Mao and the Cultural Revolution, 3-Volume Set 1623201578, 9781623201579

Table of contents :
Cover
About the pagination of this eBook
Contents
Chapter 1
Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong and the Significance of the Cultural Revolution
Basic Characteristics of the Cultural Revolution
Analytical Framework
Content and Organization
Chapter 2
Mao Zedong’s Preparations for the Cultural Revolution
International Background to Mao Zedong’s Class Struggle Theory
Mao Zedong’s Basic Assessment of the Political Situation in China
Mao Zedong’s Basic Assessment of the Economic Situation in China
Fomenting Public Sentiment for the Launch of the Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong’s Political Differences with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping
How the Intraparty Democratic System Failed
How China Missed Development Opportunities
Chapter 3
The First Salvo of the Cultural Revolution
February Outline and February Minutes
Notice on May 16 and the First Purge of Veteran Cadres
The Big-character Poster at Peking University and “Letter to Jiang Qing”
The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and “Bombarding the Headquarters”
The “Destroy Four Olds” Movement and Nationwide Chaos
Criticism of the Bourgeois Counter-revolutionary Line and the Convention of the Central Work Conference in October
Chapter 4
The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China
Seizure of Power and the Purging of Class Enemies
The Revolutionary Forces Struggle and the February Counter-current Forces Counterattack
Open Denouncement of Liu Shaoqi and the Fabricated Case Against Him
Civil Unrest and Class Struggle
Total Suppresion and Purging of Veteran Cadres
The Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and the end of Liu Shaoqi’s Political Life
Chapter 5
The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao
The 9th National Congress of the CPC and Lin Biao Becoming Successor
The “Order No. 1” Event and the Fight over the Post of State President
Lushan Conference and Mao Zedong’s Resistance
Criticizing Chen, the Rectification Movement, and Mao Zedong Turning up the Pressure
Mao Zedong’s Tour of the South and the Lin Biao Incident of September 13
Criticizing Lin and the Rectification and Liberation of Veteran Cadres
Preparing for the 10th National Congress of the CPC
Chapter 6 The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing
(1973–1976)
The 10th National Congress of the CPC and the Rise of Wang Hongwen
Mao Zedong Promoted Deng Xiaoping to Important Positions
Attacks against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Zhou Enlai
Political Struggles at the 4th National People’s Congress
Deng Xiaoping’s Overall Restoration of Order, and Political Fights
with Jiang Qing
Critique of Tale of the Marshes and the Campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the Rightist Tendency
Death of Zhou Enlai and the Tiananmen Square Incident
Mao Zedong’s Last Words and Death
The Political Challenge and the Demise of Jiang Qing
Chapter 7 Remarks on the Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Cultural Revolution and Related Historical Remarks
Economic Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution
Social Assessment of the Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong’s Chinese Social Ideals and Economic Reform
China’s International Status
Political Remarks on the Cultural Revolution
The Systemic Root Causes of Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years
Deng Xiaoping’s Success Following Mao Zedong’s Failure
Postscript
Appendix
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Mao and the Cultural 3-Volume Set

Hu Angang

About the pagination of this eBook This eBook contains a multi-volume set. To navigate this eBook by page number, you will need to use the volume number and the page number, separated by a hyphen. For example, to go to page 5 of volume 1, type “1-5” in the Go box at the bottom of the screen and click "Go." To go to page 5 of volume 2, type “2-5”… and so forth.

Mao and the Cultural Revolution

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Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Volume 1

Mao’s Motivation and Strategy

Hu Angang

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. Suite 208 Davies Pacific Center 841 Bishop Street Honolulu, HI, 96813 Website: www.enrichprofessional.com A Member of Enrich Culture Group Limited Hong Kong Head Office: 11/F, Benson Tower, 74 Hung To Road, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China China Office: Rm 309, Building A, Central Valley, 16 Haidian Middle Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Singapore Office: 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660 Trademarks: SILKROAD PRESS and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. © 2017 by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. With the title Mao and the Cultural Revolution Volume 1: Mao’s Motivation and Strategy Edited by W. H. Hau All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher. ISBN (Hardback) ISBN (pdf)

978-1-62320-151-7 978-1-62320-152-4

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Contents Chapter 1 Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution......... 1 Mao Zedong and the Significance of the Cultural Revolution................................... 3 Basic Characteristics of the Cultural Revolution.......................................................... 5 Analytical Framework...................................................................................................... 10 Content and Organization............................................................................................... 17

Chapter 2 Mao Zedong’s Preparations for the Cultural Revolution............... 21 International Background to Mao Zedong’s Class Struggle Theory......................... 24 Mao Zedong’s Basic Assessment of the Political Situation in China......................... 45 Mao Zedong’s Basic Assessment of the Economic Situation in China..................... 76 Fomenting Public Sentiment for the Launch of the Cultural Revolution................. 81 Mao Zedong’s Political Differences with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping............... 93 How the Intraparty Democratic System Failed............................................................ 107 How China Missed Development Opportunities........................................................ 124

Chapter 3 The First Salvo of the Cultural Revolution........................................ 135 February Outline and February Minutes........................................................................... 136 Notice on May 16 and the First Purge of Veteran Cadres............................................. 158 The Big-character Poster at Peking University and “Letter to Jiang Qing”............. 190 The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ................ 243 and “Bombarding the Headquarters”

The “Destroy Four Olds” Movement and Nationwide Chaos................................... 279 Criticism of the Bourgeois Counter-revolutionary Line and the .............................. 312 Convention of the Central Work Conference in October

Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 341 Index

................................................................................................................. 351

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Chapter

Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a major political period in the history of the People’s Republic of China. It was the decade in which the Communist Party of China, the country, and its people suffered the biggest frustration and loss since the founding of New China,1 and also encapsulated the tragic historical direction taken by Mao Zedong in his later years. The Cultural Revolution directly inspired Deng Xiaoping to launch the Reform and Opening-up and also became the basic reason China subsequently sought “complete order throughout the country” and a steady political and social situation. In 1981, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) conducted a specific historical appraisal and passed a political resolution regarding the Cultural Revolution.2 Based on the political environment at the time, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun developed the principle of “maintaining a correct path without being distracted by minor details.”3 The full text of this resolution consists of 34,000 characters, including over 6,500 characters dealing with the Cultural Revolution, and provides both a political basis and the main source of relevant opinions for our research on the mistakes made by Mao Zedong in relation to the Cultural Revolution. Although it ended several decades ago and lasted only ten years, the Cultural Revolution should never be forgotten. This period of history needs to be well remembered, and valuable lessons drawn from the experience. As Engels said, “a large class, like a great nation, never learns better or quicker than by undergoing the consequences of its own mistakes.”4 Lu Dingyi also expressed that, “The greater the historical mistake, the more deeply the historical lesson is learnt, and the better such mistakes can be prevented in future.”5 Thus, it is important and necessary for us to continue to further our understanding of the Cultural Revolution. In the production of this work, a huge and varied selection of historical literature was consulted, with carefully investigation and review of political trends and significant events during the Cultural Revolution. Detailed analysis and discussion 1.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 808.

2. 3.

Ibid., 788-846. Chen Yun told Deng Liqun, who was in charge of drafting the resolution: “I agree with

[Deng] Xiaoping that any resolutions should be general and not too detailed.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp, Selected Works of Chen Yun vol. 3, 283)

4.

Engels, “Preface to the English Edition of The Condition of the Working Class in England.”

5.

Lu, “Reflections of Lu Dingyi in His Later Years.”

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Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

of primary and secondary sources will be presented, helping to reconstruct the timeline of this seismic event and uncover the causes behind the tragedy, preserving access to this thought-provoking history for future generations.

Mao Zedong and the Significance of the Cultural Revolution This work is titled “Mao Zedong and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” because Mao Zedong alone was the key to the launch and escalation of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was not an inevitable historical development, but a movement carefully planned and orchestrated by Mao.6 During the decade of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong was motivated by the desire to oppose and eliminate revisionism, prevent the return of capitalism, and stop corruption and bureaucratism within the party and government. However, despite these noble intentions, the Cultural Revolution became a large-scale political failure, dominating and distorting Chinese social and political life, and staining the historical legacy of Mao Zedong himself. Mao Zedong’s motivations were far removed from the social turmoil his actions caused.7 His campaign of the Cultural Revolution is thus a classic manifestation of the ancient proverb, “driving north to head south,” with the motives and objectives conflicting with the effects and results. Lenin pointed out: “Frankly, admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analyzing the conditions which led to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it – that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the class and then the masses.”8 Mao quoted this passage of Lenin in 1956, remarking that communists must analyze mistakes, be them their own or of others. Mao cited Stalin as a specific example, and suggested that Stalin should be viewed in a historical context and his right and wrong actions comprehensively analyzed to learn useful lessons.9 6. Wang, Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 53. 7. Meisner believes that history should focus on people’s behaviors instead of their words. The appraisal of Mao Zedong regarding the Cultural Revolution thus should

also be based on the results of his behaviors instead of his words and motives, just as

appraisals of other historical figures typically are. (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 274.) 8.

Lenin, “Should We Participate in Bourgeois Parliaments?”

9. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

The events that have occurred in the history of New China show that getting strategic decisions right or wrong lead to the most critical success or failure of the state.10 Strategic decisions made by the leader of a ruling party and state will lead directly to positive or negative externalities. In China, where political power is heavily centralized, there is also a particularity: leadership decisions have an effect of scale on the massive population. The right strategic decisions will lead to great social progress; the wrong strategic decisions will lead to great social disaster. Furthermore, the longer the implementation of strategic decisions, the greater the scale of impact, leading to greater benefits or more severe damage to the welfare of the people of the country. Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution in his final years was, in fact, a great strategic mistake, causing a huge disaster for society in the People’s Republic of China. During the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, Mao remained the paramount leader and chief commander of the state,11 and had the “final word” in all matters. This situation resulted from the highly centralized political system in China, which was then exploited to become a particularly autocratic rule by the individual. Mao was thus uniquely positioned either to do immense good or immense harm. Unfortunately, the latter was what transpired, and a tragedy for Mao’s legacy, the party and state’s politics, and China as a whole unfolded.12 The maturity of a political party lies not in whether it makes mistakes or not, but in whether it can face up to its mistakes and transform them into valuable historical wealth. The Cultural Revolution reflected the political mistakes made by of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 19–21. 10. Hu, China’s Political and Economic History (1949-1976). 11. Lin Biao said: “In this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao is the

supreme commander and leader. We must follow the instructions of our great leader.

We believe the Great Cultural Revolution will be successful!” (Lin, “Speech to a People’s Meeting Celebrating the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”)

12. Meisner appraised the Cultural Revolution in this way: “The last revolutionary activity of Mao became the biggest tragedy of his long revolutionary career and also brought the Chinese people disaster. It was a big failure, dominating and distorting the social and political life of the People’s Republic of China for ten years and leaving a stain on

his historic image. Mao launched the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’, announced principles and ideals he was unable to maintain, and released uncontrollable social and political

forces which caused huge casualties and social disasters. In the last ten years of Mao Zedong’s government, the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ plunged the whole country into turmoil and almost destroyed China.”(Meisner: Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 271.)

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Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

Mao in his later years. Although a historical failure, this event is also a source of historical wealth, and we must view Mao’s later years and the Cultural Revolution in a practical, historical, and objective way, making full use of this historical wealth and comprehensively learning this historical lesson. Our assessment and appraisal of the Cultural Revolution will be based on its actual results, effects, and social consequences rather than the slogans, objectives, and motives of its leaders.

Basic Characteristics of the Cultural Revolution What motivated Mao to launch the Cultural Revolution? According to Lin Biao’s report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC, Chairman Mao had briefed him on the necessity of the Cultural Revolution: “It is absolutely necessary and timely to launch this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, prevent capitalist restoration, and construct socialism.”13 The result was, on the contrary, a political disaster and a historical failure. The 1981 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC claimed that the Cultural Revolution was not and could never have become a revolution that achieved meaningful social progress; history has shown that the Cultural Revolution was a leadership mistake (Mao) exploited by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques that brought disastrous turmoil to the party, state, and the people.14 How should the Cultural Revolution, as it happened, be viewed from a historical perspective? How different was it from Mao’s own subjective beliefs? How should we view the Cultural Revolution from a historical perspective? A good place to begin with would be to think in reverse about the ironically right perspective and principle expressed by Mao himself in the midst of the Cultural Revolution: the “Three Dos and Three Don’ts,” which were “Do uphold Marxism, don’t practice revisionism; Do uphold unity, don’t create division; Do act fairly, don’t plot conspiracies.”15 Mao developed this principle after he suffered heavy blows politically and personally with the 1970 Lushan Conference and the 1971 Lin Biao affair. In 1973, the principle was officially written into the General Program of the Constitution of the CPC that was approved during the 10th National Congress 13. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969 14. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 811.

15. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 224.

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of the CPC. However, the events of the Cultural Revolution demonstrates that it was precisely what he advocated that he contravened, and it was precisely what he condemned that he practiced.16 The “Three Dos and Three Don’ts” principle thus, in fact, reveals three major characteristics of the Cultural Revolution. First, Mao followed feudalism and opportunism instead of Marxism in the Cultural Revolution. For instance, he insisted on reversing the party’s critical view of the ‘burning of books and burying of scholars’ performed by the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, a representative of feudal absolutism.17 As Deng Xiaoping later remarked, “There was something feudal in him,”18 that “for a leader to pick his own successor is a feudal practice.”19 Mao displayed an opportunistic attitude towards the establishment of his personality cult that was unconnected to Marxism.20 Second, Mao constantly created political divisions instead of unity. He maintained that “rebellion is reasonable,” insisted on a “philosophy of fighting,” stressed that “class struggle is the core,” and upheld his theory of “inevitable intraparty separation.”21 Political differences began to appear within the party before the Cultural Revolution, and eventually they split the party into factions.22 16. Deng Xiaoping had strong feelings and a deep understanding of this matter, and

said that Mao Zedong had begun to exhibit unhealthy thoughts in his old age. Mao

Zedong’s work style developed in a direction that ran against his original thoughts and opinions. (Deng, “Answers to Questions from the Italian reporter Oriana Fallaci.”)

17. “Burning of books and burying Confucian scholars alive” refers to the events of 213–

212 BC, when the first Emperor, Qin Shihuang, sought to unify and control thought and culture after subjugating the “warring states” to create a unified China.

18. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 347–348

19. Ibid. 20. Deng Xiaoping commented: “The democratic life of the party and the country was

becoming abnormal, with patriarchal phenomena like acting arbitrarily, making significant decisions alone, personality cult, and acting above the organization appeared one by one.” (Ibid, 330.)

21. In 1971, Mao Zedong announced his theory of “inevitable intraparty separation.” He

said: “Some people have already created 10 divisions. I think they may make another 10, 20, even 30 divisions. Do you believe me? Maybe you don’t believe, but I believe.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 224.)

22. On November 10, 1968, Mao Zedong first admitted to foreign guests that political

divisions had developed within the Communist Party of China. (Pang and Jin eds., Mao Zedong Biography (1949-1976), vol. 2, 1539.)

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Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

The movement itself never realized real political unity or stability. Third, instead of acting fairly, Mao often conspired against formerly close comrades, launching cruel struggles and ruthless attacks instead of allowing them to realign their politics with Mao. To realize his political goals, he placed Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in important positions, and conspiracies and relentless struggle became the mechanism of intraparty struggle and of the social movements of “overthrowing everything” and “full-scale domestic struggle,” which in turn produced a long list of cases involving fabricated and unjust charges.23 What was the fundamental characteristic of the Cultural Revolution? In April 1969, Lin Biao gave a speech during the 9th National Congress of the CPC, describing the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ as “a great political revolution personally initiated and led by our great leader, Chairman Mao, under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a great revolution in the realm of the superstructure.” He went on to detail it as “a great political revolution carried out by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie.”24 In fact, the Cultural Revolution turned out to be a series of political disasters, and even Lin himself would fall victim to Mao’s “struggles.” Mao appraised his own political performance in leading the Cultural Revolution as “30% wrong and 70% right.”25 The “30% wrong” refers to Mao’s own admission 23. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that while Mao Zedong was at fault for the increasingly

intense persecutions that later occurred, he should not be held solely liable. There were

occasions where Lin Biao and the Gang of Four acted on their own and reported to Mao Zedong only after the event, and sometimes they carried out such acts behind his back.

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 301)

24. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969. 25. Mao Zedong believed: “Generally speaking, the Cultural Revolution was right but had some basic deficiencies. Now we shall research the deficiencies. 30% percent of

the movement was wrong, 70% was right. Maybe people will now see this movement differently. The Cultural Revolution made two mistakes: one, overthrowing everything; two, starting a full scale domestic struggle. As for the former, some actions were

appropriate, such as purging the groups headed by Liu (Shaoqi) and Lin (Biao.) But

some actions were inappropriate, like condemning certain senior officials. Of course,

appropriate condemnation is okay because they themselves had also made mistakes. The last war ended over ten years ago, so ‘starting an full scale domestic struggle’ is

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

that “overthrowing everything” and “full scale domestic struggle” was wrong. Deng Xiaoping, however, thought that “overthrowing everything” and “full scale domestic struggle” was incompatible with the judgment of “70% right.”26 Declining to endorse Mao’s appraisal of the Cultural Revolution, Deng underwent another purge by Mao. Mao’s “30% wrong” narrative reveals precisely the two fundamental characteristics of the Cultural Revolution: One, it was a period of “overthrowing everything,” that is, ordinary politics of party and state was fractured and destroyed; two, it was a period of “full scale domestic struggle,” that is, society in China engaged in internal conflict and turmoil.27 Indeed, Mao was the mastermind in these respects as well: the editorial “Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons,” published in the People’s Daily on June 1, 1966, was the origin of the concept of “overthrowing everything”; the editorial “Carrying the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End,” published in the People’s Daily and Red Flag on January 1, 1967, with its discussions concerning class struggle, was the origin of “full-scale domestic struggle.” The Cultural Revolution was a period when ordinary politics of party and state was destroyed. Party and state institutions failed, left with only nominal power. The convention system of party and state leadership was severely damaged, with its main functions impaired and certain functions (e.g., judiciary and procuratorial) abolished. Local party committees at all levels were replaced by “core CPC leader groups,” and local government at all levels was substituted by revolutionary committees. Party and state politics fractured as a result of the arbitrary suspension, also a valuable drill. Of course, some people seized guns by force, but most guns were provided legally. However, it is very bad to allow people to be beaten to death and not

intervene.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 488.) 26. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 301.

27. The resolution passed by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee

of the CPC in 1981 stated: “History shows that the Cultural Revolution did not achieve and could not have achieved any sort of revolutionary or social progress. It was a domestic turmoil launched mistakenly by the leader and exploited by counterrevolutionary groups, bringing serious disaster to the party, country and people both

in China and abroad.”(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 811.)

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Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

dismissal and persecution of leaders, including members of the party leadership (mainly members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC) and members of the group of leaders of state agencies (leaders of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the CPPCC, and members of the State Council and National Defense Commission.) During the Cultural Revolution, five political splits within the party leadership occurred. In May 1966, the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC purged members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, including Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun. In August 1966, the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC condemned members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. In February 1967, the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC purged seven members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, including Tan Zhenlin. Between 1970 and 1971, two members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, including Chen Boda and Lin Biao, and five members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, were purged. In April 1976, the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC purged Deng Xiaoping for a second time, and stripped Ye Jianying, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Li Xiannian, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, of their responsibilities. Mao was the undisputed sole winner in all five intraparty political struggles during the Cultural Revolution. The Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC (August 1966,) the Communiqué of the Enlarged Twelth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC (October 1968,) the Political Report of the 9th National Congress of the CPC (April 1969,) and the Political Report of the 10th National Congress of the Party (August 1973,) all fully affirmed and proclaimed Mao’s personal success, while providing theoretical justification for the inevitability of line struggle and intraparty conflict. These political struggles, however, caused political divisions among the collective leadership of the party, organizational divisions within the party, and social divisions throughout the country. As Deng Xiaoping later remarked, the CPC suffered the greatest political setback, and the movement was a comprehensive and fatal mistake with serious consequences.28 28. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

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Analytical Framework This book presents a history and a historical analysis of the Cultural Revolution. Creating an analytical framework, based on the available historical records, will help to provide clear historical context, analyze historical events, and appraise the performance of historical figures. The Cultural Revolution was the inevitable result of the gradual slide of the central collective leadership from democracy, accord, and unity of the institution, to autocracy, conflict, and division. It also reflects the tortuous path towards the strategic failure of Mao. How did Mao’s desire for political unity end up creating continuous political conflict? The analytical framework of this study is based on decision-making theory, which holds that not all political differences cause political divisions, and that political divisions result from interaction between two factors. The first factor is the asymmetry and uncertainty of information, which is the information-related root of political differences; the second factor is the asymmetrical and uncertain power of members of a collective leadership, which causes the failure of democratic collective decision-making mechanisms and leads to individual arbitrary decisionmaking mechanisms, which is the root cause of political difference sliding into political conflict. First, the asymmetry and uncertainty of the information and knowledge of members of a collective leadership directly influence the information structure and decisions of decision makers. Information is the major basis and reference for decision making. Information scattering, scarcity, and insufficiency, as well as costs and temporal lags in obtaining information, mean that decision makers face a problem of “misinformation”: information is necessary in decision making, but at the same time, there is plenty of information that leads to decision mistakes. Obtaining information is costly and time consuming. There is loss of fidelity in transmitting information. Information selection is subject to personal bias. In China’s political system, information is monopolized and kept classified, which leads to the creation of systematic misinformation. Thus, decision makers can be faced with information that is lagged, distorted, and biased. They also face the issue of “seen” and “unseen” information.29 They may be aware of “seen benefits,” of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 301. 29. This question was raised by the French economist Claude Frédéric Bastiat in his paper, “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” The paper examined the basis for the difference

between economic thinking and other forms of thinking. Bastiat believes: “There is only one difference between a good economist and a bad economist: the bad economist

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Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

but not “unseen costs,” magnifying the former while overlooking the latter. Such information uncertainty and incompleteness means that it was impossible for Mao to have perfect information or to be perfectly correct. In fact, Mao was aware of the problem of information incompleteness as late as 1965.30 At the time, he admitted that he had made mistakes, and that it was impossible for one to be absolutely right.31 Nonetheless, the idea of a “perfect Mao,” which contradicts both information economics and Marxist principles,32 was created and sustained by numerous leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Wang Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao, all of whom served as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the entire party, army, and country fell for this image. From the perspective of members of the collective leadership, their diverse sources of information, differences in political preferences, and differences in information selection, led to greater asymmetry and uncertainty of information, which in turn causes greater political differences amongst themselves. In fact, can only see visible consequences, while a good economist can simultaneously balance

visible consequences and hypothesized consequences.” Any choice has an associated

cost, or involves giving up another valuable opportunity. Therefore, one should not simply see the visible “gains,” but should also seek the “losses,” which are hard to see and may even be invisible. (Bastiat, “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.”)

30. Mao Zedong said: “Humans can never completely and objectively view the physical

world, human society and human beings themselves. If someday anyone says they have seen the world and it has become perfect (as though they were a divinity making

an announcement,) this would only inspire subjective spiritualism and metaphysical

thought. Marxists do not view the world this way.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 499.)

31. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 38.

32. In 1960, Mao Zedong commented: “As Lenin said, nobody is infallible. A dedicated party identifies mistakes and the reasons behind them, analyzes their subjective and

objective causes, and corrects them in public. Our party has a correct general roadmap

and does a good job in practice. Maybe some mistakes are inevitable. Where can we see the perfect ‘man of god’ who can find truth at the first try? Truth cannot be identified

easily, and appears only gradually. We are the epistemologists of dialectical materialism. We are not metaphysical epistemologists.”(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 9, 215–216.)

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

the members of the collective leadership could not easily predict the course and consequences of the Cultural Revolution, including Mao himself. Although Mao had said he wanted the Cultural Revolution to be concluded as early as possible, he ended up exploiting the movement opportunistically; once the Cultural Revolution was launched, Mao was unable to predict its course of development, much less control it like a “perfect” leader. An unprecedented scale of chaos occurred, including the illegal and undisciplined behavior, crimes against humanity, and destruction of cultural relics by the Red Guards, and the actions of the conspiratorial groups headed by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in attacking political elites and persecuting officials, intellectuals, and the masses at all levels of society. Second, asymmetry and lack of clarity in the power of the members of the collective leadership had a direct impact on the decision-making mechanisms, and in turn the extent of sharing of decision-making information and the decisions themselves. The asymmetry in power refers to the irregular and unequal power distribution among members of the collective leadership. This leads to two ways in which the mechanism of checks and balances is undermined and the structure and results of decision-making are impacted. When the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC is equal in power to other committee members, he is merely the “head of a class” and the decisionmaking process is collective, conducted through “democratic discussion, one member one vote, and decision made by majority votes.” Given that information is asymmetrical and uncertain, a collective democratic decision-making mechanism allows all members to communicate, exchange, and share information, thus reducing information asymmetry and uncertainty. Even when political differences exist among collective leadership members, they can manage these differences, reach political agreement, and maintain political unity by following collective decision-making rules (such as the organizational rules regarding ‘majority decision making’ prescribed in the Party Constitution.) For instance, the Second Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC, held in March 1949, approved the resolution “Methods of Work of Party Committees” to expressly prescribe that the secretary is merely the “head of a class” and their relationship with members (other classmates) is one in which the majority decision rules.33 In the early period of New China (1949－1956), this structure underpinned the correct decisions of the Central Committee of the CPC.34 When the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC has significantly 33. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4, 1440.

34. Hu, China’s Political and Economic History (1949–1976).

12

Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

more power than other members, they become the “absolute head” and “feudal patriarch.” As Deng Xiaoping remarked: “Without limitations on power, absolute obedience from everyone is expected, occasionally going as far as personal servitude.”35 In such circumstances, instead of being collective, decisions are made personally by the chairman, or are controlled by the “veto power” of the chairman, while the other members exercise a nominal voting right merely to express their obedience. Such personal decision-making mechanisms aggravate the problems of asymmetry and uncertainty of information. In such circumstances, any policy differences that exist within the collective leadership, especially differences between the chairman and members of the Central Committee of the CPC, can be abruptly exposed and escalate into conflict, resulting in inevitable political division. At the time when the Cultural Revolution started, Mao’s personal powers already exceeded those of the Central Committee of the CPC and its collective leadership. In the Notice on May 16 issued in 1966 by the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao modified the rule “the whole party must obey the Center [Central Leadership Collective]” to “the whole party must obey [the personal decisions of] Mao Zedong.”36 Later, in August of the same year, Mao Zedong modified “700,000,000 Chinese people led by the CPC” in the draft of the Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC to “700,000,000 Chinese people led by Mao Zedong and the CPC.”37 Naturally, the situation quickly turned into one filled with personal autarchy, personal despotism, personality cult, and non-democratic decisions centered on Mao. This not only prevented the Central Committee of the CPC from reaching political agreement, but also turned political differences into line rivalry and political struggle, eventually descending into further political division and fatal power struggles (such as the Lin Biao Affair in 1971.) Thus, an unbalanced political power structure leads to failure in strategic decision-making. The power structure of the Central Committee of the CPC consists of three parts: the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. Among these, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC is the official leadership 35. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 330.

36. On April 14, 1966, Mao Zedong gave personal instructions on a draft of the Notice on

May 16. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 43.)

37. Ibid, 95.

13

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

and decision-making core. However, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong became the only real core of decision making, having the “final word” on all matters. This special decision-making system existed outside the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and its standing committee and was highly unstable, changing at least six times: Mao and his deputies Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping (1956 – August 1966); Mao and Lin Biao and their deputy Zhou (August 1966 – September 1971); Mao and his deputy Zhou (September 1971 – August 1973); Mao and his deputies Zhou and Wang Hongwen (August 1973 – June 1975); Mao and his deputies Zhou and Deng (June 1975 – February 1976); and Mao and his deputies Hua Guofeng and Wang. On the lines indicated above, an organizational structure was formed within the Central Committee of the CPC as follows: two leaders (generally including Zhou Enlai) directly reported to Mao and also organized the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and its standing committee. But Mao usually did not attend the meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and its standing committee in person, and so failed to fully communicate and share information with other members of the collective leadership, or directly exchange opinions about decision making. Thus, the mistakes of Mao during the course of the Cultural Revolution originated from the interrelated failures of information and decision-making structures. On the one hand, Mao became alienated from the Marxist epistemology he had once advocated38 and from personal engagement in Marxist study and research. As a result, he cut himself off from both the masses39 and the political 38. Mao Zedong stated: “Correct knowledge can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and then back to matter, that is,

leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge, the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.”(Mao, “Where do Correct Ideas Come From?”)

39. Deng Xiaoping believed that in his later years, Mao Zedong “spent less and less time

in the real world.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 347–348.)



Hu Sheng believed that as his popularity with the Chinese people peaked, Mao

Zedong became arrogant, and gradually grew increasingly detached from the masses and real life. (Hu, Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China, 468.)



Between January to July 1976, Mao Zedong commented personally on just 13 letters

from common people (i.e., not from senior officials.) His comments basically ignored

matters related to the lives of the common people; he also rarely investigated grass-roots units, visited common people in person, or traveled to poor and undeveloped rural areas, minority areas and remote areas. Only two of Mao’s letters during this period

14

Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

situation in China. This only worsened the information failure surrounding him, and made his subjective judgments regarding Chinese society increasingly removed from reality.40 On the other hand, political power became increasingly centralized involve the people’s livelihood. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12 & 13.)



From the first letter, sent by Li Qinglin, a teacher at Xialin Elementary School,

Chengjiao Township, Putian, Fujian, and dated April 25, 1973, Mao Zedong learnt that the educated city youth working in rural areas “spend their days eating grains from

the black market at home because the grain ration provided by the production team is

insufficient,” that “they not only cannot get enough rationed grain, but also never see a dividend, and receive not one cent of income,” and that “they have no homes of their

own and live with local poor and lower-middle class peasants.” Since the start of the sending of numerous educated city youth to rural areas at the end of 1968, this was the

first time Mao Zedong had heard the truth about their situation. He decided to directly intervene and commented: “Please allow us to make a plan to solve this issue because this phenomenon is common all over the country.” Therefore, during June and July of 1973, the State Council held a workshop on the settlement of nationwide educated

youth in mountainous and rural areas, and organized a Central Committee Workshop

to draft Opinions on Solving Current Serious Problems Associated with the Settlement of Educated Youth in Mountainous and Rural Areas. (Party Literature Research Center of the

CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 349-350.)



From the second letter, sent by Bai Yuntao, a Secretary of the Political Department

of the 38th Army, Mao Zedong learned that “there are poor households in affluent

teams and also affluent households in poor teams.” Mao Zedong appointed Li Xiannian to solve this problem, and on June 24, Li Xiannian submitted a report to Mao

Zedong and the Central Committee of the CPC. The report said, “In 1973, 72 counties had grain production that was unchanged from the establishment of New China. Also, there were nearly one million production teams (approximately 20% of the total in China) with annual income per capita below CNY40. These teams basically had no

cash distribution and some even had difficulty conducting simple reproduction.” In response, Mao Zedong stopped insisting that experimental units offer two purchase prices to poor and rich production teams. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 436-437; Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian: Li Xiannian Biography (1942–

1992), vol. 2, 856–859.)

40. Joseph believes that Mao Zedong’s subjective judgment regarding the danger of revisionism developed through extended speculation into a political crankiness that

15

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

in Mao himself, as he enjoyed the “final word” on all matters. As Mao’s personal power peaked on the back of his personality cult and the concentration of political power in his hands, Mao also made the biggest political mistakes, contravening party and state constitutions, overriding the Central Committee of the CPC, using the Gang of Four to achieve his political goal,41 conducting “cruel struggle and ruthless beating,”42 stirring up political division within the party and social turmoil throughout the country.43 The failures in information and decision-making structures fed off and intensified each other, leading to a circular mechanism through confirmation bias, a trap of the Cultural Revolution that Mao could not escape from. From the beginning, Mao was deeply resolute in the need for the Cultural Revolution, as well as the correctness of the theory of class struggle in socialist society and “continuing the revolution under proletarian dictatorship”. When implemented and proven to be wrong and cruel in practice, and widespread doubt and dissent appeared (for example, the “February Adverse Current” in 1967,) Mao would interpret the backlash as further evidence of the presence of more “class enemies” and the necessity of escalating the Cultural Revolution. Only towards his own end did he reluctantly admit that the campaign was “30% right and 70% wrong,” and that he had made two mistakes — “overthrowing everything” and “full scale domestic struggle,” although he remained adamant on the essential correctness of the Cultural Revolution.44 The Cultural Revolution is a lesson in the importance of having a scientific, democratic, and institutionalized collective leadership decision mechanism. The biggest issue to be resolved is the asymmetry and uncertainty of information enabled the launch of the Cultural Revolution. (Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-leftism in China.)

41. Deng Xiaoping said: “No doubt Chairman Mao made mistakes, including wrongly promoting those persons [the Gang of Four]. However, they cleverly built a clique

of some size. Particularly, they made use of ignorant young people as a front. They also had a firm foundation for their actions. Jiang Qing did these evil things in the name of Chairman Mao, and Chairman Mao failed to intervene effectively. On this

point, Chairman Mao had responsibility.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 347–348.)

42. In December 1972, Mao Zedong asked: “Who prescribed such fascist methods?” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 334.)

43. In December 1970, Mao Zedong remarked that the Cultural Revolution had caused a full scale domestic turmoil. (Ibid, 176.)

44. Pang and Jin eds., Mao Zedong Biography (1949-1976), vol. 2, 1781–1782.

16

Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

during decision-making. First, information should be acquired from different channels, information asymmetry and uncertainty should be reduced, information transparency increased, information sources expanded, information analysis strengthened, and the consultation of information in decision making encouraged. In particular, collective leadership, democratic decision-making, full information sharing, timely communication of information, and honest information exchange should be implemented, and political decisions should be made according to majority opinion via a democratic process based on political consensus. The core of China’s democratization is intraparty democratization. In turn, the core of intraparty democratization is a strong institution. According to the provisions of Article 10 of the Party Constitution, all party organizations and members must abide by the National Congress and Central Committee of the CPC rather than the party leader personally. Through reforms of these two parts of the CPC and the construction of institutionalization, Deng Xiaoping gradually formed a practical and realistic information and decision-making mechanism based on “self-correction” that can not only avoid poor decisions, but also make appropriate adjustments in response to such decisions and prevent minor errors becoming significant, and short-term errors becoming long-term, ensuring that the future China will succeed by avoiding major errors while promptly correcting minor errors. Taking the Cultural Revolution as the subject of study, examining the mechanism and process of Mao’s decision-making in his late years, in particular understanding his thoughts, his information sources, and the figures behind Mao’s decisions and actions, will help to build a good historical study for understanding of China’s political democratization, especially the democratization of decision making, through the painful mistake of the Cultural Revolution.

Content and Organization This work presents an in-depth analysis on the historical account of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. The major questions to be asked are: How does one judge the Cultural Revolution? How do Mao’s self-evaluation and an objective historical evaluation differ? Why and how did the Cultural Revolution happen and last for 10 years? What phases occurred within the Cultural Revolution? What was the main focus of the political struggle in each phase? Who were the representatives of the various factions? What were the symbolic political events? What characteristics did the political struggle have? What connections and political causalities existed between the political struggles during the different phases? How

17

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

did the Cultural Revolution end? Why did it ultimately fail? What were its social and political consequences? How does one historically and quantitatively evaluate the Cultural Revolution? How does one identify and analyze the institutional causes of the Cultural Revolution – was it simply a mistake made by Mao in his later years? What lessons should we learn from the Cultural Revolution? Why is the failure of the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao often considered essential to the success of the reform policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping? Why was the decade of “nationwide turmoil” so swiftly replaced by three decades or longer of complete order throughout the country? This work is presented in three volumes. Volume 1 introduces the background to the Cultural Revolution: the domestic and international historical contexts, Mao’s preparations for the Cultural Revolution through building his Mao’s theory of class struggle and his manipulation of public opinion, the political reasons for Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution, and the failure of the intra-party democratic system. It will also look at the launch phase of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, when Mao used his supporters to attack the “rightist” faction in the Central Committee of the CPC. Volume 2 continues with the development of the movement, as Mao, having taken down Liu Shaoqi’s allies and completely isolated him, completed his purge of his most powerful political rival. However, Mao continued to be increasingly antagonistic until he “bellowed down all his opponents at the Lushan Meeting” in 1970, and ultimately entered into a fierce political struggle with his appointed successor, Lin Biao. Volume 3 looks at the final phases of the Cultural Revolution, as furious conflicts between the moderates within the party and the clique loyal to Mao led to a final political struggle, purging Deng Xiaoping for a second time. Mao’s passing not long after led to conflict breaking out between the moderate faction and the Gang of Four, with a bloodless coup finally ending the 10-year Cultural Revolution and the chaos in the country. The volume closes with historical appraisals of the Cultural Revolution, including self-appraisals by Mao Zedong, official appraisals by the Central Committee of the CPC during different periods, and analyses and quantitative evaluations of the Cultural Revolution by historians, including quantitative calculation of the accumulated economic and human-capital losses using the counter-fact method and statistics on incurred losses from the destruction of national institutions and legal rights.45 45. This method involves making assumptions regarding hypothetical situations. It was adopted by Fogel in his research on American economic history. Fogel hypothesized

the costs and benefits of replacing existing railways with canals, rivers, carriages, and

18

Introduction: Historical Lessons of the Cultural Revolution

Throughout the work, there will be analyses of the institutional defects behind the mistakes made by the aging Mao, including lifelong tenure of state leaders, failure of the official democratic decision system, and conversion of intra-party disagreements into class struggle. Additionally, this work looks at how the Cultural Revolution influenced China’s reform, particularly how Deng Xiaoping viewed its historical lessons, and how its failure became crucial to the success of the reform policy initiated by Deng. The historical lessons of the Cultural Revolution have been far-reaching. No leader since Mao has been given the opportunity to copy his mistakes, and thus no incarnation of Mao in his late years will appear in the party’s political decisions or institutional arrangements in future.

other alternative transport infrastructures. This method allowed Fogel to research

counter-factual questions such as: What would American economic growth have been

like without the railways? (Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History.)

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2

Chapter

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

The Cultural Revolution, launched and personally led by Mao Zedong in 1966, did not occur incidentally or on a whim. The movement was a long deliberated political response by Mao to a particular situation. Mao deemed the movement one of his two great accomplishments (the other being the founding of New China,) signifying its importance to him.1 The direct cause of the Cultural Revolution lay in political differences between Mao Zedong and other state leaders — in particular, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen — regarding China’s political and economic condition at the end of the 1950s. Mao saw these leaders as representing “Rightist” forces within the party, while he himself was becoming a “Leftist.” As Deng Xiaoping said, “After 1957, ‘Leftist’ thought began to rise and gradually took over”2 and “[Mao Zedong’s] mistakes appeared one after another.”3 Here, it is necessary to discuss the following questions: What was the theoretical background against which Mao Zedong pursued class struggle? How did Mao judge the political situation of China (for example, in terms of domestic class conflicts?) How did the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) officially view Mao’s political line? How did Mao conduct political drills to prepare for the Cultural Revolution? What political differences existed between Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping? Why did the differences among leaders turn into intense conflicts rather than peaceful resolution through the normal party system for managing debate (that is, the “Party Constitution” approved during the 8th National Congress of the CPC?) How did Mao prepare the public for the Cultural Revolution? What were his political objectives? Why did Mao employ 2,000 year old strategies of the tyrannical Qin Shi Huang? What commonality existed between Mao’s policy and Stalin’s cultural absolutism? What was the direct political trigger of Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution? How did Mao see the CPC and the government under his leadership? How did Mao react to the “peaceful evolution” that the Americans sought to promote in China at this time? What did Mao think about measures to prevent Khrushchevian revisionism from appearing in China? Why did Mao shift from opposing to advocating personality cults? What factors caused the increasingly extreme personality cults of other party leaders (like Lin Biao) that emerged before that of Mao Zedong? How did these personality cults relate to the Cultural Revolution? Why did the intra-party democratic system fail from the late 1950s? What responsibility should Mao assume for the Cultural 1.

Hu ed., The 70 Years of the Communist Party of China, 465.

2.

Deng, Construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 102.

3.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

22

of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 295.

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

Revolution? What responsibility should the Central Committee of the CPC assume for the Cultural Revolution? The Cultural Revolution resulted from the interaction of multiple domestic and international factors, and from Mao Zedong making impulsive decisions against the advice of others. The Cultural Revolution thus may be understood as a response by Mao to various internal and external political challenges. Mao’s leadership was based on crisis response, and his style was to “challenge, stimulate, express, and react strongly (even excessively.)” He made decisions based on his subjective opinions regarding domestic and international events. Mao was also highly sensitive to challenges and to the political attitudes of his colleagues. When he believed challenges represented serious political or even existential threats to the party and the state, he would experience “crisis hallucination.” In this state of “crisis hallucination,” Mao subjectively distorted and even aggrandized challenges and threats, causing him to misjudge and react mistakenly to crisis situations.4 Rather than containing these potential crises, Mao allowed small crises to grow, and intentionally created new crises. This reflects Mao’s state of mind at the time, a culmination of his experiences, political beliefs and ideological preferences, information selection (the selection of information consistent with his political beliefs,) and physical and mental state (his age, constitution, physical strength, energy, health, and disease.) Mao wielded ultimate power in China, and the CPC leadership had little ability to influence Mao. His personal opinions determined the policies of the leadership and by extension the party. In the following sections, we introduce and analyze how Mao Zedong subjectively perceived domestic and international challenges, and domestic challenges from within and outside the CPC, and how he made basic judgments regarding such challenges. Section 1 introduces the international background that led Mao to his socialist theory of class struggle, which provided the external driver of the Cultural Revolution; Section 2 outlines Mao’s basic assessment of China’s political situation, which became the internal driver of the Cultural Revolution; Section 3 presents how Mao prepared the public for the launch of the Cultural Revolution, matching his political belief that “Before you make a revolution, you must first create public opinion”; Section 4 explains the direct political causes of Mao’s move and reveals the political differences and conflicts between Mao and 4.

“Crisis hallucination” refers to subjective recognition being inconsistent with objective

circumstance, causing an individual to distort the intensity of external stimulation; this phenomenon causes wrong judgments, such as extreme miscalculations. See Watkins

and Bazerman, “Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, and How to Prevent Them.”

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

Liu Shaoqi; Section 5 then analyzes why Mao successfully launched the Cultural Revolution from the perspective of institutional failure; finally, Section 6 explains how the Cultural Revolution caused China to lose an opportunity for economic development, and led to it lagging behind Japan and the Four Asian Tigers.

International Background to Mao Zedong’s Class Struggle Theory The two big threats represented by America and the former Soviet Union were the two most important external influences on New China after its founding in 1949. Conflicts with these countries attracted the close attention of Mao , who reacted strongly and even excessively, displaying closed-minded and paranoid thinking.5 Mao’s subjective thinking directly influenced his assessments of domestic situations. For example, he closely associated global and domestic class struggles instead of viewing them as distinct from each other. Consequently, when China simultaneously faced severe domestic challenges and peaceful pressure from the United States, Mao responded by focusing on resisting the American pressure. In 1953, John Foster Dulles, then U.S. Secretary of State, presented the strategy of promoting peaceful evolution in socialist countries. He said that the “enslaved people” in socialist countries should be “liberated," but that “liberation can be achieved through means other than war” and “the means ought to be and can be peaceful.”6 The Eisenhower government committed to this strategy and advocated a “strategy of peaceful conquest” through the pursuit of peaceful change within the Soviet bloc. Dulles later added that communism “will gradually give way to 5.

On this point, Hu Qiaomu later argued that one of the reasons for the “leftist” mistake

was the deterioration of the international situation from the 1950s to the 1970s and Mao Zedong’s overreaction to this deterioration. American policy towards China,

which included economic embargoes and military threats, forced China to maintain an extended state of war preparedness. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang's military attacks

against the Chinese mainland sharpened the sense of crisis. In the late 1950s, the

relationship between China and the Soviet Union worsened, and by the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had also adopted a threatening and militaristic stance toward China. The

Chinese government (especially Mao Zedong) felt that almost the whole world was encircling and threatening "the last true bastion of the revolution," and naturally felt obligated to enter a state of high preparedness and perform various internationalist

revolutionary obligations. (Hu, “Why did China make a Two-Decade ‘Leftist’ Mistake?”) 6.

24

Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1138–1139.

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

a system that pays more attention to the welfare of the state and people," and that “Russian and Chinese Communists are not working for the welfare of their people” and “this kind of communism will change.” Mao was sensitive to this rhetoric and responded swiftly. In November 1958, Mao said that every word of Dulles’s speech should be carefully reviewed.7 In November 1959, immediately after the Lushan Meeting, Mao ordered the distribution of Dulles’s three speeches to central government leaders attending the Hangzhou Meeting. He also issued many instructions and stated that the Americans were deviously attempting to corrupt China through a peaceful policy that masked aggressive expansionism.8 In December, the Johnson government announced a new strategy of containment, embargo and peaceful evolution in China.9 Mao 7.

Ibid, 1140.

8.

Ibid, 1140–1143.

9.

On December 13, 1963, Roger Hilsman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern

Affairs delivered a speech on American policy toward China at the San Francisco Commonwealth Club. This speech represented the first policy document released by an American official since Johnson entered the White House and the first comprehensive

official presentation of American policy toward China in a long time. The American government made the following basic assessments: •

• • •

China was an “antagonistic power hostile to the West and threatening to

neighboring countries,” and was America’s “biggest and most troubling issue” in the Far East.

China was dangerously insistent on revolution, but did not take blind risks.

The political power and leadership in China were consolidated and there was no sign of change in China’s diplomatic policies and attitude toward the U.S. In the long run, potential existed for peaceful evolution in China.

The main items of American policy toward China were: •

• • •

The chief goal was to prevent “China from destabilizing or invading the free world and its neighboring countries,” which meant establishing an “enclosure” around China to constrain Chinese ambitions and stabilize the Far East.

Make the acceptance of “two Chinas” a condition for the improvement of the Sino-US relationship.

Deny the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China and maintain a trade embargo against the Chinese mainland, while continuing Sino-US negotiations.

Follow a long-term objective of “adopting a policy of maintaining strength with a firm, but negotiable attitude.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

again paid close attention to this announcement and passed a report on the new American strategy to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping with special instructions for their reference.10 Mao was the first Chinese leader to stress the need to be wary of the American political strategy of promoting peaceful change. While this opinion was insightful, Mao also overestimated the threat and overreacted to it. Bo Yibo later commented that Mao exaggerated the danger of foreign powers manipulating peaceful change in China, and elevated it into the most serious political issue of the time.11 Mao’s views regarding world peace and the threat of war can be seen in an interview with a Japanese Communist Party delegation on October 18, 1959. Mao pointed out that while the international situation was improving, China had to consider how to respond if some extremist powers try to launch World War III. Shortly after, while speaking about a political economics textbook compiled by the Institute of Economics, Soviet Academy of Sciences, Mao pointed out: “We hope to avoid world war and we value peace. We agree to strive to prevent nuclear war and struggle for a mutual non-aggression accord. Our objective is to achieve peace in 10–20 years. The accomplishment of this objective would help the socialist camp and our own socialist construction.”12 Mao initially pursued long-term world peace through this strategic design, which demonstrated his agreement with the mutual non-aggression accord between the Soviets and Americans. However, the changing global situation, especially the American invasion of Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet split, disillusioned Mao, and turned him from pursuing world peace to preparing for war. In 1961, America sent significant numbers of American military personnel to South Vietnam, threatening China with the prospect of a war on its southern Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 467–468.) 10. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 467.

11. On June 16, 1964, during the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and the First Regional Secretary, Mao said, “The

Imperialists have said they cannot pin their hopes on the first and second generations of the CPC, and perhaps must wait for [a softening of stance in] the third and the

fourth generations. Can this work? I hope not, but it is possible. For instance, did Lenin

and Stalin hope for the appearance of Khrushchev? Regardless, he still appeared!” (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1159.)

12. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee and The Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People's Liberation Army comp., Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts Since the Founding of New China, vol. 2, 70.

26

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

border. This was followed in August 1964 by the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which gave America a pretext to bomb North Vietnam and initiated a dangerous extension of the Vietnam War. On August 6, the Chinese government officially released a statement to protest against the imminent American invasion of Vietnam. On reviewing the draft of the statement of protest, Mao commented, “I must reconsider my decision on the actions now because there is an imminent war.”13 On August 12, reflecting Mao’s concerns, the Combat Unit of the General Political Department drafted a report on how the state could prevent and prepare for a sudden enemy attack on its economic infrastructure. Mao reviewed and approved this report the same day, and gave instructions for careful research and gradual implementation.14 On August 19, with the approval of Mao, the State Council established a special team dedicated to this matter. This 13-member team was headed by Li Fuchun, assisted by Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing. Mao saw two future scenarios for world war: evitable war and inevitable war. He said, “Things always go this way in the world: if your preparation is poor, the enemy will come; if you are well prepared, the enemy will not dare to come.”15 He therefore insisted on preparation for war as a means to avoid war. On April 10, 1965, Deng Xiaoping, sepeaking for the Central Committee of the CPC, announced that China should prepare for the worst,16 and developed a policy of “strengthening preparations for 13. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1349. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid, 1347. 16. On April 10, 1965, Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPC, sent the Instructions of the CPC Central Committee on Strengthening Preparations

for War to the Committee for approval. It read: “American Imperialists are extending the war in Vietnam to directly infringe the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam, and seriously threaten the safety of our country. We have repeatedly

clarified our position before the whole world: we will not ignore this development and are prepared to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with the people of Vietnam at any time. We are prepared to strongly resist the flames of war that American Imperialists are

pushing toward our territory. The Central Committee believes that the current situation

demands strengthened preparations for war. Officials of the Central Committee of the

CPC at county levels and above should heighten their awareness of preparations for

war and focus on the evolution of the war in Vietnam. We must consider the possibility that our enemies may do something rash. We should prepare mentally and practically to respond to a crisis, such as the bombing of our military facilities, industrial infrastructure, transport hubs and big cities by American imperialists, and should even

be ready to repel an invasion.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

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war” that Mao Zedong officially approved.17 Regarding the American extension of the Vietnam War and its challenge to the core national security interests of China, Mao swiftly outlined guidelines on “preparation for war” and “preparation of the people for war and famine.”18 In a speech addressing the whole CPC, Mao stressed the imperialist threat to China’s sovereignty. He announced: “We shall prepare not only for the challenge of imperialism, but also the joint attack of imperialism and revisionism.”19 In fact, Mao overestimated the danger of world war and the possibility of associated worldwide revolution.20 This error was later reflected in the Political Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969 and the Political Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973. Believing in a constant external threat to national sovereignty, Mao was very concerned with controlling domestic reactions to various external influences and pushed for nationwide implementation of “taking class struggle as the core.” China also faced pressure from its former ally, the Soviet Union. Mao believed that, like the U.S., the Soviet Union was also seeking peaceful change within China. Consequently, he issued the guidelines on “opposing and preventing revisionism” to prepare the theories backing the launch of the Cultural Revolution.21 Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 11, 359–360.) 17. Ibid. “We must take the situation seriously and prepare thoroughly for war. In particular, important military facilities, industrial bases, transport hubs and big cities

must be prepared for enemy air attacks. We should also prepare for battles on different

scales so as to exploit our natural advantages and minimize our natural disadvantages. Provided we have properly prepared, we will be invincible and victory will be assured

regardless of how the situation develops.” Mao Zedong gave his written agreement to these sentiments.

18. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 20.

19. This speech was made on October 10, 1965, during the Meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central Bureaus. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 2, 328.

20. Bo Yibo later believed Mao Zedong overestimated the threat of war. (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1216.

21. “On Preparations for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” presented in the Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC, mentions: “...various leaders from Khrushchev to Brezhnev were ruling capitalist roaders hidden inside the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union. Once they took office, they immediately sought vainly to achieve a bourgeois restoration, usurped the power of the communist party which had been led

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Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

Immediately following its establishment, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had leaned towards the Soviet camp. The Soviet Union was also the first country to establish diplomatic relations with China, on October 3, 1949, and was followed by another 10 socialist countries. Following tough negotiations between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on one side, and Stalin on the other, on February 14, 1950, China and the Soviet Union officially entered into various accords, including the “SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” and the “Soviet Union Loan to the PRC.” According to the loan accord, the Soviet Union extended China a 5-year loan of USD 300 million with a favorable annual interest rate of 1%. China and the Soviet Union then entered a honeymoon period that was vital for the establishment and survival of New China. Besides receiving Soviet help, the alliance also placed China under the protection of the Soviet Union. Still, there were certain aspects of the Sino-Soviet accords that were unfavorable to China, and cooperation with the Soviet Union placed China in opposition to the capitalist camp led by the U.S.22 After Khrushchev took office, Sino-Soviet relations briefly continued to flourish. Khrushchev gave China substantial assistance when he visited on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the PRC in 1954. For instance, he returned SinoSoviet joint ventures in Lüshunkou and Xinjiang to China, assisted in repairing and building railways linking Lanzhou with Almaty, loaned 500 million rubles to China, and helped China initiate 15 projects. Together with 141 projects that Stalin had previously committed to, this meant the Soviet Union was involved in 156 projects in China, all of which were core projects in the First Five-Year Plan. Khrushchev needed China’s support after taking office, so he pulled the Sino-Soviet relationship closer and limited the chauvinism the Soviet Union had exhibited under Stalin.23 by Lenin and Stalin, and peacefully transformed the first dictatorship of the proletariat

into a fascist-controlled dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Mao Zedong fought tit-for-tat against the modern revisionism of the renegade Soviet revisionist clique, and became

the inheritor, champion and developer of Marxist and Leninist theory of proletarian

revolution and dictatorship. Mao Zedong comprehensively concluded the historic experience of the proletariat on both sides and developed the theory of continuous

revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.” (Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.)

22. Li, “Preface: The History of the Sino-Soviet Relationship and the Future of the SinoRussian Relationship.”

23. Mao Zedong’s speech to the Enlarged Meeting of the Secretariat of the Central

Committee of the CPC on March 17, 1956. (Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-

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From the mid-1950s, significant events occurring in the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe began to worry Mao. After the anti-rightist struggle in 1957, these changes also formed the international background against which Mao directed the 8th National Congress of the CPC to resolve to “take class struggle as the core.” In February 1956, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its 20th National Congress. During the congress, Khrushchev made his famous “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin. The CPC Delegation learned of this almost immediately, but had no opportunity to respond since they were informed via a draft report that was taken away after just one review. After the New York Times published excerpts from Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” on March 10, Mao immediately convened an enlarged meeting of the Secretariat and Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC to discuss the issues raised in the report and its international impact. Mao said, “On the one hand it was a good thing that Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin “Secret Speech” removed his [Stalin’s] mask; but on the other hand, it created disruption internationally.”24 On April 5, through discussions with the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, the People’s Daily Editorial Board published an article titled “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” to express their unique opinions on material matters related to international communist movements. While emphasizing the essential correctness of the policies of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Stalin, the article also pointed out some minor mistakes. The next day, Mao interviewed Anastas Mikoyan, Head of the Soviet Government Delegation and Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mao said, “While there exist some differences of opinion between the Chinese and Soviet governments, we believe Stalin’s feats are remarkable in comparison with his mistakes. We should analyze him concretely and evaluate him comprehensively.” The Soviet Union’s Pravda reprinted the article containing this interview. In June and October of the same year, the Poznan Uprising in Poland and the Hungarian Revolution broke out. Mao Zedong believed the root cause of these events, and their fundamental lesson, was the failure of class struggle. Many counter-revolutionists remained, and the proletariat and other laboring classes had not been trained in class struggle to identify friends and enemies, right and wrong, and immaterialism and materialism. The socialist countries that had allowed this to occur were now facing the consequences and paying the price. Mao stressed that Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 1, 6.) 24. Ibid.

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Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

it was dangerous to conduct class struggle without firm support from the masses and clear distinction between enemies and friends.25 Mao further judged the Soviet Bloc countries to have abandoned Marxism and Leninism, and even believed that Russia itself had abandoned Stalinist and Leninist thought.26 In February 1957, commenting on events in Hungary and Poland, Mao said that reactionary elements within socialist countries had colluded with imperialists and had attempted to “achieve their conspiratorial aims by taking advantage of contradictions among the people to foment dissension and stir up disorder.” Mao thus saw important lessons in the Hungarian Revolution.27 In July 1958, Mao angrily rebuked the Soviet Union (particularly Stalin) for its actions in the “two spheres of influence” of Northeast China and Xinjiang during a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to China. However, despite growing tensions, the two countries continued to present a united front to the world. In April 1959, in a conversation with Field Marshal Montgomery, Khrushchev said: “China is just like the hinterland of Soviet Union; both countries sit back to back, and each takes care of the home front of the other.” Zhou Enlai expressed the Chinese position in similar terms, saying: “If any country dares attack the Soviet Union, China will raise the hatchet against it immediately; if World War III broke out for some reason, China would fight on the side of Soviet Union.”28 But soon after, this military alliance became a nominal one. On August 26, 1959, a clash occurred on the Sino-Indian border. On September 9, a press release from the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union concerning the Sino-Indian border conflict blamed China and took the side of India. On December 4, when talking about the international situation, Mao said, “Khrushchev is not a good Marxist, but he is still not completely revisionist. His world view is based on pragmatism and his methodology is metaphysics, involving chauvinism and bourgeois liberalism.” 25. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 606–607; Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 1, 61.

26. Mao Zedong's Speech on the Second Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of

the CPC on November 15, 1956. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, 321–322.

27. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 211.

28. While Zhou Enlai was communicating with British Field Marshal Montgomery and American journalists Edgar Snow and Anna Louise Strong, he stressed: “China will

never let go if American Imperialists attack the Soviet Union or any other socialist country (Jin, Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1400.)

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The 1960s saw Sino-Soviet relations turn from friendship to divergence, conflict and opposition. The ideological divergences and struggles between the two sides directly influenced the evolution of their relationship.29 As Deng Xiaoping later said, “Now, looking back on more than 20 years of practice, we can see there was a lot of empty talk on both sides.” He also said, “We no longer think that everything we said at the time was right. The basic problem was that the Chinese were not treated as equals and was humiliated.”30 In May 1960, Mao labeled Khrushchev a semi-revisionist. Mao said: “Now we have criticized him within the organization without mentioning him by name. We just want to make our case face to face. Someday we may criticize him in public, but we will never be the first to challenge him.”31 In June 1960, Khrushchev attacked the CPC at the Bucharest Conference. He said the CPC was “crazy,” blamed the CPC for launching a war against India, and accused it of “sectarianism” in the international communist movement. Peng Zhen, the head of the CPC Delegation, retaliated fiercely with criticisms of Khrushchev. On June 29, the People’s Daily published an editorial, containing revisions by Mao Zedong that criticized the Communique of the Bucharest Conference. One of Mao’s sharpest criticisms was the comment, “Who is the owner in this world?”32 This comment shamed Khrushchev into anger. In July, the Soviet Union unilaterally tore up 12 economic contracts, and by September it had cancelled more than 200 technological assistance contracts, and withdrawn 1,390 experts deployed to assist China. The Chinese government responded with a note asking that the Soviet Union reconsider this decision, but the Soviet Union would not relent. In other words, Khrushchev extended the ideological divergence between the two governments to a souring of the wider relationship between two countries. This 29. Li, “Preface: The History of the Sino-Soviet Relationship and the Future of the SinoRussian Relationship.”

30. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 3, 294–295.

31. On May 22, 1960, during the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, held in Hangzhou, Mao Zedong said, “Based on

the situation of the past two years, Khrushchev’s revisionist tendency has appeared in

dealing with major problems. But we should not conclude he is a thorough revisionist or has a fully formed revisionist position. Generally speaking he is a half revisionist. Khrushchev is a capitalist politician, and not very smart” (Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 1, 270–273.)

32. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 9, 226–227.

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period was a particularly difficult one for China, as its people were suffering from the Great Chinese Famine. Mao said: “There exists a rapidly growing anti-China trend. Behind this trend, there are not only American Imperialists and bourgeois reactionaries in nationalist countries, but also revisionists within the CPC.”33 In September, during the Summit of the CPC and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Deng said, “The CPC will never accept a relation of subordination with another political party or country. You withdrew your experts to damage and interrupt our development. But the Chinese people are ready to recover from this loss and build up our country with their own hands.”34 As the domestic economic situation deteriorated, the Central Committee of the CPC had to make substantial concessions to the Soviets during the Moscow Meeting (November 10–December 1, 1960.) Chinese leaders represented by Liu Shaoqi held discussions with Khrushchev and others to end their disagreements and restore bilateral relations. Both parties decided to continue their military and national defense technology cooperation. In February 1961, Khrushchev wrote to Mao to say the Soviet Union was willing to provide China with 1 million tons of food and 0.5 million tons of sugar. The Soviet Union provided this assistance to China later that same year.35 During China’s toughest days economically, the Soviet Union provided timely and crucial assistance. In October, 1961 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its 22nd National Congress. During the congress, Khrushchev unexpectedly announced the direction of “peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition; a state of the entire people and a party of the entire people,”36 causing confusion in the international communist movement and ripples in socialist countries. In September, just before the Congress, Mao opined during a meeting that Khrushchev was on the side of the high-income class.37 In November, just after the congress, 33. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 1, 234. 34. Xie ed., China’s Contemporary Diplomatic History (1949–2001), 203. 35. Shen ed., A Historical Outline of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991, 293–294. 36. The “peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition; a state of the

entire people and a party of the entire people” quote of Khrushchev refers to: first, the policies of peaceful co-existence, peaceful contest, and peaceful transition announced by the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; second,

to “a state of the entire people and a party of the entire people” brought at the 22nd National Congress of Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

37. Mao Zedong said, “The question is this: which class is Khrushchev on the side of? The

answer is the high-income class. The class he represents is the same in nature as that which imperialism represents. The high income class is inhumane compared with the

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Mao observed: “Revisionists want to isolate China; however, who will really be isolated? Revisionists deviate from the masses and isolate themselves, while we (dogmatists) enjoy the support of the masses.” 38 Tensions between China and the Soviet Union continued in the summer of 1962, as over 74,500 ethnic Kazakh residents from the counties of Tacheng, Yumin, and Huocheng of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region defected to the Soviet Union, along with over 230,000 livestock and 1,500 carts, in what is known as the Ili incident of 1962. In October, India sent troops across the McMahon Line and caused a large-scale military conflict with China. In November, Khrushchev made a series of anti-China speeches in support of the Indian government. These events influenced the opinions of the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong differently. Mao believed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had become a revisionist party because of various forces manipulating a process of peaceful change; rather than being accidental, the changes were the products of the common actions of the new capitalist powers domestically and imperialism internationally. If China failed to fight against the manipulation of modern revisionists and imperialists exploiting peaceful change, the tragedy of the Soviet Union could occur in China too. During this period, the Central Committee of the CPC reflected on the lesson from the failure of the Great Leap Forward and held the famous 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres in 1962 – so named because there were over 7,000 attendees. Mao had to perform self-criticism in front of the attendees and was on the defensive. He believed the suffering of the party during the previous three years was the result of the party having violated natural law. However, Mao said in August that those who disagreed with the “Three Red Flags” (the general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people’s commune) were holding back the progress of the country and the party.39 Mao deemed selfreflection on policy errors inside the Central Committee of the CPC to be denial of the “Three Red Flags.” Furthermore, Mao felt that the self-reflection of the Central Committee was a response to Khrushchev’s self-criticism, and thus suspected it heralded the appearance of revisionism in China. During the Beidaihe Meeting and the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong strongly rejected Peng Dehuai’s personal letter appeal. Mao believed that Peng low income class. Therefore, all of his opponents are low-income common workers and farmers.”

38. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 9, 600.

39. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1073, 1077.

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was reversing the established case by exploiting the current furious international class struggle, the difficult domestic economic situation, and the anti-China front of Kennedy, Khrushchev and Nehru.40 On February 25, 1963, Liu Shaoqi submitted a report on the anti-revisionist struggle to the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, and announced his opinions on how China should prevent the development of revisionism. Liu concluded the following: “Never degenerate,” “This is a life or death problem” and “This is a problem that concerns the very survival of the CPC and the state.” Mao added: “Only two possibilities exist regarding degeneration: possible or impossible. Degeneration would transform the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeois.” On February 28, Mao proposed, “Revisionists also exist domestically. We should oppose monsters and demons including the revisionists and bourgeois among us.”41 On June 14, 1963 the Central Committee of the CPC released “A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement.” On July 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published “A Letter to Party Organizations at All Levels and All Party Members in the Soviet Union.” From September 1963 to July 1964, via the People’s Daily and Red Flag, the Central Committee of the CPC published nine articles (the “Nine Reviews”) commenting on this public letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.42 The Sino-Soviet public conflict reached a climax, and the Central Committee of the CPC replaced its 1950s diplomatic strategy of “hit with a fist” (meaning establishing a united anti-American front) with one of “hit with two fists” (meaning opposing both imperialism and revisionism.)43 A vicious circle developed, in which increasing numbers of international enemies led to a more radical diplomatic strategy, while increasing numbers of domestic class enemies led to a more radical domestic line. Each pair of trends interacted with and enhanced the other. 40. Ibid, 1090–1094. 41. Ibid, 1146. 42. The nine articles were: “The Origin and Evolution of the Divergence between the Leaders

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPC”; “On Stalin’s Mistakes”; “Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country? ”; “The Defender of ‘New’ Colonialism”; “Two Lines

on Opinions Regarding War and Peace”; “Two Fundamentally Opposite Policies on Peaceful Co-existence”; “The Leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times” “Proletariat Revolution and Khrushchev’s Revisionism”; “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons.” 43. Shen ed., A Historical Outline of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991, 335.

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On March 17, 1964, during the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao said, “For nearly the past year all my energy was devoted to the struggle with Khrushchev; now I should turn to domestic issues connected with the prevention and opposition of revisionism.”44 On June 8, at the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao talked about preventing revisionism and said there were two kinds of communist parties in the world: true and false. Liu Shaoqi added that both the October Revolution in the Soviet Union and the identification of revisionism were of international significance to the development of communism, and cautioned the CPC to guard against revisionism appearing within its ranks. Mao paused and said that revisionism had already appeared, in the form of the “Silver Factory Event” and the “Xiao Zhan Commune” founded by Chen Boda. Zhou Enlai and Peng Zhen then interrupted to stress that the enemy held power in many places, and Mao agreed, saying: “In my opinion, one third of power in this country is not held in our hands. It is held by our enemies.” Liu Shaoqi had said that the current problem was the ignorance of the top leadership. Notably, the farmers of Funing County had said that support was necessary at the top and bottom, and everything would be easy with central government support. Furthermore, Liu said, “Once a ‘Khrushchev’ appears in China, I do not believe he will get support in all provinces,” to which Mao responded, “I think this issue — what should we do if a ‘Khrushchev’ appears — should be circulated to each region of the country. We must resist the revisionist central government.”45 The above exchange indicates that the desire to prevent revisionism from appearing in China was not simply a personal opinion of Mao, but the political consensus of the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC. However, Mao was especially worried about the appearance within the party of someone like Khrushchev. Mao also talked about his successor, and stressed that something unexpected could happen at any time. Therefore, official successors should be ready at the first, second and third frontiers. Once a leader dies, these successors should immediately take over. On June 11, 1964, during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao talked again about the appearance of revisionism in China, and outlined the same two possibilities as he had previously.46 On June 16, Mao said 44. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 2, 733. 45. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1345–1346. 46. Mao Zedong said during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC on

June 11, 1964: “We cannot see many things before they happen. For instance we never predicted the appearance of revisionism in the Soviet Union, yet it happened. Certain

things are inevitable and cannot be controlled by human will.... In my opinion, the

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Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

again that since the Soviet Union had experienced revisionism, China might experience the same.47 This coarse logic ignored the enormous differences between the Soviet Union and China in terms of their respective states and ruling parties. However, at that time, nobody dared to doubt Mao, so it became accepted as the theoretical basis of the political line of the ruling party. On July 14, the People’s Daily and Red Flag jointly published “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World” (one of the “Nine Reviews.”) In the article, Mao reaffirmed his theory of class struggle in socialist societies and added there exists a danger of the restoration of capitalism.48 Mao believed a privileged bourgeoisie class had appeared in Soviet society, and that the irreconcilable contradiction between this class and the people was the main contradiction facing the Soviet Union. Mao worried that a similar class could appear in China, and directly applied class analysis of Soviet society to Chinese society. Two years after announcing his conclusions about Khrushchev, Mao extended those conclusions to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. In addition, in the “Nine Reviews,” Mao clearly expressed that his biggest worry for the future of China concerned imperialists (e.g. then U.S. Secretary of State Dulles) and their hopes for a “peaceful evolution” in the third or fourth generation of the CPC leadership.49 Mao overall situation is optimistic, but we should be prepared. The weather is changeable,

and can sometimes be sunny, and sometimes rainy, thundery or cloudy. Do you think

this world is always clear cut? Absolutely not! An unclear world is reasonable, and the

alternative would be contradictions. The unity along with opposition means unity on both sides. Do you just take one side? What is the real opposition and unity?” He also said: “Confidence is still a key. Will a Khrushchev appear in China? Maybe not. There

are only two possibilities. But in my opinion, it does not matter even if a Khrushchev does appear in China. The Soviet Union has a Khrushchev now, but one day the Leninists will return. As the saying goes: the future is bright, the road is tortuous” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1346.)

47. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 85.

48. The article stated, “Judging from the actual situation today, the tasks of the dictatorship

of the proletariat are still far from accomplished in any of the socialist countries. In all

socialist countries, without exception, there are classes and class struggle, the struggle

between the socialist and capitalist roads, the question of carrying the socialist revolution

through to the end, and the question of preventing the restoration of capitalism.” (People’s Daily Editorial Board and Red Flag Editorial Board, “On Khrushchev’s Phony

Communism and its Historical Lessons,” People’s Daily, July 14, 1964.

49. Regarding the “Nine Reviews,” Mao Zedong commented, “Khrushchev’s Revisionist

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therefore paid close attention to cultivating successors to the current leadership to safeguard the destiny of the CPC and China, and his concern with this issue is crucial to understanding the Cultural Revolution. One of the political intentions behind Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution was to train a new generation of revolutionary successors through class struggle. However, Mao elected to rely on millions of Red Guards and insurrectionists to train future leaders rather than entrusting this task to the CPC and the Communist Youth League. As Mao pointed out, “We must especially watch careerists and schemers like Khrushchev and prevent such bad elements from seizing power from leaders at all levels of the CPC and the state.”50 Mao’s political predictions demonstrated foresight, but he tended to adopt extreme views that only became magnified over time from lack of being challenged by external dissenting opinions. On October 14, Soviet leaders led by Leonid Brezhnev launched a coup against Khrushchev. Brezhnev was subsequently elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union. Konstantin Chernenko, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to China, notified the Central Committee of the CPC, under instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the CPC immediately sent a congratulatory message to Brezhnev and other relevant leaders. The message was intended to signal a new and more positive direction in the Sino-Soviet relationship, and read: “The party takes pleasure in every forward step taken by the great Soviet Union, its communist party and its people.” Mao immediately sent Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Union to attend the commemoration of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution. During his stay, Zhou visited Brezhnev and several other leaders to begin the relationship on a positive note by expressing the desire for close contact and regular exchanges. During a party celebrating the October Revolution, Marshal Malinovsky, Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, looked Marshal He Long in the eye and said: “We have pulled Khrushchev down. You should overthrow Mao Zedong too, so that we can further improve our friendship.” He Long answered, “Our party is totally different from your party and they should not be mentioned in the same breath. What you think is wrong, impossible.” He Long later reported the incident to Zhou, who formally raised the matter with Brezhnev and others, and treated Malinovsky’s suggestion as a severe challenge to the leadership of Group is launching a peaceful evolution in the Soviet Union, and this should be a warning

to all socialist countries, including China, and all communist parties, including the CPC.” (Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 2, 7781.)

50. People’s Daily Editorial Board and Red Flag Editorial Board, “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons” People’s Daily, July 14, 1964.

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Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

the CPC. After an investigation, Brezhnev explained to Zhou, “That was not the opinion of the Central Committee and Malinovsky cannot speak on behalf of the Central Committee. Please, the Chinese Delegation should just ignore this.” Zhou said, “This was never a slip of the tongue after drinking. He said exactly what he wanted to say.” After the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC accepted the report of the CPC Delegation, Mao agreed with the opinions of his comrades. He ordered the delegation to protest to the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC and demand an official reply. Mao saw the Malinovsky event as sufficiently serious that the two parties could not communicate further even if the new leader of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union apologized. However, the event also indicated that the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had no intention to change Khrushchev’s policies.51 While Malinovsky’s desire to see Mao removed attracted no support in the CPC, it placed extreme stress on Mao mentally and politically, and he found reasons to suspect the loyalty of his comrades. Later, the February Mutiny, February Adverse Current, and Yang Yufu Event of 1966 saw Mao take measures to suppress various marshals and generals he believed to be plotting against him, but in all cases, evidence suggests he was mistaken and targeted people who were not guilty. Between March 11 and 18, 1965, Mao personally modified the “Review of the Separatist Meeting in Moscow” republished by the People’s Daily and Red Flag. He stressed, “We must keep revealing the real face of the modern revisionists, isolate them as much as possible, and insist on fighting Khrushchev revisionism to the end.”52 On March 23, the People’s Daily republished the “Review on the March Moscow Meeting,” which revealed the true direction of the new leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and accused them of “fake imperialism with real capitulationism, fake revolutionary socialism with real defection, and fake unity with real separation.”53 On August 3, when discussing the revisionism of the Soviet Union during an interview with Andre Malraux, special envoy of the French President, Mao said the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had adopted this position on behalf of a class instead of all people. This showed how the party changed. Plekhanov and the Mensheviks were Marxists who had broken away from the masses to oppose 51. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 2, 861–864. 52. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 2, 345–350

53. People’s Daily, March 23, 1965.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Now a change had occurred within the Bolsheviks. Mao extended the lessons of the Soviet Union to the future of China and said the nation faced two paths: one was the road of Marxism, Leninism, and Socialism, while the other was the road of revisionism. Mao said that while some social classes wanted to follow revisionism, the party could take measures to avoid this. However, nobody could be certain of the direction followed decades in the future. Malraux asked, “Are China’s revisionist classes extensive?” to which Mao replied: “Yes. They are quiet but extensive. Their numbers are small, but their influence is considerable.”54 That was the basic judgment of Mao about the political situation in China. It was not based on personal investigation or reliable evidence. He simply made a bold assumption based on the “revisionism-oriented evolution” of the Soviet Union. In 1966, the Sino-Soviet relationship was rapidly deteriorating. In March, the Soviet Union increased its military deployment on the Sino-Soviet border. On March 16, during the Meeting of the North China Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Zhou Enlai said that in the event of an incident: “North China would be the target of the main attack of the enemy [the Soviet Union,] and so would be a main battlefield...preparations for war and famine are essential.”55 On March 28, during an interview with Kenji Miyamoto, Secretary General of the Japanese Communist Party, Mao said: “American Imperialists threaten to intensify the Vietnam War and extend the war to China. The U.S. may conduct air raids and naval blockades on coastal areas such as Shanghai, Qingdao and Guangzhou. If the U.S. digs up the hatchet and goes to war with China, the Soviet Union will immediately invade. Actually, the Soviet Union has stationed two divisions on our border and also has A-bombs prepared. The Soviet Union previously invaded Northwest China by attacking Xinjiang. The plan is that the United States will invade from the South to the North, and the Soviet Union from the North to the South. Each of them wants to occupy half of China, taking the Yangtze River as the border.” Mao continued: “One or two hundred million may die in this battle, but we don’t care”; “Death is normal on the battlefield. Do not be afraid. We lost many lives in the Korean War, but now North Korea has completed its reconstruction and is better than before”; “The United States air attack on (North) Vietnam is not a big deal. In China, we were bombed by Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese but we still triumphed. The bombing by the United States is a good thing actually because it unifies the people of Vietnam.”56 Between March 28 and 30, Mao spoke many times 54. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1393. 55. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 21.

56. Fuwa, Fighting Chinese Hegemonism. According to “Records of Mao Zedong’s

40

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

with Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao, and finally decided to criticize Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi.57 These discussions took place simultaneously and were necessarily connected. So far there has been no evidence uncovered to support Mao’s belief in a United States or Soviet Union conspiracy to invade and occupy China, although the army of the Soviet Union naturally had plans associated with the Sino-Soviet boundary conflict that occurred in the spring of 1969. In retrospect, the worries expressed by Mao reflected serious misjudgments based on his subjective assumptions about the domestic and international situation, and his tendency to experience “crisis hallucination.” Mao believed it was necessary to fight both external invasion and internal class struggle and naturally decided to promote a tough line to cope with a potential United States invasion while implementing the leftist line taking class struggle as the core domestically, but this would end up hurting more people. On July 8, Mao talked about how most of the world’s numerous political parties had given up Marxism and Leninism, and asked, “If Marxism and Leninism were crushed, what could we then do?”58 On December 26, his 73rd birthday, Mao released a speech that laid out the necessity of the Cultural Revolution based on the example of the capitalist restoration of the Soviet Union. He emphasized the famous words of Lenin, “It’s easiest to breach a fortress from within,” and outlined the well-known “theory of intra-party agents.”59 At that time, Liu Shaoqi had been Conversations with Kenji Miyamoto and others” (March 28, 1966,) Mao Zedong said:

“Good preparations have been made to fight the American invaders on the east coast, including in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Qingdao, Tianjin and elsewhere. We should prepare to resist an attack of revisionism [i.e., an invasion by the Soviet Union] in Manchuria,

specifically the three provinces of the Northeast, and Xinjiang, as well as being prepared for an attack on Beijing from Outer Mongolia.” Mao Zedong further commented that

the Soviet Union had established “A-bomb and H-bomb positions in Outer Mongolia

involving two divisions. In Central Asia, the Soviet Union has enhanced its military strength in Kazakhstan on the border of Xinjiang. Troop numbers have also been

increased in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and north of Cita.” Finally, he advised: “Prepare

for American-Soviet cooperation to divide China, using the Huaihe and Longhai

Railways as boundaries, with the Soviet Union occupying the North and America getting the South” (Shen, A Historical Outline of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991, 386–387.) 57. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1406. 58. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.

59. On December 26, 1966, Mao Zedong told Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Wang Li, and others that the socialist revolution had developed into a new stage. In this stage,

41

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

purged as “China’s Khrushchev.” The shift of the Soviet Union toward revisionism thus became the international background against which Mao launched the Cultural Revolution. Later, the Communique of the Third Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in 1978 would report that the main reason for Mao launching the Cultural Revolution was the move of the Soviet Union toward revisionism, and so the Cultural Revolution started with the opposition to and prevention of revisionism.60 Mao adopted a dual strategy that called for “anti-revisionism” internationally, and firmly opposed revisionism domestically. This strategy was most clearly expressed in the United Communique between the CPC and the Japanese Communist Party in March 1966, which Mao personally modified to read: “Oppose dangerous modern revisionism (internationally,) and above all firmly resist modern revisionist thought inside both parties. To ignore and fail to overcome such thought through appropriate measures will be extremely dangerous.”61 “Revisionism” entered the CPC lexicon as a borrowed word. According to Bo Yibo, the political conceptions of “opportunism” and the “wrong line” were frequently used in intra-party struggle, and “revisionism” was not used until the concept was introduced to the intra-party struggle of the CPC by the international communist movement after 1956. During the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in 1962, the term rightist opportunism was officially changed to revisionism.62 The question of how Mao defined “revisionism” naturally arises. Since Mao himself never gave a clear definition, revisionism became confusing, arbitrary, and changeable according to the situation. In February 1957, Mao said, “Revisionism, or right opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought that is even more dangerous capitalism had been restored in the Soviet Union, and so the cradle of the October

Revolution was no longer socialist. The lesson of this development in the Soviet Union was that the new central problem was whether the proletariat could maintain the new order and prevent the restoration of capitalism. Problems always appear first within the party, because it was easiest to breach a fortress from within. The class struggle had

not finished, and the Cultural Revolution was an all-encompassing contest between the agents of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie within the party (Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 880.)

60. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 1, 13.

61. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 32.

62. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1266.

42

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

than dogmatism.”63 Mao officially accepted the “revisionism” in the international communist movement, but he also associated it with the “rightist opportunism” inside the CPC and believed both were the same. On May 15, 1957 Mao observed, “In previous months, the people universally repudiated dogmatism, but ignored revisionism.”64 The Moscow Statement of 1960 then pointed out that revisionism remained the major danger.65 This view was consistent with that of Mao. In the 1960s, Mao pointed out many times that revisionism was embodied in the “Three Concessions and One Reduction” (aimed at Wang Jiaxiang) internationally,66 and the “new rural policy” (aimed at Deng Zihui) domestically.67 Mao evaluated the “rightist opportunism” of certain leaders, represented by Peng Dehuai, saying, “I think it is better to rename it China’s revisionism.”68 63. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 211.

64. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 6, 469.

65. Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, 1960. 66. In the spring of 1962, Wang Jiaxiang, then Director of the Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, proposed to the Central Committee: “To overcome difficulties

as swiftly as possible and seize the chance to proceed with domestic construction, it is

necessary to strive for a détente in international relationships. We should pay attention to strategy in the struggle against us by Soviet Union and India, and should provide [our

allies] with external assistance as practical and realistic given our abilities.” However, during an interview on May 22, 1963 with Victor Wilcox, then Secretary General of the

New Zealand Communist Party, Mao Zedong explained the proposal of Wang Jiaxiang as follows: “‘Three Concessions and One Reduction’ means making small concessions

to the forces of Imperialism, opposition (Nehru) and revisionism (Khrushchev) and reducing the assistance offered to the struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American

people.” Mao further condemned this as a “revisionist line.” (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1153–1154.)

67. In 1962, Deng Zihui, then Director of the Rural Work Department of the Central

Committee of the CPC, suggested a new rural policy of giving farmers private plots, establishing a free market, letting farmers take individual responsibility for losses and

profits, and fixing farm output quotas at the household level. Mao Zedong severely punished Deng, not only removing him from his position, but also dissolved the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.

68. Mao Zedong’s Speech on the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC on September 24, 1962. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949– 1976), vol. 2, 1252.)

43

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

Mao talked constantly about how “poverty leads to revolution and affluence turns to revisionism.”69 He even believed that “poverty is socialism” and “affluence is revisionism.”70 His judgments about revisionism, however, was not supported by extensive investigation. Most of his judgments were subjective, unscientific, and based on simplistic and absurd logic. Mao developed his own political logic that was characterized by path dependence, closed-mindedness, and absolutism – “the only one representative of rightness.” Similarly, the Cultural Revolution’s objective of opposing and preventing revisionism also became confusing, arbitrary, and opportunist. Even Mao himself could not explain his objectives in the Cultural Revolution, not to mention the historical basis tested by social practices. As the top political leader of the CPC, Mao had sole power to define “revisionism” and determine what kinds of people were “revisionists.” During the Cultural Revolution, however, Mao simply labelled dissidents as revisionists. A single illconsidered word could result in political or actual death; such were the fates of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Chen Boda. In the 1960s, China’s national security faced a huge challenge from the two superpowers of the United States and Soviet Union. Mao first announced a policy of “Oppose American Imperialists and Modern Revisionists in the Soviet Union.” However, this policy had the potential to be a double-edged political sword aimed at both international and domestic struggles. Nobody within the Central Committee of the CPC anticipated that this policy would come to determine Mao’s basic judgments about the political situation in China. Mao’s deep worry and sense of crisis are reflected in his poetry during this period. On November 17, 1961, Mao wrote “Reply to Comrade Guo Moruo,” which contained the phrase, “But the malignant demon must wreak havoc”; in December 1961, his poem “Ode to the Plum Blossom” referred to “On the ice-clad rock rising high and sheer”; on December 16, 1962, his “Winter Clouds” expressed “Winter clouds snow-laden, cotton fluff flying. None or few the unfallen flowers. Chill waves sweep through steep skies. Yet earth’s gentle breath grows warm.”71 These poems reflect Mao Zedong’s heavy mood and negative assessment of the international situation. He was very sensitive to changes in the international or domestic microclimate, and to how such changes could provoke drastic political responses. This sensitivity conforms to the mode “challenge-stimulation — reactionresponse.” Mao’s basic judgments regarding the political situation in China, and his “philosophy of struggle” were reaffirmed as the informational and theoretical 69. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1154. 70. Ibid. 71. Mao, Chairman Mao’s Poems.

44

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

basis of his famous theory of “taking the class struggle as the core.” The Party Constitution approved by the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969 predicted that the socialist society in China would see a long period in which “the threat of overthrow and invasion by imperialism and modern revisionism will exist.” As stated in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981, the leadership of the Soviet Union had launched the Sino-Soviet split and extended an argument about principle between two political parties into a dispute between two states. Further, the Soviet Union had previously imposed enormous political, economic, and military pressure on China and forced China into a struggle against the big-power chauvinism of the Soviet Union. In this context, the “anti-revisionism” movement spread throughout China, class struggle erroneously spread throughout the CPC, and intra-party relationships became tense as normal disagreements among party members were treated as manifestations of “revisionism” or “line struggle.” The CPC found it impossible to resist the “leftist” opinions of Mao and others. The Sino-Soviet split thus provided the crucial international background to Mao Zedong’s launch of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao Zedong’s Basic Assessment of the Political Situation in China In July 1945, in a response to a question from a group (including Huang Yanpei) that visited Yan’an, Mao Zedong described how the CPC could avoid the temporal limitations on power faced by previous feudal dynasties or contemporary governments in democratic countries. As Mao put it, “We have found a new way to overcome this limited life cycle. That new road is democracy. The grip of the government on power cannot be loosened if the government is under the supervision of the people. Transitions of power will be peaceful and the government will never be terminated abnormally provided the people assume responsibility for supervising the government.”72 The CPC was not yet in power at that time but Mao had already considered this vital future issue. However, Mao needed practical experience to determine the type of democracy best suited to China, the best way to achieve democracy, and how to realize his objectives for the CPC. How did Mao judge the domestic political situation on the eve of the establishment of New China? In March 1949, in the Report of the Second Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao pointed out that after the proletariat had assumed control over the state, the main domestic contradiction 72. Huang, A Trip to Yan’an; Visits of Mao Zedong, 116.

45

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

was the “contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.” Mao also reminded the CPC: “After the enemies with guns are destroyed, some enemies without guns will still exist and incite a life-and-death struggle. So we should never ignore these enemies. We will make serious mistakes if we cannot identify the problem as we can now.”73 At that time, Mao had not clearly identified the “enemies without guns,” but his concern at their existence became the historical background for his policy of “taking class struggle as the core” and launching the Cultural Revolution. 74 After the founding of New China in 1949, Mao remained focused on how to maintain the CPC as a strong ruling party. On March 23, 1949, before the Central Committee of the CPC left Xibaipo, a mountain village in Hebei, to return to Beijing, Mao told other leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC, “We are to undergo ‘examination’ in Beijing today,” to which Zhou Enlai replied, “We shall pass the examination and will never return.” Mao immediately added: “Return means failure. We must not become another Li Zicheng.”75 (Li Zicheng led a peasant rebellion that overthrew the Ming Dynasty and established the short-lived Shun Dynasty. Mao’s words show that he did not wish the CPC to become another weak and transient dynasty of the type founded by Li Zicheng, with its rule marred by corruption, fighting amongst the leadership, and separation from the masses.) Mao thus had always been concerned with how to prevent the CPC from becoming corrupted once it achieved power. Once the CPC had spent a decade in power, Mao grew concerned with how to avoid a ‘Khrushchev’ appearing. One of the important political causes of the Cultural Revolution was that Mao saw potential for a ‘dark side’ to emerge within the CPC, particularly now it had become the government, and wanted to mobilize the masses (especially the most disenfranchised) to counteract this ‘dark side’ and clean up bureaucrats or privileged classes that had emerged within the CPC. His positive aims and 73. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4, 1427, 1433.

74. In Section I of the Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC, titled “Preparation for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” after referencing the words of Mao Zedong,

the report states: “Chairman Mao predicted the long-term and complex class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie after the establishment of the dictatorship of the

proletariat, and thus considers that the entire CPC must struggle against Imperialist, Kuomintang and bourgeois forces in the political, ideological, economic, cultural and

diplomatic fields.” (Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.)

75. Chen, Analyses of Mao Zedong’s Reading Notes, vol. 2.

46

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

proactive spirit were admirable, but his rigid adherence to theory kept leading him away from objective reality. Mao Zedong controlling the collective, and replaced democracy with arbitrary rule, and rule of law with dictatorship. Following this course led to more failures than successes and more disasters than achievements. Hu Yaobang later remarked: “After the CPC took the helm of the state and completed the socialist reconstruction of the ownership of production materials, it failed to solve the problem regarding what should be taken as the core between class struggle and socialist construction.”76 As a result, two lines formed in the CPC. Mao directed one line, a non-mainstream line. Meanwhile, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping directed the other line, a mainstream line. Mao would not have enjoyed the vast power that he did if he had not damaged the democratic decision-making system within the CPC and left autocratic despotism as the only workable tool for exerting control. However, even as Mao increasingly bypassed established party organs, his personal opinions still influenced the Central Committee of the CPC. It is necessary to understand how Mao viewed the political situation of China, how his views changed, and how, as supreme leader of the CPC, he influenced the thinking of both the Central Committee of the CPC and the party as a whole regarding the shift from “taking economic construction as the core” to “taking class struggle as the core.” In April 1956, Mao said: “We should unite everyone who can be united to reduce the number of our enemies to the minimum possible. In this way, only the imperialists and their minor domestic followers — the capitalist and feudal classes closely connected with them — will be left for us to deal with. The more friends and fewer enemies we have, the better. Our party must fully utilize all the forces available to attain this goal. Taking unity as the core may be considered a guideline for governance.”77 On September 15th, in the Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPC to the 8th National Congress, Liu Shaoqi published basic judgments regarding the political situation of China. He pointed out that the tasks of socialist reconstruction had basically been completed: “The problem of the winner between socialism and capitalism in our country has been solved.”78 The 8th National Congress of the CPC correctly analyzed the domestic situation and accordingly made a major decision to alter the priority of the work of the CPC.79 76. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 19. 77. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 62.

78. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 219.

79. The 8th National Congress of the CPC concluded that the major domestic contradiction

47

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

Table 2.1

Mao Zedong's Understanding of China's Political Situation (1956–1966)

Time / Venue

Mao's Assessment

November 1956 / Guarding against

Political Background Source Events in Poland

and Hungary; Mao

Second Plenary

the emergence of an

8th CPC Central

divorced from the masses of allowing the

Session of the Committee

aristocracy that was within the party

Selected Works of

Mao Zedong, vol. 5,

advanced the policy 325–326. "hundred flowers

to bloom" and the

"hundred schools of

thoughts" to contend December 1956

Class conflicts had largely Socialist been resolved

transformation of agriculture,

handicrafts, and

capitalist industry

Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since

the Founding of the

People’s Republic of China, vol.6, 255.

and commerce

basically complete January 1957 /

Many social conflicts

Consolidating the

party secretaries

among the people

working style

Rightists accounted for

Democrats invited to Selected Works of

intellectuals in society

forward suggestions 424–426.

Meeting for

at provincial,

Selected Works of Mao

were classified as conflicts party and rectifying Zedong, vol. 5, 357.

municipal, and autonomous

region levels May 15, 1957

October 13, 1957

1%–10% of non-party 10% of people

disapproved of or

opposed socialism; those who firmly opposed

socialism accounted for 2%

48

air opinions and put Mao Zedong, vol. 5, Anti-rightist campaign

Selected Works of

Mao Zedong, vol. 5, 482–483.

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

(Cont'd)

Time / Venue

Mao's Assessment

Political Background Source

August 1959 /

The struggle at the

Criticism of Peng

Session of the

was the continuation

leaders at the Lushan Mortars and Other

Eighth Plenary 8th CPC Central Committee

Lushan Conference

of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and

Dehuai and other Conference.

Committee.

major risk to the party.

Session of the

and production teams

8th CPC Central Committee

counties, communes,

1959; resolution

the 8th CPC Central

opportunism posed a

Ninth Plenary

Matters,” August

Plenary Session of

past 10 years. Rightist

Productivity of 30% of

of Guns and

approved the Eighth

the proletariat over the

January 1961 /

Mao, “The Origins

Terrible natural disasters.

Mao Zedong’s

speech delivered at the Ninth Plenary

Session of 8th CPC

was high; 50% was

Central Committee,

intermediate, and 20%

January 1961

was low.

January 1962 /

Within socialist society,

Chiang Kai-shek

Mao Zedong’s

Work Conference

new bourgeois elements

China; border

the Founding of the

Enlarged Central

there was emergence of

of the 7,000 Cadres and class enemies

(landlords, affluent

peasants, reactionary

attacked mainland conflicts between

Manuscripts since

People’s Republic of

China and India.

China, vol.10, 71–72.

Socialist Education

Biography of Mao

elements, evil people, and rightists,) who accounted for 4%–5% (26.92–33.65

million) of the population. January 1964

If revisionists seized power, capitalist

restoration would occur in China. If China emulated

Movement.

Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1338.

the Soviet Union,

revisionism would one day appear in China.

49

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

Mao's Assessment

June 1964 /

In China, 1/3 of the power Public debate

Biography of Mao

Conference

party hands. Revisionism the Soviet Union.

vol. 2, 1345.

Central Working

Political Background Source

(Cont'd)

Time / Venue

rested in enemy hands, not between China and emerged in the CPC

Zedong (1949–1976),

Central Committee and it had to be defeated. July 1964

In the light of dramatic changes in the Soviet

Union, imperialists rested

Peaceful evolution in Biography of Mao the Soviet Union.

Zedong (1949–1976),

Revolution in

Reviews on Several

their hopes on peaceful

vol. 2, 1303.

evolution in the third

and fourth generation

of the central collective leadership. November 1964

At least 1/2 of the power

in the area of culture was

literature and the

not controlled by the CPC. arts December 27, 1964 The CPC had at least two factions—socialist and capitalist factions. January 15, 1965

Socialist Education Movement.

Major Decisions and

Events, vol. 2, 1227. Biography of Mao

Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1393.

The bureaucratic class and Socialist Education

Biography of Mao

with poor peasants were

vol. 2, 1388–1389.

the working class along

Movement.

two antagonistic classes:

Zedong (1949–1976),

the working class was

bound to overthrow the bureaucratic class. August 1965

Though few in number,

The Soviet Union

Biography of Mao

extensive influence and

forces along the

vol. 2, 1393.

Chinese revisionists had some social classes chose to follow revisionism.

50

deployed military Sino-Soviet and SinoMongolian border.

Zedong (1949–1976),

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

Time / Venue

Mao's Assessment

September 1965

Guarding against

Political Background Source

(Cont'd)

Red Flag, issue 13, 1967.

revisionism within the

CPC Central Committee,

which posed the greatest danger. February 1966

After the reactionary

line is eliminated, other

Jiang Qing sought political support

similar lines will appear in from Lin Biao and the future. It is therefore

necessary to continue the

struggle; otherwise, many

formed a political alliance with Lin.

Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since

the Founding of the

People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 25.

positions will be occupied by reactionary lines. March 1966 /

Bourgeois intellectuals

of the Standing

and educational circles.

Political Bureau

socialist revolution, they

Enlarged Meeting dominated academic Committee of the

With the furthering of the

Criticism of Wu Han Chronicle of Zhou and Jian Bozan.

Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 25.

would increasingly revolt against socialism and

reveal their anti-party and anti-socialist nature. April 14, 1966

In contrast to workers and

Mao Zedong’s

no political consciousness

the Founding of the

peasants, intellectuals had and immersed themselves only in books and

Manuscripts since

People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 35.

concepts. Therefore, they were an easy target for

counter-revolutionaries, those wanting to

restore capitalism, and revisionists.

51

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

Time / Venue

Mao's Assessment

April 16–26, 1966 / Revisionism emerged Enlarged Meeting within the party, of the Standing

Committee of the

government, and army

Political Background Source

(Cont'd)

Criticism of Peng

Biography of Mao

errors; Report

vol. 2, 1407–1408.

Zhen for political Outline of the Five-

Zedong (1949–1976),

Member Cultural

Political Bureau

Revolution Group revoked; five-

member Cultural

Revolution Group dissolved May 5, 1966 /

Millions of older

with Mehmet

dominated the people’s

Mao Zedong met Shehu

intellectuals in China

Launch of the

Documents of the

Cultural Revolution People’s Republic

of China: Domestic Turmoil and

cultural education.

Resistance: The 10

Years of the “Great

Cultural Revolution”, 109. May 7, 1966

Bourgeois intellectuals

had ruled China’s schools

Cultural Revolution Mao, “Letter to Lin

Biao”, People’s Daily,

August 5, 1966.

for a long period May 1966 /

Power in cultural fields

Continuing struggle “Notice on May 16,”

of the Political

bourgeoisie; there were

Zhen, Luo Ruiqing,

Enlarged Meeting was usurped by the Bureau

bourgeois representatives Lu Dengyi, and Yang in the CPC Central

Committee, central

organizations, provinces, municipalities, and

autonomous regions.

Some were unmasked by their actions; others won trust and were groomed as successors to party

leadership, but were really Krushchevian revisionists

52

against the Peng

Shangkun anti-party clique.

People’s Daily, May 18, 1967

Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

(Cont'd)

Time / Venue

Mao's Assessment

Political Background Source

August 1966 /

Liu Shaoqi and Deng

Cultural Revolution. Mao, “Bombarding

Session of the

attacked

Eleventh Plenary 8tfh CPC Central

Xiaoping bourgeois faction

the Headquarters”, August 5, 1966.

Committee

Sources: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5; Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol.

10–12; Bo, Review of Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2; Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2; He, China in the Era of Mao

Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2; Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong

(1949–1976), vol. 3; Xu, Mao Zedong’s Theories and Practices in His Later Years

(1956–1966); Chen, Analyses of Mao Zedong’s Reading Notes; Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance: The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”.

Although Mao is often said to have adopted the mainstream line, he actually represented a divergent path. Since the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, Mao began to misjudge the political situation of China. He significantly altered the line of the revolutionary party to “taking the class struggle as the core.” This marked the beginning of a significant divergence between Mao and other leaders such as Liu Shaoqi.80 In February 1957, in the article “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” Mao said: “There are two kinds of class contradictions before in China was between the people's demand for the construction of an advanced industrial nation and the reality of being an underdeveloped agricultural nation, as well as between the people's need for rapid economic and cultural development and

the actual state of economic and cultural underdevelopment. This contradiction is essentially between having an advanced socialist system and underdevelopment in national productivity. Thus, the priority of the CPC and the nation was to concentrate

their efforts to transform China from an underdeveloped agricultural country into

an advanced industrial country and thus resolve this contradiction. (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China, vol. 9, 341.)

80. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.

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us – the contradiction between ourselves and enemies and the contradiction among the people. These are completely different kinds of contradictions.” Mao also believed that both antagonism and non-antagonism existed between the exploited and exploiting classes.81 This belief represented a significant theoretical innovation. Mao also stated: “In China, although socialist transformation has essentially been completed regarding ownership...there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remolding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started.” He maintained: “In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism and capitalism, is not really settled yet,” and “the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field will be protracted, tortuous, and at times even very sharp.”82 These beliefs became the basis of Mao’s theory of class struggle in socialist society, signaling a shift in the guideline for governance from “unite all who can be united” to “take class struggle as the core.”83 Lin Biao, in his Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC of 1969, praised Mao for correctly pointing out the error made by Liu Shaoqi in his 1956 opinion that “The problem about which is the winner between socialism and capitalism in our country has been solved.” Furthermore, Lin’s report strongly praised the theory of Mao: “For the first time in the theories and practices of international communist movements, the theory that the classes and class struggle still exist, and that the proletariat must continue the revolution even after completing the basic socialist reconstruction of the ownership of production materials, has been expressly presented.”84 In April 1969, Liu Shaoqi made an observation regarding the political situation of China, namely that the major contradiction in the socialist stage of China’s development was that among the people, and most particularly that between the officials and the common people.85 This judgment was objective and correct. 81. Mao Zedong believed that the contradictions among the people included contradictions among the working class, farmers, intellectuals; between the working class and farmers;

between the working class and other laborers and the bourgeoisie; contradictions among the bourgeois; and so on. Mao then stressed that the contradictions among the

working classes were non-antagonistic. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 211.) 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid, 62. 84. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969. 85. On April 27, 1957, during the Shanghai Party Members and Officials Conference, Liu Shaoqi said: “The main contradiction in socialist society is the contradiction among the

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Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

Accordingly, the core focus of the CPC should be democracy and rule by law rather than class struggle, and the main task should be to educate CPC and government officials through constructive criticism and gentle self-criticism instead of periodic political movements. Liu announced that, to prevent special treatment of leaders, the party should criticize the privilege enjoyed by officials, as well as socialist chauvinist thought, subjectivist thought, and bureaucratist thought.86 In this context, Mao’s judgment that the contradiction between party officials and the common people was part of the contradiction among the people appears consistent and appropriate. However, since June 1969, under instructions from Mao, the Central Committee of the CPC suddenly turned its focus from the rectification of the party and its working style to anti-rightist struggle.87 Mao directed that the anti-rightist struggle should proceed in this manner: first, select targets and define them as “rightists.” The identification of the targets as “rightists” would make them objects of struggle, or objects of the contradiction between the party and its enemies. Second, determine the proportion of targets of the total population involved in the struggle. According to Mao’s arbitrary estimate, rightists accounted for 1–10% of non-party intellectuals. At that time, there were about 5 million intellectuals in China, which implied 50,000–500,000 rightists. Third, after determining the size of the target population, ensure the actual struggle extends slightly beyond the target size so that the task objectives are thoroughly completed. Thus, the campaign targeted 550,000 so-called “rightists.” The directions Mao gave reflect the highly arbitrary way in which rightists were identified, class struggles were instigated, and struggle subjects increased at will, all of which had serious social consequences. As the people, and the main contradiction among the people is the contradiction between the masses and the leaders, more precisely between bureaucratism and the masses.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 303)

86. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 75–76. 87. The relevant documents of the Central Committee of the CPC include: Organize Our Strength to Resist the Furious Attacks of Rightists, an internal instruction from the Central

Committee of the CPC issued on June 18, 1957; Things Are Changing, released by the

Central Policy Research Center on June 12, 1957; Instruction on Purging and Isolating Bourgeois Rightists, released by the Central Committee of the CPC on June 26, 1957;

Situation in the Summer of 1957, published by Mao Zedong in July, 1957; and Standards

for the Classification of Rightists, approved by the Third Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in October, 1957 to conclude the work-style rectification movement and anti-rightist struggle.

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resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 noted, the anti-rightist struggle was greatly extended so that many intellectuals, patriots and officials within the CPC were mistakenly identified as “rightists,” with tragic results.88 The direct political consequence of the anti-rightist struggle was that Mao denied the line of “taking economic construction as the core,” which had been party policy since the 8th National Congress of the CPC, and promoted the theory of “class struggle in socialist society.” This theory of class struggle then became the basis for a series of political movements. In September 1969, Mao announced that the main contradiction throughout the transitional period of a socialist society was that between socialism and capitalism — that is, a contradiction existed between the working class and the bourgeoisie. This judgment differed from that regarding the main domestic contradiction in the resolutions approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC. In October, at the Third Plenary Meeting of the Eighth CPC Central Committee, Mao reaffirmed this opinion,89 changing the right judgment of the previous resolutions approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC on the situations in China. In 1958, the Second Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC formally altered the CPC’s judgments of the resolutions approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC.90 Mao also changed the nature of the contradiction that the CPC needed to overcome, from the “contradiction among the people” to the “contradiction between ourselves and our enemies.” During this period, Liu Shaoqi accepted Mao’s opinions on class struggle, but prioritized the struggle objectives differently. Notably, the plenary meeting saw the CPC accept that two exploiting classes existed.91 88. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 805.

89. Mao Zedong said, “The conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the conflict between the socialist and capitalist roads, are undoubtedly the main conflicts

in current Chinese society.” (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 657.)

90. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 722. 91. The documents recording the Second Meeting of the 8th National Congress of the

CPC described two exploiting classes: the first exploiting class included anti-socialist bourgeois rightists, suppressed comprador bourgeoisie, and other reactionaries; the

bourgeois rightists comprised the agents of imperialism, residual feudal comprador forces, and Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang. The second exploiting class included national bourgeoisie and intellectuals who accepted gradual socialist reconstruction, most of whom were wavering between the socialist and capitalist roads. (Party

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Mao Zedong's Preparations for the Cultural Revolution

After the Lushan Meeting in 1959, Mao’s class struggle theory aggressively expanded, with its application extended from outside the party to inside the party, and from lower levels to higher levels. Mao believed that the conflict between himself and Peng Dehuai reflected not simply a difference in opinion, but an extension of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the context of the ongoing socialist revolution. On August 9, the Central Committee of the CPC formally launched the antirightist movement.92 The Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, held during May and June 1961, organized special discussions of the problems of rehabilitation and identification, and Mao performed self-criticism regarding the extension of the anti-rightist movement to grassroots units. According to statistics on the identification and rehabilitation of rightists, as of August 1962, some 6.95 million so-called “rightists” had been rehabilitated. Including their families, this meant over 20 million people were affected.93 As pointed out by the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981, the struggle that began with the Lushan Meeting seriously damaged the democratic life of the CPC, from the central government to the grassroots units. It had interrupted the correct course of leftism, and led to mistakes persisting longer.94 During the Great Chinese Famine, Mao focused on class enemies and pushed strongly for class struggle. These actions diverted attention from his mistakes. During this period, from 1959 to 1961, China experienced over 15 million deaths due to unnatural causes, and a reduction in births of over 16 million. The evidence that Mao is responsible for the events of this devastating period is compelling.95 In January 1961, the Communique of the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that the land owner and bourgeois Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China, vol. 11, 289.)

92. The main documents of the Central Committee of the CPC include: Resolutions Regarding the Mistakes of the Anti-Party Group Led by Peng Dehuai and the Fight for the

Protection of the General Line of the CPC and Opposition to Rightist Opportunism approved by the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC on August

16, 1959; Resolutions of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission approved on September 12; and Instructions Regarding Anti-rightists released by the Central Committee of the CPC on August 9, 1959.

93. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1258–1259. 94. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 806.

95. Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976), 390–394.

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classes, despite accounting for just a few percent of the total population, had consistently tried to exploit natural disasters and defects in grassroots work to destroy the new society and restore the old order, just as had been said during the Moscow Declaration of 1957. According to this view, while over 90% of employees of the CPC and government were loyal servants of the people, the remainder were “bad elements” who infiltrated revolutionary teams and economic organizations to create trouble, or land owner and bourgeois classes who had not been reconstructed completely, or other sorts of reactionary forces.96 The tragic failure of the Great Leap Forward represents a typical human-caused disaster, and resulted from poor decisions by Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC. While the Ninth Plenary Meeting involved some self-reflection and self-criticism, it also ascribed blame for the disaster to “several percentage points” of the total population. This judgment was subjective and without supporting evidence. Thus, Mao made ordinary people the scapegoats for the failure of the Great Leap Forward. This deflecting of blame onto the people also explains why Mao became increasingly fixated with class struggle following the Great Chinese Famine. January 1962 saw the opening of the 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres, also known as the Enlarged Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC. Around the time of this meeting most of those who had been mistakenly identified as “rightists” in the anti-rightist movement were identified and rehabilitated, and many more were also rehabilitated at the meeting itself.97 This was in order to correct mistakes made by Mao, who had extended intra-party political struggle and class struggle throughout society in an attempt to reduce their political consequences, relieve various domestic contradictions and respond to the crisis of the Great Chinese Famine. Further steps to right these wrongs were later made under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. During the conference, Mao was forced to undertake self-criticism, but on the other hand he advocated class struggle. In fact, this was a political ruse. Mao said, “In the socialist society, a new bourgeois class will appear. Throughout the socialist stage of social development, there will be classes and class struggle (the theory of ‘existence’.) Such class struggle will be protracted and sometimes furious.” Mao also introduced the theory of “95% and 5%,” where the 95% were the masses and the 5% were class enemies (meaning land owners, affluent peasants, reactionaries,

96. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Important Documents Since the Founding of New China, vol. 14, 86.

97. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 806.

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bad elements and rightists.)98 This theory was based on nothing more than a subjective guess Mao made about China’s political situation, but he continued to use these same figures in later theories. For China, one of the most populated countries in the world, such percentages equate to a huge number of people. In terms of the total population of China in 1962 (672.95 million,) 4–5% represented 26.92–33.65 million individuals, or 100–150 million if their immediate families were included. These large numbers help us understand the arbitrary and subjective nature of the class divisions and contradictions drawn by Mao. Mao’s theories made an extended class struggle with arbitrary objectives inevitable. He refused to learn lessons from the extension of the anti-rightist struggle. On the contrary, he extended the class struggle from urban to rural areas, from criticism and struggle against intellectuals to struggle against ordinary farmers (including peasants and land owners and their families.) Struggle was also extended to such issues as the spreading of rumors, and the private economy. Deng Xiaoping latter commented on Mao’s speech to the 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres, saying that: “Chairman Mao conducted self-criticism regarding these problems in 1962. However, his conclusions were too superficial to avoid the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.”99 Deng’s comments show that Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution was rooted in his failure to perform thorough self-criticism. On August 13, 1962, during the Beidaihe Meeting, Mao talked about revisionism within the party. On September 24, he referred to a paragraph of the speech Lenin made after the success of the October Revolution to highlight the persistent risk of the restoration of capitalism. On September 26, he said: “In the history of the bourgeois revolutions in France and Britain, there were three or four feudal restorations.” He also said, “Besides the contradictions between ourselves and the imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries in the world, we also face domestic contradictions between the masses and revisionists.”100 During the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao made observations regarding the characteristics of society during the 98. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 25–27.

99. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 347–348.

100. Mao Zedong said: “Will revisionism appear in China? I’m afraid it will. It may not appear in this generation, but it will in the next. But even if revisionism does appear,

Marxism and Leninism will surely rise in subsequent generations. Things inevitably

swing back and forth according to dialectics, and this applies to us too.” (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1098–1100.)

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historical socialist phase, and specifically identified two co-existent struggles: the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and the struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads. Mao concluded that class struggle had to be stressed continuously.101 The Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, which was modified and approved by Mao, formally approved Mao’s theory of class struggle during the socialist phase of development, laying a theoretical basis for Mao’s subsequent official launch of the Cultural Revolution.102 It expressed that: “Class struggle is very complex, tortuous and sometimes even furious. Such class struggle inevitably comes to be reflected within the party. The pressures from international imperialism and domestic bourgeois interests persist as the social source of revisionism inside the party. When conducting class struggle against international and domestic class enemies, we must firmly oppose various opportunistic tendencies within the party.” Subsequent events show that the opinions of Peng Dehuai and other leaders were correct and Mao’s decision to undertake the Great Leap Forward was a mistake, which led to serious economic and political consequences. However, in the communique, Mao and the CPC leadership fully affirmed the criticism of “rightist opportunists” during the Lushan Meeting.103 This amounted to relying on mistakes to select an incorrect path, thus allowing the mistakes to worsen rather 101. In the modified draft of the Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao wrote: “Throughout the history of the proletariat and the

dictatorship of proletariat, during the whole transition from capitalism to communism (a period that will last decades or even longer,) there will be class struggles between

proletariat and bourgeoisie, and struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 196–197.)

102. On November 6, 1967, the People’s Daily, Red Flag and PLA Daily jointly published “Advance Along the Road Opened by the October Socialist Revolution.” The article

refers to the conclusion voiced by Mao Zedong during the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee in 1962 and takes it to represent Mao’s thinking regarding

continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The article was drafted by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan and reviewed by Mao Zedong.

103. Besides censure of Peng Dehuai, the meeting also forced Huang Kecheng, Zhang

Wentian, Zhou Xiaozhou, Tan Zheng, Deng Hua, Gan Siqi, Hong Xuezhi, and other high officials to accept censure and conduct self-review. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the

Founding of New China, vol. 15, 654; Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 1, 1093. )

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than be corrected — “repeated mistakes becomes bigger mistakes.” Mao thus not only expanded the scope of the class struggle, but also used it to provide a political basis for extended intra-party struggle. In fact, the existence of different opinions within the party is normal, and reflects the different streams of thought that exist in society. However, Mao branded dissenting opinions within the party as reflections of revisionism or bourgeois thought, whether of domestic or international origin, which led to ruthless purges and the transformation of friends into enemies. The inclusion of this piece of Mao Zedong Theory in the Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC had direct and immediate negative effects. Thousands of people were driven to suicide during the Socialist Education Movement.104 Furthermore, the political hazard of this incorrect theory was magnified during the Cultural Revolution itself. Kang Sheng later explained Mao’s conception of the classes existing in socialist society, as follows: “Chairman Mao sees class problems comprehensively, not only economically, but also politically and ideologically. According to his view, classes and class struggle exist in socialist society, but they differ in nature from their manifestations in capitalist society. The existence of classes in capitalist society is especially reflected on economic exploitation relationships. The contradiction between classes in socialist society exists not only in the economy, but also in ideology and politics.”105 Therefore, Mao’s concept of classes in socialist society extended arbitrarily from the economic field to the political and ideological fields, making the extension of class struggle inevitable. Mao used his class struggle theory to prepare for struggle against other leaders of the CPC. This activity deviated from the line he himself presented during the 8th National Congress of the CPC, and only later did Deng Xiaoping and others become aware of the seriousness of this problem.106 As highlighted by the revolution that occurred during the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981, Mao’s 104. For instance, over 2,000 deaths occurred in the first group of Socialist Education pilot areas in Hubei; the pilot plan was then rolled out in Guangdong in the autumn and winter of 1963, causing 602 suicide attempts with 503 deaths. (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1114–1115.)

105. “Kang Sheng’s Speech on the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” in Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1261–1262.

106. Deng Xiaoping later stated that the post–1957 anti-rightist struggle view that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie remained the main social

contradiction in China was in fact a deviation from the line taken by the 8th National Congress of the CPC. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 3, 330.)

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speech during the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC extended the “class struggle that exists in a certain part of socialist society.” He also explained his opinion that the “contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is still the main contradiction of our society,” and further alleged that the bourgeoisie would remain a reactionary force throughout the socialist phase, becoming a source of revisionism within the party.107 As Bo Yibo concluded later, even if the proletariat is in power, theoretical errors will cause practical errors, tortuous national development, and serious social damage.108 From the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in 1962, Mao began to establish the theory that supported the launch of the Cultural Revolution. The 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres and the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC failed to correct or terminate the class struggle line of Mao, and on the contrary fully affirmed his line and formally validated his actions. Both the theory and practice of class struggle in socialist society as introduced by Mao displayed “path dependence.” This path was continued until Mao’s death in September 1976. After the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao was determined to carry out a large-scale class struggle movement in rural and urban areas across China. The movement began with a campaign against the “Five Evils” in urban areas, which was followed by a “Socialist Education Movement” in rural areas. Later, the entire movement was labeled the Social Education Movement. The movement lasted for four years, up until the launch of the Cultural Revolution in the second half of 1966. Rather than being the end of class struggle, the Social Education Movement was merely the start of a bigger class struggle.109 In February 1963, during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Zhang Pinghua (then First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC) reported to Mao: “The current class struggle is furious; whether in rural or urban areas, class enemies are rampantly destroying everything. An antisocialist ‘dark wind’ blows loudly.” Zhang’s report proposed defeating these enemies and suppressing the “dark wind” with an “east wind.” Mao issued special instructions in response to this report.110 The Hebei Provincial Committee of the CPC submitted a report similar to that of Zhang, and Mao transmitted both 107. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 807.

108. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1104. 109. Ibid, 1105. 110. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 255–256.

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reports to delegates attending the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC.111 These reports catered to Mao’s wish to extend class struggle through top-to-bottom interaction. Mao announced to delegates at the meeting: “There are two possibilities: the appearance of revisionism in China is either possible or impossible. Socialist education is the only way to prevent revisionism.”112 Here “class enemy” and “dark wind” became synonyms of “revisionism.” However, Mao did not clarify how “revisionism” in China differed from that in the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Under Mao's instructions, the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC decided to carry out a movement against the “five evils” (corruption and embezzlement, speculation, waste, decentralism, and bureaucracy.) By the end of 1963, over 1,800 work units and 410,000 people had participated in the movement, which arrested 15,100 individuals engaged in “corruption, embezzlement or speculation,” and punished 2,300 of those caught. This movement had no legal basis; all participating areas and work units treated the allegedly corrupt individuals identified according to the “policies of the CPC”; in fact, these individuals received no constitutional or legal protection against unjust treatment. In April and May of 1963, Mao stressed that the bourgeoisie would continue to exist in socialist countries even hundreds of years in the future.113 Mao tried to solve these social problems by focusing on class struggle and defeating class enemies instead of democracy and rule of law. He failed to evolve from a revolutionary party leader into a ruling party leader and continued to insist on “rule by class struggle” instead of “rule by law.” In April, Mao received a report submitted by the Baoding Area of Hebei Province Committee of the CPC to the Hebei Provincial Committee of the CPC about work on socialist education. The report was the first to outline the tasks 111. Ibid, 257–258. 112. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1106–1107. 113. Mao Zedong stated: “In any socialist country, even decades or hundreds of years after

socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivization, we cannot say that the

groups attacked by Lenin, including bourgeois individuals, parasites, speculators, liars, idlers, rogues, and thieves of public money, will no longer exist; also, we cannot say any

socialist country has accomplished or given up on Lenin’s mission, namely ‘Clearing

out the infectious diseases, pestilence and abscesses left by capitalism on socialism.’ The winner of the struggle between socialism and capitalism in a socialist country is

a problem to be gradually resolved over a long historical period.” (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 279–280.)

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involved in “Socialist Education,” and described them as including “the cleaning up of accounts, warehouses, workplaces and finances.” The report reflected problems of widespread misappropriation of public funds, unclear accounting, and corruption involving officials in rural areas. According to the report, this phenomenon demonstrated the continued existence of classes and class struggle, and a fierce ongoing struggle about the path of future development. The report further argued that the implementation of socialist education in production teams could target the “five evils” in rural areas. Thus, another socialist revolutionary struggle was necessary to resist the attack of capitalism on the collective economy.114 Mao immediately affirmed this report, and commented, “How does one construct socialism without socialist education?” When Mao later passed through Jinan and Nanjing, he recommended this report to the leaders of the Shandong and Jiangsu Provincial Committees of the CPC.115 In May, Mao chaired a meeting in Hangzhou to discuss the Decision on Certain Problems in the Present Rural Work (Draft) (the First 10-point Decision.)116 Mao believed that a serious class struggle had appeared in Chinese society, and that the leadership of certain local communes and production teams had fallen into the hands of local kulaks whose agents had penetrated these organizations. According to Bo Yibo, Mao said over 90% of the population were united, which implied the remaining 10% were “class enemies.” Zhou Enlai immediately pointed out the consequences of attempting to implement such an extreme view through policy, and Mao agreed to adjust the proportion of the population he considered united to over 95%.117 114. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China, vol. 16, 254.

115. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1313. 116. Mao Zedong designated Peng Zhen (and later appointed Chen Boda) to draw up the

resolution. From May 2 to 12, Mao Zedong held a meeting in Hangzhou to discuss and modify the resolution. The meeting was attended by Peng Zhen and Chen Boda (then

First Secretaries of the Central Bureaus,) Hu Yaobang (then First Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Chinese Communist League,) and Jiang Hua (then First Secretary of Zhejiang CPC Committee.) After this meeting ended, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, presided over by Zhou Enlai, held another meeting on

May 18. During this later meeting, the Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese

Communist Party On Some Problems in the Current Rural Work (Draft) was approved. The draft was officially released on May 20 and became a guiding document for the socialist

education movement in rural areas across the country. (Pang and Jin, Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1314 and 1328.)

117. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1109–1110.

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This change reflects the arbitrary and irresponsible quantitative estimates that Mao made. In the First 10-point Decision, Mao assessed the political situation of China as follows: “Current Chinese society is characterized by severe class struggle.118 Many characteristics of current society prove the correctness of the above judgment about class struggle (meaning Mao’s judgment in the Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC about class struggle.)” Mao proved he was right using the documents issued by the Central Committee of the CPC. He also presented his famous argument in the “Former 10 Items,” namely that all problems could be solved by understanding the theory of class struggle.119 On May 9, Mao issued an instruction that defined class enemies as “landowners, affluent peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and ‘Monsters and Demons,’” and issued a warning to the entire CPC about the emergency arising from the need for nationwide counter-revolutionary restoration. He worried that eventually, “The party of Marxism and Leninism will become the party of revisionism and the whole of China will change.”120 Displaying his alarmist nature, Mao made up a political crisis to persuade everyone of the need to launch the Socialist Education Movement and the Cultural Revolution. His words were later published in 118. The draft resolution listed nine points to supported this conclusion, including: “the overthrown landowners and affluent peasants are waiting for their chance to retaliate, restore the old order, and take revenge, and have managed to corrupt officials, seize

power and conduct activities to restore the feudal patriarchal clan system; there

is exploitation, usury, and trading of land; a new bourgeoisie has appeared and are growing rich through speculation and exploitation; corruption, embezzlement, speculation and degeneration have surfaced in some people working in state organs and in the collective economy.”

119. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 303–304.

120. Mao argued, “...When landowners, affluent peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and ‘monsters and demons’ come out together, yet our officials remain indifferent to them,

or worse, cannot distinguish friend from foe and are thus corrupted by and collude with the enemy, while the enemy successfully uses all kinds of means to divide and demoralize our officials, workers, farmers, and intellectuals, then, within a short period

— a few years, or a few decades at most — counter-revolutionaries will inevitably appear nationwide, and the party of Marxism and Leninism will become the party

of revisionism or fascism. China will then change its color. Think, comrades, what a

dangerous and critical situation this would be!” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 292–293.)

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Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong (The Little Red Book,) and became the most notable “supreme instruction” issued during the Cultural Revolution. Bo Yibo commented that Mao took class struggle too seriously, and deviated from the real conditions of the CPC and society.121 However, the Central Committee of the CPC still accepted Mao’s basic judgment regarding the political situation of China and approved his proposal to launch this new political movement. The rural Socialist Education Movement, at least initially, referred to the cleaning up of accounting, warehouses, financial institutions, and work units; the campaign against the “five evils” in urban areas referred to opposition against corruption and embezzlement, speculation, waste, decentralism and bureaucracy, and the cleaning up of accounting, warehouses, financial institutions, and work units. By the spring of 1964, the Socialist Education Movement had been promoted in about one sixth of northern China and about one fifth of central and southern China. By the end of the year, many work teams, totaling over one million members, had been sent to the countryside. The extension of the movement and the occurrence of illegal and undisciplined behaviors appeared shortly afterwards.122 On June 8, Mao again stressed the problem of preventing capitalism during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC. Mao believed subjectively one third of the state regime had been lost. Early in January 1961, in a speech to the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, Mao mentioned that agents of the landed class and bourgeoisie had appeared in the party and about 20% of local authorities had been corrupted through their leadership falling into the hands of the enemy.123 Mao’s judgments during this period regarding the national situation were also highly subjective. Without being based on investigation and basic objective analysis, these judgments simply reflected his own unfounded beliefs. Wild guesses, confusing political conceptions, inconsistent words, and changing attitudes characterized Mao’s later years. In January 1964, in response to a report submitted by Xu Bing (then Director of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC,) Mao declared that the leadership at all levels were not real Marxists and revisionists had seized control. Consequently, Mao saw a risk that China might follow the road of

121. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1110. 122. At the very beginning of the Socialist Education Movement, struggle was extended

and illegal and undisciplined behaviors appeared. In October of 1963, Deng Xiaoping suggested restraint was needed to avoid the movement involving too many people (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1111–1112.)

123. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1116.

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capitalist restoration in the future.124 In March, Mao proposed that the whole-party all-people socialist education movement of the CPC, starting from 1963, must be completed within the next several years. This movement was intended to free officials at all levels of the poisons of bureaucratism, revisionism and doctrinarism.125 In September, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Provision of Certain Concrete Policies of the Central Committee of the CPC Concerning the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas (Draft) (also known as the Latter 10-point Decision)126 to officially communicate Mao’s instruction to “take the class struggle as the key link.”127 This instruction became Mao’s guiding principle of governance, substituting for the political line “taking economic construction as the key link” determined by the 8th National Congress of the CPC. This change transformed the ruling party, the CPC, back into a revolutionary party. Unfortunately, the Central Committee of the CPC approved Mao’s guiding principle of governance. On December 5, Mao questioned the report submitted by Xie Fuzhi (then Minister of Public Security) and asked: “What proportion of our industry has capitalist tendencies in operation and management? One third? A half? Maybe the figure is bigger.”128 The question of the definition of capitalist tendency thus 124. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 17.

125. Ibid, 43–44. 126. After the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Decision on Certain Problems in the

Present Rural Work (Draft) (the “First 10-point Decision”) in May 1963, local governments submitted a succession of materials to report problems and deviations from the correct

line in rural socialist education, and asked that the Central Committee of the CPC draw clear policy boundaries. Therefore the Central Committee of the CPC designated Deng Xiaoping and Tan Zhenlin to draft the Provision of Certain Concrete Policies of the Central

Committee of the CPC Concerning the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas (Draft) (the “Second 10-point Decision.”) (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong

(1949–1976,) vol. 2, 1329, Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2003.)

On August 5, 1964, the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the

CPC decided that Liu Shaoqi would be responsible for revising the “Second 10-point

Decision,” as well as leading the Socialist Education and Anti-Five Evils movements. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1352.)

127. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China, vol. 16, 387.

128. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 256–257.

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was crucial, and the report provided Mao with important relevant information.129 In fact, capitalist tendencies were defined such that normal enterprise operations exhibited them. The definition of capitalist tendencies was also exaggerated and influenced by various principles and political lines. This reveals that many central government ministers knew nothing about capitalism, and lacked first-hand experience of capitalist countries. With limited actual knowledge of capitalism, leaders nevertheless sought evidence of capitalist restoration in grass-root units simply to comply with Mao’s calls for class struggle. Xie Fuzhi was a typical example of such a leader, and Mao showed his appreciation for his activities by promoting him. Xie’s report became an important source that Mao used to understand the situation of capitalist operation and management and capitalist restoration in China. After reading this report, Mao immediately transmitted it to the leaders of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, all central government ministries and commissions, and to the provincial, municipal and autonomous region party committees, to offer them an example of what was meant by “capitalist tendencies.” Mao influenced all these sectors of government in their views on the political situation of China. Consequently, they took capitalist restoration increasingly seriously and an imagined crisis based on Mao’s “crisis hallucination” evolved into a real crisis. 129. According to Xie Fuzhi’s report on his work at the Shenyang Metallurgical Plant, capitalist operational and management methods had eight characteristics: (1)

falsification of documents to cheat the country; (2) benefitting the factory at the expense

of the collective interest; (3) benefitting certain individuals at the expense of others and exploiting friends and neighbors; (4) profiteering from speculation; (5) manipulating

the market through fictitious transactions; (6) stimulating employees with bonuses and other material inducements; (7) exploiting scientific knowledge to acquire fame and

wealth; (8) wastage and abuse of resources. The report further identified three hazards associated with capitalist operation and management: (1) obstruction of technical innovation and development of production; (2) corruption of management teams and the working class; (3) destruction of unity and cooperation. Finally, the report identified

the root causes of capitalist operation and management in the refinery as: (1) influence

of existing structures of the Soviet enterprise and revisionism; (2) old capitalist forces

(including feudalism); (3) certain influences from central government. On December 12, 1964, Mao Zedong commented in response to these final words on central government:

“They are not irrelevant. They are the main sources of the problem.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 11, 256–257)

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On December 12, Mao gave instructions on the report submitted by Chen Zhengren (then Minister of Agricultural Machinery.) The report listed seven major problems existing in enterprises and deemed them to represent contradictions between two classes and two roads. Particularly, the report expressed that bureaucratism was a serious danger,130 a conclusion that shocked Mao. Mao believed that a “bureaucratic class” had formed within the CPC and was “in fierce confrontation” with the “working class and poor farmers.” He further said that this bureaucratic class “has created or is creating a phenomenon of the bourgeoisie sucking the blood of workers” and should be “a target of struggle and revolution.”131 Mao transferred this report to Liu Shaoqi and Bo Yibo with special instructions. On December 14, Mao issued instructions regarding the report on the investigation by Zhang Pinghua (then First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC,) who then transmitted his report to other officials. The report said that the leadership of more than one third of the grass-roots units in Hunan had been seized by the enemy.132 On December 19, Mao issued instructions 130. Chen Zhengren’s report listed seven serious problems and discussed them as follows: “(1) corruption and theft involving the leaders of the workshops; (2) waste of national

resources; (3) serious violations of workers’ political and economic democratic

rights; (4) acceptance and promotion of malefactors, in serious violation of the class

line of the party; (5) serious bourgeois ideology and lifestyle; (6) obvious influences of doctrinarism and revisionism in enterprise management; (7) well-established and

active hidden enemies. Therefore we must settle not only the serious contradictions among the people, but also the contradiction between ourselves and our enemies.

Both these contradictions are class struggles between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and contradictions between the socialist and capitalist roads. It is worth mentioning

that, after the victory of the revolution, certain senior officials with access to power can easily escape the supervision of the masses. When such officials gain power over a unit, they tend to exploit their position to violate party policy and do whatever they

like. However leaders like ourselves, facing serious problems of bureaucratism, cannot identify the sources of these problems in time. This has become an extremely serious

risk since we assumed power. In the past we have monitored bureaucratism within the leadership. How serious is the danger of bureaucratism? Personally, I am gradually learning about the dangers from my investigation of production facilities.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 11, 267–269.)

131. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 265–266.

132. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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on the investigation report by Gao Yangwen (then Vice Minister of Metallurgy) and transmitted them to others. The report claimed that class struggle was the key link, which implied that the first priority was victory in the class struggle.133 Between December 15 and 28, the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC finalised a resolution Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in Rural Areas (also known as The 23-Article Document) to decide whether the urban and rural socialist education movement should focus on political, economic, organizational and ideological cleanup, or “Socialist Education.”134 A resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 noted that, from 1963–1965, the socialist education movement implemented in the grass-roots units of some of the rural areas and minor cities had helped to solve problems such as the work style of officials, and economic management. However, all these problems, despite their different natures, were believed to be rooted in class struggle or its manifestation within the party. Consequently, numerous officials in grass-roots units were wrongly targeted in the second half of 1964. Furthermore, in early 1965 the priority of the movement was determined to be purging “capitalist roaders within the party.”135 This urban and rural socialist education movement personally launched and led by Mao can be deemed the “Quasi Cultural Revolution” or a rehearsal for the Cultural Revolution.136 Mao used the movement to further develop and complete Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 275–276. 133. Gao Yangwen’s report contained the words: “During the past two years, we have spent enormous time and effort on class struggle. The climax of the class struggle resulted

in a peak of production. As the spiritual becomes material, so does the success of class struggle become success in production.” Mao responded with the instruction: “It is

correct that production can improve only after winning the class struggle.” (Ibid, 277– 279.)

134. According to the Organization Department of the CPC, during this period about 1.5 to 1.6 million people participated in the “socialist education,” “anti–five evils,” and other

movements through involvement in grassroots unit work teams that operated all over the country. In 1964, 130,000 employees in the transport industry alone participated

in work teams within 1,800 state-owned enterprises throughout the country, while over 22,000 officials led by 45 ministers and vice ministers from 18 ministries and

commissions were stationed in grassroots units. (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1120 and 1127.)

135. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 812.

136. Hu Qiaomu believed that the socialist education movement, which started from the

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his theory of class struggle in socialist society. Why did Mao Zedong insist on “taking class struggle as the key link”? The answer lies in his long-held “philosophy of struggle.” First, after taking office, Mao re-advocated that “rebellion is right.” Earlier in 1939, he said that while there were millions of roads to Marxism, rebellion was ultimately the right road.137 When Mao was the leader of a party that was not in power, rebellion was absolutely necessary, but he simultaneously universalized and simplified Marxist thought and principles. On July 3, 1966, the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School displayed a big-character poster titled Discussion on the Proletarian Revolutionist Rebel Spirit. This was an early example of how Mao’s famous quotation advocating rebellion was a driver of the Cultural Revolution. On July 31, in his Letter to the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School, Mao Zedong expressed his passionate support for their activities. After a few days, the Red Flag and People’s Daily reprinted and distributed the big-character posters displayed by the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School.138 From that point “Rebellion is right” became the loudest political slogan of the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution and also the battle cry that Jiang Qing relied on.139 However, answers to essential questions remained unclear, including the objectives of the movement, the identities of the protagonists, the methods used, and whether the methods were rural areas and eventually spread to the urban areas, served as an ideological and

political preparation for the Cultural Revolution because it introduced the slogan, “Oppose capitalist roaders inside the CPC.” The movement involved every rural area, enterprise, and economic institution, and was finally upgraded to become the

nationwide Cultural Revolution. (Hu, “Why Did China Make a Two-decade ‘Leftist’ Mistake?”)

137. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 386. 138. The Red Guards of the Tsinghua High school sent the posters “Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit” (created on June 24, 1966) and “Renew the discussion of

Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit” (created on July 4, 1966) to Jiang Qing for review and asked her to send them to Mao Zedong for instruction. Both posters were

published in Issue 11 of the Red Flag on August 21, 1966 and renamed “Long Live the

Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Spirit” and “Renew the discussion of Long Live the Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Spirit” respectively.

139. On January, 1981, When the Special Court of the Supreme Court of the People’s

Republic of China announced her crimes, Jiang Qing protested by crying: “Revolution

is Innocent! Rebellion is Right!” (Tan and Lü eds., Trial of China: Public Trial of Ten Principals in the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-revolutionary Groups, 182.)

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right. Without answers to the above questions, a movement advocating rebellion naturally resulted in domestic turmoil. Second, Mao always advocated: “The philosophy of the Communist Party is the philosophy of struggle.” He developed this thought in 1945, before the CPC gained power and as it faced political purges and suppression from the ruling Kuomintang. These circumstances made struggle essential for the CPC to survive and eventually assume power. However, once the CPC became the ruling party, its political program should have changed to become one of development and construction. In 1959, after the founding of New China, Mao reaffirmed his philosophy of struggle during the Lushan Meeting and announced that the struggle would last at least another 20 years and possibly another half century.140 From 1950 onwards, the CPC regularly launched political movements under the influence of Mao’s philosophy of struggle. According to statistics of the author, by May 1966, the CPC had initiated thirty-eight such movements and struggles, harming hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people.141 Mao subjectively believed that Chinese society contained hundreds of thousands, millions, or even tens of millions of class enemies, and that the number was increasing. He kept creating new political conceptions, all of which were unclear and confusing, such as “rightists,” “firm antisocialists,” “emerging bourgeoisie,” “bourgeois intellectuals,” “capitalist roaders,” “proponents of independent fiefdoms,” and “two commands.”142 The enemy classes that Mao 140. On April, 1945, during the 7th National Congress of the CPC, Mao Zedong said:

“Someone (meaning Deng Baoshan) said our philosophy was the philosophy of struggle. I said theirs was also the philosophy of struggle. The philosophy of the

proletariat struggle was gentler than theirs.” On August 16, 1959, during the Lushan

Meeting, Mao further said: “the bourgeois politician (again meaning Deng Baoshan)

said, ‘The CPC’s philosophy is the philosophy of struggle,’ He was right. But the struggle has different forms at different times.” (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 348.) Mao pointed out, “In China, in our party, it seems the struggle will last for at least 20 years and maybe even for half a century. Anyway

the struggle cannot stop until all classes have become history.” (“Peng Dehuai and His Backers Cannot Avoid Punishment,” People’s Daily, August 16, 1967.) 141. Hu, “Political Movements of the PRC (1949–1976).” 142. Deng Xiaoping said, when discussing the “Socialist Education” from the end of 1964 to the beginning of 1965: “[Mao Zedong] declared that not only were there capitalist

roaders, but there were also two independent kingdoms in Beijing.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Deng Xiaoping’s Comments on the History of the CPC, 97.)

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invented were arbitrary rather than based on investigation. He exploited these labels to encourage mass anxiety about class enemies and class struggle. However, the political hallucinations Mao nurtured had a life of their own and naturally grew and became more extreme – as the ancient proverb goes, “the wind will not cease even if trees want to rest.”143 At the time the Central Committee of the CPC and the party as a whole unreservedly accepted Mao’s baseless new conceptions, and cooperated to drive growing political paranoia and terror. The Central Committee of the CPC unanimously agreed that while the Soviet Union had restored capitalism, China should prevent its restoration. However, the question of how best to realize this goal remained unresolved, and different opinions co-existed within the Central Committee of the CPC. In July 1965, Liu Shaoqi said: “To prevent the restoration of capitalism and avoid ‘peaceful evolution’ and revisionism, there are three essential measures: first, the socialist education movement; second, the work study system; and third, the participation of officials in grass-roots work.”144 This view represented the mainstream line inside the Central Committee of the CPC. While this line was based on “taking class struggle as the key link,” it was relatively mild, and combined revolutionary spirit with denial that there was an urgent crisis. For instance, although Liu believed the education system was bourgeois, his proposed reform based on the “part-time study school” demonstrates that he saw innovation within existing institutions as an adequate solution. However, Mao believed the problems could only be solved through drastic change. Mao worried that without drastic change China would slowly move in the wrong direction and it would eventually be too late to implement remedies.145 Mao suggested shining a light on China’s dark side through comprehensive top-tobottom implementation of a new form and way of struggle – cultural revolution.146 143. “The trees want rest but the winds do not cease; the children wish to provide but the parents’ time do not wait.” (Kongzi Jiayu, 8.10)

144. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2,. 145. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1459. 146. On February 8, 1967, Mao Zedong said: “In the past, we have conducted struggles

in rural areas, in factories, and in the cultural field. We have also launched a socialist education movement. But we cannot solve the underlying problems because there is no form or way via which we can reveal our dark side to the masses, comprehensively,

from top to bottom.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 220.)

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Third, Mao advocated “thorough revolution” and “continuous revolution.”147 Early in his political career, in 1927, Mao defined “revolution” as rebellion, namely violent action by one class to overthrow another class.148 In 1967, he said, “In the last 17 years (1949–1966) (the years since the founding of New China,) we were engaged in socialist revolution, but the revolution was not thorough because we failed to find a method of top-to-bottom implementation. This time we have finally found a method for implementing a cultural revolution from top to bottom.”149 Key Points on the Theory of Comrade Mao Zedong Regarding Continuous Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (the Six Items,) prepared by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan under the instructions of Mao over many years,150 became the theoretical basis not only for launching and leading the Cultural Revolution, but also for the Enlarged 12th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, the report of the 9th National Congress of the CPC and the report of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. While launching and leading the Cultural Revolution, Mao kept developing theories like Order in Universities Comes From Great Chaos (July, 1966);151 Smash the Four Olds (August, 1966); Complete Takeover (January, 1967); and 20–30 Line struggles (August–September, 1971.) As Meisner notes, countless political organizations and actors in the Cultural Revolution were using the version of class struggle theory that best matched their own political and social interests. 147. Hu Qiaomu believed that the most important aspect of China’s economic work after 1958 was revolution and the continuation of the revolution. After 1962, like other work,

Hu Qiaomu believed that economic work should focus on opposing and preventing revisionism, criticizing the bourgeoisie and preventing its restoration. This opinion

developed into the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat during the Cultural Revolution. (Hu, “Why did China make a Two-decade ‘Leftist’ Mistake?”)

148. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 17.

149. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech During the Army Corps Official Meeting,” March 13, 1967. 150. The Articles pointed out that “all the theories of Mao Zedong about continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat were creative breakthroughs that built on the opinions of Marxism and Leninism about the dictatorship of the proletariat.

They demonstrated genius and established a third great milestone in the history of the development of Marxism.” (People’s Daily, Red Flag and PLA Daily Editorial Boards, “Advance Along the Road Opened up by the October Socialist Revolution — The 50th Anniversary of Great October Socialist Revolution,” November 6, 1967.)

151. arty Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.

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The confusion regarding class and class struggle helped the Cultural Revolution rapidly develop into domestic turmoil.152 Fourth, once Mao chose the paths of class struggle and cultural revolution, he repeatedly launched revolutions and class struggles with the same pattern.153 With Mao himself igniting the ‘engine’ of class struggle and intra–party line struggle, the machine kept dutifully identifying what were considered to be “political enemies.” In response, Mao then needed to keep purging these political enemies and proving the correctness of his class struggle theory. Once established, the system became self-perpetuating, and the class struggle and Cultural Revolution could not have been terminated even had Mao wanted, but the engine naturally burnt itself out upon Mao’s death. The political struggle process of “attacking and defeating political enemies” was a process of continuously destroying the apparatus and systems of the modern state. The “anti-rightist struggle” in 1957 abolished “multi-party cooperation under the leadership of the CPC;” the Lushan Meeting in 1959 seriously damaged the democratic system of the party, caused political divisions within the party leadership, and laid a political foundation for the Cultural Revolution; during the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in 1962, Mao announced his theory of “taking class struggle as the key link” and subsequently implemented the ideological policies of “big criticism” and “urban and rural socialist education,” which further damaged existing party and state systems and seriously violated the human rights of citizens. Correct theory can be a powerful driver of social development, while incorrect theory can be a powerful force of social destruction. As the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 pointed out: “The history of the cultural revolution has proved that Comrade Mao Zedong’s principal theses for initiating this revolution conformed neither to Marxism, Leninism, nor to Chinese reality. 152. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic. 153. Hu Qiaomu said: “Such beliefs are unimaginable now, but seemed normal at that time.

These ideas had formed and been accepted by the majority of people, at least on the surface. This should be understood as demonstrating the influence of conventional thinking and behavior regarding the class struggle. Of course such conventional

thinking had been intentionally extended through incorrect arguments. But the effect of the inertia was still undeniable.” (Hu, “Why did China make a Two-decade ‘Leftist’

Mistake?”)

Hu Sheng also pointed out that Mao Zedong believed excessively in the principle

that “revolution is omnipotent," and continued to insist on revolution until his death (“Reflection of a Nation," April 7, 1988, People’s Daily.)

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They represent an entirely erroneous appraisal of the prevailing class relations and political situation in the Party and state.”154 The theories and practices of the Cultural Revolution thus caused a huge political disaster.

Mao Zedong’s Basic Assessment of the Economic Situation in China For Mao Zedong, the Cultural Revolution was a revolution unprecedented in human history, with both political and economic dimensions, both of which were strongly pushed. His behavior in launching the Cultural Revolution was based on his basic judgment regarding the economic situation of China; his economic objective was not merely to enable China, with its large population, lagging economy and imbalanced regional development to rid itself of the appearance of being a poor and undeveloped country, but also to establish a uniquely pure and ideal socialist society, effectively providing a communist school from which communists elsewhere could learn. In this sense, Mao, as a theorist and a thinker, was the most innovative and ambitious leader in China. However, as a politician and state leader, he was also the farthest removed from real life in China. His theories, no matter how innovative, all ended in failure when they were implemented. All of the innovations of the Cultural Revolution became flashes in the pan. Early in 1958, Mao planned to establish politically oriented people’s communes with participation by all groups, including workers, farmers, businessmen, students and soldiers, and involving all sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, small-scale manufacturing, and fishery, “so as to include all the basic units of China.” He tried to establish “large scale and collective” communes as the only path to realize socialist ideals and a communist society. In Mao’s eyes, the essential characteristic of socialist society was public ownership. He saw public ownership as the root from which an affluent and strong society would grow, and believed pure socialist ownership had to be realized before the country could become wealthy.155 In this respect Mao was influenced by the “Moscow Declaration” (otherwise known as the Declaration on the Meeting of Deputies of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Socialist Countries) that was approved in Moscow on November 19, 1957. “The nine common rules universally applicable to all countries on the socialist road” were concluded based on the Soviet Union’s 154. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 809.

155. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 152.

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experience, and included: eliminate private ownership and establish public ownership; eliminate the private economy and carry out nationalization; eliminate the individual economy and carry out thorough collectivization; prohibit the free market economy, and implement a planned economy. Mao attached high importance to all nine of these rules and used them as standards to measure whether a country was socialist and whether a political party insisted on the principles of Marxism and Leninism.156 Demonstrating his commitment to the nine rules, in 1958 Mao told Eugene, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to China, “The Soviet Union’s experience should be learned from and common truths followed.”157 In September 1962, Mao introduced his theory of “continuously stressing class struggle” at the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. The meeting approved the “Decision on Further Consolidating the Collective Economy of the People’s Commune and Developing Agricultural Production” and the “Regulations on Questions Concerning Commercial Works.” The meeting also clearly stated that trade in rural markets passively impacted the planned economy and created room for market speculation, and therefore should be restricted or prevented. In March 1963, the State Council promulgated the “Interim Provisions on Policies to Beat Market Speculation and Ban Long-distance Private Transportation,” which mandated that, except for state-owned businesses, permissible commercial activities could only be conducted locally; long-distance private transportation was banned because of its association with serious illegal speculation. The same month, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council issued the “Instruction on Strictly Managing Market Trade in Large and Medium Cities and Preventing Speculation.” This instruction restricted, or in some cases entirely prevented, market activities on the basis that they were a form of speculation. Between 1961 and 1965, 4,437 markets across China were closed, and market transaction volumes declined by 50%. Almost all market trade activity in large and medium cities was banned. In 1960 China had about 3.81 million small traders, but as they were merged by state-owned enterprises and cooperatives the number decreased to 0.58 million by 1965, and 0.48 million by the first half of 1966 (an 87.4% decrease from 1960.)158 Despite the frustrations encountered during the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune Movement, Mao never gave up on his dream of realizing 156. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 743. 157. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 387.

158. Teng et al. ed., History of Industrial and Commercial Administration in New China, vol. 1, 37, 46.

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Sidebar 2.1

Mao Zedong’s Ideal Society (May 7, 1966)

In times of peace, the army should function as a big school. Even if WWIII breaks out, the army can still serve as a big school – soldiers can perform various other work besides fighting. Did we not try this in the anti-Japanese bases during the eight years of WWII? This big school can provide not only knowledge of politics, military affairs and culture, but also an environment for small-scale production in rural areas and the operation of medium and small factories to manufacture products for self-use or for trade with the government. Besides, soldiers should be able to engage in mass work and participate in the social education movement in factories or rural areas. After undergoing “Socialist Education”, soldiers can perform periodic mass work to unite them with the people. They should continuously participate in the cultural revolutionary struggle to criticize the bourgeoisie. In this way, they will simultaneously act as soldiers, students, farmers, workers and common people. Of course, the specific arrangements for achieving this should be appropriate, and should prioritize the major works. Each military unit should involve itself in just one or two of the three kinds of work, namely the work of farmers, urban workers and the masses. This will allow our army, which is composed of millions of soldiers, to play a very important role. Similar arrangements should apply to workers. They should treat industry as their main work while simultaneously learning military, political and cultural knowledge. They should also participate in “Socialist Education” and criticize the bourgeoisie. If conditions allow, they should also engage in small-scale agricultural production, following the example of workers at the Daqing Oil Field. As for farmers, they should remain engaged in agriculture (including forestry, animal husbandry, small-scale manufacturing and fishery) while simultaneously gaining military, political and cultural knowledge. If conditions allow, collectives may run small factories, but they should not forget to criticize the bourgeoisie. Students should follow a similar pattern. They should focus on academic study while simultaneously learning other knowledge. In other words, they should learn not only academic knowledge, but also the skills of workers, farmers and soldiers. Meanwhile, they too should not forget to criticize the bourgeoisie. We should shorten the length of schooling. The existing education system should be overthrown and steps taken to ensure schools are not controlled by bourgeois intellectuals. Industrial and service workers, as well as party and government authorities, should also implement the above measures if conditions allow.

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None of the above thoughts are new inventions or truly original. People have been doing these things for a long time, but previously their work was not publicized. Meanwhile, the army has implemented these measures for decades. Now we are simply further developing existing ideas. Source: Mao, “Instructions on the Report of the General Logistics Department on Further Improving Agricultural Sideline Production.”

an ideal and pure socialist society. In a letter to Lin Biao dated May 7, 1966, Mao boldly proposed the construction of revolutionary schools that would combine lessons in industry, agriculture, culture and military drills, and would be located in workplaces throughout the country. Mao’s dream comprised four parts: urban workers would be engaged in industry while learning other skills; rural farmers would be engaged in agriculture while learning other skills; school students would be engaged in study while learning other skills; and military personnel would be engaged in military duties while learning other skills. On May 15, the Central Committee of the CPC approved the instruction of Mao and the report of the General Logistics Department on the further enhancement of small-scale manufacturing in rural areas and offered the additional instruction: “The Central Committee of the CPC believes the letter of Comrade Mao Zedong to Lin Biao to be an extremely important historic document, an epoch-making new development of Marxism and Leninism.” 159 On August 1, the People’s Daily released an editorial personally approved by Mao titled “China Should Become a Big School for Mao Zedong Thought.” Within the body of the editorial was the “May 7th Instruction” of Mao, which “called on the people of the whole country to turn China’s factories, rural people’s communes, schools, businesses, services and Party and governmental organizations into great schools for revolutionization like the Liberation Army.” The editorial urged: “By acting in accordance with what Comrade Mao Zedong has said, it will be possible to elevate the proletarian ideology of our people considerably, push forward the revolutionization of people’s thinking and help them to break away from all the old ideology, culture, customs and habits surviving from the old society. It will be possible to promote step-bystep narrowing of the gap between workers and peasants, town and countryside and mental and manual labor. In this way, the whole country will be a great school of Mao Zedong Thought, a great school of communism.”160 The sentiments of this 159. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 56.

160. People’s Daily, October 1, 1966.

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editorial summarized the ideal socialist blueprint that Mao hoped to realize when he launched the Cultural Revolution to establish a “big communist school.” A subsequent article published by the Xinhua News Agency on August 3 said, “The Chairman’s words are the most useful authority. Chairman Mao’s instruction (the “May 7th Instruction”) is our golden bridge to a communist society.” Mao thus created many new things. First, he created the educational revolution. He decided to abolish the high school entrance examination system in early June 1966 and later proposed a policy of “selecting (university) students from workers and farmers with practical experience” in July 1970.161 In September of that year the universities began to recruit students from workers, farmers and soldiers, and students were assigned the common task of “learning from colleges, managing colleges and reconstructing colleges.”162 Second, Mao established schools to train new officials and transferred existing officials to practice lower level work. In September 1968, Mao announced, “Lower level work is a great opportunity for officials to re-learn and all officials should participate except the old and weak.”163 Despite this, in February 1971, the Central Committee of the CPC chose to keep open the Schools for Central Government Officials. The Central Committee believed that the schools for officials were important to cultivate members of the proletariat so that they became capable officials able to boost the strength of the revolutionary authorities, accelerate the work of struggle, criticism and rectification, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and construct a socialist society.164 A large-scale movement was implemented in which the educated youth were sent to the countryside and remote mountain areas. On December 22, 1968, the People’s Daily published Mao’s instruction: “It is necessary for educated youth to go to rural areas to undergo re-education and study from poor farmers. Local authorities should mobilize officials and other groups in urban areas to send students who have graduated from junior schools, high schools and universities to rural areas.”165 Mao considered “sending educated youth to the mountains and countryside” part of a long-term plan to oppose and prevent revisionism, and 161. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 505.

162. People’s Daily, September 5, 1970. 163. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 573.

164. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Time of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 192–194. 165. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 616.

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essential to cultivate a new generation of revolutionary proletariat.166 Mao’s new socialist initiatives took the form of compulsory changes to the system with a clear political purpose — to oppose and prevent revisionism, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, and prevent the restoration of capitalism. However, none of these initiatives were lasting. They appeared with the Cultural Revolution and disappeared when it ended, ultimately becoming mere flashes in the history of the PRC. Hu Qiaomu has pointed out that the pursuit of utopian goals was one reason for China’s two-decades-long ‘leftist mistake.’ From the perspective of the evolution of production relationships, given the logical development of a series of social movements, such as the Great Leap Forward, people’s communes and the anti-revisionism movement, the launch of the Cultural Revolution was inevitable historically. After 1963, the opposition and prevention of revisionism, criticism of the bourgeoisie and prevention of the restoration of the bourgeoisie became the core of all work. During the Cultural Revolution, this conception directly evolved into the theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to this theory, the Chinese people should focus solely on pursuing revolution, rather than material life and social affluence, because affluence means revisionism. The main social goals thus changed from developing productivity to purifying production relations, state power and ideology. The pursuit of utopian goals thus ultimately provided the theoretical basis for the launch of the Cultural Revolution.167

Fomenting Public Sentiment for the Launch of the Cultural Revolution The Cultural Revolution was labeled “cultural” because it began from cultural criticism.168 The cultural field was not only the first political target of the Cultural Revolution, but also a political position Mao used to prepare the public for the movement. He grasped that public opinion represented the final word in politics, and so individually attacked and undermined various elements of existing public opinion to prepare the ground for launching the Cultural Revolution.169 166. Dong, Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 563. 167. Hu, “Why did China make a Two-decade ‘Leftist’ Mistake?” 168. Hu, The 70 Years of the Communist Party of China, 455. 169. One of the preliminary moves made was the publishing of Yao Wenyuan's “Review on the Historical Opera Hai Rui Dismissed” in the Shanghai Wenhui Daily on November 10,

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Mao’s approach to problems in the scientific, cultural and artistic fields is an important question, as are the guidelines he followed to facilitate scientific progress, cultural prosperity and artistic innovation. As his uniquely Chinese-style policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend” was a significant innovation, this will be discussed first. On April 28, 1956, Mao announced the policy of “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend” during the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC.170 On February 27, 1957, in the report “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” he mentioned that people should not make hasty judgments regarding “right and wrong” in relation to problems in scientific and artistic fields, and should engage in free discussion and never draw conclusions rashly. Mao expressed his opposition to the use of administrative power to promote or prohibit any style or school of thought, saying that this would harm artistic and scientific development.171 However, although Mao developed the policy of “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,” it was never implemented. From the founding of New China, he regularly intervened directly in literary and artistic circles, and launched numerous major criticisms of movies, including A Secret History of the Qing Imperial Palace,172 Legend of Wu Xun,173 Hu Feng’s Counterrevolutionary Group,174 and Dream of the Red Chamber.175 1965, which set in motion a series of purges. (Hu, The 70 Years of the Communist Party of China, 456.)

170. Mao had said then, “‘Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought

contend’ should become our guideline in my opinion. Let a hundred flowers bloom in

the arts and let a hundred schools of thought contend in academia.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 54.)

171. Ibid, 211. 172. In 1950, Chairman Mao admonished that “A Secret History of the Qing Imperial Palace is a traitorous movie and must be punished.” He also said, “Some people believe A Secret History of the Qing Imperial Palace is a patriotic movie, but I think it is a traitorous movie,

a thoroughly traitorous movie.” (Qi Benyu: “Patriotic or Traitorous? — Comments on the reactionary movie A Secret History of the Qing Imperial Palace,” Red Flag, Issue 5, 1967.)

173. Mao, “Pay Attention to Discussion of the Movie Legend of Wu Xun,” People’s Daily, May, 1951.

174. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, 160–167.

175. On October 16, 1954, Mao Zedong wrote the “Letter about Research (on the movie

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After 1962, Mao launched a series of criticism movements that clearly contradicted his own guideline of cultural liberalism. “Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend” was replaced with the opposite extreme, cultural absolutism and the formation of an academic and cultural desert. Here we try to answer two questions: First, why did Mao turn to “big cultural criticism” and “big academic criticism”? Second, how did he prepare the public for the launch of the Cultural Revolution? In 1962, under the direction of Kang Sheng, then Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, criticism was launched of the work Liu Zhidan176 and of Xi Zhongxun, then Vice Premier of the State Council and Secretary General of the State Council. On September 24, during the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Kang gave Mao a note that read, “The use of the novel for anti-party activities is a big invention.” Mao read the note aloud and commented that public opinion, or ideological works, are always be used prior to overthrowing a regime, whether for revolutionary or counter-revolutionary purposes.177 The Report of the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969 commented: “The words of Chairman Mao struck at the revisionary group headed by Liu Shaoqi. This group used every chance to control ideology and superstructure. The departments under the control of this group have imposed a crazy counter-revolutionary dictatorship on the proletariat and poisoned the proletariat with evil and unhealthy thoughts. They have just one goal — preparing the public for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must purge them politically and crush their counter-revolutionary public opinions with revolutionary public opinions.”178 Dream of the Red Chamber)” and transmitted it to members of the Political Bureau of the

Central Committee of the CPC and the persons in charge of publicity and culture. The letter expressed Mao Zedong’s belief that the criticism by Li Xifan and Lan Ling of Yu Pingbo’s article was the “first serious attack on the wrong opinions of so called scholars

regarding Dream of the Red Chamber.” The letter also criticized “bigwigs” who ignored

the problem and even discouraged criticism. These people talked about a united line with respect to bourgeois writers and felt happy to be bourgeois followers. Mao

Zedong saw the uncritical acceptance by many scholars of Dream of the Red Chamber as

analogous to their acceptance of A Secret History of the Qing Imperial Palace and Legend of Wu Xun.

176. Li, Liu Zhidan. 177. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 194.

178. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.

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On September 27, the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC established a Special Case Committee headed by Kang Sheng to review certain leaders, such as Xi Zhongxun, Jia Tuofu (then Vice Director of the State Economic and Trade Commission,) and Liu Jingfan. This committee became a typical modern “literary inquisition.” Kang later became Mao’s political hatchet man, leading and participating in a number of major injustices during the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing was politically ambitious and resentful of being excluded from politics. After Mao stressed the importance of ideological works during this plenary meeting, Jiang seized the opportunity and immediately informed Mao that serious problems existed in the literary and artistic fields. Jiang and Kang had collaborated before, and so easily reached agreement and became the initiators of the campaign of “Big Criticism in Literature and Art” and the Cultural Revolution.179 In 1963, with the direct support and intervention of Mao, Jiang carried out criticism of the rewritten Kun Opera Li Huiniang. Her activities were later officially recognized by Mao as marking the start of the Cultural Revolution itself.180 Jiang not only understood Mao’s strategic goals, but also was willing to do anything to help implement them. In December of 1963, Ke Qingshi, then a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and the First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC, provided an important report, and Mao immediately provided Peng Zhen and Liu Ren with related instructions and materials. Mao harshly criticized many members of the CPC who showed enthusiasm for “feudalist” and “capitalist” art instead of “socialist” art.181 To show his discontent regarding current literary works in Beijing, Mao also criticized the Ministry of Culture for publicizing works dealing with feudal dynasties, love stories and 179. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1228. 180. On January 1, 1967, the People’s Daily and Red Flag published the editorial “Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the End,” which was reviewed and approved by Mao Zedong himself. The editorial said: “The literary and artistic revolution signaled by the drama reform under the instruction of Chairman Mao in

China in 1963 was actually the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” (People’s Daily, January 1, 1967.)

181. Mao Zedong pointed out, “It is absurd that many communists are enthusiastic

about feudalist and capitalist arts rather than socialist arts. Many literary and artistic

authorities remain under the control of ‘dead people’. The social economic base has changed, but the arts, one of the superstructures servicing this base remain a big

problem” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao

Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 436–437.)

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historical foreign artists.182 In February 1964, in a conversation about educational revolution, Mao said, “the old teaching system wrecks talents and youth.” He proposed an educational revolution and fewer years of schooling.183 In July, he had a conversation with Mao Yuanxin and once again raised the need to reform the education system and make class struggle a major course in the nation’s colleges.184 These two conversations laid a foundation for the educational revolution that later occurred during the Cultural Revolution. In June, when receiving foreign guests, Mao praised the First Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, but denounced Confucius.185 He praised the personal role Qin Shi Huang played in unifying China, but criticized the absolutism he displayed in the “burning of books and burying of scholars.” Mao commented to his guests that rehabilitation would have been better. However, in extending the anti-rightist struggle in 1957, Mao “buried the scholars” albeit without “burning the books.” On

182. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1226–1227 183. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 22–23.

184. Mao Zedong told Mao Yuanxin: “Class struggle is your main course. Your college should carry out socialist education in rural areas and take part in the movement against the

‘five evils’ in factories. How can you graduate from college without knowledge of class struggle? I disagree with the ‘filling’ teaching method. Bourgeois educators already

identified this problem during the May 4 Movement. Why can we not make reforms? The key to educational reform is teachers.” Mao Zedong therefore criticized college students because they lacked knowledge of workers, farmers or class struggle (Ibid, 96–97.)

185. Mao Zedong expressed: “Qin Shi Huang was far greater than Confucius. Confucius liked empty talk, while Qin Shi Huang was the first person to unify China. He unified China not only politically, but also by standardizing systems such as writing and metrology. Some of the systems he created remain in use today. No other emperor among China’s feudal dynasties was greater than him. But he was cursed for thousands

of years for two reasons: first, he killed 460 intellectuals; second, he burned some books.” On August 30, 1964, Mao made further comments: “Qin Shi Huang was a good emperor. In fact only 460 people were killed in the ‘burning of books and burying of

scholars’ incident, and they were all followers of Mencius. Actually, he did not bury all schools of thought. For instance, Shusun Dao survived. We face many problems we

cannot solve, just like Qin Shi Huang.” (Chen, Analyses of Mao Zedong’s Reading Notes, vol. 2, 1155.)

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February 8, 1958, he commented, “The CPC is far better than Qin Shi Huang.”186 Mao re-evaluated Qin Shi Huang’s actions in the “burning of books and burying of scholars” to create a historical precedent for the analogous actions that were to occur in the coming Cultural Revolution. Nobody predicted that the Cultural Revolution would see Mao became a modern incarnation of Qin Shi Huang. The fact was, Mao felt there were many things to learn from the Qin Shi Huang. Mao explained: “Like Qin Shi Huang, there are many things we cannot solve.” In August 1974, Mao wrote a poem titled “Comments on the ‘Discussion of Feudalism’ - to Guo Moruo,” commenting: “Please re-evaluate the First Emperor; we too should ‘burn books and bury scholars’.”187 In September Mao told a foreign guest: “I am also Qin Shi Huang, and in fact Lin Biao referred to me in this way.”188 In fact, the scale of the “burning of books and burying of scholars” in the time of Mao far exceeded that in the time of Qin Shi Huang. The Cultural Revolution created a “big cultural desert” that had nothing to do with Mao’s specific personal opinions on communist theory, including insisting on Marxism, opposing and preventing revisionism and preventing capitalist restoration, and was simply a return of feudal absolutism from 2,000 years previously. From the summer of 1964, Mao led the biggest cultural criticism movement since the founding of New China, which ranged from the literary and artistic fields to the fields of philosophy, economics, history, and so on.189 Mao personally 186. In February 1958, during the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central

Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong called for a re-evaluation of Qin Shi Huang. He explained: “Qin Shi Huang might have had a lot of flaws, such as a clubbed hand. His

biggest crime was the ‘burning of books and burying of scholars’. But in my opinion,

the CPC is just like Qin Shi Huang. No. We are better than him.” In the summer of 1959, Mao further commented that the evaluation of Qin Shi Huang should consider both sides. (Ibid.) 187. Ibid, 1156 188. In September 1974, Mao Zedong told foreign guests: “Qin Shi Huang was the first

famous emperor during China’s feudal period. I, too, am a ‘Qin Shi Huang’; Lin Biao has called me so. Qin Shi Huang has traditionally been a divisive figure in China, some

believe he was good and others believe he was bad. Personally, I support the Qin Shi Huang and oppose Confucius.” (Ibid, 1161.)

189. Some scholars, like Pang Xianzhi, think that political criticisms in the form of academic discussion became integral to the “anti-revisionism” movement. For examples of such criticisms and their objectives, see Yang Xianzhen’s “Two Unite Into One” theory in

philosophy, Sun Yefang’s “production price theory” and “view of enterprise profits” in

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conducted political intervention and criticism, first by “burying scholars” and then by “burning books.” On June 4, Mao requested that Jiang Qing talk with Lin Biao.190 This may have marked the start of the political alliance between Lin and Jiang, and one that was approved by Mao, despite Jiang holding no position in the army and occupying a position unconnected with literary and artwork in the army. On June 26, Mao issued an instruction strongly praising Jiang’s “Speech on Modern Beijing Opera Performance.”191 In the speech, Jiang said: “The stage has traditionally been dominated by emperors and their ministers, scholars and ladies and even ‘Monsters and Demons’. This phenomenon will destroy the economic basis of socialist society. Such a stage does not serve all working people, but rather is exploited by minorities such as landowners, affluent peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and the bourgeoisie.”192 Mao issued official instructions on behalf of Jiang (who at that time did not hold any office in the CPC) and transmitted them to the whole of the CPC. In doing this Mao violated the internal provisions of the CPC by directly giving the green light for Jiang’s political career. On July 1, Peng Zhen delivered another speech on the modern performance of Beijing Opera, and said: “The priority of performances should be the representation of living people, such as workers, farmers and soldiers, and heroes. As for dead people, feudal emperors and ministers, less is better.” On July 23, Mao issued an instruction supporting Peng’s speech.193 On June 27, Mao harshly criticized the Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles and all attached associations. He said they were flirting with revisionism. He was worried about an association like Hungary’s Petofi Club appearing in China.194 Through his criticism of the Chinese Federation of Literary and Art economics, and Jian Bozhan’s “historicism” and “concession policy theory” in history

(Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976,) v 2, pp 1384–1385, Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2003.)

190. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 81.

191. Ibid, 89. 192. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1228–1229 193. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 89.

194. Mao Zedong believed that the previous 15 years had seen most of these associations and their associated publications refuse to cooperate with party policies. He felt they

viewed themselves as standing above the masses, failed to reflect the goals of socialist revolution and construction, and were in danger of becoming revisionist. Should

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Circles, Mao was also issuing a serious warning to the whole CPC. In August, Mao sent Qi Benyu’s article “Problems in the Evaluation of Li Xiucheng,” published in the Guangming Daily, to Jiang Qing with special instructions.195 Jiang then expressed her support for Qi’s “historical revolution” and criticized Jian Boda (a professor of history at Peking University) without actually mentioning him by name. In December 1965, Qi’s “Studying History for the Revolution” was published in Issue 13 of the Red Flag, and stated that “Marxists stand up and declare loudly to the crowd: Rebellion is right.” Mao praised this article twice: “I read it three times. The only regret is that it did not mention names (meaning Jian Bozhan.)”196 On August 27, Mao gave instructions on two articles provided by the Office of the Propaganda Department of the CPC: “Refutation of Yang Xianzhen (then Vice President of Central Senior Party School) and Others Who Deny Oneness of Thinking and Existence” and “Feng Youlan (then Philosophy professor at Peking University) and his Spreading of Bourgeois Educational Thoughts.” Mao wrote: “We cannot triumph without concerning ourselves with philosophy.” He then transferred the articles with instructions to Chen Boda.197 The criticism on Yang’s “Two things may become one” theory was reported to Mao and organized by Kang Sheng by himself.198 Mao said: “‘Everything has two sides’ is dialectic, but I think revisionism take hold, an association like Hungary’s Petofi Club might appear in China. (Ibid, 91.)

195. Qi Benyu’s “Comment on Li Xiucheng’s Autobiography,” published in Issue 4 of Historic Research in 1963, described how Li Xiucheng, an outstanding general of the

Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, came to betray his kingdom. Luo Ergang, a historian, had different opinions, and so an argument developed between him and Qi. Jiang Qing

submitted Qi’s article to Mao, who agreed with its assessment of Li Xiucheng and issued the instruction: “According to historical literature and irrefutable evidence, the

written accounts left behind by this traitor were untrue.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the

Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 130–131.) The Guangming Daily then published Qi’s “Comment on Li Xiucheng’s Autobiography” together with “Feedback on the Discussion of the Evaluation of Li Xiucheng” which was submitted by Jiang Qing to Mao Zedong. (Guangming Daily, July 25, 1964)

196. Mao Zedong: “Speech during the Hangzhou Meeting,” December 21, 1965; “Discussions of Mao Zedong with Kang Sheng and Others,” March 28, 1966.

197. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 148.

198. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1230.

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‘Two Unite into One’ may be revisionist or display class conciliation!”199 Criticism of the economic opinions of Sun Yefang (President of the Institute of Economics, CAS) was also carried out at this time, and was reported to Mao by Kang and Chen. 200 Peng Zhen (then member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC) expressed the opinion that “all people are equal before the truth,” regardless of whether they were party or state leaders, literary workers, or common people.201 Peng’s statement apparently included Mao along with other leaders of the party and the state and it attracted his anger. In his Notice on May 16, Mao responded to the perceived challenge to his supreme authority by denouncing Peng’s statement as “a bourgeois slogan.”202 In 1964, Mao asked Peng: “In your opinion, how should we conduct class struggle in the ideological and cultural fields? Beijing is the capital, the model for all other provinces and cities.” Instructed by Mao, Jiang Qing frequently talked with Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi and Zhou Yang, but they disagreed on the matter of class struggle.203 Jiang had now become Mao’s political agent, powerful enough to interfere in the work of the Central Committee of the CPC. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao appointed his grandniece, Wang Hairong, and his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, as his agents to transmit the “supreme instructions” of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. This arrangement was contrary to Marxism and resembled feudal absolutism. This habit of Mao’s also set a bad precedent in the CPC that was imitated by others. For instance, Lin Biao let his wife, Ye Qun, act as his political agent. In November, Mao evaluated the cultural system. He said: “What percentage of the cultural system is in our hands? 20%? 30%? 50%? Perhaps it is less than 50%? In my opinion, at least 50% is not in our hands.” He even went so far as to say, “The whole Ministry of Culture has collapsed.”204 On December 27, during the Central Working Meeting, Mao again said: “The whole Ministry of Culture has been corrupted. The whole unit is under the joint dictatorship of the bourgeois and feudal classes.”205 199. Pang and Jin eds., “Records of Mao Zedong’s Speech during the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC.”

200. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2. 201. Peng, “Several Issues on Academic Discussion.” 202. “Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC,” People’s Daily, May 16, 1967. 203. Xiaodi, Secrets Buried with the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 5. 204. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1227. 205. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1372–1373.

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Mao ’s estimates regarding China’s cultural circles were very arbitrary. He made subjective judgments that violated his proclaimed principles of “no investigation, no right to speak,” “being practical and realistic,” and “prohibit cruel struggle and ruthless purges.” This tendency showed that enjoying power for too long led Mao to deviate from the right path. The extension of the struggle objectives made his political hallucinations increasingly extreme and his political mistakes became magnified and he launched the all-encompassing Cultural Revolution. On March 3, 1965, during the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Peng Zhen expressed reservations about Mao’s “big cultural criticism.” He said: “We should be careful of this phenomenon. We should be aware that some people have become famous not for their academic contributions but simply for finding faults with others. The criticism should be under control.” Bo Yibo later commented: “Peng Zhen’s correct opinion was not adopted. Instead, the tide of criticism became furious.”206 On December 12, Mao talked with Chen Boda and others in Hangzhou and said, “Some intellectuals like Wu Han and Jian Bozan are becoming weak.” Referring to the ongoing campaign to criticize Wu Han’s play on a Ming Dynasty official, Mao said, “The key to Hai Rui Dismissed is the ‘Dismissed’. We dismissed Peng Dehuai in 1959.”207 This statement clearly shows that Mao never reflected deeply on the wrong decisions made during the Great Leap Forward, which had caused numerous deaths during the Great Chinese Famine. On the contrary, he believed that Hai Rui Dismissed was politically dangerous since it could be interpreted as a call to reverse the political purge of Peng Dehuai. Mao thus used the debate surrounding this play as a direct motivation for the launch of the Cultural Revolution. Mao constantly pursued rash policies. The mistakes he made in his later years were the inevitable results of the path dependence that had come to dominate his thinking. Mao’s absolute power ultimately led him to become divorced from the 206. As a result, famous historian Fan Wenlan was forced to perform self-criticism, and Guo

Moruo (historian and President of CAS) was forced to resign. (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1244.)

207. Mao Zedong said, “Yao Wenyuan wrote powerful articles, shaking the fields of drama,

historiography and philosophy. But they still failed to hit the target. The target was ‘dismissal from office’. Emperor Jiajing dismissed Hai Rui; in 1959 we dismissed Peng

Dehuai, another ‘Hai Rui’.” Mao added: “In recent years some young people (referring

Yao Wenyuan, Qi Benyu, and Yin Da) have made some progress. But some senior

professors have made no progress. Wu Han has been [Beijing's Deputy] Mayor for so long, its about time he steps down to be a county governor.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1401, Beijing.)

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rest of the party, and to travel in the opposite direction from the correct one. In March 1966, at the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao said: “The deeper the socialist revolution goes, the more strongly they resist and the more their true antiparty and anti-socialist colors are revealed....The bourgeois intellectuals control real power in academia and education; local governments must watch those who control schools, newspapers, publications, and publishing houses; bourgeois academic authority must be criticized harshly.”208 He further said: “Even today many of those university professors have only one type of learning: anti-party, antiproletariat and anti-revolution. Besides counter-revolution, bourgeois restoration, and revisionist cultivation, they know nothing.”209 Mao criticized the “concession policy” that Jian Bozan, professor of Peking University, proposed, which moved towards the feudal landed class. Simultaneously, he praised articles by Qi Benyu and various others. In 1966, “Criticisms of the Historical Views of Comrade Jian Bozan,” co-authored by Qi and others, was published in Issue 4 of the Red Flag.210 Mao said repeatedly: “More reading leads to more stupidity; dependence on intellectuals makes it easier for revisionism to appear.”211 He fully reversed his previous judgments and opinions on Chinese intellectuals. In January 1956, during the intellectual affairs meeting held by the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao had said: “China’s socialist construction cannot work without the participation of intellectuals. We cannot depend solely on the uneducated. China needs a large number of intellectuals.” He called upon the whole CPC to strive to learn scientific knowledge and to cooperate with intellectuals within and outside the party to close the scientific gap between China and the rest of the world.212 In February 1958, Mao wrote to Lu Dengyi (then Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, head of Cultural Education Team of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC) to propose “persuading all the professors, lecturers, assistants and researchers we can to serve the cause of educating the proletariat, as well as 208. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1240. 209. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 35.

210. Chen, Analyses of Mao Zedong’s Reading Notes, vol. 2, 1179. 211. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1154. 212. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Resolutions

about Several Historical Issues of the CPC since the Founding of New China (with Remarks), 242.

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engaging in cultural and scientific work.”213 However, from 1957, Mao began to call intellectuals “bourgeois intellectuals,”214 and said that bourgeois intellectuals should not be allowed to remain in control of schools.215 This caused the party to make serious mistakes in its policy towards intellectuals, and was exploited and taken to an extreme by the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution.216 All of the aforementioned large-scale criticism movements launched by Mao violated his own avowed basic guideline of “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,” and turned the literary and artistic fields from cultural liberalism to cultural absolutism. Most of these movements were led in the name of Mao Zedong, just as had occurred with Stalin in the 1930s. Mao viewed cultural problems as ideological, saw academic debate as political struggle, personally intervened in the cultural field, wildly suppressed cultural elites, directly purged intellectual elites, and indirectly attacked political elites to shape public opinion for the launch of the Cultural Revolution and seize absolute control of Chinese politics and culture. The 1981 resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that Mao made ideological errors in his excessive responses to perceived political criticisms expressed in various literary and art works, or voiced by academics, writers, or artists. Mao became increasingly extreme in his treatment of intellectuals, education, science and culture, and his struggle to impose his will eventually sparked the Cultural Revolution.217 These movements begun by Mao seriously suppressed China’s cultural life for a very long period.218

213. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7.

214. Mao said: “Most of the intellectuals among us grew up in the old society and came from families that were not working class. Even those who came from the families

of workers or farmers experienced a bourgeois education before the liberation and so generally gained a bourgeois view of the world. Therefore they remain bourgeois intellectuals.” (Ibid, 272.)

215. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 53–54.

216. Needham, “Rebirth of Science in China — The Rise and Fall of the Anti-intellectual ‘Gang of Four’”; Pan ed., Collected Works of Joseph Needham.

217. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 807.

218. Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1245.

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Mao Zedong’s Political Differences with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping The Cultural Revolution was an inevitable consequence of a series of political struggles that followed after the CPC gained power. After the anti-rightist struggle was launched in 1957, those outside the party no longer dared to judge the CPC, and multi-party political consultation under the leadership of the CPC turned to a one-party dictatorship. After the Lushan Meeting and its attacks on intra-party “right opportunists” in 1959, those within the party also no longer dared criticize Mao. From that point, collective leadership and democratic decision making was replaced by personal authoritarianism and arbitrariness. First Secretaries of the CPC Committees at all levels generally became “patriarchs,” and Mao became the highest ranking “patriarch” in the CPC.219 After the Lushan Meeting, Mao became increasingly isolated from other leaders of the CPC. Many supporters of the Great Leap Forward, especially Liu Shaoqi, began to reflect on the decisions of the Lushan Meeting. For example, they came to believe that while natural causes contributed to the Great Chinese Famine, the event was largely a man-made disaster. Deng Xiaoping began to distance himself from Mao, while Peng Zhen believed that Mao’s refusal to review his own role in the mistakes made by the party would negatively impact the party. 220 The failure of the Great Leap Forward depressed Mao, but he also became unhappy with the pressure he was facing from other factions within the leadership, and eventually retaliated by challenging Liu, Deng, Peng, and others after the Beidaihe Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. During the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC held in January 1962, Mao stressed the problem of watching for revisionism. During the Beidaihe Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in August 1962, and the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in September of the same year, Mao further completed the basic line of the CPC in the whole socialist phase. “This Marxism and Leninism line brought by Chairman Mao is the lifeline of our party.”221 Between May and July 1962, Deng Zihui (then Secretary of the Secretariat of the 219. Yang, The Deng Xiaoping Era: A Record of the Two Decades of Reform and Opening in China, vol. 1, 10.

220. Tong, 40 Years of Ups and Downs, vol. 2, 393. 221. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.

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Central Committee of the CPC and Vice Premier of the State Council) introduced his policy of implementing “fixed farm output quotas for individual households” in rural areas. Chen Yun commented that it would be better to “allocate farmland to each household” than require households to fulfill production quotas. He communicated with various members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, successively approaching Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai. They all agreed with his proposal to allocate farmland to households. At the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC held on July 2, Deng Xiaoping appraised Chen’s proposal highly, saying: “Comrade Chen Yun performed some investigations, told some truths and provided some opinions. Contracting production to each household is the best among all the organizational modes for agriculture. During the transition period we should adopt whatever mode helps recover production.”222 During this period (as the country sought to recover from the Great Chinese Famine,) despite the central leadership group reaching agreement on rural reform, Mao used his veto power to reject their proposal. On June 6, Mao interviewed Chen Yun regarding why he advocated a policy of allocating farmland to individual households. Chen maintained that the policy would not cause polarization or lead to land requisition through purchase, and focused on its benefits, saying: “In this way we can recover in just four years. Otherwise, it will take much longer.” Mao became angry after hearing this.223 He harshly criticized the policy of allocating farmland to individual households as a form of revisionism that would destroy the rural collective economy and dissolve the people’s communes. To Mao this issue of farmland allocation became central to the line of the party.224 As for determining exactly what comprised revisionism, he alone had the final word. On July 20, Mao talked with the First Secretaries of all the Central Bureaus and criticized the opinions of Chen Yun and Deng Zihui about “fixed farm output quotas for individual households” and “allocating farmland to individual households.” He said, “Now some people want to fix farm output quotas for households and even allocate farmland to households throughout the country. Someone (Chen Yun) said that we need eight years to restore agricultural production under current policies, but four years will be enough if we fix farm output quotas for individual households. All these words came from Beijingers (meaning the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC.)”225 222. Jin and Chen eds., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1322. 223. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1230. 224. Zhou, “Before and After the Four Investigations of Comrade Chen Yun in Rural Areas.” 225. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1234.

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On August 6, Mao chaired the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC and expressly declared: “‘Fixed farm output quotas for individual households’ and ‘allocating farmland to individual households’ are the way of capitalism.”226 Here, Mao equated revisionism with capitalism, showing his tendency towards vague definitions of political terms, and confusing and selfcontradictory concepts. Regardless of his confused analysis, Mao clearly viewed the proposed policies as mortal dangers to China’s revolution. What worried him most was polarization between rich and poor in rural areas. On August 9, in a central team meeting, Li Jingquan, First Secretary of the Southwest Central Bureau, said, “If farmlands were allocated to individual households, the polarization between rich and poor would become obvious within two years.” Mao responded: “It will not take 2 years. Class polarization will appear in just over 1 year. On one hand, there will be some secretaries of the party branches who have been corrupted, have mistresses, give away money and buy land; on the other hand, poor farmers will be bankrupted, including families of officials, employees, teachers and soldiers and families composed of vulnerable groups. They constitute our social base.”227 Mao could see the potential negative aspects of rural reform, but failed to realize the importance of re-allocation of land to help farmers build a better life together. Mao’s limited knowledge of governing a modern country became a big obstacle to his understanding of socialism. He saw everything simply in terms of a struggle between socialism and capitalism. More importantly he stopped engaging in investigation and research of real life conditions, ignored the voices of farmers who simply wanted to feed themselves, and did not respect the desire of farmers for a better life. Despite Chen Yun offering pragmatic suggestions based on four field investigations, Mao Zedong believed only in his instincts, and showed no empathy for the real situation of farmers. This was an important reason for the divergences between Mao and other leaders of the CPC. In August, during the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao said: “There are two commands in Beijing (meaning the ideological divisions within the Central Committee of the CPC) and a fierce struggle exists between them.” He also referred to the words of Lin Daiyu in Dream of the Red Chamber: “Either the east wind prevails over the west wind, or the west wind prevails over the east wind.”228 Mao did not specifically identify who made up the ‘other command,’ but he had earlier labeled Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as the “bourgeois command.” Later in 1966, Mao’s “Bombarding the Headquarters — 226. Ibid, 1241. 227. Ibid, 1242. 228. Chen, Analyses of Mao Zedong’s Reading Notes, vol. 2, 1483.

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My First Big-character Poster” heavily criticized the rightism introduced by Liu in 1962.229 The ‘other command’ thus referred to Liu. In May 1963, Mao Zedong organized the preparation of the First 10-point Decision in Hangzhou. This period saw illegal and undisciplined behavior among grass-roots officials, including seeking special treatment, misappropriation, and corruption. These should have been punished according to normal party discipline and existing legal punishments. However, the First 10-point Decision framed the situation as a struggle between two lines, a manifestation of serious class struggle in Chinese society. Mao said that the Socialist Education and “Anti–Five Evils” movements were part of the socialist revolutionary struggle to “beat down and crush the furious attacks of capitalism.” Liu and Deng disagreed, and the Latter 10-point Decision was published in September 1963. This still seeked to establish “taking the class struggle as the key link,” but unlike the wording and method used by Mao, this required determining a policy line to differentiate class enemies from individuals engaged in temporary behavior, and to distinguish speculation from normal market trades. On May 11, 1964, during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao declared, “To prevent the success of the counter-revolutionary strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ promoted by imperialists and revisionists and ensure the future of Marxism and Leninism, we should cultivate and train successors to continue the Proletariat Revolution.” Accordingly, Mao proposed the famous “Five Standards.”230 In the same month, he told Zhang Pinghua, Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC, “It seems that the socialist education movement cannot solve all of our problems.” Internally, Mao was thus preparing for a largescale revolution.231 His subsequent direct conflict with Liu caused him to insist on “individual decision making.”

229. Mao, “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster,” August 5, 1966, People’s Daily, August 5, 1967.

230. The ‘five standards’ include: follow Marxism instead of revisionism; serve the interests of the majority of people rather than a minority; pursue the unity of most of the people, including those who are mistakenly opponents; insist on democracy rather than

autarchy; adopt a democratic rather than a paternalist work style; and conduct selfcriticism of one’s own mistakes. Additionally, Mao Zedong said that he wanted to find

a successor to ensure his policies were continued (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 85–87.)

231. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1391

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On June 16, Mao talked again about revolutionary successors.232 This was the first time he asked: “How should we respond if a ‘Khrushchev’ appears (in the Central Committee of the CPC)? What should we do if revisionism appears in China? Please transmit my words down to every county and tell the county committees to resist a revisionist Central Committee.”233 These comments show that Mao sought to alert the Central Committee and local party organizations at all levels to the potential for revisionism. In August, during the discussion and modification of the Latter 10-point Decision within the Central Committee of the CPC, conflict occurred between Mao and Liu regarding the problems of the social education movement.234 The report of the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969 pointed out: “In 1964, during the great socialist education movement, Liu Shaoqi began to cover up capitalists, and said in public that the Marxist scientific method of investigating social conditions, advocated by Chairman Mao, was not possible without implementing his line. It was necessary to restore capitalism.”235 In September, Mao told a group of officials from Hunan that both the Central Committee and Provincial Committees should encourage people to supervise their superiors and criticize their work. He further urged that if the object of criticism was something more than a mere bureaucrat, people should draw attention to the criticism, even if this meant rebelling against the Central Committee of the CPC. The Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC himself thus mobilized local party organizations to rebel against the Central Committee of the CPC, and undermined the organizational principle that the entire CPC should follow the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC. On October 10, while issuing instructions about power seizure in relation to the socialist education movement to the Central Committee of the CPC, Liu Shaoqi released his opinion that “various conflicts and contradictions are intertwined.”236 232. Mao Zedong said, “The Soviet Union encountered revisionism, so our country might

experience the same. As for how to prevent the appearance of revisionism, we need to

cultivate successors to the proletarian revolution.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 85–87.)

233. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 363. 234. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1352. 235. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969. 236. On October 24, 1964, Liu Shaoqi transmitted the “Report on the Power Struggle in

the Xiaozhan Area,” originally submitted by Tianjin Municipal Committee of the CPC. To transmit this report, he drafted the “Instruction on Matters Related to the Power

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At the end of the year he put this opinion to the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, but was harshly and immediately criticized by Mao. During the public censure of the Soviet Union’s Khrushchev-led revisionism, Mao became worried that a “Khrushchev” would appear in the Central Committee of the CPC and implement revisionism. In fact, Mao was not so much worried as displeased that Liu Shaoqi was now rivaling himself in power and standing. The political conflict between Mao and Liu continued to display a similar pattern, with Mao always emerging as the dominant party. From December 15 to 28, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC held the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC to discuss the problems appearing in the urban and rural Socialist Education Movement. Mao organized the implementation of the 23-Article Document to further highlight that this movement was intended to solve the contradiction between socialism and capitalism, and above all to “purge capitalist roaders within the CPC.” In particular, Mao believed that Liu was no longer a Marxist and instead had become bourgeois. However, the background to Mao’s change of heart towards Liu was that he felt unhappy about Liu’s power relative to his own.237 At that time, Mao and Liu enjoyed equal standing within the CPC, there being were two chairmen de facto: Mao was the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, while Liu was the Chairman of the State. Demonstrating the equal standing the two enjoyed, a report to the Central Government by Chen Zhengren, Director of the Machinery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, on November 25, 1964 was worded in a manner typical of the time to say that objectives would be achieved “only if we firmly implement instructions of the Central Committee of the CPC, Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu.” This power sharing arrangement was inconsistent with Struggle in the Socialist Education Movement” for the Central Committee of the CPC, based on the experience of Xiaozhan: “Currently, some of the contradictions between

us and our enemies take the form of contradictions among the people and even within

the CPC. The contradictions between ourselves and our enemies are interlaced with contradictions within the people and the CPC.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1357.)

237. During a meeting at the end of 1964, Mao Zedong said, “Liu Shaoqi still leads all work, including the Socialist Education Movement, the movement against the ‘five evils,’ and the economy. Something unexpected could happen at any time. If something happened,

for example if I died, you would be unable to take power. You may take over power

now and become Chairman and ‘Qin Shi Huang’. I face something I cannot handle. My curses are useless now. If you’re the best, you can act as the damn commander.” (Cong, Tortuous Years, 602.)

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the “no two kings in one state” principle of Chinese political tradition. Mao naturally fell into the “successor trap.” On the one hand, he needed a successor, and had to enhance the power and reputation of that successor to make them effective; on the other hand, the expanded power and enhanced reputation of the successor might endanger Mao himself. Once Mao and his successor became political equals, a “successor crisis” would occur. Mao’s control over supreme power was naturally exclusive, and he never allowed his successor to be his equal. Under circumstances of mutual suspicion and lack of communication, the political successor naturally also became a political rival and potential victim of any political struggle. This is demonstrated by Mao’s relationships with Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Politically, the frequent political struggles launched by the older Mao were closely related to this “successor crisis.” From the perspective of the psychology of aging, these struggles were also related to Mao being suspicious of his successor. In fact, Liu had remained loyal to Mao Zedong despite having different opinions on how to deal with the Socialist Education Movement. On November 10, during a meeting of the Standing Committee of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC presided over by Mao, Liu said, “It is not easy for a party to elect its leader. The leader can emerge as a result of struggles and tests over a very long period. The history of our party also proves that the recognition of a leader within the party occurs only as a result of extended struggle, including fighting with class enemies, imperialists and opportunists in the party. Chairman Mao is a recognized leader within our party even though some have opinions about him. I am the first to promote Mao Zedong Thought and I feel Mao Zedong is our best leader. He is the best among our leaders and best represents the collective wisdom of our party.”238 Mao offered no response and shortly afterwards turned hostile toward him. On December 20, during the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao and Liu had a disagreement about the main contradictions of the Socialist Education Movement. It developed into a face-toface confrontation. Liu believed the main contradiction was between clean and dirty “political, economic, ideological, and organizational” elements; Mao denied this and claimed the main contradiction was capitalism. Liu said that the problem was that the “political, economic, ideological and organizational areas have not been cleaned up,” and contradictions between ourselves and the enemies existed, as did contradictions among the people. He also issued a special instruction: “Seize the lead wolf before controlling the foxes following the wolf — that is the key. You must start from the establishment.”239 The same day Mao gave a speech during the 238. Wu, A Decade of Polemics—Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966, vol. 2, 869–870. 239. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1390.

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Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC. He quoted a poem by the famous Tang Dynasty poet Du Fu that read: “Shoot the horse before the horseman; Capture the chief to beat his force.”240 The ‘chief’ that Mao referred to here was Liu. Mao intended to attack the “chief” to win the battle and “capture the chief to beat his force.” On December 27, during a plenary meeting, Mao said, “The CPC comprises two groups: socialists and capitalists. The latter have formed independent kingdoms during the past 15 years. Two independent kingdoms exist in Beijing besides the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee. You can take a guess as to what they are. I have no comment to make.”241 The two independent kingdoms referred to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC led by Deng Xiaoping and the Station Planning Commission headed by Li Fuchun. This indicates that while Mao Zedong claimed unity and fairness existed within the CPC, he never undertook positive communication to reach mutual understanding and eliminate divergence. On the contrary, Mao launched political struggles and ‘schemes’. He intentionally encouraged mutual suspicion, disclosure and struggle among the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC, and became the source of political divisions inside the CPC. Mao thus threw stones at the Central Committee of the CPC and the leading state institutions.242 On December 28, during the same plenary meeting, Mao spoke out against Liu’s analysis of the Socialist Education Movement, arguing instead that the contradiction between socialism and capitalism was the main contradiction. Mao said that the key was to beat capitalist roaders within the CPC.243 Liu continued to insist on a more practical and realistic line. He believed, “The situation is complicated. We should focus on solving existing problems. Everything should be based on facts. We must not exaggerate everything into contradiction between ourselves and the enemy.” The phenomenon of Liu working within the Central Committee of the CPC and presenting a different opinion to Mao should have been normal and consistent with the principle of intra-party democratic centralism. However, Mao could not tolerate dissent and ignored the opinions of Liu. He complained, “One (Deng) doesn’t want me to attend the meeting and another (Liu) doesn’t allow me to speak.” Holding the texts of the Constitution and the Party Constitution in his hand, Mao asked the meeting: “Are we citizens of the People’s Republic of China? Do we have free speech if we are? Can we talk with you? Do we have a 240. Jin, Biography of Mao Zedong (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1617. 241. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1372–1373. 242. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 32. 243. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1373–1374.

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free press? Right now, the Ministry of Culture just gives those people a free press. I always support protests against our bureaucratists.”244 Mao was clearly very angry and wanted to display his strength to Liu and Deng. The incident also shows that an atmosphere of discussing decisions on a basis of political equity and using democratic mechanisms to eliminate political differences still prevailed inside the CPC Central Committee, as did the organizational principle of majority rule. On the evening of January 3, 1965, Mao chaired the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and criticized some of Liu’s actions in directing the Socialist Education Movement without actually naming him.245 On the afternoon of January 5, Mao re-chaired the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and again harshly criticized Liu, still without naming him.246 The instructions of Mao Zedong on the documents of the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC indicated that he believed Liu to be “neither Marxist nor Leninist” and warned Liu’s supporters that “ignorance of basic theory and the basic practices of the CPC will take us in an incorrect direction,” but again did so without actually mentioning names.247 On January 14, the Central Committee of the CPC issued its Summary of Discussions of the National Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC on "Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas” (the 23-Article Document) together with an associated notice. The notice said, “We hereby issue this document to you. In case of any conflict between this document and previous documents on the Socialist Education Movement released by the Central Committee of the CPC, this document prevails.”248 Mao thus used his ultimate personal authority to deny the opinions of Liu. Inexplicably, when Liu was re-elected as Chairman of the PRC during the First Meeting of the Third NPC, a political crisis broke out inside the Central Committee of the CPC, cracking the external display of political unity and worrying other leaders. During the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Zhou De, He Long, and other leaders talked with Liu and persuaded him to be prudent and respect Mao. After the meeting, Liu took the initiative and performed self244. Ibid, 1374–1375 245. Ibid. 246. Ibid, 1377–1378. 247. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 281.

248. Ibid, 284.

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criticism before Mao.249 This shows Liu was willing to obey the leadership of Mao Zedong to maintain political unity and eliminate the political crisis within the CPC. Despite this, Mao still blamed Liu and sought to settle old scores. On January 17, 1956, when interviewing Chin Peng, the Secretary General of the Malaysian Communist Party, Mao talked about intra-party struggle and said that, with regard to the decisions on necessary guidelines and policies, the struggle with Liu dated back to the summer of 1964. In December 1970, when Mao was interviewed by Edgar Snow, Snow asked, “When did you clearly decide that you had to beat Liu Shaoqi politically?” Mao replied that this occurred after the release of the 23-Article Document in January 1965. Mao explained that the first article of the 23-Article Document specified that the goal of the Socialist Education Movement was to beat down the people in the CPC who were taking the capitalist road, but this was opposed by Liu.250 Mao felt he could neither cooperate with people with different political opinions, nor forgive their apologists. He followed personal absolutism by destroying groups he could not control. The conflict between Mao and Liu at the top level of the CPC thus became open and sharp, and was a direct cause of Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution. While Mao had previously limited his criticisms of Liu to internal speeches and opinions, his hostility was later made public in 1969 with the Report on the 9th National Congress of the CPC, which stated: “At the end of 1964, Chairman Mao convened the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC and organized the preparation of Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas (the 23-Article Document) to smash the bourgeois reactionary line of Liu Shaoqi, which was rightist while seeming leftist.” This document was the first to expressly declare that “the key to this movement is to purge the capitalist roaders.”251 This Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1964 was the start of Mao’s political purge of Liu, then also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and was also an important preparatory step towards the launch of the Cultural Revolution.252 249. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1379. 250. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 173.

251. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969. 252. Some scholars like Pang Xianzhi believe that the exposure of divergence between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi was not accidental but resulted from the long accumulated

divergences in serious matters such as assessments of the domestic situation, measures

to overcome difficulties, and instructions regarding the Socialist Education Movement.

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At the time, Mao was fairly isolated within the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. He no longer believed in collective leadership and had begun to act alone. He told Wu Xujun, his personal nurse: “I have given a lot of advice, but they (the leaders in charge of the front line work of the Central Committee of the CPC) did not accept it. I feel strong resistance and am worried about who will be a reliable successor. How dare they do this! I am still alive!”253 These words, and the way he confided in his nurse, indicate that he was unable to communicate information and opinions to other members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC face to face and had already decided that “rebellion is right.” To purge other leaders, especially Liu, he encouraged local and even military forces to rebel against the Central Committee of the CPC. His main strategy for orchestrating this was to warn local and military leaders that it could become necessary to agitate for a public rebellion. On August 5, Mao received Dipa Nusantara Aidit, the Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party. Mao said: “Now Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping do 70–80% of the work. Deng Xiaoping is Secretary General and Zhou Enlai is Premier. They’re better than me at practical work. I am a bureaucratist in a sense. This arrangement is necessary. For things to be otherwise would not be good.” However, Mao continued to face a contradiction. He did not trust Liu, and was worried about the changes in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. On August 11, Mao told Luo Ruiqing, “Revisionism was also a kind of pestilence. The leaders are now important. I have said, ‘everyone had a head covered with skin that could resist the cold wind.’ So, we must resist unhealthy trends by ourselves. Such trends appeared in 1962. The CPC would have changed its colors in just half a year if I and several other members had not resisted and won support. This need to resist negative changes applies to many things. The natural course of events can change if leaders change their minds. For instance, if I approve something, some members here might The divergence between the two leaders that appeared during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC represented an eruption of these accumulated

conflicts. During this Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong’s discontent was directed toward leaders of the CPC at all levels, but especially

the “capitalist roader.” That caused the leftist advocating of the extension of class struggle to intensify, mentally and theoretically completing the preparations for the

launch of the Cultural Revolution. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949– 1976), vol. 2, 1383.) 253. Ibid, 1389–1390.

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disagree and some might agree. There are a lot of positive or negative examples in this respect domestically and internationally.”254 These words indicate that Mao had disagreements with other members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. Specifically, Mao perceived an unhealthy trend led by three members, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun, who had proposed “fixing farm output quotas for each household” and “allocating farmland to each household.” One year later, Mao released his “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster” during the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, once again referencing this “unhealthy trend.” Devoted to ideal socialism and people’s communes, Mao began to doubt the political line of the leadership of his own party. On October 10, during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao spoke before the First Secretaries of all regions and said: “If there is anything wrong within the Central Committee of the CPC, anything could become a terrible ‘wrong’. If a person like Khrushchev appears, he could cause a rebellion on our home front. Chinese people tend to rebel historically. Are we just rebels like Song Jiang?”255 On October 12, during the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao said, “I am going to heaven to see the late Marx. What should I tell him about my work? If there is any revisionist here, I am his opponent!”256 In December, Mao formally instructed the General Office of the Central Committee to protect the secrets of the party, resist being used by revisionists, avoid revisionism appearing internally, and be on alert to destroy “Monsters and Demons” in case of war.257 However, exactly who the “revisionists” and the “Monsters and Demons” were was determined exclusively by Mao, and he was confusing the definitions of “revisionism” and “Monsters and Demons” just as he did those of “revisionism” and “capitalism.” On January 12, 1966, speaking in front of Tao Zhu (then First Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Mid-South Regional Committee of the CPC,) Wang Renzhong (then Second Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Mid-South Regional Committee of the CPC and First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPC,) Chen Yu (then Third Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Mid-South Regional Committee of the CPC and Governor of Guangdong Province,) and 254. Ibid, 1393–1394. 255. Ibid. 256. Ibid, 1395–1396. 257. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 489.

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Zhang Pinghua (then First Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC,) Mao said: “I said in Beijing last October, if revisionism appears in Beijing, what about your local governments? Will you follow the lead of Cai E to arise and attack Yuan Shikai? I feel something is wrong.”258 On March 30, Mao spoke with Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao in Shanghai and announced his concept of “Overcoming the king of hell and liberating the spirits.” He said, “I always believe you should attack the Central Committee of the CPC if the Central Committee does evil. The ‘Monkey King’ is welcome locally.”259 Kang later communicated the instructions of Mao to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. Encouraging a constant state of high alert was a tool used by Mao in political struggle. He encouraged opposition to the “heaven” — the Central Committee of the CPC and national institutions — as well as the rules and regulations specified in the constitutions of the party and the state. He not only encouraged local leaders to rebel, but also incited “Monkey Kings” like Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu to attack the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council. These would later join the Central Cultural Revolution Group, established at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, as the commanders of China’s insurrectionists, attacking targets like Liu and Deng. Historically, the divergences, contradictions and conflicts between Mao and other leaders, including Liu and Deng, originated from their significantly different opinions regarding the political situation, development phase and guiding principles of governance in China. Two political lines existed and struggle occurred between them.260 258. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1398. 259. Ibid, 1406. 260. Hu Qiaomu also admitted that two lines existed within the CPC. He pointed out that after 1957, China had basically completed the tasks of the revolution, and thus the focus of realizing a socialist society should shift from revolutionary struggle to

peaceful construction. During this period, the main trend within the CPC was to focus

on the following: adapt to historic change, start from practice, and steadily develop the Chinese economy under the new systems while building the new socialist society.

This trend represented the will of the majority in the CPC and the country. However, another trend existed that did not adapt to historic change and advocated following the previously established revolutionary track. Mao Zedong led or supported the correction of the ‘leftist’ mistake during the first half of 1959, 1961 and the first half of

1962, but in a sense was representative of the second trend (Hu, “Why did China make a Two-decade ‘Leftist’ Mistake?”)

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From the founding of New China, the small faction of idealists and radicals represented by Mao believed that even after establishing mass ownership of production materials, furious class struggle would persist and new class divisions would appear in society. Furthermore, the new privileged classes would find political agents within the party. The agents of the new privileged classes were the capitalist roaders within the party. Within the CPC, most pragmatists or moderates, represented by Liu and Deng, believed that since socialist reconstruction had been mostly completed, domestic class enemies had perished and class struggle was over. Thus, they saw the main task of the CPC and the Chinese government under the leadership of the CPC as developing production and economic construction. The preface to the Counterrevolutionary Utterances of China’s Khrushchev — Liu Shaoqi, written by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing and officially approved by Mao Zedong on October 9, 1967, provides the best account of this perspective, and reflects Mao’s opinions of Liu:261 “After the revolutionary victory in China, Liu Shaoqi strongly opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist revolution and pushed for capitalism in China on the pretext that it could solve the problem of lagging productivity. After the socialist reconstruction of the ownership of production materials was basically completed, he claimed ‘classes have become history,’ advocated class conciliation, viciously attacked the ‘Three Red Flags,’ called for rural reform and tried to restore capitalism. In the furious international class struggle, he pushed for a line based on capitulationism and featuring a ‘crack down on revolutionary movements in all countries’.”262 Although some leaders like Liu and Deng disagreed with Mao, they could not argue against him in public. Instead they used various means to resist implementing his policies. Of course, Mao was greatly angered by this, and so prepared to launch a large-scale social revolution to purge the party of the capitalist roaders represented by Liu and Deng.263 Mao’s personality was such that although he was the supreme leader of the 261. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 422.

262. People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev — Liu Shaoqi.

263. As Deng Rong recounted, Mao Zedong had become isolated and unhappy, and faced

various dissenting opinions. Initially, he participated in policy and organization

work, but eventually decided to use unusual measures to remove all obstacles to the

promotion of the revolutionary line he believed in. (Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 4.)

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ruling party, he still needed enemies. If he found himself without enemies, he would make them up, and his first act after destroying an enemy was typically to create a new one. This reflected not only the logic of Mao Zedong’s class struggle theory, but also his personal political style. As he himself put it: “Fighting against others is a great joy!”264 Mao felt a continuous urge to seek and win conflicts, and these urges only grew as he approached the end of his life. He thus launched and led a final political revolution to eliminate thoroughly the residual influence of revisionism in the Central Committee of the CPC. As recorded in the Report of the 9th National Congress of the CPC, “Looking back at this history, we will realize that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, involving hundreds of millions of the masses, was no accident. Instead it was the necessary result of the long-term struggle between two classes, two roads and two lines within socialist society. The proletariat, poor farmers, PLA, revolutionary officials and revolutionary intellectuals who resolved to follow the great leader Mao on the way of socialism can no longer stand the reactionary activities of Liu and his party. Therefore, a grand class struggle is inevitable.”265 This shows Mao Zedong could no longer tolerate his opponents, and so a confrontation became unavoidable. Liu became Mao’s enemy simply because Mao believed him to be. The same later applied to Lin Biao. Therefore the Cultural Revolution can be analyzed as entirely a man-made “grand class struggle.”

How the Intraparty Democratic System Failed Intraparty democracy was already broken by the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. As pointed out later in the Several Rules about Intra-party Political Life approved by the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, unhealthy tendencies like separation from reality and the masses, subjectivism, bureaucratism, monopolization, and privileged thinking were deteriorating even before the Cultural Revolution occurred. Hu Sheng believed that for various historical reasons the democratization of the political life of the CPC and the state had failed to proceed smoothly since the founding of New China. Consequently the leadership and organization systems of the party and state remained incomplete in many respects. These defective systems failed to restrict Mao Zedong, the respected state leader, from allowing careerists like Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to 264. In 1917, Mao Zedong wrote the words “Fighting against heaven, fighting against earth, fighting against men — what great pleasure!” (China Youth, (24) (1954).)

265. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.

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seize power and run amok, and finally failed to stop the disaster of the Cultural Revolution.266 How did Mao, a mere human being, become a “god” before the Cultural Revolution? How could he overwhelm the Central Committee of the CPC? What role did Mao play in the Cultural Revolution? What about the roles of other leaders? The following seeks answers to these questions.

Personality cult and the Cultural Revolution From the 1960s, among the CPC, PLA and the country, the personality cult around Mao Zedong became excessive, creating an important condition for his launch of the Cultural Revolution. Without this personality cult, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. Therefore, we should ask how the personality cult surrounding Mao emerged, and how it caused the Cultural Revolution. Before the CPC became the ruling party, Mao Zedong opposed Chiang Kaishek’s personal dictatorship outside the party and criticized his personality cult inside the party. Similarly, at this time Mao still opposed anything that could foster a personality cult involving himself. For example, on August 15, 1948, in a letter to Wu Yuzhang (then President of North China University,) he would not allow his name to be listed together with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. He pointed out, “China’s revolutionary experience included handbooks written by Chinese communists (including Mao himself) based on the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the documents of the provisions, lines and policies of the Central Committee of the CPC," and concluded “therefore, it is nothing to do with ‘Maoism.’”267 Before the founding of New China in 1949, the Second Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC, acting on a proposal of Mao, made a special resolution to prevent the emergence of any form of personality cult, and prohibited the praise of individual leaders, including through such actions as birthday congratulations, or the naming of cities, streets, factories and other objects after them.268 Mao’s opposition to personality cults continued after the founding of New China. In 1954, he said: “Some people said that the deletion of certain clauses in the draft of the Constitution reflected the opposition of a single individual (meaning himself.) This explanation is wrong. The reason is not opposition, but rather that those clauses are inappropriate, unreasonable, and unscientific. In a people’s democracy like China, such inappropriate clauses should not be considered. 266. Hu, The 70 Years of the Communist Party of China, 468–469. 267. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 88. 268. Mao, “Methods of Work of the CPC Committees.”

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Humility is nothing in science.”269 At that time Mao firmly maintained a scientific attitude. He also believed that nobody was perfect, and everyone had faults and could make mistakes. These beliefs were not aimed at others, but showed he was still analyzing himself with a clear mind. He allowed others to criticize him and did not accept his idolization.270 In December 1954, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC issued a notice: “Comrade Mao Zedong has instructed, stop using ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ from today to avoid material misunderstanding.” However, Mao did not explain why this could cause misunderstanding. In reality the confusion lay in the collective thinking of the Central Committee of the CPC versus the individual thinking of Mao. In April 1945, when drafting Resolutions on Several Historical Issues, Mao said, “You can describe me as a representative of the party, but I cannot represent the party alone.” This statement clarifies Mao’s concern, namely that he did not want Mao Zedong Thought to be misunderstood as his personal thoughts. However, although Mao made important contributions to the party, he also undervalued and excluded the contributions of other leaders to claim credit for himself. He thus undermined the collective leadership of the party and substituted himself for the Central Committee of the CPC. In March 1955, during the National Congress of the CPC, Mao said, “We have learned various historic lessons, and personal wisdom can help avoid work mistakes only if it is combined with collective wisdom. The Central Committee of the CPC and the party committees at all levels therefore must insist on the principle of collective leadership and keep opposing the two tendencies of individual autarchy and decentralism.”271 That is the fundamental reason the CPC, the new ruling party, was able to create the first golden period (1949–1957,) with Mao a key factor in its success.272 269. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 6, 330.

270. Mao Zedong said, “I do not think there are any saints in this world. People have faults

and make mistakes. The thing is not to make too many mistakes. We should be practical

and realistic. We should analyze all things. We should affirm the good and criticize the

bad. The ancient proverb goes, ‘Men are not sages; who can be without fault?’. These words should be modified in my opinion. Even saints make mistakes. But we should not care too much provided they correct their mistakes in time. As I have said myself, do not build idols.” (Ibid, 346–347) 271. Ibid, 391–392. 272. Hu, China’s Political and Economic History (1949–1976).

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On March 24, 1956, Mao chaired the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. When the discussion turned to personality cults, Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary General of the Central Committee said, “A personality cult is bad and our party always strives to avoid it. I remember that this problem was mentioned during the rectification movement in Yan’an. At that time Mao Zedong stressed the line to oppose personality cults when teaching the work methods of party leaders. The criticism and self-criticism called for during the 7th National Congress of the CPC also showed our opposition to personality cults. Mao Zedong wrote Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership in 1943 and On Strengthening the Party Committee System in 1948. Both these works are important pieces of literature with regards to carrying out the mass line and preventing the emergence of a personality cult. In 1949, the Second Plenary Meeting of the 7th National Congress of the CPC expressedly required not assigning special importance to particular individuals, for example by prohibiting birthday congratulations, and the naming of cities, streets, factories and other objects after specific individuals. All these policies showed foresight and wisdom.”273 On April 5, Mao led the drafting of an article “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” published by the People’s Daily Editorial Board. The article described a personality cult as a corrupt historical heritage that remained influential and practiced by tens of millions of people. Mao wrote the following: “Stalin, in his later years, gradually became addicted to a personality cult. As a result, he broke the party rule of democratic centralism and the system of collective leadership combined with personal responsibility.” Mao believed that the CPC should learn from the experience of the Soviet Union and establish a complete political system featuring the mass line and collective leadership to prevent the appearance of individualism and a personality cult. The article also made the insightful point that the influence of a personality cult can be very persistent. Even when a personality cult is overcome, it may reappear, or transfer to another individual. Mao therefore stressed the need to be vigilant toward the emergence of a personality cult.274 In the same month, during the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao reaffirmed: “Do not list Mao Zedong together with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; insist on democratic centralism and collective leadership.” Thus, the political report of the 8th National Congress of the CPC did 273. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956–1966, vol. 1, 18–19. 274. This article was written by the People’s Daily Editorial Board based on the discussions of the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC (People’s Daily, April 5, 1956.)

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not mention “Mao Zedong Thought” as it had previously. It was a modification of the wording of the political report of the National Congress of the CPC, and represented historic progress and a significant political consensus within the party. Thus, for a few years after the founding of New China, Mao knew himself well and remained humble and prudent. He merely sought to be the political equal of other members of collective leadership. This was the key both to his success and to the first golden period of economic development and social progress in China. However, after the Great Leap Forward, Mao turned to cultivating his own personality cult, which directly violated the resolution of the Second Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC. A symbiotic relationship existed between Mao’s mistakes and this personality cult, and Mao himself ultimately became its biggest victim. In March 1958, during the Chengdu Meeting, Mao changed his mind and said that a personality cult was necessary. He said there were two kinds of personality cult. The first type was the correct personality cult, which correctly worshipped figures such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, all of whom held the truth in their hands and so needed to be followed forever. The second type was the incorrect personality cult, which was based on blindly obeying a leader. During his speech Mao also identified two motivations for opposing personality cults: the first was based on simple opposition to incorrect personality cults and the second was based on the fear that people would worship Mao over anyone else. Mao also stated that he believed the class head at school needed to be worshipped by all the other students in the class to maintain order and prevent mistakes occurring.275 The Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC not only prohibited the emergence of a personality cult, but also said that it signified feudal absolutism, and that the so called ‘proper personality cult’ damaged both the individual and the party. This was political and a consequence of the mistakes made by Mao in his later years. Personality cults make humans into ‘gods,' and so Mao made himself the supreme ‘god’ in China. Notably, in the 1960s, Mao encouraged his own personality cult and repeatedly used important articles or central documents, which will be discussed in subsequent sections, to build it up. In November 1963, Mao added a self-assessment to Zhou Yang’s “The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," as follows: “In China, Comrade Mao Zedong is making furious argumentations against various opportunist lines within the party in spite of ‘Parochial Experience’ imposed on him. He integrated the common truths of Marxism in practices of the Chinese revolution 275. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 369.

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and creatively developed Marxism and Leninism in new conditions.”276 Mao thus said that he “creatively developed Marxism and Leninism” and proclaimed himself the representative of the correct line within the party. These actions were typically self-centered and exclusive. Further, Mao labeled those who opposed his opinions representative of various opportunist lines. Support for Mao personally became the main basis of struggle between the two lines in the party and the only measurement of allegiance (to the correct line versus the wrong line) during the Cultural Revolution. It was also inconsistent with the principle of “social practice is the only standard for testing truth” advocated by Mao himself.277 Therefore, Mao exhibited typical contradictions not only between his words and deeds, but also between different speeches given in the same period. On September 29, 1964, Mao added the words “Comrade Mao Zedong always tells us” and “All the nationalities in China are armed with Mao Zedong Thought” to Peng Zhen’s “Speech on the Ceremony to Mark the 15th Anniversary of New China.” Mao Zedong also invited Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Zhen to read this modified speech draft.278 This shows that Mao himself was beginning to encourage his personality cult. The usage of the term “Mao Zedong Thought” was inconsistent with the official resolution of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, and thus with the official party line at the time, but Liu, Zhou, and Peng did not object. Indeed, “Mao Zedong Thought” was officially used in Peng Zhen’s speech. Two years later, the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC officially approved the usage of the term “Mao Zedong Thought.”279 This 276. Based on the article published in the People’s Daily, December 27, 1963. See also

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 403.

277. Editorial Boards of the People’s Daily and Red Flag, “Two Different Lines on the Question

of War and Peace — Five Reviews of a Public Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” November 19, 1963, People’s Daily. See also Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 414.

278. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 174–176.

279. Section 3 of the Communique of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee

of the CPC discussed “Hold High the Great Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thought.” This

document defined “Mao Zedong Thought” as “Marxism-Leninism for the era of

the collapse of imperialism and worldwide victory of socialism.” The communique

expressly declared, “Mao Zedong Thought is the guideline for all the work of the CPC and the state.” (“Communique of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central

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was a typical example of Mao willfully changing resolutions approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC. Meanwhile, the upper levels of the party began to change “Mao Zedong Thought” to “Mao Zedong’s Personal Thought.” Mao not only did not stop this, but actually introduced the new term to the highest levels of party discourse. In the records submitted by Chen Boda to Mao Zedong regarding conversations between Chen Boda and Yu Qiuli on December 31, 1964, Yu Qiuli (then Minister of the Petroleum Industry) said, “We should obey the Chairman’s thinking," where the “Chairman’s thinking” meant “Mao Zedong Thought.” Mao transmitted this document on the same day to the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Vice Premiers of the State Council for review.280 On January 3, 1965, Mao made additions to the draft of the speech of He Long (then Vice Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC, Director of the National Defense Industry Commission, and Vice Premier of the State Council) titled “On the First Meeting of the 3rd National Congress of the CPC.” Specifically, Mao added: “Our people and army possess the revolutionary spirit cultivated under the instructions of the party and Chairman Mao.” On the same day, He Long delivered another speech during the meeting titled “The Great Thinking of Comrade Mao Zedong about the People’s War Pointing the Way for National Defense Construction in Our Country.”281 Here, “Mao Zedong Thought,” the collective outcomes and collective thinking combining Marxist common truth with practices of China’s revolution, become Mao’s exclusive personal outcomes and personal thoughts, which was “great (personal) thinking” according to Mao. During an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao admitted that a personality cult existed in China.282 However, he maintained that people needed personality cults, and in December 1970, he expressly told Snow that he encouraged his own personality cult as a tool for defeating Liu Shaoqi.283 Mao had been clear Committee of the CPC,” approved on August 12, 1966.) 280. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 290–291.

281. Ibid, 299–300. 282. Snow suggested: “Some Russians say there is a personality cult in China,” to which Mao Zedong responded, “I am afraid so. It is said people created a personality cult for Stalin, but not for Khrushchev. Chinese people have also developed a personality

cult. This makes sense. Maybe Khrushchev was overthrown because people created no personality cult for him.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 8, 408.)

283. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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that personality cults were not Marxist, and there was no such thing as a correct personality cult. In fact, personality cults simply reflected feudal absolutism and individual authoritarianism by suggesting that history was created by individuals.284 However, Mao followed an opportunist path influenced by the demands of political struggle. He encouraged his own personality cult and gradually intensified it, editing important documents to include references to “Mao Zedong Thought," and also rephrased “Mao Zedong (collective) thought” to read “Mao Zedong (personal) thought” to complete the political course whereby individuals substitute for the collective and the self excludes others. Mao even proclaimed that “Mao Zedong Thought” was “great thought.” The personality cult surrounding Mao that emerged during the 1960s thus developed because Mao himself felt he needed to be a ‘god’. Mao’s own desire thus was the major driver behind the emergence of his personality cult. Meanwhile, a group represented by Lin Biao sought favor with Mao by actively encouraging his personality cult. Lin gave a classic evaluation of Mao: “selfworship, superstition, narcissism, claiming credit and blaming others.”285 He saw through Mao’s fatal weaknesses and exploited them for his own ends. In the summer of 1958, Kang Sheng, alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and leader of the Central Theory Team, introduced the “peak” theory, which maintained that “Mao Zedong Thought is the peak of Marxism and Leninism.” At the end of 1959, he went further, adding: “Mao Zedong Thought is the supreme and ultimate standard of Marxism and Leninism.”286 During the Chengdu Meeting in 1958, Shi Qingke, First Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee vociferously praised Mao saying: “Believe in Mao Zedong superstitiously; believe in Mao Zedong blindly.” In the same year the Second Meeting of the 8th National Congress of the CPC elected him the Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. After Lin Biao replaced Peng Dehuai as Minister of National Defense responsible for the work of the Military Commission of the Central Committee during the Lushan Meeting in 1959, he began a large-scale campaign to deify Mao Zedong. In early 1960, Chen Boda announced that “Comrade Mao Zedong successfully championed Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 174. 284. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 330.

285. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 408. 286. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 29.

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and developed Marxism and Leninism.”287 At the beginning of 1962, Mao was forced to perform self-criticism during the 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres regarding the Great Leap Forward. However, Lin tried to relieve Mao of this responsibility, stating: “In a sense, these difficulties are just the result of our ignorance of instructions, warnings, and the thinking of Mao Zedong. If we listened to Chairman Mao and fully understood his spirit, we would have had fewer misinterpretations and would face fewer difficulties today. I am convinced that we can do a good job only if we successfully carry out and eliminate interference in Chairman Mao’s thinking. Things will go wrong if Chairman Mao’s opinions are not respected or are interfered with. The recent history of the CPC proves my words. Therefore, our party needs to work together by rallying behind Chairman Mao in his time of difficulty.”288 Mao was extremely satisfied with Lin’s speech. After the meeting, he asked Luo Ruiqing, the Chief of Staff: “Lin Biao is an excellent orator. Are you able to give such a speech?” Luo replied, “We cannot.” On March 30, Mao wrote to Tian Jiaying and Luo Ruiqing about modifying Lin’s speech. The letter said: “I read this speech and generally it is a high-quality piece. I feel happy after reading it.” The Central Committee of the CPC later officially published Lin’s speech. Pushed by Lin, the General Political Department of the PLA compiled Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong and Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong. Later, based on Chen Boda’s evaluation of Mao, Lin said in the preface to the reprinted Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, “Comrade Mao Zedong is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. He has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism creatively and comprehensively and has brought it to a higher and completely new stage.”289 In 1965, 1.14 million volumes of Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong and over 5 million volumes of Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong were printed and distributed. Various activities, such as daily reading, frequent reading, daily work style rectification, teaching and application workshops, political classes, half-day official training and collective training were organized,290 triggering an unprecedented climax of the personality cult surrounding Mao throughout the PLA. Instead of criticizing or restricting these 287. Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 250. 288. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China, vol. 15, 107

289. Lin, “Preface to the 2nd edition of Quotations from Chairman Mao.” 290. People's Liberation Army General Political Department, “Conditions and Suggestions on Emphasizing Politics, Carrying out Four Good Practices and Enhancing Preparations for War (Draft.)”

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activities, Mao praised them. In an instruction to Lin, Mao said simply, “perfect.”291 In November, Lin brought out the “Five Principles to Guide PLA Work in 1966.” The first principle was “flexibly learn and use Chairman Mao’s works, make special efforts in their ‘use’ and take the Chairman’s works as the supreme instructions of all work within our army.”292 Lin invented the “supreme instructions” that came to guide all work within the CPC and PLA. In the instructions for the PLA political working meeting dated January 24, 1966, Lin said: “Mao Zedong Thought is the peak of modern Marxism and Leninism, the supreme and most flexible expression of Marxism and Leninism.” Lin in similar instructions the next year stated that, “Chairman Mao’s works are the supreme instructions for all the work of the PLA; Chairman Mao’s words display the highest level, the greatest authority and the strongest force. Every one of his words is truth, and carry greater weight than 10,000 empty words.”293 Deng Xiaoping later said: “Lin Biao was beating the drums for ‘peak’ theory and claimed Chairman Mao’s words were the supreme instructions. Such thinking was popular throughout the CPC and the PLA.”294 In “A letter about Flexible Learning and the Application of Chairman Mao’s Work to the Battlefronts of Industry and Transportation” dated March 11, 1966, Lin said, “China is a great socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, with a population of 700 million. It needed unified, revolutionary and correct thinking — Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong Thought was not the spontaneous result of the working people, but rather was created by Chairman Mao based on his excellent revolutionary practice and his genius in inheriting and developing the thoughts of Marxism and Leninism and combining new experiences of the international communist movement to build up Marxism and Leninism to a new stage.” Lin thus ignored the important contribution of other leaders to Mao Zedong Thought and instead assigned it entirely to Mao. On March 22, in a letter to the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, Lin officially proposed: “We must hold the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought high.” That same year, the Communique of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC announced, “Comrade Lin Biao called on the whole army to carry out a mass 291. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 472.

292. Lin, Five Principles for PLA Work in 1966. 293. Lin, “Important Instructions in the Report on the PLA Political Working Meeting,” People’s Daily, January 24, 1966.

294. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 330.

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movement of learning Mao Zedong Thought to set a model for the CPC and the country.”295 That was the first public political evaluation of Lin made by the Central Committee of the CPC and the reason Lin became the political successor of Mao. These events show that Mao and Lin had reached a political deal whereby Mao would promote Lin, while Lin would help establish Mao Zedong Thought. Thus, on the eve of the launch of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s personality cult had reached a unprecedented climax within the rank and file and leadership of the CPC, a development that contradicted official resolutions previously made by the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the 7th National Congress of the CPC and the 8th National Congress of the CPC to stop the promotion of Mao Zedong Thought. This development also laid a foundation of public opinions that allowed Mao to replace the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC with his personal authority (in politics, thought and theory.) With everything in place, Mao formally finished his plan at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in August 1966.

The failure of the intra-party democratic system and the Cultural Revolution The Party Constitution of the CPC approved in 1956 established an appropriate institutional arrangement for intra-party democratic life and collective decision making on major issues. However, this fundamental system was not rigorously implemented, and ultimately came to be seriously compromised. The Nanning Meeting in 1958,296 the Lushan Meeting in 1959, the Tenth Plenary 295. “Communique of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 14, 1966.

296. The Nanning Meeting refers to the meeting that took place from January 11 to 22, 1958 in Nanning, Guangxi attended by central and local government leaders. The priority

of the meeting was to conclude the first Five-year Plan and discuss the economic development plan for 1958, the national budget, second Five-year Plan and long-term planning. For this meeting Mao Zedong drafted “Six Points on Working Methods” to

stress his philosophy of “continuous revolution.” During the meeting Mao Zedong

criticized the slogan “Anti-bold Advance” that had been introduced in 1956. Mao said, “Do not use the term ‘Anti-bold Advance’... it is a political problem. Attacks by rightists have caused some comrades to become ideologically close to rightists. Some people say ‘The past was better’ and ‘Losses caused by bold-advance are bigger than those caused

by conservatism’. We should therefore study why some people wrote an editorial on

anti-bold advance (this was a reference to ‘Anti-conservatism is Necessary, but Anti-

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Sidebar 2.2. How Did the Intra-party Democratic System Fail? (1956–1965) Before Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution, the formal organizational system of the CPC had already been seriously damaged and existed in name only. The National Congresses of the CPC and the Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of the CPC during 1956–1965 provide examples: First, the actual term of the 8th National Congress of the CPC and the 8th Central Committee of the CPC was 13 years (from 1956–1969,) equivalent to two and a half standard terms of the Central Committee of the CPC and thus violating the specific provisions of Articles 31 and 33 of the Party Constitution. In this sense the 8th Central Committee of the CPC was unconstitutional from 1962 onward. Second, during 1957–1966, there were two National Congresses of the CPC (the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1956 and the Second Meeting of the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1958) in violation of Article 31 of the Party Constitution. Third, except for the Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1958 (namely the Fifth and Sixth Plenary Meetings of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,) only one Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC took place each year, and there were 5 years (1960, 1963, 1964 and 1965) in which no meetings were held. This violated Article 36 of the Party Constitution. Meeting of the National Congress of the CPC in 1962, and the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1964 were important meetings in the years just prior to the introduction of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. These years represented a period when the democratic life and institution of the CPC were destroyed through the dismantling of party institutions and the move from central collective leadership to personal leadership by Mao Zedong. The longer Mao held office, the more arbitrary his work style became and the more damage he did to the democratic system of the CPC. Eventually the intra-party democratic system disintegrated as Mao grasped complete control over the party by simply going bold Advance is also Important’ published in the People’s Daily on June 20, 1956.) I issued an instruction noting that I would not read this editorial because it blames me.”

Mao harshly criticized the “Anti-bold Advance” slogan introduced by Zhou Enlai, Lian Xiannian, and Bo Yibo in 1956 and also criticized Chen Yun. Because of the absence of Chen Yun at this meeting, Zhou Enlai had to perform self-criticism and took full

responsibility for the errors Mao perceived. (Jin and Chen eds., Biography of Chen Yun,

vol. 2, 1122; Xi and Jin, A Short History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 31.)

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around the Central Committee. First, Mao violated the specific provisions of the Party Constitution dealing with the five-year term of the National Congress of the CPC and the Central Committee, and the requirement for plenary meetings at least semi-annually. Article 31 of the Party Constitution approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1956 mandates a five-year term for each National Congress of the CPC. The Central Committee of the CPC holds annual meetings of the National Congress of the CPC and can postpone these meetings or hold them early in special circumstances. According to Article 36, the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC should be held by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC at least semi-annually. However, the National Congress of the CPC and the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC failed to occur as scheduled (Sidebar 2.2.) Article 33 mandates that the term of the Central Committee of the CPC should be five years, so the term of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC headed by Mao should have expired in 1961. However, that year coincided with the Three-year Famine that affected the whole of China from 1959 to 1961. If the 9th National Congress of the CPC had been held as scheduled to elect the 9th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao would have faced extreme difficulty in continuing to hold office. The documents of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC contain no resolution on the postponement of the 9th National Congress of the CPC, nor any explanation of why it was postponed. The term of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC thus was improperly postponed for thirteen years until the 9th National Congress of the CPC elected the new Central Committee in 1969. In other words, Mao and the other leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau remained in their positions after 1961 in violation of the Party Constitution. This was a serious blow to the democratic and organizational system of the CPC, and this systemic failure contributed to Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution and the accompanying decade of nationwide turmoil. Besides the failure to rotate the leadership as scheduled, the unofficial internal system of supreme leaders “having the last word” replaced the official system of collective decision-making stipulated in the Party Constitution. Article 19 of the Party Constitution stipulates that decisions regarding major problems should be made collectively. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping evaluated this provision: “From the Zunyi Meeting to the Socialist Reconstruction Period, the Central Committee of the CPC and Comrade Mao Zedong stressed collective leadership and carrying out democratic centralism, and therefore intraparty democracy remained normal.”297 297. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

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However, from 1957, many major issues were decided by Mao personally, and the importance of the Central Committee of the CPC became nominal. After the Nanning Meeting in 1958, Mao did not regularly attend the meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. Instead he would raise discussion topics prior to those meetings. These topics would then be discussed during the meeting and a report made to Mao for his approval.298 Since Mao spent much of 1965 away from Beijing, he was absent from the Meetings of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Political Bureau. However, he continued to control these meetings remotely, and received regular reports. Other Standing Committee Members would see Mao in other cities even when Mao wanted to be involved in the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. Regarding the decisions being made at the top level of the CPC, Mao made arbitrary decisions personally instead of discussing matters with other leaders. With party institutions undermined and Mao’s arbitrary decision-making relied on, Mao was able to launch the Cultural Revolution, demonstrating the complete failure of the CPC’s mechanism of collective and democratic decision making. According to Pang, Kang Sheng’s communication to the Meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC in April 1966 that Mao had requested Peng Zhen and Lu Dengyi be placed under special observation was a crucial event that shows how the collective leadership of the CPC had been replaced by the individual leadership of Mao.299 None of the leaders of the CPC were able to criticize Mao, and none of the systems of the CPC were able to provide checks and balances to his activities. This failure of existing party mechanisms had historical roots. During the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC held in March 1943, it was decided to officially change the supreme leader of the Central Committee of the CPC from the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPC to Chairman. Mao was elected Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. According to an unwritten rule, the Chairman had the final word on the resolutions made by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.300 This of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 330. 298. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 32 299. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1406. 300. On March 20, 1943, the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee

of the CPC approved the “Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC about the Adjustment and Simplification of the Central Institutions.” This move established a Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC composed of “three comrades, namely

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rule was never written into the records of the 7th National Congress of the CPC and the Party Constitution of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, but nevertheless was implemented continuously for a long period and replaced the official system of collective decision-making regarding major affairs.301 In February 1958, during the Nanning Meeting, Mao proposed changes to the rules governing the leadership of the CPC, saying: “Major power is centralized and minor power is decentralized; the party committee makes decisions that are implemented by all parties; everything should have a solution that conforms to principles; the party committee is responsible for work inspection.” He explained, “Regarding centralism, power can only be centralized in the CPC Committee, the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, and the Standing Committee. Only the core is to be allowed power.”302 Since Mao had positioned himself as the core of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and its Standing Committee, this was an attempt to achieve personal autocracy.303 Unlike collective decisions, the high levels of information asymmetry and Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi.” The meeting also elected Mao Zedong as the

Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and determined

that he would concurrently serve as Chairman of the Secretariat. The decision stated

that the “Chairman has the final word on all problems discussed in the meetings” of the Secretariat (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–1949), vol. 2, 430–431.)

301. Li Donglang believed the personality cult around Mao Zedong within the CPC was reflected in the concept of the “final word,” and its influence on Mao seriously

and negatively impacted intraparty democracy. The “final word” was not formally recognized by the 7th National Congress of the CPC, but still exerted a strong effect

on relations between Mao Zedong and other leaders. These effects were mutual, and

definitely facilitated paternalism and damaged the principle of democratic centralism of the CPC. (Li, “An Analysis of the Issue of the ‘Final Word’ Enjoyed by Mao Zedong.”) 302. Mao, “Talks at the Nanning Meeting.” 303. Qian Liqun explained, “‘Autocracy’ here means that Mao Zedong seized complete

power. First, the CPC had absolute leadership and control over all aspects of national affairs and social life. Second, the First Secretary had absolute leadership and control

over all affairs inside and outside the CPC. ‘Absolute leadership’ means centralization of absolute power, i.e., ‘only one core is allowed’. With regard to the ‘core,’ the state

takes the CPC as the core, embodied in the core roles of the First Secretaries of CPC

Committees at all levels, while the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC (i.e. Mao Zedong) was the core among the cores” (Qian, “The Anti-rightism System Characteristic to China.”)

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incompleteness in personal decisions make the correction of errors difficult. The failure of the CPC to either implement its existing systems or stop and correct the mistakes of its leader demonstrated a failure to establish mature politics, complete systems, and democratic decision-making mechanisms. While Mao bears much responsibility for the mistakes made during this period, the leaders sitting on the Central Committee of the CPC at the time should also be accorded some responsibility.304 Notably, earlier in the 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres, Liu Shaoqi had said: “Recent years have seen numerous unusual phenomena appear in the political work of the CPC. This is not because there is anything wrong with existing party structures and systems, but rather because they have sometimes been ignored, distorted or broken.” On behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC, Liu reaffirmed that the Party Constitution approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC represented the laws and regulations applicable to the whole party, and its working rules. He further requested that all organizations and party members follow the Party Constitution unconditionally, uncompromisingly and unyieldingly.305 In fact, once Mao, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, took the lead in breaking the provisions of the Party Constitution, the leadership group of the Central Committee of the CPC was unable to take corrective action. Confusingly, at the very start of the Cultural Revolution, Mao appeared to be pushing for democratic centralism. On February 6, 1966, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Circular Concerning Printing and Circulating Mao Zedong’s ‘Speech during the Enlarged Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC,’ which officially communicated the latest instructions of Mao: “Real democratic centralism can be realized only through serious, long-term, repeated education, experiment and promotion. Otherwise it will remain meaningless among most of our comrades.”306 But Mao never took this seriously. The large-scale personality cult made Mao a “sage,“ and the failure of intraparty democracy enabled him to 304. Resolutions approved by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the 11th National Congress

of the CPC in 1981 stated that during the period between 1956 and 1966, the Central

Committee of the CPC should also assume responsibility for work mistakes, even if Mao Zedong should assume the main responsibility. (Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 808.)

305. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 413

306. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 9.

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override the Central Committee of the CPC. Even though Liu and Deng disagreed with his opinions and behaviors, they were unable to influence him, with the formal institutions of democratic centralism incapacitated. Subsequently, their political disagreement with Mao grew until it evolved into public struggle and criticism in the Cultural Revolution. Mao led the design and construction of the institutions of the CPC and the new Chinese state, but all the political movements he launched in the Cultural Revolution attacked party and government officials as “capitalist roaders,” challenging and breaking institutions such as the systems regulating party meetings, the system of democratic centralism that elected and dismissed party leaders and the Central Committee of the CPC, collective decision-making regarding significant affairs, the National Congress of the CPC and the legislature, the system for electing and dismissing state leaders, the administrative and judicial systems, the military, and the structure protecting the rights of citizens. Mao advocated “destroying the old and establishing the new,” but in fact his actions were purely destructive. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping remarked on the leadership system of the CPC and the state during this period: “After the ‘anti-bold advance’ and ‘anti-rightist’ movements were launched in 1958, the democratic life of the party and the state became abnormal and phenomena appeared such as arbitrary decision making, individuals making decisions regarding significant matters, the emergence of a personality cult and individuals using their personal authority to override party organizational structures.”307 The “individual” refers to Mao, the only powerful individual among the collective leadership of the CPC, as well as Jiang Qing, a ‘semi-powerful individual’ at the time. These two individuals occupied a special position in the CPC, beyond the control of the law.308 As an important member of the collective leadership led by Mao, Deng engaged in deep reflection from the 307. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 330.

308. In 1971, Zhou Enlai told the American writer William Hinton, “Chairman Mao told Edgar Snow: ‘I am just like a “monk with an umbrella.”’ Zhou Enlai explained that this

was a pun. [It plays on the words wufa 無髮 (a monk literally has no hair) and wutian 無 天 (carrying an umbrella, one does not see the sky,) which is homophonic with a Chinese

phrase 無法無天 for having no regard for both law (of Men) and (law of) Heaven.] He explained that Mao was a rebel, like the Monkey King in Chinese mythology, and thus

not bound by established rules or practices, both human or divine. (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Zhou Enlai in His Own Words.) On December 24, 1980, during her trial, Jiang Qing echoed Mao's words: “That’s right, I am a monk holding an umbrella; I have no regard for law and Heaven.”

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failure of the collective leadership of the CPC in this period and the change of direction initiated by Mao. Indeed, Deng’s success was built on Mao’s failure, and this was why Deng rather than Mao abolished the lifelong tenure of the CPC and state leaders. By 1966, politically, Mao had completely set himself above the Central Committee of the CPC; theoretically, he had finished developing the theory of class struggle under socialist conditions; organizationally, he had secured the support of Lin Biao, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng and arranged for Jiang Qing to participate in the decision making of the Central Committee of the CPC; and in public opinion, he had secured the support necessary to insist on having the final word on all major decisions and other arbitrary rights. He had thus completed all preparations for the launch of the Cultural Revolution. By centralizing and monopolizing political resources,309 he pushed the Cultural Revolution to a climax in order to oppose and prevent revisionism in China.310

How China Missed Development Opportunities After the founding of New China, the CPC transformed from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Completing this significant change required the CPC to lead the completion of two basic constructions: economic construction, including large-scale industrialization and modernization; and institutional construction, including establishing the basic systems necessary for a modern country. These two forms of modernization and construction were mutually complementary, and were determined as the key focus for China during the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1956, but China subsequently suffered severe economic blows from 309. The 1981 Resolutions of the CPC Central Committee Concerning Several Historical Problems

of the Party since the Founding of New China stated: “During this period, Comrade Mao Zedong’s mistakes in the class struggle in socialist society worsened in both theory

and practice. Mao’s arbitrary work style slowly damaged the democratic centralism of the CPC and his personality cult worsened by the day. Unfortunately the Central

Committee of the CPC failed to correct these mistakes in time. Worst of all, schemers like Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and Kang Sheng used and extended these mistakes. As a result, the Great Cultural Revolution was launched.” (Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 808.)

310. On June 1, 1966, the People’s Daily released the famous editorial “Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons,” compiled under the direction of Chen Boda, which drove the Cultural Revolution toward its climax.

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Mao launching the Anti-rightist Struggle, Great Leap Forward, and People’s Commune Movement. Still, China’s economy rapidly recovered through economic adjustment and reconstruction, and became poised for growth from 1963 onwards. Early in the summer of 1963, Mao introduced the strategic objective of building China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century.311 On September 9, led by Deng Xiaoping, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC approved “Concerning Industrial Development (First Draft,)" which proposed a strategic plan for industrial development comprising “two steps.”312 At the end of 1964, during the First Meeting of the Third NPC, Zhou Enlai officially proposed the goal of “four modernizations” and the strategy of completing “two steps” by the end of the 20th century.313 This meant the Chinese 311. Mao Zedong proposed treating the three years from 1963 to 1965 as a transition phase. During this phase, China would continue to follow the national economic plan of

adjustment, consolidation, enrichment, and enhancement. After this period, a primary

independent national economic system or industrial system should be established

within 15 years, followed after another 15 years by a strong socialist country with modernized agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. (Pang and Jin ed, Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1358.)

312. Between August 13 and 14, 1963, the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC established a Drafting Commission for Industrial Development Matters that comprised Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, and various

other leaders. Subsequently the internal document About Industrial Development Matters was produced. This document announced the following goal: “Build our country into

a great socialist country through the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, and achieve this within a limited timeframe.”

The document also assumed: “Industrial development can be performed in two steps

after a three year transition period: the first step will be to build up an independent industrial system over 15 years to bring China’s industry to the level of that in advanced countries; the next step will be to bring China’s industry close to an advanced level internationally over another 15 years” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1359.)

313. In December 1964, the First Meeting of the Third NPC approved the Government Work

Report of Premier Zhou Enlai. This report announced that the task of adjusting the national economy was basically complete and the national economy was about to enter

a new development phase. Instructed by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai proposed to build China rapidly into a powerful country through “four modernizations” that would

allow it to swiftly close the gap with and surpass the advanced nations. The Third

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government once again began to implement the CPC line determined during the 8th National Congress of the CPC and took economic construction as the core and the “four modernizations” as the goal. This was not only the political consensus of the Central Committee of the CPC, but also supported by Chinese society generally. Such agreement would have provided favorable conditions for economic construction. Mario Monteforte Toledo, then a journalist for the Mexican weekly Siempre!, admired the three advantages of China: “an efficient government, a wise plan, and confident people.”314 These were unique political advantages, and China’s economy appeared ready to take off. On September 30, 1965, Zhou announced to the world: “China’s industrial and agricultural production have entered a new phase of steady growth, and the national economy has entered a new era.” At that time, the Chinese people were confidently anticipating the third Five-year Plan Period starting in 1966,315 which would have signaled a new stage in China’s economic development. However, the launch of the Cultural Revolution by Mao prevented this from happening.316 Mao was constantly changing, and whenever things settled and began to improve, he would launch a new struggle. First he launched an economic struggle, in the form of the Great Leap Forward, and subsequently launched a political struggle in the form of the Cultural Revolution.317 These two destructive events Five-year Plan should be completed in two steps: first, establish an independent and

relatively complete industrial system and national economic system; second, by the end of the century, realize comprehensive modernization in agriculture, industry, national

defense, and science and technology, and thus transform the Chinese economy into a world leader (People’s Daily, October 1, 1965.) Unfortunately this was not implemented due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 808.)

314. Toledo, “A View of China,” Reference News, July 20, 1964. 315. People’s Daily, October 1, 1965. 316. As a resolution by the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 pointed out, the 3rd National

People’s Congress from December 1964 to January 1965 announced that the task of adjusting the national economy was basically complete, and the national economy had entered a new development period of building China into a large socialist country with

modern agriculture, national defense, and science and technology. Unfortunately, this

was not implemented due to the launch of the Cultural Revolution. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 812.)

317. “Two struggles” was how Li Xiannian summarized this historical period in September

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were connected. The former was the root of the latter and the latter was the continuation of the former; without deep reflection on the lessons of the former, the latter became inevitable. The tasks of both economic and institutional construction were challenging and urgent. Domestically, China had the basic conditions of high domestic investment, expanded market demand, enhanced human capital, greatly improved infrastructure, rapid economic growth, a stable society, excellent potential of the CPC and the state in mass mobilization, and a population with a remarkable enthusiasm and talent for economic construction. China had the potential to take off economically and enter a new golden age. Internationally, there were also precious historic opportunities and favorable external conditions for China. The period from the 1950s to 1970s was deemed by international economists to be the second golden period of global economic development since 1820.318 During this period, China faced economic competition from its neighbors Japan and South Korea. From 1965 to 1975, both South Korea and Singapore entered the stage of economic takeoff and enjoyed double-digit economic growth rates of 11.6% and 11.2% respectively. Meanwhile, Japan maintained consistently high economic growth (with annual GDP growth of 8.0%,) and in 1967 its aggregate GDP exceeded that of Germany, making it the third largest economy in the world (trailing only the U.S. and the Soviet Union.) Comparing aggregate GDPs between China and Japan, Japan’s GDP was 1.17 times that of China in 1965, and this figure increased to 1.59 times by 1975.319 However, Chinese leaders at the time, especially Mao, seemed unaware of this situation and did not respond. Meanwhile, there was also competition from Taiwan under the governance of Chiang Kai-shek, and Hong Kong under British governance. This form of competition was both political and economic. Between 1965 and 1975, annual average GDP growth rate was just 2.2% in mainland China, compared with 6.8% in Taiwan. The relative gap in GDP per capita between Taiwan and mainland China was 2.9 times in 1965 and 4.5 times in 1975 (the year of Chiang's death,) while the absolute gap grew from USD1,350 to USD3,084 over the same period. Clearly, the Cultural Revolution caused China to lag behind its competitors. 1981 (Li, “Determining a Practical and Realistic Economic Growth Rate.”) 318. Angus Maddison divided the history of economic growth in the modern world from

1820 into five periods, where 1870 to 1913 was the first golden period for world prosperity. 1950 to 1973 was the second golden period and was focused on accelerated

technological advancement and economic development (Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy: 1820–1992; Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective.) 319. Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics.

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Table 2.2. Global Comparison of Per Capita GDP and Growth Rates (1965–1975) Country/Region

Rate of GDP

Mainland China Hong Kong Taiwan India Indonesia Japan Philippines Korea Thailand Malaysia Singapore

1965–1975 (%) 4.7 5.9 9.1 3.8 6.6 8.0 5.2 11.6 7.0 6.4 11.2

Growth,

GDP per capita (USD) 1965

1975

706 1,804 2,056 771 990 5,934 1,633 1,295 1,308 1,804 2,667

874 2,648 3,958 897 1,505 11,344 2,033 3,162 1,959 2,648 6,430

Rate of GDP per capita growth, 1965–1975 (%) 2.2 3.9 6.8 1.5 4.3 6.7 2.2 9.3 4.1 3.9 9.2

Source: Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Table 5b and Table 5c.

While Mao Zedong was preparing to launch the Cultural Revolution, his old rival Chiang Kai-shek was driving economic development and opening the Taiwan area up to investment and trade. Besides the political competition between the two, there was also economic competition - for example, driving and facilitating various modernizations. However, Mao ignored this new theatre of battle with his old rival, and instead focused his energies on manipulating the class struggle to purge those who had once been his comrades in arms and friends, costing China precious time and valuable opportunities for economic development. Mao’s manuscripts and other relevant literature during the Cultural Revolution show that he offered no instructions or comments regarding the rapid economic growth occurring in Taiwan and neighboring countries and perhaps was entirely blind to it.320 In the mid-1960s, China enjoyed great opportunities and geographical advantages which could have facilitated economic takeoff. Had there been united collective leadership, China would have joined Japan and the other four emerging countries in Asia in entering a period of rapid economic growth, and its economic development would not have been delayed until after the death of Mao in 1978. According to the arrangement of the Central Committee of the CPC, the main task of 1966, the first year of the Third Five-year Plan, was economic construction. 320. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12 (January 1966 – December 1968) and vol. 13 (January 1969 – July 1976.)

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On January 1, the People’s Daily published a New Year Editorial on “Welcoming the First Year of the Third Five-year Plan Period.” This editorial encouraged party members to “strive to construct a group of new enterprises, enhance national defense construction, intensify basic industry, strengthen the transportation industry and further change the national industrial layout while developing light industry and gradually improving the life of the people based on the development of production.”321 However, Mao quickly gave up the economic creed of implementing the four modernizations that he had just developed and instead insisted on “taking class struggle as the key link.” Despite opposition from other leaders, Mao launched a large-scale political revolution and organized a grand political movement to oppose revisionism, surprising other Chinese leaders.322 Economic globalization drew countries into fierce economic competition, and failure to advance meant regression. The gap between China and other countries and regions rapidly grew as China languished economically. However, Mao showed almost no awareness of or response to these issues, failing to grasp the strategic opportunity. The isolationism of Mao led to the isolationism of China, which in turn caused the nation to lag behind its neighbours. After 1957, Mao never visited other countries or attended international meetings. While he opened the door between China and the U.S. politically, China remained a closed state in domestic turmoil for another decade until 1978. By then, the politically rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping became aware that there existed a gap of about 20 years between China and developed capitalist countries in terms of industrial, scientific, and technological modernization. In all these areas, China remained at the level of the 1950s,323 and the gap between China and the rest of the world was steadily growing. Deng remarked that while the Cultural Revolution had postponed China’s development

321. People’s Daily, February 1, 1966. 322. MacFarquhar and Fei described the situation: “At that point, the country appeared to

have recovered from the disaster of the Great Leap Forward in 1965, and the regime

was ready to launch its postponed 3rd Five-Year Plan. Despite the earlier break with the Soviet Union, China once again looked like simply a variation of a Stalinist-type state. Virtually all Chinese, including most top leaders, and all foreign observers were unaware that Mao Zedong was about to launch a new campaign to transform that

image, a movement that in every respect except loss of life would be more damaging than any that had gone before.” (MacFarquhar and Fei, “Preface to Volume 15.”)

323. A speech made by Deng Xiaoping during a meeting with the Nigerian Press Delegation

on August 28, 1973. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1979.)

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by a decade, the economic gap with developed countries was two to five decades.324 Deng visited Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, and then the U.S. and Japan in January 1979. He became determined to reopen China to the world and integrate its economy into the global economy by prioritizing economic construction. From the perspective of state-building, the state systems (the centrally planned economic system and centralized policy system) of New China were established step-by-step through normal operations between 1949 and 1956. This period also saw the establishment of state capabilities to mobilize and configure various social resources, including the integration and deployment of social forces, and the establishment of equal political relations among all nationalities. Mao launched the “anti-rightist” struggle in 1957 to directly attack 550,000 social and intellectual elites through class struggle.325 However, the CPC and the state maintained effective control and leadership over society. The debate between Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai about economic policy during the Lushan Meeting in 1959 turned into a large-scale political movement within the CPC and PLA, involving the purge of over 3 million political and military elites.326 The Cultural 324. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 132.

