Mao Zedong and Contemporary China: Exploring the World Where Truth Falls from the Heavens 9819717604, 9789819717606

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Author
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Photos
1 Mao Zedong’s Philosophy and Thought: Pitfalls of His “Contradiction” and “Practice” Theories
1 The Structure of “On Contradiction” and “On Practice”
2 Practicality of Mao’s Philosophy
3 Evaluation of Mao’s Philosophy and Thought
4 Tricks and Pitfalls of Mao’s Philosophy: My Interpretation
2 Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution?
1 Mao Zedong’s Fury with Liang Shuming
2 The Hu Feng Incident
3 Lu Xun and Mao Zedong
3 Class Struggle Theory and the Mass Line: “Marxism” According to Mao Zedong
1 Revolutionary Struggle and Class: Characteristics of Mao’s Early Concept of Class
2 Changes in the Concept of Class after the Founding of the Country
3 Land Reform and Class Distinction
4 Masses, People, and the Mass Line
5 Class Struggle and Violence
4 The Development of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and Its Aftermath: Turning Point of the Chinese Politics during the Mao Era
1 Prehistory of the Anti-Rightist Struggle: A Hundred Flowers Blossom, a Hundred Schools of Thought
2 The Start of the Struggle
3 The Aftermath of the Struggle
4 The Reality of the Anti-Rightist Struggle: My Interpretation
5 The Great Leap Forward, the People’s Commune, and the Great Famine: Mao Zedong’s Fantasy with Disastrous Results
1 The Birth of the Great Leap Forward Policy
2 Development of the People’s Commune Policy
3 Famine and Starvation: Its Reality and Number of Victims
4 The Great Famine and Starvation: The Mechanism
5 What Was the Great Leap Forward?: My Hypothetical View
6 The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: The Lushan Conference and Its Aftermath
1 The Reversal of the Great Leap Forward Policy
2 The Lushan Conference: Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter
3 Mao’s Criticism of Peng Dehuai
4 The Tragic End of Peng Dehuai
5 The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: My Interpretation
7 Mao Zedong’s “Political Economy”: An Anatomy of His “Economics of Contradiction”
1 Characteristics of Mao’s Political Economics
2 Mao’s Economic Goals
3 Deng Xiaoping’s Economics
4 How to Evaluate Mao’s “Political Economics”
8 The Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong: The Outcome of a Revolution without Revolution
1 The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference
2 The Socialist Education Campaign
3 Launching and Expanding the Cultural Revolution: Its Mechanisms
3.1 The Cultural Revolution as a Sweeping Political Movement
3.2 The Mechanism of the CR Expansion: A Hypothetical Model
4 The Tragedy of the Cultural Revolution: Its Scale and Brutality
5 Evaluating the Cultural Revolution: What Was the Cultural Revolution?
9 Emperor Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai: A Brief Analysis of the Mao-Zhou Relationship
1 The Mao-Zhou Relationship during the Revolutionary Struggle
2 Mao-Zhou Relationships after the Founding of the Country
3 How to Evaluate Zhou Enlai: My Own View and Hypothesis
10 How Should We Evaluate Mao Zedong?: Mao Zedong and Contemporary China
1 Marxism as Religion, Mao as Guru
2 The Charisma of Mao Zedong
3 Mao’s Legacies to Contemporary China
4 The Character of Mao Zedong
5 An Evaluation of Mao Zedong: My Tentative View
Epilogue: Living in an Ah Q-Like World
References
Index

Citation preview

Katsuji Nakagane

Mao Zedong and Contemporary China Exploring the World Where Truth Falls from the Heavens

Mao Zedong and Contemporary China

Katsuji Nakagane

Mao Zedong and Contemporary China Exploring the World Where Truth Falls from the Heavens

Katsuji Nakagane University of Tokyo Tokyo, Japan

ISBN 978-981-97-1760-6 ISBN 978-981-97-1761-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3 Translation from the Japanese language edition: “Mou Takutou ron: Shinri wa ten kara futte kuru” by Katsuji Nakagane, © Katsuji Nakagane 2021. Published by The University of Nagoya Press. All Rights Reserved. The translation was done with the help of an artificial intelligence machine translation tool. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

Numerous works on Mao Zedong have been published around the world in many genres—biographies, critiques, research books, for example, including Edgar Snow’s Red Star over China. It is no exaggeration to say that the majority of research on China during Mao’s reign, especially in the areas of politics and history, is in effect research on Mao Zedong. This is because, to put it bluntly, the politics and history of China at that time were in fact Mao Zedong himself. He was the one who gave birth to the New China, he was the one who awakened the sleeping lion, and he was the one who moved and ruled China until his death. Mao passed away in September 1976, and Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policies that began in 1978 seem to have completely overshadowed “Mao Zedong,” but he still exerts a profound influence on contemporary Chinese politics and society. People have widely divergent assessments of Mao Zedong. From the perspective of Zhang Rong, a Chinese-born British woman writer, he has always been a shady character, and the history of the liberation struggle directed by him was in fact a drama embellished with lies and exaggerations. When we look back at the tragedies of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the land reform, the rectification movement, that is, all of the policies he initiated and led, there are so many victims that he can appear to be nothing less than the very devil. In practice, some people count him as one of the three villains in the world of the twentieth century, along with Adolf Hitler and Iosif Stalin. Even within China, his reputation is divided. I remember a Chinese professor visiting my home in the mid-1980s, seeing an embroidery of Mao’s poetry displayed in the entrance and exclaiming in utter disgust, “This man has made China worse!” The professor, who had close ties to Japan, must have been one of the victims of Mao’s 1957 “Anti-Rightist Struggle” policy of suppressing intellectuals, and of the Cultural Revolution that raged from 1966 to 1976.

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On the other hand, Mao Zedong is revered in China as a great charismatic hero who liberated and founded the country. People from all over the country constantly visit both his house in Shaoshan, Xiangtan County, Hunan Province, where he was born and raised, and his former residence in Yan’an, where the Chinese Revolution was based. It is no surprise that the official Biography of Mao Zedong, which was edited by the Communist Party in China, glorifies Mao Zedong. Further, articles on Mao published in academic journals such as Mao Zedong Thought Research and Party History Research in China, although they may not outright glorify him, do not view him critically and are virtually not allowed to do so. Let me consider the following questions not on the basis of whether we like him or not, but with more objectivity and distance. Why and how did Mao Zedong do what he did? What was the main theme and the basis of his thought that determined the fundamentals of his actions? More importantly, how was he able to continue to rule China despite the horrific disasters and sacrifices of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution? My main aim in this book is to consider and explain these various issues in relation to his actions and policies, and to do so in a somewhat commonsensical way, but as logically as possible. I believe this is the key to understanding contemporary Chinese politics and society. Simply put, you cannot understand modern China without understanding Mao Zedong. One of my basic viewpoints is to perceive Mao Zedong as the guru of the MarxistMaoist religion, and as an absolute guru at that, given that Mao Zedong called himself “Marx plus the First Emperor of Qin (Qinshihuang).” Nevertheless, a look at his thought and his actions shows that he is not always consistent, often contradicting himself or saying something different from what he said before. For example, “No right to speak without investigation” is his famous exhortation, but sometimes he spoke and acted with impunity, that is, without investigation or regard for investigation. While he said, “Let’s discuss a great deal, criticize and self-criticize each other, and if a leader is wrong, don’t hold his subordinates accountable,” he was furious when he himself was criticized for mistakes, and he never seriously self-criticized or took responsibility. As is well known, he asked, “Where does the correct thought of a person come from? Does it fall from the heavens? No. Is it inherent in one’s own mind? No. The correct thought of a person comes only from social practice.” However, underlying his words, deeds, and thoughts was his intense pride that the correct thought, knowledge, or truth, was in his mind only, thus, while he was in power, truth did indeed fall from “the heavens.” Mao Zedong was not only a politician, but also a military strategist, a thinker, a philosopher, and a poet. It is extremely difficult to capture his multifaceted personality as a whole, and if we try to do so, we may make the mistake of “not seeing the forest for the trees,” that is to say, if we focus on all the specific parts of a person, we cannot grasp the whole picture of that person. Mao Zedong is a major figure in world history and a hero who rebuilt a nation with thousands of years of history and the largest population in the world. Nevertheless, there is a Chinese proverb that says, “A newborn calf does not fear the tiger.” As a timid calf, I would like to confront this big tiger, Mao Zedong. This is my attitude toward him in this book.

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Why do we focus on Mao Zedong now? One reason is that after the reform and opening-up of China, a number of people have tried to look at Mao Zedong calmly and objectively, not as “Chairman Mao” but as “Mao Zedong.” Some examples are Li Rui, one of the Mao’s secretaries, Qian Liqun, former professor at Peking University, Wang Hui, a Tianjin municipal government official during the Cultural Revolution who later became a sociologist, Yang Jisheng, former journalist of the Xinhua News Agency, among others who have in turn begun to reveal facts about him that have been hidden in the past. Another reason is that after the Tiananmen Square incident of June 4, 1989, many books on China and Mao which were banned (i.e., books that cannot be published or sold on the Chinese Mainland) were published outside of China, and in the movement to take a fresh look at contemporary Chinese history, authors began to reassess Mao and contemporary China with a more critical eye. Yet another reason is that, as Qian Liqun has said, “after Mao’s passing, his specter is still haunting China, influencing the development of Chinese society.” At first glance, we get the impression that China has become “de-Maoized” since the reform and opening-up. For example, the materialistic values and the worship of money that Mao detested have now become one of the basic behavioral principles of the ordinary “people”. However, the more we look at the real picture of contemporary China, the more we realize that the “specter of Mao” not only still haunts China, but it has firmly taken root in the governance principles of Chinese society and politics. In this sense, his influence is still enormous to this day. In terms of his behavior, if not his substance, the current President of the State, Xi Jinping, appears to be trying to deify himself and become a second Mao Zedong. To comment a little on the materials used in this book, as was once the case with the Soviet Union, most of the information emitted by the Communist Party and the government speaks of ideals (models), while the raw and sometimes ugly reality (muddles) is often revealed through underground publications or literature transmitted abroad. During the Soviet era, the truth about the “Gulag Archipelago,” which held vast numbers of political prisoners, was revealed not by the Soviet Communist Party’s official newspaper, Pravda (Truth), but by the dissident novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and underground publications. Similarly, China’s official publications such as the Biography of Mao Zedong and the Biography of Zhou Enlai portray only an ideal image of these leaders, the front face, so to speak, never the back face. The reason why this book uses a relatively large number of materials published abroad along with official documents is to explore the real picture of Mao Zedong and China by looking at both the models and the muddles. Social and historical phenomena are extremely complex and generally cannot be explained entirely from a single fact or perspective. Theories and frameworks that attempt to explain them are all “hypotheses.” In the fields of statistics and economics, although there has been recent progress in research related to causality testing, rigorous verification that a certain cause produces a certain result, we may call it “science,” is impossible unless strong conditions are put in place. So-called scientific social science theories are no more than theoretical hypotheses that are deemed to have “relatively high explanatory power” in terms of our experience so far. Similarly, the concept of “scientific socialism,” often used by Marxists, is a contradiction

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in terms if “science” is taken to be synonymous with the natural sciences. History teaches us that the moment a theory is called “science,” it becomes perceived as an absolute truth, a historical law, a religious dogma, and finally a violent device to force people to follow it. This is also my hypothesis and the basic viewpoint that runs through this book. It has often been said that “Mao Zedong was just an emperor.” However, as mentioned above, Mao Zedong possessed, or more precisely, tried to possess, the ideological authority of Karl Marx combined with the political power of the First Emperor of Qin, and such power was probably reinforced by the ideological authority. What is more, he may have possessed both a theory of tyranny and violence similar to that of the First Emperor and an ideology in favor of violence derived from Marx’s theory of violent revolution. This is still my hypothesis and my basic point of view. I would like to ask readers to judge how realistic and explanatory these hypotheses really are. At any rate, I hope that my viewpoints and hypotheses will be of some help in observing not only Mao Zedong but also the nature of contemporary Chinese politics and society. The many references in this book to the “abnormal deaths” and the enormous human cost of the Mao era may be disconcerting to some readers, but they may also be repelled by the way I see the situation. Some may be repulsed by my attempt to highlight the flaws and negative aspects of Mao’s policies, as well as his personal ruthlessness, rather than the achievements of his policies. However, I believe that we can understand Mao Zedong and his era only by confronting particularly those facts that make us want to turn our eyes away. I am a researcher of contemporary Chinese economy, not an established collector or researcher, nor am I an expert on Mao literature and history, as are the likes of Stuart Schram, Roderick MacFarquhar, Takeuchi Minoru, among other Chinese specialists. Therefore, this book may contain many factual errors and misinterpretations regarding Mao Zedong. However, I welcome any criticism of my interpretation and understanding of Mao Zedong, provided that we do not claim that “truth falls from the heavens,” that is, that we recognize and respect each other’s various objections. In any case, simply praising or hating Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party will not produce anything. Especially since there is a strong tendency these days to view China emotionally, I believe it is necessary to rethink Mao and contemporary China as “scientifically” (in the sense of refutable or hypothetical) as possible. Each chapter of this book examines various aspects of Mao’s ideology, policies, and actions, with the final chapter providing an overall evaluation of Mao Zedong. While the chapters are closely interrelated, they are designed to be readable independently as well. The book is written more for general readers than China specialists, and it is hoped that it will be read as an accessible history book on contemporary China, bearing in mind the author’s unique perspective. Let me add several comments on the English translation of non-Japanese references used in this book. When citing or referring to sources in languages other than Japanese, the following principles are adopted:

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(1) Quotations from Selected Works of Mao Zedong are based on the officially published English version of Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung available in China. (2) Citations from other Chinese-language sources related to Mao Zedong are translated directly from Chinese into English. (3) Citations from Marx’s Capital and Lenin’s Collected Works are referenced using commonly cited English translations. (4) When the original texts are in English and there are Japanese translations available, efforts were made to refer to the original texts whenever possible. However, due to time constraints, some passages are retranslated from the Japanese version. (5) When the original texts are in Chinese and there are English translations available, efforts were made to refer to the English translations whenever possible. However, due to time constraints, some passages are translated directly from Chinese or Japanese. (6) When the original texts are in French or German and there are Japanese translations available, the Japanese texts are translated directly into English. Tokyo, Japan

Katsuji Nakagane

Acknowledgments

During the process of crafting this book, I was fortunate to receive an array of assistance, both direct and indirect, from numerous esteemed friends and colleagues. For the original Japanese edition, On Mao Zedong: Truth Falls from the Heavens (Nagoya University Press, 2021), I extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Emeritus Mohri Kazuko of Waseda University, Prof. Takahara Akio of the University of Tokyo, Professor Emeritus Kokubun Ryosei of Keio University, and Prof. Kajitani Kai of Kobe University for their gracious and meticulous feedback. Their thoughtful and detailed reviews significantly enriched the content of this work. Additionally, I am indebted to Thomas Rawski, Professor Emeritus of Pittsburgh University, a cherished friend from the USA, who generously shared his expertise not only on matters concerning the Chinese economy but also on technical nuances in English translations. Mitsunami Kohei, Lecturer at Teikyo University, provided invaluable technical insights during the editing process, while Nakajima Kentaro, Associate Professor of Hitotsubashi University, offered many insightful suggestions regarding the materials utilized in this book. Special appreciation is extended to Mr. Tachibana Sogo of the editorial department at Nagoya University Press and Ms. Kawakami Juno of the editorial department at Springer for their exceptional support and unwavering commitment to the publication of this work. Furthermore, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Ms. MaryRose Hendrikse, whose exceptional editorial prowess undoubtedly enhanced the readability of the English version of this book. I also wish to convey my gratitude discreetly to several Chinese scholars, whose identities I must safeguard for their safety, yet whose invaluable insights significantly contributed to my understanding of Mao Zedong. It is my fervent hope that one day, we may openly engage in discussions regarding our assessments of Mao Zedong in global forums such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo, Washington, or any other corner of the world.

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Acknowledgments

Last but certainly not least, I extend profound appreciation to my wife, Eiko, whose steadfast support across various domains has been instrumental in seeing this project through to fruition. Her unwavering encouragement throughout the arduous process of editing and translating this book has been indispensable, and without her support, this endeavor would not have reached its completion.

Contents

1

2

3

4

Mao Zedong’s Philosophy and Thought: Pitfalls of His “Contradiction” and “Practice” Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Structure of “On Contradiction” and “On Practice” . . . . . . . . . . 2 Practicality of Mao’s Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Evaluation of Mao’s Philosophy and Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Tricks and Pitfalls of Mao’s Philosophy: My Interpretation . . . . . . . .

1 2 5 7 9

Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Mao Zedong’s Fury with Liang Shuming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Hu Feng Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Lu Xun and Mao Zedong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 21 28 33

Class Struggle Theory and the Mass Line: “Marxism” According to Mao Zedong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Revolutionary Struggle and Class: Characteristics of Mao’s Early Concept of Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Changes in the Concept of Class after the Founding of the Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Land Reform and Class Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Masses, People, and the Mass Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Class Struggle and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Development of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and Its Aftermath: Turning Point of the Chinese Politics during the Mao Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Prehistory of the Anti-Rightist Struggle: A Hundred Flowers Blossom, a Hundred Schools of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Start of the Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Aftermath of the Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Reality of the Anti-Rightist Struggle: My Interpretation . . . . . . .

41 42 49 54 59 65

69 69 75 84 87

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5

6

7

8

9

Contents

The Great Leap Forward, the People’s Commune, and the Great Famine: Mao Zedong’s Fantasy with Disastrous Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Birth of the Great Leap Forward Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Development of the People’s Commune Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Famine and Starvation: Its Reality and Number of Victims . . . . . . . . 4 The Great Famine and Starvation: The Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 What Was the Great Leap Forward?: My Hypothetical View . . . . . . .

93 94 102 106 112 120

The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: The Lushan Conference and Its Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Reversal of the Great Leap Forward Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Lushan Conference: Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Mao’s Criticism of Peng Dehuai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Tragic End of Peng Dehuai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: My Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123 124 125 129 135 140

Mao Zedong’s “Political Economy”: An Anatomy of His “Economics of Contradiction” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Characteristics of Mao’s Political Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Mao’s Economic Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Deng Xiaoping’s Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 How to Evaluate Mao’s “Political Economics” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

143 144 153 157 162

The Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong: The Outcome of a Revolution without Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Socialist Education Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Launching and Expanding the Cultural Revolution: Its Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Cultural Revolution as a Sweeping Political Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Mechanism of the CR Expansion: A Hypothetical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Tragedy of the Cultural Revolution: Its Scale and Brutality . . . . 5 Evaluating the Cultural Revolution: What Was the Cultural Revolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emperor Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai: A Brief Analysis of the Mao-Zhou Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Mao-Zhou Relationship during the Revolutionary Struggle . . . . 2 Mao-Zhou Relationships after the Founding of the Country . . . . . . . 3 How to Evaluate Zhou Enlai: My Own View and Hypothesis . . . . . .

167 168 174 177 178 181 187 191 197 198 203 209

Contents

10 How Should We Evaluate Mao Zedong?: Mao Zedong and Contemporary China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Marxism as Religion, Mao as Guru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Charisma of Mao Zedong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Mao’s Legacies to Contemporary China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Character of Mao Zedong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 An Evaluation of Mao Zedong: My Tentative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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217 217 223 226 230 234

Epilogue: Living in an Ah Q-Like World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

About the Author

Katsuji Nakagane is a professor emeritus of The University of Tokyo. He also taught at Hitotsubashi University and Aoyama Gakuin University. He obtained his Ph.D. in international economics at The University of Tokyo in 1992. He was formerly president of the Japan Association of Asian Studies, president of the Japan Association of Comparative Economics Studies, president of the Japan Association of Chinese Economic and Management Studies, and editor-in-chief of the Developing Economies. He has published several books on the Chinese economy, development economics, and systemic transition in Japanese, such as Studies on the Chinese Economy (University of Tokyo Press, 1992), Studies on the Development of the Chinese Economy (Yuhikaku, 1999), The Political Economy of Systemic Transitions (Nagoya University Press, 2010), Contemporary China and Development Economics (Nagoya University Press, 2012), and Mao Zedong—The Truth Falls Down from Heaven (Nagoya University Press, 2021). Most recently he edited the English language book Studies on the Chinese Economy During the Mao Era (Springer, 2023).

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List of Figures

Chapter 1 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Structure and transformation of contradictions: Mao’s model . . . . . Structure of knowledge and its development through practice: Mao’s model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 4

Chapter 3 Fig. 1

People and the masses in the Chinese context during the Mao era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 5 Fig. 1

Mechanism that generates and develops the Great Famine and hunger in China after the Great Leap Forward: A hypothetical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

118

Chapter 10 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Self-perpetuating and expanding mechanism of power in China . . . Structure of Mao’s character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

229 232

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List of Tables

Chapter 3 Table 1 Table 2

Mao’s original class classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Class and political attitudes: an exemplified Mao’s hypothesis . . .

43 46

Chapter 5 Table 1 Table 2

Major estimates of the number of abnormal deaths during the GLF period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cao’s estimated abnormal deaths and death rates (1958–1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

108 111

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Chapter 2 Photo 2.1 Photo 2.2 Photo 2.3 Photo 2.4

Liang Shuming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Land to tillers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hu Feng and his wife Mei Zhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lu Xun and his family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21 23 28 34

Zhang Bojun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Luo Longji . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chu Anping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74 80 81

Exaggerated report of rice production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Backyard furnaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

101 103

Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peng Dehuai tortured by the Red Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125 139

Mao Zedong and the Red Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Zhou Enlai, Deng Yingchao, and Sun Weishi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 4 Photo 4.1 Photo 4.2 Photo 4.3 Chapter 5 Photo 5.1 Photo 5.2 Chapter 6 Photo 6.1 Photo 6.2 Chapter 8 Photo 8.1 Chapter 9 Photo 9.1

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Chapter 1

Mao Zedong’s Philosophy and Thought: Pitfalls of His “Contradiction” and “Practice” Theories

Among the many leaders who have served in the Communist Party of China (CPC), Mao Zedong has particular distinguishing qualities, especially when compared with other leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai, for example. Mao excels in terms of his ability as a poet and his talent as a philosopher and thinker. Few can compose Chinese poems with the same panache and elegance as he could, and no one could manipulate a powerful “philosophy” like him. Another factor that made ordinary people worship him and tend to obey him was his vast knowledge of the ancient and modern world, especially the Chinese classics and history. In this respect, Mao stood out among the CPC leaders, and these qualities, together with his skillful speeches, attracted many cadres and Party members, as well as the general public.1 In this chapter, I will examine Mao’s philosophical theories from my personal perspective, pursue their structure and latent problems and then boldly evaluate them. First, I would like to note the difference between “Mao Zedong thought” and “Mao Zedong philosophy.” Mao Zedong thought, as officially stated in the Party’s “Historical Resolution” of 1981,2 consists of three pillars: (1) the idea of “seeking truth from facts” (shishi qiushi), (2) the mass line, and (3) the principle of independence and self-reliance. While these are all central to Maoism, Mao’s philosophy refers more specifically to the philosophical framework he created that formed the foundation of Mao Zedong thought. Mao’s representative philosophical works are the two essays: “On Contradiction” and “On Practice” included in his Selected Works Vol. 1. Both are based on lectures he gave at the “Anti-Japanese Military and Political College” in Yan’an in 1937. Therefore, they are not esoteric philosophies addressed primarily to philosophers and 1

That he was a great reader is attested to by Lin Ke, who was one of his secretaries (see Lin and Ling 1994). 2 Formally, this resolution is called “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of Our Country,” which was passed by the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_1

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thinkers, but are relatively plainly written, so that even the ordinary people unaccustomed to philosophical thinking can understand them (otherwise they would not be in keeping with the spirit of his practical philosophy). For this same reason he trashed the arguments of Wang Ming3 and other Moscow-returned CPC activists and theorists, calling them “foreign stereotypes (yangbagu)” for their dogmatic understanding of Marxism.4 Mao’s political actions and economic policies are closely tied to his philosophy. It is no exaggeration to say that the essence of Mao’s thought and philosophy is concentrated in these two philosophical works commonly referred to as “the two essays” (lianglun); and that, moreover, all of his actions, policies, and strategies have their roots in the logic of these essays. In this sense, knowing these essays is a gateway to understanding Mao Zedong and his thought, and, dare I say it, a major key to understanding contemporary China. I will begin with my own summary of the contents of these two essays, his most basic philosophical works, and then consider how these essays should be evaluated and how Mao’s philosophy should be viewed, with reference to the opinions of scholars both inside and outside Mainland China.

1 The Structure of “On Contradiction” and “On Practice” Let me begin with Mao Zedong’s perhaps most representative and famous philosophical treatise, “On Contradiction.” The content of this essay may be summarized as follows. All things are made up of contradictions, but there are special things (causes) that distinguish one thing from another. One’s perception of the particular leads to the general, and one’s perception of the general leads to the particular, in a cyclical development. Mao also explains that as contradictions develop, we must comprehensively analyze the contradictions and their aspects at each stage of development in concrete terms, including their linkages. A contradiction consists of a principal contradiction and a secondary contradiction, and similarly the aspect of a contradiction consists of a principal aspect and a secondary aspect. One principal contradiction plays a decisive role at all stages, and the nature of things is defined by the principal aspect. However, this is not fixed—the two forces of the contradiction, i.e., principal and secondary contradiction and the principal and secondary aspects of the contradiction are mutually transposed. This “structure” is illustrated in Fig. 1. Not all of these contradictions are antagonistic; some are non-antagonistic, but in some cases the antagonistic can be turned into the non-antagonistic and vice versa. Here, too, contradictions are mutually transposable.

3

Wang Ming’s real name is Chen Shaoyu. He took lead for a time, but later fell out of favor with Mao Zedong and was ousted. 4 The term “bagu” refers to the stereotyped format for writing answers for imperial examinations in traditional China.

1 The Structure of “On Contradiction” and “On Practice”

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Fig. 1 Structure and transformation of contradictions: Mao’s model

Next, let me look at the essay “On Practice.” What Mao was trying to insist on in this essay can be summarized in the following two points. First, whether a perception or theory is correct is not determined by subjectivity, but by the results of objective, social practice. In May 1963, Mao asked: “Where does the correct thought of a person come from? Does it fall from the heavens? No. Is it inherent in one’s own mind? No. The correct thought of a person comes only from social practice. It comes only from the three practices of production struggle, class struggle, and scientific experiment in society … The correct thought representing the advanced class, once grasped by the masses, transforms into a material force that remodels society and the world”.5

This theoretical criterion was also used by Deng Xiaoping after Mao’s death to oust Hua Guofeng of the “the whatevers” ( fanshipai), those who insist that everything Mao said was right: “The only criterion for verifying truth is practice.” In other words, if the policies and measures used are effective and therefore “correct,” then the theory, ideology, and perception on which the policies and measures were constructed can be judged to be “correct.” This is a very simple and naive logic. Mao thus said, “Generally speaking, what succeeded was right, and what failed was wrong”. This logic is easy to understand, but as we will see later, it had a big pitfall. Second, the process of discovering such truth is a dynamic process that begins with practice, sublimates into perceptual knowledge (ganxingde renshi), is analyzed and theorized, thus raising it to rational knowledge (lixingde renshi) which is then referred back into practice. As social practice is carried out, certain sensations and impressions occur repeatedly. Then, according to Mao, a sudden leap in the cognitive process occurs in people’s brains, and a new concept is born. This is not a phenomenon of something perceived by perceptual knowledge, but the essence of 5

This statement can be found in Mao Zedong Wenji (Collected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 8, 1993.

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something perceived by rational knowledge. What is even more important is that from the rational knowledge thus obtained, another leap is made, that is, to revolutionary practice. We must make the leap from the rational knowledge of grasping the laws of the world to the practice of transforming the world. The discovery of the above truth is obtained in the process of an upward movement consisting of an infinite series of practices: From practice to perceptual knowledge, to practice, to rational knowledge, to (higher) perceptual knowledge, and to (higher) practice (see Fig. 2). Therefore, according to Mao, any theory that is not accompanied by practice and that is not connected to practice is nothing more than empty theory. In this sense, it is not wrong to regard Mao as a pragmatist. Deng Xiaoping is well-known as a pragmatist among Chinese leaders, but Mao was a pragmatist in a different sense from Deng. Or, it may not be wrong to say that Deng’s pragmatism was inherited from Mao (see Chap. 10). Mao’s favorite idiom, “seek truth from facts,” is the very essence of his pragmatism. This theory of practice can also be used as “scientific” support for his contradiction theory. In other words, if it is objectively admitted, or if it has actually happened, that the world consists of a structure of various contradictions, and that changes in circumstances transform principal contradictions into secondary contradictions, and secondary contradictions into principal contradictions, then this becomes truth and science. If the revolutionary struggle, whether real or fictitious, is regarded as

Fig. 2 Structure of knowledge and its development through practice: Mao’s model

2 Practicality of Mao’s Philosophy

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successful through the “scientific” application of such a contradiction theory, then Mao’s philosophy goes beyond mere ideology and approaches absolute truth, the “Word of God.” These philosophical discussions made reference not only to the theories and discourses of Karl Marx, Friedlich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and others, but also to Chinese classics, concrete examples from everyday life, and even to experiences from the revolutionary struggle, so as to make them accessible to the soldiers and young people who attended Mao’s lectures. Some of them, perhaps most of them, must have been hearing the terms “contradiction” and “dialectics” as philosophical concepts for the first time. However, it is likely that many of them became more familiar with thought and philosophy after listening to Mao’s lectures.

2 Practicality of Mao’s Philosophy One of the things that made this philosophy accessible and appealing to the students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College was that Mao’s arguments were often connected to the experience of the revolutionary struggle. They must have felt the relevance of Mao’s every word as it linked with their own history and current situation, and would have been moved and perhaps even fascinated by him. In his contradiction theory, Mao teaches that there are various kinds of contradictions and that both sides of contradictions have their own characteristics and cannot be treated in a uniform manner. He argues in “On Contradiction”: “In the course of China’s bourgeois democratic revolution, where the conditions are exceedingly complex, there exist the contradiction between the various oppressed classes of Chinese society and imperialism, between all the oppressed classes in Chinese society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of the people and feudalism, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other hand, the contradiction between the various reactionary ruling groups, and so on.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 1, p. 322)

However, what Mao mostly wanted to emphasize to the students was the necessity of a strategic shift in the revolutionary struggle, one that revolved around the second cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CPC that happened to start in 1936. Mao says that: “In the period of its first cooperation with the Communist Party, the Kuomintang stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism and was therefore anti-imperialist; on the other, it stood in contradiction to the great masses of the people within the country although in words it promised many benefits to the working people, in fact it gave them little or nothing … In the present period of Anti-Japanese War, the Kuomintang stands in contradiction to Japanese imperialism and wants cooperation with the Communist Party, without however relaxing its struggle against the Communist Party and the people or its oppression of them. As for the Communist Party, it has always, in every period, stood with the great masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism, but in the present period of the Anti-Japanese War, it has

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1 Mao Zedong’s Philosophy and Thought: Pitfalls of His “Contradiction” … adopted a moderate policy towards the Kuomintang and the domestic feudal forces because the Kuomintang has expressed itself in favor of resisting Japan”. (ibid., pp. 327–328)

In other words, during the first KMT-CPC cooperation (1924–27), the principal contradiction was between imperialism and the domestic masses, and the contradiction between the Communist Party along with the masses and the Kuomintang was a secondary contradiction, but after the KMT-CPC conflict in 1927, the conflict between the two parties became the principal contradiction. However, as the Manchurian incident in 1931 and the Japanese invasion of China developed and accelerated, and in particular when the Xi’an incident of December 1936 brought about a renewed collaboration between the KMT and the CPC, the conflict between Japan (imperialism) and the domestic masses turned into a principal contradiction, while the conflict between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang turned into a secondary contradiction. The KMT’s alliance with the CPC was interpreted at this point as the principal but positive contradiction, while the oppression of the Communist Party and the domestic masses was interpreted as a negative but secondary contradiction. Some of the soldiers of the Red Army (Communist Army), who had fought Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang at great cost and had been burning to overthrow them, might have been hesitant to enter a new KMT-CPC cooperation. The above interpretation, then, must have been very effective in convincing them. It is known that these two philosophical essays of Mao Zedong were written to criticize dogmatism within the Party. The note to “On Practice” by the Mao Zedong Selected Works Publication Committee states that “‘On Practice’ was written in order to express the subjective errors of dogmatism and empiricism in the Party, and especially the error of dogmatism from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of knowledge” (ibid., p. 296). The note to “On Contradiction” also states that it was “written to overcome the serious error of dogmatist thinking to be found in the Party” (ibid., p. 311). Dogmatism, for example, the idea of interpreting and applying Marxist classics without regard to Chinese reality, was unacceptable to Mao, who monopolized the right of interpretation of Marxism in China. Therefore, these two philosophical essays were an extremely effective and useful means of unifying ideas within the Party and establishing Mao’s authority as well as power. These philosophies, especially the contradiction theory, were useful to Mao in another sense as well. That is, if contradiction is absolute and combative, then this theory can naturally be applied to the detection of “enemies” within the country and within the Party. The criticism and impeachment of Mao’s critics, whether inside or outside the Party, which would later appear, were facilitated by this theory. In the 1960s when Yang Xianzhen, director of the Central Party School, developed a theory that “two are combined to form one (heer eryi),” Mao criticized him by saying that “one is divided to form two (yifen weier).” He stated: “It is not Marxism-Leninism that always emphasizes unity and concord but not the struggle. Unity is possible only through struggle. The same is true for the Party, the class, and the people. Unity is transformed into struggle, and once again it unites” (“The Case of Dialectics,” in Takeuchi (ed.), 1975, p. 135).

3 Evaluation of Mao’s Philosophy and Thought

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When one reflects on it, Mao’s life was a series of “struggles.” Even after the major struggles, i.e., the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War against the KMT, were over, Mao continued to struggle against “anti-Party elements” and “counterrevolutionary groups,” and for a long period of time there was no peace or tranquility. This was a necessary “practice” to realize Mao’s ideals and consolidate his power.

3 Evaluation of Mao’s Philosophy and Thought The Communist Party and government have held Mao Zedong’s philosophy and thought at their core and revered them as if they were the Bible. Although the official assessment has changed over time, the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party”6 of 1945 announced: “Comrade Mao Tse-tung has creatively applied the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, the acme of human wisdom, to China, a large semi-feudal and semi-colonial country in which the peasantry constitutes the bulk of the masses and the immediate task is to fight against imperialism and feudalism, a country with a vast area and a huge population, where the situation is extremely complicated and the struggle is extremely hard, and he has brilliantly developed Lenin and Stalin’s theories on the colonial and semi-colonial questions as well as Stalin’s theory concerning the Chinese Revolution.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 3, pp. 177– 178)

Although Stalin’s name is emphasized here because his influence was still strong at the time, Mao is seen as having creatively developed the “scientific theory” of Marxism-Leninism so that it could be applied to China. Since Marxism-Leninism was regarded as a scientific theory, Mao’s theory (philosophy) that developed it may be seen as even more “scientific.” Since the beginning of the reform and opening-up in 1978, the official evaluation of Mao’s philosophy and thought has changed under the general understanding that the era of class struggle is over and the era of economic construction has come. However, the status of his thought as “science” has not changed. “Based on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, he theoretically summed up a series of original experiences in China’s long-term revolutionary practice and formed a scientific ideology suited to China’s situation. This is the product of combining the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution—Mao Zedong thought” (“Comrade Mao Zedong’s Historical Status and Mao Zedong Thought,” in Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenum (Part Two), People’s Publishing House, 1982). It is not surprising that many scholars in China hold up and subscribe to Mao’s philosophy (ideology). Bound by ideological constraints, it is difficult to ideologically criticize Mao, the founding father of the People’s Republic of China. A typical example is Shi Zhongquan, who discusses the creativity and usefulness of these two 6

This resolution was issued at the enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the CPC Sixth Central Committee in April 1945.

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philosophical essays from many angles (Shi 1991). However, it is not impossible to find some who are more critical, even if only partially, of Mao’s philosophical essays. Yong Tao, for example, criticized the major flaw in “On Contradiction” to be its emphasis on the philosophy of struggle. He argued that emphasizing struggle, denying identity, and confusing contradictions with different characteristics only serve to intensify contradictions through antagonistic means, which he believed to be “in violation of dialectics and unsuitable for building a harmonious socialist society”, but we have to remind that this criticism was made just during the era of Hu Jintao, who advocated for a harmonious society (Yong 2007). However, even critics like him highly value “On Contradiction” and “On Practice” as providing philosophical justification for the Sinicization of Marxism and the effective application of Marxist philosophy to the Chinese Revolution. Among foreign scholars, there is no shortage of those who hold a high regard for Mao Zedong’s philosophy and thought. For instance, Jin Sikai argued: “Mao Zedong early on harbored skepticism toward dialectics summarized as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’ and presented a dialectics that made the law of the contradiction of unity and struggle the sole fundamental law … Its significance is extremely profound and represents a transformation of dialectics not seen since Hegel.” (Jin 1977, p. 103)

Furthermore, he highly praised Mao’s theoretical achievements, saying that in the process of “leaping” from perceptual to rational knowledge, Mao clarified points that Marx and others had not made clear. In fact, Mao himself stated: “Neither Marx nor Engels clearly stated the reason for the leap from practice to sensibility, and then from sensibility to reason. Lenin did not state it clearly either.” (“Discourse on Sakata’s Thesis,” August 1964, Takeuchi (ed.) 1975, p. 117)

Thus, from Jin’s point of view Mao’s dialectical philosophy was really a development since Georg Hegel, and even if only partially, it showed a new development that Marx, Engels, and Lenin had never achieved. A similar statement was made by a Japanese Marxist philosopher Matsumura Kazuto. He said: “The impact of ‘On Contradiction’ on me was more than I expected. In a word, my impression was: This is a new stage of material dialectics. In his contradiction theory, Mao Zedong brought a new treasure to the treasury of Marxist philosophy, in the theory of dialectics itself as well.” (Matsumura 1953, pp. 4–5)

Commenting on “Mao Zedong Thought,” a famous Japanese Sinologist Takeuchi Minoru regards “the combination of Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese Revolution, and the way of thinking of what is manifested in the very way of that combination, as original and added to Marxism-Leninism” (Takeuchi (ed.) 1975, p. 2). He evaluates Mao’s theory as a development of Marxism-Leninism, too. There are many discussions on Maoism in Europe and the United States. Here I would like to introduce the opinions and evaluations of two leading Mao Zedong researchers. First is Stewart Schram, who denies that Mao Zedong’s ideas contributed to the development of Marxism as a system, arguing that Marx would not have included him amongst his “apostles” and declines to see him as an orthodox Marxist.

4 Tricks and Pitfalls of Mao’s Philosophy: My Interpretation

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Yet, he regards Mao as “one of the major Marxists of our time in terms of his contribution to history, and places him as a Leninist in terms of his work in the revolutionary movement” and emphasizes his contributions to Leninism, including his discovery of the peasantry as a subject of the movement (Schram 1977). Benjamin Schwartz, on the other hand, offers a very telling assessment. According to him, “On Contradiction” illustrates “Mao’s ongoing obsession with conflict not only as a propulsive force of history but almost as a good in itself,” and “On Practice” illustrates “his Baconian inductionist view of natural science … as well as his aversion to the authority of mere book-learning and abstract intellection.” He then asks, “Do these works provide a key to Mao’s life as a political actor?” and concludes, “Mao himself seemed to believe that this entire dialectical and epistemological apparatus could be applied correctly only by men of superior insight” (Schwartz 1977). It may be Nakajima Mineo who takes the harshest view of Mao’s philosophy. He criticizes the essay “On Practice,” pointing out that we do not know what the “sudden leap” in knowledge is, and “in fetishizing practice, the essay brings about a downgrading of thought and theoretical laziness, on the one hand, and the danger of falling into a commonplace ‘practice-first doctrine’ on the other” (Nakajima 1964, p. 55). He also warns that “to seek the criterion of truth only in practice is to reject the constant search for new possibilities (for example, the unproven possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism), and … may even lose sight of the creative orientation of Marxism” (ibid., p. 56). Nakajima’s criticism of “On Contradiction” is also harsh. He asserts: “Mao Zedong lacks an understanding that ‘contradiction itself’ simultaneously produces abundant vitality without limits, as Marx and Engels demonstrated. Due to his lack of insight into the internal structure of contradiction, he perceives it only in a very external, technical, and mechanistic manner”. (ibid., p. 57)

From my point of view, however, Mao certainly emphasizes that “contradictions” create dynamic development, which is what Mao understood to be “producing an endless supply of rich vitality.” The problem is not with the “external, technical, mechanistic” aspects of such contradictions. Both Mao’s contradiction theory and practice theory contain major tricks or pitfalls that have been overlooked, as will be discussed below.

4 Tricks and Pitfalls of Mao’s Philosophy: My Interpretation Nakajima contrasts the two essays by Mao Zedong with the textbook Dialectical Materialism Course published by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1931 for party and other schools, and points out that they were teaching materials that Mao made great use of in writing his “On Practice” and “On Contradiction” (Nakajima 1964, pp. 51–52). In reality, as Takeuchi noted, these two essays seem to have been assigned as part of Mao’s “Lecture Syllabus on Dialectical Materialism (handout

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outline),” which was based on excerpts from Soviet philosophy in the 1930s (Takeuchi (ed.) 1975, p. 244). Even within China, some researchers have questioned Mao’s “originality” in these philosophical essays. For example, Lu Dingxue speculates that Chen Boda, then Mao’s academic secretary, may have read Li Da’s Shehuixue Dagang (Outline of Sociology) (1935) and drafted “On Contradiction” (Lu 2011). Questioning the “originality” of Mao’s philosophy is an issue to be taken up separately, but here I will focus on the intrinsic qualities of Mao’s philosophy and the theoretical flaws, or rather certain tricks, latent in it. I see several major pitfalls, tricks, or loopholes in Mao’s philosophy from a logical point of view. The first pitfall involves “seeking the criterion of truth only in practice,” as pointed out by Nakajima. As anyone familiar with the complexity of social phenomena can recognize, Mao’s logic is fraught with the following problems. Suppose a person adopts policy A1 and practices it and successfully achieved the expected result B. Then, according to Mao’s logic, A1 is evaluated as “right” or correct. This is because practice is the highest and greatest standard of truth for him. However, it is not necessarily true that result B is entirely due to factor A1. Put it differently, B may have been caused by a combination of many other factors. This is generally the case with social phenomena. Even if A1 was involved at the time, it may or may not have been the primary factor, and other factor A2 may or may not have been the primary factor. In extreme cases, A1 may not have practically worked at all, and A2, A3, etc. may have acted as main actors. However, according to Mao’s criterion, if there is a means (practice) called A1 and a result called B, then A1 is always the cause of B. In the case of the military tactics in which Mao Zedong excelled, the causality relationship is relatively simple. For example, if, after launching a surprise guerrilla attack on an enemy base, the enemy dispersed, resulting in victory, then the surprise guerrilla attack is A1 and the enemy’s dispersal is B, meaning that the attack was effective. In other words, the operation was “correct.” However, in the case of social phenomena, including politics and economics, things are not so simple. For example, suppose that one year, landlords in a certain district were forcefully seized and eventually killed, and all their property was confiscated then redistributed to poor or landless peasants through a land reform. Suppose that the average income of the peasants in that area increases in the following year, would we then conclude that the land reform was effective in motivating the general peasantry to raise productivity? Upon closer inspection, perhaps the weather that year was very good and the crops just happened to grow well. Probably the weather just compensated for the negative effects of the fear-induced land reform. Using the previous formula, where B is the average farmer’s income, A1 is the land reform, and A2 is the weather, we might interpret the positive effect of A2 as outweighing the negative effect of A1. Undoubtedly, A3 may be the result of technological progress (e.g., introduction of new varieties) or A4 may be the result of an increase in farm capital, which may or may not be related to land reform. In the social sciences, causality cannot be strictly determined without very stringent conditions and assumptions. Next, as it relates to the current discussion, who will judge what is “correct” and “right”? Mao argues that truth is only confirmed and obtained through practice.

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What is the “truth,” then? Who is to judge? In his “Outline of Lectures on Dialectical Materialism” referred to above, Mao Zedong stated: “Truth is objective, relative, and absolute. This is the view of truth in dialectical materialism.”

Concerning the objectivity of truth, he pointed out: “The material world, which objectively exists, is the sole source of the content of our knowledge or concepts, and there is no other source. Only idealists claim that knowledge or concepts originate independently from subjective consciousness, denying the fundamental principle of materialism, that knowledge or concepts are generated subjectively, and that no objective (truth) is needed, and therefore they acknowledge subjective truth while denying objective truth. However, this does not conform to reality.” (Mao Zedong Collection, Vol. 6, p. 295)

However, whether in the case of natural phenomena and natural science, or at least in the realm of social phenomena and social science, is it not ultimately the subjectivity and value judgment of an individual or group that determines or certifies what is right or correct, whether a certain policy is right or correct, or whether it is the truth? More precisely, one subjectively judges proved whether it was effective in light of the criteria determined by that individual or group. Usually, objective B is set with certain criteria, and the correctness (effectiveness) of A is judged by whether means A achieves that objective under certain subjectively determined assumptions. In the case of a battle, such a decision may be made relatively objectively. If the enemy raises the white flag and surrenders, we can objectively conclude that the battle is won. However, if, after a certain period, the own army is forced to withdraw from the areas it has taken, the battle may not necessarily be considered won in the long run. It may be tactically correct, but strategically wrong. In the previous example, many landlords were killed in China’s land reform as we will see in Chap. 37 but was it really the “right” policy to kill them in light of the original purpose of land reform? From Mao’s subjective point of view, it was indeed correct. This kind of rule by fear was convenient and effective in reducing the resentment of the poor and of tenant farmers who had been “oppressed” by the landlords and thus establishing the CPC power in the countryside. But by the subjective and value standards of many sensible people, Mao’s policy is wrong. This is because the main purpose of land reform was to give land to landless peasants or tenant farmers, and above all to motivate them to increase agricultural production, and raise the overall income of the peasantry. Therefore, the correctness of the policy should be judged by whether it was effective considering this purpose. As pointed out in Chap. 3, a policy is said to be “efficient” if it produces more effects with fewer sacrifices. In the cases of Taiwan, Japan, and other countries, more benign land reform was possible and more efficient for the stability of the regime from the long-term perspective. Mao Zedong, however, had a different view. He believed that many peasants were poor because they had been exploited by landlords and rich peasants, and that if the latter were overthrown and power given to ordinary peasants, production would 7

It was Mao Zedong who said, “Landlords must be killed, but not too many, for unlike a Chinese chive, a human head does not grow back after it is cut off.” See Chap. 3.

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expand and they would become rich. Using the previous formula, if B was to increase peasants’ income and lift them out of poverty, A1 was to overthrow and eliminate the power of the landlords and rich peasants. Moreover, from the point of view of Mao, who was bound by the class struggle theory, the landowners were members of the reactionary forces, and if they were not physically eliminated, there was no telling when they would return. Consequently, the newly liberated peasants had to repress them and, in some cases, kill them. B has two objectives: If B1 is to increase peasant income, B2 is to gain power and stability in the rural areas, and A1 is necessary to achieve B1 and B2. As this example illustrates, the effectiveness (correctness) of a policy depends on its objectives as well as on the value judgment of those objectives. Nevertheless, this practice-based truth standard was convenient for Mao. Because we can conclude that China won the revolution → because of Mao’s leadership → that leadership was based on Mao’s theory and philosophy → therefore his theory and philosophy were proven to be “correct,” or Mao discovered the historical law of the Chinese Revolution → then his philosophy and thought is “science.” Thus, his authority was elevated to the point that no one could challenge it, and his theory and philosophy became the common “truth” for the Chinese people. However, if we include factors other than Mao’s leadership in the victory of the Chinese Revolution, such as the historical coincidence of the Japanese invasion of the Chinese Mainland since 1931, the above logic may collapse, or at least should be revised.8 As Mao himself has candidly admitted, the success of the Chinese Revolution was largely dependent on the Japanese invasion of Mainland China. Third, as noted above, the heart of his practice theory is the endless back-and-forth between sensibility and reason, from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge, from rational knowledge to perceptual knowledge. Let us take the example of a relationship between two persons who are not emotionally compatible at first, but through repeated contact and interaction come to understand each other, come to appreciate each other’s strengths, and may even deepen their friendship emotionally. However, as the contact between the two deepens, the emotional conflict becomes more intense, and the relationship may deteriorate to the point where the two eventually hit each other. This suggests that it is not a process of perceptual knowledge → rational knowledge, but a pattern of good perceptual knowledge → bad perceptual knowledge or bad rational knowledge. In the first place, is there really any objective standard or basis for what constitutes the rational or perceptual? It is not necessarily true that a relationship between the two persons is rational if it improves, and perceptual if it deteriorates. It is possible for an emotional conflict to develop into coldhearted murderous behavior. Fourth, and closely related to the above points, is that Mao’s contradiction theory hides a major trick, a deep pitfall, that has not received much attention so far. That is, he did not clarify the mechanism by which the mutual transformation of contradictions and their aspects, i.e., the transformation of principal contradictions into 8

To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasize that I am not ignoring Mao’s tremendous contributions to the Chinese Revolution. As I will later point out, I cite his revolutionary achievements as the primary basis for his charisma (see Chap. 10).

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secondary contradictions, principal aspects into secondary aspects, and vice versa, occurs, and under what criteria it is judged. No matter how much I read in that relatively short essay, I could not find any explanation on this point. While Nakajima Mineo raised concerns about the concept of “sudden change and leap in cognition” within “On Practice,” there is a much more significant trick embedded in this contradiction theory. Again, let me consider the social phenomenon. What or who considers a contradiction and its aspects to be “principal” or “secondary”? When we get to this point, we can understand why Mao Zedong did not clarify the mechanism of contradiction-transformation and its definitive criteria. If we follow his actions and statements, we find that in the end, Mao himself determined the criteria for his judgment. If Mao called someone an enemy, he or she was an enemy; if he called someone a friend, he or she was a friend; if he called someone a counterrevolutionary, he or she was counterrevolutionary. This can be demonstrated by many examples. I will discuss them in detail in Chap. 4, but let me take as a typical example Mao’s speech of February 1957 entitled “On the Correct Handling of Internal Contradictions among the People” (hereinafter referred to as “internal contradictions”). He admonished that all social classes, ranks, and groups who agree and participate in the project of socialist construction fall within the scope of the ‘people’,9 and that the internal problems among the ‘people’ should not be solved by violent methods and he urged intellectuals to offer constructive criticism of the Party “to help the Communist Party.” However, as the initially hesitant intellectuals and students began to criticize the Party, the circle of criticism gradually widened, and voices of criticism of the regime began to rise. Mao finally lost his patience and launched a counterattack, and the “Anti-Rightist-Struggle.” A turning point in China’s modern political history unfolded from this moment. Let me examine the trick or pitfall contained in this “internal contradictions” theory. According to Mao’s logic, if one criticizes socialism or the Party, and if one does not agree with the project of socialist construction, then such a person is transformed from the ‘people’ to the “enemy,” and thus the “internal contradictions among the ‘people’” is transformed into an “antagonistic contradiction.” In other words, the methods of criticism, self-criticism, persuasion, and education were not applied to them, but, instead, methods of repression were employed. Those who voiced criticism at the time were classified as “enemies” even though they never intended to “rebel against the socialist revolution and regard socialist construction as hostile.” Since they were not capitalists, they could not be called the bourgeoisie, but were classified as the “enemy class” anyway because their ideology was recognized as bourgeois. To put it simply, the enemy constitutes those who oppose Mao, and ‘people’ consist of those who follow him. Tangential to this point, there was another pitfall in the “internal contradictions” theory that undermined the ‘people’. The content of Mao’s address in the subsequent Supreme State Council in March differed considerably from the transcript

9

During the Mao era the term “people” carried a specific meaning. Therefore, I use ‘people’ to distinguish it from ordinary “people”. See Chap. 4 for more details.

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of his speech published on June 19 at the start of the Anti-Rightist-Struggle.10 In extreme cases, those who expressed their opinions and initiated movements in line with the “internal contradictions” speech in February 1957 as well as Mao’s subsequent statements, were criticized on the grounds of the official “internal contradictions” document published in June of the same year. It is almost as if the principle of “non-retroactivity of laws” is being disregarded, but for Mao Zedong, it is simply a case of “contradictions undergoing transformation.” Those who were considered rightists complained, “How can Chairman Mao accuse me of being anti-Party and counterrevolutionary? I have just criticized the Party because he asked me to criticize it. Wasn’t this a conspiracy by Chairman Mao in the first place?” Having heard such a complaint, Mao arrogantly declared, “It’s not a (secret) conspiracy (yinmou), but an open conspiracy (yangmou).” In the first stage, they bait and lure, essentially “luring the snake out of its hole (yinshe chudong).” In the second stage, they capture and strike, meaning that what was initially a secondary contradiction in the first stage transforms into the principal contradiction in the second stage. In this sense, the contradiction theory was an incredibly useful weapon for Mao. It is unfortunate that those who could not keep up with Mao’s logic, and who earnestly believed in his initial statements, but criticized the system or voiced their opinions, found themselves in a pitiable position. The same situation had occurred fifteen years earlier during the Rectification Movement (zhengfeng yundong) in Yan’an. In 1942, Mao Zedong himself wrote the “Decision on the Relationship between Communist Party Members and NonParty People (Draft)” which proclaimed that “Any non-Party member who wishes to cooperate with our Party has the right to criticize our Party, Party members, and cadres. Except for malicious attacks aimed at destroying the unity in the resistance, whether in written or oral form or any other form, our Party and Party members should attentively listen to all well-intentioned criticisms.” He further cautioned that the Party and its members should not attack “just criticisms” (Gao 2000, p. 318). However, when a popular writer Wang Shiwei criticized the Party’s ideology, he was condemned as a “Trotskyite,” arrested, and later executed in secret. The question was how to measure the “goodwill” of “well-intentioned criticism” and the “correctness” of “correct criticism.” Ultimately, only Mao Zedong had the right to interpret these concepts. As quoted above, Mao stressed that “one is divided to form two” is absolute, while “two is combined to form one” is temporary and relative. If this logic is true, then, China should be divided into ethnic republics (then federated or unified), and the Communist Party should be divided into multiple parties (and then federated). However, such a split, would weaken and undermine power, which is what Mao was most wary of and avoided. Opposition and unity are relative concepts by nature, and neither one is always more important than the other.

10

See Chap. 4 for a description of how the “internal contradictions” text of February and that of June differed and how shocking that difference was to the intellectuals.

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Certainly, Mao Zedong was conscious of the possibility of being criticized for the “errors” in the implementation of his theory, and had prepared a loophole. Namely, he stated: “Errors are, after all, inevitable … The correct line is formulated in opposition to the incorrect line, and the two are in contradiction and unity … The viewpoint that any errors can be avoided or that there are no errors except for what is correct goes against Marxism-Leninism”. (“The Case of Dialectics,” in Takeuchi (ed.) 1975, p. 138)

According to this argument, he admits that even he may make mistakes, and these mistakes are a necessary measure for finding the “right” way. Nevertheless, this loophole is a dead end, because in the end it is Mao Zedong alone who can decide whether one is “right” or “wrong.” These tricks and theoretical pitfalls in Mao’s philosophy often became real and deadly pitfalls for those who opposed him, but they also became pitfalls for Mao himself. For example, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) policies which resulted in a one of the greatest tragedies in history, were “proven” wrong by the very practice (see Chap. 5). He presented the following philosophical argument to the mainstream or passive factions within the Party who opposed rash advance policies: “Dialectics studies the mainstream vs. the tributary, essence vs. phenomena. Contradictions consist of principal and secondary contradictions, and the past anti-rash advance policies, in other words, failed to grasp the mainstream and essence, resolved secondary contradictions as principal contradictions, considered the tributary as the mainstream, and failed to grasp essential phenomena.” (Li 1999b, p. 277)

In other words, those who opposed the GLF mistook the principal contradiction for the secondary contradiction, whereas those for it, not Mao particularly, correctly grasped the principal contradiction and could distinguish between the mainstream and the essence. The tragic failure of the GLF movement, however, revealed who had really mistaken the principal contradiction for the secondary contradiction. Hu Feng (see Chap. 2), Peng Dehuai (see Chap. 6), and Liu Shaoqi (see Chap. 8) are just a few of the many persons who were criticized by Mao and eventually lost their lives. Most of their reputations were rehabilitated (pingfan) after Mao’s death, and it was officially declared that Mao’s judgment on them was “wrong.” Exactly the same situation emerged in China as in the Soviet Union, where many of those purged by Iosif Stalin were subsequently restored to honor after his death. This demonstrates how the autocratic judgment and self-righteous decisions of a single leader can be perilous, as evidenced by the facts. As mentioned previously, Schwartz pointed out that Mao’s philosophy could be used correctly “only by men of superior insight.” If we replace “men of superior insight” with Mao Zedong himself, Schwartz has beautifully described the essence of Mao’s philosophy. If we extend the notion “men of superior insight” to refer to the elite,11 then, although Mao repeatedly emphasized the “mass line,” elitism is ultimately at the basis of his thought. As Chap. 3 explains, the masses were not the 11

The term elite here does not necessarily mean a small number of highly educated and well-born people. It is used in the sense of “selected people or group,” or “jingying” in Chinese.

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final decision-makers in Maoist China, but were merely objects or, much worse, just tools to be manipulated by the elite (Party members and leaders, especially Mao during his era). Politically, his views have been singled out. In 1943, the CPC Political Bureau passed a resolution giving Mao “final decision-making authority” over the Party. Therefore, no one could oppose him without reversing that resolution.12 Since even top-level leaders such as Political Bureau and Central Committee members could not oppose him, there was no way that lower-level cadres or the general public could challenge him directly. What was the basis of his subjective criteria for determining the truth? Several explanations must be possible. One is his theory of practice. He was proud of the fact that his own strategies and tactics were proven “correct” since he succeeded in founding the country, while the lines of the former CPC leaders such as Wang Ming, Li Lisan, Zhang Guotao,13 etc. who had once become political opponents of Mao during the revolutionary period, were all judged to have been “wrong.” But the more essential and fundamental bases of his criteria were his intense authoritarian, power-oriented aims and the class struggle theory employed to achieve them (see Chap. 3). This theory of class struggle, which was later extended into the “theory of continuous revolution” when considered closely was full of “pitfalls” like his philosophy, yet no one could resist this theory. It was just before the Cultural Revolution when he felt most threatened by a loss of power (see Chap. 8). Conversely, the logic, policies, and means suitable for maintaining and expanding his power were the ultimate criteria of truth for him. Thus, he was able to alter the standard of truth and its original principles in a very pragmatic way as much as he wanted so as to achieve that end. There is another important basis of his subjective criteria that cannot be ignored. It is the “scientific accuracy” of Marxism-Leninism or its “universal principles” mentioned above. Since the principles are “universal,” they can be used anywhere, anytime, for anything, as if they were a universal scale. His opponents were brought to their knees once they were simply told, “Marx talked such and such, Lenin wrote such and such.” Needless to say, these principles and truths were only Mao’s interpretation. Besides, Mao himself had a strong pride since his youth that he was the one who knew the truth.14 However, this is not Mao’s fault alone. Many Marxists and activists around the world, including those in China, who have espoused Marxism as real science and 12

After the reform and opening-up, a similar privilege was secretly granted to Deng Xiaoping. When Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing just before the Tiananmen Square incident, the Party secretary, Zhao Ziyang, who was subsequently purged, leaked this secret to him and this act was listed as one of Zhao’s “charges.” 13 Li Lisan became the party leader in 1930 and led the uprising of urban workers, but failed and subsequently fell from power in the Party. Zhang Guotao, alongside Mao Zedong, was a Central Committee member at the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1921 and participated in the Long March, but later came into conflict with Mao and defected to the Kuomintang. 14 On the evening of July 11, in the middle of the Lushan Conference, that is, just before Mao was outraged by Peng Dehuai’s letter (see Chap. 6), Mao joined a peaceful gathering with Li Rui and others and confessed, “Before I was 40 years old, I was short-tempered, feeling that justice and

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Marx’s socialism as “scientific socialism,” should bear some of the responsibility for this sort of erroneous belief. What is to be stressed is that almost everyone, from high-level officials such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping to the unnamed common people, believed in Mao’s philosophy and ideology, unaware of the pitfalls and contradictions inherent in his thought, and assumed that “Chairman Mao is always correct.” This created a climate and a system in which Mao was virtually deified during the Mao era. Wang Hui, a Tianjin City’s cadre during the Cultural Revolution, looks back on the past and admits with a feeling of regret: “Almost everyone in Tianjin was a Maoist. Almost everyone thought that Mao was absolutely right, that he had made no mistakes, and that he could not make mistakes. If Mao Zedong said something was right, it was right; if he said something was wrong, it was wrong … An old leader and comrade-in-arms of Bo Yibo, a former Deputy Prime Minister who was criticized during the Cultural Revolution, losing his post, is said to have admonished Bo, ‘Never say what Chairman Mao talks is wrong, even if you think he is wrong. If you go home and reflect on that several times, you will gradually realize that Chairman Mao is right’.” (Wang 2013a, pp. 81–82; Wang 2013b, pp. 69–70)

Did Bo’s fellow soldier simply intend to advise him, “You cannot believe that Chairman Mao is wrong, but if you think about it carefully, you will gradually realize that you have been mistaken”? Probably not, in my view. It seems to me that what he really meant was, “Even if you know that Chairman Mao is wrong, you must believe wholeheartedly that he is absolutely right. Never say that the Chairman is wrong, even though your mouth is torn.” If that were the case, the thought would cease to be thought and become a mere religious doctrine. No doubt, Mao was the guru of a Marxist religion called Maoism. Marx is said to have spoken well-known words of wisdom, “Doubt everything!”15 but it was only Mao in China who could truly “doubt everything,” although he had never doubted himself. The consequences were pitiful and tragic for those who foolishly and honestly believed in such words of wisdom, and were left doubting even Chairman Mao, as well as his ideology and the system he had built in China.

truth were always in my hands. I am still short-tempered, though” (Li 1999a, p. 75). In fact, a few days later he exploded in anger before Peng. The point is, he believed that “justice and truth are always in his hands” not only before the age of 40, but throughout his life. 15 Marx, in practice, did not speak such words of wisdom, but it is undeniable that he strongly encouraged a critical attitude toward existing doctrine and authority.

Chapter 2

Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution?

Mao Zedong and Lu Xun, whether liked or disliked, were undoubtedly both outstanding “giants” representing twentieth century China. While Mao Zedong was a giant in Chinese and global politics, Lu Xun, often referred to as China’s Nikolai Gogol’, was a giant in the realm of modern Chinese literature and the arts. Lu Xun died relatively early, in 1936, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and the two men lived and worked in different areas, so they never met in person to discuss their views. Lu Xun did not associate with big politicians and did not directly speak out about Mao Zedong, but Mao, who was also involved in the literary and cultural sphere, knew Lu Xun’s work well. In his speech for the Anniversary Meeting of Lu Xun’s Death at the Northern Shaanxi Cadre Training School in October 1937, he commented as follows1 : “He is, as I see it, a first-class saint of China. If Confucius was a saint of feudal society, Lu Xun is a saint of the New China”. (“On Lu Xun,” Mao Zedong Collection, Vol. 5, p. 281)

Furthermore, in his speech “On New Democracy” in 1940, he called Lu Xun “the chief commander of China’s cultural revolution” and “a great thinker and revolutionary.” In his “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” in 1942 (hereinafter, referred to as the “Literary Talks”) he gave Lu Xun the highest praise. This may be because Lu Xun, for a man of literature, was full of fighting spirit and resistance. In modern China, a number of literary figures, artists, and writers emerged, some of whom remained active after the Chinese Revolution while coming to terms with the Communist regime. Some, like Ba Jin, a popular novelist as well as essayist, however, were subjected to a kangaroo court during the Cultural Revolution (CR), and some, like Lao She, a world-renowned novelist, committed suicide. Hu Feng, a famous literary critic discussed in this chapter, regained his honor after Mao’s death, but he was infuriated by Mao and was subjected to a fierce nationwide “criticism-campaign” 1

In this speech, Mao mistakenly believes that Kautsky, an Austrian of Czech descent who was active in Germany, was a Russian.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_2

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for being a member of a “counterrevolutionary conspiracy group.” Zhou Zuoren, Lu Xun’s younger brother and the renowned translator as well as essayist, endured a difficult life due to his collaboration with Japan during the wartime period, which led to a guilty verdict under the Nationalist government after the War. He was later released following the establishment of the New China, but lived a challenging life as result. In contrast, Lu Xun was never criticized by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) during this time. The reason was that he was revered as a “saint” by Mao Zedong. So what would have happened if Lu Xun had lived longer and stayed in revolutionary China after the founding of the country? Would he still be adored as a saint by the cadres and ordinary people, and would even Mao Zedong have bowed before Lu Xun and followed him as an apostle? One man boldly raised this hypothesis to Mao himself. It was Luo Jinan, a famous translator in China. In the summer of 1957, when Mao Zedong met with literary circles in Shanghai, Luo asked Mao, “If Lu Xun were alive today, what would have happened to him?” Mao did not ignore this bold question, and after a few moments of silent contemplation, replied: “My guess is that [Lu Xun] would still be writing even if he was locked up in prison, or he would be reasonable and remain silent. Having heard this harsh answer, Luo was so surprised that he was speechless”. (Zhang 2009, p. 14)

After all, the literary “saint” and the revolutionary political hero were unlikely to have gotten along given their different characters.2 Certainly, the anecdote is hypothetical,3 but the story sharply illuminates the essence of Mao Zedong’s character and his policy toward intellectuals. If Lu Xun had lived and remained in China even after the Chinese Revolution, he would certainly not have remained silent against the Communist regime, and his sharp tongue and combative critical spirit would surely have had Mao burst into a fit of rage at some point. On the other hand, when confronted with the 1955 Hu Feng incident, which is taken up in this chapter, and the 1957 Anti-Rightist Struggle, which will be the main subject of Chap. 4, it is likely that Lu Xun would have shared the anguish that many intellectuals experienced. Let me consider below why this is so and what might have angered Mao.

2

This story is taken from an autobiography (Zhou 2001) written by Lu Xun’s only son, Zhou Haiying, in which he wrote the following. “He (Luo Jinan) kept this in his heart and never revealed it to anyone. Only when Dr. Luo became very ill did he decide that this secret dialogue of decades ago needed to be made public and should not be taken to the grave, so he finally entrusted it all to one trusted student” (Zhou 2001, p. 371). Later, when Zhou Haiying attended a symposium in 1996, he heard it from that student. 3 Some argue that these hypotheses are meaningless (e.g., Marukawa 2010), but I believe that they are very effective as thought experiments in considering the character, behavior, and beliefs of the charismatic figure known as Mao Zedong.

1 Mao Zedong’s Fury with Liang Shuming

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Photo 2.1 Liang Shuming. The philosopher who had a heated confrontation with Mao Zedong. Source Baidu

1 Mao Zedong’s Fury with Liang Shuming When answering this hypothetical question, one of the most useful references is the relationship between Liang Shuming and Mao Zedong. Liang Shuming, known as “the last great Confucian of modern China,” was born in the same year as Mao, but he was already a professor at Peking University teaching Indian philosophy at the time that Mao came to Beijing from Hunan Province and worked as a humble clerk at the Peking University Library. Mao later self-deprecatingly described those days as follows (Photo 2.1): “My position was very low, and no one paid any attention to me. One of my jobs was to register the names of persons who came to the library to read the newspapers, and I did not exist for anybody. Among those who came to read the newspapers were the names of some well-known figures of the new cultural movement … I was very interested in them and wanted to talk to them about political and cultural issues, but they were all busy persons and did not have time to listen to the Southern Chinese dialect of one library assistant”.4

Liang may have possibly seen Mao in the library, but even for him, Mao’s existence at that time must have been unnoticeable. The two had met several times at the Beijing home of Yang Changji, Mao’s former teacher at the First Hunan Normal College, who later became a professor of philosophy at Peking University like Liang Shuming, but Liang did not remember him at all. At the time, Mao stayed at Yang’s home, taking care of Professor Yang’s visitors, but Professor Liang never paid any attention to the live-in clerk. The relationship between Mao and Liang is livelily and vividly described in a collection of essays 4

http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2011/07-05/3159225.shtml. Mao Zedong came from Hunan Province and his southern dialect was said to be difficult to understand.

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by Dai Qing (Dai 1990). The following is a description of their relationship, based mainly on Dai’s writings. Later in 1928, Liang Shuming gave up his position and honor as a professor at Peking University and began to immerse himself in practical activities especially the “Rural Construction Movement” which he had advocated in Shandong and Henan Provinces. Its aim was to build new farming villages and improve the lives of poor peasants. When this attempt was frustrated by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he participated in the formation of the Democratic League and attempted to create a third political force separate from the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and which gradually moved further from the Kuomintang and closer to the Communist Party. He even went to see Mao Zedong in Yan’an. After the founding of the New China, he was elected as a member of the Political Consultative Conference (hereinafter, PCC), a national united front organization formed by the Communist Party and several democratic parties. Mao, having become the leader of the liberation of the whole country, very politely invited Liang Shuming to his home soon after Communist China was founded. In January 1950, Mao Zedong called Liang Shuming to Zhongnanhai5 after his return from Moscow, where he had concluded the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, and together they had dinner and discussions. Since Liang had a consistent interest in rural issues, Mao suggested that he see what rural China was like now. Liang made a tour of rural villages in Shandong and Northeastern China, and was given a warm welcome in many places. Of course, this was not due to Liang’s fame or political power, but rather because Mao had informed local officials of Liang’s inspection tours. Later, at Mao’s suggestion, he made a tour inspecting the Sichuan Province’s villages to see the land reform that was underway throughout the country. After returning from Sichuan, Liang was invited by Mao to frankly express his opinions on the implementation of land reform in Sichuan. He told Mao about the problems he discovered there over dinner: “Our policy forbids the beating of landlords, but I witnessed severe violence during a struggle assembly. One landlord couple couldn’t endure the physical punishment and jumped into the river, committing suicide. This is a matter of grave concern”.

Mao responded to this view with a laugh, saying: “What you have said is happening in other provinces as well. But our general policy is to overthrow the landlords, distribute their fields and properties, but leave the landlords to their own devices, so that most landlords will find a way out and will not commit suicide or counterattack. The point is that the poor peasants and farm laborers have suffered oppression (by landlords) for so many years that once their anger is ignited, they have no inhibitions and beat and curse the landlords”. (ibid., p. 120)

This conversation highlights the vast difference between their views on land reform. They continued to meet several times a year until September 1953, 5

It is located next to the Imperial Palace, the seat of the Party and government, and Mao’s residence was there.

1 Mao Zedong’s Fury with Liang Shuming

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exchanging opinions on a variety of issues until finally they clashed head-on in September 1953. The year 1953 was a major turning point for China. Until then, the leadership had officially claimed (and the people agreed), that China was in a “New Democratic” stage, and that socialism was a long way off. In fact, at the PCC meeting in February 1953, Zhou Enlai called for the “establishment of a New Democratic order,” and was supported by Liu Shaoqi. What was meant by “New Democracy”? According to Mao Zedong, the world’s state systems are determined by the class nature of the regime and fall into one of the following three categories: (a) bourgeois dictatorships (as in the West), (b) proletarian dictatorships (as in the Soviet Union), and (c) republics with a coalition dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. The New China was seen to follow this third path, with its economy being a new type of democratic system that implements the “land equalization” advocated by Sun Yat-sen, “land to tillers,” and “moderate capitalism” (“On New Democracy,” 1940). Thus, the New Democracy was intended to incorporate the capitalists and merchants who cooperated with the Communist Party and the regime, and to gradually move toward socialism (Photo 2.2). However, perhaps due to the prospect of a truce in the Korean War (1950–1953), Mao Zedong presented in that year the “General Line for the Transitional Period” to promote socialist industrialization. Mao referred to the period between the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the basic completion of socialist transformation as the “transitional period,” and declared that he would implement three five-year plans during this period to achieve the basic completion of socialist

Photo 2.2 Land to tillers. During the land reform, poor and landless farmers rose up, while landlords and rich peasants were overthrown. The former gained land and moved up the social hierarchy, while the latter had most of their land confiscated and were relegated to a lower social caste. Source Baidu

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industrialization and transformation. To this end, state control of food, cotton, and other commodities was promoted. The central idea was to promote industrialization centered on heavy industry by providing the industrial sector with cheap agricultural products, so as to increase profits in the industrial sector, expand fiscal revenues, and increase savings and investment in the economy as a whole, which would then be invested in the heavy industrial sector (see Chap. 7 for more details), as was the case in the Soviet Union during the Stalin era. The collectivization of agriculture was an important policy tool for this purpose. Thus, in a sense, this total policy line amounted to an industrialization line at the expense of the rural areas and peasants. At the same time, a policy of “socialist transformation” of commerce and industry was implemented, specifically, the conversion of the private economy into one of public–private partnership or state ownership and collective ownership. Song Qingling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen, who was elevated to the position of Vice Chairperson of the State after the Chinese Revolution, wrote a letter to Mao Zedong in 1955, appealing to him as follows: “I don’t understand the socialist transformation of commerce and industry at all. The Communist Party should have at once guaranteed long-term coexistence for private commerce and industry, and profits for the merchants and industrialists. Isn’t that what you promised?” But Mao laughed off her criticism, saying, “Vice Chairperson Song’s opinion represents what the capitalists are saying”. (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 81; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 54)

By the way, after the General Line was proposed, Liang Shuming participated as an observer in the enlarged executive meeting of the National Committee of the PCC held from September 8 to 18, 1953. Also, from September 16 to 18, the 27th meeting of the People’s Government Central Committee was held, and the Beijing members of the PCC attended the meeting, where Liang was prompted to speak by Zhou Enlai, who was presiding over the meeting. He then made the following remarks: “Until now, China has been amid a revolution for nearly 30 years, and the Communist Party of China has always relied on the peasants and used the countryside as its base. However, after we entered the big cities (after liberation), the focus of our operations shifted to the cities, and cadres who had been trained by the peasants entered the cities, leaving the countryside untouched. Especially in the past few years, the lives of urban workers have rapidly improved, while the lives of rural peasants remain difficult, so peasants from all over the country have fled to the cities (including Beijing). The cities cannot accommodate them and are turning them away, creating a contradiction. Some even go so far as to say that the life of the worker is now in the ninth heaven ( jiutian) while the life of the peasant is in the ninth hell ( jiudi), and that there is a ‘difference between the ninth heaven and ninth hell’ [meaning they are as far apart as heaven and hell]”. (Dai 1990, pp. 127–128)

While praising the achievements of the Communist Party, Liang Shuming strongly appealed to the PCC members to take better care of the peasants. As a former leader of the Rural Construction Movement, he wanted to sound the alarm against the tendency to neglect rural areas and peasants as the Party’s attention shifted from rural to urban areas after the founding of the New China. Although Mao Zedong was not present at the meeting to express critical opinions on this Liang’s view, Mao did speak at the enlarged Conference of Central People’s Government the following day, where he vigorously criticized Liang as follows:

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“Some oppose our General Line, saying that the peasants’ lives are too hard and demanding and that we should care for them. This is probably the ‘Confucian’ way of administering benevolence. However, we must know that there are two kinds of benevolence, great and small, and that it is the small benevolence that takes care of the peasants while the great benevolence is to develop heavy industry to defeat the U.S. imperialists. If we do the small benevolent government but not do the great benevolent government, we will be helping the Americans. Our Communist Party has been working for decades in the peasant movement. It is quite laughable that there is someone who pretends to know everything about the peasants, saying that we still do not understand them. Workers and peasants, who form the basis of our government today, are united in their basic interests, and we will not allow this basis to be divided or destroyed!” (ibid., pp. 128–129)

Liang was not ostensibly opposed to the General Line itself. But even though he said he was defending it, as will be noted later, he criticized it in a euphemistic way. Mao saw through his true intentions and hurled abuse at him. The phrase “Confucian way of benevolence” was a play on the fact that Liang was regarded a “great Confucian,” and thus ironically made fun of his sympathy for the peasants. If Liang Shuming had remained silent, there probably would have been no problem. If Mao had criticized the PCC members in this way, most of them would have turned pale, shaken, and either immediately gone to Mao to apologize, or sneaked away. Liang, however, was a blunt and straightforward person. He tried to respond to Mao’s blatant criticism by writing a letter on the spot, but the meeting was adjourned before he could finish writing the letter. He wrote a letter at home and handed it to Mao at the venue the next day. The letter was something along the lines of, “You said that I opposed the General Line and destroyed the workers/ peasants alliance, but I have no such idea. What you said is not correct, so please take it back, and show me if you have the generosity to do so.” The two had a brief talk that evening when they shared time to see a Peking Opera at the Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai6 but a violent argument ensued and they ended up parting ways. A few days later, Liang Shuming still asked to speak at the PCC meeting, and said that he was not opposed to the General Line, but rather defended it. Then Zhou Enlai joined a front to criticize Liang, saying, “Liang Shuming has been consistently reactionary,” referring to the days when he tried to mediate as a “third force” between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the Civil War. He concluded: “Historically, Liang’s line appeared to help the people’s democratic forces achieve victory, but at the critical moment it was a line that defended the rule of Chiang Kai-shek’s group and let the ‘people’ suffer failure” (ibid., p. 134). This attack by Zhou Enlai must have been unexpected for Liang. The details of why Zhou suddenly began criticizing Liang are not clear, but probably, in my view, it was because he heard Mao Zedong’s scathing criticism of Liang on the stage and felt compelled to join in Mao’s attack on Liang. As will be discussed in Chap. 8, Zhou was so submissive to Mao that it became his life and political philosophy, ultimately allowing him a long political career. What was more terrifying was Mao’s attack on Liang Shuming after Zhou’s comments. He began with the following words: 6

One of the conference halls in Zhongnanhai. It is used for various political meetings and as a venue for literature and art.

