist spirit. Many local cadres will be leaving their native places for the front, and many southern-born cadres who went to Yan’an are also going to the front. Once there, all comrades going to the front should be psychologically prepared to take root, blossom, and bear fruit. We Communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with the people, take root, and blossom among the people. Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned about the people, and help them overcome their difficulties. We must unite with the masses; the more masses we unite with, the better. We must go all-out to mobilize the masses, expand the people’s forces, and under the leadership of our Party defeat the aggressor and build a new China. This is the policy laid down by the Party’s Seventh Congress. We must strive to carry it out. China depends on the Communist Party and the people to run her affairs. We have the will and the way to achieve peace and democracy. Provided we unite even more closely with all of China’s people, China’s affairs can be run well. The world after World War II has a bright future. This is the general trend. Does the failure of the Five Power Conference of Foreign Ministers in London8 mean that a third world war is about to break out? No. Just think, how is it possible for a third world war to break out right after the end of World War II? The capitalist and socialist countries will reach compromises on a number of international matters because compromise will be advantageous. The proletariat and the people of the whole world are firmly opposed to an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist war. During the past thirty years, two world wars have been fought. Between the First and Second World Wars there was an interval of more than twenty years. In the half-million years of human history, it is only in the last thirty years that world wars have been fought. After World War I the world made great progress. After World War II the world is sure to make even faster progress. Following World War I, the Soviet Union was born and scores of Communist parties were founded – they did not exist before. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has become much stronger, the face of Europe has changed, the political consciousness of the proletariat and the people of the world is much higher, and progressive forces throughout the world are more closely united. Our China is also undergoing rapid and drastic change. The general trend in China’s development

8.  The meetings between the ministers of foreign affairs from the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Great Britain, and France took place in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945. This group held six meetings between 1945 and 1949. The meeting mentioned here was held in London from September 11 to October 2, 1945.

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is certainly for the better, not the worse. The world is progressing, the future is bright, and no one can change this general historical trend. We should carry out constant propaganda among the people about world progress and the bright future ahead to build up their confidence in victory. At the same time, we must tell the people and our comrades that there will be twists and turns in our road. There are still many obstacles and difficulties along the road of revolution. Our Seventh Party Congress assumed that the difficulties would be many, for we preferred to assume there would be more difficulties rather than fewer. Some comrades do not like to think much about the difficulties, but the difficulties are facts; we must recognize as many difficulties as there are and we should not adopt a “policy of non-recognition.” We must recognize difficulties, analyze them, and combat them. There are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to follow a road that twists and turns and not look to get things on the cheap. It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will get down on their knees of their own accord. In a word, while the prospects are bright, the road has twists and turns. There are still many difficulties ahead that we must not overlook. By uniting with the entire people in a common effort, we can certainly overcome all the difficulties and win a victory.

Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan’an Party School (October 17, 1945) Comrades, let us talk about the present situation. First, about the negotiations in Chongqing. This time the negotiations have lasted for dozens of days. As you all know, the results have been published in the newspapers. The representatives of the two parties are continuing to negotiate. The negotiations have been held against the background of a new situation. The two parties held many negotiating sessions during the War of Resistance, but none of them bore any fruit. This time, however, agreement has been reached on some points, whereas there has been no agreement on some other points. A compromise will be necessary in the end, but this will take some time. The agreed-upon points are ones that were not settled previously. But they still are only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. A very great effort must be made before they can be turned into reality. Anyway, the negotiations this time have borne fruit. During the negotiations, some comrades, both in Yan’an and Chongqing, are pessimistic. They think that is no hope for peace and compromise and that a civil war will break out. This idea is shared by some foreigners. Nonetheless, the results have shown that hope does exist. Others are too optimistic. They believe an agreement will soon be reached and everything can be resolved based only on our willingness. Many comrades 1

Our source for this text is from Gang’ersi Wuhan daxue zongbu, zhongnan minyuan geweihui xuanchuanbu and Wuhan shiyuan geweihui xuanchuanbu, eds., Mao Zedong si­xiang wansui (1968), pp. 74–79. This report was revised and included in the 4th volume of Xuanji (1960), pp. 1155–64, and its title was changed to “On the Chungking Negotiations.” Like many other speeches by Mao, this report has been greatly revised. More importantly, we still cannot find the master copy used by the editors of Xuanji. The master copy and the edition of Mao Zedong sixiang wansui used here may not be the same version. In other words, Mao’s speech was recorded by different people, and their respective records are quite different. The Wansui text and The Xuanji text can almost be regarded as two different works. Therefore, we decided to translate the full text of the Wansui text, but not to mark the differences with the Xuanji text. See the English edition of Xuanji, Vol. 4, pp. 53–63, and the entry “On the Chongqing Negotiations,” supra. 112

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-47

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in Yan’an and the Great Rear Areas think in this way. These two ideas are not right. It has already been proved and will continue to be proved by the facts. Let us talk about the agreements on the principles of peace and democratic rights. The two parties accepted the principle of peace and agreed that civil war should be averted and they should cooperate in peace to build a new China. But, in fact, in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Shandong, and Shanxi— where there are Liberated Areas—fighting is going on or preparations for fighting are being made. Because the Guomindang has mobilized so many troops to attack us, we cannot wait until they attack. The very first article of the “October 10 Agreement” is about peace. Don’t these words on paper contradict the reality? Yes, they do. That is why we say it still will require effort on our part to turn what is on paper into reality. And we should be well-prepared for when the Guomindang launches a major strike on our troops in the Liberated Areas. Why does the question of the Liberated Areas remain unsettled? Because long ago, the Guomindang made up its mind to occupy the major cities, launch a major offensive attack against us, and wipe us out. Most of all, it wants to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, it hopes to worsen our situation and to improve its own situation. On the one hand, this is a contradiction between the thoughts of the Guomindang and the thoughts of the people all over the world. Peace, though written into the agreement, has not in fact been realized. Who knows what will happen in the future? Now there is large-scale fighting. For example, in Shanxi Yan Xishan sent twelve divisions to attack us. Shouldn’t we follow the policy of tit-for-tat and fight for every inch of land? This time, we engaged in tit-for-tat and did a very good job of fighting. In other words, we wiped out all twelve divisions. Their attacking forces had 38,000 men, and we only deployed 31,000 men. Of their 38,000 forces, 35,000 were destroyed, 2,000 fled, and 1,000 were scattered. Such fighting will continue. They desperately want to seize our Liberated Areas. This seems difficult to resolve. Why are they so anxious to fight? Isn’t it good for the Liberated Areas to be in our hands? Yes, but that is only what we think and what the people think. They think differently. If they thought so too, then there would be unity and we would all be “comrades” gathered here in the auditorium. But not all people in the world are comrades. They cannot see why they should not oppose us. For our part, we cannot see why we should let them seize our Liberated Areas. When two “can’t-see-whys” come together, fighting begins. When it is natural that they will grab our Liberated Areas, then we will fight back. Since there are two “can’t-see-whys,” then why have they engaged in negotiations? And why have they concluded the joint communiqué and declared lasting cooperation? In this world, things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from many different perspectives, not from just one perspective. Our thinking is thus complicated. In Chongqing, some people think that Chiang Kaishek is unreliable and deceitful and that negotiations with him will lead to nowhere. I was told so by many people whom I met, including some members of the Guomindang. I told them what

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they said was justified and well-founded and that we are firmly convinced by eighteen years of experience that this will be the case. The Guomindang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting, and sure to break with each other. But that is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that many factors are bound to make Chiang Kaishek have misgivings. Among these, there are three main factors: opposition to a civil war by the people in the Great Rear Areas and in the Liberated Areas, the international situation, and the might of the people and the army in the Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party. The majority of people in the Great Rear Areas and the people in the newly recovered areas desire peace and require democracy. People who have not been to Chongqing do not feel this way. It is only when I was there in Chongqing that I had this profound sense of the warm support given to us by the broad masses of people and friends. They are dissatisfied with the Guomindang government. Many capitalists are dissatisfied because of the economic panic. They called on me and asked me to talk to them, and they also invited me to dinner. Some college professors, even including some from Central University, said they no longer wanted to teach in Chongqing. I tried to persuade them to continue there, but they seemed impatient. Some figures from cultural, theatrical, and film circles said they did not want to perform anymore. I again persuaded them, but they still expressed their unwillingness and some even wept. They had hoped that my visit there would generally bring about peace and resolve everything. I told them I had come to be examined. Who are the examiners? You and the Chinese people at large. I am afraid I cannot fulfill your expectations. How I wish everything will be settled. Yet, I told them, things are not determined only by me or by the Communist Party. If only other parts of China were like the Liberated Areas! There is real freedom in the Liberated Areas, where one can teach or work as long as one is willing to go there. But I was just a guest in Chongqing and I was invited there for the negotiations. That is also the case for many foreigners. The U.S. government did a good job fighting against Japan. But it also had many reactionary policies, for example supporting Chiang Kaishek and opposing the people. That being said, you should not take it for granted that all foreigners are reactionaries. I saw many foreigners, including some journalists, air force fighters, economists, and even some from the foreign embassies, who were sympathetic with us and enthusiastic about the negotiations. In other words, most foreigners, dissatisfied with China’s reactionary forces, are willing to see the rise of the Chinese people. Among the foreign countries, there is one country that is different. That is the Soviet Union. It has signed a treaty with China and has legal relations with China. Is the treaty beneficial to China? At most, it is beneficial and absolutely beneficial to the Chinese people. In the very beginning, some from the Guomindang and the U.S. government happily thought the Sino-Soviet Treaty would be good for the Guomindang and would isolate the Communist Party. Nevertheless, after only a bit more than one month, they changed their attitude. One general from the Guomindang said: The Sino-Soviet Treaty gave them a shot, a shot of

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malaria rather than a shot of blood, making them feel alternately hot and cold. These words were not from our mouths, but from the mouths of the Guomindang. Today, I’d like not to make any more comments on this point. This year, in every Liberated Area as well as in Yan’an, on the day of the October Revolution we should celebrate the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and call for earnest implementation of the treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, China is forbidden to join any bloc against the Soviet Union. The Chiang Kaishek government, as the legal Chinese government, signed this treaty. It is best that the Chiang Kaishek government signed the treaty because all previous anti-Soviet talk came from this reactionary clique. After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, it is impossible for Chiang Kaishek to wage such a large-scale civil war against the Communist Party as it did in 1927. This is the general trend. Things have changed under the treaty and the launch of a civil war cannot now be decided merely by Chiang Kaishek. In other words, it is Chiang Kaishek’s subjective desire to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. At present, all Chinese people, not only people in the Liberated Areas but also among the Allies, do not wish to see a civil war. The outbreak of a civil war in China will have a direct bearing on the entire world. Moreover, our Party is not the same as it was in 1927. Our status has improved. Previously our Party was not recognized as a legal equal, but now it has been recognized, which is clearly revealed in the joint communiqué. This is the first time the Communist Party has become legitimate and has been treated as an equal. In addition, work in the Liberated Areas and by the Communist Party in other parts of China has impacted all of China and even the entire world. Against this backdrop, Chiang was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to Chongqing to negotiate with him. We arrived in Chongqing on August 28. During that first evening, I told Wang Shijie that the country has needed peace and unity ever since the September 18 Incident of 1931. We had asked for peace and unity, but it never materialized. Peace and unity materialized only after the Xi’an Incident of 1936 before the outbreak of the War of Resistance on July 7, 1937. I mentioned this point not only to other representatives of the Guomindang but also to Chiang Kaishek. During those eight years we fought together against Japan. This was the main factor, though the civil war never really ended—we had different fighting methods and there were various conflicts amongst us. To say that there was no civil war is deceptive and does not square with the facts, but the general trend of fighting against Japan was not overshadowed. During the past eight years, we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate as long as they made some changes. At our Seventh Party Congress, we declared the policy of “washing faces.” We wanted them to “wash their faces.” They refused, so our desire was not fulfilled. But now they have proposed washing; they washed, and we have accepted. This time we have reached many agreements concerning the principles of peace and democratic rights. On the one hand, it will require efforts to turn these words on paper into reality. On the other hand, we should not deem

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these agreements as outright deceptions. This is determined by a variety of forces. The power of the people in the Liberated Areas and the Great Rear Areas as well as the general trend in the international situation are bound to make Chiang Kaishek a little more realistic. The above is what I want to say to the comrades about the present situation. Everyone agrees there are many contradictions. In the negotiations between the Guomindang and our Party, why is there agreement on some issues and not on others? Why does the communiqué speak of peace and unity, while fighting is actually still going on? Some comrades just cannot understand such contradictions. Other comrades cannot understand why we are willing to negotiate with Chiang Kaishek, who has always been anti-Communist. Was our Party right or wrong in deciding at its Seventh Congress that we were willing to negotiate with the Guomindang, provided that it changed its policy? What I have said is meant to answer these questions. Some comrades have asked why we should concede the eight Liberated Areas. It is a pity to make this concession, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity? Because these Liberated Areas have been created and arduously built by the people with their sweat and blood. Therefore, we must explain matters clearly to the people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas that are to be conceded. Why should we concede these areas? All means of propaganda in China, except for those in the Liberated Areas, are now controlled by the Guomindang. They are all rumor factories. Concerning the current negotiations, they have spread the rumor that the Communist Party only wants territory and will make no concessions. Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to principles, it is permissible to make certain concessions. It should be known that this is not our first concession in dealing with Chiang Kaishek; in the past, we made even larger concessions. Do you know we formerly formed the “Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government” in the Central Soviet Area? But, at the beginning of spring and summer of 1937, we voluntarily conceded this government and area to bring the Guomindang into the War of Resistance. In the past, we also carried out an agrarian revolution by confiscating the land of the landlords. But to rally the landlords around the nationwide resistance, we changed our policy to one of reducing rents and interest. For a concession this time, we will not set up a separate kitchen and form a new government; we will continue the policy of reducing rents and interest rather than the policy of giving land to the tiller. In terms of areas, by conceding certain areas in the south, we have revealed our willingness to concede and we have completely exposed the Guomindang’s rumors before the people of all of China. This is also the case in terms of the problem of the armed forces. First, we proposed cutting our present strength to forty-eight divisions. As the Guomindang has 236 divisions, this means our strength would be only about one-sixth of the total. But Guomindang propaganda has been saying that the Communist Party is just scrambling for guns. Therefore, we proposed further cutting our strength to forty-three divisions and we allowed them

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to maintain 236 divisions. Then the Guomindang said it would reduce its armed forces to 120 divisions, 100 divisions, or even 90 divisions. We said we would reduce by the same proportion to twenty divisions, which would still be only onesixth of theirs. In the Guomindang army the proportion of officers to soldiers is unduly large and the complement of a division is less than 6,000. By this standard, should we surrender our guns to them? No, not that either. If we hand over our guns, won’t the Guomindang have too many? The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be retained and must not be handed over. But we still proposed cutting our strength. Therefore, the Guomindang can say nothing more and all their rumors are bankrupt. About recognition of the rest of the Liberated Areas in the south, will the Guomindang recognize their existence? We proposed this question as many as five times in the past and there will still be arguments back and forth in the future. Since fighting for every inch of land is our principle, why have we conceded almost every inch of land? You may feel puzzled. In fact, fighting for every inch of land is a slogan. Just imagine, they have already placed their beds there. But if we are also there, they will not sleep easily. They are returning to Nanjing and will therefore fight for those places in Zhejiang at all costs because those places are just near their beds. Therefore, we have to concede. Moreover, we are not able to hold these areas. Why shouldn’t we be generous and voluntarily withdraw? We even should withdraw from some areas as soon as possible! Take Guangdong as an example. General Wang Zhen took a long and tortuous route but finally arrived there. But not long after he arrived, the Japanese invaders surrendered! He had to return. This shouldn’t have been a big matter. But what an arduous way he and his army traversed from Yan’an to Guangdong and then to Hubei! The Guomindang troops attacked them all the way. Some of the troops blocked them from the front while others chased them from behind. Nonetheless, they didn’t stop us. We moved ahead unhindered as if the Monkey King were in Heaven. Finally, we retreated to the north of the Yangzi River. Arduous as it was, we won a great victory. In the negotiations, we also made some concessions in the Liberated Areas of Hunan. Take the Liberated Areas in eastern Zhejiang as another example. Although Gu Zhutong’s troops stood in our way of retreat, finally we arrived near Shanghai, rather than being forced to cross the Yangzi River. Calculating these gains and losses in a holistic way, we find the gains outweighed the losses. The principle of fighting for every inch of land still works, because our losses in one place are soon compensated for in another place. We lost one inch in one place but we gained one foot in another place. Therefore, we gained 11 inches. How to engage in “tit-for-tat” depends on the situation. Is tit-for-tat only reflected in not participating in the negotiations? Sometimes, not participating in the negotiations is tit-for-tat, and sometimes participating in the negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to participate before, and we were also right to participate this time; in both cases we engaged in tit-for-tat. They sent three telegrams in succession to invite us, and we finally accepted. But they were totally

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unprepared, and we had to make all the proposals. We exposed the rumor spread by the Guomindang that the Communist Party did not want peace and unity. Our task now is to uphold the agreement, to demand that the Guomindang honor it, and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight, we will wipe them out completely, and then peace will follow. Take the fighting in the Shangdang area as an example. This area, surrounded by the Taihang, Taiyue, and Zhongtiao Mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, so the reactionary Yan Xishan sent his troops to grab it. We wiped them out, and they were convinced. Wipe out some, some persuasion; wipe out some more, more persuasion; wipe out the whole lot, complete persuasion. China’s problems are complicated, and our brains must also be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we will fight back. But peace will not be broken. This is determined by the general trend. Now a few more words about our work. Some comrades present here will be leaving for the front. Some will stay here for study and work. For all of you, I must offer suggestions. Many, full of enthusiasm, are vying with one another for the opportunity to go to the front. If they want to go, we will give them sendoffs. Please rest assured that these “send-offs” are not like those given by the Guomindang to Wang Zhen. Such an active and fervent spirit is valuable, but I want to throw in some cold water. There are a few comrades who have mistaken ideas, who don’t think of the many difficulties to be overcome and believe that everything will be plain sailing at the front and they will have an easier time than in Yan’an. Are there people who think that way? I believe there are. Some comrades want to go to the Northeast to recuperate rather than to work. I think it is better to recuperate in Yan’an than in other places. I went to Chongqing, but I feel Yan’an is more suitable. I advise such comrades to correct their ideas. If one goes, it is to work. What is work? Work is struggle. In those places there are difficulties for us to overcome and resolve. We go there to work and struggle to overcome these difficulties. A good comrade is one who is more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is hard. Hard work is like a load placed before us, challenging us to shoulder it. Before us there are two loads—one weighs 40 kilos and the other weighs 50 kilos. Which one should we choose? (Of course, the choice is only applicable to people with enough strength; we cannot expect a 14-year-old boy to shoulder such heavy work.) Some people prefer a lighter load, but they feel embarrassed to speak out. Therefore, they dodge about, asking “how about the weather.” Yet other comrades are different. Rather than asking about the weather, they ask which load is heavier. On hearing the answer, they directly shoulder the heavy load. We should all learn from their spirit. Many local comrades will be leaving their native places for the front in the Northeast. All the comrades going to the Northeast should be psychologically prepared, and, once there, they should take root, blossom, and bear fruit. Not too long ago, Liberation Daily published an article entitled “To Take Root and Blossom in a Local Place” (published on August 28). This is a good article and it is worthy of being broadcast. Many southern-born comrades who joined the

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Eighth Route Army took root and blossomed in Yan’an, and now they are going to the Northeast to take root, blossom, and bear fruit. The place is like the people and those few going there are like the seeds. The seeds must be planted in the soil. They must unite with the people, take root, and blossom. We must unite with the masses; the more masses we unite with, the better. This is also the line laid down at our Seventh Party Congress. Wherever our comrades go, they should shoulder the 50-kilo load when two loads are placed before them. They should choose to eat one less steamed bun and leave one more steamed bun for the others. Comrades acting in this way are the best comrades and the best Communists, deserving respect and admiration. For those who will stay here, I also have some words. I hear that some comrades need to be persuaded to stay here. Some comrades may ask why they are asked to stay here to study while others are allowed to eat and work for a better life. Why am I being kept in Yan’an while others can go the Northeast? Of course, going to the front is a revolutionary requirement and it is good that some comrades are active and fervent in choosing to go to the front. Still, Yan’an also needs comrades. If we now were to hold a vote to decide whether to abolish the Central Committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Border Region Government, I am afraid none of you present would raise your hand. The work of the Central Committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Border Region Government also needs to be done. Therefore, not everyone should leave for the front. Otherwise, who will do the work here? So, I have to decide whether you stay or whether you leave. Some people say that the lot has already been cast and the Central Committee is about to leave. Why not leave before the Central Committee? I tell them that the lot has not yet been cast, so the Central Committee will remain here. When will the Central Committee leave? We will not leave until such a situation exists that moving is better than not moving. Now it is better not to leave, even though leaving is very easy. “The tortoise creates a bumpy, mud road at the front, so the tortoise in the back can follow.” This will help those left behind. Since tens of thousands have tested the road, isn’t it easy for the Central Committee to follow that path and leave? Nevertheless, we still need comrades and cadres to work here in the Central Committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Border Region Government, as well as in their lower organs. Therefore, those who stay here, I advise you had better focus your minds on your work. The Chinese Revolution is a long struggle and victory must be won gradually. It is unrealistic for us to swallow the whole of China in just one mouthful. The results of the negotiations depend on how we struggle. In about half a year, the situation will still be full of unrest. We must struggle to achieve a situation that generally favors the people of the whole country. While the prospects are bright (despite so many difficulties), the road will have many twists and turns. Our Seventh Party Congress assumed that the difficulties will be many, for we prefer to assume there will be more difficulties rather than fewer difficulties. Some comrades do not like to think much about difficulties. But difficulties are facts: we

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should recognize as many difficulties as there are. We Communists, as realists, should not adopt a “policy of non-recognition.” Such a policy of non-recognition can only be applied to the traitor Wang Kemin and his ilk. Those traitors should be beheaded. Nonetheless, this policy is not applicable to difficulties. We must recognize difficulties, analyze them, and combat them. I hope that comrades, whether they leave or remain, will all think in this way and avoid looking at problems one-sidedly. The world after World War II has a bright future. This is the general trend. Does the failure of the conference of the foreign ministers of the five Allied powers in London mean that a third world war is about to break out? No. A third world war will not break out soon. There will be compromise. Compromise will be advantageous; in the past, compromise was advantageous for fighting against fascism and now it is advantageous for safeguarding peace. Why will there be compromise between the capitalist countries and the socialist countries? There is no need to explain this. A third world war would be a war against the people and against Yan’an, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and communism. Therefore, the proletariat and the people of the whole world are firmly opposed to an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist war, which will make war impossible. In Chongqing, I told many people that people around the age of 40 all watched the outbreak of two world wars. World War I began in August 1914 and ended in 1918; World War II began in 1939 or 1941 and ended in August 1945. Between these two world wars there was an interval of twenty-eight years. People who died before August 1914 and those who will be born after August 1945 are not blessed enough to have observed the outbreak of two world wars within thirty years. In the half a million years of human history, it is only during the last thirty years that world wars have been fought. Why have two world wars broken out in the last thirty years? It is because of the collision of the two classes—the capitalists and the socialists. When they meet each other, they will squeeze each other and conflicts will be unavoidable. When there are large conflicts, large-scale wars will emerge. After World War I, the world made great progress. After World War II, the world is sure to make even faster progress. After World War I, the Soviet Union was born and scores of communist parties that did not yet exist were established. After World War II, what changes will take place in the Soviet Union? How will China change? What changes will occur in Europe? What will happen in the United States? The political and class consciousness of the proletariat and the people of the United States are much higher, and the progressive forces of the world are more united. Therefore, a third world war can be avoided, the bluster of the reactionaries can be frustrated, and the world can be progressive and bright. We should engage in constant propaganda among the people on these points. At the same time, we must tell the people and tell our comrades that there will be twists and turns along the way and there are no straight roads in the world. We must be prepared to follow a tortuous road and not try to get things on the cheap.

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It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will get down on their knees of their own accord. In a word, while the prospects for the world are bright, the road will have many twists and turns. By uniting all the people in China and the people in the world at large, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and achieve victory.

Telegram to Chen Geng, and for the Information of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, and Xiao Ke1 (October 19, 1945) A. The Sixteenth Army of Hu Zongnan’s2 diehard troops has successfully crossed the Zhengtai railway and arrived at Shijiazhuang. Hu ordered it to actively prepare for the march into Beiping. The Thirty-second Division of the Third Army stayed overnight in the Huexian county seat on October 11. The next day it continued its march northward, and it is estimated to have arrived at Yuci. The Seventh Division stayed overnight in Zhaoqu, south of Linfen, on October 12; its subsequent movements are unclear. The army headquarters stayed in Zhaocheng during the night of October 14, and we estimate that it has arrived at Yuci. On October 16, Hu ordered the 167th Division of the First Army to amass at Houma and await further orders. It appears that it is going to continue marching northward; this division was in Wenxi, Anyi, and Yuxiang before October 16. B. The Taiyue Brigade should secretly amass in eastern Hongtong, Lingshi, and Jiexiu, actively prepare for battle, and be determined to wipe out the Seventh or 167th Division. If this division does not move northward, you should occupy the segment of the Tongpu railway between Linfen and Jiexiu, mobilize the masses, and create a battlefield. C. All the local military corps and militiamen in every military subregion north and south of the Zhengtai railway should continue to destroy and attack the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 376. 1.  Chen Geng (1903–1961, born in Xiangxiang, Xiangtan) was field commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Fourth Column. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992, native of Sichuan) was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, and Xiao Ke (1907–2008, born in Jiahe county, Hunan) was deputy commander. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.

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Zhengtai railway. The main forces under the command of Zhao Erlu3 should turn toward the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway at once, amass their forces to attack and take over several railway stations and county seats between Shijiazhuang and Baoding, control part of the railway, and wipe out the diehard enemy troops one by one.

3.  Zhao Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi (Ji-Jin) Military Region.

Local Troops Should Be Transferred to Replenish the Field Army (October 19, 1945) To Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian]:1 1. We received your telegram sent on October 14 between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M.2 You have too few field armies and too many local armies. We expect you to transfer at least 10,000 troops from the subdistricts to replenish the field army, raising the number of troops in each regiment to over 2,000 so it will be possible to win major victories. This will be the first field army group and its total must reach about 24,000. 2. In the future, the field army should form a second group. We estimate that the first group will not survive in the Yanhe Plain District under the Guomindang’s policy of annihilation. Senior officials must now become psychologically prepared and begin the necessary preparatory work. When the time comes, our struggle in the area will become lawful (in coordination with other local unlawful struggles),3 and you will organize the principal local forces into a second group of the field army (one brigade for each subdistrict) to accompany the first group of the field army in its operations in the new area. Careful thought should be given to this matter, and it should not be done in a haphazard way. 3. The forces in southern Hubei Province and around Jiujiang must move north at once. 4. We look forward to hearing your opinions. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 62–63, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Zheng Weisan was acting secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui (E-Yu-Wan) Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Li Xiannian was a committee member of the bureau and commander of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army as well as commander and political commissar of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui-Hunan-Jiangxi (E-Yu-Wan-Xiang-Gan) Military Region. 2.  The telegram from the Hunan-Henan-Anhui Military Region spoke of reorganizing the number of personnel in the military region. 3.  Mao here uses “lawful” and “unlawful” (hefa, feifa) to designate what the Chinese Communist Party usually referred to as “open work” and “secret work.” 124

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The Current Policy for Developments in the Northeast1 (October 19, 1945) Our Party’s basic orientation is to concentrate our main forces on the JinzhouYingkou-Shenyang line and our secondary forces on the Zhuanghe-Andong line, resolutely rebuff the landing of Chiang’s army, and annihilate all of its possible attacks. First of all, defend Liaoning and Andong,2 and then control the entire Northeast. This marks a change in our former orientation of dispersion.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 64, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong added this paragraph to a telegram that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent to the Central Committee’s Northeast Bureau. 2.  Andong was the name of a province that the Guomindang government had just created out of the eastern portion of Liaoning and the southwestern portion of Jilin. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-50

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The Current Situation and the Tasks for the Next Six Months (October 20, 1945, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.) To all Central Bureaus, and to be forwarded to all district Party committees and all commanders of army units: The next six months or so, beginning now, will be a transitional period from the stage of resistance to Japan to the stage of peaceful reconstruction. The struggle over the next six months will be a decisive factor in determining our future political position during the entire stage of peace. During this period, the task of our Party in the areas occupied by the Guomindang (such as Chongqing, Shanghai, and Beiping) will be to expand the work of the national democratic united front; to cooperate with our vast numbers of sympathizers and those whom we are likely to win over, both in China and abroad; to organize the broad masses; to launch movements advocating democracy, meting out punishment to Chinese traitors, remedying the economic crisis, extending relief to the unemployed, and assisting people to return to their homes; and to continue to negotiate with the government authorities on issues yet to be resolved. The central task of our Party in the Liberated Areas will be to concentrate our forces to resist the attacks of the diehard armies and to expand as many of the Liberated Areas as possible. To achieve this, one thing we must do is to move a large number of army troops and cadres to places such as the Northeast and Rehe, organize the people there and expand the army, and stop and repel incursions there by the diehard armies. In all the Liberated Areas you will organize powerful field armies and systematically annihilate the diehard troops when they attack us, the more the better, and the more neatly and thoroughly the better. This is a defensive war. We have every reason to act like this since our position is justified and we are in a better situation. All the work in the Liberated Areas should serve this central task. This includes a reduction of rent for land and a reduction of interest on loans; wiping out traitorous Chinese elements; establishing a democratic government; and carrying on the political task of dismantling the diehard puppet regime. An especially important part of this battle for victory will be to organize the production activities of the 1

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 40–42, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 126

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people in the Liberated Areas next year and to guarantee the supply of grain, bedding, clothing, and daily necessities to both the army and the people in the Liberated Areas. The next six months will be similar to the last six: an especially intense period for the work of the whole Party. We hope that the leaders in each area and the core cadres demonstrate skill in managing their own work. During the past few months our Party has achieved great victories, but what the final result will be depends on our efforts in the next six months. Our view is that while the diehard faction is contending with us for North China and the Northeast (with the support of the Americans, the Japanese, and the puppet armies), it suffers from its own disadvantageous conditions (thin distribution of troops across vast areas, lack of familiarity with the people and the territory, deep penetration into the territory, isolation from the masses, logistical difficulties, structural disparities, and so on). As long as our Party adopts a clear orientation and makes resolute efforts, it is altogether necessary and entirely possible to triumph over and wipe out a great part of the diehard army attacking North China and the Northeast; to achieve an advantageous position for our Party and our army in North China and the Northeast, thus forcing the diehard faction to acknowledge our position; and then for the two parties to reach a compromise and create a new stage of peaceful reconstruction. Peace, democracy, unity, and unification are the established policies of our Party. This is stipulated in the October 10 Chongqing Agreement,1 and it is also the road the Guomindang must take. The Guomindang has, however, been trying hard in recent months to control more territory to gain superiority in North China and the Northeast. It has been trying hard to weaken our Party and our army to force us into a compromise that will be favorable to them in the realization of a peaceful reconciliation. Therefore, in this current transitional stage, large-scale and intense military struggle has broken out (we must not mistakenly conclude from the current large-scale military struggle that civil war has already begun). Our Party must clearly perceive the current situation, which is both unavoidable and already upon us, and we must resolutely uphold the orientation of both uniting and struggling and of achieving the goal of unity through struggle. We must never hesitate in the slightest in striving for victory in the current struggle, so we will then be at a greater advantage as we turn to the new stage of peaceful reconstruction. The greater our victory in the current struggle, the speedier the realization of peace will be and the better for all the people of China. Hence, we must make use of all the forces built up in the Liberated Areas over the years and the forces we will continue to rapidly build up in the fighting over the next six months to strive for a great victory in this struggle, because this is a decisive battle for China in the new historical stage. The Central Committee

1.  This refers to the summary of the conversation signed by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang in Chongqing on October 10, 1945, which is also known as the “Double Ten Agreement.”

On the Warfare in Shandong and Central China (October 22, 1945) To Zhang [Yunyi], Rao [Shushi], and Lai [Chuanzhu], and for the information of Luo [Ronghuan], Li [Zuopeng], Chen [Yi], and Li [Yu]:1 1. We received the telegram of October 20 from Chen Yi and Li Yu [which informs us that] the Eighth Division of our army in Shandong has taken Zou county, controls more than 40 li of the railway line, wiped out more than 2,000 of the diehard enemy and puppet troops, and is prepared to wipe out the diehard troops that are continuing to advance. Apart from this, the Third and Fourth divisions of our army in Shandong have taken Dawenkou2 and control 20 li of the railway line. 2. We hope that our New Fourth Field Army will expand its occupied area in the region near the railway line between Bangfu and Xuzhou and concentrate its main forces to wipe out the enemy. 3. So long as we control part of the railway line, the diehards are definitely going to attack, and the campaign will become bigger and bigger as it goes on. Our army must therefore first of all expand the occupied region both to the north and to the south to create a battlefield that is advantageous for fighting a mobile war. Second, we must assemble large and powerful field armies. Shandong and Central China must each have a field army of about 35,000 to 40,000, and they should also consider recruitment after continuous campaigns, and the mobilization of militiamen to assist the campaign. The local Party and administrative institutions should volunteer to assist the campaign.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 271–72; it also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 67–68. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander of the New Fourth Army, Rao Shushi was political commissar, and Lai Chuanzhu was chief-of-staff. Luo Ronghuan (1902–1963, native of Hunan) was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Military Region, and Li Zuopeng (1914–2009, native of Jiangxi) was chief-of-staff; at this time, they were preparing to go to Shandong. Chen Yi (1901–1972, born in Sichuan) was commander of the New Fourth Army, and Li Yu (1906–1986, native of Guoxian, Shanxi) was commander and deputy political commissar of the Shandong Military Region. 2.  Dawenkou is the name of a village south of Tai’an, Shandong Province. 128

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Shandong and Central China should each have the objective of wiping out 40,000 to 50,000 diehard troops. Third, for the purpose of amassing to wipe out the diehard forces, Shandong and Central China should each have only one principal line of attack, with the rest all being subordinate lines of attack. Do not disperse your strength. 4. In the Shangdang Campaign in Shanxi, a main force of 31,000 assisted by 50,000 militiamen fighting several consecutive campaigns during forty days eliminated 38,000 of the troops of diehard Yan.3 Apart from the 4,000 or so that escaped, more than 33,000 were wiped out and we captured a great many; this may be considered a model campaign. At present, Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]4 have assembled a field army of 60,000 and are ready to wipe out 40,000 of the 80,000 enemy troops that are marching northward from Xinxiang. Nie Rongzhen and He Long5 have amassed a field army of 50,000 men and are wiping out most or all of the 50,000 diehard enemy troops in eastern Suiyuan. If you can fight several excellent campaigns of annihilation, it will have a great impact on the overall situation.

3.  Diehard Yan is Yan Xishan, commander of the Guomindang’s Second War Zone. 4.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. 5.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. He Long (1896–1969, native of Hunan) was commander of the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia-Suiyuan Joint Defense Force and field commander of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region.

Isolate and Then Annihilate the Forces of Fu Zuoyi in Jining (October 24, 1945) To Nie [Rongzhen] and He [Long]:1 If the main force of Fu’s Army2 stubbornly defends Jining and you cannot capture it for the time being, we hope you will concentrate your main forces on destroying the enemy forces at Shibatai, Zhuozishan, Sandaoying, Qixiaying, and Baita,3 and on occupying the 200 li or so of the railway between Jining and Guisui.4 Mobilize the masses to establish political power, collect grain, isolate Fu’s forces in Jining, and then annihilate them. Please consider this method and telegraph us as to whether it is feasible. If Jining can be captured and Fu’s main force can be annihilated, there is no need to change the deployment. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 75–76, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Nie Rongzhen was commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. He Long was commander of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. 2.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone. 3.  These are all villages located along the Beiping-Suiyuan line between Jining and Guisui. Shibaitai, Sandaoying, and Qixiaying are all in Zhuozi county. Zhuozishan is the name of the village that is now the county seat of Zhouzi county. Baita is located near modern Hohhot. 4.  Modern Hohhot. 130

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Speech at the Seventh Branch School of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (October 25, 1945) Comrades: The student comrades at the Seventh Branch School of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University are all from the border areas and North China, and they have all worked in these areas; quite a few fought in battle and contributed to the cause of resisting Japan. You have been studying at the Seventh Branch School of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University for a long time, and now you are heading to the front; we have therefore convened a conference here to welcome you as well as to see you off. As everybody knows, the War of Resistance Against Japan has already ended, but a large part of the Japanese army has still not surrendered its arms, also hundreds of thousands of puppet troops have not yet handed over their guns, and a number of Japanese and puppet troops are still fighting us. Our Liberated Areas in North China, Central China, the Northeast, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area, have a total population of 150 million people, 1,300,000 troops, and more than 2,500,000 militiamen. Right now, the diehard faction in the Guomindang also wants to fight us. During the eight years of the War of Resistance they hid in the rear, seldom engaging in battle. Many of the troops have basically never fought a battle at all. Now that Japan has surrendered, they have reemerged, and they want to devour our Liberated Areas and fight our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. On this visit to Chongqing, I saw Chiang Kaishek, and our representatives and their representatives talked for more than forty days and discussed several things. There were two items, the first being that China wants peace and the second being that China wants democracy; we brought these up, and they, having no grounds on which to object, could only support them and we signed the Double Tenth Agreement.1 But at the same time, they were preparing a large number of troops

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 47–50, where it is reproduced from the transcript of Mao’s speech preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  This refers to the summary of talks signed by representatives from the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang in Chongqing on October 10, 1945, which is also known as the “Double Tenth Agreement.” DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-54

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to attack the Liberated Areas, altogether numbering 800,000, not including those surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area, which if included would bring the total to more than one million. We have already fought a number of battles, and in the first several battles, they lost face. If the fighting continues and we win, it is possible that peace could be achieved, and at that time we will send a representative to say to him: “Chairman Chiang, we have negotiated in the past, let us still make peace!” We do not want to fight, and if we do not go on fighting, peace will be possible. If it is they who are victorious in battle, our Liberated Areas will become dark places, our Party school will be unable to operate, and the Seventh Branch School likewise will be unable to operate. If they are allowed to occupy the border areas, there will no longer be a border area government, and the reductions in rent and interest will be canceled. Therefore, the people’s army, government, and Communist Party in the Liberated Areas must unite closely to smash the diehard faction’s offensive and resolutely wipe it out. Whoever dares to come, we shall wipe him out; there is no other way, there is only this way. Recently, we have been victorious in two battles.2 The first was in the Taihang Mountain region, fought in the Changzhi-Changzi area. Thirty-eight thousand men of Yan Xishan’s mountain army attacked us, while we only had 31,000 regular troops, all the rest being militiamen. With the help of 50,000 militiamen carrying the wounded and providing transport, we annihilated 35,000 of their men, with only 3,000 getting away, and we also captured a great number of their rifles, machine guns, and heavy artillery. The second battle was fought in Suiyuan. The diehard puppet armies attacked us with more than 60,000 men and advanced to the Zhangjiakou region. The first time, they were beaten back by us; the second time, they advanced to Jining (Pingdiquan), Fengzhen, and Hunyuan, and occupied 250 li of railroad line; we are currently still fighting. On the Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou lines, and in Hebei, Jiangsu, and Anhui, battles are being taken up everywhere. In all these battles, victory is within our grasp because vast areas are in our hands, the people support us, and local armies and guerrilla units have already developed into field armies. A place that has field armies numbering in the tens of thousands or one hundred thousand, and also has hundreds of thousands of militiamen, can deal with them very well. What does the future hold? In the future there eventually will be peace. In the coming months we must undertake a great deal of work to implement the Double Tenth Agreement and also to realize our demands for the realization of peace and democracy. The Double Tenth Agreement did not resolve the question of the Liberated Areas because they were unwilling to recognize the Liberated Areas. After several months, we will still demand that they recognize the Liberated Areas; not to recognize them will not do; this is the trend of the times in China.

2.  This is a reference to the Shangdang Campaign, which lasted from September 10 until October 12, 1945, and the Suiyuan Campaign, which began on October 18, 1945.

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This is the task of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army, and the task of the people of the Liberated Areas. Speaking of the people, I have seen many people in the Great Rear Area. They are all extremely enthusiastic, willing to help us, and they approve of our Liberated Areas. I have also seen a number of foreigners, for example Americans. Although their government’s policy is bad and anti-Communist, their pilots and ground troops are very friendly; they flock to me and always want to present me with a little something. In Chongqing I also saw Englishmen and Frenchmen. Some among them are not good, but the majority are good; their governments are not good, just like that of the Americans. Therefore, we must learn to analyze: a small number of people are bad, the large number are good. We have friends in all of China and the whole world; we are not isolated. It is good that you are going to the front. In going to the front, I hope you keep in mind that our general task is to struggle for nationwide peace and to break the reactionary elements who dare to attack us. Obtain peace; this is the first item. The second item is that we hope you expand and consolidate your ranks. Officers must absolutely be mindful of their attitudes and treat their troops as friends, comrades, and brothers. When you become an officer, you should adopt this kind of attitude and you should not learn from the Guomindang army officers, who treat their brothers poorly. Since we all stand on the same line to serve the people, and we all are prepared to sacrifice our lives for the good of all of China’s people, why would we treat our soldiers poorly? We absolutely must treat them well. After today, no matter which army you go to, you all must handle officersoldier relations well. If you treat the soldiers well, the soldiers will undoubtedly adopt an excellent attitude and will treat you well. This is the kind of army that no enemy can tear asunder. The Party Central Committee is just the same. We want to have democracy within the Party and to adopt a comradely, friendly, brotherly, and sisterly attitude toward our comrades. With the entire Party united, and with more than one million Party members united, we need not fear any enemy. The third item is that we must build good relations with the common people. Regardless of where our troops go, they all must look after the common people and resolve their difficulties. Every place we go, everything we eat, every house in which we stay, every piece of clothing we wear, all relies on help from the common people; if we do not properly handle our relations [with them] and do not receive their help, there will be no way for us to fight. We definitely want to handle military-civilian relations properly, but there are a number of places that have not done this. Of course, generally speaking, our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army have been good to the common people. You at the Seventh Branch School have also done this well. You at the Seventh Branch School have also undertaken production in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (Shaan-Gan-Ning) border area. If we do not engage in production, the people’s burden will be too heavy. Right now, fighting has broken out in North China, the Northeast, and a number of other areas and we must be even more attentive to improving military-civilian relations. We have brought up this issue with every group that has started out [for

134 Mao’s Road to Power

the front], and now we are raising it with you, and after you reach the front, we will raise it again. All our armies must unite with the people. You have studied a great deal, so I have raised these several items. If these matters I mentioned – that is, resolutely opposing offensives by the reactionary factions, struggling for nationwide peace, improving officer-soldier relations, and uniting the whole of the people with the whole of the army – are carried out, China’s situation will be easy to resolve. Handling China’s situation depends on the Chinese Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and the common people. We have determination, and we have a way to bring about peace, democracy, unity, and national unification. Peace, democracy, and unity are the orientation that our Party has established. We must struggle for this orientation. The Center’s work and your work is the same. My work, Commander Zhu [De]’s work, and your work is the same. We have no work other than the liberation of the people of China. Comrades! Unite together, be of one heart, and fight for the liberation of the people of China.

Transfer Our Forces to the Northeast as Rapidly as Possible (October 25, 1945) To Chen [Yi] and Li [Yu], Luo [Ronghuan] and Li [Zuopeng]:1 1. Crossing the seas and fighting in the field2 are equally important, but crossing the seas is more urgent. We request that Chen and Li please evaluate the situation regarding the arrival of the New Fourth Army and the circumstances of the obstinate enemy. If the New Fourth arrives in larger numbers than expected and the situation of the diehard enemy is not very acute, would it be possible to send troops ahead for the crossing and to let them go first? 2. Luo and Li, please organize the crossing of the seas carefully. You must keep crossing every day without interruption and continuously transfer the soldiers northward. The soldiers promised by Shandong should set out by both land and sea. They must all be transferred by next month and arrive in Liaoning Province, where they are in urgent demand. The faster this happens, the better. 3. Please consider these two points and respond. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 82–83, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar of the Shandong Military Region. Luo Ronghuan was the commander and political commissar, and Li Zuopeng was chief-of-staff, of the Shandong Military Region. At this time, they were preparing to go to Shandong. 2.  “Crossing the seas” refers to the Eighth Route Army’s forces in the Shandong Military Region crossing the Bohai Gulf to begin actions in the Northeast. “Fighting in the field” refers to both the counterattacks being waged by forces in the Shandong Military Region, including the New Fourth Army in Shandong, against the Guomindang forces invading the Shandong Liberated Areas along the Jin-Pu line near Xuzhou and Ji’nan, and the campaign to annihilate those puppet troops that refused to surrender. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-55

135

Dispositions for the Pinghan Campaign1 (October 27, 1945) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Bo [Yibo], Zhang [Jichun], and Li [Da]: We received your telegram of October 26.2 Your dispositions are entirely correct. Wait until all your units have arrived, conserve strength, and store up energy. By then the enemy will be hungry and exhausted and its weakness will be exposed. We will concentrate our main forces, seek the enemy’s weak spots, and wipe out one or two of its divisions, and the enemy’s morale will surely suffer a setback. Hu [Zongnan]’s troops3 in Shijiazhuang sent a telegram to Hu on October 26, saying that they would order one division to move toward Gaoyi in coordination with Hou Ruyong4 to reinforce the troops marching northward from Anyang. Its fighting capacity is not as good as that of the enemy now confronting you, and you may use local forces to delay its movements. The diehard enemy troops in Shijiazhuang and Xinxiang total eight divisions, and the diehard enemy troops in front of you total six divisions, adding up to no more than fourteen divisions.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 84–85. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 376–77. 1.  This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was sent to Commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region Liu Bocheng, Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping, First Deputy Political Commissar Bo Yibo (1908–2007, born in Taiyuan), Second Deputy Political Commissar and Chair of the Political Section Zhang Jichun (1900– 1968, native of Hunan), and Chief-of-Staff Li Da (1905–1993, born in Mei county, Baoji). 2.  The telegram from Liu Bocheng et al. said: The enemy now lacks confidence but is still resolute, and our rear troops consisting of 13,000 men have yet to arrive. We have thus resolved to continue harrying the enemy south and east of the Fu River. With only one-third of our military strength, we will try to wage a small battle to annihilate the enemy a column and a fort at a time. With our small elite force united, we will penetrate deep behind enemy lines to engage in positive activity while amassing our forces to rest. Once the rear troops that we are awaiting arrive, we will look for an opportunity to eradicate one or two enemy divisions. 3.  This refers to the Third and Sixteenth armies under the command of Hu Zongnan, commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone, which had just advanced in Shijiazhuang. 4.  Hou Ruyong (1908–1986, born in Zhaoxian Hebei) was originally a brigade commander for the puppet armies of the Independent Second Brigade of the Sixth Field Army. After Japan surrendered, his unit was absorbed by the Guomindang army and Hou became commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s advance army in the First War Zone. 136

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-56

October 1945 137

If you wipe out one or two divisions of the enemy troops in front of you, it may lead to a reinforcement of the remaining enemy troops from both the north and the south. You must be prepared to wipe out four or five divisions of the enemy in successive and repeated campaigns to change the overall situation. As far as the situation in Suiyuan is concerned, more than 50,000 of our forces under the command of Nie Rongzhen and He Long5 began the campaign on October 18. The enemy is very tenacious. In the beginning we wiped out only one regiment, put to flight one cavalry division, one infantry division, and a few less well-known units. After a week of hard fighting, we took Fengzhen and Liangcheng and we took Jining on October 24. Then the situation began to change. We wiped out the Twenty-sixth Division under the command of He Wending6 (who belongs to the Chiang faction) at Zhuozishan.7 The main forces of Fu Zuoyi’s8 101st and Thirty-second divisions are fleeing westward, and we are pursuing them in Guisui.9 As regards the situation in Hubei and Henan, the field army brigade of our Fifth Division is already set up. It has taken Tongbo and has joined forces with Wang Shusheng, Dai Jiying, and Wang Zhen.10 We have ordered it to operate freely and to cooperate with your campaign. We hope that you will pay attention to mobilizing the people to participate in the campaign, strengthening defense work, evacuating noncombatants, and hiding provisions and livestock, and that you will amass all possible strength to defeat the enemy facing you. As regards food supplies, you should prepare for protracted warfare.

5.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, He Long was commander of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. 6.  He Wending (1903–1968, native of Shaanxi) was commander of the Guomindang army’s 26th Division. 7.  The name of a town. It is now the county seat of Zhuozi county in Inner Mongolia. 8.  Fu Zuoyi was commanding officer of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone. 9.  Guisui is the old name for the city of Hohhot, now located in Inner Mongolia. 10.  Wang Shusheng and Dai Jiying were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Henan War Zone. Wang Zhen was commander of the 359th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army.

Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping1 (October 29, 1945) After reaching Gaoyi, we predict that one of the three divisions of the Sixteenth Army will be stationed in Lincheng, Boxiang, and Gaoyi to reinforce the rear and the wings. The other two divisions will proceed southward. If we use our local forces and land-mine warfare by the militia to launch a powerful strike and create the misleading impression that we have our main forces in this area, it is sure to cause a couple of days of delay and to prevent [the enemy] from advancing with confidence. Meanwhile, we can win enough time to wipe out the enemy in front of us. Afterwards, we can turn on the enemy reinforcements and wipe them out. This will be very much to our advantage. There are six divisions in front of you. If you add to this the two divisions of the Sixteenth Army, the total number will not exceed eight divisions. As long as we adopt the policy of annihilating them one-by-one and amassing an absolutely superior military force to wipe out one division each time, after wiping out two or three divisions in two or three campaigns, the overall situation is certain to change. The Military Commission

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 91. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 377–78. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar. 138

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-57

Additional Points for the Negotiations with the Guomindang (October 29, 1945) To C and D, from A and B1 on the 29th: 1. We agree on the measures described in the telegram of [October] 26.2 2. Except for the cities of Beiping, Tianjin, and Qingdao, the Guomindang troops must not be quartered on the eight railways (or twelve railways, if adding the Rehe, Cang-Shi, Bai-Jin, and Dao-Qing railways). At least one unit of the Eighth Route Army must be stationed in the cities of Beiping, Tianjin, and Qingdao. 3. End the civil war immediately and withdraw the attacking armies from all areas. 4. Carry out Sun Yatsen’s policies of popular elections and local self-government in the Northeast, North China, northern Jiangsu, and northern Anhui, as well as in the border areas. It is forbidden to appoint personnel. 5. Meanwhile, please explain to all circles that the government’s so-called peace and democracy are a complete fraud. In reality, they have already launched a nationwide civil war. The Double Tenth Agreement3 is a mere scrap of paper. The purpose of the government’s urgent desire to convene a political conference is to force all parties to accept the old delegates and to arrange for a grand ceremony of induction.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 51–52, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1. This is a telegram from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (referred to here as A and B) to the Chinese Communist delegation in Chongqing (referred to here as C and D). 2.  The telegram from Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei stated that in an effort to avoid civil war, they had recommended to the Guomindang four temporary measures: (1) To immediately cease all military offensives. (2) To immediately cease all deployments by the Guomindang army into the Liberated Areas. (3) To restore the railways to their normal conditions and not to station troops along rail lines (apart from those in the cities). (4) For the Guomindang not to move troops on eight railways (the Ping-Sui, Tong-Pu, Zheng-Tai, the eastern portion of the Long-Hai, the northern portion of the Ping-Han, Jin-Pu, Jiao-Ji, and Bei-Ning railways). 3.  See previous documents, in particular “The Current Situation and the Tasks for the Next Six Months,” October 20, 1945, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-58

139

Zhao Erlu Is to Proceed to Lincheng1 (October 30, 1945) To Zhao Erlu, and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], and Deng [Xiaoping]:2 The Thirtieth Army, the Fortieth Army, and the New Eighth Army are surrounded in the Handan area by our comrades Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, and a fierce battle is ongoing. Hu Zongnan3 ordered all three divisions of the Sixteenth Army at Shijiazhuang to move southward to provide reinforcements. To resolutely wipe out the encircled enemy and then eliminate the enemy reinforcements, we have decided to change the deployment of Zhao’s forces. After receiving this telegram, Comrade Zhao Erlu should lead the six main-force regiments directly southward to the Lincheng area, southwest of Gaoyi, where they will be commanded by Liu and Deng. After completing this task, [Zhao] can move on to Pingbei.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 95. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 374. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  Zhou Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi (Ji-Jin) Military Region. Nie Rong­ zhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Military District, and Xiao Ke was deputy commander. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. 3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 140

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-59

Prepare to Pin Down Wang Zhonglian’s Troops, Which May Move North as Reinforcements (October 30, 1945) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 For the purpose of amassing all possible forces to annihilate the enemy facing you and then to wipe out the reinforcing enemy troops, in addition to ordering Zhao Erlu to lead six main-force regiments southward, we suggest that you consider the possibility of moving the main forces in the Seventh and Eighth subregions of the Taihang Region to the Ci county region to prepare to pin down Wang Zhonglian's2 troops, which may move northward as reinforcements. You need not attack Qinyang. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 96, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 378–79. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. 2.  Wang Zhonglian (1904–1991, born in Suzhou) was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Thirty-first Army Group. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-60

141

Annihilate the Enemy Facing Us and Then Attack the Reinforcements (October 30, 1945) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 The Ninety-fourth Division (originally the First Reserve Division) and the 109th Division of the Sixteenth Army of Hu [Zongnan]’s2 forces were formerly stationed along the river in Shaanxi and they have not engaged in any fighting for a long time. The Twenty-second Division (originally the Third Reserve Division) has also not engaged in any fighting for a long time. In the Chunhua Incident in July of this year,3 we annihilated five companies of one regiment of this division. After this long expedition, we estimate that the actual strength of each of these three divisions does not exceed 5,000. On October 25, Hu Zongnan ordered the entire Thirty-fourth Army Group to move south to serve as reinforcements. Not until October 29 did Li Wen4 order the Sixteenth Army to move southward for reinforcement. This was already four days later, and moreover his order was to move south step-by-step after reaching Gaoyi; it seems he [Li Wen] is not very enthusiastic. Apparently part of this army may set off at any time, but the balance will not be able to move south until it has handed over its duties to the Third Army (two divisions). Besides, after arriving at Gaoyi the army must ascertain the situation before moving on. If our local forces and the militia in the north can carry out forceful resistance and harassment, they may confuse the enemy so that it will be hesitant to proceed. This will provide us with plenty of time to amass a superior force, fight an all-out campaign, and annihilate the enemy facing us (wiping out a portion each time). After that, you can attack the enemy reinforcements. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 93, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 378. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 3.  The reference is to an unsuccessful attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area launched on July 21, 1945, by forces under the command of Hu Zongnan. 4.  Li Wen (1905–1977, born in Xinhua, Hunan) was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Thirty-fourth Army Group. 142

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-61

Telegram to Zhou Enlai1 (October 31, 1945) Of the three armies that entered the Handan area, Gao Shuxun of the New Eighth Army rebelled and abandoned his post as deputy commander yesterday evening (October 30) after seven days of bloody fighting. The entire Thirtieth and Fortieth armies are retreating south of the Zhang River and we are engaged in pursuing them. A detailed report will follow. Withhold from publication for now.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 380; it does not appear in Mao Zedong junshi wenji. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-62

143

Amass the Greatest Force to Annihilate the Present Enemy (October 31, 1945) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We have ordered Zhao Erlu to lead six main-force regiments southward to focus on annihilating the present enemy. We hope you can quickly tell us the route upon which Zhao’s forces will advance. Do you still feel your forces are insufficient? Apart from the main forces of Chen Geng’s2 column, you can move every unit within fifteen days of marching to amass the greatest possible force. The brigade that was sent by Yang Yong and Zhang Linzhi3 to the areas of Zou and Teng4 to assist the campaign of Chen Yi and Li Yu5 can be moved westward at once. The [New] Fourth Army has continued on to Shandong and is not needed over there. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 103, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 379–80. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. 2.  Zhao Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi (Ji-Jin) Military Region. Chen Geng was field commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Fourth Column. 3.  Yang Yong (1913–1983, born in Liuyang, Hunan) and Zhang Linzhi (1908–1967, native of Hebei) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the HebeiShandong-Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. 4.  Referring to Zou county and Teng county in Shandong. 5.  Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army. Li Yu was commander and deputy political commissar of the Shandong Military Region. 144

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-63

Rapidly Set Off for the Lincheng Area (October 31, 1945) To Zhao Erlu:1 We assume that you received the telegram we sent you yesterday ordering you to lead six main-force regiments southward to coordinate with our forces from Taihang to wipe out the Sixteenth Army, which is moving southward from Shijiazhuang. The situation is extremely critical. The battle in this locality is of vital importance to the overall situation, and we hope that you will speedily set out along separate routes and take a shortcut directly to the Lincheng area and place yourselves under the orders of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping.2 Inform us promptly of how things go.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 379. It also appears in the form of a note to Mao’s telegram of the same date to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, note 1, pp. 103–4. 1.  Zhao Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi (Ji-Jin) Military Region. 2.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-64

145

November Operational Preparations1 (November 1, 1945) To Lin [Biao] and Peng Zhen; Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], and Luo [Ruiqing]; Chen [Yi] and Li [Yu]; Luo [Ronghuan] and Li [Zuopeng]; Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]; Zhang [Yunyi], Rao [Shushi], and Lai [Chuanzhu]:2 November operational preparations. 1. Situation: In the Northeast, we have taken the 5,000 troops deployed by Li Yunchang as a foundation and we have enlarged them to 100,000, but their fighting power is weak. Up to now, the only units of our forces that have moved into the Northeast from various places are those of Wan Yi, Sha Ke, Yang Guofu, Liu Zhuanlian, Zao Lihuai, Xiao Hua, Wu Kehua,3 and others, a total of somewhat over 30,000. Those in advanced positions

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 107–10, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  Lin Biao (1907–1971, born in Huanggang, Hubei) and Peng Zhen were the commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar; Xiao Ke was the deputy commander; and Luo Ruiqing (1906–1978, native of Sichuan) was the deputy political commissar and chairman of the Political Section of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Military Region; Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar of the Shandong Military Region. Luo Ronghuan was second political commissar of the Northeastern People’s Autonomous Army. Li Zuopeng was originally chief-of-staff of the Shandong Military Region, but by this time he had accompanied Luo Ronghuan to the Northeast. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. Zhang Yunyi, Rao Shushi, and Lai Chuanzhu were deputy commander, political commissar, and chief-ofstaff, respectively, of the New Fourth Army. 3.  Li Yunchang at that time was deputy commander of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army; Wan Yi (1907–1997, native of Liaoning) was deputy commander of the Binhai Military Region; Sha Ke (1907–1993, native of Liaoning) was chief-of-staff of the Central Hebei Military Region; Yang Guofu (1905–1982, native of Anhui) was commander of the Seventh Division of the Shandong Military Region; Liu Zhuanlian (1912–1992, native of Hunan) was a guerrilla in the Eighth Route Army; Zao Lihuai (1909–1998, native of Hunan) was chief-of-staff of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region; Xiao Hua (1916–1985, born in Xingguo county, Jiangxi); Wu Kehua (1913–1987, native of Jiangxi) was commander of the Fifth Division of the Shandong Military Region. 146

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-65

November 1945 147

in the field include the Shandong Division of Liu Qiren [1916–1974, native of Shandong], Shandong’s First, Second, Third, and Seventh divisions, and so forth, the New Fourth Army Division of Huang Kecheng [1902–1986, born in Yongxing county, Chenzhou], and others, approximately 80,000 troops. Chiang’s army, in contrast, has already decided to land at Huludao and Yingkou. Its numbers amount to approximately two armies, or 60,000 men, and its plan is to advance to the Jinzhou-Haicheng front by November 12 and reach Shenyang by the end of November. The Soviet army will complete its withdrawal from the Northeast by the end of November. In North China, we have already basically smashed the plan of the Guomindang main force to move from the [Bei]ping-Sui[yuan], [Da]tong-Fenglingtu, [Bei] Ping-Han[kou], and [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railways, concentrate their forces in [Bei]ping and [Tian]jin, and enter the Northeast on the Rehe and BeipingShenyang lines. Our armies commanded by Nie [Rongzhen] and He [Long] have already routed more than 50,000 of Chiang’s troops on the [Bei]pingSui[yuan] line and have encircled Guisui.4 The armies of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping] have begun to destroy 60,000 of Chiang’s troops on the [Bei]ping-[Han]kou line (Gao Shuxun’s two divisions revolted and surrendered to us), drawing in the 35,000 Guomindang troops that fled from the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] line to Shijiazhuang, and they will not find it easy to move north. The armies of our commanders Chen Yi and Li Yu and our armies in Central China have already cut the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] line into three sections, south, north, and central, obstructing Chiang’s army. Because of this, we have succeeded in isolating Chiang’s two armies providing air transport to [Bei]ping and [Tian]jin and we will isolate the two armies providing sea transport to the Northeast and hem them in between north and south. 2. Our Party’s task is to fight for the Northeast, consolidate North China and Central China, and, beginning in November, to turn the main direction of the war toward the Northeast, with the second direction of the war being North and Central China. Deployments for this objective are as follows: a. In the Northeast, Lin Biao and Peng Zhen are immediately assigned to the war on the inner front; first do everything possible to block the landing of Chiang’s army along the Huludao-Jinzhou and YingkouHaicheng lines, await the formation of those troops already there and the arrival of the troops en route, and at an opportune time resolutely annihilate Chiang’s army and keep it from advancing to Shenyang. b. Chen [Yi] and Li [Yu], Luo [Ronghuan], and Li [Zuopeng] will immediately order the first group of Shandong troops heading northeast (the First, Second, Third, Seventh and other divisions) to speedily advance

4.  Guisui is the old name for Hohhot in Inner Mongolia.

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north. The second group and a portion of the Fourth Route Army should also speedily head north. c. Huang Kecheng’s division should rapidly head north via the [Bei]ping[Tian]jin line. d. The field army of Xiao [Ke] and Luo [Ruiqing] should, within the first half of the month, finish amassing and organizing north of Beiping and should await orders to move east and attack the Guomindang armies above the Shanhai Pass-Jinzhou-Shenyang line. e. The armies of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping] should wait for completion of the campaign at hand and prepare to release the column of Yang [Dezhi] [1911–1994, born in Zhuzhou] and Su [Zhenhua] [1912– 1979, born in Pingjiang county, Yueyang] to support the ten regiments awaiting orders to advance north. f. In Central China, Ye Fei’s column will await the provision of cotton clothing and then will set off for the North. g. The armies of Nie [Rongzhen] and He [Long] will wait until completion of the Suiyuan Campaign and then immediately shift their main forces toward [Bei]ping and [Tian]jin, and with coordinated action support the war in the Northeast. h. Of the three sectors commanded by Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Li [Yu], and Central China, except for those forces that are advancing toward the Northeast, the others must fulfill their original tasks and prepare to annihilate the main forces of Chiang’s army, which will inevitably continue to attack northwards. 3. Please keep us updated by telegram regarding each unit’s execution [of the above orders]. The Central Military Commission

Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da1 (November 2, 1945, 10 P.M.) 1. Congratulations on your great victory. 2. Please publicize via Xinhua News Agency about how the Guomindang troops launched the offensive, the number of personnel, the burning and the killing, how the army and the people in our areas had to resort to self-defense and launch a counteroffensive, the number of enemy troops we wiped out and captured, the behind-the-scenes descriptions by the captured officers of the civil war aimed at suppressing the Communists, the stories told by the captured soldiers about how they were forced to attack, and the content of the reactionary documents. You should not, however, directly mention the name of Chiang Kaishek (unless the reactionary documents explicitly use his name). 3. You may also publicize the course of the Shangdang Campaign.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 381. 1. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, Zhang Jichun was second deputy political commissar and chair of the Political Section, and Li Da was chief-of-staff. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-66

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The Process of Winning the Pinghan Campaign1 (November 2, 1945) III, IV [CPC Delegation in Chongqing]: 1. We received your two telegrams of yesterday and today. The enemy has a whole bag of tricks, and we must increase our vigilance. 2. Two divisions under the command of Gao Shuxun have arisen in revolt2 to extremely great effect. The entire Thirtieth and Fortieth armies retreated and were surrounded and attacked by us in the narrow area east of Ci county and north of Zhanghe. After two days and two nights of fierce fighting, the headquarters of the Fortieth Army, the entire 106th Division, and another regiment were annihilated, the division commander was captured, the artillery battalion and two other regiments of the Thirtieth Army (armed with American weapons) were wiped out, and all the others were scattered. We are just now in the process of annihilating what remains; the fighting will be over either tonight or tomorrow morning. Upon hearing that Gao Shuxun has rebelled and all units are in danger, Hu Zongnan3 has ordered that the Sixteenth Army stop moving southward to provide reinforcements. The central forces in places such as Zhengzhou and Xinxiang remain motionless, watching their comrades being annihilated and without coming to their rescue. Following our victory in this campaign, the socalled “bandit suppression” troops will be greatly shaken, and we plan to publicize this.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 115, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 380–81. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and sent it to the Party’s representatives in Chongqing. 2.  See the document entitled “November Operational Preparations,” November 1, 1945, in this volume. 3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 150

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3. While annihilating He Wending’s4 Twenty-sixth Division, we obtained many diaries and other anti-Communist documents. We order Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping5 to examine these documents and to openly publish many of them to refute the slanderous propaganda by the Guomindang. I, II [The Central Committee]

4.  He Wending was commander of the Guomindang’s Twenty-sixth Division and Sixtyseventh Army. 5.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region.

Method for Dealing with Captured Officers and Soldiers (November 3, 1945, 11 P.M.) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Bo [Yibo], Zhang [Jichun], and Li [Da]:1 We have received your telegram of November 3. 1. It is correct to give preferential treatment to the officers of the Northwest faction, but they should not be released. If they are willing to publish statements and comments opposing the civil war and advocating peace, they should be encouraged to do so. 2. In principle, according to the instructions of the Central Committee, all captured officers and soldiers should be retained and educated. Keep a close watch over the reactionaries, but do not release any of them. Only when absolutely necessary can we consider releasing a few special individuals. 3. Search very carefully for Chiang Kaishek’s “bandit suppression” documents (for example, the Handbook on Bandit Suppression2 and so on) and publish them openly. Special attention should be given to materials regarding collusion with the United States in waging the civil war. The Military Commission Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 121–22, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 382. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, Zhang Jichun was second deputy political commissar and chairman of the Political Department, and Li Da was chief-of-staff. 2.  The Handbook on Bandit Suppression was a manual edited by Chiang Kaishek in 1933 detailing methods for attacking the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas. After the end of Anti-Japanese War in 1945, Chiang reprinted this manual and distributed it to Guomindang officers, with secret orders that read: “This time, when we eradicate the bandits, the happiness of the people is at stake. The fundamental task from here on in is to follow the spirit of the War of Resistance and to respect and follow the correct way set forth in the Handbook on Bandit Suppression by encouraging those below you to strive for eradication and quickly complete this mission. Those who contribute to the nation will surely be rewarded. Those who delay and commit errors will be prosecuted for their crimes according to the law. We hope you will pass this along to the officers and men in your bandit eradication units so they will follow and familiarize themselves with it.” 152

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-68

Yang and Su’s Column Should Replace Its Losses and Then Leave for Jinzhou and Shenyang (November 3, 1945, 3:00 P.M.) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Bo [Yibo], Zhang [Jichun], and Li [Da], and for the information of Yang [Dezhi] and Su [Zhenhua]:1 1. We received your telegram of 3:00 P.M. on November 2, which pleased us greatly.2 2. It is essential to rest and reconsolidate for ten days. 3. Yang and Su’s column should rapidly replace its losses, and it should add as many as ten regiments, or 20,000 men. In ten days, it should leave for Jinzhou and Shenyang and take part in the campaign of great importance in the Northeast. 4. You should organize a new column to replace that of Yang and Su. 5. As regards the next operation, if it is easy to attack Li Zhengxian’s3 Sixteenth Army in Gaoyi, then it will be politically most advantageous and also most

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 119–20, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It also appears, under a different title, in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 382. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, Zhang Jichun was second deputy political commissar and chairman of the Political Department, and Li Da was chief-of-staff. Yang Dezhi (1911–1994, born in Liling county, Hunan Province) and Su Zhenhua (1912–1979, native of Hunan) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the First Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping stated that their army had annihilated the Guomindang’s 106th Division in its entirety (capturing the division commander) and a unit of the 217th Division, while other portions of that division were surrounded and being annihilated. Liu and Deng’s troops had also destroyed two units and the mountain bombardment base of the Thirtieth Division of the Thirtieth Army and the headquarters and four units of the Fortieth Army. 3.  Li Zhengxian (1904–1983, native of Zhejiang) was commander of the Guomin­ dang’s Sixteenth Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-69

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helpful to support the campaign in the Northeast and to annihilate the enemy. If it is not easy to attack this army but easier to strike to the south, go ahead and do so. Please reconnoiter, consider this, and inform us by telegram. The Military Commission

There Is Ample Reason for Our Side to Initiate a Counteroffensive1 (November 3, 1945) From AB to CD [The Central Committee to the CPC Delegation in Chongqing], November 3: We received your telegram of the 2nd. Guisui, Baotou, Wuyuan, and Linhe must be captured. The time period should be at least half a month. As for Datong, only encircle it for now as it cannot be dealt with until after Guisui and Baotou are resolved. Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan2 have instigated the civil war, each attacking our Liberated Areas with forces of more than 50,000 troops, so there is ample reason for our side to initiate a counteroffensive. If our side is falsely accused of instigating the civil war, we shall make public Chiang Kaishek’s telegram of October 19th to Hu Zongnan3 and all the various other documents related to the civil war. Delegates to the National Assembly must be re-selected and the timing must be postponed for one year, otherwise our side will resolutely oppose it. You4 should discuss and draft a resolution concerning procedures for holding a political conference, the dates it should be convened, and so on; only after your return and after discussion can we express our final opinion, and only then the matter of delegates can be considered. Provided that the conference is postponed, you should stay on in Chongqing for as long as possible and not return. A political conference is actually a means by which the centrists can be educated and a way for them to gain experience, but the problems are not going to be resolved there. To add a point to our previous telegram,5 Eighth Route Army troops should be stationed in the three cities of Beiping, Tianjin, and Qingdao; for the time being, only a small contingent of Central Army troops can be stationed there and in the future they should withdraw. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 59–60, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  This telegram was sent by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to its representatives in Chongqing. 2.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone. Yan Xishan was commander of the Guomindang’s Second War Zone. 3.  See “Method for Dealing with Captured Officers and Soldiers,” November 3, 1945, in this volume. 4.  The editors of Wenji indicate that this is referring to Zhou Enlai. 5.  See “North China, the Northeast, and Other Areas Must Be Returned to People’s Self-Governance,” November 3, 1945, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-70

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Telegram to Zhou Enlai1 (November 3, 1945, 11:00 P.M.) In the Handan Campaign, we captured the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eleventh War Zone, Ma Fawu, who was also commander of the Fortieth Army; Chief-of-Staff of the Eleventh War Zone Song Kentang [1899–1992, born in Jinxian, Hebei]; Commander of the Thirty-ninth Division of the Fortieth Army Si Guangkai (sic.) [Si Yuankai, born in Zhili, present-day Hebei]; Commander of the 106th Division Li Zhenqing [1901–1976, born in Linqing, Shandong]; Commander of the Thirtieth Division of the Thirtieth Army Wang Zhen [1902– 1945, born in Renqiu, Hebei]; Commander of the Sixty-seventh Division Li Xuezheng [1902–1951, born in Lingbao, Henan]; and other senior officers. We have already ordered that the front give them preferential treatment.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 383. 156

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-71

North China, the Northeast, and Other Areas Must Be Returned to People’s Self-Governance1 (November 3, 1945) AB to CD [The Central Committee to the CPC Delegation in Chongqing], November 3rd: We received yesterday’s telegram. The present situation is to our advantage, and we must achieve the following objectives: North China, the Northeast, northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and the entire border region must be returned to the people’s self-governance (as Sun Yatsen advocated); a small contingent of Central Army troops may be temporarily stationed in Beiping, Tianjin, and Qingdao, but they too must withdraw in the future. As for the Central Army troops elsewhere, those that have already arrived must withdraw, and those that are yet to arrive must halt their advance. Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi2 must be dismissed, and all provincial governments must be chosen by the people; political committees must be set up in North China and the Northeast to exercise centralized administration of the various provinces; the central government must not be allowed to violate the principle of self-rule by dispatching officials, and those who have already been dispatched must be recalled. The question of the Northeast should be raised now. In all areas of North China, we are to be in charge of receiving the surrender of all Japanese and puppet troops. As for the various transport routes in North China, once the Japanese and the puppets have surrendered their arms and Chiang’s armies have withdrawn, the political committees chosen by the people will be responsible for restoring them. It is impossible to restore them at present because the enemy armies have not yet surrendered their arms, the puppet armies have not yet been destroyed, and Chiang’s armies have launched a civil war. After these problems are resolved, our side will be in charge of recovery, but right now it is absolutely impossible. It should be openly recognized that

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 57–58, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  This telegram was sent by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to its representatives in Chongqing. 2.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone. Yan Xishan was commander of the Guomindang’s Second War Zone. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-72

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destruction of the railways is absolutely necessary for the purposes of surrender, annihilating the puppet armies, and halting the civil war, so there is nothing wrong with it whatsoever. In addition, Chiang’s armies must withdraw from all counties they have seized. Please warn Chiang’s side that our side categorically refuses to accept not being the ones throughout North China to receive the enemy’s surrender. The Northeast is to be defended and public order is to be maintained there by the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army; the Central Army is prohibited from entering the area, and if civil war breaks out, they [Chiang’s side] will be held responsible.

Great Victory in the Battle of Self-Defense by Our Forces in Southern Hebei 1

(November 4, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency urgent dispatch from Hebei-Shandong-Henan) More than 100,000 Guomindang troops advanced northward along the [Bei]ping-[Wu] han railway and occupied our Liberated Areas in northern Henan and southern Hebei. The units that invaded our Ci county and Handan areas are the Thirtieth Army, the Fortieth Army, and the eight divisions of the New Eighth Army, totaling approximately 70,000 troops. Our forces and people in that region, proceeding from a position of self-defense, carried out a counterattack and won a great victory. Among the invading forces, the New Eighth Army is opposed to civil war and staged an uprising on the battlefield, rendering powerful assistance to our battle of self-defense. From mid-September onward, following secret instructions from He Yingqin, Hu Zongnan, commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s First War Zone, transferred troops from various places to engage in fierce attacks on our Liberated Areas in northern Henan. One after another, he took the seven cities of Fengqiu, Yanjing, Yuanwu, Wushi, Huojia, Huixian, and Tangyin, as well as many towns and broad areas of the countryside in our Liberated Areas in northern Henan. Everywhere they went, they engaged in “clean-up operations,” destroying popularly elected governments, slaughtering cadres who resisted Japan, and family members of soldiers who participated in combat against Japanese forces, seizing and pillaging people’s property and raping women. The people have been subjected to great suffering and cannot contain their anger. Nonetheless, our Eighth Route Army, for the sake of the great design of peace and unity, continued to make one concession after another, and in the end withdrew north of the Zhanghe River. Under these circumstances, the Guomindang authorities still believed that their various units were advancing too slowly. They ordered Hu Zongnan to secretly fly to Zhengzhou, distribute the Handbook on Bandit Suppression, “eliminate bandits” resolutely, and compel Mr. Sun Lianzhong, commander-in-chief of the Eleventh War Zone, to order all his

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 345–47. It is from a section of the volume containing texts issued in the name of Xinhua News Agency that were revised by Mao. We have followed the pattern of the Chinese edition by using bold type for passages added or substantially altered by Mao. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-73

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units to attack within a specified time limit. On October 21, Gao Shuxun’s New Eighth Army, Ma Fawu’s Fortieth Army, and the Thirtieth Army of Lu Chongyi [1898–1994, native of Shandong], under strict orders and supervision, crossed the Anyang River (the Zhanghe River) and advanced northward in separate columns. On the 23rd, they occupied our Ci county. On the 24th, they occupied our Matouzhen and advanced to attack Wu’an and Handan. It was only from this time on that our forces and people in southern Hebei began to rise up in self-defense. On October 25, our forces staged a counterattack, recovered Ci county, and surrounded the various invading units. At the same time, our forces tried to persuade the officers and men of the various invading units to put an emphasis on domestic peace, democracy, and unity, requesting that they immediately refuse to carry out orders to engage in civil war. On October 30, General Gao Shuxun, deputy commander-in-chief of the Eleventh War Zone, deeply conscious of the righteousness of this cause, responded to the appeal made by our forces and people. He led all the officers and men of the New Eighth Army directly under his command (including two divisions, the Temporary Twentyninth Division and the New Sixth Division) to carry out an uprising, reject the order of the Guomindang reactionaries to “suppress bandits,” end the civil war, and come over to the side of the Chinese people. But the commanders of some units of the Fortieth and Thirtieth armies who had not yet been awakened continued to attack us. In the evening of the 30th, our forces were compelled to launch a general counteroffensive. After one day of an intense battle, by the 31st both armies were defeated in succession. By this time, most of the officers and men in these two armies were willing to lay down their weapons and only a few of their troops, numbering around 2,000 to 3,000 men, fled southward. The high-ranking officers who laid down their arms include, among others, Ma Fawu, deputy commander of the Eleventh War Zone; Song Kentang, chiefof-staff of the Eleventh War Zone; Si Guangkai (sic.) [Si Yuankai], commander of the Thirty-ninth Division of the Fortieth Army; Li Zhenqing, commander of the 106th Division; Wang Zhen, commander of the Thirtieth Division of the Thirtieth Army; and Li Xuezheng, commander of the Sixty-seventh Division. The people of our Liberated Areas in southern Hebei are now rewarding General Gao Shuxun as well as all other officers and men in his forces who oppose civil war and have come over to the side of the people. Regarding these high-ranking officers as well as all other officers and men of the Thirtieth and Fortieth armies who laid down their arms, they will also be treated well. Many among them state that the Guomindang authorities, particularly He Yingqin and Hu Zongnan, have been using the pretext of restoring transportation routes to carry out the policy of “suppressing bandits” and to invade the Liberated Areas. They say that this in fact goes counter to the wishes of the majority of the people. They are willing to recount in detail how they were forced to stage the invasion and from now on they will be on the side of peace and democracy. All three divisions of the Thirtieth Army are equipped with U.S. arms

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and are known to be combat-hardened. The Fortieth Army is also renowned for its skill in combat. Like the New Eighth Army, they both played a significant role in the War of Resistance Against Japan. In no way can they be compared to those corrupt forces that took to their heels without firing a shot or those who sat there waiting for victory. This time, they were forced to engage in the effort to “suppress the bandits” and prosecute the civil war. They advanced reluctantly under strict orders and supervision. But because this went counter to the wishes of the majority of officers and men, no sooner had the battle begun, they were routed. Even though they were armed with American weapons, they still could not win. Among the weapons captured by our forces are many anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers. Many of the documents on “suppressing bandits” issued to them by the Guomindang have also been seized and are now being processed.

Commence Military Transport Work against the Northwest and Northeast Troops1 (November 4, 1945) To Chen [Yi] and Li [Yu]; Zhang [Yunyi], Rao [Shushi], and Lai [Chuanzhu]; and the Central China Bureau: 1. The Handan Campaign2 came to an end on the 2nd, and aside from 3,000 men who escaped, the two divisions led by Gao Shuxun revolted and came over to our side; three divisions of the Thirtieth Army and three divisions of the Fortieth Army were completely annihilated; and we captured Ma Fawu, deputy commander of the Eleventh War Zone and commander of the Fortieth Army, Song Kentang, chief-of-staff of the Eleventh War Zone, as well as the division commanders of the Thirty-ninth, 106th, Thirtieth, and Thirty-seventh divisions. We are currently granting them preferential treatment to win them over. 2. Other than three divisions of the Eighth Army (mechanized with American aid) in Guangzhou awaiting transport to Qingdao, Deputy Commander of the Eleventh War Zone Li Yannian [1904–1974, native of Shandong] has a total of ten divisions under his command. We believe these include three divisions of the Twelfth Army of Huo Shouyi3 (the 111th Division, the 112th Division, which is already in Ji’nan, and the 117th Division, which is in Xuzhou); He Zhuguo’s4 two divisions of the Second Cavalry (as He Zhuguo was blinded in

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 123–25, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, and Li Yu was political commissar of the Shandong Military Region; Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander, Rao Shushi was political commissar, and Lai Chuanzhu was chief-ofstaff of the New Fourth Army. 2.  The Handan Campaign is also known as the Pinghan Campaign. See “November Operational Preparations,” November 1, 1945, in this volume. 3.  Huo Shouyi (1898–1967, native of Liaoning) was commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth Army. 4.  He Zhuguo (1897–1985, native of Guangxi) was originally deputy commander of the Guomindang’s Tenth War Zone. After the end of the War of Resistance, he was appointed chairman of the Guomindang government’s Military Committee and chief-of-staff of the Northeast battalion. He became blind before arriving at this post. 162

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-74

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Chongqing, we are inquiring as to who was commander), which are already in Ji’nan; Wang Shuwen’s5 two divisions of the Ninety-seventh Army (the Thirty-third Division and the provisional Thirtieth Division) in Lincheng;6 and the Eighth Cavalry Division, which is in Xuzhou, along with two divisions of the Fifty-first Army. We calculate that the Lincheng-Xuzhou line has a total of six divisions (all under the command of the Nineteenth Army Group’s Chen Daqing),7 all of which will head northward, but the fighting strength of all of them is weak. 3. The three divisions of Fifty-fifth Army Commander Cao Fulin,8 under Second Army Group Commander Liu Ruming9 (the Thirty-ninth Division, Seventyfourth Division, and Eighty-first Division), as well as Liu Ruzhen’s10 two divisions of the Sixty-eighth Army (the 119th Division and the 143rd division) are now moving toward the Weishi, Fugou, Taikang, and Lanfeng region, and are currently amassing toward Lanfeng,11 and we judge that they will move north toward Xuzhou. These two armies constitute the northwestern section and their fighting power is fairly strong. We hope to utilize the influence of Sun Lianzhong’s12 defeat and Gao Shuxun’s rebellion to win them over. According to what was written in Liu Ruming’s telegram of 5 P.M., more than 2,000 [men] of the Thirtieth and 120th regiments under his command in the Taikang region have turned traitor, and the Thirty-ninth Division has been ordered to suppress them. Please verify whether [they can be] pulled over to our side. 4. Carrying out military transport work against all northwestern sections (the Fifty-fifth Army, Sixty-eighth Army, and Thirty-eighth Army) and the northeastern sections (the Twelfth Army, Second Cavalry, Fifty-first Army) is extremely important. The same goes for against all Northwest puppet armies. The Military Commission

5.  Wang Shuwen (1902–1984, native of Shanxi) was commander of the Guomindang’s Ninety-seventh Army. 6.  Lincheng is now Xuecheng, in Zaozhuang city of Shandong Province. 7.  Chen Daqing (1904–1973, native of Jiangxi) was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Nineteenth Army Group 8.  Cao Fulin (1894–1964, native of Hebei) was deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Nineteenth Army Group and commander of the Fifty-fifth Army. 9.  Liu Ruming (1895–1975, native of Hebei) was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Second Army Group. 10.  Liu Ruzhen (1904–1999, native of Hebei) was commander of the Guomindang’s Sixty-eighth Army. 11.  Lanfeng county was merged with Kaocheng county in 1954 to become Lankao county, Henan Province. 12.  Sun Lianzhong was commander of the Guomindang’s Eleventh War Zone.

Deployment to Increase Troops in the Northeast (November 4, 1945) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Bo [Yibo], Zhang [Jichun], and Li [Da], and for transmission to Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], Liu [Lantao], and Luo [Ruiqing], and Luo [Ronghuan] and Li [Zuopeng]:1 Regarding moving the 20,000 men from the column of Yang and Su2 and the 12,000 men from Chen Geng’s3 column to the Northeast to take part in resisting diehard Chiang’s attack, so as to control the Northeast and deploy for a project of lasting significance and vital importance, please consider how you plan to handle this and respond by telegram. The Soviet Union already allowed Chiang’s side to land in Huludao and Yingkou on October 30, to advance to the JinzhouHaicheng line on November 12, and to advance to Shenyang on November 20, and the Soviet troops will complete their withdrawal by November 25. At present, our army controls Huludao and Yingkou and is repelling a landing by Chiang’s army. Wang Shijie4 has made representations to the Soviet ambassador urging that the Chinese Communists not put up such resistance. The Soviet ambassador responded that this is the Chinese people’s own affair and the Soviets will not intervene, so until now Chiang’s troops have not yet landed. It may be possible

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 63–65, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Liu Bocheng was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region, and Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da were political commissar, first deputy political commissar, second deputy political commissar, and Political Department chairman, respectively. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Military Region, and Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao (1910–1997, native of Shaanxi), and Luo Ruiqing were deputy commander, deputy political commissar, and deputy political commissar and Political Department chairman, respectively. Li Zuopeng was originally chief-of-staff of the Shandong Military Region. When this document was written, he was accompanying Luo Ronghuan to the Northeast. 2.  Yang Dezhi and Su Zhenhua (1912–1979, born in Yueyang) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the First Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 3.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 4.  Wang Shijie was foreign minister of the Nationalist government. 164

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to force Chiang’s troops to land first in Dagu, Tangshan, and Qinhuangdao, in which case we could gain time to prepare for war on the inner front, resolutely defend Shenyang, and prevent Chiang’s army from occupying it. As soon as the Soviet army withdraws, our side will declare the autonomy of the people of the Northeast. Lin Biao has now been assigned the position of commander-in-chief of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army; Lü Zhengcao, Xiao Jinguang [1903– 1989, born in Changsha, Hunan], Li Yunchang, and Zhou Baozhong [1902–1964, born in Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan] (volunteer army leader) have been assigned the positions of first, second, third, and fourth deputy commanders, respectively; Peng Zhen and Luo Ronghuan have been assigned the positions of first and second political commissars, and Cheng Zihua [1905–1991, native of Hubei] has been assigned the position of deputy political commissar to place unified command over all troops in the Northeast and to make battle deployments. Within two weeks or so, we can complete the process of taking on all provincial governments and industry in the Northeast. The 5,000 men under Li Yunchang who were the first to enter the Northeast have already expanded to 80,000 men and have been dispersed throughout southern Manchuria as the local armies, although their fighting ability is weak. At this point, it is estimated that our regular army troops that have entered Manchuria total approximately 50,000, and those currently en route that are to arrive within two weeks total another 50,000 or so, which makes a total of approximately 100,000 troops that can serve as the main fighting force on the inner front. But Chiang Kaishek is determined to fight for the Northeast; he had originally planned to dispatch two armies, but seeing that our forces are strong, there is news that he has now dispatched three more armies. We estimate that he has at least five armies, fifteen divisions (American-outfitted), and 150,000 men. Under these conditions, the focus of the war will shift to the Northeast and there will be a fierce battle. Because of this, our side must dispatch additional strong military units to join in the combat. It has been decided to move 20,000 men from Yang and Su’s column, 12,000 from Chen Geng’s column, 12,000 from Zhao Erlu’s5 forces, 40,000 and during the second stage from Shandong, 20,000 from the New Fourth Army, and 5,000 from the border region, for a total of 109,000 who in the latter half of December will arrive at the juncture of Rehe, Liaoning, and eastern Hebei to launch a pincer attack on Chiang’s army from the outer front, with one section doing everything possible to break into the inner front. Transferring 32,000 men from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan [Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu] Region will certainly be difficult in terms of carrying out a continued attack against diehard Chiang and pushing northward, but after your two great victories, there is still the possibility of organizing two new columns to replace the forces that were transferred. How does this sound? Awaiting your response. The Central Committee

5.  Zhao Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi (Ji-Jin) Military Region.

A Chinese Communist Party Spokesperson Denounces Wu Guozhen’s Shameless Lies and Presents Ironclad Evidence Regarding the Repeated Attacks by the Guomindang Army1 (November 5, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, November 5) In a dispatch from Chongqing dated November 4,2 United Press International reported that Wu Guozhen [1903–1984, native of Hubei], director of the Propaganda Department of the Guomindang,3 had declared that the government is entirely on the defensive in this war and had raised the question of restoring communications.4 A Xinhua News Agency reporter asked the spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Party about this. The spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Party replied to the reporter as follows: What Mr. Wu said about being “on the defensive” is a complete lie. The Guomindang, besides occupying the five Liberated Areas evacuated by our troops in eastern Zhejiang, southern Jiangsu, eastern5 and southern Anhui, and Hunan, and trampling on the people there, has already moved more than seventy divisions of its regular troops into or close to most of the other Liberated Areas – for example, those in Guangdong, Hubei, Henan, northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, Shandong, and Hebei – and has been oppressing the people there and attacking or preparing to attack our troops. Furthermore, scores of other Guomindang divisions are heading for the Liberated Areas. Can this be described as on the defensive? Of the eight Guomindang divisions that reached the Handan area in

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 339–42, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, November 6, 1945. 1.  A Chinese Communist Spokesman Denounces Wu Guozhen’s Shameless Lies and Presents Ironclad Evidence Regarding the Guomindang Army’s Repeated Attacks → The Truth about the Guomindang Attacks 2.  November 4 → November 3 3.  Guomindang → Guomindang Central Executive Committee 4. ​rais​ed the question of restoring communications. → proposed measures for restoring communications. 5.  eastern → central 166

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their drive northward from Zhangde, two opposed civil war and favored peace, while the other six (including three U.S.-equipped divisions) were compelled to lay down their arms after the troops and people in the Liberated Areas struck back in self-defense. Many officers of these Guomindang troops, including war-zone deputy commanders, army commanders, and divisional6 commanders,7 can confirm the whole truth about where they came from and how they were ordered to attack. Can this, too, be described as on the defensive? Our troops in the Liberated Areas in Henan and Hubei provinces are now completely encircled by more than twenty Guomindang divisions from the First, Fifth, and Sixth War Zones, with Liu Zhi [1892–1971, born in Ji’an] as field commander in charge of the suppression of the Communists. Our Liberated Areas in western and central Henan and southern, eastern, and central Hubei have all been invaded and occupied by Guomindang forces that burned and so wantonly killed that our troops commanded by Li Xiannian and Wang Shusheng could find no shelter and had to seek quarters on the Henan–Hubei border to survive. But there they have again been closely pursued and attacked by Guomindang troops. Can this, too, be described as on the defensive? In Shanxi and Suiyuan,8 Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi, in collusion with the enemy and the puppets,9 attacked the Xiangyuan-Tunliu sector in the Shangdang Liberated Area. Fighting in self-defense, our troops and the people there disarmed them all, and several commanders of the armies and divisions were among the captured. They are now in the Taihang Liberated Area, all of them alive, and they can confirm the whole truth about where they came from and how they were ordered to attack. Recently in Chongqing, Mr. Yan told all sorts of lies about how he had been attacked and how he had merely been “on the defensive.” Probably he had forgotten all about his generals: Shi Zebo, commander of the Nineteenth Army; Guo Rong (born in Guoxian, Shanxi), commander of the Provisional Forty-sixth Division; Zhang Hong, commander of the Provisional Forty-ninth Division; Li Peiying (born in Wutai, Shanxi), commander of the Sixty-sixth Division; Guo Tianxing, commander of the Sixty-eighth Division; and Yang Wencai (1897–1980, born in Neihuang, Henan), commander of the Provisional Thirty-seventh Division. They are now living in our Liberated Areas and can refute any lies told by Wu Guozhen, Yan Xishan, and all the other reactionary instigators of the civil war. Fu Zuoyi, under orders, has been attacking our Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Chahar, and Rehe for over two months, and on one occasion he pushed right to the gates of Zhangjiakou and occupied our entire Suiyuan Liberated Area and western Chahar. Can this, too, be described as on

6.  divisional commanders → army deputy commanders 7.  Here the Xuanji version adds: “are now in the Liberated Areas, and they…” 8.  In Shanxi and Suiyuan → It is the same in the three provinces of Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Chahar. In early October… 9.  Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi, in collusion with the enemy and the puppets, attacked → Yan Xishan ordered thirteen divisions and attacked.