325. In the attack on the “Rightist Alliance” of Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun, 550,000 people

were identified as rightists. (Muster Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists’ Wild Attacks,

released by the Central Committee of the CPC on June 18, 1957; Things Are Changing

released by the Central Policy Research Center on June 12, 1957; Instruction on Purging and Isolating Bourgeois Rightists issued by the Central Committee of the CPC on June

26, 1957; The Situation in the Summer of 1957 published by Mao Zedong in July 1957;

Standards for the Classification of Rightists issued during the Third Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.) A similar ideological movement to the “Work Style

Rectification Movement,” the anti-rightist struggle concluded with most ‘rightists’ being rehabilitated between 1959 and 1962.

326. This purge included Peng Dehuai (Marshal, Member of the Political Bureau of the

Central Committee of the CPC, Vice Premier of the State Council, Minister of National

Defense, and Vice Chairman of the Central Military,) Huang Kecheng (Senior General, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Vice Minister of

National Defense, and Chief of Staff of the General Staff Department of the PLA,) Zhang Wentian (Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and Vice

Minister of Foreign Affairs,) Zhou Xiaozhou, (First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC,) Tan Zheng (General, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central

Committee of the CPC, and Director of the General Political Department of the PLA,)

Hong Xuezhi (General, Director of the General Logistics Department of the PLA,) and

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Revolution damaged the basic institutional structure of the CPC and the state, but China still maintained strong state capacities and public service abilities. Whether measured in educational indicators or health indicators,327 China was better positioned after the Cultural Revolution than in 1949. However, such systems of the CPC and the state were imperfect, and contained various malpractices and serious defects. For instance, political centralization and monopolization were prevalent, as were ideological control, cultural monopolization, bureaucratism and privilege among officials. Various forms of corruption appeared among officials, and there was furious conflict between officials and the masses. Two factors were the main causes of these phenomena. The first factor was China’s long-standing tradition of feudal absolutism, which meant that society had neither experienced a complete phase of capitalist evolution, nor fully developed the institutional systems, concepts of value and cultural traditions necessary to capitalist democracy. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong, as the founder of New China, resembled Qin Shi Huang more than someone like George Washington. This was the major source of the contradiction and the major problem. Feudal absolutism would result if Mao acted unilaterally to oppose capitalism, and would also result if capitalism returned. The Cultural Revolution highlighted this contradiction of Mao’s approach to government. The second factor was the external influence from the high centralization of political and economic power in the Soviet Union. In Deng Hua (General, Vice Chief of Staff of The General Staff Department of the PLA and Commander of the Shenyang Military Region.) From mid-September to midOctober in 1959, 847 People’s Liberation Army officers were punished; by November

1959, about 1,848 officers had been labeled as “rightist opportunists,” including about

195 senior officers; between 1959 and 1960, 17,212 officers were labeled as “rightist

opportunists” or politically questionable (Zhen, Party vs State in Post 1949 China: The

Institutional Dilemma, 125.)

On August 9, 1959, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the “Anti-rightist

Instruction.” According to statistics on the identification and rehabilitation of rightists, as of 1962, over 3 million officials and party members had faced serious criticism or were identified as rightist opportunists.

327. Compared with figures before 1949, in 1964 (the Second National Census) literacy

rates in China increased from 20% to 61.9%, length of education per capita increased from 1.0 years to 2.4 years, and the population with a college education increased from 185,000 to 2.87 million. The average life expectancy of the Chinese population

increased from 35 years to nearly 50 years, while infant mortality decreased from 19% to 12% (Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision.)

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particular, while the personality cult and personal authoritarianism of Stalin had nothing to do with Marxism, they did reflect the politics, culture and tradition of the feudal absolutism with which the Chinese were familiar, and so were easily accepted and imitated by Mao. The combination of both factors resulted in the phenomenon of Mao himself coming to embody the “Marxist Qin Shi Huang.”328 In fact, the “Stalinist Qin Shi Huang” may be more appropriate because Marx never wielded power in government, much less ran a dictatorship. After the founding of New China in 1949, the party and state leaders had various different assessments of Chinese society and understandings of China’s political situation. Two basic paths existed to reconstruct Chinese society and the state system:329 the first was that taken by Mao Zedong, which included political revolution and class struggle. This path mobilized the masses through the “allround power takeover” movement, and used radical methods to crush and destroy existing machines and state systems so that new ones could be established;330 328. On August 19, 1958, Mao Zedong convened an Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in Beidaihe, and discussed the policy of mass

industrialization: “It is not feasible for us to simply focus on decentralism without autarchy. If we want to see fast results, the Wuhan Steel and Iron Base may work quickly. However, if we rely on a single production base, then it is impossible for all counties

and communes to show their enthusiasm. Control is necessary because democracy is not the only useful thing. Marxism and Qin Shi Huang should be combined.”

329. The resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 pointed out: “There are some dark sides within the organs of the party and the state. Of course, we

should make appropriate estimates and implement suitable measures to solve these

problems and comply with the State Constitution, laws, and the CPC Constitution.

However, the theories and methods used in the Cultural Revolution should not be used to solve problems within the party and state. The political revolution through which ‘one class overthrows another class’ under socialist conditions cannot have any

economic foundation or political basis, and cannot lead to any constructive creeds. On the contrary, it can only cause serious chaos, destruction and retrogression.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 811.)

330. On December 26, 1966, Mao Zedong made a speech to mark his 73rd birthday. The core of the speech was that the old machines (of the state) should be replaced by new

machines, the old ways by new ways, the old (social) order by a new order, the old systems (regulations) by new systems and the old discipline by new discipline. Mao

Zedong believed: “Our old stuff was similar to the stuff used by capitalism, feudalism and the Soviet Union.” (Wang, Reflections of Wang Li,, vol. 2, 698.)

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the “Cultural Revolution Committee” and “Revolution Committee” were also established without any legal basis or democratic elections.”331 These developments caused serious social turbulence, institutional destruction, human rights abuses and backsliding on democracy. Mao thus jeopardized the socialist society he founded, and damaged the CPC-led government he had established. However, he soon found he could only destroy the old society, and could not establish a new society as intended. This created a situation where there was no old society, and also no new society. The new society had to originate from, replace, and be built on the old society. This could be achieved only through economic reform rather than a political resolution. Deng then advocated the second path of “gradual reform” and “institutional construction.” This path enabled the improvement, enhancement, and reform of existing systems to be realized step-by-step through democracy and rule of law to further improve the systems of the state and establish an era of selfreform, self-opening and institutional self-improvement. Once Mao Zedong passed away, the Cultural Revolution ended, and China soon replaced class struggle with economic construction, and institutional destruction with institutional construction. This period marked the transition between two connected but distinct historical periods: the Cultural Revolution and the Reform and Opening-up. The former was a time of national chaos, and the latter one of good governance. In the larger historical context, the Cultural Revolution is an unfortunate but brief period in the historic course of China’s socialist modernization. We should reflect on this abnormal history. We must understand the details of how the Cultural Revolution happened, how it evolved and how it ended in failure.

331. Mao Zedong renamed the “Revolutionary Committee” the “Guizhou Revolutionary

Committee Following Mao Zedong Thought” (Mao, “Instruction to the Press about the Establishment of the Guizhou Revolutionary Committee.”)

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3

Chapter

The First Salvo of the Cultural Revolution

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

In April 1981, the Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC on Certain Questions in Our Party’s History since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China was approved at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC. It summarized the Cultural Revolution in three stages. The period from May 1966 to April 1969 comprised the first stage. This phase began with the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC in May 1966, followed in August by the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, and ended with the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.1 On August 14, 1967, an editorial published in the Red Flag and People’s Daily, reviewed and approved by Mao Zedong, proclaimed that the proletarian headquarters, headed by Chairman Mao, had attacked the “bourgeoisie roaders” at two meetings.2 Specifically, the editorial announced that Mao had purged four members of the Central Secretariat, namely Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun, at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, and had destroyed the “bourgeoisie headquarters” and purged two members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, namely Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, thus splitting the central collective leadership elected at the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

February Outline and February Minutes Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi had divergent views as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the political struggle at the Lushan Conference. Events clearly showed that Mao should assume primary responsibility for the Great Leap Forward. Nevertheless, he did not consider undertaking serious self-reflection and 1.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Documents since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 811–814.

2.

The article “Should We Choose to Follow the Socialist Line or the Capitalist Line”

was published by the editorial office of the Red Flag and People’s Daily. Chen Boda,

Leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and Jiang Qing, Deputy Leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, submitted this article to Mao Zedong on August 11, 1967, and Mao Zedong immediately gave feedback as follows: “This is a

good article. Nevertheless, it is unconvincing since it contains only condemnations and lacks arguments. Please reconsider its publication.” (Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 397.)

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self-criticism. Instead, he resented Peng Dehuai and suspected Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and other leaders of having ulterior political motives. Without collective discussion to involve the CPC Central Committee, he secretly instructed Jiang Qing to criticize the new Peking opera Hai Rui Dismissed as a prelude to the purge of Liu Shaoqi and other party leaders.3 During the Seventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC In April 1959, Mao had suggested that there was much to learn from the historical figure Hai Rui, a Ming dynasty official famous for being upright and daring in admonishing the emperor. Mao sent copies of the “Biography of Hai Rui” from the History of Ming to Peng Dehuai and Zhou Enlai, and instructed Hu Qiaomu to form a research group with historians to study the perspectives and methods to best promote the “Spirit of Hai Rui.” Hu passed Mao’s instructions to Wu Han, a recognized expert in Ming history, and it was decided that Wu would write a play on Hai Rui. Hai Rui Dismissed was completed in late 1960, and opened by the Beijing Peking Opera Company in February 1961. After viewing the play, Jiang Qing considered it problematic and banned further performances. Her initial attempts at having the play criticized was unsuccessful. According to Jiang, Mao acknowledged that the play was “toxic,” but was also aware that Peng Zhen was doing his utmost to protect his subordinate Wu Han.4 Only in early 1965, when Mao resolved to act against Liu Shaoqi, did he gave approval to Jiang to organize criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed. Mao would later reveal that he intentionally kept this decision secret from the Central Committee of the CPC.5 To do so, Jiang went to Shanghai in February 1962, where she sought the help of Ke Qingshi, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhu Yongjia to compose the criticism.6 Mao further implied that Jiang had to operate in Shanghai because it 3. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 16. 4.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of

5.

Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1397, 1399.

6.

Peng Zhen, 1182–1188.

On April 12, Jiang Qing delivered a speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central

Military Commission of the CPC, saying: “Comrade Ke Qingshi expressed support for

the criticism directed at the new historical play titled Hai Rui Dismissed and Comrades Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan took big risks and kept the preparation of this

criticism secret. Peng Zhen spared no effort to protect and defend Wu Han, and Chairman Mao concealed his dissatisfaction with Peng Zhen’s actions. Since Chairman

Mao allowed me to express reservations concerning the play, I organized the writing of the article, keep it secret from others for seven or eight months, and make numerous

modifications to the original during that period.” (Yan and Wang, Reflections on History,

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had been impossible to conduct the work in Beijing.7 On November 10, 1965, Yao Wenyuan published the article titled “Commentary on the New Historical Play Hai Rui Dismissed” in Shanghai's Wen Hui Daily to criticize the play’s writer Wu Han,8 who was then the deputy mayor of Beijing. In the article, Yao alleged: “The real significance of the play must be understood in the context of its production background in 1961, when China faced the after-effects of the Three Years of Natural Disasters, as well as a new wave of anti-China movement forged by imperialist, counter-revolutionist, and modern revisionist forces. ‘Monsters and demons’ advocated ‘allocation of farmland to individual households’ and ‘reversal of past verdicts,’ exaggerated the superiority of the system of land allocation to households, and sought the restoration of the individualistic economic system and the return of farmland to farmers; they ultimately wished to dismantle the people’s communes and restore the oppressive rule of landlords and rich peasants. Meanwhile, imperialists, landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and rightists who had fabricated numerous wrong and unjust cases against laborers in the old society clamored to reverse historical verdicts and relied on proxies to safeguard their interests, attack the proletariat, reverse historical verdicts, and return themselves to positions of power. The bourgeoisie revolted against the dictatorship of the proletariat by requesting the reversal of past verdicts and the return of farmland to farmers. In this environment, the ideological class struggle was expressed in various forms, including in the works of certain authors. The new historical play Hai Rui Dismissed was an example.”9 Thus, in criticizing this new 276–277.) 7. In May 1967, Mao Zedong introduced the political background to the Albanian Military Delegation as follows: “Since some of our departments and local authorities

were dominated by revisionism, I suggested that Jiang Qing organize the writing of an article to criticize Hai Rui Dismissed and had to instruct her to do this in Shanghai

since the “red city” of Beijing refused to obey my orders. After the article was finished,

I reviewed it three times and asked Jiang Qing to publish it. In addition, I suggested Jiang Qing circulate it to other leaders for review. Nevertheless, Jiang Qing feared

opposition from Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Lu Deingyi, and proposed keeping the article secret from Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng until publication. In the end I accepted Jiang Qing’s suggestion.” (Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1233.) 8.

The article was written by Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and modified nine times by

Yao Wenyuan before it was published in the Wen Hui Daily on November 10, 1965, and

then republished in the People’s Daily on November 30, 1965. 9.

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Yao, “Commentary on the New Historical Play Hai Rui Dismissed,” Wen Hui Daily,

The First Salvo of the Cultural Revolution

work, Yao was in fact criticizing the policies of land allocation and the contracting of production to the household level that had been shaped by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Deng Zihui in the 1960s, and was conducting a political struggle against them on behalf of Mao Zedong.10 After reading Yao's article, Peng Zhen was furious that public criticism had been conducted against the Deputy Mayor of Beijing, his subordinate, without approval from the Central Committee of the CPC; nonetheless, he adopted a cautious attitude. Peng was already aware of Mao’s intention to criticize Wu since September of the previous year, when Mao raised the question in the Extended Meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC.11 At the same time, various members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, specifically Liu, Zhou, and Deng, all disapproved of Yao Wenyuan’s article,12 and Peng Zhen forbade all Beijing newspapers from republishing it. This deepened Mao’s dissatisfaction with the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC and the central leadership. He also suspected that Peng was backing Wu behind the scenes, and had established an independent kingdom that he could not politically influence.13 A furious Mao, who was then in Shanghai, ordered the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee to publish an offprint of the article and distribute it nationwide. He then asked Zhou to pressure the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee and force Beijing newspapers to publish Yao’s article. November 10, 1965. 10. Hu Sheng believes that Yao Wenyuan’s article revealed that the Central Collective

Leadership held divergent political views on major policies, and that the target of the

article was not limited to Wu Han. (Hu ed., Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China, 456.)

11. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1188–1189.

12. Deng Xiaoping spoke to Peng Zhen: “Some people enjoy stepping over others for their own fame and I despise them. Please tell Professor Wu Han, ‘Don’t worry about this

matter. We should treat academic errors and political errors differently. Confusing them is dangerous and will stifle criticism and suggestions.’” Additionally, he comforted Wu

Han personally, saying: “Professor, try to be optimistic instead of pessimistic. I am 61 years old and have survived hard times since joining the revolution. Based on my

experiences I have learned the following: one, don’t be afraid of anything; two, try to be optimistic and look to the future. You can be confident that we will back you.” Deng

thus demonstrated his disapproval of the criticism Mao Zedong directed at Wu Han. (Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 5–6.) 13. Hu ed., Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China, 456–457.

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Directed by Zhou, Peng convened a meeting with the editors of all newspapers in Beijing to discuss the publication of Yao’s article. During the meeting, Deng Tuo, then Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, mentioned that Wu was afraid because he knew the criticism had been ordered from a “power.” Peng responded: “We should seek truth from facts, and everyone is equal before truth.” He ordered that the newspapers should publish the article on separate days to relief the political pressure. Zhou and Peng then personally modified and reviewed the People’s Daily editorial.14 Deng Tuo also published an article “From the New Historical Play Hai Rui Dismissed to the Theory of Inheriting Old Ethics” under the pen name “Xiang Yang Sheng” in the Beijing Daily on December 12. Jiang Qing and her clique then understood that the criticism of Wu Han was being steered towards academic discussion in order to protect Wu. On December 21, Mao spoke with Chen Boda, commenting that while Yao’s article was well-written, it did not hit the vital point, which was the “dismissal” aspect of the play. Mao drew a historical parallel between the Ming emperor’s dismissal of Hai Rui and his 1959 dismissal of Peng Dehuai. He thus intepreted Hai Rui as an allegory of Peng.15 Interestingly, Mao had read an article in the Guangming Daily prior, where Wu had defended himself against Yao’s attack: “Yao Wenyuan alleges that Hai Rui Dismissed was produced against the backdrop of the land allocation trend and verdict reversal trend in 1961. This is false. Hai Rui Dismissed was written in 1960. I am not so capable as to have clairvoyance to have 14. The editor of the People’s Daily commented: “Yao Wenyuan has published an article in the Wen Hui Daily to criticize the historical character Hai Rui and the new historical play

Hai Rui Dismissed, and these comments on Hai Rui and the play reflect our attitudes towards historical characters and plays, our study of history, and our artistic creativity in the portrayal of historical characters and events. Party members hold different

political views on this issue, and in the absence of systematic debate have failed to reach a consensus and resolve these issues.

“The People’s Daily has also published Wu Han’s Hai Rui Criticizing the Emperor under the pen name Liu Mianzhi on June 16, 1959, followed by Comments on Hai Rui on September 21, 1959, and other commentary articles on historical characters. We will

debate Hai Rui Dismissed and related issues, and readers who have interests in the fields of history, philosophy, literature and arts are welcome to participate in our debate.



“We hope everybody can remain open to mutual criticism and mutual debate, and

can stick to the guidelines of allowing others freedom to make and respond to criticism,

as well as convincing people with rational arguments.” (The People’s Daily, November

30, 1965.)

15. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1401.

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foreseen what would happen in 1961. Such farfetched criticism and unreasonable labelling breeds an unhealthy culture. Who would still dare to write? Who would still dare to work on history?” Mao had commented in response, “I could not sleep after reading it.”16 The next day, Peng Zhen and Kang Sheng met with Mao in Hangzhou. Mao repeated his judgment that the crux of Hai Rui Dismissed is the “dismissal,” and that Peng Dehuai was another Hai Rui. Peng Zhen responded that investigations conducted showed no organizational link between Wu Han and Peng Dehuai.17 In a sense, this affair reveals that the root of Cultural Revolution lay in the Lushan Conference of 1959. Subsequent history proved that Mao made a fatal economic mistake in launching the Great Leap Forward. Peng Dehuai had presented suggestions on how to prevent the Great Leap Forward from escalating into a great famine, but Mao ignored his advice and compounded the error by dismissing him from office.18 Mao not only refused to reflect, but further exploited this to settle old scores, thus moving from a fatal economic error to a fatal political error. Yao’s article lighted the fuse for Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution, using the criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed to directly attack Peng Zhen and the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee.19 On December 27, the Bejing Daily published Wu Han’s self-criticism on Hai Rui Dismissed. Wu confessed that he had forgotten about class struggle, and had taken a formalist approach in presenting a one-sided, plain, and subjective narrative of Hai Rui and the peasant masses; this, he said, was a serious error concerning thought and class. Yao commented that Wu would have been better off not writing this piece, since it was bound to provoke anger, and Wu was sure to fall.20 Yao’s words indicate that his political backing was not just Jiang Qing but also Mao himself. Indeed, the attempts by Peng and Wu to steer the criticism of the play in the direction of academic discussion rather than political criticism only further angered 16. Ibid, 1398–1399. 17. Ibid, 1401. 18. See Hu, “From the ‘Great Leap Forward’ to ‘Economic Reconstruction’” for detailed analysis.

19. Pang concluded that Mao Zedong ordered the publication of the article to break the silence that then existed, which he found dissatisfactory, and provide a prelude to the

Cultural Revolution. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1397.)

20. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1195–1196.

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Mao.21 On February 3, 1967, Mao announced to foreign guests that a struggle was in progress in relation to Yao’s article and denounced the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC for its refusal to obey his orders.22 Mao saw the publication of Yao’s article as a first salvo, targetting his struggle not just at Peng Zhen, but also Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. In fact, Zhou Enlai was also opposed to the article’s publication because he was a long acquaintance of Wu Han, and he also attempted to steer the criticism of Wu such that it was academic rather than political.23 At the insistence of Peng, Mao had reluctantly agreed to postpone making a political verdict of the Wu Han question for two months. On February 3, Peng convened the enlarged meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group.24 Xu Liqun (then Executive Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC,) Yao Qin (then Vice Director of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC,) Wang Li (then Deputy Editor in Chief of Red Flag Magazine,) Hu Sheng, Fan Ruoyu, Liu Ren (then Second Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee,) Zheng Tianxiang (then Secretary of the Secretariat of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC,) and four other leaders joined the meeting to discuss issues arising from academic criticism. During the meeting, Peng Zhen advocated not mentioning the Lushan Conference, noting that 21. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1234–1235. 22. Mao Zedong remarked, “After the article was published, when I was in Shanghai, all the provincial newspapers republished it, and only those in Beijing refused. Subsequently,

I ordered the production of pamphlets but the Beijing presses refused. The Beijing

Municipal Committee of the CPC had established an independent kingdom.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1397, 1399.) 23. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1655. 24. Following a motion by Mao Zedong, the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group was set up in July 1964, which comprised Peng Zhen (member of the Central Politburo of the CPC and Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee,)

Lu Dingyi (alternate member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Minister of the Publicity

Department of the Central Committee of the CPC,) Kang Sheng (alternate member of the Central Politburo of the CPC and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central

Committee of the CPC,) Zhou Yang (Deputy Minister of the Publicity Department of

the Central Committee of the CPC,) and Wu Lengxi (President of Xinhua News Agency

and editor in chief of the People’s Daily,) with Peng Zhen appointed as Chairman, and leader in charge of implementing the directives on literature, arts, philosophy and social sciences of the Central Committee of the CPC. (Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1236.)

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the findings of the investigation on the political controversy surrounding Wu Han proved he was not an ally of Peng Dehuai. Peng Zhen commented that even highly respected academics such as Guo Moruo was now unnerved; Guo had handed in his resignation as President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences after hearing that “someone” was about to criticize his past poetry on the historical figures Wu Zetian, Cai Wenji, and Hai Rui. Peng said that the leadership had to adhere to the direction Mao proposed in the 1957 National Conference on Propaganda Work, to “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,” using facts and reason to convince people. He also suggested that the “Leftists” had to rectify their culture and avoid forming a clique.25 In contrast, Kang Sheng advocated highlighting the political controversies surrounding Wu and continuing the struggle against him.26 This disagreement sparked a serious political dispute. Although Kang was extremely isolated and Peng came out on top of the dispute, he would later find another opportunity to defeat Peng. Peng proposed a motion that Yu Liqun and Yao Qin undertake the editorial work for the Report Outline of the Current Academic Discussion (the February Outline,)27 which he later personally modified and finalized. It proposed an adherence to the principles of seeking truth from facts and justice from truth, and to convince others with reason instead of forming cliques and using power to suppress dissent.28 25. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1201–1202.

26. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1236–1237. 27. Wang, Wang Li’s Reflection on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 580. 28. “The Outline calls for applying the guidelines proposed by Mao Zedong at the National Publicity Work Conference. That is, the Party should allow members to air different

political views, including opposing Marxism-Leninism, to struggle and perform

analysis and criticism, and to refute reactionary and incorrect ideology with rational arguments. Complex academic debate requirs adherence to the principles of seeking truth from facts, and all being equal in the face of truth. To address academic issues requires convincing others with rational arguments instead of suppressing them like a

scholar tyrant, advocating upholding the truth, timely rectification of errors, correcting

incorrect guidelines, devising correct guidelines, studying Mao Zedong Thought, carrying out academic research to obtain sufficient data, conducting scientific analysis, and promoting academic causes. Additionally, those who have committed errors and

come to hold reactionary academic views should be given a chance to rectify their

errors. We should treat them seriously but leniently instead of making compromises, and should be cautious in openly criticizing some comrades in newspapers. Please

note that criticism directed at specific individuals is subject to approval by the relevant

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Earlier in September 1965, Peng had set out the guidelines for differentiating political issues from academic and artistic issues, and pointed out that all men should seek truth from facts and remedy errors, and that everyone was equal in the face of the truth.29 Ten years later, he regularly explained that it was Mao who first proposed that practice is the sole criterion for testing truth, and that everyone was equal in the face of truth, having proposed these ideas in his Theory of New Democracy.”30 At this point, though, Mao was no longer aware that he authored this principle. Peng presided over the compilation of the February Outline, and this report was then presented to members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC to help discuss and settle the political dispute under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee, in the spirit of “letting a hundred schools of thought to compete.”31 On February 5, Liu Shaoqi organized a discussion for members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC on the February Outline. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu Lengxi, Wang Li, and Yao Qin attended the meeting to hear the presentation by the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group headed by Peng.32 During the meeting, participants approved Peng’s proposal, particularly with regards to the Wu Han question, and passed the February Outline, reflecting a collective decision by the majority of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. Meanwhile, the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC requested that the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group report to Mao in Wuhan for a final decision on the February Outline;33 Mao’s absence in this and other meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee at the time reflects his inability to communicate and reach mutual understandings with other leaders, nor make collective political decisions. On February 8, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, and Xu Liqun went to Wuhan to report on the February Outline to Mao Zedong, who offered neither opposition nor approval, and instead turned the topic of conversation to Wu Han. He simply asked whether authorities, and actors or actresses who performed in the historical play Hai Rui Dismissed will be dealt with by the relevant authorities instead of being required to

make self-criticisms in the newspaper.” (The February Outline Presented by the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group to the CPC Central Committee, February 7, 1966.) 29. Peng, “Several Issues on Academic Discussion.” 30. Meng, “Peng Zhen, a Pursuer of the Truth.” 31. Wu, Remembering Chairman Mao, 150. 32. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1656. 33. Wu, Remembering Chairman Mao, 150.

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Wu Han had revolted against the Communist Party of China and socialism, while alleging that “Wu Han would be relieved if he could retain his position of Deputy Mayor of Beijing.” Mao then asked whether Hai Rui Dismissed was linked to verdict reversal of the dismissal of Peng Dehuai. Peng Zhen replied that an investigation had found Wu Han was not an ally of Peng Dehuai, to which Mao responded that it was Kang Sheng who first pointed out to him that the crux of Wu Han’s play was in the “dismissal.”34 Peng also spoke of correcting the prevalent culture in the “Leftist” camp; Mao responded that such problems should be resolved at a future time, since ideological struggle with capitalists is a long-term class struggle that cannot be resolved with a hurried political verdict.35 Based on this rather ambiguous meeting, Peng and other leaders mistakenly concluded that Mao approved of the February Outline.36 Even though Xu Liqun and Hu Sheng witnessed Mao personally agreeing to the Outline,37 Mao would later “self-deny” and denounce Peng for his actions.38 After returning to Beijing, Peng asked Xu Liqun to draft an instruction on behalf of the CPC Central Committee. On February 12, Deng Xiaoping approved the issuance of the Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC Forwarding the Report Outline of Current Academic Discussion of the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group,39 which was cosigned by Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Li Fuchun. The notice was issued on the same day. This deepened Mao’s dissatisfaction with Peng and other central leaders in office such as Liu.40 In line with the February Outline, the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC denied the publication of an article co-authored by Guan Feng and Qi Benyu to criticize Hai Rui Dismissed.41 They did not realize that the article was a directive from Mao himself. On April 2 and 5, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and Guangming Daily published the article and claimed that Wu Han wrote Hai Rui Dismissed with the ulterior motive of celebrating Peng Denghuai and 34. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 47.

35. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1204–1205.

36. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1402. 37. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1205.

38. Wang, Wang Li’s Reflection on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 589 39. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1237. 40. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1403. 41. Hu, Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China, 457.

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his grievance, and ultimately returning him to power. This shows clearly Mao’s political intentions behind his organization of criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed. From March 17 to 20, Mao convened the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, attended by himself, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, with Zhu De, Chen Yun, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping absent.42 During this meeting, Mao vetoed the decision of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC to send a party delegation to attend the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.43 Mao then criticized the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC for not supporting the “Leftist” faction and suppressing the publication Guan and Qi’s article criticizing Hai Rui Dismissed. He warned the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC against emulating the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee of the 42. From March 17 to 20, 1966, Mao Zedong held an Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in Hangzhou attended by just three members of the Standing Committee, namely himself, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai, with the other

four committee members absent. The absent members included Deng Xiaoping, who

had asked for leave to conduct investigation on the third front in Northwest China. The First Secretaries of the central bureaus of each region and the relevant leaders of

the Central Committee of the CPC were present at the meeting. (Pang and Jin eds.,

Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1404.) Regarding the other absent members of the committee, Chen Yun and Lin Biao had not attended the Standing Committee Meeting or the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC for a long time, while Zhu De attended irregularly.

43. In March 1966, the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC met to discuss whether they should attend the 23rd National Congress of Communist Party

of the Soviet Union. The Standing Committee had requested Mao Zedong’s opinion in advance, and rather than expressing a view he simply said that the committee

members could discuss the matter in his absence and then report to him. Liu Shaoqi chaired the Standing Committee Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, in which

Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, and Liu Ningyi were

participants, while Wu Lengxi, Yao Qin, and Wang Li were non-participating attendees.

The meeting unanimously agreed to send a CPC delegation to the National Congress and telegraphed Mao Zedong accordingly. However, Mao Zedong responded by

prohibiting such a delegation. (Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 581–582.) At the Enlarged Standing Committee Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Mao Zedong proposed that the Party should not attend the 23rd National

Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1404.)

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CPC.44 Mao fully exploited this meeting to exert his political will and dominance. He even openly accused Peng Zhen of forming an “independent kingdom,” which Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping denied.45 Mao then denounced the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, the Front magazine, Wu Han, Liao Mosha, and Deng Tuo as anti-party and anti-socialist counter-revolutionaries, and that Wu Han and Jian Bozan were anti-communist, underground Kuomintang members.46 Mao proposed initiating a Cultural Revolution in the fields of literature, history, philosophy, law, and economics.47 He believed that the bourgeois and petty bourgeois (intellectuals) dominated Chinese academic and educational circles, and that they had collaborated with landlords and rich peasants to dictate education in universities, middle schools and primary schools. He judged this to be a serious class struggle that was necessary to prevent these parties from establishing revisionism in future. In fact, Mao’s beliefs were unsubstantiated, and he was arbitrarily fabricating unjust political cases. Mao’s erroneous appraisal of the domestic class struggle situation led to his erroneous decision regarding the overall work direction.48 Under Mao’s personal directive, publications directly controlled by the Central Committee successively published articles to criticize Wu Han and Jian Bozan.49 44. In 1962, Mao Zedong disbanded the Central Rural Work Department headed by Deng Zihui for having implemented policies of “reserving land for individual use, permitting

free markets, encouraging individual responsibility for profits and losses, and fixing

farm output quotas at the household level.” In taking this action, Mao Zedong implied that the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee should not be

dissolved for making “errors” like those of the Rural Work Department. (Bo, Review of Several Important Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1240.)

45. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1658. 46. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 72; Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1404–1405.

47. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 25, 1966.

48. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1045. 49. Guan and Wu, “Comments on Wu Han’s Moral Theory”; Qi et al., “Jian Bozan’s Historical Views Should be Criticized,” People’s Daily, March 25, 1966; Qi, “The Reactionist Nature of Hai Rui Condemns the Emperor and Hai Rui Dismissed,” People’s

Daily, April 2, 1966; Guan and Lin, “Two Poisons to the CPC and Socialism — Hai Rui

Condemns the Emperor and Hai Rui Dismissed,” People’s Daily, April 5, 1966; People’s Daily

editorial: “What was the Intention of Wu Han in Writing Hai Rui Dismissed?,” People’s Daily, April 8, 1966.

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Guan Feng and Qi Benyu served as the vanguard of political criticism, gaining the favor of Mao and were swiftly promoted to leading positions in the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Ironically, even the ruthless Chiang Kai-shek had not dared to harm Wu and Jian during the Nationalist regime, and these two eminent scholars were persecuted to death during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution.50 Subsequent events would prove, as pointed out later in the 1981 resolutions, that the Cultural Revolution was staged precisely to persecute and purge intellectuals as reactionary academics, with Wu and Jian being the first victims.51 On March 28, Kang Sheng met with Mao Zedong in Shanghai to report on the meeting with the Japanese Communist Party. Kang seized the opportunity to act against Peng Zhen. He relayed to Mao an incident that had taken earlier in March, when Zhang Chunqiao had dispatched Yang Yongzhi, Minister of the Publicity Department of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC, to Beijing to gather information. Through Xu Liqun, Peng had supplied a number of curt answers to Yang’s questions. Yang asked if the “clique” in the February Outline had any target in particular. Peng replied that there were no specific targets; whoever was “Ah Q” [a fictional character in the eponymous novel of the writer Lu Xun] was the target. Yang then asked if important articles of criticisms should be sent to the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC for approval. Peng lashed out at the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC for the Shanghai Wenhui Daily's publication of Yao’s article without notifying either the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC or the Cultural Revolution Five-man Group. Yang immediately reported back to Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing.52 Kang remarked, “He’s hit the Chairman’s head now.” Hearing about the incident, Mao raged: “The Tenth Plenary of the Eighth Central Committee passed the resolution on class struggle, yet the Publicity Department makes no notification in allowing the publication of Wu Han’s numerous reactionary articles, while demanding notification for the publication of Yao’s criticism? Does the resolution of the Central Committee not matter?”53 On March 28 and 29, Mao told Kang, “The February Outline erroneously took 50. Wu Han died tragically in Qincheng Prison on October 11, 1969; Jian Bozan and his wife committed suicide at Peking University on the night of December 18, 1968.

51. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, vol. 2, 810.

52. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1212.

53. Ibid, 1215.

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the wrong political line, and failed to distinguish right from wrong. I did not point this out earlier because the February Outline had already been discussed by members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC.”54 On the one hand, Mao had to consider the opinions of the majority of members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, while on the other hand, on major issues he arbitrarily wielded sole power via his right of veto. Why was Mao so unhappy with the February Outline? One important reason was that he considered Peng Zhen to be using it to mount a political challenge against him. This shows how Mao bore grudges against his comrades. At the Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres in 1962, Peng boldly pointed out: “The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Chairman Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC should assume responsibility for the Great Leap Forward. It is impossible for Chairman Mao never to commit errors that affect his prestige. There is currently a tendency within the Party that members dare not air opinions and undertake self-criticism for fear of removal from office, and Chairman Mao’s refusal to undertake self-criticism for his occasional errors (which represent no more than 1–10% of his decisions) will adversely influence the Communist Party of China.”55 In September 1965, Peng delivered a speech at the Meeting for the Directors of the Provincial Department of Culture, convened by the Ministry of Culture, at which he stressed that “Everyone, no matter who, is equal before the truth.” Peng was the only party leader who dared criticize Mao, and did so only to safeguard the interests of the Party and Mao himself. Nevertheless, Mao always bore grudges against dissidents, refused to accept objections, and viewed the slogan “everyone is equal before the truth” as a challenge to his personal authority. Hence, he denounced Peng as a “political clique leader” who failed to read books and newspapers, be in contact with the populace, and acquire practical knowledge, and denounced Peng’s constructive criticism as repeatedly assaulting Mao.56 Years later, Mao would also denounce Lin Biao as a “military clique leader” for failing to consult him before issuing the No.1 Central Document.57 In fact, Mao was the 54. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1238. 55. Tong, Four Decades of Rise and Fall, vol. 2, 393. 56. “Notification of the Central Committee of the CPC,” May 16, 1966, People’s Daily, May 17, 1967.

57. Mao Zedong denounced Lin Biao as an ignorant clique leader and warlord who did

not read books or papers. Jiang Qing delivered a speech and relayed Mao Zedong’s remarks on Lin Biao. (“The Speeches of Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi and

Yao Wenyuan at the Meeting for Central Government and State Organs to Mobilize the

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greatest “clique leader,” with the power to take down other “clique leaders,” and overturn the collective decisions of the members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, thus creating a modern version of feudal autocracy. Peng Zhen’s predictions in 1962 regarding Mao turned out to be unfortunately true, creating a hugely negative impact on the Party. Mao dictated the power of rhetoric, calling himself “struggling against this revisionist line” instead of reflecting on his past errors.58 When he first received reports on the February Outline in early February, Mao did not reject it openly. Instead, he bypassed the Central Committee of the CPC, asking Jiang to organize the creation of the February Minutes as a counter to Peng. Later in March 1967, Chen Boda would explain that Mao wanted to initiate a conflict between himself, representing the proletariat, and Liu and Peng, representing the bourgeoisie.59 In October 1968, Lin Biao spoke at the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, and said: “Comrade Jiang Qing wrote the February Minutes to oppose the February Outline advocated by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.”60 More recent scholarship has also speculated on the motives of Mao.61 The fact is, even though Mao served as the leader of the Central Committee Masses to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.) 58. The Notice on May 16 claimed that the February Outline opposed socialist revolution and the cultural and revolutionary line of the Central Committee of the CPC headed

by Mao Zedong, resisted proletarian leftists, plotted with bourgeois rightists, and

paved the way for the restoration of capitalism. Thus, the February Outline reflected

bourgeois ideology within the Party and advocated revisionism. The notice stressed

the importance of the struggle against revisionism, which endangered the Party and country, as well as the global revolution.

59. In March 1967, Chen Boda said, “Peng Zhen prepared a Report Outline last February in

a bourgeois attempt to overthrow the proletariat in the cultural and ideological fields.

During the same period Comrade Lin Biao authorized Comrade Jiang Qing to prepare

another document to defend the proletariat. Human will cannot influence the course of

class struggle. The two documents thus are contradictory: one supports the bourgeoisie and the other supports the proletariat.” (Chen, “Speech at the meeting for Offices at the Army Corps and Higher Levels.”)

60. Lin Biao, “Speech at the Second Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.”

61. Yan Changgui believed that Mao Zedong initially considered the launch of the criticism

against “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office” would easily attract support, but instead the movement was strongly rejected. This frustration was a big blow to Mao Zedong, who was typically prudent when starting in a new direction and so was unprepared for this

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of the CPC, he had became isolated from what he believed to be numerous “private kingdoms” within the Party’s frontline and backline.62 Mao thus went to Lin, Kang, and Chen for support, promoting Jiang as the new center of Chinese politics, and using the breach in the cultural sector to launch an attack on Liu, Deng, and Peng, the mainstream figures wielding real political power.63 Earlier on January 20, Jiang had traveled from Shanghai to Suzhou to visit Lin and proposed holding the Forum on Military Literary and Artistic Work, to which military officers would be invited. Lin supported the proposal. The next day, Lin announced to various military officers that “Comrade Jiang Qing not only excelled in the arts but brought a positive political stance to literary and artistic work,” and further instructed them to heed and act on her valuable advice.64 Before the forum on February 2, Ye Qun, Lin’s wife and director of his office, repeated Lin’s instruction to Liu Zhijian (Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department,) Xie Tangzhong (Minister of Culture,) Chen Yading (Deputy Minister of Culture,) and Li Mancun (from the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.) Liu Zhijian relayed Lin’s directive to Jiang in Shanghai. This marked the first collaboration between Lin and Jiang.65 It was also a political trade between Lin and Mao, with Lin looking for Mao’s support amidst the ongoing purge of Luo Ruiqing, and Mao’s request for Lin’s support was naturally answered with enthusiasm. From February 2 to February 20, Lin approved Jiang to preside over the Forum on Military Literary and Artistic Work and the publication of the February Minutes. Subsequently, Mao formally denounced the incorrect line being followed in literary and artistic circles and called for “a socialist revolution to root out the wrong line,” as well as calling for party members to be alert to and struggle against future wrong lines. Additionally, he stressed: “the struggle will be complex, fierce, type of difficulty. Mao thus came up with a new idea and instructed Jiang Qing to seek help from the capable Lin Biao. (Yan and Wang, Reflections on History, 278–279.)

62. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 143

63. Consistent with the beliefs of certain scholars, including Hu Sheng, the political criticism was directed at some officials in positions of cultural authority and some

leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC. (Hu ed., Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China.)

64. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 74. 65. Xi Xuan and Jin Chongming believed that the preparation of this “Summary” marked the start of the counter-revolutionary collusion of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to take advantage of the Cultural Revolution. (Ibid.)

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and long-lasting, and might take dozens or even hundreds of years to conclude.”66 On February 22, Liu Zhijian reported to Lin on the February Minutes. Lin praised the document and ordered it to be relayed more widely and used to carry forward the concluded forum’s spirit of following the right line. On February 28, Chen Boda and Zhang Chunqiao jointly modified the document according to Mao’s advice, and Mao later personally made further modifications. On March 19, Mao reviewed the February Minutes and modified the title so that rather than stating the forum was convened by Jiang acting independently, it instead stated that Lin had entrusted Jiang to do so.67 Jiang asked Chen Yading to write to Lin to inform him of Mao’s instruction and proposed circulating the February Minutes to leaders of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Committee of the CPC for suggestions and modifications. In fact, strictly speaking, Lin could not entrust Jiang Qing with tasks because Jiang was not his subordinate. After Mao modified the February Minutes, it was he rather than Lin who entrusted Jiang with the task of convening the forum. Mao also officially approved Lin’s involvement in non-military affairs, and encouraged him to become involved in the literary and artistic matters that formed an important front in the Cultural Revolution. Lin took the hint from Mao and organized a political response by completing the formalities associated with the February Minutes following Jiang’s advice. The February Minutes relayed Mao’s directive: “We acted late to root out wrong lines and we draw painful lessons from this. After passing the resolution in support of nationwide class struggle, we should have conducted such struggle to foster 66. In March 1966, Jiang Qing submitted the Summary of the Army Literary and Artistic Work

Seminar Organized by Comrade Jiang Qing Entrusted by Comrade Lin Biao to Mao Zedong, who later made three related instructions and modifications. The Summary claimed that: “Since the founding of New China, the literary and artistic field has been dominated by

an anti-CPC, anti-socialist ‘black line’ that runs opposite to Mao Zedong Thought. This ‘black line’ combines bourgeois literary and artistic thought, contemporary revisionist literary and artistic thought, and so-called ‘1930s’ literary and artistic thought.”



On May 3, 1979, on the request of the General Political Department of the Central

Military Commission, the Central Committee of the CPC approved the cancellation of

this summary, and identified and rehabilitated the persons and artistic works that had been wrongly treated. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 23–28.)

67. The original title was Summary of the Army Literary and Artistic Work Seminar Organized by Comrade Jiang Qing, and Mao Zedong modified it during his review. (Ibid.)

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proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideology.”68 This directive suggested that Mao firmly believed a wrong line existed within the Party, and nationwide class struggle was necessary. When party members and members of the Central Committee of the CPC opposed his thoughts, Mao resorted to the army and Jiang to carry on the struggle within the Party, and took advantage of students and the Red Guards to carry out the Cultural Revolution. On March 22, Lin wrote to He Long and other leaders who presided over the day-to-day work of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and praised the February Minutes for having used Mao Zedong Thought to address important issues related to the Cultural Revolution, and for being of great practical and historical significance. Lin noted that a fierce class struggle has been ongoing between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in literary and artistic circles since 1949, and pointed out that if the proletariat did not occupy this battleground, it was sure to be taken by the bourgeoisie. Should the ideological battles be lost, revisionism would prevail. To that end, Lin stressed that the Chinese people must uphold Mao Zedong Thought and resolutely carry out the Cultural Revolution. On March 30, the Central Military Commission of the CPC approved the February Minutes and submitted it to the Central Committee of the CPC as directed by Mao Zedong. On April 10, the Central Committee of the CPC officially issued the February Minutes as a clear counter to the February Outline, signalling Mao’s intent to escalate the movement.69 On April 18, the PLA Daily published the editorial “Uphold Mao Zedong Thought and Carry out the Socialist Cultural Revolution” and officially proposed the concept of the Socialist Cultural Revolution in accordance with the notification from the Central Committee of the CPC.70 Additionally, the paper released the main contents of the February Minutes and stressed the leading role of the army in the Socialist Cultural Revolution. The following day, the People’s Daily republished the full editorial. When plotting the Cultural Revolution, Mao obtained political support from Lin through the collaboration with Jiang to organize the February Minutes. This political support was demonstrated when Lin ordered the publication of an 68. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 25.

69. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1239. 70. Before this, on April 14, the Xinhua News Agency officially broadcast the report by Shi Ximin, Vice Minister of Culture on the Standing Committee of the CPC, titled “Holding

the Great Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thought High and Carrying out the Socialist Great Cultural Revolution to the End.”

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editorial in the PLA Daily that supported the Cultural Revolution. The following year, Jiang noted at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC on April 12 that the political background and significance of the February Minutes lay in winning the support from Lin.71 Later that year on August 9, Lin remarked that the success of the Cultural Revolution depended on Mao Zedong Thought, the prestige of Chairman Mao, and the PLA.72 Lin obviously understood Mao’s political intentions, and thus actively engaged in the political struggle within the Party and took the initiative to support Mao in staging the Cultural Revolution. Having forged a political alliance between the writers who supported him and the armed forces, Mao felt secure enough to launch the Cultural Revolution. It can be seen that in every intraparty conflict, Mao would first notify military leaders and obtain their support, and once the military joins the conflict, Mao would emerge victorious over his opponents. This of course contravenes the principle that the party should command the army, substituting the party’s position for the individual leader, and turning the army into a tool for political conflict. 73 Mao’s 71. On April 12, 1967, during the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission,

Jiang Qing said, “The army has done a good job during this Great Cultural Revolution.

From the very beginning, represented by Comrade Lin Biao, the army has been

positively involved in the intra-party political struggle, and has supported a leftist position.” She also introduced the political background of the February Minutes, saying:

“Last February (1966,) Lin Biao entrusted me to hold an army literary and artistic

seminar. In the summary of this seminar, I asked your ‘god’, namely the ‘god’ of proletariat dictatorship, to attack those representatives of the bourgeoisie hidden in the CPC and cause them to throw in the towel. Why did this work? Because we have the support of the army and they fear the people’s army.” (“Make a New Contribution to

the People — Jiang Qing’s Speech at the Enlarged Military Committee,” April 12, 1967.)



On April 15, Jiang Qing submitted the draft speech to Mao Zedong, who made four

modifications and instructions. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 310–313.)

72. “Records of Lin Biao’s Speech during Interviews with Ze Siyu and Liu Feng,” August 9, 1967. Mao Zedong modified the draft speech many times. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 414–416.)

73. Jin Chunming believes that Mao Zedong’s reputation in China and among the PLA allowed him to make the PLA a personal political tool that he used to launch the Cultural

Revolution. The PLA thus came to unquestioningly obey the personal commands of Mao Zedong. (Jin ed., Comments on ‘The Cambridge History of China’, 392–393.)

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arrangement lasted until May 3, 1979, when the PLA General Political Department requested instructions and the Central Military Commission of the CPC approved the revocation of the February Minutes. The February Outline contradicted the February Minutes, and these opposing central documents reveal publicly the division among the party leadership that had been ongoing for a long time.74 From March 28 to March 30, Mao spoke with Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao, as noted earlier. During these conversations, he criticized the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group and the February Outline, denounced the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC as the “Palace of Hell” and called for “purging Hell and liberating the little demons,”75 as well as encouraging rebellion against the Central Committee of the CPC. Additionally, he declared: “The older generation of proletarian revolutionaries has become senile and it is hard for the next generation to resist revisionism. This means we must carry out the Cultural Revolution for a long period, a hard task that I lack the time to complete.”76 Mao’s private conversations show that he was determined to criticize Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi and take strong action concerning the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Five-member Group, so as to set the stage for the Cultural Revolution.77 Mao threatened that the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and the Five-member Group would be disbanded if they insisted on sheltering “bad elements.”78 Instead of consulting with members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Politburo of the CPC, Mao made these crucial political decisions after secret discussions with Kang, Jiang, and Zhang, who were not even members 74. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1403–1404. 75. On March 30, 1966, in a speech on academic criticism in Shanghai, Mao Zedong said: “Don’t submit academic criticism-related articles for review. Ghosts do not want to see hell, so we must overthrow hell and liberate the ghosts. I always insist that the local masses have the right to attack the central government if the central government does

wrong. During the central meeting last September (in 1965,) I specifically discussed this issue, namely that the appearance of revisionism in the central government might

lead the local masses to rebel.” (Mao, “Overthrow Hades to Liberate Ghosts.”) Mao

Zedong’s instruction “Overthrow Hades to Liberate Ghosts” was officially published by the People’s Daily on August 13, 1966 in the form of a direct quotation. 76. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1406. 77. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1153. 78. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1658.

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of the Central Committee of the CPC at the time. Mao thus purged Peng Zhen in violation of the Party’s constitution and organizational procedures. Based on secret discussions, Mao plotted to dominate the Central Committee of the CPC and manipulate the mass media to support the Cultural Revolution, and established relationships whereby members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC became “ministers” to his “emperor,” which allowed him to “issue edicts” to purge leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC. The Cultural Revolution was thus a practice of feudal autocracy.79 Unfortunately, the Central Committee of the CPC failed to detect this trend, and all Central Committee members, including Zhou and Deng, led by example in obeying Mao’s “imperial edicts.” On March 31, Kang returned to Beijing and relayed Mao’s instructions to Zhou and Peng.80 Since Mao’s directives were revered as “imperial edicts,” both Zhou Enlai and Peng Zhen had to obey. From April 9 to 12, Deng presided over the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. Deng had been urgently recalled to Beijing. At the meeting, Kang relayed the contents of his conversations with Mao, and Chen and Kang criticized Peng for his serious faults. Peng had to conduct self-criticism, saying that he had made serious mistakes in not following Chairman Mao for the academic struggle, and that he will never oppose Chairman Mao ever.81 This shows that an unwritten law had been established within the Party: Mao’s criticism must be accepted, with no room for doubt or opposition.82 Zhou, Deng, and Peng were compelled to investigate the Central Committee for “failing in its duties,” and expressed their unanimous acceptance of Mao Zedong’s criticisms and instructions.83 The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC passed a resolution on drafting the notification of the criticism and revocation of the wrong Report Outline of the Five-member Group (the February Outline,) and the establishment of a Cultural Revolution Drafting Group headed by Chen Boda.84 This indicated 79. In 1981, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that China had a long history of feudalism. The residual influence of centuries of feudal autocracy

could not be easily eradicated from the ideological and political fields, leading to

overcentralization of power in individuals, as well as authoritarianism and worship of individuals.

80. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1241. 81. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Peng Zhen, 1219.

82. Ibid, 1217. 83. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1660. 84. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1241.

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that democratic centralism had been severely damaged. Internal political life of the Party had been transformed from egalitarianism to feudal absolutism, with Mao’s personal control having succeeded the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC.85 On April 14, Mao personally modified the notification for the resolution and added instructions on dissolving the “Cultural Revolution Five-member Group” and setting up the “Cultural Revolution Drafting Group” under the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC.86 Chen Boda was appointed leader of the Cultural Revolution Drafting Group, Jiang Qing and Liu Zhijian were appointed deputy leaders, and Kang Sheng was appointed as a consultant to the group. This signaled Mao’s establishment of his own group of writers to promote his personal agenda. The group was officially renamed the Central Cultural Revolution Group later on May 28, publishing under Mao’s direction a total of 58 articles from June 1966 to March 1971, including seven published from June 1966 to December 1966.87 The Central Cultural Revolution Group served as Mao’s spokesperson and political tool through which he personally led the Cultural Revolution. The same day, Mao reiterated that the Central Committee of the CPC should be alert to the restoration of the bourgeoisie, which had first been proposed at the First Session of the 1st CPPCC National Committee, held on September 29, 1949. Additionally, he stressed that imperialists and domestic reactionaries refused to admit defeat and had destroyed and disrupted society in an attempt to restore capitalism. Mao maintained this situation necessitated continued vigilance. Mao’s assessment of China’s political situation might have been correct in 1949, but he was wrong to reiterate this assessment in 1966 after he had ruled the country for 17 years. By arbitrarily suspecting class enemies and manufacturing a crisis, Mao began to struggle against his own comrades rather than against “imperialists” (i.e. the United States) or “reactionaries” (i.e. Chiang Kai-shek,) and persisted on this path because of his inflexibility and growing distance from others in the Party.88 As the Central Resolution of 1981 pointed out, Mao was incorrect in his assessment of China’s class struggle and of the political situation of the Party and country.89 85. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1046. 86. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1241. 87. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12 and vol. 13.

88. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 37.

89. “Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC on Certain Questions in Our Party’s History since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” unanimously approved

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Mao overemphasized class struggle, created political tensions and illusions of revisionism within the Party,90 and thus misrepresented the truth.

Notice on May 16 and the First Purge of Veteran Cadres Purge of Yang Shangkun and Luo Ruiqing On November 10, 1965, the same day that Wenhui Daily published Yao’s criticism on Hai Rui Dismissed, Yang Shangkun, Alternate Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC, was dismissed from office. Yang was accused of secretly installing wiretaps and allowing unauthorized access to numerous confidential documents and archives. Subsequently, Wang Dongxing was appointed Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC and Chief of the Guard and Protection Bureau, thus serving as Mao’s loyal proxy and bodyguard. He would also play a vital role as Mao’s secret enforcer during the Cultural Revolution. On November 30, Lin Biao sent Ye Qun to submit a letter and eleven pieces of materials to Mao, accusing Luo Ruiqing (former Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Deputy Premier of the State Council, Standing Commissioner, and Secretary-general of the Central Military Commission of the CPC) of seizing military power, opposing military involvement in politics, revolting against Mao Zedong Thought, and overstressing military technology.91 Ye’s report lasted nearly 5 hours. In his memoir, Zhang Yaoci recounts Ye Qun’s attack on Luo Ruiqing during the meeting with Mao: “Luo Ruiqing opposed Lin Biao’s involvement in politics and had declared that Lin Biao was chronically ill and should resign from his post. Our Party would sustain massive losses should the ambitious Luo Ruiqing gain power over the army and public security. Luo Ruiqing was plotting to succeed Lin Biao as Minister of National Defense.” Mao was uncertain about Ye’s report, but his attitude towards Luo had changed. On November 2, he spoke with Yang Chengwu (then Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA) for over an hour to go through the situation.92 Mao decided to purge Luo without giving him the chance to respond to the during the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC on June 27, 1981. 90. Hu ed., Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China, 458. 91. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1399. 92. Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci-Those Days with Chairman Mao, 76–77.

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accusations against him in a face-to-face meeting, and without discussing the matter with other members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. From December 8 to 15, Luo was criticized at an enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC held in Shanghai.93 This was a secret meeting presided over by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in turn, and the members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee, namely Liu, Zhou, and Deng, were not informed of the agenda prior to the meeting. Mao and Lin were absent from the meeting.94 Ye denounced Luo on behalf of Lin and won support from Wu Faxian (Commander of the Air Force,) Li Zuopeng (Political Commissar of the Navy,) and Yang Chengwu (Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA.) She also presented Lin’s letter and the materials that supported the accusations.95 Mao’s directive criticizing Luo was also circulated at the meeting.96 On the last day of the meeting, Zhou presided over the meeting and Deng gave a summary.97 Just 93. From December 8–15, 1965, the Central Committee of the CPC held a meeting in Shanghai to criticize the errors made by Luo Ruiqing and carry out a struggle against

him. After the meeting, the Central Committee designated comrades such as Zhou Enlai to help Luo Ruoqing through patient education. However, Luo Ruiqing refused to conduct self-criticism, protested that he considered himself wronged, and attempted to defend himself. Following the spirit of the Central Meeting of the CPC in Shanghai,

during the army political working meeting, some senior party and army officials

denounced other serious errors committed by Luo Ruiqing. (Central Work Group, “Report on the Errors of Luo Ruiqing,” April 13, 1966.)

94. During the meeting, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai asked Wu Faxian (then Commander of

Air Force) about the condition of Luo Ruiqing. The details of the meeting can be found in Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 558–562.

95. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 2, 27. 96. Mao Zedong denounced Luo Ruiqing as follows: “People should watch those who oppose putting politics first, particularly those who express oral agreement while

secretly harboring disagreement simply to spread opportunism.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1400.)

97. Deng Xiaoping’s summary comprised five points: “1. This meeting disclosed problems

involving Luo Ruiqing and further meetings should be suspended for some days; 2. The main mistake of Luo Ruqing was that he failed to implement the instruction of

Comrade Mao concerning the prioritizing of politics and made an error of eclecticism.

3. Some of Luo’s errors were brought up at the meeting and will be presented to him at an appropriate time so he can undertake self-criticism. 4. The errors of Luo should

not be made public and discussion should be limited to attendees of the meeting. 5. Relevant measures shall be subject to the discussion and instructions of the Central

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as it had been at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC following the Lushan Conference in 1959, this meeting created a huge stir in the PLA, marking the second time a major split occurred in the PLA. The critical point was that Mao, as Chairman of both the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the CPC, only believed Lin’s statements and did not allow Luo to defend himself. He issued the directive on criticizing Liu Ruiqing, then serving as Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, without convening meetings of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC or the Central Politburo of the CPC, sharing information, or exchanging views.98 This contravened established party procedures and set a precedence for persecution by individuals. On January 8, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a notice announcing that Luo Ruiqing was relieved of his posts of Standing Commissioner and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, while appointing Chen Yi, Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, and Ye Jianying as vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. On March 4, the Central Committee of the CPC convened a group meeting to discuss the Luo Ruiqing question, in accordance with Mao Zedong’s directive and the decision of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC.99 Before the meeting was convened, Deng Xiaoping proposed that the meeting resolutely abide by the guiding principles of seeking truth, helping and saving comrades, and allowing self-revolution.100 The first phase of the meeting lasted from March 4 to 11, involving 42 participants. The meeting was enlarged to 53 participants on March 17. Only Peng Zhen, leader of the Central Working Group, spoke fairly on Luo.101 Meanwhile, Yang Chengwu accused Luo of opposing study of the works of Mao Zedong, denigrating Mao Zedong Thought, and rejecting the recognition of Mao Zedong’s genius.102 Additionally, he relayed Mao’s directive, “As an important Committee of the CPC after its members return to Beijing.” (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 561–562.)

98. Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci — Days with Chairman Mao, 78. 99. The Central Committee of the CPC designated a three-member work team, comprising Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen and Ye Jianying, to manage the investigation into the errors of Luo Ruiqing. Ye Jianying chaired the team.

100. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1898.

101. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 12. 102. Yang Chengwu said that Luo Ruiqing disagreed with taking Mao Zedong’s works as the supreme instruction of all works in the army. After Lin Biao introduced the five

principles of emphasizing politics in November 1965, on November 28, 1965, Luo

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tool of the proletarian dictatorship, the army is strictly prohibited, regardless of circumstances, from revolting against the Central Committee of the CPC and destroying the unity of the Party.” Shortly after this meeting, Yang succeeded Luo’s positions. Ironically, Yang himself would fall victim to political struggle later in March 1968. This would be the pattern for the political struggles to follow, whereby individuals would persecute others, and then become the persecuted; this soon extended from the party’s central leadership to the rest of society in China. For the members of the Eighth Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, who purged Luo in obeying Mao’s directive and were not conscious of Mao’s political logic, they would successively fall victim to the Cultural Revolution themselves. Liu, Deng, and Lin were later purged, while Zhou became the political target of Mao’s campaigns in the late years of the Cultural Revolution. Zhu De and Chen Yun were marginalized, barely escaping Mao’s campaigns by withdrawing from active participation in the political struggles. On March 18, Luo attempted suicide by self defenestration in protest of his Ruiqing told him in Suzhou that “Taking Comrade Mao’s works as the supreme instruction for all army activities conflicts with our country’s political system.”



Luo Ruiqing disagreed with praising Mao Zedong Thought as the peak of modern

Marxism and Leninism. On June 29, 1965, when discussing the foreword of the republished “Quotations of Chairman Mao,” to which the General Political Department

of the PLA added a foreword saying “Mao Zedong Thought is the supreme and most flexible form of Marxism and Leninism in existence,” Luo Ruiqing said, “Can we say that? Are there further heights to be reached? Can we climb higher? Is there a way to

be more flexible? We can say these things internally, but never to the outside.” Luo

Ruoqing thus deleted the above phrase from the foreword. While discussing this matter he also said: “The phrase ‘Mao Zedong Thought is the peak of modern Marxism and Leninism’ is inappropriate and may lead to a bad impression internationally.” In 1965,

the phrase “Mao Zedong Thought is the supreme and most flexible form of Marxism

and Leninism in existence,” which had appeared in an editorial in the PLA Daily, was also deleted by Luo Ruiqing.



Luo Ruoqing also disagreed with any mention of the formation of Mao Zedong

Thought, including the idea that it derived from Mao Zedong’s “personal talent.” In December 1961, when discussing Lin Biao’s speech at the Enlarged Central Work

Conference of the 7,000 Cadres, Ye Qun proposed adding the words “individual

talent” to the phrase “Mao Zedong Thought formed through the collective struggle of the Party and the people.” Luo Ruiqing strongly disagreed, saying “Nobody dares mention individual talent these days!”

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treatment. He had left a suicide note to his wife.103 He was the first of party and state leaders to turn to suicide in protest at being framed. Luo survived, but this provoked Mao further to denounce Luo’s suicide attempt merely a strategy to alienate the Party and the people.104 From March 22 to April 8, the meeting entered the second stage, during which 95 participants criticized Luo Ruiqing in his absence. On April 12, Zhou, Deng, and Peng jointly submitted the Report on Luo Ruiqing’s Faults and the Comments on the Report (Draft) by the Central Committee of the CPC to Mao, who was in Hangzhou.105 On April 13, the Central Working Group submitted the same report to the Central Committee of the CPC. This report listed Luo’s major faults as follows: “1. Revolting against Mao Zedong Thought and slandering and attacking Comrade Mao Zedong; 2. Following the bourgeois military line, opposing Chairman Mao’s military line, boldly organizing contests of armed force and resisting the prioritization of politics; 3. Breaching discipline, establishing an independent powerbase and destroying the democratic centralism of the Party; 4. Having moral faults, selfishly speculating, defending the exploiting class, and advocating bourgeois individualism; 5. Plotting to succeed Lin Biao and organizing conspiracies to usurp the power of the army and Party.”106 In fact, Lin had simply framed Luo and used Mao’s support to purge him. Years later in 1973, Mao acknowledged at the meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC that he had wrongly purged Luo at Lin’s instigation.107 103. In the suicide note he wrote to his wife Hao Zhiping, Luo Ruiqing said: “I didn’t tell

you about the things that occurred at the meeting to maintain Party discipline [this refers to the internal meeting in which Mao Zedong criticized Luo Ruiqing to his face.]

This is the end. Tell our children to heed the Party and Chairman Mao forever. Our

party will be always glorious, right and great. You should keep improving yourself and conducting revolution!”

104. On May 16, 1966, the Transmission of the “Report on the Errors of Luo Ruiqing” Submitted by the Central Working Group to the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that not only

had Luo Ruiqing not reviewed his errors but, on the contrary, he had attempted suicide to alienate himself from the party and the people.

105. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1908.

106. Central Work Group, “Report on the Errors of Luo Ruiqing,” April 13, 1966. 107. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1677. On November 15,

1973, Luo Ruiqing wrote to Mao Zedong: “I have diseases throughout my body and two injured legs. I ask the Chairman and the Party to release me from jail and give me

some limited freedom.” Mao Zedong responded: “I think he should be released. Will the Central Committee please make a decision according to the situation.” Luo Ruiqing

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On May 16, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated the Report on Luo Ruiqing’s Faults and summarized his faults as “five revolts,” including revolting against Mao and Lin, and imposing political despotism. The report said that the Central Committee of the CPC had decided to relieve Luo of his posts as Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and Deputy Premier of the State Council owing to his serious faults, and this decision had subsequently been approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC.108 The unjust persecution of Luo was the first such case of political injustice to occur in the Cultural Revolution, and led to his wrongful imprisonment for seven years. In August 1978, Deng remarked that the case of Luo demonstrated the conspiracies and fierce political struggles waged among the Party leadership prevailed during the Cultural Revolution”109. was released from jail soon after Mao Zedong gave this instruction. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 366.)

108. The Central Committee believed that Luo Ruiqing’s error was that he used the bourgeois

military line to oppose the proletarian military line, exploited revisionism to oppose Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, opposed the Central Committee of the

CPC, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, and plotted to seize control over the army and oppose the CPC.” (“Remarks of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Report on the Errors of Luo Ruiqing,” May 16, 1966.)

109. Deng Xiaoping said: “Comrade Luo Ruiqing was a well-known and fearless fighter

against the anti-CPC group led by Lin Biao, and thus was persecuted cruelly by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four during the Party’s internal two-line struggle. Luo Ruiqing held firm in the struggle against Lin Biao’s revisionist line and the bourgeois military

line, and insisted on Mao Zedong Thought and systematic learning of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Chairman Mao. He maintained the revolutionary learning style of our Party that was continuously advocated by Mao, and resisted and struggled

against disingenuous wordings of Lin Biao like “peak” and “the supreme and the most flexible.” He steadfastly defended the comity and unity of the CPC and the army,

and hated Lin Biao’s formation of a clique to pursue selfish interest and separate the

Party and army. He struggled against crimes of Lin Biao such as separating the army from political organizations, canceling military technical training, and damaging the

nation’s war readiness. He was fair, upright, and clearly distinguished between right and wrong. He had a noble moral character and revolutionary sentiments. Lin Biao regarded Luo Ruiqing as the obstacle to his seizure of power over the CPC and cruelly

framed him, making him the target of psychological and physical torture.” (Deng, “Regrets Expressed to the Memorial Meeting for Luo Ruiqing,” 12 August, 1978.)

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Purge of Peng Zhen and His Allies On April 15, the Beijing Daily and Frontline published articles and editorials criticizing Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha. The month before, Mao had directed criticism at Reading Notes of Sanjiacun and Evening Chats at Yanshan, which the three had coauthored. However, the publishing of the criticism of the three were deemed to be a tactical maneuver “sacrificing the chariots to save the marshall (referring to their superior, Peng Zhen.)” All other media outlets were forbidden from republishing the criticism. From April 16 to 26, Mao Zedong presided over the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC in Hangzhou.110 Of the Standing Committee, only Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping was present. Mao took advantage of Liu Shaoqi’s month-long visit to Pakistan, Myanmar, and Afghanistan; Liu, failing to foresee the unprecedented political storm to come, returned on April 20 to attend the meeting when Mao had already set his agenda in motion.111 Also attending the meeting were Peng Zhen, Chen Yi (then Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs,) Ye Jianying (then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, and President and Political Commissar of the PLA Academy of Military Science,) Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and the secretaries of the central bureaus Li Xuefeng, Li Jingquan, Tao Zhu, Song Renqiong, Wei Wenbo, and Liu Lantao.112 On the afternoon of April 22, Mao declared his personal belief that the “problem” was not limited to Wu Han, but was a widespread spiritual and ideological struggle; the severity of the “Wu Han Problem” was because there were supporters and revisionists in the “court” (implying Peng Zhen) and the PLA (implying Luo Ruiqing and Yang Shangkun.) Mao then threatened to “comprehensively and systematically” identify the revisionists, revealing his intention to return to the frontline of the leadership. When discussing the February Outline that had been officially issued by the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao rebuked Peng for overturning the resolution urgently passed by the Central Committee of the CPC.113 In accordance with Mao’s directive, the Cultural Revolution Five-member Group was dissolved, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group was established 110. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 37.

111. Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Chen Yun were absent from the meeting. 112. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1007. 113. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1407–1408.

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to draw up the Notification of the Central Committee of the CPC (draft) (which became the Notice on May 16.)114 However, the notice was not submitted to members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC for review and approval. Instead, Mao Zedong alone modified, reviewed,115 and decided the final version of the document,116 rendering the Central Committee of the CPC a “rubber stamp.” During the meeting, Peng Zhen was criticized and Kang Sheng denounced the February Outline. Kang claimed that he had not seen the February outline before it was issued, and that it was approved by Peng alone. Peng refuted that the document had been sent to Kang for approval before it was issued. , and to have not read it before its issuance. Controversially, Peng Zhen denied the document had been submitted to Kang Sheng for approval and then officially issued after discussion and modification. Eventually, Mao officially declared that the February Outline was revoked.117 Peng was dismissed from office, and Mao removed Peng’s name from some party documents.118 Lu Dingyi, alternate member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Minister of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Deputy Premier of the State Council, was also dismissed from office. From April 28 to 29, Mao delivered several speeches in which he stressed that “class struggle observes the law of nature rather than bending to human will, and we must purge enemies through class struggle.” “Class struggle” thus became a political tool Mao Zedong deployed to take out his rivals. Bo Yibo later recalled that it was at this point that the purge of Peng Zhen and the launch of the Cultural Revolution became inevitable.119 On April 24, the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC was held to discuss and endorse the Notice on May 16, which had been drafted by Chen Boda on April 12 and submitted to Mao by Zhou the same day, 114. The group was established on April 16, 1966, and was also known as the Cultural

Revolution Document Drafting Group. Chen Boda led the group, which consisted of members Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wu Lengxi, Wang Li, Yin Da,

Chen Yading, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu and Mu Xin. (Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the

Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 585–586.) Mao Zedong personally reviewed and approved the list of team members.

115. Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 587; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1660.

116. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1008. 117. Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci — Those Days with Chairman Mao, 79–80. 118. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1660. 119. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1242.

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and was resubmitted by Kang on April 18. Mao Zedong modified the report eight times on April 14 and 18. The Notice on May 16 was scheduled to be passed at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC held in May.120 This document laid the first guidelines for the Cultural Revolution and ten years of turmoil.121 Mao declared that the struggle involved the very soul of the Party, claimed Peng Zhen was behind the Wu Han Case, and warned against revisionism.122 Between April 28 and 29, he delivered speeches in which he said: “The Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC disobeyed my directives and Peng Zhen boldly sought to reform our Party. However, the effect was precisely opposite to that intended and Peng Zhen was doomed to failure, just as predicted by the law of class struggle. I will call for the attack of anyone who organizes conspiracy within the Central Committee of the CPC. Peng Zhen sneaked into our Party and I could purge him blindfolded. Our comrades have no need to worry about him.”123 This speech shows the extent to which Mao dominated the Party during the Cultural Revolution, and his readiness to purge Party leaders. When he was modifying the Notice on May 16, Mao denounced Peng and his allies as clique leaders who failed to learn from books and newspapers, or connect with the masses,124 and who oppressed the people by force.125 On May 4, Peng proposed to Liu and Deng that he stop presiding over the day-to-day work of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC. Deng wrote and circulated the Notification of the Central Committee of the CPC on Appointing Comrade Li Xuefeng as the First Acting Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC to the North Central Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Beijing 120. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 38–45.

121. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1153. 122. Mao Zedong said, “Revisionists are not just active in cultural circles. They will also appear inside the CPC, government, and army, in which case they will become even more dangerous. However, the earlier they appear, the more easily they can be

eliminated.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1407–1408.) 123. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC ,” May 25, 1966.

124. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 38–45.

125. Marx wrote, “Despotism’s sole idea is contempt for man, the dehumanised man, and this idea has the advantage over many others of being at the same time a fact. The despot always sees degraded people.” Marx, Letter to Arnold Ruge (May 1843).

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Municipal Committee of the CPC.126 Peng Zhen was officially purged, with Liu and Deng’s tacit acknowledgement in obeying Mao’s “imperial edict.” Mao’s criticism of high-ranking Party leaders shocked other Party leaders, and even Liu and Deng had no warning of his intentions. His actions contravened the Party Constitution and the National Constitution. Without authorization by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC or allowing individuals the right of appeal, members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Committee of the CPC were relieved of their posts.127 This contravened Article 16 of the Constitution of the Party.128 Without convening the National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, vice chairmen of the National People’s Congress and deputy premiers of the State Council were dismissed from office. This contravened Articles 28, 31, and 33 of the National Constitution.129 The disruption to the official 126. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1911–1912.

127. Peng Zhen served as Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC; Lu Dingyi served as Alternate

Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC and Secretary of the Secretariat of the

Central Committee of the CPC; Luo Ruiqing served as Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC; and Yang Shangkun served as Alternate Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. All of them were members of the Central Committee of the CPC.

128. According to Article 16 of the Party Constitution approved by the 8th National

Congress of the CPC in 1956, only the National Congress of the CPC had the power to dismiss members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC, or

punish them by placing them on probation within the Party. In an emergency, this was

to be decided by the majority (i.e., over two thirds of the votes of the Plenum of the

Central Committee of the CPC,) in which case the decision would then be subject to confirmation by the next meeting of the National Congress of the CPC. (Museum of

the Chinese Revolution comp., Compilation of the Constitutions of the Communist Party of China, 155.)

129. According to Article 28 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954), the National People’s Congress has the right to dismiss the premier and vice premiers of the State Council, ministers of all ministries, and directors and secretary-generals of all

commissions. According to Article 31, the Standing Meeting of the National People’s Congress performs the following duties when the NPC is not sitting: appointing and dismissing vice premiers of the State Council, ministers of all ministries, and directors

and secretary-generals of all commissions. Article 33 gives the NPC the right to dismiss

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party system caused differences within the Party to grow into allegations of line struggle and class struggle, and even to life-and-death struggle. The unconstitutional purge of Peng Zhen and another three members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Committee of the CPC set a dangerous precedent that opened the way for further ruthless persecution of party leaders during the Cultural Revolution. However, Liu, Zhou, and Deng, all members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, accepted and tolerated Mao’s unconstitutional practices. On May 5, Mao proposed formal policies on purging veteran cadres. The target was the frontline of the collective central leadership, particularly Liu. When he met with the Albanian Government Delegation, Mao discussed China’s political situation and the need to purge veteran cadres via a Cultural Revolution, and expressed his resolution to even purge members of the Central Committee of the CPC,130 naming Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, and Peng Zhen. The policies to purge veteran cadres were expressed in the Notice on May 16, and by October 1968 had resulted in the purging of 47 members of the Central Committee, more than the total members of the Standing Committee of the NPC. (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 5, 527–529.)

130. In an interview with the Albanian government delegation headed by Shehu in

Hangzhou on May 5, 1966, Mao Zedong said: “We should keep two ‘possibilities’ in mind. The first is counter-revolutionary dictatorship and counter-revolutionary

restoration. Lenin said that the defeated exploiting class would remain stronger than the triumphant proletariat for a long period. He also said that capitalism was continuously

growing amongst farmers and petty bourgeoisie. China’s national bourgeoisie and their intellectuals are all lurking in our team, as are the offspring of the landed class. In the past, most of our college students came from the bourgeoisie and the landed

class. We currently still have millions of old-style intellectuals. Some old intellectuals have infiltrated our party and are awaiting their opportunity.” (Chen and Du eds.,

Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years

of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 109.)

Mao Zedong later continued: “The second possibility is that ‘evil people of all kinds

are unmasked’. In the past 45 years (since the founding of the CPC in 1921,) scores of members of the Central Committee of the CPC have been peeled away from the

healthy core of our Party and discarded, but some bad apples (incompetent members

of the Central Committee of the CPC) still remain to be discovered.” (Jin ed., Biography

of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1839–1841.) Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, and Wu Xiuquan all attended this interview.

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number of cadres purged between 1949 and 1965. By this measure, the Cultural Revolution was the most serious split in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. The enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC held in May was a prelude to the Cultural Revolution, and Mao’s schemes forced the Central Committee of the CPC to officially approve his decisions. During the meeting with Mehmet Shehu, Mao praised Deng (present at the meeting) for his outstanding military talent in commanding the Nanjing campaign. This exchange occurred in front of Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Li Fuchun,131 and demonstrates that Mao still trusted Deng even though he had begun to move against Liu. From May 4 to 26, Liu presided over the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC in Beijing, attended by 76 members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and related Party leaders. Jiang Qing officially attended the meeting for the first time, together with Zhang Chunqiao, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu. The meeting thus marked the official start of Jiang’s participation in government and political affairs. Mao deliberately arranged for Jiang to assume leadership of the Party. The collective leadership, including the Central Committee of the CPC, failed to realize that his actions had violated Party systems and policies and would have numerous serious political consequences. Although he was absent from the meeting, Mao remotely controlled the Central Committee of the CPC through Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Zhang Chunqiao. Kang relayed to the meeting Mao’s speeches regarding revisionism, delivered in Hangzhou at the end of March, as well as his directive on the purging of Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun.132 Participants were shocked and confused by the contents of Mao Zedong’s speeches, but by continuing to support him they allowed him to continue to dominate the Central Committee of the CPC. At a meeting held on May 6, Zhang Chunqiao, Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC, denounced Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, and their allies for revolting against Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution line after the Tenth Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee of the CPC in 1962. Chen Boda proposed that Peng should be persecuted for his current and past mistakes. The actions of Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Zhang Chunqiao, serving as Mao’s agents, further exacerbated Mao’s unconstitutional practices previously set with Jiang, Mao’s nephew Mao Yuanxin, and Mao’s grandniece Wang Hairong. In fact, Mao’s actions were deliberately planned to undermine the state and party constitutions. The leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC held various 131. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1913.

132. Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 591.

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different views on critical domestic issues, particularly on class struggle, and despite the respect for Mao and his views, Mao had become politically isolated since 1962, and he could no longer find support for his politics through ordinary means of collective discussion, voting, and decision-making. Thus, Mao had to lead his own campaign to not just undermine but destroy the rules according to the state and party constitutions, in order to launch his Cultural Revolution and achieve his political ideals. Mao expressed outright disdain for rules and his preference for struggles, which allowed him to control the initiative in conducting political struggles. Mao actively promoted regional rebellion against the central authority, and then tried to claim that going against the established trend is a critical principle in Marxism-Leninism.133 During the meeting, the major newspapers published a series of articles that criticized Deng Tuo (former member of the Secretariat of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC,) Wu Han, and Liao Mosha (former director of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.) In fact, the real intention was to criticize Peng Zhen and other leaders of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC.134 On May 8, the editorial office of the PLA Daily published the article “Counterattacking the Anti-party and Anti-socialist Reactionary Line,” while Guan Feng published the article “Increase Vigilance and Distinguish Truth from Falsehood” in the Guangming Daily under the pseudonym “He Ming.”135 On 133. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 138.

134. The opening of the article delivers Mao Zedong’s instruction: “After the armed enemies were destroyed, unarmed enemies still remained. These enemies will definitely start a

life-and-death struggle with us, and so we should never treat them lightly.” The article considered the anti-CPC and anti-socialist activities of a minority of people like Deng Tuo to be symptomatic of a real problem rather than merely isolated phenomena.

Such activities were related to the Lushan Meeting in 1959, and temporary economic difficulties during 1959 to 1962. Deng Tuo and his faction were said to be impatient and

to have been encouraged to take action due to China’s difficulties. The article also said: “Deng Tuo was a leader of the evil ‘Three-household Village’, established by himself

together with Wu Han and Liao Mosha. He was also the leader of the minority faction

of anti-CPC and anti-socialist activists. This faction used the Frontline, Beijing Daily, and Beijing Evening as anti-CPC tools, and furiously attacked socialism with their poisonous

arrows.” (PLA Daily, May 8, 1966; People’s Daily, May 9, 1966; Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1015.)

135. The article criticized the group represented by Deng Tuo, Liao Mosha and Wu Han as

activists opposed to the CPC and socialism. (Guangming Daily, May 8, 1966; People’s

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May 9, Lin Jie, Ma Zemin, and Yan Changgui published the article “Deng Tuo’s Evening Chats at Yanshan Revolts against the Party and Socialism” in the People’s Daily.136 On May 10, Yao Wenyuan published the article “Commentary on the Reactionary Nature of Sanjiacun, Evening Chats at Yanshan, and Reading Notes of Sanjiacun” in the PLA Daily and the Wen Hui Daily and directed criticism at Peng Zhen as the figure behind Deng Tuo, Liao Mosha, and Wu Han.137 On May 11, Qi Benyu published the article “Remarks on the Bourgeois Stance of Frontline and Beijing Daily” targeting Peng Zhen.138 On May 16, the People’s Daily republished Daily, May 9, 1966; Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1015.) 136. The article stated: “Since 1961, Deng Tuo has released a series of articles opposing the

CPC and socialism in newspapers such as the Frontline, Beijing Daily, and Beijing Evening.

He has furiously attacked the CPC and socialism. Deng Tuo’s Evening Chats at Yanshan is full of criminal attacks on the CPC and socialism. The article has five criminal faults:

first, it viciously attacks our great CPC; second, it opposes the general line of socialist

construction, the Great Leap Forward, and the dictatorship of the proletariat; third, it airs the grievances of dismissed rightist opportunists, gives moral weight to their anti-CPC positions, and encourages them to ‘defend Li Sancai, the dismissed Minister of Revenue’ [Li Sancai was an honest and frank Ming Dynasty official who suffered persecution]; fourth, it absurdly suggests that the Party ‘rest’ from its work; fifth, the article uses the pretext of introducing ‘knowledge’ to attack the CPC and socialism.”

137. The article claimed that Deng Tuo acted as the editor in chief of Frontline, and held and monopolized the leadership of ideological and cultural work in Beijing. Together

with his co-conspirators in the ‘Three-household Village’, he used the Frontline, Beijing Daily and Beijing Evening...as tools to oppose the CPC and socialism. He followed a rightist opportunist road, or the revisionist road, and acted as the tool of the counter-

revolutionary class and the rightist opportunists. The article also claimed that “even if the ‘Three-household Village’ grew to a ‘Four-household Village’, regardless of the

prominence of its leaders, and no matter who supported or manipulated its actions,

the conspirators behind the plot will be identified, criticized, and defeated.” (Liberation Daily and Wenhui Daily, May 10, 1966; People’s Daily, May 11, 1966.)

138. The article also stated: “It is time to unequivocally refute the articles published by the

Frontline, Beijing Daily, and Beijing Evening. When class enemies at home and abroad stirred up evil winds, who were the supporters of the anti-CPC and anti-socialism activities of Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha? When the revolutionary masses opposed the anti-CPC and anti-socialism activities of Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao

Mosha, who defended them? When their crimes could no longer be covered up, who instigated fake criticism that ‘attacked minor scapegoats to protect the chief plotters?’” Red Flag, issue 7, 1966; republished by the People’s Daily, May 16, 1966.

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the above articles. On May 14, Lin Jie published the article “Unmask Deng Tuo as a Rebel against the Party and Socialism” and claimed that Deng Tuo, Liao Mosha, Wu Han, and their allies had recently conspired to attack socialism and the Central Committee of the CPC led by Mao.139 These politically ambitious writers served as Mao’s hatchet men, and attacked his political rivals by publishing criticisms and stirring up sentiments.140 Mao hailed his new assistants as a new proletarian force and as proletarian leftists.141 The political struggle became an open season of political terror. On the night of May 17, Deng Tuo committed suicide to protest his vilification and political framing, writing in his suicide note: “Of my 171 works in Evening Chats at Yanshan and Reading Notes of Sanjiacun, how many are actually problematic? what precisely is the problem? I believe the objective truth will eventually be found....I am willing to suffer torture and make sacrifices to contribute to our Party and revolutionary cause. I revere our Party and Chairman Mao. As I leave you, I wish a long life to our great, correct, and glorious Chinese Communist Party, and to our Chairman Mao.”142 Back in July 1944, Deng Tuo had presided over the compilation and publication of five volumes of Mao Zedong Anthology, and had penned its preface praising Mao’s vital role in Chinese revolutionary history and presenting Mao Zedong Thought as the very essence of Chinese Communist Party Thought which combines Marxism with the Chinese revolution.143 He would never have imagined that, 22 years later, he would be part of the first purges personally conducted by 139. People’s Daily, May 14, 1966. 140. Qi Benyu and Yao Wenyuan became political hatchet men attacking Liu Shaoqi and Tao Zhu, and republished important articles to politically eliminate Liu Shaoqi

and Tao Zhu under the instructions of Mao Zedong. See Qi, “Patriotism or National

Betrayal? Comments on the Reactionary Movie A Secret History of the Qing Imperial Palace,” Red Flag, issue 5, March 30, 1967, republished in People’s Daily, April 1, 1967; and Yao, “Comments on Tao Zhu’s Two Works,” People’s Daily, September 8, 1967. Mao

Zedong made many instructions on and modifications to the articles. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 292–294.)

141. “Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC,” People’s Daily, May 17, 1967. 142. Yang ed., Museum of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), vol. 2, 320. 143. In the foreword of his compilation, Deng Tuo wrote: “The experience of past revolutionary struggles teaches us that all members of the CPC must be united by Mao

Zedong Thought.” He also said: “All officials and party members must seriously learn

Mao Zedong Thought, open their minds to it, and take it as a weapon with which to arm themselves...this is an urgent task.”

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Mao through a “cultural revolution.” In an even more shocking event, Tian Jiaying, Mao’s political secretary and Deputy Director of the Policy Research Office of the Central Committee of the CPC, hanged himself at Zhongnanhai, the location of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council, on the morning of May 23, aged 44,144 in reaction to being blamed for falsifying accounts of Mao’s conversations. In his suicide note, Tian expressed his belief that the Party would exonerate him, but instead the Party denounced his suicide as further evidence of anti-CPC plotting.145 Deng Tuo and Tian Jiaying were senior party cadres, and as delegates to the Third National People’s Congress were supposed to be protected by Article 37 of the National Constitution.146 On suffering political persecution during the Cultural 144. From 1948, Tian Jiaying acted as Mao Zedong’s secretary, and from 1949 he successively

became Director of the Secretary Office of the Central General Office, Secretary of

the Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (Mao Zedong,) Vice Director of the General office of the Chairman of the PRC (Mao Zedong,) Vice Director

of the Political Research Center of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Vice Director

of the Central General Office. Additionally, he was Deputy of the 3rd and 8th National

Congresses of the CPC. He oversaw the editing, commenting and publishing of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (volumes 1–4,) an ambitious task, and helped draft the documents of the Central Committee of the CPC.

145. On May 22, 1966, An Ziwen, Director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, as well as Wang Li and Qi Benyu, Vice Directors of the External

Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, announced the following decision of the Central Committee of the CPC addressed to Tian Jiaying: “First, the

Central Committee of the CPC believes an unusual relationship exists between you

and Yang Shangkun. Yang Shangkun has been identified as an opponent of the CPC

and of socialism, so you should engage in self-criticism on this matter; Second, the

Central Committee of the CPC believes you to be a rightist, so on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC, you must immediately stop your activities and undertake self-

criticism. Additionally, you must surrender all your personal documents, accept that you are barred from Zhongnanhai, and hand the work of the Secretary Office over to Qi Benyu.” That night Tian Jiaying told his wife Dong Bian, “Jiang Qing and Chen

Boda have framed me. Look after yourself. I do not believe the people behind this will have a good end!” The next day he committed suicide in Zhongnanhai. He was not rehabilitated until March 1980. (Ye, Mao Zedong’s Secretaries.)

146. Article 37 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954) exempts deputies of

the NPC, outside of the meeting times of the NPC, from arrest or trial except with the authorization of the Standing Committee of the NPC.

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Revolution, both elected suicide to protest against feudal autocracy. Their deaths demonstrate the illegitimacy and cruelty of the Cultural Revolution. The negligence of the Central Committee of the CPC in tolerating Mao’s faults and unanimously accepting and approving his wrong theories and decisions during the Cultural Revolution enabled the fabrication of the unjust cases against Luo Ruiqing, Deng Tuo, and Tian Jiaying, setting a model for the later fabrication of cases against Liu Shaoqi, Tao Zhu, and He Long. The national and party constitutions should have protected the victims, but the central leadership allowed the law to be ignored. How did Mao came to dominate the Central Committee of the CPC? Who were key to this coup? Mao’s manuscripts reveal that he personally ordered the Party to obey his directives, with the Notice on May 16 specifically stating: “The party committees at all levels are required to cease enforcing the Outline Report on Current Academic discussion prepared by the Central Cultural Revolution Five-member Group, and the Party is required to obey Comrade Mao Zedong’s Directives.” On May 16, the Notice on May 16 was unanimously approved without modifications at the second enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, presided over by Liu Shaoqi. Liu remarked: “The enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC was held to discuss the Notice, but it was proposed that no modifications be made. Is this not authoritarian and undemocratic? I had actually planned minor modifications, but Chen Boda and Kang Sheng disagreed and said that nothing could be better than a report revised by Chairman Mao himself.”147 From the outset of the Cultural Revolution, then, Mao changed the old order of “the Party obeying the Central Committee of the CPC” for a new order of “the Party obeying Mao Zedong,” rejecting the collective leadership of the Central Committee (specifically the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.) Mao intimidated the Central Committee of the CPC into officially approving the new rule, and Liu found himself without the support he desired for a response, resulting in Mao dominating the Central Committee of the CPC. At the meeting, Zhou Enlai remarked that the purge of Peng Zhen and his allies was conducted in the same way as the CPC’s policy against the Kuomintang in the past.148 That is, Mao was employing the same tactics in fighting against the 147. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1010. 148. Zhou Enlai said: “It is important to purge revisionists. Revisionists will definitely

appear, but ‘purging’ can avoid their restoration. This is the policy used by the CPC against the Kuomintang. After 1927, the Kuomintang separated into leftist, centrist and rightist factions, and the centrist faction became the target of a ‘purge’ by the rightists,

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Kuomintang to fight against the CPC itself. Zhou’s summary of Mao’s policy is excellent, and he further spoke to Party leaders of self-preservation through unconditionally following Mao; any disloyalty against Mao would wipe away all past merits.149 But it was precisely this attitude perpetrated by Zhou that prompted the entire party to unconditionally obey Mao, enabling Mao to launch and conduct the Cultural Revolution for a decade. Who would be the chief target in the Cultural Revolution? The Notice on May 16 expressed that the current struggle was a question of executing or opposing the Cultural Revolution line of Comrade Mao Zedong. Clearly, Peng was purged by Mao for his differing opinions, which Mao denounced as a problem of lines; this also shows that Peng merely opposed Mao’s line rather than the Party line. But the Notice also published Mao’s own words criticizing the presence of the bourgeoisie and Chinese Khrushchevians within the Party, government, PLA, and the cultura sector, “sleeping right next to us.”150 (Sidebar 3.1.) This turned an international rivalry of ideology between the CPC and the CPSU into an intraparty conflict although that ended in failure. China is now under the dictatorship of the proletariat until the realization of communism. Since the founding of New China, the first purge

of counter-revolutionary elements was the Gao (Gang)–Rao (Shushi) event, the second

was the Peng (Dehuai)-Huang (Kecheng)-Zhang (Wendian) event, and the third was the ‘four families’ event. In these instances we must adopt a policy of ‘peeling’ away

undesirable elements to protect the healthy core and thus prevent revisionism from

infiltrating our country. As Chairman Mao said, ‘They have bronchitis, 50 pills can

destroy all the bacteria.’ This situation has only two possible resolutions: the first is that we are beaten by them and the second is that we purge them. The first resolution

sees them get their way, and the second sees them purged.” At this point Lin Biao

interrupted and said: “Either they peel us or we peel them, such is the life-anddeath struggle throughout the socialist revolution.” Zhou Enlai then continued: “You should consider the consequences should we not purge them all. The very future of

our country and party would be cast into doubt. If we consider these three purges of counter-revolutionary elements together, we can see that the Peng (Dehuai) and Gao (Gang) events originated from conflicts of interest among individuals. The danger was

that had these conflicts been left unresolved they would have grown. This was the

danger. Unmasking the ‘four families’ and wresting away their power represented the

victory of the ‘peeling’ policy and of Mao Zedong Thought.” (“Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC ,” May 21, 1966.) 149. Ibid. 150. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 38–45.

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Sidebar 3.1 Notice on May 16 (May 16, 1966) We should carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to unmask academic authorities who have revolted against our Party and against socialism, and who support the bourgeoisie. We should also do this to criticize the bourgeois reactionary ideology prevalent in academic, educational, journalistic, literary, artistic, and publishing circles, and should seize power in these cultural fields. We therefore must criticize, purge or permanently transfer bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated our Party, government, army and cultural circles. Particularly, we should avoid appointing these people as leaders of the Cultural Revolution. That such reactionary elements have already infiltrated the Party and elsewhere is already very dangerous. The bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated our Party, government, army and cultural circles are counter-revolutionary revisionists. When they judge the time to be right they will seize power and transform the proletarian dictatorship into a bourgeois dictatorship. While we have unmasked some of them, we also mistakenly trusted others or trained them to be our successors. Party committees at all levels should be alert to the Chinese Khrushchev within our Party. within the CPC. The Notice was Mao’s declaration of war against Liu Shaoqi. At the time, party leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, all took the references to ‘China’s Khrushchev’ to mean Peng Zhen and his allies, and had nothing to do with them. The deceptively powerful and lethal aspects of Mao’s masterful writing in the Notice on May 16 had escaped their notice. On May 18, when meeting with the Vietnamnese leader Ho Chi Minh, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping were all convinced that ‘China’s Khrushchev’ had been unmasked with the purge of Peng Zhen and his allies.151 Even as veteran politicians, they fail to detect Mao’s conspiracy; even Zhou could not have imagined that it was Liu whom Mao had designated as “China’s Khrushchev.”152 On May 19, the meeting pressed on with criticism of Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi. Peng conducted self-criticism and stated, “I have never plotted to stage a coup or overthrow the Central Committee of the CPC, and nor have I colluded with foreign countries. Please have the Central Committee of the CPC investigate whether I, Luo Ruiqing and Lu Dingyi, conspired to topple the Party.” In response to these 151. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1841. 152. Ibid.

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pleas, Lin Biao and Kang Sheng only reprimanded Peng Zhen. Kang rebuked him: “This means that you reject the Notice on May 16 and oppose the Party, Chairman Mao, and Comrade Lin Biao.” Lin added further accusations, saying: “You have upheld revisionism all along.” Peng’s self-criticism was judged insincere, and so was taken as further evidence of his defiance toward the Central Committee of the CPC.153 This followed the same pattern as the persecution of Peng Dehuai after the Lushan Conference of 1959, who was also unjustly denounced for establishing a military faction and colluding with foreign countries.154 Years later, Mao would use the same tactics in handling the Lin Biao Affair. On May 23, the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC relieved Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun of their positions as secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and Alternate Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, with the decision submitted to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC for confirmation. Peng was dismissed from his post as First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC and Mayor of Beijing, and Lu was removed as Minister of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. Tao Zhu was appointed Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and Minister of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Ye Jianying was named Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and General Secretary of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. All these appointments and dismissals were submitted to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC for confirmation, and Li Xuefeng was appointed as the First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC.155 The decision was announced by Deng Xiaoping and unanimously passed by the participants present. Subsequently, the decision was submitted to the Eleventh 153. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 14–15; Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 593.

154. During the 1962 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres, Liu Shaoqi said, “There are two problems with Peng Dehuai. One, as Chairman Mao said, Peng

colluded with Gao Gang and escaped during the purge of the Gao-Rao group. Two, as our comrades have uncovered, Peng colluded with foreign countries. Therefore, while

others can be rehabilitated, Peng Dehuai cannot.” Mao Zedong interrupted: “Those

colluding with other countries can never be rehabiliated, especially Peng Dehuai who wanted to overthrow the government.” On August 5, when visiting Wuhan, Mao

Zedong said to Tao Zhu, Zhang Pinghua, and Wang Renzhong, “I know Peng Dehuai well. We cannot rehabiliate him. Ever.”

155. “Resolutions of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 23, 1966.

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Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC for confirmation. On May 24, the Central Committee of the CPC issued Explanation Regarding Comrade Lu Dingyi and Comrade Yang Shangkun’s Faults, which listed the faults and offences of these two officials.156 Mao used the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC held in May to officially launch the Cultural Revolution, with the aim of taking down and guarding against revisionism. This reflects the impact of the appearance of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union. Consequently, class struggle philosophy prevailed in the senior party leadership, and even ordinary differences in opinion came to be viewed in terms of revisionism and line struggle, which resulted in paranoia and attacks on political rivals, and plots to frame members of the Central Committee of the CPC as revisionists. This further fuelled Mao’s belief in his own misjudgments, and the Party fell under the same illusion.157 Mao then 156. “The Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC decided that the Central Committee of the CPC shall establish a case investigation committee to further investigate the anti-party activities of and unusual relationships among four comrades, namely Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shangkun.



“During this period, Lu Dingyi took whatever chances he could get to furiously

oppose Mao Zedong Thought, and alleged that the flexible learning and application

of Mao Zedong Thought, considered by his contemporaries as the peak of Marxism

and Leninism, was “pragmatism,” “philistinism,” and “simplification.” He slandered Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought in the tone of a bourgeois reactionary. He

also opposed Stalin, as well as so-called “dogmatism,” and sought to establish his own faction in opposition to the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman Mao.

Regarding the Cultural Revolution, Lu Dingyi’s position and opinions were identical

to those of Peng Zhen. Lu Dingyi also dictated the Propaganda Department of the CPC, and used this power to attack leftists, protect rightists, and prepare public opinion for the capitalist restoration.



Comrade Yang Shangkun has committed the following major errors: (1) Despite

the Central Committee of the CPC repeatedly stressing that the installation of bugs was strictly forbidden, he used bugs to record Chairman Mao’s conversations with standing

committee members and steal party secrets; (2) He allowed others unauthorized access to numerous confidential documents and records and so leaked core party secrets.

(3) He maintained unusual connections with Luo Ruiqing, and actively engaged in anti-CPC activities. (4) He also committed other serious errors.” (“Explanation of the

Central Committee of the CPC about the Errors of Comrade Lu Dingyi and Comrade Yang Shangkun,” May 24, 1966.)

157. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 16, 27.

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further suspected Liu Shaoqi of being a political rival and plotted to purge him. Mao never attended the meeting, remotely controlling and dominating the Central Committee of the CPC. The Notice on May 16 was passed with Liu presiding over the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, with Zhou and Deng also participating, and they remained oblivious to the fact that they had just approved the instrument that would be used to purge Liu and Deng.158 Even Mao’s trusted subordinate, Zhang Chunqiao, knew nothing of Mao’s intentions in advance.159 The meeting established the struggle pattern whereby everyone purged one another and was purged by others in turn. Zhu De, Member of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, opposed criticism of Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun, arguing for the preservation of political unity. Earlier in December 1965, Zhu De had argued in a central emergency meeting held in Shanghai that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought would develop further, and that it was improper to say it had reached a pinnacle since this implied it could develop no further. On May 23, Liu Shaoqi presided over the meeting to criticize Zhu, and Lin Biao mentioned Zhu’s opposition to the pinnacle theory at the December 1965 meeting held in Shanghai, denouncing him for harboring political ambition and revolting against Chairman Mao in the name of Marxism.160 Chen Yi accused 158. On August 5, 1967, an editorial in the People’s Daily claimed: “Chairman Mao researched and concluded the experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China and the

rest of the world, and especially learned the painful historical lessons of the Soviet Union, where the Khrushchev counter-revolutionary revisionist group had restored

capitalism, and he launched and led this unprecedented Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution alone and mobilized hundreds of millions of the masses from the bottom to

the top to unmask and attack the intra-party bourgeois command headed by China’s

Khrushchev [meaning Liu Shaoqi].” (Editorial Board of the People’s Daily, “Bombard the Bourgeois Command,” People’s Daily, August 5, 1967.)

159. On May 19, 1967, during the Enlarged Standing Committee of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, Zhang Chunqiao said: “At the time, I did not understand

the significance of the segment ‘Political figures like Khrushchev...’ and simply thought of Peng Zhen. I overlooked Liu Shaoqi.” Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 13.

160. On May 23, 1966, Lin Biao criticized Zhu De during the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, saying: “You harbor ambitions and make insufficient selfcriticism. After the Luo Ruiqing event last year (1965,) during the Shanghai Meeting he

(Zhu De) also said, ‘We cannot say Mao Zedong Thought is the peak of Marxism and

Leninism. Can the peak continue to rise?’ Probably the ‘peak’ here is not Chairman

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Zhu of intending to seize power and become emperor himself, and for eulogizing Khrushchev. Kang Sheng attacked Zhu for seeking to outshine Chairman Mao and being a Party member only in name.161 Zhou Enlai relayed Mao’s insult that Zhu was a mere “extra” who goes around talking nonsense. Zhu De defended himself, saying that he merely hoped to preserve the unity of the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC and prevent a split.162 This event further demonstrates the severe damage done to the democratic centralism of the Party.163 Mao became a cult figure at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC held in May and his personal leadership replaced the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC.164 Lin and Zhou, both members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, played a leading role in making this happen, as did Chen Boda and Kang Sheng, both alternate members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. Mao became increasingly reliant on these allies, all of whom served as leaders of the Cultural Revolution. On May 18, Lin delivered a speech: “Marx died at the age of 64, Engels died at 75 and Lenin died at 54. Now in his 70s, our Chairman Mao looks very healthy and may become a centenarian. Our great leader Mao Zedong has gained unrivalled revolutionary experience and can even be compared with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, but yourself or Khrushchev.” (“Lin Biao’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 23, 1966.)

161. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Panel Meeting of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central

Politburo of the CPC,” May 24–25, 1966; Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Zhu De, 907.

162. Zhu De rebutted the criticisms from Lin Biao and others, “As for whether or not I have ambition today, I am 80 years old and need help simply to climb stairs or walk, not

to mention doing anything significant. I can hardly manage anything, and certainly cannot act as emperor. But regardless, I care for our group and hope it can hang in there forever.”

163. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 21, 31–32. 164. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 pointed out that the

Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, held in May 1966 and the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, held in August of the same year, signaled the full scale launch of the Cultural Revolution. The leftist individual leadership of Mao Zedong replaced the collective leadership of the Central

Committee of the CPC and the personality cult of Mao Zedong grew extreme. (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important

Literatures since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 818.)

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Stalin. Chairman Mao enjoys a reputation as a great leader. He enjoys prestige in China and elsewhere, and is renowned as a genius based on his utterances, articles and revolutionary practice. When someone negates such genius in violation of Marxism we should respond by revering that genius. In the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels were hailed as great geniuses. In the twentieth century, Lenin and Comrade Mao Zedong have similarly become regarded as geniuses. Every word uttered by Chairman Mao reveals the truth and carries more weight than ten thousand words by someone more ordinary. The Chairman is our great and permanent leader and his directives are our guidelines. The whole Party and country are subject to attack those who oppose him.”165 Despite this flattery, Mao still became suspicious that Lin was using him as a tool to purge his own political rivals.166 This reflects Mao’s general mistrust and ostracizing of other Party leaders. On May 21, Zhou said in a speech: “Mao Zedong Thought represents the pinnacle of Marxism and ushers in a new era in which imperialism and capitalism are doomed and socialism and communism will be victorious. Both our Chairman Mao and Lenin are gifted world leaders.”167 Besides Lin, Zhou also flattered Mao Zedong as a genius, and followed and supported Mao in defeating his political rivals and prolonging the Cultural Revolution. Zhou thus also committed mistakes during the Cultural Revolution that outweighed his earlier contributions, and was second only to Mao in this regard. On May 24, Chen Boda delivered a speech titled “Mao Zedong Thought represents the pinnacle of Marxism and is the truth based on the three major parts of Marxism.”168 On May 25, Kang Sheng noted: “Why is Mao Zedong Thought 165. “Lin Biao’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 18, 1966.

166. Mao Zedong wrote: “People should know their distance. During the Hangzhou Meeting (the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central

Committee) held this April I expressed my disagreement with the wording [this refers

to the phrase “Mao Zedong Thought”] of my friend [Lin Biao]. But what can I do? He continued to use the phrase during the May Meeting in Beijing and the media treated me as a god. I have no choice but to follow this same road. I guess their intention is to

create a new Zhong Kui to beat down devils [Zhong Kui was a character from a folk story who was renowned for catching ghosts]. So I have become the CPC’s ‘Zhong Kui’ in the 1960s.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.)

167. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 21, 1966.

168. “Chen Boda’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,”

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hailed as representing the pinnacle of contemporary Marxism-Leninism? The contemporary era is divided into three periods: (1) The Marxist period, during which capitalism persisted and socialism was not yet established; (2) The Leninist period, during which imperialism went into decline; and (3) The period of Mao Zedong Thought, or the Maoist period, during which Mao Zedong Thought outshone Marxism. Therefore, we can conclude that Mao Zedong Thought outshone both Marxism and Leninism, and became the greatest masterpiece of Marxist and Leninist thought.”169 Mao knew of the contents of these speeches and did not express opposition or remark that such flattery ran contrary to Marxism. Instead, he opportunistically took advantage of this useful flattery. During the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, committee members Lin and Zhou resolutely supported Mao, and their support carried weight since Lin presided over the work of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and Zhou presided over the work of the State Council. Mao swiftly reciprocated, and at the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC Lin became the sole Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, and thus rose to second place in the party hierarchy, while Zhou maintained third place. Meanwhile, Kang and Chen were promoted from alternate members to full members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. Bizarrely, in his May 18 speech, Lin also spoke on the subject of counterrevolutionary coups: “Our unmasking and purging of Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun is a historic event that has foiled a counter-revolutionary coup against the Party and government. We have successfully carried out a revolution to seize power, and the proletariat and laboring classes have become the masters of the country. In recent months, Chairman Mao has taken various actions to foil counter-revolutionary coups. After the Luo Ruiqing Case, Chairman Mao focused on this area. After Peng Zhen was purged, Chairman Mao communicated with other Party leaders and deployed troops to foil counter-revolutionary coups and prevent their occupation of key sectors, such as transmitter receivers and radio stations. We made military and public security system deployments and Chairman Mao suffered some sleepless nights. It is imperative for us to foil coups.” Lin went on to list dozens of examples of domestic and international coups.170 May 24, 1966. 169. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 25, 1966.

170. Lin Biao said: “Coups have been launched all over the world. There are two ways to

change political power. The first possibility is revolution, in which the people seize

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Why did Lin deliver a speech on this topic? It was rare for high-ranking Party leaders to speak of coups, and for such a speech to occur reflected Mao’s intense anxiety regarding the matter. As early as 1962, Mao had responded to the possibility of counter-revolutionary restoration by dispatching military officers to various key sectors.171 During their previous time as party leaders, Lin Biao and Chen Yun seldom attended the meetings of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and were not engaged in high-level political struggle within the Party. However, around the time Lin delivered this speech, he shifted his political attitude power. Examples include Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and our CPC. The second possibility is a counter-revolutionary coup. Most counterrevolutionary coups are palace coups. Some result from collusion between different classes; some result from domestic force, or perhaps an armed invasion from overseas; some are opportunistic, perhaps precipitated by natural disasters. In recent years, and

especially last year (1965,) Chairman Mao has become concerned with the problem of

revisionism and warned that revisionists may be exposed both inside and outside the CPC, on all frontlines, and at all levels. In recent months, Chairman Mao has turned

his attention to the prevention of counter-revolutionary coups, and has undertaken numerous measures in this regard. Over the past decade, especially before the

founding of New China, we only considered the seizure of power. After the victory of the revolution, many comrades failed to consider the problem of political power itself.

Instead they focused on construction, education, and the confrontation with Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. They never considered the possibility that we might lose the

power we had seized, and the dictatorship of the proletariat might become a bourgeois

dictatorship. Certainly, I did not consider these issues. We were all focused on war. However, numerous examples highlight the need to prevent counter-revolutionary coups, whether internal or otherwise. These days there are many abnormal phenomena

to be watched, and there exists a real risk of a counter-revolutionary coup intended to murder, seize power, restore capitalism, and overthrow socialism. You (addressing the central leaders attending the meeting) may see some signs of what is occurring

through the struggles against Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi and his wife (Yan Weibing,) and Yang Shangkun. Representatives of the bourgeois have entered our

party organizations and have seized power in an attempt to control the mechanisms of the state, namely political power, military power, and ideological power. These people

have colluded to overthrow the Party and create trouble. They hide in the cultural and

military fields, plotting to obtain the support of public opinion or the army, which

are necessary for a counter-revolutionary coup.” (“Lin Biao’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 18, 1966.)

171. Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 592.

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from non-intervention to active intervention, and went on to provide behind-thescenes support to Mao and Jiang in issuing the February Minutes. On May 21, Zhou expressed his complete agreement with Lin’s speech and again stressed the danger of a coup.172 On May 24, Chen Boda delivered a speech that not only affirmed Lin’s speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC but eulogized it as the most important speech in recent years. He also remarked that Mao had made a wise decision in purging Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang.173 On June 1, the People’s Daily published an editorial, “Purging Evil People of all Kinds,” and relayed Lin’s views on the regime.174 Although 172. Zhou Enlai said: “The first concern currently is to prevent a revisionist seizure of power. Peng (Zhen,) Luo (Ruiqing,) Lu (Dingyi,) and Yang (Shangkun) have tried to

seize our positions one by one, from culture, to the army, and the CPC. The second concern is to prevent a revisionist political coup, and the third concern is to prevent

a revisionist military coup. As for the risk of the army launching a coup, I agree with the speech of Comrade Lin Biao that the central committee is a higher priority than the

local committees, the domestic situation is a higher priority than the overseas situation,

internal party matters are a higher priority than matters outside the CPC, and the upper levels are a higher priority than the lower levels. The priority is the high levels within the CPC. The Chairman said that revisionism may also appear in socialism, and that two possibilities exist. The appearance of revisionism thus is inevitable. The revisionist

coup involves two bases: culture and the army. When they have seized power in these

two fields, they will take action. But the power of the CPC is most important and Peng Zheng is actually a ‘warlord’ inside the CPC. To prevent revisionists from stealing the power of our party, we should focus on the domestic situation at high levels inside the

central committee of the CPC. Regarding the history mentioned by Comrade Lin Biao, we should remember that coups are common and should also believe that we always

have our party, state leaders and army to beat down any counter-revolutionists should a coup be mounted in Beijing.” (“Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 21, 1966.)

173. Chen Boda claimed: “Comrade Lin Biao’s speech is the most important speech in recent years. Political power lies at the core of all class struggles. The struggle against the four

families (Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun) is important to

prevent a counter-revolutionary restoration and coup. The four families are landholders and bourgeois engaged in counter-revolutionary restoration.” (“Chen Boda’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 24, 1966.)

174. The editorial claimed: “The key to the revolution is the political power that comprises the core of all fields, including ideology, religion, arts, law and political power. If

you grasp political power, you have everything. If you lose political power, you lose

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Lin’s speech expressed his thoughts and he personally approved its circulation, Mao nevertheless wrote to Jiang, “I feel uneasy about Lin Biao’s speech.”175 This foreshadowed the subsequent political struggle between Mao and Lin. Mao’s guideline centered on class struggle eventually prompted Lin (through his son Lin Liguo) to plot a coup. With Mao’s approval, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notification of the Circulation of Comrade Lin Biao’s Speech on September 22, praising the speech as an important Marxist-Leninist document.176 As the saying goes, it is lonely and dangerous at the top. Both Mao and Lin everything. The Khrushchev revisionist group seized the powers of the communist party, the army, and the government in the Soviet Union.” (People’s Daily, June 1, 1966.) 175. Mao Zedong wrote: “The Central Committee of the CPC urged the publication of the

speech by my friend (Lin Biao) and I also support publication because his speech on

coups was a good one. Until Lin Biao raised this issue none dared to talk about it.

However, some of the wordings he used make me feel uncomfortable.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.)

176. The notice stated: “Comrade Lin Biao’s speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central

Politburo of the CPC on May 18, 1966 is an extremely important Marxist and Leninist document. Comrade Lin Biao has provided systematic and precious illustrations of how to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent a counter-revolutionary

coup, and has done so using the theory of Comrade Mao Zedong on class and class struggle during the socialist period in accordance with the serious reality of struggle between different roads within the party and historic lessons regarding international

proletarian dictatorship, especially the lesson of the revisionist group inspired by the Soviet Union’s Khrushchev, which tried to seize control of the party, government and

army. Comrade Lin Biao pointed out that seized political power might be lost, and said that no matter how complicated things become, the priority should always be

maintaining political power and adhering to the fundamentals of Marxist thought.

Comrade Lin Biao held the flag of Mao Zedong Thought highest. His speech contained comprehensive, correct and scientific evaluations of Mao Zedong Thought. Comrade Lin Biao said, ‘Chairman Mao is the supreme leader of our party and his thinking is

forever true. Anyone who is opposed to Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought

will be unanimously condemned by the Party and the people.’ Comrade Lin Biao’s speech is the model of the flexible learning and application of Mao Zedong Thought,

and an important document guiding the Proletariat Great Cultural Revolution. The army and Party should discuss Mao Zedong thought in depth and apply it in the

Cultural Revolution and all other actions.” (Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Circulation of Lin Biao’s Speech, September 20, 1966.)

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feared a coup during the high-level struggle within the Party, and Mao issued a directive on strengthening the security in the capital. During the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, the Central Committee of the CPC made a decision on work to strengthen the defense of the capital.177 On May 26, the decision to report to Deng Xiaoping for instructions on the deployment of the Beijing Garrison should an emergency arise during Zhou’s absence was made at the first meeting of the Capital Working Group. The Capital Working Group also made three further decisions: One, to restructure the Beijing Garrison by making Fu Chongbi commander and Huang Zuozhen political commissar, and by bolstering the garrison’s forces with two main divisions of the field army; Two, to restructure the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC by relieving Peng Zhen of his concurrent posts as First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC and Mayor, appointing Li Xuefeng (former first secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC) to the post of First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and appointing Wu De (former First Secretary of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the CPC) to the concurrent posts of Second Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, acting mayor, and first political commissar of the Beijing Garrison. The list of new members of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC was released on June 4; Three, to restructure the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau.178 The above decisions demonstrate that even though Mao staged the Cultural Revolution and waged class struggle, thus creating tension within the Party, he also felt unsafe and maintained high vigilance. On May 26, Zhou Enlai presided over the last enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC during the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shaoqi acknowledged that he had failed to understand the Cultural Revolution and treat it with sufficient seriousness, and criticized his own pessimistic view of the economic difficulties 177. The Central Committee of the CPC was determined to strengthen security work in the

capital, and established a capital working group headed by Ye Jianying (Vice Chairman

& Secretary General of the CPC Military Commission) in support of Yang Chengwu (Deputy General Chief-of-Staff of the PLA) and Xie Fuzhi (Ministry of the Public

Security) to assume responsibility for the security of the capital and report directly to

the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo. On the day Lin Biao made the speech (May 18,) Mao Zedong approved the above preparatory measures. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949– 1976), vol. 2, 31–33.)

178. Zhu et al. eds., Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing, 4–5.

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faced during 1962, and of the problems caused by capitalist roaders during discussions of the 23-Article Document in 1964. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Deng Xiaoping made self-criticisms of their past failure to keep pace with Mao Zedong Thought and Mao Zedong’s work.179 On May 25, Deng undertook self-criticism at the request of Mao, denouncing the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC as an independent kingdom, and criticized his own failure to understand the Cultural Revolution and treat it with sufficient seriousness.180 These events demonstrate that the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC approved of and supported the actions of Mao in staging the Cultural Revolution. However, different members of the collective leadership had different aims. Liu supported Mao because he hoped to root out the bureaucracy of senior cadres who were divorced from the masses. Mao in contrast viewed senior cadres as capitalist roaders who needed to be purged, and Liu became the main target of this purging.181 The other members of the collective leadership also differed from Mao in their approach to the Cultural Revolution. Mao was a typical radical and rebel whereas others were more gradualist and conservative. Since Mao was dissatisfied with their self-criticism, he caused the split at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in the August of that year. On May 28, the Central Committee of the CPC announced the establishment of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, with the leading members including Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan,182 all 179. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1012–1013. 180. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1915.

181. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 328. 182. The members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group were: Group Leader, Chen Boda; Consultant, Kang Sheng; First Deputy Head, Jiang Qing; Deputy Heads, Wang Renzhong (Second Secretary of the Central Middle South Bureau and First Secretary of

the Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPC,) Liu Zhijian (Vice Director of the General Political Department) and Zhang Chunqiao; ordinary members, Xie Tangzhong (Director of the Cultural Section of the General Political Department,) Yin Da (Vice

President of the Historic Institute, CAS,) Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, Mu Xin (Editor in Chief of the Guangming Daily, and Vice Editor in Chief of the Red Flag,) and

Yao Wenyuan. A further four members later joined the team, including Guo Yingqiu (Secretary of Cultural Education of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and Representative of the Central Northeast Bureau,) Zheng Jiqiao (Representative of the

Central Northeast Bureau,) Yang Zhilin (Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central

Northwest Bureau, and Representative of the Central Committee of the CPC,) and

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of whom were supporters of Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution and were promoted to membership of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. The Party leaders failed to alert themselves to Mao conferring considerable power to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, which comprised his favorite writers,183 and the group quickly substituted or supplemented the functions of the Central Politburo Standing Committee, the Central Politburo Standing Committee, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.184 Mao set a particularly dangerous precedent when he appointed Jiang as Deputy Leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, a Liu Wenzhen (Representative of the Central Southwest Bureau.) Meanwhile, the representatives of the Central South Bureau and North China Bureau were Wang

Renzhong and Zhang Chunqiao, respectively. (Lin ed., Spring and Autumn Annals of the People’s Republic of China, 691.) In mid-July the Central Cultural Revolution Group

Office was established, headed by Mu Xin, Qi Benyu, and Cao Yi’ou (Kang Sheng’s wife.) On August 2, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a notice. Tao Zhu then

acted as consultant to the Central Cultural Revolution Group until he became the target of political attack on January 4, 1967. (Yin, “Establishment of Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.”)

183. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 812.

184. According to public provisions, the Central Cultural Revolution Group was led by the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, but still responded directly to the personal instructions of Mao Zedong, unsupervised by other members of the Standing

Committee, including Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai was later authorized to participate in and chair the “Central Cultural Revolution Briefing Meeting.” This institution played the roles of the Standing Committee, Political Bureau and Secretariat until the 9th

National Congress of the CPC. As late as March 15, 1969, Mao Zedong continued to

convene a “Central Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography

of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1541.) Hu believes that this group was actually a special institution beyond the control of the Central Politburo of the CPC, and was a

command center during the Cultural Revolution. (Hu, Seven Decades of the Communist

Party of China, 460.) Meisner believes that the newly established “Cultural Revolution Group” was a vehicle through which Mao Zedong and his followers controlled the

main publicity authorities in Beijing and throughout China, which in many ways allowed them to wield an equivalent level of authority to the Central Committee of the

CPC and the Central Politburo of the CPC during the Cultural Revolution. (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 293.)

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post that ranked her above Wang Renzhong, who was an Alternate Member of the Central Committee of the CPC.185 This clearly violated the Constitution of the Party passed at the Eighth Congress of the CPC, and also reflects that he used the Central Cultural Revolution Group to displace the power of the Central Committee of the CPC. The Notice on May 16 was Mao’s political guideline in conducting the Cultural Revolution. It openly espoused the theory that the proletariat exercises dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, as well as over the government, including various cultural fields. Another aspect of this theory was the existence of a relationship between proletarian despotism and proletarian dictatorship. In fact, Mao was effectively advocating feudalism in the name of following the proletarian guideline. Zhang Chunqiao, who participated in drafting the Notice on May 16, would later further develop Mao’s theory into the comprehensive dictatorship theory.186 Mao’s economic guideline for the Cultural Revolution was the May 7 Directive. In this he proposed the establishment of revolutionary labor schools (also known as Mao Zedong Thought schools and communist labor schools) for workers, peasants, intellectuals and soldiers.187 Such schools were based on the vision of a society characterized by a small peasant economy, utopian socialism, and military communism.188 The Notice on May 16 also revealed Mao’s tactics in conducting the Cultural Revolution, which is Mao’s theory of destroying “Olds” and establishing “News,”189 which he had formulated as early as 1949. Back then, at the Seventh Session of the Second Plenary Session of the CPC, Mao had proposed to destroy “Olds” and establish “News,”190 with emphasis on the establishment aspect, and the destruction aspect being a means to establishment. Now in 1966, however, Mao’s theory only 185. Yan and Wang, Reflections on History, 279. 186. Zhang, “Discussion on Absolute Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie.” Red Flag, issue 4, 1975.

187. “The Whole Country Shall Become a Big School of Mao Zedong Thought — Celebrating the 39th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA,” People’s Daily, August 1, 1966. This editorial was reviewed and approved by Mao Zedong. 188. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 3–4. 189. As written in the Notice of May 16, Chairman Mao constantly said: “Without destruction

there can be no construction. Destruction is criticism and revolution; destruction means argumentation, which itself implies construction; destruction leads to construction.”

190. In 1949, Mao Zedong said, “We are not only good at destroying the old world, but also

at constructing a new world.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4, 1439).

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focused on the destruction aspect, assuming that destruction of “Olds” would be followed naturally by establishment of “News.” In fact, Chen Boda, who was in charge of drafting the Notice on May 16, further developed Mao’s theory into the theory of destroying the “four olds,” namely the Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits and Old Ideas, through which the exploiting class oppressed the masses.191 All “Olds” belonged to the exploiting class, and the entirety of thousands of years of traditional Chinese culture and history must be broken off with.

The Big-character Poster at Peking University and “Letter to Jiang Qing” The approval of the Notice on May 16 by the Central Committee of the CPC was a coup engineered by Mao Zedong to fully launch the Cultural Revolution by introducing it to the top echelons of the Party. The launch of the Cultural Revolution would have taken longer to complete had it continued along the previous path of gradual transmission, implementation and enforcement via individual layers. Being impatient, Mao Zedong sought a new method that would allow him to launch the Cultural Revolution throughout the whole of society, and sought appropriate major measures and areas where political breakthroughs were necessary. On June 1, 1966, the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Sweep Away all Monsters and Demons.” This editorial, including the title, was dictated and modified by Chen Boda, and was not reported to the Central Committee of the 191. The People’s Daily published an editorial by Chen Boda titled “Sweeping away All ‘Monsters and Demons,’” in which he wrote: “Proletarian Cultural Revolution involves

breaking with all old thoughts, cultures, customs, and habits that poison the people and have been created by the exploiting classes over thousands of years, and creating and

forming new proletarian thoughts, cultures, customs, and habits among the masses. This undertaking is unprecedented, and involves transforming the social traditions

that are part of human history. We must adopt a proletarian perspective to criticize all feudalist and bourgeois legacies, customs, and habits.” (Chen, “Sweeping away

All ‘Monsters and Demons,’” People’s Daily, June 1, 1966). Chen also drafted a speech

for Lin Biao: “We should destroy all the old thoughts, cultures, customs and habits of

the exploiting class, and should reform all superstructures unsuited for the economic foundation of socialism. We should drive out all pests and remove all obstacles! We

should establish the authority of the proletariat and create new thoughts, cultures,

customs, and habits on a proletarian foundation.” (“Lin Biao’s Speech at the Mass Meeting to Celebrate the Proletariat Great Cultural Revolution,” August 18, 1966.)

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CPC before publication.192 On May 29, 1966, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping had convened a conference involving the relevant departments of the Central Committee of the CPC, which resolved that Chen Boda, leader of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee, should lead a working group to be dispatched to the People’s Daily and there learn about the newspaper’s layout and guide the news published by Xinhua News Agency and the Central People’s Broadcasting Station. The next day, Liu, Zhou, and Deng jointly reported this to Mao, and the same evening Mao indicated his support.193 Chen Boda thus acted as Mao Zedong’s spokesman, and his editorial became the political mobilization order with which Mao publicly launched the Cultural Revolution and actively attacked his opponents.194 The phrase “monsters and demons” comes from the 192. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1017. 193. Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi’s 20 Years since the Founding of New China, 351–352. 194. The editorial began by claiming: “The climax of the Proletarian Great Cultural Revolution is emerging in socialist China, home to one quarter of the world’s people. In

just a few short months, directed by the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman Mao, hundreds of millions of workers, farmers and soldiers and other masses, together

with revolutionary officials and intellectuals, have taken Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon to unmask and purge numerous ‘monsters and demons’ that dominate

important ideological and cultural positions within our Party. Acting swiftly and furiously, they have broken the spiritual chains long imposed on them by the exploiting

class, and have beaten down numerous bourgeois experts, scholars, authorities and masters. The defeated bourgeois representatives, scholars and authorities are

dreaming of the restoration of capitalism. Their political rule was overthrown, but they still attempted to maintain their academic ‘authority’ and manipulate it to generate support for restoration and influence the masses who support our Party, including

both the youth and future generations. The Proletariat Cultural Revolution involves thoroughly destroying all old thoughts, cultures, customs and habits that poison the

people and have been created by the exploiting classes over thousands of years, and

creating proletarian new thoughts, cultures, customs and habits among the masses.

This is an unprecedented undertaking that involves a transformation of the social traditions in human history. For all feudalist and bourgeois legacies, customs and

habits, we must thoroughly criticize the proletarian view of the world.” The editorial concluded: “The launch and victory of the Proletariat Great Cultural Revolution, which is unprecedented in human history, marks the end for the remaining capitalist forces in

China, and the end for all reactionaries, including both imperialists and contemporary revisionists. The end of your world is coming. The victory of this Cultural Revolution

will further consolidate the proletarian dictatorship in China and ensure a thorough

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Preface to Li He’s Poems, written by the Tang poet Du Mu, and it alludes to all sorts of evil people. It had previously been used by Mao in March 1955, when he said: “All wrong thoughts, all poisonous weeds, and all types of monsters and demons shall be criticized and we must not let them run wild.”195 On May 9, 1963, Mao associated the phrase “all monsters and demons” with landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and other “bad elements,” thus officially making it a political term.196 The People’s Daily editorial of June 1 gave an extended list of what was meant by this new political term, including the bourgeois “experts,” “scholars,” “authorities,” and “creators of Chinese traditional life,” and the large and small reactionary lines opposed to the Party and socialism centered in the “Three-family Village.” Specifically, “sweeping away all monsters and demons” came to mean “overthrowing everything” and was referenced in the political mobilization order Mao issued personally on January 1, 1967 that formally announced the slogan, “Carry out comprehensive class struggle across the country.” This slogan in turn became the source of the call for “full-scale civil strife.” Once the directive to “sweep away all monsters and demons” had been given, there arose the question of how this should be achieved. Based on the “Breaking and Building Theory” of Mao Zedong, Chen Boda proposed the theory of “Abandoning the Four Olds” (namely, Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits and Old Ideas.) This initiated an era during which there was “no rule of law and justice” and “culture was revolutionized.” However, why did Mao Zedong feel China needed the Cultural Revolution? The June 1 editorial pointed out that the proletarian revolution was a revolution that ended all the old exploitative systems, and thus eliminated the illusion that the exploiting classes would quietly allow the proletariat to take away their privileges and would not want to restore their rule. The exploitative class remained alive and intended to retain its old privileges. Therefore, just as Lenin said, they would undoubtedly make redoubled attempts to restore their lost privilege. The Khrushchev revisionist group’s usurping of the party, army and government in the Soviet Union thus was a serious lesson for the proletariat all over the world.197 This editorial showed that from the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution, those socialist revolution on all battlefronts and the smooth transition from socialism to the greatness of communism!” (People’s Daily, June 1, 1966.)

195. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, 417.

196. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 10, 293.

197. People’s Daily, June 1, 1966.

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who directed the movement engaged in “self-evaluation” and “self-flattery.”198 That evening, Mao ordered the nationwide distribution of the big-character poster What Did Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun Really Do in the Great Cultural Revolution? This poster had been written by seven people including Nie Yuanzi (then Party Secretary of Peking University’s Department of Philosophy,) but was initially developed by Kang Sheng.199 The full text of the poster was published the next day,200 and on May 17 Kang sent his wife, Cao Yi’ou, to Peking University, to instigate Nie and others to write further big-character posters to attract the attention of their superiors. On May 25, Nie’s poster was suddenly displayed on campus.201 That night, after receiving news of the poster, Zhou Enlai sent a group of his supporters to Peking University to observe the situation there. Zhou’s party harshly criticized the conduct of Nie and others, saying that it did not accord with the provision of the Central Committee and violated party discipline. Meanwhile, Kang secretly sent the text of Nie’s big-character poster to Mao, who was then in Hangzhou.202 Without conducting any investigation in person, Mao denounced the Party Committee of Peking University as “a reactionary fortress.”203 He intended 198. The editorial claimed: “Currently, the scale and influence of China’s Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution is unprecedented in human history. The big force, powerful

influence and endless wisdom of the masses during this movement far exceed the imagination of the bourgeois officials. History proves that once Mao Zedong Thought

influences the masses it will became a mighty spiritual A-bomb. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is driving the advance of the socialist undertaking of the Chinese

people and will definitely have an immeasurable and far-reaching influence on the present and future world.” (People’s Daily, June 1, 1966.)

199. Song Shuo was Vice Director of University Department of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC; Lu Ping was President of Peking University and Secretary of the Committee of the CPC; Peng Peiyun was Vice Secretary of the Peking University Committee of the CPC. Shortly thereafter all three were dismissed.

200. Nie et al., What are Song Shuo, Lu Ping and Peng Peiyun really doing in the Great Cultural Revolution? The poster was reprinted in the People’s Daily, June 2, 1966.

201. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1016. 202. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1662–1663. 203. Mao Zedong issued the following instruction on June 1, 1966: “Comrade Kang Sheng and Comrade Boda: This article may be broadcast by Xinhua News Agency and

published in the media throughout the country. I think it is necessary. From today, the reactionary fortress in Peking University should be broken. Please implement according to the conditions.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of

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to strike first in the education sector, first sending Peking University into disorder and then letting the whole country follow. In fact, before Nie and others posted the big-character poster, Zhou Enlai explicitly instructed Lu Ping: “International students from dozens of countries study at Peking University, so we must be careful in carrying out the movement.” Having received the news, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai sent their agents to Peking University to observe the situation there the evening after the big-character poster was posted.204 Li Xuefeng went to Peking University and gave a speech, saying: “The Party has its discipline and the state has its laws, so we should observe this discipline and carry out policies that differentiate between insiders and outsiders. Big-character and small-character posters should be separated, as should posters targeting party insiders and outsiders.” The next day, Zhou Enlai sent Zhang Yan to Peking University to emphasize that the principle of applying policies differently to insiders and outsiders should be observed in displaying big-character posters. Meanwhile, Cao Yi’ou sent someone to seize the manuscript of the big-character poster prior to publication, an intervention that Kang Sheng secretly reported to Mao Zedong. Kang Sheng also notified Zhou Enlai of the poster by telephone, but did so only just before it was published.205 The big-character poster incident shows that Mao Zedong made personal and arbitrary decisions regarding major matters without considering the opinions of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee. Mao Zedong became determined to publicly broadcast the big-character poster written by Nie and others from Peking University after realizing that “Socialist Democracy” was the best method of carrying out the Cultural Revolution. Specifically, he sought to use the “Four Major Ways”: “speaking out freely, airing one’s views fully, writing big-character posters, and holding great debates,” directly breaking from and even dismantling Party organizations and mobilizing the masses via the newspapers and periodicals controlled by the Central Committee. On the surface, the “Four Major Ways” aimed to mobilize the masses, promote democracy and expose enemies. In fact, they became a weapon for the leadership to make personal attacks, destroy the legal system, violate human rights, and torture one another, and thus had enormous negative effects. However, Mao believed that the “Four Major Ways” were an innovative means of directing the masses to carry out the Cultural Revolution. He thus firmly snatched the Central Committee’s monopoly powers over the formation of public opinion and transformed them China, vol. 12, 62–63.) 204. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1016. 205. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 24–25.

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into his personal powers. The displaying of the big-character poster by Nie and others that evening caused huge reverberations at Peking University. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping convened a meeting, and ordered Zhang Chengxian, then Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Secretariat of the CPC, to lead the working group of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC to take up stations in Peking University and direct the Cultural Revolution.206 The Working Group thus took over control of the university from the Party Committee, and attempted to curb the rising student movement. On June 2, in accordance with Mao’s instructions, the People’s Daily published a commentary written by Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Cao Yi’ou, titled “Celebrating the Big-character Poster of Peking University.” The article read: “Whoever opposes Chairman Mao, opposes Mao Zedong Thought, or opposes the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC, actually represents the interests of the overthrown exploiting class. This holds true regardless of the flag they claim to act under, or their seniority. People all over the country thus must rise up against them, overthrow them, and eliminate their reactionary gangs, illegal organizations, and illegal disciplines. The so-called ‘Three-family Village’ (referring to Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha) and the ‘Four-family Village’ are nothing but paper tigers, and so their ‘general’ (referring to Peng Zhen) will not be preserved, and nor will their “chariots and horses” (referring to Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun.)”207 The article further proposed that overthrowing “reactionary gangs, illegal organizations, and illegal disciplines” is to overthrow those in charge of the Party and government, overthrow the party organization and discipline, and defy all party laws and regulations. Mao praised the big-character poster as the “first big-character poster of Marxism-Leninism to be displayed across the country,” and the “1960s equivalent of the Paris Commune Proclamaton” that exceeded the original in significance.208 In fact, the big-character poster did not discuss the principles of Marxism-Leninism or even mention Marx or Lenin, but merely criticized three leaders by name. It was devoid of any clear “Marxism-Leninism” and instead was simply rebellious, denouncing the Party Committee of Peking University and the Beijing Municipal 206. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1016–1018. 207. “Celebrating the Big-character Poster of Peking University,” People’s Daily, February 2, 1966.

208. Mao Zedong made his comments in a speech before the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC on July 21, 1966. (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 378.)

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Party Committee, saying “What kinds of people are you and what conspiracy are you plotting? Surely the answer is clear? You are ‘sticking to your posts’ in a last-ditch struggle to destroy the Cultural Revolution.” This was possibly Mao’s own perspective. His intention was to send a message to the people, using the bigcharacter posters, that it was acceptable to attack local party leaders.209 On August 5, Mao reviewed “Celebrating the Big-character Poster of Peking University” with the following comment: “Wrong leadership harming the revolution shall not be accepted unconditionally, and shall be firmly resisted.”210 By now Mao not only wielded supreme political power, but also supreme and exclusive ideological power, and so he alone judged whether something belonged to Marxism-Leninism, whether it was revisionist, or whether it represented correct leadership. His high appraisal of the big-character poster of Peking University later came to be seen as a joke for many years.211 Ten years later, Mao would reverse his attitude and denounce Nie as an anarchist.212 From a theoretical perspective, Mao saw Marxism-Leninism and anarchism as interchangeable, which revealed his typical theoretical opportunism. From a political perspective, a mere word from Mao could send Nie or any person to either “heaven” or “hell.”213 This gave him enormous scope to indulge in the political opportunism he favored. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s opportunism was clearly displayed as at different times he contradicted himself as expedient according to the circumstances of political struggle. The event on June 1 is considered the official beginning of the Cultural 209. Wang, Frustrations of a Transcendent Leader, 53. 210. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, p 93.

211. In 1965, Mao Zedong wrote, “What is Marxism on earth? At that time the leaders of

the Central Committee of the CPC (meaning the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC who had made leftist dogmatist errors during the period from early 1931

to late 1934) knew little or nothing, and so they continued these errors for years.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 499.)

212. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 488–489.

213. In March 1973, Nie Yuanzi was dismissed from the Party in the name of the May

16 counter-revolutionist movement and forced to work under supervision; in April

1978, he was arrested, and in 1983 he was jailed for 17 years on charges of counterrevolutionary activities. Tu Guangqun: “Nie Yuanzi-from Rebellion to Purgatory,” Tastes of Life, Beijing: China Workers Publishing House.

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Revolution.214 Mao said: “Once broadcast (publicly,) this big-character poster caused a nation-wide stir.”215 Nie later described events as follows: “On that day, a blast occurred in Peking University, in Beijing, and across the country! A great proletarian cultural revolution reached its climax.”216 The publication of the bigcharacter poster caused an immediate and strong response across the country. Chaos instantly engulfed every university, college, junior college and technical secondary school in Beijing and paralyzed their party organizations. After Peking University denounced Lu Ping and Peng Peiyun, Nanjing University denounced its president Kuang Yaming, Wuhan University denounced its president Li Da, the Shanghai Conservatory of Music denounced its president He Lüting, and Tsinghua University not only denounced its president Jiang Nanxiang but also suspended him from duties on June 10 pending the results of an investigation into his conduct. This response exceeded the expectations Mao, and took Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping by surprise.217 However, they had different ideas about how best to deal with the explosive student movements and so responsed differently. These different ideas became the roots of fundamental political divisions. The central collective leadership (that is, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee) formed since the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1965 thus disintegrated. Liu’s party considered maintaining social stability as fundamental to the interest of the CPC. Mao, on the other hand, was a revolutionary leader with a naturally rebellious spirit. Mao and Liu parted in opposite directions at the start of the Cultural Revolution, respectively leading the struggle between the rebels and conservatives both within the Party (where the rebels were represented by the “Cultural Revolution Group”) and within society (where the rebels were 214. Wang, Frustrations of a Transcendent Leader, 53. 215. On October 25, 1966, Mao Zedong recalled, “I never expected that things would change so swiftly. Simply broadcasting a big-character poster created a nation-wide stir.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 413.)

216. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 27. 217. Jin Chongji reflected the views of many scholars: “Just like the Wenhui Daily incident with Yao Wenyuan’s article, the Central Committee members, including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping were completely unprepared for the public broadcasting of

the big-character posters by Nie Yuanzi and others. Chen Yi asked Zhou Enlai, ‘Why didn’t you say anything about a big thing like this?’, to which Zhou Enlai replied, “I

had no advance warning either, and learned of it only when Kang Sheng told me just before publication.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1663.)

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represented by the colleges and universities.) The political struggle and related social movement suddenly came together, exploding into the launch of the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s ruling philosophy was that of struggle, and the launch of the Cultural Revolution fully expressed this. On June 2, the People’s Daily published an editorial, “A Revolution Touching the People’s Soul — further developing Mao’s ‘philosophy of struggle.’” The article read: “Chairman Mao often quotes, ‘The tree craves calm but the wind will not drop’, by which he means to tell us: class struggle exists objectively and is independent of human will. Struggle is life. If you do not fight you will face attack. If you do not hit, you will be hit. If you do not destroy, you will be destroyed. This is a life-and-death class struggle in which it is crucial to maintain vigilance.”218 This editorial restored the historical memory and collective memory of the Party and nation of the revolution and struggle, and stirred their passion to continue the revolutionary struggle. Young students full of revolutionary passion immediately responded strongly to the political mobilization by Mao. On the same day, Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School posted a big-character poster written by Red Guards, Fight to the Death to Defend the Dictatorship of the Proletariat! Fight to the Death to Defend Mao Zedong Thought! The poster read: “We will resolutely follow all instructions from Chairman Mao and show determination to cope with all difficulties! We will smash whomever opposes Mao Zedong Thought no matter who they are, what name they use, or what high position they occupy!” This poster fully expressed the political passion and excitement of young students, and expressed unprecedented social resonance with Mao’s own political slogans and objectives. As a result, the first Red Guard organization was established on May 29, 1966, and the date came to be known as “Red Guard Day.” Over 100 students including Pu Dahua openly joined. Students from every middle school in Beijing flocked to the Tsinghua University High School to imitate such so-called revolutionary action; Red Guard organizations appeared on the campuses of every Beijing college and university in succession. This was what Mao had hoped for, and his political excitement grew in response. On June 3, the Central Committee of the CPC formally decided to reorganize the Beijing Municipal Party Committee.219 The next day, the new Beijing Municipal 218. People’s Daily, June 2, 1966. 219. The Central Committee of the CPC announced their decisions: “Li Xuefeng, First Secretary of the North China Central Bureau, is to concurrently serve as First Secretary

of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC; Wu De, First Secretary of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the CPC, is transferred to the Beijing Municipal Committee of

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Party Committee decided to reorganize the Party Committee of Peking University and send a working group to lead schools paralyzed by leadership void.220 The same day, Liu, Zhou, and Deng presided over the enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and formulated the Eight Provisions: implement policies in a way that differentiates insiders and outsiders; pay attention to keeping secrets and do not post bigcharacter posters on the streets; do not organize demonstrations; do not discuss revolutionary experiences; do not engage in large-scale meetings to politically denounce others; do not surround the residences of “reactionary gangs”; do not hit people, insult people, or similarly abuse people.221 The core aim of the Eight Provisions was to uphold the Party’s leadership and maintain social stability, but these instructions were conveyed verbally rather than being distributed in written form. Specifically, Beijing sent nearly 10,000 working group members successively to verbally relay these provisions and other instructions. With a few exceptions, all major cities across the country sent working groups which acted as “temporary Party committees” or “temporary Party branches.” The Eight Provisions apparently were designed to control the young student movement, and Liu and others made similar interventions intended to control the movement. This differed from Mao’s original intention, which was to launch an uncontrolled mass movement. Liu repeatedly sought instructions from and reported by telephone to Mao, who was then in Hangzhou, but failed to receive clear responses. After listening to the report on the Cultural Revolution in the Beijing region, the enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee agreed with the proposal of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee to send working groups to universities and high schools in an attempt to control the

the CPC as Second Secretary, and will reform the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC. The work of the socialist Great Cultural Revolution in Beijing will be under the direct leadership of the reformed municipal committee.” (People’s Daily, June 4, 1966.)

220. The reformed Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC made the following decisions: (1) designate a work team headed by Zhang Chengxian to lead the Socialist Great Cultural Revolution in Peking University; (2) Dismiss Lu Ping and Peng Peiyun, the Secretary and Vice Secretary of the Peking University Committee of the CPC respectively, from

all their positions and reorganize the Peking University Committee of the CPC; (3)

authorize the work team to exercise the duties of the Committee of the CPC during the reorganization of the Peking University Committee of the CPC.

221. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 35.

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chaos.222 From June 5, the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC accelerated the dispatch of working groups. By the middle of June working groups successively entered and were stationed in most of the colleges and universities in Beijing, as well as in some high schools. However, the Central Committee of the CPC under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi actually did not make any (formal) decision to send working groups, and did not even issue any documents regarding this matter.223 The fact is, the first working group dispatched was a collective decision made by the Party Central Committee, sending Chen Boda’s group to the People’s Daily. On May 30, Liu, Zhou, and Deng wrote to Mao, saying: “For the past two months, the prestige of the People’s Daily has greatly decreased, which has adversely affected the Party and state. The Editorial Committee cannot change the present situation, so many people support the Central Committee’s sending a working group there. We will hold a meeting today to discuss this and intend to organize a temporary working group under the direct leadership of Chen Boda, to manage the newspaper’s daily layout, and to direct the press releases of the Xinhua News Agency and the broadcasting station. The members of the working group who are in Beijing intend to enter the newspaper office to commence work on May 31.” The same day, Mao officially responded: “Agreed.”224 The decision to send the second working group to Peking university was jointly discussed and made by Liu, Zhou, and Deng, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, as well as other relevant leaders, and was also reported to Mao.225 On June 3, Kuai Dafu, a third-year student from Tsinghua University’s Department of Chemical Engineering, posted a big-character poster, Long Live “Suspecting Everything.” A few days later, Ye Lin, leader of the university’s working

222. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1415. According to Wu De, when Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping heard the reports of Li Xuefeng and Wu De, Li

discussed how to solve the problem that university management was paralyzed in the

absence of leadership, so Deng Xiaoping suggested the Beijing Committee of the CPC designate a work team, but Chen Boda disagreed. Liu and Deng decided to designate

a work team anyway to understand the situation and lead the movement in the school.

(Zhu et al. eds., Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing, 8.)

223. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1020. 224. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 61.

225. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 173.

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group, judged this comment a “rightist view.”226 Wang Shaoguang believed that from June to July leaders at all levels, from the Central Committee to the grassroots, considered the Cultural Revolution movement another anti-Rightist movement. According to this interpretation, any unauthorized attack against the party branches or the officials of party committees was considered an attack against the Party itself, and hence was unforgivable.227 On June 4, the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Tear off the Bourgeois Fig Leaf of ‘Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity’,” written under the auspices of Chen Boda and in accordance with the Notice on May 16. The article said: “Any monster or demon, conspirator or ambitious schemer is sure to bump their head until it is broken and bleeding, lose all standing and reputation, and see their schemes end in complete failure, if they attempt to seize our fortress from within and restage Khrushchev’s usurping of the Party, army and government in China.”228 226. On the Tsinghua University Staff and Students Meeting, Ye Lin said, “The situation

of Tsinghua University during the Great Cultural Revolution is good, but we should prevent bad elements from profiting from this situation. There is a Kuai Dafu who has

sought to create doubt and overthrow the existing order with a big-character poster. Did he want to overthrow socialism? That would be a rightist desire.”

227. Wang, Frustration of a Transcendent Leader: the Great Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 53–54. 228. The editorial claimed: “Several bourgeois representatives (Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi,

etc.) entered our party organization through deceit and covered the class nature of the struggle with ulterior motives. They insisted the serious political struggle was a ‘pure academic issue’ and involved ‘discussion of different opinions,’ and held illegal

opinions regarding bourgeois ‘freedom, equity, and fraternity’ while opposing the line of the proletarian Cultural Revolution of the Central Committee of the CPC headed by

Mao Zedong. They spouted crazy slogans like ‘express all different opinions (including

anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist thoughts,)’ ‘everyone is equal before the truth,’ ‘never arbitrarily suppress others like a clique,’ ‘be cautious and tolerant in struggling against

the anti-CPC and anti-socialist monsters and demons,’ and so on, and thus deceived the masses, muddied the waters, blurred lines between classes, and change struggle

targets. Their goal was to encourage the bourgeois rightists and erode the authority of the proletarian leftists, and to protect the former while attacking the latter. They

advocate bourgeois liberalization and revisionism, and await an opportunity to

destroy the proletarian world, and to seize political power from the proletariat and

implement capitalist restoration. These years you, the bourgeois authorities, have allowed monsters and demons to cooperate with the anti-China forces of imperialists, contemporary revisionists, and reactionaries in different countries around the world in releasing toxic thoughts. Your toxic thoughts have spread throughout our country, via

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This article thus fabricated a false sense of danger from a “Chinese Khrushchev,” and the false threat of “usurping the Party, army and government.” On the same day, the People’s Daily published an editorial, “New Victory for Mao Zedong Thought,” saying: “The leadership of the former Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC is advocating an anti-Party and anti-socialist reactionary line. Some main persons in charge of the former Beijing Municipal Party Committee (referring to Peng Zhen, Liu Ren, etc.) are not Marxists, but revisionists. The decisions by the Central Committee of the CPC and the new Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC are very wise and correct, which represents a new victory for Mao Zedong Thought.”229 On July 1, Red Flag published an editorial, “Thoroughly Criticize the Revisionist Line of Some Main Persons in Charge of the Former Beijing Municipal Party Committee.” Without mentioning names, this article described Peng Zhen and others as “promoting an anti-Party and anti-socialist reactionary line.” The main point of this reactionary line was presented as being: “to oppose the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the correct line of the Central Party Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong, and to carry out the counterrevolutionary revisionist line.” The article also listed 10 charges, saying: “a handful of anti-Party insurgents of the former Beijing Municipal Party Committee regard Beijing as an ‘independent kingdom’; no one can meddle in or criticize it, and it is an untouchable tiger. However, they have reached out and stirred up trouble, and belong to a group of conspirators or ambitious schemers.”230 newspapers, broadcasts, publications, books, textbooks, speeches, literary and artistic

works, movies, dramas, folk operas, fine arts, music, and dance. What you want is

the freedom to have a ‘Three-household Village’, an illegal group that spreads illegal speeches, and that performs or shows reactionary operas and movies like Xie Yaohuan, Li Huiniang, Hai Rui Dismissed, and City Under Siege. This group airs the grievances of rightist opportunists and encourages their return, while suppressing the passion of the

workers, farmers, soldiers, and masses for the flexible learning and application of the works of Chairman Mao, and advocating for the corruptive decline of the bourgeois

thought of the landholder class, as well as for revisionism and preparation for the

capitalist restoration. You worship bourgeois ‘experts’ and ‘scholars,’, regard them as your deities and strive to advocate for them. Your slogan ‘everyone is equal before the

truth’ is really calling to oppose Mao Zedong Thought and substitute it with reactive bourgeois thoughts and revisionism.” (People’s Daily, June 4, 1966.) 229. People’s Daily, June 4, 1966. 230. “The main errors of some leaders of the Beijing Municipal Committee are as follows:

first, resisting the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Second, opposing the urban

and rural socialist education movement. Third, ignoring class struggle and seeking

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In June, acting on the instruction of Mao, the Central Committee reorganized the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Department of Culture. Tao Zhu, then First Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, was instructed to work in the Central Committee of the CPC and act as Administrative Secretary of the CCCPC Secretariat and Minister of the CCCPC Propaganda Department. Tao thus formally filled the political positions vacated by Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi, and began his political life in the Party Central Committee. On June 6, Zhang Pinghua, then First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, was transferred to work in the Central Committee of the CPC and act as the Administrative Vice Minister of the CCCPC Propaganda Department. On the same day, the session of the CCCPC Secretariat decided to send the working group to the CCCPC Propaganda Department. In August 2, the Central Committee of the CPC decided to send Tao to act concurrently as a consultant to the CCCPC Cultural Revolution Group. On December 27 and 28 of the same year, Tao was denounced as “the biggest royalist in China” by Jiang Qing and her allies,231 and thus became the shortest-serving member of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau, fully demonstrating the unpredictable political situation and ruthlessness of the political struggle during the Cultural Revolution. On June 10, in Hangzhou, Mao convened the persons in charge of each region for a discussion, saying: “Dare to go all out and do not be afraid of chaos. Go all out to mobilize the masses, and make great efforts, and we will expose all monsters and demons. It is not necessary to send working groups and we should not fear even if the rightists make trouble. A big-character poster at Peking University ignited the Great Cultural Revolution! This is a revolutionary storm that none can suppress. The characteristics of this movement are: it has come ferociously, the leftists are very active, and while the rightists are stubbornly resisting and doing ‘peaceful evolution’. Fourth, trying to replace the proletarian dictatorship with

bourgeois dictatorship. Fifth, preparing public opinion for capitalist restoration and the overthrow of proletarian political power. Sixth, disagreeing with the educational guidelines of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC and implementing bourgeois revisionist education guidelines. Seventh, opposing flexible learning and the

use of Mao Zedong Thought. Eighth, summoning traitors to surrender and form a clique to pursue selfish interests. Ninth, enforcing a ‘blockade’ around the Central Committee

of the CPC. Tenth, superficially praising the ‘red flag’ while secretly opposing it.” (Red Flag, issue 9, July 1, 1966; People’s Daily, July 3, 1966.)

231. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–1949), vol. 2, 105..

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some damage they are not dominant.”232 Mao himself lit the fire of the Cultural Revolution, and would not permit anyone (particularly Liu Shaoqi and other members of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau) to “put out the fire.” Mao encountered information asymmetry and uncertainty throughout the Cultural Revolution. It was unclear who were leftists, who were rightists, and who were “monsters and demons.” Equally it was unclear who could distinguish these various actors and how, who should provide the necessary information, and who should verify that information. Mao Zedong never solved any of these information problems, and acted “like a blind man feeling an elephant, where everywhere he felt he found a target.” Nie Yuanzi was one of the first targets Mao felt. The same day, while meeting Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh, Mao talked about the “Necessity of a Split within the Party,” saying: “It is impossible for a party not to split. Everything is divided into two.” Mao always advocated that the Party “unite and not split,” yet he himself contradicted this. Based on the theory of “dividing one into two,” he believed that a party split was inevitable. From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to his death, Mao’s theories and practices became the roots for a lasting political split within the Party. However, the Party failed to realize the severe negative political consequences of Mao’s actions. Mao also talked to Ho about the sensitive issue of leadership succession. He said: “We are both over 70.233 One day, we will be invited to join Marx, but who will succeed us? Bernstein, Kautsky or Khrushchev, we do not know. We should prepare for this and still have time to do so.”234 Mao enjoyed revealing to foreign leaders 232. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1417. 233. In 1966, Mao Zedong was 73 years old while Ho Chi Minh was 76. 234. Mao Zedong said to Ho Chi Minh, “Now China has revisionists too. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun, all are our friends. You may ask, why did we

not find these revisionists earlier. Actually, we knew. Peng Zhen has made many errors and I have wanted to replace him for years, but the Beijing Municipal Committee was

an independent kingdom out of our control....This struggle started in November of last year and has lasted over seven months. At first Yao Wenyuan stirred up criticism against the revisionists. Yao is a young man with a passion for discussing how to

ensure officials are clean. Do you admire clean officials? You have claimed there are clean officials in the world, but I have never seen them. All officials have problems to different degrees, and in reality there is no such thing as a clean official....Now we

have abandoned the debate over clean or corrupt officials, and are focused on the

Great Cultural Revolution in the fields of education, literature and art, philosophy, historiography, and the mass media. This time hundreds or even thousands of people

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thoughts that he would not discuss openly with other party leaders. At this time, he was both ready to seek a successor and prepared for the Chinese Communist Party to split once more. He regarded Liu Shaoqi as akin to Khrushchev, and felt there was still time to replace or overthrow him. The question was how to achieve this. Mao did not reveal the answer to Ho, and Liu was equally in the dark. Simultaneously, Mao was very suspicious of Lin Biao’s political motives. As he commented to Ho: “Everyone wishes that you ‘live long’. Here is some advice. Not everyone is loyal to you. Most may be loyal, but a minority may merely verbally wish that you ‘live long’ while privately thinking other thoughts. When he (referring to Lin Biao) wishes that you ‘live long’, you should be careful, and should stop to analyze. The more a person flatters you, the less reliable that person is.235 One month later, in “A Letter to Jiang Qing,” Mao again expressed his suspicion of Lin’s political motives. Mao had complex relationships with other leaders (Liu and Lin for example,) and under the highly centralized political system these relationships came to display a “paradox of gerontocracy.” On the one hand, he chose his successor based on loyalty, and judged the loyalty of others based on whether they agreed with his personal opinions. On the other hand, he distrusted those who flattered him (such as Lin) and suspected their political motives. In his later years, Mao Zedong rarely communicated and lacked mutual political trust with the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC. In most cases, this distrust developed because Mao first doubted the political motives of others, which caused distrust within the collective leadership and a consequent split. At this time, divergent opinions existed on whether working groups should be sent to colleges and universities. Since the issue was very important, Mao was asked to make the final decision. However, Mao imperiously refused to return to Beijing. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng thus went to Hangzhou from June 9 to 12 to report to Mao on the condition of the Cultural Revolution. Liu asked: “What methods should schools adopt in pursuing the Cultural Revolution? Some simply seize power, others criticize the academic authorities and then seek to reform teaching systems, or to solve problems such as those of exams and teaching materials. Should the Cultural Revolution movements in urban factories and the countryside be combined with the Four Clean-ups movement?” Mao did not clearly answer these questions. The meeting in Hangzhou did not specifically discuss the issue of sending working may be the targets of attack.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 126.)

235. Bo, Reviews on Several Major Decisions and Events, vol. 2, 1167.

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groups to schools but Mao was already suspicious of the practice, and said: “It is not good to send working groups quickly and without preparation. Why not delay sending a working group to a place in extended turmoil until after the situation is clarified?”236 At this time, Mao as not merely unafraid of national disorder, but actually needed it. However, Liu and other leaders did fear disorder, and hoped to obtain political support from Mao. When Liu and other leaders asked Mao to return to Beijing237 to preside over the work of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao refused, but “authorized” Liu and other leaders to watch for opportunities to deal with the problems arising in the movement. The reality was that Mao deliberately sent out conflicting signals to lure Liu into a political trap. At the meeting in Hangzhou, Mao Zedong first mentioned the assumption that the Cultural Revolution movement “might last for half a year.” He said: “I think, during the next half year, reading books will be unnecessary, and newspapers will be more relevant to real life.”238 In fact, since June 1, almost all students of colleges, universities and secondary schools (534 thousand college and university students and 12.97 million secondary school students) had essentially stopped attending classes in response to Mao’s calls to pursue Cultural Revolution. However, the initially proposed half year during which these students would stop reading books to pursue the Cultural Revolution extended to several years. Following this directive, on June 13, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council decided to reform the college entrance examination and postpone college enrollment preparations for half a year.239 In fact, colleges and universities 236. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1021. 237. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., In Memory of Liu Shaoqi, 343; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1663–1664.

238. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1422; Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1022.

239. The notice read: “The Great Cultural Revolution is gathering force in junior colleges

and high schools, and it is time to deepen the movement. The high school entrance examination has been somewhat improved since the founding of New China, but

remains influenced by the bourgeois exemption system, and contradicts the educational guidelines of the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman Mao. This weakness of the entrance examination prevents revolutionary youth, including workers, farmers, and soldiers, from entering high schools. The examination system must be thoroughly reformed, and so time is needed to research and implement new enrollment methods.

Considering the above conditions, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State

Council decided in 1966 to postpone enrollment in higher education for half a year.”

(Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council on the Reform of Entrance

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across the country were allowed to suspend classes for half a year to carry out the Cultural Revolution movement. On June 27, the Ministry of Higher Education announced the suspension of graduate enrollment in 1966 and 1967. On June 18, the People’s Daily published the decision of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council together with the editorial, “Strive to Implement the Great Cultural Revolution and Thoroughly Reform the Education System.”240 On July 12, the People’s Daily published the Letter to the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong, written by seven students including Li Yusheng from Renmin University, advocating that the old educational system be resolutely, thoroughly, and quickly smashed, and suggesting the implementation of a brand new educational system based on liberal arts colleges and universities.241 These events reflected the manner Examination Methods for Higher Education and the Postponement of Enrollment for Half a Year in 1966, June 13, 1966.)

240. The editorial claimed: “The existing entrance examination system has become an obstacle to socialist education and the proletarian Cultural Revolution movement. The thorough revolution of the education system will destroy the influence of the

old educational thinking of the exploiting class, which has been implemented for thousands of years since Confucius, and will overthrow a key position of the bourgeois

authorities and scholar-tyrants. It is suggested that primary school students in lower grades can learn some Chairman Mao quotations, and those in higher grades can learn more quotations and read three representative articles by Chairman Mao. Meanwhile,

middle school students can read Selected Readings of the Works of Mao Zedong and

relevant articles, and those in university can read the Selected Works of Mao Zedong.

Whether in primary school, middle school, or high school, Chairman Mao’s works shall be a required course.” People’s Daily, June 18, 1966.

241. The letter suggested: “First, once this Great Cultural Revolution is over, all students who have studied in liberal arts universities must be graduated early and dispatched to the three major revolutionary movements to join the workers, farmers and soldiers

unconditionally and for a long period. Second, Chairman Mao’s works must be used as

teaching materials in liberal arts universities, and class struggle shall be a main course. Third, from now on the period of study at liberal art universities shall become 1–3

years as instructed by Chairman Mao and the state, and there shall be daily education on industrial and agricultural work, military learning and class struggle. Fourth,

self-study and discussion shall become the main form of teaching, with teachers to adjust their instruction as appropriate; moreover, schools shall teach democratically, and shall abolish teaching based on cramming and rote learning. Fifth, in the future universities shall absorb those young people who have undergone testing in the

three major revolutionary movements and have enlightened political consciousness

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in which Mao interacted with young students at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Young students responded positively whenever Mao called for action, and he in turn reacted positively and issued another call for them to rally behind. On July 24, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council issued the Notice on the Reform of Enrollment Work for Colleges and Universities, which cancelled entrance exams and replaced them with a combined system of recommendation and selection.242 College and university enrollment work in 1966 started on January 1 and ended at the end of the month. At the time, students of colleges, universities and secondary schools, as well as their parents, remained unaware that the Chinese college enrollment system had been abolished and college enrollment had stopped. China thus entered a disruptive period during which human capital was destroyed, and a record was and a certain cultural level even if they may not have graduated from high school. In

this way the elites among workers, poor farmers and demobilized soldiers can enter

higher education.” People’s Daily published an editorial to accompany the letter, which read: “This letter is an application of red thought by those revolutionary youth who

have grown up under the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought, and who wish to devote themselves to the three fiery-hot revolutionary mass movements, and challenge the

old educational system and the bourgeois authorities. We absolutely support their revolutionary proposal that students undergo practical tests and join with the workers,

farmers, and soldiers to ardently pursue practical revolution and early graduation.” People’s Daily, July 12, 1966.

242. The Notice read: “Since the founding of New China, the entrance examination method

of higher schools has gradually improved, but remains bound by the bourgeois

framework, and does not yet reflect the educational guideline of the Central

Committee of the CPC and Chairman Mao. This situation prevents more revolutionary youth, including workers, farmers, and soldiers, from entering higher education. This

examination system must be thoroughly reformed. From this year, a combination of recommendation and selection rather than examination shall be adopted to manage

enrollment in higher education. The system of recommendation and selection for

enrollment in higher education shall follow the mass line under the leadership of local committees of the CPC. Selection of freshmen for enrollment in higher education must follow the principle ‘politics first’. The class line of the CPC must be carried out, and

eligible children of workers, poor farmers, revolutionary officials, soldiers and martyrs, and other laborers shall enjoy priority enrollment in higher education. Current high school graduates from the exploiting class shall be subject to rigorous review, with

an appropriate number who have good political performance being allowed to enter higher education.”

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set as no students were enrolled in colleges and universities for four consecutive years. Only in 1970 did colleges and universities restore enrollment, and enrollment that year totaled only 42,000, just a quarter of the figure in 1965.243 The number of students enrolled in general colleges and universities in China during 1970 was 48,000, compared to 117,000 in 1949. The educational revolution thus became a tragic historical farce, with its biggest victims being college and university students. What was Mao’s political purpose in ordering schools to suspend classes to carry out revolution? On June 15, Mao Zedong told those in charge of the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee: “The Great Cultural Revolution is an exercise to combat and prevent revisionism. I want to use this movement to train young people.”244 Thus, Mao’s most important aim in launching the Cultural Revolution was to train the youth. In fact, from the very beginning, the Cultural Revolution was not a movement to combat and prevent revisionism, but a negative movement that destroyed education and fostered a cultural desert. On June 14, Liu and Deng convened the enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau to convey the spirit of the Hangzhou Conference. Regarding working groups, Mao merely said, “It is not good to send working groups quickly,” but also did not request the withdrawal of the working groups that had been dispatched. Liu said: “The working groups dispatched to middle schools were sent by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League. Some of them are good and those that are not shall be withdrawn.” He also said: “Some working groups were sent out only to be driven back. Does this mean they lacked ability? Is disorder good?” Wang Dongxing attended this conference in his capacity as Mao Zedong’s deputy.245 Mao knew what Liu was thinking. Disorderly criticism, denouncement, and other forms of upheavel were common in most schools at the time. Schools also witnessed conflicts between or among opposing factions. Occasionally these conflicts led to suicides, or saw people beaten to death. As the frontline of leadership, Liu repeatedly held briefings on events at the universities, and personally visited Peking University and Tsinghua 243. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., 50 Years of New China (1949–1999), 577.

244. Mao Zedong said, “This movement is an anti-revisionist drill. Our young people have no opportunity to experience the test of revolutionary war and thus lack political

experience. The movement will allow them to weather storms, gain first-hand experience, and become worthy successors to the proletarian revolution. I want to

train them in the movement.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976),

vol. 2, 1418.)

245. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1022–1023.

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University to read big-character posters and understand the situation.246 On June 18, Nie Yuanzi wrote a big-character poster publicly opposing the Eight Instructions of the Central Committee of the CPC. Some students also arbitrarily decided to criticize and denounce 40 “reactionary gangsters” including Lu Ping. On receiving this news, Zhang Chengxian, leader of the working group stationed at Peking University, made a personal appearance to seriously criticize these behaviors, and the same afternoon he reported this event to the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC. The Municipal Committee immediately transmitted his report to Liu and other members of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau. The next day students drove out the working group at Tsinghua University, and Liu then dispatched Wang Guangmei as advisor to the university working group to learn about and report on the situation. On June 20, the Central Committee of the CPC transmitted its Brief Report on the Cultural Revolution at Peking University (No. 9), briefing the situation: “On June 18, the students of Peking University criticized and denounced more than 40 persons, including Lu Ping, by smearing their faces black, making them wear tall hats, ordering them to kneel, and, in a few cases, assaulting them. The working group promptly discovered these behaviors and put a stop to them.” Liu added the instruction: “The methods used by the working group of Peking University in dealing with confused criticisms and denouncements are correct and timely. If such phenomena occur, all units can apply the methods of Peking University to deal with them.” This demonstrates Liu’s opposition to the criticism and denouncement of leaders and teachers. However, Mao publicly supported these practices and considered Liu to be “suppressing the student movement,” which created a divergence between them and became the direct cause of Liu’s downfall. On August 5, Mao directed the Central Committee of the CPC to cancel the transmission of the report, calling the release of the report to be an error. The same day, Liu learned about the situation from the working group of the No.1 High School Attached to Beijing Normal University, and said: “They have taken the offensive against you. This is good. The enemy have revealed themselves. With the snake now emerged from his hole it becomes easier to wipe him out. Have a good criticism of this big-character poster and struggle again.” The development of the Cultural Revolution in the Beijing region became increasingly extreme, and the situation risked spiralling out of control. While Liu attempted to bring the situation under control, Mao thought it not sufficiently disordered and decided to further publicize “big-character posters,” doing so at the expense of the more routine publication of documents of the Central Committee 246. Ibid.

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of the CPC. On June 20, the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Revolutionary Big-character Posters are a Monster-revealing Mirror Exposing All Monsters and Demons,” which publicly conveyed Mao Zedong’s instruction: “The big-character poster is a useful new weapon and can be used wherever the masses are, for example in the cities, the countryside, factories, cooperatives, shops, governmental organs, schools, the army, and streets. This weapon has been used widely and will be used forever.”247 The editorial also said: “The attitude to revolutionary big-character posters is an important sign that distinguishes between proletarian revolutionaries and bourgeois royalists, as well as between real and false revolution. Are you a revolutionary? If your answer is ‘yes’, then you will welcome and uphold bigcharacter posters, and support letting the masses freely write such posters and expose problems.”248 Thus, the “big-character poster” formally became the main tool for pursuing the Cultural Revolution, and numerous revolutionary enemies were artificially created. Liu realized that this marked the beginnings of a nationwide schism, supported by some senior leaders.249 After June 20, the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC, including Liu, Deng, and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC, became increasingly disunited with regard to the working group issue. On June 20, the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC presented a written proposal to the Central Committee of the CPC, saying: “It is suggested that the colleges, universities, middle schools and educational authorities set up Cultural Revolution leading groups at appropriate times to lead the Cultural Revolution,” and “Working groups can be dispatched by higher authorities as and when necessary.”250 On the evening of June 21, Liu and Deng convened the enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau to study the problems that had arisen in the movement. Liu proposed: “A line should be drawn short of describing people as reactionary gangs. The movement shall restore the organizational lives of the Party and the League, and the working group can assume the functions and powers of party committees that fail to perform. However, seizure of power should not be permitted. Inadequate working groups can be disbanded, but casting aside party leaders is destructive since most party committee members are good. Take the Cultural Revolution as the focus, but do not overthrow everything. In pursuing the movement, attach importance to production, work, and living. Use Sunday as 247. Mao, “Introduction to a Cooperative,” People’s Daily, April 15, 1958. 248. People’s Daily, June 20, 1966. 249. Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi’s 20 Years after the Founding of New China, 354. 250. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 175–176.

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a day for rest, and pay attention to combining work and rest. Additionally, pay attention to the fact that some counter-revolutionaries appear to be ‘leftists’ while others appear to be ‘rightists’. While we make use of big-character posters, so too do counter-revolutionaries. Based on the spirit of the 23-Article Document, we should prohibit attacking and insulting people, and punishing them under the guise of administering justice.”251 Liu and Deng strongly refuted Chen Boda’s suggestion to cancel the working groups. The session proposed: “Further strengthen the leadership of the Great Cultural Revolution,” and emphasized: “Arresting, seizing and denouncing people without reason is not allowed. It is forbidden to beat and insult people, and to punish them under the guise of administering justice. Willfully seizing power and overthrowing the existing order is not allowed. It is necessary to restore the organizational life of the Party and the League, do well in production, work, and living, and safeguard the normal social order.”252 Liu, Deng, and others tried to put the Cultural Revolution under the leadership of the Party, curb anarchism, maintain the integrity of the legal system, protect personal safety, and maintain social order. Their approach thus differed markedly from Mao’s idea of “great national disorder,” making conflict inevitable sooner or later. From this perspective, Liu was the biggest “conservative” in terms of maintaining the Party’s leadership, while Mao was the biggest “rebel.”253 The next question is, why did thousands of young students spontaneously and actively responded to Mao’s call that “rebellion is justified”? On the same day, Kuai Dafu of Tsinghua University wrote a note on a bigcharacter poster, saying: “The first question of the revolution is to seize power. In the past, power was monopolized by the University Party Committee, so we fought them and took power. Now, power is in the hands of the working group. As leftists, we should consider whether this power is wielded such that it represents us. If it does, we should uphold it, while if it does not, we should seize it back.” Wang Guangmei, who joined the working group of Tsinghua University, analyzed the situation and warned: “Kuai Dafu is going to seize power.” Bo Yibo thus phoned the working group and instructed them to strike back against Kuai. 251. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1025. 252. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1920.

253. Meisner believes that the Cultural Revolution is the historical highlight of post-1949 China because the call for the overthrow of and struggle against the political order came precisely from those who had created it, particularly Mao; having created the party and

state institutions, they now considered them obstacles to realizing revolutionary social change. (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 298.)

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On June 24, the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School posted a big-character poster, Long Live the Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Spirit!254 Apparently, the young Red Guards had been informed of Mao’s evaluations regarding education, and his opinion on “Wreaking the Celestial Palace,” and enthusiastically responded with a big-character poster. A month later, following recommendation by Jiang Qing, Mao vigorously praised and supported this poster and the Red Guards rapidly became a “rebel” organization that swept across the country. In June, Mao wrote the poem “Seven-character Regulated Verse On Some Thoughts.”255 This poem compared the launching of the Cultural Revolution to “a pine tree showing its anger towards heaven,” “a gust of a tempest shocking the world, and crowds wearing green clothes and red armbands, and walking with banners.” He passionately hoped the “people of the motherland could be inspired to new thoughts,” and that people could fully and timely appreciate his purpose and good intentions in launching this movement.256 On June 26, Mao told those in charge of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and the Xiangtan Prefectural and County Party Committees: “In the past, I led you on the Long March. Now, I will lead you on a new Long March.”257 Mao took class struggle as his lifelong philosophy, maintained a revolutionary and rebellious spirit from beginning to end, and derived endless satisfaction from doing battle with others. He ignored the reality that China in the mid-1960s was vastly different from China in the mid-1930s. A modernizing China needed order, not 254. The big-character poster claimed: “Revolution is rebellion and Mao Zedong Thought is rebellion in nature. The courage to devote one’s thoughts, words, and actions to

revolution is the most basic and most precious character of the proletarian revolutionary,

and the basic principle of the spirit of a proletarian political party! To refuse rebellion is to implement revisionism! Revisionism has ruled our schools for 17 years, and now is the best time to rebel! To uphold the invincibility of Mao Zedong Thought we will

show our ability to overthrow the old world and destroy the old order! We will launch a proletarian revolution and create a proletarian new world!”

255. The full poem read, “As the Chinese capital experiences a political movement, I arrive at the south to see the spring. The green pines soar to the sky, and the leaves fall away

in the water. A storm shakes the world and flags are found everywhere on the street; I

listen to rain on the railings, and sense the concerns of the people in their homelands.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 67.)

256. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 41. 257. Gong et al. ed., Mao Zedong Back in Hunan (1953–1975), 165.

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chaos; economic development, not class struggle; and the construction of national systems, not their wholesale destruction. Mao’s “new Long March” thus became historical retrogression. The same day, the Central Committee of the CPC commented on and transmitted the Instruction Request Report of the Ministry of Culture on Struggling to Thoroughly Eliminate the Reactionary Line against the Party, Socialism and Mao Zedong Thought, written by Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, which required thoroughly criticizing the anti-Party and anti-socialist reactionary line headed by Zhou Yang.258 Subsequently, Zhou Yang was publicly criticized in the People’s Daily and elsewhere.259 This marked the public implementation of cultural despotism in literary and artistic circles across the country, and that of the proletarian dictatorship to crack down on cultural elites, in a “burning of books and burying of scholars” event. On June 27, Deng presided over a democratic forum convened by the Central Committee of the CPC, and Liu notified the meeting of the problem of Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun. Liu said: “This is a serious incident that opposes the Party, socialism, and Mao Zedong Thought. It’s impacts go beyond the Party. It has influenced our country and people.” He further explained: 258. The reply of the Central Committee of the CPC said: “The Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution which is developing vigorously across the country is the top priority in the destiny and future of the Party and the state, and also the main event related to the

destiny and future of the world. We must win this struggle and thoroughly solve the

problem of the cultural and educational sectors which have fallen out of the control

of the proletariat. Since national liberation, the cultural authorities have mainly been under the control of the illegal anti-CPC and anti-socialist line led by Zhou Yang, against

the cultural work line of the Central Committee of the CPC and Comrade Mao Zedong. As a result, the majority of cultural authorities have been seized by this illegal antiCPC and anti-socialist line and used to conduct dictatorship against the proletariat.

The ‘national defense literature’ advocated by Zhou Yang is the slogan of Wang Ming’s

rightist opportunist road, and so shall be thoroughly criticized and sterilized.” Zhou Yang was the Vice Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of

the CPC, Vice Chairman of the National Literature Federation, and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Writers Association. (Central Committee of the CPC, Report of the Ministry

of Culture Asking for Instructions on the Struggle to Thoroughly Destroy the Illegal Anti-CPC, Anti-Socialist, Anti-Mao Line.)

259. Even Yin Chengzong, pianist with the Central Philharmonic Orchestra, wrote the article “Accusing Zhou Yang’s Gang of Conducting Peaceful Evolution on Me,” published in the People’s Daily, July 18, 1966.

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“Recently, has there not been a global phenomenon of frequent coups? Since 1960, there have been over 60 coups in Asia, Africa and Latin America, over 50 of which have succeeded. Some national leaders have been killed, some have been exiled, some have been deposed, and some have become puppets. In the Socialist countries, Khrushchev came to power through a coup, and coups also occurred in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang Incident could have escalated into a coup, reflecting the fierce international and domestic class struggle in the leading organs of our Party. Had this coup succeeded, our country would have changed power.” Talking about the Cultural Revolution, Liu commented: “This Great Cultural Revolution is historically unprecedented. It is very fierce and strongly impacts the bourgeois and feudalist cultures. This great revolutionary movement can transform our Party.”260 Finally, Deng said: “To expose the problem of Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang is a major matter, and in a sense it is more serious than the Gao Gang and Rao Shushi Event, or the Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, and Zhang Wentian Event.”261 Liu and Deng agreed to uphold the major decision of Mao to launch the Cultural Revolution, and also supported the application of the policy of purging political rivals such as Peng Zhen and other suspected revisionists. However, they never imagined that Mao would continue to purge political rivals, and that eventually they themselves would be purged. This was the inevitable political logic of taking class struggle as the key issue, and even they could not escape the political phenomenon whereby those who victimized others ultimately fell victim themselves. On June 28, Liu and Deng convened the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau and proposed that the movement should proceed in steps, and concrete policies should be formulated that were suitable for easy mastery and implementation. On June 30, Mao wrote to Liu and Deng, refusing their request to formally publish his “Address to the 7000-Cadres Meeting” made in 1962.262 Wang Renzhong also expressed his disapproval of the request for publication.263 Since this address marked the first time that Mao 260. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1022. 261. Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Democratic Representatives Seminar Held by the Central Committee of the CPC, June 27, 1966.

262. See Mao Zedong’s speech at the Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres

on January 30, 1962 about democratic centralism and other issues. In this speech, Mao

Zedong first conducted self-criticism regarding his incorrect decisions during the Great Leap Forward and assumed major responsibility.

263. Mao Zedong wrote: “Your letter has been received. After consideration, I think this

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Zedong had conducted self-criticism, the publication of the address would have undermined the personality cult that Mao Zedong was trying to bolster. Since Mao remained outside Beijing, Liu, Zhou, Deng, and all members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee requested instructions from Mao Zedong on major issues.264 The same day (June 30,) they dispatched their letter to Mao Zedong together with the Notice by the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council on How Industrial and Transportation Enterprises and Basic Construction Units Should Conduct the Great Cultural Revolution (Draft) enclosed for his examination. Liu and Deng reported to Mao the severe impact of the Cultural Revolution on industry, transportation, and infrastructure construction. The report expressed their fears that the national economy would suffer from “decreased production” and “poor execution of the economic plan,”265 and proposed that industry, enterprises, is not the right time to release the speech. After the Great Cultural Revolution is over we will have a lot of new experiences based on which the speech can be modified. We

should reconsider its release at that time. Wang Renzhong also disagrees with releasing

the speech right now.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 65.)

264. Zhou Enlai left to visit Romania and Albania on June 15, returning to Beijing on July 1. 265. On June 30, 1966, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao Zedong, who was staying

in Hangzhou. Their letter read: “The Great Cultural Revolution is being carried out in the fields of culture and education. If cultural revolution is launched in industrial and mining enterprises simultaneously with basic construction entities, errors may result

from leaders being too busy to supervise. In recent years the revolutionary program was not always well implemented in the fields of industry, transport, and basic

construction, output of crude steel, processed steel, and coal has declined, and there

have been additional problems such as falling quality, increased rate of accidents, and

basic construction tasks that have not been achieved. After discussions, some comrades in Beijing believe the priorities in the deployment of the Great Cultural Revolution shall

be the cultural and educational authorities, as well as party and political institutions.

For grass-roots entities involved in the industry, traffic, basic construction, commercial, hospital, and other sectors, the original “Socialist Education” deployment and the

“23 Items” (i.e., the document of the Central Committee of the CPC titled “Some Issues in the Current Rural Socialist Education Movement”) shall be implemented in

the Great Cultural Revolution. The draft of the notice submitted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping pointed out: “Currently the party committees of all areas must strive

to lead the revolutionary movements in culture and education. We should also note the requirements of industrial and mining enterprises, as well as basic construction

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and infrastructure construction units should continue to carry out the Cultural Revolution in accordance with the 23-Article Document. Liu and Deng had also found that only 35.6% of the capital construction tasks for 1966 were completed in the first half of the year, which was well below expectations. They then spoke with Bo Yibo, Tao Lujia, and other leaders. They made a final decision to report the situation to Mao and propose practical suggestions.266 In fact, Mao already knew about the severe impact of the Cultural Revolution. On July 2, he replied his agreement, saying the notice should be issued quickly.267 The same day, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council issued the Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council Concerning How Industrial and Transport Enterprises and Capital Construction Entities Carry out the Great Cultural Revolution. On July 22, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council issued the Supplementary Notice on How Industrial and Transportation Enterprises and Basic Construction Units Should Conduct the Great Cultural Revolution.268 Liu and others intended to uphold the Party’s leadership, carry out the Cultural Revolution in a guided, planned, and systematic way, and strictly limit the cultural and educational departments. Their entities, which must ensure the completion of the tasks of national construction. The

Central Committee of the CPC believes that the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ involving industrial and transport enterprises and basic construction entities (including design

and construction entities) shall be progressed by the leadership step by step and in

accordance with the “23 Items” as well as the ‘Socialist Education’ movement. This notice requires that the party committees of all areas stress revolution and ensure production

to achieve win-win outcomes in these two key areas. The entities participating in the Great Cultural Revolution and the ‘Socialist Education’ movement must focus on revolution, while a dedicated team will simultaneously ensure production and

construction.” On July 2, 1966, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the “Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council Concerning How Industrial and

Transport Enterprises and Capital Construction Entities Carry out the Great Cultural Revolution.”

266. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1026. 267. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 69..

268. The two notices came from the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council, respectively, to prevent the recently launched Cultural Revolution from negatively

impacting the economy. The basic spirit of both notices was that the Cultural Revolution should be carried out according to the schedule of the party organizations at all levels, and should “further boost production and construction and seek win-win outcomes in terms of revolution, production, and construction.”

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ideas thus were completely different from, and even opposed to, the idea of “great national disorder” advocated by Mao. On July 1, the Editorial Office of the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Long Live Mao Zedong Thought: Commemorating the 45th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party.” This editorial pointed out: “Throughout the 45 years of our Party’s history, under the leadership of Marxism and Leninism, the Central Committee of the CPC headed by Mao Zedong has engaged in three big struggles against the anti-Party and revisionist cliques. The first struggle was that against the Gao Gang and Rao Shushi Anti-party Alliance. The second struggle was that against another handful of right opportunists, that is, the Revisionist Anti-Party Clique. The third big struggle was that against the recently exposed Reactionary Clique that sought to attack the Party, socialism and Mao Zedong Thought.”269 The editorial further defined the nature of these three struggles as: “The struggle between Mao Zedong Thought and its enemies, the struggle between the Marxist and Leninist Line and the Revisionist Line, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between socialism and capitalism.”270 The editorial said: “The villainous activities conducted by those anti-Party cliques are intended to launch reactionary coups and substitute the dictatorship of the proletariat for that of the bourgeoisie. If their villainous plots were not exposed, they would undoubtedly lay their murderous hands on the people. If their plots succeeded, the power of the proletariat and the people seized through decades of bloodshed and sacrifice would immediately be lost. The people of our country would once again be oppressed and exploited, and would live like dogs. The imperialists would stage a comeback, Khrushchev Revisionism would bully us, and our country would be reduced once more to a colony or semi-colony.”271 The claims made in this editorial were fabricated. Gao Gang and Rao Shushi had never planned to launch a coup, and it was simply a political lie manufactured by Mao Zedong to crack down on political enemies. Chen Boda was its main writer, and he would fall victim to similar political lies later, at the Lushan Conference in 1970 The editorial praised Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, and not only quoted the “Genius Theory” proposed by Liu at the 7th National Congress of

269. Here the “reactionary clique” refers to Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shangkun.

270. People’s Daily editorial board, “Long Live, Mao Zedong Thought — In Commemoration

of the 45th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party,” (People’s Daily, July 1, 1966.)

271. Ibid.

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the CPC in 1945,272 but also the “Peak Theory” and “Highest and Most Flexible Theory” of Lin Biao. However, the editorial did not mention Lin Biao’s name.273 While Liu had originally developed the “Genius Theory” regarding Mao, it was Lin who inherited and further developed the theory according to the new political situation. The personality cult of Mao Zedong helped Liu and Lin to win Mao’s political trust and political support, but it would later cause them to suffer his political persecution and retaliation. Simply put, they became subject to Mao’s political demands and political purposes. Mao did not hesitate to use whatever means were necessary to achieve his political goals, and in this sense was a typical political opportunist. On the same day, Red Flag published the editorial “Believing in the Masses and Relying on the Masses,” which conveyed Mao’s latest instruction on organizing and developing the proletarian leftist team.274 At this time, Mao still wished to rely 272. According to the editorial, during the 7th National Congress of the CPC, Liu Shaoqi said:

“Comrade Mao Zedong is a ‘gifted Marxist with creativity’. The birth and development of Mao Zedong Thought ‘are the greatest achievements and glories of our Party and people in the long-term struggle, and will benefit our nation for generations to come.”

He further said that Mao Zedong “has significantly contributed to the revolutionary undertakings of people of all countries, especially all nationals in Asia.” (Ibid.)

273. The editorial said: Revolutionary leaders like Mao Zedong, who have gone through extended, complex, furious, and all-round struggles, are historical rarities—just like Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Comrade Mao Zedong is good at drawing conclusions

from new experiences of various revolutionary struggles, and at incorporating the

dialectic and historic materialism of Marxism and Leninism, and so Mao Zedong Thought is the only correct guide for all stages of the revolution in China, as well as being a powerful ideological weapon with which suppressed people and nations

can oppose imperialists, contemporary revisionists, and reactionaries. Mao Zedong Thought is to giftedly, creatively, comprehensively inherit and develop Marxism and

Leninism during a time when Imperialism faces collapse and socialism is victorious. Mao Zedong Thought is the peak of Marxism and Leninism, and is their supreme and

most flexible form. Comrade Mao Zedong is the greatest Marxist and Leninist of the present age.” (Ibid.)

274. Mao Zedong instructed: “In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, we must

organize and develop a proletarian leftist group and use it to mobilize, solidify and

educate the masses.”(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 68.)



The editorial claimed: “The majority of communists and league members are

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on party and league members, and regarded them as the core of the “leftists in the proletarian revolution.” However, he soon abandoned the two political groups and organizations and switched to the Red Guards organization. When Mao failed to solve the problem of who to rely on, the Cultural Revolution became destined to evolve into a messy political struggle. On July 5, Liu and Deng convened the enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau to study the problems that had arisen during the Cultural Revolution. Liu proposed formulating plans for further implementing the Cultural Revolution. The implementation plan for middle schools was to be drafted by the League Central Committee, while that for colleges and universities was to be drafted by the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, and would be finished within a week and forwarded to the enlarged session of the Standing Committee for discussion.275 In situations where production in certain places was impacted, Deng proposed completing at least two thirds of scheduled production by the end of August.276 That Deng needed to make such a suggestion shows the impact of the Cultural Revolution on normal production. Both Liu and Deng tried to minimize the loss and impact of the Cultural Revolution, but had limited ability to do so, hampered by Mao’s idea of “great national disorder.” On July 7, the Thirty-third Session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress held a joint conference with the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Fourth CPPCC National Committee. Chairman Zhu De presided over the conference, and Vice Chairman Kang Sheng explained the decision to extend the National People’s Congress and the National Congress of the Political Consultative Conference. On August 30, the CPPCC National Committee renamed itself a “united front” and “political consultative conference.” The reality was different though. Previously, on June 27, Liu Shaoqi had already proposed that since the National People’s Congress had already been postponed once before (in 1965,) and since the Cultural Revolution meant there was simply no time to hold it, it should be postponed once again.277 Liu realized that Mao’s Cultural Revolution was a deliberate means to postpone the National People’s Congress, the basic political institution of the state. In contrast, Kang Sheng described the Cultural reliable, as are the core of the proletarian revolutionary leftists when correctly led by the CPC.” (Red Flag, issue 9, July 1, 1966.)

275. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1026. 276. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1923.

277. “Liu Shaoqi’s Speech at the Democratic Representatives Seminar Held by the Central Committee of the CPC,” June 27, 1966.

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Revolution as a great expression of national democracy. Kang thus used the socalled democracy of the Cultural Revolution to substitute for that of the National People’s Congress. From this point, the Third National People’s Congress system (which included the sessions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress) was terminated. This violated the express provision of Article 25 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, namely: “The session of the National People’s Congress is to be held annually and convened by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.” This showed that Mao had formally abandoned rule of law in favor of direct personal rule, namely controlling the state through personally issued “supreme instructions,” and governance via the newspapers and periodicals controlled by the Central Committee of the CPC. This phenomenon resulted from the practical demand to mobilize the broad masses to participate in the Cultural Revolution, and the political need for Mao Zedong to overthrow his political opponents. Once Mao Zedong had destroyed the basic system of the party and the state, it was inevitable that China would fall into disorder. At the time, no party or state leaders knew that the decision announced by Kang on behalf of Mao would mark the beginning mob rule in defiance of rule of law, and Mao himself openly described the defiance of laws as though it were a positive.278 Precisely when Mao made the final decision to follow the route of the Cultural Revolution is uncertain, as were the circumstances that drove him to do so.279 According to Zhao Yaoci, on June 17 Mao entered Dishui Cave in Changsha, Hunan, and he did not emerge until June 28. Zhang described this as a period in which Mao experienced complex emotions and “cut himself off from the rest of the world.” In fact, Mao pored over documents, materials, and newspapers day and night, including the address by Lin Biao at the enlarged session of the CCCPC Political Bureau on May 18.280 This episode shows how Mao and the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (both Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao) were not building up mutual trust and mutual communication, but rather were becoming suspicious of and defensive towards each other. Zhang believes that it was during the eleven days in the Dishui Cave that Mao decided to launch the 278. On December 8, 1970, in a conversation with Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong said: “I am just like a ‘monk with an umbrella.’” This is a pun on the words wufa 無髮 (a monk literally

has no hair) and wutian 無天 (carrying an umbrella, one does not see the sky,) which is homophonic with a Chinese phrase 無法無天 for having no regard for both law (of

Men) and (law of) Heaven. This quote expresses his anarchic nature. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Zhou Enlai in His Own Words.) 279. Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci — Those Days with Chairman Mao, 73. 280. Ibid, 87.

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Great Cultural Revolution on his own, and there he formed its objectives, guiding principles, policies, guiding ideologies, methods, scale, and time.281 Mao’s thoughts during these 11 days are reflected in his “Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing on July 8.”282 This was the second in just his four representative works produced in the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution.283 In this letter Mao summarized his core ideas to Jiang on how to manage state affairs during the Cultural Revolution, namely the so-called “Theory of Great National Disorder.”284 In his opinion, “great national disorder” was actually positive because it could confuse “enemies” (meaning his political opponents) and mobilize the masses. Since Mao saw “disorder” and “order” as parts of the same political cycle, he welcomed the former as a means to realize the latter. He considered the Cultural Revolution a “nationwide exercise” to prevent rightists from assuming power via a coup after his death. Just one year before the Cultural Revolution, Mao had said: “It is good if the country is at peace, but it is not necessarily bad if the country is in disorder. Disorder (referring to the civil war) has great merits. For example, our Party has experienced 25 years of war and we have always emerged victorious.”285 Having selected his political strategy, Mao still faced the problem of how to create “great national disorder.” The top levels of the Party included only a few on whom Mao could truly rely. Besides Lin Biao, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng, Mao 281. Ibid, 90. 282. On July 8, 1966, Mao Zedong wrote to Jiang Qing. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.) Mao’s letter was circulated during the Meeting on Criticizing Lin Biao and Rectifying Work Style in May 1972. On October 1, 1972,

September 2, 1973, and March 1, 1975, the People’s Daily released the contents of this letter in installments. Zhang Yaoci later commented: “Mao Zedong obviously thought about the core of this letter while in the Dishui Cave.” (Ibid, 97–98.)

283. The four works, in chronological order, were: Instruction on the Report of the General

Logistics Department of the PLA Concerning Further Agricultural and Sideline Production

in the Army (May 7 Instruction)” in May 1966, “A Letter to Jiang Qing” in July 1966, “Bombarding the Headquarters—My First Big-character Poster” in August 1967, and “My Views” in August 1970.

284. Mao Zedong wrote, “Chaos in the universe leads to order. The cycle lasts for 7–8 years.

‘Monsters and demons’ jumped out by themselves, and their class nature determined their actions.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.)

285. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, 389.

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Zedong had difficulty forging political alliances or attracting political supporters in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC (Zhou Enlai later provided support and alleviated this problem.) Mao thus wrote his letter to Jiang, one because he had no other political choices, and two to pass her his political project and give her the “green light” to assume power in future as the vanguard of the Cultura Revolution. Based on partial records of Jiang’s speeches from late 1966 to July 1974, as many as 172 leaders were accused by name, including 28 members and alternate members of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.286 Mao’s “Theory of Great National Disorder” proved hugely destructive. First, it severely damaged China’s economic construction and disrupted the process of economic growth. Second, it severely damaged China’s state systems and sent the country into disorder. Third, it severely violated the civic and human rights of Chinese citizens, and eroded the basis of state rule. Mao’s “Theory of Order and Disorder” was inseparably interconnected with the theory of “Continuing the Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” created by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan in November 1967. While the former was more popular and vivid, the latter was more theoretical and logical. Since Mao, as supreme leader, constantly sought to provoke “great national disorder,” the unprecedented Cultural Revolution was doomed to involve unprecedented civil political strife.287 During the later leadership of Deng, he too faced the same political problem, whereby party officials, having been in power for a long period, formed a privileged class that was increasingly cut off from the people. However, he and Mao held opposing ideas on state governance. Based on his personal experiences in the Cultural Revolution, Deng opposed the Theory of Great National Disorder, and instead insisted on his own theory of Making Stability the Top Priority,288 as 286. Tan and Lü, Trial of China: the Public Trial against Ten Principals in the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-revolutionary Groups, 114 and 160.

287. The Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 pointed out: “The Cultural Revolution created trouble for our people, instead of the enemy, making it impossible

for order to replace chaos in the universe.” (Party Literature Research Center of the

CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 811.)

288. On February 26, 1989, Deng Xiaoping told visiting U.S. President Bush: “Stability is the

top priority of China. Without a stable environment there can be no progress, and even

if progress were achieved it would soon be lost. Failure to achieve stability will mean the absence of democracy and economic development, divisions in public opinion, and national chaos. We have experience on this point because we have experienced

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the means for pursuing China’s development and rejuvenation and establishing a stable social order.289 Through democracy and the rule of law, Deng reformed the leadership systems of the Party and the state and managed the contradiction between the government officials and the people using a moderate and gradual approach. Mao’s “Letter to Jiang Qing” reflected the political guiding principles of the Cultural Revolution, and clearly expressed his short-term political purposes, strategies and measures. Mao’s direct political purpose in launching the Cultural Revolution was to overthrow the so-called capitalist roaders headed by Liu and Deng, and to this end he used the political support and associated personality cult provided by the Lin Biao Clique. Simultaneously, Mao was very sensitive and paranoid, and explicitly noted that Lin’s real political intention in flattering him was to “exorcise ghosts with the aid of the Heavenly Ghost Catcher” (that is, purge his political rivals using the power of Mao,)290 and in doing this he foreshadowed his own future intention to depose Lin. On a prior occasion, speaking on Lin’s formulation of Mao Zedong Thought, Mao said, “Do not say ‘the highest or the best’, and do not say ‘the peak’, either.”291 Mao thus was clearly aware that the “Peak Theory” contradicted Marxism. However, Lin later used these phrases and theories even more intensively, and Mao gained reason to begin to suspect his the Cultural Revolution and seen its bitter consequences.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 3, 284.) 289. MacFarquhar analyzed the political divergence between Mao and Deng: Mao liked

chaos, while Deng loathed it, especially after having experienced first-hand the nationwide turmoil and the individual tragedies caused by the Cultural Revolution. In the mold of a traditional Chinese politician and philosopher, Deng pursued order, and

considered state unity necessary to progress. (MacFarquhar, “Postscript — Missions after Unity.”

290. In his letter to Jiang, Mao said: “During the Hangzhou Meeting held in April (the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC in

Hangzhou on April 16, 1966,) I disagreed with the wordings used by my friends. But what could I do? At the meeting in Beijing in May of this year (the Enlarged Meeting

of the Central Politburo of the CPC in Beijing betwen May 4 to 26, 1966,) he (Lin Biao) continued to use these phrases, as did the newspapers. So I have to simply accept it. I

know their intention is to use me like a present-day Zhong Kui to hunt ghosts for them. So I had to take up the role.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.)

291. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1404.

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political motivations. At that time, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, had all read Mao Zedong’s “Letter to Jiang Qing” or been informed of its content. Wang Renzhong had also read this letter.292 This letter was not only an expression of the political struggle between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi but also an important root of the cut-throat struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, because Lin clearly understood that Mao had long seen through his political purpose. Six years later, in 1972, Mao decided to publish this letter, surprising the whole Party, as well as the army and the nation.293 Interestingly, Mao’s letter made bold forecasts about the future political development of China: “After my death, the rightists will return to power and restore capitalism.” He further asserted that the rightists would be restless and their rule likely short-lived because the leftists would reorganize themselves around Mao’s legacy.294 Indeed, Deng led the “Rightist” faction back to power after 292. Mao Zedong showed this letter to Zhou Enlai and Wang Renzhong (First Secretary of Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPC) who were staying in Wuhan, and entrusted Zhou with transmitting the letter to Jiang Qing in Shanghai. He also ordered Zhou to

visit Dalian on July 4 to deliver to Lin Biao the opinions he had expressed about him in

the letter. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1419–1420.) As instructed by Mao, Zhou was to deliver his opinions that Lin should be practical and realistic, and should use scientific, accurate, and appropriate wording in his appraisal

of Mao. Lin said he would accept Mao’s opinion and agreed to modify his speech. On July 15, Zhou returned to Beijing and reported to Liu Shaoqi. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2,

40.) According to Zhang Yaoci, after writing the letter, Mao told his Secretary Xu Yafu to

take a copy for his records and to post the original to Jiang. (Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci—Those Days with Chairman Mao, 101.)

293. After the Lin Biao incident in May 1972, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated

a copy of Mao’s “Letter to Jiang Qing” throughout the Party as part of the documents from the “Criticizing Lin Biao and Rectifying the Work Style Report Meeting,” and presented it as evidence that Mao had long ago identified the political ambition of Lin.

Zhang Yaoci believes that Mao’s letter could be considered a “prediction.” Indeed, the

move made Mao’s letter appear to show his “foresight” and people believed that Mao

had a firm grasp of Lin’s movements. (Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci — Those Days with Chairman Mao, 101.) In reality, Mao’s suspicions of Lin were the direct cause for latter’s flight, and Mao’s “prediction” was a self-fulfilling prophecy.

294. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71.

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Mao’s death, but instead of a Leftist comeback, Deng led China through a period of reform and opening up to the outside world, enabling it to thrive and prosper. Meanwhile, Jiang and other leftists (the hardliners of the Cultural Revolution) were condemned by history.295 On July 12, Mao issued written instructions on a letter from seven members of the Communist Youth League and young students of Beijing Language Institute that was received on June 28.296 Mao paid great attention to the problems they raised, believing they were important and the Cultural Revolution should prioritize their solution.297 This shows that the young students supported Mao’s assessment that a bureaucratic class had formed in the Party. However, to solve the contradictions between the officials and the people and to prevent degeneration, these young students proposed reform instead of revolution, and governance according to law instead of rebellion and seizure of power. Although this letter, together with Mao’s comments and instructions, was once printed and distributed as the third document of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, the instructions on the letter were eventually replaced by radical revolution and violence that undermined the rule of law. 295. From November 23, 1980 to January 23, 1981, the Special Court of the Supreme People’s Court completed the public trials of the case of the counter-revolutionary groups headed by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and issued the “Judgment of the Special Court

of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China.” (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 654–680.).

296. The letter said: “Our parents are revolutionary officials and CPC members. They are heroes who have undergone the test of class struggles and wars. However, their

revolutionary consciousness has weakened since they became officials, with positions of political importance and a privileged life. Should they continue on this course they

will lose their ‘freedom’ with regard to revolution and gradually become a special revisionist class. Therefore we believe we should conduct thorough reform in the

following aspects: 1. Reduce salaries and eliminate special treatments for officials; 2. Revolutionary officials should always participate in work; 3. Anyone who violates

the discipline of the CPC or the law of the state, or who impairs the interests of the people, should be punished; 4. An education system for part-time students should

be implemented across the country as early as possible; 5. During holiday periods, organize for students to work in factories or rural areas, or to serve in the army.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 77–78.)

297. Ibid.

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After the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution on June 1, there were serious confrontations within the leadership of the Party Central Committee regarding the disorderly criticism and denouncements occurring in colleges and universities, and whether to maintain or withdraw the working groups: Liu, Zhou and, Deng insisted that the movement should be led by the Party and carried out in an orderly manner, and that it was necessary to dispatch working groups if the Party committees of some schools failed to work. However, Mao disagreed with sending working groups and demanded an all-out effort to mobilize the masses to carry out the revolution. Chen Boda, in his role as Mao’s representative, repeatedly opposed the opinions of Liu and others. On July 13, Liu presided over the debriefing convened by the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee, and Chen presented his opinion on sending working groups. Liu and Deng also expressed some of their criticisms on the working groups, but disagreed with their immediate withdrawal. Liu said: “The present working groups need to be educated. They are ignorant and have not learned the policies. Unsatisfactory working groups should be rectified and cleared.” Deng said: “We shall organize the students, clear those in positions of authority, and then abandon the working groups and working teams.” Chen’s opinion was thus rejected.298 On July 18, Mao Zedong finally returned to Beijing after an eight-month absence. His return to Beijing this time was of unusual political significance, as he decided to discard an important internal system advocated by himself, namely that Liu presided over the routine work of the Central Committee of the CPC. Mao was determined to become the undisputed absolute leader, to personally lead and launch the Cultural Revolution, and to eliminate “China’s Khrushchev” (meaning Liu.) He thus replaced the top leaders.299 Liu was not immediately aware that Mao 298. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 176. 299. On October 25, 1966, in a speech at the Central Working Meeting, Mao Zedong said: “We

all want the security of the state. Because of the death of Stalin and the incompetence of Georgy Malenkov, we encountered problems, particularly from revisionism. Accordingly, we set a first line and a second line. But the situation is not so good today. I am in the second line and others are the first line, so power is decentralized. Power

cannot be centralized now that we occupy the cities. The existence of a first line and

a second line contributed to the rise of many independent kingdoms. Therefore the Eleventh Plenary Session changed the deployment of the first and second lines. Before

this meeting I was in the second line, distant from daily work, and allowed others to do that work and establish their reputation among the masses to ensure national stability

on my death. This was my original thinking, and others agreed with this deployment.

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had made any systemic changes, or what his political intentions were. Only later, on October 23, did Liu realize that July 18 had been a key turning point.300 The system that Mao targeted was an internal system that divided work between main leaders and secondary leaders. Since the system was internal and informal, Mao was easily able to abolish it without informing Liu or obtaining the approval of the Party Central Committee. Mao’s actions destroyed the basic system whereby major decisions were made by collective leadership. At that time, there had been “great disorder” in the colleges and universities of China’s major cities. However, Mao discovered that politics continued to follow the old top-down approach, and thus the situation resembled “a pool of stagnant water.” Mao later labeled this period of more than 50 days after the turmoil in the schools and universities in large cities a “white terror.”301 Mao was determined to “go against the tide.” On arriving in Beijing, Mao refused to allow Liu to report to him and instead listened to reports from Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and others. After hearing their report, he felt unhappy that some wanted to suppress the student movement. He asked: “Who suppresses student movements? Only the Northern warlords. For the Communist Party to be afraid of student movements is against Marxism. Some people are always talking about carrying out the mass line and serving the people, but instead take the bourgeois line and serve the bourgeoisie. This shows they are afraid of the revolution, and adopt different policies for ‘insiders and outsiders.’ This is a mistaken direction and must be quickly reversed as part of the movement to break down all conventions.”302 When he read the comment and instruction forwarded by Liu on the No. 9 Briefing on the Cultural Revolution, Mao said to Zhang Chunqiao: “No wonder the masses are suppressed everywhere. Only now

However, the comrades in the first line did not do well, so the coexistence of the first and second lines has changed.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 143.)

300. On October 23, 1966, in a self-criticism at the Central Working Meeting, Liu Shaoqi said, “Before July 18 this year (1966,) I organized the daily works of the Central Committee of the CPC because Chairman Mao was not in Beijing.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 651.)

301. Wang, Frustration of a Transcendent Leader: The Great Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 54. 302. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1845; Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 134–135.

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do I finally realize that there is a bourgeois headquarters!”303 This statement built on the Notice on May 16, in which Liu, Deng, and others were labeled “Chinese Khrushchevs,” and further built up the significance of the threat. Mao described his real political intention to the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee, and required them to become the “daring vanguard” in the overthrow of Liu. On July 19, Liu and Deng listened to the report by Li Xuefeng, Wu De, and Hu Keshi (then Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League) on the situation in Beijing. Li said: “The administrative organizations of each school are paralyzed and the leadership cannot be informed if working groups are not dispatched.” Chen Boda immediately expressed his opposition to sending working groups, believing they would be no wiser than the students, that they would all declare themselves to be sent by the Party Central Committee and Mao, and that some working groups would bully the students. Deng said: “In the case of certain organs and schools, we should not send working groups, but in some other cases where power has been seized, we should send working groups. The working groups mainly play an administrative role and are led by the Party Committee. Therefore, shall we consider all matters? We should carefully monitor and correctly assess the working groups. We have no experience of such a movement and nor do they. Bad working groups can be withdrawn while good ones can stay in the field to perform the work of the Party Committee.” Liu said: “Some working groups are good and some are bad. They work on the front line and suffer unique hardships, so we cannot ask too much of them. What we should do is consider how to help them, educate them and summarize their experiences for the benefit of others.”304 Chen criticized the leaders of the Central Committee in Beijing for being afraid of the masses, but Deng refuted his criticisms and unequivocally stated: “I do not agree with the withdrawal of all the working groups.” Chen’s opinion thus was rejected again. In fact, Chen was serving as Mao’s representative and his opinions represented that of Mao’s. On the same day, the Central Committee of the CPC decided to establish the Editing Committee of Mao Zedong’s Works with Liu Shaoqi as director.305 This decision was issued throughout the whole Party. However, no one expected that China’s political structure would change dramatically 10 days later. This reflected 303. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1422. 304. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1027. 305. The Editing Committee of Mao Zedong’s Works consisted of Liu Shaoqi as chairman; Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Tao Zhu as deputies; and Li Jingquan, Li Xuefeng, Liu Lantao, Song Renqiong, Wang Renzhong, Wei Wenbo, Hu Qiaomu, Xiaohua, Liu Zhijian, Zhang Pinghua, Xiong Fu, Wang Li, Qi Benyu, and Liu Han as members.

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the suddenness and drama of Chinese politics. Even Liu himself was taken by surprise, much less to say foreign observers. This course of political events was typical of personal despotism, even if it only became clearly apparent some 40 years later. On July 22, Liu and Deng chaired the enlarged session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee to discuss the Preliminary Planning of the Great Cultural Revolution in Beijing’s Colleges and Universities. The key point of contention in the session remained on working groups. Liu said: “The working groups are not well led, but most of them are good. They still need to be educated and helped to correct their mistakes. As for driving away the working groups, not all of them should be driven away.” Deng said: “We should teach the working groups how to work. I am afraid that some schools cannot do without a working group.”306 Chen and Jiang proposed canceling the working groups, but most leaders in the Central Committee of the CPC resisted this.307 Later, in a group speech delivered at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Jiang said: “Our group leader (referring to Chen) and consultant (referring to Kang) had no chance to speak, never managing past his first sentence before being interrupted.”308 The sharp debate in this session directly influenced Mao, despite him not actually being in attendance, and he concluded that the working groups “played a negative role and hindered the movement.” In accordance with Mao’s instructions, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda and Jiang Qing repeatedly represented Mao to visit the college students and support them in opposing the working groups. The slogan “kicking away the party committees to carry out the revolution” became “kicking away the working groups to carry out the revolution.”309 On July 23, Mao still agreed with the issue of the Instruction Request on Dispatching Army Cadres to Assist in the Local Great Cultural Revolution submitted by the General Political Department and circulated by the Central Committee of the CPC. This notice proposed the organization of working teams by transferring cadres to participate in the Socialist Education Movement (Four Clean-ups Movement,) with the intention being to support the Cultural Revolution in local places. At this stage, Mao had not yet proposed the cancellation of the working groups.310 On the same day, Mao changed his attitude. While listening to the reports of Li Xuefeng and Qu De, the First Secretary and the Second Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee 306. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 176. 307. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1028. 308. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 176. 309. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 38–40. 310. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 177.

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of the CPC respectively, he stated: “It is wrong for the Central Committee of the CPC to send working groups. Now, some people are overcautious, and are always afraid of disorder, counter-revolution, and taking up arms.” Mao believed that the working groups would adopt a bourgeois stand and suppress the masses, and thus decided to immediately cancel them.311 On July 24, Mao talked with the members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC. In view of Liu’s opinion, he insisted: “Working groups should not be sent and instead observers should be sent for investigation. Do not issue orders. The leftists among the students and teachers shall form cultural revolutionary committees to carry out the Cultural Revolution themselves.” He also made pointed references to criticizing Liu and the others, saying: “Now, some of our comrades are afraid of the masses. Isn’t it terrible for the communists to be afraid of the masses?” He also seriously noted: “This is not only a problem of Peking University but a nationwide problem. If it were carried out with the methods used by some persons (referring to Liu and his associates,) the movement would not accomplish anything.”312 Mao regarded the Theory of Great National Disorder as the basic idea that guided the Cultural Revolution, and as fundamentally different from Liu and Deng’s philosophy of “safeguarding social stability under the leadership of the Party committees.” The former was radical while the latter was conservative. Just as water and oil do not mix, so too was it with Mao versus Liu and Deng. Even if they had not differed on whether to send working groups, they would eventually have differed on other issues. The purpose of Mao in returning to Beijing was to remove these political opponents and clear these political obstacles. However, the question of who to remove these opponents remained. Reliance on the writers in the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC was impractical. Zhou Enlai was the most suitable person for the job since he was the core figure and occupied a strong position in the Party. Facts proved that the change in Zhou’s political attitude crucially influenced the change in the political power structure. During the Cultural Revolution, Zhou played a complex and self-contradictory role. On the one hand, from a strategic perspective, he spared no effort to support Mao ’s major decisions, and, in his own words, “closely followed Chairman Mao.” Without the support of Zhou it would have been very difficult for Mao to carry out the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, from a tactical perspective, Zhou spared no effort to deal with various problems caused by the Cultural Revolution, and if he had not, the social disorder in China would have been even greater. In 311. Zhu et al. eds., Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing, 10–11.

312. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1422–1423.

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fact, Zhou mostly played the role of assisting Mao Zedong, but people saw more of his actions in the latter role of limiting the negative fallout from Mao Zedong’s actions. Thus Zhou, like Mao Zedong, made more mistakes than correct decisions during the Cultural Revolution. The following section looks at how Zhou assisted Mao to unseat Liu. On July 20, Zhou attended a meeting at Mao’s residence.313 The pair formed a political alliance that decided Liu’s political fate. On the evening of July 23, Zhouattended a meeting at Liu’s residence to discuss the issue of working groups. Deng also attended this meeting.314 During the meeting Zhou expressed different opinions to Liu and Deng on the issue of the working groups, despite having previously supported the decision to dispatch working groups, signalling his defection to the Mao camp. The next day, Zhou sent a letter to Liu and Deng to explain the differences of opinion on the sending of working groups.315 This letter shows that Zhou wanted to mediate the political differences between Mao and Liu, but failed because Mao never made concessions on so-called principle and line issues. On July 24, Mao convened the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC to attend a joint meeting and listen to the Liu’s report. This in itself marked a departure from the usual practice: one, by listening to the report of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC; and two, by letting the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC attend the session of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the 313. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 41.

314. Ibid, 42. 315. On July 24, 1966, Zhou Enlai wrote to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping: “With regard to

the talk last night, based on careful consideration and review of the relevant literature, I believe that divergences mainly reflect different estimations of the situation, and

different understandings of the problems, rather than anything else. This means we should not talk about irrelevant reasons, and also that we have not reached an

agreement. In Beijing, the dispatch of working teams was universal and necessary,

but each working team in the unit has particular circumstances that need on-site investigation and analysis. The work relations must be clarified to ensure the work

progresses well. This morning I visited Beijing Foreign Studies University to see the

big-character posters for myself to understand the actual situation.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 137.)

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CPC. The Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC wrote to the Central Committee of the CPC, saying: “Presently, those who carry out the movement have several theories and guiding principles: First, they are absolutely determined to go all out to mobilize the masses against the Party’s leadership and believe that going all out to mobilize the masses means discarding the Party’s leadership. Second, they publicly state that we should have absolute belief in the working groups, and that opposing them means opposing the revolution. Third, clearing obstructions only incites the masses to make political denunciations. Given the above, Mao Zedong has harshly criticized Liu Shaoqi and others for their dispatch of working groups: During the past month, working groups have hindered the mass movement. Hindering the revolution undoubtedly helps the counter-revolutionaries and the reactionary gangs. But why do we want them given the trouble they have caused?”316 Mao also ordered the Central Committee of the CPC not to dispatch working groups or issue instructions, and decided personally to cancel the working groups.317 He said: “The Central Committee of the CPC has quite a few departments, but they have not done a good job. However, the Cultural Revolution Groups (of the Central Committee of the CPC) have done quite a few good things.” He also criticized Bo Yibo (then Alternate Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Director of the State Economic and Trade Commission,) along with others, for not notifying the Cultural Revolution Groups of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC for becoming the object of their attack.318 This was a key meeting in Mao’s plot to take down Liu. This meeting also reflected that the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau could not discuss decisions on major issues equally and democratically in a manner “determined by the majority, based on the principle of one person one vote,” and personal decision making had replaced collective decision making. Most importantly, Mao never allowed others to challenge his political authority and decision-making power. From the system perspective, this meeting replaced the sessions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Standing Committee Political Bureau, 316. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 651.

317. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 42.

318. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 136–137.

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being the embryonic form of the earliest so-called brief meeting of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC, and also an indicator of the serious damage Mao caused to the meeting system of the Central Committee of the CPC. Besides the National Congress, the National Representatives Meeting, and the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Party’s major conferences also included the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, and the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. This was according to provision Article 37 of the Party Constitution passed at the 8th National Congress of the CPC: “When the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC is not in session, the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC shall exercise the powers of the Central Committee of the CPC.”319 The July 24 meeting that Mao convened violated the provisions of the Party Constitution, and arbitrarily allowed the members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC to enter the core of the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC and participate in major decisions. In fact, under the political structure of that time, only by continuously disrupting the normal system of the Party could Mao maintain his personal and arbitrary control. From this meeting on, there emerged a political trend whereby the Central Committee of the CPC grew weaker as Mao grew stronger, until he finally dominated the Central Committee, forcing it to pass whatever decisions he required; it became a mere rubber stamp legitimizing his personal control. On July 25, without the knowledge of most members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and the Standing Committee of Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong held talks with the first secretaries of each region and the members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC. He said: “During the past month, the working groups have hindered the mass movement and the revolutionary forces and helped the counter-revolutionaries and reactionary groups.” He thus proposed abandoning the policy of sending working groups, and instead having the revolutionary teachers and students themselves carry out the revolution, and establishing the (Cultural) Revolution Committee. He also issued a severe warning to Liu, Deng, and the others, saying: “Some of us have stopped carrying out the revolution. If you stop carrying out the revolution, then one day you will surely be overturned.”320 By saying this, Mao revealed his real political intentions toward the leaders of the local authorities and the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC. Just 319. Museum of the Chinese Revolution comp., Compilation of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 159.

320. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1423.

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eleven days later, Mao Zedong wrote “Bombarding the Headquarters—My First Big-character Poster, overturning Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.” The same day, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Jiang Qing spoke during the conference of the Beijing Broadcasting Institute and announced that “all powers belong to the Cultural Revolution Committee,” thus transferring power outside the existing leadership structures of the CPC. When Mao resolved to cancel the working groups, Liu and Deng were obedient and voiced no objections.321 This meant Mao firmly controlled the leadership of the Cultural Revolution, and no leaders in the Party could oppose either him personally or the Cultural Revolution launched and led by him. On the same day, Mao issued an explicit instruction that terms such as “the peak” and “the supreme instruction” should not be used to describe his philosophies. On August 4, he reiterated this view.322 Mao was very clear that such words were exaggerated, typical of a personal cult, and incompatible with Marxism. On July 29, in the report to the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao, Tao Zhu proposed according to Mao’s instruction: “Such language shall not be used in the speeches and documents of the leading organs of the Party and government. However, such language can be retained for a period in manuscripts written by the masses.” On August 4, the Central Committee of the CPC merely issued Tao’s report to the provincial and corps level as a confidential report and document, and did not announce it publicly. When Mao Zedong himself proposed limitations on the personality cult that was growing around him, this marked a historical opportunity for the Central Committee of the CPC to cease all personal worship of Mao, but the chance was missed. Eliminating all personal worship of Mao was naturally a difficult goal, but instead of subsiding, the personality cult associated with Mao only climaxed with the Cultural Revolution. The more Mao Zedong desired the Cultural Revolution, the more he needed the personality cult to support it. The discussion below examines how the newspapers and periodicals of the Central Committee of the CPC contributed to the Mao Zedong personality cult. On August 4, Xinhua News Agency published a news release titled “Chairman Mao Swims in the Yangtze River,” saying: “On July 16, our beloved Chairman Mao cut through the rolling waves of the Yangtze River once more and swam for 1 hour and 5 minutes, covering nearly 15 kilometers. Cheers of ‘Long Live Chairman Mao’ continued for more than 4 hours along both banks of the river. This touching scene expressed the infinite love and admiration of the Chinese people for our 321. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1028. 322. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 85–86..

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great leader Chairman Mao. Under the guidance of the brilliant Mao Zedong Thought, seven hundred million people have opened their eyes to see the world and ridden forward on the wind and waves!”323 The next day, the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Following Chairman Mao to Advance in Strong Winds and Big Waves,”324 which read: “In a mood of extraordinary affection and great excitement, hundreds of millions of people simultaneously and sincerely wished Chairman Mao health and a long life. Chairman Mao is so healthy and energetic! This is happy news for the Chinese people, and for revolutionary people all around the world!”325 Xinhua News Agency also said: “Mao Zedong enjoying a swim in the Yangtze River is like the golden sun rising in the east and an auspicious rainbow appearing in the sky.”326 Even Guo Moruo, Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, and President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, joined the flattery of Mao Zedong.327 These developments represented a large-scale and open deification movement that stressed not only Mao’s political superiority, but also his unrivalled physical strength.328 The slogans used were remarkably similar to those used to worship feudal emperors. The editorial of the People’s Daily even referred to Mao’s instructions as “supreme instructions to guide all conduct,”329 323. People’s Daily, July 25, 1966. 324. People’s Daily, July 26, 1966. 325. The Xinhua News Agency press release also referred to the words of an African friend: “It is remarkable that Chairman Mao has swum in the Yangtze River at his age. We

wish Chairman Mao health and a long life. Chairman Mao’s good health represents

the good fortune of the oppressed, and the happiness of people everywhere!” People’s Daily, July 25, 1966.

326. Xinhua News Agency: July 29, 1966, People’s Daily, July 30, 1966. 327. A poem by Guo Moruo: “With passionate battle songs we recall the martyrs before

a bridge. The passionate people cry ‘Long May He Live!’ When looking back at the

masses lining the bank with colorful flowers, the drums on the Yangtze River suppress

the thunder. He smiles after crossing the Yangtze River.” (Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 92–93.)

328. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 296. 329. The editorial claimed: “Comrade Mao Zedong experienced a rare storm of class struggles. He has learned and summarized the experience of revolutionary struggle of the people of our country and of the rest of the world. He has shown talent in

comprehensively and creatively developing Marxism and Leninism. Mao Zedong Thought, the most vital and dynamic form of Marxism and Leninism, is the only guide

for the socialist revolution and construction, and is a powerful ideological weapon

for opposing imperialism and contemporary revisionism, and for providing supreme

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which again was stylistically reminiscent of the decrees issued by feudal emperors. This showed that the Cultural Revolution embodied feudal autocracy rather than Marxism. The editorial further claimed that Mao Zedong Thought was a philosophy of struggle.330 The swim in the Yangtze River and associated publicity was a political mobilization order issued by Mao Zedong to the nation directly through the newspapers and periodicals of the Central Committee of the CPC, and a means by which he retained his control over the state even as the Cultural Revolution raged. During this period, Mao directly commanded the largest people’s war in the world, but it took the form of a proletarian cultural revolution rather than the Anti-Japanese War or the revolutionary civil war. However, while Mao Zedong successfully launched the Cultural Revolution, he failed to control this anarchic movement, which deviated from his own political guiding line.331 Mao Zedong remained full of self-belief though, and never expected that the Cultural Revolution would end in failure.332 On July 26, during the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, Tao Zhu transmitted the contents of Mao’s two talks.333 Normally, Mao did not participate in the sessions of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC or the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, and his instructions were transmitted by representatives. On this occasion his representative was Tao Zhu, the Administrative Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. When Mao made the personal decision to cancel the working groups, Liu, Deng, and other leaders obeyed Mao Zedong’s decision rather than airing different views.334 The meeting thus finally decided to cancel the working groups.335 On July 27, Zhou attended a meeting at Mao’s residence. He then visited Liu to request talks with him and Tao.336 At that time, severe political differences had instruction for all our actions.” People’s Daily, July 26, 1966. 330. Editorial board of the People’s Daily: “Following Chairman Mao to Advance in Strong Winds and Big Waves,” People’s Daily, July 26, 1966.

331. Wang, Frustrations of a Transcendent Leader: the Great Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 1. 332. Wang Shaoguang noted that: “In 1976, immediately after Mao Zedong’s death, the active leaders of the Cultural Revolution were jailed. Thus the political line of Mao Zedong was thoroughly discarded soon after the end of the Cultural Revolution. It seems that the Great Cultural Revolution was a great failure.” (Ibid.) 333. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 178. 334. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1028. 335. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 178. 336. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of

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appeared in the top level of the Party. During this critical period, Zhou represented Mao and used soft tactics to win over Liu and Deng. His subjective desire in doing so may have been to prevent political division within the Party, but in reality he helped Mao to create political divisions. From this point until 1976, Zhou became an important figure through which Mao directed the Cultural Revolution. On July 28, after being drafted by the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC and personally revised by Mao, the Decision on the Cancellation of the Working Groups Dispatched to Colleges and Universities was issued in the name of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and simultaneously each college and university was allowed to elect and establish mass organizations to pursue cultural revolution at all levels.337 This notice was accompanied by the following special note: “Also applies to each secondary school.”338 This was a “legal” document whereby individual colleges, universities and secondary schools established spontaneous organizations during the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution, and also became a systemic arrangement that entailed sectarian strife among mass organizations because the Party organizations of the colleges, universities and secondary schools had collapsed or become paralyzed and the working groups had withdrawn. The day before, Chen, Kang, and Jiang went to Beijing Normal University to preside over the conference criticizing the working groups. Kang then created the so-called “February Adverse Current” event and fabricated a lie to overthrow He Long, then Member of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and

Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 42. 337. “Under the instruction of the Central Committee of the CPC, to better mobilize the

masses, further attack the capitalist roaders, criticize reactionary academic authorities,

reform the educational system and teaching guidelines and methods based on the strong revolutionary passion and consciousness of the revolutionary students, we have found that, based on our experience, the current method of designating work teams in

junior colleges and middle schools cannot meet the above revolutionary requirements. Therefore we have decided to withdraw the work teams from junior colleges and

middle schools. After the withdrawal of the work teams, with regard to the work of the cultural revolutionaries in the junior colleges, grass-roots Cultural Revolution

organizations at different levels shall be established through elections involving the students and teachers of the relevant schools.” (“Resolutions of the Beijing Municipal

Central Committee of the CPC Concerning the Withdrawal of Work Teams from Junior Colleges,” July 28, 1966.)

338. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 178.

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Vice Premier of the State Council.339 On July 29, Liu gave a speech in the conference convened by the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC and attended by teachers and students from the colleges, universities and secondary schools in the city that were actively involved in the Cultural Revolution. He represented the Central Committee of the CPC in accepting responsibility for the problem of dispatching working groups to the city’s schools and universities, and said: “It was the Central Committee of the CPC that decided to send the working groups. Now, it has been found that the approach of sending working groups does not suit the present needs of the great proletarian revolutionary movement, and thus the Central Committee has decided to withdraw the working groups.” In their speeches, Deng, Zhou, and Liu successively accepted that they did not know how to carry out the Cultural Revolution, and their being veteran revolutionaries did not mean they knew how to deal with every new problem they encountered.340 On July 30 and 31, in 339. In 1980, based on the investigation of the Central Committee of the CPC, it was found

that the “February Adverse Current” event that shocked Beijing when Peng Zhen and He Long were denounced in July 1966 was a lie made up by Kang Sheng.

340. Deng Xiaoping said: “After the establishment of the new Beijing Municipal Committee

of the CPC, I announced the decision to dispatch a work team to each junior college and middle school in the name of the new Municipal Committee, as proposed by the

Central Committee of the CPC. We decided to use work teams to deal with the new issues we faced. But I now have to admit that this decision was harebrained. As some

comrades have said, old revolutionaries do always have the best responses to new

issues. Our comrades in the Central Committee and Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC are inexperienced in this unprecedented movement, and so could not always

adequately support the work teams. As for the errors made by the work teams, most of these errors involved the ideological and work aspects, and some should be assumed

by their supervisors.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1926.)



In the meeting, Zhou Enlai said, “Our leaders (whether in the Central Committee

of the CPC, the local authorities, or in government) have wrongly assessed the situation

in some respects, and have deficiently evaluated the revolutionary enthusiasm, vision, and creativity of the masses; secondly, they have adopted wrong solutions. In this respect, Beijing is the best example. Some leaders feared turmoil because the boundaries of argument and struggle can easily be blurred if young people disagree. Anyway, the movement is a new one, and is strange for those of us whose experiences lie far in the

past, especially for older cadres. This is a new issue for old revolutionaries.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1666–1667.)

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accordance with Mao’s instructions, Zhou twice listened to the reports of Kuai Dafu, a student of Tsinghua University, and supported his revolutionary actions. Surprised by the attention, Kuai commented that he “had never dreamed of this,” but the ever changing whims of Mao Zedong meant that he was later dispatched to “hell” just as swiftly as he had been called to “heaven.” At that time, the Cultural Revolution suffered all kinds of restrictions from the Party and the faction of Liu Shaoqi within the collective leadership. However, outside the Party and at the grassroots of society, the Cultural Revolution attracted warm support among the vast masses of young students. Mao Zedong perceived this sharp contrast and immediately formed an enlarged interactive process. On July 28, Jiang Qing received two big-character posters written by the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School, namely “Long Live the Spirit of the Revolutionary Rebellion on June 24” and “Review the Sentiment of Long Live the Spirit of the Revolutionary Rebellion on July 4” which quoted Mao Zedong’s slogan “rebellion is justified,” coined in 1939.341 On July 8, the Red Flag Combat

Liu Shaoqi said: “You may not be clear about how to conduct the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution. If you ask me, honestly, I also do not know, and do not think others in the Central Committee of the CPC know either. Now is the time for you, the

students and faculties from different schools, to learn the practice of revolution. How to

conduct revolution? I have just one word: mobilize the masses, depend on the masses, rely on revolutionary students and faculties, unify the masses, and let them conduct

revolution fearlessly. Perhaps you are unsure of how to do this, and to be honest

so am I. The schools in Beijing have now devoted themselves to the Great Cultural

Revolution for two months. You know more than I do about this, and so I must learn from you. You should not worry about academic learning and regular school life, since the Central Committee of the CPC has suspended classes for half a year. What should

you do during this period? Pursue revolution! You may make great progress during this half year and we can also learn from you. Honestly, we, including myself, can

only learn from and listen to you. We cannot offer you any helpful opinions because

we do not understand the situation. We have previously designated working groups with the approval of the Central Committee. But we have now found that working

groups cannot meet the demands of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and so the Central Committee of the CPC has decided to withdraw the working groups.”

(People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 702–703.)

341. Mao Zedong said: “Marxism tells numerous truths, but in the final analysis it boils down to a single slogan: rebellion is right. So, we strived, we fought, and we will follow

the path of socialism.” (Mao, “Speech at the Meeting of All the Circles in Yan’an to

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Brigade from the High School Attached to Beijing University published the bigcharacter poster “The Fire Cannot Be Kept under the Lid,” which proposed: “Be a proletarian revolutionary Monkey King (a reference to the fictional character Sun Wukong) and create proletarian havoc in heaven.”342 Clearly, the Red Guards had learned that Mao was advocating a policy of “create havoc,” in accordance with his intentions as expressed to Jiang. On August 1, Mao personally wrote to the young Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School, in support of their so-called “revolutionary actions,” and praised their slogan “Rebellion is Justified.”343 This letter was printed and distributed to the delegates to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. In its eleventh issue of 1966, Red Flag published Mao’s letter and the Red Guards’ big-character poster. “Revolution is innocent and rebellion is justified” became the fashionable political slogan. Every university, secondary school and high school immediately responded to Mao’s call, and Red Guard organizations representing various factions were established across the country. On January 1, 1967, after Mao’s personal review and approval, the People’s Daily and Red Flag published the editorial, “Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End,” which spoke highly of the Red Guard movement and called it “a new development to emerge in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” Mao immediately saw the enormous vitality of the Cultural Revolution movement.344 In fact, since 1965, Mao had repeatedly advocated the spirit that “rebellion Celebrate Stalin’s 60th Birthday,” December 21, 1939.) 342. The article claimed: “We want to be the ‘Monkey King’ in the proletarian revolution and rebel against all representatives of the exploiting classes. We will pursue rebellion in heaven, and among the people, and will continue to rebel even after we gain power.

We will rebel against all counter-revolutionists and loyalists! We will rebel against

all counter-revolutionary actions! We will rebel against all the gods and create a proletarian world!”

343. On August 1, 1966, in his “Letter to the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School,” Mao Zedong said: “Your big-character posters show your anger and open condemnation of the landholder class, bourgeoisie, imperialists, revisionists, and their followers who are exploiting and oppressing the workers, farmers, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary parties, and prove that rebellion is right. I here express

my ardent support for you. Whether in Beijing or in the rest of the country, during the Great Cultural Revolution, we will support those who display your revolutionary

attitude.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao

Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 87–89.) 344. People’s Daily, January 1, 1967.

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is justified.” Even as Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, he had demanded the local authorities rebel against the Central Committee.345 To Mao’s disappointment, neither the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC or the leaders of local authorities clearly understood the political objectives of the “rebellion” he advocated (which was to attack Liu Shaoqi and other leaders,) and so they did not rebel against the Central Committee of the CPC as Mao desired. Mao had not expected the young Red Guards to wave the flag of the proletarian revolutionary spirit as fervently as they did, and this fervor was exactly what he wanted. Mao used the young Red Guards to attack and destroy the normal order of the Party and the State he had created himself,346 ushering in an era of “national systemic destruction.”347 Mao openly supported the young Red Guards rebelling to “create national disorder.”348 This explained why from the very beginning Mao opposed Liu and the others in dispatching working groups to maintain normality, and overrode objections by expressing his absolute support for the young Red Guards in implementing “proletarian democracy.” However, Mao was also gambling politically, and created a situation with numerous uncertainties. Mao did not know what “proletarian democracy” would result in, and had even less certainty of what the young Red Guards would do. He simply blindly believed that the mass movement would yield positive results. Even as Mao sharply criticized 345. In 1965 Mao Zedong told the leaders of the major regions: “The rebels will rise up if revisionism appears in the Central Committee of the CPC. Chinese people tend to rebel

historically. Are we rebels just like Song Jiang?” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1395.)



Mao Zedong told Tao Zhu and Wang Renzhong: “I asked in Beijing last October:

if revisionism appears in Beijing, how about your local governments? Will you follow

the lead of Cai E who rose up against Yuan Shikai? I feel something is wrong. Since I made that speech I have conducted tours of inspection in many areas, from Tianjin to Nanchang, but I have not noticed any response.” (Ibid, 1396.)

346. Zheng, Party versus State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma, 142. 347. Harding believed that the Cultural Revolution was special because it was a crisis launched by an absolute leader (i.e. Mao Zedong.) By casting into doubt the validity

of the political power of the CPC, Mao mobilized social forces to fight the political power he himself had created, and also provided the political and ideological slogans

to drown out his opponents. Thus, the man who had led a revolution to overthrow the old political order, once again launched a revolution against the political institution of his own creation. (Harding, “Chinese State in Crisis.”) 348. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 42.

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Liu and Deng for their “blind belief in their wisdom,”349 he, too, held absolute faith in his own wisdom. He regarded the Great Revolution he had personally launched and led as “unprecedented,” saw himself as completely correct, and was convinced he would succeed. Nevertheless, the political process he led deviated from his chosen “correct line.” When the Cultural Revolution grew too large, like a genie escaped from the bottle, Mao Zedong found he lacked the power to direct or contain it. The Cultural Revolution proceeded as a doomed ship, nominally commanded by its charismatic captain, but set to fail regardless.350 Notably, all kinds of political movements and class struggles were called “mass movements,” and were carried out in accordance with the Party’s documents (e.g. the 23-Article Document, Notice on May 16,) but were not approved by the National People’s Congress or authorized by following proper constitutional and legal procedures. Since these mass movements were not legally authorized in the first place, their development was not restricted by national laws, and as the class struggle grew they eventually evolved into political persecution that trampled on democracy and human rights and destroyed the democratic and legal systems.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and “Bombarding the Headquarters” On July 29, Mao Zedong proposed a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPC to make a formal decision on the Cultural Revolution. The Party Constitution stipulated: “Each Central Committee of the CPC has a term of five years. Two Plenums are convened each year. Meetings of the Party’s National 349. During the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong said, “It is simply blind worship of our wisdom while doubting the wisdom of the masses. Actually we are not wise, and the workers, farmers, and revolutionary

intellectuals are far wiser than us. I know nothing and we depend on them.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1426.)



On August 10, Red Flag published an editorial: “Chairman Mao always taught us

that ‘The masses are the real heroes, while we are sometimes mere children. We cannot

learn basic knowledge without accepting this truth.’ We can teach the masses only if we learn from them. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution some of our comrades forget this and believe their own wisdom is superior to that of the masses. In fact, the masses are the only people with wisdom.” (Red Flag, issue 10, 1996.).

350. Wang, Frustrations of a Transcendent Leader: the Great Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 20.

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Representatives are held once a year.” The Eighth Central Committee should have ended in 1961, and the Tenth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC had been held four years previously. Therefore, Mao’s decision to convene the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC was completely arbitrary, had no institutional basis, and was based solely on the needs of political struggle. The Party’s conference system thus became the political tool for the struggles in the Party, and specifically became his personal political tool. The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC became the occasion for Mao to take formal control of the Central Committee of the CPC, making unprecedented civil and political strife inevitable.351 What was Mao’s purpose in convening the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC?352 Mao fully realized that his pursuit of the Cultural Revolution was controversial, had encountered great resistance in the Party, particularly the Central Committee of the CPC, and should go through proper legal procedures, and so he proposed that the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC make a formal decision regarding the Cultural Revolution (the 16-Article Document) He called for a decision to be made “by the Central Committee of the CPC.” Once made, such a decision could not be reversed until the next plenary session.353 In February 1967, Mao bitterly denounced Tan Zhenlin and the other six members of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC, saying “You want to deny the Great Cultural Revolution. Impossible!”354 On 351. Pang believed that the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the

CPC was held to approve the resolutions (the 16-Article Document) as basic guidelines, policy guides, and organizational measures so that the Great Cultural Revolution

could be launched across the country with a suitable legal foundation. The tide was

irreversible and the outburst of an unprecedented domestic political turmoil was inevitable. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1432.)

352. According to Jin, Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the progress of the Cultural Revolution. He believed that during the previous phase the Cultural Revolution had made errors in response to instructions from Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and particularly that the working groups had committed errors in direction and line and thus had hindered the Cultural Revolution. Therefore he decided to hold the Eleventh

Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and issue the 16-Article

Document to eliminate resistance and invigorate the movement. (Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1030.)

353. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1426. 354. CChen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 243.

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May of the same year, when he met with the military delegation from Albania, Mao said: “The Notice on May 16 has obviously proposed both the line issue and the two line issue. In August during the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC, most members of the Central Committee disagreed with me, and sometimes I was the lone supporter of my view. They said my opinion was out of date, so I had to take my opinion to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC for discussion. Through the debate, only a little more than half of them agreed and many did not come round.”355 The other political purpose of Mao in convening the plenary session was to topple Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, reorganize the Central Committee of the CPC, solidify the core leadership of the Cultural Revolution, and guarantee the organizational implementation of the 16-Article Document. In October 1968, in his speech to the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Lin Biao best explained the political purpose of Mao, saying that it was: “to solve the problem of Liu Shaoqi and the power of Deng Xiaoping.”356 Hu Qiaomu commented in 1980: “This Plenum reorganized the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC for no reason and made the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC superior to all higher institutions in the hierarchy, which contravened the Party Constitution.”357 Mao did this intentionally because he could only launch the Cultural Revolution if the provisions of the Party Constitution were destroyed. From August 1 to 12, Mao chaired the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Compared with previous plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the CPC, the structure of the attendees at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC differed significantly. The formal delegates comprised 74 members of the Central Committee of the CPC and 67 alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC, for a total of 141 355. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1013; Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 361. 356. Lin Biao said: “Chairman Mao chaired the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and rectified the errors of Liu and Deng. Chairman Mao

published the big-character poster ‘Bombarding the Headquarters’ to suggest the existence of a bourgeois command hidden within the CPC, and to reveal the reality of struggle between two rival commands. This big-character poster of Chairman Mao

shocked the whole CPC and encouraged people throughout the country. Since then the spectacular struggle of the ‘command’ that involves hundreds of millions of the masses

has begun across the country.” (Lin, “Speech at the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,” October 26, 1968.)

357. Hu, “Summarizing the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’: from History to Logistics.”

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delegates. The non-voting delegates included persons in charge of each department of the Central Committee of the CPC, as well as each Party committee of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, the members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the persons in charge of the relevant departments of the Central Committee of the CPC. Additionally, for the first time, Nie Yuanzi and other representatives of the Cultural Revolution from colleges and universities in Beijing were invited to attend as non-voting delegates. There were 47 non-voting delegates, comprising a quarter of the total attendees. This was the first time in the history of the Party that representatives of revolutionary teachers and students had been invited to attend such a plenary session, and their presence violated the relevant provision of the Party Constitution. This episode demonstrates how Mao sought new political forces to support his launch of the Cultural Revolution. Speaking for the Central Committee of the CPC, Deng announced the session was scheduled to last for five days, with the main agenda including: one, pass the Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution by the Central Committee of the CPC (the 16-Article Document); second, discuss and approve the main domestic and international measures of the Central Committee of the CPC since the Tenth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC; third, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Party Constitution, formalize the decision on personnel changes of the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC last May. However, according to Mao’s personal suggestion, on August 5, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee made a last minute change to the timing and agenda of the original session, and extended the session period to twelve days. Why did Mao decide to change the original session agenda? The immediate reason was because two face-to-face confrontations had occurred between Liu and himself. The first occurred during the opening ceremony of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC on August 1. As the individual presiding over the routine work of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC, Liu reported to the plenary session. The first half of his report dealt with the work of the Central Committee of the CPC since the Tenth Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, while the second half mainly dealt with the work since the Cultural Revolution. He volunteered to take responsibility for the faults in the Cultural Revolution and misguided deployment of the working groups.358 However, 358. Liu Shaoqi said, “During the Cultural Revolution, conditions in Beijing were reported to the Chairman weekly. I was staying in Beijing during this period. Some errors were

committed during the Cultural Revolution, especially in the matter of working groups,

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Mao was dissatisfied with Liu’s self-criticism.359 He harshly criticized Liu, saying Liu and the others had dispatched the working groups to suppress the youthful enthusiasm of the students and others for the Cultural Revolution, and that they blindly believed they alone were wise and ignored the wisdom of the masses.360 He expressed his belief that the working groups had suppressed and hindered the masses, and that fewer than 10 percent of the working groups were good while the remainder were incorrect and actually causing damage through their work.361 Mao sternly rebuked the line followed by Liu in dispatching the working groups as supporting the bourgeoisie and opposing the proletarian revolution.362 The political differences between Mao and Liu caused great concern among the leadership. The previous day, Zhou Enlai and He Long had accompanied Mao and Liu to meet scientists from various countries participating in the Beijing Physics Seminar. He Long said worriedly to Zhou: “We must be careful in dealing with Liu Shaoqi and must consider the unity of the Party.”363 He Long knew Mao well and feared he would suddenly turn on Liu and thus cause political division within the and I should assume the main responsibility for this....For three years, Chen Boda has

proposed ceasing the dispatch of work teams or even withdrawing existing teams.... There was no discussion of this possibility when it was first raised, and Chen Boda later

presented two opinions in writing. However, most comrades agreed on the dispatch of working groups, and so did I in my speech on the issue. I thought working groups could be dispatched and withdrawn as required.” Mao interrupted to note that the

question at the time was only to dispatch or not. Liu responded: “It was already when there was a question to withdraw the work teams or not. I said that this was easy

to do, and we simply needed an order.” Mao rebuked: “Chen Boda had suggested

withdrawal, but you did not withdraw.” (Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi’s 20 Years after the Founding of New China, 358.)

359. Liu Shaoqi reflected: “Initially the Chairman was not in Beijing and I presided over the work of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee. After returning, the

Chairman assessed that the dispatch of work teams was inappropriate. I must assume the main responsibility for what happened. Initially I perceived a risk that some college

organizations in Beijing could fail to properly implement the movement, and that any

interruption of its smooth implementation could negatively impact the leadership of the CPC.” In response to this, Mao Zedong commented: “How could work be interrupted?” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1426.) 360. Ibid. 361. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1667. 362. Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi’s 20 Years after the Founding of New China, 359. 363. Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 96.

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Party. Most of the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC shared this concern. Unfortunately, He Long’s fears immediately materialized. On August 2, Zhou gave a speech at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. He clarified that he supported Mao’s decision to personally launch the Cultural Revolution, and also volunteered to assume responsibility for the dispatch of working groups. However, he sharply criticized Liu and Deng for their insistence on not withdrawing the working groups after July 18, and called this decision a “serious error.”364 Among the six members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, Zhou was strongest in his declarations of support for Mao. He also said: “We need to maintain our integrity in our later years, and so should closely follow Mao Zedong. By following Mao Zedong we will never be left behind, and will never be tested in the Great Cultural Revolution.”365 This declaration of support was extremely important to Mao. Zhou became the quintessential political chameleon during the Cultural Revolution. On the one hand, he unconditionally and fully supported every decision of Mao in the Cultural Revolution, while on the other hand, he tried to minimize the movement’s damage. Arguably, the negative aspects of the former were greater 364. Zhou Enlai said: “Since 1962, when the Tenth Plenary of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC was held, until today, all important decisions were made by Chairman

Mao personally. During the Cultural Revolution, the big-character poster of the sevenperson group that included Nie Yuanzi was published in the People’s Daily with the

approval of Chairman Mao, and its publication started the movement. The withdrawal of the working teams was also the decision of Chairman Mao after returning to Beijing.

The Cultural Revolution is unprecedented. With regard to the mistaken dispatch of

working teams, all of the members of the standing committee (meaning the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC,) especially those presiding over work

in Beijing (meaning Liu, Zhou, and Deng) should assume liability. Even after the return of the Chairman, we (meaning Liu and Deng) still insisted on not withdrawing the

working teams when we reported to Chairman Mao. This was a serious error.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–1949), vol. 2, 45; Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1033–1034.)



Zhou Enlai said: “The Chairman said on the first (of August,) 90% of working

groups had made directional errors. Even after the Chairman returned to Beijing and we reported to him, we continued to insist on not withdrawing the working groups. We

should hear different opinions and compare those of different parties; if our thoughts are wrong, we should learn from the masses, the Chairman, and the Central Committee of the CPC.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1668.) 365. Ibid, 1673.

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than the positive aspects of the latter. Zhou served on the Standing Committee of the CCCPC Political Bureau throughout the Cultural Revolution and was always Mao Zedong’s most important assistant; as Mao made mistakes, so did Zhou. On the afternoon of August 4, at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, Mao and Liu had a second face-to-face confrontation. Mao expressed resolute opposition to Liu and his allies, saying that they had suppressed the student movement and disobeyed their own orders. He also criticized the Central Committee of the CPC (another way of criticizing Liu and his supporters.) This friction within the Party created a problem of direction and line, and hence was very dangerous. Mao said: “The big-character poster written by Nie Yuanzi’s seven-person group is like the Declaration of the Paris Commune.” Mao believed that Liu and his allies were opposing the Cultural Revolution by supporting the bourgeoisie.366 By saying this, Mao exaggerated the errors of Liu. 366. On August 4, 1966, at the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Mao Zedong said: “Student movements were suppressed under the reign

of the Manchus, the Northern Warlords, and the Kuomintang. Now it is the Party

suppressing student movements. The Central Committee of the CPC is violating its own orders. The Central Committee of the CPC issued the order to suspend classes

for a half a year so students could pursue the Great Cultural Revolution, but now it is intervening to suppress the rising movement. The Central Committee of the CPC

is ignoring the opinions of others. We can say this is an incorrect direction. In fact

this incorrect direction and line violates Marxism and Leninism. This meeting needs to solve this issue to prevent a dangerous situation.



“The words of the Central Committee of the CPC about taking the mass line,

believing in the masses, and following Marxism and Leninism are simply rubbish. They have being lying for years. Their real position will be exposed as events take their course. Apparently they oppose the proletariat and support a bourgeois position.

If opposing the new Municipal Committee means opposing the CPC, why can we not

oppose the new municipal committee! The key is the class you represent and the class you are struggling against.



“I have never worked in grassroots units, but for some people, the longer they stay

there, the more they oppose the proletariat. Any attempt of the Central Committee

of the CPC to prevent communication between classes, departments and schools is meant to suppress and terrorize! Some disagreed and doubted the instruction of the

Central Committee of the CPC of June 18. The big-character poster released by Nie

Yuanzi’s seven-man group resembles the Declaration of the Paris Commune and calls

for a Beijing Commune. The big-character poster is good and should be publicized around the world. But the report submitted by (Li) Xuefeng said that a party or

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However, Liu still volunteered to conduct self-criticism. He said: “During that period, the Chairman was not at home. I presided over the work in Beijing, so I bear the main responsibility.” However, Mao was dissatisfied with Liu Shaoqi’s selfcriticism, and sternly rebuked him again: “You carried out a dictatorship in Beijing and did it very well! Putting it politely, you committed a mistake of direction, but in fact you opposed the proletarian revolution and adopted a bourgeois stand.”367 Unable to endure this, Liu said: “I do not fear losing power. In fact, there are five things I do not fear.”368 Wang Guangmei said: “During this session, when Mao criticized his implementation of dictatorship in Beijing, Liu said: ‘How can this be called dictatorship? The Central Committee collectively decided to dispatch the working groups.’” When Mao asked why he was afraid of the masses, Liu said: “I have served the revolution for decades, so I am not afraid of death. Why would I fear the masses? I fear the masses no more than I fear losing power.”369 This instantly infuriated Mao, who turned openly hostile and indignantly denounced Liu as “a monster and demon.”370 What were the “five things” that Liu did not fear, and who had first proposed this concept? Why did Mao suddenly turn on Liu? In 1962, during the “7000 Cadres Rally,” Liu recounted: “Comrade Mao Zedong once said: ‘To stick to the truth, to seek the truth from facts, and to tell the truth, we must be fearless toward five things: dismissal from our posts, expulsion from the Party, divorce, imprisonment, and execution. If you prepare yourself and do not fear these five things, you will dare to say everything, dare to seek truth from facts, and dare to uphold the truth.’”371 country requires discipline and law, and that domestic and international affairs should be differentiated. If the Central Communist Youth League (Hu Yaobang and others)

suppresses the student movements instead of supporting them, strict measures should

be taken in response.”

(Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1427; Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1035–1036; Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi’s 20 Years after the Founding of New China, 361–362.)

367. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1668. 368. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1427–1428. 369. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 183–184. 370. When Ye Jianying said: “We have millions of soldiers and should never be afraid of

‘Monsters and Demons’,” Mao Zedong responded, “The ‘Monsters and Demons’ are

among your people.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1427–1428.)

371. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 439.

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Liu adopted Mao’s concept of “five things not to be feared” both to express his own views, and to protect himself by taking the precautionary measure of referencing the words of Mao Zedong himself. By referencing the “five things not to be feared” Liu demonstrated that work could no longer be discussed normally, equally, and collectively in the meetings of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC.372 Subsequently, Liu was dismissed from his post, expelled from the Party, imprisoned and persecuted to death. The two face-to-face confrontations with Liu infuriated Mao, who regarded these incidents as major challenges to his personal authority and power. His response was immediate and excessive, and comprised two parts. First, he required that his speeches be circulated throughout the Party. On August 6, the Central Committee of the CPC distributed Mao’s speech during the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC. As requested by Mao, the scheduled meeting agenda was revised and the session extended.373 Mao had already shown his paternalism, and the extension of this session was just another example of his making unilateral decisions and ignoring the democratic decision-making procedures of collective leadership. Mao’s own reason for this was: “If this Plenum had not been convened and we still insisted on refusing to rectify our errors for several more months, I believe things would be much worse. So I think this meeting achieved some positive results.” Mao further explained the change in the session agenda as “the (temporary) adjustment of the members and alternate members of the Politburo of the CPC, the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, which guaranteed the implementation of the resolution and communiqué of the Central Committee of the CPC.”374 Zhou and other leaders helped him to realize this political purpose. Second, using the special form of the big-character poster, Mao wrote “Bombarding the Headquarters—My First Big-character Poster,” which was published in the Beijing Daily.375 By writing a “big-character poster,” Mao, 372. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2. 373. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1668. 374. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 101.

375. Mao Zedong’s big-character poster was printed in the margin of the front page of the Beijing Daily (June 2, 1966.) On the same page, the big-character post written by Nie

Yuanzi’s seven-man group and the People’s Daily editorial “Purge All ‘Monsters and

Demons’” were republished. Mao Zedong’s secretary Xu Fuye later made copies and

Mao Zedong made two further modifications before issuing a final version. In this way,

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actively led this type of rebel activity, giving it his seal of approval as the main weapon and tool of the Cultural Revolution. This shows that Mao had not only abandoned his formula of “unity-criticism-unity,”376 but also the formal system of collective decision-making he had created to resolve political differences among the leadership. Hence, political division would be inevitable. The “big-character poster” targeted Liu and Deng and cast them as representing the “wrong line” in opposing the Cultural Revolution. Mao created the impression of a political division within the Party, but in fact this split was entirely his own creation. The same day, in printing and issuing the documents of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, after the sentence “As for the proletarian revolutionaries, what we abide by is the discipline of the Chinese Communist Party and what we accept unconditionally is the leadership of the CPC Central Committee led by Chairman Mao,” Mao wrote the comment: “Wrong leadership that damages the revolution shall not be accepted unconditionally and must be firmly resisted. In the Cultural Revolution, the vast masses of revolutionary teachers and students and revolutionary cadres have fiercely resisted wrong leadership.”377 This comment was aimed directly at Liu. In fact, Mao faced a basic problem of how to distinguish “right” and “wrong” leadership, something that should be based on objective results rather than relying on his subjective judgment. However, he always managed to avoid this problem by controlling the discussion on what was correct and what was not, which was the fundamental reason he led himself astray during the Cultural Revolution and drove himself into a corner with catastrophic results. His big-character poster and this comment were important signs of the gathering storm. Mao’s extraordinary big-character poster also aimed to further expose and criticize the “historical mistake” of Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping in supporting the rural reform during the early 1960s.378 Mao had bided his time Mao Zedong’s instruction was released as a big-character poster. (Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 184–185.)