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2 Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution? “There are two ways of killing people: One is to kill with the gun and the other is with the pen. The way which is most artfully disguised and draws no blood is to kill with the pen. That is the kind of murderer you are. He says he is a paragon. Not the slightest, not the least bit. Nevertheless, you describe yourself as an incomparable beauty, outshining Hsi Shih and Wang Chao Chun and rivalling Yang Kueifei.7 (Mao Selected Works Vol. 5, pp. 121–122) Liang Shuming is an ambitious schemer, a hypocrite. He lies when he says he takes no interest in politics and seeks no office. He used to engage in what he called ‘Rural Construction,’ and what sort of ‘Rural Construction’ was it? Construction for the landlords, rural destruction and national ruin!” (ibid. p. 125)

“Now there are so many ‘representatives of the peasants,’ and who in the world do they represent? … They represent the landlord class and render it service. And the most prominent of them all is Liang Shuming, who with sweet words on his lips is actually helping the enemy” … Why is it that the Chinese Communist Party has nominated him for membership of this committee (the National Committee of the PCC)? Precisely because he can still deceive a number of people and has a certain deceptiveness. His credentials are deception, that’s exactly what he has (ibid., pp. 125–126). Murderer, useless, ambitious schemer, a hypocrite, crook, malicious reactionary thinker, representative of the landowning class, and so on. How dare he go so far as to belittle a man who had been held in high esteem as a great Confucian? I can imagine Mao Zedong’s furious tirades and the wrathful expression on his face. Just a few days previously, he had repeatedly invited this guest into his home and treated him with great warmth, but now he was berating Liang mercilessly, like striking a dog that had fallen into water. However, the stubborn Liang Shuming was not intimidated. He took the stage at the meeting the next day and made the following remarks to Mao Zedong at the chairman’s table: “I received so much criticism from you at yesterday’s meeting,” he said. “It is unfair that you are not giving me more time today. The Communist Party should not do such a thing. I hope that the leading Party and non-Party comrades in attendance will test me and examine me. Please give me the opportunity today. At the same time, I also want to clearly say that I want to test the leading party and see if Chairman Mao has generosity. What kind of generosity? That is, after I explain the situation, I want you to nod and say, ‘Okay, you didn’t mean anything wrong, it was a misunderstanding.’ This is the broad-mindedness I request Chairman Mao.” (Dai 1990, p. 137)

No doubt, Liang Shuming was extremely bold to say such astonishing words to Mao Zedong, who was the absolute, almost divine authority for all Party members, for many “progressive” non-Party-members, and for all PCC members that day. The request he made would have unnerved them all—“If you have generosity, show it to me.” Mao Zedong interrupted and declared: “I probably don’t have what you are asking for,” to which Liang Shuming immediately retorted: “If you have this generosity, I will respect you more. If not, I will lose respect for you” (ibid., p. 138). 7

Hsi Shih (Xi Shi), Wang Chao Chun (Wang Zhaojun), and Yang Kueifei (Yang Guifei), together with Diao Chan, are considered the four most beautiful women in Chinese history.

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In this case, the argument between the two sides was more of a shouting match than one that could have become physical. Having heard this remark, Mao retorted: “I have this kind of ‘generosity.’ That is, to keep you as a PCC member.” Then, Liang replied that whether or not he would remain a PCC member was not important. Furious Mao declared, then, and abused Liang: “Not important? If you say it is not important, do as you like. If you think it is, I will still nominate you as a member of the PCC when its next session opens. As for your idea [referring to Liang’s perception that workers are in heaven and peasants are in hell], it is absolutely wrong”. (ibid., p. 138)

However, Liang Shuming did not retreat, but pressed on even further: “The leadership always tells us that we need to be self-critical, but I want to see if this principle of self-criticism is real or not. If Chairman Mao has the capacity for self-criticism, I respect you even more … I am asking whether or not Chairman Mao is broad-minded with the capacity for self-criticism”. (ibid., pp. 138–139)

Taking advantage of the spirit and method of “criticism and self-criticism,” which Mao Zedong had always advocated, he said, “Chairman Mao himself should criticize himself,” a criticism that probably made all the committee members in the hall lose their nerve, or perhaps even pass out. Many attendees yelled—“Liang Shuming is bullshit! We don’t give democratic rights to rebels! Bring down Liang Shuming! Stop his bullshit! … and angry shouts rang out” (ibid., p. 139). At least after the Party’s Zunyi Conference (1935), which is said to have established Mao’s authority within the Party,8 it was probably the first and last time that criticism of Mao Zedong was so overtly leveled at an official conference and, moreover, face-to-face. After this incident, Liang Shuming stayed at home and spent his days reading. Whether or not it was thanks to Mao’s “generosity,” he remained as a PCC member and was paid a salary so that he did not have to worry about his daily life. During the Cultural Revolution that raged across China nine years later, he was fortunate to survive the attack on his house and the looting of his treasured documents by the Red Guards, and he lived 12 years longer than Mao Zedong. Why, after being abused by Mao Zedong and so severely denounced by the Party, was Liang Shuming able to survive without being arrested or sent to a prison named laogai9 (labor camp)? Was it because he was a famous philosopher? That is not the case. During the Mao era, a number of eminent intellectuals were criticized, subjected to struggles, some committed suicide, and others were sent to labor camps. Was it because Mao really showed his broad-mindedness and tried to give him protection 8

The Zunyi Conference was the enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau at which the antimainstream faction led by Mao Zedong, who insisted on achieving a revolution that encompassed the cities by establishing a base in the countryside, took the lead against the mainstream faction that advocated an urban revolution in line with the COMINTERN’s directives. See Chap. 9. 9 A labor camp refers to a prison that is the equivalent of a Soviet concentration camp. Originally, they were created by separating prisoner work facilities, such as farms and factories built inside prisons, with the purpose of correcting prisoners through labor, but in reality they became facilities for incarcerating political prisoners without trial procedures together with criminal prisoners.

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since Liang did not engage in any activities? This point may be somewhat relevant to the case, but does not seem to be the essential reason because there must have been many other people to whom Mao should have shown broad-mindedness. The most likely reason is that Liang Shuming was not a dangerous person capable of undermining Mao Zedong’s political power. Unlike Hu Feng, who will be discussed next, he did not form a political faction, such as the “Liang Shuming group,” nor did he lead such a group, and more precisely, he was not viewed as a political threat by Mao Zedong.

2 The Hu Feng Incident Unlike Liang Shuming, Hu Feng, a poet, writer, and literary critic who was a favorite disciple of Lu Xun and respected Mao Zedong, did not overtly criticize Mao, but only made a few suggestions that disagreed with the “Literary Talks.” However, his words and actions infuriated Mao and he was finally sent to prison as an antiParty and counterrevolutionary element, despite eventually publishing a lengthy selfcritical statement as a sign of submission. With reference to Li (1996) and Maruyama (2001), I will briefly review the details of the Hu Feng incident and consider why Mao Zedong was so furious with him and his associates (Photo 2.3). Photo 2.3 Hu Feng and his wife Mei Zhi. Both were arrested for “counterrevolutionaries” in May 1955. Source Baidu

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Hu Feng was a leftist literary theorist and poet who had studied in Japan during the Republican period, came into contact with communist thought, was arrested by the police for anti-Japanese propaganda, and was expelled back to China. Together with Lu Xun and others, he then formed a literary force called the “Mass Literature in the National Revolutionary War” that opposed the force of the “National Defense Literature” established by Zhou Yang and other Party member writers.10 He is also known for editing such magazines as Qiyue (July) and Xiwang (Hope) and fostering many young writers. During the Anti-Japanese War period he remained in Chengdu, Kunming, and Chongqing cities under the control of the Nationalist government, and was separated from literati like Zhou Yang who had moved to the revolutionary base area of Yan’an. This may have greatly influenced the later struggle between the two literary groups. “Hu Feng was very popular among the masses; his lectures always drew a packed house, with throngs of young people flocking to them and showing great enthusiasm. He had quite a following in various Communist guerrilla bases around, and newspapers hailed him as a mentor to the youth, a leader, and a standard-bearer of literary and artistic thought. Zhou Enlai, then the Party’s representative in Chongqing, paid tribute to him and called him ‘an old friend,’ ‘a genius of the literary world’ and ‘a direct disciple of Lu Xun’.” (Beihai Xianren 2005, pp. 142–143)

The background of the Hu Feng incident was Mao Zedong’s “Literary Talks,” which can be regarded as the culmination of his theories on literature and art, and the problem of how to perceive them. These Talks were the Bible, so to speak, for Chinese intellectuals who collaborated with the Communist regime both before and after the Chinese Revolution. In these Talks, Mao emphasized the following points. First, literature and art are for the masses, the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and must serve the proletariat. They must transform ideas, but not for the petty bourgeoisie or the intellectuals. Second, revolutionary literary figures and artists must necessarily enter the masses, observe, experience, study, and analyze them, take all the materials for their creation from them, to inform their creative process. That is to say, they must express the masses and make themselves “faithful representatives of the masses.” And since all culture, including literature and art, belongs to a certain class and a certain political line, revolutionary writers and artists must be subjected to the revolutionary tasks required by the Party. In other words, literature and art are subservient to politics. Thus, literature and art were regarded as tools to serve the Party and to communicate its policies to the masses, in the same way that the media served as the “mouthpiece” (houshe) of the Party. Such a viewpoint, even for someone who understood Marxism and sympathized with the Chinese Revolution, could not have been wholeheartedly accepted by Hu 10

On August 1, 1935, the Communist Party of China issued the “August 1 Declaration” calling for a united anti-Japanese front, and in response, Party literary figures such as Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, and Zhou Libo proposed the slogan “National Defense Literature.” On the other hand, Lu Xun, Feng Xuefeng, Hu Feng, and others opposed the style of Zhou Yang and others and proposed the slogan “Mass Literature in the National Revolutionary War,” then a “national defense literature debate” developed between these two groups.

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Feng, a literary theorist who had been educated outside the country and was working in a Kuomintang-controlled area far from Yan’an. He argues: “If an artist faithful to his art makes the effort to painstakingly search for a form that is the purest, most vital, and most expressive of the content of the life he is trying to depict, his work can reach a high degree of artistic truth, even without experiencing the great waves of life”. (Beihai Xianren 2005, p. 142)

As Fujii Shozo, a well-known Japanese researcher on Lu Xun, aptly summarizes, the Communist Party’s theoretical view of literature as a means of policy propaganda, as summarized in the “Literary Talks,” and the position of Lu Xun, Hu Feng, and others emphasizing subjectivity, were like oil and water (Fujii 2002, p. 173). There was an essential contradiction between the literary theories of Lu Xun and Mao Zedong. After the founding of the country, literary figures who had been active in Yan’an, such as Zhou Yang, and writers and cultural figures in KMT-controlled areas, such as Hu Feng, gathered in Beijing and began literary activities under Communist Party leadership, but the conflict between Zhou and Hu did not disappear, and this eventually developed into the Hu Feng incident.11 So, let me examine why Mao Zedong decided to criticize Hu Feng in 1954, and moreover, why he decided to expose what became the Hu Feng group as “anti-Party and counterrevolutionary.” First, two related incidents in the literary world initiated by Mao Zedong prior to the Hu Feng incident should be considered: One is the criticism of the 1950 film “Wu Xun Zhuan (Wu Xun Biography).” The film gave a positive portrayal of Wu Xun, a man who built schools in Shandong Province in the nineteenth century and was greatly admired for his contributions to popular education and viewed as a righteous man in the educational world. The film attracted a large audience and was generally highly praised by central leaders. However, in May 1951, Mao Zedong wrote an editorial in the People’s Daily calling for a debate on the film, claiming that it was a work of bourgeois reformism. As a result, the film’s director, leading actors, and others involved were forced to criticize themselves, and the film was banned. The other incident was the criticism of Yu Pingbo, a professor at Peking University, regarding the interpretation of Hongloumeng (The Dream of the Red Chamber), which began in 1954, and the criticism of Hu Shi12 as an extension of that criticism. In his “Letter to the Members of the Central Political Bureau,” Mao Zedong wrote about two unknown young men who criticized Yu, the leading researcher of that classic novel at the time, and described the “struggle against the Hu Shih school of bourgeois idealism in the field of classical literature, which has poisoned the minds of the young for more than thirty years.” Yu Pingbo, who took over Hu Shi’s study of the Dream of the Red Chamber, regarded it as “an ideological novel that expresses a notion that ‘all is vanity (seji shikong),’ as well as a lamented autobiography of the author Cao Xueqin.” Two 11

For a detailed history of the intervening years, see Li (1996) and Maruyama (2001). A literary figure and philosopher who studied in the United States. Upon returning to China, he became a professor and later the president of Peking University. However, due to his support for the Kuomintang, he migrated to Taiwan after the Civil War.

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young men criticized Yu Pingbo from the viewpoint of class struggle theory, saying that the novel reflects the contradictions of Chinese feudal society in the middle of the eighteenth century, depicts the luxurious, corrupt, and cruel life of the aristocrats who are parasites at the expense of many peasants, criticizes the feudal social system and expresses a spirit of defiance against it. Mao Zedong strongly supported their views. Mao condemned the literary journals and their editors for not accepting their articles, but the protests went beyond that, developing into a campaign of criticism against the “bourgeois” intelligentsia as a whole. In short, according to Mao, history must be viewed from the perspective of class struggle, and literature must push such a perspective. Yu Pingbo later went on to criticize himself for “lacking a class perspective.” The Hu Feng incident occurred amid such literary and political circumstances. Even after the founding of the New China, literature and art were evaluated according to the standard of “Literary Talks,” and any deviation from this standard easily became a political issue. For Mao Zedong, art should serve politics, and any work of art without a class perspective was a “bourgeois,” “petty bourgeois,” or “idealistic” work, and it followed that any interpretation of a work lacking such a perspective was considered “reactionary” and “counterrevolutionary.” The main reason why Hu Feng was severely mauled and finally arrested was the “three-hundred-thousand-character opinion letter” that he wrote with his colleagues in 1954.13 Since the establishment of Communist China, Zhou Yang and Hu Feng had continued to be at odds with each other about literary theory, and Hu Feng and his colleagues were dissatisfied with the fact that they were treated less favorably than Zhou Yang, who was closer to the Party leadership. In essence, Hu and his colleagues wanted to argue that Zhou Yang as well as the other mainstream leaders of the Chinese literary world after the founding of the country were interpreting Mao’s “Literary Talks” and Marxism in their own way and preventing lively and creative literary and artistic activities. Upon receiving this opinion letter, Mao read it carefully, analyzed it, and found that Hu Feng’s literary ideas were contrary to the spirit of the “Literary Talks.” For example, Hu Feng had written that: “Zhou Yang and his colleagues insist that there should be no backwardness or darkness after the victory of the revolution, even if there existed a backwardness and darkness that was overcome through struggle, etc., etc. Such an insistence made the writers lose the will to write, and what they wrote was naturally full of ‘hope,’ that is, actually full of lies.” (Li 1996, Vol. 1, p. 213)

Writers who value their independence would naturally have these doubts and complaints. However, according to Mao Zedong, Chinese writers are supposed to be obedient to the Party, and as long as the Party and the State are calling for building a “hopeful” society, writers should encourage people toward that goal, and should never write about the dark side, even if it is real and they want to delve into that aspect. In other words, it is the Party that decides what should be written, how it should be portrayed and what is correct, not the writers themselves. 13

See Li (1996) Vol. 1, Chaps. 6 and 7, for more details.

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The problem was that the opinion letter was not written by Hu Feng alone, but was co-written by his associates with Hu as their leader. Furthermore, his influence was great and he had many supporters as well as fans. Consequently, when Mao Zedong launched the attack, the Party Center and mainstream literary circles, including Zhou Yang, began to heavily criticize Hu Feng and others, and this series of actions came to be known as the “Hu Feng group” incident, unlike the case of Liang Shuming, described above. Moreover, beyond the expectations of Zhou Yang and others, this clash became a political incident rather than a mere literary theoretical dispute, and Mao Zedong declared the Hu Feng group an “anti-Party and counterrevolutionary” group.14 Thus, Hu Feng as well as many other literary figures, and even some of their readers, were interrogated, arrested, and detained. In “Preface and Notes to Material on Hu Feng Clique” in Mao Selected Works Vol. 5, Mao criticizes and abuses Hu Feng as well as his colleagues as follows: “Hu Feng elements are counterrevolutionaries who put on a disguise to hide their true features and to give a false impression. But since they oppose the revolution, it is impossible for them to cover up their true features entirely. … The main force of the clique consists of imperialist and Kuomintang secret agents, Trotskyites, reactionary army officers, or renegades from the Communist Party; with these people serving as the backbone, a counterrevolutionary faction hidden in the revolutionary camp, an underground independent kingdom, was formed”. (ibid. pp. 177–179)

However, no concrete evidence was cited as to why Hu Feng and his group were accused of being “Kuomintang secret agents,” “Trotsky elements,” or “reactionary army officers,” namely, “counterrevolutionary elements.” In fact, the authorities had a hard time citing any such evidence, even though they had thoroughly investigated Hu and those connected to him. Even those who were referred to as “Hu Feng elements” could not understand why they were labeled as counterrevolutionaries and were simply dumbfounded. The letters to Hu that were seized as critical evidence were either forged or manipulated to make up evidence of a “crime.” According to Li Hui: “Hu Feng was thoroughly defeated and crushed. Letters were turned into [counterrevolutionary] documents, complaints into [counterrevolutionary] plots, and writers into counterrevolutionary [activists]. What more could he say or do? Hu Feng’s demise only proved once again that anyone who disagreed with Mao, or rather had a different point of view from Mao’s, would not stand a chance in front of him”. (Li 1996, pp. 65–66)

No evidence was needed. As we will see in Chap. 4, intellectuals and students alike appealed that the case was falsely constructed by Mao, but the case showed, in any event, that if Mao Zedong says it is counterrevolutionary, it must be counterrevolutionary, and Mao alone holds the right to define “counterrevolution”. The way in which literary interpretation somehow became politicized, and differences in interpretation were construed as reaction and even counterrevolution, reminds us of the fact that the historical drama “Hai Rui Mianguan” (Hai Rui 14

When Zhou Yang went to Mao Zedong to ask him about the handling of a mistake found in the draft stage of publishing a “self-criticism” written by Hu Feng in the People’s Daily, Mao told him, “I don’t care about such things; Hu Feng is already a counterrevolutionary,” leaving those involved speechless. See Maruyama (2001), pp. 150–151.

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dismissed from office) written by Wu Han, was politically interpreted and became the flashpoint for the Cultural Revolution, which will be discussed in Chap. 8. In this sense, the Hu Feng incident was a foreshadowing of the CR turmoil that would take place ten years later. At the same time, this incident also symbolized the policy of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party toward intellectuals at the time.

3 Lu Xun and Mao Zedong I have discussed Liang Shuming and Hu Feng, two intellectuals who were abused by Mao Zedong in the 1950s, and looked at why they were so severely criticized and overthrown by Mao, but let me now return to the main topic in this chapter, that is the question of what would have happened if Lu Xun had lived after the Chinese Revolution. When we look at Lu Xun’s character and mode of behavior, and above all, his ideology, he would almost certainly have clashed with Mao Zedong. Lu Xun’s target was a man without a critical spirit and lacking independent thinking, what he called a “slave.” Conversely, he highly valued those who had a strong critical spirit and challenged authority. It is precisely because he had displayed this spirit and attitude prior to the Chinese Revolution that Mao declared Lu Xun a “saint” in the world of literature and art (Photo 2.4). In his December 1927 lecture entitled “Literature and Politics at the Crossroads,” Lu Xun stated: “I have always felt that literature and politics are in conflict … Politics tries to maintain the status quo, which naturally leads it in a different direction from literature, which is not content with the status quo. A politician hates it when people disagree with him more than anything else. A politician is more reluctant than anything else to have people disagree with him, to think, to say things. Literature is often excluded because it is already a thorn in the politician’s flesh. Many foreign literary figures, unable to stay in their home countries, exile to other countries one after another. The way to do this is to ‘escape.’ If they cannot escape, they are killed and their heads hanged”.

He also stated: “Politicians regard the literati as the instigators of social disturbances, and they think that if they kill them, society will be at peace”. (from Jiwaji [Stories outside the Collection])15

Now, if we replace “politician” with Mao Zedong, “literati” with Lu Xun, and the place and time with Beijing and the days of Maoist China, respectively, we may easily answer the question Luo Jinan poses to Mao. The difference between Lu Xun, the writer, and Mao Zedong, the revolutionary, is also revealed in the following episode. Masuda Wataru, a close friend of Lu Xun and a Lu Xun researcher, remembers that, around 1931, Lu Xun had said the following:

15

From Lu Xun Selected Works, Vol. 12, pp. 132–133, 136. The explanation in Zhang (2009) and this text differ slightly in content.

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2 Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution?

Photo 2.4 Lu Xun and his family. Lu Xun and his wife Xu Guangping with their child Zhou Haiying. Source https://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/ zjnews/zjxw/201610/t20161 016_1977935.shtml

“There are rumors that the communists are killing peasants near Ruijin, where the Chinese Soviet Union was located. Killing peasants, no matter what the reason, is not good. We are going to investigate by sending someone. If the rumors are true, we are going to advise the CPC not to kill people”. (Nagahori 2009)

That was right around the time of the so-called Futian incident, when a large number of peasant soldiers were killed due to internal conflicts within the Red Army.16 As can be understood from this example, Lu Xun, who believed that “killing people is not good under any circumstances,” and Mao Zedong, who was willing to take human lives for the sake of the revolution and for the “broad perspective” were 16

The Futian incident was an internal military uprising and purge that took place in 1930–31 in Futian, Jiangxi Province, in which a large number of officers and soldiers were exposed and executed for the alleged existence of a secret KMT organization (AB group) within the Red Army (see, for example, Beihai Xianren (2005), from p. 13). Mao Zedong, the Supreme Leader of the Red Army at the time, was naturally involved in the purge, and according to Beihai Xianren, he was the mastermind behind the incident. However, the official Biography of Mao Zedong only mentions the incident in passing. In September 1956, at the preparatory meeting for the Eighth Congress of the CPC, Mao mentioned the AB purge campaign in the Soviet District of Jiangxi Province, saying that he had made a mistake and erroneously purged the AB group, but he avoided going into details and did not criticize himself.

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unlikely to get along in terms of character. Their views on humanity are completely different. It is well known that Lu Xun detested the KMT and did not stop criticizing it until his death. He stated: “The way the Kuomintang did it was like fraud [referring to the purge of Communist Party youth after Chiang Kai-shek’s coup in 1927]. The way they killed them was also terrible. For example, when it came to killing, a single bullet to the brain should have been enough to accomplish the goal, but they chopped people into pieces, buried them alive, and even killed their parents and siblings. Ever since then, I have hated the KMT for deceiving people and using them as material for massacres. The hatred has stuck with me. They killed many of my students”.17

If we inspect the policies of the Communist Party after the founding of the country, the very same methods of “fraud” and “massacre” were carried out by the Party, directly or indirectly, as we will discuss later. If we substitute “Communist Party” for “Kuomintang” as mentioned by Lu Xun here, his feelings toward the Communist Party, or Mao Zedong, would be immediately reflected. Mao Zedong’s praise of Lu Xun was not only because he was a “giant” in the history of modern literature, of which China should be proud. Gao Hua points to Mao’s evaluation of Lu Xun during the Yan’an era as follows: “From the perspective of a reader, Mao greatly admired Lu Xun’s profound analysis of Chinese history, society, and national character. He also praised Lu Xun’s strong criticisms of the shallow works of the leftist literary artists of the 1930s. However, from the perspective of Mao as a leader of the Communist Party, he was concerned about Lu Xun’s disdain for authoritarianism (quangui) and his independent and unrestrained spirit, which would not be suitable for display in Yan’an. Mao was clear in indicating that Lu Xun’s style of attacking prevalent problems and exposing wrongdoers through “miscellaneous essays (zawen)” would not be generally applicable in Communist Party-controlled areas”. (Gao 2000, pp. 350–351)

According to Gao Hua, then, Mao’s evaluation of Lu Xun was based on his “political utilitarian attitude.” To put it another way, Mao was not enamored with Lu Xun’s spirit and ideology, but Lu Xun was a convenient “tool” for Mao’s revolutionary agenda. When the Northern Expedition began in 1927, Lu Xun went to Guangzhou with his girlfriend, Xu Guangping, to teach at Zhongshan University, but when Chiang Kaishek and the Kuomintang began suppressing the Communists in an anti-communist coup on April 12, he saw many students being arrested and massacred, so that he resigned from the university, escaping to Shanghai with her. From then on, Lu Xun sympathized with the Communist Party, studied and introduced Soviet proletarian literary theory, and became a standard-bearer of the leftist literary world (Fujii 2002, pp. 39–40). Because of this, when in Shanghai he was watched closely by the KMT government and its public security organs. When Mao Zedong finished his so-called 25,000 li (15,000 km) “Long March” and established a base in Yan’an, Lu Xun often met with people dispatched from there. According to his son, Zhou Haiying, Xu Guangping recalled her time in Shanghai during the 1930s, writing the following: 17

This is a direct quote from Lu Xun to Masuda Wataru. It is introduced in Masuda’s “Commentary” in Lu Xun Selected Works Vol. 7, pp. 236–237.

36

2 Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution? “One day, Feng Xuefeng [one of the leftist writers] came [from Yan’an] and told Lu Xun that the special police had followed him and that a chase was just around the corner. Feng hid in the [Uchiyama] bookstore,18 then escaped through the back door, circled around several times, shook off his pursuers, and arrived at Lu Xun’s home.” (Zhou 2001, p. 301)

He seems to have obtained information about Yan’an and Mao Zedong’s group through such leftists as Feng. It is certain that Lu Xun supported Mao when the AntiJapanese War broke out. In his “Letter to the Trotskyites,” he vehemently opposed the domestic Trotskyites who denounced Mao’s “unified anti-Japanese theory” including the Kuomintang, as class betrayal (Lu Xun Selected Works, Vol. 12, pp. 74–76). However, whether Lu Xun was completely sympathetic to Mao Zedong is a different matter. Lu Xun died before Mao’s “Literary Talks” was published, but what would he have thought if he had known the contents of this lecture? It is unlikely that Lu Xun would have had high regard for these Talks and praised Mao, just as his disciple Hu Feng, whom Lu Xun held in high esteem, was uncomfortable with the essence of the Talks. Xu Fang, who was involved in the Hu Feng incident, arrested and thrown in jail, said the following in a 1985 gathering to commemorate Hu Feng: “We used to be loyal to the Party, we used to worship it. People today may not understand this. But the structure of our thinking at that time was outdated. Even in prison, we always put unlimited trust in the abstract Party, and thought that it was the sect that was making people suffer. … Each of us, including those who have suffered persecution, should seriously reconsider this. Do we ourselves not have any left-leaning thought, or do we not have the slave mentality? In China, people like us, along with many others, have laid the foundations for stupidity and slave mentality.” (Li 1990, Vol. 2, p. 252, my emphasis)

Such words convey a strong sense of shame and reflection, a sharp criticism of the “slave mentality” that Lu Xun has consistently condemned. Xu said that people who placed “unlimited trust” in the Party and Mao Zedong, were bound by this trust, lost sight of themselves, and became “slaves,” producing false accusations as in the Hu Feng incident Lu Xun ironically divided the history of China into cycles of two periods: (1) a period in which people wanted to be slaves but could not, and (2) a period in which people could safely remain slaves for the time being.19 What Xu Fang was trying to say is that people who were supposed to have been freed from “slavery” after the Chinese Revolution, have been living in the very “period in which they are safely enslaved.” And if they attempted even the slightest “slave rebellion” or raised an objection to the regime, they would immediately return to a period in which they could not be slaves even if they wanted to be slaves. Those who inherited Lu Xun’s vision directly, such as Hu Feng and others, or indirectly through them, must have felt the desolation that Lu Xun once experienced in modern China. In his novel Kuangren Riji (Diary of a Madman) (1918), which is said to mark the beginning of modern Chinese literature, Lu Xun used the words of one madman to bitterly 18

Uchiyama Kanzo, the owner of Uchiyama Bookstore in Shanghai in pre-War China, is known as having protected Lu Xun for long time. 19 This statement is described in his Denghuo Manbi (Idle Talk under the Bean Arbor).

3 Lu Xun and Mao Zedong

37

ironize and criticize the traditional Confucian society where “people eat people” in a symbolic sense. During the Great Famine (1959–1961), as will be discussed in Chap. 5, cannibalism did in fact occur frequently in rural areas. If Lu Xun had lived to the end of the 1960s and learned of this, he might well have gone mad himself. Would Lu Xun, a man of keen sensibilities and a critical spirit, who had sharply criticized the “slave mentality” of the Chinese people, have become a slave to Mao Zedong and his ideology? It seems highly unlikely. Therefore, if he were to have survived even after the year of 1949, it would have been inevitable for him to clash with Mao Zedong. Lu Xun would not have allowed his thoughts to be reshaped or his spirit to be dominated. Although Mao Zedong and Lu Xun never had direct interactions in their lifetimes, if they were to have met, it is inconceivable that the two of them would have gotten along. The reason why Lu Xun could have been thrown in jail if he had clashed with Mao Zedong was that he had as many supporters as Hu Feng, indeed far more, perhaps including quite a number of literati and even common people who worshipped both Hu Feng and Lu Xun. As mentioned earlier, in the case of Liang Shuming, no matter how vehemently he resisted Mao Zedong and was abused by Mao, he did not form a group. In the case of Hu, however, there were a considerable number of supporters and many who were inspired by him, and this must have appeared to Mao as if they were forming a “group.” Therefore, even if, unlike Liang, they did not criticize Mao directly, Mao framed Hu and his colleagues as political criminals who challenged his power or would potentially do so; as “anti-Party and counterrevolutionary.” The Hu Feng group was not a very large “group”, and there was no such sect within the Party. However, if Lu Xun were to have lived and somehow come to Mao’s attention, it would probably have caused a huge “typhoon” or “tsunami” both within and outside the Party. Let picture it. In Mao’s view, Lu Xun is a “saint,” and his admirers are legion. Some of those interrogated in the Hu Feng case were mere readers, so if all Lu Xun’s readers were included in the “Lu Xun group,” the number would add up to tens of millions. It would have been impossible, no doubt, to investigate all of Lu Xun’s readers. In the case of the Hu Feng incident, according to the 1980 “Report on the Reinvestigation of the ‘Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Group’ Case” by the Ministry of Public Security, the Supreme People’s Prosecutors Office, and the Supreme Court, 2100 people were interrogated nationwide in connection with this case, 92 people were arrested, 62 people were subjected to segregation review, 73 people were “suspended from work,” and 78 people were identified as part of the “Hu Feng counterrevolutionary group” by the end of 1956, 23 of whom were classified as core elements (Qian 2013). It is also said that more than 1000 people were exposed and “committed suicide for fear of sanctions” (Beihai Xianren 2005, p. 155). If a “Lu Xun incident” had occurred, the number of victims would probably have been a hundred times, perhaps even a thousand times this number. As was the case with the Hu Feng indictment, if Lu Xun had been exposed, things would have been written about him, fabricated news would have been circulated, information rewritten, and everything manipulated so as to overthrow him. At that time, the issue of literature and ideology easily turned into a political issue. Because

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2 Mao Zedong and Lu Xun: What If Lu Xun Had Survived the Revolution?

once Mao Zedong declared, “This is a political issue, a class issue,” all the wheels would move in that direction. No one could resist it. Li Hui aptly points out that: “Mao’s views, Mao’s spirit, had to reign supreme in all domains, and ultimately, in the thoughts of every individual”. (Li 1996, Vol. 2, p. 244)

Hu Feng was sentenced to 15 years in prison,20 —if the “Lu Xun incident” had occurred, the punishment for the “main culprit” would have been more than that. And if that had happened, Lu Xun would likely have realized and accepted that this was the fate of a literary figure.21 Lu Xun wrote a famous poem (couplet), “Fierce-browed, I coolly defy a thousand pointing fingers, Head-browed, like a willing ox I serve the children.”22 Mao Zedong quoted this poem in his “Literary Talks” and explained: “‘The thousand pointing fingers’ are enemies, and we will never yield to them, no matter how ferocious. The ‘children’ here symbolize the proletariat and the masses. All Communists, all revolutionaries, and all revolutionary literary and art workers should … be ‘oxen’ for the proletariat and the masses.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 3, p. 96)

However, if Lu Xun had directly confronted Mao, and if he had been seized and imprisoned, he would have thought of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party as the “thousand pointing fingers,” while he would have regarded Hu Feng, “rightists,” “petty bourgeois” intellectuals, along with countless innocent people condemned as anti-Party and counterrevolutionary as the true “oxen.” In fact, Mao had been asked a similar question in a roundtable discussion with cultural figures in March 1956, a few months before Luo Jinan asked that question. Then, Mao Zedong responded as follows: “If Lu Xun were still alive, he would either try to write or he would not, and under a less than normal atmosphere he would not write, but he would still write. Isn’t there a saying, ‘He who is not afraid of death by a thousand cuts dares to pull down the emperor from his horse.’ Lu Xun is a real Marxist, a thoroughgoing materialist. A true Marxist, a thoroughgoing materialist fears nothing, so he will write.” (Mao Zedong Collection, Vol. 7, p. 263)23

What is meant here by “pulling down the emperor from his horse”? In the abovementioned essay “On Lu Xun,” Mao Zedong had the following to say about Lu Xun: 20

It was not until 1965 that he was formally sentenced, and Hu Feng had been in prison ever since his arrest in 1955. 21 If the literary scholar Lu Xun had clashed with the politician Mao Zedong, he might, in the extreme case, have been practically killed. However, Mao may have done what he did to Liang Shuming and placed Lu Xun under house arrest rather than taking his life, thereby blocking his activities. 22 One interpretation of the poem is that “I ‘mocked myself’ for working as an ox for my young son Zhou Haiying” (Fujii 2002, p. 181), and since the title of the poem is “self-mockery,” that interpretation seems to be more correct. 23 This is a re-quotation from Zhu (2013), Vol. 1, p. 107. The same point is made in “Speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Work (March 12, 1957)” (Mao Selected Works, Vol. 5, p. 412). However, Lu Xun’s name is not mentioned there.

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“He is not the least bit afraid of his enemies’ intimidation, profiteering, or killing against him, but he aims the point of his spear and stabs everything he hates with a pen that is just like a real sword”. (Mao Zedong Collection, Vol. 5, p. 281)

When I read this sentence, I suddenly imagine Mao’s state of mind, that is, if Lu Xun had lived after the Chinese Revolution—Mao himself may have intuitively sensed and feared that the tip of this pen would be pointed at China’s absolute leader and would stab him in the back.

Chapter 3

Class Struggle Theory and the Mass Line: “Marxism” According to Mao Zedong

The words “class” and “masses” or “people” are frequently used by Mao Zedong in his speeches and articles. What does class, or class struggle, mean to Mao, and what significance does it have? Who constitutes the masses for him, what does the mass line mean, and what significance does it have? When we review his talks and their logic, we find that the meaning of these terms differs from how they are commonly understood. Here I will consider Mao’s understanding and application of Marxism using an analysis of the words “class (struggle),” “mass (line),” and “people” as clues. In the following chapters, when I quote directly from Mao’s discourse, I will translate “zichanjieji” as “bourgeoisie” and “wuchanjieji” as “proletariat,” but the Chinese terms “property class” (zichanjieji) and “non-property class” (wuchanjieji) do not necessarily accurately represent the original (Marx’s meaning) of “bourgeoisie” and “proletariat”, respectively. Many of the terms and vocabularies of social science and philosophy used were imported into China from Japan after the Meiji era, especially those related to Marxism as well as socialism, and this often involved serious, often critical, mistranslations. In my view, this may have led to a mistaken understanding of Marxism among Chinese Communist leaders, Marxist scholars and activists, including Mao Zedong, who did not understand European languages. A typical mistranslation is “gongchanzhuyi” for communism, which implies a doctrine to equalize all properties.1 This gave rise to spreading the false notion that communism is simply sharing assets. Similarly, the translation of “bourgeois” as “zichanzhe” led to the misconception in China that those with assets, i.e., the rich and affluent, were what Marx meant by the bourgeoisie.

1

Part of the responsibility for these mistranslations lies with Japanese Marxists of the Meiji era, such as Koutoku Shusui and Sakai Toshiaki, who translated the original Marxist texts into Japanese.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_3

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3 Class Struggle Theory and the Mass Line: “Marxism” According to Mao …

1 Revolutionary Struggle and Class: Characteristics of Mao’s Early Concept of Class The fact that Mao’s Selected Works Vol. 1 begins with “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” indicates the importance Mao Zedong placed on class analysis. He begins that article by asking, “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution.” I will return to the meaning of class and class struggle for Mao later, but first I will briefly review the evolution of Mao’s concept of class and look at the “Sinicization” of his Marxism and its characteristics. As Imabori Seiji demonstrates, Mao’s “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (March 1926)” (first edition) is quite different from that in the official Mao Selected Works Vol. 1 published in 1951.2 While the official edition of the Selected Works divides the classes into six categories: (1) the landlord and the maiban (comprador) class, (2) the middle bourgeoisie, (3) the petty bourgeoisie, (4) the semi-proletariat, (5) the proletariat class, and (6) the lumpen-proletariat, in the first edition Mao had divided the Chinese classes into five categories: (1) the large property class, (2) the middle property class, (3) the small property class, (4) the semi-absentee class, and (5) the non-property class. Each of these categories included several layers and industries, making a total of 16 different classes (see Table 1). Let me compare this class classification with the classical class concept as defined by Marx. Marx’s class theory appears in various places. For example, he remarks in his Capital as follows: “The owners of mere labor-power, the owners of capital and the landowners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit, and ground-rent—in other words wage laborers, capitalists and landowners—form the three great classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode of production”. (Marx Capital, Vol. 3, Chap. 52, p. 1025)

Because these three major classes have conflicting interests, a “class struggle” is bound to occur. In feudal society, landowners formed a powerful class as feudal lords and clashed with the bourgeoisie, but in modern capitalist society, the conflict between workers and capitalists became the core of the class struggle. The peasants and handicraftsmen are positioned as the “middle class” or “middlebourgeois” class. Marx and Engels assert in their Communist Manifesto that “the lower middle class … small manufacturers, small traders, handicraftsmen, peasant proprietors … one and all fight the bourgeoisie in the hope of safeguarding their existence as sections of the middle class. They are, therefore, not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more; they are reactionary, for they are trying to make the wheels of history turn backward” (Marx and Engels Manifesto, p. 39). This middle class, which includes doctors, lawyers, and artists, is called the “petty bourgeoisie.” 2 The first edition was published in the magazines Zhongguo Nongmin (Chinese Peasants) and Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth). The contents were considerably compressed and altered in the officially published edition of Mao Selected Works (Imabori 1966, p. 66). The first edition is included in Mao Zedong Collection Vol. 1.

Big landowners

Big bankers/big merchants/big industrialists

Counter-revolutionary

Rural

Urban

Attitudes toward the revolution Semi-revolutionary

Owners of money shops/middle merchants/petty industrialists

Small land-owners

Neutral

Petty traders/handicraft owners

Owner farmers

Middle property class Small property class

Source Table 3 on page 69 in Imabori (1966), with some modifications in wording

Big property class

Class/area

Table 1 Mao’s original class classifications

Joining the revolution

Peddlers/clerks/handicraft workers

Semi-owner farmers/ tenant farmers

Semi-non-property class (proletariat)

Holding revolutionary spirit

Manual laborers/ industrial workers

Hired peasants (agricultural laborers)

Non-property class (proletariat)

1 Revolutionary Struggle and Class: Characteristics of Mao’s Early … 43

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3 Class Struggle Theory and the Mass Line: “Marxism” According to Mao …

Finally, Marx mentions another class, or rather a rank, called the “lumpen proletariat,” consisting of “vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, etc.” (Marx Capital Vol. 1, p. 797). Lenin took over Marx’s class theory and criticized his political opponent Narodniki’s assertion that the workers and the “working” peasants constituted one class, saying: “The so-called “working” peasant is in fact a small proprietor, or a petty bourgeois, who almost always hires himself out to work for somebody else or hires workers. Being a small proprietor, the “working” peasant also vacillates in politics between the masters and the workers, between the bourgeoisie and the workers, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat”. (Lenin Collected Works Vol. 19, p. 206)

In other words, society is basically composed of three classes: The bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. Compared to these classical class theories by Marx, Lenin, and others, Mao Zedong’s class theory may be said to be “Sinicized” in that he added (a) maiban (comprador) class, (b) middle class, (c) small property class, and (d) semi-nonproperty class. Of these, the term “maiban”; originally referred to Chinese nationals who acted as intermediaries between foreigners and Chinese merchants at foreign trading posts in traditional China, but in practice it refers to those who serve foreign capitalists, and specifically to those associated with or subordinate to “imperialist” forces. The middle class is not defined in Marx’s way as the peasants and handicraftsmen but rather as the national bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie in Mao’s definition consists of tenant farmers, manual laborers and the intelligentsia, while the semi-proletarian class consists of independent as well as tenant farmers, poor peasants, small handicraftsmen, clerks, and peddlers. In addition, each class is judged as “friend or foe.” Mao judges whether a class is completely a foe, or inclined to become a foe easily, or completely a friend. More specifically, the comprador and the landowner class are enemies to be overthrown, while the non-property class is the class that will be the mainstay of the Chinese Revolution, and the other classes are positioned between the two, with one class being considered both an enemy and a potential ally. This Maoist classification rule has the following characteristics. First, unlike Marx’s concept of class, it does not necessarily correspond to the ownership of the means of production. In terms of the ownership relationship to capital, the comprador class must be included in the middle class, with the small and medium business owners, and the independent farmers with land must be included with the landowners. The reason why handicraftsmen are placed in the small property class and small handicraftsmen are placed in the semi-property class is that the size or the volume of assets is used as a criterion for class classification. In Marx’s case, “the identity of revenues and revenue sources” was not a criterion for class classification (Marx Capital, Vol. 3, p. 1026). That is to say, for example, workers are the working class (proletariat) not because they receive wages as income, but because they do not have the means of production. Marx writes that if “identity of income and source of income” is used as a criterion for class classification, then doctors and

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officials would also constitute a class, and “the infinite fragmentation of interests and positions into which the division of social labor splits not only workers but also capitalists and landowners” must be taken into account (ibid.). However, it would be easier to determine class based on assets or wealth. Mao Zedong must have thought that it would be more convenient to divide the classes into “haves” and “have-nots” in order to clearly demarcate the classes and to make the “have-nots” rise for the revolution. Next, as I have explained above, the main purpose of class division for Mao Zedong was not to develop a consistent theory of classes, but to obtain a practical means for the revolution by determining “who is an enemy and who is a friend.” This is why he not only made the class divisions more realistic by adding “intermediate” classes such as the semi-non-proletariat and the middle class, but also brought class into the criteria for judging each class’s positive or negative attitude toward the revolution. In the case of Marx, as noted above, the three major classes were at the center of society, and in particular, the conflict between capital and labor was at the core of modern society, so the structure was simple and clear: The enemy for the proletariat to defeat was the bourgeoisie. In Mao’s case, however, the social structure of prerevolutionary China is more complex, and the relationship between friend and foe is even more complicated from his point of view. Third, related to the above, indeed more important than the above argument for Mao, although not explicitly stated in Table 1, is that there is a one-to-one correspondence between class and attitude toward the revolution. In Mao’s theory of class, it is assumed that once a person is placed in a certain class, his/her attitude toward the revolution is determined regardless of his/her personal will or principles and beliefs. In other words, the individual does not determine the class, but the class determines the entire destiny of the individual. As a result, the bad “bloodline theory,” which was especially rampant during the Cultural Revolution (CR), or any theory that class is inherited through bloodlines, was propagated (see Chap. 8). The logic was that parents’ assets would be inherited by their children, and parents’ attitudes toward the revolution would be thought to influence their children. Nevertheless, the class of origin of the leaders of the revolutionary generation was never an issue. For example, Kang Sheng, who was Mao’s right-hand man as a leader in the purges by the Party, came from a landowning family, and Zhou Enlai, as noted in Chap. 9, came from an old “feudal family.” Fourth, as will be discussed in detail later, Mao’s class theory changed in response to the changing circumstances of the times, and after the Communists seized power, especially after the Anti-Rightist Struggle of 1957, ideology and political attitudes became the decisive factors in determining class (see Chap. 4). This also shows that his class theory, unlike Marx’s, lacked theoretical thoroughness and was lacking in consistency. This may be because the concept of class was influenced by differences in historical conditions and the environment of the times, but it may also be because for Mao, Marxism itself was nothing but a tool, and the concept of class was a tool for winning the Anti-Japanese War as well as the Civil War against the Kuomintang, thereby to achieve his ultimate objective, that is, to establish revolutionary power.

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3 Class Struggle Theory and the Mass Line: “Marxism” According to Mao …

To make the logic of Mao Zedong’s class theory clearer and more understandable in this context, I would like to “theorize” it a bit. Let me provide the following simple model as an illustration. Assume that there are only two classes in pre-revolutionary society, i.e. the bourgeoisie (B) and the proletariat (P), and that they are divided according to their attitude toward the revolution, which is simply scored with positive (1) or negative (0). B is passive toward the revolution, while P is active because they are exploited by B. In the extreme case, the attitude of B and P toward the revolution are totally passive (0) and active (1), respectively. However, since some or even all of B may passively support the revolution, B’s attitude may actually be 0.1 while P is still 1. Hence P is the main force in the revolution. In addition, Mao thinks that since China is under pressure and exploitation from abroad, the classes also differ in their attitudes as to whether they are nationalist and patriotic (1) or anti-nationalist and anti-patriotic (0). In this case, B is not necessarily anti-nationalist, anti-patriotic, or traitorous. P is, certainly, assumed to be nationalistic and patriotic. Let me assume that B is half (0.5) as patriotic as P. Then, B and P’s revolutionary tendencies will be in conflict. The attitudes of B and P toward the revolution, nationalism, and patriotism can be expressed as shown in Table 2. Therefore, B and P can cooperate with each other against invasion by a foreign power, such as the Japanese army. Besides, B’s nationalism and patriotism may also “dialectically” change their attitude toward the revolution. By the way, let me assume that class determines the actual consciousness and behavior patterns of all the people who belong to it. Now, let me call temporarily the factor by which class determines people’s consciousness and behavior as “class factor.” Let me assume, furthermore, that a certain class has a certain consciousness attached to it, and that this consciousness makes people behave in a certain way. Even if B sympathizes with the revolution to some extent, in practice, the class factor peculiar to that class will have an effect, and it is assumed that only about 10% of P will sympathize or resonate with the revolution, as described above. The same is true for patriotism. Originally, both B and P, as they are Chinese, should feel equal antipathy toward aggression by foreign powers and participate equally in antiforeign activities, but B may have only half as much resistance to foreign countries as P because of this class factor. In the above examples, I have covered only two kinds of actions, namely, how to face the revolution and patriotism, but when we consider the revolutionary struggle and post-revolutionary socialist construction, we are subject to many other options, for example, attitudes toward the Communist Party, attitudes toward individual Table 2 Class and political attitudes: an exemplified Mao’s hypothesis (Social) class

Attitudes toward the revolution

Sentiment of nationalism (patriotism)

Number of members

Proletariat P Active (1)

Patriotic (1)

Np

Bourgeoisie B

Somewhat patriotic (0.5) Nb

Negative (0.1)

Revolutionary capacity

Nationalistic (patriotic) competence

Np

Np

0.1Nb

0.5Nb

1 Revolutionary Struggle and Class: Characteristics of Mao’s Early …

47

government policies, even attitudes toward foreign countries, for example, the Soviet Union and the United States, and, in particular, attitudes toward Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong may have believed that a variety of options were available to him, so that the class factor he determined was at work in all of them. This is my hypothesis. Then, by multiplying the population belonging to each class, we can roughly calculate how much strength the enemy has and how much more than that the allies have. If the number of P, Np, is overwhelmingly more than that of B, Nb, and if strength can be simply measured by the number of people, then in Mao’s mind the strength of the revolutionary sympathizers is 1 × Np + 0.1 × Nb, while the strength of the domestic enemies of the revolution is 0.9 × Nb. Since the former is overwhelmingly greater than the latter, the revolution can be judged to be possible, of course under the condition that Np can be fully mobilized. Similarly, the competence of nationalism and patriotism will be 1 × Np + 0.5 × Nb, and if it greatly outweighs the competence of the enemy (e.g., the Japanese army), it can be considered capable of taking on the enemy.3 Besides, if a nationalist struggle develops, nationalism and patriotism will bring about a change in B’s attitude toward the revolution, and their class factor may change from the initial 0.1 to, say, 0.4–0.5. It is important to emphasize here that these essential class factors had no objective criteria or basis, but were determined subjectively by Mao Zedong himself. The evaluation of the proactivity or passivity toward the revolution by class, as seen in Table 1, was not the result of his rigorous research, nor was it the result of a socially accepted theory. On the contrary, the class factors and their evaluation would change according to his judgment as the situation changed, just as the Sino-Soviet rivalry of the 1960s brought the U.S. and China closer together in the 1970s. Let us recall that he had decided what the principal contradiction was, as we emphasized in Chap. 1. This class factor changed as the national and international situation changed, including the progress of the revolutionary struggle and changes in relations with the Kuomintang. At times, a class that was a foe yesterday could become a friend today. There have naturally been criticisms that this shift in class evaluation may have been too intentional or arbitrary. However, as his theory “On Practice” taught the people, Mao’s class theory was regarded as absolutely correct. It became a major source of his strong charisma in China because he used such class analysis to carry out the revolutionary struggle and finally succeeded as a result. Mao’s practice theory teaches that if the results of any policy are good, then the analysis and theory on which the policy is based are correct. This was clearly demonstrated in the class divisions and class policies found in “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” an article in December 1939 and “On New Democracy” of January 1940. Specifically speaking, as Japan’s aggression against China progressed and the Second Cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Part of China (CPC) began in response, the 3

Needless to say, actual strategies are not based solely on such simple calculations. It also goes without saying that competence in revolutionary and liberation struggles is not determined solely by manpower.

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Communist Party’s main enemy (principal contradiction) changed from the Kuomintang to Japanese imperialism. The KMT, which had previously been an enemy of the Communist Party, was to cooperate with it on the anti-Japanese front. In his article “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” he described the class divisions as: (1) the landowning class, (2) the property class, (3) various types of small property class, (4) the peasant class, and (5) the class without property. Each of these classes is divided into several strata. At first glance, the classification of the classes is somewhat like that shown in Table 1, but the small and medium landowning classes are positively evaluated as showing “anti-Japanese activism,” while the large property class, which was once completely negative, is also viewed positively as being able to participate to some extent in the “immediate anti-imperialist front.” The “ethnic asset class” is also regarded positively. The “national asset class” is regarded even more highly as a possible “motivating force for the revolution.” Thus, Mao’s evaluation of the class factor changes with the times and with changing circumstances. In his view, “this is the dialectic.” In the article entitled “On New Democracy”, the class distinctions were more simply divided into three categories: The proletarian class, the peasant class, and the intelligentsia and other small property class, giving the impression that, at least formally, we have returned to the classical class divisions of Marx and others. However, this is not so much a change in the principles of Mao’s class rule as it is simply his strategic decision to do so, as noted above. For the time being, Mao Zedong insisted on creating a “New Democratic” state, neither socialist, nor a “bourgeois democracy” like the West’s, but a coalition of many classes, excluding those who collaborated with Japan.4 Thus, the bourgeoisie, which the Communist Party had traditionally regarded as the KMT’s supporting force and enemy, is also removed from the list of class enemies to be overthrown, apart from those who collaborate with Japan. In addition, since the KMT had no choice but to cooperate with Sun Yat-sen’s policy of “land equalization” and “land to tillers,” namely mild land reform, the Communist Party correspondingly revised its radical land reform policy and adopted a more accommodating attitude toward rich farmers, in particular. In line with the above model, the class factor in the Chinese Revolution has changed according to the demands of the times. More precisely, Mao Zedong has made such changes in accordance with his tactics and strategy. Finally, let me look at Mao’s view of class with respect to intellectuals. In the first edition of the abovementioned “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,” a class of “reactionary intellectuals” appears among the wealthy classes. More specifically, along with the cadres of the comprador banks, commerce, and industry as well as high-ranking officials of warlord governments, some students returning from Japan and the West, professors and students at universities and vocational schools, and big lawyers were also positioned in this class. The author (Mao) concluded “this 4

In this article (original), Mao Zedong said “We, the Communist Party, will never exclude all revolutionary people (if they do not surrender, if they are not even anti-communist), and we will maintain a united front and carry out long-term cooperation with all thoroughly anti-Japanese classes, strata, parties and individuals.”

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class includes the extreme counterrevolutionary who always stands on the side of imperialism and is totally incompatible with the objectives of the national revolution.” He also created a class of “higher intellectuals” within the middle class, including bank and commercial employees, most returned students from studying abroad, most professors and students at universities and technical schools, and petty lawyers, stating that “the desire of this class [referring to the middle class] is to rise to the status of the big property class. However, they are unable to develop due to the blows of foreign capital and the oppression of warlords” and therefore have a contradictory attitude toward the Chinese Revolution (Mao Zedong Collection Vol. 1, pp. 163– 164). Most of the above statements have been dropped entirely from the officially published Mao Selected Works. Yet, it seems to me that we can see the origin of his view of intellectuals in such statements.

2 Changes in the Concept of Class after the Founding of the Country Immediately after the founding of the New China, it was expected that the nation would be built on the basis of cooperation among various classes, including the national bourgeoisie, in order to build a “new democratic” society. At the time, Liu Shaoqi, then Vice President of the State, is said to have said to the national capitalists in Tianjin that “exploitation has merit” and that “the more exploitation, the better for the country.” This statement became one of the “charges” against him during the Cultural Revolution. He did not intend, needless to say, to praise the virtual “exploitation” of workers by capitalists, but to insist that even if workers took power under the communist regime, employment relations were necessary, and both capitalists and workers should work hard for economic development to help build the newly established China. Zhu De, principal general of the People’s Liberation Army, also said that it was in the fundamental and long-term interest of the working class to “consciously endure exploitation within a certain limit by the capitalists at the present stage” (Bo 1991, p. 55). The Chinese national flag, the Five-Starred Red Flag, has four small stars around a large star representing the Communist Party, and these four stars represent the workers, the peasants, the intellectuals, and the patriotic capitalists, indicating the class structure of the country. The Flag suggests, undoubtedly, that the four classes cooperate with each other under the leadership of the Communist Party to build a new nation. As has been argued in the previous chapter, socialism was considered a rather distant prospect in China at that time. In fact, Liu Shaoqi said that the “New Democratic” stage would take at least 10 years, possibly as long as 20 years. In 1953, however, Mao Zedong launched the “General Line for the Transitional Period” that would steer the country in the direction of rapid socialization. At this stage, Mao was not saying that socialization should be completed in a shorter period of time. He too was aiming for socialization over a period of 10–15 years, or even longer. But it is

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important to note that he called for a clear systemic shift from “New Democracy” to socialism. For the sake of “socialist industrialization,” he was to launch a policy of rapid agricultural collectivization (nongye hezuohua) and socialist transformation (shehuizhuyi gaizao) of commerce as well as industry. Agricultural collectivization involved taking away land, large livestock, and agricultural machinery and tools from peasants who had become small landowners as a result of the land reform, thus putting them under collective ownership. On the other hand, the socialist transformation of commerce, industry, and handicraft was a project to reform the ownership system, mainly in urban areas, by collectivizing private and individually owned enterprises, turning them into joint public–private ownerships (gongsi heying) in which the state also assumed partial operation. Thus, private stores and factories in the cities had to be given public ownership one after the other. Initially, the plan was to complete this socialist transformation after the Third FiveYear Plan, that is, by 1967, but in July 1955, Mao Zedong criticized the gradualism of Deng Zihui, director of the Party’s rural work department, calling for accelerated agricultural collectivization. This triggered a crazy and rapid collectivization drive, even faster than Mao had expected, throughout the whole countryside. This movement was then quickly followed by the socialization of the urban sector. Thus, rapidly but objectively speaking hastily, socialization was basically completed in 1956. As will be discussed in Chap. 5, this was the impetus for Mao’s “radicalism” and the Great Leap Forward (GLF) that followed. If the country becomes fully socialist, there will be neither landlords nor capitalists, consequently there will be no classes in the strict Marxist sense, so the concept of class struggle itself should essentially disappear. In fact, at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 1956, it was declared that after the socialist transformation of capitalist commerce and industry was basically completed, “the property class (zichan jieji) is already in the process of disappearing as a class … the contradiction between the non-property class (proletariat) and the property class (bourgeoisie) has basically been resolved.” This recognition and understanding were initially shared by Mao Zedong, too. In February 1957, he raised a thesis “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” (hereinafter, referred to as the internal contradictions theory) but even at that stage he stated that “the turbulent class struggle” of the past was over (see Chap. 4 for more details). However, in his article on the internal contradictions theory, which was rewritten after the start of the “Anti-Rightist Struggle” on June 7, 1957, Mao wrote as follows: “The large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have come to an end, but class struggle is by no means over.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 5, p. 395)

Moreover, in his speech at the CPC National Conference on Propaganda Work on March 12, 1957, which seems to have been also rewritten by Mao after the beginning of the Anti-Rightest Struggle, Mao Zedong argued: “[T]here is still class struggle—chiefly on the political and ideological fronts—and it is very acute too.” (ibid., p. 435)

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In other words, at the socialist stage, class is no longer based on ownership or a reflection of the disparity between rich and poor, but on shared political ideas and ideologies. If the political ideology and ideas are different among the people, even the same proletariat will have different classes; one group will be steeped in the bourgeois, another group will be the “genuine” proletariat, therefore, a “class struggle” between them can ensue. Who then decides, and by what criteria, whether a political ideology is “bourgeois” or not? As in the Hu Feng incident covered in Chap. 2, no one among the accused, including Hu Feng along with his associates, considered themselves to be “anti-Party” or “counterrevolutionary.” The same is true of most of those involved in the AntiRightist Struggle dealt with in the next chapter. From Mao Zedong’s point of view, however, if one even slightly questioned the current system of one-party dictatorship, he or she would be judged as denying the Party as well as his own power, and then be regarded as “anti-Party,” “counterrevolutionary,” or “anti-people.” After the end of the Anti-Rightist Struggle that clamped down on those who raised even the slightest objection to him and the Party’s system of rule, Mao stated in 1958: “There are two exploiting classes in China … one is imperialism, feudalism, and the remnants of bureaucratic capitalism (class), i.e., the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and the still unmodified part of the malignant elements, plus the rightists, the domestic Kuomintang, who are the agents of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.” (Shen 2008, pp. 687–688)

Thus, those identified as “rightists” were reduced to the “enemy class”. As will be discussed in Chap. 8, the “Socialist Education Campaign” was developed in the early 1960s, in which attacks were gradually focused on the so-called “persons in power on the capitalist road within the Party,” such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, but this was merely a preparation to eliminate the heretics (in Mao’s view) who occupied the majority within the Party. He regarded one third of the rural political power as not in his hands, judged that one third or a half of the urban industry had already become capitalist, thus concluding that the bourgeoisie had been fully restored in China. Furthermore, he declared: “The bureaucratic class is a class in sharp opposition to the working class and the poor as well as lower middle peasant class … These people have already transformed, or are transforming, into property class elements who suck the blood of the workers.” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 513; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 385)5

The ambiguity of Mao’s view of class is expressed in the fact that he introduces concepts such as “the bureaucratic class,” and anyone who disagrees with his ideas and policies, or is considered to have done so, or is even accused of having done so even when he did not, is a “class enemy,” for him, or at least a “class alien,” or at the very least a “class dissenter.” The term has since fallen into disuse and has been replaced by “capitalist roaders” (zouzipai), that is, persons in power taking the capitalist road. 5

The original is from Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the Country), Vol. 11, pp. 265–266.

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In 1970, Kang Sheng, Mao’s close colleague, stated as follows: “The existence of classes in capitalism is especially evident in the exploitation of the economy. The class in socialist society appears in terms of ideological and political categories, although contradictions also exist in the economic area.” (Schram 1989, p. 234)

Mao Zedong not only accepted these ideas, but in his later years he also developed a new class theory that the bourgeois elements exploited the workers and peasants through the socialist system, or state apparatus (ibid., p. 240). The “bureaucratic class” noted above was replaced here by “bourgeois elements” (in his theory) but in any case, Mao’s class concept was far removed from Marx’s original definition. After the Chinese Revolution, land reform and the socialist transformation resulted in the elimination of landlords and capitalists as well as the equalization of incomes, which in turn led to a shift in class criteria from ownership/asset to ideology/thought, and more specifically, to whether or not the Party and its Supreme Leader were followed. Ownership relations and asset status are visible, but ideology and beliefs are invisible since they are in human minds. Even if a person verbally pledges allegiance to the Party and Chairman Mao, his or her true ideology sometimes surfaces in his or her words, deeds, and attitude. For example, in the Anti-Rightist Struggle of 1957, members of the democratic parties who inadvertently criticized the Party were “upgraded” from the petty bourgeoisie to the bourgeois class. They were condemned as bourgeoisie if they were targeted by the Red Guards or other CR activists. Ideas are transmitted through words and spread like a virus, so a revolution to “remodel” them permanently, a “continuous revolution,” as advocated by Mao, was regarded as necessary. The Sino-Soviet conflict that began at the end of the 1950s was also an ideological conflict between the two countries over socialism. From the perspective of the Soviet Union, socialism was a system in which the workers and peasants had established power, the counterrevolutionary class had disappeared and the class struggle had ended, as a result. There was no danger that the old forces would revive, and the only question remained as to how to develop the economy and move it to the communist stage. From Mao’s point of view, however, socialism is a long process leading to communism, and even in a socialist society where landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists have disappeared, their influence remains in the realm of ideology. Accordingly, the class struggle will continue until they reach a communist society. Consequently, in order to prevent the emergence of new landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists, the struggle must be perpetuated. Understandably this theory of continuous revolution is an extension of his contradiction theory. As mentioned in Chap. 1, Mao’s contradiction theory was that the contradiction called struggle is ongoing and everywhere, so his logic is indeed consistent. The problem is that Mao Zedong regarded the class struggle as not only continuing, but rather as intensifying in the socialist stage. Hu Angang points out that Mao was inspired by Stalin’s theory of “intensifying class struggle” in socialism that he developed in the 1930s (Hu 2008, p. 781). Stalin believed that in the nascent Soviet socialist regime, the former bourgeoisie, cornered by the revolution, would join with foreign powers to violently resist the Party and its leadership as a last-ditch

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effort. He also used this theory as an excuse to purge Nikolai Bukharin, Grigorii Zinoviev, and many of his political rivals and opponents. In China, too, during the Mao era, especially during the CR period, those who had foreign connections or were suspected of having such connections were arrested and persecuted for litong waiguo (having illicit relations with foreign countries). Hu estimates that the number of victims of Mao’s theory of intensified class struggle in China surpassed that of Stalin’s Great Purge in the Soviet Union.6 Nevertheless, as with the Peng Dehuai incident, which will be discussed in Chap. 6, even if there was an aspect of political struggle that developed because of the alleged collusion between the domestic leadership and foreign powers, it was only a “secondary contradiction.” The “principal contradiction” was whether there was a challenge to Mao’s authority and power. To be more precise, when he judged that someone was challenging him and what he considered to be his righteous policies, he would label them “heretic” and when he saw someone challenging him by forming a group, it would be labeled as a heretical group, as anti-Party, counterrevolutionary, bourgeois, etc. In other words, the criterion for class distinction became the distance from Mao Zedong, although there was no objective criterion for that distance itself, since everything was determined by him. The more heretics were eliminated in this way, the more heretics would be regarded as “class enemies” unless they were restored their honor afterwards. Thus, the class struggle would intensify. However, Mao’s theory of intensifying class struggle has a slightly different aspect to Stalin’s. When we look at the reality and mechanism of the “class struggle” that was repeated in rural China from the land reform to the CR movement, we find that it had the following two aspects and characteristics: First, it was a class struggle as a mass movement, which had strong aspects of ideological education and propaganda. The Party sometimes dragged the overthrown landlords and rich peasants to mass rallies, had the masses repeatedly accuse them of “misdeeds,” and developed a campaign to “remind them of the suffering of the past and make them chew the happiness of today (yiku sitian)” in an attempt to repeatedly imprint the justification of the present regime on people’s minds. Wretched are those labeled as the landowning and rich peasant classes, who are dragged to rallies and abused at every class struggle. The other aspect is that the more they abused and persecuted these “class enemies,” the more their paranoid illusions emerged, such as: “Perhaps these enemies will grow resentful. Then they will surely rebel. So, let’s hurt them more so they can’t get up.” This illusion sometimes intensified, especially among local society, spurring on the struggle. Consequently, a vicious cycle emerged in which violence gave birth to delusions of rebellion, which in turn gave birth to more violence. Su Yang, who investigated a number of atrocities in rural Guangxi and Guangdong during the CR period, which will be discussed in Chap. 8, illuminates that the violence of land

6

Although the Cultural Revolution produced the most victims of all political struggles during the Mao era, other political movements also created a vast number of victims, from high-ranking Political Bureau members to nameless peasants, even though they were not executed or sent to labor camps or prisons.

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reform and the seeds of violence in the political movements that followed ultimately led to the tragic events of the Cultural Revolution. “The reason for the use of violence (in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution) was not because there was an opportunity for retaliation by the persecuted individuals—practically speaking, they had no such opportunity. Instead, it was because those perpetrators who employed violence wanted to preemptively prevent that possibility.” (Su 2017, p. 108)

Therefore, in the rural areas during the CR period, when the class struggle intensified, even the infants of those who were labeled as the “enemy class” were killed. The reason was that these infants might retaliate when they grew up. Also, it was not just the actions or thoughts of landlords and rich peasants that were at issue, but “their past class status itself became a lifelong crime” (ibid., p. 109).

3 Land Reform and Class Distinction The fact that Mao’s class theory during the revolutionary era was not based on the ownership of the means of production, as orthodox Marxists had asserted, but in effect on the ownership of assets and the source of income, or more simply, on affluence, was extremely powerful in carrying out his theory of rural revolution, especially land reform, which has been often called the “land revolution” in China. His use of the term “property class” (zichan jieji) for the bourgeoisie and “non-property class” (wuchan jieji) for the proletariat was indeed an appropriate translation for the Chinese concept of class. After the anti-communist coup d’état by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 and the collapse of the cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, Mao Zedong and his followers aimed at revolution by force, then went up to Jinggangshan in Jiangxi Province to establish a revolutionary government in Ruijin called the Soviet Republic of China. For the revolutionary regime, land reform was the first and most important task to establish and expand its power. Compared to the revolution in general and the national liberation struggle in particular, land reform focused on expropriating the land of landlords and rich peasants in order to distribute to landless peasants, so that it was very clear and easy to decide who were enemies and who were friends. The poor and hired peasants (agricultural laborers) would be more active in this movement if they could receive their coveted land for free. On the other hand, the landlords and rich peasants, who are the ones whose land is being taken away from them, will naturally be dissatisfied with the confiscation of their land, even if the regime is buying it up, and will rebel against the regime, making them enemies of the regime. Therefore, the first step in land reform was to classify the rural population, and the regime would confiscate and distribute land according to its upheld standards. The criteria varied slightly from period to period, but basically there were five categories: Landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants or agricultural laborers.

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Let me take the land reforms of the Ruijin era as an example of how the class divisions in the rural areas were defined by the revolutionary government.7 In September 1933, Mao Zedong issued as the President of the revolutionary government a “Declaration of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China,” in which he announced “the guide for surveying land (chatian)” and indicated “how to analyze classes.” The class divisions within the rural areas as stated in this guide are: Landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and laborers, of which laborers effectively refer to hired peasants. Each of these five classes is given a definition, but the definitions in the official Mao Selected Works differ considerably from those in the original text, so I will keep with Imabori Seiji in following the original description (see Imabori 1966, p. 135 and beyond, see also Mao Zedong Collection Vol. 3, pp. 265–268). (1) Landlords own land, to a greater or lesser extent, and do not work themselves, or only perform incidental labor, living solely off exploitation8 consisting of farm rent. Some also practice usury and/or engage in commercial business. Land that is not owned by the individual landlord but owned by the clan or village, such as ancestral hall (gongtang) and scholarship land (xuetian),9 is also considered land exploited by the landlord. There are landlords who have gone bankrupt, but even after bankruptcy they do not work, and live from fraud, looting, and money sent by friends They are still treated as landlords. The government declares that “the landowning class is the main enemy of the land revolution. The (Chinese) Soviet policy toward the landlords is to confiscate all their land property and extinguish the landlord class.” (2) The rich peasants are engaged in agricultural operations and work themselves, but they also hire laborers. Some of the rich peasants rent out a part of their land to tenant farmers. Some of them work as usurers, and still others engage in commercial and handicraft work, thus constantly “exploiting” the peasants. Mao added, “The policy of the Chinese Soviets toward the rich peasants is to confiscate their land. The surplus of their cattle, farming tools, and houses are also confiscated. Then, they will be allocated slightly worse land,” in other words, treated the same as landlords. (3) Most of the middle peasants own land, but a part of them rent some or all of their land. They have considerable labor equipment and live entirely or mostly off their own labor. The land of middle peasants cannot be redistributed without their consent, and middle peasants for whom land is in short supply are given the same amount of land as poor and hired peasants. At the time, there was persecution of middle peasants, especially wealthy middle peasants who were 7

These materials are contained in Mao Zedong Collection Vol. 3. Note that the original text indicates that these instructions were issued in June 1933, but the article entitled “How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas,” in Mao Selected Works Vol. 1 was written by Mao in October 1933 “to correct the deflection that occurred during land reform and correctly solve the land problem.” 8 Here, “exploitation” refers to all income other than compensation for one’s own labor. 9 Ancestral hall refers to ancestral shrines for clans, and scholarship land refers to land held by the same clans to finance education of their young members.

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relatively affluent, so the government treated wealthy middle peasants as middle peasants in general and called for unity with the middle peasants. (4) Poor peasants own some land or none at all and are exploited by usury or work as agricultural laborers. In the distribution of land, they shall receive the same benefits as middle and hired peasants, and a slight portion of land as well as the tools they own shall not be confiscated. (5) The laborers are generally those who have no land or tools at all, or have only very little land and tools, and live entirely or mainly by selling their labor, and the hired peasants are among them. They are given the same amount of land as the poor and middle peasants, and if they have a little land and tools, they are not confiscated. If someone in the family works in the city, he is a laborer and his land is not confiscated unless his family’s main source of livelihood is from crop rent. If the family’s main source of livelihood is from crop rent or loans, the land is confiscated, but the wife and children are given a share of paddy land. By the way, many personal records, surveys, and studies have been published on land reform in China. If we only include the accounts of those who actually participated or were involved in land reform, amongst others, Fukuchi (1954), Belden (1965), Hinton (1972), and Akiyama (1977) have left behind vivid records. William Hinton’s Fanshen, gives an account of his experiences as a tractor engineer in areas of the Taihang Mountains in Shanxi Province which were liberated by the Red Army. It is a moving document describing how poor peasants stood up during land reform or revolution in prewar rural China. As these records clearly show, land reform in China was implemented according to a certain standardized manual. First, a work team was dispatched to the target village to investigate the class structure of the area. The team would then organize poor and hired peasants to create a core group that would fight against the landlords and the rich peasants who were said to have ruled the village. The team would incite the core group of peasants to bring the landlords to a mass meeting to severely criticize those of the land-owning class before the masses, who, in turn, are encouraged to complain and accuse the landlords of their suffering—the “persecution” and “exploitation” they had experienced. This act is called “suffering complaint (suku).” When some of the poor or hired peasants rise to accuse the landlords, others are motivated to stand up in solidarity, one after the other, to charge them. In this way, a kind of “drama of accusations against the landlords” was played out, and a theatrical land reform movement was developed throughout rural China, whether before or after 1949. However, the actual land reforms, especially those implemented after the Communists won victory, were far more drastic than we can imagine from the various first-hand accounts referred to above. Tan Song interviewed about 100 former landlords who fortunately survived in the rural areas of Eastern Sichuan Province, now Chongqing City, in the years between 2003 and 2017. He found that as many as 448 people, including landlord relatives, friends, and neighbors, lost their lives during the land reform movement of 1950–1952, of whom 258 were shot to death, 77 committed suicide, 26 died of starvation, and 87 others were abused (Tan 2018, p. 510). There were no official trials at the time, and there is no way to find out now exactly how many

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landlords, rich peasants, or ordinary peasants were wrongly classified as “landowners” thus “falsely accused” and put to death. One former “landlord” whom Tan met was originally classified as a “poor peasant,” but when it was discovered that he had become the son-in-law of a landowner at some point, his class classification was changed so that he was declared a landlord and tortured. Let me recall that when Liang Shuming pointed out to Mao the fact that he had witnessed a terrible beating at a struggle rally against the landlords, Mao replied, “Because they have suffered from oppression (by landlords) for so many years, once their anger is ignited, they have no inhibitions and beat and curse the landlords” (see Chap. 2). In reality, the struggle against the landlords was not quite as simple as that. It was not just that the poor and hired peasants, who are said to have suffered from oppression for many years, were excited and went too far, as Mao said. Actually the work teams which carried out the land reforms, the Party that led the teams, and indirectly Mao who guided them, inflicted terror on the landlords and rich peasants (or more precisely, “those who were judged as landlords and rich peasants”) and even executed them, thereby creating an unspeakable fear in the whole village to facilitate the establishment of their power in the countryside. At the Political Consultative Conference of the Central People’s Government held in November 1948, Mao Zedong is said to have definitely instructed: “Those who have seized political power must exterminate the landowning class. The landlords must be killed. But we must not kill too many. Unlike garlic chives, a human head does not grow back once it has been cut off.”

So, how many landlords and rich peasants were really killed or committed suicide during the land reforms across the country? There are neither official statistics nor official announcements as to their deaths, so I must rely on estimates. Gao Wangling estimates that 3–5 million people lost their lives in the process of land reform, saying that the majority of them were small and medium landowners, and most of them were beaten to death (Gao 2013, p. 6). According to Margolan, “most researchers agree on a figure of between 2 and 5 million dead,” and that another 4–6 million rich peasants were sent to the labor camps that had just been set up (Margolan 2006, p. 132). By the same token, according to Hu Ping, the number of landlords and rich peasants who were killed amounted to at least 2 million (Tan 2018, p. 3). Song Yongyi also estimates the number of landowners and their families who died “abnormal deaths” over a four-year period at more than 4.7 million, based on the difference between the number of landowners in 1954 after the land reform and the estimated number of landowner population in 1950 before the land reform (Song 2019, p. 17). However, this does not include the abnormal deaths of rich peasants and people of classes other the landlord class, nor does it include the victims of the struggles in the areas liberated before 1949. In any case, there must have been a huge number of landlords and rich peasants, and perhaps also ordinary peasants wrongly classified as landlords or rich peasants, who were sacrificed to the land “revolution.” Land reform has been implemented to varying degrees in many other countries as well. In Japan, agrarian reform was almost forced by the authority of General Headquarters of the ruling U.S. army after the War, while in Taiwan, the Kuomintang

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government adopted a mild policy of reducing rent to 37.5%, which meant that the upper limit for rent tenant farmers had to pay was set at 37.5%. The government then bought up the land of landowners who owned land above a certain limit and paid it back to small farmers at relatively low prices. Certainly, in both Japan and Taiwan, landowners who were forced to sell their land at low prices may have been dissatisfied, but they did not suffer violent confiscation of their land, much less loss of life, as in China. This is because the land reform was a land redistribution project that was intended to motivate landless or tenant farmers to be productive. In contrast, China’s land reform was above all intended to change the power structure in rural areas and establish the power of the Party in the countryside. Simply put, in China, landlords and rich peasants were seen as enemies of the state, the Party, and the common peasantry, whereas in Japan, Taiwan, and other countries that implemented various sorts of land reform, landowners were not enemies at all for the people, but viewed as a part of the people. Mao Zedong defined pre-revolutionary China as a “semi-feudal and semicolonial” country. In his eyes, the landownership system was synonymous with “feudalism.” In the first place, was traditional China a feudal society in the common sense? The most common characteristics of a feudal society are said to be a fixed status and master-servant relationship. For example, if peasants were serfs, they were completely subject to their lords. However, a large-scale, detailed “survey of rural practices” in North China conducted by the South Manchurian Railway Company during the prewar period revealed that peasants at some villages did not even know the boundary of their own villages, and even recently arrived peasants could become “village heads.” These facts obviously negate the existence of a fixed master-servant relationship. This suggests that as the economy became more marketized and the labor force more mobile, fixed status relations were breaking down. No need to say, China is a vast country with a large population and a wide variety of rural types. Some villages are homogeneous but other villages are not so, some villages are endowed with a well-developed commodity economy but other villages are not so, thus villages in traditional China are by no means uniform. Some of the villages would have been close to so-called “feudalistic villages” in the common sense. Also, landlords and rich peasants varied widely in their character. What is clear is that “big landlords” were very few in number and the overwhelming majority of landlords were small landowners. During the CR period, a big rent-receiving house (shouzuyuan) in Sichuan Province was taken up as study material for the class struggle, but this was nothing more than a caricature to portray the “vicious big landlord Liu Wencai.” Let us imagine. In pre-modern Western Europe as well as Japan, on the other hand, land owned by a large landowner was passed on to the eldest son from generation to generation under the patrimonial inheritance system.10 However, there was no such stable land inheritance system in traditional China, which had adopted a custom of equal inheritance for sons. 10

No need to say, the story would be different if the descendants were able to continue to purchase new land, but this was not the case in traditional China, where the supply of land was quite limited, except in the Northeastern part of the country.

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In Communist China, land reform was implemented in a uniform nationwide manner, during a short period of time, and without sufficient preparation, as mentioned above. Moreover, in a system without democratic rules and a fair judicial system, frictions and mistakes, various and often serious, would naturally occur. Moreover, once the labels of landlord or rich peasant were attached, their families suffered indefinitely as they succeeded to the class status of their parents. Here we can see one aspect of the tragedy and cruelty of China’s land reform.