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the defensive and not firing “the first shot”? Our troops and people in Chahar and Suiyuan rose up in self-defense and in their counterattacks, they also captured large numbers of officers and men who can all testify where they came from, how they attacked, and so on. In various battles of self-defense, we have captured stacks of “bandit suppression” and anti-Communist documents, including the Handbook on Bandit Suppression, orders for “bandit suppression,” and other anti-Communist documents issued by a certain authority,10 but dismissed as a “joke” by Wu Guozhen; these are now being forwarded to Yan’an.11 The Xinhua News Agency reporter went on to ask the spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Party about his views on the measures proposed by Wu Guozhen for restoring communications. The spokesperson replied: These are nothing but stalling tactics. The Guomindang authorities are mustering up large forces and are trying to swamp all the Liberated Areas as in a great flood. Following the failure of several attacks in September and October, they are preparing new attacks on an even larger scale. And one way to obstruct these attacks and effectively check the civil war is to keep them [the Guomindang] from transporting their troops by rail. Like everyone else, we advocate speedy restoration of the lines of communications, but this can only be done after settling the three problems of accepting the Japanese surrender, disposing of the puppet troops, and realizing self-government in the Liberated Areas. Which should be settled first, the problem of communications or these three problems? Why are the troops in the Liberated Areas that fought strenuously and bitterly against Japan for eight years not qualified to accept the Japanese surrender? And why should other troops be put to the trouble of coming from afar to accept it? Every citizen has the right to punish the puppet troops; why are they all being incorporated into the “national army” and being ordered to attack the Liberated Areas? Local self-government is explicitly stipulated in the “Double Tenth Agreement,” and Mr. Sun Yatsen long ago advocated the popular election of provincial governors; why does the Guomindang government still insist on dispatching local officials? The problem of communications should be speedily settled, but even more, the three major problems should be speedily settled. To talk of restoring communications without first settling the three major problems can only serve to spread and prolong the civil war and help its instigators achieve their purpose of swamping the Liberated Areas. To quickly stop the anti-popular and anti-democratic civil war that has now spread all over the country, we advocate the following: 1. All Guomindang government forces that have entered the Liberated Areas in northern China, northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, central China, and the nearby regions to accept the Japanese surrender and to attack us should be

10.  a certain authority, → the highest Guomindang authorities, 11.  Here the revised text inserts, “All these documents are ironclad proof that the Guomindang troops have attacked the Liberated Areas.”

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immediately withdrawn to their original positions; the troops of the Liberated Areas should accept the Japanese surrender and garrison the cities and lines of communications; and the Liberated Areas that have been invaded and occupied should be restored. 2. All puppet troops should be immediately disarmed and disbanded, and in North China, northern Jiangsu, and northern Anhui the Liberated Areas should take charge of such disarming and disbanding. 3. The people’s democratic self-government in all the Liberated Areas should be recognized; the central government should not appoint and send out local officials; the provisions of the “Double Tenth Agreement” should be carried out. The spokesperson said: Only in this way can civil war be averted; otherwise, there is absolutely no safeguard against it. The documents captured during the three battles we fought in self-defense in Suiyuan, Shangdang, and Handan and such concrete actions as massive troop movements and attacks all conclusively prove that the claims of the Guomindang authorities that the so-called restoration of communications is for the sake of the people and not for civil war are completely unbelievable. The Chinese people have been fooled long enough and can be fooled no longer. The central problem at present is for the people of the whole country to mobilize by every means to stop the civil war.

The Three Big Problems of Accepting Surrender, the Puppet Troops, and SelfGovernance Must Be Resolved before Communications Can Be Restored1 (November 5, 1945) From AB to CD on November 5: We received your telegram of the 4th.2 1. In the current negotiations, we find ourselves in a disadvantaged position regarding the way several points are being raised about the issue of restoring communication lines; we must consider the matter thoroughly to regain the initiative. It has been decided that tomorrow’s Liberation Daily will publish a statement by the Communist Party spokesperson3 stressing that the civil war must be halted immediately and that the three big problems of accepting surrender, [disposal of] the puppet armies, and [realization of] self-governance must be settled before communications can be restored; doing otherwise will encourage civil war. As for the issue of accepting surrender, responsibility must be assumed by the Liberated Area, and all other armed forces are to withdraw to their original areas. 2. In the Handan Campaign the many captured documents provide evidence of the government’s comprehensive plans to engage in an anti-Communist civil war. Please consider whether we can take advantage of this to turn the tables and adopt a tough stance. Not that the four points originally proposed4 should be withdrawn; we are simply saying that the government negotiates Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 66–68, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  This telegram was sent by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to its representatives in Chongqing. 2.  The editors of Wenji indicate that this refers to a telegram from Zhou Enlai to the Central Committee, dated November 4, 1945. 3.  See “A Chinese Communist Party Spokesperson Denounces Wu Guozhen’s Shameless Lies and Presents Ironclad Evidence Regarding the Repeated Attacks by the Guomindang Army,” November 5, 1945, in this volume. 4.  Referring to four temporary measures proposed by Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei in a telegram to the Central Committee, dated October 26, 1945. 170

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3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

on the one hand while it launches large-scale attacks on the other, and it is now transferring troops on a large scale, so everything it says is deceptive and we cannot trust it. If they wish to gain our confidence, they must immediately resolve the three major problems of accepting surrender (including withdrawal of troops from garrison duty), disposing of the puppet armies, and realizing self-governance. Not only must the other side not advance on the communication lines held by us but likewise it must not advance on those not held by us, and the troops that have begun to advance must retreat. Otherwise for certain there will be a civil war. It is all right for neither side to station troops on communication lines; those from the other side that are already stationed there must withdraw to their original encampments, and they may not be stationed in our Liberated Areas. After the troops of both sides have withdrawn from the communication lines, the lines should be administered by the autonomous governments of the Liberated Areas. We cannot agree to the formation of communication investigatory groups. The three big problems of accepting surrender (including the withdrawal of troops from garrison duty), [the disposal of] the puppet armies, and [the realization of] self-governance should first be resolved, which also means solving the problem of the threat of a civil war. The Liberated Areas are to be in charge of restoring communications; at present, restoration is absolutely impossible. Do not respond hastily to the six points raised by the other side and do not be afraid that it might publish them. In fact, Wu Guozhen5 already issued them to United Press International on the 4th and we will publish a critique tonight. We agree that the question of the Northeast should not be raised for the time being. As for exposing the two points of civil war and intervention by the American military, several organs have already been ordered to carry this out, and materials [for this purpose] might be greatly increased. The news from Xi’an is that Chiang has ordered Hu Zongnan6 to proceed immediately to Zhengzhou and initiate a large-scale offensive. What the other side has started, they will carry through at any cost, so we must pay close attention.

5.  Wu Guozhen was head of the Guomindang’s Propaganda Department. 6.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.

Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of Self-Defense1 (November 7, 1945) 1. The Guomindang, aided by the United States, is mobilizing all its forces to attack our Liberated Areas. A nationwide civil war is already a fact. Our Party’s present task is to mobilize all forces, take a stand of self-defense, smash the attacks by the Guomindang, defend the Liberated Areas, and strive to achieve peace. The following have become very urgent tasks to achieve this aim. See to it that in the Liberated Areas peasants generally benefit from rent reductions and that workers and other laboring people benefit from appropriate wage increases and improved conditions; at the same time, see to it that landlords can still make a living and that industrial and commercial capitalists can still make profits. Unfold a large-scale production drive next year, increase the output of food and daily necessities, improve the people’s livelihood, provide relief for famine victims and refugees, and meet the needs of the army. Only when the critical matters of rent reduction and production are properly handled can we overcome our difficulties, support the war, and achieve a victory. 2. As the war is now dominated by large-scale operations,2 many leading comrades are in command at the front and cannot divert their attention to rent reduction and production. We therefore require a division of labor. Leading

Our source for this text is Huabei jiefangqu caizheng jingjishi ziliao xuanbian bianjizu, ed., Huabei jiefangqu caizheng jingjishi ziliao xuanbian (diyi ji) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1996), pp. 4–5. A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1169–70. 1.  Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of SelfDefense → Rent Reduction and Production Are Two Important Matters for the Defense of the Liberated Areas 2.  As the war is now dominated by large-scale operations, → As the scale of the war is now very large,

172

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3.

4.

5.

6.

comrades who remain in the rear areas, in addition to doing a great deal of work in direct support of the front, must not miss opportune times to organize these two important tasks of rent reduction and production. During the next few months of winter and spring, they must launch large-scale rent-reduction campaigns and carry out rent reduction universally in all the Liberated Areas, and particularly in the vast Newly Liberated Areas, so as to arouse the revolutionary fervor of the great majority of the peasant masses. Meanwhile, they must see to it that in 1946 there is new development of agricultural and industrial production in all the Liberated Areas. Do not neglect rent reduction and production because of the new large-scale war; rather, it is precisely to defeat the Guomindang’s offensive that rent reduction and production must be stepped up. Rent reduction must be the result of mass struggle, not a favor bestowed by the government. This depends on the success or failure of rent reduction. In the struggle for rent reduction, excesses can hardly be avoided; as long as it is really a conscious struggle of the broad masses, any excesses that occur can be corrected thereafter. Only then can we persuade the masses and enable them to understand that it is in the interests of the peasants and the people as a whole to allow landlords to make a living so they will not help the Guomindang. The present policy of our Party still is to reduce rents, not to confiscate land. During and following the rent reductions, we must help the great majority of peasants organize themselves into peasant associations. The key to victory in the production drive is to organize the great majority of producers into mutual aid production groups. An indispensable measure is to provide government credits for agriculture and industry. It is also very important to carry out agricultural work in the correct season and reduce the loss of work time. At present, we must mobilize civilian manpower to support the war; however, we must also do our utmost not to miss the farming seasons, and we should study adjustment methods. Army units, government organs, and schools should continue participating in production to an appropriate extent, provided that production does not interfere with the war, with work, or with study. Only thus can they improve living standards and lighten the burden on the people. We already hold some large and many medium-sized cities. It has become an important task for our Party to take control of the economy in these cities and to develop their industry, commerce, and finance. For this purpose, it is essential to use all available qualified personnel and to persuade Party members to cooperate with such personnel and to learn management techniques and methods from them. Tell all Party members to stand firmly with the people, to have concern for their economic difficulties, and to regard carrying out the two important tasks

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of rent reduction and production as the key to helping the people overcome their difficulties. By so doing, we will win the heartfelt support of the people and we will be able to defeat the attacks by the reactionaries. Everything must still be considered from the standpoint of long-term efforts; through the sparing use of manpower and material resources and planning for the long term, we are sure to achieve victory.

The Present Orientation Regarding Propaganda and Negotiations1 (November 7 and 8, 1945) From AB to CD on November 7: American policy merits close attention, and the opinions of our friends2 are worth considering. But given that the Americans and Chiang persist in their policy of attacks, we cannot possibly yield, and self-defense is our only option. In the Northeast, there was an exchange of gunfire at the Shanhai Pass on the 3rd, and with the support of American troops, the Fifteenth Division has launched an offensive from Qinhuangdao. Beforehand they demanded that our army retreat from the Shanhai Pass and evacuate the railroad, but our local forces refused to accede, so the other side attacked and we routed them. Whether Shenyang is won or lost will be decided by the outcome on the battlefield; if within this month we can wipe out the first two or three divisions that attack and gain enough time to amass our military strength and organize and train our reserves (which will take two months), and then we will be able to basically annihilate their attacking force, the Northeast will likely be ours, and if the Guomindang tries to make a move at that time, we will have something to talk about. At present, we can refrain from making public our propaganda and demands for an autonomous army and comprehensive self-government, but war is unavoidable. If we are unsuccessful in battle and Chiang takes Shenyang and Changchun, then our side can obtain only second-rate localities. Even if this is the case, war is the only way to solve the problem, as Taonan, Longjiang, Jiamusi, and other such places cannot be gained through negotiations. If the Central Army pulls back a bit from North China, then during the negotiations matters can be raised in an appropriate way; there can be differences between propaganda and negotiations, but the solution to the North China problem likewise can only be decided through warfare. At present, the other side is using negotiations purely as a stalling tactic and it has no sincere desire to resolve any problems. Every single arrangement by the other side is for the purpose of exterminating our Party. There are many weaknesses in our side’s

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 69–70, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent this telegram to its representatives in Chongqing. 2.  The editors of the Wenji indicate that this means the Soviets. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-79

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propaganda, and the ideas you put forth are quite right; we should adopt the stance of the “aggrieved,” take the centrists into account, and not be rattling sabers and drawing daggers but rather show the utmost forbearance. The general situation, however, is that we are on the inner front and the other side is on the outer front; we are on the defensive and the other side is on the offensive, and after a period all sides will see things clearly. Our present guiding orientation for negotiation is to allow a certain amount of leeway as long as our hands are not tied in such a way that we have nothing to say in future. Please consider the whole picture, draw up a detailed draft, and add your analysis for us, so that after we have thoroughly studied the matter, we may present it to the other side. From AB to CD on November 8: Before this telegram was sent, we received your telegram of November 7,3 and our opinions are in complete accord, so things should be done as stated in your telegram. Today Xinhua News Agency will publish in detail the designation numbers of the more than one million Guomindang troops that are attacking us, which will go a long way toward exposing the deception of the other side.

3.  The editors of Wenji indicate that this refers to a telegram to the Central Committee from Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei.

Treat Mobilizing the Masses and Creating the Battlefield as the Most Urgent Strategic Tasks in the Northeast at Present1 (November 10, 1945) Yinmao:2 1. We received on the 9th your telegram of November 6 and we are delighted with this result. 2. At present, it is necessary to struggle on for just half a month; during this time, the two brigades of Huang Yongsheng and Wen Niansheng,3 totaling 5,000 men, and the two divisions of Liang Xingchu and Huang Kecheng,4 totaling more than 40,000 men, are certain to arrive at the Shenyang and Jinzhou fronts. Please order our army at the Shanhai Pass to hold on for half a month and then we will find a way. The main force of the Shandong troops that will cross the sea must be concentrated between Yingkou and Shenyang and carry out the battle according to Lin Biao’s5 strategy. The combat strength of the American-equipped Guomindang divisions is weak. Our Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]6 have already captured three entire American-equipped

The source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 132–33, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee’s Northeast Bureau. 2.  This may well be a coded reference to something like “second level of command,” since the document is signed zichou, which by the same token could mean something like “top level.” 3.  Huang Yongsheng (1910–1982, native of Hubei) was commander of the Second Political Instruction Brigade of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Force. Wen Niansheng was originally commander of the First Brigade Garrison of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Force. At this time, he was commander of the Third Guerrilla Detachment of the Eighth Route Army. 4.  Liang Xingchu (1913–1985, born in Ji’an) was commander of the First Division of the Shandong Military Region. Huang Kecheng was commander and political commissar of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army. 5.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 6.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-80

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3. 4.

5. 6.

divisions. Please spread this message to boost the morale of the troops. The main force for crossing the sea must be concentrated between Yingkou and Shenyang and should fight according to Lin Biao’s7 strategy There are not many rifles in Shenyang, and some must be kept in reserve to equip the forces that come later, but would it be possible to send some ammunition to Rehe? Three divisions of the Sixteenth Army under Li Zhengxian8 at Shijiazhuang have begun advancing north. I calculate that within half a month they will be close to Shanhai Pass. The Thirteenth Army of Shi Jue9 will leave Shanghai by sea and close in on the Shanhai Pass by the middle of the month. The Fifty-second Army is moving up from Annam,10 and I calculate that it will arrive at the Shanhai Pass by the end of this month. The enemy you are facing consists of these three units of about 80,000 men, who are penetrating deep into our territory but are not familiar with the land or its people, and so they will be cut off from the masses. The soldiers from the south fear the cold and there are many new recruits, so there are many weaknesses. Pay close attention to maintaining tight control over the airports in Changchun and the vicinity. You must eliminate all enemy troops brought in by air. Lose no time in mobilizing the masses for the coming war; spread propaganda among the popular masses to the effect that Chiang Kaishek cannot claim credit for recovering the Northeast and that he is guilty of abandoning the region. Create a wave of feeling against Chiang amongst the popular masses. Send a large number of cadres to carry out civilian and Party work at the Shenyang-Shanhai Pass front and at the Shenyang-Yingkou-Andong11 front. Treat mobilizing the masses and creating the battlefield as the most urgent strategic tasks for now and give them your utmost attention. Zichou12

7.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 8.  Li Zhengxian was commander of the Guomindang’s Sixteenth Army. 9.  Shi Jue (1908–1986, native of Guangxi) was commander of the Guomindang’s Thirteenth Army. 10.  Annam is the name that Vietnam was commonly known by until 1945. 11.  Andong is the former name of the city of Dandong, Liaoning Province. 12.  See note 2.

Make Creating Battlefields a Strategic Task (November 11, 1945) To Chen [Yi] and Li [Yu]:1 1. Congratulations on your victory in the battle of annihilation against Wu Huawen.2 2. To prepare to defeat the inevitable large-scale attacks, in addition to assembling and consolidating the troops you must create broader battlefronts, expanding the area to the north and the south along the occupied railway, capturing the strongholds of Lin city, Teng county, Zou county, and Yanzhou, mobilizing the popular masses extensively and offering them economic benefits. The Guomindang is just now holding a conference of generals and commanders and is promoting opposition to communism throughout the country. It will take time, however, for them to muster large armies in Zou and Teng counties. You should take advantage of this interval to create the battlefield; this is your strategic task. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 134–35, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar of the Shandong Military Region. 2.  This refers to the victory of the Second Column of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Division of the Shandong Military Region over the three divisions under Wu Huawen (1904–1962, native of Shandong) (former puppet troops absorbed into the Guomindang’s Fifth Route Army) in the areas around Nanteng county, Shandong Province, in early November 1945. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-81

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The Situation after the Victory over Japan and Some Work Policies for the Future1 (November 12, 1945) Lately the situation has been developing rapidly. Things with the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and America have been in a flurry during the past three months since the dispatch of Soviet troops and the capitulation of Japan. Our situation is now like a train getting back on the tracks. Former guerrilla forces are turning into powerful field armies and we have another long march of thousands of miles ahead of us. More than 30,000 cadres are already on their way to the Northeast. Peng Zhen2 said in his telegram that 3,000 of the cadres have already arrived, excluding those sent from Shandong. The field armies we have formed, including those that just set out as well as those en route, are the following: Nie Rongzhen’s3 First Field Army should have totaled 70,000 men, but now number fewer; He Long’s4 army originally had 30,000 men, but it too also has fewer now; Liu Bocheng5 has 70,000 men; Chen Yi6 has 70,000 men; Li Xiannian’s7 army has 30,000 men; Su Yu’s8 has 50,000 men. These six large military commands within the Shanhai Pass, plus one command in the Northeast (Lin Biao’s9 200,000 men), in total make up several large military commands. There are 320,000 troops in the field armies of the six major military commands and 20,000 troops in the Northeast, for a total of 512,000 men. The formation of the field armies will basically be completed within a few weeks. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 73–80, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Mao Zedong delivered this speech at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Peng Zhen was secretary of the Central Committee’s Northeast Bureau and first political commissar of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 3.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Jin-Cha-Ji (ShanxiChahar-Hebei) Military Region. 4.  He Long was commander of the Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan) Military Region. 5.  Liu Bocheng was commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Military Region. 6.  Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region. 7.  Li Xiannian was commander of the Central Plains Military Region. 8.  Su Yu was commander of the Central China Field Army. 9.  Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 180

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-82

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The large-scale military transfer of 190,000 troops to the Northeast is a first in the history of the Communist Party; 90,000 have arrived and 100,000 more are en route. Ten thousand troops have joined Li Yunchang’s10 army, 2,000 have joined Sha Ke’s army,11 2,000 have joined Cao Lihuai’s army,12 4,000 have joined Huang Yongsheng’s army,13 5,000 have joined Liu Zhuanlian’s army,14 7,000 have joined Yang Guofu’s army,15 7,000 have joined Liang Xingchu’s army,16 20,000 have joined Xiao Hua’s army,17 and 15,000 have joined Wan Yi’s army.18 Huang Kecheng’s19 35,000 troops will set off for the Shanhai Pass in a few days. Li Yunchang’s army arrived early and has expanded to 100,000. Fighting is now going on at the Shanhai Pass and it has been continuing for a week. In terms of time, we still have the last eighteen days of the month in which to act before the Soviet army withdraws. If Huang Kecheng’s army arrives at Jinzhou, there will be more than 60,000 veteran troops there. To date, the Guomindang has not arrived at Huludao or Yingkou; perhaps it will not arrive there. Fighting is going on only at the Shanhai Pass, so there is definitely enough time. Chiang Kaishek is ready to move his troops by air, but the United States will not send pilots, and the troops cannot be transported by plane if the Soviet army has not withdrawn.20 If the following two conditions are met, we will have a solution: We will hold on at the Shanhai Pass for two weeks and the Guomindang will not make it to Huludao or Yingkou. Sha Ke, in the name of the Manchurian People’s Defense Army, did not allow U.S. Lieutenant General [Babei]’s21 troops to land and they didn’t. The coming two weeks will be a key period.

10.  Li Yunchang was second deputy commander of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 11.  Sha Ke was chief-of-staff of the Central Hebei Military District. 12.  Cao Lihuai (1909–1998, native of Hunan) was chief-of-staff of the Ji-Lu-Yu (Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Military Region. 13.  Huang Yongsheng was political instructor for the Shaan-Gan-Ning-Jin-Sui Joint Defense Force and commander of the Second Brigade. 14.  Liu Zhuanlian was commander of the Second Detachment of the Eighth Route Army. 15.  Yang Guofu was commander of the Seventh Division of the Shandong Military Region. 16.  Liang Xingchu was commander of the First Division of the Shandong Military Region. 17.  Xiao Hua was commander and political commissar of the Eastern Mongolia Temporary Headquarters. 18.  Wan Yi was deputy commander of the Binhai Military Region and commander of the Binhai Detachment. 19.  Huang Kecheng was commander and political commissar of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army. 20.  The Soviet army originally planned to withdraw from Northeast China at the end of November 1945, but it did not begin its withdrawal until March 1946 and did not complete its withdrawal until May of that year. 21.  This American military officer has not been identified.

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There is an increasing possibility that we will control the Northeast. The Guomindang army has not landed at Huludao or Yingkou, although the Soviet army would allow it. The Guomindang’s minister of Foreign Affairs asked the Communist army to withdraw. The Soviet army said this is China’s issue. The Guomindang will probably not land in the future. So the Shanhai Pass is the only place of contention. The Guomindang army has not assembled. Beiping and Tianjin need to be garrisoned and the five divisions at Shijiazhuang are in turmoil. The Guomindang took advantage of the interim and moved five divisions to Shijiazhuang and two divisions to Ji’nan, but now neither of them can move. They now plan to move one division to Changchun from Beiping, but the Tianjin headquarters says they cannot move because there are 100,000 Communist troops in the area. At most, they can only move three armies. Regarding the Northeast, do it but do not talk about it. We have seized political control of parts of the region. We have seized 120,000 firearms, some cannons, and some factories. We must take control of everything in one or two weeks before the Soviet army withdraws. We will need people and troops to do this. Near Shenyang, not many are really engaged in this way. Things are intense there; a battle for control is being waged. Now only Changchun and Harbin are left. We can take them over with one regiment as soon as the Soviet army withdraws. We are deploying 100,000 troops. There are 40,000 in Luo Ronghuan’s22 army, 22,000 in Ye Fei’s23 army, 5,000 in Tan Zheng’s24 army; 22,000 in Yang Dezhi’s25 army, and 12,000 in Chen Geng’s26 army. There are altogether 101,000 troops ready to launch a pincer attack on the Guomindang army. Now we are moving troops by sea, 6,000 at a time, once every three days. So far, we have not met any danger. The Northeast has a population of more than 30 million, so we have sent there about the right number of cadres and soldiers. Within the Shanhai Pass, we can say that we have repelled attacks by the Guomindang armies from three directions. In August of this year, more than 60,000 troops led by Fu Zuoyi barreled eastward along the Beiping-Suiyuan line and occupied the cities and towns that we had liberated. The armies of

22.  Luo Ronghuan was second political commissar of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 23.  Ye Fei was commander of the First Column of the New Fourth Army. His unit had not yet gone to the Northeast because of a change of plans by the Central Military Commission. 24.  Tan Zheng (1906–1988, native of Hunan) was political commissar and head of the Political Department of the Shaan-Gan-Ning-Jin-Sui Joint Defense Force. 25.  Yang Dezhi was commander of the First Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. His unit had not yet gone to the Northeast because of a change of plans by the Central Military Commission. 26.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. His unit had not yet gone to the Northeast because of a change of plans by the Central Military Commission.

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the Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] and Jin-Sui [Shanxi-Suiyuan] Military Regions were assembled, trained, and consolidated over the period of a month. They counterattacked against Fu’s army in a first round of fighting and pushed it back to Pingdiquan and then all the way back to Guisui. Yesterday, we launched a general offensive, planning to fight our way to Wuyuan and Linhe. Fu’s original plan has been foiled. It will be difficult for him to attack again even if we cannot capture Guisui and Baotou. During the Battle of Shangdang, Yan Xishan’s main force was wiped out. Twenty-seven generals and officers were captured. This battle has great significance: Now there is no danger of being attacked from the rear. Shangdang is an area that can supply soldiers and grain. It took ten days to fight the Battle of Pinghan, which was a major battle that stopped hundreds of thousands of Guomindang troops from moving north. Now, as a result, thirty divisions of Guomindang troops along the line from Tongguan to Xuzhou cannot move forward. Li Xiannian’s army and the New Fourth Army in northern Jiangsu have also played a role in suppressing the enemy forces. Although only two brigades of the New Fourth Army have arrived in Shandong, they have joined with the forces of the Shandong military command and have eliminated Wu Huawen’s27 army. Within a few days, four more brigades will arrive, making a total of eighteen regiments, so the force will be stronger. On the [Da]tong-Pu[zhou] line, Chen Geng’s column attacked and occupied Hongdong and Zhaocheng. Chen Geng’s troops were transferred and departed Taiyue, so Taiyue needs several regiments to guard it against Hu Zongnan’s28 troops. Chiang Kaishek is convening a meeting in Chongqing.29 In fact, he is looking for a way to deal with us. At present, the Guomindang forces dealing with us consist of at most 127 divisions (forty-nine armies). As a matter of fact, the New First Division in Guangzhou can only supply one or two regiments. The New Sixth Army in Nanjing can only look on at Pukou, so at best there are only fifty armies. Now we have eliminated nine of them, so only forty remain. It is difficult for them to increase their forces at present. After performing garrison duty, no more than half of the army is available to engage in field battles, whereas for the most part our field army has been formed. During this period, we have captured 200,000 firearms. Our strategy must definitely be to negotiate with Chiang Kaishek while at the same time to prepare for the attack that Chiang is certain to launch. Chiang is using a two-way strategy, so we will do likewise. Our military actions have not been affected because of the negotiations. We have assembled troops, waged three major battles, and sent cadres to the Northeast.

27.  Wu Huawen was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Fifth Route Army. 28.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. 29.  This refers to the Guomindang Military Affairs Conference that Chiang Kaishek convened from November 9 to 16, 1945. The conference decided to move against the Communist forces within six months.

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In general, Chiang Kaishek is certain to attack and we are determined to fight. We are unable to say yet that we have the Northeast under control or that we hold a dominant position in North China. Only when we control these areas can we say that they are ours, and only at that time when the Northeast is under control will we be able to put forward the question of self-rule in the Northeast. Should we permit the Guomindang to stick its nose in, while it will not allow us to become involved? Currently, the U.S.-Chiang clique wants to punish us and is putting huge pressure on us. There is no other way but to fight. We should still go ahead with the negotiations. We have not formed a central government, so when Chiang orders armed forces against us, we can only ask him to revoke the order. We can also hold meetings of people’s representatives in the Liberated Areas. If Chiang dismisses the Eighteenth Army Group, then our Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]30 will form a liberation army. We can also send Chiang a telegram asking him to withdraw the order and cancel his wrongful policy. There is also the possibility that he will not send his armed forces to suppress us. America is in fact interfering in the internal affairs of China, but its weakness is that it must declare that it will not interfere. Word has it that America is going to send 200,000 troops here, but this has not been confirmed. It may not go that far. Even if 200,000 troops are sent here, they will be very thinly distributed around the country and will be very weak. The American proletariat supports us. In fact, a demonstration was held in New York. Comrade Zhou Enlai sent them a telegram. There are two basic problems for Chiang’s army. The soldiers are not of one mind and the people will not give him their allegiance. Moreover, his munitions are ineffective, and his grain supplies are low. Battle is entirely a matter of firepower. His army will collapse under our first charge. One hand grenade can capture five machine guns. There is also the disadvantage of climate. There are many southerners in Chiang’s army, and it will be very cold fighting in the north. All else aside, the key element is the heart of the army and of the people. There is also the possibility that troops in the miscellaneous armies, such as those of Sun Liangcheng31 and perhaps also of Zhang Lanfeng,32 will come over to our side. In addition, there are the armies of Liu Ruming, Cao Fulin, Shang Zhen, and Feng

30.  Peng Dehuai was deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Army Group and vice-chairman and general chief-of-staff of the Central Military Commission. 31.  Sun Liangcheng was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Second Route Army. 32.  Zhang Lanfeng (1902–1952, native of Henan) was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Third Route Army.

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Zhi’an,33 plus the Thirty-eighth Army.34 The impact of Gao Shuxun joining us has been very great. We broadly publicized this fact through an open telegram, and we have asked people everywhere to celebrate. Our cutting off of transportation links has also led to a propaganda war in which Chiang’s army claims we are sabotaging the demobilization, while we claim this is one way to stop a civil war. We have set up a headquarters for the destruction of such links, which has both public and private benefits. The people were enthusiastic when they got the iron rails and sleepers. Chiang’s army is fierce and puts a lot of pressure on us, so there is no other way out except to fight. If we do not fight, we will definitely be wiped out. If we do fight, at worst we will also be wiped out, so why not fight? There is a very good possibility that we will fight and win. Is it possible that a world war might result if the fighting continues? I think not. The Soviet Union must rest and build up its strength after the war, so it will not want another war to break out. It will not become involved in another war unless some other country attacks it. As long as the current situation continues, we have nothing to fear, even if the Soviet Union does not help us. The United States is in fact interfering in China, but it will have to reconsider its position if we continue to win victories. In World War II, many people did not believe that the Soviet Union could prevail. Now people are even less confident that we can win. Bai Chongxi’s35 secretary said that Bai cannot for the life of him believe that they will not win. If we can hang on for half a year, both Chiang Kaishek and America will reconsider this issue. In the Liberated Areas we must become involved in production and reduce land rents. A big push must be made in the Newly Liberated Areas to lower rents, and this should be done thoroughly and universally. If we can accomplish this, the vitality of the popular masses can be restored. Should the land of the landlords be confiscated? The policy of the Party’s Seventh National Congress is still to reduce land rent and interest on loans. Such a reduction must be thorough to beat down the power and prestige of the landlords. In terms of production, next year we must systematically engage in growing food and producing daily necessities. Large armies are now at war and consume a lot. We must undertake industrial production, even though we have only mediumsized cities and no large cities.

33.  Liu Ruming was deputy commander of the Guomindang army’s Fifth War Zone. Cao Fulin was deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Second Army Group and commander of its Fifty-fifth Army. Shang Zhen (1888–1978, native of Hebei) was chief-ofstaff for the Guomindang government. Feng Zhi’an (1896–1954, native of today’s Hebei) was deputy commander of the Guomindang army’s Sixth War Zone and commander-inchief of its Thirty-third Army Group. 34.  The deputy commander of the Thirty-eighth Army, Kong Congzhou, revolted and went over to the Communist side in Henan’s Gong county in May of 1946. 35.  Bai Chongxi was deputy chief of general staff in the Guomindang’s Military Affairs Commission.

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If the rent reductions are not thorough, the masses will not be energized, and the people will not be interested in production. Now we must distinguish between the front and the rear and we must not let work in the rear go unattended. It will probably take another two months to get onto the right track. The economy is a major problem in the Northeast. Who can deal with places such as Benxihu and Fushun? Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi said before, whoever can handle the economy should do so. Right now, the train engineers on the [Bei] ping-Sui[yuan] railway are only those old operators. Eighty percent of the country’s industry is in the Northeast. It will be acceptable to use Japanese technicians to help develop this 80 percent of our country’s industry.

Fighting on Internal Lines, Wipe out the Guomindang’s Three Armies One by One (November 15, 1945) To Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 We received your telegram of 7:00 P.M. on the 13th.2 The diehard Thirteenth and Fifty-second armies are currently amassing in the areas of Qinhuangdao and Funing, and it is believed that another army is behind them, so at least three armies are amassing and will attack and advance toward the Shanhai Pass– Suizhong line. Right now a war in the Shanhai Pass would not be a real battle. The two forces of our [commanders] Huang [Kecheng] and Liang [Xingchu],3 numbering 42,000, have just arrived from a great distance and the officers and men are weary and unfamiliar with the terrain; they are currently moving toward Yiyuankou and will remain in Zhucaoying.4 There is no battle worth fighting, as wiping out an enemy unit would merely be a tactical victory and would reveal the strength of our military forces, which would be unable to rest and regroup and would be forced into a disadvantaged position. To avoid this type of setback, use your main forces with caution and seek to fight a decisive battle when one battle will be sufficient to resolve the problem. You should order Li Yunchang and Yang Guofu’s5 two units to hold the Shanhai Pass–Suizhong line, steadily resisting attack to exhaust the fatigued enemy, and order Huang’s and Liang’s

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 143–45, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army. 2.  The telegram from Lin Biao and Peng Zhen stated that the Communist forces had weakened the enemy forces near the Shanhai Pass. It recommended that Huang Kechang’s and Liang Xingchu’s divisions advance on Yiyuankou and Zhucaoying to attack the enemy’s right flank. 3.  Huang Kecheng was commander and political commissar of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army. Liang Xingchu was commander of the First Division of the Shandong Military Region. 4.  Yiyuankou is the name of a pass and Zhucaoying is the name of a village, both in northeastern Funing county, Hebei Province. 5.  Li Yunchang was second deputy commander of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army and deputy commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning (Ji-Re-Liao) Military Region. Yang Guofu was commander of the Shandong Military Region’s Seventh Division. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-83

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two forces to advance covertly from Lingkou and Jielingkou6 by separate routes toward the Jinzhou-Jinxi-Xingcheng triangle. Once situated on internal lines, rest and regroup; let the troops recover from their fatigue, replenish their ammunition, familiarize themselves with the terrain and the conditions of the people, create the battlefield, and carry out exercises during night fighting. Wait until the enemy has advanced to the Suizhong area or the Xingcheng area and is considerably exhausted and fatigued. Then we can concentrate maximum military strength, calculated as Huang Kecheng’s 35,000, Liang Xingchu’s 7,000, Yang Guofu’s 7,000, and the forces of Li Yunchang and Sha Ke7 on the Panshan–Jinzhou– Shanhai Pass line, totaling at least 20,000 (taking new recruits along as supplementary forces), for a total of approximately 70,000 men, and launch them in a counteroffensive at the most opportune time and place them under the personal command of Lin Biao or [Luo] Ronghuan,8 fighting several separate battles, each time wiping out two or three divisions and ultimately annihilating all three armies. In this way, we can resolve the problem strategically. Eastern Hebei has already formed two field brigades, which can be transferred to the mountainous western area of the Shanhai Pass–Suizhong–Xingcheng line to amass covertly, and when the frontal main forces undertake their decisive engagement, these troops can cut off the enemy army’s retreat from the flank. In sum, with respect to engaging in battle on internal lines, this general orientation is the most advantageous. We hope you will reflect on this matter and reply by telegram indicating whether or not you agree. Mao Zedong

6.  Lingkou is the name of a pass in the northern part of Qian’an county, Hebei Province. Jielingkou is the name of a pass in the northern portion of Funing county, Hebei Province. 7.  Sha Ke was chief-of-staff of the Central Hebei (Ji Zhong) Military Subregion. 8.  Luo Ronghuan was second political commissar of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army.

Yan’an Authority Commenting on the National Assembly Says Unilateral Action by the Guomindang Authorities Reveals Determination to Launch a Large-Scale Civil War (November 16, 1945) (Xinhua News Agency, Yan’an, November 16) According to a dispatch from the Reuters Agency Xingmei News Department, on the 12th of this month the Guomindang government announced that the National Assembly will be held next year on May 5. This agency has not received any more detailed information other than this simple report. However, Yan’an is paying great attention to this piece of news, which it regards as another renunciation of the “Double Tenth Agreement” by the Guomindang and the Nationalist government. Examining the “Summary of Conversations between Representatives of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party” published on the 12th of last month, the full text of the clause regarding the National Assembly is as follows: “Third, on the issue of the National Assembly, the Chinese Communist Party side proposes to re-elect the assembly delegates; to postpone the date for convening the National Assembly; and to revise the National Assembly’s organic law, election rules, and the May 5 Draft Constitution.1 The government side stated that the elected delegates to the National Assembly should remain effective and that there should be a reasonable increase in the number of delegates, with the issue resolved legally. As for the May 5 Draft Constitution, the government had earlier mobilized people from various fields to study and discuss the matter and contribute their opinions regarding its revision. The two sides were therefore unable to reach an agreement. However, the Chinese Communist side announced that it did not want to see unity ruptured on account of arguments over this issue. Meanwhile, both sides

The source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 345–46, where it is reproduced from a November 17, 1945, Jiefang ribao article. 1.  The Guomindang’s Fourth Central Executive Committee resolved in December 1932 to convene a National Assembly and to have a draft constitution drawn up by the Legislative Yuan. The first draft of the constitution was completed in 1933 and promulgated on May 5, 1936, because of which it was known as the May 5 Draft Constitution. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-84

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agreed to submit this issue to the People’s Political Consultative Conference2 for resolution.” Furthermore, the “Summary” stipulates that “the various issues surrounding consultation on national affairs, discussion of the guiding principles for peaceful national reconstruction, and convening the National Assembly” should be the major issues before the Political Consultative Conference. Within one month after promulgation of the Summary, and before the meetings of the Political Consultative Conference, the Guomindang government unexpectedly took unilateral action to announce the date for the convening of the National Assembly. This action is sufficient to prove that the Guomindang side lacks a sincere commitment to consult on and resolve major political issues through political channels and meetings of various political parties. This action also reveals that the Guomindang government is now determined to rupture national unity and launch a large-scale civil war. The same [Yan’an] authority said that now that the Guomindang government has insisted on doing things its own way and has carried out this unilateral action, it has become a real question whether the originally planned Political Consultative Conference, which was to regard discussions of issues surrounding the National Assembly as a central topic, still has any significance. Furthermore, even after the meeting of the Political Consultative Conference, who will be able to guarantee that the Guomindang will not once again break its promises and denounce the agreement of the conference?

2.  This is the “old” People’s Political Consultative Conference under the Guomindang and not the current Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas in 19461 (December 15, 1945) During the past few months our Party has won great successes in leading the people in fierce struggles to eliminate the Japanese and puppet forces and to smash the attacks by the Guomindang on the Liberated Areas. All our Party comrades have worked as one and have scored achievements in every field. The year 1945 will soon be over; in 1946 we must focus on the following points in our work in all the Liberated Areas: 1. Smash new attacks. Since our army smashed the large-scale attacks on our Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Shanxi, and southern Hebei, the Guomindang has been mustering larger forces and preparing for new attacks. If no new development forces the Guomindang to quickly stop the civil war, fighting will be intense in the spring of 1946. Therefore, the central task of all the Liberated Areas remains to position for self-defense and to do their utmost to smash the Guomindang attacks. 2. Spread the Gao Shuxun movement.2 In order to smash the Guomindang attacks, our Party must sow divisions among the Guomindang troops that are preparing to attack or are already attacking. On the one hand, our army must engage in extensive, open political propaganda and political offensives to undermine the will to fight on the part of the Guomindang troops who are engaged in civil war. On the other hand, we must prepare and organize uprisings within the Guomindang army and spread the Gao Shuxun movement so that, at crucial moments in the fighting, large numbers of Guomindang troops

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xuanji (1991, second edition), Vol. 4, pp. 1174–77. It also appears in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1171–75. 1.  These directives were drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to be transmitted to all Party members. 2.  On October 30, 1945, Gao Shuxun, vice-commander of the Guomindang’s Eleventh War Zone and commander of the New Eighth Army, during the battle of Handan, led more than 10,000 newly recruited Eighth Army troops in revolt. This had a substantial influence throughout the country. In order to create further divisions and uprisings in the Guomindang army, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to begin a propaganda campaign appealing to Guomindang military officers to follow Gao Shuxun’s example. This was called the “Gao Shuxun movement.” DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-85

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will follow Gao Shuxun’s example and come over to the people, oppose the civil war, and stand for peace. In order to do this work in a practical way and to produce speedy results, every area must comply with the Central Committee directive by setting up a special department and assigning a large number of cadres to devote themselves wholeheartedly and exclusively to this work. The leading bodies in each area must closely direct this work. 3. Train the troops. The field armies of the Liberated Areas have already been largely formed, and regional troops are also quite numerous. Hence, for the time being, we should generally stop expanding the number of troops and we should make use of the intervals between battles to focus on the training of troops. This applies to field armies, regional troops, and people’s militias. As for the training courses, the main objective should still be to improve skills in marksmanship, bayoneting, grenade-throwing, and the like; the secondary objective should be to improve tactics, with special emphasis on night operations. As for the method of training, we should carry out a mass training movement, in which officers teach soldiers and soldiers teach officers. In 1946 we must further improve political work in the army, overcome any dogmatic and formalist work styles in the army, and strive to unite officers and soldiers, unite the army and the people, unite with friendly troops, create divisions among the enemy troops, and ensure that the training, supply, and fighting tasks are accomplished. The local people’s militias should be reorganized in accordance with existing conditions. The army’s rear services should be readjusted. Everything possible should be done to organize and expand the artillery and engineering units in all areas. The military academies should continue their work, with an emphasis on training technical personnel. 4. Rent reduction. In accordance with the Central Committee’s November 7, 1945, directive,3 all areas must launch movements in 1946 for a reduction of rent and interest in their Newly Liberated Areas. The movements must be on a large scale and of a mass character but with leadership. As for the workers, their wages should be appropriately raised. Through these movements, the broad masses should be able to emancipate themselves, organize, and become the conscious masters of the Liberated Areas. Without these resolute measures, the masses in the Newly Liberated Areas will not be able to tell which of the two parties, the Communist Party or the Guomindang, is good and which is bad; they will waver and will not give firm support to our Party. In the old Liberated Areas, the work of rent and interest reductions should be reexamined in order to further consolidate those areas. 5. Production. All areas must follow the November 7 directive and promptly make every preparation to ensure that both public and private production in 3.  See “Rent Reduction and Production Are Two Key Matters for the Defense of the Liberated Areas,” November 7, 1945, in this volume.

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6.

7.

8.

9.

all Liberated Areas in 1946 surpasses all previous years in scale and achievements. The feeling of weariness that has appeared among the people can be overcome only after the two tasks of rent reduction and production are carried out in earnest and with marked success. Whether or not these two tasks are fulfilled will ultimately decide whether there will be victory or defeat in the political and military struggles in the Liberated Areas. These two tasks must not be neglected in any area. Finance. In 1946 the financial burden, which has become heavier to cover the intensive work in the recent period, must be normalized in a planned and systematic way. There must be appropriate reductions for those whose burdens are too heavy. In the interest of long-term efforts, the number of people diverted from production in any area must not exceed the limits of the local financial capacity. Troops are valued for quality rather than for quantity; in building the army this remains one of our principles. Developing production, ensuring supply, centralizing leadership, decentralizing management, giving consideration to both the army and the people and to both public and private interests, and stressing both production and economy—all of these remain the proper guiding principles for solving our financial and economic problems. Support the government and cherish the people;4 support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of those troops that fought in the War of Resistance. In 1946 we must perform these two tasks better than we did in the past several years. This will be of great significance for smashing the Guomindang’s attacks and consolidating the Liberated Areas. In the army, this should be handled through ideological education of every commander and fighter, so that they all thoroughly understand the importance of supporting the government and cherishing the people. As long as the army does its part, relations with the local governments and the people will also improve. Relief. In the Liberated Areas there are many victims of natural disasters, refugees, and unemployed and partially unemployed, who urgently need relief. Whether or not this problem is solved well will have a great and widespread influence. In addition to government measures, relief should mainly depend on mutual aid by the masses themselves. The Party and the government should encourage the masses to organize relief through mutual aid. Take good care of local cadres. In every Liberated Area today there are large numbers of cadres from other areas doing leading work at all levels. This is especially true in the Northeast provinces. The leading bodies in each area must tirelessly counsel these cadres to take good care of the local cadres and to treat them with great warmth and goodwill. Cadres from the outside should regard the selection, training, and promotion of local cadres as their

4.  This is an abbreviated form of the PLA slogan “Protect and support the government; love and protect the people.”

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important task. Only thus can our Party take root in the Liberated Areas. The work style whereby people from the outside look down on the local people should be criticized. 1 0. Calculate everything on a long-term basis. No matter how the situation develops, our Party must always make calculations on a long-term basis if our position is to be invincible. At present, on the one hand our Party persists in its position of upholding self-government and self-defense in the Liberated Areas, firmly opposes attacks by the Guomindang, and consolidates the gains won by the people of these areas. On the other hand, we support the democratic movement that is now developing in the Guomindang areas (as evidenced by the student strike in Kunming)5 in order to isolate the reactionaries, win numerous allies, and expand the national democratic united front under our Party’s influence. Moreover, a delegation from our Party will soon attend the Political Consultative Conference of various parties and unaffiliated public figures, reopen negotiations with the Guomindang, and strive for peace and democracy throughout the country. However, there may still be twists and turns, and many difficulties may lie ahead. For example, our new areas and our new troops are still not consolidated and we have problems of finance. We must squarely face and overcome all these difficulties, arrange all our work on a long-term basis, pay the closest attention to an economical use of manpower and material resources, and guard against wishful thinking for easy victories through good luck. These ten points should receive special attention in our work in 1946, and particularly in our work in the first half of the year. It is hoped that comrades in different places will carry out these policies flexibly in light of the local conditions. As for the work in various areas, such as building a local political authority, carrying out united front work, expanding education on current affairs inside and outside the Party, and doing work in cities and towns near the Liberated Areas—all these are important, but we will not dwell on them here.

5.  On the night of November 25, 1945, thousands of secondary school and college students in Kunming, Yunnan Province, held a rally against the civil war at National Southwest Associated University. Guomindang troops surrounded the rally area, firing off cannons, rifles, and machine guns, and they prevented teachers and students from returning home. On the next day, the students launched a strike at the university. On December 1, the Guomindang sent military police and special agents to National Southwest Associated University and other colleges and secondary schools, resulting in the deaths of four teachers and students and injuries to dozens of others. This became known as the “12-1 Massacre.”

Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Work in the Northeast1 (December 28, 1945) The Northeast Bureau, i.e., to Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng, Li Fuchun, Li Yunchang, Rehe, Eastern Hebei, Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Shandong, Zhangjiakou, Jiaodong, and Central China: 1. Our Party’s present task in the Northeast is to build stable military and political base areas in eastern, northern, and western Manchuria. To build such base areas is no easy job; it requires a hard and bitter struggle. Three or four years are needed to build such base areas. But a solid preliminary foundation must be laid in 1946. Otherwise we may not be able to stand our ground. 2. It should now be made clear that these base areas are not to be built in regions close to the big cities or along the main communication lines that are or will be occupied by the Guomindang; under present international conditions, this is not practicable. Nor are they to be built in the2 big cities or main communication lines held by the Guomindang. The reason is that the Guomindang, having seized the big cities and the main communication lines, will not let us build stable base areas in regions close to them. Our Party should do adequate work and set up our first line of military defense in these regions, which must never be lightly abandoned. But they will be guerrilla zones for both parties and not our stable base areas. And they could become buffer zones for both parties as concessions to be made by both parties. Therefore, the regions in which to build stable bases are the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centers of the Guomindang

Our source for this text is Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi, ed., Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao, Vol. 18, 1984, pp. 162–63. The English version is modified based on Selected Works, Vol. 4, pp. 81–85, and Tony Saich, ed., The Road to Power of the Chinese Communist Party (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 1272–74. A revised version appears in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1177–80. Text in italics reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised 1960 version. For more details, see “Note on Sources and Conventions.” 1.  Directives of the CPC Central Committee on the Work in the Northeast → Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast 2.  in the → in regions close to DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-86

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occupation. Those regions should now be designated so that we can deploy our forces accordingly and lead the whole Party toward this goal. 3. After we have decided on the location of our task3 and disposed our forces, and after our army’s numerical strength has greatly increased, mass work is now4 the center of gravity of the work of the Northeast.5 All cadres must be made to understand that for some time and that unless our starting point is to arouse the masses, solve problems,6 and rely on them in every way, and unless we mobilize all forces to work painstakingly among the masses and lay a solid preliminary foundation within a year, and particularly in the next few critical months, we shall become isolated in the Northeast, be unable to build stable base areas or defeat the attacks of the Guomindang, and indeed may encounter immense difficulties or even fail. If7 we rely firmly on the masses, we shall overcome all difficulties and reach our goal step by step. The goal of mass work consists of arousing the masses for struggles to settle accounts with traitors and for launching campaigns for rent reductions and wage increases, along with campaigns for production. In these struggles, we should form various kinds of mass organizations, set up Party nuclei, build armed units of the masses and organs of the people’s political power, speedily raise mass economic struggles to the level of political struggles, and lead the masses to take part in building the base areas. The directive on arousing mass struggles recently issued by the Rehe Provincial Party Committee may be applied in the Northeast. Our Party must bring tangible material benefits to the people in the Northeast; only then will the masses support us and oppose the Guomindang attacks. Otherwise, the masses will be unable to see clearly which of the two parties, the Guomindang or the Communist Party, is good and which is bad, and for a time they may be taken in by deceitful Guomindang propaganda, and may even turn against our Party, and thus an extremely unfavorable situation would be created for us in the Northeast. 4. At present, there is a subjective difficulty for our Party in the Northeast. Large numbers of our cadres and armed forces in the Northeast are newcomers, unfamiliar with the place and the people. Cadres are dissatisfied because we cannot occupy the large cities, and they are impatient with the arduous work of arousing the masses and building the base areas. These circumstances are in conflict with the present situation and the tasks of the Party. Again, we must teach all cadres from other areas to pay attention to investigation and study, to acquaint themselves with the place and

3.  task → stable base areas 4.  is now → will be 5. the Northeast’s work. → our Party’s work in the Northeast. 6.  arouse the masses, solve problems, → arouse the masses to struggle, solve their problems, 7.  If → Conversely, if

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the people, and to resolve to become one with the people of the Northeast; and we must train large numbers of activists and cadres from among the masses. We should explain to the cadres that although the big cities and the communication lines are in the hands of the Guomindang, the situation in the Northeast is nevertheless favorable to us. As long as we spread among all cadres and soldiers the idea of arousing the masses and of building our base areas, and as long as we mobilize all forces and quickly undertake the great struggle to build these base areas, we will be able to establish ourselves firmly in the Northeast and in Jehol [Rehe], and we will be sure of victory. We must tell the cadres that they should on no account underestimate the strength of the Guomindang or become impatient with arduous work because they do not think the Guomindang is going to attack eastern and northern Manchuria. Of course, in making these explanations we should not lead the cadres to believe that the Guomindang is terribly strong and that its attacks cannot be smashed. It should be pointed out that the Guomindang has no deep, organized foundation in the Northeast and that its attacks can be smashed; it is therefore possible for our Party to build base areas. But the Guomindang troops are now attacking the Rehe–Liaoning border, and if they are not limited by external forces,8 before long they are sure to9 attack eastern and northern Manchuria. All our Party members must therefore resolve to undertake the most difficult tasks, swiftly arouse the masses, build our base areas, and smash the Guomindang attacks in western Manchuria and Rehe resolutely and in a planned way. In eastern and northern Manchuria, we should quickly prepare conditions for smashing the Guomindang attacks. We must thoroughly eliminate any ideas concerning our work10 of winning easy victories through good luck, without hard and bitter struggle, and without sweat and blood. 5. Promptly delimit the military regions and subregions in western, eastern, and northern Manchuria and divide our forces into field armies and regional troops. Distribute a considerable portion of the regular troops among the military subregions to arouse the masses, wipe out bandits, set up organs of political power, and organize guerrillas, people’s militia, and self-defense forces so as to make our areas secure; coordinate with the field armies; and smash the Guomindang attacks. All troops must be assigned to specific areas and specific tasks; only in this way can they quickly unite with the people and build stable base areas. 6. At this time more than 100,000 of our troops have entered the Northeast and Rehe; the army there has recently expanded by more than 200,000, and the trend is to continue on expanding. Adding Party and government workers,

8.  if they are not limited by external forces → if no blows are dealt them 9.  sure to → will 10.  concerning our work → among our cadres

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we estimate that the total will exceed 400,000 within one year. A situation in which such a large number of personnel, divorced from production, depends solely on the people of the Northeast for supplies certainly cannot last for long and is very dangerous. Therefore, all army units and government organs must take part in production when not fighting or doing their regular work, except for the field armies that are concentrated and charged with major military actions. The year 1946 must not pass without results; the entire Northeast must promptly make plans accordingly. 7. In the Northeast, the direction in which the workers and intellectuals move is vitally important to building our base areas and winning future victories. Therefore, our Party should give its full attention to work in the big cities and along the main communication lines, and especially to winning over the workers and intellectuals. In view of the fact that in the early years of the War of Resistance our Party did not pay sufficient attention to attracting workers and intellectuals to the base areas, in addition to paying attention to underground work in the Guomindang areas, the Party organizations in the Northeast should now do everything possible to draw workers and intellectuals into our army and into the various construction tasks in the base areas. 8. The directives of the Central Committee are all applied to the Northeast, including the directive about the current situation on October 20, 1945, the directive about rent reduction and production on November 7,1945, and the directive about the policy for work on December 15, 1945. This directive is drafted in line with the conditions in the Northeast. It is hoped that comrades of the Northeast Bureau as well as its sub-bureaus will implement all these directives in a well-planned, proper, and earnest manner. Central Committee

Letter to Situ Meitang1 (December 28, 1945) For the perusal of Mr. Situ Meitang in New York: I have just received your cable of November 27, in which you oppose civil war and forcefully advocate democracy, and I admire it with no reservations. Our humble Party’s delegation has already reached Chongqing to participate in the Political Consultative Conference that is about to take place and it has proposed to the government authorities the immediate and unconditional cessation of civil war, an end to single-party dictatorship, and the establishment of a democratic coalition government to work for the unity, integration, and peaceful reconstruction of the state. I respectfully request your honorable party and all our Chinese compatriots throughout America join in advocating this and in making it a reality. Our nation’s future will truly greatly benefit from this. Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, p. 85, where it is reproduced from a copy corrected by Mao Zedong. 1.  Situ Meitang (1868–1955, born in Kaiping, Guangdong) was at this time head of the General Office of the secret society known as the Zhigongtang (“Attain Impartiality Lodge”) in the United States. For an earlier attempt by Mao to rally the support of a secret society, see his appeal of July 15, 1936, to the Gelaohui, in Vol. V, pp. 245–47. Three years after Mao wrote the present letter, the Communist authorities in North China began the process of outlawing and disbanding all societies with a “feudal” character. See Lev Deliusin, “The I-kuan Tao Society,” in Jean Chesneaux, ed., Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China 1840–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 225–33. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-87

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To Huang Qisheng1 (December 29, 1945) Esteemed Mr. Huang: I read your new poems and deeply felt your great kindness. Please extend my regards to Mr. Qian [Zheng].2 I send you best wishes on your sixty-seventh birthday as well as good health in the New Year. I am enclosing several newspaper articles that [Wang] Ruofei3 sent me. Please send them back after reading them. Among them, the rantings of the Guomindang are as laughable as the racket of crows and cicadas. They are also enclosed for your perusal. Mao Zedong December 29

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 264, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Huang Qisheng (1879–1946, native of Guizhou) was an educator and the uncle of Wang Ruofei, mentioned later in the letter. 2.  Qian Zheng (1884–1968, born in Fenghua, Fengtian) was a counsellor on the Shaanxi-Gansu-NIngxia Border Area Counsel. 3.  Wang Ruofei was secretary of the Chongqing Work Committee responsible for the daily work of the southern bureaus. He accompanied Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Chongqing for the negotiations on August 28, 1945. 200

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-88

1946



To Cai Bo and Others (January 8, 1946) To young comrades Cai Bo, Zhang Zhiming, Liu Yongbin, Huang Ping, and Zhao Xiaoyan:1 After Yongfu2 returned, he was very happy to receive your letter. Just as you said in your letter, new China will need many scholars and technicians and your efforts in this direction are most appropriate. I can only write a few lines to you here, but in any case, I hope that every day will bring you growth and good health, happiness, and progress. I also hope you will unite with all the young Chinese friends who are studying in the Soviet Union. Study hard, all of you, and return to serve your country in the future. I tightly grasp your hands. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 265–66, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Cai Bo (1924–1991, native of Hunan) was the son of Cai Hesen (1985–1931, native of Hunan), who was the founder of the first central CPC newspaper The Guide and was executed by the Guomindang in 1931; Zhang Zhiming (1927–2008, born in Changzhou, Jiangsu) was the son of Zhang Tailei (1898–1927, born in Changzhou); Liu Yongbin (1925– 1967, native of Hunan) was the son of Liu Shaoqi; Huang Ping should be Yuri (Youli) Huang Ping (1927–2010, native of Guangdong), the name used in the Soviet Union by the son of Huang Ping (1901–1981, born in Hankou, Hubei); and Zhao Xiaoyan (1928–2017, born in Youyang, Sichuan) was the son of Zhao Shiyan (1901–1947, native of Sichuan) (uncle of former premier Li Peng). 2.  Yongfu was another name for Mao Zedong’s eldest son (with Yang Kaihui), Mao Anying (1922–1950, native of Hunan). DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-90

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Notice on Halting Domestic Military Conflict (January 10, 1946) To the Party committees at all levels of the Chinese Communist Party, commanders of all military units in the Chinese Liberated Areas, and comrades at all levels of government: This Party’s representatives and the representatives of the Guomindang have reached an agreement regarding the measures, orders, and statements for halting domestic military conflict,1 and will publish the proposal today. All military forces under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, including regular armies, militias, irregular armies, and guerrilla units, all levels of government in the Liberated Areas, and all levels of committees in the Chinese Communist Party must without exception abide by it strictly and conscientiously, with no room for error permitted. The efforts of all of China’s people to establish domestic peace following the victory over the Japanese invaders have today achieved major results. A new stage of peace and democracy for China will commence henceforth. It is hoped that all comrades throughout our Party will cooperate closely with the people of the whole nation in continued efforts in the struggle to consolidate domestic peace, achieve democratic revolution, and build an independent, free, rich and powerful new China.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 88–89, where it is reproduced from the version published in Jiefang ribao, January 11, 1946. 1. After the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party signed the “Summary of Conversations between the Representatives of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party” on October 10, 1945, the CPC delegation led by Zhou Enlai continued to negotiate with the representatives of the Guomindang government. On January 10, 1946, both parties signed the “Order and Statement on Halting Domestic Military Conflict and Resuming Traffic” and the “Agreement on Halting Domestic Military Conflict.” 204

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-91

To Liu Yazi (January 28, 1946) Esteemed Mr. Yazi:1 I received and read your valued letter some time ago. I greatly regret that my reply was delayed by several months due to illness. I was very happy to learn from the newspapers that you have moved to Shanghai and that you made an emotional speech at Yu Zai’s2 funeral. I humbly accept the two seals and accompanying poems from you and Madam Sun.3 “Feeling warmth in the heart generates gratitude; upon return, I tell all to my highland wife.”4 I would say the same thing. In sum, I thank you and hope that you will work for the country. My minor illness was nervous exhaustion, but I am happy to say that I am already much improved. With best wishes. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 267–68, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Liu Yazi (1887–1957, born in Suzhou) was a resolute democrat and poet. He joined the Tongmenghui and was also a member of the Guomindang’s Central Supervisory Committee, but he was expelled from the Guomindang in 1941 for criticizing Chiang Kaishek regarding the Wannan Incident. He joined the China Democratic League in Chongqing in 1944. 2.  Yu Zai (1921–1945) was a teacher at Kunming Nanjing Middle School. He died in December 1945 during a student protest against the civil war. 3.  The reference is to Sun Sunquan (1903–1965, native of Anhui) the wife of Tan Pingshan (1886–1956, born in Gaomin, Guangdong). 4.  These lines are from a poem Liu Yazi addressed to Mao in the autumn of 1945. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-92

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Directive of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1946) To the heads of all bureaus, district Party committees, and columns: 1. After heated debates, the Political Consultative Conference in Chongqing has achieved important results. It has decided to reform the government and it passed the governmental program and the draft principles for the Constitution. It also decided to convene a national constitutional assembly, reorganize the national army, and implement the division of the military and the Party, a cabinet system, separation of the military and civilian administrations, a military-civilian divide and a parliamentary system, a cabinet system, local autonomy, and popular election of provincial governors. Adoption of these resolutions and their adaptation mark the beginning of the destruction of the Guomindang’s one-party dictatorship and of the democratization of the state on a nationwide scale. This will consolidate domestic peace and will open the way to the legalization of our Party as well as of our Party’s army and the Liberated Areas created by our Party. This is a great victory for the Chinese National Revolution. Henceforth, China will embark on a new stage of peaceful democratic construction. Although many tortuous roads certainly lie ahead, this new stage has already arrived. The various resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference have already been made public in succession. It is expected that in all localities, especially in every large city, wide-ranging and appropriate propaganda will be carried out inside and outside the Party, and that celebratory meetings will be held to send telegrams of congratulations, demanding that the government immediately carry out the resolutions. For our part, we should prepare to strive with determination for the realization of these resolutions. 1

1. Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Vol. 16, pp. 62–67. Although in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji it is not attributed to Mao Zedong, Nianpu, Vol. 3, p. 55, states that Mao revised it and put it into its final form, and he quotes from it extensively. The translation that follows is adapted from that in Saich, Rise to Power, pp. 1277–80. 206

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-93

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2. The achievement of significant agreements in Chongqing at this time is the result of the decisions of the three-country conference in Moscow and the intervention in China (represented by [George] Marshall [1880–1959, born in Uniontown, PA]). The strong presence of our Party and its resolute struggle of self-defense during the past four months, the resolute opposition of all Chinese people to the civil war and to the one-party dictatorship, and the domestic difficulties under the Guomindang are forcing Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang to begin to abandon their one-party dictatorship and to begin the democratization of the state. To be sure, all the resolutions still have to be carried out, and even if they are carried out, a thorough democratization of the entire country will still be far away. Nevertheless, as long as all parties and factions are legalized throughout the country and people have elementary political freedoms, the democratic movement will be able to develop step by step and become an irresistible force, destroying the feudal autocracy and promoting the continued democratization of the state. China’s prospects for continued democratization is guaranteed by the support of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain, the cooperation of the three major domestic political parties (the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the Democratic League), and the demands of the three main strata (the laboring people, the middle class, and a section of the big bourgeoisie), including in particular the powerful Soviet Union, the Communist Party, and the awakened working people. It should be pointed out that internal and external anti-democratic forces are still very strong and the current beginnings of democratic reforms by Chiang Kaishek’s Guomindang, like its past resistance to Japan, are very passive. Therefore, the road to China’s democratization will still be long and tortuous. Moreover, there are still many among the American and British big bourgeoisie and the Chinese big bourgeoisie who are conspiring to turn China into an anti-Soviet base. The difficulties facing our Party and the Chinese people are still very great. Nevertheless, all these difficulties can and must be gradually overcome. At present, the main form of struggle in the Chinese Revolution has shifted from armed struggle to unarmed mass and parliamentary struggles. Domestic issues should be settled by political means. All Party work should adapt to this new situation. 3. Our Party will participate in the government and in the future all parties and groups will come to the Liberated Areas to participate in all kinds of social activities and even to join the government of the Liberated Areas. Our army will soon be reorganized as part of the regular national army, the local security forces, the self-defense forces, and so forth. After reorganization, the political commissars and Party branches and committees in the army will be abolished. The Party will no longer issue direct orders to the army (this will begin to be applied after a few months). As a result, the relationship between our Party and the army will be the same as that between the Guomindang and its armies. All Party members in the army will, however, retain their Party

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membership, and all military and political cadres will remain in and will serve their original units. Political work must be strengthened. Comrades in the entire Party must understand that this change is completely necessary. At present, the army created by the Party can only obtain legal status by adopting this form; it can only be preserved by recognition of all parties and groups at home and recognition of the governments of all nations. This will be done in exchange for the legalization of the Party throughout the entire country and the democratization of the country and in exchange for the separation of the Guomindang troops from the control of the Guomindang and private or factional groups. Such concessions are therefore compatible with the interests of the people of the whole country. They will in no way change the nature of our army as the army of the people. On the contrary, they will further reform the armies of the whole country, gradually democratize them, and finally turn them into a people’s army. In the future, Party members in our army must change their work methods so as to adapt to the new situation. After being shifted from the Party’s direct command, organization, and leadership, they can only learn about the Party’s positions and the direction of the Party’s activities from the Party’s general calls and general policies and through other indirect means. Thus, in the future they will have to rely more on their own initiative and creativity to carry out their work. They should be more united than before, more disciplined, and more zealous in their study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and in enhancing political work in order to maintain and improve their own character as vanguard fighters of the proletariat and to preserve and improve the character of our army as the people’s army. During eighteen years of arduous struggle, the army and the great majority of its cadres were tempered under the direct leadership and instructions of the Party Center and Comrade Mao Zedong. After victory in the Second World War and after Party rectification and the Seventh [Party] Congress, although some people tried to destroy this people’s army of ours, we must strictly guard against this; it is the Central Committee’s firm belief that our army will not degenerate, disintegrate, or betray the people because of suspension of Party organization activities within it. (It may be necessary to guard against such behavior by a few individuals.) On the contrary, our comrades in the army will temper themselves and become more mature because of this change. If the Guomindang troops can be removed from the direct leadership of the Guomindang, we should be confident that our troops can also be separated from the direct leadership of our Party. 4. Apart from a few areas where the Guomindang may still attack us militarily and toward which we should increase our vigilance, armed struggles have generally ended. To safeguard domestic peace, all localities should use the present opportune moment to train troops for three months in a big way and be prepared for, and not be afraid of, a possible breakdown of the peace. During this period, it is essential to prepare for the reorganization of the army, and better troops and simpler administration. First, psychological

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preparations should be made for this; the matter should be considered carefully, and orders awaited. The current improvement in the troops and the simplification of administration must avoid the shortcomings that appeared during the previous campaign with that name.1 At the same time, the masses should be energetically mobilized for six to ten months (currently, the main danger is the excessive caution of many cadres who dare not mobilize boldly) to complete the reduction of land rent in the old and Newly Liberated Areas. In order to consolidate our Party’s mass bases in the Liberated Areas, we must firmly grasp the leadership of the production movement in order to speedily overcome the financial difficulties. Troop training, reduction of rent, and production are the three central tasks of the Liberated Areas at present. Moreover, we must also prepare to shift the focus of the work of the whole Party to unarmed mass and parliamentary struggles, diligently study and organize legal struggles, and coordinate the work of the united front from above and the united front from below. We should extend the scale of the Party’s work to the whole country and to all large cities. We should participate broadly in the economic construction and industrialization of the whole country. Only mobilizing and organizing the broad masses to carry out these struggles and this work throughout the country will guarantee the democratization of China and the application of all agreements. Our Party’s continued development and the continued improvement of its political position in the country, the preservation and further achievement of positional gains, and the future of the Chinese Revolution all depend on our Party’s skill in organizing and leading the broad masses to carry out these struggles and this work. The more swiftly and skillfully our Party can adopt new forms of struggle and organization, the more it will be able to seize the initiative. During the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party accomplished great achievements in these respects. As far as making use of these new forms, our Party should be relatively more skillful than the Guomindang. But we still have many shortcomings, and these must be quickly overcome. 5. Thus, we must point out that the most dangerous deviation in the Party at present is the narrow closed-door mentality of some comrades. Because of the Guomindang’s counterrevolutionary policies and the eighteen years of intense struggle between the two parties, many people, both inside and outside our Party, do not believe that the civil war can really come to an end and that peace can be truly realized. They do not believe that Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang, which exercises coercion in all sectors, will carry out democratic reform or that they will continue to cooperate with our Party in

1.  The reference is to the Crack Troop and Simple Administration Campaign in 1942–1943, in the context of the Yan’an Rectification Movement. See the editorial written by Mao, dated September 7, 1942, in Volume VIII, pp. 154–57.

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national construction. They do not believe that the peaceful new democratic stage has already arrived, and consequently they remain suspicious. With regard to many types of work, they are unwilling to genuinely change their attitude, or to diligently study the parliamentary form of struggle and that of the unarmed masses. Thus, all local Party committees must explain in detail the current new situation and tasks, and fully overcome these erroneous tendencies. Some non-Party people are even more leftist than the Party members, so we must succeed in persuading them. Because of the development of the political situation as a whole, the Central Committee is persuaded that such erroneous tendencies will not be difficult to overcome. In the ensuing period, however, with the consolidation of the nation’s peaceful new democratic stage, when the broad masses see things clearly and when the Guomindang has carried out some major reforms, rightist sentiments may increase. Moreover, this might become the most dangerous tendency. At that time, we will have to pay attention to overcoming such rightist sentiments. Today, however, we must pay attention to overcoming the leftist closed-door mentality of some of our comrades. The Central Committee

The Reactionaries Are Expanding Their Anti-Soviet and Anti-Communist Activities under the Instigation and Encouragement of the Authorities of the Guomindang Government (February 26, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency, Yan’an, February 26) Under the instigation and encouragement of the government authorities, the efforts by the fascist reactionaries within the Guomindang to foment and organize insolent anti-Soviet, anti-Communist activities in various places are now being expanded daily. In Chongqing, the reactionaries are continually planning to create incidents. After organizing the students in Shaci district to participate in the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist demonstration on the 22nd, they used the same ploy the next day to incite the students in Beibei1 to march toward Chongqing, replaying the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist farce of the 22nd. On the walls of the sales outlet of New China Daily that was destroyed on the 22nd, special agents put up loathsome insulting slogans, such as “Down with the Red Traitors.” In Chengdu, the reactionaries reenacted the same farce, inciting an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist demonstration, and similarly special agents broke into the office of New China Daily, destroying furniture and throwing books around. In Nanjing, the “Greater East Asia Youth Association” and the “Association of Resistance Soldiers,” organized by the reactionaries, “appealed for voluntary participation in the war” to “recover the Northeast by arms” (see the Associated Press telegram on the 22nd from Chongqing). In Shanghai, reactionaries incited a crowd of students to demonstrate in front of the Soviet consulate. In other places, such as Beiping, Wuhan, Taiyuan, Nanchang, Guiyang, and Bishan, reactionaries are desperately fabricating anti-Soviet, antiCommunist public opinion and making active arrangements for demonstrations. Even in Taiwan, which the Guomindang has just received [news of], there

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 351–53. Mao did not write the original draft, but he made extensive revisions and additions to it. As in the case of similar texts in the previous volumes of this series, the passages he changed are set in bold. 1.  District in Chongqing. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-94

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occurred a demonstration on the 24th, supposedly to “protest the Soviet sabotage of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Alliance.” Based on the above various news items, one may learn that the Guomindang reactionaries are now initiating a reactionary high tide throughout the country. In all these reactionary demonstrations, including the one that occurred on the 22nd in Chongqing, students who were deceived into participating by the Guomindang fascist reactionaries accounted for a very small percentage of the total student population in those places. For example, in Chongqing on the 22nd there were only 7,000 people. By the 23rd, this number had declined to 2,000. In Shanghai on the 23rd, there were just over 2,000 people. It can be seen from this that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people have a very high political consciousness. They can distinguish right from wrong and will by no means blindly follow the reactionaries. The reason the reactionaries were able to incite some of the masses to join the demonstrations was in part through coercion and in part through deceit. This was done by taking advantage of the people’s ignorance of the real situation in the Northeast and of the reactionaries’ scheme to instigate international and civil war. We believe that once the true situation in the Northeast is understood and the schemes of the reactionaries are revealed, the actual masses will by no means blindly follow the reactionaries. What is noteworthy is that these insolent activities on the part of the fascist reactionaries not only were not stopped by the Guomindang government authorities but also they received support and encouragement from many government personages. A telegram from the American United Press agency states, “Some observers in Chongqing say that the fact the government did not intervene in the anti-Soviet demonstrations shows that the government was in favor of the anti-Soviet incitement. If the government had wanted to, it could have halted the demonstrations right after they began.” When the Beibei student demonstrators, who were instigated by the reactionaries, marched to the Nationalist government building on the 23rd, according to the Central News Agency, Wu Dingchang [1984–1950, native of Sichuan], chief of Civil Affairs of the Nationalist government, told them the following: “The patriotic demonstrations by you students yesterday and today have already won respect and sympathy at home and abroad. As soon as the Chairman returns to Chongqing, I will convey your views to him. I think the Chairman will be equally moved. In recent days, demonstrations of this kind have taken place in various other places, such as in Beiping and Shanghai. This testifies to the keen patriotism of the students throughout the country, something that indeed is very fortunate for the country.” But no matter how energetically the Guomindang fascist reactionaries deceive and instigate some students to stage counterrevolutionary demonstrations designed to set off an international and civil war and no matter how some government authorities instigate and encourage such counterrevolutionary demonstrations, in the final analysis the reactionaries themselves are bound to suffer defeat. The scheme to instigate the two powers, the United

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States and the Soviet Union, to launch a so-called third world war so that the Chinese fascist reactionaries will benefit and make a turn for the better is bound to fail. The policy of unity of the United States and the Soviet Union will definitely not change and will by no means be incited by these stinking Chinese fascists. For the Chinese people, this scheme is anti-national. That is to say, if the reactionary scheme were to succeed, it would benefit only the residual forces of the German, Japanese, and Italian fascists and would be absolutely harmful to the interests of the Chinese nation. As for the reactionary slogans, such as “Recovering the Northeast by Blood and Iron,” “Voluntary Participation in War to Recover the Northeast by Arms,” and “Down with the New Imperialism,” the Chinese people will soon realize that these are part of the reactionary scheme opposing the interests of the Chinese nation. As for the reactionaries’ scheme to instigate a civil war, the Chinese people understand very well that it is manifested in their intense slander and insults against the Chinese Communist Party and the democratic personages. A civil war definitely must not be launched again. Generally speaking, under circumstances whereby the reactionaries are running amuck, the Chinese people will unite all the more to halt all reactionary activities.

Remarks at the Farewell Party for General Marshall1 (March 5, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, March 5) At 9:30 A.M. today, people from all walks of life in Yan’an held a warm farewell party for General Marshall, General Zhang Zhizhong, and General Zhou Enlai, the three members of the Executive Bureau, before their departure from Yan’an for Wuhan. Chairman Mao, Commander-in-chief Zhu [De], all the leading comrades of the Central Committee, and Chairman Lin Boqu [1886–1960, native of Hunan] of the border region government all went to the airport to see them off. Before boarding the plane, General Marshall cordially shook Chairman Mao’s hand. He said: “I would like to express again my sincere gratitude to you and to all the people in Yan’an for your warm hospitality. I am very pleased that I have had this opportunity to come to Yan’an and meet you. Our meeting is of historic significance.” Chairman Mao replied: “I would also like to extend to you once again our heartfelt thanks for your efforts in helping the cause of peace, democracy, unity, and unification of the Chinese people. In particular, I would like to declare once more that the Chinese Communist Party will make every effort to resolutely carry out the three agreements [Note: the armistice agreement, the resolution of the Political Consultative Conference, and the plan to consolidate and reorganize the national military].” Mr. Marshall then again held out his hand and warmly shook hands with Chairman Mao. At that moment, Chinese as well as foreign reporters were busy taking pictures to preserve a record of this most precious occasion.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 87, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, March 5, 1946. 1.  The reference is to General George C. Marshall, who was at the time a five-star army general, equivalent to a marshal in the British, French, or Soviet armies. This is expressed in the original Chinese text, using the Chinese term for marshal, yuanshuai, but it seems pointless to translate this literally. In December 1945, Marshall became a special U.S. envoy to China to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 214

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-95

Telegrams Regarding Ye Ting’s Admission to the Party1 (March 7, 1946) Agreed that Ye [Ting]2 should join the Party. Ye’s incoming telegram and the Central Committee’s reply should be broadcast this evening. When you have received them, please publish them in Xinhua ribao after first informing Ye, but do not put up posters.

TEXTS OF THE TWO TELEGRAMS Yan’an, March 8. After being released from prison, commander of the New Fourth Army, Ye Ting, on March 5 sent a telegram to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in Yan’an, applying to join the Chinese Communist Party. Yesterday (March 7), the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee sent a telegram in response, admitting him to the Party. The texts of the two telegrams are as follows:

According to Nianpu, Vol. 3, p. 59, on behalf of the Central Committee Mao drafted the telegram authorizing Ye Ting’s acceptance as a Party member. We have taken the telegram from that source. The Central Committee’s telegram to Ye Ting welcoming him to the Party and Ye’s own application to join the Party are taken from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 89, where they are reproduced from Huiyi Ye Ting, a memorial volume honoring Ye Ting, published in 1981 by Renmin chubanshe. According to that source, Mao revised both Ye’s letter and the Central Committee’s reply. 1.  According to Nianpu, this telegram was addressed to Dong Biwu and Wang Ruofei, who were then in Chongqing as members of the Chinese Communist Party’s delegation to the Political Consultative Conference. 2.  Ye Ting joined the Guomindang in 1919 and served as a battalion commander in the National Revolutionary Army in 1921. After studying in the Soviet Union, he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924 and took part in the Nanchang Uprising in 1927. He then led the Canton Uprising in December; after it failed, he fled first to Europe and then went into hiding in Macau and broke ties with the Party. In 1937 he served as commander of the New Fourth Army, but he was jailed for five years because of the 1940 Wannan Incident. Shortly after his release from prison, in March 1946 he reapplied to become a Party member, On April 8, 1946, he died in a plane crash while en route from Chongqing to Yan’an, as did Wang Ruofei, Bo Gu, Deng Fa (1906–1946, native of Guangdong), and other senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-96

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The telegram of Army Commander Ye: “To Comrade Mao Zedong, and for transmission to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: I was released from prison last night and I am determined to realize my long-cherished wish to join the great Chinese Communist Party and to devote myself wholeheartedly to the liberation of the Chinese people under your leadership. I ask that the Central Committee investigate and examine my history to see if I am qualified and to let me know your decision. Signed by Ye Ting on the morning of the 5th.” The telegram of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in response: “Dear Comrade Ye Ting: We received your telegram of March 5, and upon hearing the news of your release from prison, millions of people rejoiced. You have been fighting vigorously for more than twenty years for the cause of the national liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, and you have endured all kinds of rigorous trials. All of China is well aware of your boundless loyalty to the nation and the people. We have now decided to accept your application and to grant you membership in the Chinese Communist Party. In addition, we would like to extend to you our warm greetings and sincere welcome. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, March 7.”

To Hong Yu (March 12, 1946) Comrade Hong Yu:1 I received your letter of January 25 a long time ago and I am sorry that I have not been able to answer you until now because I have been ill for the past several months; I beg your pardon. After carefully reading your letter, I feel I must agree with you. In terms of your specific issues, although this is your own view and I have not heard the views of others, I feel that the suggestions you made are in fact worthy of our Party’s notice and attention. Since it is already one-and-a-half months since you sent your letter, I do not know whether your problem has been resolved. If not, please see the deputy director of the Organization Department, Comrade An Ziwen,2 and talk with him in person and try to reach a resolution. I have already sent a copy of your letter to Comrade An Ziwen. When your problem has been resolved, please let me know. I would like to know how this matter is concluded. In any case, I feel very guilty toward you and many other comrades because there are too many things in our work that are not done well. With comradely best wishes! Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 269–70, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Hong Yu (1918–1998, born in Nan’an, Fujian) was a researcher in the Literature Department of Yan’an’s Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature. When a vetting of cadres was carried out in Yan’an, Hong was wrongfully investigated, so he wrote to Mao Zedong appealing for help. The matter was resolved following Mao’s intervention. 2.  An Ziwen (1909–1980, a native of Shaanxi) joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1925 and was inducted into the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. He participated in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. In 1943 he became head of education at the Central Party School, and after 1945 he was deputy director of the Organization Department. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-97

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Circular Requesting That All Areas Report on Industry and the Labor Movement1 (March 12, 1946) To the responsible comrades in all central and local bureaus: With regard to industry and the labor movement in your areas, how are positive and negative tendencies manifesting themselves? 1. Has there been a lag in production or a pulling back by the capitalists because labor conditions have been excessively improved? If such phenomena have occurred, what sort of countermeasures have you adopted? 2. In your areas, are there many cases of workers becoming organized through struggle and their demands for improved living standards being satisfied to an appropriate degree while not being excessive or harming the entrepreneurial spirit of the capitalists and instead only raising the workers’ enthusiasm for labor, thereby increasing production, creating a more flourishing economy, and bringing benefits to both labor and capital? Has this become a common trend? 3. Is it the case that the work orientation of the labor unions and the Party branches is to cooperate with factory management (whether public or private) for the common purpose of developing production and creating a more flourishing economy? That is to say, is the correct orientation for industry and the labor movement in the Liberated Areas being carried out? Or is it the case that the labor unions and the Party branches stand in direct opposition to management and care only about the workers’ short term, one-sided interests, regardless of whether production is raised or the economy flourishes, or, in other words, adopting the orientation of the labor movement in the white areas during the civil war? With regard to these two different orientations, what is the understanding of Party and labor union cadres in your areas? Concerning the three questions above, please reply to us to the best of your knowledge in a brief telegram within the shortest time possible. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 92–93, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 218

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-98

Four Points in an Analysis of the Current Situation1 (March 15, 1946) Regarding the current situation, there are four points of analysis I want to make. You can all judge whether or not they are right. These have always been my views, but looking at things now, they still seem to be at a formative stage. The current situation is indeed tumultuous, with repercussions in other countries. Many people have asked whether a third world war might break out. More than a few people are worried about this, even though those whom we have asked say that it will not occur. I would like to make four points: First, the main fascist force has been crushed, and this has opened the road for the forward development of the people’s democratic forces in countries around the world. All of us, including Stalin and Molotov,2 say the same. It is a fact that the main fascist forces have indeed been defeated. The downfall of fascism means the forward development of democracy, not its extinction. Second, of the remaining elements of the fascist forces and the neo-fascist elements among the Allies (people like Churchill, Hurley, and He Yingqin,3 Churchill did not used to be [one], but he is now; Hurley is an isolationist; I do not include here the British Labour Party and Chiang Kaishek, only those “experts” who adopt a one-sided and not a two-sided policy) [who] are already organizing and will continue to organize in the future a reactionary anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, anti-democratic, and anti-revolutionary movement, and will try

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 96–99, where it is reproduced from a transcript record of the speech preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong delivered this speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Vyacheslav Molotov (1890–1986) was a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as first deputy president of the People’s Commissars and a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. 3.  Winston Churchill (1874–1965) was prime minister of the United Kingdom during World War II. On March 5, 1946, he delivered a speech in which he called for Britain and the United States to join in opposing the Soviet Union. Patrick J. Hurley was appointed U.S. ambassador to China in late November 1944, but he resigned in November 1945 due to controversy over his support for Chiang Kaishek. He Yingqin was chief-of-staff of the Guomindang government’s Military Affairs Commission and general commander of the Guomindang army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-99

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to start a third world war. These reactionary forces are the principal enemies now and for the future. It will be difficult to avoid a third world war if these forces are not vanquished. Third, there are two components to the democratic forces in every capitalist country: the general population and the pro-Soviet, pro-Communist bourgeoisie. Experiencing the Second World War significantly raised the consciousness of the general population, and the general population can actively engage in opposing reactionary activities against the Soviet Union and communism and a third world war. In addition, the bourgeoisie in Britain, America, France, China, Germany, Italy, and Japan are splitting into two large blocs and will continue splitting in the future, becoming anti-Soviet and anti-Communist on the one hand and proSoviet and pro-Communist on the other. The past divisions of the bourgeoisie were an important condition in the defeat of the principal fascist forces. (If there had been only Chamberlain4 and no Churchill, only Wang Jingwei and no Chiang Kaishek, it would have been impossible to defeat fascism.) The continued splitting now will certainly play a new and more important role, so we should promote it. There are two groups among the bourgeois, pro-Soviet, pro-Communist bloc: bourgeois middle-of-the-roaders and left wingers. Chiang Kaishek, for example, is a middle-of-the-roader. He adheres to two main principles: first, wipe out all the revolutionary parties; second, retain them temporarily if they cannot be eliminated for the moment, and then eliminate them in the future. But leftists such as Zhang Dongsun5 are different from Chiang Kaishek. Both can cooperate with us today. Because the middle elements hold the “retain temporarily” view, this creates the possibility of a compromise. So do not think that the picture is all black with no glimmer of light. There is a split between the general population and the bourgeoisie; and the bourgeoisie’s continued division into two is also a split. The general population, along with the bourgeois pro-Soviets and pro-Communists, may defeat the conspiracy of the anti-Soviet, anti- Communist elements, and then in the future there may emerge the possibility of a civil war instead of a world war. At least a major war can be postponed for ten to fifteen years. If we can gain ten to fifteen years, there is the possibility of not fighting a world war but only a civil war. If a world war starts at that time, the reactionary forces definitely will be defeated. Fourth, the Party’s line is to unite the general population with the middle elements and the left wing of the bourgeoisie and to defeat the remaining fascist and reactionary forces among the bourgeoisie. Historically, this has always been the

4.  Arthur Neville Chamberlain (1869–1940) served as prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940, during which time he adopted an appeasement policy toward Germany, Italy, and Japan. 5.  Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973, born in Hangzhou) was an executive member of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League.