376. Mao Zedong said: “In 1942, we concluded the democratic solution to contradictions among the people using a formula of ‘unity-criticism-unity’. Specifically, solve

contradictions through criticism, or struggle to start from the will to unite opinion to create a new union with a new basis. According to our experience, this is a good way to

resolve the contradiction among the people.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 210.)

377. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 93

378. In “Bombarding the Headquarters—My First Big-character Poster,” Mao said: “The

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and waited until after others had made their move before settling old scores with the three members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. He cracked down hard on Liu and Deng, while making Chen Yun the target of verbal attacks. On August 6, Chen Yun wrote to Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC, expressing his support for the policy adopted by Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC.379 Kang Sheng said: “Comrade Chen Yun’s thinking has long opposed that of the Chairman. He only considers the economy and neglects politics.” During the subsequent Working Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC held in October, all three of Mao’s opponents were forced to conduct self-criticism.380 Mao’s purpose in personally writing a big-character poster merits close examination. His big-character poster revealed political differences between him and Liu and Deng. These differences were both long-standing and severe. Furthermore, Mao’s nature was to be impulsive and reactive.381 He subjectively assessed his differences with Liu and Deng to be irreconcilable, and so decided on an open political showdown to reveal and resolve the struggles in the Party and break the collective leadership of the Central Committee.382 Mao genuinely first Marxist and Leninist big-character poster in China (the big–character poster written by Nie Yuanzi’s seven-man group) and the comment in the People’s Daily (by Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Cao Yi’ou) are excellent! Please re-read them. However during the past 50 days or more, from the Central Committee of the CPC to local

governments, besides these good opinions, some leaders have conducted bourgeois dictatorship and sided with the bourgeoisie. They attacked the passionate proletarian

Cultural Revolution movement and confused right and wrong. They persecuted the revolutionists, suppressed different opinions, and conducted white terror. They even encouraged the bourgeoisie and attacked the proletariat! Given the wrong trends of the

rightists in 1962 (mainly Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping) and the rightism in the name of leftism in 1964 (mainly Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping,) surely we need to be vigilant?” (People’s Daily, August 5, 1967.)

379. Jin and Chen ed., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1358–1360. 380. On October 23, 1966, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping conducted self-criticisms on the

Central Working Meeting. on October 30, Chen Yun submitted a written self-criticism. (Jin and Chen ed., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1359–1360.)

381. Editorial Committee of Hu Qiaomu’s Biography, Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 117.

382. Jin commented: “Through this unusual big-character poster, Mao Zedong made public

his discontent with the frontline work of the Central Committee of the CPC (and specifically his unhappiness with other leaders) and stoked the problem of working

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believed that Liu and Deng were taking a capitalist road, and unable to tolerate this, he attacked them. This was the direct political reason and objective of Mao Zedong in launching the Cultural Revolution. Lin Biao later said in the 1969 Political Report to the 9th Congress of the Party: “Mao Zedong published the bigcharacter poster, ‘Bombarding the Headquarters’, which revealed Liu Shaoqi as the leader of the bourgeois headquarters.”383 In reality, the framing of Liu was the result of Mao’s subjective imagination and political miscalculation. As the 1981 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC put it: “The so-called bourgeois headquarters headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping did not exist.”384 Similarly, Hu Qiaomu commented: “Mao Zedong said he was ‘bombarding the headquarters’, but actually he was bombarding the Central Politburo of the CPC.”385 Mao’s basic motivation in launching the Cultural Revolution was to expose the “dark sides” within the Party,386 but this did not mean he could solve these “dark problems,” nor that Liu and Deng actually represented the problems. Actually, at that time, the greatest problem facing Chinese society was not the so-called capitalist roaders, but the fact that over 60% of the population lived in absolute poverty, and the teams into a major issue by labeling them a manifestation of “bourgeois dictatorship.” Only now did Zhou Enlai come to understand who Mao Zedong had referred to with

the term ‘proxies of the bourgeoisie’ in the Notice on May 16.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1669.)

383. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969. 384. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 810.

385. In September 1980, when talking about the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Hu Qiaomu said: “During the meeting, Mao Zedong presented

‘Bombing the Command Post’ without any warning. The so-called ‘command post’ was the Central Politburo of the CPC. Mao Zedong had been in Hangzhou and had authorized Liu Shaoqi to preside over the daily work of the Central Committee.

Suddenly Liu became an anti-revolutionary and the target of attack. Mao Zedong fabricated two ‘command posts’, led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, respectively,

and later added a third led by Tao Zhu. Mao Zedong had no evidence or witnesses, and his word alone created two ‘command posts’. The plenary meeting approved Mao

Zedong’s decision in violation of the party constitution, and groundlessly created a

‘bourgeois command’. These events changed intra-party life and influenced daily life throughout the country. The Chairman of the State lost his freedom of action, as did

the Secretary General.” (Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 113.)

386. Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.

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Engel coefficients of both urban and rural residents exceeded 60%. The Cultural Revolution only exacerbated these serious economic and societal problems, but Mao was so obsessed with politics that he neglected the basic condition of the country. Zhou Enlai played a key role in this plenary session and became Mao’s important ally. On August 5, Mao met with Zhou to arrange the circulation of the big-character poster ‘Bombarding the Headquarters.’387 According to Wu Faxian, then commander of the PLA Air Force, Zhou told him that during this meeting Mao also discussed the issue of his successor with him. Specifically, Mao said: “Liu Shaoqi seems unsuitable. I have observed him for 21 years (referring to 1945–1966) and feel completely disappointed. I have also observed Deng Xiaoping for seven years (referring to 1959–1966) and feel disappointed. I have decided to remove Liu Shaoqi from office, so how should I do this?” Zhou suggested that Lin Biao would be the most suitable replacement for Liu. Mao nodded and said: “All right. Summon Lin Biao (then recuperating in Dalian) to Beijing.”388 This exchange demonstrated three things. First, Zhou recommended that Lin take over Liu’s political posts, a decision subsequently formally approved by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC. Second, Mao selected Lin to replace Liu as his successor not as the result of long-term observation of Lin and recognition of his achievements, but simply as a temporary expedient in response to the needs of political struggle. The appointment thus was a great surprise to Lin himself. Third, Zhou played a key role in the overthrow of Liu. On this critical issue, Zhou ignored the Party’s basic organizational principles and hatched a political conspiracy with Mao. On the evening of that day, without convening the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC to make a collective decision, Zhou notified Liu by phone not to appear in public or meet foreign guests in the near future.389 Only with this phone call did Liu learn the content of Mao’s big-character poster and clearly understand that Mao had ordered him to leave. The relationship between Mao and the members of Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC evolved into one between a ruler and his ministers, whereby ministers had to die if the emperor so commanded. This marked a historical regression whereby the Party assumed characteristics of the old feudal society. On August 5 and 6, Zhou acted for Mao and made two appointments to meet the leaders of the Central Military Commission and senior army generals and convey 387. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1669. 388. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 597. 389. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 46.

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Mao’s decisions regarding the reorganization of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC and his successor.390 In the political struggles within the Party, Mao needed the support and loyalty of the army, and this important 390. Specifically, on August 5, 1966, after calling on Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai made an

appointment with He Long (Marshal,) Nie Rongzhen (Marshal,) Chen Yi (Marshal,) Xu Xiangqian (Marshal,) Ye Jianying (Marshal,) Yang Chengwu (General,) and Liu Zhijian

(Lieutenant General.) (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–1949), vol. 2, 46.)



Liao Hansheng, then Alternate Member of the Central Committee of the CPC

and Political Member of the Beijing Military Area, recalled: “At 12 p.m. on August 6, 1966, Premier Zhou Enlai convened a meeting attended by the heads of each department of the army, the chiefs of the navy and air force, and the principal of

the Beijing Military Area to give them advance warning of Mao Zedong’s decisions. Zhou Enlai said: ‘Chairman Mao has made some decisions and hence written “My

Big-character Poster.” He summoned me to his place at night and authorized me to deliver the poster he was preparing before he retired for the night. The next night he summoned me again and gave me a copy of “My Big-character Poster.” Chairman Mao

has determined to reorganize the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.’ Zhou Enlai later convened another meeting for the same purpose, this time attended by

leaders of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1849–1850.)



Wu Faxian, then Commander of the PLA Air Force, recalled: “On August 8

(actually August 6,) Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting attended by Yang Chengwu (Deputy Chief of Staff of General Staff,) Xiao Hua (Director of the General Political Department,

General,) Xu Guangda (Senior General, Chief of Staff of the PLA Armored Corps,) Zhang Aiping (Vice Chief of Staff of General Staff, General,) Xiao Jinguang (Senior General, Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy,) Su Zhenhua (General, First Commissar

of the PLA Navy,) Wu Faxian, and the heads of each department under the Central

Committee to introduce Mao Zedong’s ‘My Big-character Poster’. During this meeting

Zhou said: ‘Past facts show that Liu Shaoqi is incompetent to carry out the daily work of the Central Committee of the CPC. Chairman Mao hoped to develop Liu Shaoqi into his successor, but apparently Liu is not a proper candidate. He has let Chairman Mao down. You are hereby notified that the Central Committee of the CPC has determined

to transfer Comrade Lin Biao to Beijing to replace Liu Shaoqi as the First Vice Chairman

of the Central Committee of the CPC.’” (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 596.) The Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC in fact was unauthorized and made solely

by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Therefore, although Lin Biao was nominally in charge of the daily work of the Central Military Commission, in fact Zhou Enlai, on behalf of Mao Zedong, controlled the Central Military Commission until 1973.

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matter was personally arranged by Zhou. On August 6, Mao decided to change the agenda of the plenary session and came to a preliminary agreement with Zhou on the adjusted list of leaders of the Central Committee and its meeting schedule.391 That night, while submitting the list of candidate members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC to Mao for examination and approval, Zhou added the following postscript: “The (draft) list decided through evening consultation at the Chairman’s place is as follows, and has been reported to Comrade Lin Biao.”392 Clearly, the other members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC had been excluded from the major decisions of the plenary session, not to mention the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. Mao wanted to take down Liu, but could not have succeeded by relying solely on the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC. Critically, he had to seek political allies on the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee. Besides Zhou, who had volunteered to become his ally, Mao also chose Lin Biao, fourteen years his junior, to formally replace Liu as successor. On the evening of the same day, Mao asked his secretary Xu Yefu to notify Lin by phone that he should immediately come to Beijing to attend the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Lin was unwilling to take up the position and tried to avoid coming to Beijing. To fulfill Mao Zedong’s instruction, Zhou personally phoned Lin and arranged for Wu Faxian to meet Lin in Dalian, from where they flew to Beijing to attend the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC. After returning to Beijing, a meeting between Lin and Mao was arranged by Wang Dongxing in the Zhejiang Hall of the Great Hall of the People. Mao talked to Lin separately and asked him to act as his successor, but Lin refused. On August 13, during the Working Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC, Lin said: “The Central Committee of the CPC (referring to Mao Zedong) has presented me with tasks that I know I lack the ability to fulfill, so I have made several pleas to quit.” Lin refused to accept his new posts until after the reorganization of the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC. After August 6, the plenary session temporarily added three substantive items to its agenda: First, the holding of several democratic meetings of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC to criticize Liu, Deng, and their associates.393 Second, the radical reorganization of the three main leadership 391. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1429. 392. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 187. 393. In the outline of the self-criticism made at the Plenum, Liu Shaoqi said: “I should

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institutions (the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.) Third, the creation of the political conditions for Lin to become Mao’s successor.394 From this point on, Mao firmly controlled the Central Committee of the CPC and was well positioned both politically and organizationally to continue the Cultural Revolution. On August 7, the plenary session printed and distributed Mao’s big-character poster.395 Although this big-character poster did not identify Liu and Deng by name, all the senior cadres of the Party, government and army attending the session understood who it referred to and were greatly shocked. During the discussion of the document, many cadres merely exchanged their understandings of the situation and avoided expressing their support. This reflected that a few leaders had reservations about this sudden and unforeseen political event. Only five attendees strongly supported Mao and attacked Liu: Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.396 Mao’s political power was demonstrated by the ease with which he took down Liu and Deng with a bigcharacter poster. Mao enjoyed supreme status and power within the Party, none could challenge him, and with a word he could get whatever he wished. Guo Moruo (Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress,) who attended the session as a non-voting delegate, wrote a poem praising Mao Zedong’s big-character poster and sincerely referred to him as “the Red Sun in the Heart!”397 Within a short period (from the Working Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1964 to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in 1966,) Mao shrewdly outmaneuvered his political opponents and assume primary responsibility for the line error committed by the Central Committee of the CPC during the Great Cultural Revolution when the Chairman was away from Beijing. I assume all responsibility for all I said and did. As for errors made by others, I assume responsibility for those too.” (Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1038.) 394. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 44. 395. The big-character poster circulated at the plenary session was signed by all members of Nie Yuanzi’s seven-man group from Peking University.

396. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 187–188. 397. In his “Comments on Chairman Mao’s First Big-character Poster ‘Bombarding the Headquarters,’” Guo Moruo said the poster showed: “The CPC is divided into two factions, and the rightists must be criticized even if they are powerful. We must identify

the enemies of the masses and take up weapons to attack them. Those who wish to

seize power are stirring up a storm. Despite these dangers, our champion Chairman Mao fills our hearts with sunshine!” (Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 114–115.)

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won the support and recognition of the majority of the senior leaders of the Party. However, in the long term, Mao’s personal decisions and political methods caused the Party to suffer major political divisions and pay large political costs. Mao’s machinations broke the existing rules governing the resolution of intraparty divisions and struggles, ushering in a period of uncertainty, opaqueness, unpredictability, intensity, complexity, and cruelty. All the leaders besides Mao lacked any sense of political security as it became apparent that Mao could simply brush opponents aside with his fingers.398 Mao felt no need to consider the Party Constitution. He simply attacked, and worried about formalities either as an afterthought or not at all (examples of his victims included Tao Zhu in 1966, Chen Boda in 1970, Lin Biao in 1971, and Deng Xiaoping in 1976.) Intra-party political struggles, in various forms, became normal within the CPC, with political games that created only losers and no winners. However, the members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC attending the session were both powerless to fix the politically damaging situation and also had no inkling that the Cultural Revolution would continue for a decade. Motivated by self-preservation they all unconditionally and consistently passed each decision proposed by Mao. Most of them soon became the objects of revolutionary criticism and political persecution and suffered the same political fate as Liu and Deng. This was the price of their support for Mao’s decision. On August 8, Zhou presided over the plenary session and Lin attended for the first time. The session passed the Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution by the Central Committee of the CPC. That evening, Lin met alone with the members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC. Lin began to deify Mao and cast him as the supreme commander of the Cultural Revolution. He said: “The Cultural Revolution Group comprises the combat personnel who will pursue the Cultural Revolution. It is not temporary and will exist for a long time.”399 The 1981 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that 398. Kang Sheng delivered Mao Zedong’s instruction in his speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, May 25, 1966.

399. On August 8, 1966, when Lin Biao received the Central Cultural Revolution Group, he

said: “Chairman Mao was the supreme commander and the captain of this Cultural

Revolution and you are all his associates. The Cultural Revolution Group and Cultural Revolution Committee are permanent organizations instead of being temporary. You

achieved much in recent months and will achieve even more in the future. You should beat down the bourgeois reactionary authorities and stir up a big storm to warn the bourgeoisie and inspire the proletariat. Chairman Mao is the greatest proletarian leader and talent that currently exists, holds supreme responsibility for the revolution, and

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the personality cult of Mao was advocated to frenzied extremes.400 Lin was not only the leader of this unprecedented deification movement but also the most important supporter of Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution, and became the biggest winner in the struggle between Mao and Liu. Moreover, Lin yielded to political temptation and participated in conspiracies and plots. Although he knew Mao well, he could not have expected that becoming Mao’s successor would ultimately see him become his biggest political rival, just as had happened to Liu. This outcome was the political logic of Mao’s struggle philosophy during the Cultural Revolution, and for both Mao and Lin, their struggle was independent of their will. The same day, the People’s Daily reported: “The Central Committee of the CPC has decided to accelerate the publication of the Works of Chairman Mao. The committee has therefore ordered the mobilization of the cadres, staff and workers of the publishing, printing and distributing departments, to fully devote themselves to the publication and distribution of this book. In accordance with the instruction of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Ministry of Culture has decided to print and distribute 35 million volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong this year and next. It has been reported: ‘Chairman Mao’s books are the best, most revolutionary, and most scientific books. Every word in Chairman Mao’s books is gold and every sentence is truth.’”401 Meanwhile, the People’s Daily published the editorial titled “A Great and Happy Event for the Whole Nation” which said: “The primary need in the political life of the Chinese people is to read Chairman Mao’s books. If our country, occupying a quarter of the world’s population, becomes a big school for learning Mao Zedong Thought and popularizing Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought more deeply and widely, our socialist proletarian dictatorship possesses the most realistic revolutionary spirit. Mao Zedong Thought has passed the test of long-term revolutionary struggle and is the supreme theory of the proletariat

and the ultimate proletarian work, as well as being one of the greatest achievements

in the history in our country.” He also criticized: “Some members of the Standing

Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC (referring to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun) have ignored this point, and thus are really misguided, just as the

Soviets were misguided when they abandoned Leninism.” On August 16 of the same year, Mao Zedong officially approved the transmission of the draft of Lin Biao’s speech. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 23–28.)

400. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 812.

401. People’s Daily, August 8, 1966.

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will remain forever red, and will contribute to revolutionary movements elsewhere in the world.”402 On the same day, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC formally passed the Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (the 16-Article Document,) drafted by the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC and examined and approved by Mao.403 Mao decided to implement the 16-Article Document to overcome problems of information asymmetry, incompleteness, and uncertainty. Mao believed the Notice on May 16 was insufficient because it dealt only with political and ideological issues. The practicalities of carrying out a movement demanded the implementation of regulations and restrictions. Limits should be established, what was permitted versus forbidden should be clarified, and the most necessary actions should be clarified.404 The reality of China was that it had an enormous population, complex society, and pronounced differences among regions, and hence the 16-Article Document could not clearly and adequately cover all of the unexpected situations thrown up by the Cultural Revolution. Having bypassed the hierarchical Party organizations and state institutions and mobilized hundreds of millions of the masses, Mao could not realistically draw clear boundaries, and in any case was too far removed from the masses and from reality to do so. However, Mao naively believed that the mobilized masses loved, respected, and worshipped him, and hence would do whatever he said. Article 1 of the 16-Article Document defined the movement as “a great revolution 402. People’s Daily, August 8, 1966. 403. Chen Boda successively submitted it to Mao Zedong on July 26, August 3, and August

7 1966, and Mao made five instructions and modifications. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the



Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 82.)

Mao Zedong issued instructions on and modifications to this draft many times between

July and August 1966. In early July, on instructions from Mao Zedong, Chen Boda,

Wang Li, and others began drafting this document and made 31 modifications. Mao entrusted Tao Zhu, Wang Renzhong, and Zhang Pinghua with the modification work,

and Zhou Enlai made suggestions regarding the modifications. The draft was finally

approved by Mao on August 7. (Xu ed., Storms of Fulu Residence: Struggles of Liu Shaoqi

During the Cultural Revolution, 124.) According to Zhou Enlai, some leaders, including Tao Zhu and Wang Renzhong, suggested that terms like ‘sinister gang’ and ‘illegal line’ be deleted from the draft, and that the draft contain careful analysis and affirm that

most officials were competent. (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1667.) 404. Wang, Wang Li’s Reflection on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 614.

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that touches the soul and marks a new stage, deeper and broader than anything that has come before, in the development of our country’s socialist revolution.” The Cultural Revolution reinstated the spirit of struggle that Mao Zedong had called for in 1927, when he said “do not be elegant, gentle, refined, modest and courteous in carrying out revolution.”405 The Cultural Revolution reflected the refusal of Mao, as leader of the CPC, to voluntarily become a ruling party politician rather than a revolutionary leader, and to abandon revolutionary struggle for modern state governance, even when the Party had been in power for seventeen years. Thus, reform was inevitable after the Cultural Revolution, substituting radical revolution for progressive reform and peaceful construction for violent destruction. However, at that time, Article 1 of this supreme instruction became the most resounding battle cry of the Red Guards in “Destroy the Four Olds,” a popular reference in revolutionary political slogans, and a main source of legitimization for a violent social movement that destroyed the rule of law and violated human rights. Article 1 also proposed that the goals of the Cultural Revolution were “to purge capitalist roaders, criticize the reactionary bourgeois academic ‘authorities’, criticize the ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all the other exploiting classes, and reform education, literature, art, and all the superstructures that cannot adapt to the socialist economic foundation to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.”406 This emphasized that the priority of the Cultural Revolution was to foil attempts by the establishment to take the capitalist road. However, as Wang Shaoguang commented, nobody, not even Mao, ever clearly defined what was meant by the term “capitalist roader.” The meaning of the term was so confused that “one explanation might be opposite to another, causing great confusion in the movement.”407 The 16-Article Document also held that the main 405. In 1927, Mao Zedong said: “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and

gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous. A revolution

is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao

Zedong, vol. 1, 18.)

406. “This refers to attacking capitalist roaders, criticizing reactionary bourgeois academics, and critiquing the ideologies of the bourgeoisie and the exploiting classes, as well as

the reforms of education, literature and art, and all the superstructures not adaptable to

the economic foundations of socialism, in order to consolidate and develop the socialist system.” (“Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” People’s Daily, August 9, 1966.)

407. Wang, Frustrations of a Transcendent Leader: the Great Cultural Revolution in Wuhan.

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obstacles to the Cultural Revolution arose from the Party’s infiltration by members of the establishment taking the capitalist road and the social force of old habits.408 Regarding the state system implemented in the Cultural Revolution, as well as its political blueprint, Article 9 of 16-Article Document stipulated that a comprehensive elective system should be implemented to choose representatives of various organizations, as had been done in the Paris Commune.409 This reflected Mao’s desire to replace the hierarchical Party and governmental bureaucracy based on the appointment system with the democratic system of the Paris Commune produced through the general election system in the Cultural Revolution. Subsequent developments showed that although Mao never implemented a comprehensive elective system, he did implement a peculiar “revolutionary committee system” that contradicted the Organizational Law of Local People’s Congresses and People’s Committees at Various Levels of 1954. Article 5 sheds some light on the political objectives of the Cultural Revolution, saying that the movement aimed to unite over 95% of the cadres and 95% of the masses. This figure of 95% became the political consensus of the Central Committee of the CPC, and nobody voiced reservations or disagreement. At that time, China had more than 15 million cadres, and the total national population exceeded 700 million, which meant 750,000 cadres and 35 million ordinary citizens were at risk of political persecution, equivalent to the entire population of a large country. Not only did the Cultural Revolution plan political persecution on a vast scale, but the mechanisms were unconstitutional. Ultimately it was Mao’s subjective judgments that determined who suffered. Only in 1979 did Hu Yaobang, Director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, recognize the serious negative consequences of the wordings of Article 5.410 408. “Resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” People’s Daily, August 9, 1966.

409. Wang Li believed that Article 9 was very important and represented the core of

Mao Zedong’s thought, saying: “Mao Zedong intended to replace the existing state

apparatus with an alternative modeled on the Paris Commune. In the Paris Commune, officials were elected rather than appointed, and were regularly subject to dismissal or replacement.” (Wang, Wang Li’s Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 615.)

410. In January 1979, Hu Yaobang said: “Since the launch of the Great Cultural Revolution,

but especially after I started organizational work last year, two questions have always been in my mind: first, what is the quantitative meaning of ‘purge’ in a big country like China? Comrade Mao Zedong always told us that most officials were competent,

and only a minority should be beaten down. But we now have 17 million full-time officials, which may reach 19 million by the end of the year. That figure is almost the

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Sidebar 3.2

The 16-Article Document (August 8, 1966)

What is the nature of the Great Cultural Revolution and what does it seek to achieve? The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution currently in progress is a great revolution that touches the soul and marks a new stage, deeper and broader than anything that has come before, in the development of our country’s socialist revolution. Our immediate goals are to purge capitalist roaders, criticize the reactionary bourgeois academic “authorities”, criticize the ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all the other exploiting classes, and reform education, literature, art, and all the superstructures that cannot adapt to the socialist economic foundation to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system. (Article 1) What are the obstacles facing the Great Cultural Revolution? The obstacles are mainly from the Establishment who have infiltrated our Party and are taking the capitalist road, as well as the forces of old social habits. Presently, these remain significant obstructions. (Article 2) How to carry out the Great Cultural Revolution? Be daring and resolute, and go all out to mobilize the masses. (Article 3) Fear nothing, and do not be afraid of getting into trouble. Chairman Mao often tells us that in revolution we should not be elegant, gentle, refined, modest, or courteous. Let the masses educate themselves, and distinguish right and wrong conduct in pursuing this great revolutionary movement. The vast masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary intellectuals are the main forces of this great cultural revolution. Numerous unknown revolutionary youth have become courageous and daring generals, and have shown enormous courage and wisdom. They have resolutely attacked the visible and hidden bourgeois representatives through big-character posters and debate, and through openly exposing and criticizing these enemies. (Article 4) What are the main policies of the Great Cultural Revolution? To firmly implement the Party’s class line, pay attention to carefully distinguishing anti-Party and anti-socialist rightists from those who support the Party and socialism but have made incorrect statements, made mistakes, or written articles expressing incorrect views. Also, to distinguish carefully reactionary bourgeois scholar-tyrants and reactionary authorities from those who merely have general bourgeois academic ideas. (Article 5) Two contradictions must be strictly distinguished: contradictions among the people, and contradictions between the enemy and ourselves. Do not mistake internal contradictions among the people for contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, or vice versa. (Article 6)

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What are the main organizational forms of the Great Cultural Revolution? The cultural revolution groups, commissions and other organizational forms created by the masses in many schools and units are both new and historically significant. They are the best organizational forms through which the masses can educate themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party. They are the best bridges for our Party to closely connect with the masses. They are the power institutions for the proletarian cultural revolution, and should be longterm and permanent mass organizations rather than temporary. The members of the cultural revolution groups and commissions, as well as the representatives of the cultural revolution representative conferences, should be chosen through a comprehensive elective system just like in the Paris Commune. The list of candidates should be proposed by the revolutionary masses after consideration and discussion, and then elected after repeated discussion. The elected members of the cultural revolution groups and commissions, and the representatives of the cultural revolution conferences, may be criticized by the masses at any time, and if unqualified can be reelected and replaced after discussion. (Article 9)

During this plenary session, Mao completed the concentration of his personal power. He transformed himself into the supreme leader, grasped absolute and decisive power, and replaced the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC. His actions represented a historical retrogression and undermined the institutionalization of the Party.411 The plenary session became a vehicle of Mao’s formal launch of the Cultural Revolution because of failures by the members of the collective leadership. The Central Committee only formally recognized this in 1981, when Hu Yaobang noted that the members of the Central Committee of the CPC of the time should take responsibility for allowing the organ to be taken population of Romania. One percent of these officials means 190,000 individuals, 2% means 380,000. To persecute such a population is a major undertaking. The question thus arises: what does ‘the majority of officials are competent’ mean? 98%, 99%, or over

99%?” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Literature Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 1, 54.)

411. The 1981 Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that during this plenary meeting the collective leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC was

replaced by the incorrect leftist personal leadership of Mao Zedong. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literature Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 812.)

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over and used to pursue the Cultural Revolution.412 As Hu Qiaomu admitted: “There were many members of the Central Committee of the CPC in the Eleventh Plenary Session (of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,) but no one opposed what was happening, including myself.”413 Among the members of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, the Central Politburo of the CPC and the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, Zhou Enlai stands out as particularly responsible, and bore secondary responsibility after Mao Zedong for what transpired. The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC initiated a struggle against the so-called “headquarters of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping” and greatly reorganized the leadership institution of the Central Committee. At that time, although Jiang Qing was not a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, she not only attended meetings as a non-voting delegate but also officially explained the article “Bombarding the Headquarters” to the Central Committee, saying: “There are two headquarters in Beijing, and one represents the bourgeoisie while the other represents the proletariat.” During the Plenary Session, Yao Wenyuan also wrote a big-character poster, titled “Follow Chairman Mao to Continuously Progress.” Yao explained Mao’s big-character poster as follows: “What does it refer to? It refers to using Mao Zedong Thought as a bomb to attack and destroy all bourgeois reactionary thoughts and reactionary lines at the headquarters.”414 On August 10, Mao visited the Public Reception Center in Zhongnanhai to meet 412. On July 1, 1981, Hu Yaobang analyzed the causes of the errors of Mao Zedong during

his later years, doing so in his official capacity as Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC. He said: “Mao developed excessive self-belief due to his long-standing high reputation in the CPC and throughout the country. This caused his behavior to gradually depart from established practice, and especially from the collective leadership of the

CPC. He sometimes refused and even suppressed the correct opinions of others, and so

failed to avoid errors and even committed blunders like the Cultural Revolution, which

impacted the national situation over a long period and caused tragedy for our Party and people. Prior to and at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the CPC not only

failed to stop Mao Zedong making errors but actually accepted and agreed with some

of his wrong opinions. Other members of the Central Committee of the CPC (including Mao Zedong’s comrades in arms and subsequent followers) bear responsiblity for

this and should learn from it.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literature Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 858.)

413. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 113.

414. Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 33.

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the masses from the capital and celebrate the Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the Central Committee of the CPC (the 16-Article Document.) During this meeting he proclaimed: “You should concern yourselves with state affairs and carry the Great Cultural Revolution through to the end!”415 With this action Mao Zedong issued a political mobilization order to the nation. On August 11, the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Grasp the Ideological Weapon of the Great Cultural Revolution,” which said: “There are two opposite guiding principles, two opposite policies and two opposite paths. One path is to trust the masses, rely on the masses, mobilize the masses, believe the masses can liberate and educate themselves, and enthusiastically support their revolutionary spirit and actions. The other path is to stand against the masses and suppress them at the critical moment of the revolution. The former path is to carry out the revolutionary lines of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The latter path is to carry out the wrong lines of opposing Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”416 While it did not mention Liu by name, this editorial clearly presented him as representing the latter wrong line. On August 12, the plenary session formally removed Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing and Yang Shangkun from their posts as secretaries and Alternate Secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, thus implementing the decision made by the Enlarged Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC in May.417 This marked another example of the typical behavioral pattern of “acting first and reporting later” and reflected the failure of the basic system for personnel adjustment in the Party’s leadership institutions. This was highlighted by the fact that, in accordance with Mao’s proposal and arrangements, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC temporarily added the reorganization of the leadership institutions of the Central Committee. Zhou explained the organizational and personnel changes. The plenary session 415. People’s Daily, August 12, 1966. 416. People’s Daily, August 11, 1966. 417. The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC approved the decisions on the removal of the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of

the CPC and the election of a successor; the resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC held in May on the suspension of Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi,

and Luo Ruiqing from the Central Secretariat, and of Yang Shangkun as Alternate Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC; and the decision of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC held in May to appoint Tao Zhu Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat and Ye Jianying as Secretary of the Central Secretariat.

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significantly adjusted the membership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC, enlarging the committee from seven to eleven members.418 Prior to this (on August 6,) Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had approved the draft list of the reorganized leadership.419 Thus, the reorganization of the leadership institutions was not approved through collective democratic decision making in accordance with the Party Constitution. Specifically, this decision was made without being proposed, discussed, or approved by the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, or the Central Committee of the CPC. Mao thus actively destroyed the internal party electoral system.420 Meanwhile, rather 418. The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC elected eleven

members of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC: Mao Zedong,

Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun; elected six members of the Central Politburo of the

CPC: Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying;

co-opted three alternate members of the Central Politburo of the CPC: Li Xuefeng, Song Renqiong, and Xie Fuzhi; and elected two secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central

Committee of the CPC: Xie Fuzhi and Liu Ningyi. (Li, From the 1st to the 16th National Congress of the CPC, vol. 2, 978.)

419. On August 6, 1966, Mao Zedong summoned Zhou Enlai to discuss the list of current

elected members and alternate members of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC, and secretaries and alternate secretaries of the Secretariat of the

Central Committee of the CPC. After the meeting, a draft list based on the discussion at the meeting was submitted to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao. When reviewing the list, Mao

ranked the standing committee members of the Political Bureau and promoted Tao Zhu from seventh to fourth in the hierarchy. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 46.)



According to Wang Li, the list of the members of the Standing Committee of the

Central Politburo of the CPC was drawn up by Mao Zedong personally as follows: Mao

Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun and Tao Zhu. Zhou sought the opinions of Lin and Jiang.

Jiang responded: ‘Why was Deng Xiaoping, who made errors, promoted from seventh

to fourth in the leadership hierarchy? How can this be explained?’ She believed Chen Boda should rank ahead of Deng, and also commented: ‘Chen Boda cannot surpass Deng Xiaoping, but Tao Zhu can.’ Consequently, Tao was ranked fourth, followed by

Chen Boda and Deng Xiaoping. Mao agreed with Jiang. (Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 617.)

420. According to Jin, prior to the closing of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central

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than cautioning Mao regarding his improper conduct or seeking to prevent it, Zhou faithfully carried out Mao’s instructions, and thus should bear secondary responsibility for these political mistakes. Mao’s “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster” condemned Liu politically, and the subsequent reorganization of the Central Committee of the CPC was a soft means of removing him, demonstrating Mao’s political arithmetic of starting with “addition,” namely to reorganize the leadership hierarchy, then “subtraction,” meaning to politically marginalize those with different views, and to conclude with a “final cancellation,” in which his opponents were expelled from the Party. The case of Liu Shaoqi demonstrates that the Cultural Revolution was characterized by feudal despotism, political division, and schemes and intrigues. The adjustment of the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC saw Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Chen Yun removed as vice chairmen, while Deng Xiaoping was relieved of the post of General Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. Additionally, Liu was demoted to eighth in the party hierarchy, and Deng was promoted from seventh to sixth place. Lin leapt to become the number two leader in the Party, and was the only vice chairman of the Central Committee.421 He also became Mao’s designated successor. On August 18, demonstrating Lin’s new position as sole vice chairman, Mao annotated a report with the following comment and instruction: “Send to Vice Chairman Lin (Biao) and the members of the Standing Committee (of the Political Bureau) for reading.” 422 On October 23, while conducting selfcriticism during the Working Conference of the Central Committee, Liu explained Committee of the CPC, Mao proposed the reorganization of the central institutions. Since this proposal was not in the original agenda, it had not been prepared for or

discussed among the Political Bureau and Standing Committee, and the Central

Committee of the CPC had not been asked to provide opinions. (Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1039.)

421. According to Wu Faxian, at this time Mao Zedong made a list of the vice chairmen of

the Central Committee of the CPC, namely Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai. But Zhou Enlai then deleted his own name, so Lin Biao became the only Vice Chairman. (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 597.)

422. During the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Lin Biao was re-elected as Member of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo

of the CPC. Shortly after, Mao Zedong appointed him Vice Chairman of the Central Committee. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp.,

Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 106.)

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the following: “It was unanimously decided in the Plenary Session that Comrade Lin Biao holds the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought the highest, and studies and applies the Works of Chairman Mao most creatively. Therefore he was chosen as Chairman Mao’s leading assistant and successor.”423 This was proposed to the Plenary Session and passed unanimously. During the meeting Lin deliberately proposed not publicly announcing the result of the election, and accordingly the bulletin of the Plenary Session did not formally report the result. The decision to make Lin the leading assistant and successor to Mao thus became the formal and “unanimous” decision of the Central Committee of the CPC. Regarding the reasons Mao chose Lin as his successor, Pang believes Lin’s relatively young age (14 years younger than Mao and 9 years younger than Liu and Zhou) was less important than his politics. Since starting to preside over the work of the Central Military Commission, Lin displayed consistency with the ideas of Mao, for example by preaching “stressing political work” and the “four firsts.”424 As Deng later said, it was a feudal practice for a leader to choose his own successor.425 In his later years Mao focused heavily on the succession problem, and hoped to transfer power to someone he trusted.426 However, he invariably became suspicious of his chosen successor and played political games with them. Lin was deeply aware that “he who rides a tiger finds it difficult to dismount,” but having been forced by Mao to be his successor, he had little option but to continue his dangerous political life. External circumstances eventually sealed Lin’s fate. Four people were newly appointed as members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, namely Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Li Fuchun. Chen and Kang had previously been alternate members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. These four people strongly supported Mao’s Cultural Revolution, and not only contributed to the “Great Cultural Revolution” theory, but also organized associated practices, and in recognition of this support Mao fast-tracked their promotion, making them members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, and part of the core 423. People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 730.

424. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1429. 425. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 347–348.

426. Bai Gang pointed out: “In the history of China, every emperor prioritized the selection of his successor to guard against power being seized by non-royals. This concern with the succession reflects the nature of China’s imperial system—“nepotism.” (Bai, Emperors in the History of China, 176.)

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leadership of the Central Committee. Tao was directly promoted to the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, having previously merely been a member the Central Committee. Additionally, responding to his nomination by Mao, the Central Committee of the CPC appointed Tao a consultant to the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC. Soon afterward, the Central Committee of the CPC further appointed Tao Vice Premier of the State Council. Finally, Mao Zedong directly nominated Tao to become Administrative Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, in which post he replaced Peng Zhen and was groomed to take over from Deng Xiaoping. Deng commented in May 1989: “In the history of our Party, the truly mature collective leadership comprised the generation of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De.”427 This collective leadership group actually comprised seven people, as the younger leaders Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Lin Biao served alongside the above four senior leaders. However, the seven-person collective leadership split during the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and was replaced by a new eleven-person collective leadership, which itself soon disintegrated. Liu and Deng stopped participating in the routine leadership work of the Central Committee of the CPC after Mao accused them of line mistakes.428 During the plenary session, Zhu De and Chen Yun were also criticized and became members of the Standing Committee in name only. Soon after, Mao also attacked Tao Zhu and Li Fuchun.429 At the beginning of January 1967, Mao criticized Tao before formally removing him from office, meaning he became the shortest serving member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC. On January 11, Liu and Deng were formally removed from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.430 Zhu De, Chen Yun, and Li Fuchun were successively marginalized and excluded from the decision making of the Central Committee of the CPC. By February 1967, only five members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC remained, namely Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. This series of leadership changes saw the leaders of the Cultural Revolution either capture the organs of the Party or render 427. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 3, 298.

428. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Liu Shaoqi remained a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in name, but

was not notified of the organization’s daily working meetings. (Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 188.)

429. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1039–1040. 430. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 40.

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them impotent, and the two main leadership institutions (the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC) were formally replaced by the so-called “brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group” presided over by Zhou Enlai. During the plenary session, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying became members of the Central Politburo of the CPC. Additionally, Xie Fuzhi, Minister of Public Security, became Alternate Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, replacing Luo Ruiqing and assuming an important place in the Jiang Qing Group, the hardliners who supported the Cultural Revolution. This “political reshuffle” was Mao’s organizational plan to ensure that the Cultural Revolution would be conducted to completion. In the final sitting of the plenary session, Mao said: “This time, some changes have been made in the organization. The adjustment of the members of the Political Bureau, the alternate members of the Political Bureau, and the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC guarantees the implementation of the Central Committee of the CPC’s resolutions and bulletins.”431 He also said: “If this Plenary Session had not been convened and we had not rectified errors for several more months, in my opinion things would be much worse.”432 In fact, after the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC was convened, China entered an era of great national disorder. Unprecedented civil and political strife became inevitable and the situation was far worse than Mao Zedong imagined. In the final sitting of the plenary session, Mao proposed the “Theory of Factions within the Party” as the theoretical basis for his pursuit of the internal party struggle. He said: “We cannot say there are no parties outside our Party. In my opinion, there are parties outside our Party and factions inside our Party. This has been always so and is normal. Someone once said: ‘Only an emperor would believe there were no parties outside the Party, and it would be exceedingly strange for there to be no factions inside the Party.’ Thus it is for our Communist Party.”433 Mao also specifically mentioned the decision of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, saying: “Whether the decision is right or not right depends on subsequent practice.” He also warned the members of the Party: “Never assume that the party committees and comrades will reliably and without exception implement what is written in this decision. There are always persons 431. Jin ed., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1350. 432. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1670. 433. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 101.

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unwilling to implement decisions.”434 Clearly, at that time, the Central Committee of the CPC and party organizations at all levels contained many persons who did not understand Mao’s decision to launch the Cultural Revolution and were unwilling to implement it, and Mao regarded these people as obstructing the movement.435 Mao was well aware that some people had opposed the Cultural Revolution from the very start. Indeed, it can be said that his decision to pursue the Cultural Revolution ran against the tide of opinion within the Party. Nevertheless, Mao overrode all objections and proceeded without hesitation, intending to let the obedient thrive and destroy those who resisted. The struggle within the Party between the supporters and opponents of the Cultural Revolution became a main focus of the movement. At the start of the movement, Mao needed to demonstrate the movement’s theoretical correctness. When practice failed to demonstrate this and doubts were voiced, Mao Zedong regarded these doubters as hostile political forces opposing the movement and aggressively turned on them, further intensifying the political persecution that was already an inherent part of the movement. As the political persecution spread, the misguided nature of the Cultural Revolution only became more evident, prompting new doubts and questions, and forcing Mao onto a path of endless Cultural Revolution. The movement became self-perpetuating, and the longer it continued the greater the political costs it incurred. However, Mao did not sense the danger of this “Great Cultural Revolution Trap” and envisioned a swift end to the movement. During the plenary session, he proposed convening the 9th National Congress of the CPC at a suitable time in 1967, and advised the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC to make the necessary preparations.436 This demonstrates that Mao intended to end the Cultural Revolution before the convention of the 9th National Congress of the CPC. He envisioned that the 9th National Congress of the CPC would become an important symbol of the movement’s success, and an important chance to build the Central Committee of the CPC into a new leadership institution. However, human planning cannot account for the unforeseen, and Mao was no exception in this regard. From the perspective of the formal Party 434. Ibid. 435. The Red Flag published an editorial titled “Framework Document of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in issue 10 of 1966, which stated: “We must admit

that there exists some strong resistance to the movement. Many areas and institutions remain in a state of preparation or passivity, and the class struggle failed to be

completed. Complexities and setbacks have appeared in some areas and institutions” (People’s Daily, August 11, 1966.)

436. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 125.

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systems, the term of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC had been extended to ten years, and Mao had served as Chairman of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC for the same period, twice the maximum five-year term stipulated in the Party Constitution. Mao offered the Central Committee no explanation for this anomaly. In fact, he postponed the convention of the 9th National Congress of the CPC until April 1969. Mao showed no regard for internal party systems and rules, and claimed for himself the authority to “openly challenge the law.” His flagrant disregard for party rules was the most outstanding behavior of his later years, and also the fundamental cause of his political mistakes during this period. Lin also spoke during the final sitting of the plenary session, and said: “This session has been led by the Chairman personally from beginning to end. In the process of this large-scale and great Cultural Revolution, a serious line mistake has been committed, which has almost throttled the revolution, brought it to a halt, suspended revolutionary activity, and even caused it to go backwards. In this time of danger, the Chairman came out and reversed the tide, rallying the forces of the Cultural Revolution, and leading them to continue to attack and defeat all the monsters and demons.”437 On August 16, Mao formally authorized the distribution of Lin’s speech.438 On the same day, acting on Mao’s instructions, the plenary session issued four documents: Mao’s “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster” (August 5, 1966); “Long Live the Proletarian Revolutionary Rebel Spirit,” a big-character poster by the Red Guards of the Tsinghua University High School (June 24, 1966); Lin’s “Speech at the Enlarged Session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC” (May 18, 1966); and the “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.” The Communiqué of the Plenary Session was immediately published and read: “The Plenary Session has formally approved the wise decisions personally proposed by Mao Zedong since the Tenth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.”439 Specifically, the plenary session approved and praised 437. Lin, “Speech at the Closing Meeting of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.”

438. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 106.

439. “The plenary session completely agreed with a series of wise decisions by Comrade Mao Zedong in the past four years (1962–1966) including:

• T he decision to implement the principle of democratic centralism and promote the mass line; • The decision to cultivate and train successors to the revolutionary undertakings of

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Mao’s instructions on the Cultural Revolution,440 and also praised Mao himself for “ingeniously, creatively and comprehensively inheriting, defending, and developing Marxism and Leninism.”441 Mao made several comments on and revisions to this communiqué submitted by Kang Sheng,442 showing his approval the proletariat; • T he decision on the call to learn from Daqing in industry, from Dazhai in agriculture, and from the PLA, to enhance political and ideological work throughout the country; • The decision regarding the strategic guideline to prepare for war and famine and to serve the people; • The decision to eliminate western influence and follow our own path of industrial development; • The decision about the system and layout of economic construction and national defense construction • The decision about the call to stress military work in the CPC and involve all of the people in military drills; • The decision to gradually plan and deploy agricultural mechanization; • T he decision that the PLA, factories, rural areas, schools, service and other industries, and the Party and governmental authorities shall work together as a big revolutionary school.”

(“Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the

CPC,” People’s Daily, August 14, 1966.)

440. The plenary session stressed: “Comrade Mao Zedong’s series of instructions on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution served as the guide to the current actions of the

Cultural Revolution in our country and represented a big development in Marxism and Leninism.” (Ibid.)

441. The Communiqué of the Plenary Session pointed out: “Comrade Mao Zedong is the

greatest living Marxist and Leninist. He has inherited, championed, and developed Marxism and Leninism in a manner that demonstrates his talent, creativity, and

comprehensiveness, and has introduced Marxism and Leninism to a brand-new stage. Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism and Leninism at a time when imperialism is progressing toward complete collapse and socialism is progressing toward worldwide victory. Mao Zedong Thought is the guideline of all the work of the Party and the country.” (Ibid.)

442. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 95. Mao Zedong deleted the phrase “The Plenary Session strongly supports the statement released

by Comrade Liu Shaoqi on behalf of our country” from the draft communiqué. The statement referred to here is that released by Liu Shaoqi, in his capacity as Chairman of

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for the wordings the Communiqué used to praise him. The Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC appraised Lin and criticized Liu. The communiqué of the plenary session praised Lin’s efforts to promote the learning of Mao’s works, emphasized that the session was historically significant for the Party, and that the whole nation should enthusiastically learn the works of Mao. According to the communiqué, Lin set a brilliant example for the Party and nation in calling on the People’s Liberation Army to implement a mass movement throughout its ranks to learn Mao’s works.443 On August 13, Xinhua News Agency broadcast the following information: “The communiqué has made the most comprehensive, scientific and profound statement on the current domestic and international situation and has issued the most correct, wise, and timely struggle call to the whole nation.”444 On August 15, the People’s Daily published the editorial, “Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman,” saying: “In the new stage of our country’s socialist revolution and at the critical moment for the development of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong personally chaired the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. This session was a milestone marking a new stage in our country’s socialist revolution.” The editorial stressed: “A voyage depends on the helmsman! The great helmsman of our country’s revolution is Comrade Mao Zedong, who has very correctly explained the enormous importance of Mao Zedong Thought to the national revolution and the future of our country.”445 One year later, on August 17, 1967, Red Flag published an editorial, saying: “The greatest historical significance of the Eleventh Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC was that it further solidified the absolute authority of Mao Zedong Thought and established the position of Comrade Lin Biao, who had always held high the great flag of Mao Zedong Thought and loyally, resolutely, and thoroughly carried out Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line as the Party’s deputy commander, further consolidated the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao, and defeated the bourgeois headquarters headed by the Establishment taking the capitalist road (referring to Liu Shaoqi.) This session was extremely significant to the fate of our Party and nation, and also to the fate of the international communist movement.”446 Liu did not confront Mao during the plenary session. Instead, he focused on the PRC, on the policy of assisting Vietnam and resisting the U.S. 443. “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 14, 1966.

444. People’s Daily, August 14, 1966. 445. People’s Daily, August 15, 1966. 446. Red Flag, issue 13, 1967.

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the greater good, adopted an open attitude, assumed personal responsibility and blame, and volunteered to withdraw politically. He offered to undertake selfcriticism during the plenary session, saying: “I bear primary responsibility for the line mistake made by the Central Committee of the CPC during the Cultural Revolution while the Chairman was not in Beijing. I bear responsibility for everything I have said and done, and will never evade that responsibility. I should also bear responsibility for the mistakes made by other comrades.” He also said: “I guarantee to obey the Party’s decisions, strive to recognize my own mistakes, do nothing to disadvantage the Party, obey the Party’s basic discipline, be honest in my dealings, engage in no underground activities, and openly express my differing opinions.”447 Liu acted justly and volunteered to step down politically without waiting for others to attack him. The plenary session did not continue to criticize Liu, and he was re-elected to the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. Many people, including Liu himself, thus thought he had survived the crisis unscathed.448 However, the political struggles within the Party that had become intertwined with the Cultural Revolution had their own political logic, which was more complex than Liu Shaoqi imagined or expected. Despite his election to the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, his political life was in jeopardy, and far from letting him go, Mao’s real intention was to “beat the drowning dog.” During the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao achieved great personal political success, establishing his own absolute political authority and the absolute authority of his political philosophy. Additionally, Mao formally made the Cultural Revolution part of the Party’s political line with the 16-Article Document, and reorganized the membership of the Political Bureau and Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC. Having made Lin his deputy, Mao obtained the political and organizational resources to launch the Cultural Revolution, strengthening his control over the Party. However, his personal political success came at great political cost to the CPC, and caused unprecedented political and civil strife. As Mao’s personal political victory grew, so too did the political cost to the Party, though this was not fully apparent at the time. China’s international strategy and guiding principle of foreign policy at this time were determined by Mao’s “Philosophy of struggle,” according to which he opposed the United States and the Soviet Union, and established an international united front with China as its core. The communiqué of the plenary session stated: “The Plenary Session believes: American imperialism is the most ferocious common enemy of the world’s people. To isolate and attack American imperialism, 447. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1038–1039. 448. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 195.

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an extensive international united front must be established to oppose American imperialism and its lackeys. The Soviet revisionist leadership group follows U.S.-Soviet cooperation to dominate the world, carries out divisive, destructive and subversive activities in the international Communist and national liberation movements, and actively serves American imperialism. Therefore, they are not included in this united front.”449 The Plenary Session believed that China had to prepare for war, and stated: “We must remain alert against surprise attacks from American imperialism and its accessories. If they dare force us into war, then the 700 hundred million Chinese will unite, and we will break the spines of the invaders. We will resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly and entirely eliminate them under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China.”450 This communiqué represented a serious misreading of the international situation and was based on Mao’s typical habit of crisis hallucination. Subsequent history has proven that the U.S. never occupied North Vietnam or invaded China. When China actively supported and volunteered to participate in the Vietnamese War against American aggression,451 it was isolated and cut off from the global economy and markets, becoming the most marginalized country in the globalized world. More importantly, the domestic political line of “taking class struggle as the focus” was strengthened by opposing both the United States and the Soviet Union. At that time, China formally entered an era of “opposing the United States and the Soviet Union internationally and opposing and preventing Revisionism domestically” with the former being a policy of “struggling against others” and the latter being “struggling against itself.” Notably, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC formally approved Mao Zedong’s decision to pursue a policy of “great struggle,” despite the negatives of this policy exceeding its benefits, both domestically and internationally. However, the communiqué of the plenary session 449. “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 14, 1966.

450. Ibid. 451. The Communiqué pointed out: “The Plenary Session supports the Appeal to the People of the Whole Country released by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Plenary Session ardently, uncompromisingly, and resolutely

supports the continued resistance of the Vietnamese until they achieve victory in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The Plenary Session completely agrees with all relevant measures of the Central Committee of the CPC, whether already implemented or planned, and the government of the PRC will assist Vietnam

and resist the U.S. in ways to be determined through negotiation with the government of Vietnam.” (Ibid.).

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firmly said: “We must uphold the great and lofty aspirations of the proletariat, dare to follow the road our predecessors have never trod, and dare to climb the peak our predecessors have never climbed. We must carefully construct a socialist China, which has one quarter of the world’s population, and make it an iron cast proletarian power that will never change its color.”452

The “Destroy Four Olds” Movement and Nationwide Chaos Eight months after the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, the Cultural Revolution reached a zenith, Mao Zedong had become a cult figure, and the Red Guards had begun the campaign to “Destroy the Four Olds” throughout the country. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and other members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC continued to flatter Mao Zedong and create a personality cult around him, leading the masses, especially young students, to revere Mao. Mao Zedong, Lin Biao and Chen Boda urged the Red Guards to “destroy the four olds,” and thus incited widespread violence and disorder. Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu and Li Fuchun attempted to curb the movement. As the situation became chaotic, Mao was initially firm on non-intervention, and thus several months of havoc ensued. Although he later called for “non-violent struggle instead of violence,” he did so too late to avert nationwide tumult. On August 13, 1966, the Central Working Conference was convened, at which Lin Biao put forward a motion to adjust the overall organizational structure by appointing new cadres, while replacing some existing cadres and retaining others. With the approval of Mao, he developed three methods for identifying, selecting, and appointing cadres, based on five principles for the selection of successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause proposed by Mao.453 Additionally, Lin expressed 452. Ibid. 453. Lin Biao proposed three new standards, saying: “First, supporting Mao Zedong

Thought. Leaders who oppose Mao Zedong Thought should be dismissed. Second, performing political and ideological work. Leaders who create obstacles to political

and ideological work and the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ should be dismissed. Third,

being passionate in revolution. Those who are not passionate should be dismissed. These three items are consistent with the five principles proposed by Chairman Mao. We should follow Mao’s five principles and these three items, especially the first item,

as standards to identify, select and appoint officials.” (Lin, “Speech to the Central

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that he felt burdened and anxious, concerned about making mistakes, and he could not perform his job competently. Nevertheless, he strove to minimize his mistakes, worked under the leadership of Mao, and opposed the two guiding principles and the two headquarters. He followed Mao’s orders to the letter, and relied on his support, and that of the standing commissioners of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Lin concluded: “It is well-known that Chairman Mao is the greatest genius in the world and there exists a big gap between Chairman Mao and us. Thus, we should rectify our mistakes as soon as possible.” He also remarked: “I was incompetent to perform the job assigned to me by the Central Government and tried several times to resign. Since Chairman Mao and the Central Government offered me my position, I will try to do a good job as ordered by Chairman Mao and the Party, but am also ready to hand over my job to a more suitable successor.”454 The above statements implied that Mao’s decision to designate Lin as his successor was a surprise to the latter. Lin thus did not intend to become the successor of Mao, but rather was cautious and simply wished to work for the Party. Meanwhile, Lin also learned from Liu Shaoqi and stressed he would follow Mao’s orders to the letter. From this point, Mao and Lin became close comrades-in-arms, and Lin supported Mao in staging the Cultural Revolution. On August 14, the Central Government notified the party committees at the provincial, municipal and prefectural levels, the ministries and commissions of the Central Committee of the CPC, state organs, mass organizations, party committees, party organizations, and the PLA General Political Department of the Central Organ Member By-election of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. On August 17, when the Central Committee of the CPC forwarded Mao Zedong’s “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster,” senior Party cadres were shocked by the Central Committee’s discernable radicalization. Subsequently, Liu and Deng were subjected to harsh criticism and relieved of their posts. Additionally, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which had been in charge of central day-to-day affairs, ceased to perform its functions and instead Zhou presided over central day-to-day affairs.455 In place of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Central Cultural Revolution Group began to exercise official power. In fact, the Central Cultural Revolution Group enjoyed special Cultural Revolution Group in Zhongnanhai.”) 454. Li ed, Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Twists and Development — Trailblazing a Socialist Path, vol. 1, 147–148.

455. Fang and Jin eds., Biography of Li Fuchun, 655.

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privilege, resulting in a situation where two central top decision-making organs existed. In response to a motion proposed by Zhou with the approval of Mao, the enlarged brief meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC was convened to discuss party and government work, and the Cultural Revolution and all members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group retained the right to attend this meeting from late August. Gradually, the enlarged meeting usually presided over by Zhou456 succeeded the Central Politburo of the CPC and the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, and the central power structure changed from “Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping” to “Mao Zedong, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai.” This personnel structure lasted until Lin’s September 13 Incident in 1971. Mao and Zhou thus boldly changed the decisionmaking mechanism of the Central Committee of the CPC, and bestowed decisionmaking powers on the Central Cultural Revolution Group, thus allowing nonformal organizations to succeed formal organizations, and non-formal systems to replace formal systems. On August 18 1966, a mass rally was held in Beijing to celebrate the Cultural Revolution. For the first time, Mao attended such an event dressed in green military uniform, implying he was the supreme commander of the PLA.457 At 5:00am, Mao granted students and Red Guards an audience on the rostrum overlooking Tiananmen Square, an action that Zhou later said broke existent protocols.458 Xinhua News Agency reported that Red Guards present for the meeting rejoiced in being granted this audience, and said: “Chairman Mao is the commander in chief and we are his red soldiers.”459 Notably, the significant changes made to the central leadership during the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC were announced at the mass rally and Jiang appeared on the Tiananmen gate tower as part of the central leadership. Xinhua also reported that Mao, Lin, Zhou, and Jiang had granted Red Guards a series of group audiences.460 By listing Jiang 456. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1671. 457. Yan and Wang, Reflections on History, 291. 458. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1675. 459. Xinhua News Agency, August 18, 1966. 460. An article titled “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the Great Pioneering Work of the Communist Movement and the Socialist Revolution; Chairman Mao

Celebrates the Great Cultural Revolution Together with Millions of the Masses” reported: “1,500 student representatives ascended the Tiananmen gate tower and

attended the meeting together with CPC and state leaders. State leaders including Chairman Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing received the students in groups,

talked with them, and took group photos.” (Xinhua News Agency, August 18, 1966;

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as fourth in the leadership hierarchy, Xinhua presented her as a bright and rising political star, second only to Lin. Around this time an updated list of the central leadership was released461 in which Lin rose to second place while Liu Shaoqi dropped to eighth place,462 shocking both China and the world. Chen Boda, who ranked fifth in the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, presided over the rally and praised Mao as “our great leader, mentor and helmsman.”463 Lin Biao stated: “Mao Zedong is the supreme commander of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the commander in chief, the greatest leader of the contemporary proletariat, and the greatest genius of our time. Under the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and armed with the powerful weapon of Mao Zedong Thought, we will become invincible and win victory in the great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!” Regarding the “Four News” (new ideas, new culture, new customs, and new habits,) Lin concluded “We should spare no efforts to spread Mao Zedong Thought.”464 People’s Daily, August 19, 1966.) 461. The same article reported that other leaders in different sectors attended the mass

meeting with the Red Guards. The attendees were: Tao Zhu, Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun (members of the Standing

Committee of the Political Bureau); Dong Biwu, Chen Yi, He Long, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Xu Xiangqian, and Ye Jianying (members of the Central Politburo of the CPC); Bo Yibo, Li Xuefeng, and Xie Fuzhi (alternate members of the Central Politburo of the

CPC); Liu Ningyi (Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC);

Xiao Hua, Yang Chengwu, and Wang Renzhong (members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC,) and Jiang Qing (Deputy Head of the Central

Cultural Revolution Group.) Additionally, Zhang Chunqiao, Xie Tangzong, Wang Li,

Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, Mu Xin, and Yao Wenyuan (members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group) also attended the meeting. (Ibid.)

462. According to a report by Xinhua News Agency titled “State Leaders including Chairman Mao, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai Receive Student Representatives and Inspect a Parade

of Cultural Revolution Troops,” leaders who also attended the mass meeting included: Tao Zhu, (Chen Boda,) Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Li Fuchun,

Chen Yun, Dong Biwu, Chen Yi, He Long, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Xu Xiangqian, Ye Jianying, Bo Yibo, Li Xuefeng, Xie Fuzhi, Liu Ningyi, Xiao Hua, Yang Chengwu, Jiang Qing, and Wang Renzhong. (Ibid.)

463. “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the great pioneering work of the communist movement and the socialist revolution: Chairman Mao celebrates the Great Cultural Revolution together with millions of the masses,” (Ibid.)

464. Lin, “On the Mass Meeting to Celebrate the Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”

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Notably, Lin encouraged and supported the students in destroying the “Four Olds” (old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits) and developing the “Four News.”465 However, he did not explain what the “Four Olds” were at this time. In 1964, while talking to the French Minister for Cultural Affairs, Andre Malraux, Mao had said that China would destroy the old ideas, culture, and customs that had existed before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and would establish new proletarian ideas, culture, and customs.466 Mao clearly advocated the destruction of traditional Chinese culture rather than its preservation, and wished to dismantle rather than continue to build the Chinese civilization that had existed for several thousand years. Mao intended to break with history and start afresh. Lin’s speech at the rally therefore relayed the substance of Mao’s directive, and proposed the replacement of Chinese culture and civilization with Mao Zedong Thought, a suggestion characterized by both cultural exclusivity and monopoly. The speech was drafted by Chen Boda and revised by Mao and Lin. Mao announced that the Cultural Revolution aimed to destroy the “Four Olds” and develop the “Four News.” How did he plan to achieve it? In the rally, Zhou formally transmitted Mao’s directive: “We must rely on ourselves to carry out the Cultural Revolution,467 educate ourselves, liberate ourselves, and stage revolution by ourselves.”468 Additionally, he remarked on Mao’s visionary leadership, “It is well-known that the helmsman is pivotal in any ocean voyage, and Chairman Mao is our greatest helmsman.” Zhou led a chant of: “Long live our great leader,

465. On August 8, 1966, on the Tiananmen gate tower, Lin Biao made the following speech:

“We should break all old thoughts, old cultures, old customs and old habits of the exploiting class, and should reform all superstructures unsuited for a socialist economy. We should sweep out all pests and remove all obstacles! We should establish the authority

of the proletariat and form new proletarian thoughts, cultures, customs, and habits. In a word, we should establish Mao Zedong Thought.” He continued: “We support your proletariat revolutionary spirit of daring to devote yourselves to revolution and

rebellion,” and “We will attack all capitalist roaders, bourgeois reactionary authorities,

and bourgeois loyalists, oppose all counter-revolutionary behaviors, and eliminate all ‘Monsters and Demons.’” (Lin, “Speech at the Mass Meeting to Celebrate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” People’s Daily, August 19, 1966.)

466. Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, 373–374; Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 278.

467. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 108.

468. Zhou, “Speech at the Mass Meeting to Celebrate the Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”

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Chairman Mao!”469 Finally, Lin took the fervent adoration even further, and concluded his speech with “long live, long live, long live our great leader Chairman Mao!”470 Ironically, these shouts outdid even the fervent adoration of earlier feudal dynasties. They reinforced the personality cult of Mao Zedong so much so that it outshone even that of Stalin. Mao was satisfied with this personality cult. Reporting on the rally of Red Guards in Tiananmen Square, Xinhua said that Mao and Lin stood shoulder to shoulder on the Tiananmen gate tower to review the parade, and the former said excitedly to Lin: “This large-scale movement has motivated the masses and is extremely significant to the development of national revolutionary ideology among the masses.”471 Mao told the Red Guards from the Tsinghua University High School, “I resolutely support you.”472 Xinhua News Agency called for the masses to support the Cultural Revolution, and said “Chairman Mao is the reddest sun in our hearts,” but why was Mao himself so excited?473 As Mao explained to his staff: “The masses involved in the Cultural Revolution are mainly young people and students, the young generation Dulles hopes will promote peaceful evolution in China. I have created a chance to let them experience the fierceness of struggle and pass this experience and knowledge on to future generations, and thus I have made it difficult for the prediction of Dulles to be fulfilled. I have mobilized the masses to undertake criticism so they can receive 469. Ibid. Before this, on August 15, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled: “A Voyage

Depends on the Helmsman.” This article claimed that in past decades, the Party and the masses were fortunate to have had a talented helmsman like Mao Zedong who had guided them in the right direction even amidst thick fog and through critical times,

thus enabling the ship of the revolution to safely negotiate countless dangerous shoals

and reefs, borne forward by the revolutionary tide of Marxism and Leninism. (People’s Daily, August 15, 1966.)

470. Lin, “On the Mass Meeting to Celebrate the Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” 471. Xinhua News Agency, August 18, 1966. 472. The Red Guards shouted excitedly before Chairman Mao: “We will faithfully follow you forever,” and “We want to pursue revolution! We will rebel to the end!” Chairman Mao responded by saying “I support you!” (People’s Daily, August 21, 1966.)

473. The report claimed: “We sincerely wish a long life to our dearest and greatest leader Chairman Mao. We will listen to Chairman Mao’s words, concern ourselves with state

affairs, and conduct the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the end. We will obey Chairman Mao’s instructions and suffer storms and other tests to become the most reliable successors of the proletarian revolution.” (Xinhua News Agency, August 18, 1966.)

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education and increase their capabilities during the movement. As a result they will be able to find the path to revolution. These were my aims and I was ready for failure. I am delighted that the masses mobilized and acted on my instructions.”474 On discovering that party members did not support the Cultural Revolution, Mao had to mobilize and rely on young students to achieve his objectives. However, these movements would turn in directions Mao Zedong did not expect. Mao’s meetings with young students and Red Guards were personally satisfying to him. Meanwhile, the young students and Red Guards who met with Mao were inspired by the experience, and began an unprecedented and uncontrollable wave of social interaction and mutual aggrandizement. Subsequently, Mao held seven consecutive meetings with young students, but despite these regular meetings the Red Guards nevertheless violated laws and statutes, infringed human rights, and destroyed China’s ancient civilization and culture. Mao had misread the passion of the masses. As Wang Shaoguang wrote: “From the outset of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong planned to manipulate the movement by exploiting the personality cult created by the masses. However, despite his allure as leader, the masses were in fact engaged in pursuing private interests,475 a trait that became a renowned characteristic of the Cultural Revolution and the root cause of its failure.” With encouragement by four members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC (Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Boda,) the country responded enthusiastically, and hundreds of thousands of Red Guard organizations were founded overnight in urban and rural regions. Red Guards rushed from school and university campuses to parade in the streets.476 The national movement against the “Four Olds” was rampant and the Red Guards in Beijing took initiatives to destroy the “Four Olds.” For instance, they renamed Chang’an Avenue as Dongfanghong Avenue, smashed the signboard of Quanjude (a famous roast duck restaurant,) destroyed Yong Bao Zai and renamed it Zhongguancun Revolution Village, and renamed Yangwei Road, located in front of the Soviet Embassy, as Anti-revisionist Road. Students proposed renaming Beijing as Dongfanghong City, setting up the Dongfanghong Preparatory Committee. Notably, the central-controlled mainstream media coverage of the actions of the Red Guards in Beijing actually praised their destructive deeds.477 The Red Guard 474. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1433–1434. 475. Wang, Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 253. 476. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1657. 477. A comment published in Red Flag on August 21, 1966 claimed: “Tens of millions of Red Guards have left their classrooms for the streets, and form an irresistible revolutionary

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movement became a large-scale, complicated, and multi-factional youth revolution, whose participants had varied motivations and objectives.478 On May 24, 1966, Chen Boda proposed the concept of proletarian cultural revolution and defined the nature of the revolution as follows: “The Proletarian Cultural Revolution is to be carried out after the seizure of power, and differs in nature from the Bourgeois Cultural Revolution. The Bourgeois Cultural Revolution refers to an exploiting class succeeding another exploiting class, whereas the Proletarian Cultural Revolution aims to eliminate exploiting classes.”479 However, both Mao Zedong and Chen Boda failed to clarify fundamental concepts such as the make up of the exploiting class, its size relative to the total population, and exactly how it should be eliminated. After Mao granted young students an audience on August 18, Red Guards from large and medium cities (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) illegally searched houses and confiscated property, humiliating and beating their victims. A wave of inhuman social violence accompanied the destruction of the Four Olds,480 and tide to cleanse the dirt left by the old society, waste that has accumulated over thousands of years. These Red Guards are the pioneers of the revolution and a new

global phenomenon. They call people to ‘beat the drums, clean the way and carry out reform’.” On August 23, all major newspapers in China published the report “The

tide of Proletarian Cultural Revolution Sweeps the Streets of the Capital, and the Red Guards Attack Bourgeois Customs.” The People’s Daily also published the two editorials

“It is Good” and “Workers, Farmers and Soldiers Should Support the Revolutionary

Students.” On August 29, the editorial “Greeting Our Red Guards” was published in the People’s Daily and said: “The Red Guards have become the pioneers of this mass movement,” and “The Red Guards fought for days, and really shocked society and the

world. They won every battle, swept out the old customs and habits of the exploiting

classes, and identified all the crafty old easy riders hiding in the corners.” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 50–51.

478. Meisner: Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 294. 479. “Chen Boda’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” May 24, 1966.

480. “Revolutionary Students and Commercial Employees in Shanghai and Tianjin Launch a Broad Attack on the Exploiting Classes and Sweep Away All Old Customs with

Revolutionary Weapons,” Xinhua News Agency, August 24, 1966, People’s Daily,

August 25, 1966; “Reform Society with Mao Zedong Thought: the Revolutionary

Rebel Spirit of the Red Guards Encourages the Revolutionary Masses Throughout the Country, and Revolutionary Students in ALL Areas Will Launch a Broad Attack on the Old Thought, Cultures, Customs and Habits of All the Exploiting Classes,” Xinhua

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became known as “China’s Red Terror.”481 Once the Pandora’s box was opened, it was hard to bring the Red Guards under control.482 At that time, only Liu Shaoqi realized that the campaign to destroy the “Four Olds” violated the national constitution and would ultimately destroy the legal system.483 Nevertheless, he could do nothing.484 In fact, on hearing reports of the violence committed by the Red Guards, Mao not only allowed this activity to continue but even encouraged it. On August 20, when reports of the violence first emerged, Mao did not deem Red Guards destroying the “Four Olds” to be illegal, and continued to insist that destroying the “Four Olds,” no matter how it was achieved, was a good deed that could unmask evil people of all kinds.485 News Agency, August 25, 1966, People’s Daily, August 26, 1966; “Chairman Mao is Our

Supreme Commander and the ‘16 Points’ is Our Action Guide: the Red Guards and Revolutionary Masses must Seriously and Flexibly Learn and Apply the Revolution

of the Central Committee of the CPC,” Xinhua News Agency, August 27, 1966, People’s Daily, August 28, 1966.

481. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution. 482. Wang, Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 69. 483. According to Article 89 of the Constitution, the citizens of the People’s Republic of

China were titled to freedom, and arrest was strictly prohibited unless adjudicated by

the People’s Court and approved by the People’s Procuratorate. Additionally, Article

90 stated that the residences of the citizens of the People’s Republic of China were inviolable, and privacy of correspondence should be protected by laws and statutes.

484. Liu Pingping recalled that when he notified Liu Shaoqi that the Red Guard organization

of the Tsinghua University High School had searched the houses and confiscated the

properties of some criticized officials, Liu Shaoqi immediately stopped him. Holding a copy of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in his hand, Liu said: “I have no objection to ‘destroying the four olds’, but you should not illegally search people’s houses, confiscate their property, or beat them. Through my position as chairman I am

responsible for the country. Many democratic people who have worked with our party for decades are valuable to our united front work. You should not destroy these people

overnight. I cannot stop you, just as you cannot stop others. However I must tell the

truth and be responsible for you.” (Liu et al., “Presenting Flowers for You: In Memory of Our Father Liu Shaoqi,” Workers’ Daily, December 5, 1980.)

485. On August 20, 1966, Mao Zedong issued an instruction on the brief report circulated

by Lin Biao to detail specific actions of the Red Guards in destroying “the four olds,” and said: “I have read the report. It is a good thing that the monsters and demons will

be thoroughly unveiled, and is not strange. By following this road we can help the masses.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 143.)

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On August 21, Li Fuchun, serving as a member of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, wrote a report to Mao, Lin, Zhou, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group and presented ten ideas on how the organs of the State Council could carry out the Cultural Revolution. On August 28, Mao circulated the report to other leaders. On August 29, Mao delivered a speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, and said “We do not need even one idea, let alone ten ideas. The most important thing is the ‘16 Articles.’ Leave it alone.”486 Mao thus called for non-intervention and allowed the nationwide turmoil to continue for several months.487 On the same day, the People’s Daily published the editorial titled “Chairman Mao Resolutely Backs Up the Masses,” which pointed out: “Some Party members have tended to enslave or suppress the masses by imposing restrictions on them, and have confused right and wrong. In contrast, Chairman Mao loves the masses, cares for them, best understands their needs, desires and emotions, and is their bosom friend. The close-knit link between Mao Zedong Thought and the masses will ensure the victory of our Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”488 The first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, Li Xuefeng, repeated Mao Zedong’s directive advocating non-intervention in the violence and thus encouraged continued beatings and violence. The supreme directive from Mao Zedong thus “legitimized” the violence. Although the destruction of the Four Olds became violent, Mao ordered the PLA and the police not to intervene in the violence committed by young students. With approval from Mao and Lin, the PLA General Staff Headquarters and General Political Department jointly issued the Rules and Regulations Regarding the Prohibition of the Army from Suppressing the Revolutionary Student Movement,489 which stated that 486. Mao Zedong: “Instructions on Li Fuchun’s Report on the Problems Existing in the Great

Cultural Revolution Among the Eight Authorities under the State Council,” August 28,

1966, Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, v 12, p 112, Beijing: CCCPC Party Literature Publishing House, 1998.

487. On August 21, 1966, during the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the

Political Bureau, Mao Zedong said: “Is Beijing a city of gangsters? Impossible! I believe

most people are good and there are only a few bad people. How did our city become a world of gangsters?” He continued: “Anyway, we cannot intervene, and should allow the movement to continue for months.” Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong

(1949–1976), vol. 2, 1438.

488. People’s Daily, August 20, 1966. 489. Article 1 of these regulations read: “All army units are absolutely forbidden to use armed force to suppress the student movement, and even the use of blank rounds to

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suppression of the revolutionary student movement was illegal.490 This document was issued to encourage social violence and protect the Red Guards. The Central Committee of the CPC forwarded the document on August 22. Why did Mao prevent army and police suppression of the revolutionary student movement? In October 1968, Lin Biao explained this controversial matter at the enlarged meeting of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, saying: “There are two distinct lines of proletarian cultural revolution: one, Mao Zedong’s mobilization of the masses; two, suppression of the masses. Chairman Mao told us before that ‘The reasons the Communist Party differs from the Nationalist Party, the Proletariat differs from the Bourgeoisie, and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat differs from the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie, lie in the protection versus the suppression of the masses.’”491 However, Mao unexpectedly ordered the army to suppress rebel organizations several times during July 1967 to July 1968.492 This use of state force to control social violence resulted in the heaviest casualties of the Cultural Revolution. On August 23, Mao pointed out at the Central Working Conference, “The manner in which local authorities address the chaotic situation is vital. In my opinion, we should firmly believe that most of the recently launched movements are well intentioned, and should allow the country to remain in tumult for several months. Even if the provincial party committees do not intervene, there are still the prefecture and county committees to maintain order!”493 Mao clearly wanted the country to remain in turmoil for several months, but the turmoil ultimately disperse the students is a serious political error that will be subject to strict disciplinary

action.” Article 4 read: “The army must not intervene in conflicts between student groups, or between students and the masses.”

490. The contents of the regulations included: 1. Police should in no circumstances be

dispatched to intervene in and suppress the revolutionary student movement. 2. Army units should not shoot at the revolutionary students or teachers, nor should they

disperse them by firing blanks. 3. Except for active counter-revolutionists committing

the crimes of murder, arson, poisoning, destruction, and stealing state secrets, who shall be legally punished, participants in the revolutionary movement should enjoy

freedom from arrest. 4. Police should not enter schools. 5. Police should merely seek to maintain order in the streets and use persuasion to resolve fights and other conflicts, and police attacked by revolutionary students must not fight back.

491. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 493.

492. Ibid, 370, 502, 506, 510. 493. Jiang et al. ed., Summaries of Important Meetings of the CPC (1921–2001), 356.

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exceeded his expectations and the situation spiraled out of control. Large-scale killing occurred in Beijing during this period. From late August to late September Red Guards illegally searched 33,695 houses and caused 1,772 deaths (including suicides) in Beijing.494 From August 27 to September 1, a series of appalling massacres occurred in Daxing County, located in the southern outskirts of Beijing.495 However, Mao still remarked that Beijing was too civilized in carrying out the Cultural Revolution and had failed to create utter chaos. After Mao and Lin heard the report delivered by Wu De on the destruction of the “Four Olds,”496 Mao commented that feudal diehards of several dynasties had been successfully suppressed, and Lin instructed: “This is a great movement and only needs to follow the principle of not beating people to death.”497 On August 21, the Red Flag published a commentary titled “Pay Homage to Revolutionary Youth,” and rejoiced that “many unknown revolutionary youth had become brave path-breakers who understood they were engaged in revolution and that Mao Zedong supported them. The Cultural Revolution staged by Mao had changed their outlook, and they suddenly realized that their mission was to stage revolution and rebellion against the bourgeoisie, imperialism, revisionism, and evil people of all kinds, and to exploit class ideology by destroying the ‘Four Olds.’”498 The following day, Xinhua News Agency broadcast a news report titled “The Proletarian Cultural Revolution Spread through the Capital of Beijing, Red Guards Criticized Bourgeois Customs, and the Masses Overwhelmingly Supported the Revolutionary and Rebellious Spirit of the Red Guards,” and announced that the Red Guards were dedicated to transforming Beijing into a revolutionary city 494. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 154.

495. From August 27 to September 1, 1966, the victims totaled 325 “landowners, affluent peasants, reactionaries, and bad elements, and their 48 production teams, in 13

communes in Daxing County, Beijing.” (Ibid.) On September 2, 1966, the Beijing Municipal Committee issued the Emergency Notice on Stopping All Violent Deaths, which threatened punishment to perpetrators if the violent deaths continued, and ordered

that the perpetrators of violence stop drawing up lists of “gangsters,” with such lists to be limited in future to active criminals and five specific kinds of bad elements.

496. On August 23, 1966, at the Central Working Meeting, Mao said, “I do not think Beijing has struggled effectively, though it did hold a meeting attended by 100,000 students....

Beijing is so civilized.” (Jiang et al. ed., Summaries of Important Meetings of the CPC (1921–2006), 356.)

497. Zhu et al. eds., Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing, 27. 498. Red Flag, issue 11, 1966; republished by the People’s Daily, August 24, 1966.

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for the proletariat.499 On August 23, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Mao Zedong Directs the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers to Resolutely Support the Revolutionary Students” and declared that the various revolutionary student organizations were legitimate organizations under the dictatorship of the Proletariat.500 On the same day, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled simply “Congratulations” that praised the revolutionary and rebellious spirit of the Red Guards.501 On August 29, the People’s Daily published the editorial “Pay Homage to Our Red Guards,” which claimed that all revolutions in history had hinged on the masses daring to speak, act, and try to enact change, and the Proletarian Cultural Revolution was simply the most recent example. The article said: “Although the Red Guards carried out revolution only briefly, they shocked society and transformed the old world. Welldone!”502 The same day, at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing 499. Xinhua News Agency reported: “Since August 20, the Red Guards of the capital have taken to the streets, where they have posted revolutionary fliers and big-character

posters. They are assembling and making speeches everywhere. They are launching

furious attacks on all old thoughts, old cultures, old customs and old habits. Some businesses whose names suggest feudalism, capitalism and revisionism have voluntarily renamed themselves following persuasion and assistance from the Red Guards. The Red Guards have suggested that revolutionary students and teachers in all schools

change politically meaningless school names. They call for revolutionary employees

in the service industry to refuse haircuts to strangers, and for the sale of unhealthy publications to be suspended. They are reconstructing Beijing into a proletarian and revolutionary city. The rebellious spirit and revolutionary actions of the Red Guards

have attracted the ardent and firm support of all revolutionary students and teachers,

as well as employees and residents of different streets.” (Xinhua News Agency, August 22, 1966; People’s Daily, August 23, 1966.)

500. The editorial praised the actions of the Red Guards as follows: “It is a good thing for all

revolutionary students to rise up and oppose the capitalist roaders. It is a good thing for them to post big-character posters. It is also a good thing for them to stir up controversy. They have the right to demonstrate on the streets, assemble, organize, and speak. The

revolutionary organizations of the revolutionary students, such as the ‘Red Guards’ and

the ‘red-flag battle team’, are legal organizations under the dictatorship of proletariat. Their actions are legal and revolutionary actions. Those who oppose the revolutionary

actions of the revolutionary students violate the teachings of Chairman Mao and the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPC.” (People’s Daily, August 23, 1966.) 501. Ibid. 502. People’s Daily, August 29, 1966.

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Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong called for non-intervention in the Red Guard Movement and gave consent to the dissolving of certain national central bureaus, as well as provincial and municipal party committees.503 On August 30, Zhou submitted the Notification on Some Specific Issues Concerning the Cultural Revolution, issued by the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council, which proposed strongly protecting key and confidential departments and units of the Party and state, and the imposition of lawful punishments on counter-revolutionaries and evildoers who attempted to destroy these institutions. However, on September 1, Mao instructed, “The notification is not to be issued.”504 On August 31, Lin accompanied Mao to meet with revolutionary teachers and students outside Beijing who eulogized him as a great mentor, leader, commander and helmsman.505 The same day, Mao issued instructions on Lin’s speech,506 thus indicating his consent and official approval of Lin’s choice of words. Zhou also praised Mao and the Cultural Revolution with his proposal of the “four greats.”507 The following day, after Zhou proposed a related motion, Xinhua News Agency officially broadcast the news that Lin was both Vice Chairman of the CCP and Mao’s close comrade-in-arms. Subsequently, Zhou addressed Lin as “deputy commander.”508 Later in December, while reviewing a document, Mao crossed out the “four greats” for the first time, and Zhou saw the reason.509 Lin delivered a speech, and said: “Red Guards and other revolutionary youth organizations from universities and schools are the vanguard of the Cultural 503. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1440. 504. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 119.

505. Lin, “Speech at the meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities.”

506. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 118.

507. Zhou Enlai said: “Our great leader Chairman Mao is the great commander of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao is our great tutor and helmsman, and is like a sun in our hearts.” (Zhou, “Speech at the meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities.”) 508. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 608. 509. On December 1, 1966, Zhou Enlai submitted Mao Zedong’s Supplementary Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council Concerning the Joint Actions of Revolutionary Students and Teachers to Mao Zedong. When Mao Zedong reviewed this

notice on December 12, he deleted the words “our great teacher, great leader, great commander, and great helmsman” from before “Chairman Mao.”

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Revolution and the powerful reserve force of the PLA.” He also praised the proletarian revolutionary spirit of the Red Guards who dared to speak, act, try to enact change, and carry out revolution, saying: “You have engaged in brave deeds and proposed good advice, and we are satisfied with your actions and fervently support you! We are resolutely opposed to any attempts to suppress you! You have successfully carried out revolution!” 510 Meanwhile, Zhou also delivered a speech and affirmed the movement to destroy the Four Olds.511 Considerable delay occurred before Mao intervened to stop the illegal violence that was being committed by the Red Guards. On August 28, Mao gave instructions on the report concerning the Cultural Revolution in Beijing submitted by Guan Feng and Qi Benyu, members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. According to the report, the core of the Red Guard Movement was healthy, but the movement had both faults and side effects.512 Mao issued the instruction: “We need to organize discussion on this matter.”513 On August 29, Mao delivered a speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, saying: “The Cultural Revolution has developed into a struggle, criticism and social transformation. However, we call 510. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 118.

511. Zhou Enlai said, “Our Red Guards broke the ‘Four Olds’ and established the ‘Four

News’, and became the pioneers of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Your spirit of daring to think, act, attack, and devote yourselves to revolution and rebellion

is supported by all workers, farmers, soldiers and revolutionary officials throughout

the country. We are cheering for our heroic workers, farmers and soldiers, and paying

respects to our Red Guards and all the revolutionary youth!” (Zhou, “Speech at the meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities.”)

512. The report was submitted by Guan Feng and Qi Benyu, members of the Central Cultural

Revolution Group, to Jiang Qing, Deputy Head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, on August 26. The report claimed: “The Red Guard organizations of Beijing

have developed remarkably since the rally of one million people on August 18 this year, and have become common in all universities and middle schools. The general

trend of the current movement is healthy, but it still has shortcomings and side effects. For instance, many people have been detained or beaten, including both some good people and some from the neutral masses. Also, searches of houses and confiscations

of property are a little too frequent, as is intervention in the daily life of the masses.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 113–114.)

513. Ibid.

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for non-violent rather than violent struggle.”514 On August 31, Lin repeated Mao’s instructions while meeting teachers, students, and Red Guards outside Beijing, saying: “We call for non-violent struggle rather than violent struggle, because violent struggle can only touch the flesh whereas non-violent struggle can touch the soul.”515 On September 5, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “We Call for Non-violent Struggle Rather than Violent Struggle” and repeated Mao’s instructions as party policies.516 However, serious violence continued to spread across the country and human right infringements actually worsened. While Mao believed his supreme directive would quell national violence, he found that the Cultural Revolution had spun out of control.517 The effect thus was exactly the opposite of what he intended. On August 28, Mao spoke with Tao Pingzhu and Hu Chi, head of the People’s Daily, saying: “We have noted how the students have deviated from pursuing struggle, criticism and transformation. Thus, we should guide them back to the correct path of struggle, criticism and transformation through newspaper publicity, and should reverse the incorrect direction of the student movement.” At that time, students in Beijing were traveling the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought, and many students from outside Beijing had come to Beijing to do likewise. Mao supported this travel since he believed it would spread the Cultural Revolution throughout the country.518 On August 31, Zhou announced the decision of the Central Government to allow 514. Ibid, 115. 515. Lin, “Speech at the meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities.”

516. Mao Zedong’s specific instructions were: “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a great revolution that touches people’s souls,” and “This great revolution shall depend on verbal struggle instead of armed struggle.” The editorial elaborated as

follows: “Verbal struggle rather than armed struggle is an important policy of the CPC

during the proletarian Great Cultural Revolution. We must insist on and implement this policy.” (People’s Daily, September 5, 1966.)

517. Pang believes that Mao did not see the armed struggle within the Red Guard movement as a big deal, and believed it would eventually be brought under control. However, subsequent facts showed that a laissez-faire attitude simply let various complex social contradictions develop into conflicts under the guise of various causes, and also let

ambitious people at different levels act with impunity to pursue private interests. Mao’s

directive was like opening Pandora’s box, and the associated evil consequences exceeded his imagination. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1440.) 518. Ibid, 1439.

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all university students, as well as some high school student representatives, to visit Beijing in groups at different times, and affirmed that such national revolutionary travel would help spread the Cultural Revolution.519 On September 5, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council jointly issued the Notification on the Organization of Revolutionary University Students, High School Student Representatives and Teacher Representatives to Witness the Cultural Revolution Movement in Beijing, which stipulated that the state would fund the train travel of revolutionary students and provide them a living allowance during their travels.520 National revolutionary travel subsequently peaked and tens of millions of students traveled the country, straining transportation infrastructure and causing social chaos. This free revolutionary travel continued for four months. On September 7, Mao wrote to Lin and other leaders, pointing out that it was wrong to organize workers, peasants, and soldiers to intervene in student movements in Qingdao, Changsha, Xi’an, and elsewhere. Additionally, he requested that the Central Government issue instructions to forbid such interventions by local authorities, and write an editorial to dissuade workers and peasants from intervening in the student movement.521 On September 11, the Central Government issued instructions against inciting or organizing workers, peasants, and citizens to protest against student movements, regardless of the reasons for such protest or the methods used. Meanwhile, the People’s Daily carried the editorial titled “Workers, Peasants, and Students Should Unite Under the Guidance of Mao Zedong Thought” and affirmed that the direction of the student movements was mainstream and benign.522 On September 15, Mao and Lin met for the third time with young students and Red Guards from across China. Lin addressed the students and said: “Your general struggle direction is right and Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC overwhelmingly support you! Your revolutionary movements have 519. Zhou, “Speech at the Meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities.”

520. In August 1966, at the Working Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Chen Boda said: “The joint action was supported by Mao, who proposed pushing for such a revolutionary mass movement.” (Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 105.)

521. Mao, “Instructions on Forbidding Intervention in Student Movements by Mobilizing Workers and Farmers.”

522. The editorial stated: “During the Proletarian Great Cultural Revolution, the workers, farmers, masses, and revolutionary students share a common struggle aim and revolutionary direction.” (People’s Daily, September 11, 1966.)

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Table 3.1 Region

Partial report of seizures in major regions Households Real estate subjected to seized

Valuables seized

Notes

10,313 taels of gold

1,700 people beaten

CNY85,459,919 of cash

people denounced as

seizure Beijing

23,695

529,999

properties

345,232 taels of silver

833,618 pieces of artifacts Shanghai 84,222 Wuhan

21,000

to death, over 785,000 “five blacks” exiled.

1,230,000m2 17,845 taels of gold

28,936 taels of silver

32 people beaten to death, 112 suicide

267,000 pieces of silver coins attempts with 62 CNY440,000,000 of cash Suzhou

64,056

deaths.

Over 170,000 books, works of art and calligraphy, and cultural artifacts

Sources: Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 1, 187; Wang ed., Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 70.

shocked society, especially the diehards of the old society. You have accomplished great feats in the battle against the “Four Olds” and the development of the “Four News,” and have done a good job in attacking reactionary bourgeois authorities, vampires, and parasites.”523 Mao later commented on and modified Lin’s speech.524 On September 7, Red Flag published an editorial from a commentator titled “Eulogy to the Red Guards” that praised the revolutionary initiative of the Red Guards as a novel feature of the Cultural Revolution. The editorial also described the relationship between Mao Zedong and the Red Guards by saying “Chairman Mao is our red commander in chief and we are Chairman Mao’s Red Guards.”525 523. Lin, “Speech at the meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities.”

524. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 118.

525. On September 17, 1966, Red Flag published a call to action in the form of the “Song of the Red Guards.” The article enthused: “The revolutionary and pioneering work

of the Red Guards has shocked the world. Red Guards are a new phenomenon that

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Table 3.2

Statistics of Red Guard “Victories”

Dictatorship over enemies

Possessions seized

Hidden enemies unmasked (Five Black Categories)

16,623

Counter-revolutionary cases

1,788

Banished “monsters and demons”

287,450

Gold

11,580,000 taels

Silver

303,000 taels

Silver yuan

9,789,000 coins

Foreign currency

CNY7,297,000

Savings and bonds

CNY42,880,000,000

Jewelry

1,719,000 pieces

Artifacts

10,000,000 pieces

Source: Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 1, 187.

The above speeches and editorials, by not mentioning the violence and cultural destruction committed by the Red Guards, deliberately covered up the truth and encouraged the Red Guards to continue their activities. Mao seemed to support the Red Guards’ destruction of the “Four Olds” with the intention of mobilizing and relying on the masses, but he failed to control the Red Guard Movement. has emerged during the Proletarian Great Cultural Revolution. Having been born and

brought up in the Proletarian Great Cultural Revolution, Red Guards are products of

Mao Zedong Thought. The Red Guards say, ‘Chairman Mao is our red commander and we are Chairman Mao’s Red Guards’. The Red Guards have done a good job.

The Red Guards are the pioneers of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The revolutionary actions of these revolutionary young people are useful. Proletarian revolutionary history will forever remember the feats of these Red Guards in the

Great Cultural Revolution. The imperialists, reactionaries, contemporary revisionists,

and followers of Chiang Kai-shek curse our Red Guards with the most evil language. They call our Red Guards wild young men, and attack their revolutionary actions as ‘destroying human dignity’, ‘breaking social tradition’, and so on. Chairman Mao has

taught us that opposition by the enemy is a good thing rather than a bad thing. It is better if the enemy strongly opposes us and describes us using awful terms. It is a great

honor for the Red Guards to be opposed by class enemies at home and abroad.” (Red Flag, issue 12, 1966; People’s Daily, September 19, 1966.)

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Sidebar 3.3 Incidents Involving Red Guards Destroying the Four Olds (August 1966–December 1966) On August 18, 1966, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao gave the Red Guards an audience. Around this time the Red Guards were planning a nighttime attack on the Forbidden City in the name of destroying the “Four Olds”, which Zhou Enlai prevented by ordering that the gates be secured. On August 20, Red Guards from Beijing No. 2 Middle School issued the Declaration of War on the Old World and called for destroying the “Four Olds” and developing the “Four News”. On August 23, Red Guards ransacked art treasures and artifacts from the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Culture, and Red Guards from Beijing Sports University smashed the Buddha image at the Pavilion of the Fragrance of Buddha of the Summer Palace. On August 24, Red Guards from Beijing Middle School issued an ultimatum to various democratic parties and central organizations, demanding they voluntarily disband and announce their dissolution in the newspapers. Failure to comply would see forceful dissolution at the hands of the Red Guards. The same day, Lao She, who held the official title of People’s Artist, committed suicide in Lake Taiping after being humiliated by Red Guards, and Li Da, Member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and President of Wuhan University, was persecuted to death. On August 25, Red Guards barged into Quanjude, a long-established roast duck restaurant, where they smashed the existing sign and replaced it with a new one reading simply “Beijing Roast Duck Restaurant”. The same day, various democratic parties and organizations were ordered to close their offices. On August 26, the Red Guard Contact Center for Beijing University and its Affiliated High School was set up; students from universities and colleges in Qingdao attacked the Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CPC and beat cadres; Red Guards from the Department of Automation of Tsinghua University put up the big-character poster “We Must Plunge Tsinghua University into Turmoil”; Red Guards from Beijing No.2 Middle School republished the Declaration of War on the Old World and claimed they would rebel against the old world and destroy all the barber shops, tailor shops, studios, and bookstalls that provided services for the bourgeoisie; Red Guards from Luoyang, Henan Province destroyed the head of the Buddha statue in the Longman Grottoes; and in Hangzhou the Lake under Autumn Moon Stele, Tiger Statue of the Spring of Hupao, and the Yue Fei and Qin Hui statues, were all destroyed or vandalized.

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On August 27, Capital University and College Red Guard Command (No. 1 Command) was set up and large-scale slaughter occurred in Daxing County on the outskirts of Beijing. On August 28, the leading party group of the Ministry of Public Security reported to the Central Committee of the CPC that students and masses were punishing criminals at prisons and reform-through-labor factories and farms, beating police, and attacking local police stations. A total of 140,000 students were said to have arrived in Beijing. On August 29, Red Guards from a middle school in Beijing proposed renaming Yangwei Road, located in front of the Soviet Embassy, as Anti-revisionist Road. The group held a naming conference attended by 200,000 people, as well as a large celebration parade. From August 29 to August 30, 400,000 people participated in the parade. Zhou Enlai intervened to order that embassies should not be attacked. In late August, Red Guards abducted religious leader Panchen Erdini Choky Gyaltsen, officially recognized as a ‘Living Buddha’, and detained him at Minzu University. At the end of August, Red Guards attacked the Temple of Soul’s Retreat in Hangzhou (a major historical and cultural site protected at the national level) and Zhou Enlai ordered that the temple be temporarily closed down. The Hengshan Temple, built in the Tang Dynasty, was also destroyed around this time. On September 3, thousands of students from Urumqi, Xinjiang laid siege to the Xinjiang Autonomous Region Party Committee of the CPC and protested through a sit-in and hunger strike. On September 5, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council jointly issued the Notification on the Organization of Revolutionary University and College Students, Revolutionary High School Student Representatives and Revolutionary Faculty Representatives to Witness the Cultural Revolution Movement in Beijing. Additionally, the Capital University and College Red Guards Command (No.2 Command) was established. From September 1 to September 5, a total of 420,000 students left Beijing (including Red Guards who had recently arrived and were returning home) and 390,000 students arrived in Beijing (including Red Guards who had been traveling elsewhere and were simply returning). On September 6, the Capital University and College Red Guards Revolutionary Rebellion General Command (No.3 Command) was set up under the leadership of Kuai Dafu. A total of 340,000 students were in Beijing. On September 22, Zhou Enlai reported a total of 36 ministers and deputy ministers had been relieved from their posts for self-examination. On September 24, Red Guards from Beijing travelling in Shanghai proposed

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forcing hundreds of bourgeois capitalists to parade through the streets, and abandoned the plan only after intervention from Zhou Enlai. On September 26, Red Guards from 34 middle schools in Beijing together with students from outside the city proposed renaming Beijing as Dongfanghong City. The next day, Red Guards held a naming conference and only intervention from Zhou Enlai stopped them renaming Beijing. On September 27, Red Guards from Heilongjiang Hejiang Reform-throughLabor Sub-bureau held a conference with the theme Bombarding the Headquarters. In September, nearly 100 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC from democratic parties in Beijing were accused and denounced and their households illegally searched. From late August to late September, Red Guards in Beijing announced that 33,695 households had been searched and 1,772 people beaten to death. In October, the national turmoil intensified prior to the work conference of the Central Committee of the CPC and the leadership organizations of many public transport enterprises became paralyzed or semi-paralyzed, causing failures in production and command, as well as the stagnation of economic construction. On October 7, a Red Guard telephone operator from Helongjiang eavesdropped on long-distance telephone calls made by the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee of the CPC and the Public Security Department of Helongjiang Province to the Central Committee of the CPC, and students from Xinjiang attacked the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. On October 9, Jiang Qing and Ye Qun ordered Jiang Tengjiao to illegally search the households of Zheng Junli, Zhao Dan, Gu Erji, Tong Zhiling and Chen Liting and burned materials related to Jiang Qing obtained during these searches. On the same day, thousands of workers and students from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps laid siege to the Kun Lun Hotel and proposed the detention and denunciation of the leaders of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. On October 26, Zhou Enlai proposed restricting the numbers of students travelling the country to promote Mao Zedong Thought to approximately 1.5 million. However, Mao Zedong protested and stressed that the number should be increased to more than 2 million or even 3 million. On October 28, students from Zhengzhou University attacked Zhongnanhai. On October 30, two factions fought at the Great Hall of the People until Zhou Enlai stopped the confrontation. At the end of October, Red Guards forced their way into the office of the deputy director of the National Economic Council.

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In early November, local Red Guards abducted the secretary of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the CPC, Tan Qilong, took him to Beijing, and proposed holding a denunciation parade and rally to be attended by 100,000 people. Only intervention by Zhou Enlai stopped the rally. On November 7, the Beijing Normal University Mao Zedong Thought Red Guard Jinggangshan Combat Regiment published the Declaration of the Crusade against Confucianism and the Burning of Confucian Temples. The document outlined plans to destroy Confucian Temples, burn portraits of Confucius, and desecrate his grave. Over the next month, until December 7, this campaign saw the destruction of 6,618 artifacts, 2,700 ancient books, over 900 ancient calligraphic inscriptions and paintings, and more than 1,000 ancient tablets. On November 9, Shanghai Workers Revolutionary General Command was set up under the leadership of Wang Hongwen. Early on the morning of November 10, rebels lay on the railway tracks at Anting Station on the outskirts of Shanghai for 31 hours to stop freight trains. On November 14, a rebel mob in Anhui Province accused and denounced Li Baohua and Li Renzhi, the leaders of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the CPC. On November 20, the Beijing Normal University Mao Zedong Thought Red Guard Jinggangshan Combat Regiment published the Ten Proposals for Destroying Confucian Temples and Establishing the Absolute Authority of Mao Zedong Thought, and requested permission to establish the National Liaison Committee for Crusading against Confucianism. On December 4, Peng Zhen, Liu Ren, Wan Li, Lin Mohan, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Xu Liqun were abducted by Red Guards. On December 6, Lin Biao proposed that the Cultural Revolution should be spread across the country, including the countryside. Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Li condemned Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, Li Fuchun, Yu Qiuli, and Gu Mu for the Outline Report for Industrial and Mining Enterprises Carrying out the Cultural Revolution. After the meeting, the Central Committee of the CPC issued two documents drafted by Chen Boda on the conduct of cultural revolution by industrial and mining enterprises, and the Cultural Revolution was thus officially carried out in fields such as industry, transportation, finance, trade, agriculture, and scientific research. In late December, students from Beihang University reached Chengdu to escort Peng Dehuai to Beijing, and Zhou Enlai ordered that Peng Dehuai be sent to Beijing under protection. On December 25, Kai Dafu and 5,000 students from Tsinghua University held an oath-taking rally in Tiananmen Square with the theme of overthrowing the

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bourgeois reactionary lines led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. On December 27, over 100,000 rebels from universities and colleges in Beijing rallied at Worker’s Stadium to support the overthrow of the bourgeois reactionary lines led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. On December 30, rebels from State Economic Commission accused and denounced Bo Yibo, and Zhou Enlai ordered that he be sent to Beijing under protection. On December 31, students from military academies criticized Chen Yi and Ye Jianying. Zhou Enlai protested their criticism. During 1966, 120 tombs at Beijing’s Babaoshan Cemetery were destroyed, accounting for 22% of the total. Sources: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 50–115; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4,

1852–1894, 1910; Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 1, vol. 2; Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”.

He not only allowed but actively supported large-scale violence, illegalities, and disruptions, and thus caused numerous casualties. It is difficult to describe the true social effects of the anarchy, and only a few historical facts can be presented here. In Beijing, an archeological survey conducted in 1958 reported that 6,843 cultural relics were still preserved. 4,922 of these were subsequently destroyed, with the majority destroyed between August 1966 and September 1966.526 From August 23 to September 8, Red Guards illegally searched 84,202 households in Shanghai, the largest city in China, including 1,231 households of senior intellectuals and teachers. From late August to early September, Red Guards illegally searched households in Tianjin and confiscated 13,000 cars, CNY5.56 million in cash, CNY40.5 million in deposits, CNY2.61 million in bonds, over 40,000 taels of gold, over 60,000 pieces of gold and silver jewelry, and over 600,000 silver dollars.527 In August, Hangzhou suffered the destruction of important cultural relics such as the Lake under the Autumn Moon Stele, the Tiger Statue of the Dream Spring of Hupao, and the Yue Fei and Qin Hui statues at the Tomb of Yue Fei.528 Suzhou 526. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 150.

527. Ibid, 166. 528. Ibid, 154.

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saw 64,056 households illegally searched, and the confiscation of 170,000 books, calligraphic inscriptions, paintings, and other artifacts.529 According to incomplete statistics, 397,000 people variously designated as bad elements were banished from cities and sent to rural areas before October 14, 1966.530 Beijing alone saw 85,000 landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionists, and other evildoers banished.531 The revolutionary movement suppressed alleged evil persons of all kinds. From October 9 to October 28, Mao presided over the working committee of the Central Committee of the CPC and distributed to attendees statistics such as those above (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) as evidence of the effectiveness of the Red Guard Movement and the nationwide destruction of the “Four Olds.” In fact, the materials Mao presented were only the tip of the iceberg. Incited by Lin and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, the Red Guards were irrational in their destruction of the “Four Olds,” and attacked schools, cultural organizations, government organs, and all of society, resulting in unprecedented destruction of Chinese cultural heritage, congestion of national transport infrastructure, stockpiling of supplies, disruption of postal services and communications, industrial stoppages, underproduction and disrupted production, attacks on numerous party and government organs and consequent functional failures. China was instantly plunged from order into turmoil (Sidebar 3.3.) Later in 1970, Mao Zedong acknowledged the truth to Edgar Snow, “China was plunged into turmoil by violent struggle.”532 Obviously, Mao recognized the state of turmoil, which was apparent to the world despite China being restricted and closed at the time.533 529. Yang ed., Great Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 2, 175. 530. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 316. 531. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 154.

532. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 176.

533. Meisner described the situation: “In the chaos of late 1966, millions of Red Guards, holding pictures of Mao, singing ‘Chairman Mao is the red sun in our heart’, waving Mao’s Quotations for Rural Areas, were travelling the country. They were taking action

in the streets and rural areas to launch a movement intended to eliminate all symbols of historical feudalism and the influence of modern capitalism. They smashed the museums and took valuable cultural relics away, searched private residences, and

burned classical texts and artworks. They seized everything from Confucian classics to Beethoven records and discarded them. They replaced existing names of streets

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Sidebar 3.4 Activities of Zhou Enlai and His Allies to Contain Social Unrest (August 1966–January 1967) On August 23, 1966, Zhou Enlai drew up a draft of Ten Ideas on How the Organs of the State Council Can Carry Out Cultural Revolution but failed to obtain Mao Zedong’s approval. Mao Zedong remarked that the “16 Articles” was all that mattered, and hence there was no need for even one idea, let alone ten. On August 29, Red Guards illegally searched Zhang Shizhao’s residence and confiscated some of his possessions. Zhang Shizhao wrote a letter to Mao Zedong reporting what had happened, and on August 30, Mao Zedong instructed that future incidents of this type should be prevented. Zhou Enlai then drew up a “Protection List” that included Song Qingling and other celebrities. On August 31, Tao Zhu drafted the Notification on Certain Specific Issues Involving the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council during the Cultural Revolution under the instruction of Zhou Enlai and requested protection for key and confidential departments and units of the Party and state. Zhou Enlai submitted the notification to Mao Zedong, but on September 1 the latter instructed that the notification should not be issued. On September 3, Zhou Enlai presided over the brief enlarged conference of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and discussed the Opinion on Red Guards (Draft). Tao Zhu and Chen Yi approved the document while Kang Sheng and Yao Wenyuan opposed it, and thus it ultimately failed to pass review and get approval. On September 9, Zhou Enlai conversed with the hunger striking student representatives from Xi’an Technological University. He persuaded them to end their hunger strike and urgently seek medical treatment. On September 14, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notification on Carrying Out Revolution and Boosting Production and requested that the industrial, agricultural, transportation, and financial sectors guarantee the maintenance of normal production, construction, research, design, market, and acquisition activities. On the same day, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Decision on the Cultural Revolution in Rural Areas at County Level or Below and required that students in Beijing and elsewhere not interfere with organs at county level or below, people’s communes, or production teams. On September 15, Zhou Enlai met with revolutionary teachers and students across China and delivered a speech, requesting that the Red Guards and revolutionary students from universities and schools not visit factories, enterprises and organs at county level or below, or people’s communes.

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On September 22, Zhou Enlai analyzed the arbitrary dismissals of numerous party and government cadres and announced that 36 ministers and deputy ministers from the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council were to be temporarily relieved of their posts for self-examination. From September 24 to September 26, Zhou Enlai and Tao Zhu jointly wrote to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao several times to report Red Guard violations of policies in Shanghai and elsewhere. On September 25, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the “Decision Forbidding Rural Areas, Enterprises, Public Institutions, Party and Government Organs, and Mass Organizations from Setting up Red Guard Organizations”. In September, Jiang Qing criticized Zhou Enlai for not sticking rigidly to Mao Zedong thought, and instructed the Red Flag to publish the editorial “Forge ahead under the Guidance of Mao Zedong Thought”. On October 5, the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the General Political Department issued the Urgent Instructions on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Military Academies, which requested that military academies follow local non-military universities and colleges in carrying out the Cultural Revolution and quashed the Decision of the Party Committee Serving as the Leader of the Movement. The same day, the Central Committee of the CPC forwarded the Urgent Instructions and requested they be implemented in all universities and schools at country level or above. On October 9, Zhou Enlai met with eight organizational representatives from Tsinghua University and stopped Red Guards from denouncing Wang Guangmei, the wife of Liu Shaoqi. In late October, Zhou Enlai proposed that Red Guards be forbidden from attacking key government agencies such as the Ministry of Defense, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, and the Ministry of Public Security. On October 31, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council issued the Urgent Notification on Maintaining the Order of Railway Transportation, reviewed by Zhou Enlai. This pointed out the need for organizational planning of the students traveling around Beijing, including controlling student numbers, forbidding the interception or stopping of trains, and forbidding the forcing of railways nationwide to extend or change the direction in which their trains were running. On November 2, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council jointly issued the Urgent Notification Requesting Revolutionary Teachers, Students and Red Guards to Leave Beijing in an Orderly Manner.

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On November 4, Zhou Enlai drafted a document on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC that prohibited the revolutionary masses from interfering with important government agencies, news broadcast media, or the organs and bureaus of the Central Committee of the CPC. On November 16, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council jointly issued the Notification on Issues Concerning Revolutionary Teachers and Students Traveling the Country to Publicize Mao Zedong Thought and the Decision Concerning the Suspension of Travel to Beijing or Around China by Revolutionary Teachers, Students, and Red Guards and the Persuasion of Those Awaiting Transportation to Continue Such Travel to Return Home. On November 17, Zhou Enlai approved the deployment of 100,000 to 110,000 officers and veteran soldiers by the Beijing Military Region Command to provide military training to the Red Guards. Acting to the instructions of Zhou Enlai, Gu Mu drafted the Decision On How Public Transportation Enterprises Can Carry out the Cultural Revolution, which proposed forbidding production stoppages for the sake of revolution, and a prohibition on students from interfering in factories. Chen Boda and the Central Cultural Revolution Group condemned the Decision and Mao Zedong instructed that industrial and mining enterprises should still wage cultural revolution, but should do so in a scheduled fashion so as to maintain continued production. On November 20, Zhou Enlai ordered the Central Committee of the CPC to forward instructions from the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC that all factories, mines, schools, organs and other units were forbidden from setting up detention centers and tribunals, making arrests, and inflicting torture in breach of national laws and party discipline. In November, students and the masses jointly attacked public security organs and injured police in Zhejiang, Fujian, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Jilin, Hebei, and other provinces and autonomous regions. On November 24, Zhou Enlai approved sending telegrams to central bureaus and provincial, municipal and autonomous regional party committees to remind them that public security organs must always remain able to carry out their work, and that those masses that had entered public security organs must immediately leave. On November 26, Zhou Enlai issued instructions and requested that the Central Military Commission of the CPC recover the weapons in the hands of the Dongfanghong Commune and the PLA Red Flag Combat Bridge of the Chengdu College of Geology. On December 1, Zhou Enlai reviewed the Supplementary Notification on Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Different Universities and Schools Traveling

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the Country to Publicize Mao Zedong Thought and requested that all traveling teachers, students and Red Guards return home before December 20. On December 2, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong and proposed caution in publishing the Xinhua News Agency news story titled “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution General Assembly of Literary and Artistic Circles Was Held in the Capital Beijing”, despite it having originally been approved by the Central Cultural Revolution Group and Lin Biao. The reason was that this story criticized by name many leaders of the Beijing Municipal Committee involved in the cultural sector, including Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi. On receiving this letter, Mao Zedong crossed out the names from the news story. On December 6, officials from Shanghai reported large-scale mass violence and casualties in Shanghai, and Zhou Enlai spoke with students from the city. On December 14, Zhou Enlai held discussions with the representatives of the Chengdu Workers Rebel Group and said that their organization should consider national and public interests instead of individual interests. On January 11, 1967, Zhu De, Ye Jianying, and Xu Xiangqian unanimously stressed the importance of maintaining the stability of the army at the meeting of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPC, and the State Council and Central Military Commission of the CPC jointly issued the Notification on Protecting Banks, which permitted the use of military force to protect important local authorities. The PLA and public security departments became responsible for protecting local banks. On January 14, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notification on the Prohibition of Struggle against the Army, which prohibited revolutionary students and associated organizations from attacking the PLA. On January 21, Mao Zedong gave Lin Biao instructions on deploying the army to support the leftist masses, contradicting his avowed policy of non-intervention. In fact, the army had intervened in the Cultural Revolution before. On January 23, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group jointly issued the Decision on the Overwhelming Support of the PLA for the Revolutionary Leftist Masses and repeated Mao Zedong’s instructions that the PLA should support the leftist masses and comply with requests for assistance from real revolutionary groups. The outcome of the social struggle rested on which groups the army would ultimately support, and so it was vital that the PLA fully supported the leftist revolutionary groups. On January 24, Zhou Enlai met with the representatives of military academies and announced that revolutionaries and associated groups were prohibited

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from attacking military academies, but could post big-character posters at these academies. On January 25, Zhou Enlai met with cultural revolutionary representatives from the finance and trade sectors and reaffirmed that they were allowed to seize control of businesses to achieve the goals of the Cultural Revolution. Xu Xiangqian wrote to Lin Biao and proposed maintaining the stability of the army. The same day, Lin Biao, Xu Xiangqian, Chen Boda, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, and Yang Chengwu drafted the Orders from the Central Military Committee of the CPC (the so called Seven Point Order.) On January 26, Zhou Enlai met with rebel representatives from Xinjiang Province and criticized the Tianjin rebels for having kidnapped municipal leaders. The State Council and the Central Military Commission of the CPC then issued the Notification of Military Control over Civil Aviation. After the army took over the civil aviation system, various revolutionary organizations were prohibited from traveling the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought. On January 28, Zhou Enlai presided over a brief meeting of members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group to discuss the Eight Point Order issued by the Central Military Commission of the CPC. (Mao had added an extra point to the Seven Point Order.) On January 30, Zhou Enlai requested that the masses led by the Zhejiang Revolutionary Rebel Joint Headquarters of the Zhejiang Military Region Command leave the military compounds they had occupied. In January 1967, according to statistical data, Zhou Enlai met with Red Guards and mass organization representatives of the movement over 160 times. Sources: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 51–120; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1910.

Desperate violent struggle took place among the Red Guards, and social and and buildings with new revolutionary names. They stuck pictures and quotations of

Chairman Mao in prominent places. If a citizen wore a suit or had a Hong Kong-style haircut, Red Guards armed with scissors would stop him or her and beat them, confiscate their clothes, or shave their head. Buddhist and Taoist temples and relics faced the

same fate. The Great Cultural Revolution simultaneously destroyed living humans and China’s ancient culture. As the target of the Red Guards changed from the ‘Four Olds’ to ‘capitalist roaders,’ many party and government officials were seized and forced to

parade through the streets wearing conical hats, and recount their ‘crimes’ during mass

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political splits occurred during the Red Guard Movement. Over time, the splits deepened and became more serious and the movement entered a vicious cycle of repeated violence and revenge by different factions.534 On October 25, Mao Zedong admitted at the Working Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC that he had created trouble by staging the Cultural Revolution.535 Wang Shaoguang believed the emergence of the Red Guards and the movement to destroy the “Four Olds” had two serious implications: one, a precedent was set for people with common interests to set up independent mass organizations to promote those interests at the expense of others; two, a precedent was set for organizing those with common interests to form alliances among work and other units to pursue common interests. These precedents created the conditions for the spawning of spontaneous mass movements.536 Two different views and practices existed in this respect within the Central Committee of the CPC. First, Mao, Lin, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group called to mobilize the masses and establish a great proletariat democracy to cause turmoil. At the time, only a few local leaders positively responded to the call of Mao and Lin and supported the rebellion of the Red Guards. For instance, on August 18, Pan Fusheng, First Secretary of the Helongjiang Provincial Committee of the CPC, openly supported the Red Guards from Harbin Engineering University in bombarding the Provincial Party Committee of the CPC, and paraded in a Red Guard armband. On August 19, Liu Jianxun, First Secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee of the CPC, acted on his own initiative to display Mao’s “My First Big-character Poster” and thus openly support the rebels from Zhengzhou University in attacking the Provincial Party Committee of the CPC. Second, members of the Standing Committee of Political Bureau, namely Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, and Li Fuchun,537 as well as other leaders from the State Council and criticism and struggle meetings. They were tortured physically and mentally. Some were killed and some committed suicide, especially the most vulnerable intellectuals.” (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 299.) 534. Ibid, 300. 535. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 143.

536. Wang, Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan. 537. In mid-July of 1966, on the recommendation of Zhou Enlai and with the approval of

the Central Committee of the CPC, Li Fuchun was appointed Zhou Enlai’s economic

assistant. At the time Li Fuchun had not been in charge of the daily work of the State Planning Economy Commission for over a year. Zhou Enlai also made it clear that Li

Fuchun’s duty was to encourage and coordinate the work of all departments on behalf

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Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC, advocated maintaining normal social order and normal production. They sought to prevent drastic actions by Red Guards, forbid them from attacking important organs and troops, and ban factories and mines, schools, organs and other units from establishing detention centers and tribunals, making arrests, and inflicting secret torture. In the face of sudden social unrest, they took a series of actions to quell this unrest, but these failed to achieve the desired effects (Sidebar 3.4.) Figuratively speaking, Mao, Lin, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group were the “arsonists,” while Zhou and his allies were the “firefighters.”538 However, it was hard for the latter to end the social unrest and stem the rising tide of the Cultural Revolution. The larger the scale of the chaotic and illegal mass movements, the more they damaged society. Mao Zedong’s political revolution was anarchic,539 and Mao Zedong himself lost control of the revolutionary violence. Although the Cultural Revolution successfully achieved Mao Zedong’s goals of dissolving old authorities and destroying mechanisms for social control,540 it also caused excessive social unrest.541 of the State Council. (Fang and Jin eds., Biography of Li Fuchun, 653.) 538. Zhou Enlai said: “We failed to anticipate the speed, width, and depth of the Great Cultural Revolution. We lack sufficient mental preparation or prediction for this. Even after the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, we still

cannot correctly forecast the evolution of this movement.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1871.

539. In November 1979, when recalling this history, Deng Xiaoping offered the following

appraisal: “Actually the Gang of Four were the anarchists. (Economic) construction is impossible under anarchy.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 232–233.)

540. Wang Shaoguang commented: “The old authority cannot be immediately replaced by a new authority. The personal reputation of Mao Zedong was all that remained of

the old authority, and in fact had been strengthened in the Cultural Revolution. The personality cult of Chairman Mao had become a tool to mobilize the masses. No matter

how the hundreds of millions of masses expressed their loyalty for Chairman Mao, the personality cult could not help people to understand the will of Mao Zedong because

he had destroyed the mechanisms of social control. This control was necessary for him to command and coordinate the masses.” (Wang, Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 83.)

541. According to Harding, “Mao’s second revolution was a failure compared with his successful first revolution. The second revolution had no clear guiding principles, nor

did it have a unified organization competent to implement the new guidelines and

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On August 30, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a notification and announced that Deputy Group Leader Jiang Qing had taken over from Chen Boda. She had previously served as leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group when Chen took sick leave or left Beijing to carry out revolutionary work. Since Jiang was neither a member of the Central Committee of the CPC nor a party leader at the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, this notification was taken to formally indicate that Jiang was the political nucleus of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. On September 2, Chen asked Lin via Ye Qun to submit a written request to Mao asking that Jiang be permitted to attend the meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee.542 With Mao’s approval, Jiang was allowed to participate in framing the decisions of the central government, and to serve as the leader of the Cultural Revolution. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao proposed a motion to let Lin preside over the work of the Central Committee. However, Lin unexpectedly resigned, and so Zhou took over. Zhou usually reported directly to Mao and Lin, while Mao, Lin, and other members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC seldom attended meetings. The collective leadership thus began to break down. For example, Tao Zhu, Kang Sheng, Li Fuchun (Members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee,) Xie Fuzhi (Alternate Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC,) Ye Jianying (Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC,) Chen Yi (Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC,) Wang Dongxing (Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC) and Zhou Rongxin (Secretary General of the State Council) attended the brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC presided over by Zhou Enlai on September 6.543 However, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun (Members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee) were excluded from attending the brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC and were gradually marginalized. The Central Cultural Revolution Group began to officially participate in decision making, serving as the political proxy of Mao Zedong, and participated in making and enforcing decisions. This was a deliberate contravention of the Party Constitution, and Mao was primarily responsible for this, while Zhou directly assisted him. policies. It destroyed existing political power, but what remained was only chaos.” Harding, “Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution.” 542. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 21. 543. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 59.

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Criticism of the Bourgeois Counter-revolutionary Line and the Convention of the Central Work Conference in October From October to December, the Cultural Revolution surged to another high point. The Central Committee of the CPC openly criticized the bourgeois counterrevolutionary line and convened the Central Work Conference to condemn Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for their wrong political line. After Liu and Deng were singled out for self-criticism, the Cultural Revolution spread through the army, public security organs, industry, media organizations, and to certain rural areas. At the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Lin Biao had taken over from Liu Shaoqi, who was removed from office, demoted to eighth in the party hierarchy, and compelled to undertake self-criticism and respond to the accusations in Mao’s “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster.” From the end of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC to August 24, the democratic meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was convened three times to criticize Liu and his allies, and was attended by all members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. However, Liu failed to pass the examination of his self-criticism.544 On August 29, Mao announced at the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau that the headquarters led by Liu had adopted incorrect ideology, and should assume responsibility for dispatching the working groups. Liu and Deng were asked to submit a written self-criticism to the Beijing Working Group Leader Conference.545 On September 10, Liu submitted a draft of his self-criticism to Mao for review at the Beijing Working Group Leader Conference.546 First, he criticized himself for his incorrect political direction after June 1, and thus accepted the criticisms made in Mao’s big-character poster and assumed primary responsibility for his mistakes. Second, he undertook self-criticism for his mistakes with regard to political principles and line, such as that at the Xilou Meeting on February 1962, his support of Deng Zihui’s allocation of farmland by contract, and at the Central Working Meeting at the end of 1964. In the draft, he analyzed the reasons for his faults, and 544. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 189. 545. Jin ed., Biography of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 2, 1042. 546. After modification, the draft of this self-criticism became the self-criticism submitted to the Central Working Meeting held the same year. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 650.

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stated reluctantly that Lin and other party members surpassed him in political and ideological consciousness.547 On September 14, Mao wrote to Liu and praised his drafted self-criticism. Particularly, he strongly commended the second half of the document, in which Liu analyzed specific cases where he had committed mistakes.548 On September 19, Zhou circulated Liu’s written self-criticism and Mao’s comments to the members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Nevertheless, Mao did not deem Liu’s power adequately weakened following his self-criticism, and so continued to call for attacks on Liu. On September 15, Lin announced Mao’s decision at the national rally of teachers and students: “The movement will focus on struggling against capitalist roaders within the Party, and bombarding the headquarters means attacking a handful of capitalist roaders.”549 On September 16, Kang Sheng wrote a report to Mao to frame Liu.550 Without the approval of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the 547. The reason is that at the opening ceremony of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong harshly criticized Liu Shaoqi (without

mentioning him by name) for believing himself to be greater than others. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1426.)

548. Mao Zedong suggested the documents be circulated in draft form to the Political Bureau, Secretariat, Work Teams (officials,) Beijing Municipal Committee and Central Cultural Group (Central Cultural Revolution Group) for discussion. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 134.)

549. Lin Biao said: “Chairman Mao has taught us that the essential contradiction to be solved in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is that between the proletariat

and the bourgeoisie, and between the socialist and capitalist roads. The key to this movement is the struggle against the capitalist roaders within the CPC. To bombard

the headquarters is to attack a small number of capitalist roaders. Our country is a socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and so the proletariat

controls the leadership of our country. The destruction of a small number of capitalist roaders consolidates and strengthens our proletarian dictatorship.” (Lin, “Speech at

the meeting to Interview Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Cities”; Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 118.

550. In a letter to Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng said: “I have long suspected Liu Shaoqi’s decision regarding the matter whereby An Ziwen, Bo Yibo, and some others ‘confessed to win release from jail’. Some people betrayed, or tried to betray, the Party to gain

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CPC or the National Congress of the CPC, Mao, Lin, and Kang openly criticized and secretly investigated Liu, deliberately contravening both the national and party constitutions, even after Liu Shaoqi had already undertaken self-criticism. On September 18, Lin delivered a speech when meeting the leaders of the army and praised Mao as a great genius, saying: “Among the classic works of MarxismLeninism, we should immerse ourselves especially in studying those of Chairman Mao, for they are revolutionary textbooks. Mao Zedong outshines Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and no one surpasses Mao Zedong, who is a great genius of the type who is born only once every few centuries, or even every few millennia.”551 When Ye Jianying (Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and Secretary-General,) Qi Benyu (Member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group,) and Xie Tangzhong (Member of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group) met with the teacher and student representatives from the PLA art academies and troupes on September 25, Ye introduced the backdrop to — and significance of — appointing Lin as successor to Mao, saying: “Recently, we were delighted by Chairman Mao’s selection of his successor. Chairman Mao has selected his successor for the next several decades. Lin Biao, who is hailed as a great politician and strategist with abundant revolutionary struggle experience and strong leadership, and who has withstood the test of four decades of revolutionary struggle, is the most suitable successor to Mao Zedong.552 Chairman Mao’s appointment of Lin Biao as his successor will help realize victory in the Cultural Revolution, and thus will help achieve revolutionary victory in China and the world. Lin Biao is healthier than all of us. We are convinced that Lin Biao will follow Chairman Mao to lead China forward for the next 20 or even 30 years. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao and Lin Biao, our revolution will be invincible, and we will devote ourselves confidently to our great revolutionary cause.” Ye’s words show that Mao had appointed Lin as his first successor at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. The speech quickly spread across China. On October 9, Xinhua News Agency reported Xiao Hua (Director of the General Political Department of the PLA) declaring that Lin showed loyalty and resolution in his promotion of Mao Zedong Thought and in his following of Mao’s correct political line. He hailed Lin as the closest comrade-in-arms and best student of Mao, personal benefit. The decision of Shaoqi legalized this traitorous behavior.” Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi

(1898–1969), vol. 2, 650.

551. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 163–164.

552. Yan and Wang, Reflections on History, 422–423.

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and a model example of the study and application of Mao’s works.553 On November 5, Ye said at a meeting of air force officers: “Vice Chairman Lin Biao is the best student of the Chairman, and sets an example of upholding Mao Zedong Thought through profound and flexible study and thorough and resolute implementation. Therefore, our old cadres should learn from vice chairman Lin Biao.” On October 1, Lin spoke at the General Meeting to Celebrate the Seventeenth Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China and announced there were two competing lines in the Cultural Revolution, namely the proletarian revolutionary line led by Mao and the bourgeois counter-revolutionary line. In this speech, Lin denounced the bourgeois counter-revolutionary line led by Liu and Deng and predicted its inevitable failure.554 The same evening, Mao spoke with Ted Hill, leader of the Communist Party of Australia, on the rostrum at the Tiananmen gate tower. He pointed to the students assembled in Tiananmen Square, and said: “Imperialism and Revisionism are afraid of these students, and so are some of our cadres. Our revolutionary environment is less perfect than you imagine. Some Chinese cadres, including members of the Central Committee and Central Politburo of the CPC, as well as secretaries of the provincial committees, prefectural committees, and county committees of the CPC, no longer embrace revolution.”555 Mao thus declared his purpose in mobilizing the Red Guards and rebel factions and staging the Cultural Revolution to struggle against cadres in power. The same day, Guo Moruo composed a poem that praised the Red Guards for embarking on a new Long March and eulogized Mao Zedong as a brilliant red sun.556 553. People’s Daily, October 10, 1966. 554. Lin Biao said, “On behalf of our great leader Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC....During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line advocated by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois counter-revolutionary line continues. Only a small minority insist on the wrong line.

They abandon the people, and oppose both Mao Zedong Thought and the people’s

interests. Thus they are predestined to failure.” (Lin, “Speech at the meeting to celebrate

the Seventeenth Anniversary of New China.”) At this stage, Mao Zedong had adopted the “bourgeois counter-revolutionary line,” and finalized its form, but Tao Zhu said

the word “counter-revolutionary” was too politically serious, and should be revised to

“bourgeois opposition to the revolutionary line.” However, Lin Biao agreed with Mao Zedong. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1446.) 555. Ibid, 1444–1445. 556. The poem describing this event went as follows: “Travelling to Beijing over two thousand miles; those inspired people from the Dalian coast learned from our red

army’s long march; with valuable quotations of Mao, they promoted Mao Zedong

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On October 2, 1966, the People’s Daily republished the editorial of Red Flag557 and called for public criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line.558 On October 6, Jiang attended the National Oath-Taking Rally of Teachers and Students to Bombard the Bourgeois Reactionary Line, held by Capital Red Guard No. 3 Command, and openly supported the Red Guards in criticizing the bourgeois reactionary line. On October 9, the Central Work Conference was convened to criticize the bourgeois counter-revolutionary line and attack Liu and Deng. Mao held this meeting because he deemed the line of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC had not been followed within the Party. Specifically, although the top leadership and grass roots obeyed this line, middle-ranking officials ignored it. Additionally, there was no consensus within the senior party leadership about attacking Liu and Deng, but those who disagreed hid their opposition and did not dare protest against Mao. In particular, Mao was dissatisfied that party cadres questioned the Cultural Revolution and the mass movements. The meeting Thought in practice and picked up real experiences on their way. They are students today and will become teachers tomorrow. Finally they saw the great leaders on the Tiananmen gate tower. They showed no fear in the face of evil. They fearlessly confronted any challenge!” (Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 116–117.)

557. An editorial in Red Flag stated: “The bourgeois reactionary line must be criticized thoroughly,” and “If we keep taking the wrong line, repeating the error of suppressing

the masses, provoking students to struggle against other students, and ignoring

the liberation of the revolutionary masses who have been wrongly attacked in the past, then how can we conduct proper struggle, criticism, and rectification?” The

editorial continued: “The criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line is the key to the

implementation of the 16-Article Document about the Cultural Revolution, as well as extensive struggle, criticism, and rectification. Eclecticism cannot be applied here.” (Red

Flag, issue 13, 1966.) This article was drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and reviewed and

approved by Mao Zedong. The wording “bourgeois reactionary line” was developed by Mao Zedong, who told Zhang Chunqiao that, “The bourgeois reactionary line

should be thoroughly criticized in the next step.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1446.)

558. On the night of October 1, 1966, Zhang Chunqiao told Mao Zedong, “the bourgeois

line opposed to revolution is a questionable phrase,” and suggested the alternative wording “the bourgeois counter-revolutionary line.” Mao Zedong said: “Do not change

again. In future works we will use the phrase ‘thoroughly criticizing the bourgeois

reactionary line.’” The editorial of Red Flag reflected Mao Zedong’s wishes. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1446.)

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was originally scheduled to last three days, and Mao requested it be prolonged to seven days. The meeting ultimately lasted 28 days.559 On October 12, Lin summarized the achievements of the Cultural Revolution at the group meeting of the Central Working Conference: “1. Study of Mao Zedong’s works are at a high. 2. We unmasked numerous anti-Party counter-revolutionaries. 3. We attacked capitalist roaders and people who follow incorrect political lines. 4. We cracked down on four types of enemies. 5. We revoked officials’ privileges. 6. We fought for proletarian democracy. 7. We purged the Party of anti-party counterrevolutionaries. 8. We performed a readiness exercise. 9. We promoted ideological revolution, production and work. 10. We trained numerous brave revolutionary successors who grew up in the struggle. Nevertheless, some people neglected the mainstream of the Cultural Revolution and publicized and even exaggerated rare negative phenomena to derogate and even resist the Cultural Revolution owing to reluctance to reform themselves.” Lin’s words show that the attitudes of the leaders towards the Cultural Revolution varied, and that Lin himself resolutely defended it. On October 25, Lin also delivered a speech that defended the Cultural Revolution. On October 16, Chen Boda delivered a speech titled “Two Lines in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” as the theme of the Central Working Meeting that systematically analyzed the wrong line led by Liu and Deng.560 Chen claimed that since Liu and Deng led the wrong political line, they should assume primary responsibility for it. He also stated that party line struggle reflected social class struggle, and the wrong line led by Liu and Deng was based primarily on the interests of the bourgeoisie. The wrong line grew in popularity within the Party with the support of a handful of capitalist roaders and others who had failed to transform their outlook. Some cadres, including Liu and Deng, unrepentantly defied Mao Zedong’s criticisms in “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Bigcharacter Poster” because they were influenced by capitalist ideology. They were afraid of the masses and revolution, and suppressed the former and resisted the latter. The Cultural Revolution was hailed as the supreme international proletarian 559. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 139.

560. This speech comprised four parts: (1) “The Situation is Favorable”; (2) “The Extension

of the Struggle between Two Lines”; (3) “Do Not be Afraid and Mobilize the Mass”; (4) “Insist on the Class Line brought by Chairman Mao and Unite the Majority of the

People.” On October 16, 1966, under instructions from Mao Zedong, this speech was circulated as one of the documents of the Central Working Meeting and Chen Boda delivered the speech at the meeting.

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revolutionary movement, and was said to have outshone the Paris Commune, October Revolution and several other large-scale mass movements in China. Chen also proposed holding exhibitions to demonstrate the revolutionary victories of the Red Guards and “unmask open and hidden evil people of all kinds.” According to his proposal, documents such as Resolutely Destroy the Old World and Briefing to the State Council Culture and Education Departments on Red Guards Illegally Searching the Households of Five Types of Disgraced People were circulated at the meeting (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.) As instructed by Mao, Chen’s speech was circulated the same day as one of the central work conference documents. Mao praised and modified the speech several times and proposed printing it in pamphlet form and distributing at least two copies to each party branch and Red Guard squad.561 The speech quoted the full text of Mao’s “Bombarding the Headquarters,” officially announced the contents of this poster, and directed nationwide criticism at Liu.562 Chen voiced Mao’s thoughts, and Mao highly praised his speech. Mao called for all party branches and Red Guards to study the speech, and gave Chen preferential political treatment. Chen then supported Mao’s attack on Liu even more enthusiastically, and provided important support at the critical moment in the high-level political struggle within the Party. At the Central Working Conference, Xie Fuzhi, Alternate Member of the Central Politburo, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and Minister of Public Security, a former subordinate of Deng Xiaoping, took the lead in accusing and denouncing Deng, saying: “After Deng Xiaoping was assigned to work in Beijing, he insisted on a wrong political line, rejected Mao Zedong’s leadership, resisted Mao Zedong Thought, and slandered the study of Chairman Mao’s works as formalism and vulgarization.”563 Thus, the Cultural Revolution became a typical internal conflict in which various leaders fought while their subordinates accused and denounced their superiors. Zhou acknowledged at the fifth group meeting: “It is true that we have not prepared sufficiently for the Cultural Revolution and lack relevant experience. However, Mao Zedong can detect new movements and trends and we should 561. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 140–142.

562. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 193. 563. Xie Fuzhi said: “In people’s minds, Deng (Xiaoping) was correct for three decades and

wielded enormous influence in the CPC. The big resistance to criticism of the bourgeois

reactionary line is somewhat related to this influence.” (Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 33.)

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follow Chairman Mao and be sure not to fall behind. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, I made an effort to follow Chairman Mao and Comrade Lin Biao, and kept close contact with the Central Cultural Revolution Group, but even so I was still sometimes in danger of falling behind.”564 These words expressed Zhou’s political philosophy of survival by unconditionally following Mao regardless of whether he was right or wrong. After learning that Liu had been attacked at the Central Working Meeting, the Red Guards began to openly criticize him. On October 10, rebels from Tsinghua University who were dissatisfied with the written self-criticism of revolutionary teachers by Wang Guangmei ordered him to attend the denunciation rally at Tsinghua University.565 The same day, Zhou requested that the Central Cultural Revolution Group send messages to Chen, Kang, and Jiang, asking them to refrain from asking Wang to attend the rally. On October 18, Mao met for a fifth time with some of the approximately 1.5 million teachers, students and Red Guards who were visiting Beijing. Before the audience, Red Guards from other cities and provinces posted the slogan “Bombarding Liu Shaoqi” on the reviewing stand in front of Tiananmen Square, and displayed the poster “Bombarding Revisionist Liu Shaoqi” at Tsinghua University. Although the Red Guards followed his call to bombard the headquarters,566 Mao was still surprised at their radical actions. On October 20, Mao entrusted Zhou with personally notifying Liu and Deng that they should prepare to undertake self-criticism at the Central Working Conference. On October 21, Deng wrote to Mao requesting instructions regarding his self-criticism. Mao responded as follows: “You should make some positive comments after promising to correct your faults and start afresh, as stated in the first row on page nine. For example, you could write ‘I believe I will correct my 564. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 77.

565. During the self-criticism, Wang Guangmei said: “I joined the Tsinghua University Work Team designated by the new Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC on June

20, and left Tsinghua University as instructed by the leaders on August 3. For over 40 days I committed very big errors and heavily damaged the work of the CPC. I failed to live up to the expectations of the Party and Chairman Mao, and betrayed the trust and

support of the revolutionary students, teachers and faculties at Tsinghua University. I am so sorry.”

566. On October 25, Mao Zedong said: “It is inappropriate to allow the big-character posters about Liu and Deng onto the streets. We should allow people to make errors.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1883–1885.)

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faults and start afresh through my own efforts and with help from comrades.’ A veteran revolutionary can learn from failure.” On October 22, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, and Li Fuchen spoke with Deng and negotiated the details of his self-criticism at the Central Work Conference.567 Mao helped Deng modify his written self-criticism, because from the outset of the Cultural Revolution his plan had been to take down Liu but moderating the attack on Deng. Mao was convinced that Liu had fundamental faults and followed wrong lines and would be hard to correct.568 Furthermore, while Deng adopted a willing attitude to undertake self-criticism, Liu contradicted Mao right in his face. Strategically, it was also advantageous to treat Liu and Deng unequally. Mao thus helped Deng to pass the examination for his self-criticism. On October 23, Liu and Deng were compelled to undertake self-criticism at the Central Work Conference, and Liu admitted that he had “committed an error in insisting on the rightist opportunistic line, causeing widespread damage and adverse influences over 50 days.” Liu assumed ultimate responsibility for the alleged wrong line and direction.569 Following Mao’s instructions, Liu had 567. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1932–1933.

568. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 244.

569. During his self-criticism, Liu Shaoqi pointed out: “For more than 50 days after June 1 this year (1966,) I committed errors of line and direction during the Great Proletariat

Cultural Revolution. I should assume the main responsibility for this. Some leaders

of the new Beijing Municipal Committee, work teams, and local governments also bear some responsibility, but the principal responsibility is mine. Before July 18 this year, Chairman Mao was not in Beijing, so I organized the daily work of the Central

Committee of the CPC. All aspects of the conditions of the Great Cultural Revolution were reported during the Central Meetings I usually chaired. These reporting meetings

made some wrong decisions and approved of or agreed to some wrong opinions.... For over 50 days after designating the work teams, I firmly supported the work teams and so increased the number and seriousness of their errors. Some work teams could

not be maintained, and so were withdrawn and replaced by new teams. Most of the heads of the work teams lacked a deep understanding of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution and the importance of remaining open minded and learning from the masses. Initially, they required the masses to act according to the plan, and subjectively

take steps designed by ourselves and the work teams. In this way they compromised the development of a revolutionary mass movement, strengthened the position of the

reactionary bourgeois, engaged in bourgeois dictatorship, suppressed the vigorous

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previously engaged in self-criticism of his political faults. For example, he accepted fault for supporting a “rightist opportunist line” in 1962 and 1964. Finally, he identified four reasons for his faults.570 Deng volunteered to assume personal responsibility during the self-criticism, saying: “In the movement that lasted for over two months (June and July) in Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and I presided over work when the Chairman left Beijing. At the Eleventh Plenary Session, Chairman Mao put up the first big-character poster to attack the headquarters led by Liu Shaoqi and myself, who were alone among the central leadership in following the bourgeois reactionary line during the Cultural Revolution.” Deng acknowledged that he had insisted on a rightist line and criticized himself as a major cause of the errors. He specially noted that as a central leader he was in a position to harm the Party and the interests of the people with his ideology, and thus should undertake rigorous self-examination.571 proletarian Cultural Revolution movement, blurred right and wrong, and helped the

bourgeoisie oppress the proletariat.” (People’s Publishing House Materials Room

comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 721-725; Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 651; Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi in the 20 Years after the Founding of New China, 365–366.)

570. In his “Draft Self-criticism,” Liu Shaoqi wrote: “These errors were made for four reasons. The first reason was misunderstanding of the Great Cultural Revolution. ‘We are afraid of turmoil, democracy, mass revolution against us, and counter-revolutionary

restoration’. The second reason was ‘incorrect estimation of the situation of the Great

Cultural Revolution at the time’. The third reason was that ideologically ‘we have not thoroughly changed our bourgeois view of the world’. The fourth reason was ‘we have

not learnt and grasped Mao Zedong Thought’, and this last was the most essential reason.” (People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 731–732.)

571. During the self-criticism, Deng Xiaoping said: “I am a kind of rightist when it comes to the class struggle and intra-party struggle. I should assume some liability for the rightist error of 1962 referred to by Chairman Mao in his big-character poster ‘Bombarding the

Headquarters’. Regarding the rightist error of 1964, although I disagreed with this error, my thoughts did not conform to Mao Zedong Thought and I did not completely follow the right road of Mao Zedong Thought.” Deng Xiaoping admitted he might have made a mistake of deviating from the masses or from practice, saying of the rightists: “They

stood high above the masses and rarely communicated with the masses, common

officials, and people in charge. They were not diligent enough in work, and did not carefully monitor the masses. Additionally, they applied simplistic and inflexible

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Neither Liu nor Deng wished to expand the political struggle by exploiting the Cultural Revolution to push other personal interests, and sought to restrict the struggle to political matters. Additionally, they believed that most of their comrades involved in working groups were not at fault, and thus that they rather than other comrades should assume primary responsibility for the conflict within the Party.572 To preserve party unity, Liu assured the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao that he would resolutely abide by all the decisions of the Eleventh Plenary Session and Mao, submit to party discipline, and would not engage in double-dealing.573 Liu and Deng thus volunteered to renounce power. However, Mao still decided to attack the “bourgeois headquarters” of Liu, and advocated Lu Xun’s spirit of “beating a drowning dog.”574 On October 24, the Central Work Conference Group Meeting was convened to discuss the self-criticisms of Liu and Deng. Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, and other leaders criticized Liu and Deng at the meeting. That evening, Mao held a meeting to hear reports.575 Mao sought to settle old scores with Liu, claiming that solutions in daily work. Therefore they became isolated, and became subjectivists and

bureaucratists. Importantly, my thoughts and style do not conform to Mao Zedong

Thought. I am not Chairman Mao’s good student, and so should be kept away from important leading positions. I am disclosing my own error in taking the wrong path,

showing that I am merely a petty bourgeois intellectual whose bourgeois view of the

world has not been thoroughly reconstructed. Therefore I am not a qualified socialist.” (“Deng Xiaoping’s Self-criticism at the Central Working Meeting,” October 23, 1966.) 572. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 21, 55. 573. People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 730–731.

574. The editorial “In Memory of Lu Xun — Pioneer of Our Cultural Revolution” pointed out:

“We commemorate Lu Xun by learning his spirit of fearlessly fighting, and thorough revolution under the instructions of Chairman Mao. ‘Beating dogs even when they are

in the water’ represents the thorough revolutionary spirit of Lu Xun. Lu Xun opposed

‘tolerance’ to the enemy and bitterly attacked the fallacy that ‘beating a drowning dog’

is excessive. Lu Xun pointed out, the nature of a dog can never change. If we allow it go to the bank and rest, it will one day bite many good people. Those people who say we are extreme should listen: Should we tolerate the class enemies at home and abroad, the counter-revolutionary revisionists, and the small number of capitalist roaders in the

Party? Should we allow them to one day return and ‘kill’ our revolutionaries? No. We should learn from the thorough revolutionary spirit of Lu Xun and beat them down forever.” (Red Flag, issue 14, 1966.)

575. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of

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the political divergence between him and Liu stemmed from Liu making decisions without first consulting with him, such as the Land Reform conference (1947,) the Tianjin Speech (1949,) the Shanxi Cooperatives, Lauding Wang Guangmei, and the Beijing Conference (1965.) Additionally, Mao criticized Deng for ignoring him, sitting far from him during meetings. He complained: “For six years since 1959, Deng Xiaoping never reported to me on work, only contacting Peng Zhen to carry out the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.” Mao denounced Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, and Peng Dehuai for being double-dealers and colluding with each other, and also criticized Peng Dehuai for his recklessness in waging the One Hundred Regiment Campaign (during the Sino-Japanese war) without consulting him, thus establishing his own personal kingdom within the Party.576 It can thus be seen that Mao harbored long and bitter resentments, and on hindsight it is no surprise that the Eighth Standing Committee of the Political Bureau disintegrated. Mao then said: “We should give Liu Shaoqi a chance to repent and start afresh. Since Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping resisted the Cultural Revolution openly instead of secretly, we should allow them to conduct self-revolution and correct their faults.” Kang interjected: “The report of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC had proposed that class struggle was finished.” Mao responded: “The report was reviewed and approved by all; Liu and Deng were not the only ones responsible.577 Stalin too proposed that class struggle was over in 1936; was not the 1939 campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries also class struggle? The four categories of (rightist) cadres only account for 1%, 2% or 3% of the total.” Chen Boda pointed out that the purpose of the meeting was to condemn Liu and Deng for their wrong political line. He noted that Mao’s “correct line” dominated the party line, and thus questioned why the line led by Liu and Deng could have been implemented throughout the country. He accused Liu and Deng of abusing their power to tamper with Mao’s line, collaborating and proposing their wrong line when Mao was absent from Beijing.578 Chen denounced Deng in particular, describing him as the vanguard of the incorrect line, warning that no one had questioned his wrong line as he acted as if he was a walking encyclopedia, making decisions without investigation and study. He carried the same flag as Liu, and hence it was dangerous not to unmask him. From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, even though Mao had forced the Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1933. 576. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 636. 577. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1449. 578. “Chen Boda’s Speech at the Central Working Meeting,” October 25, 1966.

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passage of the Notice of May 16 and the 16-Article Document through the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, central and local officials had held different views towards the mass movement, questioning the correctness and necessity of the Cultural Revolution. Mao knew and chose to confront this by convening the Central Work Conference to unify ideology and reach a consensus within the Central Committee of the CPC. Mao understood that the events of the Cultural Revolution thus far needed justification, and that Chen Boda’s speech was not convincing enough. Mao then announced his own review of the past five months of the Cultural Revolution, saying: “I staged the Cultural Revolution hastily. Compared with the Bourgeois-democratic Revolution (1921–1949) and the socialist revolution (1949– 1966,) the Cultural Revolution has lasted less than half a year (from June to October.) It is understandable that you resisted it.” Mao added frankly: “I caused trouble. First, I put up a big-character poster.579 Second, I wrote to the Red Guards from the Tsinghua University High School.580 Third, I wrote a big-character poster.581...The Cultural Revolution has only existed for a short period and our comrades do not understand it....I, too, did not expect that a big-character poster displayed at Peking University would cause a great nationwide sensation....So it is only the impact of the big-character poster and the Red Guards that can capture your attention!” Mao also explained that he staged the Cultural Revolution because he trusted others too much, particularly in proposing a central leadership that featured both a frontline (Liu and Deng presiding over day-to-day work) and a backline (Mao,) which resulted in independent kingdoms (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Lu Dingyi) that blocked the implementation of his instructions. Indeed, the dual power structure had meant that Mao was unable to share decision-making information and directly exchange decision-making suggestions, resulting in mutual suspicion and distrust. But Mao never resolved this problem as the supreme leader, when it had been proven that if he were to issue “edicts,” they were always carried out. On the same day, Lin delivered a speech at the Central Work Conference and expounded on the need for the Cultural Revolution and the methods for its implementation. Additionally, he praised the Cultural Revolution as an unprecedented example of resisting revisionism, and defended violent struggle 579. Referring to the big-character poster “What were Song Shuo, Lu Ping and Peng Peiyun Doing in the Great Cultural Revolution?” written by Nie Yuanzi’s seven-man group.

580. Referring to the letter Mao wrote on August 1, 1966 to Red Guards from the Tsinghua University High School.

581. Referring to “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big-character Poster.”

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as necessary to successful mass movements.582 He pointed out two lines for national construction: “One line is to superficially focus on supplies, machinery, mechanization, and material stimulus like the Soviet Union; the alternative is to follow the correct line led by Chairman Mao.” He also denounced the wrong line led by Liu and Deng, and rebuked the pair for planning this opposing line that was implemented across China before the Cultural Revolution and almost became the party line.583 Mao noted Lin’s attack, issuing instructions on Lin’s speech and making six rounds of modifications to it. On November 9, the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC circulated the speech to party branches at the county and regiment levels.584 Liu and Deng faced direct criticism at the Central Work Conference, while Chen Yun and other leaders who were also members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau came to be indirectly criticized. The written self-criticism of Liu implicated Chen Yun in a situation appraisal in 1962 where land had been allocated on a household basis;585 Deng Zihui, former minister of the Rural Work Department 582. Lin Biao said: “The revolutionary mass movement is reasonable in nature. Some individuals within the masses may be slightly leftist or rightist, but the main current of

the mass movement always conforms to social development and is reasonable.... Many people are afraid of trouble, but actually we are creating trouble for our enemies instead

of ourselves, and sometimes trouble amongst ourselves is necessary. As Chairman Mao has said, trouble can have double meanings. Everything has two sides and we must see both of them. The bad side may also turn good. Big trouble is generally avoidable.

Our army is loyal and our productivity is rising. How can the students and young people cause real trouble through the Cultural Revolution? I do not believe we have big problems. That is my opinion on the chaos.”(Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1451–1452.)

583. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 111. 584. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 154–155.

585. In the self-criticism, Liu Shaoqi said: “I was too trusting of Comrade Chen Yun at that time. Based on listening to his opinions, plus our common ideology, I recommended him to both the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman Mao for the post of head

of the Central Financial Group. At that time, Chairman Mao was not in Beijing. Together

with some other comrades in the Central Committee of the CPC, I reported some conditions discussed in Beijing to Chairman Mao and submitted Chen Yun’s speech

circulated by the Central Committee of the CPC to Chairman Mao for circulation. Only

later did I learn Chairman Mao totally opposed our appraisals of the situation, as well

as some of our work methods.” (People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp.,

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of the Central Committee of the CPC and Deputy Premier of the State Council, in supporting the household responsibility system; and Wang Jiaxiang, former secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, in proposals to use peaceful diplomatic policies to counter imperialists, revisionists, and counterrevolutionaries, and to reduce international revolutionary aid.586 On October 30, Chen Yun conducted self-criticism for his mistakes to Mao Zedong, including rightist mistakes committed in 1962.587 These show that Mao’s motivation for launching the Cultural Revolution had its roots in the failure of the Great Leap Forward. When Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun had corrected Mao Zedong’s mistakes in the Great Leap Forward, Mao became resentful and plotted revenge. Mao regularly attacked his political rivals, such as Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao, accusing them of historical faults or collusion with foreign countries, and in doing so reflected his nature as a modern day feudal despot. Since Chen Yun rejected party struggle and strongly resisted the Cultural Revolution, Mao also planned to marginalize him. On October 28, Zhou delivered a speech on carrying forward the spirit of the Central Work Conference, saying: “The written self-criticism was circulated to the party branches at the county and regiment levels with the approval of Chairman Mao and Comrade Lin Biao, and we were thinking of expanding this criticism. Additionally, we should review the written self-criticisms of these two comrades to check whether they need modification, and should circulate them after any necessary modification.”588 On October 31, Zhou wrote to Mao and Lin, proposing Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 727.) 586. During the self-criticism, Liu Shaoqi said: “Deng Zihui mentioned the benefits of ‘contracted farmland’ in Anhui during a central meeting in February of that year (1962.) I did not refute his opinions and this legitimized his advocacy. Since then, he

has advocated the ‘fixing of farm output quotas on a household basis’ during official meetings. Another comrade in the central committee (Chen Yun) has advocated a policy of ‘allocating farmland on an individual household basis’. Another comrade in

the Central Committee (Wang Jiaxiang) has drafted the ‘Detente for Relations with

Imperialists, Revisionists and India and Reactionaries in Other Countries, and the

Reduction of Assistance to the International National Liberation Movement’. All these were opinions based on wrong estimates of the international and domestic situations, and direct rejection of the socialist revolution and general line of socialist construction. I have heard about ‘allocating farmland on an individual household basis’, but I did not

refute him (Chen Yun.) This was an error. However, once I understood the seriousness of the situation, I urged Chairman Mao to return to Beijing.” (Ibid, pp 727– 728.) 587. Jin and Chen ed., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1360. 588. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 192–193.

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to circulate the written self-criticisms of Liu and Deng to the party branches at the county and regiment levels. Mao responded with the instruction “Please act accordingly.”589 During his speech, Zhou also proposed ending state-sponsored travel by Red Guards before the New Year Festival. He explained: “I feel I cannot keep pace with Chairman Mao, who has conferred unprecedented democratic rights on Red Guards, who enjoy four democratic rights and six privileges (free speech, rallying, association, publication, demonstration, and parading,) and who further enjoy the right to suspend classes, take holidays, carry out revolution, go hiking, and travel for free.” Zhou also proposed prohibiting Red Guards from dismissing party and government cadres, detaining people, illegally searching households, administering beatings, and imposing physical punishments.590 The Red Guards were clearly adversely impacting society, and Zhou was frustrated by his failure to win support for curtailing their activities. After the Central Work Conference, Mao had two choices: he could immediately end the Cultural Revolution, or he could ‘beat the drowning dog’ and continue the Cultural Revolution.591 The opportunity existed because Liu and Deng had undertaken self-criticism, and had volunteered to assume responsibility for previous errors and thus relieved their power. Furthermore, Mao himself had earlier proposed ending the Cultural Revolution within ten months.592 At the time 589. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1934.

590. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 172–173.

591. On October 31, 1966, Yao Wenyuan delivered a speech titled “Conduct Revolution to the End in Memory of Lu Xun” during the Meeting of All Circles in the Capital to Mark the Thirtieth Anniversary of Lu Xun’s Death. He said: “We will carry forward Lu Xun’s

fighting spirit of ‘beating dogs even after they are in the water’, and will maintain a strong revolutionary and communist spirit. For the rest of our lives we will spare

no effort to pursue revolution. We will conduct the Great Cultural Revolution to the

end, eliminate the causes of revisionism step-by-step and undertake the great historic

mission of thoroughly destroying the bourgeoisie and realizing communism.” People’s Daily, November 1, 1966.

592. According to Mao Zedong’s plan, the Cultural Revolution movement thus far had only lasted for five months, and potentially only needed another two to five months, but

perhaps even longer. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 143.)

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most participants expected the Cultural Revolution to end quickly, either before the New Year Festival or by March 1967. However, Mao chose to take the second course. As a result, the Cultural Revolution surged again instead of ending as expected.593 The Central Working Conference was pivotal to the spread of the Cultural Revolution, and in its wake the Cultural Revolution entered a third phase.594 The Cultural Revolution and associated political civil strife subsequently spread across China and destroyed cultural and educational fields, party and governmental organs, and the agricultural and industrial sectors related to the national economy and people’s livelihood. Party political struggle evolved into national political revolution and caused severe damage and loss. Deng was deeply aware of the catastrophic side-effects of the Cultural Revolution.595 The reason the Cultural Revolution failed to end as Mao had expected lay in the intrinsic political logic based on which it was staged and carried out. The more fiercely the class struggle was carried on, the more “class enemies” were unmasked, which then required further class struggle. New “class enemies” were unmasked as soon as old ones were eliminated, allowing an endless cycle of struggle. This 593. Pang believes that, in terms of the impact on party and governmental authorities at all levels after the closing of the Central Working Meeting, besides the existing policy of ‘attacking capitalist roaders’, the additional policy of ‘thoroughly criticizing the

bourgeois reactionary line’ was introduced, and had a large impact that was free of restrictions. Party and governmental authorities were regularly attacked and robbed,

and officials were humiliated or kidnapped. The team of rebels was rapidly expanding, and dissatisfied sectors of society joined the rebels and caused social disruption. The

social order deteriorated and local party and governmental authority collapsed. Even the four-level official meeting called by Mao Zedong could not take place. Officials at all levels naturally resented the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’, and Mao Zedong similarly

felt discontented with these officials. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949– 1976), vol. 2, 1452.)

594. The first two launches refer to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC in May and the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC in August. (Zheng and Zhang: China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 58–59.)

595. On April 30, 1987, Deng Xiaoping said: “The ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ started in

1966 and lasted 10 years. It was a catastrophe, and during that period, many senior officials were persecuted, including myself. I was the number two capitalist roader after Liu Shaoqi. Liu was the ‘commander’ and I was the ‘deputy commander.’” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 3, 227–228.)

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was the logic of Mao’s insistence on class struggle theory, path dependence, and sticking to a single path. Although Mao had proposed a timetable for ending the Cultural Revolution and made several calls for party unity, he found himself compelled to continue the Cultural Revolution to deal with the political split he himself had caused. Thus, no timetable was set for ending the Cultural Revolution, which ultimately ended naturally. Right up until his death, Mao continued to insist on class struggle as the guideline and never acknowledged his faults. After the Central Working Conference, Liu and Deng remained members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, but ceased party and state leader work.596 Additionally, they were classified as representatives of the bourgeois reactionary line. Nie Yuanzi and ten Red Guards from Beijing University openly put up the big-character poster “Deng Xiaoping is a Capitalist Roader Within the Party” on November 8 and claimed capitalist roaders within the Party were its most treacherous enemies, especially those in high positions. Liu was named as the number one capitalist roader, while Deng was number two. When Mao held the five meetings in October with the young students and Red Guards that had flooded into Beijing, they caused traffic congestion and shortages of food and accommodation. Zhou sought an instruction to restrict the numbers of Red Guards traveling the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought, but Mao refused, saying: “I have met with six or seven million Red Guards and plan to meet double that number. We must ensure food, accommodation and travel.”597 Zhou carried out Mao’s instruction to continue assisting Red Guards wishing to travel to Beijing, and Mao had soon granted audiences to 11 million Red Guards. On October 29, the deputy leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group claimed when meeting the Accusation Group from Jinhua, Zhejiang: “Almost all the provincial and municipal party committees came under siege in September and rebellion and revolt against superiors were the themes of August and September.”598 596. Article 39 of “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” states that the

Chairman of the PRC should serve a four year term. Article 45 states that the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the PRC exercise their functions and powers until replacements

elected by the succeeding National People’s Congress assume office. Finally, Article

46 states that should the Chairman of the PRC be unable to perform their role for an extended period for health reasons, the Vice Chairman shall act as their replacement to

exercise the functions and powers of the Chairman. (Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Manuscripts since the Founding of New China, vol. 5, 530–531.)

597. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 610–611. 598. Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 1, 179.

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Red Guards accused and denounced capitalist roaders and revolted against party organizations at all levels from the outset of the Cultural Revolution. As Mao led the rebels, he effectively revolted against his own party. From October to November, the Cultural Revolution spread into leading military organs. On November 13, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, He Long, Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Ye Jianying, and Yang Chengwu (Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA) attended the Rally of 100,000 Teachers and Students of Military and Revolutionary Academies. Chen Yi spoke at the rally, saying: “Some students rushed into Zhongnanhai and damaged its gates, while others barged into the Military of National Defense. I strongly protested against the escalating violence and advocated no retaliation against comrades.” He Long called for continued non-intervention by the PLA in the Cultural Revolution, including no participation in local disorder such as rebellions against local party organizations, illegal household searches, and rallies. Xu Xiangqian warned: “As we carry out the Cultural Revolution, we must not neglect our enemies and must remain vigilant against possible sudden attacks by American imperialists and Soviet revisionists, including troop deployments or other trouble on our borders. Relaxing our vigilance may result in serious losses.” Ye Jianying said: “As Lenin remarked, ‘a lie told often enough becomes the truth.’ Similarly, volume of action alone is sufficient to bring about qualitative change. We must understand the above laws of nature, and take care not to guide the masses to support a wrong line.” These leaders clearly disagreed with Mao on mobilizing the masses to rebel, and spared no effort to stabilize the army and protest army involvement in the Cultural Revolution. On November 29, Chen Yi and Ye Jianying spoke at the Rally of Teachers and Students of Military and Revolutionary Academies, saying: “We question the attacking of all veteran cadres.” Chen Yi further said: “I am afraid that by setting unclear struggle targets you will fail to carry out the Cultural Revolution. You should avoid simplifying the line struggle and expanding the numbers you accuse by condemning all those with work faults, all those in power, and all political lines.”599 Chen Yi’s point was valid. Since the Notice on May 16 and the 16-Article Document failed to clearly define essential concepts, simplified and expanded accusations became inevitable. The Anti-rightist Struggle, the Anti-rightist Opportunism Struggle, and the Four Clean-ups Movement all had limits in scope, whereas the Cultural Revolution spread across the country and became a disaster. On November 28, Chen Boda praised Jiang Qing for following revolutionary literary and artistic guidelines at the General Assembly of Literary and Artistic 599. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 185–186.

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Circles to Discuss the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Chen said that Jiang’s special contribution stood out among the comrades who indomitably fought against counter-revolutionaries and revisionists.600 Jiang elaborated her thinking regarding the Cultural Revolution and explicitly mentioned the struggle between Mao and Liu, a comment that Mao later commented on and modified.601 She condemned as counter-revolutionary revisionists Lu Dingyi, Zhou Yang, Lin Mohan (former Deputy Minister of Culture,) and Peng Zhen, as well as Liu Ren, Zheng Tianyu, Wan Li, Deng Tuo, Chen Kehan, Li Qi, and Zhao Dingxin from the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC. Additionally, she rebuked the old Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, and the Ministry of Culture for colluding in crimes against the Party and people, and called for them to be unmasked and denounced. Thus, with the approval of Mao, Jiang condemned and persecuted Peng Zhen and ten other cadres. The implication of cadres on such a large scale reflects the complexities of political struggle during the Cultural Revolution. Chen Yun later commented on the handling of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-revolutionary Clique case: “The Cultural Revolution of 1966 was an instance of civil strife and political struggle occurring under particular historical conditions, and some conspirators and careerists exploited the political struggle to pursue personal objectives. Besides those conspirators, others involved should be treated according to the principles of political struggle.”602 He described the 600. Chen, “Speech at the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution General Assembly of Literary and Artistic Circles,” November 28, 1966.

601. Mao Zedong issued instructions and made modifications to Jiang Qing’s “Speech at the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution General Assembly of Literary and Artistic Circles,” such that the modified version read: “Only now have I (Jiang) clearly realized, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, that the previous form of work team

was wrong, especially in terms of what they did. They aimed not at a small number of

capitalist roaders within the CPC and reactionary academic authorities, but rather at the revolutionary students. My dear friends, determining the correct targets is a problem

of right or wrong, related to the principles of Marxism and Leninism and Mao Zedong

Thought! It is said our Chairman Mao stopped designating work teams from early

June this year (1966,) but some comrades (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping) designated work teams themselves without seeking the approval of Chairman Mao.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 164.)

602. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp, Selected Works of Chen Yun vol. 3, 304.

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Cultural Revolution as political struggle occurring under particular historical conditions because it was staged and led by Mao. Since Lin and Jiang were simply attempting to obey or take advantage of Mao Zedong’s instructions, most of the political persecution they committed ultimately originated from Mao. In a speech, Zhou said: “Our Cultural Revolution brings us a new and great democratic experience under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The masses received self-education and achieved self-liberation by freely airing their views, producing big-character posters, engaging in vigorous debate, and traveling the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought, and this activity developed the Chairman’s mass line in the socialist revolution.” Zhou also highly praised Chen, Kang, and Jiang,603 lauded Jiang’s achievements in promoting literary revolution among foreigners, and noted the reforms that had been achieved under her guidance in Peking Opera, ballet, classical music, and sculpture, which together amounted to an artistic revolution. He praised Jiang particularly for participating in the struggle and artistic practice. Notably, Zhou had also praised Lin previously. On October 3, Zhou delivered a speech when meeting Red Guard attendees of the National Day Ceremony, and said: “Lin Biao carries the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought.” Subsequently, he once again praised Wang Hongwen. Interestingly, none of these remarks are included in the Selected Works of Zhou Enlai. From the start of the Cultural Revolution, Lin and Zhou were the most loyal members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in the way they followed, obeyed and carried out Mao’s instructions, and Zhou provided crucial support to Mao in staging the Cultural Revolution. Zhou’s political motives in supporting Mao remain a historical mystery, and the Central Committee of the CPC praised him excessively and distorted facts. Zhou operated within a highly totalitarian regime and a specific political environment that prevented him from maintaining his integrity and speaking candidly. He was thus compelled to become a dishonest politician. 603. On November 28, 1966, Zhou Enlai said: “Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and Comrade Jiang

Qing all support and implement the proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao.

The achievements of the Cultural Revolution in the literary and artistic fields are closely related to the instructions of Comrade Jiang Qing, and to the support and cooperation of revolutionary leftists in the field.” On October 18, 1966, when interviewing students,

teachers, and faculty in colleges in Beijing, Zhou Enlai said: “Chen Boda is the best

theorist in our Party under the leadership of Chairman Mao and Chairman Lin Biao. He is good at using a single example to draw inferences about other cases, and at

illustrating Mao Zedong Thought.” (Zhou, “Speech at the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution General Assembly of Literary and Artistic Circles,” November 28, 1966.)

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By the end of November, Mao had held eight consecutive meetings with teachers, students and Red Guards, who numbered 11 million in total. Xinhua News Agency published a summary and claimed that it showcased the great proletarian democracy and international communist movement reform. Earlier, on November 3, Lin had said in a speech: “Mao Zedong contributed to the proletarian revolution and dictatorship doctrine of Marxism-Leninism by establishing a great democracy.” Lin also announced that Mao supported his revolutionary comrades in traveling China to publicize Mao Zedong Thought. Meanwhile, Guo Moruo commemorated Mao’s meetings in poems to praise democracy.604 However, an aging Mao felt exhausted and announced that he could no longer meet with the Red Guards.605 The tide of young students and Red Guards traveling the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought thus began to recede. On November 6, with approval from Mao, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council issued the Notification on Revolutionary Teachers and Students Traveling the Country to Publicize Mao Zedong Thought, and suspended statesponsored travel to publicize Mao Zedong Thought by national revolutionary teachers, students and Red Guards from universities, colleges, military academies and schools from November 21 until Spring of the following year. On December 2, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council followed up with a supplementary notification.606 What were the motivations behind the unprecedented campaign to deify Mao Zedong in the late 1960s? The teachers, students, and masses unanimously longed to meet Mao, who had become a god to the Chinese people. Meanwhile, Mao also wished to interact closely with the people, particularly young students, and rejoiced in becoming their “god”. Psychologically, Mao derived great personal satisfaction from these meetings, while politically, his joining with the masses 604. Guo Moruo’s poem “Shuidiaogetou — Great Democracy” was as follows: “Joint actions

all over the country mark the great democracy. All waters flow to the vast sea in the

big storm. Eight ranks parade on Chang’an Street to wish the leader a long life. On the ground the leader smiles, and in the sky the sun accompanies him. The grand parade is both a big drill and a homecoming. The spiritual missile encourages the masses to destroy the old thinking, develop the theories of Marx and Engels, promote the

thoughts of Lenin and Stalin, and turn the tables on the imperialists and revisionists.

Spring returns to the universe in the blossom of white flowers.” (Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 124.)

605. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 612. 606. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 159–160.

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provided him with important assets for successfully conducting the Cultural Revolution.”607 Personal meetings with Red Guards allowed Mao to bypass party and governmental organs and directly control the publicity tools that were vital to the Cultural Revolution. However, there was a heavy price to be paid.608 Mao would later turn on the Red Guards he met with when he disbanded Red Guard organizations and even deployed troops to suppress Red Guards and arrest “May 16 counter-revolutionaries.” After the Central Working Conference held in October, the campaign to denounce the Liu-Deng Bourgeois Reactionary Line reached a climax. At this point, Mao still viewed the Liu issue as an internal conflict and had little intention of purging him. On November 3, Mao met the Red Guards at the rostrum on the Tiananmen gate tower and offered to speak with Liu and send regards to his family. When Liu stated that he planned to work together with the masses, Mao responded: “You are too old to temper yourself in grassroots units and should not do it.”609 However, the campaign to denounce Liu escalated and evolved from political issues to historical issues, as those campaigning against Liu sought to frame him with fabricated historical records as a means to purge him. Kang Sheng acted as the sinister “political director” in this activity. With the support of Kang and his allies, the campaign to unmask traitors was launched. Numerous veteran cadres, especially outstanding cadres jailed during the revolutionary period, were framed as traitors. On November 24, Zhou reported to Mao on Red Guards disclosing that Liu Lantao (former Alternate Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC) and his allies had been released from prison. Numerous people were accused of involvement in the case. In fact, Liu Shaoqi had made this decision 607. These words were spoken by Mao Zedong to leaders of the Central Committee of the

CPC and other authorities attending the audience at the Tiananmen gate tower on November 1, 1966. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 158.)

608. MacFarquhar believed that: “The ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ created a new means

of publicity that enabled the central government to spread ideology throughout the country via broadcasting stations, TV stations, and direct circulation of millions of

Mao’s quotations. Numerous violent actions were committed in the name of Mao and his thinking, and the whole country was driven to the brink of total anarchy.” (MacFarquhar, “Postscript — Missions after Unity.”) 609. Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 208–209.

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on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC and the 7th and 8th National Congresses of the CPC approved it. Therefore, the Central Committee of the CPC was aware of the case. Zhou drafted a telegram in reply to the Northwest Bureau on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC, and requested that the Northwest Bureau explain to the Nankai University Weidong Red Guard Combat Brigade and the Xi’an Bombarding the Headquarters Combat Brigade regarding the Central Committee’s knowledge that Liu Lantao and his allies had been released from prison. Mao issued instructions on taking prompt and appropriate action.610 However, the matter escalated until Liu Shaoqi unexpectedly became involved. Mao then made a critical mistake that was followed by other mistakes. The unjust framing of Liu Shaoqi typifies the way historical records were fabricated to frame others during the Cultural Revolution. On December 6, Lin presided over the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and further inflamed the case against Liu and Deng, saying in a speech: “The Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping Case is not merely about the accused having resisted the Cultural Revolution for over 50 days, but is a matter that may affect the country’s fate over the next 10 or 20 years.” Liu was present the meeting.611 On December 8, Xie Fuzhi wrote a report to Lin, saying: “It is necessary to review the political history and I proposed setting up a special case group for this purpose.” Xie’s actual intention was to frame Wang Guangmei and Liu Shaoqi. On December 18, Zhou presided over a brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, which approved the decision to set up the Wang Guangmei Special Case Group with Xie as leader.612 Wang Guangmei served as deputy to the Third 610. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 169.

611. Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi in the 20 Years after the Founding of New China, 367. 612. On December 18, 1966, the Central Committee held a workshop. The meeting discussed materials that revealed the “historic errors” of Lui Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei, and decided to establish a case investigation team. Liu Shaoqi was exempt from direct

investigation owing to being a member of the Standing Committee of the Political

Bureau and Chairman of the PRC. Therefore, a Wang Gangmei Case Group was established, known publicly first as “Team C of the Central General Office,” and later as “Team 504.” The group was headed by Xie Fuzhi and advised by Chen Boda, and its members included Jiang Qing, Xiao Hua, and Ye Qun. Xiao Hua, Director of the

General Political Department, was later attacked, and Chen Boda did not actually act as advisor to the group. Xie Fuzhi was the nominal head, but simply followed Jiang Qing, who was the de facto leader of the group and controlled its activities.

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National People’s Congress and was subject to protection under Article 37 of the Constitution, meaning the decision to purge Liu and Wang was unconstitutional. The same afternoon, Zhang Chunqiao met Kuai Dafu, the deputy director of the rebels from Tsinghua University, and encouraged him to attack Liu and Deng, together with their bourgeois reactionary line. On the morning of December 25, Kuai led nearly 5,000 rebels to hold a rally, deliver speeches, distribute leaflets and display big-character posts and slogans, intensifying the social campaign against Liu and Deng.613 On December 27, after his birthday, Mao changed his attitude towards Liu, and said: “It seems now that the handling of the Liu Shaoqi case can no longer be given insider treatment, and instead we must openly denounce him.”614 Jiang asked Kang to propose the establishment of the Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Tao Zhu Special Case Group. However, Mao denied the proposal, and noted that such an investigation would be difficult because the three were members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau elected at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Nevertheless, Jiang repeated her instruction to Kang, saying: “We must set up a special case group. If we cannot set up on its own, then we will deal with them as part of the Peng Zhen special case.”615 On December 30, Jiang gave a speech at Tsinghua University and openly denounced the Liu-Deng political line.616 She also met with the Red Guards and issued fresh instructions, saying: “The struggle situation has changed and you can do anything except detain people.”617 The Red Guards responded positively. On January 1, 1967, rebels from the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC posted the slogan “Bombard Liu Shaoqi, China’s Khrushchev” on the wall of Liu’s residence. On January 3, instigated by Qi Benyu, they accused and 613. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1935.

614. Wang, Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 775. 615. Ibid., 733. 616. Jiang Qing said, “The speeches of Lin Biao and Chen Boda at the Central Working Meeting both proposed thoroughly criticizing the wrong line of Liu Shaoqi and Deng

Xiaoping. Thoroughly criticize Liu and Deng’s reactionary line! We will improve

your understanding of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution line represented by Chairman Mao and thoroughly defeat the bourgeois reactionary line of Liu and Deng!

Overthrow the line of Liu and Deng!” (“Speeches of Jiang Qing and Others When

Interviewing Revolutionary Students, Teachers and Faculty at Tsinghua University,” December 30, 1966.)

617. Wang, Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 775.

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denounced Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei for the first time. On January 6, the Tsinghua University Jinggang Mountain Red Guard Brigade tricked Wang into leaving Zhongnanhai by pretending her daughter had been injured in a traffic accident, whereupon they abducted her, took her to Tsinghua University, and denounced her. Wang was released only after intervention by Zhou. On January 12, Qi acted on Jiang’s instructions and ordered rebels from the Secretarial Bureau of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC to once again accuse and denounce Liu and Wang.618 Liu was no longer able to perform his constitutional duties as Chairman of the State. The substitution of the rule of law by the rule of individual was both an inevitable result of the Cultural Revolution and a reason for the movement being sustained for ten years. Only Liu was aware of the seriousness of the problem. He saw that the Cultural Revolution was not only a personal takedown on him, but also a destruction of the country’s constitution. Since he considered that Mao’s intention for launching the Cultural Revolution was merely to remove himself from power, he offered to resign his positions as member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and President of the People’s Republic of China, hoping that by placating Mao, the Cultural Revolution could be brought to an end, thus preserving the constitution. On January 13, Mao finally agreed to meet with Liu after Liu made several attempts to solicit an audience. Liu volunteered to assume primary responsibility for the various crimes he had been associated with in the hope of swiftly ending the persecution of other cadres and minimizing the damage to the Party. He also proposed resigning from the state presidency and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and retiring to his hometown.619 However, Mao was unresponsive and refused to change his course. 618. Lu and Feng, Liu Shaoqi in the Two Decades after the Founding of New China, 368. 619. On January 13, 1967, while meeting Mao Zedong in the Great Hall of the People, Liu

Shaoqi said: “First, I assume responsibility for this error of political line, and stress that the majority of officials are competent, especially the many senior officials who are

valuable assets of the Party. I assume principal responsibility and hope other officials will be released from responsibility to reduce the loss to the Party. Second, I resign

from my posts as Chairman of the PRC, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and Director of the Compilation Commission of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. I plan to travel together with my wife and children to Yan’an or my hometown to begin a new life as a farmer. I hope this can help to end the Great Cultural

Revolution as early as possible and reduce the loss to the state.” Huang ed., Last Days of Liu Shaoqi, 26.

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Sidebar 3.5

Mao Zedong’s Birthday Speech (December 26, 1966)

The socialist revolution reached a new stage when the Soviet Union restored revisionists to power and negated the October Revolution. We should thus address the new issue of how the proletariat can hold on to power and prevent the restoration of capitalism. The key is to reinforce party construction, but any fortress is vulnerable to attack from within. We have not ended the class struggle, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has merely begun the struggle against the bourgeoisie and their party proxies who have seized power. I issued the Notice on May 16 to order the publication of a big-character poster, and encouraged Red Guards to travel the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought and spread the Cultural Revolution nationwide. The Cultural Revolution was staged to attack the bourgeois reactionary line. Bourgeois thoughts existed within the Party and many cadres refused to rectify their outlook and upheld a bourgeois reactionary line. These reactionary cadres existed at all levels and were influential within the party. They also claimed the achievements of others as their own, viewed themselves as the incarnation of the Party, and believed that their personal leadership represented Party leadership. They also called for unconditional and slavish obedience to instructions rather than sticking to principles. My political line and theirs were divergent. The mistakes of the cadres who resolutely followed the bourgeois reactionary line needed to be corrected. They presented themselves dishonestly, and either secretly supported capitalist roaders or were capitalist roaders themselves. The proletariat line worked to achieve socialist revolution while the bourgeois reactionary line worked to maintain bourgeois orders, organizations and procedures, resulting in struggle between the two lines. Revolutionary movements in contemporary China have always been initiated by students, and when worker, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals join in, there will be success. This is an observable pattern. The May Fourth Movement and Cultural Revolution are examples. Students, cultural organizations, superstructures, workers, and peasants should work together to establish democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat and attack the enemies of socialism. Without democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is easy for a small number of cadres to suppress the masses, and there is a risk that the dictatorship of the proletariat will become a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Our great democracy must exist under the centralized guidance of the proletarian headquarters of Marxism, and the dictatorship must protect the democratic rights of the people and ban intervention in, and suppression of, democracy, as well as unlawful detentions.

338

The First Salvo of the Cultural Revolution

Struggle between two party lines appeared to occur after we established socialism, and specifically means struggle between socialist and capitalist lines. In the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi followed the bourgeois reactionary line, which caused struggle between two party lines. This struggle has not ended and will continue even after the purging of Liu Shaoqi. A few cadres who refused to rectify their faults and presented themselves dishonestly must be attacked and purged by the masses, and have only themselves to blame for this. All those who have attempted to stop the Cultural Revolution will be eliminated. I have argued with Tao Zhu about this. It is recommended that old state apparatus be transformed into new state apparatus, old methods into new methods, the old order into a new older, the old system into a new system and old discipline into new discipline. This is necessary because the old system resembles the capitalist and feudal system of the Soviet Union. Source: Wang, Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 693–670.

Liu and other Party leaders could not understand why Mao elected to continue the Cultural Revolution even after Liu had been purged. In fact, Mao conducted two critical discussions before his conversation with Liu. First, on December 21 he spoke with a reporter from Poland and opined: “Resisting Khrushchev’s revisionism is not enough, and we must also revolt against the revisionism within our Party. If we neglect this China may change its political line and the situation may become impossible to rectify. Previously, we were so focused on fixing problems that we neglected class struggle. Nowadays, we call for class struggle to spread from schools and other organs throughout urban and rural areas, and thus are carrying on class struggle across China.”620 Second, on December 26, Mao delivered an important speech on his 73rd birthday at his Zhongnanhai residence to elaborate on his political motives in staging the Cultural Revolution (Sidebar 3.5.) Only the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, namely Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, and Yao Wenyuan, were invited to attend his birthday party. Mao said: “We have not ended class struggle, and the Cultural Revolution has seen us struggle against the bourgeoisie, and especially party proxies of the petty bourgeoisie that seized power. The Cultural Revolution is being staged to purge our Party and state organs of the proxies of the bourgeoisie that comprise a majority of party leaders at all levels and negatively influence our Party.” Mao further gave his assessment of the political situation in China, and 620. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1459.

339

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 1

expressed his belief that the Cultural Revolution had initiated a decisive struggle against bourgeois elements within the party. Finally, he offered a toast to successful nationwide class struggle.621 By secretly delivering his birthday speech,622 Mao ostracized the majority of the leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC (specifically the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC,) with the exception of Chen Boda.623 In fact, it was Mao rather than the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau who had decided to seize power.624 By secretly revealing his true intention, Mao was better able to manipulate the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group to control central political newspapers and periodicals and thus mobilize the masses. As Meisner remarked, ultimate power in China rested with Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, and Mao’s actions sealed the fates of individuals and of the nation.625

621. Wang, Reflections on the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, 693–701. 622. Mao Zedong’s speech that night was not officially recorded at the time, and records are based on the subsequent recollection of Wang Li, who attended the dinner. (Ibid.)

623. Mao Zedong did not invite Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu and Kang Sheng, then Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.

624. Pang believes that Mao Zedong’s strategic decisions, like “comprehensive power seizure,” had not been fully prepared, discussed, and officially decided upon within

the Central Committee of the CPC, but were nevertheless rapidly implemented

throughout the country. This was unusual, and further reflected that Mao Zedong’s arbitrary personal control had succeeded the collective leadership of the Central Committee.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1471.) 625. Meisner: Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 308–309.

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戰：1956–1966中蘇關係回憶錄下卷 [A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956–1966, vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1999. ———. Yi Mao zhuxi 憶毛主席 [Remembering Chairman Mao]. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1995. Xi Xuan 席宣, and Jin Chunming 金春明. “Wenhua da geming” jian shi 「文化大革 命」簡史 [A Short History of the Cultural Revolution]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 1996. Xiaodi 曉地 ed. “Wen ge” zhi mi 「文革」之謎 [Secrets Buried with the “Great Cultural Revolution”]. Beijing: Blossom Press, 1993. Xie Yixian 謝益顯 et al. eds. Zhongguo dangdai waijiao shi (1949–2001) 中國當代外 交史（1949–2001） [China’s Contemporary Diplomatic History]. Beijing: China Youth Publishing House, 2002. Xu Bin 徐彬 ed. Feng yu Fu lu ju: Liu Shaoqi zai “Wen ge” zhong de kang zheng 風雨 福祿居:劉少奇在「文革」中的抗爭 [Storms of Fulu Residence: Struggles of Liu Shaoqi During the Cultural Revolution]. Changchun: Jilin People’s Press, 1998. Xu Quanxing 許全興. Mao Zedong wannian de lilun yu shijian (1956–1976) 毛澤東晚 年的理論與實踐（1956–1976） [Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976)]. Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1993. Yan Changgui 閻長貴, and Wang Guangyu 王廣宇. Wen shi qiu xin ji 問史求信集 [Reflections on History]. Beijing: Red Flag Publishing House, 2009. Yang Jisheng 楊繼繩. Deng Xiaoping shidai: Zhongguo gaige kaifang ershi nian ji shi shang juan 鄧小平時代：中國改革開放二十年紀實上卷 [The Deng Xiaoping Era: A Record of the Two Decades of Reform and Opening in China vol. 1]. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1998. Yang Kelin 楊克林 ed. Wenhua dageming bowuguan (1966–1976) shang ce 文化大革 命博物館上冊 [Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 1]. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2002. ———. Wenhua dageming bowuguan (1966–1976) xia ce 文化大革命博物館下冊 [Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 2]. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2002. Ye Yonglie 葉永烈. Chen Boda zhuan 陳伯達傳 [Biography of Chen Boda]. Beijing: China Writers Publishing House, 1993. ———. Mao Zedong de mishu men 毛澤東的秘書們 [Mao Zedong’s Secretaries]. Shanghai: People’s Publishing House, 2005. Yin Jiamin 尹家民. “Mao Zedong yu Zhongyang wen ge xiaozu de chengli” 毛澤

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東與中央文革小組的成立 [Establishment of Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group]. In Knowledge of the History of the CPC 黨史博 覽, (1) (2006). Zhang Yaoci 張耀祠. Zhang Yaoci huiyi lu — zai Mao zhuxi shenbian de rizi 張耀祠 回憶錄—在毛主席身邊的日子 [Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2008. Zheng Qian 鄭謙, and Zhang Hua 張化. Mao Zedong shidai de Zhongguo (1949–1976) (di san ce) 毛澤東時代的中國（1949–1976）（第三冊） [China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2003. Zhou Taihe 周太和. “Chen Yun tongzhi si xia nongcun diaocha de qian hou” 陳 雲同志四下農村調查的前後 [Before and After the Four Investigations of Comrade Chen Yun in Rural Areas]. In Chen Yun yu Xin Zhongguo jingji jianshe 陳雲與新中國經濟建設 [Chen Yun and New China’s Economic Construction], compiled by the Editorial Committee of Chen Yun and New China’s Economic Construction, 168–169. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1991. Zhu Yuanshi 朱元石 et al. eds. Wu De koushu: Shi nian fengyu jishi — Wo zai Beijing gongzuo de yixie jingli 吳德口述：十年風雨紀事—我在北京工作的一些經歷 [Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing]. Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2004.

English Materials

Bastiat, Frédéric. “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” In Selected Essays on Political Economy, translated by Seymour Cain, edited by George B. de Huszar. Atlanta, GA: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1968. Engels, Friedrich. “Preface.” In Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, translated by Florence Kelley. 2nd ed. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,1892. Fogel, Robert W. Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. Fuwa, Tetsuzo. Fighting Chinese Hegemonism. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1995. Harding, Harry. “The Chinese State in Crisis.” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, edited by Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Lenin, Vladimir. “Should We Participate in Bourgeois Parliaments?” In Vladimir

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Lenin, Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, translated by Julius Katzer. Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1966. Macfarquhar, Roderick. “Epilogue: The Onus of Unity.” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, edited by Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Macfarquhar, Roderick, and John K. Fairbank. “General Editor’s Preface.” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, edited by Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Macfarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. Maddison, Angus. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1995. ———. The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective. Paris: OECD, 2001. ———. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD, 2003. Malraux, André. Anti-memoirs. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1986. Marx, Karl. “Letter to Arnold Ruge,” May 1843. Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1 (1844). Needham, Joseph. “Science Reborn in China: Rise and Fall of the Anti-intellectual ‘Gang.’” Nature, 274 (1978): 832–34. Watkins, Michael D., and Max H. Bazerman. “Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming.” Harvard Business Review, 81(3) (2003): 72–80. Zheng, Shiping. Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

350

Index 16-Article Document 244–46, 261–64, 267, 277, 316, 324, 330 allocating farmland 94–95, 104, 326 anti-revisionism movement 45, 81, 86 anti-Rightist struggle 30, 55–58, 59, 75, 85, 93, 123, 125, 130, 201, 330 anti-socialist reactionary line 170, 202, 214 Army Literary and Artistic Work Seminar 152 bad elements 38, 58–59, 65, 87, 155, 192, 201, 290, 303 Beidaihe Meeting 34, 59, 93 big-character poster 71, 193–201, 203, 210–13, 232, 240–41, 245, 248–49, 251–55, 258, 264, 266, 274, 291, 298, 308, 312, 319, 321, 324, 329, 338 at Peking University 190, 195–96 bourgeois counter-revolutionary line 312, 315–16 bourgeois headquarters 229, 254, 276, 322 bourgeois intellectuals 51–52, 72, 78, 92 bourgeois military line 162–63 bourgeois reactionary line 102, 302, 316, 318, 321, 328–29, 336, 338–39 Brezhnev 38–39 bureaucratic class 50, 69, 226 capitalist restoration 5, 41, 49, 67–68, 178, 201–3 capitalist roaders 70–72, 102–3, 106, 123, 187, 224, 238, 254, 262, 283, 291, 308, 313, 317, 322, 328–29, 331, 338

China's Khrushchev 42, 106, 176, 179, 227, 240, 270, 321–22, 326, 336 class enemies 16, 49, 57–58, 62–64, 72–73, 96, 99, 157, 171, 297, 322, 328 class struggle 7–8, 16, 18–19, 23, 30, 37–38, 42, 45, 47, 53–71, 73, 75, 77, 85, 89, 96, 103, 106, 124, 128, 130, 132, 141, 148, 150, 153, 165–66, 168, 170, 184–85, 198, 207, 213–14, 226, 236, 243, 273, 321, 323, 328–29, 338–39 collective leadership 9–14, 17, 36, 93, 103, 109–11, 117, 120, 123–24, 157, 169, 174, 180, 187, 205, 228, 234, 240, 251, 253, 265–66, 271, 311, 340 counter-revolutionary elements 51, 65, 83, 138, 175, 192, 212, 233–34, 292, 297, 315, 323, 326, 331, 334 counter-revolutionary restoration 168, 183–84, 321 cultural absolutism 22, 83, 92 cultural education 52, 187 democratic centralism 110, 119, 121–24, 157, 162, 180, 215, 274 economic construction 106, 124, 126–28, 130, 133, 223, 275, 300 educational revolution 80, 85, 209 Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC 9, 13, 112, 136, 180, 187, 226–27, 230, 241, 243–45, 248, 252, 254, 257–58, 261, 266–69, 271–72, 274–81, 310–14, 316, 319, 321, 324, 328, 336

351

Index

Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC 150, 245 Enlarged Central Work Conference of the 7,000 Cadres 58–59, 62, 115, 122, 149 February Minutes 150–55, 184 February Outline 143–45, 148–50, 153, 155–56, 164–65 First 10-point Decision 64–65, 67, 96 four News 282–83, 296, 298 four Olds 190, 279, 283, 285, 287, 290, 293, 296–98, 303, 308–9 full scale domestic struggle 8, 16 Great Chinese Famine 33, 57–58, 90, 93–94 Guo Moruo 86, 143, 236, 247, 258, 315– 16, 333 Hai Rui Dismissed 90, 137–38, 140–41, 144–47, 158, 202 intraparty conflict 9, 154, 175 intra party democratic system 17–18, 22, 107, 117–19, 122 intra-party struggle 42, 75, 102, 321 Khrushchev 26, 28–38, 43, 46, 97–98, 104, 113, 178–80, 204–5, 215 leadership hierarchy 266–69, 282 leftist mistake 24, 71, 74–75, 81, 105 Letter to Jiang Qing 224–25 letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend 82–83, 92, 143 Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-

352

revolutionary Clique 71, 331 Mao Zedong's Birthday Speech 338 Nanning Meeting 117, 120–21 national defense 114, 125–26, 130, 158, 305, 330 national economy 125–26, 216, 328 Nie Yuanzi 196–97, 204, 210, 246, 248–49, 251, 253, 258, 324, 329 old customs 190, 192, 283, 286, 291 overthrowing everything 7–8, 16, 192 Party Constitution, 12, 17, 22, 45, 100, 117–19, 121–22, 167, 169–70, 174, 234, 243, 245–46, 254, 259, 268, 274, 311, 314 party hierarchy 182, 269, 312 personality cult 6, 13, 16, 22, 108, 110–15, 121, 123–24, 132, 216, 235, 260, 279, 284–85, 310 of Mao Zedong 180, 219, 284 Peng Dehuai 43, 49, 57, 60, 72, 90, 130, 140–41, 143, 145, 177, 215, 301, 323, 326 philosophy of struggle 44, 71–72, 198, 237, 277 political line 22, 37, 67–68, 104–5, 237, 277, 330, 336–39 production teams 15, 49, 64, 290, 304 purge 8, 18, 82–83, 102–3, 106, 128, 130, 137, 151, 162, 166, 174–77, 179, 181, 191, 215, 224, 263, 334, 339 Qin Shi Huang 85–86, 98 rebellion 71, 74, 88, 104, 155, 196, 213, 226,

Index

240–42, 283, 290, 293, 309, 329–30 Red Guards 12, 38, 71, 153, 198, 213, 240–41, 262, 274, 279, 281–82, 284– 87, 289–306, 308–10, 315–16, 318–19, 324, 327, 329–30, 333–34, 336 revisionists 31–36, 44, 49, 51, 59, 66, 87, 89, 96, 104, 164, 166, 174, 178, 183–84, 196, 202, 204, 241, 326, 331, 333 rightist opportunists 43, 49, 57, 60, 131, 171, 202

violent struggle 294, 303 working groups 186, 191, 195, 199–200, 203, 205–6, 209–12, 227, 229–35, 237–40, 242, 244, 246–48, 250, 312, 322 working teams 227, 230, 232, 248 work teams 66, 70, 199–200, 227, 230, 232, 238–39, 247–48, 313, 319–20, 331 written self-criticism 253, 312–13, 319–20, 325–27

Second 10-point Decision 67 Second Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC 12, 45, 108, 110–11 Second Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC 31, 56 self-criticism 34, 58–59, 90, 110, 115, 118, 137, 144, 149, 159, 173, 187, 228, 257, 269, 277, 312–14, 319–22, 325–27 Sino-Soviet Relationship 29, 32, 38, 40 Socialist Education Movement 49–50, 61–62, 64–67, 70, 73, 96–102, 217, 230 student movements 195, 210, 228, 249–50, 288, 294–95 student representatives 281–82, 304, 314 theory of class struggle 16, 18, 24, 37, 54, 56, 60–61, 65, 71, 74–75, 124, 329 Three-household Village 170–71, 202 three Red Flags, 34, 106 Tsinghua University 197, 201, 210, 212, 240, 301, 305, 319, 336–37 uncertainty of information 10–11, 13, 16 verbal struggle 294 Vietnam 27, 40, 276, 278

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Mao and the Cultural Revolution

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Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Volume 2

The Red Guards March for Mao

Hu Angang

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. Suite 208 Davies Pacific Center 841 Bishop Street Honolulu, HI, 96813 Website: www.enrichprofessional.com A Member of Enrich Culture Group Limited Hong Kong Head Office: 11/F, Benson Tower, 74 Hung To Road, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China China Office: Rm 309, Building A, Central Valley, 16 Haidian Middle Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Singapore Office: 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660 Trademarks: SILKROAD PRESS and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. © 2017 by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. With the title Mao and the Cultural Revolution Volume 2: The Red Guards March for Mao Edited by W. H. Hau All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher. ISBN (Hardback) ISBN (pdf)

978-1-62320-153-1 978-1-62320-154-8

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Contents Chapter 4 The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China.......... 1 Seizure of Power and the Purging of Class Enemies................................................... 2 The Revolutionary Forces Struggle and the February Counter-current................... 36

Forces Counterattack

Open Denouncement of Liu Shaoqi and the Fabricated Case Against Him............ 52 Civil Unrest and Class Struggle...................................................................................... 67 Total Suppression and Purging of Veteran Cadres...................................................... 95 The Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC................... 114

and the end of Liu Shaoqi’s Political Life

Chapter 5 The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao................. 137 The 9th National Congress of the CPC and Lin Biao Becoming Successor.............. 140 The “Order No. 1” Event and the Fight over the Post of State President................. 182 Lushan Conference and Mao Zedong’s Resistance..................................................... 204 Criticizing Chen, the Rectification Movement, and Mao Zedong............................. 225

Turning up the Pressure

Mao Zedong’s Tour of the South and the Lin Biao Incident of September 13......... 242 Criticizing Lin and the Rectification and Liberation of Veteran Cadres................... 260 Preparing for the 10th National Congress of the CPC................................................. 288

Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 297 Index

................................................................................................................. 303

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4

Chapter

The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

Seizure of Power and the Purging of Class Enemies The Cultural Revolution that Mao Zedong staged became central to his beliefs. Mao later added a paragraph to the speech he delivered on his birthday when reviewing the text: “The Proletarian Cultural Revolution touched the soul of the people, their fundamental political stance, their outlook, and their past and future. China’s revolutionary history is the greatest, and the unprecedented revolution will temper a generation of resolute communists.”1 This description of the Cultural Revolution reflected Mao’s ambitious idealism and his attempt to use the Cultural Revolution to baptize a new generation in political struggle and build a new society. Each time the Cultural Revolution reached a climax, Mao was eager to label it the greatest and most unprecedented revolution, inspiring confidence in the masses of China. However, Mao had become divorced from reality. Those who participated in the Cultural Revolution did not really experience a great revolution that touched their souls. While he dreamed of tempering the rebels and Red Guards into a new generation of resolute communists, the grim reality that emerged was violent struggles and massacres. On January 1, the People’s Daily and Red Flag marked the New Year by publishing the editorial “We should Resolutely Carry out the Cultural Revolution,” written by Yao Wenyuan and reviewed by Mao. This editorial reviewed the course of the Cultural Revolution and denounced several central leaders for having taken advantage of Mao’s previous absence from Beijing to push for the bourgeois reactionary line and revolt against Mao’s right line.2 Without consulting with the National People’s Congress or the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC, Mao openly criticized Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping and judged the political nature of their cases. The New Year’s Day editorial elaborated on the nature of the struggle between the two party lines in the Cultural Revolution: “The Chairman led the proletarian revolutionary line and attempted to mobilize the masses to purge a handful of capitalist roaders and bourgeois reactionary academic authorities within the Party and reform all the old institutions of the exploiting class. One line aimed to resolutely carry out socialist revolution whereas the other sought to maintain the old capitalist order, which resulted in struggle between the two party lines.” The editorial expressed the spirit of the secret birthday speech delivered by Mao, and defined 1967 as National Class Struggle Year and the Great Proletarian 1.

Red Flag, Issue No. 1, 1967; republished by the People’s Daily, January 3, 1967.

2. Ibid.

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The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

Cultural Revolution Attack Year.3 However, what did comprehensive struggle actually mean? How did comprehensive and non-comprehensive struggle differ? Furthermore, how did comprehensive struggle influence the Chinese Communist Party, government and people at the time? None of these were clear to them. Subsequently, comprehensive power seizure and civil war reached a new climax. Mao’s assessment of the political situation in China at this time is important, as was his definition of “class enemies” and his reasons for supporting leftists in seizing power.4 On January 16, Mao remarked, “Some cadres have changed over the past decades, and the leftist seizure of power is rational.” On January 30, Mao issued instructions on the report of Tan Zhenlin: “There are a handful of counterrevolutionaries, rightists, and degenerate cadres in the Party, government, troops, militia, schools, factories, rural areas, and commercial sectors. Since the movement started, most of them have confessed to their crimes, and the revolutionary masses are responsible for investigating them and imposing penalties according to the seriousness of their crimes.”5 On February 3, Mao met with the Albanian Party and Government Delegation and described the situation: “Many party members have been unmasked. Specific examples include: 1. A group of veteran cadres who carried out democratic revolution but disapproved of attacking capitalism 2. Party members who joined after the founding of the People’s Republic of China 3. Former Nationalist Party members 4. Children of the bourgeoisie, landlords and rich peasants. These people are not treacherous, and some actually support us while others are counter-revolutionaries.”6 Mao’s subjective and arbitrary assessments relied solely on his imagination and bold speculation. He thus assumed the existence of a class enemy clique and saw crisis where none existed. 3.

This editorial claimed: “1967 will be the year when class struggle is launched throughout

the country, and when the proletariat cooperate with other revolutionary masses to

comprehensively attack a small number of capitalist roaders in the CPC and ‘Monsters and Demons’ in society.” The piece continued by saying 1967 would be: “the year of further criticizing the bourgeois reactionary line and eliminating its impact,” and “The

year when struggle, criticism and rectification achieve decisive success.” Additionally,

“All cultural revolution movements in contemporary history started from student movements, then developed into worker and farmer movements, and then brought

together revolutionary intellectuals, workers, and farmers. This is an objective rule.” (People’s Daily, January 1, 1967.) 4.

Jin and Chen eds., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1362.

5. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 209.

6.

Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1470.

3

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

Lin Biao later relayed Mao’s speech in his 1969 Report to the 9th National People’s Congress: “We previously conducted struggle in the countryside, factories and cultural circles, and initiated a socialist education movement. However, this failed to resolve our problems, for we had not yet found a way to mobilize the masses to openly and comprehensively reveal those hiding in the shadows, from the leadership to the grassroots.” Subsequently, he stated that “we have now found the way — the Cultural Revolution.” Based on such subjective judgment, based on fantasy as much as reality, Mao decided to launch a comprehensive campaign whereby the grassroots would seize power from the leadership. As early as August 1966, Mao presided over enacting the “16 Articles” and establishing the aim of the Cultural Revolution as a seizure of power by proletarian revolutionaries.7 Shanghai, as the most working-class city in China, and with its population of 11 million, became the city where the campaign to seize power was launched, and hence where the political revolution in response to the call from Mao was staged. In January 1967, the “January Storm” was staged in Shanghai. With the support and planning of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, worker rebels overthrew the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC. The rebels were led by Wang Hongwen, commander of the Shanghai Worker Revolutionary Rebellion General Command, which had been set up in November 1966. Zhang had announced on November 14 that the Shanghai Worker Revolutionary Rebellion General Command was a legitimate revolutionary organization and compelled Cao Diqiu, Mayor of Shanghai, to recognize the organization by signing its decrees. The rebels proposed replacing the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC with people’s governmental organs, and openly challenged the political authority of local party organizations. Attempting to restore order, Chen Boda sent a telegram warning Wang Hongwen and the rebels they should return to their production posts. On January 8, Mao conversed with members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu,) affirming the “January Storm”: “This is a great revolution in which one class is toppling another class, and will drive the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in different provinces and cities.8 One class is the working class and the other is the bureaucratic class.” Mao planned to mobilize the working class to topple the bureaucratic class through the seizure of power. The People’s Daily openly published Mao’s instructions on January 19, and Mao also delivered a speech: “The Shanghai revolutionary forces 7.

“Resolutions Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” approved during

the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC , August 8, 1966.

8. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 185.

4

The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

have united to seize power. If they can hold power, there is hope for the country. If leaders are divorced from the masses, the masses will leave them. I do not believe the masses should always rely on the leaders.”9 Wang Li drafted the “Announcement to the People of Shanghai,” published in the People’s Daily and Wenhui Daily, and broadcast it across China. Mao characterized the “Announcement to the Shanghai People” as the “Declaration of the Shanghai Commune,” echoing his earlier characterization of the big-character poster put up by Ye Yuanzi as the “Declaration of the Beijing Commune” in June 1966,10 and launched a comprehensive campaign to seize power. On January 10, Jiang Qing submitted two Xinhua News bulletins titled “Revolutionary Rebels in Shanghai Attack the Bourgeois Reactionary Line”11 and “Urgent Notification Issued by the Shanghai Worker Revolutionary Rebellion General Command and Other Revolutionary Rebellion Organizations via the Wenhui Daily and Jiefang Daily” to Mao. Mao then immediately issued instructions to Chen Boda and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, affirming the right guidelines and line of the Shanghai rebel organizations and calling for the Party, governmental organs, army, and people to learn from the event in Shanghai and take revolutionary action.12 Without collective discussion by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau or the Central Politburo of the CPC, Mao officially called for the Party, governmental organs, army, and people to launch a comprehensive campaign to seize power. 9. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 779–780. 10. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 378. 11. The press release claimed: “There are four important signs of the healthy situation of the Great Cultural Revolution in the Shanghai area: First, the workers and farmers are starting the revolution. Overcoming various sources of resistance, they have

established their own revolutionary organizations, liberated themselves, and driven the revolution. Second, revolutionary rebels have emerged in municipal-level party

and governmental authorities. They have broken various existing frameworks, such as ‘different standards for those in positions of authority and others’, and have criticized the bourgeois reactionary line and struggled against a small number of capitalist

roaders. In doing this they have joined with workers and revolutionary students. Third, the revolutionary rebels have increased in numbers and developed mature

strategies. Fourth, the bourgeois reactionary line has collapsed, and the ugliness of the small number of capitalist roaders protected by the bourgeois reactionary line has been unveiled.”

12. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 187.

5

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

On January 16, Red Flag published the political commentary titled “Proletarian Revolutionaries Unite,” which was reviewed by Mao. It eulogized the campaign to seize power by rebel workers in Shanghai as a valuable example and experience for the Cultural Revolution, remarking that “This is a great pioneering project in the international communist movement.”13 The article is considered the first official document in which Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC called for comprehensive seizure of power.14 The same day, speaking at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Mao said: “The leftists have seized power and taken government affairs out of the hands of capitalists.” Mao subsequently made calls for the rebels to attack all those in power and seize power themselves. On January 22, the People’s Daily published the editorial titled “Proletarian 13. On January 16, 1967, Red Flag published the editorial “Proletarian Revolutionaries Must Work Together to Seize Power from the Capitalist Roaders,” writing: “The central task of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the struggle of the proletariat to

seize power from the small number of capitalist roaders. That is the highlight of the

class struggle in the current phase in China, and the core of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads. On June 1, 1966, our great leader Chairman Mao decided

to broadcast the first Marxist and Leninist big-character poster from Peking University throughout the country to support the proletarian revolutionaries at Peking University

and launch the struggle to seize power from the Lu Ping Anti-Party Group. This was a

great strategy that ignited the flame of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution throughout

the country. Now our great leader Chairman Mao has decided to broadcast A Letter to Citizens in Shanghai and the Emergency Notice, first published by revolutionary mass

organizations in Shanghai, to support the workers and other revolutionary masses in Shanghai, and help the revolutionary officials seize power from a small number of capitalist roaders within the Party, and from the feudalists who insist on the bourgeois

reactionary line. This is another excellent strategy for dealing with the new situation, and will help achieve a new leap forward in the nationwide Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The seizure of power is a great start to the comprehensive nationwide class

struggle, an important pioneering work of the international communist movement, an unprecedented event in human history, and a significant development in world

history and human destiny.” (Red Flag, issue 12, January 16, 1967; People’s Daily,

January 22, 1967.) This article was written by Wang Li and Guan Feng, Member of the

Central Cultural Revolution Group and Vice Editor in Chief of Red Flag, respectively, and was submitted by Chen Boda to Mao for review, who commented, “Well done!”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 193.)

14. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 799.

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The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

Revolutionaries Unite to Seize Power from Capitalist Roaders,” relaying Mao’s latest instructions. The editorial called for the masses to unite to seize power.15 This marked a significant shift from Mao’s previous strategy of simply mobilizing the masses (followed from June 1966 to December 1966) to one of mobilizing the masses to seize power (followed from January 1968 to September 1968). On January 27, Zhou Enlai relayed Mao’s instructions at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. With regard to power seizure, Mao instructed: “We should first seize the power of capitalist roaders and people who upheld the bourgeois reactionary line and sought to deny historical truth. We will lose the initiative unless we do this. After power has been seized, we should judge those removed from power and submit a list of those who should face investigation to the State Council for approval.” From his residence in Zhongnanhai, Mao called for a comprehensive nationwide seizure of power, but did not clarify particulars. Questions left unanswered included: Under what circumstances was it necessary to seize power? Who should seize power? What form should power seizure take? How could different forms of power seizure be distinguished? Although Mao successfully launched a campaign to seize power, he did not closely guide the campaign, and was unable to forecast its direction. At the end of 1967, he had to acknowledge his failure to predict certain things, including factional struggle in different organs and regions.16 On January 28, the Shanghai Worker Revolutionary Rebellion General Command together with another seventeen rebel groups issued a joint statement and called for the proletariat to seize power.17 This campaign was hailed as the 15. The editorial urged: “All the party, political, financial and other powers stolen by the counter-revolutionary revisionists and royalists who insist on the bourgeois reactionary

line must be seized back! In other words, we must seize the destiny of the proletarian dictatorship and the future of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and must secure the future of the socialist economy! The statements of the rebels in Shanghai

are reasonable. Seizure of power is the correct path of proletarian revolutionaries and real revolutionary leftists! This is not personal ambition. These rebels have seized

power for the proletariat, for communism, and so that Mao Zedong Thought can reign supreme! Hundreds of millions of the revolutionary masses are going into battle under

the Chairman’s new call for ‘proletarian revolutionaries to work together to seize

the power of capitalist roaders’. This signifies the end of a small number of capitalist roaders within the CPC, and minor feudalists who insist on the bourgeois reactionary line.” (People’s Daily, January 22, 1967.)

16. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1470. 17. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 208.

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“January Storm.” Mao supported the seizure of power by Shanghai worker rebels as part of a political gamble by which he sought to exert personal control by circumventing party organizations. Speaking to a foreign military delegation in May 1967, Mao said: “Our intellectuals and young students have bombarded the bourgeois reactionary line, and our workers, peasants, and soldiers have launched the January Storm to seize power and carry out revolution.”18 Lin’s 1969 Report to the 9th National People’s Congress stated: “In January 1967, the Shanghai working class with their revolutionary traditions, the revolutionary masses, and revolutionary cadres united to seize power from the capitalist roaders of the old Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC and the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress. Power thus was transferred from the old leadership to the grassroots.” Mao summarized the experience of the “January Storm” and called for proletarian revolutionaries to unite to seize power from a handful of Party capitalist roaders. In a dangerous political gamble, Mao relied on his personal charisma, control of the mass media, and the bypassing of party and governmental organs to encourage various unorganized, non-governmental, and illegitimate social forces to shatter the state apparatus, seize power and wage class struggle. Mao was absolutely determined to overcome all his political opponents, and was prepared to risk losing everything to achieve this. From January 28 to January 30, the Shanghai Red Guard Revolutionary Committee, the earliest revolutionary organization in Shanghai, conducted a comprehensive attack on Zhang Chunqiao. On January 29, the Central Cultural Revolution Group sent a special telegram to oppose this action.19 On February 1, Zhang declared: “When Chairman Mao remarked that the real proletarian revolutionary leftists accounted for just 10% or more of the total population, the Shanghai Red Guard Revolutionary Committee was a revolutionary organization, but it may no longer be one.” Subsequently, Zhang and Yao Wenyuan wantonly suppressed the masses and persecuted over 2,500 people.20 18. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1489–1490. 19. On January 29, 1967, the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued a “Special

Dispatch” that alleged: “Some leaders of the Red Guard revolutionary committee have made Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan targets of struggle. In doing this they have aimed at the Central Cultural Revolution Group instead of the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Chen Peixian, Cao Diqiu, and the capitalist roaders within the CPC. These actions are totally wrong.”

20. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 205–207.

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On January 30, Wang Li relayed Mao’s instructions on power seizure to China National Radio, as follows: “Congratulations to the revolutionary comrades from China National Radio on having successfully seized power. I heard that a faction split has occurred, and hereby ask our revolutionary comrades to unite and consider the interests of the whole. We must follow collectivism and be wary of the formation of cliques. Additionally, I advocate consolidating dissidents, and disapprove of those who refuse to cooperate with political dissidents.” This statement indicates Mao’s growing awareness of the complexity of the struggle to seize power, which inevitably spiralled into splits and factional struggles. Mao could not understand why the rebels responded to his call to seize power only to wage endless factional struggles rather than forming a revolutionary alliance. In fact, this behavior can be likened to dogs fighting over meat: as soon as they tasted power, the various rebel organizations battle and struggle, just like a pack of ferocious and hungry dogs fighting over meat. Factional struggle peaked in China at Mao’s instigation, and the anarchic behavior of the rebel organizations reflects the politics of the era. The same day, Mao commented on and modified the Red Flag editorial titled “Commentary on the Struggle of Proletarian Revolutionaries to Seize Power.” It read: “We must uphold Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon to curb our own erroneous tendencies, such as departmental selfishness, cliquism, decentralism, non-organizational views, excessive-democracy, liberalism, subjectivism and individualism. These erroneous tendencies hinder the alliance among factions in the great proletarian revolution advocated by Chairman Mao and reflect a bourgeois outlook and fierce class struggle within revolutionary organizations. It is wrong to doubt all those in power, and to unanimously oppose all, reject all, and bombard all. Such an indiscriminate approach contravenes the class thinking of Marxism and Leninism, as well as Mao Zedong Thought. We are now entering a crucial stage of the fight between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, including the party proxies of the latter. We are now unmasking a multitude of reactionary landlords, rich peasants, bourgeois rightists, evildoers, revisionists, and spies dispatched by the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. Many evil people of all kinds have misled the public and set up counter-revolutionary organizations to carry out counterrevolutionary activities. Examples include the “Chinese Worker and Peasant Red Flag Brigade,” the “Restoration Brigade,” the “Joint Action Committee” and other conservative organizations set up by revisionists. These are all actually reactionary organizations”21 These modifications show that Mao had changed his views 21. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 210–213.

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on the mass campaign to seize power, and now considered mass organizations reactionary, which marked a reversal of his earlier concern with the eight cliques (departmental selfishness, factionalism, decentralism, non-organizational views, excessive democracy, liberalism, subjectivism, and individualism). Once Mao had launched the comprehensive power seizure campaign and the central newspapers and magazines had strengthened related publicity, the campaign spread across the country like wildfire. Mao had no means to lead or control the situation. His only tool was to denounce specific organizations “reactionary” and rely on the proletarian dictatorship to bloodily suppress them, as was the case with the “May 16 Counter-revolutionary Conspiracy Group.” Mao’s shift toward identifying “reactionary” targets marked the transition from comprehensive power seizure to comprehensive power suppression from 1967 to 1968. Mao had encountered an insurmountable information problem. At this time, Mao reverted to party policies, instructing that: “We should treat cadres with faults properly instead of simply accusing and denouncing them. Those who refuse to correct their faults but also do not oppose the Party and socialism should be offered the opportunity to rectify their faults and atone by meritorious acts. Our party policy is to ‘learn from the past and offer those with faults a chance to reform.’”22 When implementing cadre policies, Mao encountered information asymmetry and failed to clearly define who the anti-party and anti-socialist counterrevolutionaries were, who could identify them, the basis for making such judgments, and the specific meaning of “obstinacy and refusal to rectify faults even after extensive education.” These ambiguities were one reason why Mao’s policy of allowing targets of political struggle to rectify their faults was not implemented and instead, party, government, and military cadres were heavily persecuted. On February 2, the Wenhui Daily published the editorial “We Dare to be the Proletariat in Power,” which stated: “We are revolutionary rebels. The nation and the world belong to us. Our mission is to seize and hold power.”23 The editorial reflected the desire of the rebels for power. Influenced by Mao, Jiang Qing, and the general social climate, Li Na (daughter of Mao and Jiang,) who was working as a reporter at the PLA Daily, wrested control of the publication from Chief Editor Hu Chi. Lin Biao immediately wrote a letter, on behalf of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, declaring, “I resolutely support your seizure of power.” 22. This editorial was written by Wang Li and Guan Feng and published in issue No. 3 of Red Flag, on February 3, 1967. It was republished by the People’s Daily, on January 31, 1967. (Ibid, 211.)

23. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 208.

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On February 5, the Shanghai People’s Commune was officially established. Zhang Chunqiao delivered a speech, saying: “Chairman Mao instructed us to comprehensively seize power, and so we must seize power from the handful of capitalist roaders in Shanghai who have usurped it! All power in Shanghai belongs to the Shanghai People’s Commune! The founding of the Shanghai People’s Commune Interim Committee signified the ultimate downfall of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie of the old Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC and the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress, and the successful seizure of power by the revolutionary people under the leadership of the Shanghai proletariat.” The same day, the Wenhui Daily published the editorial “Great Historic Revolution — Cheering the Establishment of the Shanghai People’s Commune” and claimed: “The founding of the Shanghai People’s Commune is of great significance. The revolutionary leftists united and carried on the struggle to seize power from the leadership for the grassroots. In a socialist country, the proletariat gained experience of seizing power from a handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists and prevented the restoration of capitalism. The founding of the Shanghai People’s Commune created a new organizational form comprising local governmental organs under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a new form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”24 The Shanghai People’s Commune emulated the Paris Commune, implemented the universal suffrage system stipulated in the 16-Article Document, and also embodied the spirit of Mao’s secret birthday speech. Zhang Chunqiao proactively sought innovations in the national revolutionary experience. However, Mao soon negated the novel experience of the Shanghai People’s Commune because of the need to adopt an appointment system when local authorities of the revolutionary masses (rebel organizations), cadres, and soldiers were set up, implying that he chose to abandon the Paris Commune pattern based on universal suffrage. Actually, the Central Committee of the CPC directly appointed Zhang, Yao, and Wang Hongwen as directors and deputy directors of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee. The state organs thus continued to serve as bureaucratic tools rather than as organs of mass democratic management,25 showing that the regime change merely involved a new bureaucratic class replacing the old one. On February 11, Zhou Enlai presided over the brief meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau during which Ye Jianying asked: “Shanghai launched the power seizure campaign, which saw the local authority renamed the 24. Ibid, 209. 25. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 308,.

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Shanghai People’s Commune. Part of the state system was renamed through this action, and I question whether it was rash to allow this to occur without discussion by the Central Politburo of the CPC.” On February 12, under pressure from the Central Politburo of the CPC, Mao was compelled to meet Zhang and Yao in Beijing. During this meeting Mao said: “I planned to set up the Beijing People’s Commune, to be named the Beijing Revolutionary Committee, after considering the complexity of reforming the state system.” Following Mao’s instructions, on February 19 the Central Committee of the CPC notified newly established local authorities that they were prohibited from naming themselves people’s communes.26 On February 20, Mao instructed Chen Boda and Wang Li to name newly established local authorities “revolutionary committees,” and to rename the Mao Zedong Thought Guizhou Revolutionary Committee.27 On February 24, the Shanghai People’s Commune was officially renamed the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.28 After Mao called for comprehensive power seizure, rebels actively responded, and seized power, waged violent struggle, and attacked party and governmental organs (Sidebar 4.1). Mao believed that class and class struggle existed in socialist society, and that capitalism could regain power and dismantle the socialist society. He said: “The bourgeoisie might penetrate our superstructures and authorities and become a handful of capitalist roaders.”29 It was later reported that almost all the departmental and local Party and governmental organs either experienced seizures of power or were restructured.30 However, while turmoil, killings, and universal 26. On February 19, 1967, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notice on the Promotion and Reporting of the Struggle to Seize Power. The notice contained the following provisions: “(1) What is the temporary authority leading the struggle to seize power

in each province, municipality, and autonomous region? Is the ‘combination of three forces’ (heads of revolutionary mass organizations, local representatives of the PLA, and representative revolutionary officials of the party and government authorities) truly being realized? Answers to these questions should be first reported to the

Central Committee of the CPC and released to the press only after approval. (2) The term ‘people’s commune’ shall not refer to the authorities of individual provinces,

municipalities, autonomous regions, and cities except with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPC.”

27. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 238.

28. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 237. 29. Chen Boda’s Speech at the Meeting of Army Corps Officers, March 9, 1967. 30. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

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social violence ensued, the Cultural Revolution ultimately failed to achieve the desired results.31 “Comprehensive power seizure” and “attacking everyone in power” destroyed the entire existing organizational system and created a situation that even Mao could not control. At the beginning of 1967, Tao Zhu, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, was accused and denounced, and the attack on Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping expanded into an attack on Tao. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau formed during the Eighth Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Party thus crumbled. At the democratic meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, held in December 1966, Tao was dismissed from his post.32 On December 26, Mao criticized Tao in his secret birthday speech.33 On January 3, 1967, Yao Wenyuan published the article titled “Remarks on the Two-faced Counter-revolutionary Zhou Yang,” which nominally criticized Zhou Yang but actually referred to Tao Zhu. The article asked: “Is it enough to unmask Zhou Yang in literature and art circles? No, this is insufficient to rectify the situation. Unmasking counter-revolutionaries is not equivalent to purging them, and does not root out their influence and incorrect line. The struggle should continue.” On January 4, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and eleven members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group met with the Bombarding Wang Renzhong Revolutionary Rebel Brigade. Without any discussion with the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Central Cultural Revolution Group announced that Tao Zhu, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, consultant of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, was a loyal follower of the Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping bourgeois reactionary line.34 The same evening, a big-character poster attacking “China’s Number One Loyalist” appeared in Beijing. Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 812.

31. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 311. 32. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 778. 33. Ibid, 697. 34. Chen Boda said: “Since joining the Central Committee, Tao Zhu has loyally followed

the line of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping instead of the proletarian revolutionary

line of Chairman Mao. He is closely involved in the promotion of the line of Liu and Deng. He passed the buck, but later further compounded his errors. He was advisor of

the Central Cultural Revolution Group, but failed to consult us about many relevant issues, and regularly took the law into his own hands. He fooled the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the Central Committee of the CPC.”

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Sidebar 4.1 1967)

“Comprehensive Power Seizure” (January 1967 to March

On January 3, 1967, rebels from the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC accused and denounced Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei for the first time. On January 4, the Xinghuoliaoyuan Revolutionary Rebellion General Command announced that they had taken over the offices of the Wenhui Daily. On January 6, Red Guards from Tsinghua University Jinggang Mountain Brigade tricked Wang Guangmei into leaving Zhongnanhai with a false story that her daughter had been injured in a traffic accident, and then publicly denounced her at Tsinghua University. Wang Guangmei was released only when Zhou Enlai intervened. The same day, rebels from military academies in Beijing and Red Guards from Tsinghua and other universities formed the Liaison Committee to Purge He Long and Other Anti-party Forces. The PLA Daily Newspaper Office Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Command published “Declaration to Readers” and announced that they had taken over the PLA Daily. In Shanghai, Wang Hongwen led rebel organizations to hold the Rally to Topple the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC, usurping party and governmental power in Shanghai and starting the “January Storm.” Subsequently, Party and governmental organs in regions such as Shanxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang and Shandong were taken over by rebels and revolutionary committees of soldiers, cadres, and the masses were set up. From January 7 to January 8, four to five thousand students laid siege to Zhongnanhai demanding the denunciation of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, and other central leaders including Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, and Li Xiannian. In early- and mid- January, rebels illegally searched the house of Chen Yun, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. On January 9, Red Guards illegally searched the house of Marshal He Long, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and demanded his denunciation. On January 10, rebels from the Daqing Oil Field arrived in Beijing. The same day, rebels from Renmin University set up the Liaison Office for Bombarding Zhu De with the instigation of Qi Benyu. On January 12, rebels from Zhongnanhai acting on the instructions of Jiang Qing broke into the residences of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu to denounce them. The same day, Liu Geping (former Shanxi Provincial leader) issued “Order Number One” announcing that the Shanxi Revolutionary Rebellion

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Command, not the Shanxi Provincial Committee, now controlled the Cultural Revolution in Shanxi. On January 25, the People’s Daily published an editorial affirming this power seizure. From January 12 to January 13, rebels attacked PLA organizations. Some local party committees, seeking military protection, submitted materials on the suppression of the revolutionary masses to military organs, and suggested that suppression was necessary to ensure the safety of party and state secrets, as well as normal transmission of telegrams within the Party. These local party committees even claimed that the masses had been encouraged to attack military organizations. On January 15, the archives of the United Front Work of the CPC Central Committee were robbed. On January 16, Mao Zedong attended the brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC and said it was proper for leftists to seize power and take over party and state organs. On January 21, the PLA Military Region Party Committee reported to the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Military Commission of the CPC: “The Capital No.3 Rebellion General Command Anhui Liaison Office and other units have submitted to the Anhui Military Region a proposal to hold a rally attended by 150,000 to 200,000 people in Hefei on January 22 and January 23, and have requested the Anhui Military Region dispatch 300 to 500 soldiers to guard the venue.” On January 23, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group jointly issued the “Decision on the PLA’s Resolute Support for the Leftist Masses,” which included Article 2, “To Resolutely support the leftist masses in seizing power and order the army to respond to requests for support from genuine leftists,” and Article 3, “To resolutely suppress counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary organizations opposing revolutionary leftists, and respond to violence with military force.” On January 25, Li Zaihan (Deputy Political Commissar of Guizhou Provincial Military Region) organized the Guizhou Provincial Proletarian Revolutionary Rebellion General Command to issue the notification and announce that they had taken over the Guizhou Provincial Committee of the CPC, the Guizhou People’s Government, the Guiyang Municipal Committee of the COC, and the Guiyang People’s Government. On February 1, the People’s Daily published the editorial “All Power Belongs to Proletarian Revolutionary Rebels” and supported and affirmed this seizure of power.

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On January 26, violent struggle, firefights, and bloodshed occurred in Shihezi, Xinjiang, killing 24 people and injuring 74. On January 27, rebels led by Wang Xiaoyu seized power from the Shandong Provincial Committee of the CPC and the Shandong People’s Government. On February 3, the People’s Daily published an editorial to affirm and support their actions. On January 28, rebels attacked military readiness and secrecy systems. On January 31, Pan Fusheng, First Secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee of the CPC announced the establishment of a provisional authority with absolute power, the Red Rebel Revolutionary Committee. On February 2, the People’s Daily published an editorial affirming the power seizure. In January, numerous local party and governmental leaders died of unnatural causes, including Yan Hongyan, the First Secretary of the Central Yunnan Provincial Committee of the CPC and First Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region (January 8,) Tao Yong, Commander of the East China Fleet (January 21,) Zhang Linzhi, Minister of Coal Industry and Secretary of the Party Leading Group (January 22,) and Wei Heng, First Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the CPC and Governor of Shanxi (January 29.) In January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Office to seize power. Zhou Enlai dispatched Chen Yi to announce that rebels were entitled to seize power by leading mass movements, but were not to handle foreign affairs. In January and February, rebels handled conflicts among the people by resorting to illegal arrests, illegal house searches, detaining people in their houses, corporal punishment, and physical and mental tortures such the forced wearing of conical dunce’s hats or hanging boards bearing slogans, being paraded through the streets, and being forced to kneel in public. On February 5, the Shanghai People’s Commune was officially founded. On February 9, armed conflicts occurred in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, and the PLA arrested conservative, rightist, and counter-revolutionary leaders. On February 23, shooting and bloodshed occurred in Xining, Qinghai, causing 377 casualties. The casualties included 169 civilians and four soldiers killed, and 178 civilians and 26 soldiers injured. On March 19, traffic congestion occurred along the railway line under the jurisdiction of Qiqihar Railway Bureau, resulting in numerous urgent applications to transport materials and supplies. Over 200 wagons of cargo were unloaded in a timely manner, but the accident rate rocketed. By March 15, there had been a total of 326 accidents, an increase of 50% from the same period in 1966.

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Sources: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12;

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle

of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 50–115; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–

1976), vol. 4, 1852–1894, 1910; Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic

of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”; Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 2, 187.

In early January, numerous Red Guards and rebels laid siege to Zhongnanhai seeking to denounce Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, four deputy premiers of the State Council (Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, and Tan Zhenlin), and Yu Qiuli. Early on the morning of January 5, Zhou Enlai told university students: “I must ask for instructions on the Tao Zhu case, which should be discussed by the Central Committee of the CPC.” On January 7, he met with the representatives from the Bombarding Tao Zhu Liaison Office, and said: “Comrade Tao Zhu is undertaking self-criticism and unable to meet with you. Since he is a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, he should undertake self-criticism among other members of the Standing Committee. It would be improper for you hold a rally to denounce Tao Zhu without this first being discussed by the Standing Committee.”35 The Red Guards were attacking Tao Zhu without the authorization of the Central Committee of the CPC; nevertheless, Zhou Enlai had no way of defending him. On January 8, Mao called an emergency meeting, and said: “The Cultural Revolution has revealed Tao Zhu as a faithful loyalist who committed a serious mistake by upholding the bourgeois reactionary line and suppressing the masses.” Mao thus ended Tao Zhu’s political life and gave him no opportunity to defend himself. After Mao delivered the speech, Chen and Jiang denounced Tao as a “faithful follower of the bourgeois reactionary line, and China’s No.1 Loyalist.” Jiang framed Tao as a traitor using false evidence, and deceived Mao into approving her accusations. Tao, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, was later persecuted to death.36 After Tao was purged, Wang Renzhong, the former first secretary of the Central South Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Deputy Leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, was similarly purged.37 On February 10, Mao decided to restructure the central departments into groups. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC was restructured into the 35. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1718–1719. 36. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 227. 37. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 79.

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Propaganda Group. Wang Li took over Tao Zhu as group leader and presided over work on ideology, publicity, culture, and education.38 Mao expressed criticism at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, as follows: “Chen Boda, you are a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and yet have purged another member of the Standing Committee. Jiang Qing, you have ambition but lack capability. You and Chen Boda purged Tao Zhu.” In fact, it was Mao who purged Tao, since only he had sufficient prestige and influence within the Party to do so. On September 8, Yao Wenyuan published the article “Commentary on Two Books by Tao Zhu” in the People’s Daily,39 which openly denounced Tao Zhu and ended his political career. On January 11, Lin Biao presided over the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, Chen Yun, and He Long (Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC) were disqualified from attending.40 The Standing Committee was then restructured and reduced from eleven to seven members. Mao thus purged a second group from the Central Committee of the CPC (mainly members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Politburo) during the Cultural Revolution. Later, while resisting the “February Counter-current Forces,” Mao would purge a third group from the Central Committee of the CPC, including Tan Zhenlin and another six members of the Central Politburo. The “Congratulatory Telegram to the Shanghai Revolutionary Rebel Faction from the Central Committee of the CPC, State Council, Central Military Commission of the CPC, and Central Cultural Revolution Group” was passed at the meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee,41 but Mao deliberately added the 38. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 778–779. 39. The two books referred to were Tao Zhu’s Ideals, Sentiments, and Spiritual Life, published by China Youth Publishing House in 1962, and Ideals, Emotions, and Talent, published by Guangdong People’s Press in 1964. The original title of Yao Wenyuan’s article was “The

Ugly Soul of Revisionists — Comments on the Reactionary Nature of Ideals, Sentiments,

and Spiritual Life and Ideals, Emotions, and Talent,” but this was changed at the suggestion

of Mao. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12.)

40. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1936.

41. On January 11, 1967, acting on the instructions of Mao, Lin Biao chaired the meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC. The meeting approved the “Congratulatory

Telegram to Shanghai’s Revolutionary Rebel Groups from the Central Committee of

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phrase “in the name of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.” Wang Li proposed ranking the Central Cultural Revolution Group alongside the Central Committee of the CPC, a proposal which Mao supported.42 Mao’s real objective was to allow the Central Cultural Revolution Group to succeed the Central Committee of the CPC. The Central Committee of the CPC and other parts of the collective leadership did not put up any opposition and thus allowed Mao to dominate the Central Committee and transform it into his rubber stamp. By making the Central Cultural Revolution Group (even its brief meeting) rank more important than party and state authorities such as the Central Committee of the CPC, State Council, National People’s Congress, Central Military Commission of the CPC, procuratorate, and court, Mao had transformed the centralization of power into his own personal power. Most ministries and departments were taken over by rebels. Mao remarked: “The takeover of old centers of authority is inevitable. Our government was run by a minority of cadres appointed by their superiors, and the majority of personnel in positions of authority had been retained from prior to liberation. The government was not formed by workers and peasants through revolution, and thus it easily followed the path of Feudalism and Revisionism.”43 Mao clearly opposed the people’s governments at all levels. the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural

Revolution Group.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,

vol. 12, 188–189.) The “Congratulatory Telegram” stated: “The 32 revolutionary mass

organizations including the Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebellion Command

issued an ‘Emergency Notice.’ That is right. The guideline you introduced and the actions you took are completely correct. You took joint action organized by proletariat

revolutionaries to unify all revolutionary forces and control the destiny of the

proletarian dictatorship, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the socialist

economy. Your revolutionary actions are a model for workers and laborers across the country, and for all the revolutionary masses. We call on all circles, including the

Party, government, army, and masses, throughout the country, as well as the workers, farmers, revolutionary students, intellectuals, and officials in China, to learn from the experience of the Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels and take joint action to fend off the

resurgence of the bourgeois reactionary line, so that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution can advance along the proletarian revolutionary line represented by the Chairman.” (People’s Daily, January 12, 1967.) 42. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 794–795. 43. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 387.

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Mao enacted the Six Rules for Public Security (the full name was the Provisions for Strengthening Public Security Work in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) in place of the national laws and constitution. On January 13, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council jointly issued the Six Rules for Public Security and requested that counter-revolutionaries be brought to justice, stipulating that justice was needed for people who accused and denounced Mao and Lin, and that establishment of counter-revolutionary organizations and reactionary discourse were strictly prohibited.44 Meanwhile, violent struggle and mass movements were 44. On January 13, 1967, the Central Politburo of the CPC held a meeting and officially

approved Provisions for Strengthening Public Security Work in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (The Six Rules for Public Security.) The six items were: (1) Where evidence exists

of their involvement in murder, arson, poisoning, robbery, killing with a motor vehicle,

arbitrary imprisonment, illicit relations with a foreign country, stealing of national secrets, and other criminal activities that damage society, active counter-revolutionaries shall be punished according to the law. (2) The distribution of counter-revolutionary

anonymous letters, covert or public posting of counter-revolutionary leaflets, writing

or shouting of reactionary slogans, and attacks on the great leader Chairman Mao and

his comrade-in-arms Lin Biao, are all active counter-revolutionary behaviors that shall

be punished according to the law. (3) To protect the revolution and revolutionary mass

organizations, protect leftists, and prohibit armed struggle, it shall be illegal to attack revolutionary mass organizations, and to beat and intern the revolutionary masses.

Such behaviors shall generally be punished through criticism and education under the leadership of the party and the revolutionary mass organizations. However, the

biggest criminals, such as those who have killed the masses, hatchet men, and their puppet masters, shall be punished according to the law. (4) For certain groups, namely landowners, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, bad sorts, rightists, those in labor re-

education, those released from jail to perform farm work, key members of reactionary parties or groups, mid- and lower-level leaders and professionals from reactionary

cults, military officers (at company commander level or above), political appointees (at area chief level or above), police (at sergeant level or above), military police or intelligence agents, persons who have failed to reform after release from jail or labor

re-education, speculators, family members of those who have been executed, detained, or controlled, and escaped counter-revolutionaries who are themselves reactionary in

nature, members of these groups must not take joint action in other cities, change their names, fake their history, join revolutionary mass organizations, agitate behind the

masses, or establish their own organizations. If any persons from these groups should

engage in such damaging behaviors they shall be strictly punished according to the law. (5) The revolutionary masses shall struggle against those who spread reactionary

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strongly encouraged.45 These provisions directly contravened Articles 89 and 90 of the Constitution.46 Thereafter, the Six Rules for Public Security provided an important legal basis for exercising proletarian dictatorship over cadres and citizens, and the documentary basis for fabricating numerous unjust and false cases. On July 26, the Editorial Office of the People’s Daily published an article titled “Shooting Yourself in the Foot” and noted: “We should swear to defend Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Biao, the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and attack all who revolt against them!”47 In the Cultural Revolution, most alleged counter-revolutionaries were judged using such standards. Later, investigation by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate found that over 100,000 people had been arrested and sentenced on the charge of denouncing Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, 240,000 faced unjust, false and misjudged cases, and over a million had been implicated in other political cases.48 Mao called for the rebels to destroy local party and government bureaucracy and substitute revolutionary committees for local people’s congresses and governments through unconstitutional power seizure.49 Ironically, the Organic Law of Local People’s Congresses and People’s Committees at all Levels, which Mao’s overturned through his unconstitutional actions, was the first law he had personally enacted, on September 28, 1954. The law had been passed during the First Session of the 1st National People’s Congress on September 24, 1954. The Cultural Revolution movement saw a change in Mao’s leadership role. He went from the designer propaganda using great democracy or other means. In serious cases, the public security authorities shall work with the revolutionary masses as necessary to ensure prompt

investigation and punishment. (6) Party, government and military organs and public security organs that distort the above rules, invent facts, or suppress the revolutionary masses shall be investigated and punished according to the law.

45. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 91–92. 46. According to Article 89 of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the

residence of a citizen of the PRC is inviolable and a citizen cannot be detained except with a decision by the People’s Court or the approval of the People’s Procuratorate.

Article 90 protects the confidentiality of communications between citizens. (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Manuscripts since the Founding of New China, vol. 5, 540.) 47. People’s Daily, July 26, 1967. 48. People’s Daily, January 27, 1981. 49. Part IV of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, “Local People’s Congresses and People’s Committees At All Levels,” including fourteen articles from Article 53 to Article 66.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

and executor of the national legal system to a rebel who destroyed it. Without convening the National People’s Congress, Mao negated the legal local people’s congresses and governments with his supreme directives and called for rebels to seize power across China. Eventually, this flouting of the law would doom the Cultural Revolution despite Mao’s prestige. In the Cultural Revolution, Mao called for destroying the “Four Olds” and establishing the “Four News.”50 However, while the first step was easily achieved, achieving the second was much more difficult. It took 20 months to establish provincial revolutionary committees in different regions (see Table 4.1), timed from Mao’s announcement regarding the “January Storm” (May 1967) to Zhou Enlai’s announcement regarding “Red China” (September 1968). Six provincial revolutionary committees were established in the first half of 1967, three in the second half of 1967, fifteen in the first half of 1968, and five in the third quarter of 1968. On March 16, Mao proposed issuing a notification that power should only be seized after consultation with the Central Committee of the CPC. This was a response to the problem of people with bad motives being eager to seize power.51 Later in May, Mao told foreign guests: “The Cultural Revolution, comprehensive power seizure and great revolutionary alliances have not achieved the desired effects, and different factions and political forces have acted selfishly. This is an unanticipated natural law of class struggle. Red Guards and other intellectuals have become enslaved by their own seizure of power, have become opportunistic, and lack the necessary resolve.”52 On May 27, he noted in a report: “Serious conflicts exist between different revolutionary factions, and we can resolve them through painstaking ideological and political work.”53 The establishment of provincial revolutionary committees involved reshuffling after comprehensive power seizure. Mao repeatedly told Wang Li: “We should ensure that the first provincial secretaries comprise the majority of members of the Central Committee of the CPC.”54 Unexpectedly, only 15 people (Wei Guoqing was counted twice because he held the concurrent posts of party secretary and chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) who prior to the Cultural Revolution had been party and government leaders at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region levels (i.e. provincial party secretaries or first secretaries, 50. “Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (the “16 Points,”) People’s Daily, August 9, 1966.

51. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1486. 52. Ibid, 1489–1490. 53. Ibid, 1488. 54. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 2, 814.

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governors, mayors, and chairmen of autonomous regions), served as leaders of the revolutionary committees. Thus only 25.9% of the leaders of the revolutionary committees had previous leadership experience at the equivalent seniority level, and the comprehensive nationwide seizure of power significantly changed the personnel structure in government. By September 1968, three quarters of the leadership positions had been occupied by people without previous government experience. Since November 1967, 20 local party and government leaders (47.1% of the total) had been denounced as “Chinese Khrushchevs,” “Regional Proxies of Liu Shaoqi,” and local capitalist roaders (see Table 4.1). The struggle to seize power proved politically costly. In January 1967 when the movement peaked, several party, government, and military leaders committed suicide, including Yan Hongyan (First Secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the CPC and First Political Commissar of the Kunming Military Region) on January 8, Tao Yong (Commander of the East China Fleet) on January 22, Zhang Linzhi (Minister of the Coal Industry and Secretary of the Party leading Group) on January 22, and Wei Heng (First Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the CPC and Governor) on January 29. These twenty months of the Cultural Revolution are now believed to have been the most chaotic, complex, and tough period ever faced by the CCP, the PLA, and China.55 Mao later commented to Edgar Snow: “China entered absolute civil unrest and turmoil, and we unmasked class enemies.”56 Mao’s aim in staging the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the restoration of capitalism in China at all costs, even when it meant destroying the state apparatus. He made “class enemies” the scapegoats of national turmoil, and he would keep “finding” such “class enemies.” In the face of weak state administration and political turmoil, factionalism within party and government organs at all levels, disunity among the masses, and fighting among rebel factions, Mao was forced to rely on the PLA, which remained disciplined and obedient, and he ordered the PLA to intervene in the Cultural Revolution. This was the second time New China was placed under martial law. On January 10, Jiang Qing instructed Guan Feng and Wang Li to draft the “Proposed Guidelines on Publicity” for the PLA Daily, which proposed specific guiding principles and measures for unmasking capitalist roaders. With the approval of Lin Biao, the PLA Daily published this document as an editorial and called for attacking a small number of capitalist roaders and followers of the bourgeois reactionary line within the army. 55. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 121. 56. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 163.

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Table 4.1 Leaders of the Revolutionary Committees of Provinces, Municipalities, and Autonomous Regions (From January 1967 to September 1968) Region

Founding of the Revolutionary Committee

Leaders of the Revolutionary Main Targets of Public Committee

Heilongjiang

January 31, 1967

Pan Fusheng** and Wang

Shandong

February 3, 1967

Wang Xiaoyu, Yang Dezhi,

Shanghai

February 5, 1967

Zhang Chunqiao, Yao

Criticism

Jiadao*

and Han Jinhai

Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen

Guizhou

February 14, 1967

Li Zaihan,* Zhang Ming, Li

Shanxi

March 8, 1967

Liu Geping, Zhang Riqing,*

Beijing

April 20, 1967

Xie Fuzhi, Wu De,** Zheng

Beijing Municipal

Nie Yuanzi

CPC (before and after

Li **

and Chen Yonggui

Weishan,* Fu Chongbi,* and Committee of the restructuring)

Qinghai

August 12, 1967

Liu Xianquan,* Zhang

Inner

November 1, 1967

Teng Haiqing,* Wu Tao, and Ulanf,** Wang Yilun,

Tianjin

December 6, 1967

Xie Xuegong,** Xiao Siming, Wan Xiaotang** and

Jiangxi

January 5, 1968

Cheng Shiqing,* Yang

Gansu

January 24, 1968

Xian Henghuan,* Zhang

Wang Feng**

Henan

January 27, 1968

Liu Jianxun,** Wang Xin, Ji

Wen Minsheng**and

Mongolia

24

Jianglin, and Daluo Gao Jinming

and Zheng Sansheng

and Wang Feng Zhang Huaisan

Dongliang, and Wan Lilang Zhong, and Hu Jizong

Dengkui, and Gen Qichang

Zhao Wenfu

The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

(Cont’d) Region

Founding of the Revolutionary Committee

Hebei

February 3, 1968

Leaders of the Revolutionary Main Targets of Public Committee

Criticism

Li Xuefeng,** Liu Zihou,**

Lin Tie**

Ma Hui,* and Geng Changsuo

Hubei

February 5, 1968

Zeng Siyu,* Liu Feng,* and

Wang Renzhong**

Guangdong

February 21, 1968

Huang Rongsheng,* Kong

Tao Zhu** and Zhao

Jilin

March 6, 1968

Wang Huaixiang,* Ruan

Zhao Lin**

Jiangsu

March 23, 1968

Xu Shiyou,* Wu Dasheng,

Jiang Weiqing** and

Zhang Tixue**

Shiquan, and Chen Yu**

Bosheng, and Zheng Jiqiao Yang Guangli, and Peng Chong

Zhejiang

March 24, 1968

Nan Ping,* Chen Liyun,*

Xiong Yingtang,* and Lai

Ziyang*

Chen Guang Jiang Hua**

Keke Hunan

April 8, 1968

Li Yuan,* Long Shujin,* Hua Wang Yanchun**

Ningxia

April 10, 1968

Kang Jianmin, Zhang Huaili, Yang Jingren** and Ma and Xu Hongxue

Yuhai

Anhui

April 18, 1968

Li Desheng,* Liao

Li Baohua** and

Guofeng, and Zhang Bosen

Chengmei, and Song Peizhang

Huang Yan**

Shaanxi

May 1, 1968

Li Ruishan,** Huang

Liu Lantao,** Zhao

Liaoning

May 10, 1968

Chen Xilian,* Li Boqiu,

Ma Mingfang,** Gu

and Yu Fengying

Zhou Huan

Sichuan

May 31, 1968

Jingyao, and Hu Wei* Wang Liang, Mao Yuanxin,

Shouyi, and Li Qiming Zhouxin, Yu Ping, and

Zhang Guohua,** Liang

Liao Zhigao,** Ren

Zhang Xiting

Xinting*

Xingchu,* Liu Jieting, and

Baige, and Huang

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

(Cont’d) Region

Founding of the Revolutionary Committee

Yunnan

August 13, 1968

Leaders of the Revolutionary Main Targets of Public Committee

Criticism

Tan Furen,* Zhou Xing,**

Yan Hongyan** and

Chen Kang, and Duan Siying

Kang Jianmin

Fujian

August 19, 1968

Han Xianchu,* Pi Dingzhun, Ye Fei,** Fan Shiren, and Lan Rongyu

and Hou Zhenya

Guangxi

August 26, 1968

Wei Huoqing,** Ou Zhifu,

Wang Renzhong,

and An Pingsheng

He Ximing, and Xie Wanggang

Tibet

September 5, 1968

Zen Rongya,* Ren Zhong,

Xinjiang

September 5, 1968

You Shujin* and Sai Fuding** Xi Zhongxun, Liu

and Basang

Zhou Renshan and Wang Qimei

Lantao, Wu Guang, Lü Jianren, Zhang

Zhonghan, Yiming

Nuofu, and Bao Erhan Note: *Local military leaders, excluding political commissars of military regions; **Former party and government leaders at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region levels before the Cultural Revolution.

Sources: Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 167–169; Chen and Du eds.,

Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 143; Qiu ed., Records of the People’s Republic of China: Literature and Research, vol. 5, 276–279.

On January 11, Lin Biao presided over the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which endorsed a motion proposed by Mao to place the Cultural Revolution Group of the PLA under the Central Military Commission of the CPC. Xu Xiangqian served as leader of the restructured PLA Cultural Revolution Group, Jiang Qing served as consultant, and Xiao Hua, Yang Chengwu, Wang Xinting, Xu Liqing, Guan Feng, Xie Tangzhong, and Li Mancun all served as deputy leaders (Xie Fuzhi was appointed as another deputy leader on March 30), while Ye Qun, Wang Hongkun and other leaders served as members. The new PLA Cultural Revolution Group was thus directly controlled by the Central Cultural Revolution Group rather than by the General Political Department of the PLA.

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The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

Liu Zhijian was removed as deputy director of the General Political Department of the PLA and leader of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group and Guan Feng was appointed deputy director of the General Political Department of the PLA. The military regions, general commands, and army and service organs in cities such as Beijing, Shenyang, Kunming, Fuzhou, Nanjing, Lanzhou, Chengdu, and Xinjiang were attacked and their commanders denounced. An emergency report on these events was presented to Ye Jianying. With the approval of Mao, the Central Military Commission of the CPC convened an enlarged meeting at Beijing’s Jingxi Hotel in late January, and Lin entrusted Ye to preside over the meeting and report to him daily. A total of 17 documents were discussed and enacted at the meeting,57 all intended to stabilize the situation and the army.58 Ye Jianying delivered a speech at the enlarged meeting, saying: “They called for turmoil, negated and overthrew our Party, government and army in the name of proletarian power seizure, and accused and denounced our cadres at all levels as capitalist roaders, members of sinister gangs, reactionaries, and so on in an attempt 57. The Central Military Commission Meeting also approved other documents: Several Provisions of the Central Military Commission Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution among Military Leaders at the Corps Level and Above, Supplementary Provisions Concerning

the Great Cultural Revolution among Military Leaders at the Corps Level and Above,

Provisions Concerning the Scope of Powers to be Seized in the Army, Notice Concerning Timely Return to their Work Units for Employees Taking Leave to Participate in Joint Actions, Notice

Concerning Reaffirmation of the Effective Implementation of the Decisions of the Military Commission on February 8, Notice Concerning the Prohibition of Joint Action for Factories, Mines, Research and Design Institutions, and Capital Construction Institutions under the National Defense Industry System, Notice Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution for

Capital Construction Engineers, Notice for Armed Forest Police on the Cultural Revolution, and the Notice on the Cultural Revolution for Military Research Institutions and Secret Factories. Wu Faxian believed that these documents expressly reflected that Lin Biao

was primarily concerned with stabilizing the army and minimizing the effect of the

Cultural Revolution on the army. Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and other leaders agreed with Lin Biao. (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 647–648.)

58. According to Wu Faxian, the Central Military Commission Meeting aimed to protect the persons in charge of military units in Beijing. The leaders of the Central Military

Commission obtained Lin Biao’s approval for this plan. Lin Biao also stipulated that

nobody could return to their own entities without the approval of Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and himself. The meeting also provided an opportunity to let attendees

discuss how to carry out the Great Cultural Revolution in the army, and identify measures to stabilize the army and reduce its losses as a result of the movement. (Ibid.)

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

to purge them. They did all of this claiming that they were following the proletarian revolutionary line led by Chairman Mao. It is improper to claim those committing these actions uphold Mao Zedong Thought and follow the correct line.”59 Ye Jianying spoke at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, presided over by Zhou Enlai, and said: “The greater the turmoil of local governments, the greater the importance of the army maintaining stability. Otherwise, our enemies will catch us off guard. As the saying goes, domestic troubles lead to foreign invasion. Therefore, we should stabilize the army in the interests of the Party and the country. Specifically, seven out of thirteen military regions, as well as 157 military academies, have been waging campaigns and arresting followers of the reactionary line according to the revolutionary objectives of the leaders of various military regions. This activity has paralyzed the three general offices of the PLA (the General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department and General Logistics Department), as well as the navy, and the air force.”60 On January 13, Mao made a decision and ordered the PLA to “provide three supports and perform two military actions,” namely to support leftists, workers, and peasants, and perform military control and drills.61 59. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 341. 60. Ibid. 61. On January 13, 1967, the Central Military Commission issued the Decision Concerning

the Urgent Implementation of Military Support for Leftists, Farmers and Workers, as well as Military Control and Training and ordered the army to intervene in the Great Cultural

Revolution at the local level and comprehensively “support leftists, farmers, workers, and enforce military control and military training.” On January 21, Mao issued an instruction on the decision, saying: “The army should support the leftist masses, and should respond to requests for assistance from real revolutionaries. Non-intervention is

not possible. The army has intervened already.” On January 23, the Central Committee of the CPC, State Council, Central Military Commission, and Central Cultural Revolution Group jointly released the Decisions on the Support of the Revolutionary Leftist Masses in

the PLA. On March 13, in the Meeting of Army Officers at the Corps Level, Zhou Enlai called for military control over national defense, enterprises, public institutions, the

national treasury, border control, important coastal transportation hubs, governmental authorities, and key units like post offices, broadcasting stations, press offices, banks,

warehouses, and jails. On March 16, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated the bulletin of the Beijing Garrison Area about military control in factories. Some important and central authorities in Beijing also established military control commissions and designated local representatives. Military control was enacted or planned in ten

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The Cultural Revolution Causes Civil Unrest Across China

With Mao’s approval, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notification Forbidding Attacks on the Army on January 14. This notification stressed that the PLA was the most important tool for protecting the dictatorship of the proletariat, and was also tasked with preparing for war and defending the nation and the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, all attacks on PLA organs were to be prohibited. As PLA leader, Lin Biao adhered to two principles with regard to army involvement in the Cultural Revolution: 1. To ensure the stability of the army; 2. To forbid the army from intervening in the Cultural Revolution at the local level. He Long had previously proposed that the army be prohibited from intervening in the Cultural Revolution at the local level, and Mao was satisfied with the proposal.62 On January 21, Mao issued instructions on the Report on Whether the Nanjing Military Region should Support the Rebels: “Comrade Lin Biao, the PLA should support the leftist masses by responding to requests from real revolutionaries. Non-intervention is inappropriate, and the PLA have previously intervened in the Cultural Revolution at the local level. Reissue orders and revoke old orders in this regard as appropriate. Please handle this matter at your discretion.” Lin responded immediately.63 On January 18, Ye Jianying presided over the drafting of the Decision on the Participation of Military Regions in the Cultural Revolution and stressed the importance of the army maintaining stability. Specifically, the Decision ordered military regions and organs to carry out the Cultural Revolution at different times from local governments. Additionally, seven military regions, namely the Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Xinjiang, and Kunming military regions were ordered to postpone and suspend the Cultural Revolution.64 On January 19, the Central Military Commission of the CPC convened an enlarged meeting and argued about whether the army should engage in the four activities of the Cultural Revolution (free expression, free assembly, the holding of provinces and autonomous regions, including Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet,

Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. (Zheng and Zhang, China

in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 93–96.)