4 Masses, People, and the Mass Line Although the same Chinese characters are used, the meanings of “masses” (qunzhong) and “people” (renmin) in Chinese are slightly different from those in Japanese. To begin with, qunzhong means “crowd” in Japanese, referring to “a group of people gathered in a crowd,” while in Chinese it refers to the masses, but it does not just mean “a large number of people” or “the general public.” This term is usually used in contrast to “cadres” (ganbu). For example, it is often used to refer to the relationship between the masses and the cadres. When they talk about the “mass line” (qunzhong luxian) discussed below, they are referring to a line in which the leading cadres learn from the masses and act with the masses.11 Next is renmin, which sounds like it refers to the populace or individuals in a broad sense, but in the Mao era, it meant the people other than the hostile classes. It meant “fellow citizens,” so to speak. To be more specific, Mao Zedong defined “the people (renmin)” in his speech “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (June 30, 1949), stating: “Who are the ‘people’? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dog of imperialismthe landlord class and bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of these classes, the Kuomintang reactionaries, and their accomplices … Democracy is practiced within the ranks of the people, who enjoy the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association and so on. The right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 4, p. 417)

In his “internal contradictions” theory which I have already discussed (see the previous chapter), Mao Zedong made a distinction between the people and their enemies, and said that contradictions among the people would be dealt with through criticism and persuasion, while antagonistic contradictions would be handled through dictatorship. Thus, the concept of “people (renmin)” had a special meaning in terms of Chinese politics during the Mao era. In the following, to distinguish “people (renmin)” from the general usage, I will denote the latter meaning of “people” as ‘people’ as in Chap. 1. 11

The Chinese language also has the words “the public” (dazhong) and “the populace” (minzhong), but terms such as “public line” and “populace line” are not generally used.

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Let me consider the name of the country, the People’s Republic of China. Since China is a republic of the people, it follows that those who do not belong to the people’s category, non-people, such as former landlords, rich peasants, and the bourgeoisie hostile to the Communist Party, are at least theoretically excluded from its membership, the ‘people’. Although such class labels were abolished in 1979 in the post-Mao era, landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries (counterrevolutionaries), rightists, and bad elements had long been left outside the category of the ‘people’ during the Mao era. As a result, they had been thoroughly suppressed, repeatedly abused, and sometimes tortured. To put it differently, China under Mao Zedong was an extremely discriminatory nation. Discrimination exists in all countries to a greater or lesser extent or in various de facto forms, even if it is not institutionalized, but when the state publicly discriminates and/or encourages discrimination against some of its citizens, it reminds us of the former apartheid regime in South Africa. If we view the masses and the ‘people’ as described above, we can illustrate the relationship between the two as shown in Fig. 1. If all those who have nationality in a country are called the “the nation” or the “public”, they were divided into ‘people’ who constituted the majority and the non-people who were the few excluded from the majority, and the ‘people’ were composed of two groups, i.e. the masses and the cadres. Most of the cadres and some of the masses are Party members, who have become the core during various political movements. It is important to note that the political struggles that have been repeated many times have taken the form of mass movements, and the masses have relentlessly attacked the enemies or the non-people who were considered “counterrevolutionary” under the slogan “Don’t forget the class struggle” which Mao Zedong kept saying until his death. Even the land reform discussed above was a struggle launched by the cadres to provoke the ‘people’ to attack the non-people—landlords and rich peasants, as well as those who were mistakenly or intentionally classified as counterrevolutionaries (mostly middle peasants). If, as a result of that struggle, some of the non-people were assessed as “counterrevolutionary,” they were also excluded from the class of Fig. 1 People and the masses in the Chinese context during the Mao era

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the ‘people,’ and were often executed or committed suicide, that is to say, they were erased from the real world. According to Guo Dehong, Mao Zedong “ignored the rights of the minority and gave no guarantees to their rights because he thought that it was democratic so long as the majority had democratic rights” (Guo 2009). In reality, however, the “democracy” that was supposed to be granted to the majority was in fact nothing more than a blanket concept, and the minorities, who were regarded as non-people, were often ignored and denied their right even to a normal life. By the way, the “mass line” mentioned above is a political term sometimes used by Mao Zedong and widely used in China, but what exactly does it mean? According to the official theory, its definition and substance are given in Mao’s article “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (June 1943). He explains it as follows: “In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses.’ This means: take the ideas of the masses … and concentrate them …, then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action ….” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 3, p. 119)

In other words, applying the philosophy of “On Practice,” he insisted on the endless repetition of “from the masses to the cadres and from the cadres to the masses again,” as Fig. 2 in Chap. 1 shows, thereby elevating the masses’ opinions from emotional to rational knowledge, which he named the mass line. Even bourgeois democracy, which Mao hated, could allow for repeated exchanges of views between the masses and the cadres through freedom of speech and assembly; moreover this would be more efficient than the mass line Mao advocated, but according to him, bourgeois democracy was a system for the ruling class to exploit the masses, while China should rather refer to Lenin’s “proletarian democracy” and “democratic centralization.” In fact, Lenin asserted as follows: “Proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy; Soviet power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.” (Lenin Collected Works Vol. 28, p. 243, emphasis in original text)12

But the history of socialist countries proves that proletarian democracy was not actually even one percent as democratic as bourgeois democracy, and even that percent was often ignored by Mao Zedong. Kojima Tomoyuki, who studied the mass line in Chinese politics, points out that although the mass line in China refers to the constant direct exchange of wills between the Party and the masses, in practice, the masses are positioned as objects to be guided by the Party, and the mass line is “a tool” for effectively guiding the masses (Kojima 1985, pp. 8–9). There is no doubt that this line is a method of leadership by the Party, and it was Mao’s unique method during and even after the revolutionary struggle of drawing energy from the masses. 12

This sentence is taken from Lenin’s “The Proletarian Revolution and the Apostate Kautsky,” but history is ruthless, and as Kautsky criticized, proletarian power has turned into a violent mass repressive apparatus.

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The prototype of such a mass line is said to have been born and implemented under the revolutionary regime, i.e. the Soviet Republic of China, which was established in Jinggangshan as argued above. Kojima points out the following: “During the era of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Communist Party aimed to establish itself as a political organization through direct interactions with the masses, engaging in faceto-face encounters and experiences. By accumulating and organizing these experiences, the prototype of the mass line was gradually developed as a fundamental principle of the Party’s political and organizational work.” (Kojima 1985, p. 83)

Specifically, policies were carried out to meet the various demands of the masses, including guidance in peasant struggles for land reform, technical support in agricultural production, and solutions to problems of marriage and education, as well as literacy (ibid., p. 88). In this way, the peasant masses came to feel a sense of unity with the Party and the Soviet Republic (government) (ibid., p. 89). Thus, the latter succeeded in mobilizing the peasants for the armed struggle against the Kuomintang, which was the biggest challenge for the Party and the Chinese Soviet government at the time, at least for a few years before they finally abandoned Jinggangshan district and went on the Long March to Gansu Province. However, the mass line at that time was by no means only a pretty story. Kojima Tomoyuki aptly points out that there was also an aspect of “unity of ‘fear’ by coercive means” between the peasant masses and the Red Army (ibid., p. 91). The “Futian incident,” often referred to as a “stain” on China’s revolutionary struggles, was the most extreme example of that kind of fear.13 After the Long March, Mao and his followers established a base (liberated area) in Yan’an. The “Yan’an way,” which Mark Selden highly praises, represents all the policies for the masses and mass mobilization campaigns they implemented at such a base. The campaigns included the “Having Better Troops and Simpler Administration ( jingbing jianzheng) Movement” to reduce administrative personnel and organizations, the “Going to the Countryside (xiaxiang) Movement” to send cadres and intellectuals from other areas to the countryside in an attempt to break down barriers between the elite and the peasantry, the movement to reduce crop rent and interest on loans, and the cooperative movement, the production expansion movement, and the mass education movement (Selden 1976). According to Selden, the “significant features of this way [the “Yan’an way” or China’s mass line] include a great faith in the creative power of the Chinese people, especially the peasantry, and a belief that man will triumph in the end over nature, poverty, and exploitation.” Underlying this way of working, according to him, was an idea of human nature that sees man, all men, as capable of acting creatively in building a New China without the limits of class, experience, and ideology, but this line had actually a negative aspect as argued below. The Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958 could be said to be a nationwide version of the movement that took place in the liberated areas in Yan’an in the late 1930s and 1940s. Certainly there were no tragedies in Yan’an as there were during and after the GLF movement. There were probably a few deaths from starvation during 13

For more on the Futian incident, see Chap. 2, note 17.

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the Yan’an period. There is no way that a policy generating mass starvation would have been adopted in the midst of the revolutionary struggle and the anti-Japanese War. In any event, however, did all the people “act creatively” as Selden idealized? With reference to Chap. 1, was Wang Shiwei, a popular writer who tried to produce creative literary works, not killed by the Party? Was the mass line during the Yan’an period, at least in terms of the style and method of mass participation, not actually a “guided” and “mobilized” campaign that also led to the various mass movements after the founding of the country? Tanaka Kyoko, who studied the rural revolutionary movement centering on land reform during the Civil War period (1946–49), argues that the rural revolution in China was not spontaneously launched by the peasants to overthrow the old ruling class, but was carried out according to the Party’s predetermined procedures, with mass mobilization coming from above, and that the spontaneous struggle of the peasants was rather defined by the “lacking-leadership” (ziliu) phenomenon (Tanaka 1996, p. 411). Next, I look at the mass line after the Party seized power in 1949, by taking agricultural collectivization as a typical example. Collectivization after the founding of the country was a continuation of the trend of “cooperativization” that was part of the Yan’an way, and it expanded from the mutual aid teams to elementary cooperatives, then to advanced cooperatives. Looking at the methods by which collectivization developed at that time, we can see the essence of the mass line. From Mao Zedong’s point of view, the masses actively promoted the movement on their own initiative, while the cadres were driven by the movement from below. However, it should not be overlooked that various forms of coercion and threat were in fact used to induce the peasants to join the movements. Takahashi Nobuo notes the role that “fear” played in agricultural collectivization, saying that Mao knew that “fear” could both prevent rebellion against the revolutionary regime and serve as a catalyst for mobilization (Takahashi 2017, pp. 28–29). In other words, the counterrevolutionary purge (sufan) movement that developed in late 1955 was linked to the then growing agricultural collectivization drive. According to Gao Wangling, who has unearthed numerous rural historical documents at the local archives (dang’anguan)14 two trends were observed among rural cadres during the “high tide” (gaochao) of agricultural collectivization during 1955– 56 in rural Hubei: One was a negative attitude toward the collectivization policy, and the other was a coarse attitude toward peasants. For example, one cadre said, “A storm has come, good or bad, let’s do it all at once first,” and another said, “Chairman Mao has given us instructions, let’s punish (zheng) the troublesome middle peasants now.” In Fujian, under the political pressure of eliminating “individual farmers” (dan’gan) there was a rash advance to collectivization with a demand for target figures, and those townships where collectivization had not progressed at all had to submit to a target that 80–90% of peasant households must join the cooperatives in all townships (Gao 2013, p. 36).

14

Archives that collect and store historical materials from various regions or departments.

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What is inconceivable is that from 1955 to 1956, almost all peasants were swallowed up by the wave of collectivization at an explosive rate, as if rushing into a tidal wave. Was there some special force at work that could not be explained by coercion or intimidation from above? Gao Wanglin speculates that a kind of group mentality was at work. They may have been driven by a kind of “fear.” Gao’s interpretation is that while they “worshipped” power on one hand, they were crowded together and felt secure, on the other hand, when everyone did the same thing (ibid., p. 37). It is natural for human beings to have the mindset of “not wanting to be left behind,” since they are afraid of being alone in the world. If we consider a village as a unit, it is understandable that village leaders would be impatient if many villages collectivize, and only their village goes against the flow. This suggests that the intense competition for performance (panbi) among provinces, prefectures, the lower levels of the hierarchy, such as townships and villages, and among cadres, who involved most of all peasants, became a powerful engine for the collectivization drive (Nakakane 1992). The motives of Chinese peasants for joining the collectives must not have been uniform. Certainly, there was truly voluntary collectivization by peasants, in different villages, and in different regions, which excited and inspired Mao Zedong. However, would many peasants willingly give up their farmland, which they had acquired through land reform? The Party gave preferential treatment in terms of funds and fertilizers to some of the peasants who were the first to collectivize their lands, and advertised their increased productivity as if it were the result of collectivization. Vivienne Shue says that although fear and coercion sometimes played a decisive role in the socialization of rural China in the 1950s, the greatest force that motivated the peasants was material incentives (Shue 1980, p. 328). It is certain that diverse factors worked in China’s agricultural collectivization. However, there is no doubt that, at the very least, it was not driven solely by the peasants from below, i.e., not along purely mass lines, but rather by outside forces and pressure and/or guidance from above. Otherwise, when the government loosened its control after the post-Mao regime started, the collective farming would not have been easily dismantled and have disintegrated. What, in the end, was the mass line? The provision of various benefits to the masses, especially to the peasants, such as sanitation, education, technology dissemination and land distribution, were either neglected or not implemented during the KMT period even though the need for such benefits was advocated. However, this line did not actually start “from among the masses,” nor did it advance the movement with the masses as its main subject, but only used the masses as a means and tool to realize the goals of the Party as well as the government. After the GLF movement, when China’s farming villages suffered from starvation and the masses of peasants spontaneously broke up collective farming in Anhui Province and elsewhere, Mao Zedong took a strong dislike to this trend (see Chap. 8). The “mass line” is often thought of as a policy system that values the initiative of the masses, but Mao absolutely refused to allow any action “from within the masses” to develop against his will.

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Tokuda Noriyuki argues that the mass line has two poles: Guidance by the Party, on one hand, and mass spontaneity, on the other hand, and has in fact swung between them like a pendulum, and guidance has also swung between authoritarian and democratic guidance (Tokuda 1977, p. 276). Where, then, does that pendulum stop? If the spontaneity of the masses and democratic leadership are “right” in Mao’s view, it will go in that direction, and if it is even a little “wrong,” he will exercise guidance, especially authoritarian guidance, to “correct” the masses. If the mass line that Selden has dreamed of was ideally a politics “of the masses, by the masses, and for the masses,” to borrow Abraham Lincoln’s phrase, then the actual mass line pursued by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders was never a politics “of the masses” despite its nominal objective of “for the masses” and its “by the masses” form of mobilization. It was never a politics “of the masses,” because the masses were in fact not the protagonists (zhurenweng) as the Party had stated.

5 Class Struggle and Violence In China, Mao Zedong is acclaimed as a great thinker and revolutionary who combined the universal truths of Marxism with the realities of China. What, then, did he learn from Marx? Li Rui, one of Mao’s secretaries but disgraced during the GLF period, answered in a straightforward manner, “What he learned from Marx is only four letters jie ji dou zheng (class struggle). But Marxism is not like that. The Communist Manifesto contains other words, for example, ‘the association of free people’” (Li 2006). Why, then, was Mao particularly fascinated by class struggle theory from the doctrine of Marxism, one of the modern schools of thought? As a great reader he had read a good deal of Marx’s works through Chinese translations, though not as many as Chinese history books (Lin and Ling 1994). But perhaps the first part of the Communist Manifesto, “The history of all human society, past and present, has been the history of class struggles,” strongly impressed and shocked him. I imagine that the young Mao Zedong, upon hearing the phrase “class struggle,” might have exclaimed excitedly, “The reason why China has been ruled by foreign powers and the revolution has failed so far is that there was no class analysis or class struggle theory, so that we did not know who our enemy was and who was our friend!”15 Marx’s ideals, such as the “association of free people” could not and would not have been understood by him. He did not primarily have Marx’s philosophical reflection on “freedom.” Moreover, I feel that Mao’s view of ‘people’ was totally alien to that of Marx. 15

Mao Zedong said, “I still remember. In 1920 I read for the first time Kautsky’s Class Struggle, Chen Wangdao’s translation of the Communist Manifesto, and an Englishman’s History of Socialism, and there I learned that there had been class struggle since the beginning of mankind and that class struggle was the driving force of social development. I acquired a way, albeit rudimentary, to recognize the problem” (Takeuchi 1989, p. 55).

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For Mao Zedong, revolution meant just seizing power by overthrowing the existing forces, and since the old forces included the landowning class, the bourgeoisie, and the imperialist forces that colluded with them, revolution meant (1) overthrowing the enemy classes and establishing political power, more specifically, (2) socialization, such as land reform, collectivization in rural areas, and nationalization in urban areas, and (3) the extermination of foreign powers and national liberation. The revolutionary forces he identified were the peasants, especially the poor and hired peasants. Using the model mentioned above, Mao calculated that the proletariat was so small in prerevolutionary China that the revolutionary force could not rely on them alone, but that if a vast number of poor and hired peasants as well as other peasant forces joined in the struggle, even if their class factor was weaker than that of the proletariat, Mao had calculated that the overall revolutionary strength would exceed that of the bourgeoisie and the landlords.16 Even though he learned the concept of class from Marx and others, it was only a borrowing, as part of the “Sinicization of Marxism,” and he basically changed the concept of class based on the ownership system to one based on wealth, as I stressed above. The result was a simple and clear distinction between the rich in society as the “bad class” and the poor as the “good class,” and the “revolution” was for the poor to seize wealth and power from the rich. If it was his revolutionary strategy for the rural to encircle the urban, it was his ultimate class strategy for the poor to encircle the rich. It could be said to be a kind of “revolution of the poor”17 ideology. The Chinese Revolution would not have succeeded if, like Marx, he had positioned the peasants as a kind of “petty bourgeoisie” and excluded them from the mainstay of the revolution. For a pragmatist like Mao Zedong, the theoretical analysis of class and the logical consistency of the class theory he advocated were not important at all. The deprivation of the wealth of the rich by the poor seems to have been a tremendous engine in the execution of the revolution in two ways: First, it benefited the poor majority economically and strengthened their support and cooperation with the Communist Party. Even if it was done in a violent manner, nothing would make the poor in rural areas, especially the poor and hired peasants, happier if they were given free shares of land and other assets that were owned by the relatively rich classes, such as landlords and rich peasants. Or, if the heavy debts owed to landowners and loan sharks were cancelled, how happy the debt-stricken poor would have been! Moreover, with regard to land reform during the revolutionary struggle, they did not know when the KMT would return, and in order to maintain the joy that the Red Army had given them, they would have had to cooperate with the revolutionary regime even more. Another thing is that seizing power from the rich would have created a sense of emancipation and exaltation among the masses, which would have increased their 16

If we replace Np (proletariat) in the above equation with poor and hired peasants, etc., this argument holds. 17 Revolution of the poor refers to the social transformation of the working class and the poor through revolution.

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positive attitude toward the revolutionary struggle. This sense may have also been derived from a feeling that the poor peasants would become socially as well as politically superior to the landlords and rich peasants. In addition, in my view, the more violently and brutally the rich class was overthrown, the more the masses were seized by fear, and so compelled to cooperate in the struggle. During the land reform process many landlords and rich peasants, as well as all those who were labeled as such, were harshly punished and subjected to awful abuse, intentionally or unintentionally, by the work teams or the Party, in order to persecute the rich. What happens once one is labeled a “class enemy” naturally became deeply etched in the minds of the people during the revolutionary struggle and even after the success of the revolution as they experienced repeated political struggles. The fear instilled in the masses during the Chinese Soviet period in the early 1930s, as discovered by Kojima Tomoyuki, was used directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, not only in the subsequent land reform movements, but also in the purge campaigns and various mass movements that called themselves “class struggles” after the founding of the People’s Republic. It was an indispensable means for the Party to maintain its power. Without understanding this aspect, it seems impossible to talk about social governance in China during the Mao era. Why, then, did Mao Zedong use the means of terror and violence? There appear to have been two sources: One source is derived from the theory of violent revolution enunciated in the Communist Manifesto. Marx and Engels write: “Communists openly declare that their purposes can only be achieved by the forcible overthrow of the whole extant social order.” (my emphasis)

This was carried over into Lenin’s State and Revolution, which led to the seizure of power through violence. What Mao Zedong learned from the Communist Manifesto was not just the four words “class struggle,” as Li Rui pointed out. Another source is the traditional Chinese idea of rule by force, represented, for example, by the First Emperor of Qin. In his youth, Mao Zedong experienced intense violence and a cycle of violence in the rural areas of Hunan. In his “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” (March 1927), there is the following famous passage: “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 1, p. 28, my emphasis)

I think that he must have connected his personal experience with the theory of violent revolution in the Communist Manifesto. Furthermore, he did not endorse, but rather glorified, the “excessive” acts of violence in which the peasants rose up and violently beat to death and dragged around local tyrants, evil gentry (tuhao lieshen)18 and landowners. As is well known, Engels discovered the possibility of legitimate

18

They refer to local bosses, some of whom were landowners.

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regime change through universal suffrage in his later years,19 but from the perspective of Mao Zedong, who firmly believed that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,”20 such universal suffrage in modern societies is part of a “refined, gentle, temperate, and courteous” bourgeois system. According to Mao’s logic, revolution is an insurrection and an act of violent upheaval, so if an act is judged to be “revolutionary,” any violence is permissible. Conversely, if an act is judged to be “counterrevolutionary,” then any violence against the actor is likely to be tolerated. And in a society where laws and legal institutions do not function properly, the violence is unchecked. During the CR period, the slogan “rebellion is justified (zaofan youli), revolution is not a crime (geming wuzui)” was proclaimed throughout entire China, and violence was not only tolerated but often encouraged and even taken to extreme levels. The victims were not only the rebel workers, students, and “revolutionary masses” who wielded knives and firearms, killing each other, but mostly included the innocent and unarmed masses, especially the “non-people” (see Chap. 8 for more details). It is Wu Guoguang who captures appropriately the essence of China’s land reform. The movement first created resentment against the landlords, then used violence, and at the same time sublimated resentment and violence into class conflict, laying the class base and mass foundation for the proletarian dictatorship. And again, the violence was used against the peasants. The violence also seriously “educated” the peasants, making it easier to take land away from those peasants who were given it and incorporate them into collectivization (Wu 2019). Chinese villages are so diverse that they can never be simplified, but as noted above, in many traditional Chinese farming villages, a handful of vicious landowners did not rule the entire village like a despot. Some villages had strong kinship bonds, others were highly mobile, and the situation was not necessarily colored by severe class conflict as Mao Zedong had described. As Wu Guoguang suggests, it was land reform and violent land reform that created class and conflict rather than class conflict creating land reform. After all, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mao Zedong interpreted Marxism in his own way and used it for his own purposes, namely, to liberate the country and seize power in China, thereby to establish, maintain and expand his own power. At best, he interpreted and used Marxism pragmatically in the name of the “Sinicization of Marxism,” and at worst, he ignored and discarded Marx’s ideals of liberation of humankind and association of free people. Otherwise, such a ruthless statement and idea that “the landlords must be killed” would never have come about.

19

Engels wrote this in his “Preface to the monograph on Marx’s ‘The Class Struggle in France, 1948–1850’” (1895). 20 Remarks made at an emergency enlarged meeting of the Party Central Committee in Hankou in August 1927. At this meeting, Mao Zedong criticized the Party’s approach of only conducting mass movements instead of military action. These words also appear in “Problems of War and Strategy” (November 1938) (in Mao Selected Works, Vol. 2).

Chapter 4

The Development of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and Its Aftermath: Turning Point of the Chinese Politics during the Mao Era

After the founding of the People’s Republic, Mao promoted various movements, but the Anti-Rightist Struggle (hereinafter, often referred to as the Struggle in this chapter) that began in June 1957 is notable in that it brought about a major and serious change in Chinese politics and society, even though it was not as large in scale as either the Great Leap Forward (GLF) or the Cultural Revolution (CR), and more short-lived than these two movements. In the sense that no one had been able to criticize Mao Zedong since this Struggle, it was a major political turning point in contemporary Chinese history. It is common to distinguish in post-revolutionary China between the period before and after the reform and opening-up in 1978. But if we divide the Mao era into two periods, it seems reasonable to divide it according to the periods before and after the Struggle. This incident was thus an important turning point in contemporary Chinese history. This movement, known as the Anti-Rightist Struggle, has not received as much attention as the GLF and the CR movements, but it has gained more attention as the full picture of it has come to light, with the publication of a series of detailed research works, records, and personal accounts by authors such as Shen Zhihua (2008), Zhu Zheng (2013), Qian Liqun (2012), and Fang Wenzhai (2012), amongst others. In this chapter, I will first trace the entire process of the movement, how it started, how it developed, and how it ended up, based mainly on these research works and documents, then consider the meaning of this Struggle in my own way.

1 Prehistory of the Anti-Rightist Struggle: A Hundred Flowers Blossom, a Hundred Schools of Thought The Struggle usually refers to the campaign to purge “rightists” which began with the June 8, 1957 editorial in the People’s Daily, “Why is this?” The editorial triggered a widespread and thorough purge of intellectuals, democratic parties, Party and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_4

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government cadres, engineers, teachers, and students who were labeled “rightists.”1 Mao Zedong had repeatedly criticized “bourgeois” ideology and conducted purge campaigns known as the “rectification movement,” even during the revolutionary period, but the most thoroughgoing of these was the Anti-Rightist Struggle. After Deng Xiaoping started the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, this Struggle and its results were reevaluated, and those who were criticized and ousted, or became victims, were mostly restored to honor. Deng Xiaoping, who led this movement on Mao’s behalf, expressed regret for having expanded the scope of the Struggle too widely. However, he still justified the Struggle itself, citing Mao’s instructions as necessary. In retrospect, this perspective may resemble his response to the Tiananmen Square protests on June 4, 1989, when he suppressed the mass protest with tanks and bullets. Although the Struggle was an incident in which various national as well as international political events were linked directly or indirectly, at least the following four incidents and situations are important to know as background. The first was Nikita Khrushchev’s secret report criticizing Stalin in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in February 1956. Stalin, who had been treated as God in his country and the socialist bloc, was revealed as a cruel dictator by Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party; subsequently the movement to ban “personality cults” spread to the communist parties of other socialist countries. At the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in September 1956, Mao Zedong supported the Soviet Communist Party’s policy in his opening speech, and Liu Shaoqi followed the Soviet Union by criticizing personality cults in his Political Report, which was later incorporated into the Party’s action policy. Second, criticism of Stalin triggered the Pozna´n Riots in Poland in June 1956 and the larger-scaled uprising in Hungary in October 1956. The Pozna´n Riots, which took the form of demonstrations by factory workers demanding improvement of working conditions, were joined by citizens, developing into a major incident with anti-Soviet overtones and many casualties. The Polish United Workers Party (Communist Party), weakened by criticism of Stalin, was unable to contain the situation, and the Soviet Union even went so far as to intervene militarily. The Soviet Union’s intervention was prevented by reinstating Wladyslaw Gomułka, a nationalistic communist who had been in prison under the Stalinist regime, but more importantly by promising the Soviet Union that Poland would remain in the Warsaw Pact, the USSR led military alliance of the socialist bloc. Criticism of Stalin also spread to Hungary, which deposed the Stalinist dictator Rákosi Mátyás and later elected nationalist Nagy Imre as head of the Socialist 1

Democratic parties in China include the following political organizations: China Democratic League, Chinese Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, China Democratic Construction Association, China Association for Promoting Democracy, Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Party, Jiu San Society, Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. Although these are nominally independent organizations, in reality they are all under the control of the Communist Party.

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Workers’ Party (Communist Party), who, driven by the masses, declared the abolition of the one-party dictatorship, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the nation’s neutralization. This then led to the intervention of Soviet troops. As a result, fierce street fighting ensued, resulting in a major political incident that left as many as 17,000 dead and 200,000 people fleeing the country. These “anti-Soviet and antisocialist” movements and riots both in Poland and Hungary greatly shocked the Chinese leadership, prompting them to analyze where the popular discontent in the socialist system came from and why such violent anti-party, anti-socialist, and antiSoviet riots had occurred. As I will point out later, the incidents also had a profound impact on Chinese intellectuals and youth. Third, criticisms of Stalin gradually motivated China to “shift away from the Soviet Union,” although China had long adopted a “pro-USSR” and “Lean to the Soviet Union” policy. In April 1956, Mao delivered a speech titled “On the Ten Major Relationships” at an enlarged meeting of the Party’s Central Political Bureau in which he called for a “more active role by regional governments” and emphasized not only heavy industry but also agriculture as well as light industry, which were not part of the conventional Soviet-style centralized economic development policy (see Chap. 7). Fourth, one of the countermeasures to people’s dissatisfaction with the regime was the relatively mild policy of “Let a hundred flowers blossom (baihua qifang), a hundred schools of thought contend (baijia zhengming)” (hereinafter referred to as the “Double Hundreds (shuangbai)”). The “Double Hundreds” policy was developed under the direction of Mao Zedong himself, who delivered a speech at the Supreme State Council in May 1956, in which he stated that the Communist Party should allow a variety of cultures and arts (baihua), allow a variety of thoughts (baijia) to be expressed, and, moreover, allow a good deal of criticism of the Party (members). It also stated that the Party aimed to unite all the people and stabilize the nation by changing their three styles of work (zuofeng), namely, bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism. Mao also appealed to the democratic parties to cooperate with each other under the policy of long-term coexistence and mutual supervision with the Communist Party. Mao believed that the anti-government riots in Poland and Hungary occurred because the leadership was too “bureaucratic” and did not listen to the demands of the masses. However, because of the 1955 Hu Feng incident (discussed in Chap. 2) and the subsequent sufan (purge) movement, almost everyone was afraid to express own opinions openly, so that the “Double Hundreds” movement failed to progress as expected, and stagnated. In order to overcome this situation, on February 27, 1957, at the Supreme State Council (enlarged), which also included non-Party members, Mao Zedong delivered a four-hour seminal talk entitled “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.” This is what is known as the “internal contradictions theory,” which is also discussed in Chap. 1. In this talk, Mao Zedong argued as follows: “At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata, and social groups which favor, support and work for the cause of socialist construction fall within the category of the ‘people’, while the social forces and groups which resist socialist revolution and are

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4 The Development of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and Its Aftermath … hostile or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the ‘people’.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 5, p. 385)

He appealed to all participants in the Council in the following way: “The internal problems of the ‘people’ must not be solved by violent methods. All attempts to use administrative orders or coercive measures to settle ideological questions or questions of right or wrong are not only ineffective but harmful … The only way to settle questions of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the ‘people’ is by the democratic method, the method of discussion, criticism, and persuasion, not by methods of coercion and repression.” (ibid., p. 389)

In summary, what Mao was trying to say in his theory of internal contradictions among the ‘people’ may be summarized as follows: (a) The socialist transformation of the ownership system, i.e., the collectivization of agriculture, the transformation of urban private enterprises into public–private joint ventures, and the collectivization of handicraft industries, has basically ended and the class structure has changed accordingly, thus ending the stormy ( jifeng baoyu) mass class struggle that had existed in the past. (b) There are two kinds of contradictions in society: Antagonistic contradictions and contradictions among the ‘people’, and while enemies outside the category of the ‘people’ must be resolutely suppressed, contradictions among the ‘people’ can be resolved by means of criticism and self-criticism, unity-criticismunity. (c) If it is a matter of “within the ‘people’” it is fine and even welcome to raise objections and criticize the Communist Party in light of the spirit of the “Double Hundreds.” (d) Some workers are striking and students are making noises, but we do not need to be concerned about them. The bureaucracy’s failure to properly listen to their demands is the cause of their dissatisfactions, and society will stabilize if ideological education is promoted and such internal contradictions among the ‘people’ are resolved. This talk was recorded and listened to by many people besides the conference participants, causing a powerful and even emotional response. For example, Xu Zhucheng, editor-in-chief of the Wenhuibao (a newspaper of the democratic parties), who heard the talk at the Political Consultative Conference on March 8, expressed particular excitement about the following words: “Looking at the domestic situation, the era of wild class struggle has passed. It is true that the Party’s ‘commandism (command style)’, bureaucracy, and isolationism are still extremely worrisome. The CPC Central Committee has decided to start rectification (zhengfeng) at an early date and I hope that our friends outside the Party will assist us. But we will not force them to do so. Chairman Mao’s speeches are always full of wit. For example, when he talks about rectification, he says that this is no longer a heavy storm, nor a moderate rain (zhongyu), but a light rain (maomaoyu), a gentle breeze and drizzling rain (hefeng xiyu).” (Shen 2008, p. 483)

Members of democratic parties who listened to the recorded talk could almost feel the pleasant warmth of “spring breezes” in Mao’s speech (Dai 1990, p. 166). In this way, Mao Zedong improved the social atmosphere that had been marred by criticisms of Hu Feng and the subsequent purges, and drew up a strategy to stimulate debate, to discipline the Party as well as the government, and to unite the

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whole ‘people’, who make up the majority of the nation. The recognition that the era of wild class struggle was over was also the keynote of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and it was an expression of the Party’s determination to shift its strength “from struggle to construction” in the future. On the other hand, he appealed to Party members to accept positively and fearlessly any criticisms from the ‘people’ and from outside the Party. In response to Mao’s talk, the Party and government media, including the People’s Daily, called on people to speak out boldly.2 At the same time, Mao himself traveled around the country to explain the Party’s new policy. At the roundtable discussion on March 6 with the heads of propaganda and education departments of nine provinces and municipalities, Mao Zedong made his recommendation in the following terms: “The Constitution stipulates that those who have the right to vote have freedom of speech. We must let people speak. I can criticize him, he can criticize me. This is freedom of speech. Some people ask whether Marxism can be criticized or not. If Marxism can be defeated by criticism, then let it fall. Such Marxism has been proven to be useless.” (Dai 1990, p. 251)

Many intellectuals must have been moved by this statement: “Marxism can be criticized, and even Chairman Mao can be criticized, so it is true that we can let ‘a hundred schools of thought contend.’” In March and April, when Mao traveled south from Tianjin to speak to Party cadres in various places, he claimed that the class struggle was basically over and that he would focus his efforts on economic construction from now on. Mao was not alone. Liu Shaoqi also addressed the Congress of Party Leaders in Shanghai in April, stressing that the class contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had basically been resolved and that the internal contradictions among the ‘people’ had become the principal contradiction, then he stressed that there was “no need to emphasize the struggle or deliberately and artificially intensify the struggle” (Li 1999b, p. 47). Thus, intellectuals, cultural figures, and scholars who had initially been reluctant to speak out were moved by Mao’s strong “recommendation,” and gradually began to speak out more boldly. The decisive moment was Mao’s April 30 speech to the Supreme State Council, where the heads of democratic parties and independents were also invited and Mao again appealed to non-Party intellectuals to cooperate with the Party’s rectification movement. He acknowledged that intellectuals did not necessarily support socialism or Marxism, and asked them to take time to understand it even though it might be painful for them. Mao frankly confessed that the Communist Party was weak on science. He admitted that the class struggle had basically ended in the country and so began the struggle against nature, that the era of construction had begun and that they needed to gain more experience in this respect. In addition, he went so far as to touch on the issue of how to manage the university and even proposed to abolish the current Party committee system, that is, the system in which the Party committee has supreme decision-making authority within the university, thus reforming the system of the university as a center of the intelligentsia. 2

Mao Zedong deliberately summoned Deng Tuo and other cadres of the People’s Daily to his home and gave them a pep talk to speak out boldly.

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Photo 4.1 Zhang Bojun. He capitulated completely in the face of Mao Zedong’s criticism but harbored secret contempt for Mao’s comprehension of Marxism. Source Baidu

I can picture how very excited the intellectuals and independents must have been at the talk. Zhang Bojun, then Vice President of the China Democratic League as well as Minister of Transportation, immediately returned to the Central Committee of the League to deliver Mao’s talk. He must have been confident that “This time, Chairman Mao is speaking his true feelings. Chairman Mao’s ‘Double Hundreds’ policy is not a whim. Let’s point out the problems with previous policies and extend a helping hand to Chairman Mao and the Communist Party.” Little did he know that he would soon be hit not by a “light rain,” much less a “gentle breeze,” but by a “huge storm” (Photo 4.1). In this later talk, Mao Zedong announced his real feelings which were not made public and did not attract much attention. That is, he said that he would step down as President of the State at the next National People’s Congress election, and furthermore allowed this to be divulged to others.3 Surprised to hear this, democrats Chen Shutong and Huang Yanpei jointly wrote a letter to Mao, petitioning him not to resign as President of the State, and contacted Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai to convey their hope that they would persuade him to reconsider. The problem was that Chen Minshu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, one of the democratic parties, wrote to Mao on May 18 praising him greatly for his decision not to become the next President of the State, saying: “Not only has this broken the personality cult and created a noble as well as great character in the world, but it has also inspired tens of millions of 3

He spoke about the term limits for Chairman of the Party and President of the State at the Beidaihe Conference in the summer of 1956 and divulged that he would step down as President of the State at an appropriate time just before the Party’s Eighth National Congress in September of that year (Hu 2008, p. 774). Xinhuanet has an article titled “Jiemi 1954nian weihe Mao Zedong yao qingyuan ci guojia zhuxi (Uncover why Mao Zedong requested to resign as President of the State in 1954).” https://news.sina.com.tw/books/history/barticle/16245.html.

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Party and non-party cadres.” This alone would have been an irritating compliment for Mao, but Chen Minshu further added the following admonitions and warnings, saying that Mao had a tendency to “have a fondness for the grandiose” (haoda xigong), meaning that he should observe more deeply and seek better results, and that he was sometimes “very emotional” (xinu suocheng), which could easily damage the self-esteem of high-ranking officials and their status, even insinuating that he was wrong about the executives. He further wrote that Mao tended to be credulous of erroneous reports and dogmatic analyses sent by cadres, making decisions that were too radical (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 156). Furthermore, based on Mao’s instructions, Li Weihan of the CPC Central United Front Department invited the heads of various democratic parties and independent democratic figures to hold a roundtable discussion to hear their opinions on the Communist Party, during which Zhang Xiruo, then Minister of Education, an independent intellectual, pointed out that Mao had “four biases.” That is, in addition to the “haoda xigong” mentioned above, he cited the shortcomings of “seeking immediate merits” ( jikong jinli), “disregarding the past” (bishi jiwang), and “being optimistic about the future” (mixin jianglai) (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 156). Indeed, Mao decided to overthrow intellectuals and democrats mainly in the political context, but it is easy to imagine that these provocative expressions, whether by Chen Minshu or by Zhang Xiruo, hurt the “Supreme Leader’s” feelings and undermined his prestige. As will be described later, Mao Zedong then secretly determined to initiate the Struggle by writing a text titled “Things are beginning to change” on May 15, but this was not disclosed outside of the Party, and the United Front Department continued to hold roundtable discussions and let the non-Party members freely express their opinions. Members of the democratic parties, such as Zhang Bojun, continued unaware to engage in their criticisms and opinions about the Party until just before June 8. They were truly “falling into a snare” (zitou luowang).

2 The Start of the Struggle According to Li Weihan’s memoirs, Mao Zedong, who received regular reports from Li Weihan on the discussions held by democratic parties and non-party individuals, became furious upon hearing that Luo Longji of the Democratic League said, “Today, it’s the small Marxist-Leninist intellectuals who are guiding big non-Marxist intellectuals, and outsiders are instructing specialists.” Mao then wrote the text criticizing these intellectuals, “Things are beginning to change,” and allowed only a few senior cadres to read it. During that time, when Li likened the criticisms from non-Party intellectuals to a quarrel between a daughter-in-law and a mother-in-law, Mao retorted, “No, it’s a struggle between enemies and friends!” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 178). In other terms, criticism of the Party by non-Party members, which was only an “internal contradiction among the ‘people’” from Li’s point of view, was an “antagonistic contradiction” from Mao’s point of view. Alternatively, we may be

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able to say that Mao judged that it had turned from internal contradiction among the ‘people’ into antagonistic contradiction. “Things are beginning to change,” which signaled the start of the Struggle, is also included in Mao Selected Works Vol. 5. In this article, Mao Zedong wrote that one should criticize the revisionism of the right rather than the dogmatism of the left, that the rightists say they defend socialism and the leadership of the Communist Party, but this is a lie and should not be believed, that the struggle has not yet reached its peak, and that one should now lure out the enemy and strike them at once, isolating the rightists and bringing the middle consisting of the majority to his side. Mao’s decision to wage the Struggle was triggered not only by the “malicious” criticism of the Party and Mao by those outside the Party, especially those in the democratic parties, but also by various anti-regime movements that had begun to erupt in society, such as workers’ strikes and student uprisings. As seen above, Mao publicly stated in his internal contradictions theory and subsequent speeches that he would rather tolerate such social conflicts, but, in reality, he was not quite so accommodating, especially not when it came to the movements of the university students in Beijing. He sent his secretaries every day to see the big-character posters (dazibao) posted at Peking University, Tsinghua University, and other places and received their reports. According to the official Biography of Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong asked them, “Is our ruling system safe?” implying that he was very worried about such conflicts (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi et al. (eds.) 2003, Vol. 1, p. 696). Early in the morning of May 19, a big-character poster was posted at Peking University, and the next day, as many as 162 big-character posters were displayed on the “Wall of Democracy” set up on campus. Someone even called it “Beijing’s Hyde Park.” In hindsight, we can say that the precursor to the Democracy Wall movement in Beijing from 1978 to 1979 was already emerging in the spring of 1957 on the campus of Peking University. There, inspired by Mao Zedong’s advocated “Double Hundreds” spirit, a spread of free and open discussions developed. The two central figures in this movement were Tan Tianrong, a fourth-year physics student at Peking University, and Lin Xiling, a fourth-year law student from nearby Renmin University who came to give a speech at Peking University. Let me introduce a few of the core points of their arguments. In his writings, Tan Tianrong criticizes the myth that “the Party is always correct,” and he accuses the Party of having transformed from a “monopoly of power” to a “monopoly of truth.” He condemns the myth of the Party members being “wiser than anyone and eternally correct” and the deification of the Party. He sharply exposes the system in which truth falls from the heavens, a system where nobody can criticize the “heavens,” and he appeals for a return to the critical spirit of Marxism (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 168; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 121). He also harshly denounces Mao Zedong for allegedly writing, “The Historical Experiences of Proletarian Dictatorship: Revisited” (People’s Daily, December 29, 1956), in which Mao attributed Stalin’s errors to “the ideological situation of man.” Tan Tianrong calls this an anti-Marxist, metaphysical view—“the same as the falling motion of an object cannot be explained

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by material structure” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 205), thus sharply criticizing the foundations of the regime using Mao’s preferred logic of dialectics. Tan argues that the mistakes made by Stalin came not from personal qualities, but from the regime itself. He bluntly lashes out at China’s inability to break away from the Stalinist system and at the essential flaws in the politics of China, as well as the leaders governing the country. The other student, Lin Xiling, said: “I wrote a paper criticizing Hu Feng. Looking back on it now, I find it childish and feel it very embarrassing. Looking at it now, I see that the grounds for charging him with counterrevolution are completely ridiculous.” Now she defends Hu Feng, by saying, “Chairman Mao’s words are not the golden rule. Why can’t we oppose him? thus breaking the biggest taboo in the country, that is, criticism of Mao.” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 218)

Furthermore, she continues: “Current socialism is not true socialism. I should say, it is unreal socialism. True socialism must be democratic. But we are not democratic. This society is a completely distorted form of socialism based on feudalism.” She also cited the example of the Hungarian people’s struggle, stressing that “The blood of the Hungarian people should not be wasted! and called on university students from all over to stand up.” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 162; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 117)

Fang Wenzhai, a student at Renmin University who was criticized later as a rightist, listened with excitement and emotion to the speech given by Lin Xiling at the University on May 30. He was enthralled by her eloquent and fluent style of speaking. In her speech, she decisively covered various problems facing the current society and political realm. For example, in response to the reality that only Party members can be highly appraised, she says: “Someone tried to get me to join [the Communist Youth League] and asked me how I could solve your future, your status, and your marriage if I don’t join the Youth League or the Party. I was furious to hear that and told him that if that was the case, I would never join [the Communist Youth League]!”

She continued to say: “‘If you speak out against the leader, you become anti-leader, and anti-leader means antiorganization, and anti-organization means anti-Party, and anti-Party means anti-people, and anti-people means counterrevolution, and this is exactly Stalin’s formula,’ and so denounced the Chinese socialist system for being identical to the Stalinist system.” (Fang 2013, pp. 76– 77)

The applause did not cease throughout her speech, and the audience got extremely excited. Lin’s speech inspired the students at Renmin University to erupt with opinions and grievances that had long been buried in their hearts, so that the students went on strike, and big-character posters of more than 100 meter long appeared on campus (ibid., p. 81). The voice of students became more and more radical. One wrote:

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4 The Development of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and Its Aftermath … “After eight years since the founding of our country, democracy is a pipe dream … The Constitution does not guarantee any democratic rights to the people, the Party monopolizes everything and arbitrates everything, the Party represents the whole people, while the Party is the state, the Party is the law.”

Another wrote: “Marxism is like a ‘Bible,’ and the secretary of the Party committee in each area is like the bishop of a parish.” In Shanghai, one person insisted that the “rectification movement should rectify mainly the monk (referring to Mao Zedong).” Some even argued that “the fundamental problem of rectification lies in the Party Center, so rectifying the Party Center is the key” (Shen 2008, pp. 589–590). These arguments can be considered as much sharper critiques of the governing ideology of the Communist Party than the established views of democratic parties such as the Democratic League and the Revolutionary Committee. Indeed, it can be described as a powerful blow against Mao Zedong and his system’s fundamental principles. In Tan Tianrong’s point of view, Mao deviates greatly from original Marxism, while in Lin Xiling’s eyes, Mao’s socialism is nothing but a distorted one born of the feudal legacy. Nevertheless, neither of them sought modern democracy, or “bourgeois democracy,” which Mao abhors. They were rather pursuing a democracy more faithful to Marx than Mao, a more “genuine socialism” as they imagined. They were neither influenced nor controlled by an established political group, although the Party leadership seemed suspicious of their relationship with the democratic parties (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 166; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 120). No need to say, Mao Zedong had no intention of sympathizing with the radical ideas of students like Tan Tianrong and Lin Xiling, and they too became targets of suppression and were later condemned as “rightists.” However, Mao’s criticism was at first directed more towards influential political figures among the democratic parties, non-Party intellectuals, rather than the students. In particular, Mao found the proposals put forward by the following three major “rightist political theorists” to be absolutely unacceptable: These were Zhang Bojun’s concept of the “Political Design Institute,” the proposal by Luo Longji of the same Democratic League for a “Committee for the Rehabilitation of Honorees (pingfan weiyuanhui)” (referring to victims of the rectification movement), and “The Party above all (dangtianxia)” theory of Chu Anping, the editor-in-chief of the Democratic Party’s newspaper, the Guangming Daily. What was concept underlying Zhang Bojun’s “Political Design Institute”? He stated the following on May 5, 1957: “There are many design institutes in the industrial field, but there is no single design institute for many political facilities. I think that the Political Consultative Conference, the People’s Congress, the democratic parties, and the people’s organizations should become four political design institutes. These design institutes should play many roles. Certain basic political construction plans must first be discussed by them. They say, two heads are better than one.” (Shen 2008, p. 575)

When the Struggle began, this plan was regarded as a Western style “bicameral system” or even as a plot by the bourgeois democrats at least in the eyes of Mao Zedong. Zhang would have considered this nothing but a hasty assumption, but

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there is no way that Zhang, who was well aware of the situation they were in, would make such a claim. Even the actual Political Consultative Conference and the People’s Congress are mere decorations, so how powerful could four political design institutes be? Anyway, if one were to argue for the same bicameral system as in democratic countries, one would have to transform the democratic parties into political organizations capable of competing with the Communist Party. There were “right-wingers” who were more radical than Zhang Bojun and were really serious about establishing a genuine bicameral system. In a roundtable discussion held in Tianjin, a teacher who was a member of the Democratic League of China at a junior high school, opposed the one-party dictatorship and asserted that if the Communist Party and democratic parties were alternately in power, each party could “serve the people” effectively as it strove to gain the support of the electorate (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 260). In Mao’s eyes, of course, both the teacher and Zhang were “birds of a feather.” More radical was Ge Peiqi, a lecturer in industrial economics department at Renmin University, who said that the relationship between the Communist Party and the masses had diverged greatly since 1949, and that people were antagonistic to the Party and the government. He added: “I don’t know if what the Communist Party is doing now is good. If it is not good, the masses may possibly overthrow the Communist Party, and kill the head of the Party to overthrow him.” (Shen 2008, p. 576)

Luo Longji’s proposal for a “Committee for the Rehabilitation of Honorees,” or more specifically, a review of the past purges, seems to have attracted strong interest and support from others. Many people were deeply dissatisfied with the fact that the Party had made many mistakes in the purges it had conducted so far, resulting in a vast number of false accusations and the deaths of many innocent people. Mao Zedong was also aware of this and stated at the Supreme State Council on February 27, 1957, “We will conduct a major inspection this and next year and make a comprehensive summary.” Based on this statement, Luo Longji proposed the establishment of that Committee, but his proposal differed from Mao’s idea on two points: First, Mao did not say that he would create an independent mechanism for the Great Inspection, while Luo wanted to set up a committee from the central to the local level. Another is that Mao’s inspection was limited to the purge cases of 1955–56 and did not deal with any cases before that period, while Luo Longji wanted to cover all past purge cases, including the case of the Hu Feng incident and the Three Antis and Five AntisRevolutionary Movements.4 For Mao, there was no way he would be able to reinstate Hu Feng and the others, who had already been declared “counterrevolutionary,” even if it were in the interest of his own reputation (Photo 4.2). 4

The Three Antis-Corruption Movement was a movement to purge bureaucracy, corruption, and waste by public officials and Party members that developed from the end of 1951. The Five AntisCorruption Movement refers to the movement to expose five types of criminal activities, including bribery and tax evasion by capitalists, which was developed in 1952.

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Photo 4.2 Luo Longji. The intellectual who proposed for establishing a “Committee for the Rehabilitation of Honorees”. Source Baidu

The “Party above all” argument by Chu Anping was probably a frank recognition of the current situation shared by most non-Party intellectuals and cadres. They were depressed and frustrated by the situation in which all important positions were occupied by Party members, while non-Party members “had jobs but no authority.” In his remarks at a roundtable discussion on June 1, titled “Opinions forwarded to Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai,” Chu asserted that: “In the past few years, the Party and the masses have been in a state of confusion. The key to solving this problem lies in the view of ‘the Party above all,’ stating that the Party leads the nation not because the nation is owned by the Party, but because although people defend the Party, they have never forgotten that they are the masters of the nation.”

He went on to say: “All Party outsiders wish to walk with the Party on the great policies of the state. However, walking with the Party is because the Party’s ideals are great, its policies are correct, not because non-Party members do not have their own views. I hope that all people in the country will be able to exercise their abilities.” (ibid., pp. 201–202)

Ma Yingchu, President of Peking University, who was listening to this speech, praised him, saying “very good, very good!” in English (ibid., p. 202).5 On the other hand, from the perspective of Party members, “It is natural to think that Party members should have ‘rights’ because the Communist Party leads everyone. NonParty members should be grateful to us if only for having ‘jobs’” (ibid., p. 202) (Photo 4.3). 5

Ma was an economist with a Ph.D. in the United States and Chu Anping had studied political science under Harold Laski at the London School of Economics (LSE), and they both could speak English very well.

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Photo 4.3 Chu Anping. The intellectual who criticized the “Party above all” view. He disappeared during the Cultural Revolution, and his whereabouts remain unknown. Source https:// www.soundofhope.org/post/ 238322

The arguments of these three democratic intellectuals were, at least basically, quite decent, so we might wonder why they aroused Mao’s antipathy, but Mao saw through their true intentions: All three had studied in Western Europe, had been exposed to modern Western thought, and had originally opposed the Kuomintang, but even though they highly valued Mao’s achievements during the revolution, they did not share his ideology. Zhang Yihe, who is the daughter of Zhang Bojun and was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, relays the following account: “In 1960 or 1961, Mao Zedong raised a class and class struggle theory as the core of Marxist doctrine, but my father could not contain his anger upon hearing this and said, ‘It’s a fool’s logic to call Marxism the doctrine of class and class struggle.’ … He [her father] was very antagonistic to the Communist Party’s insistence that Marxism was a universal truth which could be adapted everywhere. My father thought it was fundamentally impossible and implausible for one theory to encompass all things.” (Zhang 2007, p. 304)

From Zhang Bojun’s point of view, Mao Zedong, who had not read Marxist literature in German like himself, was attracted only by class struggle, did not comprehend the essence of Marxism, and mistakenly believed that this ideology was the “universal truth,” thus he saw Mao as just spreading “fool’s logic” around. On the contrary, Mao must have seen Zhang as a man who was ignorant of the reality of China, an armchair theorist, and more likely the one spreading “fool’s logic.” In addition, since Zhang talked about expanding the democratic parties, Mao would have seen him as an ambitious man trying to create a political force to oppose the Communist Party and aspiring to lead a bourgeois democracy. Mao Zedong named Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji arbitrarily as “Zhang = Luo Alliance.” He identified all the “rightist intellectuals” represented by Zhang and Luo as bourgeois forces, and started the Anti-Rightist Struggle, an historical turning point in modern Chinese history, in order to capture and defeat them all at once.

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When a Hungarian delegation met with him in September 1957, Mao said, referring to the situation around May of the same year: “The Party organization at Tsinghua University has collapsed. Dozens of Party branches have disintegrated. Moreover, the Vice President, Qian Wei Chang, is Nagy Imre, and his nature is anti-Party and anti-socialist. Besides, the intellectuals in most relatively large schools and factories are rightists, and they are the masses of the Nagy, or little Nagy.” (Shen 2008, p. 603)

He even went so far as to say to Deng Xiaoping that, in the worst scenario, they should go back to Yan’an, the former sacred place of the Chinese Revolution. In other words, Mao seemed to fear that the students’ democratization movement, workers’ strikes, and the movement to withdraw from cooperatives in rural areas, in resonance with the criticism of the Communist Party by democratic figures, could develop into anti-government or anti-socialist turmoil like in Hungary, which would be a challenge to the Communist Party, and hence his own power. Furthermore, on June 6, just before the outbreak of the Struggle, Zhang Bojun invited six prominent professors to a roundtable discussion on current affairs, where it was decided that the democratic parties should extend a helping hand to the Communist Party because the Party was facing the difficult situation of students protesting and mounting big-character posters all over town.6 According to Shen Zhihua, Mao’s fear that democratic parties might defeat the Communist Party was nothing more than an unfounded speculation; however, “what can be seen between the lines of their argument is that Zhang Bojun and others would help the Communist Party to solve the difficulties so that the Democratic League along with other democratic parties could gain more power as well as higher positions. This is precisely what Mao Zedong and the CPC were most afraid of” (Shen 2008, p. 614). This roundtable discussion may have been the final decisive factor that led Mao to make the major shift from the “Double Hundreds” movement to the Anti-Rightist Struggle. The June 8, 1957, editorial in the People’s Daily, titled “Why is this?” seems to be a direct expression of Mao Zedong’s anger. This editorial was written at the behest of Mao7 to strongly and clearly state his viewpoint. It goes as follows: “Under the guise of ‘helping the Communist Party to rectify,’ a small number of rightists are challenging the very leadership of the Communist Party and the working class, even openly shouting for the Communist Party to ‘step down.’ They are taking this opportunity to overthrow the Communist Party and the working class and to upset the great project of socialism.”

It stated further: “The large-scale domestic class struggle has already passed, but the class struggle is by no means over, especially on the ideological front.” 6

The “Six-Six” incident is so called because six professors gathered on June 6. The six professors included Fei Xiaotong, whom I will refer to later. 7 This editorial has been said to have been written by Mao himself, but in fact it was written by a person named Lin Wei Lin on the order of Mao’s secretary, Hu Qiaomu, and then completely rewritten by Hu (Zhu 2013, Vol. 1, p. 288). Undoubtedly, it was then published after Mao’s perusal.

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When this editorial was published, a seismic shock of great magnitude reverberated through various sectors across the country, both at the central and local levels. For approximately one month, anyone who expressed critical opinions towards the Party, those who sympathized with them, those who were considered to have criticized or sympathized, and even those who criticized the Soviet Union, which was still a ‘friendly country’ at the time, or who were regarded as ‘anti-Soviet elements,’ were all labeled as ‘rightists’ for expressing even the slightest dissatisfaction or complaint about the system or policy, and many were targeted for criticism and punishment. Not only those who actively voiced their opinions were declared rightists. According to Wang Hui, who was in Tianjin at the time summarizing the results of the Struggle and reporting them to the Central Government, one reporter who had said nothing at a hearing of opinions in the newspaper industry was strongly urged by the leaders to confess any mistakes. Hard-pressed to think of any such errors he said, “I remember once when I was using the toilet, I thought that if a nuclear bomb fell now, everyone would die.” As a result he was immediately labeled “ultra-right” and fired from his job at the newspaper company (Wang 2013a, p. 500; Wang 2013b, p. 372). It is exactly a laughable story, but this episode accurately reflects the reality of this Struggle. Wang does not write about what fate befell this reporter afterwards, but if he survived the Cultural Revolution, he probably lived with the heavy cross of the “ultra-right” label until his honor was restored more than twenty years later, regretting every day that he had said such a trivial thing. Yet there is no guarantee that he would not have been regarded as right-wing even if he had remained silent. The “internal contradictions theory,” published on June 19, had been rewritten many times. Dai Qing describes the reaction of the intellectuals who read the text as follows: “They found that words they had heard so clearly when they listened to the recording (of the first of Mao’s talks on the “internal contradictions”) were missing: ‘The large-scale class struggle is over, and from now on it will be a way like gentle drizzle.’ Instead, they discovered, the following words were inserted: ‘The class struggle is not over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the political forces of the various factions, and the ideological class struggle between the proletariat and the propertied classes are still protracted, tortuous, and sometimes even violent.’8 Li Shu, an historian, working in the propaganda department of the Party Center, describes the atmosphere at that time as follows: ‘People were taken aback. Mao himself could not hide his failure. The official text was rewritten many times, but it still could not avoid self-contradiction’.” (Dai 1990, p. 167)9

They were more than “taken aback.” Many intellectuals must have felt “deceived by Chairman Mao.” Undoubtedly, they could not say this out loud. The rectification movements often turned into a struggle among fellow members under the name of “mass movement.” In the case of the democratic parties, the 8

The “internal contradictions” in the Mao Selected Works Vol. 5 was originally published in the People’s Daily on June 19, and contains only the sentence “The class struggle is not over yet.” The sentence “the class struggle on the ideological front is still protracted, tortuous, and sometimes violent” is omitted. 9 According to Bo Yibo, the revision was made 14 times from the February 27 talk to the official announcement on June 19 (Bo 1993, p. 589).

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leading cadres, such as Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, were immediately subjected to severe criticism and condemnation from other cadres among their colleagues and Party members. Moreover, an ugly denunciation battle where they exposed and interrogated each other unfolded. Everywhere, during this Struggle, children were accusing their parents, wives accusing their husbands, and friends questioning their friends. Dai Qing beautifully portrays the situation with the following metaphor: “It was like a scene of a huge swamp surrounded by a dense crowd of spectators, where they hoped to climb up by stepping on others, but in the end, they all inevitably sank into the swamp.” (ibid., p. 286)

3 The Aftermath of the Struggle Unlike the Cultural Revolution, the Anti-Rightist Struggle was relatively short-lived. It began in June 1957 and was virtually over for the most part by the end of that year. From the following year, the whole of China was plunged into the GLF movement. However short-lived, the consequences of the Struggle were serious and grave. The Fourth Session of the First National People’s Congress, which was convened on June 20 and held from June 26 to July 15 after the preliminary meeting, turned into a right-wing critical chorus conference. The intellectuals, the democratic parties and independents, including Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and Chu Aning, presented their self-criticism one after the other, surrendering totally to the Communist Party, or more precisely, to Mao Zedong. For example, on July 15, Zhang Bojun delivered a speech titled “I bow my head and admit my guilt to the ‘people’” stating as follows: “I resent my own ugliness. I will thoroughly destroy my old reactionary personality and never let it live again. Let me join our people in a solemn struggle against the rightist elements, including the struggle against me. The great Communist Party of China saved me in the past, and today the Party will save me once more. Guided and educated by the Party and Chairman Mao, I have embraced a renewed life. Returning to a profound love for the Party, the nation, and socialism, I sincerely repent for my past shortcomings. I am committed to wholeheartedly dedicating myself to the service of socialism.” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 2, p. 252)

What would ordinary people think regarding his confession and declaration of surrender? Do they simply feel sorry for the leader of a democratic party, Zhang Bojun, being intimidated by Mao Zedong who nodded his head in contempt, or do they laugh at his shallowness in falling for Mao’s tricks? Do they lament or ridicule the weakness of a theorist who failed to firmly reject Mao’s criticisms and failed to thoroughly expose the “pitfalls of Mao’s contradiction theory” by way of theoretical argumentation? Incidentally, while the reputations of most “rightists” were rehabilitated in the post-Mao era, this was not the case for Zhang Bojun, and Chu Anping.10 How many intellectuals were labeled rightists and disposed of or purged as a result of the Struggle? Mao Zedong had estimated on June 29, 1957, the number of 10

Luo Longji died of a disease in 1965, i.e. before the Cultural Revolution.

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rightist elements at about 400 in Beijing and roughly 4000 nationwide, but at the third Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee in September, the number had already reached 62,000, and a solid estimate from the Session estimated that there would be 150,000 nationwide, and by the end of the whole movement, 550,000 were classified as rightists (Bo 1993, Vol. 2, pp. 619–620). On the other hand, Mao wrote to Liu Shaoqi in August 1959 after the Lushan Conference, indicating: “On the issue of lifting the punishment of 450,000 rightists nationwide step by step … it is possible to convert or lift the punishment of about 10% [of the rightists] every year for the next seven years (or even longer).” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 2, p. 368)

It can be seen, therefore, that 450,000 people were subject to the disposition. In general, however, 550,000 are counted as rightists, and most have later had their dispositions withdrawn as false accusations.11 Certainly, these 550,000 were not the only victims by this Struggle. There were many intellectuals, students, cadres, and staff members who were not labeled rightists but were dragged to the struggle rallies, and their families also had to endure hard days. Those who were dragged into the Struggle were later sent to harsh labor camps,12 some died of starvation, and some committed suicide. Let me take the case of Jiang Weihong, a student of architecture at Tsinghua University, as an example. In January 1957, Tsinghua University Party Secretary went to Deng Xiaoping in Zhongnanhai along with the university’s president, Jiang Nanxiang, to explain the situation of the “Double Hundreds” movement at the University. A student named Jiang Weihong had written an “essay of ten thousand characters” (wanyanshu) and praised the Yugoslavian workers’ self-management system as well as Josip Tito (the Yugoslav leader, and a heretic from the Chinese point of view at that time). Deng responded by saying: “I have read what he wrote. His point of view is wrong, but his writing has logic and thoughtfulness … He is clear-headed and brilliant, so we would do well to help him. He could be a useful person for the nation in the future.”

In the spirit of the “Double Hundreds” movement, Deng acknowledged that Jiang Weihong’s problem was an internal contradictions among the ‘people’ and a problem of thought, and did not consider him a rightist. The leaders of Tsinghua University were deeply impressed by Deng Xiaoping’s seemingly tolerant attitude. President of the university, Jiang Nanxiang, was pleased and relieved that the Party Center understood the grass-roots masses very well. However, as soon as the Struggle began, Jiang Weihong was labelled a rightist and sent to a labor camp in the wilderness of Heilongjiang Province where he was forced to work hard for a long time. When the Cultural Revolution broke out, he was again criticized bitterly as a rightist, and 11

According to “a private research” cited by Qian Liqun, there were about 3.17 million “rightists” and 1.43 million “middle-rightists,” for a total of 4.6 million (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 197; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 143). According to Beihai Xianren, as many as 530,000 intellectuals were considered enemies, and millions were hanged in critical struggles (Beihai Xianren 2005, p. 241). 12 See note 9 to Chap. 2 for more information on labor camps (laogai).

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when he was interned in a labor camp at the May Seventh Cadres School13 in Henan Province, built by the Ministry of Construction and Industry, he escaped from there and nobody knew whether he was “dead or alive.” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 2, pp. 393–394) In the case of Chen Xueshi, a primary school teacher in Yunnan Province, he was classified as an extreme rightist when he wrote a big-character poster swearing at the school’s leaders during the “Double Hundreds” movement. Furthermore, because he came from a background of commerce, industry, and landownership, which were considered unfavorable “class backgrounds” at the time, he was labeled as a “classrevenge element.” In other words, he was deemed non-people. Additionally, his criticism of the head of the Personnel Department led to him receiving a five-year prison sentence. When the Great Hunger broke out in 1959, Chen Xueshi, unable to bear his hunger, was caught sneaking into the staff canteen to steal food, and was executed at the end of that year after being stabbed in the thigh with a bayonet (ibid., p. 394). Compared to these people at the grass roots, the bigwigs such as Zhang Bojun, along with his colleagues, were subjected to severe criticism from their peers, and in the case of Zhang, he also lost his government position as Minister of Transportation, yet he did not receive any criminal punishment because he refrained from making political statements after his self-criticism. He retained his position as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, was provided with a private car by the government, and was able to live a relatively elegant life until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution when he was persecuted by the Red Guards.14 Was this the result of Mao Zedong’s “generosity” or was he being held up as a cautionary example, that is, fanmian jiaocai (teaching materials by negative example)? An internationally renowned anthropologist and sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, who was one of the leaders of the Democratic League and was also criticized and classified as a rightist during the Struggle, served as a professor of anthropology at the Central Ethnology Institute from 1957 to 1982. However, it must be remembered that only a small number of right-wingers enjoyed such “generous treatment.” The majority of rightists, who are not known by name, had to experience a hard life, probably because they were considered unworthy of being role models.

13

The May Seventh Cadres School is a “school” established to commemorate Mao Zedong’s May 7, 1966, letter to Lin Biao, in which he said, “Let’s make the whole country into a big revolutionized school,” and to train the cadres of the Party and government agencies to do physical labor and train their brains. 14 For more details on the life of Zhang’s family after this struggle, see his daughter’s book Zhang (2007). However, they also suffered tremendous persecutions from the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

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4 The Reality of the Anti-Rightist Struggle: My Interpretation Two views can be offered as to why the rectification movement and the subsequent Anti-Rightist Struggle developed. The first is the official view, which holds that Mao Zedong started the rectification movement to oppose bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism, but he had to reluctantly turn it into the Struggle because “rightist elements” took advantage of this opportunity to attack the Communist Party. The second is the “conspiracy view,” which claims that the rectification movement was a plot by Mao Zedong from the beginning to allow democratic parties and intellectuals outside the Party to criticize the Communist Party freely at first, so as to finally overthrow them once they revealed their true “anti-socialist” nature. It does not seem to me that Mao Zedong planned this movement from the beginning as a meticulously prepared attack on the intellectuals, and it does not seem to me that his repeated explanations of the “Double Hundreds” both at the center and in local areas were entirely a pretense and a ruse. As I will discuss below, I believe that at first he sincerely tried to get the Party outsiders to talk freely, but at some stage he changed his policy. Although it is impossible to see into the depths of his mind, even Mao Zedong, a genius military and political strategist, does not seem to have had a perfect plan completely calculated in advance. As mentioned earlier, he announced his intention to resign as President of the State in April 1956, but was it just a whim or lip service to reassure the intelligentsia? Likewise, was it a complete scam when he stated in March that they could criticize even the Party and Marxism? Regardless of where Mao’s true intentions lay, what is more important is the political as well as ideological significance of this struggle. Qian Liqun, who actually experienced the Struggle when he was a student at Peking University, argues that the policy of “let a hundred schools of thought contend” (baijia zhengming) may actually go against the basic principle of MarxismLeninism which was the guiding ideology of the Party and the Constitution. He asks furthermore whether the Party and government should have allowed the media to “let a hundred schools of thought contend” and whether it is possible to question the Party’s policies in this regard, pointing out that Mao Zedong did not properly answer these fundamental questions and that this was his “inner contradiction” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, pp. 125–127; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, pp. 89–91). It might be possible to respond to this question in the following way. He did not have such an “inner contradiction” because he had always had a strong authoritarian orientation that power was everything. However, it is also possible to say that he “changed his mind” during the course of the movement because such a contradiction was in the drive of the Double Hundreds. As I discussed in Chap. 1, his contradictions theory is “full of contradictions.” The following is just hypothesis, but it seems reasonable to explain the changes in Mao’s behavior during this Struggle in the following way: (1) Mao Zedong has a certain tolerance level for dissent and criticism, and while he “tolerates and welcomes” dissent and criticism as long as it is kept below

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that level, he will not tolerate anything beyond that level, even if it is pointed out that it is not what he used to say. For example, democracy is subordinate to concentration, and in the extreme, he will not tolerate democracy that does not conform to his decisions. (2) The level of tolerance is not fixed and unchanging, and as his “contradiction theory” teaches, when a “principal contradiction” turns into a “secondary contradiction” or, conversely, when a secondary contradiction shifts into a principal contradiction, the tolerance level for the principal and secondary aspects of each, will also change. Criticism is a kind of contradiction. When a critical opinion that was previously acceptable is judged to be antagonistic and a principal contradiction, the level of tolerance is lowered and the critic becomes “anti-Party, anti-revolution, and anti-people.” As discussed in Chap. 1, it is ultimately Mao Zedong alone who decides the nature and extent of the contradiction. (3) This contradiction-turning switch is determined by distance from power, danger, and other factors. If Mao Zedong judges that criticism would immediately deny or threaten to deny the power of the Party or his power, the contradiction-turning switch is flipped. In particular, as mentioned in Chap. 2, this switch is more likely to be flipped when the persons he is criticizing are not individuals but a group. In this case, a slight emotional expression can serve as a stimulus for the switch to be flipped. Even Mao Zedong is an emotional animal. When Chen Mingshu tries to give Mao a warning “from above,” or when Luo Longji uses such terms as “small Marxist-Leninist intellectuals” guiding the big non-Marxist intellectuals, or “outsiders” instructing experts, to ridicule the Communist Party, Mao’s emotions, which had been relatively mild and calm, suddenly change and he turns into a ruthless and emotional person.15 Following the logic of his “practice theory,” we might say that rational knowledge developed into perceptual knowledge, which further developed into a new rational, even ruthless knowledge. Such a characterization of Mao and his transformation will be taken up in the final chapter. My understanding partially aligns with that of Qian Liqun’s, that the “Double Hundreds” policy was originally fraught with contradictions. Mao Zedong stated in his speech at the National Propaganda Work Conference on March 12, 1957, that there were only “two schools of thought” in the world, i.e. the proletarian and the bourgeois. In other words, the “Double Hundreds” campaign was nothing more than an ideological class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. No doubt, in this struggle, the former is supposed to overthrow and expel the latter, resulting in not “let a hundred schools of thought contend” but “only one school of thought sings” (yijia duming). In essence, Mao Zedong did not consider Marxism-Leninism

15

Dai Qing sees Luo Longji’s one comment as having stimulated Mao’s complex toward intellectuals. When he was a humble clerk at the Peking University Library, he was despised by Lu Xun’s younger brother, Zhou Zuoren (Dai 1990, p. 276). However, Shen Zhihua is dismissive of this view of Mao’s “intellectual complex” and rather says that Mao felt uncomfortable with them because many intellectuals came from landowners and the bourgeoisie (Shen 2008, pp. 37–38).

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and other ideologies to be treated equally because this ideology was science and the ultimate truth to him (Zhu, 2012, Vol. 1, p. 111). In a roundtable discussion at Tsinghua University, Professor Xu Zhangben developed a theory similar to the views of Tan Tianrong and Zhang Bojun—that “no scholar can fully explain everything with one theory, and we should abolish the restriction that one theory (specifically, Marxism-Leninism) should guide everything in order to develop culture” (ibid., p. 263). This is indeed against the basic philosophy of Mao and the Party, and even if he tried to defend himself using the “contradiction theory,” it seemed that the fate of the professor had already been sealed with this statement. Lu Dingyi, then head of the Party’s propaganda department and the person responsible for the implementation of the “Double Hundreds” policy, recalled 30 years later: “Labeling political tags indiscriminately on schools and trends in science and art, and easily distinguishing who is proletarian and who is bourgeois through simplistic methods, is unscientific, and it can no longer be called the hundred schools of thought.” (ibid.)

It is doubtful, however, whether Lu Dingyi would have recognized the true meaning of “a hundred schools” if it were not for Mao’s instructions and orders. Whether it is Tan Tianrong, Xu Zhangben of Tsinghua University, or Zhang Bojun, they questioned ideas that placed a specific ideology on the top floor of the hall of universal truth, claiming it could explain everything, or one that disparaged other ideologies, schools of thought, or worldviews, suggesting, “Isn’t there something different about this?” Even if they accepted Marxism as the highest ideology, they would have considered it necessary to “doubt everything,” as Marxists often say. It is hard to imagine that Lu Dingyi, an old Communist Party member and the chief propagandist of Communist thought, would actively acknowledge and staunchly defend such doubts and objections. Zhu Zheng sees the historical significance of the Struggle in the fact that it interrupted the course of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. That is to say, the Congress had decided to proceed along the line of “gentle breeze and drizzling rain” rather than “violent storms” ( jifeng bayu) (to borrow Mao Zedong’s expression cited above), saying that “the era of class struggle is over and we will now go forward into the era of construction,” but on June 8, 1957, that line was removed and the train named “China” was derailed. Furthermore, Zhu goes on to position the Struggle as a kind of rehearsal for the Cultural Revolution, pointing out that people were encouraged to report on each other, to blindly follow, to spread baseless accusations, to denigrate one another, and even to physically attack those who had been disparaged (Zhu 2013, Vol. 2, pp. 427–428). However, unlike the Cultural Revolution, the Struggle did not lead to the persecution and eventual death of the top leaders in the Party. Conversely, in this struggle, there were no “proStruggle” or “anti-Struggle” factions among the leadership, and everyone followed Mao, including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. I view the historical significance of the Struggle from a slightly different perspective than Zhu Zheng. First, there is only one “truth” in the world, there is only one

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interpreter of that truth, and the truth so interpreted “falls from the heavens.” The Struggle was a historical event that established these principles in China. The following interpretation by Qian Liqun astutely describes the aims and results of this Struggle. More specifically, what Mao Zedong demanded from intellectuals and democratic individuals was that any “thought” or “doubt” was a crime, and that there should only be “belief,” which meant blind obedience. He aimed to have them forced to join those who were “tamed” by the Party and Mao himself. In Lu Xun’s words, this meant that everyone had to become Mao’s (mental) slave. “In 1949, Mao and the CPC only unified the Chinese mainland militarily, but the great project of ideological unification was completed after the Anti-Rightist Struggle of 1957” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 200; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 145). As a result, no one, not central leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai at the top nor nameless ordinary people at the bottom, was allowed to offer an opinion, let alone criticism, against Mao Zedong. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, the reason why the reckless Great Leap Forward began in China and then spiraled into the disaster of famine and starvation was because no one put on the brakes on the car driven recklessly by Mao, even though there were excellent co-drivers, including Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun,16 in the passenger and back seat. Immediately after this Struggle, in January 1958, Lu Dingyi held a roundtable discussion in Shanghai, inviting Party officials from various sectors including the newspaper, publishing, literature, and film sectors. However, as someone pointed out, after the Struggle everyone became apprehensive and timid, no longer willing to speak freely. Hearing this, Mao Zedong was dissatisfied and asked: “Why don’t the intellectuals talk and write? Has the freedom of our ‘people’ been suppressed?” (Zhu 2013, Vol. 2, p. 426)

How did Lu Dingyi feel after hearing Mao’s response? How could the intellectuals who had suffered in this Struggle speak out? Perhaps this was Mao’s unique sense of dark humor. It is not just that no one spoke out after the Struggle. Everyone started blowing their own trumpets with exaggerated reports to please Mao. Second, all ideas were judged under the “truth that falls from the heavens” principle and it was truly “only one school of thought sings” instead of “a hundred schools of thought contend.” The formation of this governance principle resulted in a situation where merely expressing such thoughts, even without engaging in concrete actions that disrupt social order, such as demonstrations, strikes, riots, and the like, is considered a crime, subject to punishment, and/or results in social ostracism if it contradicts the will of the authorities.17 No need to say, there are cases of ideas being judged even before the Struggle, such as the Hu Feng case discussed in Chap. 2. However, it was 16

Chen Yun played a key role in the economic planning during the Mao era, e.g. the head of the State Commission for Capital Construction. 17 In the future, when brain science, IC, and AI technologies are further developed and it becomes possible to determine what people are thinking by analyzing brain waves, etc., under an authoritarian regime like China, people may be accused and arrested simply for having “anti-establishment thoughts” in their minds. If George Orwell were alive, he would surely write a satirical novel entitled “2084” to depict such an electro-authoritarian society.

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from the Struggle that the label “rightist” became politically constructed. Once this label was attached, they were sent to labor camps or reeducation through laboring penitentiaries ( jiaoyangsuo)18 without going through the formal judicial process and were forced to engage in hard labor. Even if they returned from these camps, the label was not easily removed, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, they were thoroughly persecuted as right-wing elements and many lost their lives. The Cultural Revolution, which is discussed in Chap. 8, can be seen as an extension and expansion of the Struggle in the sense that it allowed ideology to become a crime in an unregulated manner. In Wang Hui’s view, the Struggle was even worse than the Cultural Revolution in terms of the degree to which victims were “brutally fought and mercilessly overthrown.” This is because during the Cultural Revolution, although many leading cadres were overthrown, many of them returned to their former workplaces in a relatively short time, but in the case of the Anti-Rightist Struggle, if someone was considered a right-wing member, his honor was not restored until after 20 years or more (Wang 2013a, p. 500; Wang 2013b, p. 373). Shen Zhihua laments with regret that if the Communist Party had not stopped thinking in 1957, but had instead reformed, democratized, brought in intellectuals, and fundamentally changed its ways, it could have achieved a regime change in the 1950s that could barely have been realized in the 1980s (Shen 2008, p. 9). In other words, the Struggle has robbed the regime of the best opportunity to transform itself. But could such a major transformation have taken place under the Maoist regime? It might be the case if Mao had died suddenly after launching the “Double Hundreds” movement and propagating the “internal contradictions theory” in a successful way. But even if Liu Shaoqi or Deng Xiaoping had succeeded Mao, would they have been able to “drastically change their ways”? The events of June 4, 1989 may have provided the answer to this question. Also, did Deng Xiaoping conceive of the idea of a market economy in 1957, when the planning ideology was strong, and did he try to implement it? With the political power structure once formed, and with the firm belief that “truth falls from the heavens,” such “revolutionary” reforms may not have been possible. Finally, also relating to this point: Did Mao Zedong launch this Struggle because he was infuriated that the Double Hundreds policy had expanded beyond his expectations, even to the extent of encouraging criticism of the regime? Or was it because he had harbored reservations about the Double Hundreds policy from the beginning and could not tolerate non-Party members criticizing the Party? We cannot ignore the fact that many, especially local and grassroots Party officials, held the latter sentiment. Why did they think this way? For one thing, as Mao emphasized at the beginning of the movement, it would have seemed unfair to the cadres that criticism of the Party and its members by those outside the Party would curb the bureaucracy, as if they were the only ones to be held accountable. They also probably felt that if the masses and intellectuals criticized

18

A reeducation through labor (RTL) camp is originally a type of prison designed to correct relatively minor offenders through labor, but this system was abolished in 2014.