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Party line. We must oppose the most obstinate and uncompromising forces among the bourgeoisie and join with any forces with whom we can reach a compromise. No matter how stormy the weather, we must hold to these points. The first point is very clear. People will easily forget the second one once things calm down a bit. They forgot it from February 1 to 9, and then they were reminded of it by the Jiaochangkou Incident.6 Marshall7 is able to play a waiting game. Chiang Kaishek is different from He Yingqin. If either America or Chiang plays a waiting game for half a year, some of us will forget the second point and will feel that the world is at peace, that there is no trouble anywhere. That would be very dangerous. We are going to reduce our armies, but not by any more than that which is good for us. Some comrades do not understand this, so it must be made clear. The next five years are a critical period. Within five years, the Soviet Union will completely recover from the war and we will be stronger too, so we will be able to get things going more easily. We will be able to avoid being wiped out and we certainly will avoid this. Naturally, this will entail resolutely fighting against the reactionaries and, in the process, eliminating as many of them as possible.

6.  Guomindang secret agents carried out a violent attack on a meeting of twenty political groups celebrating the success of the Political Consultative Conference in Jiaochangkou, Chongqing, on February 10, 1946. More than sixty people were injured. 7.  George Marshall was appointed by the U.S. president as special envoy to China to take part in the negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang. He returned to the United States in August 1946.

Pay Strict Attention to Policy When Entering and Garrisoning Areas in the Northeast (March 17, 1946) To Peng [Zhen] and Lin [Biao]:1 1. The Guomindang has still not agreed to a cessation of hostilities. We agree that you should dispatch troops to enter and garrison in those areas north of Shenyang along the Changchun railway line from which the Soviet army will withdraw, and, to create conditions for future negotiations, the quicker this is done, the better. When entering and stationing troops and after garrisoning, however, do not harm the Guomindang’s takeover personnel. The Northeast is largely ours and we should make long-term plans. Please pay strict attention to this point. 2. Throughout Manchuria, great care must be taken not to kill a single person other than Chinese traitors who have committed heinous crimes, to win over popular sentiment and to facilitate the negotiations. The Central Committee

The source of this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, p. 100, where it is reproduced from a manuscript revised by Mao. 1.  Peng Zhen was secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Lin Biao was deputy secretary of the Northeast Bureau and commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 222

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-100

Control with All Our Might the Two Cities of Changchun and Harbin and the Entire Length of the Chinese Eastern Railway (March 24, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau, and for the information of Lin Biao, Huang [Kecheng], and Li [Fuchun]:1 1. U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations have already improved. The Soviet army will complete its withdrawal in April, and it has already informed Wang Shijie2 of the judgment that Chiang Kaishek will definitely move his troops north from Shenyang and fight us for Changchun and Harbin. 2. The overarching policy of our Party is to use all our strength to control the two cities of Changchun and Harbin as well the entire length of the Chinese Eastern Railway3 and to spare no sacrifice whatsoever in fighting against the occupation of Changchun, Harbin, and the Chinese Eastern Railway by Chiang’s army, with southern Manchuria and western Manchuria as subsidiary directions. 3. Toward this end, please promptly approach Elder Brother Chen4 about permitting our side to dispatch troops to occupy the cities of Changchun and Harbin and the entire Chinese Eastern Railway. If you obtain his approval, then command Zhou Baozhong’s5 unit to take on the task of occupying [the two cities and the line] and to vigorously carry out bandit suppression.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 153–54, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. The Northeast People’s Autonomous Army was renamed the Northeast Democratic Allied Army on January 14, 1946. Huang Kecheng and Li Fuchun (1900–1975, native of Hunan) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Western Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Wang Shijie was foreign minister of the Guomindang government. 3.  The Chinese Eastern Railway refers to the sections of the Chinese Changchun railway between Changchun and Harbin, and between Harbin and Suifenhe. 4.  A reference to the Soviet military representative. 5.  Zhou Baozhong was commander of the Eastern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-101

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4. Huang and Li’s troops should mobilize to control the Sipingjie6 area resolutely and with all their might; if the army of the diehard enemy advances northward, thoroughly annihilate it and by no means allow it to advance toward Changchun. 5. Southern Manchuria’s7 main forces should, in their present area of activity, resolutely destroy the enemy attacking Liaoyang, Fushun, and other areas; if they can wipe out one or two divisions, they should then pin down a large number of troops of the diehard enemy troops and block their northward advance. 6. If, because of fighting, the army of the diehard enemy consolidates its position in the Liaoyang-Fushun region and consequently can pull out its troops to head northward toward Sipingjie and Changchun, you must prepare to promptly shift the main forces in southern Manchuria toward Sipingjie and Changchun, join up with Huang and Li and Zhou Baozhong, and fight to defend northern Manchuria,8 leaving a considerable number of troops to defend the Liberated Area in southern Manchuria. 7. We expect you to consider the above and notify us by telegram.

6.  Sipingjie is the former name of today’s Siping in Jilin Province. 7.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area, east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, encompassing Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeast Shenyang. 8.  Northern Manchuria included the areas of Harbin, Mudanjiang, Bei’an, Jiamusi, and Qiqihar.

Policy Orientation on the Question of Industry and the Labor Movement (March 24 and 28, 1946)1 I. To all bureaus: For the purposes of generating discussion within the Party on the question of industry and the labor movement and correcting the problem of ultra-Leftist tendencies that is quite serious at present, please transmit the Central Committee’s survey telegram with three questions on industry and the labor movement2 to the district Party committees (or provincial committees) and subdistrict Party committees for discussion. Pay particular attention to getting copies to cadres who are involved in the work of industry and labor unions for discussion, and for them to report their opinions back here to the Central Committee. When correcting these tendencies, however, emphasis must be placed on having the cadres really get the point rather than on assigning blame for mistakes, and they must be given encouragement and reassurance on leading the masses in arduous struggle so that their “Leftist” tendencies may be corrected properly rather than just throwing cold water on them. The Central Committee March 24

The source of our text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 101–2, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Mao drafted the first of these two paragraphs on behalf of the Central Committee on March 24, but it was decided not to issue it for the time being. Mao added the second paragraph to a Central Committee circular on economic construction dated March 28. In the letter that Chen Boda (1904–1989, native of Quanzhou) wrote to inform Ren Bishi (1904–1950, born in Hunan) of the draft of this circular on the 29th, Mao commented, “Comrade Bishi: The telegram that we planned to send last time regarding industry and the labor movement should not be sent out for the moment. Add one article to this telegram and we can use it as policy. Please consider and decide.” 2.  Refers to the “Circular Requesting That All Areas Report on Industry and the Labor Movement,” March 12, 1946, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-102

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II. In the Liberated Areas, relations between labor and management must be governed by a general orientation of cooperation to achieve the goals of increasing production and creating a flourishing economy. This applies whether in public or private enterprises. In all factories, the labor unions and Party branches must cooperate with factory management in formulating production plans as well as in carrying them out, and they must strive to produce more and better products at lower cost to increase profits and thereby benefit both labor and capital. The workers’ welfare must be sought by increasing production and boosting the economy; any one-sided, excessive demands will damage the economy of the Liberated Areas.

Policy toward Armed and Unarmed Guomindang Personnel1 (March 30, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau: We have received your telegrammed directive of March 292 sent to all localities. It is very good. When you capture Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar via speedy and fierce measures, the policy you should adopt toward their armed forces is one of annihilation; all their forces should be disarmed. But their unarmed personnel (Party and government) are not to be humiliated, harmed, or killed. They should be moved to the countryside and put under house arrest to facilitate future exchanges. Order the commanders in all localities to be clear on this point and to obey it. The Central Committee

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 155–56, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The telegram from the Northeast Bureau stated that the troops should immediately prepare to take over the cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar after the Soviet forces retreat, and it offered some specific deployments. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-103

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Take Strict Precautions against Sudden Attacks by the Enemy during This High Tide of Reactionary Activity1 (April 5, 1946) To all bureaus and the commanders of all military forces: At present there is a high tide of reactionary activity within the country and internationally. You are expected to increase your vigilance, reinforce your intelligence-gathering, improve defense facilities, and take strict precautions against sudden attacks by the enemy. You must on no account be negligent. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 157, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 228

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-104

On Countering Large-Scale Attacks in the Northeast by Chiang Kaishek and the United States (April 5, 1946, noon) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao]:1 1. The United States and Chiang have decided to attack us on a massive scale with fifteen armies (seven have arrived and the other eight are yet to be transferred). Their aim is to occupy all points and lines in the Northeast and then to negotiate with us. 2. Our policy is to use the armistice teams2 to strive for a cessation of hostilities, but without being misled by the armistice teams. We must at the same time have a comprehensive and long-term plan for dealing with attacks by the fifteen armies. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 158, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Referring to the armistice teams sent around the country by the Beiping Office for Military Mediation, which was in charge of mediating the military conflict between the Guomindang and the Communists. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-105

229

Achieving Victories in the Battles at Siping and Benxi Is Key at Present (April 6, 1946) To Comrade Lin Biao, and for the information of Peng [Zhen]:1 1. As indicated in Lin’s telegram of the 4th from Siping, it is quite right to amass six brigades to wipe out the enemy in Siping District. If there is even the slightest hesitation within the Party, it must absolutely be overcome. We hope that in the Siping area you will wipe out all or most of the northwardbound enemy forces in a series of hand-to-hand combats. Even if our forces suffer thousands of casualties, we should not regret it. Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]2 won a great victory in the Handan Campaign3 last winter after a dozen days of fighting and suffering 8,000 casualties. This should be your example. 2. We also hope you can gather enough forces to wipe out one division of the attacking enemy forces at Benxi. 3. The situation in the Northeast will take a turn for the better if you can win the aforementioned campaigns. The Guomindang now has seven armies, including the Ninety-fourth Army and Jiang Pengfei4 puppet troops. These two units are either incomplete or weak; the armies they plan to transfer here will not be able to arrive for more than half a year. Besides, they include the Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 159–60. It can also be found in a slightly less complete form in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 274–75 (with notes on p. 278). 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, Lin Biao, and for the information of the first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, Peng Zhen. 2.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. 3.  The Handan Campaign, also known as the Pinghan Campaign, occurring from late October to early November 1945, resulted in the People’s Liberation Army eliminating more than 20,000 Guomindang troops and capturing Ma Fawu, deputy commander of the Eleventh Military Region and commander of the Fortieth Army. 4.  Jiang Pengfei (1907–1946, born in what is present-day Dalian) was commander of the Guomindang’s New Twenty-seventh Army, which was reorganized from the puppet “Iron Stone Troops.” 230

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Yunnan troops of Long Yun5 and other second-class forces, which is a big advantage. If we can organize many strong campaigns within three months to half a year and wipe out six to nine divisions of the attacking enemy, we will be able to train ourselves, set the enemy back, and open a bright future. To achieve this objective, you must be prepared to suffer tens of thousands of casualties. Only if you are willing to pay such a price will you be able to create a new situation. But for the next few days, the key is to achieve victory in Siping and Benxi. 4. Never let up on exterminating the bandits and mobilizing the masses in the rear of every military region, and at the same time we hope you will closely supervise this. The Central Committee

5.  Long Yun (1884–1962, Yi nationality, native of Yunnan) was a warlord and governor of Yunnan Province until he was overthrown by Du Yuming in October 1945, as ordered by Chiang Kaishek.

Supplementary Directive Regarding the Problem of Engaging in Battle in the Northeast (April 8, 1946) To Comrades Lin Biao and Peng Zhen:1 Regarding the problem of conducting operations, we add the following points: 1. The overall objective of the campaign in the north should be to wipe out the majority, or all of one or two divisions, of the diehard enemy through repeated hand-to-hand combat over the period of several days and nights. Therefore, you must amass an absolutely superior force (for example, six brigades or more), make full psychological and military preparations, and choose a favorable topography. That is to say, do not fight recklessly; we must win as soon as we begin to fight. 2. You must promptly begin to organize the necessary logistic preparations for a large-scale war in the north—for instance, food supplies, sources of military recruits, cooperation with militiamen and guerrillas in combat, and so on. Institutions and personnel in the south must be moved in large numbers to the north. Moreover, this must be done quickly; delay will be disadvantageous. 3. It is extremely important to destroy the communication lines, and you should set up a special headquarters to handle this work. All the communication lines that the enemy is going to capture or has already captured must be completely destroyed. Mobilize the masses for the benefit of public and individual interests by digging up and cutting off the roadbed, digging wide, deep ditches, and letting the masses carry away the rails, logs, and equipment. Those [lines] that have been captured by the enemy should be destroyed in a major way, but it is even more important that those that have not yet been

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 161–62. It can also be found in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 275–76, in a slightly less complete form. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this cable on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 232

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captured but soon will be (for instance, the north end of Siping, the north end of Benxi, the east end of Fushun, and so on) should be destroyed. According to information from our secret agents, the Guomindang forces that are now in the Northeast will not be able to survive if they go five days without food and ammunition supplies. Setting up headquarters all over to mobilize the masses to destroy communication lines therefore is one of the most important ways to defeat the diehard enemy. We hope you will promptly order that this be carried out. The Central Committee

Some Problems in Correcting Errors in Our Mass Work (April 11, 1946) To Comrade Chen Yi:1 We have taken note of your telegram of the 7th. Regarding correcting mistakes in our mass work, our suggestions are as follows: 1. There are two kinds of errors in our mass work. The first kind is apolitical villages and commandism. An apolitical village is the result of rightdeviationists completely failing to mobilize the people. Commandism means giving the appearance of actively mobilizing the masses, when actually the method involves a few running the whole show and forcing the others to obey. The result is still an apolitical village, but worse yet, it has a negative effect on the people. All such errors should be carefully investigated and corrected wherever they occur. 2. The second kind of error involves the Party overdoing things in leading the mass struggle; that is to say, “Leftist” errors. Among other things, we must first take note of violations of the rights of the middle peasants, which must be corrected the moment they are discovered. We have also gone too far in attacking the rich peasants and the medium and small landowners over and above the necessity of reducing land rent and lowering interest rates on loans. We must attend to this and correct it at the right moment. 3. As for severely punishing Chinese traitors, despotic gentry, local tyrants, and reactionary elements, as long as it is truly an action by the masses, it is not an error but a necessity. Despotic gentry and landlords in the major cities inevitably will make a lot of noise, but we absolutely must not be affected by it. But when the battle by the masses has been won, the accounts settled, and the rents lowered, the Party should advise the people that the policy toward the landowners should change from fighting them to winning them over. For example, let the runaway landowners return home, provide them

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 103–5, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Chen Yi was deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as well as commander of the New Fourth Army and the Shandong Military Region. 234

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4.

5.

6.

7.

with an opportunity to earn a living, and contact the enlightened gentry to participate in some work, and so forth. The purpose of the policy of winning them over is absolutely necessary to reduce the opposition so as to mitigate tensions. But it will not be good to win them over too early—that would hurt the interests of the people and affect their mood. As long as it truly is a mass movement, when we correct “Leftist” errors, that is, when we correct the actions by cadres and people who have gone to extremes in their behavior toward the middle and rich peasants and medium and small landowners, we must with goodwill and warmth win over those who have erred so that they happily correct these errors on their own initiative and find a way to make up for them. We definitely should never pour cold water on them and absolutely never make them feel disheartened. You are quite right to say in your telegram that we should gradually correct errors following the principle of recognizing and not abrogating the established rights of the peasants and not weakening the enthusiasm of the masses. The mass struggle in Shandong and elsewhere is developing and its achievements are great; there have been many errors but the future is bright. We must reduce land rent and fight treason by thoroughly settling accounts with the traitors. Both must be done. We must study the specific work content in each area and we must be skillful in leadership to allow broad-based development of the mass struggle while at the same time knowing when and where to stop. This should be done rationally, beneficially, and moderately. The points made in this telegram should be made widely known to our comrades in every area. Please transmit excerpts to the Party committee and land committee in each district if you deem it necessary. The Central Committee

When Conducting Operations in the Northeast, It Is Necessary to Take the Whole Situation into Account and Make Plans for the Long Run (April 12, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao]:1 1. We agree with Lin’s telegram of midnight on the 11th2 that we should focus on amassing forces to annihilate the enemy rather than defending the cities and that it is necessary to take the whole situation into account and make plans for the long run. 2. Occupy Changchun if you have a reliable agent planted there and the certainty of superior strength. Otherwise abandon plans to occupy Changchun, but use a portion of the forces to take the airport and block the enemy’s air transport to give us an advantage in negotiations. 3. Zhan Caifang’s3 destruction of the railway in central Suiyuan has been very effective. We hope you will seriously consider sabotaging railways as an important method for defeating the enemy. 4. Pay attention to organizing militias and carrying out a militia system throughout all of Manchuria. 5. Pay attention to organizing guerrilla units under the command of counties and districts. Every county in Manchuria should have guerrilla units.

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 163–64, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from Lin Biao stated that under the current situation, the Communist forces were unlikely to be able to defend Siping, take over Changchun, and immediately restore peace in the Northeast. He therefore advised focusing on annihilating the enemy rather than on defending the cities to avoid losing both troops and cities and then being unable to eliminate the enemy under more favorable conditions in the future. He suggested pulling back from attacking Changchun and sending those forces to Siping. 3.  Zhan Caifang (1907–1982, native of Hubei) was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. 236

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April 1946 237

6. Organize armed work teams in the enemy-occupied areas. Each county should have several teams, and each team should have several dozen members spread throughout the enemy-occupied areas. 7. Recently you have fought several battles quite well, and the enemy is moaning and groaning. You are to transmit orders of commendation to the units that have fought victorious battles to boost morale. 8. Throughout Manchuria, carry out reductions of land rent and of interest on loans, mobilize the masses, consolidate the rear areas, and base everything on planning for the long term. The Central Committee

Defend Siping and Benxi So as to Give Us an Advantage in Negotiations (April 13, 1946) To Lin [Biao], and for the information of Peng [Zhen]:1 Marshall2 has said that he would leave for China on the 12th. After Marshall arrives in China, there may be a cessation of hostilities in the Northeast, so the Guomindang is sure to go all-out to take Siping and Benxi within the next several days. You are expected to focus on doing everything possible to repel its attacks and to defend Siping and Benxi so as to give us an advantage in the negotiations. Please report to us on the situation. The Central Committee

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 165, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Peng Zhen was first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 238

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-110

Rapidly Destroy the Enemy in the Northeast and Seize the Upper Hand before the Cessation of Hostilities (April 15, 1946) To Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 1. Marshall2 may be arriving in Chongqing within a few days, and it will soon become clear what position the Guomindang and the United States will take regarding mediation in the war. 2. How far has the Seventy-first Army advanced? Is there any possibility of amassing a superior military force to annihilate, rout, or block the attacking enemy south and southwest of Siping? 3. Our troops in the Benxi area are expected to be ordered to speed up their reorganization so as to again join in battle.3 4. In addition to the correct arrangements for Changchun, as stated in your telegram of April 14th,4 it is necessary to rapidly occupy other places from which the Soviet army is withdrawing and places that are occupied by the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 166–67, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Peng Zhen was first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 3.  In early April 1946, the troops of the Southern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army that were defending Benxi defeated two attacks by Guomindang forces and annihilated more than 4,000 enemy troops. 4.  The telegram from Lin Biao recommended against encircling the enemy in Changchun on all fronts and finishing the battle within forty-eight hours, and it advised sending only a small number of troops to check but not to attack the enemy forces. Instead, the focus was to be on occupying the airport, cutting off the enemy’s air transport, and then attacking individual targets in the city. Lin felt that if seizing Changchun was entirely impossible, the Communist forces should seize a portion of Changchun and confront the enemy for the benefit of the negotiations. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-111

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bandits, and to annihilate the bandit hordes to seize the upper hand before the cessation of hostilities. We must strive to resolve nearly all of the key problems by engaging in battle within ten days or so. 5. The fighting by the enemy will be aided by planes, so please pay attention to the safety of the leadership organs. The Central Committee

Attack the Beiping-Shenyang Railway and Conduct Guerrilla Warfare North of Shenyang (April 16, 1946) To Li [Fuchun] and Huang [Kecheng], and for the information of Lin [Biao]:1 We received your telegram of the 15th.2 The occupation of Faku has great importance for supporting the battles around Siping and Changchun. You are expected to organize a superior force of crack troops (around 1,000 men, for example) with an ample amount of explosives and equipment to go south from Faku and attack the Beiping-Shenyang railway and also to conduct guerrilla warfare and develop mass work north of Shenyang. The Military Commission

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 168, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Li Fuchun was political commissar and Huang Kecheng was commander of the Western Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from Li Fuchun and Huang Kecheng reported on the People’s Liberation Army’s takeover of Faku. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-112

241

You Are Expected to Be Prepared to Handle Any Incident1 (April 18, 1946) To all bureaus, and for transmittal to Ye [Jianying], Rao [Shushi], and Lin [Biao]:2 In his telegram of the 16th from Chongqing,3 Zhou [Enlai] states: On the surface Chiang [Kaishek] shows a desire to compromise, which is a ruse to fool the people, while in secret he is making military arrangements for a huge conspiracy, and his attitude after Marshall4 arrives is as yet difficult to determine, and so forth. You are expected to prepare for all possible contingencies to deal with whatever happens. The main persons responsible for each strategic area may not leave their units without the permission of the Central Committee. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 169–70, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee. 2.  Ye Jianying (1897–1986, native of Guangdong) was the Chinese Communist Party’s representative in the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. Rao Shushi was the Chinese Communist Party’s representative in the Twenty-seventh Group (Shenyang) of the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 3.  The telegram from Zhou Enlai stated that Chiang Kaishek remained two-faced and it urged all parties to submit name-lists for the government and National Assembly and to revise the draft constitution as soon as possible, while at the same time it called for secret meetings. Chiang had instructed He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi to make military arrangements, and Chen Cheng (1898–1965, born in Lishui) had gone to Shanghai, which Zhou found suspicious. 4.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 242

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Paying Respects to the Martyrs Who Died on April 81 (April 19, 1946) Dear Comrades-in-Arms, Immortal Brave Fighters: For decades, you have performed mighty services for the cause of the people. Today you have laid down your lives for the cause of the people. Although you have died, you live on gloriously in spirit! Your deaths are a call that will deepen the Chinese people’s understanding of the Chinese Communist Party and will strengthen the resolve of the Chinese people to persist in the cause of peace, democracy, and unity! Your deaths are a call on all members of the entire Party and on the people of the whole country to unite and fight to the very end for a peaceful, democratic, and united new China! All members of the entire Party and people of the whole country will carry on at your behest and continue the struggle to victory. We will never lose heart and we will never give up!

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 10, p. 41, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, April 20, 1946. 1.  The reference is to Communist members of the Political Consultative Conference who died when their aircraft crashed on the way to Yan’an. They included Wang Ruofei, Qin Bangxian (aka Bo Gu), and Deng Fa, as well as Ye Ting, who had been admitted to the Party only a month earlier (see “Telegram Regarding Ye Ting’s Admission to the Party,” March 7, 1946, in this volume). DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-114

243

Military and Political Deployments in the Northeast after the Occupation of Changchun (April 19, 1946) 1 To Peng [Zhen] and Lin [Biao], and to be forwarded to Zhou [Baozhong], Chen [Yun], and Gao [Gang]:2 1. The occupation of Changchun has had an immense effect on the overall situation in the Northeast as well as on the entire country. Please transmit orders commending the meritorious officers and soldiers. 2. Yang [Guofu]’s division3 should move southward immediately, or at the latest after a few days of rest, to join in the battles. We must enhance our forces in the Siping area, destroy the main force of the New First Army, and prepare to fight continuously to achieve several big victories. Only by so doing will we be able to defend Changchun. 3. Make the utmost efforts to take the cities of Harbin and Qiqihar. 4. Make the utmost efforts to mobilize the millions of masses in the cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar, as well as the region extending approximately two hundred li to the east and to the west of the Changchun-HarbinQiqihar railway. Help them to organize and to arm to become the central region controlling the entire Manchurian region. Prepare everything rapidly to defend Changchun. For this purpose, we should send many cadres who are experienced and who understand our tactics to work in the county towns in the vicinity of the central region. They will mobilize the masses, eliminate the bandits, liquidate the Chinese traitors, reduce land rent and interest on

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 171–72, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. This document contains conventional Chinese characters indicating two different times, one meaning from 5:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M., and the other meaning noon, or from 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. The telegram may have been drafted in the morning and revised at noon, but there is no way of knowing. 2.  Zhou Baozhong was deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army and commander of the Jilin-Liaoning Military District. Chen Yun and Gao Gang (1905–1954, native of Shaanxi) were political commissar and commander, respectively, of the Northern Manchuria Army of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 3.  Yang Guofu was commander of the Seventh Division of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 244

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April 1946 245

loans, improve the employees’ remuneration, and distribute the land of the major Chinese traitors. These tasks must show results in the very near future. Yet we must pay attention to maintaining a broad national united front and offend only a minority rather than a large number of people. Traitors, evil gentry, and local tyrants whom the masses denounce must be punished, but do not implicate too many others. Workers’ wages and other labor compensation must not be raised too much. We must adopt policies of cooperation between labor and capital, developing production, bringing about a prosperous economy, and benefiting both labor and capital. We should never focus merely on the short-term and one-sided advantages for the workers at our own expense. The Central Committee

Concentrate a Superior Force to Launch Several Large Decisive Battles South and North of Siping (April 19, 1946) To Peng [Zhen] and Lin [Biao]:1 1. En route from Siping to Shenyang, Du Yuming2 reportedly stated that although there are great disparities between the Communist forces of more than 400,000 men and the Guomindang forces of over 100,000 men, they would have to resolve to continue fighting, that more than one hundred tanks would be sent to Shenyang, that planes would be used as well, and so on. To defeat this diehard enemy and defend Changchun we must therefore be prepared to deal with planes and tanks (officers and soldiers who took part in the resistance against Japan know how to deal with them) and we must amass a superior military force and launch several major decisive battles south and north of Siping. This is the only way to solve the problem. 2. Under the condition that work in the localities not be weakened, many cadres should be transferred to strengthen work in the area around Changchun and Harbin, i.e., north of Siping and Hailong, south of Qiqihar and Hailun, east of Taonan,3 and west of the Mudan River. There appear to be approximately thirty or forty counties and towns where more cadres should be sent to mobilize the masses, reform governance, organize the militia, resolve land problems, take charge of industry and commerce, and build this area into the center of a democratic Northeast. Cadres should be transferred mainly

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 173–74, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Peng Zhen was first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Du Yuming (1904–1981, native of Shaanxi) was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Security Headquarters of the Guomindang army. 3.  Taonan county was later merged with Baicheng county to form Tao’an county in Jilin Province. 246

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from southern Manchuria4 (without compromising the work in southern Manchuria itself), an area where the work has been more penetrating and where there are relatively more cadres. Please consider whether this is feasible. This plan has been conceived based on our being able to guarantee the defense of the three cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar, or at least the defense of Harbin and Qiqihar. Guaranteeing defense depends on whether or not we can destroy large numbers of the enemy in the Siping area. Therefore, striving for victory in battle is the key link. 3. If the Northeast Bureau moves to Changchun, it should settle in a safe place in the suburbs and handle the work of all of Manchuria and resolve all important problems regarding the overall situation rather than directly managing work in the city of Changchun. If you feel that Changchun is not yet stable, this move can be delayed for the time being. The Central Committee

4.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang.

Rapidly Transfer Troops from Southern Manchuria Northwards to Engage in Battle; Preparations Should Be Made to Defend the City of Changchun (April 20, 1946) To Peng [Zhen] and Lin [Biao]:1 1. Rapidly transfer one section of the troops in Southern Manchuria2 northwards and hand them over to the direct command of Lin [Biao] to engage in battle. 2. Preparations should be made to defend the city of Changchun. The designated unit for the defense of the city should prepare provisions and munitions to defend the city to death, coordinating with the field army to wipe out the enemy. 3. Quickly send new recruits to replenish the main force. 4. Thoroughly destroy the railway line between Shenyang and Siping. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 177, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Peng Zhen was first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang. 248

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-117

Make the Utmost Effort to Secure Victory in Battle in the Siping and Gongzhuling Areas (April 20, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao]:1 We received your telegram in the morning of the 19th. 1. As regards to the troop strength of the Guomindang, in addition to the total of four divisions, three from the New First Army and one from the Seventyfirst Army, which have advanced to the area around Sipingjie2 as attack units on the first front, there is one division of the Fifty-second Army (i.e., the 195th Division that came over from Rehe3) awaiting orders at Changtu, which seems to be a reserve force, and also one division of the Sixtieth Army (the 182nd Division, newly arrived) positioned along the Tieling-KaiyuanShuangmiaozi4 line garrisoning the railway. 2. The large-scale battle is to take place in the area from Siping to Gongzhuling, and unless we annihilate three or four divisions on the diehard side, we will be unable to solve the problem. Consequently, all troops that can and should be transferred must be transferred at once and amass in the direction of Gongzhuling. We should strive to take the initiative rather than to increase our troop strength gradually and fall into a passive position. 3. In dealing with Party, administrative, financial, and cultural personnel of the Guomindang in Changchun (and likewise in Harbin and Qiqihar), we

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 175–76, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Sipingjie is the old name for what later became known as Siping. 3.  Rehe Province covered today’s northeastern Hebei, southwestern Liaoning, and southeastern Inner Mongolia before it was dissolved in 1955. 4.  Shuangmiaozi is a town located in the middle of Changtu county in Liaoning Province.

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-118

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generally should leave a good impression on them by showing leniency; progressive elements are to be given preferential treatment, whereas spies are to be imprisoned. 4. Everything depends on winning the battle, so strive for victory with all your might. The Central Committee

The Changchun Forces Should Rapidly Divide into City Garrison and Field Army Units1 (April 21, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao], and for the information of Li [Fuchun] and Huang [Kecheng]:2 1. All of our troops in Changchun other than those already heading south with Yang [Guofu]’s division3 should rapidly divide into city garrison and field army units, to clarify their respective responsibilities. Those responsible for city garrison duty must prepare to defend Changchun to the death, and those responsible for field army duty must prepare to be transferred at any time to fight on the front line. 2. With [Zhou] Baozhong4 in charge and with the assistance of Party and government organs, take advantage of the fervor of the popular masses in Changchun by recruiting ten thousand or tens of thousands of volunteer soldiers. Cadres are to be sent from the forces in Changchun, the various brigades on the front line, and the general headquarters. A large number of new army units are to be formed, each with 1,500 to 2,000 men, and after a bit of training they are to be sent in a steady stream to the Siping front to reinforce the various brigades there. The quicker this is done the better; can this be accomplished within ten days or so? In addition, volunteer soldiers should be recruited in both Yongji and Harbin to establish several new army units.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 178–79, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Li Fuchun and Huang Kecheng were political commissar and commander, respectively, of the Western Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 3.  Yang Guofu was commander of the Seventh Division of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 4.  Zhou Baozhong was deputy commander of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army and commander of the Jilin-Liaoning Military District. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-119

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3. Regarding the captives from Jiang Pengfei’s puppet army,5 the reactionary, backward elements should be weeded out quickly and [the rest] should be given the necessary political training so they can be used to reinforce the front line at the appropriate time. The Central Committee

5.  Jiang Pengfei was commander of the Guomindang’s New Twenty-seventh Army.

Deployment for Military Operations to Annihilate the New First Army (April 21, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao]:1 The New First Army is the Burma expeditionary army,2 the main force of Chiang’s army. We must concentrate the absolute best of our military forces, conserve our energy, and build up our strength, and when they [the New First Army] are utterly exhausted and short of both food and ammunition, then we should select advantageous battlefield conditions and rout each and every one of them by engaging in continuous battle for several days. Annihilating them entirely or in large part will break the momentum of Chiang’s offensive. It is expected that, in accordance with Lin’s telegram, Yang Guofu, Cao Lihuai,3 and the Eighth Brigade will be ordered to travel southwards by night, and two southern Manchurian4 brigades will be ordered northward on the double. More troops should be transferred when necessary. The general idea is to amass a superior military force and to strive for victory in this campaign of decisive importance. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 182–83, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The Burma expeditionary army refers to the troops that the Guomindang sent to Burma to fight against the Japanese army during the War of Resistance Against Japan. 3.  Yang Guofu was commander of the Seventh Division of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Cao Lihuai was commander of the Jilin Military Region. 4.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-120

253

We Should Transfer Many of Our Forces Northward to Defend Changchun and Chahar (April 21, 1946) To Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 In the past, Chiang’s army focused its fighting on the south. This assumed that the Soviet troops stationed in Changchun and Harbin would not withdraw rapidly. Now the center of warfare by the Chiang army has shifted to the north, with the aim of taking Changchun and Harbin. Hence, many of our forces in southern Manchuria2 should be transferred to the north. In addition, they should advance on the double so we can amass superior forces, annihilate large numbers of the enemy (at least three or four divisions), and defend Changchun and Harbin. Everything will be decided by victory on the battlefield. Do not place any hope on the negotiations. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 180–81, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. It can also be found in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 276. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Peng Zhen was first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang. 254

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-121

Opinions on Military Work and Local Work in the Northeast (April 23, 1946) To Comrade Peng Zhen, and for the information of Lin [Biao]:1 I have read the several recent directives from the Northeast Bureau and they are all fine. The five-point directive of April 192 is particularly good, and I hope it is carried out conscientiously. Quickly concentrate the northern and southern main forces in the direction of Siping, as per Lin Biao’s telegram; quickly recruit new soldiers to reinforce the front line; quickly form militias and local armies to suppress the bandits and protect the countryside; quickly mobilize the broad popular masses north of Siping and south of Harbin to fight for the defense of Changchun and Harbin; quickly resolve the land question throughout Manchuria; when doing all these things, use the local people boldly and in large numbers. After Changchun and Harbin are taken, many people will undoubtedly fix their sight on the big cities and forget the countryside and the arduous work still to be done, which will need to be pointed out and corrected time and again. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 184–85, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Peng Zhen was secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  This Northeast Bureau directive called for speeding up local work, preparing local armed forces to supplement the main forces when needed, improving operations in the war zone, organizing militia, and eliminating regional Party committees and military subregions. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-122

255

Defend Benxi to the Last and Work against Time until a Ceasefire is Reached (April 26, 1946) To Cheng [Shicai], Xiao [Hua], and Luo [Shunchu], and for the information of Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 We received your telegram of the 22nd.2 Since April 18 we had been making a last-ditch effort to defend Siping with two regiments whose fighting power is not strong, and as of April 25 we had been defending it for eight days. If the enemy attacks and you are unable to crush the enemy’s attack in battle on the field, you should defend Benxi to the last with a strong force (two regiments, for example) and have the main force operate on the outside so as to sap the enemy’s morale and work against time until a ceasefire is reached, which is not far off. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 186–87, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Cheng Shicai (1912–1990, born in Dawu county, Hubei) was commander, Xiao Hua was political commissar, and Luo Shunchu (1914–1987, native of Fujian) was deputy commander of the Southern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from Cheng Shicai et al. stated that the enemy forces might deploy three or four divisions in a new large-scale attack on Benxi. Cheng and the others felt it might be difficult to hold Benxi and that they could only hope to delay the enemy and eliminate some enemy troops through mobile defense. 256

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-123

We Must Be Cautious in Utilizing Fresh Troops (April 28, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To Lin [Biao]:1 The present situation is that although Marshall2 is anxious to end the war, Chiang [Kaishek] still wants to wipe out our main forces and fight his way into Changchun. Because of this, after the fresh troops we transferred from Changchun and southern Manchuria3 have been assembled, we think we should use the fresh troops only if we are absolutely sure that we can crush the New First Army and annihilate a large contingent so as to fundamentally alter the whole face of the war. Otherwise, it is inadvisable to use them rashly, and it would be more advantageous to wait and use them in the future. We await notification of your plans. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 188, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 3.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-124

257

Resolutely Defend Siping and for the Present Do Not Launch Any Large-Scale Offensives (April 30, 1946, midnight) To Lin [Biao]:1 We received your telegram of the 27th. 1. We are very pleased to hear that you beat back the enemy’s offensive on the 26th and captured some of the enemy. 2. The situation is in a state of flux, and it is possible that a ceasefire agreement will be signed within a day or two. 3. We hope you will defend Siping to the death and fight for every inch. 4. You must command a powerful force of reserve troops, conserving their energy for use in the future; for the present, it is not advisable to launch any large-scale attacks against the enemy. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 190, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 258

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-125

Troops in the Central Plains Military Region Should Attempt a Transfer within the Rules of the Agreement (April 30, 1946) To Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], and Wang [Zhen]:1 1. As long as the diehard army does not split up, the best policy should be to attempt a transfer [of troops] within the rules as originally planned. 2. If the diehard army were to split up and launch a large-scale attack to force you to break out of its encirclement, it is hoped that you would secretly plan in advance and notify us by telegram regarding your intended direction, west or east, the relative pros and cons of each, and the prospects for the future. 3. The demobilization of 20,000 men must be completed in the first half of May. 4. Wang Zhen should not come to Yan’an. The Central Committee April 30

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 189, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  The Guomindang planned to annihilate the Communist forces in the Central Plains Military Region and open up the road to advance into East China, North China, and Northeast China. Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zheng Weisan was acting secretary of the Central Plains Bureau and political commissar of the Central Plains Military Region. Li Xiannian was commander and Wang Zhen was deputy commander and chief-of-staff of the Central Plains Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-126

259

Immediately Prepare to Launch an Attack against the Pinggu Line, Nankou, and Other Areas (April 30, 1946) To Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao], Cheng [Zihua] and Xiao [Ke]:1 Chiang Kaishek has rejected the proposals for a cessation of hostilities in the Northeast that were agreed to by Marshall,2 the China Democratic League, and us, and he continues to attack in the Northeast and to transfer troops. Regarding Hebei and Rehe,3 in addition to the fact that the 195th Division and the Eightyeighth Division have already been moved to Rehe, there is also the possibility that the armies in the [Bei]ping-[Tian]jin area will move troops into the Northeast as well. You are expected to prepare immediately, and if the diehards move any more troops, Nie and Liu must launch an offensive against the area of the Pinggu line and Nankou, and Cheng and Xiao must launch an attack against Shi Jue.4 Report to us by telegram regarding these preparations. Communicate by telegram daily. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 191–92, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Cheng Zihua was first political commissar and Xiao Ke was commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 2.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 3.  Rehe Province covered today’s northeast Hebei, southwest Liaoning, and southeast Inner Mongolia before it was revoked in 1955. 4.  Shi Jue was commander of the Guomindang’s Thirteenth Army, which was then stationed within the borders of Rehe. 260

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-127

Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation (April 1946) Some points in appraisal of the present international situation: 1. The world reactionary forces are definitely preparing a third world war, and the danger of war exists. But the democratic forces of the people of the world have surpassed the reactionary forces and are forging ahead; they must and certainly can overcome the danger of war. Therefore, the question in the relations between the United States, Britain, and France and the Soviet Union is not one of compromise or break but a question of compromise earlier or later. “Compromise” means reaching agreement based on the principle of democracy.1 “Earlier or later” means several years, or more than ten years, or even longer. 2. The kind of compromise mentioned above does not mean compromise on all international issues. That is impossible as long as the United States, Britain, and France continue to be ruled by reactionaries. That means2 compromise on some issues, including certain important ones, for example, the conclusion of a peace treaty concerning Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Finland. But there will be no3 such compromise in the near future. There is, however, a possibility that trade relations of the United States, Britain, and France with the Soviet Union will soon expand. 3. Such compromise based on the principle of democracy between the United States, Britain, and France and the Soviet Union can be the outcome only of resolute, effective struggle by all the democratic forces of the world against the reactionary forces of the United States, Britain, and France. Such compromise does not require the people in the countries4 to follow suit and to make compromises at home. The people in those countries will continue to

Our source for this text is Zhongyang dang’anguan, ed., Zhonggong zhongyang zai Xibaipo (Shenzhen: Haitian chubanshe, 1998), pp. 278–79. A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1181–82. 1. ​bas​ed on the principle of democracy. → through peaceful negotiation. 2.  That means → This kind of compromise means 3.  will be no → will not be many 4.  the countries → the countries of the capitalist world DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-128

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wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions. The principle of the reactionary forces in dealing with the democratic forces of the people is to destroy all they can and to prepare to destroy later whatever they cannot destroy now. Face-to-face with this situation, the democratic forces of the people should likewise apply the same principle to the reactionary forces.

Directive on the Problem of Military Training1 (May 1, 1946) To all bureaus: Directive regarding military training: 1. Apart from expanding the civil war in the Northeast, the Guomindang reactionaries are now preparing to launch a civil war throughout the country. Under such circumstances, our Party must be fully prepared so that when the Guomindang reactionaries launch a civil war, we will be able to smash them. 2. In our preparations, aside from cutting the number of old and weak (by demobilization), adding new recruits to our forces, reducing rent and interest rates, developing production, and reorganizing finances, every region must pay close attention to military training. 3. During the past three months the localities did not pay enough attention to military training. It did not become a campaign; some started the training, but some did not. This kind of phenomenon should be promptly investigated and corrected. 4. After receiving this directive, you should immediately issue an order that the entire army begin training. The higher levels should supervise and inspect, as this is one of the critical factors that will determine victory or defeat. 5. The content of military training: Practice and improve the three great military skills,2 and practice defending the cities and fighting at night. As regards politics, raise determination and confidence to defeat the diehard enemy and defend the Liberated Areas. 6. Report promptly on the measures taken to carry out this directive. The Central Committee

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 193–94, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  I.e., shooting, assassination, and bomb throwing. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-129

263

Struggle Resolutely in Siping and Benxi to Secure a Peace That Will Be Favorable to Us (May 1, 1946) To Lin Biao:1 We received your telegram of the 27th.2 1. The entire military and political command at the front is under your control and should not be dispersed. If you are too busy and need someone to help, you may consider transferring a comrade such as Gao Gang3 to assist you. But if it is advantageous to keep organizational simplicity at the front, maintain the status quo. 2. The country and the world are closely watching the war in the Northeast. Chiang Kaishek has refused the armistice agreement agreed upon by Marshall,4 the Democratic League, and our Party, and he has resolved to fight his way to Changchun. We must therefore fight persistently in Siping and Benxi, hit the diehard enemy in these two places until it is exhausted, wear down its forces, and deflate its fighting spirit, so that the forces, weapons, and munitions it has amassed during the past six months will suffer the greatest depletion and they will have no time to recruit. On the other hand, as a result of capturing Changchun and Harbin, we will have access to an endless supply of recruits and materiel, which may enable us to obtain a peace that will be favorable to us.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 195–96, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript. It also appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 276. 1.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from Lin Biao stated that on the previous day, enemy forces mounted an unsuccessful attack on the Communist position in the eastern part of Siping, while Yang Guofu’s troops likewise failed in an attack on the northern part of the city. Lin’s troops were constructing fortifications and struggling resolutely against the enemy. 3.  Gao Gang was commander of the Northern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 4.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 264

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-130

May 1946 265

3. Take all precautions against underestimating the enemy. You must gather all your strength for every battle, hit one part of the enemy forces, and win certain victory. You are already fully aware of this point. We hope you will teach it thoroughly and implement it uniformly. Mao Zedong

We Agree with the Policy Adopted by the Central Plains Bureau Regarding Attacks by the Diehard Army1 (May 2, 1946) To the Central Plains Bureau: We have taken note of both of your telegrams of the 1st.2 When the diehards attack, fight a few battles where you are and do not move away rashly so as to avoid being entrapped by the enemy’s scheme to sow discord and bring difficulties on yourself. If worst comes to the absolute worst, breaking out of the encirclement toward the west would be best and should be carried out forthwith, but all preparatory work should be done quickly. The Central Committee

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 197, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The two telegrams from the Central Plains Bureau stated that the troops were prepared to fight one or two battles in their current place when the enemy attacked and would only break through the encirclement and move westward as a last resort. 266

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-131

Strike at the Enemy at an Opportune Moment During Mobile Warfare (May 3, 1946) To Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 We received Lin’s telegram of the 29th.2 Because Chiang Kaishek has refused to reach an armistice agreement, our army in the Northeast needs a long-term plan. Do not storm fortified positions at the front. Aside from the number of troops necessary for the defense of the cities, powerful reserve forces should be held for striking at the enemy at an opportune moment during mobile warfare. In addition to maintaining a stronghold at Siping, quickly prepare second front positions at Gongzhuling and elsewhere. The rear must guarantee an ample supply of new recruits and ammunition and must immediately set up munitions factories to produce its own ammunition, land mines, and any weapons it needs. All institutions at the rear should go all-out to serve the front. In sum, everything should be for the sake of victory at the front. The Central Committee

The source of our document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 198–99, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from Lin Biao stated that the recent lack of moonlight had made it inconvenient to fight at night and the enemy forces had moved close to form positions. This made it unlikely that the New First Army would be annihilated or defeated within ten days. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-132

267

Keeping a Hold on Benxi Will Demoralize the Enemy (May 3, 1946) To Comrade Xiao Hua and the commanders of all brigades, and for the information of Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 We received your telegram of May 1st. The Central Committee is pleased with your determination to defend Benxi. We expect that you will boost the morale of the troops and strive for victory. When the various units attack, they should concentrate their main force on one of the enemy’s points in the hope of sure victory. Never attack multiple points, which will disperse troop strength. When engaging in defense, you should learn from the Siping model and use a small number of soldiers to fight against larger numbers and defend to the last without retreating. If you can hold the area of Benxi for ten days to two weeks, the enemy will become demoralized and we will have hope for victory. Our Zhan Caifang2 will assist you by leading two brigades to break up the railway line between the Shanhai Pass and Jinzhou. The Central Committee

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 200–201, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Xiao Hua was political commissar of the Southern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. 268

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-133

Keep up Efforts to Destroy the Section of the Railway between Jinzhou and the Shanhai Pass (May 3, 1946) To Cheng [Zihua] and Xiao [Ke], and for transmission to Comrade Zhan Caifang:1 We received Zhan’s telegram of the 30th. We were very glad to learn of the progress in destroying the railway. Major fighting is underway in the Northeast and the months of May and June will be crucial turning points. You are expected to make every effort to boost the morale of the troops and to continue efforts to destroy the section of the railway between Jinzhou and the Shanhai Pass. In order to extend the destruction of the railway to Xingcheng and Jinxian, please consider transferring northwards a portion of the troops from two brigades. Take along a large number of personnel to carry out local work mobilizing the broad masses in the areas west of the Xingcheng-Jinxian railway and east of the Chaoyang and Linyuan railways, and organize guerrilla units and establish solid base areas. Zhan should notify us by telegram regarding the current situation in the said area. The Central Committee

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 202–3, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Cheng Zihua was political commissar of the Hebei-Rehe-Liao­ ning Military Region, and Xiao Ke was commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-134

269

Opinions on the Campaign in Rehe (May 3, 1946) To Nie [Rongzhen], Liu [Lantao], Cheng [Zihua], and Xiao [Ke], and for the information of Ye [Jianying], Luo [Ruiqing], Lin [Biao], and Peng [Zhen]:1 1. We agree with the telegram of May 1st from the Hebei-Rehe-Liao[ning] Sub-bureau regarding your intention to launch attacks within a week against the diehard enemy along the Chaoyang-Pingquan railway and to completely destroy this rail link. The reason is that the diehards have transferred two divisions to the Northeast to engage in civil war in violation of the agreement. We must destroy the railway in order to prevent them from transferring troops again. 2. When attacking the enemy and destroying the railway, all armies should assemble their forces to attack certain spots. Each army should choose one spot to attack, and after it is captured, it should attack a second, and then a third. Avoid at all costs attacking everywhere at once and dispersing the troops. You should hold back a reserve force to continue the battle. 3. The columns of Huang [Yongsheng], Zhu [Dixin, 1910–2002, native of Hubei], and Wen [Niansheng]2 are being deployed in this battle and for the moment will not be transferred. 4. Zhan Caifang’s3 army will focus on destroying the Jin[zhou]-Yu[guan] railway. 5. Remain inactive along the [Bei]ping-Gu[beikou] railway and at Nankou for the time being, but Nie [Rongzhen] should order our army there to take

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 204–5, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Cheng Zihua was political commissar and Xiao Ke was commander, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Ye Jianying was the Chinese Communist Party’s representative in the Beiping Office for Military Mediation, and Luo Ruiqing was chief-of-staff. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Huang, Zhu, and Wen were commander, political commissar, and deputy commander, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 3.  Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. 270

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-135

May 1946 271

appropriate actions to capture certain unoccupied areas, which will serve as a warning and will prevent the diehard enemy from moving. 6. After the Rehe Campaign is completed, we will once again hold meetings with the United States to restore peace. The Central Committee

Views on Cutting off the Enemy’s Line of Retreat and Surrounding and Annihilating the Enemy in Siping (May 4, 1946) To Comrade Lin Biao:1 Our army is prepared to establish a stronghold south of Shuangmiaozi2 to cut off the enemy’s line of retreat and to surround and completely annihilate the enemy at Siping. This is a courageous plan.3 But you must consider the fact that when we cut off the enemy’s line of retreat, the enemy will certainly make desperate efforts to regain it. If we can defeat the enemy forces that are fighting to retain the line of retreat, the enemy at Siping will have no alternative but to retreat across the entire front; if we are unable to defeat these forces, the situation will remain stalemated and this will not be to our advantage. In order to guarantee our victory over the enemy at our stronghold south of Shuangmiaozi and thereby bring about a change in the overall military situation, it seems better if we use more than two brigades of our forces here—that is, add another unit apart from the two brigades transferred from southern Manchuria.4 If we appear in the enemy’s rear with a powerful force and guarantee the establishment of a fortified stronghold and the elimination of the enemy sent to regain the line of retreat (for example, if we wipe out one of the enemy’s divisions), then the enemy at Siping will surely retreat. If

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 206–7, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Shuangmiaozi is a town located in northeast Changtu, Liaoning Province. 3.  In the telegram that he drafted on behalf of the Military Commission to Lin Biao on May 3, 1946, Mao Zedong writes, “The plan of deploying two brigades to open a second front south of Shuangmiaozi and to cut off the enemy’s line of retreat is great. We hope you will implement it resolutely. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to allow these two brigades several days to rest and prepare before the attack as they will be tired upon arrival.” 4.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang.

272

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we counterattack while this enemy is retreating, we can achieve a great victory. You should be prepared to wage such a counteroffensive for a number of days and therefore you must ensure that you have enough food. The above ideas are offered for your consideration. You should make your decisions based on actual necessity. Mao Zedong

Main Points of the Speeches by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi on Land Policy1 (May 8, 1946) The Central Committee’s directive on the land question has begun to be distributed by telegram to the various localities. During discussion and ratification of this directive, statements by Chairman Mao and Comrade Liu Shaoqi raised several points of utmost importance that merit the attention of all comrades in the Party. They are summarized for notification as follows: 1. At the Seventh Party Congress it was stated that “an appropriate way would be sought to solve the land problem and to carry out the policy of land to the tillers.” The Central Committee’s “May 4th” directive is just such a suitable method, created by the masses and approved by the Central Committee. As during the period of the Great Revolution, the peasants are stretching out their hands and asking for land, so the Communist Party must have a firm and clear attitude as to whether or not to approve it. 2. Politically this is extremely necessary. At present, the Guomindang has the big cities, assistance from imperialism, and occupies areas with three-fourths of the population, and the only way to change our disadvantaged situation is by relying on the great strength of the broad masses of the people to fight against the enemy. If the land problem is solved in the Liberated Areas with a population of more than a hundred million, then the people in the Liberated Areas will be able to sustain the struggle for a long time without feeling exhausted. 3. This is a most fundamental problem and the key link to all our work. Cadres throughout the entire Party must be made to recognize its importance. 4. In places where land has been evenly divided (that is, equal distribution) because of actions by the broad masses, do not criticize the peasants’ egalitarianism. On the contrary, such actions on the part of the peasants to thoroughly eliminate the feudal forces should be approved. But it will not do to carry out equal distribution without limits, without uniting the middle peasants, and without taking care of all kinds of people who should be taken care

1Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 93–94, where it is reproduced from the collection Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tudi gaige wenjian xuanji, published by the Central Party School in 1981. 274

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of. In places where the masses have not proposed an even division, things should be handled accordingly and not through equal distribution. 5. Do not fear the temporary vacillation of the liberal bourgeoisie and the centrist elements. Only when we resolutely carry out land reform so that the peasants obtain land and when our strength has grown and consolidated will we have enough power to strive to win them over and unite them. But the liberal bourgeoisie and the centrists should be given correct and forceful explanations, pointing out that reducing rents and allotting land to the tillers is implementing the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and that this is very different from that during the civil war period. 6. There must be a distinction in principle between policy regarding industry and commerce and the labor movement on the one hand, and land policy and the peasant movement on the other. Wages and other working conditions must not be set too high; instead, there should be cooperation between labor and capital, with the formulation of joint production plans (adequate raw materials, a variety of low-cost and high-quality products, and broad markets) to work hard to develop production, so the economy will flourish to the benefit of both labor and capital. Only in this way can we fight against foreign as well as domestic monopoly capital so that the development of industry and commerce in the Liberated Areas will be in an undefeated position.

Step up Preparations against Fu Zuoyi’s Attacks (May 9, 1946) To He [Long] and Li [Jingquan], and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen]:1 1. You must step up preparations against Fu Zuoyi’s2 attacks. 2. Rapidly build and strengthen fortifications at Zhuozishan,3 Jining, Liangcheng, Fengzhen, and so on, and make advance troop assignments for defense of the cities (the numbers should not be too large). Store up provisions and ammunition and prepare to defend the cities to the death as you await the main forces to wipe out the enemy from flexible positions. In the recent battle of Sipingjie4 in the Northeast we deployed two regiments to defend the city (one more was added a week later). Five of the enemy’s divisions surrounded us on three sides and fought for twenty days without achieving a victory and now our main force is seeking opportunities to destroy the enemy from the periphery. We hope units will be told to follow this model. 3. Nie must make similar preparations regarding the enemy at Nankou. 4. Rapidly annihilate the bandits north of Chahar.5 5. Intensify the training of soldiers, raise the level of their skills, and boost morale in preparation for smashing the attacking enemy. You are expected to inform us by telegram of each item in the preparatory work. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 208–9, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. He Long and Li Jingquan (1909–1989, native of Jiangxi) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. 2.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 3.  Zhuozishan is now the county seat of Zhuozi county, Inner Mongolia. 4.  The battle of Sipingjie began on April 18 and lasted for one month, with the Communist forces inflicting major casualties on the Guomindang troops before the Northeast Democratic Allied Army withdrew from Siping on May 18 and then from Gongzhuling and Changchun. 5.  Chahar Province covered today’s northwestern Hebei and Xilingol, Inner Mongolia, and then also northeastern Hebei and northern Shanxi, until it was abolished in 1952. 276

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Attend to Other Work While Arranging for the Eastern Rehe Campaign (May 10, 1946) To the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning local bureau, and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao], Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1 1. While making deployments for and carrying out the Eastern Rehe Campaign,2 do not forget about suppressing the bandits in western Rehe and do not forget about mass work in central, western, and northern Rehe and in eastern Hebei to fight the traitors and to settle accounts with them, and to lower rents and reduce interest on loans, as well as to emphasize leadership over production. 2. After victory in the Eastern Rehe Campaign, prepare the column of Huang [Yongsheng], Zhu [Dixin], and Wen [Niansheng]3 to advance into western Liaoning for battle (you will still be in command), positioning them in the area north of the Jinzhou-Shenyang railway. They will be responsible for destroying the Jinzhou-Shenyang railway and for mobilizing the masses in that area. Please consider when this column can move to western Liaoning and what preparatory work is needed and inform us by telegram. 3. Zhan Caifang’s4 column should expand the scope of its railway destruction to the Xingcheng and Jinzhou lines, while also paying attention to mass work in this area and organizing local guerrilla units. The Central Committee

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 210–11, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The Eastern Rehe Campaign, also known as the Rehe Campaign, was carried out in May 1946 in Chaoyang and Pingyuan by troops of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region aiming to destroy traffic lines. 3.  Huang was commander, Zhu was political commissar, and Wen was deputy commander of the Rehe-Liaoning Column of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 4.  Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-139

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Cut off the Retreat of the Enemy Army at Siping and Pin Down the Enemy Reinforcements at Benxi (May 12, 1946, 9 P.M. to 11 P.M.) To Lin [Biao]:1 1. We hope the main forces will be placed in the areas of Kaiyuan and Changtu, cutting off the retreat of the enemy in Siping and wiping out the enemy forces moving north from Shenyang. 2. Southern Manchuria2 should actively take the initiative to pin down the five enemy divisions now in the Benxi area so they cannot be moved or at least cannot be moved to any great extent. 3. In Rehe,3 our forces will begin tomorrow to attack the Thirteenth Army and after taking this in hand, we will advance toward western Liaoning to assist you. Mao Zedong

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 212–13, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Southern Manchuria here refers to the Southern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, which covered the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, encompassing Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang. 3.  Rehe Province covered today’s northeastern Hebei, southwestern Liaoning, and southeastern Inner Mongolia before it was abolished in 1955. 278

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Quickly Send Troops to Watch for an Opportunity to Occupy Western Jinzhou (May 13, 1946) To Xiao [Ke] and Cheng [Zihua], and for immediate transmission to Zhan Caifang:1 The news is confirmed that the Eighty-ninth Division, stationed in western Jinzhou, is advancing toward Chaoyang and Linyuan, and western Jinzhou is weakly defended. We hope you will quickly advance an adequate force (a brigade, for example) toward western Jinzhou and watch for a chance to occupy it, and also break up the railway lines in Jinzhou and Xingcheng, mobilize the popular masses, and coordinate all sides for battle. The Military Commission

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 214, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Xiao Ke and Cheng Zihua were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-141

279

The Guomindang’s Plot for Civil War and Our Countermeasures (May 15, 1946) To all bureaus, Zhou [Enlai], Ye [Jianying], Luo [Ruiqing], Rao [Shushi], Li [Lisan], and Wu [Xiuquan]:1 Regarding the current situation and countermeasures: 1. Aside from waging a major campaign in the Northeast, the Guomindang is also actively preparing for a nationwide civil war. But because U.S. policy, although generally supporting Chiang [Kaishek] and assisting him in his war efforts in the Northeast, is not yet in favor of a nationwide civil war and because Chiang has misgivings about our military strength, international public opinion, and domestic popular support, he does not dare to immediately launch a nationwide civil war, even though his preparations are unusually active. 2. Our Party’s guiding orientation is to strive for a cessation of hostilities in the Northeast and to prevent a nationwide civil war, or at least to postpone the advent of a nationwide civil war. Because of this, we should adopt the following countermeasures: (a) Do not challenge the Guomindang; if its side encroaches upon us or attacks, we must resolutely beat it back and recover our lost territory; otherwise, the other side will become insatiable and a large-scale civil war will occur much sooner. But we must firmly hold to a position of self-defense and not initiate an attack on the other side. If disputes arise, after struggle they should be mediated by the operational teams,2 which will place us in a justified and advantageous position. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 215–17, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were the Chinese Communist Party’s representatives to the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. Luo Ruiqing was chief-ofstaff. Rao Shushi, Li Lisan (1899–1967, native of Hunan), and Wu Xiuquan (1908–1997, born in Wuhan) were the Chinese Communist Party’s leaders in the Twenty-seventh Executive Group of the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 2.  The reference is to the operational teams of the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 280

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(b) Regulate the work of the Office for Military Mediation and the various mediation teams, and improve relations with the Americans. No matter how much the Americans side with the Guomindang, other than arguing vigorously on justifiable grounds, as long as the United States does not reinstate Hurley’s3 policies or instigate a nationwide civil war, we should do everything possible to win them over. Recently, relations with the Americans have not worked out well in some places. Of course, this was brought about by a bad attitude on the part of the Americans, but our attempts to win over the Americans have also been inadequate and from now on we should pay attention to figuring out how to win over the Americans. We must also be mindful of winning over the representatives and officials of the Guomindang. In sum, where we have rights, we must struggle for them, and the other side’s unreasonable demands must be rejected. But our general spirit is to achieve the resolution of disputes without putting ourselves at a disadvantage without making the disputes more serious. (c) In the Northeast, one aspect is to keep fighting resolutely; the longer the battle to defend Siping can be sustained, the better. Another aspect is that our personnel involved in external negotiations should emphasize a cessation of hostilities and strive for an armistice. In the Rehe area, because the other side is continually dispatching troops to expand the civil war in the Northeast, we have no choice but to destroy the JinzhouChengde railway, and as soon as that is completed, we should turn to regrouping. (d) In addition to stepping up the fighting in the Northeast and at the same time getting a handle on rent reduction and production, all Liberated Areas should take care of the three big tasks of training troops, rent reduction, and production. Notable results must be achieved within the next six months to prevent a nationwide civil war. If the Guomindang insists on instigating a civil war, we can thoroughly crush it and thereby put ourselves in an undefeated position. The next six months are to be divided further into two periods: one in May, June, and July, and the other in August, September, and October. All areas are expected to first gain a good grasp of the work in the first three months and not slacken their vigilance or become careless. (e) In all large cities, in addition to developing mass work, a great deal of effort should be put into winning over the centrists in the various sectors as well as the centrists in the Guomindang. The Central Committee

3.  Patrick J. Hurley was appointed U.S. ambassador to China in late November 1944, but he resigned in November 1945 due to controversy over his support for Chiang Kaishek.

The Various Forces in Rehe Are Expected to Actively Coordinate with Our Army to Battle in the Northeast (May 15, 1946) To Xiao [Ke] and Cheng [Zihua], and for transmission to Zhan Caifang:1 1. The battle situation in the Northeast is extremely tense, and Xiao and Cheng are urgently expected to command the various forces in Rehe2 to destroy as much as possible of the diehard enemy’s effective strength and to thoroughly destroy the railway. 2. During the second stage of fighting, we hope you will consider sending the column of Huang [Yongsheng], Zhu [Dixin], and Wen [Niansheng]3 eastward to the Fuxin and Yixian area to carry out a surprise attack and lure out the Ninety-third Army (the Yunnan army, whose main force is now landing at Huludao). 3. The main force of Zhan [Caifang]’s column should push forward rapidly to Jinzhou and the area west of it, inflict extensive damage on the BeipingShenyang railway, and lure out the Ninety-third Army. This is extremely important. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 220–21, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Xiao Ke was commander and Cheng Zihua was political commissar, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. 2.  Rehe Province covered northern Hebei, southwestern Liaoning, and eastern Inner Mongolia before it was abolished in 1955. 3.  Huang Yongsheng was commander of the Rehe-Liaoning column, Zhu Dixin was political commissar, and Wen Niansheng was deputy commander, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 282

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We Hope for a Study of Techniques for Destroying Tanks (May 18, 1946) To Lin [Biao]:1 1. One division of the Sixteenth Army attacked our town of Panggezhuang2 south of Beiping, using military vehicles. Meeting our solid fortifications, the attack was not effective, and we are now amid a counterattack. The diehard army is prepared to use tanks in the area of Siping, and we are hoping for a study of techniques to annihilate the enemy. 2. Our crushing Rehe Campaign3 has been going on for four days, and aside from luring out the entire Thirteenth Army and preventing it from moving, it has also lured out one newly arrived division of the Ninety-third Army. Under such circumstances, the Ninety-third Army is only able to deal with Rehe4 and the Beiping-Shenyang railway. 3. Word has it that the Fourteenth Division of the New Sixth Army is being deployed to the Xifeng area, so you are expected to watch for this. The Military Commission

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 222–23, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Panggezhuang is a township in the southern area of today’s Daxing county, Beijing. 3.  For more information on the Rehe sabotage operations, see “Opinions on the Campaign in Rehe,” May 3, 1946, in this volume. 4.  Rehe Province covered northern Hebei, southwestern Liaoning, and eastern Inner Mongolia before it was abolished in 1955. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-144

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Firmly Defend Siping, but When This Becomes Impossible, Abandon It on Your Own Initiative (May 19, 1946) To Lin [Biao], and for the information of Peng [Zhen]:1 We received your telegram of the 18th.2 1. Our forces at Siping have been holding firmly for a month, resisting the attacks by ten divisions of enemy forces, and thereby exhibiting the brave and indomitable spirit of the people’s army. This struggle is of historic significance. 2. If there comes a time when you feel that it has become impossible to continue holding Siping, you should give up Siping on your own initiative. Use one unit to resist and delay the enemy in the front, withdraw the main forces to the two flanks for rest and consolidation, and prepare to switch from positional warfare to mobile warfare. 3. If this orientation is adopted, our army is sure to change the present passive and disadvantaged position to an active and advantaged position, whereas the farther the enemy advances, the more dispersed it will become and the more difficulties it will have getting grain and ammunition, and its strength is bound to wane. 4. The railways south of Changchun should be promptly and thoroughly destroyed.3 The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 224–25, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and Peng Zhen was first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Lin Biao’s telegram stated, “Some positions east of Siping have been lost, and the enemy is currently launching a vicious attack. The situation is desperate.” 3.  The editors of Mao Zedong junshi wenji indicate here that another version of this telegram preserved in the Central Archives has a fifth item, which reads: “Regarding which orientation should be adopted, this is to be decided by Lin [Biao] in accordance with the current situation.” 284

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To Nie Rongzhen and Wang Jiaxiang (May 19, 1946) To Nie [Rongzhen], and for transmission to Comrade [Wang] Jiaxiang:1 Regarding sending a plane to take Jiaxiang to the Soviet Union for medical treatment, the other side has been considering it for quite some time since we approached it on this matter. At first, it was rather concerned about the international atmosphere and wanted Jiaxiang and his wife to go to Outer Mongolia to board their flight, but this concern no longer exists and they have decided to send a plane directly to Zhangjiakou. There is therefore only the question of whether Jiaxiang’s health will permit him to travel by plane. Please have Jiaxiang himself decide and let me know, at which point those far away2 can be notified to send a plane for him. In my opinion, as long as his health allows him to fly, even if with difficulty, the best plan is for him to go to the Soviet Union for treatment. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 271, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Nie Rongzhen was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Wang Jiaxiang (1906–1974, born in Jing county, Anhui) was assistant secretary of the Central Military Commission and director of the General Political Department during the War of Resistance Against Japan. 2.  The editors of Shuxin xuanji state that “those far away” refers to the Soviet authorities. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-146

285

In the Northeast, Work in the Countryside and the Small and Medium-Sized Cities Should for Now Still Be Given Priority (May 19, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and the Northern Manchuria1 local bureau: Although we have already taken the two large cities of Chang[chun] and Har[bin], work in the countryside and in the small and medium-sized cities is still the priority, and we must be sure not to accumulate many cadres in Chang[chun] and Har[bin]. All counties should be ordered to step up the training of troops, suppression of bandits, and resolution of the land question. This year, we must finish resolving the land question completely or in large part. Once the land question is resolved and we have troops, the bandits will be more easily suppressed and our hold on the large cities will be consolidated. Toward this objective, a number of cadres from counties in southern and eastern Manchuria2 where mass work has penetrated most deeply should be pulled out and transferred to the various counties in northern Manchuria to do mass work. Mass work is extremely important in the dozen or so counties on either side of the Changchun-Harbin railway. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 119–20, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Northern Manchuria refers to the regions surrounding Harbin, Mudanjiang, Bei’an, Jiamusi, and Qiqihar. 2.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang. Eastern Manchuria refers to the area east of the Shenyang-Changchun section of the Chinese Changchun railway, including the region around Jilin, Xi’an (today’s Dongliao), Antu, Yanji, and Dunhua. 286

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Local Retaliation Adopted toward Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 19, 1946) To Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:1 1. Siping has become difficult to continue to defend and we have decided to give up that city and engage in mobile warfare. 2. During the past week, the diehards have taken from us the four towns of Anci, Xiao county, Xiayi, and Dingyuan and have attacked our Shuidong region.2 In each place they deployed a force of about 20,000 troops in what were clearly acts of deliberate provocation. In the main, we will continue to put up with this and we only need to take local retaliatory measures. A and B3

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 228, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript held in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Ye Jianying was the representative of the Chinese Communist Party to the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 2.  Shuidong, or “east of the water,” refers to the area in eastern Henan Province, south of the Longhai railway and east of the Yellow River when it was rerouted in 1938. The Chinese Communist Party established its Shuidong Military Subregion in the area of Sui and Ji counties and Taikang during the war with Japan, and it became the Twelfth Military Subregion of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region in January 1945. 3.  Here as elsewhere, we have substituted the letters A and B for the characters jia and yi. Since our source indicates that Mao drafted this text on behalf of the Central Committee, A and B may stand for the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-148

287

Military Deployments after the Withdrawal from Siping (May 19, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao]:1 1. Once the withdrawal from Siping is accomplished, our troops can be freely deployed. The larger the area occupied by the diehards, the longer the supply line and the more difficulties they will have. 2. Because we were unable to destroy the section of the railway between Shenyang and Siping before the enemy advanced northward, we suffered a big loss. Now all forces should be mobilized to work day and night without ceasing to thoroughly destroy the section of the railway between Changchun and Siping. Not only should the tracks be removed and the bridges, water towers, and railway stations blown up, but large areas of railbeds should be dug up so the diehards cannot easily repair and restore them. By no means should there be any slackening of effort on this matter. 3. Begin immediately to build munitions factories in stable areas in the rear so we can manufacture weapons and munitions ourselves in preparation for protracted warfare. 4. The garrison forces in Changchun should immediately begin making arrangements to defend the city and to hold fast for a month without relying on help from the main forces, while our main forces will take action on the enemy’s two flanks and in the far rear. 5. The large number of captured rifles should be used to replenish the arms of the main forces and the local army units, but also to arm large numbers of peasants and to organize militias and self-defense corps. 6. Pay particular attention to mass work in the ten or so counties on either side of the Chang[chun]-Har[bin] railway. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 226–27, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 288

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-149

To the Xin’an Tour Group1 (May 20, 1946) To all comrades in the Xin’an Tour Group: I have received your letter; thank you very much! My wish for you is that you work hard, continue to advance, and strive for the victory of a democratic China. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 272, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript. 1. The Xin’an Tour Group was a children’s and youth propaganda troupe organized by the Chinese Communist Party out of what had been the Xin’an Elementary School in Huai’an county, Jiangsu Province. Established in October 1935, the troupe traveled to eighteen different localities to engage in propaganda for resisting Japan and national salvation. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-150

289

For the Time Being, Do Not Engage in Battle at Dongming (May 21, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 Siping has been lost. To avoid giving the diehards any excuse to launch a largescale conflict, do not engage in battle at Dongming for the time being, but prepare to carry out intelligence gathering on places such as Dongming, Changyuan, Kaocheng,2 Yongnian, and Liaocheng. The Central Committee 5–7 A.M. on the 21st

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 232, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. On the morning of May 20, 1946, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping sent a telegram to the Central Committee in which they proposed focusing on the main forces of the Seventh Column to capture Dongming and expanding in the direction of Changheng. On the same day, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Central Committee agreeing to this measure and inquiring into the possible conditions for Yongnian and Liaocheng. The telegram of May 21 made changes to the original deployment for attacking Dongming and other places. 2.  Kaocheng county was combined with Lanfeng county to form Henan’s Lankao county in 1954. 290

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-151

Our Policy after Forfeiting Siping (May 21, 1946) To Chen (Yi), Shu (Tong), Zhang (Dingcheng), Su (Yu) and Tan (Zhenlin):1 Siping is lost. To avoid giving the obstinate enemy any excuse to launch a major attack, remain inactive everywhere except for in Dingyuan, Xiayi, and Xiao counties, all of which are under attack. Engage in counterattacks there and recapture them. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 231, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, and Shu Tong (1905–1998, native of Jiangxi) was director of the Political Department of the Shandong Military Region. Zhang Dingcheng (1898–1961, native of Fujian) was commander, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-152

291

Letter to Yu Guangsheng (May 22, 1946) Comrade [Yu] Guangsheng:1 Beginning from the twenty-third, broadcasting news of frictions should be temporarily stopped. Only newspapers can still cover them in part. If you are going to write a commentary on Marshall’s declaration,2 please let me have a look! Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao xuanbian, Vol. 1, p. 34, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Yu Guangsheng (1907–1978, born in Zhenhai, Zhejiang) was acting head and editorin-chief of Xinhua News Agency and Jiefang ribao. 2.  The reference is to General George Marshall’s declaration of May 20 regarding cessation of the civil war in the Northeast. 292

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-153

Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from Representatives of the China Democratic League 1

(May 23, 1946) Dear Messrs. [Zhang] Junli [1887–1969, native of Jiangsu], Renzhi [Huang Yanpei, 1878–1965, native of Jiangsu], Hengshan [Shen Junru, 1875–1964, born in Suzhou], [Zhang] Bojun [1895–1969, native of Anhui], and [Liang] Shuming [1893–1988, born in Beijing] I received your telegram of May 22. The peaceful resolution of the Northeast problem has always been our Party’s consistent policy, and on behalf of our Party Comrade Zhou Enlai carefully considered the suggestions made by you gentlemen and the others on April 28. Unfortunately, they were turned down by the other side without reaching agreement. We regret this very much. After reading your telegram, we very much agree with you in principle. Enlai will discuss everything with you in person. Best wishes! Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 95, where it is reproduced from Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng lishi wenxian, published by Wenshi ziliao chubanshe in 1983. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-154

293

Actively Prepare for Battle and Strengthen Work among the Diehard Army (May 26, 1946) To Nie [Rongzhen] and Tang [Yanjie], and for the information of He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]:1 The Guomindang is actively preparing to attack, so you must actively prepare for battle. To this end, apart from intensifying the training of soldiers, stepping up the suppression of bandits, and speeding up resolution of the land issue, you should attend to the expansion, consolidation, and training of the militia so you can mobilize some of it to replace the soldiers killed at the front in future battles. In addition, you should pay close attention to the work of agents planted in the diehard puppet army. Assign competent cadres to supervise this work. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 233, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Tang Yanjie (1909–1988, native of Hunan) was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. He Long was commander and Li Jingquan was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. 294

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-155

The Main Force in the Northeast Should Not Fear Losing Territory and It Should Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (May 27, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao]:1 We received your telegram of the 26th.2 The current overall military policy calls for one unit to remain engaged with the enemy, creating a disturbance and sabotaging the railway, while the main force should not be afraid of losing territory or of separating itself from the enemy. Find time to rest, consolidate, replenish your forces, and restore your vitality before going into battle again. We have informed [Zhou] Enlai of our diplomatic policy. We only agree with regard to Changchun, where both parties will refrain from stationing soldiers, but nothing else. If the United States and Chiang [Kaishek] want to fight, let them fight; if they want to occupy places, let them occupy them. Our side will never recognize their fighting and occupying as lawful. In short, the Northeast is in an unresolved situation. Our Party must be prepared for a protracted struggle, and we will win in the end. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 234–35, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from the Northeast Bureau stated that the army in the Northeast had endured a long and bitter battle and its main forces were exhausted. The enemy had already taken the line between Siping and Changchun and between Zhengjiatun, Xi’an, and Hailong. Communist forces were absent from western and northern Manchuria, and at the same time the enemy was staging an offensive that the Communist forces would find difficult to forcefully resist. The Central Committee’s guidance was requested. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-156

295

The Battle to Defend Siping Cannot Represent Our General Battle Strategy1 (May 27, 1946) The primary reason why we have been able to defend Sipingjie2 in the Northeast for so long is that the enemy did not anticipate that our army had a line of defense and consequently repeatedly sent more troops, making it easy for us to destroy them one by one and causing the enemy to suffer a serious blow by our army. The battle to defend Sipingjie therefore was characterized by special temporary conditions and it cannot become the general strategy for our military operations. We are currently making great efforts to defend the large cities while losing many small and medium-sized cities, and we have not been able to take advantage of many opportunities to destroy the enemy by mobile warfare. Therefore, if the enemy continues to send more troops to encircle and attack our defending armies, we will still have to abandon the large cities.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 236, where it is reproduced from a mimeographed copy preserved at the Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to all strategic regions. 2.  Sipingjie is the former name of the town now known as Siping in Jilin Province. 296

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-157

Prepare to Deal with the Guomindang’s Offensive against Shanxi-Suiyuan and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei1 (May 27, 1946) To He [Long] and Li [Jingquan], and to Nie [Rongzhen] and Tang [Yanjie]: In order to prepare to deal with the large-scale offensive that the Guomindang is going to launch: 1. The military forces in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Region should divide into two sections, with the main force taking on Fu [Zuoyi]’s2 forces positioned in the Liangcheng, Zhuozishan,3 and Jining areas and preparing to wait until the enemy makes a move before attacking and then annihilating it. The other section, together with the local militias, will take on Yan [Xishan]4 in the stronghold regions that diehard Yan occupies along the Datong to Taiyuan line. This section will prepare more TNT and practice laying siege to a city and using explosives and it will prepare to capture Datong and all counties and cities to its south in succession. The Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar forces positioned east of Tongpu have the same preparatory tasks. 2. The Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar forces positioned on either side of the [Bei]pingGu[beikou] railway likewise should prepare more TNT, practice laying siege to cities and using explosives, and prepare to attack and occupy the Pinggu railway. Central Hebei must organize a column of its main forces, strengthen every independent regimental barracks of the district branches, strengthen county and district guerrilla troops and militias, and prepare to deal with an imminent attack by the diehard army. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 237–38, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. He Long was commander and Li Jingquan was political commissar, respectively, of the ShanxiSuiyuan Military Region. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Tang Yanjie was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. 2.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 3.  Zhuozishan is now the county seat of Zhuozi county, Inner Mongolia. 4.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Second War Zone of the Guomindang army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-158

297

Make Ample Preparations to Counter the Guomindang’s Large-Scale Offensive1 (May 29, 1946) To all military district commanders: 1. The Guomindang is expanding its war in the Northeast and is actively preparing to launch a major offensive against us within the [Shanhai] Pass; because of this, we should make ample preparations against the enemy’s war plans. 2. As regard to those cities, railroad stations, bridges, and other strategic areas that, based on relative strength, can and should be captured or bombed, you should finish gathering intelligence on the enemy, deploying troops, outfitting arms and ammunition (for example, TNT), drawing up war plans, and other aspects of preparatory work from within one-half month to one month of receiving this telegram. There must be no mistakes, and this applies also to preparatory work for defensive aspects as well. 3. Please report at any time on the progress of the preparations. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 239, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 298

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-159

Purchase TNT in Large Quantities and Emphasize Training for Attacking Cities1 (May 29, 1946) To all military district commanders: Because TNT is an important weapon for attacking the cities, all military districts must find a way to buy and stockpile large quantities of it; every brigade should have several hundred to several thousand catties. All major strategic work units should manufacture TNT on their own. For the training of the troops, besides drilling them in the three major skills2 and in guarding the cities and night warfare, they should also be trained in how to attack the cities, which includes training in the use of TNT. This matter is extremely important, and we hope the entire army will take notice. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 240–41, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. A June 8, 1946, telegram that Mao drafted on behalf of the Central Military Commission again emphasized the importance of TNT. 2.  The “three major skills” (san da jishu) were marksmanship, bayonet fighting, and throwing grenades. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-160

299

It Will Be Advantageous to the Shandong Military Region to First Annihilate the Armies of Wu Huawen et al. (May 30, 1946) To Chen [Yi]:1 Regarding the opinions raised in your telegram of the 23rd,2 after consideration by Zhang [Yunyi] and Li [Yu],3 it seems advantageous to first annihilate Wu Huawen’s4 12,000 troops in the Tai’an, Dawenkou,5 and Yanzhou area, Zhang Jingyue’s6 12,000 troops in the Zhangdian, Zhoucun, and Nanding area,7 and Wang Jixiang’s8 6,000 troops in Dezhou, a total of 30,000 troops. The reasons are as follows: First, the development of the current situation is gradual, not sudden, and it is clearly more reasonable to start out small; starting out with large battles is clearly unreasonable. Second, watching what actions the enemy takes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 242–43, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and commander-in-chief of the Shandong Military Region. 2.  Chen Yi’s telegram suggested that with the eruption of civil war, Shandong was likely to adopt a “northern offensive, southern defensive” strategy. Based on the current situation in which the Guomindang forces lacked operational strength but had solid fortifications in the Xuzhou region, Chen proposed coordinating with the Central China forces for mobile defense of Xuzhou and also for besieging Ji’nan, with a view to capturing it. Thereafter, his main force could go on the offensive to take Beiping and Tianjin, while another portion of the troops could head east to recapture the railroad line from Ji’nan to Qingdao. 3.  Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander of the New Fourth Army and deputy commander-in-chief of the Shandong Military Region. Li Yu was deputy political commissar. They were both in Yan’an at this time. 4.  Wu Huawen was commander of the Provisional Seventh Column of the Guomindang army. 5.  Dawenkou was a township located in the southern portion of today’s Tai’an in Shandong Province. 6.  Zhang Jingyue (1904–1978, native of Shandong) was commander of the Third Division of the Shandong Security Forces. 7.  Zhangdian, Zhoucun, and Nanding are townships in Zebo city, Shandong Province. 8.  Wang Jixiang (1904–1950, native of Zhejiang) was commander of the Guomin­ dang’s Provisional Thirteenth Independent Army Unit. 300

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-161

May 1946 301

after we have annihilated the aforementioned three sections and then deciding where to deploy our main forces will keep us from being caught in a passive position. Third, when we fight Wu Huawen, both Ji’nan and Xuzhou will probably send reinforcements, and when we fight Zhang Jingyue, Ji’nan and Wei county9 will likely send reinforcements; we can annihilate the enemy’s reinforcements by mobile [warfare]. The above opinions are provided for your consideration; if you have important new arguments, please inform us by telegram. The Military Commission

9.  Wei county became part of Weifang city in 1983.

It Is Unnecessary to Give Notice before Attacking and Seizing Tai’an and Other Places (May 31, 1946) To the East China Bureau, and for the information of Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], and Bo [Yibo], and of Deng [Zihui], Zhang [Dingcheng], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 We received your telegram of the 30th.2 The Guomindang is expanding its war in the Northeast. It has occupied more than ten of our cities, including Siping, Changchun, and Jilin, and it is now launching an offensive against Harbin. Within the [Shanhai] Pass, [the Guomindang] has in the last five months occupied hundreds of our cities, towns, townships, and villages. In recent days it has also seized Anci, Xiao county, Fuyi, and Dingyuan, and it has attacked Shuidong. Today we have learned that the Beiping Eleventh Military District Command, without any notice whatsoever, set out with tens of thousands of troops to attack Sanhe, Baodi, Xianghe, Ninghe, and other counties in eastern Hebei. You therefore no longer need to give notice before taking action, and you can commence the attack and seizure of Tai’an, Dawenkou, Zhangdian, Zhoucun,3 Dezhou, Zaozhuang, and other areas. Inform us of the battle situation at any time by telegram. The Central Committee Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 244–45, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, where Deng Xiaoping was political commissar and Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar. Deng Zihui (1896–1972, native of Fujian) was political commissar of the Central China Military Region, where Zhang Dingcheng was commander, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. 2.  This refers to a telegram from the East China Bureau to the Central Committee on May 30, 1946, in which it was stated that the Bureau had finished drafting a notice to be sent to the Nanjing three-person committee and to the Beiping Executive Department. If no reply was received by the 10th, the capture of Tai’an, Dawenkou, Zhoucun, Zhangdian, Dezhou, and Zaozhuang would begin immediately on the 11th. If there was agreement, it was to be sent from the Central Committee to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying on the 5th [of the month] for compliance. 3.  Dawenkou is a township located in the southern part of Shandong’s Tai’an city. Zhangdian and Zhoucun are both townships under Zibo city in Shandong Province. 302

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-162

The United States Is Transporting Large Numbers of Chiang’s Troops to the Northeast to Extend the Civil War1 (June 1, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, June 1) Reliable sources have it that just as Mr. Marshall2 seems to be making efforts to appeal for peace in the Northeast and in China, three divisions of the Guomindang’s Fifty-third Army now stationed in Vietnam are about to be transported by American naval vessels to the Northeast within a few days to expand the civil war, which has already been greatly expanded as it is. It is also said that the Fifth Army will be transported to the Northeast by American naval vessels. Note: Mr. Marshall holds authority when it comes to transporting Guomindang troops with American naval vessels. It was agreed previously that only five armies would be transported to the Northeast for the Guomindang, but later that agreement was violated and two additional armies were transported. In April, an agreement was again made that after the American vessels transported the Ninety-third Army, they would not transport any more troops for the Guomindang. But after Chiang Kaishek, commander of the civil war in China, turned down peace in the Northeast and peace in the whole country seemingly under orders, the American side then actively continued to use its own naval transport vessels and large amounts of armaments and munitions to help the Guomindang expand the civil war, and the result was in fact an unprecedented expansion of the civil war in China. This situation, in which the United States and Chiang are closely colluding to slaughter the Chinese people, merits close attention.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 354–56, where it is reproduced (along with a facsimile) from Mao’s original edited manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. Text in bold refers to changes made by Mao. 1.  The editors of Xinwen gongzuo wenxuan indicate that this was the heading on the Xinhua News Agency news item. 2.  George Marshall became a special envoy of the United States to China in December 1945 in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-163

303

The Central Plains Forces Must Seek Their Own Path to Salvation and Prepare to Break out of the Encirclement (June 1, 1946) To Zheng Weisan, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen:1 1. The United States and Chiang Kaishek have extremely evil intentions toward us, and a full-scale civil war is inevitable. We fear there is little hope in asking American planes to transport money to help you. You must seek a way to save yourselves: For example, on the one hand you should be economical in your expenditures to save up money for when you break out of the encirclement; on the other hand, the wheat is ripe, and you can collect grain taxes from the people. 2. You must be prepared to fight the enemy’s attack and to fight your way out of the encirclement; you should prepare in advance two plans for when you break out of the encirclement, one for concentrated operations and the other for dispersed operations. During the breakout and immediately thereafter, it will probably be most advantageous for the entire army to act together, but when the enemy’s “pursuit and annihilation” is very serious, and marching and supplies have both become extremely difficult, it will be better to divide up into two or three independently operating groups. This will avoid the difficulties of a concentrated operation while helping to contain the enemy separately and to assist one another strategically. 3. This is a very critical moment, and you should be very careful, unite internally, and prepare for a difficult struggle. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 246–47, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zheng Weisan was political commissar, Li Xiannian was commander, and Wang Zhen was deputy commander and chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. 304

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-164

First Seize Tai’an and Other Cities, and Then Consider Attacking Ji’nan1 (June 1, 1946) To the East China Bureau: 1. After consideration, we agree with the strategic orientation put forward in your telegram of May 23rd;2 but you should first seize Tai’an, Dawenkou, Zhangdian, Zhoucun,3 Dezhou—all these points—and then attack Ji’nan. We expect you to carry out deployments and all other preparatory work in accordance with this plan. 2. If, after fighting for Tai’an and other places, the situation is not suitable for an attack on Ji’nan, you can decide to forgo it for the time being. 3. It is important for the agents working among Huo Shouyi’s4 Ji’nan troops and Feng Zhi’an’s5 Xuzhou troops to step up their work. 4. The revised diplomatic notes have been sent to Nanjing and Beiping. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 248–49, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. On June 5, 1946, Mao Zedong also drafted a telegram to Chen Yi and Shu Tong, in which he expressed the wish to “capture Tai’an, Dawenkou, Zhangdian, Zhoucun, Dezhou, and Zaozhuang within the next few days—the sooner the better.” 2.  See ftn. 2 in “It Will be Advantageous to the Shandong Military Region to First Annihilate the Armies of Wu Huawen et al.,” May 30, 1946, in this volume. 3.  Dawenkou is a township located in the southern part of Tai’an, Shandong Province. Zhangdian and Zhoucun are townships under today’s Zibo city in Shandong Province. 4.  Huo Shouyi was commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth Army. 5.  Feng Zhi’an was deputy director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office and commander of its Third Pacification Zone. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-165

305

We Agree to Adopt an Overall Policy of Mobile Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare in the Northeast1 (June 3, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao], and for the information of Li [Fuchun] and Huang [Kecheng]:2 We agree that you should prepare to abandon Harbin, adopt a policy of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare, carry out the Central Committee’s work instructions for the Northeast of December of last year,3 make long-term plans, and strive to build base areas in small and medium cities and in the vast countryside. As for scattered and isolated enemy strongholds, you should attack and seize them when conditions allow. For now, the troops should try to rest and reorganize, recuperate from exhaustion, and raise morale. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 250–51, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  After the Guomindang army invaded and occupied Siping, it also successively occupied Gongzhuling, Changchun, Jilin [city], and other cities and towns, and an assault was planned on Harbin. In late May and early June 1946, the Northern Bureau, Lin Biao, and Huang Kecheng proposed abandoning Harbin to consolidate the main forces. Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in response to the former telegram. On June 5, Mao Zedong drafted another telegram on behalf of the Central Committee to Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, and Luo Ronghuan, changing the above deployment in hopes of holding on to the region north of the Songhua River, especially Harbin, as well as Anshan and Yingkou. 2.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Huang Kecheng was commander and Li Fuchun was political commissar, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. 3.  See “Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Work in the Northeast,” December 28, 1945, in this volume. 306

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-166

Battle Deployments for Datong, Kouquan, Shuo County, Ningwu, and Other Places1 (June 4, 1946) To He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]; and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:2 1. We received your telegram of June 1.3 In the Datong and Kouquan4 areas, the enemy has consolidated its defenses; the Japanese armies are also there, and Fu Zuoyi5 will possibly be involved as well. Because of this, for the time being you should only undertake preparatory work, strengthen intelligencegathering and the work of agents in Guomindang units, and prepare TNT, but do not take [offensive] actions. 2. In Shuo county and Ningwu the enemy forces are relatively small and will not involve Fu Zuoyi, so there you can first attack and seize one place (either Shuo county or Ningwu), and after that is in hand, look at the situation and consider whether to fight for a second place. 3. At the time of fighting, you must be sure to make ample preparations and quickly prevail. Also, you must grasp the rationale and gather facts regarding Yan [Xishan]’s6 attack against us as ample grounding for our side’s argument. 4. Do not transfer troops from the northern front to take Fu Zuoyi.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 253–54, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  He Long was commander of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region, and Li Jingquan was political commissar. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. 3.  The telegram from He Long and Li Jingquan reported on the enemy presence in the Yanbei region as well as their own troop deployment for capturing Datong, Ningwu, Shanyin, and Huairen. 4.  Kouquan is a township southwest of Datong city in Shanxi Province. 5.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 6.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Second War Zone of the Guomindang army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-167

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308 Mao’s Road to Power

5. After the wheat harvest, you should mobilize a portion of the people’s militia to supplement our main forces. You should reinforce every company to bring them up to a strength of 120 men and prepare to shatter Fu Zuoyi’s attack. This is extremely important. The Military Commission

Increase Troop Strength, Completely Control the Lüliang Region (June 4, 1946) To Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]:1 According to He and Li’s telegram, troop strength in Lüliang is weak. When passing through Lüliang, Chen Geng stated that troops could be moved from Taiyue to strengthen Lüliang. Responsibility for investigating whether Lüliang can serve as a connecting hub for Taiyue and Shan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia], and whether there is a need to increase troop strength and to control this area completely has been delegated to Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi]. We expect you to inform us by telegram about deployments for your overall plan. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 252, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Geng was commander and Xie Fuzhi (1909–1972, born in Hong’an county, Hubei) was political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. He Long and Li Jingquan were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the ShanxiSuiyuan Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-168

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Prepare All Conditions for Using Mobile Warfare to Destroy the Enemy Forces Attacking Chengde (June 5, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To Nie [Rongzhen], Liu [Lantao], Tang [Yanjie], and Zeng [Yongquan], and for the information of Cheng [Zihua] and Xiao [Ke]:1 We received your telegram of 4:00 P.M. on the 3rd.2 The Guomindang is currently preparing to attack Chengde, and we should concentrate our efforts on preparing conditions so that when the enemy launches an offensive against us, we can destroy a large number of the enemy in mobile warfare and shatter its schemes for attack. Because of this: 1. Do not attack the [Bei]ping-Gu[beikou] railway and do not attack Nankou or Badaling to avoid provoking the enemy and exhausting ourselves. 2. It is up to you to coordinate military procedures in the Jin-Cha-Ji and HebeiRehe-Liaoning regions to defeat the enemy’s attack under unified command. 3. Intensify the drilling of the troops, conserve your energy, and build up strength. 4. Call up a section of the people’s militia to supplement the main forces. Every company should be brought up to full strength of 120 men. 5. Step up mass work (resolving the land question) and bandit suppression work and consolidate the base areas.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 255–56, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Liu Lantao was the deputy political commissar, Tang Yanjie was chief-ofstaff, and Zeng Yongquan (1902–1996, native of Sichuan) was deputy chief-of-staff of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Cheng Zihua was political commissar and Xiao Ke was commander, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 2.  This refers to the telegram that Nie Rongzhen and Liu Lantao forwarded from Guo Tianmin (1905–1970, born in Huang county, Hubei), commander, and Li Tianhuan (1921– 1986, native of Hubei), deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Hebei-Chahar Military Region, regarding attacking the enemy at Badaling and Nankou rather than at Sanxia, Miyun, or Huairou. 310

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-169

June 1946 311

6. Prepare a large quantity of TNT and carry out drills on its use so that after you shatter the enemy’s attack, you can capture the enemy’s fortifications or recover those strongholds that were previously lost. The Military Commission

During the Ceasefire Period, the Northwest Troops [of the Democratic Allied Army] Should Rest and Reorganize, Replenish Their Ranks, and Be on Guard against Enemy Raids (June 6, 1946, noon) To the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao], and for the information of Xiao [Hua] and Zeng [Kelin], Li [Fuchun] and Huang [Kecheng], Chen [Yun] and Gao [Gang]:1 According to Zhou [Enlai]’s telegram of the 5th, the fifteen-day ceasefire agreement2 will begin on the 7th and will be carried out until the 21st. During these fifteen days, our Party’s delegation will engage in talks with the Guomindang in Nanjing. All troops in the Northeast Democratic Allied Army should take advantage of this fifteen-day period to rest and replenish their ranks, raise morale, and prepare to fight again. If the Guomindang abides by the agreement and ceases its attacks during these fifteen days, we will also abide by the agreement and cease military hostilities, but we must guard against enemy raids and not relax our vigilance. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 257–58, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and Zeng Kelin (1913–2007, native of Jiangxi) was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Xiao Hua was commander and political commissar of the Southern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Li Fuchun was political commissar and Huang Kecheng was commander, respectively, of the Western Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. Chen Yun was political commissar and Gao Gang was commander, respectively, of the Northern Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Declaration of a fifteen-day ceasefire in the Northeast for negotiations was suggested by George Marshall, U.S. special envoy to China, negotiated by the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, and promulgated on June 6, 1946. 312

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-170

Rest, Reorganize, Conserve Strength, and Prepare to Shatter the Enemy’s Attack (June 6, 1946) To Xiao [Ke] and Cheng [Zihua], and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao]:1 1. The New First Army and the New Sixth Army on the Changchun-Jilin line cannot advance toward Rehe.2 There is no change in the enemy facing you; the Thirteenth Army is in its original position, one section of the Ninety-third Army is guarding the Jinzhou–Shanhai Pass railway, and one section is positioned west of this line as far as the Jianchang region and it is attempting to wipe out Zhan [Caifang]’s3 column and our local troops. Unless new troops are transported by sea from the south, the enemy will be unable to send reinforcements to Rehe. 2. You are, however, quite right in preparing to defend Chengde; we must prepare for all conditions to shatter a possible, indeed inevitable, attack. But until the situation has been clarified, you should not transfer too many troops; for the present, the main thing is to rest, reorganize, and conserve your strength. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 259–60, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Xiao Ke was commander and Cheng Zihua was political commissar, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-ChaharHebei Military Region. 2.  Rehe Province covered what is now northeastern Hebei Province, southwestern Liaoning Province, and southeastern Inner Mongolia until it was abolished in 1955. 3.  Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-171

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First Take Shuo County and Ningwu, Then Take Shanyang and Daiyue; Make Sure Not to Disturb Fu Zuoyi1 (June 9, 1946, 9:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M.) To He [Long] and Li [Jingquan], and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao]:2 1. You can capture the two points of Shuo county and Ningwu either simultaneously or one after the other. After you have those in hand, also consider capturing the two points of Shanyin and Daiyue.3 2. Do not disturb the three points of Datong, Kouquan,4 and Huairen. 3. Do not move the main forces on the northern front and do not disturb Fu Zuoyi.5 The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 261–62, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  He Long and Li Jingquan were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-ChaharHebei Military Region. 3.  Shanyin refers to a city in southern Shanyin county, Shanxi Province. Daiyue is the county seat of Shanyin county. 4.  Kouquan is a town located southwest of Datong city, Shanxi Province. 5.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 314

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-172

Authoritative Person in Yan’an Declares Opposition to the Byrnes Bill to Assist Chiang Kaishek (June 16, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency, Yan’an, June 16) Ignoring appeals from the Chinese people and all the democratic parties to stop nurturing the Chinese Civil War, certain American authorities are determined to continue providing military support to the initiator of the Chinese Civil War—the Chiang Kaishek government. According to a June 14 telegram from an American news bureau in Washington, “Today (the 14th) U.S. Secretary of State, [James S.] Byrnes [1882–1972] submitted a bill to the Senate, requesting approval of assistance to China in the form of military training and technology. In a related letter, Byrnes pointed out that it is extremely important that military assistance to China continue unabated. Byrnes stated that China had requested that the United States send to China a military diplomatic mission, like the American military delegations to Latin America. This bill authorizing implementation of military aid to China was drawn up jointly by the Army, the Navy, and the State Department. [Byrnes said] he firmly believes that [U.S.] national interests (including the country’s interest in rebuilding and maintaining peace and security in Asia) require that America assist China in organizing and maintaining a certain number of modern military forces, so that China can contribute to peace and security in that region.” People here think that at a time when representatives of the Chinese Communist Party in Nanjing are negotiating through [George] Marshall with the Guomindang government to try to achieve a comprehensive and permanent peace in China and the Guomindang is openly calling for an all-out and protracted civil war, the U.S. government’s proposal for a bill that encourages civil war in China is indeed an unfriendly expression toward the Chinese people’s wish for peace. The facts are absolutely the opposite of what Mr. Byrnes has asserted. If this bill is passed, China will sink into a serious lack of peace and security, and the interests of the American people and America’s national reputation will suffer great damage. As Chinese public opinion and public opinion around the world have repeatedly made clear, 1

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 10, pp. 43–44, which reproduces a June 17, 1946, Jiefang ribao article. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-173

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the huge military assistance of the United States to the warlike dictatorial government of China’s Guomindang is the one fundamental condition underlying the occurrence and expansion of the civil war in China today and of the difficulties in ending it. The Chinese people cannot understand what right the U.S. government has to impose civil war and dictatorship upon China, or to demand that, like Latin America, China should fall within the American sphere of influence or be part of the scope of U.S. “national interests.” Nor can the Chinese people understand what right the American government has to violate President Truman’s declaration last December that America “will not influence the course of any Chinese internal struggle through military interference” or the principles of the “communiqué of the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers” last December. An authoritative source in Yan’an said that peace and democracy in China are the sacred rights of the Chinese people and no one can interfere with them or take them away. If the Chinese reactionaries, relying on foreign assistance, persist in civil war and dictatorship, openly and directly change the present Guomindang government with a Qin Hui, Zhang Bangchang, or Liu Yu1 government, and turn the present chairman of the Guomindang government into a puppet emperor who submits to foreign nations, then it is certain that the Chinese people will resist to the very last drop of blood.