By the second half of 1967, military control was enacted in most provinces,

municipalities and autonomous regions, the Central Government, all ministries and

commissions under the State Council, certain important railway stations and sections, large industrial and mining enterprises, ports and docks, hospitals, banks, and other

relevant institutions throughout the country. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1497.)

62. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 649. 63. Ibid. 64. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 342.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

great debates, and big-character posters). There were two opposing views. Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and their allies ordered the army to support the revolutionary masses in the four activities and carry out the Cultural Revolution. Ye Jianying and other military leaders disapproved of the army performing the four activities and insisted on maintaining army stability. Ye argued: “Failure to maintain stability will leave the army incapable of resisting an enemy invasion. If the army performs the four activities there will be anarchy. Individuals will defy organizations and subordinates will defy superiors. Such a situation will make it difficult for us to follow the guidelines of the Party, fight a war, and fulfill the task of defending socialism and our motherland. Without strict discipline, military orders will be disobeyed and the army itself will be seriously crippled.”65 On January 22, Mao met participants at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. During the audience, Ye Jianying briefed attendees on his views, and other military leaders also reported the situation of attacking the army and accusing and denouncing military leaders. Mao expressed, “The army should concentrate on its combat readiness, maintaining stability, and preserving unity instead of causing further splits.”66 On January 23, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group jointly issued the Decision on the PLA Resolutely Supporting the Revolutionary Leftist Masses, which instructed the PLA to support power seizure by the proletarian revolutionary leftist masses. In cases where real proletarian leftists solicited support from the army, the army should send in troops to support them. On February 3, the Red Flag published the editorial titled “Commentary on the Seizure of Power by Proletarian Revolutionaries,” which was drafted by Guan Feng and Wang Li and reviewed by Chen Boda, and relayed Mao’s directive that “the PLA should resolutely support and assist real proletarian revolutionaries and revolt against rightists.”67 Mao painted a simple picture in his conjectures about leftists and rightists. However, the reality was that several rebel factions existed in each region, and even Mao was unable to differentiate the leftists and rightists. The army faced the same problem. Who were the real proletarian leftists, and who was authorized to identify them? If multiple leftist rebel factions existed, which one should the army support? How could the army rectify its faults if it used incorrect methods to support leftists? Failure to solve these problems, which were problems of 65. Ibid, 343. 66. Ibid, 344. 67. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 213.

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information, would result in turmoil and civil unrest. Lin Biao was such a case. On the same day, Lin Biao attended the brief enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and said: “Leftists should seize power from rightists at all levels.” However, other marshals urged Lin to abandon this extreme radicalism in favor of a conservative position of defending the army after the power seizure campaign undermined army stability and destroyed military organs. According to Mao’s instructions, Ye Jianying presided over the brief meeting of the Central Military Committee and the participants reached a consensus on maintaining the stability of the army at any cost. Ye proposed that the army itself should issue orders to maintain its own stability, and Nie Rongzhen called for restrictions on army conduct, including a ban on its involvement in the ongoing political turmoil. The committee finally decided to report to Lin on the crisis in the army in an attempt to issue related orders as soon as possible.68 On January 24, Xu Xiangqian reported to Lin Biao on certain military organs that were plunged into paralysis or semi-paralysis, and on numerous senior military cadres arrested, subjected to illegal house searches or torture, and even driven to suicide. On January 25, Xu wrote to Lin: “Although the army must resolutely support real leftists and carry on internal class struggle at the local level, I worry that we may fail to control the army and thus suffer serious side effects.69 The same day, Lin urgently met with Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Yang Chengwu and declared: “The army’s continued intervention in the Cultural Revolution and internal struggle is dangerous and we should impose restrictions.” He then canvassed the views of the attending leaders and dictated seven orders, on which attendees reached a consensus. The seven orders were then submitted for urgent discussion at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. However, despite fierce advocacy by Ye Jianying and his allies, Jiang Qing and the Central Cultural Revolution Group disapproved of the proposal. Marshal Ye Jianying then telephoned Lin Biao and asked him to find a way to obtain approval from Mao, and so Lin met Mao together with Marshal Xu Xiangqian. This strategy won Mao’s approval of the “Seven Orders,” which became “Eight Orders” after Mao added an order regarding the strengthening of education for children. Lin Biao strongly praised Mao’s decision to approve the Eight Orders: “You decision to append your signature to the eight orders is a great and wise one!”70 The Eight Orders stated that the great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had entered a new stage of comprehensive class struggle, and the army’s previous position of non68. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 345. 69. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1475. 70. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 648.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

intervention in the movement at the local level needed to be altered. Specifically, all military commanders were required to take up their posts and absence without leave was banned; military units engaged in cultural revolution were to rigorously distinguish two kinds of conflicts, and were to prevent illegal arrests and house searches, as well as violent struggle; all revolutionaries who were traveling the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought were to return to their units, and were prohibited from attacking military organs. Mao had previously instructed: “We should punish counter-revolutionaries who attack military organs, while leftists who do the same should be absolved. In the future, we should resist rightists to attack military organs while encouraging leftists to do so.”71 Article 5 of the Eight Orders stipulated that counter-revolutionaries that attacked military organs should be punished, but leftists that did the same should not. However, the rebels were also strictly prohibited from attacking military organs.72 On January 28, the Central Military Commission of the CPC issued the Eight Orders.73 The urgency and importance were such that in some regions they were distributed via leaflets dropped from planes. In many regions there were additional orders to ban attacks on military organs. On February 21, the Central Committee of the CPC instructed that the Eight Orders be implemented across China. On February 6, Ye Jianying presided over the brief meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and proposed that merely issuing the Eight Orders was insufficient and additional restrictions were required. He also disclosed that there had originally been nine orders, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group had crossed out an order concerning the assumption of leadership by party committees and banning the establishment of fighting brigades. The formation of fighting brigades within military organs would effectively have permitted power seizure by the military. This issue continued to lead to debate. Therefore, Ye and Nie Rongzhen presided over the drafting of the Rules of the Central Military Commission of the CPC to Govern Military Organs above the Corps Level in Carrying Out Cultural Revolution (the Seven Orders,) which prohibited all army and air force units below the corps level, and all naval units below the naval-base level, from engaging in the four activities, and required them to undergo political education. Specifically, rebels were not allowed to enter these military organs to publicize Mao Zedong Thought, and military organs at all levels were prohibited from power seizure. Military organs 71. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 203.

72. Ibid, 204–205. 73. On January 25, 1967, Lin Biao submitted a draft of the seven orders from the Central Military Commission Order to Mao for review. (Ibid.)

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above the corps level were to carry out the Cultural Revolution only under the leadership of the Party Committee, and combat organizations outside the military were to be dissolved. Broad attacks on all cadres were prohibited, and unhealthy tendencies such as anarchism, excessive democracy, factionalism, individualism, and subjectivism were to be discouraged.74 The Seven Orders were not intended to make the army a special zone where power seizure was prohibited. Based on the directive Studying the Scope of Power Seizure in the Army, issued by Mao on January 26, the Central Military Commission of the CPC issued the Rules on Defining the Scope of Power Seizure in the Army and pointed out that it should restrict the scope of military power seizure to academies and schools (excluding secret colleges, cutting-edge technology schools, flying schools and classes, and departments with external training tasks,) theatre troupes, sports teams, hospitals (only including PLA general hospitals, military region and army service general hospitals, and teaching hospitals,) and military factories (excluding those developing cuttingedge technology, those belonging to naval bases, and secret factories.)75 Mao had to deploy the army to stabilize and control the national situation, yet army intervention in the political movement created further splits and factional struggles. Mao also placed the army in a conundrum. Although the army actively responded to and carried out Mao’s instructions, it lacked understanding of how to identify revolutionary leftists. There were numerous mass organizations, and the army was unclear about how to differentiate allies and opponents. Meanwhile, the army itself was split into different factions (e.g. local troops and field armies that supported different mass organizations) and struggles among these factions often resulted in shooting and bloodshed. However, with almost all local party and government organizations restructured and paralyzed following seizures of power, Mao was forced to enforce military control to end the chaos. Proletarian democracy thus regressed into military despotism. The Cultural Revolution was the second time Mao resorted to military force to exert control, with the first time having been in 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established.76 According to the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference drawn up on September 74. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 345–346. 75. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 202.

76. Zhou Enlai said: “In 1949, we destroyed the army of the Kuomintang, liberated the whole of China, and implemented military control via the millions of soldiers of the

PLA.” (“Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Meeting of Army Officers at the Corps Level,” March 13, 1967.)

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1949, military control was exerted in the newly liberated regions and the People’s Representative Conference was to be convened as a basic political structure to enable mass participation in governmental and political affairs, and the election of local people’s governments to replace the people’s congresses. The State Council stipulated the General Rules of the Peoples’ Governments at the Provincial, Municipal and County Levels and the General Rules of the People’s Governments at the District and Country Levels, respectively, in January and December of 1950. At the end of 1952, the People’s Representative Conference was convened to elect local people’s governments.77 In contrast, on the second occasion Mao exerted military control to resist and guard against revisionism and defend the Cultural Revolution. However, his actions destroyed legitimate and constitutionally elected peoples’ congresses and governments at all levels, and established illegal and unelected revolutionary committees of the revolutionary masses (rebel organizations,) cadres, and soldiers. According to Zhou’s documents, by the middle of February over 6,900 units had been placed under military control, including those in public security, post and telecommunications, broadcasting, newspaper offices, prisons, and particularly banks and warehouses, with over 3,100 warehouses (50% of total units) and more than 1,400 banks (20% of the total) under military control. Additionally, military control was implemented or approved in 10 of China’s 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions (Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangsu); five revolutionary committees of the revolutionary masses, cadres and soldiers (rebel organizations) were established in Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Guizhou, Shanghai, and Shandong; and military control was exerted over the majority of the 62 public security bureaus at the provincial and municipal levels. Military control took one of two forms: 1. The establishment of a military control committee; 2. The dispatch of military representatives or deployment of troops to enforce military control where necessary. Generally, local supreme military organs and other military organs dispatched leaders to form military control committees to exert ultimate military control at the provincial, prefectural and county levels.78 Following Mao’s instructions, on March 19 the Central Military Commission of the CPC issued the Decision on Supporting Leftists, Peasants, and Workers, Exerting Military Control, and Holding Military Drills. The Decision expanded the mission of the army at the local level from simply supporting leftists into a wider role of exerting military control that saw decisive

77. He, History of the People’s Republic of China, 27–28. 78. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Meeting of Army Officers at the Corps Level,” March 13, 1967.

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military intervention in the Cultural Revolution.79 By September 1968, the army controlled almost all the state and local governmental organs, and most local governments were military led. In 22 out of 29 provinces, cities and autonomous regions, military representatives served as directors of the revolutionary committees or Party branch leaders (see Table 3.3). The 9th Congress of the Central Committee of the CPC, held in 1969, was attended by a total of 279 members of the Central Committee of the CPC (including 170 members of the Central Committee of the CPC and 109 alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC,) 47.5% of whom were military leaders.80 In April 1969, Lin Biao claimed at the 9th Congress of the Central Committee of the CPC: “The best way to raise combat readiness is by supporting leftists, peasants, and workers, exerting military control, and conducting military training.”81 Why did Mao call for the army to exert military control to support leftists, peasants, and workers, and to hold military training? On July 14, Mao had expressed to military leaders: “The Party and government failed to perform their functions and only the PLA could preserve order.”82 However, the disorder only developed as a result of Mao’s policy of comprehensive seizure of power that resulted in indiscriminate attacks on party and government leaders. The structure of government that emerged from the chaos comprised revolutionary committees that represented the revolutionary masses but were controlled by military leaders. Mao had envisaged the Cultural Revolution as comprising two stages: 1. Attacks on party and government organs and the unmasking of evil people of all kinds; 2. The establishment of revolutionary committees that represented the revolutionary masses, cadres, and soldiers. Zhou Enlai later recalled that Mao originally predicted China would enter the second stage between February and April, 1968. However, on March 13 he revised this timeframe to between April and May, 1968.83 79. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 649. 80. Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma, 146. 81. Lin Biao said: “During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, many military officers

and men supported industry, agriculture and the leftist masses through asserting military control over strategic economic and other units, and through engaging in

political training within the PLA. Representatives of all three service branches of the PLA participated. In this way, the army engaged in class struggle and joined with the

masses, thus boosting the ideological revolution among the PLA and making a new contribution to the people. This was also the best means of preparing for war.” (Lin, “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, 28 April, 1969.) 82. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1475. 83. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Meeting of Army Officers at the Corps Level,” March 13,

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From June 1966 to February 1967, China went from order to turmoil. The early phase of the Cultural Revolution, lasting seven months, proved that Mao’s theories and decisions in relation to the Cultural Revolution were wrong, and the Cultural Revolution brought disaster to the Party, the army and the country. The healthy forces within the Party thus felt bound to protest the Cultural Revolution.

The Revolutionary Forces Struggle and the February Counter-current Forces Counterattack As the saying goes, opportunity lies hidden in every crisis. In October 1966, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping volunteered to undertake self-criticism at the Central Work Conference. In January 1967, Liu Shaoqi volunteered to resign from his post and return to his hometown. This gave Mao a third opportunity to rectify his mistakes and end the Cultural Revolution. Unfortunately Mao still refused to correct his faults, just as on previous similar occasions, and continued to uphold his incorrect line. This behavior was characteristic of Mao in his later years, when he regularly refused to discard erroneous beliefs. In February 1967, during the Huairentang Meeting in Zhongnanhai, Tan Zhenlin and another six members of the Central Politburo had a face-to-face confrontation with the Central Cultural Revolution Group.84 In this confrontation they led the healthy forces within the Central Committee of the CPC in an attempt to persuade Mao to rectify his errors in the Cultural Revolution. In the political struggle between the alliance of Mao, Lin Biao, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on the one hand, and the majority of the members of the Central Politburo on the other hand, Mao exploited his special political status to win by simply using noninstitutional means to remove his opponents from their positions. This caused a third split in the Party. Additionally, Mao proposed a motion that the brief meeting 1967. 84. According to a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC from 1981: “In and

around February 1967, some leaders of the Political Bureau and Military Commission, including Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, and

Nie Rongzhen, expressed their strong disagreement with the wrong actions being taken during the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’. They did this repeatedly at multiple meetings,

but were suppressed and attacked as representatives of the ‘February Counter-current’.

Zhu De and Chen Yun were also wrongly criticized.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 812.)

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of the Central Cultural Revolution Group should be superior to both the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. This measure prevented others from defying Mao, and thus his faults came to be compounded instead of rectified. The political struggle took place because Mao was unsatisfied with the turmoil caused by the campaign to purge veteran cadres. Someone came up with the slogan “completely improving the dictatorship of the proletariat,” which Mao viewed as reactionary. Mao disapproved of anarchism and “suspecting and purging everyone in power,” and proposed criticizing anarchism and opposing ultra-leftism.85 On February 10, Mao presided over the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, at which he criticized the Central Cultural Revolution Group repeatedly and expressed his disapproval of ultra-leftism in the comprehensive campaign to seize power. Additionally, he detected that the Central Cultural Revolution Group had succeeded the leading institutions of the Central Committee of the CPC, such as the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.86 The change in attitude of Mao towards 85. Mao criticized the slogan as follows: “In the 17 years since the founding of the New China, the direction has largely been correct. Therefore the slogan ‘thoroughly improving the proletarian dictatorship’ is reactionary. The real intention of this slogan

is to overthrow the proletarian dictatorship and establish a bourgeois dictatorship. An appropriate slogan is ‘partially improving the proletarian dictatorship’. Anarchy is

an evil caused by opportunists, and excessive actions are an incorrect direction.” (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 389.)

86. On February 10 1967, during the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Mao criticized Chen Boda, saying: “You created a situation where a standing member attacked another standing member (Tao Zhu)!” Mao believed Jiang Qing had ambitious aims but limited abilities, and ordered the

Central Cultural Revolution Group to hold a meeting to criticize the pair. On February 12, during conversations with Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Yao Wenyuan and Qi

Benyu, Mao criticized the Central Cultural Revolution Group for having become an ‘independent kingdom’, and said: “Since the establishment of the team, nobody has

asked me to chair the meeting. Since June last year (1966), it has replaced the Secretariat

of the Central Committee and become an independent kingdom. The Central Cultural Revolution Group accuses others of establishing independent kingdoms, but its own actions are arbitrary and ignore the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The

Great Cultural Revolution will end in one or two years. Now ‘attacking everything is popular’. But how can we function if every official is attacked? The current situation is simply anarchy.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2,

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the Central Cultural Revolution Group was welcomed by most members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and they became encouraged to resist Jiang Qing and her allies.87 On January 11, Zhu De delivered a speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, and said: “The Cultural Revolution has sabotaged production and the masses have forgotten about ‘simultaneously carrying out revolution and production work’ (a quote from Mao,) creating a fresh problem. Additionally, some of the masses have continued to conduct violent struggle despite us long having called for it to end — these groups have even destroyed machinery and burned houses. Counter-revolutionaries have caused disturbances and we should be alert to this problem.”88 On January 28, Tan Zhenlin, Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and Director of the Agriculture and Forestry Office, reported to Mao and the Central Cultural Revolution Group on how the Ministry of Agricultural Reclamation, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Fisheries were carrying out the Cultural Revolution, and also expressed his personal views on the movement. On January 30, Mao sent Tan’s report to Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai and expressed his agreement with Tan. He further requested that Zhou circulate the report among other comrades to raise their awareness of its contents.89 Mao thus clearly encouraged Tan to become the vanguard of the “February Countercurrent.” From February 11 to February 16, Zhou Enlai presided over the meeting at Huairentang in Zhongnanhai. Seated on one side of Zhou were seven vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, the vice premier, and the two State Council officials Yu Qiuli and Gu Mu. Seated on the other side of Zhou were Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and other members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The meeting eventually became a direct confrontation between two opposing factions. A heated argument broke out, focused on three issues: whether the Cultural Revolution should be carried out under the leadership of the Party, whether the army should be stabilized, and whether all veteran cadres should be purged. 1480–1481.) 87. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 87. 88. “Zhu De’s Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC,” January 11, 1967. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Zhu De, 909.)

89. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 209.

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Ye Jianying was the first to sharply criticize the Central Cultural Revolution Group,90 saying: “You, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, have created disruptions in the Party, governments at all levels, factories, and the countryside, and you have even plotted to disrupt the army! More seriously, you instructed rebels to seize power in Shanghai, renamed the Shanghai local government the ‘Shanghai People’s Commune,’ unilaterally restructuring the national system of government without consulting the Central Politburo of the CPC. What kind of conspiracy is this?” Xu Xiangqian added: “The army is the mainstay of the proletarian regime and yet you plotted to disrupt the army. How can the country be defended under these conditions?”91 Nie Rongzhen continued in even more extreme terms, saying: “You have seized and denounced children, implicated innocent family members, persecuted veteran cadres, and beaten people even after they are already down. Your intentions are evil!” Ye Jianying asked Chen Boda: “We do not read books and newspapers and know nothing of the guiding principles of the Paris Commune. Please explain to us the guiding principles of the Paris Commune. How can we carry out revolution without the leadership of the Party and the support of the army”? Ye and other members of the Politburo succinctly described their view of what was occurring, saying: “The Cultural Revolution was staged to cause turmoil by disrupting the Party, the country and the army.” At the meeting on February 16, veteran cadres denounced the Cultural Revolution. Tan Zhenlin told Zhang Chunqiao: “You plotted to purge veteran and local cadres. This is the fiercest struggle in the Party’s history.” Chen Yi believed that it would take one or two decades to resolve the problems created by the Cultural Revolution. Li Xiannian asked: “If you purged all the veteran cadres, how will you then carry out revolution? You are forcing confessions from dissenters.” Ye Jianying added: “Veteran cadres are a valuable resource of the Party and country. You have no right to purge them.”92 Zhou Enlai presided over two meetings. Although he agreed with the views of Tan and Chen, he said nothing and persuaded both parties to cool down. The two meetings ended with ill feeling.93 On February 17, Tan wrote a letter to Lin Biao rebuking Jiang Qing for organizing a sinister conspiracy and defaming the Party.94 Lin further inflamed the situation 90. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 347. 91. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 125.

92. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 232–233 93. Zhou Enlai later reported this to Wu Faxian. (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 658.)

94. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 88–89.

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by sending the letter to Mao, who only responded by noting that he had read it.95 Mao had once said: “Share everything you know without reserve. Rather than blaming the speaker you should carefully listen to them. Correct your past mistakes and guard against future ones.”96 Mao could have rectified and limited the errors he committed in his later years if he had acted in this spirit of humble self-criticism when others pointed out his faults. However, he not only rejected all criticism but also purged critics. This naturally silenced his critics, and marked a departure from earlier days when members of the Central Politburo of the CPC had felt free to openly oppose Mao’s views — examples include Peng Dehuao at the Lu Shan Meeting in 1959, Peng Zhen in February 1966, and Tan Zhenlin in February 1967. Conspiring with Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Li collated the Minutes of the Huairentang Meeting on February 16. On February 17, Zhang and Yao reported the Huairentang Meeting to Mao. On February 18, Mao issued instructions on the Red Flag editorial titled “We must Treat Cadres Correctly.”97 The same evening, he met Ye Qun and spoke furiously: “I am prepared to send you and Lin Biao to South China. Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, Li Fuchun, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian all revolted against the Cultural Revolution and disobeyed my orders. They disapproved of mass movements and strongly resisted them. However, I am determined to carry out the Cultural Revolution. If they refuse to follow me, I will send you and Lin Biao to South China. If the PLA refuse to follow me, I will lead you two to recruit another PLA in South China and return to Jinggang Mountain to start the revolution anew.” Ye responded with the pledge, “Lin Biao will loyally follow Mao forever.” Mao 95. In a letter to Lin Biao, Tan Zhenlin said: “They (the Central Cultural Revolution Group)

are plotting to purge senior officials. They will detain and execute you for even the smallest of errors. Can they remain in office? Can you be their successor? I doubt it.”

In a subsequent letter to Mao, Lin remarked: “It is surprising that Tan Zhenlin is so stupid.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1482.)

96. Mao said, “We should periodically review our works and promote democracy while doing so. We should have the courage to perform criticism and self-criticism, and should abide by some useful Chinese maxims such as “speak only about what you know,” “the speaker is innocent, but the audience should pay attention,” and “correct

the errors you make and guard against those errors you have not made,” which are

the only way to prevent political dirt from entering the minds of our comrades and the

organ of our party.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 3, 1097.)

97. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 233.

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continued: “Inform Lin Biao that Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, and their allies resisted the Cultural Revolution and claimed it was staged to purge all veteran cadres. They spread a series of reactionary fallacies, negated the Cultural Revolution, and created anarchy.” Mao also proposed that Ye attend the meetings of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the brief meetings of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and report the contents to Lin Biao.98 On the morning of February 19, Mao met with Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Li Fuchun, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing, and other leaders. Ye Qun attended as Lin Biao’s proxy. At the meeting, Mao suddenly changed his political attitudes from criticizing the Cultural Revolution Group to rebuking Tan Zhenlin and allies for reversing verdicts, restoring purged cadres to power and attacking the Cultural Revolution Group, saying: “You can never negate the Cultural Revolution Group.”99 Zhou persuaded Mao not to take offence and volunteered to conduct self-criticism. Mao then asked Ye Qun to again pass Lin Biao the message that: “If the Cultural Revolution ends in failure, I will leave Beijing and return to Jinggang Mountain to fight a new guerrilla war.” Mao also expressed: “If the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau fails to resolve the problem, we should mobilize the entire Party to resolve it.” After saying these words, Mao angrily left the meeting. Kang Sheng explained: “The Chairman expressed outrage on behalf of the proletariat.”100 In fact, Mao was coercing the Central Committee of the CPC into approving the Cultural Revolution and banning other members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau from voicing opposition at the Politburo meeting. By passing up opportunities, he compounded his faults again. The emergence of the “February Counter-current” saw a struggle occur between different forces within the Party. Tan Zhenlin and his allies represented a healthy force within the Party that deeply understood the nature and negative political effects of the Cultural Revolution.101 However, they were beaten back and 98. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 658–659. 99. Xiaodi ed., Secrets Buried with the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 63. 100. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 234–235.

101. In a letter to Lin Biao, Tan Zhenlin said: “They (Jiang Qing and her clique) never analyze the class nature and use poisonous methods not previously seen in the CPC. Their rash words have ruined the political careers of many people, including Tao Zhu,

Liu Zhijian and Tang Pingzhu. Almost all senior officials, namely high officials at the

provincial level or above, except those in the army and Zhongnanhai, have become the targets of struggle, suffered torture, and even lost their families and property, just as Tan Qilong and Jiang Hua are now experiencing. Our Party has become extremely ugly,

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marginalized by Mao. As an emerging evil force within the Party, Jiang Qing and her allies led the Cultural Revolution and caused turmoil. However, they enjoyed overwhelming support from Mao, and were rapidly promoted to a position where they succeeded the Central Politburo of the CPC, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. The Jiang Qing Clique falsely denounced those leaders who opposed her as the “February Counter-current.” Meanwhile, Zhu De and Chen Yun, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, were unjustly criticized.102 On February 19, Mao removed Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, and Xu Xiangqian from their posts and compelled them to undertake criticism at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. Mao’s decision blatantly contravened the 16 Points of the Party Constitution, and Articles 28 and 29 of the National Constitution. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, Central Committee leaders (including Lin Biao) were purged unconstitutionally, as political struggle was conducted through non-institutional means. On Mao’s instructions, seven self-criticism meetings of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau were convened from February 25 to March 18. Zhou Enlai presided over these meetings, which criticized Ye Jianying, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen. At the meeting, Zhou was the first to conduct self-criticism and he shouldered responsibility for certain mistakes made by others. Additionally, he spoke with several veteran cadres and persuaded them to conduct self-criticism and rectify their faults.103 It was hard for Zhou to simultaneously support and obey Mao, protect the seven members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC targeted for self-criticism, and secure their cooperation. At the self-criticism meeting, Jiang Qing accused and the ugly events in of Beijing have opened a Pandora’s box in Shanghai and Beijing.

Meanwhile, the real revisionists and counter-revolutionists enjoy protection. They do not care about the real issues, but are simply attacking senior officials. They will detain

and execute you over the slightest error.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s

Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 235–236.)

102. “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the

People’s Republic of China,” unanimously approved during the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC on June 27, 1981. (Party Literature Research

Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third

Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 812.)

103. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1731.

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veteran leaders of reversing the verdicts on the Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping case and protecting traitors and spies. Showing his treacherous nature, Kang Sheng denounced the “February Counter-current” as the most serious threat to the Party since the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, and the prelude to a coup that would restore capitalism. Chen Boda exaggerated the situation and talked of “continued struggle between two headquarters.”104 In late February, violent conflicts occurred between military leaders and imperialist writers, between marshals including Ye Jianying and Xu Xiangqian, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and between Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. On February 19, the Central Cultural Revolution Group denounced Xiao Hua, director of the General Political Department of the PLA.105 On February 20, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, acting without any authorization (not even from Mao), arrested Yang Yong, Commander of the Beijing Military Region. The same day, Ye Jianying, who presided over the day-to-day work of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, reported the incident to Lin Biao, who flew into a rage and asked his secretary to summon Jiang to his residence, whereupon Lin rebuked Jiang: “Chen Boda claimed the PLA was on the verge of revisionism and the restoration of capitalism under our leadership. What basis do you have for these claims? You also denounced the Central Military Commission of the CPC as a ‘Palace of Hades’ and vilified the army and the Central Military Commission of the CPC. The army is commanded by Chairman Mao. Can you explain how it was on the verge of revisionism? You are hostile to the army, and to military leaders (Ye Jianying and Xu Xiangqian.) I do not feel competent to perform my job under these circumstances, so you must allow me to resign from my post. I will report to Chairman Mao on your denunciation of Xiao Hua, illegal search of his home, and stealing from archives without consulting me. What kind of plot is this? Without the approval of Chairman Mao, you intervened in military work and plotted to disband the General Political Department. Did you act on the Chairman’s instructions? I will report this serious situation to the Chairman and ask him to remove me from all my positions.” Jiang replied: “I did not say that the army was on the verge of revisionism, nor did I attend the meeting last night. Chen Boda is the leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and I am merely the deputy leader. I have no right to control his speech.” As Lin continued to accuse 104. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 143. 105. On February 19, 1967, the Central Military Commission, Central Cultural Revolution Group, and PLA Cultural Revolution Group jointly held a small meeting in the Jingxi Hotel, chaired by Guan Feng, to criticize the poor leadership of Xiao Hua over the Great Cultural Revolution in the army.

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Jiang of having directed Chen, she not only denied responsibility but also accused the Central Military Commission of the CPC of placing excessive restrictions on the Cultural Revolution. Lin became angrier, saying: “Too many restrictions? The Eight Orders was issued by Chairman Mao personally. You plotted to disrupt the army! Who will benefit from such disruption? Do you dare overturn the Eight Orders approved by Chairman Mao?” Lin continued: “The two of us must meet with Chairman Mao and report this incident. If he indicates I should assume responsibility, I will resign from my post.” The fierce argument only ended when Ye Qun knelt in front of Lin to implore him and Jiang to stop. Although Jiang finally apologized to Lin, the argument still caused a split. However, Lin Biao dared not denounce Jiang Qing too fiercely for fear of offending Mao.106 Mao approved counterattacking the February Counter-current Forces. On February 28, he issued instructions on the document We Must be Alert to Counterrevolutionary Restoration, provided by the Central Cultural Revolution Group Office. He said: “We should be alert to counter-revolutionary restoration from the leadership to the grassroots.” Chen Boda had originally submitted the document to Mao on February 27 with general remarks on the danger of the restoration of capitalism, and Mao had responded in a threatening fashion by specifically mentioning the “February Counter-current forces.”107 On March 6, Jiang Qing asked Qi Benyu to plot with rebel leaders, including Tan Houlan, a rebel leader from Beijing Normal University, to counterattack Tan Zhenlin and the “February Counter-current Forces.” On March 8, Tan Houlan led over 1,000 students from Beijing Normal University to attack the National Agriculture Exhibition Center and openly accused and denounced Tan Zhenlin. On March 9, Chen Boda, acting on instructions from Mao, officially proposed counterattacking those seeking capitalism restoration. The next day, Xie Fuzhi, Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu openly supported Tan Houlan in accusing and denouncing Tan Zhenlin and counterattacking the “February Counter-current Forces.” On March 14, 100,000 students paraded in Beijing to demonstrate their resolve to defend Mao and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, with their blood if necessary, and accused and denounced Tan Zhenlin and allies.108 On March 21, rebels from finance and trade authorities proposed denouncing Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Zhou Enlai intervened to prevent the display in the streets of related 106. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 653–655. 107. “Who Does the Beijing Political and Law Commune Support in the Tianjin Xiaozhan

Commune,” Central Cultural Revolution Group Office: Express, No. 1332, issued on February 25, 1967.

108. Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 237.

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big-character posters.109 From March to April, a nationwide campaign was launched to counterattack the perceived counter-revolutionary threat. Soon after the launch of the campaign, Mao developed doubts and intervened to stop it. He also stressed that Zhou Enlai should not be attacked.110 Zhou later acknowledged that he enjoyed protection, saying: “Chairman Mao defended me from the start. When the February Countercurrent Forces were denounced, Chairman Mao protected me.”111 Mao was constantly worried about possible threats from others. Wu Faxian, commander of the PLA Air Force, revealed that Mao did not trust several marshals and deputy premiers living on Xishan Mountain, and thus after criticizing them he dispatched agents to watch them. Mao requested that Wang Bingzhang, Deputy Commander of the PLA Air Force, assess the situation and directly report to him. Wang submitted two reports, which stated: “The marshals have learned a lesson. They changed their attitude towards the Cultural Revolution after being denounced, and remarked that the movement made a vital contribution to resisting revisionism and preventing capitalism restoration.” After reading Wang’s reports, Mao felt reassured and forwarded them to Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and other members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Lin proposed ending the criticism of marshals by their Party branches to prevent excessive criticism damaging their health. Mao approved Lin’s proposal. On the evening of April 30, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Li Xiannian to meet at his residence. He also approved them mounting the rostrum on the Tiananmen gate tower on May 1,112 signifying they had not been purged. On May 5, Zhou Enlai wrote to Chen Yi: “The unity on May 1 was intended to preserve your political life and warn you not to seek revenge, support conservatism, suppress rebels and show others that the ‘February Counter-current Forces’ have been negated.”113 The letter suggested Zhou resolutely supported Mao in counterattacking the “February Counter-current Forces” and wished to seriously warn Chen Yi and other leaders against seeking revenge. Mao won in his counterattack on the “February Counter-current Forces” at a high cost, and the struggle had adverse effects and disrupted systems. 109. Jin and Chen eds., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1364. 110. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1731. 111. “Outline of Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Enlarged Central Military Commission,” April 24, 1967. (Ibid, 1732.)

112. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 661–663. 113. “Zhou Enlai’s Letter to Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli—Also Circulated to Li Fuchun,” May 5, 1967. (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1732.)

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First, Mao purged Tan Zhenlin and another six members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, making them the third group to be purged from the Central Politburo of the CPC. Although Mao expressed his opposition to purging all cadres, in reality he did exactly this by means of class struggle and caused a split within the party. Second, the party leaders appointed at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC underwent a political reshuffle. By March 1967, among the eleven members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Tao Zhu had been purged; Zhu De, Chen Yun and Li Fuchun had been politically marginalized. Only Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng remained unscathed and in their posts. Moreover, out of 21 members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, 12 had been purged, four had been politically marginalized, and only five still held posts. Four out of six alternate members of the Central Politburo of the CPC had been purged, and only Xie Fuzhi and Li Xuefeng still held their posts. Furthermore, out of 11 secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Deng Xiaoping (General Secretary,) Tao Zhu (Executive Secretary,) Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Ye Jianying, and Wang Jiaxiang had been purged, and only Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Li Xuefeng, and Liu Ning still held their posts. Also purged were the alternate secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, Liu Lantao and Hu Qiaomu. In the Cultural Revolution, the majority of the leaders from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC were purged or politically marginalized, leaving the three leading organs unable to function. Without approval by the Plenary Session of the CPC and the National People’s Congress, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau officially ceased meeting. Third, Mao raised the political status of the Central Cultural Revolution Group higher than that of the three leading organs of the CPC. From late 1966 to early 1967, the Central Politburo, Standing Committee of the Political Committee, and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC successively ceased functioning as the majority of their members were purged or criticized. After early February, Zhang Chunqiao relayed Mao’s instructions and Zhou Enlai held and presided over brief meetings with leaders from the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission to collectively address crucial issues related to the Party, the government and the army. The important resolutions were reported to Mao for approval. Meanwhile, Chen Boda presided over Central Cultural Revolution Group Brief Meetings, attended by leaders of the Party, government, and army, to address issues related to the Cultural Revolution,

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and sought Mao’s approval for the implementation of important resolutions. Thus there were two groups dealing with central day-to-day work.

Sidebar 4.2 How the Central Cultural Revolution Group Succeeded the Central Committee of the CPC (May 1966–April 1969) On May 28, 1966, the Central Committee of the CPC announced the establishment of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, with Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan as leading members, under the leadership of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. In the middle of July, the Central Cultural Revolution Office was established by the Central Cultural Revolution Group to report on the progress of the Cultural Revolution, and preside over work in the academic, educational, literary and artistic, press, and publishing circles. However, it had no right to issue directives. On July 24, Chen Boda gave a speech at National Communication University and addressed Jiang Qing as a central leader for the first time. From August 1 to August 12, all the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group sat in on the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC , and Chen Boda and Kang Sheng were appointed to the Central Politburo. On August 8, Lin Biao met with the Central Cultural Revolution Group and announced that the Cultural Revolution Group and the Cultural Revolutionary Committee would be historically important for a long time. On August 18, Mao granted the Red Guards an audience for the first time, and Xinhua News Agency reported that Mao, Lin, Zhou, and Jiang met successive groups of student representatives. Notably, at these meetings Jiang ranked above other members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. In late August, Zhou Enlai held and presided over the (enlarged) brief meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which was attended by all the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Subsequently, all the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group sat in on the meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC. At this time, Chen Boda had a case of pneumonia. On August 30, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a notification that the first deputy leader Jiang Qing would take over from Chen Boda as leader of the Central Cultural Revolution Group should he fall ill or travel outside Beijing. On November 28, Chen Boda spoke at the Proletarian Cultural Revolution Assembly of Capital Literary and Artistic Circles and eulogized Jiang Qing for her special contribution to the ongoing struggle against reactionaries and counterrevolutionary revisionists. The same day, the Central Military Commission of the

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CPC appointed Jiang as PLA Cultural Work Consultant. On January 2, 1967, Zhou Enlai presided over the brief meeting the Central Committee of the CPC, which discussed issues related to student military drills in East China, and was attended by Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, and Yao Wenyuan. Subsequently, the leading members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group attended the brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC. In early January, Tao Zhu, Wang Renzhong, Liu Zhijian, and other leaders were denounced by Jiang and removed from the Central Cultural Revolution Group. On January 11, in response to a directive by Mao, the Congratulatory Telegram to the Revolutionary Rebel Factions in Shanghai was released in the name of the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The Central Cultural Revolution Group, which at this time was under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, ranked alongside the Central Committee of the CPC and issued the above document in the name of all four central leading organs of the Party and Country. The same day, the Central Military Commission of the CPC issued the Notification on Restructuring the PLA Cultural Revolution Group and appointed Xu Xiangqian as leader and Jiang Qing as consultant. From January to February, the Central Cultural Revolution Group set up the Literature and Art Group, led by Wang Li, to replace the Advocacy Group of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Ministry of Culture. On February 2, Zhou Enlai wrote to Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group and proposed: 1. To hold a brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC to preside over work related to the Cultural Revolution; 2. To hold a brief meeting presided over by four members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and Li Fuchun) and attended by all four deputy premiers (Chen Yi, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin and Xie Fuzhi,) Jiang Qing, and other comrades designated by the Central Cultural Revolution Group to discuss party and governmental work. On February 4 Mao responded in writing to reject the proposal. On February 16, Zhang Chunqiao relayed Mao’s directive to Zhou, saying: “You should rank the Central Cultural Revolution Group alongside the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, and crucial party and governmental issues should be reported to the Central Cultural Revolution Group for discussion”. At the same time, Mao abolished the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and made the Central Cultural Revolution Group his personal political tool. On the morning of February 19, Mao held the enlarged meeting of the

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Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and remarked that the Central Cultural Revolution Group had resolutely carried forward the spirit of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and basically upheld the correct political line, with a record of achievement of 97% or more, and its faults comprising 3% or less. Additionally, he also expressed he would revolt against anyone who opposed the Central Cultural Revolution Group. This showed that Mao strongly supported the Central Cultural Revolution Group. From February 25 to March 18, seven political criticism meetings were held in Huairentang on the orders of Mao, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (including the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC) ceased work and was succeeded by the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Additionally, the brief meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, presided over by Zhou Enlai and attended by deputy premiers and related leaders, which addressed crucial Party and governmental issues, was replaced by the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The Central Cultural Revolution Group under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau thus became a special institution that ranked above the Central Committee of the CPC. Notably, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyan, and their allies were not appointed to the Central Committee of the CPC. On April 12, Jiang Qing delivered a speech at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and remarked that the Central Cultural Revolution Group acted as a secretary of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, as well as a sentinel and staff officer. In July, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, and Wang Dongxing attended the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. From October 13, 1968 to October 31, 1968, all the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group attended the enlarged meeting of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Zhou Enlai, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Wang Dongxing, Wen Yucheng, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan attended the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. In fact, the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group succeeded the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and presided over the day-to-day work of the Central Committee of the CPC. Most members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group became members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC after the Ninth National Congress of the CPC. After the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969, two leading members of the

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Central Cultural Revolution Group were appointed to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and four leading members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group were named as members of the Central Politburo of the CPC. This action automatically dissolved the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Sources: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 51, 57, 106, 112, 122, 129–130; Yan, “How Did Jiang Qing Become a Political Star?” General Review of the Communist Party of China, Issue 1, 2005; Yin, “Mao Zedong and the Establishment of the Central

Cultural Revolution Group,” General Review of the Communist Party of China,

Issue 1, 2006; “Press Communiqué on the Eighth Session of the Enlarged 12th

Central Committee of the Party”, issued on October 31, 1968; Wu, Rough Years:

Wu Faxian’s Memoir.

After the Political Life Criticism Meeting held in March, most participants in the brief meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau were purged, including two members of the Standing Committee of Political Bureau (Tao Zhu and Li Fuchun,) six members of the Political Bureau (Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian and Ye Jianying,) and Yu Qiuli and Gu Mu. Only Zhou Enlai, Xie Fuzhi, and members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group escaped. Zhou reported the situation to Mao, and the brief meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was cancelled and integrated with the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. This combined meeting was called the Central Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting. Zhou presided over the Central Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting to address issues related to day-to-day central work and the Cultural Revolution. Important resolutions were signed by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Jiang Qing, and then submitted to Mao and Lin Biao for approval.114 In fact, the Central Politburo of the CPC, the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC existed only in name (Sidebar 4.2.) Although Jiang was not appointed a member of the CPC, Mao arranged for her to participate in central decision making and to rank sixth among CPC leaders as a special party figure. 115 114. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 678–679. 115. Wu Faxian reported that during the Central Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting, Jiang Qing had said: “Attempts to rival our Central Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting are useless. The ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ is now ongoing across the country, and is

conducted solely in the name of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. You (Zhou

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Fourth, Mao set up the Administrative Group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC to replace the collective leadership of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and Lin Biao held the power to deploy troops. In March 1967, there were seven vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, among whom He Long, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, and Ye Jianying (who concurrently served as Secretary-general of the Central Military Commission of the CPC) were purged, while Liu Bocheng was politically marginalized, and only Lin Biao held a post. After the counterattack on the “February Counter-current Forces,” the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of the CPC ceased to function and Mao established a non-institutional alternative as a temporary measure. He initially set up a “Three-leader Group” comprising Ye Jianying, Yang Chengwu, and Xiao Hua to handle the day-to-day affairs of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. However, the counterattack against the “February Counter-current Forces” had politically marginalized Ye and compelled Xiao to stop work. On July 17, Zhou Enlai announced at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution: “With the approval from Chairman Mao, the Central Military Commission of the CPC Interim Caretaker Group, comprising Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo (Minister of the General Logistics Department,) and Zhang Xiuchuan (Director of the PLA Navy Political Department,) with Wu as leader, was set up to perform the tasks assigned by the Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting and preside over the day-to-day work of the Central Military Commission of the CPC.116 On September 26, Zhou announced that the Central Military Commission of the CPC Interim Caretaker Group was abolished and the Central Military Commission Administrative Group of the CPC was established, with Yang Chengwu as leader, Wu Faxian as deputy group leader and Ye Qun and Qiu Huizuo as group members. As the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution performed the Enlai) are a standing member of the Political Bureau and the Premier of the State Council. It is reasonable and legal for you to chair the Central Cultural Revolution Workshop.” Kang Sheng then continued: “We hope Zhou Enlai will respect the opinions

of Comrade Jiang Qing. If you two work together, you will become the leading core of the Central Cultural Revolution Brief Meeting and bring more opinions to Chairman

Mao. Comrade Jiang Qing quickly understands the intentions of Chairman Mao.” Presented with this, Zhou Enlai was forced to agree. Wu Faxian described the situation

thus: “Jiang Qing can talk to the supreme leader (Mao) and give orders to Zhou Enlai. She pays Kang Sheng less attention than she pays others. All other members of the

Central Cultural Revolution must follow her or be expelled from the organization and even attacked.” (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, vol. 2, 681.) 116. Ibid, 676.

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function of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, the Central Military Commission of the CPC Administrative Group exercised the power of the working meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the leader and deputy leader of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Administrative Group ranked alongside the former secretary-general and deputy secretary-general of the Central Military Commission of the CPC.117 On October 1, the People’s Daily, the Red Flag, and the PLA Daily published an editorial: “The great PLA is led by our great leader Chairman Mao. Under the command of Comrade Lin Biao, the PLA holds the red flag of great Mao Zedong Thought and establishes close ties with the masses.”118 Mao questioned this declaration, saying: “There is no doubt that I can muster and command the PLA.”119 Zhou Enlai played a vital role in empowering Lin Biao to command the army. On October 11, Zhou issued the instruction: “Reports and documents of the Central Military Commission of the CPC related to day-to-day administrative affairs in the military, troop deployment, appointment and removal of cadres, troop reorganization, and weaponry should be directly submitted to Vice Chairman Lin Biao by the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the General Staff of the PLA for approval instead of being forwarded by me. Meanwhile, documents dealing with supporting leftists, workers, and peasants, military control, military drills and defense diplomacy, should continue to be forwarded to me only.”120 This instruction served as the official document that empowered Lin Biao to command the army, empowering Lin in accordance with Mao’s directives.

Open Denouncement of Liu Shaoqi and the Fabricated Case Against Him The Liu Shaoqi injustice case was the first case of unjust framing of a political opponent to occur after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, and eventually involved tens of thousands of people. It was an extremely important case, and so it is important to understand how the case was fabricated, the role of Mao, and what lessons the case offers. 117. Ibid, 677. 118. Red Flag, issue 15, 1967. 119. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 246.

120. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 191, 194–195.

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On January 17, Mao met with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Malaysia, Chin Peng, and said: “The struggle between Liu Shaoqi and myself took place in the summer of 1964 and the 23-Article Document in 1965 resulted from this struggle. I approve of electing Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to the Central Committee of the CPC at the next National People’s Congress.121 It is normal that the Party should contain leftists, centralists, and rightists. It would be dangerous if this were not so. However, the Red Guards must resist the centralists and rightists.” Kang Sheng and Liu Ning were present when these words were said. Mao’s words show that he hoped to see Liu elected to the Central Committee of the CPC, but at the same time he did not explain why the Red Guards objected to Liu. Actually, when he spoke these words Mao had already read the materials framing Liu. In fact, Mao had also gathered materials that could be used to attack other leaders, such as Zhou Enlai, and even Jiang Qing and her allies. Mao thus gathered political weapons for future use but never expected that the historical materials he collected on Jiang would later be used to end her political life.122 On February 18, Zhang Wentian, who served as member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in 1936,123 wrote to Mao: “Shortly after Liu Shaoqi worked at the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC in the spring of 1936, he wrote a letter on how to solve the problems facing cadres in the Kuomintang-controlled White Area. At that time, a group of outstanding cadres were imprisoned in Beijing. According to messages from prison, the jailers were willing to flee and release the prisoners on condition that the prisoners signed commitments not to fight against communism, and not to make anti-communist statements. Liu Shaoqi’s letter proposed an approach for handling the matter. Additionally, he attached an application for release and requested me to append my signature to assure the jailors that the Central Committee had approved the formalities. I believed in Liu Shaoqi and deemed it proper to secure the release of comrades in difficulty if it could be achieved at no cost. Therefore I replied to Liu 121. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1936.

122. In October, 1976, Hua Guofeng obtained materials disclosing the historical problems of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, and the criticisms leveled by Mao against the Gang

of Four. The materials were based on Mao’s personal archives, and were later used as political bombs to destroy the Gang of Four.

123. Zhang Wentian took charge of all daily work according to the decision of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the CPC after the Zunyi Meeting in January.

At this time he was an Alternate Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC and a researcher at the Economic Institute of CAS.

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Shaoqi’s letter to express my approval of his proposal and appended my signature to the application.”124 While this seems to suggest Zhang bore no responsibility, the fact is that in 1936 the Central Committee of the CPC, following a motion by Liu, officially approved the collective release of sixty-one cadres, including Bo Yibo, dependent on the completion of simple formalities.125 Mao issued instructions to circulate this evidence to the Central Politburo of the CPC, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.126 These events show that Mao and all the Party leaders understood this history, and subsequently Chen Yun took the lead in redressing the unjust case involving Bo Yibo and another sixty cadres at the Central Work Conference held in November 1978, and proposed that the cadres be freed in accordance with the decision of the Party organization and the Central Committee of the CPC, and were not to be denounced as traitors.127 In March, Mao said he would propose electing Liu Shaoqi of the Central Committee of the CPC at the 9th National Congress. 128 In early March, Zhang Shizhao129 voiced his opinions as a non-Party member, saying: “If we continue to carry out the Cultural Revolution, the country will face collapse. It is wrong to purge Liu Shaoqi! Jiang Qing and her allies will destroy the country. I feel duty bound to write to Chairman Mao and asked him to stop the purge of Liu Shaoqi, for the split between Mao and Liu Shaoqi will split the country.”130 On March 4, he 124. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 179.

125. In 1936 Liu Shaoqi was appointed Secretary of the North Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. After obtaining the approval of the Central Committee of the CPC, the 61 cadres (including Bo Yibo) were released according to the provisions of the Kuomintang. The Central Committee of the CPC thus had long ago made a decision regarding this matter.

126. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 169.

127. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp, Selected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 232.

128. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 381–382. 129. Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973), whose courtesy name was Xingyan, was born in Changsha,

Hunan, and elected as member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Standing Commissioner of NPPCC, and President of the Central Literature and History Research Center.

130. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 245.

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wrote to Mao, saying: “Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, our country has achieved prosperity under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The solidarity between Mao and Liu Shaoqi is essential to guaranteeing the effective leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and I hope that two leaders will have a frank and honest private conversation. I suggest Chairman Mao criticizes Liu Shaoqi for his faults instead of purging him.” 131 Since Mao attached excessive importance to historical remarks, he adopted a negative and radical political stance rather than seeking the truth. On March 10, Mao replied to Zhang’s letter, saying: “I advocate unity in the national interest. However, the Liu Shaoqi Special Case is too complex and so I have to put your proposal on hold.”132 Subsequently, he sent the historical materials framing Liu to Zhang, who realized they had been manipulated and reported to Mao that Liu was being framed to end his political life. However, Mao still rejected Zhang Shizhao’s admonishment and resolutely decided to purge Liu Shaoqi. The reason Mao remained determined to purge Li Shaoqi even after Liu conducted self-criticism and Zhang Shizhao tried to dissuade him from continuing the persecution was revealed by Chen Boda and Kang Sheng, who expressed Mao’s real intention at the meeting for army officers at the corps level. On March 9, Chen Boda spoke at the meeting for army officers at the corps level: “In 1962, Liu Shaoqi sought to permit individual farming in an attempt to carry out the restoration of capitalism. Deng Xiaoping approved this request. In 1964, Liu Shaoqi initiated the ‘Four Clean-ups’ Movement and Chairman Mao denounced it as rightist. At the Central Work Conference, Liu Shaoqi negated class struggle and the two-line struggle and pronounced that the socialist education movement aimed to resolve the conflicts between the ‘Four Clean-ups’ and the ‘Four non-Clean-ups’, the conflict between ourselves and our enemies, and the conflict among the masses. Thereafter, Mao Zedong opposed Liu Shaoqi’s wrong pronouncements. The conflict between the ‘Four Clean-ups’ and the ‘Four non131. Ibid. 132. Since August, 1966 and the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee

of the CPC, Liu Shaoqi conducted numerous self-criticisms before Mao and the

Central Committee of the CPC, and expressed his political commitment, saying:

“I am determined to strictly obey all resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session

and Chairman Mao, and all the disciplines expected of a CPC member, and will be honest with everyone.” (People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter

revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 730–731.)

On January 13, 1967, Liu Shaoqi took the initiative and announced his plans to resign

and return to his hometown before meeting with Mao.

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Clean-ups’ failed to define the nature of the conflicts in socialist society, since the conflict between honest and corrupt officials also existed in feudal society.” Chen Boda’s explanation provides a historical perspective on Mao’s motivation in launching the Cultural Revolution.133 On March 10, Kang Sheng delivered a speech at the meeting for army officers at the corps level, saying: “What is the two-line struggle? Chairman Mao remarked that the two-line struggle had long existed and simply intensified in the Cultural Revolution. What is the nature of the Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping Line? It defies Mao Zedong’s revolutionary line and decides whether the People’s Republic of China follows the socialist or the capitalist line.”134 Kang also announced, “Liu Shaoqi opposed the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC studying Mao Zedong Thought in 1957 and showed negative attitudes towards the denouncing of Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng at the Lushan Conference in 1959. He advocated individual farming in 1962 and initiated the rightist movement in 1964. In the Cultural Revolution, he followed the bourgeois reactionary line.”135 Kang made these criticisms of Liu and Deng on behalf of Mao. Since Mao proposed treating Liu and Deng differently, Liu was denounced according to the above instructions. Kang played a vital role in bombarding and framing Liu, and organized the fabrication of materials on Liu and their provision to Mao, Zhou, and other leaders. On March 16, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated the Written Comments on the Historical Materials Related to the Surrender and Betrayal of the Party by Bo Yibo, Liu Lantao, An Ziwen, Yang Xianzhen, and Other Cadres, and the associated appendixes. The Comments stated that “the surrender and betrayal of the party by Bo Yibo and other cadres was plotted by Liu Shaoqi and approved by Zhang Wentian behind Mao’s back rather than being done according to proper processes as had been reported to the Central Committee of the CPC. Under the auspices of Liu Shaoqi and his allies, this group of traitors was appointed to senior Party, government and military posts. A minority of this group of traitors made sacrifices in the anti-Japanese war and the majority sneaked into the Party and became faithful followers of the Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping bourgeois reactionary line, and of counter-revolutionary revisionists and capitalist roaders within the Party.” On April 14, Liu Shaoqi responded: “The Minister of Organization of the North Bureau, Ke Qingshi proposed to let the cadres in prison perform simple release 133. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 246–247.

134. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Meeting of Army Officers at the Corps Level,” March 10, 1967.

135. Ibid.

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formalities, and I wrote to the Northern Shaanxi Central Committee of the CPC to report this and let them make a final decision. Shortly after, I received the reply from the Central Committee of the CPC, as well as received three written release conditions proposed by the cadres in prison and signed by Zhang Wentian. After reading the reply, the cadres in prison learned that the Central Committee of the CPC approved their release with the completion of simple formalities. I then sent the reply to Ke Qingshi and entrusted him with dealing with this political matter. At that time, Zhang Wentian (also known as Luo Fu) presided over the day-to-day work of the Central Committee of the CPC and told me he had replied without reporting the matter to Chairman Mao, but had held a meeting to discuss it. I did not inquire further about the formalities involved until I recently read relevant information and learned they had published an anti-Communist notice from the Rebellion Newspaper. Therefore I should assume responsibility.”136 On March 21, Mao personally presided over the meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC to discuss and approve the Review Report on Historical Materials Regarding Liu Shaoqi, and officially ordered the distribution of relevant materials to the Wang Guangmei Case Group (managed by Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Xie Fuzhi) for investigation.137 Without discussion and approval by the National Congress of the CPC, the National Representative Conference of the CPC, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the National People’s Congress, the “Wang Guangmei Case Group” was renamed the “Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei Case Group.”138 Subsequently, Lin Biao wrote a 136. People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 733–735.

137. Qi Benyu recalled that Kang Sheng was designated to organize this work. The Central

Committee of the CPC made no express provision for the establishment of a special case

group dealing with Liu Shaoqi, but Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Xie Fuzhi established one anyway. From May of that year, the “Wang Guangmei Case Group” began to be verbally referred to as the “Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei Case Group.” However, all documents and reports on Liu were produced under the name of the “Wang Guangmei

Case Group” rather than the “Liu Shaoqi Case Group” or the “Liu Shaoqi and Wang

Guangmei Case Group.” This changed only in the middle of April, 1968.

On May 18, 1967, when clarifying the tasks of the “Wang Guangmei Case Group,” Xie

Fuzhi said: “The real purpose of the Wang Guangmei Case Group is to investigate the political and historical errors of Liu Shaoqi.” On September 5 of the same year, Xie told

the members of the case group: “To investigate Wang Guangmei is to investigate Liu Shaoqi. Understand this vital point and never forget it.”

138. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu

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letter to the “Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei Case Group” to praise Jiang for her “outstanding case work and great achievements.” Jiang thus played a pivotal role in fabricating the Liu Shaoqi injustice case.139 Mao personally approved the Liu Shaoqi injustice case and it was subsequently endorsed by the enlarged Eighth Session of the 12th Central Committee of the CPC. On March 23, Mao commented on the article “Patriotism or National Betrayal? Commentary on the Reactionary Film Secrets of The Qing Court,” saying: “The commentary is terrific.” He also made many modifications to the article.140 On March 28, Liu wrote a letter to clarify the facts surrounding the case, and said: “I did not appraise the film Secrets of the Qing Court as a patriotic film, and it is impossible for me to have uttered such words.”141 Mao did not reply to Liu’s letter. Instead, he authorized Qi Benyu, Member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, to publish “Patriotism or National Betrayal? Commentary on the Reactionary Film Secrets of the Qing Court” in Red Flag on March 30. Acting on behalf of Mao, Qi Benyu denounced Liu Shaoqi as the number one capitalist roader within the Party. Qi’s article falsely accused Liu of committing eight crimes,142 and vilified him as “a false revolutionary, counter-revolutionary Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 654. 139. According to Jin Chunming, Mao had previously read the report about Liu Shaoqi

submitted by the case group, but initially did not believe it. He then asked for all other relevant information and carefully read it. Finally he decided he believed the report and thus approved it. (Jin, History of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 269–270.)

140. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 292–294.

141. Liu Shaoqi wrote to Mao to report on the rumor mongering being encouraged by some

people, including Zhang Chunqiao, in their evaluations of the Secrets of the Qing Court: “I did see the movie Secrets of the Qing Court. I remember I watched the movie at Chun Ou Zhai after meeting at the Chairman’s place, after midnight and finished it in the

early morning hours, so I do not remember the last part. I was with Premier Zhou

Enlai, Hu Qiaomu, and possibly some others. We went our separate ways after the movie finished, and without discussing it further.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 654.)

142. In the article, Qi Benyu rhetorically asked Liu Shaoqi: “Why did you bring out the

capitulating line of ‘a new stage of peace and democracy’? Why did you oppose the socialist reconstruction of capitalist industry and commerce, as well as agricultural cooperatives? Why did you attempt to restructure cooperatives after the liberation?

Why did you advocate the theory of the elimination of class struggle and positively support cooperation among different classes and the ending of class struggle? During

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and a ‘Chinese Khrushchev’ rather than a veteran revolutionary.”143 Liu realized the article was an attempt to frame him and flew into a rage after reading it. He remarked: “The article typifies frivolous struggle within the Party and it may be widely debated by the Central Committee of the CPC and the masses!”144 After Qi Benyu published the article, Liu Shaoqi was anonymously denounced or attacked in various newspapers and magazines throughout China. On April 7, Wang Hongwen published the article titled “Attacking the Chinese Khruschev” in the People’s Daily145 and was subsequently appointed to a senior post by Mao. the three years of difficulties, why did you respond to the ‘monsters and demons’

attacking the three flags at home and abroad by advocating the revisionist roads of ‘private land management, free markets, individual responsibility for losses and profits, and fixing farm output quotas at the household level’? Why did you also seek

‘detente with imperialists, revisionists, India, and reactionaries abroad, and reduced assistance for the international national liberation movement’? Why did you, in 1962,

republish the illegal work Discussion on Culture which is filled with double speak, and

denies revolution, class struggle, power seizure and proletarian dictatorship, opposes

Marxism and Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and promotes a corrupted bourgeois

worldview and reactionary bourgeois mentality? Why did you advocate and promote

the rightist opportunist line in the name of leftists in the social education movement to

destroy it? Why did you collude with another big capitalist roader in the CPC (Deng Xiaoping) and promote the bourgeois reactionary line in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution? There is only one answer: you are not an old revolutionist! You are a fake

revolutionist, and a counter-revolutionist. You are a Khrushchev hiding among us!” (Red Flag, issue 5, 1967; republished by the People’s Daily, April 1, 1967.)

143. This article was published in issue 5 of Red Flag on March 30, 1967, then republished the next day by other major media including People’s Daily.

144. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 256–257.

145. Wang Hongwen’s article claimed: “Qi Benyu’s ‘Patriotism or National Betrayal’ beats

the war drums for a political attack on the biggest capitalist roader in the CPC. The

illegal speeches of the biggest capitalist roader in the CPC as disclosed by Qi Benyu fully

reveal the ugly face of a follower of the bourgeoisie. This biggest capitalist roader in the

CPC is a schemer like Khrushchev. Our worker class owns the state. What we most care about is maintaining political stability, and thus ensuring the future and destiny of our

great nation. We must never allow ambitious schemers to cheat others. We must topple and sideline this Chinese Khrushchev. We will destroy his reputation!” (People’s Daily,

April 7, 1967.) Wang Hongwen then acted as the representative of revolutionary mass organizations, namely the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, and also served as the

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On April 6, the Zhongnanhai Weidong Revolutionary Rebel Brigade issued the Emergency Orders (No. 2 Order) to Liu and asked him to respond to the “Eight Questions” raised in the article by Qi Benyu. On April 14, Liu wrote the Selfexamination Addressed to the South China Sea Weidong Revolutionary Rebel Brigade to refute the “Eight Questions” using historical facts146 and offer historical answers to the alleged “61-traitor Case.”147 Liu’s reply was displayed on the wall of Zhongnanhai via big-character posters, but was torn down within just a few hours. Subsequently, Liu was completely deprived of his rights to defend himself.148 On April 8, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng met to officially relay Mao’s criticism of Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party at the office building of the Central Military Commission of the CPC,149 and said: “The book espouses the philosophy of idealism and revolts against Marxism. Even Chiang Kai-shek appreciates it, for in reality it advocates individual cultivation instead of class struggle and political power struggle.”150 The same day, the People’s Daily published the editorial “Holding the Banner of Proletarian Revolutionary Criticism” and proposed criticizing Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party by “the number one capitalist roader in the Party.”151 chief of the Shanghai worker rebellion command. 146. People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 733–735.

147. Liu Shaoqi said: “This question is ridiculous! The action regarding the 61 prisoners was approved by the Central Committee of the CPC. With the Japanese army about to attack Northern China we had to protect these officials from being killed by the

Japanese. At that time the Wang Ming line had destroyed a major part of the party

organizations in ‘White areas’, making these officials all the more valuable to us. Many leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC learned the truth of this event soon after

it occurred.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 655.) 148. Ibid, 656. 149. This refers to the work “Discussion on the Culture of Communists,” which included parts 1 and 2 of Liu’s speech on communist culture in the Yan’an College of Marxism and Leninism, first published in Issues 81–84 of Liberation, the internal publication of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1939.

150. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 260.

151. The editorial claimed: “The work ‘Culture’ is a complete deviation from practical class struggle, revolution, and political struggle. It ignores the truth that political power is the key to revolution. The work advocates bourgeois culture rather than proletarian

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On April 10, rebels from Tsinghua University organized a rally attended by 300,000 people to accuse and denounce Wang Guangmei, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Bo Yibo, and Jiang Nanxiang.152 The next day, the People’s Daily published the article “We should Fiercely Attack the Number One Capitalist Roader within the Party and Further Mobilize the Country to Criticize Liu Shaoqi.”153 On May 8, the Red Flag and People’s Daily, with Mao’s approval, published the article titled “Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party — Revolting against the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and remarked: “Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party is the representative work of the first capitalist roader within the Party, and revolts against Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”154 The article was drafted by Wang Li and Guan Feng, modified by Chen Boda, and reviewed and modified by Mao.155 On May 11, the Central Committee of the CPC officially announced: “The article titled ‘Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party—Revolting against the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,’ was discussed and endorsed by the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, and personally dictatorship, and promotes intellectualism, bourgeois individualism, and slavery. The

work opposes Marxism and Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought.” (People’s Daily,

April 8, 1967.)

152. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 260.

153. This article claimed: “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched and led by

Chairman Mao is a struggle to conduct socialist revolution to the end, and a great political movement to eradicate the roots of revisionism, prevent the restoration

of capitalism, and safeguard the nature of our party and state. This movement has

unveiled a small number of capitalist roaders and identified the biggest capitalist roader behind them. This is the greatest victory of Mao Zedong Thought, and a great victory of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao. The three

articles published in Red Flag, including “Patriotism or National Betrayal,” “The Bourgeois Reactionary Line Concerning Cadres in Governmental Positions Must be

Criticized” and “‘Purge Many and Protect a Few’, the Integral Features of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line” beat the drums of war for an attack on the biggest capitalist roader in the CPC. A mass movement to thoroughly criticize the biggest capitalist roader in the

CPC is in progress across the country and within the PLA, and is both deep and wide.” (People’s Daily, April 11, 1967.) 154. Red Flag, issue 6, 1967. 155. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 322–325.

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approved by our great leader Chairman Mao. The article is exceptionally accurate. By presenting facts and giving reasons, it strikes back at revisionism and publicizes Mao Zedong Thought. Therefore, our revolutionary comrades from different units should seriously study and discuss it, and should further criticize the minority of capitalist roaders within the Party.”156 Mao had previously encouraged the public criticism of Liu. Back in February, Zhang Chunqiao had openly relayed Mao’s directive at the mass rally held in Shanghai, saying: “Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party misled the masses and favored the bourgeoisie, and so we should bitterly criticize it.” On March 9, Chen Boda had officially relayed Mao’s latest directive on criticizing Liu Shaoqi’s Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party at the meeting of army officers above the corps level.157 On May 18, the People’s Daily and Red Flag published the article titled “Valuable Historical Documents,”158 which denounced Liu Shaoqi as a Chinese Khrushchev.159 On July 4, the director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC, Wang Dongxing officially notified Liu that he should undertake self-criticism to the August First Rebel Brigade from Beijing University of Civil Engineering and 156. Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC Concerning the Criticism of Liu Shaoqi’s “Culture”,

May 11, 1967. At this time, Liu Shaoqi was a member of Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.

157. Chen Boda said: “Chairman Mao believes that this book (Commentary on the Culture of the Communist Party) deviates from class struggle and the struggle of the proletariat

to seize power. It simply talks about personal culture, and is nothing but rubbish.

Class struggle does appear in the book, but remains conceptual and is never taken

seriously. This book was written during the anti-Japanese struggle, but the author

did not analyze how the proletariat should act during this period. Chairman Mao said, this book is platonic, and inconsistent with Marxism and Leninism. This book

contains many Marxist and Leninist concepts, including class struggle, but the focus is shifted from class struggle to personal culture. The book advocates bourgeois personal culture. Chairman Mao has said that stressing personal culture without practical, realworld class struggle and power-seizure was acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek and other

bourgeoisie.” (“Chen Boda’s Speech at the Meeting of Army Officers at Corps Level,” March 9, 1967.)

158. The document referred to was the “May 16 Circular.” Mao made multiple comments

on and modifications to “Valuable Historical Documents.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 350–352.)

159. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 656.

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Architecture. On July 9, Liu performed self-criticism under compulsion.160 On August 5, the People’s Daily carried Mao’s “Bombard the Headquarters” the Red Flag and People’s Daily published an editorial with the same title, which claimed: “There are two opposing headquarters—a proletarian headquarters led by Chairman Mao and a bourgeois headquarters led by the Chinese Khrushchev. Liu Shaoqi is the main capitalist roader within the Party, a veteran opportunist, revisionist, and a representative of the bourgeoisie who has sneaked into our Party. During struggle, Mao unmasked Liu Shaoqi and his naked ambition as the biggest hidden scourge within our Party.”161 On October 9, Chen Boda and Jiang Qing attacked Liu by officially submitting the Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev Liu Shaoqi to Mao,162 together with an attached “Publication Note.”163 In response, Mao issued instructions, and 160. People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi, 736–743.

161. Red Flag, 1967, issue 13, p 16, published on August 17. 162. Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev — Liu Shaoqi was published and circulated in 1967 by the Materials Room of the People’s Press.

163. The “Publication Note” stated: “We should identify a small clique of capitalist roaders within the CPC, and their general agent Liu Shaoqi. We should smash the bourgeois

headquarters hidden in the proletarian authorities headed by Liu Shaoqi. Achieving

this will be a great victory of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao! The great leader Chairman Mao pointed out: ‘We should pay special

attention to individual plotters and schemers like the Soviet Union’s Khrushchev, and should prevent these bad people from controlling the leadership of the party and the

state.” The biggest capitalist roader in the CPC, Liu Shaoqi, is just the type of plotter

and schemer Chairman Mao referred to. Once he gets an opportunity, he will seize control of the Party and government, and will turn the proletarian dictatorship into

a bourgeois dictatorship. For a long time, this Chinese Khrushchev shamelessly pretended to be a senior revolutionary. Before the founding of the New China, he worked furiously with various opportunists to oppose the armed seizure of power and advocate an electoral route to gaining power. After the nationwide victory, he strongly

opposed proletarian dictatorship and socialist revolution on the pretext of lagging

productivity and instead pushed for capitalism. After the basic completion of the socialist reconstruction of the ownership of production materials, he advocated ending

class struggle, reconciliation among classes, and ‘individual management of land, free markets, individual responsibility for profits and losses, and the fixing of farm output

quotas at the household level’, attacked the three flags, and tried to restore capitalism. In the furious international class struggle, he pushed the line of capitulationism and

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recommended their attacks not mention Deng Xiaoping.164 The same day, Xie Fuzhi and Qi Benyu met rebels determined to attack Liu and supported them in attacking Liu, Deng, and Tao Zhu.165 At the time Liu was a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, Central Politburo of the CPC, and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and his individual rights (including the right to defend himself) were protected by the national and party constitutions. However, without holding the meeting of the Central Politburo of the CPC, the meeting of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, and the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC to discuss and vote on the Liu Shaoqi case, Mao unilaterally criticized sought ‘surrender and the extinguishing of the revolutionary mass movement’. Liu

Shaoqi is a real fake revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, a senior opportunist, and the most important agent of the bourgeoisie hidden within the proletarian

authorities. We must be clear. Neither the small number of capitalist roaders in the

CPC nor China’s Khrushchev can change their counter-revolutionary natures, though

they have been uncovered by the revolutionary masses and are now as doomed as a dog in the water. They are still alive and do not want to give up. They continue to wait

for change. If we forget numerous bloody historical lessons and allow them to get their way, the proletarian revolutionaries and revolutionary masses will be killed and the glorious achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will disappear. The

comments of Liu Shaoqi provide useful negative teaching materials, and the proletarian revolutionaries should carefully read and criticize them with the sharpest weapon,

invincible Mao Zedong Thought.” (People’s Publishing House Materials Room comp., Counter-revolutionary Comments of China’s Khrushchev—Liu Shaoqi.)

164. Mao changed the phrases “He (Liu Shaoqi), together with Deng Xiaoping, another big capitalist roader in the CPC” and “He, together with other some capitalists” in the

“Publication Note.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 422.)

165. Qi Benyu said, “Today is August 5, and the first anniversary of the publication of ‘Bombarding the Headquarters’ by our great leader Chairman Mao. One year ago, Chairman Mao launched a general mobilization campaign to eliminate a small number

of the largest capitalist roaders within the CPC! Our Red Guards and revolutionary

workers are the good students of Chairman Mao. In response to the call of Chairman Mao, and to drive the biggest capitalist roaders from the CPC and prevent the Party

becoming rotten, we call on Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu to surrender

themselves! Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu are scared to come out. They have hidden in a dark corner. What should we do? The masses answer: Draw them out!”

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members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in central newspapers; this contravened the Party Constitution. Meanwhile, without holding the National People’s Congress or the meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, he abused his position of power and publicly criticized, slandered, and vilified Chairman Liu Shaoqi, all in violation of the constitution. Mao had presided over the drafting of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (1956) and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954), yet for the sake of political struggle he negated, violated, and ultimately destroyed both these laws. Although he won political victory by attacking and purging Liu Shaoqi, his actions adversely affected the Party and nation. The basic systems of the Party and Country were destroyed, the national and party constitutions ceased functioning, and Liu, the CPC, and the country suffered great tragedy. On October 31, Liu was expelled from the Party and dismissed from his posts through noninstitutional means at the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Kang Sheng and his allies fabricated the incident of “Bo Yibo and Other Cadres Surrendering in Exchange for Release from Prison” and set a precedent for unmasking traitors across China. Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and their allies falsely alleged that a Liu Shaoqi traitor group line existed in China and thus fabricated unjust cases such as the “Xinjiang Traitor Group Case,” “Northeast China Traitor Group Case,” and “South China Traitor Group Case.”166 The hostile political environment made it possible to fabricate the unjust cases against Liu and others. Tragedy resulted because Zhou Enlai failed to persuade Mao not to fabricate the case against Liu, or to persuade the Red Guards conducting the campaign to “unmask traitors” across China not to twist the Wu Hao Affair into a fabricated case against himself — the case actually targeted Zhou himself, since ‘Wu Hao’ was an alias he had previously used. On May 17, Jiang reported the “Materials Relevant to the Resignation of Wu Hao and Other Cadres from the Chinese Community Party” (1932) to Lin, Zhou, and Kang. The same day, Zhou stated historical facts,167 checked old newspapers printed in Shanghai (namely 166. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), vol. 2, 654.

167. Zhou Enlai instructed: “The announcement regarding Wu Hao and others leaving the CPC was a ruse by our enemies. We know it is a ruse because it simply listed 243

persons and did not give names. I was staying in the Soviet Area at that time, but Kang Sheng and Chen Yun were in Shanghai and knew it was simply an enemy scheme. We took appropriate measures.” “Zhou Enlai’s instructions on the letter of Jiang Qing dated May 17.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1921.)

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the Chronicle for 1931–1932) and wrote a letter to explain that the declaration was a forgery.168 Significantly, rather than reply to Zhou’s letter, Mao instructed that historical materials for the purpose of framing Zhou and ending his political life be sent to Lin and the Central Cultural Revolution Group for review and record keeping purposes.169 These historical materials handcuffed Zhou politically since Jiang and her allies could frame him as a traitor just as they had done to Liu. Zhou remembered the unjust smearing of his name via the fabrications against Wu Hao throughout his life. Before going into surgery on September 20, 1975, he requested that his ashes not be preserved for fear he would be framed as a traitor after death.170 Besides obtaining information from Jiang and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Mao also obtained information through other private channels. On May 27, 1967, Tang Wensheng (English Translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Wang Hairong (Translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and grandniece of Mao) wrote directly to Mao to report that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had attacked Zhou because he followed the bourgeois reactionary line, defended evil people of all kinds, allied with deputy premiers who had political faults, and supported the “February Counter-current Forces.”171 The environment of the Cultural Revolution was one where everyone became an informer, struggled against rivals, and lived in fear. Even Zhou, who served as a member of the Central Politburo of the CPC and of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC from the Sixth Session of the 1st Central Committee of the Party in 1928, remained insecure and fearful despite being absolutely loyal to Mao, whose Cultural Revolution he strongly supported. The Liu Shaoqi injustice case reflected the ruthless, arbitrary, and unpredictable nature of the Cultural Revolution, and numerous similar cases occurred. From May to June, Li Lisan, former CPC leader and the secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, wrote to Mao on June 22 after having been denounced 14 times and swallowing sleeping pills. He said: “Chairman Mao, unable to defend myself against my accusers, my only option was to commit suicide. Nevertheless, my family and I never colluded with foreign countries and I request that the Central Committee of the CPC conduct an investigation and reach a verdict based on historical facts.” Li Lisan died the same day and his wife Li Sha (who had Soviet citizenship) was unlawfully arrested. 168. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 275–276.

169. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1920–1921. 170. On September 20, 1975, Zhou Enlai signed the article “About the Publication of the Fake News (the Wu Hao Announcement) by the Kuomintang” (Ibid, 2145.)

171. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1732–1733.

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From 1967 to 1971, over 500 senior central and local cadres were imprisoned in Beijing’s Qingcheng Prison, among whom 34 were tortured to death, while over 20 were injured, and more than 60 developed mental illnesses.172 As described in the poem “Long Black Night,” written by Zhang Aiping, former deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA and the deputy director of The Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense of the People’s Republic of China: “The allegations inevitably are not supported by evidence. In the face of national calamity and family disaster, I cannot help lamenting the many heroes who have passed away. How can I spend the long black night!”173 As an iron-handed supporter of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Xie Fuzhi, Minister of Public Security pronounced when speaking to members of the Special Case Group in October 1967: “All the personnel involved in special cases revolted against the proletarian headquarters led by the Chairman, and we should fiercely struggle against them instead of showing them benevolence. Showing mercy to enemies means showing cruelty to comrades.” In the Cultural Revolution, many special cases were handled in a ruthless and dictatorial fashion by following the instructions of Xie Fuzhi to the letter, contributing to the failure of the Cultural Revolution and its end after Mao passed away.

Civil Unrest and Class Struggle After the Central Committee of the CPC counterattacked the “February Countercurrent Forces” in 1967, there was widespread civil unrest across China characterized by factional struggle and violence. On March 16, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission of the CPC issued the Notification to Protect State Properties, Practice Frugality and Carry out Revolution, which pointed out: “State properties were damaged, means of collective economic production were broken up, and equipment and supplies of industrial and mining enterprises, enterprises, organs, schools and other units were destroyed.” The Notification reveals that chaos was such that the funds, collective grain reserves, and seeds of production teams were redistributed without permission. Agricultural production funds were appropriated and agricultural tools and machines were destroyed in rural areas, and public houses were secretly occupied in urban areas. On the same day, the 172. Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 1, 187. 173. Zhang, Song of the Divine Sword — Selected Poems, Calligraphy, and Photographs of Zhang Aiping.

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Central Committee of the CPC issued Several Provisions on Newspaper Publicity at the Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Level. These provisions allowed for the publication of photographs showing those who had been denounced wearing dunce caps or sign boards, and kneeling at public denunciations. In some local newspapers the photographs were accompanied by abuse. The newspapers became tools with which revolutionary organizations attacked each other. On March 20, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Several Provisions on How to Deal with Properties Looted by Red Guards during Illegal Home Searches in the Cultural Revolution, the details of which reveal that Red Guards secretly raided properties for the purpose of looting, refused to hand in confiscated property to the appropriate authorities, and generally displayed a lack of discipline. In spring, Red Guards began a violent struggle that crematorium statistics indicate claimed over seventy lives a day. Hoping to control the situation, Xie Fuzhi, Director of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and Wu De, Deputy Director of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, decided to order the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC and the Beijing Public Security System to issue the Notification to Prohibit Red Guards from Beating People to Death. However, Mao criticized the public security system and Xie for the Notification, saying: “You have suppressed the masses and crushed the Cultural Revolution.” Wu later said: “No one dared to stop the turmoil and quell the violence in Beijing despite people being beaten to death, and the violence was even more serious outside Beijing.”174 Both Mao Zedong and Lin Biao neglected the serious situation and actually hoped to compound the turmoil. On March 20, Lin Biao elaborated on the practical and historical significance of Mao personally staging and commanding the Cultural Revolution at the meeting for army officers above the corps level, and tried to eliminate their doubts and convince them to support the Cultural Revolution (Sidebar 4.3). He said: “You have nothing to fear. We have simply unmasked and beaten off enemies, capitalist roaders, and bourgeois leaders who have infiltrated the Party and our socialist society, and the turmoil has helped us win a victory for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” With regard to the achievements and losses of the Cultural Revolution, Lin remarked, “We sustained minimum losses yet accomplished maximum achievements.”175 He also eulogized that the Chairman showcased the wisdom, courage, experience and prestige of Marxism-Leninism, implying Mao was capable of controlling the situation. Mao really appreciated Lin Biao’s 174. Zhu et al. eds., Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing, 28. 175. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 252–253.

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speech, and deliberately made modifications and issued instructions to circulate it throughout the country.176 On April 24, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated Lin’s speech as instructed by Mao.177 It clearly declared Mao’s intentions and embodied Mao Zedong Thought, and that Lin was a close comrade-in-arms of Mao. Lin’s political stance toward the Cultural Revolution show that he himself was the political product of the movement. It was ironic that he became both the biggest beneficiary of political struggle (as Mao’s successor) and its biggest victim (as a member of the counter-revolutionary clique).178 It was Mao who dominated the Cultural Revolution and politics in China, and Lin failed to really understand this. 176. Mao issued some instructions on and modifications to Lin Biao’s speech. He said:

“This draft is excellent. Please submit to the (Central) Cultural Revolution Group for deliberation and then make brochures for the grass-roots units of the CPC, government,

army, and the masses.” He added: “China is the most important country in the world

right now. Both for its national revolution, and for international revolution, China is a country with a decisive role to play. People talk about the medium countries or big countries, but currently these countries are less important than China. The world retains hope for as long as the PRC continues to exist and maintain its nature. Revisionists and

reactionaries exist everywhere, but we can show them the light and turn them red.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 300–303.)

177. According to Instruction of the Central Committee of the CPC: “This speech, based

on Mao Zedong Thought, highlights the essential issues in the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution movement. It provides important guidance not only for the army in supporting leftists, workers and farmers, as well as in management and training,

but also in carrying out the overall criticism of the small group of important capitalist roaders within the CPC and thoroughly smashing the bourgeois reactionary line.”

(“Instruction of the Central Committee of the CPC Concerning the Transmission of the Draft of Comrade Lin Biao’s Speech,” April 24, 1967.)

178. Four years later, in September, 1971, Lin Biao “courted destruction by attempting to defect and betray our party and the state.” Lin Biao thus was identified as a “bourgeois plotter and schemer” by the Central Committee of the CPC. The notice of the Central

Committee of the CPC on this matter claimed: “The defection of Lin Biao is the

extension of class struggle and line struggle since the Second Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the CPC, which disclosed Lin Biao to be a bourgeois plotter

and schemer.” On reading this analysis Mao simply instructed: “issue as usual.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 269–270.)

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Sidebar 4.3 20, 1967)

Lin Biao’s Remarks on the Cultural Revolution (March

We must adopt a proletarian perspective to understand the “turmoil” of the Cultural Revolution. We used turmoil to unmask and drive off enemies, capitalist roaders and bourgeois leaders who had infiltrated our Party and our socialist society, and thus won a victory for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was intended to conduct serious class struggle. The bourgeoisie initiated the struggle and the proletariat counterattacked using ideological struggle, political power struggle, and economic struggle. Within our great Party, Chairman Mao upheld a correct revolutionary line and safeguarded the interests of the proletariat, whereas Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping followed an incorrect bourgeois reactionary line and served as a proxy of the bourgeoisie. A fierce two-line struggle thus ensued. Individuals plotted to seize power or stage counter-revolutionary coups, capitalist ownership plotted to replace socialist ownership, and landlord and rich peasant ownership plotted to replace the existing system of ownership via people’s communes. The outcome of the struggle would determine the fate of China, and of humanity. We must stress class and class struggle to muster the courage and determination to carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and must admire the extraordinary boldness and courage of Chairman Mao. We must do this to keep pace with Chairman Mao. Otherwise, we will commit the fault of lagging behind. We should focus on the mainstream of the Cultural Revolution. Since we ourselves staged the Cultural Revolution, we have nothing fear from the associated turmoil. The turmoil has allowed us to beat off the capitalist roaders, the bourgeois and their leaders, and the “four olds”, and they suffered chaos and defeat. While the turmoil may have appeared a high price, our cause achieved sustained development. A minority of cadres considered that we paid a heavy price for the Cultural Revolution. In fact, the Cultural Revolution did not cause great losses compared with other great revolutions around the world, and the losses were minimal compared with those suffered in our war of resistance against Japan, in the war of liberation, in other wars, or in disease epidemics. In a word, the Cultural Revolution inflicted minimal losses yet achieved excellent results. However, some comrades misunderstood the gravity of the situation, and gained a negative impression from seeing several notable friends accused and denounced.

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By staging the Cultural Revolution, we unmasked evil people and identified good people. Our actions prevented the evil people assuming leadership. Using the means of democracy, debates, and big-character posters, Red Guards, members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, party members who upheld the correct proletarian line, the masses, and revolutionary leftists have all played a vital role in unmasking evil people of all kinds and capitalist roaders. We purged evil people of all kinds by ensuring political principles overrode factional considerations. The political principles included questions of whether to be proletarian revolutionaries or bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, whether to support or revolt against Chairman Mao, and whether to uphold or resist Marxism-Leninism. We should focus on the mainstream of the Cultural Revolution. Otherwise, we will misunderstand the gravity of the situation on witnessing several veteran comrades being accused and denounced, and will thus be entrapped by our enemies. The fact that some regions enforced military control and appointed many inexperienced cadres was dangerous, and we may have committed faults in allowing this. The Chairman showcased the wisdom, courage, experience, and prestige of Marxism-Leninism in launching this unprecedented movement, one which has shocked the country and the world. The Cultural Revolution is of great historical significance. Without this movement our great achievements of the Democratic Revolution (lasting 28 years) and the Socialist Revolution (lasting 17–18 years) would have been destroyed. Source: Lin Biao: Speech Delivered at the Meeting for Army Officers at the Corps Level, March 20, 1967.

On May 16, Mao met with the Security Delegation of the Government of the Republic of the Congo and acknowledged that China was in a state of turmoil and the Red Guards were resolutely conducting the Cultural Revolution by putting up big-character posters and bombarding and purging enemies. He added: “By relying on the Red Guards, we have identified and resolved challenging problems that we previously failed to address. Without the Red Guards we would have failed to tackle these problems even given more time. Given what has been achieved, the associated turmoil is no great loss.”179 Numerous large-scale violent struggles occurred across China and intensified the widespread turmoil. 179. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1486–1487.

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On July 13, Mao convened a meeting with Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Xiao Hua, and Yang Chengwu. At the meeting, he unveiled his tentative plan for the Cultural Revolution, saying: “I planned to stage the Cultural Revolution in 1966, observe its effects and lay a solid foundation in 1967, and end it in 1968.”180 On August 16, Mao reiterated this timeframe during a meeting with a visiting delegation from Albania.181 However, while Mao announced a 3-year plan for the Cultural Revolution, he had previously unveiled half-year and 1-year plans. The truth was simply that he had initially underestimated the situation, but subsequently became convinced that the class struggle was out of control. Mao lost control of the Cultural Revolution almost as soon as it started. To end the Cultural Revolution as soon as possible, Mao decided to conduct a tour of inspection of Northern, Central, Southern, and Eastern China from July to September to examine the movement’s progress. During the tour he was kept informed of large-scale violent struggle, attacks on military organs, thefts of PLA weapons, equipment and military supplies, and personally endorsed massive numbers of central documents. During his inspection tour, Mao delivered a speech, saying: “The Cultural Revolution has reached its moment of glory in July, August, and September, as the masses are mobilized. Although some regions have entered a state of turmoil, our enemies have been distracted and beaten off, and the will of the masses has been strengthened. The overall situation will improve in the coming months. We expect the Cultural Revolution will end next spring.”182 The composer Li Jiefu published the song “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Is in Its Moment of Glory—Music Composed to Celebrate Chairman Mao’s Directive.”183 The song spread across China, presenting a false picture of peace and prosperity and covering up the bloodshed and violence caused by both the rebels and the army’s suppression of them. On October 7, the Central Committee of the CPC officially circulated Mao’s speech during the inspection tour of Southern China.184 From July to September, the Cultural Revolution peaked in serious turmoil, as “comprehensive power seizure” escalated into “comprehensive violent struggle” 180. Zhang, Records of Interviews with General Yang Shangkun, 39. 181. Mao said, “Our plan is for this movement to last three years. The first year will see the

movement launched. Success will be achieved in the second year, and the movement will be completed in the third year. The three years started from June last year (1966).” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1500.)

182. Zhang, Records of Interviews with General Yang Shangkun, 40. 183. Red Flag, issue 16, 1967. 184. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 385.

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and “comprehensive civil unrest.” (Sidebar 4.4) Mao, Lin, Zhou, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group all understood the situation and the Central Committee of the CPC issued various notifications and orders to quell social unrest. According to statistics, the Central Committee of the CPC issued 24 notifications and orders during July 1967, 32 during August 1967, and 22 during September 1967, totaling 78 notifications and orders during these three months. This was the peak of activity in issuing central documents since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.185 On June 3, Zhou criticized rebels from the Seventh Ministry of MachineBuilding of the PRC for waging factional struggle and causing civil unrest. On August 24, he reproached two factional representatives from Guangxi Province for stirring up civil unrest, and described the conflict as more serious than the warlord conflicts. On September 1, he expressed opposition to civil unrest when meeting with rebels from Guangzhou.186 However, Zhou was deliberately isolated and so received little information related to civil unrest. Despite his best efforts to end the unrest, the various conflicts naturally tended to escalate, and he had only a limited capacity to quell them. On July 20, Xie Fuzhi, Alternate Member of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and Deputy Leader of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group, and Wang Li, Member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and Deputy Editor of Red Flag were assaulted in Wuhan after having been sent there to address issues related to the Cultural Revolution on behalf of Mao. This incident came to be known as the Wuhan Incident (also called the ‘July 20 Event’). With approval from Mao, the PLA Wuhan Military Region issued a notification, saying:187 “The ‘July 20 Event’ was instigated by a few military officers 185. Song ed., The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.. 186. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1748. 187. On July 24, 1967, with the approval of Mao, the Wuhan Military Area of the PLA released

a proclamation that was published in the People’s Daily on June 29. On November

26, 1978, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated the “Report Concerning the Handling of the ‘July 20 Event’ in Wuhan” to the Hubei Provincial Committee of the

CPC, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee and Wuhan Military Area Committee of the CPC. The report announced: “Through long investigation, we found the ‘July 20

Event’ to be a significant event planed by Lin Biao and the ‘Gang of Four’ to oppose

Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, and the CPC, disturb the army, provoke the masses to struggle with one another, and ultimately to destroy the Great Cultural Revolution and seize the power of the party and the state. This plot was integral to their scheme.”

The report continued: “After the event, Lin Biao and the ‘Gang of Four’ opposed the instructions of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou, and claimed the ‘July 20 Event’ was

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with ulterior motives, and the commander of the PLA Wuhan Military Region, Chen Zaidao, and his allies are the chief culprits.” Subsequently, numerous senior leaders from the Wuhan Military Region were accused and denounced as capitalist roaders, Unit 8210 was framed as a “rebel army,” many families of soldiers and officers were denounced as “rebel family members,” unit leaders were accused as reactionaries, family members of members of allied mass organizations were denounced as “bandit family members,” and even cadres and masses who showed sympathy to Unit 8210 were persecuted. On July 22, Jiang met with the representatives of the masses from Commune No. 27 in Henan, and said: “You are entitled to take up arms to defend yourselves if the evil minority factions that have instigated violent struggles continue to resort to arms even after agreeing to end violent struggle. I remember that a revolutionary organization in Henan coined the excellent slogan ‘Attack with the pen and defend with the sword.’ You should be alert to class enemies. When enemies resort to armed force, revolutionaries will suffer heavy losses if they refuse to take up arms themselves. The ‘July 20 Event’ is an example.”188 On July 23, the Wenhui Daily published the slogan “Attack with the pen and defend with the weapon,” which soon became the slogan of local rebel organizations across China. Rebels attacked military organs and factories and stole their weapons, escalating violent struggle and causing civil unrest. On July 28, Xie Fuzhi spoke at the Central Meeting of Representatives of Mass Organizations in the Political and Legal Sectors, and said: “The public security organs, procuratorate organs, and people’s courts should form a revolutionary alliance and purge Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Luo Ruiqing.” On July 27, Lin presided over a meeting convened to decide on whether to remove Chen Zaidao and Zhong Hanhua (Political Commissar of the Wuhan Military Region) from their official posts within the Party, and remarked that the Wuhan Incident was of national importance, and it was imperative to root out the Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping Line and purge the capitalist roaders in the army.189 a ‘pure counter-revolutionary event’. Using all the publicity tools under their control,

they spread counter-revolutionary public opinions and conducted revolutionary

suppression of the army and masses in the Wuhan area.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 381–382.) In fact, Mao, Lin, Zhou, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group jointly instigated the Wuhan Incident.

188. “Jiang Qing’s Speech when Interviewing Revolutionary Representatives from Henan,” July 22, 1967.

189. Yang, Autobiography of Yang Chengwu, 294.

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Sidebar 4.4 “Comprehensive Violent Struggle” (April 1967 to September 1967) On April 14, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao to report that struggle between rebels had affected the Guangzhou Fair, and then went to Guangzhou to personally resolve the conflict. On April 29, rebels strongly resisted the PLA. Stationed troops who supported leftists were scolded and arrested, their spouses beaten and scolded, and their children also beaten. The rebels also attacked numerous factories and enterprises. On May 4, the PLA Shandong Provincial Military Region sent a telegram to the Jinan Military Region, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and the PLA Cultural Revolution Group, and reported that rebels had attacked the PLA across Shandong Province. The specifics of the attacks included: 1. The display and distribution of big-character posters, slogans, and leaflets targeting the PLA, and the purging of almost all the officers that had assumed leadership positions on the revolutionary committees of soldiers, cadres and masses from provincial military regions, sub-commands, and departments at the municipal and county levels; 2. Attacks on and sieges of military organs, and kidnappings of soldiers and officers; 3. Insults, beatings, accusations, and denouncements of PLA officers and soldiers, from the leadership to the grassroots, causing many military subcommands and departments at the municipal and county levels to cease normal functioning, affecting fight readiness and other work, and paralyzing many local provisional authorities. On May 6, violent struggles and bloodshed occurred in Chengdu, Sichuan. On May 7, large-scale violent struggles took place in Urumqi, Xinjiang, and spread from there across the rest of the autonomous region. The whole of 1967 saw a total of 117 violent struggles, causing over 700 deaths and 5,000 injuries. On May 11, violent struggles broke out in Beijing and intensified as rebels commandeered vehicles and some units dispatched workers to participate in breach of labor discipline. Numerous workers took unexplained absences from work, and many state properties were severely damaged. On May 20, the PLA Artillery Academy Hongda Rebel Brigade attacked various military organs, arrested a deputy political commissar, and stole important documents and materials. On May 25, numerous people died in a violent clash between two major rebel factions from Guangxi Province. On May 27, most units within certain ministries of the State Council contained two fighting rebel factions, negatively affecting business and production.

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Therefore the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group decided to place the ministries of the State Council under military control. This was successfully done with the approval of Mao Zedong. On June 1, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Order to Resolutely Maintain Railway and Transportation Order. This demonstrated that orderly transportation had been severely disrupted by revolutionary students and masses riding trains and boats without tickets, sneaking onto trucks, intercepting trains, cars, and ships, and blocking traffic by lying on railway tracks. On June 6, the Central Committee of the CPC, State Council, Central Military Commission of the CPC, and Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the “June 6 Circular Order”, which sought to stop rebels making arrests, ransacking units, illegally searching homes, setting up illegal courts, destroying the official archives, documents, and stamps of Party, government and military organs, beating enemies, looting, and forming gangs to fight other units. On June 19, Yan Jingtang and other rebel leaders from the Guangxi Alliance Command commanded the Reserve Brigade, Bloodshed Brigade, and other rebel brigades to besiege and attack the stronghold at the “Kindling Building” of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Hydroelectric Investigation and Design Institute, waging violent struggle and killing 62 people. On June 25, the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification on Prohibiting Rebels from Attacking the Central Military Commission Cultural Revolution Group. On June 29, the Jiangxi Proletarian Revolutionary Alliance Preparatory Committee attacked military organs and stole their weapons. From June 3 to June 30, incomplete statistics record that 108 people died and 2,774 people were injured in violent struggles in Wuhan. In July, peasants travelled into towns and cities in Jiangxi, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Henan, Anhui, Ningxia, and Shanxi to participate in numerous violent struggles. Rebels mobilized peasants to make weapons, armed them with guns and ammunition, and commanded them to besiege factories and mines, organs and schools and set up road blocks on railways, roads, and waterways to intercept vehicles and vessels and disrupt transport. In July, large-scale violent struggles in some regions affected grain transportation, processing, and supply. The tight supply led to grain robberies, production stoppages involving grain processors, and supply disruptions, and

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affected the normal life of urban and rural people. Mao Zedong issued instructions that prohibited peasants from entering towns and cities to participate in violent struggle. From July 14 to late August, two mass factions from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region fought to obtain weaponry and ammunition that they then used to wage violent struggle. On July 20, two mass factions from Luzhou, Sichuan waged a violent and bloody struggle that resulted in the sinking of a ship, four deaths, and dozens of injuries. From September to July of the following year, Luzhou witnessed two further large-scale violent struggles, causing several hundred deaths and a larger number of injuries. In August, the Ministry of Coal Industry waged violent struggle, terrorized factional enemies, destroyed equipment, and stopped production. On August 14, the Liaison Office for Unmasking Military Capitalist Roaders was set up in Taiyuan, Shanxi, and abducted and unlawfully detained for 56 days the deputy commander of the Shanxi Provincial Military Region, Zhao Guanying. On August 17, large-scale struggle took place at Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation, the largest iron and steel producer in China, and the Central Committee of the CPC decided to exert military control over the entire city of Anshan, including its iron and steel production base. On August 20, the Red Battle Corps Headquarters of the Ministry of Chemical Industry stole confidential national archive materials (filling 11 trucks in doing so.) On August 21, three mass factions from Shenyang, Liaoning (the Mao Zedong Thought 8.31 Shenyang Revolutionary Rebellion General Command, Liaoning Proletarian Revolutionary Liaison Office, and Liaoning Revolutionary Rebel Alliance Committee) reached an agreement with one another to cease violent struggle, beatings, vandalism and theft, illegal home searches, unlawful arrests, and killings. On August 23, large-scale violent struggle and bloodshed occurred in Fuzhou, Jiangxi. On August 26, a massacre took place in Haifeng County, Guangdong, in which over 100 people died, over 400 were seriously injured, and over 3,000 people suffered minor injuries. The same day, a large-scale struggle took place in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang, in which over 90 people were killed and many others were injured. On August 28, the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Special Official Letter to Strictly Prohibit Nuclear Submarine Research Units

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from Waging Violent Struggle, Attacking Production Units, or Stopping Production. Serous bloodshed occurred the same day in Qingtongxia, Ningxia, claiming 101 lives and leaving 133 people injured. From late July to late August, a large quantity of weapons and ammunition was stolen from the Shaoyang Military Sub-command and Shaoyang Municipal Department of the People’s Armed Forces. In August, numerous fierce violent struggles took place in Guizhou. On September 2, a large-scale struggle occurred in Xi’an, Shanxi, in which rebel factions deployed tanks, fire engines, machine guns and rifles. The struggle claimed nearly 100 lives and resulted in over 290 injured. On September 23, secret radio stations were set up to broadcast illegal programs, and wireless transmission stations, portable radio transmitters, and telephone transceivers were unlawfully installed to enable secret communications using codes in certain regions. The Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group thus issued the Orders on the Banning of Illegal Wireless Stations, Radio Stations and Portable Radio Transmitters. Sources: Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and

Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”; Yang ed., Museum of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), vol. 1, 187.

On August 1, Wang Li and Guan Feng published an editorial in issue No. 12 of the Red Flag that openly attacked Liu Shaoqi as a “Chinese Khrushchev,” denounced as his military proxies Peng Dehuai and Luo Ruiqing, and instigated a national movement against capitalist roaders within the Party and army.190 On August 4, Wang Hongwen led tens of thousands of rebels in an attack against the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory, and in the ensuing fighting both sides suffered serious casualties. Zhang Chunqiao reported the results of the struggle to Mao, who remarked, “Well-done!” Zhang, Yao, and Wang had previously planned the violence, and had reported their plans to Mao.191 After he arrived in Nanjing and witnessed that its best hotel had been burnt down, Mao commented, “our enemies have been distracted, but the masses have tempered their willpower through

190. Red Flag editorial board: “The Proletariat Must Control Weapons—Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese PLA.” (Red Flag, issue 12, 1967.)

191. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 33.

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violent struggle.”192 Clearly, Mao understood the gravity of the violent struggle and considered the violence legitimate, and his support was critical for Jiang and the Central Cultural Revolution Group to carry on violent struggle across China. On August 7, Wang Li met with representatives from the Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and expressed his support for power seizure in the Ministry. He also agreed with them on the slogan “Purge Chen Yi.” Subsequently, a rally was held by the foreign affairs organizations to attack Chen Yi, and Zhou attended in Chen Yi’s defense. The same day, Xie Fuzhi delivered a speech at the Ministry of the Public Security, saying: “We call for completely negating the people’s public security system, procuratorate system, and court system, and shattering the old state apparatus.” Additionally, Xie and Kang fabricated the threat of a reactionary public security ministry through the Luo Ruiqing case, and cruelly persecuted many cadres who worked in the public security sector, the procuratorate, and the people’s courts. Mao fully supported this, and told Zhou that he was overjoyed to hear of the shattering of the public security system, procuratorate, and people’s court. On August 9, Lin Biao spoke with the leaders of the Wuhan Military Region, saying: “We staged the Cultural Revolution based on Mao Zedong Thought, Chairman Mao’s prestige, and the PLA, and are capable of dispelling danger and restoring security. Nowadays, many Party and governmental organs have become paralyzed, and China seems plunged into turmoil. However, this turmoil is both necessary and normal.” In relaying Mao’s assessment of the political situation in China, Lin believed that capitalists and revisionists had infiltrated the existing state apparatus, and thus advocated the establishment of a new state apparatus in place of the old one.193 Lin relayed Mao’s secret birthday speech in 1966 and expressed his loyal support for power seizure encouraged by Mao. Mao strongly praised Lin’s speech, and after making extensive modifications proposed circulating it in the name of the Central Committee of the CPC. On October 19, the Central Committee of the CPC circulated Lin’s speech together with a note strongly praising it.194 At this 192. Ibid. 193. Lin Biao believed: “During the past 18 years (1949–1967), capitalist roaders within the

CPC have controlled the party and governmental authorities. Since the Great Cultural Revolution, some leader groups have collapsed and some state apparatus have failed,

so we must create new state apparatus. The leader groups are very important. They represent the power and state apparatus. The eliminated leader groups left by history failed to become state apparatus and broke down, so the army will take over.” (“Records of Lin Biao’s Speech while Interviewing Zeng Siyu and Liu Feng,” August 9, 1967.)

194. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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time, Mao continued to call for turmoil. When meeting with visiting experts from Albania, Mao claimed: “We need to plunge some regions into turmoil for a period. Without turmoil, we will fail to detect various conflicts and confrontations.”195 On August 19, rebels from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attacked the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proclaimed they had seized the power of the Party Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, forcibly closed the offices of all deputy ministers, and detained in the basement both Ji Pengfei, who presided over the day-to-day work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Qiao Guanhua, who was the deputy minister. On the evening of August 22, over 10,000 people organized by Red Guards and people from the foreign affairs sectors in Beijing staged a rally at the British Embassy, which they attacked and partially burned down. By the early morning of August 23, the fire had been extinguished and Zhou reported the violence to Mao. Rebels had previously attacked the embassies of India, Burma, and Indonesia.196 These four incidents involving attacks on embassies severely tarnished China’s global reputation, and the Chinese government swiftly apologized to the British Government. Zhou had to ascertain the political responsibility for recent events instigated by members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. On the early morning of August 23, he met with rebel leaders and declared the power seizure involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs illegal, invalidated, and subject to investigation and appropriate punishment. He also said that the incident had been reported to Mao on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council. Additionally, he criticized Wang Li for having instigated the rebel seizure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, forced the Ministry of Foreign Trade and other ministries under the State Council to respond politically, burned down the British Embassy, and besieged Zhongnanhai to bombard Liu Shaoqi and unmask capitalist roaders in the army (see the editorial drafted by Guan Feng and published in the Red Flag on August 11.) On the early morning of August 25, Zhou met with the alternate chief of general staff of the PLA and mentioned the series of recent events. Additionally, he forwarded a transcript of the August 7 speech delivered by Wang to Mao. The same afternoon, Yang Chengwu flew to Shanghai to report the issues relating to Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu,197 and to relay Zhou’s opinions. Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 414–416. 195. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1500. 196. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1923–1924. 197. Wang Li was Member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Vice Director of the

External Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, and Vice Editor in

Chief of Red Flag. Guan Feng was a Member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group,

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After listening to Yang Chengwu’s report, Mao took his time before responding.198 Wang, Guan, and Qi were all writers loyal to Mao and overwhelmingly supported him in staging the Cultural Revolution. Since June 1966, among the articles Mao had personally modified and approved for publication, five were by Wang, four by Guan, and two by Qi. Notably, all these articles were vital in staging the Cultural Revolution. They published and relayed Mao’s latest directives and intensions, and served as his political bombs for purging Liu and his allies. Particularly, Qi had published the first article attacking Liu on April 1. After spending a day deliberating,199 on August 26 Mao finally decided to purge the above three members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. His decision took into account Zhou’s opinions, the pressure of world opinion, and aspects of domestic and foreign affairs that were beyond his control. Mao first purged Wang and Guan while temporarily leaving Qi in his post. In August 1967, Wang and Guan were interrogated and removed from their posts with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPC. Later,.on January 13, 1968, Qi was interrogated and dismissed from his post with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPC. Mao’s purge of Wang, Guan, and Qi delivered a severe blow to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. After Qi was purged, the Central Cultural Revolution Group was reduced to just five members (Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.)200 Jiang was saddened by the fate of her loyal aides,201 but immense pressure from Mao forced the purge of Wang and Guan. In fact, Mao was also reluctant to purge them.202 All three were Deputy Head of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group, and Vice Editor in Chief of Red

Flag. Qi Benyu was Member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and Vice Editor in Chief of Red Flag.

198. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1925. 199. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1501. 200. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 696. 201. On September 4, 1967, Qi Benyu wrote to Mao: “Jiang Qing is sad about the error of the

(Central Cultural Revolution) Group. She designated (Zhang) Chunqiao and myself to see and persuade Guan Feng and Wang Li.” Qi Benyu further reported: “Guan Feng

and Wang Li made serious errors through their blind leftist actions. The print and broadcast media are calling for the identification of a hostile minority within the PLA,

and are encouraging widespread doubts and skepticism. I am willing to make a fresh start and become a loyal soldier of Mao.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976),

vol. 4, 1926.)

202. On September 7, 1967, Mao inspected the self-criticism letter of Qi Benyu, and commented: “Some errors are useful since they encourage us to reflect and correct.

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leftist writers whose quotations and articles Mao relied on to rule the country. It was only through clever tactics that Zhou Enlai was able to prompt Mao to purge them, and Jiang and her allies harbored a grudge against Zhou over his role in this incident.203 On April 5, Mao officially approved the Orders of the Central Military Commission of the CPC (the “Ten Orders”), which explicitly stated: “We shall do political work instead of attacking revolutionary mass organizations or mass organizations under the control of counter-revolutionaries or unknown organizations. We shall ban arbitrary arrest and mass arrest. We shall prohibit the dissolution and denouncement of mass organizations as reactionary, and shall even more strongly ban the vilification of revolutionary organizations as counter-revolutionary. We shall absolve the masses of attacks against military organs regardless of whether their targets were rightists, centralists, or leftists.” Mao was certain that his issuing of the Ten Orders would automatically end violent struggle. Unexpectedly though, the rebels ignored his orders, forcing him to impose penalties. As violent struggles occurred throughout China and civil unrest ensued, Mao suddenly changed his political attitude from supporting revolutionary student movements to ordering the suppression of rebels nationwide. Enormous bloodshed resulted, and the number of casualties is still unknown. Mao followed no legal procedure in ordering this suppression of rebels, and it was enacted purely on his personal orders. On September 4, Mao ordered a stop to the theft of guns.204 On September 5, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the “September 5 Orders,” which prohibited all organizations from stealing weapons, equipment and military supplies from the PLA, and allowed the PLA to use force in self-defense against those that resisted arrest or attempted to steal guns.205 On July 6, Mao was informed of a fierce struggle in Ganzhou, Jiangxi that had resulted in serious casualties, shortages of grain and water, and blockades against transportation networks. In response, he ordered the deployment of a division of soldiers to suppress the rebels.206 Thus, Mao negated Please inform Guan (Feng) and Wang (Li) of my comments at your convenience.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 412.)

203. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1738–1739. 204. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1500. 205. This order was implemented on the personal instructions of Mao himself. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 410–411.)

206. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 370.

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the Provisions Prohibiting Troops from Suppressing Revolutionary Student Movements of the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA and the General Political Department of the PLA, despite previously having personally endorsed these provisions. On September 8, the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee and Beijing Garrison Command issued the “September 8 Notification” to prohibit people outside Beijing from traveling into the city.207 The same day, a large group of people from Sichuan and Northeast China managed to board trains bound for Beijing hoping for an audience with Mao after it was rumored that he planned to meet petitioners on October 1. On September 13, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification on Banning the Theft of State Material Goods and Attacks on Warehouses to Ensure the Safety of State Properties with the approval of Mao. On September 23, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution issued the Urgent Notification Ordering Students Traveling the Country and Petitioners in Beijing to Swiftly Return to Their Work Units. The notification ordered all traveling students to promptly and unconditionally return to their homes, and the dissolution of all liaison and other offices in Beijing and elsewhere.208 With this notification Mao once again negated his previous decisions, since it was he himself who had called for Red Guards to travel the country to publicize Mao Zedong Thought. With the approval of Mao, the People’s Daily published the “Commentary on Two Books by Tao Zhu” written by Yao Wenyuan. Mao then wrote a review of the article, saying: “Please note that a handful of counter-revolutionaries used 207. The “September 8 Notification” provided for: “1. Persons who have travelled to Beijing

to conduct revolution must immediately return to their original cities and conduct

revolution locally. 2. Persons in Beijing but originally from other cities must neither

attend meetings nor publish newspapers in Beijing, and any publications they produce will be banned. 3. Those in Beijing but originally from other cities must not participate

in armed struggle, assaults, vandalism, or theft, and the Beijing Garrison Area has

the right to punish infractions. 4. Those in Beijing but originally from other cities can

neither seize others without authority, nor illegally search the houses of others. 5. Those in Beijing but originally from other cities must purchase food with money or food tickets, and must purchase their tickets for travel. 6. Should a person currently in Beijing but originally from elsewhere destroy state property, they must compensate the

cost price, and in serious cases should be punished by the law.” (“Bulletin of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee and Beijing Garrison Area Command,” September 8, 1967.)

208. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 417.

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rightist slogans and took advantage of popular suspicion against all those in power to sow dissension. This group courted trouble by attacking the proletarian headquarters in an attempt to overthrow and split it. The group also organized other sinister conspiracies. The organizers and manipulators of the May 16 Event led this counter-revolutionary clique as part of a broader political conspiracy, and we should uncover the full extent of their political conspiracies to enlighten those youth whom they misled into turning against their own side.”209 Mao believed that participants in the May 16 Event had caused the nationwide turmoil,210 and therefore he called for them to be made the target of a nationwide purge. In 1968, he ordered the establishment of the “Investigation of the Central Committee of the CPC into the May 16 Group under the leadership of Chen Boda” to conduct investigations across China and suppress participants in the May 16 Incident in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Several million people became involved in the nationwide investigations. It is ironic that Chen Boda was denounced as the manipulator behind the May 16 Event after the Second Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the CPC in 1970. Mao’s greatest fear was that the Cultural Revolution might end in failure. In September, he spoke with Yang Chengfu, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yu Lijin, saying: “There are two possible futures for the Cultural Revolution. One is to achieve another peak. The other is that the country splits up. There are irreconcilable factions in Nanjing, Wuxi, Beijing, and across China. If we fail to achieve unity, China may enter a state of turmoil and split up as it did during the chaos that followed the Revolution of 1911.”211 However, while he recalled the chaos and disunity that followed the Revolution of 1911, he failed to realize that his calls for class struggle and creation of turmoil only worsened the national crisis. On August 30, Mao delivered a speech to the Albanian Party and Government Delegation, saying: “The Cultural Revolution may end in failure or victory, but victory appears more likely.”212 Mao’s concern about the fate of the Cultural Revolution was justified, since the majority of leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, failed to understand 209. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 694. 210. On December 18, 1970, while interviewing Edgar Snow, Mao said: “In July and August,

1967, the situation was out of control, which created an opportunity to identify him (Chen Boda). Otherwise, who knows? Most people are good but several are bad. The

bad ones are known as the ‘May 16 Group.’” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 163.)

211. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1500. 212. Ibid, 1508.

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and refused to obey his orders when he staged the Cultural Revolution. After he mobilized the masses and the Red Guards to attack and purge Liu Shaoqi, Mao assumed the victory of the Cultural Revolution was assured. Little did he realize that the movement was doomed to failure. The world perceived China to be in a state of turmoil, and Mao had to field difficult questions from foreign visitors. On October 3, when Mao met with Ambroise Noumazalaye, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo, Noumazalaye asked about the chaos. Mao acknowledged that the country had fallen into anarchy and said the problem would be resolved once the rebels rejected struggle and turmoil.213 On October 12, Mao spoke with the Albanian Party and Government Delegation, and said: “Your questions about the turmoil in China are justified, and requesting information is better than spreading rumors. Nevertheless, we need to intensify the turmoil in some areas. Only by causing turmoil can we detect hidden conflicts.214 We plan to continue the Cultural Revolution for three years. Specifically, we plan to stage the Cultural Revolution in the first year, achieve victory in the second year, and end it in the third year.”215 Mao initially had a three-year and three-phase plan for the Cultural Revolution, whereby the movement would be staged from June 1966 to June 1967, would secure victory during June 1967 to June 1968, and would end during June 1968 to June 1969. However, Mao misjudged the Cultural Revolution. The national turmoil unexpectedly continued for a decade, and ultimately was only brought to an end by natural laws. Mao called for turmoil because it was a means of distracting and unmasking enemies, and subsequently stirred up civil unrest to achieve this. While it was easy for him to stage the Cultural Revolution and mobilize Red Guards and rebels, it proved more difficult to control those forces and end the movement. Mao staged and fomented the Cultural Revolution but lost control of it. Although he controlled the state through his supreme directives, he could not control the turmoil, and the Red Guards he had placed his faith in shattered his hopes that the Cultural Revolution would achieve a swift victory. Finally, he had no choice but to negate his previous orders to believe in and rely on the masses, and his ban on the suppression of student movements. He deployed the army to repress the unarmed masses, a shift from political liberalism to political despotism that signified the failure of the Cultural Revolution. In staging the Cultural Revolution, Mao relied on the Lin Biao Group to supply 213. Ibid, 1508. 214. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 328.

215. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1508.

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armed forces and the Jiang Qing Group to supply political writing. These two groups then plotted together to purge Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and veteran Party and government cadres. Taking advantage of Mao’s political support, the two groups purged Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, seized power, and then fought over the power they had seized. The political struggle transformed the two groups into political rivals and the fierce struggle between them erupted into serious conflicts. After more than one year, the Cultural Revolution underwent a marked shift from a peak of fervor to a phase in which Party, government, military cadres, and even the masses, began to express disappointment and doubts about the associated destruction and disruption. Nevertheless, Mao refused to acknowledge the failure of the Cultural Revolution and remained convinced that he upheld a correct line and had a great vision that transcended even Marxism and Leninism. On November 6, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published an article announcing to China and the world that “Mao staged and led the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in history.”216 The Cultural Revolution descended into endless class struggle. Mao felt that a theoretical system was needed to legitimize the movement, and proposed the theory of continuing to carry out revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, Mao’s intellect in his later years was no longer compared to what it had been during his prime, when he authored influential works such as Theory of Practice (1937), Theory of Contradictions (1937), How to Handle the Ten Relationships (1956), and Properly Resolve the Conflicts among the People (1957). Now in his seventies, Mao issued confusing, subjective, and ambiguous directives. For instance, he defined the Cultural Revolution as “class struggle,” but failed to define “class.”217 Mao had to rely on his loyal writers, Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan, to create the necessary theoretical system. Chen and Yao thus collated a dozen of the supreme directives 216. Harding evaluated Mao’s launch of the Cultural Revolution: “Mao’s pursuit of the

purity of the revolution caused him to magnify and make mistakes regarding the issues

China was facing in the 1960s. While through his personal authority he could mobilize all social forces, he lacked the ability to control those forces. As the nature of the

mass movement shifted to violence, struggle among various parties, and turbulence, it became clear that Mao’s ideas about mobilizing the masses to save the state were totally wrong. The original purpose of Mao was that the Cultural Revolution would be

his most important and durable contribution to China, and to Marxism and Leninism,

but in fact the movement became the biggest error of his later years. Due to his power to control the nation, his personal tragedy became a national tragedy.” (Harding, “The Crisis Situation in China.”)

217. Wang, Failure of Charisma: the Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, 251.

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issued by Mao from 1957 to 1967 and summarized his basic judgment of China’s political situation as “three existences,” namely: the existence of class, class conflict and class struggle; the existence of struggle between the socialist and bourgeois lines; and the existence of the danger of capitalist restoration. Based on the “three existences,” the pair established “Mao Zedong’s Theoretical Points for Continuing Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” (the “Six Points.”) (Sidebar 4.5) Since it observed socialist society based on the Law of Opposites, the theory tended to follow an either-or thinking pattern; in other words, either socialism or capitalism, either Marxism or revisionism, either leftists or rightists, and either proletarian revolutionaries or bourgeois conservatives. This kind of thinking was clearly too simple, extreme, and absolute to be applied to a complicated society. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao failed to clearly define his theoretical terminology, not to mention give specific instructions on the practical implementation of his theories. Mao’s theories emphasized class struggle, and required the Party to conduct this class struggle. In reality, the Cultural Revolution became a tool for torturing others. In the Cultural Revolution, everyone tortured others and was tortured by others in turn. It is also worth mentioning that the theory of cultural revolution first introduced the concept of “comprehensive dictatorship,” which was defined as the proletariat exercising comprehensive dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie (including in culture). The theory of cultural revolution emphasized Mao’s historical contribution to the international communist movement.218 However, the reality was that the Cultural Revolution saw Mao develop incorrect theories and plot sinister political conspiracies. Mao’s “Theoretical Points for Continuing Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” (the Six Points) was credited to Chen Boda,219 who ironically fell victim to this theory. 218. The article claimed: “Comrade Mao’s great contribution to the international communist movement is that he systematically summarized the historical experience of the Chinese and international proletarian dictatorship since the October Socialist Revolution, including not only positive experiences, but also lessons learned, especially the heavy lesson of the complete restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. Through this

he completely and thoroughly solved the most important issue of our time—how to continue revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent the restoration

of capitalism. This a great epoch-making development of Marxism and Leninism in relation to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a highly significant symbol of the

brand-new stage of Marxism—Mao Zedong Thought.” (Editorial of the People’s Daily,

Red Flag, and PLA Daily, “Advancement on the Path Opened by the October Socialist Revolution,” November 6, 1967.)

219. Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan rewrote and modified this article six times, while the

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Sidebar 4.5 Mao Zedong’s Theoretical Points for Continuing Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (November 1967) 1. We must maintain a socialist society by applying the Law of Opposites of Marxism-Leninism. In socialist society, there are two social conflicts, namely conflict between ourselves and enemies, and conflict among the people. Conflict between ourselves and enemies is classified as antagonistic struggle whereas conflict among the people is classified as non-antagonistic struggle. 2. Class, class conflict and struggle, struggle between the socialist and capitalist lines, and the danger of capitalist restoration all exist in socialist society. To prevent the restoration of capitalism through peaceful evolution, we must continue to carry out ideological and political revolution. 3. The class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat involved power and attempts to alter the existing regime, and resulted from the bourgeoisie plotting to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the proletariat consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. Additionally, the proletariat must exercise comprehensive dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure (including various cultural fields). 4. A two-class and two-line struggle exist in society, and a handful of capitalist roaders serve as the proxy of the bourgeoisie within our Party. Thus, we must identify the ‘Chinese Khrushchevs’ and unmask, denounce, and purge them. 5. We should continue to carry out revolution under the dictatorship of the Proletariat. What is more, we must carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and mobilize the masses, from the leadership to the grassroots, by means of great democracy to forge a proletarian revolutionary alliance and form the revolutionary committee of the revolutionary masses, PLA, and revolutionary cadres. 6. By adhering to the guidelines of fighting against selfishness and denouncing revisionism, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution touched the inner soul of the people and changed their outlook. Source: “Forge Ahead along Path of the October Socialist Revolution,” People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, October 6, 1967.

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Mao defined the Cultural Revolution as a revolution in which one class would overthrow another, the proletariat would resist the bourgeoisie and all the other exploiting classes, and struggle would occur between the masses under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Kuomintang reactionaries, as well as between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in socialist society. Prior to May 18, Mao had followed class struggle theory in the Revolutionary War and had proposed staging the Cultural Revolution multiple times. The People’s Republic of China had already been established for 18 years, and hence he had spent 18 years in power. However, Mao failed to transform himself from a revolutionary driven by struggle philosophy and dreams of world conquest, into a politician focused on national construction and the cultivation of expertise in government, not to mention a politician dedicated to harmonious government.220 The People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily drove the fervent support for Mao’s political remarks and theories to a new peak and declared, “Mao Zedong has accomplished missions that Marxism failed to complete and Lenin had no time to carry out, made a great contribution to the proletarian doctrine of MarxismLeninism, developed theories that will transform the world, and set up the third great ideological monument in the development history of Marxism-Leninism.”221 changes made by Mao simply involved the addition of a 19-character instruction and the deletion of 15 characters. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 432–434.)

220. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1485. 221. The editorial, “Forging Ahead on the Path Opened by the October Socialist

Revolution,” wrote that “Mao’s great contribution to the international communist movement is his systematic summarization of the historic experience of the Chinese and international proletarian dictatorship since the October Socialist Revolution, including not only positive experiences, but also lessons learned, especially the heavy

lesson of the comprehensive restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. Through this he completely and thoroughly solved the most important issue of our time — how to continue revolution under the dictatorship of proletariat and prevent the restoration

of capitalism. This is a great epoch-making development of Marxism and Leninism in relation to proletarian dictatorship. Comrade Mao has comprehensively inherited,

championed, and developed Marxism, developed the great theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and independently launched and

led the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in human history. The great theory of Mao regarding the continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat

is historically meaningful, and establishes the third great theoretical milestone in the

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The theory that Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan helped Mao to formulate became the theoretical basis for the Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969 and the Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973, and these two national congresses legitimized Mao’s incorrect theory and practice.222 Chen Boda’s flattery of Mao at this time was such that even Mao himself protested,223 and instructed that certain remarks be deleted from the written speech Chen Boda was to deliver at the 9th National Congress of the CPC.224 In 1981, the Central Committee of the CPC passed the resolution negating Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution.225 The Cultural Revolution impacted economic growth and caused economic instability. In September 1965, the State Planning Commission drafted the Third Five-year Plan (1966–1970) Protocol and proposed a target for average annual development of Marxism.” (People’s Daily, November 6, 1967.) 222. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 808, 811.

223. In September, 1968, Mao deleted the phrase “This is the greatest and most pioneering work in the history of the communist movement since the ‘Declaration of the Communist Party’ was published in 1848” from Lin Biao’s “Speech at the Meeting to Celebrate

the Nineteenth Anniversary of the New China.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 576–577.)

224. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 33.

225. The “Resolution” of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1981 stated: “These ideas mainly appeared in the ‘May 16 Circular’, a framework document of the Great Cultural

Revolution, and in the political report of the Ninth National Congress of the Central Committee of the CPC. Together these ideas comprised the theory of continuing

revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat (the ‘Six Points’), and so endowed the phrase ‘continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat’ with special

meaning. These incorrect leftist ideas that supported Mao’s launch of the Great Cultural Revolution clearly deviated from Mao Zedong Thought, which combines the common principles of Marxism and Leninism with China’s own revolutionary practices.



Political revolution aiming to achieve the overthrow of one class by another

under socialist conditions lacks economic and political foundations. Such a movement

definitely cannot create a constructive framework, and instead can be expected to cause serious chaos, destruction, and setbacks.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 2, 811.)

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growth of gross output value of industry and agriculture of 9% during the plan period. Specific production targets for 1970 included: grain production of 220– 240 million tons, cotton output of 44–48 million piculs, iron output of 16 million tons, raw coal output of 280–290 million tons, crude oil output of 18.5 million tons, electricity generation capacity of 110 billion kWh, and rail freight volume of 700 million tons. Had the Cultural Revolution not occurred, China would have achieved rapid economic growth by implementing the Third Five-year Plan.226 In 1966, China did begin to implement the plan, and the first half of the year saw national industrial and agricultural output value increase 20.3% year on year, state budget investment increase 21%, retail sales value of social commodities increase 11.6%, and fiscal revenue increase 15.7%. This period thus saw almost all indicators of industrial production hit record highs since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.227 One biographer noted of Mao: “Although he was determined to plunge the nation into turmoil through the Cultural Revolution, Mao believed this revolution would promote production, and hoped to efficiently and economically achieve success.”228 However, the Cultural Revolution proved unexpectedly difficult to control, and resulted in turmoil that went beyond Mao’s expectations. The Cultural Revolution disrupted the sustained economic growth and rapid economic development that China was enjoying in 1963, and caused a nationwide economic recession. This proved the folly of using revolution to promote production, as revolution in fact negatively impacted production in China at this time. As early as May, the Jingguang, Jinpu, Longhai, and Zhegan Railways had become semi-paralyzed, disrupting passenger and freight transport, including international trains.229 On September 9, 1967, Zhou announced that the national railway network had ceased to function except in northeastern China, and that even there many railway lines were blocked. The situation created difficulties in transporting coal to generate electricity, and thus disrupted the industrial and residential electricity supply. Additionally, many ships carrying international freight failed to be loaded or unloaded on schedule, creating a situation where many ports and terminals were piled high with freight and tarnishing the reputation of the state.230 Mao, Lin, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group fully understood the severity of the situation. 226. Sun, General Economic History of China (1949–2000), vol. 2, 1762–1765. 227. Ibid, 1763. 228. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1456. 229. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1744. 230. Ibid, 1744–1745.

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On October 1, 1967, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published an editorial that relayed Lin’s claim: “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution incurred minimal losses and its achievements were considerable.”231 The claim was clearly an audacious lie, but Lin told this political lie to prevent the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution being called into question. On October 24, the Business Group of the State Council submitted a report to the Central Committee of the CPC and pointed out that the Cultural Revolution had damaged the economy, impacted industrial production, and it would therefore be impossible to achieve planned production targets.232 From 1967 to 1968, national industrial and agricultural output value shrank for two consecutive years, reaching -10% and -4.2%, respectively. Output value in 1968 thus was just 87.3% of that in 1966. The Cultural Revolution significantly decreased industrial and agricultural output,233 paralyzed economic management institutions, led to the abolishment of national economic policies, blocked national transport systems, disrupted the economy and daily life, slowed or stopped production, resulted in idle production capacity, and increased industrial accidents. Fiscal revenue declined markedly, decreasing by 25% in 1967 and 14% in 1968. Production failed to keep up with market demand, and declines occurred in retail sales of daily necessities such as cereals, edible oil, pork, fresh eggs, cotton cloth, bicycles, and watches. In 1968, residents in urban and rural areas were rationed to just 3 meters of cotton cloth annually, a decrease of 1.53 meters from 1967. The Cultural Revolution affected formal education at different levels. From June 231. Editorial boards of the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily: “Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution — Celebrating the Eighteenth Anniversary of the PRC,” Red Flag, 1967, issue 15, p 10, published on October 6.

232. The report of the business team of the State Council stated: “Since May, industrial

production and railway transportation have successively declined. By September, national average daily output of steel and pig iron dropped to 12,000 tons of each, or just

26% of planned average daily output; average daily output of crude coal (from mines directly administered by the state) had decreased to 268,000 tons, or 50% of planned

average daily output; average daily electricity output decreased to 160 million KWH,

or 60% of planned average daily output; average daily output of crude oil declined to 19,000 tons, or 40% of planned average daily output; and average daily number

of carriages loaded decreased to 19,000, or 46% of the planned number. Overall, the average industrial output of Q3 was just 50% of the planned output. It is therefore

estimated that industrial output in 1967 will reach only about 70% of planned levels.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1933.)

233. Sun, General Economic History of China (1949–2000), vol. 2, 1772–1773.

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1966, universities, middle schools, and primary schools across China suspended classes for 17 months while students conducted revolution. All students stopped attending class and reading books, while university and middle school students had to choose between active participation in factional struggle or active refusal. The education system was thrown into chaos, and on October 14, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification to Universities, Middle Schools and Primary Schools on Resuming Class and Carrying out Revolution, which requested that all educational institutions across China quickly resume classes. The escalation of civil unrest caused large-scale havoc, particularly in the railway sector. On October 29, Zhou Enlai spoke at the National Railway Transport Working Meeting, saying: “The railway transport sector plays a vital role in revolution and production. However, railway transport has become disrupted. If we fail to improve the transport situation, it will hinder economic development over the next year. The interventions by the masses involving railway terminals have actually damaged the revolution.”234 On November 25, Zhengzhou Railway Station, a transport hub connecting the Jingguang Railway and the Longhai Railway, simply ceased functioning, thus impacting the normal movements of 3,000 railway wagons. Zhou had to personally intervene to order that smooth train services were maintained.235 On December 2, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Order to Ensure the Safety of Rail Transport Supplies and noted that theft targeting railway warehouses, freight yards, and rail transport supplies had caused tremendous losses of state property, and that when such theft involved hazardous goods it posed a threat to people’s lives.236 On February 4, 1968, the Production Headquarters of the Military Control Commission of the Ministry of Railways reported that two passenger trains on the Jinpu Railway had been attacked by armed robbers on February 2, several attendants had been abducted, and guns had been stolen. Several sections of the Jinpu Railway were destroyed, communications were cut off, and railways and bridges were bombed several times. The same day, Zhou wrote a report to Mao on recent damage to the national railway system, and stated that damage was concentrated on the K-shaped section of railway linking Xuzhou, Bengbu, 234. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1747. 235. Ibid, 1747. 236. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 342.

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Zhengzhou and Lianyungang, the triangular line linking Hengyang, Liuzhou, and Guangzhou, and the line linking Kunming and Chengdu.237 On February 17, Zhou told visitors from Vietnam, “I presided over work related to railway transportation, an area that suffered side effects from the Cultural Revolution.” In August, Zhou also acknowledged to foreign guests from Albania: “Our problems with transportation and social struggle directly affected production. In the first half of 1968 and the second half of 1969, many economic indicators stagnated, and we unexpectedly failed to boost production.”238 Lin Biao later claimed in the Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC: “In the summer of 1967, the Chairman conducted a tour of inspection along the Yangtze River. During his tour he issued important directives to guide the masses to distinguish conflicts between ourselves and our enemies from conflicts among the people, forge revolutionary alliances, form revolutionary committees of the revolutionary masses, soldiers, and cadres, and transform petty-bourgeois thought into proletarian revolutionary ideology. The Cultural Revolution distracted our enemies and tempered the willpower of the masses.” In reality, during his tour Mao had said that he could not understand why workers, Red Guards, schools, and factories had all split into two factions to carry on fierce struggle.239 On July 29, 1970, Mao discussed the Cultural Revolution with the North Korean Military Delegation and acknowledged that it had decreased production, and had the unexpected effect of splitting factories across China into rival struggling factions. He claimed: “Some struggles were instigated by old Kuomintang members who exploited the opportunity to stage a rebellion, and attacked and burned British agencies in Beijing.”240 In December, Mao acknowledged to Edgar Snow: “The nature of the Cultural Revolution is to involve civil unrest, and China entered a state of turmoil in July and August 1967.”241 Mao headed the regime and held ultimate power over the fate 237. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1937–1938. 238. Ibid, 1938. 239. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1504. 240. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 612.

241. On December 18, 1970, in an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao said: “Long ago I told you to watch carefully China’s Great Cultural Revolution and all-round civil war. Now I have learned the true meaning of the term ‘all-round civil war’. Struggles are

taking place everywhere. Every factory, school, province, county, and ministry (for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has split into two struggling factions. We

have to struggle in this way because there are counter-revolutionists and capitalist

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of the country, but was unfortunately unique in being a world leader that wished to plunge his own country into turmoil. The Cultural Revolution created a manmade disaster that plunged China into turmoil for a decade.

Total Suppression and Purging of Veteran Cadres The Cultural Revolution paralyzed party organizations at all levels throughout the country, and almost all party members suspended regular organizational activities for eighteen months. Mao then planned to remedy by reestablishing party organizations at all levels and convening the 9th National Congress of the CPC. On September 19, 1967, Mao spoke with Yang Chengwu and proposed the 9th National Congress of the CPC be convened in late 1968 or January 1969 so that some existing cadres could retire from their positions and replacements could be appointed. Mao acknowledged that the majority of cadres had performed well in their posts, and thus suggested expanding the Central Committee of the CPC by electing new members, and also streamlining party and government organs.242 Mao also wished to use the 9th National Congress of the CPC and the 4th National People’s Congress to reestablish party and government organizations and thus end the Cultural Revolution. It was unfortunate that he believed streamlining party and government organs and retiring cadres could end the Cultural Revolution, and failed to realize that the key to ending the turmoil lay in the transformation of party and government functions. On October 21, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification on Seeking Opinions on the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Simultaneously, Mao proposed the convention of the 9th National Congress of the CPC and asked for opinions on the best timing and any necessary preparations. Mao entrusted Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan with carrying out investigations in Shanghai and authorized Kang Sheng to preside over the drafting of a new party constitution. On November 5, Mao and members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group discussed the 9th National Congress of the CPC and the proposed reform of the roaders everywhere. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was plunged into chaos and

fell under the control of counter-revolutionists for one and a half months.” Snow asked, “Did this period coincide with the burning of the British Embassy?” Mao answered,

“Yes. The situation was out of control in July and August of 1967.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 163.)

242. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1505.

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party, and Mao claimed, “After we had carried out the Cultural Revolution for more than a year, lots of evil people were unmasked, and we planned to reform and renew the party through class struggle. Naturally we cannot complete the reform of the Party before the 9th National Congress of the CPC. After the 9th National Congress of the CPC, we plan to continue to reform our Party and implement new party guidelines and a new party constitution. The Cultural Revolution was staged to reform and rectify the Party, Communist Youth League, the army, trade unions, youth federations, women’s federations, and student unions. The Constitution requires revision and our Party requires reform.”243 On November 27, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification on Seeking Opinions on the 9th National Congress of the CPC and in response local governments offered opinions on the revision of the party constitution and guidelines. The Mao Zedong Anthology (Volumes 5 and 6) was published before the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Additionally, the Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC, and the associated resolution, secured Lin Biao’s position as Mao’s close comrade-in-arms and successor.244 Mao planned to end the Cultural Revolution as soon as possible and convene the 9th National Congress of the CPC to summarize and affirm his theories and practices related to the Cultural Revolution and guard against future generations revising his legacy. On December 2, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Opinions on Issues Related to Party Organization Rectification, Restoration and Reorganization and proposed to rectify, restore and reorganize party organization by upholding Mao Zedong Thought, imposing conditions, scope and policy limits through rectifying, restoring and reorganizing party organizations, and setting up a core party group of the revolutionary committee.245 After dissolving party organizations at all levels, Mao proposed their 243. Mao said, “Our party must absorb fresh blood, including activists and workers, poor

farmers, and Red Guards. There is not enough oxygen in our blood and we need to

clean out the carbon dioxide. Everyone has arteries and veins, and the circulation of

blood through those arteries and veins depends on the pumping of the heart, and the inhalation of oxygen and expelling of carbon dioxide by the lungs. Through this process we ‘eliminate the stale and ingest the fresh’. Without rejection, there can be no fresh blood.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1509.)

244. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 340.

245. Ibid, 343–344.

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restoration and reorganization, and the resumption of regular party activities. Although Mao contravened the Constitution of the Party and failed to adopt democratic elections within the Party, he saw core party groups at the local level as vital to the maintenance of social order. On January 1, 1968, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the New Year’s Day editorial “Clinching Victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” by Yao Wenyuan. When the editorial was submitted to Mao for approval, Mao crossed out the phrase “red sun,” as well as the second “long live” in the phrase “Long Live, long live our great mentor and red sun Chairman Mao!”246 The editorial relayed Mao’s latest views, saying: “Under the leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao, we staged the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in history and notched up a historic victory in 1967. Guided by Chairman Mao, we will continue the struggle and achieve a comprehensive victory.”247 At the time the editorial was published, nine revolutionary committees had been established in twenty-nine provinces, cities, and autonomous regions, and the struggle among competing rebel factions was escalating.248 Mao viewed 1968 as the year the Cultural Revolution would achieve comprehensive victory, and wished to see China shift from turmoil to peace and order. He planned to end the Cultural Revolution within three years, and to set up revolutionary committees in all twenty-nine provinces, cities, and autonomous regions.249 Mao never expected the rebels to disobey the supreme directive to achieve proletarian revolutionary unity, and so he had to deploy troops to suppress the rebels in order to achieve his political goals. Mao proposed to reform the Party by purging certain veteran cadres and appointing new cadres. On New Year’s Day 1968, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda fabricated numerous cases that unjustly framed their opponents based on historical events. On December 26, 1967, Chen delivered a speech in Tangshan in which he framed various parties in the “Eastern Hebei Traitor Clique Case.”250 In 1967, Zhang 246. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 460–461.

247. People’s Daily, January 1, 1968. 248. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1752. 249. Some scholars like Pang Xianzhi believed: “Though in 1967 Mao advocated ‘comprehensive power seizure’ and nationwide armed struggle, in 1968 he prioritized the criticism of struggle between rival factions, suppression of armed struggle, promotion of unity, and the establishment of revolutionary committees that combined

three forces. He still imagined that his Great Cultural Revolution would end within three years.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1512.)

250. The “Eastern Hebei Traitors and Secret Agents Anti-CPC Group” involved 1,604 officials

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Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen fabricated the “Shanghai Underground Party Case.”251 On January 21, 1968, Kang fabricated the “Zhao Jianmin Spy Case.”252 In February, Kang and his allies fabricated the “New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party Case.”253 In August, the Core Zhejiang Provincial Party Group in 29 central government ministries and 29 provinces, of whom 737 were identified as

traitors, secret agents, Kuomintang reactionaries, and capitalist roaders. In total some

84,000 officials and members of the masses were persecuted in and around Tangshan, including 2,955 killed and 763 severely injured. Those wrongly targeted in this unjust persecution were not exonerated until the close of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th

Central Committee of the CPC. (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 348.)

251. Before liberation, there had been over 80,000 communists in underground communist party organizations in Shanghai. Zhang Chunqiao began framing those who had

previously been underground communists in Shanghai as "Kuomintang", "hidden

secret agents" and "traitor cliques". This unjust persecution movement saw up to 3,600 persons criminally investigated, which represented 45% those who were denounced.

Among those investigated, 99 leaders at or above the district, county or bureau levels was removed from their positions, and 65 were arrested or tried. (Ibid, 350.)

252. “Zhao Jianmin was then an alternate member of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the CPC. On

January 21, 1968, Kang Sheng concocted the ‘Zhao Jianmin Secret Agent Case’, in which Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi framed Zhao Jianmin as a traitor and secret agent using

materials fabricated by a rebel organization. Kang Sheng asked Xie Fuzhi to arrest Zhao Jianmin on the spot, and Zhao Jianmin spent the next eight years in jail. Many officials and ordinary people in Yunnan were labeled ‘members of the Kuomintang

secret agent clique headed by Zhao Jianmin’. A total of 1.38 million were investigated,

and 170,000 were persecuted to death.” (Ding and Tingyu, Kang Sheng and the Unjust Case against Zhao Jianmin.)

253. “The ‘Inner Mongolia People’s Party’ was established with the approval of the Central

Committee of the CPC and the Communist International in 1925, and was dissolved during the Great Revolution. In early February, when hearing the report of the core

team of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Revolutionary Committee, Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing announced: ‘The Inner Mongolia People’s Party is still active underground. We must root them out. Perhaps our initial investigations will need to

be too wide in scope, but that is okay.’ The movement to ‘root out the Inner Mongolia

People’s Party’ thus began in Inner Mongolia. The unjust persecutions that followed involved 346,000 people, of whom over 160,000 were persecuted to death. Mao later

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purged its ranks and fabricated numerous unjust and false cases.254 On February 5, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group forwarded instructions on the Report on Unmasking Traitors issued by the Heilongjiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee, saying: “Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, An Ziwen, Xiao Hua, and other traitors and counter-revolutionary revisionists infiltrated the Party and even held senior posts for a long period. They formed a traitor clique and followed the counter-revolutionary line by appointing traitors and spies to key positions in various party and government organs. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unmasked these spies and traitors, and we achieved a victory for the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong Thought.”255 In February, the majority of ministers and deputy ministers of the State Council were purged or dismissed from their posts, paralyzing the organization. According to data furnished by Zhou Enlai, only 90 cadres at the minister level from 42 units of the State Council held posts, accounting for 32% of the total. This group included three ministers and directors, and the rest were dismissed from their jobs.256 realized that a mistake had been made and on March 9, 1979 he instructed: ‘The scope

of the case investigations in Inner Mongolia is too wide.’ With the approval the Central Committee of the CPC, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee of the CPC announced that all those involved in the ‘Inner Mongolia People’s Party’ were fully

exonerated.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 369.)

254. “On August 10, 1968, the Zhejiang Province Core Team of the CPC discussed the team tasked with purging class enemies. Nao Ping said, ‘As for officials at the levels of provincial committee secretary and provincial governor, some were identified as traitors, some as secret agents, and others as fake communists. None of them were good.’

Chen Ligeng said, ‘over 3,000 people were identified as traitors in Wenzhou, including

over 100 in the Central Government at all levels.’ Extortion to extract confessions was common in Zhejiang and caused many unjust cases. According to statistics from June,

1969, the team cleansing state organizations in Zhejiang investigated more than 24 existing members of the provincial committee, or two thirds of its total membership. Also, among over 400 officials at the level of area committee secretary and departmental director, 133 were investigated for working for the enemy, representing one third of the

total. Hundreds of thousands of people across the province were detained and publicly denounced, including 9,198 who were persecuted to death.” (Ibid, 411–412.) 255. Ibid, 363. 256. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1951.

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Zhou reported the gravity of the situation to Mao, Lin, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group. In late March, the “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Case” shocked the whole country. On March 24, Lin Biao delivered a speech at the Meeting for Army Officers above the Corps Level held in the Great Hall of the People, saying: “New issues emerged within our Party, issues that were less serious than the ‘Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun Case’ but more serious than ordinary issues. Recently, Yang Chengwu, Standing Commissioner of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, Deputy Secretarygeneral and Associate Chief of General Staff of the PLA, colluded with the political commissar of the air force to seize power and purge Wu Faxian, Commander of the PLA Air Force. Yang Chengwu also colluded with the commander of the Beijing Garrison to purge Xie Fuzhi, and plotted to oust Xu Shiyou, Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Han Xianchu, Commander of the Fujian Military Region, and Huang Yongsheng, Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, together with various associates of this last target. Chairman Mao presided over four meetings at his residence in relation to this matter, and Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng successively accused and denounced Yang Chengwu. Chen Boda was particularly vehement, and presented the purging of Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi as the fifth victory of the Cultural Revolution.”257 The same day, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued an order, which read: “According to a decision by Chairman Mao Zedong and Vice Chairman Lin Biao, Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi are removed from their positions, Huang Yongsheng is appointed chief of the general staff of the PLA, and Wen Yucheng is appointed commander of the Beijing Garrison.” The account shows that it was Mao who was determined to purge Yang Chengwu. The case was complicated by the fact that Yang Chengwu had accompanied Mao on a tour inspection around South China, which implied that he was loyal and trusted by Mao. Yang had also ordered the administrative group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC to organize the “Red Sun Exhibition” at the Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution, and eulogized Mao as the “Red Sun.” On November 3, 1967, Yang had issued the article titled “Establish the Absolute Authority of Our Great Leader Chairman Mao and Uphold Mao Zedong Thought — Punish Luo Ruiqing’s Grave Crime against Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought” in the People’s Daily. Several days after the publication of this article, Mao critiqued it, saying: “The title is wrong because it embraces incorrect 257. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 560–564.

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concepts from metaphysics. It is impossible to establish authority over nature, and authority is relative instead of absolute. What is the real purpose of the article?” Mao thus was aware his subordinates flattered him excessively. Yang unexpectedly fell victim to Mao’s political struggles, and suffered a similar fate to Lin Biao. On March 28, Mao, Lin, and Zhou met with Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and Wen Yucheng, and Mao stated that the administrative group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC directly under Lin acted on behalf of the Central Military Commission, and the standing committees of the Central Military Commission ceased meeting after Mao’s statement.258 Mao thus reauthorized Lin to directly command the PLA, and enabled the administrative group under Huang to succeed the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. In May, Mao issued instructions on a report on troop deployment, saying “The reports of troop deployment are subject to endorsement after Mao Zedong, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai append their signatures,”259 signifying that only these three possessed the power to deploy troops.” Lin’s 1969 Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC described the reasons behind the “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin and Fu Chongbi Case” from the perspective of class struggle, saying: “A handful of evil people were unmasked together with their leader Liu Shaoqi, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution achieved a historical victory.”260 In fact, the “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Case” was another form of political conspiracy organized by Lin, which was unrelated to the earlier purges of Liu Shaoqi, landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, evil people of all kinds, and rightists. Tt was later proven that Lin and Jiang Qing fabricated this case with the prior approval of Mao. Lin first let Mao know his resentment 258. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 226–227.

259. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 731. 260. Lin Biao alleged: “The small number of traitors and secret agents hidden among the masses and landowners, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements, unreformed

rightists, active counter-revolutionaries, aspiring bourgeoisie, and double-dealers cannot be rooted out until the situation is right. In the summer of 1967 and the spring of 1968, these groups stirred up a reactionary current based on rightist and extreme

leftist positions. Their targets were the proletarian headquarters led by Chairman Mao, the PLA, and the rising revolutionary committees. They provoked struggle among the masses, organizing counter-revolutionary groups, and seized power from the

proletariat. However, this small number of bad elements has been finally rooted out

like their chief Liu Shaoqi. This is an important victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” (Lin, Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC.)

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towards Yang Chengwu, and then purged Yang with Mao’s support, just as he had framed Luo Ruiqing several years previously. Yang was imprisoned as a result of Lin’s persecution. On his release, Zhou told Yang, “Lin Biao framed you with Chairman Mao Zedong’s approval.261 However, Mao had certain reservations.”262 In December 1973, Mao acknowledged that Lin had fabricated the “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Case” but denied all personal responsibility, saying: “I was not at fault since I simply relied on Lin Biao’s one-sided statement.”263 Qiu Zuohui doubted Mao’s claims, particularly given that he held four meetings to discuss the case and that Lin’s speech denouncing Yang Chengwu reflected Mao’s decision on the case.264 Meanwhile, Jiang also delivered a speech and played a vital role in fabricating the case. After the “Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Case,” Mao developed a new understanding of the nature of the Cultural Revolution and the largescale violent struggle across China. He explained: “Unexpectedly, all the organs and local governments split into two factions and carried on large-scale violent struggle. This was not mere coincidence, and reflected fierce class struggle. I believe it was the Kuomintang members, bourgeoisie, landlord class, Kuomintang spies, and counter-revolutionaries who instigated violent struggles.”265 On April 10, the People’s Daily and PLA Daily published an editorial that relayed Mao’s latest directive: “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a political revolution by which the proletariat resist the bourgeoisie and exploiting class, the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary masses carry on long-term struggle against Kuomintang reactionaries, and the proletariat struggle against the bourgeoisie in the socialist society.”266 By redefining the nature of the Cultural Revolution, Mao showed his attitude of continuing class struggle. Mao thus historically reframed his struggle against Liu Shaoqi as a civil war that resembled his earlier struggle 261. Yang, Autobiography of Yang Chengwu, 303, 339, 374; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2.

262. Mao showed leniency by issuing the following instruction on a document: “I suggest

the names of Yang Chengwu and Zhang Pinghua (then First Secretary of the Hunan

Provincial Committee of the CPC) should not appear on this document to give them a chance. Their names can be disclosed in future if required. It will not be too late then.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1514.) 263. Ibid, 1515. 264. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 564. 265. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1515. 266. Editorial published in the People’s Daily and PLA Daily, “Morning Sunlight on Lotuses,” People’s Daily, April 10, 1968.

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against Chiang Kai-shek.267 It can be inferred that Mao was inspired by the theory of civil war in his staging of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the escalation of the Cultural Revolution into a comprehensive civil war was inevitable. According to the above theory proposed by Mao, the Central Committee of the CPC decided to purge the class ranks across China. On May 15, the Notification on Issues Arising from Work to Purge Class Ranks was endorsed by the Plenum of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee and issued. On May 19, Mao issued instructions on the article “The Mobilization of the Masses by the Beijing Xinhua Printing House Military Control Commission to Swap Experience of Fighting Enemies,” which appeared in the Cultural Revolution Trends Column published by Xinhua News Agency, saying: “This article is exceptionally good.” With Mao’s approval, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group circulated the article across China and launched the “Campaign to Purge Class Ranks.” Although Mao stressed enforcement of policies which allowed enemies the opportunity to reform, avoid unjust persecutions, and forbid forced confessions, these directives were routinely violated, and unjust and false cases were fabricated. In different regions, those accused of historical errors or reactionaries were detained, denounced, insulted, and tortured, resulting in heavy casualties and severe consequences. Mao personally directed the Central Committee of the CPC to launch the campaign to purge the class ranks through struggle, criticism, and transformation, which resulted in too many people arrested compared with the number liberated.268 From May to June, a series of disruptions occurred in Liuzhou, Guilin, and Nanning, including disruption to railway operations, theft of materials and supplies intended for Vietnam, attacks on PLA organs and troops, theft of weapons and equipment from the PLA, and armed attacks on PLA soldiers or officers. In Shaanxi Province, rebels constantly instigated violent struggles and formed professional struggle brigades to organize a series of severe counter-revolutionary events, such as robbing state banks and warehouses, burning down stores, bombing state warehouses, public buildings and private houses, looting vehicles and vessels, disrupting railways, postal and communications services, setting up secret broadcasting stations, attacking PLA organs and troops, stealing weapons and equipment, and shooting injured PLA soldiers and officers. On June 3, when he 267. Pang suggested that Mao believed the “Great Cultural Revolution” was the “extension of the long-term struggle with Kuomintang reactionaries” and this new wording further

intensified the problem. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2,

1515.)

268. Ibid, 1542.

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was informed of large-scale violent struggle in Guangxi Province, Mao commented: “The violent struggles in Guangxi Province have mainly been confined to Liuzhou and Nanning, but recently have also occurred in Guilin. Evil people with ulterior motives instigated these struggles, and a large group from outside Guangxi stole more than 18 million bullets in Liuzhou.269 Red Guards responded to Mao’s call for revolution, and China entered a state of turmoil as class struggle among the upper stratum of society combined with social movements among the lower stratum of society. The extent of the turmoil can only be inferred from internal central government documents. On July 31, a communiqué modified by Zhou Enlai and issued by the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group presented a summary of widespread civil unrest, saying: “A handful of counter-revolutionaries organized a series of counter-revolutionary events, falling into ten categories: 1. Disruption of railways, aviation, transportation, postal services, and communications; 2. Killings, arson, and poisoning; 3. Theft of state property, vehicles, vessels, and warehouses; 4. Beatings and killings of PLA soldiers and officers, and theft of their weapons and equipment; 5. Instigation and manipulation of the violent struggles of the masses and the sabotaging of production; 6. Theft of state archives; 7. Secret establishment of broadcasting stations and illegal broadcasting of programs; 8. Organization of underground counter-revolutionary cliques and violent struggle brigades; 9. Attacks on state prisons and penal farms; 10 Fabrication of counter-revolutionary rumors.”270 On August 8, a large-scale violent struggle occurred in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. According to incomplete statistics, 1,470 people were killed and 9,845 were taken prisoner during an assault on Jiefang Road and Zhanlan Road in Nanning. Of the 9,845 captives, 7,012 were denounced as killers, arsonists, old Kuomintang diehards, and members of reactionary cliques, 2,324 were executed, and 246 were illegally imprisoned. There was also significant property damage. A total of 33 streets and lanes and 2,820 buildings, with a total built area of 460,000 square meters, including government organizations, schools, factories, stores, and private houses, were burnt down, and over 50,000 residents from five communes had their homes destroyed.271 269. Ibid, 1519. 270. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 249.

271. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 410.

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On August 10, over 10,000 people were captured during a siege and massacre incident in Fengshan County, Guangxi Province, accounting for a tenth of the total population. The massacre claimed the lives of 1,016, all of whom died from gunshot wounds. The casualties included 246 cadres and workers, 20 red army veterans, and 117 guerrillas.272 On August 13, a large-scale struggle occurred in Wuzhong County in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. According to incomplete statistics, a series of violent struggles that occurred in Ningxia from June to September resulted in 250 people being beaten to death.273 The Cultural Revolution, which by its nature involved social unrest and turmoil, was launched by Mao, supported by the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and carried out by Red Guards and rebels. However, Mao became concerned after the Cultural Revolution escalated into turmoil, and changed his attitude from a supporter and promoter of mass movements to a dictator and suppresser of the masses. Mao thus both stirred up violent civil unrest and resorted to violence to suppress that unrest. Earlier in February 1967, Mao proposed that it was improper to appoint inexperienced workers and students to senior posts.274 In May 1967, he had stated that he disagreed that the ideal new appointees to vacated posts after the seizure of power should be intellectuals since, although they were capable of promptly identifying problems, and were flexible, they lacked revolutionary willpower, and so proved impractical in reality.275 During his tour of inspection of South China, Mao specifically stated that the leaders of Red Guard and rebel groups were acting legally.276 However, less than a year later, he decided to expel the Red Guards and rebels from the Chinese political arena. The difficulty he encountered was that while it was easy to mobilize Red Guards and rebels to conduct revolution, it was difficult to suppress them.277 Mao resorted to harsh proletarian dictatorship and ordered the issue of two communiqués to deploy troops and policemen to suppress Red Guards and rebels. The number of casualties remains unknown.278 272. Ibid, 412. 273. Ibid, 413. 274. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1481. 275. Ibid, 1489–1490. 276. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 388.

277. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 301. 278. Pang believes that the successive release of the ‘July 3’ and ‘July 4’ communiqués strongly deterred rebels across the country, and clearly decreased the domestic

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On July 3, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Communiqué on Banning Violent Struggle (the “July 3 Communiqué”) with the approval of Mao.279 On July 19, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group forwarded the Notification on the Publicizing and Enforcement of the ‘July 3 Communiqué,’ issued by the Hunan Garrison Leftist Supporter Leading Group, and stated that the “July 3 Communiqué” pursued Chairman Mao’s grand strategy.280 With the approval of Mao, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Communiqué on Banning Violent Struggle (the “July 4 Communiqué”) simply by putting up a public notice281 instead of by the normal tension. However in some areas, serious errors committed by mass organizations were

determined to be counter-revolutionary events, with serious consequences for the affected areas. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1521.)

279. The “July 3 Communiqué” stated: “Under the leadership of the Guangxi Revolutionary

Preparation Team, supported by the PLA in Guangxi, the following provisions shall be

obeyed: 1. Immediately cease armed struggle, dismantle fortifications, and withdraw from advance positions. Units occupying advance positions along the railway line should withdraw first. 2. Unconditionally and quickly restore normal operations on

all railway lines administered by the Liuzhou Railway Bureau, and stop all actions that interfere with transportation. 3. Unconditionally return stolen materials that are

needed to resist American aggression in Vietnam. 4. Unconditionally return weapons and equipment stolen from the PLA. 5. All persons from other cities and persons who have gone to rural areas to accept re-education, and who return to the city shall

return to the areas and units where they should be. 6. If evidence exists of murder,

demagoguery, interruption of traffic and communications, interference in jails, stealing state secrets, unauthorized broadcasting or other crimes, the counter-revolutionaries responsible must be punished according to the law. The Central Committee of the

CPC believes that counter-revolutionary events caused by a small number of class

enemies ultimately will only cause problems among the enemy, and in fact can help the revolutionary masses exercise their vigilance.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 502.) 280. Ibid, 506. 281. The “July 4” communiqué stated: “To stop this small number of counter-revolutionary crimes as soon as possible, the Central Committee of the CPC re-affirmed that all mass organizations, groups, and individuals must: (1) firmly, thoroughly, and rigorously

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means of internal circulation within state organs. Thus the whole country was immediately and simultaneously informed of this new order, implying that Mao considered the problem extremely urgent and could no longer tolerate turmoil.282 Unexpectedly, Mao, who two years previously had viewed himself as the commander of Red Guards, reversed his attitude towards them and began to view them not as groundbreaking revolutionaries, but rather as a social menace. On May 11, Mao mentioned that the main distinction between the CPC and the Kuomintang, the bourgeois and the proletariat, and the dictatorships of the bourgeoisie and proletariat rested on the protection versus the suppression of the masses.283 However, he failed to elaborate on who comprised the masses, which of course allowed him to define “the masses” at will. By approving and issuing the July 3 and July 4 communiqués that denounced the rebels as counter-revolutionary thugs and resorting to bloody military suppression, Mao finally ended the turmoil. The troops obeyed Mao’s orders to suppress the rebels, and there was enormous bloodshed in remote areas. In Guangxi Province, Wei Guoqing, the leader of the Guangxi Military Region, shocked the country by ordering the killing of all radical Red Guards.284 On August 20, Wei Guoqing was appointed director of the Guangxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee by the Central Committee of the CPC, and the People’s Daily published an editorial that extended congratulations to the revolutionary masses and heroic PLA troops in Guangxi Province. Besides military suppression of Red Guards outside Beijing, Mao dealt with Red Guards in Beijing by dispatching the Capital Worker Mao Zedong Thought Publicity Group and disbanding Red Guard organizations. Beijing served as the political center of the Cultural Revolution at the time, and thus was the information implement the ‘July 3’ communiqué approved by Chairman Mao, the leader of the armed struggle, and this directive should not be violated. (2) Immediately stop armed

struggle, dissolve all armed struggle teams, educate the misguided members to return

to productive work, and dismantle fortifications and strongholds. (3) Stolen cash and goods should immediately be returned. (4) Normal operations of vehicular, maritime,

and communication traffic must be restored immediately. (5) Stolen weapons and equipment must be returned immediately; (6) Where evidence exists of murder, arson,

damage to state property, intentional disruption of normal traffic and communications,

unauthorized broadcasts, and interference in jails and camps for re-education through labor, the responsible counter-revolutionists and their puppet masters must be punished by the law under the dictatorship of proletariat.” (Ibid, 510.)

282. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1519–1521. 283. Ibid, 1516. 284. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 319.

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and organizational center of the Red Guards. University rebel organizations in Beijing sent Red Guards to travel the country, set up liaison offices, incite unrest, and provoke violence, and rebel organizations from elsewhere also set up liaison offices in Beijing. In early 1967, Beijing had nearly a thousand liaison offices,285 which were considered sources of the nationwide violent struggle. Mao thus adopted a strategy of first dealing with the Red Guards in Beijing, and then dealing with them elsewhere. Additionally, he adopted the tactic of dissolving rather than suppressing Red Guard organizations in Beijing, in order to avoid bloodshed. Given the presence of foreign embassies in Beijing, this soft approach was also important to preserve China’s international image. Although he ignored the views of the Chinese people, Mao was concerned with international opinion, and did not wish to tarnish his image as a world leader of the proletariat. At the time Mao had numerous international followers (Maoists,) most of whom were young students in both developing and developed countries. However, these international followers soon became disillusioned with Mao’s dictatorial behavior. On July 27, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, following the decision by Mao, issued the Notification on Exerting Military Control over the Ministry of Education. The same day, the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee dispatched over 30,000 workers to form the Capital Worker Mao Zedong Thought Publicity Group, which worked in the main universities in Beijing. Mao realized it was inappropriate to deploy troops and police to handle the students, and thus it was ironic that he had rebuked Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for dispatching working groups to suppress the student movements, and had even said that those who suppressed the student movements would not come to a good end. In August, he ordered that troops not be deployed to suppress local student movements.286 Rather than use military force, Mao sent the Capital Worker Mao Zedong Thought Publicity Group to handle the students.287 The publicity group served as a working group for suppressing the student movements and 285. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1521. 286. August 21, 1966, The General Staff and General Political Department of the PLA issued the “Provisions on Forbidding the Suppression of the Revolutionary Student Movement with Armed Force” following its approval by Mao.

287. Wen Yucheng, Commander of the Beijing Garrison Area Command, reported conditions in Beijing to Mao as follows: “Now Beijing’s students are not afraid of the PLA. But

they are afraid of the workers. They know the soldiers cannot engage them due to the

provisions of the ‘Five-No Policy’, but the workers are tougher.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1525.)

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maintaining social order. At different times both Liu Shaoqi and Mao dispatched the Working Group. Later in 1989, Deng Xiaoping also dispatched the Working Group to deal with the Tiananmen Square Protests Event. At Tsinghua University, Kuai Dafu and other Red Guard leaders ordered retaliation against the members of the worker publicity group, and thousands of members were assaulted by rebel organizations. There was considerable bloodshed, and five worker publicity group members were killed while a further 732 were injured. The bloodshed provoked Mao into better controlling the Red Guards at various universities in Beijing.288 From 3:30am to 8:30am on the morning of July 28, Mao urgently met five university rebel leaders in Beijing (Nie Yuanzi from Beijing University, Kuai Dafu from Tsinghua University, Han Aijing from Beihang University, Tan Houlan from Beijing Normal University, and Wang Dabin from Beijing University of Geosciences). Also present were Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Yongsheng, and Ye Qun. The conversation lasted 5 hours and Mao criticized the five student leaders for using violence instead of verbal struggle, criticism and reform. Additionally he proposed four methods for handling university Red Guards: 1. Use of the military; 2. Separation of different factions by sending them to different cities; 3. Dissolution of all Red Guard organizations; 4. Non-intervention combined with withdrawal of workers. Mao concluded that the students had serious faults, and were divorced from the peasants, workers, soldiers, and producers. Noting down his words as he spoke, Mao warned student leaders, “If you continue violent struggle, our workers will intervene and place your organizations under the dictatorship of the proletariat. You may also be found to have committed errors. Additionally, if rebels stage rebellion, attack PLA soldiers, and disrupt transportation, we will arrest or annihilate them; if they use heavy weaponry to disrupt transport, we will deploy troops to suppress them.” Han Aijing stated, “I am afraid the Central Cultural Revolution Group has abandoned us.” Jiang Qing replied, “We could not speak up for you due to your excessive use of violence.”289 This exchange shows that Jiang and the Central Cultural Revolution Group had initially backed the five leaders of the rebel student organizations, but that even Jiang could not continue to back them once Mao decided to abandon them. On July 30, the conclusions of this conversation became the basis of Mao Zedong’s Directive on Banning Violent Struggle, which was issued across the country. On August 8, Mao spoke at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, saying: “It is irrational to rely on students to resolve historical problems 288. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1522. 289. Ibid, 1522–1525.

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for they have no power over industry, agriculture, transport, and troops, and can only cause disturbances. The five (student) rebel leaders have lost the trust of the masses, workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and the majority of members of all factions.”290 This represented a complete reversal of his earlier attitude, when he had praised and encouraged student rebels, and denounced Liu and Deng for suppressing the student movements and incorrectly viewing the Red Guards as agents of social unrest. Subsequently, the five student leaders were punished by the dictatorship of the proletariat and victimized through class struggle. On August 19, Mao criticized rebels from some universities for fighting with each other instead of carrying on struggle, criticism and reform. When conducting violent struggle, the rebels denounced their rivals as Kuomintang members. Mao acknowledged for the first time that he had contributed to the situation by mentioning the struggle between the CPC and the Kuomintang.291 On August 25, the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Commission of the CPC, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification of the Dispatch of the Worker Publicity Groups to Work at Universities and dispatched in rotating batches the Mao Zedong Thought Publicity Group, which largely comprised industrial workers, to support the PLA soldiers and work in universities. Approximately one tenth of the workers in China were dispatched to work in schools, universities, and other educational institutions in this way.292 PLA publicity groups were similarly deployed. The same day, Yao Wenyuan published the article titled “The Working Class must Assume Leadership” in Red Flag,293 and relayed Mao’s supreme directive that the working class were to lead schools, while the poor and lower-middle class peasants were to manage schools.294 Mao decided to abandon the Red Guards and 290. Ibid, 1526. 291. Ibid. 292. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 415–416.

293. Yao Wenyuan claimed: “The struggles, criticisms and rectifications in the battle

regarding education cannot be successfully completed by relying solely on students. Workers and PLA soldiers must be involved, and the powerful leadership of the

working class is also required. We must criticize the ‘theory of multiple centers or no

center’, denominationalism, sectarianism, and other bourgeois reactionary trends that impair the leadership of the working class.” (Red Flag, issue 2, 1968; republished by the People’s Daily, August 26, 1968.)

294. Mao had said: “The proletarian educational revolution must be led by the working class, and carried out by the workers and masses, in cooperation with soldiers from the PLA.

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dissolve the Red Guard organizations, and thereafter relied instead on the working class and poor and lower-middle class peasants. On September 2, the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification of the Failure of Workers to Unite to Exert Military Control over Military Academies and relayed Mao’s latest directive: “Subject to their meeting certain conditions, workers are to be dispatched to work with personnel overseeing military control at all military academies to undermine the dominance of intellectuals.” On September 12, the People’s Daily and Red Flag published the editorial “Issues Related to the Re-education of Intellectuals” and noted that the “Editor’s Note on Issues Related to the Re-education of Intellectuals” published in Red Flag relayed Mao’s directive. The “Editor’s Note” had proposed the re-education of intellectuals who had completed a tertiary or secondary level education, and also elaborated on this re-education.295 Red Guards thus became new revolutionary targets for dispatch, education and reform. In the campaign to purge class ranks across China, some Red Guards were accused of being emerging counter-revolutionaries and members of the “May 16 Group.” Mao held absolute power over the media and publicity, and had at first eulogized Red Guards as the vanguard of the revolution, then denounced them as counter-revolutionaries. The Red Guards were the defining feature of the Cultural Revolution, but they eventually became scapegoats of the movement they had helped start. In this way the three revolutionary forces become united, including the students and teachers in the schools, and the workers who will conduct the proletarian educational revolution through to the end. Worker propaganda teams shall stay permanently in the

schools, participate in all struggle, criticism and rectification tasks there, and lead the schools. In rural areas the most reliable alliance, that of the workers and poor farmers, shall administer the schools.” (People’s Daily, August 26, 1968.)

295. The article stated: “Why is it named reeducation? On the one hand, our people

accepted bourgeois education in the past and accept proletarian re-education today. On the anther hand, the people were previously educated by bourgeois intellectuals and followed the revisionist line of China’s Khrushchev, yet now they are educated by

workers, farmers and soldiers guided by Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line. The reconstruction of this view of the world is the most fundamental reconstruction.

Intellectuals should be educated with a proletarian view of the world, and enabled to give up the bourgeois world view obtained from their previous bourgeois education.

This is the nature of re-education. Re-education is essential, and involves being part of providing a service for workers, farmers and soldiers.” (People’s Daily, September 12, 1968.)

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Mao changed his attitude towards the Red Guards for various reasons. On July 28, 1968, Lin remarked that the Red Guards had been taken advantage of by evil elements, and had transformed from a force for good into a force for bad.296 In his 1969 Report to the 9th Party Congress, he recounted: “To respond to Chairman Mao’s instruction that ‘The workers must assume leadership,’ the working class, the main force of the proletarian revolution, and its close ally, the ‘poor and lower-middle peasants,’ entered the political arena and participated in struggle, criticism, and structural reform. As early as July 27, 1968, workers were dispatched to conduct revolution in places where capitalist roaders dominated and intellectuals gathered. Through this movement the proletariat captured the cultural and educational battlefield, effected transformation, and carried out the Cultural Revolution.”297 In the second half of 1968, Mao began to develop methods for expelling the Red Guards from various colleges and universities and dissolving their organizations. On June 20, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notification on the Allocation of Employment for College and University Graduates in 1967 which instructed that graduates (including postgraduates) in 1966 and 1967 should work as workers and peasants in rural and frontier areas, and that such contact with the grassroots would help unite the workers, peasants, and masses. On September 7, Zhou Enlai said in a speech that youth should respond to the call of the great leader Mao to work together with the masses at the grassroots level, including in factories, mines, and rural areas.298 Mao thus drove the Red Guards from their bases on school campuses into society, and from the cities to the countryside, and dissolved the Red Guard organizations. By the end of 1968, the Central Committee of the CPC had assigned 56,000 graduates to jobs at the grassroots level, and local governments and departments had allocated grassroots level jobs to 98,000 out of the 150,000 university graduates in China. The majority of university students 296. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1524.

On September 8, 1968, Jiang Qing alleged: “Individual revolutionary students

made various errors, and we are responsible for correcting these. Some institutions have organized armed struggles. That is ridiculous and wrong. These actions set them

apart from both the masses, and the employees of their own institutions. This is bad

and we oppose it.” Jiang Qing: “Speech to Celebrate the Establishment of Revolutionary Committees in Provinces, Municipalities and Autonomous Regions Across China,” September 7, 1968, People’s Daily, September 8, 1968. 297. Lin, Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC. 298. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Celebration of the Establishment of Revolutionary

Committees in Provinces, Municipalities and Autonomous Regions Across China,” September 7, 1968. (People’s Daily, September 8, 1968.)

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were dispatched to work with the masses in places far from where they had been involved in political struggle or social movements. Additionally, many students were accused of belonging to the counter-revolutionary “May 16 Group.” Despite these moves to dampen the Cultural Revolution, Mao remained a cult figure and Chinese people revered him to an extreme degree. For example, many of his written works were published, and physical representations of him (whether as portraits or statues) constantly increased in size and number. The Chinese people created a personality cult surrounding Mao,299 and he became revered as a “god.” While Mao had encouraged this personality cult, it reached a point where even he considered the flattery excessive. In December 1968, he crossed out “Long live our great leader Chairman Mao” (literally “May our great leader Chairman Mao live for 10,000 years”) on a draft document he was modifying and made the comment “Do not use such words in future.”300 Mao was well versed in Chinese history, and knew that this form of address had been used towards emperors by feudal courtiers. On September 7, revolutionary committees were set up in twenty-nine provinces, cities, and autonomous regions, creating what Zhou Enlai called “Red China.” It took 21 months to create “Red China,” from the January Storm in Shanghai in January 1967 through to the comprehensive seizure of power by revolutionary committees. Mao expected that the struggle, criticism and reform campaign that drove this process would take China to a new climax of achievement.301 Lin Biao later explained the reasons it took 21 months to create “Red China” in the Report to the 9th Party Congress: “Currently, two classes, two class lines, and proletarian and non-proletarian thoughts are carrying on a fierce struggle and the situation has become complicated. As Chairman Mao pointed out, ‘In the past, we knew clearly who our enemies were and won numerous wars. But in the Cultural Revolution, the numerous conflicts have made us confused about the identity of our enemies, which has made it difficult for us to continue the revolution.’”302 299. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 320–321. 300. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 609.

301. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Celebration of the Establishment of Revolutionary

Committees in Provinces, Municipalities and Autonomous Regions Across China,” September 7, 1968. (People’s Daily, September 8, 1968.)

302. Zhou Enlai delivered Mao’s instructions: “Establish a revolutionary committee in order

to ‘combine the three forces’, start large-scale criticism, clean up class teams, rectify the organizations of the CPC, streamline institutions, reform unreasonable regulations

and rules, and demote certain officials. All struggles, criticisms and rectifications in the factory should follow these basic phases.” (People’s Daily, September 8, 1968.)

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Thus even Mao was confused by certain issues and faced information asymmetry and uncertainty; distinguishing enemies and friends among China’s enormous population of 700 million was a major challenge. The Cultural Revolution continued to wreak economic havoc despite the successful realization of “Red China,” and national industrial output fell further in 1968. Yu Qiuli recalled that the Central Committee of the CPC had no way of convening the national planning meeting. So severe was the disorganization that the Central Committee of the CPC did not even formulate a national annual economic plan for 1968, making it the only such year since the First Five-Year Plan.

The Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC and the end of Liu Shaoqi’s Political Life As early as November 27, 1967, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification on Seeking Opinions on the 9th Party Congress of the CPC and proposed to convene the 9th Party Congress before National Day in 1968. After the 9th Party Congress, it was planned that the National People’s Congress would be convened to purge Liu Shaoqi. However, the Central Committee of the CPC failed to convene the 9th Party Congress prior to National Day in 1968. Therefore, Mao proposed to convene the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC as a preparatory meeting prior to the 9th Party Congress and to purge Liu.303 On September 19, 1968, Zhou Enlai presided over the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group which discussed the agenda of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC: 1. Prepare for the 9th National Congress of the CPC; 2. Summarize the experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; 3. Set up the Central Revolutionary Committee and purge Liu Shaoqi. On September 20, Mao rejected these suggestions and deemed the timing inappropriate for setting up the Central Revolutionary Committee.304 During the comprehensive power seizure conducted from January 1967 to September 1968, a total of over 60 Party and governmental leaders in twenty-nine provinces, cities and autonomous regions were denounced as enemies, and 88 out of the more than 190 members of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC (including alternate members) were framed as “traitors,” “ spies,” “evil people who colluded 303. Yu, “A Rock in the Stream,” 49–50. 304. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1528.

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with foreign countries and resisted the Party,” “counter-revolutionary revisionists” and “people with historical problems.”305 On July 21, Kang Sheng wrote a secret letter to Jiang Qing containing a list of targets to be framed. Although she was not a member of the Central Committee, Jiang determined the fate of senior party and government leaders. By this stage of the Cultural Revolution numerous leaders had been purged, and the number of members of the Central Committee to have been purged during the Cultural Revolution already exceeded the total purged in all sessions prior to 1966. The purges had been so extreme that the Central Committee of the CPC was unable to convene a plenum as mandated by the party constitution. Zhou and Lin were shocked at the number of purged leaders, all of whom had been purged by Kang and Jiang acting on directions from Mao. Mao was aware that the Cultural Revolution might end in failure. From May 1966 to June 1966, he discussed the possibility of failure with the visiting delegation of leaders from Albania. However, in February 1967, during another meeting with a delegation from Albania, he talked positively about the possibility of victory. On October 5, 1968, he again spoke of victory to a delegation of Albanian leaders, but declared that this was not a final victory.306 However, he also acknowledged 305. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1952. 306. On May 24, 1969, when Kang Sheng was reporting to the 9th National Congress of the

CPC, he mentioned Mao’s remarks, saying: “In conversations with guests from Albania,

Mao has talked twice about the two possible endings of the Great Cultural Revolution.

I remember, in May–June, 1966, when talking with Comrade Shehu (the head of the Albanian Party and Political Delegation), Chairman Mao believed there were two

future possibilities for the Great Cultural Revolution: the first was that the capitalist roaders win and we lose; the second was that we win and the capitalist roaders lose. Later, in February, 1967, after the Great Cultural Revolution had progressed through the

January revolutionary storm in Shanghai and local struggles to seize power, Comrades

Kapo and Beqir Balluku from Albania revisited China. While talking with them, the

Chairman said, there were still two possibilities for the Great Cultural Revolution. But this time he used different words. The Chairman said that the first possibility was

victory for us and a loss for capitalism, while the second possibility was a loss for

us. On a third occasion, in October, 1968, when Comrade Beqir Balluku attended the National Day activities and met the Chairman on October 5, Comrade Beqir Balluku

said there was no second possibility and the only possible outcome of the Cultural

revolution was final victory. To this the Chairman replied: ‘We have achieved great victories, but our defeated enemies continue to struggle. They remain alive and their class remains alive. So we cannot say we have achieved a final victory until several decades have passed. We need to remain calm.’”

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that the Cultural Revolution involved violent struggle and saw people beaten, publicly humiliated, and tortured.307 Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Huang Yongsheng were present when he made these last remarks. On October 13, Mao presided over the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Zhou declared that the purpose of convening the session was to prepare for the 9th National Congress of the CPC, as well as to discuss the principles and methods for electing deputies to the congress, revise the Constitution of the Party, analyze the situation at home and abroad, and endorse the review report on the Liu Shaoqi Case. Zhou Enlai deliberately introduced the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the administrative group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC.308 Actually, the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group succeeded the Central Committee of the CPC. Of the twelve members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, three (Zhou, Chen, and Kang) were members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and one (Xie) was an alternate member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Additionally, the administrative group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC replaced the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission. None of the six members of the administrative group were members of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. 307. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1529. 308. According to Zhou Enlai, “The Central Cultural Revolution (Group) is a new force

born in this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The group was approved two years ago by the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee. At that time, under the

leadership of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin, the Central Cultural Revolution became a frontier institution that directly mobilized the masses to implement the

proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Through the efforts of the past two years, the institution has gradually

developed into the Central Cultural Revolution Workshop, which has 12 members,

including Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and seven others (Zhou Enlai, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Wang

Dongxing, and Wen Yucheng). A military commission office was established and

approved by our great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade Vice Chairman Lin, and comprised six members: Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng,

Qiu Zuohui, and Liu Xianquan.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic

of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 431.)

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The brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the administrative group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC were set up in contravention of the Constitution of the Party. Zhou was compelled to obey Mao, but the negative effects of his support for the flouting of the Party Constitution exceeded his positive role in defending veteran cadres. Had the Party Constitution not been undermined, veteran cadres would not have been persecuted. This reflected the political costs of the Cultural Revolution. The 133 participants in the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC included 59 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC. Notably, 47 out of the 97 members of the Central Committee of the CPC were denounced and deprived of their right to attend the plenary session, which again was done in contravention of the Constitution of the Party.309 Only 40 members of the Central Committee attended the plenary session. Since there were not enough participants for a quorum, 10 associate members were temporarily promoted to the status of full members of the Central Committee.310 Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent explanation of events in April 1981 was slightly different, and he recalled that 50 members of the Central Committee of the CPC attended the plenary session.311 Historical records show that 74 participants attended the plenary session, including all the members of the Cultural Revolution Group, as well as leaders of local revolutionary committees, and leaders of the army. The communiqué of the plenary session provided no detail on the actual number of attendees, saying only that both members and associate members of the 309. Regarding the problem of purged central committee members, Article 16 of the Party

Constitution, approved by the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1956, stipulated:

“In such a situation, remove their titles as members or alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC, or place them on probation within the Party, subject to the decision of the National Congress of the CPC. In urgent situations, the Plenum of the

Central Committee of the CPC can make a majority decision with over two third of the votes, but its decision must be confirmed by the next meeting of the NPC.”

310. To meet the legal requirement under the Party Constitution and create a quorum, the

closing meeting of the Plenary Session suddenly elected 10 alternate members as full

members, including Huang Yongsheng, Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, Zhang Dazhi, Han Xianchu, Pan Fusheng, Liu Jian Xun, Li Dazhang, Wu De, and Liu Zihou, so that the number of members of the Central Committee present just exceeded half of total number

of members. (Li, From the First National Congress to the Sixteenth National Congress, vol. 2, 979.)

311. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 304.

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Central Committee of the CPC attended.312 While some details remain uncertain, the attendance figures clearly show the impact of two years of the Cultural Revolution, whereby Mao had purged more than half the members of the Central Committee. Mao delivered a speech at the opening ceremony, saying: “Two opinions exist on the Cultural Revolution. 1. Some people consider it proper; 2. Some people deem it improper. So should we have staged the Cultural Revolution? Has the historical influence of the Cultural Revolution been negative or positive? Should we continue the Cultural Revolution?” Mao’s comments show that the Central Committee of the CPC faced questions and controversy over whether the negatives of the Cultural Revolution exceeded the positives. Mao understood the issue could not be avoided, and hoped participants would support the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the plenary session focused on these issues. Mao reaffirmed the need to stage the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, prevent the restoration of capitalism and construct a socialist society. Nevertheless, at the plenary session he acknowledged that the movement had faults, and for the first time also acknowledged that the Central Committee and himself, rather than local governments and the army, should assume primary responsibility for those faults.313 However, Mao did not consider the nature of the faults, their severity, adverse effects, origins, or how they could be avoided in future. Mao failed to raise these questions or attempt answers. Mao proposed to ban excessive praise of the Cultural Revolution. On August 22, he issued a ban on the use of the word “unprecedented” to describe the Cultural Revolution, and commented the word was more appropriate for inventions such as fire, the steam engine, and Marxism and Leninism.314 Additionally, he disagreed on the eulogizing of the Cultural Revolution as the greatest reform in the history of the Communist movement and a new development of Marxism and Leninism, despite this having been315 proposed by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan and previously approved by himself. By this stage, Mao had become aware that international opinion of the Cultural Revolution, even in socialist countries, was largely negative. On October 26, Lin delivered a long speech, in which he said: “The Cultural Revolution accomplished maximum gains with minimum losses.”316 He also 312. “Communiqué of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ” approved on October 31, 1968. (People’s Daily, August 26, 1968.)

313. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1531. 314. Ibid, 1526. 315. Ibid. 316. Lin Biao’s speech covered six areas: “The first is the necessity of the Cultural Revolution;

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presented the Cultural Revolution in the context of four ‘cultural revolutions’ to have occurred in world history, specifically: “the classical culture of ancient Greece and Rome, the Italian Renaissance, Marxism, and the Cultural Revolution led by Chairman Mao. Among them, the Cultural Revolution outshines the others.” Lin summarized the contribution of Mao and other comrades to the Cultural Revolution, saying: “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was staged and led by Chairman Mao and the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Premier Zhou Enlai, and comrades Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng presided over dayto-day work and religiously followed Chairman Mao’s directives day and night. I was in poor health and did little work.”317 Lin also stated that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had won a great victory and achieved a great leap forward in terms of production and the economy.318 The communiqué of the plenary the second is its victory and historical significance; the third is the line and method of the Cultural Revolution; the fourth is the great contribution of the Chairman to Marxism and Leninism, especially in relation to how revolution should progress in

socialist conditions; the fifth is the Chinese and world revolutions; and the sixth is how to proceed in future.” (Lin, “Speech at the Second Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ,” October 26, 1968.)

317. Lin Biao said: “The Great Cultural Revolution, as I have said, achieved maximum gains with minimum losses. Now the losses have decreased compared to the period

when I made the above speech and the gains have increased. The gains will definitely increase further in the future. Therefore the rate of losses to gains may be 1:100, 1:1000

or 1:10000. The Cultural Revolution thus has achieved big gains at only a small cost. Compared with the gains, the losses are insignificant. China’s Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution will continue to achieve maximum gains with minimum losses. I say this today not simply to repeat my past words, but because I can now see the gains and losses more clearly than ever.” (Ibid.)

318. Lin Biao said, “The victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will definitely

cause both an economic “Great Leap Forward” and a production “Great Leap Forward.”

The Cultural Revolution is the first line that will lead to the political revolution.

Therefore we believe in and have seen both the economic “Great Leap Forward” and the production “Great Leap Forward” caused by the Cultural Revolution, and we will see

further similar outcomes in future. Marxism and Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought

believe that the three forms of class struggle — political struggle, economic struggle and ideological struggle — are interconnected, overlapping, and freely convertible. Restated, the three forms of revolution — political revolution, economic revolution

and ideological revolution — are three integral parts, elements, and components of proletarian revolution that overlap and are interconnected. Sometimes revolution

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session also suggested that the Cultural Revolution had realized a leap forward in economic construction.319 Chen Boda recorded Lin Biao’s opinion in the Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC, and noted that it represented that of most party members. This shows that Lin’s opinions on the Cultural Revolution differed from those of Mao, and they were criticized by Mao and Zhou at the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973 as representing the theory of the productive forces.320 Lin relayed Mao’s remarks on the relationship between the Chinese and world revolutions, saying: “The Chinese revolution is a vital part of the new world socialist revolution instead of the old world bourgeois revolution.” Lin further interpreted Mao’s words as follows: “Nowadays, the world appears to have a promising future, and we can see that China has had an unprecedented influence on world and human history. China has driven global progress, promoted and supported world revolution, and developed into a powerful country. Additionally, we have managed to create ‘Red China’ and a ‘Red World’ and are destined to be victorious in develops in one form, sometimes in another; in one period one form will dominate with the support of the other two; in another period, another form would dominate. In most

cases, one form is a preparation phase for the next form, and is converted into the next form when it develops sufficiently. Therefore the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

is a political great revolution that will definitely bring an economic revolution, and is a rule of proletarian class struggle.” (Ibid.)

319. The communiqué of the plenary session stated: “We must grasp revolution and boost production, work, and war preparation (“grasp one thing and boost three things”) to

further construct socialist industry, agriculture and other undertakings in China. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution provides a great impetus for socialist production, and will continue pushing ahead to gain new ground in our socialist construction.” “Communiqué of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC.” (People’s Daily, November 2, 1968.)

320. In August 1973, in the Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC, Zhou Enlai pointed out: “Before the 8th National Congress, Lin Biao and Chen Boda drafted a political report. They opposed the continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the

proletariat and believed the main task after the 9th National Congress was to develop production. This was the main domestic contradiction imposed by Liu Shaoqi and Chen Boda on the resolutions of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, and was not

the contradiction between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. It was simply revisionist

sophistry, namely the false ‘contradiction between the advanced socialist system and

lagging social productivity’ that was said to have emerged in the new situation. So the report submitted by Lin Biao and Chen Boda was rejected by the Central Committee of the CPC.”

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the Cultural Revolution.”321 Lin had a profound understanding and interpretation of Mao’s thoughts. However, he suffered from holding an unfounded belief that China would serve as the center of the world revolution, and would create a “Red World” after the Soviet Union converted to revisionism and the world revolution lost its command center. Mao and Lin shared these views. Unfortunately they overlooked the reality that China ranked among the poorest countries in the world in terms of per capita income, and had the largest population living in absolute poverty, and hence should focus on accelerating economic growth and reducing the population living in poverty rather than on continuing the Cultural Revolution domestically and leading world revolution internationally. Lin opposed the proposal to name him Mao’s successor that had been written into the preface of the new draft of the Party Constitution, saying: “I reserve the right to oppose my being named as Chairman Mao’s successor in the Constitution of the Party. The proposal really disturbs me and I deem it improper and difficult to take seriously. I reported my opposition to the Central Committee of the CPC but was rejected. Although I will obey this organizational order, I reserve my right to express my opposition.”322 On October 17, the new draft of the Party Constitution was discussed at the plenary session and Jiang Qing pointedly observed: “Lin Biao has shown a modest proletarian revolutionary demeanor, and will be proclaimed Chairman Mao’s successor in the Constitution of the Party.”323 On October 27, the new Party Constitution was discussed and Jiang still insisted on including Lin as Chairman Mao’s successor into the Constitution of the Party. 324 On October 29, Kang Sheng delivered a speech at the plenary session and highly praised Lin Biao’s speech, saying: “We must uphold Mao Zedong Thought when carrying on struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (the two classes), and between the socialist line and capitalist line (the two lines), and by erecting three milestones (Marxism, Lenin and Mao). We can thus achieve the great goal of creating a ‘Red World’. The naming of Comrade Lin Biao as Chairman Mao’s successor concerns the fate of our Party, our country, our revolution, and the world revolution. Although Comrade Lin Biao showed a modest demeanor and requested the cancellation of his being named Chairman Mao’s successor in the Constitution of the Party, we hereby insist on proclaiming Comrade Lin Biao 321. “Lin Biao’s Speech at the Second Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,” October 26, 1968.

322. Ibid. 323. Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci — Those Days with Chairman Mao, 202. 324. Ibid.

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as Chairman Mao’s successor. Comrade Lin Biao was proclaimed Chairman Mao’s successor at the plenary session and is worthy of carrying out this important mission. I strongly believe that Comrade Lin Biao should be named Chairman Mao’s successor in the Constitution of the Party.”325 Since Kang presided over the drafting of the Constitution of the Party at the 9th Party Congress, his opinion also represented the opinions of Mao and the Central Committee of the CPC. At the plenary session, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, and Kang Sheng, under instructions from Mao, once again criticized the “February Counter-current Forces.” At the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan suddenly reported to Zhou Enlai on the re-criticism of the February Counter-current Forces and the identification of their faults, and Zhou requested that Jiang seek further instructions from Mao. Jiang obtained Mao’s approval, and reported: “Mao Zedong approved the criticism and proposed that it be conducted over at least three days. In short, participants in the ‘February Counter-current Forces’ must undertake rigorous self-criticism.” Notably, Mao deprived Tan Zhenlin of the right to attend the plenary session. The Central Cultural Revolution Group also fabricated framing materials, including alleged crimes of veteran cadres, both through involvement with the ‘February Counter-current Forces’ and also historical crimes.326 Xie Fuzhi took the lead in criticizing the “February Counter-current Forces,” saying: “Veteran cadres denounced the Cultural Revolution, instigated turmoil at the Beijing Jingxi Hotel,327 and merged the State Council with the Central Military Commission of the CPC by creating the alliance among Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Yu Qiuli, Xu Xiangqian, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Chen Yi. Kang Sheng delivered a speech, saying: “The ‘February Counter-current Forces’ is a serious political case and a prelude of capitalist restoration, and the vanguards of the ‘February Counter-current Forces’ are followers of the Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping bourgeois reactionary line. Veteran comrades who carried out the democratic revolution, not foreign enemies, are behind the ‘February Countercurrent Forces’, and this shows the danger is very real.”328 325. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central

Committee of the CPC,” October 29, 1968; Zhang, Memories of Zhang Yaoci — Those Days with Chairman Mao, 202–203.

326. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 665–666. 327. “Speeches of Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and Xie Fuchun During the First

Panel Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ,” October 17, 1968.

328. “Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central

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Lin Biao delivered a speech at the closing session of the plenary session, saying: “After witnessing temporary setbacks, some comrades lost their belief and began to doubt that the Cultural Revolution was necessary and would be victorious. The ‘February Counter-current Forces’ reflected the misunderstanding regarding the necessity of the Cultural Revolution and the certainty of its victory,329 and thus are considered the most serious anti-Party case since the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC , and the prelude to the capitalist restoration.” Mao disagreed, stressing: “They openly voiced their opinions instead of engaging in secret conspiracies. Additionally, they served as members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, and as deputy premier and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. They are still allowed to gather to undertake normal Party activities. We should criticize and defend veteran cadres and put them on probation.”330 With the approval of Mao,331 the communiqué of the plenary session stated that: “The ‘February Counter-current Forces’ that revolted against the decisions of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the proletarian headquarters led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Biao in 1967, were severely criticized at the plenary session, and we won a crucial victory in which Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line defeated the bourgeois line by smashing the ‘February Countercurrent Forces’ and the evil trend of reversing verdicts against these forces.”332 After the plenary session closed, the Central Committee of the CPC decided to circulate the report on the plenary session and the issues related to the “February Counter-current Forces.” Prior to the 9th Party Congress, Kang Sheng reported to Mao in writing on the criticism of the “February Counter-current Forces” at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan approved of the proposal while Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Huang Yongsheng, Wang Dongxing, and Wu Faxian disapproved. Mao made the final decision: “We should cease criticizing the February Countercurrent Forces.”333 Committee of the CPC,” October 29, 1968. 329. Lin Biao: “Speech at the Closing Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ,” October 31, 1968.

330. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1532–1533. 331. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 591.

332. People’s Daily, November 2, 1968. 333. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 667.

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At the group meeting of the plenary session, Zhu De and Chen Yun, both members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, were also criticized, and Xie Fuzhi joined in to lead the criticism.334 The plenary session saw the circulation of the Report on the Major Crimes of the Second Capitalist Roader in the Party — Deng Xiaoping, submitted by the Deng Xiaoping Special Case Group. The Deng Xiaoping Special Case Group was set up in May. Kang Sheng, who was responsible for handling the case of Deng Xiaoping, said: “It is inappropriate to interrogate Deng Xiaoping. Instead, we need to carry out a thorough investigation to obtain evidence. Deng Xiaoping’s historical case has not been solved.” Given the lack of evidence with which to convict Deng, the Deng Xiaoping Special Case Group requested that Deng write his historical autobiography to help the search for evidence of his crimes. From June 20 to July 5, Deng Xiaoping wrote the first draft of The Autobiography of Deng Xiaoping, and stated: “I desperately longed to retain the right to remain as a common Party member, be assigned petty work, do whatever jobs I could, and rectify my faults.335 334. At the meeting Xie Fuzhi said: “Comrade Zhu De opposed Chairman Mao since the

first day in Jinggangshan. Comrades Tan Zhenlin, Zhu De, and Chen Yi joined hands to expel Chairman Mao from the army.” “Comrade Chen Yi was the Chief of Staff

working with Comrade Zhu De. All these people shall be criticized.” “Let us recall the ‘7000-person Meeting’, at which Comrade Chen Yun ignored the Chairman’s three

invitations to give a speech, and said ‘Without an investigation, I have no right to give a speech’. But a month later he made an irresponsible report opposing the Chairman, the

Great Leap Forward and the general line.” “The consequences of adopting Comrade

Chen Yun’s report would be unimaginable. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping promoted counter-revolutionary revisionism, and comrades Zhu De and Chen Yun also encouraged revisionism. The remaining forces of the ‘February Adverse Current’ have

been unwilling to give up and continue to work for them.” “Comrade Chen Yun has

been away from practical work for years, but Liu Shaoqi unexpectedly appointed him to lead the economic team and repair recent economic failures. In other words, Liu Shaoqi used this appointment to promote revisionism. Let us look at what Comrade Chen Yun did. He encouraged the masses to earn money, opened up free markets for cloth and meat, and lifted prices. Comrade Chen Yun continually opposes Chairman Mao

and his evil behavior continues even when he is on holiday. All this must be stopped.” (“Speeches of Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and Xie Fuchun During the First

Panel Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ,” October 17, 1968.)

335. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1943–1944.

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No matter what punishment I was dealt, I would unconditionally accept it and not seek to reverse the verdict. I do not wish to be an unrepentant capitalist roader.” Although Mao attacked both Liu and Deng, he treated them differently. Earlier in September 1967, Mao had spoken with Yang Chengwu and said: “After ending the Cultural Revolution next spring (1968), I plan to convene the 9th Party Congress to liberate veteran cadres and elect veteran cadres such as Deng Xiaoping, Wu Lanfu, Peng Zhen, and He Long as deputies to the congress and members of the Central Committee of the CPC.” On September 20, Mao said to Zeng Siyu: “I defend Deng Xiaoping because Deng Xiaoping fought in wars, and has never joined the Kuomintang or advocated the cultivation of evil.336 At the group meeting of the plenary session, Lin, Jiang, Kang, and Xie denounced Deng and proposed his expulsion from the Party.337 On June 30, Mao conversed with members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, saying: “I do not believe that Deng Xiaoping colluded with enemies, and I think you fear Deng Xiaoping because of his abilities.”338 At the closing meeting of the plenary session, Mao deliberately raised the matter of Deng, saying: “I disapprove of expelling Deng Xiaoping from the Party. I am a conservative. In my opinion, Deng Xiaoping differs in nature from Liu Shaoqi.”339 He further remarked: “Deng Xiaoping is divorced from the masses but lacks the capability to wage rebellion. In fact, Deng Xiaoping merely develops tactics while Liu Shaoqi makes final decisions.” Despite Mao’s defense, Deng was still dismissed from all his party and governmental posts, but remained a Party member. The plenary session was held to endorse the Review Report on the Crimes of the Traitor, Spy, and Scab Liu Shaoqi submitted by the Central Special Case Review Group led by Xie Fuzhi on September 1968, and to pass the “Resolution on Expelling Liu Shaoqi from the Party, Relieving Him of all Party and Organizational Posts and Punishing the Crimes of Betraying the Party and the Country Committed by Liu Shaoqi and his Allies.” In late November, the above communiqué, review report, and appendix were circulated within the Party and were orally relayed to the masses. The Liu Shaoqi Special Case was fabricated under the instructions of Jiang Qing. On February 26, 1968, Xie Fuzhi issued instructions that Jiang was to preside over the Liu Shaoqi Special Case, and that all important related issues were to be 336. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1505–1506. 337. Compiled by the CCCPC Party Literature Research Center: Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), v 2, p 1946, Beijing: CCCPC Party Literature Publishing House, 2009.

338. Ibid, 1944. 339. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1537.

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reported to Jiang.340 Lin made a point of mentioning to members and associate members of the Central Committee of the CPC, “Jiang Qing played a vital role in handling the Liu Shaoqi Special Case.”341 In August 1966, Ye Qun ordered Lei Yingfu, Deputy Minister of the General Staff Operations Department, to fabricate materials to frame Liu Shaoqi, and to submit them to Jiang. (Sidebar 4.6) Zhang Chunqiao also spoke: “You should not neglect the Review Report on the framing of Liu Shaoqi. Comrade Jiang Qing spent over one year leading an arduous and thorough investigation, and the Review Report is vital in the purging of Liu Shaoqi.”342 The Review Report on the Crimes of the Traitor, Spy, and Scab Liu Shaoqi alleged how Liu followed the bourgeois reactionary line, conspired to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat, undermined revolutionary movements, and led both the counter-revolutionary revisionist group within the Party, and the forces seeking capitalist restoration. Later, the resolution of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, the Review Report severely distorted history. Liu was deprived of his freedom, as well as the right to attend meetings and plead his case. After the plenary session, Jiang also plotted to sentence Wang Guangmei to death as an American spy, but Mao disagreed with the plan, and said: “Although Wang Guangmei worked as a spy, we should retain her as living proof. In Yan’an, I disagreed with the Central Committee of the CPC on sentencing Wang Shiwei to death.” Zhou relayed Mao’s directive at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, which forced Jiang to abandon her conspiracy and allowed Wang to survive the Cultural Revolution.343 On the evening of October 17, 1969, Liu Shaoqi, who was seriously ill, was sent to Kaifeng in Henan and imprisoned in a special prison. On November 12, he passed away and was secretly cremated. 340. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1535. 341. On October 26, 1968, during the Second Meeting of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC , Lin Biao said: “The recovery of

the main traitors, secret agents and scabs led by Liu Shaoqi, who had lain hidden for over 40 years, represents a big victory. Honestly, we did not know these people and

thought they were revolutionaries and senor communist party members. Through

investigation, we found they were snakes, demons, traitors, dirty secret agents, and scabs. Our project team did an exceptional job, especially under the leadership of

Comrade Jiang Qing, allowing us to collect these appalling unknown facts, as well as gathering witnesses and evidence, and thus overthrow Liu Shaoqi.”

342. The speech of Zhang Chunqiao on November 6, 1968, submitted during the trial of Jiang Qing in the Special Court on December 3, 1980. People’s Daily, December 4, 1980.

343. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 378.

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Sidebar 4.6 Liu Shaoqi

Specifics of the Fabrication of the Unjust Case Against

In August 1966, Lin Biao asked Ye Qun to dictate materials for framing Liu Shaoqi to Lei Yingfu, Deputy Minister of the General Staff Operations Department. In December, Zhang Chunqiao granted student leader Kuai Dafu from Tsinghua University an audience, and ordered him to organize a demonstration and instigate the purge of Liu Shaoqi. In July 1967, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda decided to persecute and detain Liu Shaoqi. As early as May 1967, Jiang Qing had already assumed direct control of the Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei Special Case Groups and colluded with Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi to order the groups to torture those arrested or detained into giving confessions, and so fabricated evidence to frame Liu Shaoqi as a traitor, spy, and counter-revolutionary. In 1967, Jiang Qing decided to detain and arrest 11 people in relation to the Liu Shaoqi case, including the deputy governor of Hebei Province Yang Yichen (formerly the administrative secretary of the Organizational Department of the Manchuria Provincial Committee of the CPC), Renmin University professor Yang Chengzuo (formerly a professor at Fu Jen Catholic University and mentor of Wang Guangmei), Wang Guangen (former assistant general manager of Fengtian Spinning Mill, a resident in Tianjin) and Hao Miao (Liu Shaoqi’s chef). The purpose of these detentions was to fabricate evidence to frame Liu Shaoqi. Yang Chengzuo was already severely ill when Jiang Qing ordered his interrogation and he was ultimately persecuted to death. Additionally, Jiang Qing and Xie Fuzhi ordered the torture of Beijing Normal University professor Zhang Chongyi (formerly a professor of Fu Jen Catholic University and mentor of Wang Guangmei) to force a confession. Zhang Chongyi, also gravely ill, died within two hours of being interrogated. Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi also ordered the torture of Ding Juequn, who had worked with Liu Shaoqi in leading the worker movement in Wuhan, and Meng Yongqian, who had been arrested together with Liu Shaoqi in 1929, to fabricate further false evidence and frame Liu Shaoqi as a traitor by extracting confessions. Source: Verdict Delivered by the Special Court of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, TFZ No. 1, January 23, 1981.

The framing of Liu Shaoqi was the first case of politically motivated framing in the history of the People’s Republic of China, and set the pattern for later cases. That

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this could occur demonstrates that the state system had been utterly destroyed and both the civil rights and human rights of party and state leaders had been severely infringed in the Cultural Revolution. Ye Zilong, who served as Mao’s bodyguard and secretary, said to Wang Guangmei, “Mao should be blamed for wrongly persecuting Liu Shaoqi to death! I would rather face execution than say nothing.”344 In February 1980, the resolution to vindicate Liu was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC.345 Mao had incorrectly analyzed the Chinese political situation. In reality there was no bourgeois headquarters led by Liu, and the Liu Shaoqi Revisionist Line did not exist. On October 31, Mao proposed at the closing meeting of the plenary session: “We should rigorously purge class ranks instead of relying on extracted confessions. Additionally, I disapprove of purging over 500 intellectuals out of the faculty of over 10,000.346 Instead, the bourgeoisie academic authorities such as Feng Youlan, 344. Liu Yuan said: “My mother rarely cried during her 12 years in jail. But she hugged me

and cried loudly after Ye Zilong left. Once somebody told her the truth, and especially hearing it from Ye Zilong, it was like a bomb thrown into my mother’s heart. The strong

shock aroused all the grievances that had accumulated over a long period, and all her

grievances and indignation came pouring out together! I put my hand on my mother’s back while she cried loudly. I told her, everything had changed, and her days in jail were over.” Learning Times, May 10, 2010.

345. The resolution pointed out: “On the eve and at the beginning of the Great Cultural Revolution, due to unrealistic assessments of the situation within the party and the country, it was believed that a counter-revolutionary revisionist line had emerged

that was opposed to the central line of the party, and that a bourgeois headquarters

existed led by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, who was thought to be the leader of a counter-

revolutionary revisionist group within the CPC, and the biggest capitalist roader in China. Besides deviating from the principle of democratic centralism, incorrect

guidelines and measures were adopted to publicly criticize and struggle against

Comrade Liu Shaoqi, and to dismiss him as Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman of the PRC.”

346. The Case Group forced Jian Bozan to disclose the defection of Liu Shaoqi during negotiations with the Kuomintang in 1935. However, Jian Bozan could not bear the

humiliation of having lied. On the night of December 18, Jian Bozan and his wife committed suicide by overdosing on drugs. Peking University submitted the brief

report The Suicide of Jian Bozan to the Beijing Revolutionary Committee, and this

report was later circulated to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Mao, and Lin.

On hearing the news of Jian Bozan’s death, Mao angrily rebuked Xie Fuzhi. Later, on August, 1978, Deng Xiaoping issued a personal instruction, saying: “I believe he

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Jian Bozan, Wu Han,347 Hua Luogeng (mathematics,), Zhao Jibin (philosophy,) Ren Jiyu (philosophy,) Zhou Gucheng (history,) Liu Dajie (history,) Tan Jiazhen (genetics,) Su Buqing (mathematics,) and Yang Rongguo (philosophy,) should be criticized, defended, retained, assigned work and offered opportunities to rectify their faults.” He also introduced Wang Hongwen, a worker representative, to the deputies present, saying: “For young comrades to attend the meeting is democratic. It is a pity that there are only a few young deputies here. I believe our meeting has been a success.”348 The communiqué of the plenary session issued Mao’s supreme directive, saying: “It is necessary and proper to stage the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, prevent the restoration of capitalism and construct a socialist society.”349 The communiqué also eulogized the Central Cultural Revolution Group for its vital role in carrying on the struggle to follow Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line. It stressed the importance of being alert to the exploiting class and the sabotaging of socialist society. According to Mao’s political logic, China needed to carry out several political movements like the Cultural Revolution. The communiqué claimed that the plenary session was convened as a meeting to seek victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, promote party unity under the leadership of Mao and Lin, and continue to wage proletarian revolution to take advantage of the favorable domestic and overseas situation.350 At the plenary session, Liu Shaoqi was purged and Mao once again estimated that the Cultural Revolution might end in the summer of 1969. On November 10, Mao told foreign guests: “It took twenty-two years (1927– 1949) to seize power and it might take about three years to carry out the Cultural Revolution.” He also acknowledged that there had been a split within the Chinese Communist Party.351 Mao did not expect to come into conflict with his political ally should be exonerated.” Jian Bozan thus was exonerated completely. (“The Mystery of the Suicide of the Famous Historian Jian Bozan,” South Weekend, March 11, 1999.) 347. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 390–391. 348. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1537. 349. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 539; “Communique of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC,” People’s Daily, November 2, 1968.

350. “Communique of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC ,” People’s Daily, November 2, 1968.

351. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1539.

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and successor Lin, which led to splits in the Party and the army and forced him to continue the Cultural Revolution and class struggle. The extent to which Mao purged his opponents and split the Party can be seen by presenting some statistics:352 In terms of the three leadership bodies of the Central Committee of the CPC, out of 11 members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Liu Shaoqi was purged and relieved of his posts in October 1968, while Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu were purged, Liu Fuchun was criticized, and Zhu De and Chen Yun were dismissed from their posts. Thus 54.5% of the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau were purged, and only Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng remained. Out of 23 members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen were purged and relieved of their posts, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, Peng Dehuai, He Long and Li Jingquan were purged, Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqiang and Nie Rongzhen were criticized, and Zhu De, Chen Yun, Dong Biwu and Liu Bocheng were dismissed from their jobs. Thus 78.3% of the members of the Central Politburo were attacked, and only five members remained in their posts. Six of the seven alternate members of the Central Politburo of the CPC were persecuted, representing 85.7% of the total. Only Xie Fuzhi retained his post. Out of ten secretaries and alternate secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC, eight were persecuted, accounting for 80% of the total. Only Kang Sheng and Li Xuefeng remained in their posts, and all three alternate secretaries were purged. In terms of the Central Committee of the CPC, Kang Sheng wrote a secret letter to Jiang Qing containing a list of targets for persecution on July 21, 1968. Out of the 193 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC elected at the 8th National People’s Congress in September 1956, 88 members and alternate members were framed as traitors, spies and counter-revolutionaries, seven were purged without being implicated in special investigations into political crimes, and 29 were denounced as having faults or historical problems, together accounting for 64.2% of the total membership.353 352. On October 5, 1968, Mao described the importance of the Cultural Revolution to the Albanian Party and Government Delegation, saying: “This time all of our party,

government, army, and people are launching a big clean up. We are cleaning up our team and identifying our enemies.” He further optimistically estimated that China might achieve peace within 10–20 years. (Ibid, 1529.)

353. The list included: Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi,

Peng Dehuai, He Long, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Li Jingquan, Tao Zhu, Xu Xiangqian,

Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, Wu Lanfu, Zhang Wentian, Lu Dingyi, Bo Yibo, Song

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In terms of the leadership of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, out of seven vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the CPC elected in January 1966, six were persecuted and purged, and only Lin Biao remained in his post. Out of twelve standing commissioners of the Central Military Commission of the CPC,354 all except Mao and Lin were persecuted. Secretary Dong Biwu of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC, elected by the First Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Party in September 1956, was also dismissed from his job. Out of five deputy secretaries, Xiao Hua, Wang Congwu, and Zhang Yunyi were purged, while Qian Ying and Liu Xiwu were dismissed from their jobs. Consequently, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC largely ceased functioning. In terms of the presidency, Liu Shaoqi, elected at the 3rd National People’s Congress in January 1965, was relieved of his post at the end of 1968, and vice chairmen Dong Biwu and Song Qingling were dismissed from their posts.355 After Renqiong, Wang Jiaxiang, Luo Ruiqing, Liu Ningyi, Liu Lantao, Yang Shangkun,

Hu Qiaomu, Wang Renzhong, Jiao Jinguang, Su Yu, Xiao Ke, Chen Shaomin, Wang

Zhen, Zeng Shan, Ouyang Qin, Wang ShuSheng, Wang Enmao, Deng Hua, Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng, Liu Xiao, Li Weihan, Yang Xiufeng, Zhang Jichun, Cheng Zihua, Wu Xiuquan, Qian Ying, Wang Congwu, Ma Mingfang, Li Baohua, Xu Guangda, Lin

Tie, Deng Weisan, Xu Haidong, Xiao Hua, Hu Yaobang, Xi Zhongxun, An Ziwen, Lv Zhengcao, Zhang Jingwu, Liao Chengzhi, Ye Fei, Yang Xianzhen, Zhang Dingcheng,

Shu Tong, Pan Zili, Yang Yong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Manyuan, Su Zhenhua, Feng Baiju, Fan Wenlan, Li Jianzhen, Gao Kelin, Zhong Qiguang, Jianghua, Li Zhimin, Yang Chengwu, Zhang Hanfu, Shuai Mengqi, Liu Ren, Wan Yi, Zhou Yang, Xu Zirong, Liu Lanbo, Kui Bi, Qu Mengjue, Zhu Dehai, Zhang Qilong, Ma Wenrui, Wang Shitai, Liao

HanSheng, Hong Xuezhi, Zhang Yun, Xu Bing, Liao Luyan, Song Shilun, Zhou Huan,

Chen Peixian, Zhao Jianmin, Qian Junrui, Jiang Nanxiang, Han Guang, Li Chang, Wang Heshou, Chen Zhengren, Zhao Yimin, Kong Yuan, Zhang Su, Yang Yichen, Zhao Boping, Zhang Aiping, Yao Yilin, Wang Feng, Fang Yi, Wang Shangrong, Liu Zhen,

Zhang Jinfu, Li Jiebo, Liao Zhigao, Jiang Weiqing, Tan Qilong, Zhang Zhongliang, and Zhang Pinghua. (Tan and Lü, Trial of China: the Public Trial against Ten Principals in the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-revolutionary Groups, 113–114.)

354. Luo Ronghuan died of disease on December, 1963, and was excluded from this list. 355. According to Article 39 of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: “The

term of the Chairman of the PRC is 4 years.” According to Article 45: “The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the PRC exercise their functions and powers until a new Chairman and Vice Chairman elected by the succeeding National People’s Congress assume office.” According to Article 46: “In the event that the Chairman of the PRC

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1968, the presidency ceased to perform its constitutional functions because it was consistently vacant. In terms of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, out of the 18 chairmen and vice chairmen elected at the 3rd National People’s Congress convened in January 1965, only two (Kang Sheng and Li Xuefeng) remained in their posts. Zhu De was dismissed from his job, Peng Zhen was relieved of his post in August 1966, Liu Ningyi (who held a concurrent post of secretary general,) Lin Feng, and Li Jingquan were purged, four vice chairmen passed away, and Xu Xiangqian and Liu Bocheng were unconstitutionally dismissed from their jobs.356 The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress ceased functioning and its members were either prohibited from doing their jobs or relieved of their posts without the approval of the National People’s Congress. From 1966, the National Peoples’ Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference stopped meeting. On August 30, 1966, the National Committee of the CPPCC ceased functioning. On July 7, 1966, the Standing Committee of the CPC and the Fourth Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee convened their joint conference for the last time, and subsequently stopped functioning. In terms of the leadership of the State Council elected at the 3rd National People’s Congress convened in January 1965 (including the Premier, Deputy Premier and Secretary General,) only Zhou Enlai and two of the 16 deputy premiers (Lin Biao and Xie Fuzhi) remained in their posts at the end of 1968. Ke Qingshi passed away in April 1965; Luo Ruiqing and Lu Dingyi were relieved of their posts in August 1966; Bo Yibo, Deng Xiaoping, and He Long were purged; Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, and Nie Rongzhen were dismissed from their jobs; and Zhou Rongxin, Secretary General of the State Council, was purged. Out of 18 leaders of the State Council, 14 were persecuted or purged unconstitutionally.357 cannot work for a long period for health reasons, the Vice Chairman shall exercise the functions and powers of the Chairman on their behalf.”

356. According to Article 30 of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: “The

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress comprises the following persons elected by the National People’s Congress: the Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Secretary General, and members.” According to Article 37, no deputy to the NPC may be arrested or tried without the consent of the NPC, or when the NPC is not in session, without the consent of its Standing Committee.

357. According to Article 40 of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: “The Chairman of the PRC, in pursuance of the decisions of the NPC and its standing committee appoints or removes the Premier, Vice Premiers, Ministers in charge of ministries or commissions, and the Secretary General.”

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During this period, Mao purged his political rivals by setting up unconstitutional special case groups. Wu Faxian described the successive establishment of fourteen central special case groups from September 1967. Zhou Enlai also proposed establishing special case investigation groups, appointing personnel to oversee them, and designating the members of these special groups at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. With the approval of the brief meeting, Zhou appended his signature to written case reports and submitted them to Mao and Lin for approval. Zhou Enlai (the first person in charge,) Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Jiang Qing presided over the work of the Central Special Case Group. Three offices existed under the Central Special Case Group: Wang Dongxing served as director of the No. 1 Office under the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC, and his office managed seven special case groups. Meanwhile, Yang Chengwu and Huang Yongsheng successively served as directors, while Wu Faxian served as the deputy director of the No. 2 Office under the Administrative Group of the Central Military Commission of the CPC. The No. 2 Office managed three special case groups. Meanwhile, Xie Fuzhi served as director of the No. 3 Office, under the Ministry of Public Security, and the No. 3 Office oversaw four special case groups. The reports prepared by the special case groups were discussed and endorsed at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, signed by Zhou, and submitted to Mao and Lin for approval.358 For instance, the Review Report on the Crimes of the Traitor, Spy and Scab Liu Shaoqi and the Criminal Evidence Regarding the Traitor, Spy and Scab Liu Shaoqi prepared by the Central Special Case Review Group on October 18, 1968 were circulated to all party members by the Secretary Bureau of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC. Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and their allies denounced and framed numerous members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC during the Cultural Revolution. Evidence presented during the trial of Jiang showed that Kang framed 592 people, including 120 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC. Records of Jiang’s speeches from late 1966 to July 1970 indicated that she framed 172 people, including 28 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC.359 Incited by Xie Fuzhi, who led several special case groups, numerous cadres were wrongfully imprisoned, relentlessly persecuted, and tortured. From 1967 to 1971, over 500 central and local senior cadres were imprisoned in Beijing, among which 34 were tortured to death, over 20 were maimed, and over 60 developed mental illness following torture.360 358. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 697–699. 359. Xinhua News Agency, December 12, 1980. 360. People’s Daily, December 23, 1980.

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Table 4.2

Central Special Case Groups and Associated Persons in Charge

Office

Special Case Group

Person in Charge

No. 1 Office

Liu Shaoqi Special Case Group

Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chen

Wang Guangmei Special Case Group

Chen Boda

Bo Yibo and Allies Special Case Group

Kang Sheng

Tao Zhu Special Case Group

Jiang Qing

Lu Dingyi Special Case Group

Chen Boda

Zhang Wentian Special Case Group

Unknown

Peng Zhen Special Case Group

Kang Sheng

Peng Dehuai Special Case Group

Huang Yongsheng

He Long Special Case Group

Kang Sheng

Luo Ruiqing Special Case Group

Jiang Qing

May 16 Special Case Group

Xie Fuzhi

Traitor Apprehension Special Case Group

Xie Fuzhi

Ye Xiangzhen Special Case Group

Xie Fuzhi

Other Special Case Group

Xie Fuzhi

No. 2 Office

No. 3 Office

Boda, and Kang Sheng

Source: Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 698.

Mao also deemed that too many capitalist roaders had been unmasked and denounced, and thus that he had to redefine the concept of capitalist roader. In December 1968, he issued instructions on a notification, saying: “There are only a few unrepentant capitalist roaders. The majority are willing to undergo education and rectify their faults. Therefore, we should avoid viewing all the capitalist roaders as evil people.”361 These words typified Mao’s paradoxical approach to implementing policy. When he proposed a new political concept, he would simultaneously create additional problems surrounding its interpretation. For instance, when he proposed the new concept of capitalist roaders, Mao created new problems such as who the capitalist roaders were, how to identify them, and how to identify those among them who were unrepentant. Actually, even Mao himself was unsure how to define 361. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 617.

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concepts such as “capitalist roader,” and so those responsible for implementing his policies faced an impossible task. Purging capitalist roaders thus ultimately came to mean purging all those in power, which forced Mao to try to distinguish clearly between the minority of unrepentant capitalist roaders and the majority who were willing to undergo reeducation and rectify their faults. In short, Mao’s staging of the Cultural Revolution not only purged party and government leaders, but also violated and destroyed basic party and state systems. The next chapter will cover detailed analysis and assessment of how this occurred.

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5

Chapter

The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 2

The second phase of the Cultural Revolution lasted from the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in April 1969 to the 10th National Congress in August 1973.1 Lin Biao was designated “Mao’s close comrade-inarms and successor” in the General Principles of the Constitution of the Party approved at the 9th National Congress of the CPC.2 He was then described as a careerist, conspirator, and double-dealer of the capitalist class in Zhou Enlai’s 1973 Report to the 10th National Congress. This second phase can be divided into the following periods. (1) Mao and Lin were close comrades-in-arms, and Lin was officially designated as Mao’s successor. (2) Mao and Lin competed against each other in a power struggle as to who would issue “Order No. 1” and in a political struggle as to whether there should be the post of state president. Mao acted contrary to collective opinion and dissolved the post. (3) The followers of Mao and Lin engaged in a retaliatory struggle with one another, and Chen Boda challenged Zhang Chunqiao. Mao took the opposing position by criticizing Chen and protecting Lin at the Lushan Conference. (4) Mao launched the “Criticize Chen and Rectification Movement” to steadily close in on the Lin Biao clique. (5) A bitter political struggle ensued, and Mao made an inspection tour of the south of the country to issue his instructions. (6) Lin died in a plane crash on September 13, 1971 while fleeing the country. Mao was victorious, but his health suffered a huge blow. (7) The campaign of “Criticizing Lin and Rectification” was launched and Mao liberated veteran party officials but forbade criticizing ultra-leftists. How does the CPC Central Committee explain the bitter political struggle between Mao and Lin? In May 1972, Zhou Enlai said that this was the 10th line struggle within the party, but it was the fiercest, most serious, and most complex class struggle.3 In August 1973, Zhou Enlai explained further in the report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC that a political struggle inside the party was a reflection of class struggle in society. After the collapse of the traitorous Liu Shaoqi clique, the anti-party Lin Biao clique began to fight against the proletariat, which was a direct reflection of the domestic and international class struggle.4 In fact, it 1.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 812–813.

2. Museum of the Chinese Revolution comp., Compilation of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 206–207.

3. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee’s ‘Criticizing Lin and Rectification Meeting,’” May 21, 1972

4.

138

“Zhou Enlai’s Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.

The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

was closer to a power struggle between Mao and Lin. The important questions that need to be addressed are as follows: Why did Mao decide to convene the 9th National Congress of the CPC? What was the political line of that congress? Why was that line regarded as the essence of Mao’s political errors? Why did the party’s Constitution designate Lin as the successor? Who played the key role in making that stipulation? Mao viewed the 9th National Congress of the CPC as a “congress of unity, a congress of victory,” and he expected China to achieve even greater success thereafter.5 But why had any chance of unity vanished even before he finished his speech? Why did the bitter political struggle between him and Lin take place instead of Mao’s own wishes being fulfilled? How was it that such a serious political crisis could occur? What brought to an end the short period of Mao and Lin being close comrades-in-arms? Why did the majority in the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee agree on establishing the state presidency, which Lin supported but Mao opposed? What kind of political struggle took place at the Lushan Conference? Why was the conference agenda changed so as to criticize Chen Boda? After the conference, how did Mao gradually push out the “Five Generals,” which included Wu Faxian and Ye Qun? Why did Mao make his inspection tour of the south of the country? Why were Mao and Lin unable to reach a political compromise but were forced into conflict with each other? Why did the 10th political split occur in the CPC, thereby leading to a political purge with respect to party institutions, the government, and the army, just as Mao said it would? What was the role of Zhou Enlai in all these events? Why did the Lin Biao family (except Lin Liheng) flee the county? What was the political meaning of the Lin Biao Incident (September 13 Incident)? With this incident, what were the costs of victory for Mao, both politically and personally? Despite these costs, why did Mao not resign? Why was the CPC Central Committee unable to rectify Mao’s errors at that time? Why did the Cultural Revolution continue? Some of these historical questions have been answered to various extents, while others remain a mystery. This chapter will use existing historical literature for analysis, and demonstrate that Mao’s “philosophy of struggle” was politically detrimental to China and the CCP. In their political struggle, neither Mao nor Lin emerged on top. Being both the the advocator and eventual victim of his own philosophy of struggle, Mao suffered — both mentally and physically — more deeply than when he purged Liu Shaoqi.

5. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 14, 23–30.

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The 9th National Congress of the CPC and Lin Biao Becoming Successor After the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, Mao considered convening the 9th National Congress of the CPC to end the three-year Cultural Revolution. He pointed out that appropriate measures for less purging and more education were part of efforts to forgive people for their past errors. In the closing session of the Enlarged Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC on October 31, 1968, Mao said that it was necessary to undertake suitable measures to purge class ranks quickly.6 On December 1, Mao issued his instructions in the Report on the Beijing Xinhua Printing House’s Implementation of the “Offering a Way Out” Policy in the Fight against Enemies: take appropriate measures for purging fewer and educating more people to deal with counter-revolutionaries and individuals who made mistakes; focus on investigations but never extract confessions under torture; and forgive good individuals who made mistakes after helping them heighten their political awareness.7 In the Xinhua Printing House, 68 of the 3,000 workers were labeled as “enemies” at that time; they were later rehabilitated following approval by the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee and State Publication Bureau in 1979.8 Mao also proclaimed that only a few of the capitalist roaders were irredeemable; most of them would correct their errors after being properly educated. Mao requested that capitalist roaders not be referred to as vicious individuals, and he suggested that the children of the counter-revolutionaries and capitalist roaders be termed “children who can be educated” instead of “children of gangs” so as to differentiate them from the actions of their family.9 So, who were regarded as enemies? On December 17, Yao Wenyuan, acting on behalf of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, labelled nine categories of individuals as enemies: traitors, spies, incorrigible capitalist roaders, landlords, affluent peasants, counter-revolutionaries, evildoers, rightists, and active counterrevolutionaries.10 On December 26, the CPC Central Committee and the Central 6. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594

7.

Ibid, 606.

8.

Ibid, 607.

9.

Ibid, 617–618.

10. Ibid, 618.

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

Cultural Revolution Group issued the Notification of Taking Appropriate Measures in the Fight against Enemies after modification and approval by Mao. On January 28, 1969, Mao approved the CPC Central Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group’s policies of Reeducation and Offering a Way Out. These policies included criticism of capitalist academic authorities while also giving them a chance to redeem themselves; they treated different counter-revolutionaries in different ways and gave them the opportunity to perform meritorious services to atone for their crimes. On February 21, an editorial published in the People’s Daily claimed “Chairman Mao recently stated that appropriate measures should be taken in the Cultural Revolution’s stage of struggle, criticism, and transformation.”11 Soon after, Mao declared that the proletariat “can and must unite the majority, and isolate and fight the small number of enemies.”12 In December, only 20 former members of the 8th CPC Central Committee and alternate members of the Central Committee, including Zhu De, remained on the delegate list for the 9th National Congress of the CPC, which was drafted by Zhou Enlai.13 This indicated that the direct political results of the Cultural Revolution were irregular political purges, acts of political elimination, and even political splits. It was for this reason that Mao liberated the veteran party officials. After February 1969, Zhou Enlai was officially responsible for the preparations for the 9th National Congress of the CPC. On February 1, Zhou presided over a brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group to discuss the preparations for the 9th National Congress. He submitted the draft of the Notification of Preparations by the CPC Central Committee and the Central Cultural Revolution Group for the 9th National Congress of the CPC to Mao and Lin Biao. The draft included the following: selection of delegates; amendments to the party Constitution; the national economic plan for 1969; policies regarding the domestic and international situation and central state organs; and publicity policies of the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Mao approved the draft the same day.14 11. People’s Daily, February 21, 1969. 12. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1955.

13. Delegates to the 9th National Congress of the CPC in the list drafted by Zhou Enlai

included the following: Zhu De, Chen Yun, Dong Biwu, Deng Zihui, Li Fuchun, Li

Xiannian, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Niu Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, Zhang Dingcheng, Wang Zhen, Hu Yaobang, Tan Qilong, Yang Yong, Fang Yi, Sai Fuding, and Fan Wenlan. (Ibid, 1956.)

14. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1544–1545.

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On February 5, Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao, which stated, “I planned to report to Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin in person about whether members and alternate members of the CPC Central Committee who had attended the Twelfth Plenary Session would or would not be selected as delegates to the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Please make your final decision.” Mao remarked that Chen Yihan15 should be selected as a delegate to the congress. 16 On February 7, Mao, Lin, Zhou, and members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group discussed preparations for the 9th National Congress. Mao proposed that Lin assume command of the draft political report to the congress, Chen Boda organize it, and that Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan participate in producing the draft. He disagreed that Mao Zedong Thought (Maoism) should be regarded as the third milestone in the development of Marxism.17 Zhou stated that the Third Five-Year Plan should be discussed at the congress and that the government’s administrative structure needed simplifying.18 This procedure was different from that in drafting the political report to the 8th National Congress of the CPC.19 First, with the 9th National Congress, the 15. Chen Qihan was an alternate member of the 8th CPC Central Committee, having been

elected as a member of CPC Central Committee at the 9th National Congress of the CPC, which was held in April 1969.

16. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 5.

17. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1545. 18. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 278.

19. On April 21, 1955, Deng Xiaoping submitted a list of members to the Political Report

Drafting Committee for the 8th National Congress of the CPC. Mao instructed the list to be submitted to the Political Bureau meeting for discussion. On May 12, the Political

Bureau meeting approved that the Political Report Drafting Committee should consist

of Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Lu Dingyi, Hu Qiaomu, and Chen Boda. Mao wrote On the Ten Major Relationships from March to April 1956 after conducting considerable investigations and research. Hu Qiaomu wrote the first draft

of the political report in July 1956 at Liu Shaoqi’s suggestion that the draft should be guided by the Ten Major Relationships. Mao chaired meetings to discuss and modify the draft during this process. From July 6 to 14, Mao called six meetings of the Drafting Committee to discuss the first draft of the political report, and he chaired an enlarged

meeting of the Political Bureau for further discussion on July 15 and 19. In his one-

month stay in Beidaihe, Mao held and chaired meetings of the CPC Central Political Bureau; he also held meetings of the drafting committee of two political reports in

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drafting time was very short—just two months, whereas drafting the report to the 8th National Congress had taken one year four months and involved elaborate preparations. Second, the people who drafted the political report to the 9th National Congress were selected and decided by Mao himself and they were accountable only to him. In contrast, the members of the report drafting committee for the 8th National Congress were selected by the Political Bureau, and the draft was jointly prepared by its leaders. Third, Mao did not write the draft himself but relied on the drafters, yet with the report to the 8th National Congress, Mao had played an important role in drafting the document and, following extensive research, had written “On the Ten Major Relationships,” the draft of which he himself modified several times. However, at the time of the 9th National Congress, Mao was incapable of creating another such great work. Finally, Mao himself approved the draft of the political report to the 9th National Congress without taking any advice from other leaders (including Lin Biao.) With the drafting of the 8th National Congress Report, however, Mao had respected and allowed the collective leadership to function, and had presided over many meetings of the drafting committee and the Political Bureau. In the 13 years from 1956 to 1969, both Mao and the CPC had undergone considerable changes, and their behavior at the end was very different from how it had been at the beginning. On March 7, Mao was dissatisfied with Chen Boda since the latter had not submitted a draft political report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Mao said, “Just dissolve the [report drafting] group and we can discuss the draft at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group headed by Zhou Enlai.”20 On March 8, Zhou chaired the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group to discuss the draft report by Chen Boda. After the meeting, Zhou wrote to Mao and Lin Biao, “Chen Boda has submitted three-fourths of the draft report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC. He was asked to finish it in two or three days, and all of us will discuss it then.”21 On March 11, Mao, Zhou, and other leaders held a meeting to discuss the draft addition to many other meetings; he modified political reports, wrote a report on amending the party Constitution and often exchanged views with such people as Liu

Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. After returning to Beijing on August 20, Mao called and chaired the Seventh Plenary Session and held a preparatory meeting for the

8th National Congress of the CPC while continuing to modify political reports. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 509-512.)

20. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 283–284.

21. Ibid, 284.

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report. On the second day, Mao criticized Chen Boda once again for being unable to complete the draft report, and Mao decided to let Kang Sheng, Zhang Wenqiao, and Yao Wenyuan form a drafting group. The group and Chen worked independently.22 Mao also stated that the subject of the 9th National Congress report was to discuss why the Cultural Revolution was instigated.23 The political report to the 9th National Congress was written by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, and it was checked and modified by Mao many times.24 The report endorsed Mao’s theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution, summarized his theory about continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship, and put this theory into the general principles of the party Constitution at the 9th National Congress. In drafting the political report to the 9th National Congress, Mao introduced the element of competition for the first time, causing Chen Boda and Zhang Chunqiao to compete politically. On March 16, 25, 28, and 31, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan submitted parts of the report draft to Mao, who made modifications.25 Mao rejected Chen Boda’s draft and returned it untouched.26 Chen lost this political contest, and the result was a conflict between Chen and Zhang at the Lushan Conference. Why did Mao reject Chen’s draft report? Zhou Enlai explained the reason afterward in the political report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC in August 1973. That report was also drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. Zhou said that Lin Biao and Chen Boda had drafted a political report in which they opposed the continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship,27 and advocated that the main task after the 9th National Congress was to improve productivity.28 This 22. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1546. 23. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 36.

24. Ibid, 11–16. 25. Ibid, 16–18. 26. Chen Boda said he spent one month writing the draft political report and thought that

he would be praised by Mao. But Mao wrote on the envelope containing the report,

“Return to Boda, by Mao.” It transpired that Mao returned the report to Chen without opening the envelope. Chen wept at that point. (Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 498–499.)

27. This was obviously false since Chen Boda was the one who made critical contributions

to Mao’s theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship, and Lin Biao was a prominent supporter of this theory.

28. Zhou Enlai said that Mao personally led the drafting of the political report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Before that congress, Lin Biao and Chen Boda drafted a political report. They opposed the continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship

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followed the political line of the 8th National Congress of the CPC.29 Mao himself had presented the proposal for the report to the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1956, and Chen Boda and Hu Qiaomu drafted the report.30 However, after 1957, Mao rejected the political line of the 8th National Congress, and turned instead to focusing on class struggle. As a result, in 1969, Mao repudiated the former political line irrespective of who proposed it. According to Wu Faxian, vice secretary-general of the 9th National Congress and believed that the main task after the 9th National Congress was to develop social productivity. Their thoughts reflected the fallacy of revisionism, which Liu Shaoqi and Chen Boda had put into the resolutions of the 8th National Congress; according to this, the main domestic challenge was that between having an advanced socialist system

and backward social productivity, rather than the newer conflict between proletariats

and capitalists. The political report by Lin Biao and Chen Boda was rejected by the CPC

Central Committee. (“Zhou Enlai’s Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,”

People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.) Mao did not in fact approve the draft personally, and the CPC Central Committee did not discuss this draft.

29. Resolutions in the political report to the 8th National Congress of the CPC stated, “The

principal inconsistency is that between the people’s desire to establish an advanced industrial country and the fact that China is still an undeveloped agricultural country,

and also between the people’s desire for faster economic and cultural development

and the fact that the current economy and culture do not meet the people’s needs.

The essence of the inconsistencies is that between an advanced socialist system

and backward social productivity in the context of the socialist system having been established in our country. The major task of the CPC and the whole nation is to focus on solving these inconsistencies and changing China from an undeveloped agricultural

country to a developed industrial nation...The major task of the nation is to develop productive forces instead of liberating productive forces after the socialist revolution

has been completed.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Compilation of Important Manuscripts since the Founding of New China, vol. 2, 341–

342, 350–351.)

30. Under the guidance of Mao, Chen Boda and Hu Qiaomu drafted the Resolution on the Political Report to the 8th National Congress of the CPC. Mao attached great

importance to the drafting, and he discussed modifications to the resolution many times with Chen Boda and Hu Qiaomu. At 5 a.m. on September 24, 1956, Mao wrote

to Yang Shangkun and had him inform the head of each delegation and group that they should read the draft resolution immediately and discuss it before 2 p.m. The

Secretariat collected modifications and gave them to Hu Qiaomu for further revision. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 535–537.)

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of the CPC, Chen Boda reported to Lin Biao about a draft titled Strive to Make China a Powerful Socialist Country. Chen Boda wrote the first part of the draft. In it, Chen claimed that the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to improve socialist productivity and the material and cultural living standards of the whole nation to make China a powerful socialist country. When this part was discussed at the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau headed by Mao, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan regarded it as reflecting the “theory of the unique importance of productivity.”31 Mao agreed with them, and he thought that Chen Boda’s draft overemphasized productivity, neglected revolution and class struggle, and so could not be approved. Zhou Enlai dared not express his opinion about this matter,32 although he agreed with Chen. Half a month later, Mao presided over a meeting to discuss the first part of the draft report to the 9th National Congress, About the Preparations for the Proletariat’s Cultural Revolution. Chen Boda was the only one to suggest that it was necessary to concentrate on improving productivity. Focusing only on revolution was just as Eduard Bernstein commented, “The movement is everything, the final goal is nothing.” Mao flew into a rage and said to Chen, “It is never too late to take one’s revenge. Why are you in such a hurry? You couldn’t wait just half a month to exact your revenge! The nature of imperialism won’t change; the nature of MarxismLeninism won’t change, and neither will you! When we were in Yan’an, you served another master behind my back. You were willing to be my secretary and were also willing to be Zhang Wentian’s [then general secretary of the CPC Central Committee] secretary. You played the same trick when you and I were in Moscow in 1950, when you met the Soviet leaders without reporting to me or getting my approval. Did you want to serve another master when I was in danger of failure?”33 No one replied, and Mao finally said, “This draft is approved. Please finish the second part.” Mao then left, and the meeting was over. On the evening of the same day, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chuanqiao, and Yao Wenyuan criticized Chen Boda at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Being vindictive, Mao could not tolerate different opinions and persecuted others even over past issues. 31. Zhang Chunqiao retorted, “What you [Chen Boda] are referring to is the doctrine of the

unique importance of productivity! Small countries such as Luxembourg and Belgium have the highest labor productivity. The examples you cite are small and medium-sized

cities in China." This was according to the recollection of Chen Boda. (Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 497.)

32. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 739–740. 33. Ibid, 740–741.

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Seeing Mao in such a rage, Lin Biao did not air different views about the draft report by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, but Lin still agreed with Chen Boda.34 Later, Lin never expressed his views about the draft report. He likewise said nothing when participating in the discussion about the report and made no modifications to the draft. When Zhang Chunqiao asked him to sign the draft, he refused.35 From March 9 to 27, a preparatory meeting for the 9th National Congress of the CPC was held at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. In all, 128 heads of provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional revolutionary committees and each military region and departments of the central government attended the meeting. On March 15, Mao talked about preparations for the 9th National Congress of the CPC with members of the brief meeting of the Cultural Revolution Group. He said that he sincerely hoped that the 9th National Congress of the CPC would be a conference of unity and that it would especially allow those (referring to the seven members of the Political Bureau, including Tan Zhenlin) who participated in the “February Counter-current Forces” to sit on the platform (of the National Congress.) Mao proposed that the report to the 9th National Congress should not mention the February Counter-current Forces because those individuals had suffered a great deal; he also stated that the report should mention just a handful of people, including Liu Shaoqi, as representatives. Mao said that the present was different from times when people were able to publically air their views. He declared that those who made mistakes should be forgiven after one or two years, but they should not be allowed to hold power. Mao also suggested that participants in the February Counter-current Forces be selected as delegates to the 9th National Congress and that their participation would not make a big difference. He said that the world has its own laws, and it does not change for anyone.36 In fact, Mao had issued the following instructions on January 3: “Do not criticize any veteran comrades who participated in the February Counter-current Forces and their families, but maintain good relations with them.37 Those individuals were 34. Zhou Enlai said that Lin Biao supported Chen Boda in openly opposing the political

report approved by Mao. Lin reluctantly accepted the political line of the Political Bureau after being defeated, and he read the report at the meeting. (“Zhou Enlai’s Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.)

35. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 741. 36. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 618. 37. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594.

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obviously sworn political enemies of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, and they harbored a grudge against Mao, but they dared not show it. Fully aware of the situation, Mao proposed forgiving them in preparation for the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Mao also criticized the Cultural Revolution for having arrested and imprisoned too many people and liberating too few. He stated that it was wrong to have criticized and incarcerated so many professors and party members.38 This indicated that Mao understood that arresting and imprisoning people violated the law and had negative consequences. He intervened personally with a view to reducing such negative consequences, implementing policies to release party members and intellectuals in preparation for the 9th National Congress in an attempt to rebuild and restore the party organization which had been damaged at all levels. Without that organization, he would be unable to control or govern the country. On March 16, Zhou Enlai said at the preparatory meeting for the 9th National Congress that a number of veteran party officials should be liberated. Zhou also conveyed Mao’s latest instruction, namely that there were two kinds of capitalist roaders.39 At the beginning of 1965, Mao formulated the elusive concept of “capitalist roaders,” but Liu Shaoqi disagreed with this. In August 1966, Mao’s political concept of “Fight the Capitalist Roaders” was officially approved at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee. However, Mao did not supply answers to the following questions: who were the capitalist roaders? Who could be labeled as capitalist roaders at central committee level, at local governmental level, or in different departments? A lack of answers to these questions would inevitably result in everyone falling under suspicion. However, this time, he made some concessions and partially repudiated his earlier position by claiming that there were two kinds of capitalist roaders. This indicated that Mao was inconsistent with respect to the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution as well as in applying theory to practice. On March 22, Mao talked about preparations for the 9th National Congress with members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Five members of the Political Bureau (Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, 38. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1542–1543. 39. On March 16, Zhou Enlai said at the Second Plenary Session of the preparation meeting for the 9th National Congress, “We didn’t do a good job in summarizing our experience

and implementing policies in the first three years of the Cultural Revolution. More

importantly, we now need to release a group of cadres just as Chairman Mao said: there are two kinds of capitalist roaders. Not all of them are incorrigible, and we should give

them a chance to correct their mistakes.” (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1956.)

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and Nie Rongzhen) participated in the talks. Mao stressed again that the report to the 9th National Congress should not deal with the February Counter-current Forces.40 He did this in the political and strategic interests of the party so as to maintain unity at the National Congress and achieve political reconciliation with members of the Political Bureau. Since he held contradictory ideas, Mao had to revise his strategies to ease the political conflict inside the party. On March 25, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao and Lin Biao to ask them if a standing committee should be set up in the presidium of the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Mao decided that the presidium would not have a standing committee, but it would have a chairman, a vice chairman, and a secretary-general.41 Mao and Lin Biao were chairmen and Zhou Enlai was secretary-general, which represented the Mao-Lin-Zhou system. This system was officially approved at the 9th National Congress, but it was very fragile and collapsed after the Lin Biao Incident on September 13, 1971. Zhou Enlai compiled the list of members of the 9th CPC Central Committee before the 9th National Congress. On March 29, Zhou Enlai reported to Mao and Lin Biao about preparations for the 9th National Congress. At the end of his report, he wrote, “At the brief meeting on the evening of the 27th, I proposed a draft of the number of members of the 9th Central Committee [115 members and 95 alternate members of the CPC Central Committee, making a total of 210 people]. Please consider my proposal before we choose prospective candidates.” Mao gave the following instruction, “Approved, but there may be an increase in the number of members of the CPC Central Committee.”42 On April 24, the 9th National Congress of the CPC approved a total of 279 members—170 members and 109 alternate members—of the CPC Central Committee. This indicates that rather than Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai had become the number two decision maker after Mao. He made the same decisions as Mao. At that time, Mao found himself in a political dilemma: he had to declare that the Cultural Revolution was “absolutely necessary and very timely” and also prohibit any questioning and challenges from other party leaders. However, he also hoped for political unity within the party, especially among the top leaders; that was an important reason and major political purpose for convening the 9th National Congress of the CPC. Despite this latter hope, the political unity Mao was 40. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1543. 41. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 288.

42. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 22.

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able to achieve was temporary, superficial, and fragile; this was because a political split in the party was inevitable as long as he focused on class struggle. On March 31, the day before the 9th National Congress, Mao requested Zhou Enlai to invite the following to sit on the platform of the opening session of the 9th National Congress on April 1: Dong Biwu (member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and vice chairman of the People’s Republic of China); Liu Bocheng (member of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Committee); Zhu De (member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and chairman of the National People’s Congress); and Chen Yun (member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the State Council.)43 These four leaders had been dismissed from their positions from around January to March 1967 and had been marginalized thereafter. Also on March 31, Mao added the following sentence to the report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC: “For the sake of unity, we should help those who made progress in their political development or raised their own level of political consciousness.”44 Thus, Mao was essentially stating that in party matters, he was always right and that only others could be wrong. He was able to allow wayward officials a seat on the platform of the party congress as long as they showed evidence of having developed the proper political consciousness. The 9th National Congress was held from April 1 to 24. By that time, the number of CPC members had risen to 22 million, which was over double the number of 10.73 million members in 1956, when the 8th National Congress was held. It had therefore been 13 years since that 8th National Congress, which was contrary to the party Constitution, which stipulated that the national congress had to be every five years. This was evidence of the party’s supreme congress system having been seriously disrupted since 1961. Kang Sheng admitted that this was not in keeping with the rules set out in the party’s Constitution, but he claimed that it was simply not mechanically following the party Constitution.45 Mao took 43. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 19–20.

44. Mao added the sentence when he modified the report to the 9th National Congress, March 31, 1969. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1544.)

45. Kang Sheng explained the situation as follows: “It’s true that we haven’t convened

the national congress in 13 years. The party Constitution stipulates that the national congress be held every five years, which means we should have held the 8th National Congress in 1956, the 9th National Congress in 1961, and the 10th National Congress

in 1966. Two congresses did not take place, and that violated the party Constitution. We would say to other political parties that if we had held the 9th National Congress

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the primary responsibility for the timing of the congresses, and members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau such as Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng also had political responsibility. Unlike the 8th National Congress, a considerable number of workers, farmers, members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA,) and Red Guards were among the delegates at the 9th National Congress. A press communiqué at the time of the 9th Congress claimed that these delegates had been elected by the people.46 However, since most of the grassroots party organizations had not then been properly restored, many of the delegates were not elected through normal election procedures. They were selected either by leaders of the Revolution Committee or rebel organizations, or they were designated by higher-level departments.47 This was the political reason for Jiang Qing being elected as member of the CPC Central Committee and the Political Bureau. It can be said that the 9th National Congress was a political event of the Cultural Revolution. At the opening ceremony, Mao chaired the meeting that approved the presidium list of 167 individuals. As a political barometer, the list clearly reflected the political power structure of the CPC Central Committee.48 The first level consisted of Mao in 1961, when Liu Shaoqi’s problem had not yet been discovered, we would have been holding the 9th National Congress with traitors in our midst. The same thing would have happened if we had held the 10th National Congress in 1966, when the Cultural Revolution had yet to begin and we could have elected traitors to serve as members of

the CPC Central Committee. I now ask you this question: is it better for us to hold the national congress at a later date, after having rid ourselves of traitors, or hold it at an earlier date with the traitors still among us? Others have said that it would be better to

hold the Congress at a later date since it is necessary to guide the National Congress

properly regardless of when it is held or whether the party Constitution is followed or

not.” (“Kang Sheng’s Speech to all the Comrades Participating in the Discussion about the Party Building of the CPC Central Committee and the Army,” April 18, 1969.)

46. According to the news bulletin of the 9th National Congress, there were 1,512 delegates to the congress with a large number of senior party members involved in the Cultural Revolution. Among all national congresses of the CPC, the Ninth Congress had the

greatest number of industrial workers as delegates, such as from the mining industry, as well as peasant and women delegates who were party members. That was the first

time for representatives of the Red Guards to attend the national congress. All the delegates were elected by the people.

47. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 129. 48. The List of the Presidium of the 9th National Congress of the CPC (approved on April 1, 1969) included a total of 167 people. The list was made up of four levels. Mao

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and Lin Biao, who were the actual decision makers and stood above the CPC Central Committee, but Lin himself rarely participated in the decision-making process. The second level consisted of the 12 members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, led by Zhou Enlai, which replaced the Political Bureau. Seven members of this group, including Jiang Qing, were not members of the CPC Central Committee. The third level was made up of the 10 members of the Eighth Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, including Dong Biwu, who had previously been politically marginalized; they symbolized the political unity that was being achieved at the 9th National Congress. This latter move also explains why Mao issued instructions not to criticize the February Counter-current Forces and seated the 10 members of the 8th Standing Committee of the Political Bureau on the platform of the 9th National Congress. Knowing full well Mao’s political intentions, Zhou Enlai played an important role in the entire process as the only political figure who was accepted by all factions of the CPC. On April 1, Zhou worked with Mao on the list of executive chairmen at the 9th National Congress.49 The list established a basis for selecting and Lin Biao were at the first level. There were 12 people at the second level, namely

members of the brief meeting of the Central Group of the Cultural Revolution: Zhou

Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Wang Dongxing, and Wen Yucheng, There

were 10 individuals at the third level, namely members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee: Dong Biwu, Liu Bocheng, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Chen

Yi, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying. There were 143 people

at the fourth level, who were listed in the order of the number of strokes in the Chinese

characters of their surnames. Zhou Enlai drew up the list and presented it to Mao and Lin Biao. Jiang Qing ranked sixth after the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Zhou Enlai ordered Xinhua News Agency to release the news

on October 1, 1968 as follows: “Reviewing the troops with Chairman Mao and Vice-

Chairman Lin on the Tiananmen gate tower were Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Wang Dongxing, and Wen Yucheng.”

49. On April 1, 1969, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao and Lin Biao and drafted the seating plan for the platform. There were twelve people on Mao’s left: Lin Biao (member of the Standing

Committee of the Political Bureau); Chen Boda (member of the Eighth Standing Committee of the Political Bureau); Kang Sheng (member of the Eighth Standing

Committee of the Political Bureau); Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and

Xie Fuzhi (alternate members of the Eighth Political Bureau); Huang Yongsheng, Wu

Faxian, Ye Qun, Wang Dongxing, and Wen Yucheng. There were eleven people on

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the members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee for the 9th CPC Central Committee. Those seated on Mao’s left were clearly important members of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques. Although they had struggled with each other for political power, they were the hardliners and beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Except for Wen Yucheng, all of them had been elected members of the Political Bureau; Wang Dongxing had been appointed as an alternate member. Those seated on Mao’s right were the party moderates and were all members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee; they were excluded from political decision making. Since the counterattack against the February Counter-current Forces in 1967, there had been two conflicting factions within the party and Mao had to achieve a political balance between those factions to make the 9th National Congress a conference of unity. Mao stated to the congress, “I elect Lin Biao to be chairman of this congress.” Lin stood up in distress and declared loudly, “The great leader, Chairman Mao should be the chairman of this congress.” Mao said, “How about electing Lin Biao chairman and me vice chairman of the congress?” Lin Biao waved his hands in protest and said, “Chairman Mao should be the chairman. Please raise your hand if you agree with me.” All the participants raised their hands to accept Lin’s proposal. Mao then agreed to be chairman of the congress, and he proposed that Lin serve as vice chairman and Zhou Enlai as secretary-general. The proposal was accepted by all the participants.50 No one (including Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai) knew why Mao made such a proposal: it was not clear if this reflected his own thoughts or if it was just a political show. In any event, this presented a challenge for Lin, who had not been prepared for this. Mao delivered a speech, stating that he hoped the 9th National Congress would be a conference of unity and victory. He also hoped that China would achieve

Mao’s right: Zhou Enlai (member of the Eighth Standing Committee of the Political Bureau); Dong Biwu (member of the Eighth Political Bureau); Liu Bocheng (member of the Eighth Political Bureau); Zhu De (member of the Eighth Standing Committee

of the Political Bureau); Chen Yun (member of the Eighth Standing Committee of the

Political Bureau); Li Fuchun (member of the Eighth Standing Committee of the Political Bureau,) Chen Yi (member of the Eighth Political Bureau); Li Xiannian (member of the Eighth Political Bureau); Xu Xiangqian (member of the Eighth Political Bureau); Nie Rongzhen (member of the Eighth Political Bureau); and Ye Jianying (member of the

Eighth Political Bureau.) (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1957.)

50. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 184–185.

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greater success after that congress,51 to which he referred in terms of the Cultural Revolution instead of economic development. Although fully aware of the serious conflict between the party moderates and hardliners in the Cultural Revolution, Mao could not predict that the leftists who sat on his left at the congress would split up into two strongly opposing camps one year later at the Lushan Conference. Thanks to his philosophy of struggle, every time Mao talked about political unity, the result was political conflicts and splits contrary to his will. In his speech in 1969, Mao said that, among the 12 delegates to the 1921 First National Congress of the CPC, only he and Dong Biwu were still alive. Looking back on the Seventh National Congress, Mao claimed that at that time the political history of Liu Shao, Bo Yibo, and Peng Zhen was not known, and they were elected as representatives to that Seventh Congress.52 At the 7th National Congress, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo had been elected as members of the CPC Central Committee. Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen were elected as members of the Political Bureau in the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, and they served as secretary and alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in August with Ren Bishi as director of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. In attacking Liu Shaoqi and others and claiming that their history was not known at the time, Mao was both distorting the facts and not taking due responsibility; that would later damage both his political prestige and credibility. Mao ended his brief opening speech with the phrase, “Congratulations on the success of this party’s national congress.” Guo Moruo, who attended the congress, wrote a poem The River All Red: on the Opening of the 9th National Congress of the CPC to glorify Mao. The poem described the electric atmosphere of the 9th National Congress, in which all the participants wished Mao a long life.53 Guo was elected as member of the CPC Central Committee in the following First Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee. 51. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 24.

52. Ibid. 53. The poem read: “It’s magnificent like roaring waves in the sea. The sun rises with rays of light and the cheers sound like thunder. The blessing is loud and the three years

of the Great Cultural Revolution is like a song of victory. Every word in the opening speech is a big bell. Revisionism is just a daydream and only the theory of Mao is the truth. The congress is another success after having defeated so many enemies.

Everyone in this nation celebrates in red, and I would like to contribute myself to this great nation!” (Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 200.)

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In the opening session, Lin Biao delivered a political report on behalf of the 8th CPC Central Committee. The report consisted of eight parts,54 and it was prepared to affirm and laud Mao’s theory of the “continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship” and the practice of the Cultural Revolution.55 It labeled the party’s history as one of “line struggle,”56 particularly the party’s history since 1957 as having been one of a two-class struggle and two-line struggle.57 It described 54. (1) on preparations for the Great Cultural Revolution; (2) on the course of the Great

Cultural Revolution; (3) on the work of struggling, criticizing, and changing the capitalist roaders; (4) on policies of the Great Cultural Revolution; (5) on the final

success of revolution in China; (6) on party improvement and construction; (7) on

relations between China and other countries; and (8) on the unity of the whole party and people of the whole nation to achieve greater success. (“Lin Biao’s Political Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, April 28, 1969.)

55. Lin Biao said, “Chairman Mao waged a fierce struggle with modern revisionism,

with the Soviet revisionist rebel group at its center, and he inherited, defended, and developed the Marxist and Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution and dictatorship. Chairman Mao comprehensively summarized the positive and negative

experience of the proletarian dictatorship, and he advanced the theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship to prevent the restoration of capitalism.

The great leader, Chairman Mao, then launched and led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in person according to the theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship. The revolution was truly necessary and timely, and it signified a great new contribution to the theory and practice of Marxism and Leninism.” (Ibid.)

56. Lin Biao said, “The history of the party is a history of the struggle between Mao’s Marxist and Leninist line with the rightist and leftist line of opportunism. Under Chairman

Mao’s leadership, we defeated Chen Duxiu’s rightist opportunism, Qiu Qiubai and Li Sanli’s leftist opportunism, Wang Ming’s leftist and rightist opportunism, Zhang Guotao’s attempt to divide the Red Army, the rightist opportunist anti-party allies

of Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Rao Shushi, and Liu Shaoqi’s counter-revolutionary revisionism. Our party underwent consolidation, development, and expansion in the two-line struggles, especially in the fight against the rebel group of Chen Duxiu, Wang Ming, and Liu Shaoqi.” (Ibid.)

57. Lin Biao said, “All struggles were waged over whether to take the road of socialism

or capitalism and whether to stick to the proletarian dictatorship or the capitalist

dictatorship—from the struggle with the capitalist rightists in 1957 to the struggle with Peng Dehuai’s anti-party group at the Lushan Conference in 1959 and from the debate

on the party’s socialist construction to the two-line struggle in socialist education.” (Ibid.)

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the political nature of Liu Shaoqi and his underground bourgeois faction.58 The report further described the nature of the Cultural Revolution,59 and it stated that the revolution was “one of the most extensive and profound campaigns of consolidating party organization in the party’s history.”60 Thus, the report provided a basis for the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution, even though it was in fact a period of trampling on the democratic rights of the people, the flouting of laws, violent conflicts, vandalism, and the repudiation of Chinese civilization. The report theorized and took to extreme Mao’s political errors in his later years. The drafters of this report, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, made a major contribution to its content. 58. Lin Biao said, ”We have found that Liu Shaoqi turned traitor and that he was a mole, scab, and lackey of notorious imperialism, modern revisionism, and Kuomintang reactionaries; he was the main representative of the capitalist roaders during the First

Revolutionary Civil War. His political aim was restoration of capitalism in China and making China a colony of capitalism and revisionism; this was in accordance with his

counter-revolutionary political line. For many years, Liu Shaoqi gathered together many traitors, spies, and capitalist roaders, who concealed their counter-revolutionary

intentions to occupy many important political positions in the party and the country;

they took control of many departments of central government and local governments, and they formed an underground bourgeois faction to fight the proletarian faction led by Mao. They ganged up with imperialists, modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries and wreaked the damage that American imperialists, Soviet revisionists, and the reactionaries of other countries were unable to achieve.” (Ibid.)

59. Lin Biao said, “The Cultural Revolution was not launched by accident. It was a

necessary result of the long-term struggle between two classes, two roads, and two lines in socialist society. It was ‘a political revolution for the proletariat to fight against

the capitalist class and any other exploiting classes and the continuation of a long-term struggle between the CPC, with the people under its leadership, and the Kuomintang

reactionaries and continuation of struggle between the capitalist and the proletariat’

[words of Mao]. The Cultural Revolution was a political revolution under proletarian dictatorship, personally led and launched by Mao, and it was a revolution in the superstructure.” (Ibid.)

60. Lin Biao said, “The proletarian Cultural Revolution was the most extensive and profound improvement in the party’s history. Party organizations at all levels and

party members gained experience; they improved their class consciousness and

consciousness of the two-line struggle after having undergone the two-line struggle, large-scale class struggles, and examination of revolutionary individuals both within and outside the party.” (Ibid.)

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In the report, Lin Biao criticized Liu Shaoqi and the February Counter-current Forces.61 He conveyed what Mao wished to be stated: the proletariat was the greatest class in human history and the most powerful revolutionary class in terms of ideology and politics. The proletariat could and must unite the majority of the population around it, and it also had to isolate and defeat its handful of enemies.62 However, the results of the Cultural Revolution were the reverse of this: an enormous number of people (about 100 million) were isolated and purged, and that set an unfortunate new record in Chinese history. Lin Biao promoted the personality cult of Mao by claiming that all the party’s achievements should be attributed to Mao himself: following Mao was the only truth,63 and Mao was always right. Lin Biao announced to the nation and the whole world that whoever opposed Mao or Mao Zedong Thought anytime and 61. Lin Biao said, “The adverse environment lasted from winter 1966 to spring 1967, and it

was directed at the proletarian faction headed by Mao. Its general program boiled down to the following: reject the resolution approved at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the

8th CPC Central Committee; overturn the verdict on quashing the bourgeois faction headed by Liu Shaoqi; reverse the verdict on the capitalist reactionary line, which had already been thoroughly repudiated and discredited by the people; and repress and retaliate against the revolutionary actions of the people. However, the countercurrent

was seriously criticized by Mao and resisted by the revolutionary masses, and it could never halt the main current of the mass revolutionary movement.” (Ibid.) 62. Ibid. 63. Lin Biao said, “The Communist Party of China owes all its achievements to the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and the success of Mao Zedong Thought. For half a century,

Chairman Mao has integrated the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution. He has inherited, defended, and developed Marxism-

Leninism in political, military, economic, cultural, philosophical, and other spheres. In leading the great struggle of the Chinese people toward accomplishing the new

democratic revolution, China’s great struggle for socialist revolution and construction,

and in the struggle of the contemporary international communist movement against imperialism, modern revisionism, and reactionaries of other countries, Mao has

brought Marxism-Leninism to a higher, completely new level. Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism for an era when imperialism is heading toward total collapse and

socialism is advancing to worldwide victory. The entire history of the party has borne out the truth that the party will suffer setbacks and defeats without the leadership of Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. The party will advance and triumph following Chairman Mao closely and acting on Mao Zedong Thought. We must forever keep this experience in mind.” (Ibid.)

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anywhere would be subject to criticism and attack by the entire party and nation.64 That announcement was made to exercise personal despotism within the party and the whole nation by means of force - Lin Biao contributed significantly to that. Ironically, Lin himself would be criticized and attacked by the party and the whole nation as he fell victim to Mao’s personal despotism. On April 14, the conference officially approved Lin Biao’s report, and it was lauded in the news communiqué of the presidium secretariat.65 Lin’s report was the political line of the 9th National Congress of the CPC. On April 11, Mao said at the Secretariat of the 9th National Congress of the CPC and meeting of conveners from different groups, “We have learned lessons from the past, and there are no people like Liu Shaoqi at this conference. Liu Shaoqi’s revisionism would have led to the collapse of the party and the fall of the state. We recognized the problem of revisionism before, and we saw that problem even more clearly during the Cultural Revolution.”66 Mao admitted that the purging of class ranks had been extensive in some areas, but he said that it had happened many times in history. He stated, “It was not right to imprison more than 900 people from one college. It is necessary to have reasons for imprisoning people and setting them free, and a number of people are being kept in places of detention across China. However, we’re doing better than Qin Shi Huang, who killed more than 400 people at one time. We do not kill people but only impose physical punishment.”67 Mao defined socialist revolution as “wiping out the capitalist class. The Cultural Revolution had to take place because some individuals [referring to Liu Shaoqi] used the capitalist class instead of confining and changing it.” Mao explained once again why he launched the Cultural Revolution. He arrived at his decision based on the following political situation: we had to launch the revolution from the CPC central government and extend it industrial plants, institutions, and schools because in the past these were not under the control of the CPC but were under the sway of the Kuomintang and capitalist intellectuals, who had backstage political 64. Ibid. 65. The news bulletin of the session read as follows: “Lin Biao’s report upheld Marxism-

Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, elaborated at length Mao’s theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship, systematically summarized the experience

of the proletarian cultural revolution in China, analyzed the domestic and international

situations, and established goals for the party, the army, and the whole nation. The report provides guidelines for the socialist revolution and socialist construction in China.”

66. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 628. 67. Ibid, 631.

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supporters.68 This was clearly Mao’s subjective judgment, and he was making a wild guess at the situation even though this would have a direct effect on the National Congress of the CPC. On April 13, Mao said to members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, members of the Central Military Committee, and conveners from different groups, that the Cultural Revolution was characterized by anarchy and the ideological trend of attacking and suspecting everything; it was a violent struggle that led to loss of life, acts of arson, death, and the spreading of poisonous thoughts. However, Mao did not believe that these facts had a bearing on the overall merits of the revolution.69 Mao did not deny the large-scale violence that accompanied the Cultural Revolution; he did not think it was a mistake or that he had committed any errors in setting it into motion. Mao did in fact contradict himself when he placed the blame on anarchistic tendencies of the people and some evildoers, while at the same time claiming “to trust and rely on the masses” as well as criticizing Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for “suppressing mass campaigns” and “believing only in themselves.” On April 14 Mao chaired a conference which approved the political report of Lin Biao on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and the Constitution of the CPC.70 Having eliminated Liu Shaoqi and others, Mao Zedong Thought that the Central Cultural Revolution Group had fulfilled its historical mission. Thus, he proposed at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group on March 3 that the Central Cultural Revolution Group be discontinued and that the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau be restored.71 Accordingly, the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group was dissolved; in its place, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau would meet according to the new party Constitution. This move indicates that Mao hoped to restore the leading institutions of the CPC Central Committee and the party’s organizations at all levels at the 9th National Congress. However, this amounted to a fundamental change in the political rules of the ruling party; the party’s organizational system was undermined and disrupted. The party was unable to restore the organizational 68. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1551. 69. Ibid, 1550–1552, 1554. 70. “News Bulletin of the Presidium Secretariat of the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” April 14, 1969.

71. Mao said, “There is no need for the Central Cultural Revolution Group to continue any longer since it was responsible for the Cultural Revolution. Since the Cultural

Revolution is now about to end, we need to use the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1542–1543.)

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system that had been established at the 8th National Congress, and the party Constitution underwent drastic modification. The Party Constitution at the 9th National Congress was totally different from that of the 8th Congress. With respect to the preparation of the new Constitution and its characteristics, Kang Sheng made the following explanation: under Mao’s instruction, the new shorter Constitution was the outcome of previous international and domestic constitutions, and it underlined the importance of political ideology meeting the needs of the masses.72 In line with Mao’s instructions, the new Constitution consisted of only 12 articles and it was one-fifth the length of the Constitution of the 8th National Congress in 1956. The new Constitution of the 9th National Congress made the following changes. (1) It did not stipulate that the CPC Central Committee be elected for a term of five years, but it did state that the National Congress of the party had to be held every five years instead of every year. (2) It did not specify how often a plenary session was to be held, which was a change from the provision whereby a plenary session had to be held twice a year. (3) There were only four articles in Chapter 2, which dealt with membership, in the new Constitution, and there was a reduction in the number of provisions concerning party members’ rights; in the Constitution of the 8th National Congress, there were 18 articles in Chapter 1 (membership) with 10 provisions relating to party members’ duties and seven provisions dealing with party members’ rights. Deng Xiaoping said afterward that the Constitutions of the 9th and 10th National Congresses were not true Constitutions owing to the lack of provisions related to party members’ duties, rights, and qualifications.73 This was a clear sign that the party’s basic organization had been seriously disrupted. The new Constitution involved major changes in the party’s central organization. Comparing Chapter 3 of the 8th National Congress Constitution, which dealt with central party organization, with Chapter 4 of the 9th National Congress Constitution, which dealt with the same content, the following details emerge: 1. There were seven articles in the earlier Constitution and only two in the later one.74 72. “News Bulletin of the Presidium Secretariat of the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” April 14, 1969.

73. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2, 269.

74. Article 8 of Chapter 4 in the party Constitution stated that the National Congress of

the CPC had to be held every five years and could be held earlier or later under special circumstances. In Article 9, it was stated that the plenary session of the CPC Central

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2. The earlier Constitution provided that the National Congress of the CPC be held annually, whereas the later one made no such provision. 3. The earlier Constitution provided that the National Congress of the CPC had four functions, whereas the later one made no such provisions. 4. The earlier Constitution provided that the Central Committee was to be elected for a term of five years, though the later document had no such provisions. 5. The earlier Constitution provided that the plenary session of the Central Committee had to be held at least twice a year, whereas the later one made no such provisions. 6. The earlier Constitution provided that the Central Committee was to be made up of the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The later Constitution stipulated that the Central Committee was to be made up of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and provided that “some efficient departments be established to deal with the daily work of the party, the government, and the army under the leadership of the chairman, vice chairman, and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.”75 The Central Cultural Revolution Group was one such “efficient department.”76 7. The earlier Constitution provided that “the CPC Central Committee could appoint an honorary president as necessary;77 the later Constitution had no Committee should elect the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political

Bureau, and the chairman and vice chairman of the Central Committee. The plenary session of the Central Committee was to be held by the Political Bureau. The Political

Bureau and its Standing Committee were to exercise the official power of the Central Committee during the inter-sessional period of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Under the leadership of the chairman, vice chairman, and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, some major organs were to be established to deal with the daily work of the party, government, and army.

75. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 584.

76. Zhou Enlai reported to Mao on July 3, 1969 that the Central Cultural Revolution Group

would be kept as a central organ in accordance with the instructions of the chairman.

Mao agreed with this in principle on that day. However, the group did not remain as a standing body. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp.,

Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 51.).

77. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 9,

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such provision. In other words, Mao did not intend to retire but wanted to continue serving as chairman of the Central Committee. 8. The earlier Constitution provided that any party organization had to strictly adhere to the principle of integrating collective leadership and individual accountability; it stated that any party member or organization had to be subject to the party’s top-down and bottom-up supervision in accordance with the party’s standard of democratic centralism.78 Chapter 7 of the earlier Constitution also had special provisions on the party’s “supervisory departments.” Article 53 of the earlier Constitution provided that central and local supervisory commissions were responsible for dealing with cases in which party members violated the party Constitution or discipline, communist morality, or national laws and decrees; those commissions administered or cancelled punishments, and dealt with party member’s appeals and accusations. The above provisions were removed from the Constitution of the 9th National Congress. As a result, the political systems that had been established over the previous 48 years were seriously compromised, and this reflects the minimum degree of institutionalization that existed at the time of the 9th National Congress. The seven articles relating to the central organization of the party in the earlier Constitution were reduced to three. This move concentrated more power in the hands of Mao within the party. It also made it more difficult for the Central Committee to correct Mao’s political errors, and it allowed the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques to take advantage of those errors.79 The resulting political struggle was extremely bitter and fierce. It should be noted that the Constitution of the 9th National Congress strengthened the centralized leadership of the CPC.80 On July 1, the editorials of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag reiterated that the centralized leadership

331. 78. Ibid, 318–319. 79. According to Harding, the party organization structure that developed at the 9th

National Congress was “inevitably weaker, less institutionalized and more likely to be

manipulated by the top leaders than the one before the Cultural Revolution.” (Harding, “The Chinese State in Crisis.”)

80. Article 7 of the party Constitution stipulated that party committees at all levels, when

setting up offices or appointing representatives, had to adhere to the principles of centralized leadership and maintain close relations with the people.

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of the CPC was the personal leadership of Mao81 and that the party and the whole nation had to follow Mao’s orders to the letter. This was an authoritarian model: it represented the personal despotism of the supreme leader of the party, and it continued until Mao’s death. The Cultural Revolution would not have been able to last 10 years without this political model. However, the Constitution of the 9th National Congress and the editorial of the central media supported this formal system. The political line of the 9th National Congress of the CPC rejected that of the 8th National Congress in the following ways.82 1. The two congresses amounted to different judgments regarding the nature of Chinese society. The “Resolution on the Political Report” at the 8th National Congress stated that successful socialist transformation had resolved the contradiction between the proletariat and the capitalist, put an end to a thousand years of class exploitation, and established socialism in China.83 81. On July 1, 1969, the editorials of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag emphasized the centralized leadership of the CPC. The editorials pointed out that the 9th National

Congress of the CPC elected the CPC Central Committee with Mao as chairman and Lin Biao as vice chairman. These represented the highest authorities for the party, the army,

and the people of the nation. The party had to abide by unified discipline and obey the CPC Central Committee. The agencies of power of the proletarian dictatorship, the

PLA, the Communist Youth League of China, workers, the poor and lower-middle class,

the Red Guards, and other revolutionary organizations had to accept the leadership of

the party, follow Mao’s great strategic deployment and implement the party’s policies as developed by the great Chairman Mao. Meanwhile, it was necessary to be aware of the damage caused by class enemies and criticize “multi-leadership,” which was

“non-leadership.” It was necessary for all individuals and organizations to avoid

making mistakes in their relations with the party. It was of crucial importance to build and rectify the leadership in the party as part of a consolidating and building process.

According to specific conditions, the CPC Revolutionary Committee at all levels had

to establish strong, centralized leadership of the Party on the basis of Mao Zedong Thought, and maintain close relations with the people. (People’s Daily, July 1, 1969.)

82. On April 18, 1970, Kang Sheng explained that the Constitution of the 9th National Congress was drafted by modifying the old one, and he criticized the Constitution

produced by Liu Shaoqi at the 8th National Congress. (“Kang Sheng’s Speech to All

the Comrades Participating in the Discussion about Party Building of the CPC Central Committee and the Army,” April 19, 1970.)

83. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 9,

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The general principles of the Constitution of the 9th National Congress defined the time span of socialist society as “a considerably long historical period”; according to Mao’s plan, this period would last 100 to many hundreds of years.84 Mao advanced the theory that there were four kinds of existing phenomena: classes, class contradictions, and class struggles; struggles between socialism and capitalism; the risk of capitalist restoration and the threat of imperialism; and the aggression and subversion of modern revisionism. He believed that these would always exist in a socialist society.85 This was Mao’s judgment regarding China’s political and social situation, and it included one more existing phenomenon than the three that had been theoretically identified in the past. 2. The two congresses offered different explanations about the party’s mission. The party Constitution of the 8th National Congress stated that the mission of the CPC was systematic development of the national economy, achieving industrialization as rapidly as possible, and systematic improvement 341. 84. On April 18, 1970, Kang Sheng explained the phrase in the party Constitution of the 9th

National Congress of the CPC: “The notion of socialist society lasting for ‘a considerably long historical period’ was Mao’s creative development of Marxism-Leninism. Socialist society will be a considerably long historical period in human history. The

terms ‘historical period’ and ‘considerably long’ were developed from Marxism and Leninism and help clear ideological confusion. Party members have always hoped that communism would be achieved very quickly, but Chairman Mao often said that this

would be a considerably long historical period, not several decades but 100 to many hundreds of years.” (“Kang Sheng’s Speech to All the Comrades Participating in the

Discussion about Party Building of the CPC Central Committee and the Army,” April 18, 1970.)

85. On April 18, 1970, Kang Sheng explained the phrase in the party Constitution of the

9th National Congress of the CPC: “Mao viewed class issues from an integrative

perspective of the economy, politics, and ideology. Classes and class struggle in socialist society are materially different from those in capitalist society. The existence

of classes in capitalist society is evidenced by economic exploitation. The existence of classes in socialist society is evidenced by class contradictions and class struggles,

struggles between socialism and capitalism, the risk of capitalist restoration and threat of imperialism, and the aggression and subversion of modern revisionism in addition

to economic contradictions. We can therefore determine why the Soviet Union turned from a socialist country to a fascist and imperialist nation and why there are capitalist roaders in power within our own party.” (Ibid.)

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of technology to bring about modernization of industry, agriculture, transportation, and national defense. As the ruling party, the CPC would focus on modernization, construction, and do its utmost to meet the people’s material and cultural needs.86 In contrast, the Constitution of the 9th National Congress stated that Marxist general principles related to the theory and practice of continuing revolution were the only way of resolving the two-class and two-line struggles. The Cultural Revolution was the political revolution of the proletariat against capitalists and other exploiting classes in a socialist country. As a revolutionary party that adhered to class struggle and line struggle, the CPC would continue the Cultural Revolution to resolve all contradictions.87 3. The two congresses had different ruling principles. The Constitution of the 8th National Congress declared that for complete victory in the great cause of socialism, the party had to cement the alliance between workers and peasants, consolidate the united front of all patriotic forces, reinforce long-term cooperation with each democratic party and with people without party affiliations, and mobilize and unite all positive forces that could be mobilized.88 Regarding the primary task of the CPC, Mao said at the 9th National Congress, “We should serve those who account for more than 95% of China’s total population, and we should fight against the landlords, affluent peasants, the counter-revolutionaries, evil people of all kinds, and rightists, who account for 4% to 5% of the total population.”89 According 86. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 9, 315–316.

87. Kang Sheng explained: “What form could we take to continue the revolution in a socialist society? We have answers from the party Constitution. ‘The Great Cultural Revolution is the proletariat’s political revolution against the capitalist and other exploiting

classes in a socialist country.’ This was an innovation of Mao, who gave a theoretical

explanation about continuing revolution under socialist conditions and found a way of revolution, namely the proletarian Cultural Revolution.” (“Kang Sheng’s Speech to All

the Comrades Participating in the Discussion about Party Building of the CPC Central Committee and the Army,” April 18, 1970.)

88. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 9, 316–317, Beijing: CCCPC Party Literature Publishing House, 1993.

89. Editorial department of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag: “Hold High the Flag of Unity of the 9th National Congress and Fight for Greater Success,” June 9, 1969.

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to Mao’s estimate, 4% to 5% of 800 million people in 1969 amounted to 32 million to 40 million. If their families and related persons are included, the population of landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, evil people of all kinds, and rightists would come to 150 million to 200 million, which was equivalent to the population of a very large country. 4. The two congresses had different international policies. The party Constitution of the 8th National Congress stated that the CPC advocated maintaining world peace, implementing a peaceful foreign policy among countries with different social systems, establishing and developing diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with all countries in the world, and developing and reinforcing friendly relations between the people of China and those all over the world. The party firmly opposed any acts of aggression by imperialist countries and their new war plans.90 Internationally, Mao declared the “Three Oppositions”: “We unite all real Marxist-Leninists and all revolutionary people, and we strongly oppose imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries of any country.”91 The general principles of the Constitution of the 9th National Congress stated the “Three Overthrows”: overthrow U.S.-led imperialism, overthrow the modern revisionism led by the rebel Soviet revisionist group, and overthrow reactionaries of other countries. This was Mao’s philosophy of struggle in dealing with foreign relations. Lin Biao conveyed Mao’s judgment on the international situation in the report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC, stating, “The enemies are weakening, but we are getting stronger.”92 Mao Zedong Thought that there were two possibilities of world war: one was that war would cause revolution and the other was that revolution would stop war. Lin said, “We need to prepare for a large-scale war, early breakout of war, and a conventional war as well as a nuclear war. We therefore need to be prepared.”93 Lin said that U.S.-led imperialists and Soviet revisionists always 90. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected

Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, vol. 9, 317.

91. Editorial department of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag: “Hold High the Flag of Unity of the 9th National Congress and Fight for Greater Success,” June 9, 1969.

92. Lin Biao said, “Overall, the situation in the world is just as Chairman Mao said, ‘The

enemies are weakening, but we are getting stronger.” (“Lin Biao’s Political Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, April 28, 1969.)

93. Ibid.

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

wanted to isolate China, which he thought was a kind of honor. He repeated Mao’s words that “people of the world were rising up and that a new era of fighting against U.S.-led imperialists and Soviet revisionists has begun.” Then who should be the leader and organizer? Lin regarded China as the center of world revolution when he proposed to the world on China’s behalf that all countries and people that had suffered from aggression, control, interference, and bullying by U.S.-led imperialists and Soviet revisionists join up to form a broad united front to defeat the enemies.94 The political line of the 9th National Congress clearly negated that of the 8th National Congress. That political line included the following points. (1) The CPC was not the ruling party but a revolutionary party. (2) The party should focus on class struggle, not economic growth. (3) Party policy should be aimed at staging the proletariat’s political revolution against the capitalist and all exploiting classes, not mobilizing positive elements, uniting all forces that could be united, and distinguishing between the two types of contradictions. (4) The party should follow an international isolationist policy of overthrowing imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries by attacking in all directions, not maintaining a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. Kang Sheng claimed that the chairman creatively developed Marxism-Leninism in the form of the new Constitution.95 A serious flaw in the Constitution of the 9th National Congress was in designating Lin Biao as Mao’s successor (as an individual.)96 There are several different accounts as to why the Constitution included such an item (Article 6.) 1. Zhang Yaoci, Mao’s guard regimental commander and member of the 9th National Congress Presidium, said that Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao insisted on writing this point in the Constitution. After thinking about it overnight, Mao finally said to Zhang Chunqiao (and the drafting group) that the paragraph could be incorporated into the Constitution if the majority agreed with it.97 It seemed that Mao was reluctant to agree to Article 6 of 94. Ibid. 95. Kang Sheng: “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” April 14, 1969.

96. Article 6 of the general principles of the party Constitution stated, “Lin Biao has upheld Mao Zedong Thought and has implemented and defended Mao’s proletarian

revolutionary line. Lin Biao is Mao’s close comrade and successor.” (Museum of the

Chinese Revolution comp., Compilation of the Constitutions of the Communist Party of China, 206–207.)

97. According to the recollection of Zhang Yaoci, on October 17, 1968, at the Twelfth Plenary

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the general principles of the Constitution. This version of events was clearly designed to absolve Mao of his own political responsibility for this act. 2. Jiang Qing had her own version. She called a meeting of representatives of revolutionary rebels during the 9th National Congress of the CPC and explained that Mao was considering the appointment of Lin Biao as his successor. This was because Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping could not hold their former positions after having been criticized and dismissed. Jiang Qing said, “One day, Chairman Mao asked me about who could take over Liu Shaoqi’s work. At first, I dared not say anything. At his insistence, I said that the successor should be chosen from the present members of the CPC Central Committee and meet three requirements: (1) he has never pursued an incorrect political line; (2) he has worked closely with Chairman Mao for a long time; and (3) he needs to have a thorough understanding of Marxism-Leninism. Chairman Mao laughed and said, ‘I know who you are talking about.’ We both laughed when we found that we had written down the name of the same person. Chairman Mao and I proposed that year [August 1966] that Lin Biao be chosen as the successor.”98 Jiang Qing’s version was unofficial, and its purpose was to highlight herself since Mao had always said to the leader of the Central Committee that Jiang Qing could not represent him. If her version of events was correct, Mao would have violated party discipline, if he did talk with Jiang Qing or seek her advice in private about such an important issue. 3. On behalf of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng presented the official written version of events. On April 14, Zhou gave a speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th National Congress, Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, Jiang Qing said, “Lin Biao has proletarian

revolutionist bearing...He is so modest and must be enshrined in the Constitution

as Chairman Mao’s successor.” When the CPC Central Committee discussed the

Constitution on October 27, 1968, Jiang Qing insisted that Lin Biao, being appointed

successor of Mao, be enshrined in the Constitution. At a meeting of the CPC Central Committee about amendments to the Constitution in April 1969, Jiang Qing said, “Lin Biao must be included in the Constitution to prevent others casting their greedy eyes on the position of successor, and it will give great relief to the whole nation.” Zhang

Chunqiao was the first to agree to this and said, “It’s true that all of us can feel relieved as a result.” Mao Zedong thought about this issue overnight and finally said to Zhang

Chunqiao (and the drafting group,) “If the majority agree, Lin Biao can be placed in the Constitution.” (Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 113–115.) 98. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 638.

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

explaining on behalf of the CPC Central Committee how Lin Biao was chosen as Mao’s successor. Zhou affirmed Lin’s historical achievements before and after the founding of new China, especially in the Cultural Revolution.99 Zhou said that Lin had been one of Mao’s close comrades-inarms 40 years earlier, when Lin was one of the glorious representatives of the forces after the failure of the Nanchang Uprising who accepted Mao’s leadership in the Jinggang Mountains. Zhou deliberately exaggerated Lin’s status in his speech: it was Zhu De who led the force to meet Mao in the Jinggang Mountains, not Lin; this was a historical fact and was known to all. Zhou Enlai continued that Lin Biao had followed Chairman Mao ever since, pursued Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line, and made enormous contributions to the Chinese people’s revolution. It should be said that this evaluation was in accordance with the facts. Zhou also praised Lin for his actions, which had contributed greatly to the popularization of Mao Zedong Thought in the party and army as well as among the Chinese people and people across the world. This was admitted by the public, but it also had many elements of personality cult, and Mao had reason to feel annoyed by what Zhou said. Zhou Enlai said that in the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao had always followed Chairman Mao and that he was worthy of being widely accepted as vice commander of the proletarian faction led by the great commander Mao. Clearly, Mao had to take prime responsibility for the errors of the Cultural Revolution, and Lin also had to take heavy responsibility for them. Lin actually played a secondary role in events since it was Zhou, rather than Lin, who dealt directly with the party, army, and in governmental affairs. Regarding the significance of Article 6 of the Constitution’s general principles (in which Lin Biao was appointed as Mao’s successor,) Zhou Enlai said, “That is the best conclusion and is naturally drawn from Lin Biao’s 40 years of revolutionary struggle, and it is in accordance with historical facts. Lin Biao had support from the whole party, the whole army, people of different ethnicities, and revolutionary people across the world. We feel happy not only for our great leader, today’s greatest Marxist and Leninist, Chairman Mao, but also for the widely accepted successor of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Biao.” Finally, he asked the whole party and Chinese people to unite around the proletarian faction led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.100 When Zhou referred to Lin as the glorious representative of 99. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 292.

100. “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee,” April 14,

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joining forces in the Jinggang Mountains (as noted above, it was in fact Zhu De,) Lin suddenly stood up and said, “I have done nothing special. We owe all success to Chairman Mao’s outstanding leadership.”101 This showed that Lin had some integrity and that he did not agree with what Zhou had said. Zhou, it should be noted, was acting according to Mao’s instructions when he gave that speech on behalf of the CPC Central Committee. Previously on September 24, 1967, Mao had said, “The successor is Lin Biao, of course,” when Zhou and Mao talked about issues related to the 9th National Congress.102 But Zhou did in fact play a more important role in Lin Biao being chosen as Mao’s successor than Jiang Qing and Zhang Chuanqiao; this was because the latter two individuals were not members of the CPC Central Committee and Zhou’s explanation was more acceptable to the delegates at the 9th National Congress. Looking back on the above experience in August 1972, Zhou later said, “I knew nothing about Lin’s scheme and would not have delivered that speech if I had known.”103 But Zhou had taken the lead in praising Lin and Wang Hongwen and helped Mao in appointing Lin and Wang as vice chairmen of the CPC Central Committee, and this was officially recorded. In this situation, Lin Biao panicked, and he gave an impromptu speech to explain that his achievements were not as great as Premier Zhou had said after Zhou made his own speech.104 1969. Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 201. 101. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 743. 102. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 191, 194–195.

103. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1958. 104. Lin Biao said, “I did not prepare a speech, but I wish to say something. I heard Premier

Zhou’s speech, about which I knew nothing in advance. What he said about Chairman Mao was completely correct. However, I felt ashamed when I heard what he said about

me. When I was young, I met Chairman Mao in the Jinggang Mountains. I was too young to know much, but all I knew was to follow Chairman Mao because I felt that I should follow this man, who was a much wiser leader than all the other leaders. I just

developed a little awareness and was not as foresighted as Premier Zhou indicated. To be honest, I supported Chairman Mao for several decades and achieved some success under his leadership, but my ideological level was very low. Without the wise

leadership of Chairman Mao, neither the whole party nor I would have today’s success. Thanks to the chairman, I was able to contribute a little to the party since I followed

all the guidelines he issued. Chairman Mao made the greatest contribution to success, and I did very, very little. That is my brief declaration here.” (“Lin Biao’s Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee,” April 14, 1969.)

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On May 14, Zhou spoke highly of Lin’s modesty when Zhou addressed the subsidiary bodies of the State Council of the 9th National Congress.105 The same day, Kang Sheng gave an official explanation about the new Constitution on behalf of the CPC Central Committee at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Kang said that a feature of the new Constitution was the clear provision of Lin Biao as Mao’s successor,106 and this was detailed in the news communiqué of the presidium secretariat of the 9th National Congress.107 On June 105. Zhou Enlai said, “The news bulletin of the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC

Central Committee gave details of the newly elected Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. We are happy that Chairman Mao was elected chairman of the 9th Central Committee and Vice Chairman Lin, who is Chairman Mao’s close comrade and successor, as vice chairman of the 9th Central Committee. Vice Chairman Lin’s

speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee on April 14 showed his modesty. He is worthy of our love and support.” (“Zhou Enlai’s Speech of

Conveying the Spirit of the 9th National Congress in Affiliations of the State Council,” May 14, 1969.)

106. On April 14, 1969 Kang Sheng explained the new Constitution at the 9th National Congress: “What are the main characteristics of the draft of the new Constitution? First,

the new Constitution clearly provides that the party’s guiding principle and theoretical basis is Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Second, the new Constitution stipulates that Lin Biao is the successor of Chairman Mao. Lin Biao has always upheld

Mao Zedong Thought and has implemented and defended Chairman Mao’s proletarian

revolutionary line. Lin Biao was the best at learning, applying, and implementing Mao Zedong Thought, and he is Chairman Mao’s close comrade and successor. The new Constitution’s provision on Lin Biao as Mao’s successor is of great importance to the

future and fate of the party, the whole nation, and world revolution. It will absolutely

guarantee that the party and the nation follow Mao Zedong Thought in conducting socialist construction and revolution and proceeding ahead successfully along the road led by Mao.” (“Kang Sheng’s Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th National Congress of the CPC,” April 14, 1969.)

107. The news bulletin from the presidium secretariat of the 9th National Congress of the

CPC stated that all delegates discussed the amended draft of the new Constitution. Delegates understood that the draft was prepared by the whole party and the revolutionary people of the whole nation as an outcome of Chairman Mao’s wise

leadership and that it reflected the party’s democratic centralism and mass line.

Delegates understood that the new Constitution clearly stated that the ideological basis

of the party’s guideline was Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; it was also stipulated that Lin Biao would be the successor of Mao, which was a success of the

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9, the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag magazine published an article entitled “Hold High the Flag of Unity of the 9th National Congress and Fight for Greater Success,” which claimed that the new Constitution clearly stipulated that Lin Biao was Mao’s successor and that this constituted a remarkable achievement of the 9th National Congress.108 There was a unified CPC Central Committee before the Cultural Revolution. However, after the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, there were two factions in the CPC Central Committee. One was the proletarian faction led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin before the 9th National Congress and the Central Committee (or CPC Central Committee) led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin after the 9th National Congress. The selection of a successor blatantly contravened the party’s organizational principles of democratic centralism and the electoral system of leaders. That system was established with the founding of the CPC in 1921, and it stated that the party’s leaders were to be elected by the National People’s Congress and at plenary sessions. The supreme leader appointing his own successor was akin to the hereditary system of a feudal emperor; it was clearly absurd and unsophisticated, and it was the most serious flaw in all the Constitutions that had been drafted since the founding of the CPC. Ironically, Lin Biao was later changed from being declared Mao’s close comrade-in-arms and successor to becoming a “capitalist careerist and schemer,”109 and he was charged with attempting to murder Mao and planning an armed coup. From April 15, the third item on the agenda for the 9th National Congress was electing the CPC Central Committee. On April 15, Zhou Enlai was responsible for making preparations for electing the 9th CPC Central Committee at the 9th National Congress.110 Mao proposed that 16 people, including Zhu De, be chosen Cultural Revolution, Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. The party would become greater and better by following the provisions of the new Constitution.

108. Editorials of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag stated that “The 9th National Congress fulfilled Mao’s wishes and that it had been a meeting of unity and success. The meeting elected a new Central Committee led by Mao and Lin Biao. The new

Constitution clearly stated that the party’s ideological basis was Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and that Lin Biao was the successor of Mao. This was a new victory of the unity of the 9th National Congress and that of the whole party.”

Editorials of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag: “Hold High the Flag of Unity of

the 9th National Congress and Fight for Greater Success,” June 9, 1969.

109. The CPC Central Committee, Notice on Lin Biao’s Treason and Escape, September 18, 1971. 110. The drafted provisions on electing the 9th CPC Central Committee were as follows:

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as members of that committee.111 On April 20, Zhou Enlai chaired an enlarged presidium meeting of the 9th National Congress, which approved the draft for the list of members of the 9th CPC Central Committee.112 Zhou had played an important role in making that list. On April 23, Mao called a meeting with members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, members of the Central Military Committee, and conveners from different groups to the list of members of the 9th CPC Central Committee; in that list, members of the 8th CPC Central Committee accounted for less than 20%.113 The same day, an enlarged meeting of the presidium of the 9th National Congress approved the preliminary list of members and alternate members of the 9th CPC Central Committee.114 According to the “Provisions on the Election of the 9th CPC Central Committee,”

approved by the presidium, 45 local groups nominated members and the presidium secretariat compiled the initial list. That list was made after being discussed and

preliminary elections were held, and it was submitted to the presidium for approval. Finally, the official list was made, and it was submitted to congress for election. (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 292.)

111. Mao proposed in the opening speech that several veteran party officials be elected as members of the committee: Zhu De, Chen Yun, Deng Zihui, Zhang Dingcheng, Ye

Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yi. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1550–1552, 1554.)

112. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 293.

113. On April 23, Mao called a meeting for members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolutions Group, members of the Central Military Committee, and

conveners from different groups, and he added five people to the list, which totaled 279 individuals. There were 170 members of the 9th CPC Central Committee and 109 alternate members. Mao said at the meeting, “It needs to be stated that there are many

great individuals whose names do not appear on the list and not all the persons on the list are great...On the whole, those who were elected to the CPC Central Committee

for the first time are in the majority because the Seventh and 8th National Congresses didn’t have so many new members. There are only 53 members of the 8th CPC Central Committee, and they account for less than one-fifth of the members on the list. More

industrial workers and peasants were elected to the CPC Central Committee because we need to keep in mind that we must never break away from production.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1542–1543.)

114. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of

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According to the election method proposed by the presidium secretariat of the 9th National Congress, Mao and Lin Biao would obviously be chosen, and no more than 53 members and alternate members of the 8th CPC Central Committee would be nominated. In the secret ballot, 170 members and 109 alternate members of the 9th CPC Central Committee were elected; of those, there were 53 members and alternate members of the 8th CPC Central Committee (which accounted for 19% of the total number of members of the 9th CPC Central Committee and 29% of the total number of members of the 8th CPC Central Committee.)115 Among the members of the 9th CPC Central Committee, the proportion of civil officials (mainly from the State Council) fell sharply, and they accounted for about one-third of the total. There were 124 military officials, who accounted for 44% of the total, though they represented only 19% in the 8th CPC Central Committee. Delegates of workers, peasants, and soldiers increased in number and accounted for 19% of the total; this led to a dramatic decline in the literary level of the members of the CPC Central Committee. Local officials (mainly at the provincial level) increased from 38% in 1956 to 67% in 1969. After electing members of the CPC Central Committee, the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee was not held as usual to choose members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. Mao appointed Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Huang Yongsheng to invite nominations for members. Wishing to be a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Jiang Qing said to Huang Yongsheng, “I would like to propose you as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.” Huang refused her promise of “a high post.” Then Jiang suggested that Deng Yingchao serve as a member of the Political Bureau and that she become a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. However, Zhou also rejected her proposal. Jiang then went to Ye Qun and asked Lin Biao to propose her as a member of the Standing Committee. Lin refused and said, “I follow Chairman Mao’s instructions dutifully.”116 Being politically ambitious, Jiang Qing did everything she could to become a member of the Standing Committee. However, Zhou made every effort to make Jiang a member of that committee. On April 26, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Huang Yongsheng made a list of 23 members for the Political Bureau117 and submitted this to Mao and Lin Biao. Mao Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 293. 115. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 132–134. 116. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 745–746. 117. The list included: Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Zhu De, Liu

Bocheng, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, Wang

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removed Jiang Qing and added Ye Qun to the list. Lin then removed Ye. Zhou said at the meeting of the three people, “Taking into consideration the overall situation, we must insist on adding two people [Jiang Qing and Ye Qun] to the list, even though Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin removed them.” Kang Sheng and Huang Yongsheng agreed with Zhou. Once again, Mao removed Jiang Qing’s name and added Li Desheng and Ji Dengkui. Lin Biao eliminated Jiang Qing’s name again. Zhou Enlai and the other two met Mao and proposed once again that Jiang Qing be added to the list. Mao said, “You can add the name if you insist. In any event, I have to take responsibility for it if you add her.” Zhou met Lin, and Lin said, “I abide by Chairman Mao’s decision regardless of whether I agree or disagree with adding Ye Qun to the list.” Finally, an initial list of 25 members of the Political Bureau was confirmed at a meeting chaired by Mao. He said, “I take complete responsibility for the list.”118 On April 27, the list of members for the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee was compiled in a secret ballot at a preparatory meeting for the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Zhou Enlai reported the voting results to Mao and Lin Biao.119 On April 28, the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee elected Mao as chairman of the Central Committee and Lin Biao as the sole vice chairman as well as five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau: Mao, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. At 76, Mao was the oldest, but he made no move toward retirement but continued as chairman. Jiang Qing and Huang Yongsheng received many votes, but they were not elected.120 One month before the election, Mao remarked in a letter about proposing Jiang as a member of the Political Bureau, “She is a person with undeserved reputation and has shown gross incompetence.”121 Obviously, Mao understood Jiang very well Dongxing, Ye Jianying, Xie Fuzhi, Li Xiannian, Li Xuefeng, and Wang Xiaoyu. (Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 665.) 118. Ibid, 650–652. 119. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 293.

120. In all, eighteen people were nominated to the Standing Committee of the Political

Bureau at the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Five people, including Mao, were elected. Jiang Qing received 150 votes, Huang Yongsheng 130

votes, and the other eleven nominees fewer than 35 votes. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1553.)

121. Mao’s remarks were published in the People’s Letters Digest, compiled by the Correspondence Room of the State Council’s Secretariat on January 11, 1969. The digest

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and strongly opposed her election; that reduced the number of members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to five. Mao did not initially agree with the election of Chen Boda; finally, though, he reluctantly concurred.122 It is evident from the above exposition that the political shuffle of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee aimed to increase the number of members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to 11 people. The political shuffle this time was to decrease the number of members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau after six members were replaced, three members (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Tao Zhu) were officially purged, and three (Zhu De, Chen Yun, and Li Fuchun) were politically marginalized and no longer members of the Standing Committee. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng formed a nucleus of power, which I term the Cultural Revolution Leading Nucleus. This power center reestablished its dominant position at the First Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee through official procedures, though it collapsed at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Through a secret ballot in a single-candidate election, 25 members of the 9th CPC Central Political Bureau were elected; two-thirds of those were newly elected. Except Wen Yucheng, all members of the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group were elected as members of the Political Bureau.123 In addition to the five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Huang Yongsheng and Jiang Qing were elected as the sixth and seventh members.124 Only stated that someone from a state-run farm in Wusan, Henan Province, wrote to Zhou Enlai on January 10, proposing that Jiang Qing be elected as a candidate for the Ninth

Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and hoped that Jiang could concurrently hold the post of minister of the Central Organization Department. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 4.)

122. According to Wu Faxian, while chairing the meeting that discussed candidates for the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Mao said, “Chen Boda cannot be elected as member of the Standing Committee. His opinions have often differed from mine.”

Mao finally agreed that Chen could become a member of the Standing Committee after he endorsed the views of Zhou Enlai and the majority. (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s

Memoir, 746.) 123. Ibid, 747.

124. Of the 277 votes from members of the Central Politburo, Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng received all the votes. Chen Boda obtained 275 votes, Huang Yongsheng

274, and Jiang Qing 270. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2,

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12 of the 30 members (three members who had died are not included) of the 8th Central Political Bureau were elected this time, accounting for 40% of the total.125 Mao and Lin Biao had set a bad precedent in allowing their wives to be elected as members of the Political Bureau; that was a serious historical fault for the CPC. Mao had said, “I take all responsibility”;126 however, Zhou Enlai was also responsible. Jiang Qing became a sworn enemy of Zhou because she was dissatisfied with her failure to become a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Since the Central Cultural Revolution Group had ceased to function, she held a title (member of the Political Bureau) but no real power. Of the 25 members of the Political Bureau, 12 were military officials, accounting for 48% of the total. The increase of military members in the Central Committee and Political Bureau demonstrates that the party’s government had departments that failed to function properly. Thus, Mao felt obliged to fill the political vacuum created by the constant instability during the Cultural Revolution with military men, and China entered an era of military dominance in the political party and government.127 Fully aware of this situation, Mao declared at the first session of the Political Bureau, “In accordance with the practice in the Soviet Union, the Political Bureau might be termed a military bureaucratic dictatorship: the ‘military’ means that there are military cadres in the Political Bureau and the ‘bureaucratic’ refers to Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and myself.”128 As a result of the 1553.) 125. The 21 members of the CPC Central Politburo were as follows: Mao Zedong*, Lin Biao*, (other members were listed in order of the number of strokes in Chinese characters of

their surnames) Ye Qun, Ye Jianying*, Liu Bocheng*, Jiang Qing, Zhu De*, Xu Shiyou, Chen Boda*, Chen Xilian, Li Xiannian*, Li Zuopeng, Wu Faxian, Zhang Chunqiao, Qiu Huizuo, Zhou Enlai*, Yao Wenyuan, Kang Sheng*, Huang Yongsheng, Dong Biwu*, and Xie Fuzhi**. The four alternate members of the Political Bureau were as follows:

Ji Dengkui, Li Xuefeng**, Li Desheng, and Wang Dongxing. (Li, From the First to the

Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, vol. 2, 977–978, 981.) Note: * signifies a member of the 8th Political Bureau; **signifies an alternate member of the 8th Political Bureau.

The names in bold were military leaders. Xie Fuzhi was the first political commissar of the Beijing Military Region.

126. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 651–652. 127. David Goodman commented that although not the same as military governments that had come to power by staging coups, the Chinese government at that time was one

with excessive involvement of military personnel. (Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography, 123.) 128. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 654.

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term “military bureaucratic dictatorship,”129 Mao soon began to worry about the increasing political elements in the army—especially when he found that Lin Biao enjoyed increasing personal prestige.130 This explains why Mao criticized the offices of the central military and undercut Lin’s power. In the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, there were three major political factions. There were the moderates, led by Zhou Enlai, which represented the healthy, advanced forces within the party, and they were then at a political disadvantage. The other two factions were the two political cliques led by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, which represented the evil, destructive forces within the party, and they held the political advantage. The three factions led to the formation of a very complex political landscape.131 That directly affected the subsequent intraparty struggles and the course of the Cultural Revolution, and it was an indication of the fact that China’s politics was at that time characterized by the coexistence of a number of factions within the main party, though all of this was carefully orchestrated and manipulated by Mao. On the same day, the first session of the Political Bureau approved the list of chairman, vice chairman, and members of the Central Military Committee and the list of members of the Central Military Office. The lists were proposed by Mao and compiled by Zhou Enlai.132 The following individuals were elected: Mao as chairman of the Central Military Committee; Lin Biao as member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; Liu Bocheng as member of the Political Bureau; Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying (members of the Political Bureau) as vice chairmen of the Central Military Committee; Huang Yongsheng 129. Qiu Huizuo thought that Chairman Mao’s dissatisfaction was evidenced by his actions

after the 9th National Congress. Believing in military bureaucratic dictatorship, Mao Zedong Thought it appropriate that the military should gain power. Mao eliminated

Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and their factions and agents in the Cultural Revolution. How could he relinquish the power he had gained to Lin Biao? (Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 654.)

130. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 33. 131. Harding thought that the composition of the Political Bureau reflected the split among

the victims, survivors, and beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution; between military and civilian radicals who came to power in the Cultural Revolution; between Lin Biao

and his opponents in the central military leadership; and between the central military institutions and commanders of each military region. (Harding, “The Chinese State in Crisis.”)

132. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 293–294.

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(member of the Political Bureau and chief of the general staff of the PLA) as director of the Central Military Office; Wu Faxian (member of the Political Bureau) as deputy director of the Central Military Office; Ye Qun (member of the Political Bureau,) Liu Xianqian, Li Tianyou, and Li Zuopeng (members of the Political Bureau,) Li Desheng (alternate member of the Political Bureau,) Qiu Huizuo (member of the Political Bureau,) Wen Yucheng (deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA and commander of the Beijing garrison,) and Xie Fuzhi (member of the Political Bureau) as members of the Central Military Office.133 The Central Committee did not publish the above lists until May 27. According to Wu Faxian, Mao proposed five people, including Liu Bocheng as vice chairman of the Central Military Committee at the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee; they were all elected after all participants welcomed Mao’s proposal. Wu Faxian said that Mao made the final decisions on the personnel at that point.134 According to Qiu Huizuo, Zhou Enlai presented the lists and Lin Biao agreed with them.135 There were two political factions within the Central Military Committee. By commanding the Central Military Office, which was the daily responsibility of the Central Military Committee, the Lin Biao clique was able to gain the upper hand and take control of the army. However, Mao used five marshals, including Ye Jianying, to thwart the Lin Biao clique and those five marshals played an important role in the September 13 Incident, in which they supported Mao and broke up Lin’s clique. Mao did not allow Jiang Qing’s clique to take part in military affairs in the Cultural Revolution but simply allowed her to be his personal chronicler of events. Well versed in Chinese politics and the details of political struggles, Mao was capable of controlling different political forces and was also able to bring about reorganization through political struggle. Being thoroughly familiar with the current situation, Lin Biao was always careful and never acted rashly. As the biggest political victor to emerge at the 9th National Congress, Lin went to the forefront of China’s political arena and was in a position just behind Mao, but that brought him into conflict with the chairman. Like the conflict between Liu Shaoqi and Mao, this one also resulted in a bloody struggle. However, unlike Liu, Lin did not have much real power in the party or government. In fact, as the only vice chairman in the Central Committee since the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee in August 1956, Lin never presided over the daily work of that committee. In addition, as vice premier of the State Council, Lin never presided over or participated in the daily work of the State Council since Zhou Enlai took 133. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 135. 134. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 748. 135. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 653.

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charge. Lin Biao had only limited military power under Mao, and he was restricted by Zhou136; that was evident in the September 13 Incident, when Lin was able to muster a plane only through Zhou. As the titular second state leader, Lin did not have as much power as Zhou, and it was very clear that Zhou was the real second leader, who held power over the army on behalf of Mao. On the same day, Mao gave a speech at the first Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee to reiterate his judgment on China’s political situation. He explained once again to all members of the Central Committee why he had launched the Cultural Revolution, claiming that neither real Marxists nor mass workers had assumed leadership at most plants.137 Instead of claiming that radicalism had destroyed the party’s organizations at all levels and aiming to purge capitalist roaders as he had done three years previously, Mao turned to political conservatism and proposed rebuilding the party’s organizations at all levels. He said, “Some foreigners and journalists say that our party is rebuilding itself. Now, we propose to use this catchword too— consolidating and building the party. The party needs to be rebuilt by rectifying every branch among the masses.”138 He stated again clearly, “Let’s unite toward the goal of consolidating the proletarian dictatorship.” However, he did not think that the revolution was over and he predicted, “Maybe the revolution [Cultural Revolution] will take place again in a few years.”139 What Mao could not have predicted was that only one year later, he would launch a new revolution and struggle at the Lushan Conference. When estimating once again the duration of 136. In May 1968, Mao clearly stated that troops could not be deployed without the joint

approval of himself, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai. (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 731.)

137. Mao gave a speech at the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee on

April 28, 1969, saying, “The Cultural Revolution was necessary because of our unstable foundation. From my observations, at most plants, the leadership is not assumed by

the real Marxists or mass workers. Not all leaders of plants in the past were bad. The secretaries, vice secretaries, and members of party committees were good. But most

leaders followed Liu Shaoqi’s [capitalist] direction, using such things as material

incentives, benefits, and bonuses without proletarian politics.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 35–37.)

138. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 41.

139. “Zhou Enlai’s Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.

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the Cultural Revolution, Mao said, “It may take about one more year [1970 or 1971] to carry out the revolution across the country. If it goes smoothly, it may end on the 20th anniversary [of the founding of China—on October 1, 1969].”140 Mao would once again be proven wrong.141 Guo Moruo, who had been newly elected as a member of the Central Committee, wrote a poem, To Celebrate the Closing of the 9th National Congress of the CPC, which described the scene: “The great shouts wishing Chairman Mao a long life were like a hurricane and thunder.”142 Mao was at the peak of his personality cult and even Guo, a famous historian, deeply eulogized Mao. At the 9th National Congress, Deng Xiaoping was dismissed from all his posts both within and outside the party, but he was not expelled from the CPC. On May 3, Deng wrote to Wang Dongxing, letting Mao know that he would respect all the political judgments and punishment of the party without reserve; that profoundly impressed Mao. Mao thought that it was significant that Deng had volunteered to criticize himself and that he was correct in not expelling Deng from the party. Mao subsequently allowed Deng’s children to visit Deng and his wife, who was under house arrest.143 Later, after the downfall of the Lin Biao anti-party clique in August 1973, Zhou Enlai affirmed, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, that the political line of the 9th National Congress was Marxist-Leninist. In his political report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC, Zhou had declared that both the political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress were correct;144 but this illogical 140. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 391. 141. According to Pang, Mao had not predicted that a new political storm would erupt shortly after the 9th National Congress: the Lin Biao clique wanted to seize more power,

and this upheaval turned into a life-and-death struggle. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1557.)

142. The poem, To Celebrate the Closing of the 9th National Congress of the CPC, read: “The 9th

National Congress closed in glory with the song ‘The International.’ The great shouts wishing Chairman Mao a long life were like a hurricane and thunder. All evil vanished,

and imperialist revisionism was defeated. Everyone celebrated the proletarian dictatorship and real democracy. This meeting of unity was like a timely rain that gave

us hope for a new victory. We still have a long way to go, and we need to be prepared for war and guard against arrogance. We must hold high our red flag and let it fly in the sky.” (Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 203.)

143. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 115. 144. Zhou Enlai stated in the political report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,

“According to Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought on continuing revolution

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assessment would inevitably be subject to historical revision. In 1981, the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of China came to the following judgment regarding the 9th National Congress: the 9th National Congress of the CPC legalized the incorrect theories and practices of the Cultural Revolution, and strengthened the positions in the party of such individuals as Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and Kang Sheng. The political, ideological, and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress of the CPC were all wrong.145 That resolution showed that the party made monumental errors at the 9th National Congress; the CPC officially accepted and approved the incorrect line of the party leader, and that caused serious damage to the party, the people, and the country. This will be analyzed in greater detail in the following section.

The “Order No. 1” Event and the Fight over the Post of State President After the 9th National Congress of the CPC, the Lin Biao clique was increasing its political power.146 Before the 9th National Congress, the clique focused on furthering under the proletarian dictatorship, the 9th National Congress of the CPC summarized

the historical experience and latest experience of the Cultural Revolution; it criticized Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist line and once again affirmed the party’s basic guidelines in

the socialist period. Chairman Mao’s speech and the political report of the CPC

Central Committee, approved by Congress, provided a Marxist-Leninist guideline

for the party. The revolutionary practice since the 9th National Congress—mainly the struggle with the Lin Biao clique—proved that the political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress were correct and that the leadership of the CPC Central

Committee, headed by Chairman Mao, was also correct.” (“Zhou Enlai’s Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.) The report was drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and personally checked by Mao.

145. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 812.

146. Pang thought that the Lin Biao clique rose to unprecedented heights of power after the 9th National Congress. The clique gained considerable political capital since Lin Biao

had become the legal successor and could take greater, direct control of military power through the Central Military Office under Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and Ye Qun.

Since the implementation of “helping leftists, industry and agriculture, furthering

military control and training,” the army played an important role in the country. All

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Mao’s personality cult so as to earn his trust; it also publicly engaged in factional activities in the party and army, and it took advantage of the Cultural Revolution to eliminate those who held different views. Examples of the latter include persecuting Marshal He Long and Peng Dehuai, criticizing Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi, and excluding Marshal Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen. After the 9th National Congress, the Central Military Office was established, and it was headed by Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian; the Central Military Office replaced the CPC Central Military Committee as an unofficial organization and it took charge of the committee’s daily work. The Central Military Office took orders from Lin Biao, who presided over its work, which was in accordance with organizational principles, though it led to a new political struggle. They were soon referred to by Mao as the Lin Biao clique (one marshal and five generals.) As the major force for Mao in launching the Cultural Revolution and its biggest beneficiary, the Jiang Qing clique initially worked with the Lin Biao clique in attacking and persecuting Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Tao Zhu (three members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau); they also worked together in attacking the February Counter-current Forces, persecuting seven members of the Political Bureau, including Tan Zhenlin, and opposing Zhou Enlai at all opportunities. The Jiang Qing clique later challenged the Lin Biao clique, which resulted in an ideological and power struggle between two irreconcilable factions and soon escalated into a deadly struggle.147 Mao both relied on and closely watched the two factions that he used in the Cultural Revolution.148 The two cliques made every effort to win Mao’s political support, seize political power, and eliminate each other; that represented an ugly political phenomenon emerging and spreading within the party during the Cultural Revolution.149 this made the Lin Biao clique unprecedentedly ambitious. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1557.)

147. Wu Faxian said “After the 9th National Congress, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan began to attack Lin Biao. We sided with Lin Biao, which was a focus of fierce struggle at the Lushan Meeting.” (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 822.)

148. Deng Rong said, “In order to reach the goal of revolution in the Cultural Revolution, Mao used Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to plot and launch the movement. Mao regarded them as the real leftists and the true

guards of his thought and guidelines.” (Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the

“Cultural Revolution”, 133.) This reflected Deng Xiaoping’s view.

149. Pang thought that the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques worked together closely in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution despite conflicts over some issues. That situation

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Mao relied on the moderates, led by Zhou Enlai, to govern the country. Mao was fully aware that the country had to undergo economic construction in addition to revolution, and he could not purge all the veteran officials, including Zhou, because he needed some of them. On July 3, Zhou reported to Mao about adjusting the operation group of the State Council. The group consisted of nine people: Zhou Enlai, Xie Fuzhi (vice premier,) Li Xiannian (vice premier,) Ji Dengkui, Li Desheng, Li Fuchun (vice premier,) Yu Qiuli, Su Yu, and Su Jing; Zhou was the leader and Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui the deputy leaders of the group. After Mao said that he “agreed in principle,”150 the operation group performed the functions of the State Council and made the national economic development plan of 1970 and the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Mao coordinated and controlled the three political factions—the Lin Biao clique, Jiang Qing clique, and the moderates led by Zhou Enlai. Therefore, Mao appealed for “unity and not splitting” many times in public and in the party, and he requested that the CPC Central Committee unite for greater success at the First Plenary Session of the 9th National Congress.151 However, Mao’s theory that class struggle was the engine was the very root of political divisions in the party. The Second Plenary Session held one year later showed the extent of the political split in the party. After the 9th National Congress, the CPC Central Committee made efforts to moderate the personality cult of Mao, which was in accordance with Mao’s own wishes. On June 12, the Central Committee issued a document entitled “Issues on the Publicity of Chairman Mao’s Image.” The document said that his current prominence was not in line with proletarian politics and that promoting Mao’s image changed subtly after the 9th National Congress: the two cliques became locked in open,

smouldering strife so frequently that they were unable to coexist. (Pang and Jin eds.,

Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1557–1558.) The “Special Judgment of the Special Court of the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of China” (TeFaZi No.1;

January 23, 1981) stated that the two counter-revolutionary groups headed by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were attempting to seize ultimate power over the party and the state. They allied and competed against each other. (Party Literature Research Center of the

CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 664.)

150. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1942– 1992), vol. 2, 683–684.

151. Mao said, “What I am saying here has been said many times, and it is known to all:

we should unite for greater success. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–

1976), vol. 2, 1553.)

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and thoughts since the Cultural Revolution was a kind of formalist exaggeration. Accordingly, the Central Committee raised seven points for improvement with regard to the prevailing personality cult of Mao across the nation.152 Mao approved the document.153 After the 9th National Congress of the CPC, the personality cult of Mao receded, and China became relatively stable despite the violent struggles that were occurring in some places. Following Mao’s instructions, the Central Committee issued a notice on July 23 about the large-scale violent struggle in Shanxi Province.154 On August 23, the Central Committee issued the Order from the CPC Central Committee regarding the large-scale violence in Xinjiang Autonomous Region.155 In accordance with these orders, the Central Committee dispatched the army to suppress the mass organizations and restore social order. The event of Lin Biao’s Order No. 1 led to a power struggle between Mao and Lin Biao. On August 20, the Soviet ambassador in the United States told Henry Kissinger about the Soviet Union’s plan to attack China, and he requested the United States to remain neutral. However, the American government intended to prevent this attack and leaked the news to the Washington Post. On August 28, 152. The document of the CPC Central Committee Issues on the Publicity of Chairman Mao’s Image set out the following requirements. (1) Leaders at all levels should guide the

masses in creatively studying and applying Mao Zedong Thought, revolutionizing their thoughts, and focusing on actual effects instead of pursuing forms. (2) Reiterate

the “Instructions of Erecting Chairman Mao’s Statue,” issued by the CPC Central

Committee on July 13, 1967, and request that instructions be followed henceforth when erecting Chairman Mao’s statue. (3) Badges of Chairman Mao can no longer be

made without approval from the CPC Central Committee. (4) Newspapers may not

use images of Chairman Mao as banner images under ordinary circumstances. (5) No goods and packages may print images of Chairman Mao; printing Chairman Mao’s

image in china is prohibited; Quotations from Chairman Mao must be used properly. (6) The word “loyalty” implies class content, and it should not be overused. Do not launch “loyalty movements.” Do not build feudal-style buildings and deal with such existing buildings in a proper way. (7) Do not launch formalist activities, such as asking

for instructions in the morning and reports in the evening; do not read Chairman Mao’s quotations before meals and salute Chairman Mao’s image. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 50.) 153. Ibid. 154. Ibid, 54–55. 155. Ibid, 59–61.

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that newspaper claimed that the Soviet Union planned to attack Beijing and other places in China using nuclear weapons.156 Further, the Headquarters of the General Staff of the PLA was informed that the Soviets might suddenly attack China. On September 11, Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi talked with Kosygin in the terminal building of Beijing Airport. Zhou warned Kosygin, “You said that you are first going to destroy our nuclear bases. If you do so, we will announce to the world that this is an act of aggression and amounts to war, and we will strongly resist to the end.” Finally, Zhou and Kosygin agreed that the two sides should hold talks at the deputy foreign minister level about the Sino-Soviet border issue in the near future.157 However, the Soviet Union continued to increase its troops in the country’s Far East, putting 40 army divisions into Sino-Soviet border areas. Mao, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai requested that precautions be taken. On the eve of National Day, having personally inspected national defenses, Lin Biao reported to Mao and proposed that measures be taken in case the Soviets took advantage of the National Day festival to attack suddenly. Mao agreed with Lin, and later Lin requested the Central Military Office to deploy the army.158 On October 1, Mao met Choi Yong-kun, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea in Tiananmen gate tower and said: “America is happy about the Sino-Soviet split. The Sino-Soviet border has been at peace for more than 10 days. We will not fight if they do not attack us since we don’t want war.”159 On October 7, the Chinese government issued a statement to make clear its position on the Sino-Soviet border negotiations. The statement declared, “China and the Soviet Union first need to reach an agreement on interim measures to maintain the status quo along the border and avoid armed conflict.” Mao instructed that veteran party officials be evacuated in case a nuclear device was detonated in Beijing.160 On October 14, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice, requesting that party and state leaders in Beijing be evacuated before October 20.161 Zhou Enlai and Wang Dongxing implemented the evacuation plan 156. Liu, “China Has Faced Nuclear Threats Five Times.” 157. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 510–511.

158. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 761-765. 159. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 522.

160. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 765–767. 161. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 526.

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in full detail.162 On October 16, Mao and Lin Biao were evacuated to Suzhou and Wuhan, respectively.163 China clearly overreacted to the Soviet threat because the Sino-Soviet border negotiations were held as scheduled on October 20 following the agreement reached by Zhou and Kosygin in Beijing. On October 15, Lin Biao chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to analyze the current international situation and Soviet strategies. It was concluded at the meeting that according to intelligence sources, some senior Soviet officials proposed destroying China’s nuclear facilities before China’s nuclear weapons could threaten the Soviet Union.164 It should be noted that the intelligence was indeed accurate. The same day, Kissinger met with the Soviet ambassador in the United States and told him that America would not remain neutral if a conflict developed.165 With the approval of Mao, the Political Bureau decided to make immediate military preparations for war, and the Central Military Office was given responsibility for deploying troops. It was then that the Order No. 1 Incident occurred. There are two different accounts of how this took place. According to Wu Faxian, on October 17, Lin Biao dictated Six Orders to Prepare for a Sudden Soviet Attack following the assessment by Mao and the CPC Central Committee that Soviet troops might invade China. Ye Qun called Wang Dongxing (alternate member of the Political Bureau and director of the general office of the CPC Central Committee) and had him report immediately to Mao. Meanwhile, Ye Qun told Huang Yongsheng and the Central Military Office, “The �Six Orders� have been reported to Chairman Mao by Dongxing. Any instructions issued by Chairman Mao are to be followed.” Later, Wang Dongxing called Ye Qun and told her that Mao expressed no disagreement with Lin Biao’s “Six Orders.”166 Mao had done the same with Peng Zhen’s February Outlines in 1966: he would say nothing even though he disagreed at that time. On October 18, Lin Biao issued his Order to Make Thorough Military Preparations for a Sudden Soviet Attack (referred to as “Order No. 1”; it was compiled by Yan Zhongchuan, deputy chief of the general staff) to the head of the Central Military Office and chief of the General Staff, Huang Yongsheng. With this order, the army was on call to respond to emergencies and enter fortifications or it was to evacuate 162. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 765–767. 163. Ibid. 164. Lin Biao seldom chaired meetings of the Political Bureau except when authorized to do so by Mao. Usually, Zhou Enlai chaired such meetings and reported to Mao and Lin Biao.

165. Liu, “China Has Faced Nuclear Threats Five Times.” 166. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 765–767.

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many large and medium-sized cities and hold air defense exercises. The military evacuation involved more than 940,000 people, over 4,000 planes, and more than 600 naval vessels.167 According to Wang Dongxing, Mao was very displeased that Lin Biao had not reported to him by telephone until the second day after the order was issued, which had been done without Mao’s approval. Mao even wanted to burn the record of the telephone call, but he was dissuaded from doing so by Wang Dongxing. Zhou Enlai knew what had happened that evening.168 Lin Biao’s “Order No. 1” clearly violated the rule within the army that only Mao, chairman of the Central Military Committee, or one authorized by him, could issue orders to deploy troops. As close comrades-in-arms, Mao and Lin Biao were suspicious of each other as to who had the right to issue orders to the army; they could not communicate face-to-face nor could they solve problems by democratic centralism within the party. Viewing Lin’s issuing an order first and reporting about it afterward as a challenge to his ultimate authority, Mao was extremely angry to the extent of wanting to burn the telephone record. However, Lin Biao cancelled “Order No. 1” when he learned of Mao’s reaction.169 Surprised at this power struggle between Mao and Lin, Zhou Enlai, the third party leader, was unable to do anything to resolve the conflict between them. However, repelling the attack by the Soviet social imperialists took priority, and Mao had no time to cope with the actions of Lin Biao. Lin’s “Order No. 1” would be denounced by the CPC Central Committee in December 1971 as “a prelude to usurping party and state powers.”170 This was divorced from the international situation and showed that Mao would not tolerate any challenge to his power by anyone. As the old saying goes, to accompany the emperor is to be in the company of a tiger: no party leaders were able to work with Mao all the time because they were 167. Liu, “China Has Faced Nuclear Threats Five Times.” 168. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 14–16.

169. Lin Biao and Huang Yongxing repealed the order after learning about this from Wang Dongxing. (Ibid, 16.)

170. On December 11, 1971, the CPC Central Committee issued a document entitled

“Struggle against the Lin Biao and Chen Boda Anti-Party Clique” (one of several

documents) prepared by the Central Special Case Group. The document pointed out that Lin Biao issued the so-called Vice-Chairman Lin’s Order No. 1 on October 18, 1969, when Chairman Mao was not in Beijing. Lin did this without reporting to Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee, which was actually a prelude to usurping power of the party and state.

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either persecuted (Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, and Tao Zhu) or marginalized (Zhu De, Chen Yun, and Li Fuchun.) Mao was constantly “finding” political enemies among the members of the Standing Committee of the 9th Political Bureau, and this time he found them in Lin Biao and Chen Boda. On the same day, the CPC Central Committee decided to evacuate leaders of the Central Committee from Beijing: Zhu De, Dong Biwu, and Ye Jianye were sent to Guangdong; Chen Yun and Wang Zhen went to Jiangxi; Nie Rongzhen and Chen Yi were sent to Hebei. Mao ordered Wang Dongxi to establish lines of communication between Chen Yun and Wang Zhen since they would be needed if war did indeed break out. At the same time, Liu Shaoqi was evacuated to Kaifeng in Henan Province, Deng Xiaoping to Nanchang in Jiangxi Province, and Tao Zhu to Hefei in Anhui Province.171 Zhou Enlai told the revolutionary committee in Jiangxi Province that Chairman Mao had said at the 9th National Congress that the issue with Deng Xiaoping was different from that of other individuals and that Deng had been sent to Nanchang to temper himself through manual labor. On October 21, Deng wrote to Wang Dongxing, so that he could inform Mao that Deng would respect all the political judgments and punishment of the party and that he would work as an ordinary party member and socialist citizen.172 In Jiangxi Province, Deng still believed that he would work for the party in the near future and that he could continue working for the party for another decade. However, Liu Shaoqi was persecuted, and that led to his death on November 12 in Kaifeng, Henan Province. It was also on November 12 that Tao Zhu died of illness in Hefei. Of the three members of the 8th Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, only Deng remained alive. Meanwhile, Jiang Qing, who was almost elected as member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau at the 9th National Congress, was incriminating everyone in the party, beginning with Mao’s successor. Jiang took the initiative in challenging Lin Biao—an act that was opposed by most members of the Political Bureau. At a meeting of that bureau, Jiang proposed that Lin be criticized for his speech at the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th National Congress: she claimed that Lin had not given due emphasis to class struggle and that he had dishonored the Cultural Revolution. Jiang said to Huang Yongsheng, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo that Lin Biao should be condemned for his speech: it was one that Lin had delivered without adequate preparation; it had not been discussed at the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution group and had not received Chairman Mao’s approval. Lin heard Huang Yongsheng’s report and said, “Just let 171. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 121–122. 172. Ibid, 124–127.

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her criticize me. But keep a close watch on her to find out what she is up to.” Jiang and Yao Wenyuan proposed criticizing Lin Biao’s speech by using Chernyshevsky’s article at a meeting of the Political Bureau; however, except for Kang Sheng, most members of the Political Bureau disagreed with this. After having learned what Jiang had done, Lin said, “Jiang Qing can do whatever she wants in the Political Bureau, and no one can stop her.” Zhou Enlai thought that Jiang Qing had acted improperly, and he said at a meeting of the Political Bureau, “Comrade Jiang Qing, please gain a little knowledge of democratic centralism and the principle of collective leadership! This notice about criticizing Lin Biao’s speech can’t be issued since most people disagree with it: only you three or four people [Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Yao Wenyuan] agree with it. You would be creating a split in the party if you insisted on carrying this out when most members disagree with it.” As a result of Zhou’s direct intervention, Jiang relinquished her intention to criticize Lin’s speech;173 this indicated that Zhou supported Lin by adhering to the principle of the minority being subordinate to the majority and that he aimed to suppress the Jiang Qing clique in its struggle with the Lin Biao clique. Thereafter, power and political struggles took place between Mao and Lin Biao regarding whether to elect a state president and whether to continue Mao’s personality cult.174 In early March 1970, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao with an abstract of the draft amendment to the Constitution attached. In the letter, Zhou discussed the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and asked Mao whether an article related to the state presidency should be added to the new Constitution as it had been added to the old one.175 This meant that the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was proposing that the presidential system be retained, but Mao had the final say in this matter. On March 7, when talking with Wang Dongxing (alternate member of the 173. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 749–751. 174. On December 11, 1971, the CPC Central Committee issued a document titled Struggle against the Lin Biao and Chen Boda Anti-Party Clique (one of several documents) prepared by the Central Special Case Group. The document stated that the counter-revolutionary

clique headed by Lin Biao and Chen Boda viewed the 4th National People’s Congress as a meeting of “power redistribution.” The clique plotted to take advantage of amendments to the Constitution and the 4th National People’s Congress to fulfill its

ambition of usurping ultimate power over the party and state. The clique’s counter-

revolutionary political plan was to create the position of state president and they aimed to place Lin Biao in this position so as to gain complete power.

175. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 19.

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Political Bureau and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee,) Mao said that there was no mention of the state president in the new Constitution and that he no longer wished that office to exist. Mao asked Wang to convey his instructions to Beijing immediately.176 On March 8, Mao issued instructions to Zhou Enlai through Wang Dongxing. According to Wu Faxian, Wang conveyed the following message: “The Political Bureau should consider restoring government departments and preparing for the 4th National People’s Congress as follows: (1) summarize the experience since the Cultural Revolution at the NPC; (2) establish and restore the government at all levels; (3) explore issues related to developing the national economy and making preparations for war.”177 This indicated that Mao hoped to end the Cultural Revolution by means of full-scale civil war where everything in the country would be subject to attack. If that did not take place, he clearly understood that his supreme command alone was insufficient for ruling such a large country and that party reorganization was required at all levels if China was to remain intact. Instead of radically overthrowing everything and starting afresh, Mao aimed to undertake more conservative measures: he aimed to rebuild the party’s institutions at all levels by consolidating the CPC’s organization, as evidenced by developments at the 9th National Congress. After that congress, Mao hoped to reconstruct the government at all levels, as became clear at the 4th National People’s Congress. On the domestic front, Mao intended to develop China’s economy, and internationally he aimed to defend the nation against Soviet aggression; he endeavored to turn from revolution to construction by following a policy of great order instead of great disorder. According to Wu Faxian, Wang Dongxing passed on Mao’s instructions regarding electing a state president. Mao said, “I don’t think we need a state president. If everybody [members of the Political Bureau] thinks we need to have this position, who will occupy it? I will not take that position. Only Lin Biao could.”178 Mao himself, rather than Lin or his clique, was proposing that Lin be elected state president. Kang Sheng and Wang Dongxing proposed that Lin take up the position in accordance with Mao’s instructions. On the evening of March 8, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau. It faithfully followed Mao’s instructions and established several groups to make preparations for the state presidency.179 As a basic state system, the presidential system was established by Mao to act 176. Ibid.. 177. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 775. 178. Ibid. 179. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1565.

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as a buffer between the State Council and the standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) for the safety of the country since three authorities would rarely be wrong at the same time.180 The First Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1954 stipulated that a presidential system be established in the country. As authorized by the Constitution, the state president was to exercise power on behalf of the country domestically and perform functions as head of state on behalf of the country and the standing committee of the NPC.181 The presidential system 180. In early March 1954, Mao modified the Introduction to the First Draft of the Constitution and referred especially to the issue of creating the position of state president. He wrote, “The state presidential system of the People’s Republic of China provided in the draft

is totally different from that of capitalist countries and the presidential system in

China’s history. The president of the People’s Republic of China is a symbol of unity of the people, not a legislative or administrative head with special personal power. The president can make proposals to the National People’s Congress, executive committee

of the National People’s Congress, and the State Council or Supreme State Conference to make his contributions to our country owing to his position and authority.” As to why

China should have a state president, Mao gave the following explanation: “We created the position of state president for the country’s security. With a chairman, premier, and

president, the country can be safer since the three individuals are unlikely to function improperly at the same time. If the National People’s Congress is ineffective, we can

do nothing but wait another four years. The state president acts as a buffer between the

State Council and the National People’s Congress. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 324.)

181. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, approved at the First Plenary Session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in September 1954, stipulated that the

state president of China perform the following functions: command the national armed forces as chairman of the National Defense Committee; hold and chair the supreme state conference to discuss national issues; promulgate laws and appoint and dismiss the premier of the State Council and ministers of each ministry following the decisions

of the NPC; and perform functions as head of state internationally with the Standing

Committee of the NPC. (People’s Daily, September 21, 1954.) In September 1954, Liu Shaoqi stated in the Report on the Constitution Draft that the president of China and the NPC Standing Committee elected by the NPC should jointly perform the functions of head of state in light of China’s current situation and the experience of having

established organs of state power since the founding of People’s Republic of China.

The head of state is a collective head of state. Meanwhile, neither the president of China nor the NPC Standing Committee can exceed the authority of the NPC. (“Liu Shaoqi’s

Report on the Draft Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” People’s Daily,

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

plays an important role in modern state systems and represented an innovation in China’s own state system. Sixteen years later, however, Mao was opposed to electing a state president because of his own personal reasons: that was a refutation of the previously established system and violated the basic principles of the Constitution. Why did Mao refuse to establish the state presidency? First, the Cultural Revolution itself destroyed systems of state. During the Cultural Revolution, most state systems, particularly the state presidency, failed to perform properly. Second, Mao resigned as state president in 1959 and proposed that Liu Shaoqi occupy that position; that would allow Mao to fall back to the second level of work, study theoretical issues, and concentrate on being chairman of the CPC Central Committee. After discovering that power had fallen into the hands of others, Mao used the Cultural Revolution to dismiss Liu. However, serving as president at the age of 77 would damage Mao’s political credibility. Third, in view of what had happened when Liu occupied the presidency, Mao did not want anyone else to share power with him. In addition, he did not want there to be two heads, which happened in around 1964, when Mao was chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Liu was president.182 Politically, Mao held ultimate power; he did not tolerate power sharing or being checked, and he was particularly sensitive about the power of the state president. Mao Zedong Thought that nobody would oppose his proposal for eliminating the presidency. He did not offer any reasons to persuade the other leaders in the Political Bureau to back his proposal. However, he had never thought that Lin Biao, his close comrade-in-arms and designated successor, would take the lead by opposing his proposal by claiming that the state president should be properly elected and that the Political Bureau would unanimously agree with Lin. Through his agent Ye Qun, Lin Biao told Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian in Beijing on March 9 that Vice Chairman Lin agreed with establishing the position of state president.183 Zhou Enlai continuously chaired meetings of the Political Bureau. On the evening of March 13, that bureau decided to set up a preparation group for the September 15, 1954.) 182. On November 25, 1964, a report by Chen Zhengren (minister of the Agricultural

Machines Department) to the Central Committee of CPC was a typical example. The report stated, “We should firmly carry out instructions of the CPC Central Committee,

Chairman Mao, and Vice Chairman Liu.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 267–269.)

183. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 21.

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4th National People’s Congress, which would be responsible for the number and election of delegates to the NPC.184 The constitutional amendment group was responsible for bringing changes to the Constitution,185 and it examined the issue of establishing the position of state president. According to Qiu Huizuo, the premier repeated Lin Biao’s opinion at a meeting of the Political Bureau, and all the members, including Jiang Qing, agreed to establish the position and let Chairman Mao serve as state president.186 On March 14, Zhou Enlai gave Mao and Lin Biao the Report on Convening the 4th National People’s Congress and other Issues,187 which related to preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress. In the afternoon of that day, Mao signaled his agreement with the Central Committee’s arrangements.188 Authorized by Mao, the various groups set to work. Kang Sheng set up a secretariat under Lin Xin in the constitutional amendment group. In the middle of March, Zhou Enlai chaired meetings of the Political Bureau. They approved the reports Decisions on the Number and Election of Delegates to the 4th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China and Request for Instructions regarding Constitutional Amendments. These were passed on to Mao for approval. On March 17, the Political Bureau sent the report Request for Instructions regarding Constitutional Amendments to Mao and offered proposals concerning guidelines for constitutional amendments. After accepting the proposals, Mao requested each department for amendment suggestions,189 and he expressed his disagreement with respect to establishing the state presidency,190 though he provided no reasons for this. From March 17 to 20, the CPC Central Committee held meetings to discuss convening the Fourth NPC as well as constitutional amendments. Lin Biao asked his secretary to convey the following to Mao’s secretary: “Vice Chairman Lin has proposed that Chairman Mao become state president.” Mao replied with an irrelevant sentence, “Send my regards to comrade Lin Biao!”191 It is evident that 184. The preparation group for the 4th NPC consisted of Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, Huang Yongsheng, Xie Fuzhi, and Wang Dongxing, with Zhou Enlai as head.

185. The constitutional amendment group consisted of Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Zhang Chunqiao, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Ji Dengkui, with Kang Sheng as head.

186. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 676. 187. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1967. 188. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 80.

189. Ibid, 85. 190. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1565. 191. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

the two men were playing political games and challenging each other instead of communicating face-to-face to exchange their views about important issues. This was the first time for them to disagree openly over an important issue since the Cultural Revolution.192 However, instead of resolving the dispute by means of a democratic decision-making process within the party, they regarded their conflict as a kind of class struggle, and it rapidly escalated. On April 3, Mao checked a draft for a commemorative article on Lenin’s 100th birthday, which had been written by the editorial departments of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag, and once again he deleted Lin Biao’s eulogy on him.193 Zhou Enlai passed Mao’s remarks to the Political Bureau. Lin was initially revolutionary Group, 21. 192. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1566. 193. On April 3, 1970, Mao checked the draft for a commemorative article on Lenin’s 100th birthday written by the editorial departments of the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red

Flag. He remarked, “I deleted some paragraphs of things about me and what I said that were useless and irritating. I have said many times before that articles should not use those particular paragraphs, but no one listens. Please make note of what I have

done.” The sections he deleted included the following: “The greatest contemporary Marxist and Leninist and our great leader, Chairman Mao, said, ‘Leninism developed

Marxism.’” “Mao Zedong has combined the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with practice in revolution. He has continued, defended, and developed MarxismLeninism, and he has improved Marxism-Leninism in creating a new period—the

period of Mao Zedong Thought. He has done so in leading China to victory in the new democratic revolution, leading China’s socialist construction and socialist revolution, and engaging in struggle with imperialists, modern revisionists, and reactionaries of

other countries in the contemporary international communist movement over the past half century.” “Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism at a time when imperialism is to collapse completely and socialism is to succeed in the world.” “Mao Zedong

is a contemporary Lenin.” “It is because of the socialist victory and the imperialist collapse that the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism is fiercer than

at any other time. At the beginning of Khrushchev’s revisionism, our great leader,

Chairman Mao realized the serious harm it was having on the proletarian revolution.

Chairman Mao worked with the Party of Labour of Albania, led by Enver Hoxha, a real Marxist and Leninist, and other true Marxists and Leninists in the world to repulse

the countercurrent of revisionism again and again and defend Marxism and Leninism. This is of great historical value to the world proletarian revolution and the liberation

of oppressed nations.” “Mao Zedong also stated brilliantly that a country can prosper or fall apart because of one or two words: ‘The proletarian dictatorship of Marxism can

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silent,194 but he later gave a political response. On April 11, Lin offered Mao three suggestions by phone. First, Lin continued with his proposal that at the NPC, Mao should become state president: that would meet the expectations of people both within and outside the party, at home and abroad. Second, Lin did not think that the position of vice chairman was sufficiently significant for it to be continued. Third, Lin Biao did not think that he was appropriate as vice chairman.195 The phone record, in which Lin stated his reasons and views, was sent to the Political Bureau,196 and it did not indicate that he wanted to become state president. On April 12, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss Lin Biao’s proposal of electing Mao as state president. Most members, including Zhou Enlai, agreed to adopt Lin’s suggestion. Most members, again including Zhou, believed the position to be just a matter of form, because whether Mao was state president or not, his supreme authority was unquestionable and unshakable.197 They sent the results of their discussion to Mao.198 As indicated above, it should be noted that at this time, instead of attending Political Bureau sessions or exchanging views face-to-face, Mao and Lin Biao expressed their opinions through their representatives. Zhou Enlai chaired the make a country prosper and the world manage without armies, weapons, or wars; a

state of the entire people and a party of the entire people by Khrushchev can destroy a country.’” “Mao Zedong is referring to a socialist country here. The only thing a

proletarian dictatorship can lead to is socialism. Otherwise, there is no socialism.” “Mao Zedong summarized the positive and negative historical experience of the proletarian dictatorship and creatively used materialist dialectics to analyze the contradictions in socialist society, shed light on the law of socialist society, and establish the theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship. He launched and led the

proletarian Cultural Revolution and solved the two important contemporary problems

of consolidating the proletarian dictatorship and preventing capitalist restoration. This

is an epoch-making contribution to the world proletarian revolution.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594.)

194. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1566. 195. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 21–22.

196. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 361.

197. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1970. 198. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 361.

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

sessions to discuss their opinions and made a report about them on paper or other forms for Mao’s and Lin’s approval.199 After the 9th National Congress of the CPC, three members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng,) eight members of the Political Bureau (Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Xie Fuzhi, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo) and two alternate members (Li Desheng and Ji Dengkui) attended the daily working meetings.200 In all, 13 of 25 CPC Political Bureau members participated in the decision making. Usually Zhou Enlai chaired the meetings and reported to Mao and Lin, or Zhou, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng reported to them. This indicates that Mao and Lin were above the Political Bureau: they did not follow the rules and were not restricted by other people; they did not directly exchange their views and were highly suspicious of each other. This situation inevitably resulted in political differences between the two men over major issues and led to a political split. It also demonstrates that Zhou presided over the daily work of the Central Committee and had real power; Kang Sheng was next after Zhou. According to Wu Faxian, Kang always presided over daily work when Zhou was absent and thus he was called “Deputy Premier Kang.”201 On April 12, Mao gave his instructions regarding the Political Bureau’s report on Lin Biao’s suggestion: “I cannot accept the proposal of myself serving as state president.”202 Mao abandoned the system of state presidency because he did not wish to occupy that position, which was a reflection of his arbitrary attitude toward state systems as provided in the State Constitution. He never gave sufficient reasons for abolishing the state presidency nor did he reach a political consensus with other leaders through political consultations. At a meeting of the Political Bureau in late April, Mao cited a historical story to explain why he did not agree to establishing or occupying the position of state 199. According to Wu Faxian, after the 9th National Congress of the CPC, the brief meetings

of the Central Cultural Revolution Group were replaced by Political Bureau sessions, which were chaired by Zhou Enlai. Mao and Lin Biao did not attend the sessions.

Documents and problems proposed in those sessions or assignments given by Mao

were discussed in those sessions and signed by Zhou; these were then reported to Mao and Lin. Implementation took place after they gave their approval. (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 748.)

200. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 305.

201. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 824. 202. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 94.

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president. He said to Lin Biao, “Sun Quan once advised Cao Cao to become emperor, but Cao Cao said such a move would lead to his own end. You had better not regard me as Cao Cao and yourself as Sun Quan.”203 Deeply affected by traditional Chinese politics, Mao did not accept that the state presidency was part of the basic modern national system; he likened his relationship with other members of the Political Bureau to that between politicians in ancient China. The political inequality and betrayal of the principle of the minority being subordinate to the majority in important decisions would inevitably lead to conflicts between Lin and Mao. On May 17, Lin Biao had talks with Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo. Wu recalled that the position of state president was discussed with respect to Chairman Mao’s instructions. If the position became established, only Lin was qualified to hold it. However, Lin said, “Only Chairman Mao—not myself or anyone else—should be state president. It is inappropriate for a country with a population of 1 billion not to have a head of state. The vice chairman can be selected to visit other countries or pay return visits since it is inconvenient for Chairman Mao, who is getting older, to do so. I cannot continue as vice chairman either since I am not well enough to visit other countries often. Only Chairman Mao can be state president.”204 It should be said that Lin’s suggestion was sensible, and he held clear, consistent views about not continuing to serve as vice chairman. Lin did, though, understand Mao’s intention very soon. According to Qiu Huizuo, Mao did not agree with establishing the state presidency because he did not want Lin to serve in that position.205 Lin Biao’s accurate assessment reflected Mao’s paradoxical position with respect to his successor, his extreme sensitivity to sharing ultimate power, and his suspiciousness and capriciousness. Mao Zedong Thought afterward that Lin proposed establishing the position of state president as part of his political plan to follow in Liu Shaoqi’s footsteps.206 All the party, the army, and the nation believed 203. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 22.

204. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 777–778. 205. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 678. 206. In August to September, 1971, Mao said that Lin Biao wanted to create the position of

state president: “Someone is keen on being state president to seize power and split the

party.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 244–245.)



On December 11, 1971, the Central Committee issued the document titled Struggle

against the Lin Biao and Chen Boda Anti-Party Clique (one of several documents) prepared

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

that Mao always found political power excuses for purging his political enemies, including Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Mao was in conflict with Lin Biao over the continuation of his personality cult, which became mixed with their dispute about establishing the position of state president. Mao unquestionably believed himself to be the incarnation of correctness and to have the final say on what was right and what was wrong. It is of course clear that practice is the sole criterion for being right and wrong: whether Mao or Lin was right or wrong depended on the actual situation. In terms of his personality cult, Mao believed himself to be right or became right after correcting his errors and Lin was wrong and never corrected his own errors. With regard to establishing the position of state president, Mao was wrong and never corrected his errors; Lin was correct from the outset. The restoration of the state presidency in the Constitution of 1982 proved that Lin was right. However, Lin Biao had two political sides. On the one hand, he followed Mao step by step and supported Mao everywhere to avoid any conflict with him. On the other hand, Lin did not make any compromises on major issues as he became more powerful; this presented a challenge to Mao’s political authority regarding the successor paradox or successor trap. Owing to their forceful personalities, the conflicts between Mao and Lin took place with greater rapidity and intensity than the ones between Mao and Liu Shaoqi. On July 10, Zhou Enlai chaired a Political Bureau meeting to pass Mao’s instructions on amendments to the Constitution and establishing a central constitutional amendment committee, with Mao and Lin Biao as director and deputy director.207 At the meeting, the following schedule was planned: finish drafting the related documents for the 4th NPC by August 20; hold the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee from August 21 to 28; and hold the First Plenary Session of the 4th NPC from September 15 to 24.208 From July 17 to 22, Zhou Enlai chaired a plenary session of the central constitutional amendment committee to discuss issues related to constitutional amendments without Mao and Lin Biao being present. Mao rejected the proposal once again when in that session some Political Bureau members insisted on creating by the Central Special Case Group. The document pointed out that the Lin Biao and Chen Boda Anti-party Clique wanted to follow in the footsteps of Liu Shaoqi becoming state president instead of really wanting Chairman Mao to take that office, which revealed their ambition for usurping power over the party.

207. However, Mao and Lin Biao did not directly participate in the drafting. 208. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 378.

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the position of state president. Mao said, “The position is just a formality, and we do not create a job so as to accommodate a person.”209 At a group meeting on July 18, Zhou Enlai clearly proposed that the new Constitution had to give prominence to Mao as founder of the People’s Republic of China and the CPC as the core of China’s leadership; Mao was commander of the national armed forces and Lin was vice commander and the positions of president and vice president of China would not be established.210 Zhou’s proposal was accepted by the CPC Central Committee. On July 20, the Notice of Discussions on Constitutional Amendment Issued by the Central Committee pointed out that several principles had to be adhered to in the ongoing discussions about the constitutional amendment. It stated that the third principle was “Chairman Mao is the great leader of the Chinese people and a founder of the People’s Republic of China. The Communist Party of China Central Committee, led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin, is the core leadership in exercising national power. Mao is commander of the national armed forces and Vice Chairman Lin is the vice commander.” With his political experience and wisdom, Zhou Enlai tactfully resolved the political disagreement between Mao and Lin Biao by suggesting that Mao’s personal wishes be respected and maintaining Lin’s political status. However, Lin did not accept Zhou’s political solution as a compromise and still adhered to his own view: once again, this posed an open challenge to Mao’s authority, and it led to political conflict and turmoil. Furiously provoked, Mao said, “I have repeated six times that we are not going to create the position of state president, and I will not hold such a post. If I said one sentence each time, that would amount to 60,000 sentences.211 But they don’t listen to me, which means I have effectively said nothing.”212 Why approve a new Constitution? What was the difference between the new Constitution and that of 1954? The Notice of Discussions on the Constitutional Amendment by the CPC Central Committee quoted what Mao had said at the meeting 209. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 26–27.

210. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 380.

211. This referred to a remark by Lin Biao on January 24, 1966 whereby Chairman Mao’s words were at the highest level, the most authoritative, and most powerful. Every utterance of Mao was truth and equaled 10,000 sentences. (“Lin Biao’s Important

Instructions in a Report on the Army Political Work Conference,” People’s Daily, January 24, 1966.)

212. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 246.

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of the Constitution Drafting Committee on March 23, 1954, “The Constitution is for a transitional period and will be effective for about 15 years [to the year 1969].” The prediction of Chairman Mao was correct since the Constitution of 1954 had to be amended to meet the needs of the current situation: the proletarian dictatorship had undergone unprecedented consolidation, and great changes had occurred in China after the capitalist faction headed by the traitor, spy, and scab Liu Shaoqi was destroyed in the proletarian Cultural Revolution launched and led by Chairman Mao. The Constitution had to be amended in the form of a simplified, concise socialist Constitution, reflecting Mao Zedong Thought in the new era—one that would be easy to understand, remember, and apply. The purpose behind the 1954 Constitution had been accomplished, and the content could now be partially deleted or modified to fit the current situation; some articles needed to be simplified or streamlined.213 213. A notice by the CPC Central Committee proposed considering the following principles when making amendments to the Constitution: 1.

Mao’s development of Marxist theory about the state and his theory and practice

2.

China is a socialist country under a proletariat dictatorship led by the working

3.

of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship. class (the CPC) and based on a worker-peasant alliance.

Mao, the great leader of people of all ethnicities, is the founder of the People’s Republic of China. The CPC Central Committee led by Chairman Mao and Vice

Chairman Lin is the highest authority exercising power on behalf of the Chinese people. Mao is commander of the national armed forces and Vice-Chairman Lin 4.

is vice commander.

Combine principles and flexibility: “Principles basically include the democratic and socialist principles.” Democracy in China is led by the proletariat and the

CPC; democracy is implemented within the ranks of the people, and dictatorship 5.

is exercised over the reactionary class and counter-revolutionaries.

It is necessary to summarize our experience—mainly our revolutionary and

constructive experience—especially the experience created by the people and affirmed by Chairman Mao in the proletarian Cultural Revolution; for example,

the people’s communes and the government and community integration system, the four activities (free expression, free assembly, the holding of great debates, and

big posters,) revolutionary committees, which combined revolutionary cadres,

revolutionary masses, and local heads of the PLA, and the rule that all members in national state organs need to undergo collective labor. It is necessary to refer to positive aspects in the Constitutions of other countries.

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On July 20, with Mao’s approval, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice to encourage local party members to extensively discuss constitutional amendments and the list of candidates for delegates to the Fourth NPC. On July 27, Chen Boda and Zhang Chunqiao had an argument when discussing and modifying the editorial on August 1 in the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag. Chen proposed deleting “Chairman Mao and” in the original draft of “the People’s Liberation Army led and created by the great leader Chairman Mao and commanded directly by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.” But Zhang insisted that no modifications be made. Zhou Enlai, who chaired the meeting said, “We need turn to Chairman Mao for advice.”214 On July 28, Zhou Enlai made a formal report to Mao about the argument at the meeting of the Political Bureau.215 Zhang Chunqiao deleted the three adjectives “talented,” “creative,” and “comprehensive” before “Mao Zedong Thought,” but Chen Boda did not agree with this. Having participated in drafting documents and receiving foreign diplomats, Zhang knew that Mao had made the modifications. Zhang and Chen were scholars of party theory and loyal agents of Lin Biao and Mao. On the afternoon of August 13, Kang Sheng called and chaired a meeting of the constitutional amendment group to discuss the draft constitution. Wu Faxian and Zhang Chunqiao entered into a heated argument about what title should precede the words “Mao Zedong” in the draft.216 Wu insisted on creating the position of

“The CPC Central Committee’s Notice on Discussion about Constitutional

Amendments,” July 20, 1970.

214. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1568. 215. Ibid. 216. In the afternoon of August 13, 1970, the central constitutional amendment group held a meeting chaired by Kang Sheng to discuss the draft constitution. Wu Faxian and Zhang Chunqiao had a serious argument about the draft. There was one paragraph in

the preface of the draft: “The theoretical foundation guiding our thought is Marxism,

Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong Thought is the guideline for all national work.” Zhang Chunqiao said, “Since we have the first sentence, we can delete

the second. He also said, “It is inaccurate to say ‘talented and creatively developed Marxism and Leninism.’” Wu Faxian retorted immediately, “Talented, creative, and

comprehensively developed Marxism and Leninism is affirmed in the bulletin of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and (Lin Biao’s) Preface to the Second Edition of Quotations from Chairman Mao. Do you mean to deny both of them?” Wu also said, “We need to prevent someone from debasing Mao Zedong

Thought by using Chairman Mao’s modesty.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao

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state president, and Kang disagreed with this. Kang said, “Let’s keep our views and submit them to the Political Bureau.”217 Before the meeting, Ye Qun called Wu and said, “Lin Biao endorsed the views of yourself and Lin Zuopeng. You need to persuade them to set up that position. It is inappropriate for China to lack a head of state. Lin Biao said that the Constitutions of other countries had a president to serve as the head of state. Chairman Mao was president of China after its founding and was succeeded by Liu Shaoqi. Having that position vacant has raised doubts around the world.”218 Lin Biao stated again the political reasons for establishing the position of state president. Ye Qun called Chen Boda and Huang Yongsheng to ask them to prepare some relevant quotations about talent and the “Four Greats” (see below) to counter Zhang Chunqiao at the meeting of the Political Bureau.219 Aware of the dispute that was growing among senior party members, Mao became inflexible. A year later, when discussing the dispute with Hua Guofeng, the first secretary of the CPC Hunan provincial committee, Mao said, “They seemed to be against Zhang Chunqiao, but actually they were against me. I deleted the word ‘talented’ since I don’t think I am talented, and I am opposed to setting up the position of state president.”220 Both Mao and Lin Biao favored having a personality cult, and there was no essential difference in their positions, although they did disagree on how to bolster the personality cult and to what extent. Catering to Mao’s preferences, Lin made every effort to promote Mao’s personality cult to the extreme. Lin wrote the following in the communiqué approved at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966: “[Mao developed Marxism-Leninism] in a talented way, creatively and comprehensively.” Mao did not delete that section, although he modified the communiqué many times in the hope that Lin Biao would eliminate Liu Shaoqi. On August 31, 1966, Lin Biao used the term the “Four Greats” for the first time to describe Mao in his speech to revolutionary teachers and students in Beijing: Lin referred to Mao as the “great teacher, great leader, great commander, and great helmsman.”221 Mao did not express disagreement with this as he stood next to Lin inspecting the Red Guards. Thereafter, the Chinese people began worshiping Mao and regarded him in terms of the Four Greats for Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1569–1570.) 217. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 780–781. 218. Ibid, 780. 219. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1570. 220. Ibid, 1595. 221. “Lin Biao’s Speech at a Reception for Local Teachers and Students in Beijing,” People’s Daily, September 1, 1966.

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many years. Mao was fully aware that his personality cult could not be taken to the extreme and violate the general principles of Marxism-Leninism. On December 18, 1970, when Mao met John Snow, he said that the personality cult related to the Four Greats was excessive and should be cut back. Mao admitted that in the past, his personality cult was conducted to oppose Liu Shaoqi.222 Clearly, Mao’s initial promotion of his personality cult and later opposition to it was opportunistic and lacked theoretical consistency. By contrast, Lin Biao did have theoretical consistency in his support of the communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee. Both men were struggling for ultimate power.

Lushan Conference and Mao Zedong’s Resistance Three important preparatory meetings took place before the Lushan Conference: a meeting of the Political Bureau, a Plenary Session of the central constitutional amendment committee, and a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. At the three meetings, most leaders agreed to establish the position of state president, but Mao still had the final say in disagreeing to this, and that was the focus of debate at the Lushan Conference. On August 15, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the final draft of the constitutional amendments, which was approved with no disagreement from Zhang Chunqiao and others.223 The draft contained articles regarding the position of state president, which the Political Bureau decided to submit to the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Upon being informed about this situation, Lin Biao said to Wu Faxian, “Then just let it go as it is. Any problems will arise at the Lushan Conference.”224 On August 16, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the preparations for the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. The agenda for the meeting was set as follows: examine the constitutional amendment draft and approve the Report of the National Economic Plan and Report of Preparations for War of the Central Military Committee.225 On August 19, Wang Dongxing said to Cheng Shiqing (director of the revolutionary committee of Jiangxi Province,) “Having the position of state president has to be inserted in the Constitution. We must insist on electing 222. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1586–1587. 223. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1972. 224. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 780. 225. Ibid, 780.

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

Chairman Mao as state president and Vice Chairman Lin Biao as vice president. If we don’t set up these two positions, how can Chairman Mao be our state president, and what will Lin Biao do?”226 The next day, Cheng Shiqing informed Wu Faxian about this conversation. Wu Faxian was under investigation and forced to admit that it was not Wang Dongxing but Ye Qun who had made the above remarks after the Lin Biao Incident (on September 13.) Wu Faxian indicated this in his written confession.227 However, this statement by Wu led to a charge against Lin Biao of ambition in wishing to usurp power over the party and the state.228 On August 22, Kang Sheng stated at a meeting of the central constitutional amendment committee, “Everyone at this meeting, including those from the central government, the party, the army, and the 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions hopes that Chairman Mao will become state president and Lin Biao vice president.229 If they both refuse, we will be unable to establish these two positions. Chairman Mao is the one who makes the final decision, and we must abide by that, although the whole party and the whole nation hope that they take up these positions. Because of this situation, the CPC Central Committee has been in a dilemma for a long time.”230 That dilemma reflected a discrepancy between the central collective leadership and Mao himself. To solve this problem depended on Mao following the collective decision of the CPC Central Committee or vice versa. At 3 p.m. on August 22, Mao chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in his office (Building No. 1, Lulin)231 to discuss preparations for the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee and decide 226. Qiu Huizuo explained that Lin Biao’s position in the party was higher than that of

Zhou Enlai, and so it was inappropriate that Lin be elected as vice president. (Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 688.)

227. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 788. 228. On December 11, 1971, the Central Committee released Struggle of Shattering the Lin

and Chen Counter-revolutionary Group’s Coup (one of several materials) prepared by the Central Special Group for this case. It stated that Ye Qun said to Wu Faxian, “If there

is no state president, what will Lin Biao do?” This clearly showed that it was false that they wanted Chairman Mao to take the position, but it was correct that Lin Biao

wanted to follow Liu Shaoqi and take the position of state president: this revealed Lin’s ambition of usurping party power.

229. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1544–1545. 230. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1973–1974. 231. Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Bada, and Kang Sheng attended the meeting and

Wang Dongxing made a record of it. (Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-revolutionary Group, 32.)

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whether Zhou Enlai would give a political report on behalf of the Political Bureau to that plenary session.232 With regard to creating the position of state president, all members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau—except Mao— believed that a unified leadership of party chairman and state president was necessary to respect the will of the people. Zhou Enlai noted that a state president would be able to authorize other individuals to receive foreign envoys and take part in other foreign activities. Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Lin Biao declared that the position of president should be restored and that Mao should occupy that post. Mao expressed great disagreement with this and said, “The position of president is nominal. I proposed to make amendments to the Constitution because I don’t think there is any need to restore that position. If you wish to reinstate that position, go ahead; however, I will not occupy it.233 Under normal decision-making procedures, Mao had to accept the proposals of the four members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, though he himself voted against the above measure. It was at the August 22 meeting that Mao took the lead in acting against the prevailing opinion: he broke with the principle of the minority following the majority, and the result was irreconcilable political differences between Mao and Lin Biao within the Standing Committee. Mao had already anticipated of an inevitable political conflict between the two of them, and he warned the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee that the situation might end in divisions and failure.234 In the evening of August 22, Zhou Enlai chaired an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau for bureau members and conveners from each region of the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda conveyed the view of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau on the agenda of the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee.235 232. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 168. 233. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1571. 234. On December 11, 1971, the Central Committee released Struggle of Shattering the Lin

and Chen Counter-revolutionary Group’s Coup (one of several documents) edited by the

Central Special Case Group and commented on this meeting. On August 22, the day before the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee, Chairman Mao

gave important instructions to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and provided guidelines for that: the meeting was to be a united, successful one, rather

than a divisive, failed meeting. Lin Biao and Chen Boda proposed to establish the state presidency and let Mao assume that position at the meeting, but they came under severe censure by Mao.

235. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-

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The Bitter Struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

When Zhou asked Wang Dongxing to comment on that view, Wang said, “I attended the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and would like to add something to what the chairman said. The chairman said that after the 9th National Congress of the CPC, some people did some dirty deeds, and that had an effect on Premier Zhou and Chen Boda.236 Those deeds should be made known at the plenary session, and that will be for the good of the party. Premier Zhou advised Lin Biao to deliver a speech when Chairman Mao asked one of them to talk about the situation. Chairman Mao said that the speech could cover broader topics.”237 Later that same day, Chen Boda went to Lin Biao’s residence with the hope that Lin would give a speech at the plenary session. Chen said, “China has been in a state of anarchy as a result of ceaseless action since the 9th National Congress of the CPC, and that could destroy the country. Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Yao Wenyuan were the instigators of that situation. We can do nothing to Jiang Qing, but we can fight Zhang Chunqiao.” Lin Biao did not offer his opinion on Chen Boda’s proposal, but he said, “If I am going to give a speech, I need to report to Chairman Mao about it before the meeting.”238 From August 23 to September 6, the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee was held in Lushan. However, instead of leading to unity and victory, the conference resulted in political divisions owing to the bitter political struggle taking place in China. Thus, the conference fell short of Mao’s expectations. On August 23, Mao chaired the opening session of the plenary session. Zhou Enlai announced the three items on the plenary session agenda as follows: discuss the constitutional amendment; discuss the Fourth Five-Year Plan; and discuss the preparations for war. After Zhou’s speech, Mao turned to the other three members and asked, “Who is next?” Lin Biao then delivered his speech, which lasted over an hour.239 Lin Biao said in his speech, “The draft of the constitutional amendment gives prominence to the leadership of Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. It affirms that the chairman is our great leader, the head of state, and supreme commander and also that Mao Zedong Thought is the guideline for everything that takes place in China. It is significant that this be enshrined in the form of an article in the revolutionary Group, 35–36. 236. This was a reference to Jiang Qing, who talked with some members of the Political Bureau on May 17, 1970.

237. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 690. 238. Ibid, 691. 239. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1572.

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Constitution, and I consider this the most important of all 30 articles...All people except extremists and counter-revolutionaries at home and abroad have to admit his leadership...I still hold the view that Chairman Mao is a genius240...Chairman Mao used his talent, knowledge, and experience to advance new theories, which cannot be found in the works of Marx and Lenin since no answers to new problems can be offered in advance.”241 Ye Qun explained after the meeting that Lin often declared Chairman Mao to be a genius with considerable revolutionary experience and greater knowledge than Marx or Lenin. Lin would always hold Chairman Mao as a true genius.242 After Lin Biao’s speech at the meeting, Kang Sheng made the Report on the Constitutional Amendment. He expressed his complete agreement with the content of Lin’s speech and stated that everyone should consent to Chairman Mao and Lin Biao serving as president and vice president. Kang added, “If Chairman Mao does not wish to become president, Vice Chairman Lin should assume that post... We will follow Chairman Mao’s direction.”243 Kang’s report supported the main content of Lin’s speech and was in agreement with Lin.244 However, Mao flew into a rage, and after Kang’s speech Mao declared that the meeting was over. Mao’s secretary, Zhang Yufeng, recalled that Lin wished to say something although he had not been scheduled to give a speech. Mao was very unhappy with the situation after the meeting was over.245 According to Wu Faxian, deputy secretary general of the meeting, it was Mao’s sudden announcement of Lin giving a speech that astonished everyone at the meeting: Ye Qun had clearly announced that Lin would 240. On September 18, 1966, at a reception for heads of the Military College, Lin Biao said, “Chairman Mao is much wiser than Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. A genius like Chairman Mao appears once every hundreds of years in the world and every thousands

of years in China. Mao is the greatest genius in the world.” This was typical of Lin’s theory of genius. The “we” here referred not only to Lin himself, but also to resolutions approved officially by the CPC Central Committee, among which the most important

was Bulletin of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, which was

amended and modified by Mao and approved on August 22, 1966. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 94–96.) 241. Qiu, Memoir of Qiu Huizuo, vol. 2, 693. 242. Ibid.

243. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1573. 244. Ibid. 245. Ibid, 1572.

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not give a speech at that meeting.246 In any event, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Lin was fully able to deliver a speech at that meeting and express an opinion that differed from Mao’s: that was allowed by the party Constitution and was in keeping with the CPC’s organizational principles. Of course, Mao was also able to express his discontent, which was the result of his being at odds with the prevailing opinion. As a result of his own personality traits, Mao found himself caught in a trap with the question of choosing his successor. On the evening of August 23, Zhou Enlai chaired an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau. Wu Faxian proposed that each group should study and discuss the important speech that Vice Chairman Lin made at the opening session, and requested that a recording of the speech be played back.247 Chen Xilian, Wang Dongxing, Xu Shiyou, Zeng Siyu, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo agreed with this proposal. Zhou stated, “This is good advice. Let us do as you suggest, and I will report on this to Chairman Mao.” Zhou proposed that the recording be played the next morning (August 24) and that Lin’s speech be discussed again on the 25th;248 that was approved by the Political Bureau.249 Thus, the original agenda of the meeting was changed to allow a discussion of Lin’s speech to be the opening item.250 That caused Mao’s displeasure and led him to have misgivings about the intentions of Lin and his supporters. On the morning of August 24, everyone at the meeting, which was chaired by Wang Dongxing and had Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng as participants, except Mao and Lin Biao, listened to the recording of Lin’s speech. Zhou asked Wang to report to Mao about publishing Lin’s speech. Mao said, “If they [the members of the Political Bureau] all agree to publication, just go ahead with it. I have no objection.” Mao required Lin Biao to reappraise the speech again before publication.251 On the afternoon of August 24, Zhou affirmed Lin’s speech at a meeting of the Northeast Discussion Group and proposed that everyone be prepared to correct mistakes in a self-effacing manner once they became aware of such errors and to be good students of Chairman Mao.252 Fully aware of the provisions regarding the state president’s power that would 246. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 791. 247. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1573. 248. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 794. 249. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1573. 250. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 794. 251. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 40.

252. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1976–1977.

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be stipulated in the Constitution, Mao strongly opposed creating this position. Mao had reasons to suspect that Lin Biao wanted to become president, and Mao directed remarks specifically at Lin. From August to September 1971, Mao made a tour of the southern part of the country and said, “Someone [referring to Lin Biao] claimed that he wished me to become state president, but he actually wanted to become president himself.”253 However, that was just Mao’s suspicion, and it reflected his sensitivity to political power and being in exclusive possession of supreme power. Earlier, he had aimed such remarks at Liu Shaoqi, and he was doing the same with Lin now. This was a typical political trap of Mao’s for his successor. On August 24, Wu Faxian said to the Southwest Discussion Group, “In discussions about constitutional amendments, someone [referring to Zhang Chuanqiao] claimed that the remark about Chairman Mao having creatively developed Marxism and Leninism was meant ironically. I was furious when I heard this since such a claim would have contradicted the communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman Lin’s preface to the second edition.”254 Chen Boda said to the Northern Discussion Group that he strongly supported Lin Biao’s speech and that the Constitution affirming Mao’s position as state president was the result of a struggle.255 Chen then quoted three 253. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 246.

254. Wu Faxian said, “Different people have different ideas about how to regard the role

of Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought in the Constitution. Someone proposed

that the Constitution should not include the reference to Chairman Mao and Mao

Zedong Thought and the CPC Central Committee being led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin. And in the discussion about constitutional amendment, someone said that Chairman Mao having talentedly, creatively, and comprehensively continued, defended, and developed Marxist and Leninism ‘was meant ironically.’ I was furious

when I heard this. That phrasing was affirmed in the bulletin of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman Lin’s preface to the

second edition. If it was indeed meant ironically, the bulletin of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman Lin’s preface to the

second edition were all wrong! The Constitution does not cover this issue and is beyond our discussion; however, someone could use this to discredit Chairman Mao. It

is known the world over and been affirmed by the Chinese people that Chairman Mao

cleverly and creatively developed Marxist and Leninism.” (“Wu Faxian’s Speech to the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Second Plenary Session of 9th CPC Central Committee,” August 24, 1970.)

255. Chen Boda said, “I totally support Vice Chairman Lin’s excellent, important, sincere

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paragraphs from Lin’s speech.256 Chen said, “Someone claimed that the remark that talented Chairman Mao creatively and comprehensively upheld and developed Marxism and Leninism was meant ironically. That person was actually making an ineffective attempt to take advantage of Chairman Mao’s greatness and modesty by playing down the role of the chairman and Mao Zedong Thought. With their growing understanding of Mao Zedong Thought, the great Chinese people were easily able to see through this ruse.”257 Ye Qun said to the Central Discussion Group that Lin Biao had declared at many meetings that Chairman Mao was a genius and that the chairman knew much more than Marx and Lenin. Li Zuopeng said to the Central Discussion Group that someone [referring to Zhang Chunqiao] even denied the historical fact that the PLA was created and led by Chairman Mao and commanded directly by Vice Chairman Lin. Qiu Huizuo also gave a similar speech to the Southwest Discussion Group. Chen Boda, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo held the same opinion and entered into a heated dispute with Zhang Chunqiao. The dispute within the party was not contrary to the party’s organizational principles, but it caused Mao to feel uneasy with the situation, especially since Chen was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the four members of the Central Military Office held the same opinion as Chen. Mao was sensitive to factionalism in the party and hated it. speech yesterday [August 23]. Vice Chairman Lin said it was very important that the Constitution affirmed Chairman Mao as the great leader, head of state, and supreme

commander as well as Mao Zedong Thought being the guideline for the whole nation.

These points were confirmed in the Constitution after many struggles.” (“Chen Boda’s Speech to the Northern Discussion Group at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee,” August 24, 1970.)

256. The three paragraphs of Vice Chairman Lin quoted by Chen Boda were as follows:

“The geniuses in the nineteenth century were Marx and Engels. The geniuses in

the twentieth century are Lenin and Mao. If we don’t concur with this, we are making

a huge mistake. Without this understanding, we cannot elect the greatest proletarian helmsman as our leader.



“A genius like Chairman Mao appears in the world once every hundreds of years

and in China once every thousands of years. Chairman Mao is the greatest genius in the world.



“Chairman Mao is the greatest Marxist and Leninist of our age. Mao cleverly,

creatively, and comprehensively continued, defended, and developed Marxism and Leninism and raised it to a new level.”

(Ibid.) 257. Ibid.

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After August 24, several alternate members and members of the CPC Central Committee signed a joint letter on behalf of the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to Mao and Lin Biao to announce their support for Chairman Mao as state president. Wang Dongxing also suggested placing an article related to the state presidency in the Constitution.258 Mao initially agreed with delegates to the meeting after they learned of Lin Biao’s speech; but why did Mao suddenly go against it?259 The direct cause was the important information given to Mao by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. On the morning of August 25, the secretariat of the meeting published the Second Bulletin of the Northern Discussion Group, which contained mainly speeches of Chen Boda and Wang Dongxing, and it once again suggested that the position of state president be stipulated in the Constitution. Qian Xuesen proposed that Chairman Mao taking the position of state president and Vice Chairman Lin that of vice president should be added to Article 2 of the Constitution.260 According 258. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 46–47.

259. Mao said afterward, “Going against the trend is a principle of Marxism and Leninism.

At Lushan, my position was one of going against the trend.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 137–142.)

260. Bulletin No. 2 of the Northern Discussion Group stated, “The speech of Vice Chairman Lin was of great importance at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Vice Chairman Lin plays a glorious role in learning Mao Zedong Thought.

He holds high the flag of Mao Zedong Thought and applies it very well. At each key point, his attitude to Mao Zedong Thought is proper and correct, and it reflects the

wishes of the Chinese people, the whole party, the whole army, and people around

the world. We are deeply impressed and inspired by his speech. We expressed our greatest anger when we learned that there was someone within the party who would

deny that Chairman Mao is the greatest genius of our time: we believe such people to be careerists, schemers, extreme counter-revolutionaries, and the real modern

revisionists after four years of the Cultural Revolution. Such people in the party would be Liu Shaoqi’s agents and capitalist roaders. This situation is very serious. Any such

individuals should be made public, expelled from the party, and criticized by the whole

nation. To fight against such counter-revolutionaries, Qian Xuesen [alternate member

of the Central Committee] proposed that Chairman Mao be elected state president and Vice Chairman Lin vice president and that this be stated in Article 2 of the Constitution. Wang Dongxing further proposed that the article relating to the state presidency be

reinstated in the Constitution, and he was supported by everyone at the meeting. All of

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to Wu Faxian, each group continued that discussion and the views of one side predominated at the meeting on the morning of August 25.261 At noon, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan went to report to Mao about the situation at the meeting. Mao did not meet Jiang Qing, but he did meet Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan.262 The Second Bulletin of the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee made Mao acutely aware that something unusual had happened at the meeting.263 Having heard the report from Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, Mao became more furious and decided to combat the factionalism of Chen Boda. In the afternoon, Mao asked Wang Dongxing to call the conveners of each group to hold an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau. Mao held separate talks with Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. Then, Mao announced to the whole meeting that he did not believe that the problems being discussed by various groups were on the meeting agenda after having spoken about this issue with several members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau a short time earlier. Mao also asked that no one propose creating the position of state president: he said that whoever supported such a proposal should become president since he himself would not. Then Mao said to Lin Biao, “I also don’t advise you to serve as president, either!” Mao continued, “If you insist on supporting the proposal, I will resign and let you [Chen Boda and Kang Sheng] go ahead. Or I will resign as chairman of the CPC Central Committee.”264 This situation was similar to that us believed that we could not let anyone take advantage of Chairman Mao’s modesty

to blemish Mao Zedong Thought or use the excuse of wishing to reduce the number of meetings Chairman Mao held with foreign visitors. In fact, Chairman Mao now

meets most foreign visitors even though he is not state president.” (“Bulletin No. 6 of the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee” [or “Bulletin No. 2 of the

Northern Discussion Group”,] August 24, 1970.) The bulletin was signed and issued by Li Xuefeng (alternate member of the Political Bureau, director of the revolutionary

committee of Hebei Province,) Wu De (director of the revolutionary committee of Beijing) and Xie Xuegong (director of the revolutionary committee of Tianjian.) 261. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 800. 262. According to Wu Faxian, on August 25, Wang Dongxing told him on the phone that

Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan went to Chairman Mao without

announcing their visit in advance. Chairman Mao did not meet Jiang Qing and said to her, “You leave.” After Jiang left, Mao met Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan in

private. They declared loudly to Mao, “Now each group is checking—even the East Discussion Group—and they want to check on the background details.” (Ibid.) 263. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1573. 264. Ibid, 1576.

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of February 19, 1967, when Mao decided to fight against the February Countercurrent Forces and went to the Jianggang Mountains with Lin. It should be noted that Zhang Chuanqiao played an important role when Mao decided to attack Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Zhang gave Mao important first-hand information, and Mao trusted him considerably. Similarly, Zhang and Yao Wenyuan were important when Mao decided to fight against the February Counter-current Forces. Saying nothing at the trial in return for Mao’s trust in him, Zhang was extremely loyal and very supportive of Mao—even though he was thoroughly aware of the political struggle, in which he was deeply involved. Mao was in fact setting a trap for his successor. He thought that Lin Biao held such high prestige in the party that he would take control of the CPC Central Committee. Mao regarded anyone who went against his individual will as a challenger to his power, and he thought that the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau who completely disagreed with him as representing a huge confrontation. Mao said, “This person [Chen Boda] deliberately caused a disturbance. Lin Biao attacked in the daytime, and he attacked at night. Who knows what they are up to?”265 Mao viewed the arguments among party leaders as premeditated, planned, and organized: that was unprecedented in China’s history, and he could not tolerate it.266 In this situation, it was inevitable that Mao should overreact and turn to class struggle. On August 25, Lin Biao said to Wu Faxian after a meeting with Mao, “Chairman Mao was unhappy. He changed his opinion and criticized Chen Boda for causing a disturbance at the meeting. He also asked me not to discuss the issue of the state presidency and genius theory anymore. It’s no big deal. Don’t worry.”267 On the evening of August 25, Zhou Enlai chaired an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau and officially announced the decisions of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.268 At Mao’s suggestion, the group meeting was adjourned.269 The discussion about Lin Biao’s speech came to an end, the Second Bulletin of the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was revoked, and Chen Boda and Wu Faxian were ordered to criticize their own errors. The CPC Central Committee would issue a document on December 11, 1971 titled Foil the Counter-revolutionary 265. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 206. 266. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1575. 267. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 801–802. 268. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 49.

269. Zhou Enlai conveyed Mao’s instruction: “Let’s stop this meeting and get some fresh air.” (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 802.)

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Coup of the Lin and Chen Anti-Party Group prepared by the Central Special Case Group. This document declared that Lin’s political activities at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee constituted five monstrous lies.270 There had in fact, though, been no attacks on Chairman Mao or attempts to usurp his power: Lin and other individuals were simply expressing their differing views at the meeting, which was a normal procedure, allowed and protected by the party Constitution. Under Mao’s instructions, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau was adjourned for two days—from August 26 to 27. The political atmosphere became increasingly tense in Lushan. Wu Faxian and other individuals noticed that Mao was holding meetings with members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and conveners of each group instead of with members of the Political Bureau, which was a very unusual procedure.271 On August 26, after a meeting with Mao at his residence, Lin Biao asked Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo not to address the issue of creating the position of state president any longer. This was because Chairman Mao had said, “We have created the position of director of the Standing Committee of the NPC but not of president. I will never serve as president, and I don’t advise you to do so either.” Under this pressure from Mao, Lin had to change his opinion about

270. On December 11, 1971, the Central Committee transmitted The Struggle in Shattering the Lin and Chen Counter-revolutionary Group’s Coup edited by the Central Special Case

Group, which stated that Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huisheng had made many lies at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. There were five major lies. (1) They started rumors

that someone was opposed to Chairman Mao becoming the state president. (2) They began rumors that someone did not believe that Chairman Mao should be called a

genius and that the term “genius” had been meant ironically, and they wanted to

reverse the verdict of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee. (3) They started rumors that the new Constitution was a result of their long-term

struggle and that “Mao Zedong Thought Is the Guideline for All Works in China”

should be written into the new Constitution because of their long-term struggle. (4)

They initiated rumors that someone had taken advantage of Chairman Mao’s modesty in debasing Mao Zedong Thought, which was a despicable lie. (5) They began rumors that someone had repudiated the Cultural Revolution, and they wanted to reverse the

historical verdict about it. They were attacking Chairman Mao and wished to usurp party power, overturn the proletarian dictatorship, and restore capitalism. 271. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 802.

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establishing the state presidency.272 By then, however, it was too late. On August 27, Chen Boda told Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo that Chairman Mao had criticized him for being smug about his learning, advocating the genius theory, making trouble with the Northern Discussion Group, and forming a military faction.273 Mao claimed that those individuals were engaged in factionalism and creating divisions within the party; Mao had blamed Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng for such actions at the Lushan Conference in 1959. It never occurred to Chen that he was to blame, although he had criticized Peng Dehuai and other individuals in 1959, and he was fully aware of the political meaning of Mao’s censure.274 In accordance with Mao’s instructions, Chen admitted his mistakes to Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, who criticized him for being a traitor, betraying the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Chunqiao. They said he had thrown his lot in with the Central Military Office, was cheating Vice Chairman Lin, and colluding with the army to kill them. Wu Faxian and other individuals came to realize that such denunciations could also happen to them soon.275 On August 28, Zhou Enlai asked Wu Faxian to carefully consider his actions and take responsibility for the vice chairman, whose speech (referring to Lin Biao’s speech on August 23) had given rise to problems. Zhou said that the vice chairman has to be protected and would otherwise come under attack.276 Zhou was clearly concerned that the problems at the meeting would threaten Lin, whom Zhou wished to protect. However, Zhou found himself in a dilemma here, and so he had to ask Wu to assume prime responsibility. Zhou had made every effort to prevent divisions within the party even though Mao’s adherence to the focus on class struggle would definitely create another split, and this was independent of Zhou’s will. On August 29, Lin Biao chaired an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau. Zhou Enlai said that Chen Boda and Wu Faxian had delivered incorrect speeches: these had caused the discussion of constitutional amendments to proceed in the wrong direction at the group meeting and Chairman Mao was obliged to reverse 272. Ibid, 804. 273. Ibid, 802–803. 274. Chen Boda wrote an article criticizing Peng Dehuai in accordance with Mao’s instruction in 1959, “The World Outlook of the Capitalist and the Proletariat” (Red Flag, Volume 22, 1959.) Mao made modifications to this article. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 546–547.)

275. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 802–803. 276. Ibid, 805.

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the direction. Chen Boda and Wu Faxian underwent self-criticism at the meeting.277 Mao decided to fight back and attack Chen Boda, which fundamentally changed the nature of normal political arguments among top party leaders. On August 31, Mao issued an article entitled “My Advice,”278 in which he severely criticized Chen for his sudden attack and for creating a disturbance. He also said, “I simply described what a gifted theorist was like [regarding his conscience but not ambition]. But I don’t think that Chen can really be successful.” Mao claimed that Chen knew nothing about Marxism even though he pretended to be a Marxist and Leninist. Since he had the final say, Mao sentenced Chen to the political death penalty. It was difficult for Mao to know how to deal with Lin Biao since it was Mao himself who had designated Lin as his successor. However, Mao used tactics to politically separate Lin from the Chen Boda group and align Lin Biao with Mao. In his article “My Advice,” Mao said, “I discussed the situation with Lin Biao and we both came to an agreement.”279 Since Lin was his designated successor in the Constitution, Mao decided to protect Lin and criticize Chen,280 and he made efforts to fool the public and dispel Lin’s doubts, though Lin was aware of Mao’s intentions. Lin Liguo said that Mao was wielding his power capriciously and Lin Biao shared the same view. The “My Advice” article was the fourth article for Mao to write during the Cultural Revolution. It was only 700 Chinese characters long, and it attacked Chen Boda, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Mao showed the article to Lin ahead of publication.281 On the evening of August 29, Lin chaired an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau to criticize Chen Boda in accordance with Mao’s instructions.282 That was similar to what had happened in 1966, when 277. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1979. 278. Mao’s remark led to Quotations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Chairman Mao about Genius and

Instructions to Vice Chairman Lin, collected and sorted by Chen Boda during the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee in 1970. The title was subsequently added by Mao. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol.

13, 114.) On November 16 of the same year, the Central Committee issued instructions to convey Chen Boda’s anti-party problems and approved Mao’s modification.

279. Ibid. 280. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 207. 281. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 52.

282. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 813

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Mao let Liu Shaoqi chair an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau to criticize Peng Zhen and other individuals. Lin should have predicted that he would become the next Liu. Why did Mao write the “My Advice” article? On September 3, Zhou Enlai explained the situation at a group meeting, as follows. It took Chairman Mao three days to write the article. Chen Boda had not been cooperative with the other leaders in the Central Committee, and Chen’s problems would be revealed sooner or later.283 Later in November 1971, Mao explained himself as follows: “I did not have any title at that time and I put aside some problems, including the major issue of creating the position of state presidency. That faction does not want me but Lin Biao to be president. However, other people [referring to Wang Dongxing and other individuals] are different from Lin Biao and really want me to be state president.”284 This indicates that Mao had always suspected that Lin wanted to become state president even though Lin had declared repeatedly that he did not wish to be president or vice president. Mao always worried and suspected that, despite having supreme authority, others—especially his successor—would usurp his power. Therefore, Mao used his power as chairman in dealing with the matter of his successor, and he was able to catch others in political traps, which caused great harm. Mao made Chen Boda the first object of attack. Mao said, “I have worked with Chen Boda, the gifted theorist, for more than 30 years. But we have never cooperated on any major problems and never worked in close cooperation.” Those remarks were clearly historically inaccurate, and they caused Chen the greatest distress. Chen Boda was the nominal head, though he was actually in second position within the Jiang Qing clique (the Central Cultural Revolution Group,) and he had long served as Mao’s agent and writer. As Mao’s political secretary for a considerable period, Chen was the party’s best theorist according to Zhou Enlai— the best at interpreting and clarifying Mao Zedong Thought.285 As the first writer of the theory of the Cultural Revolution, he touched up Mao’s important articles and instructions during this period; Chen participated in drafting important documents of the CPC Central Committee and made a great contribution to Mao’s theories of class struggle and continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship. Back in 283. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1981. 284. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1544–1545. 285. On October 18, 1966, Zhou Enlai said, when he met with staff and students of Beijing

College, “Chen Boda is the best theorist of our party, led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.” Zhou stated that Chen was the best at expressing and clarifying Mao Zedong Thought.

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May 1966, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau had appointed Chen head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. At the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, Chen had been promoted from being an alternate member of the Political Bureau to a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; in the process, he rose from ranking in the 20s in importance at the 8th CPC National Congress to being fifth and a key member of the central leadership. In April 1969, Chen had been elected member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and ranked fourth in the party. Mao bestowed the above rewards for Chen Boda’s political achievements during the Cultural Revolution. Because Chen did not get along with Zhang Chuanqiao, Chen turned to Lin Biao. However, there is no evidence Chen betrayed or opposed Mao. Mao became furious and disparaged Chen Boda. Mao said that Chen was a timid person who always needed to rely on a political strongman. Mao suspected that Chen had betrayed him and then turned to Lin Biao.286 This indicates that Chen was morally corrupt and that the political struggle within the party was so fierce that a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau had to find political backing to survive. Regarding Chen as some kind of overseer, Mao decided to sacrifice Chen as a warning to Lin: this was in line with his strategies of divide and rule and beating the dog to warn its master. Chen Boda was a contributor to Mao’s theories about class struggle and continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship, and he was likewise an important exponent of these theories. But Chen also became a political victim of the Cultural Revolution hardliners and was viewed as “China’s Trotsky.”287 Before Chen became a contributor to Mao’s theories, Wang Li, deputy head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and major members of that group, such as Guan Feng and Qi Benyu, who Mao had put into important positions, assumed this function. 286. On September 19, 1971, Mao said to Wu De and other persons, “Chen Boda is like a

mouse on a boat. See, my boat is going to sink [meaning that Mao was aging], but he cannot wait to board that other boat [meaning Lin Biao]. (Wu, “The Lushan Meeting

and the Lin Biao Event”; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1983, Beijing:

CCCPC Party Literature Publishing House, 1998.)

287. Meisner said that the Lushan meeting was a symbol of Chen Boda’s collapse. For a long

time, he was Mao’s private secretary and was appreciated by him. Chen was a brilliant theorist of Maoism. During the Cultural Revolution, Chen was elevated to the power center of the party and became one of the five members of the Standing Committee— together with Mao, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Kang Sheng. Now, Chen had become a

victim of various movements by extreme leftists and he had become “China’s Trotsky.” (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 354.)

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They understood Mao’s class-struggle and line-struggle theories, and they played an important role in launching the Cultural Revolution. In the end, however, Mao had all of them purged. The history of the Cultural Revolution proved that Mao was acting like a modern Qin Shi Huang, who had the final say in everything; to accompany the emperor was like being in the company of a tiger under feudal autocracy.288 Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan were followers of Chen Boda, and they took his place and became Mao’s most appreciated and trusted writers and agents. They had already surpassed their master and reproved and criticized him relentlessly. On September 1, Mao delivered a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau with conveners from each group. Mao stated that whoever had given an incorrect speech at the Lushan Conference should undergo self-criticism. He asked Chen Boda to censure his own mistakes, and he also requested Lin Biao to hold a meeting for Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo so that they could conduct their own self-criticism, with Wang Dongxing also participating in this.289 On September 4, Mao talked with Lin Biao, but there are no records of their conversation. On September 5, Mao met with Lin at Chen Boda’s request. Mao said, “You have rarely come to see me in the past two years.” Chen admitted that he had seldom come to visit Mao in private except for formal meetings since it was not easy for Chen, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, to see Mao. Mao felt slighted that Chen had not visited him in private. Mao did in fact criticize Chen for being too arrogant to see Mao and asking other people to write Mao’s articles. At the end of their short conversation, Mao asked Chen to talk with other members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group who had worked with him. Mao ended their conversation with one word, “Unite,”290 though Chen did not understand the relevance of this at all. Who did Mao want Chen to unite with—Zhang Chunqiao or someone else? Chen never anticipated that Mao meant his word and would have Chen sent to prison and labeled a Kuomintang 288. Wu Faxian’s comment about Mao’s treatment of Chen Boda was: “Once they had disagreements, once they made ‘mistakes,’ he [Mao] said that they had not cooperated

for over 30 years. If that was the situation, how could Mao have kept Chen Boda around him and made him a member of the Standing Committee? How could they

have worked together? If there is disagreement, Mao denies everything. It was just the same with Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. It is really dangerous to be in the company of a king! How disappointing!” (Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 54.)

289. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 54.

290. Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 540–541.

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anti-communist, Trotskyite, traitor, spy, and revisionist.291 That was what Chen had to pay for having followed and applied Mao’s guidelines for the Cultural Revolution—as Chen realized in his later years.292 On the afternoon of September 5, Mao discussed the closing session of the meeting with Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng.293 In the evening of the same day, Lin Biao and Ye Qun visited Jiang Qing and offered her their apology. In the evening of September 6, Hu Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo went to Jiang Qing’s residence to apologize to her.294 On September 6, when submitting a bulletin draft for the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee to Mao, Zhou Enlai also wrote that the head and deputy head of various groups would call to learn Chairman Mao’s instructions. Those instructions included reinforcing unity, supporting the army, and encouraging the people to fight enemies, read books toward self-criticism, and abide by the principles of the party and the army. Mao wrote comments on that bulletin draft.295 The same day, Zhou declared an investigation of Chen Boda on behalf of the CPC Central Committee in the closing session. Zhou also proposed study of Chairman Mao’s “My Advice” toward uniting the CPC Central Committee, forgiving others but undergoing self-criticism, and never compromising or giving in on vital issues.296 On September 6, the Draft Constitutional Amendment of the People’s Republic of China was approved at the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. The preface stated that Chairman Mao, the great leader of people of all ethnicities, was the founder of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese people should uphold Mao Zedong Thought and advance under the leadership of the CPC 291. In July 1972, the Central Committee published the Central Special Case Group’s Examination Report on the Counter-Revolutionary Historical Crimes of the Kuomintang Anticommunist, Trotskyite, Traitor, Spy, and Revisionist Chen Boda.

292. Chen Boda looked back at his whole life and said in grief, “I have committed a big

crime. In the Cultural Revolution, I was so stupid and committed many crimes. The time of the Cultural Revolution was crazy, and I was a crazy person then. My life was a

tragedy, and I was a tragic figure. I hope people can learn from my life.” (Ye, Biography of Chen Boda, 1.)

293. Wang, Wang Dongxing’s Memoir — Mao Zedong’s Struggle with the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Group, 56.

294. Xi and Jin, A Short History of the Cultural Revolution, 212. 295. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 128.

296. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1982.

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Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin. Article 2 of the General Principles declared that Chairman Mao was the great leader of people of all ethnicities, the head of the proletarian dictatorship, and the supreme commander of the nation and the army. Vice Chairman Lin was Chairman Mao’s close comrade and successor, deputy commander of the nation and the army. Chapter 2 mentioned only the National People’s Congress and the State Council as national institutions. There were no references to the state presidency or other national systems. Article 26 in Chapter 3 related to citizens’ basic rights and obligations, and it stated that the most basic right and obligation of citizens was to support Chairman Mao and his close comrade, Vice Chairman Lin, support the leadership of the CPC, support the proletarian dictatorship and socialist system, and abide by the Constitution and laws of the People’s Republic of China. On September 12, the draft was published for discussion by the whole party and the whole nation, and the CPC Central Committee informed Mao that the position of state president would not be established.297 It is fair to say that The Draft Constitutional Amendment approved at the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee legitimized Lin Biao’s political status in the party and country. At the forthcoming 4th National People’s Congress, Lin’s political status would be constitutionally legitimized. It is clear that these provisions in the Draft Constitutional Amendment were political flaws of the state system in the 1970s. Lin had suffered his first setback in the CPC Central Committee when his proposal for creating the state presidency was rejected by Mao and the session approved Mao’s decision. Mao said in the closing session on September 12, “No one reads books about Marxism and Leninism. He [Chen Boda] boasted about the third edition [referring 297. The Central Committee issued a notice on September 12 to core groups of the party at

all levels and the Central Military Committee to mobilize people to discuss the Draft

of the Constitutional Amendment of the People’s Republic of China, and it stated that

this draft was a continuation and development of the 1954 Constitution. Mao proposed that the 4th NPC be held in March 1970 to make constitutional amendments, and he suggested not establishing the state presidency. The Political Bureau made preparations

for constitutional amendments in March, and it set up the Central Constitutional Amendment Committee on July 12. Mao chaired the committee. The Political Bureau

and the committee studied people’s opinions about the amendment to the 1954 Constitution and presented the Draft of Constitutional Amendment of the People’s

Republic of China. It was submitted to the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central

Committee for review on August 23; it was approved by the session on September 6. The whole nation was encouraged to discuss this draft.

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to the fact that Chen had quoted some sentences from Engels’s preface to the third German edition of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx when he compiled the Gifted Quotations]. But you will be cheated by the bad scholars if you haven’t read those books. Of course, there are some really good scholars [Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan].298 The party will not approve and the people will not be happy about neglecting unity. What kind of unity are we talking about? Of course, it’s the unity based on Marxism and Leninism—not unity without principles. The mountains will never disappear and the earth turns as usual. I will not take your advice even if you [Chen Boda] made the mountains disappear. Are you really acting on behalf of the people? It has been over ten years since I was president. And they [Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Ye Qun, Wu Faxian, and others] think that I must become state president to represent the people. Does that mean that I haven’t represented the people in the over ten years since I was president? Whoever wants to represent the people [as state president], just go ahead. I will not be president even if you make the mountains disappear. What can you do to me?”299 Mao seemed to be directing his criticism at Chen Boda, but it was actually aimed at Lin Biao. This was because Lin had directly suggested to Mao and the Political Bureau on April 11 that it would be contrary to the expectations of the people if Mao did not become state president. The close comrades-in-arms period between Mao and Lin had come to a sudden end, and a period of political confrontation began, in which they would become suspicious of each other’s motives and clandestinely competed against each other. Their strong personalities led them to fight each other instead of uniting, and that resulted in even greater failure. Lin was very familiar with Mao’s political measures in making a move to warn and restrain the other party. That was a tactic that Mao had employed in May 1966 at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau, when Mao appeared to be targeting Peng Zhen (member of the Political Bureau,) though he was actually attacking Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Lin Biao, who was chairing the closing session, finally said, “This meeting was held under Chairman Mao’s direction. Chairman Mao identified and tackled the problems at the meeting. Is this meeting one of unity or division? It has finally turned out to be a meeting of unity and success under Chairman Mao’s instructions.”300 Lin Biao could not speak sincerely at that time, but he had to maintain the appearance of political unity in front of the members and alternate 298. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 816. 299. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1581. 300. Ibid.

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members of the CPC Central Committee. On September 6, the meeting released a bulletin. The bulletin stated that the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee maintained that the entire party, army, and people had accomplished the missions proposed at the 9th National Congress. Great success had been achieved under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship and his belief in uniting for greater success since the 9th National Congress of the CPC and the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. The bulletin declared that people across the country sincerely hoped that the 4th NPC would be held in light of the favorable situation at home and abroad. The bulletin proposed that the Standing Committee of the NPC make the necessary preparations for the 4th NPC. Finally, the bulletin called upon the party to unite under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee, headed by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin, for greater success.301 It was ironic that Mao’s call for unity should mark the beginning of political divisions: this was not the first time for this to happen, nor would it be the last. Political divisions had been continuously provoked in the party during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao himself was the creator of everything. How did Mao evaluate the Lushan Conference? He said, “To act against the prevailing current is one of the principles of Marxism and Leninism. What I did at the Lushan Conference was to act against the prevailing current.”302 Later in August 1973, “acting against the prevailing current” (which was stated in the general principles of the party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC) was an important experience and principle of Mao in defeating Lin Biao. In theoretical terms, there is in fact no principle of acting against the prevailing current in Marxism and Leninism. Such a principle of acting against the prevailing current and the right to rebel was something that Mao simply labeled as being part of Marxism. Since the claim that acting against the prevailing current belonged to the principles of Marxism and Leninism was clearly untrue, this indicated that Mao had the final say as to the content of Marxism and Leninism. In practice, Mao did in fact act against the prevailing current at the Lushan Conference by firmly opposing establishing the state presidency since this went against the beliefs of the majority (the Political Bureau and CPC Central Committee.) When others — not only Lin Biao and Chen Boda — held different opinions, he believed that this amounted to attacking him, organizing and planning secret activities, and developing programs 301. “Bulletin of the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee,” September 6, 1970. People’s Daily, September 10, 1970.

302. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 137–142.

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for such matters as setting up the state presidency, advancing the genius theory, and breaching the guidelines of the 9th National Congress. He believed that the Lushan Conference also represented a struggle between two factions.303 Mao applied the principle of acting against the prevailing current to deliberately create a political struggle and turn his close comrade and political secretary into opponents. As the saying goes, planning never catches up with change. In addition, political change in China was unpredictable. The first session of the 4th National People’s Congress, which was scheduled to be held from September 15 to 24 after the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee,304 was postponed until January 1975 owing to the unexpected conflict between Lin Biao and Mao. As a result, the reconstruction of the state system during the Cultural Revolution was also postponed.

Criticizing Chen, the Rectification Movement, and Mao Zedong Turning Up the Pressure Why did Lin Biao panic and why in his conflict with Mao, which increased after the Lushan Conference, was Lin able to retain his political status in the party and also strengthen his status in the nation and the army? Why did the Lin Biao Incident occur? The political struggle between Mao and Lin was in fact very complex and dramatic. In the political contest between the men, which developed based on Mao’s class-struggle and line-struggle theories, Mao dominated; Zhou Enlai assisted Mao, and Lin Biao was passively attacked. The situation bore some similarities to what had happened from July to late August in 1966, when Liu Shaoqi gave himself up to Mao and made a self-criticism; however, Liu was still labeled a big traitor, scab, and spy. Lin, though, was not prepared to give in, and he went ahead at all costs; eventually, he found himself labeled as a big careerist and schemer. Mao gained a personal political victory, but the party became divided and suffered a loss in its political reputation. After the Lushan Conference, Mao said, “The Issues at the Lushan Conference haven’t yet been settled.” In August 1971, Mao said that the struggle between him and Lin Biao “concerns line and principle issues, and he will never yield on matters of principle.”305 Therefore, after the Lushan Conference, Mao attacked the Lin clique 303. Ibid, 244–245. 304. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 378.

305. On August 27, 1971, Mao said to the head of Hubei Province, Liu Feng, “I will not

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and steadily advanced. Mao decided to weaken Lin’s power within the party by means of political action and reorganization.306 Mao issued instructions in the form of relevant reports at least 16 times so that the Lin clique became aware of its errors. Zhou Enlai, who firmly sided with Mao and followed his instructions, played an important role in eliminating five members of the Central Military Office, who had been referred to as the five commanders by Mao.307 Not entirely trusting Zhou, Mao asked Kang Sheng and Li Desheng (alternate member of the Political Bureau and member of the Central Military Office, respectively) to act as his agents. On September 9, Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng talked with Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo to investigate the problems of the Lushan Conference. Wu said, “I made mistakes at the Lushan Conference, and I underwent self-criticism three times. But we haven’t engaged in any non-organizational activities.”308 On September 12, Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng again held discussions with Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo. Zhou said, “We have reported the last conversation with Chairman Mao. He criticized members of the Central Military Office for engaging in factional activities and attempting to rule the nation.” Zhou asked them to explain their activities before, during, and after the Lushan Conference. Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo argued with Kang Sheng over this. Zhou finally said, “You are now members of the Political Bureau. Chairman Mao wants to protect you: you should learn a lesson and be careful about unity and cooperation in the future.”309 In the middle of September, with the approval of Mao, the CPC Central Committee established the Chen Boda Special Case Inspection Group, headed by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Li Desheng. On September 22, Zhou criticized Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo and asked them to undertake a written self-criticism. They were instructed to tell the truth and make a complete break with Chen, which would be good for both themselves and the party.310 Mao relinquish or give in on major principle issues.” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 245; Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 246.)

306. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 246–247.

307. Ibid, 244. 308. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 824–825. 309. Ibid, 825–826. 310. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1984.

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and Zhou did not ask Ye Qun to make a written self-criticism at that time. On the eve of National Day, Mao had a conversation with Lin Biao after he returned to Beijing. Later, Lin met with Wu Faxian and said, “I did not agree that you should have to make a self-criticism at the Lushan Conference. But now I think you need to go to Chairman Mao to criticize yourself and concentrate on your argument with Zhang Chunqiao.” Wu immediately called Mao. Mao’s secretary said, “Chairman Mao is too busy to meet with you before National Day. He may talk with you later.” Wu felt snubbed and was refused each time he asked to talk with Mao on three occasions. Lin said, “There is then no way out.”311 Wu was correct when he thought that perhaps Chairman Mao had decided to have Lin thrown out of the party. Back in April 1967, Liu Shaoqi had been met with refusal when he asked to meet Mao. From December 1975 to January 1976, Deng Xiaoping was also refused many times when he made the same request. In the middle of August 1971, Mao said when touring the south of the country, “They [Lin Biao, Wu Faxian and others] did not come to meet me, but I asked to meet with them after the Lushan Conference. Some of their requests can be carried out; others cannot. It all depends on the manner in which the requests are made.”312 On October 14, Mao made comments in ten areas in Wu Faxian’s written selfcriticism. He questioned Wu on why he lacked the spirit of being honest as a member of the CPC. Mao said that it was unprecedented in the party for several people to launch an attack and defraud more than 200 members of the CPC Central Committee. Mao labeled Chen Boda a suspect who was revealed at a meeting of the Political Bureau, and it provided a warning to some individuals (Lin Biao.) In his self-criticism, Wu wrote that he discovered in the draft for Chen Boda’s speech on August 27, 1970 that rumors suggested that there was a struggle in the CPC Central Committee. Mao commented that that was correct. There was a bitter political struggle within the Central Committee. Struggle was a normal part of life.313 This showed that Mao hoped for party unity, but he would make his political judgment and wage political conflicts in accordance with his philosophy of struggle. It would therefore be impossible to resolve political conflicts within the party or achieve party unity and harmony. It was inevitable that the party would become divisive, and all sides would have to pay for this. This was the lose-lose political contest that took place between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, between Mao and Lin Biao, and between Mao and Deng Xiaoping. It would appear that Mao always 311. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 827–828. 312. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 245–246.

313. Ibid, 137–142.

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emerged the victor in these political struggles, but he had to pay a price for making too many enemies and persecuting many people. This philosophy of struggle ran through the Cultural Revolution, which admitted no compromises or ways back to its point of origin. Mao—both the biggest winner and biggest loser—always destroyed his own political reputation and paid dearly for it. On September 15, Mao made comments in twelve areas in Ye Qun’s written self-criticism. He criticized her for her love of being praised and hatred of being censured; he criticized her for paying attention to gossip and her inability to bear hardship. He also criticized her for being so happy about becoming a member of the Central Committee after the 9th National Congress of the CPC as to totally forget the political line of that congress.314 Mao criticized Ye Qun severely, which amounted to reprimanding Lin Biao. Lin thought that Mao was being too aggressive, but he did not voice his opinion. Clearly, Lin was the victim of an indirect attack. On the same day, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuolin, and Qiu Huizuo, and it said, “Mao’s two remarks are of great educational value to us.” Zhou intended to persuade them and reduce the tension. After the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee, Mao decided to use the Jiang Qing clique to check and balance the Lin Biao clique. Mao determined that he should pay particular emphasis on establishing a publicity front based on writing: that had been key to all his previous victories in political struggles within the party. On November 6, with Mao’s approval, the CPC Central Committee published the Decision on Establishing the Publicity Group of the CPC Central Committee. Led by Kang Sheng, the publicity group included Jiang Qing, Zhang Chuanqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, and Li Desheng; they were to administer the Organization Department and other institutions of the CPC Central Committee.315 Similar to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, this group of writers, which did not include Chen Boda, was aimed at Lin Biao, rather than Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and it fought the Central Military Office (armed forces) 314. Ibid, 143–144. 315. This “Decision” pointed out the following. (1) For the unified management of organizational publications, the CPC Central Committee has decided to establish a Central Publishing Group under the direction of the Political Bureau. (2) The Central

Publishing Group has one head—Kang Sheng—and several members, including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chuanqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, and Li Desheng. (3) The Central Publishing Group governs works in the Central Organizational Department, the

Central Party School, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, the Xinhua head office, the Central Broadcasting Bureau, the Guangming Daily, the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, and other areas designated by the Central Committee.

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under the control of Lin by means of two political agents. On November 13, after having received foreign visitors, Mao said to Huang Yongsheng, “You were the first to attack at the Lushan Conference, and your group almost dominated. I want Xie Fuzhi and Ji Dengkui to join your group to bring about a change to the situation.”316 This reflected Mao’s worry that the Lin Biao clique might expropriate military power for itself because Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo had served in the First Red Army and Fourth Field Army. Mao decided to alienate them and retake power. On November 16, with the approval of Mao,317 the CPC Central Committee issued Instructions on Chen Boda’s Anti-Party Problems and Mao’s “My Advice”, and it launched the Criticizing Chen and Rectification Movement within the party.318 The instructions stated that Chen was a suspect with a complex background. The Central Committee was investigating him and appealed to party members who knew about him and his problems to accuse him. Among Mao’s three political secretaries—Chen Boda, Hu Qiaomu, and Tian Jiaying—only Chen had been powerful and influential during the Cultural Revolution. Now it was Chen’s turn to suffer. On December 16, Mao made remarks on the 38th Army’s report, which accused Chen Boda of anti-party crimes as follows: why had the Beijing Military Committee allowed Chen to have such a strong voice? Chen did not have a position in the Beijing Military Region; the CPC Central Committee had not entrusted him to 316. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 803. 317. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 153.

318. The Central Committee’s “Instructions on Chen Boda’s Anti-party Problems” (drafted

by Zhou Enlai) was prepared according to Mao’s instructions. It stated that at the Second Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee, Chen launched a sudden attack and started

rumors so as to cheat comrades, and he conducted activities to usurp party power.

Chairman Mao realized everything and immediately wrote “My Advice” to break Chen’s anti-party plot and ensure that the session proceeded in the right direction. To

educate other party members and allow them to understand this situation, the Central Committee decided to publish “My Advice.” The instructions stated that this was to be

conveyed to local core group members and members of the party’s standing committee and members of the Central Special Case Group. The instructions also noted that Chen

had complex historical problems and that he was a suspect. The Central Committee

was investigating him and appealed to people who knew about him and his problems to reveal the details. (“The Central Committee’s Instructions on Chen Boda’s Antiparty Problems,” November 16, 1970.)

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handle any military and administrative problems. So why had Chen become so powerful in the Beijing Military Region and North China?319 This had come about because Li Xuefeng and Deng Weishan had accompanied Chen when he inspected Baoding in Hebei Province. When Chen subsequently found himself in trouble, Wang Meng, political commissar of the 38th Army, reported to the Central Military Committee that Chen intended to establish his authority in his inspection. Mao, not Chen, was the real person in control, as evidenced by Mao’s questioning Chen. On December 18, Mao met with John Snow. When Snow asked how the party was faring, Mao replied, “Not very well at present. The party is dogged with misfortunes and mishaps.”320 Mao did not explain why the party that had ruled China for 21 years was beset with problems or whether internal or external factors had led to this situation. Mao said, “My personality cult is receiving too much support, and that has resulted in formalism.321 A few years ago, the personality cult was necessary, but it needs to be scaled back since things are different now.” This demonstrates that Mao clearly understood that the personality cult was not in keeping with Marxism, but he considered it necessary or unnecessary at different times. In fact, this, of course, was blatant opportunism. Fully aware of the political role of the personality cult, which had two aspects and was capable of leading to alienation, Mao adopted different strategies at different times. The personality cult was clearly a political tool for Mao in his struggle with Liu Shaoqi, and this time the anti-personality cult was Mao’s device against Lin Biao. John Snow asked Mao, “Sometimes I wonder if people who are very keen on personality cults are sincere in their intentions.” Mao replied, “There are three kinds of people: the first kind are sincere; the second kind always does as others do; and the third kind are false. Do not trust them!”322 Mao was clearly referring to Lin having promoted the personality cult. Mao knew Lin very well and

319. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594.

320. Mao said, “Our party is dogged with misfortunes and mishaps.” Snow asked how the

party was currently doing. Mao said, “Not very well.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 176.)

321. Mao explained, “For example, there are the “Four Greats”: Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Supreme Commander, and Great Helmsman. That’s annoying. One day, there will be only one left—Great Teacher.”

322. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 174.

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was suspicious of Lin’s political motives;323 he certainly regarded Lin as the third category of person. The CPC Central Committee published a summary of Mao’s conversation with Snow on May 31, 1971, and requested that it be distributed to grass-roots party branches and given to all party members. Zhou Enlai later admitted that Lin had particularly hated this conversation.324 On December 19, Mao made remarks about the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and asked that it play an important role in checking unhealthy trends in the army and banning the practice of arrogance and complacency; these had resulted from meritorious military service in times of war and new achievements during the Cultural Revolution.325 This was the first time for Mao to criticize the army and rebuke Lin Biao for his arrogance. In accordance with Mao’s instructions, the Political Bureau decided to hold a meeting of the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee; this was to include officials above regimental level in the Beijing Military Region and in each department of the Central Military Committee. Zhou Enlai, Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui, Huang Yongsheng, and Li Zuopeng formed a guidance group at the meeting, which lasted from December 22, 1970 to January 24, 1971. Mao asked Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to participate in the meeting and to report directly to him. The meeting appeared to criticize Chen Boda, but it was actually directed at Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan.326 On January 14, 1971, Zhou Enlai gave Mao and Lin Biao a report about extending the rebuking of individuals at the meeting of the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.327 He said, “Without clear direction, more people would 323. In July 1966, Mao wrote to Jiang Qing, “Some of his [Lin Biao’s] suggestions make me uneasy. I don’t believe that some of my little books can have had such a big effect. Now, all the nation and the party have become crazy because of his boasts. He pushed

me, and now I have to disagree with him. It’s the first time for me to lie about major

problems...So, I was pushed by him to do this. I think he aims to use me, the guard,

to make his attack. I have been the party’s guard since the 1960s.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 71–72.) 324. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 2004.

325. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 188.

326. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 832. 327. The North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee meeting was held from December

22, 1970 to January 24, 1971 in Beijing. A total of 449 leaders, including ones from the Beijing Military Region, the military regions of each province in North China, the

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agree to eliminate them,328 which would affect more individuals, lead to more serious conflicts, and weaken unity. Therefore, we [the Political Bureau] should take into consideration the two aspects of Zheng Weishan and the Beijing Military Region and achieve unity after serious criticism. Otherwise, we would not be being practical and realistic.”329 Mao commented on three places of the outline of Zhou’s speech at the meeting of the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.330 Since Jiang Qing delivered two speeches at the meeting that arbitrarily rebuked others by name, Mao requested that Zhou not publish Jiang’s speeches, but just retain them as internal reference material.331 This indicated that Mao was politically restricting Jiang Qing and also protecting her. On January 8, Mao forwarded a report on learning and implementing his instructions to the army. He said that it was necessary to act cautiously with the political department of the Jinan Military Region. This was because that military region always did a good job in challenging leaders’ theories in a way that was correct and wise. That military region capitalized on its achievements, which was just what Mao wanted. Mao remarked that the document was very good since it clarified problems from the perspective of both theory and practice. He asked Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng to read the report to determine whether it could be distributed to the whole army. Mao said, “It has been a long time since the army and local organizations undertook a rectification movement, and now is the time to conduct self-education.”332 The CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Committee immediately did as Mao had said. On January 11, after Mao’s review and approval, the CPC Central Committee, Beijing Garrison, the Tianjin Garrison, and relevant units in North China. After January 9, 1971, 143 people attending the Central Military Brief Meeting also participated in this meeting. The North Bureau meeting presented and criticized Chen Boda’s anti-party

crimes. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594.)

328. This refers to Li Xuefeng (alternate member of the Political Bureau, first political commissar in the Beijing Military Region, and director of revolutionary committee in

Hebei Province) and Zheng Weishan (member of the Central Committee, commander of the Beijing Military Region, and first secretary of the party committee of that military region.)

329. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1986. 330. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 203.

331. Ibid. 332. Ibid, 200.

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the Central Military Committee, and its General Political Department issued a notice to criticize some officials for their arrogance, warlord tendencies, conceits, lies, and domestic and international bigotry; this had impeded the implementation of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line.333 It was clear that Mao’s intention to criticize Lin Biao, Huang Yongsheng, and the others was being undertaken covertly. The notice requested that army, local, and central committees begin a movement for self-education, opposing arrogance, and promoting modesty in accordance with Chairman Mao’s instructions (his remarks on January 8.) Mao just wanted Lin Biao and army leaders to educate themselves; what Mao was doing was rather like slowly killing a frog in gradually heated water. However, Lin had to take risks as Mao continued pressing forward. On January 24, the Central Committee issued an outline of the speech Zhou Enlai delivered at the North Bureau Meeting on behalf of the Central Committee. The speech covered the following matters: (1) systematically expose and criticize Chen Boda; (2) announce the Central Committee’s decision to reorganize the Beijing Military Region and elect Li Desheng as commander of that region, Xie Fuzhi as first political commissar and first secretary of the party committee of that region, and Ji Dengkui as second political commissar; (3) announce the appointment of leaders in the party, government, and army of Hebei Province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; and (4) request that the party committees above division level in the Beijing Military Region and core group of revolutionary committees of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in the North China region launch a planned Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement in the party according to arrangements of the Central Committee so as to eradicate the influence of Chen Boda. Mao described the decision to reorganize the Beijing Military Region as undermining solidarity.334 Mao was very unhappy that Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo did not criticize Chen nor make self-criticism at the North Bureau meeting. He thought that the meeting did not achieve his purposes.335 On January 26, the CPC Central Committee issued a document titled Chen Boda’s Anti-party Crimes. The document consisted of four parts: (1) Chen’s reactionary history; (2) Chen following Wang Ming and Liu Shaoqi in opposing Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line; (3) Chen defying Chairman Mao’s great strategic deployment and destroying the Cultural Revolution to usurp party 333. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 202.

334. Ibid, 247. 335. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1986.

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power; and (4) Chen following Wang Ming and Liu Shaoqi and assembling traitors to form an independent faction. These four parts were typical of documents for persecuting party members, and Chen had been very good at writing those. As head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Chen had prepared similar documents to persecute Liu Shaoqi and others. However, he never thought that it might someday become his turn and that Mao would persecute him. That was the high price he paid for contributing to Mao’s continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship. On the same day, after the North Bureau meeting, Zhou Enlai received Mao’s instructions about not using the terms “most creative,” “peak,” and “the highest instruction” as conveyed by Tao Zhu at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution336 and in Tao Zhu’s report to the Central Committee.337 Mao commented that when Vice Chairman Lin was promoting and defending Mao Zedong Thought, he used those terms to prevent Liu Shaoqi from neglecting Mao Zedong Thought; Lin did so to encourage the Chinese people and party and to deflate Liu Shaoqi’s reactionary arrogance.338 Zhou clearly intended to explain Lin’s historical use of the terms. Although Zhou tried to maintain political unity between Mao and Lin and acted as a political buffer, Mao would not relinquish and he continued to steadily exert pressure on Lin. On February 19, Mao commented on Zhou Enlai’s report as follows: “Please inform everyone that the Criticizing Chen and Rectification Movement should focus primarily on criticizing Chen and secondly on rectification. Do not repeat what happened at the brief meeting of the Military Commission, which was held for a month without criticizing Chen. Also, do not do as they did at the beginning of the North Bureau meeting, when Li [Xuefeng] and Zheng [Weishan] chaired the meeting and they rebuked Chen only superficially.”339 On February 23, the CPC 336. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 85.

337. On July 29, 1966, Tao Zhu suggested the following in his report to Mao: in speech and

documents on behalf of the party and governmental institutions and in newspaper

editorials, titles and news items, such wording should not be used. Published documents should not contain this kind of wording for a period. On August 4, with

the approval of Mao, the Central Committee issued this report to provincial level army units. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao

Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 86.)

338. “Comments of Zhou Enlai on the Central Committee’s Document No. 66, 394,” January 26, 1971.

339. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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Central Committee issued Mao’s instructions on criticizing Chen and rectification. This indicated that Mao was admonishing the Central Military Office, but his attack was directly aimed at Lin Biao. On February 22, the Central Military Office was forced to write a self-critical report to Mao to admit that it had made a mistake.340 Mao censured them sharply for their passive attitude. He passed comment on four items in the report.341 On March 1, Mao’s comment on the Report on the Central Military Office Receiving Chairman Mao’s Instructions on the Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement342 Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 206–207. Li Xefeng

was the first political commissar of the Beijing Military Region and Zheng Weishan the

commander of that region. Together, they chaired the early stage of the North Bureau meeting. On January 24, 1971, they announced that they were being “transferred from their original positions and continued to learn and accept reviews.”

340. On February 20, 1970, the Central Military Office wrote a report to Mao, “On the

evening of February 29, Premier Zhou conveyed Chairman Mao’s instruction that ‘the emphasis in the Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement is to criticize

Chen; the secondary emphasis is rectification. Do not act as in the brief meeting of

the Military Committee, which went for a month without criticizing Chen.’ We held a meeting to discuss and study this instruction and agreed that the chairman’s instruction was completely correct and reflected his care for us. We firmly support and accept this sincerely...Owing to our inadequate understanding of the significance of criticizing Chen, at the brief meeting of the Central Military Committee, we did not

view criticizing Chen as the emphasis of the movement. That was a serious mistake.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 209.)

341. Ibid, 208–209. 342. On February 28, 1971, the Central Military Office submitted to Mao this report about the

meeting to convey and discuss Mao’s instruction that the focus of the Criticizing Chen

and Rectification Movement was to criticize Chen. The meeting on February 22 was attended by the heads of each head office, each military category, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, colleges and universities directly affiliated with

the Military Commission and the Beijing Garrison. The report stated that at the brief meeting of the Military Commission from January 9, it had not been understood that the focus was on criticizing Chen: “As a result, the meeting lasted a month without

criticizing Chen, which was a serious political mistake, a big loss for the army's political

and ideological construction, and a heavy lesson for us. Some members of our Central Military Office made mistakes in the direction and guidelines for the Second Plenary

Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. They should have educated themselves by

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was as follows: “It is very good that you took the initiative. Try to do well.”343 On March 15, Mao made an important comment on the article “Long Live the Victory of the Proletarian Dictatorship” as follows: “Some party members have not read books on Marxism and Leninism for years, and they have been cheated by some swindlers. As a result, many members do not properly understand materialism and idealism, and they made big mistakes at the Lushan Conference,344 which was a hard experience. So, we should now focus on promoting Marxism and Leninism.”345 Mao had labeled Chen Boda and Lin Biao as the political swindlers, and Lin had to react to this. On March 24, Mao commented on the written self-criticisms of Huang Yongsheng, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng as follows, “I think that they are well written.”346 But Mao gave a “political death sentence” to Chen Boda, claiming that Chen had betrayed him, was a Kuomintang anti-communist, and had been arrested in 1931. Chen became a traitor and a spy following Wang Ming and Liu Shaoqi after he had wormed his way into the party. This time, Chen was just a political scapegoat, but people naturally asked themselves why Mao had assigned Chen to a key post and was now denouncing him if Mao had known earlier that Chen was a spy? This reflected the typical way that politics operated during the Cultural Revolution, which could make any person a victim depending on Mao’s decision. Mao attacked Lin Biao, but Lin kept silent all the while. Lin gave no speeches, expressed no opinions and made no self-criticism. However, his son, Lin Liguo, reacted strongly and took drastic actions. In late March, Lin Liguo secretly developed a counter-revolutionary coup plan called “Summary of Project 571 in Shanghai”: “571” and “armed uprising” are homophones in Chinese. The summary declared that Mao was the greatest criticizing Chen at the meeting and clarifying their thoughts. But they did not do that,

which made them more passive and increased their errors...Those comrades rebuked

themselves at the meeting for their mistake and they stated that they had been cheated by the anti-communist Chen Boda and quoted his words. They said they would review

themselves seriously in the Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement.” (Ibid, 212–213.) 343. Ibid, 212. 344. This refers to the Quotations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Chairman Mao about Genius and Instructions of Vice Chairman Lin collected and sorted by Chen Boda during August and September 1970. (Ibid, 217.) 345. Ibid, 216. 346. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 12, 594.

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feudal tyrant in Chinese history and that a fierce line struggle was being waged to compete for supremacy in the current tense situation. Some people wanted to usurp Vice Chairman Lin’s power and Lin would be removed to a less powerful position if he was not the defense minister. The summary also claimed, “It should be remembered that the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee will be held in September and the Fourth NPC in October. A power struggle is inevitable.” Those involved made plans and developed strategies in the summary and decided to launch a coup at all costs.347 At the end of March, Lin Biao preliminarily identified the command system and division of labor in the coup. According to Wang Nianyi, it was still not known whether Lin Biao had contacted the Combined Fleet because no relevant documents provided authentic information about this. It is not clear whether Lin Biao and Ye Qun read the draft summary or not; the same applies to Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng. There is no evidence to suggest that the latter four people became actively involved in the coup. At the end of March, Mao suddenly called a meeting, and Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui, and Wang Dongxing attended it. Mao said, “First, I have read the written self-criticism of Huang Yongsheng, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng. They are very good. Second, Wu Faxian and Ye Qun have written their self-criticism many times, but they still need to continue working on them. Third, Wu Faxian asked to meet me many times in the past, and I refused. Today, we can meet. Fourth, Zhou Enlai will take all of you to Beidaihe to report to Lin Biao.” Mao said to Wu, “You need to write another self-criticism. I will stand by you.348 On the second day, Zhou Enlai, Huang Yongsheng and Li Desheng went to Beidaihe to report to Lin Biao about Mao’s instructions on criticizing Chen Boda and give him the news that the CPC Central Committee was going to hold a meeting to criticize Chen and rectify the party. When talking about Chen’s historical background and the serious mistakes he had made in the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai said that Chen committed a grave error when he once fought with Tao Zhu: this was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau attacking another member without reporting the matter to Chairman Mao. Lin Biao said that he totally supported Mao’s instructions and working arrangements after the Lushan Conference. Lin stated that he was happy about the self-criticism of Huang Yongsheng, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo and asked Wu Faxian and Ye Qun to write their self-criticism again. Lin said he had never thought that Chen had made 347. “The Central Committee’s Notice and Attachment on the Organization of Conveying

and Discussing The Struggle to Break the Lin and Chen Anti-party Coup,” January 13, 1971.

348. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 836–837.

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such serious mistakes and that it was a victory to discover Chen’s problems in time. Lin noted that he completely agreed that the CPC Central Committee should hold a meeting to criticize Chen.349 Lin Biao also admitted that he had been wrong in being blunt and that was something of which Chen had taken advantage. Lin offered an explanation for his speech (at the opening session of the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee,) saying, “I told Chairman Mao at the meeting that I shouldn’t have repeated what I said in private. What I said was not in the speech draft. It was wrong of me to have spoken like that because I hadn’t slept well during the Lushan Conference.”350 This was the first time for Lin Biao to have made a verbal oral self-criticism to Mao, and Zhou Enlai played an important role in this. Zhou succeeded in persuading Lin because he did not want Mao and Lin to continue in their conflict with each other. But Mao would never cease until Lin admitted his mistakes personally. On April 1, Zhou Enlai wrote Mao a report about his trip to Beidaihe,351 stating, “We said that we hoped Vice Chairman Lin would return to Beijing in spring. He was very happy to hear that and wanted us to give his regards to the members of the Political Bureau.”352 In fact, Zhou said this to persuade Mao to stop his conflict with Lin. But Mao became even angrier upon hearing his report. Li Desheng said afterward that according to Chairman Mao’s instructions, Zhou Enlai traveled to Beidaihe to persuade Lin Biao to attend the meeting, give a speech, and find a way out for himself. Lin did not say that he wanted to attend the meeting, which irritated Mao. Upon hearing Zhou’s report, Mao rebuked Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo seriously to their faces, saying, “You have gone too far down the wrong path, and you have to decide what you are going to do next.”353 Mao was issuing stark warnings to the Lin Biao clique 349. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 447.

350. “Record of the Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao in Beidaihe,” March 30 and 31, 1971.

351. Zhou Enlai said, “Vice Chairman Lin wanted us to tell Chairman Mao that he totally supported the chairman’s instructions and work deployment after the Lushan Meeting

and thought they were correct and effective. Lin thought it was a great victory to discover Chen Boda’s problem and he felt happy about several comrades’ [Huang Yongsheng and others] review letters and asked Wu Faxian and Ye Qun to write a review letter once again.” (“Zhou Enlai’s Letter to Mao Zedong,” April 1, 1971, manuscript.) 352. Ibid. 353. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1991.

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and was posing a challenge to Lin, which meant that Mao and Lin would fight to the bitter end. Lin was fully aware that this was Mao’s political logic and that any written self-criticism would put him in a vulnerable position. So Lin just made denials right up to the end. On April 4, Zhou Enlai submitted the CPC Central Committee’s Notice on Holding a Meeting on Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement. The notice summarized the national situation with regard to implementing the Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement since the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. The notice stated that the CPC Central Committee had decided to hold a meeting for the Movement on April 15 to summarize and exchange experiences for the further development of the movement and to promote an understanding of Chen’s crimes. On April 7, the CPC Central Committee decided to let Ji Dengkui and Zhang Caiqian join the Central Military Committee, which Mao referred to as reorganization.354 In April, Mao commented on four items in Zhou Enlai’s report,355 and he gave instructions for Zhou’s speech outline at the meeting as follows: the six members of the Political Bureau (Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Huang Yongsheng, Yao Wenyuan, and Ji Dengkui) would draft a summary of the meeting and criticize the five members of the Political Bureau who had made mistakes (Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo.)356 Mao wished for unity and hated divisions, but what he did would lead to a political division in the Political Bureau. On April 11, Mao gave instructions to Zhou Enlai on the written self-criticisms of Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo. Mao stated that the self-criticisms of Ye Qun and Wu Faxian were fine and that theirs and those of Huang, Li, and Qiu should be reported to the Political Bureau for proper treatment.357 At this time, Mao was under no illusions about Lin Biao and his clique.358 Mao was rebuking the five members of the Central Military Office as 354. Mao said, “If the earth is too hard, the air cannot get in. Just mix a little sand with the

earth and then the air can enter. We need to get a better mix of people in the Central Military Office. I refer to this as “mixing with sand.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 247.)

355. Ibid, 223–224. 356. Ibid, 230. 357. Ibid, 226. 358. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1992.

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an act of coercion:359 he did this to isolate Lin and attack them separately so as to weaken Lin’s power. From April 15 to 29, Zhou Enlai chaired the CPC Central Committee’s reporting meeting, and 99 leaders from central and local parties, and governmental and military institutions were in attendance. Mao invited Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen—Lin Biao’s political opponents and vice chairmen of the Central Military Committee—to attend the meeting.360 Under strong political pressure from Mao, major members of the Lin Biao clique made self-criticisms at the meeting. On April 29, Zhou Enlai pointed out on behalf of the CPC Central Committee that the five members of the Central Military Office had taken the wrong political line. They had become involved in factional activities because they had not followed Chairman Mao’s instructions and had adopted incorrect positions. At that time, Zhou once hinted that Lin Biao should deliver a speech at the meeting, but Lin adamantly refused to do so,361 and he was very angry with how the meeting had gone. On May 1, party and state leaders watched the International Workers’ Day fireworks at the Tiananmen gate tower. Except for Lin Biao, all the other leaders had arrived before Mao. According to He Shuying, Zhou Enlai’s guard, Zhou Enlai called Lin’s office and was told that Vice Chairman Lin was not feeling well. Zhou heard how Lin had participated in activities that morning, but he could not attend the event in the evening. Zhou asked Lin to come to the phone and said, “Vice Chairman Lin, please come to the fireworks this evening. Chairman Mao will attend, and it wouldn’t be good if you weren’t there. If you don’t feel well, you can go home before the fireworks are finished. The fireworks are presented to the people of the whole nation.” Lin finally agreed to attend. He arrived later than Mao, who ignored him by chatting all the time with Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. Lin said nothing to Mao and left without saying good-bye before the fireworks. 359. Mao said, “We criticized Chen Boda’s material, which showed he had cheated many

people, and we issued the 38th Army’s report and the anti-arrogance report of the Jinan

Military Region. The brief meeting of the Central Military Office went on for a long time without criticizing Chen, and I made remarks about this on one of their documents. My method was like fetching stones, making remarks about them, and letting people

discuss the results. I call this ‘throwing stones.’” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 247.)

360. Except for Chen Yi, who was in hospital, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen attended the Criticizing Chen and Rectification meeting.

361. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1591.

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After Lin left, Zhou told Prince Sihanouk that Vice Chairman Lin was not feeling well and left early. Lin leaving early without saying good-bye caused Mao to become enraged.362 It is evident from the above event that Mao and Lin were unable to communicate face-to-face let alone understand each other. Mao had picked his successor himself, but he had fallen into the successor trap, whereby the successor had become more powerful and posed a political challenge to Mao. Believing in the philosophy of struggle, Mao did not care about provoking anyone. Mao said to Nixon’s daughter and son-in-law that only Stalin had been a match for him in his life.363 Zhou Enlai made every effort to display the unity of the CPC Central Committee, instructing journalists of Xinhua News Agency to publish a photo of Mao and Lin Biao sitting together on the front page of every local newspaper across the country. He said, “Mao proposed unity at the 9th National Congress. Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin celebrating International Workers’ Day on Tiananmen gate tower together with all Chinese will attract national publicity.”364 Zhou wished to maintain the unity of Mao and Lin, but he could not change Mao’s philosophy of struggle and Mao’s determination in seeking conflict with Lin. Finally, Zhou sided with Mao and helped him in eliminating Lin. However, all the players involved ended up losers as a result of the political schism, unrest, and torment in the CPC. The price for Mao was that of his failure in the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution. On August 1, the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag published an editorial entitled “Celebrating Army Day on August 1.” The article stated at the very beginning that the PLA, created and led by Chairman Mao and commanded by Vice Chairman Lin, was becoming stronger in domestic and international class struggles and two- line struggles within the party, and it was advancing toward victory following its 44-year history.365 At least up until that point, the CPC Central Committee still held the view that Lin commanded the army, though it had omitted the term “personally” from that description. No one then had any idea that the vice chairman would be fleeing in just one month’s time. In August, Mao commented on a summary of political and ideological work at a brief meeting held to help leftists, industry and agriculture, and military control 362. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 330–331, 335–336; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898– 1976), vol. 4, 1992.

363. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 336; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1992. 364. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 336–337; Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1992.

365. People’s Daily, August 1, 1971.

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and training in the Guangzhou Military Region ahead of publication by the CPC Central Committee.366 He made critical remarks in some places, which indicated that the army led the party committee instead of vice versa.

Mao Zedong’s Tour of the South and the Lin Biao Incident of September 13 The political struggle between Mao and Lin Biao suddenly became fiercer. Mao proposed the Three Dos and Three Don’ts: allow Marxism but not revisionism; support unity but not division; and promote honesty but not conspiracy.367 Mao labeled Lin a revisionist who was engaged in political division and conspiracy. Lin thought that Mao was pressuring him and was alluding to himself when Mao criticized the Central Military Office. As a political backstage manipulator of the Central Military Office, Lin resolutely refused to attend the meeting about the Criticizing Chen and the Rectification Movement, and Lin held a grudge against Mao since Mao had rebuked Huang Yongsheng and the others.368 As the only vice chairman in the CPC Central Committee at that time, Lin Biao did not attend any committee meetings nor approve any documents. Lin was a special figure inside the party. Fully aware that criticizing Chen was actually intended to criticize himself, Lin predicted that Mao would resolve this issue at the Third Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee.369 The history of the CPC shows that ever since Mao was elected chairman of the Political Bureau in 1943, anyone who was rebuked by Mao—irrespective of whether he was a member of the Political Bureau or a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau—had to make a self-criticism. That included Gao Gang, who was forced to commit suicide. Only Lin Biao did not make such a self-criticism, 366. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 242. Mao later said, “I approved the Guangzhou Military Region’s document ‘Helping Leftists, Industry

and Agriculture, and Military Control and Training,’ but I added the comment ‘Study carefully’ in the Central Committee’s remarks to draw people’s attention. The local

party committee had been established, and the committee should have had centralized leadership. It is a reversal for the army committee to discuss matters that have already been decided by the local party committee.” (Ibid, 248.) 367. Ibid, 242. 368. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1591. 369. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 245.

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and that was something that Mao would not allow. Similarly, Lin knew Mao very well, and he knew that once he made a self-criticism he would be dead—just like Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, and Liu Shaoqi. There was no longer any trust between Lin and Mao, and Lin would be the loser once they started to attack each other. Mao was the party’s supreme leader, and his aggressiveness, hostility, and lack of tolerance led to the conflict and finally the fatal struggle between himself and Lin. Lin was beginning to panic, and he did not feel politically secure—even though he was named in the party Constitution of 1969 and the CPC Central Committee’s Constitutional Amendment (Draft) in 1970 as Mao’s successor. There was, in fact, no political disagreement in principles between Mao and Lin. Even if there had been, that could have been solved through direct communication, arguments, criticism, or self-criticism. However, Mao’s theory of class struggle held that life-and-death political struggles were a constant feature in China and that this was independent of a man’s will. Mao’s outlandish philosophy of struggle would inevitably lead to class struggle. Mao and Lin had supported each other in eliminating Liu Shaoqi, Mao’s political enemy, but they had themselves became political opponents after Liu’s removal or—to be more precise—Mao needed a political adversary because he gained enormous pleasure from being in conflict with others. At the Lushan Conference, Mao made unexpected moves to spotlight his political opponent, turned up the pressure, and caused Lin to become exposed. In July, a large amount of material was disclosed, prompting Mao to become aware of how suspicious Lin Biao’s actions were. On the evening of July 9, Mao learned from Xiong Xianghui (minister of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA) that Huang Yongsheng had completely failed to report the truth about the Lushan Conference and had withheld the written self-criticisms of the Five Commanders (Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo.) Mao concluded that their self-criticisms were false. The issue of the Lushan Conference had not yet been settled, and the Five Commanders had a manipulator behind the scenes — Lin Biao. Zhou Enlai, who was present at the meeting between Mao and Xiong, had asked Xiong not to release this information.370 Zhou feared a political division between Mao and Lin, and what Mao had said showed that he had to decide to eliminate the behind-thescenes manipulator. On August 12, Zhou Enlai asked Mao for instructions on when to hold the 4th NPC, and Mao replied it should be held after National Day. That evening, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss preparations for the 4th NPC.371 370. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1993. 371. Ibid, 1993–1994.

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On August 14, Mao left Beijing to tour the south of the country. He aimed to inspect 10 provinces and cities to take action by giving hints to local party and army leaders to prepare for the Third Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee372 and also to make a change with regard to his successor. This showed that Mao was taking political action to gain the support of local party, governmental, and army leaders before revealing his intention at the Third Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee to eliminate Lin Biao and his clique. On August 16, Zhou Enlai, Ji Dengkui, Huang Yongsheng, and Zhang Chunqiao went to Beidaihe to report to Lin Biao. Zhou told Lin that the CPC Central Committee had decided to hold the Third Plenary Session before or after National Day and then hold the Fourth NPC in accordance with Mao’s instructions.373 Mao’s secret speeches during his southern tour were aimed directly at Lin Biao. Mao labeled the Lushan Conference in 1970 as a struggle between two factions374 and the tenth line struggle in the party’s history.375 He told local leaders that Lin had not discussed the speech with him nor shown him the draft.376 Mao said, “Someone [Lin] regards me as old and he cannot wait to divide the party and usurp power.” 372. Li, “Review from the Lushan Meeting to the September 13 Event” ;Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1994.

373. Ibid. 374. Mao said, “The struggle with Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Meeting in 1959 was a struggle

between two factions. The struggle with Liu Shaoqi was also between two factions, and

at this Lushan Meeting, things were the same as they were before.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 244.)

375. Mao said to local leaders during his tour of the south in August and September 1971, “Our party has a history of 50 years [from 1921 to 1971], and there were ten big

struggles related to guidelines: Chen Duxiu’s right opportunism in 1921; Qu Qiubai’s

left putschism from 1927 to 1928; Li Lisan’s left adventurism from 1928 to 1930; Luo

Zhanglong’s establishment of another Central Committee [the Central Non-standing Committee] from 1930 to 1931; Wang Ming’s left dogmatism from 1931 to 1935; Zhang

Guotao’s establishment of another Central Committee from 1935 to 1936; Gao Gang and Rao Shushi’s anti-party alliance from 1953 to 1954; Peng Dehuai’s military club at the Lushan Meeting in 1959; Liu Shaoqi’s dividing the party in 1966; and the struggle against Chen Boda at the Lushan Meeting in 1970.” (Ibid, 223–244.)

376. This refers to Lin Biao’s speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central

Committee on August 23, 1970. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 245.)

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Mao believed that the Lin Biao clique had planned and organized their attack at the Lushan Conference and that this represented a struggle between two factions.377 Mao also advanced his theory of an inevitable division within the party, saying, “Various people in the party have tried to split it on ten occasions, and I believe that they will continue to do so ten, twenty, or thirty times in the future.”378 This indicated that the political conflict between Mao and Lin was increasing and that it would lead to a division within the party just like the one between Mao and Liu Shaoqi. Mao would have eliminated the Lin Biao clique at the Third Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee even if the Lin Biao Incident of September 13 had not occurred. The purpose of Mao’s tour of southern China was to brief local party, governmental, and army leaders379 on his plan to replace his successor; he would change the party Constitution, which stated that Lin Biao would be Mao’s successor. To tackle this sensitive issue, Mao employed the strategy of wishing to replace the old with the young: he proposed to groom a successor aged 35 to 60 years old (for example, Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, and Wang Hongwen.)380 Subsequently, he appointed Hua Guofeng and Wang Hongwen as his successors and Li Desheng as vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee. In any event, Mao wished to appoint his successor himself rather than having one elected by the collective decision of the Central Committee. Mao talked about the contributions of Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Li Xiannian, and Ye Jianying,381 and he needed them since they were political enemies of Lin Biao. Mao wanted Li Xiannian to join the Central Military Office. Mao was very sensitive to military power at that time. He said to local party, governmental, and army heads, “How can they say that I created the PLA and that Lin Biao commands it? Why can’t the one who created the army command it? The army was created by me. Now, I will be in charge of the army. I do not believe that the army will rebel. They [the Lin Biao clique] cannot mobilize the army to do bad things.”382 Mao also commented, “I don’t believe that Huang Yongsheng 377. Ibid. 378. Ibid, 246. 379. Mao had conversations with the leaders of Hubei, Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1593.)

380. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1594–1598. 381. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1942– 1992), vol. 2, 728.

382. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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can mobilize the army to do bad things.” That was similar to what he said to Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference in 1959: “If the army follows you, I will wage guerrilla warfare in the mountains!”383 Lin Biao clearly reacted strongly to this. Mao persistently fought with Lin to seize power over the army and weaken Lin’s influence on the army. They both viewed the army as their personal property and political tool—rather than being a public product that provided national security. Lin was by no means Mao’s rival, but he was the big loser in this struggle for influence in the army. The PLA would obey Mao’s personal command unconditionally, though this would again severely damage Mao. Mao decided to marginalize Lin Biao but he did not want to oust Lin immediately or have him killed at that time.384 He said, “This political struggle was different from the ninth line struggle in the party. This time, we need to protect Vice Chairman Lin.” Mao believed that Lin might correct his mistakes. But Mao also knew from the struggles within the party that it was difficult for the leader who has made mistakes in terms of principles, lines, and directions to remedy those errors.385 That effectively left Lin in a political cul-de-sac. In a speech during his southern tour, Mao criticized Lin Biao’s wife and son.386 This represented a political attack on Lin Biao’s whole family (except Lin Liheng,) and it made the three people decide to flee on September 13. Both Lin Biao and Mao were remarkable, arrogant men with forceful personalities.387 Once they disagreed with each other, they found themselves Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 246. 383. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 330–331, 364. 384. On July 25, 1975, Mao said, “We will not kill Lin Biao even if he doesn’t escape, but we

will criticize him.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 8, 444.)

385. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 245–246.

386. Mao said, “I am always against making your wife office director in the place where

you work. Lin Biao uses Ye Qun as his office director and they [Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo] have to report to Lin Biao about work through Ye Qun.” Mao also criticized Lin Liguo, saying that it was not good for a young man in his

20s to be called a “super genius.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central

Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 249–250.)

387. Mao said to foreign visitors in 1974 that Lin Biao was a tyrant in the party. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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unable to make concessions, and that deepened the conflict. More importantly, their espousal of the philosophy of struggle and favoring power struggles turned their relationship from one of close comrades to a bitter clash. However, Lin, who was not Mao’s political rival, became vice chairman without a strong following, and he realized that he had no way out, eventually dying in a plane crash. On September 2, Mao talked with Cheng Shiqing, the head of Jiangxi Province. Cheng told Mao three things. First, in July, Zhou Yuchi went to Jiangxi twice with an amphibious vehicle and asked Jiangxi to make a model like that for him. Zhou transported the vehicle by plane at the end of July. Second, at the Lushan Conference, Wu Faxian took Cheng to meet Ye Qun, and Ye Qun asked, “What will Lin Biao do if the state presidency is not established?” Third Lin Liheng, Lin Biao’s daughter, talked with Cheng’s wife about Lin Biao; Ye Qun told Cheng not to contact Lin Biao’s family anymore or that family would be killed. Mao Zedong Thought for a while after hearing this.388 Thereafter, Mao took unusual measures. On September 4, Zhou Enlai received the text of a secret speech that Mao delivered in the south of the country (written by Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng and reviewed by Mao,) which had been sent especially by Wang.389 The speech was shrouded in secrecy to all the members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. An important strategy of Mao in waging political struggles was that of giving hints to and briefing local organizations; although this was not an open way of proceeding, it was normal practice within the party. Liu Shaoqi pointedly remarked that it was not allowed for any party members to hold a different opinion from that of the leadership and any who did were suspected of having ideological problems or being insurgents; any party members who offered advice about areas of work were thought of as being politically questionnable and adopting the wrong line; and any party members who criticized party leaders were considered opponents of the leadership. Liu said, “No distinction was made between disagreements within the party and between the party and its enemies. Some party members were tried and punished as though they were actual enemies when all they had done was Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 244.) In fact, Mao was the real tyrant and that was the root of the problem between Mao and Lin. 388. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 188. 389. Mao made amendments to his summary of the conversations. On March 16, 1972, Zhou Enlai submitted the document for Mao to check, and Mao remarked, “Approved with a few amendments.” On March 17, the Central Committee issued this summary of the

conversation. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 250.)

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make mistakes. This particularly happened during the Cultural Revolution.” From November 1965 to July 1966, Mao had adopted the strategy of dropping hints when he went to southern China to prepare for his conflict with Liu Shaoqi. Now, in 1971, this was the second time for Mao to make such hints in the south of the country. This was described by Mao’s biographer, Ross Terrill, as “his last battle in a battle-hardened life, although it was not the best conceived. This could only result in a great, bloody battle.”390 This was because Mao’s political enemy this time was different. Lin Biao, who had worked with Mao for a long time and joined forces with Mao in persecuting Liu Shaoqi, was very familiar with Mao’s political strategies. He paid close attention to Mao’s secret speech in the south and was eager to learn what hints Mao had given. Lin anticipated that his own end was approaching, and that drove him to despair. On September 5 and 6, Lin Biao was in panic after he learned the content of Mao’s speech.391 He felt like a rat in a trap waiting to be caught, and in this anxious state,392 Lin gave an order in his own handwriting on September 8.393 Mao knew nothing about the order with respect to Lin Liguo’s plan for a military coup (Project 571) at that time. Lin Liguo planned to assassinate Mao by various methods including: (1) attacking Mao’s special train with a flamethrower or bazooka; (2) blowing up the Suzhou Shuofang Railway Bridge, where Mao’s special train had to pass; (3) blowing up Mao’s train using an attack bomber; (4) sending Wang 390. Terrill, Mao: A Biography, 414–415. 391. The Lin Biao clique made every effort to learn the content of Mao’s speech to local

heads during his tour of the south. In early September 1971, Liu Feng (former political

commissar of the Wuhan Military Region,) Wang Pu (former air force commander of

the Guangzhou Military Region,) Gu Tongzhou (former chief of staff of the Guanzhou Military Region,) Chen Ligeng, and Wang Guowei related to Lin the content of Mao’s speech. (Special Case Group of the Central Committee, Struggle to Shatter the Lin and Chen Counter-revolutionary Coup (second version), January 13, 1972.) On September 5, the

air force chief of staff of the Guangzhou Military Region learned the content of Mao’s

speech, and he immediately reported it secretly to Lin Biao. On September 6, Liu Feng told Li Zuopeng, who accompanied foreign visitors to Wuhan. Li came back to Beijing the same day and related the content to Huang Yongsheng and Qiu Huizuo. Huang Yongsheng told Ye Qun. Lin Biao panicked. (Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 358.) 392. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 179. 393. On September 7, 1970, Lin Biao instructed Lin Liguo to give the “Combined Fleet” a “No. 1 Alert” order. On September 8, Lin Biao wrote an order, “Hope that you act according to the order sent by [Lin] Liguo and [Zhou] Yuchi.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1598–1599.)

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Guowei (political commissar of the Fourth Air Force in Shanghai) to kill Mao when he met with others.394 Up to September 11, Lin Liguo had still not decided how best to assassinate Mao and nobody dared to do it at the last minute.395 It was thus hardly appropriate to charge Lin Biao with launching an armed counterrevolutionary coup just because of this order. Wu Faxian and others had never heard of Lin Liguo’s Project 571, the armed coup, or plans to kill Mao.396 Ross Terrill thought that perhaps the proposed actions of Lin Liguo and his associates were exaggerated. Whatever the reasons, the outlandish plan could not be implemented. Terrill asserted that Lin Biao would not personally assassinate Mao.397 The true picture of what actually took place may never emerge. On September 10, Mao and Zhou Enlai planned to hold the Third Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee before National Day mainly to deal with the problem of Lin Biao. They would expel Chen Boda from the party and adjust the organizational structure of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.398 Zhou did not report to both Lin and Mao as usual, but just to Mao. Alert to the Lin Biao clique, Mao made some calculations based on confidential information.399 Mao promptly decided to leave, and not even Zhou Enlai was aware of this. Mao went to Fengtai Station in Beijing on September 12, thereby disrupting Lin Biao’s plan.400 At Fengtai Station, Mao met with Li Desheng, Ji 394. Ibid, 1599. 395. Wang, Those Turbulent Years, 359. 396. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 888. 397. Terrill, Mao: A Biography, 418. 398. On September 10, 1971, Zhou Enlai asked Mao in his report whether the Third Plenary Session should be held before National Day and whether to expel Chen Boda from the

party at the meeting and also whether to select some members of the Central Committee.

Mao remarked: “Agree to all, and we also need to select some members of the Standing Committee.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp.,

Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 268.)

It was planned at that time to hold the Third Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. But the meeting did not take place because of the September 13 event.

399. When in Hangzhou, Mao became suspicious about Ye Qun and Lin Liguo, and that alerted him. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1599.)

400. According to Wang Dongxing, who guarded Mao at that time, Chairman Mao knew

about Lin Biao and Ye Qun’s conspiracy through conversations with local heads. In the evening of September 8, Mao knew that a plane was being equipped in Hangzhou;

someone said that Mao’s train in Hangzhou Lanqiao Airport was posing an obstruction. There were other suspicious circumstances. Mao decided to move his special train.

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Dengkui, Wu De, and Wu Zhong. He said, “We follow the policy that the political line determines everything. Soldiers and weapons cannot replace the correct line, no matter how many of them there are. The correct line can lead us to everything, but the wrong line brings us nothing but failure. Last year, the Lin Biao clique made a sudden attack at the Lushan Conference, tricked three [Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng] of the five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and issued a bulletin for the purpose. I wrote an article [‘My Advice’] after nine days of consultations and study with others. Their ‘genius theory’ is idealism. I don’t want to deny a genius, who is indeed smarter than other people, but a genius relies on many people, not just one. A genius must rely on the party, which is the vanguard of the proletariat and relies on the masses and their collective wisdom.” Mao was against being called a genius and stated that Mao Zedong Thought resulted from the efforts of the party and the people, rather than himself. Mao said at last that there was another backstage manipulator (Lin Biao) in addition to Chen Boda.401 Later, Wang Dongxing reported to Zhou that Mao had arrived in Beijing.402 However, Mao never imagined that an event, which would shock the world, would happen that evening.403 On the afternoon of September 12, Lin Liguo reported to Ye Qun after he learned that Mao had returned to Beijing. Lin Liguo took a trident plane from Beijing Xijiao Airport to Qinhuangdao Airport and arrived at Building 96 in Beidaihe at 8 p.m. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo discussed how to flee, and this was overheard by Lin Liheng. She reported it to Jiang Zuoshou, captain of the second team of Army 8341 at 9:50 p.m., “Lin Liguo and Ye Qun are planning to coerce Lin Biao to flee, and I need to report it to your leader.” Jiang Zuoshou informed Zhang Hong (deputy regimental commander of the CPC Central Committee’s guards regiment,) who reported the matter to Zhang Yaoci (vice director of the Central Office of the CPC Central Committee, deputy director of the guard bureau of the Central Office, But Mao was unaware of Lin Biao’s order and the coup plan of the Lin Biao clique. However, Mao did not tell Wang about all the dangerous circumstances of which he

was aware. Mao was waiting for a better time. Even Zhou Enlai was unaware of what

was happening until he arrived at Zhongnanhai and Wang made his report to Zhou.

Zhou asked in surprise, “Why did you come back without any information? Didn’t you stop anywhere? This was not our plan!” (Wang, “Chairman Mao in Days of Breaking the Lin Biao Clique’s Counter-revolutionary Coup Plan.”)

401. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1600. 402. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 480.

403. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 191.

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and regimental commander of the central guards charged with protecting Mao) at 10:20 p.m. Zhang requested that someone be assigned to monitor Lin Biao. Zhang Yaoci related the matter to Wang Dongxing, who immediately reported it to Zhou Enlai.404 That evening, Zhou was chairing a meeting to discuss the working report draft at the 4th NPC. Some members of the Political Bureau and ministers attended the meeting. Huang Yongsheng (chief of General Staff,) Wu Faxian (commander of the air force,) Qiu Huizuo (minister of the General Logistics Department,) and Li Zuopeng (first political commissar of the navy) were present. Zhang called Zhou at 10:40 p.m. and said that according to Lin Liheng, Lin Liguo and Ye Qun were planning to force Lin Biao to flee to Zhangzhou and then Hong Kong. They had mobilized Lin Biao’s special train No. 256.405 Zhou was surprised at these developments and ordered Wu Faxian to check the Trident plane in Shanhaiguan Airport. Hu Ping (deputy chief of Staff Air Force Headquarters) had used the Trident without authorization, and he reported this to Wu Faxian, saying “I didn’t report it since it was a test flight after the plane had been refitted.” Hu Ping could not provide an answer when Wu Faxian asked, “Why did the plane fly just to Shanhaiguan—not anywhere else?” Wu Faxian ordered that the plane had to fly back to Beijing immediately. Hu Ping went to arrange that, but he called back five minutes later, saying, “The plane is being repaired because of engine failure.” Wu Faxian ordered that the plane return to Beijing as soon as it was fixed and that this be reported to Zhou. Zhou instructed that the plane should not have anyone onboard on its return flight. Wu conveyed Zhou’s instruction to Hu Ping.406 At 11 p.m., Zhang Hong called Wang Dongxing and Zhang Yaoci, saying that Lin Liheng had reported that Lin Liguo and Ye Qun were discussing how to flee with Lin Biao that evening and that they had planned a plane to bomb Zhongnanhai so as to kill Chairman Mao. Wang reported this to Zhou Enlai immediately. At 11:30p.m., Ye Qun called Zhou in an attempt to conceal their effort to escape.407 Zhou fully understood this ruse and told Li Zuopeng to forward the order of the CPC Central Committee that the plane at Shanhaiguan Airport did not have permission to take off except with the joint order of Zhou Enlai, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and Li Zuopeng. Zhou instructed Yang Dezhong (deputy director of the Central Guard Bureau and political commissar of the Central Guard Regiment) to go to Xijiao Airport to monitor Wu Faxian and Li Desheng in the combat duty 404. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 191–193. 405. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 3-4. 406. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 862. 407. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 194–195.

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room of air force headquarters and assist them in allowing Zhou to command the air force. Zhou requested the other members of the Political Bureau to await orders in Fujian Hall. He also ordered Wu to prepare two planes immediately, saying, “If Lin Biao’s plane takes off, I will fly to Shanhaiguan Airport to stop him.”408 At 11:40p.m., Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo drove to Shanghaiguan Airport, and they boarded their plane for escape at 00:23a.m., September 13. This was a move that Zhou Enlai had not expected. Zhou recalled in August 1972 that no one could ever imagine that Lin might attempt to escape. Zhou stated that Lin became frightened and fled because Zhou had checked his use of air transport without authorization.409 Having heard the report about Lin’s movements, Zhou Enlai told a dispatcher to call plane no. 256 by radio to tell Lin to return, saying, “Zhou will meet him in person at the airport,” wherever he landed. However, Lin did not reply.410 Zhou immediately went to Mao’s residence to inform him of Lin’s escape. 1:10a.m. on September 13, Wu Faxian reported to Zhou Enlai by phone from Xiyuan Airport, saying that Lin Biao’s plane was flying to Mongolia, and he asked whether it should be intercepted. Zhou asked Mao for instructions, and Mao said, “Lin Biao is the vice chairman of our party. If we shoot him down, how can we explain that to the people? Since this has already happened, we may as well just let him go.”411 Lin Biao’s fleeing the country was in fact good news for Mao. Wang Ming was labeled a traitor within the party after escaping to the Soviet Union. The same occurred with Lin, and that was exactly the result Mao wanted. At 1:55a.m., plane no. 256 entered Mongolian air space above the Chinese border at boundary post no. 414. Subsequently, the aircraft vanished from the radar 408. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 8. 409. Zhou Enlai spoke with party members who returned to China to report and those in foreign affairs departments, August, 1972. (Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 2004.)

410. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 481.

411. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 11. On October 12 and 13, 1971, when Zhou Enlai was being debriefed and explaining why they did not shoot

down Lin Biao’s plane, he said that Lin was the vice chairman. “How could I explain

our shooting him down to the people? All we could do was to monitor the plane on radar until it went beyond the frontier. We reported this to Chairman Mao, and he said,

‘It’s just like when it’s going to rain: what can we do if he wants to run away?’” (Ibid, 488–498.)

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screen of air force headquarters. Zhou Enlai had Mao moved to the Great Hall of the People. Following Mao’s instructions, Zhou called an emergency meeting of the Political Bureau members in Beijing to inform them that Lin Biao had fled and preparations were in place for wars or emergencies.412 Li Xiannian was shocked to hear that Lin Biao had escaped.413 Zhou Enlai instigated a nationwide ban on flights after Lin Biao’s aircraft crossed the border with Mongolia. His order included the following points: (1) henceforth, no aircraft are permitted to take off in China except with the joint order of Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and Li Zuopeng; (2) no aircraft are permitted to fly to Beijing; and (3) the air force across China must obey the orders of the commander of the Large Military Region. At 3:15 a.m., a report arrived from Shahe Airport, which stated that a helicopter had taken off and flown to Zhangjiakou. Zhou Enlai immediately conveyed this information to Mao, and Mao ordered, “Intercept it and force it to land or shoot it down!” After the helicopter was forced to land, Zhou Yuchi and Yu Xinye, who were on board, committed suicide, but Li Weixin was captured alive.414 On September 13, Zhou Enlai called leaders of the 11 military regions and 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to inform them that Lin Biao had fled the country. He requested them to obey the command of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao. A state of emergency was declared in China.415 On the afternoon of that day, Zhou Enlai proposed the following: The Political Bureau should work together with Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Huang Yongsheng, and Wu Faxian in the Great Hall of the People; Li Xiannian, Li Desheng, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo should work at Jingxi Hotel; Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing should work at home; and Wang Dongxing should defend Chairman Mao.”416 That evening, the air force reported that at 6 p.m., the regimental commander of the radar regiment of the People’s Republic of Mongolia sent telegrams stating that an unidentified plane had crashed and caught fire in the Undurkhaan district at 2:30 p.m. This appeared to be the earliest news of Lin Biao’s plane having crashed. Zhou Enlai immediately reported the matter to Mao.417 412. Ibid, 482. 413. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1942– 1992), vol. 2, 729.

414. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 199–200. 415. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 1997–1999. 416. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 866. 417. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 15.

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At 2 p.m. on September 14, the Foreign Affairs Department conveyed a tip-off sent by the Chinese Embassy in Mongolia: a Chinese military plane had crashed in Undurkhaan at 2:00 p.m. on September 13. All nine persons on board, including a woman, died in the accident. The plane number was 256. Zhou Enlai immediately reported this to Mao, and they discussed the matter for an hour. Zhou then proceeded to Fujian Hall and announced the news to members of the Political Bureau.418 Zhou said that the Central Committee would issue a document informing the whole party about the Lin Biao Incident on September 13 in accordance with Chairman Mao’s instructions. Zhou suggested that Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan draft the document. Zhou also asked for Lin Liheng to be praised for her timely report to Zhou Enlai and Wang Dongxing about the incident. Further, Zhou conveyed a list put together by himself and Mao of sixteen mistakes that Lin Biao had made.419 These actions reflected Mao’s tendency to settle his decade-old scores with others. Mao had done this to Peng Dehuai (1959,) Deng Xiaoping (1966,) and now to Lin Biao (1971,) even when Lin was his handpicked successor. Discrediting Lin would amount to tarnishing Mao’s own reputation since they had worked together very closely in the first five years of the Cultural Revolution.420 People would ask why Mao had appointed Lin as his successor if Lin had made those serious mistakes. Lin’s errors reflected on Mao’s own political image, of which all politicians are particularly sensitive. The appointment of Lin demonstrated that Mao was not always 100% correct. On September 18, the CPC Central Committee issued the party’s Notice of Lin Biao’s Treason and Fleeing the Country, which announced that Lin Biao ran away in sheer panic, bringing about his own ruin. The notice, which Zhou Enlai submitted to Mao for approval, was passed on to divisional level on September 28 and to the whole party and nation in late October. On November 6, Deng Xiaoping, who had been sent to undertake manual labor in Jiangxi, learnt of the document’s content and simply remarked: “Divine justice.”421 Lin’s death in the plane crash helped Mao considerably. At this point, it had been just two and a half years since the party Constitution was approved at the 9th National Congress of the CPC on April 14, 1969. The CPC Central Committee published Notice of Lin Biao’s Treason and Fleeing the Country in contravention of the Constitution; this meant that the party had lost its political credibility, both domestically and internationally, and that was its most important 418. Ibid, 15–16. 419. Wu, Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir, 870–871. 420. This refers to the proletarian faction headed by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin. 421. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 206–207.

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asset. However, at this point, Mao was not thinking critically about his theory and practice of class struggle as the engine for developments; he was preoccupied with the power and personal struggle between himself and Lin. He had pressured Lin into fleeing422 as a continuation of the class struggle and two-line struggle.423 The fact that Lin had done so proved the accuracy of Mao’s theory and his capability in predicting the occurrence of this incident.424 422. Mao used “Qijue Chibi” by the Tang-dynasty poet Du Mu to express his regret over the September 13 Incident: “With broken halberds in the sand and the iron has not

vanished yet, it is evident which dynasty they belonged to. If the east wind had not helped Zhou Yu, Cao Cao would have found himself again among beauty.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1604.)

423. The Notice of the Central Committee declared that Lin Biao had fled to rely on

Soviet revisionist socialist imperialism. It stated that this was a continuation of the class struggle and two-line struggle that had continued for a long time; in particular, the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee finally revealed the bankruptcy of Lin Biao’s ambition and plots. The notice specified that the party had

developed and become strong through the class and two-line struggles. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 269–270.)



On October 24, the Central Committee issued a notice to the whole nation about

Lin Biao’s treason and flight. The notice proposed that the people should follow Mao’s

instructions about the two classes, the two lines, and the two-line struggle that existed in socialist society. The people should also fully understand the counter-revolutionary

plots of the Lin Biao and Chen Boda cliques, which aimed to change the political lines and policies of the CPC and the socialist system and to overturn the proletarian

dictatorship so as to restore capitalism. It was important to build the people’s confidence and determination in the struggle against the Lin-Chen counter-revolutionary clique.

424. Zhou Enlai said in the political report of the 10th National Congress of the CPC that

the revolutionary practice since the 9th National Congress of the CPC — especially the experience in the struggle with the Lin Biao clique — had proved the following:

the political line and organizational line of the 9th National Congress of the CPC

were correct and the leadership of the Central Committee headed by Mao was also correct. (“Zhou Enlai’s Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s

Daily, August 31, 1973.) The “Examination Report” pointed out that Lin Biao’s anti-

party clique was a reflection of intense class struggle domestically and internationally. In that situation, the Lin Biao anti-party clique stood out as a representative of class enemies, domestically and internationally. The clique was defined by its class nature

and had to make an expression. Its purpose was to fundamentally change the party’s

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The historian Maurice Meisner commented that a struggle of plot and anti-plot definitely took place in the senior leadership of the CPC in the second year of the Lushan Conference. This struggle was a sad commentary on the political nature of the Cultural Revolution. It appeared very likely that Mao would take the political initiative to eliminate Lin Biao and his clique for the sake of power and Mao’s own policies.425 Mao biographer Ross Terrill commented that Mao paid dearly for the Lin Biao Incident and that its effects were considerable. Terrill noted that only two years after the victory of the Cultural Revolution, one-third of the party’s leaders had become party enemies.426 Author Roderick MacFarquhar believed that defeating Lin came at great cost to Mao and that the reputation of the Cultural Revolution suffered severely.427 On September 23, Mao ordered Wang Dongxing to ask Zhou Enlai about what had happened to Huang Yongsheng and other people suspected of being involved in the Lin Biao Incident. On September 14, Mao had said to Zhou, “Lock them up for 10 days and make them confess. The veteran comrades can be forgiven for their mistakes, but we first need confessions.”428 Later on September 14, Zhou and Wang reported to Mao that Huang and the others were burning materials. Mao said that it seemed like they wanted to fight to the end,429 and he decided to have Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo arrested and placed under investigation.430 Zhou said, “Chairman, you can rest assured that I will work on this matter without delay and have everything finished tonight or tomorrow morning.” Zhou then made immediate arrangements to have Huang and the three basic political lines and organizational lines in socialist society, overturn socialism, and restore capitalism. The clique wanted to rebuild the landlord capitalists, who were

deposed by the party and people of the nation. The clique needed a domestic alliance of

landlords, affluent peasants, counter-revolutionaries, vicious individuals, and rightists

to establish a fascist dictatorship of capitalists that could succumb to Soviet revisionist socialist imperialism and forge an alliance with imperialists, revisionists, and counter-

revolutionaries in fighting against the party, China, and the Chinese revolution. (The Central Committee, Examination Report on Lin Biao’s Anti-party clique’s Counterrevolutionary Crimes, August 20, 1973.)

425. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 356. 426. Terrill, Mao: A Biography, 423. 427. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 340. 428. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 483.

429. Ibid, 485. 430. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1604.

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others arrested.431 On September 24, in accordance with Mao’s wishes, Zhou Enlai summoned Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo to attend a meeting held in the name of the Central Military Office to convey Chairman Mao’s instructions. On behalf of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou announced that Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu would resign from their posts and conduct introspection. He said to them, “Don’t worry. Your problems won’t affect your wives and children. This is our consistent policy.” That day, Zhou convened leaders of the army’s general departments and all army branches for a meeting to inform them about the decisions regarding Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu.432 After the meeting, Zhou drafted the Central Committee’s Notice on Huang Yongsheng and Others Resigning for Introspection (top secret) and issued the notice on September 29. The notice stated that the Central Committee ordered the four to resign for introspection and make confessions because they had become deeply involved in the factional activities of the Lin-Chen anti-party clique and could not continue doing their present work. Thus, the four chief members of the Lin Biao clique were dealt with after the Lin Biao Incident. Their resignations and confessions amounted to their arrest, though without any formal procedures. Ye Jianying assisted Zhou Enlai in dealing with them and did the same on October 6, 1976, when he assisted Hua Guofeng in arresting the Jiang Qing clique—the Gang of Five (including Mao Xinyuan)—in the form of holding a meeting. This indicated that the party’s fundamental system was so seriously damaged that exceptional measures had to be undertaken to deal with internal party political struggles during the Cultural Revolution. The CPC Central Committee’s notice stated that the committee had decided to appoint Ye Jianying, vice chairman of the Central Military Committee (CMC,) to preside over the daily work of the CMC and that he would be responsible for making preparations for CMC meetings. Zhang Caiqian, Li Desheng, and Yu Qiuli were to preside, respectively, over the work of the headquarters of the General Staff, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department. Mao decided to reshuffle the leadership of the party, the government, and the army. Zhou Enlai was to preside over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. On October 2, with Mao’s approval, Li Xiannian (member of the Political Bureau) and Hua Guofeng (member of the Central Committee and first secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee) were appointed as chief and deputy chief of the State Council’s service group to assist with the daily work of the State Council. At a meeting of the Political Bureau, it was decided that Li Xiannian and Hua 431. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 20. 432. Ibid, 21–23.

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Guofeng be sent to Guangzhou to investigate persons and events related with the Lin Biao Incident. On September 26, the Central Committee issued a notice saying that there would be no parades on National Day. It had been usual practice for Mao and Lin Biao to review the parades. On October 1, Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Ye Jianying attended a banquet to celebrate National Day in the Summer Palace. Touring activities were arranged for National Day in the Working People’s Cultural Palace and other parks. China Pictorial that day still published a photo of Mao and Lin on its cover. On October 3, with the approval of Mao, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice stating that a Central Special Case Group (CSCG) would examine issues related to the Lin Biao clique. The CSCG consisted of Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, Li Desheng, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, and Wu Zhong. The CSCG had office space, and Ji Dengkui and Wang Dongxing were in charge of daily work.433 The list indicated that Jiang Qing ranked fourth among party leaders just after Mao, Zhou, and Kang, who were members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. All the materials exposing the Lin Biao and Chen Boda anti-party clique from regions and institutions were submitted to the CSCG as top-secret documents.434 This means that information about the struggle between Mao and Lin would never be brought to light, and the details would become something of an enigma. However, this does not prevent a historical analysis of the influence of that event. Also on October 3, the CPC Central Committee, with the approval of Mao, issued a notice to dismantle the Central Military Office and establish the Central Military Committee Meeting to take charge of daily work of the CMC; the CMC Meeting was to be under the direction of the CMC leadership. The Central Military Committee Meeting consisted of ten individuals with Ye Jianying, CMC vice chairman, presiding over daily work.435 Zhou Enlai proposed the above plan when chairing a meeting of the Political Bureau in late September,436 which was when Mao reinstated Marshal Ye Jianying. On October 4, Mao conferred with members of the newly established CMC 433. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1606. 434. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 208. 435. The Central Military Committee Meeting consisted of 10 people: Ye Jianying, Xie Fuzhi, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian, Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui, Wang Dongxing, Chen Shiju,

Zhang Caiqian, and Liu Xianquan. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949– 1976), vol. 2, 1606.)

436. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 27.

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Meeting. He made it clear that the CMC had to invite Premier Zhou to attend its meetings whenever major issues were being discussed.437 This was because Zhou had played an important role in assisting Mao in handling the Lin Biao Incident.438 After the fall of the Lin Biao clique and the reshuffle, the structure of China’s leadership was divided into two factions. One consisted of the moderates, who had achieved dominance and were headed by Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. Zhou presided over the Central Committee and State Council and Ye the CMC, in which, as noted above, Zhou was an authorized participant. The other faction was that of the Cultural Revolution hardliners, headed by Jiang Qing. This group continued to lead the Cultural Revolution.439 Initially, the two factions were united in attacking the Lin Biao clique, but they soon focused more on their differences. Mao soon promoted another faction—the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution—so that the three factions would exert mutual constraints. The Lin Biao Incident of September 13 was an important turning point in the Cultural Revolution. Viewed objectively, it marked the failure of the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution, as evident in the CPC Central Committee’s resolutions.440 The Cultural Revolution had also greatly exceeded Mao’s expectations. On November 14, 1971, Mao said, “Who knew that the Lin Biao clique was engaged in counter-revolutionary activities? I didn’t.”441 However, Mao’s theory about focusing on class struggle and theory about an inevitable division within the party would certainly have led to something like the Lin Biao Incident. Even without the Lin Biao Incident, Mao had referred to the Lushan Conference in 1971 as marking the 10th line struggle within the party, the 10th division in the party, and also the struggle between two factions. Both Mao and Lin emerged as losers from this political struggle, and Mao paid for it dearly. Mao’s political difficulties led to political difficulties and losses for the CPC. After several political struggles and splits, among the seven members of the 437. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 2008. 438. Jiang Zemin evaluated Zhou Enlai in 1998: “From 1970 to 1971, Zhou Enlai assisted Mao in demolishing the plot to usurp supreme power by the Lin Biao counter-

revolutionary clique.” (“Jiang Zemin’s Speech at a Convention for Zhou Enlai’s 100th Birthday Anniversary,” People’s Daily, February 24, 1998.)

439. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 213. 440. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the

CPC, vol. 2, 788–846; Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1605.

441. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 2004.

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Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Mao, as top leader, had eliminated three people (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Lin Biao,) marginalized one person (Chen Yun was excluded from the Political Bureau and became a member of the Central Committee,) and semi-marginalized another (Zhu De was excluded from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and became a member of the Political Bureau); only one person (Zhou Enlai) and himself remained. Among the five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, he eliminated two people (Lin Biao and Chen Boda,) with only three people (Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and himself) remaining. Similarly, Mao’s political difficulties led to political difficulties and losses for the PLA. Mao adhered to the philosophy of struggle and eliminated his colleagues and comrades by different means simply to prove his theory of continuing revolution under a proletarian dictatorship. Mao was always the representative of correctness in political struggles and also the destroyer of the political system. He was an evervictorious general on political battlefields, and he was a loner in the political leading group. Fully aware that his political reputation — his greatest political asset — had suffered unprecedented damage, Mao felt great pain and disappointment. Several days after the Lin Biao Incident of September 13, Mao’s health rapidly deteriorated. He suffered a heart attack and almost died.442 Thereafter, he suffered a great deal because his health did not recover and his condition remained poor. However, with his strong will, he did not relinquish the class struggle and line struggle; neither did he stop the Cultural Revolution but continued conducting it for another five years. Believing that it brought endless joy to be engaged in conflicts with others, Mao needed new enemies and he fought with them until his death.

Criticizing Lin and the Rectification and Liberation of Veteran Cadres The Lin Biao Incident of September 13 demonstrated the fallacy of Mao’s political line with the Cultural Revolution. The incident led to adverse consequences, and it 442. Some have suggested that the Lin Biao Incident led to Mao suffering a serious mental

breakdown. Mao’s physical condition certainly deteriorated afterward. In midSeptember he suffered a heart attack. On October 8, when he met with Haile Selassie, emperor of Ethiopia, Mao said, “a few weeks ago, I died of heart disease and met God in Heaven, though I’ve now returned.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1610–1611.)

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would have been the best time for the CPC Central Committee to end the Cultural Revolution and stop pursuing Mao’s erroneous policies. However, to protect Mao’s personal prestige and his preeminent position of ultimate power, the party corrected some of the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution only to a limited degree, and so it continued until October 1976. After the Lin Biao Incident, Mao was a 78-year-old sick man with deteriorating health. He was old and tired and—most importantly—he had ruled the country for too long and made many political mistakes in his later years. However, he was unable to correct his mistakes because he was bent on confirming the theory and practice of focusing on class struggle. During the five years after the Lin Biao Incident, even though Mao found it contradictory and painful, he sincerely hoped to correct the errors of the Cultural Revolution and achieve stability and unity. He had to suppress expansion of the Cultural Revolution into attacking everything and everyone and leading to fullscale civil war, which was certainly not his goal when he launched the revolution. On the other hand, Mao believed that the Cultural Revolution had been necessary and correct in fighting against revisionism and solidifying socialism, which he regarded as one of the greatest contributions he had made in his life.443 Mao learned from the Lin Biao Incident that it was necessary to continue focusing on class struggle and he would continue working toward that for the rest of his life. In the latter five years (1972–76) of the Cultural Revolution, Mao still wavered between the above two beliefs about the revolution, and he used the two factions (the moderates headed by Zhou Enlai and the Cultural Revolution hardliners led by Jiang Qin) within the party toward his ends. Overall, though, he insisted on pursuing the line of the Cultural Revolution and so had to rely on the Jiang Qing clique. At this time, the power structure changed from Mao plus Lin–Zhou to Mao–Zhou; it further changed to Mao–Zhou plus Wang (Hongwen) after the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973. Although aware of the political mistakes that Mao had committed with the Cultural Revolution and attributing the blame to Lin Biao’s ultra-left trend of thought, the CPC Central Committee could not correct Mao’s major errors. The committee made only some adjustments to a limited degree, and these were quickly reversed by Mao.444 443. Mao offered this comment about his life: “I did two great things in my life. One was driving Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, and the other was launching the Cultural Revolution. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1644–1645.)

444. The party’s resolutions in 1981 stated that in 1972, in the process of criticizing Lin

Biao, Zhou Enlai proposed to censure the extreme left ideological trend; that was a

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After the Lin Biao Incident, Mao requested launching the movement of Criticizing Lin and Rectification; this rehabilitated, liberated, and reinstated many veteran officials, but it corrected only some errors of the Cultural Revolution because unjust and false cases affected millions of innocent people across China. Mao rehabilitated veteran leaders who had become politically marginalized in the Cultural Revolution as witnesses for Lin Biao’s crimes and historical problems. From September 28 to October 15, Li Fuchun (member of the Central Committee) was authorized by the Central Committee to summon some veteran officials, and he held nine brief meetings to investigate and criticize Lin Biao. Marshal Zhu De and Liu Bocheng submitted written materials, and Marshal Chen Yi, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xianqian gave speeches at the meetings.445 However, this did not mean that Mao would reinstate those veteran officials. On October 4, when meeting with members of the newly established CMC Meeting, Mao talked about the two-line struggle and said, “Lin [Biao] and Chen [Boda] organized conspiracy for a long time and became involved in anti-party activities to usurp power...Lin Biao should bear the blame for persecuting those veteran marshals.”446 Mao did not scrutinize himself but shirked the prime responsibility, making Lin the scapegoat for Mao’s having persecuted the veteran officials (with regard to the February Counter-current Forces.) In October, Zhou Enlai assigned someone to locate Xue Ming, He Long’s wife, and instructed her to write down the details of how Marshal He Long was persecuted by the Lin Biao clique, and the report was submitted to the CPC Central Committee.447 Back in September 1967, the brief meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group chaired by Zhou Enlai decided to establish a Special Case Group (headed by Kang Sheng) to investigate He Long’s case. On June 9, 1969, Marshal He Long, who was innocent, died; Xue Ming was sent to Guizhou to carry out manual labor under supervision. In May 1971, the Special Case Group submitted the Investigation Report of He Long’s Crimes, which labeled He Long as a collaborator continuation of proposals by many leaders to correct the mistakes of the Cultural

Revolution in around February 1967. Mao, however, still wrongly believed that the

mission then was to criticize the extreme right. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary

Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 813.)

445. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 485.

446. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1606. 447. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 493.

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within the party and army as well as an anti-party individual; it proposed expelling He Long from the army and party and making public his crimes so as to eliminate any adverse influences.448 It was not until December 1973 that Mao admitted it had been wrong to persecute He Long. On September 29, 1974, the CPC Central Committee issued the Notice on Rehabilitating He Long, and it was approved by Mao.449 On November 8, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao, saying, “It is a cause for celebration that the Lin Biao and Chen Boda clique was uncovered and eradicated so quickly. Without the wise leadership of the chairman and the CPC Central Committee and if their plots had not been uncovered but succeeded, our socialist country would have suffered great disaster. Now, the Chinese people and I are delighted that this problem has been solved!” In addition to reference to other matters, Deng wrote, “I have been in Jiangxi for two years under Chairman Mao’s care.” Mao showed Deng’s letter to members of the Political Bureau.450 Deng had considerable political experience, and he knew that the Lin Biao collapse was a good opportunity for him to return and so he provided a hint to Mao. Mao soon responded. On November 14, when meeting with Zeng Siyu (commander of the Wuhan Military Region,) Mao reflected on the Cultural Revolution for the first time. He said, “Some people decided to follow the party after they had been cheated by the vice chairman [Lin Biao] into following him. You should follow the party rather than individuals since both the chairman and vice chairman will change. You should follow the right line. You should follow the leader if he takes the correct line; otherwise, you shouldn’t. Someone came up with a new phrase ‘Follow Chairman Mao closely,’ but I don’t like that.” It should be noted that the phrase “Follow Chairman Mao closely” was presented by Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, but it was directed at Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao did not reject the phrase at that time. Further, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan both closely followed Chairman Mao to the end. Mao personally rehabilitated the February Counter-current Forces and thought that the old marshals had been expressing their opinions and that there was no problem in having several arguments.451 In the spring of 1967, not only Lin Biao and Chen 448. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 74–75. 449. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1893-1894. 450. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1956–1957.

451. Mao said, “What was the nature of the February Counter-current Forces? They intended

to strike down everything, including the premier and old marshals. The old marshals were angry and complained a great deal. They caused a great commotion at party

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Boda but also Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao persecuted the veteran marshals in the February Counter-current Forces. Mao needed veteran marshals and veteran officials in his struggle with Lin Biao and therefore he rehabilitated them personally. At the November 14 meeting, Mao admitted for the first time that the Lin Biao Incident had humiliated the CPC Central Committee and the entire party. However, Mao thought that Lin Biao’s death in the plane crash (Zhou Enlai explained that Lin’s body had been smashed to pieces) had benefited the party and the whole nation and that it was a great victory.452 Though a great victory for Mao himself, the Lin Biao Incident was a serious failure for the party and the country. Lin’s failure was Mao’s failure.453 Also on November 14, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice to the provincial army in line with Mao’s instructions. The notice said that the CPC Central Committee had discovered the guideline for the counter-revolutionary coup in a document titled Summary of Project 571. The document had been found in a secret place belonging to Lin Liguo, Lin Biao’s son, in the Beijing Air Force College when investigating the case of the Lin-Chen anti-party clique. This summary proved that the counter-revolutionary coup of the Lin Biao clique was a calculated act.454 On January 13, 1972, the Central Committee issued a notice on meetings. There were faults with that, but arguments were allowed. They should have spoken to me, but we didn’t clearly understand the situation. Wang, Guan, and Qin

had not been exposed at that point, and many problems needed years to be solved.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1608–1609.) 452. Ibid, 1609. 453. Resolutions of the Central Committee in 1981 pointed out that in 1970 and 1971, the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique plotted to usurp supreme power and launched an armed coup. This was a result of overthrowing a series of the party’s basic principles in the Cultural Revolution. Objectively speaking, that announced the failure of the theory

and practice of the Cultural Revolution. (“Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Selected Important Literatures Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, vol. 2, 813.)

454. The Central Committee pointed out that this counter-revolutionary guideline slandered the party’s history of struggle under the leadership of Chairman Mao in the second half

of the century, and it described the domestic and international situation as gloomy. That

guideline fabricated stories and started rumors to attack the great leader, Chairman Mao, and other leaders in the Central Committee. Its core purpose was to oppose the party’s line at the 9th National Congress and fundamentally change the party’s basic

policy and line during the whole socialist period and with respect to the proletarian

dictatorship and socialism. The clique needed to forge an alliance among landlords,

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organizing discussions, which presented a document titled Struggle against the Lin Biao and Chen Boda Anti-party Clique, which had as an attachment Lin Liguo’s Summary of Project 571. Members of the Political Bureau had different opinions on whether to release the summary since it contained many vicious words attacking Chairman Mao. However, Mao said, “This is a most important document, and it must be released.”455The notice declared that Summary of Project 571 was a counterrevolutionary guideline and a collection of reactionary opinions from landlords, affluent peasants, counter-revolutionaries, vicious individuals, and rightists as well as imperialists, revisionists, and counter-revolutionaries fighting against the party, China, and the Chinese revolution. The summary confused right and wrong; it slandered the party’s history of struggle over the past half century under the leadership of Chairman Mao, aimed to besmirch the great victory of the Chinese people after a long-term struggle, and painted a depressing picture of the domestic and international situation. On December 21, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice on organized discussion about Struggle against the Lin Biao and Chen Boda Anti-party Clique Counter-revolutionary Coup and related materials. The document stated that Mao’s theory about class struggle was correct.456 Mao’s theory about class struggle had rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, vicious individuals, and domestic rightists

so as to build a fascist dictatorship of capitalists; this would then succumb to Soviet revisionist socialist imperialism and lead to an alliance of imperialists, revisionists, and

counter-revolutionaries to fight against the party, China, and the Chinese revolution.

If their plots had succeeded, China would have found itself in a situation like that

described by Chairman Mao, “There would inevitably be national restoration and the

Marxist party would become a revisionist and fascist party, and the whole of China would undergo a massive change.” However, the counter-revolutionary plan of the Lin Biao clique could never succeed. They were just like the other reactionaries who

always evaluated situations poorly and exaggerated their own power. Their references

to a “basic force” and “power to be used” amounted to nothing but an illusion, and

very few people truly followed them in fighting against the revolution. (The Central Committee, Notice on Issuing the Counter-revolutionary Guideline “Summary of Project 571,” November 14, 1970.)

455. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1607. 456. Struggle to Shatter the Counter-revolutionary Coup of the Lin Biao Clique stated that breaking up the counter-revolutionary coup of the Lin Biao and Chen Boda clique was a thrilling

conflict: “That struggle was a continuation of the struggle between the two classes, the two lines, and the two roads since the 9th National Congress—especially since the

Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee—and it was a continuation

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theoretical roots, and it was the inevitable result of his fierce political conflict with Lin Biao. Mao adhered to his theory of class struggle. On January 1, 1972, the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag published a New Year’s editorial entitled “Unite for Greater Success.” The title, which originated in Mao’s Speech at the 9th National Congress of the CPC on April 1, 1969, was an expression of his aspirations and political goals. Mao even asked delegates at the meeting, “Can we achieve greater success after this meeting?” He answered the question himself firmly, “I believe we can.”457 However, Mao himself had to admit that the Lin Biao Incident had humiliated the Central Committee as well as the entire party.458 For the first time, the editorial labeled Lin Biao as a swindler like Liu Shaoqi, and it publicly castigated him.459 What exactly did “swindler like Liu Shaoqi” mean? Mao had said at the 9th National Congress of the CPC, “We elected Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo to the CPC Central Committee (Seventh National Congress,) though we did not know of the struggle between two factions—the proletarian faction headed by Chairman

Mao and the bourgeois faction headed by Lin. Domestically, the coup needed to ally

landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, vicious individuals, and rightists and

establish a fascist dictatorship of capitalists that would succumb to Soviet revisionist socialist imperialism and form an alliance among imperialists, revisionists, and counter-revolutionaries to fight against the party, China, and the Chinese revolution.

The direction of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique reflected the wishes of domestic landlord capitalists and imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries. In the

Cultural Revolution, launched and led by the great leader, Chairman Mao, we shattered the bourgeois faction led by Liu Shaoqi and the counter-revolutionary anti-party clique led by Lin Biao and Chen Boda. This was of profound value in consolidating our proletarian dictatorship and preventing the restoration of capitalism. This was a

heavy attack on imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries. This was a great victory of

Chinese proletariats and the national people as well as a great victory of Mao Zedong Thought and the proletarian lines in our country, led by Chairman Mao.” (The Central Special Case Group, Struggle to Shatter the Counter-revolutionary Coup of the Lin Biao Clique, December 7, 1971.)

457. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 23–24.

458. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1609. 459. The editorial pointed out that the swindlers who joined Liu Shaoqi’s counterrevolutionary activities to restore capitalism were extremely isolated in the party, army,

and the whole nation. The only thing they did was to make plots and start rumors. (People’s Daily, January 1, 1972.)

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much about their political background. Now, after the 8th National Congress, we know much more about them.”460 Mao meant that he had been cheated by Liu Shaoqi at the Seventh National Congress in 1945 and that he had been cheated once again by swindlers like Liu Shaoqi (referring to Lin Biao) at the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969. However, people naturally would ask why he was always appointing swindlers as his successor. On January 2, Zhou Enlai visited Marshal Chen Yi in hospital. On January 6, in his conversations with Zhou and Ye Jianying, Mao said that it had been demonstrated that the February Counter-current Forces had not actually existed, and so no mention of them should henceforth be made.461 Mao asked them to pass this information on to Chen Yi. On the same day, Ye Jianying went to the hospital to convey the information to Chen, and a couple of hours later Chen passed away.462 Also on January 2, when checking Chen Yi’s memorial speech, Zhou added in an evaluation of his life, saying that Chen’s achievements outweighed his errors. Mao checked the content and remarked, “Such an evaluation is inappropriate at a memorial.”463 On January 10, Mao, who was himself sick, unexpectedly attended Marshal Chen Yi’s memorial, and he praised Chen highly.464 Mao’s praise politically rehabilitated Chen, who was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. It was a significant move in liberating veteran officials. In this regard, Zhou Enlai said on August 1, “We veteran cadres loyal to Chairman Mao were moved that Chairman Mao attended Chen Yi’s memorial.”465 This also reflected Mao’s attitude of liberating veteran officials after persecuting them. To be more specific, it was the Lin Biao Incident that made Mao change his mind. Mao remarked to Prince Sihanouk, who attended Chen Yi’s memorial, “I would like to tell you that my ‘close comrade’ Lin Biao boarded a plane to the Soviet Union on September 13 last year, but he died in a crash in Undurkhaan. Lin Biao fought with me, but Chen Yi supported me...I had only one ‘close comrade,’ but 460. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 24.

461. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 2010. 462. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 45. 463. Ibid, 46. 464. Mao said, “Chen Yi followed the line of the Central Committee of the CPC that we

should be united. He had several arguments with me, but that doesn’t matter at all.

If Lin Biao’s plot had succeeded, he would have struck all of us down.” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 270.)

465. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1615.

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he wanted to assassinate me. He escaped and died when his plot was uncovered. Are you all here today not my close comrades?...Although Chen Yi sometimes had arguments with me, we worked together very well for several decades. Chen Yi was not different from the others like Lin Biao, who plotted a coup and wanted to surrender to the Soviet Union.”466 Mao was in fact too sick to speak coherently, but he had not realized that the Lin Biao Incident was the inevitable result of his having promoted class struggle and that it represented the total failure of the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution. The Lin Biao Incident dealt such a severe mental blow to Mao that his health rapidly worsened. Chen Yi’s death delivered another misfortune, and Mao was left in a low spirits and felt very tired. In the early hours of February 12, Mao lost consciousness and his heart stopped beating owing to a pulmonary disorder and oxygen deficiency. After emergency treatment, Mao was revived in the afternoon.467 This was the second time that he had come close to death after the Lin Biao Incident. The CPC Central Committee assigned Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Dongxing to supervise his care and set up a medical team to attend to him. Mao was unable to regain his health after this serious condition. He did not attend important meetings or give long speeches, and he made few remarks on documents that year.468 From that point on, Mao was unable to work, let alone run the country. However, this was kept top secret, and even staff in Zhongnanhai were unaware about Mao’s health issues. Several days later, on February 21, when Mao met with U.S. President Richard Nixon, photographs of the meeting were published following approval by Zhou Enlai, showing Mao as healthy, smiling, and chatting with the visiting delegation. But Du Xiuxian, the photographer, would later disclose that when he was taking the photos, a team of tense medical workers with medical equipment was standing by behind a screen in case of an emergency.469 On March 17, the CPC Central Committee issued the Summary of Chairman Mao’s Conversations with Local Heads When Touring outside Beijing. The notice stated that Chairman Mao’s conversations were to be published as guidance documents to educate the party and the army about ideology and the political line, to promote party and army construction, and would be used as a powerful weapon to defeat the remainder of the Lin Biao clique. 466. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao, 103. 467. Ibid, 107. 468. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1610–1617. 469. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao, 107–113.

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On May 20, the CPC Central Committee issued the first Reference Document for Reporting the Meeting for Criticizing Lin and the Rectification Movement, which included nine articles by Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Ke, Zeng Shan, Deng Zihui, and Cai Chang. As the name indicates, the document criticized and examined Lin. A representative article was that by Nie Rongzhen.470 Xiao Ke commented on the Lin Biao Incident and summed up Lin’s personal characteristics. These articles represented the prevailing views of veteran officials: they focused mostly on Lin’s moral character but did not examine the underlying reasons for the Lin Biao Incident or Mao’s personal responsibilities in that regard. All their articles praised Mao for his wisdom and greatness, and that made Mao happy. On May 21, the CPC Central Committee held its first plenary session about the Criticizing Lin and Rectification Movement, and about 312 people attended the meeting. Zhou Enlai gave a speech to explain the reason for changing the name of the meeting from “Criticizing Chen and Rectification” to “Criticizing Lin and Rectification.”471 In particular, he stated that the most important document for 470. Nie Rongzhen pointed out that he supported Lin Biao as elected successor at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee. Even though he knew

that Lin had made mistakes in the past, he thought that perhaps Lin had corrected his faults under the education of Chairman Mao through all these years. Nie stated that

he had also made some efforts to help correct Lin’s mistakes. Therefore, Nie did not suspect that anything was amiss in electing Lin as the successor. At the Second Plenary

Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee, Nie realized that perhaps the crimes of Chen Boda, Huang, Wu, Ye, Li, and Qiu were connected with Lin, but Nie had never

supposed that Lin was so designing and hated Chairman Mao to the extent that he plotted to murder the chairman and that he was a traitor and collaborator. Now, Lin had been exposed and Nie found that a thrilling process. Lin had revealed himself as

an aspirant and schemer, and that had finally led to his death. People felt deeply about Chairman Mao’s greatness and his keen insight which caused the complete failure of

Lin’s plots. Nie believed that that was a really good thing: “From my experience of over 50 years, I believe it to be true that anyone who intends to divide the party and plots against Chairman Mao will come to a bad end.” (“Nie Rongzhen’s Letter to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of CPC,” November 18, 1971. )

471. Zhou Enlai said, “From the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee to the September 13 Incident, we were concentrating on Criticizing Chen and

Rectification. But since September 13, we have known the truth that the leader was Lin Biao, not Chen Boda and Lin Biao, and he did not want Gao [Gang] and Rao [Shushi] as

allies. Lin Biao conducted a conspiracy and his anti-chairman and anti-party thoughts

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the meeting was Mao’s letter to Jiang Qing on July 8, 1966. Zhou said that after Lin’s speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau on May 18, 1966, that speech was submitted to Chairman Mao, who made many amendments. Chairman Mao was somewhat upset because the coup had been described improperly. Zhou praised Chairman Mao for his amendments: he was able to point out the weak points and identify all problems. Zhou said, “Of course, Chairman Mao’s remarks were not aimed at Lin Biao but at the rightists. The letter referred to Lin Biao’s leftism, but what had appeared to be leftism was actually rightism. Lin Biao was a rightist. Chairman Mao said that rightists reappear every 7 or 8 years, but this time it took only 6 years. Only our great leader, Chairman Mao, could have made so accurate a prediction. The content of that letter was accurate for the whole of the Cultural Revolution.”472 In Jiang Qing’s words, Chairman Mao realized early that Lin was not a Marxist.” From June 10 to 12, Zhou Enlai submitted his long report Personal Understanding of the Party’s Six Line Struggles in the Period of New Democratic Revolution in the form of three speeches at a meeting for Criticizing Lin and Rectification. The six line struggles consisted of the following: Chen Duxiu’s right capitulationism in the great revolution period; Qu Qiubai’s putschism; Li Sanli’s adventurism; Luo Zhanglong’s right separatism; Wang Ming’s left dogmatism and Zhang Guotao’s right separatism in the land revolution period; and Wang Ming’s right capitulationism in the Japanese War period. When talking about the issues of Wang Ming’s left-deviation and right-deviation, Zhou blamed some of his own actions. He said, “During these two line struggles, I could not have managed if Chairman Mao hadn’t taught me, saved me, and given me another chance. I always have and always will think that I am the one who assists Mao but not as the helmsman.” In the speech, Zhou explained how he viewed himself, and he expressed his political loyalty rather than his political ambition. In a conversation with Wang Li, Mao said, “Whoever rules the country—Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, or myself—he cannot do it without Zhou Enlai.”473 Zhou clearly understood Mao’s political opinions and arrangements. Zhou’s report was submitted to Mao on June existed over a long period. He took the lead to fight Chairman Mao after Liu Shaoqi.

Finally, his conspiracy was exposed and failed. With this 10th line struggle, we are aiming at criticizing, exposing, and defeating the Lin Biao anti-party clique.”

472. “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee Meeting

for Criticizing Lin and Rectification,” May 31, 1972; Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 827–828.

473. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 1, 319.

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7, and Mao made remarks on it. Zhou wrote the report based on two conversations with Mao about lessons from the party’s line struggles. Zhou used his experience to advise those who were connected with the Lin Biao Incident so that they could make a full confession and correct their mistakes as quickly as possible.474 On June 23, in accordance with Mao’s instructions, Zhou Enlai presented the report The Truth about the Kuomintang Publishing the Fabricated Wu Hao Notice. (Wu Hao was an alias that had Zhou formerly used.) Red Guards claimed to have discovered the “Declaration of Wu Hao” (about Zhou quitting the CPC as reported in newspapers before 1949; Zhou wrote to Jiang Qing, saying that the announcement was a fabrication of the enemy) in the last session of the meeting. He said, “Members of the CPC need to take responsibility for this historical issue and to clarify it for the party and the global communist movement. The ’Wu Hao Notice’ was a Kuomintang scheme.”475 The CPC Central Committee explained the matter of the issued document using some original materials and sent these to the top leaders. Mao said, “We have done this to inform top party leaders about the truth to prevent anyone using this event to frame Zhou Enlai.”476 After the Lin Biao Incident, Zhou ranked second in the party after Mao. With his deep understanding of CPC politics, Zhou was fully aware that the second leader never came to a good end. Therefore, when he became group leader of the Liu Shaoqi Special Case Group, he worried that he would become persecuted as a traitor like Liu Shaoqi. Zhou was tormented by the Wu Hao incident, which Jiang Qing would use to attack him for the rest of his life. On June 28, when meeting with the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Mao said, “Years ago, unrest in China led to full-scale civil war. There were different cliques supported by different troops. The so-called leftist clique was counter-revolutionary. A few years later, that clique’s backstage manipulator got on a plane to take him to the Soviet Union, and he died in a plane crash.” Zhou Enlai also attended that meeting.477 Although Mao admitted that the Cultural Revolution was an era of civil unrest and civil war, he regarded Lin Biao—not himself—as the backstage manipulator. Lin was the scapegoat who persecuted the veteran marshals and launched full-scale civil war. 474. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 528–529.

475. Ibid, 531. 476. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 828.

477. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 834–835.

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On July 2, with the approval of Mao, the CPC Central Committee issued the Notice of the Investigation Report on the Counter-revolutionary Crimes of Chen Boda, a Kuomintang Anti-communist, Trotskyist, Traitor, and Spy with related materials. Before that notice, Mao had branded Chen a Kuomintang anti-communist, traitor, and spy. The Central Special Case Group, headed by Zhou Enlai, thus applied five political labels to Chen.478 This investigation report clearly provided a basis for Mao’s political labeling of Chen in March 1971. Chen had long served as Mao’s political secretary and assistant. He was the main contributor to Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution and acted as a political hatchet man in eliminating Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao had complete power over Chen. It was ironic that Chen was treated as he had treated others. On July 10, when meeting with Schumann, the French foreign minister, Mao talked about his relationship with Lin Biao: “Lin Biao praised me every day, but he actually wanted to kill me. I had fought alongside him for decades and he became a close comrade and vice chairman. Finally, in the space of just one year—from the Lushan Conference to last year—he was unable to wait to seize power. No one had thought that he would escape by plane and die.” Zhou Enlai also attended that meeting.479 At a meeting on August 1 and 2, Zhou Enlai explained the reasons for the Lin Biao Incident and the lessons to be learned from it. He said, “It is not right to say that Chairman Mao was unaware of Lin Biao’s problems when he intended to eliminate Liu Shaoqi. Chairman Mao was in fact conscious of Lin Biao’s anti-party problems at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. But that is not how we see problems as party members, and it was not Chairman Mao’s style of work. We need to address problems from the perspective of history, dialectics, and development. A person’s thoughts change and we cannot be certain that Lin Biao’s thoughts did 478. The conclusion of the examination was as follows: Chen Boda was a Kuomintang anticommunist. He joined the Trotskyist organization in 1929 in Moscow and continued to plot anti-communist activities. He was arrested in Tianjin in 1931 and became a spy and

communicated with the Soviets behind the backs of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee. He persistently pursued revisionism in the socialist revolution period

and intended to restore capitalism. The survey of the Special Case Group proved that Chen Boda was a flagitious Kuomintang anti-communist, Trotskyist, traitor, spy, and

revisionist. (The Central Committee, Notice on Issuing the Examination Report of the

Kuomintang Anti-communist, Trotskyist, Traitor, and Spy Chen Boda’s Counter-revolutionary Historical Crimes, July 2, 1972.

479. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution”, 837.

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not undergo any change. It took us time to see through Lin Biao. That is why we elected him vice chairman. Lin Biao deceived us. Lin Biao became the successor for historical reasons and due to how situations inside the party developed. All in all, the Lin Biao Incident amounted to a bitter lesson.”480 On behalf of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou gave the above historical explanation and basic view of the Lin Biao Incident. But he did not specify what that lesson was and why that lesson should be learned. He did not explain the role of Mao and the Central Committee in the incident or how to prevent something similar happening again. After 1972, Mao began to review some important cases, halt the practice in the Cultural Revolution of attacking everything and everyone, and implement the cadre policy. Mao first turned his attention to Deng Xiaoping. On 10 January, when Mao attended Chen Yi’s memorial, he said that Deng and Liu Shaoqi were different cases and that Deng’s problem involved contradictions among the people. Zhou Enlai also attended Chen Yi’s memorial. Mao decided that it was time to reinstate Deng after the death of Lin Biao,481 and Zhou made efforts to create a favorable public opinion for that. On January 24, Zhou Enlai met representatives attending the Xinjiang Working Meeting in Beijing with several members of the Political Bureau (including Jiang Qing.) Zhou said that the Lin Biao clique intended to make an issue of Deng Xiaoping entering the conflict between ourselves and the enemy, which was against Chairman Mao’s expectations.482 On March 25, Mao made remarks about the case of Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi: “The case may have been improperly handled because of Lin Biao’s version of the story.”483 Owing to obstruction by Kang Sheng, those three generals were not liberated until July 1974. In March, Xu Bing, former minister of the United Front Work Department died. In April, Chen Zhengren, minister in the State Council before the Cultural Revolution (Minister of Agricultural Machinery,) Zeng Shan (Minister of Internal Affairs,) and Li Dequan (former Minister of Public Health) also died. Their deaths came as a shock to Zhou Enlai, and he stated that veteran officials were valuable assets of the party. He instructed that the health of officials above vice minister should be checked toward improving their medical conditions. He proposed the implementation of the cadre policy. 480. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 4, 2004. 481. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 215. 482. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1958.

483. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 67.