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the Party too much, they would lose control of the situation and society would be disrupted. Another reason, which I think shows their true intentions, is that they had a sense of something like “founder’s profit,” as if to say, “Since the Communist Party made great sacrifices to bring about the revolution and build this country, it is only natural that Party members should be given leadership positions.” This is what Luo Longji had argued against, “the Party above all” approach where non-Party members were not given authority even if they were given jobs. Deng Xiaoping made the following speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau on May 23, 1957, when the Double Hundreds policy was still being maintained on the surface: “The current issue is whether we are afraid of this movement. We are indeed somewhat concerned right now. For example, we have a considerable number of senior cadres in our Party School, all of whom are comrades from the Party committees of the provinces and districts, and they are worried. There is a reason for this concern. It is inconceivable that we would not be anxious when we see the Communist Party being denounced in such a manner. I am also a little anxious.” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi et al. (eds.) 2003, Vol. 1, pp. 696–697)

Here, we can perceive the candid concerns and discontent of Party officials about their privileges and authority being undermined. In my view, due to such anxieties and dissatisfaction, Mao Zedong’s call for a “counterattack” against the rightists provided them with the perfect opportunity to launch vigorous counter-criticism campaigns in various regions and departments. Communist Party power is by no means the exclusive domain of Mao Zedong alone. From top to bottom, there are unlikely to be any Party member officials who willingly want to relinquish the established power structures and accompanying privileges. To them, the masses and non-Party members should remain entities to be led. Thus, on this stage where there is no one left to resist, criticize, or doubt Mao Zedong, Mao’s directed and produced epic drama entitled “the Great Leap Forward”, involving the entire nation, was about to begin. It started as a bizarre comedy and ended as a terrifying tragedy.

Chapter 5

The Great Leap Forward, the People’s Commune, and the Great Famine: Mao Zedong’s Fantasy with Disastrous Results

The two major social upheavals of the pre-reform and opening-up era of Mao’s China are the Great Leap Forward (GLF), which began in 1958, and the Cultural Revolution (CR), which lasted for 10 years from 1966. Both were initiated by Mao Zedong himself; both involved the entire nation, brought the state, society, and economy to the brink of destruction, and ended in indescribable misery. Focusing on the GLF movement, this chapter examines why this policy was implemented, how it unfolded, how it finally led to the greatest famine in history, how many people were sacrificed as a result of this famine, and how Mao perceived and what role he played in bringing about such a catastrophe. I will consider these questions drawing from published sources, especially the two memoirs written by Li Rui, one of Mao’s secretaries at the time.1 This chapter will cover the GLF policy from its birth to its tragic end. The well-known “Peng Dehuai incident” at the Party’s Lushan Conference during the GLF process, will be discussed independently in the next chapter. The main texts used in this and next chapters are the following three memoirs written by Li Rui. Dayuejin Qinliji Vol. 1 (Personal Experiences of the Great Leap Forward Vol. 1 (Li 1999c, hereinafter, Li’s Notes (1))), Dayuejin Qinliji Vol. 2 (Personal Experiences of the Great Leap Forward (2)) (Li 1999b, hereinafter, Li’s Notes (2)), and Lushan Huiyi Zhenmianmu (The True Features of Lushan Conference) (Li 1999a, hereinafter, Li’s Notes (3)).

1

Li Rui was active in the water resources sector after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In 1958, he served as Deputy Minister of Water Resources and Electric Power while also concurrently holding the position of secretary to Mao Zedong. He was criticized at the Lushan Conference and ousted from office. He was restored to honor in 1979 and subsequently became one of the leading reformist intellectuals, publishing many books and essays mainly on Mao Zedong. He died at the age of 102 years old in 2019 in Beijing.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_5

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1 The Birth of the Great Leap Forward Policy We may trace the starting point of Mao Zedong’s GLF policy to the “success” of the three major ownership reforms of 1955, which brought agricultural collectivization, and the socialization, i.e., public ownership and management, of commerce, industry, and handicrafts. Mao’s dream was captured in these developments. Undoubtedly, his radical inclinations had long existed, and the roots of this policy could be traced back further, perhaps even to the “General Line for the Transitional Period” proposed in 1953 (refer to Chap. 2). However, the main catalyst was indeed the “socialist transformation” that unfolded from 1955 to 1956. The unexpected “success”, in particular, of agricultural collectivization had a great impact on Mao Zedong’s decisions regarding this policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, he sharply criticized the gradualist approach to agricultural collectivization promoted by Deng Zihui, then director of the Party’s Rural Work Department, and called for rapid collectivization in 1955, which, in effect, exceeded even Mao’s expectations and swept across the country. Initially, Mao had planned to complete the spread of “elementary cooperatives,” a moderate form of collectivization in which only land was used jointly, but by 1967 this had been surpassed by the drive of “advanced cooperatives or collectives,” which collectivized not only land but also all agricultural capital, including horses, cattle, and large farm equipment, and on a large scale. In just a little over a year, nearly 90% of the nation’s farmers participated in advanced cooperatives. Mao Zedong, who was overjoyed at the “socialist aggressiveness” of the peasant masses and key cadres, took it up in his January 1956 “Preface to Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside.” He notes how this “rise of socialism” has had a great impact on production, investment and growth rate in agriculture, industry and the economy as a whole. He states: “The problem today is that what can be done by a measure of exertion is considered by many to be impossible. It is therefore entirely necessary to continue the criticism of right conservative ideas, which do in fact exist.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 5, p. 240)2

Evident here is his view that even moderate gradualism is a right-leaning conservative idea, and that it is necessary to criticize it and develop a path toward radicalism. In particular, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Anti-Rightist Struggle from June 1957 onward did much to give political meaning to such a movement. Moderate arguments could easily be labeled “rightist” = anti-Mao = anti-Party, anti-revolution, and anti-people. Thus, society as a whole moved more and more toward radicalism

2

For Mao Zedong, this “success” in agricultural collectivization was even more pleasing than the National Liberation of 1949. As Pang Xianzhi, who helped edit the book, said: “The national liberation was something we had anticipated and prepared for a long time. However, the speed and smoothness of agricultural collectivization was beyond his (Mao Zedong’s) expectations. He always thought that transforming 500 million individual farmers was the most difficult task … Now that it has been resolved smoothly, could there be any more difficult problems to solve?” (Shen 2008, p. 150).

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and the left-wing drive. With the publication of Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside the radical ideology that Mao fostered was transmitted at Party meetings, and a radical mood quickly arose and spread throughout the country. In the following section, I will look at the movements that brought about the creation and implementation of the GLF policy, for the most part using Li Rui’s Notes (1), as well as referring to Shen Zhihua’s research (Shen 2008) for a detailed analysis of the developments leading up to the Anti-Rightist Struggle of mid-1957. First, in the summer of 1955, when the State Council under the leadership of Zhou Enlai formulated the Long-Term Outlook Plan for 1953–1967, it set a target of producing 600 billion jins (300 million tons) of grains in 1967, 56 million dans (2.8 million tons) of cotton, 18 million tons of steel, and a 15-year average growth rate of 9.5% in total industrial and agricultural production value. In the People’s Daily on New Year’s Day 1956, the editorial called for the completion of the Five-Year Plan to “achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results” (duo, kuai, hao, sheng), but Mao stressed “greater and faster” (duo, kuai), while Zhou, the chief executive of economic practice, emphasized “better and more economical” (hao, sheng). At a meeting of the State Council presided over by Zhou Enlai in February, the planning indexes and the annual investment plan were reduced several times, then he said the following: “The leader is totally crazy about the plans. If you cool him down with cold water, he might wake up a little. When each department draws up a plan, whether it is a 12-year perspective plan or an annual plan for this and next year, it must all be seeking the truth from facts.” (Li’s Notes (1), pp. 38–39)

It goes without saying whom the “leader” here refers to. Zhou Enlai was not alone. Chen Yun, Li Xiannian,3 and others with an economic background, wrote in a report by the State Council for the National People’s Congress that “impatience and rash advance” (maojin) were especially important problems to be addressed in economic construction. Vice President of the State Liu Shaoqi responded similarly. He instructed the Party’s Central Propaganda Department to write an article in the People’s Daily titled “We must oppose conservatism and the mood of impatience.” Thus, the voice of an “anti-rash-advance” sentiment echoed throughout the country. The Second FiveYear Plan (1958–1962) also reflected these ideas, and the policy of being “active, moderate, and reliable” became commonly accepted by the Central Government as well as the various departments of the State Council. “At the time, Mao Zedong did not object to such index compression or opposition to rash advance, and he never expressed a different opinion at Party meetings or in talks with officials.” (ibid., p. 40, my emphasis)

It should be noted that although Mao “showed no objection” and “never expressed a different opinion,” he was by no means in favor of the mainstream view. In his usual fashion, he may have been cautiously exploring opportunities to fight back, or he may not yet have made up his mind to switch to a policy of rash advance. 3

Li Xiannian was Minister of Finance as well as Vice Premier of the State Council at the time.

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In September 1956, the Party’s Eighth National Congress was held, at which it was stated that the emphasis of the Party’s work would shift from class struggle to socialist construction. As a guiding policy for economic construction, it was decided to maintain the policy of the anti-rash-advance movement of 1956 and to oppose conservatism as well as rash advance. In addition, under the influence of criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, it was decided to oppose the personality cult and to oppose individual prominence. After this Congress, in the process of formulating the economic plan for 1957, the State Planning Commission and the State Economic Commission stated, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, that they would continue to pursue the policy of anti-rash-advance. At a national meeting of the Secretaries of the Party Committees held in January 1957, Chen Yun strongly insisted that the scale of economic construction should be commensurate with national strength, and stressed that a balance should be achieved among fiscal balance, bank loans, and the supply of commodities. As a top planning official himself, his assertion was quite appropriate because economic planning is, after all, just a balancing act. By June 1957, however, the situation had changed abruptly, with the beginning of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and the revival of class struggle theory paving the way for the rash advance policy. Why was this? As Li Rui pointed out, in the discourse of some right-wing debates, there were criticisms of the rash advance policy for “seeking quick success and instant benefits” ( jigong jinli), and so Mao Zedong equated such views with “rightist aggression.” It can be said that an economic issue about developmental speed suddenly became a political issue. Another, even more important point is that, as emphasized in the previous chapter, no one had been able to criticize Mao as a result of the Anti-Rightist Struggle, either inside or outside the Party. In doing so one would be labeled a rightist, condemned as a rightist, and possibly lose not only one’s political life but even one’s physical life. Therefore, his criticism of anti-rash-advance and his attack on right-leaning conservatism made it impossible for anyone to oppose his policy of rash advance. As Li Rui says, “As history has long shown, the ‘left’ is like a safe and secure stance for Communists, they are not afraid of the ‘left,’ they are not afraid of ‘running to extremes’ and they are not afraid of ‘advancing rashly,’ they are only afraid of being considered ‘right-leaning’ or ‘conservative’” (Li’s Notes (1), p. 82). Mao Zedong, empowered by the Anti-Rightist Struggle, urged a major policy shift in the Party and the government, that is, from an anti-rash-advance to rash advance. This was the Great Leap Forward. The starting point for this policy shift was the Nanning Conference in January 1958, but Mao had already launched the policy before that Conference. The editorial to the People’s Daily of November 13, 1957, which was written according to Mao’s intention, criticized the anti-rash-advance errors of 1956 and said: “Some persons have made the mistake of leaning to the right, walking too slowly like snails, not realizing the conditions for and need for a major breakthrough on the production front after the agricultural collectivization.”

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This editorial marked the first time that the term “Great Leap Forward” appeared in a newspaper. At the Nanning Conference, Mao Zedong appealed as follows: “Don’t take up this noun ‘anti-rash-advance.’ OK? This is a political issue. [If you go against rash advance] you will lose momentum. It would be terrible if 600 million people lost momentum. The issue of the ten fingers must be clarified. Stretch out your hand and see. How many fingers have boils? Isn’t it just one finger?”

This metaphor of nine fingers versus one finger is one of his favorite metaphors, in which he refers to the positive (achievements and results) with nine fingers and the negative (shortcomings and failures) with one finger. In other words, he was saying “don’t pick on the small faults and ignore the big achievements.” The first to be singled out for criticism were Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun. They were criticized by Mao Zedong by name as the promoters of anti-rash-advance policies. Before the Eighth National Congress, when the final draft of the Second Five-Year Plan was being formulated, Zhou omitted some important words from the plan, namely, those expressing the spirit of “achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results.” “This made the situation at the Nanning Conference so tense that some comrades could not sleep at night” (ibid., p. 73). Not only did Zhou admit to the “mistake” of the anti-rash-advance policy at the meeting, but he also made a separate self-criticism ( jiantao) to Mao, and at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress in May 1958, Zhou, Chen, and others who had “made the mistake of the anti-rash-advance” formally criticized themselves in writing. Zhou Enlai criticized himself at the meeting as follows: “I am the main person responsible for the mistake of ‘anti-rash-advance’ and we should learn more lessons from this mistake.” He criticized himself further, saying that: “Those who made the mistake of the ‘anti-rash-advance’ were those who tried to build socialism by administrative order instead of through the active efforts of the cadres and the masses, which is clearly contrary to the guideline of building socialism, that is, to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results, as expressed by Chairman Mao.”

And he said the following, completely expressing his submission to Mao Zedong: “As the historical experience of decades of revolution and construction in China proves, Chairman Mao is the representative of truth. If we depart from or violate his guidance and instructions, we will always lose our orientation, make mistakes, and damage the interests of the Party as well as the people. The many mistakes I have made prove this point.” (ibid., p. 370, my emphasis)

Stirred by this spirit of criticizing the anti-rash-advance, the plan’s indicators were raised one after another. The indicators of the Second Five-Year Plan were originally decided by the Party Central Standing Committee and the Political Bureau, therefore Mao Zedong himself, as Chairman of the Party, would naturally have agreed with the decisions, but at the Nanning Conference, he “reprimanded the correct decisions that had originally been made collectively, without allowing for rebuttal, and criticized and rejected them as vehemently as he had done with the right-wingers” (ibid., pp. 81–82).

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The Nanning Conference was nothing but the starting point for the formulation of the GLF policy. The policy was further “advanced” at the Chengdu Conference in March 1958, the Wuhan Conference in April 1958, and the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress in May 1958. The following is a brief account of this process. At the Chengdu Conference, each locality and administrative department set its own breakthrough goals, which were praised by Mao Zedong, so that enthusiasm for breakthrough grew stronger and stronger. The Conference’s common phrase was “break through superstition,” and existing theories, expert knowledge, and the Soviet experiences to date were seen as “superstitions” that needed to be overcome. The target of industrial gross output for 1958 was to be raised by 33% while that of agricultural gross output was increased by 16.2%. The nominal target of steel production for 1958 was 6,248,000 tons, 19.2% up from the 5,244,000 tons in 1957, but the actual target was raised to 7,000,000 tons, an increase of 33.5%. More importantly, the Chengdu Conference further enhanced Mao’s authority. He emphasized that there were two kinds of personality cults, “right” and “wrong”, and that a right personality cult is necessary. That is to say, Mao was saying that his personality cult is qualitatively different from that of Stalin, knowing well that the personality cult was indeed an effective means of strengthening and further establishing his power. Zhou Enlai’s self-criticism as I quoted above is a typical manifestation of “Mao worship.” Not only Zhou, but all the prominent central leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and Bo Yibo, submitted to Mao Zedong after the Chengdu Conference. China’s GLF policy was not born solely out of domestic political dynamics. The birth of this policy also has an international background. The Soviet Union successfully launched the world’s first artificial satellite in October 1957, and this confidence led Khrushchev to declare at the Supreme Soviet (Congress) in November of the same year that “within 15 years we will catch up with the United States in the production of important products.” Mao Zedong, who was attending the Moscow Conference in November, was soon to declare that “China will catch up with the United Kingdom in the production of steel and other important products in 15 years.” Mao Zedong had long had a great ambition to catch up with the United States. In October 1955, at the “Roundtable on the Problem of Socialist Remolding of Capitalist Industry and Commerce,” Mao stated as follows: “Our goal is to catch up with the U.S., and we must surpass it. The U.S. has a population of only 100 million, while we have a population of over 600 million. We must catch up with the U.S. … We will need decades to catch up with the U.S. In the end, it will depend on everyone’s efforts as to how many decades it will take. It will take at least 50 years, or 75 years, which is equivalent to 15 five-year plans. Some day we will catch up with the U.S., overtake the U.S., then we can release our pent-up frustration”. (Mao Zedong Collection, Vol. 6, p. 500, requoted from Shen (2008), p. 16)

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It may have been a grand dream, or even a fantasy, for China to catch up with the world’s leading economic power at that time. However, Mao really thought, “China is rich not only in people but also in resources, and it is not a mere dream for China, through hard work, to catch up with the U.S. So how can we catch up with the U.S.?” His solution was “high rate of growth, that is, a great leap forward.”4 Mao Zedong also believed that China could develop faster than the Soviet Union, stating in early 1956 that: “The speed of our industrial development should not be bound by the Soviet Union’s several previous five-year plans; our speed can exceed that of the Soviet Union,” citing as his reason the logic often quoted during the GLF period: “Poor and blank” (yiqiong erbai). (Shen 2008, p. 175)

This expresses the paradox that if we are poor, we will work hard to become rich, and if we have nothing, we can create what we want from the beginning, afresh, like drawing a new picture on a blank slate. The phrase “East wind overwhelms West wind,” which he used at the same Moscow Conference, typifies the exuberant optimism Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders had about the socialist system at the time—that socialism (the East wind) would finally overwhelm capitalism (the West wind). As we will see later, this Khrushchev-like illusion must have been in the minds of the Maoists when they saw the People’s Commune (PC) system as “the best road to communism.” Mao began to dream like a visionary, “If the Soviet Union is going to enter a communist society, then we will also go to communism in our own way.” At the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress, the GLF policy was officially adopted, with Liu Shaoqi delivering a keynote report that sounded exactly like Mao’s critique of anti-rash-advance, while departmental heads launched spectacular production targets, turning the meeting, so to speak, into a chorus for the Great Leap Forward. Liu proclaimed that “1958 is not only the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, but also the first year to catch up with and overtake the United Kingdom in 15 years,” but in his own speech Mao proposed the task of catching up with and overtaking the U.K. in seven years and then catching up with and overtaking the United States in eight or ten years. Since the Supreme Leader set such unrealistic goals for high-speed development, their subordinates followed suit and began to develop empty theories on super-speed development. For example, Wang Heshou, Minister of Metallurgical Industry, set an ambitious goal that a breakthrough in steel production was entirely possible, which would catch up with and surpass the United Kingdom within five years and catch up with the United States within 15 years. Li Fuchun, the head of economic planning, stressed that the country would catch up with or overtake the U.K. in the production of steel and other major industrial products within 7–8 years, and catch up with or overtake the U.S. in 15 years or a little longer. According to him, by 1962, the final year of the Second Five-Year Plan, gross industrial output should be two to three times that 4

75 years after 1955 is 2030, and there are many predictions on China’s economic prospect today, but if the current growth speed continues, China may very well catch up with the United States around 2030 in terms of total GDP, just as Mao Zedong had expected.

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of 1957, with an average annual growth rate of 26–32%. Thus, the GLF policy itself “leapt forward greatly.” In particular, Mao was obsessed with the plan to double steel production in one year, which was to fuel the metallurgical sector.5 With regard to agricultural production, too, the signal flare of the Great Leap was launched to celebrate the goals and achievements. The “Outline of National Agricultural Development for 1956–1967 (revised draft)”, commonly known as the “Forty Articles on Agriculture”, adopted at the Third Session of the Party’s Eighth National Congress held in September–October 1957, divided the country into three regions and set the following goals for 12 years: Foodgrain production was planned to be increased from 150 jins per mu (1.125 t/ha) to 400 jins per mu (3 t/ha) in the North, from 208 jins per mu (1.56 t/ha) to 500 jins per mu (3.75 t/ha) in the Central, and from 400 to 800 jins per mu (6.75 t/ha) in the South.6 The “production results” of foodgrains announced from around the end of 1957 were still mild compared to the exaggerated reports that followed, such as one district in the South having already exceeded 1200 jins per mu and another in the North having exceeded 1000 jins per mu. After the summer harvest of 1958, one report after the other inflated positive results. In the words of the People’s Daily, “Since May, the happy news of a good harvest has been flying around the country’s sky like spring swallows” (Li’s Notes (2), p. 47). One agricultural collective reported that it had achieved 2100 jins, then another reported 3000 jins, followed by a different collective reporting 4000 jins, and then a case appeared which reported 5000 jins (i.e., 37.5 t/ha).7 In August 1958, when the news was reported that the rice output of Maocheng County, Hubei Province, was 36,956 jins per mu, or about 277 tons per hectare, the People’s Daily even published a photo of four children standing on the densely planted ears of rice with a comment below the photo that “the children look like they are standing on a sofa” (Ding 1991, p. 84) (Photo 5.1).8

5

According to Li Rui’s recollection, on or around June 10, 1958, he was summoned by Mao Zedong to the pool in Zhongnanhai, where, in high spirits, Mao surprised him with the announcement of a plan to double steel production. He was so astonished that it almost knocked him off his feet. The next day, when he happened to meet Minister of Metallurgical Industry Wang Heshou on the street and conveyed this news, Wang also found it to be a sudden development. On June 19, at a meeting convened by Mao with the central leaders, this plan was formally presented. Wang then expressed that “Due to insufficient production capacity, it might be difficult,” but in the end, he was overruled by Mao (Li’s Notes (2), pp. 1–3). 6 The North refers to the area north of the Yellow River and the Qinling Mountains, where wheat and coarse grains are produced; the Central part refers to the area south of the Yellow River and north of the Huaihe River, also a wheat-producing area; and the South, south of the Huaihe River and the Qinling Mountains, a rice-producing area. 7 Liu Shaoqi later said, “The People’s Daily must bear half the responsibility for launching the ‘Great Leap Forward’” (Li’s Notes (2), p. 47). However, compared to the responsibility of the leaders, the responsibility of the “People’s Daily,” which is the “mouthpiece” of the Party, is a minor one. 8 However, “such ‘miracles’ also quickly became stale news. A month later, another photo adorned the paper, with the explanation added that ‘three adults can stand on the rice without crushing it’” (Ding 1991, p. 84).

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Photo 5.1 Exaggerated report of rice production. The children stand on thick rice stalks, but in fact, the stalks beneath their feet are a fabrication, bringing together crops from many fields into one. Source http://www.chi nafotobank.com/picture.do? method=getpicture1&id=266 544&ivk_sa=1024320u

It goes without saying that these unscientific “miracles” were staged and manipulated. One People’s Commune in Sichuan Province interviewed by Stephen Endicott gathered rice from several rice fields in one place and claimed to have produced 2000 jins per mu, while in another place rice straw was brought from a warehouse and covered with rice to make it look like there was a mountainous harvest (Endicott 1988, p. 58). It can be said that a large-scale comedic competition was performed throughout China. Scientists played a role as the directors of this comedy. Qian Xuesen, well-known as the father of rocket development in China, told to the China Youth Daily in June 1957: “The final limit of agricultural production is determined by the amount of solar energy per unit area each year, and if this light and energy is converted into crops, the current abundant production will increase even more … the production of rice and wheat will not stop at the level of just over 2000 jins, but will be more than 20 times that amount.” (Li’s Notes (2), pp. 49–50)

In addition, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences in the capital along with other agricultural scientists and experts held a round-table discussion with more than 30 grain production masters from all over the country, and they manipulated one another’s harvest targets upward. When the scholars proposed 60,000 jins per mu of wheat (461 t/ha) and 65,000 jins per mu of paddy rice (488 t/ha) for a good harvest, two agricultural collectives in Henan and Shaanxi Provinces announced a figure of wheat 100,000 jins per mu (750 t/ha), and one agricultural collective in Jiangsu Province gave a tremendously exaggerated figure of 70,000 jins per mu (525 t/ha) of paddy rice (ibid., p. 51). It was a competition among liars and boasters. Because scientists were spreading these figures, political leaders like Mao Zedong, who were laymen in science, also believed in these numbers and became elated. When Li Rui asked Mao later why he believed these figures, Mao replied, “I believed them because I had read Qian Xuesen’s writings” (ibid., p. 50).

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But why did this crazy “GLF fever” among scientists occur in the first place? “Breaking through superstition” was a popular slogan at the time, but why were scientific theories treated as “superstitions,” and why were theoretically unfounded claims and experiments transformed into “rational knowledge”? Understanding this abnormal mechanism is undoubtedly a powerful key to comprehending the society of Mao’s era in China. Both agricultural collectivization (see previous chapter), as well as the GLF and the PC movements which I will discuss next, were fueled by competition among regions as well as among leaders. Let me take a closer look at the mechanism whereby target figures were inflated during the GLF period.

2 Development of the People’s Commune Policy The Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune which emerged in the wake of the policy wreaked havoc on the Chinese economy and society as a whole. According to Kojima Reiitsu, it was the “explosive collective investment” in water conservancy construction and fertilizer production in the fall of 1957 that gave rise to the GLF policy and the birth of the People’s Commune system. He says, the latter were led by poor and lower middle peasants. They broke away naturally from the framework of existing agricultural production collectives, since they found such organizations were too small in scale to implement these projects (Kojima 1975, p. 108). We have an impression from his findings that the PC systems, were formed by merging several collectives, born as a natural result from below. However, this somewhat idealized version, based on official information at the time such as the People’s Daily, fails to capture the reality which was not so simple and magical. As was the case with the rise of agricultural collectivization in 1955, it was the power of Mao Zedong and the local cadres inspired by him—their guidance, orders, and often threats—that fueled the seemingly spontaneous, voluntary movements seen in areas throughout the region and even the whole country, and which were then held up as “typical examples.” Otherwise, it would have been impossible for them to pull off such an acrobatic feat as the transformation of the entire country’s rural areas into People’s Communes in just two months. There was also a strong sense of competition among the cadres, as they did not want to lose to other regions, and if they did not act quickly, they would fall behind. The havoc and economic losses wrought by the PC system throughout the country are typically exemplified by the “mess halls” and the “nationwide steel-making (quanmin liangang) movement.” These two events are closely interrelated, but let me first take a look at the latter, the steelmaking movement. As I argued above, Mao’s obsession with steel was extremely strong, in fact, one of the criteria for catching up with and overtaking the United Kingdom was steel production. Although he was not Otto von Bismarck, he seemed to be bound by a notion similar to “iron is the state.” For Mao, heavy industry was a key for socialist industrialization, and steel was at the core of that industrialization.

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Photo 5.2 Backyard furnaces. Mini-mini blast furnaces created by the farmers, which ultimately only produced unusable pig iron. Source https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA5NjMwN jc1NQ==&mid=2663486190&idx=4&sn=980aade11e01aef25e1c2b1931f437be&chksm=8b8721 c2bcf0a8d42bba335467e3c8835e412101f1598a91d75d4ea0a9366c969e434d76e083&scene=27

Because of his dream or fantasy that even amateurs should be able to produce iron by “breaking through superstition,” and moreover, because of his illusion that a great breakthrough in agriculture had been achieved, he decided to transfer massive labor force from agriculture to industry and to mobilize that labor in a large-scale steelmaking movement.9 As a result, a tremendous number of mini blast furnaces, called “indigenous blast furnaces” (tufa gaolu), were built all over the country, both in urban and rural areas, and people worked day and night, devoting themselves full-time to producing iron.10 At the end of September 1958, Mao published a discourse to newspaper reporters, stressing the significance of mobilizing the masses and launching a large-scale steel-making movement and criticized critics who contemptuously called it “abnormal,” “rural style,” or “guerrilla manner” (Li’s Notes (2), p. 220). At that time, small blast furnace fires were burning red-hot in the dark at night all over rural China without electricity. Such furnaces were built in places unrelated to production activities, such as schools, government offices, military units, and even neighborhood committees ( jumin weiyuanhui), where even people unexperienced in physical labor worked hard, dripping in sweat, to produce iron (Photo 5.2).

9

It is said that as reports of exaggerated grain production came in one after another from various regions, Mao Zedong, along with other leaders, was under the illusion that foodgrains were no longer a concern, but rather that overproduction of grains was the real problem. 10 There were also mini blast furnaces with a volume of only a few cubic meters. Such “steel mills” were called “backyard furnaces.”

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Not only did this steel-making campaign produce huge amounts of unusable scrap iron, causing an enormous financial burden11 but it also wasted a vast labor force estimated to be as many as 90 million people mobilized for the campaign. In order to shift everything to steel production, coal mining was rushed and transportation of iron ore as well as coal was prioritized, which resulted in the production and transportation of other commodities being sacrificed or falling short. During this period, the freight backlog became serious in many parts of the country. Even more serious damage was done to forests. With the lack of enough coal to make iron, nearby timber was cut down and used as fuel for blast furnaces. As a result, even scarce forests were cut down extensively, resulting in the appearance of bald hills in many areas. An economy is an organic entity consisting of closely interconnected industries and regions. When one industry develops, other industries related to it will also grow in a market economy. However, in a planned economy, where the government controls resources, if one industry is allowed to develop at the expense of others, the overall balance will be upset and the entire economy may decline. However, Mao Zedong, who believed in the “economics of contradiction,” had no such sense of economic balance (see Chap. 7). A popular Chinese idiom says, “Only when the key link is grasped, will everything fall into place” (gangju muzhang). It can be said that not only Mao but many other leaders were caught up in the easy and optimistic thinking that if they can hold down the steel industry, the other industries will develop accordingly. The PC system was a convenient organization for enabling, promoting, and fomenting the frenzied steel-making movement in rural areas. It was defined as a comprehensive organization engaging in industry and agriculture, as well as commerce, schools, and the militia, so that the peasants’ involvement in such industrial production as steel-making was in line with the Marxist commune’s ideal of abolishing the division of labor. What reflected the Commune’s ideals even better were the mess halls12 (gonggomg shitang). In some Chinese villages, there had long been communal canteens called “farmers’ canteens” that were open only during the busy farming season, but during the GLF period, these canteens spread under the name of “mess halls.” This system was promoted by Liu Shaoqi. Even before the establishment of the People’s Communes, Liu was a big proponent of the mess halls, saying the following: “An agricultural collective in Henan Province has about 500 households, of which about 200 households are running a mess hall and they no longer cook meals at home. The labor input has thus increased by 1/3 since they organized this hall. About 200 people used to cook meals before, but now only 40 people cook, and they are getting plenty of good meals and saving grains.” (ibid., p. 165)

When the Beidaihe Conference of August 1958 decided to create People’s Communes, the mess halls, which provided free meals, spread rapidly as a truly 11

As much as 5.4% of fiscal expenditures were used to make up the deficit caused by the large-scale steel-making campaign in 1958 (Li Xiannian Wenxuan (Selected Works of Li Xiannian 1935–1988), People’s Publishing House, 1989, p. 247. Requoted from Jiang (2015)). 12 Mess hall is also translated into “communal dining hall, or canteen.”

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communist way of “distribution according to need.” Mao Zedong, who was filled with excitement about the GLF movement, claimed: “In about 10 years or so, products will become so abundant and morals so noble that we will be able to implement communism in terms of food, clothing, and shelter.” He excitedly exclaimed, then, “Free meals in the mess halls, that is communism.” (ibid., p. 168)

Such a utopian fantasy escalated finally into the illusory idea of abolishing the most fundamental human institution, i.e. the family. Mao’s close aide Kang Sheng is said to have told rural cadres as follows: “Once we have communized the society, we don’t need family. The family is the biggest obstacle to the progress of the revolution … We should break up the affection between parents and children, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, etc., and uniformly organize men into male production units and women into female production units, and place children in nurseries and the elderly in nursing homes. If the family is dissolved and extinguished in this way, everyone will become more agile, so we can put more effort into the revolution, which will greatly liberate the productive forces.” (Ding 1991, p. 104)13

The mess halls also led to the liberation of the female labor force. Indeed, women no longer spent time cooking meals in each household. Since meals were not cooked in each house, there was no need for pots and kettles, and they were thrown into mini blast furnaces and transformed into “pig iron,” helping to accomplish a nominal production mission. By the end of October 1958, as many as 26,576 People’s Communes had been established nationwide, and the nation’s rural areas were almost entirely communized, while according to “incomplete statistics” by the end of October, just after the PC system was established, 2.65 million mess halls had been created nationwide, and 70–90% of the rural population could eat there (Bo 1993, p. 749). On average, a single People’s Commune had as many as 100 mess halls. In some rural villages, anyone could eat there freely, even if they were not villagers. These mess halls were supposed to have the effect of producing more food by increasing the overall labor supply. However, “after only two months of eating a full meal, many rural areas had devoured half a year’s worth of food.” (Yun 2016) It was only for a short time that people were able to immerse themselves in the illusion of “communism” that they could eat as much free food as they wanted. Not only was there a shortage of food. Once the mess halls were built, all the food that had been distributed to each home was supplied to the halls alone, and farmers had no choice but to eat in the halls. Moreover, because the food was free, it was distributed uniformly amongst those who worked and those who did not, and this excessive averageness caused severe conflicts among the people. And since “communism” was implemented in an impoverished society, the food was monotonous and disregarded individual tastes, so the dream of communism was replaced by disillusionment and the excitement of the period cooled off. And as food shortages worsened, it became 13

This is based on Mao’s utopian fantasy. He said in a speech on March 1958, “In socialism, private property still exists, factions still exist, families still exist. Families are the product of the last stage of primitive communism, and every trace of them will be eliminated in the future” (Yang 2012, p. 174).

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impossible to provide the meals themselves. In some areas, the famine had already begun in 1958, but in many areas it spread and became more serious from 1959 on, finally leading to the greatest and worst famine and hunger in world history.

3 Famine and Starvation: Its Reality and Number of Victims So, how much did people actually suffer from famine during and after the GLF movement, and how many people starved to death. The realities of the famine in rural China at that time, its severity and the tragedies that accompanied it, have attracted much attention. Numerous documents, records, research papers, and articles have been published on it, including those by Becker (1996), Tsuji (1990), Ding (1991), Yang (2012), and Zhou (2012). According to the records of Liang Zhiyuan, who surveyed six villages belonging to a production brigade in Anhui Province in 1960, “239 people, or 41.5% of the population, had died there, and 18 families had perished. … In mid-March of 1960, two students aged 12 or 13 died at the entrance of their classroom at the Li Yao Primary School of Gucheng Commune during a break between classes. On March 19, when they checked the main roads because it had rained, they found 19 people who had starved to death on the roadside. Based on such surveys, Liang Zhiyuan judged that the abnormal deaths14 of the rural population in the entire county were more than 200,000, and 30,000 households were wiped out” (Yang 2012, p. 380). In such circumstances, the horrifying phenomenon of cannibalism, where people ate people, was observed in various places. As mentioned earlier in Liang Zhiyuan’s account, in the outskirts of cities and at village stalls, human flesh was shockingly sold as “simmered pork” (ibid., p. 381). How many people, I wonder, starved to death in the entire country during this period? The scale of deaths by starvation, or more precisely abnormal deaths, has been the subject of intense debate within China. Some pro-regime advocates and Maoists insist that there was no famine or starvation at all, and that it is a hoax to say that a large number of people died of starvation. For example, Li Shenming, former Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has gone so far as to claim that “the 30 million people who died of starvation during the so-called ‘Great Leap Forward’ launched by Mao … is fraudulent data that was deliberately created by some people”. (requoted from Hong 2014a) Sun Jingxian represents those who have tried to reject the Great Famine/starvation view a little more “logically.” He argued that the decline in the population since 1959 or the increase in the number of deaths that appear in official statistics are fictitious 14

All deaths other than natural deaths are called abnormal deaths. Deaths due to starvation and suicide are also included in this type of death.

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figures resulting from confusion in household registration management given the mass departure and migration of peasants during a period of great turmoil; involving errors such as double reporting, cancellation, omission, and supplemental reporting, etc. He concludes that the actual number of “deaths due to malnutrition” was no more than 2.5 million (Sun 2014). Stimulated by this argument, Yang Songlin developed his own population estimates in an attempt to extend Sun’s argument and “refute” the common view of “30 million deaths from starvation” (Yang 2013). He even denies the fact that the total population declined in 1960 and 1961, as published by the National Bureau of Statistics, claiming that the population continued to grow during that period. The biggest problem with Sun Jingxian’s and Yang Songlin’s estimates, apart from the lack of demographic basis for their estimates, is that they ignore micro-data from many provinces that recorded various, but alarmingly large numbers of starvation deaths. Even Wu Zhipu, a loyal Maoist and then Henan Provincial Party Secretary, admitted in his self-criticism that more than 2 million people died due to starvation in the whole province from October 1959 to November 1960 (Yang 2012, p. 94). The only official Chinese reference to the number of victims during the GLF period is a report made by Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, who, in his report at a meeting to discuss a draft “Historical Resolution” in June 1981 admitted that “during the period 1959–1962, 22 million people across the country suffered ‘abnormal deaths’ due to difficult circumstances caused by the failure of the Party’s overall activities” (Beihai Xianren 2005, p. 298). China has never officially released any details or specific estimation methods for the abnormal deaths. This is because it is a historical fact that the Party does not want it to be touched on and probably because the Party is afraid that if it were to reveal the specifics on abnormal deaths, its authority and legitimacy, and especially that of Mao Zedong, would be damaged. As such, pro-regime scholars and Maoist supporters inevitably try to turn a blind eye to or forcibly deny this horrifying historical fact. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, in particular, caused enormous loss of life, and the local archives are now closing their doors to researchers who want to know the true facts. However, many researchers, both inside and outside China, have attempted to estimate the number of victims during the GLF period using various perspectives and methods, and they are largely in agreement that its scale was unprecedented in history. Nevertheless, when it comes to the specific number of victims, there is quite a variation in the estimates. Let me expand the list of major estimates compiled by Li (2012) and include estimates related to the number of abnormal deaths during the period that have been published since then (see Table 1).

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Table 1 Major estimates of the number of abnormal deaths during the GLF period Author

Year of publication

Investigation period

Number of abnormal deaths (ten thousands)

Wang Weizhia

1981

1959–61

3300 ~ 3500

Judith Banister

1984, 1987

1958–61

2887

Ansley Coale

1985

1958–61

2697

Jiang Zhenghua

1986

1959–61

1700

Jin Hui

1993

1959–61

4060

Ding Shu

1996

1958–62

Less than 3500

Li Chengrui

1997

1959–61

2200

Cao Shuji

2005

1958–62

3246

Yang Jisheng

2008

1958–62

3600

Lin Yunhui

2009

1958–62

3000

Li Che

2012

1958–62

3457

Frank Dikotter ¨

2015

4500

Source Based on Li (2012) Table 1, supplemented by the author. The sources of the other original texts are omitted for brevity Note Excludes estimates from critics of the Great Famine/Hunger view a Requoted from Yang (2012): original text Tombstone Chap. 23

There are two main estimation methods: (a) estimates are made based on micro and regional data, specifically collecting and compiling reports and statistics on the number of abnormal deaths in a household, village, People’s Commune, county, or higher regional level that were available in the archives (micro estimates); (b) estimates are made based on macro population data such as total population, mortality rates as well as fertility rates (macro estimates). The latter also differ depending on whether published or unpublished demographic statistics are used. Each of these methods has its pros and cons, and it is not easy to say which method is superior. The problem lies in the reliability of macro and micro statistics, and moreover, the fact that definitive casualty figures are not available because China does not fully and adequately publish its statistics. For example, deaths and mortality rates may have been over-reported in order to receive aid from the State, or conversely, local leaders may have deliberately under-reported local human losses in order to save their own reputations. Furthermore, when famine becomes severe, as has been the case in China for a long time, peasants often flee their villages. In some cases, the number of farmers who fled but are still alive are treated as “deaths.” As noted above, even government statistics are not always consistent. As an example, let me look at the differing government statistics on deaths in Sichuan Province in 1959. Hong Zhenkuai finds that Zhongguo Renkou: Sichuan

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Fence (Chinese Population: Fascicle Sichuan) published in 1988 gives the number of deaths as 3,282,000, whereas the Zhongguo Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian (1949– 1985) (Compilation of China Demographic Data), published in the same year, gives it as 1,409,000. However, from the winter of 1961 to April of the following year, the Sichuan Provincial Public Security Bureau “conducted a full population registration survey (but not yet published) of each production team, each household, and each person, with the People’s Commune as the unit, and found that the number of deaths amounted to 3,304,000” (Hong 2014b). This micro-estimate perhaps appears to be closest to the actual situation. And it is quite close to the figures in the Chinese Population: Fascicle Sichuan referred to above. Using these hidden statistics and archival materials, Becker (1996), Yang (2012), and Dikotter ¨ (2010) estimated the number of abnormal deaths during the GLF period. The basis for Becker’s estimates was a report by Chen Yizi, then Director of the Institute for Systemic Reform. After the reform and opening up, under the direction of Zhao Ziyang (Premier and later General Secretary of the Party until his downfall in the Tiananmen Square incident), a research team of 200 people was formed, including Chen Yizi, to visit various places, examine internal Party documents, records, and data stored in numerous archives, and create a report on rural areas in the Mao era. The number of victims of the famine listed in the report was astonishingly a total of 43–46 million (Becker 1996, p. 272). In addition, an internal meeting of high-level officials cited a death toll of 50–60 million. This report was never made public, but according to Becker, who interviewed Chen after he fled to the United States following the Tiananmen Square incident, Chen recalled that the number of deaths from starvation was 7.8 million in Henan, 8 million in Anhui, 7.5 million in Shandong, 9 million in Sichuan, and 900,000 in Qinghai. Dikotter ¨ combines such micro-estimates, concluding that “the death toll thus stands at a minimum of 45 million excess deaths”. (Dikotter ¨ 2010, p. 333) How, then, can and should the actual number of victims during the period in question be estimated, bearing in mind the distortions in the published population statistics? The simplest approach is to compare the mortality rate for the period 1958–1962 in the published China Statistical Yearbook with the average death rate for a normal year, say 1956–1957, and regard the excess as the “abnormal death rate,” from which the number of abnormal deaths can be estimated. This method, however, is not considered to be accurate since it may omit infants who were dead shortly after birth due to starvation but are not recorded as deceased, as well as those who fled their villages and died thereafter. This simplified method assumes that the population counts, fertility rates (number of births), and mortality rates (number of deaths) in published statistics for the period in question are all correct. If such statistics were influenced by over-reporting or under-reporting they should not qualify as real figures, so this method will obviously lead to inaccurate estimates. Therefore, it is necessary to use published statistics

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after carefully examining the situation at the time, adding qualitative analysis, and thoroughly assessing which years and which statistics are problematic and, even if problematic, relatively reliable. A common method is to use population censuses conducted in China in 1953, 1964, and 1982, as well as a 1% sample fertility rate survey conducted in 1982. It is said that the Chinese statistical system had become more reliable by 1982, and the published statistical figures for 1982 were considered reliable, so Judith Banister and others used such a method. In China, Jiang Zhenghua used the 1953, 1964, and 1982 censuses to demographically estimate the number of abnormal deaths during the GLF period. Using the 1982 demographic census which is assumed to be particularly reliable as a basis, he estimated the number of abnormal deaths to be 17 million in the three years after the GLF started, based on the population by age group, mortality rates, and fertility rates (Jiang 1987). Since then, however, numerous estimates of the number of victims during the GLF period have been attempted and refined.15 Next, as an example, let me introduce the relatively recent and influential estimate by Cao Shuji, which has been widely cited, and consider the issues related to this estimate of casualties (Cao 2005). Specifically, Cao uses the following estimation method. First, based on the 1953 and 1964 population censuses, he adjusts the administrative divisions of the prefectures to create population statistics based on “prefectures” as units during the Qing Dynasty. Next, based on data from a large collection of local journals and population records, he uses the pre-disaster and post-disaster population growth acceleration for each prefecture to determine the abnormal death population for each prefecture. Subtracting the pre-disaster population from the post-disaster population yields the net population loss during the disaster period, which is then added to the (negative) natural increase in population in excess of the normal death population during the disaster period to obtain the total population loss, which is then added to the net out-migration (including out-migration from and to the cities) to obtain the number of abnormal deaths for each prefecture. The period covered differs by region because of the different timing of disasters in different regions, but all fall within the period 1958–1962. Although data from all local journals are not necessarily available, if we regard them as a kind of sampling survey data and inflate them to obtain data for the entire province, we obtain the results shown in Table 2. However, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Xizang, Ningxia, and the special cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are excluded from his samples.16

15

Refer to Jia and Zhu (2015) for a survey of research by researchers in Mainland China. Therefore, if the number of abnormal deaths in these areas were added, the total number would be much higher, but the number of starvation deaths in these areas, especially in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, would have been small.

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Table 2 Cao’s estimated abnormal deaths and death rates (1958–1962) Region name

Pre-disaster population (ten thousands)

Number of abnormal deaths (ten thousands)

Death rate (%)

Anhui

3446.0

633.0

18.37

Sichuan

7191.5

940.2

13.07

Guizhou

1706.4

174.6

10.23

Hunan

3651.9

248.6

6.81

Gansu

1585.7

102.3

6.45

Henan

4805.8

293.9

6.12

Guangxi

2009.9

93.1

4.63

Yunnan

1918.3

80.4

4.19

Shandong

5343.5

180.6

3.38

Jiangsu

5296.3

152.7

2.88

Hubei

3074.9

67.5

2.20

Fujian

1547.9

31.3

2.02

Liaoning

1931.0

33.0

1.71

Guangdong

3839.3

65.7

1.71

Heilongjiang

1564.0

19.0

1.21

Hebei

5544.6

61.0

1.10

Shaanxi

1832.0

18.7

1.02

Jilin

1280.9

12.0

0.94

Zhejiang

2570.3

14.1

0.55

Shanxi

1621.1

6.0

0.37

63,474.9

3245.8

5.11

Total

Source Cao (2005) Note Excludes Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia Autonomous Regions, and the special cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin

The following facts can be confirmed from this table. First, the differences by region are very large. Sichuan had the highest number of abnormal deaths, followed by Anhui, Henan, and Hunan. In terms of mortality rates, Anhui had the highest rate, followed by Sichuan and Guizhou, and these three provinces can be considered the regions with the highest rates of abnormal deaths or, more specifically, starvation deaths during the GLF period. Conversely, the situation was relatively mild in Shanxi, Zhejiang, Jilin, and Shaanxi. It is interesting to note that compared to the great famines of the period between 1851 and 1880, which intervened the Taiping Rebellion, the regions with severe famines 100 years prior did not necessarily have severe famines during the GLF period. This implies that natural disasters were not the primary cause of the Great Famine.

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Cao’s estimate is unique in that it uses population data by region from local journals, but it is still not without question whether such data are truly reliable. It also seems one-sided in that it does not utilize the 1982 Population Census as Li (2012) does, that is, it does not cross-check with other macro population data. However, the resulting number of victims is in close agreement with Li Che’s estimate (see Table 1), suggesting reliability.

4 The Great Famine and Starvation: The Mechanism During the Mao era, China officially attributed the tragedy of the Great Famine as described above to three causes: (1) a drought unprecedented in a century, (2) the cessation of Soviet aid, and (3) policy errors. It was said that natural disasters, namely, not man-made disasters, are the main cause of the Great Famine as well as its resulting starvation. However, as will be discussed in detail in Chap. 8, at the so-called “the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” held in January–February 1962, Liu Shaoqi clearly pointed out that the cause of the Great Famine was “70% man-made disasters and 30% natural disaster,” admitting that policy failures and misguided leadership were the main causes of the famine and starvation concerned. However, even that assessment is too lenient to the political authorities, in my view. Even if there were some “unprecedented” weather events in some areas, the cause of the disaster was directly and entirely a failure of policy, in other words, it was a 100% man-made disasters. Furthermore, there is a view that the weather during the relevant period was not so bad, and even if there were some natural disasters, it was the government’s responsibility to deal with them properly, so the natural disaster view cannot stand in the first place.17 Let me examine the reasons why this was a 100% man-made disasters. Based on the discussions at the aforementioned Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, Bo Yibo summarizes the leadership’s “fundamental causes of errors” during the GLF period as: (1) inexperience of cadres, (2) violation of the principle of “democratic centralism”, (3) decentralized decision-making, (4) ignoring the principle of “seeking the truth from facts,” and (5) the mistake of only opposing the right and not opposing the left. In particular, he found the main cause of the “man-made disasters” in the fact that the Party disregarded the opinions of the masses (Bo 1993, pp. 1029– 1043). However, it was suggested that these were problems in the implementation of the policy, and not fundamental errors of the policy itself. Moreover, the question of who should ultimately bear the responsibility for this havoc became taboo in China. Let me first examine why the famines that intensively appeared in the 1959–61 period occurred, sort out the mechanisms that caused the famines and starvation, and look for the fundamental causes of these man-made disasters.

17

According to Jin Hui, using the “National Historical Drought and Flood Grade Data Table,” for the period 1959–1961 showed “three years of calm weather” when viewed nationally (Jin 1993).

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This Great Famine and starvation has become a target of international interest because it was so large-scale, and many researchers and critics at home and abroad have presented various views on its causes and mechanisms.18 Chen (2011) compared the various theories and found that, in addition to differences in agricultural geography, the following two factors were important in explaining why the level of hunger differed so much between Anhui and Jiangxi (see Table 1).19 These were: (a) factors related to grain procurement; the latter was excessive compared to production in Anhui Province. In fact, Anhui over-reported its grain procurement as three times more than its actual production; (b) factors related to the leadership: Partly due to differences in the leadership styles of provincial leaders; Zeng Xisheng, the Party secretary of Anhui Province, was autocratic in his leadership, whereas leaders represented by Yang Shangkui, the Party secretary of Jiangxi Province, were more cooperative with the people, so that they could realize the actual situation and were able to take measures to minimize the sacrifices of the people. Mao Zedong, at one point, erroneously argued that the famine during the Great Leap Forward was a class issue, attributing it to “landlords and rich peasants holding power in the villages.”20 This is a misguided argument not based on evidence. However, setting this aside, when summarizing the previous discussions from my perspective, numerous factors contributed to the Great Famine, and among them, it seems to me that the following six factors are considered important: (a) Disincentives and declined motivation under the PC system: As official statistics admit, food production fell far below the previous year’s level every year from 1959 to 1961. The main reason for this is said to be that the PC system was introduced during the GLF movement. As such the “equalitarianism and indiscriminate transfer of resources (yiping erdiao)” along with the elimination of self-distribution and rural free markets significantly reduced peasants’ motivation to produce foodgrains. Gao Wangling describes how certain villages were “communized” in Fengyang County, Anhui Province. The scope of “communization” was extremely wide, ranging from land, houses, food, labor, livestock, and farming tools to poultry, pots, pans, bowls, gourds, and ladles. The most serious was the forcible occupation of private homes, rounding up people and 18

For example, the 1998 Volume 9, Number 2 of the China Economic Review, a specialized academic journal on the Chinese economy, has a special issue on this, with five papers and eight authors discussing the causes of famine and hunger during the GLF period from various angles. 19 The agricultural geographical factor refers to the fact that Anhui Province has many plain fields, while Jiangxi Province has many mountains and hilly areas, and is blessed with water, with paddy fields at the center. Jiangxi Province had many alternatives to food in case of famine. 20 In October 1960, Mao mentioned the mass starvation incident in the Xinyang area of Henan Province (where it is said that one million people died), saying, “In Xinyang, a large number of landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and villains are usurping leadership and committing all kinds of evil deeds” (Yang 2012, p. 81). In my view, this prejudice of the top leader, who sees everything from the perspective of class struggle, was one of the factors that prevented an accurate grasp of the situation and the implementation of appropriate measures.

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forcing them to move in, and if owners did not comply, throwing their belongings out of their homes. In some areas, “potential excavation teams” were assigned to search villages and homes, whispering, “What is yours is only your teeth.” (Gao 2013, p. 139). It was as if the village had been robbed. The “communist wind” was not the only thing that discouraged and tormented the peasants. In the early years of the PC system, the cost-accounting unit was often higher than the production brigade level, so the distribution tended to average out among brigades for both those who worked hard and those who did not. This would mean that those who did not work much would receive more than their fair due, which would be unfair for those who did work.21 In particular, the larger the size of the cost-accounting unit, the greater the sense of unfairness among the same unit members. After the post-Mao era arrived, when collective farming was eliminated and individual farming was revived, farmers’ motivation increased dramatically; accordingly, their production and income increased, suggesting how difficult it was for the collective farming system itself to motivate its members to work. (b) Mass mobilization of agricultural labor into the industrial sector: As mentioned above, a nationwide campaign to construct small blast furnaces and produce iron was launched in the fall of 1958 with the goal of making a breakthrough in steel production. As a result, a massive agricultural labor force with physical strength was mobilized for these activities, resulting in a shortage of labor for agricultural work in rural areas so that a large amount of foodgrains could not be harvested or stored adequately after harvesting. In addition, as the labor force moved to the industrial sector in large numbers, the urban population increased, which in turn increased the demand for staple foods. Furthermore, the mobilization of large numbers of rural labor for basic human-energy-intensive construction projects such as water conservancy is also said to have contributed to the intersectoral transfer of agricultural labor and increased food consumption, albeit within rural areas. By the same token, the urban-oriented distribution of food also discouraged farmers and contributed to the spread of hunger in rural areas (Lin and Yang 1998). In urban areas, where the government sector and state-owned enterprises play a central role, the state distributes a predetermined amount of grain, but in rural areas, the grain is collectively owned, and the farmers themselves must procure foodgrain for consumption. (c) Mess halls: As grain production declined and mess halls were found to have wasted foodgrains, this “communist style of dining” quickly ceased to operate efficiently, and with the elimination of eating at home this led to starvation. A hypothesis that mess halls were the main cause of the Great Hunger has also been put forward by a relatively large number of researchers. For example, Wen Guanzhong and Liu Yuan point out that “the mess hall system, symbolized 21

In 1961, the “Sixty Articles on Agriculture” were enacted and it was decided that the production unit would be the cost-accounting unit and that it would not be moved for 30 years, so this issue was taken into consideration to a certain extent. However, in the early years of the communization, the idea of “the bigger and more public, the better” (yida ergong) was strong, and there was no such idea of lowering this unit below the production team.

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by the deprivation of private plot, the abolition of family side jobs, and the forced collectivization of all peasants’ food allocations, was the primary cause of the GLF famine” (requoted from Jia and Zhu 2015). Liu et al. (2014) similarly conclude, from their econometric analysis, that mess halls were the main culprit in the GLF famine. In fact, the famine fluctuation patterns match quite well with the diffusion, promotion, adjustment, re-promotion, and abolition of mess halls. (d) Exaggerated production reports and excessive grain procurement: Exaggerated grain production reports were a major catalyst for the excessive procurement of grain. Grain procurement carried out by the government is done in two ways, that of agricultural tax and obligatory purchase at officially determined price, or requisition. While agricultural taxes are relatively fixed, the amount of grain requisition fluctuates according to annual production, and if farmers report that they produced more grain than they actually did, the amount procured increases accordingly. Then if the cadres of the county or People’s Commune, or the production team overstates grain production, the portion of grains that team members can obtain for self-consumption and seed will decrease. Thus, the innocent farmers become the victims of the false reports that their cadres made on production. Certainly, exaggerated reports were not the only cause of the increase in forced purchase, but they were certainly an important part in the share of procured grain in total production, which increased from 29.4% in 1958 to 39.4% in 1959 and 35.6% in 1960, notwithstanding drastic fall in total grain production. In the case of Henan Province, for example, the actual grain production in 1958 was only 14.5 million tons, but the Party Committee, the Secretary of which was Wu Zhipu, as I argued above, a typical Maoist along with Ke Qingshi of Shanghai City, reported that the production amounted to as much as 35.1 million tons, namely 2.4 times the amount actually produced. In order to complete the target of requisition, the officials in the field were engaged in the “detection of falsified production reports,” in other words, requisitioning foodstuffs that corresponded to the overstated production (Su et al. 1992, p. 450). Even though the cadres at the grass-roots honestly reported the amount of produced grains, it was forcibly requisitioned as they were suspected of concealing the amount to be procured. The more loyal localities were to Mao Zedong and the Party, the more they exaggerated their reports, and the more they strangled themselves. (e) Excess exports and insufficient imports of foodgrains: When a serious famine occurs and the domestic food supply is drastically reduced, domestic stocks are generally drawn down, and if that is not enough, the nation usually relies on imports or aid from abroad. Needless to say, imports require foreign currency, but China did not have sufficient foreign currency at the time. In such cases, a normal government would borrow money from abroad, even if it had to take

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on huge foreign debts, to import the necessary amount of food from overseas since the country is in a state of emergency. At the time, however, the Chinese government imported only a small portion of foodgrains, nor relied on foreign aids. On the contrary, it continued to export large quantities of grains to repay its loans from the Soviet Union as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated.22 (f) Political attitudes of leaders: One aspect of this famine/starvation being manmade rather than a natural disaster is that the results of the same policies varied greatly depending on the political stance and attitudes of central as well as local leaders. This is the key political factor behind all of the above factors. Imagine, for example, if Mao Zedong and other central leaders had not carried out the fast and sloppy communization, if they had stopped foodgrain exports or asked for foreign aid, and if there had not been an unusual competition for results among provinces and regions, the situation might not have become so serious. While pointing out that there is a close correlation between the participation rate in mess halls and the degree of famine, political scientists Yang Dali and Su Fubing, draw the following conclusion, albeit paradoxical, that the areas with high participation rate in mess halls is associated with lower Party membership. That is to say, we can infer that in “politically backward” areas with lower party membership ratios, leaders pursued more radical policies to demonstrate their loyalty to the Party, specifically the establishment of mess halls and the policy of enforcing participation in them (Yang and Su 1998). Alternatively, Kung Kai-sing and Chen Shuo, believe that political radicalism was stronger in provinces where the leader was a candidate for the Party’s Central Committee, making the famine more severe a result of the leader’s career aspirations (Kung and Chen 2011). The same is true of the competition among provinces to report exaggerated comedic achievement. As Yang Jisheng said correctly, “loyalty to Mao created famine” (Yang 2012, p. 443), and while such loyalty competitions may bring about rapid social and economic changes, as was the case with agricultural collectivization, for example, they also produced irreversible consequences, as in the GLF movement. What was fueling the competition among cadres was not only competition for performance and loyalty. As many reports have told us, perhaps due to the AntiRightist Struggle and the “criticism of right-leaningness,” local and grass-roots cadres, in order to avoid being perceived as “rightist” or “right-leaning” elements themselves, tended to involve excessive actions. Such actions as forcible, sometimes even violent, procurement of foodstuffs was a phenomenon seen in many regions.

22

As we saw earlier, there are various estimates about the number of people who died of starvation, but if the number was 30 million, we can calculate the “price of life” per person who died of starvation by multiplying the international grain price at that time by the total amount of grains imported (the minimum necessary to prevent starvation) divided by 30 million people, assuming that the imported grains could save the hungry people.

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By rearranging the above six causes, the mechanisms of famine and starvation that occurred immediately after the GLF movement can be depicted as shown in Fig. 1. No doubt, this figure is not a complete picture of the mechanisms. The actual structure is more complex, involving many more factors, and moreover may differ from region to region. For example, wastage of food by malicious cadres is often pointed out as a cause of hunger, but it is not depicted here. The following implications can be drawn from this Fig. 1. First, the famine and starvation would not have occurred if the government had not created the PC system and if it had not launched the GLF policy that created it. The reason why the GLF policy was initiated in the first place was Mao’s dream of rapid industrialization. The central policy was to give priority to heavy industry, and if only that policy had been modified or abandoned, horrific tragedies such as the cannibalism mentioned above would not have occurred. Second, however, even if a famine had occurred and even if the PC system had existed, the tragedy could have been avoided or at least mitigated if only such institutions had existed and policies been employed that could have dealt with and corrected those crises immediately. Such policies may have included, for example, the abolition of mess halls, a drastic overhaul of rural cost-accounting plus distribution units, an end to unscientific steel-making campaigns and rural labor migration for the irrational industrialization, a revision of the foodgrain requisition system, and the rapid release of large-scale emergency grain imports and national grain reserves. Some of these policies were certainly adopted and implemented, but too late and/or too little. However, no drastic measures to improve the collective farming system, such as increasing grain production by reviving individual farming to give a strong impetus to farmers, were ever officially adopted. Moreover, drastic reductions in the procurement of foodgrains were untimely, either due to the rigid bureaucracy, or due to saving the face of the Supreme Leader, or due to maintaining blind faith in him. Conversely, a simple instruction by Mao Zedong could have alleviated and relieved famine and hunger, since a strict system based on the law had not been established at that time. Starving peasants tried to survive by secretly stealing harvests from neighboring villages, cultivating hidden fields, and cheating on procured foodgrains to pay up.23 The number of deaths from starvation varied from region to region, from village to village, and it is said that one of the reasons for this was the difference in “generosity” of the cadres at the grass-roots level who deliberately overlooked such actions of the peasants.24

23

Gao Wangling named these actions “anti-actions” ( fanxingwei). See Gao (2013). Cao Shuji has an interesting hypothesis that the large differences in mortality rates among regions may be due to differences in “historical memory” (Cao 2005). More specifically, in areas that had experienced famines in the past, cadres and farmers would have been more cautious about food supply and would have known relatively well how to cope with famines, and would have realized that over-reporting of production would lead to over-procurement; while in areas where such memories were absent or weak, cadres would have been more likely to run amok.

24

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Fig. 1 Mechanism that generates and develops the Great Famine and hunger in China after the Great Leap Forward: A hypothetical model

No doubt, Mao Zedong was primarily responsible for creating these “man-made disasters” as the ultimate decision-maker, but he was not the only one. Vice Premier Tan Zhenlin, who was in charge of agricultural policy, was aware that people were dying all over the country, but he still demanded that the local governments fulfill

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their mandate to requisition grains. Chen Zhengren, Minister of Food, the very implementing arm of food policy, was more concerned with piling up foodgrain stocks than with what was happening to food consumption in the country (Yang 2014).25 Hunger does not necessarily occur because food production declines overwhelmingly or because a famine occurs. As Amartya Sen has asserted appropriately, it occurs when people are deprived of their entitlement to acquire food and other subsistence items in order to survive, in other words, when they are deprived of the right to life itself (Sen 2000). The Great Famine during the GLF period was caused by the deprivation of and disregard for the peasants’ right to life by many leaders at all levels, from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other Party and government leaders at the top to the leaders at various levels of the People’s Communes at the bottom. The essence, reality, and emptiness of the “mass line” that Mao and the Party leadership had so glibly trumpeted are typified in this event, too. Sen emphasizes that famine does not cause starvation in democracies, and he points to post-GLF China as a bad example, but this historic famine and starvation in China will forever be recorded as a classic example of how a country where “truth falls from the heavens” cannot prevent starvation from occurring and spreading. By the way, what was Mao Zedong’s attitude to the grave and serious hunger situation at that time? At the Shanghai Conference in March 1959, he surprisingly stated: “If resources are equally distributed, it will only destroy the Great Leap Forward. If there is not enough to eat, people will starve to death. [Then] it would be better to let half the people die and let the other half have enough to eat.” (Zhou 2012, p. 25)26

One may differ in views as to whether this as an expression of his ruthlessness or merely an exaggeration, but in any case, he did not have a serious sense of crisis, that the nation would be unsustainable due to starvation if he did not do something about it. In the first place, Mao Zedong was extremely insensitive to human life, as evident in his saying, “landlords must be killed.” He made a speech typifying his disregard for human life—at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC Central Committee in May 1958, he said: “Nuclear war has not yet been experienced. We have never experienced nuclear war. I don’t know how many people will die due to this war, but the best thing is that half of us will survive, the second-best thing is that one-third will remain. Many hundreds of millions will survive out of the two billion or so (of the world’s population) and will be able to develop if we implement several five-year plans, while all capitalism will perish in return, then we will have permanent peace. This is not bad.”27 25

See Chap. 8 for Zhou Enlai’s attitude and stance toward the Great Famine. This statement was found by Dikotter ¨ in the archives in Gansu Province (Zhou 2012, p. 20). 27 The same thing was said by Mao at the “Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution” held in Moscow in November of the previous year, leaving the attendees from various countries dumbfounded. 26

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At the Beidaihe Conference in August 1958, Mao claimed: “We have fought so many battles for so many years, and so many people have died. No one can make amends for that loss. We are building now, but this is also a terrible battle, and we have risked our lives for years and will have to continue to risk our lives. This is generally less deadly than war.” (Yang 2014)

Thus, from his point of view, achieving the great goal of national and economic breakthrough came first, and the deaths from starvation came second. In fact, we never hear that he was horrified to learn of the devastation and tragedy in various parts of the country. At best, he refrained from eating meat for a while.28 Does this Supreme Leader’s view of mankind not have something in common with his view of the “masses,” as shown in Chap. 3?

5 What Was the Great Leap Forward?: My Hypothetical View In retrospect, the Great Leap Forward was as extraordinary as the Cultural Revolution. What was abnormal was not only the various phenomena and actions, such as the rash industrialization, exaggerated reports, the “communist style” in mess halls, and especially the tremendous scale of famine and starvation, which were unprecedented in history. It was during this period, and in many parts of the country, that an astonishingly comedic situation emerged, as if the entire society was in a state of acute mania, with everyone from Mao Zedong and other central leaders at the top to the peasants of the People’s Communes at the bottom telling tall tales and giving in to a buoyant mood as if “communist society” would arrive any day in the future. Li Rui refers to the experience of Gao Yang, a Vice Minister of the Industry, when in a mountain village in Shandong Province in September 1958: “Old women and children (come from far away to assist the steel-making movement), each of them was carrying fans for cooking rice, or fans made of Japanese banana plants or chicken feathers used to cool off in the summer. The purpose of these fans is to blow air for steel-making. If I told you about it, you would probably laugh, but the kind of passion the masses displayed is truly moving.” (Li’s Notes (2), pp. 224–225)

The idea of using a fan for cooking or a fan for cooling in the summer to blow air through a blast furnace to produce iron is just cartoonish, but how did such “moving stories” actually come to be? 28

In the words of Yang Jisheng, that story, too, “was nothing more than propaganda by those who wanted to create a God” (Yang 2012, p. 489). At the time, Mao Zedong was fond of Western cuisine, and it is said that the menu prepared for the Chairman included more than a dozen dishes using beef and lamb.

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It may be not political science or sociology that can adequately describe and analyze this situation, but rather religious studies. Was everyone, from Mao Zedong, the guru, to the masses, the ordinary believers, not involved in a kind of religious excitement, or ecstasy, that is incomprehensible to reason? Peng Dehuai called it “petty bourgeois radicalism,” which provoked Mao’s anger (see the next chapter), but petty bourgeois people with a modicum of rationality, such as intellectuals, would not ordinarily have put themselves into this state of excitement. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966 and hundreds of thousands of Red Guards had an audience with Mao in Tiananmen Square, they were so moved and excited that they shed tears just to “see” the Chairman’s face, which can be compared to the relationship between a guru and his followers. Probably the GLF movement was one such pseudo-religious ceremony. The Lushan Conference and the severe criticism of Peng Dehuai and others at the Conference, which will be discussed in the next chapter, remind us of the witch hunts of the Medieval and Early Modern periods in the Western Europe. In the Cultural Revolution witch hunts were carried out on an even larger scale. Let me look at Li Rui’s evaluation of the Great Leap Forward and Mao Zedong’s promotion of it. In his view, with the slogan of “breaking through superstition and liberating ideas,” Mao ignored objective conditions, ignored economic laws, and rushed toward a utopia which was doomed to fail. What original method did Mao devise? “At best, he simply imposed the methods of the revolutionary struggle era onto the Soviet socialist system,” Li dismissively observed. A certain kind of idealization of the GLF movement was once evident in the Western world regarding Mao Zedong’s literal invocation of the “mass line,” in which the masses rose voluntarily and passionately to challenge modern technologies and create an entirely new socialism, albeit one that was amateurish. For example, Nakaoka Tetsuro, a technology analyst who visited various parts of China in the mid1970s, found that the spirit of the GLF movement was still alive in an automobile factory in Shanghai, which produced only 2200 trucks a year. Nakaoka was sharply critical of the capitalist mode of production and management that put efficiency first and prioritized mass production. Thus, he was deeply impressed to see workers making trucks as if they were handmade with “their own power” (Nakaoka 1976). He discovered workers in socialist China running production that was the complete opposite of the capitalist style. However, at the time he was already worried that what moved him might amount to “unrequited love.” His fears were realized when he visited post-reform China again, and was disappointed to see Chinese workers stuck in the same gears of high productivity demanded by enterprises in capitalist countries. Many intellectuals who criticized modernization in the Western industrialized world praised China’s GLF or CR movements as well as Mao Zedong. Nakaoka, who admits that he had “projected his awareness of issues and aspirations in Japan onto China,” was honest enough to realize that traveling to post-Mao China would require him to “free himself from the view of things that put his own aspirations onto other countries” (Nakaoka 1983, p. 123).

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The passion shown by the old women and children of the village, as experienced by Gao Yang in a mountain village in Shandong Province at the height of the indigenous blast furnace movement, was not a “funny story,” but was certainly a moving one. But being moved by such cannot be authentic if it was born by being stirred up from above. As Nakaoka admits, the labor of amateurs “pooling all their wisdom” to create something may be beautiful, but I am not sure whether we can or should be easily moved by such a phenomenon without looking at why it was initiated, who decided on it, what were the aims of such decision and what were its results.

Chapter 6

The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: The Lushan Conference and Its Aftermath

The initial momentum of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) policy and the People’s Commune (PC) movement was tremendous, but the flaws and contradictions of this “radicalization” soon became apparent. There was no easy way to double steel production as the GLF policy initially expected. It was impossible to increase total foodgrain production from less than 200 million tons to 350 million tons. From the end of 1958 to the beginning of 1959, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held a series of meetings to correct the exaggerated reports generated by the GLF policy and the excessive communization movement, and tried to propose corrective measures. Mao Zedong himself came to recognize the excesses of these policies, to some extent, and began to seek modifications toward more realistic policies. Thus, the overall atmosphere of the Party was shifting “from left to right,” or more precisely, from fantasy to reality. Although there are quite a few published documents on the Lushan Conference itself, Lushan Huiyi Zhenmianmu (The True Features of the Lushan Conference) (Li 1999a, hereinafter, Li’s Notes (3)), a memoir by Li Rui, in my view, is the richest in content and analysis. Li Rui was a close friend of Peng Dehuai and his associates. He was also deeply involved in this incident. He himself came under heavy criticism and condemnation at the Lushan Conference, was subsequently sent to a remote area and even to the Qincheng Prison outside Beijing, which is well known for its incarceration of political prisoners. In this Chapter, I will focus on his memoir and supplement it with other sources to describe the major changes in the direction of the GLF policy up to the time of the Lushan Conference. First, I will examine Peng Dehuai’s personal letter to Mao, the so-called “Opinion Letter” at the Lushan Conference, which in a sense marked a major turning point in the GLF policy. Next, I will consider Mao’s fierce criticism of it, and how and why the subsequent war of accusations against the “Peng Dehuai group” started. Then, I will review the relationship between Peng and Mao after the Lushan Conference. Finally, I will try to consider the significance of the Peng tragedy in my own way.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_6

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Those who were involved in this incident, including Li Rui, were restored to their honor after the death of Mao Zedong. Still, when we read Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter, it is hard to imagine why his policy criticism and advice to Mao, which were very restrained from an ordinary person’s point of view, would have infuriated Mao Zedong. I feel that this dramatic incident demonstrates and condenses the idiosyncrasies of Mao’s way of thinking and behavior.

1 The Reversal of the Great Leap Forward Policy As soon as the GLF policy and the establishment of the PC system began, various problems became apparent. One of the major policy changes initiated by the Party and the government was to lower the basic accounting unit of the PC to the level of a production brigade. When the Commune was first established, the scale of production and distribution was several to dozens of times larger than the previous advanced producer cooperatives, that is, almost equivalent to a production brigade consisting of approximately 200–300 households. Public mess halls were also established where people could eat for free. Thus, the illusion was created that a “communist” society was imminent. The biggest problem, as pointed out in the previous chapter, is that as the production as well as distribution unit expands, the problem of the reduced motivation of member farmers arises—the fate of collective farming—and becomes more and more serious. When a large number of people work together and the fruits of their labor are distributed, there is always a sense of dissatisfaction among the members, who may say, “I worked so hard, but I am only paid this much.” In the case of a business corporation, there are established rules for distribution like a wage system and a management or supervisory function for the members works appropriately. In the case of collective farming, however, the more the number of members increases, the more difficult it becomes to manage or supervise them. The fact that the old individual farm system was naturally restored when the government allowed collectives to be dismantled after the reform and opening-up of the country in 1978 clearly suggests the inherent fragility of collective farming. The reduction of the basic unit of production to the level of a production brigade was not enough, and then, after 1960, when famine spread and the number of deaths from starvation exploded in rural areas, the pendulum of the policy swung back even further, as the unit of production was reduced to the level of production teams, or the level of the previous elementary cooperatives of about 20–30 households. Another shift was the review of small-scale and indigenous production (tufa), such as that of steel, to lower the excessive production targets to a more realistic level: The cost of producing one ton of pig iron was 100 yuan for a large blast furnace, while a small blast furnace cost 345 yuan, whereas the state procurement price for pig iron was only 150 yuan. According to an estimate by the National Bureau of Statistics, the deficit (the difference between the cost and procurement price) caused by the indigenous steel and iron production amounted to 5 billion yuan in 1958 (Li’s Notes (2), p. 234). As for the production of steel for 1959, Mao proposed, at the First

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Photo 6.1 Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong. Peng Dehuai (left) and Mao Ze Zong. They clashed at the Lushan Conference in 1959. Source https://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2006-08-30/160810874009. shtml

Zhengzhou Conference in November 1958, to lower the target from the previous 30 million tons to 22 million tons, and then still not confident, he suggested lowering the target further to 15 million tons. He stated: “Are you confident about the 18 million tons (proposed by Bo Yibo)? The prospect will open only when you can persuade. I don’t agree at all with the basis for this or that you are saying now. I’ve decided to take an opportunistic standpoint and to struggle for it …. Others have opposed my rash advance (maojin) stance before, but now I oppose their rash advance.” (ibid., p. 362)

In 1956, Mao Zedong had sharply criticized the “anti-rash-advance” views of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and others (see previous chapter), but now he probably inwardly wondered, “Did I say too much at that time?” Did he reflect a little on these criticisms? No, he had never sincerely criticized himself before or after, so it is very unlikely he did at this time.1

2 The Lushan Conference: Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter At the enlarged meeting of the Party’s Political Bureau held in Shanghai from late March to early April 1959, Mao Zedong addressed 16 issues. I will concentrate on three of them that anticipate the Lushan Conference and might even indicate a strategy on his part to invite criticism of Peng Dehuai (Photo 6.1). First, Mao spoke as if he were admonishing himself, calling for “being resourceful and decisive” (douomou shanduan): 1

Mao Zedong is said to have stated explicitly that he would “never self-criticize” (Guo 2007).

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“Some comrades are very subjective and arbitrary, thinking that their opinions are correct, and the result of practice may fail, and may even create meaningless phenomena. We must listen to opinions from all sides, especially opposing opinions, [and] different opinions” (Li’s Notes (2), p. 456).

Next, he admonished everyone to “communicate with others” (yuren tongqi), exclaiming: “Everyone must communicate with each other. The center and the regions must consult and communicate with each other, the Party committee members must consult and communicate with each other, as well as with their secretaries. We have not communicated well in the past, and we must think of ways to communicate …. Comrades, I want you to use your brain a little more and listen carefully to opposing opinions.” (Ibid., p. 462)

He then continued: “We must listen to the views of the majority. We must also pay attention to the opinions of minorities and individuals. Within the Party, we must create an atmosphere where if there is a problem, we discuss it, and if there is a flaw, we fix it. Being criticized for flaws can often be a bit painful, but if we correct them after being criticized, it gets better. It is often a little painful when our shortcomings are criticized, but it gets better when they are corrected through criticisms. Some comrades do not speak their mind or they adopt the golden mean of the Confucian school (zhongyong zhi dao).” (Ibid., p. 463)

As a matter of fact, however, he lost his temper in the Lushan Conference. When he received a letter from Peng Dehuai. Mao advocates the need to create an atmosphere of freer exchange of opinions and mutual criticism within the Party, but do the Party members who have seen Mao’s behavior up to that point dare to criticize him? He points out that one person sometimes outweighs many, that the truth is in his hands, not in the hands of many (ibid., p. 463), so he stresses that it is possible for one person to be correct. By his standards, he alone was always the “monopolizer of truth”, suppressing the opinions of many, at least in matters of the grand national scheme. One of the governing principles of the communist parties since Lenin has been “democratic centralism,” but who is it then who decides what is democratic, or what is centralized, and how it should be decided? Under this principle, usually very few people, or in the extreme case, one absolute leader, decide(s). Finally, Mao Zedong made a profound statement regarding Peng Dehuai: “Many people resent me, especially Comrade Peng Dehuai, who resents me very much. Don’t you think so? Even if he doesn’t resent me terribly, he does resent me a little, though, because he and I do not get along with each other very well …. My position on Comrade Peng Dehuai is like this. When others do not offend me, I do not offend them. When others offend me, I will certainly offend them.” (Ibid., pp. 467–468)

It is a frightening warning that foreshadows Peng Dehuai’s impeachment four months later. At the same time, it suggests that the confrontation between Mao and Peng was not something new, but one with deep historical roots. It also demonstrates Mao’s tenacity. Mao Zedong sent Peng Dehuai a copy of the History of Ming Dynasty, Biography of Hai Rui, recommending that he read these books. Hai Rui was a Ming dynasty’s

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prime minister who wrote a letter to Emperor Jia Jing, but was imprisoned for his direct advice. Mao said, “Who is as brave as Hai Rui among our comrades? I don’t know which is excellent, Hai Rui or Bao Wenzheng2 (ibid., p. 469). According to Li Rui, Peng Dehuai was a man of very honest character, so that he seriously read Biography of Hai Rui as Mao Zedong had recommended. It was because he was so deeply impressed by the spirit of Hai Rui that he sent a personal letter to Mao at the Lushan Conference (ibid., p. 474). Peng could not have foreseen at the time that this would prove fatal to him. As argued above, in the spring of 1959, the failures of the GLF as well as PC policies became increasingly apparent. The Party leadership, too, became aware of the extreme crisis over the entire countryside when they visited farming villages in various regions and recognized the spread of hunger and heard about strong calls for the abolition of mess halls. They also saw the terrible economic imbalance caused by the unreasonable steel production campaign, and so the political atmosphere changed dramatically from anti-rightist to criticism of the left. At the Party meeting held in July in the scenic summer resort of Lushan, most of those in attendance believed that such a trend would be confirmed and advanced further. In fact, at the regional subcommittees held in the first half of the Conference, the participants talked about the current misery and problems. To ostensibly save face for Mao it was said that the GLF policy had been successful, but one policy after another was listed that needed improvement or correction. Peng Dehuai also attended and talked at a subcommittee. Perhaps because he had just visited his home village in Hunan Province with the devastation and the earnest appeals of the farmers strongly etched in his mind, he made up his mind to write a personal letter to Mao Zedong on July 14 during the Conference, calling for drastic correction of past policies. Having received the letter, Mao immediately printed it out, distributing it with the title “Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter“ to all the participants at the July 16 meeting. This was his signal for the impeachment of Peng. Below I summarize the main points of this letter, adding my own comments. The Opinion Letter begins by noting that China has achieved high growth in 1958 and praises the great achievements of the GLF policy. Peng Dehuai states: “This is not only a great achievement for the country, but will also have positive long-term effects on the socialist camp in the world.”