1.  Qin Hui (1091–1155, native of present-day Jiangsu), Zhang Bangchang (1081– 1127, native of present-day Yunnan), and Liu Yu (1073–1146, native of present-day Hebei) were Song dynasty figures who were regarded as traitors.

Telegram to Zheng Weisan, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen1 (June 19, 1946) 1. Zhou Enlai’s telegram from Nanjing stated that Chiang [Kaishek] has decided to fight in a big way; for your part, you must be ever on the alert as to the enemy’s situation and prepare to break out of the encirclement. 2. After breaking out of the encirclement, there are two possible outcomes: The first is being able to achieve the objective of going northward, and the second is being blocked by the enemy and being unable to achieve the objective of going northward. 3. You therefore need to prepare for two eventualities: The first is to try by all available means to go north, and the second, if it is not possible to go north, is to prepare to create base areas in the Guomindang regions and wait for a change in the overall situation.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 281. 1.  Zheng Weisan was political commissar, Li Xiannian was commander, and Wang Zhen was deputy commander and chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-174

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Military Dispositions for Dealing with a Major Assault by Chiang Kaishek (June 19, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], and Bo [Yibo]; He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]; Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao]; and for the information of Chen [Yi] and Shu [Tong]:1 1. Observations of the current situation indicate it is almost inevitable that Chiang Kaishek will launch a major assault. Within about six months after the war starts, peace negotiations will be certain if we score a great victory; they will still be possible if the outcome of the war is in the balance, but they will not take place if Chiang’s army is victorious. Thus, our army must overcome an assault by Chiang’s army to secure a peaceful future. 2. After the war starts, our main forces in Shanxi, Chahar, Hebei, Rehe,2 and Liaoning must deal with Chiang’s main forces in Rehe, Beiping, and Tianjin. Send one unit to support He [Long] and Li [Jingquan] to deal with Fu Zuoyi3 and to take the northern [Da]tong-Pu[zhou] railway, and another to support Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], and Bo [Yibo] to take the Zheng[ding]Tai[yuan] railway. 3. Our main forces in Shanxi and Suiyuan under the unified command of He [Long] and Li [Jingquan], together with one unit under Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao], will prepare to smash the attack by Fu Zuoyi and take the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 277–78, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Liu Bocheng was commander, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, and Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, respectively, of the ShanxiHebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. He Long was commander and Li Jingquan was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, with Shu Tong as director of the Political Department. 2.  Rehe Province covered what is now northeastern Hebei, southwestern Liaoning, and eastern Inner Mongolia before it was abolished in 1955. 3.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 318

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-175

June 1946 319

4.

5.

6. 7.

northern section of the [Da]tong-Pu[zhou] railway. Another unit [of Nie and Liu] will support Liu, Deng, and Bo to take southwestern Shanxi and the southern section of the [Da]tong-Pu[zhou] railway. Our main forces in Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan must deal with Chiang’s main forces in Henan. The rest of our army will be used to take the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway and the southern section of the [Da]tongPu[zhou] railway as well as southwestern Shanxi. Last, they should cooperate with northwestern and northeastern Shanxi to take Taiyuan. Appoint Chen Geng4 commander and Bo Yibo political commissar. They will establish a command headquarters and provide unified leadership for all Party, political, military, and popular forces in the area of Taihang (excluding southern Taihang), Taiyue, southwestern Shanxi (Lüliang region), and the two subdistricts of northeastern Shanxi near the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway. Their task is to take the southern [Da]tong-Pu[zhou] railway, all southwestern Shanxi, the Dong[guan]-Qin [county] section of the Bai[gui]Jin[cheng] railway,5 and the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway between Taiyuan and Niangziguan. Someone else will replace or act for Chen Geng as column commander. Please inform us of your opinions regarding the above dispositions. Our launch of major battles must come after Chiang’s assault to show that he started the provocation. The Central Committee

4.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 5.  The Baigui-Jincheng railway in central Shanxi Province had not yet been completed at the time.

Prepare to Capture Ningwu and Other Cities (June 20, 1946) To He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]:1 1. We are pleased to hear of your seizure of Shuo county and Xuangangzhen.2 2. We hope you will make ample preparations before attacking and seizing Ningwu, and then capture it in one stroke. 3. Wait until after occupying Ningwu, and then consider attacking and seizing Guo county,3 Dai county, Fanzhi, Shanyin, Daiyue,4 and other places one by one. 4. Fighting for these cities will temper and toughen a contingent of troops that is skilled in attacking cities. 5. Do not alarm or move against Fu Zuoyi5 or Datong, Kouquan,6 or Huairen. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 279–80, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong wrote this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. He Long was commander and Li Jingquan was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region. 2.  Xuangang township is in northwestern Yuanping county in Shanxi Province. 3.  Guo county was abolished in 1958, with part of it incorporated into Ningwu county and the other part merged with Dai county to form Shanxi’s Yuanping county. 4. Shanyin city is in southern Shanyin county. Daiyue township is under the jurisdiction of Shanyin county in Shanxi. 5.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 6.  Kouquan township is located southwest of Datong city, Shanxi Province. 320

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-176

The Question of Whether Chengde Should Be Defended or Abandoned Should Be Considered (June 21, 1946) To Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao], and to Cheng [Zihua] and Xiao [Ke]:1 If the enemy concentrates three divisions at Pingquan and advances westward and we are unable to destroy its main forces in the field, then there is a possibility that Chengde will be taken. If this situation materializes in the future, then we should consider the question of whether to defend Chengde or to take the initiative in abandoning it. If it is certain that we can destroy the enemy’s main forces and fundamentally shatter its offensive, then we should defend Chengde; if success is not assured, then we should prepare to abandon Chengde. The first reason for this is to conserve the strength of Yang [Dezhi] and Su [Zhenhua]’s2 column and other troops and not expend their strength and to hold on to the vast area of Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning until resolution of the land question, when our military strength will increase, as at that time it may be possible to recover the Jin[zhou]Chengde railway and Chengde. The second reason is to draw Zhao [Erlu]’s3 column back toward Shanxi-Hebei and to coordinate with the forces in Taihang and central Hebei to fight for Baofu and Shimen4 and the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 281–82, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Cheng Zihua was political commissar and Xiao Ke was commander, respectively, of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. On June 25, 1946, Mao Zedong drafted another telegram on behalf of the Central Committee stating that if the talks were to collapse, the Guomindang was sure to attack Chengde: “If the diehards are able to gather a superior force and we are unable to stop them, we must be prepared to retreat from Chengde and avoid haste when facing this matter lest we lose resources.” 2.  Yang Dezhi was commander and Su Zhenhua was political commissar, respectively, of the First Column of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. 3.  Zhao Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi Column of the Shanxi-ChaharHebei Military Region. 4.  Baofu is the abbreviated term for Baoding prefecture, which is the city of Baoding in Hebei. Shimen is the city of Shijiazhuang. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-177

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railway. In considering which is the appropriate [course of action], please take into consideration the relative strength of the enemy and of ourselves and inform us by telegram. When considering these matters, do not inform the lower levels. Additionally, in the case that Chengde cannot be defended, please state how this will increase the difficulty of our situation. The Central Committee

Statement Opposing the U.S. Bill to Provide Military Assistance to Chiang Kaishek1 (June 22, 1946) The bill for continued military assistance to China put forward on the 14th of this month by the U.S. Department of State for deliberation by Congress has an extremely negative impact on peace, security, independence, and democracy in China. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party firmly opposes this bill. Furthermore, this view of the Chinese Communist Party enjoys the support of a large number of democratic personages in China. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the United States extended military assistance to China and sent American soldiers to fight together with us on Chinese soil for the purpose of defeating the common enemy of China and America—Japanese imperialism. At that time, however, because the United States made the mistake of only assisting the Guomindang warlords, this assistance did not, in fact, effectively strengthen China’s resistance. On the contrary, it was used by the Guomindang warlords, who were actively resisting Japan, to strengthen their attacks and blockades against the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Liberated Areas. After Japan surrendered, the United States did not halt its various types of military assistance to the Chinese Guomindang government; rather, it increased it greatly, and for this purpose in fact it sent a huge military force and stationed it on Chinese soil and in Chinese waters. These actions have been proven to be the fundamental reason for the outbreak of the large-scale civil war in China and for its continued expansion. It is only when the U.S. government announced that it would carry out the articles on the China question in the communiqué of the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers in December 1945, and when the Chinese Guomindang declared a cessation of the civil war and announced that it would carry out the

This statement first appeared in Jiefang ribao on June 23, 1946. We have translated it from Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 123–24, which reproduces the text. 1.  Mao Zedong delivered this declaration as the chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. On the same day (June 22, 1946), Mao drafted a telegram on behalf of the Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, who was in Nanjing for negotiations. The telegram states, “Today, as chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, I issued a statement protesting the American bill to provide China with military aid. After receiving this, immediately formally present this letter to Marshall and request that he pass it on to the American government.” DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-178

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resolution on national democratization taken at the Chinese Political Consultative Conference that the Chinese Communist Party did not oppose the U.S. extension of certain kinds of military assistance to China. But now these prerequisites have all been seriously compromised, as a result of which the so-called military assistance provided by the United States is in fact nothing short of armed interference in China’s internal affairs; nothing short of forcibly supporting the Guomindang’s totalitarian government as it continues to plunge China into civil war, fragmentation, chaos, terror, and poverty; nothing short of making it impossible for China to achieve a reorganization and demobilization of its armed forces and to fulfill its obligations to the United Nations; nothing short of endangering China’s national security, independence, and territorial sovereignty; and this will only sabotage the glorious friendship between the two great nations of China and the United States and the prospects for the development of trade between these two countries. What the Chinese people urgently need today is not American guns and artillery or for American troops to be stationed on Chinese soil; on the contrary, the Chinese people feel strongly that the United States has already shipped too many armaments to China, that there are already too many American troops stationed in China, and that they have already become a grave and enormous threat to China’s peace and stability and to the survival and freedom of the Chinese people. Under such actual circumstances, the Chinese Communist Party cannot but firmly oppose the American government’s continued supply of arms to China’s autocratic Guomindang government by means of sales, loans, gifts, or transfers; firmly oppose the sending of military advisory delegations from the United States to China; resolutely demand that the United States immediately halt and take back all so-called military assistance to China, and immediately withdraw the American troops stationed in China.

Strategic Plans for the Taihang and Shandong Regions after the Overall Situation Has Fallen Apart (June 22, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng Xiaoping, and Bo Yibo, and to Chen [Yi] and Shu [Tong]:1 Since the overall situation has fallen apart, please consider the following plans: 1. Regarding the Taihang region, with eastern Henan as the main direction of battle, concentrate the main forces and make every possible effort to capture Changyuan, Kaocheng,2 Minquan, Lanfeng, Fengqiu, Ninglong, Zhi county, Qi county, Chenliu,3 Tongxu, Taikang, Tuocheng, Huaiyang, Shangqiu, Luyi, and Xihua. The main emphasis is to wipe out the enemy army’s effective strength in field combat and watch for an opportunity to occupy Kaifeng. 2. Regarding the Shandong region, with the Xuzhou area as the main direction of battle, concentrate the main forces in Shandong to coordinate with the northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui regions to capture Huangkou,4 Dangshan, Yucheng, Woyang, Jiagou, Fuli,5 Su county, Renqiao,6 and Guzhen (that is, between Xuzhou and Bengbu). The main emphasis is on engaging the enemy forces in Xuzhou in field combat and annihilating them, and to watch for an opportunity to occupy Xuzhou.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 283–85, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Liu Bocheng was commander, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, and Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region, with Shu Tong as director of its Political Department. 2.  Kaocheng county was merged with Lanfeng county in 1954 to form Lankao county in Henan Province. 3.  Chenliu county was merged into Henan’s Kaifeng county in 1957. 4.  Huangkou township is located northwest of Xiao county, Anhui Province. 5.  Jiagou is a village located in northwestern Su county, Anhui Province. Fuli township is in western Su county. 6.  Renqiao is a village located in northwestern Guzhen county, Anhui Province. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-179

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3. Regarding the Taihang region, apart from the forces in Shanxi dealing with Yan [Xishan],7 one portion of the remainder should keep an eye on the enemy in northern Henan and the largest main force should mobilize in the eastern Henan region. 4. Regarding Shandong, [the forces in] eastern Shandong should deal with [the enemy in] Qing[dao] and Wei[fang], and Bohai should deal with Ji’nan. The remainder of the main forces in the central Shandong and southern Shandong regions and along the coast and the main forces of the New Fourth Army should all move southward. 5. It would be advantageous to occupy even only the major railway lines between Kaifeng and Xuzhou and between Xuzhou and Bengbu, and approximately half of the county towns mentioned above. Some of the county towns may be left for the local forces to capture one by one, and there is no need for our main forces to wage battle in each town. 6. During the period of fighting mentioned above, pay ample attention to winning over to our side the miscellaneous and puppet troops. 7. In the combat plans outlined above, the main force of our Fifth Division is to break out of the enemy’s encirclement and move toward Henan, the task being to pin down the enemy in Henan and coordinate with you in combat. 8. Su [Yu]’s and Tan [Zhenlin]’s8 main forces will deal with the enemy north of the [Yangzi] River and coordinate with you in combat. 9. After victory in the battles mentioned above (not necessarily having captured Kaifeng and Xuzhou), if the situation is favorable, consider having the main forces in the Taihang and Shandong regions cross the Huai River and advance toward the Dabie Mountains–Anqing–Pukou line. 10. The gist of this plan is to stress moving southward, which is the opposite of Chiang Kaishek’s emphasis on moving northward; it could leave a large portion of Chiang’s troops in the north and place them in a passive position. 11. This plan will ensure that the Fifth Division does not get wiped out or suffer significant losses. 12. This plan relies on the old base areas, involves moving southward step-bystep in a steady manner, and it is not risky. 13. If we can gradually cross the Huai River and move southward, we will be able to acquire manpower and material resources from the Guomindang areas so that our old base areas will not suffer damage. 14. Chiang has now extended the truce until the 30th of this month and he will start fighting in a big way at the beginning of July. We must quickly set our overall strategic policy to facilitate battle. 15. We look forward to hearing your opinions. The Central Committee

7.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army. 8.  Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army.

The Northeast Should Prepare to Shatter Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive When the Negotiations Fall Apart1 (June 22, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau, to be transmitted to all local bureaus, all provincial committees, and all columns: To complete preparations for an attack, Chiang Kaishek is extending the ceasefire2 by eight days to the 30th, and if our Party cannot accept his harsh terms (for example, giving [us] only old Heilongjiang3 and nothing else in the Northeast), then at the beginning of July he will launch an offensive against the Northeast and the entire country. You should prepare right now for the time when the negotiations break down, mobilize the whole Party and the whole army to overcome any wavering or feelings of hesitation or fear, make use of our side’s various advantages, and closely rely upon the masses in establishing base areas to shatter the Guomindang’s offensive. After our Party has won a major victory, it will definitely be possible to establish domestic peace. In this great struggle, our Liberated Areas in North China and Central China and all democratic forces nationwide will take actions to come to your aid. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 286–87, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party each issued a declaration on June 6, 1946, stating that a fifteen-day ceasefire in the Northeast would begin on June 7 at 12:00 and that the two parties would commence negotiations. On the 21st, Chiang Kaishek announced that the ceasefire would be extended to June 30. 3.  This refers to Heilongjiang as constituted before the Guomindang government broke it up during the administrative reorganization that took place after the Japanese surrender, not the smaller entity then called Heilongjiang. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-180

327

Give Proper Treatment to Guomindang and American Personnel on the Military Mediation Operational Teams1 (June 22, 1946) To all bureaus, and for transmission to all relevant organizations and all relevant military units: A telegram of June 20th from the Beiping Office for Military Mediation reads as follows: “With regard to the matter of guaranteeing the safety of the operational teams that come to our areas and the attitude taken toward them, much has gone wrong recently. For example, there have been many instances of deliberately making things difficult, investigating and detaining them, and being rude to them. In particular, careless shootings have resulted in an American team member being injured in Beipiao, the Guomindang team member Lei Fenqiang [?–1946] being killed in Yancheng, and today, according to reports, the death of one Guomindang team member and the wounding of another when the Xinxiang team was fired upon in the Xiuwu area. Many such incidents arise out of misunderstandings, but many others stem from simple feelings of hatred at the lower levels toward the Guomindang and the United States. If this is not corrected, even though our side is not completely without any grounds (especially since there have been quite a few cases in which our team members have been detained, humiliated, or harmed), it is a situation that is ultimately unjustifiable politically and it erodes sympathy. The central bureaus are requested to issue directives to all strategic areas to the effect that they must conscientiously restrain their subordinates and work on educating them so that the kinds of incidents mentioned above do not recur. Regarding the unfairness of the Guomindang side and the Americans in the mediation process, our side must always adopt a serious and principled attitude, but as far as our relations and interactions with the teams are concerned, we must always take pains

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 130–31, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this notice on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. On the same day, Mao drafted a telegram on behalf of the Central Committee to Ye Jianying, Luo Ruiqing, and Zhou Enlai stating: “The order has been circulated to strategic units to begin education regarding treating the Nationalists and Americans politely, and especially to prevent anything that causes harm.” 328

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to maintain appropriate manners and cordial friendliness to put our diplomatic struggles in an even more justifiable, reasonable position. Whether or not this is appropriate, the Central Committee is requested to decide and act accordingly. And so on.” The above is very reasonable, and all bureaus are expected to issue instructions to all relevant organs and military units to undertake widespread education measures and from now on to treat Guomindang and American personnel with courtesy, and especially to avoid further harmful incidents. This matter is of utmost importance. The Central Committee

We Agree That the Forces from the Central Plains Military Region Should Break Out Immediately1 (June 23, 1946) To the Central Plains Bureau: 1. We received your telegram of June 21.2 You are quite right, and we agree that you should start the breakout immediately, the sooner the better. Do not have any misgivings whatsoever; survival first, victory first. 2. From now on you are to make your own decisions regarding every operation. Do not ask for permission, avoid delay that may lead to missed opportunities, and keep everything secret. 3. We hope you will unite in struggle and we wish you success. The Central Committee

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 288–89, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The telegram stated that the Guomindang had encircled the region and the blockade was increasingly strong, creating a situation that required breaking through the encirclement. A number of strategies were presented, but in any case, “We believe that even though it will be very difficult to break through the encirclement and we will likely suffer losses in the process, it will be much more difficult if we do not take the initiative to break the encirclement now.” 330

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First Attack Places Such as Huairen, Then Watch for a Chance to Capture Datong (June 23, 1946) To He [Long], Li [Jingquan], Nie [Rongzhen], and Tang [Yanjie]:1 1. You must soon attack and capture Huairen, Daiyue,2 Shanyin, Ningwu, Ying county, Fanzhi, Dai county, Guo county, Yuanping, Xin county, Wutai, and Dingxiang,3 and then watch for a chance to capture Datong. 2. To carry out this task, we agree with He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]’s second plan, which is to transfer one of the four brigades from the main force in eastern Sui[yuan] for the above purpose. During the transfer, stay under cover, hiding your location and direction. 3. Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao]4 should immediately send one brigade with artillery from the main force to carry out the above task under the command of He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]. At the same time, order the local Party, government, and army east of the Tongpu railway to coordinate with the operation and to immediately send people to carry out the orders of He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]. 4. To accomplish this task, we hope that He [Long] and Li [Jingquan] will make direct contact with Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao]. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 290–91, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. He Long was commander and Li Jingquan was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region; Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Tang Yanjie was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. 2.  Daiyue township is now under the jurisdiction of Shanyin county, Shanxi Province. 3.  Dingxiang county was abolished in 1958; one part was incorporated into Shanxi’s Ningwu county and the other part was merged with Dai county to form Shanxi’s Yuanping county. 4.  Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-183

331

Reply to the Telegram from the American Sailors’ Union 1

(June 24, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, June 25) The 3,000 Overseas Chinese members of the American Sailors’ Union yesterday sent a telegram to Mme. Song Qingling [1893–1981, born in Shanghai] for transmission to the chairman of the Guomindang government, Chiang Kaishek, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and the chairman of the Democratic League, Zhang Lan, appealing for an end to the civil war, elimination of one-party dictatorship, and realization of peace and democracy. The text of the original telegram is as follows: [the text of the telegram is omitted]. (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, June 25) The Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, sent a telegram in reply to Mr. Kuang Saichao and the 3,000 Overseas Chinese worker-friends in the American Sailors’ Union. The text of the original telegram follows: To Mr. Kuang Saichao [Kwong Sai Chew] and the three thousand Overseas Chinese worker-friends in the American Sailors’ Union: I have received your telegram and have learned that you have appealed to stop the civil war at once, eliminate one-party dictatorship, and establish a democratic coalition government, and that you also expressed your anger over the fighting of a civil war with the help of foreign forces. I am very glad to know of your great concern about the future of our native land and of your love for peace and democracy. I sincerely hope that you will continue to make persistent efforts to awaken all Overseas Chinese throughout America and all the toilers and people from all walks of life and demand that the American authorities immediately halt all assistance to the autocratic Guomindang government, recall the American army, naval, and air forces stationed in China, and withdraw the bill calling for continued military assistance to China that has been presented before the U.S. Congress, so that peace and democracy in China will be realized as soon as possible and the traditional friendship between China and America will be maintained. Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 101–2, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, June 26, 1946. 332

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-184

Break out of the Encirclement by Separate Routes and Protect the Security of the Military Mediation Teams (June 25, 1946) To Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], and Wang [Zhen]:1 We have respectfully taken note of your telegram.2 1. Skillfully avoid the enemy’s attack and break out of the encirclement by separate routes. 2. If you encounter seriously disadvantageous situations, advance separately in brigade formations. 3. Leave behind a troop strength of at least ten thousand men and hold firm to the originally held areas. 4. It is necessary to protect the security of Team Thirty-two.3 Either leave them where they are now and allow our local forces to properly escort them back to Wuhan, or take them to the vicinity of the railway and let them return to Wuhan, or take them with you (prohibiting their use of radio equipment). It is up to you to decide on these alternatives. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 297–98, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zheng Weisan was political commissar, Li Xiannian was commander, and Wang Zhen was deputy commander and chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. 2.  The telegram from the Central China Bureau relayed its decision to break out of the encirclement on June 28 and asked for guidance. 3.  Team Thirty-two was the group sent to the Central Plains Military Region by the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-185

333

Telegram of Appreciation and Solicitude to Ma Xulun and Others (June 25, 1946) To Comrade Zhou Enlai in Nanjing, with the request that he transmit it to the gentlemen who are petitioning delegates representing various Shanghai people’s organizations, Messrs. Ma Xulun, Kui Yanfang, Zhang Jiongbo, Bao Dasan, Sheng Pihua, Wu Yaozong, Yan Baohang, Lei Jieqiong, Chen Zhenzhong, and Chen Lifu1 for their perusal: As representatives of the people of Shanghai, you gentlemen are busy with the cause of peace, yet you had the misfortune of being besieged and beaten by fascist thugs.2 Thus it is plain to see that the bellicose elements do not hesitate to

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 136–37, where it has been reproduced from Jiefang ribao, July 6, 1946. 1.  Ma Xulun (1885–1970, born in Hang county [today’s Yuhang]), Zhejiang) was a teacher and a revolutionary activist during the 1910s and 1920s. After serving briefly in the Nanjing government, he returned to teaching, and as Japanese aggression against China intensified, he became increasingly outspoken against the government’s lack of resistance. At this time, he was general director of the China Association for Promoting Democracy, which he helped found in late 1945, and head of the Shanghai People’s Association to Petition for Peace, a conglomeration of more than fifty organizations that sent a group of delegates to Nanjing on June 23 to demand an end to the civil war. Kui Yanfang (1883–1957, native of Zhejiang) was general manager of a commercial firm and chairman of the board of a bank. Zhang Jiongbo (1985–1969, native of Zhejiang) was an industrialist. Bao Dasan (1884–1957, native of Zhejiang) and Sheng Pihua (1883–1961, native of Zhejiang) were managers of several commercial firms. Wu Yaozong (1893– 1979, native of Guangdong) was an officer in the Chinese YMCA and was involved in the publishing business. Yan Baohang (1895–1968, native of Liaoning) was involved in various economic-affairs organizations in the Northeast. Lei Jieqiong (1905–2011, native of Guangdong) was a professor at Soochow University and a director of the China Association for Promoting Democracy. Chen Zhenzhong (1926–?, native of Zhejiang) was a student at St. John’s University and chairman of a student association in Shanghai. Chen Lifu (1924–1994, native of Jiangsu) was a student at Soochow University and head of a student organization there. 2.  When the delegates from Shanghai arrived at the Nanjing train station on the evening of June 23, they were attacked by Guomindang agents. As a result, Ma Xulun and three other delegates, along with several newspaper reporters, sustained injuries.

334

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alienate themselves from the people. The Chinese Communist Party has always maintained the principles of peace and democracy, vowing to fight hard together with the people of the whole nation to prevent civil war and attain peace. This telegram brings our sympathy and solicitude, and we trust you will take very good care of yourselves. Mao Zedong Zhu De

All of the Guomindang’s Initiatives Are to Fight; for the Time Being, There Is No Hope for Peace (June 25, 1946) To Lin [Biao]:1 We respectfully received your telegram of the 24th.2 1. All the Guomindang’s initiatives are to fight, and for the time being there is no hope for peace. 2. When the negotiations break down, the fighting will be nationwide and not limited to the Northeast. 3. In everything, we must completely rely on our own efforts. 4. If we win a victory within six months to a year, there is hope for peace. 5. In the future, a friendly nation3 may offer assistance on the diplomatic front. 6. In the Nanjing negotiations, our Party must make the ultimate effort and the greatest concessions to seek a compromise, but you must not harbor any illusions. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 134–35, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram from the Northeast Bureau stated that it would be better to fight to retain the cities of Baichengzi, Harbin, Jiamusi, Mudanjiang, and Andong rather than to hand them over to the Guomindang forces. It advocated the launch of major offensives in North and Central China to force the Guomindang to accept an armistice. 3.  I.e., the Soviet Union. 336

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-187

Basic Tasks for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region Following the Guomindang’s Major Assault (June 28, 1946) To Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], Liu [Lantao], Luo [Ruiqing], and for the information of [Cheng] Zihua:1 We received your telegram of the 26th.2 1. Your opinions on strategy are correct. 2. Following the Guomindang’s major assault, your basic tasks are to defend the local areas and to seize the three railway lines and the four cities.3 3. The four independent brigades in Rehe [Military Region], the two brigades in eastern and central Hebei, the two regiments in Shangdu, and other local forces should all be used to protect local areas. In a war of local defense, the temporary loss or gain of a city or area is not at all unusual as a last resort. 4. When the enemy attacks Chengde, your main forces are not to defend Chengde (as this would be a fruitless effort) but rather to take advantage of the enemy’s northward move to amass the four columns of Yang [Dezhi],

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 305–7, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar, Xiao Ke was deputy commander, Liu Lantao was deputy political commissar, and Luo Ruiqing was deputy political commissar and director of the Political Department, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Cheng Zihua was commander and political commissar of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 2.  The telegram from Nie, Xiao, Liu, and Luo agreed with the Center’s strategic orientation to take control of the Shanxi plateau, combine the Shanxi-Suiyuan, Shanxi-Northwest, and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Regions, and liberate a large military force for mobile warfare against the enemy. This would require a policy of “defense in the east and offense in the west.” 3.  The three railway lines were the section of the Beiping-Hankou line from Bei­ping to Shimen (now Shijiazhuang), the Zhengding-Taiyuan (now the Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan) line, and the Datong-Puzhou line. The four cities were Baoding, Shimen, Taiyuan, and Datong. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-188

337

338 Mao’s Road to Power

Yang [Chengwu], Guo [Tianmin], and Zhao [Erlu]4 and all the forces in Hebei and Shanxi to engage in the Pinghan Campaign, occupy the entire [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway from Changxingdian5 to Shimen, and watch for an opportunity to occupy the two cities of Baoding and Shimen. 5. There are seven advantages to engaging in the Pinghan Campaign: One, the largest troop strength can be amassed; two, we can fight through to Hebei-Shanxi and central Hebei; three, the left arm of the [Bei]ping-[Tian] jin railway can be severed; four, new troops can be tempered; five, manpower and material resources can be increased; six, strategic coordination between Rehe and eastern Hebei can be effectuated; and seven, after this line is seized, it may be consolidated. For these reasons, we hope you will make a full effort to organize the Pinghan Campaign, complete preparations within half a month, and await orders to attack. 6. After victory in Pinghan, a main force of three columns comprised of no fewer than twenty regiments and 40,000 men is to enter Shanxi and act as the main force in seizing Shanxi. The first thing is to coordinate with all areas in Shanxi and seize the Zhengding-Taiyuan and Datong-Puzhou railways, wipe out all enemy strongholds other than Datong and Taiyuan, link up the five regions of Hebei-Shanxi, Shanxi-Suiyuan, Lüliang [county], Taihang [Mountains], and Taiyue [Mountains], and then watch for an opportunity to take Taiyuan and Datong. 7. The field army will have Xiao Ke as commander and Luo Ruiqing as political commissar. 8. As for the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region, Cheng Zihua and Li Yunchang6 will be responsible for military leadership there. 9. All attacks on the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou], Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan], and [Da] tong-Pu[zhou] railways will involve sieges on cities, so we hope you will immediately commence training on tactics to lay siege to a city, prepare large quantities of TNT, and have the plants make TNT during both the day and night shifts. 10. The taking of the three railway lines and the four cities (Baoding, Shimen, Taiyuan, and Datong) will require six months of preparation or longer, but this task must be completed. 11. Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]7 have other duties and cannot use their main forces to coordinate with your attack on Shimen. 12. We look forward to hearing your opinions on these matters. 13. Burn this telegram immediately after reading. The Central Committee 4.  Yang Dezhi, Yang Chengwu (1914–2004, native of Fujian), and Guo Tianmin were commanders of the First, Third, and Second Columns of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, respectively, and Zhao Erlu was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. 5.  Changxindian is a township in the southwestern portion of Beijing’s Fengtai District. 6.  Li Yunchang was deputy commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 7.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region.

Unmask the Enemy at the Appropriate Moment (June 30, 1946) Comrade [Yu] Guangsheng:1 Starting from the present moment, please publish and broadcast all news of attacks on us by Chiang’s forces wherever they occur because Chiang is paying lip service to an armistice but in fact he is continuing to wage war; we should thoroughly expose him by spreading this news. Please add news items from today’s Cankao xiaoxi,2 such as “Diehard Armies Capture the Qingzhou and Longshan Railway Stations,” “Yan’s troops at Wenshui Occupy Our Xiaoyi Township,” and so on, then broadcast this news and print it in the newspaper. Mao Zedong Regarding the lead story in today’s paper about notables such as Huang Mohan,3 it seems they are in Chongqing, not Shanghai, so please look further into the question of whether it is wrong to say they are in Shanghai.4

Our source for this text is Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao xuanbian, Vol. 1, p. 37. 1. Yu Guangsheng was acting head and editor-in-chief of Xinhua News Agency and Jiefang ribao. 2.  Cankao xiaoxi (Reference News), a news bulletin for restricted circulation, contains information deemed not yet suitable for open publication. 3.  Huang Yunpeng (aka Huang Mohan, 1882–1955, native of Sichuan) was elected to parliament in the early years of the Chinese Republic. In 1945, he helped organize the Democratic Association for Building the Country (Minzhu jianguo hui). It is doubtlessly for this reason that at this time Mao regarded him as an illustrious person. 4.  Mao soon discovered that these people were indeed in Chongqing. See “Telegrams in Reply to Distinguished Personages of Various Circles in Chongqing,” July 5, 1946, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-189

339

The Reactionaries’ Schemes Will Ultimately Fail (June 30 and July 7, 1946) 1. To Comrade [Ren] Bishi, and for the information of Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu:1 Please consider publishing a declaration on “July 7th” for the purpose of mobilizing the people of the entire nation against the reactionaries’ attacks. Such a declaration would begin by summarizing the declaration put forward by our Party after the Japanese surrender, advocating peace and national construction,2 and then discussing the October Tenth Agreement3 and the civil war. It would then report on the promising achievements of the Political Consultative Conference; thereafter, it would describe how foreign and Chinese reactionaries have mounted attacks on a nationwide scale against the Liberated Areas and the broad popular masses since the Jiaochangkou Incident,4 and lay out the overall guiding principles that the people should follow. The entire statement should make clear that foreign and Chinese reactionaries are working in concert in an attempt to turn China into a colony and that the central task for the Chinese people remains to fight for independence and democracy. It should clearly state that our Party resolutely opposes civil war, and it should say that the tide of history cannot be reversed and the schemes of the reactionaries will ultimately fail. Please have [Hu] Qiaomu do the writing. Mao Zedong June 30th Our source for these three texts is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 141–43, where they are reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. As indicated by the editors of the Chinese text, part 1 is a letter with suggestions for a statement commemorating the ninth anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937. Parts 2 and 3 were added by Mao when revising the draft of the commemoration statement. 1.  Ren Bishi was a secretary in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Hu Qiaomu (1912–1992, native of Jiangsu) was secretary to Mao Zedong. 2.  See “Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation,” August 25, 1945, in this volume. 3.  This refers to the agreement, also called the “Double Tenth Agreement,” between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party signed on October 10, 1945. 4.  The reference is to an incident in Chongqing on February 10, 1946, when Guomin­ dang agents disrupted a mass demonstration in support of the Political Consultative Conference, injuring dozens of demonstrators and journalists. 340

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2. The fact that the reactionaries are rampant in China right now is not an indication of their strength and vitality, but rather it is a sign of their weakness, their last gasp before collapse. This is the nature of fascist rule in any country and China cannot be any exception. Fascism is the most ugly and despicable, but at the same time it is also the weakest and the most lacking in vitality. Therefore, the desire of China’s reactionaries to obliterate the people’s strength and realize permanent fascist rule cannot be accomplished and it is an impossibility.

3. All compatriots across the nation should understand that the reactionary schemes of the reactionaries in China and abroad can be defeated. We are absolutely determined to defeat all the reactionary schemes of the reactionaries inside and outside of China; we are absolutely determined to realize independence, peace, and democracy; and we are absolutely determined to carry out the ceasefire agreement,5 the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference,6 and the military reorganization program.7 Toward all who want to carry out these things, no matter who they are, we extend our welcome. Toward all who oppose these things, no matter who they are, we express our opposition. Compatriots throughout the nation, our demands are so reasonable and our cause is so righteous that our demands are bound to be realized and our cause is bound to be victorious.

5.  The Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang signed a ceasefire agreement on January 10, 1946. 6.  The five resolutions passed at the meeting of the Political Consultative Conference held in Chongqing from January 10 to 31, 1946, covered government organization, peacetime construction, a national assembly, drafting a constitution, and military affairs. 7.  The resolution on military affairs passed at the Political Consultative Conference included stipulations regarding the reorganization of the Guomindang army and the military forces in the Liberated Areas.

Action to Be Taken by the Central Plains Military Region after Breaking Out of the Encirclement (July 3, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian], and for the information of Wang [Shusheng] and Dai [Jiying], Wang and Zhang [Tixue]:1 1. In the course of a few days’ march, you should advance into the area west of Tianhekou2 and north of Zaoyang and try to rest for several days. 2. The area north of the Xinyang-Tianhekou-Zaoyang line belongs to the Fifth Pacification Zone of Sun Zhen,3 who only commands four complete divisions: the Fifteenth, Forty-first, Forty-seventh, and Third Divisions. Of these, the Forty-seventh Division of Chen Dingxun [1893–1973, native of Sichuan] has been ordered to attack Xuanhuadian.4 In the Fifteenth Division, Wu Tinglin [1892–1952, native of Henan] has only two brigades, which have now arrived at Liulin5 in preparation for moving west. Zeng Suyuan’s6 Forty-first Division is marching from Queshan to Xinyang, and he is preparing to deploy one unit at Tongbo. His main force is working in coordination with the Fifteenth Division to strike westward, where Tianhekou is the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 317–19, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Zheng Weisan was political commissar and Li Xiannian was commander, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. Wang Shusheng was deputy commander of the Central Plains Military Region and commander of its First Column. Dai Jiying was political commissar of the First Column. Wang is unknown. Zhang Tixue (1915–1973, native of Hunan) was commander of the Eastern Hubei Military Region. The editors of the Chinese text were unable to identify the individual surnamed Wang. 2.  Tianhekou is a village located in the northern part of Hubei’s Sui county. 3.  Sun Zhen (1892–1985, native of Zhejiang) was commander of the Fifth Pacification Zone. 4.  Xuanhuadian is a township located in northeastern Dawu county of Hubei Province. 5.  Liulin is a township located in the southern part of Xinyang city of Henan Province. 6.  Zeng Suyuan (1896–1960, native of Sichuan) was commander of the Reorganized Forty-first Division of the Guomindang army. At the time, Chen Zongjin (1894–1951, native of Sichuan) was acting commander. 342

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-191

July 1946 343

3. 4.

5. 6.

common target of all units. In addition, it is likely that one unit from Song Ruike’s7 Sixty-sixth Division will be joining them in the advance to the west. We estimate that in all there will be no more than six brigades pursuing and attacking us. The unit of Zhao Xitian [1907–?, native of Jiangsu] in the Third Division is also under the command of Sun Zhen. Sun has ordered Zhou Qingxiang’s8 Third Brigade of the Third Division to advance eastward from its position west of Zaoyang to defend Zaoyang, resisting and attacking steadily while it awaits the pursuing troops. Therefore, as soon as you arrive in the area west of Tianhekou and north of Zaoyang, you will have outdistanced and outflanked the enemy and you can spend several days resting, which is absolutely necessary. While resting, you can deploy columns and brigades in the east-west rectangle. We will wait until the enemy advances toward us and then we will gradually draw the units back from east to west, leaving a few troops behind as rear guards to maintain contact with the enemy. In this way, we can secure several days or a week of rest. There are still two brigades of the Third Division garrisoned in Xiangfan and Nanyang that will be difficult to deploy in field operations. After waiting until you have rested and obtained intelligence reports, consider when it will be the best moment to ambush and annihilate part of the enemy army (a brigade, for example) to thwart the enemy’s plan to pursue and attack. The Military Commission

7.  Song Ruike (1908–1995, native of Shandong) was commander of the Reorganized Sixty-sixth Division of the Guomindang army. 8.  Zhou Qingxiang (1904–1948, native of Shandong) was deputy commander of the Reorganized Third Division of the Guomindang army.

First Fight Several Victorious Battles on the Interior Lines and Then Shift to the Exterior Lines (July 4, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and the Central China Bureau:1 According to the telegram from the Central China Bureau, the news from Liu Ruming and Cao Fulin’s2 forces is that these two armies will advance from Kaocheng3 and Dongming to Jining. According to [Ye] Jianying’s4 telegram, on July 1 he received a memorandum from the Guomindang, setting noon on the 30th as the deadline for our army to withdraw from the passage between Dongming and Kaocheng or else we will bear all the consequences. According to [Zhou] Enlai’s telegram of July 2, the situation now is that we are fighting while negotiating, and fighting is of the first importance. According to the telegram from Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], the diehards are preparing to deploy the Thirty-first Army Group to attack Jiaozuo, and the Forty-fourth Army Group is preparing to attack southern Shandong. According to the telegram from Chen [Yi], the two diehard armies at Ji’nan and Wei county are attacking the line between Jiao[dong] and Ji’[nan], and so on. If this is the situation, the diehard enemy forces in Jiaoji, Xuzhou, northern and eastern Henan, and northern Jiangsu may attack us simultaneously. If that happens, we will first win several battles on the interior lines, then shift to the exterior lines; politically, this will be more advantageous. Please heighten your vigilance toward a possible large-scale attack by the diehard armies. The Military Commission Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 320–21, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the Shandong Military Region. 2.  Liu Ruming was commander of the Guomindang army’s Fourth Pacification Zone. Cao Fulin was deputy commander of the Fourth Pacification Zone and commander of the Reorganized Fifty-fifth Division. 3.  Kaocheng county was combined with Lanfeng county in 1954 to become Lankao county, Henan Province. 4.  Ye Jianying was the Chinese Communist Party’s representative to the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 344

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-192

Telegrams in Reply to Distinguished Personages of Various Circles in Chongqing (July 5, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, July 7) Last month, distinguished personages of various circles in Chongqing, including Huang Mohan, Huang Cixian, and Deng Chumin, numbering 4,271 in all, as well as the Pray for Peace Assembly of the Protestant Christian Promotion Society, sent telegrams to Chairman Mao of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee appealing for peace. Chairman Mao replied by telegram as follows on July 5: Messrs. Huang Mohan, Huang Cixian, Deng Chumin,1 and others in Chongqing: I have received your telegram and greatly admire your brilliant ideas. Resolute support for peace and opposition to civil war is the only national concern in China today. Our humble Party is determined to fight to the very end for this policy. We hope we can all work together to promote the rapid achievement of peace. With respectful regards, Mao Zedong Respectfully submitted for the perusal of the gentlemen in the Pray for Peace Assembly of the Protestant Christian Promotion Society: I have received your telegram and am greatly moved by your enthusiasm for national affairs and your appeal for peace. Our humble Party has always insisted on solving all domestic disputes through peace and unity, and the delegation of our Party in Nanjing has proposed that both sides should give explicit orders to end the civil war absolutely, permanently, and unconditionally. But a few bellicose elements still believe in solving problems with armed force, so the civil war crisis continues on. I hope we can work together to stop the war; the fate of the nation and the survival of the people depend on it. With respectful regards, Mao Zedong Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 107, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, July 7, 1946. 1.  Huang Yunpeng (1882–1955, aka Huang Mohan, native of Sichuan) was elected to parliament in the early years of the Chinese Republic. In 1945, he helped organize the Democratic Association for Building the Country (Minzhu jianguo hui). Huang Cixian (1890– 1952, aka Huang Xizu, native of Sichuan) was a member of the association as well as a youth leader and a Christian. Deng Chumin (1889–1981, native of Hubei) was a prominent scholar. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-193

345

The Tactical Orientation to Be Adopted after Issuing the “July 7th” Declaration1 (July 6, 1946) To all bureaus and to Zhou [Enlai], Ye [Jianying], and Wu [Xiuquan]:2 The Central Committee’s “July 7th” declaration sharply criticizes the American and Chinese reactionaries and calls upon our compatriots to rise up and save the nation; it is enough to rouse the people’s will and place the reactionaries in a difficult position so that they will be isolated from the people. At the same time, however, the declaration points out that contacts with American democratic personages and with advocates for the convening of a political consultative conference that includes all parties and groups in China are to be strengthened, extending a welcome to any and all who support such a conference, no matter who they are. Therefore, all areas in relation to the Beiping Office [for Military Mediation] and all teams should continue to follow the previous directive to treat the Guomindang and American representatives with respect and to take pains to win over all American personnel.3 As for Marshall,4 he should not publicly be said to be either good or bad, as he must still be relied upon to ameliorate the situation in the negotiations. Regarding American troops in all areas, conflict with them should still be avoided. As for Guomindang troops, on the other hand, it will depend on the other side’s attitude; if they fight, we fight, and if they stop, we stop. Regarding the negotiations, our Party has already made certain concessions, but the Guomindang is insatiably greedy and has raised many unreasonable

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 144–45, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  See “The Reactionaries’ Scheme Will Ultimately Fail,” June 30, 1946, in this volume. 2.  Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were the Chinese Communist Party’s representatives to the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. Wu Xiuquan was chief-of-staff for the Chinese Communist Party’s Twenty-seventh Executive Group at the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 3.  See “Give Proper Treatment to Guomindang and American Personnel on the Military Mediation Operational Teams,” June 22, 1946, in this volume. 4.  George Marshall in December 1945 became a special envoy of the United States to China in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the negotiations. 346

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-194

July 1946 347

demands, which must be refused. There are many difficulties facing both the American reactionaries and the Guomindang reactionaries, and we should make a realistic appraisal of their difficulties to utilize them in a resolute but appropriate struggle and strive for a turn for the better in the current political situation. Some centrist personages are bound to feel that the attitude we take in our declaration is too harsh, and it should be explained to them: The American and Guomindang reactionaries have made use of the people’s ugly behavior toward them and their muddled understanding is an excuse to suppress the people and thereby derive benefit; we should sharply expose this to isolate their ilk from the people and in that way repel their attacks. The Central Committee

The Fundamental Policy toward the United States and Chiang Is Not to Compromise but to Struggle (July 6, 1946) To Li [Fuchun] and Huang [Kecheng]:1 We received your telegram analyzing the current political situation.2 Many points in your analysis are realistic and good, but the weakness lies in your inadequate appraisal of the difficult conditions confronting American imperialism and Chiang Kaishek. At the same time, the appraisal of the advantageous conditions of the international and domestic people’s democratic forces is also inadequate. After the Second World War, the position in which revolutionary forces in all countries find themselves will be much better, not worse, than it was following the First World War. We should relent a bit in our demands and put pressure on the Americans and Chiang Kaishek, but the fundamental policy is not to compromise but to struggle. If our Party can make significant concessions and at the same time struggle resolutely against their unjustified bullying and groundless demands, the outcome will actually be better than making even more and greater concessions; without a spirit of resolute struggle, the results will be extremely bad. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 146–47, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Li Fuchun was political commissar and Huang Kecheng was commander, respectively, of the Western Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  The telegram noted various conditions in China and abroad and advised compromising to achieve peace while awaiting an opportune moment to fight for ultimate victory. 348

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-195

Notice Regarding Study and Propagation of the Central Committee’s “July 7th” Declaration (July 8, 1946) To all bureaus, and to be transmitted to all provincial committees and district Party committees: 1. Discussion of the Central Committee’s “July 7th” declaration1 should be launched within the Party to unite comrades throughout the Party to carry out the Central Committee’s line and eradicate the feelings of pessimism and hopelessness that exist among some comrades in the Party. 2. Guide people outside the Party to discuss the current political situation during discussion meetings, try to get them to agree with our Party’s proposals, and unite all progressive elements and centrists to act in concert with our Party. 3. Use the various points in the declaration as topics to be developed in newspaper and periodical articles or in speeches. For example, that the American reactionaries and the Chinese reactionaries are colluding with each other to harm China; that all attacks by the reactionaries must and can be defeated; that the fact that fascists are rampant in China right now is not an indication of their strength and vitality but rather a sign of their weakness and their last gasp before collapse; that international and domestic democratic forces are growing stronger and are sufficient to defeat all the reactionaries; the importance of the four demands in the declaration and the need to realize them; that some people’s inadequate recognition of the bright prospects internationally and for China is mistaken; the importance of the patriotic united front; the importance of uniting all American democratic personages, and so on. 4. Print the declaration on leaflets and distribute them widely in major cities and among the Guomindang troops. Central Propaganda Department

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 148–49, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  See “The Reactionaries’ Schemes Will Ultimately Fail,” June 30, 1946, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-196

349

If the Guomindang Does Not Completely and Permanently Cease Hostilities, We Will Not Do So Unilaterally (July 9, 1946) To Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:1 1. Since January 13, the diehards have captured about twenty counties and key towns, and within the Shanhai Pass they still hold more than ten counties other than those we have recovered. Most importantly, they have captured about 2,000 of our villages and towns. Most conspicuous of all is their occupation of the Central Plains Liberated Area, with its population of five million. 2. If the diehards completely and permanently cease hostilities, we will naturally stop retaliating. Otherwise, there is absolutely no reason for a unilateral ceasefire. 3. It has been decided that we will not fight at Datong and Taiyuan for the time being. We will wait until the diehards attack northern Jiangsu, Chengde, or some other places. We must, however, fight whenever we can in the other of Shanxi’s counties, unless the overall situation and the [matter of the] Fifth Division can be resolved peacefully. You should not consider asking the teams [of the Beiping Office for Military Mediation] to come to Shanxi because that would tie your hands. 4. Shuo county and Fanzhi were captured after being attacked; Shanyin,2 Ningwu, and Dai county were abandoned by the diehards themselves. The plan is still for you to attack and capture counties such as Huairen, Ying,

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 330–31, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were the Chinese Communist Party’s representatives to the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 2.  The city of Shanyin is in the southern portion of Shanyin county in Shanxi Province.

350

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-197

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Guo,3 Wutai, Dingxiang, Yin, Jiexiu, Lingshi, Huo, Xiaoyi, Zhongyang, Shilou, Fenxi, Pu, Xi, and Daning, combining these Liberated Areas together to make up for the loss of the Central Plains Liberated Area. A B4

3.  Guo county was abolished in 1958, when one portion of it was incorporated into Shanxi’s Ningwu county and the other portion was combined with Dai county to form Shanxi’s Yuanping county. 4.  Here as elsewhere, we have substituted the letters A and B for the characters jia and yi. Since our source indicates that Mao drafted this text on behalf of the Central Committee, A and B may stand for the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.

Suggested Revisions to the Resolution of the Northeast Bureau on the Situation and Tasks in the Northeast1 (July 11, 1946, noon) Comrade Lin Biao: Regarding the resolution on the situation and the tasks in the Northeast, we propose the following revisions: 1. The first section should be revised to read as follows: “In August of last year, when the courageous Soviet Red Army came to China and attacked the Japanese invaders, our Northeast Democratic Allied Army and the people of the Northeast joined in battle with the Red Army, destroyed the Japanese bandits and the puppet Manchurian [army], and opened a path for a free life for the people of the Northeast. From the day when the Japanese bandits began their invasion, our Party in the Northeast led the people of the Northeast in organizing an anti-Japanese volunteer army, opposed Chiang Kaishek’s policy of non-resistance, and carried on a protracted and heroic struggle. After the counteroffensive against Japan, our Party sent an even larger number of armed forces and cadres from within the [Shanhai] Pass to the Northeast to aid the people of the Northeast in the creation of a vast Northeast Liberated Area. But Chiang Kaishek, who was guilty of losing the Northeast and had achieved no merit in getting it back, launched a major attack on the Northeast Liberated Area with the support

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 332–35, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  From July 3 to July 11, 1946, the Northeast China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened an enlarged session in Harbin on the instructions of the Central Committee to analyze the situation domestically, internationally, and in the Northeast, draw lessons from the past year of building bases and restraining the Guomindang army’s offensive, and reach a consensus regarding certain issues: the relative strength of the two sides, war and peace, urban areas and rural areas, as well as battle directives. The resolution entitled “The Situation and Mission in the Northeast” was passed on July 7. Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee to Lin Biao, who was serving as secretary of the Northeast Bureau and as commander and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 352

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-198

July 1946 353

of the American reactionaries and in contravention of the terms of the peace agreement. Beginning with the battle of Shanhai Pass in November of last year2 and until the armistice between the two armies on June 7 of this year, our Northeast Democratic Allied Army has waged a courageous and resolute war of self-defense. Although there is a cessation of hostilities between the two armies at present, it is possible that war may break out again. Mass work and resolution of the land question are only at an initial stage in the broad areas of the Northeast. Our rural bases have not been consolidated, and many of our cadres do not understand the necessity and importance of entering deep into the villages and engaging in a bitter struggle for a protracted period to establish the bases. The current international and domestic situations favor the efforts by our Party to establish a Northeast base and to smash the capacity of Chiang’s army to carry out another attack. But only if we recognize and overcome our own weaknesses can we attain our goal.” 2. We suggest that the first paragraph of the second section be revised to read as follows: “Overcome confused thinking about the issue of peace and war and be prepared to achieve peace through prolonged hard struggle. At the moment, the contradictions between Great Britain and America are increasing; in addition, the contradictions within America itself are very serious. In terms of the entire nation, Chiang Kaishek still feels the insufficiency of his troops. Furthermore, the public feels very frustrated and the economy faces difficulties. Particularly important is the increase in strength and the firm struggle of our Party and army. That is why, after the expiration of the fifteen-day and eight-day armistices, Chiang Kaishek had to announce an indefinite armistice once again. In certain areas where Chiang Kaishek’s troops are inadequate, the armistice will help them a little. In regions where there are plenty of Chiang Kaishek’s troops, however—for instance, in the Central Plains Region and along the Jiaoji railway3—Chiang Kaishek has already started a major war; in Jiangsu and Anhui, it is highly possible that there will soon be a major war. In the Northeast, a truce is advantageous to the Guomindang since Chiang Kaishek does not have sufficient forces at present, but if reinforcements arrive, he will probably begin to attack us again. In the recent negotiations in Nanjing,4 Chiang Kaishek wanted to take over everything except for agreeing to give us Xing’an Province, the new

2.  The Guomindang army landed at Qinhuangdao and launched a sudden attack on the Shanhai Press on November 1, 1945, forcing a retreat by the Communist forces in the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. 3.  This line, running from Qingdao to Ji’nan, was the main axis for transport in Shanxi. 4.  This refers to negotiations held between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang that began on June 6, 1946, in Nanjing. The negotiations covered ending the conflict in the Northeast, restoring regular transportation, and reorganizing the army.

354 Mao’s Road to Power

Heilongjiang Province, part of Nenjiang Province,5 and the Yanji region. He not only wanted to take over these spots but also the area, and we would never accept this. If we lose such a large territory without fighting, we will not be able to regain it in the future; it is better to fight for it and lose it so that we may still be able to regain it in the future. What is more, it is highly possible that as the result of fighting we may be able to shatter the enemy’s attack and regain much of the lost territory, with the possible exception of losing some cities and key communication routes. Therefore, the whole Party must be resolute, strive to prepare all the necessary conditions, shatter Chiang’s attack, and win peace through victory in war. Any wavering ideas and thoughts of trusting luck should be completely eliminated. Under the guidance of this general principle of wholeheartedly preparing for a prolonged hard struggle to win peace, our method is to increase the revolutionary forces and reduce the reactionary forces through war, through mass work, through resolution of the land issue and improvements in the people’s living conditions, and through every other possible effort, so that changes in the balance of strength between the two sides will favor us. The most important thing is to mobilize the masses and let our Party be intimately linked to the people. If the strength of the ordinary people is added to our side, this may change the balance of strength between the enemy and us in our favor. We will be able to set up solid base areas and the enemy will not be able to defeat us. In sum, peace must and will be achieved, yet we should mainly depend on our own strength rather than depend on outside forces. Only if we are self-reliant, depend on our own strength with our own solutions, and put ourselves in an invulnerable position will the international and domestic forces be able to assist us effectively. Only then can we say that peace is guaranteed. Otherwise, it will be unreliable and dangerous.” 3. In the second paragraph [of this section], cut out the sentence: “Develop bases on the borders with Korea, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and Rehe.”6 4. In the third paragraph on the aims of the struggle and the war, you should speak first of the struggle to defend the Liberated Areas. The people of the Northeast have already been liberated from rule by the Japanese and their puppets and have set up their own Liberated Area where they can live freely. But the Chinese reactionaries, with the support of the foreign reactionaries, are attacking our Liberated Areas. Our Northeast Democratic Allied Army

5.  After Japan surrendered in 1945, the Guomindang government divided the original three Northeast provinces into nine provinces: Liaoning, Liaobei, Andong, Jilin, Hejiang, Songjiang, Heilongjiang, Nenjiang, and Xing’an. The text refers to three of the nine provinces. 6.  Rehe Province covered today’s northeastern Hebei Province, southwestern Liaoning, and southeastern Inner Mongolia before it was abolished in 1955.

July 1946 355

and the people of the Northeast have no choice but to undertake a war of self-defense; if they do not defend themselves, they will perish, so a war of self-defense is altogether just and necessary. Afterwards, speak again of the democratic struggles in the economic and political realm and in war and of their concrete content. The slogan of class struggle should not be put forward. 5. We agree with all the other parts [of the draft]. The Central Committee

Pay Attention to Strengthening the Disciplinary Education of the Troops1 (July 12, 1946) To all departments, and to be relayed to all unit commanders: All units, before undertaking any action, must carry out disciplinary education completely and publicly, and according to the specific matters requiring attention under the existing circumstances. Only if all officers and men are clearly informed, on the condition of not revealing any confidential information, can we ensure that all officers and men will observe political discipline at the time of action and make a good impression on the people. Recently, due to forgetting to undertake such education before taking action, or failure to adopt a serious and conscientious attitude when carrying out such education, or thinking that having carried out such education in the past meant there was no need to do so again, or making only a small number of men aware without the troop commander being able to deliver a speech to the entire unit, things went so far in some units that a breakdown of discipline occurred while entering the cities, and this was truly bad. We expect the commander of every unit to instruct the political organs to carry out self-criticisms on this. Strengthening the disciplinary education of all troops is extremely important. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 336–37, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 356

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-199

The Central Plains Army Should Pin Down the Enemy by Flexible Mobile Action on the Exterior Lines (July 13, 1946) To Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian]:1 1. Chiang Kaishek has decided to fight a major war. His plan is to first attack Jiangsu and Anhui, and then to attack North China. He also seeks to wipe out our forces in the Central Plains. He has decided to carry out his plan to attack Jiangsu and Anhui within a few days along three routes: one southward from Xuzhou, another eastward from the [Tian]Jin-Pu[kou] railway, and yet another northward from the north of the Yangzi. At the same time, he will attack our Jiangsu-Anhui Border Region. His total forces exceed twenty divisions. 2. Our Party is determined to shatter the attack by the reactionaries, achieve victory, and secure peace. 3. The task of the Central Plains Army is to pin down large numbers of Guomindang troops by highly mobile and flexible operations on the exterior lines in the broad areas of Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, and Shaanxi, thus aiding our troops fighting on the interior lines to achieve victory. This is the first stage of the war. Afterwards, our forces fighting on the interior lines will cross the Huai River to the south and join our troops in the Central Plains, where they will capture the region extending from Xinyang and the Dabie Mountains to Anqing. This will constitute the second stage. 4. The aforementioned plan is highly confidential and must be kept secret. 5. Destroy this telegram as soon as you have read it. 6. Inform us regarding your plan of operations. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 338–39, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zheng Weisan was political commissar and Li Xiannian was commander, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-200

357

Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Li Gongpu (July 13, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, July 15) Chairman Mao and Commanderin-chief Zhu sent a telegram of condolences to the family of Mr. Li Gongpu on July 13; the text of the original telegram is as follows: To the wife of Mr. Li Gongpu,1 Madam Zhang Manjun [1901–1975, native of Jiangsu], in Kunming: We are greatly shocked and extremely angered to learn that Mr. Li Gongpu has been shot and killed by the reactionaries! Mr. Li Gongpu devoted his life to the cause of national salvation and progressive culture. He was a person who would never be subdued by force and never became corrupted by wealth. Now he has fallen victim to the murderous schemes of the reactionaries because of his devotion to peace and democracy. This is a loss for the people of the whole country but also to the eternal glory of Mr. Li Gongpu. People all over the country are sure to take the death of Mr. Li Gongpu as an alarm bell to rise up forcefully to save the country and to save themselves. This telegram brings our sincere condolences. Mao Zedong Zhu De

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 109, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, July 15, 1946. 1.  Li Gongpu (Li Kungpu, 1902–1946, native of Jiangsu) was a prominent member of the China Democratic League. He was gunned down by an unknown assailant on a Kunming street on July 11. Another Democratic League member, Wen Yiduo (1899–1946, aka Wen Ito, born in what is now Xishui county of Hubei Province), a professor of Chinese literature at Southwest Associated University, was also killed after speaking at a memorial assembly for Li on July 15, 1946. An operative of the Guomindang secret police was executed in 1959 for killing Li. 358

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-201

The Significance of the Central Plains Army’s Success in Breaking out of the Encirclement (July 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], and Dai [Jiying], and for the information of Wang Zhen:1 1. We received your telegram of the 15th.2 It is very good that you are resting for two days. 2. Once you have entered the Shanyang, Zhashui, and Zhen’an areas, since they are in the mountains and there is no enemy on either side, you should rest for a few more days to completely recover from your fatigue. You should consider whether it is possible to strike a blow at the pursuing enemy in southern Shaanxi and wipe out some parts of it; you should also consider whether it is possible to establish a temporary base area in southern Shaanxi, where it would be convenient to stay for a certain period of time, and afterwards leave behind a small detachment to fight guerrilla actions in southern Shaanxi while the main force crosses the Han River, takes Tong[jiang], Nan[jiang], and Ba[zhong], and opens up a new situation. 3. You should rest as much as possible; the enemy can do nothing to you. 4. After Wang [Shusheng] and Liu [Zijiu]3 crossed the Xiang River, the Fifteenth Brigade was pursued by the Sixth Division of the Seventy-fifth

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 346–47, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Zheng Weisan was political commissar and Li Xiannian was commander, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region, and Dai Jiying was political commissar of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region. Wang Zhen was deputy commander and chief-of-staff of the Central Plains Military Region. 2.  The telegram from Zheng Weisan and Li Xiannian described the exhaustion of their troops after four days of marching and blocking the enemy offensive, exacerbated by rain and mud. They reported crossing the Danjiang River and reaching the area west of Xichuan, while the right column of Wang Zhen’s troops reached the coast of Henan at Jingziguan. 3.  Wang Shusheng and Liu Zijiu (1901–1988, native of Shandong) were commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-202

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Army at Liushuigou4 and was unable to cross the river. Now it is marching northward along the east bank of the Xiang River and has arrived at the Gengjiaji and Xinjie5 area northeast of Yicheng. Although this brigade fought with the Sixth Division, it suffered very slight losses (according to the enemy’s report). 5. The entire campaign to break out of the encirclement has been a success and the enemy gained nothing. This action of yours has shifted the strength of the three units under Cheng Qian, Liu Zhi, and Hu Zongnan,6 dealt a great shock to the reactionaries, and caused them great difficulties. Your operation is therefore very significant to the overall situation. 6. According to information from Xi’an, director of the Political Department of the First War Zone Gu Xiping [1900–1957, native of Jiangsu] and Garrison Commander Zhao Caiji [1907–1961, native of Zhejiang] said at a banquet that Li Xiannian’s intention is to occupy southern Shaanxi, control the central Shaanxi plains, and coordinate with northern Shaanxi; his movements are swift, and the threat is very great; the Guomindang army was planning to attack northern Shaanxi in two weeks, and now this plan has been spoiled, and so on. From this, we can see how greatly you have contributed to the overall situation. The Military Commission

4.  Liushuigou is a township located in southeastern Yicheng county, Hebei Province. 5.  Gengjiaji is a township, now known as Gengji, located in southwestern Zaoyang county, Hebei Province. Xinjie is a township located in northeastern Yicheng county. 6.  Cheng Qian (1882–1968, born in Liling, Hunan) was director of the Wuhan Field Headquarters of the Guomindang government’s Military Affairs Commission. Liu Zhi was director of the Guomindang army’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office. Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone.

The Strategic Task of the Central Plains Army Is to Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (July 15, 1946) To the Central Plains Bureau:1 Hu Zongnan’s2 powerful military forces are blocking our strikes at every turn and it is very difficult to pass through to the north. Pinning down a large contingent of the enemy army and establishing bases behind enemy lines is therefore the glorious strategic task of our Central Plains Army. The entire Central Plains Army should abide by the Central Committee’s telegram of July 13th,3 and in the area within the five provinces of Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, and Shaanxi carry out flexible and mobile warfare, smash the Guomindang’s ruling organizations, pin down a large portion of the Guomindang armies, and coordinate with our main forces for battle in North China and Central China. At present, to avoid engaging in battle with the two large army units of Hu Zongnan and Liu Zhi4 and secure some time to rest, you can enter Bashan from the south and proceed to occupy the Tong[jiang]-Nan[jiang]-Ba[zhong] area and the vast area of northeastern Sichuan and create base areas. Our columns under Wang [Shusheng] and Liu [Zijiu]5 will establish base areas in western Hubei; Pi [Dingjun] and Xu [Zirong]6 will operate

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 344–45, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. 3.  See “The Central Plains Army Should Pin down the Enemy by Flexible Mobile Action on the Exterior Lines,” July 13, 1946, in this volume. 4.  Liu Zhi was director of the Guomindang army’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office. 5.  Wang Shusheng was commander and Liu Zijiu was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region, which with the Second Column’s Fifteenth Brigade (minus one regiment) broke through the encirclement by the Guomindang army. At this time, these troops were in the region of Yicheng, Nanzhang, and Baokang in Hubei Province. 6.  Pi Dingjun (1914–1976, native of Anhui) and Xu Zirong (1907–1969, native of Henan) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the First Brigade of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region. At this time, their troops were in Anhui’s Feixi Guanting region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-203

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in western Anhui and neighboring areas; troops remaining in the original base areas east and west of the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway are to hold their original areas. In the future, you should prepare to dispatch a portion to develop the great southwestern region. In short, to fundamentally demolish Chiang Kaishek’s reactionary plan of employing massive military forces to attack the Northeast, North China, Central China, and the Central Plains, and to develop the Liberated Areas toward the Central Plains and the upper reaches of the Yangzi River, our Party must adopt the plan laid out in the July 13th telegram and the deployments detailed in the present telegram. Inform us quickly of your opinions. The Central Committee

Study the Combat Method of Chen Geng’s Army in Amassing Forces to Destroy the Enemy One by One (July 16, 1946) To all departments, all military regions, and for transmission to all division and column commanders:1 Chen Geng’s2 telegram of the 14th states: “Yesterday (the 13th) evening, my column’s main forces destroyed the attacking right flank of the diehard army at Wenxi,3 and after five hours of night fighting destroyed eleven brigades and two regiments. According to incomplete statistics, we captured four mountain guns, seven mortars, eight heavy machine guns, more than 500 rifles, more than thirty light machine guns, and more than 1,000 prisoners of war—all of this with extremely small losses on our side. We are currently carrying out the second phase of the struggle and are continuing to annihilate the diehard forces.” Chen Geng’s telegram of the 15th further states: “On the night of the 14th, the second battle was held at Wenxi. Fierce fighting all through the night resulted in our capturing six mountain guns, two flat trajectory guns, eleven mortars, two small cannons, eight heavy machine guns, ten light machine guns, more than 500 rifles, and more than 700 prisoners of war. The morale of our army has risen to new heights, and we are preparing to continue the fight, and so on, and so forth.” This time, Yan [Xishan]’s4 army of more than 10,000 and Hu Zongnan’s5 First and Twentyseventh armies of more than 50,000 men are attacking our Liberated Areas in southern Shanxi. Chen Geng’s column has already begun to fight and has adopted a general policy of concentrating the main forces to fight individual enemy units and rout them one by one, and he has twice been victorious. All our forces everywhere should employ these methods in fighting, each time amassing their forces

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 348–49, where it is reproduced from a printed copy preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 3.  Wenxi is in Yuncheng city of Shanxi Province. 4.  Yan Xishan was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Second War Zone. 5.  Hu Zongnan was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-204

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to fight one unit of the enemy. The ratio should be three to one, or preferably four to one, to assure victory and destroy the enemy one by one. We hope this type of warfare will be widely taught to all commanders above the regimental level. This is extremely important. The Military Commission

Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Wen Yiduo (July 17, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, July 19) Chairman Mao and Commanderin-chief Zhu sent a telegram of condolences to the family of Mr. Wen Yiduo on the 17th. The text of the original telegram follows: Kunming, to National Southwest Associated University, with a request to forward this telegram to the family of Mr. Wen Yiduo:1 We are greatly shocked to learn that Mr. [Wen] Yiduo has been assassinated, and we send you our heartfelt condolences. Mr. Wen Yiduo fought hard and indomitably for democracy and is worthy of respect and admiration. Today he has been treacherously assassinated. All those throughout the country with lofty ideals are determined to continue his unfinished work and will strive ceaselessly to carry the cause of democracy to a successful conclusion. We send this telegram to express our condolences. Mao Zedong Zhu De

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 111, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, July 19, 1946. 1. Wen Yiduo, a member of the China Democratic League, was assassinated after speaking at a memorial service for another slain League member, Li Gongpu. See “A Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Li Gongpu,” July 13, 1946, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-205

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Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Defeat of Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive by a War of Self-Defense1 (July 20, 1946) 1. Chiang Kaishek, after violating the truce agreement,2 violating the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference,3 and occupying Siping, Changchun, and other of our cities in the Northeast, is now launching another large-scale offensive against us in Central and North China;4 later, he may again attack the Northeast. Only after completely smashing Chiang’s offensive through a war of self-defense can the Chinese people regain peace. 2. Our Party and our army are making every preparation to smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive and thus to win peace. Although Chiang Kaishek has U.S. aid, the feelings of the people are against him, the morale of his troops is low, and his economy is in difficulty. As for us, although we have no foreign aid, the feelings of the people are for us, the morale of our troops is high, and we can handle our economy. Therefore, we can defeat Chiang Kaishek. The whole Party should be fully confident of this. 3. For defeating Chiang Kaishek, the general battle method is mobile warfare. Therefore, the temporary abandonment of certain places or cities is not only unavoidable but also necessary. Certain places or cities are temporarily abandoned in order to win a final victory, which would otherwise be impossible.

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang gaoji dangxiao, ed., Dangnei wenjian cankao ziliao, Vol.1, pp. 7–8 (publication date unknown). A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1183–87. 1.  Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Defeat of Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive by a War of Self-Defense → Smash Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive by a War of Self-Defense 2.  The reference is to the truce agreement of October 10, 1945. 3.  The Political Consultative Conference, convened by the Guomindang government in January 1946 with the participation of the Communists and other parties, adopted five agreements on government organization, peace and national reconstruction, the National Assembly, the Draft Constitution, and Military Affairs. 4.  Central and North China → East and North China 366

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-206

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We must make all Party members and all the people in the Liberated Areas understand this so that they will be psychologically prepared. 4. In order to smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive, we must cooperate closely with the popular masses and win over all who can be won over. In the rural areas, on the one hand, we should resolutely solve the land problem, rely firmly on the farm laborers and poor peasants and the middle peasants;5 on the other hand, when solving the land problem, we should distinguish the ordinary rich peasants and the middle and small landlords from the traitors, bad gentry, and local tyrants. We should be stricter in our treatment of the traitors, bad gentry, and local tyrants, and more lenient in our treatment of the rich peasants and middle and small landlords. In places where the land problem has already been solved, we should shift to a moderate attitude toward the landlord class as a whole, with the exception of a few reactionaries. To reduce the number of hostile elements and to consolidate the Liberated Areas, we should help all landlords who have difficulty making a living and we should induce runaway landlords to return and give them an opportunity to earn a living. In the cities, besides uniting with the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, and all progressives, we should also take care to unite with all the middle elements and isolate the reactionaries. Among the Guomindang troops, we should win over all possible opponents of civil war and isolate the bellicose elements. 5. To smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive we must make plans on a long-term basis. We must most economically use our manpower and material resources and do everything possible to avoid waste. We must investigate and clean up the petty graft that has appeared in some places. We must work hard on production in order to become completely self-sufficient in all necessities, first and foremost in grain and cloth. We must promote the extensive planting of cotton and encourage every family to spin and every village to weave. We should begin to promote this even in the Northeast. In the fields of finance and supplies, we must meet the material needs of the war of self-defense and at the same time lighten the burden on the people so that there will be some improvement and increase in the living conditions of the people in our Liberated Areas, even under wartime conditions. To sum up, we rely entirely on our own efforts, and our position is invincible; this is the very opposite of Chiang Kaishek who depends entirely on foreign countries. We live plainly and work hard, we take care of the needs of both the army and the people; this is the very opposite of the situation in Chiang Kaishek’s areas, where those at the top are corrupt and degenerate, while the people under them are destitute. Under these circumstances, we shall surely be victorious.

5.  the middle peasants → unite with the middle peasants

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6. Difficulties lie ahead of us but they can and must be overcome. All Party comrades and all troops and people in the Liberated Areas must unite as one, in line with the guidance of the Central Committee Declaration of July 7, 1946, completely smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive and build an independent, peaceful, and democratic new China.

Fight Flexibly and Establish Base Areas in Eastern and Western Hubei and Southern Henan (July 24, 1946) To Wang [Shusheng], Liu [Zijiu], and Zhang [Caiqian], and for the information of Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], Dai [Jiying], and Wang [Zhen]:1 1. Congratulations on your great victory in smashing one regiment and six companies of the enemy forces.2 2. Your task is to fight with flexibility and mobility within the large area north of the Yangzi and south and west of the Xiang River, and there to destroy the enemy piece by piece, arouse the masses, and establish base areas. All commanders must be persuaded to resolutely carry out this task. You must gradually shift to thinking about converging with the units in North China and joining forces with Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian] because the enemy will repeatedly obstruct you from doing this. As long as you fight well and achieve a few more victories like the one on the 21st (by concentrating superior forces, each time taking out an enemy battalion or regiment, and destroying the enemy piece by piece) and as long as you can resolve the relationship between the people and the military, you will be able to establish base areas.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 362–63, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Wang Shusheng was commander of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region, Liu Zijiu was its deputy political commissar, and Zhang Caiqian (1911–1994, native of Hubei) was its chief-of-staff. Zheng Weisan was political commissar and Li Xiannian was commander, respectively, of the Central Plains Military Region. Dai Jiying was political commissar of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region. Wang Zhen was deputy commander and chief-of-staff of the Central Plains Military Region. 2.  In the battle on July 21, 1946, in the area around Shihuajie in Sucheng county, the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region defeated six companies of the 553rd Regiment of the 185th Brigade of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Sixty-sixth Division and the 153rd Regiment of the Sixty-fourth Brigade of the Reorganized Fifteenth Division. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-207

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3. The task of Min [Xuesheng], Zhang [Yan], and Wu3 is to build base areas in the region east of the Xiang River4 and west of Pinghan (the original Jianghan Military Region), and to work in concert with Zheng, Li, and Wang. This section is now in southwestern Henan, and three enemy brigades are currently turning back from the tail end of Zheng and Li’s forces and heading east to take on this section; this section should therefore turn around and head south toward the area between the Xiang River and Pinghan and divide the area into regimental units and disperse its activities. This section should also change its thinking about converging with troops in the north and meeting up with Zheng and Li in the west because the enemy’s situation will not permit this. This section will not be able to meet up with you because working in concert but acting separately is better than amassing all in one place. Please relay this telegram to Min, Zhang, and Wu. 4. Zheng and Li, please instruct Huang Lin5 that he is still to return to the Tongbai area in southern Henan and construct base areas there. 5. You must flexibly apply the strategy of breaking up the whole into parts and joining the parts into the whole, and you must be good at deceiving the enemy, luring him into a scattered formation and then destroying him piece by piece. 6. Right now our armies in Central and North China are engaged in a truly great counteroffensive. After they have achieved victory, the situation of our Central Plains Army may also improve. The Military Commission

3.  Min Xuesheng (1914–2003, born in Huang’an, Hubei) was deputy commander of the Third Brigade of the First Column of the Central Plains Military Region. The position of Zhang Yan (1917–2003, born in Lingbi, Anhui) is unclear. The editors of Junshi wenji were unable to identify the individual surnamed Wu. 4.  The reference is to the Xiang River in Anhui and Zhejiang, which runs into the Yangzi just south of Nanjing, not to the Xiang River in Hunan. 5.  Huang Lin (1914–1986, born in Liuyang, Hunan) was commander and political commissar of the Henan Military Region.

Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Tao Xingzhi (July 25, 1946) (Xinhua Agency dispatch, Yan’an, July 28) Chairman Mao and Commander-inchief Zhu sent a telegram to the family of Mr. Tao Xingzhi, expressing their solicitude and condolences. The text of the original telegram is as follows: Shanghai, Victory Hotel, Huanlong Lukou, Luban Road, respectfully submitted to the family of Mr. Tao Xingzhi:1 We were shocked to learn that Mr. Tao Xingzhi has passed away, and we express our deep condolences. Mr. Tao Xingzhi was an educator of the people and he had been working ceaselessly for the liberation of the nation and the cause of social reform. The news of his sudden passing is truly an immense loss for the Chinese people. This telegram brings our condolences. Mao Zedong Zhu De

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 113, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, July 29, 1946. 1.  Tao Xingzhi (1891–1946, native of Anhui) was a prominent educator and reformer who had returned to China after studying in the United States. Fearful that he would be assassinated by Guomindang agents like other intellectuals, he worked himself into exhaustion and as a result died. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-208

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It Is Better to Lose Some Places Than to Be Forced to Fight (July 30, 1946) To Zhang [Dingcheng], Deng [Zihui], and Su [Yu]:1 Before such time as our main forces have been amply replenished and have rested and recovered from their exhaustion, and while the enemy does not yet occupy a position that is advantageous to us, we would rather lose a few localities than be coerced into battles that we have no assurance of winning. This time, Su’s forces wiped out 20,000 of the enemy and fought very well.2 From now on you must not be over-eager to engage in battle, and in principle you should fight only those battles you are likely to win. A large enemy force of 100,000 men is advancing to attack us, and it is inevitable that we will lose some localities. You should be mentally and organizationally prepared to deal with any adverse circumstances. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 369–70, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Zhang Dingcheng was commander, Deng Zihui was political commissar, and Su Yu was deputy commander, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. 2.  The Central China Field Army fought a battle at Xuanjiabao and Taixing, and another at Ru’nan (Rugao city). More than 13,000 Guomindang troops were annihilated in these battles. 372

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-209

Talk with Anna Louise Strong1 (August 1946) Strong: Do you think there is hope for a political, peaceful settlement of China’s problems in the near future? Mao: That depends on the attitude of the U.S. government. If the American people hold back the hands of the American reactionaries who are helping Chiang Kaishek fight the civil war, there is hope for peace. Strong: Suppose the United States gives Chiang Kaishek no help, besides that already given, how long can Chiang Kaishek keep on fighting? Mao: More than a year. Strong: Can Chiang Kaishek keep on that long economically? Mao: He can. Strong: What if the United States makes it clear that it will give Chiang Kaishek no more help from now on? Mao: There is no sign yet that the U.S. government and Chiang Kaishek have any desire to stop the war within a short time. Strong: How long can the Communist Party keep on? Mao: As far as our own desire is concerned, we do not want to fight even for a single day. But if circumstances force us to fight, we can fight to the finish. Strong: If the American people ask why the Communist Party is fighting, what should I reply? Mao: Because Chiang Kaishek is out to slaughter the Chinese people, and if the people want to survive, they must defend themselves. This the American people can understand. Strong: What do you think of the possibility of the United States starting a war against the Soviet Union? Mao: There are two aspects to the propaganda about an anti-Soviet war. On the one hand, U.S. imperialism is indeed preparing a war against the Soviet

Our sources for this text are Mao Zedong xuanji (1991, second edition), Vol. 4, pp. 1191–96, and Anna Louise Strong, “A World’s Eye View from a Yenan Cave: An Interview with Mao Tze-tung,” Amerasia, No. 4 (April 1947): 122–26. It also appears in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1189–94. 1.  Anna Louise Strong (1885–1970) was a progressive American author and journalist. Beginning in 1925 she made multiple visits to China, with her fifth visit taking place in June 1946. Mao Zedong made these remarks during a meeting with Strong in Yan’an in August 1946. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-210

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Union; the current propaganda about an anti-Soviet war, as well as other anti-Soviet propaganda, is political preparation for such a war. On the other hand, this propaganda is a smoke screen put up by the U.S. reactionaries to cover many actual contradictions immediately confronting U.S. imperialism. These are the contradictions between the U.S. reactionaries and the American people and the contradictions of U.S. imperialism and other capitalist countries with the colonial and semi-colonial countries. At present, the actual significance of the U.S. slogan of waging an anti-Soviet war is the oppression of the American people and the expansion of the U.S. forces of aggression in the rest of the capitalist world. As you know, both Hitler and his partners, the Japanese warlords, used anti-Soviet slogans for a long time as a pretext for the enslavement of the people at home and the aggression against other countries. Now the U.S. reactionaries are acting in exactly the same way. To start a war, the U.S. reactionaries must first attack the American people. They are already attacking the American people—oppressing the workers and democratic circles in the United States politically and economically and preparing to impose fascism there. The people of the United States should stand up and resist the attacks by the U.S. reactionaries. I believe they will. The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone that includes many capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question. In the Pacific, the United States now controls areas larger than all the former British spheres of influence there together; it controls Japan, that part of China under Guomindang rule, half of Korea, and the South Pacific. It has long controlled Central and South America. It seeks also to control the whole of the British Empire and Western Europe. Using various pretexts, the United States is making large-scale military arrangements and setting up military bases in many countries. The U.S. reactionaries say that the military bases they have set up and are preparing to set up all over the world are aimed against the Soviet Union. True, these military bases are directed against the Soviet Union. At present, however, it is not the Soviet Union but the countries in which these military bases are located that will be the first to suffer U.S. aggression. I believe it will not be long before these countries come to realize who is really oppressing them, the Soviet Union or the United States. The day will come when the U.S. reactionaries find themselves opposed by the people of the whole world. Of course, I do not mean to say that the U.S. reactionaries have no intention of attacking the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a defender of world peace and a powerful factor preventing the domination of the world by the U.S. reactionaries. Because of the existence of the Soviet Union, it is absolutely impossible for the reactionaries in the United States and the world to realize their ambitions. That is why the U.S. reactionaries rabidly hate the Soviet Union and actually dream of destroying this socialist state. But the fact that the U.S. reactionaries are now

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trumpeting so loudly about a U.S.–Soviet war and creating a foul atmosphere so soon after the end of World War II compels us to look at their real aims. It turns out that under the cover of anti-Soviet slogans they are frantically attacking the workers and democratic circles in the United States and turning all the countries that are the targets of U.S. external expansion into U.S. dependencies. I think the American people and the peoples of all countries menaced by U.S. aggression should unite and struggle against the attacks by the U.S. reactionaries and their running dogs in these countries. Only by victory in this struggle can a third world war be avoided; otherwise, it will be unavoidable. Strong: That is well put. But suppose the United States uses the atom bomb? Suppose the United States bombs the Soviet Union from its bases in Iceland, Okinawa, and China? Mao: The atom bomb is a paper tiger that the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it is not. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons. All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but, in reality, they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful. In Russia, before the February Revolution in 1917, which side was really strong? On the surface the tsar was strong, but he was swept away by a single gust of wind during the February Revolution. In the final analysis, the strength in Russia was on the side of the Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers. The tsar was just a paper tiger. Wasn’t Hitler once considered very strong? But history proved that he was a paper tiger. So was Mussolini, so was Japanese imperialism. In contrast, the strength of the Soviet Union and of the people in all countries who loved democracy and freedom proved much greater than had been foreseen. Chiang Kaishek and his supporters, the U.S. reactionaries, are all paper tigers too. Speaking of U.S. imperialism, people seem to feel that it is terrifically strong. Chinese reactionaries are using the “strength” of the United States to frighten the Chinese people. But it will be proven that the U.S. reactionaries, like all the reactionaries in history, do not have much strength. In the United States, there are others who are really strong— the American people. Take the case of China. We have only millet plus rifles to rely on, but history will finally prove that our millet plus rifles are more powerful than Chiang Kaishek’s planes plus tanks. Although the Chinese people still face many difficulties and will long suffer hardships from the joint attacks by U.S. imperialism and the Chinese reactionaries, the day will come when these reactionaries will be defeated and we will be victorious. The reason is simply this: The reactionaries represent reaction, and we represent progress.