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On April 24, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled, “Learn from Past Mistakes to Avoid Future Ones and Cure the Sickness to Save the Patient,” after approval by Zhou Enlai. The article stated, “We should strictly distinguish between conflicts with our enemies and conflicts among the people: these are two different kinds of conflict. Except for a few class enemies that have wormed their way into the party and incorrigible persons, we follow a policy of educating all comrades who made mistakes—irrespective of whether they are old or new comrades or comrades within or outside the party. We shall use the formula of ‘unite-criticizeunite’ to educate them.” Zhou Enlai carried out many policies to liberate veteran officials and allow them to recover their benefits. In July, Chen Yun, who was sent to work in a petrochemical machinery plant in Jiangxi Province, wrote a letter to Mao and the CPC Central Committee to request that he be allowed to do some proper work. On July 22, Mao agreed with his request.484 Following Zhou Enlai’s proposal and arrangements, before long Chen had joined the Service Group of the State Council and was responsible for economic (mainly foreign trade) work. Chen wrote a letter to Mao and returned to work earlier than Deng Xiaoping, though Chen’s position was not too high. Mao said, “Chen Yun is always a rightist and cannot be put in an important position.”485 Mao’s opinion affected Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing, who prevented Chen being accepted by the Political Bureau in 1977. On August 3, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao and the Central Committee about Lin Biao and Chen Boda and asked to be allowed to return to work. Deng assured Mao and the committee that he would never request his verdict to be reversed.486 484. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1621. 485. Jin and Chen eds., Biography of Chen Yun, vol. 2, 1464. 486. Deng Xiaoping said in his letter, “I think Lin Biao is a jealous and mean person. Lin Biao

said he held high the flag of Mao Zedong Thought. Now, we can see that he really held the red flag to fight against the red flag and that he was prepared to usurp power. Chen

Boda struck me as an arrogant, false person, who never criticized himself. He had the ability to write and he was jealous of others who could also write. Chairman, you know

that Lin Biao and Chen Boda would have been happy with my death. I cannot imagine what I would be like without the Chairman’s protection. I am so happy to celebrate

with the people of the nation the victory of breaking Lin Biao’s counter-revolutionary

clique after the shattering of Liu Shaoqi’s counter-revolutionary capitalist faction. As for me and my mistakes, I have reviewed what I wrote in “My Self-introduction” in June and July 1968. I still admit those errors and assure the Central Committee of my

promise that I will never seek to have my verdict reversed. In the letter to Chairman

Mao in November last year [1971], I asked to work for the party. Here is my thought:

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Deng knew that Mao wanted to know his stand on criticizing Lin Biao and also on Deng’s own mistakes during the Cultural Revolution. Beyond Deng’s expectations, Mao gave him a quick answer.487 On August 14, Mao stressed in his remarks on Deng’s letter, “Deng Xiaoping’s mistakes were serious, but we need to distinguish his mistakes from those of Liu Shaoqi.” As early as July 14, 1967, in his conversation with Wang Li, Mao did not agree with the notion of eliminating Liu and Deng together. He said, “Deng Xiaoping can be ousted for one year; two years at most. Xiaoping can be compared to Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi in his knowledge of literature and with Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai in military affairs. Only Deng Xiaoping can command two field armies (the second and third field armies.) If Lin Biao is not well, I need Deng to be able to work. Xiaoping can shoulder heavy responsibilities and is good at making decisions. His shortcoming is that he is hot tempered and likes to make quick decisions, though that doesn’t matter. He doesn’t aim to grab all the power and he can get the best out of people.”488 In November of that year, Mao said again that Deng and Liu should be treated differently.489 Zhou understood Mao’s thinking very well.490 It is clear then that Mao had been considering the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping for a long time: he had even thought about replacing Lin Biao with Deng Xiaoping as his successor. Upon reflecting on Deng, who was thousands I have been isolated from society and worked for five to six years since I committed those mistakes, and I have been hoping that there might be a chance for me to correct

my mistakes in work and return to the Chairman’s proletarian revolutionary line.

Although I am 68 years old, I still feel well. I can do some technical work (such as

checking and research work) and should be able to work for the party and the people for seven or eight years to make some amendments for my mistakes. I have no other

requirements, and I await instructions from the Chairman and Central Committee.

(Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 31; Deng, My Father Deng

Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 234–235; Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1974), vol. 2, 1959–1960.)

487. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 234–235. 488. Wang, Reflections of Wang Li, vol. 1, 319. 489. On November 5, 1967, Mao said to members of the Central Military Group, “We need to criticize Deng Xiaoping, and the Central Military Committee needs to prepare an

article for this. My opinion is that we need to distinguish him from Liu Shaoqi and treat

them separately.” (Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”,

62.)

490. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 28.

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of kilometers away, Mao decided to reinstate him after Lin’s death on September 13.491 On August 15, Zhou Enlai chaired a Political Bureau meeting to convey Mao’s instructions. Zhou chaired Political Bureau meetings many times to discuss Deng Xiaoping’s reinstatement, though this was delayed because of opposition by Jiang Qing and others.492 On September 29, the State Council approved and issued the State Council’s Report on Housing Conditions of Veteran Cadres, High-Level Intellectuals and Patriotic Personages. The document stated that veteran cadres were officials above viceminister level, high-level intellectuals were professors above level 3, and patriotic personages were members of the NPC and Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In December, Mao received a letter from Liu Jianzhang’s wife, vice minister of the Ministry of Railways. He commented on that, “Who carries out this kind of fascist inspection method? It should be abolished.”493 Clearly, the Central Special 491. Mao’s remark about Deng Xiaoping’s letter: “Deng Xiaoping’s mistakes are serious, but we need to distinguish him from Liu Shaoqi. First, he was criticized in the Central

Soviet Area and was called one of the four sinners: Deng [Xiaoping], Mao [Zetan], Xie

[Weijun], and Gu [Bai] and leader of the Maoists. Materials criticizing Deng include “Two Lines” and “Since the Sixth National Congress.” The man who criticized him was Zhang Wentian. Second, Deng had no historical problems, which means that he

did not give in to enemies. Third, he assisted Liu Bocheng in the war very ably and had many successful battles to his credit. In addition, Deng has done some good things, for

example, he didn’t bow to Soviet revisionism when he led the delegation to negotiate in

Moscow. I have said this many times, and now I want to say it again.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 308.)

492. Deng Rong believed that, after the death of Lin Biao, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, headed by Jiang Qing, had greater power. He also believed it strongly opposed the return of old officials like Deng Xiaoping, and it firmly resisted such efforts. At that time, the Central Cultural Revolution Group had become the only supportive force for continuing the Cultural Revolution, and Mao had to rely on them in that respect. Mao

had to take their opposition into consideration.” (Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 236.)

493. Liu Shuqing, wife of the former vice minister of Railway Department, Liu Jianzhang, wrote to Mao on October 20, 1972. She said in her letter that Liu Jianzhang joined the party in 1926: “He is 62 years old this year, and he has been in prison for inspection

since February 1968—five years. On June 8, 1972, the Central Special Case Group gave us notice that we could visit him in prison, and I found that he was not well at all. He

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Case Group persecuted veteran comrades using fascist inspection methods, and Liu Jianzhang was just one of those cases. Mao and Zhou Enlai were very much aware that many illegal activities had taken place during the Cultural Revolution.494 On December 17, when talking with Zhou Enlai, Mao said that Tan Zhenlin was a good comrade and that he should be liberated.495 Zhou Enlai wrote to Ji Dengkui and Wang Dongxing, who were in charge of cadre inspection in the Political Bureau, and urged them to reinstate Tan Zhenlin and Deng Xiaoping.496 That day, Zhou Enlai had a conversation with Ji and Wang about the issue. On December 27, Ji Dengkui and Wang Dongxing reported to Zhou about the reinstatement of Tan Zhenlin and Deng Xiaoping, and they suggested that Deng Xiaoping become vice premier of the State Council. Mao soon accepted Zhou’s proposal concerning Deng Xiaoping’s position.497 Zhou was battling with cancer at that time, and somebody was very thin and could not articulate words clearly. The living conditions of the prison

were very bad, with only three cups of water to drink and 30 minutes to walk outside. He had no access to any political information.” She begged in her letter to change this kind of inspection method and allow frequent family visits or permit Liu Jianzheng

to wait at home for the conclusion of the inspection and seek medical care. Mao: “Remarks on the Letter of Liu Jianzhang’s Family,” December 1972. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since

the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 334.)

494. In accordance with the essence of Mao’s remarks, Zhou Enlai gave the following instructions on December 18, 1972: “The Ministry of Public Security and garrisons

should make a thorough check of prisons in Beijing this year. Any type of “fascist inspection method” and abuse needs to be listed, announced in the presence of

prisoners, and then terminated. Anyone who violates this shall be punished. Prisoners

should also be allowed to make accusations. Reports should contain full details.” (Ibid.) 495. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 32. 496. The content of Zhou Enlai’s letter was as follows: “Chairman Mao instructed me that

although Tan Zhenlin made some mistakes [they realized then that Tan Zhenlin had failed in Huai Rentang and that it was Lin Biao’s plot to use this to attack old cadres], he is a good comrade and we should allow him to return. Chairman Mao told me to

deal with this matter. Tan suffered in Guilin, so please take good care of him. Wang Liangen is aware of Tan Zhenlin’s condition and you can ask him about Tan’s family.

The family of Deng Xiaoping asked that he be allowed to do something for the party, and Chairman Mao discussed this matter several times. Please consider this too.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 340.)

497. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1650.

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was needed to take over daily governmental work. Mao therefore decided to reinstate Deng as soon as possible. On January 12, 1973, Tan Zhenlin, who had been sent to Guangxi to perform manual labor, wrote to Mao, and Mao forwarded the letter to members of the Political Bureau.498 In August 1973, Tan Zhenlin was elected member of the Central Committee at the 10th National Congress of the CPC. In February, when receiving the notice from the Central Committee allowing him to return to Beijing, Deng Xiaoping said, “I can work for China for another 20 years.” It would be 1993 in another 20 years. Like Mao, Deng was a leader who fulfilled his political ambitions. On March 3, Mao said at a Political Bureau meeting, “We need unity as well as stability.” That was Mao’s first step toward a policy of unity and stability in the Cultural Revolution. However, he never implemented the policy adequately. He also said apologetically, “I had no idea that so many veteran cadres were suffering. My purpose was to cut out bureaucracy, not purge veteran cadres.” Zhou Enlai said, “It seems that the cadre policy was not effectively implemented.” Mao replied to Zhou, “You address the issue!”499 In the first half of 1973, after reading letters from Tan Zhenlin, He Changgong, Li Yimeng, Shu Tong, Tan Zheng, Lin Tie, and Ye Fei or their families, all of whom had suffered in the Cultural Revolution, Mao instructed the relevant departments to liberate them soon and assign them work. Ji Dengkui and Wang Dongxing (alternate members of the Political Bureau) were in charge of this, and Mao issued most of his instructions to them. The Organization Department, the political working group of the State Council Office, and the General Political Department of the PLA made their lists, and there were 300 people in all. These officials came from different levels of the party, government, and army.500 According to statistics from 1969 to 1976, 49 veteran officials were liberated following Mao’s approval. 1972 could be called “Liberation Year,” when 22 persons were liberated, including Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, and Chen Yun. Perhaps Mao did not then foresee that his decisions and arrangements would help those veteran cadres in toppling the Jiang Qing clique and allow Deng and Chen—the younger generation of Chinese leaders—to be reinstated, thereby starting China’s reform and opening-up. After the Lin Biao Incident, Mao changed his attitude and was too ill to do 498. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 340.

499. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 56–57. 500. Ibid,.57.

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much work. That made it possible for Zhou Enlai, who presided over the daily work of the Central Committee, to reshape policies on cadres, intellectuals, the economy and other areas and to restore the normal functioning of the party and national institutions. On many occasions, Zhou proposed that the ultra-left trend of thought, which he believed to be a worldwide phenomenon, should be criticized. He said, “There is an ultra-left trend of thought in China too—in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies of foreign countries. Lin Biao was responsible for reinforcing the ultra-left trend of thought everywhere: it is characterized by empty talk about proletarian politics, extreme formalism, vague generalizations, and it is against Mao Zedong Thought.” Zhou stressed that service was extremely important, and each department should liberate its veteran officials.501 This meant that the Central Committee accepted the proposal that Tan Zhenlin and the other six members of the Political Bureau made for correcting their mistakes during the Cultural Revolution. On July 2, 1973, when meeting with Professor Yang Zhenning, Zhou Enlai agreed with him that basic science in China was very poor and that there was a lack of communication with other countries. On July 14, Zhou Enlai advised Zhou Peiyuan, president of Beijing University, to promote research at that university. In early September, when meeting with Abdus Salam, science advisor to the president of Pakistan, Zhou Enlai said, “What I am dissatisfied with the most is the lack of research and ignorance of theories.” Zhou Enlai wrote to eighteen scientists, including Zhang Wenyu, and he stressed, “The Academy of Sciences must be devoted to basic research and theoretical research, and it should combine theoretical research with scientific experiments.” He said to Professor Li Zhengdao that it should be possible to go to college directly after high school without having to undertake a two-year work period.502 It was also during this period that Zhou Enlai instructed relevant departments to assign working teams to ethnic regions to implement ethnic policy. In accordance with Zhou Enlai’s instructions, the People’s Daily published three articles, including one titled “Anarchism as a Counter-revolutionary Tool by Marxist Swindlers—Study Notes Signed by Long Yan.” The articles criticized ultra-leftist lines and anarchism, and they so angered Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan that they made all efforts to find out who wrote them. The political struggle among the top leaders of the Central Committee suddenly became fierce and each side tried to win over Mao’s political support. On October 18, Zhou Enlai met with the head of the Ministry of Public Security and criticized him for following the ultra501. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1821. 502. Ibid, 1822–1823.

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left trend of thought, which denied everything. In fact, Zhou Enlai rectified only some minor errors—not fundamental ones— of the Cultural Revolution; he was unable to repudiate the Cultural Revolution itself. Even so, his rectification was questioned by Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, and it made Mao so dissatisfied that Mao changed his attitude immediately and stopped the rectification. On November 28, the Application Report of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Holding a Foreign Affairs Meeting proposed that the purpose of the meeting would be to criticize the ultra-left trend of thought and anarchism instigated by the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique. On November 30, Zhou Enlai endorsed this report. But on December 1, Zhang Chunqiao asked, “Is the ultra-left trend of thought the main problem at present? Is criticizing Lin the same as criticizing the ultra-left trend of thought and anarchism?” On December 2, Jiang Qing commented, “I think we should criticize the Lin Biao clique for its ultra-rightist thoughts and Lin Biao for seeming to be ultra-leftist but actually being ultra-rightist on some problems. We shall stress our success in the proletarian Cultural Revolution while criticizing Lin Biao. That clique could not have been uncovered without the Cultural Revolution, which would have led to greater damage to the party and the people.” On December 3, Zhou Enlai had to concede, deleting sentences about criticizing the ultra-left trend of thought and anarchism in the report when he chaired the Political Bureau meeting to discuss the issue.503 On December 5, Wang Ruoshui of the People’s Daily wrote to Zhou Enlai, agreeing with Zhou on criticizing the ultra-left trend of thought. On December 6, Mao met with Jiang Qing and asked her to pass on Wang Ruoshui’s letter to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan. Zhou remarked on the letter, “I agree that we should discuss this within the Political Bureau.” That day, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan met and talked with the head of the People’s Daily. Yao Wenyuan said, “The chairman has said that Lin Biao was a rightist all the time, and his theory and practice are both rightist.” Zhang Chunqiao said, “Is great disorder anarchism? In the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao called on the Red Guards to rebel. That threw the country into disorder and caused some damage, such as to the railway, but it was not a major problem. It was the chairman’s decision to suspend the party’s organizational life, but that could not be called anarchism...It was class struggles and lack of unity in the party, not the people’s anarchism, that affected production. It does not seem appropriate to criticize the ultra-left trend of thought. Lin Biao changed his mind about things, so 503. Ibid, 1825–1826.

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how can we criticize him only for ultra-left thoughts? His giving in to the Soviet Union was ultra-rightist.”504 From December 15 to 16, Zhou Enlai chaired a Political Bureau meeting to discuss Wang Ruoshui’s letter to Mao and the issue of criticizing the ultra-left trend of thought. The two sides of the debate were headed by Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing, and the result was a heated argument. Mao did not attend the meeting, but decided about it afterward. Mao stated clearly that he supported Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao in the matter. On December 17, when talking with Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, Mao said, “I don’t think Wang Ruoshui’s letter is correct. We need to criticize the ultra-left trend of thought a little less.” Regarding Zhou’s proposal for criticizing the ultra-left trend of thought and anarchism, Mao stated that Lin Biao was not an ultra-leftist but an ultra-rightist. Mao said that Lin was a revisionist and a traitor of the party and the country.505 Previously, when meeting foreign guests on June 8, Mao said, “The ultra-leftists are the ones who burned the British agencies and intended to eliminate Zhou Enlai one day and Chen Yi and Ye Jianying another day. These so-called leftists are all in prison now and are actually counter-revolutionaries. Their backstage manipulator was Lin Biao, who was an ultra-leftist.” This reflected Mao’s final say on everything. He could call someone a leftist today and a rightist tomorrow. He could deny others as well as himself according to his need for political struggle. Mao knew clearly that the Cultural Revolution would be fundamentally repudiated and that he would be criticized too if Lin was censured for being a leftist. On December 19, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan talked with Lu Ying, Wu Lengxi, and Wang Ruoshui from the People’s Daily. Zhou admitted that the CPC Central Committee had not undertaken sufficient theoretical discussion about criticizing leftists. Zhou dropped his political proposal and obeyed Mao again, which reflected Mao’s domineering presence and Zhou’s blind loyalty and cowardice. Unlike Zhou, Deng Xiaoping dared to fight directly with Jiang Qing, and Deng rejected Mao’s proposal for the campaign of combating the “Rightist Deviationists’ Attempt to Reverse Verdicts” and began all-out rectification in 1975. Deng was resilient and unafraid of once again being eliminated. The content of Mao’s conversation of December 17 was related to the party. On January 1, 1973, the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag published an editorial entitled “New Year’s Message,” which officially conveyed the gist of that conversation.506 This meant that Lin Biao could be criticized only for being ultra504. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 277–278. 505. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1648. 506. The article stated, “Swindlers [meaning Lin Biao] followed the Liu Shaoqi line of

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rightist, nothing else.507 Mao had the final say, which was the root cause of his failure in his later years. Also on January 1, Red Flag published an article entitled “Fully Address Problems” written by Nan Yu. This was an attempt to clarify doubts regarding the Cultural Revolution because of the Lin Biao Incident. The article claimed that breaking up the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique was the most remarkable achievement of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, and it constituted an important indication of the stable situation in China. This article reflected the main thrust of Jiang Qing’s remarks on December 2 indicated above. That was how Mao and Jiang evaluated the Cultural Revolution even though Mao’s theory and practice in that revolution had been a total failure. On March 25, to quash talk of the Cultural Revolution having been a failure, Mao said, at a Political Bureau meeting, “How can people say that? The Cultural Revolution revealed both the Liu Shaoqi clique and the Lin Biao clique, which is a great success. Without this revolution, how could Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao have been revealed and eliminated?”508 However, the people were not stupid and could not be deceived. If they were unaware that the Cultural Revolution was a failure when the Liu Shaoqi clique was eliminated, they definitely became aware of this when the Lin Biao clique was defeated. In March, Tu Deyong, a teacher at Chengdu Telecom Engineering College, wrote and posted to numerous universities and Revolutionary Committees Ten Crimes of the Cultural Revolution, in which he stated that the Cultural Revolution was “the most disastrous result of the left deviation line in the party’s history, and it is a dreadful calamity for the party and the people.” counter-revolutionary revisionism. They believed in revisionism rather than Marxism; they tried to achieve division instead of unity; they betrayed the party and the country and became traitors. Their purpose was to fundamentally change the party’s basic lines and policies in the socialist historical period, overturn the proletarian dictatorship, and

restore capitalism. They wanted to reinstate the landlord capitalists, who had been

removed by the party and people of the whole nation. Domestically, they needed

to ally landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, vicious individuals, and

rightists to set up a fascist dictatorship of capitalists, succumb to Soviet revisionist socialist imperialism, and form an alliance of imperialists, revisionists, and counterrevolutionaries to fight against the party, China, and the Chinese revolution. This was the essence of their revisionist lines. We must grasp the essence of this and criticize it in

depth.” (“New Year’s Message—Editorial for the New Year,” People’s Daily, January 1, 1973.)

507. Jin ed., Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 1827. 508. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1654.

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(Sidebar 4.1.) This showed that even an ordinary citizen could objectively see that Mao’s Cultural Revolution had failed and was unpopular.

Sidebar 4.1 Tu Deyong: Ten Crimes of the Cultural Revolution (March 1973) The Cultural Revolution is the most disastrous result of the left deviation line in the party’s history, and it is a dreadful calamity for the party and the people. The 10 monumental errors of the Cultural Revolution are as follows: 1. The Cultural Revolution resulted in the mental, political, and even physical persecution of more than 90% of cadres and more than 60% of the masses, which dented the cadres’ and the masses’ enthusiasm for socialist construction and their political loyalty to the party. 2. The Cultural Revolution allowed a handful of schemers, such as Lin Biao, Zhang Chunqiao, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda, to usurp Party leadership, which led to a terrible disaster for the country and the party. 3. The Cultural Revolution destroyed industrial production and depleted financial resources. 4. The Cultural Revolution caused the fields of science, culture, education, and art in China to suffer a historical catastrophe. 5. The Cultural Revolution isolated the party and the country internationally, causing ideological confusion all over the world and seriously blocking world revolution. 6. The Cultural Revolution corrupted social morality and made young people commit crimes. 7. The Cultural Revolution provoked division and incited hatred among people and even caused people to kill one another. 8. The Cultural Revolution damaged the party’s prestige, reduced the fighting capacity of the armed forces, and destroyed the party’s democratic centralism. 9. The Cultural Revolution caused a split in the army and ended the fine traditions of the PLA. 10. The Cultural Revolution destroyed the proletarian dictatorship and produced confusion in class alignments. Source: “The Gentle Scholar Against the Cultural Revolution: A Complete Account of the Tu Deyong Affair,” Sichuan News Network, September 8, 2009.

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Mao’s instructions were that Zhou Enlai had to lead the whole nation in the Criticizing Lin and the Rectification Movement and in the change from criticizing the ultra-left to criticizing the ultra-right. Correcting the mistakes made in the Cultural Revolution would represent a serious setback for Mao.509 But in 1975, Deng Xiaoping presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee and began all-out rectification efforts to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. Deng resisted the counterattack of the Gang of Four, and Zhou Enlai said that Deng had done better than him in that regard. Although Deng’s rectification efforts were halted by Mao, this was seen as a prelude to reform and opening-up. It should be noted that from the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution, there were positive forces against it. Although these forces were always suppressed by Mao, they continued despite opposition, ultimately grew stronger, and resulted in the breaking up of the Gang of Four after Mao’s death. In this period, China made great progress in foreign affairs. Mao’s meeting with American President Nixon provided a great opportunity for Deng’s reform and opening-up in 1978. Previously, on December 3, 1969, the American ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, directly passed on instructions from the American government to the Chinese ambassador in Poland, stating that they hoped to resume diplomatic relations with China. Zhou Enlai had immediately reported this to Mao, who said, “We have found the way and the stepping-stone!” In October 1970, Nixon privately sent a message to China, indicating that he wished for a summit meeting. In November, with the approval of Mao, Zhou Enlai sent a message to America that the Chinese government would welcome American envoys for talks in China. In April 1971, Mao decided to invite an American table tennis team to visit China. On April 14, Nixon announced measures to liberalize trade and travel restrictions with China, which had been in existence for 20 years, and also to relax controls on the Chinese currency. From July 9 to 11, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s emissary and national security advisor, visited China 509. Pang and Jin believed that the Central Committee’s conflict on criticizing the ultraleft thought trend had ended because of Mao’s “verdict.” Its direct result was the

struggle of criticizing the ultra-left trend of thought under the lead of Zhou Enlai, which suffered a setback in 1972. This proved again that Mao, who launched and led

the Cultural Revolution, could correct some serious mistakes that had led to several

important policies on specific problems, but he would never allow criticism of the guiding thought behind the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the great problems caused by the Cultural Revolution could not be remedied. In the years that followed, many

important changes took place in China that were closely connected to Mao’s ideological position. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1648.)

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secretly and reached an agreement with Zhou Enlai. On July 16, the two countries simultaneously released communiqués announcing that Nixon would visit China, which created great surprise around the world. On October 25, the 26th Session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China to the UN. At the same time, China became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. On February 21, 1972, when Nixon arrived in China and met with Mao, Mao admitted that he was responsible for China’s closed-door policy.510 But Mao at that time did not fully understand the price China was paying for being shut off from the rest of the world. Mao did not formulate a policy of reform and opening-up, which gave Deng Xiaoping a historic opportunity to become the chief architect of such policy. On February 28, the Chinese and American governments released a joint communiqué, which declared that bilateral trade was an area from which mutual benefit could be derived. Thereafter, China began conducting trade with the West. This was in accordance with what Mao said: “Normalizing relations between China and the United States is key to solving many other problems.”511 In March, China and Britain upgraded diplomatic relations from the level of chargé d’affaires to ambassadorial level. China established formal or upgraded diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, Greece, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In late September, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited China and signed the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement with Premier Zhou Enlai, announcing the end of abnormal relations between the two countries and establishing diplomatic relations from that day (September 29.) In 1972, China established or upgraded diplomatic relations with 18 countries. China’s relations with the West changed significantly, and China began breaking its blockade of western countries. China changed its policy of being closed to international communications, which made it possible to introduce advanced western technology into the country. The year 1972 was the first one of China’s opening-up to the world economy. 510. Mao said to Nixon: “There is bureaucracy in China too. You wanted to exchange visits and carry out trade with us, but we refused again and again. For decades, officials, including myself, failed to work on this major problem. But finally, we discovered that you were right. And so we invited your table tennis team to visit China.” Finally, Mao told Nixon, “I told Snow, the journalist who passed away some days ago, that whatever the result of our talk, we should not hold it there.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1638.)

511. Lin et al., The Truth of History, 255.

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In early February, with the approval of Mao, the State Development Planning Commission introduced technology and equipment for producing artificial fibers and fertilizer. The CPC Central Committee and the State Council approved a program to import US$4.3 billion of foreign advanced technology and equipment, which was the biggest such program since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.512 However, the actual volume of the imports amounted to only $2.86 billion.513 In May 1972, Zhou Enlai was diagnosed with bladder cancer. In November, medical officials reported to the CPC Central Committee that Zhou Enlai was suffering from serious heart disease. Mao said that Zhou should rest more and work less. He gave the instructions, “Take care of him.”514 Mao had to find someone to assist Zhou in presiding over the daily work of the State Council. This was something that Zhou had discussed with him many times. On March 9, when chairing a meeting of the Political Bureau, Zhou Enlai requested two weeks’ leave for a medical check-up and treatment of his condition. He proposed that Ye Jianying chair meetings and sign reports in his stead. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were responsible for organizational work or reported to higher authorities. Ye Jianying presided over work of the CMC or reported to higher authorities. Li Xiannian and Service Group of the State Council presided over the work of the State Council or reported to higher authorities.515 Mao approved these arrangements. Zhou also wrote to Mao, saying, “The Political Bureau has discussed Deng Xiaoping’s return many times and reported it at meetings at the chairman’s residenc...The Political Bureau proposed that the Central Committee should make a decision and announce it to party committees at the county level.” In the draft of the Central Committee’s, Zhou said, “On August 14, 1972, Chairman Mao issued important instructions regarding Deng Xiaoping’s letter to him. The Political Bureau discussed Chairman Mao’s instructions and the issue of Deng Xiaoping, and it decided that Deng Xiaoping would be reinstated as vice premier of the State Council, which would arrange specific work for him.”516 512. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1622. 513. Comprehensive Statistics Division for the National Economy of the National Bureau of Statistics comp., Compilation of Fifty Years of Statistical Data of New China, 60.

514. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 328.

515. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 583.

516. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13, 347.

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On March 10, the CPC Central Committee issued a document titled Decisions to Reinstate Deng Xiaoping as the Vice Premier of the State Council. The NPC had not in fact held a meeting to officially decide on Deng’s status as vice premier since he was elected vice premier of the State Council at the First Plenary Session of the 3rd NPC in January 1965. Mao himself decided that Deng would be reinstated, and Mao also decided that Deng would be removed from office three years later. On March 28, Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Jiang Qing met with Deng Xiaoping. On March 29, Mao met with Deng in his residence in Zhongnanhai in the company of Zhou. This was the first time for Deng to meet Mao in seven years since September 1966. Mao said to Deng, “Work hard and take care of yourself.”517 Then, Deng attended a Political Bureau session chaired by Mao, who announced the bureau’s decision that Deng join the service group in the State Council, serve public functions concerning foreigners as vice premier, and attend the Political Bureau meetings in discussing major issues. On April 1, Zhou said at a meeting of heads of ministries and commissions of the Central Committee, “Deng Xiaoping couldn’t be reinstated if we hadn’t succeeded in solving the problems of Lin Biao and Chen Boda and in breaking the Lin Biao clique.”518 This indicated that the Lin Biao Incident of September 13 led to the direct political consequences of Ye Jianying beginning to preside over the work of the CMC to clear Lin Biao’s influence there; it also resulted in Deng being reinstated as vice premier of the State Council. Zhou and Li Xiannian remained among the 18 members of the State Council and were elected at the Third NPC in January 1965. On April 9, Deng Xiaoping and his wife visited Zhou Enlai and his wife. Zhou told Deng the truth, “Zhang Chunqiao is a traitor, but Chairman Mao doesn’t want him to be exposed.”519 Neither Zhou nor Deng understood Mao’s motives in this regard. After Mao’s death, this issue became an important factor in breaking up the Gang of Four. On April 12, Deng Xiaoping made a public appearance as the vice premier of the State Council. This announced the important news to China and the rest of the world that the second-most important capitalist roader in the party, who had been removed from his position seven years earlier, was now reinstated. This was a dramatic political change. Deng Xiaoping was undoubtedly the best statesman among the political figures who were trained, screened, and selected in the intense, complex political struggles in China. He had been purged and rose to power twice during the 517. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1652. 518. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 33. 519. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 275.

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Cultural Revolution.520 He was sent to a tractor repair plant in Xinjian County, Jiangxi Province by Zhou Enlai in October 1969. The three years in the plant gave him the time and energy to observe the Cultural Revolution from a distance and think deeply about Mao’s mistakes and the reasons for those mistakes. That helped Deng become politically more mature and more far-sighted. Without that experience, he would not have developed his theory of Chinese economic reform and reconstructing national systems and put that into practice.

Preparing for the 10th National Congress of the CPC After the Lin Biao Incident, the five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau were reduced to three. The 21 members of the Political Bureau were decreased to 14. The four alternate members of the Political Bureau were reduced to three (Li Xuefeng was dismissed in 1971.) The number of members of the Political Bureau was decreased by one-third without formal procedures in the National Congress of the CPC and Plenary Session of the Central Committee. This was the greatest organizational change since the founding of the CPC in 1921 and the CPC began ruling the country in 1949. The organization of the party had become complex owing to the Lin Biao Incident, and the situation was made difficult by Mao and his theory of inevitable political divisions in the CPC. With the above organizational changes in the party, a temporary political vacuum developed within the Political Bureau, but three political forces soon rose and contested against one another under the control of Mao. One faction was the Cultural Revolution hardliners; this was headed by Jiang Qing and included Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Xie Fuzhi (who died in 1972) and was called the Gang of Five. They strongly supported the Great Cultural Revolution; Mao trusted Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan placed them in important positions. But before the Lin Biao Incident on September 13, Kang Sheng resigned for reasons of illness, and Mao promoted Wang Hongwen, putting him into an important position. Thus, the Gang of Five became the Gang of Four, which was the political force that faithfully followed Mao’s policy with the Cultural Revolution. However, this group was very isolated in the party and was entirely dependent on Mao’s support. The second faction was the moderates, headed by Zhou Enlai and included Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Xu Shiyou, Zhu De, Dong Biwu, and Liu Bocheng. Only the first four individuals played a positive role in China’s political arena; the latter three were too ill and old to be effective. Although not agreeing with Mao with respect 520. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography, 122.

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to the Cultural Revolution, the moderates were unable to correct Mao’s errors in his later years. This group enjoyed strong political support within the party, and represented the mainstream positive force in the party. The moderates spared no effort to make the party and nation function normally, reduce the negative effect of the Cultural Revolution, and protect a large number of party and government officials.521 The third faction was the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution, and it included Chen Xilian, Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui, and Wang Dongxing; the latter three individuals were alternate members of the Political Bureau.522 As the strongest supporters of Mao, they were direct beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution and were loyal to Mao. However, they adopted a different political stance from that of the Cultural Revolution hardliners and did not have much important influence in the party since they were a minority in the Political Bureau. The political landscape regarding the three political factions changed greatly after the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Wang Hongwen joined the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and was rapidly promoted in the party. Deng Xiaoping was reinstated and rejoined the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Hua Guofeng and Wu De became members of the Political Bureau and were placed in important positions. The three factions coexisted and contested with one another. In 1973, Mao intended to bring forward the 10th National Congress of the CPC to make amendments to the party Constitution and delete the provision of Lin Biao being his close comrade and successor. Lin Biao had died but the provision remained, and that tarnished Mao’s political image. Both Mao and Zhou Enlai wanted those provisions deleted as soon as possible. A plenary session of the Central Committee or National Congress of the CPC was required to legally discharge Lin Biao and the other six people from their posts; this was because they were members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee at the 9th Central Committee and issuing documents by the CPC Central Committee was insufficient to dismiss them. Of the 21 members of the Central Committee elected at the First Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee, only 13 members remained. That left a political vacuum that had to be filled. As a result, Mao and the Central Committee decided to bring forward the 10th National Congress of the CPC;523 by contrast, the 9th National Congress had been delayed by eight years 521. Jin, Comments on “The Cambridge History of China,” 445. 522. MacFarquhar and Fairbank eds, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: The People’s Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, 351–353.

523. Pang and Jin believe that, in accordance with the party Constitution approved at the 9th

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(from 1961 to 1969.) It was therefore political struggles, rather than the provisions of the party Constitution, that determined when the National Congress of the CPC was to be held. This is indicative of the state of decay of the party’s systems. Mao asked Zhou Enlai to make arrangements for the 10th National Congress of the CPC. In May, the Central Committee called a meeting for members and alternate members of the Central Committee and the heads of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions; there were a total of 246 people. Zhou announced the three items on the agenda: discussing the problems regarding the Criticizing Lin and the Rectification Movement; making preparations for the 10th National Congress; and discussing the Report on the National Economic Plan. Zhou conveyed Mao’s four instructions: (1) plans should be, but were not, effectively developed for many projects; (2) plans should be made in cooperation with local authorities in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions; (3) areas of collaboration should be established; and (4) it was not right to focus only on production and neglect the social superstructure. Mao also said that it was necessary to criticize Confucius. This latter point indicated that Mao was also criticizing Zhou’s Political Bureau. It was announced at the meeting that in accordance with Chairman Mao’s suggestion, the Political Bureau had decided to transfer Wang Hongwen (secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee and deputy director of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee) from Shanghai to Beijing and participate in Political Bureau sessions; it was also announced that Hua Guofeng (first party secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee) and Wu De (first secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee) would participate in those sessions.524 All three were members of the CPC Central Committee. In addition to Mao, 12 people participated in the decision-making process of the CPC Central Committee: Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao National Congress of the CPC, the 10th National Congress was held in 1974. However,

owing to the special circumstances of the Lin Biao Incident, the provision of Lin Biao

being “Mao’s close comrade and successor” in the Constitution, which was approved at the 9th National Congress, had to be modified. Further, members of the Political

Bureau and the Central Committee needed to be changed, and the Lin Biao Incident required a formal conclusion by the National Congress of the CPC. Therefore, Mao and

the Central Committee decided to bring forward the 10th National Congress. (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1653.)

524. In January, 1971, Hua Guofeng was deputy chief of the service group of the State Council. Xie Fu died after illness on March 26, 1972. Wu De succeeded him as first

secretary of Beijing and the first political commissar of the Beijing Garrison. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 319.)

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Wenyuan, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, Li Dengsheng, Wang Dongxing, and the newly joined members of Wang Hongwen, Hua Guofeng, and Wu De. This political structure of checks and balance was purposely designed by Mao. The Decision on Electing Delegates to the 10th National Congress of the CPC, which was approved by Mao, determined that the number of representatives would be 1,740. Mao concurred with the Political Bureau’s Proposal concerning Constitutional Amendments.525 At Mao’s suggestion, the meeting decided that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan would be responsible for drafting the new party Constitution and political report to the 10th National Congress. It was also concluded at the meeting that 13 people, including Tan Zhenlin, Li Jingquan, and Wu Lanfu, would be liberated.526 On behalf of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai said at the meeting, “The political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress of the CPC were correct, and that congress was successful even though it was disturbed by Lin Biao. The whole party still needs to hold high the flag of unity and victory of the 9th National Congress.” With regard to Deng Xiaoping’s return, Zhou said that most members were satisfied with the document the CPC Central Committee issued about reinstating him. Deng attended that meeting.527 Zhou suggested to Mao that Deng should rejoin the Political Bureau since all the vice premiers except Deng were members of the bureau. Upon hearing this, Jiang Qing said to Kang Sheng, “If Deng Xiaoping joins the Political Bureau, we will no longer have any say.” Kang Sheng said, “I don’t agree with Deng Xiaoping joining the Political Bureau and neither do the people. We should report this to Chairman Mao.” Jiang Qing said, “I will ask Chairman Mao whether his Cultural Revolution is still functioning and whether we should continue to criticize capitalist roaders.” Zhang Chunqiao said, “Mr. Kang, I remember you gave a speech criticizing Deng Xiaoping at the CMC meeting in 525. The meeting approved the CPC Central Political Bureau’s Proposal on Constitutional Amendments, which was reviewed by Mao. They agreed that the key point of

constitutional amendments was the General Principles and made amendments according to Mao’s proposal that this was still a time of imperialism and proletarian

revolution without the saying of “three milestones.” Do not put in any names and add content like new instructions from Mao in recent years and experience of the “tenth struggle on lines.”

526. The meeting announced the liberation of 13 veteran cadres: Tan Zhenlin, Li Jingquan, Wu Lanfu, Li Baohua, Liao Zhigao, Jiang Hua, Jiang Weiqing, Wang Jiaxiang, Tai Jiwei, Li Chengfang, Fang Qiang, Tao Lujia, and Zeng Xisheng.

527. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1653.

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April 1967. The speech was very comprehensive and profound.” Kang said, “We can stop Deng Xiaoping’s return even without me giving a speech. We can tell the other members not to vote for Deng Xiaoping in the plenary session.”528 Deng Xiaoping’s reinstatement was a challenge to the Jiang Qing clique. After the 10th National Congress, especially after 1975, the Cultural Revolution hardliners, headed by Jiang Qing, would contest with the moderates in the party, led by Deng Xiaoping. In preparations for the 10th National Congress, Mao, who was old and sick, had to consider who would be his successor. He set two requirements for this person: the successor had to be young, and the successor had to be directly selected from among the workers and peasants. He stated many times after the 9th National Congress, especially after the Lushan Conference and the Lin Biao Incident that the vice chairman and members of the Standing Committee should be selected from among the workers and peasants.529 In July 1972, he said, “Foreigners say that we’re now getting old and are pinning our hopes on the young. They believe that our country will turn to revisionism after we die. What should we do? I propose selecting some young workers or farmers to be vice chairman of the CPC and to join the CMC. But we still need middle-aged and older people. You [Zhou Enlai and others] search the nation for people with little education; they can be assisted by intellectuals.”530 At the chairman’s suggestion, Wang Hongwen (worker and leader of a rebel faction,) Chen Yonggui (peasant and model worker,) Wu Guixian (worker and model worker,) and Ni Zhifu (worker and model worker) were elected directly to the new leadership at the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Mao was satisfied with Wang Hongwen, who was 37 years old and rose through a rebellion, even though Wang had no merits. He praised Wang Hongwen for his being a peasant, worker, soldier, and leader of the Shanghai Workers Rebellion Group. Mao pinned great hopes on Wang because he thought Wang could continue to pursue the aims of the Cultural Revolution; it was very important for Mao that his successor be loyal to his revolutionary beliefs.531 Zhou Enlai said afterward that Wang participated in the work of the CPC Central Committee under Mao’s instructions in September 1972; Wang participated in the preparations for the 10th National Congress and worked in the Political Bureau as a member of the CPC Central Committee.532 528. Chen, Heavy Attack—Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 37. 529. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1655. 530. Ibid. 531. Deng, My Father Deng Xiaoping — Days of the “Cultural Revolution”, 283-284. 532. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1655.

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Mao selected Wang Hongwen because he worried that Zhou Enlai, who ranked second in the CPC Central Committee after the Lin Biao Incident, was a threat to his power. Although Zhou had risen to his position without any political ambitions, Mao had to use someone like Wang to share power with Zhou. Zhou believed that he had to support Wang and relinquish part of his own power for his own security. Zhou had in fact done a great deal of work to support Wang in accordance with Mao’s instructions. As early as September 20, 1972, Zhou wrote to Mao, saying that the Political Bureau agreed with Mao in transferring Wang to Beijing.533 In light of the Lin Biao Incident, Mao did not officially elect Wang as his successor, although he was grooming Wang for that role. Wang’s rapid promotion reinforced the Jiang Qing clique. Thus, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan formed the Gang of Four in the CPC Central Committee. The other reason for Mao’s selection of Wang Hongwen resulted from Mao’s severe criticism of Zhou Enlai. On June 28, the magazine New Situations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an article titled “Views on the NixonBrezhnev Meeting,”534 which drew Mao’s censure. On July 4, Mao talked with Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao and directly criticized Zhou Enlai and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said, “I used words like ‘upheaval,’ ‘division,’ and ‘reorganization’ to describe that meeting and they came up with phrases like ‘deception’ and ‘dominance,’ which are superficial, not substantial.” He rebuked Zhou Enlai for his work in the Political Bureau, claiming, “The CPC Central Committee submits reports only on minor issues instead of focusing on major ones. If it continues doing this, there will be revisionism in the future!”535 Mao expressed his great dissatisfaction with Zhou in a stern warning to him. That evening, Zhang Chunqiao told Zhou Enlai to call a meeting of the Political Bureau to relay the content of Mao’s conversation.536 On July 5, having learned of Mao’s opinion, Zhou made a self-criticism: “These mistakes are related to my political understanding and working methods.”537 533. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 552.

534. “Views on the Nixon-Brezhnev Meeting” analyzed the global situation after the United States and Soviet Union signed an agreement to prevent nuclear war, arguing that their meeting was full of fraudulence.

535. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), vol. 3, 320–321. 536. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 604.

537. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1656. Ji Pengfei was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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In early July, Mao approved in principle the drafts of the Political Report to the 10th National Congress538 and Report on Constitutional Amendments, which had been prepared by Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen. Mao’s trust in Wang was evidenced by his appointing Wang director of the Preparation Committee for Elections to the 10th National Congress. Wang worked together with other deputy directors, including Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Ye Jianying, and was responsible for producing a draft list of the presidium members of the 10th National Congress and waiting lists of members for the Tenth Central Committee and Political Bureau. When the CPC Central Committee was preparing for the 10th National Congress, Mao turned to the struggle between the Confucianists and Legalists in Chinese history to find a historical basis for the Cultural Revolution. Mao advocated the Legalists and opposed the Confucianists in reversing the verdict on Qin Shi Huang. In May, Mao proposed for the first time at a meeting of the CPC Central Committee that criticizing Confucius amounted to criticizing Lin Biao. Mao gave Jiang Qing a book by Guo Moruo titled Critique of Ten Schools of Thought and said, “This book can be used for criticizing.” Mao also wrote a poem, which had five characters to a line: it stated that Guo Moruo was not like Liu Zongyuan. Although he was a communist, he worshiped Confucius.539 Guo Moruo made positive comments about Confucius in “Critiquing Confucius and Mo Zi” in Critique of Ten Schools of Thought. Guo said that Confucius hoped to enhance people’s happiness by means of culture since he adopted a stance in accordance with the social revolution and acted in the public interest. Guo Moruo made negative comments about Qin Shi Huang in the chapter “Criticizing Lu Buwei and Rule of Qin Shi Huang”; he especially criticized Qin Shi Huang for his burning of books and burying Confucian scholars alive, regarding it as a catastrophe in China’s cultural history. Guo wrote the book during the war with Japan to criticize the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek; he never thought that he would be criticized for the book by Mao. Mao, who was 80 years old, was politically sensitive to criticism of Qin Shi Huang. On July 4, when talking with Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao, Mao said, “Mr. Guo called himself a humanist in his book, and so was Confucius. Mr. Guo not only praised Confucius but criticized the Legalists. That was what the Kuomintang and Lin Biao did!” 538. The political report of the 10th National Congress of the CPC was drafted by Zhou Enlai,

Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian. The

final version was written by Zhang Chunqiao. The group that drafted the amendment of the CPC Constitution included Kang Sheng, Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.

539. Jin Chunming: History of the Cultural Revolution, p. 361, Chengdu, Sichuan People’s Press, 1995.

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On July 17, when meeting with Yang Zhenning, Mao talked about the struggle between the Confucianists and Legalists. Mao said, “I agree with Mr. Guo about the timeline of historical periods. However, I disagree with him in praising the Confucianists and being against the Legalists in his Critique of Ten Schools of Thought. The Legalists proposed that society should move forward instead of retrogressing by extolling the present and denigrating the past.”540 Mao’s interest in and comments on history were directed at the contemporary political situation in China. Mao took advantage of China’s traditional political culture in conducting political movements, and he liked to express his opinions through historical anecdotes. On that day, Zhou Enlai said to Yang Zhenning, “Qin Shi Huang represented the ruling class. We cannot praise him too lavishly, but he basically belongs to the school of Legalists.”541 On August 5, when Mao told Jiang Qing about the struggle between the Confucianists and Legalists, he said, “All the politicians who made great achievements were Legalists: they proposed to rule the country by law and extolled the present; the Confucianists gave priority to morality and virtue and extolled the past, which retarded social development.” Mao also composed a poem with seven characters to a line entitled “On Theory about Feudalism for Mr. Guo.”542 On August 5, he also gave an assignment on annotating Theory about Feudalism. Jiang Qing started the Criticizing Lin and Confucius Movement in accordance with Mao’s instructions and made public Mao’s poem at a meeting to launch the movement. On August 7, with the approval of Mao, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery” by Yang Guorong of Zhongshan University. Yang asked at the beginning of the article what Confucius, who had been respected as a great sage by the reactionary ruling class for over 2,000 years, was like. He drew his conclusion as follows: Confucius adopted the standpoint of the slave owners; he fought against the emerging feudal forces and defended the rule of slave owners to prove that the workers could only be exploited, enslaved, and ruled and that exploitation was justified and rebellion was wrong. Therefore, all the exploiting classes, including the feudal landlord class 540. Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1656–1657. 541. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), vol. 2, 607.

542. Mao wrote, “I advise you to criticize Emperor Qin less. The reputation of Confucius

was mostly false. Many dynasties advocated Legalism and your Criticism of Ten Schools of Thought is not a good book. I advise that you read about the theory of feudalism with

respect to retrogression.” (Pang and Jin eds., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1657.)

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and capitalist class, supported Confucius and his followers because they wanted to secure their dominance. As the reactionary ruling class, they took advantage of Confucian thought to rule the people. Thus, for over 2,000 years, Confucius was regarded by them as an extremely sage teacher. Only from the perspective of Marxist historical materialism and the standpoint of the proletarian could one identify the reactionary nature of Confucius.543 This article voiced Mao’s intentions to criticize Confucius, and it became compulsory reading in the Criticizing Lin and Confucius Movement. Why was Mao interested in the struggle between Confucianists and Legalists, which occurred over 2,000 years earlier? It was for clear political reasons. What he feared most was that people in the present or future would repudiate his Cultural Revolution, and he wanted to find answers from history to support his actions. Mao constantly believed that he was right and represented the correct direction of development. However, the more correct he thought he was, the likelier it was that he was wrong. Mao had no political enemies at that time and no one could challenge him. However, he could challenge others, and he was the only person to challenge Confucius in over 2,000 years. But he was now too old to advance new theories. Unable to write great works anymore, Mao turned to Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan to write for him. Mao was doomed for greater failure because he was unwilling to step aside from the stage of history but wanted to be at the center of events all the time.

543. People’s Daily, August 7, 1973.

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Wu Faxian 吳法憲. Suiyue jiannan: Wu Faxian huiyi lu 歲月艱難：吳法憲回憶錄 [Rough Years: Wu Faxian’s Memoir]. Hong Kong: North Star Publishing Company, 2006. Xi Xuan 席宣, and Jin Chunming 金春明. “Wenhua da geming” jian shi 「文化大革 命」簡史 [A Short History of the Cultural Revolution]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 1996. Xiaodi 曉地 ed. “Wen ge” zhi mi 「文革」之謎 [Secrets Buried with the “Great Cultural Revolution”]. Beijing: Blossom Press, 1993. Xu Quanxing 許全興. Mao Zedong wannian de lilun yu shijian (1956–1976) 毛澤東晚 年的理論與實踐（1956–1976） [Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976)]. Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1993. Yan Changgui 閻長貴. “Jiang Qing shi zenme bei peng hong de” 江青是怎麼被捧紅 的 [How Did Jiang Qing Become a Political Star?]. Dang shi bo lan 黨史博覽 [General Review of the Communist Party of China], (1) 2005. Yang Kelin 楊克林 ed. Wenhua dageming bowuguan (1966–1976) xia ce 文化大革命博 物館下冊 [Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 2]. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2002. Yang Chengwu 楊成武. Yang Chengwu jiangjun zishu 楊成武將軍自述 [Autobiography of General Yang Chengwu]. Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Press, 1997. Ye Yonglie 葉永烈. Chen Boda zhuan 陳伯達傳 [Biography of Chen Boda]. Beijing: China Writers Publishing House, 1993. Yin Jiamin 尹家民. Mao Zedong yu Zhongyang wenge xiaozu de chengli 毛澤東與中 央文革小組的設立 [Mao Zedong and the Establishment of the Central Cultural Revolution Group]. Dang shi bo lan 黨史博覽 [General Review of the Communist Party of China], (1) 2006. Yu Qiuli 余秋里. Zhong liu di zhu, li wan kuang lan 中流砥柱,力挽狂瀾 [A Rock in the Stream]. In Wo men de Zhou zongli 我們的周總理 [Our Premier Zhou], compiled by the Editorial Committee of Our Premier Zhou 我們的周總理編輯 組, 49–50. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1990. Zhang Aiping 張愛萍. Shenjian zhi ge — Zhang Aiping shici, shufa, sheying xuanji 神劍 之歌張愛萍詩詞、書法、攝影選集 [Song of the Divine Sword — Selected Poems, Calligraphy, and Photographs of Zhang Aiping]. Beijing: People’s Fine Arts Publishing House, 1991. Zhang Yaoci 張耀祠. Zhang Yaoci huiyi lu — zai Mao zhuxi shenbian de rizi 張耀祠 回憶錄—在毛主席身邊的日子 [Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2008.

301

Bibliography

Zheng Qian 鄭謙, and Zhang Hua 張化. Mao Zedong shidai de Zhongguo (1949–1976) (di san ce) 毛澤東時代的中國（1949–1976）（第三冊） [China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2003. Zhu Yuanshi 朱元石 et al. eds. Wu De koushu: Shi nian fengyu jishi — Wo zai Beijing gongzuo de yixie jingli 吳德口述：十年風雨紀事—我在北京工作的一些經歷 [Wu De’s Dictations: The Unusual Ten Years — My Experiences in Beijing]. Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2004.

English Materials

Goodman, David S.G. Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography. London & New York: Routledge, 1994. Harding, Harry. “The Chinese State in Crisis.” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, edited by Roderick Macfarquahar and John K. Fairbank, 105–217. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Macfarquhar, Roderick, and John K. Fairbank eds. The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Macfarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. Meisner, Maurice. Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic. New York: The Free Press, 1986. Song Yongyi ed. The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database (Index). Hong Kong: Universities Service Center for China Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. Terrill, Ross. Mao: A Biography. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Zheng, Shiping. Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

302

Index Albanian Delegation 3, 72, 80, 84–85, 94, 115, 130 anarchism 33, 37, 279–81 armed struggle 20, 83, 97, 106–7 bourgeois faction 157, 266 bourgeois headquarters 63, 128 bourgeois reactionary line 2–3, 5–8, 17, 19, 23, 56, 59, 61, 66, 69, 126 capitalist roaders 2, 6–8, 11–12, 27, 56, 58–64, 68, 70–71, 74, 78–79, 115, 134–35, 140, 148, 155–56 Central Cultural Revolution Group 4–6, 8, 13, 17–19, 36–41, 43–50, 73–76, 78–81, 95–96, 103–6, 108–11, 116–17, 140–143, 159, 218–20 Central Military Commission 15, 18–19, 26–34, 42–44, 46–49, 51–52, 76, 82–83, 93, 99–101, 106, 110–111, 116–17, 122–23, 131, 159, 173, 178– 79, 188, 204, 222, 230–233, 235, 239– 40, 257, 275 Central Politburo Standing Committee 18, 42, 46–47, 49–50, 52, 57, 61, 64, 66 China’s Khrushchev 23, 55, 57, 59–60, 62–64, 78, 88, 111 China’s Trotsky 219 class enemies 16, 49, 57–58, 62–64, 72–73, 96, 99, 157, 171, 297, 322, 328 class struggle 3, 6, 9, 58–60, 62–63, 69–70, 86–88, 101–2, 145–46, 164–65, 218– 19, 243, 255, 259–61, 265–66 international 63, 138, 241

comprehensive power seizure 3, 6, 10, 12–14, 22, 35, 72, 97, 113–14 constitutional amendments 194, 199–200, 202, 204, 207–8, 210, 216, 222, 243, 291, 294 continuing revolution 87–90, 144, 155, 165, 181, 201, 218–19, 234 contradictions 86, 120, 163, 165, 167, 196 Criticizing Chen and Rectification Movement 138, 225, 229, 234–36, 239–40, 242, 269 democratic centralism 171, 283 factional struggle 9, 22, 33, 38, 63, 93–94, 102, 109–10, 152–53, 172, 178, 183, 218, 244–45, 259, 288–89 February Counter-current 18, 36, 38, 41–45, 51, 66–67, 122–23, 147, 149, 152–53, 157, 183, 214, 262–64, 267 Guo Moruo 154, 170, 181, 294 Jinggang Mountains 40–41, 169–70 Kuomintang reactionaries 98, 102–3, 156, 221, 236, 272 large-scale struggle 77–78, 105 Lin Biao and Chen Boda anti-party clique 199, 215, 237, 257–58, 264–65 Lin Biao Counter-revolutionary Group 188, 190, 193, 196, 198, 200, 205, 209, 212, 214, 217, 220–221

303

Index

Lin Biao Incident 139, 205, 225, 242, 245, 256–62, 264, 266–69, 271–73, 278, 282, 287–88, 290, 292–93 Lin Biao’s anti-party clique 138, 274 Lin Liguo 217, 236, 248–50, 252, 264 line struggle 69, 138, 155, 165, 220, 225, 237, 244, 246, 259–60, 270 long-term struggle 102–3, 156, 215, 265 Lushan Conference 56, 138–39, 144, 154–55, 180, 183, 204, 216, 219–220, 224–27, 229, 236–38, 243–47, 250, 256, 259 Mao Zedong Thought 7, 9, 28, 56, 61, 69, 77, 157, 166–69, 171–72, 195, 201–2, 207, 211–12, 218 marshals 14, 31, 43, 45, 183, 262 veteran 262, 264, 271 Marxism-Leninism 89, 146, 157, 164, 168, 172, 195 military control 28–29, 33–35, 52, 76–77, 111, 182, 241 military regions 26–29, 33, 147, 178, 231–32, 253 Nixon-Brezhnev Meeting 293 North Bureau meeting 232–35 organizational lines 181–82, 255–56, 291 party moderates 153–54, 178, 184, 259, 261, 288–89, 292 personality cult 113, 169, 181, 199, 203–4, 230 political line 139, 145, 147, 156, 158, 163, 167, 181, 228, 250, 255, 260, 268 philosophy of struggle 139, 154, 166, 227–28, 241, 243, 247, 260

304

proletarian dictatorship 7, 10, 19, 21, 37, 59, 63, 87, 89, 144, 155–56, 180–182, 195–96, 201, 218–19, 222, 282–83 Qin Shi Huang 158, 294–95 rectification 3, 110, 113, 138, 234–35, 260, 262, 269–70, 280 Rectification Movement 225, 232–33, 235–36, 239, 242, 269, 284, 290 revisionists 9, 18, 59, 63, 69, 79, 166–67, 221, 242, 256, 265–66, 272, 281–82 revolutionary committees 12, 23–26, 35, 88, 96–97, 101, 112–13, 189, 201, 204, 213, 232–33, 282 rightists 3, 16, 20, 30–31, 53, 55, 82, 87, 101, 140, 155, 165–66, 265–66, 270, 280– 282 self-criticism 17, 36, 40–42, 62, 122, 217, 220–221, 225–28, 233, 236–37, 239– 40, 242–43, 293 Shanghai People's Commune 11–12, 16, 39 Shanhaiguan Airport 251–52 Sino-Soviet border 186 Snow 95, 230–231, 285 Special Case Group 57, 133, 248, 262, 272 stability 29–31, 33, 261, 278 state presidency 138–39, 182, 190–194, 196–99, 203, 205–6, 210, 212–18, 222–25, 247 student movements 3, 85, 108, 110 successor trap 199, 241 suppression 15, 82, 85, 97, 107–8 theory of class struggle 243, 266 theory of cultural revolution 87

Index

veteran cadres 3, 38–39, 41–42, 95, 97, 117, 122–23, 125, 184, 260, 262, 264, 269, 273, 276, 278–79, 291 violent struggles 2, 16, 20, 32, 68, 72, 74–79, 82, 102–5, 109–10, 159, 185 working group 108–9 Wuhan Incident 73–74

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Mao and the Cultural Revolution

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Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Volume 3

Battling for China’s Future

Hu Angang

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. Suite 208 Davies Pacific Center 841 Bishop Street Honolulu, HI, 96813 Website: www.enrichprofessional.com A Member of Enrich Culture Group Limited Hong Kong Head Office: Unit A, 17/F, 78 Hung To Road, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China China Office: Rm 309, Building A, Central Valley, 16 Haidian Middle Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Singapore Office: 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660 Trademarks: SILKROAD PRESS and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. © 2017 by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. With the title Mao and the Cultural Revolution Volume 3: Battling for China’s Future Edited by Barbara Cao, Glenn Griffith, and H. Y. Poon All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher. ISBN (Hardback) ISBN (pdf)

978-1-62320-155-5 978-1-62320-156-2

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Contents Chapter 6 The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang .................... 1

Qing (1973-1976)

The 10th National Congress of the CPC and the Rise of Wang Hongwen............... 2 Mao Zedong Promoted Deng Xiaoping to Important Positions................................ 21 Attacks against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Zhou Enlai................................................. 28 Political Struggles at the 4th National People’s Congress.......................................... 68 Deng Xiaoping’s Overall Restoration of Order, and Political Fights ....................... 97 with Jiang Qing Critique of Tale of the Marshes and the Campaign against........................................... 131 Deng Xiaoping and the Rightist Tendency Death of Zhou Enlai and the Tiananmen Square Incident ......................................... 148 Mao Zedong’s Last Words and Death............................................................................ 190 The Political Challenge and the Demise of Jiang Qing............................................... 200

Chapter 7 Remarks on the Cultural Revolution................................................. 229 Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Cultural Revolution and Related......................... 233 Historical Remarks Economic Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution........................................................ 238 Social Assessment of the Cultural Revolution.............................................................. 255 Mao Zedong’s Chinese Social Ideals and Economic Reform..................................... 270 China’s International Status............................................................................................ 284 Political Remarks on the Cultural Revolution.............................................................. 288 The Systemic Root Causes of Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years.................... 296 Deng Xiaoping’s Success Following Mao Zedong’s Failure....................................... 317

Postscript ................................................................................................................ 329 Appendix ................................................................................................................ 337 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 349 Index

................................................................................................................. 365

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6

Chapter

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973–1976)

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The third period of the Cultural Revolution lasted from the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1973 to October 1976. During that period, the moderates in the CPC, led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and the Gang of Four, led by Jiang Qing, underwent a fierce, complex struggle. Mao promoted Wang Hongwen and placed him in important positions; Mao also endorsed Jiang Qing’s campaign of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius in order to attack Zhou. In view of stability and unity, Mao convened the 4th National People’s Congress, in which Zhou and Deng presided over the State Council. Mao criticized the Gang of Four; however, he also resisted Deng’s attempts to remedy the errors of the Cultural Revolution. Under pressure from Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong launched a campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency of whitewashing and overturning past convictions. After Zhou’s death, Mao chosen Hua Guofeng — a beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution — as the acting premier. Indignant at the attacks against Zhou and Deng, the masses launched a large-scale protest, which developed into the April 5 Incident. As a consequence, Mao removed all Deng’s official positions. After Mao’s death, Jiang Qing challenged Hua Guofeng; Hua, Ye Jianying, and others arrested the Gang of Four and brought an end to the 10-year Cultural Revolution.

The 10th National Congress of the CPC and the Rise of Wang Hongwen When the 10th National Congress of the CPC was convened in August 1973, Mao Zedong was approaching his 80s and was very weak and ill. He was left with only two options, which would lead to significantly different political outcomes. One was to terminate the Cultural Revolution and leave the political stage. Mao’s retirement would benefit both himself and China. The other option was to serve another term as chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and maintain his “philosophy of struggle“ against the new political opponents that he himself had created (Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) and also against his advanced age and poor physical and mental condition, which would do neither China nor himself good. Mao then considered establishing the Central Consultative Committee, which would have consisted most of the old party officials and be chaired by himself. This was an innovative political concept that Deng Xiaoping had proposed to Mao, and Mao attached great importance to it. However, owing to strong opposition

2

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

from Zhou Enlai and others, this plan was dismissed.1 The Central Committee of the CPC allowed Mao to remain as chairman, yet denied Mao’s possibility of choosing at the first place. Zhou and others had to pay a personal price for this; the Cultural Revolution lasted for another three years and did not end until Mao’s death. By choosing to act as director rather than chairman of the Central Consultative Committee at the 12th National Congress of the CPC in 1982, Deng was well aware of China’s supreme leaders’ life long tenure demerits.2 Deng thus developed his own individual political concept and distinguished himself from Mao. That proved to be a wise move. However, in 1982, nine years been elapsed since Deng first proposed his innovative idea. The Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notice on Convening the Preliminary Meeting for the 10th National Congress of the CPC on August 8, 1973. The notice demanded that all delegation groups attending the congress should hold preliminary meetings to discuss the Report on the 10th National CPC Congress, Report on Amendments to the CPC Constitution and Draft of the Amended CPC Constitution and 1.

Zhou Enlai stated that Deng Xiaoping had declared some old party officials lacked the

physical capacity to properly engage in their work. Chairman Mao paid considerable attention to Deng’s proposal. Mao proposed establishing the Central Consultative Committee, which would be made up of mostly older officials. No such system had previously existed in the CPC. Mao said that he wished to be chairman of the

committee, but that faced a general objections. However, Mao was completely serious in what he said: he planned to take on that role. Mao said that he definitely wanted to

become involved in the work of the committee — not simply as a consultant but toke

responsibility for an active role. When facing oppositions, Mao however said that he

might as well remain the chairman of the CPC Central Committee and devote the rest

of his life to that. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1666.) 2.

Deng Xiaoping said that the Central Consultative Committee was a new institution

established to meet the current circumstances of the CPC and that it was a new means of transferring power in the central leadership from the older to the younger generation

with the older retired officials involved. The Central Consultative Committee was in

a sense a transitional organization. Deng said that it was a fundamental necessity for the nation and the party to establish a retirement system. Soon after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng recognized the necessity of revoking

the life tenure of the party and state leadership and acknowledged that many other countries had a better policy than that of China. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 5.)

3

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

to study the documents related to the Criticizing Lin and Rectification campaign in preparation for the official convening of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. On August 19, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the list of members and alternate members for both the 10th Central Committee of the CPC and the Political Bureau. The next day, another meeting concerning the Political Bureau was held with Mao Zedong’s presence so as to report the results of the previous day’s discussion and to finalize the list of names.3 Zhou Enlai played a key role in the 10th National Congress of the CPC, especially regarding participant’s assignment. Mao and Zhou essentially made joint decisions in this respect. Zhou made various proposals and implemented those with Mao’s consent. On August 20, the CPC Central Committee approved and passed the Investigation Report on the Counter-Revolutionary Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-party Clique by the Case Inquiry Team. The report concluded that Lin and members of his anti-CPC group were found guilty of the heinous crime of having launched a counter-revolutionary coup against the party and the nation. As a result, this report had revoked the party membership of eight from the 9th Political Bureau.4 Among those individuals, two of the five were the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, seven of the 20 members of the Political Bureau, and one of the four alternate members for the Political Bureau. Between April 1969 and August 1973, the 9th National Congress of the CPC and the 9th Political Bureau membership underwent a complete transformation. This was however more the result of political maneuvering conducted by Mao splitting the governing party

3.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of

4.

The CPC Central Committee stated in Investigation Report on the Counter-Revolutionary

Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 613.

Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-party Clique resolved the following: (1) to revoke the party membership of Lin Biao — capitalist careerist, conspirator, and counter-revolutionary double-dealer, traitor, and collaborationist; (2) to revoke the party membership and all

the official positions within and outside the party of Chen Boda — a key member of

the Lin Biao anti-party clique, anti-CPC agent of the Kuomintang, Trotskyite, traitor,

secret agent, and revisionist; (3) to revoke the party membership of Ye Qun — a key member of the Lin Biao anti-party clique, dissident belonging to another social class, secret agent, traitor, and collaborationist; (4) to revoke the party membership of Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Xuefeng — key members of

the Lin Biao anti-party clique and to remove them from all official positions within and outside the party.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

than any counter-revolutionary coup instigated by Lin Biao.5 Mao claimed that this was the 10th Political Line struggle of the CPC and the CPC Central Committee. He proclaimed that this represented a great success of Mao’s proletariat revolutionary course.6 Also on August 20, the CPC Central Committee held a plenary session of the election preparation committee. In accordance with Mao’s wishes, Wang Hongwen was appointed chairman of the election committee; Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Li Desheng were appointed deputy chairpersons. This was purposely arranged by Mao7 and personally implemented by Zhou.8 With his advanced age, Mao was anxious to select the next successor. Except for Jiang Qing, the other six individuals were elected members of the Standing Committee of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Wang was ranked third — just behind Mao and Zhou. On August 22, Zhou Enlai reported to Mao Zedong the personnel arrangements for the 10th National Congress and indicated who would be appointed chairman, vice chairman, and secretary-general of the presidium. The two men decided that Dong Biwu and Zhu De would be added to the Standing Committee of the 10th

5.

There was no evidence that Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo

participated in the “Summary of Project 571“ (“571“ signifies an armed uprising) since

they assisted Zhou Enlai in dealing with the September 13 Incident from September 13 to 18. 6.

The Investigation Report on the Counter-Revolutionary Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-party

Group stated that under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, the party, army, and Chinese people defeated the Lin Biao anti-party

group and achieved success in the 10th political line struggle. This dealt the heaviest blow to both class enemies at home and abroad. It also represented a great success of the

Cultural Revolution and a great success of Chairman Mao’s proletariat revolutionary course. 7.

Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 239.

8.

On August 13, 1973, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the members of the election preparation committee for the 10th National Congress of

the CPC and the list of names for the 10th Presidium as proposed by the 10th National Congress preparation team, led by Wang Hongwen. Zhou and Wang wrote a joint letter

to Mao, recommending Wang as chairman of the election preparation committee and seven other members of the Political Bureau in to act as chairpersons. Mao read and commented on this letter. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee Comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 611.)

5

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Political Bureau.9 On August 23, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of military and government leaders at central and provincial levels to discuss the membership of the central leadership. At that meeting, Zhou said that the report for the 10th National Congress had not been written by himself but by Zhang Chunqiao, stressing that everything included was approved to be in accordance with Chairman Mao’s thoughts and political course. Zhou stated that the report was based on the ideas of Chairman Mao. It was also Chairman Mao’s wish to have Zhou presenting the report.10 On July 7, Mao declared that he basically agreed with the political report concerning the 9th and the 10th CPC National Congresses, drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, whose political influence surpassed that of Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai as report presenters.11 On August 24, Zhou Enlai chaired a preparatory meeting for the 10th CPC National Congress to deliberate over the list of names for the presidium and the conference program. Zhou conveyed Mao Zedong’s direction that the minority should submit to the majority once a decision had been reached based on majority opinion at all levels of the CPC organization.12 Mao hoped to restore the organizational principle of majority rule; however, he did not clarify the implementation of regulations with respect to one person, one vote and majority rule. There was however evident from records of the meetings of the 10th Standing Committee and the 10th Political Bureau that no such majority rule was ever in operation. Many of the decisions were “proposed by Chairman Mao and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau.“ Mao thus enjoyed the privilege of casting the deciding vote. From August 24 to 28, the 10th National Congress of the CPC was convened in Beijing, chaired by Mao Zedong. All 1,249 delegates attended the congress representing the 28 million party members across China. Since Mao had decided to bring forward the date of the 10th National Congress, only three months of time was allowed to prepare from sketch to the official opening. As a consequence, delegates were not elected in representative meetings at all levels: they were elected based on “democratic consultation“ in outreach meetings of CPC committees at provincial, 9. Ibid., 614. 10. Jin ed., A Biography of Zhou Enlai, vol. 4, 2032–2033. 11. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 358.

12. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 615.

6

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

municipal, and autonomous regional levels. There was no qualification review committee to screen the delegates for the 10th National Congress.13 The majority of delegates were from the working class, farmers, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), who accounted for 67%;14 revolutionary intellectuals accounted for only about 5% of the delegates.15 At the 10th National Congress, Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the presidium. Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, and Li Desheng were elected vice chairmen, and Zhang Chunqiao was elected secretary-general.16 The conference program consisted of three parts: (1) Zhou Enlai made a political report on behalf of the CPC Central Committee; (2) Wang Hongwen presented a report on amending the Party Constitution on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and proposed a draft of that Constitution; (3) the 10th CPC Central Committee was elected. Mao Zedong granted the same power to Wang Hongwen and Zhou Enlai, so they became “equals.“ He also given Zhang Chunqiao the title of “theorist“ for having written 10 important documents, which ensured adherence to the political line of the Cultural Revolution: the collapse of the Lin Biao clique had led to some serious questions about that revolution. Mao thus subtly controlled and balanced the political contest between the Cultural Revolution hardliners and the moderates. The political line of the 10th National Congress was clearly incorrect. 17 This is fully evident in the reports made by Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen. The political report presented by Zhou set out to affirm the political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress.18 In that report, Zhou described Lin Biao and his 13. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 238. 14. “Press Communiqué of the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ August 29, 1973. 15. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 238. 16. “Press Communiqué of the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ August 29, 1973. 17. The CPC Central Committee resolved in 1981 that the 10th National Congress continued

the leftist mistakes of the 9th National Congress, whose political influence surpassed

that of Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai as report presenters. (Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

18. Zhou Enlai said that the national policy of continuous revolution under a proletarian

dictatorship based on Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism was a summary of the experience of the Cultural Revolution and repudiated the revisionist line of Liu Shaoqi;

it reaffirmed the basic political course and policy of the CPC throughout the history

of socialism. The revolutionary practices since the 9th National Congress of the CPC — especially the struggles against the Lin Biao anti-party clique — proved that the

political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress had been correct. The

7

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

collaborators as a counter-revolutionary faction.19 Zhou claimed that defeating Lin’s anti-party clique had been the CPC’s greatest success since the 9th National Congress. He described it as dealing a heavy blow to the party’s enemies at home and abroad. The thorniest issue for the 10th National Congress of the CPC was explaining how the Lin Biao clique had been able to develop within the party. Zhou Enlai’s explanation was based on Mao Zedong’s view, which referenced to Marxism and Leninism, internal struggles within the party were a reflection of class struggles in society at large. The fall of the traitors led by Liu Shaoqi, and was followed by the collapse of the Lin Biao anti-party clique. This reflected the intense class struggle taking place both domestically and internationally. As to why the party had been unable to detect the Lin Biao clique earlier, Zhou Enlai declared that Lin was a capitalistic careerist, schemer, and double-dealer. Lin had been secretly lurking in the party for decades. It took time for him to be exposed. Zhou traced Lin’s historical mistakes back to those Gutian Meeting in 1929. It took quite some effort to demonstrate that Lin’s capitalistic spiritualistic worldview had not undergone any fundamental transformation since then. At important moments in the revolutionary cause, Zhou said, Lin had committed the

leadership of the CPC Central Committee under Chairman Mao had also been good and appropriate. (Zhou, “Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.)

19. Zhou Enlai stated in the political report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC that

Lin Biao and his handful of collaborators were a counter-revolutionary cabal: they kept the book of Mao’s quotations close at hand, constantly yelled “Long Live Chairman

Mao!“ and uttered sweet words into Mao’s ear, but they tried to stab the chairman in his back. The nature of the counter-revolutionary revisionist line advocated by the Lin Biao clique and their pernicious purpose in launching the counter-revolutionary armed coup was to seize supreme power over the CPC and the country, go against the political

line of the 9th National Congress, and fundamentally change the basic line and policy

of the CPC; they aimed to transform the CPC from directed by Marxism and Leninism to fascist revisionism; they also aimed to topple the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore capitalism. In China, the clique tried to reinstate the ruling of the capitalist

landlord class, which was overthrown by the CPC, the PLA, and the Chinese people

and to restore the fascistic dictatorship of feudalistic compradors. Internationally, they wanted to surrender to the Soviet Union, revisionist socialist imperialism, and to

collaborate with imperialistic, revisionist, opposing forces to fight China, the CPC, and China’s revolutionary cause. (Ibid.)

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

rightist mistakes and played a double game to deceive the party and the people.20 Clearly, what Zhou was saying was not internally consistent. Accusations against the two leaders of the Cultural Revolution — Lin Biao and Chen Boda — led to public questioning of the revolution itself.21 Nonetheless, it was true, as Zhou described, that the higher Lin rose to, the more ambitious he became. Lin had been overestimating his own power while underestimating that of the people. However, what applied to Lin also applied to Jiang Qing. This resembled Mao Zedong in his very advanced years very much. Supreme power without any restraints inevitably leads to alienation. With such power, the supreme leader rules the society and expanded his dictatorship to not alone people but also other leaders. Zhou failed to convince himself, let alone the entire CPC. Then what was the basic cause of the Lin Biao clique? Can we regard the elimination of this group as a success? Zhou Enlai reaffirmed the basic political line of the CPC during China’s period of socialism, and he held that this two-line political struggle would continue for a long time: similar incidents could re-occur perhaps 10, 20, or even 30 times.22 In accordance with the political logic of Mao Zedong, the basic task of the CPC was to instigate political line struggles. If, for example, 10 of such struggles occurred within 50-year, 20 of these struggles would take place before 2021 (the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC) and 30 would take place before 2071 (the 150th anniversary). This was the true reason behind the actions of the Lin Biao clique. Zhou Enlai was unaware that only a few months later, Mao would launch a campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, which was exactly in keeping with Mao’s political logic. This time, the 11th political struggle would be targeted at Zhou, not Lin. As long as Zhou supported and upheld Mao’s political line, he would have a price to pay. 20. Ibid. 21. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 361. 22. According to Zhou Enlai, socialism takes place over a very long historical period:

“During this time, conflicts between the classes and class struggles will always exist,

and the struggles between socialism and capitalism will always exist; there will always be the risk of capitalism being restored; the threats of invasion and subversion from

imperialism and socialistic imperialism will always exist. The struggles between the two political lines within the party reflect those conflicts, and these struggles will always continue. Incidents like that with Lin Biao will re-occur — 10, 20, or even 30

times. And people like Lin Biao, Wang Ming, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang

will appear again. This is independent of human will.“ (Zhou, “Report on the 10th

National Congress of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.)

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

With regard to its national circumstances, Zhou Enlai defined China as an economically poor and developing country. However, the primary task of the CPC was still to resolve class struggle, whereas economic growth was ranked fourth on the to-do list.23 What was Mao Zedong’s general view of those times? Zhou Enlai quoted Mao as saying that the country was still in an era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Mao was not sensitive or conscious of the fact that it had move on to a new era of scientific revolution and economic globalization; China was left for behind in terms of science and technology. Mao however predicted domestic disorder will eventually develop into international disorder as globalization developed.24 Although China had joined the United Nations and begun to play an important role in the community, Mao clung tightly on his theories regarding world war and world revolution:25 He wanted to convince other with his theory — revolution continues under a dictatorship of the proletariat. This indicates that Mao’s analysis of domestic issues had a direct effect on his evaluation over international issues. However, his dominant policy was related more to exclusionism and isolationism than to revolution and war. Being subjective and close minded, Mao not alone made a wrong assessment of China’s society nature and national circumstance, but also 23. Zhou Enlai detailed the major tasks of the CPC as follows: “(1) Continue the Criticizing

Lin and Rectification campaign; (2) the whole party should carefully study Marxist,

Leninist, and Maoist literature; (3) attach importance to class struggles in the social structure, including all cultural areas, and reform parts of the social structure that fail

to fit with economic foundations; (4) we should adhere to the overall political line of devoting our greatest efforts to establishing socialism with greater, faster, and better economic results — promoting production while still furthering revolution; (5) further strengthen the centralized leadership of the CPC.“ (Ibid.)

24. Zhou Enlai said on behalf of Mao Zedong that the current international situation was characterized by overall chaos: “The wind sweeping through the tower heralds a

storm rising in the mountains. This reflects all the fundamental conflicts in the world as analyzed by Lenin. Abatement can be only a temporary, superficial phenomenon.

Chaos will continue. But such chaos is good, not bad, for our people. Such chaos will

disturb and divide our enemies. It will awaken and energize our people, and it will push the international situation in a direction that is favorable to us and adverse to the imperialist, modern revisionist, and reactionary forces in all countries.“ (Ibid.)

25. Zhou Enlai repeated Mao Zedong’s view on May 20, 1970: “The risk of another world war still exists, and the people of all countries should be prepared for this. However, the dominant tendency in the world is still revolution.“ (Ibid.)

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

misjudged internal affairs. He was mistaken not only with regard to his assessment of the national circumstances in China and the nature of Chinese society but also in his judgment of international affairs. He did not visit other countries to learn directly;26 instead, he relied on issues of Reference News, published daily by Xinhua News Agency as an internal reference, to learn about Western countries and the rest of the world.27 As a result, Mao knew little about the world and made no efforts toward an exchange of information with foreign places since he was afraid of open competition. The information sources, knowledge structure, and learning ability of Mao as China’s supreme leader restricted the learning ability of the entire CPC and Chinese society as a whole. The Party Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress of the CPC inherited the basic principles and content of the Constitution approved at the 9th National Congress. Wang Hongwen declared that the political and organizational lines followed at the 9th National CPC Congress were both correct. The Party Constitution approved at the 9th National Congress adhered to the fundamental principles of the CPC; it reflected the recent experience of the Cultural Revolution, which was launched by the proletariat, and it played an active role in the political life of the party, the army, and the people. The general provisions of the revised Constitution retained the stipulations of those adopted at the 9th National Congress with regard to the nature, guiding thoughts, fundamental creed, and basic political line of the CPC. What was the biggest difference between the Constitutions adopted at the 9th and 10th National Congresses? What was the main purpose in amending the Constitution? How did Wang Hongwen explain these changes in his report about amending the Constitution? Wang said that there had been a paragraph related to Lin Biao in the Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress and that paragraph had been deleted in light of the demands of the whole party, army, and people. This move became necessary following Lin’s betrayal of the party and the country and Lin’s alienation from the party and the people.28 It may be observed that the sentence “Comrade Lin Biao is the close comrade-in-arms and successor of Comrade Mao Zedong,“ which was put into the general provisions of the Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress, proved to be a historical 26. Mao Zedong did not visit any other countries after 1957. After June 1966, no Chinese

leaders visited other countries but they allowed the leaders of other countries to come to China.

27. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1712. 28. Wang, “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, September 2, 1973.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

setback. This sentence was deleted in the Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress. Compared with the Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress, some new content was added to the Constitution of the 10th National Congress. This was related to the experience regarding the Lin Biao Incident as summarized by Mao Zedong. Wang Hongwen made a number of insertions. First, based on the definition of the Cultural Revolution made by Mao Zedong, Wang Hongwen added a sentence: “Such revolutions will happen many times in the future“ (quotation from Mao).29 Wang read the sentence as history proven class and line struggles are reflected in the party; in addition, trends in imperialism and social imperialism in the international community are also mirrored in the party.30 Second, Wang Hongwen added the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots to the general provisions.31 This was Mao Zedong’s most important assessment of the Lin Biao Incident. Mao believed that the Three Must-Nots are the culprit of the Cultural Revolution’s failure. 1. Feudalistic dictatorship had prevailed, such as the personality cult, personality dictatorship, and belief in the supreme leader’s words, but this was totally unrelated to Marxism. 2. Political divisions occur constantly in the CPC Central Committee, which to Mao was unavoidable. 29. The Constitution of the CPC stipulated that China’s Cultural Revolution was a political revolution, in which the proletariat fought the capitalist class and all the exploitive

classes under socialistic conditions; it consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat and safeguarded against the restoration of capitalism. Such revolutions would take

place many times in the future. (“Constitution of the CPC,” People’s Daily, September 2, 1973.)

30. Wang Hongwen said that in 1966, when the Cultural Revolution was launched by the

proletariat, Chairman Mao stated that the purpose was to “put the world in disorder to achieve a new order.“ This process would then be repeated in seven or eight years’

time. The bad elements would then become exposed. This exposure would be inevitable since it was determined by the nature of the social class to which they belonged. “The reality of class struggles has proved and will continue to prove this objective law, as

revealed by Chairman Mao.“ (Wang, “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, September 2, 1973.)

31. The so-called “Three Musts and Three Must-Nots” refers to the quotation from Mao Zedong: “We must stick to Marxism, and we must not carry out revisionism; we must

unite with each other, and we must not be divided; we must be just and honorable, and we must not resort to all sorts of schemes and intrigues.“

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

3. There were many kinds of schemes and intrigues being played within the party, and surges of unpredictable political persecutions took place all the time. It can be said that except for Mao Zedong, no member of the central leadership, including Jiang Qing, felt politically safe. There were no rules of conduct for the internal struggles within the CPC. Shortly after the 10th National Congress of the CPC, campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was initiated, though the actual target of this action was Zhou Enlai. The movement against rightist whitewashing — targeted at Deng Xiaoping — was launched by the end of 1975. In April 1976, Deng was stripped off all official positions both inside and outside the party. Replacing him as the first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee was Hua Guofeng. In October 1976, the Gang of Four was arrested without undergoing the procedure of discussion and approval at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee and the National Congress of the CPC. Third, it was necessary to possess the revolutionary spirit even if this went against the general current. Backing with Mao Zedong’s instructions, Wang Hongwen stated that it was a Marxist principle to go against the stream. The Party Constitution stipulated that the party had grown and developed in its struggles against rightist and leftist opportunist political lines. Party members had to possess the revolutionary spirit even if this meant going against the stream.32 This came out of Mao’s experience at the Lushan Meeting in August 1970. Mao always regarded the history of the CPC as the struggle between himself — the correct delegate — and the other delegates, who were wrong, with regard to the political line. The CPC had always been a revolutionary party that was subjected to internal struggles over the political line. Mao was against the idea of establishing internal regulations, democratic systems, or voting systems within the party. Instead, he advocated the spirit of going against the stream and rebellion. Wang also advocated the Five Fear-Nots: do not fear dismissal; do not fear losing party membership; do not fear imprisonment; do not fear execution; do not fear divorce. Instead, Wang declared, it was necessary to have the courage to go against the current.33 Unlike most other rebel leaders across China ending up behind bars, Wang, despite being one of the most active rebels, was promoted to become the third-most important figure in the CPC by Mao. 32. “Constitution of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, September 2, 1973. 33. Wang “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ September 2, 1973.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fourth, it was necessary to select and promote talented workers and poor farmers to leading posts at all levels, and party officials also had to be cultivated among women and people of minority ethnicities. However, intellectuals and those possessing other specialized talents were to be excluded. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions, a number of party officials were promoted from industrial workers and farmers directly. Representatives of industrial workers, Wang Hongwen, Wu Guixian (aged 35) and Ni Zhifu (aged 40); and representative of farmers, Chen Yonggui (aged 59), were selected to be part of the Political Bureau. These individuals did not follow the steps of the normal political course, but skipped most of those steps and rocketed to high positions during the Cultural Revolution, becoming members or alternate members of the Political Bureau. Mao Zedong did not like people with particular talents or technical expertise but preferred industrial workers and farmers as party officials. This was in contrast to the aims of the Central Committee of Science, which was created by Mao himself in 1956. Such a policy hamstrung the expansion of knowledge and professionalization of CPC Central Committee members. Fifth, it was essential that the centralized leadership of the CPC become stronger. Article 7 of the amended Party Constitution stipulated that government organs, the PLA, and all revolutionary mass organizations had to “accept the centralized leadership of the CPC.“ Wang Hongwen instructed to read centralized leadership in the following 2 lights. First, in terms of the relationship between all organizations at the same level, such as those of industrial workers, farmers, businessmen, students, members of the PLA, and government officials, and the CPC — the CPC had to be above all the other organizations. These two sets of institutions were not parallel to each other, the CPC was certainly not to be subordinated to other organizations. Second, in terms of authority, subordinates had to obey superiors, and the entire party was obliged to obey the central CPC leadership. At all levels, CPC committees had to be well aligned with the central CPC leadership in terms of their thoughts, policies, plans, directions, and actions — based on the revolutionary course determined by Chairman Mao.34 Article 7 was clearly intended to bolster a one-party political system featuring highly centralized power and considerable monopolization. This was a far cry from the political system of CPC leadership, multi-party collaboration, and political consultation established in 1949.35 It amounted to abandoning the basic spirit of the general provisions of the Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the

34. Ibid. 35. Hu, History and Theory of China’s Political Economy (1949–1976).

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

CPC.36 In terms of the relationship of organizations at the same level, the CPC was superior to all others, where all power were held. With regard to the central organization of the CPC, the power of the supreme leader became further enhanced. The Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CPC did not define the functions and core position of the chairman, but it underlined the core position of the collective leadership of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee.37 According to Article 9, which was passed at the 10th National Congress, several essential functional departments should be established under the leadership of the chairman, vice chairman, and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to handle the daily work of the CPC, the government, and the PLA. This stipulation removed the system of collective central leadership that was formulated in the Party Constitution during the 8th National Congress of the CPC. This proviso highlighted the core position of the chairman, at the same time reducing the position of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. It negated the core position of the collective leadership of the Political Bureau while strengthening the political power of Mao Zedong as an individual in terms of political procedures, i.e., his supreme authority incorporated that of the CPC, the government, and the PLA. Interestingly, at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong upheld romantic liberalism and ultra-anarchism. He advocated the great democracy of the proletariat and justified rebellion, overall seizure of state power, and destruction of the old state machinery. Instead of relying on and bolstering the leadership of the CPC, Mao tried to reduce and eradicate that leadership, which almost led to the paralysis and failure of CPC organizations at all levels around the country. At that early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Mao relied on his monopoly of public opinion through the newspapers to support his absolute authority and rule the country through supreme orders. Now, he returned to the opposite. He 36. The general provision of the Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CPC stipulated that the party had to consolidate the brotherly alliance of industrial workers and farmers in all aspects, and it had to consolidate the unified front linking

all patriotic forces; it had to consolidate the long-term cooperation between democratic parties and nonparty figures.

37. Article 37 of the Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CPC

stipulated that the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee had to exercise the

functions of the CPC Central Committee during adjournments of the plenary sessions of that committee. The secretariat of the Central Committee was to handle the daily work of that committee under the leadership of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

wanted to re-establish CPC organizations at all levels, and he naturally returned to political conservatism and political centralism. During his re-establishment of CPC organizations at all levels, Mao reinforced his supreme power via adopting a hierarchical structure, i.e., centralized power for the ruling party plus the supreme chairman. It is clear that the Party Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress of the CPC provided a legal basis for this model of centralized dictatorship to sustain. It was not until 1978 that Deng Xiaoping censured this model. Deng declared that the model had transformed the leadership of the CPC into a monopoly and that the party’s centralized leadership led to confusion regarding identification of the party with the state. He noted that the party was characterized by bureaucracy and over-centralization of power: many major problems were often decided by one or two individuals, and all that others could do was simply to obey.38 On August 28, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the presidium of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Zhou proposed to liberate those first secretaries of provincial CPC committees who committed errors during the Cultural Revolution. Zhou suggested that they be promoted as candidates for the new CPC Central Committee as long as they had showed a positive attitude in admitting to their mistakes. Zhou proposed that some of those old party officials who had committed serious mistakes should also be retained and claimed that was a typical case for which Mao Zedong’s policy of education should apply.39 At the 10th National Congress of the CPC, 195 members and 124 alternate members were elected to the CPC Central Committee. Zhou Enlai noted that among the members of the CPC Central Committee, industrial workers, farmers, members of the PLA, and other working people accounted for about 67%, with the remaining 33% being made up of revolutionary cadres — many was members of the PLA.40 Compared with the 9th National Congress, there was an obvious decrease in the proportion of PLA members in the CPC Central Committee, which was a reflection of the direct political impact of the Lin Biao Incident. Some of the members of the CPC Central Committee were young individuals who had joined the CPC at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the CPC Central Committee could be described as a combination of old, middle-aged, and young

38. “One individual“ here refers to Mao Zedong and “one or two individuals“ refers to

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 141–142.)

39. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 616.

40. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1665.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

members.41 Many of those committee members had benefited from the Cultural Revolution and there were also Cultural Revolution hardliners who were part of the Jiang Qing clique. Among others, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zhenlin, Wu Lanfu, Li Jingquan, Su Zhenhua, Yang Yong, Liao Chengzhi, Tao Lujia, and Ye Fei, who had been excluded from the CPC Central Committee during the Cultural Revolution, were reelected as committee members. Also on August 28, Zhou Enlai announced at the closing of the conference, “We will soon hold the 4th National People’s Congress.“ After the 9th CPC National Congress in April 1969, it was proposed that 4th National People’s Congress be convened in September 1970 after the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. However, the movement of criticizing Chen Boda was also ongoing. It was originally rescheduled to September 1971, but the Lin Biao Incident ends up pushing the schedule back again. Zhou announced that the 4th National People’s Congress would take place in October; however, it was once more delayed owing to Mao Zhedong’s movement of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius launched back in 1974. The Congress only got to officially convent in January 1975. The convention of the National People’s Congress reflects a period of national chaos created by state administration and ruling prevailed and policies. On August 30, the First Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee elected the party’s central leadership. Mao Zedong (aged 80) was elected chairman of the CPC Central Committee; Zhou Enlai (aged 75), Wang Hongwen (aged 38), Kang Sheng (aged 75), Ye Jianying (aged 76), and Li Desheng (aged 57) were elected vice chairmen of the committee,42 the number of vice chairmen remained the same as that of the 8th CPC Central Committee. The above six individuals plus Zhu De (aged 87), Zhang Chunqiao (aged 56), and Dong Biwu (aged 87) were elected the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The Standing Committee of the 9th Political Bureau comprised five members. The average age of the members of the Standing Committee of the 10th Political Bureau was 70.4 years, which was a very old leadership. By September 1976, Dong Biwu (died April 1975), Kang Sheng (died December 1975), Zhou Enlai (died January 1976), Zhu De (died July 1976), and Mao Zedong (died September 1976) had all passed away. As a result, only three of the nine Standing Committee member remains: Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, and Zhang Chunqiao — those Mao wanted to train them into his successors. 41. “Press Communiqué of the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” August 29, 1973. 42. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, there was only one vice chairman (Lin Biao) in the party’s central leadership; in the 9th Central Committee of the party, there was again only one vice chairman (Lin Biao).

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Comparing to the 9th Political Bureau in 1969 with 40% of the members being newly elected, nine out of twenty five (36%) members of the 10th Political Bureau were newly elected.43 Wang Hongwen became the rising political star at this National Congress of the CPC, which shocked China and the world. Before the Cultural Revolution, Wang was merely an ordinary official in a Shanghai factory, but he soared to the third-most important position in the CPC Central Committee — just behind Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai — thanks to his rebellion during the Cultural Revolution. No other leader in the history of the CPC had rocketed to power this way. This was a deliberate political arrangement of Mao’s, implemented by Zhou. Wang being the youngest vice chairman and member of the Political Bureau made him the best candidate becoming Mao’s successor. Wang’s ascent to power violated the tradition of gradual step-by-step promotion in the CPC. As a consequence, Xu Shiyou, a member of the Political Bureau, headed to oppose against Wang’s chairmanship. On the evening of August 23, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of leaders of the CPC, the state, and the PLA under the direct leadership of the CPC Central Committee and all provinces and municipalities and autonomous regions. At the meeting, Zhou presented the details of Wang’s promotion to the CPC Central Committee. Zhou said that after the Lin Biao Incident, Chairman Mao had mentioned many times that Wang, who had formerly been an ordinary worker, should be promoted and trained to work in the CPC Central Committee. Zhou stated that it is his duty to execute Mao’s will, especially he been keep mentioning about it. Under this light, Zhou saw the necessity of attaching importance of the young officials than looking down on them as merely boy scouts.44 Zhou was not politically ambitious, so he always accepted and obeyed Mao’s leadership; vice versa, Mao needed Zhou’s political submission and support. It is obvious that even if Mao personally appointed Wang as the next vice chairman, there would sure be voices against the decision and even protest. Thus, Zhou played an essential role in ensuring Lin Biao be succeeding 43. The 10th Political Bureau consisted of 21 members: Mao Zedong,* Wang Hongwen, Wei Guoqing, Ye Jianying,* Liu Bocheng,* Jiang Qing,* Zhu De,* Xu Shiyou,* Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui,* Wu De, Wang Dongxing,** Chen Yonggui, Chen Xilian,* Li Xiannian,* Li Desheng,** Zhang Chunqiao,* Zhou Enlai,* Yao Wenyuan,* Kang Sheng,* and Dong

Biwu*; there were 4 alternate members: Wu Guixian, Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Sai Fuding. [Note: * indicates members of the 9th Political Bureau; ** indicates alternate members of the 9th Political Bureau] (Li, From the First to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, vol. 2, 981, 984–985.)

44. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 64.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao’s place in the party’s Constitution at the 9th National Congress of the CPC. To reinforce central leadership, Mao prevail over putting young industrial workers and farmers at considerable opposition than intellectuals and professionals. As a result, individuals like Wang Hongwen became prominent in the Cultural Revolution and rapidly ascended to power. Later, in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun drew on this experience of Mao’s. Deng and Chen promoted leaders who were revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and professional;45 however, they also supported step-by-step promotion and were against sudden promotion,46 citing the example of Wang Hongwen. Taking advantage of the political vacuum that developed after the fall of the Lin Biao clique, the Jiang Qing clique advanced rapidly within the party, accounting for three members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Chunqiao) and two members of the Political Bureau (Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan), and the clique also officially formed the Gang of Four. 47 It was at odds with the moderates, headed by Zhou Enlai.48 For the Gang of Four, 45. In August 1980 at a meeting of Political Bureau, Chen Yun proposed that party officials

should be revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and professional. (Zhao ed., Chen Yun and Important Events in the History of the Central CPC Leadership, 297.)

46. Deng Xiaoping said that party officials should climb up step by step: “In 1975, I spoke out against wrong practices during the Cultural Revolution. We cannot promote cadres

by suddenly elevating them into top positions.“ (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 324.)

Chen Yun said that step-by-step promotion was good: “This method was proposed by

Comrade Deng Xiaoping. It is necessary to promote cadres one step at a time. They must be promoted just one level every time.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 301.)

47. The CPC Central Committee’s resolution in 1981 pointed out that the 10th National

Congress of the Party made Wang Hongwen vice chairman of the party’s central committee. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen

organized themselves into the Gang of Four, which strengthened the power of the antirevolutionary group led by Jiang Qing. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee Comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

48. Roderick MacFarquhar held that after the radicals headed by Jiang Qing achieved

their success at the 10th National Congress of the CPC, they prepared to attack their

most formidable enemy — Premier Zhou Enlai. (MacFarquhar and Fairbank eds., The

Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution (1966–1982), 1998 ed., 358.)

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Zhou represented its greatest obstacle to seizing supreme state authority. Mao Zedong wanted to redress the balance of the radicals and moderates within the party so that they could act as a check on the actions of the others. Mao also actively supported those who benefited from the Cultural Revolution and placed them in important positions; many of these individuals became members and alternate members of the Political Bureau. Mao Zedong appeared in public for the last time at the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Later, he retreated to his study owing to old age illness and increasing frailty. He was unable to participate neither meetings of the Political Bureau nor visit different parts of the country. There are only a few reports of his meetings with foreign visitors. However, Mao still possessed supreme authority, and he personally launched and led two large-scale political movements: the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius, which was targeted at Zhou Enlai, and the movement against Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing. The fate of China was dependent on this 80-year-old individual. After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, important reports were drafted by Zhou Enlai and cosigned by Zhou and Wang Hongwen before being submitted to Mao Zedong.49 Mao talked with Wu De and others and officially proposed to the Political Bureau that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan be promoted. As he did so, Mao pointed to the green vegetables outside the window and said that those comrades should be cultivated like the vegetables. Mao placed great hopes on them.50 This indicates that Mao was training Wang as his successor. However, in light of the experience with Lin Biao, Mao did not officially appoint Wang as his successor. He first needed to train and observe Wang over a period of time. As Deng Xiaoping later remarked, as a national leader Mao Zedong chose his successor in the same manner as a feudal monarch.51 This was a non-institutional practice since in accordance with the Party Constitution, the supreme leader of the CPC had to be officially elected by the CPC Central Committee. Such a noninstitutional practice was random, variable, and unpredictable — and free of any restraints. However, Mao soon became dissatisfied with Wang Hongwen, and selected Deng Xiaoping instead as his successor. Just before Mao died, he officially appointed Hua Guofeng as the first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee. All of these events took place within three years, just before April 1976. Mao was 49. Pang and Jin eds, A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1679. 50. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 224.

51. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee Comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 7, 347.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

old and found himself in a dilemma regarding the question of his successor. On one hand, he needed a successor designated by himself to inherit his power and causes — especially the Cultural Revolution; on the other hand, he was concerned that this successor would use his support to gain greater political power and pose a challenge to Mao or betray his cause. Therefore, for every political struggle, Mao had to change his successor. This act of changing of successor itself would lead to a new political crisis. The political concept of finding a successor to the Proletariat’s Revolution was corrupt owing to this practice of feudalistic dictatorship. Mao was unable to achieve his goal, but he could not stop himself from attempting to. That was in his character. As supreme leader of the CPC, Mao Zedong was a contradiction. He used the traditional strategy of balancing and checking political forces (which was very undeveloped) to rule the largest ruling party in a modern country. Regardless of the conflicts they had and difference they shared, Mao needed the Jiang Qing clique made up of Cultural Revolution hardliners to keep the Revolution ongoing even after his death. 52

Mao Zedong Promoted Deng Xiaoping to Important Positions By the end of 1973, Mao Zedong had decided to promote Deng Xiaoping to important positions, and granted Deng more power so that he could take over from Zhou Enlai, who was very ill. Mao wanted Deng to rule the country and restore economic and social order, and order in people’s lives. At that time, Mao wanted to end the Cultural Revolution 53 to deal with the various problems in Chinese society. So the question was, how should the revolution be brought to an end? Who would be able conclude it? How should anarchy be transformed into order? For Mao, Deng appeared to be the one who could most appropriately deal with these and related problems. It should be noted that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying came under severe criticism 52. On December 24, 1980, Jiang Qing defended herself in the first trial of the Special

Tribunal: “I was like Chairman Mao’s dog — a pawn on his political chessboard.“ (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 323.)

53. President Moussa Traoré of Mali visited China in June 1973 and asked Mao Zedong when the Cultural Revolution would end. Mao Zedong answered: “Not yet.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1654.)

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before Mao Zedong officially appointed Deng Xiaoping. On November 14, the People’s Daily published a communiqué about Henry Kissinger’s visit to China, which stated that Zhou and Ye had held discussions with Kissinger. Mao and all the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing read and commented on the draft of this communiqué in advance. Zhou went to Mao to report on the communiqué, but he found Mao asleep. Mao thought that Zhou had failed to report to him and flew into a rage. Mao maintained that Zhou and Ye had shown weakness in the Sino-U.S. meeting. On November 17, Mao Zedong addressed a meeting with Zhou Enlai and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “It is necessary to proceed with caution: we have to be leftist when combating the United States, but rightist when allying with that country.“ Mao also remarked that the Soviet Union “was very ambitious but still lacked sufficient power.“ He proposed convening a Political Bureau meeting to discuss the errors that Zhou had made in the Sino-U.S. talks.54 Among the party leaders, it was up to Mao to decide if one had or had not made mistakes. On November 18, Zhou Enlai, who was very ill, initiated an examination on his mistakes with Mao Zedong, and admitted that he “had not done well“ in the SinoU.S. talks.55 This once again demonstrated the dictatorship of Mao as the leader of the CPC Central Committee. He had the final say on all matters and would not tolerate contrary opinions. On November 21, in accordance with the wishes of Mao Zedong, Wang Hongwen called and chaired meetings of the Political Bureau to criticize Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. In those meetings, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, and others attacked Zhou and Ye: they dismissed the Sino-U.S. talks as a “betrayal and humiliation of our country“ and a gesture of surrender; they declared them to have been the 11th political-line struggle. They slandered Zhou Enlai as the leader of the incorrect political line, and claimed that Zhou was only counting the days before he could replace Mao Zedong.56 Although Zhou was enraged by all this, he remained silent.57 After the meeting, Jiang Qing demanded of Mao Zedong that he add her and Yao Wenyuan as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.58 Jiang instructed Wang to make a copy of the meeting minutes concerning attacks on Zhou and submit it to Mao. However, Mao responded: “Make no mention of the 11th political-line struggle. Promoting additional members to the Standing 54. Ibid., 1670–1671. 55. Ibid., 1671. 56. Ibid. 57. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 288. 58. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1670–1671.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Committee is out of the question.“59 After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, the Jiang Qing clique started their first wave of attack on Zhou Enlai making use of the instructions given by Mao Zedong. It signified that once again the central leadership was faced with political confrontation and even division. To maintain political unity, which was then very fragile, it was necessary for Mao to criticize Jiang Qing, placate Zhou, and retain the confidence of Ye Jianying. Since the 9th National Congress of the CPC, Mao had been against Jiang to work as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. On November 25, Mao Zedong commented on a letter from an ordinary CPC member that criticized Jiang Qing: “Have it printed and distributed to the comrades in the Political Bureau.“ Mao believed that some opinions were beneficial, and so criticisms should be allowed.60 Mao implied to the members of the Political Bureau that Jiang could be criticized. However, who dared rebuke the domineering Jiang? Even Zhou Enlai had to bow to her. She was the real boss and bully within the CPC. On December 9, in discussions with Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen, Mao Zedong first agreed with the Political Bureau meeting’s criticism of Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, though to protect Zhou he allowed no words on the 11th political-line struggle. Mao criticized Jiang Qing about the “counting the days“ reference.61 Mao also refused Jiang’s request to become a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. In this way, the Political Bureau stopped its criticism of Zhou. This is an indication of how Mao was always in need of and yet dissatisfied with Zhou Enlai. Mao criticized Zhou, but he would not bring Zhou down.62 Zhou 59. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 366–367. 60. This letter, “A Letter from an Ordinary CPC Member,“ made the criticism that Jiang Qing was not at all democratic, she overemphasized the arts and literature, and failed

to follow the policy of letting “a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of

thought contend.“ In this letter, it was contended that the slogan the “Revolutionary

Model Theater Goes Before Everything“ and the exaggeration of Jiang Qing as the

standard bearer of the Cultural Revolution were inappropriate. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee Comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 367.)

61. Mao Zedong said that two mistakes had been made. One was to make the proposal

about the 11th political-line struggle, which was incorrect. The other one was that some (referring to Jiang Qing) accused Premier Zhou of impatiently craving power, which

was also not true: it was in fact she who impatiently craved power. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1671.)

62. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 289.

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had no choice but to swallow Mao’s anger, tantrums and try to appease him. Deng Xiaoping respected Mao, but he did not indulge him.63 This also shows the nature of the retaliatory struggles between the two main factions within the CPC Central Committee. They both needed Mao’s support for relative peace to exist with the other faction: otherwise, conflicts could break out at any time, and that was something that Mao wish not to see. With the supreme leader’s dominance over the CPC Central Committee, there was no chance of any one faction prevailing within the party. Only Mao could resolve troubles and maintain unity. After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, Zhou Enlai discussed with Ye Jianying and came to a conclusion that Ye should propose directly to Mao Zedong allowing Deng Xiaoping to join the Political Bureau while concurrently holding a post within the PLA. Mao responded that he would consider the matter. After several months of deliberation, especially after Mao criticized Zhou Enlai, who was still very ill, Mao decided to raise Deng to important positions.64 Mao did in fact replace Zhou with Deng to conduct the routine work of the CPC, the state, and the PLA and to engineer a political balance. On December 12, Mao Zedong stated at a meeting of the Political Bureau that he and Ye Jianying had asked Deng Xiaoping to work as a member of the Central Military Committee. They decided to schedule a discussion at the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee over the issue if Deng should be a member of the Political Bureau. Mao accepted the suggestions of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping and made changes to the commanders of China’s eight military areas. Mao made the criticism that the Political Bureau as presided over by Zhou Enlai failed to properly handle politics and that the Military Committee as presided over by Ye Jianying did not properly deal with military affairs.65 Later, the Political Bureau continued that meeting, chaired by Zhou, and it unanimously agreed to allow Deng to sit in on Political Bureau meetings and participate in the bureau’s work; Deng’s membership of the Political Bureau would be submitted for approval at the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee. Deng 63. Ibid., 286. 64. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 287. 65. Mao Zedong said: “The Political Bureau should discuss political affairs. The Military Committee should discuss both military and political affairs. We need to change the fact that the Military Committee does not discuss military affairs and the Political Bureau does not discuss political affairs. As long as you do not change, I will hold

meetings here. I have no option but to hold meetings and talk to you in person here in

the Political Bureau.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1672.)

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

was promoted as a member of the Central Military Committee, and he participated in the committee’s work and attended its office meetings. The Political Bureau meeting also agreed with the change in the commanders of China’s military areas.66 On December 14, Mao Zedong told the members of the Political Bureau: “I now have a chief strategist, and his name is Deng Xiaoping. The notice has been issued that Deng will become a member of the Political Bureau and Central Military Committee. The Political Bureau is in charge of everything — the CPC, the state, the PLA, the masses, and the students in the north, south, east, west, and central areas. I think the post of secretary-general should be created for the Political Bureau. Since you [Deng] do not wish to accept this title, you should become chief of staff.“67 Mao Zedong gave Deng some advice: “Be firm, but gentle. Have an iron hand, but keep it in a velvet glove. Be gentle and soft, but also be iron-willed.“68 This is an indication that Deng was a leader of principle, which is the moral standard of a statesman and also a mark of Deng’s political maturity. Deng’s most important characteristic was that he worked in the public interest, and Mao was correct in identifying this trait. During the Cultural Revolution, many leaders forsook their principles to retain their positions and adopted a neutral position against their will. Mao looked down upon such individuals. That was why Mao made Deng his chief strategist to lead the country and the PLA. On December 15, Mao Zedong and some Political Bureau officials talked to the commanders of the Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, and Wuhan military areas, and Mao introduced Deng Xiaoping to them.69 On December 21, Mao held discussions with the members of the Central Military Committee about the change in the commanders of China’s eight military areas. Mao said that all the blame was his: “I am to blame — more than you — and so I have tried to step down several times. At the 8th National Congress, I set up the post of honorary chairman for myself, so that others [Liu Shaoqi] could be chairman. I like him [Deng Xiaoping], though

66. Ibid., 1673. 67. Mao Zedong said: “Now we have a general chief of staff. Some are afraid of him, but

he is quite resolute. His achievements accounted for 70% of his life, with mistakes accounting for 30%. Your old superior is now back at my request — well, not mine

alone, but also that of the Political Bureau.“ Mao said to Deng Xiaoping: “Well, some are afraid of you. But let me give you some advice: be firm, but gentle. Have an iron

hand, but keep it in a velvet glove. Be gentle and soft, but also iron-willed. Your past shortcomings need to be changed somewhat.“ (Ibid., 1672–1673.) 68. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 286–287. 69. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1674–1675.

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some are a little afraid of him.“70 On December 22, Zhou Enlai drafted an official notice on behalf of the CPC Central Committee regarding the appointment of Deng Xiaoping. This stated that Deng would participate in major resolutions of the CPC, the state, and the military, and he would preside over their daily work.71 To a large extend, this can be considered a restraint on Wang Hongwen, who at that time presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, and it amounted to a strengthening of the moderates. The same day, Deng Xiaoping announced on behalf of the Central Military Committee the order to change the commanders of the eight military areas, requiring that all commanders update all newest posts within 10 days. The commanders of the Beijing and Shenyang military areas exchanged posts, and so did the commanders of the Nanjing and Guangzhou military areas, the commanders of the Jinan and Wuhan military areas, and the commanders of the Fuzhou and Lanzhou military areas.72 70. Ibid. 71. The notice stated that on the recommendation of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central

Committee had decided to appoint Deng Xiaoping as a member of the Political Bureau

and to participate in the leading work of the CPC Central Committee; this would be submitted to the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee for official

approval. In addition, Deng would be appointed as member of the Central Military Committee and participate in the leading work of the CPC Central Committee and the Military Commission. (Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 287.)

72. The Central Military Committee made the following appointments: Li Desheng,

commander of the Beijing Military Area since January 1971, as commander of the

Shenyang Military Area, and Chen Xilian, commander of the Shenyang Military Area

since October 1959, as commander of the Beijing Military Area; Xu Shiyou, commander

of the Nanjing Military Area since March 1955, as commander of the Guangzhou Military Area, and Ding Sheng, commander of the Guangzhou Military Area since July 1969, as commander of the Nanjing Military Area; Yang Dezhi, commander of the

Jinan Military Area since March 1955, as commander of the Wuhan Military Area, and

Zeng Siyu, commander of the Wuhan Military Area since August 1967, as commander

of the Jinan Military Area; and Pi Dingjun, commander of the Lanzhou Military Area since November 1969, as commander of the Fuzhou Military Area, and Han Xianchu, commander of the Fuzhou Military Area since October 1957, as commander of the

Lanzhou Military Area. (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China:

Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1003; Qiu ed., Records of the People’s Republic of China — Literature and Research, vol. 5,

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Why did Mao Zedong introduce these changes in the command of the eight military areas? The Central Literature Research Office provides information on the historical background. According to the records, Mao asked Zhou Enlai if there were any close comrades in arms like Lin Biao after the Lin Biao Incident; Zhou replied that all Chinese people supported and protected Mao. Mao however responded: “Is that true? I don’t think so. I have persecuted many people. Would these people still protect me after that? Do you believe that they would?“ Mao did not believe that. He felt that there were a number of hidden dangers in the army. Deng helped Mao in bringing forth the change in the commanders of the eight military areas as an answer to the question regarding the danger in the army.73 This tactic was intended to lure the tigers out of the mountains as well as to send a warning; it was also a way to remove some military power from the commanders. Mao Zedong intended to nip any problems in the bud.74 Deng was able to learn from Mao’s superior political wisdom, and he helped Mao with some of his political problems. This move in swapping the military commanders had political implications since it prevented local leaders or high-ranking officials with military power from establishing their own area of authority, and it prevented them from being overpowered. Later, this exchange system was applied to major CPC, state, 93–100.) 73. Li Su, the second son of Li Sheng, was a famous general in the middle period of the Tang dynasty. Li Sheng was a great general during Emperor Dezong’s reign in the Tang

dynasty. He was instrumental during the quelling of Zhu Ci and in the reoccupation of Chang’an. Li Su was a brave general during the Yuanhe period of Emperor Xianzong’s

reign in the Tang dynasty. The major conflicts at this time were the separationist ruling of the warlords after the rebellion of An Lushan and Shi Siming. Among the

separationist warlords, Wu Yuanji in Caizhou was the most powerful and was closest to Luoyang, the eastern capital of the Tang dynasty. Therefore, Wu Yuanji posed the

biggest threat to the Tang government. Wu Shaoyang, father of Wu Yuanji, ruled

Caizhou for five years without paying tribute to the Tang government. After Wu Yuanji rose to power, he appointed himself the governor of Caizhou and ignored orders from

the Tang government. Xianzong, the Tang emperor at the time, determined to send punitive expeditions against Wu, but these were to no avail. Emperor Xianzong won

the support of Pei Du, who determined to quell the rebellion of Caizhou using the strength of the whole country. The government appointed Pei Du as prime minister

and commander of the armed forces to fight the rebel troops in the upper reaches of the Huaihe River.

74. Zheng, “Mao Zedong’s Intention in His Old Age to Ask That Political Bureau Members Read Ancient History,“ Oriental Morning Post, November 18, 2010.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and PLA leaders. It still runs today to ensure all power is unified and centralized at the central government, and to prevent local areas from taking an independent course, as well as guarding against political divisions in China.75

Attacks against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Zhou Enlai After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, Zhou Enlai started preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress according to Mao Zedong’s instruction. On September 12, Zhou and Wang Hongwen reported the preparation progress to Mao. On the same day, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss preparations for the congress. Three teams were organized within the Political Bureau: one team, led by Wang Hongwen, dealt with organizational work; another team, headed by Kang Sheng and with Zhang Chunqiao as acting team leader, handled constitutional amendments; the third team dealt with drafting government work reports and was headed by Zhou Enlai. It was estimated that the work of the three teams would be completed before October 5. On September 14, Zhou reported to Mao, saying that if the above procedures went well, the 4th National People’s Congress would last about 5 to 6 days. The same day, Mao read and commented on Zhou’s report.76 From October 16 to 19, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress. At that meeting, the government draft report was passed in principle.77 All necessary preparations were completed for the congress. However, this plan was terminated due to a sudden change — Mao abruptly launched of the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius. As noted above, Zhou was in fact the indirect target of this movement. Change and unpredictability characterized the political situation during this period and were the result of the supreme leader’s personal political resolutions. 75. Deng Xiaoping said in September 1989 that during the late Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao swapped around the commanders of China’s eight military areas. Mao

knew the art of commanding armed troops: no small spheres of influence or small factions and cliques should be allowed among any PLA members. This tradition still exists in the PLA, with commanders frequently transferred. Outside the PLA, leaders

also often have to be transferred. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 319.)

76. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 621–622.

77. Ibid., 628.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

After the Lin Biao Incident, Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the radical leftists being subjected to criticism; instead, he decided to attack the radical rightists. One of the direct causes of this was that Jiang Qing and others discovered Lin Biao’s notebooks in his residence. In those books there were many notes, works of calligraphy, and materials related to Confucius and Mencius. These were submitted to Mao and aroused his considerable interest. Mao was inspired and hence, like Emperor Qin Shi Huang (the First Emperor), Mao developed Project 571 to goad and enrage himself. As a consequence, Mao thought that Lin respected Confucius and was opposed to legalism. Mao mentioned the need to condemn Confucius in many discussions. After Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi reported to Mao on Lin’s interest in the works of Confucius and Mencius, Mao asked them to prepare necessary materials to attack Confucius and Lin Biao.78 Without going through the collective deliberations of the CPC Central Committee, Mao launched the movement against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Emperor Qin Shi Huang after the 10th National Congress of the CPC. This movement was used by Jiang Qing and others to attack Zhou Enlai — member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — and later to strike on Ye Jianying, also member of the Standing Committee. On August 5, Mao Zedong talked to Jiang Qing about the struggles between Confucianism and legalism in Chinese history. Mao said that all the politicians with achievements and who made substantial contributions in the early period of feudalistic society had been legalists. These people advocated the rule of law, and whoever violated the law had to be punished. They were more concerned about their own times than about the ancient era. By contrast, Confucianists were hypocrites — saints on the outside but devils within. They were more interested in the past than the present. They aimed to reverse the course of history. On August 7, under Mao Zedong’s instructions, the People’s Daily published an article by Yang Rongguo (professor at Zhongshan University) entitled “Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery.“79 Professor Yang Rongguo also wrote articles about the struggles between Confucianism and legalism during the era 78. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1012.

79. Yang Rongguo believed that although Confucius preached humanity and ethics and presented himself like a saint, his ideas actually served the interests of the declining

slave-owning noble class. At that time, thinkers who were against Confucius and stood in support of feudalism were Xun Zi and his student Han Fei, as well as other legalists.

The struggles between Confucianism and legalism during the period before Qin Shi Huang reflected a class struggle. (Yang, “Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery,“ People’s Daily, August 7, 1973.).

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before Qin Shi Huang that were published in the magazine Red Flag.80 On September 4, the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team81 wrote “Confucianism and the Reactionary Thoughts of Confucianism.“82 This article was written in form of ancient story to attack the deceased (Lin Biao), and to allude those remain (Zhou Enlai). The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team was established by Chi Qun (leader of the Science and Education Team under the State Council and secretary of the CPC Tsinghua University Committee) and Xie Jingyi (member of the CPC Central Committee, vice secretary of the CPC Tsinghua University Committee) in the latter half of 1973 under the instructions of the Gang of Four. The Criticism Team consisted of over 30 members, and it was personally directed and controlled by Jiang Qing. This team published articles under the following names: the Big Criticism Team of Two Universities, Liang Xiao, Bai Qing, Gao Lu, Jing Hua, An Jie, Qin Huaiwen, Shi Jun, Guo Ping, Jin Ge, Wan Shanhong, Zhu Xiaozhang, and Liang Xiaozhang.83 80. Yang, “Struggles between the Two Political Lines in the Ideological Sector during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Period,“ Red Flag, December 1 ,1972.

81. The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team was also called Liangxiao; it was a writing team made up of around 30 students from Peking University

and Tsinghua University, headed by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. Mao Zedong gave direct instructions and orders to Xie Jingyi, and these were transmitted and implemented by

Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun. Liangxiao wrote a total of 219 articles, among which 181 were published, and over 30 were used as learning materials.

82. The article stated: “All reactionary forces adopted Confucianism as a spiritual weapon

to quell the people and revolutions. Confucius was the first saint in feudal society — the so-called sage and teacher; Mencius became the second saint — the so-called second

sage. Confucianism-Mencianism became a synonym for feudalism.“ The article also pointed out that politically, the CPC overthrew the reactionary ruling of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. Culturally, the CPC needed to eradicate the

enslaving imperialism and feudalism that respected Confucius and advocated the

reading of classic Confucian texts, old rites, thoughts, and education. Agents of the

landlord capitalists within the CPC advocated the way of Confucius and Mencius and followed the opportunist line of the surrendering rightist. Liu Shaoqi and Lin

Biao advocated the way of Confucius and Mencius and stood against the systematic theory of Marxism and Leninism regarding class struggle, proletarian dictatorship,

and continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. (Beijing Daily, September 4, 1973.)

83. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 951.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

From September 8 to 11, the Science and Education Team under the State Council convened a symposium in Beijing on the problems that had arisen during the educational system’s attack on Confucius. Professor Yang Rongguo of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou prepared the report “The Struggles between Confucianism and Legalism and the Impact of the Reactionary Thoughts of Confucius.“ Chi Qun declared at the meeting that attacking Confucius amounted to implementing the spirit of the 10th National Congress of the CPC and stated that it was an important task in the campaign against Lin Biao. Chi noted that attacking and criticizing Confucius and incorporating such activities in revolutionary education should involve not only university schools of humanities and the arts but all other kinds of schools.84 Later, Zhou Enlai spoke to Chi and censured him for the unconventional slogans he had used with regard to the education system.85 On September 15, the debut issue of Shanghai-based Learning and Criticism published an article entitled “On the Worship of Confucius and Combating Legalism,“ written by Shi Lun.86 “Shi Lun“ was the pen name of the Writing Team under the Shanghai CPC Committee, which was established in July 1971. The Writing Team and its subordinate teams wrote under such names as Luo Siding, Kang Li, Shi Lun, Zhai Qing, Fang Hai, Qi Yonghong, Liang Lingyi, Qi Chenglou, Jin Ge, Shi Shanghui, Shi Feng, Cao Sifeng, Fang Yanliang, Shi Yige, and Ren Du and had a large number of articles published. The articles under the name of Shi Lun were actually written by Yao Wenyuan. After the September 15 article was published, Yao Wenyuan ordered Red Flag to reprint it. The Two Universities’ 84. Ibid., 953. 85. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 625–626.

86. The article held that Confucianism was a reactionary school of thought of the declining slave-owning nobility and that legalism was a progressive school of thought that represented the interests of the emerging landlord class. The struggle between

Confucianism and legalism was a fierce ideological class struggle between the slave

owners and the landlords. The article stated that burning of the Confucian books and

burial of Confucian scholars was a continuation of the long-term struggle between the emerging landlord class and the declining slave owners; it said that this was a continuation of the centuries of struggles between Confucianism and legalism, that it

was a struggle between the efforts to restore or to overthrow the old ruling class, and

that it was a revolutionary action to quell the restoration of slave owners: “During

the progress of the proletariat revolution, whether or not to criticize the convention of upholding Confucianism and fighting against legalism was an important part of the struggle between the two political routes.“ (Red Flag, issue 10, October 1, 1973.)

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Criticism Team published over 1,000 articles and dozens of books. The leader of the writing team said: “Our work involves a fierce struggle from which we can’t flee. We have to be prepared for the possibility of being killed or imprisoned...If we reveal what we do now, we will be killed now. If we reveal it in the future, we will be killed in the future. Each issue of Learning and Criticism is a tombstone for us.“87 On September 23, when receiving the Egyptian vice president, Mao Zedong said: “I am like Emperor Qin Shi Huang. I support Emperor Qin Shi Huang, not Confucius.“88 Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen joined the talks. Why did Mao show his favor for this emperor? One direct political reason was that Lin Biao accused Mao of acting like that emperor and “pleaded on behalf of the people“ to “emancipate a large batch.“89 Under Mao’s instructions, Jiang Qing commissioned 87. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 956–957.

88. On September 23, 1973, Mao Zedong received Hussein el-Shafei, vice president of Egypt.

Mao said that Emperor Qin Shi Huang was the famous first emperor in feudalistic society: “I am also a first emperor. Lin Biao accused me of being the first emperor. China’s historians are divided into two camps: one regards Emperor Qin Shi Huang

as good; the other regards him as bad. I am in favor of Emperor Qin, not Confucius.

Emperor Qin Shi Huang unified China for the first time; he unified the language and built good roads. He eliminated many states within one country; he centralized power

into his own hands and that of the central government, which involved sending officials to different places to rule. Those officials underwent changes after several years; so the

positions were not hereditary.“ Mao Zedong stated that Emperor Qin Shi Huang was

responsible for 22 feats. (“Yao Wenyuan Relayed Mao Zedong’s Instructions on the Movement against Confucius,“ January 27, 1974, in Mao Zedong’s “Golden Stick”: Yao Wenyuan and the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, edited by Sisyphus, 91.)

89. An article written by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team stated that Chairman Mao had said: “We should never be benevolent regarding the

reactionary actions of the reactionary forces and classes. Lin Biao and his clique used the old tricks of the ancient slave owners when they tried to restore their rule. In the

Summary of Project 571, Lin Biao attacked the proletariat dictatorship by slandering Emperor Qin, and he upheld the slogan to plead on behalf of the people to ’emancipate

a large batch [of people].’ The ’people’ they represented and the ’large batch’ they

wanted to emancipate were none other than the former landlords, the former rich

farmers, counter-revolutionary elements, bad elements, and rightists quelled by the proletariat dictatorship during the 20 years since the founding of the People’s Republic

of China. Their evil purpose was to overthrow China’s proletariat dictatorship and restore the fascist ruling by big landlords and big capitalists. Like all the restorative

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the writing of articles that praised Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s book burning and the burial of Confucian scholars: this was in fact in defense of the book burning and persecution of scholars during the Cultural Revolution. On September 27, the People’s Daily published an article entitled “Was Confucius an Educator for the Common People?“ by Tang Xiaowen.90 Tang was the name used by a writing team within the Central CPC School established by Kang Sheng. This writing team officially published articles under that name in Red Flag in 1972.91 On September 28, “The Case for Burning the Books and the Burial of Confucian Scholars“ was published under the name of Shi Ding. The article said that the book burning and burial of Confucian scholars was a progressive measure against the restorative forces of the time. The book burning and burial of Confucian scholars by Emperor Qin Shi Huang was part of the struggle between the new ruling landlord class and the slave-owning nobles away from the political stage. They were also part of a resolute action toward new unification under Emperor Qin Shi Huang, by crushing the restorative scheme and safeguarding the new feudal ruling. The effects of such a cruel measure had to be affirmed. The article declared that the burning of Confucian books and burial of Confucian scholars may have played an active role in consolidating the new feudal country and strengthening the centralized government.92 Clearly, the Cultural Revolution was being presented as forces in history, they were bound to fail. This is a law of history.“ (Peking University

and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, “On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin,“ People’s Daily, January 21, 1974.)

90. The article stated that in all respects the educational activities of Confucius served the purpose of restoring the reactionary slavery system of the West Zhou dynasty and that

Confucius himself was at heart a loyal servant of the slave-owning nobles. The socalled educator for the common people was nothing more than a disguise. The reason

that Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao hailed Confucius as an educator for the common people

and advocated that education knows no class distinction was that they were trying to

create a theory for their revisionist education; they wished to remove the proletariat from education and transform schools into places for training the successors to the capitalistic class.

91. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 963–967.

92. Shi Ding’s “The Case for Burning the Confucian Books and the Burial of Confucian Scholars“ maintained that the effects of such actions had to be affirmed. The article

was originally published in the Liaoning Daily, later republished in the People’s Daily,

September 28, 1973, with minor revisions. During the period of Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s rule, some people collected and read books of poetry and all schools of thought;

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

a modern version of the book burning and burial of Confucian scholars. Justifying the Cultural Revolution required argumentation using the historical precedent of the measures taken by Emperor Qin Shi Huang. At the same time, the author of that article also publicly supported dictatorship through a centralized government. In October, with the support of Jiang Qing, Chi Qun and others launched the first movement against rightism in Tsinghua University. They had articles published in the Education Revolution Newsletter, stating that there was a trend for attacking and denying the achievements of the Cultural Revolution.93 This movement was some people cursed Emperor Qin Shi Huang and the feudalistic country system that had followed after the book burning and burial of the scholars. However, no Confucian scholars dared publicly criticize current affairs using the standards of ancient dynasties or stood for the system of counties and prefects instead of the centralization of power.

As a result, the system of counties and prefects developed smoothly, and it contributed to the unification of the feudalistic country under the rule of the landlord class. In the

history of China after the Qin dynasty, the feudalistic system of that dynasty exerted a profound influence on the feudalistic society that was to last 2,000 years. Throughout

all the dynasties after the Qin, irrespective of the change in name, the system of counties and prefects remained; regardless of the organizational form of the political systems,

they were basically a development of the centralized political system of the feudalistic dictatorship. Lin Biao — capitalistic careerist, schemer, and counter-revolutionary double-dealer, traitor, and collaborator — and his clique condemned Emperor Qin Shi

Huang for burning the books and burying the Confucian scholars alive. That clique

was inspired by the poem “Books in the Burning Pit“ in making a venomous attack on the CPC and the socialistic system under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The members of that group were sympathetic with Chunyu Yue, Hou Sheng, and the other Confucian scholars that were buried alive: they had been reactionary forces in history

and denied that the progress represented by Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s measures and

his preference of today over yesterday. They distorted history, confused right and

wrong, and attempted to reverse the course of society. This was the proof that the members of that clique were at heart historical idealists. The counter-revolutionary

revisionist line and evil actions that betrayed the CPC and the country pursued by them showed that they tried to rewrite history in the light of idealism; they created

counter-revolutionary theory and wished to sway public opinion for the evil purpose of overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring the rule of capitalists.

The article first appeared in the Liaoning Daily, and later republished in the People’s Daily, with minor revisions.

93. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 631.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

clearly against Zhou Enlai, and it underscores the fact that the focus of the internal struggles within the CPC was the struggle between the forces that affirmed and those that negated the Cultural Revolution. The former won every debate, though the latter later scored a historical victory in 1978. On November 1, the 11th issue of Red Flag published the article “The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism.“ It appeared under the name of Luo Siding, though it was in fact the work of the writing team of the CPC Shanghai Committee.94 This article criticized Lu Buwei’s eclecticism and made an allusion to the modern political situation. Jiang Qing said, “This article is good since it criticizes Lu Buwei, who was a premier.“95 This was a reference of course to Zhou 94. The article argued that after Emperor Qin Shi Huang came to power, the struggle toward

establishing the dictatorship of the landlord class entered a new stage. Emperor Qin Shi Huang made two strategic steps: one was to eradicate the group led by Lu Buwei to

ensure the victory in the war of unification and the establishment of the Qin dynasty; the other was to take the revolutionary measures of burning the books and burying the Confucian scholars to consolidate the rule of the landlord class. These two historical

incidents were a continuation of the struggle between the emerging class of landlords

and the declining slave-owning nobles; they were also a continuation of the struggle between the forces for and against the restoration of the old order since Shang Yang’s Reform in the State of Qin. The policy of burning the books and burying the scholars

was based on the reasoning that the new emperor would not be respected if the books

relating to and people adept in the six fields of knowledge and skills were not disposed of. The incident was not due to the brutality of Qin Shi Huang, but a necessary result

of the class struggles at that time. Vituperated by all the reactionary forces, ancient and

modern, and in China and abroad — including the revisionists in the Soviet Union

and Lin Biao — Emperor Qin Shi Huang made a historical achievement. He was an expert in and practitioner of legalistic thoughts: he had greater respect for modern times than for the past, and he was a politician of the landlord class who was able to

bring about and maintain the unification of China. That is the historical conclusion.

(Luo, “The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of

the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism,“ originally printed in Red Flag, issue 11, November 1, 1973; reprinted in the People’s Daily, November 14, 1973.)

95. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique

of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Enlai. On January 21, 1974, the People’s Daily published an article entitled “On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin Shi Huang“ by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, which affirmed the role of that emperor.96 The same day, Red Flag published an article titled “Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism“ by Jin Yunge.97 During that period, Red Flag, under Yao Wenyuan, was at the forefront of the ideological battle against Lin Biao and Confucius (Appendix 6.1). On December 7, Yu Huiyong, head of the Ministry of Culture, commented on the report of two musicians from a friendly country being invited to perform in China. This report was read and approved by Zhou Enlai and other central leaders, and stated that such an invitation amounted to inviting thieves into the country. Yu appealed to the public against “untitled music“ and the “counter-revolutionary revisionist line.“ Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan distorted the content of the report and dismissed it as being “without social implications,“ and they launched nationwide criticism on this issue. As evidenced by incomplete statistics, after December 1973 over 100 papers appeared criticizing untitled music.98 Mao Zedong fully affirmed the letter from Zhang Tiesheng of Liaoning and said that university professors should be tested on this issue. He said: “In my opinion, the professors at the eight universities and colleges in Beijing should be made to take such an examination. They always look down on their students.“99 96. The article maintained that Emperor Qin Shi Huang (259 BC–210 BC) effectively swept away the remnants of the slavery system by revolutionary violence, which objectively was in the interests of the people. (Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, “On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin Shi Huang,“ People’s Daily, January 21 , 1974.)

97. The article said that Lin Biao had inherited the ideas of Confucius in restoring states and clans that had been defeated and promoting forgotten talents; Lin advocated the history of political coups during the thousands of years since the Zhou dynasty

and harbored plans to launch a counter-revolutionary coup against the proletariat dictatorship and restore the rule of the landlord capitalists, which had been struck down by the CPC, PLA, and the people led by Chairman Mao; Lin wished to establish

a comprador fascist monarchy based on his own family. Wang Ming, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and the heads of the rightist opportunist line called on the spirit of Confucius to serve the purpose of sabotaging the revolution and restoring capitalism in China.

This highlighted the severity and complexity of the class struggles within the sphere of

ideology. (Jin, “Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism,“ originally printed in the Red Flag, Issue 11, November 1, 1973; reprinted in the People’s Daily, November 22, 1973.)

98. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 994–995.

99. On December 15, 1973, Mao Zedong talked to members of the Political Bureau and

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao also stated: “Many people look down on the boycotts.“100 On December 30, in accordance with Mao’s instructions, the Science and Education Team of the State Council and the Science and Education Team under the Revolutionary Committee of Beijing Municipality prepared a sudden examination for university and college professors. 613 professors at 17 universities and colleges in Beijing were assembled for a symposium and were made to sit an examination in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Later, professors in Shanghai and Tianjin were also tested. On January 25, 1974, Xie Jingyi announced in a mobilization meeting concerning the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius that 560 (91.4%) professors had failed the test; with 200 leaving the papers blank; and some averaged of only 0.1 or 0.4 points. At that meeting, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, and Chi Qun praised this testing.101 This was typical of the intrigues that took place during the Cultural Revolution: not only were the elite in the CPC subject to persecution, but the intellectual elite in society at large were also maltreated. The intellectuals were dismissed as “the stinky 9th.“ On December 28, 1973, the People’s Daily added editorial notes to a letter and journal entries that had appeared in the Beijing Daily by Huang Shuai, a Red Guard and student in class 2 grade 5 of Zhongguancun No. 1 Primary School of the Haidian district of Beijing. The Beijing Daily commented it was important to be constantly aware of the complexity of the struggle between the two political lines and attitudes on the educational front. The newspaper stated that there was considerable contention with regard to such issues as the relationship between politics and specific job requirements and the campaign to persuade educated urban youth to move to rural areas. Similarly contentious areas included the campaign for industrial workers, farmers and soldiers to study at universities, and the Five-Seven Route, open schools, the examination system, the re-education of teachers, and working class leadership of the schools. These areas required continuous effort.102 These issues reflect the disputes that took place between those who supported and those who were opposed to the Cultural Revolution. Political opinion in the public media was dominated by the views of Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan — proponents of the Cultural Revolution. They enjoyed absolute monopoly and capricious dictatorship over ideological discourse for a period of 10 years. However, these views were not supported by the CPC, the PLA, or the people. stated that professors should be made to sit an examination. (Ibid., 1003.) 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid. 102. Huang, “Letter and Journal Entries from a Primary School Student,“ originally printed

in the Beijing Daily, December 12, 1973; reprinted in the People’s Daily, December 28,

1973.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

In December, Mao Zedong personally instructed Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi to examine what Lin Biao had said and written about Confucius and Mencius.103 The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team put together “Lin Biao and the Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius“ based on the public comments, notes, works of calligraphy, and other materials of Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Chen Boda. This document amounted to almost 30,000 Chinese characters, and it was divided into eight parts: 1. Materials relating to Confucian self-denial and the restoration of rites for the purpose of bringing back capitalism; 2. Advocating a theory of talent, whereby a person is born to acquire particular knowledge and skills, with the purpose of seizing power over the CPC and the state; 3. Spreading a theory of history whereby the most and least intelligent people are born that way and that this is immutable, which is a slander against the laboring class; 4. Advocating virtue, humanity, loyalty, and tolerance in such a way as to attack the proletarian class; 5. Promoting the “middle way,“ which is a violation of the Marxist philosophy of struggle; 6. Making use of Confucian philosophy for the creation of conspiratorial factions; 7. Advocating the thoughts of the exploitative class whereby white-collar workers should rule over blue-collar workers, which could be used to attack the Five-Seven Route; 8. Teaching children to worship Confucius, read Confucian works, and hope to set up Lin as emperor. What was the purpose behind Mao Zedong compiling such materials? The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team submitted these materials to Mao, reporting that Lin Biao — a careerist from the capitalist class, schemer, double-dealer, traitor, and collaborator — was a pious follower of Confucius. Like all reactionaries that were doomed to die, he worshipped Confucius and rejected legalism. Lin attacked Emperor Qin Shi Huang, and he used the thoughts of Confucius and Mencius as an ideological weapon in his plan to seize state power and restore capitalist rule. Like Confucius and Mencius, Lin wanted to restore 103. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1012.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

old institutions and reverse the course of history. Lin ordered his subordinates to collect the sayings and theories of Confucius and Mencius, copy them onto cards, and use them to create a counter-revolutionary atmosphere, conduct intrigues, and ferociously attack the proletariat. On January 18, 1974, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee issued the notice “Printing and Distribution of Materials by Lin Biao and the Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius“ (CPC issue no. 1, 1974), which signaled the official launch of the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius. Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, Yao Wenyuan wrote a New Year editorial, informing the whole nation of the attack on Lin Biao and Confucius. On January 1, 1974, the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag jointly published this editorial, which emphasized that it would be dangerous for the CPC Central Committee to ignore major issues and bury itself in trivialities since this would lead to revisionism. What, then, were the major issues? The editorial stated that the campaign against Lin Biao should be continued. Historically, the leaders of reactionary forces and opportunism have worshipped Confucius. Therefore, censuring Confucius was part of the criticism of Lin Biao.104 At that point, it had been over two years since Lin Biao died, and Confucius had died over 2,000 years earlier. This movement was clearly targeted at the living figure of Zhou Enlai. However, on December 24, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss how this editorial should be revised.105 This shows that Zhou not only tolerated Mao’s attacks but also followed his instructions completely. Zhou however paid his price for these political intrigues by shortening his life. It was widely known that Zhou died in a tormented state, and that formed the political cause for the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1976. There was a 9.2% increase in industrial and agricultural output in 1973 comparing that to 1972, with agricultural output increasing by 8.4% and industrial 104. The editorial pointed out that Lin Biao’s political stance was a revisionist one: “The

CPC teaches us in its basic guideline for the historical period of socialist society that the struggle against revisionism is a long-term one. For over 20 years, our struggles

against the cliques of Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao

have been against revisionism. To state that Lin Biao was an ultra-rightist is a criticism

against revisionism. In history, the leaders of reactionary forces and opportunism have worshipped Confucius. Therefore criticizing Confucius is part of the criticism against

Lin Biao.“ It was printed as New Year’s message of People’s Daily, Red Flag and PLA Daily on January 1, 1974.

105. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 638.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

output rising by 9.5%.106 Zhou Enlai stated that the targets for the major indexes of the national economy in 1973 had been achieved or surpassed.107 At that time, there was a short period of social stability in the country. The CPC Central Committee and all ministries and committees under the State Council had cancelled their Central Military Committee or PLA representatives, and they restored or established leadership by ministers and CPC ministerial committees. That provided the necessary conditions for promoting the national economy. If Mao Zedong had not launched the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, total industrial and agricultural output would have grown further in 1974. However, this political movement disrupted the normal growth of the national economy, and it resulted in a low growth rate. On January 4, 1974, the People’s Daily published an article titled “What Message Was Sent When Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao?“ by Tang Xiaowen. In this article, Confucius was referred to as premier: “Confucius worked as the minister of justice and acted as the premier in the state of Lu.“ This was an apparent allusion to Zhou Enlai. On January 12, Wang Hongwen and Jiang Qing submitted “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius“ in addition to a letter, which stated, “We have read ’Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,’ which was compiled by Peking and Tsinghua Universities, and we find it of great help in the ongoing criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius...We suggest that this document be distributed to the eight military areas, provincial military areas, the PLA, the CPC Central Committee, ministries under the State Council, and all municipalities and provinces as reference material in the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius...We hereby submit this material for your approval.“ Mao Zedong agreed with the content of the letter.108 Mao had apparently instigated and led the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, and Wang Hongwen and Jiang Qing were simply following his instructions.109 The criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius was not targeted at any 106. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1983), 19.

107. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 640.

108. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 371.

109. The CPC Central Committee resolved in 1981 that in early 1974, Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen and others initiated the so-called movement against Lin Biao and Confucius.

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

of these individuals but at Zhou Enlai.110 Mao had directed one member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Wang Hongwen) and a member of the Political Bureau (Jiang Qing) to criticize another member of the Standing Committee (Zhou Enlai). Nonetheless, Zhou Enlai criticized Liu Shaoqing by order of Mao, which was the political price that Zhou had to pay. On January 13, in response to an article issued to criticize Confucius written by the Chemical Defense Company of Army Corps No.22, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to the company. Jiang sent 200 copies of “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ compiled by Peking and Tsinghua Universities, as well as 200 copies of the appendixes. She asked Xie Jingyi, member of the CPC Central Committee and vice secretary of the CPC committee of Tsinghua University, and Chi Qun, secretary of the CPC committee of Tsinghua University, to personally deliver what she put together to the company.111 On January 25, the CPC Central Committee published the “Report on Learning of Comrade Jiang Qing’s Letter to the Chemical Defense Company of Army Corps No. 22 by the CPC Committee of the Nanjing Military Area,“ the “Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing from the CPC Committee of Army Corps No. 22,“ and the “Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing from All Comrades in the Chemical Defense Company“ as reference material for the party, the state, the PLA, and the people in criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. This indicates that the CPC Central Committee at that time obeyed the instructions of Jiang Qing or was used by her for her own purposes. Also on January 13, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Wu De, in which she said that she had asked Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun to provide him with such materials as “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius." Jiang hoped that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius initiated by the Cultural Team under the State Council would have an extensive impact.112 On January 14, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi submitted the document titled “Major 110. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 295. 111. Jiang Qing sent the following documents: (1) “Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and Landlord Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius and Restoration

of Old Institutions Since the May 4th Movement;“ (2) “The Struggle between Forces

For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty;“ (3) “Was Confucius an Educator for the Common People?;“ (4) “The

Way of Juste Milieu of Confucius Is a Philosophy Against Social Revolutions;“ and (5) “Reading Notes of Liu Zongyuan’s ‘On Feudalism.’ “

112. “Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at

the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Problems Exposed in the Current Movement in Peking and Tsinghua Universities“ to Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng. In the accompanying letter, Chi said that those problems were like those exposed by ministries and departments under the State Council. One of the most importat conflit arousing question among the two class and two political rules is whether to affirm or deny the Cultural Revoulation. Issues arose under this light, such as how to evaluate the problems occured in the past 17 years, how one should evaluate their own mistakes, and how to regard the series of revolutionary changes that had taken place under the dictatorship of the proletariat, including recent issues.113 Also on January 14, Wang Hongwen, who presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee, delivered a report to the Reading Class of that committee in an effort to “inform people about the problems concerning the Cultural Revolution.“ To prove the correctness of that revolution, Wang cited Mao Zedong, “Those people objected to by our enemies are good rather than evil.“114 If Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao had taken power, they would have restored capitalism, and China would have fallen back to a semi-feudalist, semi-colonized society, hence becoming a colony of socialistic, imperialistic Soviet Russia, and tens of thousands of people would have been killed. Wang argued that during the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao predicted that the current Cultural Revolution was only the first of many: “The result of this revolution — the question of who will win or lose — will not be known until after a great deal of time has elapsed. If things go badly, capitalism could be restored at any time. The members of our party and the Chinese people at large should not think that peace can come with one, two, three, or four Cultural

113. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 788.

114. Wang Hongwen stated in his “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central

Committee“ on January 14, 1974 that it was not strange that class enemies at home and abroad should attack the Cultural Revolution: “Chiang Kai-shek denounced the

Cultural Revolution, and the radio and newspapers of the Soviet Union have likewise condemned the Cultural Revolution for seven or eight years. The Lin Biao clique used

the language of the Soviet Union in criticizing the Cultural Revolution in its Summary of Project 571 [which refers to the armed uprising], which was part of the counter-

revolutionary coup. Chairman Mao said that those people objected to by our enemies are good rather than evil, which proves that the Cultural Revolution was correct. The

more we carry out our campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the more Chiang Kaishek, South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union denounce us; that is not at all surprising in terms of the class struggle.”

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Revolutions. We should never lose our vigilance.“115 Mao Zedong made the above statement as a result of his misjudgment of the existing conditions in China. The most basic condition was that the country at that time had a large poor population, within which there was a considerable rural population that was unable to feed itself. Zhou Enlai stated in a report related to natural disasters that affected parts of the country had received insufficient food, relief funds, seeds, and fodder, and that they suffered from a serious lack of adequate clothing. Agricultural production was at a low level; agricultural implements were inadequate, and there was a lack of fuel, drinking water, welldrilling equipment, medical teams, and sanitary conditions.116 Such conditions existed in many parts of China, and Zhou was acutely aware of this. However, in volume 13 of Mao Zedong's Works Since the Founding of New China, there is no record of Zhou Enlai reporting to Mao about this matter. There are two possible reasons for this: one was that Zhou deliberately withheld the information according to the principle of reporting only good, not bad, news; the other is that Zhou reported this matter to Mao, but Mao refused to accept the accuracy of the report. Either possibility indicates that Mao did not have a strong political desire to solve the greatest problem: the livelihood of the Chinese people. Mao’s biggest concern was that rich farmers might restore capitalism. Wang Hongwen maintained that the successor should be found using a topdown approach: “The issue of training a successor to Chairman Mao has met with stronger resistance in the PLA and less resistance among local governments. I propose that someone aged about 30 should be appointed commander of a greater military area.“ Wang reiterated Mao Zedong’s philosophy of struggle that rebellion was justified,117 and Mao’s conclusion was that any objection to the Cultural 115. Wang, “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central Committee,” January 14, 1974.

116. Jin ed., A Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1890–1891. 117. Wang Hongwen said in his “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central

Committee,“ which was published on January 14, 1974: “The theories of Marxism can be boiled down to one sentence: rebellion is justified, and Marx taught us to rebel. Some dismissed us as grabbing power through rebellion. The Communist Party of

China rebelled against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism under the leadership of Chairman Mao, and it won the revolutionary wars and seized power.

What’s wrong with that? In the Cultural Revolution, we rebelled against the capitalist class and all exploitative classes, and we consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What’s so wrong with that?“ (Wang, “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central Committee,“ January 14, 1974.)

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Revolution would lead to a dictatorship of capitalists.118 Wang was the successor who seized power through rebellion and who was personally chosen and carefully cultivated by Mao. On January 18, the CPC Central Committee officially approved and promulgated “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius“ (CPC Central Committee, Document No. 1, 1974). A notice by the committee declared that this material, compiled by Peking and Tsinghua universities, would be very helpful in further criticizing Lin Biao, exposing Lin Biao’s ultra-rightist political nature, castigating the worship of Confucius and the opposition to legalism, and strengthening political and ideological education. Using historical anecdotes to deliver a political message was one of the political characteristics of the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong regarded the Cultural Revolution as a profound historical phenomenon, and he believed that it could be compared to legalism in history. Mao’s campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was targeted at the so-called followers of Confucius in the party who hindered the social revolution. Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen launched the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius with the purpose of criticizing the philosophy of selfdenial and the restoration of traditional rituals — specifically, safeguarding against the restoration of capitalism.119 On January 20, the CPC Central Committee issued a supplementary notice. In that notice, the committee stated that the documents and articles listed in Appendix 6.2 should be used in communicate, learn, and analyze CPC Central Committee Document No. 1 1974. The notice particularly recommended three articles by Professor Yang Guorong and one by Professor Feng Youlan: the former actively supported Jiang Qing, whereas the latter was compelled to write the article.120 118. Wang Hongwen said that any opposition against the Cultural Revolution would be

contrary to the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. Such opposition was not

an ordinary problem, but an attempt to restore capitalism and carry out revisionism. He

said that any objection to the Cultural Revolution would necessarily lead to a capitalist dictatorship. (Ibid.)

119. Editorial, “On Criticizing Self-Denial and Restoration of Rituals — the Reactionary

Guidance of Lin Biao in His Attempt to Restore Capitalism,“ People’s Daily, February 20, 1974.

120. Feng Youlan had two articles published in the Journal of Peking University titled

“Criticizing Confucius and Self-Criticism against My Former Worship of Confucius“ and “The Struggle between Restoration and Anti-Restoration Is that between Two

Political Routes.“ These were republished in full by the Guangming Daily and Beijing Times. Feng Youlan was coerced into writing the article against his own wishes to

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On January 22, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Su Zhenhua, alternate member of the Political Bureau and the first political commissar, with attachments like “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.“121 Two days later, Jinag Qing wrote another letter written to Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Zhang Chunqiao, and Deng Xiaoping. She stated in the letter that based on considerable evidence, there was some imbalance in the campaigns against Lin Biao and rectification, and the campaign against Confucius had even been hindered to some extent. She also stated that the relationship between the ideological system of Lin Biao and Confucius was insufficiently clear. She hence put forward that censuring Lin Biao and Confucius was of paramount importance to the party, the PLA, and the Chinese people. “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ compiled by Peking and Tsinghua universities, and other materials might be helpful to the entire PLA. The same day, the Central Military Committee officially mobilized the whole country for the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. Jiang Qing intervened not only affairs of the CPC Central Committee but also those of the Central Military Committee; both committees had to obey her. She being Mao Zhedong’s wife granted her the privileged position in the party. On the afternoon of January 25, Zhou Enlai held a mobilizing conference (hereafter referred to as the January 25 conference) among the organizations directly under the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. At this conference, Zhou introduced the background of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius and stated that the document titled “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius“ had been highly praised by Chairman Mao.122 Zhou said that an official in the PLA conform to party authority. He later confessed: “Instead of seeking truth from facts, I wrote balderdash out of hypocrisy instead of sincerity.“ (Feng, The Hall of Three Pines: An Account of My Life.)

121. “Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at

the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.

122. Zhou Enlai said: “At a meeting convened by the Science and Education Team under the State Council after the 10th National Congress of the CPC last year [1973], Comrade Chi Qun conveyed the message to all the provinces that a movement against Confucius

was about to be launched. He stated that criticism of Confucius was an integral part of the movement against Lin Biao. Censuring Confucius is not a new development at

Peking and Tsinghua universities. Recently, other materials were added to Document No. 1 issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1974. Things thus proceeded in a stepby-step fashion. During this process and with the help and guidance of Comrade Jiang

Qing, the material that indicated how Lin Biao was a confirmed believer in Confucius

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

(referring to Zhang Chunqiao, director of the General Politics Department of the PLA) had taken a step before others in criticizing Confucius: “Yesterday, Comrade Chunqiao chaired a conference in West Beijing Hotel. Our Central Committee and State Council have lagged behind. Today, we make up for this by asking the comrades of the Political Bureau in Beijing to attend a mobilizing meeting.“123 Almost all, over 10,000 party and state central leaders and officials, attended the meeting. Jiang Qing planned the January 25 conference together with Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. She gave advises on Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi’s speeches content.124 Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun explained the process of compiling “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.“125 They stated that one of the social phenomena that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius attacked was the “back-door approach“ to secure advantages126, which was associated with Ye Jianying.127 Yao Wenyuan said going was ’Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.’ This document was highly praised by Chairman Mao.“ (Ibid.) 123. Ibid. 124. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.

125. Chi Qun said that the compilation of this material involved a writing team, which

Comrade Jiang Qing suggested should be made up of older, middle-aged, and younger members. Some old professors with research background in this field should act as

consultants. Members of the Writing Team at Peking and Tsinghua universities included Feng Youlan, Zhou Yiliang, and Wei Jiangong of Peking University as well as Wang Shimin and Shi Guohong of Tsinghua University. A total of 30–40 older professors were

designated by Jiang Qing. (“Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie

Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,“ January 25, 1974.)

126. Chi Qun said that there was still a problem with regard to “getting in by the back door.“ He stated that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius needed to be applied to

the current situation. Otherwise, it would be a total denial of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. Xie Jingyi said that the practice of getting in by the back door was totally against China’s socialistic system and the Cultural Revolution: “There is also an issue about whether to stick to Marxism or return to revisionism. To get in by the back door

is to betray Marxism!“ (Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the

Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976).

127. Xie Jingyi said that to have his sons and daughters admitted into the PLA or college, the

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

against the mainstream was one of the principles of Marxism and Leninism. It was included in the Party Constitution and the political report of the 10th National Congress of the CPC and the report on the Party Constitution: “I remember the spirit of Chairman Mao in swimming across the Yangtze River against the stormy waves as he revealed in his ’Prelude to Water Melody.’ We should carry forth this spirit and continue the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. A smile remains on my face regardless of the raging storm.“128 With the approval of Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing used the opportunity of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius to launch a surprise political attack on Zhou Enlai.129 Jiang and Yao Wenyuan pointed out that objecting to the censure of Confucius amounted to an objection to criticizing Lin Biao. They stated that it was an essential safeguard against eclecticism and that all those who advocated juste milieu were wholly immoral.130 Under the pressure of this attack by Jiang, Zhou was forced to acknowledge at a conference, “I am not aware of the circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, and I have not been informed of the current situation. It is admirable that Comrade Jiang Qing is properly informed. I need to reconsider my thoughts on this matter.“131 Most party and state leaders present could not understand why Zhou should admit to Jiang that he had made mistakes. Jiang thus became dizzy her victory and called Zhou a loser.132 In addition, Jiang publicly instructions of some individual leader (referring to Ye Jianying) or approval worked

better than the instructions of Chairman Mao. (“Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang

Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,“ January 25, 1974.) 128. Ibid. 129. The CPC Central Committee stated in 1981 that Jiang Qing and others targeted Zhou Enlai. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp.,

Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

130. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 789.

131. “Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.

132. Jiang Qing said that in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, she directed the battle from the front line: “We cornered Zhou Enlai, so that this powerful man had to

acknowledge in public that he had lagged behind. He was no big deal — just a loser,

and we defeated him.” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976),

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

singled out Guo Moruo with the accusation that his On Ten Criticisms was incorrect since he treated Confucius the same way he treated Lin Biao. This was the so-called January 25 Conference Incident. Also attending the conference, Li Xiannian was also one of the witness of this unusual incident. Li, with a heavy heart under great pressure, was acutely aware that serious consequences would ensue.133 Geng Biao, director of the Central Liaison Department of the CPC, visited Zhou Enlai after the conference to express his extreme dissatisfion concerning how he was singled out for criticism and to express his will to resign. Zhou replied: “First, when people try to bring you down, no matter how hard they try, you cannot let yourself fall. Second, when people try to drive you away, no matter how hard they try, you cannot leave. Third, when people persecute you, no matter how brutal their persecutions, you cannot die by your own hand.“134 This was the philosophy of self-protection that Zhou had adopted during the Cultural Revolution: it explained why he was able to remain in power even though people tried to topple him, why he was able to retain his official position even though people tried to drive him away, and why he survived even though people tried to persecute him. However, during the Cultural Revolution, such a political philosophy of self-protection was insufficient to protect the whole party or its political elite from serious harm. By the time of his death, Zhou was no longer able to bear the persecutions he had to suffer. After Mao Zedong received news of the January 25 conference, he criticized Jiang Qing at a meeting of the Political Bureau for, among other matters, calling the conference and distributing materials without authorization.135 In December 1976, the Central Special Case Group of the CPC Central Committee drew its conclusions about the January 25 Conference Incident.136 vol. 3, 350.) 133. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 789.

134. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 301–302. 135. Pang and Jin eds. A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1685. 136. The materials of the Special Case Group of the CPC Central Committee stated that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan had carried out immoral activities by trying to seize supreme power over the party and the PLA by criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. Without the authorization of Chairman Mao, they had convened

a mobilization conference among the military units in Beijing for the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius on January 24, 1974; they organized another such conference

among the central organizations of the state and the party on January 25. These two conferences were actually an attempt to create favorable public opinion for the Gang

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Also on January 25, as part of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the People’s Publishing House published four books: Compiled Words of Lu Xun against the Way of Confucius and Mencius, Compiled Articles against Lin Biao and Confucius (part I and II), and Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and Landlord Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius and Restoration of Old Institutions Since the May 4th Movement. These books were distributed around the country. On January 27, Zhou Enlai and members of the Political Bureau interviewed students of the Central Reading Class and delivered speeches on the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. The points were as follows: 1. The criticisms against Lin Biao and Confucius should be combined, and it was important that the latter be integrated with the former; 2. Criticizing Confucius amounted to eradicating the social roots of old thoughts, old culture, old habits, and old customs; 3. The criticisms of Lin Biao and Confucius represented a long-term, intense ideological struggle.137 This indicates that Zhou was in agreement with Mao Zedong in launching the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, even though he himself was its actual target. Zhou was fully aware that if he did not agree, he would end up like Liu Shaoqi or Lin Biao, whose fall he had facilitated. Zhou did not realize that this time it was his turn to fall. Zhou had no choice but to let people like Jiang Qing make oblique accusations and gnaw away at his own political life. of Four to seize power over the party and state. Through the scheming of the Gang of Four, Wang Hongwen and Jiang Qing attended the conferences as major leaders

of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius; Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi arrogantly delivered long speeches to incite the masses against Premier Zhou and other central

leaders. In their speeches, they declared that allowing candidates to get in by the back door was a scheme. They stated that this bad practice among people wishing to join the

army or go to college should be stopped. However, at the mobilizing conference for the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, which involved millions of people, such a trivial problem was mentioned purely to create confusion with regard to two kinds of conflicts with totally different natures. The Gang of Four aimed to change the direction

of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius and to persecute some leaders of

the party, the state, and the PLA who held dissenting opinions. (Central Special Case

Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.).

137. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 646–647.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On January 28, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and others. Accompanying the letter were 500 copies of “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and the Land-Owning Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius, Compiled Articles against Lin Biao and Confucius (parts I and II), and Compiled Words of Lu Xun against the Way of Confucius and Mencius. Jiang presented herself as though she were some kind of empress of the PLA. On January 31, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the problems of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. Zhou proposed that some policies and restrictions should be drafted and approved by Mao Zedong and presented across the country as soon as possible. It was decided at the meeting that the freedom to air one’s views in the form of large posters and great debates should be forbidden in the PLA and party organizations; it was also agreed that the government and CPC organizations should put aside half-days for learning and that schools, factories, and villages in rural areas should not launch or participate in mass movements.138 This showed that with the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, Zhou and others did not want chaotic situations to develop as in the early period of the Cultural Revolution; instead they wanted restrictive policies to be adopted. It was resolved at the meeting that a seven-member team — made up of Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Hua Guofeng, and Wang Dongxing — should be established to deal with the daily affairs of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. In the meantime, a sixmember team of the Central Military Committee would be placed in charge of problems related to the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. On February 21, the two teams held a joint meeting chaired by Zhou to discuss the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.139 On February 1, the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team published an article titled “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.“140 The article 138. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 289. 139. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 648, 653.

140. The article claimed that the criticism being conducted against Confucius was an important part of the drive against Lin Biao. This was a battle to dig deep into the revisionist cause of the counter-revolutionary activities of Lin Biao. The reactionary ways of Confucius and Mencius were an important source for Lin Biao’s revisionism.

Lin Biao and his followers tried to restore capitalism, tamper with the theoretical foundations of the party, and recruit followers into their counter-revolutionary gang,

and they undertook strategic schemes. They did all this based on the thoughts of

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

explained why the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was launched. Historically, the thoughts of Confucius and Mencius represented the ideology of the declining slave-owning class and the deceptive thought system of the exploitive class. Their nature was to advocate regression and object to progress, stand for conservatism and resist renovation, and fight for the restoration of old institutions and against revolution. This was the way of exploitation and oppression, and it was completely counter-revolutionary. This argument, which was targeted against those who were opposed to the Cultural Revolution in the party and army, regarded that revolution — personally launched and led by Mao Zedong — as progressive, innovative, and radical. This article officially communicated to the country Mao’s view of this movement, which was that not criticizing Confucius and the ideas that Confucius upheld or were against legalism essentially amounted to a failure to castigate Lin Biao. The article also conveyed Mao’s conclusion regarding Lin Biao — the head of the revisionist movement, was a warlord who did not read books, newspapers, or documents.141 On October 20, Mao stated when talking to a foreign visitor that Lin acted like an overlord in the party.142 However, this party overlord and warlord was no match for Mao. On February 2, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Continue the Struggle against Lin Biao and Confucius to the End.“ The article began with the statement that a mass-based political struggle against Lin Biao and Confucius, personally launched and led by the great leader Chairman Mao, was being conducted in all sectors. The philosophy of the CPC was one of struggle: “To continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must continue the struggle against Lin Biao and Confucius to the end. We will progress with this struggle; otherwise, we will regress and fall back to revisionism.“143 This was a further development of Mao Zedong’s philosophy of struggle as articulated by Confucius and Mencius. The article stated that if the painted skin of Lin Biao was torn away, the wicked, ugly heart of a Confucian disciple would be exposed. (Peking

University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ originally printed in the Red Flag, issue 2, February 1, 1974; reprinted in the People’s Daily, February 7, 1974.)

141. This conclusion by Mao Zedong was communicated via Jiang Qing in her speech.

(“Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,“ January 25, 1974.)

142. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 114.

143. People’s Daily, February 2, 1974.

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Yao Wenyuan and others. Whenever political struggles arose within the party, this philosophy would repeatedly being emphasized and execute to the extreme. On February 5, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Self-Denial, the Restoration of Old Rituals, and Lin Biao, the Careerist and Schemer.“ The article stated that there will be a time where keeping the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius going would carry paramount importance to the party, the PLA, and all the Chinese people. To criticize Lin Biao required censuring Confucius; to censure Confucius was to better criticize Lin: “We must make a tremendous effort in criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, and we have to continue this struggle to the end!“144 On February 6, Jiang Qing submitted to Mao Zedong materials against Lin Biao and Confucius that had been prepared by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. On February 9, Mao instructed that Jiang should consult with the Political Bureau. At that time, Mao was suffering from a serious medical condition.145 On February 10, Jiang Qing created the so-called Snail Incident in the No. 4 Ministry of Machine-Building Industry. Jiang charged that when the investigation team of the ministry accepted the gift of a glass snail from a color TV camera tube manufacturer in the United States, it was actually “yielding to the pressure of imperialism...worshipping foreign things and fawning on foreign countries.“ Jiang declared: “We reject this color TV production line.“ Zhou Enlai instructed the foreign ministry to inquire into this incident. On February 21, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a report to Zhou on the American gift. Zhou gave his instructions on this matter. Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the Snail Incident, in which it was resolved that Jiang’s comments about the gift should not be printed or distributed; comments that had already been distributed had to be recalled immediately.146 The Snail Incident was a typical case of Jiang’s exclusivism. Later, Jiang created the Fengqing Incident and other incidents. Jiang was acting like a mad political dog. She first bit Zhou Enlai and then Deng Xiaoping; however, Deng did not accept this but fought back against Jiang. After the Sino-U.S. relationship, the Sino-U.K. relationship was restored in 1972. As a consequence, the second wave of introducing equipment from foreign countries after the founding of the PRC took place. Through the active efforts of 144. People’s Daily, February 5, 1974. 145. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 372.

146. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 650.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yun, equipment worth USD1,259 million was imported in 1973; however, owing to the interference of Jiang Qing and others, that figure fell to USD831 million in 1974 (Table 6.1). The struggle between the two groups was not only a political one; it was also a struggle between opening-up and exclusion, and in this struggle Jiang prevailed. On February 11, the People’s Daily published an open letter in reply to Wang Yazhuo.147 In the editor’s note stated the struggle between the two routes and thoughts was still on going, even in the front line of education: “Should we progress or regress, support revolutions or choose compromises, support and develop fresh phenomena of revolution, or criticize them without studying them first? These are important problems that must be solved to further promote the cause of revolution in education.“148 This incident was perpetrated by Jiang Qing and Chi Qun, and it was essentially a political dictatorship over those who doubted the merits of the Cultural Revolution and a cultural dictatorship over dissent among the common people. Table 6.1

Value of Imported Equipment (1972–1976) (USD1 million)

Petrochemical Steel Fertilizer Coal and electricity Transportation Communications and electronics Nonferrous metals Manufacturing Oil and gas Other* Total

1972 — — — 23 — —

1973 698 — 392 161 — —

1974 114 651 120 46 — —

1975 90 — — — 200 —

1976 136 40 — — — —

— — — 3.5 58

— 8 — — 1259

— — — — 831

— 74 — — 364

— 9 — — 185

Source: The U.S. Joint Economic Committee of Congress, ed., China under the Four Modernizations, vol. 1b, 328.

Note: *Includes cement factories, hotels and office buildings, and caustic soda plants. 147. Wang Yazhuo was the name adopted by Wang Xiaowen, En Yali, and Xing Zhuo from the

19th Regiment of the Production and Construction Corps of Xinjiang. They expressed a

different opinion against “A Letter and Journal Entries of a Primary Student“ (authored by Huang Shuai), which was reprinted in the People’s Daily on December 28, 1973, as well as the corresponding editor’s note. 148. People’s Daily, February 11, 1974.

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On February 12, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Criticizing Selfdenial and the Restoration of Old Rituals — Lin Biao’s Reactionary Guidelines to Restore Capitalism.“149 Issue no. 4 of Red Flag published an article titled “On Lu’s Historical Commentaries“ by Luo Siding, and another, “Confucius the Individual,“ by Liang Xiao (the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team). Written under the instructions of Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan, these two articles were directed at Zhou Enlai.150 Other articles published on the orders of Jiang Qing included “Wu Zetian, the Talented Stateswoman in Ancient China“ and “Profile of Legalistic Figures — Empress Lu,“ which aimed to enlist public support for Jiang Qing in her efforts to seize supreme power over the party and state.151 These articles embodied feudalism, not Marxism. The article “On the Policy of Salt and Iron,“ written by the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, was published in issue no. 5 of Red Flag, having been personally revised and approved by Yao Wenyuan. Following the instructions of Jiang, Yao revised the article such that it alluded to Zhou Enlai.152 At the very beginning, the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius met with 149. The editorial stated that Lin Biao’s political program was to insist on establishing the

position of state president. Lin’s theoretical guideline was his theory of genius. In terms of class struggle, Lin was attempting to reinstate the land-owning capitalist class in China and set up a fascist monarchy based on his family. Lin’s revisionist course, which

was contrary to the revolutionary direction, reflected the wishes of landlords, rich

farmers, reactionary forces, evil elements, rightist forces, imperialists, revisionists, and

counter-revolutionaries in restoring China’s old institutions. (People’s Daily, February

12, 1974.)

150. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

151. Zhu Yongjia (head of the CPC Shanghai Committee Writing Team) confessed that

“Confucius the Individual“ was an immoral article written by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team based on Jiang Qing’s proposal. On March 26, 1974, Jiang personally sent the article to Yao Wenyuan, who replied upon reading

it: “This article is eloquent and publishable.“ This article was an attack on Zhou Enlai under the guise of criticizing Lin Biao. Materials provided by the Red Flag. (Ibid.)

152. When Yao Wenyuan revised this article, he added the following: “They strongly advocated the ideal political atmosphere. During the period of Regent Zhou, all

scholars, wise or not, were allowed to discuss politics.“ This was an allusive attack on Zhou Enlai. Materials provided by the Red Flag. (Ibid.)

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

resistance and was disputed in the party. It was targeted both Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, when Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, and Xie Jingyi attacked the phenomenon of “letting people in through the back door.“ Their actions and such attacks enraged Ye Jianying, so much so that Mao Zedong had to mediate between them. On February 15, Mao Zedong replied to the letter from Ye Jianying.153 Mao stated that biased and excessive views were rampant. Mao said that if an attack were made on the so-called bending of the law to admit disqualified people, the criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius might be diluted and weakened. Mao’s opinion was that the speeches of Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun were flawed and should not be distributed154 Mao stopped the recordings of Xie’s and Chi’s speeches at the January 25 conference from being played around the country. Apparently, Mao was unwilling to incur widespread dissatisfaction within the party. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and vice chairman of the Central Military Committee, Ye Jianying was influential in the army. This act was a political concession made by Mao in the Cultural Revolution. On February 16, Zhou Enlai told Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi that the rampant biased and excessive views mentioned by Mao Zedong were a criticism of Jiang Qing. Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to communicate Mao’s reply to the letter from Ye Jianying.155 When the meeting was over, Jiang Qing returned home and raged over Mao and Zhou.156 On February 18, Jiang wrote a letter to Mao, admitting the fact that she had done something foolish and had let him down; she also promised to learn avoid being biased or own excessive views.157 On February 20, the “Notice on the Issue of the Back Door“ was issued by the CPC Central Committee. It stated that in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, leading officials of many units had used the “back door“ to have their children enter the army or be admitted to college. Following the instructions of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central Committee deliberated on this problem. 153. On January 31, 1974, Ye Jianying wrote a letter to the CPC Central Committee and Mao

Zedong, stating that he was willing to accept Jiang Qing’s help in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius; Mao Zedong replied to this.

154. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 377.

155. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 290. 156. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.

157. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 290.

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The committee resolved that those leading officials should be grateful for these criticisms from the masses; more than a million individuals are involved. Those who entered through the back door may have been well qualified and excellent, while those who entered the institutions in the regular manner may not always meet the expected standards and requirements. The committee decided that this problem warranted careful analysis and cautious treatment. The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius had just started. As in Mao’s letter, the committee stated that if the so-called bending of the law to admit disqualified people were attacked, the criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius might be diluted and weakened. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee held that this problem should be investigated so that a policy could be formulated to deal with these issues in the later period of the campaign. The political confrontation between Ye Jianying and Jiang Qing came to a temporary halt with Mao’s censuring of Jiang. This was the cause of their political enmity, and it was the direct reason for Ye Jianying strongly supporting Hua Guofeng in having Jiang arrested. Also on February 20, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Criticizing Self-denial and the Restoration of Old Rituals — Lin Biao’s Reactionary Guidelines toward Restoring Capitalism.“ The editorial emphasized that Lin’s anti-CPC group had to be repudiated for denying the merits of the Cultural Revolution and the basic theories and practices of Chairman Mao with regard to socialist revolution and socialist construction.158 This was targeted at doubts over the Cultural Revolution and at the criticisms of Zhou Enlai and others over the ultra-leftism and errors of the Cultural Revolution. From February to March, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao 158. The editorial argued that criticizing Lin Biao’s problem demanded an association with the class struggle and political direction. Lin’s anti-CPC clique had to be criticized

for repudiating the Cultural Revolution and denying the basic theories and practices of Chairman Mao regarding socialistic revolution and construction, and also for

attempting to restore revisionism: “We should stick to the party’s basic political route

and remain on the course of socialism. The vicious curses of Lin Biao and his followers on the fresh phenomenon of socialism need to be censured. We need to adhere to the

principles of combining younger, middle-aged, and older cadres. Revolutions in such areas as education, literature and the arts, and health care should continue; cadres

should go to the grassroots and educated young people should go to the countryside. Lin Biao is also to be criticized for his attempt to ally with the Soviet Union socialistic

imperialists, yield to other countries, and betray our own country. We should stand on

our own feet, rely on ourselves, and carry forth internationalism and patriotism of the proletariat.“ (People’s Daily, February 20, 1974.)

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

voiced their criticisms at campaign meetings of the military and meetings of the leaders of military propaganda units. Qing, Wang, and Zhang declared that the leading organizations of the military had been passive and perfunctory in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. They said that the organizations had displayed rightist softness and it was necessary to “set a fire to burn the weeds“ in the PLA so as to bring down those who needed to be brought down politically.159 Jiang’s group took advantage of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius to attack the PLA, yet faced military resistance. Jiang Qing also made efforts to further her ideas in the area of scientific research. On March 10, she wrote a letter to the Photosensitive Materials Laboratory in the Chemistry Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and sent them an article titled “Liuxia Zhi Criticized Confucius,“ written by Tang Xiaowen. In her letter, she called on the academics to learn from Liuxia Zhi in fighting the followers of Confucius in their laboratory. The same day, Jiang wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, and Wang Dongxing, saying: “It is our responsibility to support Tang Xiaowen since truth is on the side of the comrades who have written to us.“ She went on describing those capitalist and collaborative capitalist supporters as closeminded: they blatantly attempted to criticize the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese Academy of Sciences held a meeting, during which Liu Xiyao, Wu Heng, and other heads of the academy underwent public criticism.160 The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius encountered resistance from both within and outside the party; Liang Shuming was considered the most outspoken intellectual among all. From February 22 to 25, Liang Shuming publicly expressed his resistance to the campaign both orally and in writing. In late 1973, when the campaign was initiated, Liang Shuming addressed the December 14 meeting of the Study Teams of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), democratic parties, and the Beijing Federation of Industry and Commerce: “Chairman Mao has repeatedly affirmed that dissent should be allowed...I have reservations about the current campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius...I disagree with the current criticism of Confucius.“ On January 25, 1974, Jiang Qing said at a mobilization meeting for central organizations, “Liang Shuming objects to us and our campaign against Confucius. He worships Confucius...The chairman has said that Confucius was a tyrant and a fascist...Academics like Liang Shuming don’t understand.“ 159. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 654.

160. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 793.

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Liang Shuming delivered a speech at study meetings on February 22 and 25 titled “How Should We Evaluate Confucius Today?“ Liang argued that evaluating Confucius required affirming the influence of Confucius in the cultural history of China and acknowledging both his shortcomings and his achievements: “In my eyes, Confucius has his merits and flaws...But my views as expressed in my articles are at odds with the current movement to censure Confucius.“ Liang stated that Confucius had been contributing in China’s 5,000-year culture. He saw this culture playing an important role in the past, and so would it be in the future: “The criticism of the Confucian insistence on self-denial and restoration of old rituals is now prevalent. However, such criticism and arguments are baseless...As to why Lin Biao practiced calligraphy by writing ’Self-denial and the Restoration of Old Rituals’ and what he understood by ’self’ and ’old rituals,’ no one can answer except Lin himself...I believe that Lin should be censured, but Confucius should be spared...Liu Shaoqi made many proposals, and those are openly known. Peng Dehuai also wrote an open letter to Chairman Mao. Both Liu and Peng made many proposals in the interests of the nation. For many years, I have tried to establish a basic common ground in spite of differences with the leaders of the CPC. “For these words, Liang was politically rebuked. He responded at the meeting on September 13: “You may kill the general of the army, but you can’t force me to change my mind.“161 On March 20, Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing, saying that despite having access to all the books introducing Marxism and Leninism as well as his own books, Jiang ignored them: “I am now seriously ill. I’m 81 years old, and yet you ignore that too. Now you are enjoying certain privileges. But what will happen to you after I die? You’re just like the others: you disregard the fundamental principles and make a fuss over trivialities.“162 As Mao Zedong became older, weaker, and sicker, his became more and more concern over the fate of Jiang since she was making many enemies. Mao was aware that bad deeds, like good ones, may rebound on the doer. However, Mao was unable to withhold Jiang’s privileges. He criticized her for causing further trouble and attacked Deng Xiaoping, who had just returned to power. In late March, Mao Zedong proposed that Deng Xiaoping should head the Chinese delegation at a special meeting of the United Nations. Mao’s idea had been well considered: he hoped Deng would soon be replace Zhou Enlai in handling 161. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1041–1042.

162. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 372.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

China’s foreign affairs.163 However, Jiang Qing repeatedly objected to this proposal. She was extremely dissatisfied with the fact that Deng had returned to power, and she was even angrier when Deng was placed in important positions. Jiang could not bear the idea that Deng would take the limelight on the world political stage at this special United Nations meeting. Citing security issues and onerous domestic duties, Jiang objected to this proposition at a meeting of the Political Bureau.164 Seeing that Jiang Qing was causing trouble with the Political Bureau, Zhou Enlai instructed Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng to report the matter to Mao Zedong. Wang and Tang became liaison officers for Mao, bridging the communication between Mao and the Political Bureau. On March 26, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau, and all the members but Jiang Qing, unanimously agreed to have Deng Xiaoping leading the delegation at this special meeting of the United Nations. Mao instructed Wang and Tang to tell Zhou: “I think that Deng Xiaoping should attend the meeting at the United Nations. But I will not insist on this if the comrades of the Political Bureau object.“ Zhou Enlai responded: “We are all in full agreement with Chairman Mao’s idea.“ On March 27, Mao Zedong angrily wrote a letter to Jiang, saying: “I want Comrade Deng Xiaoping to go abroad. You’d better not objecting this. Be modest and prudent. Do not oppose my idea.“165 This showed that Jiang regarded both Zhou and Deng as her political opponents. Jiang acknowledged that she was acting like a mad dog, but this mad dog had to restrain herself since Mao supported Zhou and Deng. On April 10, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Several Problems on the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.“ In light of what had occurred earlier in the Cultural Revolution, some restraints and regulations were adopted concerning the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.166 163. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 298. 164. Ibid., 298–299. 165. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 373.

166. The notice stipulated the following points: first, the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius had to be conducted under the unified leadership of the CPC Central

Committee. Such mass organizations as independent brigades were prohibited, as

was the establishment of links between industries and regions. Organizations that had

been established, such as liaison stations, appeal groups, and report groups, should be persuaded by the CPC committees to return to their own units to participate in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius as well as participate in the efforts toward revolution, production, and preparing for war. Second, servicemen and servicewomen

had made a huge contribution toward efforts to support the leftist masses as well as

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On May 18, the CPC Central Committee issued “Notice on Policy Problems That Arose in the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius“ as revised and approved by Mao Zedong. This notice represented a further regulation of the campaign, especially restraining the campaign in the military.167 In accordance with Mao’s instructions, the notice stated that Chairman Mao had always believed China and its people to be good, and he held the same about the CPC, state organizations, and the PLA: he maintained that they were like pure gold that did not fear the furnace. However, in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974, Mao allowed only two leading officials to be liberated, which was the smallest number in years.168 In May, Mao Zedong hosted some foreign visitors, with Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai also in attendance. Mao intended to provide some training to Wang Hongwen, who was completely inexperienced in foreign affairs; he also wished to observe Deng closely under such circumstances. Mao wished

industrial and agricultural production; they had also made a major contribution in

conducting military control in some places, departments, and units and in the military training of students. Those involved in such efforts need not return to their units to

participate in the campaign. Third, great achievements had been made in the campaign against Lin Biao; however, the campaign against Confucius posed more difficulties. Fourth, CPC committees at all levels should reinforce their leadership, become united

with over 95% of the people and cadres, and make all efforts to continue the movement. 167. The notice stipulated that the problems concerning leaders that required investigation

should be restricted to problems related to the activities of the Lin Biao anti-CPC clique. It further stated that in terms of time, only the problems that arose after the August-

September inspection tour of Chairman Mao in 1971 should be investigated in addition to problems that arose, despite the publication of Document No. 57, 1971, by the CPC

Central Committee. That document declared that the CPC Central Committee would

not readily doubt comrades who had clearly distanced themselves from Lin Biao — irrespective of whatever influences he or she may have received from Lin or whether he or she had made mistakes. Past problems — including severe mistakes — should be ignored as long as the individual confessed their errors to the party and distanced

themselves from the Lin Biao anti-CPC clique. The notice stated that it was necessary to

ensure that among the leading organizations and armies under the level of army corps, only positive education was promoted.

168. This calculation was based on the contents page of Mao Zedong’s Works Since the

Founding of New China, vol. 13, compiled by Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Wang and Deng to form a new team of leadership,169 with Wang presiding over the routine work of the CPC Central Committee instead of Zhou, who was suffering from deteriorating health. Mao wanted Wang to continue the political course he had adopted in the Cultural Revolution; however, Mao was also desirous that Deng become able to rule the country and restore economic growth. In terms of the power structure, such a strong team would be able to ensure a unified, mutually balanced political situation in China. However, in terms of their individual competence, Wang was no match for Deng — particularly in terms of political influence and prestige. Without Mao’s personal support, the Gang of Four would have already been perished.170 On June 12, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan held a meeting with Chi Qun and others. Jiang asked why it was necessary to launch the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. She said that it was because Lin, who worshipped Confucius, was a Confucian disciple. Jiang declared that it was essential to criticize and inherit the situation which they found themselves in: the struggle between the forces that aimed to restore old institutions and those that fought against them — and the struggle between progressive and regressive forces — had existed since the slavery and feudalistic societies through to the socialistic one. There were still some people, stated Jiang, who wanted to restore the old institutions: “To do this requires Confucian theories; to conduct our revolution requires criticism and inheriting legalism in history. Everything Confucian is a betrayal of our national interests, and everything legalistic is patriotic.“171 On June 14, Jiang Qing convened a meeting of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius for the military. She delivered a speech on the so-called history of the struggles between Confucians and Legalists, and she demanded that articles be written to criticize modern Confucians: “Why should we fight against Confucius? Are there any Confucians around nowadays? Confucians abound, and Chiang Kai-shek was the chief one.“172 Later, Jiang ordered Chi Qun to write an article against Zhou Enlai, denouncing Zhou as a modern Confucian.173 From June 17 to 169. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 307–308. 170. Deng Rong believed that Mao Zedong may have believed that the political checks had

basically been put in place. However, such arrangements — even though they had been carefully made — were not at all stable. Mao was over-confident in his belief that such arrangements would ensure a stable political situation after his death. (Ibid., 294.)

171. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1091–1092.

172. Ibid., 1092. 173. “Jiang Qing proposed that my recent perusals of inside materials had led her to ask a

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28, when Jiang visited Tianjin, she talked about the struggles between Confucians and Legalists and the need to expose modern Confucians.174 On July 12, Jiang Qing demanded that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius be extended to the elementary and junior high schools across the country.175 Since February, Mao Zedong had criticized Jiang Qing six times hoping she would behave; yet she was acting just as reckless as before. Angry and fed up,176 Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing on July 17, 1974 at a meeting of the Political question that few had asked before about modern Confucians. It related to the identity

of old Confucians, who are far more than just Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.“ (Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.)

174. On June 19, 1974, Jiang Qing addressed a report meeting about the history of the struggles between Confucians and Legalists in Tianjin. She said that in the history of China, all the forces that had worshipped Confucian theories and fought against legalism since the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods had betrayed the national interests;

all those forces that had worshipped legalism and fought against Confucianism were

patriotic. This was a very important principle. All the legalistic forces in history had

struggled up from the grassroots level; all the great feudalistic figures and emperors — regardless of whether they were established emperors or had inherited the position

— were generally legalistic or close to legalism. In general, the Legalists in history were

patriotic, caring for and encouraging the people; the Confucianists were ruthless and cruel to the people, regardless they were slaves, peasants, or working class. “Don’t

make the mistake of thinking that there are no Confucianists in socialistic societies.

There are quite a few Confucianists in our party. The focus of this campaign is to criticize the Confucianists in the party.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s

Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1093–1094.)

175. On July 12, 1974, Jiang Qing wrote a comment on a letter from Su Wucheng on the

campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius at No. 27 Secondary School in Beijing, and the comment was published in a magazine within the Beijing Daily: “We need to

conduct the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in schools — even elementary schools. We need to exert influence even from that age. Any delay would harm the

children as they later become teenagers. Such classics as the Three-Character Scripture were written for children. We haven’t paid enough attention to this problem. We would

face a real problem if we didn’t have our children familiar with the basics of Marxism and didn’t educate them against Confucius.“ (Ibid., 1103.)

176. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 309.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Bureau: “You need to take greater care! Others are not happy with your conduct, but they are unable to tell you directly. You’re still unaware of this. Do not make hasty accusations. Don’t make allegations, and don’t organize yourself with others into a Gang of Four [referring to Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan]!“ Mao publicly declared that she did not represent him: she represented only herself.177 Mao said in conclusion about Jiang Qing: “She has both good and bad sides!“ After this, he called the meeting.178 However, Jiang knew that even though Mao had rebuked her, he would never bring her down politically: he needed to protect her as her fate was closely intertwined with the development of the Cultural Revolution, which Mao had launched. The members of the Political Bureau at that time were also aware of this. As a result, Jiang continued along her course with Mao behind her.179 Jiang and her supporters were Cultural Revolution hardliners. Nonetheless, Mao’s criticism on Jiang and her associates acted was like a Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the Gang of Four. After Mao’s death, such rebukes would be used by the other members of the Political Bureau to politically bury the Gang of Four. On September 8, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Zhao Gao’s Usurpation of Power and the Doom of the Qin Dynasty.“ This article was read by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, and revised by Yao Wenyuan. Aiming to analyze the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism, the article attacked Zhou Enlai. At the same time, it sang the praises towards Lu Zhi, which amounted to ideological preparation for Jiang Qing to become a modern empress.180 On October 1, Red Flag issue no. 10 published the article “Research on the Historical Experience of the Struggle between Confucianism and Legalism“ by Liang Xiao. This article, which had been planned, revised, and finalized by Yao Wenyuan, made an allusive attack on Zhou Enlai, and stated that Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who were as dangerous as Zhao Gao and Liu Bi, had sneaked their way into the party. The article declared that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, agents of the capitalist class in the party had adopted the antirevolutionary strategy of “removing the evil people close to the emperor“ to attack the revolutionary force that adhered to the correct course of Chairman Mao.181 This 177. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1693. 178. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 188–189. 179. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 309. 180. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1122; Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 309–310.

181. The article argued: “In feudalistic societies, there always existed the struggle between

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article did in fact predict the political fate that would befall the Gang of Four in October 1976. Taking advantage of the fact that Zhou Enlai, her greatest political opponent, was being ill, Jiang Qing struck him further. Earlier, on June 1 in Hospital 205, Zhou Enlai underwent his first big operation. He then spent the last year and a half of his life in hospital. He underwent a total of 14 operations, six were major and eight minor. Even hospitalized, he held 233 meetings: 161 were with central leaders, 55 were with the heads of local areas and departments, and 17 were with people who worked for him.182 The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius accelerated Zhou’s demise. During that period, Deng Xiaoping acted as vice premier of the State Council and shared some of Zhou’s duties, especially foreign affairs related duties. Wang Hongwen presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. All the leaders had to report to Mao Zedong, who left Beijing for southern China on July 17 for recreational purposes. With the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee announced in July that the problems of Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi were the result of a frame-up by Lin Biao. Those individuals had been wronged, and it was now time to redress their grievances. Shortly thereafter, Yang, Yu, and Fu were those who worshipped Confucianism and objected to legalism and those who

worshipped legalism and objected to Confucianism; that has continued through to the present time: ’Whether the emergent landlord class retained ruling power depended

on whether it could keep to the legalistic route.’ After Emperor Qin Shi Huang died, Zhao Gao launched a coup to replace legalism with Confucianism, whereby lowly

people would be recommended and placed in important positions; humble people would be promoted, poor people would be enriched, and approaches would be made

to those who had been held at a distance. Bloody vengeance was carried out against the political representatives of the landlord class. After Liu Bang died, generations of

emperors, from Empress Lu to Emperor Wendi, continued the legalism of Liu Bang; Legalists, such as Chao Cuo, Zhang Tang, and Sang Hongyang, were promoted to important positions in the central government. The rule of this legalistic leadership in

the central government ensured adherence to legalism. Liu Bi, king of the Wu State,

furthered the anti-revolutionary strategy of ’removing evil people close to the emperor’ to remove the legalistic figures in the decision-making process and crush the legalistic leadership in the central government; as a result, the legalistic route became replaced.“ (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1133–1134.) 182. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 385.

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released and reinstated by the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Committee.183 On July 31, Zhou Enlai and members of the Political Bureau in Beijing held meetings with Lu Zhengcao, Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, and the rehabilitation of those individuals was announced. When Zhou talked to Yang of this incident, Zhou said that anyone would feel frustrated in Yang’s circumstances: “When you were brought down in March 1968, the chairman was somewhat hesitant, and so four meetings were held to deal with the matter. Several days later, when the chairman mentioned you, he clenched his fists and said, ’One was a vice admiral and the other was the acting commander in chief; which one do you think I should bring down? At that time, I didn’t have sufficient reason to abandon the vice admiral! I couldn’t account for my actions to the Chinese people!’ The chairman blamed himself because of you. I now blame myself because of you.“ To Yang’s great distress, Zhou informed Yang that his eldest daughter had died as a result of the persecutions.184 Zhou wrote three applications to reinstate Yang. On the previous occasion, Mao lost his temper before it was resolved that Yang be reinstated.185 This indicates that the incident relating to Yang, Yu, and Fu created by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in March 1968 was not resolved until two years after the fall of the Lin Biao clique as a result of hindrance by Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing. On August 16, Zhou Enlai held a meeting with Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng to obtain a clear picture of the situation when Wang Hongwen supported the Central Military Committee in passing the policy of criticizing that committee’s leaders in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.186 This demonstrates how Wang Hongwen took advantage of Zhou’s hospitalization to intervene military affairs and conduct class struggles in the PLA. On September 29, according to a Mao approved plan proposed by Zhou Enlai, the Central Military Committee issued the “Notice on Rehabilitating Comrade He Long.“187 Who then was responsible for He Long being framed? Why should a 183. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1102.

184. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 69. 185. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 673.

186. Ibid., 674. 187. The notice stated that after the September 13 Incident in 1971, the CPC Central

Committee launched a direct investigation into the problem of He Long: “Chairman

Mao has instructed on many occasions that we should not waste any time in

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marshal of the PRC have been persecuted to death? On December 30, 1966, Jiang Qing declared at a mass meeting that Comrade He had problems, and she incited people to rise against him. On January 9, 1967, Lin Biao slandered He Long at a meeting by saying he tried to seize power everywhere, and proposed “exposing the problems of Comrade He.“ Jiang and Lin fabricated the story that He Long had intended to launch the February Mutiny, and they launched violent protests at He’s residence. On February 14, Yan Zhangyan, son of Yan Yunpu (who had been director of Division 2 under the Kuomintang Nanchang Field Headquarters and a teacher in Wuhan Secondary School no. 20), wrote to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. In that letter, Yan concocted the story that He Long had once begged to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek and had thus tried to betray the nation in yielding to the enemy. Following the instructions of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, an investigation team alleged that He attempted to betray the country and surrender, though he was unsuccessful; they then reported this allegation to the CPC Central Committee on July 12. On September 13, a meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group chaired by Zhou Enlai resolved to set up a case team under the direction of Kang Sheng to investigate the He Long case. Kang stated that He’s case involved two betrayals: the February Mutiny of 1966 and the betrayal of history. On June 14, 1968, Office 2 of the Central Special Case Group made He Long a suspect as part of its investigations and put him into custody. On October 13, Mao Zedong announced at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee that he would no longer protect He Long. On June 9, 1969, Admiral He Long died without the false charges against him having been cleared. In May 1971, the “Investigation Report on He Long“ by the Central Special Case Group identified Admiral He Long as a collaborationist in the party and the PLA. The report stated that He was an anti-CPC element who had seized military power; it proposed to deprive He’s party membership and declaring him a criminal to some degree in an effort to cleanse his poisonous influence. rehabilitating Comrade He Long. Comrade He Long died of illness on July 9, 1969. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee, Comrade He

Long was a good comrade; he made great contributions to the revolutionary cause of the party and the people. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee has resolved to reinstate

Comrade He Long. The Central Special Case Group in the CPC Central Committee made a report on September 13, 1974, declaring that Lin Biao, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and others framed Comrade He Long by trumping up charges, fabricating history, and deceiving the party and the people.“

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

At the end of February 1973, Mao Zedong told Zhang Chunqiao in the swimming pool of Zhongnanhai: “I believe that He Long was innocent. He killed Xiong Gongqing, the spy sent by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933...I was wrong to have only listened to one side of the case.“ However, Zhang Chunqiao deliberately failed to convey Mao’s opinion to the Political Bureau. On December 21, 1973, when addressing delegates at a meeting of the Central Military Committee, Mao Zedong said He Long’s name should be cleared: “I think I’ve been wrong about Comrade He Long and that I am to blame for what happened to him. I told him that he was different from other officials since he led the army, and I must protect him. We must reverse the verdict on He Long: we can’t continue with the present judgment of him. This situation is all because of Lin Biao: I listened to just one side of the story from Lin Biao and that was a mistake.“188 This misjudgment in the case of He Long shows that, although Mao Zedong promised He Long he would protect him, He died as a result of the struggles within the CPC rather than at the hands of the Kuomintang. This demonstrates that Mao’s theory about the Cultural Revolution was very wrong and that the political conflicts were brutal. However, instead of thoroughly grasping the situation, Mao attributed his mistake to having listened to Lin Biao’s allegation. At that time, Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing, who were responsible for investigating the He Long case, were a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and a member of the Political Bureau, respectively. Why did Mao not think to check their allegations? The notice of the Central Committee retained this wording: “The Central Committee was convinced at that time that it was necessary to investigate and clear the name of Comrade He Long.“ On June 9, 1975, when Zhou Enlai attended the enshrinement ceremony of He Long’s ashes, he confessed to Xue Ming, wife of He Long: “I failed to protect him.“ Zhou bowed seven times to the portrait of the deceased.189 Apparently, Zhou also bore political responsibility for what happened to He. On September 30, Zhou Enlai, though ill, attended the reception celebrating National Day for the last time, and thunderous applause rocked the hall. His toast was interrupted over a dozen times by the applause. In all, 4,500 domestic and foreign guests attended the reception, which indicates that the attacks on Zhou by Jiang Qing and others in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius were contrary to the wishes of the party, the military, and the people. That National Day reception was presided over by Wang Hongwen; Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and 188. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 74–77. 189. Editorial Committee of Biography of He Long comp., Biography of He Long.

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others were also present. They accelerated their attacks on Zhou. The moderates and the Cultural Revolution hardliners were vying for Mao Zedong’s support in the political contest. Mao tried to strike a balance between the two forces while firmly retain supreme power.

Political Struggles at the 4th National People’s Congress When Mao Zedong launched the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the national economy suffered from a drastic decline from January to May 1974; comparing with the same period of time in previous year, coal, steel and fertilizer output decreased 2.5%, 9.4% and 3.3% respectively. However, despite the financial revenues shrank by 4 billion yuan, the financial expenditure increased by 2.5 billion yuan.190 Owing to the financial deficit, supplies of agricultural products and byproducts were very tight, so as those daily household articles191 On June 13, Li Xiannian submitted the “Outline Report on Industrial and Agricultural Production by the State Planning Commission and Notice on Strengthening Revolution and Production“ to Wang Hongwen, which Li had drafted on behalf of the CPC Central Committee. On June 18, the Political Bureau listened to the State Planning Commission’s report, and on July 1 the notice was officially issued with Mao Zedong’s approval. The notice acknowledged that some regions and units had failed to fulfill the plans set by the state: there was a severe shortage in output and congestion with rail transport, which affected freight transport across the nation.192 190. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 809.

191. Sun, General Economic History of China (1949–2000), vol. 2, 1786–1788. 192. The notice stated that some regions and units did not fulfill the state plans for industrial production in the first half of 1974. The two weak areas at that time were coal and rail

transport. From January to May, there was a shortfall of 8.35 million tons of coal in China’s major coal mines; in particular, the leading coal mines in Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu suffered a drastic reduction in production, which caused national output

to fall. Xuzhou, Changsha, Baotou, and Guiyang suffered frequent rail congestion: this was so severe that the four trunk lines of Tianjin-Pukou, Beijing-Guangzhou, Beijing-

Baotou, and Guiyang-Kunming were impeded, which hampered freight transport

across the nation and caused many enterprises to shut down or reduce production. Output of steel, nonferrous metal, fertilizer, and cement fell short of the plan and so did

military production. Wuhan Steel Company, Baotou Steel Company, and other major

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

This indicates that the central leadership, including Mao, was acutely aware of the severe economic consequences of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. Why did the economic downturn continue? The notice stated that the basic cause was that the revolutionary activities had not been conducted properly — like the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, a small number of class enemies had taken the opportunity to cause trouble and disruption. The notice said that it was necessary to deliver a heavy blow against the evil elements that had sabotaged production, transport, and the social order; it was necessary to expose and deal with the people who had caused the shutdowns. At the same time, the notice criticized economism.193 The so-called evil elements however was not the key factor for causing rapid national economy decay, the initiators and the against Lin Biao and Confucius campaign itself was the actual culprit. In the era of Mao Zedong, the author concludes that political factors were the major cause of economic fluctuation in China: the fiercer the political struggles, the greater their impact on the economy. The fluctuation coefficient of the growth rate of GDP in the Mao era was 154%, which reflects the unpredictable, uncontrollable dramatic swings.194 In 1974, Mao Zedong felt increasingly dissatisfied with the chaos in the economy, social instability, and political divisions; and hoped to make this right by preparing to convene the 4th People’s National Congress — which had not been held in the eight years since 1966. In accordance with Article 25 of the Constitution of the PRC, the People’s National Congress of China should be held once a year. Such a disparity between the Constitution and the actual situation shows that Mao had severely damaged basic systems of state or essentially disabled them. Only until 1974 would Mao wanted to re-establish this system to restore stability and unity. With Zhou Enlai being so ill, Mao Zedong charged Wang Hongwen with the enterprises suffered a drastic decrease in production. 193. The notice declared that economism was revisionist thought that corrupted the proletariat and undermined the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius: “Leading

comrades and revolutionary masses should enhance their alertness against this evil

spirit of economism. The CPC Central Committee has repeatedly stated that we should focus on the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. The questions asked by some

people about salaries and economic policies should be set aside until the final stages of

this campaign; at that time, thorough investigations and in-depth analyses should be made to arrive at a unified, coordinated solution.“

194. For detailed discussion, please see Hu, Report on the Economic Fluctuations in China, 185–190.

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task of chairing the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. With Zhou’s role being replaced, that was to manage the daily work of the State Council, aroused a new round of struggle between the two political forces, in spite of the fact that Mao always had the final say. On May 22, the “Temporary Labor Division Plan of the Offices of the State Council“ proposed that Li Xiannian should supervise the daily work of the State Council. Specifically, Li had to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economy, and the Ministry of Light Industries.195 On July 17, Mao Zedong convened a meeting with the Political Bureau, during which he said to Deng Xiaoping: “You are now in charge of Foreign Affairs. Li Xiannian is to act as premier.“ Li Xiannian explained that he was responsible for the affairs of the State Council only during Premier Zhou’s sick leave.196 On August 20, Mao Zedong held a meeting with Li Xiannian, and Mao instructed him to tackle domestic problems as following: 197 This was the first time for Mao to propose the concept of “unity and stability. Li Xiannian immediately communicated the content of this conversation to Zhou Enlai upon his return to Beijing. At a meeting of commanders and political commissars of the eight military areas convened by the Political Bureau, Mao Zedong’s instructions were officially communicated: the Cultural Revolution of the proletariat had lasted for eight years, but now it was necessary to emphasize stability. The party and the PLA had to be united.198 This implicated that Mao was aware of the country being unstable and the PLA were not united; yet, Mao did not mention about the namely class enemies this time. For the first time, he articulated that the Cultural Revolution had dragged on for too long and achieved too little, and would like to call this campaign off. It was a chaotic time where a fine prime minister — one that could restore stability, was in need; and barely anyone disagree that Deng Xiaoping was the best fit among all. In the evening of October 3, the Political Bureau discussed whether to convene the 4th National People’s Congress. In the afternoon of that day, Mao Zedong’s secretary called Wang Hongwen, proposing that Deng Xiaoping should assume the position of first vice premier of the State Council, and asked Wang Hongwen to communicate this proposal to the Political Bureau. Clearly, Mao had decided 195. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 812.

196. Ibid., 813. 197. Ibid. 198. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 402.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

that based on the above political considerations, Deng should replace the ill Zhou Enlai to take charge of the State Council; if Zhou died, Deng should replace him as premier of the State Council. A very important outcome of this was that the decision precluded Jiang Qing from organizing her own cabinet. However, that evening Wang Hongwen failed to communicate this message to the Political Bureau, but delivered it to Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan instead. Wang waited two days before communicating Mao’s instructions to Zhou and the members of the Political Bureau. On October 6, when Zhou Enlai heard of Mao Zedong’s decision, he immediately made an appointment with Deng Xiaoping. Zhou believed that Jiang Qing would be unable to seize power over the State Council as long as Deng was made premier. Zhou thus placed his hopes regarding his unfinished work in Deng. That evening, Jiang talked to Zhou about the participants for the 4th National People’s Congress and the candidates for the position of general chief of staff of the PLA.199 This clearly showed that Jiang aimed to appropriate authority over personnel and military affairs and that she was a true careerist. Zhou did not give her any support.200 On October 11, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Convening the 4th National People’s Congress,“ which officially updated the whole party Mao Zedong’s latest will on stability and unity.201 This indicates that Mao planned to rebuild China’s fundamental systems as a modern country, restore the National People’s Congress, revise the Constitution of the PRC, and establish the 4th national leadership group and complete its personnel arrangements. This signaled a return to the character of the 1st National People’s Congress, which was held in 1954. The predominant cause was Mao’s rapidly deteriorating physical condition and that he finally gain some insight. He sometimes said: “At 73 or 84, one goes towards death even if death does not come by itself.“ He had to put the nation in order.202 However, a fierce struggle for power was underway. The notice stated that the 4th National People’s Congress would soon be held and that all units should prepare for it. The notice declared that special cases would be investigated and that veteran party officials would be liberated. However, the notice also specified that veteran officials should deal appropriately with the revolutionaries who had put up big posters criticizing them during the Cultural Revolution. The notice stated that retaliations were prohibited. However, this was self-contradictory. Mao Zedong 199. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 316.

200. “Testimony of Wang Hongwen in Court,” November 20, 1980.

201. Mao Zedong said: “The Cultural Revolution of the proletariat has lasted eight years. Now, stability should be emphasized. The party and the PLA should be united.“

202. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 317.

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was afraid that once the veteran officials rose again to power, they would repudiate the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing was politically ambitious and eager to form her own cabinet. She stirred up trouble in the State Council and Political Bureau. On October 14, Jiang commented on the report about the Fengqing Steamer Incident:203 “This incident filled me with indignation as a member of the proletariat! Isn’t the transportation ministry one of the state organs of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee? And the State Council is a state institution for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Unfortunately, some individuals in the Ministry of Transport bowed to the foreign forces as collaborators and they tried to dictate to us. Can this demeaning attitude go unchallenged?“ Jiang demanded that the Political Bureau should state its position about this matter and take necessary measures.204 It clearly reflected that Jiang regarded herself as empress over the Central Committee: she acted in a superior, domineering manner without realizing that she was in fact isolated and excluded for her arrogance. As the historian Joseph Needham said, the isolation of the Gang of Four was like ostriches burying their heads in the sand.205 On June 18, Wang Hongwen commented on concerned letters that he had received from ordinary individuals about buying ships from abroad206 being an act of worshiping foreign 203. The Fengqing steamer was a domestically made 10,000-ton cargo vessel, which sailed to Romania and returned to Shanghai on the eve of National Day, 1974.

204. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 678.

205. Needham, “Science Reborn in China: Rise and Fall of the Anti–intellectual ‘Gang.’ “ 206. This refers to the fact that in view of the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars spent on

renting foreign ships each year, Zhou Enlai instructed in 1970 that during the Fourth

Five-Year Plan, efforts should be made to accelerate the development of China’s own ocean transport fleet. Following investigation and research, Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli argued that the domestic shipbuilding industry could not meet the demand at that time and that buying ships in the international market would be more effective. On March

8, 1974, Li Xiannian commented that China should largely rely on itself in developing

its shipbuilding industry, which was a basic need, but that it did not preclude the possibility of buying some ships from abroad as appropriate since China was so short

of ships. Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun agreed with this. On June 6, Li Xiannian stated again that to save time, it would be practicable to buy ships. Therefore,

the strong recommendation was made to purchase a number of ships since their price at the time was not so high, and the purchase would still be worthwhile even if the

ships lasted only 10 years or even five years. (Editorial Committee of Biography of Li

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

capitalists and following the revisionist line.207 His words were targeted directly at Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian. Jiang had thus started another dispute. On the evening of December 17, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan enraged Deng Xiaoping via attacking him with the Fengqing incident.208 This represented a sharp conflict in the Political Bureau between the Cultural Revolution hardliners represented by Jiang, who followed exclusivism, and the healthy forces represented by Deng, who wanted to open up to the outside world. This argument left a mark on Deng, and it was an important political reason in his decision to open up to the outside world in 1978. Later, when Deng recalled this argument, he said seclusion was inappropriate: “I quarreled with the Gang of Four [referring to Jiang Qing] about a ship that was only 10,000 tons. What a fuss they made! When I went to study in France in 1920, I took a 50,000-ton foreign mail steamer.“209 In 1973, Japan was already building 420,000-ton ships. Clearly, Jiang was rather like a frog at the bottom of a deep well that believed the sky to be something very small. Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992), vol. 2, 794–795. 207. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 671–672.

208. Jiang Qing questioned Deng Xiaoping at the meeting of the Political Bureau: “What

do you think of this issue (the Fengqing incident)?“ Deng replied: “I have read the

reports. We need to investigate the matter.“ Jiang Qing asked again what he thought

of the criticism of the collaborators. Deng said that they were equals as members of the Political Bureau when discussing issues and that she should not bully people in that manner: “How could they cooperate under those conditions?“ Deng said that she

was imposing her opinion on him: “Do I have to support your way of thinking?“ Jiang then yelled at him. Deng said in rage: “Without an investigation, you can’t make such

accusations. What kind of meeting is this!“ Deng left. After he left, Zhang Chunqiao

remarked that Deng was against them again. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 318–319.)

209. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 367.

The Wenhui Daily published articles on October 12, 1974 against the collaborators in

the name of criticizing Confucius and Mencius. Deng Xiaoping recalled in December

1977 that he took a 50,000-ton mail steamer when he went abroad in the 1920s: “The Fengqing was less than 10,000 tons. And they made such a fuss about it. When Jiang

Qing berated me, I argued with her. Jiang Qing emphasized only theories and was always domineering.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 245.)

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After that meeting, Zhang Chunqiao remarked that Deng Xiaoping was against them again. Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal, “The situation has suddenly changed! Comrade Deng Xiaoping yelled at Comrade Jiang Qing...It was like we were back at the Lushan Meeting!“210 That evening, Jiang Qing summoned Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to a meeting, where she demanded Wang go to Changsha as soon as possible report to Mao that Deng and Zhou would not become first vice premier of the State Council. On October 18, Wang Hongwen went to see Mao Zedong in Changsha and made accusations against Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping: “The atmosphere in Beijing now is just like at the Lushan Meeting...I took a political risk in coming here.“ Wang did not expect that Mao would admonish him: “You should be alert against Jiang Qing and keep your distance from her. Now go back and talk to Premier and Comrade Jianying. Stay united with Comrade Xiaoping.“211 This indicates that Mao hoped to create a new political authority, in which Wang was responsible for the daily work of the Central Committee and Deng took charge of the State Council, with the two of them united and coordinating with each other. Rather than being just general chief of staff of the PLA, Mao expressly ordered Deng to work concurrently in that position as well as taking charge of the State 210. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 319. 211. Zhang Yufeng, Mao Zedong’s secretary, stated that in April 1974, Wang Hongwen went

to Chairman Mao without having informed Premier Zhou and the Political Bureau to

make false accusations against Premier Zhou and other central leaders. Wang accused

Zhou and other leaders of trying to seize supreme authority just as Lin Biao and his supporters did at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Wang

said: “The atmosphere in Beijing now is very like it was during the Lushan Meeting.

I came to Hunan without telling Premier Zhou and other comrades in the Political Bureau. The four of us [Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao] discussed the situation throughout the night and decided that I should come and report to you. I left when Premier Zhou

took a rest. I took a political risk in coming here.“ Wang continued: “Although Premier Zhou is seriously ill, he was busy talking to people day and night, and those who

often go to his place are Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian.“ Wang highly

praised Zhang Chunqiao’s competence, Yao Wenyuan’s interest in reading, and also praised Jiang Qing. Chairman Mao rebuked Wang Hongwen, saying: “You should talk

face to face if you don’t agree! Coming to me is not good! You should be careful with Jiang Qing and keep your distance. Now go back and talk to Premier and Comrade Jianying.“ Zhang Yufeng, October 20, 1976. (Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.)

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Council. Previously, Ye Jianying had warned Wang Hongwen against following Jiang Qing: Ye said that Wang should choose the correct side and keep his distance from her. However, instead of following Ye’s advice, Wang thought that Ye was trying to alienate him from Jiang, and he became closer to her, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.212 Mao disliked factions and cliques among the high-ranking officials in the party, and he despised corrupted individuals who were the first to voice complaints. Wang had to write a self-criticizing letter to Mao, which was kept and later became important evidence in Wang’s fall.213 Mao Zedong did not attend the meetings of the Political Bureau, which meant he does not know the complete information, nor the false information conveyed in the meeting. Communication between Mao Zedong and the Political Bureau mostly occurred only with foreign guests’ presence. When Mao interviewed foreign guests, Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, and Deng Xiaoping were also present. This was their best opportunity meeting Mao himself; consult and report to him. After July 17, 1974, when Mao Zedong received foreign guests outside Beijing with Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian accompaniment. Mao source of information back then was his personal liaison officers, including Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng who was outside Beijing and the Political Bureau. When Mao Zedong met foreign guests, it was Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng who recorded and translated the talks: Wang and Tang thus knew Mao’s instructions and communicated them directly or indirectly to the Political Bureau. Under Mao’s instructions, Wang and Tang attended meetings of the Political Bureau and were on the list of Political Bureau members for receiving official documents. Wang and Tang functioning 212. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 369. 213. The self-criticizing letter Wang Hongwen wrote to Mao Zedong stated that he had made a serious mistake by going to Changsha to report to Mao about the quarrel between

Comrade Jiang Qing and Comrade Xiaoping about the Fengqing: “It is permissible for Comrade Deng Xiaoping to have different opinions about the candidate for the general

chief of staff. Instead of consulting with the majority of the Political Bureau to solve this issue, I listened to several comrades and wrongly associated the candidacy for the

general chief of staff and Comrade Jiang Qing’s instructions about the Fengqing problem with her quarrel with Comrade Xiaoping. I added my own guesses and assumptions

and drew the wrong conclusion that there might be something else to this matter. As a result, I made my report to the chairman. The fact is that Comrade Xiaoping was

correct, whereas I made a serious mistake.“ “Self-Criticizing Letter by Wang Hongwen

in Changsha,“ December 1974. This letter was not released. (Central Special Case

Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.)

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as Mao’s liaison officers was actually an arrangement that violated systems and regulations. Wang and Tang hence became political targets and well-known figures that all forces attempted to influence. Their own biases had a direct bearing towards Mao’s opinions. The two political forces in the CPC vied for the support of Wang and Tang, and they played a key role in Mao’s objection to Jiang Qing’s efforts to organize her own cabinet. A year later, Mao Yuanxin replaced them and became a crucial figure in striking down Deng Xiaoping. On October 19, Jiang Qing summoned Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, ordering them to report to Mao how the State Council developed a tendency to worship foreign things and fawn over foreign countries; she also told them to criticize Deng Xiaoping’s behavior at the Political Bureau meeting of October 17 as an example of the February Counter-current Forces.214 Jiang Qing did not realize that she reached too far this time. Mao wanted to achieve unity and stability, not chaos, and he needed talents like Deng Xiaoping, highly recommended by Ye Jiangying, to stabilize the country. Also on October 19, Zhou Enlai talked to Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, Li Xiannian, and Deng Xiaoping separately in hospital gain a full view over the argument took place at the Political Bureau meeting two days ago. Zhou also received instructions from Mao, brought by Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, the same day in the light of investigations. It ends up with an obvious conclusion that Jing Qing twisted the situation while presenting it, and revealed the fact that Dang was schemed in advance. Jiang and her associates had assailed Deng many times, and he had put up with this over a long period.215 Wang and Tang knew what to report to Mao after they listened to Zhou. Who would Mao Zedong listen to since he did not attend Political Bureau meetings? Who provided what information to him? The information communicated by Wang and Tang had a significant influence on Mao. This was why both Jiang and Zhou held discussions with Wang and Tang. It was also on October 19 that Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng jointly submitted to Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee the “Brief Report on the Current Economic Status,“ which stated that the total agricultural and industrial output in the country from January to September had shown a 2.1% decrease over the same period in the previous year. Coal production and railway transportation were still weak, and that was affecting the whole nation. Since the industrial production plan was not being met, there was a drop in financial revenue, and

214. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2060.

215. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 298–299.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

expenditure surpassed revenues by 2.7 billion yuan.216 This made Mao realize the severity of China’s economic problems. In addition, the 4th NPC was about to be convened. It was clearly imperative to remedy the economic situation. On November 6, after meeting foreign guests, Mao listened to Li Xiannian’s report on the status of the economy, and he stated: “We need to improve the economy.“ Li Xiannian returned to Beijing to officially communicate Mao’s instructions to the Political Bureau.217 He played a key role in helping Mao formulate his ideas about emphasizing unity and stability and also the need to promote the economy by keeping Mao supplied with accurate information. On October 20, after Mao Zedong met Poul Hartling, the Danish prime minister, in Changsha. Meeting between Mao, Hartling and Deng was held. Unlike Wang Hongwen, who made false accusations against Deng, Deng was smart enough to say no words about Jiang Qing until asked about the quarrel took place at October 17 in the Political Bureau. When Mao asked about amending the national Constitution at the 4th People’s National Congress, he said that his name should not be mentioned in that document. Deng Xiaoping said that Beijing (meaning the Political Bureau) was studying personnel arrangements, and he wanted to hear the chairman’s opinion. Mao said: “I don’t know much about Beijing. I heard that the [4th] National People’s Congress is about to be held. I don’t think that we need to rush. It all depends on the physical condition of the premier and on the preparatory work. I do not wish to voice my opinion. It’s up to you. It’s that simple and clear. Those who once studied in France are good enough.“218 Deng asked: “Should I convey this message back to Beijing?“ Mao nodded in agreement. Deng had the content of discussion checked word by word with the help of the presented, which included Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng, and Zhang Hanzhi. The next day, Deng wrote a letter to Wang Hongwen about the meeting, as well as informing members of the Political Bureau. 219 This was a clear demonstration of will that Mao would like to have Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping take charge of the State Council. Mao Zedong then listened to Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng’s report on the Political Bureau meeting of October 17. Mao was dissatisfied with the actions of Jiang Qing and her associates, saying that the Fengqing incident was only a small 216. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 817.

217. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1715. 218. ”Those who once studied in France” refers to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, both of whom went to France to work and study.

219. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2060–2061.

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issue: Li Xiannian was already handling the situation, and it was wrong for Jiang to make such a commotion about it. Mao Zedong asked Wang and Tang to officially inform Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen that the premier was still the premier. If the premier was sufficiently healthy, he and Wang Hongwen could consult all sectors to make a list of appropriate candidates for important positions: “Ye Jianying recommended that Deng Xiaoping should work as first vice premier of the State Council and concurrently as general chief of staff of the PLA,220 and I agreed with him. The military position is honorary in peacetime. Yang Chengwu should work as vice general chief of staff. When Wang Hongwen came, this issue was not clear. Now, I would like it to be decided. The candidates for the positions of chairman and vice chairman of the National People’s Congress need to be selected. Essentially, the guideline is unity and stability.“221 On November 6, Mao talked to Li Xiannian after meeting foreign guests. Li said that there would be no more questions once the problem of Deng was solved. The Political Bureau unanimously supported Mao’s proposal. Mao said: “I agree with Comrade Ye Jianying’s opinion.“ It is thus clear that Ye played a key role in the appointment of Deng: the two men had a mutual understanding. Mao Zedong told Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng to warn Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan against following Jiang Qing.222 The same day, Mao Zedong commented on a letter he had received from Jiang Qing on October 19: “Proceed with caution. Take care to win over the comrades who don’t agree with you.“223 On October 22, Zhou Enlai listened to the report by Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng following their meeting with Mao Zedong. Zhou was very excited. In accordance with Mao’s instructions, Zhou was busy preparing for the 4th National People’s Congress. On October 23, Zhou Enlai held separate meetings with Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Qing to convey Mao’s directions. On October 25, Zhou Enlai had a long discussion with Ye Jianying. On October 27, Zhou talked to Li Xiannian. On October 28, Zhou held a meeting with Wang Hongwen. From November 1 to 3, Zhou held meetings with three groups of members of 220. Mao Zedong agreed with Ye Jianying on his recommendation that Deng Xiaoping should work as first vice premier of the State Council and concurrently as general chief of staff of the PLA.

221. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2060.

222. Ibid., 2060–2061. 223. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 374.

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The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the Political Bureau in Beijing, including Ye Jianying, to solve the problem of the Fengqing incident.224 Zhou related to them the content of what Mao had said. Zhou was thus continuing to play a key role in the central leadership. At that time, Zhou underwent a major operation. Soon afterward, however, he had to carry out his work, constantly meet people, and mediate the forces in the Political Bureau. On November 1, Red Flag published an article titled “A Brave 32,000 Miles across the Sea — Proud and Elated“ written by the CPC Committee about the Fengqing, and it included a note by the editor. This article was targeted directly at Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and it claimed that they followed the beliefs of collaborators, landlords, and capitalists who crawled to foreign countries for their favors.225 It is clear that the struggle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing was now half out in the open. Jiang constantly attacked people — with or without the approval of Mao Zedong, resulting with her being isolated and ended up as target of public condemnation. On November 6, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao Zedong to report on the state of preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress. In that letter, Zhou said that he had voiced his active support for the chairman’s proposal that Deng should concurrently serve as first vice premier and general chief of staff. That day, Mao made the following written comment: “I’ve read this letter and agree with its content.“226 Zhou’s wisdom was evident when he changed Ye Jianying’s proposal into one by Mao so that the Political Bureau would unanimously pass it. Also on November 6, Mao Zedong had a meeting with Li Xiannian after talks with foreign guests. Li said that there would be no more questions once the problem of Deng Xiaoping was solved. The Political Bureau unanimously agreed with Mao’s directions. Chairman Mao said: “I support Comrade Ye Jianying’s

224. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 680–681.

225. CPC Committee of the Fengqing, “A Brave 32,000 Miles across the Sea — Proud and

Elated,“ originally printed in Red Flag, issue 11, November 1, 1974. The magazine included a note from the editor: “This inspiring revolutionary article is well worth

reading. The Fengqing’s successful maiden voyage was a victory for Chairman Mao’s guidance for independence and self-reliance, and it boosted the morale of the proletariat and revolutionary people. This was compelling criticism against the thinking of collaborators, landlords, and capitalists that crawled to foreign countries for their favors. Its significance is not limited to shipbuilding and ocean transport.“

226. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2064.

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opinion.“227 Mao criticized Jiang Qing: “She opens a store that sells ideological labels...Her steel company is quite prosperous and now she opens a labeling store. She invites resentment from others...She falls out with many people. In her eyes, no one else is important. I have communicated this situation to the Political Bureau, so they understand the situation. I told her not to organize a Shanghai gang, but she went ahead and did it anyway.“228 Wang Dongxing was present at this meeting. It was also on November 6 that Zhou Enlai met Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, asking them to report to Mao Zedong about his physical condition and the status of the Political Bureau.229 On the evening of November 7, Zhou spoke again with Wang and Tang, who related Mao’s rebuke of Jiang Qing to Zhou. On November 8, Zhou met Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui; on November 9, Zhou talked to Wang Hongwen; and on November 10, Zhou spoke separately to Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Wang Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao to convey Mao’s opinions.230 On November 12, Deng Xiaoping reported in person to Mao Zedong in Changsha about the argument related to the Fengqing incident at the October 17 meeting, and Deng said that the conditions within the Political Bureau were not normal. Mao approved of Deng’s opinion and actions. Mao declared: “I am not very happy when Jiang Qing imposes her opinions on others.“231 Deng was different from Zhou Enlai since he belonged to the leaders who were bold enough to fight with Jiang Qing; they never gave ground on fundamental problems and would not yield to Jiang’s political pressures. Mao appreciated Deng for these qualities and decided to place him in important positions,232 whereas for her part Jiang grew to hate Deng more. It was also on November 12 that Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong wrote in reply: “Do not show up in public too much. Do not approve official documents. Do not organize a cabinet and attempt to be the boss behind 227. Ibid., 2061. 228. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 824.

229. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 682.

230. Ibid. 231. Ibid. 232. Deng Xiaoping told Mao Zedong: “The chairman has announced his decision about my

work. I should not air my concerns anymore, but the responsibilities are very heavy.“

Mao Zedong replied in confidence: “There is no other way but for you to shoulder them!“ He thus encouraged Deng to continue to make his best efforts in his work. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 323.)

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the curtain. You have made too many enemies. You need to make peace with the majority. Heed my words. It is important to know yourself.“233 However, the more Mao tried to persuade Jiang, who was at the apex of her power, the more arrogant she became and the more eager to play the mastermind. Mao’s comments in writing formed part of the evidence that eventually led to Jiang’s downfall. On November 18, Zhou Enlai had a meeting with Deng Xiaoping, who reported to Zhou the discussion between Mao Zedong and Deng. The same day, Zhou talked with Ye Jianying and Xu Shiyou.234 On November 19, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, in which she said: “I let the chairman down because I lack self-knowledge: I’m unable to recognize reality and cannot analyze myself objectively. Some strange things have occurred, and the thought of them makes me shudder in horror. Since the 9th National Congress of the CPC, I have been pushed out of the loop — particularly at present.“235 After reading Jiang’s letter, Mao commented: “This isn’t self-criticism but a demand for power. Hasn’t she got enough power already?“236 This indicates that Jiang’s purpose in supporting Mao in conducting the Cultural Revolution was to seize political power. Mao understood Jiang, but he could not do anything about her. On November 20, Mao said to Jiang: “Your job is to study current affairs in China and abroad, and that is your biggest task. I’ve talked to you many times. You can’t say that you are out of the loop. Heed my words.“237 Before that, on June 24, Mao asked Jiang to carry out some investigations: “You don’t understand the people and their lives.“238 Jiang Qing and her supporters had always been arrogant and aloof. She had been to the countryside only once, and that was a prearranged trip. She did not know that over 700 million Chinese were living in absolute poverty and that in 233. Mao Zedong’s comment was written on the letter from Jiang Qing on November 12,

1974. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 394.)

234. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 683.

235. Special Case Team, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“

December 1976; Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 376.) 236. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 249. 237. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 374–375.

238. Ibid., 374.

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many places the people were unable to feed themselves. Mao Zedong was well aware of this weakness of Jiang’s. He referred to her as “one-sided,“ “always complaining,“239 and “privileged.“240 On November 28, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Carry on the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.“ The editorial stated that the campaign against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Mencius had not run its course and should be continued. The editorial related the latest instruction from Mao Zedong: “Everything is going well. Should we still make the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius our first priority? Yes. To continue the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius is an important part of the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee. We should bear in mind the instructions of Chairman Mao that ’political guidance is the key: when the correct political guidance is in order, everything else will fall into place.’ We should focus on major issues and political guidelines.“241 From November to December, when the central leadership was preparing to convene the 4th National People’s Congress and make personnel adjustments for the national authorities, Jiang Qing wrote three letters to Mao Zedong, demanding to make Wang Hongwen and Xie Jingyi the vice chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; she also stress her preference on having Chi Qun over Mao Yuanxin as Minister of Education, and suggested Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Jin Zumin should attend be cultivated as successors, hence should be granted permission to sit in the Political Bureau meetings. 242 Mao admonished Jiang: “Jiang Qing is ambitious. She wants to make Wang Hongwen chairman of the National People’s Congress and herself chairperson of the party.“243 Mao Zedong proposed that Song Qingling should be a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress after Zhu De and Dong Biwu. Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian and others should work as vice premiers of the State Council. Other personnel affairs needed to be handled under the leadership of Zhou Enlai.244 Mao Zedong objected to Jiang Qing forming her own cabinet, but he allowed Zhang Chunqiao to enter the cabinet and rank after Deng. Mao was attempting to check 239. Ibid., 373. 240. Ibid., 372. 241. People’s Daily, November 28, 1974. 242. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 824.

243. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 395.

244. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 301.

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the moderates in the party with the Cultural Revolution hardliners. Such were the political mechanics adopted by Mao. On December 12, Zhou Enlai reviewed the list of the delegates to the 4th National People’s Congress and proposed increasing the proportion of veteran party officials. On December 21, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau in Beijing to discuss the personnel arrangements for the 4th National People’s Congress.245 Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao tried to place their favorites in important positions. After the meeting, Zhou held a discussion with Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui, proposing to have Zhou Rongxi take charge of the Ministry of Education; concessions could be made among the candidates for the leading positions in the Ministry of Culture and the State Sports Commission. Zhou and Wang Hongwen jointly drafted three personnel plans and submitted them to Mao for approval. Before Wang Hongwen went to visit Mao Zedong in Changsha, Jiang Qing said to Wang: “You didn’t achieve your goal when you went to Changsha in October, but that’s nothing! Status and power are earned, not given. You need to fight for them again. We cannot be afraid when we do what we do. If you don’t fight for your food, do you wish others to feed you instead? Do you know how much I have thought and how many measures I’ve taken for you to become vice chairman? You should go to Changsha again. Who else but you can do this?“ To this, Wang Hongwen replied: “I would jump into the abyss for this prize. I am ready to pay any price. I will go and talk to Chairman Mao in person and fight for this again.“ Jiang encouraged him: “So long as there’s a trace of hope, we should grasp it. We cannot give up. We must fight for every inch of power. We must strive for it.“246 Jiang Qing was indeed a political careerist. She possessed a strong sense of urgency and crisis — so much so that she wanted to organize her own cabinet even though Mao was still alive. If she failed to do this, she believed that all would be lost. For her, the 4th National People’s Congress appeared to be the last chance. On December 23, when he met Mao, Wang Hongwen voiced his own opinions and Jiang’s suggestions. On hearing his words, Mao said: “Jiang Qing is indeed ambitious, isn’t she? She certainly is to me.“247 245. The meeting was attended by Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang

Chunqiao (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) as well as Li

Xiannian, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De (members of the Political

Bureau). Like Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng, Zhu De, and Dong Biwu (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) did not attend the meeting. 246. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 249–250. 247. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp. Mao Zedong’s

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On December 23, Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen flew to Changsha to report to Mao Zedong. From December 23 to 27, Mao talked to Zhou and Wang many times. Mao made the Changsha Resolution and defined the personnel arrangements for the 4th National People’s Congress. He proposed again that Deng Xiaoping should work as first vice premier of the State Council, with Zhang Chunqiao and Li Xiannian as vice premiers. The other vice premiers should be appointed by Zhou Enlai.248 On December 24, Mao Zedong repeatedly warned Wang Hongwen: “Stop the activities of the Gang of Four. There are so many people in the central leadership. You must be united with all of them. Don’t organize yourselves into factions, which will lead to your downfall.“249 On the afternoon of that day, Mao stated again when he saw Zhou Enlai and Wang that Jiang Qing was ambitious: “I am well aware of this. I have criticized her many times, but she won’t listen. She just can’t change!“250 Mao said that he was also trying to persuade Jiang to modify three habits: first, criticizing things at will; second, standing in the limelight; third, participating in the government (or organizing a cabinet).251 The implicit meaning was that Jiang had had always had those habits. Mao had made Jiang a member of the Political Bureau, so did he still expect her to suppress all political ambitions? Mao sang the praises of Deng Xiaoping, saying that Deng was an exceptional talent with strong political know-how. Mao pointed at Wang Hongwen, saying: “He is not as talented as Deng Xiaoping.“252 It is thus apparent that Mao Zedong was a politician full of self-contradictions. On the one hand, in November and December 1974, he repeatedly rebuked Jiang Qing, but that was known only to a handful of members of the Political Bureau. That criticism lasted until May 1975. However, those internal criticisms made in a comradely manner became the evidence and grounds for Hua Guofeng and other Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 395; Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 251.

248. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 825.

249. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1711; Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong's Works Sincer the

Founding of New China, vol. 13, 395; Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 251.

250. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 252–253. 251. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1711. 252. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 252.

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members of the Gang of Four to be arrested in October 1976.253 On the other hand, the instructions Mao announced to the nation involved continuing the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. However, Mao also felt that the campaign had run its course. Mao was again innovative and proposed new political campaigns to check and balance the opposing forces in the central leadership. December 26 was Mao’s 81st birthday. That evening, he talked alone to Zhou Enlai until the next morning. The discussion had two aspects: one was personnel arrangements and the other was theoretical problems.254 In accordance with Mao’s instructions, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao published a series of theoretical articles.255 Mao mentioned again that Jiang Qing was ambitious, saying that she was responsible for three things: the campaign against Lin Biao, the campaign against 253. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works

Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 394–397.

The CPC Central Committee forwarded on December 10, 1976 the Document No.1 of

“Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan,“ and then on September 23, 1977, the Document No.3, in which Mao Zedong’s criticisms against the Gang of Four became known to the public.

254. In the minutes arranged by Zhou Enlai and printed by the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong communicated the following message concerning theoretical problems: “Lenin said that articles should be written on the dictatorship of capitalists. If this issue

is not clarified, revisionism will ensue. This should be made known to the whole nation.

China is a socialist country. Before 1949, China was similar to capitalist countries. At

present, the eight-tier salary system is still in place. We still carry out distribution according to work and exchange for money, which is not so different from the old

societies. The difference lies in the ownership system. We still have a commodities system, and our salaries are not equal, but we follow the eight-tier salary system. This

can be limited only under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, if Lin Biao and

his like had gained power, China would have easily turned to capitalism. Therefore, it is necessary for us to read books on Marxism. Lenin said that petty production constantly produces capitalism and capitalists — daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale. This is

also the case among some workers and CPC members. The capitalist lifestyle may also

be found among the proletariat and government workers.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 413–414.)

255. In issue no. 3 1975, Red Flag published Yao Wenyuan’s article titled “On the Social Foundation of the Anti-Party Group of Lin Biao“ and in issue no. 4 Zhang Chunqiao’s article titled “On the Overall Dictatorship over the Capitalists.“

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Confucius, and she had worked against backdoor deals, which was confusing: “This mess was kept hidden even from me.“256 Zhou revealed to Mao that Jiang and Zhang Chunqiao had had severe political problems in their personal history. Mao stated that he was already aware of that. However, Zhou reminding him of that made no influence anyways.257 It is clear that Mao was conscious of putting problematic people on important positions. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were the ones who had been most supportive of his Cultural Revolution. If Jiang and Zhang were removed from the Political Bureau, that would amount to a denial of the Cultural Revolution — and eventually the denunciation of Mao himself. On December 27, when Wang Hongwen proposed to Mao Zedong that Jiang Qing should be given a job, Mao replied that her job was to study the international situation by reading Reference Materials compiled and printed by Xinhua News Agency. Mao said that he had the same job.258 On the evening of December 27, Zhou Enlai flew back to Beijing. The next day, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau259 to convey Mao’s Changsha Decision. Zhou also handed out the list bearing the names of the chairman and vice chairmen for the 4th National People’s Congress as well as those of the vice premiers; the list was drafted by Zhou on December 25 and finalized by Mao on the 27. On December 29, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau, and the above list of names was approved.260 Zhou related Mao’s rebuke of Jiang Qing and others at those two meetings. On December 30, Jiang wrote a letter to Mao, saying she fully supported the instructions and criticisms of the chairman.261 With Mao’s stated position, Jiang was unable to achieve her goal of organizing her own cabinet, and as a result she bore a bitter grudge against Zhou and Deng Xiaoping. During the campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency, she determined to bring Deng down. On January 1, 1975, Zhou Enlai talked to Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian and then chaired a Political Bureau meeting to further discuss the participants for the 4th National People’s Congress. That meeting approved the report on candidates 256. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 255. 257. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 330–331. 258. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1712. 259. Those present at the meeting were Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, and Deng

Xiaoping (members of the CPC Central Committee) as well as Zhang Chunqiao. Those absent from the meeting included Kang Sheng, Zhu De, and Dong Biwu (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) as well as Mao Zedong.

260. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 303. 261. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1712.

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for the positions of ministers of the State Council, directors of committees, and the chief of the Supreme People’s Court, which was drafted by Deng. This showed that Mao had authorized Deng to be responsible for the personnel arrangement of the State Council.262 On January 4, Zhou and Wang Hongwen reported to Mao on the meetings of the Political Bureau and submitted to him the file regarding personnel arrangements, which had been passed. On January 5, in line with Mao Zedong’s instructions, the CPC Central Committee issued Document No. 1, appointing Deng Xiaoping vice chairman of the Central Military Committee and concurrently the general chief of staff of the PLA; Zhang Chunqiao was made director of the General Political Department of the PLA. At that time, Zhang Chunqiao worked concurrently as the first commissar of the Nanjing Military Area. From January 8 to 10, Zhou Enlai chaired the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee. At this session, Deng Xiaoping was recognized as a member of the Political Bureau and elected vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; Li Desheng was dismissed from the positions of vice chairman of the Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The meeting adopted the reports on the 4th People’s National Congress and the list of its participants. In summing up the meeting, Zhou officially communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions about unity and stability.263 Chinese society at that time was not stable; likewise, the CPC was not united. All of this could be attributed to the Cultural Revolution, led by Mao, and his theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. From January 13 to 18, at the first meeting of the 4th National People’s Congress, Deng Xiaoping was appointed first vice premier of the State Council and Zhang Chunqiao as second vice premier. Mao Zedong was well aware that Zhang had once betrayed the party, and Mao possessed all the evidence in that regard. However, since Zhang Chunqiao was a Cultural Revolution hardliner and the one who had written the political reports for the 9th and 10th CPC National Congresses, Mao placed him in an important position to ensure the continuation of the Cultural Revolution and to check Deng’s power. However, the two political forces behind 262. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 1.

263. Zhou Enlai said that before the Second Plenary Session came to an end, he asked Chairman Mao for additional instructions, and Mao said: “We should emphasize unity

and stability.“ Therefore, Zhou wished to repeat those words: “Unity and stability should be emphasized.“ (Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 304.)

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the two men were completely hostile to each other.264 It is foreseeable that political confrontation would be inevitable upon Mao’s death. Mao’s strategy to balance the two forces only accelerated the downfall of the Gang of Four. In 1974, as a result of the impact of the political campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the national economy continued to founder, which caused intense dissatisfaction among the people and was a source of serious concern for Mao Zedong. In view of the instability and hostility in China, Mao stated again in January 1975 that China should restore unity and stability. 265 With regard to the weakening economy, Mao proposed economic development.266 Despite the common weariness and dissatisfaction with the Cultural Revolution, Mao insisted on the guidance of class struggle. This was the first of Mao’s “Three Supreme Instructions,“ and was soon interpreted by Deng Xiaoping as the guidance of the Three Supreme Instructions, which Deng used ingeniously to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. From January 13 to 17, the first meeting of the 4th National People’s Congress (NPC) was held — 10 years after the first meeting of the Third NPC and 6 years after Mao Zedong proposed convening the 4th NPC after the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969. If calculated from July 1966, the NPC and its Standing Committee had been suspended for 8 years, which meant that all the local people’s representative meetings were effectively paralyzed. Therefore, that first meeting of the 4th NPC was hailed as a political opportunity for relaunching the drive toward modernization and rebuilding state organizations. The government work report delivered by Zhou Enlai was drafted under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions, and it was revised and finalized by Mao and Zhou. Also in line with Mao’s instructions, the essence of the report was Zhou’s repetition of the two-step vision of realizing the Four Modernizations by the end of the twentieth century.267 Later, Deng 264. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 334. 265. When the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee came to an end

in January 1975, Zhou Enlai relayed Mao Zedong’s appeal for unity and stability. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1716.)

266. Ibid., 1722. 267. Following the instructions of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai repeated the two-step conception formed at the Third NPC in December 1964: step one, take 15 years to build

an independent, complete industrial and national economic system before 1980; step

two, achieve overall modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and

science and technology so that our national economy will rank as one of the top world economies. (Zhou, “Government Work Report,“ People’s Daily, January 21, 1975.)

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recalled: “In 1974, Premier Zhou Enlai was sick, so the government work report for the 4th NPC was drafted under my leadership. This was a shift of the focus of our party and the state toward the single-minded construction of the Four Modernizations. As a result of their historical impact — especially with regard to political movements — establishing the Four Modernizations was stopped, which was a setback. Now, we intend to focus on construction unless the international situation changes drastically, such as if war breaks out. This is not a task just for our generation, but for the coming three or four generations. This shift did not really come about until the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee at the end of 1978. This was not the shift of only one individual; it was that of the whole party and the whole nation.“268 The government work report described the international situation as “chaotic and deteriorating.“ It stated that the elements of revolution and war were increasing, which reflected the basic judgment — or assumptions — of Mao Zedong.269 Mao was of advanced age, sick, and weak and could not possibly visit foreign countries. He relied on reading the two issues of reference materials to know what was going 268. Deng Xiaoping said these words when interviewed by a journalist for Courier in Yugoslavia on November 13, 1981. (Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 192.)

269. On October 20, 1974, Mao Zedong held talks with Poul Hartling, the Danish prime

minister, and said that in his eyes the world was not at peace, and it was even worse than it had been in the past. On November 6, when Mao met with Eric Williams, premier of Trinidad and Tobago, he stated that he had witnessed the First and Second World Wars: “Now peace is being discussed everywhere, but I see danger.“ On November 12,

when Mao met with Salim Rubai Ali, president of South Yemen, he declared that the

international situation was even tenser than it had been during the turmoil of four years previous: “And yet people talk about mitigation and peace. The more they talk about

it, the less peaceful the world will be.“ On December 25, when Mao had a meeting with Zhou Enlai in Changsha, he said that the more people talked about peace, the more

they made preparations for war: “We can say that the major tendency around the world is not revolution. We need to emphasize that preparations for war are very intense, and

all peoples should be alert to this.“ On January 16, 1975, when Mao held talks with the West German politician Franz Josef Strauss, he said that people talked about peace

every day but they also made preparations for war every day: “We don’t agree with this so-called peace, mitigation, and friendship.“ (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 1141, 1143, 1146, 1159–1160, 1174–1175.)

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on in the world. He was locked into the mindset of revolution and war and was unable to make the shift toward the path of peace and development. On the same day, Zhang Chunqiao, who was leading efforts to revise the Constitution, delivered a report on such amendments at the first meeting of the 4th NPC on behalf of the CPC Central Committee.270 Zhang’s report stated that the task of amending the Constitution reflected the common wish of the Chinese people to continue the revolutionary case under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The newly added preface of the Constitution was a complete rejection of the preface of the 1954 Constitution. The number of articles in the Constitution had been reduced from 106 to 30 between 1954 and 1975. This is a clear indication of disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution on fundamental system. When they were rebuilt in 1975 those systems had artificially regressed or become reduced. The amendment deleted the sentence that “All power belongs to the people,“ and it revoked the position of state president without supplying any reasons. 271 The amendment underscored the military power of the chairman of the CPC Central Committee as an individual, such that instead of the party leading the army, the supreme leader himself led the army. 272 This strengthened the unitary leadership of the party over state organizations. 273 It dramatically reduced the functions of the NPC and its Standing Committee into just five plus seven items.274 The amendment canceled the function of the NPC and its Standing Committee in supervising the 270. People’s Daily, January 20, 1975. 271. Zhang Chunqiao said in explaining the amendment draft that owing to the removal of the national presidency, the draft revised articles relating to state organization set out in

the 1954 Constitution since those articles would help strengthen the unitary leadership of the party over state organizations.

272. Article 15 of the Constitution stipulated that the chairman of the CPC Central Committee would command the country’s armed forces.

273. Article 16 of the Constitution stated that the NPC held supreme power over the nation under the leadership of the CPC.

274. Article 17 of the Constitution decreed that the five functions of the NPC were as follows: amending the Constitution; setting and adopting laws; appointing or removing the

premier and members of the State Council; approving plans for the national economy, national budget, and final settlements; and other functions that the NPC believed it should fulfill at the suggestion of the CPC Central Committee. Article 18 stipulated

that the Standing Committee of the NPC was the standing body of the NPC. Its seven functions were as follows: to hold NPC meetings; interpret laws; create decrees; send

and recall its authorized deputies abroad; receive foreign envoys; approve of and revoke treaties made with foreign countries; and other functions granted by the NPC.

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implementation of the Constitution, and it reduced the rights and functions of the State Council to just five items.275 The amendment retracted the standing committees of local people’s representative meetings and local people’s government, and it established the revolutionary committee of the Cultural Revolution.276 The amendment denied the nature of the PRC as defined in the 1954 Constitution as the people’s democratic country (Article 1), changing it into a socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and it strengthened the overall dictatorship of the proletariat. 277 The amendment restored the paralyzed legal court system, but it removed the definition in the 1954 Constitution whereby the people’s court would be able to try cases independently (Article 78). The amendment canceled the procuratorial system (Articles 81–84), whose functions were taken over by public security services at all levels (Article 25). The amendment emphasized the existence of classes and the need for continuing revolution in socialist society. 278 275. Article 20 of the Constitution stipulated that the functions of the State Council were to create administrative measures and issue resolutions and orders according to the

Constitution, laws, and decrees; the State Council was to lead ministries, committees, and state organs at all levels; the council was to make and implement plans for the

national economy and national budget; the council was to manage administrative

affairs around the country as well as other duties granted by the NPC and its Standing Committee.

276. Article 22 of the stated that revolutionary committees at all levels outside Beijing

were the standing bodies of local people’s representative meetings, and local people’s governments.

277. Article 12 of the Constitution declared that the proletariat class had to practice dictatorship over the capitalist class in all cultural fields of the superstructure.

Article 14 stipulated that the state should safeguard the socialist system and quell all treasonous and counter-revolutionary activities as well as punish all traitors and

counter-revolutionaries. The state should deprive landlords, rich peasants, reactionary capitalists, and other deleterious elements of their political rights during certain periods

according to the law, and provide them with the means to earn a livelihood so that they

may be transformed into law-abiding, self-reliant citizens through the process of labor. 278. The third paragraph of the preface of the Constitution stated that socialist society

constituted a very long historical stage. During this historical period, classes, conflicts between classes, and class struggles would always exist; the struggles between

socialism and capitalism would always exist; the risk of capitalism being restored would always exist; and the threats of invasion and subversion from imperialist and

socialistic imperialism would always exist. These conflicts could be solved only by the theory and practice of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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The amendment denied the four ownerships as defined in the 1954 Constitution (Article 5) and replaced them with two ownerships: state-owned and collectively owned. 279 The amendment revoked the ownerships of individual laborers and capitalists, allowing members of the people’s commune to operate a small patch of land for themselves and to engage in sideline production. Zhang Chunqiao explained that the new stipulations were a complete departure from the household contracting system and the cancelation of commune members being able to own their patch of land, which had been advocated by Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. In rural areas, the people’s communes were established throughout the country (Article 7). This further legalized the “four activities“ promoted by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution.280 As instructed by Mao himself, Article 28 added that citizens had the freedom to strike and that no citizen could be arrested without the verdict or approval of the people’s court or public security services. In fact, during the Cultural Revolution, all of these practices, including the quelling of the Tiananmen Square Incident in April 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976, were direct violations of this article. In the new amendment, sentences were deleted relating to how citizens were free to engage in scientific research, cultural and artistic creation, and other cultural activities, and how they were free to choose where they lived. This amendment reflected the cultural dictatorship that existed during the Cultural Revolution: all the major criticisms that were made during the Cultural Revolution were contrary to the 1954 Constitution. Article 85 in the 1954 Constitution, whereby all citizens were equal under the law, was also deleted. The new Constitution was thus a dramatically simplified, diminished document — a badly maimed effort that was certainly not an improvement on the 1954 Constitution; it was grossly worse. The 1954 Constitution, which had been created under Mao’s leadership, came to be repudiated by Mao himself. It is noteworthy that throughout the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Chunqiao was the main drafter of both the Party Constitution and the Constitution of the PRC. Zhang also wrote the political report for the National Congress of the CPC and important articles approved by Mao Zedong. He was Mao’s most loyal speaker and effectively articulated Mao’s wrong theories. The next in line was Yao Wenyuan. The actual role of these two men was more important than those of Jiang Qing and Zhou Enlai — so much so that their words almost destroyed the country. 279. Article 5 of the Constitution stated that there were two forms of ownership with regard to production in the PRC: state-owned and collectively owned.

280. Article 13 of the Constitution stipulated that public discussions, debates, and large posters represented new forms of socialist revolution, and the state guaranteed the people’s right to use these forms.

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On January 17, the 4th NPC elected the new NPC Standing Committee, with Zhu De as chairman; it appointed Zhou Enlai as premier of the State Council and Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, Chen Yonggui, Wu Guixian, Wang Zhen, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, and Sun Jian as vice premiers. Among them, the youngest vice premier was Wu Guixian. The 37 year-old former vice secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of CPC became the first woman vice premier in China’s history. The next youngest was Sun Jian, who had worked as secretary of the CPC Tianjin Committee. Apart from the 29 ministers appointed, Ye Jianying was appointed Minister of National Defense; Yu Qiuli was elected concurrent director of the State Planning Commission and Gu Mu as concurrent director of the State Infrastructure Construction Commission. Zhang Jinfu was appointed Minister of Finance, Wan Li as Minister of Railways, Ye Fei as Minister of Transport, Zhou Rongxin as Minister of Education, Hua Guofeng as concurrent Minister of Public Security, Qiao Guanhua as Minister of Foreign Affairs,281 Yu Huiyong as Minister of Culture, 282 Liu Xiangping (wife of Xie Fuzhi) as Minister of Health Care, 283 and Zhuang Zedong director of the Sports Commission. The last among the above people were the favorites or followers of the Gang of Four. This indicates that within the leadership of the State Council and the ministries, the moderates (led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) politically prevailed, whereas the Cultural Revolution hardliners (headed by Zhang Chunqiao) were at a disadvantage. There were also the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution, who accounted for six vice premiers: they were subject to the influences of the two hostile political forces, and this gave rise to a complex situation in the power struggle. On January 23, Jiang Qing, who was not prepared to accept defeat, went alone to Changsha to seek a meeting with Mao Zedong in a desperate effort to prevent Mao from approving the “Report on the Duties of the Vice Premiers of the State Council,“ submitted by Zhou Enlai. Jiang Qing waited for 4 days and eventually succeeded in seeing Mao, though the meeting lasted only 15 minutes. She received

281. The third meeting of the Standing Committee of the 4th NPC decided in November 1976 to dismiss Qiao Guanhua from his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

282. After the Gang of Four was defeated in October 1976, Yu Huiyong was stripped of all his official positions and subjected to isolated investigation. He killed himself on

August 28, 1977. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Members of the First to Fifteenth CPC Central Committees, 8.)

283. In October 1976, Liu Xiangping was dismissed from her official positions and deprived of her party membership in August 1985.

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a harsh rebuke from Mao and dejectedly returned to Beijing the same day.284 On January 30, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to discuss the duties of the 12 vice premiers. On February 1, Zhou chaired the first meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, during which he presented Mao Zedong to pass his appraisal toward Deng Xiaoping, stating that Deng had a strong sense of politics and possessed exceptional political talents. The meeting addressed the duties among the vice premiers of the State Council. It was decided that Deng, the first vice premier, should take charge of foreign affairs and should took Zhou’s duty during his ill days — to char meetings and submit major documents to Mao for examination. It was decided that Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng would work as standing vice premiers and Zhang Chunqiao would take charge of culture and education. Zhou highly praised the efforts of Li Xiannian.285 Zhou announced that he was physically unfit to continue his job and that the State Council would be led by Deng.286 Also on February 1, Zhou Enlai chaired a plenary session of the State Council and presented the duties of the leadership. He said that he would be unable to attend many such meetings in the future and that Deng Xiaoping would replace him in chairing such meetings. Deng replied that the supreme leader of the State Council was still Premier Zhou and that they all needed to support him in his illness. Deng repeated Mao Zedong’s instruction emphasizing unity and stability as an important message that they had all to heed. Deng stated in particular: “The international situation is favorable to us. We need to make a huge effort to promote the economy.“287 In fact, when Deng reported to Mao on December 17, 1974, he proposed for the first time the concept of doubling total industrial output over the next 10 years, and he talked about maintaining a five-year period of international peace for foreign cooperation and trade. Deng emphasized the importance of unity and stability as called on by Mao. Without stability, production would be

284. Zong, ”In the Swirlpool of the Struggles between Deng Xiaoping and the Gang of Four — Anecdotes of Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng.“

285. Zhou Enlai said it was noteworthy that after the September 13 Incident or even earlier, it had mainly been Li Xiannian that took charge of the State Council; he had never lost

heart since the start of the Cultural Revolution and stuck to his work. He worked in the middle of the oppositions and attacks from the large posters. (Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992), vol. 2, 828–829.)

286. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 15.)

287. Ibid.

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impossible. Mao said that Deng’s idea was excellent.288 This indicates that at that time Mao approved of Deng’s concept of economic growth and social stability. Thus, with Mao’s approval, Deng decided to start overall housecleaning and restoring order. Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao Zedong on February 2 about the duties of the vice premiers of the State Council, and Mao officially approved this. Thereafter, Deng officially started to direct the daily work of the State Council. On February 5, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on the Cancellation of Military Commission Office Meetings and Establishment of the Central Military Committee“; this had been recommended by Ye Jianying in writing to Mao Zedong and received Mao’s approval. There were 11 members of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee: Ye Jianying (field marshal); Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, and Liu Bocheng (field marshals); Chen Xilian (admiral); Wang Dongxing and Su Zhenhua (admirals); Xu Xiangqian (field marshal); Nie Rongzhen (field marshal), and Su Yu (senior general). Ye Jianying 288. When explaining the Government Work Report of the Fourth NPC to Mao Zedong,

Deng Xiaoping said that the total industrial output should increase 1.9-fold during 1975–1985 — an average yearly increase of over 11% — which would be ideal. When

speaking of foreign cooperation and trade, Deng said: “It would also be possible for

us not to do anything in this respect, and we would still be able to develop — only at a lower speed. No country can remain isolated from the international community; all

countries try to make up for one another’s deficiencies, including the United States. This international environment could last another five years since the United States will not dare start another war as it engages in extensive world cooperation and trade,

and the Soviet Union will not do so either. We should not waste any time in making the best use of these five years. Fundamentally speaking, we need unity and stability, as instructed by the chairman. Stability is indispensable for construction. To me, the

most important point is having a stable, trusted provincial CPC committee, whose words carry weight — on the premise that those words are correct. It is inappropriate

for the central government to do everything. There have been unsettling whispers and turmoil. For example, the majority of researchers do nothing at all, and it’s not

that they don’t want to work, but they have no choice in the matter. Absenteeism is

not the exception, but the norm. And not all working people are satisfied with their

current status. I am afraid what this boils down to is the priority order of revolution and production. Without stability, production would be impossible. The chairman said that this process would take eight years. And the question is how to build up a trusted,

respected provincial committee of the CPC.“ Mao Zedong said that Deng’s ideas were excellent. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1709–1710.)