Nevertheless, he warns that certain projects in basic construction have been implemented too hastily and too much, and have led to a dispersion of funds, yet still this trend is continuing in 1959, so the situation will get worse if those projects are not stopped in order to correct such economic malaise. Next, he admires Mao’s PC strategy for its significant role in lifting China’s peasants out of poverty, speeding up socialist construction, and providing the correct path to communism, so acknowledges that although there was some confusion, things are basically back on a normal track after a series of meetings. 2

The name may refer to Bao Zheng, a famous vassal of the Northern Song Dynasty who was known for his integrity, bravery, and determination.

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He also takes up the issue of the small-scale indigenous blast furnace—how such a steel-making movement was effective in educating many technical personnel as well as training cadres, although it wasted a lot of resources. In light of the above performances, he concludes, the GLF and the PC policies have been successful, but following points need improvement. First, a tendency toward aggrandizement has run rampant in various regions and sectors, and many comrades have become inflamed by information about the imminent arrival of a communist society. Many leaders, including himself, did not properly understand Chairman Mao’s instructions to combine great enthusiasm with scientific analysis. Second, he claims, because of our “petty bourgeois fanaticism,” we have made errors of the left. We have forgotten the mass line and the way of seeking truth from facts that our Party has cultivated for many years. We have confused the long-term policy with immediate measures, the whole with the part, so that the “catch up with the United Kingdom in 15 years” policy has become a goal that we want realized immediately, even though it is a long-term one. Some comrades also think that we can ignore economic laws as long as they do “politics in command” (zhengzhi guashuai). These subjectivist errors of the left are more difficult to correct than right-leaning conservative ideas. Finally, he concludes by saying that if we can unite all Party members from now on and learn lessons from our past mistakes, the future will be bright as Chairman Mao has said, and the goal of catching up with the U.K. in 15 years will basically be realized within four years. Having examined this letter, we can see that Peng Dehuai, while suppressing his true feelings and showing his obedience to Mao Zedong, was quite blunt in pointing out the fundamental flaws inherent in and resulting from the GLF and PC policies. Although he had intended to send these comments only to Mao personally, the reaction of many participants at the meeting who read this was relatively positive, as Bo Yibo (then Deputy Prime Minister) wrote in retrospect: “A great many people were very much in favor of Peng Dehuai. Many people agreed with Comrade Peng Dehuai’s letter, seeing it as affirming the achievements of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ while pointing out a number of serious problems and lessons. However, some of the terms, such as ‘petty bourgeois fanaticism,’ are not appropriate and should be reconsidered. Comrade Peng Dehuai’s spirit of boldly presenting his views was almost unanimously affirmed by everyone.” (Bo 1993, p. 858)

Certainly, some had different views. For example, Chen Zhengren, Minister of Labor, stated that “even though there were problems, they were being improved.” A well-known marshal, He Long, criticized Peng for taking the problem too seriously. Many, however, supported Peng’s opinion, at least in principle. Probably some of the positive reactions were unexpected for Mao, who was about to distribute the Opinion Letter so as to launch an attack on Peng Dehuai. Alternatively, perhaps Mao would have been satisfied if more members were negative towards Peng, or if most had gently criticized his stance and views in which case the matter might not have become so serious. No, that would be a misjudgment of Mao’s true character. He is the type to go all out once he decides to do something.

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Peng Dehuai’s Letter was strongly supported by Zhang Wentian, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a group discussion meeting. Ignoring the restraints of Party Secretary of Shanghai City Ke Qingshi, known as a loyal follower of Mao Zedong and chairman of that meeting group, he continued his speech for a whopping three hours. His manuscript contained more than 8,000 characters, of which only 270 talked about the achievements so far, with 39 “but” (dan) adverbs (Li’s Notes (3), p. 153). In other words, the entire statement was a broad list of flaws, problems, and reevaluations of the GLF and PC policies. Finally, he referred to Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter and praised its central part as an attempt to summarize the past experiences, saying that its main intention was very good, though regarding the most sensitive expression, petty bourgeois fanaticism, “it would have been even better if he had not said it. [But] even if he had said it, it would have been fine. We can think about what we should do in the end. However, it is probably petty bourgeois fanaticism that makes the communist wind blow” (ibid., p. 158). In this way, he firmly defended Peng and his opinion. Zhang Wentian, who was far more learned and theoretical than Peng, who was from a poor peasant family and low educational background, sorted out the policy problems and developed a sharp discussion. Possibly it may have been Zhang’s frank, bold, and convincing criticism that infuriated Mao Zedong more than Peng’s restrained opinions had. Soon after the Lushan Conference had begun, Mao Zedong appointed Hu Qiaomu, Yang Shangkun, Chen Boda, Wu Lengxi, and Tian Jiaying to form a drafting committee to prepare a type of conference bulletin. He later added six more members, including Lu Dingyi and Li Rui, and ordered them to prepare a “Protocol Record on Various Issues of the Lushan Conference” of up to 5000 characters. Based on the discussions of each group, 18 issues were organized into this “record” to be used as discussion material for the meeting. However, in the middle of this process, Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter was distributed, and as a result the discussion turned to the Letter. In this way, a review of the policies promoted by Mao Zedong, including the GLF movement, escalated from consideration to criticism, from this Protocol to Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter, then to Zhang Wentian’s quite harsh evaluations of Mao’s policies as a whole. Mao Zedong may have felt that an all-out attack on him had finally begun. So, during a plenary session on July 23, having been silent and absent from the Conference until then, Mao launched a bitter and fierce attack on Peng along with those who sympathized with him, and on the “right-leaning” climate of the Conference.

3 Mao’s Criticism of Peng Dehuai Mao started off by saying, “Since everyone has talked so much, now let me talk, too.” He continued to say, “I have taken sleeping pills three times, but I can’t sleep well.” His words were a glimpse of his excitement, seething frustration and anger over the past few days. Perhaps because of his lack of sleep, or perhaps because of his

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excitement, this talk is repetitive in content, therefore not well organized and poorly prepared for a discourse by Mao Zedong. Ignoring the actual order of his statements and arranging them in my own way, he roughly states the following: “First of all, it is true that the past policies have lacked balance and have not considered comprehensive equilibrium, but this is also because we have focused their energies on revolution rather than construction, and because we did not understand, including Mao himself, what planning is in the first place.” “They say we have separated ourselves from the masses, but that is only temporary; now we are together with the masses. If there is petty bourgeois fanaticism, it is only a little. They are trying to do communism in rural Henan and Hebei (Provinces), but this is because they are so poor that all this enthusiasm of the masses cannot be called petty bourgeois enthusiasm. We must not dampen the enthusiasm of the masses. Even mess halls should be open where they can. One third of the mess halls should remain at the very least in the whole country.” “I have two charges against me. One is that I asked the masses to make 10.7 million tons of steel, which mobilized 90 million people, spent 4 billion yuan in subsidies, and consequently lost more than it gained. The other is the People’s Commune, which was indeed my proposal at Beidaihe Conference, and although there was a bit of petty bourgeois enthusiasm, everyone agreed to the proposal, so it is everyone’s responsibility.” “Some comrades are shaken. They were shaken in 1956 and 1957 in terms of ‘opposition to the rash advance.’ Now they are inclined, although they do not say so, against the Great Leap Forward. In fact, they say they have ‘something to lose but also something to gain,’ and they first set ‘something to lose.’ They are not rightist, but they are close to being rightists, ‘only 30 km away,’ that is, they are almost rightists.” “If you do ten things and nine are bad [the ‘one finger and nine fingers’ theory, discussed below] and put them all in the newspaper, society will perish. If that happens, I will go to the countryside and lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If the People’s Liberation Army does not follow me, I will go and find the Red Army or organize another Liberation Army. The People’s Liberation Army will follow me [not Peng Dehuai].”

And finally, he concludes his talk by saying, “if you have complaints and opinions, you should not keep them to yourself, but express them.”3 Hearing this talk, those who had actively defended Peng Dehuai were surprised, nervous, and fearful. For Li Rui, too, Mao’s discourse was a bolt from the blue. Probably Li was frightened that he might too be condemned as a “rightist.” After the meeting, he went outside with Chen Boda, Tian Jiaying, and Wu Lengxi to walk along the mountain path, but no one spoke; everyone fell into a depressed mood (Li’s Notes (3), p. 174). Li Rui and others could feel Mao’s anger quite easily. They felt threatened by Mao, who had implied, “If you don’t listen to me, I will start a revolution again.” The most depressed was, of course, Peng Dehuai. He could not sleep that night and kept thinking about this and that until dawn. He may have been thinking “Why did Chairman Mao criticize me when I had not said anything wrong? Even if there was a serious mistake in the letter I wrote, why didn’t he call me to talk about it instead of making it public?” He finally came to the following conclusion: 3

The use of vulgar expressions such as “If you have shit, let it out, if you want to fart, do it, it feels good to let it out and you will feel better” is very much like Mao Zedong. Only Mao could use such an expression in an official setting.

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“If the prestige of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, is damaged, it will cause even greater damage to the international proletarian movement. With this thought, my original belief that my opinion was correct began to waver.” (Peng 1981, pp. 277–278)

This clearly reflects the typical psychology of “self-criticism” by Party members in China, a tendency to rationalize justification for their actions. As a Party member, Peng probably thought that when a Party member clashed with the Party, it was the Party member’s mission to prioritize the Party’s dignity and interests over sticking to his own thoughts. He was likely convinced that the truth was on his side and he would eventually be proven right, but for the sake of the Party and the nation, he told himself that the truth was with Chairman Mao. In the first place, why was Mao Zedong so outraged by Peng Dehuai‘s Opinion Letter? As far as his July 23rd talk is concerned, it is obvious that Mao, the supposed originator of the GLF as well as PC policies, was dissatisfied with the Letter because Peng emphasized too many failures and defects (nine fingers) and too few achievements (one finger) of these policies. However, he would have been aware of such an assessment of the situation without being told by Peng since he had already heard it from several people personally. However, when Peng boldly and frankly pointed it out to him, perhaps the flames of Mao’s prideful anger flared up. In Chinese, it might have been “naoxiu chengnu” (getting angry out of embarrassment). No matter how much Peng praised Mao at the beginning of his Opinion Letter, stressing that “The Great Leap Forward was a great achievement,” Mao saw through Peng’s innermost thoughts. Mao must have wanted to say, “I know your true feelings are against the GLF and PC policies that I have been promoting. If you are opposing me, you should just say so.” Or perhaps Peng Dehua’s use of the term “petty bourgeois fanaticism” was the trigger. This expression had been called into question by Zhang Wentian and other participants even before Mao’s talk. No need to say, Peng did not mean to say that Mao himself had been affected by such fanaticism. He must have meant to say, “Chairman Mao was calm, but the other people were moved by petty bourgeois fanaticism,” whether he truly meant it or not. Mao Zedong, while ostensibly acknowledging that “there was a bit of petty bourgeois fanaticism,” was particularly enthusiastic about “criticizing the bourgeoisie” and advocating class struggle theory, and may have felt as if he were being attacked for being bourgeois. Moreover, Mao Zedong was suspicious of Peng Dehuai’s relationship with the Soviet Union. By that time, relations between China and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate, and Mao was also quite angry at Khrushchev’s refusal to provide China with nuclear weapons technology. In addition, Khrushchev was critical of China’s PC policy. He had made a speech in Poland in July 1959, pointing out, “The Soviet Union once created a similar commune organization that failed. It is wrong for China to declare [at the Beidaihe Conference in August 1958] that the People’s Commune is the path to communism,” thus pouring cold water on the People’s Commune so praised by Mao. Defense Minister Peng and Zhang Wentian had visited the Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe just prior to the Lushan Conference, where they

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also met with Khrushchev in Moscow. It is no wonder that skeptical Mao suspected that Peng and his group may have been secretly connected behind the scenes with the Soviet Union or Khrushchev. At the enlarged meeting of the CPC Central Military Commission held in Beijing immediately after the Lushan Conference, Mao Zedong again sharply criticized Peng Dehuai and others, by saying: “We will not allow Chinese Communists to go abroad and destroy foreign communist organizations, to seduce some people to oppose others. At the same time, we will not allow them to defy our Center and accept foreign provocations.” (Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui, p. 312)4

Peng, who could no longer endure Mao’s persistent criticism, pleaded with Mao after the meeting, “Chairman Mao, please stop,” but Mao retorted, “This is not just your problem.” When Peng asked, “Is this the last time I will see you?” he was coldly dismissed with the words, “Is that your wish?” (Mao Zedong’s Secret Records, Vol. 1, pp. 287–288) Certainly, the phrase “petty bourgeois fanaticism” and the alleged Soviet connection may have ignited Mao’s anger. But are these the only factors that enraged Mao? There may have been other factors in this instance. One is that Mao perceived several opponents criticizing him together, forming a group, in his view, to challenge his authority, and more precisely, his power. Huang Kecheng, People’s Libertion Army (PLA) Chief of the Staff and known for speaking very frankly, attended the meeting late, but expressed his views on the negative sides of the GLF and PC policies. Party Secretary of Hunan Province Zhou Xiaozhou, who attended the meeting from the beginning, was well aware of the plight of his Province, so called for fundamental policy changes. They were all regarded as “dissenters” in the eyes of Mao. In the end, the so-called “Peng (Dehui), Zhang (Wentian), Huang (Kecheng), and Zhou (Xiaozhou) group” was created regardless of their will, to the effect that they were collectively labeled as an “anti-Party counterrevolutionary group,” lost their positions, and were later persecuted, criticized and deprived of their political power. By the same token, Li Rui and many other Party members who were either close to the group or supported Peng’s Opinion Letter were criticized and fell from power. The other factor is historical resentment. Let me recall Mao’s criticism of Peng Dehuai at the Shanghai Conference as referred to above. Mao, it seemed, had not gotten on well with Peng for a long time. The Opinion Letter may have served to ignite the fuel of underlying tensions between the two communist heroes. According to Lin Ke, one of Mao’s secretaries, the Central Standing Committee meeting on the evening of July 26 was to discuss Mao’s talk of July 23, but Peng brought up historical issues, using the following violent language towards Mao: “You cursed me for 20 days at the Luochuan Conference [the enlarged Political Bureau meeting held in Luochuan, Shaanxi Province, in August 1937 during the revolutionary 4

At this meeting, when someone criticized Peng along with his colleagues for forming a “military club” at the Lushan Conference, he asked Peng Dehuai to provide him with information on the organization, charter, objectives, and list the names of members of this club. Peng was so angry that he said, “Strip me of my Party membership and shoot me! And then you can tell me by yourself who belongs to the ‘military club’ among yourself!” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 309)

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struggle] Why is it wrong for me to curse you for 20 days now?” (Lin and Ling 1994, p. 153)

Regarding this issue, Su and others give a slightly different account: “On the night of the 26th, during the Standing Committee meeting held on the second floor of Meilu [Mao’s residence], Peng Dehuai, brimming with enthusiasm, confronted Mao Zedong and uttered those famous harsh words: ‘In Yan’an, you scolded me for 40 days. Is it not permissible for me to scold you for 20 days?’ Peng Dehuai’s outburst served as evidence of his ‘unforgettable grudge,’ forever etched in Mao Zedong’s memory.” (Su et al. 1992, p. 295)

It does not matter whether Mao cursed in Luochuan or Yan’an, whether he cursed for 40 days or 20 days. What is more important is that the cursing over 20 years ago foreshadowed the deterioration of their relationship.5 Originally, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai had opposite personalities, and moreover they did not get along well ideologically. In colloquial terms, the former was far left while the latter was further right. An event that typifies this contrast occurred during the Yan’an period, so let me look back on it with reference to He (2011). In December 1942, Peng Dehuai, as Secretary of the CPC Northern Bureau, delivered a speech entitled “How to steadfastly maintain and strengthen the AntiJapanese democratic bases” addressed to the military cadres of battalion-level and above as well as to Party cadres of county-level and above, in Taihang District. In the speech he stressed that postwar Chinese politics be directed toward peaceful founding and democratic freedom, pointing out: “Today’s democracy in China lies in equality among classes within the country and in the acquisition of rights that the oppressed classes should obtain for themselves as protagonists.”

He criticized those within the Party who lacked a true democratic spirit, who were not accustomed to the customs of democratic life, and could not cooperate well with non-Party persons. The speech was later published on March 19 in the North China edition of the Xinhua (New China) Daily, in which he specifically developed his democratic theory. His message can be summarized in the following way. What is the democratic spirit? Simply put, it is the spirit of freedom, equality, and fraternity. This has been the common slogan of national democratic revolutions since the French Revolution and a unanimous assertion of progressive, righteous people. He makes the following several specific points about what freedom means. It is freedom of thought, freedom of voice and publication, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of residence and movement. Finally, he brings up freedom from feudal restrictions, such as freedom of marriage, since most peasants in many areas have no right to choose their partners freely, while workers and students are still in bondage to feudal customs. Next, Peng Dehuai explains what equality means. First, in addition to political rights such as the right to vote and the right to be elected, people should equally 5

According to Yuan Xiaorong, the two cursed at the Standing Committee meeting on the 27th, where other Standing Committee members, such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De, were surprised and criticized Peng Dehuai‘s attitude (Yuan 2010, Vol. 1, p. 826).

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possess the right to recall, the right to reconsider, the right to establish systems, and the right to submit criticisms and suggestions to the state. Second, he advocated equality in law, that is, equality before the law for both the emperor and the common people, and personal equality, regardless of status, Chinese or degree of consanguinity. Finally, regarding fraternity, in relationships between people, he preached that the spirit of fraternity and the spirit of democracy are to demonstrate the spirit of “mutual love, mutual respect, mutual aid, and not doing to others what you do not want done to yourself,” not to regard the pain of others as one’s own pleasure, and to have a high degree of sympathy for others. In short, the democracy that Peng Dehuai preached in this speech was the universal value of modern civil society, and from our point of view, he was merely stating something quite natural. He must have had strong expectations that victory in the Anti-Japanese War and success in the Chinese Revolution would lead to the creation of a modern society that could realize such natural values. However, from his point of view, the order in Yan’an at that time was not in line with these natural values. For example, there existed not only the “feudal” status relations, but also the atmosphere in which one could not speak freely. Peng Dehuai understood that this was contrary to what Mao Zedong had advocated. More than two months after this speech by Peng Dehuai was published, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to Peng in Yan’an, severely criticizing this “theory of democratic education.” The content of the letter can be summarized and translated as follows: “Peng Dehuai talks about democracy, freedom, equality, and fraternity, but he is not speaking from the political necessity of the current Anti-Japanese struggle. For example, he does not distinguish between revolution and counter-revolution by saying, for example, equality before the law, etc. Can we give freedom, equality, and fraternity to the enemy or class to be overthrown? He advises ‘not doing to others what you do not want done to yourself’ and so on, but what must be done now is to overthrow the enemy by war and other means, and since the present social basis is the commodity economy, it is necessary to do to others what you do not want done to you.”

This criticism of Peng Dehuai is like Lenin’s criticism of Karl Kautsky, discussed in Chap. 3. From Mao’s point of view, Peng Dehuai is the Kautsky of China. He is “apostate” to Marxism and to Mao himself. Following Lenin, Mao Zedong disliked the “bourgeois” democracy, because it did not guarantee his own power. Mao’s criticism of Peng escalated further, and from February to July 1945, Peng was involved in a struggle meetings held intermittently for 43 days in North China on local and military affairs. He was forced to self-criticize the “freedom, equality, and fraternity” theory in the Xinhua Daily, which, in Mao’s view, was nothing but a “bourgeois worldview.” Besides that, Peng’s every action during the liberation struggle became a target of criticism. Criticism of Peng at that time was reminiscent of the Lushan Conference 14 years later. According to Gao Hua, Mao saw Peng as a man who had a strong self-esteem, self-righteousness and arrogance, so he could not allow a general with very high prestige in the military to rebel against him, given Mao’s narrow-minded jealousy (Gao 2000, p. 623).

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Peng Dehuai’s theory of democratic education seems to have remained in Mao’s mind for a long time, and came to the fore again during his August 11 talk at the Lushan Conference. Li Rui recorded Mao’s remarks as follows: “I think, their [referring to Huang Kecheng, Peng Dehuai, Zhou Xiaozhou, Li Rui, Zhou Hui, etc.] bourgeois standpoint has not changed for more than 30 years. Why has it not changed? With regard to comrades who made the mistake this time …. Comrade Peng Dehuai as their main leader has not changed his bourgeois position for more than 30 years. This is because this bourgeois worldview of his cannot be Marxist. That is why for 31 years since 1928 (when the revolutionary struggle began) he has been incompatible with us. …. They were not Marxists, but bourgeois democrats, and they joined the Communist Party as bourgeoisdemocratic people. Peng Dehuai talks about ‘freedom, equality, and fraternity,’ but he either does not understand or pretends to understand what Marxism is, what the superstructure is, and what the economic foundations are.” (Li’s Notes (3) pp. 350, 355)

According to Mao, Peng was a “bourgeois democrat” even before the founding of the People’s Republic, and his criticism of Mao’s policies in the Opinion Letter was considered an act of opposition to the Party from a class perspective, and moreover part of a collective challenge to Mao’s power, thus making Peng and his followers an “anti-Party group.” In other words, they were hypocrites as well as being “counterrevolutionary.” No matter how heroic Peng was in the liberation struggle, no matter how much he contributed to the Chinese Revolution and the founding of the New China, no matter how much he achieved as the supreme commander of the Chinese army in the Korean War, once he got under Mao’s skin and was excluded from his class division, the fate of this “hero who was anti-people” became nothing but pitiful.

4 The Tragic End of Peng Dehuai The group meeting started that afternoon and continued until July 26th, but after Mao’s criticism of Peng Dehuai began, the atmosphere changed dramatically with a swing back from right to left. By noon on the 26th, Peng was “self-critical” in the group meeting. He admitted that statements in his Opinion Letter such as “there are both positive and negative aspects to the GLF policy” were “political,” that such phrases as “petty-bourgeois fanaticism” were “wrong,” and demonstrated his obedience and reverence to Mao by saying, “I thank Chairman Mao for correcting my mistakes.” Zhu De, an elder revolutionary who was present at the meeting, was relieved by Peng’s self-criticism and comforted him. Everyone thought this would settle the matter and the meeting would end quickly. However, it did not turn out that way. A fierce “class struggle” against the “Gang of Four”—Peng, Zhang, Huang, and Zhou—was waiting. The meeting was extended, and a terrifying public criticism, or rather, a harsh face-to-face criticism, even a witch hunt, of Peng and “his group” by the participants was about to begin. For example, at the August 1st meeting of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Central Committee, Lin Biao said:

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“Many people say you tell lies and have ambitions [Mao Zedong interjected here and said, lies that appear in the form of true stories]. [You] once said during the Long March ‘If not me, then who will save China?’ before joining the Party …. You despise all thoughts within the Party and often defy your superiors. You are rebellious, have [your own] ideas, aspirations, and goals, always think you are correct. You have [your own] policy, program, and worldview, and you are conceited.” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 247)

Zhou Enlai criticized Peng in line with Lin Biao’s criticism. He asked: “Does being obedient mean lacking backbone? All leaders must be obedient. How can you win if you are not so? Your backbone is to defy your superiors.” (Ibid.)

Thus he suggested that Peng be more obedient to his superiors, namely, Mao Zedong. As Chap. 9 explains, this was Zhou Enlai’s style of criticism. After the Zunyi Conference in 1935, Zhou was determined to be Mao’s loyal servant for the rest of his life (Wilson 1984, p. 296). Even leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Tao Zhu, and Luo Ruiqing, who were all to be severely beaten by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, joined together in a chorus of criticism against Peng Dehuai. Until Mao’s criticism, many of the participants had been favorable towards Peng’s Opinion Letter, as Bo Yibo put it, but once Mao became furious, they changed completely and cooled off toward Peng. It was like “throwing stones at a person who has fallen into a well” (taking advantage of a person’s crisis to add insult to injury (luojing xiashi) or “beating a dog that has fallen into the water (da luoshuigou)” (adding insult to injury to a fallen enemy). They might have hidden their true feelings, but they all, nonetheless, criticized or condemned Peng. Were they driven by herd mentality? Probably most of them took such an action for their own self-preservation. Tao Zhu, then the First Secretary of Guangdong Provincial Committee, added criticisms attacking Peng Dehuai’s personal character: “He strikes others and elevates himself. If there is merit, it’s his, if there is a mistake (failure), it’s others’. This is Comrade Peng Duhuai’s consistent manner …. On the surface, he looks full of hardship and modest, with a serious face, but if you peel back the surface, it’s not like that at all.” (Li’s Notes (3), pp. 292–293)

Luo Ruiqing, then Vice Minister of Defence, also chastises Peng by saying: “His political ambition is extremely large, attributing all good things to himself and blaming others for the bad. This proves that he lacks Party spirit, is extremely selfish, is neither honest nor selfless, and that his individualism is very serious.—Before the Zunyi Conference, you opposed Comrade Mao Zedong, but this may have been due to your lack of knowledge, so I can forgive you a little. [But] after the Zunyi Conference, you rebel whenever you have the opportunity, and you still want to rebel now. Why is this?” (Ibid., p. 287)

Huang Kecheng, who was criticized along with Peng Dehuai during the Conference, recalls in later years: “I was labeled a ‘conspirator,’ ‘ambitious person’ and a ‘hypocrite.’ No matter how much I tried to defend myself, I could not prove my innocence in that situation. I really don’t know what to say about the pain in my heart. However, the meeting had to continue, so I had to make more self-criticisms ( jiantao), one after another, and no matter how many times I did, I was still told that I was being dishonest.” (Re-quoted from Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi et al. 2003, Vol. 2, p. 1005)

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In his memoirs, Peng Dehuai’s Autobiography, Peng does not write anything about how he must have felt, suffered, and regretted, even though he was criticized much more severely than Huang. Just before the end of the Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, and others sent a letter to Mao Zedong, “admitting their mistakes” and surrendered to him totally, but they were nevertheless officially condemned as an “anti-Party group.” Peng was removed from his position as Defence Minister, and replaced by Lin Biao, who had criticized him heavily at the Conference but would be slammed as an “ambitious person” himself after his downfall in 1971. Huang Kecheng, Chief of Staff, was also dismissed and replaced by Luo Ruiqing, who had been a leading critic of the Party and who would also be ousted during the CR movement. As the campaign criticizing the “Peng Dehuai Anti-Party group” erupted, a movement “against right-leaning opportunist elements” was launched throughout the Party and the military, and the number of cadres and Party members classified as “right-leaning opportunist elements” reached more than three million, while the number of cadres, Party members, and masses who were considered “hidden enemies within the class” amounted to as many as six million. The number of people in the People’s Liberation Army who were labeled as “right-leaning opportunists” and the like reached 17,200 (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 388; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, pp. 297–298). After the Conference, Peng Dehuai requested to return to the countryside in Hunan Province to become a peasant, but his wish was not granted, nor was he removed from his duties as a member of Central Committee as well as the Political Bureau. He was virtually under house arrest in Beijing, rarely participated in important Party activities and stayed at home. He himself had a strong desire to go to rural areas to conduct research, so he wrote a letter to Mao, expressing this desire. Unexpectedly his desire was supported by Mao, who said “You can go anywhere. It doesn’t matter if it’s for half a year.” In early November 1961, he went to his hometown in Hunan Province and began his research, which was scheduled to last three months (Wang 2012). He may have wanted, in my view, to confirm with his own eyes and ears the disastrous results of the GLF as well as PC policies in the rural areas, in order to report back to Mao on the actual situation. At the end of January 1962, the Party’s enlarged Central Working Conference, called “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference“ was held, at which Liu Shaoqi summarized the GLF policy and delivered his famous speech, “30% natural disaster, 70% man-made disaster” (see Chap. 7 for more details). In that speech, Liu Shaoqi virtually affirmed the content of Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter, saying that even if there were some mistakes in it, it was not so much that he had made serious errors, but he condemned Peng as having been a long-term member of a small group, the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi anti-Party group,6 and assumed “they (Peng and Gao) had an international background, and their anti-Party activities were related to a plot with certain 6

Gao Gang, head of the State Planning Commission in the early 1950s, who is said to have had close ties with the Soviet Union, along with his associate Rao Shushi, opposed Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai and attempted to seize leadership of the Party, resulting in his downfall in 1954. The truth of this incident, however, is unverified.

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foreigners to overthrow the regime. Therefore, most of those who were criticized at the Lushan Conference and afterward can have their honor restored, but Peng Dehuai alone should not have his honor restored,” and thus he justified Peng’s punishment (ibid.).7 Peng was so furious upon hearing Liu’s decision that he immediately called the Party’s Central Office, saying: “Please tell Chairman Mao and Liu Shaoqi. I am making a solemn statement that there is no such thing [referring to Liu Shaoqi’s accusation above].” (Ibid.)

He spent three months writing a letter to Mao Zedong in June 1962, a letter of a frightening length of “80 thousand characters,” claiming that the charge against of him of plotting to seize Party power or having foreign relations was absurd, and that if this were true, “I would be willing to be executed for treason” (Luo 1998). He requested that his punishment at the Lushan Conference was unjust and that his honor be restored, but this request went unheeded.8 If Peng’s request were granted, Mao would be formally admitting that he had been wrong, and such a thing was absolutely unacceptable to him. Mao could never accept such a request because the truth as well as justice must always be on his side. After this letter was sent, the Peng Dehuai Review Committee was established in the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee held in September 1962, and the scrutiny of Peng and those around him became increasingly severe. This also led to Peng divorcing his wife, Pu Anxiu,9 no doubt out of concern for her safety. Shortly before the start of the Cultural Revolution, Peng Dehuai was suddenly called by Beijing Mayor and Political Bureau member, Peng Zhen, to hear that, as “a decision of the Party Central and Chairman Mao,” Peng would be appointed to head the Third Front Construction project10 of the Southwest region. Then Mao contacted him and the two met after a long interval. Peng received a call from Mao early in the morning on September 23, 1965, and rushed to Zhongnanhai. Mao jokingly said while holding Peng’s hand nostalgically: “You, never show your face, but when it comes to letters, you write tens of thousands of characters.”

They talked until 3:00 p.m. when Mao said: 7

In fact, except for Peng Dehuai, the other three members of the “Peng Dehuai Group” have had their honor restored since the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference. Zhang Wentian became an economics researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Huang Kecheng was appointed as a Deputy Provincial Governor of Shaanxi, and Zhou Yizhou returned to Hunan Province, but was demoted to Deputy Secretary (from former Secretary). 8 Let us recall the “three-hundred-thousand-character opinion letter” that Hu Feng wrote to the Party Center (see Chap. 2). No matter how long a letter he wrote to the Party Center and Mao Zedong, once he was labeled as reactionary and anti-Party, it was seen as meaningless and only used as material for criticism. 9 Luo (1997) provides more details on this issue. 10 Third Front Construction refers to a policy based on Mao’s military strategy of moving coastal factories to the interior and building factories in the interior again in response to the escalation of the Vietnam War and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. See Chap. 7.

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Photo 6.2 Peng Dehuai tortured by the Red Guards. Peng Dehuai being physically abused at a mass assembly during the Cultural Revolution. Source https:// mil.news.sina.com.cn/201501-12/1802817875.html

“It seems I was too critical of you. It was a mistake. Let’s talk about it again in a few years. But you don’t have to wait. You should devote yourself to your work.”

He then instructed Peng to go to Sichuan Province to take on the task of the Third Front Construction (Yan and Gao 1996, Vol. 2, pp. 196–197).11 Considering the tragic injustice that Peng Dehuai would suffer ten months later, I may wonder what kind of affection Mao showed at that time. Was this, as typical of Mao, an “open plot” (yangmou)? Some say that he moved Peng far away so as to prevent a coup in advance.12 At the end of 1965, after six years of house arrest, Peng Dehuai was appointed to head a national defense equipment company, the site of the Third Front Construction in Sichuan Province, but as soon as the CR movement began, he was called back to Beijing and confined to military quarters, after which he was thoroughly tortured by the Red Guards. He was forcibly dragged to a struggle meeting, and the way he was abused, with his neck held down, often appears as a representation of the madness of the Cultural Revolution, along with photos of the struggle meetings opposing Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing (see Photo 6.2). At a struggle rally held at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics in July 1967, Peng Dehuai was assaulted by Han Aijing, leader of the Red Guards of this Institute, and 11

According to Peng Dehuai himself, Mao told Peng at that time: “The most important strategic rear area is the Southwest region. There are various resources there, the geography is just right, and it’s worth doing (dayou zuowei). If Comrade Peng Dehuai goes, he might be able to achieve a little merit.” (Peng 1981, p. 289) 12 Before the start of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong was said to have taken many measures to prevent a counterrevolutionary coup (Secret Records of Mao Zedong (I), p. 353).

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knocked to the ground seven times. He broke two ribs and was left paralyzed in the lower half of his body as a result. According to his niece, Peng Meikui, Peng Dehuai, who found it difficult to walk, was later taken out with Zhang Wentian to a rally of 100,000 people, beaten, tied with rope, and made to walk through the crowd with a nameplate on his back to make an example of him (Peng 1990). He was then confined to a hospital under the supervision of a special task force and spent eight years in a room with the windows covered with newspaper. He died of rectal cancer in November 1974 without anyone knowing it. His body was cremated without the consent of his family, and his ashes were secretly taken to Chengdu, Sichuan Province, labeled with the pseudonym “Wang Chuan.” Miserable and tragic—there are no better words to describe the death of Peng Dehuai, one of the heroes of the Chinese Revolution and the supreme commander of the Chinese army in the Korean War. But once judged as an “enemy” by the supremo, his last years of life would be ruined. The circumstances of his death show us how he had been abandoned and how he ended up. After the reforms and opening-up policy arrived, Peng’s honor was restored, and in December 1978, the Party held a grand memorial service under the auspices of the CPC Central Committee. However, in this service, even his niece, whom Peng loved like a daughter, did not question who was ultimately responsible for this tragedy, even though they criticized the Cultural Revolution and “Gang of Four” including Jiang Qing.

5 The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: My Interpretation If Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter had been accepted at the Lushan Conference, the famine and starvation that had already begun might have been put on hold and a significant portion of the victims might have been saved. The PC policy might have been revised, mess halls might have been abolished, the crazy steel-making campaign might have been stopped, and possibly the government might have actively appealed to foreign countries for food aid. But no one dared or was able to put a stop to Mao Zedong’s despotism. Li Rui, looking back on the Lushan Conference in later years, lamented and wrote: “To tell the truth, my psychological state during the dozen days of the Conference was extremely complicated and very gloomy. I wonder why there was not a single person who had the courage to come out and speak a little bit of justifiable (gondao) truth at this Central Committee, which is the meeting of our Party’s top leaders.” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 325)

In February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev made his historic criticism of Stalin, it is said that someone from the audience asked, “What were you doing when Stalin was alive?” Khrushchev then asked, “Who are you to ask this?” There was no answer, and he went on to say, “You see, it is the same thing.” Just as all members of the Soviet Communist Party had prostrated themselves before Stalin, so too had members of the Chinese Communist

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Party feared Mao Zedong.13 Or perhaps I should say that there was not a single adherent of Maoism who could stand up to the divine Mao. Members of the Communist Party not only feared Mao Zedong and prostrated themselves before him as their leader. They also integrated themselves with the Party, that is, with Mao Zedong; they tied their own interests to the interests of the Party, namely Mao Zedong, and prioritized protecting the Party and Mao above all else. The criticism of Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference, which I covered above, is a typical example of the behavior and thought patterns of the CPC members. Qian Liqun has brilliantly pinpointed the essence of the situation: “The Communist Party had become a vested interest group. When a contradiction arose between interests and principles, when a conflict arose between the interests of the Party and the interests of the people—as was the case at the Lushan Conference—they had to submit to the interests of the Party without hesitation.” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 390; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 299)

Ideology became formalized, power became the goal, and interest groups and vested interests were formed around it. The same can be said of contemporary China, which I will review in the final chapter. It is not hard to understand Li Rui’s lament as above. No doubt, there were persons who tried to speak righteously at the Lushan Conference. These included Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, Huang Kecheng, and Zhou Xiaozhou, all of whom were criticized by Mao Zedong and all of whom were broken by a single word from Mao. This was not just due to fear, but probably due to the idea of: “Let’s sacrifice ourselves for the unity of the Party, for Chairman Mao. Let’s agree with Chairman Mao rather than justice.” During the Lushan Conference, Tao Zhu sent a letter to Huang Kecheng, writing as follows: “Loyalty to the Party is like a married woman in the old society, and you are never allowed to ‘cheat’ for a lifetime. Otherwise, you will not be called a ‘chaste wife’. .... Is there anything we can’t do to protect Chairman Mao and the Party Center?”

To put it differently, Tao Zhu advised Huang to cut ties with Peng, maintain political integrity, even if it goes against his sense of justice; like a wife obeying her husband, he should “protect Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party.” According to Li Rui, “Political chastity, such as this feudal morality demanded of women’s chastity, was certainly a common psychology that the absolute majority of people at the time longed for.” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 309) It is extremely strange that a cadre of self-identified Marxists and communists would try to persuade their fellow cadres using feudal morality as a tool. What is to be stressed is, no one, including Tao Zhu, even thought about which was more important and more righteous—to protect the prestige of Mao Zedong and the authority of the 13

Yang Jisheng argues that the West’s is a parliamentary politics (yihui zhengzhi) while China’s is a “conference politics” (huiyi zhengzhi), which he describes as characterized by “holding meetings to ensure the Supreme Leader’s ideas and holding conferences to lay siege to ideas that differ from those of such a great leader.” (Yang 2012, p. 274) Under a one-party dictatorship, “democracy” is a mere “decoration” for “concentration.”

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Party, or to protect the lives of tens of millions of people. The idea of “the Party first” was extended to “Mao first,” and then became the personality cult of Mao Zedong. This is not only the tragedy of Peng Dehuai, but also the root of the ruthlessness of revolutionary China. After the Lushan Conference, policy again swung from right to left, and the Party that was supposed to put the brakes on the GLF policy ended up promoting it in the opposite direction, thus economic chaos continued and the famine as well as starvation grew worse. No one pursued the question of how great a price was to be paid for the downfall of Peng Dehuai and his colleagues until after the end of the Cultural Revolution. The tragedy of Peng Dehuai was not only his own tragedy, but the tragedy of China and the entire Chinese people.

Chapter 7

Mao Zedong’s “Political Economy”: An Anatomy of His “Economics of Contradiction”

The Great Leap Forward (GLF) policy of 1958, discussed in the previous two chapters, had catastrophic and disastrous consequences, making us wonder what kind of “economics” Mao Zedong had in mind when he proposed and promoted this policy, and whether he understood economics in the first place. Especially since the Chinese economy achieved spectacularly high growth under Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, the catchphrase “Mao’s failure, Deng’s success” may well ring true from an economic perspective. Mao Zedong, the revolutionary and politician, is generally viewed as an “antieconomic” figure who had no economic background or awareness of economic concepts, and was skilled at wreaking economic havoc, as evidenced by the GLF movement and the Cultural Revolution (CR). He could be characterized as a “destroyer,” rather than a constructor or creator, since in the Mao era, China did not achieve the impressive economic successes seen during the Deng era on an international scale, and people endured a prolonged period of difficult living conditions. It seems, then, that his era and policies left few economic achievements, but rather saddled China with an enormous negative legacy. Although different economists define economics differently, if we define economics as “the science of studying human behavior with respect to scarce economic resources and objectives that have other uses” (Lionel Robbins), then it is safe to say that there was no “economics” in Mao’s thought and policies, since he was totally indifferent to the scarcity of resources. When we search his writings and speeches, we find that the terms “efficiency” and “productivity,” which are related to the scarcity of resources, hardly appear. As I discussed in Chap. 5, his slogan for the GLF policy was to “achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results” (duo, kuai, hao, sheng), with his emphasis always being on “greater and faster” (duo, kuai). Nevertheless, since his “economics” was strongly influenced by politics, it may be said that Mao Zedong had his own style of “political economy.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_7

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Let me begin by dissecting Mao’s “political economics” as it were, and then compare it with Deng Xiaoping’s “economics”. After that, I will evaluate Mao’s political economy in my own way.1

1 Characteristics of Mao’s Political Economics To learn more about Mao’s political economics, it is convenient to read a booklet titled Reading Notes on the Soviet Union’s Textbook of Political Economy (hereinafter referred to as the “Notes”). These Notes are compiled from a record of discussions Mao Zedong had with his reading group, which included Chen Boda, Hu Sheng, Tian Jiaying2 and others who were Mao’s entourage between December 1959 and February 1960. They read together and discussed the third edition of Textbook of Political Economy (Socialist Part) edited in the Soviet Union (Zhang 2018, p. 153), therefore the Notes can be said to be a joint product of this reading group, but basically this booklet clearly reflects Mao’s political and economic thought, and can generally be regarded as his own work. The “reading group” was held at a time when the great famine was spreading across the country due to the failure of the GLF policy, and it is thought that Mao and his colleagues started reading the Soviet Union’s Textbook of Political Economy with the aim of reviewing their own economic policies. Certainly, it cannot be denied that the reading notes were a byproduct of the ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union, which was growing increasingly fractious at the time. At any rate, the notebook is replete with Mao’s “economic philosophy,” and while it seems to me that he should have explored the causes of the failure of his economic policies, the Notes do not address this point squarely, which is unsatisfactory from my point of view. However, it is easy to understand from the Notes how such an economic philosophy and policy style would eventually lead to an unviable economy. At the same time, his socialist economic thought in the Notes expresses part of his theory of continuous revolution and his ideal image of socialism, which later became prominent during the CR period, so in that sense the Notes are very meaningful. Hereafter, I will examine Mao Zedong’s political and economic thought, referring mainly to these Notes, supplemented with some other references. First and foremost, what is striking when reading the Notes is that Mao Zedong describes his experiences during the previous revolutionary struggle as if it were beautiful memory. For example: “When we were in the base areas, we implemented a payment-in-kind system; people were healthy and did not fight over treatment. After Liberation, when we implemented the wage system and appraised workers grades, we encountered many problems …. Until the early 1

This chapter is a partial revision with additions to Chap. 2 of Nakagane (ed.) (2023). At the time, Chen Boda was Mao’s policy secretary, Hu Qiaomu was the head of the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department, Hu Sheng was secretary of that Department, and Tian Jiaying was one of Mao’s secretaries.

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days of Liberation, we lived almost egalitarian lives …. we worked hard, fought bravely, and relied not at all on material incentives but on the encouragement of the revolutionary spirit. In the late Second Civil War, we were defeated despite the victories before and after that, but this was due not to the presence or absence of material incentives, but to whether the political and military lines were correct. This historical experience is of great significance for solving the problem of our socialist construction.” (Notes, pp. 82–83)

Mao Zedong once said: “Some say [that] egalitarianism produces idlers. In the past twenty-two years, how many idlers have been produced [referring to the period of revolutionary struggle and Civil War]? I haven’t seen many idlers. Only grade-ism3 produces idlers.” [Remarks made at the enlarged Conference of the Central Political Bureau on August 30, 1958] (MacFarquhar et al. 1989, p. 436)

From the above quotations, we can see that Mao Zedong essentially abhorred material incentives and the wage system, while he highly valued moral incentives and rationing in kind. This may be because from his point of view “equality” (egalitarianism) was one of the noblest principles of socialist society, even of human society as a whole, and was the ideal of Marx and other “utopian socialists.” Or perhaps it was because his socialist economic thought was rooted in and influenced by Kang Youwei’s concept of “Great Harmony” (datong). However, just as the masses and leaders are not equal, the equality he refers to is equality in terms of distribution, not equality in terms of rights and duties, and much less equality of power, which is the hallmark of modern democracy. The latter could not be part of his ideology for he would never allow his own privileges to be touched. To put it simply, the cadres and the masses should be equal, except himself. He even said: “A division commander in Yunnan went down to be an [ordinary] soldier in a company for a month. I think many ‘commanders’—army commanders, division commanders, and so on—all ought to serve as soldiers for at least month [a year]…. Civilian cadres should participate in manual labor for at least one month a year …. Learn agriculture one year and industry another. Learning them, in turn, one is bound to master these two skills.” (Ibid., p. 438).

That is to say, from Mao’s point of view, the commander and the soldier should be basically equal in terms of treatment, despite the differences in their duties— completely equal in that they wear the same clothes, eat the same food, have ascetic relations between the sexes, and lead a simple life. Here we can see him pursuing the fantasy of Marx and other classical socialists who idealized the abolition of the division of labor. However, a soldier is subject to his commander, and the two cannot be equal in terms of rights and duties. Moreover, Mao and the commander are in an absolute hierarchical relationship. The commander can be removed if he makes a mistake, but no one can oppose Mao. After he succeeded in the Chinese Revolution, Mao had luxurious villas all over the country, enjoyed sumptuous meals and, as Mao’s private doctor Li Zhisui revealed frankly, he did not find anything unnatural about enjoying sexual pleasure almost every night with the female staff serving him (Li 3

It means worrying about one’s rank in the cadre scale.

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1994). Perhaps he was unknowingly immersed in feudal thinking or, more precisely, enjoyed the authority and consciousness of an emperor, even though he strongly criticized it. His view of socialism and Marxism seems to have been influenced by an “emperor consciousness.” At any rate, the “successful experience” he had was in a limited area and situation during the liberation struggle and cannot be directly applied to the post-Revolution period, which differed in time and situation, as well as in scope and scale. This should have been obvious given his favored “dialectical” point of view, but he did not seem to apply this viewpoint here. The past was directly connected to the present for him, so that he simply and firmly believed that measures that had worked in the past would basically work in the present. These simple ideas and measures were applied in various situations after the founding of the country, sometimes at great cost. Land reform, agricultural collectivization, and the establishment of the People’s Communes (PC) are typical examples.4 This was characteristic of Mao’s philosophy of pragmatism explored in Chap. 1, but all the same, the fundamental limitation of his thought. Let me analyze Mao’s “political economics” in more detail. For the sake of convenience, I will look at his political economy from three areas: (a) economic thought or philosophy, (b) economic institutions, and (c) macroeconomic policies. By doing this, I believe that it should be possible to grasp the overall picture and fundamental characteristics of Mao Zedong’s political economy. (a) Economic thought or philosophy. There are two words that repeatedly appear in the Notes, namely, contradiction and struggle. For example, Mao Zedong stresses that: “There would be no movement without contradictions. Society is always in motion and developing, and contradictions are still the engine of social development even in the age of socialism.” (Notes, p. 40)

Furthermore, he claims: “Under the socialist system there is no war, but there is a struggle, a struggle of the various factions within the people. Under the socialist system there is no such revolution where one class overthrows another, but there still exists a revolution. The transition from socialism to communism is a revolution, the transition from one stage of communism to another is also a revolution. Moreover, there are technological and cultural revolutions. Communism must necessarily go through many stages, and there can be many revolutions.” (Ibid., p. 64)

4

Consider the class of “landlords” who were victims of China’s land reform. Most of them were small landowners, yet their assets were all confiscated according to the simple logic that “they own land and lease all or part of it to tenants. They should be overthrown because their landholdings are feudal exploitation.” Not only were their lands confiscated based on this simple logic, but many of them were killed and the remaining ones were forced into the lowest social class (caste). (See Chap. 3). In the first place, Mao’s recognition of landlordism as a feudal system is unscientific. For example, did the small and medium-sized landlords, who had no labor and no choice but to rent their little land to tenant farmers, exploit and control the peasants like “feudal lords”?

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Furthermore, he says: “Balance and imbalance are both sides of a contradiction, with imbalance being absolute and balance being relative. Otherwise, the productive forces, relations of production, and superstructure cannot develop and are solidified. Contradiction and struggle are absolute, while unity, unanimity, and solidarity are relative because they are transient. The various balances of planned work are also relative because they are temporary, transitional, and conditional, and therefore relative. It cannot be assumed that a balance is permanent rather than conditional.” (Ibid., pp. 78–79)

His “contradiction theory Contradiction theory,” discussed in Chap. 1, is thus directly incorporated into his politico-economic thought. This is a typical example of Mao Zedong’s belief that philosophy should be applied and practiced in real affairs. However, this “economics of contradiction” sounds a little odd to me. Everything on earth is continuously moving in the final analysis; even when things appear to be at a standstill, they are “temporary” and we do not need Mao Zedong’s teaching to know this. The same is true of the economic situation: As soon as a plan is made, it diverges from reality. So, does that make planning meaningless? Is it then meaningless to make economic plans? Mao Zedong gives a somewhat positive assessment of planning, saying that “the elimination of private ownership [in socialist countries] and the ability to organize the economy in a planned manner makes it possible to consciously capture and exploit the objective laws of imbalance, creating many relative and temporary balances” (ibid., p. 78). Thus, if imbalance is absolute, planning, which is also the art of balancing, is considered merely “temporary.” The result of this kind of thinking was that breaking plans and destroying equilibrium was inclined to be tolerated or even praised in the Chinese context at that time. As noted in Chap. 5, Mao was extremely dissatisfied with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai‘s insistence on “anti-rash-advance.” In 1956 and at the Nanning Conference in January 1958, he harshly criticized such “anti-rashadvance” views, resulting in the subsequent rash GLF policy, that is, of creating and destroying economic balances. In other words, he ordered a policy of creating contradictions and destroying equilibrium. In hindsight, if Mao had agreed with the moderate “anti-rash-advance” policies suggested by Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, the reckless GLF policies would never have been implemented, and the disastrous consequences would never have occurred. To put it bluntly, the tragedy of the Great Leap Forward was largely the result of Mao’s “economics of contradiction.” Along with contradiction and struggle, another term that appears numerous times in the Notes is “class.” I have already discussed in Chap. 3 how Mao Zedong adopted the concept of class and class struggle, but let me look at some examples of how this term is used in the Notes. “The transition to communism is not, of course, the overthrow of one class over another, but this does not mean that it is not a social revolution, because the substitution of one productive relation for another is a qualitative leap, a revolution.” (Ibid., p. 42) “Even if classes disappear in socialist societies, there can be a problem of a kind of ‘vested interest group’ in the development process.” (Ibid., p. 43)5 5

Later, Mao Zedong came to admit that since the entire socialist stage was a transitional stage leading to communism, classes existed, and therefore class struggle would remain. In the same

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“The statement [in The Soviet Union’s Textbook of Political Economy] that class struggle in China is not intense does not align with reality. The Chinese Revolution was indeed highly intense.” (Ibid., p. 44). “The transformation of capitalist commerce and industry has been basically completed, but they [the bourgeoisie, the national capitalists] will launch a mad counterattack if given the chance. We repelled the right-wing attack in 1957, but in 1959 they attacked again through representatives within the Party. Our strategy against our national capitalists is to lure them in and trap them.” (Ibid., p. 45)

In fact, during the “Anti-Rightist Struggle” that unfolded nationwide in 1957, many intellectuals, mainly from the various democratic parties, were caught in the “open plot” (yangmou) set by Mao Zedong and were subjected to severe repression (see Chap. 4). The “attack” in 1959 refers to Peng Dehuai’s opinion letter at the Lushan Conference and the “anti-right-leaning” struggle against Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian and others (see Chap. 6). From Mao’s point of view, different classes can fall into the category of ‘people‘ as long as they obey the Party, or more precisely Mao Zedong himself, and contradictions and conflicts between the Party and them are resolved peacefully through criticism and self-criticism as the “internal contradictions” theory indicates. However, when a part of ‘people’ comes to sharply oppose the Party represented by Mao, this is treated as an “antagonistic contradiction.” They then cease to be the ‘people’ and are thoroughly suppressed by the Party. As we have already seen in Chap. 3, class as a political term was no longer defined in terms of the ownership of the means of production as Marx originally defined it, but in terms of the political distance from Mao Zedong, more specifically whether ‘people’ followed or opposed him. Nevertheless, Mao admits, the ownership was the most important economic system i.e. production relations in the Marxist terminology, so that class, which is essentially determined by the ownership relations to the means of production, must be the most basic structure of society. He had a considerable obsession with public ownership. This is because, according to him, public ownership is the fundamental condition for developing productive forces. In his Notes Mao writes: “Looking at world history, it was before the Industrial Revolution that the bourgeoisie established their own state through the bourgeois revolution. Before the Industrial Revolution, the bourgeoisie first transformed the superstructure, seized and propagated state institutions, gained power, and greatly advanced the transformation of the relations of production, and only after the relations of production had been transformed did they get back on track, paving the way for the development of productive forces …. It is a general rule to first create public opinion and seize power, then solve the problem of the ownership system, and after that greatly develop the productive forces.” (Ibid., pp. 47–48)

That is to say, the general law of historical development, in his view, is the transformation of the superstructure (seizure of power) → transformation of ownership (i.e. abolition of private ownership and establishment of public ownership) → development of the productive forces. This logic is the exact opposite of the orthodox materialist view of history as usually understood. Mao Zedong has been trying to Notes, he referred to the Anti-Rightist Struggle of 1957 and the struggle against Peng Dehuai in 1959 as struggles against a “mad” class.

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manage the economy according to his logic alone. It seems that none of the members of the “reading group,” including Chen Boda as a Marxist theorist, ever advised him that “such logic is not purely Marxist, let alone the many intellectuals, even Marxist adherents, who had experienced the Anti-Rightist Struggle, who instead shrank from expressing their own views and were silent about such flawed logic. (b) Economic systems There are at least three economic systems to which Mao Zedong strongly adhered beside the ownership: First, the incentive system. As I have already noted he was a fierce critic of material incentives and an admirer of the payment-in-kind system. The second was the People’s Commune (PC) system. He had a considerable “adherence” to this system—a major new rural organization established in 1958—often applauding it in the following way: “The People’s Commune is good!” (renmin gongshe hao!), 98% of the nation’s farmers have joined these “large scale, public organizations (yida ergong) within a month,” “organizations, unifying industry, agriculture, commerce, schools, and militia,” “administrative as well as production organizations (zhengshe heyi). Establishment of these Communes was enough to create an illusion in his mind that a shortcut to a “communist society” had been found.6 The Communes had mess halls, where all villagers could eat for free, and they were much praised for having realized the communist principle of “distribution according to need.” It was also widely reported that the amount of food produced had increased dramatically. As I pointed out in Chap. 5, the atmosphere of high spirits and exaggerated reports were out of control in China at that time. The reality, however, was harsh. After the Great Leap Forward, a horrific famine occurred, and in various places, including Anhui Province, the backbone of the PC system began to waver. Not only did this lead to the cessation and abolition of mess halls and the regression of agricultural collective organizations to their previous state (before the People’s Communes), but as will be discussed in the next chapter, many villages began to regress to a de facto individual farming system. For the villagers, they had no choice but to rely on the initiative of individual farming in order to increase food production for survival. Third, the decentralized system is one of the economic systems that Mao Zedong insisted on. As discussed in Chap. 4, in April 1956, Mao delivered a speech titled “On the Ten Major Relationships” in which he implicitly criticized the Soviet system of centralization and stressed the importance of the “dual positiveness” of the center and the localities. In fact, in 1957, some state-owned enterprises directly under the Central Government were transferred to local state management or joint management between the central and local governments, and local enterprises that had been recentralized during the adjustment period from 1962 were to be decentralized again from 1969 to 1970. Large central state-owned enterprises such as the Daqing Oil Field 6

This expression appears in the “Beidaihe Resolution” (August 1958) by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and although it cannot be confirmed whether it is based on Mao’s own statement, he probably used such or similar words during this meeting. In Chinese, the word “commune” is translated as “gongshe.” Therefore, “communism” should have been originally translated as “gonghe-ism” in China.

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and the Changchun Automobile Factory were also decentralized to the regions. As a result, there were only 500 central enterprises, 86.5% fewer than in 1965, and their industrial output value accounted for only 8% of state-owned industrial enterprises (Wu 2009, Vol. 1, p. 529). At the same time, the decentralization of the economy, which began with the contracting out of basic construction investment to the regions, undeniably contributed to the development of local industries. This type of decentralization was in a sense a natural policy for a country with a huge population, large land area, and historical diversity like China, but it had major impacts on the Chinese economy in the years to come. One is that it created the grounds for what Tajima Toshio called “territorialism.” More specifically, each region tends to seek to maximize its own interests based on this principle, such as by giving preference to the purchase of products produced in its own region. This type of policy led to similar industrial structures for each region (in fact, against the economic principle of comparative advantage), which in turn was one of the factors that brought about competition among regions, especially in the post-Mao era, leading to the high economic growth. (c) Macroeconomic policies Mao’s economic policies, discussed in the Notes and emphasized above in the “Ten Major Relationships,” are three: One involving industrial policy, one involving the savings rate, and one involving technology policy. Mao’s “economic policy” regarding industrial policy, in a nutshell, was to strike an appropriate balance between agriculture and industry, as well as between heavy and light industry, while giving priority to heavy industry, though he criticized the Soviet Union‘s policy for giving too much priority to heavy industry, neglecting light industry and sacrificing agriculture. He stated as follows: “The preferential development of the means of production is an economic law common to the expanded reproduction of all societies, and capitalist societies cannot expand and reproduce unless they give priority to the development of the means of production. During the Stalin era, priority was given to the development of heavy industry, and as a result, agriculture was neglected …. Only through the simultaneous and rapid development of agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry can heavy industry be developed quickly and the people’s lives moderately improved. The experiences of the Soviet Union and China prove that if agriculture and light industry are not developed, it is disadvantageous for the development of heavy industry.” (Notes, pp. 72–73) “Although industry develops faster than agriculture … undue emphasis on industry will surely lead to problems …. We propose the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture under the principle of preferential development of heavy industry.” (Ibid., pp. 107–108)

While I do not believe that the preferential development of producer goods, or heavy industry, is an “economic law common to the expanded reproduction of all societies” we have certainly seen the phenomenon of producer goods industries growing faster than consumer goods industries even in many capitalist countries during the industrialization process. In development economics, this is called

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“Hoffman’s Law.”7 The priority given to the development of heavy industry in the Soviet Union was partly an outcome of the socialist industrialization debate of the 1920s, but a result of this policy was to encourage the development of defence industries and this created the material basis for the Soviet Union to repel the invasion of Nazi Germany. It thus became propagated as an “economic law” in the socialist countries along with Stalin’s prestige. Mao Zedong was presumably unaware of this historical background, much less Fel’dman’s theory8 in the socialist industrialization debate, but assuming that the economy is virtually closed (indeed, the Soviet Union and China were both economically blockaded by the West) and that the efficiency of capital would remain the same, then, investing more in the producer goods (heavy industry) sector is known to increase the higher rate of economic growth in the long run.9 Although Lin Yifu and others criticize this policy for being irrational and ignoring the principle of comparative advantage (Lin et al. 1997), this theory of heavy industry-first development is rational in the sense that it guarantees higher growth in the long run from an economics perspective, assuming that certain conditions are satisfied and as long as the state can keep people’s consumption down to a low level at the initial stage of economic development. I feel that such theoretical rationality was not important to Mao Zedong. His primary concern was to protect the newborn nation as well as his power. To protect the nation, the country had to strengthen its military power and increase its national defence capability. It would need bullets, artillery, tanks, warships, and airplanes for the sake of increasing defense capability, and to do so, he believed naturally that the country would first and foremost need iron. Such was the simple logic of his political economy. Agriculture and light industry are necessary because national defence would be impossible without providing people with the minimum necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. Strengthening the nation, needless to say, would serve to stabilize his own political power. To finance this type of heavy industrialization, cheap food as well as cheap labor had to be available. There was some argument about who could provide sufficient accumulation funds for industrialization. Mao Zedong explained it in the following way: “Developing agriculture and light industry and accumulating for heavy industry will be beneficial to the people in the long run …. Lenin and Stalin once said, ‘During the period of socialist construction, peasants need to contribute to the state.’ The majority of our country’s peasants are actively ‘paying tribute,’ and only 15% of the wealthy middle peasants are not happy and oppose the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune.” (Notes, pp. 87–88)

7

This law is not as generalized as Petty-Clark’s Law, which empirically rules the changes in industrial structure from agriculture to industry, then to service industry as the economy develops. 8 In the 1920s, a debate on “socialist industrialization” took place in the Soviet Union. One faction, represented by Fel’dman, argued that producer goods industry (heavy industry) should be prioritized, while another faction, led by Lev Shanin, argued that consumer goods industry and agriculture should be given priority, and the debate became intense, with the inclusion of the middle faction. 9 This is called the Fel’dman-Domar model, which was developed in the 1920s and theorized by Domar after War II. See Domar (1957).

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“The proportion of our accumulation to national income was 27% in 1957, 36% in 1958, and 42% in 1959, and we can continue to accumulate more than 30% or even more in the future. The main problem is the great development of production, and as long as production increases, the specific weight of accumulation can be increased or the people’s lives can be improved.” (Ibid., p. 110)10

As can be seen from the above quote, accumulation was more important for Mao Zedong than “people’s consumption” or people’s livelihood. For this purpose, ‘tribute’ from the peasants was necessary, as well as state control of all production, sales, and prices of foodgrain. Accordingly, China expelled all private merchants from rural areas in 1953, initiated a system of state control and procurement of food, and embarked on agricultural collectivization. The state procured foodgrains from the individual farmers at low prices determined by the state, simultaneously taking away farmers’ right to sell grains to the state and transferring it to the cooperatives or collectives they belong to, which in turn would supply the food cheaply to the cities. Thus, urban workers, mainly in state-owned enterprises, could live on low wages, which would ensure and increase the profits of state-owned enterprises and so increase fiscal revenues for investment funds. In this way, the mechanism of interconnection for economic development between foodgrains, wages, profits, fiscal revenues, and investment funds would be completed. The cyclical mechanism of the Chinese economy during the Mao era can be simplified as such. Mao’s repeated insistence on “agriculture as the foundation (yi nongye wei jichu), take grain as the key link (yiliang weigang)” was based on this developmental mechanism, along with his doctrine of self-reliance discussed below. In short, it was not based on a desire to put the interests of the peasants first. Finally, regarding technology policy, Mao Zedong in his Notes calls for a parallel between indigenous and modern methods, and between large-sized and small-sized plants. In other words, he argues that instead of seeking only modern technology (yangfa) and large-scale plants, as in the Soviet Union, emphasis should also be placed on indigenous technology (tufa) and the development of small and medium-sized plants, in line with the Chinese reality. He insists: “In 1959, half of the annual pig iron production of 20 million tons or so was produced by small and medium-sized plants. In the future, small and medium types of plants will continue to play a major role in the development of steel production, with many of the small types turning into medium types, many of the medium types turning into large types, the backward types turning into advanced types, and the indigenous methods turning into modern methods. This is the objective law of development.” (Ibid., p. 99)

10

The concept of “accumulation rate” is from Marxist economics. It is the “accumulated value” of the output produced by the physical production sector minus the consumption value, divided by the value of that output. It is different from the “investment rate” in the concept of national income accounting, which China also adopted soon after the reform and opening-up era started. The investment rate, which is the amount of capital formation divided by total domestic production, was 25.4% in 1957, 33.5% in 1958, and 42.8% in 1959, almost the same as the accumulation rate. Incidentally, in 1960, when the Great Famine and mass starvation had begun, the investment rate reached as high as 38.1%, far exceeding the level of a normal year like 1957.

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This kind of technological choice theory in the development process reminds us of the “intermediate technology” or “appropriate technology” theories that attracted worldwide attention in the 1970s. Developing countries are inclined to import advanced and often large-scale technologies from developed countries in order to catch up with them as quickly as possible. However, even if capital-intensive, very advanced, and large-scale technologies are introduced to developing countries with large populations and excessive labor forces, they often tend to be either unusable or wasteful investments. Still, relying solely on traditional technologies cannot be technologically progressive. Therefore, technologies are required to meet the factor endowment of developing countries, i.e., the conditions of existing production factors. To be more specific, developing countries generally have a large labor force but lack capital and technology, so that, according to the intermediate or appropriate technology theory, they should introduce technologies that are relatively more advanced than before but still utilize labor. “Appropriate technology” refers to one that is appropriate in terms of the factor endowment of such developing countries, usually technology that has been relatively generalized or has become already outdated in developed countries, with preference for small and mediumsized machines and equipment rather than large-sized ones. Such technologies are easy to learn and to handle, and the inclusion of such technologies may also contribute to solving their employment problem Furthermore, as Mao Zedong also said, it is expected to be easier to introduce and learn more advanced and larger-sized technologies in the future through the acquisition of those appropriate technologies. The “indigenous blast furnaces” that were deployed throughout the country during the GLF period could be regarded as such technologies, at least theoretically. Indeed, it is undeniable that such technology makes sense from a developmental perspective. For example, under certain conditions, it may be less expensive and more effective to build 100 smaller dams or reservoirs made of earth and stones than to build one big concrete dam. However, not all technologies function on a continuum from small to large, from backward to advanced. Iron is one example, and as pointed out in Chap. 5, pig iron made by indigenous blast furnaces actually turned out to be mere scrap iron.

2 Mao’s Economic Goals The above provides a summary and brief commentary on features of Mao’s “political economics” and the economy of his era, in particular the three aspects of thought and philosophy, institutions, and policies, but in general Mao was interested in the economy in a broad sense with the following four focal points: One is high-speed economic development, that is the Great Leap Forward. He was furious when Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and others criticized “anti-rash-advance” two years before the start of the GLF policy, and he resolutely promoted the rash advance policy because he firmly believed that China had become socialist and should be able to achieve a higher rate of growth than capitalism (see Chap. 5). This was because,

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according to the naive Marxism and historical materialism he believed in, socialism would promote development more successfully than capitalism, that is, if private economy is abolished and large-scale public ownership is implemented, productivity should soar. Then, he imagined, China would get closer to the “communist” society that Marx had envisaged. Mao must have been euphoric when the previously mentioned exaggerated reports circulated throughout China during the GLF period. Beyond this dream, Mao had great ambitions and grand ideas of catching up with and overtaking not only the United Kingdom, but also the United States and the Soviet Union (as discussed in Chap. 5). The second focus is self-reliance. This idea had already existed during the revolutionary struggle period. When surrounded and often pursued by Kuomintang forces, and lacking adequate supplies of necessary materials from outside, Mao Zedong and his followers had no choice but to overcome their difficulties with the spirit and policies of self-reliance. In a speech titled “We Must Learn to Do Economic Work” (January 1945), Mao Zedong said as follows: “We cannot imitate the Kuomintang, which does not lift a finger itself but depends entirely on foreigners even for such daily necessities as cotton cloth. We stand for self-reliance …. We depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people.” (Mao Selected Works Vol. 3, p. 241)

Certainly, this policy was particularly emphasized during the Sino-Soviet confrontation that developed from 1960. Khrushchev refused to provide China with atomic bomb technology, so Mao proceeded to have China develop the bomb on its own. This policy was also applied to each region, requiring them to create food self-sufficiency as well as a comprehensive industrial system. The third focus was on moral incentives or subjective initiative. This corresponds to the theory of voluntarism in philosophy. Ding Shu says that one of the characteristics of “Mao’s thought” was a blind belief in the “transformation of spirit into matter” (Ding 1991, p. 12). Mao certainly believed that if only the thought could be changed, human beings would have unlimited power. He believed that if the masses awakened and rose up, they could perform any miracle. In fact, he was convinced that the reason why the revolutionary struggle managed to maintain and develop the poor bases, and the reason why the Communist Party, which was inferior in military strength at the start of the Civil War, was eventually able to defeat the Kuomintang, was that it motivated the masses to convert their spiritual energy into material power. After the founding of the country, the promotion of large-scale construction by mobilizing a massive labor force instead of machines exemplified Robert Guillain’s vision of “600 million ants” working in unison (Guillain 1967). In Mao’s eyes, this was the fruit of the labor power of spiritually motivated masses. And finally, socialization. The intense hostility he harbored toward those considered class enemies, his promotion of the class struggle, his abhorrence of private management by farmers, his contemplation of the eventual transition of the People’s Communes to “ownership by the whole people” or nationalization, his insistence on egalitarianism and the abolition of the market—were all part of his attempt to pursue the classical socialist vision. In addition to the above-mentioned assumption that

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socialism = public ownership = expansion of scale = development of productive forces. Correspondingly, there was also a political formula at work: Privatization = capitalist forces = counterrevolution. So, what was lacking in Mao’s political economy was a realistic and “purely economic” perspective on the interrelationships among the various institutions and elements that made up the entire economic system and mechanism. For example, it is impossible to motivate many people over a long period of time through moral incentives alone and, without such a motivation engine, economic development cannot be maintained at a high rate of speed. High growth cannot be achieved by self-reliance alone because it does not allow for the efficient allocation of resources, and because the introduction and diffusion of new technologies are difficult. While advocating the priority of heavy industry, he also called for a balance between agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry. This was an industrial policy necessary to guarantee a sustainable high rate of growth. However, the emphasis on accumulation neglected consumption, especially that of the peasantry, leading them into a poverty trap. If the three aspects mentioned above, i.e., economic ideology, economic system, and economic policy, had been balanced and interrelated, reckless and wasteful policies such as the Great Leap Forward and such institutions that ignored humanity like the People’s Communes would not have appeared. In my view, Mao’s economic thought, especially his economics of contradiction, broke the rational linkage between such institutions and policies. Zhang Wenkui’s interpretation is that the biggest problems faced by “Mao’s economics” and his economic policies were problems of information distortion and incentive incompatibility (Zhang 2018). These two are in fact closely related, and it can be said that the former problem arises because of the latter. This has been an extremely important theme in theories of economic systems, even in the socialist planned economies represented by the former Soviet Union. The information distortion problem means that correct information about reality does not reach the top decision-makers so that they subsequently make wrong judgments. There are three different types of problems involved in this process. First, those at the lower levels are familiar with the personalities and preferences of the leaders at the top, so they tend to distort reality to provide leaders with the most attractive information (models) in order to please them. Second, leaders also tend to confuse the ideal with the reality and do not want to see the ugly reality (the muddle). Mao Zedong had a famous epigram: “No investigation, no right to speak,” yet he often turned his eyes away from the real information coming from below, especially after the GLF movement in 1958. Third, local leaders were highly competitive and tended to exaggerate their reports to the top leaders. The nationwide competitiveness discussed in Chap. 5 which led to exaggerated reports of foodgrain production, right from the central leaders at the top to the village cadres at the bottom, was generated by this mechanism. This is by no means a Chinese or Maoist problem alone. Similar tragic situations are said to have existed in former socialist countries with same political systems. Michael Ellman points out:

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“Once accurate information has been screened out, and its sources suppressed, an entirely fanciful picture of reality emerges in Stalin’s perception of the agricultural situation, one largely derived from films which portrayed an idyllic picture of rural prosperity.” (Ellman 1979, p. 70)

Further, the problem of incentive incompatibility represents a situation in which the stimuli of the higher-ups (planning authorities, leaders, cadres, etc.) do not match those of the lower ones (factories, the general public, workers, etc.). The more the higher-ranking people preach idealism, the more the lower-ranking ones show false obedience. This is because the motives of the former and the real motives of the latter do not match well or are incompatible. Zhang Wenkui points outt: “What [Mao Zedong] could never have contemplated or accepted was probably the following: After the establishment of the people’s government and the implementation of the public ownership system, why would the working masses be less active in collective labor than they were in their own private plots, notwithstanding that the working masses were no longer exploited and oppressed? Why was their positivity for collective labor not comparable to the positivity when they worked for themselves, why was the quality of the labor they performed for everyone not comparable to the quality of the labor they performed for themselves?” (Zhang 2018, p. 173)

Once the entire economy had been socialized by the Communist regime, it was thought there would no longer be any exploitation by capitalists or oppression by landlords. The “liberated” workers and peasant masses would be happy to work for the collective and for the state. This was Mao Zedong’s naive, or rather, innocent assumption, a reflection not only of Mao’s personality, but also based on the historical success story of the Yan’an period and the liberation struggle period. Zhang Wenkui, quoting Mao’s remarks at the Central Work Conference in December 1960, speculates as follows: “[After the Lushan Conference] Mao Zedong said, ‘I had no idea that the communist wind would blow. There were several major projects (daban). We did a lot of water conservancy, we did a lot of pig raising, and we built a lot of commodity production bases. All of this was proposed by the Central Government, and no one thought that it would lead to extreme egalitarianism (pingjun zhuyi) and unpaid-for appropriation of peasants’ resources. If we had thought about it, we would not have done such things.’ Unfortunately, Mao’s assessment did not extend to the institutional mechanism. He probably just felt that the only problem was the poor work method and insufficient work experience, and perhaps thought that this problem would not occur if the PC or the GLF policies were tried again.” (Zhang 2018, p. 177)

However, the problem was not only the institutional mechanism as Zhang suggests. In my view, if we look at the problem from an economic policymaker’s perspective, it was Mao’s ideology that was fundamentally flawed or, in his words, “contradictory.” Zhang Wenkui insists that Mao’s persistent pursuit of a cooperative, sharing, equal, and mutually supportive society and a flexible operation of the organizational method of mass mobilization would continue to generate enormous attractiveness in the future (Ibid., p. 178). However, how “enormously attractive” can Mao’s method of organization be when it treats the masses as a means of mobilization and sees them only as tools for realizing his ideals as well as maintaining his power? In fact, the

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more China advanced Mao’s political economy, the worse the problem of “incentive incompatibility” became. Besides in times of war or extreme poverty, or in a society that mobilizes the masses, or has achieved a certain degree of affluence, is it really possible to realize a cooperative, sharing, equal, and mutually supportive society in the true sense of the word? What does it mean for individuals who are not really independent to “cooperate and share” with each other? In a society where there is only a relationship of domination and submission between the leaders and the masses, how can “equal and mutual support” be realized in the first place? Mao’s political economics do not deliver adequate answers to these questions. Li Rui, who was once Mao’s secretary, reflects on the GLF policy, in which he was also involved, and says as follows: “The Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune movements put into practice Mao’s ideas of socialist construction which took on a strong utopian color in his later years. During the (GLF) movement, Mao repeatedly spoke of his social ideals. In general, he thought that the utopian dreams of his predecessors would be realized more and more closely. In addition, in order to actualize his beautiful vision, he proposed theoretical perspectives such as overthrowing bourgeois rights, doing away with commodity-money relations, and abolishing the eighth-grade wage system as well as the private family economy.” (Li 1999a, p. 397)

If his fantasy had remained just that, the tragedy would not have happened. But he recklessly tried to make it a reality; moreover, no one could stop him because he was the only one who could decide what was true and correct.

3 Deng Xiaoping’s Economics Zhang Wenkui describes Deng Xiaoping’s character and behavior as “no big truths or slogans, no poetic words, no flowery theories” (Zhang 2018, p. 205), aptly expressing the philosophy of Deng, a realist who was committed to “adjusting to reality.” Mao, on the other hand, was a man of “big truths, many slogans, words like poetry, and flowery theories.” There was indeed a significant gap between the thoughts of these two men: Mao Zedong tried to change human thought and spirit, or the superstructure, while Deng Xiaoping emphasized productive forces, the infrastructure and results, rather than thoughts and ideals. The famous saying, “Whether it’s a black cat or a white cat, it’s a good cat that catches mice,”11 is synonymous with Deng Xiaoping’s approach. Translated into political economy terms, it means “whether it is capitalism or socialism, it is a good system when production and income rise.” When the GLF and PC movements promoted by Mao Zedong failed and, in the midst of the Great Famine and Hunger of 1959–61, collective farming was dismantled and individual farming was revived 11

Originally a saying in Sichuan Province, “Whether it’s a yellow cat or a black cat, it’s a good cat as long as it catches mice. It is unknown when the yellow cat became a white cat.

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in some rural areas and achieved good results, Deng condoned this trend, or rather supported it by bringing up the “white cat, black cat” notion (see Chap. 8). It goes without saying that Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism was by no means unlimited but kept within the bounds of his conception of socialism and the Communist Party system, yet this utilitarian approach may have offended Mao’s idealistic vision of socialism, especially the PC system, thus resulting in one of the reasons for Deng’s downfall during the CR period. The logic used by Deng Xiaoping to attack Hua Guofeng, who became Chairman of the Party after the “Gang of Four” incident in 1976, was “practice is the only criterion for verifying truth.” This was the criterion used to bring down Hua, who was one of the “whatevers” ( fanshipai), that is, a person who believes “everything Mao Zedong said was right,” using Mao’s very words (see Chap. 1). In order to put an end to Mao’s insistence on the theory of continuous revolution and class struggle and to concentrate on the economy rather than politics, the two most effective systems of capitalism for economic development—private ownership and the market mechanism—were introduced on a large scale during the Deng era. At the same time, the policy of allowing the widening of disparities, or a doctrine called “theory of getting rich first” (xianfulun), which was completely opposite to the ideal of socialism, was introduced into the Chinese economy (see Chap. 2). From Deng’s point of view, what Mao was doing seemed to him to be “poor socialism,” that is, the construction of an equal but poor society. He rejected the main tenets of Mao’s political economy, arguing that “this is not real socialism; real socialism should be a system in which the productive forces are more developed than capitalism, as Marx and others had supposed,” a return, so to speak, to a naive Marxist understanding of historical materialism. Deng states the following: “The tasks of socialism are very many, but its fundamental task is to develop the productive forces. On the basis of developing the productive forces, its superiority over capitalism is manifested and the material basis for the realization of communism is realized.” (Deng 1993, p. 137)

In the early years of reform and opening-up, Deng Xiaoping did not necessarily accept that the market was an effective alternative to planning as a resource allocation mechanism, and Chinese economists in the 1980s were engrossed in a somewhat offtarget debate regarding whether planning or market was more important in a socialist economy and, if both are necessary, how to combine them and in what proportion. For a conservative economic theorist like Chen Yun, socialism is a planned economy based on public ownership, so while the market can be used as a complementary tool, the leading role must always be planning. Chen put forward the “birdcage theory,” arguing: “Birds [referring to the economy] will die if they are tied tightly, but they will fly away if they are left completely free. Therefore, if we keep them in a birdcage [meaning planning], we can control them and help them grow.”