Actively Fight in the Taihang Mountains and Eastern China to Assist the Central China Forces (August 9, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng], [Deng Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Su [Yu]:1 1. Liu and Deng’s August 6 telegram was received (late) today.2 You decided to begin the campaign on August 10; this is good timing. 2. Except for one brigade (the Fifty-third) that will enter Shanxi and six brigades that will be garrisoned along the Luoyang-Tongguan-Xi’an security line, the thirteen brigades under Cheng Qian,3 the thirteen brigades under Liu Zhi4 (east of Tongguan and north of Xinyang), the six brigades under Hu Zongnan5 (west of Tongguan), the five brigades under the Chongqing army headquarters, and the two brigades of the Guangxi army—thirty-nine brigades in total—will all be used against our Central China forces. Therefore, our forces in Central China have an extremely heavy burden and need immediate assistance. 3. If within the one-month period from August 10 to September 10 our forces under Su Yu can wipe out two to three brigades of the enemy in central

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 396–97, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party to Field Army Commanding Officer Liu Bocheng, Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping, Shanxi Field Army Commanding Officer and Political Commissar Chen Yi, and Central China [Hunan and Hubei] Field Army Commanding Officer Su Yu. 2.  On August 6, 1946, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping sent a telegram to Chen Yi, Song Shilun (1901–1991, native of Hunan), and the Central Military Commission concerning the ongoing issue of the battle at the Longhai railway. The telegram said: “At present, the enemy has already discovered our armed forces have amassed at Longhai railway … The enemy’s resolve to start operations on August 10 is a favorable opportunity for us.” 3.  Cheng Qian was director of the Guomindang’s Field Headquarters in Wuhan, capital of Hubei Province. 4.  Liu Zhi was head of the Guomindang army’s office in Zhengzhou, capital of Henan Province. 5.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. 376

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-211

August 1946 377

Jiangsu, our troops under Chen [Yi] and Song [Shilun]6 can wipe out two to three brigades of the enemy along and to the east of the Xu[zhou]-Beng[bu] railway, our forces under Liu and Deng can capture the Bian-Xu railway7 and 10-plus cities in eastern Henan and northern Anhui and wipe out two to three brigades of the enemy—if we can wipe out six to nine brigades of enemy troops altogether—it will greatly help the overall situation. On the one hand, attacks by the enemy forces in central Jiangsu and northern Jiangsu will definitely suffer setbacks; on the other hand, the New Yellow River8 will come under a military threat from us. These two factors will force Chiang Kaishek to transfer at least a few brigades of the enemy troops confronting our Central China forces to reinforce the east and the north. If our forces have greater victories thereafter, an increasing number of the enemy troops facing our forces in Central China are sure to be transferred to the east and to the north. Consequently, our forces in Central China will be able to hold firm in seven or eight regions, such as southern Shaanxi, western Henan, eastern Sichuan, western Hubei, central Hubei, eastern Hubei, and western Anhui. This will be a major strategic victory. The Military Commission

6.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Song Shilun (1907–1991, native of Hunan) was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Shandong Military Region. 7.  The Bian-Xu railway passed between Kaifeng and Xuzhou as a segment of the Longhai railway. 8.  This refers to Chiang Kaishek’s strategy in June 1938 to destroy a dam on the Yellow River north of Zhengzhou, to divert the river and create a flood plain to obstruct the Japanese army from moving west. The breach in the dam was repaired in 1947.

Arrange for Several More Battles in Central Jiangsu1 (August 13, 1946) To Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], Chen [Yi], and Song [Shilun]:2 We received your telegram of the 12th.3 Your deployment to wipe out the Ninety-ninth Brigade and part of the Sixty-fifth Division was very good, and we are very pleased. The dispersed enemy forces in central Jiangsu can be destroyed one by one, and we hope you will arrange several other military operations. You should annihilate whatever you can, including the transportation security forces.4 If you can completely crush the attack by Chiang’s troops in central Jiangsu, it will have a great impact on the overall situation. But you must take note of the following: 1. Admonish your soldiers and subordinates never to be arrogant and conceited, to plan carefully and prepare fully for every campaign, and never to underestimate the enemy. 2. As appropriate, rest and reorganize the troops, recover from fatigue, and maintain vigor. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 406–7, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army. 2.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Song Shilun was chief-ofstaff, respectively, of the Shandong Field Army. 3.  The telegram from Su Yu et al. reported on their successful efforts to repel a push by Guomindang troops to consolidate their forces in Hainan and Rugao. The bold action by the Communist forces wiped out the Guomindang’s Fifty-fifth Battalion and a substantial portion of the Sixty-fifth Division, opening up central Jiangsu. 4.  The transportation security forces refer to the Guomindang’s secret police force, which was reorganized into the zhongyi-jiuguo jun or the “Loyal and Patriotic Army” after the War of Resistance Against Japan. 378

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-212

Do Not Deploy Equal Military Strength in All Campaigns and Combat (August 22, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], and all leading officers:1 1. We received the telegram you sent at 9:00 P.M. on August 21. Congratulations on your great victory in wiping out two divisions of the enemy forces.2 2. We hope you will assemble at least eighteen regiments of the main forces for rest and reorganization north of the railway and supplement them with new recruits to prepare for future campaigns. 3. This is the beginning of a major war, and you must be prepared to fight seven to eight large campaigns in the coming three or four months. This should be the objective of all troop-replenishment and rest-and-reorganization efforts. 4. Do not fight any battle you are not sure of winning; once you start a battle, you must be victorious. When fighting the diehard regular forces of the enemy, you must enjoy a military-force advantage. Ideally, the ratio of forces should be four-to-one (four thousand troops against one thousand enemy troops, and forty thousand troops against ten thousand enemy troops), but it should be at least three-to-one. First wipe out one unit, then strike another unit, and finally attack the third unit; destroying them separately. We hope you will educate the cadres along these lines to overcome the notion of employing equal force in all campaigns and battles and the widespread underestimation of the enemy in seeking victory (such ideas do exist among many of our cadres). The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 422–23, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  This refers to the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army’s campaign at Longhai, August 10–22, 1946, which annihilated the Guomindang’s Fifty-fifth Reorganized Division and part of its Sixty-eighth Division. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-213

379

Liu and Deng Should Replenish Fifteen to Twenty Regiments as a Main Force (August 25, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Chen [Yi]:1 You should replenish a main force of at least fifteen to twenty regiments of 2,000 to 2,500 troops each. Ensure that they always remain at full strength for use as an assault force. Do not adopt a policy of uniformity. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 429, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army. 380

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-214

Storm and Capture Weak Positions and Then Displace and Annihilate the Enemy (August 27, 1946) To Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Chen [Yi], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 1. We received Su and Tan’s telegram of the 26th2 and are very pleased to learn that you wiped out the Ninety-ninth Brigade. 2. After managing to surround and annihilate the enemy at Jiali city, rest for a few days and recover from fatigue. Afterwards, choose the weakest enemy forces among Huangqiao, Jiangduo, Guxi, Yunlianghe, and other places, and storm and capture them (ignore for now enemy positions where victory is not assured). Eliminate small strongholds at the enemy’s rear one by one to completely isolate the enemy along the Hai’an-Qutang-Dabaimi-XiaobaimiJiangyan line, and then try to capture this line at an opportune moment. In sum, attack and capture the weak points, threaten the enemy’s rear, and then displace and annihilate the enemy. We hope you will make your deployments according to the current situation. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 430–31, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Su Yu was commander and Tan Zhenlin was political commissar, respectively, of the Central China (Hunan and Hebei) Field Army. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Su Yu et al. stated that the field army had wiped out the Guomindang’s 6,000-member Fifty-fifth Brigade east of Huangqiao and had shifted its military strength to surround the Guomindang’s Third Regiment at Jiali in hopes of eliminating it. Jiali city is in southwestern Rugao county, Jiangsu Province. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-215

381

The Battle Experience of the Central China Field Army1 (August 28, 1946) To the commanders of all strategic regions: According to Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin’s August 27 telegram, our troops wiped out the Ninety-ninth Brigade of the Sixty-ninth Division in the area southwest of Rugao on August 26, and then on August 27 in that same area annihilated the relief troops from the 187th Brigade of the Sixty-fifth Division and a regiment of the Seventy-ninth Division that had come from Rugao. During two days of combat, we completely disposed of 15,000 enemy troops and, excluding the dead and injured, we took nearly 10,000 prisoners. Half of a second regiment of relief troops from Rugao was also annihilated. To prepare for future campaigns, our troops are taking a brief period of rest and reorganization. During the one-and-a-half months from July 13 to August 27, our troops under Su and Tan fought six battles and eliminated six-and-a-half brigades of enemy troops and 5,000 transportation security troops,2 thus bringing about a brilliant victory.3 We have only fifteen regiments of main forces, but these fifteen regiments are at full strength and have great combat effectiveness, and they did not adopt egalitarianism in their build-up. For each battle, they assembled a fighting force with absolute superiority to strike an enemy unit (for example, on August 26 they assembled ten regiments to strike two enemy regiments, and on August 27 they brought together fifteen regiments to strike three enemy regiments). As a result, they did not lose any of the battles they fought, and they enjoy very high morale. They seized a lot of booty, so their equipment is excellent. Relying

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 438–39, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  Transportation security troops refers to the Guomindang’s secret police force, which was reorganized into the “Loyal and Patriotic Army” after the War of Resistance Against Japan. 3.  Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army, fought seven successful battles between July 13 and August 31, 1946, eliminating roughly 53,700 Guomindang troops and earning the campaign its reputation as “Seven Battles, Seven Victories.” At the time of this telegram, the seventh battle (the Battle of Huanglu) had not yet concluded, so the telegram refers to six rather than seven battles. 382

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-216

August 1946 383

on the Liberated Areas while fighting their campaigns facilitated their buildup. In addition, their command has been correct—that is, flexible and bold— enabling them to win great victories. This experience is very good experience, and we hope that every region will learn from and emulate it. We also hope you will draw your subordinates’ attention to it. The Military Commission

Guiding Principles for Annihilating the Enemy in Shandong and Central China (August 29, 1946) To Chen [Yi], Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], Zhang [Jingcheng], Deng [Zihui], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for transmission to the Party committees of every region and the commanding officers of each division and column:1 The Ninth Division in Central Shandong successfully attacked Wenzu and Bucun,2 and the Central Shandong Garrison Brigade successfully attacked Weijiazhuang.3 We hope you will cite the officers and soldiers for their meritorious service. Even though these are small victories, they should be rewarded for boosting the morale of the people and damaging the enemy’s prestige. We should encourage all regular forces, local forces, and militiamen to bring their initiative into play, fight more winning battles, and strike enemy forces one by one and wipe them out in large quantities. You should tell the whole Party and the whole army in Shandong and Central China that we must eliminate large numbers of the regular forces under Wang Yaowu4 (fourteen brigades), Xue Yue5 (thirty-five Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 440–42, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar, and Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander and Li Yu was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shandong Military Region; Zhang Jingcheng was commander and Deng Zihui was political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. Su Yu was commander and Tan Zhenlin was political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army. 2.  From August 24 to 25, 1946, the Central Shandong Military Region combined the Fourth and Ninth divisions for a battle force four times the size of the Guomindang forces in a long-range raid on Wenzu village and Bu village in Zhangqiu county, Shandong Province. They attacked the Guomindang’s Reorganized Fifteenth Division, eliminating one regiment and sixteen companies of five battalions as well as defeating two regiments of reinforcements. 3.  From August 24 to 25, 1946, the Central Shandong Military Region’s Zhangqiu county independent battalion coordinated with the Fourth Division’s reconnaissance company to encircle and repeatedly attack the enemy, while the Zhangqiu Armed Working Team led a surprise attack on the headquarters of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Fifteenth Division. 4.  Wang Yaowu (1904–1968, native of Shandong) was commander of the Guomin­ dang’s Second Pacification Zone. 5.  Xue Yue (1896–1998, native of Guangdong) was director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 384

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-217

August 1946 385

brigades), and Tang Enbo6 (fifteen brigades); only then will we be able to solve our problems. The first objective of our forces in Jiaoji, southern Shandong, and northern Jiangsu should be to wipe out one-third of the forces under Wang Yaowu and Xue Yue (that is, five and twelve brigades, respectively). During the past month and a half (from July 13 to August 27), our forces in central Jiangsu have eliminated six-and-a-half brigades of the enemy’s regular troops and 5,000 transportation security police, or nearly one-half of the enemy forces. Hereafter, the goal should be to wipe out eight-tenths to nine-tenths of the enemy. Our method for eliminating the enemy involves assembling a large force to strike one unit of enemy troops. For example, during the July 27 Yugou Campaign in northern Jiangsu,7 we brought together twelve regiments (only seven regiments were used) to eliminate two regiments of the enemy’s Ninety-second Brigade. Another good example is the August 26 Campaign in southwestern Rugao of central Jiangsu,8 when we assembled ten regiments to wipe out two regiments of the enemy’s Ninety-ninth Brigade. From the perspective of the overall situation, these tactics require less strength and bring greater success. Victory is assured in each battle, allowing us to thoroughly wipe out the enemy and to win swift victories. We must educate our cadres to adopt these tactics universally. The field army should place emphasis on replenishing its ranks. The three war zones in Jiaoji, northern Jiangsu, and central Jiangsu should each replenish ten to fifteen regiments of their main forces for the field army. Each of the regiments should consist of 2,500 to 3,000 troops (the Guomindang has regiments of more than 3,000 troops). They should be equipped with the best weapons and enough ammunition to be used as shock troops; do not adopt equalitarianism. We hope you will plan everything in accordance with the above guiding principles. The Central Committee

6.  Tang Enbo (1900–1952, native of Zhejiang) was deputy director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office and commander of the First Pacification Zone. 7.  In the Yugou Campaign, also known as the Zhaoyang Campaign, from July 27 to 29, 1946, the Shandong Field Army concentrated its strength in Zhaoyang, Lingbi county, in northern Anhui Province, wiping out the Ninety-second and Sixtieth brigades of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Ninety-fifth Division, a total of 5,000 troops. 8.  See “The Battle Experience of the Central China Field Army,” August 28, 1946, in this volume.

Eliminate the Enemy’s Third Division at an Opportune Moment1 (August 29, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], and Chen [Yi]:2 Liu Zhi3 should order Liu Ruming4 to lead his unit in an attack on Cao county, and should order Sun Zhen5 to lead his unit in an attack on Dingtao. Liu Ruming should order Cao Fulin6 to take his remnant unit and Zhang Lanfeng7 to take three regiments to mop up the southeast of Cao county and then to attack Cao county, with a unit of Liu’s own Sixty-eighth Division following behind them. Apart from these offensives, Liu Ruming’s group is also tasked with garrisoning Kaifeng, Lanfeng,8 Minquan, Liuhe, and Shangqiu. Sun Zhen should order the Third Division (two brigades) and the Forty-seventh Division (two brigades) to first mop up Zhang hamlet and other areas south of Dingtao and then to attack Dingtao. The Forty-first Division of Sun’s unit is tasked with tenaciously defending Fengqiu

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 443–44, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. In late August 1946, the Guomindang had amassed 32 brigades of 14 reorganized divisions, totaling more than 30,000 troops. The Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army had just concluded the Longhai Campaign, and the Guomindang had sent troops in an attempt to hold the field army at Dingtao, Cao county. In accordance with the Central Military Commission’s directive, the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army annihilated the Guomindang’s Reorganized Third Division group by group from September 3 to 6 and took Commander Zhao Xitian as prisoner. The field army then pursued the Guomindang’s Reorganized Forty-seventh Division and part of the Forty-first Division in the Dingtao Campaign on September 7, annihilating 17,000 troops. 2.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army. 3.  Liu Zhi was director of the Guomindang’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office. 4.  Liu Ruming was commander of the Guomindang’s Fourth Pacification Zone. 5.  Sun Zhen was commander of the Guomindang’s Fifth Pacification Zone. 6.  Cao Fulin was division commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Fifty-fifth Division. 7.  Zhang Lanfeng was commander of the Guomindang’s Temporary Fourth Column in the Fourth Pacification Zone. 8.  Lanfeng is the former name of the county that merged with Kaocheng county in 1954 to become Lankao county in Kaifeng, Henan Province. 386

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-218

August 1946 387

and Changyuan, attacking Dongming at the proper time, and so forth. We hope you will order our main forces to complete their rest and reorganization within one week, and then once the two brigades of the Third Division have arrived at a suitable position, concentrate all your strength to annihilate one brigade and then wipe out another brigade at an opportune moment. This division belongs to the Central Army, so if you can annihilate it, the impact is sure to be great. We hope you will handle things according to the actual situation. The Military Commission

Drawing in Chiang’s Army to Reinforce Central Jiangsu Will Greatly Benefit the Overall Situation (August 31, 1946) To Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]; and for the information of Chen [Yi], Zhang [Dingcheng], and Deng [Zihui], and Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 1. We received the telegram sent by Su and Tan on the 29th2 and very much agree with the opinions therein. Regardless of how the enemy’s situation changes, the First and Sixth divisions should rest and reorganize for at least ten days and replenish their ranks. After the Fifth Brigade occupies Huangqiao, it should also rest and reorganize, conserving strength and storing up energy in preparation for more fighting. Pi Dingjun’s brigade3 should

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 449–50, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army. Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan) Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin reported that the Central China Campaign had destroyed the offensive capabilities of the existing enemy forces. It was anticipated that the Guomindang would shift six divisions to the Central China Military Region to open up the Haitai, Rugao, and Tongru communication routes. At the time, the Central China forces were exhausted and needed to take ten days of rest. There were six divisions temporarily in Rugao, some resting and regrouping in West Hai’an and some intensifying the encirclement of Hai’an, having ordered the Fifth Brigade to storm and capture Huangqiao. If the Guomindang was unable to send reinforcements to Rugao and Hai’an within ten days, the Central Field Army would capture Hai’an; otherwise, it would wait until the Guomindang army had dispersed. 3.  Pi Dingjun (1914–1976, born in Jinzhai, Anhui) was commander of the First Brigade of the First Column of the former Central Plains Military Region. After the brigade broke the siege of the Jiangsu-Anhui Liberated Area, it was re-designated as the Thirteenth Brigade of the Central China Field Army. 388

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-219

August 1946 389

head for the area southwest of Rugao, draw close to the main forces, and take part in the fighting. 2. If, in accordance with what you said, you can draw several divisions of Chiang’s army to reinforce central Jiangsu, it will be very beneficial to the overall situation. After all reinforcement divisions have arrived, if you can follow the fighting method of July and August and wipe them out one by one, it will also benefit central Jiangsu. The Military Commission

Letter to Xi Zhongxun (September 2, 1946) Comrade Zhongxun:1 I have received your letter. Please act according to the principles that have been decided upon. During the campaign, be sure to assemble an absolutely superior fighting force to wipe out each unit of enemy troops. As you said in your letter, amass six to seven regiments to destroy one regiment of enemy troops. Once you have achieved victory, evaluate the situation. If our losses are not too great and it is an opportune time to strike the enemy, you may launch a second attack to wipe out another regiment of enemy troops. If further fighting appears to be difficult, you can withdraw, begin your rest and reorganization, and wait for the right opportunity to strike again. In addition, you should prepare about 3,000 troops to make up for the casualties among the combat troops; please begin this preparation as early as possible. It is best to assign new troops to each brigade for training early on so they can quickly replenish the ranks when the time comes. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 273, where it is reproduced from the handwritten original. 1.  Xi Zhongxun (1913–2002, born in Fuping county, Shaanxi) was secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and political commissar of the Northwest Joint Defense Army Headquarters. 390

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-220

Deploy Immediately to Destroy Liu Zhi’s Forces (September 3, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 1. Chiang Kaishek has forced Liu Zhi2 to take the risk of advancing, so this is a good opportunity for us to eliminate the enemy. We hope you will deploy forces at once to wipe out the route of his troops. 2. We hope you will give some thought to strengthening the main forces with a unit from the suppression forces in northern Henan. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 456, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  Liu Zhi was pacification director of the Guomindang’s Zhengzhou garrison. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-221

391

Arrangements for Action Following Elimination of the Third Division (September 4, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 1. If you still have enough reserve forces that have not been used, or if the main forces did not suffer major casualties, you can fight another campaign. After wiping out the Third Division, immediately move your forces to the Dongming area and eliminate the two regiments2 of the Sichuan army near Dongming. Make sure that we have Dongming in hand; this will be very beneficial. 2. If you do not have enough reserve troops, or if the main forces suffered heavy casualties and are not suitable for continued fighting, it would be beneficial for you to rest and reorganize for a few days and wait for the right opportunity to resume fighting. 3. Xue Yue’s3 main direction of attack is in the east. It seems that the task of the Eleventh Division (one brigade), Fifth Division (two brigades), and other units now along the Feng county-Dangshan-Xiayi line under Xue Yue’s command is to assist in the attack rather than be involved in the main attack. The main attack forces facing you are the seven brigades of Sun Zhen’s4 group. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 457–58, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  This refers to the 311st Regiment of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Forty-first Division and the 374th Regiment of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Forty-seventh Division. 3.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 4.  Sun Zhen was deputy director of the Guomindang’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office and commander of the Fifth Pacification Zone. 392

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-222

After the Third Division Is Eliminated, Find an Opportunity to Dispose of the Enemy Troops near Dongming (September 5, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 The two brigades (the 122nd and the 127th) of the Sichuan army that are now attacking Qianwanglou, Houwanglou, and Zhuanmiaoji are not very tired and, moreover, they are a cohesive force, so they seem rather difficult to attack. The two regiments of the Sichuan army that are now attacking Dongming belong to two different divisions (the 311th Regiment of the Forty-first Division, and the 374th Regiment of the Forty-seventh Division), and after the long trek through northern Hubei and southern Shaanxi, they are fairly tired. Moreover, they are far away from their real position, isolated deep in enemy territory and pressing toward Dongming, so they seem to be a relatively easy target. We hope you will use one unit to tenaciously defend Dongming. Wait until the Third Division is totally finished off and then find the right opportunity to wipe out the enemy near Dongming. Please decide according to the actual situation. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 463–64, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commander, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-223

393

Dispatch Local Troops to Harass the Brigade Attacking Shan County (September 5, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 Based on its action of dispatching a regiment southward to clean up the Yinggeji area, the brigade from the Fifth Division that is occupying Xiayi seems for the time being to have no intention of attacking northward. The regiment of the Eleventh Division (under the Eighteenth Brigade) occupying Dangshan also seems to be staying put for the time being. Only the brigade (the Eleventh Brigade) of this division that is occupying Feng county appears to be likely to attack Shan county. We hope you will dispatch local troops to make some disturbances. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 465, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives . 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 394

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-224

The Main Force That Has Taken Part in Battle Should Assemble for Rest and Reorganization; Troops That Were Not Used Should Annihilate a Unit of the Enemy Forces in Dongming (September 7, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 1. We were very pleased to receive the telegram you sent at 11:00 P.M. on September 7. Congratulations on your great victory in wiping out the Third Division; we hope you will commend the entire army for its meritorious service. 2. The enemy still has offensive strength. The main force of our army that took part in this campaign should immediately regroup to rest, reorganize, replenish its ranks, and prepare for further fighting. The rest and replenishment should be completed within ten days, beginning on September 8. 3. At an opportune moment, using troops that were not used earlier, annihilate one unit of the enemy troops in Dongming, and when the time is right, capture Kaocheng and recover Dongming. Use local forces to penetrate deep into the enemy’s rear area to harass the enemy. 4. Please tell us of the deployment of your forces, the number of personnel and guns, the names of your main officers, and the strength of your fighting capacity. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 466–67, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-225

395

Resolutely Overcome All Thoughts of Retreating; Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (September 10, 1946) To all the comrades of the district Party committees, and for the information of the Central Plains Bureau:1 1. We completely agree with the Central Plains Bureau’s September 8 telegram2 that all fifteen brigades should be transferred promptly to southern Shaanxi and that some other forces should be sent to Dahongshan to establish contact with the local forces and to develop the base areas there. In that way, the western and central parts of Hubei and southern Shaanxi will form a pincer that holds a large part of Chiang’s forces in check, thus helping northern China, Central China, and the Northwest crush the Guomindang’s attacks. This is your great strategic task; you should convey this strategic task to all officers and men and resolutely overcome all thoughts of returning to your units. 2. Chiang’s army is deploying fourteen brigades to deal with our Central Plains armies (including those in southern Shaanxi; western, central, and eastern Hubei; and western Anhui). Chiang’s army is deploying ninety-eight brigades along the lower reaches of the Yangzi River, the southern branch of the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou]3 railway, the New Yellow River,4 and the entirety

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 472–74, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  The telegram from the Central Plains Bureau stated that leaving the main force of the Central Plains army behind enemy lines might be the most effective strategy to ensure survival and advancement. Overcoming any thoughts of retreating north, the fifteen brigades should all immediately move into Shaanxi, with one section crossing the Xiang River east of Dahongshan to inflict a new phase of heavy losses on the enemy. 3.  The Tianjin-Pukou railway was part of what is now the Beijing-Shanghai railway. 4.  This refers to Chiang Kaishek’s strategy in June 1938 to destroy a dam on the Yellow River north of Zhengzhou to divert the water and create a floodplain to obstruct the Japanese army from moving west. The dam breach was repaired in 1947. 396

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-226

September 1946 397

3. 4.

5.

6.

of the Longhai railway (from Xuzhou to Tianshui) to attack our Liberated Areas in central Jiangsu, Huaihai, southern Shandong, eastern Henan, western Shandong, southern Shanxi, and eastern Gansu. In a span of less than two months between July 13 and September 8, we have annihilated or crippled eighteen-and-a-half enemy brigades. We plan to annihilate another twenty or so brigades over the next four to six months to enable us to crush the Guomindang’s large-scale attacks and its prospects of making gains in the Central Plains. If we can destroy another twenty enemy brigades, the armies of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]5 will certainly be able to cross the New Yellow River and advance toward the Nanyang-Xinyang railway, and our Central China army and a unit of the Shandong army will certainly be able to advance toward the Dabie Mountains. At that time, they can directly cooperate with you in battle. For this reason, resolutely overcome all thoughts of retreating, establish several base areas behind enemy lines, and overcome large numbers of the enemy in their firmly entrenched positions. This is your sacred task. While it might be possible for a small army that is near its base to take the risk of retreating, a large and remote army like yours could become dangerously worn down if forced to withdraw. Hence, you absolutely must not do this. To carry out the above strategic task and more easily solve the problems of food and clothing, you should follow the instructions of the Central Plains Bureau. Quickly transfer the Fifteenth Brigade to southern Shaanxi, and then send Li Renlin6 to take radio equipment and a fairly large force to Dahongshan. If there are extreme difficulties in supplying food and clothing to the troops in northwestern Hubei, apart from the decision to send the Fifteenth Brigade and Chen Xianrui’s7 unit to southern Shaanxi and the need for all of Luo [Houfu] and Wen [Minsheng]’s8 forces to remain in northwestern Hubei unchanged, you can consider having Wang [Shusheng] and Liu [Zijiu]9 lead a column of the main forces to Dahongshan to develop base areas. But you

5.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 6.  Li Renlin (1914–1995, native of Hubei) was political commissar of the Northwest Hubei Fourth Military Subdistrict. 7.  Chen Xianrui (1914–1996, native of Anhui) was deputy commander and chief-ofstaff of the E-Yu-Shaan (Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi) Military Region. 8.  Luo Houfu (1909–1975, native of Hubei) and Wen Minsheng (1915–1997, native of Shanxi) were second deputy commander and second deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Hubei Military Region. 9.  Wang Shusheng and Liu Zijiu were commander and political commissar, and first deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Hubei Military Region.

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must allow for the contingency of the whole of the Sixty-sixth Division and the majority of the Seventy-second Division marching on central Hubei. 7. In short, no matter what happens you must create base areas behind enemy lines, and you must not retreat. You must launch a resolute struggle against the especially dangerous thought of retreating, which runs counter to the strategic task. You must oppose the wavering and fleeing of some comrades in the face of difficulty. 8. You may inform leading cadres in all districts of the gist of this telegram, but you all must burn it promptly after reading it. You must not lose it or verbally transmit it to comrades below the district level. The Central Committee

Notification Regarding the Battle Experience of Liu and Deng’s Army (September 13, 1946) To Zhang [Zongxun] and Luo [Ruiqing]; and for the information of Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Chen [Yi], and Song [Shilun]:1 1. How is the campaign going? It is very much on our minds. 2. This time 50,000 troops under Liu and Deng2 attacked 9,000 troops from two brigades of the enemy’s Third Division. The battle continued from dusk on September 3 until the morning of September 6, and our forces finished off one brigade, causing panic all along enemy lines. Another brigade was wiped out by our forces in half a day as it tried to break through the encirclement on the afternoon of September 6. In the morning of September 7, two brigades of reinforcements from the Forty-seventh Division rushed to the scene and we eliminated these two brigades in one day. In addition, we wiped out one unit, respectively, in the Forty-first Division and the Seventy-fourth Brigade. This experience tells us: First, it is necessary to first amass four to five times, or at very least three times, as many troops as the enemy; at the outset, wipe out one or two regiments of enemy troops to boost the morale of our forces and stir up panic amongst the enemy; after this victory, wipe out a second and third unit, eliminating them one by one. Never be too greedy and never disperse our fighting forces. We have conveyed this point repeatedly in our telegrams, but we do not know if you are acting in accordance with this principle. Second, you must be prepared for five to seven days of fighting to

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 478–79, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission to Commander Zhang Zongxun (1908–1998, native of Shaanxi) and Political Commissar Luo Ruiqing of the Datong Frontline Command. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Military Region. He Long was commander of the Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan) Military Region. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Song Shilun was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Shandong Field Army. 2.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-227

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annihilate and rout the enemy in the vicinity of Pingdiquan.3 This is because you will have to eliminate the enemy unit by unit, and we reckon the enemy to be tenacious. You should therefore set aside plenty of time to deal with this enemy. If the enemy attempts to retreat to the west, then that will be a different story. The Military Commission

3.  Pingdiquan is the former name of what is now part of Jining city in Inner Mongolia.

Order of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission Regarding Amassing a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One1 (September 16, 1946)2 Each Head: 1. The method of fighting by amassing a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one must be employed not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign but also in the disposition of troops for a battle. 2. With regard to the disposition for a campaign, when the enemy employs many brigades (or regiments) and advances against us from several directions, we3 must amass an absolutely superior force—six, five, four, or at least three times the enemy’s strength—and pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy brigade (or regiment) first. It should be one of the enemy’s weaker brigades (or regiments), or one that has less support, or one stationed where the terrain and the people are favorable to us.4 We5 should tie down the rest of the enemy brigades (or regiments) with small forces in order to prevent them from rushing reinforcements to the brigade (or regiment) we are encircling and attacking so that we can destroy it first. When this has been achieved, we should, according to the circumstances, either wipe out one or several more enemy brigades or retire to rest and consolidate for further fighting. (For example, our army in Central China under the command

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, pp. 117–20, where it is reproduced from Zhongguo gongchandang shi cankao ziliao, Vol. 5. 1. Mao Zedong drafted this inner-Party directive on behalf of the Central Military Commission. 2.  This is the date given in Mao Zedong xuanji, and confirmed in Nianpu. The version reproduced in Mao Zedong ji, which we follow here, is evidently wrong on this point. In what follows, we indicate only variants of some substance, ignoring those that are purely stylistic changes in the Chinese or that have no significant impact on the meaning. 3.  We → Our army 4. ​a​re favorable to us. → are most favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy. 5.  We → Our armies (Similarly, “The enemy” has been replaced in the official version by “The enemy armies.” These variants occur repeatedly and will not be further noted.) DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-228

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of Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin] wiped out 5,000 of the enemy’s communications police corps near Rugao on August 22, another enemy brigade on August 27, and one-and-a-half brigades on August 28.6 Another example is how our troops under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping annihilated one enemy brigade near Dingtao between September 3 and 6, another on the afternoon of September 6, and two more on September 7–8.) In the disposition for a campaign, we must reject an erroneous method of fighting that underrates the enemy and therefore divides our forces to deal with all of the enemy detachments, for by using this method we cannot destroy even one enemy detachment and we will land ourselves in a disadvantaged position. 3. In a battle,7 when we have amassed an absolutely superior force to strike at8 one of the enemy detachments (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out the entire encircled enemy at one blow, and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it difficult to get results. Instead, we should amass an absolutely superior force (that is, a force six, five, four, or at least three times that of the enemy, and concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery), select one9 of the weak spots in the enemy’s positions, attack it fiercely, and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one. 4. The effects of this method of fighting are twofold: first, complete annihilation, and second, quick decisions. Only complete annihilation can deal the most telling blows to the enemy, for when we wipe out one regiment, it will have one regiment less, and when we wipe out one brigade, it will have one brigade less. This method is most useful when employed against an enemy lacking second-line troops. Only complete annihilation can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition but also an important source of our manpower. Complete annihilation demoralizes the enemy’s troops and depresses popular feeling, whereas on our side it raises the morale of the troops and inspires the people. Quick decisions make it possible for our troops either to wipe out the enemy reinforcements one by one or to evade them. Quick decisions in battles and campaigns are a necessary condition for the strategy of protracted warfare. 5. At present, many of our military cadres approve of the principle of amassing our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one but they often fail to apply it in practice. This results from underestimating the enemy and a lack

6.  The dates of August 27 and 28 have been changed to August 26 and 27 in Xuanji, and in the most recent and authoritative text in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 482. 7.  In a battle, → In the deployment for a battle, 8.  to strike at → to encircle 9.  one → one (not two)

September 1946 403

6.

7.

8.

9.

of intensive education and study. It is necessary to cite detailed cases of past battles to explain again and again the advantages of this method of fighting and to point out that it is the chief method for defeating Chiang Kaishek’s attacks. By using this method, we will win. By acting counter to it, we will lose. The principle of amassing our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one has been a fine tradition in our army ever since its foundation more than a decade ago; this is not the first time it has been put forward. But during the War of Resistance Against Japan, dispersing our forces for guerrilla warfare was primary and amassing our forces for mobile warfare was supplementary. In the present period of civil war, however, conditions have changed.10 Amassing our forces for mobile warfare should be primary and dispersing our forces for guerrilla warfare should be supplementary. Now that Chiang Kaishek’s army has acquired more powerful11 weapons, it is necessary for our army to place special stress on the method of amassing a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one. When the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive, this method must be employed. However, when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive, we should adopt different methods depending on the situation. When our force is big and the enemy in that locality is rather weak, or when we are making a surprise attack on the enemy, we may strike at several of its units simultaneously. For example, between June 5 and 10, our troops in Shandong Province simultaneously attacked and captured more than ten towns on the Qingdao–Ji’nan and the Tianjin–Pukou railways. Thus,12 when we do not have enough forces, we should seize enemy-occupied towns one by one.13 That was how our forces in Shanxi Province took the towns along the Datong–Puzhou railway. When the main force of our troops is amassed to annihilate the enemy, it must coordinate its operations with vigorous activity by regional formations, local guerrillas, and people’s militia. When regional formations (or troops) attack an enemy regiment, battalion, or company, they should also adopt the principle of amassing our forces to annihilate the enemy forces one by one. The principle of amassing our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is aimed chiefly at annihilating the enemy’s effective strength, not at holding or seizing a place. In some circumstances, it is permissible to abandon

10. ​ha​ve changed. → have changed, and so should the method of fighting. 11.  more powerful → relatively more powerful 12.  Thus, → Or to take another example, between August 10 and 21, our troops under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping attacked and captured more than ten towns along the section of the Longhai railway between Kaifeng and Xuzhou. Thus, 13. ​o​ne by one. → one by one, and should not attack the enemy in several towns simultaneously.

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certain places for the purpose of concentrating our forces to strike a blow at14 the enemy or of enabling our main force to avoid heavy enemy attacks and to facilitate rest and consolidation for further fighting. So long as we are able to wipe out the enemy’s effective strength,15 it will be possible to recover lost territory and seize new territory. Therefore, all those who succeed in destroying the enemy’s effective strength should be commended. This applies not only to those who destroy the enemy’s regular forces but also to those who destroy the peace preservation corps,16 home-going contingents,17 and other reactionary local armed bands. We must, however, hold or seize territory wherever the relative strength of the enemy and our own forces makes this possible or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns or battles; to do otherwise would be a mistake. Those who succeed in holding or seizing such territory should therefore also be commended.

14.  strike a blow at → wipe out 15.  effective strength, → effective strength in a big way, 16.  the peace preservation corps, → the enemy’s peace preservation corps, 17.  During the war, some landlords and local tyrants fled the Liberated Areas to the Guomindang-controlled areas. The Guomindang organized them into “home-going contingents” that accompanied the Guomindang army in its attacks on the Liberated Areas.

Letter to Chen Jinkun1 (September 22, 1946) Mr. Chen Jinkun: Today I read your article, “Why I Take Part in CPC Work.” It speaks with the force of justice; it can strengthen the will of warriors and sap the spirits of those who are crafty and evil. I plan to send it to Liberation Daily for publication and to broadcast it to the whole nation. Right now, Chiang’s army is carrying out a large-scale attack against Zhangyuan,2 and I intend to invite you to Yan’an so we can plan together how to carry out our work. What do you think of this? I look forward to your reply. Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 274, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript. 1.  Chen Jinkun (1887–1959, native of Hunan) was a jurist from Changde city, Hunan Province. After arriving in Yan’an from Beiping in 1946, he served as a member of the Legal Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and as president of the People’s Court of North China. 2.  Zhangyuan is another name for Zhangjiakou, a prefectural-level city in northwestern Hebei. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-229

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Letter to Lu Dingyi1 (September 27, 1946) Comrade Dingyi: The way in which the article2 is written should be changed because the central issue among the soldiers and people in the Liberated Areas at the moment is not one of illusions about the United States and Chiang. The time for such illusions is past. Before July, it was necessary to describe to the soldiers and to the people how formidable and fierce the United States and Chiang Kaishek were. Since July, it has not only become unnecessary, but it may even have harmful side-effects. Now the central question in the minds of the soldiers and people in the Liberated Areas is whether we will be victorious and how we can secure victory. In particular, since the fall of some places, everyone has become very concerned. Therefore, instead of saying how oppressive and fierce the enemy is, our articles and our news should put the emphasis on explaining that although the enemy has troop strength of 200 divisions as well as assistance from the United States, and although the enemy has captured some places and may take some more, there are all sorts of conditions that will guarantee our victory and Chiang Kaishek’s defeat. Every time we win a victory, an editorial should be written to hail it and stress its importance. Every time we lose an important place, a short article should be written to explain this event, making clear that once we annihilate the enemy, we will regain the place in the future. Please give some thought to the above guidelines and discuss them with [Hu] Qiaomu and [Yu] Guangsheng3 before applying them as you judge appropriate. As far as exposing the deception of the United States and Chiang Kaishek is concerned, you may write an article to lay bare the enemy’s deceptions, using the enemy’s attack on Zhangjiakou as an example, but the conclusion should stress the certainty that our armies will be victorious so that no one will be disheartened. This article can be used for this purpose, but it must be revised. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 275–76, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. 1.  Lu Dingyi (1906–1996, native of Jiangsu) was head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Our source gives no information about the authorship of the article being discussed here, nor about the content, apart from what can be deduced from Mao’s own text. 3.  Hu Qiaomu was Mao’s secretary. Yu Guangsheng was editor-in-chief of Jiefang ribao. 406

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-230

Chairman Mao Meets with American Journalist Steele and Answers Questions about the Current Situation1 (September 29, 1946) Steele: Sir, do you consider that the U.S. effort to mediate in the Chinese Civil War has failed? If the policy of the United States continues as at present, what will it lead to? Mao: I doubt very much that the policy of the U.S. government is one of “mediation.” Judging by the large amount of aid that America is giving to Chiang Kaishek to enable him to wage a civil war on an unprecedented scale, the policy of the U.S. government is to use the so-called mediation as a smokescreen for strengthening Chiang Kaishek in every way and suppressing the democratic forces through Chiang Kaishek’s policy of slaughter, to reduce China to virtually a U.S. colony. The continuation of this policy will certainly arouse the firm resistance of all patriotic people throughout China. Steele: How long will the Chinese Civil War go on? What will be its outcome? Mao: If the American government abandons its present partial policy of aiding Chiang Kaishek, withdraws its forces now stationed in China, and carries out the three-nation agreement in Moscow,2 then the Chinese Civil War is sure to end at an early date. Otherwise, it may turn into a long war. This would of course bring suffering to the Chinese people, but, on the other hand, the Chinese people will certainly unite, fight for survival, and decide their own fate. Whatever the difficulties and hardships, the Chinese people will certainly fulfil their task of achieving independence, peace, and democracy. No forces of suppression, domestic or foreign, can prevent the fulfilment of this task.

Our source for this text is Jiefang ribao, October 7, 1946, p. 1. A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1199–201. 1.  Chairman Mao Meets with American Journalist Steele and Answers Questions about the Current Situation → The Truth About U.S. “Mediation” and the Future of the Civil War in China—Talk with American Correspondent A. T. Steele 2.  the three-nation agreement in Moscow, → the agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-231

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Steele: Do you consider Chiang Kaishek to be the “natural leader” of the Chinese people? Is the Communist Party of China going to reject Chiang Kaishek’s five demands under all circumstances?3 If the Guomindang attempts to convene a National Assembly without the participation of the Communist Party, what actions will the Communist Party take? Mao: There is no such thing in the world as a “natural leader.” If Chiang Kaishek deals with the political, military, economic, and other problems of China in accordance with the truce agreement and the joint resolutions then adopted by the Political Consultative Conference, not in accordance with the so-called “five demands” or ten demands, which are one-sided and run counter to the agreement and joint resolutions, we will still be willing to work with him. The National Assembly must be convened jointly by various political parties, in line with the resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Conference; otherwise, we will firmly oppose it.

3.  In August 1946, Chiang Kaishek proposed a five-item request, demanding that the People’s Liberation Army withdraw from all of the following areas: one, all areas south of the Longhai railway; two, the entire Qingdao-Ji’nan railway; three, Chengde and all areas south of Chengde; four, most areas in the Northeast; five, all Liberated Areas in Shandong and Shanxi that the people’s forces of the Liberated Areas had liberated from the hands of the puppet forces on June 7, 1946.

Letter to Fu Dingyi1 (September 30, 1946) To my esteemed Master Yu Cheng: I have been touched by your radiance and have received your letter. Your teachings are always so moving and I am very grateful to you. De Fang2 is returning to Beiping and I asked her to bring you a little present, which I hope you will accept. The world situation is very chaotic and I hope you will take care of yourself for the sake of the nation. Respectfully, I wish you well. There is more to say than can be written here. Your student, Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 277, where it is reproduced from a handwritten version. 1.  Fu Dingyi (1887–1958, born in Hengshan, Hunan), also known as Yu Cheng, was a philologist from Hengshan city, Hunan Province. After the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, he was the principal of Hunan High School during the time when Mao Zedong was studying there. In summer 1946, Mao Zedong invited him to Yan'an. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Fu served as director of the Central Research Institute of Culture and History. 2.  Fu Dingyi’s daughter, Fu Defang (De Fang), accompanied him to Yan’an. Fu returned to Beiping first, and Mao sent this letter with De Fang for her to give to Fu when she returned. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-232

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A Summary by the CPC Central Committee on Work in July, August, and September of 19461 (October 1, 1946) 1. The Central Committee’s directive of July 20 on the current situation states: “We can defeat Chiang Kaishek. The whole Party should be fully confident of this.” The fighting in July, August, and September has proved this judgment to be correct. 2. Apart from the fundamental political and economic contradictions that Chiang Kaishek cannot resolve and that are the basic reason rendering our victory certain and Chiang’s defeat inevitable, a sharp contradiction has arisen in the military field between Chiang’s overextended battle lines and his shortage of troops. That contradiction is bound to be the direct cause of our victory and the cause of Chiang Kaishek’s defeat. 3. The total of Chiang Kaishek’s regular troops targeting2 the Liberated Areas, not counting the puppet troops, the peace preservation corps, and the communications police corps, consist of more than 180 brigades.3 In addition to this total, the most Chiang can do is again move part of his troops from south to north as reinforcements, but after that it will be difficult for him to send any more reinforcements. Of the 180-odd4 brigades, twenty-five have been wiped out by our army during the past three months. This does not include the forces we wiped out in the Northeast from February to June of this year. 4. Of Chiang Kaishek’s more than 1805 brigades, nearly half must perform garrison duties; only a little more than one-half can be put in the field. When these field forces advance to certain regions, part or even a majority of them will have to switch over to garrison duty. The enemy’s field forces are bound

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang gaoji dangxiao, ed., Dangnei wenjian cankao ziliao, Vol.1, pp. 9–13 (publication date unknown). A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1203–8. 1.  A Summary by the CPC Central Committee on Work in July, August, and September of 1946 → A Three-Month Summary 2.  targeting → attacking 3.  180 brigades → 190 brigades 4.  180-odd → 190-odd 5.  180 → 190 410

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-233

October 1946 411

to dwindle as the fighting goes on because, first, they will be continually wiped out by us and, second, many will have to perform garrison duty. 5. Of the twenty-five brigades we destroyed during the past three months including in July, August, and September, seven were under the command of Tang Enbo (previously under Li Mo’an), two under Xue Yue, seven under Gu Zhutong (previously under Liu Zhi), two under Hu Zongnan, four under Yan Xishan (5,000 soldiers forming a brigade), two under Wang Yaowu (the sum of several sections), and one under Du Yuming the (sum of several sections in Rehe).6 Only the five7 groups under Xue Yue, Li Zongren, Fu Zuoyi, Ma Hongkui, and Cheng Qian have not yet received crushing blows by our army;8 all the remaining six9 groups have received serious devastating blows or initial blows. Those who have received serious blows are Du Yuming (taking into account the fighting in the Northeast from February to June of this year), Tang Enbo, Gu Zhutong, and Yan Xishan. Those who have received initial blows are Xue Yue, Hu Zongnan, and Wang Yaowu. All this proves that our army can defeat Chiang Kaishek. 6. During the coming period our task is to wipe out some twenty-five more enemy brigades. The completion of this task will make it possible to halt Chiang Kaishek’s offensive and recover part of our lost territory. It can be predicted that after wiping out this second batch of twenty-five brigades our army will certainly be able to seize the strategic initiative and go over from the defensive to the offensive. Our task then will be to destroy a third batch of twenty-five enemy brigades. If we achieve that, we can recover most or even all of the lost territory and expand the Liberated Areas. By that time a tremendous change will surely have taken place in the relative military strength of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. To attain this, we must follow up our great achievement of wiping out twenty-five brigades

6.  Tang Enbo was deputy director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. Li Mo’an (1904–2001, native of Hunan) was commander of the First Pacification Zone. Xue Yue was commander-in-chief of the Xuzhou Pacification Office. Gu Zhutong (1893–1987, native of Jiangsu) was commander of the General Headquarters of the Guomindang army. Liu Zhi was director of the Guomindang’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office. Hu Zongnan was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. Yan Xishan was commander-inchief of the Guomindang’s Second War Zone. Wang Yaowu was commander of the Guomindang’s Second Pacification Zone. Du Yuming was commander of the Guomindang’s Northeast Pacification Headquarters. 7.  five → four 8.  Li Zongren (1891–1969, born in Guilin) was chairman of the Guomindang government and head of the Beiping Field Headquarters. Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Guomindang’s Twelfth War Zone. Ma Hongkui (1892–1950, native of Gansu) was chairman of the Guomindang government and deputy head of the Northwest Field Headquarters. Cheng Qian was director of the Wuhan Field Headquarters of the Guomindang government’s Military Affairs Commission. 9.  six → seven

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

during the past three months and destroy about twenty-five more brigades in the coming three months or so. This is the key to changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves. During the past three months we have lost a few dozen large10 and small towns, such as Huaiyin, Hece, Chengde, and Jining. The abandonment of most of these towns was unavoidable, and it was right to temporarily abandon them on our own initiative. We were forced to abandon some others because we did not fight well. In any case, we will be able to recover our lost territory as long as we fight well from now on. In the future, there may still be places we cannot prevent the enemy from taking, but we will be able to recover all of them later. All areas should critically review their past fighting experience in order to draw lessons and to avoid repeating mistakes. During the past three months, our Central Plains Liberation Army has shown matchless stamina in overcoming difficulties and hardships, and aside from the portion of the army that has moved into the old Liberated Areas, its main force has established two guerrilla bases in southern Shaanxi and western Hubei that are developing into regular bases.11 Moreover, in both eastern and central Hubei our troops are persisting in guerrilla warfare. All this has greatly helped, and is still helping, the fighting in the old Liberated Areas, and it will play a greater role during the long war ahead. During the past three months of battle south of the Great Wall, we have pinned down several of Chiang Kaishek’s crack forces, which he had originally planned to send to the Northeast, and we have thus gained time for our troops to rest and consolidate, and to mobilize the masses in the Northeast. This, too, is of great significance for our future struggles. Amassing a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is the only correct method of fighting and it is the method we have used during the past three months to destroy twenty-five enemy brigades. Only by amassing a force seven, six, five, four, or at least three times as strong as the enemy’s force can we effectively wipe it out. This must be done both in campaigns and in battles. This method of fighting must be mastered not only by all highranking commanders but also by all middle and lower-ranking cadres. During the past three months, in addition to twenty-five regular enemy brigades, our army has also destroyed considerable numbers of reactionary forces, such as puppet troops, peace preservation corps, and communications police corps; this is also a great achievement. We should continue to annihilate such troops in large numbers.

10.  large → medium 11.  At the end of June 1946, forces of the Central Plains Military Region led by Li Xiannian, Zheng Weisan, and others broke through an encirclement by 300,000 Guomindang troops. The units mentioned here are those, under the command of Wang Zhen, that entered the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area.

October 1946 413

12. The experience of the past three months has proved that to wipe out 10,000 enemy troops we have to pay a price of 2,000 to 3,000 sacrifices12 of our own. This is unavoidable. To cope with a long war (and everything, everywhere, should be considered with such a war in mind), we must expand our army in a planned way, ensure that our main forces are always kept at full strength, and train large numbers of military cadres. We must develop production and regulate finances according to plan, and firmly put into effect the principles of developing our economy and ensuring supplies, of unified leadership and decentralized management, and of giving consideration both to the army and to the people and to both public and private interests. 13. The experience of these three months has proved that higher fighting efficiency was shown by all troops, who during the period of the truce from January to June intensified their military training according to the directives of the Central Committee (which has repeatedly instructed the various areas to regard troop training, production, and land reform as their three central tasks). It has also proved that all troops not thus trained showed a much lower fighting effectiveness. From now on, all areas must utilize the intervals between battles for intensified military training. All army units must strengthen their political work. 14. The experience of these three months has proved that the peasants stood with our Party and our army against the attacks by Chiang Kaishek’s troops wherever the Central Committee’s May 4th Directive13 was carried out firmly and speedily, and the land problem was solved radically and thoroughly. The peasants took a wait-and-see attitude wherever the May 4th Directive was not carried out firmly or the arrangements were made too late, or wherever this work was mechanically divided into stages, or land reform was neglected on the excuse of preoccupation with the war. In the coming few months, all areas, no matter how busy they are with the war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to solve the land problem, and on the basis of the land reform, they must make arrangements for large-scale production work next year. 15. The experience of these three months has proved that wherever the regional armed forces, including the people’s militia, guerrillas, and armed work teams, are well organized, we can control vast rural areas even though many points and lines are temporarily occupied by the enemy. But wherever the regional armed forces are weak and the leadership is poor, the enemy has a much easier time. From now on, in areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, we must strengthen the Party’s leadership, develop the regional armed

12.  sacrifices → casualties 13.  This refers to the Directive on the Land Question issued on May 4, 1946, by the Central Committee.

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forces, persevere in guerrilla warfare, safeguard the interests of the masses, and strike blows at the activities of the reactionaries. 16. Three months of war have almost exhausted the reserve forces of the Guomindang and have seriously weakened its military strength in its own areas. At the same time, the Guomindang’s resumption of conscription and grain levies has aroused popular discontent and created a situation favorable for the development of mass struggles. Nationwide, we14 must strengthen leadership of the mass struggles in the Guomindang areas and intensify the work of disintegrating the Guomindang army. 17. The Guomindang reactionaries, under the direction of the United States, have violated the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference of January of this year and they are determined to wage perpetual civil war in their attempt to destroy the CPC and the democratic forces.15 All their fine words are nothing but humbug; we must expose all the plots of the United States and Chiang Kaishek, and fight for the restoration of the truce agreement reached in January. 18. During these three months, the broadest strata of the people in the Guomindang areas, including the national bourgeoisie, have quickly arrived at a better understanding of the fact that the Guomindang and the United States government are working in collusion, have started the civil war, and are oppressing the people. More and more people now realize the issues16 that Marshall’s17 mediation is a fraud and that the Guomindang is the archcriminal of the civil war. The broad masses, disillusioned with the United States and the Guomindang, now place their hopes on a victory by our Party. This domestic political situation is extremely favorable. Internationally, the reactionary policy of U.S. imperialism is arousing increasing discontent among the broad masses of the people in America and other18 countries. The level of political consciousness of the people in America and other19 countries is rising every day, and an economic pandemic in America is soon to come. The people’s democratic struggle is mounting in all capitalist countries, the strength of the Communist parties in many countries has greatly increased, and it will be impossible for the reactionaries to reduce them to submission. The might of the Soviet Union and its prestige among the people are growing daily. The noise of “war against the Soviet Union” made

14.  Nationwide, we → The whole Party 15. ​t​he CPC and the democratic forces. → the people’s democratic forces. 16.  the issues → the truth 17.  George Marshall in December 1945 became special envoy of the United States to China in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after his negotiations were declared a failure. 18.  America and other → all 19.  America and other → all

October 1946 415

by the U.S. reactionaries and the reactionaries whom the U.S. supports in other countries is nothing but bluff and bluster. The U.S. reactionaries and the reactionaries whom they support in other countries are bound to become more and more isolated. This international political situation is extremely favorable. The situation both at home and abroad differs greatly from that after World War I. The revolutionary forces have grown tremendously since World War II. We can defeat the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, no matter how rampant they are (this rampancy is historically inevitable and not at all strange). Leading comrades in all areas should explain this fully to those comrades in the Party who are gloomy about the future of the struggle owing to their inadequate understanding of the favorable situation at home and abroad. It must be made clear that the enemy still has strength, that we ourselves still have some weaknesses, and that the struggle is still long and cruel. But we can certainly win a victory. This understanding and conviction must be firmly established throughout the Party. 19. The coming few months will be an important and difficult period. We must strenuously mobilize the whole Party, undertake meticulously planned military operations, and radically change the military situation. All areas must resolutely carry out the above policies and strive for a radical change in the military situation.

Issues Relating to the Current War Situation and the Negotiations (October 10, 1946, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.) To Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu], and for the information of Ye [Jianying]:1 We received your telegram sent on the 8th between 5:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M. 1. [Chen] Jiakang’s2 speech is excellent. 2. It can be clearly seen that all our current actions result from the fact that the Guomindang is responsible for the disunity, and we are not. 3. Chiang [Kaishek]’s army is usually good at defense, but it is deficient in offensive spirit. This reflects a contradiction between officers and soldiers in the Guomindang army, and a lack of fighting spirit among the soldiers and lower-level officers. Since we destroyed one regiment and one battalion of their Sixteenth Army at the front near Huailai, their offensive force has been blunted. Now, they are preparing to launch a second assault, transferring two divisions of the Ninety-fourth Army (minus one regiment and one battalion) from Mentougou to the areas south of Huailai as well as one of the two divisions of the Fifty-third Army from Yanqing to join the front at Huailai, while at the same time bringing one brigade from the Northeast to concentrate its forces at Changping and prepare a second assault. In addition, the Thirteenth Army will attack Weichang and march toward Guyuan, and one unit of Fu Zuoyi’s3 army will move to Zhangbei. Chiang [Kaishek] has proposed a tenday armistice solely for the purpose of facilitating their troop movements and preventing us from launching a counterattack during these ten days. 4. The assault of Chiang’s army is about to reach its peak everywhere, and after that he will not be able to attack again. We can then immediately seek Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 517–19, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu (1886–1975, native of Hubei) were the Party representatives in Shanghai. Ye Jianying was serving as the Communist Party member in the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 2.  Chen Jiakang (1913–1970, native of Hubei) was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Nanjing Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party and spokesperson on current affairs for the Party’s Shanghai Office. 3.  Fu Zuoyi was commander of the Guomindang army’s Twelfth War Zone. 416

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-234

October 1946 417

out their weak points and destroy their vital forces. Thereafter, we will be able to gradually shift to a counterattack and regain the places we have lost (although in the immediate future we will lose a few more places). Such a possibility has already clearly emerged. 5. In July, August, and September we destroyed a total of twenty-five brigades of Chiang’s regular army (including Yan Xishan’s4 troops). In the next three or four months, we must strive to destroy twenty-five more brigades. 6. The current negotiations are unrelated to military matters, and the question of cooperation has not arisen. All you have to do is educate the masses and make it very clear that we should not be held responsible for the disunity. We must resolutely disclose the fraud carried out by the United States and the Guomindang, and not urge Marshall and [John] Leighton Stuart5 to stay when they talk about withdrawing from mediation. We should consider in the near future withdrawing from the Office [for Military Mediation in Beiping] (it seems better if we raise this point after winter, because neither side has any intention of fighting major battles during the winter in the Northeast, and the Beiping Office would still be of some use during this period). 7. The temporary armistice in the Northeast will continue for a certain period because Chiang needs to move some of his troops to attack Rehe (one division of his Seventy-first Army) and the [Bei]ping-Sui[yuan railway] (his mobile force plus one brigade). We shall now launch a retaliatory operation, take Xifeng, and fight a few more battles. In the Northeast as a whole, however, we should continue to maintain a generally peaceful attitude. But do not reveal any of this to outsiders. A B6

4.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Second War Zone. 5.  George Marshall in December 1945 became a special envoy of the United States to China in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after the negotiations were declared a failure. John Leighton Stuart began serving as American ambassador to China on July 11, 1946. 6.  Here as elsewhere, we have substituted the letters A and B for the characters jia and yi. Since our source indicates that Mao drafted this text on behalf of the Central Committee, A and B may stand for the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.

On the Problem of Selecting Students to Be Sent to Learn How to Operate Tanks1 (October 13, 1946) To the East China Bureau, and for the information of the Northeast Bureau: We notified you previously to select 600 students from Shandong and to send them to Dalian to learn how to operate tanks, but we have not yet received your response. We are not sure whether you have begun selecting them. This is a rare opportunity. We expect you to put someone in charge of secretly selecting these students. They must be young and strong, either Party members or reliable sympathizers. This must be kept secret from outsiders. Send them to Dalian as soon as they have been selected. We hope you will inform us regarding your progress. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 524, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 418

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-235

Assemble the Full Forces of the Shandong and East China Field Armies and Eliminate the Enemy Moving Eastward North of the Huai River (October 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To Chen [Yi], Zhang [Dingcheng], Deng [Zihui], Zeng [Shan], and for the information of Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 We received the telegram you sent last night.2 We are pleased to learn that you are determined to fight north of the Huai River. The news from Nanjing is that Chiang’s plan is to lead us to Shandong. We have not been there for some time, so the enemy is determined to engage us in a decisive battle north of the Huai River. This type of situation is to our advantage. We hope that you will assemble the full forces of the Shandong and East China field armies (you absolutely must not disperse them) and eliminate the enemy moving eastward. Afterward, have the whole army cross and recover the west bank of the canal. If you eliminate seven to ten of Xue Yue’s3 brigades within two to three months, it will definitely change the situation; you can recapture territory on both sides of the Huai River and prepare to advance toward the Central Plains. To carry out this sacred task, it is absolutely crucial for Chen, Zhang, Deng, Zeng, Su, and Tan to unite and cooperate.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 525–26, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army; Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region; Zeng Shan (1899–1972, native of Jiangxi) was minister of the Central China Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee; and Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that the field armies planned to fight north of the Huai River, with Li Yannian assigned to attack Shuyang and Su Yu assigned to lead the First and Sixth Divisions north to assemble in Shuyang. The intention was to win several battles, but if the enemy moved eastward before the Central China Field Army could return north, the armies would seek opportunities to attack the enemy’s flanks and rear. This meant delaying the plan to move back to southern Shandong. 3.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-236

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Under Chen’s leadership, you should make joint decisions on major policies (the six of you should get together frequently to avoid bungling military opportunities by sending telegrams back and forth) and give Su responsibility for combat operations. Ye [Fei]’s4 column and all the garrison brigades should keep watch on the enemy in southern Shandong, and, if necessary, you can consider sending over the coastal garrison brigades. As long as you can win a victory north of the Huai River, the enemy in southern Shandong will not dare to penetrate Linyi. In sum, changing the situation mainly depends on your armies and the armies of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping].5 The key is to wipe out ten to fifteen of Xue Yue’s brigades (you are responsible for eliminating seven to ten of them, while Liu and Deng are responsible for eliminating three to five). As long as you do not make additional mistakes, this goal is certainly attainable. The Central Committee

4.  Ye Fei was commander of the First Column of the Shandong Field Army. 5.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

Adopt the Method of Besieging a City and Destroying the Relief Forces to Eliminate the Enemy’s Effective Strength (October 24, 1946) To Zhan [Caifang], Li [Chuli], and Wang [Zhitao]; and for the information of Cheng [Zihua] and Li [Yunchang]:1 Your guiding principles for combat should emphasize eliminating the enemy’s effective strength; once that is done it will naturally be easy for us to recover all the strongholds occupied by the enemy. In order to put this principle into practice, you should adopt the method of besieging a city and attacking the enemy’s relief forces. The purpose of besieging a city is not to capture the city but rather to destroy the relief forces. You should assemble a military force seven or eight times the size of the enemy’s (for example, gather together four or five regiments to attack one or two battalions of the enemy’s relief forces), and you should be fully prepared before every event. Do not fight frivolous battles; when you fight, you must win. During combat, you must surround and outflank the enemy forces in order to wipe them out completely. You should thoroughly educate the cadres about this point. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 527–28, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Zhan Caifang was commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region, while Li Chuli (1903–1999, native of Hebei) and Wang Zhitao (1906–1999, native of Hebei) were political commissar and chief-of-staff, respectively. Cheng Zihua was commander and political commissar, and Li Yunchang was deputy commander, respectively, of the Ji-Re-Liao (Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning) Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-237

421

The Enemy Is Strong and We Are Weak, So We Must Prepare for a Protracted Struggle1 (October 25, 1946) To the Northeast Bureau: We received your October 22 telegram. Your appraisal is correct; the Chinese and American reactionaries’ policy of wiping out the Liberated Areas will not change. Our Party comrades should never be deluded into thinking that peace will be bestowed upon us. A temporary ceasefire will only be possible after we have eliminated a large part of the enemy’s effective strength, crushed various enemy attacks, and enabled the development of the Liberated Areas. Throughout the country and the Northeast, the enemy is strong and we are weak. In order to change this situation, we must be prepared for a protracted and arduous struggle. The Central Committee

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 529, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 422

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-238

Expand Your Forces and Make the Capture of the Whole of Hainan Island Your Goal (October 30, 1946) To Feng [Baiju], Huang [Kang], and Li [Ming]:1 We received your telegram2 of the 26th. Your views are very correct. You should fight resolutely and expand the army and the Liberated Areas. Learn how to assemble your main forces for mobile warfare. Strive to eliminate one battalion or one regiment of the enemy forces at a time. At the same time, develop militia and guerrilla forces to join your main forces in the fighting. You should make the capture of the whole of Hainan Island your goal, with future development toward the southern route.3 Your “repeated resolution to persist in self-defense while counterattacking”4 is correct. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 534–35, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Feng Baiju (1903–1973, native of Hainan) was secretary of the Central Committee’s Qiongya (now Hainan) Special Committee and also commander and political commissar of the Qiongya Independent Guerrilla Column. Huang Kang (1909– 1995, native of Guangdong) was deputy secretary of the Central Committee’s Qiongya Special Committee, and Li Ming (1910–1977, aka Lin Liming, native of Guangdong) was head of the Political Department of the Guerilla Column. 2.  The telegram from Feng Baiju et al. stated that following the retreat of the Dong­ jiang Column, the higher authorities had indicated that they should persist in fighting while withdrawing cadres out by sea and evacuating personnel. Feng and the others unanimously agreed that it would be difficult to follow these instructions due to the lack of secure harbors and boats, and it would lead to the total collapse of operations in Qiongya. They asked the Central Committee for further instructions, agreeing to withdraw if the situation in Guangdong and Hainan was considered hopeless, but they were willing to fight on if it would be possible for them to survive in Hainan. 3.  The southern route refers to Guangdong’s Leizhou Peninsula region, the Lian River, and Huazhou; and Guangxi’s Pubei and Qinzhou regions. 4.  This refers to the summary report on self-defense, submitted to the Central Committee by Feng Baiju, Huang Kang, and Li Ming on October 27, 1946. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-239

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The Fighting inside the Shanhai Pass Will Soon Reach a Turning Point That Will Benefit Our War in the Northeast (November 1, 1946) To Lin [Biao], Peng [Zhen], Gao [Gang], and Chen [Yun]:1 1. We received your October 31 telegram.2 Your battle plan is very good. We hope you will carry it out resolutely. 2. The fighting inside the Shanhai Pass will soon reach a turning point. Chiang [Kaishek]’s attacking force will soon be used up. If we can wipe out more than ten brigades of the enemy troops in November and December, we will be able to halt the enemy’s attack, shift to a strategic counterattack, and recover lost territory. This should make it possible to clamp down on Chiang’s army such that it has no way to bring reinforcements to the Northeast. This will facilitate execution of your new battle plan. 3. Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]’s3 armies wiped out another brigade of the Twenty-eighth Division south of the Lianshui River, and now they are

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 542–43, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Peng Zhen, Gao Gang, and Chen Yun were deputy political commissars. 2.  The telegram from Lin Biao and the others stated that the enemy had used the Song­ hua River to halt the Northeast Democratic Allied Army and had also assembled its main forces to attack southern and western Manchuria. The enemy had also recently dispatched forces to attack Taonan, but its military strength was weak north of Changchun. The Northeast Democratic Allied Army planned to send by train five divisions from Harbin through Qiqihar to the south of the Songhua River and then launch an attack that would frustrate the enemy’s plan to attack Taonan as well as support southern Manchuria and foil the enemy’s plan to attack Harbin. 3.  Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army.

424

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-240

November 1946 425

continuing to attack the Seventy-fourth Division. Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]’s4 armies eliminated one brigade of the Sixty-eighth Division and are now proceeding to attack another brigade. The Central Committee

4.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

Congratulatory Telegram to Marshal Stalin Celebrating the Twenty-Ninth Anniversary of the Soviet Union1 (November 6, 1946) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, November 6) On the eve of National Day in the Soviet Union, Chairman Mao of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Commander-in-Chief Zhu sent a congratulatory telegram to Marshal Stalin. The original text of the telegram follows: Your Excellency Marshal Stalin of the Soviet Union: Congratulations on the twenty-ninth anniversary of your esteemed country. Over the past twenty-nine years, the Soviet Union has consistently sympathized with the cause of China’s national independence and the people’s liberation. Starting with Dr. Sun Yatsen, the Chinese people have also consistently sympathized with the Soviet Union’s contributions to the peace and progress of mankind. May this friendship be perpetually strengthened. Mao Zedong Zhu De

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 10, p. 59, where it is reproduced from an article published on November 7, 1946, in Jiefang ribao, entitled, “Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu Send a Congratulatory Telegram to Marshal Stalin, Perpetually Strengthening the Friendship between the People of China and the People of the Soviet Union.” 426

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-241

Guiding Principles for Work in the Rural Areas of the Southern Provinces (November 6, 1946) To Fang [Fang] and [Yin] Lin [Ping]; and for the information of Zhou [Enlai], Dong [Biwu], Liu [Xiao], and Wu [Yuzhang]:1 Given the current situation of all-out civil war, two different guiding principles should be adopted regarding work in the rural areas of the southern provinces: First, anyone who is able to establish an open guerrilla base should do so immediately. In the original base areas such as Hainan Island, the Southern Route, the Middle Route, Xijiang, Beijiang, Dongjiang,2 and southern and western Fujian, you should encourage the original overt and semi-overt forces to closely rely on the masses as they continue their struggle. They should not adopt a policy of passive demobilization, which boosts the morale of the enemy and undermines our authority. At present, large numbers of Guomindang regular troops are being transferred out of the southern provinces. Conscription and grain levies are being carried out on a widespread basis, so this is a good opportunity for us to launch a guerrilla war. In light of this principle, the second item in your October 25 telegram referring to large-scale demobilization in southwestern Fujian is inappropriate and should be reconsidered. You sent personnel to Hainan Island

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 552–53, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Fang Fang (1904–1957, born in Puning, Guangdong) and Yin Linping (1908–1984, born in Xingguo, Jiangxi) were secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the Guangdong Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Liu Xiao (1908– 1988, native of Hunan) was secretary of the Shanghai Bureau of the Central Committee, and Wu Yuzhang (1878–1966, born in Rong county, Sichuan) was secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  These were five anti-Japanese guerrilla bases that the Chinese Communist Party established in southern China. The Southern Route base area was in Qinzhou and Lianjiang, in the northern part of Leizhou Peninsula. The Middle Route, also called the Central base area, was in Xinxing, Enping, Yangchun, and Yangjiang prefectures. The Xijiang (West River) base area was in Guangning and Sihui prefectures; the Beijiang (North River) base area was along the border of Yingde, Wengyuan, Xinfeng, Fogang, and so forth, as well as in the Wendong area of Qingyuan county; the Dongjiang (East River) base area was in the Luofu Mountain area bordering Zengcheng and Boluo county, and also part of Dongguan and Huiyang county. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-242

427

428 Mao’s Road to Power

to communicate the demobilization policy, which has aroused intense resentment there. The Central Committee has already sent a telegram instructing them to fight resolutely with the goal of capturing the whole of Hainan Island and to advance toward the Southern Route in the future. Second, in all areas where conditions are not yet ripe, you should adopt a policy of lying low and waiting for the right conditions to develop. At the moment, the majority of areas are like this, but our goal in these areas is still to actively prepare for open guerrilla warfare and to create the various conditions for establishing guerrilla bases rather than to adopt a policy of lying low for a protracted period, regardless of whether conditions are ripe. The above two guiding principles apply to all the rural areas in the various southern provinces. You should adopt the first or second policy according to the specific circumstances. We hope that Zhou, Dong, and Liu will directly make arrangements for the southeastern provinces, and that Wu and the Sichuan Provincial Committee will handle the southwestern provinces. The Central Committee

The Method for Handling Captured Officers (November 8, 1946) To Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], and Shu [Tong]:1 We received your November 4 telegram. Captured officers should be dealt with in different ways: 1. Apart from those who have been recruited into our army, deputy commanding officers should all be released. 2. First officers at the rank of battalion-commander or above as a rule should not be released; only individuals who might be useful in sowing division among the enemy should be released. You should educate company and platoon commanders and strive to have some of the more progressive elements join our army. The rest can be released if it is impossible to retain them, but the most reactionary among them should not be released. 3. Those to be released should be educated and then released. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 554, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander of the Shandong Military Region, Li Yu was deputy political commissar, and Shu Tong was director of the Political Department of the Shandong Military Region. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-243

429

Campaigns and Tactics Both Require Concentrating the Fighting Forces to Ensure Victory (November 9, 1946) To Xiao [Hua], Jiang [Hua], Cheng [Shicai], and Luo [Shunchu]; and for the information of Lin [Biao]1 and Ximan and Dongman:2 The experience you gained from this campaign3 is very good. 1. The first time, when you assembled five regiments to strike the Twenty-fifth Division, you were unable to succeed. The second time (from October 31 to November 2), when you assembled eight regiments to strike this division, you were victorious. During future campaigns, whenever you are going to fight somewhat larger battles, always amass eight or ten regiments of troops; ideally, you should be able to assemble twelve regiments to be assured of victory. Concentrating your fighting forces is imperative during the campaign. 2. Tactically you also need to concentrate your soldiers. You encircled the Twenty-fifth Division on October 31 and launched nine attacks on November 1, but all were unsuccessful. At daybreak on November 2, you concentrated your artillery fire and broke through a point at Nanbeishan, after which you were able to expand your victory and entirely eliminate this division in half a day. You should follow this approach in all future campaigns. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 555–56, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Xiao Hua was commander and political commissar of the Liaodong Military Region, and Jiang Hua (1907–1999, native of Hunan) was deputy political commissar; Cheng Shicai and Luo Shunchu were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Third Column of the Liaoning Military Region. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 2.  Ximan and Dongman were military regions of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, under the command of Huang Kecheng and Zhou Baozhong, respectively. 3.  This refers to the Xinkailing Campaign of October 25–November 2, 1946, during which the Northeast Democratic Allied Army’s Fourth Column in the Liaodong (Nanman) Military Region annihilated 8,000 troops of the Twenty-fifth Division of the Guomindang’s Fifty-second Army. 430

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-244

Letter to He Kaifeng (November 14, 1946) Comrade Kaifeng:1 I have received the four books as well as your letter. On the left is the masthead I wrote,2 please consider using it. Is your health a bit better now? I have been ill for more than half a year, but I am feeling much better now and should be even better after another half-year. Please send my regards to all the comrades. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 279, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript. 1.  He Kaifeng (1906–1955, native of Jiangxi) was director of the Propaganda Department of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  This refers to the words “Dongbei ribao” (Northeast Daily) written by Mao on the left-hand side of the letter. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-245

431

Directive on Chiang Kaishek’s Recent Moves of Attacking Yan’an and Convening the “National Assembly”1 (November 18, 1946) Bureau and District Party Committees as well as Column Commanders: Chiang Kaishek is at the end of his rope. He wants to strike at our Party and strengthen himself by two methods—by convening the “National Assembly” and by attacking Yan’an. Actually, he will accomplish the very opposite. The Chinese people resolutely oppose the “National Assembly” stage-managed by Chiang Kaishek to split the nation; the opening day of that assembly marked the beginning of the self-destruction of the Chiang Kaishek clique. Militarily, now that we have wiped out thirty-five brigades of Chiang Kaishek’s troops and their offensive power is nearly exhausted, even if he should gather eight or nine brigades and2 occupy Yan’an by means of a sudden thrust, it would not damage the general prospect for victory in the People’s War of Liberation, nor could it save Chiang Kaishek’s future of self​-destruction.3 In short, Chiang Kaishek has taken the road to ruin; as soon as he makes these two moves of convening the “National Assembly” and attacking Yan’an, all his trickery will be exposed; this will help the progress of the People’s War of Liberation. In every area we should fully explain to the people inside and outside the Party that these two actions by Chiang Kaishek, the convening of the “National Assembly” and the attack on Yan’an, and we should unite the whole Party, the whole army, and the whole people in the fight to smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive and bring democracy to China.4 Central Committee November 18 Our source for this document is Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript found in the Central Archives. It can also be found in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi diyi bianyanbu, Junshi kexueyuan junshi zhanlüe yanjiubu, and Zhongguo renmin geming junshi bowuguan, eds., Lishi juren Mao Zedong huazhuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2013), Vol. 3, p. 135. A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960). 1.  Directive on Chiang Kaishek’s Recent Moves of Attacking Yan’an and Convening the “National Assembly” → Directive of November 18, 1946 2.  he should gather eight or nine brigades and → his troops should 3. ​s​ave Chiang Kaishek’s future of self-destruction. → save Chiang Kaishek from the doom awaiting him. 4. ​bri​ng democracy into China. → build a democratic China. 432

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-246

Winning Requires Successfully Forming a United Front1 (November 21, 1946) We already predicted at the time of the Party’s Seventh National Congress that after the capitulation of Japan, if we could not overcome the conspiracy of Chiang Kaishek and the danger of a Chinese Scobie,2 a civil war in China could not be avoided. Chiang Kaishek seemed to change a little bit this January and February,3 but subsequent events have demonstrated that the prediction of the Party’s Seventh Congress was correct after all. The world had previously witnessed the conflict between fascism and anti-fascism. After the war, this was replaced by a world marked by confrontation between the American reactionaries and the people of the world, and this confrontation was also reflected in China, where Chiang Kaishek, with the support of the United States, launched a civil war against the people. The struggle in China is therefore intimately linked to world events. In recent times, the question of whether there might be a civil war has arisen among both the Chinese people and within our Party, and everyone has hoped there would be no fighting between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But now the question has been resolved. For example, this time the people have far fewer illusions about Chiang’s ceasefire order, as shown by the reaction in Shanghai and elsewhere. The question remains whether we can win. This is like the situation at

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 196–202, where it is reproduced from a stenographic record of the speech preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong made this speech during a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Ronald Scobie (1893–1969) was commander of the British armed forces stationed in Greece after World War II. After the invading German army was defeated in Greece in October 1944, Scobie brought the Greek government-in-exile with him from London to enter Greece together with the British forces and he assisted the Greek government in attacking the Greek People’s Liberation Army. 3.  On January 10, 1946, the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang formally promulgated a ceasefire agreement. On the same day, the Political Consultative Conference was convened in Chongqing, and it passed the “Outline for Peaceful Construction of the Nation” and four other motions related to government organization, the national congress, the drafting of the constitution, and military affairs. On February 25, the Communists and the Guomindang concluded the “Basic Proposal Regarding the Reorganization of the Armed Forces and Incorporation of the Communist Forces into the Guomindang Army.” It was not long thereafter before each of these agreements collapsed. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-247

433

434 Mao’s Road to Power

the beginning of the global struggle against fascism when people worried whether it would be possible to defeat Japan and Hitler. Now many people hope that we will be victorious, but at the same time many people fear we will not be victorious because we have lost places such as Changchun, Zhangjiakou, and now perhaps Yan’an, Yantai, and others. As a result, the problem of exposing Chiang’s scheme to launch a civil war and of dissipating any illusions about peace has become of secondary importance. Our priority is to publicize the fact that conditions exist for us to win and to build up firm confidence in a victory. We have been doing this work for the past several months and will continue doing it in the future. If we want to win, we must succeed in establishing a united front, which means increasing our numbers and isolating the enemy. Of course, the enemy also intends to isolate us, but the enemy itself is the only one who will be isolated. With respect to the international situation, there too we cannot be isolated. At present, there are three zones in the world: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the intermediate zone between them.4 The people of all three zones oppose the American reactionaries. Today’s world is characterized by confrontation and conflict between American imperialism and the people of the whole world. Several months ago, we told American journalists that American policy was wrong, but they would not believe it and they tried to defend it. Now they no longer defend it. When they come to Yan’an, they only ask why we do not criticize the Soviet Union. The people in the United States may also undergo a change, rise up, and oppose the American reactionaries. The foundation of the United States is in an extremely perilous condition. It is not like Danbazhaizi in Bao’an5 in the past, which would not have faced a crisis if you had not attacked it. A crisis in the United States is going to occur, and it will be much more serious than in the past. The American imperialists are outwardly strong but inwardly weak, like Chiang Kaishek, and they can be overthrown. Were not both Napoleon and Hitler overthrown in the end? We say that the Chinese and American reactionaries are outwardly strong but inwardly weak, so we must despise them. This is not merely to boost our own morale, but it is also based on fact. In short, the world is making progress, the Soviet Union is developing, and the United States is facing a crisis. The principal contradiction today is between the United States and the other countries in the capitalist world, that is, between the United States and the intermediate zone. We are not isolated, and our united front is broad. If we can manage to survive the next year, things will become better in the following year. 4.  Eds.: The Theory of Intermediate Zones was first articulated by Mao Zedong in an interview with American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The intermediate zone refers to the vast area lying between the United States and the Soviet Union. 5.  Bao’an refers to today’s Zhidan county in Shaanxi Province. Danbazhaizi was a village in southwestern Bao’an with 200 or more families, strategically situated and easy to defend. The Red Army besieged the village many times without capturing it, but finally in August 1936 the Red Army used the local militia to encircle the village and in December 1936 it was liberated.

November 1946 435

Chiang Kaishek’s basic orientation toward us is, first, not to give us freedom, and second, to eliminate us. He is unwilling to allow us to retain any territory at all according to the conditions of the treaty he seeks to impose on us. Our basic orientation therefore must be to fight, and this has already been established. Compared to the first period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our conditions are somewhat better, and the united front is broader. We have asked all the people returning from Shanghai and Beiping, “Was the united front during the War of Resistance Against Japan broader, or is today’s united front broader?” Some of our comrades were ignored at the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, but now the situation is different. Many people would like to have a word with our comrades, saying our policy is all right, and they only ask whether it will change in the future. In the Liberated Areas, is our united front narrower than it was during the War of Resistance Against Japan? It is almost the same. Carrying out land reform will not affect our uniting with the landlords, just like rent and interest reductions during the War of Resistance, even though they caused some losses to the landlords, it did not prevent us from uniting with them. After completion of land reform, we can win them over next year by showing consideration for their livelihood and allowing them, like the peasants and in accordance with our experience in Yan’an, to engage in production. At present, only one-tenth of the landlords in southern Shaanxi, western Hubei, and western Henan are against us, and nine-tenths are neutral or willing to help us. The united front is a fundamental issue, and no matter what, we must unite with the vast majority of the people. Provided only that we do not adopt a closed-door policy, Chiang Kaishek cannot isolate us. Look at the second article of the Sino-American Trade Treaty.6 How can Chiang Kaishek not be isolated? If he is isolated, we will be victorious. Militarily, Chiang Kaishek launched an all-out civil war almost five months ago. We have so far wiped out thirty-eight enemy brigades, a little more than half of the seventy-five [that we plan to destroy]. It is difficult to imagine that we are not going to destroy any more of them in the future. The armies of Yan Xishan and Gu Zhutong7 in their two regions are already unable to attack, and at present, Cheng Qian8 does not have the strength to attack either. The campaign launched

6.  The Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation signed by the Guomindang and American governments on November 4, 1946, consisted of thirty articles. The primary content of the second article granted Americans the right to reside and travel in all internal territories of China; to pursue employment in commerce, manufacturing, production, science, religion, charitable enterprises, and all other jobs not set aside specifically for Chinese; and to rent and lease land. Americans were granted the same economic rights as Chinese, and equal treatment to that of any other third-party country in China. 7.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Second War Zone. Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s army’s General Headquarters and director of the Zhengzhou Pacification Office. 8.  Cheng Qian was director of the Wuhan Field Headquarters for the Guomindang’s MIlitary Affairs Commission.

436 Mao’s Road to Power

by Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]9 can be described as our counterattack, since we attacked them while they were passive everywhere. Gu Zhutong will find it very difficult to attack again without a transfer of troops from Hu Zongnan.10 It is possible that he may benefit from the transfer of the Eleventh Army from Xue Yue11 or of the troops from Hu Zongnan to participate in the fighting, and in that case the siege of Yan’an will have to be raised. If Gu Zhutong is unable to attack, we will attack him. We will still use the method of a surprise attack, assembling a superior force to eliminate the enemy. At present, the Guomindang may still have the strength to attack Yan’an, Lianshui, Linyi, and Yantai, and to launch some attacks in Shanxi, Chahar, Hebei, and the Northeast, but the others are not in much danger. If we do not analyze the enemy’s strategy, it will be like the time when Cao, during the period of the Three Kingdoms, claimed he had a force of 830,000, causing a heated debate in the Kingdom of Eastern Wu.12 Chiang Kaishek’s attack can be smashed, eliminating seventy to eighty of his brigades in six to twelve months. When his attack has been halted, we can begin our counterattack and crush his forces, which have accumulated during the last seven or eight years with American assistance, thus creating a balance of power between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Once we have achieved a balance, it will be easy to surpass him. At that time, we can break out, first to Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and Gansu, and then south of the Yangzi. This will take approximately three to five years. Of course, we cannot say that by that time we will be able to wipe out Chiang Kaishek. We prefer to make a somewhat more conservative estimate, but at the very worst, we will fight no more than fifteen years. And we might end up without a single county town on our side. We must prepare for this too. In 1941 and 1942 we occupied very few county towns. Now we have lost only a few more than 170 of the 499 that we originally occupied. Solving the land problem is the foundation of all our work. The spring plowing next year will be the first created on the new basis by land reform. Everything should be calculated based on the assumption of a protracted war. The delegation has engaged in negotiations for a year and it has done its work well. The main purpose of the negotiations is to educate the people, and this

9.  This refers to the Huaxian Campaign from November 18 to November 22, 1946, during which the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping carried out long-distance raiding tactics and annihilated a total of 12,000 troops of the Guomindang army’s Twelfth Column, 104th Brigade, and parts of the 125th Brigade. This destroyed the Guomindang’s plans to control the southwestern parts of Shandong and opened up the Beiping-Hankou railway. 10.  Hu Zongnan was deputy director of the Guomindang army’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office as well as commander of its First War Zone. 11.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 12.  In this story from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Cao Cao led an immense army south to attack Eastern Wu. The military and civilian leaders of Eastern Wu disagreed over whether to surrender or to fight.

November 1946 437

has been achieved. The delegation cannot return early; it can only return after the National Assembly convenes.13 Only in this way can the responsibilities for war and division be clarified, and the confidence of the people be maintained. When the fighting begins, we will lose if the hearts of the people are not with us. Educating the people has always been a task of our Party, and we should persevere in it. Now the people have finally come to know who wants to fight and who wants peace; the people have also become clearer about the deception by the American government. Our Party itself also needs to be educated; there is also a process of education. We suffered losses in demobilization and as a result, some of our forces are not adequate and the militia has also been reduced. Shall we adopt the slogan, “Down with Chiang Kaishek”? We must do the work, but not put forward the slogan. Our slogan is still restoration of the positions when the ceasefire agreement came into effect on January 13th and implementation of the decision of the People’s Political Conference. We must consider that if we keep on fighting against Chiang Kaishek, after we eliminate his seventy-five brigades, the United States may again increase its support and new difficulties will then arise. Therefore, on the one hand, we must despise them, since we cannot otherwise boost our morale and dampen the enemy’s spirit; but, on the other hand, we must take the enemy seriously, be careful and accurate in each battle, and not be careless. When shall we return to negotiations? It is a faulty strategy for Chiang Kaishek to convene a “National Assembly.” He wants to strengthen himself, but instead he will weaken himself. He has, however, promised in advance that the “constitution”14 can still be changed within six months. If we eliminate his seventy-five brigades, by that time he will “love peace” again. He may want to negotiate again, and we will not be able to refuse. There will be many tiresome issues. In sum, this is a long-term struggle, and there will be many twists and turns in the course of it. This is not caused exclusively by Chiang Kaishek’s side. The principal factor is interference by the imperialists. The split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party this time is different from that in 1927. We were completely passive at that time, while this time we are prepared. The cadres are clear about the future, and the masses also understand it.