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worked as chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee. In the party, government, and PLA, there were two fiercely hostile political forces: the moderates, headed by Deng Xiaoping, and the radicals, led by Jiang Qing. This situation was even reported in the international media. Time magazine featured Zhou Enlai on its cover and commented that it was no simple matter for Zhou Enlai, who had been premier since October 1949, to once again be appointed premier of the State Council at the age of 70 (Zhou was actually 77). The situation was also difficult for Deng. It was not a simple matter for him being the first vice premier — among the 12 vice premiers — of the State Council. Besides working as first vice premier of the State Council, Deng Xiaoping had two other important official positions: vice chairman of the Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Military Committee, as well as concurrently being general chief of staff of the PLA. Deng became the only person to be promoted both within the party and the government, and for the first time he had assumed an important military position. Toward this end, Zhou had taken a great deal of trouble. Zhou’s efforts did not end with Deng. Most of the 29 ministers in the State Council were loyal, reliable veteran officials; for example, the 78-year-old Ye Jianying, Minister of National Defense, and the 65-year-old Li Xiannian, who was in charge of finance and trade. The Gang of Four obtained only one position: the Ministry of Culture. These arrangements of Zhou Enlai were regarded by the Gang of Four as part of efforts to restore the old order. Time remarked that in many respects it was fair and appropriate to reinstate the old-generation revolutionary party members.289 Unlike the Cultural Revolution hardliners in 1966, the moderates represented the healthy mainstream power in the CPC that enjoyed wide support; the hardliners represented the evil elements, and they were a minority that basically relied on the support of Mao Zedong. Mao was well aware of this situation. His strategy was to use Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao to contain Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying so as to achieve balance between the two political forces. Why did Mao Zedong choose to balance the political forces? By 1975, the Cultural Revolution had lasted for nearly 9 years. At that point, Mao was in a dilemma. On the one hand, he was unwilling to witness chaos in the country and see the economy floundering as well as declining living standards, widespread dissatisfaction, and plummeting personal authority. On the other hand, he was reluctant to end the Cultural Revolution and for others in the party to repudiate the revolution he had personally launched and led. The Cultural Revolution was for him the political bottom line, and no one was allowed to challenge it. It was because of these complex self-contradictory thoughts that he charged Deng 289. Xinhua News, “Zhou Enlai Seen in the Western Eye: Six-Time Cover of Time Magazine.”

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Xiaoping with the work of the State Council and Zhang Chunqiao with that of the Central Military Committee. As noted above, Deng was one of the moderates, whereas Zhang was a Cultural Revolution hardliner. Between these men, there were those that had benefited from the Cultural Revolution who became members of the Political Bureau during that period. They included Hua Guofeng (vice premier of the State Council), Ji Dengkui (vice premier of the State Council), Chen Xilian (vice premier of the State Council), Wu De (vice chairman of the NPC), Chen Yonggui (farmers’ representative, vice premier of the State Council), Wang Dongxing and Wu Guixian (alternate members of the Political Bureau, industrial workers’ representatives, and vice premiers of the State Council), Ni Zhifu (industrial workers’ representative, second secretary of the Beijing CPC Committee, vice director of the Revolutionary Committee of Beijing), Sun Jian (representative of grass-roots party members, vice premier of the State Council), Li Suwen (industrial workers’ representative, vice chairman of the NPC), and Yao Lianwei (industrial workers’ representative, vice chairman of the NPC). These people were different from the Gang of Four, though they supported and implemented Mao’s political policies. Around the time Mao died, many party members found that they were unable to agree with the Gang of Four in continuing the Cultural Revolution, but they were also unable to concur with Deng Xiaoping in repudiating it. They did not approve of the activities carried out by the Gang of Four, but they also did not agree with Deng’s efforts to correct the mistakes made by Mao in his later years, particularly the errors of the Cultural Revolution. There were thus three different political forces within the Political Bureau, and the form of their alliances and struggles characterized politics in the late 1970s.

Deng Xiaoping’s Overall Restoration of Order, and Political Fights with Jiang Qing In May 1979, Deng Xiaoping recalled that from 1974–1975, he was in charge of everything and was thus the major obstacle to the Gang of Four: “They focused their efforts on attacking me, and so within a year’s time I was forced out of power.“290 However, it was in fact Mao Zedong who forced Deng out of power. Since Deng’s policy of overall restoration of order involved correcting the errors of the Cultural Revolution, it amounted to a refutation of that revolution. That was anathema for Mao. 290. Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 169.

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In early 1975, the convening of the 4th NPC and newly established State Council prepared a suitable political atmosphere and important opportunity for Deng Xiaoping to make efforts toward overall restoration of order. The moderates and the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution cooperated with each other to engage in a political battle with the Cultural Revolution hardliners. On February 10, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on the 1975 National Economy Program,“ which called on the whole party to unite with all those who could be united; it also required the mobilization of all positive elements to boost the national economy, particularly transportation and coal and steel production. To this end, Deng convened a series of meetings, made important speeches, and took drastic reform measures to restore order in the country. The first area was the restoration of railway transport. On January 28, Deng Xiaoping heard the report of Wan Li, Minister of Railway Transport, and Deng demanded that Wan solve the problems facing railway transport in the first half of that year. Deng stated that this matter could not be delayed any longer. China had to undertake rapid and resolute measures to improve the national economy. On February 6, when Deng and others listened to further reports by Wan, Deng instructed the Ministry of Railways to draft a document for solving the problems that rail transport faced.291 This move represented a breakthrough in Deng’s overall restoration efforts. From February 25 to March 8, the CPC Central Committee held a meeting of industrial secretaries in the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to tackle the issue of the railways. The meeting was chaired by Wang Zhen, vice premier of the State Council. Deng Xiaoping made a speech at the meeting, in which he proposed boosting the national economy.292 Deng severely criticized the existence of factions in the party. He stated that he heard how some comrades were engaged purely in revolutionary campaigns and were loath to promote production. He noted how they believed that it was politically safe to engage in revolutionary activities, though it was dangerous and risky to encourage industrial production; however, that was totally incorrect.293 291. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 12.

292. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 4–7.

293. Deng Xiaoping said that the CPC Central Committee had decided to try and break

down the factions. The factions in the party also affected larger plans. Rather than dealing with specific problems, this issue had to be resolved: “We need to educate

those involved in factions and fight against their leaders. They have used the chances

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On March 5, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Decision on Improving Rail Transport.“ This Central Document No. 9 was drafted by Wan Li and Fan Weizhong, then finalized by Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping wrote in that decision that leading officials and heads who showed capitalist loyalties yet did not alter their position following criticism and education had to be transferred from their official capacities in due course. Any delays would badly affect overall plans.294 After the meeting, Wan Li, the Minister of Rail Transport, began to make major improvements to Xuzhou Railway Station, which was the worst kept in the nation. The second area was restoration of the steel industry. As a result of the impact of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, steel output in 1974 fell to 21.119 million tons — a drop of 4.1 million tons from the previous year and 5 million tons short of the planned 26 million tons for 1974. The steel industry was badly hit by the factional struggles, and it also offered a way for Deng Xiaoping to achieve overall restoration of order. On May 21, Deng Xiaoping chaired a meeting of the State Council to discuss the documents submitted at the national steel industry symposium. Deng stated: “It is time we solved the problems that exist in steel production since the conditions are now ripe for improvement. We need to choose those who dare to stick to the principles of the party and who have sufficient resilience to stand up to the risk of being politically attacked — those who are responsible and bold enough to fight their way into the leadership teams. ’I am like a Uygur girl with a lot of pigtails. I make many mistakes and have shortcomings that can be easily exploited by opponents.’“ Deng also declared that socialist construction could not proceed without promoting industrial production as well as science and technology: “We must emphasize productivity and science and technology, which should not be regarded as an overemphasis on productivity.“295 Deng’s political proposition was the opposite of Jiang Qing’s. On May 29, Deng Xiaoping stated at a symposium of the steel industry that that industry had to focus on the following four aspects:

that these factions provide to disrupt the socialist order, damage the construction of the national economy, and become promoted to higher positions by means of political

speculation. We must get rid of these people.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 143.)

294. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 12.

295. Ibid., 15.

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1. 2. 3. 4.

establishing a resolute leadership team; firmly fighting against factions; carefully implementing related policies; establishing necessary rules and regulations.296

On June 4, the CPC Central Committee issued “On Fulfilling the Plan of Steel Production for 1975“ (Document No. 13). The State Council established a leadership team headed by Gu Mu to restore production in the steel industry. The third area was restoration of order in the financial sector. On January 9, 1975, the State Council issued “On Further Improving the Financial Sector and Strictly Checking Financial Statements in 1974.“ Zhang Jinfu, the Minister of Finance, was in charge of restoring order. Following the instructions of Li Xiannian, the Ministry of Finance on May 18 drafted the “Outline of the Report on Financial Problems“ and “On Solving Several Financial Problems“ (10 financial regulations). The fourth area was restoration of order in industry. On March 5, Deng Xiaoping addressed a meeting of industrial secretaries of the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, and he observed that industrial productivity was still low. Industrial production had not been ideal in 1974, and 1975 would be the last year of the 4th Five-Year Plan. If production is not boosted, the implementation of the 5th Five-Year Plan would be seriously affected. Deng declared that the whole party should pursue the main goal of boosting the economy.297 In July, Deng Xiaoping demanded that the State Planning Commission draft the document “On Several Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development“ (18 regulations on industrial development). On August 18, the State Council discussed that document and Deng expressed his opinions on industrial development. Those opinions were as follows: 1. We must raise awareness of agriculture as the foundation of the national economy and we must serve agriculture. 2. We must introduce new technologies and equipment to expand imports and exports. 3. We must improve science and technology research by enterprises. 4. We must restore order in the management of enterprises. 5. We must guarantee the quality of products. 6. We must restore and improve rules and regulations. 296. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 8–11.

297. Ibid., 4–5.

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7. We must stick to the principle of distribution according to labor.298 This document was drafted by the State Planning Commission and revised by Hu Qiaomu, Wu Lengxi, Yu Guangyuan, and Deng Liqun in the Politics Research Office of the State Council. It was printed on September 2 by the Central Office, but was not officially submitted to the CPC Central Committee and State Council.299 Owing to interventions by the Gang of Four, the document was not released. The fifth area was restoration of order in the PLA. Based on statistics from the General Politics Department of the PLA in 1974, there were 1.526 million members of the PLA as well as 467,000 excess staff members. After restructuring and reduction of quotas, another 100,000 would become supernumerary. It was estimated that the number of excess staff could amount to 600,000. At the same time, the leadership in the PLA at all levels had excessively large staffs: 36 staff members was the average for a large military area, though this figure could rise to 44; 38 was the average for provincial military areas, with the figure being up to 58 at most; the figure was 20–40 for army corps, divisions, and even regiments. The average age of the leadership was high: that of a division commander and commissar was 49, while that of a colonel and commissar was 45.300 On January 19, Deng Xiaoping conveyed Mao Zedong’s instruction on restoring order in the PLA to a forum of heads of the big military areas. Deng stated that factions represented a significant problem for the country’s army. He argued that army units that formed factions should be transferred to other regions. He said that the issue of unity and stability was one that also concerned the army. On January 25, Deng Xiaoping once again communicated Mao Zedong’s instruction on restoring order in the PLA in talks with the general chief of staff of the PLA. Why was Mao so keen to overhaul the PLA? Deng explained that since Lin Biao had been responsible for the PLA in 1959, the PLA had been poorly organized — especially during the later period of Lin’s management. Many excellent traditions had been disposed of, and military institutions had become excessively large. The PLA was not lean and tough, and it would not be able to win a war.301 Deng said that restoring order in the PLA required two things: one was improved consciousness of being a member of the CPC rather than being part of 298. Ibid., 28–31. 299. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 24–25. 300. Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 417–418. 301. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 8.

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some faction; the other was strengthened discipline.302 From June 24 to July 15, the Central Military Committee convened an expanded meeting.303 At that meeting Deng Xiaoping made a report titled “On the Task of Restoring Order in the PLA.“ He emphasized that it was necessary to address the excessive size, poor organization, extravagance in some areas, and laziness in improving the PLA. Deng also stated that the leadership needed to fight weaknesses, laziness, and slackness.304 Ye Jianying summarized the content of the meeting by saying that no careerists should be allowed to intervene in the PLA and that no scheming should be allowed in the army.305 Ye Jianying also conveyed Mao Zedong’s repeated criticisms against the Shanghai gang — the group of Jiang Qing.306 This meeting fully reflected the direct, sharp hostility between the moderates, headed by Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying, and the Cultural Revolution hardliners, led by Jiang Qing. Since Jiang Qing and her supporters were still protected and supported by Mao, Ye Jianying could not get to them; in his words, he was “afraid of burning the house in trying to get rid of the mouse.“ On July 19, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee issued the Central Military Committee’s report on that meeting, including the speeches by Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying. The Central Military Committee decided to reduce the 1.6 million servicemen and servicewomen in the total quota 302. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 1–3.

303. In all, 70 people attended the meeting. They included the leaders in the Standing

Committee of the Central Military Committee, headquarters staff under the Central Military Committee, and members of the National Defense Science Committee, the

National Defense Industry Office, the Academy of Military Science, and the military colleges and universities directly under the Central Military Committee. The meeting was chaired by Ye Jianying. The “Report on Reducing Military Quotas and Readjusting

the Military System and Replacing Supernumerary Cadres“ was discussed and adopted. On July 15, Ye Jianying made a speech summarizing the content.

304. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 15–24.

305. Ye Jianying said at the meeting, “You should be aware that some people [referring to

Jiang Qing] have been handing out books, materials, and letters to confuse the thinking of the PLA. No one should be allowed to do this without the approval of the Central

Military Committee! No careerists should be allowed to intervene in the party or hatch

any plots.” (Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 372.)

306. Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 416–417.

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of the PLA and remove around 600,000 excess staff members. On August 20, Xiao Jinguang, a navy commander, wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, reporting to him that Shanghai News had published an article titled “Diao Xiaosan’s Logic“ (Emancipation Daily, July 14, 1975) and “What the 8th Route Looks Like“ (Learning and Criticism, issue no. 7, 1975) to attack the expanded meeting of the Central Military Committee. These two articles were written and published according to the instructions of Zhang Chunqiao, who objected to the program that had been approved at that meeting. With little of support, Zhang had these two articles published so as to voice his objection.307 The sixth area was restoring order in national defense. After having being appointed as director of the National Defense Science Commission, Zhang Aiping led a team to conduct investigations in the Seventh Machinery Industrial Department, where the factional conflicts had been the fiercest. Deng Xiaoping assured Zhang Aiping: “Be bold in your work, and I will be responsible for your mistakes.“ Deng added angrily: “Such struggles in the 7th Machinery Industrial Department show no patriotism, let alone socialism.“308 On June 30, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Report on Solving the Problems in the Seventh Machinery Industrial Department by the National Defense Science Commission.“ In August, the Central Military Committee convened a conference about key industrial enterprises for national defense. For this purpose, Deng Xiaoping wrote a report titled “On Restoring Order in National Defense Industrial Enterprises.“309 In the second half of 1975, China successfully put three artificial satellites into orbit. The seventh area was restoring order in the science community. In 1975, Deng Xiaoping proposed reforms to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. To improve leadership, the CPC Central Committee decided to appoint Hu Yaobang, Li Chang, and Wang Guangwei to the core leading team of the CPC in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (with Guo Moruo as team leader and Hu Yaobang as the first vice team leader). This team would be responsible for drafting “On Several Problems in the Science Community“ (outline report for discussion). On September 26, Deng Xiaoping chaired a meeting of the State Council to discuss the outline report, and he proposed that scientific research be given top

307. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 38, 55.

308. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the ”Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1200.

309. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 24–27.

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priority.310 The report fully affirmed the scientific achievements that had been made in the previous 20 years. It stated that the current 4 million workers in science and technology were mostly excellent or good. The report proposed ending China’s exclusion and isolation in the area of science: it was necessary to introduce advanced technologies and equipment from abroad as well as conduct friendly exchanges with the international scientific community. It stated that theoretical and basic research in the natural sciences should not be ignored. Following the instructions of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and others revised the outline report many times. Deng submitted this report to Mao Zedong on September 30; however, Mao did not approve the report.311 The main reason was that the “Outline Report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences“ quoted Mao saying that science and technology were critical to productivity: this derived from “Chairman Mao’s Talk on Scientific and Technological Research,“ a pamphlet compiled and printed by the State Science Commission in 1969. That quote was based on “Mao Zedong: Talk after Listening to a Report on the Planning of Scientific and Technological Research, December 1963.“ Based on research by Hu Qiaomu, this was recorded when Mao Zedong heard Nie Rongzhen discussing the 10-year planning of scientific and technological research. Han Guang, Zhang Jinfu, Fan Changjiang, and Yu Guangyuan were also present when Mao said those words. However, Mao denied having said them.312 In August 1976, the Gang of Four criticized Deng Xiaoping for having distorted Mao’s instructions. Mao Zedong’s assertion that science and technology were related to productivity was correct. However, because of the ongoing political struggles — especially when he decided to criticize Deng Xiaoping and the rightists — Mao went back on his own earlier correct idea. Later, Deng developed this idea of Mao’s into “Science and technology are the first elements in productivity.“313 310. Ibid., 32–34. 311. Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China and Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee eds., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Science and Technology (1975–1994), 17.

312. On October 13, 1975, Mao Zedong gave Deng Xiaoping his opinion about the outline report. On October 14, Deng informed Hu Qiaomu about his discussion with Mao. Deng told Hu that he had not professed that science and technology were linked to

productivity, and he did not completely approve of the report. (Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 393–394.)

313. In 1975, Deng Xiaoping said that the first issue was understanding how science and technology were linked to productivity: “The Gang of Four once confused right and

wrong in this issue, and this caused confusion among many people. That science and

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The 8th area was bringing reform to education. On September 3, when Deng Xiaoping talked to the seven leaders of the Politics Research Office of the State Council, he said that there were many problems in education. With low enthusiasm on the part of both teachers and students and low education quality, how could the Four Modernizations be achieved? On September 15, Deng Xiaoping proposed at a meeting that the nation learn from the agricultural model and spirit of Dazhai Village; order also needed to be restored in culture and education.314 He said that the most important task was to redefine education as being the most basic factor in economic construction and for achieving the Four Modernizations. When listening to a report titled “Several Problems in Scientific Research“ by Hu Yaobang and others, Deng sharply rebuked some universities for being no more than secondary technological schools: “With no skills or knowledge of foreign languages or natural sciences, math, physics, and chemistry, how can we scale the mountains of development? We could not even scale small hills. This problem is most probably due to the education community. Science and technology are essential to productivity, and technical and scientific researchers are the equivalent of laborers!“315 Zhou Rongxin, Minister of Education, wrote the “Education Work Outline Report“ in line with the instructions of Deng Xiaoping. This report reaffirmed Mao Zedong’s speech at the first CPPCC meeting on September 9, 1949: “With the growth in economic construction, cultural growth is inevitable. The time when China was regarded as uncivilized is over. We shall stand as a highly civilized nation in the eyes of the world.“316 Zhou Rongxin reaffirmed Mao’s view in 1957 that it takes 100 years to properly educate people.317 The outline report expressly stated that technology are linked to productivity has always been a Marxist idea. What was the

source of the huge development of social productivity and the drastic improvement in efficiency? The primary element was the power of science and technology.“ (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 86–87.)

314. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts (1975–1997), 18.

315. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 34.

316. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, 3–7.

317. Mao Zedong stated in 1957: “We should build up our own technological ability over

the next 10 years. The so-called 100-year efforts to develop talent should be changed

into 10-year efforts. Socialism cannot be achieved without this. The proletariat will

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China faced a severe problem if it fell behind in education: the dictatorship of the proletariat and progress toward the Four Modernizations would be affected.318 The third version of the report was not finalized until November 10. Before it could be issued, Zhou Rongxin came under attack from Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. The 9th area was agricultural reform. On July 11, Deng Xiaoping met with Liu Xingyuan, first CPC secretary of Sichuan Province and director of the Sichuan Revolutionary Committee. Deng told Liu that in 1974, the per capita production value of agriculture in Sichuan was the second lowest in China. Many local people lacked sufficient food, and that situation could not lead to stability. Deng said it was necessary to prioritize agriculture. He stated that research should be conducted into agricultural matters, such as pig-raising policies. It was also important that once these policies became introduced they should not be changed: otherwise, people would lose faith in the authorities.319 Deng Xiaoping proposed at a forum of rural workers that it was necessary to restore order in rural areas and to boost agricultural production.320 Deng noted in particular that the grain output in some counties and regions was even lower than immediately after the foundation of the PRC. He said that China was unable to boast about its agricultural production. Deng even debated this issue face to face with Jiang Qing.321 This shows that Deng was well aware of the destitution not succeed without a vast technological, theoretical, and professional force using the thoughts of Marxism.“ (Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 500.) 318. Ibid. 319. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 67.

320. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 35–37.

321. Deng Xiaoping said: “We cannot brag. Such counties, communes, and production teams

as Dazhai exist across the country; there is a lack of balance. The grain output in some counties and regions is even lower now than immediately after the foundation of the

PRC!“ Deng was interrupted by Jiang Qing, who exclaimed: “That’s not true. Those are very isolated incidents!“ Deng Xiaoping maintained: “Even isolated incidents are worth

our attention!“ He said: “According to statistics of the 23 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, the per capita production value of the people’s commune

is 124 yuan. The lowest in China is Guizhou, where it is just over 60 yuan; the second

lowest is Sichuan, where it is just over 90 yuan. Can we go on like this? There are still quite a few provinces where the per capital production value is around 100 yuan. We

are talking about production value, not the income of the commune members. People

only get the minimal income, and some are further burdened with debts. Should we be

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and backwardness that existed in rural China during the Cultural Revolution; he was conscious of the fact that the Chinese lacked sufficient food and clothing, especially in the poorest provinces of Guizhou and Sichuan. By contrast, Jiang did not conduct investigations to seek solutions but was single-mindedly engaged in class struggles. In the overall restoration of order in 1975, Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen and other members of the CPC Central Committee and State Council played an important role in the collective leadership. In addition, Wan Li, Hu Yaobang, Zhang Jinfu, Zhou Rongxin and other ministers in the State Council were actively involved in frontline activities. This reflects the fact that by following the wishes of the people, the mainstream force in the CPC in this special political period was engaged in an open political contest with the Jiang Qing clique. As Zhou Enlai said to Deng Xiaoping on September 20: “You have had a wonderful year — much better than I would have had!“322 In July 1985, Deng Xiaoping reviewed the efforts made in restoring order in 1975: “In 1975, I was in charge of the whole nation and undertook some experiments to try to restore order in all sectors. At that time, those efforts had an immediate effect, and all aspects of life greatly improved. And the people were happy — except for the Gang of Four.“323 In the process of restoring order, Deng Xiaoping established a decision-making think tank so as to engage in his political and theoretical struggle with Jiang Qing. At that time, the major newspapers and magazines in China were controlled by the Gang of Four, who cultivated a batch of writers, such as Liang Xiao and Luo Siding. Because of this situation, Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian considered establishing a Political Research Office, though Li was concerned that this might be viewed as a team set up to oppose the Gang of Four.324 On January 6, Deng Xiaoping talked to Hu Qiaomu about establishing a writing team to develop some articles against revisionism and imperialism.325 satisfied with these circumstances?” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 432.)

322. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 102.

323. This was what Deng Xiaoping said on July 15, 1985 in talks with George Michael Chambers, prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago. (Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 2, 1060.)

324. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 13. 325. The team at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse referred to the document drafting team

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Deng proposed some themes for research and writing. He said that producing those articles required a proper writing team.326 On June 8, Deng talked to Hu Qiaomu about setting up a Political Research Office in the State Council. On June 15, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Wang Hongwen, stating that the Political Research Office should be established. On July 5, with the approval of Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee, the Political Research Office was established under the State Council, and it was under the charge of Hu Qiaomu, Lu Lengxi, Hu Sheng, Xiong Fu, Yu Guangyuan, Li Xin, and Deng Liqun.327 The office had to deal with the following: assisting Deng Xiaoping in efforts to restore order nationwide; compiling the fifth volume of Selected Works of Mao Zedong; conducting research into thought and culture; collecting and submitting appropriate materials to the CPC Central Committee and Mao; participating in drafting and revising documents on restoring order in all sectors, publishing the journal Frontline of Thoughts; and organizing teams for conducting theoretical research. From July to November, Hu Qiaomu made 16 reports to Deng, who for his part assigned tasks to Hu Qiaomu.328 The Political Research Office became Deng’s major think tank, and it played an important role in his campaign to restore order around the country. Later, Deng Liqun recalled that from the very first day the Political Research Office was established, it set out to combat the Gang of Four and its writers.329 On May 29, Deng Xiaoping conveyed three directions of Mao Zedong at the symposium of the steel industry: first, be alert against revisionism; second, maintain stability and unity; and third, boost the national economy. Deng Xiaoping stated: “These three instructions will be the guidelines for our future work for a period of time. They are interrelated and inseparable from one another. None of them should be ignored.“330 On July 4, Deng Xiaoping said when addressing the fourth enrolment of the Central Reading Class: “Comrade Mao Zedong gave us three important instructions, which should serve as our guideline for our current work.“331 This officially established by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in February 1963. Its members were Wu Lengxi, Hu Sheng, and Xiong Fu.

326. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 11–12.

327. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 57.

328. Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 213. 329. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 13.

330. “Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Steel Industry Symposium,” May 29, 1975.

331. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

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was based on the three instructions stated in the guideline. In October, Mao Zedong denied these instructions when talking to Mao Yuanxin. He stated that the practice of taking his three instructions as some kind of guidance was incorrect. Mao said that maintaining unity and stability did not preclude class struggle: class struggle was the guideline, whereas everything else was a secondary detail.332 On September 10, Deng Xiaoping informed the seven leaders of the Political Research Office of the State Council about overall publicity regarding Mao Zedong’s thoughts. He said that current publicity work was rather biased, with each side taking what they needed from the material. As a result, Mao’s thoughts were not being properly communicated.333 On October 4, Deng Xiaoping declared at a central rural working meeting that Mao Zedong’s thoughts amounted to a complete ideology with rich content: “How could we bias his thinking by highlighting one word or two or one point of view or the other?“ The problem of dissecting Mao’s thoughts was thus not solved.334 These two speeches were targeted at the Gang of Four, which often distorted what Mao had said. The address given by Deng in May 1977 was contrary to Hua Guofeng’s proposition that it was important to support the chairman’s decision and strictly follow his instructions. These talks laid a theoretical foundation for Deng’s drive for reform and opening-up: the system of Mao’s thoughts. Deng Liqun, leader of Political Research Office of the State Council, presided over the drafting of “On the General Outline of Work in the Party and Country.“335 Although this article was not composed under the instructions of Deng Xiaoping, it was written based on the talks and speeches of Deng and other leaders in the State Council. The article cited three of Mao’s instructions, and quoted Mao in “On Coalition Government:“ “The policies and practices of all parties in China and their effects on the Chinese people ultimately depend on whether they are helpful and how helpful they are to the development of the productivity of the Chinese people.“336 Deng Liqun proposed that this should be used as a criterion regarding of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 12. 332. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 486.

333. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 63. 334. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 35–37.

335. Those that participated in the drafting of the documents included Hu Jiwei, Yu Zongyan,

Su Pei, and Teng Wensheng in the Political Research Office of the State Council. (Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 26–27.)

336. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

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whether a political line was correct or not or practices were socialistic or not. This could be considered using Mao’s words against himself. It reflected the fact that Deng and others were trying to correct the mistakes that Mao had made in his later years and to rebuke the senseless arguments of the Jiang Qing clique by using the correct thoughts of Mao. Subsequently, Jiang Qing openly criticized the three important documents titled “On the General Outline of the Work of the Party and the Country“ by Deng Liqun, “Several Problems on Accelerating Industrial Development“ by Fang Weizhong, member of State Planning Commission, and “Outline Report of Work in the Chinese Academy of Sciences“ by Hu Yaobang. She dismissed these as three poisonous texts and said that “On the General Outline of the Work of the Party and the Country“ was a political manifesto for restoring capitalism.337 Jiang Qing exclaimed that Nikita Khrushchev did the same thing in the years after Stalin’s death, whereas Deng Xiaoping was doing this while Chairman Mao was still alive. She declared that they were worse than Khrushchev.338 Those three documents were in fact an initial attempt to correct the wrongs of the Cultural Revolution, end chaos, and restore order. That was the first full-scale effort to put things right. On May 24, 1977, Deng Xiaoping said to Wang Zhen and Deng Liqun: “I have only recently read ’On the General Outline’ among the three poisonous texts: the article was well written and makes very good points in its arguments. We have tried to adopt the ’Outline Report’ but to no avail. We need to continue discussing and writing articles on some issues. I have read the second draft of the ’22 Regulations on Industries’ but not the other drafts. These articles have their shortcomings. But then, all good things do have their shortcomings.“339 Soon after fighting to restore orders in all sectors, the nation’s economic situation showed to have improved. In all walks of life, it became possible to shake off the stagnation and temporarily enter a period of high growth. Comparing to previous year, the value gross industrial product increased by 14.9% and that of agricultural product increased by 3.7%; which adds up to contribute an 11.5% rise of the overall of Mao Zedong, vol. 3, 1079. 337. In February 1976, Yao Wenyuan remarked with regard to the “General Outline of the

Work of the Party and the Country“ that such an outline targeted at restoring capitalism was very similar to the Summary of Project 571: “Can capitalism be restored at all?

In your dreams!“ (Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987),

30–31.)

338. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1280–1281.

339. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 31.

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gross product value. Fiscal deficits dropped, and imports and exports reached a new height. This was in complete contrast to the economic decline caused by the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974. Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to restore order to the nation gain him universal approve and support. The party, the PLA, and the Chinese people began to understand and support Deng.340 This laid an important foundation for Deng’s comeback in 1977 and his drive for reform and opening-up in 1978. Without the trust of the people, there would have been no era of Deng Xiaoping in China. On the one hand, Deng Xiaoping’s work was supported by Mao Zedong and approved by the Political Bureau.341 On the other, his focus on economic development ran against the political grain of the Cultural Revolution. Deng was thus taking a good deal of political risk. First, Mao posed the biggest impediment to Deng’s theories and policies, and Mao also represented a considerable threat to Deng. Second, Deng had to deal with Jiang Qing’s open hostility toward him. Deng and Jiang had been through many political struggles and debates over theory. Each had accumulated wins and losses, which owed less to their own political strength than to the stance of Mao in the particular matter. Both of them tried to convince Mao of their own cause and garner his support, and he in turn used these two political forces for his own purposes. The first political struggle between Deng and Jiang was over Mao’s instructions relating to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan led in the attack against Deng for pursuing the path of capitalism. During the discussions with the Danish prime minister, Poul Hartling, on October 20, 1974, Mao Zedong proposed the theory of socialism and the dictatorship 340. On October 13, 1987, Deng Xiaoping said that in 1975, he was responsible for the routine work of the CPC Central Committee: “My reforms that year were conducted in the name of restoring order so as to boost the economy. The first step was to rehabilitate

production. Wherever such measures were undertaken, they led to considerable effects.

However, I was soon kicked out of power by the Gang of Four. In all, I fell from power but was restored three times. The April 5 movement in 1976 broke out in memory of Premier Zhou, but it was also to show support for me. This proved that the reform

efforts made in 1974 and 1975 were very popular and were in line with the wishes of the people.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 255.)

341. On September 27, 1975, Deng Xiaoping said at the Central Rural Working Meeting: “I proposed restoring order in certain areas in the Political Bureau, and I reported my proposals to Comrade Mao Zedong. He agreed.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 35.)

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of the proletariat.342 On December 26 1974, which is also Mao’s birthday, Mao warned Zhou Enlai over the discussion of socialism and dictatorship proletariat. He stressed that such issue should be clarified — otherwise China would slide into revisionism. Mao also warned that if Lin Biao and his supporters had gained power, China would have easily turned to capitalism.343 At that point, it had been over 20 years since Mao had begun to build his socialist system. However, he was dissatisfied with the current situation and believed that China then was similar to how it had been before 1949, which was in effect a denunciation of his own efforts. Mao insisted that mandatory measures, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, should be used to quell capitalism. He believed that it was still possible for capitalism to be restored in China, and quoted Lenin: “Petty production constantly makes capitalism and capitalists — daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale.“ Mao Zedong needed enemies: he believed in the philosophy of struggle and that fighting was enjoyable. Almost all of Mao Zedong’s opponents had been struck down — first Liu Shaoqi and then Lin Biao — neither of whom he regarded as politicians any more but as petty producers acting out of self-interest. Even with the dictatorship of the proletariat, how could he help the 700 million peasants in China? This old, sick man had recently written only a 400-character paragraph, which discussed theoretical problems. He was no longer able to produce new 342. Mao Zedong said: “In a word, China is a socialist country. Before 1949, China was similar to capitalist countries. At present, the eight-tier salary system is still in place.

We still distribute goods according to work needs and in exchange for money, which is not so different from previous societies. The difference lies in the ownership system.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 413.)

343. Mao Zedong said that articles should be written on why Lenin advocated dictatorship over capitalism: “Tell Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan to find Lenin’s arguments on

this in his works and send me a copy. Read those first and then write articles on this. Tell Zhang Chunwiao to write the articles. If this issue is not clarified, revisionism will

ensue. And the whole nation needs to be aware of this. I talked about socialism with the prime minister of Denmark. We still have our commodities system, and our salaries are not equal: we have the eight-tier salary system. This can be rectified only under

a dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, if Lin Biao and his sort came to power,

China would soon descend into capitalism. Thus, we need to read books on Marxism. Lenin said that petty production constantly makes capitalism and capitalists — daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale. That applies to some workers and CPC members.

The capitalist lifestyle may also be found among the proletariat and government workers.“ (Ibid.)

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theories or write masterly articles on theory. He had to rely on his most trusted assistants — Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan — in formulating a theoretical system. On January 29, 1975, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan presented Mao a report. The report contained excerpts of Lenin’s arguments on the dictatorship of the proletariat. On February 2, Mao agreed to have this report printed and distributed.344 On February 22, the People’s Daily used 33 quotes in an article titled “Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.“ Among those quotes, 23 was by Lenin, among them 20 was found by Zhuang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. Zhang and Yao did not study the current situation in China but simply referred to books when writing the report. Hence, even they were from Shanghai, they turned a blind eye to those 700 million Chinese who was living in absolute poverty. In compliance with Mao’s request, they sought answers and support in the works of Marx and Lenin. Zhang and Yao were however more than writers of the government; they were also the main malefactors that damaged the party, the country, and the people by driving China’s modernization to an impasse. At that time, they helped Mao in his theoretical interactions. It should be particularly noted that Zhang Chunqiao was an important figure in removing the rights of the capitalist class, which was in line with the thinking of Mao Zedong. On October 13, 1958, Mao Zedong wrote an editorial note for Zhang Chunqiao’s article “Remove the Rights of the Capitalist Class.“ Mao completely agreed with removing the rights of the capitalist class. From that point on, Mao was trapped within the mindset of agricultural socialism.345 Based on his letter to Lin Biao on May 7, 1966, Mao pursued the ideal of the large, highly publicized people’s commune, communal canteens, and large communist schools together with the elimination of old thoughts, old culture, old customs, and old habits. Mao advocated restricting the rights of the capitalist class and establishing a completely pure socialist society. On February 9, the People’s Daily published an editorial — “Study Well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.“ This editorial conveyed Mao Zedong’s thoughts on the theoretical problem of why Lenin argued for dictatorship over the 344. Ibid., 420. 345. Wang Xiaoqiang argued that agricultural socialism is at the core of egalitarianism.

This means that eliminating private ownership will help realize egalitarian supply and

a cultural dictatorship; a series of extreme measures will once and for all eradicate the possibility of polarization and land merges; this is related to issues of production, distribution, consumption, and ideology and will ensure the end of petty producers. (Wang, “Criticism of Agricultural Socialism.”)

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capitalist class and why this issue needed to be clarified: “Otherwise, revisionism will ensue. It is necessary for the whole nation to be aware of this.“ The editorial placed particular emphasis on the fact that the struggle against revisionism was a long-term one — not something that could be resolved by a debate or two.346 Also on February 9, the People’s Daily published the article “We Must Establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariats over the Capitalists“ by Liang Xiao. The article claimed that socialist society was a transitional state between capitalistic and communistic societies. To achieve the ideal of communism, it was essential for the proletariat to break free from conventional ownership systems as well as conventional thoughts and ideas. For the proletariat to break free, it was necessary to restrict the rights of capitalists and criticize the way of Confucius and Mencius as well as the ideology of all exploitative classes. This was a long-term task for the whole socialist stage of history.347 On February 11, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to all Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, namely Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Chunqiao, proposing to discuss the previously presented directions on theoretical problems with the Political Bureau. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which the above four leaders attended in addition to Yao Wenyuan to discuss Mao’s instructions.348 With Mao’s approval, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Learning the Important Instructions of Chairman Mao on Theoretical Problems“ on February 18. On March 1, the People’s Daily published the article “On the Social Foundations of the Anti-party Group of Lin Biao“ by Yao Wenyuan. This article criticized Lin Biao and his followers for attempting to expand the rights of the capitalist class in a socialist country. This was so that the emerging new capitalists as well as some factions and groups that wished to pursue the course of capitalism, in addition to 346. The article stated that all revisionist elements were trying their best to distort, attack, and eliminate the dictatorship of the proletariat. These elements denied the fact that

the conflicts between proletariats and capitalists and between socialism and capitalism were the major fundamental conflicts in socialist society. These people also denied the

fact that the proletariat class had to exercise a dictatorship over the capitalists in the superstructure, including all cultural sectors. These elements also denied the fact that

the proletariat class had to set necessary limits on the rights of the capitalist class. The

article stated that some party members were confused over this issue and even took some capitalist matters to be socialistic. (People’s Daily, February 9, 1975.) 347. Ibid. 348. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 19.

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landlord capitalists who had been struck down, colluded with one another in an effort to restore capitalism. Lin Biao and his like were the political agents of these people. This article backed with Mao’s instruction and approval after debating at the Political Bureau.349 As a result of Mao’s instruction, Chunqiao addressed a forum of directors of the politics departments of all major units of the PLA on March 1. Zhang stated that the 4th NPC proposed a grand scheme: “By the end of this century, we will have built our country into a strong, prosperous nation and stand among the most powerful countries in the world. What we need in order to achieve this is no more than hundreds of billions of kilograms of grain and tens of millions of tons of steel. However, if the theoretical problems remain unresolved, the mistakes that Stalin made will repeat in China. That country had tens of millions of tons of steel and less grain than us. However, after the Soviet Union sent its satellite into orbit, Stalin was already in disgrace.“350 Zhang had aspirations to become a theorist of the Cultural Revolution, and he was very familiar with Mao’s way of thinking. Mao was indeed concerned that after his death, China would be capable of putting satellites into orbit and that capitalism would took socialism’s place. Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping recalled that there were fierce struggles with the Gang of Four on whether to launch the drive for the Four Modernizations: “The Gang of Four said some nonsense that once the Four Modernizations were achieved, capitalism would be restored.“351 This was part of the violent theoretical struggle between Deng and the Gang of Four, and it also reflected his long-term major dispute with Mao Zedong. What means did Mao Zedong adopt to prevent the restoration of capitalism? He exercised feudalistic dictatorship in the name of the proletariat dictatorship. On behalf of Mao, Zhang Chunqiao showed his supported towards this dictatorship. On April 1, Red Flag published the article “On Overall Dictatorship over the Capitalist Class,“ which proposed exercising complete dictatorship over the capitalist class in all fields and through all stages of revolution and development. This article underscored the functions of the state in exercising dictatorship and quelling riots, and it advocated that the state could practice this dictatorship in a random fashion. This was a political program for state dictatorship, and it predicted 349. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1193.

350. Zhang, “Speech at a Forum of Directors of the Politics Departments of All Major Units of the PLA,” March 1, 1976.

351. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 86.

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an overall dictatorship if the Gang of Four achieved power. This article was fully reprinted and distributed all over the country in newspapers and magazines with Mao’s consent alongside with Yao Wenyuan’s article. These articles explained Mao’s thoughts about learning the theory about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which provided the theoretical basis for the Cultural Revolution. The articles were politically targeted at Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. When Jiang Qing failed to organize her own cabinet, she prepared theoretical weapons to continue her attacks against Deng and the rightists. On June 21, Mao Zedong held discussions with Pol Pot, general secretary of the Cambodian Communist Party. Mao said: “There were two possibilities for democratic revolution: one was that it would turn to socialism; the other was that it would turn to capitalism. It is still the same now.” This was Mao’s historical summary of his 26 years in power. He also made a prediction about China’s future. He said that in the next 50 years (by 2025) or 100 years (by 2075), there would still be struggles over the two political lines: “It will still be the case in 10,000 years. This is the case in a communist society: if it wasn’t, we wouldn’t be Marxists. In the era of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was different from what it was like in the era of Lenin. However, in the future, the Soviet Union will still return to Leninism.“ According to Mao’s political prediction, China could follow the same course as the Soviet Union. Revisionism could appear in China in the future, but the country would eventually return to Marxism and Leninism: “This country of ours is still a capitalistic country without capitalists, as described by Lenin. Our country protects the rights of capitalists and exercises unequal salary systems. It retains inequalities under the name of equality.“352 Mao Zedong preferred egalitarian poverty to unequal wealth. He judged Chinese society to be a capitalist country without capitalists. Mao did not understand the functions of a modern country in terms of income distribution, personal income tax, social security, financial transactions, and public services. He believed that polarization could be avoided by having people learn his supreme instructions, by launching the Cultural Revolution, and by restricting the rights of the capitalists. He was likewise unaware and failed to mention that China’s basic national problem was that its per capita GNP ranked among the lowest in the world. There is no evidence that during the course of the Cultural Revolution he ever visited rural areas, particularly old revolutionary areas, minority ethnic regions, border areas, and destitute regions. He was so aloof that he was ignorant of the actual conditions that existed in rural areas and of how the peasants lived. 352. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1229.

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Mao was likewise ignorant of the fact that hundreds of millions of Chinese were still living in absolute poverty and were unable to feed or clothe themselves. In terms of political targets, he believed egalitarian poverty to be greatly preferable to economic growth and that eliminating the capitalist class was better than eradicating poverty. Mao imposed his own thoughts on the people and his own will on the entire country. In his later years, Mao was increasingly alienated from the fact that China ranked as a low-income nation and also from the needs of the Chinese people — especially the poor peasants — in wanting to shake off poverty and pursue wealth. That was Mao’s particular tragedy. The political route that Liu Shaoqi followed and Mao attacked was based on national circumstances and the ultimate interests of the people. That course was one that led to prosperity and wealth: it was inherited by Deng Xiaoping, who revised it, and eventually it became the mainstream policy of the CPC. The second political struggle took place from March to June 1975. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan made allusive attacks on Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping for their experience-based approach. This was resolutely stopped by Mao Zedong, who severely criticized the Gang of Four for these attacks. On March 1, 1975, Zhang Chunqiao stated at a forum of directors of the Politics Departments of all major units of the PLA that it was necessary to be alert to the dangers posed by empiricism. The same day, Yao Wenyuan had an article published in Red Flag. In the article, he quoted a paragraph that Mao Zedong wrote in 1959, which emphasized that “the main danger is empiricism.“ Yao claimed that for over 10 years, Chairman Mao had repeated many times the necessity of guarding against this danger. Yao likewise argued that the dominant danger was empiricism and that if certain people achieved power — referring to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping — China would revert to capitalism. Zhang and Yao attacked others in addition to Deng. An editorial titled “Leading Cadres Should Set an Example in Learning“ was published on March 21 in the People’s Daily. It noted that the past 10 years had demonstrated that empiricism was the assistant of revisionism. Those who subscribed to empiricism ignored theories and the importance of the correct political route as set forth by Chairman Mao. They regarded partial experience as a universal truth. Their practices lacked vision, and they were ready to follow the course of revisionism. The editorial stated that research had to be undertaken with regard to the two classes and the political routes in criticizing revisionism, capitalism, and the rights of capitalists. In mid-April, Jiang Qing propose to criticize empiricism at a Political Bureau meeting and demanded the bureau to discuss over the issue. However, Deng

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Xiaoping did not yield to this; instead, he fought back.353 On July 14, when Hu Qiaomu brought materials to Deng against empiricism that had been published in March and April, Deng said: “What’s the meaning of all this? Some of these articles were directed against me!“354 This indicates how Jiang Qing and her supporters conducted a great deal of scheming in the party. On April 18, when Deng Xiaoping reported to Mao Zedong about Jiang Qing’s criticism of empiricism, Mao said that he did not believe empiricism was the major danger back then, hence he now switched and agreed with Deng,355 and once again censured Jiang. Apparently, Mao Zedong thought that Jiang Qing had gone too far, and he was also worried conflicts would develop in the party, which was against his will. Mao was self-contradictory for this. He had to mediate when the conflicts in the party became intense. The struggle between Deng and Jiang depended on Mao’s political preferences. Whomever he supported would win; whomever he objected to would lose. This political contest was not conducted according to rules expressly set down by the party. This was a typical case of Mao’s personal dictatorship. On April 23, Mao Zedong commented on Yao Wenyuan’s report, which stated that it was necessary to resist revisionism, including empiricism and dogmatism. Mao said: “It will not do to ignore these problems. Not many people properly understood Marxism and Leninism. Some individuals thought that they understood, but that was not the case, and they often criticized others in such matters. This amounted to a basic lack of knowledge of Marxism and Leninism.“ Mao proposed to go over this issue with the Political Bureau.356 On April 27, in line with Mao Zedong’s will, Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying criticized and quarreled with Jiang Qing’s at a Political Bureau meeting. Deng argued that the rebuke of empiricism was apparently an organized action against Premier Zhou. Jiang declared that the meeting was a surprise attacking her and her followers and just like the Lushan Meeting in 1970. This demonstrated Jiang was acting out of her mind, biting everyone at all opportunity. After the meeting, Wang Hongwen wrote a letter to Mao, claiming that this struggle occurred because Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping expressed what Premier Zhou was not in a position to say in an effort to overthrow the case verdict passed in December 1973. Jiang called 353. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 309. 354. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 69.

355. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 309. 356. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 426.

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Mao and telling him that she felt besieged at the Political Bureau meeting.357 This marked the boiling point of among the Political Bureau. On April 29, Zhou Enlai held a meeting with Deng Xiaoping; the next day, Zhou held a discussion with Hua Guofeng. Both of these talks aimed to establish what had happened in the meeting of the Political Bureau. Mao Zedong was displeased receiving Wang Hongwen’s letter. Mao wanted Jiang Qing and the others stop causing trouble, and was well aware that he is the only one capable to put an end to this struggle.358 Late in the evening of May 3, Mao decided to hold a Political Bureau meeting at his residence359 to mediate the conflict within the party and promote unity inside the bureau.360 Mao Zedong knew that Jiang had gone too far and once again he censured her:361 “Disband the 357. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 310. 358. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 356. 359. It had been a long time since Mao Zedong convened a meeting of the Political Bureau. Among those attending the meeting were Zhou Enlai and Xie Jingyi (secretary of the CPC Committee at Peking University; she participated in the work of the Political Bureau although she was not a member. For the details of this meeting, please see Gao et al. eds., Mao Zedong the Historical Figure, 1563–1570.

360. Mao Zedong said: “It has been a long time since we last met. There is a problem that

I’d like to consult with you about. Some people failed to correctly understand some

things, but only a few. I myself made a mistake. In the article titled ’On the Social Foundations of the Anti-party Group of Lin Biao’ by Chunqiao [which was actually

written by Yao Wenyuan — Ed.], I failed to notice the mistake it contained. I listened to

the document once, but I didn’t read it. My eye disease could not allow me to read. It

talked about empiricism and I let it go at that. The document of Xinhua News Agency [referred to the ’Report on Learning the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’

— Ed.], Wenyuan showed it to me. It as well as the ten experiences summarized from the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant [referring to the materials against the ten expressions

of empiricism written by the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant on the orders of the Gang of

Four — Ed.] all talked about empiricism instead of Marxism or dogmatism...We need stability and unity. Both empiricism and dogmatism are attempts to revise Marxism

and Leninism. They need to be corrected through education...Some of our comrades who have made mistakes should be criticized. Emphasis has to be placed equally on three aspects: criticism of Lin Biao, criticism of Confucius, and back-door dealing...We need unity and stability. We do not need to rush into censuring dogmatism, empiricism,

revisionism, and the rights of capitalists. Whoever makes haste in these matters will fall.” (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1731–1732.)

361. Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing by saying that she lacked experience of fighting and

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Gang of Four. Why don’t you get along with the over 200 members of the Central Committee?“ Mao Zedong even lost his temper, yelling: “Jiang Qing is such a bitch!“ Jiang and Zhang Chunqiao remained composed, though Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan turned pale.362 This indicates the complexity of the relationship between Mao and the Gang of Four. Once Mao had defined Jiang and the others as the Gang of Four, that clique was destined to perish after Mao’s death. Mao’s words became the political basis for Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing to arrest the Gang of Four in October 1976. Mao Zedong was against the formation of factions within the party. The Gang of Four constituted a minority in the CPC Central Committee, and it was isolated from all the rest of the party. Finally, Mao again emphasized the principles of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots.363 This was the last time for Mao to chair a meeting of the Political Bureau. The principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots was a consistent demand from Mao Zedong which was repeated whenever there was a major irreconcilable political struggle in the party. And this was one faceoff between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing. Even after the 4th NPC, which bring forth good news, Mao was worried about another political rift developing in China. The intense political pressure in the party forced him to mediate the conflict by criticizing Jiang, even though he had no intention leading her to her political downfall.364 It was Mao’s duty to maintain balance between the two forces in the party, yet it was out of his

was unable to write articles. She was not dogmatic but she was an empiricist. In the presence of the members of the Political Bureau, he warned Jiang against arbitrary

actions, and he told her to be cautious. She should not be too self-assertive but needed to consult the Political Bureau when she had a different opinion. He said that documents

had to be issued in the name of the CPC Central Committee, not in her name or in Mao’s name since he would not send any materials to others. (Gao et al. eds., Mao Zedong the Historical Figure, 1568.) 362. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 390. 363. Mao Zedong said: “I have just three things to say, which is to repeat what was said

at the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. We must stick to Marxism and

Leninism; we must not have revisionism. We must be united; we must not be divided. We must play fair; we must not resort to trickery.” (Gao et al. eds., Mao Zedong the Historical Figure, 1569.)

364. In 1987, Ji Dengkui remarked that Chairman Mao believed that Jiang Qing and others had made a positive contribution by criticizing Liu Shaoqi. Therefore, Mao did not wish to bring them down politically, but at the same time he did not want to put them in power. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1734.)

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power to reconcile the two fundamentally hostile entities.365 Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau on May 4 despite being sick, to hear and implement Mao Zedong’s speech; attending the meeting also included Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Chunqiao. Zhou drafted the “Opinion on the Work of the Political Bureau,“ which emphasized that the guidelines and political courses adopted at the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC had to be followed. This meant that the principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots had to be adhered to for maintaining unity and stability. For the first time, that document expressly stated that all major issues had to be discussed first at the Political Bureau Standing Committee meeting. All documents drafted — except those related to emergencies in foreign affairs and national defense — had to be submitted two or three days in advance for study and discussion. Unless trivialities or emergencies, if members of the Political Bureau had any propositions to make, they had report to the chairman two or three days in advance before discussed by the Political Bureau. All the documents that needed to be distributed throughout the country need approval from the Political Bureau Standing Committee or competent authorities of the Political Bureau. It was expected that those circulated within the unit for which a particular official was responsible. Documents related to personal opinion should not be issued in the name of any individual or the Political Bureau; all personal correspondence was considered an inappropriate tone of instruction.366 These regulations were apparently set to restrain Jiang Qing and her followers, which had become the fundamental principles for discussion and decision making by the Political Bureau. Unfortunately, those regulations were soon breached by Jiang Qing and others. She had always felt herself to be privileged and above any laws and party regulations — until October 6, 1976, when she was arrested and put under investigation. On May 8, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Chunqiao were in attendance, and the purpose was to discuss further the implementation of Mao Zedong’s speech of May 3. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided on May 17 to have Deng Xiaoping take over the daily routine work of the CPC Central Committee and the Political 365. Deng Rong remarked that Jiang Qing thought nothing of anyone except for Mao Zedong. In actuality, Mao himself was only able to achieve a superficial balance rather

than provide a basic solution to the problem. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 357.)

366. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 312.

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Bureau;367 so as to chair the meeting devoted to censuring the Gang of Four.368 The next day, Zhou had talks with Deng, who just returned a France visitation. On May 21, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to all the Political Bureau, providing an account of the proposition of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to criticize empiricism. In the letter also stated that a meeting would be held to rebuke the Gang of Four. If the members agreed, the letter would be forwarded to the chairman.369 On May 22, Zhang Chunqiao made the sharp refutation that the letter from the premier was not entirely accurate. On May 27, Zhou wrote another letter to Zhang Chunqiao, arguing against Zhang’s disagreement. Zhang read the letter the same day and remarked: “There’s no need for further revision.“370 It is a solid proof of the total irreconcilable between the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau. On May 27, Mao Zedong instructed Deng Xiaoping to chair a meeting of the Political Bureau criticizing the Gang of Four — headed by Jiang Qing. Deng said that the speech made by the chairman on May 3 was of great importance to the party since the chairman was addressing the Political Bureau — the core leadership of the CPC: “The chairman proposed that the Political Bureau should be united and stable by following the principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots and that factions within the party and the Gang of Four should be admonished. This is a very important fundamental issue, which should be carefully discussed.“ Deng repudiated the unreasonable accusations that Jiang Qing made in the Political Bureau meeting of April 27. Deng emphasized that there were three issues that had to be clarified: “The first is the 11th political line struggle proposed at the December meeting in 1973. The second is the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius also involved condemning back-door dealings. The final issue is that theories of empiricism have also been attacked. I’d like to ask, why have these things happened? If we allow this situation to continue, we will not be able to achieve any good. Li Xiannian said that the Wenhui Bao and PLA newspapers were wrong to publish articles rebuking Wang Hongwen and acknowledging empiricism as the major danger did not conform to the political course determined at the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. He also stated that communicating Chairman Mao’s instructions for unity and stability was delayed even though this was meant to quell the mass movement. 367. Ibid., 314. 368. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 390. 369. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1735. 370. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 707–708.

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Li Xiannian declared that it was wrong to speak of the meeting in December 1973 as the 11th political line struggle. He also quoted Mao Zedong when speaking of the Gang of Four: the chairman told them not to make trouble, but they still went ahead and did so.“371 Wu De and Chen Xilian also spoke out against the factional activities of the Gang of Four. This indicates that since Mao Zedong had criticized the Gang of Four, the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution also stood on the same side as Deng Xiaoping. Three Political Bureau meetings were convened to allow other members to voice their opinions. Ye Jianying gave a long speech on the three issues raised at the previous meeting by Deng Xiaoping and made a number of incisive points.372 Ye described life in the partly lately had been peculiar: “If we allow the existence of illegal organizations, such as the Gang of Four, our unity will be damaged, and the party will become divided.“ Ye also emphasized in particular the necessity of asking for instructions and upholding discipline. He singled out Jiang Qing and her supporters for particular rebuke: “You almost never request instructions, and the reprimands of the chairman and Comrade Xiaoping were completely correct. You need to redress your relationship with individuals and with the party. Any and all major issues have to be submitted to the Political Bureau for discussion.“373 In early June, Jiang Qing visited Deng Xiaoping for a discussion. Mao Zedong made her do so374 since he did not wish internal strife to continue within the Political Bureau. Mao coerced Jiang to concede to Deng Xiaoping in an attempt to help them reach an amiable settlement.375 Even though Mao’s own mediation was unable to lead to unity and stability, the actual source of the party’s inner strife was Mao’s own philosophy of struggle. Jiang made a retreat, though it was only temporary. She had every intention of continuing her battle with Deng. This was a low period in Jiang’s political life. 371. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992), vol. 2, 872.

372. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1735–1737. 373. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 371. 374. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 53.

375. Deng Rong explained that Mao Zedong wished that through this criticism, Jiang

Qing would behave herself and Deng Xiaoping would be satisfied. Mao even wished that Jiang and Deng could forget about the past and even become friendly enough to

cooperate with each other — or at least live in peace. For this purpose, he made Jiang talk to Deng so that they could shake hands. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 363.)

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On June 7, Deng Xiaoping reported to Mao Zedong about the Political Bureau meeting and in particular about Jiang Qing’s behavior. Deng received Mao’s political support. Mao believed that Wang Hongwen possessed only a low level of authority, and so Mao decided that Wang should listen closely to Deng. Mao believed that Jiang had made a good contribution in the fight against Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. However, he thought that she and her supporters had gone too far since they had fought against Premier Zhou, Deng, and Ye Jianying. Now the Political Bureau was going to change. Mao Zedong said: “You need to do your job!“ Deng Xiaoping replied: “With this, I am resolved. There will always be people who object to me. I am certain of that. Mao Zedong said that if a tree stands apart from the wood, it will surely be destroyed by the wind.“376 Previously, Jiang told Mao that she had felt besieged at the meeting of the Political Bureau.377 However, the more Jiang objected, the more Mao supported Deng. This period was Deng’s political peak based on Mao’s political support: without that support, Deng would soon fall. On June 28, Jiang Qing made a written self-criticism to Mao Zedong and the Political Bureau.378 She wrote: “It wasn’t until I came to understand the Gang of 376. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 315–316. 377. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 55.

378. Jiang Qing said: “I apologize to the chairman, to the comrades of the Political Bureau,

and to Comrade Deng Xiaoping.“ She admitted the mistakes she had made in the previous year. The mistakes included the proposition relating to the 11th political line

struggle, the involvement of backdoor dealing in the campaign against Lin Biao and

Confucius, handing out materials without approval, and the proposition that the major current danger was empiricism. She wrote: “It wasn’t until I came to understand the Gang of Four objectively that I realized it had the potential of developing into a faction

that could split the party. And because this is a fundamental issue, the chairman told me about this three or four times both last year and this. The chairman never budges on fundamental issues. I am responsible for my errors, and I am sorry that I involved three

other comrades [Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan] in this matter.

This mistake is serious, and it went against the call of the chairman for unity and stability and his principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots. The cause of these

mistakes was that I did not change my world outlook; I have too much individualism and subjectivity, and I am not cautious or modest. But I now have the confidence and determination to follow the instructions of Chairman Mao and to correct my mistakes

in accordance with the requirements of the party.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1738.

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Four objectively that I realized it had the real potential of developing into a threat of causing the party to split. And because this is a fundamental issue, the chairman told me about this three or four times both last year and this.“379 This was the first time Jiang had written a self-criticizing letter, and she was forced into it more by Mao than by Deng Xiaoping. Mao remarked once to Zhang Yaoci that Jiang Qing was totally isolated. She was in fact a political burden for Mao380 since he could not get rid of her. As long as Mao was in power, Jiang held a privileged position. However, if Jiang suffered, Mao would suffer too, and he was clearly aware of this. He knew what would happen to Jiang after his death. For a period of some months, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping enjoyed a temporary political victory and the Jiang Qing clique had to put up with severe political frustration, which forced them to retreat.381 Deng was their sworn enemy. After Jiang’s self-criticizing letter was given to the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing, Mao Zedong also commented on the letter. The members of the Political Bureau read Jiang’s letter on June 30 at Zhou’s request; Zhou said that Jiang was welcome to criticize herself. Zhou did this to help Jiang, and he knew that Mao wished him to do so. Zhou often performed such acts against his will, but he did not receive any direct political returns for them. Jiang used Mao’s criticism of the novel Tale of the Marshes to attack Zhou as one who had capitulated. The Gang of Four, which was in control of the media, then became even more aggressive. On June 30, the Wenhui Bao newspaper published the article “The Historical Result of the Confucianists in Power — On the Rise and Fall of Xiao Wangzhi,“ written by Cai Ji and Hu Shensheng. The article targeted Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping by criticizing the Confucian master in power who caused the decline of the country. The Political Research Office of the State Council reported the article to Deng. Deng said to Hu Qiaomu: “I already knew about this article. Let them go ahead with it.“382 On July 12, Wenhui Bao published the articles “On the Social Foundations for the Restoration of Zhao Gao“ and “If Confucian Forces Exist, Society Will Not Be Peaceful.“ Under the pretense of commenting on historical events, the articles were actually an attack on Zhou, Deng, and a large number of veteran officials, drawing a parallel with Zhao Gao and the government officials 379. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1232.

380. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 239. 381. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 18. 382. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1232.

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that followed the Confucian route of the Zhao Gao group.383 This form of scheming politics was very prevalent in China at that time. Thus, Jiang had not in fact lost the political struggle. She was ready to attack again. In the eyes of Deng Xiaoping, the Gang of Four was nothing but a pack of crazy political dogs. As long as Mao was still alive, Deng could do nothing but allow Jiang to do what she wanted. Deng was prepared to play a long-term political strategy with the Gang of Four. At that time, Mao Zedong was very disappointed with Wang Hongwen. Mao remarked to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping that Wang showed low political competence and lacked prestige. Instead of chairing Political Bureau meetings, Wang was transferred to Zhejiang and Shanghai in late June to help with local work, which was in line with Mao’s wishes. On July 1, Ye Jianying wrote a letter to Mao, recommending Deng to chair Political Bureau meetings. Soon with Mao’s approval, Deng began to take charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee in early July.384 In terms of power structure, the shift from the Mao-Zhou-Wang to Mao-Zhou-Deng setup was completely Mao’s personal decision, without having to undergo any legal procedure. This power structure was, however, very fragile. Wang said to Deng before he left Beijing: “I’ll see you in 10 years’ time.“ Deng made particular note of this remark, and he said: “Yes. They have advantages in terms of age.“ Wang was then 40 years old, whereas Deng was already 71.385 Four months later on November 15, the pressure of the campaign against rightists obliged Deng to write to Mao, signaling that he wished to be relieved of taking charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee.386 This was a typical example of rule by men instead of by law. The third political struggle took place from May to September 1975, when Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing clashed on issues relating to cultural and artistic policies and intellectuals. Mao Zedong supported Deng. Culture had always been an area that was under the control of the Gang of Four. The group used all measures of cultural dictatorship over the intellectual elites.387 This area was the one that was hardest hit in the Cultural Revolution, and it was here that a general dictatorship reigned or secret policing was exercised. During the Cultural Revolution, Yao Wenyuan, on behalf of the Central Revolutionary Team, divided class enemies into eight categories: traitors, spies, capitalist roaders who would not repent, landlords who resisted change, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, evil elements, rightists, 383. Ibid., 1237–1238. 384. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1739. 385. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 18. 386. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1761. 387. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 370.

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and counter-revolutionary elements.388 All intellectuals were affected or criticized to different degrees. Despite their high economic status or income, they suffered the lowest political and social status. They were dismissed as the “Stinky 9th.“ Liang Shuming wrote a poem titled “On the Stinky 9th.“ The poem included such lines as “In ancient times, Confucians ranked 9th, just above beggars, / Now they are called the Stinky 9th. In the past, the 9th lived decently, / But today, they are treated worse than dogs. Dictators rose to power owing to ignorance; / Education makes one reactionary. If Marx and Lenin were alive today, They’d also be paraded through the streets.“ As Joseph Needham said, the Gang of Four was anti-intellectual in nature and particularly hostile to science and technology. They would surely have agreed with the French revolutionaries who hanged the chemist Antoine Lavoisier: “Revolutions never need scientists.“ However, the Gang of Four was possibly unaware of Lavoisier.389 On May 3, when Mao Zedong talked to the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing, he said that the following two points could be made regarding the issue of intellectuals. The first was that in the sectors of education, science, the arts, news, and health care, where there was a concentration of intellectuals, there were some good comrades who believed in Marxism and Leninism. The second was that the Stinky 9th had to remain.390 In early July, Mao Zedong held a discussion with Deng Xiaoping. Mao admitted that the Cultural Revolution was in fact a cultural desert — with no wealth of novels, poems, or culture.391 On July 9, Deng talked to Hu Qiaomu and others to convey Mao’s opinions about cultural and artistic work. Mao had said that in addition to diversity and variety, there were other issues to be debated: “Articles in recent years have all followed the same pattern, like the eight-part essays popular in the Ming dynasty. There has been no guidance with regard to variety 388. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 618.

389. Needham, “Science Reborn in China: Rise and Fall of the Anti–intellectual ‘Gang.’ “ 390. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 431.

391. Mao Zedong argued that there were too few model operas and even slight mistakes

would be severely criticized: “There has not been a great variety of cultural and artistic creations. It’s not good when people aren’t allowed to have different opinions.“ When

Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the cultural and artistic sectors were inactive, Mao said that people were afraid of writing articles or dramas. There were no novels or poetry.

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 64.)

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and diversity, and so culture and the arts have not thrived or prospered.“392 Deng said that basic theories were not being emphasized in the natural sciences, and proper research was not being conducted in applied science: “This will not do if we want to catch up with global levels.“393 Deng demanded that the Political Research Office of the State Council collect materials on the failure to implement guidance related to variety, diversity, and debate in the fields of culture, science, education, and publishing for discussion by the Political Bureau.394 Hu Qiaomu and others submitted many important materials and wrote letters about these issues to Mao and Deng. On July 13, Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, saying that the draft of “On the Ten Major Relationships“ had been prepared and that it was waiting to be finalized and published.395 Mao Zedong replied that this report could be distributed to members of the Political Bureau, but that it should not be published: “It should be handed out for discussion within the party rather than being published.“396 On July 22, Deng chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to read the draft of “On the Ten Major Relationships.“397 Under the editorial direction of Hu Qiaomu, “On the Ten Major Relationships“ was a representative work on socialist construction by Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping and Hu Qiaomu examined the materials and suggested publication of the article since they wanted to preserve the historical memory of Mao Zedong for the whole party. This was Deng’s strategy for remedying the mistakes of Mao Zedong in his later years by using Mao’s own correct thoughts. However, the timing was bad, and Mao disagreed with its publication. When talking to Jiang Qing on July 14, Mao Zedong remarked that the cultural and artistic policy of the party should be modified to allow the expansion of the 392. Ibid., 66. 393. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 63. 394. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 26.

395. Deng Xiaoping’s report to Mao Zedong stated: “We all felt that this article was of great

importance and provided targeted theoretical guidance for the present and the future — both to China and the international community, especially the third world. Therefore,

we wanted it to be finalized as soon as possible and published as an important article to promote the learning of theories across the nation. I hereby ask you to consider this.“ (Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 11–12.)

396. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 444.

397. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 68.

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diversity of cultural and artistic programs over a period of one to three years: “We lack poetry, novels, essays, and critical studies. Writers should be allowed to learn from their past mistakes so as to avoid future ones. As long as they don’t conduct any counter-revolutionary activities, such writers should not be silenced.“398 On July 18, Zhang Tianmin, who scripted the movie Pioneering and who was a screenwriter for Changchun Film Studio, wrote to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Zhang defended himself against the 10-item accusations of Jiang Qing and the core team of the Ministry of Culture, according to which Pioneering committed serious political and artistic mistakes. Zhang requested that the ban on the movie be revoked. After reading the letter on July 25, which stated that the movie had not made any major mistakes, Mao recommended that it be released and commented: “We shouldn’t be too picky. The 10 accusations were excessive and are not really helpful for the cultural and artistic policies of the party.“399 After receiving Mao’s comments, Deng held a discussion with the seven leaders of the Political Research Office of the State Council. It was concluded that the Ministry of Culture had dealt with affairs too roughly since it would not allow the release of such a good movie as Pioneering. If this kind of approach continued, it would not be possible to expand variety in cultural and artistic creations.400 Later, Jiang Qing stated that Zhang had put forward a good case and that Mao’s comment was a verdict against the Ministry of Culture.401 At that time, Yu Huiyong, who was a favorite of Jiang’s, was the Minister of Culture. On July 29, Mao made favorable comments about the movie Haixia. As a result, Deng decided to allow the movie national release.402 Following the instructions of Deng Xiaoping and based on investigations, Deng Liqun (who worked in the Political Research Office of the State Council) was from July to August in charge of investigating books published during the Cultural Revolution. It was found that a total of 100,000 pamphlets had been published, among which only 20 were of academic value and several were republications. The investigation findings were submitted to Deng and others.403 In 1965, a total of 20,143 books were published; in 1974, that number fell to 11,812 — only 58.6% of 398. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol.13, 446.

399. Ibid., 450. 400. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 36. 401. Ibid., 37. 402. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1246.

403. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 59.

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the earlier figure.404 On August 8, Li Chunguang, a young teacher in the Composition Theory Department of the Music College of May 7 Arts University, displayed a large poster criticizing China’s artistic and cultural policy. Deng Xiaoping submitted this poster to Mao Zedong, who wrote a comment on it.405 On September 26, when listening to Hu Yaobang report the work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Deng Xiaoping said that the technical staff of Anshan Steel Company lacked competence. Deng said that such talents as Huang Kun — a researcher in the Institute of Semiconductors at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, whose work was unrelated to what he had studied — were numerous: “Such people should be allowed to do what they excel at. Otherwise, this represents a huge waste for the country. Why shouldn’t this person do what he’s good at?“406 On November 2, Mao Zedong commented on a letter from Mao Xueyin, a famous writer, which was submitted by Hu Qiaomu.407 On October 16, Mao Zedong commented on “Reflections on Older Intellectuals Who Attended the Reception for the National Day Holiday,“ that “The incorrect pursuit of perfectionism should be brought to an end.“408 Mao was clearly at odds with Jiang Qing’s actions against older intellectuals. The temporary cultural policy adjustment brought a welcome breath of fresh air to the cultural sector. However, these moves were overwhelmed by the campaign against the novel Tale of the Marshes and against the rightists. Once again, China found itself entering a political maelstrom.

404. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 87.

405. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 451.

406. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 46.

407. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 451.

408. Ibid., 477.

The material was submitted to Deng Xiaoping by Hu Qiaomu, one of the leaders of the

Political Research Office of the State Council on October 13, and Deng Xiaoping passed this on to Mao on October 15.

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Critique of Tale of the Marshes and the Campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the Rightist Tendency In August 1975, when Deng Xiaoping, who was in charge of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, took dramatic measures to restore order across the nation, an improvement began to take shape in all sectors. But then, Mao Zedong suddenly made a political turnaround. He launched the critique of Tale of the Marshes, in which Yao Wenyuan played an important role. The launch of critique also triggered the fourth severe conflict between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing. Later, as a result of lobbying by Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong decided to launch a campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency. When talking to members of the Central Military Committee on December 21, 1973, Mao Zedong reproved Zhou Enlai when he said that Tale of the Marshes had not opposed the emperor — only corrupt officials. Later, the outlaws accepted amnesty and surrendered to the government.409 Zhou was aware of Mao’s intention in rebuking Song Jiang. Two years later, Mao once again mentioned this matter. On August 14, 1975, Mao Zedong again commented that Tale of the Marshes fought only against the corrupt officials — not the emperor. Song Jiang surrendered: he followed revisionism and accepted amnesty.410 This discussion was printed and distributed as Document No. 196 in 1975 by the Central Committee Office. After reading the document, Deng Xiaoping suggested to Mao that it be handed out for discussion by the Political Bureau. Mao replied that this was a literary issue — a comment on classic literature. Therefore, it was inappropriate for discussion or distribution.411 Three hours after this discussion, when Yao Wenyuan received Mao’s comment on Tale of the Marshes, he felt as though he had found a great treasure. Yao immediately reported to Mao that he felt this issue to be very important. From the perspective of developing Marxist literary criticism, Yao believed it to be of positive significance in discussing and making comments on Tale of the Marshes as well as criticizing the reconciliation of the classes reflected in the novel and fighting against and preventing revisionism. On August 18, Yao submitted the discussion that appeared in the People’s Daily and Guangming Daily as well as his preliminary plans to Mao. After reading these materials, Mao changed his mind about releasing 409. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1003.

410. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 457.

411. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 20.

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the document, and he gave his approval.412 During the political movement against Tale of the Marshes, severe rainstorms hit Henan Province, causing dam breaches on a large scale. The stricken areas included 29 counties, 62,939 production brigades; where 10.36 million people were affected, 5.68 million houses collapsed, and 31,300 people died.413 This news was not officially announced, but it was reported to Mao Zedong in a classified document. After reading the report, he sobbed and said to himself: “I am more and more emotionally fragile. I cannot help feeling sad on hearing about this calamity.“414 However, Mao did not give up on the primacy of class struggles, and he went ahead and launched the political movement against Tale of the Marshes. On August 28, Red Flag published an article which was revised by Yao Wenyuan “Emphasize the Critique of Tale of the Marshes,“ for communicating Mao Zedong’s idea to the public. On September 4, with Mao’s approval, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Conducing a Critique of Tale of the Marshes,“ as prepared by Yao Wenyuan,415 who was an expert of arranging fragmentary words, phrases, and sentences into a system and constructing a theory. He developed Mao’s instruction into a political message. The editorial led to the critique of Tale of the Marshes becoming another major battle on China’s political and ideological front, and it was directly targeted at Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.416 On September 7, when Zhou Enlai met delegates from Romania, he said that he was sick and was unable to work anymore. Zhou stated that Deng Xiaoping would replace him in taking charge of the State Council. By then, the vice premier had already taken over overall responsibility for the council.417 Zhou did not expect at that time that Deng was about to become politically marginalized. He told the foreign visitors that he had received an invitation from Marx to join him. He knew that his days were numbered, though the political prospects for China and for the Chinese people were far from certain. Zhou did not expect that after his death, Jiang Qing and her supporters would ever allow the dead Zhou to overwhelm the living Mao. Their activities led to the shocking Tiananmen Square incident. 412. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 459.

413. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1249.

414. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1747. 415. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 459–460.

416. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 405. 417. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 317.

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On September 12, Jiang Qing said at a meeting with villagers from Dazhai that the essence of Tale of the Marshes was that Chao Gai became excluded and marginalized so that Song Jiang could surrender to the emperor. Song Jiang gathered around him a gang of local lords, immoral gentry, and corrupt officials and put them into important positions. Jiang maintained that to criticize Tale of the Marshes was to warn people that there were CPC members who wanted to surrender.418 In late August, Jiang had held discussions with Yu Huiyong, Minister of Culture, and others, and she said that the chairman’s criticism of Tale of the Marshes had practical significance. The essence of censuring Tale of the Marshes was to marginalize Chao Gai, and at present there were some people in the Political Bureau (meaning Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) who had tried to make Chairman Mao into a figurehead.419 Jiang’s explanation was an excellent one. Both before and during the Cultural Revolution, Mao did not lead directly and neither did he attend Political Bureau meetings. Mao had to operate via agents, such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping.420 However, there was a severe imbalance in information, and so Mao always felt as though he was just a figurehead, and this was something that Jiang well understood. However, she always used any opportunity to elaborate on her own ideas: she constantly used any new words or phrases of Mao in her attacks on other people. On September 15, Zhou Enlai said to others that the Gang of Four had gone too far: “In recent times, they have criticized Tale of the Marshes and have fought against those who would surrender. What they were driving at is perfectly clear. If there were people who surrendered, they should of course be reproved. However, that was not the case. I have made mistakes; but for scores of years, I have always worked hard for the party and for the people.“421 Zhou could not stand allusive political attacks being made against him, and in this way for the first time in his life shortly before his death, he made a strong protest against Mao. On September 17, at the meeting in Dazhai, Jiang Qing described the criticism against her at Political Bureau meetings as a form of persecution: “I was attacked every day. The revisionists were attacking me. Should a communist be afraid of such harassment? I struggled with my persecutors for half a year in Beijing.“422 418. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1751. 419. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 405. 420. Over a very long period, Mao Zedong did not attend meetings of the Political Bureau. He had Liu Shaoqi take charge of the daily work of the Political Bureau. (Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 9.)

421. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 318. 422. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and

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That was the second time for Jiang to visit rural areas. However, Dazhai was no true reflection of the poverty, ignorance, and backwardness that existed over vast areas of rural China. Jiang, though, was not particularly concerned about economic growth or poverty relief; she was interested in class struggles. Since she was alienated from the people, there was all-round satisfaction when she was finally supplanted — even though this occurred in the form of a coup. On September 20, right before Zhou Enlai was wheeled into the operation room for his 13th operation, well aware that he had one foot in his grave, he had received the “Report on the Kuomintang’s Slanderous Publication of the Wuhao Announcement,“ which he had prepared for the campaign meeting against Lin Biao and noted, “September 20, 1975, before entering the operating theater.“ This was the last time Zhou signed his name to a document,423 to prove his political innocence. Deng Rong commented: “This is rather sad.“424 Upon entering the operation room, he yelled: “I have always been loyal to the party and to the people! I am not a capitulant!“ At that time, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, and Deng Yingchao and others were present. Deng Yingchao asked Wang Dongxing, director of the Central Committee Office, to report what had occurred to Mao Zedong.425 This demonstrates that in the last moment of his life, Zhou knew that the Gang of Four would not spare him even after his death. The gang would use the Wu Hao incident to make him out to be a traitor who accepted amnesty. However, the Gang of Four would also use the critique of Tale of the Marshes to describe Zhou as a capitulant who fought against corrupt officials but not the emperor. During the Cultural Revolution, political information was always in the form of comments on ancient history.426 Under Mao’s personal dictatorship, even Zhou — who was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and premier of the State Council — did not feel politically secure. This was the political price of Mao’s philosophy of struggle. Instead of realizing the error of his ways, Mao launched large-scale political actions. It should be noted that Zhou Enlai’s dying words were: “I have always been loyal to the party and to the people!“ He said that rather than “I am loyal to Chairman Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1267. 423. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 394. 424. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 407; Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 352–356.

425. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 721.

426. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography, 83.

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Mao,“ which was something that he had very often stated. This reflects that before his death, Zhou chose the party and the people over Mao. His final declaration was “I am not a capitulant!“ This was a strong protest against the false accusations that had been made against him, and it also explains why he demanded that his ashes not be left behind. Zhou was concerned that he would be made out to be a capitulant. As a great statesman — renowned both in China and overseas — Zhou was distressed, sad, and indignant. Although he kept all of this a secret and the people could not possibly have been aware of this, they felt that Mao was unfair to Zhou, hence the people organized themselves in conducting memorial services for Zhou. By September, the drive to restore overall order, led by Deng Xiaoping, had been in existence for only half a year. However, it had brought new vitality and hope to China and won attention and praise around the world. But then, dramatic changes once again took place on China’s political stage. On September 24, Mao Zedong disclosed three important messages to Le Duan, the first secretary of the communist party of Vietnam. The first was that the poorest country in the world then was not Vietnam, but China. As to the reason, Mao said it was because China had a population of 800 million. How poor was China at that time? Mao did not expound this point — perhaps because he had no detailed figures. In fact, the per capita GDP of China in 1974 was USD835 (referencing 1990 International Dollars), whereas that of Vietnam is USD783, which respectively amounted to 20.4% and 19.1% of the world average. At that time, the populations of China and Vietnam were 900.35 million and 46.9 million respectively.427 China’s per capita GDP was slightly higher than Vietnam’s, but China was still one of the world’s poorest countries. Unlike China, Vietnam had had to fight against the French and the United States in its country — a situation that did not end until 1975. After 26 years of dictatorship, Mao, in September 1975, finally realized that China being one of the world’s poorest nations is its greatest and most basic characteristic. However, Mao did not relinquish his policy of taking class struggles as his primary course, nor did he decide to focus on rebuilding the economy. Deng Xiaoping was present at that meeting with the Vietnamese leader. In view of China’s situation, Deng decided to emphasize economic growth. The second message was that Mao Zedong admitted to the party and the country that he was facing a leadership crisis. Premier Zhou, Kang Sheng, and Ye Jianying — members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — were in poor physical condition. Mao was 82 and sick. Only Deng Xiaoping was strong and in good health. On April 18, Mao Zedong told Kim Il-sung, president of North 427. Maddison, Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2006AD.

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Korea, that Dong Biwu had died on April 2 and that Premier Zhou was sick. Mao noted that Kang Sheng and Liu Bocheng were also ill — as was Mao himself. Mao observed that he was already 82 and his days were numbered.428 Zhu De, another member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, was likewise in his advanced years. This indicated that it was likely that these five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, including Mao, would not live much longer. This was a cause of great distress and anxiety for Mao. It was a political crisis that had arisen as a result of his life tenure of supreme leadership. Deng was aware that this crisis had not been solved in Mao’s later years. When Mao met Henry Kissinger and George Bush (the latter was chief of the Liaison Office to China) on October 21, the first thing he said was: “I’m going to die soon. I’ve received the invitation from God.“ Even Bush was shocked. He wrote in his autobiography that it was amazing that the leader of the world’s biggest communist country should have said this.429 Deng was also a witness of this incidence.430 The third message was that Mao Zedong believed that in the CPC Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping was both healthy and strong. This showed that up till 24 September, Mao placed great hope in Deng. It may thus be concluded that Mao appreciated and affirmed Deng’s boldness and competence. Mao believed that Deng would be his successor.431 However, three days later — on September 27 — Mao suddenly changed his mind about this. On September 27, when Mao Zedong listened to Deng Xiaoping’s report after his meeting with foreign visitors, Mao was enraged by Jiang Qing’s speech at the Dazhai meeting: “That’s nonsense! What she said was just irrelevant. The purpose of the meeting was to call on farmers to learn from the situation in Dazhai, whereas she made a critique of Tale of the Marshes. She is so ignorant and unreliable. Few people trust her.“ After listening to the report by Hua Guofeng, Mao gave specific instructions to forbid Jiang’s speech from print, distribute, or broadcasted.432 In view of Zhou Enlai’s indignation and Deng’s queries, Mao had to restrain Jiang, and he announced that the criticism of Tale of the Marshes was not targeted at either Zhou or Deng. 428. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1206.

429. Ye, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, 478. 430. Those attending the meeting included Deng Xiaoping, the vice premier, Qiao Guanhua,

foreign minister, Huang Zhen, director, Wang Hairong, deputy foreign minister, and

Tang Wensheng and Zhang Hanzhi, deputy chief secretaries. (People’s Daily, October 22, 1975.)

431. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 411–412. 432. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1751.

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Deng Xiaoping was politically mature, and so he maintained his silence until the right moment presented itself. He did not attempt any direct fights with Mao Zedong, but Deng did emphasize the political struggle that would ensue after Mao’s departure. Deng’s greatest advantage was that he was much younger and healthier than Mao. His complex relationship with the chairman underwent a change: it became less a matter of political competition and more a question of who would outlive the other: that person would emerge as the true winner. Mao decided to launch a campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency; however, that produced the reverse result of accelerating Mao’s own demise and leading to Deng’s real ascendancy. At the time, of course, no one knew that this would be the outcome. Even Deng did not know that he would fall owing to the political circumstances set up by Mao Yuanxin. On September 27, Mao Yuanxin (CPC secretary of Liaoning Province, deputy director of the Liaoning Provincial Revolution Committee, and political commissar of the Shenyang Military Area) reported that there was a dispute within the senior leadership of the CPC over the Cultural Revolution, and he made false accusations against Deng Xiaoping.433 At that time, Mao Zedong did not conduct any investigations, nor did he place any trust in other leaders, including Jiang Qing. Instead, Mao Zedong attached importance to the report by Mao Yuanxin (his nephew), and Mao Zedong was particularly intolerant of the fact that Deng should dare to repudiate the Cultural Revolution while Mao was still alive. The most prominent characteristics of politics during the era of Mao Zedong were his unpredictability and caprice. Mao could put Deng Xiaoping in or out of power as he wished. He did it to Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, he could also easily do it to Deng. Mao’s political strategy was always the same. This was the inevitable result of Mao being alienated in supreme authority and enjoying absolute power, and it was also the cause of Mao’s political failure in his later years. 433. Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong: “A wind is blowing against the Cultural

Revolution, and it would appear to be fiercer than the criticism against the ultra-leftists

in 1972. Questions are asked about the revolution. Was it 70% or 30% good? Disputes are held about this. Should Liu Shaoqi be criticized? Now, the people seem to have forgotten about this matter and have begun to believe in the guidance of the three

instructions. I don’t agree with this. The guidance should be that of class struggle and the struggle over political direction. The three instructions have become simplified into

just one: promote production.“ Mao Yuanxin was afraid that there might be setbacks

and regressions in the CPC Central Committee. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 441.)

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Subsequently, Mao Yuanxin became Mao Zedong’s personal liaison, the major information source for Mao Zedong, and also the main channel by which the Political Bureau received its instructions from the chairman. Mao Zedong placed Mao Yuanxin into a core leadership position in the CPC Central Committee without going through any legal procedures.434 In terms of information for his decision making, Mao Zedong was alienated from the CPC Central Committee and his source of information became biased and unbalanced; as a result, it was inevitable that he would make a series of poor decisions. In terms of the decision-making mechanism, Mao Zedong violated the party’s organization principle, and he was unable to correct his own mistakes in this regard. Later Ye Jianying commented that abnormalities had arisen in the party: “By the winter of 1975, there came the liaison officer, the baby [Mao Yuanxin], who conveyed Chairman Mao’s opinions, and he also reported on the meetings of the Political Bureau to the chairman.“ Ye once told Chen Yun that although he was vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, he had no chance meeting Chairman Mao: “This is totally abnormal in the party.“435 This indicates how the central leadership was displeased with the practices of Mao Zedong and regarded them as extremely irregular. However, they were unable to do anything about the situation. On October 19, Mao Zedong held meetings with Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing, among others. Mao said that some people were now spreading reports that although he had criticized Jiang Qing, she had not repented: “Liu Bing and others from Tsinghua University wrote a letter to me, making accusations against Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. But their motives were not good. They were trying to attack Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, but they targeted their condemnation at me. You six [Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Xie Jingyi, and Chi Qun] should have a meeting and examine ways of dealing with this problem.“ On October 23, Deng Xiaoping held a meeting with five other people to discuss what Mao had said. On October 27, Deng, Li Xiannian, Wu De, and Wang Dongxing wrote to Mao Zedong and reported the results of their discussion and their opinions on how to implement Mao’s instructions. They unanimously stated that they believed Chairman Mao’s instructions to be very important. They also declared that the issue they discussed was not an isolated incident since it reflected the struggle 434. Deng Rong said that Mao Yuanxin became the messenger of Mao Zedong, and one

of the very few people who could actually see and talk to Mao Zedong owing to the fact that he was Mao Zedong’s nephew. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in Cultural Revolution, 413.)

435. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 242–245.

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between two different political directions.436 After September 27, when Mao Yuanxin made the false accusations against him, Deng Xiaoping was unable to see Mao Zedong. On October 31, Deng wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, requesting a face-to-face meeting for instructions and lessons.437 On the evening of November 1, Mao Zedong spoke to Deng. Mao Zedong rebuked Deng for having submitted the letter from Liu Bing.438 Liu Bing, Hui Xianjun, and Liu Yi’an of Tsinghua University had written again to Mao Zedong to expose the problem of Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. This letter was forwarded to Mao by Deng.439 Deng asked Mao whether recent policies and guidance had been correct. Mao affirmed that they were.440 On the afternoon of November 2, Mao Yuanxin once again told Mao Zedong that Deng Xiaoping had repudiated the Cultural Revolution.441 Mao Yuanxin played a 436. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1754. 437. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 413. 438. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 125.

439. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1281.

440. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 413–414. 441. Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong that since the start of the year, he had worked

in the provinces, and he could sense a force against the Cultural Revolution. First, people were asking how they should assess the revolution: “Should we judge it as

a mainstream development or a tributary? Was it 30% negative and 70% positive —

or was it the other way around? Should we affirm or deny the Cultural Revolution? Second, what should we make of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius: should

we regard this as a mainstream action or only a subsidiary one? At present, some people are just perfunctorily describing the achievements of the revolution, and they are listing many bad aspects. They have ignored the achievements of the campaign

against Lin Biao and Confucius. The third point is that people are wondering whether the political direction of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao should continue being a subject of

censure. People seem to have forgotten how essential it is to condemn Liu Shaoqi. Class struggle also seems to have become marginalized. The three instructions have become guidance, but I do not agree with this. Our guidance should be class struggle and the

struggle over political direction. Now, the three instructions have become simplified as one: promote production. Some comrades have always discussed the negative

aspects of the Cultural Revolution, and some even regard the Cultural Revolution as a catastrophe. I have listened carefully to the speeches of Comrade Deng Xiaoping. I felt that he seldom seemed to talk about the achievements of the Cultural Revolution or the

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major role in causing Mao Zedong to make Deng fall — even Jiang Qing could not rival Mao Yuanxin in this regard. This indicates how Mao Zedong believed only his nephew, not the collective leadership of the party. Mao Zedong said to Mao Yuanxin that there were two attitudes toward Cultural Revolution: one was dissatisfaction, and the other was total denial, regarding the revolution as a complete mistake: “They [referring to Liu Bing and others] target their criticisms at me. The issue they discussed is not an isolated one since it reflects the struggle between two political directions. Talk to Deng Xiaoping, Wang Dongxing, and Chen Xilian and express your opinion to them — frankly and directly.“442 Mao Zedong could not tolerate Deng’s rejection of the Cultural Revolution: it was a political baseline that no one could touch. That evening, Mao Yuanxin did as Mao Zedong had told him: “You need to help him [Deng Xiaoping] to improve his understanding.“ However, that was absurd since Mao Yuanxin was nobody compared with Deng Xiaoping in his position as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Mao Yuanxin spoke to Deng, Wang Dongxing, and Chen Xilian on behalf of Mao Zedong, and he criticized Deng. Deng was obliged to refute his earlier comments.443 He also said that he was willing to criticize himself. On November 3, Mao Yuanxin reported his talk to Mao Zedong, saying that Deng Xiaoping was very agitated and was having difficulty trying to categorize him, Mao Yuanxin. Mao Zedong asked: “What was the Cultural Revolution? It was a class struggle. The general view of the Cultural Revolution is that it was basically correct, though it did have some shortcomings. Now, we need to study its insufficiencies. People do not generally agree that it was 30% negative and 70% positive. Two mistakes were made in the Cultural Revolution: overthrowing everything and sweeping civil strife. With regard to the first mistake, it was correct to do some overthrowing, such as with Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. But it was wrong to bring some individuals down, such as the many veteran officials. Having said revisionism of Liu Shaoqi. I have not heard him talk about learning theories, criticizing Tale of the Marshes, or revisionism this year.“ (Ibid., 414–415.)

442. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1754–1755. 443. Deng Xiaoping said: “From your description, the central leadership followed a revisionistic course. The central leadership, headed by Chairman Mao, following revisionism? Isn’t that absurd? I began to resume work on March 9, 1975, and I have been in charge of the daily work of the central leadership since July. Since the issuing

of Document No. 9, things have taken a turn both for the better and for the worse. That is something that we need to think about. Facts speak louder than words.“ (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 442.)

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that, those individuals had made some errors, so it was acceptable to admonish them. When the Civil Revolution began, it had been over 10 years since China had had any experience of war. Thus, the civil strife was a kind of exercise. However, it was unacceptable for people to be beaten to death.“444 Mao Zedong in that period was acting in a noninstitutional and unorganized fashion by communicating his instructions to the members of the Political Bureau via his liaison officer and nephew, Mao Yuanxin;445 he was censuring members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. A meeting was arranged to include the following individuals in addition to the members of the Standing Committee: Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, and Zhang Chunqiao. In all, eight individuals would take part in this meeting. It appeared to be Mao’s intention to gradually push Deng Xiaoping out of the picture. On November 3, Wu De, member of the Political Bureau, and first secretary of the CPC Committee of Beijing, conveyed Mao Zedong’s instructions at an expanded meeting of the CPC Committee of Tsinghua University.446 Mao did not trust Deng Xiaoping and believed that he was following the wrong political course, and Mao was even prepared to have Deng ousted. On November 4, in accordance with Mao’s 444. Mao Zedong said that Liu Bing and others at Tsinghua University had made an

accusation against Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi: “In my view, they were driven by the

wrong motive in writing that letter. They were trying to attack Chi Qun, who was secretary of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Revolutionary Committee

of Tsinghua University as well as Xie Jingyi, who was a member of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the Beijing Committee of the CPC, and deputy secretary of the

CPC Committee of Tsinghua University. But they were actually targeting their criticism at me.“ Mao Zedong believed that Deng Xiaoping took sides with Liu Bing and others

by forwarding the letter. The issue they discussed at Tsinghua University was not an isolated incident since it reflected the struggle between two political directions. (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 488.)

445. In the second half of 1975, Mao Zedong’s physical condition deteriorated, and he had

difficulty reading, speaking, and moving. Therefore, Mao Zedong decided to have

his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, operate as his liaison officer. Mao Zedong’s opinions were

communicated by the liaison officer, and the meetings of the Political Bureau were reported to Mao Zedong by this person. As a result, even the vice chairman of the CPC

Central Committee was unable to see Mao Zedong. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 441.)

446. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 486.

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direction, the eight-member meeting was held to discuss the Cultural Revolution where Zhang Chunqiao and others rebuked Deng Xiaoping.447 That evening, Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong about the meeting. Mao Zedong commented that the general view of the Cultural Revolution was that it was basically correct, though it did have some shortcomings: “Now, we need to examine its insufficiencies, though opinions do differ here.“448 Mao stated that to maintain unity and stability did not mean that it was necessary to abandon the class struggle: “Class struggle is of primary importance: everything else is secondary.“449 It was Mao’s wish that the meeting be expanded to include other individuals so as to offer help to Deng. On November 7, a second meeting of the eight individuals was held.450 That meeting, which was intended to help Deng, soon developed into one of castigation: that was unavoidable because of Mao Zedong’s thesis of the class struggle. This was not the first time such a thing had happened, but it would be the last time. On November 10, Deng Xiaoping held a discussion with Hu Qiaomu, saying that he was being criticized and that the trigger had been when he forwarded the letter from Liu Bing: “The chairman disparaged me harshly, but he also criticized himself.“ The CPC Central Committee decided that it was not correct to follow the guidance of the three instructions. The political guidance at that time was the class struggle. Deng admitted that he had incorrectly understood the situation.451 Deng had placed too much reliance on Mao Zedong’s support, and he had failed to take Mao’s ambivalence into account. On November 11, an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau was held. In addition to others, Mao Yuanxin, Xie Jingyi, and Chi Qun attended the meeting. On November 13, Mao Zedong suggested that Zhou Rongxin and others should also participate in the meetings to help Deng and that the necessity to help Deng should be communicated to dozens of people in the party. Mao mentioned in particular Deng’s words: “People in the hidden retreat of Peach Blossoms did not know of the Han, let alone the Wei and Jin dynasties.“452 Deng was reaching the stage where he 447. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 127.

448. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1292.

449. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1756. 450. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 127–128.

451. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 104.

452. Mao Zedong wrote: “People in the hidden retreat of Peach Blossoms did not know of

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could no longer bear the situation. At that time, Wang Hongwen returned from Shanghai to Beijing. On November 15, Deng Xiaoping was forced to write a report to Mao Zedong, officially proposing that Wang should take charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. Mao Zedong commented on the letter from Deng that evening: “Comrade Xiaoping should remain in his position for the time being. We will discuss this matter later.“453 Mao made Deng chair the meetings of the Political Bureau that were intended to criticize Deng. Later, Mao despised and humiliated Deng by openly declaring that Deng’s promise never to repudiate the Cultural Revolution was unreliable.454 During this period, Kang Sheng told Mao Zedong that Deng Xiaoping disagreed with the Cultural Revolution. Spurred on by this, Mao was determined to make a historical conclusion regarding the Cultural Revolution while he was still alive. In that way, all those who opposed the Cultural Revolution would never be able to deny it.455 On November 20, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held, attended by 17 people, and its purpose was to evaluate the Cultural Revolution.456 Following Mao Zedong’s direction, the Political Bureau asked Mao Yuanxin to tell Deng Xiaoping that he should chair the meeting, whose purpose was to pass an affirmative resolution declaring that the Cultural Revolution had been 70% positive and 30% negative. Deng declined this demand. He said: “It is inappropriate for me to write the Han, let alone the Wei and Jin dynasties. Let this be known to some old comrades, such as Zhou Rongxin, minister of education, Li Chang, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hu Yaobang, leader of the core CPC team of the Chinese

Academy of Sciences, Hu Qiaomu, leader of the Political Research Office of the State Council, Liu Bing, vice secretary of the CPC Committee of Tsinghua University, and Li Jingquan, member of the CPC Central Committee.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 495.) 453. Ibid., 497. 454. This referred to Deng Xiaoping’s letter to Mao Zedong after listening to the communication relating to the Lin Biao Incident on August 3, 1972. Deng said in the

letter: “I admit to all the self-criticisms I have made, and reaffirm my promise to the

CPC Central Committee that I will never repudiate the Cultural Revolution.“ Deng requested to be allowed to return to his official position. This was the origin of the unreliable promise of Deng’s never to deny the Cultural Revolution. 455. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 426. 456. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong's Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 505.

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this resolution since I am from the hidden retreat of Peach Blossoms and do not know the Han, let alone the Wei and Jin dynasties.“457 Deng Xiaoping refused to chair a meeting to pass a resolution on the Cultural Revolution, and that was a great disappointment for Mao Zedong.458 This prompted Mao to launch a last political battle against Deng.459 For a sick 82-year-old man, this is as if playing his last card politically. Zhou Enlai did not understand why Deng Xiaoping could not just put up with Mao Zedong.460 That was the biggest difference between Deng and Zhou. Deng was steel-willed and would not budge on fundamental issues; in contrast, Zhou conceded to Mao time and again, with the result that the Cultural Revolution lasted 10 years. But this did not of course mean that Zhou was able to escape from political persecution. Zhou was also a victim of the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing and others cooked up charges, imprisoned Zhou’s adopted daughter, Sun Weishi, and his brother, Zhou Enshou, and persecuted them to death. Xu Ming, vice director of Zhou Enlai’s office, was forced to commit suicide as a result of Jiang’s persecution. Zhou Jiading, Zhou Enlai’s secretary, was obliged to conceal his identity for having displeased Jiang. On July 1, when Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian appeared in a group photo with industrial workers after they had met Kukrit Pramoj, prime minister of Thailand, Zhou said: “This is my last photo taken with you. I hope that you won’t

457. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 426–427.

As explained by Ji Dengkui, the series of measures taken by Deng Xiaoping when he

was in power went against the Cultural Revolution. After the incident of Liu Bing’s

letter, Chairman Mao intended that Deng should write a resolution on the Cultural Revolution. Mao even dictated that the revolution should be regarded as 30% negative

and 70% positive. Deng declined this demand. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1757.)

458. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1756. 459. Deng Rong stated that Deng Xiaoping’s obstinacy caused Mao Zedong to decide to attack Deng. At the last moment of Mao’s political life, he wanted to protect the

Cultural Revolution. Mao would not bear any criticisms or denial of the revolution. This was the ultimate principle that he adhered to. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 427.)

460. Zhang Shuying, deputy leader of Zhou Enlai’s staff, said that after talking to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping knew immediately that things were not good and that the

results would be severe. Deng drove to Hospital 305 to explain the matter to Zhou. Zhou was upset and stared at Deng, saying: “Can’t you just restrain yourself?“ (Qin, “What Did Zhou Enlai Think of at the Last Stage of His Life?“)

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attempt to have my face erased in the future.“461 Since late November, Mao Zedong had bypassed the CPC Central Committee, and no plenary sessions of the committee had been held. Mao maintained contact with a meeting attended by over 130 leaders of the party, government, and PLA on November 24 by to exchanging messages. That meeting was chaired by Deng Xiaoping. Li Xiannian communicated Mao Zedong’s “Points of Messages to Be Sent.“ The points were arranged based on Mao Yuanxin’s notes on his talks with Mao Zedong. On November 26, the CPC Central Committee officially passed its “Notice on Issuing the Points of Messages to Be Sent.“462 This was the last political struggle to be officially launched by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong would not allow Deng Xiaoping to rectify the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. Through noninstitutional practices, such as personal instructions, political liaisons, meetings held by means of exchanging messages, and receiving meeting summaries via messages, Mao launched a campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency to overthrow past verdicts. In the process, China was once more thrown into chaos. The attempts to achieve overall restoration of order conducted in 1975 by Deng Xiaoping had indeed gone against the Cultural Revolution;463 they could be regarded as measures to correct the mistakes made by that revolution and preparatory steps for reform and opening-up in China.464 In June 1966, there was only one drama being played out on China’s political stage, but by November 1975 two totally different dramas were being enacted. Comparison leads to discernment, 461. Ibid. 462. The notice announced that the CPC Central Committee regarded Chairman Mao’s

instruction on the letter from Liu Bing and others as very important: “The issue discussed at Tsinghua University was not an isolated incident since it reflects the struggle between

the two political directions. Denying old verdicts is a rightist tendency. The big debate

at Tsinghua University will definitely affect the whole country. Chairman Mao pointed

out that messages should be sent to some comrades to prevent them making mistakes. (Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 505.)

463. Deng Xiaoping recalled: “In fact, the efforts to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution started in 1975. At that time, I took charge of the party and the government, and I undertook a series of corrective measures, which had an immediate effect. Those

measures were indeed contrary to the Cultural Revolution.“ (Party Literature Research

Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 81.) 464. Gong, From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, 285–287.

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and competition leads to selection. The Chinese people were doing the comparison and selection. Deng could not possibly deny the Cultural Revolution under the prevailing circumstances. His long-term strategy was one of overall rectification, i.e., correcting all the disastrous consequences of the Cultural Revolution. Deng’s policy would inevitably lead to repudiation of that revolution. Mao Zedong would never allow Deng to pose a political challenge to him. The Cultural Revolution was the personal creation of Mao Zedong as an individual. In the final period of Mao’s political life, he made all efforts to preserve the Cultural Revolution. He would not allow any criticisms or rejection of that revolution. This was his ultimate principle and he adhered to it.465 However, Mao Zedong was suffering from a debilitating physical condition. He was also hemmed in by inescapable conflicts.466 Launching another large-scale political movement was an obligation for Mao as an old man. Ultimately, he needed and relied on the Gang of Four. In November, Zhang Chunqiao stated that the Political Research Office of the State Council had been put together for no good purpose. Jiang Qing remarked that the office was a huge rumor-making machine: “Hu Qiaomu is evil, and Deng Xiaoping put him into a position even higher than that of the Political Bureau.“ Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi echoed these sentiments when they said that the office specialized in scheming and plotting. They said that the Political Research Office put together a number of malicious scholars to act as a tool for Deng Xiaoping’s manipulations.467 On December 4, the People’s Daily reprinted the article “The Direction of Education Revolution Will Not Be Distorted,“ which originally appeared in issue no. 12 of Red Flag in 1975. On December 14, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Report on the Big Debate on Education Revolution in Tsinghua University.“ Despite his illness, on December 8 Zhou Enlai met Wang Hongwen and reminded him about Mao Zedong’s warning in his Changsha talk in 1974 that Jiang Qing was ambitious.468 The same day, Deng Xiaoping went to see Zhou in hospital. When Zhou asked: “Will you change your position?“ Deng resolutely replied: “Never!“ Zhou said: “Then I am reassured!“469 Apparently, Zhou adopted Deng’s position 465. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 427. 466. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1761. 467. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1227.

468. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 723.

469. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 430–431.

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before he died: he was opposed to the campaign against the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts. This shows that Mao had made too many enemies in the party and had become an isolated emperor. On December 9 at a Political Bureau meeting, Jiang Qing reprimanded Deng Xiaoping and some other senior party officials. Wang Hongwen made a systematic attack against Deng’s efforts to restore order in China. Wang declared that Deng’s policies would drag China back to the stage before the Cultural Revolution. Wang said that Deng’s efforts to promote the economy were also misguided. On December 13, the Political Bureau meeting continued criticizing Deng, and Mao Yuanxin communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions. On December 16, Kang Sheng — a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — died. In August, Kang had talked to Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, and he reported to Mao Zedong that Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao had betrayed the party; claiming himself had witnessed the process and could attest the fact.470 However, Kang withheld the information until just before his death. Kang acted as a dangerous political element in the party. He persecuted most CPC leaders in the most aggressive manner. However, Mao kept the materials related to Kang locked away in a safe. As a result, Jiang was anxious to get her hands on those archive materials of Mao’s soon after his death. Those materials became the evidence used by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Wang Dongxing and others to denounce Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao in October 1976. On December 20, Deng Xiaoping was forced to criticize himself at a meeting of the Political Bureau. He expressed his wish to see Mao Zedong.471 Although Deng was still in charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee, Mao refused this request. At the meetings of the Political Bureau on December 29 and 31, Mao Yuanxin conveyed Mao Zedong’s instruction that the greatest danger was that of capitalist roaders in power. Deng Xiaoping chose to talk to neither the Political Bureau nor the State Council, but took sides with the capitalist intellectuals. Mao Yuanxin stated that since such individuals were targets for revolutionization and the rights of capitalists were restricted, they were dissatisfied.472 In December, Zhou Enlai said to Ye Jianying that it was necessary to carefully 470. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1258.

471. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 136–137.

472. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 883.

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select the methods used in political struggles. He further said that whatever the outcome, power should never fall into the hands of the Gang of Four. This was Zhou’s last political statement. During the period from June 1, 1974, when he was hospitalized, to his death, he underwent six major operations and eight minor ones, which was an average of one operation every 40 days.473 Also in December, Zhu De, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and chairman of the NPC, talked to Zhou Huan, secretary of the Liaoning CPC Committee, and expressed his satisfaction with the work of Deng Xiaoping: “Things are going very well, though people are still not convinced.“ Zhu also commented on the campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts: “Some people are still causing trouble. Efforts to usurp power never succeed. Didn’t Lin Biao fall? Some people want to bring me down. But these matters do not concern me alone. I didn’t want to be in power. I was put in power by the party. If some people want to attack me, they first need to attack the party. There is no other way.“474 As a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Zhu apparently did not agree with the campaign against Deng, but he was as helpless in this regard as Ye Jianying, and he was unable to restrain Mao Zedong. On December 31, Mao Zedong met Julie, daughter of former U.S. President Nixon, and her husband, David Eisenhower. Mao said that China was undergoing a class struggle: “We are going through a struggle among the people and within the party. There can be no progress or peace without struggle. With 800 million people, what else can we do?“475 This was the philosophy of struggle in which Mao firmly believed: it was his theoretical foundation and logic every time he launched a political struggle. For Mao on the threshold of 1976, there were various questions. Who should he struggle against? For what purpose? What would be the outcome of such a struggle? Could he keep on struggling indefinitely? Would he emerge as the winner as he had in the past? There were no answers to these questions.

Death of Zhou Enlai and the Tiananmen Square Incident The year of 1976 was an eventful one: it was a year of struggles, but it was also one of good fortune for China. With the death of Mao Zedong, the 10-year-long Cultural 473. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1285.

474. Ibid., 1307. 475. Ibid., 1305.

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Revolution came to an end. This represented a victory of the laws of nature over the philosophy of struggle. On January 1, two poems by Mao Zedong — “Prelude to Water Melody: Reascending Jinggang Mountain“476 and “Two Birds: A Dialogue to the Tune of Niannujiao“477 — were published in the People’s Daily. The People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published a New Year editorial titled “Where There Is a Will There Is a Way,“ which presented Mao’s latest direction, whereby maintaining unity and stability did not preclude the class struggle: class struggle was the primary aim, with everything else being secondary. The same day, Red Flag published an article titled “On the Practical Significance of Tale of the Marshes,“ by Yi Ming. The article stated that with the development of the struggle between the two classes and two political directions, the practical significance of criticizing Tale of the Marshes had become increasingly clear: revisionism was obviously the major danger at present. The article said that the Party Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress of the CPC stated: “We need to be especially alert against careerists, schemers, and double-dealers. We have to prevent such evil ones from usurping the leadership of the party and government at all levels. We must ensure that the leadership of the party and the nation is always in the hands of Marxist revolutionaries. If the leadership were 476. “Prelude to Water Melody: Reascending Jinggang Mountain“ by Mao Zedong: “I have long aspired to reach for the clouds / And I again ascend Jinggang Mountain. / Coming from afar to view our old haunt, / I find new scenes replacing the old. / Everywhere

orioles sing, swallows dart, / Streams babble / And the road mounts skyward. / Once

Huangyanggai is passed / No other perilous place demands a glance. / Wind and thunder are stirring, / Flags and banners are flying / Wherever men live. / Thirtyeight years have fled / With a mere snap of the fingers. / We can clasp the moon in

the 9th Heaven / And seize turtles deep down in the Five Seas / Nothing is difficult in

this world / If you dare to scale the heights.“ (First appeared in the Poetry Magazine in January 1976 and the People’s Daily in January 1, 1976.)

477. “Two Birds: A Dialogue to the Tune of Niannujiao“ by Mao Zedong: “The roc wings fanwise, / Soaring ninety thousand li / And rousing a raging cyclone. / The blue sky

on his back, he looks down / To survey man’s world with its towns and cities. / Gunfire

licks the heavens, / Shells pit the earth. / A sparrow in his bush is scared stiff. / ‘This is an awful mess! / I want to flit and fly away.’ / ‘Where, may I ask?’ / The sparrow replies, / ‘To a jeweled palace in Elfland’s hills. / Don’t you know that a trilateral treaty was signed / Under the bright autumn moon two years ago? / There’ll be plenty to eat,

/ Potatoes piping hot, / Beef goulash.’ / ‘Stop your windy nonsense! / Look, the world is being turned upside down.’ (Ibid.)

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not in the hands of the Marxist working class, the proletariat Cultural Revolution would be repudiated; the basic political course of the party would be altered and the verdict on revisionism would be overthrown.“ This article also stated that the practical significance of censuring Tale of the Marshes was to attack Deng Xiaoping, which was a reflection of the allusiveness and trickiness that then existed in politics. Yao Wenyuan, a member of the Political Bureau and the editor of Red Flag, was the most important political fighter. On January 3, Deng Xiaoping underwent self-criticism for the second time at a meeting of the Political Bureau over which he presided. Deng still wished to talk to Chairman Mao in person about his mistakes.478 Mao Yuanxin reported this to Mao Zedong, who was still dissatisfied and once again refused Deng’s request. At that point, Mao Zedong listened only to Mao Yuanxin. On January 7, Jiang rebuked Deng Xiaoping at a Political Bureau meeting, saying that Deng had tried to reverse past verdicts and restore the old order.479 Apparently, Deng’s policies of overall restoration of order had directly affected the interests of the Cultural Revolution hardliners headed by Jiang, as Deng’s policies aimed to rectify the mistakes of that revolution. Once Mao Zedong had decided to criticize Deng, Jiang inevitably attacked Deng. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s directions to criticize and help Deng Xiaoping, the Political Bureau on January 8 compiled Mao’s comments about Deng in a document titled “Important Instructions of Chairman Mao.“ This document was based on Mao Yuanxin’s notes of Mao Zedong’s talks with Mao Yuanxin against Deng Xiaoping and the rightists from October 1975 to January 1976. Mao Yuanxin initiated and carried out this last political movement on behalf of Mao. Mao Yuanxin thus played an even more important role in this regard than Jiang Qing. Mao held the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, there he witness the adoption of the 16 articles that launched the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, Mao Zedong now needed only to authorize Mao Yuanxin to launch the campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts. It was on January 8 that Zhou Enlai died. Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian were the first to bid farewell to Zhou. Deng Yingchao told them Zhou’s last three wishes: his ashes should be scattered around the vast land of China; the funeral should be quiet; there should be no memorial meeting or ceremony for people to pay

478. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997), vol. 1, 140.

479. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 441.

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respect to his remains.480 Li Xiannian and Deng Xiaoping replied that the Chinese people would never agree with this. Deng Yingchao said that she had promised to fulfill Zhou’s three wishes. She had to keep her promise; she said firmly: “He was extremely concerned that I would not be able to fulfill his wishes. He didn’t want any of his ashes to be left behind. Never!“ Finally, the central leadership and Deng Yingchao reached a compromise: the memorial meeting and ceremony for the people to pay their respects to his remains should be held, but Zhou’s ashes would not be kept.481 At three o’clock in the afternoon, Deng Xiaoping chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss Zhou’s funeral affairs. Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter about this to Mao Zedong, who responded that he agreed.482 Zhou Enlai had worked as head of the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government for five years from 1949 to 1954. Zhou had also served as premier of the State Council for 22 years, from 1954 to 1976. He had been premier for 27 years. Zhou Enlai was something of a contradiction. He was both a proponent of the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong and a statesman who attempted to restrict the chaos caused by that revolution. He played different political roles. First and foremost, Zhou was unconditionally loyal to Mao Zedong, and he advocated Mao’s personality cult. Zhou did his best to maintain Mao’s personal authority, and he conscientiously implemented all of Mao’s instructions, with the result that the Cultural Revolution was protracted and its consequences became more widespread. It is considered that Mao made many mistakes in his late years, so did Zhou. Zhou carried out many things against his will — otherwise he would not be able to survive. If conditions allowed, he would protect individuals who had been attacked and were subject to persecution, including Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian. Zhou died in a state of agony, indignation, and regret. Later, Deng said that the Chinese people would forgive Zhou for his actions.483 480. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 888.

481. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 410–411. 482. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 141.

483. Deng Xiaoping said that during the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai had been in a very difficult position and so he had said and done many things against his will.

However, the Chinese forgave him. This was because he would not be able to survive and neutralize the consequences of the Cultural Revolution if he had not done so. He

had protected many people. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 348.)

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Following Mao Zedong’s instructions as relayed by Mao Yuanxin, on January 9 Yao Wenyuan demanded that Xinhua News Agency not publish any reports about the memorial activities of Zhou Enlai.484 At four o’clock that afternoon, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao Zedong: “After the news of the premier’s death was announced, many countries have requested that they send delegates or a delegation to attend the funeral in Beijing. The Political Bureau has discussed this matter and decided to follow the plan approved by Chairman Mao.“ With Mao’s consent, the committee responsible for the funeral affairs announced that no foreign governments, political parties, or friendly parties would be invited to the funeral.485 On January 10, Mao Yuanxin officially communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions to the Political Bureau that the funeral arrangement should be inexpensive; no memorial meetings, mourning halls, black gauze, nor wreaths would be allowed across the country. No foreign delegacies would be invited to the memorial meeting in Beijing. All party members should turn their grief into power and dedicate themselves to revolution, production, and the ongoing struggle against the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts. Deng Xiaoping asked when the chairman had given those instructions. Zhang Chunqiao explained that they were in a report made by Comrade Yuanxin. After Mao Yuanxin read his report to Chairman Mao on January 9, Mao agreed with the content and asked that the matter be discussed by the Political Bureau. Zhang Chunqiao suggested that Yao Wenyuan should draft a notice following Mao’s instructions and issue this notice in the name of the Funeral Affairs Committee as soon as possible.486 What happened was that Mao Yuanxin created a set of instructions, which, upon approval by Mao Zedong, became the chairman’s instructions on the matter; this would then be presented to the Political Bureau, and it became the decision of the central leadership. In a sense, Mao Yuanxin had become the authority over the Political Bureau. This was the form of the decision-making process at that time, and it was noninstitutional. How could Mao Yuanxin convey such directions from Mao Zedong? Mao was very particular about his role as supreme leader, and he would never allow any other leader in the party to enjoy greater authority and popularity among the people: in the words of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Mao Yuanxin, he would never allow a dead figure (Zhou Enlai) to overwhelm the living one (Mao Zedong). However, the people were extremely dissatisfied when 484. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1316.

485. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 141–142.

486. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 7–8.

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the central leadership deliberately suppressed the report about Zhou’s death and memorial activities. Such suppression was the political trigger for the Tiananmen Square Incident.487 This incident was targeted at political dictatorship and also at Mao. Late at night, Yao Wenyuan told Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily, that some people had tried to exert pressure on the central leadership under the guise of mourning the premier. They wished to disrupt the campaign against the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts.488 On January 11, the remains of Zhou Enlai were solemnly escorted to Babaoshan for cremation. Along the dozens of kilometers of roads from Chang’an Street to Babaoshan, millions of people braved the piercing wind and stood at the roadside along which Zhou’s hearse passed to pay their respects to their beloved premier. As Li Xiannian recalled later, a huge number of people spontaneously went to the streets to pay their respects to a CPC member and a state leader in their deepest grief. This was an unprecedented act.489 Zhou stood for justice. The Chinese people made a clear stand on what they loved and hated.490 487. Wu De later recalled that these abnormal “should-nots,“ which suppressed the

memorial activities for Premier Zhou and debased Premier Zhou’s achievements, led to strong objections from the people: the greater the suppressions, the stronger the

people’s wish to defy them: “They just dared to defy the despotic power of the Gang

of Four and engaged in struggles with them.“ (Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 203– 204.)

488. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 9. 489. On February 5, 1988, Li Xiannian, then state president, recalled that when the word of

Zhou Enlai’s death spread, hundreds of millions of people wept, and unprecedented mourning crowds appeared in Tiananmen Square for several days in a row. On January 15, 1976, over a million young people, senior citizens, women, and children stood for hours in piercing winds to bid their last farewell to their respected and dear leader.

(Party Literature Research of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Li Xiannian (1935–1988), 492.)

490. In 1981, the CPC Central Committee made a resolution about evaluating Zhou Enlai: “Comrade Zhou Enlai was extremely loyal to the party and the people, and he spared no efforts in fulfilling his duty. He was in a very difficult position during the Cultural

Revolution. He kept his focus on the big picture, and he willingly bore the burden of hard work; he made unremitting efforts to conduct the normal work of the party and

the country so as to minimize the losses caused by the Cultural Revolution and protect

numerous cadres within and outside the party. He engaged in struggles of various

forms with the counter-revolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. His death caused deepest sorrow among CPC members and the Chinese people of all ethnic

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On January 13, Yao Wenyuan issued three instructions to the Xinhua News Agency: he demanded that the reports on the daily revolutionary and production activities should not be marginalized owing to reports on Zhou’s memorial activities.491 The same day, Yao Wenyuan told Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily, that the reports on the death of Premier Zhou should be scaled back, saying: “The typeface for domestic news and comprehensive news should be reduced in size. The reports on the death of Premier Zhou should not be too prominent.“492 On January 14, as arranged by Yao Wenyuan, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Big Debates Produce Big Changes“ by one of its reporters as the front-page headline, and it dealt with the situation at Tsinghua University. This was a deliberate move to enrage the public.493 The fact that Zhou Enlai died and Deng Xiaoping was under attack left a political vacuum in the CPC Central Committee and State Council. That forced Mao Zedong to select a new leader as soon as possible. Zhang Chunqiao was selected to act as premier of the State Council since he was the first in line to succeed in this position. On the afternoon of January 15, Xiao Mu (secretary of both Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao) told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen (secretaries of the Shanghai CPC Committee) that since Premier Zhou had died, Chairman Mao and the Political Bureau were thinking about his successor: “Comrade Chunqiao sent me back to deliver a message to you. He wanted to know your opinion, and he hoped that Shanghai would respond to this — especially the industrial workers.“ Ma Tianshui said: “Personally, I think that now Premier Zhou has passed away and Deng Xiaoping is under attack, the talk of being premier of the State Council will weigh heavily on the shoulders of Comrade Chunqiao.“ Xu Jingxian made the following proposal: “First, the masses should be mobilized in the form of symposiums, and workers should be encouraged to write letters to the CPC Central backgrounds.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.)

491. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1319.

492. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 25. 493. On July 24, 1980, Yao Wenyuan confessed that during that period there were no important articles that criticized the rightists: “The masses and cadres are resisting this

campaign, which is having difficulty continuing. If I delayed any longer, there would be no fighting the rightists anymore. To continue and reinforce news reports on the campaign against rightists, I decided to publish that article as the headline story in the People’s Daily on the 14.“ (Ibid., 26–27.)

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Committee, requesting that Comrade Chunqiao should assume the position of premier of the State Council. Second, we must create a publicity campaign to draw public attention to Comrade Chunqiao. Third, the Shanghai CPC Committee should compile such activities of the Shanghai people and their demands into a situation report, which should then be submitted to the Central Committee as an official document of the Shanghai CPC Committee.“494 The same day, the memorial meeting for Zhou Enlai was held in the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People. Deng Yingchao, Deng Xiaoping, and the leading officials waited for Mao Zedong to attend, but he did not appear. Wang Dongxing called Mao’s office only to be informed that the chairman would not attend. The memorial meeting did not start until that point.495 Deng Xiaoping made a memorial speech, in which he retraced Zhou’s life, which was devoted to the causes of revolution and construction in China, and he expressed his high regard for Zhou. The memorial speech was finalized by the Political Bureau and approved by Mao.496 Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily, proposed to Yao Wenyuan that to prevent bad elements from causing trouble, it would be better not to publish any articles against rightists for the time being: instead, priority in the newspaper should be given to memorial messages, telegrams, and articles related to Premier Zhou Enlai. However, Yao strongly objected to this. He said to Lu Ying that it was correct at that time to continue the fight: “After the news about the memorial meeting today, all memorial activities about Premier Zhou should be kept out of the media. All the media attention should be focused on articles against the rightists.“497 Yao intended to subdue memorial activities to further provoke the public and create new political struggles. In January, Deng Xiaoping held a meeting with Ye Jianying. Ye Jianying said in rage: “These people are going too far. They are scheming for power now that Premier Zhou has passed away and the chairman is sick. Who knows what they will do next? We need to take effective measures against them soon!“ Deng responded: “There is nothing to be afraid of. I am prepared. The worst that can happen to me is that I get deposed and treated like Luo Mai. My only regret is that I have so much to do, with the economy still in a poor state and many veteran comrades as yet not liberated.“ Ye replied: “The biggest problem at the moment is that the chairman does not listen to us. Instead, Jiang Qing and others have Mao Yuanxin relate lies 494. Ibid., 16–17. 495. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 412. 496. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 142–143.

497. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 23.

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against us to the chairman.“ Deng continued: “At the end of last year, I talked to the chairman several times alone, and I asked him what he felt about the policies and guidance outlines that I had proposed. He approved of them. Later, the chairman sent Mao Yuanxin to me, who was accusing me of having repudiated the Cultural Revolution. I argued against this, but it was to no avail!“ Ye Jianying suggested: “We suppose to seek for chances talking to the chairman again?“ Deng answered: “I’ve already done so. It’s useless. You know me, I never yield on fundamental issues!“ Ye Jianying said: “As long as there’s hope, we must strive!“ Deng replied: “The Political Bureau has actually suspended me from work. I suppose that the chairman is already determined to make a change in his successor...I am prepared for the worst, but I believe that our cause will be carried forth and that our cause is hopeful...It doesn’t matter if I fall from power. As long as you and the other veteran comrades are here, those clowns will achieve nothing!“ Ye Jianying responded: “As long as we live, we shall fight no matter what!“ Deng Xiaoping concluded: “We should be careful in choosing our methods. That was the last instruction of the premier before he passed away.“498 On January 20, Deng Xiaoping underwent a self-criticism for the third time at a meeting of the Political Bureau. At that meeting, the Gang of Four launched a fierce onslaught against him, but he argued back. He made an official proposal to that bureau: “I am unsuitable to work as the principal figure.“499 On the evening of the same day, Deng wrote to Mao Zedong, noting that it had been two months since the criticism against him, and had no sign of stopping. Hence, he had to resign for the sake of CPC Central Committee: “Therefore, first of all, I again officially propose to the chairman to relieve me of my duties in taking charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. I hope that this request may be granted.“500 On January 21, Mao Zedong had a meeting with Mao Yuanxin. Mao Yuanxin reported Deng Xiaoping’s self-criticism at the Political Bureau meeting the previous day. Mao Zedong said that the matter was still a cause of conflict among people, but that it had been well guided: “It is good not to make him [Deng] an enemy, like Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Deng Xiaoping is different from Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao — Deng is willing to criticize himself.“ Mao Yuanxin reported that Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian had proposed that new leader of the State 498. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, 1st edition, 69–71. 499. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 145; Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 446–447.

500. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 145.

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Council should be appointed, so they could report their specific jobs to whom. Mao therefore instructed: “Then let Hua Guofeng lead the State Council, even though he regards himself as low in political talent. Let Xiaoping take charge of foreign affairs.“501 This was the first time Mao had appointed Hua Guofeng as leader of the State Council. On January 28, Mao Zedong officially proposed to have Hua Guofeng take charge of the daily work of the central leadership.502 On January 24, Wang Hongwen wrote to Mao, exposing Deng Xiaoping’s mistakes. Wang submitted materials written by Ma Tianshui, secretary of the Shanghai CPC Committee and deputy director of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, which claimed that Deng warned him against taking sides with the Gang of Four on June 12, 1975 and singled Zhang Chunqiao out to be someone wary. Wang added: “I feel that Comrade Xiaoping’s talk was politically wrong and followed his own agenda. This was not a fair act but a scheming ploy.“503 On January 28, the Political Bureau held a meeting to condemn Deng. Wang Hongwen said that although Comrade Xiaoping had not implemented his policy of restoring order over a long period, its influence was felt across a number of different sectors, and it affected a great number of people, many of whom were the leaders of central committees, state councils, provinces, and municipalities. Thus, Deng’s activities had an organizational character. Deng Xiaoping said: “Comrade Hongwen, I need to explain.“ However, Wang interrupted him: “Your explanation will be nothing more than a refutation. That is of course allowed, but I have evidence [referring to the materials Wang submitted to Mao Zedong].“ Zhang Chunqiao also rebuked Deng. Deng made the following repudiation: “According to the logic of Comrade Chunqiao, only revolutionary principles are sufficient for the construction of socialism. Whether my policies were right or wrong is something that has to be judged by history.“ Hua Guofeng criticized Deng Xiaoping: “You have been brought down many times, and you have criticized yourself many times. Even ordinary people say that you are now like a dead pig that is not afraid of boiling water. You need to change your image in terms of concrete actions.“ Mao Yuanxin stated: “The chairman has instructed that the candidacy for the premier should be discussed by the Political Bureau. Jiang Qing believes Zhang Chunqiao to be the most appropriate!“ Zhang Chunqiao responded: “The chairman should make the appointment. Otherwise, we will spend three days and nights discussing 501. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1321.

502. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 146.

503. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 450.

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the matter in the Political Bureau, but that will not yield any results.“504 On January 29, Mao Zedong listened to Mao Yuanxin’s report on the situation at the meetings of the Political Bureau. Mao Yuanxin briefed him that Comrade Hua Guofeng had made the remark that Comrade Deng Xiaoping was like a dead pig that was not afraid of boiling water: Deng always committed the same mistakes. Mao Zedong thought that Deng was not yet a dead pig. Deng had already written two self-criticisms, which showed that he was willing to evaluate himself: “The Political Bureau should help him even if he is already a dead pig. The policy of our party has always been that of curing the sickness to save the patient.“ Mao Yuanxin explained: “Comrade Xiaoping has a new understanding of his own mistakes. He admits that he’s ambitious and wishes to usurp the chairman’s authority when he is in charge of the daily work of the central leadership.“ Mao Zedong said: “That’s an exaggeration. He is ambitious, but not too ambitious.“ Mao Yuanxin responded: “The comrades in the Political Bureau unanimously believe that in view of the mistakes that Comrade Xiaoping has made, he should not assume important positions or be responsible for foreign affairs. Since the Political Bureau began its criticism of Comrade Deng Xiaoping, Comrade Jianying has been on sick leave, and he seldom attends the meetings; when he does, he remains silent. I feel that he seems to be on the side of Comrade Xiaoping.“ Mao Zedong replied: “Deng Xiaoping was recommended by Ye Jianying, so it’s hardly strange that Ye Jianying would be on his side. They have similar thoughts and political ideas: how could they not be friendly and sympathetic?...With supporters, one rules; and with few supporters, one is ruled. Therefore the wise emperor tries to win supporters.“ Mao Zedong continued to explain that a wise emperor controls power. Emperor Qin Shi Huang set up a centralized government on the advice of Han Fei. The CPC should learn from Qin Shi Huang in ruling the country by taking control of state power.505 Qin Shi Huang was Mao Zedong’s political idol. Mao repeatedly said of himself that he was Karl Marx plus Qin Shi Huang. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, the rule was less that of the party than that of a man. The Cultural Revolution was personally launched and led by Mao, and he maintained it for 10 years. For the second time, Mao Zedong proposed that Hua Guofeng should act as premier of the State Council and take charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. Mao referred to Hua as solemn and wise. Mao instructed Hua to publicize himself around the country. In the evening of January 29, a Political Bureau meeting chaired by Wang Hongwen, Mao Yuanxin conveyed Mao Zedong’s urgent message about Hua 504. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol.1, 35–39. 505. Ibid., 43–46.

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Guofeng becoming premier of the State Council; but Hua declined, saying that he was not good enough. Deng Xiaoping was the first to express his support towards Mao Zedong’s proposal. Jiang Qing also agreed. Later, the Political Bureau unanimously approved Mao Zedong’s proposal. Mao Yuanxin relayed Mao Zedong’s direction that a meeting of the Political Bureau should be held and that Deng be further helped and criticized: “To continue the struggle against the rightists, we may openly discuss the problem of Comrade Deng Xiaoping and present the chairman’s recent remarks to the whole party. However, the area of criticism should be kept reasonably narrow, and it would be unwise to expose ostensible rightist agents at all levels. Such problems that arise in the lower levels should be dealt with by the CPC Central Committee, and the problems at the level of the Central Committee should be handled by Comrade Xiaoping.“506 The above decision-making procedure by Mao Zedong was wholly arbitrary and did not involve consultation with any other leader. In the past, when Mao chose Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, and Deng Xiaoping, he did at least confer with Zhou Enlai. Toward the end of his lifetime, Mao became increasingly lonely and subjective in decision making; officializing plans without Central Committee or the NPC plenary session. His only request was to have his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, convey his command to the CPC Central Committee, which in turn issued its notice accordingly. On February 2, the Central Committee officially issued a notice (1976 Document No. 1), which was proposed by Chairman Mao and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau, whereby Hua Guofeng named the premier of the State Council and would be taking charge the Political Bureau work. As proposed by Mao and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau, this document stated while Ye Jianying was ill, Chen Xilian (member of the Political Bureau and Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee; commander and first secretary of the CPC Committee of the Beijing Military Area) would take charge of the Central Military Committee.507 After the notice was issued, Deng Xiaoping became excluded from the leadership of the CPC Central Committee and Ye Jianying was dropped from the leadership of the Central Military Committee.508 Why did Mao Zedong not appoint Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao — both members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — to head the Central Military Committee? On October 8, 1976, Hua Guofeng gave an explanation at a 506. Ibid., 56–58. 507. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 146–147.

508. Ibid., 147.

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Political Bureau meeting. Considered Ye Jianying was sick and Mao questioned the abilities of Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, who lacked authority in the military, Mao thus appointed Chen Xilian, who had fought in wars, to take charge of the Central Military Committee. Mao Zedong sent an open message to people both at home and abroad that his successor was no longer the moderate Deng Xiaoping (first in line among the vice premiers in the State Council), the Cultural Revolution hardliner Wang Hongwen (second in line among the vice chairmen of the Central Committee), nor Zhang Chunqiao (member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and third in line among the vice premiers of the State Council), but personally appointed the Cultural Revolution beneficiary Hua Guofeng as his successor. At that time, Hua Guofeng was not a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — just an ordinary member of the Political Bureau, ranking sixth among the 12 vice premiers. It was therefore inappropriate for him to act as premier of the State Council and be in charge of the daily work of the Central Committee. In terms of the power structure, the transition from the leadership of Mao-Zhou-Deng to that of Mao-Hua-Wang was a completely subjective decision of Mao’s — one that did not go through any legal procedures. Why did Mao Zedong choose Hua Guofeng? The decision was based on Mao’s policy of using different political forces in the party to check and balance one another. Hua Guofeng made a decent candidate to Mao not only because of Mao believed he would be widely accepted in the party, but also because of his loyalty — where he would be committed in carrying out all Mao’s instruction concerning the Cultural Revolution. Mao knew that the Gang of Four, particularly Jiang Qing, had made a lot of enemies in the party, the PLA, and among the people. If any of those people became Mao’s successor, there would inevitably be a negative impact — possibly chaos around the country. Thus, the Gang of Four is out of the question concerning such pose of supreme power at this crucial juncture in China’s history. Mao Zedong’s decision delivered a blow, which might fairly be described as fatal, to the aspirations of the Gang of Four. That group planned for the reinstatement of Wang Hongwen in chairing the daily work of the Central Committee and for Zhang Chunqiao to head the State Council after the gang had deposed Deng Xiaoping. At a meeting of the Political Bureau on October 8, 1976, Ye Jianying said that the Gang of Four had seized some power in the central leadership, but it thirsted for more: the members wanted supreme power of the central leadership. After Deng was ousted, Wang Hongwen was next in line to head the Central Committee and Zhang Chunqiao to assume the post of premier. However, Mao did not grant them that power and chose Hua Guofeng instead.

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Craving to be the premier, Zhang Chunqiao was extremely dissatisfied with Mao’s decision, and hence he made a prediction on February 3 that Hua would be just like another Deng Xiaoping, who quickly rose to power and just as quickly fell.509 This staff movement made Hua the Gang of Four’s biggest opponent, and the clique also resented Mao for not having appointed one of them, particularly Zhang, as premier. Zhang’s political ambition were exposed. His supposed fight or precautions against revisionism and the restoration of capitalism was just a political front for him to achieve his political goals. Jiang Qing scorned Hua Guofeng. She wanted to become chairperson or some kind of modern-day Empress Wu Zetian.510 All evidence revealing the forceful political exclusiveness of the Gang of Four was made criminal evidence and hence gave Hua a good reason to arrest them all. The intensifying political struggle in the party led to political turmoil. Party discipline and state laws and regulations were being disregarded; coercive measures and activities of the secret police were rife. The most intrusive organization was the Public Security Ministry. In early February 1976, the “Minutes of the Symposium of Public Security Directors“ (for discussion), which had been convened by the Public Security Ministry, proclaimed that with the deepening of the socialist revolution, class relationships had undergone changes. The result was that capitalist roaders within the party had become a hostile class against workers and poor peasants; the main body and core of the whole capitalist class as well as major forces against the proletariat posed the huge risk of overthrowing the proletarian dictatorship and restoring capitalism. Therefore, class enemies at home and abroad increasingly placed their hopes in the restoration of the capitalist roaders in the party. It was necessary for public security to adapt to this new situation: “We need to watch both the old class enemies and the emerging counter-revolutionaries. In particular, we have to be alert to capitalist class elements and the persistent capitalist roaders in the party. This means that we have to observe the association between counterrevolutionary elements and capitalist roaders in the party; we need to look carefully for evidence of such elements and report cases to party committees. We have to strike hard and quell the destructive counter-revolutionary activities of capitalist roaders. Sabotage efforts of counter-revolutionaries are always closely linked to the efforts of capitalist roaders within the party to restore capitalism. This feature has become increasingly obvious.“ Zhang Chunqiao commented on these minutes: “Be 509. Zhang Chunqiao wrote an article titled “Thoughts on February 3“ on February 3, 1976:

“This is another Document No. 1. A Document No. 1 was already issued last year

[1975]. The person who achieves his ambition is aggressive. However, some people who quickly come to power also quickly fall from power.“

510. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 479–482.

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alert to revisionism, especially in the CPC Central Committee.“511 These minutes were clearly not targeted at Hua Guofeng since they were severely censured and withheld by Hua. On February 13, the Guangming Daily published a headline article titled “The Worries of Confucius“ written by Gao Lu (alias of Liang Xiao). The article made allusive attacks against Zhou Enlai, and it expounded the word “worries“: it compared the Chinese people grieving over the death of Zhou to “whining and wailing women.“ The article announced: “Let the whining women of old systems cling on to the skeleton of Confucius [alluding to Zhou Enlai] and whine and wail their worries and woes.“ This was a deliberate act to provoke social and political incidents and public rage. On February 14, the CPC Central Committee held a meeting to prepare a message about the campaign against Deng Xiaoping. After announcing the beginning of the meeting, Wang Hongwen introduced the campaign program and the significance of the meeting. Jiang Qing said: “Deng Xiaoping is not here today since the Central Committee has suspended him and ordered him to review his work.“ Jiang made further attacks on Deng.512 Hua Guofeng said: “The chairman has said that Comrade Deng Xiaoping committed a major mistake in his political direction and the consequences affected the grassroots. As we know, some provincial leaders have presented and implemented some of Deng Xiaoping’s bad ideas. All these problems can be traced back to Comrade Deng Xiaoping. Everyone just needs to relax. There is no need to feel weighed down by numerous problems. I wouldn’t have been this aware of the mistakes made by Comrade Deng Xiaoping if the chairman had not pointed them out.“ Jiang Qing rebuked 511. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

512. Jiang Qing made fierce attacks against Deng Xiaoping. She said: “Deng Xiaoping is evil! He is ungrateful and without conscience! It was I that recommended him to enter the Political Bureau back in 1974, and he publicly criticized me in 1975. Last year, he

unleashed such vicious spite against me! He was worse than fascists! He schemed and tried to split up the party and to deceive the chairman and frame me! My dear comrades, he shut me up for months last year! I was prohibited from uttering even

one word. He has talked about freedom of speech and a democratic work style. But these are just words. He is arbitrary and patriarchal, and he has his own circle of fascist power. He is a typical warlord. He seized my power and shut me up. Now I am out,

having been released by the chairman! Today, I am here to testify to the crimes he committed.“ (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 82–83.)

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Hua: “The master report you delivered at the agricultural meeting was written by Deng Xiaoping, which I believe should be criticized too!“ Hua Guofeng responded: “That report was deliberated upon collectively by the Political Bureau and revised and approved by the chairman. We can’t attribute that to Deng Xiaoping alone.“513 This confrontation, which amounted to an aggressive political challenge to Hua Guofeng, made Hua into a political enemy of Jiang’s. With her special relationship with Mao, she challenged everyone; hence when Mao was alive, she was isolated, upon Mao’s death, she was made target to be attack. It was foreseeable that she would lose everything without Mao, which was made reality after Mao’s death. On February 16, with Mao Zedong’s approval, the CPC Central Committee issued a document agreeing with the committee’s decision on February 6 to stop implementing the reports and speeches of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping at the expanded meeting of the Central Military Committee in July 1975. This was the end of the drive to rectify the work style of the PLA. Just one year had elapsed between Mao Zedong’s decision that the PLA needed to be rectified and going back on that decision. On February 17, the People’s Daily published an editorial, “Criticizing the Guidance of the Three Instructions,“ which was an allusive attack against Deng Xiaoping, calling him the capitalist roader who failed to repent. On February 20, Jiang Qing held a meeting with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, Wang Xiuzhen, and Ding Sheng (commander of the Nanjing Military Area). Jiang said that Deng had tried to build his own independent kingdom and practice fascism: “You need to criticize Deng Xiaoping. Last year, he criticized me for months. I was living like a prisoner. Now that I’ve come back and can speak out, I will prosecute him.“514 Following Mao Zedong’s instruction to criticize Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao formulated the notion of “From a Democratic to a Capitalist Roader“ as the basis for criticizing Deng. Back in November 1975 and January 1976, Zhang Chunqiao held two talks with Huang Tao, a member of the Standing Committee of Shanghai CPC Committee. Zhang said that people who supported democratic revolutions received great benefits at the end of the war in 1949, and they were unwilling to support the socialist revolution: although they had participated in the democratic revolution, they opposed the socialist revolution since that would harm their interests. Zhang claimed that the democratic revolution that the party had conducted for 28 years ended with political consensus, whereas the socialist revolution that had gone on for 28 years, paying a huge price and were opposed 513. Ibid., 84. 514. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1329.

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by many. In February, Zhang Chunqiao held talks with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, Wang Xiuzhen, Huang Tao, and Li Binshan. Zhang concluded that veteran party officials were democratic revolutionaries, which amounted to them being categorized as capitalist roaders. In the evening of February 19, Zhang Chunqiao remarked that veteran cadres were capitalist roaders who were even worse than the old capitalist class. Later, Zhang commented on a letter from Zhu Yongjian: “Be alert to revisionists in the party, especially in the Central Committee.“ During the message-sending meeting in February, Zhang repeatedly called Deng Xiaoping a monopoly capitalist and comprador bourgeoisie who practiced revisionism in the country and capitulationism internationally. Zhang thus gave it all in to politically destroy Deng.515 As Zhang instructed, Red Flag published an article on March 1, “From Democratic Bourgeoisie to Capitalist Roader“ under the name of Chi Heng.516 On December 8, 1980 at a special tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court, Yao Wenyuan admitted to having had Red Flag publish it, but he argued that the “democrat to capitalist roader“ notion was not his but had derived from important talks of Chairman Mao.517 Moreover, Yao stated that the article had appeared with 515. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

516. The article began with a claim that the great struggle personally launched and led by the great leader Chairman Mao against the rightists was being conducted in the sectors of education, science and technology, and arts: “The campaign is targeted at

capitalist roaders who will not repent that are currently in power in the party. It is a continuation and deepening of the Cultural Revolution, and it represents another

fight between proletariats and capitalists, socialism and capitalism, and Marxism and revisionism in the frontline of ideological battle. It is the capitalist roaders — the source of rightist thoughts — who oppose cooperatives and communes in rural areas and

support the practice of contracting production quotas to individual households; they preach the ridiculous theory that good cats catch mice irrespective of whether they are white or black; they oppose the Cultural Revolution and quelled the movements of revolutionary people and they now attempt to repudiate the Cultural Revolution and

restore capitalist rule. The transformation from a democratic capitalist to a capitalist roader in power, from a party comrade in the democratic revolutionary period to the dissenter in the socialist period, and from the believer in capitalistic democratic

revolution to the believer in revisionism: isn’t this the journey taken by the capitalist

roader who fails to repent?“ (Originally printed in the Red Flag, issue 3, on March 1, 1976; reprinted in the People’s Daily on March 2, 1976.)

517. Mao Zedong remarked that some party officials, mostly veterans, believed in the

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the chairman’s approval.518 In fact, Zhang and Yao were both named authorized political spokesmen by Mao. Mao had correctly predicted Deng’s political stance: he had always believed that Deng would represent the emerging new capitalists and attempt to restore capitalism. Despite his deteriorating physical condition, Mao Zedong still had sufficient strength of will to personally launch this final political movement, which in turn accelerated his death. Even the visiting President Nixon was surprised at Mao’s acuity despite his frailty. Mao Zedong met Nixon and his wife on February 23.519 Later, Nixon would describe the meeting in detail.520 On February 25, the Guangming Daily published an article, “The Guidance of Class Struggles Should Be Followed in Economic Construction — On Lenin’s Discussions of Trade Unions, the Current Situation, and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin,“ written by Liang Xiao, to make an allusive attack on Zhou Enlai. The same day, the “Important Instructions of Chairman Mao,“ prepared by Mao capitalistic democratic revolution: “They did not understand, resist, or even oppose

socialist revolution. Why? Because they became government officials and wanted to protect the interests of such officials. They’ve got big houses, cars, large salaries, and

even attendants: they are even more privileged than the capitalists. Therefore, when their interests were damaged during the socialist revolution, such as through building

cooperatives, some of them objected to this in the party, and they were displeased at criticisms of capitalist authority. It is wrong not to know of the existence of the capitalist

class in the middle of socialistic revolution. Capitalism has existed in the party and there are capitalistic roaders in power. Capitalist roaders are still going their own way.“

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 487.) 518. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 29. 519. Meeting attendees included Hua Guofeng (acting premier), Qiao Guanhua (foreign minister), Huang Zhen (director), Wang Hairong (deputy foreign minister), and Tang

Wensheng and Zhang Hanzhi (deputy chief secretaries). (People’s Daily, February 24, 1976.)

520. Nixon said that Mao Zedong moaned and groaned monosyllabic utterances.

Nonetheless, his mind was quick and clear: “He understood what I had said, though

he could not speak. If he thought that the translator misunderstood him, he would impatiently grasp a slip of paper to write down his words. It was painful to see him in

such distress. No matter what people thought of Mao, it was undeniable that he was

a soldier who fought to the last moment of his life. Parkinson’s disease caused Mao’s movements to rigidify. At the end of our meeting, secretaries helped him up from the chair and helped him walk me to the door.“ (Nixon, Leaders, 224–225.)

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Yuanxin, was presented at a meeting of leaders of all provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and military areas convened by the CPC Central Committee. In February, a speech drafted by Wang Hongwen and delivered at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee argued that the guidance of the Three Instructions was by nature opposed to the guidance of the class struggle initiated by Chairman Mao: “The Three Instructions are against the basic political direction of the party and against the basic theory and practice that our party has had for over 20 years. There is confusion in the relationship between that guidance and secondary tasks as well as between the commander and those being commanded.“521 This indicated that Mao Zedong saw through the political trick being played by Deng Xiaoping, “which set Mao’s spear against Mao’s shield.“ On February 29, the People’s Daily published an article “On Taking the Three Instructions as Guidance“ by Liang Xiao and Ren Ming. The article defined Deng Xiaoping as a capitalist roader who would not repent, and it stated that he adhered to the revisionism of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.522 Ironically, just one month earlier (on January 20), Mao Zedong professed that Deng should be judged according to the principle of the internal struggle among the people (see above). On March 1, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee determined that during the illness of Vice Premier Li Xiannian, Li Suwen 521. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1333.

522. The article stated that Mao Zedong spoke about using the Three Instructions as a guideline: “To maintain unity is not to cast away class struggle. Class struggle is the

primary guideline: the rest are just secondary.“ This important instruction of Chairman Mao exposed the guideline of the Three Instructions as being a downright revisionist

guideline that denied class struggle. The key link in that guideline was restoring

capitalism: “The guideline of the Three Instructions was proposed by the capitalist roader [Deng Xiaoping] who adhered to Liu Shaoqi’s and Lin Biao’s revisionism

and would not repent without the authorization of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee. The promulgation of the guidance of the Three Instructions has a deep political background. It was targeted against the Cultural Revolution and the

movement against Lin Biao and Confucius. It was a direct opposition to Chairman Mao’s important instructions on theoretical problems. The reason we dismiss it as revisionist is that it betrays the basic theory and practice of class struggle in our party.

Those who created the guideline of the Three Instructions ignored the guidance of class

struggle and the basic political course of the party, focusing instead on productivity and modernization — whatever route should be taken for development.“ (People’s Daily, February 29, 1976.)

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(vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC) would be in charge of departments and ministries involved with finance and trade.523 Thus, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) and Li Xiannian (member of the Political Bureau) were relieved from their duties without convening in the CPC Central Committee plenary session. This marked the fifth political shakeup since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. On March 2, Jiang Qing announced at an unauthorized meeting that she called of the 12 provinces and districts during a notification meeting of the CPC Central Committee, that Deng Xiaoping was responsible for spreading many rumors: “He is a downright traitor and has alienated himself from the people. I say that he represents the collaborative capitalist class, compradors, and landlords. Deng Xiaoping is the agent of international capitalists in China. He uses three methods in the Political Bureau. The first is to create close alliances with others; the second is to deceive others; and the third is to strike with great force. When he does strike, he carefully identify his targets. He attacked me. He knows that I am just a pawn, but I am proud of being a pawn in defending the revolutionary course determined by the chairman. And a pawn like me is still able to bring down the commander in chief of counter-revolutionary elements. So he struck out at me first. Some people have accused me of being a cruel queen, and for that I feel honored. Lu was such a cruel queen: she was the uncrowned empress who held supreme power in the state and she followed the legalistic route.“ Jiang Qing claimed that she had played no part in the so-called civil war: “Deng Xiaoping repudiates the Cultural Revolution and everything else too. He is a counter-revolutionary, a double-dealer that plays one side against another, and he creates slander. He has exposed himself faster than Lin Biao did. If Deng gained power, people like me would be killed in the tens of thousands. I have announced at meetings of the Political Bureau that I am psychologically prepared to be killed or imprisoned.“ Later when Deng assumed power, and Jiang was jailed, not killed. Even Chen Yun objected to the death sentence for her: “She got a life sentence in jail. She would be unable to bear the lack of affection or compassion to the point where she might kill herself...524 523. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1335.

524. Xinhua News Agency related on June 4, 1991 that “Jiang Qing, principal member of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-revolutionary Group” had killed herself in her Beijing

residence in the early morning of May 14, 1991 during medical parole. Jiang had been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve at a special session of the Supreme People’s

Court in January 1981 and was deprived of political rights for life. In January 1983, she was resentenced to life imprisonment. On May 4, 1984, she was granted medical parole.

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This is an example of the good becoming inevitably successful and the bad being inevitably punished.“ Also on March 2, Mao Zedong listened to a report by Mao Yuanxin where Jiang Qing was warned to keep a low profile.525 Mao Yuanxin explained that Zhang Chunqiao was not satisfied with the words of most members of the Political Bureau. Zhang wanted to invite some academics from Tsinghua University and Peking University to be present at meetings of the Political Bureau to help explain the campaigns against rightist tendencies being conducted at the two universities. Mao Zedong expressed his consent: “More people should be invited and encouraged to talk so that the stereotyped thinking in the Political Bureau can be swept away.“526 On March 3, the article “Criticize Capitalist Roaders in the Party That Will Not Repent,“ which was revised by Yao Wenyuan, appeared in the People’s Daily. The article slandered Deng Xiaoping as a capitalist roader who would not repent: a crazy man who aimed to restore old institutions, attempted to repudiate the Cultural Revolution, and organized restorative activities according to particular theories and guidelines.527 On December 8, 1980, Yao Wenyuan defended himself at a special session of the Supreme People’s Court: “Such charges against Deng Xiaoping presented in the article did not come from me, but from the Political Bureau.“528 On March 3, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Learning Important Instructions of Chairman Mao,“ which communicated the words of Mao Zedong. The same day, the Central Committee related Hua Guofeng’s speech at a meeting of leaders of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions and military areas that had been convened by the committee. In accordance with Mao’s instructions, a campaign against Deng Xiaoping’s revisionism was launched within the party. The notice adopted a similar definition to that used for Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on August 5, 1966 in “Cannon Fired to the Command — My First Big Posters.“ Hua Guofeng also proposed several policies against Deng,529 which 525. Mao Zedong said it was not right to do: “You [Mao Yuanxin] tell Jiang Qing not to

overestimate herself and not to interfere too much. There are vice chairmen and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. She has no business calling meetings of the Political Bureau. She needs to change her old habits and she should learn to behave.” (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 94.)

526. Ibid., 96. 527. Ibid., 28. 528. Ibid., 29. 529. Hua Guofeng’s speech was discussed by the Political Bureau and approved by Mao Zedong. The speech emphasized: “Do not expose the agents of Deng Xiaoping at

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were different from those followed by Mao Zedong when he launched the Cultural Revolution in the latter half of 1966. In “Notice on Learning Important Instructions of Chairman Mao,“ Mao stated that Deng Xiaoping’s promise never to reverse the verdict on the Cultural Revolution was unreliable.530 This move was to deprive Deng of political credibility within the party. Second, Mao Zedong criticized Deng Xiaoping’s “cat theory,“ which failed to focus on class struggle.531 Different political philosophies were involved here. Mao advocated the philosophy of struggle, whereas Deng supported the philosophy of construction. The latter was the political consensus and resolution of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, and it later became the political consensus and resolution of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. Without Mao, the philosophy of construction became the mainstream line of thought for the CPC: it represented the fundamental direction of socialist modernization in China. Third, Deng was very likely to repudiate the Cultural Revolution.532 This different government levels, do not settle old historical issues, and do not become entangled in trivialities. For comrades that have made mistakes [meaning Deng Xiaoping], we should follow the instruction of Chairman Mao to learn from past

mistakes and avoid future ones and also to cure the sickness to save the patient. Do not emphasize old mistakes. Do not sentence people to death for old mistakes.

Some comrades need to self-criticize publicly. Comrades should be allowed to make mistakes and correct them. Our whole drive should not involve nationwide visits by Red Guards or fighting teams. The focus should be on revolution, production, work,

and preparations for war.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1772.)

530. Mao Zedong quoted Deng Xiaoping’s words saying that ”education was undergoing a

crisis,” and Mao continued: “If students do not read books, neither would he [Deng]. He [Deng] does not understand Marxism and Leninism. He represents capitalism. His

statement about ’never reversing the verdict’ is just unreliable.“ (Editorial of People’s Daily, “Great Victory.“)

531. Mao Zedong said that Deng Xiaoping did not advocate class struggle and he had

not mentioned this guideline. Deng advocated the theory of the white cat and black cat irrespective of whether this was imperialism or Marxism. Mao Zedong said that

there was no class struggle in a socialist country: “What is this adoption of the Three Instructions as the guideline? To maintain unity is not to cast away class struggle. The

class struggle is the primary guideline, with the rest being secondary.“ (Li ed., Deng Xiaoping Entered and Left Zhongnanhai Three Times, 290–292.)

532. Mao Zedong noted that there were two attitudes toward the Cultural Revolution: dissatisfaction and total denial, regarding the revolution as a complete mistake. (Ibid., 291.)

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amounted to a total denial of Mao’s great historical achievement. Fourth, Mao believed that capitalism existed within the party and that capitalist roaders were maintaining their course.533 Mao understood Deng very well. Mao thought that Deng was still by nature a capitalist roader and a representative of the capitalist class. This indicates that the political division between Mao, Liu Shaoqi and Deng had a long history. Mao and Deng followed different political courses, and that obliged Mao to depose Deng just before his death. Objectively, the second campaign of criticism launched by Mao Zedong against Deng Xiaoping helped Deng a great deal. The second, third, and fourth points helped Deng spread his theory, especially that of the black and white cats. It was not clear at that time and it could not have been predicted, but that campaign was the spark that later led to reform and opening-up in China. As a result, no matter how much Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing and other Cultural Revolution beneficiaries objected to Deng’s return to power or how much they upheld their policy of believing in whatever Mao said and doing whatever Mao instructed, when Deng returned to power in 1977, he was determined to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. Deng aimed to return to the policy of “seeking truth from facts,“ which Mao had advocated during the Yan’an period. Deng resolved to drop the guideline of class struggle, adopted by Mao Zedong after 1957, and focused on developing productivity and launching the drive of reform and opening-up, which produced huge social changes in Chinese society.534 It is not hard to understand why it was Deng that initiated and created China’s reform and opening-up — a totally different era from that of the Cultural Revolution. Deng was acutely aware 533. Mao Zedong said: “It is wrong to be unaware that a capitalist class existed in the middle

of the socialistic revolution. Capitalism exists in the party, and there are capitalist roaders in power. The capitalist roaders are still pursuing their course.“ (Ibid.)

534. Deng used to say to foreign visitors with regard to reform: “We experimented with reform from 1974 to 1975. I presided over the routine work of the CPC Central

Committee in 1975. The reform was conducted as a type of house-cleaning — a policy

that emphasized economic development, and the first step was restoring order to production. I was quickly kicked out of power by the Gang of Four. I have fallen from power and risen three times. The reform of 1974 and 1975 was very popular since it

fulfilled people’s wishes. After the fall of the Gang of Four, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee reestablished ’seeking truth from facts’ as the guideline, and it transferred the focus of our work to developing productivity in the

party and in the country. It was only then that reform could be carried out again.“

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 255.)

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after his political fall that China would not go anywhere without reform. He was even more conscious of the fact that Mao’s mistakes were not due only to Mao; they were also the result of severe defects in systems and institutions: “Reform of the leadership system of the party and the state has fundamental significance that may affect the overall long-term stability of China.“535 On March 10, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Reversing the Verdict Is Unpopular,“ which was in accordance with the latest instructions from Mao Zedong. The article said that Deng Xiaoping claimed that he would not reverse the verdict, but once he returned to power he would relapse to his former capitalist course: “People like him never were Marxists. As pointed out by Chairman Mao, those people were democratic capitalists whose thoughts remained in the democratic revolutionary period.“536 The editorial was revised and approved by Yao Wenyuan, and it amounted to an open attack against Deng. As instructed by Mao Zedong, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi from Peking University and Tsinghua University took part in a meeting of the Political Bureau on March 26 to criticize Deng Xiaoping in person. Chi, Xie and others dismissed Deng’s moves, such as exporting petroleum and introducing necessary technical equipment, as being wasteful, collaborative, Westernizing attempts to export the economic crisis. Deng Xiaoping was assailed as the head of all the old and new capitalist elements and all corrupt people both within and outside the party: he had always looked backwards and tried to restore retrogressive systems and institutions. Deng was a schemer and careerist. He had always opposed Maoism, and the class struggle. Deng had tried to advocate materialist incentives and propound his theory of 535. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 333.

536. The editorial said that in around the summer of last year (1976) there had been a rightist campaign: “The person who stirred up the trouble [Deng Xiaoping] objected to the

guideline of the class struggle. He distorted the basic political course of the party and denied the proletariat revolution in education, literature, and the arts; he repudiated

the socialistic revolution in science and technology; he denied combining the old, the middle-aged, and the young; he refuted new phenomena on various fronts of socialism;

he denied the proletariat Cultural Revolution, and he attempted to reverse the verdict

on the Cultural Revolution and point out its mistakes. The great leader Chairman Mao has recently pointed out, ’Reversing the verdict is unpopular.’ Chairman Mao’s words reflect the revolutionary people’s strong objection to the restoration of backward institutions and desire to carry on the revolutionary cause; they reveal the reactionary

nature of the capitalist roader who did not repent [Deng Xiaoping] and still tries to go against the tide of history.“ (People’s Daily, March 10, 1976.)

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black cats and white cats. Zhang Chunqiao concluded that Deng Xiaoping was an opportunist — even worse than Trotsky.537 On the afternoon of March 26, the anti-Deng meeting of the Political Bureau was suddenly interrupted when Wang Hongwen announced that large-scale riots had broken out in Shanghai and Nanjing.538 Following instructions by the Jiang Qing clique, the Shanghai Wenhui Bao newspaper published an article, in which Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were dismissed as “capitalist roaders who tried to restore capitalism and were once brought down and yet did not repent.“ This took the political struggle among high-level party members into the open and into society. It was this article that triggered the protests in Nanjing, in which slogans like “Protect Zhou Enlai, Bring Down Zhang Chunqiao“ were shouted. Yao Wenyuan read an express telegram by Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily. Based on the results of the discussion by the Political Bureau, Yao Wenyuan drafted a telegram for the CPC Central Committee.539 Yao wrote in his journal that a number of large posters had appeared in Shanghai, bearing such slogans as “Expose Careerists Like Nikita Khrushchev“ and “Oppose the Attempt on the Supreme Leadership.“ These posters reflected the intensification of the class struggle. Every time the struggle reached a certain point, the reactionary force would protest and parade. Yao wrote: “Well, let the revolutionary masses see what the reactionary forces looked like. The Political Bureau was too blunt. When the Qingming Festival approached, it was discovered that in Nanjing, Beijing, and Taiyuan some people were trying to take advantage of this occasion of mourning to show their grief and sorrow for the

537. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 116–124. 538. Ibid., 126. 539. The CPC Central Committee’s telegram on March 27, 1976 stated the following: “First, it is known that in recent days, big posters with slogans have appeared that target the

leaders of the CPC Central Committee. This political incident was intended to cause

a split in the Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao and divert attention from

the campaign of criticizing Deng. You must take effective measures to cover up these posters and slogans. It is necessary to communicate with the masses that they should be on the alert for some people with ulterior motives who may attempt to expand the

impact of these actions by stirring up trouble and causing destructive actions. Second, the identity of the person responsible for this political incident has to be thoroughly

investigated. Third, the so-called last words of the late premier were nothing more than a counter-revolutionary rumor: this must be contradicted, and the source of the rumor

has to be traced and identified. Fourth, no one is allowed to attack the railroads.“(Ibid., 132.)

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death of Zhou Enlai and to create social disturbances.“540 On March 29, more large posters appeared declaring “Bring Down Zhang Chunqiao, the Careerist and Schemer“ on Xinjiekou Street in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. The same day, Hu Gongfu, a Anhui University Chemistry student; Xu Jinrong, a sewing machine factory worker; and Tang Hao, a Chinese teacher at No. 1 Middle School of Wuhu jointly posted a slogan: “How unfortunate that Xiaoping, who promotes the interests of the country and the people and who is to blame for nothing, should have suffered this mishap!“541 On March 30, Wang Hongwen said to an editor of the People’s Daily that the Nanjing Incident was targeted at the CPC Central Committee: those who put up the posters were trying to appeal to the public for their counter-revolutionary restoration of old institutions.542 According to Mao Yuanxin’s proposal, Hua Guofeng chaired an urgent meeting of six of the Political Bureau on the evening of March 31. Yao Wenyuan insisted on drafting an official notice. The next day, he wrote in his journal that the posters in Nanjing singled out Zhang Chunqiao: “It is clear that there is an underground capitalist command at work here.“543 Yao used all the tools of public opinion in his possession to provide biased information to the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong. During April, there occurred a surge of mass movements — notably the Tiananmen Square Incident — to mourn Premier Zhou, support Deng Xiaoping, and express opposition towards the Gang of Four, dictatorship, and the personality cult that existed for too long. This movement is regarded as the true voicing of the people’s opinion under special historical conditions. It was also a direct result of the movement against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency to repudiate the Cultural Revolution personally launched by Mao Zedong. However, this situation was totally different from 10 years earlier — People in 1976 was sufficiently informed, mature, and shrewd. After 10 years of chaos and suffering, the people used the name of mourning for Premier Zhou to express their objection towards the Gang of Four. A poem posted in Tiananmen Square stated: “In sorrow, we hear ghosts wailing, and as we cry, jackals are laughing. In tears, we pay respect to our heroes who raised their eyebrows and pulled their swords from their sheaths.“ An ordinary individual stated to the People’s Daily: “China is no longer as it has been, and the Chinese are not as foolish as they once were. The feudalistic society of Emperor Qin Shi Huang no longer exists. We believe in Marxism and Leninism, and 540. Ibid., 133–134. 541. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 558–559. 542. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1774. 543. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 144.

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let the bookworms [meaning Jiang Qing and others] that castrated Marxism and Leninism go to hell.“544 In 1980, Deng’s explanation towards why this movement erupted was that 97% to 98% of the Chinese people, including party members, PLA members and the Chinese people, resented the crimes committed by the Gang of Four.545 On April 1, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee informed Jiangsu and other places in China that the Nanjing Incident was a political act that aimed to cause a division in the CPC Central Committee, headed by Chairman Mao, and divert the direction of the campaign against Deng. The Central Committee demanded an investigation into the person who was behind the incident and into the rumor makers.546 On the evening of April 1, according to Mao Yuanxin’s proposal, the Political Bureau had Hua Goufeng chaired an urgent meeting with five attendants, including Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan. Mao Yuanxin was also present and made a record of the meeting minutes.547 The meeting discussed the Nanjing Incident and the situation in other places across the country. It resolved that the CPC Central Committee had to issue a document announcing that the content of the supposed last words of Premier Zhou was just a rumor spread by enemies, who intended to sabotage the current class struggle. It was decided that there an investigation into the matter is needed so the committee would never swallow the bait.548 It was decided to expand the scope of the “Important Instructions of Chairman Mao“ and to further push the movement against Deng and rightist activities. In the early morning of April 2, Mao Yuanxin wrote a report on the op inion of the Political Bureau to Mao Zedong and received his approval.549 This was like pouring oil to the fire of the incidents that continued erupting across the country, and it led to the Tiananmen Square Incident in Beijing. It should be noted that the tarnishing of Deng Xiaoping and the campaign against him and the rightist political course were the true causes of the Tiananmen Square Incident. On April 2, Red Flag published “General Guidance on Restoring Capitalism — Analysis of the General Guideline of the Work in the Party and Country,“ which 544. Worker-peasant-soldier correspondents and staff correspondents of the People’s Daily, ”Counter-revolutionary Incident at the Tiananmen Square.”

545. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 349.

546. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1774. 547. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 144. 548. Ibid., 145. 549. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1774.

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was written by Cheng Yue.550 On the afternoon of that day, there was a telephone call between Lu Ying and Yao Wenyuan, and the content was as follows: “We need to analyze this counter-revolutionary current. It seems that there is someone controlling. This rampant counter-revolutionary counter-current would not be popular among the people simply since it represents classes that are now in decline. There are capitalists at work here, and they make trouble whatever happens.“551 On April 3, Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal that reactionary slogans had begun to appear in Beijing after Jiangsu and Zhejiang: “Yesterday [April 2], the crowds in the Tiananmen Square dramatically increased. They vented their dissatisfaction over the movement against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts in the name of mourning for Premier Zhou’s death. They made counter-revolutionary speeches and yelled counter-revolutionary slogans. Some even spoke openly against the CPC. This struggle is attacking on the dying China. It shows that if the capitalist roader got power, not only would the revolutionary achievements of socialism be lost but also the revolutionary achievements of democracy. In China, fierce struggles have continued, but there has been no thorough solution to the problems. Why not shoot a batch of counter-revolutionary elements? After all, dictatorship is not as graceful as embroidery.“552 The above is a good expression of modern dictatorship and the best evidence for the artificially manufactured Tiananmen Square Incident. It was also on April 3 that the People’s Daily published an article titled “Confession of the Restoring Forces — On an Article Created on the Order of the Capitalist Roader Who Would Repent“ by the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism 550. The article said that “On the General Guideline of Work in the Party and in the Country“ used harsher words and thoroughly exposed the fact that using the Three Instructions

as a guideline as advocated by the capitalist roader in the party (Deng Xiaoping) was a recipe for comprehensively restoring capitalism: “To achieve the Four Modernizations

is only one item among the tasks that need to be fulfilled to meet the basic guidelines of our party. Although this is a great task, it is not our basic task or the only task of our

party. In the eyes of the capitalist roader in the party who will not repent, the only task for the present, the next 25 years, and even throughout the whole socialistic period is production and construction — no class struggles or the revolution and dictatorship of

the proletariat. His so-called Four Modernizations are nothing more than a blueprint

for comprehensively restoring capitalism. Our party, our army, and the Chinese people

at large will surely fight against such a revisionist route.“ (Originally printed in the Red Flag, issue 4, on April 1, 1976; reprinted in the People’s Daily on April 5, 1976.) 551. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 157. 552. Ibid., 158–159.

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Team. It claimed that the capitalist roader who would not repent in the party (Deng Xiaoping) instructed an article to be written titled “On the General Outline of the Work of the Party and the Country“ the previous year, when rightism prevailed. That article had advocated that the guidance of the Three Instructions should operate as a general outline not only for present work but also for the next 25 years. The People’s Daily article spoke of the article ordered by Deng as a huge poisonous weed spread over 10,000 characters as a typical negative teaching material — a confession by the restoring forces. On the evening of April 3, Deng Xiaoping appeared among the crowds in Tiananmen Square. The people shouted: “Criticizing Deng Is Against the People’s Will!“553 This became the evidence that incriminated Deng as being the mastermind behind the Tiananmen Square Incident. April 4 was the day of the Qingming Festival. Over 2 million people in Beijing and other places gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn the death of Premier Zhou.554 The people shouted that whoever was against Premier Zhou should be struck down. In the afternoon, the Political Bureau held a meeting in the Great Hall of the People. As Wu De noted, based on incomplete statistics, over 30,000 wreaths had been sent to Tiananmen Square since April 1 and over 5 million people had taken part in the memorial services: “We did not expect that there would be so many people who would gather in Tiananmen Square mourning for Premier Zhou’s death. Our investigation concluded that there were no illegal organizations behind this nor were there any leaders behind this action. Hua Guofeng argued that before in-depth investigations were concluded, no one should be arrested, so no to escalate the event. In addition, the wreaths in Tiananmen Square should not be removed to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the people.555 However, Yao Wenyuan said: “As far as I understand, what the so-called masses demand is not just that the wreaths stay there a few days longer: they also want to overthrow this Political Bureau and the rule of the CPC.“ Jiang Qing said: “Those wreaths are demonstration provoked by our class enemies. Whoever budges this issue is rightist and a capitulant!“556 Consequently, Yao Wenyuan ordered Lu Ying of the People’s Daily to furnish internal materials and submitted to the Political Bureau. Coerced by Jiang Qing and others, Hua Guofeng gave way. He announced solemnly: “To prevent a handful of class enemies creating trouble in Tiananmen 553. Ibid., 163. 554. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 297. 555. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 170–172. 556. Ibid., 172, 175.

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Square and to maintain normal order in the capital, the Political Bureau has resolved the following. 1. Wreaths, elegiac scrolls, and all posters are to be immediately removed. 2. All counter-revolutionary elements that have posted reactionary poems and made reactionary speeches at Tiananmen Square should immediately turn themselves in to the public security bureau for leniency. All those who continue their counter-revolutionary agitations and who flee to escape due punishment will be punished once arrested. 3. No one is allowed to send any wreaths, elegiac scrolls, and big or small posters for any reason to Tiananmen Square. Any violations will be punishable by law.557 The Political Bureau held an emergency meeting without Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Xiannian,558 whom been excluded from the central decisionmaking process. That meeting defined the Tiananmen Square Incident as a counterrevolutionary action, in which counter-revolutionary forces had attempted to agitate the masses to fight against Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee and to disrupt the campaign against Deng Xiaoping.559 Zhang Chunqiao said: “Without the manipulation and orders of those in power, would those people have dared stage such a counter-revolutionary incident?“ Zhang stated that Deng Xiaoping was at Tiananmen Square too. Jiang Qing said no wonder that there were so many people at Tiananmen Square since the counter-revolutionaries had turned savage. Mao Yuanxin asked: “Should this be reported to Chairman Mao?“ Jiang Qing replied: “Yes, of course. Deng Xiaoping is to be blamed for.“560 Mao Yuanxin’s notes at that time read: “It seems to have been planned. Deng Xiaoping made many preparations in manipulating public opinion from 1974 to 1975. Today’s incident was planned by Deng Xiaoping long ago. The nature of the action is clear: it is a counter-revolutionary incident.“561 Thus, Mao Yuanxin had defined Deng Xiaoping as a counter-revolutionary. At five o’clock, April 5, Mao Yuanxin wrote a report to Mao Zedong concerning the large scale gathering in Tiananmen Square; counter-revolutionary speeches were 557. Ibid. 558. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 149.

559. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1775. 560. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 177–178. 561. Ibid., 180.

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being made and even direct attacks on Chairman Mao, which was unprecedented since the founding of the PRC: “This is apparently a planned and organized incident, which took place in other places as well as Beijing. It is an on-going and developing spread of counter-revolutionary rumors to manipulate public opinion. Last year, Deng Xiaoping argued that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was an attack against Premier Zhou and that the criticism against empiricism was also directed at Premier Zhou: this was exposed by Ma Tianshui, secretary of the CPC Shanghai Committee. Deng Xiaoping led to spread of many rumors, which are now rampant. The comrades at the Political Bureau have concluded that it is good when class enemies make trouble since they are able to rely on rumors and the figure of the dead premier to agitate people who are unaware of the truth. There seems to be an underground ‘Petofi club,’ which organizes activities in a planned way.“562 Mao Yuanxin provided essential materials to Mao so that he could strike at Deng. In the early morning, as decided in the emergency Political Bureau meeting, the concerned departments removed all the wreaths, banners, and memorial posters in Tiananmen Square and arrested some individuals there. In the late morning, people at Tiananmen Square shouted “Return our wreaths“ and “Return our friends,“ while clashing against the authorities. At the same time, Hua Guofeng held an emergency meeting in Zhejiang Hall of the Great Hall of the People with Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian presence. When pictures of a large broadcasting car being smashed and burned being shown, Zhang Chunqiao and others yelled at Deng Xiaoping: “The counterrevolutionaries have turned savage thanks to your support! This riot was your creation; you are its mastermind; you are the Nagy of China.“ Deng remained silent. A dispute arose at the meeting to whether the militia and the armed forces should bear weapons. Zhang Chunqiao said that a class struggle was a life-anddeath fight without any moral principles. Jiang Qing argued for bearing weapons. She said: “Without weapons, how can our militiamen and soldiers destroy the enemies?“ Wang Hongwen disputed this: “You can authorize taking weapons and shooting at people! Don’t count me in on that. Anyone that dares issuing such order, please sign your name here now.“ Hua Guofeng proposed that Mao Yuanxin should immediately report the situation in Tiananmen Square to Chairman Mao. Whatever measures to be taken should be decided by the chairman.563 The same day, when Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong about the Political Bureau meeting, he said that most of the comrades in the bureau believed that the 562. Ibid., 180–183. 563. Ibid., 192–198.

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Tiananmen Square Incident was an organized, premeditated counter-revolutionary riot — just like that took place in Hungary — and that all was schemed and implemented by Deng Xiaoping. When Mao asked for evidence, Mao Yuanxin replied that Deng had been very active in recent days. Deng asked his children and secretaries to collect information everywhere, he even visited Tiananmen Square himself to show his support to the reactionaries. Mao Yuanxin then asked: “Should we use weapons?“ Mao Zedong answered: “Yes. A man of honor both reasons things out and uses force.“564 It was with those words that pushed Mao Zedong to officially order the use of weapons. At noon, Mao Yuanxin communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions to the Political Bureau. He said that when Chairman Mao listened to the bureau’s report on how to deal with the Tiananmen Square Incident, he gave the following instructions. First, the Tiananmen Square Incident was a premeditated organized counterrevolutionary riot. Second, the Political Bureau must take resolute measures to quell the riot and when necessary, weapons could be use; however, field armies should not be deployed and guns should not be used. Third, considering the fact that Deng Xiaoping was responsible for this counter-revolutionary incident, he is to be isolated for investigation.565 Hua Guofeng presided over the meeting at which the Political Bureau unanimously supported and adopted Mao’s instructions. This shows how the only source of information for Mao Zedong as supreme leader and ultimate decision maker was his nephew, Mao Yuanxin. It was based on the information provided by Mao Yuanxin that Mao Zedong made the final decision to take action in dealing with the Tiananmen Square Incident. According to the material submitted to the CPC Central Committee by Zhang Yufeng in October 1980, the discussion results of the Political Bureau were submitted to Chairman Mao for final deliberation. Being extremely weak, Chairman Mao could do no more than nod to show that messages were well conveyed. It is perhaps inappropriate and unwise to blame a dying patient, who was unable to speak and eat, bedridden, and had difficulty breathing, for the series of mistaken resolutions made by the CPC Central Committee.566 This was the political tragedy of Mao Zedong as an individual. He had enjoyed fighting against other people all his life. Even when the halo around his head began to fade as he lay in bed dying in pain, he still dominated the historical stage in political decision making as the supreme leader. The system he created — especially the system of chairmanship and life tenure of the chairman of the CPC Central Committee — became the fundamental cause of 564. Ibid., 218–219. 565. Ibid., 223. 566. Ibid., 219–220.

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the series of mistakes he made in his later years. This was also a political tragedy for the CPC as the ruling party since it put the destiny of a huge country populated with 1 billion in the hands of a dying man. The party had to pay a tremendously high price for this; all paid in April 1976. The same day, the Political Bureau decided to take action in Tiananmen Square. As scheduled, Wu De (member of the Political Bureau and first secretary of the CPC Beijing Committee) delivered a speech at 6 p.m., and at 8 p.m. the militiamen were called out. Wu De, Ni Zhifu (second secretary of the Beijing CPC Committee), and Wu Zhong (commander of the Beijing Garrison and secretary of the Beijing CPC committee) were in charge of this action, Wu Zhong was appointed the onthe-scene commander.567 At 6:30 pm, Wu De delivered a speech on the radio, saying “In Tiananmen Square, some evil people were causing a disturbance and carrying out counterrevolutionary activities. We need to examine the reactionary nature of this political incident and expose their intrigues.“ Wu ordered the people to immediately leave the square and remain clear-headed despite efforts being made to hoodwink them. At 8 p.m., Hua Guofeng and Chen Xilian, who were in the People’s Auditorium, called Wu De, asking why the militiamen had not been called out.568 At 9:30 p.m., 10,000 militiamen and 3,000 policemen (an additional force of over 20,000 militiamen and five battalions of troops were standing by) closed in on Tiananmen Square,569 beating up those remained and arresting 388. Thorough investigations concluded that no one there was a counter-revolutionary.570 Later, Wu De announced that when Tiananmen Square was cleaned up, no one had died in the process.571 From late in the evening of April 5 to the early morning of the 6, some members of the Political Bureau listened to a report made by Beijing leaders, and the meeting defined the Tiananmen Square Incident as “counter-revolutionary and violent.“ An additional 30,000 militiamen and nine battalions were mobilized to stand by.572 It was proposed at the meeting that this incident be rapidly communicated to the whole country and be openly reported.573 Mao Yuanxin wrote a report on the 567. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 215.

568. Ibid., 214–215. 569. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 298–299. 570. Xinhua News, November 8, 1978. 571. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 216.

572. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 299. 573. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1775.

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developments to Mao Zedong at 3 a.m. The report affirmed the action taken on the evening of April 5, and it concluded that the incident was downright counterrevolutionary: “To have demons dancing in broad daylight in Tiananmen Square is something that has never been allowed in history. We finally achieved success, but this incident has taught us a good lesson. The public security bureau should find the underground command of this action. And we should heighten our vigilance against bigger struggles.“574 At 11 a.m., Mao Zedong commented on Mao Yuanxin’s report, agreeing with the decision made by the Political Bureau.575 Mao Zedong said: “It has greatly boosted our morale. It’s good, good, good.“576 On the afternoon of the same day, Jiang Qing reported to Mao Zedong that this whole action was to quell the living person (referring to Mao Zedong) by means of a dead (referring to Zhou Enlai): “Deng Xiaoping is behind all of this. I want to press charges. I suggest kicking Deng Xiaoping out of the party.“ Mao offered no comment on this.577 On April 7, Hua Guofeng presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau. It was attended by 11 people (Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Chen Yonggui, Wu Guixian, and Ni Zhifu), accounting for half of the 22 members of the 10th Political Bureau (including alternate members). Mao Yuanxin was also present. It was proposed that Yao Wenyuan should have the reporters of the People’s Daily write on-the-scene reports about the Tiananmen Square Incident, which should be presented to Mao Zedong by Mao Yuanxin. On the morning of April 7, when Mao Zedong heard Mao Yuanxin’s report, he affirmed the measures taken by the Political Bureau in handling the Tiananmen Square Incident. Mao Zedong proposed that the Political Bureau pass two resolutions. One was to appoint Hua Guofeng as first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council. The other was to depose Deng Xiaoping from all official positions both within and outside the party — his behaviour in future would decide if he could retain his party membership. Mao Zedong said that these two resolutions and reports about the Tiananmen Square Incident should be published and that the following points should be emphasized: first, it had occurred in the national capital; second, it had occurred in Tiananmen Square; and third, a good deal of arson and beatings had taken place. The description 574. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 228–231. 575. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1776. 576. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 232. 577. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1776–1777.

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of the nature of the incident had thus undergone a change.578 On the evening of April 7, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held in the People’s Auditorium. Mao Yuanxin passed Mao Zedong’s instruction according to Zhu De, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and Su Zhenhua, who should not attend. Later, Mao Yuanxin gave a further notification whereby all should participate in the meeting except for Su Zhenhua.579 Mao Yuanxin communicated these instructions to the Political Bureau from Mao Zedong. The bureau unanimously passed a resolution based on Mao Zedong’s directions to remove Deng Xiaoping from official positions within and outside the party, though he could retain his party membership if well behaved. Hua Guofeng was appointed the first vice president of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council. Mao Zedong emphasized that Hua Guofeng should be the first vice chairman of the party; Mao also stated that there should be a resolution to the effect that Hua Guofeng would become his official successor. In June 1977, Li Xiannian explained why Mao Zedong had named the first vice chairman in this manner. Mao Zedong knew that he would soon die and that then, there would be upheaval in the bid for power. In this way, Hua Guofeng was legally announced as the successor to the supreme leader, and if anyone else attempted to grab the supreme power, it would be contravening the law.580 In August 1977, Hua Guofeng explained at the 11th CPC National Congress that it was the first time for the post of first vice chairman to be created in the history of the party. This strategic decision made by Chairman Mao guaranteed the leadership of the party and state such that even when Chairman Mao fell critically ill and died, supreme authority would not be stolen by the Gang of Four.581 Mao Zedong agreed with publishing the report and the speech of Wu De. At 8 p.m. on April 7, it was broadcast by the Central People’s Broadcasting Station and published in all the major newspapers and magazines around the country the next day. On the same day, Yao Wenyuan wrote in his diary describing the incident was a crucial moment to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and bring down the leader of the counter-revolutionary incident (Deng Xiaoping); it was also an opportunity to mobilize tens of millions of people to struggle and show the boldness 578. Ibid., 1776. 579. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 217.

580. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 894–895.

581. Hua Guofeng’s “Report to the 11th National Congress of the CPC,“ was delivered on August 12, 1977, and approved on August 18, 1977.

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and resolution of Chairman Mao as a revolutionary of the proletarian class: “I fully supported the resolution of the chairman. He specially noted that the ’Compiled Summaries of the Situation’ in the recent four issues of the People’s Daily had been revised and published by himself as a historical document.“582 Apparently, the information provided by Yao Wenyuan to Mao Zedong and the Political Bureau became important in decision making. Yao monopolized the information intended for domestic and international audiences. Deng Xiaoping heard the news on the broadcasting station on the evening of April 7. On April 8, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee to show his full support for the committee’s decision: “I express my heartfelt gratitude to the chairman and the Central Committee for allowing me to stay in the party.“583 However, Deng did not know that Mao Zedong had not agreed with Jiang Qing’s suggestion of kicking him out of the party. It was not until 1981 that the CPC Central Committee handed down a fair verdict on Deng and the Tiananmen Square Incident.584 In September 1977, Deng Xiaoping said: “The resolution on my part in the 1976 Tiananmen Square Incident was also approved by Comrade Mao Zedong. The Tiananmen Square Incident involved so many people and was defined as counter-revolutionary, but that was so wrong! They accused me of being behind the Tiananmen Square Incident, but the fact was that I was totally isolated at the time.“585 Why did Deng Xiaoping allow himself to be ousted instead of solving the problem of the Gang of Four when he criticized them at the behest of Mao Zedong? Ye Jianying offered some explanation at the Political Bureau meeting on October 8, 1976. Ye said that Chairman Mao was the first to refer this group as the Gang of Four, but that was not a criticism as such. The Gang of Four took advantage of the chairman’s illness, making use of his power; however, it was not only the Gang of Four, but also Mao Yuanxin. When Deng Xiaoping was attacked, the chairman 582. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 234. 583. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 150.

584. In June 27, 1981, the CPC Central Committee resolved: “At that time, the Political Bureau and Comrade Mao made incorrect judgments related to the Tiananmen Square

Incident and wrongly deprived Comrade Deng Xiaoping of all official positions within

and outside the party.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.)

585. Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 170.

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was so ill that he could only to listen to the reports and minutes prepared by Mao Yuanxin, who would bridge the communication between the chairman and the Political Bureau. Mao Yuanxin was very opinionated and made additions to or even distorted the chairman’s words. From the above, it is clear that Mao Yuanxin played a crucial role. He provided Mao Zedong with both information and suggestions. As a result, the clique actually consisted of a Gang of Five. Mao Yuanxin was the “emperor’s father“ — an important figure in the Political Bureau, though he was not even a member of the CPC Central Committee. Deeply influenced by the history of feudal emperors, Mao Zedong breached the rules and regulations of the party by placing his own nephew in important positions. In addition, Mao Zedong held supreme authority, and he would not allow anyone in the party to challenge the theory nor any decisions related to the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, when Deng Xiaoping started to make sweeping plans to reform and overhaul that revolution and remedy its mistakes and also when the Tiananmen Square Incident occurred, it was inevitable that Deng would once again be politically deposed by Mao.586 What distinguished Mao Zedong from Jiang Qing was that Mao allowed Deng to retain his membership, which was something that Deng had not expected. Mao Zedong also asked Wang Dongxing to protect Deng. On April 8, the CPC issued a directive via telephone. It demanded that largescale mass gatherings be held in all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions so that the resolutions of the CPC Central Committee could be announced. Major leaders would deliver speeches to show clearly understanding of their 586. Deng Rong believed that Mao Zedong adopted a mixed attitude toward Deng Xiaoping.

Mao appointed Deng as one of his potential successors before the Cultural Revolution,

and he did so again when Deng Xiaoping was reinstated during the Cultural Revolution. It could be said that Mao believed Deng to be politically astute, talented, and a good commander. Mao highly appreciated Deng and had high expectations of him. Nonetheless, Deng and Mao failed to agree about the Cultural Revolution, which

was a great disappointment for Mao. His disappointment was bitter, painful, and sad. Deng conducted a comprehensive overhauling of the merits of the Cultural Revolution, and he repudiated it through his actions. As a result, Mao rebuked Deng, though he did

not think of deposing Deng again. Mao always clung to the belief that Deng admitted

his mistakes and would change. Mao did not expect that Deng’s attitude would be vastly different from during the early period of the Cultural Revolution. When the

Tiananmen Square Incident arose, it was a tremendous political disturbance, and it

prompted Mao to topple Deng again. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 482–483.)

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position.587 The next day, gatherings and parades were organized in all major cities around the country to show support for the resolution of the CPC Central Committee in expelling Deng Xiaoping. This was a political declaration in compliance with orders, and it reflects one of the characteristics of China at that time: when the CPC Central Committee was correct, the whole country was correct; when the Central Committee made mistakes, the whole country made mistakes. However, the Tiananmen Square Incident educated and awoke the people: putting an end to the Cultural Revolution as quickly as possible began to exert a strong appeal. This incident laid a solid social foundation for demolishing the Gang of Four six months later. That was the punishment that the Gang of Four deserved: crimes do not go unpunished. The People’s Daily on April 8 published an article that characterized the Tiananmen Square Incident as “a premeditated, planned, organized, counterrevolutionary political incident.“ The article also argued that the incident began through efforts to make Deng Xiaoping into a kind of Chinese Imre Nagy.588 It was also on April 8 that Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal: “The situation is generally good in most places. The counter-revolutionaries still wreak havoc, though that was to be anticipated. Once Deng Xiaoping fell, the landlords, rich farmers, reactionaries, corrupt people, and rightist forces howled in desperation. There is nothing strange about that. We needed only to quell the disturbances stirred up by them. The problems still exist in the party.“589 On April 10, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Great Victory,“ which claimed that Deng Xiaoping was the greatest, most relentless capitalist 587. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 300. 588. The article argued that during the first days of April, a handful of class enemies

launched a premeditated, planned, organized counter-revolutionary incident in Tiananmen Square in the name of mourning Premier Zhou as part of the Qingming

Festival. They delivered public reactionary speeches, posted reactionary poems and slogans, handed out reactionary fliers, and called for setting up counter-revolutionary

organizations. They used allusions and expressly counter-revolutionary language.

They shouted: “The era of Emperor Qin Shi Huang is over.“ They upheld the flag

of Deng Xiaoping and targeted their attacks against the great leader Chairman Mao. They tried to create a rift in the CPC Central Committee, headed by Chairman Mao, and to turn the current campaign against Deng and rightist whitewashing activities

and engage in counter-revolutionary actions. (Worker-peasant-soldier correspondents and staff correspondents of the People’s Daily, “Counter-revolutionary Incident at the Tiananmen Square.”)

589. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 237.

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roader in the party. The article also presented Mao Zedong’s political evaluation and definition of Deng, according to which Deng failed to understand Marxism and Leninism and he represented the interests of the capitalist class: “His claim about ’never reversing a verdict’ was just unreliable.“590 The article announced an important piece of background information: based on the counter-revolutionary Tiananmen Square Incident and the recent actions of Deng Xiaoping, the CPC Central Committee had decided that the problem of Deng had become a confrontational conflict. Accordingly, Deng was to lose all official positions. Deng, youngest among the old-generation revolutionaries, was once again demoted from political power, and this time the move appeared to be permanent.591 However, no one, including Deng himself, would ever have imagined that just a year later, he would once again miraculously ascend onto China’s political stage. On April 18, the People’s Daily published the editorial “What Did the Tiananmen Square Incident Tell Us?“ This described Deng Xiaoping as a representative of the interests of the new and old capitalist elements within and outside the party as well as the interests of landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, corrupt people,

590. The article argued that over a long period, Deng Xiaoping had opposed Chairman Mao, Maoism, and the revolutionary route of the proletariat as instructed by Chairman Mao. Together with Liu Shaoqi, Deng had advocated revisionism before the Cultural

Revolution; during the early Cultural Revolution, Deng and Liu had quelled the

masses in an effort to spread reactionary capitalism. After being criticized by the masses, Deng expressed his willingness to repent and declared that he would “never reverse the verdict.“ Chairman Mao saved Deng by giving him a new chance to work

in the government. However, instead of benefiting from Chairman Mao’s education and help, Deng relapsed as soon as he had regained his former power: he attempted

to reverse the verdict on the Cultural Revolution and ascribe many poor outcomes to the Cultural Revolution. Deng drafted a revisionist guideline titled “Following the

Three Instructions;“ Deng promoted counter-revolutionary revisionism and launched

a campaign for a rightist judgment of the Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao had sufficient foresight to detect Deng’s attempt to make a different judgment about the

Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao stated that Deng “did not support the class struggle. He never mentioned that as a guideline...He does not understand Marxism

and Leninism, and he represents the capitalist class...His statement about ’never reversing the verdict’ is just unreliable.“ Chairman Mao’s words were accurate and

revealed Deng as being of the reactionary class. (Editorial of People’s Daily, “Great Victory.“)

591. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 375.

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and rightist forces: Deng was the head of all those counter-revolutionaries.592 The article repeated Mao Zedong’s words in his letter to Jiang Qing in July 1966: if rightist forces in China launched a coup, they would not be successful or may only achieve a temporary victory since all the revolutionaries, who represent over 90% of the people’s interests, would not tolerate it. Mao’s assumption was that Jiang Qing and the other rebels — rather than Deng Xiaoping — represented the interests of over 90% of the people. As a result, Deng’s cause would not last long. However, 6 months later, Jiang would become the most short-lived political figure after Mao’s death. Mao was correct in his political logic, but his prediction proved false. On April 28, the People’s Daily published “Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen

592. The article claimed that Deng Xiaoping was the biggest relentless capitalist roader in the party: “He is the leader of the rightist whitewashing tendency. The counter-

revolutionary revisionism he preaches represents the interests of the new and old

capitalist elements within and outside the party as well as the landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, corrupt people, and rightist forces that have not changed despite our educative efforts. As a result, capitalist forces and all our class enemies

pin their hopes on the restoration of Deng Xiaoping. When Deng Xiaoping preached

his rightist whitewashing theory last summer, those people became so excited.

When the campaign against the rightist whitewashing theory and Deng Xiaoping was launched, those people voiced their grievances and even conducted counterrevolutionary disruptive activities in public. This meant that the struggle against the rightist whitewashing theory had struck a nerve, and the capitalists would surely make

a desperate struggle and launch counterattacks. As a capitalist roader in the party,

Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the capitalistic class and the major force in trying to restore capitalism in China with the aim of beating the proletariat. Chairman Mao was clearly aware of this. Last year [1975], a few people in Tsinghua University [Liu

Bing and others] wrote a letter accusing Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao immediately recognized that Deng Xiaoping was behind the act and that Deng was staging a fullout attack against the proletariat. Chairman Mao pointed out scathingly, ’The problem

of Tsinghua is not isolated. It gives us a glimpse of the current class struggle.’ The

development of the class struggle aptly demonstrated the veracity of Chairman Mao’s

words. The letter of accusation from Tsinghua University and the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident have a deep political background and they reflect the

class struggle, but they were all due to Deng Xiaoping. Our struggle with Deng Xiaoping

is a fierce class struggle.“ (Editorial of People’s Daily, “What Did the Tiananmen Square Incident Tell Us?“)

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Square Counter-revolutionary Incident,“ an article by Liang Xiao593 whose publication had been approved by Yao Wenyuan on April 22. Liang proposed that it was necessary to concentrate on criticizing Deng Xiaoping as the general orchestrator of counter-revolutionary public opinion.594 What was the Cultural Revolution? What was the nature of the Cultural Revolution? Yao Wenyuan provided the best explanation for this. On May 7, Yao said to Chen Jide, a member of the writing team of the Shanghai CPC Committee, that the Cultural Revolution was about violence: “The Tiananmen Square Incident was about violence. Future struggles will also take the form of violence to solve problems.“595 In the middle of the campaign against Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing activities, China was once more in a state of turmoil. Wide-scale 593. The article argued that the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Political Incident was the result of fierce struggles between two classes, two political

directions, and two guidelines. The incident exposed the hideous nature of the counter-

revolutionary capitalists in the party; it was an inevitable outcome of Deng Xiaoping’s

campaign to whitewash revisionism, and it was a dying performance of the corrupt, declining capitalist class. A small number of class enemies had initiated a counterrevolutionary riot in renowned Tiananmen Square to overthrow the dictatorship of the

proletariat and to restore capitalism in China. This was Deng Xiaoping’s dream, plan, and purpose behind promoting rightist whitewashing the previous year, and it was the class nature of the counter-revolutionary revisionism he preached. (Liang, “Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident.“)

594. This is based on the records of telephone calls made by Yao Wenyuan to Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily. “Deng Xiaoping’s Revisionism and the Counter-

revolutionary Incident of Tiananmen Square“ was written by Liang Xiao. It was concise, and in political terms what he wrote was factually accurate: “The party is conducting

class analysis. However, criticism should be of an allusive nature. Fundamentally speaking, Deng Xiaoping represents their interests. This article should help the people

recognize that the cause of the incident was Deng Xiaoping. Since July, August, and

September of last year, some rumors have been circulating, but they were fabricated by Deng. Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on criticizing Deng. The theme should

be focused, and the title should be concise. It is necessary to reconsider points that have

been emphasized. It is acceptable to describe Deng as a general manager of a counterrevolutionary rumor company.“ (Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes

Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,” September 1977.)

595. Article 46 of the “Indictment against Yao Wenyuan” by the Special Procuratorate under the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.

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activities were launched by the secret police in major cities to arrest counterrevolutionaries — even though this was in blatant violation of the 1975 Constitution, which declared that no citizen could be arrested without the ruling of the People’s Court or the approval of the public security bureau. On May 16, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily jointly published the editorial “The Cultural Revolution Shines Forever — In Memory of the CPC Notice Promulgated on May 16, 1966.“ The article stated that Deng Xiaoping was a leading revisionist roader, just like Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. On May 18, the People’s Daily published an article titled “There Are Capitalist Elements in the Party — An Analysis of the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident,“ written by Liang Xiao. This article was the work of the writing team of the People’s Daily in collaboration with Liang Xiao, and the title was formulated according to Yao Wenyuan’s declaration that there was a capitalist agent within the party. Yao made careful revisions to the article and personally added the point that Deng Xiaoping was the one who had organized the counter-revolutionary political incident.596 On June 28, Zhang Chunqiao told the Central CPC Workshop that the April 5 counter-revolutionary incident sent an important message to members of the CPC, the PLA, and the Chinese people: “The class struggle still exists, and capitalist roaders maintain their capitalist course. All revolutionaries should cast away their innocent illusions that the world has become peaceful. The reason Deng Xiaoping dared to put up such resistance is that he has many followers. Some speak up publicly for him; some stay hidden and yet release poisonous arrows. We should carry on the political struggle against the rightist whitewashing activities — and mostly against Deng Xiaoping — to the end. We should launch more, larger-scale actions against the counter-revolutionaries in our country. If we don’t achieve it this year, we will continue it next year. If one year isn’t enough, we’ll take two years, three years, and — if necessary — five years [to 1981] or 10 years [to 1986].“ Following the political logic of the class struggle according to Zhang Chunqiao, Cultural Revolution will have to go on for another 10 years in China. In July, a national planning meeting was held about reducing the output of major industrial products in 1976. From January to May of that year, steel production fell short by 1.23 million tons; there was also a decrease in production of chemical fertilizers and cotton, and financial revenues fell by 2 billion yuan.597 The campaign against Deng and the rightist whitewashing tendency resulted in 596. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

597. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 292.

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political interference in normal economic activities; this was similar to what had happened with the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974. China was plunged from booming into recession. There was a 10.3% difference recorded in the GDP between 1975 and 1976, 8.7% and –1.6% respectively. The growth rate of industrial added value also decreased from 16.0% in 1975 to –3.1% in 1976 — a fall of 19.1%.598 The Gang of Four had become the greatest political impediment to China’s economic development. The Cultural Revolution was the biggest political restraint to China’s drive toward modernization. Although Mao Zedong had expelled Deng Xiaoping, he sent Wang Dongxing to protect Deng.599 No one understand the reason behind this political decision. For his part, Deng did not offer any explanation. It is, however, noteworthy that in protecting Deng, Mao was protecting the most important talented in China. There would have been no economic reform and opening-up without Deng.

Mao Zedong’s Last Words and Death As the victor on China’s political stage, Mao Zedong never thought that his final triumph would be that of toppling Deng Xiaoping. It was ironic, however, that that move laid a solid foundation among the Chinese people for the subsequent downfall of the Jiang Qing clique and for Deng to stage his own comeback.600 Mao, though, paid a heavy price for this victory. Sick and advanced in years, Mao Zedong sustained a severe blow in dealing with Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen Square Incident. His condition continued to worsen, and he became extremely fragile. Tortured by the severity of his illness and pain, Mao even lost consciousness several times. Most of the time, he was obliged to use an oxygen inhaler. If Mao was to meet a foreign guest, the medical 598. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 11.

599. Deng Xiaoping recalled: “The Gang of Four just had to bring me down and — more than

that — persecute me to death. I lost my official position, but not my CPC membership,

thanks to Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao sent a special cadre [Wang Dongxing] and a special force to protect me, and he announced that no one was to intervene: that is

to say, the Gang of Four should not interfere.“ (Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 169.)

600. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.

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staff would hide the oxygen tank behind a curtain and return it once the guest had left, allowing Mao to use the inhaler again.601 Nonetheless, Mao did not succumb to his disease but insisted meeting foreign visitors. He met the following guests: U.S. President Nixon on February 23; Kaysone Phomvihane, leader of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, on March 17; Vice President Mubarak of Egypt on April 19; New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon on April 30; Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, on May 12; and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former prime minister of Pakistan, on May 24. When Mao Zedong met Bhutto, he was barely able to stand. He had to sit on the sofa while extending his welcome to Bhutto, the meeting lasted only 10 minutes.602 Why did Mao Zedong insist on receiving the foreign visitors? He did this for domestic and international reasons, but mostly it was for domestic considerations. The future of China then hinged on Mao as an individual. His physical condition and ability to remain at the helm were both very sensitive political matters. It was only by continuing to meet foreign visitors that he could deliver the message to people at home and abroad that Mao Zedong was still alive and China was stable. Mao was acutely aware of this situation and felt that he had no choice in the matter. People in China saw the pictures of Mao receiving foreign guests — unaware that Mao already had one foot in the grave and could pass away at any moment.603 In addition, Mao intended to demonstrate to the party, the PLA, and the Chinese people his political trust in and support towards Hua Guofeng by including Hua in meetings with foreign guests. On the evening of April 30, as Mao Zedong was listening to Hua Guofeng’s report about talks with foreign visitors, he wrote: “Take your time. Don’t hurry... Follow past guidelines...I am relying on you to do the job. My heart is at rest.“604 This statement was believed to reflect the true thoughts of Chairman Mao: Mao had not only chosen Hua as his successor, he also officially entrusted the power of ruling the country to Hua, who was well aware of his role. If the Gang of Four dared to distort those words of Chairman Mao’s, they were in fact challenging Hua, and would be doomed in such attempts. Early in June, Mao Zedong suffered a myocardial infarction. He underwent 601. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 284. 602. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1778. 603. From 1971 to 1976, Mao Zedong fell critically ill several times, and for him death was almost like a shadow, threatening this old man in decrepit health. (Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 282.)

604. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 538.

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emergency treatment, which took him out of immediate danger. The Chinese government officially announced that Mao would no longer meet foreign visitors. It was obvious that Mao could not carry on much longer. Realizing that death was imminent, he decided to undertake the necessary political arrangements and leave the last words to his successor. On June 15, as Mao Zedong’s condition worsened, he summoned Hua Guofeng, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Dongxing, Wang Hairong, and others for his injunctions. He knew that his end was near. It was his wish that when he was given a final verdict, people would not just assess him in negative terms. Mao repeated his self-evaluation. He had achieved two things in his lifetime: he had unified China by driving Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan; and launched the Cultural Revolution. He admitted that unlike its numerous objectors, there were not many proponents of the Cultural Revolution. He was worried that coming generations would repudiate the Cultural Revolution and dismiss his political legacy. Mao predicted that peaceful succession might not be possible after his death: “If that’s the case, then let power be transferred in turmoil. In the worst scenario, blood will be shed in this process.“605 This was the last time that Mao showed his concern for Jiang Qing and gave political instructions. At that time, he was indeed powerless and helpless, but his political predictions proved to be highly accurate. Earlier, on March 20, 1974, Mao Zedong wrote to Jiang Qing: “I am now very ill and am already 81 years old. And yet you show no consideration. Now you enjoy a privileged position. But after I die, what will happen to you?“606 Mao foresee Jiang’s political destiny and made predictions for her based on his knowledge of her and her political ambition in the party: she had made a lot of enemies and become a loner.607 If Mao had not put her into an important position and granted 605. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1781–1782. 606. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 359. 607. On July 17, 1974, Mao Zedong rebuked Jiang Qing at a meeting of the Political Bureau:

“You should take greater care! Other people are not happy about you, but they can’t yet say anything directly to you. You’re still not aware of this. Do not make hasty accusations or label people. It’s not good. You need to pay attention to this. You just change.“ “Minutes of Mao Zedong’s Talk with Members of the Political Bureau in

Beijing,“ July 17, 1974. Mao Zedong wrote to Jiang Qing on November 22, 1974: “Do not show up in public too much. Do not approve of official documents. Do not organize

a cabinet and attempt to be some leader behind the curtain. You have made too many enemies. You need to unite with the majority. Heed my words. It’s important that you understand yourself.“ (Ibid., 367.)

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her privileges, she would have been unable to remain in the party, let alone take the law into her own hands. Mao was clearly aware of the truth of this assessment. Soon after Mao’s death, Hua Guofeng had the Gang of Four arrested. Although Mao Zedong suffered from severe illness before his death, he was iron-willed: he believed that the Cultural Revolution had been politically correct and he also regarded it as the second of his lifetime achievements. Mao knew that by the time the Cultural Revolution had dragged on into its 10th year, it had lost the support of the party, the PLA, and the Chinese people. He felt that he stood alone in the party and was powerless and unsupported. Such was the suffering in Mao’s heart. Although Mao had deprived Deng Xiaoping of all his official positions several months earlier, Mao felt that Deng would return to power. Mao Zedong said to Jiang Qing and the others: “What will happen to you? Heaven knows.“ As noted above, Mao Zedong was by this time very lonely, and as an old statesman he was very isolated. He was over 80 years old, but he was engaged in fierce, complex struggles within the party: he still wished to defeat Deng Xiaoping, who was 11 years younger and much healthier. Mao paid the price for that struggle: he was exhausted and his physical condition worsened. During July and August, he was often in a coma and unable to work.608 He had to fight against both his political opponents and his illness. He was able to beat any political opponent, but he could not defeat the laws of nature. On June 25, when Mao Zedong was talking to Hua Guofeng, he wrote: “Pay attention to domestic problems.“609 Those were the last words he wrote. What did

Mao Zedong said to Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen on December 24, 1974, “Jiang

Qing is ambitious. What do you think about that? I know that she is. I know her better than you. I’ve known her for many dozens of years.“ “Mao Zedong’s Talking Points as

Drafted by Zhou Enlai and Communicated at the Meeting of the Standing Committee

of the Political Bureau,“ end of 1974 to early 1975. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao

Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1711.)

During the third part of January of 1975, Mao Zedong censured Jiang Qing again: “You

can’t just do what you like. You need to have self-discipline. Be cautious. Do not make your own decisions. Discuss them with the Political Bureau. It’s important that you



know yourself.“ (Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 152.)

Mao Zedong said to Mao Yuanxin on December 10, 1975 that after Jiang Qing became

a member of the Political Bureau, she remained ignorant. She always scolded other people with a stiff face and in a haughty fashion as though they were her slaves. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1761.)

608. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1782–1784. 609. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

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he mean by “domestic problems?“ Mao provided no specific explanation. Wang Hongwen seized upon those words as a pretext to air his own opinion. In July, Wang wrote to Mao, saying: “Since the chairman has instructed us recently ’to pay attention to domestic problems,’ in my view it is still necessary to criticize Deng. Nationwide, campaigns vary in their effectiveness: some go well; some are average; others are beset with problems. The latter two kinds seem to be the most frequent in China. This is a matter that requires action by the leadership — especially in the case of that third category of campaign. That is certainly true in the case of some departments under the State Council and also under the Central Military Committee. As has been carried out in a number of departments, the solution here is to replace the major leaders of those departments.“ Mao did not give any response 610 or authorization to this. He was no longer able to issue his supreme instructions. On July 6, Zhu De, chairman of the PNC, died. Zhu had been hailed as the “Father of the Red Army.“ He became vice chairman of the Central People’s Government and commander in chief of the PLA in 1949. He assumed the role of vice chairman of the PRC in 1954 and rose to became vice chairman of the 8th CPC Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in 1956; he worked successively as the chairman of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th NPCs. That day, when he heard the news of Zhu’s death, Mao Zedong sighed: “Zhu De and Mao Zedong were inseparable. Now Zhu De is gone, and I be leaving soon too!“ Mao recited in sorrow “On the Withered Tree,“ a poem by Yu Xin, a poet of the Liang and Northern Zhou dynasties in ancient China: “How supple and fresh / the willows newly planted; which turn desolate and dry / over the vast river. Trees die, and so does man.“611 In his old age, Mao was very lonely and sad. He compared himself to a withered tree, which reflected both his emperor-like loneliness and his helplessness against the forces of nature. This was the heavy price he paid for his philosophy of struggle and it was an inevitable outcome of it. In July, the Political Bureau approved of a notice to explain Mao Zedong’s physical condition to high-ranking party officials. The notice, which was drafted by the Gang of Four, claimed that Mao was showing signs of improvement and would soon return to work. When discussing the notice, Ye Jianying, Wang Dongxing, and others strongly objected to such expressions and argued fiercely with Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing. In the notice that was signed and released by Hua Guofeng, phrases relating to improvement and Mao’s imminent return to Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 538. 610. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1782–1784. 611. Ye, A Biography of Jiang Qing.

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work were deleted.612 On July 16, the People’s Daily published the editorial “Brave the Storms — On the 10th Anniversary of the Great Leader Chairman Mao Swimming in the Yangtze River.“613 At the time of publication, Mao was of course unable to swim in the Yangtze as he did 10 years earlier. He was no longer able to lead 800 million people in continuing the Cultural Revolution. However, this editorial presented Mao’s declarations of Mao Zedong: “No progress without struggles“ and “Can we afford not to struggle with 800 million people in this country?“ This was in fact the last spent bullet of the great leader. Mao Zedong did not regret those statements on his deathbed: he still wanted the 800 million Chinese to continue with their struggle. On July 28, a massive earthquake hit the city of Tangshan, Hebei Province, which was a great shock for China and the whole world: 242,000 people were killed and 164,000 were seriously injured. On August 4, Hua Guofeng arrived at the area with over 100,000 troops and over 20,000 medical workers. On August 18, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on the Disaster Relief Efforts in the Fengnan Area of Tangshan.“ When he read this, Mao Zedong burst into tears. 614 This most saddening document was the last document that Mao read and commented upon.615 This earthquake was a sudden catastrophe for the people, and a great blow to Mao. He died one month later. Curiously, the Chinese government not only refused to disclose accurate information about the disaster to the Chinese people, it also declined any international humanitarian aid or financial assistance. Hua Guofeng, the first vice 612. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1373.

613. The article claimed that 10 years earlier (1966), at the critical moment when the Cultural Revolution was first launched: “The great leader Chairman Mao, together with the masses, braved the waves in the Yangtze River. The spirit of Chairman Mao greatly

encouraged the Chinese people to win the grand victories in the storm of class struggle. Today, our celebration of this glorious act will further encourage the whole party, the army, and the Chinese people to adhere to the revolutionary course of the proletariat

class and carry on the campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist whitewashing activities to the end.“ (People’s Daily, July 16, 1976.)

614. Wang Xinde, a member of the medical team for Mao Zedong and an expert in neurology and geratology, recalled: “When the secretary reported to Chairman Mao that this

earthquake had left over 240,000 people dead and caused heavy losses, he burst into tears. That was the first time I ever saw the chairman cry loudly.“ (Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 284.)

615. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1783.

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chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council, was responsible for this. This shows the severe deficiencies of a centralized political system, where news where blacken out, information blocked and decision-making process is very intransparent. The same process happened during the severe famine of 1959–1961 owing to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. History had repeated itself. From 1976 to 1980, Tangshan received 1.17 billion yuan in disaster relief funds from the central government and 2.2 billion yuan toward infrastructure reconstruction, adding up to a sum of 3.37 billion yuan. Unfortunately, this severe natural disaster did not change the class struggle characteristic of China, nor did it stop the movement against Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing activities. China was still trapped in manmade disasters. On August 11, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Further Criticize Deng and Focus on Earthquake Relief,“ stating that where people fought against the disaster was also a battlefield for criticizing Deng: “In our campaign against Deng, we must be motivated to carry out disaster relief work. The leaders of the opportunists in the party have always tried to make use of temporary difficulties caused by natural disasters to turn the tables and restore capitalism.“ This editorial was based on the ideas of Yao Wenyuan.616 On August 23, the People’s Daily published “Grasp the Key Points in Further Criticizing Deng.“ In that article, “General Principles of the Programs of the CPC and the State,“ “Several Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development,“ and “Several Issues in Scientific Work“ were dismissed as “three kinds of anticommunist and anti-Marxist toxic weeds“ that indicated the ultra-rightist counterrevolutionary revisionist route advocated by Deng Xiaoping. The editorial argued that even though Deng had been driven out of power, the struggle had not ended: “We must realize the complexity and persistence of the struggle against capitalism within our party.“ In all, 110 articles and news items criticizing Deng Xiaoping were published by the People’s Daily from August 13 to October 6. From August, tens of millions of the three pamphlets compiled by the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team were distributed. The vast land of China was not mourning victims, showing sympathy, or helping the families, but it was locked in bitter hatred directed at the class enemy — Deng Xiaoping. The campaign against Deng and rightist whitewashing activities was the last political movement to be personally launched and led by Mao Zedong, and — like Mao himself — it had run its course. That campaign would soon come to an end. 616. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 303–304.

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On August 14, Mao Zedong summoned the members of the Political Bureau to his sickbed, and he bid them farewell one by one. Having been informed that Mao was critically ill, the Political Bureau had Yao Wenyuan and Ji Dengkui prepare the memorial speech and obituary notice.617 On August 26, Mao once again suffered a heart attack.618 The same day, Hua Guofeng withheld the news item “Comrade Jiang Qing Visited the People in the Capital on Behalf of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee“ and kept it off the air.619 On September 2, Mao’s condition further deteriorated, and by September 3 his condition had become critical.620 In August, Mao Zedong, knowing that he was fatally ill, mentioned several times his wish to return to Dishuidong in Shaoshan, his hometown. After some deliberations, the Political Bureau finally agreed to this last request of Mao’s. On September 8, Zhang Pinghua (first secretary of the Hunan CPC Committee) phoned the manager of the Dishuidong Hotel to say that in accordance with the wishes of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central Committee had decided to arrange the chairman’s return to Shaoshan on September 15 and stay there for a while. However, at 11 o’clock that evening, the Dishuidong Hotel received an urgent message that halt the preparations of the visit.621 In addition to several severe natural disasters, China experienced over 60 political movements from 1950 to 1976. The class struggle was the one of overriding importance: as the core task of the party, this engine of the class struggle was continuously turning. So what forces could stop it from turning? When could it stop turning? It is now evident to protect the authority of Mao Zedong as an individual, the CPC Central Committee continually made concessions. The party was unable to correct the political mistakes he made in his advanced years and bring the Cultural Revolution to an end. This problem was one that demanded a natural solution. On September 9, Mao Zedong died in Beijing. It had been 33 years since Mao 617. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 7. 618. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 286. 619. The news item stated: “On August 26, on behalf of the great leader Chairman Mao

and the CPC Central Committee, led by Chairman Mao, Comrade Jiang Qing, member of the Political Bureau, visited in the rain the masses and cadres at Beijing Xinhua

Printing Factory, Tsinghua University, and Peking University. She participated in collective labor and encouraged the people to carefully learn the series of important

instructions of Chairman Mao, further criticize Deng Xiaoping, and actively participate in revolutionary and production activities to support people in the disaster-hit areas.“ 620. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 286. 621. Ibid., 283.

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became the chairman of the CPC Central Committee in May 1943, and 27 of those years were after the foundation of People’s Republic of China. He was the supreme national leader of China and had been in power for a long time. The same day, “A Letter to the Whole Party, the Whole PLA, and All Ethnic Groups in China,“ which was prepared by the Standing Committee of the PNC, the State Council, and the Central Military Committee, sang Mao’s praises. It stated that with the willpower of a proletariat revolutionary, Mao Zedong had fought his illness and led the party, the PLA, and the whole nation until his last breath. An “Open Letter to the People“ was written by Yao Wenyuan and approved by the Political Bureau, which evaluated Mao’s revolutionary life and fully affirmed the “great theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat“ as well as “the great success of the proletarian Cultural Revolution and campaigns against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing activities.“622 No one then imagined that with the death of a historic figure, a historic revolution — the Cultural Revolution — would likewise come to a close.623 The same day, Deng Xiaoping and his family set up a shrine for Mao in his house and silently mourned in front of a portrait of the chairman.624 In 1976, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De — supreme leaders of the party and state — died during their tenure of office. Earlier, Dong Biwu, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the PNC, had also died because of illness. These men were all the founders of the People’s Republic of China, great leaders of the Chinese people, and leaders of the party and state with the longest tenure in the history of the People’s Republic of China. These facts reflect the features of the centralized political characteristic of China: the lifelong 622. People’s Daily, September 10, 1976. 623. Maurice Meisner commented that 1976 marked not only the end of the era of Mao Zedong but also the end of the historic mission of the first generation of Marxists

in China, who had matured politically and ideologically during the May Fourth Movement. The Cultural Revolution and its catastrophic results had devoured the lives

of many old revolutionaries (and national leaders) — first, the capitalistic roaders (Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping), who were persecuted in the early stage of the Cultural

Revolution, and then the Maoistic leaders, who were the leaders of the Cultural Revolution but then became the victims of the ongoing anti-ultra-leftist movements. Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, who were once appointed as successors of Mao Zedong, died

in the chaos. (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic of China,

374.)

624. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 151.

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tenure in leading positions as well as a continuous or infinite term of office. This feature was not based on the personal shortcomings of the above individuals but on severe defects of the system itself. Neither the CPC Charter nor the Constitution stipulated the tenure and retirement of leaders of the CPC and state. The length of their political life depended on their lifespan. As a result, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Dong Biwu gave their all until their hearts stopped beating. However, from an institutional viewpoint, lifetime tenure is a very backward system. As we will see later, the system of lifetime tenure was repealed by Deng Xiaoping. The 1982 Constitution expressly stipulated a two-term tenure for national leaders, and the 13th National Congress of the CPC in 1987 halted the lifetime tenure of party leaders. Lorraine Glennon commented on the death of Mao Zedong in her book Our Times: An Illustrated History of the 20th Century (Sidebar 6.1).

Sidebar 6.1 Mao Zedong Bids Farewell to China (1976) By the time Mao Zedong died, his personality cult had developed to an incredible degree. Mao had become the supreme authority in the hearts of the people. He was worshipped by 800 million Chinese people at all times and in all places. His portrait hung in every household; his words were recited as holy instructions, and his name was blessed thousands of times. However, he was trapped in extreme loneliness. Mao’s death triggered a struggle for supreme power. After the death in January 1976 of Zhou Enlai — premier since 1949 and an influential figure who stabilized the situation in the late Mao era — Hua Guofeng was rapidly made premier. However, this did not solve all the problems. Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow and representative of the ultra-leftists, was a very domineering figure. She was also a member of the Gang of Four. The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao to purge ideological impurity in China, and at that time the Gang of Four were the four people who directed the Political Bureau. Their opposing force was headed by Deng Xiaoping — also a member of the Political Bureau and a perceptive statesman who saved a desperate situation. He was the opponent of Jiang Qing and her allies. After Zhou died, the Gang of Four once again consigned Deng Xiaoping to limbo. To control the chaotic situation in China, the forces against the Gang of Four launched a forceful attack and had Jiang Qing and her allies arrested in October. By 1977, Deng Xiaoping had emerged as the real power in the party. Hua Guofeng’s authority had declined. Soon the political persecutions stopped, and the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong also came to an end. Source: Glennon ed., Our Times: An Illustrated History of the 20th Century, 552.

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The Political Challenge and the Demise of Jiang Qing In a country characterized by highly centralized power and personal dictatorship, when the supreme leader is alive, the issue of successor may lead to a political crisis; however, his death can cause a bigger crisis. After Mao Zedong died, an intense power struggle developed in the party. The struggle focused on who would succeed Mao as chairman. Mao had actually appointed Hua Guofeng as his successor, having promoted him from the first vice chairman to chairman of the CPC Central Committee. However, Jiang Qing wanted Hua replaced as chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Hua was forced to challenges and attacks from the Gang of Four. Mao Zedong made two predictions regarding the political situation after his death. The first was made when he wrote “A Letter to Jiang Qing“ on July 8, 1966. He said: “If there was a rightist coup against the CPC, I do not believe that the coup would succeed since all revolutionaries — who represent the interests of over 90% of the Chinese people — would not tolerate it. At such a time, the rightist force may make use of my words to gain temporary power, and the leftist force will surely make use of my other words to bring down the rightist force.“625 The second prediction was made in January 1975, when he said that in the future, Jiang Qing would be unable to cooperate with all other people: “At present, the others are just paying lip service to her. After I die, Jiang Qing will cause troubles.“626 On September 9 Mao Zedong died, and on October 6, the Gang of Four collapsed: less than a month passed between the two events. Thus, Mao’s political predictions were fulfilled. This was both a historical certainty and a contingency: the CPC finally and resolutely made its historical choice. The Chinese people finally gained true historical emancipation. We will now see what caused this political result. By the time of Mao Zedong’s death, the Standing Committee of the 9th Political Bureau, which had had nine members in August 1973, had reduced to only three member, namely Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, and Zhang Chunqiao. Hua Guofeng served as first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and took charge of its daily work. A mutually intersecting and evenly balanced political situation had developed. However, since conflict was imminent, the tension between the two sides was almost explosive. This was an area of great concern both within and outside the party with respect to the future of the country. The political position 625. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 73.

626. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1717.

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and power of the Gang of Four headed by Jiang Qing had been totally reliant on the protection and support of Mao Zedong, but the clique lacked the support of CPC members, PLA members, and the people at large. Once Mao died, its political life would also come to an end. This reflects the saying “When the tree falls, the monkeys scatter; when the boss falls from power, his lackeys disperse.“ As a result, the Gang of Four instinctively felt that it was doomed — especially Jiang Qing. At the first Political Bureau meeting on September 9, Hua Guofeng led a discussion on distributing “A Letter to the Whole Party, the Whole PLA, and All Ethnic Groups in China“ by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Committee. Jiang Qing requested first to continue criticizing Deng Xiaoping, and she proposed that the Political Bureau pass a resolution to immediately expel Deng from the party to safeguard against future troubles. She said that if Deng were allowed to restore capitalism, the results of the proletariat’s Cultural Revolution would be lost. Jiang Qing was acutely aware that her biggest threat after Mao Zedong’s death came from Deng, who was likely to rise to power again. This was the prediction that Mao had made to her in a letter on July 8, 1966. She had to remove this threat: otherwise, she would fall and — more importantly — capitalism would be fully restored in China. Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen supported Jiang’s suggestion. Ye Jianying replied that since Mao had decided on the issue of Deng’s party membership, it was not necessary to discuss the matter further. Wang Hongwen proposed that the Third Plenary Session should be held. Jiang emphasized that the Political Bureau had the mandate to do this. It was the Political Bureau that had resolved to strip Liu Shaoqi and An Ziwen off their CPC membership.627 The Political Bureau meeting passed the above open letter. It also assigned the members of the Funeral Preparation Committee for Chairman Mao Zedong, and it prepared an announcement for memorial ceremonies to be held across the nation as well as an order from the Central Military Committee for the whole PLA to enter top-level combat readiness. Though lacking appropriate authorization, on September 10 Wang Hongwen instructed his secretary, Liao Zukang, to set up a duty room: this was the first step in Wang’s efforts to seize supreme control. On the night of the 11th and on the morning of the 12th, Mi Shiqi followed Wang’s instructions in requiring officials from all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to report to Wang. This move was intended to deprive the General Office of the CCCPC of its power. At 3 a.m. on September 12, Hua Guofeng received an urgent phone call from Zhang Pinghua, first secretary of the Hunan CPC Committee. This caused great consternation for Hua since he realized that Wang was attempting to establish 627. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 8–10.

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another CPC Central Committee. That would of course lead to a division within the party.628 Hua told Wang Dongxing that Wang Hongwen was clearly making a wrong move. The operations of the duty room that Wang Hongwen set up in Zhongnanhai had to cease. The direct telephone link between the General Office to all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions had to be restored as soon as possible.629 On October 8, Hua told a meeting of the Political Bureau: “After the death of the chairman, the Gang of Four found itself in the situation where it just could not wait any longer, and it began to panic.“630 CPC Central Committee Document (1976) No. 24 defined the above incident as “the first move taken toward seizing supreme leadership of the party and the state by the Gang of Four after the death of Chairman Mao.“631 At the trial held in a special court in December 1980, this crime was ignored owing to a lack of evidence. However, Wang Hongwen’s actions did in fact represent the first move in his challenge of Hua’s authority, and that put Hua on an alert and stirred him into taking countermeasures. At a meeting of the Political Bureau on the morning of September 11, Jiang Qing proposed that Mao Yuanxin should retain Mao Zedong’s documents, but Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying objected to this. It was finally concluded that Mao’s documents should be put into the charge of the General Office and be sealed by Wang Dongxing.632 Following this, Li Xiannian went out of his way to impress on Hua that it was necessary to ensure that Mao’s documents did not fall into the hands of the Gang of Four. Hua told Li that he had already ordered Wang Dongxing to take proper care of the materials.633 Late in the evening of September 11, Zhang Chunqiao told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen (secretaries of the CPC Shanghai Committee) that without Deng Xiaoping, no one could guarantee that “Li Xiaoping or Liu Xiaoping“ would remain: “You should be prepared in Shanghai for the possibility of revisionism in the CPC Central Committee. Now that the chairman is gone, that is a real possibility.“634 “Li Xiaoping or Liu Xiaoping“ had developed into another name for Hua Guofeng. Zhang Chunqiao was thus targeting a political attack on Hua Guofeng, and he was informing the Shanghai Gang of this. 628. Ibid., 47–48. 629. Ibid., 57. 630. “Hua Guofeng’s Talk at the Meeting of the Political Bureau,“ October 8, 1976. 631. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 49–50. 632. Ibid., 36–37. 633. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 902.

634. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 30.

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It was also on September 11 that Hua Guofeng went to the residence of Li Xiannian. Hua said: “Now that the Gang of Four has set up a hotline with all the provinces, a conflict with that gang is inevitable. Now is the time for action.“ Li asked: “Are you already decided?“ Hua replied: “Yes. We can’t wait any longer. The question is when and how. Think this matter over. If you agree, please visit Field Marshal Ye on my behalf: ask his opinion on the issue and what he thinks about when and how to solve the problem of the Gang of Four.“ Li expressed his full support and approval of Hua’s views and opinions and said he would visit Ye Jianying as soon as possible. On September 12, Li Xiannian and Chen Xilian reached a consensus. Chen said that the Gang of Four was about to take action and that it was necessary to arrest its members. On September 14, Li visited Ye Jianying with a message from Hua Guofeng, who wrote: “This struggle is inevitable.“ Ye responded: “This struggle will result in death or glory.“ Li said: “Please indicate the time and method.“ Ye nodded in agreement and then wrote down the names of Chen and others. Then he added a question mark. Li responded: “They are fully reliable. Please feel assured on that score.“ On the evening of September 14, Li reported back to Hua Guofeng.635 Earlier, on September 13, at a meeting of the Political Bureau, Jiang Qing attacked Hua Guofeng about preserving the remains of Mao Zedong. Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal: “Jiang Qing proposed to hold a meeting of the Political Bureau. At the meeting, she quarreled with Hua over the remains of Mao Zedong. Her words were vehement and caused dissatisfaction among the members. This is dangerous. Some people already feel alienated by her. I can’t go along with that: I must help and support her to the best of my ability. I must honor the chairman.“ He also wrote: “With the chairman’s passing, some people might take this chance to stir up a riot. We must be alert and prepared.“636 Also on September 13, Wang Hongwen received a letter from the son of Xu Shiyou, commander of the Guangzhou Military Area and a member of the Political Bureau. This letter expressed Xu Shiyou’s view of the political situation: “Since the chairman has passed away, civil disturbances may develop over the supreme leadership. The Shanghai Gang is rotten. With the support of Chairman Mao, they have wielded a big stick of power and carried out evil actions. Now that the chairman has gone, their days are limited.“637 The contents of this letter fully reflected the views of most members of the Political Bureau. Mao’s death marked 635. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 899–901.

636. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 84. 637. Ibid., 86.

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the end of the Jiang Qing clique since it did not have the support of members of the CPC, PLA, or the Chinese people. Wang showed the letter from the son of Xu Shiyou to Mao Yuanxin. Wang said with some trepidation: “It appears that they are going to strike. What would we be doing without the army?“ Mao Yuanxin believed that the Beijing Military Area and its garrison were unreliable: “They would be in danger if an armed conflict arose. The best course would be to transfer two divisions from the Shenyang Military Area.“638 Later, Wang Hongwen informed Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan about the above letter. Zhang replied that Xu Shiyou would launch a mutiny — just like An Lushan did in the Tang dynasty: “This is a sign that they are sharpening their knives, ready to plunge the capital into a bloodbath. I don’t think that the PLA would obey Xu Shiyou. Lin Biao had a far higher position and held far greater power, but what did he achieve? If he [Xu Shiyou] tried to fight against the party and seize power through intrigue, he wouldn’t be able to muster even one guard.“639 However, Zhang forgot one significant difference: in September 1971, Mao Zedong was still alive and in power, and it was Zhou Enlai behind him to help dealt with the Lin Biao Incident. Now that Mao was dead, Xu Shiyou and many more people, such as Ye Jianying, would stand up against the Gang of Four. On September 16, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the editorial “Chairman Mao Will Live Forever in Our Hearts,“ which exhorted “Follow the set guidelines.“ This attracted the concern of Wang Dongxing640 since it was manipulating the deathbed words of Chairman Mao. The Gang of Four undertook this action to present themselves as Mao’s loyal successor, placing a higher value on themselves and attacking Hua Guofeng and other leaders.641 Ye Jianying detected this and informed Hua who further discussed with Wang and instruction given to him [Wang] by Mao was to “follow the past guidelines“ not “follow the set guidelines.“642 Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal on September 16 that the great danger for 638. Wang Hongwen’s confession during the trial on July 12, 1980. (Ibid., 84.) 639. Ibid., 85–88. 640. Wang Dongxing said: “After Chairman Mao passed away on September 9, the Gang of Four distorted his words, and they published the set guidelines on September 16. At first, I thought that the chairman had perhaps written something to them, but I soon

realized that he did not write to them. Their intrigue has now been exposed. They distorted the injunction of Chairman Mao.” (“Wang Dongxing’s Talk at the National Publicity Meeting,” November 18, 1976.)

641. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 307. 642. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 111–113.

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the proletariat dictatorship was not from such people as Huang Wei and others, but from the capitalist class and capitalist roaders in the party. Yao was referring to Hua Guofeng. It was also on September 16 that Hua Guofeng convened a meeting in the Meeting Hall of the State Council, which was attended by Li Xiannian, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Yonggui. Hua Guofeng proposed that they needed to solve the problem of the Gang of Four. Some replied that the members of the gang should not all be treated the same. Other participants did not pass an opinion. Hua felt that this issue could not be discussed collectively: it could be discussed only on an individual basis.643 September 16 also had Hua Guofeng convene a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau at the request of Jiang Qing. However, Jiang wanted Yao Wenyuan and Mao Yuanxin to participate rather than Ye Jianying. She also demanded Wang Dongxing to transfer the documents and archives in Mao’s residence to her and Mao Yuanxin.644 Earlier, Jiang Qing had demanded that Zhang Yufeng, Mao Zedong’s secretary, give her Mao Zedong’s documents, and she successfully received two of them. Zhang reported this immediately to Wang Dongxing, who ordered that the two documents be recovered. As a result of these moves, Ye Jianying reminded Wang Dongxing that he should tighten security and increase vigilance to prevent Jiang Qing from taking supreme power over the CPC Central Committee. Ye warned Wang seriously: “When Chairman Mao was alive, you protected him. Now he has passed away, you need to carefully guard his documents and archives. Even though there is no time for sorting through these materials, you need to seal them. Never lose any of them. This has a direct bearing on the core secrets of the party and the state.“645 On September 21, Hua Guofeng officially decided that all Mao’s documents, materials, and books should be sealed and kept by Wang Dongxing.646 Jiang was very dissatisfied with this situation and argued with Hua many times about it.647 This decision foiled Jiang’s attempt to control Mao’s documents and materials. Why was Jiang Qing so anxious to lay her hands on Mao Zedong’s documents? 643. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 902.

644. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 406. 645. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 380. 646. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1415.

647. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 231.

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When Hua Guofeng talked to Wu De about this, Hua said Jiang’s purpose was to control Mao’s documents so that she could find and distort his words, which she could use to persecute some leading officials in the PLA, government, and party organizations. She aimed to remove obstacles on her way to seizing leadership of the CPC and state.648 In fact, Jiang aimed to find and destroy the materials against her that Mao possessed. Mao held some very sensitive materials relating to all the leaders, such as Wu Hao’s “Revelation against Zhou Enlai,“ the selfcriticism materials of Deng Xiaoping, and the disclosure materials written by Qiao Guanhua and Zhang Hanzhi against Deng Xiaoping. It may well have been that Mao wished to control and decide the political life of all leaders, including Jiang Qing. For example, Kang Sheng summoned Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng in December 1974: Kang demanded them reporting to Mao that in the archives of Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing, there were materials against Jiang Qing confessed by the traitors. Jiang soon heard about this and knew that Mao possessed all those materials.649 She was afraid that such documents would provide evidence that would lead to her political demise after Mao’s death: she was such a vehement political force that her actions had led to the death of Liu Shaoqi and others. In March 1977, the Central Special Case Team exposed the historical problems of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao using the archive materials of Mao Zedong.650 At that time, no one, including Mao Zedong, suspected that those documents would become a deadly weapon against Jiang. Thus Jiang, who harbored guilty secrets, had to get hold of these materials. On the afternoon of September 18, a memorial meeting was held for Mao Zedong. After the meeting, Yao Wenyuan instructed Deng Gang (director of the Central Broadcasting Administration) and Lu Ying (editor in chief of the People’s Daily) that the news reports should not highlight any individual (meaning Hua Guofeng), but should emphasize the collective leadership. During this period, the chairman’s instructions relating to following the set guidelines should be underlined in all propaganda efforts.651 648. Ibid. 649. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 21. 650. In 1933, Zhang Chunqiao joined the fascist organization Huadi Society, which was under the Kuomintang Fu Hsing Society, and in 1935 he took part in cultural spying

activities. In 1934, Jiang Qing (at that time her name was Li Yungu) confessed this

after she was arrested in Shanghai. (Central Special Case Team, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.2,“ March 1977.)

651. Lu Ying’s confession on May 13, 1980. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 122–123.)

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On the evening of September 18, Zhang Chunqiao held a discussion with Xiao Mu, Wang Hongwen’s secretary, and the content of this talk was secretly communicated to the Standing Committee of the CPC Shanghai Committee. Zhang said that although Deng Xiaoping had been ousted, the capitalist class still had power, no matter who was leading them: “At present, the capitalist forces have not yet gathered strength. They lack a leader. If revisionism appears again in China, it will arise in the upper levels — in the CPC Central Committee and among capitalist elements in the party. The present is the most difficult period, but we can survive it. Putting someone like Deng Xiaoping into power now would be impossible since the people would rise up against it...652The Comrades in Shanghai should take heart, work hard, and prepare for the struggle.“ However, Zhang drastically underestimated his political opponents, and he was soon imprisoned. On September 21, Field Marshal Nie Rongzhen, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee, sent Yang Chengwu to inform Ye Jianying that the problem of the Gang of Four had to be dealt with: “The Gang of Four is nothing more than a band of counter-revolutionary elements, and they will stop at nothing to seize power. We should ward against a preemptive strike by them. If they arrested Ye Jianying and assassinated Deng Xiaoping — or even Hua Guofeng — China would regress dozens of years.“ Nie said that the normal means of inter-party struggle would be useless in solving the problem of the Gang of Four: “Only by striking first and taking resolute measures can we ward against unwanted results.“ Nie urged Ye Jianying to make up his mind as quickly as possible. Ye replied to Yang: “Tell Nie Rongzhen to rest assured.“653 Field Marshal Xu Xiangqian, a member of the Central Military Committee Standing Committee, also urged Ye Jianying indirectly to make a quick decision about handling the Gang of Four.654 This shows that although the members of the Gang of Four held high positions, they were not supported by the majority of CPC and PLA. Dealing with the Gang of Four had to be done by political consensus and tacit agreement among the upper levels of the Central Military Committee. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao talked to Li Xin, the vice colonel of the Guards Regiment of the CPC Central Committee, on September 16. They tried to control the regiment by promising Li a bright future. Li immediately reported this matter to Wang Dongxing, who promptly informed Hua Guofeng, and this led to Hua 652. Confession of Wang Zhichang (member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai CPC Committee) on December 14, 1976. (Ibid., 123–125.)

653. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1415.

654. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 307.

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making a decision.655 It was also on September 16 that Ye Jianying visited Hua Guofeng to discuss ways of handling the problem of the Gang of Four. They decided to conduct separate investigations.656 As noted above, Ye Jianying believed that this struggle would end in death or glory: “Either we kill them, or they kill us...657 Neither meetings [of the Political Bureau or CPC Central Committee] nor criticisms nor ideological struggles can solve this problem. Only by using special means can we surprise them and deliver a hard blow.“ Ye mentioned the way that Zhou Enlai had dealt with Lin Biao’s Four Guardian Warriors in September 1971. After the September 13 Incident, in which Lin Biao died in an air crash, his Four Guardian Warriors (Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo) remained in the Political Bureau and controlled key departments in the PLA, thereby posing a major threat. Later, Premier Zhou came up with the method of summoning them to the Great Hall of the People for a meeting, where their crimes were suddenly announced and they were immediately arrested and detained. Then, a meeting of the Political Bureau was convened to resolve the situation. This procedure was referred as “taking action first and holding a meeting later.“ Hua Guofeng said that according to Li Xin, Nikita Khrushchev used this method when he arrested Lavrentiy Beria.658 After Mao Zedong’s death, Ye Jianying believed: “Although they [the Gang of Four] are immensely haughty and arrogant now, they cannot possibly control our party or change the history of China. Their days in power are numbered. They will get nowhere.“ 659 Ye was acutely aware that it was wrong to get rid of the mouse (Jiang Qing) by burning down the house (Mao Zedong): “If the Political Bureau is united and determined, it can deliver a destructive blow to the Gang of Four.“660 He believed it was necessary to choose the right moment in dealing with the challenges 655. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee’s Interview with Wang Dongxing in April 1984. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 172–173.)

656. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 903.

657. Hua Guofeng said: “Vice Chairman Ye was very firm in the struggle against the Gang

of Four. He visited and consulted with me on this matter. He said that our struggle

against the Gang of Four was one of death or glory. During that period, I talked to a lot of comrades in the Political Bureau, who were making preparations.“ (Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 382.) 658. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 190–195. 659. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 381. 660. Ibid., 381–382.

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posed by Jiang Qing. In shouldering this great task, Ye became a historic figure. On September 22, Zhang Chunqiao wrote a letter to Ma Tianshui in Shanghai, asking him to prepare countermeasures. In his letter to Ma, Zhang said: “Shanghai is a city with a glorious history of revolutionary struggles, and it is the origin of the Cultural Revolution launched by Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao always believed Shanghai to be center of hope. Now, Chairman Mao has left us forever. You should be alert against revisionism in the party, especially in the central areas and in the upper level — against people like Lin Biao, whom are still quite large in numbers. I hope that you would prepare countermeasures for this situation.“661 On September 23, Wang Hongwen demanded in a phone call that Shanghai “heighten its vigilance.“ He emphasized in his call to Wang Xiuzhen: “You should heighten your vigilance: the struggle has not ended against the capitalist agents within the party. They have not resigned themselves to defeat and will always want Deng Xiaoping.“662 At that time, Hua Guofeng was determined to remove the Gang of Four. On September 24, Li Xiannian conveyed Hua’s resolve to Ye Jianying: “General Ye should please consider when and how to solve the problem of the Gang of Four.“ Ye responded to Li: “The struggle between us and them is one of death or glory: there is no room at all for reconcile.“663 On the evening of September 26, Hua Guofeng, Li Xiannian, and Wu De discussed possible solutions to the question of the Gang of Four. They agreed that there were two options: one was to arrest them; the other was to expel them from their official positions through a vote in the Political Bureau. They concluded that they would best remedy the situation by means of voting in the Political Bureau; however, they were uncertain whether this vote should extend to the members of the CPC Central Committee. It was necessary, they decided, to conduct an isolated investigation. Hua stated that it was better to do this sooner rather than later, and the sooner the better.664 Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing held a discussion and reached a major resolution: full preparations would be made so that at the right moment — around 10 days after the National Day holiday — the Gang of Four would be summoned to a meeting. They would then be isolated for investigation and a 661. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol.2, 1416.

662. Ibid. 663. Liu ed., Chronicle of Ye Jianying, vol. 2, 111. 664. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 237–239.

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meeting of the Political Bureau would be convened to announce the news.665 This would be a case of first taking action and later reporting to a meeting. On September 28, Zhang Chunqiao sent his secretary, Xiao Mu, to deliver a message to the Shanghai CPC Standing Committee: the committee should analyze the current situation regarding the class struggles. The committee had to be alert and it had to realize that despite setbacks, the capitalist class retained power — irrespective of its leader: “Now, some individuals may want to attack Shanghai. This is a severe test that Shanghai has yet to go through.“666 Based on Zhang Chunqiao’s instructions about the possibility of war, Xu Jingxian and others planned to launch an armed rebellion in Shanghai.667 According to Jiang Qing’s proposal, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held late in the evening of September 29, being presided over by Hua Guofeng. Jiang was the first to make a move. She said: “Now that Chairman Mao has passed away, what will happen to the leadership of the CPC Central Committee?“ Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao echoed similar sentiments: Collective leadership should be strengthened to avoid any deviation from the revolutionary route of Chairman Mao. Tonight, let us discuss the work of Jiang Qing. This proposal was immediately opposed by Ye Jianying and others. Hua Guofeng read out a letter written by Mao Yuanxin, saying that agreeing to the suggestion of bring Liaoning back in work. However, Jiang insisted instead that Mao Yuanxin should stay to draft a report and handle the funeral arrangements for Chairman Mao. Hua Guofeng countered this by saying that Jiang had declared that she and Mao Yuanxin would keep out of arrangements for Chairman Mao’s funeral. Jiang Qing yelled: “I never said that. This is a setup! I’ve been framed!“ Wang Dongxing testified that Jiang Qing had declared that she and Mao Yuanxin would stay out of Chairman Mao’s funeral arrangements. Ye Jianying expressed his support for Hua Guofeng, for Mao Yuanxin returning to work in Liaoning and Chairman Mao’s documents being held by the General Office of the CCCPC. Jiang Qing and her supporters objected to this at the Political Bureau meeting, insisting that Mao Yuanxin should draft the report to be presented at the Third Plenary Session. Hua Guofeng stated that Mao Yuanxin should return to Liaoning and that was the resolution of the majority of the members of the Political Bureau: “Even if a report is to be presented to the Third Plenary Session, it should be me who drafts and presents that report. 665. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 385. 666. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1417.

667. Xu Jingxian’s confession on July 24, 1980. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 204.)

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The personnel arrangements of the CPC Central Committee should be decided following deliberations of the Political Bureau.“ Hua Guofeng then announced that the meeting was over.668 This shows that the struggle in the CPC Central Committee was on a crescendo, and further boosted Hua and his supporters’ determination on getting one step ahead of the Gang of Four. On the evening of September 30, Hua Guofeng summoned Li Xiannian and Wu De, consulting them over the plans on isolating and investigating the Gang of Four as soon as possible. Li Xiannian and Wu De completely supported Hua Guofeng’s plan.669 On October 1, the People’s Daily published the article “Learn the Thoughts of Mao Zedong and Carry on Chairman Mao’s Unfulfilled Wishes.“ This reiterated the necessity to “follow the set guidelines.“ The same day, Jiang Qing delivered a talk at Tsinghua University. She said that she was pressing charges against Deng Xiaoping at the first meeting of the Political Bureau after the death of Chairman Mao. Jiang also declared that Deng’s party membership should be taken off; however, if this did not happen, she would keep an close eye on Deng in case some individuals (meaning Ye Jianying) made an attempt to conceal his faults: “You young people should do your best to resist such individuals. The struggle between the classes over political direction will last a long time. But that situation is good. What do you think of this situation? Whatever you think, please remain alert.“ On October 2, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying agreed that the struggle with the Gang of Four had reached a mutually irreconcilable juncture and that a major conflict was inevitable — one that went far beyond normal internal party disputes. Consequently, the situation called for something beyond the usual means of settling party problems. Nonetheless, the case of the Gang of Four had to be dealt with legally so as to avoid political upheaval.670 Following their consultation, the two men decided to call a meeting to announce the isolation and investigation of the Gang of Four.671 It was also on October 2 that Hua Guofeng wrote a comment on a speech transcript: “I checked the quote by Chairman Mao and detected three differences: what Chairman Mao wrote and what I conveyed to the Political Bureau indicated ’follow past guidelines.’ To avoid further mistakes, I deleted that section.“ Zhang Chunqiao suggested that Hua Guofeng’s comment not be communicated to 668. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 263–267. 669. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 905.

670. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 478. 671. Jin, The Outline of Chinese History in 20th Century, vol. 3, 1109.

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avoid any unnecessary disputes.672 Wang Hongwen and Ye Jianying both signaled their agreement with the speech transcript. Zhang Chunqiao also agreed, but he proposed to not pass on Hua Guofeng’s comment so as to avoid unnecessary disputes.673 Hua Guofeng had in fact communicated Mao Zedong’s instruction to “follow past guidelines“ to the Political Bureau on April 30, and he showed this instruction of Mao Zedong’s to Yao Wenyuan. The quotation also appeared in the notes of Yao Wenyuan and Jiang Qing. It is clear that Jiang Qing and her supporters were deliberately changing the instructions of Mao Zedong and presenting this distortion to the public. This put Hua Guofeng on high alert: what were Jiang Qing and her clique attempting to do? This gave greater impetus to Hua’s efforts to remove Jiang Qing and her gang. On October 3, Wang Hongwen delivered a speech in Beijing’s Pinggu County. He said with regard to the revisionists: “What should you do? Bring them down! Beware of Tang Xiaoping and Wang Xiaoping in the future! Stay alert about revisionism.“674 Wang was clearly referring to Hua Guofeng. On October 4, the Guangming Daily carried a large headline article on its front page: “Forever Follow the Set Guidelines of Chairman Mao,“ which was written by Liang Xiao. It announced that the instruction of Chairman Mao was to “act according to the set guidelines,“ which shone and were as valuable as gold: “The capitalist roaders are still keeping to their course.“ The article stated that the direction they followed was the basic course of the opposition party throughout the socialist historical period: overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring capitalism, which they would do by tampering with the set guidelines of Chairman Mao: “To tamper with the set guidelines of Chairman Mao is to betray Marxism and socialism and the theory of ongoing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Any revisionist politician who dares tamper with the set guidelines of Chairman Mao will come to no good end.“675 Published under the direction of Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing, the article was a targeted attack on Hua Guofeng. At 7 p.m. of the same day, Hua Guofeng met Li Xin, and Hua said

672. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 308. 673. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 245. 674. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 307. 675. This article was written by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism

Team under the direction of Jiang Qing for publication in the People’s Daily. Yao Wenyuan was instructed by Hua Guofeng on October 2 to publish the article in the

Guangming Daily on October 4 instead of the People’s Daily. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 247–250.)

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to Li: “They [the Gang of Four] are trying to kill me.“676 Hua Guofeng immediately consulted with Ye Jianying. Ye Jianying decided that the Guangming Daily article signaled the intention of the Gang of Four to seize power over the party and the state: “If we don’t attack the enemy, the enemy will attack first. And if our attack isn’t quick enough, the enemy will win.“ Ye held a meeting with Hua Guofeng and declared: “In view of recent developments, it is now high time for us to solve this problem. They are about to attack. We cannot wait any longer. We must take the bull by the horns.“ The two men decided to take action on October 6 or 7 to destroy the four causes of their ills.677 Chen Xilian hurriedly returned to Beijing from Tangshan and directly to the residence of Hua Guofeng. He mentioned the article published in the Guangming Daily and said that the Gang of Four was ready to take action: “We can’t wait for them to arrest us.“678 The same day, Hua Guofeng conferred with Wang Dongxing and Wu De on how to isolate the Gang of Four and what further actions they should take against the gang.679 In the afternoon, Wang Dongxing formulated an action plan against the Gang of Four. That evening, Hua Guofeng approved that plan.680 Hua then notified Li Xiannian of the time to arrest the Gang of Four, and Li fully agreed.681 On October 5, Ye Jianying ordered the PLA to stay alert and obey orders. Ye instructed Liang Biye, vice director of the General Political Department, that his department should remain vigilant and steady and that it should reinforce the management and education of troops. Ye directed Yang Chengwu, acting chief of the General Staff Headquarters, to exercise tight command over the General Staff, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department in addition to the army, air force, and border defenses; Yang had to maintain combat readiness and ensure that there would be no problems in the PLA. Yang Chengwu replied: “The PLA obeys the CPC and follows the directions of the Central Military Committee.“682 676. Ibid., 253–254. 677. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 363–365. 678. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 907.

679. Ibid., 906. 680. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee’s Interview with Wang Dongxing in 1986. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 253–254.)

681. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 907.

682. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1420.