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However, Deng Xiaoping, a realist as well as pragmatist, realized that the bird could not fly freely in such a birdcage. Therefore, he allowed the creation of a market-based mechanism. He points out that: “The difference between capitalism and socialism does not lie in the matter of planning versus markets. Socialism has markets, and capitalism has planning and control. …. We need both planning and markets. If you don’t do the market, you won’t understand the information in the world, and you will be content with being backward.” (Deng 1993, p. 364)

That is to say, Deng Xiaoping was not afraid to take risks, and he urged the cadres to adopt a market system. He then launched a new policy, the “socialist market economy,” which was the springboard for China’s economy to shake off the stagnation that had prevailed before and after the Tiananmen Square incident (June 4, 1989) and enter a prolonged period of high growth that drew worldwide attention. To put it bluntly, it was marketization and, in effect if not in name, capitalism, that saved the Chinese economy and propelled it forward. The stock market system, which had been avoided as capitalistic until then, was introduced extensively, after which people became fanatically obsessed with tracking the fluctuations of the stock market. The popular phrase at that time was “money first” (xiangqiankan), as people started to seek economic benefits above all else.12 When contrasted with such four institutions and policies that form the backbone of Mao’s political economy as discussed above, Deng Xiaoping’s economics has the following characteristics. First, his emphasis on stability makes Mao’s theory of contradictory dynamics seem not only irrelevant but also harmful. Yet, he was not an equilibrist like the classical theorists of planning, but rather a supporter of institutions and policies that greatly endorsed imbalances, such as the market and the “theory of getting rich first‘. A phrase that well represents the economic policy of his era is “crossing the river by groping for stones (mozhe shitou guohe),” which refers to an experimental, gradualist approach of first experimenting with a policy in certain regions or organizations, and if successful, trying to spread it to other regions or organizations. After the reform and opening-up, new policies were adopted in turn in this way and spread throughout the country. Second, Deng Xiaoping totally ignored or rejected Mao’s subjective activity theory. To begin with, his economics contained almost no ideological or spiritual elements. He was literally a “materialist” thinker, and so believed that “development is the first priority (yingdaoli)” and prioritized material growth and affluence above all. According to Zhang Wenkui, “In the case of Mao Zedong’s economics and economic policies, it is necessary to transform human nature. On the other hand, in the case of Deng Xiaoping’s economics and economic policies, a moderate compromise with human nature is sought. This is the primary difference between the two men’s economics and economic policies.” (Ibid., p. 178).

12

Originally it means “look ahead” (xiang qian kan) but “ahead” and “money” have the same pronunciation (qian) in Chinese, so it was replaced with “look money” symbolizing the reality of society and people’s true intentions.

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To be more precise, Mao Zedong fancifully believed that transforming human thought would generate unlimited power, while Deng Xiaoping was more realistic, believing that human thought could not be easily changed and that vitality could be generated by stimulating the innate desires that people possess. This is the major difference between the idealist Mao Zedong and the realist Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping, who was well aware that human nature is dominated by material desires, understood that such a system that stimulates these desires can actually promote development. The markets and disparities mentioned above were merely tools for development for Deng, and as he himself admitted, he was not originally a scholar, did not read the classics of Marxism well, and had little interest in what Marx and Engels had said, as he had originally made his mark as an organizer and activist. Paradoxically, it was his lack of theoretical basis and shallow knowledge of Marxism that enabled China’s economy to develop at a high speed in the post-Mao era, by following the path of realism and pragmatism rather than dogmatism. Third, Deng Xiaoping effectively rejected the theory of self-reliance. As for systemic reforms, Mao Zedong also had promoted certain reforms in his own way. For example, besides the decentralized systems referred to above, he introduced the “Party Committee-led enterprise responsibility system,” which replaced the Sovietstyle “one man-management system,” i.e., the system in which the head of an enterprise assumed all authority and responsibility in management. However, during the Mao era, China basically did not adopt an “open-door” policy, or rather, avoided it. This was because China aimed for a self-sufficient economy, in terms of trade, while regarding foreign investment, it was thought that accepting foreign investment would lead to the loss of management autonomy and domination by foreign countries. However, during the Deng era, China shifted to a comprehensive and bold open policy. One aspect of this was the rapid expansion of foreign trade, and another was the active acceptance of foreign investment, as well as the establishment and expansion of special economic zones and economic development zones closely related to these two policies. In contemporary China since the death of Deng Xiaoping, openness has become synonymous with globalization, and “the outward expansion of capital” has also been actively pursued. China has now become a major capital exporter rather than an importer as before. Deng Xiaoping‘s decision to open to the outside world was also part of his pragmatism, because he believed it would accelerate economic development. As the theory of comparative advantage in economics teaches, free trade and the international division of labor allow for more efficient allocation of resources and faster economic growth than self-sufficiency or self-reliance. Deng, who was not a theorist, intuitively grasped this logic very well, not from economics textbooks, but from the experiences of surrounding countries and regions. In the background of his open-door policies there were also favorable changes in the international environment. During the Mao era China initially belonged to the socialist bloc with the Soviet Union as its ally, but as the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, China had to confront the Soviet Union. Partly as a result of such military tensions, Mao Zedong chose a policy of self-reliance. However, by the time of Deng Xiaoping, the Cold War had eased and the United States and China had established

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diplomatic relations, so that an environment was created where China could cooperate with the international community. When the reform and opening-up era arrived, China was able to enter the global market extensively and to receive the utmost benefits of free trade. In such an era, self-reliance has become an outdated policy. No need to say, Chinese leaders do not entirely abandon the pursuit of economic and technological self-reliance, even in the face of the challenging international environment.13 Fourth, while emphasizing growth, Dengist China also began to pursue efficiency. In this sense, full-fledged economics in the sense of Robbins began to work for the first time in China’s economic policy. In the Deng era, especially after the transition to a market economy, a number of huge projects were launched, including the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, but the “600 million ants” type of projects that had mobilized massive labor power during the Mao era were no longer carried out. In today’s era, labor is not free as in the Mao era, and it has been found to be far more economically and technologically efficient to replace labor with machines. In addition, the Party Committee-led enterprise management of the pre-reform era became a thing of the past, and there were calls for more efficient business management. Under Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism, anything that was useful for business management, whether capitalistic or not, was actively incorporated. Since the early 1990s, a large number of Western business books began to appear widely on the shelves of Chinese bookstores. This can be attributed to the simultaneous emergence of numerous private entrepreneurs in the country. Such a trend amounts to China’s revision of the definition of socialism, or giving up the realization of a complete, original socialist society. In 1987, at the Partys 13th National Congress, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang advocated the “theory of the Primary Stage of Socialism.” The essence of this theory, to simplify drastically, is “China is still very poor. Didn’t Marx say that capitalism would develop highly and transition to socialism? Then, let’s go to a socialist society in the original sense after becoming a little richer.” In principle, this theory maintains that the public ownership system, which is the basic system of socialism, is to be maintained, but the primitive socialist economy must take “supplementary lessons in capitalism,” so to speak, which it has not done enough to achieve. In a sense, this approach is tantamount to turning back the hands of the clock to the pre-1953 state of New Democracy. However, it is clear that the richer the country becomes, the more the division of labor develops, and the further away it drifts from socialism (communism) in the Marxist sense. This theory can only be defined as “Chinese socialism.” After all, the Party Center decides how to define socialism.

13

In today’s context, a typical example is the development of semiconductors. When the United States imposed restrictions on the export of high-performance semiconductors, China embarked on the independent development of such technologically advanced products.

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4 How to Evaluate Mao’s “Political Economics” It is generally understood that it was Mao Zedong’s talk on the “Ten Major Relationships” mentioned earlier that prompted China to move away from the Soviet Union‘s economic model and to seek a Chinese-style socialist model for its own economic strategy. China, stimulated by the criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party in February 1956, was freed from the yoke of the Stalinist economic model and began to search for its own way to solve the various problems of the centralized socialist economy that China had learned from the Soviet Union. In his talk, Mao focuses on the following “relationships” directly related to economic policy: The relationships among heavy industry, agriculture, and light industry; those between coastal and inland industry; those between economic and national defense construction; those among the state, production units, and individual producers; and those between the Central Government and local governments. Mao Zedong paid particular attention to the relationship among heavy industry, agriculture, and light industry, as well as the relationship between the central and local governments. However, it is not necessarily true that such an idea was unique to Mao Zedong. The platform proposed at the above 20th Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party set forth policy objectives similar to those of the “Ten Major Relationships”: (1) to rapidly develop the production of consumer goods on the premise of prioritizing the development of heavy industry, (2) to eliminate the phenomenon of agricultural lagging and the resultant imbalance between agriculture and industry, and in addition, (3) to transfer many industrial enterprises belonging to the Central Government to the management of local institutions. These policy objectives are all exactly the same as Mao’s “Ten Major Relationships” (Shen 2008, pp. 87–88). Since this Platform had been addressed before Mao’s talk, it is natural to assume that Mao Zedong used it as inspiration for his doctrine of Ten Major Relationships.14 It goes without saying that the platform was only a goal, and whether or not it was actually realized is another matter. In fact, the Soviet centralized system basically continued after that, Khrushchev’s attempt at a large-scale food production program failed, and the agricultural problem was one of the Achilles’ heels of the Soviet economy even after the 20th Party Congress. If there is any uniqueness in Mao’s economic policy and thought, it lies in his emphasis on moral incentives, class struggle, and the “economics of contradictions,” while he had no great interest in technology, machinery, or productivity as seen in the Platform. The theory of the Ten Major Relationships included the relationships between the Han and ethnic minorities, those between the Party and the nonParty, those between revolution and counterrevolution, and those between right and wrong, suggesting that Mao was strongly interested in the political and ideological aspects. This may be because, in my view, politics, ideology and more specifically, maintaining power, were more important than economics to Mao Zedong. 14

Other emphasis is placed on the development of the eastern region as the “rational allocation of productive forces,” which is in keeping with the relationship between coastal industry and inland industry in the doctrine of the Ten Major Relationships.

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During the Mao era, the Soviet-style planned economy system created by Stalin was realized around basically maintained, although the planning mechanism was temporarily disrupted during the CR period. However, a huge and strong planning bureaucracy like that of the Soviet Union was not produced in China partly because of its short history of socialism, so that while the Soviet Union is said to have had around 2000 kinds of goods included in the planning and control items, in China there were only 40 kinds of planned items at most, of which only a dozen or so important items such as steel were properly planned. (Xue 1988). Mao Zedong himself did not like to create or be bound by strict systems, and as seen above, he emphasized contradictions and imbalances in the economy, so there was no way that a strict planning mechanism could be established in China during his era. During the same period, alternative socialist economic systems were envisioned in Eastern European countries to replace the Stalinist-type centralized planning system. Well-known and internationally influential was the “decentralized socialist” model developed by Polish reformist economist Wlodzimierz. Brus15 (Brus 1971). In that model, enterprises were to be given autonomy in production decisions and consumer goods were to be traded on the market rather than planned.16 Mao’s idea of decentralization was not a market-based one, but only an administrative one that gave authority to localities representing the state, specifically provinces and municipalities. As a result, enterprises were not given their own decision-making power, nor was there a market, and from the perspective of enterprises that were completely transferred from the central to the local level, the Central Government’s directives were simply replaced by the directives of the local government. Moreover, such decentralization was not conceived independently by China; in fact, it had already been proposed at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, as I mentioned above. Another reason Mao chose administrative decentralization rather than a marketbased one is that he had no faith in the market and was concerned that the market would lead to disorder and chaos. His lack of respect for the market law, i.e., the law that supply and demand are regulated by prices alone, is typified by the following observations: “It is fine to use the law of value17 [hereafter read as the market law in our sense] as a planning tool. But we cannot use the law of value as an important basis for planning. We 15

Włodzimierz Brus (1921–2007) is a Polish-born economist and professor at the University of Warsaw, but was expelled from Poland for political reasons in 1968 and then taught at Oxford University in England. 16 Regarding investment, it was an indecisive model that mixed planning and market, following the central plan. The economic reforms implemented in Hungary in 1968 are said to have been based on this Brus model. After the transition of socialist regimes starting at the end of the 1980s, Brus finally withdrew this model. 17 The law of value is a concept in Marxian economics that states that goods are exchanged with other goods of equal value as measured by labor power. Although market laws that are not based on the theory of labor value and the law of value based on that theory do not theoretically coincide, we can assume that the volume of transactions and prices determined by these two laws would trend in a similar manner if the law of value were to be established.

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made the Great Leap Forward not on the basis of the demands of the law of value, but on the basis of the fundamental law of socialism, the need to expand our production. If we conclude that the GLF is not a success solely from the standpoint of the law of value, we can say that last year’s [1959] pig iron and crude steel production was wasteful, that crude steel made by the indigenous method is of poor quality, that the government’s subsidized expenditures are too high, that it has no economic effect, etc. If we look at the GLF from the standpoint of the law of value, we can say that it was a failure. In the local and short-term, pig iron and crude steel production may seem to be a loss, but in the overall and long-term perspective, it is highly significant. …. Depression does not occur in socialist societies primarily not because of the grip of the law of value, but because of socialist ownership, the basic economic laws of socialism, planned production and distribution throughout the country, no free competition and no anarchy ….” (Notes, pp. 86–89)

We find the classical Marxist view of economics in Mao’s argument here: That is, socialism is a planned system without anarchy, while capitalism is anarchic because it is a market economy. Thus, Mao emphasizes that in the long run they need a holistic and planned perspective that is not bound by the market law. Ironically, however, Mao was compiling these Notes amid the chaos caused by the GLF disaster, and the Notes fail to admit that the policies promoted by Mao and others were exactly the ones that led to that “anarchy.” Be that as it may, in hindsight, Mao and his colleagues were bound by a lack of basic understanding of the market system, including a failure to recognize its endogenous dynamics. Not only Mao, but also other famous reformist economists active in Eastern Europe at the time, such as W. Brus, Kornai Janos,18 and Ota Sik,19 recognized the necessity of the market and price mechanism as a function to regulate supply and demand, but failed to grasp the active and creative nature inherent in the market mechanism. They had no idea about the active and creative nature of the market or price mechanism, such as the entrepreneurial roles of Joseph Schumpeter or the animal spirit of J. M. Keynes. With the economics of contradictions theory in hand, it would seem that Mao Zedong should have discovered such an economic mechanism, but while he spoke of the “contradictions” of planning and its regime, he had no idea of the dynamism the market mechanism brings about. From his point of view, the active nature of the economy was not a product of the market, but of the innate spirit of the masses. It was Deng Xiaoping who virtually discovered the dynamic roles of the market and used them in actual policies during the post-Mao era, especially after 1992, when he formulated the so-called “theory of socialist market economy.” According to Shen Zhihua, Mao’s dissatisfaction with the planned economy that he showed at the Party’s Eighth National Congress in September 1956 was not about the system itself, but about the “evasive balancing” approach of this system (Shen 2008, p. 347). Mao’s emphasis was on “letting the localities be proactive, breaking through the balance of planning with mass movements, making up for the lack of 18

Kornai Janos was a reformist economist from Hungary. He had a significant influence on Hungary’s economic reforms. 19 Ota Šik was a Czechoslovak reformist economist as well as politician. He was one of the leaders who orchestrated the Prague Spring (1968), which called for democratization under the socialist regime.

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funds, and creating miracles and high speed,” all of which eventually led to the economy being run on administrative orders. On the other hand, Liu Shaoqi and other adherents of the planned economy did not fully understand the essence of the planning that had just been imported from the Soviet Union, nor did they recognize its substantial defects. Instead, they simply followed Mao’s lead, pursuing the virtually unplanned disastrous GLF policy. Qian Liqun highly praised the ideas of Gu Zhun, a researcher at the Institute of Economic Research of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who was ousted from office after being labelled a rightist in the Anti-Rightist Struggle. Qian even calls him “the only critical intellectual on Mainland China during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 176; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 128). In his diaries and other writings, Gu secretly laid out his vision of China’s ideal economic system. The idea was that China should recognize the commodity plus money economy, that is, the market economy, and create a democratic socialist system, or “social democracy” that combines capitalism and socialism. At first glance, it appears that he had similar ideas to those of Brus at the time, but his ideas were not theorized and systematized like the Brus model, and were only in a fragmentary conception stage. Nevertheless, he was obviously trying to find a third way of socialism, different from both the Stalinist and the Maoist model. But even if he had not been politically ousted, such an idea would never have been publicized and discussed under the Maoist regime. This is because the Anti-Rightist Struggle deprived everyone of independent thinking, and afterwards, China developed an unbalanced system and political climate in which the truth was monopolized by Mao Zedong alone. Last but not the least, I expect that readers of this chapter will surmise that I have doubts as to whether Mao Zedong and his political economy left any discernibly positive legacies for contemporary China. However, I do not deny the fact that the Chinese economy during the Mao era did bequeath certain economic legacies for the post-Mao period, as I will stress in the last chapter. These include fundamental economic infrastructure such as transportation networks, basic industrial sectors like steel and chemical industries, essential social infrastructure such as education and healthcare, and, most importantly, a substantial pool of technical personnel. Nevertheless, it is crucial not to overlook that these accomplishments and legacies were achieved at a considerable cost, whether financial, or time, or human.

Chapter 8

The Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong: The Outcome of a Revolution without Revolution

When the Great Leap Forward (GLF) policy that Mao Zedong had vigorously promoted and the People’s Commune (PC) system that he dreamed of as the “path to communism” both proved to be dismal and tragic failures, his prestige greatly declined. At this point, practical politicians, later known as the “persons in power faction” (dangquanpai), led by Deng Xiaoping, stepped forward and proposed adjustment policies to rescue the economy from the brink of crisis. The starting point for this was the Party’s enlarged meeting called the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” (Qiqianren Dahui) (January–February, 1962). Besides reflecting on and summarizing the GLF policy, this was an important meeting in the sense that its failure was summarily explained by Liu Shaoqi as “30% natural disasters, 70% man-made disasters,” which was taken as a euphemistic criticism of Mao Zedong and foreshadowed the subsequent Cultural Revolution (CR). In this chapter, I will consider the process leading up to this Revolution, which, along with the GLF movement, is considered one of greatest tragedies of modern China. I will examine why Mao Zedong launched this movement; how much tragedy this movement caused; what mechanisms led to it and how it should be evaluated. The following section will discuss the chronology of the CR movement, including events leading up to it. Although much of the literature covers the chronological trend of this Revolution,1 my interest lies less in the history and more in Mao’s ideology, the logic of his actions, and how the characteristics of his personality influenced this unprecedented historical and political event.

1

For example, Yan and Gao (1996) provide excellent commentary, and Wang (2013) gives a powerful record of his own experience as a mid-level cadre in Tianjin and his observations amid this Revolution. For full-scale research, see Kokubun (2003), Yang (2006), or Kagami (2001). Relatively recently published analytical books on the Cultural Revolution include Walder (2019), Yang (2019), and Dikӧtter (2016).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_8

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1 The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference2 By the end of 1961, the chaos caused by the GLF policy had gradually come to an end, the PC system envisioned by Mao Zedong had been revised, while rural areas and agriculture had finally begun to recover from the catastrophic situation they had experienced. The Party Central Committee then decided to hold a conference of cadres at all levels to review the past experiences and to unify thoughts among the members. This conference was originally intended to bring together only highranking officials, but at Mao’s discretion, it became an extraordinarily large-scale enlarged central work conference, bringing together a total of more than 7000 cadres at the fifth level and above, from various departments, regions, and enterprises. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were assigned to draft the report of the Conference. It was virtually drafted by Chen Boda, Hu Sheng, Tian Jiaying and others, then rewritten many times by Liu and Deng to incorporate their opinions. In June of that year, Mao Zedong had made something akin to a self-criticism at a work conference held in Beijing: “The direct responsibility for all the mistakes made by the Central Committee after the Great Leap Forward lies with me, and I also bear some indirect responsibility. This is because I am the Chairman of the Central Committee. I will not shift the responsibility to others. Some other comrades also bear responsibility, but the primary responsibility lies with me.”

At the November meeting, he also nobly admitted that the central leadership, including himself, was responsible for the failure of the GLF policy, adding that “We should learn lessons from our mistakes.” But what did his “self-criticism” really mean? Was he really self-critical, and had he really learnt lessons from those failures? On looking at his subsequent statements and actions, the answer is apparently not. The keynote of the Conference report did not deny the GLF policy in and of itself, but rather asserted that despite its achievements, there were many mistakes in its implementation that had caused great difficulties. The draft report was, of course, forwarded to Mao Zedong, who agreed to have Liu Shaoqi report it at the enlarged Central Work Conference (commonly known as the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference) held in January–February 1962. Liu had prepared a short summary of his oral report and distributed it in advance to Politburo members, including Mao.3 However, in his actual speech, he ignored the summary and proceeded, in his own words, to make a comprehensive and lengthy review of the GLF policy for a solid three hours.4 Mao must have been inwardly shocked when he heard Liu’s report, as it 2

Zhang (2006) provides the most detailed information on this Conference. It is also outlined in Yang (2012, p. 520 and beyond). 3 This dozen-page summary was distributed at a meeting of the Political Bureau Standing Committee held the day before the report. According to Zhang (2006), Mao did not express any critical opinion on it, probably because the summary had already been decided and he did not have time to put forward a different opinion. 4 It is extremely rare for a rapporteur to address an official and important report without a manuscript in a dictatorial country like China. To avoid political risks, most usually read a preprepared manuscript.

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included contents that were not even in the draft outline, that is, without Mao’s prior approval. This report is important in the sense that it provided the initial impetus for the subsequent clash between Mao and Liu, and although it is somewhat lengthy, let me introduce the main parts of his speech, as outlined by Zhang (2006). Liu Shaoqi first describes the national economic situation and frankly admits that the country is facing great difficulties. He points out that agricultural production is declining considerably, and that industry has also fallen sharply, with a drop of 40% or more compared to 1961. He emphasizes the need to acknowledge this situation as it is. Second, what are the reasons for this decreased production? There are only two causes: One being the three consecutive years of natural disasters which have plagued agriculture and industry; the other being the flaws and mistakes in the Party’s practices since 1958. Which of these two causes was the main one? Liu Shaoqi gives an account of his visit the previous year to a region in Hunan Province, his hometown, and the great difficulties he witnessed there. He asked the peasants, “What is the cause of your difficulties, were there any natural disasters?” They replied, “There were natural disasters, but nothing serious.” They suggested the difficulties were “30% natural disasters and 70% man-made disasters.” Liu had presented this view of “30% natural disasters and 70% man-made disasters” at a smaller Central Work meeting in May of the previous year, but now does so again at a Conference gathering of 7000 cadres. Liu’s speech was praised by Bo Yibo for showing “fearless revolutionary courage,” and by Wu Lengxi, then editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, for its “amazing wisdom and courage.” The audience reacted fervently to Liu’s report, with applause lasting from five to ten minutes. Third, Liu asks: What are the results of the efforts that the entire Party has been gritting its teeth about for many years, and what is the relationship between the results and the mistakes? Until now, flaws, mistakes, and achievements have always been likened to the relationship between one finger and nine fingers. Now it is more likely a relationship between three fingers (achievements) and seven fingers (mistakes). In some areas, the flaws and mistakes cannot be covered by three fingers. His word choice recalls Mao’s criticism of Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference—“The relationship between mistakes and achievements is one finger to nine fingers.” In this way, Liu Shaoqi implicitly but severely criticized Mao. Given that this was not in Liu’s previously released report, we can well imagine Mao’s expression and state of mind on hearing this. Fourth, Liu Shaoqi explains how the “man-made disasters” occurred and who should take responsibility for them. In addition to lack of experience, he attributes the most blame to blindly seeking excessive indicators, giving rise to a “communist wind,” and moreover, an excessive struggle waged within the Party which made people unwilling or unable to talk truthfully. Here Liu makes a self-criticism on behalf of the Central Government by admitting that those who made these errors were members of the Central Government, but does not say a word about Mao Zedong’s responsibility for them. Fifth, he admits the mistakes of past policies and concludes that the guiding ideology, based on the “Three Red Banners (sanmian hongqi)” (General Line for

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Socialist Construction, the Great Leap Forward, and People’s Communes) was correct in direction and should be maintained in the future, even though each has had its problems. Zhang Suhua, rightly points to Liu’s contradictory attitude here. Inwardly, he may have wanted to boldly assert the error of this guiding ideology, but felt he could not go that far in Mao’s presence. Or, maybe he was too distressed to say that all of Mao’s guiding ideology was wrong, since he himself had actively followed Mao’s lead. Liu Shaoqi’s report is particularly famous, but other leaders also delivered speeches at that Conference. For example, Lin Biao, then Defence Minister, made a speech which was, in a nutshell, a thoroughgoing eulogy of Mao Zedong, with a completely different tone to Liu Shaoqi’s. He emphasizes that the “Three Red Banners” is correct, and asserts that the difficulties after the GLF were mainly caused by “extraordinarily large, continuous, and in some areas catastrophic” natural disasters. He suggests that while mistakes had been made, they were not mistakes regarding the (Party) Line. He says that both industrial and agricultural production was reduced, but that there was great spiritual gain. He justifies the failure of the policy with the bizarre theory that a student produces nothing while studying, but after graduating from college, he earns an income, so the sacrifices made after the GLF movement were something like tuition fees. Lin Biao also praised Mao by saying: “As the facts prove, these difficulties were caused precisely because we did not follow Chairman Mao’s instructions, his warnings, and his ideas …. If we had listened to Chairman Mao more carefully, if we had imbibed his spirit, if we had done so, we would not have had to go so far, and today’s difficulties would have been much less severe. .... I personally have learned from decades of experience that Chairman Mao’s most outstanding virtue is that he is pragmatic.”

Mao would have been comfortable with Lin’s remarks. Sometime after the meeting, Mao read the transcript of Lin’s speech again and told his secretary Tian Jiaying and Chief of General Staff Luo Ruiqing, “This is very good. I was glad to read it.” After that, Lin went on to deify Mao Zedong by compiling Quotations from Chairman Mao and to spread this “Red Bible” throughout China. Although not covered in Zhang (2006), Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing City, also delivered a significant speech at this Conference that would later fuel the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution—one that Mao Zedong could not afford to ignore. He directly referred to Mao’s responsibility, saying that the mistakes of the GLF policy must first be borne by the Central Government, including Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, and that “Chairman Mao was not entirely without mistakes …. If we do not address Chairman Mao’s 1% or 10% mistakes, it will reflect badly on our Party.” Later, in September 1965, at a meeting convened by the Party’s Culture Department, Peng Zhen said, “Before the truth, we are equal, even if you are the Chairman of the Party’s Central Committee” (Hu 2008, p. 110). In other words, he meant to say, “Truth must not fall from the heavens.” Three days after Liu Shaoqi’s report, Mao Zedong also made a talk without a manuscript at the Conference. He did not particularly praise the Three Red Banners policy he had promoted, nor did he vehemently refute critical opinions. He did not

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directly rebut Liu Shaoqi’s indirect criticism, nor did he conduct a thorough analysis of how his own policy had led to such great chaos. What he did say was, at least at first glance, very “benign,” such as pointing out the importance of democratic methods that encourage people to express their opinions.5 The transcript of this talk is also included in an unofficial source titled Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought),6 but its content differs slightly from that cited by Zhang Suhua. I will follow Zhang (2006) and extract the parts of Mao’s talk that I regard important.7 Mao Zedong argues: “Don’t we have many difficulties at the present time? .... If you don’t explain the situation to the masses and the cadres, if you don’t communicate with the masses and the cadres, if you don’t let them express their opinions, they will still be afraid of you, and they will not want to talk to you, then you won’t be able to get their positive energy to come out. ... You must have democracy to overcome difficulties, and even more so if you don’t have concentration. But there can be no concentration without democracy, therefore difficulties cannot be overcome without democracy. Isn’t the current emphasis on concentration? The emphasis on concentration must first be laid on a democratic basis.”

He further says: “If there is a mistake, you must always criticize yourself. We must let others speak and criticize. You must take responsibility for your shortcomings and mistakes in your work. All those who don’t take responsibility, are afraid of responsibility, don’t let others speak, don’t touch the tiger’s ass, and this attitude will fail ten out of ten. People must always speak out.”

For many participants, especially for those who were hearing Mao’s voice for the first time, the more they listened, the more impressed they must have become with his beautiful “general theory.” Originally, this Conference was supposed to be relatively short, but at Mao’s suggestion, the meeting was extended, because he said, “Everyone has a lot to say at this time after the GLF movement, so we need to let them talk more and clear their minds.” However, some participants with good memories must have suddenly recalled that Chairman Mao said something similar or to the same effect during the “let a hundred flowers blossom, and a hundred schools of thought contend” movement in 1956 and in his “internal contradictions ” theory in early 1957 (see Chap. 4). On the other hand, Liu Shaoqi and other high-ranking officials familiar with Mao’s speeches and statements and who knew his personality well, must have thought to themselves, “Not again!” but it would have been impossible to gauge their innermost feelings at that time. 5

While Qian Liqun regards Mao and Liu as basically not in conflict at this stage (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 530; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 95), Li Zhisui says, on the other hand, that when Mao learned of Liu’s report at the Conference, he was furious that “he [Liu] was not maintaining a class standpoint.” (Li 1994, Vol. 2, p. 110) 6 A record of Mao Zedong’s speeches and writings published unofficially during the Cultural Revolution. 7 According to Zhang Suhua, this talk was revised and printed in February 1966, that is, just before the CR movement, based on the 1962 edition by Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Wang Renzhong, and others. Mao must have read it, naturally, so the “left leaning” tone of the time is strongly reflected in the talk. Zhang describes Mao’s talk based on the 1962 edition.

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Mao Zedong admitted that the GLF policy had failed due to his lack of experience, that he did not understand the economy well, and that the responsibility lay with the Party Center, especially with himself. According to Zhang Suhua, Mao’s talk, brought some participants to tears, for they felt that “Chairman Mao is absolutely right, and we are the ones who have to criticize ourselves, and yet we let him criticize himself.” Again, the relationship between Mao and many of the participants is reminiscent of the relationship between a guru and his believers. Thus, at this Conference Mao Zedong was calm, at least superficially, thoughtful, and he delivered a talk that moved the ordinary participants, one without the “wildness” typical of him during the Anti-Rightist Struggle and his criticism of Peng Dehuai, for example. There was no significant mention of “class struggle” in this talk.8 But the situation was soon to change. It is at the Beidaihe Central Work Conference in August of the same year and the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in September that Mao Zedong became more combative. At this Beidaihe Conference, he issued a warning which foreshadowed the arrival of the Cultural Revolution, saying that “the reactionary class that has already been overthrown is still trying to resurrect itself. Even in socialist societies new bourgeois elements can be born. At all socialist stages there are classes and class struggle. This class struggle will be long, complex, and sometimes extremely fierce.” What exactly happened during the interim period, and what made Mao reiterate the class struggle? In order to recover agricultural production, which was in a catastrophic state as a result of the Great Famine, there was a move, at any cost, toward de-collectivization of the production contracting to households (baochan daohu) system and partial dismantling of the PC system. This was evident throughout the country, especially in Anhui Province, where the “responsible field” (zerentian)9 was revived around 1960, and Zeng Xisheng, then Party Secretary of Anhui Province, contacted and told Mao Zedong about these spontaneous developments in his Province for the sake of getting his permission to approve them. This trend was by no means limited to Anhui, but also occurred in other provinces, such as Henan and Sichuan Provinces. According to Deng Zihui, who was in charge of the Party’s Rural Work Department, various forms of household responsibility systems were developing in Communes and production brigades across the country, amounting to about 20%—and in some counties as high as over 60%—of the total number of households (Nakakane 1992, p. 242). The figure of 20% occurred at the time when Mao Zedong was resisting these measure; the decollectivization movement would have been much faster if that pressure had been removed. This can be deduced from how rapidly the PC system was dismantled after the new policy of reform and opening-up was introduced to post-Mao rural China. 8

To be precise, the term “class struggle” appears only at one point, that is, when Mao says, “We have a series of experiences in class struggle.” As pointed out above, the 1966 version of this speech differs in content from the 1962 version which was first published, in that it emphasizes the long and intense nature of the class struggle at the socialist stage. 9 This refers to a field that is cultivated and managed responsibly by farmers belonging to production teams.

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There was a difference of perception between Mao and other political leaders over this decollectivization movement.10 Prominent leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun were inclined to support the production contracting system in rural areas, which Mao disliked. Roderick McFarquhar connects the origins of the Cultural Revolution with the growing decline of Mao Zedong’s prestige and, simultaneously, the increasing prominence of Liu Shaoqi during this rural decollectivization drive (McFarquhar 2003). Chen Yun argued for re-dividing the land and restoring the individual farming system to solve rural problems and submitted a report to Mao who later harshly criticized it. Tian Jiaying, one of Mao’s secretaries, after obtaining Liu Shaoqi’s agreement, conveyed to Mao the results of his rural survey calling for a production contracting system, suggesting that 60% of rural households nationwide carry out this system, while 40% conduct collective management (McFarquhar 2003). This was also later criticized by Mao.11 Mao Zedong clearly expressed his opposition to the contracting-out system at a meeting with Liu and others (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 479; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 364). Mao believed that such a move from below would lead to the destruction of the PC system, and seems to have sensed that his authority and power were being violated little by little, as he was exceptionally sensitive about maintaining power. There are many ways to define socialism, but if it is defined as a system to pursue equality under a combination of public ownership (rather than private ownership) and planning (rather than the market), then allowing farmers to contract out production and restoring the free market to rural areas would make capable farmers richer and less capable farmers poorer. Mao Zedong, as an “orthodox socialist,” would have seen this as a deviation from socialism. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others must have thought, in my view, that allowing the production contracting system was just a temporary emergency measure and there would be a return to collective farming once the problems had been alleviated, but it is not surprising that Mao believed that if China allowed the “capitalist way” to take its course, even temporarily, it would forever be unable to return to socialism. If Mao came back to life and looked at China today, he would definitely shout: Once you introduce markets and allow private ownership, capitalism will surely return and inequality will grow. I didn’t carry out the revolutionary movement to create such a capitalist China!

He would either be furious or shed tears of regret. No, he would not just regret it. He might threaten, as he made all the participants tremble at the Lushan Conference in 1959, “If you don’t follow me, I will go to Jinggangshan again and start the new

10

On the movement toward a household production contracting system in Anhui Province around 1960–61, and the accompanying correspondence between Provincial Secretary Zeng Xisheng and Mao Zedong, see Nakagane (1992, Chap. 7), and Wang (2012). 11 According to Li Zhisui, Mao refused to approve the report and wrote in the margin: “The report describes a very dark situation and does not show even a ray of light. This man, Chen Yun, comes from a family of small merchants. He is unable to dismiss his bourgeois nature. He always leans to the right” (Li 1994, Vol. 2, p. 119).

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revolutionary struggle.” This kind of threat was actually used by him during the CR period, too, as we will see later.

2 The Socialist Education Campaign The period from Mao Zedong’s political revival at the Eighth CPC Plenum in September 1962, when he again called for class struggle, up until 1965, can be called the preliminary period of the Cultural Revolution, with the conflict between Mao and Liu Shaoqi and others gradually intensifying behind the scenes. The feud between Mao and Liu came to the surface at an enlarged Work Conference in January 1965, culminating in Mao cursing Liu to his face. Let me look at the process until that incident.12 Mao Zedong, who reiterated the class struggle at the Eighth Plenum, spoke of the danger of a resurgence of the reactionary class, and the need for increased vigilance and education of the youth, cadres, and masses in the winter of 1962 and early 1963. Mao toured 11 provinces, and only the secretaries of Hunan and Hebei Provinces talked about socialist education. He became aware that socialist education was not emphasized in many provinces, not even by cadres and Party members. In February 1963, the Party’s Central Work Conference was held and it was decided to launch a large-scale “Five-Antis Movement”13 as well as a socialist education campaign in both urban and rural areas. In May, discussions were held regarding rural socialist education issues, and under the leadership of Mao Zedong, a draft of the “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s Decision on Several Issues in Rural Work in the Current Stage,” commonly referred to as the “First Ten Guidelines” (qian shitiao) was formulated. It stated that “a serious and acute situation of class struggle has emerged in Chinese society for the time being,” and called for “Four Clean-ups (siqing)”, that is, an inspection and reorganization of the accounting books, inventories, property, and the number of labor points, and, at the same time, calling for the participation of cadres in production labor. Mao Zedong gave instructions on how to convey this information and develop the socialist education campaign, urging the cadres as follows: “This revolutionary movement is the first and greatest struggle since the land reform.” This indicates how much importance Mao attached to this movement and how he recognized the crisis the Party was facing. Therefore, a test operation of the socialist education campaign was carried out in rural areas throughout the country, and extreme acts of violence such as beating and hanging people were observed in some provinces. In order to take measures against these acts, the leadership went to several provinces to inspect and diagnose 12

In order to understand the changes in Mao’s mindset, I will rely on the following realistic descriptions by Lin (2005) and others. 13 It refers to the movement to rectify and discipline against the corruption, speculation, waste, decentralization, and bureaucratism of cadres in the urban area.

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the problems. Based on the results of their inspections, Deng Xiaoping and Tan Zhenlin took the lead in formulating a directive titled “On Several Specific Policy Issues in the Rural Socialist Education Campaign,” which was decided upon by the central authorities. This document is referred to as the “Later Ten Guidelines” (hou shitiao). The two “Guidelines” are similar in that they both emphasize the socialist education campaign as a serious socialist revolution, as well as a class struggle, but the hou shitiao calls for unity with more than 95% of the cadres and the masses, and advocates that the absolute majority of cadres at the grass-roots are good ones and that their shortcomings and mistakes can be gradually corrected. To assess the progress of the movement, Mao Zedong made a southern inspection tour from late March to early May 1964, stressing that the movement must be carried out for at least 3–4 years and that the cadres, including brigade, People’s Commune, and county secretaries, must participate in field labor. He also noted at the time that the political conflict between China and the Soviet Union was becoming more and more intense, as China was criticizing the USSR Communist Party, along with its leader Khrushchev, for being “revisionists.” But what was most surprising was that Mao Zedong also claimed that there were over a dozen individuals who held revisionist views within the Chinese Party, e.g., among Central Committee members and candidates, that the theories of these individuals were similar to those of Khrushchev, and then posed the question, “If a Khrushchev emerged in China, what would you do?” The implications were profound. His perception at the time was that preventing revisionism was a major issue for China, and he even believed that “one-third of the power in our country is not in our hands, but in the hands of our enemies.” In August 1964, during a meeting of the Central Secretariats, a decision was made to establish “Work Teams for the Four Clean-ups and Five Antis Campaigns.” Liu Shaoqi was designated to lead these teams, and from then on, he took charge of implementing these campaigns on the front lines. Liu made a vigorous inspection tour of various regions, and on seeing that the local leadership cadres had a serious “rightist ideology” and were not putting much effort into leading the campaigns, he urged them to work with the peasants, live in the same place, and eat the same food (santong). Based on this experience, the “Later Ten Guidelines” were later revised, and these instructions are known as the “Revised Later Ten Guidelines.” Although it was Liu who took the initiative in drafting these Guidelines, they emphasized class struggle more than the earlier version, which indicates that Liu Shaoqi was not “right-leaning” in the way Mao had suggested at the time. In September, the “Decision on Some Specific Policies in the Rural Socialist Education Campaign (Revised Draft)” was to be formally enacted by the CPC Central with Mao’s consent. The main amendment was to give the leadership to the work teams dispatched by the upper-level organizations, instead of having the base organizations and grass-roots cadres lead the movement. As a result, some 1.5 million cadres, teachers, and students from universities and other institutions throughout China were released from their posts, and the entire country was on the verge of a nationwide upsurge in the rural socialist education campaign. Liu Shaoqi had intended to faithfully carry out Mao’s instructions regarding the Four Clean-ups policy, but differences of opinion and conflicts began to emerge

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between the two leaders. Liu was working on the front lines, while Mao had retreated to the second line. It was at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee held in December 1964 that their conflicts suddenly came to the surface. The two leaders clashed face-to-face over the issue of the “Four Clean-ups,” and about the issue of contradictions among the ‘people‘ and antagonistic contradictions. According to Liu, in the rural areas, the conflict between those who are willing to do the Four Clean-ups mentioned above and those who are not is mixed in with the contradiction brought about by class enemies such as some former landlords and rich peasants. Upon hearing this, Mao retorted as follows: “What kind of contradiction are you talking about? What nature of contradiction do you mean? What we find in rural areas is only anti-socialism, that is, there is only contradiction between capitalism and socialism. What other kind of contradiction are you talking about?”14

On the afternoon of the 27th, Mao said: “We have at least two factions within our Party, one socialist and the other capitalist …. There are two independent states in Beijing. I won’t tell you; you should investigate by yourself.”

On the afternoon of the 28th, Mao Zedong shouted at Liu Shaoqi: “How great do you think you are? I can overthrow someone like you with just a flick of my little finger!”

Why did Mao Zedong curse Liu Shaoqi to his face? Gu Baozi and Qian Cijie’s interpretation is that Mao may have noticed the subtle signs of Liu’s growing popularity during his leadership role in the Four Clean-ups campaign during the year, and his ability to mobilize a huge number of work team members nationwide (Gu and Qian 2013). That is to say, unable to take the initiative in the rural socialist education campaign or the Four Clean-ups Movement he had initiated, Mao felt that he was being marginalized by Liu. In fact, before this Central Work Conference began, Deng Xiaoping had suggested to Mao that, “This meeting is not important, so there is no need for you to attend.” Mao, outraged to hear this, retorted, “I insist on attending the meeting,” to which Liu responded: “You may attend, but please don’t speak up.” Angry Mao asked, “Why can’t you let me participate in the meeting, why can’t you let me speak?” Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping saw that Mao was really angry and went no further.15 It is said that Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, and others then hurriedly advised Liu Shaoqi to criticize himself ( jiantao). At a subsequent meeting, Mao brought up the State and the Party Constitutions and shouted:

14

At this time, Mao quoted Du Fu‘s following poem: Draw your bowstring taut and strong, Use arrows that are straight and long. Shoot the horse before the rider’s harm, Capture the king before his band takes alarm. 15 The true intention behind Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping’s remarks to Mao remains unclear. If interpreted generously, it could have been meant as, “Chairman, you are old and your health is not good, so please rest.” If interpreted negatively, it could have been an attempt to keep him at a distance because his involvement would complicate matters.

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“We are free to participate as citizens of the People’s Republic of China and to speak as members of the Communist Party of China!”

Such a dispute over the socialist education campaign between Mao and Liu reflects the basic conflict between the two over the movement and, moreover, the political process. It was not just that Mao felt threatened that he had lost or might lose the leadership of the movement, but also because he was uncomfortable with Liu’s style of mass movement—a style that placed emphasis on leadership by work teams rather than direct orders from above. This conflict would be replayed a year and a half later in the Cultural Revolution. In this meeting, the Party Center formulated an action policy entitled “Several Issues Raised in the Rural Socialist Education Campaign,” commonly known as the Twenty-three Guidelines (ershisantiao). Although it partially follows the Later Ten Guidelines, the main focus of this policy is apparently on the criticism of Liu Shaoqi. The second paragraph of these Guidelines, “Nature of the Movement,” reads as follows: “Contradictions” in this movement can be taken as 1) the contradiction between the Four Clean-ups and the Four-Unclean-ups, 2) a mixture of contradictions within and outside the Party, or a mixture of antagonistic contradictions and contradictions among the ‘people‘, or 3) contradictions between socialism and capitalism.”

The policy asserts that the first two contradictions (as stated by Liu Shaoqi) are contrary to Marxism-Leninism, while the last (as stated by Mao Zedong) is in line with Marxism-Leninism. It goes on to state that the emphasis of this movement is to eliminate the persons in power within the Party who follow the capitalist road and to further consolidate as well as develop the socialist positions in the urban and rural areas. Who are the “persons in power within the Party who follow the capitalist road?” Obviously, Mao was euphemistically referring to Liu Xiaoqi and his group (Xia 2015). It was precisely this socialist education campaign that was the prelude to the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shaoqi strongly opposed inserting this section into the Twenty-Three Guidelines, but was eventually overpowered by Mao. Later on, Mao characterized the rural socialist education campaign driven by Liu as “left in form but right in essence” (xingzuo shiyou), and dismissed it outright.

3 Launching and Expanding the Cultural Revolution: Its Mechanisms Records of persons who experienced the Cultural Revolution are by no means few. For example, Wang (2013), noted above, has documented his own experience of the CR movement in Tianjin City from its beginning to its end, and he tells the inside story of the movement in a frank and honest manner. Qian (2012) describes the realities of this movement in a small city in Guizhou Province. Zhang (1993) vividly illustrates her own and her mother’s experiences during this movement in Chengdu,

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Sichuan Province, and Yang (1985) tells the story of how during the Cultural Revolution, many city cadres entered the May Seventh Cadres School (wuqi ganxiao), an institution that was set up to reform their ideology through physical labor. Furthermore, Wang (2017) includes a lot of information obtained by interviewing persons involved and documents the victims and casualties of the movement. Walder (2019) collects narratives of those involved in the struggles based on a wide range of surveys of local annals. The Chinese experience of the Cultural Revolution is by no means uniform. The experiences differ between rural and urban areas, and even within rural and urban areas, and differ depending on the way the political movement developed. Perceptions of the movement may also differ depending on the attributes of those who experienced it, such as whether they were intellectuals, ordinary peasants and workers, or cadres, and so on. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the mechanism of the launch and expansion of this historically unpreceded incident from the records of these experiences. However, I believe that it is possible and meaningful to try to typify this historically unprecedented movement as much as possible and so I have formulated my own hypotheses.

3.1 The Cultural Revolution as a Sweeping Political Movement First, let me briefly summarize the major trends of the Cultural Revolution. Officially, China defines the CR period as the 10 years from 1966 to the arrest of Jiang Qing and the other Gang of Four members in 1976, but it can be broadly divided into the first stage up to 1970 and the second stage from then until 1976. The Cultural Revolution began in November 1965 with Yao Wenyuan’s article “On the Evaluation of the Historical Play ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,’”16 in which he criticizes Wu Han, an historian and then Deputy Mayor of Beijing City. Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing City, wanted to keep it as an academic criticism and controversy, and had the support of Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai in February 1966, but Mao Zedong disagreed. On May 16, 1966, Mao issued a notice for the Party Center to acknowledge that Peng’s decision was a mistake, thus the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” was officially launched. This “May 16” notice was directly aimed at disqualifying Peng Zhen and others, but it was also a declaration of the beginning of a wide-ranging political struggle aimed at exposing the “representatives of the bourgeoisie” lurking in various circles and calling for people to beware of “Khrushchev-like figures” 16

It is commonly believed that the Cultural Revolution began from there, but in the preceding year (June and July 1964), Mao Zedong had encouraged his nephews and nieces, saying “Schools should allow students to rebel. Take the lead in rebelling,” and “Class struggle is your main subject” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 2, p. 25; Qian 2012b, Vol. 2, p. 19). As result a rebellion began primarily among the students of high-ranking officials. In October 1965, the son of a cadre who was at a middle school affiliated with Tsinghua University posted a “small character poster” (xiaozibao) with the words “Long live the spirit of rebellion” (ibid.).

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around them. Liu Shaoqi had no idea who these “Khrushchev-like figures” were, so he actively promoted the movement, not realizing that it included himself, Peng Zhen and others. This movement spread to Peking University, and when Nie Yuanzi, a lecturer in the Philosophy Department, and others published a big-character poster (dazibao) criticizing the University’s President, Lu Ping, it led to a confrontation between the Party Committee of Beijing City, which defended Lu, and the leftist “CR Subgroup” within the Party (with Chen Boda as leader, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao as subleaders, and Kang Sheng as advisor). In early June, Mao Zedong praised the bigcharacter poster written by Nie and others, and broadcast it nationwide, after which the flow of support suddenly leaned in the direction of Mao and the CR Subgroup. When the Party Committee of Peking University was reorganized in response to the criticism, Beijing City dispatched a work team to help clean up the mess at the University and other schools, with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping contacting Mao to obtain his agreement to do so. As the CR movement brought about the tragic death of Liu Shaoqi, we tend to portray Liu as a mere victim, but it is less known that he was actively involved in dispatching work teams in the early days of the movement, and that he took the lead in this Revolution without knowing that he would eventually lose his position and be condemned as an “anti-Party, anti-socialist element.” He even “set a quota” for the number of students and teachers in schools and universities to be denounced as rightists.” (Dikӧtter 2016, p. 64)17 However, the confrontation between the work teams and the teachers as well as students did not subside. The resistance against the work teams’ attempts to suppress their actions through authoritarian measures grew stronger. Mao Zedong himself even remarked to Liu Shaoqi that sending the work teams had been a mistake. Upon hearing this, Liu might have gritted his teeth in frustration, thinking, “You also agreed to our policy.” Yet, Mao had already made up his mind to overthrow the “most influential faction in power (dangquanpai)” within the Party, represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Eventually, on August 1, the Eighth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee issued the “Decision on the Proletarian Cultural Revolution” and the CR movement thus began in earnest. Immediately after that, Mao publicly released a big-character poster proclaiming, “bombard the headquarters (paoda silingbu),” openly criticizing central leaders like Liu Shaoqi and others. On August 18, Mao Zedong met with tens of thousands of Red Guards for the first time and encouraged them to carry out the Revolution, after which the Red Guards organization quickly spread throughout the country. At the same time, the radicalized Red Guards broke into the homes of the “five black categories” (Black Five),18 confiscating their properties, physically torturing them, and destroying their “old and feudal” cultural properties and committing all manner of violent acts. The first Red Guards were mainly made up of children from families of the “five red 17

Liu Xiaoqi branded the principal and Party secretary of the First Middle School affiliated with Beijing Normal University as an “anti-Party, anti-socialist element,” and “personally led the work team. He even had the work group and his own daughter fight against this principal.” (Wang 2017) 18 The “five black categories” refer to the group consisting of landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, delinquents, and rightists, corresponding with the “non-people” described in Chap. 3.

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categories (Red Five),” and later Red Guards from ordinary families were created to oppose the Black Five, but within two years these Red Guards were driven out of the political arena and relegated to the countryside. They were in effect used only as Mao’s tools for this movement. In 1967, a temporary power structure combining the revolutionary masses, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and revolutionary cadres was proposed. The CR faction in Shanghai declared the establishment of the “Shanghai Commune.” This situation led to clashes between the CR Subgroup, represented by Jiang Qing, and the existing leaders of the Party, government, and military personnel, who were unable to keep up with such a radical movement. A well-known example is the so-called “February Countercurrent (eryue niliu)” incident, which occurred in February 1966, involving the vehement criticism of the CR Subgroup by senior generals such as Chen Yi and Tan Zhenlin.19 They heavily criticized the Subgroup at the Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai. Mao Zedong, while expressing support for the CR Subgroup, shouted that he and Lin Biao would leave Beijing and ascend to Jinggangshan, the starting -point of the Chinese Revolution, to wage guerrilla warfare if those generals would not obey him. The senior generals present at the scene trembled in fear, unable to speak and just exchanged glances with one another (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 254). In May 1967, the whole of China was caught up in a great turmoil, exemplified by the incident20 in which a mass organization in Wuhan imprisoned members of the CR faction from Beijing. It was especially in 1968 that violent clashes and massacres occurred in various parts of the country. In April 1969, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party was held, at which Mao Zedong declared the victory of the Cultural Revolution, and at the same time Lin Biao was nominated as Mao’s successor, which was bizarrely enshrined in the Party Constitution. However, their power did not stabilize. In August 1970, when Chen Boda and others spoke out about installing a new President of the State, a post left vacant by the ousting of Liu Shaoqi, Mao Zedong criticized them harshly. The relationship between Lin Biao and Mao deteriorated gradually. In September of the following year, a coup d’état by the so-called Lin Biao faction was announced, and

They are, so to speak, the “lower caste.” The opposite upper caste comprises the “five red categories,” consisting of revolutionary cadres, revolutionary martyrs, revolutionary soldiers, workers, and peasants. Yu Luoke also uses the term “castes” to refer to these two groups. 19 Chen Yi was a general who fought along with Mao Zedong against the Kuomintang forces at Jinggangshan. After the founding of the country, he served as Mayor of Shanghai, Vice-premier of the State Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Tan Zhenlin was a political commissar of the Red Army during the revolutionary struggle, and after the founding of the New China he became Secretary of the Party Committee of Zhejiang Province and then a member of the Party’s Political Bureau. 20 From June to July 1967 in Wuhan, a violent confrontation broke out between the rebel factions and the mass organization “Million Heroic Lions” (baiwan xiongshi), and Wang Li, a member of the Central CR Subgroup, was captured and detained, despite his efforts to mediate between these two confronting factions.

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his son Lin Liguo took an Air Force plane with Lin Biao as well as his group and tried to flee the country, but it crashed on the Mongolian plain, killing them all.21 There is much documentation and literature providing detailed accounts of the movement, including those of Yan and Gao (1996) and Walder (2019), and which detail how this nationwide socio-political upheaval and struggle developed till it eventually came to an end with the help of the military forces. Hereafter, I will focus on the mechanism of its development and will try to formulate my own hypothesis as to why and how this movement resulted in such a tremendous number of casualties.

3.2 The Mechanism of the CR Expansion: A Hypothetical Model Yin Hongbiao asks why the masses showed unprecedented “political fervor” during the Cultural Revolution. He argues that the conflict arose from the “social difference between the leadership with real power and the masses without power.” He points out further that the masses’ dissatisfaction and resentment toward the cadres “were not properly handled on a daily basis, so that the accumulated resentment took violent forms.” (Yin 2003) Similarly, Dikӧtter explains that once they were allowed to criticize the leadership, the masses moved and released their “their pent-up rage” like a dam wall bursting. “Temporary factory workers demanded permanent jobs, youths who had been sent to the countryside wanted to return to the cities, laid-off government employees called for reinstatement. All of them blamed the ‘bourgeois reactionary line’.” (Dikӧtter 2016, pp. 118–119) Put it differently, many people took advantage of the opportunity of the uncontrollable CR movement to settle their personal grudges, and this also contributed to its escalation. Mao Zedong depicted the essence of the CR movement as a class conflict between “capitalism or revisionism and socialism,” thus between “the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,” and tried to encourage the movement in that direction. It was structured, however, in a much more complex way, in my view. According to Yin Hongbiao, in the cities that became the central arena of this movement, there were social contradictions “among the three social groups: Leading cadres, intellectuals, and workers” and, taking into account the whole society, there was a “confrontational relationship among the Supreme Leader (Mao Zedong), leading cadres, and the masses” (Yin 2003). It should be said that Mao’s mass line was incited independently of his intentions, and as a result, the structural contradictions mentioned above were exposed. The question is, by what mechanism did these social contradictions and conflicts intensify and develop? Sociologist Yang Lijun regards the CR movement as a struggle over the distribution of civil rights (Yang 2003). Citizenship here refers to “all rights centering 21

This is based on the official explanation, but it is not necessarily clear whether a coup plan was actually planned by the Lin Biao faction.

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on people’s political and economic interests, including the right to survive,” and is not a legal concept like in the Western countries, but rather a political concept. In socialist China, there are no democratic rights such as freedom of voice, publication, and assembly, nor the rule of law to guarantee these rights. Since the concept of “citizens” differs greatly between democratic and socialist countries, the terms, “right to life” or “right to livelihood” may be more appropriate than “civil rights.” As pointed out in Chap. 3, in Maoist China there were “non-people” in addition to ‘people‘, so the term “citizens” could not be applied without leading to misunderstanding, for not all citizens were regarded as the ‘people.’22 What made the collective violence of the Cultural Revolution so expansive and why did it protract for so long? According to Yang Lijun, the competition for civil rights was transformed into a political struggle among factions or groups, and once the political struggle began, violence became a part of the competition. However, this interpretation does not clearly explain the mechanism of why conflicts accompanied by violence emerged and escalated. Furthermore, while the initial trigger might have been the pursuit of civil rights, it seems that the conflict fueled more intricate and murky mechanisms, where one confrontation led to another, one animosity bred further animosity, and a more convoluted cycle of escalation unfolded. A look at the struggle for power in Shanghai City and its development reveals the following process: After Mao Zedong met with tens of thousands of Red Guards at Tiananmen Square in August 1966, many students began traveling to various parts of the country as part of “exchange of experience” (chuanlian) programs, taking full advantage of the government’s special provision of free transportation, lodging, and meals. When the Beijing students who had arrived in Shanghai responded directly to Mao’s call to action in the slogan “bombard the headquarters,” they launched an attack on Shanghai’s Mayor, Cao Diqiu. This event further ignited the preexisting conflict between the factions of the Red Guards (radical activists) and the conservatives. The discontented workers, who had harbored grievances, also joined in, initiating attacks on the “Headquarters” of Shanghai City. When workers began to rebel, temporary and contract workers, who were at the bottom of the social ladder, were the first to put forward their economic demands. Then, regular workers also began to put forward economic demands such as wage increases, and some of them even went on strikes. After all, workers’ wages had hardly increased since the founding of the country. In this way, the Cultural Revolution saw a chain of reactions where issuing orders for “system disruption” to overthrow the power-holders stimulated students, who, in turn, ignited temporary and contract workers, then regular workers to make demands regarding their economic and civil rights, such as wages and employment, which, in turn, fueled inter-group (factional) conflicts and the disorder of the whole system deepened. The disorder of this Revolution also gained momentum from other sources. Yu Luoke wrote a pamphlet entitled “Origin-based discrimination” in October 1966. 22

The civil rights that Yang Lijun refers to indicate the totality of rights that civilians should and do have. Although her concept of “civil right” does not seem to be elaborated, I will follow Yang’s usage here to use the term civil rights.

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This was a thorough critique of a couplet written by Red Guards Tan Lifu and Liu Jing of the Beijing Institute of Technology, which went as follows: “If the parents are heroes, their children are good persons; if the parents are reactionaries, their children are big idiots.”

As Yu’s parents had been criticized as rightists, his class of origin was of the “five black categories,” and as a result he was unable to go to college and had no choice but to become a temporary worker. It was in revolt against this that he wrote the poster criticizing Tan Lifu’s “origin theory” and this caused a great sensation. According to Kagami Mitsuyuki, this is what “shook the foundations of the Chinese ruling system” (Kanami 2001, p. 52). I think that it is an exaggeration to say that this poster “shook the foundations of the ruling system,” but for this appeal he was heavily criticized by Qi Benyu,23 one of the main members of the Central CR Subgroup and finally publicly executed in 1968. What is the “theory of origin” criticized by Yu? There is a famous Chinese proverb, “Longshenglong, fengshengfeng,” which means a dragon gives birth to a dragon and a phoenix gives birth to a phoenix. It is generally used in the sense of “like father, like son,” meaning that if the parents are good, the child is also good, or conversely, if the parents are ordinary, the child is also ordinary. This proverb has a subordinate phrase, “The child of a mouse is a good digger (laoshude erzi huidadong)” which means that ordinary people are the subjects of despicable behavior. If we assume that dragons and phoenixes are the upper class and mice are the lower class, the hierarchical relationship between classes was completely reversed during the Mao era. That is to say, formee dragons and phoenixes, such as capitalists and landowners, were now ranked as the lowest class, while mice, such as poor peasants and laborers, ascended to the upper class. Moreover, class was inherited by bloodline. If the parents were from the upper class, their children would also be upper class, and if the parents were labelled as reactionary, their children would also be labelled as reactionary. So, the children of former dragons and phoenixes resented their parents, while the children of mice treated such families as long-time enemies. When such class views are taken over by the Red Guards of the “five red categories,” they are expressed in arrogant statements such as the following: “Who created history? It is by our Red Five fathers and older brothers! Who runs the society? It is by our fathers and brothers of the Red Five!” (Kagami 1980, p. 112)

They then proudly declare that they are “Chairman Mao’s Red Guards” and join in the battle to hurt the “Black Five.” According to Yu Luoke, “Isn’t it a violation of Mao’s ideology that class determines all people’s actions and people are all evaluated according to their class?” Inevitably his ideas would clash with Mao’s theory of class and class struggle. He was too naïve, in my view. In the view of Mao’s class theory, for example, former landlords who lost their land would still be part of the landlord class, and former landlords would pass on their class consciousness to the next generation. 23

Qi Benyu served as Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department and Deputy editorin-chief of the Party magazine the Red Flag.

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Therefore, the class struggle against the landlords will continue forever unless it is proven that the consciousness of the entire nation has been “revolutionized”. In this sense, his statement did have the capacity to “shake the foundations of the Chinese ruling system,” as Kagami put it. The theory of origin or pedigree raised by Yu Luoke is directly related to employment and academic achievement, which is precisely what Yang Lijun means by the distribution of civil rights. Individuals classified as “five black categories” with undesirable class backgrounds (chengfen) were often denied civil rights or faced significant obstacles in accessing those rights enjoyed by the “five red categories.” What was not noted by Yu is that the household registration system (hukou), which creates a “status barrier” between peasants and urban residents, is also connected to this theory of origin or blood line.24 If the parents were classified as peasants, their children were, in principle, peasants for life and could not enjoy the civil rights that urban residents could. The peasant class, even if they were poor or lower-middle peasants of the Red Five, have been discriminated against in many ways simply because they are peasants. This absurd system was established by the household registration ordinance of January 1958, and has basically continued even after the reform and opening-up era without anyone questioning it, apart from a very small number of intellectuals. When the Cultural Revolution occurred and the entire social system was temporarily loosened, it would have been expected that “peasants” like Yu Luoke would emerge to call for the abolition of such a registration system, but in fact, no such a person appeared in the countryside, much less in the cities. However, the CR movement was not merely a struggle over origin. As I have stressed above, it was a movement with a complex structure. It is undeniable that ethnic issues and various other problems were also deeply interwoven in this “Revolution.” In my view, there were various axes of conflict intertwined around the axis of “class struggle.” So, let me enumerate what kinds of conflicts and contradictions were involved and erupted in the Cultural Revolution. (1) Conflicts over power: Ideologically rebel faction or conservative faction (2) Conflicts over hierarchy: Whether they are the children of high-ranking cadres or the children of ordinary people (cadres or the masses) (3) Conflicts over class background: Red Five or Black Five (4) Conflicts over income and assets: Rich or poor (5) Conflicts over education: Being a highly educated/intellectual or a less educated/ non-intellectual (6) Conflicts over occupational status: Regular or non-regular/temporary workers (7) Conflicts over ethnicity: Han Chinese or ethnic minorities

24

In China, household registers (huji) are divided into agricultural registers for farmers and nonagricultural registers for non-farmers, or city dwellers and during the Mao era it was almost impossible for farmers to change their household registration. In this sense, Chinese society was a dual society, and although it is now relatively easy to change household registration, the dual structure of society has not fundamentally changed.

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(8) Conflicts over foreign relations: Whether there is some kind of relationships with foreign countries or not. These conflict axes existed even before this movement, however, even though they often appeared on the surface, they had not all manifested at once. For example, during the land reform, class conflicts such as landlords and rich peasants versus poor and hired peasants intensified, but conflicts over power and education were not significant. During the Anti-Rightist Struggle, conflicts over ideology and education became apparent, but conflicts over power did not occur, at least not at the top level. During the CR period, however, all of the abovementioned conflicts erupted and emerged at once, in some cases blurring categories, such as in the conflict between the working class and the Red Guards. The disparity over origin and blood line that Yu Luoke protested about might have been simply dismissed with the following words, “There have always been differences in status in society.” If only other conflicts, especially those over power and class, had not also been involved, far fewer would have been executed. With the above hypothesis in mind, let me try to draw my own model of the genesis and expansion mechanism of the CR movement. By comparing various incidents in different parts of the country, as will be seen below, it appears that this movement was predominantly driven by two different mechanisms. One is the mechanism of confrontation and strife, in which two or more groups, typically the rebels and the defenders, which are rival factions formed within the Red Guards or workers’ groups, fight and sometimes kill each other for legitimacy, while raising the same slogan “Long live Chairman Mao.” The other is what might be called a mechanism of repression and command. For example, in a conflict between two groups, one may overwhelm and repress the other, but there are also cases in which one group unilaterally represses the other from the beginning. In this case, the repressor is the socially powerful and the repressed is the socially weak. These two mechanisms may be interrelated or completely independent. As we can easily imagine, in terms of the number of victims and casualties, the second mechanism was by far the more common. In both cases, the starting point is a directive, with the permission or tacit approval from above to destroy the established order. Typically, Mao Zedong’s supreme directive, “bombard the headquarters,” referred to above, was such a starting point. When this directive is issued, the existing order and the rules, systems, and values that had supported it collapse, and with regard to conflict and strife, the conflict develops into strife because multiple factions and social groups, including the Red Guards, potentially have different interests. Various non-political factors such as (4)–(8) listed above are also involved and/or intermixed, and the confrontation actually escalates into a violence under the guise of a “class struggle.” The Central Government may step in mid-stream to coordinate the conflicting groups, but conflict begets conflict and violence incites violence, making it difficult to end either. In many cases the situation must eventually be resolved by the military forces, the official violent apparatus. No matter how much Mao Zedong and the CR Sub-groups appealed for “struggle through intellectual means (wendou) rather than armed conflict (wudou),” those swept

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up in the fervor of the struggle did not cease the use of violence. In response, Mao played his trump card by deploying the military, placing schools and factories under military control. In the case of repression and command, the mechanism is simple: The strong unilaterally hurt the weak. In a typical case, the Red Five oppressed the Black Five, and the Black Five became victims of the Red Five’s persecution without any way to rebel. Let me look at a case of the August 1966 massacre in Daxing and Changping Counties, agricultural districts near Beijing. When a false rumor broke out that poor and lower middle peasants had been killed, the “Black Four” (Black Five minus a category of rightists) and their children in the counties were killed one by one (Yang 2019, p. 32). In the beginning of this incident, certain kinds of directives to kill the village Black Fours must have been informally or tacitly sent from a particular level of local Red Fives. Another example is when the military or other state organs repress certain vulnerable groups for reasons deemed appropriate, such as “counterrevolution,” as was seen in the case of Guangxi Autonomous Region. In these cases, when a catastrophe occurs in one region, it may spread to other regions. In other words, interregional competition seems to have magnified the tragedy. According to Su Yang, local leaders were divided into three categories based on the intensity of their “class struggle”: Advanced, moderate, and backward, and if they were advanced, they were commended and encouraged; if they were backward, they were criticized and even purged (Su 2017, p. 143). In each case, because the movement started with a break with the established order, the moral code tends to be broken, ethical restraints on behavior are lost, sadistic abuse is more likely to occur, and fear also prevents the system from working to deter it. Because the CR movement unfolded in a situation where order had been broken, even personal grudges between individuals could trigger “rebellion” behavior. Wang Hui who was involved in this movement in Tianjin City describes this Revolution as “madness,” and it can be said that madness created and spread more madness (Wang 2013a, p. 508; Wang 2013b, p. 379). Song Yongyi compared various cases of massacres that occurred during the Cultural Revolution, pointing out as follows: “The greatest number of deaths during the Cultural Revolution … occurred after the widespread establishment of revolutionary committees at various levels in 1968, and were the result of violence and massacres committed openly in the name of the new state apparatus. …. The nationwide infamous massacre event involved a vast majority of perpetrators who indiscriminately wielded violence and committed brutally bloody killings. Among them were military officers and soldiers, armed civilian militias, as well as key figures within various levels of the Communist Party and Communist Youth League.” (Song 2006, p. 21 and beyond)

A professor who had participated in a rebel organization at the Inner Mongolia Normal Institute told an interviewer Yang Haiying that: “The rebel factions were not main complicit in the massacres either. People from the PLA Maoist Thought Propaganda Brigade and the Workers’ Maoist Thought Propaganda Brigade,

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namely, PLA soldiers and workers, were enthusiastic about the brutal violence.” (Yang 2009, Vol. 1, pp. 261–262)

These two cases imply that in both Guangxi in the south and Inner Mongolia in the north, armed forces such as the PLA (the strong) intentionally and under certain directives, physically crushed vulnerable, downtrodden individuals such as the “Black Five” (the weak) who had been marginalized even before this movement. It is astonishing that these power-backed massacres were not necessarily carried out arbitrarily without the knowledge of the upper leadership, but sometimes had the tacit approval of the top leaders. In fact, when the Red Guards in Beijing committed the illegal large-scale acts of violence discussed below in 1966, Mao Zedong is said to have made the following comments: “The Party’s policy doesn’t advocate hitting people. However, even when it comes to hitting people, a class-based analysis must be conducted. For good individuals to hit bad ones is a natural occurrence, for bad individuals to hit good ones is an honor for the good, and for good individuals to hit other good individuals is a misunderstanding.” (Song 2006, p. 35)

Thus, the theory of affirmation of violence emerged: It is acceptable for the good class, such as the Red Five, to beat up the bad class, such as the Black Five. Against this background, Xie Fuzhi, Director General of the Public Security Department, gave the following instructions in the early stages of the CR movement: “I don’t agree with the people beating someone to death. But if the people have a deep-seated grudge against the wrongdoers, we will not force them to stop because we cannot control them …. The police must stand by the Red Guards, work with them, establish friendships, provide them with information, and give them information about the five categories of bad elements.” (Yan and Gao 1996, p. 69)

Surprisingly, Xie called on the police to help the Red Guards conduct raids (chaojia)25 and commit violence against the “class enemies.” It is as if the police were turning a blind eye to theft by thieves and even encouraging murder by robbers. Could Mao Zedong’s advocacy of violent revolution not be behind this endorsement of violence by the public authorities?

4 The Tragedy of the Cultural Revolution: Its Scale and Brutality As detailed in Chap. 5, the Great Leap Forward was marked by many horrific tragedies related to hunger and food distribution. In December 1978 at an enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau, Ye Jianying26 revealed the following numbers of people 25

During the CR period, many homes of intellectuals were ransacked by the Red Guards, and valuable books and cultural assets were confiscated. 26 Ye Jianying was one of the generals of the People’s Liberation Army. At the time of Mao’s death, he played a major role in the expulsion of the Gang of Four as a member of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Political Bureau and Vice President.

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persecuted and killed by the Cultural Revolution: (1) more than 123,700 people died in armed conflicts, (2) more than 115,500 cadres died abnormally in the struggle, (3) more than 683,000 people died abnormally in the cities on a charge of the historical counterrevolution, (4) 1.2 million landlords, rich peasants and their families died abnormally in the countryside, and (5) 113 million people suffered political blows, and more than 557,000 disappeared (Yang 2019, pp. 225–226). A simple total would put the number of abnormal deaths at more than 2.12 million, but I do not know if these numbers are accurate. Also: “According to government agencies, incomplete statistics indicate that 4.2 million people were detained and screened during the CR period, 1.72 million people lost their lives due to abnormal deaths, and 130,000 political prisoners were executed on the spot for counterrevolutionary crimes.” (Yang 2019, p. 226)

“Some 230,000 people died in the armed struggle and more than 7 million were left disabled” (Xu 2017). This is also an “incomplete statistic,” so the actual figure may be many times higher. At any rate, there is no doubt that this Revolution recorded a huge number of casualties that may be second only to the wrongful deaths after the GLF movement and even comparable to land reform.27 In terms of the number of deaths, the Cultural Revolution is not comparable to the Great Leap Forward, but the abnormal deaths during the CR period stand out in terms of their brutality. In August 1966, the first victim of this Revolution in China’s educational field was Bian Zhongyun, a vice principal of a girls’ middle school affiliated with Beijing Normal University. Bian was subjected to a chillingly harrowing experience of both psychological and physical humiliation in front of the entire body of students. Wang Youqin, who herself witnessed the incident, vividly depicts how Bian was brutally killed by Song Binbin, the daughter of a high-ranking official, Song Renqiong, and other members of the Red Guards, (Wang 2017) (Photo 8.1).28 The so-called charges against Bian Zhongyun were so trivial as to elicit laughter if the outcome were not so tragic. For example, when asked by students whether during an earthquake they should take Mao’s portrait displayed in the classroom outside, she did not directly answer, but instead advised them to “quickly go to an open area outside the classroom.” This was twisted into an accusation of “opposing Chairman Mao.” What Wang Youqin laments and resents more than this is that the students insulted and hurt the teacher so much. It was unprecedented to have such barbaric 27

Even during the land reform, a staggering number of victims, said to be 2 million, were recorded (see Chap. 3), and it is believed that the government’s official death toll of 1.72 million during the Cultural Revolution greatly underestimates the reality. Regardless of the number of deaths, the Cultural Revolution and land reform were similar in terms of brutality. The difference is that the land reform targeted mainly landlords and rich peasants in rural areas, whereas the CR movement targeted various classes, strata, and groups, including urban and rural, intellectuals and peasants, cadres and masses. 28 It is well known that Song Binbin met Mao Zedong in August 1966, representing the Red Guards and attached a “Red Guard” armband to Mao. In the post-Mao era, She studied in the United States to obtain a doctorate, then returned to China, and acknowledged and apologized for her mistakes during the Cultural Revolution.

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Photo 8.1 Mao Zedong and the Red Guards. In August 1966, Song Binbin placed a Red Guards armband on Mao Zedong. She was involved in the brutal killing of the vice principal of the middle school to which she belonged. Source https://hb. ifeng.com/pic/detail_2014_ 12/26/3341828_3.shtml

behavior at a school in China with its strong Confucian tradition. Wang recognizes that it was, ironically, “revolutionary” that such large-scale atrocities were carried out at a school. The CR movement thoroughly tortured the intelligentsia. A writer Cao Yu, who had always been a staunch supporter of the Party, was so distressed during this Revolution that he decided to simply commit suicide, asking his wife, writer Fang Rui for assistance in the following way: “Help me die! Kill me with electricity!” Fang Rui, on the contrary, retorted, “Why don’t you help me die first!” (ibid., p. 235) Many intellectuals and cultural figures, including famous novelist Lao She, committed suicide during this Revolution because they could not bear the persecution. For them, suicide was the only weapon to protect their dignity. Until now, it has been believed that the Cultural Revolution mainly claimed victims in the cities. In some cases, it was primarily in urban institutions and streets, such as universities and factories, where the so-called armed struggles were most intense. However, this Revolution spread from Beijing to other large cities, from large cities to small and medium-sized cities, then to rural areas. In the case of Shaanxi Province, the Red Guards who came from the big cities to the provincial cities under the guise of “exchange of experience” sowed the seeds of rebellion like a virus in the countryside (see Tanigawa 2011). As Ye Jianying’s report referred to above suggests, the rural areas suffered far more casualties, and moreover, the brutality of the CR movement in some regions far surpassed that of the cities.

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In the case of Guangxi Autonomous Region, the number of victims was so huge that after the end of the Revolution, a survey team was dispatched from the Central Government to collect confidential records stocked in the local archives. Song Yongyi and his team collected those records as well as related materials, then published a 36-volume series entitled “The Guangxi Cultural Revolution Confidential Archives” (Guangxi Wenge Jimi Dang’an Ziliao). In the entire Autonomous Region, nearly 230,000 cases of wrongful convictions, fabrications, and misjudgments occurred. Among those who were killed or persecuted to death, there are more than 89,700 individuals whose names and addresses are known. In practice, the number of abnormal deaths reached 120,000 to 150,000 people according to official figures, and according to civilian investigations, it exceeds 200,000 people. Moreover, most victims were rural people. The case of the massacre in Guangxi had the following characteristics. First, conflicts between the majority and minority factions took place. The majority group that supported Wei Guoqing, Party Secretary as well as President of the government in this Region, consisted of core members of the armed forces of the military districts and prefectures, key militias, the Party, and the Communist Youth League. The minority group that advocated to overthrow Wei consisted of young students, civilians, workers, intellectuals, and a small number of cadres. Conflicts between these two factions often led to armed struggle, but many of the murders were the result of deliberate “mopping up” of the minority by the majority under the leadership’s direction.29 In terms of the abovementioned classification, this was a repression/ command type of movement developed from a confrontation/strife type of struggle. Second, massacres were carried out throughout the Region in order to extinguish the “Black Four.” For example, in Quanzhou, Guanyang, and Pingle Counties of Guilin District, and Rong, Pingnan, and Bobai Counties of Yulin District, kangaroo courts named the “Supreme Court of the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants” and the “Committee for Repressing the Counterrevolution of the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants” emerged, killing a total of 440 people between September and December 1967, including the children of those “four categories” of people. This is another case of the repression/command-type mechanism at work. Third, the army and armed forces led the elimination of “class enemies” and committed atrocities. A writer Zheng Yi left detailed and vivid research records on such incidents. In late July 1968, Wang Jianxun, chief of the Revolutionary Committee of Binyang County in Guangxi and deputy division commander of the People’s Liberation Army, ordered an onslaught against “class enemies” under the guise of carrying out the “July 3rd Declaration.”30 As a result, the number of those killed or who committed suicide, including those killed before the proclamation, reached 3,951 in all prefectures (Zheng 2006).

29

See Xu (2006) for more detailed information on this incident. In response to incidents of armed struggle, destruction, and looting in Guangxi and other areas, the CPC Central Committee and others jointly issued a proclamation on July 3, 1968, calling for the immediate cessation of armed struggle and the return of looted goods.

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According to the government’s official internal document quoted by Zheng Yi, the “Brief Chronicle of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Binyang County,” within a mere 11 days after the proclamation, a total of 3,781 individuals in the entire County had been either killed or persecuted to death. Among them, the number of farmers and residents reached as high as 3,441 people. Some were shot to death, some were strangled, some were clubbed to death, some were beaten to death with stones, some were drowned, some were buried alive, and even children were ripped to pieces, reportedly in a ruthless and brutal manner. In the cases of Daxing and Changping Counties, the oldest killed was 80 years old, and the youngest was a 38-day-old infant. I cannot even imagine how brutal human beings can be. Were “class enemies,” such as the Black Five or Black Four, really so horrible? Did their persecutors perceive them to be terrifying demons like the people obsessed with witch hunts in Western Europe during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern era?31 It is true that in some areas, false rumors spread that the Black Five class would launch a counterrevolution, then the Red Five, including poor and lower middle peasants, took the lead to try to exterminate the “enemy classes.” Anyway, such cases of unorganized massacres make up only a small portion of the tragedies that occurred during the CR turmoil.