13.  The National Assembly convened by the Guomindang government in 1946 agreed to convene again in accordance with the Political Consultative Conference’s January 1946 resolution, but only if the reorganized government allowed for participation by all parties. In the meantime, the civil war was launched and the Guomindang convened the National Assembly from November 15 to December 25 with additional participation by the Youth Party, the Democratic Society Party, and other small parties. The Chinese Communist Party and other parties and organizations refused to participate in or to recognize this National Assembly. 14.  This refers to the constitution passed during the National Assembly held from November 15 to December 25, 1946.

The Overall Situation Will Improve if the Enemy Forces Advancing to the North Can Be Eliminated within a Month or Two (December 1, 1946) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]; and for the information of Teng [Daiyuan], Bo [Yibo], and Wang [Hongkun]:1 1. Your last two battles have already put Gu Zhutong2 in a passive position, and we have seized the initiative. Now the Eighty-fifth and Fifth divisions of the enemy’s Fifth Army are attacking toward the north in retaliation, as they have been forced to do. If we fight well, this should still be beneficial to us. We hope you will deploy one military unit to keep watch on the enemy while assembling your main forces for rest and reorganization. When the time and place are right, attack and annihilate one enemy unit. It is best to attack the relatively weak parts first and prepare to fight several battles in succession within the next one to two months to wipe out the army. This will improve the overall situation. 2. Because we took resolute measures, we have forced Chiang Kaishek to temporarily abandon his plans of attacking Yan[an]. Two brigades of the Ninetieth Division returned to Linfen from Hejin, and two brigades of the First Division returned to Hejin from Hancheng. All that remains of Dong Zhao’s3 military units on the west bank are one brigade from the First Division and one brigade from the Twenty-seventh Division, so there is no

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 569–70, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Teng Daiyuan (1904– 1974, Miao nationality, native of Hunan) was first deputy commander, Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, and Wang Hongkun (1909–1993, born in Macheng, Hubei) was second deputy commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military Region. 2.  Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the General Headquarters of the Guomindang army. 3.  Dong Zhao (1902–1977, native of Shaanxi) was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army. 438

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-248

December 1946 439

main force to attack Yan’an. Apart from Zhang Zongxun’s4 two brigades, which remain in the border regions for training and reorganization, our plan is for Chen Geng’s column5 to coordinate with Wang Zhen’s unit6 and to go all-out in dealing with Lüliang and to threaten the flank of Linfen. On the Taiyue front, the twelve brigades under the command of Teng [Daiyuan], Bo [Yibo], Wang [Hongkun], and all the local regiments will form a column that bears responsibility for defending the area. 3. To strengthen our military forces in the south, which will be advantageous for our subsequent attack on Henan, we are sticking to the decision to transfer the columns of Yang [Dezhi] and Su [Zhenhua]7 to the south. These columns can begin to move on December 10. After they have crossed the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway, we plan to let them move on to Taihang to rest and reorganize for two months. We hope you will prepare good weapons and a batch of new recruits to replenish your forces. These columns will subsequently come back under your command. How to deploy them will be decided after the columns have moved south and have completed their rest and reorganization. The Military Commission

4.  Zhang Zongxun was commander of the First Column of the Jin-Sui Field Army. 5.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 6.  Wang Zhen was commander and political commissar of the Second Column of the Jin-Sui Field Army. 7.  Yang Dezhi was commander and Su Zhenhua was political commissar of the First Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Field Army.

Guiding Principles for Fighting in the Eastern Hebei Area (December 4, 1946) To the Party Committee of the Eastern Hebei Region; and for the information of the Central Bureaus [of Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei] and the branch offices [in Hebei, Chahar, Rehe, and Liaoning]:1 We received your telegram of November 30. During the last five months our forces have wiped out thirty-nine brigades and have essentially halted large-scale attacks by Chiang’s army. Within the next half-year, our army must strive to destroy about forty enemy brigades to bring about a fundamental change in the military situation. Generally speaking, for the time being it will be natural to treat guerrilla warfare as the main approach in your area and in Rehe.2 However, you should regularly assemble three brigades (nine regiments) and seek out the enemy’s weak points to carry out mobile warfare and strike at the enemy’s less firmly entrenched strongholds. You should use one unit to carry out a frontal attack while using your main forces to outflank the enemy. On each occasion, you should wipe out one or two battalions or a regiment of enemy forces. Within the next half-year, you should strive to eliminate five to six enemy regiments and to recover all the strongholds that can be recovered. All zones should engage in guerrilla warfare. The Central Committee

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 571–72, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.  Rehe Province covered what is now northeastern Hebei, southwestern Liaoning, and southeastern Inner Mongolia before it was abolished in 1955. 440

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-249

Conversation with Three Western Journalists (December 9, 1946) 1. Question from [George Harmon (?)]1: Are the Guomindang armies still attempting to attack Yan’an? Answer: Their plans to attack Yan’an were set long ago, and they still want to do it. But we have an excellent chance of crushing the invading army. 2. Question from Roderick:2 Given the situation inside China, will the fighting continue? What would it take to get the negotiations started again? Answer: Yes, the fighting will continue because the other side wants to fight. “The current overall orientation of the Chinese Communist Party remains that of respecting the line of the Political Consultative Conference and striving to restore the position of the January ceasefire agreement. The illegal and divisive National Assembly now being held should be dissolved.”3 At present, they have been allowed to destroy all the agreements concluded at the Political Consultative Conference. Politically, they are holding a “National Assembly” and militarily they are launching an overall offensive. 3. Question from Roderick: Is the Chinese Communist Party no longer bound by the ceasefire agreement? In the past, the pretext was always retaliation only when attacked; is it true at present that you may launch an attack wherever the Communist troops have the strength to do so? Answer: They abrogated the ceasefire agreement long ago, so of course we are no longer bound by it. Future negotiations will hinge upon the results of the war. 4. Question from [George Harmon (?)]: So are there only two possibilities for the future: that the Communist Party becomes very strong or that the Communist Party becomes very weak? Answer: Very possibly so.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 203–9. According to the editors of Wenji, the passages in quotation marks contain what Mao agreed to allow the journalists to publish. 1.  We believe this journalist was George Harmon, perhaps affiliated with United Press. 2.  John Roderick (1914–2008), an American foreign correspondent with Associated Press, was considered a leading “China watcher.” 3.  This is one of the two brief passages that Mao Zedong authorized the three journalists to publish. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-250

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5. Question from Roderick: The U.S. State Department spokesman gives the following reasons for the United States Marine Corps to be stationed in China: (1) To ensure the safety of the families and the property of American personnel in the Office for Military Mediation; and (2) to ensure that trains keep running on the railway line between Tianjin and Tanggu so that American personnel in the Beiping Office [for Military Mediation] can obtain supplies. Since this is the case, why doesn’t the Chinese Communist Party withdraw its members from the Office [for Military Mediation] so that it would cease to exist altogether? Wouldn’t this destroy its pretext and be a clever move? Answer: There are now Americans in Harbin and Yan’an, so why wouldn’t it be just fine for the United States to go ahead and station troops in Harbin and Yan’an? What the U.S. State Department spokesman says is just an excuse. 6. Question from [George Harmon (?)]: What is, in fact, the rationale for keeping the Office [for Military Mediation] at all? Answer: The Americans are not going to withdraw, so we are not planning to withdraw either. As to whether or not we will withdraw in the future, we have yet to consider it. 7. Question from Roderick: The reason that Americans fully support Chiang Kaishek is that the Chinese Communist Party is anti-foreign. Historically, that’s how it was in 1927. Answer: The Chinese Communist Party is not, in fact, anti-foreign; it welcomes people such as you, Mr. Roderick. On the other hand, we do oppose Hurley4 and his ilk, but that doesn’t mean we wouldn’t give him anything to eat. We’d give him some millet to eat, but we wouldn’t hold a welcoming reception for him and we wouldn’t applaud when he speaks; in fact, we would prefer to have all of his kind sent out of China. There are now two kinds of Americans. Ma Haide,5 Li Dunbai,6 and [Agnes] Smedley7 are all good

4.  Patrick Jay Hurley, appointed ambassador to China in November 1944, supported Chiang Kaishek. He resigned in November 1945. 5.  This is the Chinese name adopted by George Hatem (1910–1988), a LebaneseAmerican physician who first went to China in 1933 because of an interest in tropical diseases, and ultimately spent the rest of his life there as a member of the Chinese Communist Party. At this time, he was medical adviser to the Chinese Communist Party’s delegation to the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. 6.  This is the Chinese name adopted by Sidney Rittenberg (1921–2019), an American who first went to China in 1945 as an intelligence officer in the U.S. army, and ultimately stayed in China for more than thirty years as a broadcast journalist in the English-language section of Radio Beiping. During the latter half of 1946 he handled English-language newscasts for Xinhua News Agency radio stations in Zhangjiakou and Yan’an. 7.  Agnes Smedley (1890–1950) was an American journalist who went to China at the end of 1928 as a correspondent and became involved in left-wing cultural activities in Shanghai. In 1937, she interviewed leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in Yan’an and she spent two years following the New Fourth Army in central and eastern China.

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Americans. In Yan’an there’s [Anna Louise] Strong,8 also a good person. We welcome all such people. Not just people like these, but we want even those who oppose us to come and have a look at the Liberated Areas. As long as they write relatively fair reports, it will do us good. We hope that all journalists will become spokesmen for the people rather than for the reactionaries. 8. Question from Roderick: Do you plan to hold a people’s congress? Answer: We have seen the text of your dispatch, which takes a relatively fair-minded stance. A people’s congress is not yet being held, regardless of whether or not the Guomindang attacks Yan’an. But it certainly will be held in the future because it is a meeting of the people’s representatives and it will at least allow us to sum up some work experience. 9. Question from [George Harmon (?)]: The Communist Party opposes the “Sino-American Trade Treaty.”9 Why is that? Answer: The Sino-American Trade Treaty is an unequal treaty that permits Americans to purchase and construct buildings and real estate, set up factories, and open stores in China at will, and allows American ships to navigate on China’s inland rivers. In the past, the Japanese used the “Twenty-One Demands”10 to ask for all of these things in one part of China—Manchuria— and this met with opposition from all the Chinese people. Question from [George Harmon (?)]: American ships are also permitted on England’s inland rivers, and Chinese people can purchase buildings and open factories in foreign countries, so why do you say that the SinoAmerican Trade Treaty is an unequal treaty? Answer: Only after many years, when China has the capital and the ships, will we be able to go abroad; it’s not possible at this point. Question from [George Harmon (?)]: I’m planning to buy a house in Beiping. Will it be confiscated in the future? Answer: No, it won’t be confiscated. We can give a few houses to people like you to live in. Question by [George Harmon (?)]: So an equal treaty in the eyes of the Chinese is one that gives none of China’s interests to foreign countries but does enjoy the benefits of foreign interests. Answer: A treaty such as you describe would also be unequal.

8.  Anna Louise Strong (1885–1970) was an American journalist who arrived in China in June 1946 on her fifth visit to the country. See “Talk with Anna Louise Strong,” August 1946, in this volume. 9.  The Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation was signed in Nanjing, by the Guomindang government and the U.S. government on November 4, 1946. 10.  The “Twenty-One Demands” was a secret agreement that the Japanese imperialists proposed to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916, native of Henan) on January 18, 1915, taking advantage of the opportunities presented by World War I. Among other things, the “TwentyOne Demands” acknowledged special privileges for Japan in Inner Mongolia and southern Manchuria. The demands ultimately were not fully implemented.

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Question from Roderick: Why doesn’t the Chinese Communist Party publicly express its opposition to the Sino-American Trade Treaty? Will you nullify it when the Communists take power in the future? Answer: We openly state that we will definitely abolish it in the future. Even now, this treaty is not being implemented in the Liberated Areas. “We express our opposition to the Sino-American Trade Treaty. November 4th is China’s new day of national humiliation. This trade treaty should be nullified and another, equal trade treaty should be concluded.”11 1 0. Question from Roderick: In February of this year, Mr. Chairman, you spoke of the world situation as advantageous to the development of the democratic movement. Is this still the case? Answer: The tide is even higher now. From February of this year until now, all of the actions by American imperialist elements have gone against the will of the people, and they will soon be defeated. There is a difference between the American reactionary elements and the American people. The reactionary elements wish to exercise exclusive domination over the world, and this is bound to give rise to opposition from the people of the whole world. Every country in the world has its reactionary elements, and they go against the will of the great majority of the people, suppress democracy, and oppress the people, so they are sure to meet with opposition from the people. Several months ago the American people were not yet aware of the reactionary policies of the United States. For example, they did not realize that stationing troops in China, interfering in China’s internal affairs, and supporting Chiang and opposing the Communists are all reactionary policies. Now American journalists such as Snow,12 Smedley, and others have written articles expressing their opposition. On July 7th of this year we issued a statement13 in which we criticized the policies of the Americans and Chiang. At that time, people in China and abroad said it went a bit too far, but today there are few defenders of American policy. Even Steele14 doesn’t defend American policies, and Bai Xiude15 has written a book criticizing the Guomindang. The

11.  This is the second quotation that Mao authorized for publication. 12.  Edgar Snow (1905–1972), an American progressive writer and journalist, went to China in 1928 and visited the revolutionary base in northern Shaanxi in 1936 and 1939, interviewing Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party numerous times. He left China in 1941, but he returned in 1942 and stayed until 1943. 13.  See “The Reactionaries’ Schemes Will Ultimately Fail,” June 30 and July 7, 1946, in this volume. 14.  Archibald Steele (1903–1992) was an American correspondent in China for the New York Herald Tribune. 15.  The Chinese name for Theodore Harold White (1915–1986), an American journalist and author, who served as the Chongqing correspondent for Time magazine from 1939 to 1945. White visited Yan’an in 1944, and coauthored the book Thunder Out of China in 1946 with his wife Annalee Jacoby (1916–1963).

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current anti-Soviet stance of the United States is a smokescreen to disguise the fact that it wants to dominate the world. First of all, it damages the interests of China and Britain, and second, it damages the intermediate zones between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union has closed its doors to carry out reconstruction, so it is not affected in the least. This sort of policy is therefore bound to fail. The American people are also leaning to the left and do not like the current policies, as demonstrated by the recent elections. If they liked the Democrats’ policies, people would have voted for the Democrats, but they voted Republican because the Republican Party hasn’t been in charge for the past twelve years and they wanted to try a change, and in ten years there may indeed be changes. The British people are also leaning to the left. Forty percent of Parliament’s Labour Party members oppose Bevin’s16 policies, and I predict that within a year or so, those in Britain’s Labour Party who oppose Bevin and Attlee17 could be a large majority. The Chinese people, too, are leaning to the left. The Communists are living in earthen caves in Yan’an and subsisting on millet, so what capital do we have? Yet in five months we have already wiped out thirty-nine brigades of the regular Guomindang army. Journalists of good will should not believe anti-Soviet rumors. The workers’ movement in the United States is not yet unified. There are two or three factions that are not unified either organizationally or politically, but there is hope for the future. Socialism will surely be realized in America in the future. In China, on the other hand, it is a bit more difficult; there may be twists and turns in the future. In sum, the worldwide movement for democracy is on the rise. 11. Question from Chen Yifan:18 It has become impossible for the Communists to accept American mediation between the Guomindang and themselves, but would British mediation be welcomed? Answer: At present, Britain does not have the courage to oppose American policy; it follows America’s lead. And what would be the use? Even if it wanted to oppose the U.S., the U.S. is difficult to deal with. Ultimately, China’s problems must be solved by the Chinese people themselves, but we welcome technical aid from foreign countries. 1 2. Question from [George Harmon (?)]: What is the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party toward the question of Hong Kong?

16.  Ernest Bevin (1881–1951) was British foreign minister at that time. 17.  Clement Attlee (1883–1967), a leader of the British Labour Party, was prime minister at that time. 18.  Chen Yifan (Jack Chen) (1908–1995) was the son of Eugene Chen (1878–1944), who served as China’s foreign minister in Nanjing from June 1931 to 1932. After many years living overseas, Chen Yifan was invited to return to China in 1950. He moved to Hong Kong in 1971 and wrote for Far Eastern Economic Review and The New York Times.

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Answer: Right now we are not demanding its immediate return. China is so vast and many places have not been managed well, so why should we be in a hurry to take back this small territory? The problem can be solved in the future by means of negotiation.

Telegram to Overseas Chinese Associations in Siam (December 25, 1946) To seventy-one overseas Chinese associations in Siam,1 including the Siam Overseas Chinese General Union for Building the Chinese Nation and Saving the Motherland, the Siam Workers Union, the Siam Overseas Chinese Youth Union, the Siam Overseas Chinese Education Association, and the Siam Qiongya Association, and to all overseas Chinese in Siam: I received your telegram of November 22; it spoke with the force of justice and I am greatly moved. The Guomindang authorities turned down the proposal to suspend the illegal National Assembly and then refused to dismiss the illegal National Assembly. The actual intention is to shut the door on negotiations. China’s people will never accept the illegal, separatist, single-party National Assembly, and the so-called constitution it passed. From now on, our Party is determined to fight to the last for restoration of the political consultation line and to restore the January 13 military position. We hope that our countrymen abroad will work together to bring about an independent and peaceful democracy in our motherland. Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Renmin ribao, December 25, 1946, p. 1. It is also reproduced in Mao Zedong sixiang wansui. Neibuben, November 1967, p. 276. 1. The Chinese term used here, Xianluo, is the name by which Chinese referred to Thailand before June 24, 1939, when it was still known as Siam. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-251

447

Fight More Small Battles and Make Destruction of the Enemy’s Effective Strength Your Objective (December 26, 1946) To Chen [Geng], Xie [Fuzhi], and Wang [Zhen]:1 We received each of the telegrams you sent. 1. Your last two battles were fought very well; you wiped out an enemy battalion each time. If you can fight several more such battles, it will amount to a great victory. 2. Fighting in the current areas is very difficult for both the enemy and for us. You should seek out small battles in the vicinity of Xi county and Yonghe, destroying one or two enemy battalions each time. Persist in this for a while, and do not worry about enemy penetration. Your purpose should always be destruction of the enemy’s effective strength. For the moment, do not attack Pu county or Tumen. 3. Wait roughly two weeks until the enemy has penetrated deeply, and the enemy’s rear is completely defenseless. At that time, you can consider letting the Twenty-fourth Brigade remain in its present location, while the three brigades led by Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi] pass through Pu county. As a first step, they should capture Xiangning, Hejin, and Jishan. Their second step should be to take Wanquan, Ronghe, Yishi, and Linjin,2 pushing all of Dong Zhao’s3 military units back southward and smashing Liu Kan’s4 plan

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 594–95, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Wang Zhen was commander and political commissar of the Second Column of the Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan) Field Army. 2.  Wanquan and Ronghe counties were merged to form Wanrong county, Shanxi Province, in 1954. Yishi and Linjin counties were merged to form Linyi county in 1954. 3.  Dong Zhao was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army. 4.  Liu Kan (1906–1948, native of Hunan) was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Twenty-ninth Army. 448

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-252

December 1946 449

of using all his units to attack Yan’an. If by that time Liu Kan has already penetrated deeply into northern Shaanxi to attack Yan’an, you can immediately cross the river near Hancheng to attack his rear (all the counties on the Central Shaanxi Plain). 4. We hope for a report on whether Hejin, Jishan, and other locations on the lower reaches of the Fen River are already iced up, or whether they are passable. 5. The plan stated in the third item above is still under study. Future developments must be taken into account before making a decision on its feasibility. The Military Commission

1947



Congratulatory Speech on the Occasion of the New Year (January 1, 1947) In 1946, in the aftermath of the war, the bright side of the world waged a victorious struggle over the dark side, and likewise after the war, the bright side of China also waged a triumphant fight over its dark side. In the postwar world and in postwar China, a people’s movement to achieve peace and to strive for democracy and liberty has developed on a massive scale. This movement is bound for victory. There is no force that can stop this movement. The reactionaries are nonetheless always trying to stop it. The task of the people of the whole world and of all of China is to unite all forces to smash the obstruction by the reactionaries. In 1947, a worldwide united front of people from all nations in the world, including China, against the U.S. policy of aggression will develop rapidly, and the Chinese people’s movement to achieve democracy and freedom will attain even greater victories than in 1946. The result will be a change in China’s situation that will be advantageous to the restoration of peace and to the nation’s independence. We Communists were striving for postwar cooperation among all parties even during the War of Resistance Against Japan. But at the same time, we sounded a warning: “The principal ruling clique of the Guomindang is surreptitiously carrying out preparations for civil war behind the smokescreen of ‘convening a National Assembly’ and [achieving] a ‘political settlement.’ If our compatriots fail to take note and fail to expose their schemes and put a stop to their preparations, then one fine morning the cannonade of civil war will be heard.”1 After the War of Resistance Against Japan came to an end, we joined with China’s people to patiently make every possible effort to prevent an outbreak and expansion of civil war. Unfortunately, these efforts have been sabotaged by the reactionaries’ general offensive and the Guomindang’s single-party “National Assembly.” But the Chinese people continue to strive for peace through two kinds of efforts, namely, the extremely harsh and arduous struggle by people of all social classes to crush the reactionaries’ offensives in the Liberated Areas, and the steadily

This text first appeared on January 1, 1947, in Jiefang ribao. We have translated it from Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 210–11, where it is reproduced from the above source. 1.  This quotation is from Mao’s report of April 24, 1945, to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, entitled “On Coalition Government.” For the full text of this latter report, see Vol. VIII, pp. 759–822. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-254

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intensifying mass movement by people of all social classes to win democracy and freedom in the areas under Guomindang rule. This collective will of the Chinese people will surely overpower the will of any reactionary elements, and thereby enable sincere peace negotiations among the various parties and groups and a truly peaceful life throughout the country. Up until now, the Guomindang authorities have not shown the slightest intention of seeking peace. Under the direction of the American government, they are busy dressing themselves up with the splittist “National Assembly” and the autocratic “constitution” to “legitimize” their war and American assistance. But as long as all of China’s people can unite as one and persist in unremitting and unyielding struggle, then the sun of freedom will surely shine on every corner of our motherland in the very near future, and a stable foundation for an independent, peaceful, and democratic new China will surely be established within a few years.

Strive to Annihilate Three to Four Brigades in Each Battle (January 2, 1947) To Chen [Yi], and for the information of Su [Yu]:1 We received your telegram of January 1.2 1. The slogan of making battles self-supporting and using battles to improve fighting tactics is a very good one. You should take the battle of eastern Suqian3 as an example and strive to fight a large-scale war of annihilation, which is to say, completely and thoroughly wipe out three to four enemy brigades in each battle. If you fight two or three more battles like this, the enemy’s attacks can be stopped and some of the lost territory can be recaptured. 2. Are preparations complete for fighting Ma Liwu?4 Have Su and the First Division joined you in southern Shandong? We hope the fighting this time will bring results like those in eastern Suqian. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 599–600, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Su Yu was commander of the Central China Field Army 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi summarized the lessons of the Subei (Northern Suqian) Campaign and the battles in Yancheng and Lianshui, noting that the territories gained were many and large but that misuse of resources by certain departments was resulting in excessive losses and waste; he advocated making battles self-supporting and also using battles to improve fighting tactics. 3.  This battle, which took place in mid-December 1946, was also called the battle of northern Suqian. 4.  Ma Liwu (1904–1963, born in present-day Guapo town, Shaanxi) was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Twenty-sixth Division. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-255

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Go All-out toward the Goal of Fighting a War of Annihilation (January 5, 1947, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 We received your telegram sent between 9 P.M. and 11 P.M. on the 4th.2 1. The thorough annihilation of the Twenty-sixth Division is wonderful and of great comfort; orders will be given for officers and men of the entire army to be cited. 2. The second step is to wipe out the four brigades in the two divisions of Feng [Zhi’an]’s forces.3 We estimate that you may use the tactic of pursuit and attack to deal with one section, but resolving the matter in its entirety and recovering the Yi [county]–Tai’[erzhuang]–Pi [county]4 fortification line may require more than a week. 3. After the above task is fulfilled, the entire southern Shandong army should rest and recuperate for two or three weeks in the area around the Yi [county]– Tai’[erzhuang]–Pi [county] line, replenish their ranks with new recruits, recover from exhaustion, and prepare to fight again.

The source of this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 603–5, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this is telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Su Yu was commander of the Central China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan) Field Army. Tan Zhenlin was political commissar of the Central China Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi and Su Yu stated their intention to annihilate the Guomindang’s Twenty-sixth Division that day. It also stated they would strive to wipe out Feng Zhi’an and then proceed to eradicate the enemy forces in southern Shandong and to create a formation that threatened Xuzhou, after which they would fight the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Seventy-fourth Division and Eleventh Division and attack Haizhou to reclaim the lost territory to the south. 3.  Feng Zhi’an was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Fifty-ninth Division and Reorganized Seventy-seventh Division. 4.  Yi county (now Yicheng) and Tai’erzhuang are now under the jurisdiction of Zaozhuang city, Shandong Province; and Pi county is in Jiangsu Province. 456

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-256

January 1947 457

4. At this time, Xue Yue5 is certain to transfer around ten brigades from central and northern Jiangsu as well as move several brigades from other places (for example the Sixty-fourth Division, the Fourteenth Division,6 and so on). It is estimated that a total of approximately fifteen brigades could be deployed to guard the Longhai line and attempt to recover the Tai’[erzhuang]–Yi [county] line; this would require about three weeks’ time. 5. After annihilating Feng’s forces, occupying Tai’[erzhuang] and Yi [county], and allowing the troops to rest and reorganize, your task will then be to annihilate any enemy forces that appear on the Longhai railway or areas north or south of it. When fighting on this railway, large armies can be spread out to fight an even larger war of annihilation. At that time, you should amass a troop strength of about forty regiments and make ample preparations so as to wipe out five or six enemy brigades at one time. 6. Because of these considerations, after occupying Yi [county], Tai’[erzhuang], and Pi [county], you must not rush to battle in Haizhou,7 or engage the Seventy-fourth Division or the Eleventh Division in battle. Rather, it would be better to have the troops rest and reorganize, consolidate your victory, and lure the Seventy-fourth and Eleventh divisions (and possibly the Fourth Division, the Forty-fourth Division, and others as well) northward into a suitable area near you and then annihilate them. 7. The only way to recover lost territory in central and northern Jiangsu is to lure the enemy northward and wage three or four battles of annihilation like the ones we fought in eastern Suqian and southern Shandong. It will not do to try to recover lost territory prematurely, before having annihilated the enemy’s main forces; the aim of recovering the Yi [county]-Tai’[erzhuang] line is to create a battlefield. 8. After wiping out Feng’s forces and occupying Yi [county] and Tai’[erzhuang], for the purpose of creating a battlefield, consider annihilating the Fifty-first Division, occupying Zaozhuang, and then sending an advance detachment across the canal to control the Longhai railway. The entire Ninth Column should go north of the Huai River to the areas of Sui[ning], Su[qian], Ling[bi], and Si [county] and resume operations there. Pi [Dingjun]’s brigade8 should go to the Yan[cheng]-Fu[ning] area and continue operations there. The Second Division,9 Second Column, and Seventh Division (twenty

5.  Xue Yue was head of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 6.  According to the editors of Junshi wenji, this should be the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Tenth Division, not the Fourteenth. 7.  Haizhou is an old name for what is now a district of Lianyungang city, Jiangsu Province. 8.  Pi Dingjun was commander of the Thirteenth Brigade of the Central China Field Army. 9.  According to the editors of Junshi wenji, this should probably be the Sixth rather than the Second Division.

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regiments in all) should also rest, regroup, and replenish their ranks, and prepare to participate in a new large-scale battle. The temporary loss or gain of Shuyang is of little significance. In sum, the overarching objective is to fight a major war of annihilation, and it is hoped that operations will be arranged in accordance with this general policy. 9. Only one situation would cause us to abandon the above plan and adopt a policy of moving southward at this time to recover lost territories, and that is if Chiang [Kaishek] and Xue do not, in fact, move the enemy troops from central and northern Jiangsu northwards to the Longhai railway and do not move troops from elsewhere to the Longhai railway. But this sort of prediction appears somewhat premature at this time, as the Longhai railway lies before us, and troops should be moved in order to defend this line. The Military Commission

Congratulatory Telegram on the First Anniversary of the Insurrection by the Central China Democratic Allied Army1 (January 8, 1947) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, January 9) This is the first anniversary of the founding of the Central China Democratic Allied Army. Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu have sent a special congratulatory telegram, the text of which is as follows:) For the perusal of Commander-in-chief Hao [Pengju] [1903–1947, born in Wenxiang, Henan], Deputy Commander-in-chief Bi [Hao] [1927–2014, native of Jilin], and all commanders and soldiers of the Central China Democratic Allied Army: Our warmest congratulations on the first anniversary of the founding of your honorable army. We hope you will work with us to utterly destroy the offensive by Chiang Kaishek to promote the realization of a peaceful and democratic new China. Mao Zedong, Zhu De

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 127, where it is reproduced from Jiefang ribao, January 9, 1947. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-257

459

Encircling Cities and Attacking Reinforcements Are an Important Way to Annihilate the Enemy (January 11, 1947) To Lin [Biao], Gao [Gang], and Peng [Zhen]:1 1. It is a great relief that you have recently begun fighting victorious battles in northern and eastern Manchuria.2 Encircling Qitamu led the enemy to send unplanned reinforcements from Jiutai, Jilin, and Dehui, all of which we annihilated or put to flight.3 This experience shows that encircling cities and fighting the reinforcements are an important way to annihilate the enemy. It is absolutely necessary to take advantage of the period during which the river freezes over to initiate a planned attack, seek out the enemy’s weaker fortified points, adopt the method of encircling the cities and fighting troop reinforcements, wipe out large numbers of enemy troops, and reverse the situation between the enemy and ourselves. 2. The experience of the southern Manchurian4 Fourth Column in fighting for twenty days behind enemy lines also clearly shows that the only road to victory over the enemy is to adopt an overarching policy guideline of valiant attack. We can be even a little more valiant and dare to attack one or two of

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 612–13, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Gao Gang and Peng Zhen were deputy political commissars. 2.  Northern Manchuria included the regions of Harbin, Mudanjiang, Bei’an, Jiamusi, and Qiqihar. Eastern Manchuria refers to the areas east of the main highway between Shenyang and Changchun, including the regions of Jilin, Xi’an, Antu, Yanji, and Dunhua. 3.  On January 1, 1947, the Northeast Democratic Allied Army assisted in the battle in southern Manchuria by sending some of its forces to the key point of Qitamu, northern Jilin. They eliminated enemy reinforcements from Jiutai and Dehui, and ultimately succeeded in eliminating the enemy at Qitamu. In all, they annihilated two regiments of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized First Army and one division of the Guomindang peacekeeping forces. 4.  Southern Manchuria refers to areas east of the main highway from Shenyang to Dalian, including Andong (now Dandong), Tonghua, Linjiang, and Qingyuan, as well as Liaozhong and other areas in southwestern Shenyang. 460

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-258

January 1947 461

the enemy’s defensive battalions and wipe them out, and in every case, we must definitely be prepared to fight the reinforcements. 3. On several of the main battlefields within the [Shanhai] Pass, our armies have begun to gain the advantage and are gradually moving closer to large-scale wars of annihilation. Large numbers of Chiang Kaishek’s main forces (Xue Yue’s5 eighty brigades, Gu Zhutong’s6 thirty brigades, and Hu Zongnan’s7 twenty-four brigades, making a total of 134 brigades) have been destroyed. In the country as a whole, it is calculated that a total of fifty-one brigades of the enemy’s regular army were wiped out over the course of six months and ten days, and by July of this year it is possible that we will have destroyed approximately 100 of the enemy’s brigades and thus we will have fundamentally turned the tables on the enemy. Under these circumstances, Chiang Kaishek will be forced to use all his strength to cope with all the battlefronts on the Longhai railway, making it impossible for him to increase troop movements toward the Northeast. Using all possible means to weaken Du Yuming’s8 currently available forces (fifty armies, fifteen divisions, as well as technical troops, security forces, and so on), for example, by annihilating on average one enemy division (equivalent to one regiment within the Pass) or more per month and twelve enemy divisions or more within a year, will enable you to shift into an advantageous position. Fighting in this manner for two or three years (because the enemy can replenish its ranks even after being wiped out) will enable us to effect a fundamental change in the situation between the enemy and ourselves and to establish and consolidate the base areas. The Military Commission

5.  Xue Yue was head of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 6.  Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Ground Forces. 7.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. 8.  Du Yuming (1904–1981, born in Mizhi county, Yulin) was commander of the Guomindang army’s Northeast Security Headquarters.

To Chen Jinkun1 (January 16, 1947) Comrade Jinkun: I have read your report carefully. It is essential to study law from a new point of view. The law of new democracy is different from the law of socialism and it is also different from the law of capitalism in Europe, America, and Japan. Please study it according to this principle. The current peace negotiations proposed by America and Chiang Kaishek are exactly the same as those in the past. They are all essentially deceptive. Because of their military failures, they are trying to gain time to rest and consolidate their army for future fighting. We must never be taken in. Best wishes and good health! Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 280, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. 1.  Jurist Chen Jinkun (1887–1959, native of Changde, Hunan)) went to Yan’an in 1946 and was subsequently appointed to the Legal Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 462

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-259

Capture Zaozhuang and Prepare to Eliminate Ou Zhen’s Forces (January 17, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Chen [Shiju], and Su [Yu], and for the information of the East China Bureau:1 We received your January 16 telegram.2 1. We are very glad that you captured Qicun.3 It is essential to take a few more days to capture Zaozhuang. 2. After capturing Zaozhuang, it seems appropriate to destroy the majority of the fortifications but to leave some of them and assign troops to defend them. Do things this way in Duo county4 as well. When you begin to launch attacks on Ou Zhen,5 you can use these strongholds for defense against possible attacks from Feng Zhi’an and Hu Lian6 to buy some time. After finishing the fight against Ou Zhen, attack Feng and Hu. 3. Apart from the four regiments attacking Zaozhuang, the others have been resting and reorganizing for a week, and the division commanded by [Tan]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 620–21, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Chen Shiju (1909–1995, native of Hubei) was chief-of-staff. Su Yu was commander of the Central China Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that on that morning, the division under Ye Fei had captured Qicun, wiped out the headquarters and one regiment of the enemy’s 113th Brigade, captured more than 2,000 enemy troops of the rank of brigade commander or below, and killed more than 500 enemy troops. At this time, the division under Tao Yong (1913–1967, native of Anhui) was surrounding and annihilating the remnant enemy troops defending Zaozhuang. 3.  Qicun is a town located in the middle of today’s Zaozhuang city, Shandong Province. 4.  Duo county is now Duocheng, Shandong Province. 5.  Ou Zhen (1899–1969, native of Guangdong) was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Nineteenth Army. 6.  Feng Zhi’an was commander of the Guomindang’s Third Pacification Zone and its Thirty-third Army. Hu Lian (1907–1977, native of Shaanxi) was commander of the Guomindang army’s Eleventh Division. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-260

463

464 Mao’s Road to Power

Zhenlin7 has been resting and reorganizing for nearly a month. It will be roughly one week to ten days before you can launch the campaign against Ou. We hope you will seize this opportunity and make timely preparations. As far as recruiting new troops to replenish your ranks is concerned, the quicker the better. 4. You should make it your goal to wipe out six to eight brigades under Ou Zhen. Assemble approximately forty-five regiments and convene a cadre conference beforehand (it should last half a day to one day). Prepare to engage in larger battles of annihilation with continuous multi-day fighting. The Military Commission

7.  Tan Zhenlin was political commissar of the Central China Field Army.

Telegram to Chen Yi and Su Yu1 (January 17, 1947) If you feel the need to amass more troops to attack Ou Zhen, would it be possible for you to keep either the Fourth or Ninth Division and then to send it back to central Shandong after Ou Zhen is defeated? It doesn’t matter even if you lose Tai’an.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, p. 396. 1.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Su Yu was commander of the Central China Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-261

465

Go All-Out to Annihilate Ou Zhen’s Army and Open a Route to Advance South (January 18, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Chen [Shiju], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 There is no doubt that Xue Yue2 will fight us for control of the Longhai and Tai’[erzhuang]–Zao[zhuang] railways. You must prepare to fight several major battles of annihilation along these two railways and open up a route to advance southward. At present, except for one unit used to attack Zaozhuang, the main forces should immediately prepare to attack Ou Zhen.3 The goal is to wipe out eight brigades from Ou’s unit, and you must complete your preparations within one week. As soon as Ou Zhen advances to the Longhai railway, you should launch an all-out attack. The earlier this preparatory work is completed, the better. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 622–23, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff. Su Yu was commander of the Central China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin was political commissar. 2.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 3.  Ou Zhen was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Nineteenth Army. 466

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-262

When Sufficiently Prepared, Attack Ou Zhen Again (January 19, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 The earlier telegram asked you to quickly prepare for an attack on Ou Zhen,2 but Ou Zhen’s forces are advancing north so fast that within a few days they will capture the Longhai railway. If your units do not have enough time to prepare and cannot wipe out the enemy forces before they have settled in, it would be best to postpone your attack for about two weeks so you are fully prepared and able to finish off the majority or all of Ou’s troops in one stroke. If you launch your attack in a hurry, you will only be able to wipe out some of the enemy forces, and you will have to rest and reorganize before fighting again. It would be better to wait until you are fully prepared before attacking. Twenty days after the Twenty-sixth Division took over Xiangcheng and Lanling our forces were still able to attack and annihilate it within two days; this is proof. We hope you will decide what to do according to the situation. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 630–31, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army. Su Yu was commander and Tan Zhenlin was political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army. 2.  Ou Zhen was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Nineteenth Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-263

467

To Fight Ou Zhen, Amass Fifty Regiments on One Battlefield (January 21, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 1. It is excellent and a great relief that you have captured Zaozhuang and annihilated the entire Fifty-first Division, and we are very pleased. We hope you will cite the officers and soldiers who have made great contributions. 2. Starting from the day on which Zaozhuang was captured, the entire army should rest and consolidate for two weeks and amass all forces to wipe out Ou Zhen.2 3. In thirty-five days you wiped out three complete divisions, the Sixty-ninth, the Twenty-sixth, and the Fifty-first, and won an unprecedented great victory. The major drawback is that we were unable to combine the Shandong Field Army and the East China Field Army into a single campaign for the two battles in Subei and southern Shandong, allowing Ou Zhen and Li Yannian3 to pin down more than twenty regiments of our troops; otherwise, the two divisions under the command of Hu [Lian] and Feng [Zhi’an]4 would have been annihilated as well. In future battles against Ou Zhen, you must amass more than fifty regiments on one battlefield. As regards Tai’[erzhuang], Xu[zhou], and Lin[cheng], it suffices to have local guerrillas keep an eye on them. The Military Commission

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 632–33, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. In late January 1947, in accordance with a decision by the Central Military Commission, the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army were merged to form the East China Field Army, and the Shandong Military Region and the East China Military Region were merged to form the East China Military Region. 2.  Ou Zhen was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Nineteenth Army. 3.  Li Yannian was deputy head of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou Pacification Office. 4.  Hu Lian was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Eleventh Division. Feng Zhi’an was commander of the Guomindang army’s Third Pacification Zone and its Reorganized Thirty-third Army. 468

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-264

A Spring Festival Appeal to Cadres and Residents of the Districts and Villages 1

(January 24, 1947) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Yan’an, January 29) On January 24, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] held a banquet to entertain the labor heroes, residents, and cadres of the military units stationed in the Yan’an area. After shaking hands with each of their guests and wishing them a Happy New Year, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu asked them about work and life in detail in each township. District Head Lu reported on production, self-defense, land revenue, and other issues in his district. Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu called on the cadres and masses to actively engage in production, improve their living standards, produce sufficient clothing and food, and not hold extravagant wedding receptions and funeral ceremonies. Chairman Mao said: As if climbing a mountain, we are about to reach the peak. We have overcome last year’s hardships, yet to achieve peace throughout the country, we must resolutely defeat the offensive by Chiang Kaishek, who sabotaged the Political Consultative Conference and the “ceasefire order.” Chairman Mao also called for friendship and unity between the army and civilians and among neighbors to achieve peace as early as possible.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 8, p. 129, where it is reproduced from Renmin ribao, February 1, 1947. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-265

469

Two Conditions for Fighting a Large-Scale Battle of Annihilation (January 25, 1947) To Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], and Luo [Ruiqing]:1 Two conditions for fighting a large-scale battle of annihilation: 1. Use a small unit of troops to pin down other units of the enemy’s forces while amassing an absolutely superior force to strike at one enemy contingent. Never fight two enemy forces at the same time; it is also not permissible to use massive troop strength to pin down the enemy. 2. Use one unit to attack from the front, and the main force to outflank the enemy. It is absolutely not permissible to make a frontal attack with the main force and to use a single unit to outflank the enemy. It is hoped that you will reference these two points in examining past experience, making plans for new battles, and fighting a few really good large-scale battles of annihilation. The Military Commission

The source of this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 640, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-ChaharHebei) Military Region, Xiao Ke was deputy commander, and Luo Ruiqing was deputy political commissar. 470

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-266

The General Principle Should Be to Increase Attacks on the Weaker Enemies and Isolate the Stronger Enemies (January 27, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received your January 26 telegram.2 1. It is a good idea to first attack the weaker enemy forces on the right flank. After your victory, if the Seventy-fourth and Eleventh divisions have not moved, you may strike the Sixty-fourth and Twentieth Divisions on the left flank and the Seventy-seventh, Fifty-ninth, and Eighty-third divisions and other units in the middle. This will leave the Seventy-fourth, Eleventh, and Seventh divisions completely isolated, and you can annihilate them later when the opportunity arises. In sum, the general principle is to increase attacks on the weaker enemies and isolate the stronger ones. 2. How is the rest and reorganization of our troops proceeding? It seems advisable to rest for about ten more days. 3. Liu and Deng have already captured Dingtao; there should be no problem in cutting off the Longhai railway and stopping the Fifth Army. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 641–42, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that seventeen enemy brigades had amassed around Longhai and Xin’an villages, and eight had amassed around Lincheng and Tai’erzhuang. They decided to attack the right flank of the Twenty-fifth and Sixty-fifth divisions before luring the Seventy-fourth and Eleventh divisions north and attacking them. They suggested that Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping’s forces cut off the railway line and then pin down the Fifth Army until an initial victory could be attained in early February. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-267

471

Ideas on How to Smash Chen Cheng’s Attack Plan (January 28, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 Have you heard the news that the offensive under the direct command of Chen Cheng2 will begin soon? His troops for this offensive will come from among the more than twenty brigades along the Xuhai and Xulin railways.3 It seems that the number of brigades to be used at the front will not exceed eighteen, of which only six are relatively strong. Do you think that Chen Cheng will have to wait until troops have been transferred from other places before he can actually launch an offensive? If it is true that Chen Cheng’s offensive will not begin until early or mid-February, it seems better for us to wait until after his offensive has begun. First, our troops will have more time to rest and reorganize; second, we can strike the enemy before it has settled down; third, we can fight continually and wipe out more of the enemy. But if the enemy postpones its offensive until the end of February or early March, it will not be advantageous for us to wait too long. Moreover, how strong are the fortifications built by the Twenty-fifth and Sixtyfifth divisions? Do you think it would not be difficult to wipe out these two divisions? In addition, when you attack these two divisions, the Seventy-fourth and Eighty-third divisions will come to their aid. It is possible that after wiping out these two divisions you will be able to proceed to wipe out part or the greater part of the Seventy-fourth and Eighty-fourth divisions in successive campaigns. If so, Chen Cheng’s plan for an offensive will be completely destroyed. Thereafter,

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 643–44, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. 2.  Chen Cheng was chief-of-staff of the Guomindang army. 3.  This refers to the railway lines from Xuzhou to Haizhou (now Lianyungang city in Jiangsu Province), and from Xuzhou to Lincheng (now Xuecheng in Zhaozhuang city, Shandong Province).

472

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-268

January 1947 473

we will attack Feng Zhi’an, Hu Lian,4 the Sixty-fourth Division, and the Twentieth Division one by one based on positional warfare. You must also take this possibility into consideration. Please inform us by telegram of your opinions. The Military Commission

4.  Feng Zhi’an was commander of the Guomindang army’s Third Pacification Zone and commander of the Reorganized Thirty-third Army. Hu Lian was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Eleventh Division.

We Should Lure the Enemy to Penetrate Deeply and Fight a Major Battle of Annihilation in Southern Shandong (January 31, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 Chiang Kaishek is seeking to defeat our armies before the Council of Foreign Ministers meets in Moscow in March.2 According to news from Nanjing, Chiang’s troops will launch their offensive within a few days. This would seem very conducive to eliminating large numbers of enemy forces in field operations. It seems that our guiding principle should be to lure the enemy to penetrate deeply. Not only should we not first strike the Longhai railway; we should also reconsider attacking as soon as the enemy troops reach the Tan[cheng]-Ma[touzhen] area.3 It seems preferable to wait until they have advanced north of the Tan-Ma area before launching an all-out offensive. We can then fight several consecutive major battles of annihilation, putting ourselves in a completely advantageous position and never falling into a disadvantaged position (if we attack too early, there is the possibility of fighting ourselves into a stalemate and consequently falling into a disadvantaged position). We hope you will make your ultimate decisions about how to proceed according to the actual situation. In addition, you should move your rear echelon to a secure location in case Linyi is lost. To deal with Chiang’s plan of carrying out a pincer attack from the south and the north, a field army under Xu Shiyou and Wang Jian’an4 should be formed at once, and it should

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 649–50, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and Rao Shushi was deputy commander, respectively, of the East China Military Region. Su Yu was deputy commander and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army. 2.  This refers to the “Four Power Conference” held in Moscow from March 10 to April 24, 1947, with the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France, to discuss arrangements after World War II. This meeting focused on the state of Prussia, but it also suggested further discussion on implementing the treaties on China agreed upon during the Council of Foreign Ministers conference in December 1945. 3.  Matou village was in northwestern Tancheng, Shandong Province. 4.  Xu Shiyou was commander of the Jiaodong Military Region. Wang Jian’an (1908– 1980, born in Hong’an county, Huanggang) was commander of the Luzhong (Central Shan474

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-269

January 1947 475

march south of the Jiaoji railway and await an opportunity to eliminate the enemy. In sum, this time Chiang Kaishek has put all his eggs in one basket. Our forces must have a comprehensive plan. We should be prepared to fight consecutive campaigns to eliminate about ten brigades of his troops, which will enable us to thoroughly crush his offensive. Please decide based on the actual circumstances. The Military Commission

dong) Military Region. On January 25, 1947, the Central Military Commission approved a report from the East China Military Region and agreed to form a Jiaoji Field Army from the Jiaodong and Ludong armies, with Xu Shiyou as its commander and Wang Jian’an as its political commissar. This new army became the Jiaoji Line Assault Corps. The divisions under Wang Jian’an and Xu Shiyou were eventually integrated into the Eighth and Ninth columns of the East China Field Army.

Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and Tasks1 (February 1, 1947) 1. All circumstances now show that the situation in China is about to enter a new stage of development. This new stage is one in which the nationwide struggle against imperialism and feudalism will develop into a new high tide.2 We are now on the eve of this revolution. The task of our Party is to struggle for the advent of this high tide and its triumph. 2. The military situation has now developed in a direction favorable to the people. During seven months of fighting, from last July to this January, we wiped out fifty-six brigades of Chiang Kaishek’s regular forces that had invaded the Liberated Areas,3 not counting numerous puppet troops and the peace preservation corps that were wiped out and those of Chiang’s regular forces that were routed. Although Chiang Kaishek’s offensive continues in southern and western Shandong, in the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region, along the northern section of the Beiping–Hankou railway, and in southern Manchuria, it has become much weaker than it was last autumn. The munitions Chiang Kaishek took over from the Japanese invaders and those he got from the United States are nearly exhausted. Chiang’s army does not have enough troops to deploy and cannot fulfil its conscription quotas; this fact is seriously contradictory to its extended battle lines and the enormous drain on its manpower. In particular, the morale of Chiang’s army is sinking.4 During the recent fighting in northern Jiangsu, southern and western Shandong, and western Shanxi, the morale of many of Chiang’s forces sank to a very low level. On several fronts our armies are beginning to seize the initiative, while

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang gaoji dangxiao, ed., Dangnei wenjian cankao ziliao, Vol. 1, pp. 14–19 (publication date unknown). Text in italics reflects the original text. A revised version was published in Xuanji (1960). 1.  Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and Tasks → Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution 2.  a new high tide. → a great new people’s revolution. 3.  Liberated Areas, → Liberated Areas, a monthly average of 8 brigades, 4. ​t​he morale of Chiang’s army is sinking. → the morale of Chiang’s army is sinking by the day. 476

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-270

February 1947 477

Chiang Kaishek’s armies are beginning to lose the initiative. We can foresee that during the next few months we may achieve the objective of wiping out a grand total of 100 of Chiang’s brigades, including those that previously had been destroyed. Chiang Kaishek has a total of 905 infantry and cavalry divisions (corps), composed of 2466 brigades (or divisions), totaling 1,916,000 men, not counting the puppet troops, police, local peace preservation corps, rear services,7 and technical forces. The forces attacking the Liberated Areas number 78 divisions (corps), composed of 218 brigades (or divisions), totaling 1,713,000 men, or about 90 percent of Chiang Kaishek’s regular troops. Only 128 divisions with 289 brigades, totaling 203,000 men, or about 10 percent of the total, remain in the Guomindang rear areas. Chiang Kaishek can therefore no longer send large combat-worthy reinforcements from his rear areas to attack the Liberated Areas. We have already wiped out more than one-quarter of the 218 brigades attacking the Liberated Areas. Although some have been replenished and10 restored after having been wiped out, their combat effectiveness is very low. Some have been wiped out a second time. Some have not been replenished at all. If our armies can wipe out another forty to fifty brigades in the next few months,11 there will be a major change in the military situation. 3. Meanwhile, a great people’s movement is unfolding in the Guomindang areas. Riots by the people of Shanghai, which began on November 30 of last year because of the Guomindang’s persecution of street vendors,12 and the student movement in Beiping, which began last December 30 because of the rape of a Chinese female student by U.S. soldiers,13 both mark a new upsurge in the struggle of the people in the Chiang-administered areas. The student movement that began in Beiping has spread to other major cities all over the

5.  90 → 93 regular 6.  246 → 248 7.  rear services, → communications police corps, rear services, 8.  12 → 15 9.  28 → 30 10.  and → and under their original designations 11.  next few months, → next few months, and bring the grand total up to about 100, 12.  Beginning in August 1946, the Guomindang authorities in Shanghai banned street vendors in Huangpu and Laozha districts. After the arrest of nearly 1,000 vendors in late November, 3,000 street vendors staged a protest outside the Huangpu district police station on November 30. The authorities opened fire, resulting in the death of seven protestors and in many more wounded and arrested. The protests continued to spread, and shops were closed throughout the city. 13.  After reports that a Peking University student was raped by American soldiers on December 24, 1946, more than one million students in dozens of cities in the Guomindangcontrolled areas staged protests demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from China.

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country, with hundreds of thousands taking part and on a larger scale than the December 9th student movement against Japanese imperialism.14 4. The victories of the People’s Liberation Army in the Liberated Areas and the development of the people’s movement in the Guomindang areas show15 that a new high tide16 against imperialism and feudalism is surely approaching and can be victorious. 5. This situation has arisen because U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kaishek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Jingwei, and they have adopted policies of turning China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war, and strengthening the fascist dictatorship. Confronted by these reactionary policies of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kaishek, the Chinese people have no way out except through struggle. Therefore, the struggle for independence, peace, and democracy still constitutes the basic demand of the Chinese people in the present period. As far back as April 1945, our Party’s Seventh National Congress foresaw the possibility that U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kaishek would carry out these reactionary policies and it formulated a comprehensive and completely correct political line to defeat them. 6. These reactionary policies of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kaishek have compelled all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation. These strata include workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie,17 national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry, other patriotic elements, minority nationalities, and overseas Chinese. This is a very broad united front throughout the nation. In comparison with the united front during the War of Resistance Against Japan, it is as broad in scope and it is much deeper.18 All Party comrades must strive to consolidate and develop this united front. In the Liberated Areas the policy of the “three-thirds system”19 will remain unchanged, on the condition that the policy of land to the tillers is carried out resolutely and without hesitation. In addition to Communists, we should continue to draw the broad ranks of progressives outside the Party and centrist elements (such as enlightened gentry) into the organs of political power and into social undertakings. In the Liberated Areas, all people,20 irrespective of class, sex,

14.  The first student protest calling for unity against the Japanese occupation was held on December 9, 1935. 15.  show → foretell 16.  new high tide → People’s revolution 17.  petty bourgeoisie, → urban petty bourgeoisie, 18. ​​it is much deeper. → it has an even deeper foundation. 19.  Under the Chinese Communist Party’s “three-thirds system,” united front organs in the Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan consisted of one-third each of Communist Party members, leftist progressives, and centrist elements and others. 20.  people, → citizens,

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or belief, will be granted21 the right to elect and stand for election, except traitors and reactionaries who have opposed the interests of the people and have incurred their bitter hatred. After the system of land to the tillers has been thoroughly carried out, the right to private property will continue to be guaranteed.22 7. Because the Chiang Kaishek government has pursued reactionary financial and economic policies for a long time, and because Chiang Kaishek’s bureaucrat-comprador capital has become linked with U.S. imperialist capital through the notorious and treasonable Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce,23 malignant inflation has swiftly developed; the industry and commerce of China’s national bourgeoisie are going bankrupt daily; the livelihood of the working masses, government employees, and teachers is deteriorating daily; large numbers of middle-class elements are losing their savings and becoming penniless; and as a result, strikes by workers and students and other struggles are constantly occurring. An economic crisis more serious than China has ever faced is threatening people of every stratum. To carry on the civil war, Chiang Kaishek has restored the extremely vicious system of conscription and grain levies used during the War of Resistance; this makes life impossible for the vast urban and rural population, particularly the poverty-stricken peasants; as a result, peasant revolts have already started and will continue to spread. Hence, the reactionary Chiang Kaishek ruling clique will become increasingly discredited in the eyes of the broad masses of the people and will be confronted with serious political and military crises. This situation is promoting the people’s anti-imperialist, anti-feudal movement in the Chiang-controlled areas while further demoralizing Chiang’s troops and increasing the possibility of victory by the People’s Liberation Army. 8. The divisive24 National Assembly convened to25 isolate our Party and all26 democratic forces, and the bogus constitution fabricated by that body, enjoy no prestige at all among the people. Instead of isolating our Party and other democratic forces, they have isolated the reactionary Chiang Kaishek ruling clique itself. Our Party and the democratic forces27 adopted the policy of refusing to participate in the bogus National Assembly; this was perfectly correct. The reactionary Chiang Kaishek ruling clique has brought over to its

21.  will be granted → have 22.  guaranteed. → guaranteed in the Liberated Areas. 23.  The “Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce,” or “Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,” was signed by the Nationalist government and the U.S. government in Nanjing on November 4, 1946. 24.  divisive → illegal and divisive 25.  convened to → which was convened by Chiang Kaishek to 26.  all → the other 27.  democratic forces → other democratic forces

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side the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party,28 two small parties that never had the slightest prestige in Chinese society, as well as certain so-called “public personages,” and it can be foreseen that some middle-ofthe-roaders may also take the side of the reactionaries. The reason is that the democratic forces in China are becoming stronger and stronger while the reactionary forces are becoming more and more isolated.29 All reactionary elements concealed within the democratic front and deceiving the people will eventually be sorted out30 and cast aside by the people; and the people’s anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ranks will grow even stronger because they have drawn a clear line of demarcation between themselves and these hidden reactionaries. 9. Development of the international situation is extremely favorable for the Chinese people’s struggle. The growing might of the Soviet Union and the successes of its foreign policy, the increasing radicalization of the people of the world and their ever-developing struggles against reactionary forces both at home and abroad—these two great factors have increasingly isolated U.S. imperialism and its running dogs in various countries (including Chiang Kaishek, Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Shigeru Yoshida, and Manuel Roxas) and will continue to do so. If one adds the factor of an economic crisis that will break out soon31 in the United States, then U.S. imperialism and its running dogs wi1l be forced into an even worse predicament. The power of U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kaishek is only temporary; their offensives can be smashed. The myth that the offensives by the reactionaries cannot be smashed should have no place in our ranks. The Central Committee has pointed this out time and again, and development of the international and domestic situations has increasingly borne out the correctness of this judgment. 10. To gain respite to replenish his troops and launch a fresh offensive, to obtain new loans and munitions from the United States, and to allay the indignation of the people, Chiang Kaishek is perpetrating a new hoax by demanding the resumption of so-called peace negotiations with our Party. Our Party’s policy is not to refuse negotiations and, in this way, to expose his deception. However, the condition is that Chiang Kaishek must, first, abolish the bogus constitution and restore the line of relying on the Political Consultative

28.  The Chinese Youth Party opposed the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and enjoyed support from powerful political figures and overseas governments. The Democratic Socialist Party, formed in August 1946 through the merger of the Democratic Constitutional Party and the National Socialist Party, consisted mainly of politicians and social leaders from the era of the northern warlords. 29.  isolated. → isolated, and therefore the line between the enemy and ourselves must be so sharply drawn. 30.  be sorted out → be revealed with their true colors 31.  an economic crisis that will break out soon → an inevitable economic crisis

February 1947 481

Conference, and, second, withdraw his troops from the Liberated Areas to their positions of January 13 of last year. We must not refrain from our insistence on these two preconditions or we will be deceived by Chiang Kaishek and the U.S. This warning should not be ungrounded. The armistice agreement and political resolution made in January of last year should have been observed by our two parties and Chiang Kaishek should not be allowed to violate them. But since Chiang Kaishek has violated these two agreements, provoked a civil war, and fabricated the bogus constitution, he must show his sincerity for the negotiations by accepting the two conditions put forward by us. Otherwise, he is being deceptive. All comrades in the Party must strive to expose the deception by Chiang Kaishek and the U.S. and to persuade those who fail to see through this point. 11. To thoroughly smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive and recover our lost area, we must wipe out another forty to fifty of his brigades in the next few months; this is the key that will decide everything. To achieve this objective, we must put into full effect the Central Committee’s directive of October of last year, “A Three Months’ Summary and Tasks for the Future” and the Military Commission’s directive of September 16 of last year on concentrating our forces to destroy the enemy forces one by one.32 We here once again emphasize a few points for the attention of comrades in all areas: a. The Military Problem. During the past seven months of bitter fighting our army has proved that it can certainly smash Chiang Kaishek’s offensive and win a final victory. Our army has improved in terms of both equipment and tactics. From now on, the central task in building up our armed forces is to make every effort to step up the building of our artillery and engineer corps. All military regions, big and small, and all field armies should solve concrete problems involved in strengthening the artillery and engineer corps and, first, the problems of training cadres and manufacturing ammunition. b. The Land Problem. In about two-thirds of the territory in the various Liberated Areas, the Central Committee’s directive of May 433 has been put into effect, the land problem has been resolved, and the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out; this is a great victory. There remains, however, about one-third of the territory where further efforts must be made to fully mobilize the masses and put the policy of land to the tillers into effect. In places where the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out, there are still shortcomings whereby it was not

32.  See “A Summary by the CPC Central Committee on Work in July, August, and September of 1946,” October 1, 1946, in this volume, and “Order of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission Regarding Amassing a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One,” September 16, 1946, in this volume. 33.  May 4 → May 4, 1946

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thorough—mainly because the masses were not fully mobilized so the confiscation and distribution of land was not thorough, and the masses became dissatisfied. In such places, we must check carefully and must “even up”34 to ensure that peasants with little or no land obtain some land and that bad gentry and local tyrants are punished. Throughout the process of carrying out the policy of land to the tillers, we must unite firmly with the middle peasants, and it is absolutely impermissible to encroach on the interests of the middle peasants (including the well-todo middle peasants); if cases occur where the interests of the middle peasants are encroached upon, there must be compensation and apologies. Moreover, during and after land reform, appropriate consideration should be given to ordinary rich peasants and middle and small landlords in accordance with the will of the masses and in accordance with the “May 4th Directive.” To sum up, during the land reform movement in the rural areas we must unite with the more than 90 percent of the masses who support the reform, and we must isolate the small number of feudal reactionaries who oppose the reform so we can rapidly realize the policy of land to the tillers. c. The Production Problem. All places must engage in long-term planning, work hard at production, practice economy, and properly resolve financial problems based on production and economy. The first principle here is to develop production and ensure supplies. For this reason, we must oppose the erroneous view that places undue emphasis on finance and commerce while neglecting agricultural and industrial production. The second principle is to consider both the army and the people, and both public and private interests. We must therefore oppose the erroneous view that takes only one side into account and neglects the other side. The third principle is unified leadership and decentralized management. Therefore, except where conditions call for centralized management, we must oppose the erroneous view that favors centralizing everything, regardless of the circumstances, and that dares not give full rein to decentralized management. The above three military, land, and production problems are at the core for us in the war of self-defense in the Liberated Areas. The Central Committee hopes that comrades everywhere, under the slogan of “everything for the war of self-defense,” will effectively solve these problems and strive for a great victory this year. Victory in the Liberated Areas is the prerequisite

34.  “Evening up” was a policy adopted in the old Liberated Areas, where comparatively thorough land reform had been carried out. The method involved readjusting the distribution of land and other means of production by taking from those who had better land and giving to those who had worse land and taking from those who had a surplus and giving to those who had a shortage.

February 1947 483

for the advent of a great new high tide against feudalism and imperialism and the victory over it. 12. Our Party and the Chinese people have every assurance of final victory; there is not the slightest doubt about this. But that does not mean there are no difficulties before us. China’s anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle is protracted in nature; Chinese and foreign reactionaries will continue to oppose the Chinese people with all their strength, and fascist rule in the Chiangcontrolled areas will intensify; certain parts of the Liberated Areas will temporarily become enemy-occupied areas or guerrilla zones, some of the revolutionary forces may suffer temporary losses, and there will be losses of manpower and material resources in a long war. Comrades throughout the Party must take all this fully into account and be prepared to overcome all difficulties with an indomitable will and in a planned manner. Both we and the reactionary forces face difficulties. But the difficulties of the reactionary forces are insurmountable because they are forces on the verge of death and they have no future. Our difficulties can be overcome because we are a new and rising force with a bright future.

Suggestions on How to Thoroughly Crush Chen Cheng’s Attack on Southern Shandong1 (February 3, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]: To thoroughly crush Chen Cheng’s2 attack on southern Shandong, please pay attention to the following points: 1. Amass an absolutely superior fighting force. It was quite right of you to transfer the three divisions under Wang Jian’an, Xu Shiyou, and Song Shilun3 to the south. 2. Rest and reorganize the troops. Use the eve of the enemy’s large-scale offensive to rest and reorganize all your forces. The more time the better; rest and reorganization means victory. 3. Lure the enemy to penetrate deeply. We should not strike unless the enemy has moved, and we should not attack unless the enemy has moved into a position that is favorable to us and unfavorable to it. We must occupy a completely advantageous position. 4. Attack the weaker enemy forces first and the stronger enemy forces later. Of the twenty-two enemy brigades that may take part in the offensive, eight have a relatively strong fighting capacity and fourteen have a relatively weak fighting capacity. If we can first eliminate the fourteen weaker brigades, Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 651–52, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  In late January 1947, the main force of the East China Field Army amassed in Linyi, Shandong Province, and Shandong became a major battlefield. The Guomindang forces decided that the East China Field Army would defend Linyi, so they planned a mass campaign in southern Shandong in hopes of fighting the decisive battle around Linyi. Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission before the “mass campaign.” Chen Yi was commander of the East China Military Region, Rao Shushi was political commissar, Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar. Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were deputy commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army. 2.  Chen Cheng was chief-of-staff of the Guomindang army. 3.  Wang Jian’an was commander of the Eighth Column of the East China Field Army. Xu Shiyou (1905–1985, native of Henan) was commander of the Ninth Column of the East China Field Army. Song Shilun (1907–1991, native of Hunan) was commander of the Tenth Column of the East China Field Army. 484

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-271

February 1947 485

this offensive can be considered thwarted. We can then wipe out the eight stronger brigades at our leisure. 5. Each time you attack the enemy, do not try to wipe out more than four brigades; it is best to wipe out three brigades. On the one hand, you must ensure a quick victory. On the other hand, we have large numbers of unused reserve troops and we can fight a second battle in quick succession. That is to say, divide all your forces into two groups that can alternate between fighting and resting, and be prepared to fight seven or eight major battles continuously over the next one-and-one-half to two months in order to thoroughly crush the enemy’s offensive. The above points should be taken as suggestions; you must decide the most appropriate way to handle things in accordance with the actual situation. The Military Commission

You Must Wait until the Enemy Enters the Tancheng-Linyi Region before Fighting the First Battle (February 4, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 Regardless of whether or not Qiu [Qingquan]’s2 troops reach Shandong, the deeper the enemy penetrates the better, and the later we strike the better. As long as you do not seek immediate results and are prepared to give up Linyi if necessary, we are assured of victory this time. At present, the enemy’s strategy is to lure us into launching an early attack, to grapple with us and exhaust us, and then to securely attack and occupy Linyi. You must by no means fall for this. You must wait until the enemy has advanced into the region between Tancheng and Linyi (closer to Linyi) before fighting your first battle; this is the best policy. The farther north the enemy forces advance, the more their morale will fall, the more panicked the commanding officers will feel, and the more difficult their logistics will become. Now Nanjing is already starting to panic, and the personnel at the Defense Ministry and the General Staff Headquarters lack confidence. They believe that even capturing Linyi will not solve the problem. The current position of our troops under the command of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]3 is very good; this will inevitably have a positive effect on the military situation and will help you. We hope you will order the political agencies to make full arrangements for political propaganda targeting the enemy along its route of advance to undermine the fighting spirit of the enemy officers and soldiers. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 655–56, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi and Rao Shushi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the East China Military Region. Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were deputy commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army. 2.  Qiu Qingquan (1902–1949, born in Wenzhou) was commander of the Guomindang’s Seventh Army. 3.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 486

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-272

Attack the Weaker Enemies First, Then the Stronger Enemies; Strive for an Advantage (February 6, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], Zhang [Dingcheng], Deng [Zihui], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 1. We completely agree with the third plan2 in the telegram from the early afternoon of February 5. This can put us in a completely advantageous position and cause Chiang Kaishek to fall into a completely disadvantaged position. 2. Within the next one week to ten days, the whole army should carry out training and reorganization in its existing location, giving outsiders the impression that it will attack to the south. Wait until the enemy’s Twelfth Army has taken over Laiwu and the enemy’s Seventy-third Army and Forty-sixth Division have captured the Xintai-Boshan line, and then secretly move the whole army (minus one column). First wipe out the Seventy-third Army, the Twelfth Army, and the Forty-sixth Division, and then storm and capture the entire Jiaoji [Qingdao-Ji’nan] railway. This will require one to one-and-ahalf months. Meanwhile, the enemy forces to the south will have moved to

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 658–59, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Rao Shushi, Zhang Yunyi, and Li Yu were political commissar, deputy commander, and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Military Region. Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 2.  The third battle plan that Chen Yi et al. proposed in their telegram to the Central Military Commission was that if the enemy forces on the south line do not advance, then almost the entire main force should hasten northward, wipe out the enemy forces on the north line, destroy the Jiaoji line, and threaten the forces on the south line. Only one column would remain in the Linyi region to engage the enemy. This would lure the south-line enemy forces into the mountains north of Linyi or drive them to reinforce the Jiaoji railway. The Communist forces would then counterattack with full strength and wipe out the enemy units one by one. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-273

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their disadvantage deep into the mountainous region north of Linyi. We can counterattack with all our forces, wiping out large numbers of the enemy. In short, attack the weaker enemy forces first and strike the stronger ones later. Strive to gain the advantage and avoid putting yourself in a disadvantaged position. 3. To make Wang Yaowu3 feel free to head south, we should end our attacks in the Bohai region. The Military Commission

3.  Wang Yaowu was commander of the Guomindang’s Second Pacification Zone.

Construct Defensive Fortifications in Linyi to Facilitate Annihilating the Enemy (February 6, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 You should construct the necessary defensive fortifications in Linyi so you will be able to annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of Linyi under favorable circumstances. Doing this does not contradict our plan to prepare to give up Linyi when necessary. The fortifications in Yi [county] and Zao[zhuang] should all be razed. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 657, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander of the East China Military Region, Rao Shushi was political commissar, Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar. Su Yu was commander of the East China Field Army and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-274

489

Questions on Setting off for Laiwu and Xintai to Fight (February 7, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1 It has been confirmed that the Twelfth Army has occupied Laiwu. Are the Seventy-third Army and the entire Forty-sixth Division advancing toward Xintai? How many days do you need to set off from your present location to reach Laiwu and Xintai to fight? Are you able to move in a concealed fashion without revealing your position? Moreover, will you be able to wipe out the enemy forces in Laiwu and Xintai simultaneously, or will you first strike Laiwu and then Xintai without allowing the Twelfth Army to escape? We await word on the above points. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, p. 662, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. 490

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-275

Elimination of Hao Pengju’s Forces Should Be Considered in Connection with the Overall Strategic Plan (February 9, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Rao [Shushi], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 It is very good that you have finished off Hao Pengju’s unit.2 But in terms of the overall strategic plan, if your plan is to take care of the south, it seems you may have struck a little too soon; it may cause other enemy units to advance more cautiously. Following your attack on Hao Pengju, it seems you should hold back and take no action (you must have great patience). Let all the enemy units feel free to march north and then you can wipe them out one by one. If your plan is to take

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 663–64, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-LuYu Field Army. 2.  Hao Pengju (1903–1947, born in Lingbao city, Sanmenxia) was commander of the Guomindang’s Sixth Route Army when he switched his allegiance to the Communists in January 1946. In January 1947, he changed sides again, and in early February 1947 his forces were annihilated and Hao himself was taken prisoner.

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-276

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care of the north first, then your decision to attack Hao Pengju is no impediment. You must first make a choice between the two plans.3 The Military Commission

3.  A February 11, 1947, telegram from Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin to the Central Military Commission stated the intention to bring together a total of fifty-three military units on or around February 19 to annihilate the Guomindang’s Seventy-third Army and one division under the Twelfth Army stationed in Nanbeishizhuang. They would then proceed to annihilate the Forty-sixth Division, occupy Xintai, and attack the Jiaoji railway to eliminate the Guomindang’s north-line forces. After fighting for a month or so, they expected to advance southward to attack the enemy’s south-line forces. The next day, February 12, Chen Yi and Tan Zhenlin sent the Central Military Commission a telegram proposing an alternative plan in which they would move their troops north to annihilate the Seventy-third and Twelfth armies and their reinforcements, starting on February 17 or as late as the 20th. They would then lure the Forty-sixth Division west and ambush it along the way. Their entire army would then raid the Jiaoji railway to lure and then attack the Guomindang’s Eighth Army. After that, they would consider advancing south to attack the enemy, or encircle Ji’nan to lure other Guomindang forces close enough to attack.

Carrying Out the Jiaoji Campaign Requires Full Preparation (February 23, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 Following our victory in the present campaign,2 1. Riding the crest of victory, attack the Jiaoji railway. If your troops did not suffer heavy losses and are not too fatigued, and if you did not fight the Eighth Army or other units of the enemy’s main forces, you can carry out this plan. 2. Rest and reorganize for a certain number of days, rectify the configuration of your troops, and then attack the Jiaoji railway. If your troops suffered heavy losses and are very fatigued, or if they had to fight the enemy’s main forces, you should adopt this plan. In short, the Jiaoji Campaign is a stand-alone, very significant campaign, and you must make full preparations before carrying it out. We hope you will decide in accordance with the actual situation. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 665–66, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 2.  This refers to the Laiwu Campaign carried out by the East China Field Army. See “Attack the Weaker Enemies First, Then the Stronger Enemies; Strive for the Advantage,” February 6, 1947, in this volume. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-277

493

Our Army’s Plan of Action Following the Laiwu Campaign (February 24, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Rao [Shushi]:1 1. Today we received the telegram that Chen, Su, and Tan sent at 18:00 on February 23.2 We were very pleased to learn that 50,000 troops under Li Xianzhou3 have been wiped out. All officers and men are to be commended. 2. We agree with the opinion of Chen, Su, and Tan. First, we should use one unit to destroy the railway and allow the main forces rest and reorganize for five or six days. After that, we should carry out the Jiaoji Campaign. We hope that during the first ten days of March you can annihilate the entire Twelfth Army and part of both the Ninety-sixth and Eighth armies, and open transport routes between the Bohai and the Jiaodong areas and the central Shandong area so we can use the manpower and material resources of Jiaodong and Bohai to provide for the needs of the army’s protracted

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 667–68, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. reported that the East China Field Army had encircled the Seventy-third Army of Li Xianzhou (1894–1988, native of Shandong), the Fortysixth Army, and the Reorganized Thirty-sixth Division of the Twelfth Army, annihilating some 50,000 enemy troops and capturing Li Xianzhou and the two other commanders. They then sent Song Shilun’s and Xu Shiyou’s forces to attack Boshan and the Jiaoji (Qingdao-Ji’nan) railway, and the main force planned to rest for a few days before advancing to the north with full strength. They expected the forces of Ou Zhen and Wang Jingjiu (1902– 1964, native of Jiangsu) to converge at the Jinpu (Tianjin-Pukou) railway in Yanzhou. 3.  Li Xianzhou was deputy commander of the Guomindang’s Second Pacification Zone. 494

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-278

February 1947 495

campaign. This will also benefit our future efforts to assemble the largest possible fighting force to attack the forces of Ou Zhen and Wang Jingjiu.4 3. Except for one unit used to monitor Wang Jingjiu, the main forces of Liu and Deng’s army (five columns in all) should be assembled north of the Yellow River to reinforce the area, rest and reorganize, and replenish their ranks. They should wait until our troops in eastern China have completed the Jiaoji mission, and then they should be prepared to find the proper opportunity for the two armies to join forces and wipe out Ou and Wang. Please order the Sixth and Seventh columns to quickly take a shortcut and draw in toward the main forces. The Military Commission

4.  Ou Zhen was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Nineteenth Army. Wang Jingjiu was commander of the Guomindang’s Twenty-seventh Army.

Assemble the Main Forces and Ride the Crest of Victory to Capture the Jiaoji Railway (February 25, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Rao [Shushi], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received the telegram you sent at 9:00 on February 24.2 We completely agree with your views that apart from having the Third Column stay in the area of Zou [county] and Teng [county], you should assemble sixty regiments to ride the crest of victory to annihilate the Eighth and Twelfth armies and take care of the Jiaoji problem once and for all. This time the battle in Laiwu was of very short duration, and our troops do not seem to have suffered heavy losses or severe exhaustion, so they should be able to launch an attack to the north after a few days of rest and reorganization. As for the enemy’s southern line, do not obstruct them but let them advance north, the farther the better. We estimate it will take them at least two weeks to reach the Tai’an line. We think we can complete the Jiaoji assignment within two weeks and then rest and reorganize for two or three weeks, heading south to fight in early April. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 669–70, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. reported that the Guomindang’s main forces in Linyi were moving westward and the Seventh Army was moving from Tancheng to Lincheng and would advance north alone toward the Tianjin-Pukou railway. Chen Yi et al. planned to leave one unit of the local forces to fight around Linyi and to send the Third Column to check the northward advance of the Guomindang forces. They believed they could deal with the enemy at the Jiaoji railway with a combined force of sixty divisions. 496

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-279

Facilitating the Annihilation of the Enemy Should Be a Criterion for Considering Battle Operations (March 6, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], and Li [Yu], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], and Chen [Shiju], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received your telegram of midday on the 4th.2 It is essential for the five columns of your main forces to secure a period of two weeks or more to rest and reorganize. As for your next move, you can consider several plans now and see how the enemy’s situation develops before deciding. But facilitating the annihilation of the enemy should be a criterion in considering action. No matter where it takes place, if the enemy can be wiped out in large numbers, this will constitute a threat to the enemy and represent cooperation with friendly armies, so it is not necessary to worry about the time being short or long. Right now, it is also unnecessary to worry about the timing of the move to the exterior lines because part of the main force of the five divisions has crossed the river and arrived in Taiyue, and another part is awaiting the chance to cross northward. As for Wang Shusheng’s3 forces in western Hubei, some of them have crossed the river and gone to western Hunan,4 Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 1–3, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander, Rao Shushi was political commissar, Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Military Region. Su Yu was deputy commander, Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar, and Chen Shiju (1909–1995, born in Wuhan) was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that the East China Field Army was taking the five columns around Zhangdian and Zhoucun to rest and reorganize and to create favorable conditions to lure the enemy forces on the Younan line deep into the mountains and then to annihilate them there. They proposed further detailed movements for Liu and Deng’s troops. 3.  Wang Shusheng was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Hubei Military Region. 4.  On February 14, 1947, chief-of-staff of the Northwest Hubei Military Region, Zhang Caiqian, led more than one thousand men across the Yangzi River south of Hubei’s Yidu county to the Hunan-Hubei Border Region. On March 3, they joined forces with the DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-280

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and the others have stayed where they were. Therefore, the Central Committee’s original order that had you moving to the exterior lines ahead of schedule to assist the five divisions may now be changed, and basically the rest of this year can be spent fighting the interior lines. Regarding our East China Army, within the next ten months, assuming an average of four to five enemy brigades are annihilated each month at a cost of 6,000 to 7,000 casualties, they must wipe out a total of forty to fifty enemy brigades at a cost of up to 60,000 to 70,000 casualties (next year’s figures are not included in this estimate). You must take protracted warfare as your starting point and see to it that the majority of cadres establish this mindset. Only by always economizing on human and material resources in all places can we defeat Chiang Kaishek and accomplish China’s historic task. With the same task of long-term fighting, our forces under Liu and Deng also need to rest, reorganize, and be reinforced at this time to regain their full strength. As for their next move, what appears most appropriate is to attack the two forces under Wang Zhonglian and Sun Zhen5 north of the Yellow River and coordinate with East China from a distance. Under normal conditions (excluding special circumstances), the troops under Liu and Deng must stay north of the Yellow River, basically doing away with the two units under Wang and Sun and drawing the two divisions under the command of Wu Shaozhou6 north of the Yellow River and annihilate them there. After that it would be advantageous to move southward to Longhai because the Yellow River is rising, and the situation now is different from what it was previously. It also seems best for your Third Column to stay where it is for rest and reorganization so that later it can join the main force in the fighting. Do not obstruct the northward advance of the enemy’s [Tian]jin-Pu[kou railway] group but let them get to the Tai’an line; this would be most advantageous for us. It would be very good if the two columns, one under Wang [Jian’an] and the other under Xu [Shiyou],7 were able to annihilate the Eighth Army and take Wei county,8 but if conditions do not permit this, it would be better to have them rest and reorganize to ensure that it will always be possible to amass sixty regiments for action in future battles. The Military Commission

Fourth Army of the Northwest Hubei Military Region under Li Renlin to create the Jiangnan Guerrilla Unit. On May 1, they received orders from the Central Committee to cross the river and return north. 5.  Wang Zhonglian was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Twentysixth Army. Sun Zhen was commander of the the Guomindang army’s Fifth Pacification Zone. 6.  Wu Shaozhou (1902–1966, Miao nationality, born in Tianzhu county, Guizhou) was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Eighty-fifth Division, which included the Reorganized Twenty-third and 110th brigades. Mao here uses the old designations before the reorganization: the Eighty-fifth Army and its Twenty-third and 110th divisions. 7.  These were the East China Army’s Eighth and Ninth columns, respectively. 8.  This county was incorporated into the city of Weifang in Shandong Province in 1983.

The Defense of Yan’an Mainly Depends upon Fighting on the Exterior Lines (March 6, 1947, 9:00 P.M.–11:00 P.M.) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi], Wang [Xinting] and Sun [Dingguo], Han [Jun], and Teng [Daiyuan], Bo [Yibo], and Wang [Hongkun]:1 We trust that our telegram of noon on the 6th2 has reached you. The best way to force Hu [Zongnan]’s3 army to move and to defend Yan’an is for Chen and Xie to lead five brigades across the river on March 19th and occupy the Tong[guan]Luo[yang] section of the Longhai railway. You must complete your rest and reorganization before March 15, and you are expected to cross the river with Chen and Xie on March 19 and at the same time attack the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway. After the first battle is over, you should join with the Taihang army units and

We have translated this text from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 4–6, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Geng was commander and Xie Fuzhi was political commissar of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. Wang Xinting (1908–1984, born in Xiaogan, Hubei) and Sun Dingguo (1910– 1964, born in Muping, Shandong) were commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the Tai-Yue Military Region. Han Jun (1912–1949, born in Luoyang) was deputy commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Teng Daiyuan, Bo Yibo, and Wang Hongkun were first deputy commander, first deputy political commissar, and second deputy commander, respectively, of the ShanxiChahar-Hebei Field Army. Beginning from March 1947, the Guomindang forces in these regions went on the defensive and shifted their troops to Shandong and northern Shaanxi for a key-point offensive. At the beginning of March, the Guomindang army amassed 34 brigades with 250,000 troops in the Northwest region in preparation for an attack on the Liberated Areas in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia. 2.  The editors of Junshi wenji believe this refers to a telegram from the Central Military Commission to Chen Geng, Xie Fuzhi, et al. that ordered Chen and Xie to lead the Fourth Column, the Twenty-Fourth Brigade, and the main force of Wang Xinting’s column to set off for the Yellow River on March 9, to begin crossing the river on March 19, and to occupy the counties of Wenxiang and Xin’an and the areas from Luohe to the north. They were to then begin attacking the Beiping-Hankou and Daokouzhen-Qinghuazhen railways to contain Gu Zhutong’s troops and to prevent them from moving south. 3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-281

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continue to launch a second, third, and more battles. You should move the rear area to Taihang for a time and engage in fighting toward the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] and Dao[kouzhen]-Qing[huazhen]4 railways to directly support Chen and Xie. This battle is of great importance, and it is hoped that you will prepare for it right away. Hu Zongnan commands three brigades of the First Division, two brigades of the Ninetieth Division, two brigades of the Twenty-seventh Division (one regiment is in Daning), two brigades of the Thirty-sixth Division, two brigades of the Seventeenth Division, three brigades of the Seventy-sixth Division, one brigade of the Fifteenth Division, plus a security brigade and a cavalry brigade, making a total of seventeen brigades. Except for one unit garrisoned in eastern Shanxi and the Central Shanxi Plains, the main force is advancing rapidly along the YichuanLuochuan-Zhongbu5 line and may finish amassing by March 10 and could begin attacking on March 15 (or it may not occur until sometime between March 15 and March 20). Our current arrangements for a deep interior-line defense may be delayed for a period of ten days, mainly depending on whether Chen and Xie raise the siege from the exterior lines. We figure that if Chen and Xie’s five brigades cut off the Tong[guan]-Luo[yang] railway, changes will certainly be brought about, and even if there is an attack on Yan’an, it will be difficult to sustain it for long. In addition, Chen’s and Xie’s actions on the Tong[guan]-Luo[yang] railway need your active support. The current attack on Yan’an by Hu’s forces has an element of nervous intensity. Only four brigades will be left in Shanxi, and both the Xi’anLanzhou Highway and the Longhai railway will be left undefended as they stake everything on a single throw of the dice. Our judgment is that because of the defeats in both Shandong and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan region, Xue Yue’s6 dismissal, and Gu Zhutong’s7 transfer to Xuzhou, Hu Zongnan is actually in charge of military affairs in Zhengzhou and he is eager to transfer troops to attack northern Henan, so they want to strike a blow at Yan’an first. Yet we must defend Yan’an and the border areas to pin down Hu’s forces. As long as Yan’an and the border areas exist, we can keep large numbers of Hu’s troops pinned down so that they will not dare to move east. We look forward to hearing how your preparations are going. The Military Commission

4.  This railway ran from Daokouzhen in Hua county to Qinghuazhen in Bo’ai county, Henan. 5.  Zhongbu is the former name of Huangling county in Shaanxi Province. 6.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou Pacification Office before he was dismissed in March 1947. 7.  Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Ground Forces. At the beginning of March 1947, he formed the Xuzhou Command Headquarters of the Ground Forces Central Command and he unified the Xuzhou and Zhengzhou Pacification Offices under one command.