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At that juncture, the conflict and struggle intensified between Hua Guofeng and most members of the Political Bureau on the one side and the Gang of Four on the other: on the verge of a decisive battle, the situation was reaching a fever pitch.683 Jiang Qing and her supporters overestimated their political power and were unaware of the fact that without Mao Zedong, their aspirations would amount to nothing.684 On October 8, Ye Jianying said at a meeting of the Political Bureau that after Mao’s death: “The situation quickly deteriorated, and so [Jiang Qing and her supporters] felt they had no choice but to step up their efforts.“ On October 4, the Guangming Daily published the article “Forever Follow the Set Guidelines of Chairman Mao,“ which signaled that the gang was about to take action. The gang’s efforts to control public opinion proved that it was unable to wait any longer. Under these critical circumstances, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying had to react to the aggressions of Jiang Qing and her clique by arresting the Gang of Four, accelerating its political demise. On the evening of October 6, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing isolated Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan for investigation in the guise of convening a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. At that point, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice to the effect that recently, following the death of Chairman Mao, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan had conspired to seize control of the CPC and the state and that they had committed a series of anti-CPC and antisocialistic crimes. In view of this situation, the CPC Central Committee decided to isolate and investigate those four individuals.685 When Zhao Yaoci announced 683. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 475. 684. During the National Publicity Meeting on November 18, 1976, Wang Dongxing said:

“We were afraid; everyone was afraid after Chairman Mao passed away that they

would misjudge the situation and overestimate themselves, as well as underestimate

the people and Comrade Hua Guofeng and the majority of the Political Bureau members led by Hua Guofeng.“

685. Wang Dongxing recalled this action as follows: “On the evening of October 6, 1976, a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was held in the orchestra

pit of Huaihuitang Auditorium. Comrades Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying were sitting there. A notice about isolating the Gang of Four had been written in advance. This was to be announced by Hua and implemented by me. Zhang Chunqiao was the first to

arrive. He listened to the resolution and said nothing. Wang Hongwen was the second to arrive, and he struggled. When he was 5 meters away, he suddenly made as if to

attack Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. When there were only 2 meters between them,

our men caught and grabbed him, pushing him to the ground. Yao Wenyuan was at his

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this resolution of the CPC Central Committee, Jiang Qing retorted: “The Central Committee didn’t hold a meeting about this. Whose resolution is it? This is some kind of scheme! You’re launching a coup! The bones of the Chairman are not even laid to rest and you’re already taking action against me! The people will never forgive you!686 Later, she said that Hua Guofeng was being a traitor to Chairman Mao.687 This situation was in accordance with what many people believed: there would have been no Jiang Qing without Mao Zedong, and when Mao Zedong passed away, Jiang Qing fell. At 10 p.m. on October 6, Hua Guofeng convened an urgent meeting of the Political Bureau, which was attended by 11 of the 19 members — those who had stayed in Beijing.688 Hua Guofeng said: “Comrades, I have gathered you here tonight to announce an important incident: Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan used the death of Chairman Mao in conspiracy to seize power of the CPC and the state. To prevent this counter-revolutionary group from bringing a severe calamity on the Chinese people, the CPC Central Committee had to take the resolute measure of isolating and investigating on the Gang of Four at 8 p.m. on October 6.“ Hua described in detail the struggle against the Gang of Four, and he listed Chairman Mao’s criticisms of that group:689 “At that residence, which belonged to the garrison. Therefore, Comrade Wu Zhong was asked to wait for him in his office, and if Yao did not go to Zhongnanhai, Wu was to arrest him

at his home. Then Yao went to his office and was arrested there. When that had been done, I called Wu Zhong and told him to go home. Meanwhile, comrades Zhang Yaoci and Wu Jianhua arrested Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin at their homes. They offered no

resistance. The arrest of the Gang of Four started at 8 p.m. and ended before 9:30 p.m. Since the preparations had been done carefully, the CPC resolution was announced

in advance of the arrests. The resolution stated that the CPC Central Committee had

decided to isolate those individuals for investigation because they had committed crimes.“ (Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 390.) 686. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 318–319. 687. On December 24, 1980, Jiang Qing defended herself against the indictment during her trial: “Thanks to the betrayal by Hua Guofeng — the traitor and villain — you have a temporary victory.”

688. The eight members of the Political Bureau who attended this meeting were Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Chen Yonggui, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De in addition to three alternate members — Wu Guixian, Su Zhenhua, and Ni Zhifu. (Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, 2nd revised edition, 395.)

689. Hua Guofeng said, in view of the rampant activities of the Gang of Four, Chairman Mao

instructed the Political Bureau during his illness to discuss this problem. Chairman

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time, General Ye and I did not take immediate action because Chairman Mao was sick. After Chairman Mao passed away, we did not wish to tackle them if they did not act aggressively. However, they were too foolish to respect Chairman Mao and the Political Bureau. They attempted to establish another CPC Central Committee and seize supreme power. According to the intelligence we’ve intercepted, they were prepared to launch a coup on October 10.690 We were aware of the severity of the situation: if their scheme succeeded, the revolutionary cause of the proletariat initiated by Chairman Mao could have been lost, and our party and nation would have declined; capitalism would be restored, and it would have led to the death of thousands of people. Considering this, we decided to take special measures to detain them all for investigation.691 Comrades, we did this to fulfill the unfulfilled wish of Chairman Mao. What we did reflected the fundamental interests and wishes of the whole party, the whole PLA, and Chinese people of all ethnic groups. This victory over the Gang of Four helped our party avoid a major split, major bloodshed, a major catastrophe, and a major setback for our cause.“692 Ye Jianying also delivered a speech. Following Ye’s proposal, the Political Bureau appointed Hua Guofeng chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee. Just before that meeting, Hua and Ye discussed the choice of chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Ye said: “Chairman Mao demanded that you should assume this role.“ Hua recommended that Ye preside over the work of the Central Committee. Ye Jianying said: “You are the successor appointed by Chairman Mao before he passed away.“693 At that time, a number of leaders wanted Ye to preside over the work of the CPC Central Committee. Ye replied: “I am a military officer, and if a military officer presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, wouldn’t that amount to a political coup?“ Ye insisted on Hua assuming power.694 After the meeting, Wang Dongxing called the other Mao said: “The problem of the Gang of Four will be solved in the second half of this

year if not in the first half; it will be solved next year [1976] if not this year [1975]; it will be solved the year after next [1977] if not next year [1976].“

690. This may refer to the fact that the militia in Shanghai were prepared for sudden changes

in the CPC Central Committee. In fact, the Gang of Four did not possess any military power over the whole nation or part of the nation, so it did not have the power to launch a coup. The members were in fact like rats in a hole.

691. Here, Hua Guofeng recognized that the means adopted were noninstitutional means, i.e., it was a coup.

692. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 348–351. 693. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 393–394. 694. Ibid., 402.

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four members of the Political Bureau — Wei Guoqing, Xu Shiyou, Li Desheng, and Sai Fuding — who were not in Beijing and asked for their opinion. They all expressed their support for the decision of the Political Bureau. Ye Jianying immediately recommended that Hua Guofeng should take over the Central News Agency and firmly control the nation’s media. Following the instructions of Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying, Geng Biao took over the Central People’s Broadcasting Station on October 6 evening, and Chi Haotian, vice commissar of the Beijing Military Area, took charge of the People’s Daily. On October 7, the CPC Central Committee submitted its “Resolution on Appointing Comrade Hua Guofeng as Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Committee.“ The resolution stated that as arranged by the great leader and mentor, Chairman Mao Zedong, and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau, Hua Guofeng would work as chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee. This resolution was to be presented for approval at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. It was also on October 7 that Wu De and Wu Zhong, who was commander of the Beijing Garrison and concurrently secretary of the Beijing CPC Committee, arrested Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Jin Zumin and other individuals during a Beijing CPC Committee meeting. The Beijing Garrison guarded the buildings of the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, the Central Broadcasting Station, the Central Department, Tsinghua University, and Peking University.695 On October 7, Ye Jianying personally notified Deng Xiaoping of the fall of the Gang of Four and communicated to Deng the content of the Political Bureau meeting. Ye arranged for Deng to live in Building No. 25, Xishan.696 The same day, Ye also conveyed this news to Chen Yun, member of the CPC Central Committee and vice chairman of the PNC. Ye thus contacted the only two leaders left of the first generation of national leaders, and this played a critical role in the political return of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. On October 10, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Hua Guofeng and the CPC Central Committee, indicating that he was extremely pleased to support the committee’s decision.697 Shortly after, Li Xiannian, Chen Xilian, and Wu De visited Deng with the news. Deng said: “This is wonderful. I can now live peacefully in my old age. This was handled well and efficiently!“698 695. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 247–250.

696. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, 2nd revised edition, 399–400. 697. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 152.

698. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some

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On the evening of October 8, the Political Bureau convened its first meeting at Yuquanshan. The following people attended the meeting: Ma Tianshui (secretary of the CPC Shanghai Committee); Zhou Chunlin (deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Area and commander of the Shanghai Security Area); Peng Chong, Xu Jiatun, Liao Hansheng, and Ding Sheng (leaders of the Jiangsu CPC Committee and of the Nanjing Military Area); Bai Rubing, Yang Dezhi, and Wang Ping (leaders of the Shandong CPC Committee and Jinan Military Area); and Zeng Siyu (leader of the Hubei CPC Committee and Wuhan Military Area). Notification of the CPC Central Committee’s resolution was given at the meeting. The meeting was held in two parts, with the second part being held later the same evening. In the second part of the meeting, everyone supported the resolution of the CPC Central Committee except for Ma Tianshui. Ma defended the Gang of Four, arguing that the reasons given by the CPC Central Committee were not convincing and that the influence of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao in Shanghai could not be underestimated. Hua Guofeng criticized Ma severely.699 On the evening of October 9, Li Xiannian and Chen Xilian met Zhou Chunlin, who was Li Xiannian’s subordinate during the Red Army period. Li asked Zhou: “After the news of the isolation of the Gang of Four is announced, what do you think their followers in Shanghai will do?“ Zhou answered: “There are three possibilities. One is that they will launch a large-scale uprising; they could also launch a medium-sized uprising; or they could just remain quiet. However, a largescale uprising would not really be possible.“ When Li asked why he thought so, Zhou answered: “Because after arresting Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, they would have lost their flag bearers.“700 On October 8, the CPC Central Committee passed its “Resolution on the Publishing of Selected Works of Mao Zedong and on Preparations to Publish Collected Works of Mao Zedong.“ The same day, the CPC Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the PNC, the State Council, and the Central Military Committee passed the “Decision on Building the Memorial Hall of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Great Leader and Mentor.“ It was decided that after the memorial hall was constructed, a crystal coffin containing the remains of Mao Zedong would be moved into the hall so that the people could admire and pay their respects to the chairman. However, this decision was a direct violation of the initiative signed by Mao and other leaders of the Central CPC Committee on April 27, 1956, which Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 255. 699. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 956–957.

700. Zhou, Fifty Years through Thick and Thin, 281–282.

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specified cremation rather than interment.701 The Political Bureau convened a “notifying meeting“ on October 8 (the meeting ended on October 15), at which the fall of the Gang of Four was announced. Ye Jianying explained that the “Gang of Four“ term was introduced by Chairman Mao at a Political Bureau meeting on April 17, 1974: “Eradicating the Gang of Four was not just the wish of a few members of the Political Bureau or a last-minute decision. This was a problem that Chairman Mao wanted to tackle though it remained unresolved. We have inherited the wishes of Chairman Mao. If we allowed the Gang of Four to take power, our party and our country would have been placed in great danger. Our party would have been in great danger if we hadn’t overthrown the Gang of Four.“702 It is noteworthy that early in 1975, Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing and said: “She will make trouble after I am dead.“ On May 3 of that year, Mao rebuked the Gang of Four at a meeting of the Political Bureau: “The problem of the Gang of Four will be solved in the second half of this year if not in the first half; it will be solved next year if not this year; and it will be solved the year after next if not next year.“ At that time, all members of the Political Bureau paid close heed to Mao’s instruction, which was unfortunately very obscure. It did not provide answers to the following three questions. First, what did Mao mean by “solve“? Did that mean criticizing, repudiating, or overthrowing the gang? Second, who was to solve this problem? Would it be at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee? Or would it be done by the Political Bureau? Third, how should it be solved? Would it be achieved by voting within the party or by the use of arms? Mao Zedong’s political ambiguity offered great opportunity for political maneuvering by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. In August 1977, Hua explained in a report to the 11th National Congress why he officially announced Mao’s two instructions relating to the Gang of Four when the members were arrested. He said: “The announcement showed Chairman Mao’s decision to solve the problem of the Gang of Four. At that critical point, the Political Bureau took firm measures to crush the Gang of Four and their schemes of attaining supreme power over the CPC and the state, and also aimed to realize Chairman Mao’s unfulfilled wish to solve the Gang of Four 701. In view of the prevalence of interment, Mao Zedong and other leaders opted for cremation in April 1956. They issued an initiative during a meeting of the CPC Central

Committee, declaring: “First and foremost, leaders in government organs may choose cremation of their own will.“ On April 27, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu

De, and Deng Xiaoping and others signed their names on the initiative. (Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 312–313.)

702. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 397–398.

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problem.“703 Putting the Gang of Four under arrest was never Mao’s political wish, but it was the will of the CPC, the PLA, and the Chinese people in general, and it was fulfilled by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. Interestingly, on July 8, 1966, Mao Zedong in a letter to Jiang Qing predicted that after his death, both rightists and leftists would use his words against each other.704 Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying made use of Mao Zedong’s ambiguous instructions, and in the name of inheriting the ideals of Chairman Mao, they arrested the wife and nephew of Mao Zedong without resorting to arms. Ye Jianying later wrote a letter to his youngest daughter, who was living outside Beijing: “On October 6, I watched a drama and ate crabs — three male and one female — in memory of our victory.“705 Ye was thus comparing Jiang to the female crab, which he ate. Jiang came to her political end on October 6, 1976, which was an inevitable fate of hers after all the corrupted acts she carried out. Subsequently, Hu Yaobang on behalf of the CPC Central Committee stated that Ye had played “a decisive role.“706 On October 6, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen sent people to Beijing to locate Jiang Qing and her supporters. Xu and Wang convened a meeting, during which they mobilized forces to fight against the militia for 3, 5, or 7 days so as to let the whole world understand what had happened in China. Xu issued the mobilization order to deploy 33,500 militia. Xu and Wang prepared their preliminary plan for armed rebellion. The next day, the Shanghai Militia Command held a meeting of the leaders of the 10 areas and five militia divisions directly under its command. The CPC Central Committee notified Xu and Wang that they had to attend a meeting in Beijing and to return later to Shanghai together with Ma Tianshui and Zhou Chunlin to communicate the content of the Beijing meeting to party members and the people. This move removed those leaders from Shanghai, and it disrupted 703. “Hua Guofeng’s Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the CPC“ was presented on August 12, 1977 and was adopted on August 18, 1977.

704. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 73.

705. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 407. 706. Hu Yaobang said in his “Memorial Speech at the Memorial Meeting for Ye Jianying,” held on October 30, 1986, that in the struggle that led to the fall of the Gang of Four,

Ye Jianying played a decisive role: “He and other comrades in the Political Bureau

concentrated the collective wisdom of the people. In line with the opinion of most comrades in the Political Bureau and on behalf of the will of the party and the people,

they made a resolute decision and demolished the counter-revolutionary group of Jiang Qing, and they saved the party in its time of crisis.“

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the plans of the Gang of Four’s supporters to launch an uprising. The Central Military Committee ordered the Nanjing Military Area to be prepared for sudden incidents.707 The Political Bureau decided to send a work team led by Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Peng Chongshuai to Shanghai to control the situation.708 On October 12, the uprising planned by the Shanghai Militia Command was thwarted.709 It is evident that the Gang of Four did not have any support among CPC members, the PLA, and the people at large — even in Shanghai, where it was politically based. Once the situation of Shanghai was under control, the CPC Central Committee officially announced the news of the fall of the Gang of Four. On October 14, the CPC Central Committee announced the fall of the Gang of Four. On the 18th, the committee issued the “Notice on the Incident of the Counterrevolutionary Group of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan“ (CPC Central Committee Issue No. 16, 1976), which was immediately distributed to party members. The notice stated that when the great leader and mentor, Chairman Mao, fell sick and died, Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao believed that their time had come to relentlessly attack the party and seize leadership of the party and the state. The CPC Central Committee had to undertake firm measures to thwart this counter-revolutionary scheme, which would have brought calamity to the Chinese people. On October 6, the CPC Central Committee decided to arrest and investigate Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao. The notice declared that the CPC Central Committee was calling upon all party members to be closely united around the committee; it strongly urged comrades who had made mistakes — including those who had made severe errors in following the gang of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao — to recognize their faults. The struggle against the group of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao had to be conducted under the direction of the CPC Central Committee: no independent groups were allowed to take part in this struggle. 707. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1423.

708. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 959.

709. Ruling of the Special Court of the Supreme People’s Court (Special Legal Court No. 1) stated on January 23, 1981 that on October 8, 1976, when Xu Jingxian and Wang

Xiuzhen and others knew that Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan had been imprisoned, they decided to launch an armed uprising. As a result of the forceful

measures of the CPC Central Committee and fighting by the Shanghai people, their

plan of armed rebellion was thwarted. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 668.)

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On October 20, the CPC Central Committee set up a special case team to investigate the crimes committed by Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan. The special case team consisted of Hua Guofeng and the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing, and the office of the special case team was headed by Wang Dongxing and Li Xin. On October 21, 1.5 million soldiers and civilians held a massive parade in Beijing to celebrate the appointment of Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee; it was also held to celebrate the great victory in thwarting the schemes of the Gang of Four to seize power from the CPC and the state.710 That day, Guo Moruo wrote a poem titled “Prelude to Water Melody: Demolishing the Gang of Four:“ “General satisfaction comes from the fall of the Gang of Four. / The political rogue Wang Hongwen, the literate ruffian Yao Wenyuan, the wicked counselor Zhang Chunqiao, / And the spirit of the white skeleton Jiang Qing, who compared herself to Empress Wu Zetian and swept the nation with an iron broom. / Those who tried to seize supreme leadership of the CPC and the state had only dreamed of power.“711 These actions reflect the level of political criticism and support within and outside the party. It is evident that the Gang of Four committed many malicious acts, which justify the downfall that they deserve.712 Guo said: “Chairman Mao’s successor was a hero, who inherited the chairman’s political ideals and aimed to make great achievements! I support Chairman Hua and the CPC Central Committee. Chairman Hua called the fall of the Gang of Four the eradication of evil in the party as well as the removal of calamity in the nation, and it also fulfills the wish of the people.“ On October 24, millions of soldiers and common people gathered in the capital to celebrate the great victory and express their firm support for the CPC Central Committee’s resolution to appoint Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee. The following members of the Political Bureau attended this large gathering: Hua Guofeng (chairman of the CPC Central Committee); Ye Jianying (vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau); nine members of the Political Bureau (Li Xiannian, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Xu Shiyou, Wei Guoqing, Li Desheng, and Chen Yonggui); and alternate members of the Political Bureau (such as Wu Guixian, Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Sai Fuding). In all, there were 15 members and alternate members of the Political Bureau in attendance. Compared with the 25 members of the 10th Political Bureau 710. People’s Daily, October 22, 1976. 711. Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 390–391. 712. Guo, Wu Zetian, eps. 4.

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in 1973, the members of the present Political Bureau had thus fallen by 10. Of the members of that 10th Political Bureau, five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Kang Sheng, and Dong Biwu) had died; Deng Xiaoping had been demoted; and Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan had been arrested. Wu De (member of the Political Bureau, first secretary of the CPC Beijing Committee, and director of the Beijing Revolution Committee) announced at the gathering that Comrade Hua Guofeng was the successor who had been personally selected by the great leader, Chairman Mao: “In April 1976, Chairman Mao proposed that Comrade Hua Guofeng be appointed the first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council. On April 30, Chairman Mao wrote to Comrade Hua Guofeng saying ’With you in charge, I can rest easily,’ which expressed Chairman Mao’s infinite trust towards Hua Guofeng. The CPC Central Committee, headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng, took resolute measures after Chairman Mao died; at a critical historical point of China’s revolution, the committee uncovered the counter-revolutionary actions of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, and it saved the revolution and the party.“713 On October 25, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the editorial “A Great Historic Victory,“ announcing Mao Zedong’s criticism against the Gang of Four from July 1974 to May 1975, particularly Mao’s talk to the Political Bureau on May 3, 1975.714 This became the legal grounds for the CPC Central Committee’s arrest of the Gang of Four. The editorial stated that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan were agents of capitalism in the CPC, relentless capitalist roaders, schemers, and capitalist careerists.715 This was the same political slander that had been imposed on Deng Xiaoping by the Gang of Four, and now just six months later it was being applied to the gang members. On October 27, the Shanghai CPC Committee convened a meeting, during which Su Zhenhua announced the decision of the committee to revoke all official positions 713. People’s Daily, October 25, 1976. 714. On May 3, 1975, Chairman Mao repeated the fundamental principles of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots and said: “We must adhere to Marxism and we must not

apply revisionism; we must unite with each other, and we must not divide; we must play fair, and we must not become involved in intrigues. The Gang of Four should not continue. Why are you still involved in it? The problem with them will be solved in the

second half of this year if not in the first half; it will be solved next year if not this year; and it will be solved the year after next if not next year.“ (Ibid.) 715. Ibid.

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of Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen in Shanghai. Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Peng Chong were appointed first, second, and third secretaries of the committee respectively. The leaders of all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions sent congratulatory telegrams to Hua Guofeng and the CPC Central Committee and expressed their firm support for the committee, headed by Hua Guofeng. Thus, the 10-year Cultural Revolution had come to an end. The decision made by the Political Bureau on October 6 reflected the political wishes of the CPC, PLA, and the people.716 Why did special measures have to be taken in arresting the Gang of Four? On October 8, Ye Jianying explained at a meeting of the Political Bureau that Jiang Qing was the prime mover in the gang and that Zhang Chunqiao acted as counselor: “When Deng Xiaoping presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, he tried to rally with them, but it was to no avail. The Gang of Four acted like a cancer within the CPC, and at some point it would attack.“ On March 22, 1977, Ye Jianying said at a working meeting of the CPC Central Committee that the Gang of Four was a minority within the Political Bureau: However, we see that among the members of the Gang of Four, one was a vice chairman of the CPC [Wang Hongwen], one was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau [Zhang Chunqiao], one was a domineering and ambitious schemer [Jiang Qing], and one was a trumpeter who was in control of all propaganda tools [Yao Wenyuan]. Though they were few in number, they were quite powerful. After Chairman Mao fell sick, he appointed a liaison officer — Mao Yuanxin — who conveyed messages between Mao and the Political Bureau. At that time, the comrades in the Political Bureau allowed major issues to take precedence, and for the sake of Chairman Mao’s health and without breaking fundamental principles, they exercised restraint until Chairman Mao passed away.717 This indicates that most members of the Political Bureau were simply waiting for the right moment to remove the Gang of Four. The death of Mao Zedong was certainly a trigger. However, the Gang of Four challenged Hua Guofeng and the CPC Central Committee, and that was the direct cause that accelerated their political demise. In

716. The CPC Central Committee stated that in the first days of October 1976, the Political Bureau had implemented the mandate of the CPC and the people by eliminating

Jiang Qing’s counter-revolutionary group and ending the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution. Among the long-term victories of the CPC, PLA, and Chinese of all

ethnicities, this was the greatest. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the

Eleventh CPC Central Committee,” vol. 2, 814.) 717. Li, Research Review of Zhou Enlai, 571–572.

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1980, Deng Xiaoping explained the political background of this decision.718 In terms of organizational procedure, the move against the Gang of Four violated Article 9 of the Party Constitution adopted at the 9th CPC National Congress, and it broke party rules.719 However, the Gang of Four had also broken CPC regulations. Interestingly, the Party Constitution passed at the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973, which was amended under the direction of Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, removed that Article 9. As a result, the decision made by the Political Bureau on April 7 to strip Deng Xiaoping of all official positions both within and outside the CPC was illegal and contrary to party regulations. With regard to the unusual means of dealing with the Gang of Four, Chen Yun (member of the CPC Central Committee and vice chairman of the NPC) was the only leader at the time to question the legality of arresting the Gang of Four. He agreed with adopting the stringent measures to break up the Gang of Four, but he was worried about this move in contravention of party regulations. He said: “This should never be taken as a precedent.“720 In July 1977, the Third Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee passed the “Resolution on Granting Comrade Hua Guofeng the Title of Chairman of CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Committee“ and “Resolution on the Counter-Revolutionary Group of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan.“ It was decided that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan should lose their CPC membership as well as all official positions. This process was conducted in accordance with all legal procedures. At that meeting, modifications were also made to the central CPC leadership. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau consisted of Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping, and the Political Bureau comprised 16 members. 718. Deng Xiaoping said: “Although Chairman Mao appointed a successor [Hua Guofeng], the Gang of Four was not willing to obey him. After Chairman Mao passed away, the

Gang of Four used this opportunity to usurp power and posed a deadly threat. The Gang of Four was so aggressive that it was prepared to overthrow the new leader.

Under such circumstances, most of the comrades in the Political Bureau agreed to fight the Gang of Four.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 349.)

719. Article 9 of the CPC Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress of the CPC stipulated the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and

chairman and vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee were to be elected at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. 720. Yang, The Era of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 1, 84.

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In August 1977 at the 11th National Congress of the CPC, Hua Guofeng officially announced the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, Hua had inherited and implemented Mao Zedong’s political course of continuous revolution, and he was thus unable to disclaim the Cultural Revolution. Hua held the power of the CPC, the state, and the PLA, and as such he became the focus of all conflicts and disputes in China: in Mao Zedong’s words, Hua roasted over the fire like Cao Cao in ancient China.721 Hua lacked the ability to solve the consequences of the Cultural Revolution as well as the social conflicts and disputes in China. He also did not possess the vision or resolution to initiate the epoch of reform and opening-up. Hua was a political figure who played a transitional role, and he would soon be replaced by Deng Xiaoping, China’s true statesman. The procedure by which Hua stepped down was different from that decided upon at the Political Bureau meeting on April 7, 1976 and at the emergency meeting on October 6, 1976. It was in strict accordance with CPC regulations as established at the Sixth Plenary Session of 11th CPC Central Committee,722 and it was the first peaceful succession of the supreme leader. When Mao Zedong went on his tour of southern China from August to September 1971, he said that all efforts to divide the party had failed: “This issue is worthy researching on. Such a big nation with such a large population has remained united only because the people and CPC members around the country strongly desire unity. Judging from the history of our party, we have grounds for hope.“723 721. In 1970, Mao Zedong said that there would no longer be a state president and that he did not wish to work in such a position. He provided a historical anecdote at a Political

Bureau meeting in the last days of April. He said that when Sun Quan persuaded Cao Cao to become emperor, Cao Cao replied that Sun Quan was trying to roast him over

the fire. Mao Zedong requested that he not be Cao Cao and the others not be Sun Quan. (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1966), 415.)

722. From November 10 to December 5, 1980, it was decided at Political Bureau meetings that it was inappropriate for Hua Guofeng to continue working in his present official position. Hua Guofeng requested to resign. It was resolved at a meeting that a proposal

be made at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee for Hua Guofeng to resign from the posts of chairman of the CPC Central Committee and

chairman of the Central Military Committee. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th

CPC Central Committee approved this suggestion, and so Hua officially resigned.

Hu Yaobang was elected chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Deng Xiaoping chairman of the Central Military Committee. (Li, From the First to Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, vol. 2, 990.)

723. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong’s Works

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The Cultural Revolution, launched and led by Mao, deviated from its original political target: it resulted in numerous, persistent political splits in the CPC, and it eventually lost the support of party members, the PLA, and the Chinese people. The CPC was unable to act on this matter when Mao was alive and had to await the right moment and muster its strength to resolutely make its historic decision. As the CPC Central Committee declared in 1981, when Mao Zedong died in September 1976, the counter-revolutionary group of Jiang Qing stepped up its efforts to seize leadership of the party and state. In the first days of October 1976, the Political Bureau implemented the mandate of the CPC and the people by eliminating Jiang Qing’s counter-revolutionary group and ending the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution. Among the long-term victories of the CPC, PLA, and Chinese people, this was the greatest. In defeating Jiang’s counter-revolutionary group, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and other officials played important roles,724 as did Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian,725 Wu De,726 Su Zhenhua, and Ni Zhifu, among others. The CPC Central Committee’s resolution also mentioned the special role played by Mao Zedong: although Mao had insisted on the incorrect political route of the Cultural Revolution, he remedied some errors and protected some leading party officials and non-party individuals, which ensured that some responsible officials would return to leading positions. Mao led the defeat of the Lin Biao counterrevolutionary group; he also revealed and criticized the mistakes of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and prevented them from appropriating the leadership. These actions played an important role in the party’s subsequent ability to defeat the Gang of Four.727 Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 242. 724. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.

725. At that time, Chen Xilian presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee

and concurrently worked as commander of the Beijing Military Area. Hua Guofeng

discussed with him how to solve the problem of the Gang of Four on four occasions. (Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 244.)

726. At that time, Wu De worked concurrently as first political commissar of the Beijing Garrison.

727. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.

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History is more complex than many people imagine. It proceeds with or without particular individuals, and future generations are smarter than previous generations. As Mao Zedong said at the National Congress of the CPC after handling the incident of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi: “Will the Earth stop revolving without you? The Earth will still revolve, and it may perhaps do so much better than when you were alive.“728 In January 1965, Mao said: “Future generations will be smarter than us.“ The journalist Edgar Snow once asked Mao what future generations in China would do. Mao Zedong said that there were two possibilities: “One is that they will carry on the revolution. The other is that they will go against the revolution, become reconciled with the imperialists, and welcome Chiang Kaishek back to the mainland, and they will go along with the counter-revolutionary elements that presently make up just a few percent of the Chinese population. That is the counter-revolutionary route. Let’s leave future matters to future generations. In the long term, the future generations will be smarter than us — just like people in a capitalist society are smarter and better than those in a feudalistic society.“729 Deng Xiaoping said that during his lifetime, the Cultural Revolution was the harshest period. Nonetheless, when Deng Xiaoping visited the Jinggang Mountains in November 1972, he said: “Our party is good and hopeful. Our people are good and hopeful. Our country is good and hopeful.730 Our party, people, and country remain hopeful in hardship, and they see the sunshine after rain.“ Without Mao Zedong, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution ended along with Mao died. Mao’s death marked not alone the end of the Mao era but also the end of the Cultural Revolution. It is also a milestone of China entering a new times: the start of the Deng Xiaoping period with reform and opening-up. Instead of disruption or termination of China’s socialist modernization, progress was achieved at a faster rate. However, China did not move directly from the era of Mao Zedong to that of Deng Xiaoping: it went through a short transitional period — that of Hua Guofeng, during which time there were changes among those wielding political power. History put Deng onto the political stage again, and he played an epoch-making role as the leader. Once again, China moved forward.

728. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 6, 412.

729. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 8, 400.

730. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 243.

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Chapter

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Different from other developed and developing countries in terms of its economic and political systems, China is one of a kind. With a powerful central government that was established in 1949, China had the capacity to mobilize social resources — both material and human resources — to improve the rate of investment or accumulation, boost consumption, secure people’s livelihoods, and provide essential low-level, broad-based social services. In addition, China was able to achieve economic and social targets by relying on popular movements. According to an investigative report on China by the World Bank in 1983, China was a low-income country with a unique social and political system that had various advantages and held high potential for future success. However, the unique systems were also capable giving rise to unexpected consequences,1 such as the Cultural Revolution. China’s special politic and economic system made strategic decision making crucial, and which are in hands of the leadership. In other words, making the right move would bring forth massive success, yet poor strategic resolutions would lead to partial or complete failure associated at painful price. The Cultural Revolution signified a special era in China’s political history. Mao Zedong’s theory on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat was based on his own supreme directives, which were refined by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan during the Cultural Revolution. However, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee approved Mao’s theory on continuing the revolution under the proletariat dictatorship at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, and the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. By putting the correct theories into practice, it might help China to success. However, 1.

According to a report from the World Bank in 1983, China’s economic system was organized to mobilize material and human resources for such purposes as attaining specific iron and steel production targets and eradicating infectious disease. With this system, the CPC Central Committee had the power to control resources, and thus it

is capable of improving accumulation rate, boost consumption, and secure people’s livelihoods in low-income areas of the country. In rural and urban regions, China had a characteristic rigid organizational hierarchy. With central administration, central

directives could be relayed effectively and basic social services (education, health care, and family planning) could be provided for the masses in a desirable, fruitful manner.

By relying on popular movements to achieve social and economic targets and lift the

will of the masses, China had raised the possibility for future success. Nevertheless, unexpected consequences could also develop radically. (World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, 146.)

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following incorrect theories might lead to court disaster. Mao manipulated both the political decisions and theories of the CPC Central Committee; carried out the 10-year-long Cultural Revolution on the basis of an illogical theory, resulting in China being catastrophic. How should we define the nature of the Cultural Revolution that launched and led by Mao Zedong?2 Who were the targets of this revolution? The author addresses these issues from a historical perspective as follows: 1. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the CPC and the Chinese government, despite the fact that he had formed and headed both. 2. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the state institutions of the Peoples’ Republic of China, despite the fact that he had established and headed them. 3. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the human rights of the masses, despite the fact that he loved them and sought to defend them. 4. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against Chinese civilization and culture, despite the fact that he had inherited and respected them. 5. Mao Zedong launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the Mao Zedong Thought, despite the fact that he had created and developed it himself. In April 1956, Mao Zedong said, “It is inevitable that all of us make mistakes. In the process of revolution and construction, all countries — including China — 2.

In March 1927, Mao Zedong, age 33, stated in the “Investigation Report of the Peasant Movements in Hunan” that revolution was actually a form of armed rebellion by

nature through which one class overthrew another class instead of entertaining guests, writing essays, painting pictures, and doing embroidery in a temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous way. (Publishing Committee of Selected Works

of Mao Zedong of the CPC Central Committee, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 17.)

In April 1970, Kang Sheng, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central

Committee, interpreted the Cultural Revolution as follows: “How should we conduct a revolution in a socialist society? We can find an answer in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China: our Cultural Revolution is a great political revolution through which the proletariat revolts against the bourgeoisie and the exploiting class in the

socialist society. The Cultural Revolution was created by Chairman Mao who called for continuing the revolution and working on solutions for the revolution — the Cultural Revolution.” (Kang, “Speech at the Working Forum on Consolidating and Building the CPC Central Committee and the Army,” April 18, 1970.)

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are bound to make errors. However, if we adopt the proper attitude, we will make fewer mistakes and be able to rectify national errors.”3 This was Mao’s subjective wish, so as a theory he sincerely believed in. However, Mao did made the first disastrous decision with the Great Leap Forward two years later, and it took several years to rectify the faults thereby created and to revive the economy following the deaths of a great many Chinese. Subsequently, Mao made a second major error starting the Cultural Revolution, and the CPC Central Committee did not rectify this until 10 years later, after Mao had died. The Cultural Revolution was in fact more meant to be a self-torture than self-revolution. It is necessary to address the following questions. What kind of losses did Mao Zedong incur from his political faults in his later years? How should we make an objective assessment of such losses in a quantitative fashion? Was China able to achieve its modernization goals in the Cultural Revolution? What economic and social levels did China attain during that revolution? What level of historical progress was China’s industrialization and modernization able to make in the Cultural Revolution? In this period, what were the disparities between China and its counterparts in neighboring countries and territories? We may find solutions to the above questions through an analysis of remarks made by Mao Zedong and those of others. In this way, we might come up with an accurate assessment of the major right and wrong decisions in a systematic fashion. The author will first presents Mao Zedong’s comments on the Cultural Revolution as well as remarks made by the CPC Central Committee at different times. Then the author would examines China’s economic growth, social development, political influence, and international status during the Cultural Revolution based on various forms of data, calculations, and an analysis of the results obtained. Though repudiating the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution, launched and led by Mao, I objectively affirm the fruits of China’s modernization and the progress it made, and I evaluate various losses — both direct losses (statistical losses) and indirect losses (the loss of opportunities incurred because of Mao’s major fault in instigating the Cultural Revolution). After that, the author analyzes and makes generalizations regarding the fundamental causes of Mao Zedong’s errors in his later years; these included life tenure of the leader, failure of the central democratic and collective decision-making system, and political struggles against dissidents within the party. The author will also conduct an analysis and makes a comparison between Stalin and Mao regarding their errors and those consequences. At last, the author explains how Deng Xiaoping was able to achieve success in reform through having learned from Mao’s failure in his later years, which is the dominant theme 3.

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of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 65.

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

of this book. It is evident that Mao was wrong in initiating the Cultural Revolution and that it ended in failure. However, having learned from Mao’s mistakes, Deng was able to formulate a viable strategy of reform and opening-up, thereby achieving success.

Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Cultural Revolution and Related Historical Remarks Mao Zedong designed the Cultural Revolution, which provoked a great controversy. So what were Mao’s own views on this revolution? How did his comments vary as the Cultural Revolution progressed? After instigating the Cultural Revolution, Mao quickly announced to apply it throughout the country without first putting it to test as social practice: “The Cultural Revolution is bound to achieve victory.” Actually, he extolled himself in his decision to stage the Cultural Revolution. On August 13 1966, Mao Zedong personally reviewed and approved the “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee”; this Communiqué stressed that Mao’s guideline in carrying out the Cultural Revolution amounted to a reformation of Marxism-Leninism.4 The 16-point “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on the Cultural Revolution” was prepared under Mao’s instruction: “The Cultural Revolution touches the inner soul, and it ushers in a new era in our socialist revolution.” The Communiqué declared that the Cultural Revolution was bound to achieve victory under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao.5 On August 18, Lin Biao delivered a eulogy at a rally to celebrate the revolution, which was staged in Tiananmen Square: “The Cultural Revolution, launched by Chairman Mao, is a pioneer in the communist movement and socialist revolution.”6 Despite the fact that two years later, the Cultural Revolution was proving to be an unprecedented political catastrophe, Mao Zedong insisted on praising it. 4.

The “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee”

was passed on August 12, 1966. (People’s Daily, August 13, 1966.)

5.

The “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on the Cultural Revolution” was passed

6.

It was written in Lin Biao’s speech, which was delivered at a rally to celebrate the

on August 8, 1966. (People’s Daily, August 9, 1966.)

Cultural Revolution on August 18, 1966. (Xinhua News Agency, “Chairman Mao, Lin

Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Other Leaders Met with Student Representatives and Inspected the Cultural Revolution Parade,” August 19, 1966.)

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On October 31, 1968, the Communiqué of the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee affirmed the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution. Mao was convinced by the necessity of conducting the Cultural Revolution quick so as to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent the restoration of capitalism. It is notable that the above Communiqué actually declared the Cultural Revolution as achieving a great, decisive victory.7 On April 1, 1969, the “Report to the 9th National People’s Congress of the CPC” — authored by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan and reviewed by Mao Zedong — was delivered by Lin Biao. The report claimed that it was necessary for the great mentor, Chairman Mao, to quickly conduct and lead the Cultural Revolution. This was based on the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, thereby making a contribution to the theory and practice of MarxismLeninism.8 Even though the Lin Biao Incident demonstrated the incorrect theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution, Mao still spoke highly of himself in deciding to launch and conduct it. On August 24, 1973, Zhou Enlai delivered the “Report to the 10th National People’s Congress of CPC,” which was coauthored by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 7.

The “Communiqué of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee” was passed on October 31, 1968: “All the participants reached a consensus

that our great leader, Mao Zedong, had launched and led the Cultural Revolution to revolt against the bourgeoisie and the exploiting class on behalf of the proletariat under a proletarian dictatorship. As Chairman Mao remarked, practice had shown that it was

necessary to quickly conduct the Cultural Revolution to consolidate the dictatorship of

the proletariat, prevent the restoration of the bourgeoisie, and build socialism. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line and the leadership of

the proletarian faction led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Biao, we have finally destroyed the bourgeoisie faction — led by Liu Shaoqi and his allies — which

had the ulterior motive of usurping power over the party, government, and army. We have seized power by conducting a complex, fierce class struggle for two years,

mobilizing millions of revolutionary people and winning the support of the PLA. Except for the province of Taiwan, revolutionary committees have been established

in 29 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions across China. In a word, the Cultural Revolution has achieved a great, decisive victory.” (People’s Daily, November 1, 1968.) 8.

“Lin Biao’s Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC” was delivered on April 1,



The “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC” was coauthored by Zhang

1969, and passed on April 14. (People’s Daily on April 28, 1969.)

Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan and personally reviewed and modified by Mao Zedong

eight times. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 130.)

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Wenyuan and reviewed by Mao Zedong. The report declared that the revolutionary practice of carrying on the struggle against the Lin Biao anti-party clique after the 9th National People’s Congress of the CPC had proved the party right in following the political and organizational guidelines given by the congress and the CPC Central Committee, which was headed by Mao.9 Mao Zedong’s comments were relayed across China. He touched on issues related to the Cultural Revolution on many occasions, and he reflected on the errors launching and conducting that revolution at his middle and later stages rather than totally affirming the revolution. On October 14, 1968, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee. He said, “The Cultural Revolution may be regarded as merely a historical episode in 50 or 100 years’ time.”10 When he met the commissioner of the Central Committee Standing Presidium of the Communist Party of Romania, Emil Bodnaras, on June 11, 1970, Mao claimed that the Cultural Revolution had plunged the country into turmoil. Mao defined its nature as the continuous civil war between the CPC and the Nationalist Party.11 On June 27, Mao met with a delegation from North Korea, and he mentioned 9.

The report was published in People’s Daily on September 1, 1973. (Zheng and Zhang,

China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 341.)

Mao Zedong issued instructions about “agreeing to the principles” of the report, and

the report was submitted by Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to Mao

Zedong. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 358).

10. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of

Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, vol. 1, 55.

11. On June 11, 1970, Mao Zedong met with the commissioner of the Central Committee Standing Presidium of the Communist Party of Romania, Emil Bodnaras. With regard

to the Cultural Revolution, Mao said, “China went into a state of turmoil, and rebels shouted slogans about purging Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and other leaders. In the past,

we failed to unmask class enemies because we seized power by means of military force,

and our class enemies sneaked into the party, the work force, schools, party organs, and

villages. The Cultural Revolution was by nature a continuation of the civil war between the CPC and the Nationalist Party. There was a batch of reactionaries from various countries in Beijing and elsewhere in China. If we are not afraid of turmoil, China will

not go into such a state.” Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Huang

Yongsheng were present at the meeting. (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s

Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 1, 596.)

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the turmoil in China caused by the Cultural Revolution.12 On December 18, Mao conversed with the American journalist Edgar Snow and acknowledged, “The Cultural Revolution plunged the country into turmoil.”13 From 1975 to 1976, Mao Zedong remarked on the Cultural Revolution, “We basically followed the correct course, but we had flaws. At present, we need to focus on identifying those errors. Specifically speaking, 70% of what we did in the Cultural Revolution we can regard as achievements, with the remaining 30% having been errors.”14 Mao further conceded that there were two main areas of error with regard to the revolution: purging all the veteran officials and inciting civil unrest.15 However, Mao was positive with respect to the Cultural Revolution and viewed it as his greatest accomplishment. As Hu Qiaomu pointed out, “Mao Zedong was caught in the trap of the Cultural Revolution.”16 In June 1976, shortly before his death, Mao looked back on his life and declared, “I achieved two major feats: I defeated Chiang Kai-shek and founded the new China, and I initiated the Cultural Revolution.” However, Mao acknowledged that most people opposed the Cultural Revolution, which was in sharp contrast to the small number who expressed support for it.17 Mao did in fact fear that future generations would repudiate the Cultural Revolution. The verdict of history would be given by others 12. Mao Zedong met with a delegation from North Korea. With respect to the Cultural Revolution, Mao remarked, “The Cultural Revolution plunged the country into turmoil, and rebels shouted slogans about purging Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and other leaders.

In the past, we failed to understand some issues about the Cultural Revolution. Now, we are beginning to understand that the Capital May 16 Red Guard Corps committed

some evil acts, and they were unmasked in the Cultural Revolution.” Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Li Xiannian, Wu Faxian, and Qiu Huizuo were present at that meeting. (Ibid., 602–603.)

13. On December 18, 1970, Mao Zedong conceded to Edgar Snow that China went into a state of turmoil through carrying on that violent struggle. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 176.)

14. Ibid., 488–489. 15. Ibid.

16. Wang, The Era of Great Turmoil, 4.

17. Mao Zedong said, “I have achieved two feats in my life. First, with the support of most

people, I fought against Chang Kai-shek for dozens of years and drove him away to an

island. I won the war against Japan, which lasted for eight years. I repelled the Japanese

and formed a new government in Beijing. Second, I staged the Cultural Revolution. Most people were opposed to the Cultural Revolution and few expressed support for it.” (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1966), 359.)

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

and viewed by posterity rather than through remarks by the participants at the time or the impressions of contemporaries. Even the official remarks made by the CPC Central Committee would soon be superseded by the judgment of history. By October 1978, Deng Xiaoping had become keenly aware that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four had hindered China’s development, causing China to develop a 10-year lag behind other countries: “In the early 1960s, there was a narrow gap between the level of our science and technology and that of the most advanced countries. In recent years, the world has achieved considerable development and thus that gap has widened. Compared with developed countries, our economy may be 20, 30, or even 50 years behind.”18 In March 1981, Deng remarked, “We made a grave and basic error in staging the Cultural Revolution, and the consequences we suffered were catastrophic. The Cultural Revolution destroyed the fate of at least one generation of our people.”19 It is notable that Deng described the Cultural Revolution as a disaster and a 10-year catastrophe.20 At the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, held in June 1981, the CPC Central Committee passed the “Decision on Some Historical Aspects Since the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China.” That document reviewed the history of the Cultural Revolution and commented that the revolution inflicted the most serious setbacks and losses on the party, country, and people. History had clearly demonstration that China’s leaders had wrongly staged the Cultural Revolution, where the counter-revolutionary cliques took advantage of the situation. The outcome was civil unrest, a man-made disaster for the party, country, and people.21 As more and more information concerning the Cultural Revolution has been released, shedding light on this occurrence as well as on reform and opening-up, we are in a better position to examine the history of that revolution. This chapter reviews that history and reflects on those events. In the following sections, the author will make comprehensive remarks on China’s economic growth, social development, political influence, and international status during the Cultural Revolution based on calculations and analysis of the data. 18. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 132.

19. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 269.

20. Ibid., 227.

21. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of

Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 808–819.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Economic Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution Economic growth During the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy achieved modest growth despite the impact of political movements.22 An average GDP growth rate of 5.1% is recorded from 1966 to 1976, which was lower than the 9.2% recorded from 1952 to 1957 and the 9.7% from 1978 to 2006. The country’s GDP from 1966 to 1976 (based on 1952 prices) increased by 65%: secondary industry achieved the rapid growth rate of 108%; tertiary industry achieved a modest growth rate of 54%; and primary industry achieved a slow growth rate of 25%. Within the 5.1% average growth rate in GDP in 1966–1976, secondary industry contributed 7.6%, tertiary industry contributed for 4.4%, and primary industry contributed 2.3%. Thus, by industrial sector, economic growth was mainly driven by secondary industry, and the GDP growth rate of tertiary and primary industry lagged behind, being lower than the average GDP growth rate (Table 7.1). From the above data, it is evident that the national economy was not on the verge of any collapse.23 However, the 10 years political struggles during the Cultural Revolution did slow China’s economic growth from its growth potential, which results in economic fluctuations. The author will make a detailed analysis in the following section. Table 7.1

GDP and industrial growth, 1966–1976 (%)

Year

GDP

Primary industry

Secondary industry

Tertiary industry

GDP per capita

1966

100

100

100

100

100

1976

165

125

208

154

131

5.1

2.3

7.6

4.4

2.7

Average annual growth rate

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949-2004), 12.

Note: 1966 is taken as the baseline.

22. China’s long-term economic growth potential over the next 50 years was approximately 9%. If we classify economic growth at an average annual GDP growth rate of more than

6% or average annual GDP per capita growth rate of over 4% as rapid and economic growth at an average annual GDP growth rate of up to 6% or average annual GDP per

capita growth rate of up to 4% as moderate, the economic growth in the period of the Cultural Revolution is categorized as moderate.

23. On February 26, 1978, Hua Guofeng stated that the national economy was on the verge

of collapse in the “Report on the Work of the Government” at the 5th National People’s Congress.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Dramatic progress in China’s industrialization The plan after 1949 was to advance China’s industrialization from private sector bases to operate at the national level via mobilizing social resources and state forces. During 1949 to 1976, China reached its initial targets of industrialization by setting up an independent, complete industrial system (affecting all industrial sectors) and a national economic system.24 This laid the industrialized foundation for China’s future economic boom and attracted foreign investment in the 1980s. Proceeding into the 1990s, China is served as the world’s finished-product processing base. As is widely known, China has industrial base advantages like product specialization and processing capacity over other big developing countries with large populations, e.g., India and Indonesia. China became one of the world’s major industrial countries. From 1966 to 1975, its major industrial production capacity increased.25 Taking the purchasing power parity recorded in the World Bank database as a reference, China’s industrial strength accounted for additional 3.4% of value worldwide. In 1978, China got herself among the top 10 nations in the world in terms of product output value.26 Based on an analysis of historical records, Maurice Meisner concluded that the era of Mao Zedong was characterized by rapid industrialization. Whereby comparing with its counterparts, China was able to achieve striking development on the stage of modern history.27 China emulated the industrial pattern of the Soviet Union by prioritizing the growth of heavy industry. From 1928 to 1949, the industrial output value of the Soviet Union increased 5.5-fold, and its heavy industrial output rose 9-fold. Prior to the Second World War, the industrial output of the Soviet Union accounted for 24 Except for Tibet, complete, coordinated industrial systems were set up in China’s provinces. Industrial systems for defense were also established, and there were striking developments in resource exploitation. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 795, 808.)

25. National Bureau of Statistic of the People’s Republic of China, Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 50–52.

26. In 1978, China ranked fifth in the world’s steel output, third in coal output, in the top

eight for crude oil output, the top seven for generating capacity, the top four for cement

output, the top three for fertilizer output, the top eight for sugar output, and it was

the top country for cotton cloth output. (National Bureau of Statistics of China comp., China Statistics Abstract (2007), 224.)

27. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 384.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

84% of total national output value.28 From 1965 to 1978, China’s industrial output value showed a 3.53-fold increase: the average annual growth rate was 10.2%, with the heavy industrial output value showing a 4.27-fold rise at an average annual growth rate of 11.8%. China’s proportion of industrial output value to national income increased from 36.4% to 46.8% between 1965 and 1978.29 China’s industrialization denied participation of the private sector, hence suppressing the private economic development potential. In addition, rural industrialization was rejected, and the limited industrialization in urban areas restricted the capacity to create and provide employment. China’s industrialization had a monolithic character, and it was unable to adapt to meet current situations and accommodate the country’s vast territory, large population, abundant labor resources, and regional variations.

Unprecedented development of infrastructure China’s industrialization offered advantages in mobilizing social resources for the national infrastructure. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s rail, road, air transport, telecommunications and urban infrastructure underwent unprecedented development: 1966 to 1976 witnessed the development of modern infrastructure. For example, the laying of pipelines showed the rapid growth rate of 24.6%, hydroelectric power generating capacity increased by 13.7%, overall electricity generating capacity increased by 9.4%, and aviation mileage increased by 9.5%; it was only the length of navigable inland waterways that achieved negative growth (Table 7.2). These moves laid a solid foundation for the economic boom in the era of reform and opening-up.

28. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 490.

29. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Statistical Information for the 55 Year Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, 18, 20.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.2

Development of infrastructure and growth rates, 1966–1976 1966

1976

33055.0*

44981

Annual average growth rate, 1966–1976 (%) 3.13

39.3

49.1

2.25

Length of roads opened (1,000 km)

543.6

823.4

4.24

Length of navigable inland waterways (1,000 km)

147.2

137.4

–0.70

Aviation mileage (1,000 km)

39.4

97.8

9.52

Pipelines laid (1,000 km)

0.7

6.3

24.6

Water pipes (1,000 km)

19.0

31.9

5.32

Electricity-generating capacity (100 million kWh)

8,250

20,310

9.43

Hydroelectric power-generating capacity (100 million kWh)

1,260

4,560

13.70

Length of postal routes (1,000km)

3,680.6

4,836.0

2.77

Key indicators Irrigated area (1,000 hectares)

Length of rail track opened (1,000 km)

Drainage pipes (1,000 km)

12.9

18.3

3.56

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 26, 29, 41, 44, 54.

Note: *Data for 1965.

The start of rural industrialization in the 1970s During the Great Leap Forward, rural industrialization made some progress, though it was halted in line with economic adjustments. A new pattern developed that was characterized by state-owned industry in the cities and five small industries in the counties (iron and steel, chemical, fertilizer, cement, coal and machinery).This was the result of deliberate policies allowing and encouraging rural industrialization being introduced to replace the original monolithic model of industrialization. In August 1970, the State Council convened the Northern Region Agricultural Conference,30 and Zhou Enlai proposed increasing the pace of 30. The conference set the objective for the level of mechanical operations exceeding

70% in state agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries. To attain this objective, the conference stated that manufacturing and repairing networks should be

promoted at county, commune, and production team levels. This would help develop

rural communes and production teams in the production of steel, coal, machinery,

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

agricultural mechanization.31 In September 1971, the State Council held the National Agricultural Mechanization Conference to establish guidelines for setting up rural communes and production team enterprises and initiating industrialization in rural areas. After 1970, rural communes and production teams underwent rapid development and achieved an average annual output growth rate of 24%. In August 1975, Deng Xiaoping proposed that urban industry should support the small-scale rural industries.32 By the end of 1975, the output value of rural communes and production teams had amounted to CNY19.78 billion; of that, the output value of rural communes accounted for CNY8.68 billion and that of rural production teams CNY11.1 billion, which was correspondingly 30.7%, 29.9% and 13.1% more than the previous year (Table 7.3). On top of that, the proportion of the output value of rural communes and production teams to national industrial output value increased from 3.3% in 1970 to 9.3% in 1975. These figures were significant for them representing rural communes and production teams, which laid a foundation for China’s rural industrialization and underwent rapid development in the era of reform and opening-up.

cement, and fertilizer, which would enhance agricultural mechanization, processing of agricultural products and by-products, refrigeration, and transportation. There

would be an emphasis on manufacturing and supplying small agricultural tools and improved implements.

31. The conference declared that “modern agriculture should use mechanical operations and aim toward mechanization. By relying solely on manual labor, it would be

impossible to boost agricultural productivity, change the agricultural labor structure of 600 million farmers, and redirect labor toward accelerating industrial development.

Chairman Mao once called for ‘basically achieving agricultural mechanization within 25 years,’ and after 15 years of elapse, we should increase the pace for the following 10 years.”

32. On August 18, 1975, Deng Xiaoping requested at a theoretical forum on the planning

work of the State Council, “We should promote the ideology of developing agriculture as the mainstay of our national economy, and we should encourage industry to support agriculture and promote agricultural modernization as a major task. In addition, industrial zones and industrial cities have to help surrounding rural areas

in developing small-scale industry and boosting agricultural production. We need to

incorporate such measures into our plans. Industry and agriculture need to support each other to reinforce the alliance between industrial workers and farmers.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 28–29.)

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.3 Growth in Output value of rural communes and production teams, 1970–1976 Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Output value of rural communes (CNY100 million) 27.6 39.1 46.0 54.8 66.8 86.8 123.9

Output value of rural production teams (CNY100 million) 40.0 52.9 64.6 71.6 84.5 111.0 119.6

Total output value of rural communes and production teams (CNY100 million) 67.6 92.0 110.6 126.4 151.3 197.8 243.5

Growth rate over the previous year (%) 20.7 36.1 20.2 14.3 19.7 30.7 23.1

Source: Editorial Board of Contemporary China Series ed., Township Enterprises in Contemporary China.

Substantial agricultural input In October 31, 1974, Deng Xiaoping met with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Con and made an objective evaluation: “Over the past decade, China’s grain yields have shown an average annual increase of 4%, and agriculture has achieved stable development thanks to an effective farmland infrastructure.”33 China had achieved a remarkable feat in solving its food problems. As a large agricultural country, China is subjected to frequent natural disasters, such as droughts and floods, and the Chinese people also suffered from wars in the twentieth century. As the economist Dwight H. Perkins estimated in 1969,34 the total area of irrigated land in China amounted to approximately 21.7 million hectares in 1820 and 20 million hectares in 1952, thereby marking a decrease. After the foundation of the People’s Republic, the Chinese government set a clear goal on controlling floods by irrigating farmland, and Mao Zedong proposed that guidelines be established for water conservation as the lifeblood of agriculture. The area of irrigated land in China expanded after 1952. From 1965 to 1976, the irrigated area increased from 33.1 million to 45 million hectares, and the proportion of land in China under irrigation rose from 31.9 to 45.3% (Table 7.4). In 1978, the country had 86,000 reservoirs and over 200,000 kilometers of levees; China’s 82,000 rural small hydroelectric power stations had a generating capacity of 2.28 million kilowatt-hours. The area of irrigated land in China exceeded that of some developed countries, such as the United States (13%), and some developing 33. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2062.

34. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

populous countries, such as India (35%). According to the high praise from the economist Angus Maddison for China’s water conservancy, China put sustainable labor input into major construction projects, ongoing conservancy, and irrigation.35 By promoting water conservancy, China was able to control droughts and floods, hence increase grain yield, which made a significant contribution to resolving China’s problems of food shortage. However, all actions have their pros and cons, and the large number of water-conservation facilities damaged the environment and also led to economic calamities. For instance the Sanmenxia Hydropower Station caused flooding in the Weihe Catchment. Table 7.4 Year 1820a 1952a

Area of irrigated and arable land in China, 1820–1976 Irrigated area (1 million hectares)

Area of arable land (1 million hectares)

Irrigation proportion (%)

33.1 45.0

103.6 99.4

31.9 45.3

21.7 20.0

1965b 1976 b

73.7 107.9

29.4 18.5

Sources: a Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 43;

b National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 32.

Table 7.5

Agricultural production factors and growth rate, 1965–1978 1965

1978

Average annual growth rate from 1965 to 1978 (%)

Mechanized farming area (1,000 hectares)

15,579

40,670

7.7

Irrigated area (1,000 hectares)

33,055

44,965

2.4

8,093

24,895

9.0

1,942

8,840

12.4

7,436*

82,387

16.2

37.1

253.1

15.9

Indicator

Irrigation of mechanized farming land (1,000 hectares)

Chemical fertilizer consumption (1,000 tons)

Small hydroelectric power stations in rural areas (o. of stations Rural electricity-generating capacity (100 million kWh)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1981), 182.

Notes: 1. *Data for 1962;

2. Chemical fertilizer consumption: sales for 1965 and consumption in 1978.

35. Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 44.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, there was an increase in agricultural production factors, and that contributed to agricultural growth. From 1965 to 1978, the area of mechanized farming increased 1.6-fold, with an annual growth rate of 7.7%, and the consumption of chemical fertilizers increased 3.6fold, resulting in a general annual growth rate of 12.4%. From 1962 to 1978, there was an approximately 10-fold increase in the number of small hydroelectric power stations — from over 7,400 to more than 82,000 — and the average annual growth rate in rural electricity consumption attained 15.9% (Table 7.5).

Slow growth in agricultural labor productivity Agricultural labor productivity underwent a process of initial decrease and then increased during the period of the Cultural Revolution (Fig. 7.1). Based on agricultural output value, agricultural labor productivity in 1970 showed a 3.1% decrease over the 1966 figure, which represents an average annual rate of decrease of 0.8% from 1966 to 1970. In contrast, agricultural labor productivity in 1976 showed a 15.7% increase over the 1970 level — an average increase rate of 2.45% from 1970 to 1976. Net agricultural output value reflected that trend: agricultural labor productivity in 1970 presented a 6.3% decrease over the 1966 figure, which was an average annual rate of decrease of 1.6% from 1966 to 1970; agricultural labor productivity in 1976 showed a 10.4% increase over the 1970 level — an average rate of increase of 1.66% from 1970 to 1976. Fig. 7.1

Changes in agricultural labor productivity, 1965–1976

Based on agricultural output

Based on agricultural net output

Source: Indicated in Appendix 7.1. Note: 1965 equals to 100.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fig. 7.2

Changes in the relative gap between industrial and agriculture labor productivity, 1965–1976 Based on total output value Based on net output value

Sources: 1. Industrial data: National Situation Analysis and Study Group of Chinese

Academy of Sciences, Township and Countryside — Study of China’s Rural and Urban Contradictions and Coordinated Development, 23;

2. Agriculture data is given in Appendix 7.1.

Note: Agriculture equals to 1.

The relative gap between industrial labor productivity and agricultural labor productivity in the period of the Cultural Revolution initially widened and then narrowed. In the 1970s, the relative gap continued to narrow. Based on total output value, industrial labor productivity showed a 14.2-fold increase over agricultural labor productivity in 1966 and a 15.1-fold in 1971; however, the decrease was 12.1fold in 1976. Based on net output value, industrial labor productivity presented a 5.4-fold increase over agricultural labor productivity in 1966 and a 7.35-fold increase in 1969; however, the decrease was 5.41-fold in 1976 (Fig. 7.2). The main causes behind these trends were that the Cultural Revolution intensified segmentation and conflict between two different labor markets; it limited the transfer of agricultural labor to non-agricultural industries in towns and cities as well as the inter-regional transfer of the rural labor force. From 1965 to 1979, the rural labor force accounted for over 80% of China’s total labor force. The proportion began to decrease only in the 1970s; the number of dependents supported per agricultural worker initially decreased and then increased to under dependents (Fig. 7.3); that was lower even than the number for India.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Fig. 7.3

Proportion of workers in agriculture employment and number of dependents per agricultural worker in China, 1965–1976

Proportion of agriculture workers to all employed workers (left axis) Number of dependents supported per agriculture worker (right axis)

Source: Given in Appendix 7.1.

Employment created in urban and rural areas There were 287 million employed people in China in 1965 and 388 million in 1976. That was an increase of 100 million people in an 11-year period — an average annual growth rate of 2.78%, which established a new record for employment growth.36 Within this trend, the number of employed urban people increased from 51.36 million in 1965 to 86.92 million in 1976, which was an average annual growth rate of 4.9% and represented an increase of 69.2%. The number of employed rural people increased from 235.34 million in 1965 to 301.42 million in 1976, which was an average annual growth rate of 2.3% — an increase of 28.1%. The urban employment growth rate was twice that of the rural employment growth rate. As political disturbances spread across China through the Cultural Revolution, huge economic losses were incurred. In his essay entitled “What Is Seen and What Is Unseen,” published in 1850, the French economist Frédéric Bastiat referred to such a development as a “deadweight loss” that signifies the destruction, damage, 36. Employment growth at an average annual growth rate of over 2% is classified as fast growth in China.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and waste could not increase national wealth.37 I will now adopt the counterfactual analysis approach developed by Robert Fogel to examine China’s deadweight loss and what its economic growth rate would have been if Mao Zedong had not initiated the Cultural Revolution.38

Cumulative economic growth losses of one-fourth to twofifths of GDP in 1976 On December 20, 1977, Li Xiannian, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and deputy premier of the State Council, delivered a speech at the National Planning Working Conference. He said, “The Cultural Revolution incurred huge losses of CNY500 billion for the economy and national income. That amounts to 80% of total investment in capital and exceeds the aggregate national fixed assets since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.”39 The author made a comparison between China’s long-term economic potential output growth rate and actual growth rate. The former displays the combined effect of key factors that affected and determined China’s economic growth, and the latter reflects the actual growth rate. In addition, the gap indicates the degree to which the actual growth rate deviated from the long-term growth rate, which can be viewed as reflecting the economic losses incurred during the Cultural Revolution. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic, the record of China’s economic growth suggests that the country achieved rapid economic growth in the early and late period and slow economic growth in the middle period — from 1952 to 1957, real GDP increased at a rate of 9.2%. From 1978 to 2005, real GDP rose 9.7%. From these data, I estimate that China’s long-term economic growth potential is approximately 9%. Based on the economic growth rate in the early and late period and assuming that the long-term economic growth trend ranged from 7.5% (lower limit) to 9.0% (upper limit), the actual economic growth rate for 1966–1976 was 5.1%; 4% lower than in 1952–1957 and 1978–2005 and less than the long-term economic growth as a result of the Cultural Revolution. I estimate that decision errors incurred economic losses and reduced economic growth rates by one-third to one-half. After 1978, China’s actual economic growth rate was close to, equaled, or even exceeded the long-term economic growth trend or potential (9%). 37. Bastiat, "What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen," in Selected Essays on Political Economy. 38. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History. 39. Wang, 541.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.6

Comparison of China’s economic growth performance, (%) GDP growth rate

Population growth rate

GDP per capita growth rate

1952–1957 1966–1976 1978–2005

9.2 5.1 9.7

2.4 2.4 1.5

6.8 2.7 8.2

1966–1976 (Option A) 1966–1976 (Option B)

9.0 7.5

2.4 2.4

6.6 5.1

Actual results

Simulation results

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 1–4.

In terms of cumulative economic growth, real GDP in 1976 showed a 1.65-fold increase over 1966, whereas the simulated GDP in 1976 registered a 2.1- to 2.4-fold increase over the 1966 figure. Thus, I estimate that the economic losses incurred as a result of decision errors accounted for approximately one-fourth to two-fifths the simulated GDP in 1976. Evidently when adopting the same approach that the growth rate of real GDP per capita and growth rate of labor productivity were both lower than the simulation results under the same conditions, i.e., constant population growth rate, and employment growth rate (Table 7.6). Simulated results refer to economic growth performance without the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Option A assumes that the economic growth rate was 9.0% from 1966 to 1976; Option B assumes that the economic growth rate was 7.5% from 1966 to 1976. The simulation results were obtained based on data ranging from the upper limit of Option A and lower limit of Option B. The simulation results reveal that, if the Cultural Revolution had not occurred China, would have achieved rapid economic growth and its long-term growth potential would have extended for at least 9%. Furthermore, China achieved faster economic growth than its counterpart developing countries, with a growth rate approaching those of Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. According to figures pertaining to economic growth following 1978, China had tremendous growth potential, ranging from 9.3% to 9.5%, whereas the actual growth rate in fact reached 9.7%.

Four economic fluctuations as a result of political factors China was subject to marked economic fluctuations during the period of the Cultural Revolution. From 1965 to 1977, China’s economy achieved peaks in 1965,

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

1970, 1973, and 1975 and fell to troughs in 1967, 1972, 1974, and 1976 (Fig. 7.4). It is clear that the troughs in the Chinese economy were the result of political factors and that fierce political struggles contributed to the economic fluctuations. In addition, fluctuations in investment coincided with the economic fluctuations during the same period. For example, in 1967, 1968, and 1974, investment achieved negative growth rates of –26.3%, –19.3%, and –1.1%, respectively. As a result of strict price controls during this period, there was no major change in the inflation rate, which presented a different situation to that during the period of reform. From 1966 to 1977, the fluctuation coefficient of the GDP growth rate was 126%, and the GDP growth rate ranged from –5.7% in 1967 to 19.4% in 1970, which amounts to a difference of 25.1%. The fluctuation coefficient of the growth rate of fixed-asset investment was 240%, and the fixed-asset investment growth rate ranged from –26.3% in 1967 to 62.9% in 1969, which amounts to a difference of 25.1%. It is evident that the economic fluctuation range during the period of the Cultural Revolution was narrower than that from 1958 to 1965, when the fluctuation coefficient of GDP growth rate was 245% and the fluctuation coefficient of the fixed-asset investment growth rate was 242%. During the Great Leap Forward, the national economy was on the verge of collapse. Fig. 7.4

China’s economic fluctuation, 1965–1977

GDP Growth Rate

Investment Growth Rate

%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004).

Note: 1966 is taken as the baseline.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Implementation of the five-year plans severely inhibited by political movements During the Cultural Revolution, the Five-Year Plans failed to be implemented owing to political movements as China went through a period of change that upset economic plans. This was characterized by implementation only of economic controls instead of the formulation of economic plans. Except in the case of the 1st Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), when 94% of the plan targets were basically achieved, the national economy had inadequate or no economic plans. The 3rd Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) and 4th Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) failed to be implemented, and during that period (except for 1969) the Chinese government seldom formulated an annual national economic plan. Thus, China failed to run its economy in a structured fashion during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Almost all CPC leaders failed to anticipate the initiation of political movements by Mao Zedong and what their political impact would be on national economic plans (Table 7.7). Table 7.7

Target fulfillment of five-year plans (1953–1975)

Period

Number of planned targets

Fulfillment (%)

Backdrop

First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957)

18

94

Achieved political stability and unprecedented unity

Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962)

14

—

Third Five-Year Plan (1966–1970)

11

82

Cultural Revolution

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975)

12

59

Cultural Revolution

Great Leap Forward

Source: Yan, “Assessment Report of the Implementation of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.”

Cumulative urban and rural consumer welfare losses 15%– 12% of mass consumption in 1976 From 1966 to 1976, the average annual growth rate in consumption by urban residents was 3.32% and that for rural residents was 1.51%. Calculating the opportunity cost based on the growth rates for 1952–1957, the loss in consumption for all residents is estimated at 26.9%: a loss in consumption by rural and urban residents are 15.3% and 24.2% respectively (Table 7.8).

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Table 7.8

Consumption growth rates for urban and rural residents All

1952–1957 (growth rate, %) 1966–1976 (growth rate, %) Loss assessment 1966 (CNY) 1976 actual (CNY) 1976 simulated value (CNY) Estimated losses (CNY)

Rural

Urban

residents

residents

residents

4.48 1.96

3.15 1.51

5.66 3.32

139 171 215 46 (26.9%)

111 131 151 20 (15.3%)

262 365 454 89 (24.2%)

Urban/ rural

residents

— — —

2.36 2.79 3.01

—

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 14.

Note: The proportion of losses to the simulated values is given in parentheses.

During the Cultural Revolution, China failed to improve people’s livelihoods and it even led to their deterioration. Specifically, grain consumption per capita was 190.28 kilograms in 1976, which was only 0.71 kilograms more than the 1966 figure of 189.57 kilograms, and 14.01 kilograms less than the 204.29 kilograms in 1956. Edible vegetable oil consumption per capita in 1976 was 1.60 kilograms, which was lower than both in 1966 and 1956 –– 1.76 kilograms and 2.57 kilograms respectively. Cloth consumption per capita in 1976 was 23.55 chi (1 chi=1/3 meter), which was slightly more than that in 1966 (19.89 chi), yet less than in 1956 (29.17 chi). During the period of the Cultural Revolution, employees working in stateowned enterprises did not receive a pay rise until 1971; during the 3rd and 4th Five-Year Plans, the average annual growth rate of the salaries of these employees was –1.2% and –0.1%, respectively, their monetary wages and real wage indexes having been lower than that in 1957 and in 1965.40 In 1976, the Engel coefficient of rural households was about 70%, higher than that in 1957. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the Engel coefficient of rural households was 65.7% in 1957, 68.5% in 1965, and 67.7% in 1978.41 The author estimates that in terms of the Engel coefficient, approximately 70% of rural households were below the absolute poverty line (i.e., 60%) during the Cultural Revolution; thus, the whole rural Chinese population was actually living in absolute poverty back then. China’s task therefore should have been to 40. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol. 2, 969.

41. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 34.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

reduce the grinding poverty of the world’s largest population rather than rooting out capitalism, which was what Mao Zedong demanded. Although most CPC leaders knew nothing of the above economic indicators, Zhou Enlai remained informed about the actual situation in China at that time. On July 16, 1974, Zhou issued instructions regarding the “Report of Disasters in Dingxi and Qingyang, Gansu”: “Your two regions have been hampered by a shortage of grain, relief funds, seed, fodder, agricultural tools and implements, fuel, and drinking water. There is a dire need of clothing. Sideline production has not been developed. Production funds and agricultural loans have not been granted to key departments. Insufficient medical teams were dispatched, and medical and sanitary conditions need to be improved.”42 There is no evidence to suggest that Zhou reported to Mao Zedong about the occurrence of these natural disasters,43 and Zhou did not have the courage to order that the details be made public. At that time, there was official secrecy and a lack of transparency with information about such events. The large impoverished population had to suffer from natural disasters; but it also suffered from the calamities caused by political movements and secrecy, which exacerbated the damage caused by natural catastrophes.

Export losses due to the closed-door policy were 40%–80% of export values in 1976 In 1966, China’s export value accounted for 1.16% of the world’s export value. That figure fell to 0.72% in 1970 dramatically, increased slightly in 1972, and reached 1.01% in 1973 before decreasing to 0.69% in 1976, which was the lowest level in the nation’s history, and much lower than the 2.5% in 1870.44 However, Mao Zedong was not informed of the severity of this situation. It is possible to calculate the opportunity cost losses in export value as a result of the closed-door policy. Assuming that the proportion of China’s export value to the world’s export value remained the same during the Cultural Revolution, the 42. Jin, A Biography of Zhou Enlai, vol. 4, 2099. 43. On July 14, 1974, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting of the Central Political Bureau of the CPC for members in Beijing held at Mao Zedong’s residence. There was no report

about the disasters in Dengxi and Qingyang, Gansu and no record of a speech by Mao

Zedong about them. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 672–673; Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1693–1694.)

44. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy: 1820–1992.

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cumulative real export value was CNY44.03 billion and the cumulative simulated export value was CNY61.36 billion, which was 39.4% higher than the cumulative real export value. Supposing that the proportion of China’s export value to the world’s export value increased by 0.05% annually, the cumulative simulated export value would have been CNY79.42 billion — 80.3% higher than the cumulative real export value. It is clear from this calculation that the closed-door policies suppressed China’s export growth potential; the losses incurred are estimated to have accounted for 40%–80% of the export value in 1976, and the resultant import value losses were 40%–80% of the import value in 1976. By making a comparison between Japan and China’s export values according to international records, Japan’s export value was 4.13 times that of China’s in 1966; it rose to 9.18 times in 1976, then decreased, and finally increased to 9.81 times in 1976 (Table 7.9). Since then, the gap between Japan’s and China’s export values began to narrow, and China’s export value exceeded Japan’s in 2004. This indicates that the closed-door policy widened the gap between China and Japan’s export values. In contrast, the policy of opening-up narrowed the gap. It is estimated that the opportunity costs may have increased owning to the closed-door policy. Thus, Mao Zedong lacked economic knowledge,45 and Jiang Qing and her supporters lacked political vision.

45. The author retrieved the data from Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12 and vol. 13, since there is elsewhere a lack of related literature and information.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.9

China’s real and simulated export values, 1966–1976 World

China’s

China’s

export value export value export value export value

Year

(USD100 million)

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Total

2040 2145 2391 2726 3138 3481 4124 5787 8400 8761 9916 52909

(USD100 million)a 23.7 21.4 21.0 22.0 22.6 26.4 34.4 58.2 69.5 72.6 68.5 440.3

(USD100 million)b 23.7 24.9 27.7 31.6 36.4 40.4 47.8 67.1 97.4 101.6 115.0 613.6

Proportion

Japan’s/

export value

export

China’s

(USD100 million)c

of China’s

to the world

23.7 26.0 30.1 35.7 42.7 49.1 60.2 87.4 133.6 141.1 164.6 794.2

value (%) 1.16 1.00 0.88 0.81 0.72 0.76 0.83 1.01 0.83 0.83 0.69

a

China’s value

(fold) 4.13 4.88 6.18 7.27 8.55 9.10 8.31 6.35 7.99 7.68 9.81

Sources: World export value data: Maddison, The World Economy — A Millennial Perspective, 164;

China’s export value data: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004).

Notes: Real export value; a

b

Simulated export value, assuming a constant proportion of China’s export value to the world export value;

c

Simulated export value, assuming a constant proportion of China’s export value to the world export value.

Social Assessment of the Cultural Revolution In the Cultural Revolution, China was still able to achieve rapid social development, and it made remarkable social progress.

Modern accelerated demographic transition Under the low-income conditions during the Cultural Revolution, China brought about a modern demographic transition from a high birth rate and high mortality rate to a low birth rate and low mortality rate (Table 7.7). In the Cultural Revolution, China’s population policy went through two phases. From 1966 to 1970, China undertook no family planning policy; after 1970, it introduced a family planning policy.

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In 1962, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the “Directive on Seriously Calling for Conducting a Family Planning Policy,” which expressly stipulated, “China advocates birth control and proper control over the natural population growth rate to achieve the marked shift from unplanned to planned birth.” In August 1965, Zhou Enlai proposed family planning to control China’s total population, which was to increase to 800 million over the period from 1966 to 1980.46 In fact, China’s population attained 987 million in 1980 since the Cultural Revolution brought an end to family planning efforts. From 1966 to 1970, births in China went unplanned, and the population increased by over 20 million per year. In the 1970s, the Chinese government embarked on its family planning policy.47 In 1970, the government’s family planning policy took the form of a call for later marriage and supplying oral contraceptive pills, and it stressed that the population was to grow in a planned manner to suit economic development. In 1971, the State Council issued its “Report of Doing a Good Job in Carrying Out the Family Planning Policy,” which was submitted jointly by the National Health and Family Planning Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Coal Fuel and Chemicals. The report proposed that urban and rural residents should volunteer to marry later and carry out family planning. In 1973, the State Council incorporated family planning targets into the national economic program: it set up the Family Planning Leader Group to preside over national family planning, and subsequently, family planning agencies began to be established in various regions and at grassroots levels. In February 1974, Mao Zedong met with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda on his visit to China, and for the first time, Mao publicly acknowledged that the country’s population was excessive. The same year, Mao issued an instruction on urging population control, and he stated, “The population has to grow in a planned manner instead of by unplanned birth.”48 In 1970, China’s birth rate underwent a dramatic reduction. From 1965 to 1970, the birth rate was somewhere in the vicinity of 35%, and it decreased to 20% in 1976. The natural population growth rate decreased from 26% in 1966 to 12.7% in 1976 — a reduction of over 50%. Statistical data at the city and county level point to the same trend (Table 7.10).

46. Jin ed., A Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1629. 47. Xu Dixin and other economists were convinced that party leaders who insisted on the family planning policy did much to change the population structure in the 1970s. (Xu ed., The Population of Contemporary China, 21–22.) 48. People’s Daily, July 9, 1978.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.10 Population birth, mortality, and national growth rates, 1966–1976 (%) National level City level County level

Birth rate Mortality rate Natural growth rate Birth rate Mortality rate Natural growth rate Birth rate Mortality rate Natural growth rate

1966 35.05 8.83 26.22 20.85 5.59 15.26 36.71 9.47 27.24

1971 30.65 7.32 23.33 21.30 5.35 15.95 31.86 7.57 24.29

1976 19.91 7.25 12.66 13.12 6.60 6.52 20.85 7.35 13.50

Source: Jiang, The Population of Contemporary China, 470.

After the 1970s, the fertility rate decreased rapidly. Before, China’s fertility rate fell slowly from 6.1% in 1965 to 5.8% in 1970 — a decrease of only 0.3% in five years. After 1970, it decreased rapidly, falling to 3.2% in 1976 — a drop of 2.6% over the 1970 figure (Fig. 7.5). The fertility rate of urban and rural women decreased dramatically, and China’s cities and towns notably entered a period of low birth rate (Table 7.11). Fig. 7.5

Fertility rate of Chinese women, 1965–1976

Total Birth Rate

Source: Given in Appendix 7.3.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Table 7.11 Year 1965 1970 1976

Fertility rate of urban and rural women in China, 1965–1976 Nationwide 6.076 5.812 3.235

Rural areas 6.597 6.379 3.582

Source: Zou and Hu, Human, Development, Prospect, Choices, 130.

Urban areas 3.749 3.267 1.608

The rapid decrease in the total fertility rate and population growth rate created favorable demographic conditions for the subsequent reform and opening-up and played a positive role in promoting the welfare of the Chinese people. This was evident in the following ways. 1. Material capital per capita showed a faster growth trend. 2. Pressure for grain supply eased. 3. The decline in the number of children and in the school-age population led to an increase in educational enrollment and the scope of education as well as a rapid rise in per capita educational investment. 4. The proportion of the working-age population (aged 15 to 64 years) to the total population increased rapidly: it approached or even exceeded 60%. This meant that China had entered the demographic bonus stage49 with a resultant tremendous, persistent employment pressure.

Improved elementary and high school education coverage Based on data from the second national population census in 1964 and the third national population census in 1982 (Table 7.12), the author estimates that the average number of years in education for the population aged over 6 was 2.35 years in 1964 and 2.53 years in 1966; that figure rose to 3.70 in 1976. From 1964 to 1976, the annual growth rate of the educated population having an educational background in multiple institutions was greater than the total population growth rate. In particular, the population having a high school and vocational high school education showed the highest growth rate; that was followed by the population with junior high school education background; the population with an associate degree and that with only elementary school education showed the lowest increase in growth rate (Table 7.12). Except for the population with an associate degree, the population with other educational backgrounds increased to a varied extent; China showed especial improvement in its high school education coverage. 49. The author classified the proportion of the population aged 15 to 64 years to the total population at 60% or over as the demographic bonus period and the proportion of

the population aged 15 to 64 years to the total population being below 60% as the demographic debt period.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.12

Educational background of the national population, 1964–1982 College or above

High school

Elementary

1,319

4,680

28,330

6,779

17,892

35,237

916 3,300 6,834

3,250 12,025 18,037

19,674 25,682 35,523

11.27 11.81

11.52 10.00

2.25 3.34

school

high school

Population (100,000 people) 1964 416 1976 1982 615 Population (100,000 people)

1964 289 1976 385 1982 620 Average annual growth rate (%) 1964–1976 1964–1982

Junior high

and vocational

2.42 4.33

school

Source: The second national population census of 1964 and the third national population census of 1982.

Note: The data for 1976 were estimated by the author.

In the 1970s, China’s elementary and junior high school enrollment rate exceeded that of the majority of developed countries. China’s adult literacy rate exceeded the average rate of low-income countries and was close to that of middleincome countries (Table 7.13). Table 7.13

International comparison of education indicators in the 1970sa (%) Elementary school net

Nation

enrollment ratio

China India Indonesia Sri Lanka Low-income Countries Middle-income Countries All developing countries Industrialized countries

Secondary school gross enrollment

93 64 66 62 56 75d 62 94

ratio c 51 28 21 47 25 28d 26 68

Adult

literacy rate 66 36 62 78 38 71 51 99

Source: World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, Table 3.22, 96.

Notes: a Data for China refer to 1979, for other countries to 1975 or 1977; b c d

Proportion of elementary school age group enrolled;

Secondary school enrollment as ratio of secondary school age group; Intermediate middle-income countries.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The author estimates that in the 1970s, China’s total human capital (product of the population aged 15 to 64 years multiplied by the average number of years in education of the population aged over 15) would take accounted for 17.5% of the world total and would rank first globally; by comparison, India’s total human capital accounted for only 7.3% of the world total. China’s total human capital in the 1970s was thus over twice that of India,50 and this laid a solid foundation for economic growth and social progress in the period of reform. Deng Xiaoping stated that the Cultural Revolution caused the gravest losses owing to its long-term disruptive political impact on the human capital of the population with a higher education and vocational high school education background.51 Since universities stopped enrolling new students for a period of four years during the Cultural Revolution, the number of university students dropped dramatically (Table 7.14). It is estimated that at least 1 million college students and 2 million vocational high school students lost the opportunity to receive schooling; this loss was particularly notable in the case of universities, which ceased enrolling postgraduates during the Cultural Revolution.52 The situation may in fact have been more serious than these figures suggest since the enrollment rate at China’s universities and high schools was much lower than that in other countries at the same income level. In 1979, after college entrance examinations had been restored for three consecutive years, the enrollment rate at Chinese universities was still only 1.2%; that amounts to just half the average university enrollment rate of other low-income countries and one-fourth the average university enrollment rate of all developing countries. China also ceased to enroll overseas students for a period of six years, and that typified the closed-door policy. From 1966 to 1976, there was a total of 1,033 million university graduates, which includes 669,000 high school graduates in 1966–1970. Later in the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong called for selecting university students from among industrial workers, farmers, and 50. Hu, “From a Populous Country to a Country Rich in Human Resource,” 1–10.

51. In July 1978, Deng Xiaoping remarked, “The Cultural Revolution caused severe

disruption and damage to our country and inflicted losses on various industries. Our science and education suffered the most severely. The Cultural Revolution resulted in the failure of education and squandered the talent of a generation of Chinese people,

causing the gap to grow between China’s scientific and technical level and the advanced

level in the world. It was clearly easier to recoup these losses in the areas of agriculture and industry. However, it could take more time to recover these losses in the fields of science, technology, and education.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 347.) 52. Dong, The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 572.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

soldiers: it seemed fair to have such individuals undergo the three-year training system. This was in fact not such an effective move since only 364,000 students were enrolled the universities from 1970 to 1976, and the university enrollment rate was under 0.5% at that time. As a result, an increasing number of universityage students lost the opportunity to receive a university education. Based on the number of university students and graduates, Li Chunbo determined that the population with a background in higher education (associate degree or above) increased by 18.5% from 1966 to 1976 at an average annual growth rate of 1.71%.53 Table 7.14

China’s secondary and higher education, 1965–1976 (10,000 students)

University students

Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Enrollment

Number of graduates

Vocational Vocational Vocational University high University high University high school school school 67.4 53.4 40.9 25.9 10.9 4.8 8.3 19.4 31.4 43.0 50.1 56.5

54.7 47.0 30.8 12.8 3.8 6.4 21.8 34.2 48.2 63.4 70.7 69.0

16.4 — — — — 4.2 4.2 13.4 15.0 16.5 19.1 21.7

20.8 4.6 0.8 1.8 1.3 5.4 21.3 26.8 29.4 32.7 34.4 34.8

18.6 14.1 12.5 15.0 15.0 10.3 0.6 1.7 3.0 4.3 11.9 14.9

9.1 11.9 17.0 19.7 10.3 2.8 8.9 9.5 12.2 16.6 24.8 33.9

Number of overseas students 454 — — — — — 36 259 180 245 277

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 80–83.

The Cultural Revolution had a severe impact on vocational high school education, and it resulted in decreased enrollment. Some vocational high schools ceased enrollment, and the number of vocational school students declined dramatically (Table 7.15). In 1979, the number of vocational school students was 1.4 million, which was much lower than the figure in 1965. The number of vocational high school students accounted for only 2.4% of the total number of all high school students, which was much lower than the average proportion of 11% in other developing countries. In 1979, only 0.5% of the labor force had received higher 53. Li, “Study into China’s Regional Human Capital and Economic Development Gap.”

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

education and 0.9% had undergone technical or vocational high school education. It is worth mentioning that teachers formed the majority of the educated group.54 Cai Fang and Du Yang calculated the human capital loss as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Owing to changes in human capital stock and the resultant impact on human capital accumulation through the decrease in the total length of schooling from 12 years to 9 or 10 years, the drop in university, college, and vocational high school education, changes in the teaching staff, and the lack of vocational education, the average duration of education for the population aged over 15 was 4.8 years in 1982. If the Cultural Revolution had not taken place, that figure could have been 5.6 years. Thus, the Cultural Revolution caused a 14.3% reduction in the potential human capital stock. Fang and Yang determined that the Cultural Revolution exerted a long-term impact on human capital accumulation and that a great number of unemployed urban workers were victims of the political movement.55 The young students who took part in various political movements during the Cultural Revolution were also victims of the revolutionary rebellion, and their futures were seriously affected as a result of the disruption of human capital investment. Even when those former students reached retirement age, the overwhelming majorities of them were still within the low-income group and found themselves caught in a poverty trap.

Health promotion in urban and rural area During the period of the Cultural Revolution, average life expectancy increased and the infant and maternal mortality rate declined. At that time, China’s healthcare policy had three important characteristics. 1. A policy was introduced that stressed implementing preventative measures and improving health care by vaccinating against chicken pox and controlling infectious disease media. 2. There was an expansion of basic medical services — especially through the use of “barefoot doctors” (i.e., farmers who received minimal basic medical and paramedical training and worked in rural villages. Their purpose was to bring health care to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle). 54. World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, 136.

55. Cai and Du, “The Cultural Revolution Caused Destruction on Physical Capital and Human Capital,” 795–806.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

3. There was continued reliance on traditional Chinese medical practice.56 During the period of the Cultural Revolution, there was one qualified Western doctor for every 2,500 Chinese people, which was much higher than the ratio of 9,900:1 of other low-income countries and greater than the ratio of 4,300:1 of middle-income countries. When barefoot doctors are taken into account, the figures for China are even more impressive. Excluding barefoot doctors, the above ratio for China was 900:1; including barefoot doctors, the ratio was 400:1. By comparison, the ratio of other low-income countries was 8,800:1 and that of middle-income countries 1,900:1. China made remarkable progress in improving health. According to data from the World Bank in 2005, the mortality rate of China’s children aged under 5 years was 225% in 1960; that figure fell to 64% in 1980 at an average annual rate of decrease of 6.3%. In addition, the maternal mortality rate in China was about 1.5% in 1960, which fell to 1% in 1980. The World Bank stated that China achieved a great feat by improving health care despite low economic growth (China’s per capita growth in income was 4% from 1960 to 1979). The average life expectancy increased rapidly: before the foundation of the People’s Republic, it was 35 years, which was lower than the world’s average life expectancy of 49 years. As a result of great famine, it fell to 36 years in 1960 and then rose rapidly to 62 years in 1970, which was higher than the world’s average of 58.6 years. In 1980, life expectancy increased to 66.8 years, which was higher than the world average of 62.6 years and the average for middle-income countries of 65.6 years (Table 7.15). From 1950 to 1980, the growth rate of life expectancy in China was higher than the world average and that of developed countries, which indicates that China was following world trends in population health indicators.

56. World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, 97.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Table 7.15

International comparison of life expectancy, 1950–1980 (Years)

Nation

1950

1960

1970

1980

China United States United Kingdom France Germany Japan South Korea India Middle-income countries

35.00 68.00 — 65.00 67.00 61.00 — 32.00

36.32 69.77 70.76 70.24 69.54 67.67 54.15 44.33

61.74 70.81 71.67 72.01 70.46 71.95 59.93 49.37

66.84 73.66 73.78 74.18 72.63 76.09 66.84 54.18

Growth for 1950–1980 31.84 5.66 — 9.18 5.63 15.09 — 22.18

—

45.72

61.20

65.64

—

—

68.92

70.86

73.76

—

49.00

50.24

58.63

62.57

13.57

High-income countries

Average world growth

Sources: 1. Date for 1950: Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Table 1–5a; 2. Data for 1960–1980: World Bank, World Development Indicator 2004.

Urbanization at a standstill The national urban population was 130 million in 1965; that figure increased to 144 million in 1970 and continued to rise to 160 million in 1975. From 1965 to 1975, the average annual growth rate of the national urban population as a proportion of the total population was 2.08%. From 1965 to 1970, the average annual growth rate of the urban population was 2.03%, which was lower than that of the total population. From 1970 to 1975, the average annual growth rate of the urban population was 4.21%, which was higher than the total population. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s urbanization went into reverse. The urbanization rate basically declined instead of increasing owing to the ban on mobility and migration from rural to urban areas. In addition, 17 million urban educated young people were obliged to migrate to rural areas: the proportion of the urban population to the total population remained around 17.5%. As the rate of industrialization increased, the gap between the industrialization rate and urbanization rate widened. In 1977, the industrialization rate was 30% higher than the urbanization rate (Fig. 7.6), which reflected the division between urban and rural areas. Rather than driving urbanization, industrialization actually acted as an impediment to mobility of the population and labor force. This resulted in an increase of agricultural laborers and surplus agricultural laborers; there was

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

a widening gap between industrial and agricultural labor productivity as well as between urban and rural labor productivity. The author estimates that there were 58 million surplus agricultural workers in 1965; that number increased to 102 million in 1970 and further rose to 110 million in 1976. The proportion of surplus agricultural workers to the national total of laborers increased from 20% in 1965 to 28% in 1976, which incurred social economic costs through the division between urban and rural areas. Fig. 7.6

China’s industrialization and urbanization rates, 1949–1978 Industrialization rate Urbanlization rate Gap between industrialization rate and urbanlization rate

Source: Appendix 7.2.

Disrupted science and technology The Cultural Revolution resulted in severe disruption in science and technology. Research funding was cut, and there was accordingly a reduction in the proportion of research funding to national income. Until 1969, there was increased research funding as part of national defense to help in preparing for wars (Table 7.16). In addition, many research institutes discontinued research work and some were even closed. As the leading research institution, the Chinese Academy of Sciences had 106 research institutes and employed 21,900 researchers; it basically constituted the scientific research center and boasted the full range of disciplines. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the majority of research institutes were not affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1967, there were 47 research institutes

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

in the country; they were under the direction of the New Technology Committee, which was responsible for military research and was under the administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In 1972, there were 43 research institutes, which were put under the administration of local governments or local governments and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1973, there were 53 research institutes; they had 35,200 staff, of whom 13,500 researchers worked under the Chinese Academy of Science (including dual mobile units). In 1976, there were 64 research institutes under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, of which 44 research institutes were under the administration of local governments and the academy.57 Table 7.16

Year

State expenditure on scientific research funding, 1965–1976 Total expenditure

Per capita

research funding

funding

on scientific

(CNY100 million) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

27.17 25.06 15.35 14.80 24.15 29.96 37.68 36.10 34.59 34.65 40.31 39.25

research (CNY) 3.80 3.41 2.03 1.91 3.03 3.66 4.48 4.19 3.92 3.85 4.40 4.22

Proportion of expenditure on research

funding to fiscal expenditure (%) 5.8 4.6 3.5 4.1 4.6 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.9 4.9

Proportion of

expenditure on

research funding

to national income (%) 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Four Decades of China’s Science and Technology (1949–1989), 202–203.

Severely depleted cultural undertakings In a notice released on May 16, 1966, Mao Zedong proposed the theory of cultural dictatorship, signifying a dictatorship of the proletariat over the social superstructure, which included various cultural fields. The Cultural Revolution 57. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Four Decades of China’s Science and Technology (1949–1989), 20–21.

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Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

was launched to reform culture in China. However, Mao’s theory of cultural dictatorship strangled the revival of Chinese culture and diminished its prosperity. The effect of the Cultural Revolution was akin to the destructive efforts in the Qin dynasty that led to the burning of books and the live burial of Confucian scholars. During the Cultural Revolution, there was a dramatic decrease in cultural and intellectual products, and their number was even smaller than that in 1950. In 1965, China published 20,143 books, 790 magazines, and 343 newspapers. The quantity was reduced in the Cultural Revolution: in 1967, 2,925 books were published — just 14.5% of the figure in 1965 (Table 7.17). In 1968, 22 magazines and 42 newspapers were published, which accounted for 2.8% and 12.2%, respectively, of that in 1965. In 1976, the number of books, magazines, and newspapers published amounted to 63.8%, 68.6%, and 53.1%, respectively, of the number in 1965. From 1966 to 1976, China published annually on average 8,006 books, 189 magazines, and 134 newspapers: that was fewer than the number of cultural products in 1950. It is possible to estimate cultural product losses based on opportunity costs. Taking 1965 as the baseline, the reduction in China from 1966 to 1976 was 121,000 books, 6,000 magazines, and 2,090 newspapers (Table 7.17). Table 7.17 Year

Books, magazines, and newspapers published in China, 1950–1976

1950 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1966–1976 Annual average

Books

12,153 20,143 11,055 2,925 3,694 3,964 4,889 7,771 8,829 10,372 11,812 13,716 12,842 80,057 8,006

Magazines 295 790 191 27 22 20 21 72 194 320 382 476 542 1885 189

Newspapers 382 343 49 43 42 42 42 195 185 192 189 180 182 1341 134

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 87.

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MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fig. 7.7

Growth index of books, magazines and newspaper, 1965–1976

Books

Magazines

Newspaper

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 87.

Note: Based on 1965’s data as 100.

Cultural undertakings suffered the greatest. During the Cultural Revolution, 800 million Chinese were in the unfortunate position of being able to attend only eight model opera performances. Performances of most traditional arts were forbidden, and the overwhelming majority of the country’s top artists were ordered to undergo reform at cadre schools. All theatrical performances served to eulogize Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. In the early Cultural Revolution, almost all the leading artists, such as celebrated writers and playwrights, were subjected to political persecution; they included Wu Han, Ba Jin, Lao She, Cao Yu, Luo Guangbin, Zhou Libo, Zhao Shuli, Liu Qing, Yang Mo, Liang Bin, Wu Qiang, Zhou Erfu, Ai Qing, Liu Baiyu, Xia Yan, Ouyang Shan, Ding Ling, Liu Binyan, Tian Han, Wang Meng, Deng Tuo, and Liao Mosha. Among them, Lao She, Luo Guangbin, and Deng Tuo committed suicide — by force or otherwise — and Wu Han, Zhao Shuli, Liu Qing, and Tian Han died in prison. In addition, the eminent painters Qi Baishi and Lin Fengmian, the famous musician He Luting, and a large number of directors and actors were subjected to criticism or persecution.58 58. Macfarquhar and Fairbank eds., The Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, 1992 ed., 629–630, 641.

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During the period of the revolution, cultural institutions were reorganized or dissolved, and the result was a suffocation of literary life.59 Except for an increase in the number of television stations, the number of national cultural institutions declined at first from 1965 to 1976, before increasing (Table 7.18). The purpose of the Cultural Revolution was reform of culture and the arts. Table 7.18

Changing number of national cultural institutions in China, 1965–1976

Art performance troupes Art performance venues  Cultural centers Public libraries Museums Radio stations Television stations

1965 3,458

1970 2,541

1976 2,906

2,943 2,598 577 214 87 12

1,432 2,303 323 182 80 31

1,458 2,609 768 263 89 32

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949-2004), 86.

China’s cultural heritage was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution on a scale that was unprecedented in the country’s history. How did Mao Zedong evaluate the demolition of China’s cultural heritage wrought by the Cultural Revolution? On May 7, 1974, Mao Zedong met with Léopold Sédar Senghor, president of the Republic of Senegal. Senghor expressed his puzzlement over the fact that the Cultural Revolution was leading to the destruction of artifacts and historical relics. Mao failed to clarify Senghor’s puzzlement. Subsequently, Mao suggested conducting a survey and he rashly reckoned that nine-tenths of historical relics had been preserved, whereas one-tenth had been destroyed. In front of Senghor, Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, and Li Xiannian, who were present during the meeting with Senghor, Mao acknowledged that the CPC had had its faults in the Cultural Revolution.60 It is clear that Mao underestimated the severe destruction to Chinese culture and historical relics that was taking place during the Cultural Revolution. In late 1966, China’s traditional cultural heritage spanning thousands of years was ravaged by the Red Guards in the destruction of the Four Olds movement, 59. Ibid., 623. 60. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,“ vol. 2, 1077.

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which was called for and supported by state leaders. Historical artifacts, ancient scripts, historical relics, temples, tombs, and ancient buildings underwent largescale damage. That brought shame to China’s great civilization, splendid culture and history. It represented an unfilial act and an offense to the country’s ancestors. The CCCPC Party Literature Research Office made the following remark: “The Cultural Revolution disrupted Chinese science and culture, and it resulted in a cultural reverse. History has demonstrated that the Cultural Revolution brought havoc to Chinese culture rather than the virtuous cultural revolution defined by Marxism.”61

Mao Zedong’s Chinese Social Ideals and Economic Reform Mao Zedong’s ideal for Chinese society62 Mao Zedong pursued lofty ideals for Chinese socialist society, though they failed to correspond to China’s actual circumstances and the preliminary stage of socialism. I present below an analysis of Mao’s ideal for Chinese society. Mao Zedong had the ideal of building China into a kind of communist school. This would result in a narrowing of the gap between industry and agriculture; rural and urban areas; and physical and mental work, and ideally produce hundreds of millions of successors to embrace the struggle for communism.63 Mao’s Chinese social ideal was entirely different from the classical Western economic thought of 61. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol.2, 968.

62. Dong, The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 446–451. 63. On August 1, 1966, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “The Whole Country Calls for Establishing the Mao Zedong Thought School — Celebrating

the 39th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation Army.” It stated, “Complying with the directive of May 7 issued by Comrade Mao Zedong could narrow the gap between industry and agriculture, the gap between rural and urban areas, and the gap between physical and mental work. It avoids abnormal urban and

industrial development and encourages intellectuals to undertake manual work and working people to acquire knowledge. This will help develop hundreds of millions of communist all-around successors with a higher political consciousness.” (People’s Daily, August 1, 1966.)

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Adam Smith, who believed that human nature was characterized by selfishness and economic interests — those of the rational economic man, drove that human behavior. By contrast, Mao was eager to promote unselfish communist fighters who were devoted to serving the people.64 It is possible to generalize basic approaches to narrowing the above-mentioned three gaps by learning from the history of world modernization. 1. The gap between industrial labor productivity and agricultural labor productivity can be narrowed by means of industrialization. Nevertheless, from the 1960s to the 1970s, there was a huge gap between China’s industrial labor and agricultural labor productivity, and that gap continued to widen (Fig. 7.2). Additionally, the average number of dependents supported by agricultural workers was small (Fig. 7.3). 2. It is possible to narrow the gap between urban and rural residents’ income and public services by means of urbanization. However, from the 1960s to the 1970s, China’s urbanization made slow progress. This was because the country implemented the world’s strictest household registration control system that restricted migration from rural to urban areas. China also pursued a counter-urbanization or de-urbanization policy by forcibly mobilizing large numbers of urban educated youth — upwards of 16 million — to settle in rural areas. 3. It is possible to narrow the human capital gap between intellectual and manual workers by means of education (investing in human capital). The Cultural Revolution produced unprecedented destruction of China’s education and training systems, science and technology, culture and the arts, and it hindered the increase in the capacity of Chinese laborers and their accumulation of social knowledge. Industrialization is defined as the transfer of agricultural labor to industrial or non-agricultural labor. Urbanization is defined as the migration of the rural population from rural to urban areas. Education is defined as the improvement in cultural quality and the accumulation of social knowledge resources; these resources include investment in R&D, the number of scientific papers published at home and abroad, the number of patents filed and granted at home and abroad, and other parts of the knowledge infrastructure, such as libraries and literature. Thus, these processes refer to the transfer and migration of laborers as the most 64. Wang, Mao Zedong’s Idealism and Deng Xiaoping’s Realism — the Views of U.S. Scholars on China, 313.

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active factor in productivity and in the increase, accumulation, and use of human capital. What is more, industrialization, urbanization, and education interact and support one another. Mao Zedong’s social vision was contradictory to the social development trends since he knew very little about industrialization, urbanization, and education in developed and developing countries. During his 27-year tenure of office, his only journeys overseas were two trips to the Soviet Union, and he examined China’s modernization through self-study, self-innovation, and selfpractice. Firstly, the communist school advocated by Mao Zedong was meant to set up small, self-sufficient, self-reliant communities based on natural economic needs. This meant forming factories, rural areas, schools, and the military into small, integrated, self-sufficient, isolated communities. As a result, China established a unique pattern of isolated small communities. Almost all the large and mediumsized state-owned enterprises, institutions, and military units had their own kindergartens, elementary schools, junior high schools, stores, hospitals, and even universities; almost all universities set up their own factories, stores, hospitals, and elementary and junior high schools. In addition, many Chinese were versatile people and could work as industrial laborers, farmers, soldiers, and students at the same time.65 When choosing his successor, Mao thought highly of Wang Hongwen.66 The editorial of the People’s Daily of August 1, 1966 stated that the 65. On August 1, 1966, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “The Whole Country Calls for Establishing the Mao Zedong Thought School — Celebrating the

39th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation Army.” It stated, “Our 700 million people will become critics of the old world and builders and defenders

who can do manual work with the hammer, work in farming with the hoe and plow,

fight against enemies with the gun, and write articles with the pen in complying with Comrade Mao Zedong’s directive.” (People’s Daily, August 1, 1966.)

66. Harry Harding deemed that Mao Zedong thought badly of the division of labor and comparative advantage, and he advocated that all departments conduct the same

business and all factories and enterprises build their own stores, hospitals, and schools. Mao hoped for all-round citizens who could serve as farmers, soldiers, and students

at the same time. After the 9th National Congress of the CPC and especially after the

Lushan Conference and the September 13 Incident, Mao proposed the promotion of farmers and industrial workers to positions of chairman and members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC. Among farmer and industrial worker

candidates, Mao counted on Wang Hongwen, who served as farmer, industrial worker, and soldier as well as head of the worker rebels in Shanghai. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s directive, Wang was transferred to Beijing in September 1972. (Harding,

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whole country was devoted to building the school of Mao Zedong Thought and the communist school, which went against the development trends of professions, the division of labor, and industry service. Mao’s Chinese social ideal had its roots in the independent, isolated revolutionary base areas in the Revolutionary War. In the face of blockades by the Kuomintang, the revolutionary base areas had to establish an integrated, self-sufficient, and self-reliant development pattern, which lacked divisions of labor and a service industry. Secondly, Mao Zedong had the social ideal of restricting and suspending the relationship between commodities and currency and pursuing a closed economy. Historically, China shaped its traditional agricultural society based on a selfsufficient peasant economy, in which the commodity economy was underdeveloped and economic policies emphasized agriculture but restricted commerce; the statemonopolized economy was followed, but the commodity economy and private economy were despised. Marx envisaged eradicating the commodity economy and setting up an ownership system whereby all means of production belonged to the whole of society once socialism had been established. That affected Mao’s social ideal to a certain extent. As early as the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao considered abolishing the salary system, restoring the military communist-style supply system, and restricting bourgeois rights. Although Mao acknowledged that China was a country that had previously had an underdeveloped commodity economy and it later aimed to boost commodity production and exchange and build socialism following the law of value, he still confused the commodity economy with capitalism. The circumstances in China differed from those in the Soviet Union, where small producers subsisted on agriculture and handicraft production. Mao Zedong frequently quoted Lenin, who said that small producers were the embryo of capitalism and the bourgeoisie,67 and that formed the basis for embracing military communism after the victory of the Russian October Revolution. In 1922, Lenin had to abolish military communism because 80% of the Russian population were farmers and he had to conduct the New Economic Policy. What’s more, Lenin stressed the importance of pursuing this New Economic Policy, which would be integrated with the peasant economy on which millions of farmers subsisted.68 It China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao, 18.) 67. This was Lenin’s political view as detailed in the article entitled “Left-Wing Communism — An Infantile Disorder.” (Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Lenin Collected Works, vol. 31, 17).

68. Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Lenin Collected Works, vol. 32, 402–416.

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should be noted that Mao deliberately avoided pursuing this course of Lenin’s. Mao Zedong regarded free markets, private ownership of land, self-financing, and contract production quotas for individual households, as advocated by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, as a domestic revisionist political program for restoring capitalism. Thus, he called for a crackdown on all political advocacies of such tendencies and a continuation of class struggle. During the Cultural Revolution, individual or private economy in urban community was forbidden. In 1978, there was 150,000 self-employed workers, which accounted for 0.16% of all urban workers in the country.69 Mao predicted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee that small producers would evolve into the bourgeoisie and become capitalists. The CPC therefore formulated a series of leftist economic policies directing to class struggle for urban and rural areas.70 Thirdly, Mao Zedong had the social ideal of restricting distribution of income according to work and advocating egalitarianism. Mao was concerned that the distribution of income according to work and the salary system might widen the disparity in social income and cause class polarization. Although his concern was reasonable, Mao had little knowledge and experience of regulating the distribution of income and wealth by modern methods (e.g., public financing). Mao’s concept of an ideal social distribution system took root of China’s agricultural society, which is in harmony, equality, and justice prevailed, and was inspired by his experience during the Revolutionary War. Evidentially, Mao Zedong endeavored to tackle issues related to unequal social distribution and social polarization. However, Mao possessed knowledge only related to Chinese history and lacked a proper understanding of the international situation. After rejecting an open policy, he studied and examined socialism and communism in a closed fashion. Facing the problem of China’s low per capita income and large rural population in 1958, Mao developed a Utopian vision of establishing a communism that would be characterized by rich products and high morals with free food, clothing, housing, and public canteens in 10 years’ time. However, this dream was divorced from reality. Mao failed to take China’s economic situation and global conditions into account. Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution to restrict the rights of the bourgeoisie and to prevent revisionism and the restoration of capitalism. After 69. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, China Labor Statistical Yearbook (2000), 8, 25.

70. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 818.

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having witnessed the dramatic changes that took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after Stalin’s death, Mao was concerned that China might follow the course of revisionism and restoration of capitalism of the Soviet Union. On December 26, 1974, Mao Zedong’s 81st birthday, he had a conversation with Zhou Enlai, who was seriously ill, about theoretical issues. Mao addressed issues related to his theory of continuing revolution under a dictatorship of the proletariat. During the conversation, Mao aired his political views on distributing income according to work, currency exchange, and the salary system were a legacy of the old society and that such unequal systems were the based on capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and revisionism. He advocated restricting such systems under a dictatorship of the proletariat.71 After quoting Lenin, who said that small producers were the embryo of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, Mao claimed that some workers, party members, and some civil servants had adopted the bourgeois lifestyle. Mao further reproved the whole party, declaring that it was easy for Lin Biao and other rightists to come to power and advocate capitalism owing to the existence of bourgeois rights in Chinese society.72 He feared that China’s bourgeois right, social hierarchy, and currency exchange might work to widen the gap between rich and poor and thereby lead to social and class polarization. Although China retained the salary grade system, salaries were frozen in the Cultural Revolution. In the 1970s, bonus system was abolished. Instead of improving productivity by means of material incentives, Mao Zedong advocated egalitarianism,73 and he misinterpreted and dogmatized some visions and views in the collected works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.74 71. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 413.

72. Ibid., 413–414. 73. Riskin, China’s Political Economy: the Quest for Development Since 1949; Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao.

74. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee passed the “Resolution

on Some Historical Party Issues after the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China.” Since some visions and views in the collected works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were misinterpreted and dogmatized; incorrect decisions appeared to have a theoretical basis. For example, Mao Zedong determined that it was appropriate to criticize the principle of distribution of income according to work and that the principle

of material interests advocated by Marx restricted bourgeois rights (e.g., equal rights

to the exchange of equal labor value in distributing consumable goods) in socialist

countries. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC

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Fourthly, Mao Zedong had the social ideal of preventing the restoration of capitalism and rooting out private economy and trade. On November 22, 1967, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the article “Two-Line Struggle in China’s Rural Areas,” which was a criticism of rural capitalist trade, and it elucidated the nature of the free market as a stimulus for rampant capitalism in rural China. It stated that such trade was a political tool of the party’s enemies to overthrow socialist collective ownership. On December 18, 1970, Mao said to Edgar Snow, “Rich peasants advocate capitalism, and there is a multitude of petty bourgeois in China — an agricultural country with the largest peasant population in the world.”75 On December 26, 1974, Mao conversed with Zhou Enlai and quoted Lenin, who said that small producers were the embryo of capitalism and the bourgeoisie; some workers and party members had adopted a bourgeois lifestyle.76 Thus, the Cultural Revolution’s principle was modified into rooting out capitalism. There were 37,000 farmers markets in rural areas back in 1965, but that number fell to 29,000 in 1976. The number of self-employed urban businesspeople stood at 1.02 million in 1965, but the number drastically reduced to only 140,000 at the end of 1977 — an 86.3% decrease.77 Mao purged Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, and others he regarded as bourgeoisie sympathizers within the party. He also rooted out the capitalist economic and social base typified by self-employed business people by using measures at the national level to stifle private and individual economy under the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to establish his vision of pure socialism. Lastly, Mao Zedong maintained the social ideal of reforming the education system and changing the system whereby bourgeois intellectuals dominated the nation’s schools. Mao believed that bourgeois intellectuals ruled China’s education system. In March 1966, he delivered a speech at an extended meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, in which he declared that the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, landlords, and rich farmers dominated China’s universities, junior high schools, and elementary schools.78 On May 7, 1966, he emphasized again his political view in a letter to Lin Biao.79 In December 1970, Mao said to Edgar Snow, Central Committee, vol. 2, 818.

75. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 180.

76. Ibid., 413.

77. State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chronicle of Administration for Industry and Commerce of New China, vol. 1, 50, 52.

78. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1404. 79. Mao Zedong stated that China had to reform education and change the situation of

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“We don’t have our own university professors and schoolteachers: all the professors and teachers in our universities and schools are the legacy of the Kuomintang. The Cultural Revolution was launched to set that as the first area of reform.”80 The Cultural Revolution in fact marked the start of the education reform, where classes were suspended to carry out the revolution in June 1966. Classes were resumed for revolution sake, (educating urban young people to work in the countryside and mountainous areas in 1967), and worker’s publicity groups and PLA publicity groups were dispatched to universities. Educational reform was carried out in China in 1968. In 1970, industrial workers, farmers, and soldiers were admitted to college. In 1974, the university entrance examination system was abolished. As a result, the development of human capital was disrupted and experienced the greatest broke down in the People’s Republic history. Mao Zedong’s ruling strategy lacked the concept of human capital: he did not understand that human capital and human talent were the major assets for modernization. Since he viewed the world in the light of classes and class struggle, Mao Zedong had a narrow grasp of China’s political situation, which hence affected and limited his understanding of China’s economic situation and human resources. As a populous country that lacked human capital, China had to regard human capital as its prime capital, human resources as its prime resource, and investment in securing people’s livelihoods and developing human resources as the most important state policy. Mao Zedong held different views from Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping with regard to the ideal model for Chinese socialism. In the 1950s, Mao also had different opinions from Liu and Deng regarding China’s current circumstances and its stage of development, such as whether to establish socialism or a new democracy, whether to choose a gradual transition to socialism or quickly embrace it, and whether to avoid rash moves or call for the Great Leap Forward. In the 1960s, the political divergence of these three individuals with respect to China’s social discrepancies and its political situation developed into a disagreement in terms of ruling policies and strategies. Since Mao regarded Liu and Deng as espousing capitalism, it was inevitable that Mao should wage a political and theoretical struggle against them. Mao stated repeatedly that the Cultural Revolution was bourgeois intellectuals ruling the country’s universities and schools. (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 54.)

80. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol.13, 171; Xu, The Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 365.

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launched to oppose revisionism and prevent the restoration of capitalism. It should be noted that Mao Zedong was good and sincere in his intentions to serve the Chinese people, and he pursued his lifelong political and economic policy in eradicating the economic base for capitalism: that was his rationale and motivation in launching the Cultural Revolution. However, it was unfortunate that he began this revolution on an incorrect theoretical basis, with the result being one of tragedy.

Mao Zedong’s economic system reform After launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong aimed to align his national economic plan with the centralized plan, hence to recentralization policy in the early 1960s. In 1965, 10,533 enterprises and institutions operated directly under the control of central ministries; and the number of that reduced by 1,233 in 1957. The industrial output value of those enterprises accounted for 42.2% of the national total in 1965, which exceeded the 39.7 recorded in 1957. These data show that the Chinese government restored the highly centralized economic system. In addition, Mao made preparations for war as a result of the tense international situation, and he requested that local governments become ready to fight independently against enemies in the event of an invasion of China. On March 20, 1966, Mao Zedong delivered a speech concerning the extension of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau: “I want to have a republic with a practical ruler, in which the CPC Central Committee is responsible for establishing policies and guidelines instead of merely implementing them. Toward that end, enterprises are being placed under the direction of a lower administrative level.” Nevertheless, Mao lacked the time to reform the central planned economy owing to the turmoil caused after launching the Cultural Revolution. In 1969, Mao Zedong issued a directive on initiating economic system reform for the second time as a result of the stable domestic political situation. In February of that year, three documents related to fiscal, corporate, and material management were released. Under those stipulations, in terms of fiscal management, remaining incomes were to be redistributed to local authorities (except for corporate income under the direct management of the CPC Central Committee) and remaining expenditures (except for central fiscal expenditure) were included in local budgets. In terms of corporate management, research and design units, universities and colleges under the control of central ministries were placed under the administration of local authorities. Alteration and extension projects came under the administration of production units, and new units (except for key projects)

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were placed under the administration of local authorities. In terms of material management, raw materials and equipment were uniformly distributed by the central government, and remaining materials were managed by local authorities in coordination with one another and with the support of appropriate government departments. In addition, the products manufactured by five small enterprises were not uniformly distributed by the central government. The CPC Central Committee delegated power to local authorities to remedy system defects, such as over-centralized government and overlapping agency authority. In February 1970, the State Council convened the National Planning Work Conference to examine and weaken the direct, exclusive control of enterprise by government ministries, so as to establish a reform program of the economic system by reinforcing local economic autonomy. On March 5, the State Council drafted the “Notice of Industrial and Transportation Enterprises Directly under Various Ministries of the State Council to Be Placed under the Administration of Local Government”; in 1970, the State Council requested all enterprises and institutions directly under ministerial control be placed themselves under the administration of local authorities. Among them, a few enterprises and institutions were placed under the administration of both the central government and a local authority, whereby the local authority was dominant; a small number of enterprises and institutions were placed under the administration of both central government and a local authority, with the central government being dominant. On June 22, 1970, the CPC Central Committee issued instructions in the “Report on Setting up the Core Party Group and Revolutionary Committee by Various Ministries under the State Council,” which called for the delegation of power in stages in the course of that year. By the end of September 1970, 2,237 of 3,082 (73% of the total) enterprises and institutions that had been directly under the administration of industry and transportation sectors of the government were placed under the administration of local authorities. An additional 469 enterprises and institutions came to be placed under the administration of local authorities and 104 were dissolved. To meet the need of achieving combat readiness, China was divided into 10 economic cooperative zones (Southwest China, Northwest China, Central China, South China, East China, North China, Northeast China, Shandong, Fujian and Jiangxi, and Xinjiang). These zones had to develop industries in the following areas in a planned manner: metallurgy; national defense; machinery; power, fuel, and chemical industry; agriculture; light industry; and transport. It is noteworthy that small, complete economic system had to be established in Shandong, Fujian and Jiangxi, and Xinjiang. From February to March 1970, the “Outline of the 4th

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Five-Year Plan” was drawn up. The document decreed that various provinces and autonomous regions were to operate a number of small and medium-sized iron and steel enterprises and that some prefectures and counties were to operate their own small coal mines, iron mines, and steel mills; together, this would result in a combination of large-, medium-, and small-sized enterprises and a disseminated steel industry. In addition, the document called for various provinces to be selfsufficient in coal, steel, electricity, agricultural machinery, and light industrial products as well as a change in the situation whereby grain was transported from South China to North China and coal from North China to South China. These reform efforts in the dissolution and consolidation of national authoritative bodies were carried out. On June 22, 1970, the CPC Central Committee approved the “Report on Setting up the Core Party Group and Revolutionary Committee by Various Ministries of the State Council,” and it decided to reorganize ministries, commissions, and institutions directly under the State Council by consolidating 90 departments into 27 departments and downsizing the staff to 82%. Mao Zedong strived to realize his vision of the republic of the practical ruler and pave the way for delegating economic management power and reforming the state bureaucracy. As a result, the number of agencies and staff under the State Council was reduced to its lowest level since the founding of the People’s Republic. However, after 1973, there was a 93% increase in the number of agencies under the State Council: there were 52 in 1978. The majority of enterprises and institutions that had been under direct central government control were placed under the administration of local authorities: the number of enterprises and institutions directly under the central government decreased from 10,533 to 1,674 (an 84% reduction). In addition, the proportion of the industrial output value of enterprises and institutions directly under the central government to total industrial output value decreased from 42.2% to 6%. This represented a shift in the dominant economic pattern from one of direct, exclusive control of enterprises by a government ministry to one of local economic autonomy. With decentralization of industrial enterprises, first-level distribution centers under the Ministry of Commerce were placed under the administration of provincial governments; second-level distribution centers were placed under the administration of prefectural governments. Further, all enterprises under the Ministry of Foreign Trade located in different regions were placed under the administration of both local authorities and the ministry (with the local authorities being dominant), thereby reducing the amount of materials uniformly managed by state and other departments. In all, the 579 kinds of materials that had been uniformly distributed and managed by the state and various ministries in 1966

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were reduced to 217 in 1972 (reduction of over 60%). Among those, there was a decrease in the number of materials distributed by the state from 326 to 49 (reduction of 85%); there was a decline in the number of materials managed by various ministries from 253 to 168 (down by one-third). Moreover, all universities and colleges located in different regions were placed under the administration of local authorities. On December 18, 1970, Mao Zedong stressed to Edgar Snow that China had created both central and local incentives. Thus, the CPC Central Committee needed to avoid acting taking the local authorities’ place wherever possible. Furthermore, Mao claimed that he lacked the capacity to handle all affairs and that it was necessary to learn from the decentralization experience from the United States. It is notable that Mao expressed his dissatisfaction towards the CPC’s failure in making proper use of the central and local incentives over the previous decade and that the road to reform in the world was doomed to meander.81 Nevertheless, the result for China was failure in its reform of the centralized planned economic system. In the mid-1970s, the CPC Central Committee resumed centralization, and the national economy was adjusted and revived. This implied that it was superior in mobilizing state resources and tackling the economic crisis produced by the centralized planned economic system; it also displayed the inherent inertia of centralization. Before China underwent economic reform, its centralization reached a new climax. In 1973, 617 kinds of materials were uniformly distributed and managed by the state and various ministries, which represented a rise to the level witnessed during the Cultural Revolution. In June 1975, the State Council convened a meeting to discuss the planning system for work: the aim was to overhaul the existing planning system and resolve the contradiction between direct, exclusive control of enterprises, and local economic autonomy by managing large enterprises while loosening control over small ones. This was intended to rectify the chaotic economic order, tighten loose economic regulations, and stress centralization. This planning system adopted a top-down approach while granting local economic autonomy. In terms of business management, the following were largely managed by central ministries (with direct exclusive control of enterprise by a particular ministry): inter-provincial railways, telecommunications, power grids, shipping along the Yangtze River, civil aviation, oil pipelines, ocean shipping, major research and design units, professional construction teams, large oil fields, and a few key enterprises and construction projects; the remainder were managed

81. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 181.

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by local authorities rather than delegating power to lower administrative levels.82 In terms of material management, the State Council decided to found the State Reserves Bureau; this was based on the Materials Bureau of the State Planning Commission, which was placed directly under the State Council in November 1975. It thus restored the material management system that had existed before the Cultural Revolution: the State Planning Commission was responsible for uniformly distributing materials in a balanced manner, and the State Reserves Bureau was responsible for organizing distribution. Just like previous reform efforts, decentralization led to an economic leap as well as economic chaos, and China was thus obliged to make economic adjustments. Centralization was a prerequisite for economic adjustment, though it curbed economic vitality and creativity; and it created the situation of decentralization, leading to economic chaos and centralization halting economic development. This phenomenon emerged in the period of the planned economy as well as in the period of economic reform and transition. Governments at different levels excessively intervened in market economic activities by means of direct exclusive control of enterprises and local economic autonomy, which led to market monopolies and barriers. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s financial management system was changed seven times (once every 1.4 years on average), which set a record for economic system’s change frequency, and also reflects the contradiction between centralization and decentralization. From 1966 to 1967, the CPC Central Committee implemented the system of linking revenue with expenditure and sharing total profits. In 1968, the CPC Central Committee imposed the measure of separation of revenue and expenditure, i.e., the total revenue within the budget went to the central government rather than revenue being linked to expenditure. In 1969, production increased, and the CPC Central Committee restored the system of revenue being linked to expenditure, sharing of total profits, and installation of annual quota. Concerning fulfilling and exceeding quotas, local authorities sought to strike a balance between revenue and expenditure, and apportioned profits went to the local authorities. Local authorities were able to receive subsidies from the central government based on the supporting index in the central budget to avoid lowering the expenditure index when fail to meet quotas. In 1970, the CPC Central Committee delegated power to lower administrative levels, and it placed enterprises and institutions under the administration of the central government, provincial governments, and county governments under the unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee. Unlike the economic system in 1969, that of 1970 set 82. Sun, General Economic History of China (1949–2000), vol. 2, 1791–1792.

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quotas on revenue and expenditure. In 1971, various provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions implemented the system of setting annual quotas on revenue and expenditure; this ensured that profits (or deficiency payments) went to the central government, and the central government set the revenue and expenditure budget in a balanced manner. In the event of revenue outstripping expenditure, the revenue went to the central government in the form of quotas; when expenditure exceeding revenue, the central government granted subsidies to make up for the deficit. Furthermore, the apportioned profits and balance went to local authorities, and local authorities sought to achieve a balance between excess revenue and overexpenditure. In 1973, the financial management system underwent change, and some regions imposed the measure of fixed percentage revenue retain, where local authorities retained a fixed percentage of the revenue, apportioned excess revenue, and made expenditure in the form of expenditure quotas. It is unfortunate that this measure was implied only in North China, Northeast China, and Jiangsu Province on a trial basis, but failed to be implied across the country as planned. In 1976, the Ministry of Finance made a decision about implementing a financial management system that set annual quotas on revenue and expenditure. This system linked revenue with expenditure, while the sharing of total profits was to a certain extend linked to the fiscal power and accountability of local authorities, making expenditure accounted as excess revenue. This also played a role in encouraging local authorities to increase revenue and cut expenditure. The CPC Central Committee overhauled the system of planned economy, but its efforts ended in failure. Mao Zedong had good intentions; he suppressed oppositions and launched the Cultural Revolution to overhaul the current system. However, he failed to gain the support of the bureaucracy in the government, and China was plunged into economic recession and chaos owning to the ongoing political movements. During the Cultural Revolution, the CPC Central Committee shifted focus from reform to decentralization by resuming the decentralization reform of 1957–1958 and rectifying the centralization reform that took place in the early 1960s. After the Cultural Revolution, China became a decentralized country: it however differed from China of the early and mid-1950s, as well as from the highly centralized planned economic systems of the Soviet Union and socialist Eastern Europe. The CPC Central Committee begun to establish the planned economic system in the early 1950s. Consequently, the ratio of fiscal revenue and expenditure to GDP dramatically increased: central financial income accounted for 80% of the total and central financial expenditure amounted to 70%. After the first implication of fiscal decentralization reform in 1957, a dramatic decrease in the ratio of central financial

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income to total financial income: from 80.4% in 1958 to 24.4% in 1959 — a reduction of 56% occurred. There was a decline in the ratio of central financial expenditure to total financial expenditure from 71% in 1957 to 44.3% in 1958 — a drop of 26.7%. After 1961, the proportion of central financial income to total financial income and the proportion of central financial expenditure to total financial expenditure increased slightly. In the early 1970s, the CPC Central Committee once again carried out decentralization reform. Consequently, the proportion of central financial income to total financial income fell to 11.8% in 1975, which was the lowest level in the history of both China and the world. Furthermore, central financial expenditure accounted for 49.9% of the total. The above data suggested that China’s economy could not be categorized as demonstration of centralized planned model. China implemented a planned economy that was characterized by decentralization, and thus different from the highly centralized planned economic system of the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping followed Mao Zedong’s administrative strategy of decentralization while advocating the development of market economy.

China’s International Status In April 1981, Deng Xiaoping remarked that China had made excellent accomplishments in terms of foreign affairs. Despite domestic civil unrest, China had won international recognition and raised its global status.83 China listed itself among the world’s major political powers. In the 1970s, China regained its legitimate seat on the United Nations Security Council, and it was one of the five nations that had the power of veto along with the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France. This signified that China had raised its international status and extended its influence in global affairs. China was also among the world’s major military powers. China had succeeded in independently developing its own atomic and hydrogen bombs as well as artificial satellites. Along with the United States, the Soviet Union and France, it became one of four states in the world possessing nuclear weapons, and this strengthened China’s national defenses. From October 16, 1964 to September 1976, China conducted 19 nuclear tests and several missile tests, and launched six artificial satellites. This act played a vital role in breaking up the nuclear monopoly, hegemony, and gain China the ability to blackmail of the two world superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union. 83. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 305.

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China was among the world’s major powers that boasted comprehensive national power. In 1980, it was estimated that China’s comprehensive national power accounted for 4.7% of the world total, ranking itself fourth after the United States (22.5%), the Soviet Union (no figures), and Japan (6.0%), but it was above India (3.4%).84 The above data indicate that China made itself one of the five leading nations in the world and carried weight global politics. As Deng Xiaoping remarked, “China improved its international status and our great country, with nearly one-fourth of the global population, is rising in the world following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.”85 It should be noted that Mao Zedong made great achievements in mapping out a political strategy toward the United States.86 This encouraged China to open up to Western countries,87 thereby creating favorable conditions for Deng Xiaoping’s pursuit of the opening-up after 1978. The Cultural Revolution had a great impact on China’s diplomatic efforts, and its international image was severely tarnished. From late 1966 to the latter half of 1967, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was attacked by rebels; Minister Chen Yi and other deputy ministers were seized and underwent harassment. In addition, officials responsible for foreign affairs were criticized, and almost all of China’s diplomatic envoys were transferred to China to participate in the Cultural Revolution. In those days, China was embroiled in diplomatic disputes with more than 30 of the over 40 foreign countries with which it had established diplomatic relations.88 China was thus an isolated country, and Mao Zedong called it an angry loner.89 84. Hu and Men, “International Comparison of National Strategic Resources of China, the United States, and Russia — Elucidation of China’s Grand Strategy for Improving People’s Livelihoods and Reinvigorating Our Country.”

85. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 299.

86. Premier Zhou Enlai also played a pivotal role. 87. In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping stated that Mao Zedong had shaped the strategic thinking of the third world and had made pioneer efforts in establishing new relations

with the United States and Japan, thereby laying a foundation for conducting the world struggle against hegemonism and shaping the world’s political future: “Thus, the Chinese people thank Comrade Mao Zedong for his great feats because he created a

favorable international environment for us to achieve the Four Modernizations.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 172.)

88. Chen, History of the People’s Republic of China, 326 89. On January 20, 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon delivered his inaugural speech, “In

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In terms of international public relations, Mao Zedong conspicuously promoted himself. As reported by Xinhua News Agency on August 4, 1966, the Hanoi-based New Vietnam Chinese Newspaper carried an article stating that the people on the five continents rested hope in the new China. They revered Mao Zedong as the great banner of world revolution and believed that China’s Cultural Revolution had made a great contribution to the international proletarian revolution.90 On March 27, in response to a congratulatory telegram on the 20th anniversary of the armed struggle of the Communist Party of Burma drafted by the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Mao noted “Please do not mention Mao Zedong Thought or attempt to promote me in any external documents and articles.”91 As early as March 1958 at the Chengdu meeting, Mao criticized the dogmatism and sectarian character of the Central Soviet Area Period after Bolshevik magazine promoted him as being 100% correct.92 In the Cultural Revolution, Mao was the recipient of excessive flattery. Chinese newspapers proclaimed Mao Zedong as the great leader of world revolution. On August 1, 1966, Xinhua News Agency reported that on a welcoming banquet hosted by Shanghai People’s Government deputy mayor, Rathe Deshapriya Senanayake, secretary-general of the Afro-Asian Writers’ Bureau, declared: “Chairman Mao is the greatest mentor of the world’s revolutionary people.”93 The same day, Xinhua News Agency reported the news that Liang Ha’an, acting chairman of the Khmer Writers Association, hailed Chairman Mao as the great leader of the Chinese People, the great mentor of the world’s revolutionary people, and the lighthouse of the world’s people.94 On August 5, Xinhua News Agency published a news item entitled “Chairman Mao, the Sun of the World’s People — the reign of the government, we will present a new image, demonstrating openness and

seeking an open world including an open mind and open exchange of ideas, goods,

and personnel. Irrespective of population size, any nation cannot live in a state of

loneliness in anger.” Mao Zedong remarked on Nixon’s inaugural speech, “From 1949, we were the angry loner that fought against the United States.” He issued instructions

for Nixon’s inaugural speech to appear in the editorials published in the People’s Daily and Red Flag. (Gong, Deng Xiaoping and the United States, 32.)

90. People’s Daily, August 5, 1966.

91. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 287–288.

92. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 369–370.

93. People’s Daily, August 2, 1966. 94. Ibid.

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Scientists from Four Continents Meet with the Great Leader Chairman Mao.”95 On August 13, Xinhua News Agency reported news that José Garcia and Napoleon Martinez from the Dominica Republic had written articles hailing Chairman Mao as the great leader of contemporary world revolution, and claiming that revering Mao Zedong Thought was an effective tool against U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism.96 On April 6, 1968, Mao Zedong deleted “Chairman Mao, great mentor of the world’s revolutionary people” from a document drafted by the General Staff Headquarters.97 Moves were made for China to proclaim itself the center of world revolution. However, on May 16, 1968, Mao Zedong criticized this proposal in a document, stating that it was inappropriate for the Chinese people to be so self-centered.98 From the above analysis, it showed that China introduced some modern elements into its society, accelerated modernization and industrialization, and introduced demographic changes. In addition, it made progress toward urbanization, the human development index and per capita income developed in tandem. Despite China’s low salaries, its human development index (HDI) increased from the world’s low level (HDI0.5 in 1975).99 These achievements laid a solid foundation for accomplishing modernization in the era of Deng Xiaoping. I have made a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the various losses incurred as a result of Mao Zedong’s faulty decisions, and research findings indicate that China suffered huge losses in economic growth and opportunity cost of human capital. Without such major errors in decision-making, China could have made greater progress by 1978 in terms of economic growth, level of consumption, and human capital accumulation. Despite the turmoil that it caused in China, the Cultural Revolution only impeded the progress of China’s socialist modernization: it did not halt that progress. As Mao Zedong stated, “When the prospects were bright, the road had twists and turns.100 After the era of Mao Zedong, China entered a new era of development, and the twists and turns of the Cultural Revolution paved the way for the subsequent successful reform and opening-up. 95. People’s Daily, August 6, 1966. 96. People’s Daily, August 14, 1966. 97. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 275.

98. Ibid., 275–276. 99. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2007 Human Development Report.

100. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4, 1162.

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Political Remarks on the Cultural Revolution As the ruling party, the CPC demolished national systems, which underwent selfdestruction during the Cultural Revolution. In February 1980, the “Criteria on Party Political Life” was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. The document stated that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four plotted to seize control over the party and state power by taking advantage of the party’s decisionmaking errors. They wished to promote feudal fascism, anarchy, and factionalism, thereby violating party rules and regulations, negating the party’s leadership, and damaging the party’s organizations, ideology, traditions, and working style.101 This serious situation went against Mao Zedong’s good intentions. Like all things in the world, it was inevitable that China’s ruling party — the CPC — and socialist China should have both good and bad aspects. It is necessary to examine these good and bad sides in an objective, dialectical, and comprehensive manner. It is necessary to distinguish between major issues and minor issues, hence identify whether such figures as 70% accomplishments or 70% errors — as embodied in the tenets of Mao Zedong Thought — stand up to specific analysis. Mao Zedong seldom carried out surveys for the purpose of analysis; he tended to exaggerate negative elements such that in his later years he viewed his eventual successor as his enemy. The framing and purging of Liu Shaoqi typified this tendency.102 Although Mao Zedong had good intentions in launching the Cultural Revolution, 101. “Criteria on Party Political Life” was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 29, 1980.

102. In Lin Biao’s “Report to the 9th national Congress of the Communist Party of

China,” he declared, “It was proved that Liu Shaoqi defected to the enemies in the

first revolutionary civil war and served as a traitor, scab, and running dog of sinful imperialism, modern revisionism, and Kuomintang reactionaries and worked as a proxy of the capitalist roaders. Over recent years, Liu Shaoqi recruited deserters and

traitors and assembled a gang of traitors, spies, and capitalist roaders, who concealed their counter-revolutionary history and harbored and colluded with one another

to enter the party and state organs and seize central and local power. They actually

plotted to establish an underground capitalist base to revolt against the proletarian base headed by Chairman Mao. Liu Shaoqi and his allies colluded with imperialists,

modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries and destroyed socialist systems, which U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists, and reactionaries from different countries failed to do.”

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that revolution actually destroyed the fundamental systems of the party and state. In the Cultural Revolution, China entered a period of self-destruction. The party and state apparatus failed to function, and the party and state existed in name only, which sparked civil unrest. Party organizations were severely damaged. After launching of the Cultural Revolution, party grassroots organizations in the fields of culture, education, science and technology as well as party and government organizations and leaders were attacked; this was done in the name of revolution, and the leadership of party committees was not reestablished until several months later. From the end of 1966 to the beginning of 1967, majority of the party’s organizations were paralyzed or malfunctioned. This so-called widespread party rectification movement was contrary to all good intentions,103 and it disrupted the party’s guiding ideology, destroyed the party’s democratic centralism and working style, led to reduced discipline, and lowered the party’s prestige and cohesion.104 The party organization had failed to function. In violation of the Party Constitution, the CPC Central Committee failed to convene plenary sessions in 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1976 as scheduled. The Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee failed to function and was subsequently dissolved. The Central Cultural Revolution Group (with Chen Boda as group leader and Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao as deputy leaders) succeeded the CPC Central Committee; the brief meetings of the Central Cultural Revolution Group chaired by Zhou Enlai replaced the meetings of the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The 9th National Congress of the CPC called for one-party leadership, resulting in the integration of party and government, where party’s leadership replaced government leadership. The First Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was passed at the First Session of the 1st National People’s Congress was severely violated (Sidebar 7.1). Plenary sessions of the CPC Central Committee, sessions of the National People’s Congress and Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the National Political Consultative Congress, the Supreme State Conference, and meetings of the State Council were cancelled; the People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and other judicial bodies failed to function and democratic party organization became defunct. In January 1967, the January Political Storm was launched in Shanghai, and 103. It is from Lin Biao’s “Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” which was delivered on April 1, 1969 and approved on April 14, 1969.

104. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol. 2, 970–971.

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national party and government organizations subsequently became paralyzed or semi-paralyzed. On February 19, 1967, the CPC Central Committee issued the notification and request to set up the Revolutionary Committee. From January 1967 to September 1968, the Revolutionary Committee was established in various provinces, cities, and autonomous regions without legislation or democratic election. As a result, the staff in provincial organizations was reduced to 1/20 or even 1/30. The Revolutionary Committee integrated the party and the government, so as the administration and the judiciary. It was hailed as a great achievement of the proletarian struggle for power. In fact, it failed to govern the country.105 During the Cultural Revolution, many CPC leaders and leaders of democratic parties were framed and persecuted. According to the most authoritative data based on the verdicts of the tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court (TFZ No. 1) and the list of framed individuals produced by Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Xie Fuzhi in late December 1968,106 103 members and alternate members of the 8th CPC Central Committee (71%) were prosecuted; including 22 members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, 14 general secretaries of the Central Committee, and secretaries and alternate secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Among them, Liu Shaoqi and Tao Zhu (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) and Peng Dehuai (member of the Political Bureau) were persecuted to death. Of the 115 members of the Standing Committee of the 4th National People’s Congress, 52 members (including 1 chairman and 8 vice chairmen) were prosecuted. 12 deputy premiers of the State Council and 6 vice chairmen of the Central Military Committee of the CPC were framed; among them, He Long was persecuted to death. In all, 76 members of the National Committee of the 4th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and 11 leaders of democratic parties were framed. Persecution resulted in 40 deaths of celebrities. Over 80,000 PLA soldiers were persecuted, and 1,169 soldiers died. 13 leaders of the CPC Beijing Municipal Government and Beijing People’s Government were framed, and 4 of them did not survived. 12 leaders of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Government and Shanghai People’s Government were persecuted, where 2 of them 105. He ed., The History of the People’s Republic of China, 297–298. 106. The list of framed members of the 8th CPC Central Committee was made by Jiang Qing

and Kang Sheng in 1968. In August 1968, Kang Sheng and others fabricated the “Report of the Political Background of Members of the Central Supervision Commission,” the “Report of the Political Background of Members of the Standing Committee of the Third

National People’s Congress,” and the “Report of the Political Background of Members of the National Committee of the Fourth Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference.” In December, Xie Fuzhi appeared on the (Marxist-Leninist) False Case List of the CPC.

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were dead. Persecution also killed another 1,565, who worked in public security organizations, People’s Procuratorates, and the People’s Courts at all levels.107 The state president, Liu Shaoqi, lodged a protest, “I serve as president of the People’s Republic of China. It does not matter how you treat me. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to defend the dignity of this position. Who relieved me from my post? Removing me from office has to be approved by the National People’s Congress. Your deeds violate the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: that Constitution guarantees the rights of citizens, and anyone who violates it shall be punished in compliance with the law.” Records indicate that 28,000 people were implicated and 26,000 cases were brought to trial in connection with Liu Shaoqi.108 Information related to various cases of injustice or false accusation and efforts to redress such cases can also be obtained from documents issued or approved by the CPC Central Committee from 1978 to 1981 (Appendix 7.4).

Sidebar 7.1

The Cultural Revolution Seriously Damaged National Systems

In the Cultural Revolution, national systems were undermined, and national agencies ceased to function. 1. Meetings of the National People’s Congress system were discontinued. From 1966 to 1975, the National People’s Congress and Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress held no meetings and organizations of the National People’s Congress exerted military control. As China’s supreme authority, the National People’s Congress failed to perform its functions, including legislative power, state staff appointment and dismissal, major state affairs decision-making, enforcing the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, and supervising other national agencies, as stipulated in that Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution in 1975 and 1978 violated the stipulation that such amendments had to be approved by two-thirds of deputies to the National People’s Congress as declared in the Constitution of 1954; that stipulation was later rescinded. According to the Constitution of 1954, the chairman was responsible for promulgating laws based on the decisions of the National People’s Congress, but this stipulation was not enforced until 1967. Further, the deputies to the 107. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 654–679.

108. He, The History of the People’s Republic of China, 299.

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National People’s Congress and standing commissioners failed to exercise the right of interpellation, their voting power and privilege of immunity (without legal action), and power of habeas corpus (banning arrests and criminal trials without the permission of the National People’s Congress); local people’s congresses at all levels failed to perform. 2. The system of head of state was first disrupted and then abandoned. Under the Constitution of 1954, the chairman was an independent state agency and shared power as head of state with the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (amounting to a collective head of state based on collective decisions and exercising individual power). In August 1966,

Liu Shaoqi was persecuted and relieved of his position as state president in addition to being deprived of internal power exercised by the president, such as commanding the armed forces, presiding over supreme state conferences to discuss major state affairs, promulgating national laws, exercising the power to issue orders, and appointing and dismissing staff to the State Council. Dong Biwu exercised external power granted to the state president on behalf of Liu Shaoqi. 3. As the supreme administrative authority, the State Council came under attack, and normal work order was disrupted. In 1965, the State Council had a total of 49 ministries and commissions; 22 agencies came directly under the State Council, and there were seven offices, one secretariat, and 79 agencies; the total staff was 41,000. After 1967, various ministries and commissions exerted military control and dispatched military representatives. At the end of 1970, the State Council had only 32 agencies, and a sum of 10,000 staffs; the majority of staff members were sent to the Cadre School (labor camps). 4. The national military system failed to function properly and was abolished. According to the Constitution of 1954, the state president was responsible for commanding the armed forces, and the National Defense Commission was established as an advisory body for the armed forces — rather than operating in some supervisory role. Because Liu Shaoqi served as chairman of the National Defense Commission, it failed to perform its functions during the Cultural Revolution. The Constitution of 1975 and that of 1978 called for the disbanding of the national military commanding body and the National Defense Commission; they stipulated that the Central Military Committee of the CPC was responsible for commanding the armed forces. 5. National judicial systems consisted of the justice system, procuratorial

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system, investigation system, enforcement system, notary system, arbitration system, and lawyer system. After 1967, national People’s Courts and procuratorates failed to perform their functions; China’s four judicial bodies (public and national security, the procuratorates, courts, and judiciary) and three service agencies (notary public offices, arbitral bodies, and lawyers) were essentially paralyzed or dissolved. In violation of the Constitution, the Central Special Case Group was responsible for imposing sentences. After 1967, the chairman and members of the State Council approved appointment by the National People’s Congress or deputies to that congress; the result was that various party and government officials were arrested and imprisoned without legal proceedings being taken.109 The rights of citizens as detailed in the Constitution were severely infringed. The Constitution of 1954 defined the rights and obligations of citizens and their entitlement to equal justice under the law. That Constitution also stated there should be freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration for citizens; it stipulated that citizens’ personal freedom and residence would not be violated and that their privacy and rights would be protected. Nevertheless, citizens’ personal freedom and rights were infringed, and the country had no way of protecting citizens during the Cultural Revolution: state systems failed to function. How many people were persecuted in the Cultural Revolution and how many were implicated in such persecutions? The records differ in this regard. According to statistics of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, 2.3 million party members’ file were opened for reviewed — 19.2% of the 12 million members, in other words. Among those members, 75% of senior officials who ranked deputy minister and deputy governor or above had their files reviewed and over 60,000 were persecuted. Overall, there were over two million cases of injustice, and hundreds of thousands of party members were implicated in such cases.110 Zheng Shiping estimated that 29,885 officials in central and state organizations were removed from office. In 1978, injustice and false accusation ended up redressing 300,000 party officials and other personnel; another 2.9 million people were criticized and persecuted. 34,400 policemen, judges, prosecutors, and judicial officers were criticized and persecuted, among them, 1,100 were killed 109. Li, Chinese Government System. 110. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol. 2, 967.

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by persecutions and 3,600 were maimed. Headed by Xie Fuzhi, who came under censure, were 225 officials of the Ministry of Public Security. Xie and one of his deputy ministers arrested other deputy ministers.111 According to the data of the CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 700,000 party officials and ordinary people were persecuted, leading to death of l34,000 individuals. It is estimated that over 100 million people were framed, persecuted, or falsely implicated.112 Records indicated that the public security department, the People’s Procuratorate, and the People’s Court redressed 1.09 million cases of injustice from 1978 to March 1984, most of which occurred during the Cultural Revolution.113 Vice Chairman Yie Jianying said at the closing session of the Central Work Conference on December 13, 1978, “Over 100 million people, including the political elite, intellectual elite, technical elite, industrial workers, farmers, and ordinary people masses were prosecuted and persecuted in the Cultural Revolution. That is one-ninth of our population.114 Li Ruihuan recalled himself working as an industrial worker and corporate official where he was honored as a national model worker and activist for studying Chairman Mao’s works. Nevertheless, he was suddenly denounced as possessing the three evil elements and was detained in a cowshed for over 4 years. According to his description, all relations were simplified as class relations and the relations between revolution and counter-revolution; people with good reputations were denounced as evil and revolutionaries were framed as counter-revolutionaries.115 What was the aim and what were the consequences of Mao Zedong launching the Cultural Revolution? On January 1, 1967, Mao Zedong wrote the editorial on New Year’s Day for the People’s Daily and Red Flag: “The Cultural Revolution has touched the soul of the people and changed their political stance, their worldview, and their revolutionary course as well as the course of Chinese history. As an unprecedented political revolution, it will groom a generation of communists.”116 It is clear that Mao had great political ambitions and lofty political ideals when he launched the Cultural Revolution. 111. Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma, 137–138.

112. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Resolutions

about Serval Historical Issue of the CPC Since the Founding of the New China (with Remarks), 391.

113. Wang, The Era of Great Turmoil, 539. 114. Ibid. 115. Li, “Harmonious Socialist Ideology,” 82. 116. Wang, The Era of Great Turmoil, 2.

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Mao Zedong was a staunch revolutionist who devoted himself to the revolutionary cause in the struggle against landlords, bureaucratic capitalists, and imperialists; he wanted to touch the souls of the ruling party, the government and bureaucracy, technocrats, intellectuals, and all people when he created the Cultural Revolution. Like party leaders, the populace believed in Mao Zedong Thought and motives behind the revolution. Nevertheless, it is not easy to define the real nature of the revolution in terms of how it touched people’s souls and its consequences. All the evidence pointing to the fact that Cultural Revolution had been an unprecedented political and social catastrophe for China.117 At great cost to the people and the country, even Lin Biao and Jiang Qing fell victim to the Cultural Revolution and had to pay the penalty. In January 1981, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were brought to trial as criminals of two counter-revolutionary cliques. Of the 16 defendants,118 13 were members of the Political Bureau, including three vice chairmen and five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. This was an unprecedented political case in the history of new China and was a rare case in world history.119 Going through the Cultural Revolution, which stressed on class struggle round the clock, the CPC completely repudiated the ruling philosophy that had regarded class struggle as the guideline. Instead, it advocated building harmonious socialism.

117. The verdict of the tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court (TFZ No. 1) stated that

China’s political life went into an abnormal state and that the socialist legal system was severely destroyed in the Cultural Revolution: “The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques plotted to frame and persecute state leaders, overthrow the government and the army, persecute cadres, intellectuals, and the masses, poison

the mind of young people and endanger the life, property, and autonomy of the people by seizing power and organizing conspiracy for 10 years. Consequently, they brought

a catastrophe to the whole country and people of all nationalities, disrupted the people’s democratic dictatorship system and socialist social order and also damaged

the national economy and other undertakings.” (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 657.)

118. There were 16 defendants in total: Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang

Hongwen, Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Jiang Tengjiao; six defendants who had since died — Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and Zhou Yuchi.

119. Xiao, Historical Transition — From Restoration of Order to Reform and Opening-up, 301.

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The Systemic Root Causes of Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years After Mao Zedong’s death, the CPC affirmed his great feats though changing his radical line and arbitrary method of decision-making. It was undeniable that Mao had made errors in decision-making and was primarily responsible for the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. There were, however, problems rooted in the system causing his errors.120 At the end of this book, the author provides a detailed analysis of these causes and the general historical experience of China and its people in Mao Zedong’s later years. These prompted Deng Xiaoping to shape the party and state reform policies so as to avoid a recurrence of the previous catastrophes.

Systemic root causes for the life tenure of leaders After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong’s successes and errors, his rights and wrongs, feats and flaws were related to his tenure of office. The longer his tenure was, the more errors he made. In his later years, he committed fatal errors. In the Soviet Union, Stalin did the same. Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the CPC Central Committee in March 1943, since then, he remained chairman for 33 years until his death in September 1976. Mao served as leader of China’s ruling party for 27 years since the foundation of the People’s Republic. He had the longest tenure of office of any leader of a socialist country. None of the amendments to the Party Constitution at any National Congress of the CPC (from the 8th National Congress in 1956 to the 10th National Congress in 1973) stipulated the tenure of party leaders. Further, none of the amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China at any National People’s Congress (from the 1st Congress in 1954 to the 4th Congress in 1975) defined the tenure of state leaders. This constituted a major flaw in the leadership systems of both the party and the state. Although Mao’s lifetime tenure did not actually violate the Party Constitution, some backward hidden rule was kept, making Mao’s tenure akin to feudal emperors. In summer 1956, Mao Zedong had imposed a limit to chairmanship’s tenure, proposing that the chairman could be re-elected at most to a second term of office. 120. Deng Xiaoping claimed that Mao Zedong made decision-making errors and that these had system root causes. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 292.)

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He also rejected the idea of being selected as chairman at the next election.121 It appears that Mao planned to retire from the party and state leadership and devote himself in studying as a theorist and philosopher rather than remain political active. In fact, Mao would have been better suited to the former, since it requires innovative attributions and the ability to transcend reality and history, whereas the latter confronts reality, where one had to accept reality’s limitations, and being innovative within bounds. On September 13, 1956, Mao Zedong brought up the question of the central leadership, suggesting that he might resign as chairman and serve instead as honorary chairman.122 In accordance with Article 37 of the Party Constitution approved at the 8th National Congress of the CPC, the Central Committee took the innovative step of creating for Mao Zedong the position of honorary chairman “if necessary." This was in response to Mao’s advocating against lifetime tenure at the Beidaihe meeting. Unfortunately, in his report on amendments to the Party Constitution, Deng Xiaoping did not elaborate on that “if necessary” clause, nor discuss how Mao might move into retirement. In reality, this formal position of honorary chairman existed in name only but never materialized. In April 1957, Mao Zedong handed in his resignation for both state president and chairman of the CPC Central Committee. However, after the anti-rightist campaign, he withdrew his resignation and rejected initiatives to enforce the Constitution. Under his influence, the Central Committee avoided discussions over the matter. Consequently, Article 37 of the Party Constitution existed only in name; it performed no function. In 1969, the 9th National Congress of the CPC amended the Constitution and had this article removed. Owing to the failure of system execution, the necessary restrictions were not imposed. At the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973, Deng Xiaoping proposed setting up a Central Advisory Commission of the CPC, and Mao Zedong volunteered as chairman. Yet, with Zhou Enlai and other leaders’ opposition, the Central Committee123 missed this opportunity of abolishing lifetime tenure for leadership. According to the Constitution of the CPC, party leaders (the chairman or general secretary of the CPC Central Committee) had a 5-year tenure and could be elected only up to a second term of office (10 years). Under this Constitution, Mao Zedong’s tenure should have ended in 1959. If Mao had abided by the Constitution, mistakes 121. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 31. 122. Ibid. 123. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1666.

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like launching the Cultural Revolution right after the erroneous Great Leap Forward would have been avoided. His life tenure granted him chances to commit the two greatest errors in his political life.

The democratic collective decision-making system failed to function How was Mao Zedong able to launch the Cultural Revolution and continue it for 10 years? Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, who worked long with, identified the underlying causes. In August, Deng remarked, “It was the abnormal political life in our party and state, patriarchy and paternalism, personality cults, and unhealthy political life, that contributed to the Cultural Revolution.”124 In November, Chen claimed that Chairman Mao had made errors in disrupting democratic centralism, dominating the CPC, and beating any dissidents.125 In July 1981, Hu Yaobang declared that the failures to remedy these fatal errors over such a long period were rooted in the disruption of normal political life in the party, the party’s democratic centralism, and, especially, the central collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee.126 It was inevitable that Mao Zedong would commit errors in his later years. Nevertheless, it those mistakes would have been remedied swiftly. Yet, since the CPC lacked the capacity of restricting Mao’s deeds and correct his errors, Mao was capable in violate and disrupt the party’s democratic centralism and dominate the CPC Central Committee. As Mao Zedong noted in 1968, “It is necessary to learn from history.”127 As early as 1945, Liu Shaoqi stated in the “Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC” that the Party Constitution embodied a special kind of system under which everyone was equal rather than some enjoying particular privileges. Liu viewed any violation of the system as anti-democratic despotism.128 From 1949 to 1956, 124. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 345.

125. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Chen Yun (1905–1995), vol. 2, 260.

126. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 869.

127. People’s Daily, November 25, 1968. 128. In 1945, Liu Shaoqi stated in the “Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC,”

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Mao strictly obeyed the party’s regulations and occupied a status equal to that of the other leaders. He advocated a democratic working style and accepted the opinions of other people. Under his leadership, the CPC established democratic principles and reached a consensus on major issues, and China’s socialist cause made rapid progress. Nevertheless, when he violated party rules, exerted his personal dictatorship, and disregarded democracy, he began to commit serious errors,129 and that led to great losses to the CPC and to the country. With the extension of his tenure of office, Mao changed his style of ruling the party and the country. Instead of being the core leader of the party’s collective leadership, he became a dictator. The democratic working style became a dictatorship; decisions made by the collective leadership became personal decisions by his single vote; collective leadership thinking gave way to his supreme commands; resulting in a long term impact of feudal despotism.130 “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China and party regulations have to stipulate the party’s fundamental principles, political methods of action of party organizations,

the party’s organizational structure, and rules relating to the party’s political life.” He also criticized privilege: “Some party leaders have misinterpreted its rules and

resolutions as serving the interests of its top leaders enjoying special privileges instead

of being for the common interests of party members. This reflects anti-democratic personal despotism trends and the thoughts of a privileged class within the party.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, 316, 360.)

129. Deng Xiaoping remarked that Mao Zedong by and large exercised correct leadership

up to 1957: “After the anti-rightist campaign in 1957, he committed more and more

errors.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 294–295.)

130. The CPC Central Committee stated in its resolution in 1981, “China is a country with a long history of feudalism, and our party has fought against feudalism — especially

the feudal landlord system and despotic gentry. During its anti-feudalism struggle, it

established democracy.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to root out the ideological and political legacy of long-term

feudal autocracy. For various historical reasons, the CPC Central Committee lacked the capacity to institutionalize and legalize party democracy and democratic national

political and social life. Or when it enacted relevant laws and statutes, such laws and statutes failed to perform their proper functions, which resulted in the excessive

concentration of power in the hands of some individuals as well as a totalitarian

dictatorship and personality cult within the party. Therefore, our party and country failed to prevent the Cultural Revolution.” (Party Literature Research Center of the

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The Constitution of the CPC approved at the party’s Seventh National Congress stipulated that the CPC Central Committee had to uphold democracy within the party. Liu Shaoqi offered an explanation of this in his “Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC” on behalf of the Central Committee: “No party leaders, including members of the CPC Central Committee, are allowed to air political views on national issues without the permission of the Central Committee.”131 He also criticized anti-democratic personal despotic trends, which had caused great damage to the party.132 During the long, bloody war, the CPC suffered setbacks and failures many times against its strong enemies. This was due to both the weakness of the PLA, and to decision-making errors. Thus, the CPC began to exercise democratic centralism. In 1948, it promoted the concept of collective leadership instead of individuals making crucial decisions.133 Democratic centralism and collective leadership underpinned the CPC’s capacity to build up its strength, achieve power, and exercise leadership in an appropriate manner, thereby gaining the support of the Chinese people and establishing legitimate basic core systems. Within 7 years of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the CPC strengthened and perfected democratic centralism within the party. In 1956, Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed collective leadership and the personal accountability system and opposed personal dictatorship in the “Report of Amending the Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” which was presented at the 8th National Congress CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 819.)

131. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, 369.

132. Liu Shaoqi criticized some problems within the party: “Disrupting democracy and harmony, exerting dictatorship and implementing obscurantism, carrying on struggles and punishing, expelling, and purging party members is certain to ruin our party.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, 369.)

133. In August 1948, the CPC Central Committee imposed the stipulation of “Strengthening

the Party Committee System”: “The party committee system ensures collective

leadership and prevents a totalitarian dictatorship. All major party issues are subject to discussion by the party committee; members of the party committee voice their

opinions, and the party committee makes decisions to be enforced. It is necessary for us to implement both the collective leadership system and individual accountability

system at the same time. This resolution has to be enforced within the party.” (Ibid., 328–329.)

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of the CPC.134 He summarized the historical experiences of, and lessons learned by, communist parties around the world. He stated that evidentially individuals making crucial decisions betrayed the founding principles of communism and would inevitably led to errors.135 Deng also declared that the party congress should be regularly convened across levels so as to properly exercise its function.136 Deng was keenly aware that the CPC had to uphold and perfect democracy and collective decision making as a basic ruling system, and he made a great contribution in improving that system. If the CPC had implemented the above systems, China would have avoided the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong could have avoided his decision-making errors, which were rooted in his violation of basic party principles and formal systems. In the end, Mao’s launching of the Cultural Revolution was clearly contrary to fundamental party principles and formal systems. It was Mao Zedong who altered the party’s collective leadership system and exercised personal dictatorship. By issuing a notification on May 16, 1966, Mao subverted the regulations of the CPC that ensured collective leadership, and this led to the whole party simply obeying the commands of Mao Zedong.137 In the 134. According to Article 19 of the Constitution of the CPC, approved at the 8th National Congress, party organizations at all levels have to exercise collective leadership and implement the personal accountability system at the same time to make crucial decisions

collectively and stress the role of individuals. Deng Xiaoping noted that in practice, the system had defects and that the collective leadership served as a cover for personal dictatorship. He therefore proposed to oppose and remedy such defects and properly

implement the collective leadership system by discussing issues raised at meetings

and allowing participants to lodge objections. In the case of divergent views on nonurgent major issues, discussions should be prolonged, allowing personal negotiations

and obtaining approval from the majority of participants instead of holding hasty votes and reaching rash conclusions.

135. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 1, 229.

136. Deng Xiaoping declared that the national party meetings failed to take the place of the congress of the CPC, and he proposed that party congresses be held every year so

that they could serve as the supreme decision-making and supervisory authority of the party. According to this new system, crucial party decisions would be subject to discussion at party congresses. (Ibid., 232–233.)

137. On April 14, 1966, Mao Zedong issued instructions about “Notification of the CPC Central Committee Revoking the Report Outline on Current Academic.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works

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“Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee”

in 1966, Mao changed the party rule of asserting the leadership of the CPC Central Committee into “asserting the leadership of Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee.”138 This resulted in personal dictatorship and autocracy, the Mao personality cult, and non-democratic decision- making. Mao Zedong himself willfully destroyed formal systems and adopted hidden rules. During the Cultural Revolution, he set up the Central Cultural Revolution Group and from May 1966 to January 1967 convened brief meetings of the Central Cultural Revolution Group instead of those of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Mao invited rebel representatives to participate in the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in June 1966. As Mao put up the “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big Poster” on August 5, 1966 without central collective discussion, he purged of two members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping) and the censuring of one member of the Political Bureau (Chen Yun). Mao’s action in delivering a secret birthday speech without convening a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee on December 26, 1966, led to the purge of Tao Zhu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Further, Mao personally appointed Mao Yuanxin (his nephew) as his informal liaison officer with the Political Bureau in October 1975 instead of going through the normal meetings and resolution procedures. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s directive, secret meetings replaced plenary sessions of the CPC Central Committee. Key points of the speeches at these secret meetings were reviewed and approved by Mao rather than being approved as resolutions at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. According to a motion proposed by Mao, the Political Bureau unanimously approved the resolution to remove Deng Xiaoping from office and appoint Hu Guofeng (who was not a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) as first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee on April 8, 1976. No plenary session of the CPC Central Committee had been convened for this purpose. Though chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong seldom attended meetings of the Political Bureau. On July 17, 1974, Mao convened a meeting with members of the Political Bureau in Beijing before leaving the city on vacation, instead of a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. On May 3, Mao returned Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 43.) 138. Ibid., 96.



302

The Communiqué was approved at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central

Committee on August 12 and published in the People’s Daily on August 14, 1966.

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

to Beijing and chaired one more final meeting of the Political Bureau. Subsequently, members of the Political Bureau only chance to report to Mao or obtain his opinion were when accompanying him to meet foreign guests. Additionally, Mao alone decided to grant Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng, and Mao Yuanxin right to attend meetings of the Political Bureau. Why did Mao Zedong initially adopt the correct form of leadership but then later make decision-making errors, even leading to an unprecedented historical catastrophe? What caused the split in the collective leadership of the 8th CPC Central Committee? What political responsibility did Mao bear in all this? It is generally better to make observations and pass judgments about China’s leaders based on their actions and the consequences of those actions, rather than based on their utterances. This analysis will comment on Mao Zedong’s errors in the Cultural Revolution while attempting to uphold Maoism by adhering to the principles of seeking truth from facts, and taking practice as the criterion for testing correct and incorrect actions. What lessons did Mao Zedong learn from the Lin Biao incident? Mao advocated the principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots, which were enshrined in the amendment to the Constitution of the CPC in 1973. Here, the adoption of the principle will be examined. In terms of the principle of advocating Marxism instead of revisionism, Mao Zedong believed that he had the sole right to define Marxism and revisionism; he boasted that the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat made a contribution to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, history reveals that Mao Zedong’s ideas were divorced from the actual situation in China. Further, Mao failed to understand and define revisionism adequately. As a result, the Cultural Revolution lost direction in its efforts to combat and prevent revisionism. Mao was under the wrong impression that he was the personification of correctness. He adopted an opportunistic attitude toward his personality cult by taking advantage of it and supporting it even though he knew at heart that personality cults were wrong. For example, although he knew that Lin Biao’s advancing the theory of innate genius and creating Mao’s personality cult was a betrayal of Marxism, Mao encouraged and supported Lin. Mao even formed a political alliance with Lin to purge Liu Shaoqi before subsequently purging Lin according to Mao’s needs for political struggle. With respect to the principle of encouraging consolidation and avoiding divisions, Mao Zedong held the theory that splits within the party were inevitable. Mao continued to foment political divisions by continuing the two-line struggle instead of having the leading members serve within a united CPC Central Committee.

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With respect to behaving in an open, candid manner rather than organizing conspiracies, Mao Zedong plotted to carry out fierce struggles; he purged his allies and coerced them into accepting his opinions. Mao forced Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun to write self-criticisms for political persecutions use. He encouraged leaders to denounce one another by way of providing testimony for political struggles, and he struck at and purged dissidents as counterrevolutionaries or traitors. Almost all the cases Mao handled were cases of political injustice.139 Just as Deng Xiaoping remarked, Mao committed errors in violation of correct guidelines and policies, and the systemic root causes compounded his errors.140 By disregarding viable systems and implementing authoritarian ones, it was inevitable that Mao would make great mistakes in his later years. In July 1966, Mao Zedong admitted the possession of contradictory attributes of arrogance and cunning; both possessed and lacked confidence; he enjoyed fame, though he found himself not deserving it; he knew himself but was prone to boasting about himself.141 As Mao once said, all things may be lost to the opposition.142 At the pinnacle of his power, Mao was also alienated by power, and it was at the time that his political mistakes also reached an apex. After creating his own personality cult across the whole country, he was doomed to commit errors, and his actions led to political catastrophe.143 It may be said that Mao personally launched the Cultural Revolution as a form of national drill144 and that it ended in failure. 139. Deng Xiaoping remarked that Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution without planning to purge all the veteran party officials, and Lin Biao and the Gang

of Four behind Mao’s back purged some veteran officials. However, Mao purged a large number of officials in his later years, and the result was political tragedy. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 301.) 140. Ibid., 295–296. 141. Mao Zedong wrote, “I am confident but lack confidence. As the saying goes, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. I rule this country in that fashion. I am arrogant and cunning, and arrogance prevails. I quoted the lines from Li Gu’s letter to Huang

Qiong, ‘It is hard to deserve fame.’ As the saying goes, one needs to know oneself. I felt

I did not deserve fame, and I read the lines at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 72.) 142. Ibid. 143. Ibid. 144. Ibid., 73.

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Party disputes escalating into class struggles Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong diverged from the majority of party leaders (e.g., Liu Shaoqi) in believing in two socialist modernization lines and he continued the two-line struggle. Since Mao carried on the struggle against different lines within the party, most party leaders had no way of airing different views and remedying Mao’s errors, which exacerbated the situation. Mao Zedong was an idealist — perhaps even a Utopian leader — who had ambitiously aimed to build socialism, eradicate private ownership, restrict bourgeois rights, exercise dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, prevent the restoration of revisionism and capitalism, avoid the emergence of a privileged bureaucratic class, shun polarization between the rich and poor, and guard against peaceful evolution in impoverished, backward China. In this regard, Mao had uncompromising attitudes, and he refused to make conciliations on matters of principle. For the most part, Mao rebuked or even denounced Liu Shaoqi, who simply obeyed Mao’s orders and supreme directives.145 Chinese leaders held divergent views about China’s industrialization policy, economic development strategies, and most appropriate economic system. Against the changing political background of the People’s Republic of China, the two-line struggle differed in terms of its content, form, and consequences. It was unfortunate that Mao Zedong diverged markedly from Liu Shaoqi in terms of political views, and this difference ultimately developed into a political struggle. As Deng Xiaoping recalled, Mao Zedong failed to reflect properly on past actions in a profound manner: even though he deliberated on his errors with the Great Leap Forward, he went on engaging in the Cultural Revolution. Mao had good intentions in launching the Cultural Revolution, where he attempted to prevent the restoration of capitalism. However, he misjudged the actual circumstances in China and the appropriate revolutionary targets, and went on to purge those he believed to be capitalists, including veteran revolutionary leaders

145. In July 1951, Mao Zedong censured Liu Shaoqi and the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee for changing private ownership of the means of production. In line with Mao’s criticism, Liu and Bo Yibo abandoned their advocacy.Mao rebuked Liu Shaiqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping for proposing to establish a new democratic social order; thereafter, no one put forward such a proposal in a formal party report. (Pang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 204–205, 295–296.)

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at all levels like Liu Shaoqi.146 As stated in the “Resolution on Redressing the Liu Shaoqi Injustice Case,” which was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, there had in fact been no counter-revolutionary revisionist line, counter-revolutionary revisionist group nor any bourgeois base related to Liu Shaoqi, and also no group of capitalist roaders with Liu Shaoqi as their leader within the party.147 Mao created these illusory enemies only to sustain his theory of class struggle. Regardless of Mao Zedong’s political motives, the Cultural Revolution clearly caused social tumult and divisions in the ruling party by purging all veteran. Mao admitted that the Cultural Revolution had led to the purging of all veteran officials and had sparked civil unrest.

Comparison between Mao and Stalin As a historical phenomenon, Mao Zedong’s errors with respect to dominating the country and party in his later years paralleled to the actions of Joseph Stalin in his own later years. From a historical perspective, how much did Mao resembled Stalin in their later years? How did Mao view Stalin’s errors? Why did Mao repeat those errors? The following presents a historical comparison to address the above questions. Begin with revealing Mao Zedong’s remarks on Stalin. On November 30, 1956, Mao delivered a speech at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau: “Stalin overemphasized the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he destroyed part of the socialist legal system instead of the entire legal system; in the same way, he followed part of the Constitution, Civil Law, and Criminal Procedure Law. Although Stalin unduly stressed the dictatorship of the proletariat and restricted democracy, it was appropriate to establish that dictatorship and democracy in the Soviet Union.”148 Regardless of the above remarks directed towards Stalin, evidentially Mao himself committed greater errors in launching the Cultural Revolution than Stalin did in his later years. In the Cultural Revolution, Mao advocated and upheld a comprehensive dictatorship instead of implementing a socialist legal system; Mao abandoned the Constitution of 1954 and annulled the 146. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 346.

147. The “Resolution on Redressing the Liu Shaoqi Injustice Case” was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 29, 1980.

148. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 67.

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majority of laws and statutes passed after the foundation of the People’s Republic. A new Constitution was not enacted until 1975. Mao apparently committed more serious errors in violation of laws and statutes than Stalin did in his later years. Then, by examining their theories in the light of class struggle, Stalin advanced the theory of class struggle in the 1930s, whereas Mao fell under the influence of Stalin and continued the notion of class struggle in a more radical way than Stalin. By 1933, the Soviet Union had basically completed the collectivization of agriculture and it had rooted out the rich farming class, thereby entering the socialist stage after the transitional stage. However, Stalin considered that the class struggle was steadily escalating across the country.149 Although he announced at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that no hostile classes existed in the Soviet Union and the Constitution of 1936 confirmed his political views, he still believed that class struggle was spreading across the country in 1937.150 He believed that the domestic class struggle was the result of increasing foreign espionage, terrorism, and subversive activities by capitalist countries.151 Let us review the history of their practices against class struggle. Stalin’s theory of class struggle provided a theoretical basis for carrying out political purges, fighting dissidents, serving as a tool in political struggles, and strengthening his own personal dictatorship. From 1934 to 1938, Stalin abused his power and conducted political purges over this four-year period by abusing the socialist legal system, fabricating numerous cases of injustice, and instituting the reign of terror. Of 1,966 deputies to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1934, 1,108 (56.3%) were arrested. Of 139 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 98 (70.5%) were arrested. Of 11 members of the Soviet Politburo, one was forced to commit suicide and two were executed, accounting for 27.2% of the total. Of six alternate members of the Soviet Politburo, three (50%) were executed. Additionally, around 100,000 149. In 1933, Stalin declared that enemies changed the pattern of class struggle from a

frontal attack to underground sabotage and that move escalated the class struggle. Additionally, class was rooted out by strengthening class struggle instead of ceasing

class struggle. (The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau trans., Collected Works of Stalin, vol. 13, 190.)

150. In 1937, Stalin reiterated that the defeated exploiting class would carry out fiercer struggles to endanger the Soviet Union and fight to the death as socialism achieved dramatic progress and was victorious. (The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau trans., Selected Works of Stalin, vol. 1, 129)

151. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 406–408.

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party officials and party members were executed, and several million people were suppressed or persecuted.152 There were parallels between Mao with the Cultural Revolution and Stalin with his Great Purge. Mao’s class struggle provided the theoretical basis for China’s political campaigns. Mao continued the Cultural Revolution for 10 years, which was longer than the Great Purge carried out by Stalin, and the number of people persecuted in the Cultural Revolution was greater than that in Stalin’s Great Purge. Unlike Stalin, Mao did not execute party members and officials in the Cultural Revolution. In 1956, the 8th National Congress of the CPC discussed the matter of the personality cult of Stalin. Without explicating Stalin’s theory of class struggle and detailing the events of the political purges, the resolution approved at that congress was modified, and Mao’s right to carry on the class struggle was granted at the second meeting of the 8th National Congress in 1958. With the escalating class struggle, Mao abused his power and dominated the country and the party, and his actions resembled those of Stalin in his reign of terror. In November 1956, Mao criticized Stalin for treating his comrades like enemies. Having learned from Stalin, Mao stated, “There are different conflicts within the CPC and among the people, and such conflicts are categorized as conflicts among the people. We should resolve conflicts among the people by means of internal democratic persuasion rather than treating them like enemies.”153 On February 27, 1957, Mao condemned Stalin for carrying out the political purges and confusing conflicts among the people with conflicts between the party and its enemies.154 In March 1963, Mao censured Stalin for his errors in broadening the scope of the class struggle.155 Based on Stalin’s theory of class struggle, Mao developed and 152. Ibid., 414–415. 153. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 67–68. 154. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 66–67.

155. In March 1963, Mao Zedong modified and annotated “Addressing Issues on Carrying on the Struggle against Modern Revisionism”: “Stalin confused conflicts between

his own party and enemies with conflicts among people in the party and non-party struggles; as a result, he handled the two types of conflicts inappropriately. He also

misjudged and mistreated anti-party elements and dissidents among the masses as

counter-revolutionaries who colluded with imperialists and enemies of the people; he

suppressed them, broadening the scope of the political purges, and victimizing many innocent people. [note: Mao later modified “many” to “some”] Stalin also committed serious political and organizational errors [note: Mao deleted “serious” from the

original text.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 262–264).

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reformed his theory of the socialist class struggle: he came up with the notion of capitalist roaders, and he maintained that they had a power base within the party. He also believed that the revolution would evolve from turmoil to peace and that this would inevitably result in a split within the party. The party struggles and political campaigns initiated by Mao were more numerous than those launched by Stalin. According to central statistics, Mao engaged in party struggles and launched political campaigns over 60 times between 1950 and 1976. Except for land reform, which was conducted in compliance with the Land Reform Law, other party struggles and political campaigns were launched in accordance with central documents or directives.156 When exercising cultural despotism, Stalin criticized theoretical and academic circles before his political purges in 1934. On December 9, 1930, Stalin delivered a secret speech about philosophy and social sciences in a meeting with party branch committee members at the Institute of Red Professors,157 but the speech was not disclosed until the 1990s. Stalin made remarks and issued directives to members of academic circles in the Soviet Union: “Our opponents have dominated the fields of philosophy, natural sciences, and politics. Thus, we need to direct our criticisms at the area of philosophy and social science. We must do all in our power to continue the party political struggle and class struggle at the same time as carrying out self-criticism in the above fields.”158 Under Stalin’s orders, many celebrated scholars and scientists were criticized and suppressed. Stalin carried out the Great Purge within the party after the Academic Criticism Campaign. Scholars — especially those specializing in social sciences — were persecuted in both the Academic Criticism and Great Purge.159 (Sidebar 7.2).

156. Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976). 157. “Stalin’s Conversation with the Party Branch Committee of the Institute of Red Professors on the Situation of Philosophy,” on record in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Archive Fond 17, Catalogue 120, File 24. 158. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 440–444. 159. Ibid., 462.

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Sidebar 7.2

Characteristics of Stalin’s Ideological and Cultural Authoritarianism

1. Highly Unified Public Opinions: The public opinions of the party and the whole of society were unified by the central government and Stalin. 2. Politicized Academic Issues: Stalin called for directing criticism at capitalist ideological fields, such as political economy, philosophy, history, humanities and social sciences. He set the boundary between socialism and capitalism, and in the process broadened the scope of the capitalist class to incorporate a large number of what were in fact communist or non-communist works in the humanities and social sciences into capitalist ideology. 3. Using Administrative Intervention as a Main Management Tool: Stalin personally initiated and led academic criticism to achieve certain political objectives. Under pressure of large-scale academic criticism, 95.5% of humanities and social science groups, 92.9% of literary and artistic creative groups, 69% of cultural and educational groups, and 48% of natural science and technology institutes suspended activities in the 1930s. Source : Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 485.

In the 1960s, Mao was aware of the catastrophic consequences and adverse international results of Stalin’s outrages in the 1930s. However, Mao emulated Stalin by unifying public opinion before the Cultural Revolution. There were parallels between Mao launching violent attacks against certain ideological and cultural fields and Stalin condemning ideological and cultural fields. In this regard, Mao Zedong perpetrated even more violent outrages than Stalin. Mao believed that capitalist scholars dominated China’s academic and cultural circles. Stalin advanced the theory of comprehensive criticism, and Mao proposed the theory of comprehensive dictatorship. In the early part of the Cultural Revolution, most activities in China’s arts and cultural groups, institutes of science and technology, and higher and secondary education groups were forcibly suspended. Normal development of China’s culture, arts, education, science, and technology was thus severely impeded. There were parallels between Stalin purging a great many of the intellectual elite in the Academic Criticism Campaign in the 1930s and Mao persecuting members of China’s cultural and intellectual elite in the Cultural Revolution. It should be noted that members of the cultural and intellectual elite persecuted in the Cultural Revolution were more than that in the Academic Criticism Campaign, and the Cultural Revolution also lasted longer than the latter campaign. It is well

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known that the Cultural Revolution inflicted incalculable losses in terms of human, intellectual, and cultural capital. Some foreign scholars remarked that there were parallels between Mao starting the Cultural Revolution to purge his close allies and Stalin carrying out the Great Purge from 1936 to 1939.160 Another stated, “Stalin annihilated his political rivals by means of the state apparatus (e.g., secret police) whereas Mao removed his rivals from office by taking advantage of popular movements.”161 Why did Mao perpetrate more violent outrages than Stalin? This was because Mao had greater power than Stalin, China’s population and its party and government officials outnumbered those of the Soviet Union, so China suffered more egregious persecution than did the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Stalin carried out the Great Purge within the party, government, and military to eradicate certain members of the political elite rather than attempting to destroy the party and replace fundamental systems. In contrast, Mao called for the purging of all veteran party officials, seized power, and caused civil unrest. Moreover, Mao became a more popular cult figure in China than Stalin did in the Soviet Union, and Mao made grandiose claims about himself as the third milestone in the history of Marxism, whereas Stalin simply claimed that he had developed Leninism.” Mao’s eradication of institutions in China resembled what Stalin did in the later years of his rule. When Lenin was in control, Lenin stressed that the supreme authority over the party was the National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Lenin insisted on convening that congress every year. From 1918 to 1923, the Bolshevik Party communicated with the National Congress of the Soviet Union six times. In contrast, Stalin failed to convene the National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as scheduled except in 1924 and 1925.162 Stalin convened that congress only once between 1939 and 1952, and he failed to convene it between 1941 and 1949.163 It is evident that Stalin dominated the communist party and that led to collapse of the system. In China, Mao subsequently emulated Stalin’s style of dictatorship. The life tenure of leaders was typical of the leadership system in socialist countries, and many socialist leaders died while in office. It was inevitable that ruling party leaders who had a long tenure of office should repeat the historical tragedies of Stalin and Mao. 160. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change, 135; Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938, 242.

161. Harry, “The Chinese State in Crisis 1966–1969,” 243. 162. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 200. 163. Ibid., 478–479.

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Stalin declared that the Politburo had full authority,164 but the power of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Soviet Central Committee rested with General Secretary Stalin, who had the power of veto and made final decisions.165 Stalin did in fact betray Leninism. In 1956, Deng Xiaoping addressed this issue in the “Report of Amending the Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” which was approved at the 8th National Congress of the CPC. The report stated that individuals making crucial decisions was a betrayal of the founding principles of communist parties and was certain to result in erroneous decisions. Deng also censured personal dictatorship under the guise of collective leadership.166 In March 1963, Deng rebuked Stalin for having committed errors as part of his personal dictatorship.167 Stalin took the initiative in choosing his successor, and Mao constantly changed his mind about his own successor. Mao decided to choose his own successor after the CPC came to power in 1949, and especially after Khrushchev rose to power in the Soviet Union. The strategy 164. The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau trans., Collected Works of Stalin, vol. 7, 328.

165. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, revised edition, 478–479. 166. Deng Xiaoping stated that Leninism called for collective decisions on major issues

instead of making individual decisions. The Twenty-Second National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union elaborated on the significance of asserting collective leadership and opposing personality cults, and this had a great influence

on the Soviet communist party and on communist parties around the world. It was evident that individuals making crucial decisions on major issues was a betrayal of

the founding principles of communist parties and that leaders who made important individual decisions inevitably committed errors. Only a collective leadership that was in close contact with the masses was able to adhere to the party’s principle of democratic centralism and was able to reduce errors. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 1, 229.)

167. In March 1963, Mao modified and annotated “Addressing Issues on Carrying on the Struggle against Modern Revisionism”: “Stalin failed to exercise proletarian democratic centralism in a proper way, or he violated it within party and stage organizations,

mass organizations, and economic organizations. Although the Constitution of the CPC

stipulates the principle of domestic centralism, party committees at all levels actually exercise personal dictatorship instead of abiding by majority rule; state organizations, economic organizations, and mass organizations all exercise personal dictatorship

because Stalin stressed exercising despotism.” As Mao noted, unequal relations were

able to develop within the party, and leaders at all levels enjoyed special privileges. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 262–264.)

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Mao implemented is a double-sided blade that facilitated the nation’s long-term development, but would also lead to political divisions. Mao’s decision of choosing a successor put him in the paradoxical position of supreme power, which was both arbitrariness and exclusivity. In 1956, Mao designated the Political Bureau as the supreme authority, whereby he served as chairman and supreme commander. The general secretary served as deputy commander. Mao first chose Liu Shaoqi as successor, and then he chose Deng Xiaoping.168 In August 1966, Mao chose Lin Biao as his successor since he was dissatisfied with his own loss of power. In 1970, Mao and Lin had divergent views on whether to re-instate the position of state president. Although Lin said that he did not want to accept the position, Mao still suspected that Lin was keen to take his post.169 After the September 13 Incident in 1971, Mao Zedong had to choose a new successor — Wang Hongwen. When Mao found that Wang had formed the Gang of Four with Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, Mao promoted Deng Xiaoping once more to the key position, and he supported Deng in rectifying conditions in China. However, since Mao suspected Deng to have repudiated the Cultural Revolution, he chose the trustworthy Hua Guofeng as his final choice as successor. This caused enmity on the part of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao toward Hua Guofeng. In choosing their successors, other socialist leaders did not change their minds as frequent as Mao Zedong, and the successors in other countries however did not suffer from similar tragical political fate. Mao had long failed to resolve the problem of his successor: although he had to choose one, he could not accept the loss of power. He suspected Liu Shaoqi, who presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, and Lin Biao, who presided over the work of the Central Military Commission, of wanting to usurp power. Ending up with bringing all his successors a tragic political end. As Deng Xiaoping remarked in 1980, leaders personally choosing their own successors is the practice of feudalism.170 From the perspective of party systems, leaders personally appointing their own successors contravened the Constitution of the CPC, which stipulated that the party’s top leaders were to be elected at the National Congress of the CPC and plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. Personally appointing successor would lead to political uncertainty: a political crisis would ensue regarding who 168. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 438. 169. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 244–245.

170. Party Literature Research Center in CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 347.

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was appointed, and abnormal changes would take place in the Political Bureau. The crisis of Mao’s successor typified China’s political situation during the era of Mao Zedong. Gao Fang made a profound remark about Stalin: “After the late 1920s, Stalin betrayed Marxism-Leninism. He implemented a state totalitarian political system that featured personal centralization, life tenure system for the leader, and a designated successor. The systems of party and government were integrated. A hierarchy developed among party officials developed a barbaric system of government privileges, which changed the nature of the democratic republic and amounted to a restoration of monarchy. Stalin also introduced a party leadership system, which featured concentration of power in the person of the general secretary, life tenure for the general secretary, a successor designated by the general secretary, supreme authority over the Politburo, an affiliation system for the Central Supervision Commission, and a system for suppressing dissent. This changed the nature of the communist party, transforming it from a democratic party into an authoritarian party for stifling democracy.”171 In 1956, the CPC was able to learn from Stalin’s historical errors.172 However, the party repeated those mistakes by tolerating Mao’s personal decisions and non-institutionalized party practices, which contributed to the launching of the Cultural Revolution. For these reasons, Mao’s efforts to find a successor ended in failure, since he refused to reflect on and correct his own mistakes. He also consistently refused to admit the possibility of other leaders rectifying those errors. Until his death, Mao made no efforts to mend his errors concerning the Cultural Revolution. As the “Resolution on Some Party Historical Issues Since the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China,” which was passed at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1981, stated, “Comrade Mao Zedong should assume prime responsibility for the long-term fatal leftist errors of the Cultural Revolution.”173 The Cultural Revolution was a result of Mao’s poor leadership and other complex social and historical factors that lasted for 10. The resolution 171. Gao, “Whether Soviet Socialist Reform was Doomed to Failure.” 172. “Drawing on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” People’s

Daily, April 5, 1956;“Drawing Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” People’s Daily, December 28, 1956; Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 24–30, 83–91.

173. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, 814–815.

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declared that Mao, at the peak of power was arrogant, unrealistic, and isolated from the masses. He exercised personal dictatorship, dominated the CPC Central Committee, and progressively undermined or even seriously damaged the collective leadership system and domestic centralism. The resolution declared that the CPC Central Committee had to assume collective responsibility for its failure to rectify Mao’s errors promptly.174 Hu Qiaomu remarked that the CPC had to be responsible for all party errors from the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee to the end of the Cultural Revolution, when the Gang of Four was ousted from power.175 It would however be unfair to blame all the errors of the Cultural Revolution on Mao Zedong, also it was not true that the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques perpetrated all the crimes. It is unfortunate that the above resolution failed to identify which leaders should assume responsibility for the Cultural Revolution and what responsibility they should shoulder. From the data and analysis presented in this book, Zhou Enlai should bare secondary responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. The reasons for this are as follows:176 1. Zhou served as member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau for 10 years longer than Lin Biao (1966–1971), Chen Boda (1966–1970), Wang Hongwen (1973–1976), and Zhang Chunqiao (1973–1976) during the period of the Cultural Revolution. 2. Lin Biao ranked the Cultural Revolution contributors in the sequence of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. Zhou Enlai was ranked second, above the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Owing to his poor health, Lin was ranked below Zhou.177 This ranking 174. Ibid., 818–819. 175. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 113.

176. In 1981, the “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee” ascertained only Mao Zedong’s

primary responsibility for the Cultural Revolution; it failed to confirm Zhou Enlai’s secondary political responsibility in that regard. Indeed, Zhou was eulogized for his deeds in that revolution. In fact, Zhou’s errors outweighed his accomplishments: he

made more serious errors in supporting Mao in staging the Cultural Revolution than he made efforts to reduce the losses incurred by that revolution.

177. Lin Biao claimed on October 26, 1968 during his speech at the Second Enlarged Meeting of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee that, “Chairman Mao personally staged and led the Cultural Revolution, and the Central Cultural

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reflected the actual situation. 3. Zhou played a more important role than Lin and Jiang when Mao made crucial decisions. In fact, Zhou’s errors outweighed his accomplishments, and he committed serious mistakes — only second to Mao in this regard. Deng Yingchao remarked that Zhou never went against Mao but insisted on following his political judgment — even if that judgment was erroneous, Zhou nevertheless followed the course. During the Cultural Revolution, Zhou consistently adhered Mao’s direction without attempting to remain true to the party line. Zhou even displayed servility toward Mao in Mao’s decision-making errors,178 being keen to protect himself in sharing supreme power with Mao and acquiring higher status than Lin. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, remained true to his political principles, and was ousted from power only to be reinstated to key positions several times. In March 1956, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech when the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee discussed the secret report of Khrushchev, who had revolted against Stalin: “Khrushchev mentioned in the secret report that nobody dared revolt against Stalin under the fear of political persecution. That argument is unconvincing. Communists have to uphold the truth by means of a clear-cut stance rather than flatteries. It is unfortunate that nobody dared air divergent political views in the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union — the top party leadership — for fear of political persecution. It was improper of Khrushchev to invent such excuses for their faults — ascribing feats to themselves and imputing errors to Stalin.” Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were present at that meeting.179 To draw a conclusion for all the above events 20 years later, it is inappropriate to ascribe positive feats towards Zhou and assign all the wrong doings of the Cultural Revolution toward Mao. Zhou has to take the blame for the negative aspects of the Cultural Revolution since he failed to uphold the truth: Zhou followed Mao’s false course and supported Mao in launching and prolonging the Cultural Revolution for nearly 10 years, owning to the fear of being persecuted and purged. That outweighed his political protection of veteran officials. Zhou differed from Deng in fear management, and displayed serious shortcomings in his later years — second only Mao. Revolution Group — Premier Zhou Enlai, Comrade Jiang Qing, Comrade Chen Boda,

and Comrade Kang Sheng — presided over the daily work day and night under the directive of Mao Zedong. Owing to poor health, I did little of that work.” 178. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 342. 179. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 19.

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To summarize, Mao Zedong was hailed as the great founder and leader of the CPC. However, he also got trampled and hence caused huge damage to the party’s democracy, falling into victim of his own autocracy. Had that not been the case, he might have achieved greater feats, committed fewer historical errors; and China might have made greater progress in terms of economic development and the modernization of its national institutions. Without Mao, no new China would have emerged. It can be said that Mao’s greatest achievement was to have found the new China. However, without Mao, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. It is regrettable that Mao’s most serious flaw was instigating the Cultural Revolution in his later years. Mao ended in failure after having achieved success, and Deng Xiaoping attained success by having learned from Mao’s failure.

Deng Xiaoping’s Success Following Mao Zedong’s Failure Historical development is both certainty and uncertainty; the Cultural Revolution was no exception. The uncertainty refers to a series of unplanned events, and the certainty reflects observable general trends. For decades after the People’s Republic was found, China’s socialist industrialization and modernization steadily progress and boosted China’s long-term prospects. The Cultural Revolution was only a short-term circumstance — a series of impromptu political incidents provoked by Mao Zedong rather than being a historical certainty.180 After Mao’s death, the Cultural Revolution leave almost no lasting historical effect, and China’s socialist modernization once again was back on its general track. Major historical figures should excel in detecting certainty and being able to reinforce particular trends. However, they have no way of reversing historical trends or going against them. Mao Zedong was hailed as a great politician and political prophet. As early as September 1956, Mao was able to make an accurate prediction of China’s future at the 8th National Congress of the CPC. When he met with a delegation from the Communist League of Yugoslavia, he said in a speech, “China has to establish socialism, and it will take 50 or 100 years to build China into a strong country. China’s prospects rest on its development. In the future, China may commit errors 180. Xi Xuan and Jin Chunming considered that not all countries had to go through a

Cultural Revolution after establishing democracy and that there was no historical

certainty in terms of the laws of human social development. (Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 349.)

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and become corrupt — alternating between an ideal situation and crisis. However, it will never repeat the dark reign of Chiang Kai-shek: it will undergo twists and turns through affirmation, negation, and affirmation.”181 Although he failed to explain what an ideal situation and crisis actually signified and how one state might develop into the other, Mao Zedong believed in the development logic of historical dialectic. Subsequent events have shown that Mao was accurate in his foresight. As he prophesied, China’s modernization now has a bright future, but it did undergo twists and turns. After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, China entered a golden era of social progress and economic development for the first time, and Mao Zedong’s career reached a brilliant climax. However, the good times do not last long. After 1957, China entered a crisis; Mao committed errors in his later years and he negated his leadership and political line after the foundation of the People’s Republic. In 1978, China entered a new era by rectifying those errors and restoring order. Deng Xiaoping adopted Mao’s approach of seeking truth from facts, and he remedied Mao’s mistakes in his later years, demonstrating that success could grow out of failure. The successes between 1957 and 1977, the first 7 years of the People’s Republic’s establishment, caused the failure that took place twenty some years afterwards, but it was also critical to the thirty some years of success since 1978. How did China came to success after Mao? On October 5, 1968, Mao met with a delegation from the Albanian government and affirmed the merits of the Cultural Revolution: it unveiled the evil of all kinds within the party, the government, the army, and the masses. Mao also optimistically predicted that the Cultural Revolution could bring China 10 to 20 years of peace.182 However, as soon as the Cultural Revolution came to end, peace prevailed in China. Without Mao, there would have been no Cultural Revolution,183 and China would have remained in peace all along. As the saying goes, failure is the mother of success. And in this respect, failure provided a historical wealth of information, though it was necessary to understand and make the best use of this wealth in an appropriate fashion. Deng Xiaoping developed an insight on the where of Mao’s later years error rooted. In June 1980, Deng remarked that it would be impossible for the CPC to tackle problems within the party by simply criticizing Mao for his mistakes: it was necessary to overhaul 181. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 124.

182. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1529. 183. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Li Xiannian (1935–1988), 423–424.

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the party’s political institutions. Since Deng worked with Mao over a long period, he witnessed the whole process of Mao committing and compounding his errors with resultant irreversible damage in his later years. Mao categorized mistakes into fundamental ones that are hard to correct and occasional ones that are easily rectified.184 The error of the Cultural Revolution was a fundamental, characterized by path dependence, and it was difficult to remedy. Deng was as well one of the victims to Mao’s errors in his later years and he suffered their devastating consequences, which prompted Deng to find the main factor for those errors. In 1956, Deng made a great contribution to establishing party democracy as stipulated in the Constitution of the CPC approved at the 8th National Congress, and Deng put political institutions in place to prevent personal dictatorship within the party. Nevertheless, all his efforts came to nothing when Mao inflicted tremendous losses on the party and the country. When the Cultural Revolution came to an end, the Chinese people began to reflect on Mao’s errors in his later years, only Deng took the initiative in providing insight into the systemic root causes for those errors (Sidebar 7.3). Following Deng’s way of thinking, how Mao destroyed the basic institutions of the party and country before and during the Cultural Revolution was examined. As Deng Xiaoping said, “Mao Zedong brought about a great catastrophe to the party and country as well as to himself.”

Sidebar 7.3 Deng Xiaoping Learned from Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years (1980) The leaders’ philosophies and work styles maybe one of the factor causing various mistakes made in the CPC history, yet what matters more is the organization’s rules and regulations. A healthy set of rules and regulation could sustain and prevent any acts of violation; whereas a distorted system obstruct the development of the society, and even push the society toward the opposite trend of development. Even great leaders, like Comrade Mao Zedong, was deeply influenced by the distorted system and hence lead to the downfall of himself; of the party; and the country. Stalin severely disrupted socialist legal systems. Comrade Mao Zedong remarked, “Such incidences would never happen in the Western countries, such as those of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.” Even with well aware of the issue Mao however still failed to resolve the problems in the leadership system. With the contribution of other problems, they added 184. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 2, 447.

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up causing the 10-year havoc — the Cultural Revolution. It was a painful and unforgettable lesson. Mao of course should bear some responsibility, but the root of the problem lies on the leadership system, and the party’s regulation, affecting the country’s stability and long term development. The party and country’s future was tied tightly to the set of defected rules and regulations — there is an urgent need for the party to address and resolve the problem. Source: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 333.

The Cultural Revolution became Deng Xiaoping’s motivation of Reform and Opening-up, as well as the main reason why China could remain political and social stability after 1978. China’s opening up and reform was no coincident; the culture revolution was the historical cause, so as a factor of the development logic. It followed the logic of things developing reversely after reaching an extreme; lessons learnt would bring forth abundance; and bad will eventually turn good. These are considered the main plus the Cultural Revolution bring forth.185 Deng described the people as “denying” the Cultural Revolution; however, we should not neglect some minor pluses that the Revolution brings forth and its value as a negative example.186 Deng’s biggest political achievement was to “turn bad into good,” where he rectified China’s crisis, turning it into a milestone which marks the beginning of reform and opening-up.187 185. Gong, From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, 283–285. 186. Deng Xiaoping remarked, “Without having learned from the Cultural Revolution, it

would have been impossible to shape a series of ideological, political, and organizational line policies after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. That

plenary session stipulated that the CPC Central Committee had to shift its focus from class struggle to boosting productivity, achieving the Four Modernizations and winning

the support of all party members and the Chinese people. The Cultural Revolution taught us lessons and became our spiritual wealth.” (Party Literature Research Center in the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 272.)

187. Deng Xiaoping answered questions raised by the American Reporter Mike Wallace: “The Cultural Revolution taught us a lesson, and it prompted the Chinese people to

reflect on the political issues in China and identify the system root causes of the Cultural

Revolution. To that end, we should learn from the Cultural Revolution and carry out reform to improve China’s political and economic situation, remedy our errors, and boost our prospects.” (Ibid., 172.)

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Based on Mao Zedong’s errors made in his later years, Deng Xiaoping started his project of overhauling with party reform and the country’s leadership system, concurrently reestablished a new set of rules and regulations.188 The system of central collective leadership was restored on the 8th Central Committee in 1956 where the collective succession system was also adopted. From February 23 to 29, 1980, Chen Yun proposed again to set up the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, stressing on the urgency of going through such measures.189 Thus the CPC Central committee decided to establish the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Stated in the rules that the Secretariat was responsible for processing all daily work of the Central government under the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee’s supervision. It implements the system of central collective leadership and division of labor. There will be one general secretary, several secretaries and alternate secretaries, all directly elected by the CPC Central Committee.190 With the establishment of the Secretariat, it shared power alongside with the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, hence served the function of inter-monitoring. The Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee presided over daily work as the first-line central authority under the supervision of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, which served as the second-line central authority. Referencing back to Mao’s error made over individual succession, Chan suggested collective succession so if any of those potential successors fall, there would still be another that were ready.191 The 12th National Congress of the CPC abolished the CPC Central Committee chairman, and restored the leadership system that used to exist before 1943 by implementing the post of general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The general secretary of the CPC Central Committee was as well member of the Central Political Bureau’s Standing Committee, whose duty includes presiding over the work of the Secretariat, and calling meetings of the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee. According to the new Constitution of the CPC, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was considered the core leadership within the party. In addition to the general secretary, the director of the Central Advisory 188. For more detailed analysis, please refer to Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976).

189. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 508.

190. The “Resolution on Setting up the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee” was passed at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 28, 1980.

191. Yang, Chen Yun in His Later Years, 67.

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Commission, the first secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline, and the chairman of the Central Military Commission were all members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, thereby guaranteeing the collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee.192 The CPC Central Committee implemented the tenure system of the central leadership. According to Article 21 of the Party Constitution, the collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee and central leaders elected by that committee continued to preside over the daily work during the next National Congress of the CPC and continued work until new collective leadership and central leaders were elected.193 The CPC Central Committee eliminated the life tenure system for party leaders. The Party Constitution approved at the 12th National Congress of the CPC stipulated the implementation of the retirement system for party officials, and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress declared that state leaders could be elected to no more than two terms of office. Chen Yun played a vital role in restoring The Constitution and rebuilding the party’s democracy of collective decision-making system in 1982. As a successful political assistant of Mao Zedong who had witnessed Mao’s successes and failures, Chen served as member of the 8th Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee. In December 1978, Chen was elected member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and first secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. After Chen presided over the work of the Central Commission for Discipline, he engaged in restoring and rebuilding fundamental party systems: he acutely spotted that the failure of the Cultural Revolution lay in Mao destroying the party’s democratic centralism. To prevent an authoritarian regime from developing, Chen presided over the establishment of the “Criteria for the Party’s Political Life,” which consisted of 21 articles. With the lesson learnt from the Cultural Revolution, these criteria upheld domestic centralism, defined important concepts in political and social life, and laid the principles on relationship management within the party. This was done to prevent the recurrence of another Mao in his later years, individuals such as Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin operating within the party, bitter struggles and purges, and infringement of the political rights of party members 192. Comrade Hu Qiaomu answered questions on the “Amendment to the Constitution of

the Communist Party of China” raised by a reporter of Xinhua News Agency on 13 September, 1982.

193. The Constitution of the CPC was approved at the 12th National Congress of the CPC on September 6, 1982.

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(Sidebar 7.4). In February 1980, these criteria were officially approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee as key party laws and statutes. The Constitution banned all forms of personality cult. The Constitution of the CPC ban all forms of personal cult when it was approved at the 12fth National Congress in 1982. It stated that party leaders would carry out political activities under the supervision of the party and the people, and it safeguarded the prestige of party leaders who acted in the common interests of the party and people.194

Sidebar 7.4

Criteria for the Party’s Political Life (1980)

The CPC shall assert collective leadership, oppose authoritarian rule, and uphold important issues associated with the party’s lines, guidelines, policies, and events. The CPC is responsible for the following: deploy works and tasks; party members’ appointment, dismissal, transfer and punishment; and the interests of the masses. Issues subject to collective decisions made by party committees in accordance with directives from superior authorities shall follow collective discussion and decision by party committees, standing committees, the secretariat, and the party leadership group rather than being implemented by personal dictatorship. Under no circumstances could other organizations replace the leadership of the party committees and standing committees. Any organization conducting work at the behest of a party committee will do so under the leadership of that committee rather than attempting to replace the function of that party committee or even seeking domination. Within party committees, issues shall be settled in accordance to the majority rule. Secretaries and commissioners will not adopt superior-subordinate relations, and the secretary shall be member of the party committee. Dictatorship is strictly prohibited. When discussing important issues, party committees shall allow party members to freely air different views. In case of divergent opinions, party committees shall conscientiously take minority opinions in account instead of holding discussions that do not result in decisions and thereby delay work. The CPC shall promote the image of its leaders based on clear facts. It will not eulogize proletarian leaders using the flattering tactics of the exploiting class, and leaders’ accomplishments should be presented without distorting historical details and fabricating facts. The CPC members shall be loyal to party organizations and adhere to party principles rather than show individual loyalty. No one shall view party officials 194. The Constitution of the CPC was approved at the party’s 12th National Congress on 6 September, 1982.

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as personal assets, change superior-subordinate relations into ones of personal dependence, flatter leaders, report only good news, fabricate facts for trust, honor, or awards. Connive, imply, induce, or force subordinates to tell lies are strictly prohibited. The CPC Central Committee shall establish democracy within the party and treat different views properly. There shall be no framing, denouncing, and purging party members. Exaggeration of errors, framing, and political persecution are also forbidden. The CPC understands that having opposing political views does not mean to challenge those comrades. Similarly, opposition towards some comrades in the authority does not equal to challenging authorities, leaders or even the party. It is normal that party members argue over differences in thought and theories. Except for important political and urgent practical issues, some issues regarding thought and theories that cannot be quickly resolved shall be addressed after further study and implemented as appropriate instead of hasty drawing conclusions. It is necessary to halt disruptive behavior, such as wantonly denouncing comrades for overthrowing socialism or for being evil, capitalists, or revisionists. It is necessary to define the nature of conflicts between allies and enemies, which can lead to the destruction of the party’s peace, give rise to rigid ideology, and even allow anti-party careerist to take advantage; hence disrupting the socialist democratic order. The CPC should guarantee party members’ rights from infringement. Party members have the right to make statements, appeals, charges, and defend themselves at party meetings to superiors, or even to the CPC Central Committee. The CPC should treat its comrades who committed errors in a proper way. When making an analysis of errors, we should distinguish conflicts — whether it was among people or between allies and enemies. Further, we should avoid exaggerating common errors in work and ideology as political errors, common political errors as directional errors, and directional errors in party struggles as being counter-revolutionary conspiracies to overthrow the CPC and socialism. There shall be no fierce struggles within the CPC, and it was prohibited for the party to treating its members in ways that violate party discipline, national laws and statutes. Under no circumstances will there be any denouncements, cruelty, personal insults or persecution, confessions through elicitation or torture, or any implication of relatives and friends. Source: Party Literature Research Center in the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 417–430.

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The “Criteria for the Party’s Political Life” expressly declared that the image of party leaders had to be promoted based on facts — rather than eulogizing with flattery and publicizing those leaders’ feats by distorting history and fabricating facts.195 The Constitution guarantees the right of party members to criticize party leaders. In December 1978, it was stated at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, “The Constitution guarantees the right of party members to criticize leaders at party committees, standing committees of the Political Bureau and at other levels, and rectify any behavior that is violates of the party’s democratic centralism and collective leadership system.196 The CPC Central Committee has learned from the experience of sentencing and executing people who criticized Mao Zedong and Lin Biao as counter-revolutionaries during the Cultural Revolution. For example, Zhang Zhixin, a party official in the Publicity Department of the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee, was imprisoned in September 1969 and executed in 1975 for criticizing the personality cult of Mao Zedong and the ultra-leftist line. On March 31, 1979, the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee examined the injustice in Zhang Zhixin’s case and she was posthumously conferred with the honor of revolutionary martyr. Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun refuted the consensus and requested that all party members affirm the fruits of the Chinese revolution, safeguard Mao Zedong’s historical status, and to uphold and further develop on Mao Zedong Thought.197 Deng Xiaoping affirmed that Mao achieved great feats. Without Mao, there would have been no new China and Mao’s accomplishments outweighed his errors. Additionally, Deng stressed that the CPC Central Committee and Chinese people would never emulate Khrushchev in his negation of Stalin.198 The practice indicates 195. The “Criteria for the Party’s Political Life” were approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 29, 1980.

196. The “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee” was approved on 22 December, 1978.

197. Gong, From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, 11. 198. Yu, A Major Turning Point: The Political Backdrop of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh

CPC Central Committee, 91–92.

Some scholars were convinced that Deng Xiaoping and other party leaders deemed that the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956,

events in Poland and Hungary, and the tide of anti-communism across the world to have all resulted in Khrushchev having repudiated Stalin. In this regard, China’s top

leaders — especially its veteran revolutionaries — reached a consensus and exercised vigilance. (Xiao, Historical Transition: From Rectifying the Turmoil to Reform and Opening-

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that Deng inherited and developed Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong was a great visionary theorist and thinker who developed coherent theories and bodies of thought, and he had great ambition in wanting to make backward China, with its large population and vast territory, into a strong, modern socialist country. Mao and the CPC thus faced challenges in promoting social development and going through a complicated, difficult reform process. At the Second Plenary Session of the 7th CPC Central Committee in 1949, Mao told all party members that the party had to study its tasks and shift the focus from rural revolution to urban work. Mao Zedong was committed to applying Marxism or Marxism-Leninism to his backward socialist country in combination with China’s historical and cultural heritage.199 Marxism, or Marxism-Leninism, rooted in Western industrialized countries, and developed in response to the challenges faced by Western capitalist countries. In terms of its circumstances, however, China differed from Western industrialized countries, and it was impossible for Marxism or Marxism-Leninism to provide a fundamental development theory, a basic framework for institution building which could provide specific practical experience for the Chinese context. Further, Marxism argued against the contradictions and problems in early Western capitalist society under the influence of Western culture and civilization, and it offered only a theoretical vision for socialist society. Even Lenin was able to answer only basic questions on how Russia built socialism, and Russia and China varied greatly in their circumstances. In 1956, Mao Zedong presided over setting the correct socialist course for modernization — one that was adapted to China’s current circumstances. However, unfortunately Mao himself went against this course, thereby ending the first golden era of China’s modernization. The country thus suffered a serious setback.200 Although the CPC made the shift from revolutionary to ruling up, 271–272.) 199. MacFarquhar and Fairbank eds., The Cambridge History of China: The People's Republic, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965, 1.

200. After having reviewed historical developments, Deng Xiaoping stated that the 8th National Congress of the CPC set forth the correct political direction. Nevertheless, this

correct political direction and other positive suggestions could not be implemented owing to lack of preparation for building socialism in the party in a comprehensive manner. After the 8th National Congress of the CPC, the party made great achievements

in socialist construction, though it also suffered serious setbacks. (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 2.)

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party, Mao failed to divert his emphasis from revolution, rebellion, and struggle toward construction, development, and harmony. He thus hindered the CPC to transforming its function.201 Mao was a great proletarian revolutionary. Through his errors in his later years,202 he showed the course that needed to be avoided and thus bequeathed China with invaluable historical wealth. Since they had different insights into development challenges and had different attitudes toward them, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping conducted their efforts toward reform and building socialism in different ways. Nevertheless, they had some parallel characteristics in that both of them pioneering a new form of socialism and created a new society. Reform inevitably leads to either success or failure, yet failure is the mother of success. Without learning from Mao’s failure, Deng Xiaoping could not achieve success with his own reform efforts. Mao conducted his reform in an idealistic, radical way whereas Deng achieved his goals with a practical, progressive approach. Although they embarked on different courses, Mao’s errors contributed to Deng’s success. When he served as leading member of the second generation of the central collective leadership, Deng avoided Mao’s major errors in his later years and rectified the minor errors, which promoted China’s economic and social development. Deng Xiaoping brought about China’s rapid integration into the world economy by pursuing the policy of reform and opening-up. He seized the opportunity of economic globalization and accelerated China’s modernization by employing modern science and technology, and in the process he ushered in the second era of China’s modernization.203

201. In May 1983, Hu Qiaomu made note of Mao Zedong’s errors in his later years: “Chairman Mao committed errors because of inertia. Comrade Mao Zedong grew up in the revolutionary war and achieved victory by means of armed struggle. Even after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong and other cadres who also came of age in the revolutionary war became accustomed to carrying on the struggle

and failed to shift emphasis from struggle to construction. If a train fails to swerve around a bend, it will continue to move forward as a result of inertia: it will derail.

That was the underlying cause of the Cultural Revolution.” (Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 212.)

202. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 818–819.

203. For more detailed analysis, please refer to Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1977–1992).

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Postscript

Postscript Drawing Lessons from History to See the Future: The Reason Why I Wrote Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution In order to foresee a nation’s rise or fall, one must know the nation’s history. That is the essence of China’s political heritage. It is believed that by studying, thus learning from, the history of a nation, the best means to govern and stabilize the nation will be found, as well as provide the means to solve the various social contradictions within it. To adequately write about modern Chinese history could be considered a difficult task, and writing on the Great Proletarian Culture Revolution of China is practically difficult. One of the reasons is due to the political atmosphere of the time. In 1981, the Party Central Committee passed the Political Resolution, in which Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun put forward the “general rather than specific” principle. As a result, only about 6,500 words of the Political Resolution were dedicated to the Cultural Revolution—less than one fifth of the total 34,000 words. Since then, many Chinese scholars have published studies on the topic over the Cultural Revolution. However, considering the significance of that particular decade of Chinese history, the number of studies pertaining to it is still relatively minor. On top of that, only a handful of those studies have enough depth to constitute a comprehensive history monograph, nor can they present a panoramic look at the true sociopolitical and economic environments of this period in Chinese history. In the light of academic essay writing, those studies also lack detailed annotations, clear references of related works and data sources. They paid little attention to the academic format. Professional quantitative analysis and analytical frameworks based on social scientific theories are also noticeably absent from these studies. Thanks to the Party’s Central Committee releasing a significant amount of historical documents, we now are able to reverse the “general rather than specific” principle and put together a much more complete and comprehensive picture of the Cultural Revolution by reviewing its major events and major figures and reevaluating their impact on the political environment over that decade. Furthermore, we are now capable of incorporating social scientific theories and various other research methods into our studies, and hence propose a theoretical analytical framework of the Great Cultural Revolution, while conducting empirical analysis

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and hypothesis verification thereby quantitatively evaluating the major political decisions made during that period, and their aftereffects. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the ideal case for a study of modern Chinese history for it compromised a series of significant historical events, yet it is rather a challenging subject to take on. This is, however, a great opportunity for historians to conduct original social scientific studies, especially those that can provide profound insight of the modern Chinese government’s decision-making process. This is because the Revolution is the most ideal period to use for a study of modern Chinese history as that period of the Revolution was comprised of a series of significant historical events. Personally speaking, writing Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution was by no means my pre-designed academic goal from the start, and the fruition was beyond my own expectations. Though I am passionate about history, I am not a historian by training but an economist, and my area of expertise lies in modern China public policy studies. To be more specific, I focus on China’s macro-economy, presenting more systematic and comprehensive insights into China’s course of development, especially the challenges that China’s development is facing. I provide background research, designing and consultation services for the nation’s long-term development strategies, Five Year Plans, and other important strategic policies. I was closely involved in the design of The Outline for China’s Tenth Five-Year Plans (2001), The Outline for China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plans (2006), The Outline for China’s Medium-Term and Long-Term Education Reform from 2010 to 2020 (2010), The Outline for China’s Medium-Term and Long-Term Talent Development Design from 2010 to 2020 (2010), and am currently participating in the design of The Outline for China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan. It is through my direct participation in the study of national development background, public policy debates and consultation on major political decisions that I realize China’s success as a nation depends almost entirely upon its major political decisions. Therefore, ensuring success and avoiding failure in major political decisions is one of the key aspects of China’s political form of economics. In order to effectively avoid mistakes made in China’s major political decisions, not only do we need to learn and improve through trial and error, but also learn from past experiences, especially those considered unsuccessful. This is necessary for further reform and improvement on our decision-making mechanism, which is rooted in democratic centralism, so that it fits the condition of our nation perfectly. Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when I was doing research on China’s economic development and policies, I summarized and commented on Mao Zedong’s three major mistakes in his political decisions:

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the Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the policies on population control. Since then, I have focused on the core issue of China’s political decision-making mechanism and been dedicated in evaluating the changes of China’s major policies after 1949 as well as their aftereffects. In my book The Report on Economic Fluctuation (Liaoning People’s Press), I dug deep into movements such as the Great Leap Forward and conducted quantitative analysis on the failed decision-making mechanism, then calculated the aftermath. In May 2005, I completed the final draft of Theory of China’s Political Economic History (19491976) and submitted it to Tsinghua University Press for publication (officially published in Sep. 2007, with the 2nd edition coming out in 2008). Later, I expanded on Chapter Six of that manuscript, writing Theory of the Great Cultural Revolution History (in four columns) and internally published in the National State Report (special issue) for the eyes of China’s lead policy-makers so that they could better learn from Mao’s mistake in his later years. Some members of the Party leadership have commented that today’s enormous, complex, and ever-changing China could afford no political mistake in governing like the ones Mao made. Given China’s current political decision-making mechanism, it is, in fact, quite unlikely for Mao’s mistakes to be repeated today. In April and May of 2006, I gave four lectures at the school of public administration of Tsinghua University over the Cultural Revolution, which were likely the only open lectures of this kind given in Beijing during the 40th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution. To my surprise and delight, the lectures were well received by students from both Tsinghua University and other local schools such as Peking University, with a total turnout of over 1200 people. I was quite honored to be given such an opportunity to educate those excellent students on such an important event in modern Chinese history and help them gain a better understanding of its political, economic, and cultural significance. I then expanded on the core content of the lectures and eventually published Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution in November of 2008 in Hongkong (Dafeng Press). Later, I received commentaries on the book by four overseas experts forwarded to me by Tsinghua University professors Tang Shaojie and Xia Yafeng. As thankful as I was for their professional and constructive criticism and suggestions, I respectfully redressed their arguments regarding incorrect references and false facts in the book, as well as responded to their questions and doubts. Additionally, I took this opportunity to do further reading, digging deeper for certain information, reinforcing some parts of my theoretical analysis, and eventually expanding into a second edition to a total of 790,000 words. In July 2010, the second edition of the book was internally published under the name of the Institute for Contemporary

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China Studies for China’s lead policy-makers and secretaries of provincial Party committees (future leadership candidates). It was also delivered to the National Library of China and other major university libraries to keep as an unofficial publication. Though the Great Cultural Revolution took place in China over a period of ten years, meaning all Chinese scholars over the age of fifty today experienced this extraordinary historic event, most of the studies on the Cultural Revolution were completed overseas. Take the book Mao Zedong’s Last Revolution by MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals as an example; the 752-page work, with 1,962 annotations, was considered one of the most comprehensive works completed by foreigners on the topic of the Revolution. I only managed to read this book after completing my own work, therefore I did not have a chance to reference it in my work. However, I was quite relieved by the fact that, as a Chinese scholar, I displayed more depth and more originality with the study I prepared for my book, which spans 826 pages and includes a total of 2,243 annotations. In comparison, I also completed a more thorough quantitative analysis in my work, with 34 tables, 7 charts, and 18 columns. It was the first ever quantitative research into the topic of the Great Cultural Revolution in the field. For example, the economic damage amounts to between 1/4 and 1/5 of the simulated GDP of China in 1976; consumer welfare of urban and rural residents was down by between 15% and 27% of that in 1976; and the damage in exports was between 40% and 80% of the export amount in 1976; and all of these strongly sustained the conclusion of the qualitative analysis. This, to a large extent, conforms to the research and thinking style I employ when studying modern China, which is an overall manifestation of how I view history in general. In the grand scheme of things, studying history will always be an applicable lesson to learn from the past to future endeavors. The reason that I study the Great Cultural Revolution specifically is to contribute to the historical process and ideals of democracy, science, and institutionalism in China’s political decision-making mechanism, and for later generations to better understand this part of Chinese history. Unlike foreign scholars who study the Cultural Revolution, my work published in the National State Report is specifically directed at China’s policymakers, and important members of the Party leadership. Therefore, I made every effort to think from their perspective and answer the questions they might ask while I was writing, so that they could benefit from looking back across history in order to make better political decisions for China’s future. This book begins by laying down an analytical framework for studying China’s particular political decision-making mechanism at the time, which entails two types

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of asymmetries. The first of these is the degree of asymmetry and uncertainty in information and knowledge among the leadership group, which directly influences decision-makers’ information structure and the quality of their decisions. The second is the degree of asymmetry and uncertainty in power among the leadership group which can affect the decision-making process, and thereby the degree of information sharing and their political decisions at the end of the day. I concluded in short that throughout the Great Cultural Revolution, in his late years, Mao’s mistakes in political decisions basically all stemmed from the malfunction of his information structure and decision-making process (pages 9-12). Unlike previous narratives of the Cultural Revolution, which are mostly descriptive and lacking in theoretical structure, the discussion of how Mao’s information structure and decision-making process malfunctioned is threaded throughout this book. Such an analytical framework not only displays originality in terms of decision-making theories, but it is suitable for analyzing China’s particular political decision-making mechanism. I am fully in favor of CPC’s democratic centralism system, because it not only functions, but it functions well in China’s mechanism, which greatly reduces the two types of asymmetries mentioned above. It is only logical to surmise that Mao and the leadership group owe their success in political decision-making to Mao’s obeying the democratic centralism system he founded at the first place. On the other hand, Mao’s eventual failure was due to him violating the system he created himself. The same can also be said for the Great Leap Forward movement. Such a narrative is beyond the superficial “power struggle” discussion and is much closer to the true cause of the history, for it also explains why after the Reform and OpeningUp in 1978, Deng Xiaoping was adamant about rebuilding and improving the system instead of abolishing it, as well as explaining the success in China’s political decision-making that followed. I argue that, to ensure future success in decisionmaking and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, CPC has to implement the democratic centralism system at full scale. This is an important conclusion to come to after learning from the successful and unsuccessful experiences of CPC’s 60 years of administration. As for how it will hold up in the future, only time will tell. Further, this book hopes to exhibit innovation of a quantitative angle that aims to dissect and evaluate the political decision-making during the Great Cultural Revolution, including economic evaluation, social evaluation, political evaluation, as well as international standing evaluation, which separates it from the qualitative descriptions in previous related studies. This book lets statistics and facts speak for themselves (18 data tables and 6 charts), asking questions such as “What is the opportunity cost of the Great Cultural Revolution and what would be the

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status of the Chinese economy otherwise?” My answer is that China would have enjoyed the economic boom as early as in the mid-60s. As for the narrative style of the book, it exhibits more professionalism and specificity than vague and hollow descriptions of the history. To Chinese readers, especially the leadership members of the Party, introducing a quantitative policy evaluation method is greatly beneficial in improving political decision-making. The most recent success story was in October of 2005 when independent evaluation for the 11th Five-Year Plan was conducted by our institute as a third party, which was taken very seriously by policy-makers, and the key points of the evaluation report were then included into Chapter 48 of the Outline for Nation’s 11th Five-Year Plan (approved by the National People’s Congress in March 2006). In August of 2008, we officially began the mid-term evaluation process for the 11th Five-Year Plan. Through these actions we can make timely policy adjustments when decision mistakes occurred so as to avoid compounding mistakes like those of the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, this book presents the evolution within CPC’s administrative system over the past few decades in a clear cut fashion so as to demonstrate how Mao Zedong led the demolition of the democratic centralism system within the Party right before the Cultural Revolution, as well as how the check and balance mechanism within the Party gradually went out of order. This further explains how Mao was able to start the Revolution and further destroy the democratic centralism system, setting up personal despotism, as well as why the Revolution lasted for a decade and only ended with the natural death of Mao. It is my belief that the mistakes that Mao committed in his later years were the inevitable result of abandoning a system that was working perfectly, and instead implementing a faulty one. The lesson here is that China’s political decision-makers should continue with policies which have shown success in the past, building upon them for a better future. The modernization of a nation’s system is the basis of the modernization of a nation, and as such the modernization of the decision-making system is the policy-making basis of the modernization of a nation’s system. This process should be ever-evolving, constantly improving and adjustable, not reset back to square one to start anew like Mao did. In the end, the book states with historical logic that the improvement in the process of China’s political decision-making mechanism is one that has benefited from past experiences. Mao’s failure during the Cultural Revolution set up the success of Deng Xiaoping’s reform, and what was most admirable about Deng was that he turned a political and economic disaster into a great opportunity for China to open up and embrace growth. He started with reforming the Party and the leadership group’s decision-making process, thereby initiating a series of systematic

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redevelopment and innovation . This serves to show that the course of history is two-sided. Just as Mao aptly put it himself: “Under the right circumstances, bad things can give birth to good things, and good things can in turn give birth to bad things.” This book is the reflection and introspection of an earnest Chinese scholar, the sole purpose of which is to help turn bad things into good ones. China owes its great success in reform to Deng Xiaoping and other leaders learning from past failures, which shows that the more we understand about our failures, the more chance we have of succeeding in the future. That is why the ancient Chinese liked to think of history as a mirror for future behaviors, and it is now upon us to carry on that virtue. I sincerely hope that studying the Great Cultural Revolution could serve as a good example for China’s social science academia as a whole, with faithfulness to the lessons of history, fulfilling a responsibility as scholarly cornerstones for generations to come. I will continue to revise the book in the future, potentially leading to third and fourth revised editions. It is my mission in life to go beyond my limitations and leave a true masterpiece of history monograph, one which can withstand the test of time and the scrutinizing eyes of other historians and experts. For that purpose, I truly welcome all criticism and suggestions from common readers and experts alike. Angang Hu August, 2011

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Appendix

Appendix Appendix 6.1

Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Published in Red Flag, 1972–1974

Author

Title

Publishing Date

Shi Lun

Arguments for Revering Confucianism and Opposing Legalism

October 1, 1973

Luo Siding

The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

November 1, 1973

Jin Yunge

Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism

November 1, 1973

Tang Xiaowen Tian Kai

Was Confucius a Educator for the Common People? The Working People Have Historically Conducted the Struggle against Confucius

December 1, 1973

Niu Zhigong

How did Confucius Safeguard Slavery by His Compilation of History? Confucius in Moscow

January 1, 1974

Criticism Group of Peking University and Tsinghua University

Lin Biao and the Philosophy of Confucius and Mencius

February 1, 1974

Hong Qun

Irrefutable Proof—Uncovering the Reactionary Philosophy of Confucius and Mencius by Studying the Evil of Confucius

February 1, 1974

Luo Siding

Probe into the Political Reform Carried out by Wang Anshi [Reformer in the Northern Song Dynasty] in Studying the Development of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

February 1, 1974

Zhou Yilang

Examining Feudalism by Liu Zongyuan

February 1, 1974

Yang Guorong

Kang Li

Two-Line Ideological Struggle in the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period — Examining Social Reform in the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period from the Perspective of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

December 1, 1972

January 1, 1974

January 1, 1974

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Appendix

(Cont’d) Author Kang Li

Title Reviewing the Advocacy of Holding Confucius in Reverence—What Was the Implication of Chiang Kai-shek's Proclamation on New Year’s Day?

Publishing Date February 1, 1974

Kang Li

Both Confucius and Lin Biao Were Political Swindlers Confucius

March 1, 1974

Luo Siding

Examining Liu's Commentaries on History (Lu Shi Chun Qiu)

April 1, 1974

Liang Xiao

Examining Debates on Salt and Iron—A Political Debate between Confucianism and Legalism in the Middle Western Han Dynasty.

May 1, 1974

Yu Fan

Failure of Lin Biao’s Counter-revolutionary Strategies—Criticizing a Reactionary Note Virtues and Morality Preached by Confucius and the Revisionist Line Advocated by Lin Biao

May 1, 1974

Criticism Group of Peking University and Tsinghua University

Yan Feng Gan Qing

Liang Xiao Jin Nan Tian Li Zai Ping Luo Siding Li Qun Chen Jin Zhong Da Shi Ping

338

April 1, 1974

June 1, 1974

Hold the People’s Heroes in Reverence— Criticizing the Advocates of Confucianism for Distorting History and Defaming Liu Xiazhi [Rebel Leader)] Comments on Shang Yang [Reformer in the Qin Dynasty] Uncovering Lin Biao’s Careerist World View from His Bedside Banner Inscribed with Pegasus Meng Ke—Advocate of the Restoration of Slavery

June 1, 1974

Is the Struggle between Confucianism and Legalism a Dogfight? Investigation into the Class Struggle in the Qin and Han Dynasties Struggle between Confucianism and Legalism and Scientific and Technological Development in Ancient China Holding Confucius in Reverence and Fawning on Foreigners

August 1, 1974

Comments on Wang Chong’s Struggle against Confucianism Hiding One's Light under a Bushel—Lin Biao’s Conspiracy for Restoration

June 1, 1974 June 1, 1974 July 1, 1974

August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974

Appendix

(Cont’d) Author

Title

Publishing Date

Liang Lingyi

Master of Qin Legalism—Comments on Books on Legalism

September 1, 1974

Zhong Zhou

Rebel Troops Headed by Li Zicheng Directed Criticism at Cheng Ying and Cheng Yi [Confucius in the Northern Song Dynasty]

September 1, 1974

Shi Lun

Comments on the Populace

October 1, 1974

Hong Shansi

Forum at the White Tiger Temple and Bai Hu Tong

October 1, 1974

Luo Siding

Exploring the Struggle between Patriotism and National Betrayal in the Northern Song Dynasty

November 1, 1974

Bian Shizhong

Criticizing the Ideology of Ruling the World with Half of The Analects

November 1, 1974

Wu Chang

Confucianism Is an Executioner That Killed Many People

December 1, 1974

Wei Li

Two Military Line Struggles between Confucianism and Legalism in the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warning States Period

December 1, 1974

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Appendix

Appendix 6.2 Documents and Articles to be Studied in the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius (1974) Author

Title

Publishing Date

My Advice

August 31, 1970

Mao Zedong

Chairman Mao’s Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing

July 8, 1966

The CPC Central Committee

Summary of Chairman Mao’s Conversations with Local Heads When Touring outside Beijing

March 17, 1972

Lin Biao; Zhou En’lai

Political report to the 9th and 10th National Congress of the CPC

April 1, 1969; August 24, 1973

Lu Xun

Compiled Words of Lu Xun against the Way of Confucius and Mencius

January 27, 1974

Part 2 The CPC Central Committee

Smashing Lin Biao’s Anti-Party Clique, Counter-Revolutionary Coup (Document No. 1–3)

December 11, 1971; January 13, 1972; July 2, 1972

Part 3 The CPC Central Committee

Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and Landlord Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius and Restoration of Old Institutions Since the May 4th Movement

January 27, 1974

Yang Rongguo

Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery

August 7, 1973

Yang Rongguo

The Struggle between Materialism and Idealism during the Western and Eastern Han Eras

August 13, 1973

Tang Xiaowen

Was Confucius an Educator for the Common People?

September 27, 1973

Luo Siding

November 1, The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions 1973 during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

Feng Youlan

Criticizing Confucius and Self-Criticism against My Former Worship of Confucius

December 3, 1973

Gao Heng

What Slavery Systems Did Confucius Defend?

December 13, 1973

Shi Zhong, Beijing Normal University

The Worship of Legalism and the Fight against Confucius in On Feudalism

December 25, 1973

Zhe Jun, Peking University

The Way of Juste Milieu of Confucius Is a Philosophy against Social Revolutions

January 13, 1974

Yang Rongguo

A Saint of the Reactionary Class — Confucius

December 1973

Part 1 Mao Zedong

340

Appendix

Appendix 7.1 Changes in China’s Agriculture, 1965–1976

Year

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1965– 1970 1970– 1976

Agricultural workers as % of total workforce

Average number of dependents per agricultural worker

Agricultural labor productivity based on total output value (1965=100)

Agricultural labor productivity based on net output value (1965=100)

81.60 81.50 81.70 81.70 81.60 80.80 79.70 78.90 78.70 78.20 77.20 75.80

3.100 3.068 3.035 3.013 2.975 2.984 3.001 3.082 3.091 3.110 3.138 3.183

100.0 105.5 100.6 97.3 90.9 102.2 103.1 102.1 109.7 112.5 116.5 118.2

100.0 104.1 102.2 96.5 93.6 97.5 96.7 95.5 103.4 106.1 108.0 107.6

—

—

0.44%

–0.51%

—

—

2.45%

1.66%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1988 & 1989).

341

Appendix

Appendix 7.2 Comparison between Industrialization and Urbanization Rate, 1949–1978 (%) Year 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

Industrialization rate 12.57 14.08 16.90 19.52 22.00 23.26 22.72 24.04 28.30 35.87 43.13 46.31 34.64 32.79 33.70 36.19 36.41 38.21 33.96 31.73 36.30 40.97 42.90 44.10 44.00 43.23 46.02 45.57 47.77 49.40

Urbanization rate 10.64 11.17 11.78 12.46 13.31 13.69 13.48 14.62 15.39 16.25 18.41 19.75 19.29 17.33 16.84 18.37 17.98 17.86 17.74 17.62 17.50 17.38 17.26 17.13 17.20 17.16 17.34 17.44 17.55 17.92

Difference 1.93 2.91 5.12 7.06 8.69 9.57 9.24 9.42 12.91 19.62 24.72 26.56 15.35 15.46 16.86 17.82 18.43 20.35 16.22 14.11 18.80 23.59 25.64 26.97 26.80 26.07 28.68 28.13 30.22 31.48

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1993), 35, 81.

Note: The urbanization rate signifies the proportion of the urban population to the total population; the industrialization rate signifies the proportion of the income of the industrial sector to that of national income.

342

Appendix

Appendix 7.3 Changes in the national birth rate and fertility rate, 1965–1976 Year

Number of births (per 10,000 people)

Birth rate (‰)

Total fertility rate

Gross reproduction rate

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

2,704 2,579 2,563 2,757 2,715 2,736 2,567 2,566 2,463 2,235 2,109 1,853

37.88 35.05 33.96 35.59 34.11 33.43 30.65 29.77 27.93 24.82 23.01 19.91

6.08 6.26 5.31 6.45 5.72 5.81 5.44 4.98 4.54 4.17 3.57 3.24

2.92 3.00 2.55 3.10 2.75 2.79 2.61 2.39 2.18 2.00 1.73 1.56

Source: Li, China’s Population and Economic Development, 34.

343

Appendix

Appendix 7.4 Some Documents of the CPC Central Committee on Redressing Cases of Injustice, 1978–1981 Date

Contents

November 26, 1978

Approved and forwarded “The Report on Handling the July 20 Political Incident,” submitted by the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee, Hubei Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Wuhan Military Region Party Committee

December 16, 1978

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Investigating the 61-Renegade Case,” submitted by the Central Organization Department

January 4, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Addressing the Issue of the January Revolution,” submitted by the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee

January 11, 1979

The Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee issued the “Report on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the General Publicity Department as the Palace of Hell,” approved by the CPC Central Committee

January 17, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Carrying out the Policy for the Kuomintang Uprising and Defecting Officers,” submitted by No. 6 Division of the Central United Front Work Department

February 3, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the National United Front and Ethnic and Religious Departments for Following Capitulationism,” submitted by the Central United Front Work Department

February 17, 1979

Notification on “Redressing the Peng Zhen Case of Injustice”

February 26, 1979

Decision on “Redressing the Case of Denouncing the Ministry of Culture as the Old Ministry of Culture, the Emperor, and Courtiers Department, the Romantic Department, and the Dead Foreigner Department”

March 5, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Reviewing the Xiao Jinguang Case,” submitted by the General Political Department

March 9, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the Case of Denouncing the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee for Seeking Reconciliation with Imperialism, Revisionism, and Reactionary Elements, Surrendering to Imperialism, Revisionism, and Reactionary Elements, and Annihilating the National Liberation Movement”

March 19, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on the Ministry of Education Suggesting that the CPC Central Committee Revoke Two Documents”

344

Appendix

(Cont’d) Date

Content

March 21, 1979

The “Report on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the General Political Department as the Palace of Hell,” submitted by the General Political Department, “Decision on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the General Political Department as the Palace of Hell” and “Decision on Redressing the Unjust Case of the Tan Zheng Anti-Party Clique” approved and forwarded by the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Commission

March 28, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Case of Injustice”

May 3, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Revoking the Minutes of the Military Literary Work Forum in February 1966,” submitted by the General Political Department

May 26, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the Anti-party and Anti-socialism Black Line in the Archival Work Unjust Case,” issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee

June 8, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Lu Dingyi Unjust Case,” issued by the Central Organization Department

June 29, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Redressing the Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha Unjust Case,” submitted by the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee

July 13, 1979

Notification of “Redressing and Rectifying the Injustice Rights Opportunist Case”

August 4, 1979

Approved and forwarded the Notification on “Redressing the Novel Liu Zhidan Case of Injustice,” issued by the Central Organization Department

August 24, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Yuan Shengping Case of Injustice,” submitted by the General Political Department

September 19, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Review Conclusion and Report of the Third Enlarged Meeting Held by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions Party Committee,” submitted by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions Party Committee

October 14, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Redressing a Local Nationalist Case of Injustice,” submitted by the Central United Front Work Department

345

Appendix

(Cont’d) Date

Content

November 12, 1978

The CPC Central Committee and State Council approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the College and University Reactionary Students Case,” submitted by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Education

December 6, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the So-Called Northern China Sectarianism Case of Injustice”

January 19, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Tan Zhenlin Case of Injustice”

February 25, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Xi Zhongxun Anti-party Clique Case of Injustice”

February 29, 1980

Resolution on “Redressing the Liu Shaoqi Case of Injustice,” approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee

May 20, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Luo Ruiqing Case of Injustice”

June 11, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Patriotic Rightist Case,” submitted by the Central United Front Work Department

June 14, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Xinjiang Ma Mingfang Case of Injustice,” submitted by the Central Organization Department and General Political Department

June 19, 1980

Notification of “Handling Cadres Criticized by Newspapers and Telegrams in the Cultural Revolution”

July 15, 1980

The Central Organization Department forwarded the “Report on Redressing and Vindicating the Central Organization Department,” approved by the CPC Central Committee before 1966

July 24, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Xiao Hua Case of Injustice”

August 26, 1980

The CPC Central Committee and Central Military Commission approved and forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Li Desheng Case of Injustice,” submitted by the General Political Department

September 22, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Opinions about Reviewing and Redressing Wrongful Death Penalty Conviction Cases in the Cultural Revolution,” submitted by the Party Committee of the Supreme People’s Court

September 29, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Hu Feng Anti-party Clique Case,” submitted by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Court, and Supreme People’s Procuratorate

346

Appendix

(Cont’d) Date

Content

October 19, 1980

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Qu Qiubai Case of Arrest,” submitted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

October 23, 1980

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Former General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Yang Shangkun Case of Injustice,” approved by the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee

December 18, 1980

The Central Supervision Commission of the CPC issued the “Report on Redressing and Vindicating the Central Supervision Commission,” approved by the CPC Central Committee

March 9, 1981

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Deng Zihui Case of Injustice,” submitted by the Party Committee of the State Agricultural Commission

Source: Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 2, 586.

347

Blank Page

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Translated Materials:

Bastiat, Frédéric. Selected Essays on Political Economy. Translated by Seymour Cain. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., 1995. Also available online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/ basEss1.html. Glennon, Lorraine ed. 20 shiji renlei quan jilu 20 世紀人類全紀錄（1900–1999） [Our Times: An Illustrated History of the 20th Century]. Translated by Yu Jixiao 餘吉孝. Beijing: China Friendship Press, 2000. Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31. Translated from the Russian and edited by Julius Katzer. Mosco: Progress Publisher, 2012. ———. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 32. Translated from the Russian and edited by Yuri Sdobnikov. Mosco: Progress Publisher, 2012. Macfarquhar, Roderick, and John K. Fairbank eds. Jianqiao Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi: Geming de Zhongguo de Xingqi (1949–1965) 劍橋中華人民共 和國史：革命的中國的興起（1949–1965） [The Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1998. ———. Jianqiao Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi: Zhongguo geming neibu de geming (1966–1982) 劍橋中華人民共和國史：中國革命內部的革命（1966–1982 ） [The Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1992, 1998. Maddison, Angus. Zhongguo jingji de changyuan weilai 中國經濟的長遠未來 [Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run]. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1999. Meisner, Maurice. Mao Zedong de Zhongguo ji qi hou — Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi 毛澤東的中國及其後—中華人民共和國史 [Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic]. 3rd edition. Translated by Chu Shunping 楚順平, and Wu Xiangsong 吳祥松. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005. Nixon, Richard. Lingxiu men 領袖們 [Leaders]. Translated by Shi Yanhua 施燕華. Haikou: Hainan Press, 2008. The Central Compliation and Translation Bureau 中央編譯局 trans. Sidalin quanji di qi juan 斯大林全集第七卷 [Collected Works of Stalin, Vol. 7]. Beijing:

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Bibliography

People’s Press, 1958. ———. Sidalin quanji di shisan juan 斯大林全集第十三卷 [Collected Works of Stalin, Vol. 13]. Beijing: People’s Press, 1956. ———. Sidalin wenxuan (shang) 斯大林文選（上） [Selected Works of Stalin, Vol. 1]. Beijing: People’s Press, 1962. The U.S. Joint Economic Committee of Congress ed. Xiang si ge xiandaihua qianjin de Zhongguo 向四個現代化前進的中國 [China Moving to the Four Modernizations]. Vol. 1b. Translated by Guo Zhongyan 郭忠言. Beijing: China Foreign Economy and Trade Press, 1986.

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Index Academic Criticism Campaign 309–10 agriculture 88, 100, 106, 242–43, 246, 260, 270, 273, 279, 307 campaign, anti-rightist 297, 299 capitalism 9, 38, 42, 85, 91, 110–112, 114–17, 164–65, 169–70, 196, 201, 216, 223, 253, 275–76 restoration of 12, 44, 115, 161, 234, 274–76, 278, 305 capitalist class 12, 38, 43, 63, 91, 113–15, 117, 161, 165, 170, 186, 205, 207, 210, 310 capitalist roaders 126, 147, 161, 163–66, 168, 170–72, 175–76, 187, 189, 205, 212, 288, 306, 309 Central Cultural Revolution Group 66, 289, 302, 315 Central Military Committee 24–26, 40, 45, 50, 55, 65, 67, 87, 95–97, 102–03, 159–60, 201, 207, 217–18, 225–26 Central Special Case Group 35, 46, 48–49, 54–55, 62, 66, 74–75, 162, 164, 188–89, 293 China’s socialist modernization 228, 287, 317 Chinese Academy of Sciences 57, 103–04, 110, 130, 143, 265–66 class struggle 8–10, 29–30, 35–36, 109, 134–35, 139–40, 142, 148–49, 165–66, 169–72, 174–75, 186–87, 189, 197, 305–09 communist school 270, 272–73 Confucian scholars 31, 33–35, 267 Confucianism 29–31, 35, 62–64, 337–40

Confucianists 29, 62, 125 Confucians 61–62, 127 Confucius 2, 17, 28–33, 36, 38–41, 44–45, 47–48, 50–52, 54, 57–58, 60–62, 82, 86, 162, 337–40 counter-revolutionaries 8, 51, 54, 91, 126, 161, 167, 175, 177–78, 180–81, 183, 185–89, 294, 304, 308 counter-revolutionary activities 4–5, 36, 42, 50, 91, 129, 177, 180, 185, 223, 340 counter-revolutionary cliques 50, 153, 215, 237, 295 counter-revolutionary incident 174, 177, 179, 182, 185, 189 counter-revolutionary revisionism 187–88 country developing 10, 230, 239, 249, 259–61, 272 low-income 230, 259–60, 263 middle-income 259, 263 CPC Central Committee, 7th 2nd Plenary Session 326 CPC Central Committee, 8th 17, 194, 290, 303 11th Plenary Session 17, 150, 230, 233, 302, 315 12th Plenary Session 66, 230, 234–35, 315 CPC Central Committee, 9th 2nd Plenary Session 17, 74 CPC Central Committee, 10th 4, 7 1st Plenary Session 17 2nd Plenary Session 24, 26, 87–88 3rd Plenary Session 225 CPC Central Committee, 11th 3rd Plenary Session 3, 89, 169–70, 320, 322,325

365

Index

5th Plenary Session 288, 306, 321, 323, 325, 346 6th Plenary Session 226, 237, 274, 314 Criticizing Confucius 31, 39, 46, 49, 51, 73 Criticizing Deng 147, 163, 172, 176, 188, 196 cultural dictatorship 53, 92, 113, 126, 266–67 Cultural Revolution 2–12, 14–26, 32–38, 40–44, 50–68, 86–94, 96–100, 118–34, 136–40, 142–48, 166–74, 184–86, 192–202, 226–327, 329–35 cultural revolution hardliners 7, 17, 21, 63, 68, 73, 83, 93, 96, 98, 102, 150 decision-making process 64, 152, 196, 330, 333–34 democratic revolution 116, 163–65 Deng Xiaoping 19–21, 24–26, 70–84, 94–111, 123–28, 130–48, 150–59, 161–79, 181–90, 195–99, 201–04, 206–13, 223–26, 284–86, 316–21 dictatorship 8–10, 12, 22, 30, 34–35, 42–43, 85, 90–91, 111–16, 175, 212, 234, 275–76, 306, 314 dogmatism 118–19, 286 economic fluctuations 69, 238, 249–50, 331 economic growth 10, 61, 95, 117, 134–35, 232, 237–38, 248–49, 260, 287 economic system 230, 279, 282, 305 education 16, 30, 33, 53, 56, 82–83, 93–94, 99, 105–06, 119, 127–28, 258, 260, 262, 271–72 Emperor Qin Shi Huang 29, 32–36, 64, 173, 185 empiricism 117–19, 122, 124, 178

366

February Mutiny 66 Fengqing Incident 52, 73, 77, 79–80 fertility rate 257–58, 343 feudalism 29–30, 43, 299, 313, 340 Five Fear-Nots 13 Five-Seven Route 37–38 Five-Year Plan 100, 251–52, 280, 334 Four Modernizations 88–89, 105–06, 115, 175, 285, 320 Gang of Four 2, 63–64, 92–94, 96–97, 107–09, 115–17, 119–20, 122–27, 160–161, 182–83, 190–91, 199–205, 207–09, 211, 213–25 Great Leap Forward 196, 232, 241, 249–51, 273, 277, 296, 298, 301, 305, 331, 333 Great Purge 308–09, 311 health care 56, 93, 127, 230, 262–63 human capital 260, 262, 271–72, 277, 287 ideology 36, 51, 109, 113–14, 242, 288–89, 294, 310, 324, 339 industrialization 239, 241, 264, 271–72, 287 infrastructure 93, 196, 240–41, 243, 271 January 25 conference 45–46, 48, 55 Jiang Qing clique 17, 19, 21, 23, 107, 110, 125, 172, 190, 204, 220, 227 landlords 31–32, 34–35, 54, 64, 79, 126, 167, 185–87, 276, 295 leftist 7, 13, 22, 29, 59, 137, 198–200, 220, 274, 314, 325 legalism 29, 31, 35, 44, 51, 62–64, 337–40 legalists 29, 61–62, 64 Lenin 10, 85, 112–13, 116, 127, 165, 273–

Index

75, 311 Leninism 7–8, 30, 46–47, 58, 116, 118–20, 127, 169, 173–74, 186, 233–34, 273, 303, 311–12, 326 Lin Biao and Confucius 9, 13, 20, 28, 36–37, 39–42, 44–52, 54–57, 59–62, 64–65, 67–69, 82, 85, 88, 139 Lin Biao anti-party clique 4–5, 7–8, 85, 114, 119, 235 Lin Biao Incident 12, 16–18, 27, 29, 204, 234 Lushan Meeting 74, 118 Mao Zedong Thought 109, 118, 158, 231, 270, 272–73, 286, 288, 295, 325 Mao Zedong’s errors 171, 233, 296, 315, 319, 321, 327, 331, 333 Mao Zedong’s instructions 13–14, 28–29, 32, 37, 39, 60, 70–71, 75, 77–78, 85, 87–88, 101, 114–15, 147, 151–52 Mao Zedong’s death 2–3, 63, 88, 120, 148, 163, 187, 193, 199, 202–03, 206, 211, 214–15, 224, 228, 317 Marxism 7, 12, 43, 46, 54, 62, 85, 106, 112, 119, 164, 169, 212, 303, 326 Marxism and Leninism 8, 30, 47, 58, 116, 118–20, 127, 169, 173, 186, 233–34, 303, 326 Mencius 29–30, 38–41, 44–46, 49–51, 73, 82, 114, 337, 340 National Congress of the CPC 7th 298, 300 8th 14–15, 17, 25, 169, 296–97, 300–01, 308, 312, 317, 319, 326 9th 4, 6–8, 11–12, 16–17, 19, 23, 44, 81, 87–88, 120–22, 225, 230, 234, 272, 288–89, 297, 319, 340

10th 2–8, 10–13, 15–20, 23–24, 28–29, 31, 44–45, 47, 87, 120–22, 149, 225, 230, 296–97, 340 11th 182, 219–20, 226 12th 3, 321–23 13th 199 Nanjing Military Area 26, 41, 87, 163, 218, 221 party disputes 211, 305 party struggles 309, 324 Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team 30, 32–33, 36, 38, 51, 54 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 7–8, 14–16, 24–25, 28, 36–37, 40–41, 45–46, 48–50, 57, 65–66, 70–71, 101–03, 206–08, 213, 226–27 planned economic system 281, 283–84 policy closed-door 253–54, 260 family planning 255–56 Political Bureau 4–6, 17–20, 22–26, 70–75, 77–80, 118–25, 140–43, 150–52, 154–60, 167–68, 176–84, 197–203, 208–11, 214–25, 302–04 9th 4, 17–18, 200 10th 5–6, 17–18, 181, 222–23 standing committee of 15, 22–23, 83, 86–87, 94, 114, 121–22, 134–36, 140–41, 147–48, 159–60, 167–68, 222–25, 302, 321–22 political struggles 9, 21, 52, 68–69, 88, 104, 111, 126, 137, 148, 161, 172, 189, 303–05, 307–09 Premier Zhou, death of 154, 176 productivity 99, 104–05, 109, 166, 272, 341 proletariat 8, 10–12, 33–34, 42–43, 69–72,

367

Index

85, 90–91, 105–6, 111–14, 186–88, 212, 234, 275–76, 306, 314 proletariat dictatorship 32, 36, 115, 205, 230 proletariat revolution 31, 171 Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan 35, 46, 49, 54–55, 62, 74–75, 81, 85, 162, 164, 188–89, 206 revisionism 39, 50–51, 107–08, 112, 114, 116–20, 131, 140, 149–50, 161–62, 164, 166, 186–88, 274–75, 303 rightist tendency 2, 86, 131, 137, 145, 147–48, 150, 152–53, 173, 175 rightist whitewashing 13, 20, 185, 187–89, 195–96, 198 rightists 13, 22, 32, 104, 116, 126, 130, 150, 154–55, 159, 164, 174, 176, 188, 200 self-criticism 44, 81, 124, 150, 156, 206, 309, 340 Shanghai Gang 80, 102, 202–03 Snail Incident 52 socialism 7, 9, 56, 91, 103, 105, 111–12, 114, 116, 157, 164, 171, 273, 276–77, 326– 27 Soviet Union 8, 22, 42, 56, 95, 115–16, 239–40, 272–73, 275, 283–85, 296, 306–07, 309–12, 316, 325 Stalin 115, 232, 275, 296, 306–12, 314, 316, 319, 325 State Planning Commission 68, 100–01, 110, 282 Stinky 9th 37, 127 struggles internal 8, 13, 35, 166 philosophy of 2, 43, 51, 112, 123, 134,

368

148–49, 169, 194 two-line 303, 305 successor 11, 17, 20–21, 33, 43–44, 82, 136, 154, 156, 160, 182, 191–92, 200, 270, 312–14 Tale of the Marshes 125, 130–34, 136, 140, 149–50 tenure demerits 3 Three Instructions 108–09, 137, 139, 142, 154, 163, 166, 169, 175–76, 186 Three Musts and Three Must-Nots 12, 120–22, 124, 303 three supreme instructions 88 Tiananmen Square Incident 39, 148, 153, 173–74, 176–77, 179–81, 183–88, 190 urbanization 264, 271–72, 287 urbanization rate 264–65, 342

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A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution from the Political Perspectives of Mao and the Politburo Acclaimed national researcher Hu Angang presents Mao and the Cultural Revolution, an immensely rich account of the massive political event of 1966–1976 that brought seismic changes to the landscape of New China. A culmination of Mao Zedong’s political ambitions, the Cultural Revolution restored his power and prestige as paramount leader, albeit at great costs to the economic and social development to the country. The impact of the movement — more significantly, the politics that drove it — deeply influences political philosophy in China today. Hu Angang’s work provides a unique perspective and objective assessment of the progression of the Cultural Revolution, focusing on the intraparty politics, the Politburo’s international outlook, and the political thought of the Chinese leadership that shaped this pivotal decade.

AUTHOR

Hu Angang is Professor of the School of Public Policy & Management at Tsinghua University, Director of the Center for China Study at Tsinghua-CAS (Chinese Academy of Sciences) and Visiting Professor at Harvard University and Keio University. He is one of the leaders in the field of China Studies, and his State of China reports are important sources for reports delivered at the National Congresses of the Communist Party of China. He has published over 40 books and 200 articles in the core periodicals and key academic magazines in China, including The Political and Economic History of China, Green Growth and Innovation in China, and Perspectives on SARS: Health and Development.

Chinese Historical Studies