5 Evaluating the Cultural Revolution: What Was the Cultural Revolution? Why did the Cultural Revolution happen and what was this Revolution all about? The answer lies in who Mao Zedong was and what he did because this Revolution was planned and initiated by Mao and basically unfolded under his supervision, even if it never proceeded as he had initially envisaged. There have been two major conflicting views on the causes and aims of the CR movement, one of which is that it was a political struggle over power between Mao Zedong and the “non-Maoist” faction, or the so-called “faction in power” (dangquanpai) within the Communist Party, represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Gao Wenqian argues that Mao launched the Revolution not so much to “preserve the purity of socialism, but was rather driven by inner fear, fearing that he himself would be posthumously castigated much like Stalin.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 114). That is to say, shocked by the fact that Stalin’s immense power and God-like authority had been undermined by Khrushchev after his death, Mao launched this Revolution to protect his own honor in the future. This is another aspect of the power struggle argument. Another view is to regard the CR movement as a clash of civilizations concerning the ideals or orientations of socialism. Kagami Mitsuyuki, for instance, perceives 31

Many witch hunts are said to have occurred against the backdrop of religious conflicts, such as the persecution of heretics and conflicts with them. If religious conflicts are replaced by ideological conflicts, witch hunts and the class struggles of the Cultural Revolution seem very similar.

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that it as a struggle between whether China would choose the path of “modernity” like Liu Shaoqi and his colleagues, or the path of “critique of modernity” like Mao Zedong and his associates (Kagami 2001, p. 9). Regardless of whether this Revolution was a struggle over modernity, the view that it was triggered to prevent “the revival of capitalism and the emergence of revisionism” or that it was a struggle over “the choice between the capitalist or socialist path” was officially advocated during the CR movement. According to Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s attempt to immunize the people against the “Soviet disease,” or corrupt socialism, and his last effort to reveal and perpetuate “the essence of Chineseness” in modern society (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, p. 460). Yang Jisheng is a bit more specific, seeing it as a struggle over Mao’s utopia, his fantasy of uniting the whole nation into a large publicly owned organization, symbolized by an ideal People’s Commune, without discrimination between urban and rural areas or disparities between manual and brain labor (Yang 2019, pp. 205– 206). Indeed, this revolutionary movement, like the GLF movement, had embodied Mao’s ideals, or rather fantasies. There was his ideology and fantasy of pursuing Kang Yongwei’s “Great Harmony (datong)” with perfect equality, without money, but under a centralized power structure. Undoubtedly, these two views are not antinomies. We can interpret the movement as Mao Zedong’s attempt to throw out the opposing “faction in power” in order to realize his own ideals. However, the view of ideological conflict posits that the primary cause of this extraordinary political movement in history was the clash of ideologies around socialism and political systems. The confrontation between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi did not begin in 1966. Already in 1956 they clashed over “rash advance” versus “anti-rash-advance,” as we have seen in Chap. 5. They also had conflicting ideas on how to proceed with socialist construction. After the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, the distance between the two gradually widened, with Mao leaning toward the theory of continuous revolution and the theory of class struggle in socialism, which was different from Liu’s understanding of socialism. As Deng Xiaoping clearly stated, a socialist society should be one which is materially more advanced than capitalist society, naturally without class struggle, as classical and orthodox Marxists have insisted. As is well known, Mao Zedong was determined to pull Liu Shaoqi down as early as January 1965.32 Certainly, there were differences in philosophy between the two factions. But perhaps what Mao feared more than anything else was losing power. His private doctor, Li Zhisui, testified that Mao had suffered from severe paranoia since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.33 Until his dying breath, he kept saying, 32

When Edgar Snow asked Mao Zedong in December 1970 as to when he decided to overthrow Liu Shaoqi, Mao replied that it was at the National Work Conference held in Beijing in January 1965, the meeting that decided the “Twenty-Three Articles” (Yan and Gao 1996, Vol. 1, p. 9). 33 According to Li Zhisui, Mao was constantly changing his place of residence due to anxiety. For example, in July 1966, when he returned to Beijing from the other parts of China, he moved to the villa “No. 1” in the suburbs, but after a few days, “the Chairmen complained that the place was polluted—he thought it was contaminated with poison.” (Li 1994, Vol. 2, p. 236)

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“Remember the class struggle,” in other words, he feared that counterrevolutionary and anti-Party elements, as well as the “resurgent bourgeoisie” would usurp the Party power that he had built through many hardships. In this sense, the above view that the CR movement was essentially initiated as a struggle over power seems to be basically more accurate than viewing it as a struggle over modernity or socialist ideals.34 Yin Hongbiao sees the Cultural Revolution as follows: “Liu Shaoqi clearly had no intention of wresting supreme power from Mao. However, his euphemistic criticism of Mao’s strong push for the GLF and his steadily growing prestige within the Party were enough to make Mao uneasy and, in turn, to make him decide to pull him down from his position as successor …. This was without doubt a power struggle.” (Yin 2003)

Yang Jisheng, however, is somewhat skeptical of the power struggle view, citing as one reason that Mao Zedong had not lost great power to others before this Revolution (Yang 2019, p. 205). However, before the start of the CR movement, Mao was substantially in a minority within the Party. That is why, in order to “regain prerogatives,” he carefully devised a strategy to drag down Liu Shaoqi and his colleagues. In this sense, although somewhat in an eclectic way, we might say that the Cultural Revolution was directly a struggle for power, indirectly a struggle over ideology, alternatively a struggle over power from the short- and medium-term perspective, but a struggle over ideology from the long-term perspective. However, I do not believe that the ideals of this Revolution were anything so noble as a “criticism of modernity.” How much value can there really be in such an ideology, an imaginary ideology that belies the fact that a huge number of people were killed, an ideology created by a leader who does not value human life? How can any society “beyond modernity” be envisioned under a centralized power structure that denies diverse opinions and ideas? Would such a “criticism of modernity” in reality not amount to a “denial of modernity,” that is, the abandonment of all the precious ideals created by modernity, such as human rights, freedom of voice, and democracy, and resulting in the awful atrocities we have seen above? And considering the enormous human, economic, and spiritual sacrifices China paid for this Revolution, it was such an empty revolution in that China has become a society completely opposite to what Mao idealized. There is an episode that characterizes Mao Zedong’s sense of power during the CR period. That is, as soon as the Cultural Revolution began, he replaced the previous Party rule that “the whole Party shall obey the Central” with a new rule that “the whole Party shall obey Mao Zedong” (Hu 2008, p. 124). In this way, “Party leadership” was replaced by “Mao’s leadership,” and an “institutional” foundation was established in which he could overthrow Liu Shaoqi along with his allies. Although his position within the Party had always been absolute, he probably wanted to confirm and establish his leadership over the Party, as a rule, at the start of the great power struggle of this Revolution. 34

For him, ideals could be compromised to some extent, but power could never be compromised. Even the dreamer Mao Zedong must have realized, if he thought about it calmly, that the “Great Harmony” could not appear in China in the near future, or not in its complete form.

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The Cultural Revolution was not caused solely by domestic factors of power struggle within the Party and within the country. The conflict with the Soviet Union had intensified, on one hand, and as the Vietnam War hardened, the threat from the United States had also increased, on the other hand. Therefore, international factors were also involved in this Revolution, as China prepared for the war between the Soviet Union (which by the end of the Cultural Revolution it called “Soviet revisionism” and “social imperialism”) and U.S. imperialism, its main enemy until then. Considering that one of the principles of the socialist education campaign, which was the preliminary stage of the CR movement, was to “oppose and prevent revisionism,” the Cultural Revolution was meant to criticize the “revisionism” of the power-holding faction domestically, and internationally, to overthrow Soviet revisionism and the modern capitalist world led by the United States, so as to liberate the Third World. Therefore, from Mao’s perspective, the Cultural Revolution was a struggle against “revisionism” represented by the Soviet Union and “bourgeois ideology” represented by the United States. According to him, these two ideologies were essentially the same anti-Marxist forces. In the first place, Mao Zedong’s emphasis on the theory of continuous revolution was strongly influenced by Stalin. Put it differently, it asserted that class struggle would persist even in a socialist society, that the influence of the bourgeoisie would manifest in the realm of ideology, that domestic and foreign enemies would conspire to revive capitalism, and that such class struggles would be reflected in intra-party conflicts. It is said that Mao inherited this theory of continuous revolution from Stalin’s theory of class struggle in “A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)” (Tanigawa 2019). No matter how we define class or what our vision of socialist society is, a socialism that does not value people’s dignity and freedom, much less life, cannot have been Marx’s ideal. If Marx were to come back to life and observe the real China today and the former Soviet Union, he would have lamented, saying “Where have my socialist ideals gone?” At the same time, he would have deeply regretted that his ideals had been so distorted by revisionists such as Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong, and others, resulting in countless victims. Viewed in this way, the essence of the Cultural Revolution can only be described as the emergence of an intertwining and blending of various elements and factors. Wang Hui is spot on when he summarizes this movement as follows: “During the Cultural Revolution, there was a convergence of religious zeal, fanaticism, the brutality of feudal times, traditional despotism, dictatorship, utopian ideals, and nihilism. Slavery, feudal oppression, and what’s commonly known as socialism all converged in one place. The accumulated weight of China’s traditional culture and history took its toll, engulfing human nature, distorting the human spirit, and suffocating human life and creativity, revealing an unfortunate and ugly aspect of it all.” (Wang 2013a, p. 508; Wang 2013b, p. 379)

Still, Wang Hui admits in the following way that this Revolution was not a total waste: “How worthwhile this Cultural Revolution was! It was the most important period for the People’s Republic of China since its establishment. Without the Cultural Revolution of that

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time, today’s reform and opening-up would not have been possible. Without understanding the Cultural Revolution, we cannot understand China. (Wang 2013a, p. 516; Wang 2013b, p. 385)”

Why did the Cultural Revolution lead to today’s reform and opening-up policies? Wang Hui insists that first, it removed superstition about Mao Zedong personally in terms of ideology; second, that it broke down the centralized planned economic system and, in a sense, laid the groundwork for the market system that followed. Indeed, Mao Zedong destroyed the existing system, saying, “First destroy, then build” (xianpo houli). However, he failed to launch a new and effective economic system. From a different perspective, Hu Angang says that “the failure of Mao’s last years is the mother of Deng Xiaoping‘s reform success.” (Hu 2008, p. 788) In his view, it was only because of the “great failure” of the CR movement that Deng’s reforms succeeded, using these reforms as a lesson against it. While pointing out that the Cultural Revolution was a failure and that it came at a huge price, Yang Jisheng sees, somewhat paradoxically, that “the beautiful image of the Communist Party and bureaucracy was destroyed, the blind confidence in the Party organization and blind respect for the bureaucracy before the Revolution” disappeared with this Revolution, and the “myth that the Communist Party cannot be criticized” was busted. He sees this as a positive legacy, concluding that the Chinese people have “awakened from the ideological myth” (Yang 2019, pp. 226–227). I cannot take a very positive view of the CR movement. Let me repeat that the sacrifices China paid and the costs the Chinese people bore during this Revolution were too huge. The same could be said for other revolutions, including the Russian Revolution. Is a political revolution really worthwhile it if it costs hundreds of thousands, millions, or even tens of millions of precious lives? Naturally if the revolution does not produce new values, institutions, and cultures that are useful for the survival and well-being of humankind, it becomes even more difficult to affirm. Qian Liqun, while confessing that he himself was once a “Maoist,” asserts that the Cultural Revolution was a “revolution without revolution,” as the bureaucracy and everything else returned to normal after the end of the first stage of the CR movement (Qian 2012a, Vol. 2, p. 144; Qian 2012b, Vol. 2, p. 111). Looking at China today, many people still do not seem to have shaken off blind trust in the Party, and I am not convinced that they have really “awakened” from the ideological myth as Yang Jisheng suggests. Certainly, the old socialist ideology of politics over economics and equality over freedom has disappeared. However, the people who equate socialism with communist rule, holding the myth of Mao Zedong in mind, and who accept stability through coercion have not changed. No one has yet offered any doubts about the long-term status quo of peasants under the household registration system.35 Such an ideological climate is what allows Communist Party 35

It is said that in the transition from feudal to modern society is characterized by a shift from status to contract. The fact that the status order system of the household registration remains, and that a new status class of Communist Party members has been created, seems to indicate that contemporary China, to exaggerate slightly and if I may add a touch of irony, is a “semi-feudal” system, of course in a different sense from that defined by Mao Zedong.

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rule to endure, and it is also the environment in which Xi Jinping is able to consolidate his power and portray himself as a second Mao Zedong. In contemporary China, nobody is allowed to criticize or even question the regime or its leaders, and the interpretation of history is often determined not by historians but by the Party. Politics often takes precedence over scientific truth. In other words, the truth still falls from the heavens, not from a single leader as in the past, but now from the Party’s Central Propaganda Department.

Chapter 9

Emperor Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai: A Brief Analysis of the Mao-Zhou Relationship

Mao Zedong is often described as “a stern father” (yanfu) while Zhou Enlai, on the other hand, is referred to as “a kind mother” (cimu). They say that Mao was harsh and sometimes deadly toward his opponents or subordinates, while Zhou was gentle and mild toward everyone, even saving some colleagues during the Cultural Revolution (CR). It is said that Mao was feared while Zhou was adored. It was Mao who had caused the societal and political system to collapse and Zhou who desperately tried to rebuild it. Mao can be likened, albeit with a somewhat extreme metaphor, to a husband who neglects his family due to alcohol and gambling, while Zhou looks like a patient and affectionate wife who steadfastly supports him through thick and thin. On the other hand, Zhou Enlai also has the reputation of being a “roly-poly” (budaoweng). In other words, he has the image of a man who gets up and revives, no matter how many times he falls or is beaten. Here rather than the image of a kind mother, the figure of an indomitable fighter, a strong man, emerges. Furthermore, unlike Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai was not a lecherous leader. He married Deng Yingchao, a female activist who was by no means considered a beauty. They adopted the orphans of revolutionary martyrs since they had no biological children of their own. Zhou Enlai is remembered as a clean fighter who dedicated his entire life to the revolutionary struggle and state affairs, and above all, to Mao. Li Peng, the conservative Premier of the State Council at the time of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, who suppressed the students’ and citizens’ longing for democracy, was one of the adopted children raised by Zhou and his wife. These prevailing images cannot be said to sum up Zhou. It may be said that they emphasize only certain aspects of him but they have in common the portrayal of Zhou Enlai as “the enduring man.” When we consider Zhou’s obedience to Mao, especially since the Zunyi Conference in 1935, when Mao Zedong’s absolute power within the Party is said to have been almost established, and after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhou’s unwavering submission to Mao can be described not just as remarkable but as rather “extraordinary.” While fulfilling the heavy duties of a premier, his profound understanding of Mao’s character and

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behavior allowed him to navigate the turbulent waters of Party politics. It can be said that because Zhou was there, Mao was able to do outrageous things like the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Cultural Revolution (CR). While unlikely to portray Zhou Enlai in his entirety, his feelings, attitudes, fears, and his adoration of Mao Zedong provide an indispensable perspective through which to understand his behavior. The conflict between Mao and Zhou, especially Mao’s suspicion of Zhou and Zhou’s submission to Mao, as well as Zhou’s ruthlessness toward “overthrown” figures, are points that cannot be ignored when discussing Zhou’s true character. By illuminating such shadowy aspects, it appears possible to simultaneously depict the multifaceted figure of Zhou Enlai and the real figure of Mao Zedong. Here, I will reexamine the figure of Mao through Zhou—an irreplaceable collaborator for Mao, but sometimes subjected to his suspicion and jealousy—by following Zhou’s actions within their relationship (hereinafter referred to as the Mao-Zhou relationship). I am not writing a biography of Zhou Enlai here. If you are interested in the whole biographical history of Zhou, I recommend that you refer, for example, to Wilson (1984). Now let me begin with the story of their relationship from the year 1926 when the two first met.

1 The Mao-Zhou Relationship during the Revolutionary Struggle For the Mao-Zhou relationship before the establishment of the People’s Republic, that is, during the revolutionary struggle, Gao (2006, Vol. 1) provides a detailed description, so I will examine their relationship and its transition based mainly on his account, and refer to Gao (2000) for their relationship until the Rectification Movement during the Yan’an period. In 1926, the year when the two first met, the cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party (CPC), (the First Cooperation between the KMT and the CPC) was established. Mao Zedong was then the Acting Director of the Central Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang, while Zhou Enlai was the Deputy Chief of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and Director of the Political Department, as well as Military Director of the Communist Party Center, and thus a leader of higher rank than Mao. In March 1926, the “Zhongshan Warship incident”1 occurred and Chiang Kai-shek began to seize real power in the military department of the Nationalist Government, so the relationship between the two parties became strained. In April of the following year, Chiang Kai-shek staged the Shanghai coup d’état in the middle of the Northern Expedition, capturing and 1

A false rumor circulated that a warship, the Zhongshan, captained by a Communist Party member, was going to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek and take him to the Soviet Union. This led to Chiang arresting the captain, Soviet military advisors, and Communist Party members one after another, and imposing martial law in Guangzhou.

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suppressing many Communist Party members, thus the cooperation between the two parties collapsed. Afterwards, Mao and his followers launched armed struggles, and in 1927 Mao led an armed uprising in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province and, after being defeated, he took a thousand peasant soldiers and holed up in Jinggangshan, Jiangxi Province. Later, in November 1931, he established a small state, “the Soviet Republic of China,” with himself as its President (see Chap. 3). Zhou Enlai, on the other hand, led an uprising in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province, but was defeated. He went to Guangdong Province and was defeated again, then fled to Hong Kong. Both Mao and Zhou were held responsible for the failed uprisings, but while Mao was dismissed as a candidate member of the CPC Political Bureau, Zhou was only given a warning by the Party, and was elected in Shanghai as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Party, a higher rank within the Party than Mao. At the time, however, the Communist Party of China was merely a branch of the Soviet-controlled COMINTERN,2 and Zhou was “caught between Moscow’s directives and the realities of the Chinese Revolution” (Gao 2006, Vol. 1, p. 35). Zhou Enlai moved from Shanghai to Jiangxi in December 1931 to become Secretary of the Soviet District Central Bureau in Ruijin, the capital of the Soviet Republic in Jiangxi Province. Given the siege by Kuomintang troops, a meeting on military operations was held at the All-Party Conference of the CPC Central Bureau of the Soviet District (Ningdu Conference) in October 1932, and Mao Zedong was stripped of his military power for two years, with Zhou taking over as the political commissar of the army. This became the most painful two years for Mao. “At that time, he was ‘a steppingstone in the latrine’ and ‘even ghost would not visit him.’ This is said to have been Zhou’s great mistake, or in Zhou’s words, ‘the biggest mistake and sin of his life,’ and it earned him Mao’s deep resentment.” (Ibid., p. 42)

According to Gao Wenqian, all the subsequent “grudges between Mao and Zhou” started from this meeting. Mao’s resentment towards Peng Dehuai was a similar case (see Chap. 6). Mao remembered well the humiliations he experienced during the liberation struggle, the incidents he resisted, and especially the persons and situations that caused his dissatisfaction and anger, and later used them as a basis to criticize and even overthrow his opponents. The official Biography of Zhou Enlai states that fierce debates took place at the Ningdu Conference (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Jin Chongji (eds.) 1998, p. 256). The majority of the Conference participants were critical of Mao’s approach and suggested that he be removed from the front lines. Zhou Enlai then intervened and proposed two approaches: One was that Zhou would lead the war and take full responsibility for it, while Mao would stay on the front lines and assist Zhou; the other one was that Mao would command the war and take full responsibility for it, while Zhou would supervise the execution of the policy. Mao Zedong opposed the second approach because he could not gain the full confidence 2

The COMINTERN, short for Communist International, is an international organization founded by the Bolshevik Party of Russia (later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in the early twentieth century.

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of the Central Bureau, but the latter approach prevailed at the meeting. As a result, Mao was allowed to take some sick leave and Zhou took over the duties of the General Political Commissar. Zhou was criticized for being “compassionate” towards Mao; he corrected his excessive criticism of Mao and went on to respect him. In the official biography no reference is made to serious feelings or perceptions from either side, such as “the most painful two years for Mao” or “the biggest mistake of Zhou’s life,” as Gao Wenqian writes. The Mao-Zhou relationship seems to be greatly idealized to give the impression to the reader that Zhou always defended and supported Mao. The Red Army led by Zhu De and Zhou Enlai withstood three rounds of sieges and assaults by Kuomintang forces, then withstood a fourth attack and crushed a large KMT army with a big victory that enhanced Zhou’s prestige within the Red Army. This victory even led to him being awarded a medal. Gao Wenqian says that this reinforced Mao’s resentment about being “sidelined” at the Ningdu Conference. “What boiled Mao’s guts was not only that his dreams of revival were dashed by the great victory in the fourth anti-encirclement attack, but also that his long-cultivated position within the Red Army was now being challenged by Zhou” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 57). Moreover, after the Ningdu Conference, Mao had asked Zhou Enlai to send a telegram to him if needed on the front line, but Zhou ignored it. Unable to withstand the massive siege by the KMT forces for the fifth time, the Red Army finally abandoned Ruijin in October 1934 to embark on the long escape journey called the Long March. A decisive disagreement took place between Otto Braun,3 the military advisor dispatched from the COMINTERN and Mao on which direction to move the Red Army, and Zhou Enlai followed Mao’s opinion and advanced the army towards Guizhou. Defeat in the battle with the Kuomintang forces and the reduction of troops led to growing criticism of the leadership, especially of Party Secretary Bo Gu4 and Braun. In January 1935, when the Red Army reached Zunyi County in Guizhou Province, Bo Gu and Braun were removed from their posts at the Politburo enlarged meeting, which is well known as Zunyi Conference, held there. It has been conceived that Mao’s leadership was firmly established at this meeting. In reality, however, Mao joined the core of the Party as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee at this meeting and, since Zhou replaced Brown as the military commander, Mao merely served as his assistant. Thus, even at this stage, Mao’s position was still below Zhou’s. In August 1935, the Standing Committee of the Party’s Central Political Bureau decided that Mao would replace Zhou in military affairs and so Mao became the actual supreme military leader. However, it was during the Rectification Movement in Yan’an from 1942 to 1943, which will be discussed later, that Mao’s leadership power within the Party was decisively established, and at the same time, Zhou began to submit completely to Mao.

3

Otto Braun is a German. He became a communist at a young age and was sent by the COMINTERN to become military commander of the Red Army, but was dismissed by the Party’s Zunyi Conference after being blamed for the defeat. 4 Bo Gu‘s real name is Qin Bangxian. During the First KMT-CPC cooperation, he served as the General Secretary of the CPC’s Central Political Bureau with the support of the COMINTERN.

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In October 1936, the Red Army completed its Long March and built a major revolutionary base in Yan’an. However, the Xi’an incident in December 1936 and the Sino-Japanese War that broke out in July 1937 triggered the second KMT-CPC Cooperation. At a meeting of the Party’s Political Bureau in December 1937, Wang Ming, who had returned from Moscow to convey the COMINTERN’s policy, argued that the Party should cooperate with the KMT in order to maintain the anti-Japanese united front, and this gained the support of the majority in the Party. It is said that what Mao feared was not an “arm-chair theorist” leader like Wang Ming but the possibility that he would form a majority in collusion with Zhou and others within the Party. In order to separate Wang from Zhou, Mao Zedong dispatched Zhou Enlai to Wuhan, then temporary capital of the Kuomintang Government and later to Chongqing, which became the new temporary capital when Wuhan fell, and stationed him there for a long period to be in charge of negotiations with the Kuomintang. Mao Zedong was once isolated within the Party, but with the fall of Wuhan to the Japanese troops, friction between the two parties intensified, eventually leading to armed clashes, and in January 1941 the “Wannan incident”5 occurred, in which the New Fourth Army, part of the Red Army, was surrounded and annihilated by Kuomintang forces. Wang Ming and his group’s theory of reconciliation with the KMT collapsed. Thus it turned out that Mao’s claim had been correct, and he was revived within the Party. In any case, there is a following common understanding about the Yan’an Rectification Movement that started in 1942. For context, many youth from the KMT or Japanese-controlled areas and intellectuals who were disappointed with the KMT’s policies gathered in Yan’an with high hopes for the Communist Party. Thousands of new people joined the Communist Party and began to participate in its activities. After a while, however, many became disillusioned with the Party when they noticed the gap between their ideals and reality. The Yan’an Rectification Movement was thus started to retrain their spirits and unify their thoughts under Marxism-Leninism.6 Indeed, a large part of the Rectification Movement involved targeting youth and intellectuals in this way. This is strongly reflected in Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art (Literary Talks)” (see Chap. 2). However, the true purpose of this Movement seemed to be political rather than cultural or ideological. To be more specific, the main purpose of this movement was to firmly establish Mao’s own authority and power, and it involved, on the one hand, a thorough critique and elimination of former Soviet-returnee officials, particularly individuals like Wang Ming who still wielded some influence, by labeling them as “dogmatists,” and, on

5

An incident in which Communist troops (New Fourth Army) on the move in the south of Wannan (southern Anhui Province) were surrounded by Kuomintang forces nearly nine times their size, and the army chief Ye Ting was taken prisoner and his deputy, Xiang Ying was killed. 6 Selden, for example, recognizes the rectification as a movement with an aim to build a unity of Party dedicated to common ideas, methods, and goals (Selden 1976).

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the other hand, in a turnabout, forcing figures like Zhou Enlai to capitulate for being “empiricists.”7 Zhou Enlai was recalled from Chongqing to write a 30,000-character study memo and self-criticism at a Political Bureau meeting held from September to November 1943, where he spoke for five days and “settled” the mistakes he had made, or rather was forced to make. He self-criticized: “I was poisoned by the empiricist faction, blindly followed the COMINTERN dogmatism, and had something in common with the dogmatist faction [Wang Ming and others] in terms of thought and mood.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 102)

Thus, he totally and completely prostrated himself to Mao Zedong. Further, he confessed: “I am the scion of a bankrupt old feudal family. My family environment gave me the traits of showing off, covering up, caring about appearances, being selfish, trying to please everyone, being introspective, only thinking about gains and losses, being complicated and impulsive. These traits have not been completely eradicated. Moreover, the education from my mother when I was a child has fostered my slavish nature within the Party, which is the source of weakness in my character, always compromising, and lacking in principle, which can be said to have a destructive aspect as well.” (Ibid., p. 103)

That is to say, he launched a defence that could be described as self-denial at best, and self-deprecation at worst. It was akin to the confession Catholics make before a priest. According to Gao Hua, one of the most severe accusers of Zhou Enlai at this time was Liu Shaoqi. Liu aligned himself with Kang Sheng,8 becoming Mao’s flatterer, and attacked the dogmatists such as Wang Ming and the empiricists such as Zhou (Gao 2000, p. 618). No need to say, the official Biography of Zhou Enlai does not touch on these ugly facts at all. It simply states that Zhou calmly acknowledged his past mistakes, self-criticized, and considered it a “debate that enlightened his thoughts” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Jin Chongji (eds.) 1998, p. 563). Anyway, as a result of the Rectification Movement, Zhou Enlai‘s obedience to Mao Zedong became definitive and basically continued until his death. Nevertheless, Mao did not discard Zhou Enlai as he did with Wang Ming. Zhou’s organizational talents, administrative abilities, and diplomatic skills were valuable capabilities that Mao did not possess and he recognized Zhou as an indispensable talent for maintaining and expanding his own power. On the other hand, Gao Wenqian argues, because Zhou may have possibly inherited the traditions of Confucian culture as for the relationship with Mao Zedong, “Whether consciously or not, he began to handle his relationship with Mao after the 7

Selden denies the Rectification Movement was a political purge, although it was a struggle for the intellectual and political leadership of the communist movement (Selden 1976), but it is more correct to view it as a purge. The core of the purge was led by Kang Sheng (see below). 8 Kang Sheng led the “Central Socialist Department,” which played a role equivalent to that of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD, later KGB) of the Stalin-era Soviet Union. See Gao (2000, Chap. 12) for more details.

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Yan’an Rectification Movement according to the way of a monarch and his subjects in all matters (wanshi junchen), and devoted himself to Mao” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 146).

2 Mao-Zhou Relationships after the Founding of the Country After the New China was founded, Zhou Enlai became Premier of the State Council until his death in 1976, doubling as Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1958. From the perspective of the international community, Zhou’s activities after the founding of the country are known for his attendance as a Chinese representative at the Geneva Agreement that led to the ceasefire in the First Indochina War in 1954 and his participation in the so-called Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference) in 1955, where he formed friendships with leaders of the Third World such as Mohammad Sukarno, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Gamal Nasser and worked to establish the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” Domestically, he assisted Mao Zedong, who became Chairman of the Party as well as President of the State, and actively contributed to the establishment of Mao’s power and the promotion of the socialist construction line, so, unlike during the revolutionary struggle, the Mao-Zhou relationship did not become acrimonious and sharply confrontational in a sudden way. However, as we saw in Chap. 5, the two were in sharp conflict over the “anti-rash-advance” policy in 1956. At a Politburo meeting held in late April 1956, Mao sought additional funding for basic construction but was opposed by Zhou and others who emphasized the need for economic balance, citing shortages of goods and the increasing urban population. Mao, unwavering in his opinion, abruptly adjourned the meeting. Zhou personally met with Mao and conveyed his disagreement, stating that he could not endorse this decision as a matter of conscience as Prime Minister. Upon hearing this, Mao became displeased and soon left Beijing (Sima and Ouyang 2009, Vol. 1, p. 58).9 Mao Zedong seemed to hold a grudge about this matter, and when Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and others tried to implement the “anti-rash-advance” policy decided at the Eighth National Congress of the Party in September 1956, Mao, a “rash advancer,” strongly opposed it at the Nanning Conference in January 1958. The tide turned towards the rash advance policy, and moderates like Zhou and Chen Yun were forced into severe self-criticism (see Chap. 5). The Nanning Conference witnessed the explosion of Mao’s accumulated dissatisfaction, including his dissatisfaction with Zhou’s actions described above.

9

According to Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai confronted Mao Zedong head-on and exclaimed at this time, “As Prime Minister, I cannot agree with that decision, on account of my conscience” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 76). It is uncertain whether Zhou became truly agitated, but in any case, Zhou Enlai openly opposing Mao in such a manner was an exceedingly rare occurrence.

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When the post-Mao era arrived, many intellectuals involved in the meetings and movements after the founding of the New China began to look back and speak out. Wang Ruoshui, a former editor of the People’s Daily, made a profound and surprising speculation: “In his ‘Speech at the National Propaganda Work Conference of the Communist Party of China’ in March 1957, Mao Zedong said ‘A thorough materialists fear nothing. We hope that all those who struggle with us will bravely take responsibility, overcome difficulties, not fear setbacks, not fear being laughed at for arguing, and not fear criticizing and proposing to us Communists. ‘Dare to pull the emperor off his horse, even if it means tearing oneself apart’, we should have such a fearless spirit when we fight for socialism and communism.’ But who was the ‘emperor’ he was referring to? Surely not Mao himself. Was he referring to an abstract struggle goal, or someone higher up than him? Ordinary people who don’t know the backstage of politics might interpret it that way. However, (Wang Ruoshui testifies) when Mao Zedong referred to the ‘emperor’ in this context, he was actually talking about Zhou Enlai. In other words, Mao had been thinking of pulling Zhou down from the Prime Minister’s position for a long time, and actually approached Liu Shaoqi about it, but Liu did not agree to this idea.” (See Wang 2001)

Zhou Enlai, who knew Mao Zedong inside out, may have sensed Mao’s psychology and maneuvers. After switching from “anti-rash-advance” to “rash advance” and making a self-criticism swearing loyalty to Mao, Zhou indicated his intention to resign as Prime Minister. At the enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee in June 1958, Zhou asked the Committee to consider whether it was appropriate for him to continue as Premier, but he was persuaded to stay. After that meeting, Deng Xiaoping, the General Secretary, sent a summary of the meeting to Mao, but Mao did not return any comments (pishi), meaning that Mao approved. It seems that Zhou did not so much resign from his position willingly, as he was disenchanted with Mao and did not crave the position (Sima and Ouyang 2009, Vol. 1, p. 75). Zhou Enlai, who was pushed into office by aggressive Mao Zedong and who effectively played the role of promoting the GLF policy from 1958, may have intuitively sensed the deadlock of this policy from the beginning. However, even Liu Shaoqi was stirred by the “GLF fever” and Zhou Enlai, being carried away by the atmosphere of the times, may not have fully grasped the problem. At any rate, there is a dearth of data related to this issue. After the “great failure” of the GLF movement, a catastrophe emerged in the form of an enormous number of abnormal deaths, and Zhou’s remarks on this subject are recorded. In March 1959, for example, he received a letter from the masses reporting a huge number of deaths from starvation in He and Wuwei Counties in Anhui Province, and forwarded it to Zeng Xisheng, then First Secretary of the Province, and gave the following optimistic instructions: “I am forwarding the letter to you. Please review and send someone to investigate in both Counties. Perhaps this is indeed the case, or perhaps it is an exaggeration. However, this kind of phenomenon exists in every province, especially in places that suffered disasters last year. Chairman [Mao] also pointed out this firmly when he approved and forwarded the documents of the sixth level cadre meeting in Shandong Province.” (Yang 2014)

These instructions do not convey a sense of urgency about the tremendous number of abnormal deaths occurring in various areas.

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As a result of the GLF and the People’s Commune policies, food supplies were severely depleted and starvation became widespread in many areas, prompting policymakers to urgently try to procure foodgrains from abroad. In fact, China imported some foodgrains from abroad at that time. However, this was only a small portion of the necessary amount. According to the recollections of the persons involved, Zhou Enlai was then selling the grains to buy gold bullion. “In 1960, our budget deficit had already reached 8 billion yuan, but we had to import large quantities of wheat from abroad to meet our minimum civilian needs. Faced with a major crisis, if our country sold gold on the international market, it would not have been impossible to solve the foreign currency shortage problem. However, Premier Zhou opposed this plan and said, ‘Don’t sell gold! We must back it up with gold. …. We didn’t sell gold, and on the contrary, we bought hundreds of thousands of taels of gold every year when the price was low.” (Sima and Ouyang 2009, Vol. 1, pp. 108–109)10

The period from 1960 to 1961 was when hunger was at its worst. This means that Zhou as Prime Minister at that time considered foreign currency more important than food, and gold more important than human lives. Alternatively, it is possible that what mattered most to Zhou was safeguarding China’s, and by extension Mao Zedong’s, reputation. As discussed in Chap. 5, the significant policy failure of not relying on bold food imports or assistance from abroad was one of the contributing factors to the devastating Great Famine. Furthermore, in 1961, three men from the Ministry of Food and the National Bureau of Statistics had each ministry fill out a statistical table of food and population changes, which, when added together, revealed a decrease of tens of millions of people. When this data was reported only to Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, Zhou notified the Food Ministry personnel to “discard it immediately and do not leak it to the outside.” These three men jointly supervised the disposal of the data, and when one of them confirmed over the phone that it had been discarded, Zhou was finally relieved (ibid., p. 109). Zhou was probably worried that if the devastation became known to the outside world, it would tarnish Mao’s authority. From my point of view, Zhou should have been more concerned about the serious implications, but he may not have had much common sense at the time, or if he did, he may not have been able to express it. According to Zhang Suhua, Zhou Enlai made the following statement at the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in 1962 that the Great Leap Forward was primarily successful, with shortcomings as a side effect; that mistakes were made because they went against the correct line set by the General Line and “went against many valuable, realistic, and forward-looking opinions of Chairman Mao” and that he was entirely responsible for the policy failures (Zhang 2006). These are the words of a loyal “vassal” trying to protect Mao, the emperor. Liu Shaoqi‘s speech at the Conference was one of the reasons for his subsequent downfall during the CR movement (see Chap. 8), but although Zhou also supported Liu’s speech, this did not become a major issue later. 10

Original text from Lin Haiyun, “Guanyu Zhou Enlai Waimao Sixiang-de Pianduan Huiyi (Fragmented memories regarding Zhou Enlai’s foreign trade ideology),” Central Literature Publishing House, 1987, p. 261.

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In the rural socialist education campaign and the Four Clean-ups campaign that began in 1963, Zhou Enlai‘s presence was not as prominent as that of Liu Shaoqi. Liu Shaoqi, along with his wife Wang Guangmei, played a leading role in these movements, while Zhou Enlai did not assume such a significant role. If Zhou had been as active as Liu, his fate during the CR movement might have been different. As already noted in Chap. 8, Mao had set his sights on bringing down Liu Shaoqi in 1965. The Mao-Zhou relationship began to change significantly again after the Cultural Revolution took place in 1966. Zhou Enlai maintained a somewhat subtle relationship with both the CR faction led by Jiang Qing and the group associated with Lin Biao while aligning himself with Mao Zedong. As a result, he indirectly contributed to the involvement and persecution of many of his colleagues and comrades, some of whom ultimately lost their lives. On August 26, 1967, Zhou Enlai was surrounded by rebel faction. When they stormed the Great Hall of the People and demanded that Chen Yi, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Chairman of the Party Military Commission, be severely criticized, Zhou Enlai is said to have shouted: “If anyone stops Comrade Chen Yi’s car on the street, I will stop it. If you want to drag Comrade Chen Yi out, I will stand in front of the Great Hall of the People. If you still want to do it, go ahead and trample on my body.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 218)

Because of Zhou’s decisive stance, it is said that the rebels eventually gave up on taking any action. Both Sima and Ouyang are dismissive of the view that Zhou Enlai was a good man, saying that he tried desperately to protect the cadres and actually did protect some of them. They also object to the view that he protected persons other than highranking Party officials. In August 1966, when the Red Guards began their rampage, Zhou included 13 democratic party leaders on the list to be protected, including Sun Qingling (Sun Yat-sen‘s widow), and Zhang Shijian, a calligrapher close to Mao, at Mao’s request. Who, then, was to protect those other than the thirteen? Sima and Ouyang ask as follows: “When the Red Guards saw this list, didn’t they get a clear hint at the same time? Leave the persons outside this list—tens of thousands of people—to their mercy? In fact, they understood it that way and acted that way. Who can say that Zhou’s role was not in the sins covered in the blood of the ‘Red August‘?11 There is a distinction among major evil, medium evil, and minor evil, but even minor evil is still evil.” (Sima and Ouyang 2009, pp. 1106–1107)

In order to obtain Mao’s approval, Zhou Enlai took care to exclude Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo from the list of senior Party officials to be protected, but included Yao Yilin and others (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 226). Zhou probably did not create such a list willingly. For his part, he must have tried to save as many officials and cultural figures as possible while keeping an eye on Mao’s response. If he tried 11

Referring to August 1966 in Beijing when the Red Guards rampaged and imposed an awful tragedy on their “enemies.”

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to save all of them, Mao would not allow it, and he would not be able to guarantee his own life. A more favorable interpretation of Zhou Enlai would suggest that he grappled with the tension between ideals and realities, leading him to make political compromises when necessary. Zhou Enlai, even if only indirectly, sent many of his comrades and their families to their deaths during this revolutionary upheaval. Certainly, Mao ought to be directly responsible for the brutal murder of Liu Shaoqi, but Zhou is by no means exempt from responsibility. According to Gao Wenqian, “Mao was the mastermind, and Zhou followed Mao’s lead. More accurately, he was dragged into it by Mao.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 305) In 1967, the “Liu Shaoqi Special Investigation Group” was formed to investigate Liu Shaoqi’s past suspicious activities, and this report, which Zhou is said to have written himself, states, “This person must be killed (ciren gaisha).” (Sima and Ouyang 2009, Vol. 2, p. 937) It goes without saying that even Zhou Enlai was not always at ease while acting in accordance with Mao Zedong’s intentions. In particular, if he had to make decisions based on arbitrary and fabricated reports, Zhou, as a “follower of the golden mean” (zhongyong), must have found it deeply troubling. Let me take the case of He Long as an opportunity to explore the relationship between the death of a high-ranking official and Zhou’s feelings. He Long was one of the marshals who contributed to the Chinese Revolution, and a key military figure who was at odds with Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai‘s successor. Moreover, because he took a noncommittal attitude towards the criticism of Liu Shaoqi after the start of the Cultural Revolution, he came to be distrusted by Mao Zedong. As a result, he became a target for overthrow and was persecuted by Jiang Qing and other rebels in the military. On January 18, 1967, Zhou Enlai invited Li Fuchun,12 Jiang Qing, and He Long to a meeting. Jiang Qing did not attend but instructed mass organizations to have a street protest outside the walls of Zhongnanhai at the appointed time, shouting slogans such as “Overthrow He Long!” The meeting therefore took place in a heavy atmosphere, and Zhou told He Long: “I really want to let you live in Zhongnanhai, but now this place is also divided into two factions. Even the luggage in Commander-in-Chief Zhu’s (referring to Zhu De) house was pried open. We have found another quiet place for your safety, so you can rest there,” and had him escorted to a mountainous area outside Beijing.” (Yan and Gao 1996, Vol. 1, p. 190)

However, He Long was later taken out and tortured by the rebel faction, and although he had diabetes, he was not given insulin, and eventually died in prison on June 9, 1969. He Long was rehabilitated after his death and a bone interment ceremony was held in Beijing. Now let me compare how the official Biography of Zhou Enlai, Gao (2007), and Sima and Ouyang (2009) report the situation at that time. In the official Biography of Zhou Enlai, it is written as follows: 12

After the founding of the country, Li Fuchun served as Minister of Heavy Industries, Director of the National Planning Commission, and Vice Premier of the State Council.

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On June 9, 1975, the sixth anniversary of the death of He Long, the Central Military Commission was to hold a small “Comrade He Long bone placement ceremony,” and He’s family was notified of their participation in the ceremony, but they were told not to leak it outside, not to hold a funeral service, not to read a eulogy, not to offer flowers, not to report it, not to publicize it. The eldest daughter, angered by this, wrote a letter of protest to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Zhou took action to obtain Mao’s permission, and told the bereaved family that he would attend the ceremony himself. Wreaths were laid in the hall, eulogies were read, and the ceremony went on as usual. Zhou, who was said to have only half a year to live, rushed to the venue, met Xue Ming, the widow of He Long, in the common room, held her hand and held her by the shoulder, his voice trembling, and said: “‘Xue Ming, I did not protect He Long. I couldn’t move the commander’s remains to the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery for six years. It was very painful ….’ he said in tears. Xue wiped away his tears, saying, ‘Prime Minister, please don’t suffer so much’…. Zhou entered the ceremony hall, bowed deeply seven times in front of He’s portrait, and read a eulogy on behalf of the Party Center” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Jin Chongji (eds.) 1998, Vol. 2, pp. 1181–1182)

Reading this text, we can imagine a scene in which all participants are moved to tears by Zhou. The depth of Zhou’s warmth and compassion touched the hearts of the participants, and readers may well be moved to tears as well. Gao (2007) also uses the same references but with somewhat different nuances to depict this scene: “On the afternoon of June 9, Zhou accompanied by his wife, Deng Yingchao, went to the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery. At the ceremony to enshrine the remains of He Long, Zhou was so overcome with emotion that he could hardly restrain himself. This was both a sense of sorrow for his late friend and a sense of his own atonement. But even though he apologized to her face-to-face, his remorse did not seem to lessen. … this [referring to his seven bows to the portrait] may have helped to put Zhou’s mind at ease somewhat, but it was too late. (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, pp. 300–302) No matter how many reasons Zhou might find to defend himself, he could not escape his guilt over the fact that He Long was later persecuted and died. In fact, Zhou felt that he owed a debt to He and was tormented by remorse of conscience.” (Ibid., p. 235)

Gao Wenqian is extremely sympathetic to Zhou Enlai. Gao suggests that Zhou regretted the mistakes he had made, admitting that: “He may have sympathized with Lin Biao in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and was actively involved in the report accusing He Long.” (Ibid., p. 235)

On the other hand, Sima and Ouyang are harsh, if not cold, toward Zhou Enlai. They depict the scene that Zhou met Xue Ming at Babaoshan as follows: “‘Xue Ming! I came too late …. I couldn’t protect him’ …, Zhou shouted for a moment, moving the participants to tears. Everyone present was deeply moved. He then told Xue, ‘My time is not long either,’ and the two cried and hugged each other. However, Zhou did not originally intend to attend this memorial service. He came because Mao Zedong instructed him to. How long will Zhou’s cries, the overflowing brotherly affection, the sorrowful voice, the seven bows, these overtly ostensible gestures continue to deceive those ignorant of the inner situation?” (Sima and Ouyang 2009, Vol. 2, p. 1059)

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According to them, Zhou Enlai was not only inactive in the restoration of He Long’s honor, but also had even delayed He Long’s rehabilitation until Mao revised his evaluation of He in 1973.13 In this light, they are suggesting that Zhou’s sobbing at He Long’s memorial service and the tears he shed were all nothing more than political performances. Reflecting on Zhou Enlai’s words and actions during the CR movement, Wang Hui notes as follows: “In recent years, there have been two sharply different views of Zhou Enlai’s words and actions during the Cultural Revolution: One is that he was a good premier who protected many people and served the people during the Revolution. The other view is that he helped the villains and committed evil deeds to protect himself, causing turmoil and fueling momentum. …. Zhou Enlai certainly tried to protect many people during the Cultural Revolution. He was never “leftist,” and even if he attacked someone, he did not do it out of the goodness of his heart. But he generally had a relatively good understanding of Mao Zedong’s intentions and found himself compelled to speak and act in ways that went against his true beliefs.” (Wang 2013a, pp. 263–265; Wang 2013b, pp. 203–204)

During the CR struggle in Tianjin, when the Tianjin Party Secretary Wan Xiaotang was wrongfully accused, Wang Hui, who knew him very well, felt a strong sense of helplessness and irrationality when he heard Chen Boda harshly criticizing him. Zhou Enlai, however, actively defended this denunciation by Chen Boda, which means that Zhou indirectly persecuted Secretary Wan.

3 How to Evaluate Zhou Enlai: My Own View and Hypothesis Roderick McFarquhar asked Wang Hui the following question: “What would have happened if Zhou Enlai had not supported Mao during the Cultural Revolution?”

Wang’s answer to this question is as follows: “There are two possibilities: One is that the upheaval would have become even more awful and the damage more severe. The other possibility is that it could have hastened the end of the Cultural Revolution and reduced the losses.” (Wang 2013a, p. 263; Wang 2013b, p. 203)

Just pointing out both, and even relative, possibilities, Wang Hui did not say anything about which possibility was stronger. The first possibility probably refers to the following. If Zhou Enlai had opposed Mao Zedong, Mao’s opponents would have included Zhou Enlai in addition to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and Mao would 13

In February 1973, “Mao Zedong, at the pool in Zhongnanhai, said to Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Chunqiao, ‘It seems that He Long has no problems… I also have my shortcomings, I only listened to one side (Lin Biao‘s side) of the opinions,’” and in December 1973, during a Central Military Commission meeting, he stated, “It appears I have done something wrong to Comrade He Long, I must take responsibility…” (Sima and Ouyang 2009, Vol. 2, pp. 1055–1056).

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have launched a more extensive and thorough counter-movement or purge campaign, resulting in a larger scale movement with more severe damage. The second possibility seems to refer to the possibility of Zhou Enlai admonishing Mao and calming the movement, but even if Zhou took on such a role, it is hard to imagine Mao, especially a determined Mao, listening to Zhou’s opinion. In fact, we cannot deny that Zhou might well have lost his position because of such action. A China Watcher imagines that the Cultural Revolution might not have happened if Zhou Enlai had opposed Mao Zedong’s launching of this Revolution (Yabuki 1989, p. 188). This is because only two of the seven Party Politburo Standing Committee members prior to the Revolution were Maoists, Lin Biao being the only one except for Mao, and if Zhou Enlai had teamed up with Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun, they could have formed a majority to oppose Mao. But this “historical if” is not very convincing. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution because he knew he was in the political minority within the Party, and because he was a man of “lawlessness” (wufa wutian) who blatantly disregarded laws and regulations and did not care about Party rules, let alone the Constitution. He had a final killer phrase that could push through his opinion even if he was in the absolute minority. That is, “If you can’t agree with me, I’ll go to Jinggangshan and start the revolution all over again! If no one will follow me, I will go alone!” When he shouted at them, even the hard opposition would be silenced and they would fall under his command like an avalanche. In fact, Mao had threatened Peng Dehuai and his group by saying those same words at the Lushan Conference in 1959 (see Chap. 5), and during so-called “February Countercurrent” incident in February 1967, when Mao was furious with the military top leaders who opposed Jiang Qing and her Central CR Subgroup’s approach (see Chap. 8). Phillip Short’s evaluation of Zhou Enlai is harsh. He states: “Zhou Enlai survived because he would betray anyone to keep the Chairman’s trust. His adopted daughter Sun Weishi was tortured by the Red Guards, imprisoned, and died of malnutrition, but Zhou Enlai did not lift a finger even when he was told that his daughter was imprisoned.14 It was because he judged that if he did lift a finger, he would be accused of prioritizing family over politics.” (Short 2010, Vol. 2, p. 290)

Whether she died of malnutrition or as a result of severe torture, there is no doubt that her adoptive father, Zhou Enlai, put politics before family love (Photo 9.1). The evaluation of Zhou Enlai by Sima Qingyang and Ouyang Longmen, is even more severe. They argue: “It is a blatant lie to say that without Zhou Enlai, China’s calamities, including the Cultural Revolution, would have been greater and that no one could have replaced him and done better. This is because if the dignity of the law had been guaranteed and the Party system had not been destroyed, even without Zhou, the old cadres would have received the protection of the law and the system.” (Sima and Ouyang, 2007, Vol. 2, p. 1103) 14

Zhou’s adopted daughter refers to Sun Weishi. Sun, renowned as an actress and rumored to have had a romantic relationship with Mao Zedong, incurred the jealousy of Jiang Qing. She was sent to detention following an arrest warrant signed by her adoptive father, Zhou Enlai, and tragically died in custody. It is said that she was found deceased in her cell, wearing only handcuffs and leg irons.

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Photo 9.1 Zhou Enlai, Deng Yingchao, and Sun Weishi. Zhou Enlai (right), Deng Yingchao (left), Zhou Enlai’s wife, and Sun Weishi (middle), their adopted daughter. During the Cultural Revolution, Sun fell victim to Jiang Qing’s jealousy, was captured, and brutally killed. Why couldn’t Zhou protect his daughter? Source https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2024-02-04/doc-inafvsqn9125498.shtml

This is a rather harsh assessment, in my view, because the “dignity of law” did not exist at all in the Maoist era, and the Party system and rules could be changed at will by the Supreme Leader. Sima Qingyang and Ouyang add the following comment: “The greatest accomplice in the Cultural Revolution is Zhou Enlai. According to our incomplete statistics, more than 2 million people were persecuted under Zhou’s name during this Revolution, far more than Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng at that time. If Zhou acted out of compulsion rather than genuine intent, we might argue that he could be considered one of the greatest hypocrites in history for decades. However, this perspective cannot be officially endorsed. Therefore, the Communist Party is trying to protect Zhou’s image, and if they acknowledge one side, it would weaken the other.” (Ibid., p. 1112)

Sima and Ouyang accuse Zhou Enlai of overseeing the Specialized Case Investigation Group for Liu Shaoqi and many other important officials, and of actively assisting in their persecution. According to Short, it was Zhou Enlai, not Jiang Qing or Kang Sheng, who added the fiercest attack against Deng in the minutes that accompanied Deng Xiaoping’s Specialized Case Investigation Group report during this Revolution (Short 2010, Vol. 2, p. 290). The most dramatic event in the Mao-Zhou relationship during the CR movement was related to Zhou Enlai‘s illness and death: When Zhou Enlai was found to have bladder cancer in May 1972, this information was immediately passed on to Mao Zedong. This was because treatment plans for leaders above the rank of Political Bureau member could only be implemented with Mao’s permission. However, the four instructions that Mao conveyed to the attending physicians through Wang

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Dongxing, Mao’s security chief, were: (1) Keep it secret and do not inform the Prime Minister or his wife, (2) No need for examination, (3) No need for surgery, (4) Strengthen nursing and nutrition support. “This incident clearly shows that Mao Zedong drove Zhou to his death, and it is the worst aspect of Mao’s humanity. As a result, even to this day, this matter remains tightly sealed, and any official acknowledgment is avoided at all costs. They fervently fear that the revelation of this ruthless and gruesome murder would tarnish Mao’s ‘great image.’” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 96, my emphasis)

It seems abnormal that the treatment plan for a leader above the rank of Politburo member requires the approval of the CPC Central Standing Committee in form and Mao Zedong in substance, but if true, Mao’s act of neglecting Zhou when he was expected to recover with surgery shows an astonishing ruthlessness. This ruthlessness could be the result of Mao’s growing suspicion and desire to ostracize Zhou Enlai after the Lin Biao incident. In the official Biography of Zhou Enlai, there is no mention of Zhou Enlai’s cancer until March 1974. Until that point, the biography is dedicated to topics such as Richard Nixon‘s visit to China, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, and the conflicts with the Gang of Four, including Jiang Qing. Zhou’s illness is suddenly revealed to the readers at a later point in the narrative. In the following paragraph, it is written as follows: “The excessive hardship and constant suffering further aggravated Zhou’s condition, which had been diagnosed as cancer two years earlier; since early March, Zhou’s daily blood in stool had reached 100 cc, and the medical team decided to conduct further examination and treatment of Zhou’s disease. On March 8, Zhou wrote a detailed review comment on the examination and treatment plan made by the medical team.” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Jin Chong (eds.) 1998), Vol. 2, p. 1133)

It is strange that a patient writes a comment on his own treatment plan, but it happened because Zhou, the patient, was a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee. Zhou Enlai finally died in January 1976, but Mao Zedong did not attend the grand memorial service held afterward. Officially, it was because Mao was not in good health. However, according to Gao Wenqian, this was not the case. He writes: “The Chinese authorities are trying to conceal the real reason as much as possible. They solely use a sentence written by Zhang Yufeng15 as their source material, explaining that the Party Center did not arrange for Mao’s attendance because he was very ill at the time. While at the time Mao could no longer walk … [according to the opinion of medical experts] the funeral committee had fully prepared for Mao’s attendance at the memorial service, not only had a wheelchair ready, but had also arranged all the travel routes. … However, Mao finally did not show up and did nothing other than send a wreath as designated by the authorities. Even Zhang Yufeng, who was ordered to write a text concealing the facts, could not overlook this point. She wrote in a twisted expression in her text that Mao Zedong did not shed any tear after hearing the news of Zhou Enlai’s death. And when she saw Mao write the instructions on the funeral committee’s deliberation report, she wrote, albeit euphemistically, ‘Can these 15

It is said that she was the secretary caring for Mao in his later years and was the only person who could understand and interpret Mao’s words in his sickbed.

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instructions be seen as an expression of the profound sense of farewell and camaraderie toward comrades who had weathered the storms of the revolution together for decades?’” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, pp. 336–337)16

On the other hand, there is differing information. Drawing on the opinions of a Chinese commentator, Yabuki Susumu writes: “Upon hearing the news of Zhou Enlai’s death, Mao Zedong slowly closed his eyes and furrowed his brows. Tears soon welled up and ran down his cheeks and even down his neck. He did not utter a word.” (Yabuki 1991, p. 166)

Which was the real Mao Zedong, the Mao who never shed a tear or the Mao who shed many tears? According to the rule of thumb that books published officially or domestically in China tend to be more “dramatized” than those published unofficially or abroad, it seems to me that the former seems closer to the truth. The Chinese commentator says, “Even if Mao really became jealous in his later years, would his conscience, humanism, and emotions really disappear due to jealousy?” It seems natural to conclude, however, that Mao’s jealousy was strong enough to suppress his emotions. After all, it is doubtful whether Mao Zedong, especially in his later years, had any “humanism.” It seems more straightforward to see him as being ruthless like the First Emperor of Qin. He was especially like that with political enemies he tried to overthrow or exclude. Mao Zedong, who had been “betrayed” by Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, may have been growing suspicious of Zhou Enlai as well. There is decisive evidence clearly indicating a gap between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, seemingly contradicting the testimony of the Chinese commentator mentioned earlier as well. Gao Wenqian, based on the opened records of Wang Dongxing, introduces Mao’s remarks. Specifically, Mao is said to have stated on January 12, 1976, immediately after Zhou’s funeral: “Why should I attend the Premier’s memorial service? I have the right not to attend! Who bestowed the title of Premier upon this great Marxist? The Premier and I have clashed more than ten times!’ Many staff members who intended to bid farewell to Zhou were reportedly detained from doing so due to such Mao’s attitude.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 338)

Why, even in his final years, did Mao Zedong become so skeptical of Zhou Enlai and avoid him to such an extent? Gao interprets the psychology of Mao’s criticism of Zhou after the Lin Biao incident, as follows: “Mao Zedong considered Zhou Enlai to be the vanguard of denying the Cultural Revolution behind his back. When Mao launched this Revolution, he was very afraid that someone would appear behind him, creating a secret report like Khrushchev, and he would be held accountable for his sins. Therefore, he successively drove Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao to death, but he still could not escape the nightmare of downfall. … At this point, Mao Zedong targeted Zhou Enlai as the ‘Khrushchev-like figure’ to be denounced.” (Ibid., p. 198) 16

In the original text of Zhang Yufeng‘s memoir, there is the following passage (referring to Mao Zedong’s marking of a circle to indicate that he had reviewed the column labeled ‘Chairman’ in the Funeral Committee’s deliberation report). “This circle represented Mao Zedong’s deep camaraderie with Zhou Enlai. However, for the people, it was indeed weak, too weak…” In this context, “weak, too weak” conveys the heavier meaning that, from the perspective of the people, the camaraderie may have been perceived as insufficient, rather than a lighter suggestion that it should have been expressed more explicitly.

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It is hard for us to understand why Zhou, who has been following Mao like a servant for long time, could be likened to a “Khrushchev-like figure,” but understanding becomes more acceptable when we consider how deeply suspicious and jealous Mao has become. According to Li Zhisui, Mao’s private doctor, his pulse became irregular around noon in January 1972, so he urgently called Zhou Enlai to tell him that Mao’s condition was dangerous and irreversible if sudden changes occurred. At Zhou’s instruction, a medical team was set up and found that his lungs were infected and his heart had been affected, and he was treated with penicillin and other injections. That evening, Zhou Enlai rushed over with Jiang Qing, and when Li Zhisui explained the condition, Mao is said to have told Zhou as follows: “I’m done. I’m done. When I die, you do everything.” (Li 1994a, Vol. 2, p. 529) At that time, he clearly entrusted the great powers of the Party, government, and military to Zhou, and Li perceived that he said so right in front of Jiang Qing. According to Li, that was the first time Mao faced his own death. The words may have been uttered because Mao was mentally very depressed due to the combination of the political fiasco of the Lin Biao incident and his own illness.17 If these words, even if only a temporary idea, represent Mao’s true intentions, Mao, who was “betrayed” by Liu Shaoqi, once scheduled to be his successor, and Lin Biao, who was also sung in the Party’s Constitution as his successor, chose Zhou Enlai as the last candidate. But was it really so? As he recovered from his illness, Mao rather cornered Zhou. I have introduced the evaluations of Zhou Enlai by several scholars above, but finally let me try my own evaluation of Zhou Enlai, albeit hypothetical. The fact that Zhou Enlai was seen as a “kind mother” in contrast to Mao Zedong, the “stern father,” seems to be just part of a heroic legend dreamed up by the common people. When looked at from afar, he seems to exude the image of a kind mother. On the other hand, those who were close to him and saw him in person, excluding those who were saved by him, might have seen him as a ruthless politician. Since he had sworn obedience to Mao Zedong, an emperor with absolute authority and power, the policy measures he could take were limited. He was far more humane, sensible, and capable of rational recognition than Mao, needless to say, but because he was mentally dominated by Mao, it is reasonable to interpret, as Wang Hui has put it, that he was “compelled and forced to say things that went against his true intentions.” For his part, in addition to Chen Yi, he may perhaps have really wanted to protect many other Party and government officials, including Liu Shaoqi, who was targeted for purge by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. But if First Emperor of Qin ordered that Confucian scholars be buried alive (kengru), would his subjects be able to disobey him? As a sign of obedience to the emperor, they had to be as ruthless as he was, and sometimes even more so. From a third-party perspective, Zhou Enlai, in cooperation with powerful leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, should have “pulled the emperor Mao Zedong 17

In the Japanese version of Li Zhisui’s book, the scene goes as follows. “It’s no good. You can’t save me. You can’t save me. You can’t save me at all. After I die, you will take care of everything… Listen, this is my last will and testament.” (Li 1994, pp. 329–330)

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off his horse” when they decided on the General Line for the Transition Period in 1953, or when they conspired with Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference in 1959, or even before the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. This would have greatly reduced the risk of loss of life for the Chinese people and the innocent masses. Also, the economy would have developed smoothly. Why didn’t he do that? Was Zhou cowardly? He might have had some twisted emotions. Why did Zhou Enlai obey Mao Zedong thoroughly? The following is my interpretation or hypothesis based on my own imagination. (1) Zhou Enlai had a kind of religious devotion to Mao Zedong. This is not a matter of rationality or irrationality. In a sense, it was a kind of instinctive sentiment that transcended reason and emotion. Therefore, it was unthinkable for Zhou Enlai as Mao’s vassal to pull down Mao, who was a guru with a God-like existence. (2) He had a sense of unity (identity) with the Party. In other words, Zhou Enlai feared that the loss of Mao would split the Party and ruin the nation. Even if he were to consider Mao’s demands as unreasonable or irrational, and if it was judged that fulfilling them was necessary for the preservation of the Party, painstakingly built through trials and tribulations, he would go to great lengths to follow Mao’s instructions, even by suppressing his own convictions. For Zhou Enlai, protecting Mao was synonymous with protecting the Party. (3) Lastly, as the most flattering interpretation, Zhou Enlai did not hesitate to sacrifice himself for the masses. As mentioned above, he himself did not seem to be a man who clung desperately to his position. However, if he had rebelled against Mao, he would have lost not only his position but also his life, which would bring chaos to the nation and endanger the lives and livelihood of the masses. To avoid such a situation, he had no choice but to sacrifice himself and obey Mao. These three interpretations do not necessarily contradict each other. If Mao Zedong is a guru, or a spiritual leader, then the Party, an organization that worships and serves this God, is equivalent to the church, and Zhou Enlai, one of its priests and the highestranking priest, would try to defend the God as well as the church for the sake of the masses of believers. When the God tries to condemn some of the priests, he would stand by the God’s side but also try to save some of priests. He would tell himself that this is for the sake of maintaining the church and protecting the believers, and act accordingly. Zhou Enlai is certainly a hero and one of the outstanding figures in Chinese history. But nothing can come from mere praise or adoration of him, or, conversely, from mere disgust or avoidance of him. It seems to me that Zhou was nothing but a tool for Mao in some sense. He had been useful in many ways to realize Mao’s aims both in political and ideological aspects. Whatever the interpretation, it is necessary to look not only at Mao Zedong, but also at Zhou Enlai, a politician with immense trust from the masses, in terms of both the ideal image (model) and the dirty reality (muddle). I believe that such work is essential in order to bring the hitherto heavily idealized historical image of socialist China closer to the truth.

Chapter 10

How Should We Evaluate Mao Zedong?: Mao Zedong and Contemporary China

So far, I have organized and analyzed Mao’s thoughts and actions, albeit from limited aspects. As repetitive as it may sound, he was a revolutionary, a military strategist, a poet and a thinker. Certainly, he was also a politician and, with his extensive historical knowledge, we might even regard him as a historian. Naturally, the way we evaluate him will differ depending on which angle we view him from. He referred to himself as “Marx plus the First Emperor of Qin (Qinshihuang),” which may in a sense be the most convenient starting point for evaluating him. He was a rare figure in Chinese history who possessed, or attempted to possess, both the immense power of the First Emperor and the high authority of Marx. His thoughts and actions were sometimes consistent, sometimes contradictory, sometimes mild, sometimes ruthless, so it is not necessarily easy to systematically grasp his overall image, but I will try to capture and evaluate him from my own perspective. This is the task of this chapter.

1 Marxism as Religion, Mao as Guru As mentioned in Chap. 3, what attracted Mao Zedong most to Marxism was the concept of class and class struggle. If he had not known this concept and had not discovered the power of the peasant class during the Chinese Revolution, he would not have attempted to launch a revolutionary struggle and, even if he had, it would have been a small military faction at most or remained a local force which would have ultimately been crushed by the superior military power of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. He had no interest in the central themes of Marxism, such as the liberation of the individual and individuality, or the overcoming of alienation. An idea like the “association of free people” so idealized by Marx was irrelevant to Mao. His highest and greatest purpose in studying Marxism was to figure out how to deploy class struggle theory as a tool to liberate a nation oppressed by imperialist

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powers, to revive China, release it from poverty, enhance national power, and thereby establish his own power. But in hindsight, is Marx’s concept of class and class struggle really an indispensable, and moreover “scientific” framework for understanding history and historical reality? I do not think so. Marx’s terrifyingly simplistic view that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” seems to be nothing more than rhetoric and should be theoretically considered a wishful hypothesis rather than an explanation of reality, as is the discourse that capitalist society is a society that necessarily involves “conflicts between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” This discourse reflects a one-sided interpretation of the “labor value theory,” the basic theory of Marxian economics—that “since commodities are created by workers, the original profit should belong to the workers by nature, therefore, the profit received by the capitalist constitutes exploitation.” Ralf Dahrendorf accurately points out how Marx’s class theory is oversimplistic and one-dimensional. He says: “In principle a theory of class illuminates only a small segment of the wide field which can be described by the vague concept of structural change. We can neither expect nor, above all, assume that a theory of class will cast a glimmer of its light on other aspects of structural change as well.” (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 129)

Therefore, political revolutions that bring about rapid changes in class structure are only a part of “structural changes with a vast domain,” and the class struggle is only one form of expressing conflicts of interest among classes, and conflicts among classes are only one way of expressing conflicts of interest “among social groups with a vast domain.” Marx saw the determinant of class in the private ownership of the means of production, but as Dahrendorf puts it: “This connection between the concept of class and the actual ownership of or exclusion from private property has limited the applicability of class theory to only a relatively short period of European social history,” and: “Class theory, based on the idea of dividing society into owners and nonowners of the means of production, loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and de facto control are separated.” (Ibid., p. 189) “We have seen …. that this tie between the concept of class and the possession of, or exclusion from, effective private property limits the applicability of class theory to a relatively short period of European social history. A theory of class based on the division of society into owners and nonowners of means of production loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and factual control are separated.” (Ibid., p. 136)

For example, is there a “proletariat versus bourgeoisie” relationship in the present day between the stockholders, who are the owners of the joint stock company, and the labor unions, who represent the workers? Instead of linking class to private ownership as Marx did, Dahrendorf’s interpretation below is far more persuasive: “As an element of social structure and a factor effecting change, they [classes] are as universal as their determinant, namely, authority and its distribution itself.” (Ibid., p. 137)

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Without critically and thoroughly analyzing Marx’s concepts of class and class struggle, Mao Zedong combined class with analysis of the current situation, and class struggle with revolutionary struggle, which was pragmatic at best and opportunistic at worst, and he interpreted and expanded these concepts in order to establish his own power. This was his so-called “Sinicization” of Marxism. Since Marxism was born in the Western world in the nineteenth century as a type of modern thought, it does not fit well when directly imported into China, a country with a completely different history and culture. In fact, Marx’s theory of revolution, centered on the proletariat, cannot be applied as such in twentieth century China where the majority of people are peasants. It was indeed a major “discovery” of Mao Zedong to focus on the peasants as a revolutionary force. Or it may be said to be a major contribution to a theory of revolution in developing countries by the “revisionist” Mao Zedong.1 However, given how he divided society under the banner of class struggle, thoroughly suppressed critical groups and individuals, persecuted and purged comrades who voiced dissent, it may rather be called a cruel misuse of Marxism than a new discovery, creation, or a contribution to Marxism. In China, Mao Zedong is revered as a great thinker who applied the “universal truth” of Marxism to Chinese reality.2 But what is the universal truth of Marxism in the first place? Is there any universality in its thought? Is the materialist view of history nothing more than a historical hypothesis? Why is the progressive historical view that history moves linearly from feudalism to capitalism, and then to socialism, as Marx predicts, a universal truth? Are Marx’s propositions that changes in productive forces change production relations, and changes in the economic base (infrastructure) change the superstructure, “universal” phenomena? No, they are not. Countless counterexamples can be raised against these propositions.3 In actual fact, Marxism and historical materialism are not universal truths, but mere hypotheses. As an example, let us acknowledge the historical reality that socialist countries, including China, have simultaneously defected to capitalism. As Branko Milanovich puts it, “Capitalism alone remains” in today’s world (Milanovic 2019).4 When this Marxist historical hypothesis is elevated to “science,” it becomes a historical truth and a powerful ideology that binds many thinkers and revolutionaries, and even justifies taking the lives of a vast number of innocent people. Then the “accountability for outcomes” of Marx himself, albeit indirectly, is significant, not to mention that of revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao Zedong. Marxists around the world call the socialism advocated by Marx “scientific socialism” while they have 1

A Sovietologist says that it is a myth that the Russian Revolution was a workers’ revolution. This is because the proletariat constituted only 2% of the population, and the revolution was mainly enacted by soldiers from revolutionary peasant backgrounds (Shimotomai 2017, p. 40). 2 The current China’s Constitution extols the “Xi Jinping thought” as a great theory that, along with Mao Zedong thought and Deng Xiaoping theory, links the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese practice. 3 For example, neither the Russian Revolution nor the Chinese Revolution was not born out of a contradiction between productive forces and production relations. 4 To use a joke once popular in Eastern Europe, real socialism was a system of “long transitional periods from capitalism to capitalism.”

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scorned the socialism of Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen prior to Marx as “utopian socialism.” But is the socialism conceived by Marx and Engels a “science” equivalent to natural science? The socialism of Marx and others, or the communist conception of Lenin, which abolishes division of labor, discards the market, and distributes according to needs, is nothing more than a cartoonish world akin to fantasy, like trying to create a paradise for humanity as distant as the Andromeda Nebula. Hannah Arendt saw Russian Bolshevism as a secular religion. In her view, “the emergence of ‘secular religion’ is itself an expression of the inevitability of human religious desire and a supreme political warning against traditional religion” (Arendt 2002). She then noted that Marx saw religion as a kind of ideology, and then reversed the relationship, positioning ideology as religion. Accordingly, we can see Marxism, Leninism and Maoism as “religions” rather than science, and it seems that this can explain well the socialist revolution, movements, and historical events of the Mao era. What if we were to boldly change the terms “Marxism,” “Leninism,” or “Maoism,” into “Marxist-Religion,” “Leninist-Religion,” or “Maoist-Religion,” respectively? Then the discourses and theories of Marx, Lenin, and Mao would be elevated to the word of “God,” or the “Bible,” so to speak, to an absolute truth that must never be doubted in the communist party dominated countries. If you dare to doubt or “revise” the word of God, you will be labeled an “apostate,” as Lenin cursed Kautsky, and in some cases you may be put on trial as if in a religious court, declared “guilty” and even executed. The members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union belong to a religious group called Leninist-Religion (let me call it a sect for now), and those who guide or control them are equivalent to priests or pastors.5 Similarly, the members of the Chinese Communist Party are members of the Maoist sect, and their leaders are the equivalent of priests or pastors of this sect. The priest of the Leninist sect’s cathedral was a great dictator named Stalin, and the founder of the Maoist-Religion or sect was strongly influenced by the new doctrine of intensified class struggle from the socialist dogma that he advocated.6 Like Christianity and Catholicism, these sects still have a variety of rituals. Portraits of Lenin and Mao are displayed in “churches” around the country, and believers are baptized by a priest or pastor (Party secretary). At times, the believers reverently swear, “I will strive hard for the realization of communism (God’s kingdom).” Those who have a promising future go to a seminary called a “party school” to study doctrines more deeply and devote themselves absolutely to God through the founder or guru. 5

Shimotomai Nobuo aptly notes that the Soviet Communist Party during Stalin’s time “was, in effect, a church by a founding atheist” (Shimotomai 2017, p. 79). 6 Drawing on Keynes and Weber, Inoki Takenori points out that “socialism was seen as a religion of twentieth century intellectuals who believed in reason and equality” (Inoki 1983). In fact, the “socialist” ideology was essentially tinged with such religious coloration. Unlike Lenin and Mao, however, intellectuals did not see the usefulness of such religiosity in developing a major revolutionary political movement.

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The general believers of this sect do not doubt the guru at all. Would Christians doubt God? They firmly believe or have been led to believe that the guru is the one who saved them. Mao Zedong is an absolute being who speaks the only truth; he is the founder and the incarnation of God, so doubting his word is “blasphemy.” Even if they are forced to live a hard life, sometimes even to the point of starvation, the believers continue to believe in the doctrine and the guru. Even if they are sometimes exploited or abused by vicious local priests, they appeal directly to the guru, saying that it is the priests who are at fault and not the guru, or that the guru may not know the priest’s wrongdoing. They continue to adore the God and the guru in their hearts. And at meetings they offer prayers saying, “We pray for the longevity of the guru” (wanshou wujiang) and they sing “hymns” called revolutionary songs. Events such as the unprecedented famine and starvation during The Great Leap Forward (GLF), or the severe violence of the Cultural Revolution (CR) when the number killed was tremendous—such events would ordinarily precipitate a revolution or a great rebellion and the subsequent collapse of the regime. First, there would be a split among leaders, then the Supreme Leader who had caused such a tragedy would be ousted, his statue toppled, his portrait torn down, and he might finally be killed by the crowd or by the military. But why did such dramatic changes not happen in Mao’s China? When the GLF policy failed spectacularly, resulting in famine and starvation that wreaked havoc on the economy, commentators abroad predicted that China would collapse. One American commentator saw the Chinese economy as being on a veritable “downward spiral.” Yet, despite tens of millions of deaths from starvation, China’s regime did not collapse, the Communist system did not waver, and Mao Zedong was not ousted. Is it because a strict surveillance network was laid out in every corner of society, and anyone showing even a slight anti-Party, anti-government, or anti-Mao tendency would be anonymously reported and cracked down on? That might be part of it. However, when a great famine occurs and society seems to be on the verge of collapse, it would be normal for the anonymous reporting and police surveillance network to also collapse. Or was it because the regime was able to concentrate on domestic measures without interference or invasion from foreign powers, especially from powerful military nations such as the Soviet Union and the United States? That might be one factor. However, it can also be interpreted that such interference or invasion was suppressed precisely because domestic control was in place. In my view, the two most likely reasons why China did not collapse during the GLF disaster are as follows: First, during this period of economic turmoil, the masses did not actively resist, but rather passively took various actions to circumvent the system, such as fleeing from their hometowns, cultivating illegal farmland and food crops, and hiding forced food procurement. Such “counteractions” ( fanxingwei), as Gao Wangling calls them, allowed many farmers to survive to some extent (see Gao 2013). However, while this factor may explain the relative stability of the regime in areas where there were relatively few deaths from starvation, it is difficult to explain the cases of areas where starvation had reached a critical point. In such dire areas, where more than half and

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in extreme cases almost all of the people in a village starved to death and even cannibalism was rampant, the means of “counteractions” must have been exhausted. The second and even more powerful regime “stabilizing” factor is the abovementioned “religious” factor: In the fourteenth century, the plague spread widely in Western Europe, causing a drastic decrease in population. Some say that as much as 60% of the entire population of Europe died because of this disease. However, we do not hear of any immediate political upheaval resulting from the plague. Was it because so many people fell ill that they lacked the strength and energy to overthrow the monarchy? That might be part of it, but a more important cause seems to have been the strength of the mental control exerted by medieval Christianity. Many of the people prayed frantically as they watched over their dying family members and friends. For the common people of Europe at that time, Christianity, the Pope, and the church (priests) were absolute entities. Kings and lords, who ruled over their people and held power obeyed this religious authority and protected the church, and opposing the king or lord would have meant opposing the church, and by extension, the Pope of Rome. If we were to transpose this onto China during the Mao era, a similar case emerges. That is to say, during the catastrophic crisis that followed the GLF movement, Maoists believed in their guru, Chairman Mao, and indeed they did not even consider Mao to be responsible for the great disaster, but saw the People’s Communes and county leaders—equivalent to the priests and pastors of the “local church”—as the culprits, and so resorted to passive resistance.7 Yang Jisheng points out that for 17 years before the Cultural Revolution, people were indoctrinated with the official ideology every day in textbooks, media, meetings, and other forms, and this became the collective consciousness of the entire society (Yang 2019, p. 210). Put it differently, ideology was applied like a strong religious doctrine. Before the start of the CR movement, when the rural socialist education campaign described in Chap. 8 was being developed in many places, meetings were held in a village in Guangdong Province two or three times a week in the evening, where peasants were required to learn new revolutionary songs and Quotations from Chaiman Mao from something called a “Mao Zedong Thought Learning Guide,” and teenagers in particular were gradually inspired by such activities. One of them later confessed: “I was very much inspired by the Maoist ideology. The youths truly believed in Mao’s thought. In their hearts they really felt this Mao Zedong was something, thought every one of the quotations made sense.” (Chan et al. 1984, p. 81)

No doubt, the “stability of the regime” during the Mao era cannot be explained by one or two factors alone, but rather by a variety of factors, and these factors may differ from region to region. The abovementioned reporting and surveillance system would have been in effect, and above all, information was controlled, bad news was 7

Needless to say, the reference to Mao Zedong as a guru is only a metaphor for illustrative purposes, and Maoism is not an actual religion. It is important to note, however, that many people did not doubt him, even in a situation of near-extreme desperation. Qian Liqun sees the Great Leap Forward of 1958 as having a kind of “religious fanaticism” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 2, p. 330; Qian 2012b, Vol. 2, p. 256).

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not transmitted, and as a result of repeated political struggles, leaders who opposed Mao Zedong were successively ousted. Furthermore, even during the catastrophic situation of the CR movement, when the Party and government structures throughout the country were paralyzed, the fact that Mao firmly controlled the military is cited as an important reason why the system did not collapse.8 In fact, it was Mao who said, “What is power, what is force, what is authority, it is nothing but the military.”9 However, it seems to me that the most fundamental factor stabilizing the regime was Mao’s “deification.” No one dared directly defy Mao, the God and the guru of the religion called Maoism, or even dared to think of rebelling against him. Why did the peasants not revolt when Peng Dehuai desperately told Mao about the earnest appeals of the peasants in Hunan Province, the appeal that caused him to be ousted?