An Order Regarding the Defense of Yan’an1 (March 16, 1947) 1. The enemy has been attacking Yan’an with five divisions and twelve brigades, a total of approximately 80,000 men, and after three days of fierce attack it has broken through our first-line battlefield. Because of our army’s firm and valiant resistance, the enemy suffered heavy casualties and heightened difficulties, so it is utterly exhausted, and this will intensify in the future. 2. Each of our border region army units has the duty to protect Yan’an resolutely. It is necessary to resist the attacks for another ten days to two weeks (from the 16th to the 29th) south of the Sanshilipu-Songshuling line and in the area around Ganquan, Nanniwan, and Jinpenwan before we receive assistance from the exterior lines to smash the attempted attack on Yan’an by Hu [Zongnan]’s2 forces. To accomplish this task, the various army units are assigned the following defense duties: a. The independent First Brigade and Eighth Brigade, and the Seventh Guards Regiment, constitute the right-flank army unit under the command of Comrades Zhang Zongxun and Liao Hansheng.3 They are to organize the defensive battle in the areas of Daozuopu, Ganquan, Dalaoshan, Xiaolaoshan, Qingquangou, and Shanshenmiao, and to resist any attack resolutely. b. The Instructional Brigade and the Second Column (Wang Zhen’s4 troops) constitute the left-flank army unit under the command of Comrades Wang Zhen and Luo Yuanfa.5 They will be commanded by

The source of this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 9–10, where it is reproduced from the original document preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  On March 13, 1947, Guomindang forces launched an attack on northern Shaanxi. After six days of intense battle, the Communist forces withdrew to Yan’an. Mao Zedong, as chairman of the Central Military Commission, issued this order to all troops in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. 3. Zhang Zongxun and Liao Hansheng (1911–2006, Tujia nationality, native of Hunan) were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army’s First Column. 4.  Wang Zhen was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army’s Second Column. 5.  Luo Yuanfa (1910–2010, native of Fujian) was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army’s Instructional Brigade. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-282

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Comrade Luo Yuanfa before Wang Zhen’s arrival. The Instructional Brigade is to organize the defensive battle in the areas of Nanniwan, Jinpenwan, Linzhen, and Songshuling. It is to hold out in the aforementioned areas for at least seven days. c. The New Fourth Brigade constitutes the Central Army unit, with a minimum troop strength of four battalions, and it is to organize the defensive battle around the areas of Miaoerliang, Chengzigou, and Sanshilipu to firmly resist attacks by enemy forces advancing from Nanniwan to Yan’an. The artillery troops under this brigade should strengthen the position at Miaoerliang. The rest are reserve forces, stationed in Yan’an, and they will prevent the enemy’s parachute troops from controlling the airfield. The commander of this brigade also serves as commander of the Yan’an garrison. 3. Each army unit involved in defense should take advantage of the topography, organize brief but fierce barrages, use large quantities of grenades and land mines to kill and wound the enemy, make good use of the reserve troops, launch flexible counterattacks, and wipe out the enemy during night-time attacks. 4. After exhausting and depleting the enemy in defensive battles, five brigades or more can be amassed to fight mobile warfare and wipe out the enemy one by one, thoroughly crushing the enemy’s offensive. 5. Beginning on March 17, all army units and border region troops mentioned above will be under the command of comrades Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun.6 Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Mao Zedong

6.  The editors of the Junshi wenji indicate that point no. 5 was added “on a copy of the telegram as received.”

Prepare to Fight a Second Battle after the Fight at Qinghuabian (March 26, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. Congratulations on your victory in wiping out the main forces of the Thirtyfirst Brigade. This battle is of great significance, and we hope you will issue an order commending all the officers and men. 2. It is possible that the 135th Brigade may head in the direction of Qinghuabian in search of the Thirty-first Brigade. We hope you are prepared to fight a second battle. 3. Mao [Zedong] yesterday met with all the comrades of the Central Committee. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 11–12, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar. On March 19, 1947, after the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission withdrew from Yan’an, the Northwest Field Army deployed a small number of troops to lure the Guomindang’s main force to Ansai (northwest of Yan’an), while the Communist main forces remained concealed in the Qing­ huabian region northeast of Yan’an, waiting to ambush the enemy. On March 25, some 2,900 men from the Thirty-first Brigade of the Twenty-seventh Division under Hu Zongnan entered the Northwest Field Army’s encirclement and were annihilated after more than one hour of battle. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-283

503

We Agree with Your Policy and the Arrangements for Actively Annihilating the Enemy (March 27, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai]:1 We received your March 26 telegram.2 Your policy of actively annihilating the enemy is very correct and your arrangements are appropriate. We have already ordered Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi]3 to take action. Now we are not afraid of Hu [Zongnan]’s4 forces advancing to the north, but we fear that they will not advance north, so it will not necessarily be detrimental if Chen and Xie take action a few days later. The 101st Division and the other units under Fu Zuoyi5 are attacking northwestern Shanxi, and Zuoyun has fallen. Yan Xishan6 captured Xiaoyi and Duijiuyu, and it is possible that he will harass Zhongyang and Shilou. He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]’s7 situation will become very tense within the next few months, but as long as we are victorious in northern Shaanxi, and Chen and Xie win on the southern line, we will have the means to deal with Yan and Fu. The Central Committee has decided not to leave northern Shaanxi. Mao Zedong

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 13–14, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Peng Dehuai stated that Hu Zongnan was seeking to combat with the Communists’ main forces, and Peng’s army planned to lure the enemy east to the mountains northwest of Qinghuabian and Ansai, where the Communists enjoyed the advantage of familiar terrain, abundant food, and welcoming people. The Communists would then circle around the back of the enemy forces and annihilate the Ninetieth and First divisions, one or two regiments at a time. The telegram stated that Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were still between Qinshui and Duanshi awaiting orders and they had requested instructions. 3.  Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 4.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 5.  Fu Zuoyi was director of the Guomindang’s Zhangjiakou Pacification Office. 6.  Yan Xishan was director of the Guomindang’s Taiyuan Pacification Office. 7.  He Long and Li Jingquan were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Sui Military Region. 504

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-284

We Need to Smash Hu Zongnan’s Army in Order to Change the Situation in Northern Shaanxi (March 27, 1947) To He [Long], Li [Jingquan], and for the information of Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 The enemy forces in Yulin can only protect themselves and they have little capacity for harassment. He Bingyan’s brigade2 can be relieved of covering the river-crossing, and you can decide how to use it. Wait until [Zhou] Enlai reaches you to decide whether the personnel directly subordinate to the Central Committee who have reached northwestern Shanxi should be transferred to Taihang. The Central Committee will stay in northern Shaanxi with several hundred personnel. Both the people and the topography here are favorable, and it is very safe. Our major enemy at present is Hu Zongnan.3 We need to smash this enemy to change the situation, and smashing this enemy is quite possible. According to Peng’s telegram, we wiped out the Thirty-first Brigade (less one regiment) and took 4,000 prisoners, with not one escaping, from the brigade commander down, and we seized 200,000 bullets. Morale has been greatly restored, confidence has increased, and it is possible for us to strive for new victories and to wipe out Hu’s forces one by one. As part of the coordinated attack against Hu Zongnan, the group under Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi]4 will launch strikes on the triangular region of southern Shanxi in the coming days; this will probably require one month’s time. If Yan Xishan5 begins to harass Shilou and Zhongyang, they [Chen

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 15–16, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee. He Long and Li Jingquan were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Sui (ShanxiSuiyuan) Military Region. Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  He Bingyan (1913–1960, native of Hubei) was commander of the Fifth Brigade of the Third Column of the Jin-Sui Military Region. 3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 4.  Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 5.  Yan Xishan was director of the Guomindang’s Taiyuan Pacification Office. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-285

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and Xie] can also head north to attack Yan at that time. Our main forces probably will not be able to head north to attack Fu Zuoyi6 in the next three or four months, so we are relying entirely on you to hold the northern front with the forces you now have. Enlai will inform you of the details in person. The Central Committee

6.  Fu Zuoyi was director of the Guomindang’s Zhangjiakou Pacification Office.

Moving the Central Military Commission Apparatus (March 29, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 We received yesterday’s and today’s telegrams. 1. Your arrangements are very good. 2. Last night we moved to an area south of Suide. To confuse the enemy, we first moved east and as our next step, we are preparing to move west. 3. The reconnaissance transceiver should arrive tonight, and we should be able to resume work tomorrow. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 19, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-286

507

The Work of the Central Work Committee Is to Be Carried Out under the Direction of Liu Shaoqi (March 30, 1947, 3:00 P.M.–5:00 P.M.) To Comrade He Long, and to be forwarded to [Zhou] Enlai:1 1. The Central Committee has decided to organize a Central Work Committee to carry out all tasks under [Liu] Shaoqi’s direction. Comrades Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi] will set out tomorrow evening from Shijuyi (70 li south of Suide), will meet with Dong [Biwu], Ye [Jianying],2 and other comrades in Lin county, and will pass through Wutai toward Taihang. Personnel in offices directly under the Central Committee who are already in northwestern Shanxi are to proceed according to the original decision—one group going toward Taihang and the other dispersing where they are. You are to inform Dong and Ye about the handling of this matter, and then await the directives of the Central Work Committee. 2. Please return within a few days after receiving this telegram, after which the Central Committee will be presided over by Mao [Zedong], Zhou [Enlai], and [Ren] Bi[shi]. We are currently in the vicinity of Shijuyi. 3. The enemy has already occupied Yan[chang] and Yan[chuan], and we are awaiting reconnaissance regarding the next move. 4. If the enemy attacks Qingjian, we are prepared to shift toward the area between Anding and Bao’an. To avoid being cut off by the enemy, we are asking you to soon return west of the river and leave matters east of the river to be handled by Liu, Zhu, Dong, and Ye. Mao [Zedong] and [Ren] Bi[shi]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 233–34. 1.  He Long was commander of the Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan) Military Region. 2.  Dong Biwu was a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Work Committee. Ye Jianying was secretary of the Central Rear-Area Committee. 508

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-287

Adopt the Battle Tactic of Ambushing from the Front and Both Flanks (April 2, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. According to our intelligence from Xi’an: Hu Zongnan2 has moved his staff to Yan’an and has decided to go all-out to take over Wayaobao, then to attack Suide, predicting, among other things, that Suide can be captured within four-and-a-half months. Our judgment is that before attacking Wayaobao, Hu’s army must first take Shejiaping, west of Yongping and Qingjian, and then it will divide into two or three groups to attack Wayaobao. 2. For us to wipe out the enemy forces, the only effective arrangement is to adopt the tactic of ambushing from the front and both flanks. Our attack on the Thirty-first Brigade in Qinghuabian was the result of a three-sided ambush. This time, we planned for an ambush in Panlong and Yongping, but because the enemy did not take this route and because we could only ambush from the front (relatively weak) and the right flank without an ambush on the left flank, we could not finish off the enemy. However, if the enemy forces advance, we will surely have an opportunity to eliminate them. 3. Please consider which arrangement will be most beneficial if the enemy attacks Wayaobao: (a) Set up an ambush between Wayaobao and Qingjian (in the area around Dantou and Yangjiayuanzi) and prepare to strike the enemy forces as they march west from Qingjian; (b) Set up an ambush in the vicinity of Yongping and prepare to strike the enemy forces as they march west from Yanshui. Please carefully consider and decide which of the two plans is actually more suitable. 4. Please investigate whether the enemy has already captured Qingjian and tell us what you learn. Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 22–23, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-288

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Temporarily Avoid Fighting, Conceal Yourselves, and Wait for an Opportunity (April 3, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 We received your April 2 telegram.2 1. A dense mass of ten brigades of enemy forces is difficult to attack, and you were quite right to avoid fighting. 2. Quickly tell us the direction of the enemy forces after capturing Wayaobao. 3. We are currently in the area northeast of Wayaobao. The Second Bureau is unable to carry out reconnaissance, so we have no information about the enemy’s situation. We hope you can send a battalion with radio equipment to take responsibility for reconnaissance and cover in the area west of Wayaobao around old Anding city. We still need two or three days to move into the secure area west of Anding. 4. For the next few days, it is best for you to remain concealed and wait for an opportunity. CD [Central Military Commission]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 24–25, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong sent this telegram to Commander and Political Commissar Peng Dehuai and Deputy Political Commissar Xi Zhongxun of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun stated that ten enemy brigades were advancing in three columns, with the left column reaching Fengjiaping east of Yongping, the central column reaching Wangjiagou northeast of Yongping, and the right column reaching the highlands west of Resiwan. Peng and Xi’s troops carried out an ambush along the Yongping highway on April 2, but then ceased and retreated to the northwest area of Panlong after discovering a dense deployment of enemy troops in ten brigades covering an area 35 li (17.5 kilometers) from south to north, and 45 li (22.5 kilometers) from east to west. They planned to await another opportunity for attack. After annihilating the Thirtyfirst Brigade, Peng and Xi did not have a clear understanding of the enemy’s situation and they requested further information as it became available. 510

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-289

Questions on a Plan of Action for the Northwest Field Operations Corps (April 6, 1947, 1:00 P.M.) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 We received the two telegrams you sent on April 4.2 Please tell us your thoughts on the following points so we can consider a plan of action: 1. After you advance to the area between Suide, Shuangmiaowan, Wa[yaobao], and Qingjian, if it is difficult to attack to the south, is it possible for you to attack to the north, wipe out the effective strength of the Deng [Baoshan]Gao [Shuangcheng] forces,3 replenish your ranks, and reduce the threat on the north side? If you attack the Deng-Gao forces, what is the plan of attack? (If the Deng-Gao forces do not launch an attack, we must storm their fortifications.) 2. Has Ma Hongkui reached Dingbian yet, and how many troops does he have in total? If we advance to the Suide area but find that attacking either to the south or to the north is difficult, should we shift to attack Ma Hongkui and then attack the enemy forces in eastern Gansu and central Shaanxi? Or do

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 26–27, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  The telegrams from Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun reported unsuccessful attacks on the Guomindang’s Twelfth and 135th brigades, and uncertainty about the enemy’s current situation. Based on intelligence reports, the Northwest Field Army planned to assemble troops between Suide, Qingjian, Wayaobao, and Shuangmiaowan and then try to wipe out one or two enemy brigades when the enemy advanced to Suide, but the concentration of enemy troops made the outcome questionable. Another option was to fight the Seventy-sixth Division in Yanchang and Yanchuan, attack the Fiftieth Brigade, and then leave Ganquan, Fu county, and Guanzhong. They requested instructions on which plan was preferable. 3.  Deng Baoshan (1894–1968, born in Tianshui, Gansu) was general commander of the Guomindang Army Headquarters for the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Region. Gao Shuangcheng (1882–1945, native of Weinan, Shaanxi [present-day Linwei District of Weinan city]) had been commander of the Twenty-second Army under that headquarters, but he died of illness in 1945. The current commander of the Twenty-second Army was Zuo Shiyun (1889–1960, born in Chang’an, Shaanxi). DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-290

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we attack Ma Hongkui4 directly from our present location and then attack eastern Gansu? 3. The plan to attack Yanchang, Linzhen, and Ganquan is very good, but if Hu [Zongnan]’s5 troops do not enter Suide and they withdraw prematurely, will this hamper our future operations? Would it be more beneficial for our future operations to lure Hu’s troops north into Suide? 4. Would it be better simply to rest for a few days, wait until we have a clearer picture of the situation, and then decide how to proceed? Mao [Zedong]

4.  Ma Hongkui was deputy director of the Nationalist government’s Northwest Field Headquarters. 5.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.

After Resting and Reorganizing for a Few Days, Carry Out Extensive Surprise Attacks on the Enemy’s Rear (April 8, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. Based on our intelligence from Xi’an and the retreat to Yongping by Hu [Zongnan]’s2 army, it seems that the enemy has given up its attempt to attack Suide. It is now facing a serious grain shortage and has been unable to locate our main forces; its commanders are extremely frustrated and think this will be a difficult campaign. 2. Under these circumstances, it seems the time has come to begin your proposed attacks on the enemy’s rear. The entire army should rest and reorganize for a few days (avoid fighting); it is of the utmost importance to review and discuss the experience thus far and to make personnel adjustments. During the rest period, consider your course of action: Either continue waiting for the right opportunity to wipe out a unit of the enemy’s main forces (this will require great patience), or split into several groups and carry out extensive surprise attacks on the enemy’s rear (one group should head out through Jinpenwan, Linzhen,3 Yichuan, Hancheng, Chengcheng, Pucheng, and Baishui, leaving a unit with radio equipment in the Jinpenwan-Linzhen area, and carry out frequent attacks along this line; another group should head out through Luochuan, Zhongbu,4 Yijun, Tongguan, and Yao county, leaving one unit with radio equipment in the Yan-Gan-Fu area, and carry out frequent attacks along this line). In the front (the area around Wa[yaobao]), one brigade or even less than one brigade will be enough. In addition,

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 28–29, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 3.  Linzhen is in southeastern Yan’an, Shaanxi Province. 4.  Zhongbu is the former name of today’s Huangling, Shaanxi Province. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-291

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assemble your main forces to attack Deng [Baoshan] and Zuo [Shiyun],5 Ma Hongkui,6 Ma Hongbin (Zhenyuan),7 eastern Gansu, and central Shaanxi, and you can also consider using one unit to pin down Hu’s army. Carefully consider which approach you will take and inform us by telegram. The Military Commission

5.  Deng Baoshan was general commander of the Guomindang Army Headquarters for the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Region. Zuo Shiyun was commander of the Twentysecond Army under the Guomindang Army Headquarters for the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Region. 6.  Ma Hongkui was a deputy director of the Nationalist government’s Northwest Field Headquarters. 7.  Ma Hongbin (1884–1960, native of Gansu) was deputy commander of the Guomindang army’s Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Pacification Headquarters.

Circular of the CPC Central Committee on Establishment of the Work Committee of the Central Committee and Other Matters1 (April 9, 1947) Each bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee, each provincial and district Party committee, and each field army commander: In order to save its moribund regime, the Guomindang, aside from taking steps such as convening a bogus National Assembly, drawing up a bogus constitution, driving out the representative agencies of our Party from Nanjing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, and declaring a break between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, has taken the further step of attacking Yan’an, the seat of our Party’s Central Committee and the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army, and attacking the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region. The fact that the Guomindang has taken these steps does not in the least indicate that its regime is strong, but rather that the crisis facing the Guomindang regime has become extremely deep. Moreover, its attack on Yan’an and the Shaanxi– Gansu–Ningxia Border Region is a vain attempt to first settle the Northwest question, cut off our Party’s right arm, and drive our Party’s Central Committee and the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army from the Northwest, and then to move its troops to attack North China, and thus achieve the objective of defeating our forces one by one. Under these circumstances, the Central Committee has decided as follows: 1. We must defend and expand the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region and the Liberated Areas in the Northwest with a steadfast fighting spirit; it is entirely possible to achieve this objective. 2. The Central Committee of our Party and the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army must remain in the Shaanxi-Gansu–Ningxia Border Region. It is an area where we have a favorable mountainous terrain,

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript. It can be found in Zhang Zhipin, ed., Ganshou Xibaipo (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), pp. 63–64. 1.  Circular of the CPC Central Committee on establishment of the Work Committee of the Central Committee and Other Matters → Circular of April 9, 1947 DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-292

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a good mass base, plenty of room for maneuver, and full guarantees of security. 3. At the same time, to facilitate our work we have set up a Central Committee Work Committee, with Comrade Liu Shaoqi as secretary, to proceed to northwestern Shaanxi or some other suitable place to carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the Central Committee. These three decisions were made last month and have already been put into effect. You are hereby notified. Central Committee

By Waiting Patiently, We Can Find an Opportunity to Wipe out the Enemy (April 15, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]; and for the information of Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi], He [Long] and Li [Jingquan]; Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], and Luo [Ruiqing]; Lin [Boqu] and Wang [Weizhou]; Ye [Jianying] and Yang [Shangkun]; Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi]; Teng [Daiyuan], Bo [Yibo], and Wang [Hongkun]; Chen [Yi] and Rao [Shushi]; Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]; Lin [Biao] and Gao [Gang]:1 We received Peng and Xi’s telegram sent between 9:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M. on the 14th, in which they inform us that after eliminating the main forces of the Thirty-first Brigade in Qinghuabian on March 25, they also completely destroyed the enemy’s 135th Brigade (under the Fifteenth Division). This victory is a heavy

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 39–40, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army, and He Long and Li Jingquan were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the ShanxiSuiyuan Military Region. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Xiao Ke was deputy commander and Luo Ruiqing was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, Lin Boqu was chairman of the government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and Wang Weizhou (1909–1993, native of Hubei) was deputy commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Shanxi Joint Defense Forces. Ye Jianying and Yang Shangkun (1907–1998, born in Tongnan county, near the city of Chongqing in Sichuan) were secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the Central Committee’s Rear Guard Committee. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Teng Daiyuan was first deputy commander of the Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan Military District, Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, and Wang Hongkun was second deputy political commissar. Chen Yi and Rao Shushi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the East China Military Region. Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were deputy commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army. Lin Biao was commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Gao Gang was deputy political commissar. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-293

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blow to Hu Zongnan’s2 invading army and has laid the foundation for thoroughly smashing Hu’s army. This victory proves that we will be able to defeat Hu’s army with only the present military forces in the border region (six field brigades and local forces), and without any external assistance. This victory also proves that by patiently waiting and guarding against arrogance and rashness, we can find an opportunity to wipe out the enemy. Please cite all the officers and soldiers, and please order a celebration for all military men and civilians in the border area to raise their spirits to continue to wipe out the enemy. The Central Committee

2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone.

The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theater1 (April 15, 1947) 1. The enemy is now rather tired, yet it is not completely exhausted. It is facing considerable difficulties with its food supply, but it is not yet in extreme difficulties. Although our army has not destroyed a large number of the enemy’s forces after wiping out its Thirty-first Brigade, during the last twenty days we have achieved our objective of tiring it and considerably reducing its food supplies, thus creating favorable conditions for exhausting it, cutting off all its food supplies, and finally wiping it out. 2. At present, despite the enemy’s fatigue and shortage of food, its policy is to drive our main force east across the Yellow River, blockade Suide and Mizhi, and then “liquidate” our forces one by one. The enemy reached Qingjian on March 31, but it did not immediately advance northward, intending to leave us a clear passage. Its westward advance to Wayaobao was designed to drive us to Suide and Mizhi. Having discovered our troops, it is now veering to the south and west of Wayaobao, and it will again advance toward that town to drive us northward. 3. Our policy is to continue our former method, that is, to keep the enemy on the run in this area for a time (about a month). The purpose is to exhaust it, drastically reduce its food supplies, and then seek an opportunity to destroy it. There is no need for our main force to hurry northward to attack Yulin or to advance southward to cut off the enemy’s retreat. You should make it clear to the commanders and soldiers, as well as to the popular masses, that our army’s method is the essential path to ultimately defeating the enemy. We cannot win final victory until we reduce the enemy to extreme fatigue and complete starvation. This method is called the “wearing down” tactic, wearing the enemy down to complete exhaustion and then wiping it out.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 37–38, where it is reprinted from Mao Zedong xuanji (1991, second edition). An earlier version appears in Zhonggong zhongyang zai Xipaipo, pp. 55–56, under the title “Cable from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, Xi Zhongxun, Zhu De, and Liu Shaoqi on Wear and Tear Tactics.” 1.  Mao Zedong sent this telegram to the commanders of the Northwest Field Army, Peng Dehuai, He Long, and Xi Zhongxun. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-294

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4. You are now in localities east and north of Wayaobao, so it would be most advantageous to lure the enemy north of Wayaobao. You can then attack the weaker part of Liao Ang’s2 forces, lure the enemy east, and then turn toward Ansai and lure the enemy west again. 5. But within a few days you must order the 359th Brigade (the entire brigade) to complete its preparations for a southward drive, so that a week from now it can be sent south for a surprise attack on the area south of the YanchangYan’an line and north of the Yichuan-Luochuan line, and to sever the enemy’s food transport line. 6. Please reply as to whether you consider the above views appropriate.

2.  Liao Ang (1901–1997, native of Sichuan) was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Seventy-sixth Division.

First Hit the Weak, Then Hit the Strong; You Fight Your Battles, I’ll Fight Mine (April 22, 1947) To Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], and Luo [Ruiqing], and for the information of Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi]:1 We received your telegram of the 21st.2 You have now gained the initiative, and if the enemy moves south with reinforcements, ignore it and continue to concentrate all your strength on completing the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] Campaign,3 which will put the enemy in an entirely passive position. This orientation is quite correct. After the Zheng-Tai Campaign is completed, you should not be confused by the enemy’s movement; rather you should choose the enemy’s weakest sections and wipe them out on your own initiative. Which section to select for attack can be decided at the time. This is the policy of “First hit the weak, then the strong, you fight your battles, I’ll fight mine” (each side doing its own fighting), or, in other words, the policy of completely seizing the initiative to wage war. The Military Commission

The source of this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 235–36, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, where Xiao Ke was deputy commander and Luo Ruiqing was deputy political commissar. 2.  The telegram from Nie Rongzhen et al. stated that they expected the enemy forces to send reinforcements south, so the main forces of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region would continue to engage in battle and complete the second phase of the Zheng-Tai Campaign. If after the campaign the enemy had not yet sent reinforcements, they would follow the Center’s directive to continue annihilating the Guomindang’s Third Army; otherwise, they would attack the enemy reinforcements and engage in battle along the Pingbao or Baoshi sections. 3.  The Second, Third, and Fourth columns of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army and local militia engaged the Guomindang army in battle along Zhengding-Taiyuan railway from April 9 to May 4, annihilating more than 35,000 enemy troops and cutting off the enemy’s connection between Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang. This united the Shanxi-ChaharHebei and the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan liberated areas and isolated the Guomindang forces in Shijiazhuang. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-295

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Arrange to Annihilate the Enemy Forces That May Flee from Wayaobao (April 26, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. Chen Geng2 is threatening Xi’an, and it is possible that Dong [Zhao]’s army3 may withdraw to the south. 2. The enemy forces in Wa[yaobao] may flee. Their route may pass through the area northeast of Wa[yaobao] (Wangjiawan, Lijiachuan, and so forth) toward Qingjian, or through the area southwest of Wa[yaobao] toward Panlong. Please arrange to annihilate them. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 44, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army and Xi Zhongxun was its deputy political commissar. 2.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 3.  Dong Zhao was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army. 522

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-296

Wang Shitai’s Unit Should Ensure That the Enemy’s Food Supply Lines Are Cut (April 26, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 Except for Yan Kuiyao,2 who will lead one regiment and two battalions to the south, the main forces should stay in their present locations and rest for a few more days. Gain a thorough grasp of the enemy’s situation and then consider what action to take. Also, Wang Shitai’s3 raids on the area between Ganquan, Luochuan, and Yao county should continue on a protracted basis to ensure that the enemy’s food supply lines are severed. Please take the above into consideration. Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 43, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was its deputy political commissar. 2.  Yan Kuiyao (1904–1994, native of Shaanxi) was deputy commander of the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Force. 3.  Wang Shitai (1910–2008, native of Shaanxi) was acting commander of the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Force. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-297

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Attack Wayaobao or Panlong Only If You Have Complete Confidence (April 30, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 Only after you have gone through painstaking reconnaissance and have complete confidence should you resolve to attack Wayaobao or Panlong. If you do not have full confidence, it would be best not to attack. The troops should step up their rest and reorganization, and we should wait for the enemy to exhaust itself. Be prepared to annihilate the enemy while in motion. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 45, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was its deputy political commissar. 524

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-298

We Can Maintain the Initiative If We Capture Panlong within a Week (May 4, 1947, 1:00 P.M.) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. We received the telegram you sent on May 3 at 15:00.2 We are very pleased that you took 600 prisoners. It seems that the enemy’s main forces will remain in Sui[de] and Mi[zhi] for a few days, and it will take them at least a week to make it back to Panlong.3 If our troops can capture Panlong within a week, we will be able to maintain the initiative. Hu Zongnan4 has already ordered Zhang Xin5 to lead a unit (it may be one regiment) from the Twentyfourth Brigade for reinforcement. Please take heed. 2. In the Northeast, following the elimination of four regiments of enemy forces in early April, the enemy’s offensive has ended, and we are now preparing to launch an offensive. In Shandong, we wiped out the three brigades of the Seventy-second Division on April 26, and it seems that preparations are being made for a forceful new campaign, but we have not yet received a report. Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]6 have captured Tangyin, and Chen [Geng]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 46–47, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was its deputy political commissar. 2.  The telegram from Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun reported a dawn attack on Panlong that resulted in the capture of more than 600 security team personnel defending the enemy’s front line. Closing in on the enemy’s position with very few casualties, Peng and Xi planned another battle after dusk. 3.  Panlong town is situated northeast of Yan’an. In May 1947, the PLA’s Northwest Field Army annihilated more than 6,700 Guomindang troops under Hu Zongnan in Panlong and seized large quantities of weapons, equipment, and supplies. 4.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 5.  Zhang Xin (1902–1985, born in Jinhua, Zhejiang) was commander of the Twentyfourth Brigade under the Guomindang’s Reorganized Seventy-sixth Division. 6.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-299

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and Xie [Fuzhi]7 are currently attacking Yuncheng. Nie [Rongzhen] and Xiao [Ke]8 are currently attacking the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway.9 Mao [Zedong]

7.  Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 8.  Nie Rongzhen was the commander and political commissar, and Xiao Ke was deputy commander, respectively, of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Military Region. 9.  The Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway is today’s Shi[jiazhuang]-Tai[yuan] railway.

Operational Arrangements after the Capture of Panlong (May 4, 1947, 5:00 P.M.) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun], and for the information of Chen [Geng], Xie [Fuzhi], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received the telegram you sent at 1:00 on May 4.2 We were very pleased to learn that you took 1,000 prisoners during yesterday’s fight. If reinforcements from the Twenty-fourth Brigade arrive after you have thoroughly captured Panlong, you should annihilate that unit. Next, wipe out the enemy forces in Guaimao, and rest for a few days in the Panlong-Guaimao area. After that, you can consider taking a direct route (Nanniwan or Linzhen3) and march straight for Luochuan, Zhongbu,4 Yijun, Pucheng, and Baishui to shake up central Shaanxi. In addition, you should consider whether to bring the main forces of Chen and Xie’s column (four brigades) across the river to join in wiping out Hu [Zongnan]’s5 army and open up the situation in the Northwest. Dong Zhao and Liu Kan6 have kept the nine-and-a-half brigades under their command in Suide today, and it seems they will remain there for a few more days. We estimate it will probably take more than twenty days for Dong and Liu to shift from Suide to the Luochuan-Zhongbu line; time is on our side. We hope you will think this over and let us know your views. Mao Zedong Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 48–49, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, of the Northwest Field Army. Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the ShanxiHebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. 2.  Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun’s May 4, 1947, telegram to the Central Military Commission reported the use of tunnel blasting to capture the highlands in southeastern and southwestern Panlong on May 3, with some 1,000 enemies taken prisoner. They estimated they would need two more days and nights to finish off the battle. 3.  Linzhen is southeast of Yan’an city, in western Shaanxi Province. 4.  Zhongbu is the former name of today’s Huangling, Shaanxi Province. 5.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 6.  Dong Zhao was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army. Liu Kan was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Twenty-ninth Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-300

527

As Long as You Have Patience, There Is Sure to Be an Opportunity to Annihilate the Enemy (May 4, 1947) To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received the two telegrams you sent earlier. It is difficult to attack when the enemy forces are concentrated, so it is quite appropriate to patiently wait for the right opportunity. As long as you have patience, there is sure to be an opportunity to annihilate the enemy. When you move your rear to the extensive area south of Jiaodong, Bohai, and the Jiaoji railway line, you can lure the enemy to penetrate deeply, allowing the enemy to capture Laiwu, Yishui, and Ju county and to fall into an extremely difficult position, and then you can attack; it will not be too late. Keep this in mind: 1. You must have very great patience. 2. You must control the largest fighting force. 3. You must not disturb the enemy’s rear prematurely. You should therefore consider whether it would be best for the First and Sixth columns to delay their movement to the south. If they move south too early, they might startle the enemy into retreating, after which it would be very difficult to wipe it out. However, it is entirely up to you to decide. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 52–53, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Su Yu was its deputy commander. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. At the time of this telegram, the Guomindang army had amassed twenty-four reorganized divisions to advance on central Shandong. 528

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-301

Is It Possible to Finish off the Enemy’s 144th Brigade? (May 5, 1947) To [Peng Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 How strong are the fortifications of the 144th Brigade, whose forces are distributed among Yanchuan, Jiaokou, Yanchang, and other places? Is it possible to capture them? Please investigate this matter further. If Dong [Zhao] and Liu [Kan]2 linger in Suide for a time, it seems that after taking care of Qinghuabian (and resting and reorganizing for a few days), you might consider moving your forces to finish off the 144th Brigade. After that, you could head for Guanzhong and Longdong.3 Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 54, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was its deputy political commissar. 2.  Dong Zhao and Liu Kan were commanders of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First and Twenty-ninth armies, respectively. 3.  These are locations in central Shaanxi and eastern Gansu, respectively. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-302

529

It Is Better to Launch an Attack When the Enemy Is Dispersed and Exhausted (May 5, 1947, 1:00 P.M.) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. If there are no good battles to fight, it is best to conceal yourselves and await an opportunity; wait until the enemy is dispersed and more exhausted to launch your attack and to wipe it out. 2. We have moved to the area northwest of the old Anding city. 3. We hope you will inform us by telegram each day of the enemy’s situation. CD [Central Military Commission]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 55, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 530

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-303

Conceal Yourselves and Rest and Reorganize before Heading for Guanzhong and Longdong (May 5, 1947, 11:00 P.M.) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 After you finish off the enemy forces in Panlong, the enemy troops in Yan’an, Wa[yaobao], Qingjian, and other places are sure to be in a panic. Yesterday Hu [Zongnan]2 ordered the First Division to remain and defend Suide on account of its importance, but at midnight, upon receiving word that Panlong had fallen, he immediately ordered Dong Zhao3 to abandon Suide. Today, both Dong and Liu [Kan]4 have started to move, and it seems that they are turning back. If they hurry the troops along the highway, they may be able to reach Panlong in four or five days. We therefore hope that the fighting in Qinghuabian5 and all postbattle matters can be handled and completed within three or four days. If the troops are exhausted, it would seem safest for you to move west of Ansai, conceal yourselves, and rest and reorganize for a time before heading to Guanzhong and Longdong. Please think this over and decide how to proceed. Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 56–57, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 3.  Dong Zhao was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army. 4.  Liu Kan was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Twenty-ninth Army. 5.  After the battle of Panlong, the Northwest Field Army planned to launch another campaign in Qinghuabian, but this campaign was never carried out due to altered circumstances. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-304

531

Do Not Be Impatient or Disperse Our Forces; Lure the Enemy in Deep and Seize Opportunities for Combat (May 6, 1947) To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 On the 4th, we received your telegram sent on the 3rd, and we immediately replied with several suggestions, which we assume you have received. Today, we received your telegram of the 2nd,2 and learned that you annihilated 3,000 of the enemy at Qingtuosi,3 but we lost an opportunity to annihilate the enemy because the First Column had been sent far off to Ningyang, and there was not enough time to concentrate our forces to strike a forceful blow at the Seventyfourth Division and other units. In the current situation, the enemy is in a hurry, and we are not. From [the battle at] Qingtuosi, we learned the lesson that we should not disperse our forces. Not only must the First and Sixth columns not be sent out too early, but the Seventh Column should also stay in the coastal area for about a month to pin down [the enemy], and then move southward, depending on the situation. Consequently, in May and June, all your troops, except for the Seventh Column located in the coastal area, should amass in the Laiwu and

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 58–60, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Su Yu was deputy commander, respectively, of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi and Su Yu stated that while the East China Field Army was attacking Tai’an, the enemy continued to storm Xintai and Mengyin to incite an attack and end the battle. The East China Field Army took the initiative to abandon Xintai and Mengyin, and it attacked Ningyang, shifting the enemy’s Fifth Army west and splitting it up, while the main force moved east to support an attack on the enemy forces entering Mengyin. Chen and Su’s troops defeated about two regiments of the Guomindang’s Eightythird Division south of Qingtuosi, but they had not yet attacked the enemy’s Seventy-fourth Division and other units. 3.  Qingtuosi (now called Qingtuo) is a town in southwestern Yi’nan county, Shandong, on the north bank of the Meng River. 532

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-305

May 1947 533

Nishui areas, rest and reorganize, wait until the enemy forces move forward, or some other change occurs, and then seize the opportunity to annihilate the enemy. First, do not be impatient; second, do not disperse our forces. As long as we retain control of our main forces, we will eventually have the opportunity to destroy the enemy. In any action, one must never consider only one possibility, but must keep two possibilities in mind. For example, when we seek to induce the enemy to move, it may or may not do so; it is possible that a large part will be induced to move, or only a small part. If the situation is uncertain, our main forces should stay in locations that enable us to deal with both possibilities. On this last occasion, your attention was focused on the western area and you did not foresee that Tang [Enbo]’s4 main forces might advance northward. You did not amass your main forces in the appropriate locations before the event. If you had done so, you would have been able to destroy not only the Fifth Army, the Eleventh Division, and other units by striking eastward from the western areas, but also the Seventyfourth Division and others by striking northward from the southern areas. You also did not have enough time to concentrate your forces when you fought at Qingtuosi, but the loss of a single opportunity is not all that important. When the situation is unfavorable for battle, it is quite correct to avoid provoking the enemy and to wait patiently for an opportunity. On the other hand, after our major victory in the battle of Tai’an,5 the enemy’s panic is growing deeper day by day, and we think there may be an opportunity to annihilate it during the months of May and June. Even if there is no such opportunity, provided that the enemy forces march to the Tai’an-Laiwu-Nishui line, it is best to allow them to advance to the Zibo area. You should then retreat to the Zibo region or the area north of Zibo. You may pretend to withdraw to Hebei to mislead the enemy. Our main forces should keep their distance from the enemy and not occupy territory. Do not fire a single shot at the front, side, or rear of the enemy, so that it may march confidently forward without having the slightest idea where our main forces are located. Then, when the circumstances are favorable, we should attack. When the circumstances are not favorable for an attack, we should shift our main forces to the enemy’s rear, and the situation will eventually change. Last time, when Hu Zongnan6 used thirty-one brigades to invade our Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, an area with a population of only 1,500,000, and he amassed eleven or sometimes ten or nine brigades to form a battlefield in an area 40 to 50 li square, depriving us of the opportunity to strike a devastating blow, we applied precisely the aforementioned

4.  Tang Enbo was commander of the First Army Group of the Xuzhou Command Headquarters under the Guomindang army’s Ground Forces General Headquarters. 5.  The Tenth and Thirteenth columns of the East China Field Army surrounded Tai’an from April 22 to 26, annihilating the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Seventy-second Division (minus one brigade) and taking division commander Yang Wenquan (1905–1973, native of Sichuan) prisoner. 6.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.

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method to deal with them. We paid no attention to enemy troop concentrations (on this occasion, nine-and-a-half brigades invaded Suide, and we did not fire a single shot). Instead, we concentrated our entire force on attacking the enemy’s rear area, forcing it into an absolutely passive position. This may serve as reference for you. The differences between this case and your situation are that the terrain in Shandong is narrower and your forces are very large and difficult to maneuver. Consequently, you should adjust the measures to fit your terrain and make decisions based on the specific situation. The Military Commission

Slow Down the Enemy’s Movement and Cover the Fighting in Qinghuabian (May 6, 1947) To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 We are quite certain of Dong [Zhao] and Liu [Kan]’s2 movements; yesterday (the 5th) they moved south from Suide to the areas north and south of Tianzhuangzhen. We estimate that if they move quickly, they may arrive at Laojundian today and at Wa[yaobao] tomorrow (the 7th). You may dispatch a unit north of Panlong to slow their movement, covering the fighting in Qinghuabian and the cleaning up of the battlefield. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, p. 61, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  Dong Zhao and Liu Kan were the commanders of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First and Twenty-ninth armies, respectively. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-306

535

Arrangements for Destroying the Frontline Troops in Gu Zhutong’s Apparatus (May 8, 1947) To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Su [Yu]:1 To smash the frontline troops of Gu Zhutong’s2 apparatus (about thirty brigades stationed along Tai’an, Xintai, Mengyin, and Linyi): 1. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping should still act according to the Central Committee’s May 4 telegram3 by trying to finish rest and reconsolidation by June 1, cross the Yellow River by June 10, and attack the enemy in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Region and the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Region, and for the second step to attack the Central Plains region. To stay in this region on a long-term basis, the entire army should be fully mobilized politically (make everyone aware of the political task, encourage them to tolerate hardship and not to be afraid of difficulties), and should fully prepare cadres, expenses, and other items. Extensively communicate the Central Committee’s February 1 instructions on the current situation and tasks.4 2. Before June 10, Chen Yi and Su Yu’s army should concentrate all its forces (twenty-seven brigades) to seek and create opportunities to annihilate the enemy, and it should prepare to cooperate with Liu and Deng’s army in extensive offensive actions after June 10. It would also seem best for Tan Zhenlin5 to set off for central Jiangsu with the Seventh Column after June 10. The Military Commission Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 64–65, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army; Chen Yi was commander and political commissar, and Su Yu was deputy commander, respectively, of the East China Field Army. 2.  Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Command Headquarters in Xuzhou, which he had established in early March 1947 to command the troops under the previous Xuzhou and Zhengzhou Pacification Offices. 3.  This telegram, drafted by Mao, assigned tasks to the various military units. 4.  See “Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and Tasks,” February 1, 1947, in this volume. 5.  Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army. 536

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-307

Chiang Kaishek’s Strategy of Driving Our Army North of the Yellow River Will Come to Naught (May 11, 1947, 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.) To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun], and for the information of Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi]:1 1. After Chiang Kaishek enforced the plan that blocked up the outlets of the Yellow River, his persistent policy has been as follows: first, drive our troops north of the Yellow River; second, destroy our forces there. 2. Last February, when Liu and Deng’s forces crossed the river for rest and reorganization, Chiang thought they had been driven out and would not be able to cross the river again. He therefore dared to use Wang Jingjiu’s2 army in Shandong. 3. For a long time, the gap at Tai’an has been open. We instructed Chen and Su’s army to cross to the north. Chen and Su did not listen and annihilated Li Xianzhou. Chiang thereupon opened Jiaozhou and Ji’nan and blockaded Tai’an, forcing Chen and Su to withdraw to the north and west.  From now on, our policy must be for all front-line enemy units (including the Fifth Army, the Eleventh, Seventy-fourth, Eighty-third, Twenty-fifth, Sixty-fifth, Seventh, and Forty-eighth divisions, and so on) to move toward Jiaozhou and Ji’nan. If Chen and Su had just let go and given ground, the enemy certainly would have misunderstood this to mean that we were afraid of battle and it would have thought it had succeeded in driving us out.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 68–69, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Su Yu was deputy commander, respectively, of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  Wang Jingjiu was commander of the Second Corps of the Xuzhou Command Headquarters of the Guomindang’s Ground Forces General Headquarters. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-308

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4. This time, Hu Zongnan’s3 attack was also to drive us east of the river. Hu occupied Qingjian on March 31, and intentionally deferred going to Suide to leave a path for our troops. Not until April 26, almost one month later, did Hu order Dong Zhao4 to lead eight-and-a-half brigades north, arriving at Suide on May 2. At the time, he really thought his army would be able to drive us to cross the river. Only when our army occupied Panlong on May 5 did Hu begin to realize that our troops were near Yan’an. He then ordered Dong Zhao to immediately withdraw southward, leaving Suide opened up without a single soldier to defend it. This indicates that the purpose of Hu’s army was not to open up the Xian-Yu Highway, but rather to drive our troops across the river. 5. When Chen and Su break through Gu Zhutong’s5 front, Liu and Deng cross the river southward, and Peng and Xi march toward eastern Gansu and central Shaanxi, Chiang will finally see that his dream has come to naught. The Military Commission

3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 4.  Dong Zhao was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army. 5.  Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Ground Forces. At the beginning of March 1947, he formed the Ground Forces General Headquarters in Xuzhou to unify the forces of the Xuzhou and Zhengzhou Pacification Offices under one command.

Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from the Inner Mongolia People’s Congress1 (May 19, 1947) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Northern Shaanxi, May 21) Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu send a reply telegram to the Inner Mongolia People’s Congress. The telegram reads as follows: Dear Representatives of the Inner Mongolia People’s Congress: We received your telegram of May 17. Under your leadership, the Inner Mongolian compatriots who have suffered extreme hardship have begun to create a free and glorious new history. We believe that the Mongolian people will become closely united with the Han people and China’s other nationalities in the struggle to eliminate ethnic and feudal oppression and to build a new Inner Mongolia and a new China. Congratulations on your victory. Mao Zedong Zhu De

Our source for this text is Renmin ribao, May 22, 1947, p. 1. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-309

539

Our Combat Orientation in the Northeast and the Situation within the Pass1 (May 20, 1947) To Lin [Biao] and Gao [Gang], and for the information of Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi]:2 We received Gao’s telegram sent from 5:00 to 7:00 this morning, and Lin’s two telegrams sent on the 18th and 19th.3 We are very relieved that you have gotten off to a good start. Under your leadership, land reform has been carried out in the Northeast, the masses have been mobilized, and a powerful army has been built. Among the country’s regions, yours comes first in terms of its economy, and second in terms of military power (Shandong ranks first). At present, you should move eight divisions southward. We expect that you can solve the problem of southern Manchuria4 in the summer and the fall and do your best to move to Rehe5 and eastern Hebei in the winter and next spring, with the goal of annihilating [enemy] units such as the Thirteenth and Ninety-second armies, mobilizing the masses, and expanding our forces. The two areas combined have a population of fifteen million, which is an indispensable condition for capturing the Changchun and Bei[ping]–[Liao]ning railways6 and the four cities of

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 78–80, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives. 1.  I.e., south of the Shanhai Pass. 2.  Lin Biao was commander and political commissar, and Gao Geng was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 3.  The telegram from Lin Biao stated that on May 8 eight divisions of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army in northern Manchuria began crossing the Songhua River and moving south, and on the 17th, they annihilated a regiment of the Guomindang’s New First Army and a peace-keeping force at Huaide, northwest of Changchun. On the 18th, Lin’s forces wiped out most of the two enemy reinforcement divisions at Huaide, capturing many. They expected to reach southern Manchuria within ten days, with the intention of improving the chances for success of the war effort in the Northeast. 4.  Southern Manchuria included Andong (now Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Lin­ jiang, Qingyuan, Liaozhong, and other areas southwest of Shenyang. 5.  Rehe was a province covering the northeastern part of what is now Hebei, the southwestern part of Liaoning, and the southeastern part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region before it was dissolved in 1955. 6.  The Changchun railway, originally built and administered by Russia, originates in Harbin and extends west to Manzhouli, east to Suifenhe, and south to Dalian. It was con540

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-310

May 1947 541

Chang[chun], Shen[yang], [Bei]ping, and [Tian]jin. There are three conditions we must bring about to take the two railways and four cities. You have fulfilled the first condition by establishing a powerful base in northern Manchuria.7 Now you are advancing toward southern Manchuria and expect within a short period of time to be able to create the second condition by setting up a solid base there. The third step is to establish a base in the region of Hebei, Rehe, and Liaoning. In the regions south of the Shanhai Pass, our forces in the Jiangsu-Shandong area8 are bearing the heaviest burden. On their front, the enemies have amassed thirty-two reorganized divisions composed of eighty-five brigades (including those wiped out). The enemy offensive faced few difficulties until the recent annihilation of their Seventy-fourth Division. If we wipe out two or three more enemy divisions (armies) from now on, we will be able to go over to a general counteroffensive. Our armies under Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]9 are now attacking Anyang. In June they will be able to move 100,000 troops across the Yellow River and advance toward the Central Plains. Our forces under Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun10 (with only six incomplete brigades) have been dealing with attacks by thirty-one enemy brigades under Hu Zongnan,11 and after two months of battle they have demoralized Hu’s forces. After several more months, they will definitely be able to wipe out the enemy in large numbers and open up new prospects. The four brigades under Chen Geng12 will be operating in the Northwest. Last month, the army under Nie [Rongzhen], Xiao [Ke], and Luo [Ruiqing]13 annihilated more than thirty thousand enemy troops in the Zheng[ding]–Tai[yuan] Campaign,14 and seized more than 15,000 guns. Now they need to rest for half a

trolled by the Soviet Union and the Japanese at various times before and during the Japanese Occupation. Following the War of Resistance Against Japan, the railway was jointly used and administered by China and the Soviet Union, and in December 1952, the government of the Soviet Union gave the railway in its entirety to the PRC. The Beiping-Liaoning railway, running from Beiping to Shenyang through Tianjin, is now a section of the BeijingHarbin railway. 7.  Northern Manchuria included Harbin, Mukden, Bei’an, Jiamusi, and Qiqihar. 8.  Referring to the East China Field Army, of which Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Su Yu was deputy commander and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. 9.  Liu Bocheng was commander, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 10.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army and Xi Zhongxun was its deputy political commissar. 11.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 12.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan Field Army. 13.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-ChaharHebei Military Region, and Xiao Ke was its deputy commander and Luo Ruiqing was its deputy political commissar. 14.  See “First Hit the Weak, Then Hit the Strong; You Fight Your Battles, I’ll Fight Mine,” April 22, 1947, in this volume.

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month, and they will be attacking the [Tian]jin–Cang[zhou] railway15 around the middle of next month in coordination with your operations. Regarding the overall prospects at present, in most regions we have now gone over to a counteroffensive. It will take only one or two more successful battles in Shandong before we enter the stage of an across-the-board counteroffensive. Mao Zedong

15.  Now part of the Beijing-Shanghai railway.

General Policy for Conducting Operations on the Shandong Battlefront (May 22, 1947) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], and [Chen Shiju, Zhang [Yunyi], Rao [Shushi], Deng [Zihui], and Li [Yu], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received your telegram of the 20th. The price we paid to wipe out the Seventy-fourth Division was rather high, but it was of great significance, proving that by engaging in battle where we are now, if we are not impatient and do not divide our forces, it is possible to crush the enemy’s offensive and win a decisive victory by using the method of wiping it out one by one. Engaging in battle in the present areas, moreover, is to our best advantage and it is most disadvantageous to the enemy. We have now adopted an offensive position in every battlefield throughout the country except for Shandong, but the purpose of all these offensives is to help crush the enemy’s attacks on the primary, Shandong, battleground. The role of gradually expanding the people’s struggle in the areas under Chiang’s control is the same. As for the offensive by Liu and Deng next month, its effect is also the same. The tactic for fighting on the Shandong front, on the other hand, is to concentrate the entire main force in the area north of the Ji’nan-Linyi-Haizhou line and prepare to spend six or seven months (beginning in May) and 60,000 to 70,000 casualties to wipe out the enemy forces along this line one by one. The day the attacks along this line are crushed will be the day that a major overall victory is won; all subsequent battles will proceed relatively smoothly after that. There are two general principles behind our next steps: (1) After several days of rest and reorganization, you should carry out the tactics set forth in your telegram

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 245–46, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army; Su Yu was its deputy commander, Tan Zhenlin was its deputy political commissar, and Chen Shiju was its chief-of-staff. Zhang Yunyi was deputy commander of the East China Military Region, and Rao Shushi was its political commissar. Deng Zihui was deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar of the East China Military Region. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army, and Deng Xiaoping was its political commissar. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-311

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of the 20th, using three columns to attack Wei county2 and six columns to attack the reinforcement troops (it is quite right to keep both the Sixth Column and the Seventh Column in the north and not to disperse them). (2) Once again, postpone plans to attack Wei [county] (it was postponed once before, and attacking the Seventy-fourth [Division] was absolutely correct), and consider first striking the Fifth Army. This army is now stationed in two places, Laiwu and Yanzhuang, and it is fairly isolated. We wonder, however, how solid its fortifications are? How confident are you regarding fighting this army? How confident are you of our forces pinning down the Eleventh Division and others to the extent that they cannot be reinforced? We hope you will consider things from a long-range perspective, assess the advantages and disadvantages, and let us know by telegram. If you can first wipe out the Fifth Army (or one or two of its divisions) and several other units, and then attack Chang[le] and Wei [county], the advantages will be even greater. Because if we attack Chang[le] and Wei [county], the enemy is sure to send reinforcements (this is inevitable), so the sooner it happens the more the reinforcements will be and the more difficult it will be for our forces to fight the reinforcements; the later it happens (that is, after wiping out several more units of the enemy’s forces from the front), the smaller the enemy reinforcements will be and the easier it will be for our forces to fight the reinforcements. Therefore, the attack on Wei [county] should be regarded as an important means by which to gain the initiative for our forces and to place the enemy in a passive position, but it should not be carried out any sooner than necessary. Only when all chances for waging battles from the front have been exhausted should the measure of attacking Wei [county] be adopted. What do you think? We look forward to your response. The Military Commission

2.  Wei county is now Hanting district in Weifang city, Shandong Province.

Deployments for the Westward Campaign of the Chen [Geng]-Xie [Fuzhi] Column (May 24, 1947) To Chen [Geng], Xie [Fuzhi], and Han [Jun], and for the information of [Wang] Xinting, Teng [Daiyuan], Bo [Yibo], Wang [Hongkun], He [Long], Li [Jingquan], Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Peng [Dehuai], and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. Before the end of June, your column should finish resting and reorganizing as well as completing preparations for the westward advance (including eliminating Lüliang and opening the communication routes). Prepare to cross the river between Daning and Jundu during the first ten days of July. First go to northern Shaanxi to fight, and then go to fight in the general area of Ning[xia] and Gan[su]. Make your goal to destroy Hu [Zongnan]’s2 army and other diehard units and to take control of the greater Northwest, which will enable you to defend Shanxi. Encourage your troops to develop an ethic of enduring hardship, laboring patiently, and not fearing difficulty, and tell them that only by eliminating Hu Zongnan will we be able to defend Shanxi. 2. Chen Geng’s telegram of 5:00–7:00 A.M. on the 23rd3 stated that Hu Zongnan was heading back to Shanxi and it advocated capturing Taiyuan.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 83–84, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan) Field Army, Xie Fuzhi was political commissar, and Han Jun was deputy commander. Wang Xinting was commander of the Taiyue Military Region. Teng Daiyuan, Bo Yibo, and Wang Hongkun were first deputy commander, first deputy political commissar, and second deputy commander, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. He Long and Li Jingquan were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the JinSui (Shanxi-Suiyuan) Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone. 3.  Chen Geng’s telegram reported that the Communist forces’ efforts in Shanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia had put Hu Zongnan in an impossible situation, but he was still expected to advance to southern Shanxi. Chen Geng planned to amass as many troops as possible to take a defensive position along the Beiping-Hankou railway. He suggested that Liu Bocheng DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-312

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3.

4.

5.

6.

Under the present circumstances, our main military objective is Chiang Kaishek; we should wait until later to deal with annihilating Yan Xishan’s4 main forces and capturing Taiyuan. Hu’s army will not necessarily return to Shanxi for now. If it does return to Shanxi, we should lure it back into the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su] region and then eliminate it. This would most greatly facilitate defending the Liberated Areas in Shanxi. To open up communication routes to northern Shaanxi and ensure that subsequent material assistance proceeds smoothly, we should undertake a major campaign to wipe out enemy forces in the eight counties of Xiang[ning], Ji, Pu, Da[ning], Ping[yao], Jie[xiu], Ling[shi], and Xiao[yi]. To achieve this objective, you may postpone entering Shaanxi by half a month. After Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi] enter Shaanxi, the unit commanded by [Wang] Xinting will coordinate with troops in Lüliang (five brigades will soon return to Lüliang from Suimi and will come under the unified battle command of [Wang] Xinting), and they will consolidate and develop the two areas of Lüliang and Taiyue. After Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi] enter Shaanxi, grain supplies should be handled by the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] border area, while Taiyue and Taihang will continue to provide all other assistance. You should prepare for this. Also, subsequent fighting is certain to involve more positional warfare, so bring more artillery shells. On the political side, carry out ample mobilization work, ensuring that each and every person understands the great political significance of our advance to the west. The Military Commission

and Deng Xiaoping reinforce the Datong-Puzhou railway with at least two columns and try to deploy additional troops from Shanxi and Suiyuan, first attacking Hu Zongnan’s troops in Shanxi and then coordinating with Nie and Xiao’s troops to seize Zhengtai and to take Taiyuan. The main forces would then advance south to the Central Plains over the winter and spring and coordinate with Chen Yi to take Xuzhou. 4.  Yan Xishan was director of the Guomindang’s Pacification Office in Taiyuan.

The Central Plains Army Has Played an Enormous Strategic Role (May 28, 1947) To Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian], and for transmission to all comrades in the Central Plains Army; and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Xu [Xiangqian], Bo [Yibo], Teng [Daiyuan], and Wang [Hongkun], and Chen [Geng], Xie [Fuzhi], Wang [Xinting], and Han [Jun]:1 To combat traitor Chiang Kaishek’s attacks, beginning in July of last year all sections of our Central Plains forces carried out the strategic plans of the Central Committee under extremely adverse conditions in southern Shaanxi, western Henan, western, central, and eastern Hubei, and western Hunan. They persisted in guerrilla warfare and pinned down more than thirty brigades of Chiang Kaishek’s regular forces, enabling our main forces in North China and Central China to pull through the most difficult period of Chiang Kaishek’s attacks, thereby playing an enormous strategic role. To all of you officers and men who participated in this valiant struggle and garnered the respect of the people of the entire nation, the Central Committee hereby expresses our admiration and great esteem. All the units that participated in this fight, although suffering considerable losses in their arduous battle against superior enemy forces, kept their backbone fundamentally intact. The Central Committee hopes that under the leadership of comrades [Zheng] Weisan and Li [Xiannian] you will step up your study and based on the Central Committee’s political line make self-criticisms regarding your experience, unite as one, and prepare to fight hard in executing the new combat task. The Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 250–51, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Zheng Weisan and Li Xiannian were first and second deputy secretaries of the Central China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army, and Deng Xiaoping was its political commissar. Xu Xiangqian (1901–1990, born in Wutai county, Shanxi) was first deputy commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military Region, Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, Teng Daiyuan was second deputy commander, and Wang Hongkun was third deputy commander. Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army, and Xie Fuzhi was its political commissar. Wang Xinting was commander of the Taiyue Military Region. Han Jun was deputy commander of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-313

547

An Authoritative Person of the Chinese Communist Party Discusses the Current Situation (May 30, 1947) (Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Northern Shaanxi, May 30) An authoritative person of the Chinese Communist Party has made a statement to a reporter of Xinhua News Agency regarding the current situation. The authoritative person of the Chinese Communist Party said: The Chiang Kaishek government, hostile to the whole people, now finds itself besieged by the whole people. On both the military and political fronts, it has met defeat, is besieged by those forces it has declared to be its enemies, and it can find no way to escape.1 The traitorous Chiang Kaishek clique and its master, U.S. imperialism, wrongly appraised the situation. They overestimated their own strength and underestimated the strength of the people. They regarded China and the post–World War II world as being the same as in the past; they would permit nothing to change nor would they permit anyone to oppose their will. After Japan’s surrender, they were determined to restore the old order in China. And having gained time by deceptions, such as political consultation and military mediation, the traitorous Chiang Kaishek government mustered two million troops and launched an all-out offensive. [There are now two battlefronts in China.]2 The war between Chiang Kaishek’s invading troops and the People’s Liberation Army constitutes the first front. Now a second front has emerged, that is, the intense struggle between the great and righteous student movement and the reactionary Chiang Kaishek government. The slogans of the student movement are “Food, Peace, Freedom,” and “Against Hunger,

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 10, pp. 63–67, where it is reproduced from Renmin ribao, June 1, 1947. 1. In Renmin ribao, the text takes the form of a single long paragraph. For the reader’s convenience, we have followed the paragraphing in the Selected Works version. 2.  This sentence was added to the Selected Works text. Here, and in several other places, the original version inserts the words, “The authoritative person of the Chinese Communist Party said.” We have omitted these statements. Other words in brackets are alternatives appearing in the Mao Zedong ji text. 548

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-314

May 1947 549

Against Civil War, Against Persecution.” Chiang Kaishek has promulgated the “Provisional Measures for the Maintenance of Public Order.” Everywhere his army, police, gendarmes, and secret agents are clashing with the student masses. Chiang Kaishek is using brute force against unarmed students, subjecting them to arrest, imprisonment, beating, and slaughter; the student movement is nevertheless [as a result] growing stronger by the day. Public sympathy is all on the side of the students, Chiang Kaishek and his running dogs are completely isolated, and his ferocious features have been completely unmasked. The student movement is part of the movement of the whole people; it is also the organizer of the movement of the whole people. The upsurge of the student movement will inevitably promote an upsurge of the movement of the whole people. This is borne out by the historical experience of the May 4th Movement of 1919 and the December 9th Movement of 1935. Since U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kaishek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Jingwei and have adopted the policies of turning China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war, and strengthening the fascist dictatorship, they have declared themselves to be the enemies of the people of the whole country, and they have driven all strata of the people to the brink of starvation and death. This has compelled all strata of the people to unite in a life-and-death struggle against the reactionary Chiang Kaishek government and has brought about the rapid development of that struggle. For the people [of the whole country], there is no other way out. The strata of the Chinese people oppressed by the reactionary policies of the Chiang Kaishek government and united for their own salvation include workers, peasants, [urban] petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry, other patriotic elements, minority nationalities, and overseas Chinese. This is a very broad national united front. The extremely reactionary financial and economic policies long pursued by the Chiang Kaishek government have now been aggravated by an unprecedentedly treasonable treaty, the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Based on this treaty, U.S. monopoly capital and Chiang Kaishek’s bureaucrat-comprador capital have become tightly intertwined and they control the economic life of the whole country. The results are unbridled inflation, unparalleled soaring prices, increasing bankruptcy of domestic industry and commerce, and daily deterioration in the livelihood of the toiling masses, government employees, and teachers. Under these circumstances, all strata of the people cannot but unite and fight for their very survival. Military repression and political deception have been the two main instruments by which Chiang Kaishek maintains his reactionary rule. People are now witnessing the rapid collapse of both instruments. On every battlefield Chiang Kaishek’s army has met with defeat. About ninety brigades of his regular troops alone have been wiped out in the eleven months since last July. His troops no longer display the overweening pride of last year when they occupied Changchun, Chengde, Zhangjiakou, Heze, Huaiyin, and Andong,

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or even of this year when they occupied Linyi and Yan’an. Chiang Kaishek and Chen Cheng underestimated the strength and fighting methods of the People’s Liberation Army. Mistaking our retreat for cowardice and our abandonment of a number of cities for defeat, they fondly hoped to finish us off south of the Great Wall within three months or at most within six months, and then proceed to finish us off in the Northeast. But after ten months, all of Chiang Kaishek’s invading troops are in desperate straits; they are completely besieged by the people of the Liberated Areas and the People’s Liberation Army and they are finding it very difficult to escape. As more and more news of the defeats of Chiang Kaishek’s troops at the front reaches his rear areas, the broad masses of the people there, suffocating from the oppression of his reactionary government, see ever greater hope of ending their suffering and winning their emancipation. At this very time, all of Chiang Kaishek’s political tricks are failing as rapidly as he plays them. Everything has gone against the expectations of the reactionaries. Things such as convening a “National Assembly” to adopt a “constitution,” reorganizing the one-party government into a “multi-party government,” and so on were originally aimed at isolating the Communist Party and the other democratic forces. They have produced the opposite result; it is not the Communist Party or any of the other democratic forces that are isolated but rather the reactionaries themselves. Since then, the Chinese people have come to know from their own experience what Chiang Kaishek’s “National Assembly,” “constitution,” and “multi-party government” really are. Previously, many Chinese people, mainly those of the middle strata, had illusions to a greater or lesser extent about these maneuvers by Chiang Kaishek. It is the same with his “peace negotiations.” Now that Chiang Kaishek has torn to shreds several solemn truce agreements and used bayonets against the student masses demanding peace and opposing civil war, no one, except those bent on deceiving people or those who are completely politically naïve, will any longer believe in his so-called peace negotiations. The whole course of events has proved our appraisal to be correct. We have repeatedly and continuously pointed out that the Chiang Kaishek government is nothing but a government of treason, civil war, and dictatorship. It seeks to wipe out by civil war the Chinese Communist Party and all other democratic forces, to turn China into a U.S. colony, and to maintain its own dictatorial rule. But because it has adopted these reactionary policies, this government has lost all prestige and political strength. The power of the Chiang Kaishek government is only temporary and superficial; in fact, it is a government outwardly strong but inwardly weak. Its offensives can be smashed no matter where or on what fronts they are launched. Its inevitable end will be rebellion by the masses, desertion by its followers, and total destruction of its entire army. All events have borne out and will continue to bear out the correctness of this appraisal.

May 1947 551

The march of events in China will be somewhat faster than expected. On the one hand, there are the victories by the People’s Liberation Army; on the other, there is the advance of the people’s struggle in the areas under Chiang Kaishek’s control; both are moving at high speed. The Chinese people should [swiftly] prepare all necessary conditions for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic, and independent new China.

We Agree That Liu and Deng’s Entire Army Should Rest and Reorganize, and Cross the River at the End of the Month (June 3, 1947) To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], Zhu [De], and Liu [Shaoqi]:1 We received your telegram of June 2.2 1. We agree that the entire field army of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping] should rest and reorganize, and that the time for crossing the river should be postponed to the end of the month. 2. During this time, we hope you will order the main forces of the local troops south of the old Yellow River and north of the New Yellow River3 to also rest and consolidate their forces, in the hope that you will be better able to coordinate the fighting next month. 3. Moving the main force south should be planned well in advance. We hope you are carrying out all necessary political and material preparations. The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 91–92, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Liu Bocheng was the commander of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army, and Deng Xiaoping was its political commissar. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, with Su Yu as deputy commander and Tan Zhenlin as deputy political commissar. 2.  The telegram from Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping stated that, based on the enemy’s situation and present conditions, Liu and Deng’s troops would not be ready to set off on June 10. They advised fording the river at the end of the month. 3.  On June 9, 1938, Chiang Kaishek ordered that the Guomindang army bomb the dikes at Huayuankou, north of Zhengzhou, in an attempt to reroute the Yellow River and thus to halt the westward advance of the Japanese army. This portion of the Yellow River, which changed course to the southeast and emptied into the Huai River at Zhengyangguan, was called the “New Yellow River.” In 1947, the breached dike was repaired, and the Yellow River returned to its original course. 552

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-315

All Large-Scale Actions to Sabotage Railroads Must Come to a Halt (June 4, 1947) To the leaders of all bureaus:1 In conducting operations at present our army has completely switched from a strategic defense to a strategic counteroffensive. In general, the railroads that had to be destroyed in the past no longer must be destroyed. On the contrary, if we do not stop sabotaging the railroads now, we will be making a mistake. Therefore, from now on all large-scale actions to sabotage railroads should be halted, except for instances during battle in which a partial tactical sabotage may still be applied due to certain tactical needs. Wherever our army goes we should afford protection to all railway personnel and workers, and to tracks, ties, roadbeds, bridges, culverts, and railway station installations, and we should advise the people to afford such protection as well. All damage of a tactical nature that is necessitated by battle should be repaired as quickly as possible once the enemy has been annihilated and the place in question has been occupied. In addition, the above principles should apply to all ordinary buildings, both public and private, all roads, bridges, mines, factories, machines, and both military and civilian resources, so that, except in cases of tactical necessity, an order prohibiting sabotage should be reissued across the board; even what may temporarily be used by the enemy should not be sabotaged. We hope you will convey to your subordinates this order that is to be followed strictly. The Central Committee

The source of this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 97–98, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-316

553

Make All Preparations to Seize the Great Northwest (June 6, 1947) To Chen [Geng], Xie [Fuzhi], and Han [Jun], and for the information of Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1 1. We agree with what you said in your telegram of the 5th about planning to start moving northward after the 15th for a westward crossing. 2. You are to hold a meeting for cadres at the battalion level and above, and repeatedly explain to them that they must be prepared to undergo much hardship in waging battle under conditions very different from those in southern Shanxi, and that they must have the courage to overcome all difficulties and have the ambition to destroy Hu Zongnan2 and seize the great Northwest. In addition, they must be prepared to wage positional warfare (mobile warfare will be greatly reduced in the future), learn to carry out short-distance maneuvers, and be good at attacking strongholds. You absolutely must adopt a positive stance in making all this perfectly clear to cadres at the battalion level and above, and through them to make it clear to the soldiers, mobilizing all commanders and soldiers to courageously carry out the new task. As for the fact that the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] Border Region can only supply you with provisions and all other material assistance will have to be taken care of by the Taiyue area, you must also explain this very clearly to the cadres to avoid complaints in the future. In sum, you must be fully prepared in all respects, both mentally and materially. For this purpose, you may choose an appropriate spot on the way from southern Shanxi to Jundu to rest for a few days and to hold meetings for cadres and soldiers. The Military Commission

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 252–53, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-HebeiShandong-Henan) Field Army, Xie Fuzhi was political commissar, and Han Jun was deputy commander. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar. 2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone. 554

DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-317

June 1947 Should Be the Month in Which to Begin a Comprehensive Counterattack (June 14, 1947) To Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi]: We have received your various telegrams; you handled things quite correctly. Has Shaoqi’s health improved? We hope that after a month of rest and relaxation he can return to work when he has recovered from his illness. We are all fine, and my health is much better than it was in Yan’an. Since the middle of April, we have moved to the upper reaches of the Dali River and have had a peaceful time for two months or so. From the 9th to the 11th of this month, four of Liu Kan’s1 brigades came to where we were stationed and to some nearby places, such as Wangjiawan, Woniucheng, and Qingyangcha, and did some parading around. Apart from some slight losses to the populace, there were no other losses. Liu’s forces have now drawn back to the area between Yan’an and Bao’an2 with no purpose except harassment. A summing up of three months of warfare in the border region shows that local work was somewhat disorganized during the first month. Starting with the second month, things have gotten back on track, and the Party, the government, the army, and the people have been fighting resolutely against the enemy. Within the enemy’s ranks, mutual resentment increases day by day, morale declines with each passing day, and there is pessimism about the future. Our confidence, in contrast, is high, and our morale is robust. Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]3 led their field army to eastern Gansu at the end of last month, and because the Eighty-second Division of Qinghai’s Ma [Bufang]4 was extremely tough, they attacked Heshui but failed to take it. Near Quzi, however, they wiped out one regiment of the Second Cavalry Brigade and one regiment of Ma [Hongkui]’s5 Eighty-first Division from Ningxia. They are right now Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 254–55, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript. 1.  Liu Kan was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Twenty-ninth Army. 2.  Bao’an is now Zhidan county, Shaanxi Province. 3.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Xi Zhongxun was his deputy political commissar. 4.  Ma Bufang (1903–1975, native of Gansu) was a deputy director of the Guomindang government’s Northwest Field Headquarters. 5.  Ma Hongkui was a deputy director of the Guomindang government’s Northwest Field Headquarters. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-318

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attacking the main force of the Eighty-first Division at Huan county, with the aim of first breaking through the lines of encirclement in the west and then advancing toward the central Shanxi plain. Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi]’s column6 is undergoing rest and reorganization this month, and they are resolved to move westward on July 1 to coordinate with the border region army units7 in opening up a new prospect in the Northwest. The situation on the Northeast front is developing very rapidly. In less than one month, more than six enemy divisions (brigades) have been wiped out, more than thirty towns have been recaptured, a population of five million has been added, and Siping is currently under attack. In Shandong, the situation has stabilized since the Seventy-fourth Division was annihilated, and new offensive battles are now being planned. Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]8 are undergoing rest and reorganization this month, and they are prepared to strike out at the end of this month and organize four new columns, so that in the future there will be eight columns waging war in that region. From the standpoint of the overall situation, this month should be the month in which to begin a comprehensive counterattack. Within the next six months, starting now, you will have achieved great success if you can (1) properly handle military issues in the Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] region, (2) do a good job of holding a land meeting, and (3) set up a finance and economics office. Mao Zedong

6.  Chen and Xie were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 7.  Referring to the Northwest Field Army, of which Peng Dehuai was political commissar. 8.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

Do Not Fight Battles in Which You Are Not Assured of Victory (June 22, 1947, 3:00 P.M.) To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1 We received your telegram of the 19th.2 1. After Siping is captured in the Northeast, the next step has not been decided. The next step for Nie [Rongzhen]’s region3 is to watch for a chance to move in the direction of the [Bei]ping-[Tian]jin and [Bei]ping-Bao[ding] railways. The plan for Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping] to launch an attack at the end of the month remains unchanged. In northern Shanxi, as soon as Chen Geng’s4 troops arrive, they plan to attack the enemy at Yulin and the three cities of Dingbian, Anbian, and Jingbian, and then to move southward. The student movement in Chiang [Kaishek]’s regions is inactive at the moment, but it is preparing for another upsurge. 2. It has been reported that because of the crisis in the Northeast, Chiang has ordered Du Yuming5 to hold fast for two months, air support will be sent to the Northeast as soon as Shandong is taken care of, and so on. The military

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 111–12, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Mao drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. 2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that Chiang Kaishek had begun to use the Japanese war criminal Yasuji Okamura as a consultant and that Okamura advised, “Reduplication is better than advancing side-by-side, advancing together is better than separately.” The Guomindang was using the military tactic of advancing three or four of its reorganized armies one after another and amassing military supplies and manpower in the mountainous areas and key villages. 3.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. 4.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army. 5.  Du Yuming was deputy director of the Guomindang government’s Northeast Field Headquarters. DOI: 10.4324/9781315719511-319

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situation in Shandong remains pivotal to the overall situation. Your general guidelines in conducting operations should still be to launch an attack only when assured of victory. If victory is assured, it is all right to fight either primary or secondary enemy positions. Otherwise, it is better to exercise restraint for the time being, and you should not fight battles in which you are not assured of victory. The Military Commission

Bibliography

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About the Editors

Joseph Fewsmith is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the Boston University Pardee School of Global Studies. He is also Associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University and Associate at the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future at Boston University. Nancy Hearst is Librarian in the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies Collection of the H.C. Fung Library at Harvard University.

562

Index

A Ying 87 Abyssinia/Ethiopia (1935–1937) xlvii Achieving Victories in the Battles at Siping and Benxi Is Key at Present (April 6, 1946) 230–31 Action to Be Taken by the Central Plains Military Region after Breaking out of the Encirclement (July 3, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 342–43 Actively Fight in the Taihang Mountains and Eastern China to Assist the Central China Forces (August 9, 1946) 376–77 Actively Prepare for Battle and Strengthen Work among the Diehard Army (May 26, 1946) 294 Additional Points for the Negotiations with the Guomindang (October 29, 1945) 139 Adopt the Battle Tactic of Ambushing from the Front and Both Flanks (April 2, 1947) 509 Adopt the Method of Besieging a City and Destroying the Relief Forces to Eliminate the Enemy’s Effective Strength (October 24, 1946) 421 After Resting and Reorganizing for a Few Days, Carry out Extensive Surprise Attacks on the Enemy’s Rear (April 8, 1947) 513–14 After the Third Division Is Eliminated, Find an Opportunity to Dispose of the Enemy Troops near Dongming (September 5, 1946) 393 “agrarian revolution” xl “Agreement on Halting Domestic Military Conflict” (January 10, 1946) 204n1 agricultural work 173 airports 178

All Large-Scale Actions to Sabotage Railroads Must Come to a Halt (June 4, 1947) 553 All of the Guomindang’s Initiatives Are to Fight; for the Time Being, There Is No Hope for Peace (June 25, 1946) 336 Amass the Greatest Force to Annihilate the Present Enemy (October 31, 1945) 144 American Sailor’s Union 332 An Authoritative Person of the Chinese Communist Party Discusses the Current Situation (May 30, 1947) 548–51 An Inscription Celebrating Victory in the War Against Japan (September 3, 1945) 83 An Order Regarding the Defense of Yan’an (March 16, 1947) 501–2 An Ziwen 217 anarchism xxx Anbian 557 Anci 287, 302 Anding city 510, 530 Andong Province, 125, 336n2, 549 Anhui lxvi, 44, 91, 113, 357, 361–62, 436 Annihilate the Enemy Facing Us and Then Attack the Reinforcements (October 30, 1945) 142 Answers to Questions Raised by Reuters News Agency Correspondent Campbell (September 27, 1945) 89–91 Anti-Japanese Military and Political University 131–34 anti-Soviet protests 211–13 anti-Soviet reactionaries 211, 219–20 Antonov, Aleksei 47 apolitical villages 234 army nationalization 77, 80–81, 91, 109, 116–17 563

564 Index

army rest periods lxxxi, 153, 188, 244, 272n3, 312–13, 381, 395, 493, 531, 541, 554, 556 army supplies lxvii, 382–83 army training 192, 263, 276, 286, 294, 299, 356, 413 Arrange for Several More Battles in Central Jiangsu (August 13, 1946) 378 Arrange to Annihilate the Enemy Forces That May Flee from Wayaobao (April 26, 1947) 522 Arrangements for Action Following Elimination of the Third Division (September 4, 1946) 392 Arrangements for Destroying the Frontline Troops in Gu Zhutong’s Apparatus (May 8, 1947) 536 As Long as You Have Patience, There Is Sure to Be an Opportunity to Annihilate the Enemy (May 4, 1947) 528 Assemble the Full Forces of the Shandong and East China Field Armies and Eliminate the Enemy Moving Eastward North of the Huai River (October 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 419–20 Assemble the Main Forces and Ride the Crest of Victory to Capture the Jiaoji Railway (February 25, 1947) 496 atom bombs 33 Attack the Beiping-Shenyang Railway and Conduct Guerrilla Warfare North of Shenyang (April 16, 1946) 241 Attack the Weaker Enemies First, Then the Stronger Enemies; Strive for an Advantage (February 6, 1947) 487–88 Attack Wayaobao or Panlong Only If You Have Complete Confidence (April 30, 1947) 524 Attend to Other Work While Arranging for the Eastern Rehe Campaign (May 10, 1946) 277, see also Rehe Campaign Attlee, Clement xli, 445 Authoritative Person in Yan’an Declares Opposition to the Byrnes Bill to Assist Chiang Kaishek (June 16, 1946) 315–16 autocracy xciv Babei, General 181 Bai Chongxi lxix–lxx, lxxvi, 27n9, 242n3 Baichengzi 336n2 Baijin railway 19 BaikuiJincheng railway 29, 68

Baishui 513, 527 Baita (village) 130 Bao Dasan 334–35 Bao’an xliii, 31, 434, 508, 555 Baodi 302 Baoding (city) 338 Baofu 321 Baotou 155 Barrett, David xlii, l, 32n16 base areas xl, lxxi, lxxiv, 3, 29, 66, 195, 326, 354, 359, 370; orders to establish xxxviii, 3, 5–6, 189, 197, 269, 306, 317, 359, 361–62, 396–98, 427 “Basic Proposal Regarding the Reorganization of the Armed Forces and Incorporation of the Communist Forces into the Guomindang Army” 434n3 Basic Tasks for the Shanxi-ChaharHebei Military Region Following the Guomindang’s Major Assault (June 28, 1946) 337–38 Battle Deployments for Datong, Kouquan, Shuo County, Ningwu, and Other Places (June 4, 1946) 307–8 The Battle Experience of the Central China Field Army (August 28, 1946) 382–83 battle of eastern Suqian 455, 457 battle of Huai-Hai lxviii–lxxvi battle of Nanjing xlvi battle of Shajiadian lxiv–lxv battle of Shangdang 183 battle of Shanghai (August 13-November 26, 1937) xliv–xlv battle of Siping lvii–lviii, lxiv, 230–31, 241, 249, 281, 287, 296 The Battle to Defend Siping Cannot Represent Our General Battle Strategy (May 27, 1946) 296 battles/campaigns, overall instructions for 64, 257, 267, 379, 401–4, 412, 421, 430, 448–49, 455–58, 470–71, 497–98, 521, 530, 532–34, 557–58 Bazhong 359 Beijiang 5–6, 427 Beijing 19 Beining railway 19 Beiping lxxvii, lxxxiii, 100, 101, 139, 155, 211, 540 Beiping-Baoding railway 557 Beiping Eleventh Military District Command 302

I ndex 565

Beiping-Gubeikou railway 270, 310 Beiping Field Headquarters 77, 81, 411 Beiping-Hankou Campaign, see Pinghan Campaign Beiping–Hankou railway 29, 68, 99–100, 123, 132, 147, 338, 362, 476, 499–500, 545–46n3, see also Pinghan railway Beiping–Liaoning railway 68, 540, 540–41n6 Beiping Office for Military Mediation 229n2, 280n2, 281, 333, 346, 350, 417, 442; telegrams from 328–29 Beiping–Shenyang railway 241, 282–83 Beiping–Suiyuan railway 29, 68, 147, 417 Beiping-Tianjin, see Pingjin Campaign Beiping-Tianjin railway 557 Beiping-Wuhan railway 159 Beiping-Zhangjiakou railway lxxx Benxi 230–31, 233, 238–39, 256, 264, 268, 278 Benxihu 186 Bevin, Ernest 445 Bi Hao 459 Bian-Xu railway 377 Bianco, Lucien, The Origins of the Chinese Revolution: 1915–1949 xxxix–xl Bikeji 68, 101 Bishan 211 Bo Gu 57, 215n2, 243n1 Bo Yibo: for the information of 302, 438– 39, 499–500, 517–18, 547; telegrams to 136–37, 149, 152–54, 164–65, 318–19, 325–26, 545–46 Bo’ai 68 Bohai 494–95, 528 bourgeoisie, splits in 220 Boxiang 138 break out maneuvers lxix, lxxix, 259, 304, 330, 333, 342–43, 359–60 Break out of the Encirclement by Separate Routes and Protect the Security of the Military Mediation Teams (June 25, 1946) 333 Bundy, McGeorge xl Burma l, 47 Burma expeditionary army 253 By Waiting Patiently, We Can Find an Opportunity to Wipe out the Enemy (April 15, 1947) 517–18 Byrnes, James S. 315

cadres 14, 109, 180, 193–94, 196–97, 208–9, 246–47, 251–52, 294, 469 Cai Bo 203 Cai Hesen 203n1 Cairo Conference (November 22–26, 1943) xlviii, lix, xciii Campaigns and Tactics Both Require Concentrating the Fighting Forces to Ensure Victory (November 9, 1946) 430 Campbell, Mr. 89–91 Cao county 386 Cao Fulin 163, 184, 344 Cao Junzhang 31n14 Cao Lihuai 181, 253 captives 252, 363, 429, 525, 527 Capture Zaozhuang and Prepare to Eliminate Ou Zhen’s Forces (January 17, 1947) 463–64 Carlson, Evans lxxxix Carrying out the Jiaoji Campaign Requires Full Preparation (February 23, 1947) 493 Central Army 13, 155–58, 175, 387, 502 Central China 21–22, 366, 376–77, 384–85, 396 Central China Bureau: directives to 195–98; telegrams from 21n2; telegrams to 21–22, 36, 344 Central China Campaign 388n2 Central China Democratic Allied Army 459 Central China Liberated Area 87 Central China Military Region 388n2 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 3–4; circulars from 218, 225, 515–16; declarations 61–63; directives from 68–71, 172–74, 195–98, 206–10, 263, 274–75, 328–29, 366–68, 432, 476–83; July 7th declaration 340, 346–47, 349; mentioned 26, 498; policy documents 225–27; Propaganda Department 406n1; telegrams from 19–20, 101–2, 126–27, 150–51, 155, 170–71, 175–76, 228, 242, 286, 296, 356, 553; telegrams to 87; telegrams to Bo Yibo 164–65, 318–19, 325–26; telegrams to Chen Shaomin 3–4; telegrams to Chen Shicai 256; telegrams to Chen Yi 179, 234–35, 291, 325–26, 384–85, 419–20; telegrams to Chen Yun 424–25; telegrams to Cheng Zihua 260, 269–71, 321–22; telegrams to

566 Index

Deng Xiaoping 164–65, 290, 318–19, 325–26; telegrams to Deng Zihui 384–85, 419–20; telegrams to Dong Biwu 416–17; telegrams to Fang Fang 427–28; telegrams to Feng Baiju 423; telegrams to Gao Gan 424–25; telegrams to He Long 318–19, 505–6; telegrams to Huang Kang 423; telegrams to Li Da 164–65; telegrams to Li Jingquan 318–19, 505–6; telegrams to Li Lisan 280–81; telegrams to Li Ming 423; telegrams to Li Xiannian 3–4, 259, 304, 333, 357, 547; telegrams to Li Yu 179, 384–85, 429; telegrams to Lin Biao 222, 229, 232–33, 236–40, 244–54, 258, 267, 284, 288, 295, 312, 336, 352–55, 424– 25; telegrams to Liu Bocheng 164–65, 290, 318–19; telegrams to Liu Lantao 260, 270–71, 318–19, 321–22, 337–38; telegrams to Luo Ruiqing 280–81, 337–38; telegrams to Luo Shunchu 256; telegrams to Nie Rongzhen 260, 270–71, 318–19, 321–22, 337–38; telegrams to Peng Dehuai 517–18; telegrams to Peng Zhen 222, 232–33, 239–40, 244–48, 254, 267, 424–25; telegrams to Rao Shushi 280–81; telegrams to Shu Tong 291, 325–26, 429; telegrams to Su Yu 291, 384–85; telegrams to Tan Zhenlin 291, 384–85; telegrams to Tang Weisan 304; telegrams to the Central Bureau of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Region 103–4; telegrams to the Central China Bureau 21–22, 36; telegrams to the Central Plains Bureau 266, 330, 361–62; telegrams to the Chongqing delegation 139; telegrams to the East China Bureau 302, 305, 418; telegrams to the Guangdong Region Party Committee 5–7; telegrams to the Hebei-ReheLiaoning local bureau 277; telegrams to the Northeast Bureau 177–78, 223–24, 227, 229, 236–37, 249–53, 288, 295, 306, 312, 327, 352–55, 422; telegrams to the Plains Sub-bureau 64; telegrams to Wang Zhen 259, 304, 333; telegrams to Wu Xiuquan 280–81, 346–47; telegrams to Xi Zhongxun 513–14, 517–18; telegrams to Xiao Hua 256, 268; telegrams to Xiao Ke 260, 269–71, 321– 22, 337–38; telegrams to Ye Jianying 280–81, 287, 346–47, 350–51; telegrams

to Ye Ting 215–16; telegrams to Yin Linping 427–28; telegrams to Zeng Shan 419–20; telegrams to Zhang Dingchen 419–20; telegrams to Zhang Dingcheng 291; telegrams to Zhang Jichun 164–65; telegrams to Zhang Jingcheng 384–85; telegrams to Zhang Yunyi 384–85, 429; telegrams to Zheng Weisan 3–4, 259, 333, 357, 547; telegrams to Zhou Enlai 280–81, 287, 346–47, 350–51, 416–17; work summaries 410–15; in Ya’an 119, 189–90 Central Committee Work Committee 516 The Central Committee’s Resolutions Regarding Our Party’s Tasks after Japan’s Surrender (August 11, 1945) 13–15 Central Field Army 388n2, 419n2 Central Military Commission lxxi, lxxix–lxxxi, 507; telegrams from 298–99, 363–64; telegrams to Bo Yibo 136–37, 152–54; telegrams to Chen Geng 309, 448–49, 545–46, 554; telegrams to Chen Shiju 463–64, 466, 497–98, 543–44; telegrams to Chen Yi 46, 146–48, 162–63, 300–301, 344, 376–77, 386–87, 455–58, 464, 466–68, 471–75, 484–98, 528, 532–34, 536–38, 543–44, 557–58; telegrams to Cheng Shicai 430; telegrams to Cheng Zihua 279, 282, 313; telegrams to Dai Jiying 359–60; telegrams to Deng Xiaoping 136–38, 141–42, 144, 146–48, 152–54, 344, 376–77, 379–80, 386–87, 391–95, 438–39, 494–95, 499–500, 536–38, 552; telegrams to Deng Zihui 372, 543–44; telegrams to Gao Gang 460–61; telegrams to Han Jun 545–46, 554; telegrams to He Long 130, 276, 297, 307–8, 314, 320, 331; telegrams to Huang Kecheng 241; telegrams to Jiang Hua 430; telegrams to Lai Chuanzhu 128–29, 146–48, 162–63; telegrams to Li Chuli 421; telegrams to Li Da 136–37, 152–54; telegrams to Li Fuchun 241, 314; telegrams to Li Jingquan 276, 297, 307–8, 331; telegrams to Li Xiannian 124, 320, 342–43, 359–60; telegrams to Li Yu 146–48, 162–63, 484–85, 489, 497–98; telegrams to Li Zuopeng 146–48; telegrams to Lin Biao 146–48, 257, 283, 460–61; telegrams

I ndex 567

to Liu Bocheng 136–38, 141–42, 144, 146–48, 152–54, 344, 376–77, 379–80, 386–87, 391–95, 438–39, 494–95, 499–500, 536–38, 552; telegrams to Liu Lantao 310–11; telegrams to Liu Zijiu 369–70; telegrams to Luo Ronghuan 146–48; telegrams to Luo Ruiqing 146–48, 399–400, 470, 521; telegrams to Luo Shunchu 430; telegrams to Nie Rongzhen 130, 146–48, 294, 297, 310–11, 331, 470, 521; telegrams to Peng Dehuai 503, 507, 513–14, 522, 524, 530, 535, 537–38; telegrams to Peng Zhen 146–48, 460–61; telegrams to Rao Shushi 128–29, 146–48, 162–63, 474–75, 484–86, 489, 497–98, 543–44; telegrams to Song Shilun 378; telegrams to Su Yu 372, 376–78, 381, 388–89, 456–58, 463–64, 466–68, 471–75, 484–95, 497–98, 528, 532–34, 536–38, 543–44, 557–58; telegrams to Tan Zhenlin 378, 381, 388–89, 466–68, 471–75, 484–98, 543–44, 557–58; telegrams to Tang Yanjie 294, 297, 310–11, 331; telegrams to the Central China Bureau 162–63, 344; telegrams to the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Sub-bureau 48–49; telegrams to the Pingyuan Sub-bureau 48–49; telegrams to the Shandong Sub-bureau 48–49; telegrams to Wang Shusheng 369–70; telegrams to Wang Zhen 448–49; telegrams to Wang Zhitao 421; telegrams to Xi Zhongxun 503, 507, 522, 524, 530, 535, 537–38; telegrams to Xiao Hua 430; telegrams to Xiao Ke 146–48, 279, 282, 313, 470, 521; telegrams to Xie Fuzhi 309, 448–49, 545–46, 554; telegrams to Zeng Yongquan 310–11; telegrams to Zhan Caifang 421; telegrams to Zhang Caiqian 369–70; telegrams to Zhang Dingcheng 372; telegrams to Zhang Jichun 136–37, 152–54; telegrams to Zhang Yunyi 128–29, 146–48, 162–63, 484–85, 489, 497–98, 543–44; telegrams to Zhang Zongxun 399–400; telegrams to Zhao Erlu 140; telegrams to Zheng Weisan 124, 342–43, 359–60 Central News Agency 34, 212 The Central Plains Army Should Pin down the Enemy by Flexible Mobile Action on the Exterior Lines (July 13, 1946) 357

Central Plains Bureau 266, 330, 361–62, 396–98 Central Plains Field Army lxx, lxxv, 304, 357, 370, 547 The Central Plains Forces Must Seek Their Own Path to Salvation and Prepare to Break out of the Encirclement (June 1, 1946) 304 Central Plains Liberated Area 350–51 Central Plains Liberation Army 412 Central Plains Military Region 259n1, 342–43, 353 Central Propaganda Department 349 Central Shandong Military Region 384n2 Central Work Committee 508 Chahar 44, 65, 80–81, 167–68, 318–19, 436; defending 254 Chahar Province 29n12, 51n3 Chairman Mao Makes Remarks in Chongqing Expressing the Hope That the Negotiations Will Come to a Successful Conclusion (September 13, 1945) 86 Chairman Mao Meets with American Journalist Steele and Answers Questions about the Current Situation (September 29, 1946) 407–8 Chairman Mao’s Statement on Arriving in Chongqing (August 28, 1945) 73 Chang Jung lx Changchun lvi–lvii, lxxxiv, 175, 182, 223–24, 227, 236, 239, 241, 244–46, 248, 251–52, 254–55, 257, 264, 286, 288, 295, 302, 306n1, 434, 540, 549 The Changchun Forces Should Rapidly Divide into City Garrison and Field Army Units (April 21, 1946) 251–52 Changchun-Harbin-Qiqihar railway 244 Changchun-Harbin railway 286, 288 Changchun railway 540–41n6 Changchun-Siping railway 288 Changle 544 Changyuan 290, 325, 386 Chaoshan 6 Chaoyang-Pingquan railway 270 Chen Boda 225n1 Chen Cheng 242n3, 472–73, 484–85, 550 Chen Daqing 163 Chen Dingxun 342 Chen Duxiu xxx, 26, 28 Chen Geng: for the information of 499– 500, 517–18, 527, 547; mentioned 144,

568 Index

165, 183, 439, 504–5, 522, 525–26, 541, 556–57; telegrams from 363; telegrams to 122–23, 309, 448–49, 545–46, 554 Chen, Jack, see Chen Yifan Chen Jiakang 416 Chen Jian xliii Chen Jinkun 405, 462 Chen Liang 92 Chen Lifu 97, 334–35 Chen Qian 435 Chen Shaomin 3–4 Chen Shiju 463–64, 466, 497–98, 543–44 Chen Xianrui 397 Chen Yi lxvi–lxvii, lxx–lxxi, lxxv; for the information of 128–29, 318–19, 380–81, 388–89, 399–400, 517–18, 552; mentioned 147, 180; telegrams from 300n2, 456n2, 492n3, 496n2, 532n2; telegrams to 135, 146–48, 162–63, 179, 234–35, 291, 300–301, 325–26, 344, 376–78, 384–87, 419–20, 455–58, 463–67, 471–75, 484–98, 528, 532–34, 536–38, 543–44, 557–58 Chen Yifan 445 Chen Yun 57, 72, 244–45, 312, 424–25 Chen Zhenzhong 334–35 Cheng Qian 360, 376, 411 Cheng Shicai 256, 256n2, 430 Cheng Zihua: for the information of 310–11, 337–38, 421; mentioned 165; telegrams to 260, 269–71, 279, 282, 313, 321–22 Chengcheng 513 Chengde lxxx, 310–11, 313, 321–22, 337–38, 350, 412, 549 Chengzigou 502 Chenliu 325 Chennault, Claire lvi Chiang Ching-kuo xxxvii, xliv Chiang Kaishek lv, lxiv, lxxviii–lxxx, lxxxv, xc–xciv, 52, 332; on civil wars 41; during the Chongqing peace talks 96, 106–7; during the War of Resistance Against Japan 11, 28–29, 33, 40–43, 46, 51–52, 68; flight to Taiwan xxxvii, liv, lxxxv; Handbook on Bandit Suppression 152, 159, 168; kidnapping of xxxiii, lv, 107, 115; and Liberated Areas 17–18; and the Long March xxxii, xxxiii; Mao on 15, 24–25, 67, 165, 184, 220–21, 257, 318–19, 352, 367, 407–8, 410–15, 432, 537–38, 548–49; popular support

for 30; telegrams to 34–35, 39, 44–47, 58, 184; and the United States 32, 407–8; and World War II xlii; Xinhua News Agency on 16–18, 39–43, see also Nationalists Chiang Kaishek bandits lxxviii Chiang Kaishek, the Enemy of the People, Has Sent out a Signal for Civil War (August 16, 1945) 40–43 Chiang Kaishek’s Strategy of Driving Our Army North of the Yellow River Will Come to Naught (May 11, 1947, 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.) 537–38 Chiang Soong Mei-ling xciii China: 1911 Revolution xxix; American policy toward xlii, xliii, lv, lviii–lx, lxxviii, 12, 32–33, 184, 280–81, 407–8, 442, 453; changes in 110–11; and Great Britain xlv–xlvin24; and imperial powers xlv–xlvin24; and Japan xlv– xlvin24; Japanese-occupied areas 45; Mao’s views of democracy in xli; Opium War (1840) xxix; population 55; and Russia xlv–xlvin24; Soviet aid to xlvii– xlviii; United States aid to xlvii–xlviii Chinese Communist Party 27–28, 335; army 133, 165, 180–81, 192–93, 208–9, 251–52; army casualties lxxxiv, 413; on civil wars 41–42, 280–81; concessions made by 108–9, 116–17, 346–48; early years of xxxi; field army system xcii; financial policy 193; First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee 11–12; and the Guomindang organization (Sun Yatsen) 23–33, 227, 249–50; internationalist faction xxxii, xxxiv; landowner-related policies 234–35; long-term planning by 194; Mao on 373–75; membership numbers l; negotiations with the Nationalists xlix, lii; propaganda 175–76, 178, 406n1; Seventh National Party Congress l, 11, 23n1, 25, 55–56, 107, 109–11, 119, 185, 274, 433, 478; Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee 11; slogan 59, 69, 437; in the War of Resistance Against Japan lxxxvi– lxxxvii, 41 A Chinese Communist Party Spokesperson Denounces Wu Guozhen’s Shameless Lies and Presents Ironclad Evidence Regarding the Repeated Attacks by the

I ndex 569

Guomindang Army (November 5, 1945) 166–69 Chinese Eastern railway 223–24 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences lxxxi Chinese Quislings 62 Chinese Revolution xxxiv, xxxv, 29, 30, 109, 119, 207, 209 Chinese Soviet Republic xxxii, liii–lv, lviii, lxix Chongqing xlvi–xlvii, lxxvi, 515; peace talks in xlix–l, lii, 56–59, 65–67, 69, 72– 73, 75–82, 84–86, 88, 94–97, 105–21; Political Consultative Conference 206; protests in 211–13, 340 Chongqing Accords (October 10, 1945) xlix–l, 105–7, 113, 127, 131–32, 139, 168–69, 189, 340, 366 Chunhua Incident 17, 142, see also Yetai Mountain attack Churchill, Winston 219 Ci county 141, 150, 159, 160 Circular of the CPC Central Committee on Establishment of the Work Committee of the Central Committee and Other Matters (April 9, 1947) 515–16 Circular Requesting That All Areas Report on Industry and the Labor Movement (March 12, 1946) 218 cities: army training for 299; besieging 421; cadres in 14; and the Chinese Communist Party 52, 281; encircling 460; occupation of 13, 19, 64, 160, 236, 239, 457; under Chinese Communist Party control 68, 173 Civil War (1940s) lxi, 157–58, 280–81, 304, 435; battle of Siping lvii–lviii, lxiv; Manchuria in lvi; and Mao xxxviii; United States-imposed ceasefire lix–lx; United States involvement in 303, 315–16; victory xxxvii, lxxviii, lxxxv– lxxxvi; and the War of Resistance Against Japan xlviii–xlix, see also specific campaigns or battles civil wars: Chiang Kaishek on 25, 41; Chinese Communist Party on 41–42, 155; Mao on 28–30, 84, 108, 115, 427– 28, 433–34; reported calls to 40–43, 70 class struggle xxxi Clausewitz, Carl von lxxxv Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] Sends a Telegram Demanding That Chiang

Kaishek End the Civil War (August 16, 1945) 44–47 Commence Military Transport Work against the Northwest and Northeast Troops (November 4, 1945) 162–63 communication lines 19–20, 232–33 The Communist Manifesto (Marx) xxxi compromises 261–62 Comrade Mao Zedong Makes a Declaration Regarding the Fact That the War of Resistance Against Japan Has Entered Its Final Stage (August 9, 1945) 9–10 Conceal Yourselves and Rest and Reorganize before Heading for Guanzhong and Longdong (May 5, 1947, 11:00 P.M.) 531 Concentrate a Superior Force to Launch Several Large Decisive Battles South and North of Siping (April 19, 1946) 246–47 The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theater (April 15, 1947) 519–20 Congratulatory Speech on the Occasion of the New Year (January 1, 1947) 453–54 Congratulatory Telegram on the First Anniversary of the Insurrection by the Central China Democratic Allied Army (January 8, 1947) 459 Congratulatory Telegram to Marshal Stalin Celebrating the Twenty-Ninth Anniversary of the Soviet Union (November 6, 1946) 426 “Constitution of the Communist Party of China” 11 Construct Defensive Fortifications in Linyi to Facilitate Annihilating the Enemy (February 6, 1947) 489 Consultative Conference, see People’s Political Consultative Conference Control with All Our Might the Two Cities of Changchun and Harbin and the Entire Length of the Chinese Eastern Railway (March 24, 1946) 223–24 Conversation with Three Western Journalists (December 9, 1946) 441–46 Council of Foreign Ministers, see Moscow Conference countryside/rural areas: for base areas 195–96, 427; importance of to Mao

570 Index

xxxii, xxxv, xlviii, 14–15, 255, 367; occupation of 37 The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender (August 26, 1945) 68–71 Cultural Revolution xxxv Current Party Policy and Work Agenda for the New Fourth Army (August 24, 1945) 59–60 The Current Policy for Developments in the Northeast (October 19, 1945) 125 The Current Situation and the Tasks for the Next Six Months (October 20, 1945, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.) 126–27 Cut off the Retreat of the Enemy Army at Siping and Pin down the Enemy Reinforcements at Benxi (May 12, 1946, 9 P.M. to 11 P.M.) 278 Dabie Mountains lxxv–lxxvi, lxxvi Dagong bao 84–85 Dagu lxxix–lxxx, 165 Dahongshan 396 Dai county 320, 331, 350 Dai Jiying 3, 37–38, 137, 342–43, 359–60, 369–70 Dai Li 16–17 Daiyue 314, 320, 331 Dalaoshan 501–2 Danba Fortress 31n14 Dangshan 325, 394 Daning county 350–51, 546 Dantou 509 Daokou–Qinghua railway 68, see also DaokouzhenQinghuazhen railway, Daoqing railway Daokouzhen-Qinghuazhen railway 499n2, 500, see also Daokou-Qinghua railway, Daoqing railway Daoqing railway 19, see also DaokouQinghua railway, DaokouzhenQinghuazhen railway, Daozuopu 501 Datong 297, 307–8, 314, 320, 331, 338, 350 Datong–Fenglingtu railway 147 Datong-Puzhou railway 29, 68, 319, 403, 545–46n3 Datong to Taiyuan line 297 Davies, John Paton xlviii Dawenkou township 302, 305

Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation (August 25, 1945) 61–63 Defend Benxi to the Last and Work against Time until a Ceasefire is Reached (April 26, 1946) 256 Defend Siping and Benxi So as to Give Us an Advantage in Negotiations (April 13, 1946) 238 The Defense of Yan’an Mainly Depends upon Fighting on the Exterior Lines (March 6, 1947, 9:00 P.M.–11:00 P.M.) 499–500 Delano, Sarah xlviii democratic countries, freedoms of 80–81 Democratic League 75, 96, 207, 260, 264, 293, 332, 358n1, 365n1 Democratic Socialist Party 480 Deng Baoshan 511, 514 Deng Chumin 345 Deng Fa 215n2, 243n1 Deng-Gao forces 511 Deng Xiaoping xliv, lxx–lxxv; directives to 195–98; for the information of 122–23, 140, 302, 307–9, 381, 388–89, 456–58, 471, 486–88, 491–93, 496–98, 517–18, 527–28, 532–34, 543–44, 547, 557–58; mentioned 104, 140, 145, 147, 151, 177–78, 230, 402, 420, 425, 436, 525, 541, 556; telegrams from 153n2; telegrams to 98–99, 136–38, 141–42, 144, 146–49, 152–54, 164–65, 290, 318–19, 325–26, 344, 376–77, 379–80, 386–87, 391–95, 438–39, 494–95, 499–500, 536–38, 545–46, 552 Deng Zihui: for the information of 302, 388–89, 487–88; telegrams to 372, 384–85, 419–20, 543–44 Deploy Immediately to Destroy Liu Zhi’s Forces (September 3, 1946) 391 Deployment for Military Operations to Annihilate the New First Army (April 21, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 253 Deployment to Increase Troops in the Northeast (November 4, 1945) 164–65 Deployments for the Westward Campaign of the Chen Geng-Xie Fuzhi Column (May 24, 1947) 545–46 Deshi railway 19 Destination Chongqing (Han Suyin) xcii–xciii

I ndex 571

Dezhou 302, 305 Dezhou–Shijiazhuang railway 29, 68 difficulties 119–20 Dingbian 557 Dingtao 402, 471 Dingtao Campaign 386 Dingxiang county 331, 350–51 Dingyuan 287, 302 Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1947) 476–83 Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Defeat of Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive by a War of Self-Defense (July 20, 1946) 366–68 Directive of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and Tasks (February 1, 1946) 206–10 Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Work in the Northeast (December 28, 1945) 195–98 Directive on Chiang Kaishek’s Recent Moves of Attacking Yan’an and Convening the “National Assembly” (November 18, 1946) 432 Directive on the Land Question (1946), see May 4th Directive Directive on the Problem of Military Training (May 1, 1946) 263 Dispatch Local Troops to Harass the Brigade Attacking Shan County (September 5, 1946) 394 Dispatch Nine Regiments to the Three Eastern Provinces (August 20, 1945) 48–49 Dispositions for the Pinghan Campaign (October 27, 1945) 136–37 Do Not Be Impatient or Disperse Our Forces; Lure the Enemy in Deep and Seize Opportunities for Combat (May 6, 1947) 532–34 Do Not Deploy Equal Military Strength in All Campaigns and Combat (August 22, 1946) 379 Do Not Fight Battles in Which You Are Not Assured of Victory (June 22, 1947, 3:00 P.M.) 557–58 Dong Biwu 416–17, 427–28, 508 Dong Zhao 438, 448–49, 522, 527, 529, 531, 535, 538

Dongjiang 6, 427 Dongjiang Column 423n2 Dongming 290, 387, 393, 395 Double Tenth Agreement, see Chonqqing Accords (October 10, 1945) Drawing in Chiang’s Army to Reinforce Central Jiangsu Will Greatly Benefit the Overall Situation (August 31, 1946) 388–89 Du Yuming lix, lxxiii, lxxviii, 246–47, 411, 461, 557–58 Duijiuyu 504 Duo county 463n4 During the Ceasefire Period, the Northeast Troops [of the Democratic Allied Army] Should Rest and Reorganize, Replenish Their Ranks, and Be on Guard against Enemy Raids (June 6, 1946, noon) 312 During the Period of Mao Zedong’s Attendance at the Chongqing Talks, He Will Be Replaced by Liu Shaoqi in the Role of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 27, 1945, 3:00 P.M.) 72 East China Bureau 302, 305, 418, 463–64 East China Field Army lxvi–lxvii, lxx, lxxv–lxxvi, 419, 468, 484n1, 493–94n2, 497n2, 498, 532n2 Eastern railway, see Chinese Eastern railway Eastern Rehe Campaign 277, see also Rehe Campaign Edson, Merritt A. lxxxix The Eight Hundred (2020, film) xlv Eighteenth Army Group 74–75, 184 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx) xxxi Eighth Army 494, 496 Eighth Route Army 17, 23–24n2, 27n9, 31, 36, 40, 133–34, 155 Eleven Points Regarding the Negotiations with the Guomindang (August 30, 1945) 76–78 Eleventh War Zone army 37 Eliminate the Enemy’s Third Division at an Opportune Moment (August 29, 1946) 386–87 Elimination of Hao Pengju’s Forces Should Be Considered in Connection with the Overall Strategic Plan (February 9, 1947) 491–92

572 Index

encirclement 259, 304, 333, 342–43, 359–60, 460–61, 494n2, 503n1 Encircling Cities and Attacking Reinforcements Are an Important Way to Annihilate the Enemy (January 11, 1947) 460–61 The Enemy Is Strong and We Are Weak, So We Must Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (October 25, 1946) 422 enlightened gentry 234–35 errors 234–35 Esherick, Joseph W. lxiv–lxv Expand Your Forces and Make the Capture of the Whole of Hainan Island Your Goal (October 30, 1946) 423 Extensively Occupy the Countryside, Do Not Fight for the Big Cities (August 15, 1945) 37–38 Facilitating the Annihilation of the Enemy Should Be a Criterion for Considering Battle Operations (March 6, 1947) 497–98 Fairbank, John K. xli Faku, occupation of 241 Fan Changjiang 87 Fang Fang 427–28 Fang Yi 71 fascism 16, 61, 74, 94, 120, 211–13, 219–20, 334, 341, 349, 374, 433–34, 478, 483, 549 Fanzhi 320, 331, 350 Feng Baiju 423 Feng County-Dangshan-Xiayi line 392 Feng Yuxiang lxxx Feng Zhi’an 184–85, 305, 456–57, 463, 473 Fengqiu 159, 325, 386 Fengzhen 68, 101, 132, 137, 276 Fenxi county 350–51 feudalism xlv–xlvin24 Fifth Army 438, 544 Fifty-fifth Army 163, 185 Fifty-second Army 187, 249 Fifty-third Army 303 Fight Flexibly and Establish Base Areas in Eastern and Western Hubei and Southern Henan (July 24, 1946) 369–70 Fight More Small Battles and Make Destruction of the Enemy’s Effective Strength Your Objective (December 26, 1946) 448–49

The Fighting inside the Shanhai Pass Will Soon Reach a Turning Point That Will Benefit Our War in the Northeast (November 1, 1946) 424–25 Fighting on Internal Lines, Wipe out the Guomindang’s Three Armies One by One (November 15, 1945) 187–88 Firmly Defend Siping, but When This Becomes Impossible, Abandon It on Your Own Initiative (May 19, 1946) 284 First Attack Places Such as Huairen, Then Watch for a Chance to Capture Datong (June 23, 1946) 331 First Division 438–39 First Field Army lxv, 180 First Fight Several Victorious Battles on the Interior Lines and Then Shift to the Exterior Lines (July 4, 1946) 344 First Hit the Weak, Then Hit the Strong; You Fight Your Battles, I’ll Fight Mine (April 22, 1947) 521 First Seize Tai’an and Other Cities, and Then Consider Attacking Ji’nan (June 1, 1946) 305 first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) xlv First Take Shuo County and Ningwu, Then Take Shanyang and Daiyue; Make Sure Not to Disturb Fu Zuoyi (June 9, 1946, 9:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M.) 314 Five Power Conference 110 flags xliv–xlv For the Time Being, Do Not Engage in Battle at Dongming (May 21, 1946) 290 Fortieth Army 103n3, 140, 150–51, 159–62 Forty-first Division 342, 386–87, 399–400 Forty-seventh Division 342, 386, 393, 399–400 Four Points in an Analysis of the Current Situation (March 15, 1946) 219–21 Four Power Conference (March–April 1947) 474 Fourteen Articles of “Present Urgent Demands” (Zhou Enlai) 53n5, 57 Fourth Field Army lxi, lxxvi Fu county 31, 511 Fu Defang 409 Fu Dingyi 409 Fu Zuoyi lxxviii–lxxix, lxxxii–lxxxv; mentioned 101, 130, 137, 157–58, 167,

I ndex 573

182–83, 276, 297, 307–8, 314, 318, 320, 411, 416, 506 Fugou 163 Fujian lxvii, 22, 44, 91 Fuli 325 The Fundamental Policy toward the United States and Chiang Is Not to Compromise but to Struggle (July 6, 1946) 348 Fushun 186, 224, 233 Fuyi 302 Ganquan 501–2, 511–12, 523 Gansu lxvi, 44, 436, 555 Gao Gang: for the information of 244–45, 312, 517–18; mentioned 264; telegrams to 424–25, 460–61, 540–42 Gao-Lei-Qin-Liang (region) 6 Gao Shuxun 103n3, 143, 150–51, 160, 162–63, 185, 191n2, 192 Gao Shuxun movement 191–92 Gaoyi 138, 140 General Policy for Conducting Operations on the Shandong Battlefront (May 22, 1947) 543–44 Georgi Dimitrov xxxiii Give Proper Treatment to Guomindang and American Personnel on the Military Mediation Operational Teams (June 22, 1946) 328–29 Go All-out to Annihilate Ou Zhen’s Army and Open a Route to Advance South (January 18, 1947) 466 Go All-out toward the Goal of Fighting a War of Annihilation (January 5, 1947, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 456–58 Gongzhuling 306n1 Grand Canal lxx–lxxi, lxxii Great Britain xlv–xlvin24, 47, 445 Great Leap Forward xxxv Great Rear Areas 24–25, 106–7, 113, 133 Great Victory in the Battle of Self-Defense by Our Forces in Southern Hebei (November 4, 1945) 159–61 Griffith, Samuel B. lxxxix Gu Xiping 360 Gu Zhutong 117, 411, 435–36, 438, 461, 499n2, 500, 536, 538 Guaimao 527 Guangdong 44, 55, 91, 113, 117, 166 Guangdong Region Party Committee 5–7 Guanzhong 529, 531

guerrilla warfare xxxiii, xxxix, xlviii, lxxiv, lxxxvi–lxxxviii, xci, 241, 403, 427–28, 440 Guiding Principles for Annihilating the Enemy in Shandong and Central China (August 29, 1946) 384–85 Guiding Principles for Fighting in the Eastern Hebei Area (December 4, 1946) 440 Guiding Principles for Work in the Rural Areas of the Southern Provinces (November 6, 1946) 427–28 Guisui lxxxiii, 19, 101, 130, 137, 147, 155, 183 Guisui-Jining-Datong line 101 Guiyang 211 Guo county 320, 331, 350–51 Guo Rong 167 Guo Rugui lxxiii Guo Tianmin 338 Guo Tianxing 167 Guofang lun (Treatise on National Defense, Jiang Baili) xliv Guomindang organization (Sun Yatsen): alliance with xxxi, 69; anti-Communist campaigns 23–24n2, 40, 42; attacks on 397; battle of Siping lvii–lviii, lxiv; ceasefire with 256, 260, 264, 267, 312, 326–27, 336, 350, 353, 417, 422, 433–34, 441, 469; Central Army 52–53; Central Committee policies toward 227, 249–50, 346–47; and the Chinese Communist Party 23–33; and civil wars 40–43, 70, 280–81; conscription by 427, 479; defectors from lxxv, 185, 191n2, 491n2; defending against 14; Fourth Central Executive Committee 189n1; “home-going contingents” 404n17; Legislative Yuan 189n1; Liaison Staff Officer 27n9; in Manchuria lvi–lvii, lxi–lxiii; Mao on 454, 515–16, 549–50; Military Affairs Conference (November 9–16, 1945) 183; and Nanjing 108, 117; negotiations with xlix–l, lii, 15, 56–59, 65–67, 69, 72–73, 75–82, 86, 88, 105–21, 139, 168–71, 183, 204, 207, 222, 238, 344, 353–54, 437, 480–81; offensives 297–98, 302, 366–67, 474, 557n2; overthrow of lxviii; persecution of street vendors 477; Propaganda Department 16–18, 116, 166–69; United States aid to 172, 175, 177, 181, 229,

574 Index

239, 280–81, 303–4, 315–16, 323–24, 332, 373–75, 406–8, 414, 437, 442, 480–81, see also Nationalist government forces The Guomindang’s Plot for Civil War and Our Countermeasures (May 15, 1946) 280–81 Guxi 381 Guzhen 325 Hai’an 388n2 Hai’an-Qutang-Dabaimi-XiaobaimiJiangyan line 381 Hailong 246–47 Hailun 246–47 Hainan Island 423, 427–28 Haizhou 457 Han Jun: for the information of 499–500, 547; telegrams to 545–46, 554 Han Suyin, Destination Chongqing xcii–xciii Hancheng 513 Handan 99, 103n3, 140, 143, 159, 160, 166, 169 Handan Campaign 156, 162, 170, 191n2, 230, see also Pinghan Campaign Handbook on Bandit Suppression (Chiang Kaishek) 152, 159, 168 Hao Pengju 459, 491–92 Harbin lvi, lviii, 182, 223–24, 227, 244, 254–55, 286, 302, 306, 336n2, 424n2, 442 Harmon, George 441–46 Hasten to Send People to Shanghai and Other Places to Establish Newspapers (September 14, 1945) 87 Hatem, George 442n5 He Bingyan 505 He Jifeng lxxii He Kaifeng 431 He Long lxv; for the information of 294, 309, 399–400, 517–18; mentioned 129, 147, 180, 504; telegrams to 130, 276, 297, 307–8, 314, 318–20, 331, 505–6, 508, 545–46 He Ming Incident 66 He Yingqin 27, 159, 160, 221, 242n3 He Zhuguo 22, 36, 162–63 Hebei xlvii, 44, 65, 80–81, 98–99, 166, 318–19, 436, 541 Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning 277, 310, 321 Hebei-Shandong-Henan, dispatches from 159–61

Hebei-Shandong-Henan Region 536 Hebei-Shandong-Henan Sub-bureau, telegrams to 48–49 Hece 412 Heilongjiang 327, 353–54 Hejin 438, 448–49 Henan 44, 55, 91, 113, 166, 325–26, 357, 361, 436 Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Region 536 Heshui 555 Heze 549 historical writings xxxix–xl Ho Chi Minh xliv Hong Kong 445–46 Hong Lake 37 Hong Yu 217 Hongtong 122 Hou Jingru lxxxiii Houwanglou 393 Hu Lian 463, 473 Hu Qiaomu 340, 406 Hu Zongnan lxiv–lxvi, lxix, lxxxv, 17, 23–24n2, 361; mentioned 52, 100, 122, 136, 142, 150, 159, 171, 183, 360, 363, 411, 436, 461, 499–500, 504–5, 509, 518, 525, 531, 533, 538, 545 Huai-Hai Campaign lxvii, lxviii–lxxvi, lxxix, lxxxiv–lxxxv, xci, see also battle of Huai-Hai Huaiji 6 Huairen county 314, 320, 331, 350 Huaiyang 325 Huaiyin 412, 549 Huan county 556 Huang Baitao lxx–lxxii Huang Cixian 345 Huang Kang 423 Huang Kecheng 177–78; directives to 195–98; for the information of 223–24, 251–52, 306, 312; mentioned 147–48, 181, 187; telegrams to 241, 348 Huang Lin 370 Huang Mohan 339n3, 345 Huang Ping 203 Huang Qisheng 200 Huang Wei lxx, lxxii–lxxiv Huang Xing xxix Huang Yanpei 293 Huang Yongsheng 177–78, 181, 270, 277, 282 Huang Yunpeng 339n3, 345n1 Huangkou 325

I ndex 575

Huangqiao 381 Huaxian Campaign 436n9 Huayuankou 552n3 Hubei 44, 55, 91, 113, 166, 357, 361, 436 Huixian city 159 Huludao 164, 181 Hunan xxix–xxx, xxxix, 44, 55, 91 Hundred Regiments Offensive (August 1940) lxxxvii Hunyuan 132 Huo county 350–51 Huo Shouyi 162, 305 Huojia 159 Hurley, Patrick J. xlix, 32, 57, 75, 96, 219, 281, 442 Ideas on How to Smash Chen Cheng’s Attack Plan (January 28, 1947) 472–73 If the Guomindang Does Not Completely and Permanently Cease Hostilities, We Will Not Do So Unilaterally (July 9, 1946) 350–51 Immediately Prepare to Launch an Attack against the Pinggu Line, Nankou, and Other Areas (April 30, 1946) 260 imperialism: and China xlv–xlvin24; Japanese xlv, 23, 323, 375; opposition to 32, 478, 483; United States 29, 32, 348, 373–75, 478–80, 548–49 In the Northeast, Work in the Countryside and the Small and Medium-Sized Cities Should for Now Still Be Given Priority (May 19, 1946) 286 Increase Troop Strength, Completely Control the Lüliang Region (June 4, 1946) 309 industry 218, 225, 275 Inner Mongolia People’s Congress 539 Instructional Brigade 501–2 Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Launching a Large-Scale Rent Reduction and Production Campaign to Win the War of Self-Defense (November 7, 1945) 172–74 internationalist faction xxxii, xxxiv Is It Possible to Finish off the Enemy’s 144th Brigade? (May 5, 1947) 529 Isolate and Then Annihilate the Forces of Fu Zuoyi in Jining (October 24, 1945) 130

Issues Relating to the Current War Situation and the Negotiations (October 10, 1946, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.) 416–17 It Is Better to Launch an Attack When the Enemy Is Dispersed and Exhausted (May 5, 1947, 1:00 P.M.) 530 It Is Better to Lose Some Places Than to Be Forced to Fight (July 30, 1946) 372 It Is Unnecessary to Give Notice before Attacking and Seizing Tai’an and Other Places (May 31, 1946) 302 It Will Be Advantageous to the Shandong Military Region to First Annihilate the Armies of Wu Huawen et al. (May 30, 1946) 300–301 Italy, and Abyssinia/Ethiopia (1935–1937) xlvii Jansen, Marius B. xl Japan xlix; and China xlv–xlvin24; Mao on 17–18, 352; Soviet declaration of war against 8–10, 23; surrender of 13, 16, 23, 33, 45, 47, 51, 61, 68, 82, 117, 131, 169– 70, 180, 548; “Twenty-One Demands” 443; and the United States 374, see also War of Resistance Against Japan Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (April 13, 1941) xlvii Ji county 546 Jiagou 325 Jiali City 381 Jiamusi 175, 336n2 Jiang Baili xliv Jiang Hua 430 Jiang Peifei 230–31, 252 Jiang Qing xliii Jiangduo 381 Jiangsu lxvi, 44, 55, 80, 91, 113, 350, 357, 378, 385, 389, 536 Jiangsu-Anhui Border Region 357 Jiangsu-Shandong area 541 Jiangxi xxxii, 22, 29, 44 Jiaochangkou Incident (February 1946) 221, 340 Jiaodong 494–95, 528 Jiaoji 385 Jiaoji Campaign 493–94 Jiaoji Field Army 474–75n4 Jiaoji [Qingdao–Ji’nan] railway 20, 68, 353, 475, 487n2, 492n3, 493, 496n2, 528 Jiaokou 529

576 Index

Jiaozhuo 537 Jiaozuo 344 Jiexiu 122 Jiexiu county 350–51, 546 Jiezi River 31 Jilin 302, 306n1 Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] Military Region 183, 556 Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border District lxxiv–lxxv Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army 436n9 Jin-Sui [Shanxi-Suiyuan] Military Region 183 Ji’nan lxxvii, 182, 300n2, 301, 305, 326, 344, 492n3, 537 Ji’nan-Linyi-Haizhou line 543 Jingbian 557 Jingpu railway lxvi, lxviii Jining 101, 130, 132, 137, 276, 297, 412 Jinmen livn45 Jinpenwan 501–2, 513 Jinpu railway 20, 22 Jinzhou-Chengde railway 321 Jinzhou-Haicheng front 147 Jinzhou-Shanhai Pass railway 269, 313 Jinzhou-Shenyang railway 277 Jinzhou-Yuguan railway 270 Jishan 448–49 Ju county 528 Juezhan huaihai (1987) lxxiv “July 7th” declaration 340, 346–47, 349, 368 June 1947 Should Be the Month in Which to Begin a Comprehensive Counterattack (June 14, 1947) 555–56 Kaifeng 386 Kaocheng county 163n11, 290, 325, 344, 386n8, 395 Keep up Efforts to Destroy the Section of the Railway between Jinzhou and the Shanhai Pass (May 3, 1946) 269 Keeping a Hold on Benxi Will Demoralize the Enemy (May 3, 1946) 268 Kissinger, Henry xliii Konshin Shah xxxvii Kouquan 307–8, 314, 320 Kuang Saichao 332 Kui Yanfang 334–35 labor movement 218, 225, 245, 275 Lai Chuanzhu 59–60, 128–29, 146–48, 162–63

Laiwu 487, 490, 496, 528, 532–33, 544 Laiwu Campaign 493, 494–95 Land and Labor in China (Tawney) lxxxviii, xc land reform policies 274–75, 367, 481–82; concessions regarding 108; in Liberated Areas 367, 478–79; and rents 14–15, 126, 172–73, 185–86, 281; resumption of xxxiv, 436; three thirds system 478 landlords xlv–xlvin24, 15, 367, 404n17, 435 landowners, policies toward 234–35 Lanfeng county 163, 325, 344n3,386 Lanling 467 Laojundian 535 Lê Duân xl Lechang 6 leftist errors 234–35; tendencies 225 Lei Fenqiang 328 Lei Jieqiong 334–35 Lenin, Vladimir xxxv Letter to Chen Jinkun (September 22, 1946) 405 Letter to Fu Dingyi (September 30, 1946) 409 Letter to He Kaifeng (November 14, 1946) 431 Letter to Lu Dingyi (September 27, 1946) 406 Letter to Situ Meitang (December 28, 1945) 199 Letter to Xi Zhongxun (September 2, 1946) 390 Letter to Yu Guangsheng (May 22, 1946) 292 Li Chuli 421 Li Da 136–37, 149, 152–54, 164–65 Li Fuchun: directives to 195–98; for the information of 223–24, 251–52, 306, 312; telegrams to 241, 348 Li Gongpu 358, 365n1 Li Jingquan: for the information of 294, 309, 517–18; mentioned 504; telegrams to 276, 297, 307–8, 314, 318–20, 331, 505–6, 545–46 Li Lisan 280–81 Li Ming 423 Li Mo’an 411 Li Peiying 167 Li Pinxian 22, 36 Li Renlin 397, 498n4 Li Shouxin 101

I ndex 577

Li Wen lxxxiii, 142 Li Xiannian: for the information of 37–38, 369–70; mentioned 167, 180, 183; telegrams from 359n2; telegrams to 3–4, 87, 124, 259, 304, 317, 333, 342–43, 357, 359–60, 547 Li Xianzhou 494, 537 Li Xuezheng 156, 160 Li Yannian 162, 468 Li Yu: for the information of 128–29, 487–88; mentioned 147, 300; telegrams to 135, 146–48, 162–63, 179, 384–85, 429, 484–85, 489, 497–98 Li Yunchang 48, 146, 165, 181, 187–88, 195–98, 338, 421 Li Zhengxian 153–54, 178 Li Zhenqing 156 Li Zhisui xlii, xcv Li Zongren 411 Li Zuopeng: for the information of 128– 29; telegrams to 135, 146–48, 164–65 Lian county 6 Liang Jia 6n6 Liang Shuming 293 Liang Xingchu 177–78, 181, 187–88 Liangcheng 101, 137, 276, 297 Liangshan 6 Lianshui 436 Lianyungang lxxi Liao Ang 520 Liao Hansheng 501 Liaocheng 290 Liaoning 44, 98–99, 135, 318–19, 541 Liaoning-Shenyang Campaign, see Liaoshen Campaign Liaoshen Campaign lxxxi, lxiii Liaoyang 224 Liaoyang-Fushun region 224 Liberated Areas 24, 44, 53, 55, 84, 114, 171, 193, 209, 327, 354–55, 362, 382– 83; anti-Japanese forces in 17, 45–46, 131; calls to expand 9–10, 13; Central China 87; Central Plains 350–51; and Chiang Kaishek 17–18, 52, 159–60; and the Chinese Communist Party 126–27, 207; and the Chongqing peace talks 96, 105, 107–8, 117, 132; democracy in 478–79; Guomindang attacks on 155, 172, 191, 340, 397, 404n17, 411–12, 422, 453, 476–77; industry in 218, 275; labor relations in 226; and land reform 367, 478–79, 482–83; Liberated Area

People’s Representative Conference 56; living conditions in 367; occupied 166–68; population of 30, 61, 106, 131; rents in 14–15, 126, 172–74, 185–86, 192; Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area 103n3; and the SinoAmerican Trade Treaty 444; work policy for 191–94; Yan Xishan’s attacks on 102n5, 106, 113, 118, 132, 155 Liberation Daily 170, 405; “To Take Root and Blossom in a Local Place” 118–19 Lin Biao lvi, lxi–lxii, lxxix–lxxxi; battle of Siping lvii–lviii, lxiv; directives to 195–98; for the information of 223–24, 241–42, 255–56, 268, 270–71, 277, 430, 517–18; mentioned 147, 165, 177–78; telegrams from 236n1, 239n4, 267n2, 424n2; telegrams to 146–48, 187–88, 222, 229–33, 236–40, 244–48, 251–54, 257–58, 264–65, 267, 272–73, 278, 283–84, 288, 295, 306, 312, 336, 352–55, 424–25, 460–61, 540–42 Lin Boqu 214, 517–18 Lin city 179 Lin Feng 49, 70 Lin Ping 87 Lin Qiangyun 6n6 Lincheng 138, 140, 145, 163n6, 471n2, 496n2 Lincheng-Xuzhou line 163 Linfen 122, 438 Lingshi county 350–51, 546 Linhe 155, 183 Linjin 448 Linyi 420, 436, 474, 484n1, 486, 487n2, 489, 550 Linzhen 502, 511–13 Liu and Deng Should Replenish Fifteen to Twenty Regiments as a Main Force (August 25, 1946) 380 Liu Bocheng lxx–lxxi, lxxiv–lxxvi; directives to 195–98; for the information of 122–23, 302, 307–9, 381, 388–89, 456–58, 471, 487–88, 491–93, 496–98, 517–18, 527–28, 532–34, 543–44, 547, 557–58; mentioned 104, 140, 145, 147, 151, 177–78, 180, 230, 402, 420, 425, 436, 486, 525, 541, 556; telegrams from 136n2, 153n2; telegrams to 98–99, 136–38, 141–42, 144, 146–49, 152–54, 164–65, 290, 318–19, 325–26, 344, 376–77, 379–80, 386–87, 391–95,

578 Index

438–39, 494–95, 499–500, 536–38, 545–46, 552 Liu, James T.C. xliii Liu Kan lxv, 448–49, 527, 529, 531, 535, 555 Liu Lantao: for the information of 277, 307–8, 313–14; mentioned 331; telegrams to 164–65, 260, 270–71, 310–11, 318–19, 321–22, 337–38 Liu Qiren 147 Liu Ruming 163, 184, 344, 386 Liu Ruzhen 163 Liu Shaoqi xliii, 203n1, 274–75; for the information of 517–18, 521, 540–42, 552; mentioned 57, 72, 186, 508, 516; telegrams to 555–56 Liu Xiao 427–28 Liu Yalou lxxxiv Liu Yazi 92–93, 205 Liu Yongbin 203 Liu Yu 316 Liu Zhi lxix, lxxiii; mentioned 167, 360, 376, 386, 391 Liu Zhuanlian 146, 181 Liu Zijiu 359–60, 369–70, 397 Liuhe 386 living conditions 367 Local Retaliation Adopted toward Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 19, 1946) 287 local self-government 77, 139, 168–69 Local Troops Should Be Transferred to Replenish the Field Army (October 19, 1945) 124 Long March (1934) xxxii Long Yun 231 Longdong 529, 531 Longhai Campaign 386 Longhai railway lxviii, 20, 22, 36, 66, 68, 397, 457–58, 461, 466–67, 474, 499–500 Longjiang 175 Longkou 68 “Loyal and Patriotic Army” 378, 382 Lu Chongyi 160 Lu Dingyi 406 Lu-Ning railway 68 Lu You 92 Lü Zhengcao 49, 165 Lüliang 309, 439 Luo Houfu 397 Luo Ronghuan lxiii, 182; for the information of 128–29; mentioned 182, 188; telegrams to 135, 164–65

Luo Ruiqing: for the information of 270– 71, 517–18; mentioned 541; telegrams to 146–48, 164–65, 280–81, 337–38, 399–400, 470, 521 Luo Shunchu 256, 430 Luo Yuanfa 501–2 Luochuan 31, 513, 523, 527 Luochuan Conference (August 22-25, 1937) lxxxvii Luochuan-Zhongbu line 527 Luyi 325 Ma Bufang 555 Ma Fawu 103n3, 156, 160, 162 Ma Hongbin 514 Ma Hongkui 411, 511–12, 514, 555 Ma Liwu 455 Ma Xulun 334–35 Ma Zhanshan lxvi McCord, Edward xl The Main Force in the Northeast Should Not Fear Losing Territory and It Should Prepare for a Protracted Struggle (May 27, 1946) 295 The Main Force That Has Taken Part in Battle Should Assemble for Rest and Reorganization; Troops That Were Not Used Should Annihilate a Unit of the Enemy Forces in Dongming (September 7, 1946) 395 Main Points of the Speeches by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi on Land Policy (May 8, 1946) 274–75 Make All Preparations to Seize the Great Northwest (June 6, 1947) 554 Make Ample Preparations to Counter the Guomindang’s Large-Scale Offensive (May 29, 1946) 298 Make Creating Battlefields a Strategic Task (November 11, 1945) 179 Make Every Effort to Capture Many Medium-Sized and Small Cities (August 25, 1945) 64 Make the Utmost Effort to Secure Victory in Battle in the Siping and Gongzhuling Areas (April 20, 1946) 249–50 Malinovsky, Rodion Y. li Manchukuo liii, lxi–lxii, lxix Manchuria xlix, liii, lv–lvi, lxxxvii, 195–98, 224nn7–8, 247, 255, 278, 443; cadres in 247; in the Civil War lvi, lxi–lxii, lxviii, lxix, lxxvi, lxxix, 165, 222, 224, 236–37, 460–61, 541;

I ndex 579

Guomindang attacks on 239n3, 254, 424n2; Campaign lvi; rents in 237, see also specific cities Manchurian Incident 88, 107 Manchurian People’s Defense Army 181 Mao Anying 203n2 Mao Zedong xli, xc–xcv; biographical details xxix–xxxi, xlii–xliv; cult of xxxiv–xxxv, lxix, xci–xcii; interviewed xli, 373–75, 407–8, 441–46; travels of xliv; United States impressions of xlii; views on war xxxviii, xlii, xlv, xlvii, lxxiv, xci Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Talks between the Two Parties (September 2, 1945) 79–82 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 340–41 Marshall, George C. xxxiv, xli, xlix, lviii– lx, lxxxv, 207, 214, 221, 238–39, 242n4, 257, 260, 264, 292, 295, 312n2, 315, 346, 417 Marx, Karl: The Communist Manifesto xxxi; The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte xxxi Marxism, Sinification of xxxiv Marxism-Leninism xxxiii, 23n1 mass education 91 mass struggles 414 mass work 234–35, 353 masses 196; and cadres 196–97; counting on 274; and education/propaganda 30–31, 417; emancipation of 192; and land reform 482; middle peasants as 14; mobilization of xl, 130, 178, 244, 540; and rent reductions 173 Matouzhen 160 May 4th 1919 student demonstrations xxx May 4th Directive (1946) 274, 413, 481–82 May 4th period xxx Mei Yu 87 Meitang, Situ 199 men 494 Mengyin 532n2 Method for Dealing with Captured Officers and Soldiers (November 3, 1945, 11 P.M.) 152 The Method for Handling Captured Officers (November 8, 1946) 429 Miaoerliang 502 Middle Route 427 Military and Political Deployments in the Northeast after the Occupation of Changchun (April 19, 1946) 244–45

Military Commission, see Central Military Commission Military Deployments after the Withdrawal from Siping (May 19, 1946) 288 Military Dispositions for Dealing with a Major Assault by Chiang Kaishek (June 19, 1946) 318–19 militias 14 Min Xuesheng 370 Ming dynasty lii–liii Minquan 325, 386 Mizhi 519, 525 mobile warfare 267, 284, 296, 306, 310, 337n2, 361, 366–67, 403 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 23, 1939) xlvii Molotov, Vyacheslav 219 Mongolian People’s Republic li–lii Moore, Barrington xc Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers (December 1945) 316, 323, 474 Mountbatten, Louis 33 Moving the Central Military Commission Apparatus (March 29, 1947) 507 Mudanjiang 336n2 Mukden Incident 107n5 Nanchang 211 Nanjiang 359 Nanjing 108, 117, 211, 419, 486, 515 Nanjing Surrender Acceptance Army 82 Nanniwan 501–2 Nanshi 6 National Assembly 66, 79–80, 84, 96,155, 189–90, 242, 341, 366, 408, 432, 437, 441, 447, 453–54, 479, 515, 550 Nationalist government forces lxx, lxxvii; army lvi, lxix, lxxxii, 147, 230–31, 410–11, 416, 427, 477; battle of Huai-Hai lxviii–lxxvi, lxxix; casualties lxxxiii, 382, 402, 410–12, 417, 440, 477, 494, 498, 532, 541; Chinese Communist Party recommended measures 62, 76–78; defeat of liv–lvi, lxxxv; defections from lxxii, lxxix, lxxxiii; during the War against Japan xxxix; North China Pacification Headquarters lxxxi; surrender of lxxxiv; talks with the Soviet Union liv; United States-imposed ceasefire lix–lx, see also Guomindang organization (Sun Yatsen)

580 Index

Nationalists xlix, li–lii, 76–78, see also Chongqing; peace talks Nenjiang 354 New China Daily 211 “New Democracy” slogan xxxiv New Eighth Army 103n3, 140, 143, 159–61, 191n2 New First Army 244, 249, 253, 257, 267n2, 313 New Fourth Army 17, 23–24n2, 27n9, 31, 69, 128, 133–35, 144, 183 New Fourth Brigade 502 The New Situation and New Tasks Following Victory in the Anti-Japanese War (August 23, 1945) 51–57 New Sixth Army 183, 283, 313 newspapers 87 Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. xl Nie Rongzhen lxxv, lxxxi; for the information of 122–23, 140, 276–77, 307–8, 313–14, 399–400, 517–18; mentioned 129, 147, 180, 526, 541, 557; telegrams to 130, 146–48, 164–65, 260, 270–71, 285, 294, 297, 310–11, 318–19, 321–22, 331, 337–38, 470, 521 Nimitz, Chester W. 47 Ninety-sixth Army 494 Ninety-third Army 282–83, 295 Ninghe 302 Ninglong 325 Ningwu 307–8, 314, 320, 331, 350 Ningxia lxvi, 44 Ningyang 532n2 Nishui 532–33 North China 157–58, 175, 357, 366, 396 North China Field Army lxxv, lxxxii North China, the Northeast, and Other Areas Must Be Returned to People’s SelfGovernance (November 3, 1945) 157–58 Northern Suqian Campaign, see Subei Campaign Northeast Bureau 352–55; directives to 195–98, 227, 255; for the information of 101–2, 418; mentioned 247; telegrams from 295n2, 336n2; telegrams to 125, 177–78, 223–24, 229, 236–37, 251–53, 286, 288, 295, 306, 312, 327, 352–55, 422 Northeast Campaign lxx, lxxix Northeast China 48, 56, 66, 88, 125, 146–48, 157–58, 180, 184, 186, 195–98, 232–33, 236–37, 239–40, 267, 276, 281–82, 303, 327, 352–55, 417

Northeast Democratic Allied Army 312, 352–55, 424n2, 430n3 Northeast Field Army lxxxi–lxxxii Northeast People’s Autonomous Army 158 The Northeast Should Prepare to Shatter Chiang Kaishek’s Offensive When the Negotiations Fall Apart (June 22, 1946) 327 northern Anhui 166 Northern Expedition lv, lxxx, 56 northern Jiangsu 166 northern Manchuria 197, 224, 286, 295n2, 260n2, 541 Northern Suqian Campaign, see Subei Campaign Northwest Bureau 119, 390 Northwest Campaign lxv Northwest Field Army lxv, 503n1 Notice on Halting Domestic Military Conflict (January 10, 1946) 204 Notice Regarding Study and Propagation of the Central Committee’s “July 7th” Declaration (July 8, 1946) 349 Notification Regarding the Battle Experience of Liu and Deng’s Army (September 13, 1946) 399–400 November Operational Preparations (November 1, 1945) 146–48 “October l0th Agreement,” see Chongqing Accords (October 10, 1945) Okamura, Yasuji 46, 557n2 On Countering Large-Scale Attacks in the Northeast by Chiang Kaishek and the United States (April5, 1946, noon) 229 On Guerrilla Warfare (1937) xxxviii “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship” xxxiv “On Protracted War” (1938) xxxiii, xxxviii, xliii–xliv “On the Chongqing Negotiations” (October 17, 1945) xlix–l On the Chongqing Negotiations (October 17, 1945) 105–11 “On the New Stage” (1938) xxxiii–xxxiv "On The Present Situation" lxxxiv On the Problem of Selecting Students to Be Sent to Learn How to Operate Tanks (October 13, 1946) 418 On the Warfare in Shandong and Central China (October 22, 1945) 128–29 144th Brigade 529

I ndex 581

Operational Arrangements after the Capture of Panlong (May 4, 1947, 5:00 P.M.) 527 Opinions on Military Work and Local Work in the Northeast (April 23, 1946) 255 Opinions on the Campaign in Rehe (May 3, 1946) 270–71 opportunism 56 oppressor/oppressed dichotomy xxxi “Order and Statement on Halting Domestic Military Conflict and Resuming Traffic” (January 10, 1946) 204n1 Order of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission Regarding Amassing a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One (September 16, 1946) 401–4 The Origins of the Chinese Revolution: 1915–1949 (Bianco) xxxix–xl Ou Zhen 463–68, 494n2, 495 Our Army’s Plan of Action Following the Laiwu Campaign (February 24, 1947) 494–95 Our Combat Orientation in the Northeast and the Situation within the Pass (May 20, 1947) 540–42 Our Policy after Forfeiting Siping (May 21, 1946) 291 “Outline for Peaceful Construction of the Nation” 434n3 The Overall Situation Will Improve if the Enemy Forces Advancing to the North Can Be Eliminated within a Month or Two (December 1, 1946) 438–39 Panggezhuang 283 Panlong 509, 522, 524–27, 531, 538 Panshan–Jinzhou–Shanhai Pass line 188 Pay Attention to Strengthening the Disciplinary Education of the Troops (July 12, 1946) 356 Pay Strict Attention to Policy When Entering and Garrisoning Areas in the Northeast (March 17, 1946) 222 Paying Respects to the Martyrs Who Died on April 8 (April 19, 1946) 243 peace xlix, 52, 61, 69, 105–6, 113, 132, 204, 206, 345, 354, 454 peace talks xlix–l, lii, 56–59, 65–67, 69, 72, 75, 168–71, 462; breaking down 336; Mao on 12, 73, 79–82, 84–86, 88,

94–95, 105–11, 318, 346–47; notice regarding 204; points raised ahead of 76–78; questions about 89–91; reports on 96–97, 112–21; and the United States l, lii, lviii–lix peaceful reconstruction 51, 86, 94 peach metaphor 28–29 Pearl River Column 6 peasants xxxi–xxxii, 14–15, 274–75, 482 Peng Dehuai li–lii, lxv–lxvi, lxxv, lxxxvii; for the information of 505–6, 554; mentioned 184, 502, 541, 555; telegrams from 34–35, 504n2, 511n2; telegrams to 503–4, 507, 509–14, 517–18, 522–27, 529–31, 535, 537–38, 545–46 Peng Zhen lxi; for the information of 230–31, 238, 256, 268, 270–71, 277, 284; mentioned 57, 72, 147, 165; telegrams from 180; telegrams to 146–48, 187–88, 222, 232–33, 239–40, 244–48, 254–55, 267, 424–25, 460–61 People on Our Side (Snow) li People’s Liberation Army lxxxvii, xcii, 4, 478, 515–16, 549–51 People’s Political Consultative Conference 88, 190, 194, 199, 206, 275, 324, 340–41, 346–47, 367, 437n13, 469 People’s Political Council 27–28 People’s Republic of China, proclamation of xxxvii Peoples’ War of Liberation 432 Pepper, Suzanne lxxxvi Pi county 457 Pi Dingjun 361–62, 388–89, 457 Pingdiquan 68, 132, 183, 400 Pinghan Campaign 103, 104, 136–37, 150–51, 338, see also Handan Campaign Pinghan railway 20 Pinghan-Suiyuan Campaign, see Pingsui Campaign, Suiyuan Campaign Pingjin Campaign lxiii, lxxvi–lxxxiv Pingsui Campaign 101–2 Pingsui railway 19–20 Pingyao county 546 Pingyuan Sub-bureau 48–49 PLA First Field Army lxvi PLA Fourth Field Army lxiii PLA Second Field Army lxxiv PLA Third Field Army lxvi–lxvii Plains Sub-bureau 64

582 Index

Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas in 1946 (December 15, 1945) 191–94 policy of non-recognition 120 Policy Orientation on the Question of Industry and the Labor Movement (March 24 and 28, 1946) 225 Policy toward Armed and Unarmed Guomindang Personnel (March 30, 1946) 227 Politburo meetings 65–67, 96–97, 219–21 political parties/associations 80–81 Potsdam Declaration 16–18, 44, 62, 110n8 Pray for Peace Assembly 345 Prepare All Conditions for Using Mobile Warfare to Destroy the Enemy Forces Attacking Chengde (June 5, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 310–11 Prepare to Capture Ningwu and Other Cities (June 20, 1946) 320 Prepare to Deal with the Civil War Situation That Is Certain to Arise (August 4, 1945) 3–4 Prepare to Deal with the Guomindang’s Offensive against Shanxi-Suiyuan and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (May 27, 1946) 297 Prepare to Fight a Second Battle after the Fight at Qinghuabian (March 26, 1947) 503 Prepare to Join with the Forces of Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao to Set up the Hunan-Guangdong Border Base Area (August 4, 1945) 5–7 Prepare to Pin down Wang Zhonglian’s Troops, Which May Move North as Reinforcements (October 30, 1945) 141 The Present Orientation Regarding Propaganda and Negotiations (November 7 and 8, 1945) 175–76 “Present Urgent Demands” 53–55 Preston, Paul lxxxviii–lxxxix Prestowitz, Jr, Clyde V. lix–lx “Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War” (1938) xxxiii The Process of Winning the Pinghan Campaign (November 2, 1945) 150–51 production increases 192–93, 218, 482 propaganda 116, 175–76, 178, 185, 289, 406n1, see also specific news outlets Protestant Christian Promotion Society 345

protests xxx, 194n195, 211–13, 340, 477–78, 548–49, 557 provincial governments 97, 139 Pu county 350–51, 448–49, 546 Pucheng 513, 527 Purchase TNT in Large Quantities and Emphasize Training for Attacking Cities (May 29, 1946) 299 Qi county 325 Qian Junrui 87 Qian Zheng 200 Qianwanglou 393 Qicun 463 Qin Hui 316 Qingdao 139, 155, 326 Qingdao–Ji’nan railway 29, 403 Qinghai lxvi Qinghuabian 503, 509, 529, 531, 535 Qingjian 508–9, 522, 531, 538 Qingquangou 501–2 Qingshuihe 101 Qingtuosi 532–33 Qingyangcha 555 Qinhuangdao lxxix–lxxx, 101, 165, 175 Qinyang 141 Qiongya 6, 423n2 Qiqihar 227, 244, 246–47 Qitamu 460 Qiu Qingquan 486 Qixiaying 130 The Question of Whether Chengde Should Be Defended or Abandoned Should Be Considered (June 21, 1946) 321–22 Questions on a Plan of Action for the Northwest Field Operations Corps (April 6, 1947, 1:00 P.M.) 511–12 Questions on Setting off for Laiwu and Xintai to Fight (February 7, 1947) 490 Quickly Send Troops to Watch for an Opportunity to Occupy Western Jinzhou (May 13, 1946) 279 Quzi 555 railways lviii, 139, 168, 270, 288, 553, see also specific railways Rao Shushi lxvi–lxvii, lxx–lxxi, lxxv; for the information of 128–29, 242, 318–19, 380–81, 388–89, 399–400, 487–88, 491–92, 494–96, 517–18; mentioned 147, 180; telegrams from 300n2, 456n2, 492n3, 496n2; telegrams to 59–60, 87,

I ndex 583

128–29, 135, 146–48, 162–63, 179, 234–35, 280–81, 291, 300–301, 325–26, 344, 376–78, 384–87, 419–20, 455–58, 463–67, 471–75, 484–98, 543–44 Rapidly Destroy the Enemy in the Northeast and Seize the Upper Hand before the Cessation of Hostilities (April 15, 1946) 239–40 Rapidly Set off for the Lincheng Area (October 31, 1945) 145 Rapidly Transfer Troops from Southern Manchuria Northwards to Engage in Battle; Preparations Should Be Made to Defend the City of Changchun (April 20, 1946) 248 reactionaries 261–62, 341, 347, 349; anti-Soviet 219–20, 373–74, 414–15; attacks on Liberated Areas by 340, 453; Chiang Kaishek as 25, 114, 160, 362, 414, 478–80, 549–50; news articles on 211–13; orders concerning 228; United States 373–74, 414–15, 434, 444 The Reactionaries Are Expanding Their Anti-Soviet and Anti-Communist Activities under the Instigation and Encouragement of the Authorities of the Guomindang Government (February 26, 1946) 211–13 The Reactionaries’ Schemes Will Ultimately Fail (June 30 and July 7, 1946) 340–41 Record of a Leisurely Journey to the West (Snow) xliii “Rectification Campaign” (1942–1943) xxxiv Red Army xxxii–xxxiii Red Star newspaper 84–85 Red Star Over China (Snow) xliii Regarding Central China’s Deployments in Preparation for the Civil War (August 12, 1945) 21–22 Regulations of the People’s Political Council 28n10 Rehe 44, 65, 71, 80–81, 98–99, 196–97, 260, 270–71, 278, 313, 318–19, 440, 540–41 Rehe Campaign 277, 283, see also Eastern Rehe Campaign Rehe–Liaoning border 197 Rehe Provincial Party Committee 196 Remarks at the Farewell Party for General Marshall (March 5, 1946) 214

Ren Bishi 225n1; other documents addressed to 340; telegrams from 508 Renqiao village 325 Rent Reduction and Production Campaign 172–74, 193, 198, 281, Reply to a Telegram from Chiang Kaishek (August 22, 1945) 50 Reply to the Telegram from the American Sailors’ Union (June 24, 1946) 332 Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan’an Party School (October 17, 1945) 112–21 Report on the Progress of the Chongqing Negotiations (October 11, 1945) 96–97 Republic of China xxxvii Republic of Vietnam xl Resolutely Defend Siping and for the Present Do Not Launch Any LargeScale Offensives (April 30, 1946, midnight) 258 Resolutely Overcome All Thoughts of Retreating; Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (September 10, 1946) 396–98 “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues” 11 Rest, Reorganize, Conserve Strength, and Prepare to Shatter the Enemy’s Attack (June 6, 1946) 313 Reuters 86, 89–91, 189–90 revolutionary guerrilla war lxxxxi–xc revolutionary ideology xxxi Rittenberg, Sidney 442n6 Roderick, John 441–46 Romance of the Three Kingdoms 436 Ronghe 448 Roosevelt, Franklin xlviii, lix, xciii Rugao 372n2, 378n3, 381, 382, 385, 388n2, 389, 402 Russia: Bolshevik Revolution xxxv; and China xlv–xlvin24; February Revolution (1917) 375; as Mao’s model xxx, see also Soviet Union Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) xlviii Saich, Tony lxxxvii Sandaoying 130 Sanhe 302 Sanshilipu 502 Schwartz, Benjamin xlii Scobie, Ronald 15n2, 433

584 Index

Second Field Army lxxvi Second Sino-Japanese War lxv, lxxxi Seizing Victory in the Pingsui Campaign Is of Great Significance (October 16, 1945) 101–2 self-criticism 356, 547 self-government 77, 139, 157–58, 170–1, 175, 184, 194 self-reliance 4, 367 Seventh Branch School of the AntiJapanese Military and Political University 131–34 Seventy-fifth Army 359–60 Seventy-first Army 239, 249, 417 Seventy-Third Army 490, 492n3 Sha Ke 146, 181, 188 Shaanxi lxvi, lxxv, 44, 357, 360–61, 396, 505, 538, 545 Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region 17, 31, 42, 91, 105, 131–33, 476, 515, 554 Shan county 394 Shandong lxvi, lxviii, 44, 80–81, 113, 128–29, 166, 235, 384–85, 403, 419–20, 476, 484–85, 525, 534, 556–58 Shandong Campaign lxvi Shandong Field Army 468 Shandong Military Region 135n2, 300–301, 468n1 Shandong region 325–26 Shandong Sub-bureau 48–49 Shang Zhen 184 Shangdang lxxiv, 100, 103, 104, 106, 118, 129, 132n2, 149, 167, 183 Shangdang Campaign lxxiv–lxxv, 102, 103–4, 129, 132, 149 Shanghai 87, 477, 515 Shanghai-Nanjing railway 68 Shangqiu 325, 386 Shangyi 101 Shanhai Pass 175, 177–78, 181–83, 187, 298, 302, 350, 461, 541 Shanhai Pass–Suizhong line 187 Shanhai Pass–Suizhong– Xingcheng line 188 Shanshenmiao 501–2 Shanxi lxxv, 44, 65, 106, 113, 318–19, 436, 504, 556 Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei region 297, 337–38, 521n2 Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Sub-bureau 48–49, 101–2

Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region 533–34 Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) bureau 101–4 Shanxi–Suiyuan (Jin-Sui) Border Region 69 Shanxi–Suiyuan (Jin-Sui) bureau 101–2 Shanxi-Suiyuan Region 297 Shanyang 359 Shanyin city 314, 320, 331, 350 Shao Lizi 57, 76–78 Shejiaping 509 Shen Junru 293 Sheng Pihua 334–35 Shenyang lvi, lxix, lxxxiv, 147, 165, 175, 540 Shenyang-Siping railway 248, 288 Shi Jue 178 Shi Zebo 167 Shibatai 130 Shijiazhuang 136, 182 Shilou 504–6 Shilou county 350–51 Shimen city 321, 338 Shu Tong 291, 318–19, 325–26, 429 Shuidong 302 Shuo county 307. 314, 320, 350 Si Guangkai 156, 160 Si Yuankai 156, 160 Siam 447 Sichuan 357, 361 Sichuan Provincial Committee 428 The Significance of the Central Plains Army’s Success in Breaking out of the Encirclement (July 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 359–60 Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (November 4, 1946) 435, 443–44, 479, 549 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (August 14, 1945) 51, 66, 71, 74, 84, 90, 97, 114–15, 212 Siping 230–31, 233, 238, 241, 244, 246–47, 255, 258, 264, 272–73, 278, 281, 284, 287–88, 290–91, 302, 306n1, 556–57 Sipingjie 224, 249, 276, 296 The Situation after the Victory over Japan and Some Work Policies for the Future (November 12, 1945) 180–86

I ndex 585

The Situation Following Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and Our Course of Action (August 13, 1945) 23–33 Sixteenth Army lxxxii, 98–100, 122, 136n3, 138, 140, 142, 145, 150, 153–54, 178, 283, 416 Sixty-eighth Army 163, 185 Slow Down the Enemy’s Movement and Cover the Fighting in Qinghuabian (May 6, 1947) 535 Smedley, Agnes 442n7, 444 Snow, Edgar 444; People on Our Side li; Red Star Over China xliii social revolution lxxxviii, xciv–xcv socialism, Mao on xxxiv–xxxv Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation (April 1946) 261–62 Some Problems in Correcting Errors in Our Mass Work (April 11, 1946) 234–35 Song Kentang 156, 160, 162 Song Qingling 332 Song Ruike 343 Song Shilun 377–78, 399–400, 484, 494n2 Songhua River 424n2 Songshuling 502 Southern Anhui Incident 27n9 Southern Manchuria 223–24, 247–48, 253, 254, 257, 272, 278, 286n2, 424n2, 443n10, 460n3,4, 476, 540–41 Southern Manchuria Military Region 239n3, 278n2 Southern Route 427–28 Soviet Red Army lv, 11, 48, 51, 56, 65–66, 68, 147, 165, 181–82, 222–23, 239–40, 254, 352, 434n5 Soviet Union xlix, 110, 185, 221, 426; aid to China xlvii, xlvii–xlviii, 32–33, 74–75; allied to the Chinese Communist Party xliii; in China 181–82; China ambitions xlviii, lii; communist training schools in xlii–xliv; and Manchuria li; Mao on 47, 74–75, 480; medical treatment in 285; and the Nationalist government (China) liv, 164; in the Northeast 48–49; October Revolution 115; and the United States 373–74, 414, 445; and the War of Resistance Against Japan 8–11, 23, see also Russia Spain lxxxviii–lxxxix

Speech at a Party Held in the Auditorium of the Military Affairs Commission (October 8, 1945) 94–95 Speech at the Consultative Conference Reception (September 18, 1945) 88 Speech at the Second Session of the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (August 9, 1945) 11–12 Speech at the Seventh Branch School of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (October 25, 1945) 131–34 A Spring Festival Appeal to Cadres and Residents of the Districts and Villages (January 24, 1947) 469 Stalin, Joseph li, 8, 219, 426 Statement Opposing the U.S. Bill to Provide Military Assistance to Chiang Kaishek (June 22, 1946) 323–24 Steele, Archibald 407–8, 444 Step up Preparations against Fu Zuoyi’s Attacks (May 9, 1946) 276 Stilwell, Joseph xlviii, xciv Storm and Capture Weak Positions and Then Displace and Annihilate the Enemy (August 27, 1946) 381 Strategic Plans for the Taihang and Shandong Regions after the Overall Situation Has Fallen Apart (June 22, 1946) 325–26 The Strategic Task of the Central Plains Army Is to Establish Base Areas behind Enemy Lines (July 15, 1946) 361–62 Strike at the Enemy at an Opportune Moment During Mobile Warfare (May 3, 1946) 267 Strive to Annihilate Three to Four Brigades in Each Battle (January 2, 1947) 455 Strong, Anna Louise 373–75, 443 Struggle Resolutely in Siping and Benxi to Secure a Peace That Will Be Favorable to Us (May 1, 1946) 264–65 Stuart, John Leighton 417 student demonstrations xxx, 194n195, 477–78, 548–49, 557 Study the Combat Method of Chen Geng’s Army in Amassing Forces to Destroy the Enemy One by One (July 16, 1946) 363–64 Su county 325

586 Index

Su Yu lxvii, lxx, lxxii–lxxiv; for the information of 302, 419–20, 455, 517–18, 552; mentioned 180, 326, 402, 424; telegrams from lxxi, 378n3, 381n2, 382, 388n2, 456n2, 492n3, 532n2; telegrams to 59–60, 291, 372, 376–78, 381, 384–85, 388–89, 456–58, 463–68, 471–75, 484–98, 528, 532–34, 536–38, 543–44, 557–58 Su Zhenhua 148, 153–54, 164, 321, 439 Subei Campaign 455n2 Suggested Revisions to the Resolution of the Northeast Bureau on the Situation and Tasks in the Northeast (July 11, 1946, noon) 352–55 Suggestions on How to Thoroughly Crush Chen Cheng’s Attack on Southern Shandong (February 3, 1947) 484–85 Suide 509, 511–12, 519, 525, 527, 531, 535 Suiyuan 44, 65, 80–81, 137, 318–19 Suiyuan Campaign 101n1, 132, 148, see also Pingsui Campaign Suizhong 188 A Summary by the CPC Central Committee on Work in July, August, and September of 1946 (October 1, 1946) 410–15, 481 “Summary of Conversations between the Representatives of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party” (October 10, 1945) 204n1 Sun Dingguo 499–500 Sun Ke 75 Sun Liangcheng 184 Sun Lianzhong 37, 159, 163 Sun Sunquan 205n3 Sun Yatsen xxix, 41, 90, 97, 139, 157–58, 168, 426 Sun Zhen 342, 386, 392, 498 Sun Zi lxxxiv Supplementary Directive Regarding the Problem of Engaging in Battle in the Northeast (April 8, 1946) 232–33 sweeping 31–32 swords 26–27 The Tactical Orientation to Be Adopted after Issuing the “July 7th” Declaration (July 6, 1946) 346–47 Tai’an 302, 305, 532n2, 533 Tai’an-Laiwu-Nishui line 533

Taihang region 325–26 Taikang 163, 325 Taiping Rebellion xxix Taiwan xxxvii, l, liv, lxxxv, 211–12 Taiyuan 102, 211, 338, 350, 545–46n3 Taiyue District 98 Taizerhuang 457 Taizerhuang-Zaozhuang railway 466 Take Strict Precautions against Sudden Attacks by the Enemy During this High Tide of Reactionary Activity (April 5, 1946) 228 Talk at the Office of the Eighteenth Army Group in Chongqing (August 29, 1945) 74–75 Talk with Anna Louise Strong (August 1946) 373–75 Talk with Dagong Bao Reporters (September 5, 1945) 84–85 Tan Sitong xxix Tan Zheng 182 Tan Zhenlin: for the information of 302, 419–20, 456–58, 517–18, 552; mentioned 326, 402, 424, 463–64, 536; telegrams from 382, 388n2, 492n3; telegrams to 291, 378, 381, 384–85, 388–89, 466–68, 471–72, 474–75, 484–98, 543–44, 557–58 Tancheng-Matouzhen area 474 Tang Enbo 385, 411, 533 Tang Yanjie 294, 297, 310–11, 331 Tanggu lxxxiii, lxxxiv, 494 Tangshan 165 Tangyin 159, 525 tanks 283, 418 Tao Xingzhi 371 Tao Yong 463n2 Taolin county 101 Taonan 175, 246, 424n2 Tawney, R. H., Land and Labor in China lxxxviii, xc Team Thirty-two 333 Telegram by Chairman Mao in Reply to Chiang Kaishek (August 16, 1945) 39 Telegram from Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai Resolutely Rejects Chiang Kaishek’s Erroneous Order (August 13, 1945) 34–35 Telegram in Reply to Chiang Kaishek (August 24, 1945) 58

I ndex 587

Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from Representatives of the China Democratic League (May 23, 1946) 293 Telegram in Reply to the Telegram from the Inner Mongolia People’s Congress (May 19, 1947) 539 Telegram of Appreciation and Solicitude to Ma Xulun and Others (June 25, 1946) 334–35 Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Li Gongpu (July 13, 1946) 358 Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Tao Xingzhi (July 25, 1946) 371 Telegram of Condolences to the Family of Mr. Wen Yiduo (July 17, 1946) 365 Telegram to Chen Geng, and for the Information of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, and Xiao Ke (October 19, 1945) 122–23 Telegram to Chen Yi and Su Yu (January 17, 1947) 465 Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping (October 12, 1945, 1:00 P.M.) 98–99 Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping (October 29, 1945) 138 Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Geng (October 16, 1945) 100 Telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da (November 2, 1945, 10 P.M.) 149 Telegram to Marshal Stalin (August 9, 1945) 8 Telegram to Overseas Chinese Associations in Siam (December 25, 1946) 447 Telegram to the Comrades of the Central Bureau of the Shanxi-Hebei-ShandongHenan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Region (October 17, 1945) 103–4 Telegram to Zheng Weisan, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen (June 19, 1946) 317 Telegram to Zhou Enlai (November 3, 1945, 11:00 P.M.) 156 Telegram to Zhou Enlai (October 31, 1945) 143 Telegrams in Reply to Distinguished Personages of Various Circles in Chongqing (July 5, 1946) 345 Telegrams Regarding Ye Ting’s Admission to the Party (March 7, 1946) 215–16 telegrams to 256, 430, 545–46

Temporarily Avoid Fighting, Conceal Yourselves, and Wait for an Opportunity (April 3, 1947) 510 Teng county 144, 179, 496 Teng Daiyuan 438–39, 499–500, 517–18, 545–47 Thailand 447 The Central Plains Army Has Played an Enormous Strategic Role (May 28, 1947) 547 Theory of Intermediate Zones 434n4, 445 There Is Ample Reason for Our Side to Initiate a Counteroffensive (November 3, 1945) 155 Third Army 98–100, 122 Third Division 342–43, 386–87, 392–93, 395, 399–400 third world war 51, 110, 120, 213, 219–20, 261, 375 Thirteenth Army 187, 283 Thirtieth Army 103n3, 140, 143, 150–51, 153, 156, 159–62 Thirty-eighth Army 37–38, 163, 185 Thirty-eighth Division [of the Northwest Democratic Allied Army] 38 Thirty-first Brigade 509, 519 The Three Big Problems of Accepting Surrender, the Puppet Troops, and SelfGovernance Must Be Resolved before Communications Can Be Restored (November 5, 1945) 170–71 Three People’s Principles (Sun Yatsen) 41, 63 three thirds system 478 359th Brigade 520 Tiananmen Massacre (1989) xli Tianjin lxxvii, lxxix–lxxx, lxxxiii–lxxxiv, 100–101, 139, 155, 540 Tianjin-Cangzhou railway 542 Tianjin-Pukou railway 22, 29, 68, 132, 147, 396, 403, 494, 496n2 Tianzhuangzhen 535 “tit-for-tat” strategy 26–28, 30, 106–7, 113, 117–18 TNT 298–99, 311, 338 To Cai Bo and Others (January 8, 1946) 203 To Chen Jinkun (January 16, 1947) 462 To Fight Ou Zhen, Amass Fifty Regiments on One Battlefield (January 21, 1947) 468 To Hong Yu (March 12, 1946) 217

588 Index

To Huang Qisheng (December 29, 1945) 200 To Liu Yazi (January 28, 1946) 205 To Liu Yazi (October 4, 1945) 92 To Liu Yazi (October 7, 1945) 93 To Nie Rongzhen and Wang Jiaxiang (May 19, 1946) 285 To the Xin’an Tour Group (May 20, 1946) 289 Tongbo 137 Tongguan 513 Tongguan-Luoyang railway 500 Tongjiang 359 Tongjiang-Nanjiang-Bazhong area 361 Tongpu 100 Tongpu railway 19–20, 98 Tongxu 325 Transfer Our Forces to the Northeast as Rapidly as Possible (October 25, 1945) 135 Treat Mobilizing the Masses and Creating the Battlefield as the Most Urgent Strategic Tasks in the Northeast at Present (November 10, 1945) 177–78 Troops in the Central Plains Military Region Should Attempt a Transfer within the Rules of the Agreement (April 30, 1946) 259 Truman, Harry lix, 316 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin li–lii Tuchman, Barbara xlii–xliii, xciv Tumen 448–49 Tuocheng 325 Twelfth Army 490, 492n3, 496 “12-1 Massacre” 194n195 Twenty-fifth Division 430 “Twenty-One Demands” 443 Twenty-second Division 142 Twenty-sixth Division 137, 151, 456, 467 Two Conditions for Fighting a LargeScale Battle of Annihilation (January 25, 1947) 470 United Press International 86, 166–69 United States: aid to China xlvii– xlviii, 323; aid to the Guomindang organization 155, 172, 175, 177, 181, 184–85, 229, 239, 280–81, 303–4, 315– 16, 323–24, 332, 373–75, 406–8, 414, 437, 442, 480–81; army 66, 323; Army Observation Group xliii, 1, 32n16; China policy xliii, lv, lxxviii, 12, 32–33,

184, 280–81, 407–8, 442, 453; Chinese Civil War casualties 328–29; and the Chinese peace talks l, lv, lviii–lx; “Dixie Mission” xlii, l, liii; Ichigo Offensive (April–December 1944) l, xciii; Mao on 12, 47, 261–62, 353, 373–75, 434, 480; “Operation Buccaneer” xciii; “Operation Causeway” l; “Operation Spaniel” xlvii; perceived imperialism of 29, 32, 348, 373–75, 478–80, 548–49; ships 443; and the Soviet Union 373–74, 414, 445 The United States Is Transporting Large Numbers of Chiang’s Troops to the Northeast to Extend the Civil War (June 1, 1946) 303 Unmask the Enemy at the Appropriate Moment (June 30, 1946) 339 Utley, Freda lxxxviii–lxxxix The Various Forces in Rehe Are Expected to Actively Coordinate with Our Army to Battle in the Northeast (May 15, 1946) 282 victory lxxvii; in the Civil War xxxvii, lxxviii, lxxxv–lxxxvi; Mao’s thoughts on lxxvii, 483; and peace 354; plans for after 22; propaganda for 406; speeches on 51–57; in the War of Resistance Against Japan 18, 28–29, 41, 83 Vietnam xl Views on Cutting off the Enemy’s Line of Retreat and Surrounding and Annihilating the Enemy in Siping (May 4, 1946) 272–73 Wan Yi 48–49, 146, 181 Wang ?? 342–43 Wang Hongkun 438–39, 499–500, 517–18, 545–47 Wang Jian’an 474, 484, 498 Wang Jiaxiang 285, 300 Wang Jingjiu 494n2, 495, 537 Wang Jingwei 18 Wang Kemin 120 Wang Ming xxxiii Wang Ruofei 200, 215n2, 243n1; mentioned 65, 79–80 Wang Shijie 76–81, 164, 223 Wang Shitai 523 Wang Shitai’s Unit Should Ensure That the Enemy’s Food Supply Lines Are Cut (April 26, 1947) 523

I ndex 589

Wang Shoudao 5–7 Wang Shusheng 497; for the information of 37–38, 342–43; mentioned 3, 137, 167, 359–60, 397; telegrams to 369–70 Wang Shuwen 163 Wang Weizhou 517–18 Wang Xinting 499–500, 547; mentioned 546; telegrams to 545–46 Wang Yaowu 384–85, 411, 488 Wang Ying 101 Wang Yunsheng 97 Wang Zhen 156, 160; for the information of 359–60, 369–70; mentioned 5–7, 117–18, 137, 439, 501–2; telegrams to 259, 304, 317, 333, 448–49 Wang Zhitao 421 Wang Zhonglian 498 Wangjiawan 555 Wanquan lxxxii, 448–49, 448n2 War of Resistance Against Japan xxxix, xlvi–xlvii, xlix, xc, xciii, 72, 161, 209, 540–41n6; Chiang Kaishek’s orders regarding 34–35, 40–43; and the Chinese Communist Party lxxxvi– lxxxvii, 45; costs of l; guerrilla warfare in xxxiii, xxxix, lxxxvii, 403; Japanese withdrawal 6; Japan’s surrender 13, 16, 23, 33, 44–45, 47, 51, 61, 68, 82, 117, 131, 169–70, 180, 548; Manchurian Incident 88n1; and Mao xxxviii, lxxx, lxxxvii; Mao on xlv, 25, 30, 73, 107, 435, 453, 478–79; and the Soviet Union 8–11, 2351; United States assistance in 323; victory in 18, 28–29, 83, see also Japan Wayaobao 509, 510, 511, 519–20, 522, 524, 531, 535 We Agree That Liu and Deng’s Entire Army Should Rest and Reorganize, and Cross the River at the End of the Month (June 3, 1947) 552 We Agree That the Forces from the Central Plains Military Region Should Break out Immediately (June 23, 1946) 330 We Agree to Adopt an Overall Policy of Mobile Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare in the Northeast (June 3, 1946) 306 We Agree with the Policy Adopted by the Central Plains Bureau Regarding Attacks by the Diehard Army (May 2, 1946) 266

We Agree with Your Policy and the Arrangements for Actively Annihilating the Enemy (March 27, 1947) 504 We Can Maintain the Initiative If We Capture Panlong within a Week (May 4, 1947, 1:00 P.M.) 525–26 We Hope for a Study of Techniques for Destroying Tanks (May 18, 1946) 283 We Must Be Cautious in Utilizing Fresh Troops (April 28, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) 257 We Must Do All We Can to Seize Communications Lines and the Cities Along Those Lines (August 12, 1945) 19–20 We Need to Smash Hu Zongnan’s Army in Order to Change the Situation in Northern Shaanxi (March 27, 1947) 505–6 We Should Lure the Enemy to Penetrate Deeply and Fight a Major Battle of Annihilation in Southern Shandong (January 31, 1947) 474–75 We Should Transfer Many of Our Forces Northward to Defend Changchun and Chahar (April 21, 1946) 254 weapons lxi, 288, 298–99, 303, 324, 363, 541 Wedemeyer, Albert 65n4 Wei county 344, 498, 544 Weifang 326 Weihaiwei 68 Weishi 163 Wen Minsheng 397 Wen Niansheng 5–6, 37–38, 177–78, 270, 277, 282 Wen Yiduo 358n1, 365 Wenxi 363 Westad, Odd Arne lxxxvi Western Jinzhou 279 Western thought, Mao on xxx When Conducting Operations in the Northeast, It Is Necessary to Take the Whole Situation into Account and Make Plans for the Long Run (April 12, 1946) 236–37 When Sufficiently Prepared, Attack Ou Zhen Again (January 19, 1947) 467 White, Theodore Harold 444n15 Winning Requires Successfully Forming a United Front (November 21, 1946) 433–37

590 Index

Woniucheng 555 work, Mao on 118 The Work of the Central Work Committee Is to Be Carried out under the Direction of Liu Shaoqi (March 30, 1947, 3:00 P.M.–5:00 P.M.) 508 work policies 191–94 World War I 120, 348 World War II xxxix, l, 33, 94–95, 120, 185; and Chiang Kaishek xlii; Mao on 220, see also War of Resistance Against Japan World War III 120, 212–13, 220, 261, 375 Wortzel, Larry lxxx Woyang 325 Wu Dingchang 212 Wu Guozhen 166–69, 168 Wu Huawen 179, 300–301 Wu Jinnan 6 Wu Kehua 146 Wu Peifu lxxvii, lxxx Wu Shaozhou 498 Wu Tinglin 342 Wu Xiuquan 280–81 Wu Yaozong 334–35 Wu Yuzhang 427–28 Wu’an 160 Wuchuan 101 Wuhan lxix–lxx, lxxxviii–lxxxix, 24n4, 211, 333 Wushi 159 Wutai 331 Wutai county 350–51 Wuyuan 155, 183 Xi county 350–51, 448–49 Xi Zhongxun 554; mentioned 555; telegrams to 545–46 Xi Zongxun 390; for the information of 505–6; mentioned 502, 541; telegrams from 511n2; telegrams to 503, 507, 509–14, 517–18, 522–27, 529–31, 535, 537–38 Xi’an lxvi, lxix Xi’an Incident (1936) xxxiii, lv, 107, 115 Xiancheng 467 Xiang, Lanxin lxxi, lxxiv Xiang River 314, 320, 331, 350, 360, 369, 370, 396n2 Xianghe 302 Xiangning 448–49 Xiangning county 546

Xiao county 287, 302 Xiao Hua 146, 181, 256, 268, 312, 430 Xiao Jinguang 165 Xiao Ke: for the information of 122–23, 140, 310–11, 517–18; mentioned 526, 541; telegrams to 146–48, 164–65, 260, 269–71, 279, 282, 313, 321–22, 337–38, 470, 521 Xiaolaoshan 501–2 Xiaoyi 504 Xiaoyi county 350–51, 546 Xiayi 287, 394 Xie Fuzhi: for the information of 499–500, 517–18, 527, 547; mentioned 504–5, 526, 556; telegrams to 309, 448–49, 545–46, 554 Xihua 325 Xijiang 6, 427 Xin county 331 Xin’an Tour Group 289 Xinbao’an lxxxii, lxxxiii Xing’an 353–54 Xingcheng 188 Xingcheng-Jinxian railway 269 Xinghe 101 Xinhua News Agency 108, 149, 176, 339; on Chiang Kaishek 39–43, 315–16; dispatches 159–61, 166–69, 189–90, 214, 303, 332, 345, 358, 365, 371, 426, 459, 469, 539, 548–51; on reactionaries 211–13; reported telegrams 8, 34–35, 39, 44–47; reporter comments 16–18; statements made to 9–10, 61–63, 73, 548–51 Xinhua News Agency Reporter Criticizes and Condemns the “Chiang Kaishek Order” for Provoking Civil War and for Destroying World Peace (August 12, 1945) 16–18 Xinhua ribao newspaper 87, 89–91, 215–16 Xinjiang lxvi Xinkailing Campaign 430n3 Xintai 490, 532n2 Xintai-Boshan line 487 Xinxiang 136 Xu Shiyou 494n2; mentioned 474, 484, 498 Xu Xiangqian lxxv, 547 Xu Zirong 361–62 Xuangangzhen 320 Xuanhuadian 342

I ndex 591

Xue Yue 384–85, 392, 411, 419, 420, 436, 457–58, 461, 466 Xuhai railway 472 Xulin railway 472 Xuzhou lxviii–lxx, lxxiii, 36, 300n2, 301, 325 Xuzhou-Bengbu railway 377 Xuzhou-Pukou front lxxi Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945) li, liv, lx Yan Baohang 334–35 Yan Kuiyao 523 Yan Xishan lxxv, lxxx, 23–24n2, 307; mentioned 100, 102, 106, 113, 118, 132, 157–58, 167, 183, 297, 363, 411, 417, 435, 504–6, 546 Yan’an lxiv–lxvi, 66, 118, 432, 434, 436, 438–39, 441–42, 449, 499–502, 503n1, 531, 550, 555 Yan’an Authority Commenting on the National Assembly Says Unilateral Action by the Guomindang Authorities Reveals Determination to Launch a Large-Scale Civil War (November 16, 1945) 189–90 Yan’an Campaign lxxxv Yan’an period xxxi, xxxiii, xliii, xlviii Yanchang 508, 511–12, 529 Yanchuan 508, 529 Yang and Su’s Column Should Replace Its Losses and Then Leave for Jinzhou and Shenyang (November 3, 1945, 3:00 P.M.) 153–54 Yang Chengwu 338 Yang Dezhi 153–54; mentioned 148, 164, 182, 321, 337, 439 Yang Guofu 146, 181, 187, 244, 251, 253 Yang Hucheng 37–38n3; mentioned 42 Yang Shangkun 517–18 Yang Wencai 167 Yang Yong 144 Yangjiayuanzi 509 Yangliuqing 68 Yangshan 6 Yanji region 354 Yanjing 159 Yanqing Campaign lxv Yanshui 509 Yantai 68, 434, 436 Yanzhou 179 Yanzhuang 544

Yao county 513, 523 Ye Fei 59–60, 148, 182, 420 Ye Jianying: for the information of 242, 270–71, 416–17, 517–18; mentioned 344, 508; telegrams to 280–81, 287, 350–51 Ye Ting 23–24n2, 243n1; telegrams from 215–16 Yellow River lxxv, 27n9, 287n2, 377, 396, 397, 495, 498, 519, 536, 537–38, 541, 552 Yetai Mountain attack 27 Yetai Mountain Campaign, see Chunhua Incident Yi county 456n4, 457, 489 Yichuan 513 Yichuan-Luochuan-Zhongbu line 500 Yidu 68 Yijun 513, 527 Yin county 350–51 Yin Linping 427–28 Ying county 331, 350 Yinggeji area 394 Yingkou 164, 181 Yishi 448 Yishui 528 Yongfu 203 Yonghe 448–49 Yongnian 290 Yongping 509, 513 You Are Expected to Be Prepared to Handle Any Incident (April 18, 1946) 242 You Must Wait until the Enemy Enters the Tancheng-Linyi Region before Fighting the First Battle (February 4, 1947) 486 Youth Party 480 Yu Cheng 409n1 Yu Guangsheng 292, 339; mentioned 406 Yu Zai 205 Yuanping 331 Yuanwu 159 Yucheng 325 Yuci 122 Yuci and Taigu front 98 Yugou Campaign 385 Yulin 505, 557 Yulin Campaign lxv Yuncheng 526 Yunlianghe 381 Zao Lihuai 146 Zaozhuang 302, 305, 456n4, 457, 463–64, 466, 468, 489

592 Index

Zechuan 68 Zeng Guofan xxix Zeng Kelin 312 Zeng Shan 419–20 Zeng Suyuan 342–43 Zeng Yongquan 310–11 Zengzhou 500 Zhan Caifang: for the information of 282; mentioned 236, 268–70, 277, 313; telegrams to 421 Zhang Bangchang 316 Zhang Bojun 293 Zhang Caiqian 369–70 Zhang Dingcheng: for the information of 302, 388–89, 487–88; telegrams to 291, 372, 419–20 Zhang Dongsun 220 Zhang Hong 167 Zhang Jichun 136–37, 149, 152–54, 164–65 Zhang Jilong 37–38 Zhang Jingcheng 384–85 Zhang Jingyue 300 Zhang Jiongbo 334–35 Zhang Junli 293 Zhang Kexia lxxii Zhang Lan 75, 332 Zhang Lanfeng 184 Zhang Linzhi 144 Zhang Manjun 358 Zhang Qilong 5 Zhang Qun 76–78 Zhang Tailei 203n1 Zhang Tixue 342–43 Zhang Wenbai 94–95 Zhang Xin 525 Zhang Xueliang lv, 42 Zhang Yan 370 Zhang Yunyi 543–44; for the information of 487–88; mentioned 300; telegrams to 59–60, 87, 128–29, 146–48, 162–63, 384–85, 429, 484–85, 489, 497–98, 543–44 Zhang Zhen (张镇) 75 Zhang Zhiming 203 Zhang Zhizhong 76–78, 94–95, 97, 214 Zhang Zongxun 399–400, 439. 501 Zhang Zuolin liii Zhangdian 302, 305 Zhangjiakou lxxix, 68, 101, 405n2, 434, 549 Zhangtan 101–2

Zhangyuan 405 Zhao Caiji 360 Zhao Erlu 100, 123, 140–41, 144–45, 165, 321, 338 Zhao Erlu Is to Proceed to Lincheng (October 30, 1945) 140 Zhao Shiyan 203n1 Zhao Xiaoyan 203 Zhao Xitian 343 Zhaocheng 122 Zhaoyang Campaign, see Yugou Campaign Zhaozhuang 489 Zhashui 359 Zhejiang lxvii, 22, 44, 55, 91, 113 Zhen’an 359 Zheng-Tai Campaign 521n2, 541, see also Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] Campaign Zheng Weisan: for the information of 37–38, 369–70; telegrams from 359n2; telegrams to 3–4, 124, 259, 304, 317, 333, 32–43, 357, 359–60, 547 Zheng[ding]–Tai[yuan] Campaign 521, 541, see also Zheng-Tai Campaign Zhengding-Taiyuan railway 318–19, 321–22, 338, 439, 521n3, 526 Zhengtai 545–46n3 Zhengtai railway 19, 99, 122–23 Zhengting–Taiyuan railway 29, 68 Zhengyangguan 552n3, Zhengzhou-Luoyang-Xuchang line 37 Zhengzhou-Xuzhou line lxxi Zhi county 325 Zhongbu 513, 527 Zhonglu 6 Zhongyang 504–6 Zhongyang county 350–51 Zhou Baozhong 165, 223–24, 244–45, 251 Zhou Enlai lvii, lxxxviii; documents from 76–78; for the information of 427–28; mentioned 50, 55, 58, 72, 79–80, 96, 184, 214, 242, 293, 295, 312, 344, 505; telegrams from 242n3, 317; telegrams to 143, 156, 280–81, 287, 323n1, 334–35, 350–51, 416–17, 508 Zhou Qingxiang 343 Zhoucun 302, 305 Zhu Bolu 31n15 Zhu De xxxii, lxxxvii; for the information of 517–18, 521, 540–42, 552; mentioned

I ndex 593

16–18, 39, 134, 184, 469, 508; telegrams from 8, 34–35, 44–47, 365, 426, 539; telegrams to 555–56 Zhu Dixin 270, 277, 282 Zhu Huaiyong 23–24n2 Zhuanmiaoji 393 Zhucaoying 187

Zhujiang 6 Zhuozi county 130, 276n3, 297n3 Zhuozishan 130, 137, 276, 297 Zibo region 533 Zou county 128, 144, 179, 496 Zuo Shiyun 514 Zuoyun 504