2 The Charisma of Mao Zedong In retrospect, the root of the abnormal and distorted structures that emerged in China at that time can ultimately be traced back to Mao Zedong’s powerful charisma. What is charisma, in the first place? And what was the source of Mao’s charisma? Max Weber identifies three types of legitimate authority: Rational-legal authority, traditional authority, and, in addition, charismatic authority. Charismatic authority, in this context, is characterized by the attribution of “innate qualities of the leader, especially magical abilities, revelation, heroic attributes, and emotional devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person,” and is often rooted in the perception of “eternally new, extraordinary, and unprecedented” qualities and the emotional fascination they generate (Weber 1960, p. 47). Because Mao was recognized as possessing “extraordinary qualities,” ordinary people “believed” in him, were fascinated by him and emotionally devoted to him. The legitimacy of the charismatic figure is based on their adoration of his “exceptional sanctity and heroism.” Then, where did Mao’s “extraordinary qualities” come from? He was not a shaman, so he did not have magical powers, nor did he make divine revelations. However, in the 1930s, when he was holed up in Jinggangshan, he repelled the powerful Kuomintang (KMT) army that surrounded the revolutionary government four times, and in the Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists that began in 1946, he started from Harbin in the Northeastern region and moved southward, besieging and capturing one major city after the other from the KMT army, which had 8

The question then becomes why Mao was able to maintain control over the military. The fact that he had Peng Dehuai, the Minister of National Defense, ousted at the Lushan Conference and replaced him with Lin Biao, a staunch Maoist, may have had a positive effect on Mao surviving the Cultural Revolution. 9 Re-quoted from Tang (2003). Originally from Liu Zhinan, “Jiuda zhi Jiujie Erzhong Quanhui Qianxi Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao de Fenqi he Maodun (The Divergence and Contradictions between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao on the Eve of the Ninth National Congress and the Ninth Central Committee Plenary Session),” Journal of Contemporary Chinese History, 1997, No. 3.

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overwhelming military power, aided by the United States, and also had the weapons of the surrendered Japanese army. This is probably one of the main reasons why Mao Zedong was revered as a person with “extraordinary qualities.” Mao left Jinggangshan with the Red Army and conducted the so-called 25,000 li Long March from 1935 to 1936. In reality the Long March was a great escape, but if dramatized and idealized it may remind us of Moses’ “Exodus” in the Old Testament. The peasants in the northern part of Shaanxi Province praised Mao by singing a song called “The East is Red” (dongfanghong) and exalted him as the “Great Star of Salvation” (dajiuxing). He indeed became the “Moses” of revolutionary history, even modern history in China. His achievements and “miracles” during the liberation struggle alone are enough to shape the charisma of Mao Zedong, but he also possessed a vast knowledge of history, a philosophical cultivatison, and ability as a poet, that is, all the essentials for a traditional intellectual (dushuren). From our point of view, there was as much difference between him and other political leaders in terms of humanistic cultivation, eloquence and persuasiveness, as there is between adults and children. Undoubtedly, compared to Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai was probably superior in terms of his human appeal, which attracted many people. In terms of understanding and knowledge of the economy, Mao Zedong could not match Chen Yun. In terms of practical ability, Deng Xiaoping was more outstanding than Mao Zedong. However, when Mao launched his “rash advance” policy in 1956, they all prostrated themselves before Mao (see Chap. 5). This was because they did not have the “extraordinary qualities” to compete with Mao. If we only consider knowledge of history and understanding of Marxism, Mao Zedong may be inferior to professors of history and Marxist philosophy at Peking University, for example. However, the professors at Peking University have no track record in the revolutionary struggle. In Chap. 1, I pointed out the serious pitfalls or logical flaws in his two major philosophical works, “On Contradictions” and “On Practice.” As far as I have researched, there are not many scholars in China who have explicitly addressed and criticized these flaws. However, there must have been intellectuals who noticed serious shortcomings inherent in his philosophy. In particular, intellectuals from the democratic parties, such independent thinkers as Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, for example, must have privately despised Mao’s philosophy.10 But no one mentioned this in public, nor could they do so because to do so would have been blasphemy against God and the guru, and if they were not careful, these intellectuals might not only have been “excommunicated,” but might have lost their lives.11 There was another factor that underpinned and even strengthened Mao’s charisma. That is the Marxist “scientific socialism” theory mentioned earlier. The fact that society “dialectically” transitions from feudalism to capitalism, and then to socialism, 10

Let us recall that Zhang Bojun told his daughter, “It is a fool’s logic to call [Mao Zedong’s] Marxism a doctrine of class and class struggle” (see Chap. 4). 11 Even today, criticism of Mao Zedong remains taboo in China. Although it has weakened compared to the past, Maoism has effectively become the “state religion” in China.

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was deemed “scientifically proven” by Marx’s teachings as if a revelation from God, so Mao’s revolutionary theory was considered to have a “scientific” nature that cannot be changed by human will. Most of the Chinese people, including intellectuals, must have thought in the following way: “What Chairman Mao says is absolutely correct. In fact, just as the prophet Marx predicted, didn’t the socialist revolution occur in Russia and then in China?” As Marx said, “Religion is opium.” For followers of the Marxist-Religion and MaoistReligion, once they committed to such religions, it settled deeply in their brain cells. They embraced these religions without reserve. One more comment regarding the perceived “scientific nature” of Marxism is that it served to justify brutal violence in practice. Stéphane Courtois says the following: “Totalitarian leaders claimed the right to put their kind to death, and in fact had the ‘moral power’ to do so. Their fundamental justifying logic was always the same– based on the inevitability of science.” (Courtois 2006, p. 357, my emphasis)

When the policies and directions of absolute leaders are said to be “scientific,” no one can argue against them. If the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolution are said to have scientific inevitability, any opposing argument is declared unscientific, giving the leader the power of life and death. During the Mao era in China, just as God was the creator of all, Mao Zedong was the ultimate decision-maker. Believing in Mao’s words was a way of life for almost everybody, at least until the Lin Biao incident in 1971, when Lin Biao, Mao’s “closest comrade-in-arms” and designated successor, attempted a coup. A young woman sent to a state farm in the Northeast (former Manchuria) was so shocked by the Lin Biao incident, she confessed that “the pillar of spiritual certainty had completely crumbled inside me. The belief in communism and my unwavering faith in Mao had collapsed.” (Dikötter 2016, p. 252) According to Gao Wenqian, who is familiar with the Party’s internal documents, wrote: “[Due to the Lin Biao incident] Mao’s image was severely tarnished, the paint of the Cultural Revolution was peeled off, and his true image began to appear. Doubts, disillusionment, and negative feelings toward the Cultural Revolution, and Mao himself, began to emerge.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 74)

Charismatic worship of politicians and leaders is not limited to Maoist China. It was also seen in the worship of Hitler in Nazi Germany and Stalin in the Soviet Union. In pre-war Japan, too, the Emperor was revered as a “living God.” Why do people succumb to such abnormal psychology? In the end, it may be because democracy does not exist or has not taken root, or even if it does exist, if there are various institutional devices and environments, such as information manipulation and education, that prevent people from thinking independently, the masses will easily follow their leaders. In addition, for many people, it is easier to have everything decided at the top than think hard and take responsibility for themselves. This is what Erich Fromm calls “escape from freedom.” Like Hitler, Stalin, and other dictators, Mao succeeded in creating such masses. However, there is a big difference between

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Hitler or Stalin and Mao. While Hitler and Stalin no longer have much influence in the contemporary world, Mao is different. Even now, his authority stands tall on the land of China together with his big bronze statues.

3 Mao’s Legacies to Contemporary China In December 1978, the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its third plenary session, Deng Xiaoping’s power was established, which symbolized the start of a new era of “reform and opening-up.” Subsequently, marketization and privatization, which had been avoided during the Mao era, progressed, the People’s Communes were dismantled, and Deng Xiaoping’s economics began to be effective. In particular, after 1992, the full marketization of the economy in the name of “socialist market economy,” started and China achieved epoch-making long-run rapid economic growth (see Chap. 7). But is Deng-era China completely different from Mao-era China? Not at all. Deng Xiaoping inherited and utilized Mao’s legacies. Without those legacies, there would be no Deng Xiaoping era. Then, what legacies did Deng’s China receive from Mao’s China? First, it inherited the political system of a one-party dictatorship as well as the institutional framework of decentralization introduced in Chap. 7. Second, when we look at the economy, China inherited the technological foundations of industry and agriculture, which were developed during the Mao era as we noted in Chap. 7. China squeezed the peasants, made industrial workers work for low wages, invested the profits obtained from this investment, promoted heavy industrialization following the Soviet Union, and created an industrial system that did not exist before the founding of the country. In the early years, China invited many engineers from the Soviet Union, learned from them, and trained a large number of technical personnel. When relationships between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated and the Soviet engineers withdrew, China developed its own atomic bomb under the spirit of self-reliance (1964). In agriculture, under the system of collective farming and the People’s Commune system, the government mobilized “600 million ants” to invest in infrastructure, including large-scale water conservancy construction, while at the same time developing basic technological capabilities. It is noteworthy that many agricultural technicians were produced compared to traditional China, and modern technology in areas such as crop cultivation became widespread. Besides that, Under Maoist rule, China achieved the widespread provision of fundamental education and healthcare. During the Maoist era, the average life expectancy of the Chinese people increased, and the school enrollment rate rose, especially in rural areas. Regardless of the quality, many people were able to go to hospitals for free or at low cost and receive basic education in primary and secondary schools, providing China with important human resources as a valuable initial condition for the economic development.

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Needless to say, these achievements are significant. However, they were obtained at great and numerous costs. Furthermore, it is not the case that such achievements could only be made in Mao’s China. I hold the belief that there could have been an alternative, less costly path to achieving the same objectives initially set by Mao. What stands as a tragedy for China is the absence of an individual capable of presenting such an alternative approach to economic development during his era. There is the fact that in Taiwan and South Korea, where there was not such a big difference compared to China at the starting point, economic growth after the war was faster than in China, and it was achieved without great upheaval China has experienced. It is true that the population size of China is different from that of Taiwan and South Korea. But in terms of development strategy, it cannot be said that Mao Zedong’s “developmental dictatorship” under the Marxist ideology was far superior to the same type of system applied within the capitalist framework of Chiang Kaishek—Chiang Ching-kuo’s Taiwan and Park Chung-hee’s Korea. In fact, from a costperformance perspective, Mao’s development strategy was overwhelmingly inferior to these economies. In Taiwan and South Korea, during the period of development of the dictatorship and rapid economic growth, policies were never adopted that resulted in the incrimination of several percent of the population, much less the loss of normal life. Third, the legacies that post-Mao China inherited from Maoist China are not only the institutional infrastructure, technological foundation, and human resources that we have seen above. In addition to these, there are principles of governance that move the entire system. The greatest legacies that Deng Xiaoping inherited from Mao Zedong, in my view, were the following three governance principles established during the pre-reform era. The first is authoritarianism (quanli zhuyi), which regards power as the supreme and ultimate entity. Mao Zedong believed that “power is everything” (quanli jiushi yiqie). Because he equated his own power with that of the Party, he thoroughly eliminated anyone who opposed him or who might oppose him, as “anti-Party or counterrevolutionary elements. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, fully aware that he did not possess the same charisma as Mao Zedong, firmly believed that the power of the Party, rather than his own power, was everything. Once power is obtained, it must not be relinquished at any cost. This kind of authoritarianism is not an invention of Mao, but it was solidified by him, passed on to his successor Deng Xiaoping, and is firmly inherited by Xi Jinping today. The second is elitism or anti-democracy. Deng Xiaoping, who was aware of the adverse effects of the concentration of power in individuals and the personality cult, emphasized a collective leadership system. Immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident, he called for the formation of a collective leadership system with Jiang Zemin as its “core,” saying that “the establishment of a third-generation leadership group is an urgent task at hand.” Acknowledging that Mao Zedong was the core of the Party’s Politburo in the first generation during the Mao era and he himself as the core after the reform and opening-up, Deng wished to revive the collective instruction

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system.12 Specifically, he proposed that authority be centralized in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This approach is a “democratic centralized system,” the traditional decision-making method of the Communist Party since Lenin, but it is also a kind of “saint politics” or “rule by a few wise individuals” system.13 Democracy does not guarantee the stability of power and can possibly lead to mob rule, so it is not adopted. Thus, he hated universal values such as freedom and democracy. The elitist view that politics, that is, decision-making, can be carried out only by a few, and in some cases only one “elected” or “wise” person, has been developed and established within the Communist Party system since Lenin. In China, it was ironically introduced and consolidated by Mao, who advocated the “mass line.” Deng can be said to have faithfully inherited this system and spirit from Mao.14 The third is pragmatism. Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism, which could be considered his trademark, although strange to say, was actually inherited from Mao Zedong. However, as mentioned above, Deng’s pragmatism originates from Mao’s theory of practice—the principle of “seek truth from facts (shishi qiushi)”. As mentioned in Chap. 1, the “Historical Resolution” of the Chinese Communist Party in 1981 interpreted “Mao Zedong Thought” to consist of the mass line, seeking truth from facts, and independence as well as self-reliance. Deng, who practiced the pragmatic principle of “seeking truth from facts” more than Mao, may be said to be his most faithful disciple. This is because, contrary to the principle of pragmatism that he advocated, Mao often chose reckless policies that ignored reality, such as the GLF and the CR movements, which could have ruined the nation. The abovementioned authoritarianism, elitism, and pragmatism have been passed down from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and then to Xi Jinping, albeit in different forms, and have become the basic governance principles of contemporary China. Reform and opening-up have indeed dramatically transformed China’s politics, society, and economy in all aspects. The emphasis has shifted from politics to the economy, from production relations to productive forces, from moral incentives to material motivation, from egalitarianism to tolerance of inequality, and from selfreliance to openness to the outside world. People began to pursue financial wealth rather than ideology. The leadership also came to rely on faith in power, with Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought being virtually ignored. In order to maintain and consolidate power, the Communist Party and Deng Xiaoping, through years of practical experience, became convinced that these three governance principles could promote economic development in a material sense. Xi Jinping has merely added the somewhat mundane principle of governance, i.e. nationalism, to these three principles, by advocating the “China Dream” and the “Revival of China.” 12

However, he continued to keep the leadership as the President of the Military Commission for some time. 13 Socialist thought included a faith in “planning by reason” (Inoki 1983). Elitism is also derived from that faith. 14 The elitism of today’s Communist Party is much more “sophisticated” than in the Mao era, and when making decisions, leaders do not practice Mao’s style of “one person alone has the say (yiyantang),” but also listen to the opinions of many “expert groups” (elites) both inside and outside the Party.

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Fig. 1 Self-perpetuating and expanding mechanism of power in China

What is important is that these three governance principles complement each other to create a powerful structure, with authoritarianism at the top or as the ultimate objective (see Fig. 1). Once power is formed, vested interests are created, and those in power will inevitably seek to maintain their power in order to protect those vested interests. Qian Liqun says that Mao Zedong was concerned about power because protecting the Party as a formed interest group would enable him to maintain his power and realize his ideals (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 128; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 91). In Mao’s case, he may not have been as strong as Deng Xiaoping in his will to protect the vested interests of the Party, as the Party was once destroyed by the CR movement. In any case, democracy and a multiparty system must be eliminated as obstacles to preserving power, and the principle of elitism becomes necessary, as it is easier to maintain and develop established power with the support of certain elites (individuals or specific groups). Power can also confer various vested interests on such elites. On the other hand, pragmatism is indeed useful for preserving power. If those in power can change rules, laws, etc. at will, they can maintain and develop their power. Moreover, ideology, Marxist theory and the like, can be remolded, adapted freely or even ignored, if necessary. In addition, those in power reward those who pragmatically change existing systems. And the principles of this pragmatism and elitism work complementarily. Only the elite, in principle, can change the system pragmatically, and the pragmatists can rise to the elite. With such a structure, it can be said that the spirit and system of “truth falls from the heavens” is easily created and perpetuated. There is no need to say that any rulers in any country will want to use their power freely and for a long time. And there are never only a few individuals in any society who seek power. It is true of all politicians. However, few individual have paid attention to the fact that only when the two principles of elitism and pragmatism are at work can the power of a few be maintained and developed in a stable and powerful manner. Mao Zedong must have discovered the existence of such a mechanism in the long and fierce struggle for power within and outside the Party, and within and outside the country. The power thus created is maintained and expanded by its own

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power, as mentioned above. Thus, a mechanism of self-perpetuation and expansion of power was formed. Stalin also maintained dictatorial power for a long time and used it as he wished. Both Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin, and Leonid Brezhnev, who succeeded Khrushchev, monopolized power for a long time in the Soviet Union. In the former Soviet Union, therefore, a similar mechanism of self-perpetuation and expansion of power must have been at work as in China. But because they lacked the principle of pragmatism and tried to maintain the old outdated socialist system as well as ideology, the system aged and corrupted over the years, and the Soviet Union finally collapsed 74 years after the Russian Revolution.15 In contrast, contemporary China continues to expand its system even after the 74th anniversary of its founding in 2023, and contrary to the expectations of China-hating people around the world, it does not seem to collapse easily.

4 The Character of Mao Zedong I have already stressed that Mao Zedong was a man of diverse talents. On the other hand, it is clear from his behavior that he had a multifaceted and complex character. I believe that his character determined his policies and actions, at least to a certain degree. I am neither a psychologist nor a psychoanalyst, but let me try to boldly analyze his character so as to understand Mao Zedong and his behavior. Lin Ke, who once served as Mao’s secretary, describes Mao’s characters. According to him, Mao Zedong had two different characters: The tiger-like character and monkey-like character: “The tiger-like character is to persistently pursue the goals one believes to be correct and to see them through to the end. The monkey-like character refers to … being very romantic and unbound, living as one pleases …. Mao Zedong had said of himself, ‘I possess both of these characters, but the tiger-like character is dominant,’ …. the tiger-like and monkey-like characters are balanced …. Problems arise when this balance is upset and the monkey-like character surpasses the tiger-like one …. During the Great Leap Forward and the Peoples’s Commune movements, it seems that the monkey-like character came to the fore and the tiger-like one receded.” (Lin and Ling 1994, p. 226)

In other words, the reckless policies of those two movements were adopted because the balance in his mind was upset, and the tiger-like character became less dominant than the monkey-like quality. By the way, Lin Ke refers to the monkey-like character as romanticism; then what is the tiger-like character? According to Lin, the tiger-like character is a realistic spirit (ibid., p. 257). But how much of the realistic spirit was reflected in such reckless movements? Also, can the tremendous sacrifices and tragedies that resulted from these policies be dismissed as due to Mao’s “romanticism”? A more accurate 15

Certainly, Gorbachev’s attempt to introduce “glasnost’” (free speech) was also significant during the 1980s. This system is antithetical to elitism, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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description of Mao’s character, based on his criticism of Hu Feng and his actions in the Anti-Rightist Struggle, would be to see him as a balance/imbalance between the tiger-like character of ruthlessness and the monkey-like character of tolerance. Once someone infuriates him, he is quickly dominated by the tiger-like character, becomes ruthless, intimidates his opponent like a fearsome tiger, and eventually devours them. Borrowing the words of Gao Wenqian, Mao Zedong was “originally very conceited, full of ambition, and enjoyed solitude and challenge. This is the quality required of someone who commands an entire army.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 75) Undoubtedly, considering the dream he had for the People’s Commune, we may need to capture his character from another dimension. That is, in terms of his attitude toward fantasy and reality. This fantasy corresponds to what Lin Ke calls romanticism. Mao’s attitude and judgment in the case of the communization moved from fantasy and tolerance at the beginning to reality and tolerance later on, and then to reality and ruthlessness, while in the case of land reform, did he not move from fantasy and ruthlessness at the beginning to reality and ruthlessness later on? In other words, he had both the ruthlessness of the First Emperor of Qin and the fantasy of Marx. According to Gao Wenqian, Mao had qualities of “cunning, cruelty, autocracy, tyranny, a tendency to surpass even his own mentor, and an inclination to go to extremes.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 198) It seems to me, however, that his character was more complex. At the Shanghai Conference held before the Lushan Conference, Mao was indeed tolerant toward Peng Dehuai (see Chap. 6). However, when Peng sent a personal letter to Mao during the Lushan Conference, implicitly criticizing the GLF and PC policies, Mao suddenly turned ruthless. Why? What happened to him? Was it because of historical resentment, or because he feared that Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, and others had formed a “counterrevolutionary group” and he felt insecure about his own power? It seems that both factors were at play. He is at times furious. In Young Mao Zedong written by Li Zehou, Mao reflects on himself as follows: “Regrettably, I had a disease of being too emotional and getting furious with righteous indignation. I am more easily moved by emotions and have difficulty in keeping regularity in my life. My personality dislikes restraint.” (Requoted from Su et al. 1992, p. 250)

The man who served as Mao’s bodyguard recalls him as “someone who was sensitive and tenderhearted” and described him as having a “kind and gentle heart.” (Takeuchi 1989, p. 200). However, it does not appear that Mao, the outstanding figure of the century, was merely an emotional, sensitive, and tenderhearted person. At times he was extremely rational. It might be necessary to add a third axis of rational vs. emotional to the above two axes (see Fig. 2). When he was rational and fanciful, as well as calm and tolerant, he would ponder philosophy or, in the midst of war, conceive of various military tactics. But when he is emotional, ruthless, and pragmatic, as in the case of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and the criticism of Peng Dehuai, he thoroughly pursues those who oppose or disagree with his policies. According to Wang Youqin, the reason why Mao cornered Liu Shaoqi during the Cultural Revolution and made him

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Fig. 2 Structure of Mao’s character

die a miserable death was because he took “a kind of sadistic pleasure in the process of persecution” (Wang 2017a). Sometimes he is compassionate, sometimes ruthless. Sometimes he is humble and modest, sometimes he is haughty and arrogant. What brought about his arrogance was a strong desire for self-display and an insatiable thirst for absolute power. He was strongly opposed to Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin (20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 1956) because he suspected that if he completely denied Stalin’s achievements and authority, it would bounce back to him someday. Gao Wenqian perceives that Mao was afraid that someone like Khrushchev would deny him his legacy after he died, which is why he hunted down Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao (Gao 2007, Vol. 2). At the same time, however, he also had an intense latent desire to be worshipped by others, and he might have feared that such a desire would not be realized under those leaders. Hu Angang has collected several examples of how Mao Zedong wanted his name and achievements to be praised. For example, in November 1963, he deliberately added the following sentence to Zhou Yang’s article “The Combat Mission of Philosophical and Social Science Workers.” “In China, Comrade Mao Zedong pushed forward a fierce argument against the various opportunists in the Party, disregarding the ridicule of ‘narrow empiricism’ once showered upon him, politically striking and isolating them, linking the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete reality of the Chinese Revolution, and creatively developing MarxismLeninism using the new theory of revolution under new conditions.” (Hu 2008, p. 62, Hu’s emphasis)

If Zhou Yang were saying it, it might be one thing, but Mao Zedong himself wrote that he “creatively developed Marxism-Leninism.”

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Furthermore, on September 29, 1964, Mao Zedong himself added the following phrases to Peng Zhen’s “Speech Manuscript at the 15th Anniversary of the National Day Ceremony.” “Comrade Mao Zedong always says to us ….” and, “the people of all ethnic groups of our country armed with Mao Zedong Thought” (ibid., p. 63). In addition, on January 3, 1965, Mao Zedong inserted in He Long’s “Speech Manuscript at the First Session of the Third People’s Congress” that “the people and the army of our country, under the guidance of the Party and Chairman Mao, will carry out the revolutionary spirit ….” (ibid., p. 63). He also changed the title of that meeting to “Comrade Mao’s great idea of people’s war will forever be the guideline for the construction of our national defence” (ibid.). If he were truly humble at all times, he would not have added words that elevate himself or have “creatively developed” other person’s manuscripts. Calling one’s own thought “great” is something that a normal and ordinary person would be too embarrassed to say. It was because he was the charismatic guru, Mao Zedong, that he could do it. He not only had a strong desire for self-display, but he intentionally and strategically tried to enhance personal worship of himself within the Party. My understanding is that this was driven by his intense desire for power, and at times, his pragmatic thinking used in various ways for this purpose, acted as a switch, changing his character. This is my judgment and hypothesis about Mao’s character and its changes. Such arrogant acts by Mao Zedong were against the “prohibition of personality cult” regulation of the Party’s Eighth National Congress in 1956, which Mao himself admitted, but Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Zhen did nothing to reprimand him. At the Party’s Seventh National Congress in 1945, Liu Shaoqi included the term “Mao Zedong Thought” in an official document for the first time. But Liu remained silent when, about 20 years later, Mao Zedong Thought became the personal thought of Mao Zedong.16 To return to the earlier metaphor, Liu was not a priest or pastor who would openly confront the guru. It was at the December 1964 meeting of the enlarged Standing Committee of the Politburo that he finally stood up to the guru face-to-face (see Chap. 8). That was why Mao was determined to eventually overthrow Liu. In the end, Mao chose his admirer Lin Biao, and a short time after the start of the CR movement, he wrote the name of his “close comrade-in-arms,” Lin, as his successor into the Party’s Constitution at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party in April 1969. In April 1970, Mao Zedong edited Lin’s political report, which described him as having “genius, creativity, and comprehensive development of Marxism-Leninism.” Mao removed the phrase “genius, creativity, and comprehensive development”, probably sensing Lin’s ambition and out of a growing concern for his own hold on power, after which Mao became more calm, pragmatic, and rational.17 16

In the record of a conversation with Yu Qiuli, then Minister of Petroleum Industry, sent by Chen Boda to Mao Zedong in December 1964, it was stated that “we should follow the Chairman’s thought” (Hu 2008, p. 63, Hu’s emphasis.). Mao had this printed and distributed to the Political Bureau and the Vice Premier of the State Council. 17 Mao had decided to get rid of Lin Biao even before that. See Gao (2007, Vol. 2), for more information on the history of this period.

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5 An Evaluation of Mao Zedong: My Tentative View Recently, the limits of capitalism have been argued worldwide, and some are hoping for a revival of “socialism.” There is also a wave of populism sweeping the world, and the defects of democracy based on a free electoral system are being loudly proclaimed. Upon reflection, all of these are rooted in the latent conflict between freedom and equality that modern societies have pursued. On the other hand, China has been promoting the “superiority” of its authoritarian regime on the basis of its remarkable economic development and, for a time, on the basis of the forced suppression of the novel coronavirus.18 As capitalist countries promote development through free competition and market economies, inequality widens, and as globalization progresses, the movement of people and immigration increases, and those who cannot benefit from competition and markets promote populist politics. On the other hand, socialist countries in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other regions have opted for capitalism en masse since the late 1980s, largely because socialism, contrary to Lenin’s oath, did not guarantee “true freedom,” it eliminated the market, the economy lagged and people were given “equality of results, but at a low level.” Winston Churchill left us the now famous quote: The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings. The inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries. What Yu Luoke sought was the elimination of social, political, and economic discrimination between “classes” (see Chap. 8). He felt strongly that the terrifying disparity between the Red Five and Black Five was inhuman and inherently contrary to socialist ideals. Moreover, if the class from which one’s parents came was passed on to one’s children, this would conform to the very tradition of pre-modern feudal society. If he had been allowed a “free spirit” and enjoyed full freedom of thought, he would have discovered that this irrational system originated from Mao Zedong’s view of class, and if he further developed his thinking, that this class view is fundamentally based on Marx’s historical materialism.19 If he deepened his thinking even further, he might have realized that the idea that a certain class is “advanced” and that society progresses by overthrowing the backward class creates serious inequality and unfortunate conflicts in society. Although he praises Mao’s ideology and MarxismLeninism in words, I imagine that he, being a brilliant youth, could have eventually broken through Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. And he might have raised fundamental questions about the “truth falls from the heavens” system. This would have been the bomb that would have “shaken the entire system” in the true sense. If it were him, he should have been able to identify more fundamental issues beyond mere criticism of “bloodline theory”.

18

The Chinese government abruptly abandoned its previous “zero-corona policy” in December 2022 and switched to a policy of coexistence with coronaviruses, claiming that its previous infection control measures, including mandatory movement restrictions, had been effective. 19 According to Pei Yiran, “The young laborer Yu Luoke wrote a ‘theory of origin,’ the ideological source of which was the Western humanist philosophy of equality, freedom, etc.” (Pei 2017).

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The thought of “scientific socialism”, beginning with Marx, could ironically be described as an “ideological current born during the long transitional period from modern times to modern times.” The original form of the current, derived from modern thought seeking freedom and equality, has resulted in tremendous violence and discrimination, and now we may be embarking on a journey to seek what true freedom and equality really are. At least, it is certain that such thought cannot be sought from Lenin or Mao Zedong. During the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath, there were quite a few individuals who praised “Mao Zedong Thought” and sought something transcendent in it. However, upon dissecting the three elements that constitute Mao Zedong Thought, we become aware of the pitfalls, contradictions, and expedience inherent in the philosophy underlying this ideology (see Chap. 1). That is to say, the “seek truth from facts” thinking is essentially the same as pragmatism, the “mass line” is ultimately nothing more than instrumentalism that treats the masses as mere tools (see Chap. 3), and “self-reliance” is a simple policy doctrine that anyone would come up with if external resource supply is constrained. Mao Zedong Thought, therefore, can hardly be called an original and unique invention. I believe that humanity has over a long period of time devised and developed three fundamental institutions related to relationships between individuals and groups. The first is the market. Humankind created the institution of exchanging goods at first in the form of barter, which evolved into the emergence of money and the everexpanding market. Monkeys and apes cannot create such a system. They have forms of goods transfer such as giving and taking, but there is no act of exchange that is conscious of value or ratio. The second is the law. Humanity created the institution of law. Even before the appearance of ancient, codified laws like the Code of Ur-Nammu or the Code of Hammurabi, there must have been something like “customary law” in the form of various rules and promises within and between tribes. Otherwise, stable order could not be maintained within and between groups such as tribes and clans. A similar system is not absent in monkeys and apes. There is a powerful male boss in a herd, and the group obeys this rule. However, there is no rule for each action of the members or the group in their herd. There is no systematized rule that this rule applies to this action, and this penalty applies to this action, except in human society. Fundamental rights related to things and property, such as the right of ownership and possession, are established and function effectively only when there is a rule of law. The third is the institution of democracy. As the institution of law developed, rational political rules developed among people, which led to ancient democracy in Greek and Roman times, and to parliamentary democracy in England since the Magna Carta. The reason why modern capitalism was able to develop so effectively in the advanced countries is that these three institutions were strongly connected and formed around the market. No doubt, all of these institutions have flaws. It is well known that markets, if left unchecked, tend to create monopoly and oligopoly situations, and that inequality among people grows. As for law, people have made various attempts to find loopholes

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since ancient times, and if detailed regulations are made to try to block these loopholes, society will become stifling. But markets and laws are still alright. Despite their flaws, they may function reasonably to some extent, and as a result, society does not immediately collapse. However, democracy, historically the most recently established system, is the most flawed of all systems, easily prone to dysfunction or potentially causing intense societal conflicts. It is exactly as Churchill said, “democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.” That is why it is a difficult political system with room for improvement and reform. In contrast to Fig. 1, in modern civil society, the market and the law support each other in the fragile institution of democracy. As can be easily seen, when we contrast this with the Chinese governance principles referred to above, power corresponds to the market, elitism to democracy, and pragmatism to law. Mao Zedong, by the way, has either ignored or consciously destroyed all three of these important institutions created by mankind. First, China imported the planning system from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, then abolished markets for food and other important goods and commodities, and later cracked down on even small markets that tried to revive them. Next, Mao advocated “lawlessness” (wufa wutian), occasionally issuing “supreme directives” in place of laws, thus blatantly violating even the National Constitution as well as the Party Constitution. And, as mentioned above, he despised modern democracy as “bourgeois,” following Lenin, and even ignored the pseudo-democratic system of “democratic centralism” introduced from the Soviet Union, preferring to establish a de facto personal dictatorship. In May 1953, he scolded Liu Shaoqi and Yang Shangkun,20 stating that all documents and telegrams issued in the name of the central authority must go through Mao’s scrutiny, and those that did not were deemed invalid (Li 1996, Vol. 1, p. 241). Why did Mao Zedong establish such a system? Hu Angang says that Mao was stuck in feudal despotism (Hu 2008), and Takeuchi Minoru points out that Mao was aiming for “emperor-type power” in the Chinese tradition (Takeuchi 1989). Li Rui argues that the mistakes Mao made in his later years came from feudal despotism and the patriarchal thinking associated with the peasant economy (Li 1999d, p. 361). In his view, “democracy” was merely a gift and a decoration for Mao (ibid., p. 333). Certainly, it is undeniable that there is such an aspect, but is it enough to liken Mao Zedong to the First Emperor of Qin, to criticize his anti-intellectualism as similar to the burning of books ( fenshu) and burying of scholars (kengru), and to highlight the feudal patriarchal influence on him? Does the other half of Mao Zedong’s face not resemble Marx and the revolutionary Lenin, as he himself said? Marx and Engels advocated violent revolution in the Communist Manifesto, Lenin carried out that violent revolution in the October Revolution, and after the revolution, Marx’s “proletarian dictatorship” was literally interpreted and violent red terror (violent suppression) was waged. The Great Purge by Stalin goes without saying. Where did the seeds of violence and brutality exhibited by Lenin, Stalin, and their successors, Mao and his followers, come from? Li Rui, an old Communist Party 20

At the time, Yang Shangkun was the director of the Party’s Central Secretariat, but was ousted during the Cultural Revolution. After the reform and opening-up, he served as President of the State.

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member, sees Mao’s tragedy as ultimately not understanding Marx correctly, but I cannot help but feel that another seed of violence and brutality was embedded in Marxism, especially in the class struggle view, its inherent absoluteness in historical materialism, the arrogance of Marxist believers who call it “science” and a certain religiosity that it produces. After the new policies started in the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping certainly tried to revive the market, develop laws, and introduce a system of democratic centralization. However, in today’s China, despite significant progress in marketization, the rule of law has not been realized, and the country is trying to maintain and strengthen a one-party dictatorship, which is the opposite of modern democracy. People’s courts, public executions, and private punishments, like those in the Mao Zedong era, have certainly disappeared. The infamous “labor reform camps” (laogai) have transformed into prisons, and the notorious “laboring penitentiaries” ( jiaoyangsuo) that allowed detention and confinement without due process have been officially abolished. However, witnessing the peculiar repressive regime, where human rights lawyers can suddenly disappear one day and the suppression of minority populations like those in Tibet and the Uighur region occurs, we cannot help but realize that contemporary China, if Marx or Lu Xun were to see it, would astonish and sadden them, as its essence remains unchanged from Mao’s China. Deng Xiaoping and the current Chinese leadership that succeeded him have firmly inherited Mao Zedong’s legacies. In China, both in the past and now, truth is still falling from the heavens. According to Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, “Mao Zedong was the tyrant of twentieth century China and a political giant who brought about a great revolution in Chinese society” (Yan and Gao 1996, p. 271). He was indeed a despotic tyrant; he was a “political giant” in Chinese history, even in world history, and his achievements were far more “giant” than Lenin’s, not to mention Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen died saying, “The revolution is not yet over,” and Lenin fled to Switzerland for safety just before the Russian Revolution. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, risked his own life in a prolonged and severe struggle in China, practiced the revolution, and finally succeeded in building up his enormous power as well as the nation’s. China has always called Mao “great.” During the CR period, the slogan “Great Leader, Great Teacher, Great Commander, Great Helmsman, Long Live Chairman Mao!” echoed across the country day in and day out. Even today, Mao Zedong appears in statues, portraits, and on banknotes as a symbol of China and the Communist Party, and as a “great man” he is the object of adoration for many Chinese people. However, as far as Mao’s actions after the founding of the country are concerned, was he really “great”? I cannot see him as truly “great” at least when I look at him from the post-Revolution era. Churchill left an extremely meaningful warning: “The price of greatness is responsibility.” In June 1959, Mao delivered the following instruction to Wang Renzhong, then Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party: “If the policy decision is wrong, the leader must take responsibility, and cannot unilaterally push the responsibility to the lower ranks. Leaders take responsibility on behalf of those who

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are led, this is one important condition for gaining the trust of subordinates.” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi et al. (eds.) 2003, Vol. 2, p. 953)

Yet, upon reflection, Mao Zedong never took responsibility for the immeasurable catastrophes he caused, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Even though he made a superficial “self-criticism” at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962, he never took responsibility for the disastrous consequences of the GLF policy. Looking back on his own serious experience of the CR movement, Wang Hui reflects with a gloomy tone, “People stood up in response to the call of Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, but the Revolution ended in failure. And the responsibility was imposed on the people.” (Wang 2013a, p. 248; Wang 2013b, p. 192, my emphasis)

Epilogue: Living in an Ah Q-Like World

It seems to me that there are broadly two types of thinking in the world or in human society. One is the idea that: While there are differences in abilities, all humans are inherently equal. However, they are flawed, and possess diverse values, so determining what is right or just requires those people to engage in discussions and reach decisions collectively. The other is the notion that: Humans are inherently unequal, not only in abilities but also in dignity, and that society comprises a very small group of “exceptional” individuals and a majority of “mediocre” people. There is a single set of values; the outstanding individuals determine what is right and what justice is. Moreover, there is the belief that following these exceptional individuals is both safe and efficient for the less capable individuals. The former view is a notion related to democracy and the rule of law, while the latter is linked with dictatorship and tyranny. Even within democratic societies, there are groups that allow or are close to the latter way of thinking. For example, new cults and certain companies with authoritarian bosses are like this. In such organizations, the leader is an absolute presence, and many people follow the leader not necessarily out of fear, but because it is reassuring and easy. Lu Xun described the history of China as cycles of two periods: (1) a period in which people wanted to be slaves but could not, and (2) a period in which people could safely remain slaves for the time being (see Chap. 2). If we take “slave” to refer to a person who has no independent thought and cannot make decisions for himself, then we can slightly alter Lu Xun’s periodization, as follows: China’s history is a cycle of (1) a period in which truth fell from the heavens, and (2) a period in which people tried to find truth on earth by themselves.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3

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Upon reflection, in post-Revolution China, there was a very short period of (2) in between the long periods of (1). For example, there was an atmosphere of relatively free and vigorous discussion of the political system for a brief moment just before the Anti-Rightist Struggle, when a Peking University student, Tan Tianrong, dealt a blow to the very system and ideology from which “truth had been falling from the heavens” (see Chap. 4). During the Cultural Revolution, there was a time when “dissenters” such as critics of the bloodline theory, like Yu Luoke, revolted at the grass-roots level (see Chap. 8), and immediately after the reform and opening-up, there was a short period when Wei Jingsheng and others celebrated the “Spring of Beijing.” Tiananmen Square in 1989 was also such a “world overflowing with dissent.” Whether in Mao’s China or today’s China, leaders have essentially preached that “truth falls from the heavens,” and the people, the masses, and now the “public” (gongmin) have embraced this way of thinking. Anyone who disagrees has been not only persecuted politically, as in the case with “rightist intellectuals,” but also marginalized by society. The important thing is that many people, the masses, and the public, directly and indirectly, have supported such systems and often actively or passively participated in the exclusion of “minorities” and “heretics.” This is exactly the world of Ah Q as depicted by Lu Xun.1 Let us recall Xu Feng’s words at Hu Feng’s memorial service, when he said: “In China, people like us, along with many others, have laid the foundation for stupidity and slave mentality.” (see Chap. 2, my emphasis)

The people of China have tacitly accepted this irrational and absurd system of social exclusion based on “class,” such as discrimination based on “household registration” (hukou) and the dang’an (historical record) system, namely, the Party-controlled personal information system with its complete disregard for privacy. Then we may ask, do only the Chinese live in an Ah Q-like world? Is it only in China that “truth falls from the heavens”? Or only in despotic countries like China? Not so. Everyone in the world still lives in the same world as Ah Q, as long as they wait for the “truth to fall from the heavens.” For example, in the face of the blatant, sometimes insidious discrimination in various parts of the world, do many people not stand by, tolerate it, or even encourage it for the fun of it? Are the “universal values” that the Communist Party abhors, that is, the principles and values of freedom, equality, human rights, and the rule of law that modern society has established, really penetrating our society? Do we often leave things to the majority without challenging the absurd? When considering these questions, it is not a waste of time but indeed very useful to look back on the turbulent Mao era, to reexamine Mao’s thoughts and principles of action, and to take a fresh look at contemporary China from a variety of angles. 1

In Ah Q Zhengzhuan (The Story of Ah Q), Lu Xun coined the term “spiritual victory method” to criticize the mentality of people who, when faced with injustice or irrationality, do nothing and simply let things pass, leaving it to the majority. The people with such a mentality are “Ah Qs” or “slaves.”

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Index

A AB group, 34 Abnormal deaths, 57, 106–111, 188, 190, 204 AB purge, 34 Achieve greater, faster, better and more economical, 95, 97, 143 Administrative decentralization, 163 Advanced cooperatives, 63, 94 Agricultural collectivization, 50, 63, 64, 94, 96, 102, 116, 146, 152 Agriculture as the foundation, 152 Ah Q, 239, 240 Antagonistic contradictions, 13, 59, 72, 75, 148, 176, 177 Anti-action, 117 Anti-Japanese military and political college, 1, 5 Anti-Japanese War, 5, 7, 29, 36, 45, 134 Anti-party, 7, 28, 30, 32, 37, 38, 51, 53, 77, 82, 88, 94, 132, 135, 137, 138, 179, 193, 221, 227 Anti-people, 51, 77, 88, 94, 135 Anti-rash-advance, 95–97, 99, 147, 153, 192, 203 Anti-revolution, 88, 94 Anti-Rightist Struggle, 20, 45, 50–52, 69, 70, 81, 82, 84, 87, 90, 91, 94–96, 116, 148, 149, 165, 172, 185, 231, 240 Anti-socialist, 71, 82, 87, 179 Apartheid, 60 Apostate, 134, 220

Appropriate technology, 153 Association of free people, The, 65 Authoritarianism, 35, 227–229

B Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery, 208 Backyard furnace, 104 Ba Jin, 19 Bandung Conference, 203 Banister, 110 Baochan daohu, 172 Bao Wenzheng, 127 Bao Zheng, 127 Barrel of a gun, 68 Becker, 106 Beidaihe Central Work Conference, 172 Beidaihe Conference, 74, 104, 120, 130, 131 Beijing’s Hyde Park, 76 Bian Zhongyun, 188 Big-character posters, 76, 77, 82, 86, 179 Birdcage theory, 158 Bismarck, 102 Black five, 179, 183, 184, 186, 187, 191, 234 Black four, 186, 190 Blast furnace, 103, 114, 120, 122, 124, 128 small blast furnace, 103, 124 Bloodlines, 45 Bloodline theory, 45, 240 Bo Gu, 200 Bombard the headquarters, 179, 182, 185

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 K. Nakagane, Mao Zedong and Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3

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252 Bourgeois democracy, 48, 61, 78, 81 Bourgeoisie, 5, 13, 41, 42, 44–46, 48–52, 54, 59, 60, 66, 73, 83, 88, 131, 148, 178, 181, 193, 194, 218 Bo Yibo, 17, 83, 98, 112, 125, 128, 136, 169, 206 Braun, 200 Breaking through superstition, 103, 121 Break through superstition, 98 Brezhnev, 230 Brigade, 106, 114, 124, 172, 175 Brus, 163–165 Bukharin, 53 Bureaucracy, 72, 79, 91, 117, 163, 195 Bureaucratic capitalism, 51 Bureaucratic class, 51, 52 Bureaucratism, 71, 87, 174

C Cadres, 1, 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 48, 59–64, 70, 73, 75, 80, 84–86, 91, 92, 94, 97, 102, 105, 112, 115–117, 128, 133, 137, 141, 145, 155, 156, 159, 168, 169, 171, 174, 175, 178, 180, 181, 184, 188, 190, 206, 210 Cannibalism, 37, 106, 117, 222 Cao Diqiu, 182 Cao Shuji, 110, 117 Cao Xueqin, 30 Cao Yu, 189 Capitalism, 52, 99, 119, 153, 157–159, 161, 164, 165, 173, 176, 177, 181, 192, 194, 219, 224, 234, 235 Capitalist roaders, 51 Capitalists, 13, 23, 24, 42, 44, 45, 49, 50, 52, 79, 148, 156, 183 Capitalist society, 42, 192, 218 Central government, 55, 169, 170, 190 Central Military Commission, 132 Chairman of the Party, 74, 170 Changchun automobile factory, 150 Charisma, 12, 20, 47, 223, 224, 227, 233 Chen Boda, 10, 129, 130, 144, 149, 168, 171, 179, 180, 209, 233 Chengdu Conference, 98 Chen Minshu, 74 Chen Shaoyu, 2 Chen Shuo, 116 Chen Shutong, 74 Chen Wangdao, 65 Chen Xueshi, 86 Chen Yi, 180, 206, 214

Index Chen Yizi, 109 Chen Yun, 95–98, 125, 158, 173, 203, 210, 224 Chen Zhengren, 119, 128 Chiang Ching-kuo, 227 Chiang Kai-shek, 6, 25, 35, 54, 198, 217, 227 Chinese Revolution, 7, 8, 12, 19, 24, 29, 33, 36, 39, 44, 47–49, 66, 82, 134, 135, 140, 145, 148, 180, 199, 207, 217, 219, 225, 232 Chinese socialism, 161 Chinese Soviet Union, 34 Chuanlian, 182 Chu Anping, 78, 80, 81, 84 Churchill, 234, 236, 237 Civil rights, 181, 182, 184 Civil War, 7, 25, 45, 63, 145, 154, 223 Clan, 55, 235 Class, 5, 6, 13, 19, 23, 26, 29, 31, 36, 38, 41, 42, 44–57, 59–63, 66–68, 71, 72, 81, 82, 85, 113, 133–135, 146–148, 171, 181, 183–185, 187, 188, 194, 195, 217–219, 224, 234, 240 Class enemies, 48, 53, 154, 176, 187, 190, 191 Class factor, 46–48, 66 Class struggle, 3, 7, 12, 16, 31, 41, 42, 50–54, 58, 60, 65, 67, 72, 73, 81–83, 88, 89, 96, 113, 131, 135, 147, 148, 154, 158, 162, 172, 174, 175, 183–186, 191–194, 217–220, 224 Code of Hammurabi, 235 Code of Ur-Nammu, 235 Cold War, 160 COMINTERN, 27, 199–202 Commandism, 72 Committee for the Rehabilitation of Honorees, 78, 79 Communism, 41, 52, 99, 105, 127, 130, 131, 146, 147, 149, 158, 161, 167, 204, 220, 225 Communist Manifesto, 42, 65, 67, 236 Communist party, 1, 5–7, 13, 14, 22–26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 46–49, 60, 62, 66, 70–76, 78–82, 84, 87–89, 91, 92, 131, 135, 140, 141, 144, 154, 158, 174, 175, 177, 180, 186, 191, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201, 204, 211, 220, 226, 228, 232, 233, 236, 237, 240 Communist Party of China (CPC), 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 20, 24, 34, 47, 50, 54, 72, 75, 82, 85, 90, 91, 107, 119, 123,

Index 132, 138, 140, 141, 149, 172, 174, 175, 179, 190, 198–201, 212 Communist wind, 114, 129, 156, 169 Communist Youth League, 77, 186, 190 Communization, 113, 114, 116, 123, 231 Comparative advantage, 150, 151, 160 Comprador, 42, 44, 48 Concentration, 88, 141, 171, 227 Confucian, 21, 25, 26, 37, 126, 189, 202, 214 Constitution, 73, 78, 87, 210, 219, 233, 236 Continuous revolution, 16, 52, 144, 158, 192, 194 Contradiction \"On, 8, 10, 15, 50, 83, 88, 147, 177, 223 principal, 2, 4–6, 8, 9, 12–15, 17, 24, 30, 31, 50, 52, 59, 72, 73, 84, 87–89, 91, 123, 141, 146–148, 155, 162–164, 171, 176, 177, 181, 184, 219, 235 secondary, 2, 4, 6, 13–15 Contradiction theory, 4–6, 8, 12, 84, 88, 89, 147 Cost-accounting unit, 114 Counteractions, 221 Counterrevolution, 32, 162 Counterrevolutionaries, 7, 13, 14, 20, 28, 30–32, 37, 38, 49, 51, 53, 60, 63, 68, 79, 132, 135, 139, 179, 186, 188, 191, 193, 227, 231 Counterrevolutionary class, 52 CR subgroup, 179, 180, 183, 210 Cultural Revolution (CR), 16, 17, 19, 27, 33, 45, 49, 52–54, 58, 69, 81, 83–86, 89, 91, 93, 107, 120, 121, 136–140, 142–144, 158, 163, 167, 170–174, 177–182, 184–195, 197, 198, 205–211, 213, 214, 221–223, 225, 228, 229, 231, 233, 235–238, 240

D Dai Qing, 22, 83, 84, 88 Dangquanpai, 167, 179, 191 Daqing Oil Field, 149 Decentralization, 150, 163, 174, 226 Decentralized socialist” model, 163 Decollectivization, 172, 173 Defense literature, 29 Deification, 76, 223

253 Democracy, 61, 78, 88, 133, 134, 141, 145, 165, 171, 193, 197, 225, 227, 229, 234–237, 239 Democratic centralism, 112, 126, 236 Democratic centralization, 61, 237 Democratic League, 22, 70, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 86 Democratic parties, 22, 52, 69, 71–76, 78, 79, 81–84, 87, 148, 224 Democrats, 74, 75, 78, 135 Deng Tuo, 73 Deng Xiaoping, 1, 3, 4, 16, 17, 51, 70, 82, 85, 89, 91, 92, 143, 144, 157–161, 164, 167, 168, 173, 175, 176, 179, 191, 192, 195, 204, 209–211, 219, 224, 226–229, 237 Deng Yingchao, 197, 208 Deng Zihui, 50, 94, 172 Despotism, 140, 194, 236 Dialectics, 5, 6, 8, 15, 77 Diao Chan, 26 Dictatorship, 23, 51, 59, 68, 71, 79, 141, 194, 226, 227, 236, 237, 239 Dikӧtter, 119, 167, 181 Ding Shu, 108, 154 Dogmatism, 6, 76, 160, 202 Dogmatists, 201, 202 Double Hundreds, 71, 72, 74, 76, 82, 85–89, 91, 92 Du Fu, 176

E Economics of contradiction, 104, 147 Egalitarianism, 145, 154, 156, 228 Eighth National Congress, 73, 74, 96–100, 119, 164, 203, 233 Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 50, 70, 73, 89 Elementary cooperatives, 63, 94, 124 Elitism, 15, 227–230, 236 Ellman, 155 Emperor consciousness, 146 Empiricists, 202 Endicott, 101 Enemy, 10, 11, 13, 26, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 55, 65–67, 76, 134, 136, 140, 194 Enemy class, 13, 51, 54, 191 Engels, 5, 8, 42, 67, 68, 160, 220, 236 Equalitarianism, 113

254 Equality, 133–135, 145, 173, 192, 195, 220, 228, 234, 235, 240 Ethnic asset class, 48 Exaggerated reports, 90, 100, 115, 120, 123, 149, 154 Excessive procurement, 115 Exploitation, 46, 49, 52, 55, 56, 62, 146, 156, 218 F Faction in power, 179, 191, 192 Family registers, 240 Fang Rui, 189 Fang Wenzhai, 69, 77 Fantasy, 99, 103, 105, 123, 145, 157, 192, 220, 231 Fear, 10, 11, 37, 57, 62–64, 67, 141, 180, 186, 191, 198, 239 February Countercurrent, 180 February Countercurrent” incident, 210 Fei Xiaotong, 82, 86 Fel’dman, 151 Fel’dman’s theory, 151 Fel’dman-Domar model, 151 Feng Xuefeng, 29, 36 Feudalism, 5, 7, 51, 58, 77, 219, 224 Feudal society, 19, 31, 42, 58, 234 First Emperor, 67, 213, 214, 217, 231 First hunan normal college, 21 First ten guidelines, 174 Five Antis, 79, 175 Five-Antis Movement, 174 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 203 Five-Starred Red Flag, 49 Foreign investment, 160 Foreign trade, 160, 205 Forty Articles on Agriculture, 100 Four clean-ups, 174–177, 206 Fourier, 220 Fraternity, 133–135 Freedom, 59, 61, 65, 73, 90, 133–135, 182, 193–195, 225, 228, 234, 235, 240 French Revolution, 133 Fromm, 225 Fujii, 30, 35 Futian incident, 34, 62 G Gang of Four, 135, 140, 158, 178, 187, 212 Gao Gang, 137 Gao Gao, 237

Index Gao Hua, 35, 134, 202 Gao Wang Ling, 117 Gao Wangling, 57, 113, 221 Gao Wenqian, 191, 199, 200, 203, 207, 208, 212, 213, 225, 231, 232 Gao Yang, 120, 122 General Line, 23–25, 49, 94, 169, 205 General Line of Transition, 23 Geneva Agreement, 203 Ge Peiqi, 79 Giant, 19, 35, 237 Globalization, 160, 234 Gogol’, 19 Golden mean” (zhongyong), 207 Gomułka, 70 Gorbachev, 16, 230 Great Famine, 111–113, 119, 152, 157, 172, 205 Great Harmony, 145, 192 Great Hunger, 86, 114 Great Leap Forward (GLF), 15, 50, 62, 64, 65, 69, 84, 90, 92–96, 98–100, 102, 104–113, 115–117, 119–121, 123, 124, 127–132, 135, 137, 142–144, 147, 149, 151, 153–157, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170–172, 187, 188, 192, 193, 198, 204, 205, 221, 222, 228, 231 Gu Baozi, 176 Guillain, 154 Guo Dehong, 61 Guru, 17, 121, 172, 215, 220–224, 233 Gu Zhun, 165

H Hai Rui, 32, 126, 127, 178 Han Aijing, 139 Handicraftsmen, 42, 44 Hegel, 8 He Long, 128, 207–209, 233 Higher intellectuals, 49 Hinton, 56 Hired peasants, 54–56, 66 Historical Resolution, 1, 107, 228 Hitler, 225 Hoffman’s Law, 151 Hongloumeng, 30 Hong Zhenkuai, 108 Household registration, 107, 184, 195 Household registration system, 184, 195 Hsi Shih, 26 Hua Guofeng, 3, 158

Index Huairen Hall, 25, 180 Hu Angang, 52, 232, 236 Huang Kecheng, 132, 135–138, 141 Huang Yanpei, 74 Hu Feng, 15, 19, 28–33, 36–38, 72, 77, 79, 90, 138, 231, 240 Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Group, 37 Hu Feng elements, 32 Hu Feng group, 30, 32, 37 Hu Feng incident, 20, 28–31, 33, 36, 37, 51, 71 Hu Jintao, 8 Humanism, 213 Hu Ping, 57 Hu Qiaomu, 82, 129, 144 Hu Sheng, 144, 168 Hu Shi, 30 Hu Shih, 30 Hu Yaobang, 107

I Idealism, 30, 156 Imabori, 42, 55 Imperialism, 5–7, 48, 49, 51, 59, 194 Imperialist, 5, 25, 32, 44, 48, 66, 217 Incentive incompatibility, 155, 156 Indigenous, 103 Indigenous blast furnaces, 103, 153 Indigenous technology, 152 Indochina War, 203 Industrial Revolution, 148 Information distortion, 155 Inner contradiction, 87 Inoki, 220 Instrumentalism, 235 Intellectuals, 13, 14, 20, 27, 29, 32, 33, 38, 48, 49, 62, 69, 71, 73–75, 78, 80–85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 121, 148, 149, 178, 181, 184, 187–190, 201, 220, 224, 225, 240 Intelligentsia, 31, 44, 48, 73, 87, 189 Intensifying class struggle, 52 Intermediate technology, 153 Internal contradictions, 13, 14, 59, 72, 75, 76, 85, 148, 171 Internal contradictions among the people, 13, 73 Internal contradictions theory, 50, 71, 83 Iron is the nation, 102 Isolationism, 72

255 J Japanese invasion, 6, 12 Jiang Nanxiang, 85 Jiang Qing, 140, 178–180, 206, 207, 210–212, 214 Jiang Weihong, 85 Jiang Zemin, 227 Jiang Zhenghua, 110 Jiaoyangsuo, 91, 237 Jinggangshan, 54, 62, 173, 180, 199, 210, 223 Jin Hui, 112 Jin Sikai, 8 Joint public-private ownership, 50 June 4, 1989, 91 K Kagami, 167, 183, 184, 191 Kangaroo courts, 190 Kang Sheng, 45, 52, 105, 179, 202, 211 Kang Youwei, 145 Kautsky, 19, 61, 65, 134, 220 Ke Qingshi, 115, 129 Keynes, 164, 220 Khrushchev, 70, 98, 99, 131, 140, 154, 162, 175, 178, 191, 213, 214, 230, 232 Kinship, 68 KMT-CPC cooperation, 6 Kojima Reiitsu, 102 Kojima Tomoyuki, 61, 67 Korean War, 23, 135, 140 Kornai, 164 Koutoku, 41 Kung Kai-sing, 116 Kuomintang (KMT), 5–7, 22, 25, 30, 32, 34–36, 45, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 62, 64, 66, 70, 74, 81, 154, 180, 198–201, 217, 223 L Labor camp, 27, 53, 57, 85, 91 Laborers, 22, 42, 44, 54–56, 183 Land equalization, 23, 48 Landlords, 10, 11, 22, 26, 50–58, 60, 66–68, 113, 119, 146, 156, 176, 179, 183, 185, 188 Landowning class, 26, 48, 55, 57, 66 Land reform, 10, 11, 22, 48, 50, 52–60, 62–64, 66–68, 146, 174, 185, 188, 231 Land revolution, 54, 55 Land to tillers, 23, 48

256 Laogai, 27, 85, 237 Lao She, 19, 189 Large property class, 48 Laski, 80 Later Ten Guidelines, 175, 177 Lenin, 5, 8, 16, 44, 61, 67, 126, 134, 151, 194, 219, 220, 228, 234–237 Leninism, 6–9, 15, 87–89, 177, 201, 219, 220, 232–234 Leninist, 8, 9, 75, 88, 220 Let a hundred schools of thought contend, 87 Liang Shuming, 21, 22, 24–28, 32, 33, 37, 38, 57 Liang Zhiyuan, 106 Liberation Army, 137, 187 Li Che, 112 Li Da, 10 Li Fuchun, 99, 207 Li Hui, 32, 38 Li Lisan, 16 Lin Biao, 86, 135, 137, 170, 180, 181, 206–210, 212–214, 223, 225, 232, 233 Lincoln, 65 Lin Haiyun, 205 Lin Ke, 1, 132, 230, 231 Lin Liguo, 181 Lin Xiling, 76–78 Lin Yifu, 151 Li Peng, 197 Li Rui, 16, 65, 67, 93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 130, 132, 135, 140, 141, 157, 236 Li Shenming, 106 Li Shu, 83 Literary Talks, 19, 28–31, 36, 38 Liu Jing, 183 Liu Shaoqi, 1, 15, 17, 23, 49, 51, 70, 73, 74, 85, 89–91, 95, 98–100, 104, 112, 125, 133, 136, 137, 147, 153, 165, 167–171, 173–180, 191–193, 202–207, 209–211, 213, 214, 231–233, 236 Liu Wencai, 58 Liu Yuan, 114 Li Weihan, 75 Li Xiannian, 98 Li Zehou, 231 Li Zhisui, 145, 171, 173, 192, 214 Local archives, 63, 107, 190 Long March, 35, 62, 136, 200, 201, 224 Lu Dingxue, 10

Index Lu Dingyi, 89, 90, 129 Lumpen-proletariat, 42 Luochuan Conference, 132 Luo Jinan, 20, 33, 38 Luo Longji, 75, 78–81, 84, 88, 92, 224 Luo Ruiqing, 136, 137, 139, 170 Lu Ping, 179 Lushan Conference, 16, 85, 93, 121, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140–142, 148, 156, 169, 173, 210, 223, 231 Lu Xun, 19, 20, 28–30, 33–39, 88, 90, 237, 239, 240

M MacFarquhar, 192 Magna Carta, 235 Maiban, 42, 44 Man-made disasters, 112, 118, 167, 169 Maoism, 1, 8, 17, 141, 220, 222–224, 234 Maoist, 16, 17, 33, 44, 91, 99, 106, 107, 115, 155, 165, 182, 186, 191, 195, 210, 211, 220, 222, 223, 225–227 Mao-Zhou relationship, 198, 203, 206, 211 Margolan, 57 Market, 91, 104, 113, 154, 158–161, 163–165, 173, 195, 205, 220, 234–237 Marketization, 159, 226, 237 Marx, 5, 8, 17, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 52, 66–68, 145, 148, 158, 161, 194, 217–220, 231, 234–237 Marxism, 2, 6–9, 15, 16, 29, 31, 41, 42, 45, 65, 66, 68, 73, 76, 78, 81, 87–89, 134, 135, 146, 154, 160, 177, 201, 217, 219, 220, 224, 225, 228, 232–234, 237 Marxist, 6, 8, 16, 17, 38, 41, 50, 54, 75, 76, 81, 88, 89, 104, 135, 141, 148, 149, 152, 158, 161, 164, 192, 194, 219, 224, 227, 229, 237 Marx’s class theory, 42, 44, 218 Masses, 3, 5–7, 15, 29, 38, 41, 50, 53, 56, 59–68, 71, 79, 80, 82, 85, 91, 92, 94, 97, 103, 112, 120, 121, 130, 137, 145, 154, 156, 157, 164, 171, 174, 175, 180, 181, 184, 188, 204, 215, 225, 235, 240 Mass line, 1, 15, 41, 59, 61–65, 119, 121, 128, 181, 228, 235 Mass Literature in the National Revolutionary War, 29

Index Mass movement, 53, 60, 63, 67, 68, 83, 164, 177 Masuda, 33, 35 Materialism, 11, 154, 158, 219, 234, 237 Matsueda, 35 Matsumura, 8 Ma Yingchu, 80 May Seventh Cadres School, 86, 178 McFarquhar, 173, 209 Mess halls, 102, 104, 105, 114, 116, 117, 120, 124, 127, 130, 140, 149 Middle bourgeoisie, 42 Middle class, 42, 44, 45, 49 Moderate capitalism, 23 Money first, 159 Monkey-like character, 230 Moral incentives, 145, 154, 155, 162, 228 Moscow Conference, 98, 99 Moses, 224 Mutual aid teams, 63

N Nagy, 70, 82 Nakajima, 9, 10, 13 Nakaoka, 121, 122 Nanning Conference, 96–98, 147, 203 Nasser, 203 National asset class, 48 National bourgeoisie, 44, 59 National Bureau of Statistics, 107, 124, 205 National Defense Literature, 29 Nationalism, 46, 47, 228 Nationalist government, 20, 29, 198 Nationalization, 66, 154 National Propaganda Work Conference, 88, 204 Natural disasters, 111, 112, 169, 170 Nehru, 203 New democracy, 19, 23, 47, 48, 50, 161 New democratic” society, 49 New Democratic” state, 48 New Fourth Army, 201 Nie Yuanzi, 179 Ningdu Conference, 199, 200 Ninth heaven ( jiutian), 24 Ninth hell ( jiudi), 24 Nixon, 212 Non-people, 60, 68, 86, 179, 182 Non-property class, 41, 42, 44, 50, 54 Northern expedition, 35, 198

257 O On contradiction, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 224 One man-management system, 160 On practice, 1–3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 47, 61, 224 On the ten major relationships, 149 Opinion letter, 123–125, 127–129, 131, 132, 135–137, 140 Ordinary peasants, 11, 57 Orwell, 90 Owen, 220

P Pang Xianzhi, 94 Paranoia, 192 Park Chung-hee, 227 Party above all, 78, 80, 92 Party Committee-led enterprise responsibility system, 160 Party School, 6, 92 Party, The, 1, 6, 13–16, 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35–37, 45, 50–52, 57, 58, 61–65, 67, 68, 70–73, 75–80, 82–97, 100, 107, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 119, 123–127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 140–142, 148, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167, 169, 170, 172, 174, 176–180, 183, 187, 189, 190, 193–197, 199–203, 206, 208, 210, 211, 214, 215, 223, 225, 227–229, 232, 233, 236, 238, 240 Patrimonial inheritance system, 58 Patriotic capitalists, 49 Patriotism, 46, 47 Peasant class, 48, 51, 53, 184, 217 Peasants, 10, 11, 22, 24–27, 29, 31, 34, 42, 44, 49, 50, 52–55, 57, 58, 60, 62–64, 66–68, 102, 104, 107, 108, 113–115, 117, 119, 120, 127, 130, 133, 146, 151, 152, 156, 169, 175, 178, 180, 183–186, 188, 191, 195, 219, 222–224, 226 Pei Yiran, 234 Peking University, 21, 22, 30, 76, 80, 87, 88, 179, 224, 240 Peng Dehuai, 15, 16, 121, 123–142, 148, 169, 172, 199, 207, 210, 223, 231 Peng Dehuai incident, 53, 93 Peng Meikui, 140 Peng Zhen, 136, 138, 139, 170, 171, 176, 178, 206, 233 People’s Commune (PC), 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 108, 109, 113–115, 117,

258 119, 120, 123, 124, 127–132, 137, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154–157, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 192, 205, 222, 226, 231 People’s Congress, 74, 78, 84, 95, 233 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 49, 132, 180, 186, 187, 190 People, The, 3, 5, 13, 15, 25, 26, 29, 35, 36, 41, 51, 56–60, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71–73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 90, 97, 104, 113, 116, 118, 121, 124, 131, 133, 134, 137, 140, 148, 154, 171, 176, 177, 182, 195, 213, 222, 226, 233 Perceptual knowledge, 3, 12 Personal historical record, 240 Personality cult, 70, 74, 96, 98, 142, 227, 233 Persons in power faction, 167 Petty bourgeois fanaticism, 128–131 Petty bourgeoisie, 29, 42, 44, 52 Petty-Clark’s Law, 151 Planning, 91, 95, 96, 99, 130, 147, 156, 158, 159, 163, 164, 173, 228, 236 Platform, 162 Political Consultative Conference (PCC), 22–27, 57, 72, 78, 86 Political Design Institute, 78 Politician, 19, 33, 38, 143, 164, 167, 214, 215, 217, 225, 229 Politics in command, 128 Poor and blank, 99 Poor peasants, 44, 54–56, 67 Poznań Riots, 70 Practice is the only criterion for verifying truth, 158 Practice theory, 47, 88 Pragmatism, 4, 146, 158, 160, 161, 228–230, 235, 236 Prague Spring, 164 President of the State, 49, 74, 87, 95, 180, 236 Primary stage of socialism, 161 Principal contradiction, 2, 4, 6, 12, 15, 47, 48, 53, 73, 88 Privatization, 155, 226 Production teams, 124, 172 Proletarian class, 44, 48 Proletarian democracy, 61 Proletariat, 5, 29, 38, 41, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 54, 66, 73, 83, 88, 181, 218, 219 Property class, 41, 42, 44, 48–51, 54 Pu Anxiu, 138

Index Q Qian Cijie, 176 Qian Liqun, 87, 88, 90, 141, 165, 171, 195, 222, 229 Qian Wei Chang, 82 Qian Xuesen, 101 Qi Benyu, 183 Qin Bangxian, 200 Qincheng Prison, 123

R Radicalism, 50, 94, 116, 121 Rao Shushi, 137 Rash advance, 15, 63, 95–97, 125, 130, 153, 192, 203, 204, 224 Rational knowledge, 3, 8, 12, 61, 102 Reactionary intellectuals, 48 Rectification, 70, 72, 73, 78, 87, 201, 202 Rectification campaign, 83 Rectification Movement, 198, 200–203 Red Army, 6, 34, 56, 62, 66, 130, 180, 200, 201, 224 Red August, 206 Red Five, 180, 183, 184, 186, 187, 191, 234 Red guards, 27, 52, 86, 121, 136, 139, 179, 182, 183, 185, 187–189, 206, 210 Reform and opening-up, 7, 16, 69, 70, 93, 124, 152, 158, 159, 161, 172, 184, 195, 226, 227, 236, 240 Renmin University, 76, 77, 79 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party, 1, 7 Revised Later Ten Guidelines, 175 Revisionism, 76, 175, 181, 192, 194 Revisionists, 175, 194 Revolution, 4, 5, 13, 17, 19, 20, 24, 27, 31, 34, 42, 45–47, 49, 50, 52, 54, 61, 65–68, 71, 77, 81, 91, 92, 97, 105, 130, 133, 134, 143, 146–148, 162, 167, 175, 179, 180, 182, 184, 186–195, 209–211, 213, 218–221, 223, 225, 230, 232, 233, 236–238, 240 Chinese Revolution, 29, 33, 70, 167 Revolutionary committee, 186 Revolutionary people, 48 Revolutionary struggle, 4, 5, 46, 47, 61–63, 66, 67, 121, 133, 135, 144, 145, 154, 174, 197, 198, 203, 217, 219, 224 Revolution without revolution, 195 Rich peasants, 11, 51–58, 60, 66, 67, 113, 176, 179, 185, 188

Index Rightists, 14, 38, 51, 60, 69, 76, 78, 82–86, 92, 130, 179, 183, 186 Robbins, 161 Ruijin, 34, 54, 55, 199, 200 Rural Construction Movement, 22, 24 Rural work department, 94, 172 Russian Revolution, 119, 195, 219, 225, 237

S Saint, 19, 20, 33, 37, 228 Saint-Simon, 220 Sakai, 41 Schoenhals, 192 Schram, 8 Schumpeter, 164 Schwartz, 9, 15 Scientific socialism, 17, 219, 224 Secondary contradiction, 2, 4, 6, 13–15, 53, 88 Second Five-Year Plan, 95, 97, 99 Sectarianism, 71, 87 Seeking truth from facts, 1, 128, 228 Selden, 62, 63, 65, 201, 202 Self-reliance, 1, 152, 154, 155, 160, 226, 228, 235 Semi-non-proletariat, 45 Semi-proletariat, 42 Sen, 46, 119 Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, 112, 137, 138, 167, 168, 192, 205, 238 Shanghai Commune, 180 Shanghai Conference, 119, 132, 231 Shanin, 151 Shen Zhihua, 69, 82, 88, 91, 95, 164 Shimotomai, 220 Shi Zhongquan, 7 Shue, 64 Sik, 164 Sinicization, 8, 42, 66, 219 Sinicization of Marxism, 68 Sino-Japanese War, 19, 22, 201 Sino-Soviet conflict, 52, 160 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, 22 Sino-Soviet relations, 116, 138 600 million ants, 154, 161, 226 Sixty Articles on Agriculture, 114 Slave mentality, 36, 37, 240 Slaves, 36, 239, 240 Small property class, 44 Socialism, 9, 13, 17, 23, 41, 49, 52, 71, 73, 76–78, 82, 94, 97, 99, 105, 121, 144,

259 146, 154, 155, 157–159, 161, 163–165, 173, 176, 177, 181, 191, 192, 194, 195, 204, 219, 220, 224, 234 Socialist education campaign, 174–177, 194, 206 Socialist Education Movement, 51, 222 Socialist industrialization, 23, 50, 102, 151 Socialist transformation, 23, 24, 50, 52, 72, 94 Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside, 94 Socialization, 49, 50, 64, 66, 94, 154 Song Binbin, 188 Song Qingling, 24 Song Renqiong, 188 Song Yongyi, 57, 186, 190 Soviet Communist Party, 70, 140, 220 Soviet Republic of China, 54, 55, 62 Soviet Union, 9, 15, 24, 47, 52, 53, 70, 71, 83, 98, 99, 116, 131, 137, 140, 144, 148, 150–152, 154, 155, 160, 162, 163, 165, 175, 194, 198, 199, 202, 220, 221, 225, 226, 230, 232, 234, 236 Spring” of Beijing, 240 Stalin, 7, 15, 24, 52, 53, 70, 71, 76, 77, 96, 98, 140, 150, 151, 156, 162, 163, 165, 191, 194, 202, 220, 225, 230, 232, 236 Starvation, 56, 62, 64, 85, 90, 106, 107, 109–114, 116–120, 124, 140, 142, 152, 204, 205, 221 State-owned enterprises, 114, 149, 152 Steel-making, 102, 104, 117 Struggle, The, 65, 68–70, 75, 76, 78, 82–87, 89–91, 165 Subjective initiative, 154 Subjectivism, 71, 87 Su Fubing, 116 Suicide, 19, 22, 27, 37, 56, 57, 61, 85, 106, 189, 190 Sukarno, 203 Sun Jingxian, 106, 107 Sun Qingling, 206 Sun Weishi, 210 Sun Yat-sen, 23, 24, 48, 206, 237 Supreme State Council, 13, 71, 73, 79 Su Yang, 53, 186

T Tajima, 150

260

Index

Takahashi, 63 Take grain as the key link, 152 Takeuchi, 8, 9, 65, 236 Tanaka, 63 Tan Lifu, 183 Tan Song, 56 Tan Tianrong, 76, 78, 89, 240 Tan Zhenlin, 118, 175, 180 Tao Zhu, 136, 141 Tenant farmers, 11, 44, 55, 58, 146 Ten major relationships, 71, 150, 162 Territorialism, 150 Theory of getting rich first, 158, 159 Theory of origin, 183, 184, 234 Theory of socialist market economy, 164 Third five-year plan, 50 Third front construction, 138, 139 Three Antis, 79 Three Gorges Dam, 161 Three-hundred-thousand- character opinion letter, 31, 138 Three Red Banners, 169, 170 Tiananmen Square, 70, 121, 159, 182, 240 Tiananmen Square incident, 16, 109, 159, 197, 227 Tian Jiaying, 129, 130, 144, 168, 170 Tiger-like character, 230 Tito, 85 Tokuda, 65 Tribute, 8, 10, 22, 29, 54, 55, 76, 105, 112–114, 119, 124, 128, 129, 152, 178, 181, 220, 223, 233 Trotsky elements, 32 Trotskyites, 14, 32, 36 Truth falls from the heavens, 76, 91, 119, 229, 234, 240 Tsinghua University, 76, 82, 85, 89, 178 20th Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, 96, 162 Twenty-three Guidelines, 177

W Wang Chao Chun, 26 Wang Chuan, 140 Wang Dongxing, 212, 213 Wang Guangmei, 206 Wang Heshou, 99 Wang Hui, 17, 83, 91, 186, 194, 209, 214, 238 Wang Li, 180 Wang Ming, 2, 16, 201, 202 Wang Renzhong, 171, 237 Wang Ruoshui, 204 Wang Shiwei, 14, 63 Wang Youqin, 188, 231 Wannan incident, 201 Wan Xiaotang, 209 Warlord, 48 Warsaw Pact, 70, 71 Weber, 220, 223 Wei Guoqing, 190 Wei Jingsheng, 240 Wen Guanzhong, 114 Whatevers, 3, 158 White cat, black cat notion, 158 Wilson, 198 Witch hunts, 121, 135, 191 Workers, 24, 25, 27, 29, 38, 42, 44, 49, 51, 52, 68, 70, 72, 76, 82, 121, 133, 144, 152, 156, 178, 180–182, 184, 185, 187, 190, 218, 219, 226 Workers’ self-management, 85 Work teams, 57, 67, 175, 177, 179 Wufa wutian, 210, 236 Wu Guoguang, 68 Wu Han, 33, 178 Wuhan Conference, 98 Wu Lengxi, 129, 130, 169 Wu Xun Zhuan, 30 Wu Zhipu, 107, 115

U Uchiyama, 36 Uchiyama Bookstore, 36 United Front Department, 75

X Xi’an incident, 6, 201 Xiang Ying, 201 Xia Yan, 29 Xie Fuzhi, 187 Xi Jinping, 196, 227, 228 Xue Ming, 208 Xu Fang, 36, 242 Xu Guangping, 34, 35 Xu Zhangben, 89 Xu Zhucheng, 72

V Vested interest, 141, 147, 229 Vietnam War, 138, 194 Violence, 22, 53, 54, 67, 68, 174, 182, 185–187, 221, 225, 235, 236

Index Y Yabuki, 210, 213 Yan’an, 1, 14, 19, 22, 29, 30, 35, 36, 62, 63, 82, 133, 134, 156, 198, 200, 201, 203 Yan’an way, 62, 63 Yang Changji, 21 Yang Dali, 116 Yang Haiying, 186 Yang Jisheng, 116, 120, 141, 192, 193, 195, 222 Yang Kueifei, 26 Yang Lijun, 181, 182, 184 Yang Shangkui, 113 Yang Shangkun, 129, 236 Yang Songlin, 107 Yang Xianzhen, 6 Yan Jiaqi, 237 Yao Wenyuan, 178 Yao Yilin, 206 Ye Jianying, 187, 189 Ye Ting, 201 Yida ergong, 114, 149 Yin Hongbiao, 181, 193 Yiping erdiao, 113 Yong Tao, 8 Yuan Xiaorong, 133 Yu Luoke, 180, 182–185, 234, 240 Yu Pingbo, 30 Yu Qiuli, 233 Z Zaofan youli, 68 Zeng Xisheng, 113, 172, 173, 204

261 Zhang Bojun, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 89, 224 Zhang Chunqiao, 179, 209 Zhang=Luo Alliance, 81 Zhang Shijian, 206 Zhang Suhua, 170, 171, 205 Zhang Wenkui, 155–157, 159 Zhang Wentian, 129, 131, 137, 138, 140, 141, 148, 231 Zhang Xiruo, 75 Zhang Yihe, 81 Zhang Yufeng, 212, 213 Zhao Ziyang, 16, 109, 161 Zheng Yi, 190 Zhengzhou Conference, 125 Zhongnanhai, 22, 25, 85, 100, 138, 180, 207, 209 Zhongshan University, 35 Zhongshan Warship incident, 198 Zhou Enlai, 1, 17, 23–25, 29, 45, 74, 89, 90, 95–98, 119, 125, 133, 136, 137, 147, 153, 173, 176, 178, 197–200, 202–215, 224, 233 Zhou Haiying, 20, 35, 38 Zhou Hui, 135 Zhou Libo, 29 Zhou Xiaozhou, 132, 135, 141 Zhou Yang, 29–32, 232 Zhou Yizhou, 138 Zhou Zuoren, 20, 88 Zhu De, 49, 133, 135, 200, 207 Zhu Zheng, 69, 89 Zinoviev, 53 Zunyi Conference, 27, 136, 197, 200